LAGGARDS, LABELING AND LIMITATIONS: RE-CONNECTING LABELING DEVIANCE THEORY WITH DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM

Frank Fitch
University of Cincinnati Clermont College

John Dewey defines democracy as a form of associated living “in which the interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups.”¹ Few would argue that people with disabilities have been among the most excluded, the least able to share in the fullness and freedom of “associated living.” In fact, as senator Lowell Weiker puts it, “the history of people with disabilities can be summed up with two words; segregation and inequality.”² The exclusion of people with disabilities in society and the nation’s schools is not just a special interest concern or even simply a civil rights issue; it highlights the principle of inclusion that stands at the very heart of democracy itself.

Language in the form of deviant labels such as “laggards,” “retards,” “morons,” and “cripples” has been central to this exclusion. The assumption that difference, disability, or deviance is internal to the individual has played a key role in justifying and maintaining this segregation and inequality. The publication of Leonard Ayres Laggards in our Schools in 1909 came at a time when the nation required schools to serve a much more diverse range of students. The education of “laggards” was effectively defined as beyond the realm of possibility: “…the education of children who are defective in body, mind, or morals is a matter of great importance to the state… it does not appear that any considerable fraction of them can ever be educated so as to become independent members of the community.”³

Since that time, special education has increasingly served as a way to manage heterogeneity by removing those categorized as “laggards,” the “feeble minded” and most recently “exceptional” from the mainstream. This practice has created and maintained a two-tiered system of education, serving as a vehicle that contains the problem of student diversity by effectively decoupling it from the core of the system. In this manner special education discourse has

³ Leonard Ayres, Laggards in Our Schools; a Study of Retardation and Elimination in City School Systems (New York: Charities publication committee, 1909), xiii.
functioned to maintain the appearance of equality and the legitimacy of the
democratic ideal of universal compulsory public education.⁴

This practice, grounded in scientific positivist assumptions and the
bio-medical model of disability, continues to legitimate segregation and
inequality and justify a dual system of special and general of education.
Demonstrating the socially constructed nature of difference/deviance, labeling
deviance theory has played a crucial role in challenging this orientation,
serving as one of the key conceptual foundations for the disability and inclusive
education movements.⁵ Because it is disconnected from its pragmatist roots,
however, it has been effectively distorted and appropriated within a positivist
framework and then deployed within the field of education and beyond. In this
paper I examine the nature of this disconnection and argue for reconnecting
labeling deviance theory with its roots within a Deweyan pragmatist tradition.

In order to do this, I will first highlight 3 common arguments
regarding “labeling” that have distorted and sharply limited the efficacy and
emancipatory potential of this approach. Three of the most common arguments
are that: 1) There is no alternative to formal disability labeling and virtually
nothing to be done about informal labeling; both are inevitable and natural. 2)
The stigma of formal disability labels (“exceptionalities”) stems from myth and
personal ignorance; correctly understood, they are actually beneficial and
necessary to adequate funding and the equitable distribution of resources. 3)
The study and application of Labeling deviance theory is, or should be, morally
neutral, that is, it should keep facts and values separate. I will argue that all
three reflect a positivist orientation as an ideology based the belief that
knowledge is objective as opposed to subjective, and is universally valid.
Positivism in this sense assumes that facts precede theories and exist
independently of them and thus science is, or should be, a value free project.
This view emphasizes exclusive reliance on observable quantitative data and
thus is the grounding assumption behind doctrines such as behaviorism,
operationalism, and methodological individualism.⁶

⁴ Thomas Skrtic, Behind Special Education: A Critical Analysis of Professional Culture
⁵ Frank Fitch, “Disability and inclusion: From labeling deviance to social valuing,”
Educational Theory 52, no. 2 (2002).
⁶ The term “positivism” is associated with the ideas of 19th century philosopher and
sociologist August Comte and others, who argued that that theology and metaphysics
are early and imperfect modes of knowledge, and that real positive knowledge is based
on natural observable phenomena verified by the empirical science. Positivism is closely
associated with the term “scientism,” which is the view that natural science has
authority over all other interpretations of life, and that methods of the natural sciences
should be applied to all areas of investigation—philosophical, social scientific, or
otherwise. Reductionism is also commonly embedded within positivism. For example, it
assumes that that the thinking process is reducible to physical, electrical, or biochemical
All of three these arguments are profoundly antithetical to Deweyan pragmatism and the historical and conceptual roots of labeling deviance theory within that tradition. Labeling deviance theory has at times served as an important explanatory tool and important counter narrative to traditionalist special education practice. Consistent with its grounding in symbolic interactionism, it is part of a tradition which has long recognized the centrality of language and power in the social construction of deviance and deviant identities. Part of the enduring value of labeling deviance theory (as opposed to categorization theory) has been its explanation of how societies create, sustain, and penalize nonconformity; how certain individuals and groups are positioned outside the norm. This labeling process inherently involves delineating and defining boundaries and power relationships.

**Labeling Theory’s Deviation from Pragmatism**

To a great extent, deviance theory and the eventual emergence of labeling deviance theory are closely associated with American pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. William James and John Dewey greatly influenced the development of symbolic interactionism and labeling deviance theory in many ways, including extending the analysis of how people make use of symbols to encapsulate and interpret their experiences. This theoretical perspective, especially Dewey’s, was then brought into sociology by Herbert Blumer and others. A central feature of this orientation is its Dewyan perspective on meaning, which holds that the meaning of deviance exists in society's response to an act, not in the act itself. In Dewyan fashion, deviance is viewed as existing in the interaction of the individual and the social group that responds to certain acts.

Irving Goffman is one of the most influential of the labeling theorists within this tradition. His careful analysis and interpretation of the daily face-to-face process of labeling or stigmatization has made a lasting contribution to the concepts of disability. Goffman’s term “stigma” is similar to deviance except that it more readily suggests social censure than personal pathology. Consistent with a Dewyan perspective and other symbolic interactions, his definition of stigma stresses what he calls a “language of relationships” rather than simply “personal attributes.” Goffman argued that we implicitly define a person with a stigma as not quite human. He emphasized the extent to which the group label or classification and its position in the social hierarchy determines personal status and identity. “Here, surely, is a clear illustration of events. It also involves the belief that social processes are reducible to individual relationships and the actions of individuals.

---

7 Symbolic interactionism is based on Dewey’s concept that human beings must be understood in terms of the practical, interactive relation to their environment.

a basic sociologic theme: the nature of an individual as he himself, and we impute it to him, is generated by the nature of his group affiliation." In fact, the status of one’s group in the social structure is also a potent factor in determining life chances: “What an individual is or could be derives from the place of his kind in the social structure.” For ‘normals’ proximity to the stigmatized is seen as contamination and a threat to basic identity beliefs.

Goffman’s analysis suggests an understanding as to why there is so much resistance to the inclusion of the stigmatized into the mainstream of society. He lends great insight into what Dewey meant about the dangers of segregation and exclusion. Goffman illustrates that the nature of what is considered “good adjustment” requires stigmatized individuals cheerfully and unselfconsciously accept themselves almost as normal, while voluntarily withholding themselves from any situations in which normals would have to explicitly recognize this ‘normality’. Not surprisingly, this is the preferred arrangement for normals because it indicates that they will never be presented directly with the unfairness and anguish of having to carry a stigma. It also implies that normals will not have to acknowledge the limitations of their own tactfulness and tolerance. Most importantly “…it means that normals can remain relatively uncontaminated by intimate contact with the stigmatized, relatively unthreatened by their identity beliefs.”

Despite the invaluable contributions of the kind of micro-level, largely inter-personal kind of analysis rendered by Goffman and others, during the 1960’s they had the unintended effect of moving labeling theory in positivist directions. Becoming less concerned with political forces and macro-level analysis, labeling theory increasingly focused on local and specific interactions rather than public policy and relations of dominance and power. At this point, Laizos argued that instead of uncovering covert institutional and normal deviance, labeling deviance theory was becoming study of "perverts, nuts and sluts.” Some argued that it had thus become an apologist and servant of the power elite. In fact, Thomas Szasz pointed out that despite its original definition and intent, the term "deviance" now implied inferiority as well as difference.

---

9 Ibid., 113.
10 Ibid., 112.
11 Ibid., 121.
14 Thomas Szasz, The Manufacture of Madness (St Albans, NY: Paladin, 1973.)
At about this time, Alvin Gouldner (1968) outlined a particularly influential critique of deviance studies by Howard Becker and others of the Chicago School.\textsuperscript{15} He argued that this “underdog” sociology was in effect the “view from nowhere.” It had unintentionally incorporated a contradictory and decidedly positivist position on value neutrality. As such, it failed to provide any normative grounding rationale as to why “underdog sociology” should choose to consistently represent the side of the deviant "victims." This amounted to what Goldner called an "unprincipled relativism." In other words, the disposition to see the world through the eyes of the deviant conflicted with the supposedly value neutral commitment which had always been to present the perspective of whichever individual or group was being studied. That is, without a normative grounding (i.e., a commitment to democratic values) labeling deviance theory opened itself up to the same problems inherent in a supposedly value neutral positivist orientation. Shortly after this time, labeling deviance theory also fell prey to other positivist influences in the wake of a backlash within the field of special education.

During the 1970’s the issue of labeling achieved increased prominence in special education. The work of Jane Mercer and others highlighting the negative effects of special education labeling and resulting segregation presented a major challenge to the long held assumption that disability is a pathology internal to the individual.\textsuperscript{16} This contributed to significant reform legislation (1975 EHA) as well as a counter reaction or backlash among traditionalists within special education intent on defending the deficit or internal pathology model and traditionalist special education discourse. The arguments presented by labeling critics at that time are instructive in that they reflect an interpretation of the labeling perspective that remains common throughout the field of special education to this day.

A central feature of this interpretation is its decidedly positivist orientation. Rather than locating the meaning of deficit or deviant labels historically within a particular discursive practice, it assumes that they reflect objective reality or individual misconceptions. Accurately understood labels are assumed to be essentially neutral and useful. Thus, it is simply popular misinterpretation and inaccurate stereotypes that are problematic.\textsuperscript{17} Note how this interpretation is reflected in the following argument:

The real issues are the meanings we attach to disabilities, not the fact that we label them. Labels, in and of themselves, are not evil. How they are interpreted by others and by the labeled person determine whether they are harmful or ameliorative. The challenge is to educate society to use labels to arrive at a better understanding of persons with disabilities…\textsuperscript{18}

This illustrates the process of naturalization and reification in which social problems are effectively redefined as “realities” that are not only individual and technical, but also inevitable facts of human existence. After subtracting the concept of stigma and deviancy from consideration, the notion presented here is that there are two distinct meanings of disability labels: the reality and the myth. There are “real” or objectively accurate, neutral definitions, and there are ill informed, inaccurate stereotypes. This assumption effectively depoliticizes and de-historicizes labeling by locating the problem in personal ignorance or negative attitudes within the individual, rather than the structure, history, and professional discourse of the labeling system itself.

Kauffman goes on to say that

The significant point is that the naming [labeling] and categorizing of things is an inherent function of human language acquisition and usage. This is an important point because there is a persistent tendency among officials to frame the labeling question in terms of whether they should or shouldn't label anomalous individuals. At the very least this is a superfluous question, at worst, a diversionary one. If, in the strictest linguistic propriety, we can recognize and accept the fact that we label and categorize all people in the formal process of apprehending and organizing our world, we can then proceed to a more accurate formulation of the problem.\textsuperscript{19}

This argument again conflates two meanings of labeling. That is, by obscuring the distinction between labels and stigmatic labels (or ‘typing’ and ‘stereotyping’) and conflating the process of naming, or linguistic signification, or categorization, with the moral/political process of social censure (defining individuals outside the norm) the entire process is made to appear neutral. The logic here is that since humans cannot avoid the use of symbols and labels in general, it is in fact “diversionary” and “superfluous” to question their specific

\textsuperscript{18} Daniel P. Hallihan and James M. Kauffman, “Toward a Culture of Disability: In the Aftermath of Denno and Dunn,” \textit{The Journal of Special Education} 27, no. 4 (1989), 505.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
and scientific use by professional experts. This view is reflected in the argument that “extreme concern regarding labels may reflect an unwillingness to confront the realities to which the labels refer.”

Deviance sociologist Marten Soder’s “Disability as a Social Construct: The Labeling Approach Revisited” serves as a useful example of a more sophisticated understanding of labeling while illustrating the problems with the academic field deviance sociology. It also helps highlight how labeling deviance theory has diverged from its pragmatist roots:

The voluntarism implicit in the application of labeling theory can thus be summarized as belief in the possibilities of rationally changing social reality… It disregards the fact that social reality is embedded in a structure, that ascription of social meaning goes on in all social life, and the earlier experiences of a labeled person. This cannot be changed by any sudden or optimistic new way of treatment. The fact that identity and self-image are socially created does not necessarily mean that they are easily changeable. You don’t change identity like you change clothes.

Although Soder’s analysis is a step beyond the deficit model of disability, it remains within the kind of positivist/empiricist framework that is explicit throughout traditionalist special education discourse. By highlighting its immutability, Soder effectively legitimizes and naturalizes informal labeling. His position reiterates the traditionalist’s cynical view that it is futile to believe that informal labeling, or the formation of in-group/out-group identity can ever be can be substantially changed—a view directly at odds with Dewey’s conception of progressive education.

In addition, Soder’s belief in the neutrality of true scientific research is manifested in his implicit affirmation of the fact/value distinction, as well as the explicit rejection of the normative dimension of empirical research. He laments the fact that labeling theory has degenerated from what he calls an “interpretative scientific tool to a moralistic ideology for social criticism” and from an “insight into basic mechanisms of social life to a voluntaristic theory of action.” Soder argues that labeling researchers should quit trying to change things and get down to the real (scientific) business of analyzing social reality: “Maybe researchers need to step down from the arena of reformers and change

---

20 Ibid., 503.
22 Ibid., 122.
23 Ibid.
agents, stop competing in that area with politicians and professionals, and do what we are supposed to be good at: analyzing social reality.”

As this passage illustrates, labeling deviance theory, severed from its connection with and application to a pragmatist understanding of democratic life and the democratic criterion in education, becomes deterministic; in effect, an apology for the status quo. This position on the fact/value distinction, ideology, ethics, and research, is instructive in that it stands in nearly perfect opposition to the epistemological and normative position upon which pragmatism itself is based. Rather than avoiding normative issues, pragmatism insists on the inseparability of facts and values and the centrality of action in the social world. Instead of attempting to control variables or somehow understand or analyze ‘social reality’ from a ‘neutral’ objective/scientific perspective, it is a form of praxis: a transformative union of theory and practice. As Cornel West puts it, “American pragmatism is a diverse and heterogeneous tradition. But its common denominator consists of a future-oriented instrumentalism that tries to deploy thought as a weapon to enable more effective action... [and the] moral aim of enriching individuals and expanding democracy.”

The view that “informal labeling” is an immutable “fact of life” amounts to the notion that there is nothing schools or society can do to substantially alter human conceptions, stereotypes, and discriminatory dispositions of mind. This view is directly at odds with the central thrust Deweyian pragmatism. Rather than the ‘view from nowhere’, it is explicitly grounded in a democratic ethic. A Dewyan conception of pragmatism holds that the injustice of segregation and isolation are precisely what limit democracy. The pernicious effects of isolation and segregation result in the rigidity of sharply defined in groups and out groups. As Dewey puts it, “Lack of the free and equitable intercourse” and “isolation makes for rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life, for static and selfish ideals within the group.” Further, Dewey points out that this isolation and segregation (social ruptures of continuity) manifests itself in the very ways we think and perceive the world. They give rise to various conceptual dualisms such as fact and value, individuality and association, and theory and practice:

Further, the assumptions underlying segregation have their origin in rigidly demarcated groups and classes, resulting in inflexible social interaction and dualisms such as practical and intellectual, fact and value, individual and collective. We

24 Ibid., 127.
26 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 95.
then proceeded to an analysis of the various assumptions underlying this segregation. On the practical side, they were found to have their cause in the divisions of society into more or less rigidly marked-off classes and groups—in other words, in obstruction to full and flexible social interaction and intercourse. These social ruptures of continuity were seen to have their intellectual formulation in various dualisms or antitheses—such as that of labor and leisure, practical and intellectual activity, man and nature, individuality and association, fact and value, theory and practice.27

Many other social dualisms, or antitheses, such as normal and abnormal/deviant, special/regular, black/white, conservative/liberal, gay/straight serve to illustrate Dewey’s point. Pragmatist philosopher Nancy Fraser extends and applies Dewey’s insight and method of dissolving dualisms to what she calls the redistribution and recognition antithesis or dilemma.28 She argues that, broadly speaking, social injustice can be understood in at least two ways: economic/material (requiring redistribution), and cultural/symbolic (requiring positive recognition). The problem is that redistribution and recognition remedies aimed at addressing these problems inherently pull in opposite directions. This difficulty is central to the issues of labeling and inclusion, but is common to other social justice movements as well. For example, the movement to abolish or de-emphasize deviant disability labels can work to undercut efforts to secure and redistribute resources to people with disabilities. This apparent contradiction is termed the "redistribution/recognition dilemma."29

Fraser argues that "affirmation" and "transformation" are two means of dealing with this dilemma. Affirmation refers to attempts to correct injustice without substantially questioning or changing the underlying social framework that generated it. Thus, it tends further to legitimize and reify binary distinctions and results in identifying disadvantaged groups as permanently deficient and dependent, thus requiring allocation of additional resources.30 This affirmative orientation effectively characterizes traditionalists position in special and remedial education. This rather cynical conceptualization assumes that since institutions such as public schools have traditionally been unresponsive to the needs of this population and are unlikely to change, additional resources must continually be secured to serve these "deficient" individuals in separate specialized environments. Thus it supports a dual

---

27 Ibid., 323.
29 Ibid., 13.
30 Ibid., 25.
system of education which further reifies binary distinctions (special/regular, normal/abnormal, able/disabled, etc.) which again results even in greater segregation.\textsuperscript{31}

This predicament directly relates to Dewey’s conception of democracy and the problem of binary distinctions/dualisms. A dual system of education (special and general) inevitably results in less frequent and equitable contact and interaction, fewer points of common interest and areas of understanding among teachers and teachers and students and students. But, in Dewyan terms, this two-tiered system is clearly un-democratic. It violates what he calls the democratic ideal or criterion. As Dewey sees it, true democracy requires at least two crucial elements: frequent and equitable social interaction among individuals and groups with various points of common interests that are mutually recognized, and a change in social habit; a continuous readjustment and growth:

The two elements in our criterion both point to democracy. The first signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interaction between social groups (once isolated so far as intention could keep up a separation) but change in social habit—its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse. And these two traits are precisely what characterize the democratically constituted society.\textsuperscript{32}

Dewey points out that without this free interaction, we have the isolation of segregation, which results in increased rigidity, stagnation, and selfish ideals: “The essential point is that isolation makes for rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life, for static and selfish ideals within the group.”\textsuperscript{33}

A Transformative Approach

What is required then is a transformative as opposed to an affirmative approach. This kind of pragmatically oriented approach is designed to redress misrecognition, stigmatization and cultural oppression, by transforming discourses and alerting the underlying structures that generate them. In Dewyan fashion, the intent must be to challenge, to blur, to re-imagine and re-describe social structures, discourses, and the dualisms of binary distinctions (e.g., normal/abnormal, male/female, gay/straight, able/disabled, special/regular). It should be recognized that this non-dualistic orientation characterizes the most

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Dewey, \textit{Democracy and Education}, 101.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 95.
progressive aspects of the inclusion movement, which is intended to eliminate the distinctions and boundaries between "special" and "regular" education. Its aim is to sustain a thorough restructuring, the signifying practices of schooling. Consistent with Dewey’s faith in the reconstructive capacity of democracy, the intent here is not simply to affirm the worth of those currently outside the norm or dominant cultural group, but to reframe all social identities, to transform the social norm itself through democracy.34

Toward this end, disability rights groups have increasingly rejected the dualistic “normal/abnormal” medical model. They have grasped the significance of language and worked toward developing a discourse in which they control the definition of their own identity.35 This process of resistance, reframing, and renaming is sometimes referred to as “claiming disability” or “coming out.” This process is at the heart of what Dewey would see as the transformative process of democratic education, signaling a fundamental change in the construction of identity. It entails a non-dualistic reframing disability within a cultural political context of resistance, a movement to alter the meaning of disability labels from the medical/individualized language of impairment to a collective understanding of social justice grounded within a democratic discourse.

Obviously, this is a long-term process. Inclusion of people with disabilities is, at its core, an on-going liberation movement and as such requires faith in the capacity over time to alter basic habits and disposition; to in fact see the world differently. It is to see pathology as existing, not in those with disabilities, but in positivist concepts and the accompanying exclusionary attitudes, policies and actions. As Dewey would see it, this is a thoroughly educational issue. Herbert Lovett puts it this way:

Inclusion, for the moment is a political process and a liberation movement. Seeing every day reality (with its stairs, curbs, narrow toilet stalls, and perversely narrow appreciation of what constitutes “intelligence”) as needing rehabilitation and seeing people with disabilities as political equals radically reverses the old assumption that such people are broken and as a result badly suited for the real world.36

---

35 Ibid.
The pragmatic position thoroughly rejects the cynical deterministic position of a disconnected labeling perspective. To the contrary, it is profound faith in the capacity and possibility of education to ‘radically reverse old assumptions’, to see and act upon the world in accordance with our highest social aims. Dewey writes of this faith in 1922 saying that “Faith in education signifies nothing less that the belief in the possibility of deliberate direction of the formation of human disposition and intelligence.” This faith is again amplified in Democracy and education. Dewey writes that the democratic conception of education requires an emphasis on cooperative pursuits and a deliberate cultivation of democratic dispositions:

The emphasis must be put on whatever binds people together in cooperative human pursuits and results... [and] the fuller, freer, and more fruitful association and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled as a working disposition of mind. This conclusion is bound up with the very idea of education as a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims.

**Conclusion**

The manner in which we name, define and label others of our kind can work to ‘bind [us] together in cooperative human pursuits’ or support the forces create and maintain segregation and inequality. The work of those within the labeling deviance perspective such as Irving Goffman has been invaluable in specifying exactly how the negative side of the process takes place. Without this kind of analysis the application of Deweyan pragmatism to issues of disability and inclusion, they remain abstract and unarticulated. However, as illustrated in the three common views of labeling outlined at the beginning this paper, the insights of this perspective have been severely limited and obscured. The reification of disability labels and the fact/value dualism are directly at odds with the explicitly normative nature of Deweyan pragmatism. A reconnection with the concept of democratic inclusive education offers an important corrective to these trends, amounting to a reaffirmation of Dewey’s definition of education as philosophy applied to everyday life and his faith in the role of progressive education to shape habits and dispositions and continually reconstruct a more democratic, inclusive public.

---
