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A b s t r a c t

This project seeks to determine the effect of the mass media on political attitudes and behaviors in Chile between the years 1970 and 2000. The relationship between the media and “political socialization” is just now gaining recognition in scholarly research, and Chile offers an excellent case study. This paper traces these two variables during Salvador Allende’s Socialist government, 1970-73; throughout Augusto Pinochet’s right-wing dictatorship, 1973-1990; and in the return to democracy since 1990.

Under Allende’s Unidad Popular government the mass media were deeply polarized and antagonistic between the political right and left. Beginning on 11 September 1973, the day that Augusto Pinochet seized power through a violent coup, only extreme-rightist media were allowed to inform the Chilean public. The Pinochet regime heavily censored these media and used them as tools of political propaganda. In the mid-1980s, prompted by the country’s new neoliberal economic experiment, the mass media began to undergo an *apertura*, during which time opposition media provided a forum for political resistance. The opposition media were a major player in the 1988 plebiscite in which Pinochet was voted out of power. Since 1990, however, the mass media have seemingly lost their *raison d’etre*: rather than the investigative reports seen at the dictatorship’s demise, they now provide little more than entertainment.

This paper sets forth hypotheses as to why the mass media underwent such dramatic changes in political character and role. It also analyzes the Chilean public’s media consumption as an indicator of political behavior, employing numerous surveys and studies conducted between 1970 and 2000 as its basis. Due to space constraints, raw data is not included in this article.

Introduction: Research Context

I returned from Chile with a suitcase filled with photocopies, news magazines, political cartoons, books, thirty-year-old newspapers, cassette tapes, recording equipment, and a *Los Prisioneros* album. With this research in hand, my senior thesis was half completed. I participated in CIEE's (Council on International Education Exchange) semester-study program in Santiago because it allowed me to take all of my classes alongside Chilean students at two prestigious universities and gave me the freedom to pursue this independent research as well.

While I arrived in Chile already knowing the subject of my senior thesis—the mass media's effect on political attitudes and behaviors in that country—the success of my research was accomplished through many unexpected circumstances that occurred during the course of my semester abroad. Little research has been done on this topic in any country, much less in Chile; thus my project simply would not have been possible were I not physically located in the country and thus able to gather these resources.

I began my research in the School of Journalism libraries at the Universidad de Chile and the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. These schools had taken strong, opposite political stances vis-à-vis the government in Chile since 1970, and their literature reflected their biases. In this phase I located raw data from various studies that had been conducted concerning citizens' media consumption and their political leanings.

This research was accentuated by my history class studying the evolution of photography in Chile with particular attention to newspaper photos that had been published prior to and during Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship. When the professor, Fernando Ramirez Morales, learned of my interest in the mass media's role in these political developments, he offered to let me interview him in-depth over the course of the semester, providing me with a more nuanced and critical analysis of the subject.

This professor also introduced me to Helen Hughes, an American photojournalist who had been working for the resistance press during the dictatorship. She graciously received me in her Santiago

home and recounted her personal experiences of repression and persecution for her work.

Through CIEE I interned for American journalist Jimmy Langman during the semester. He gave me his perspective on the state of the Chilean mass media in comparison to the United States' and also pointed me in the direction of several useful scholarly sources. After I returned to the United States and began writing my thesis, he continued to send me helpful information regarding the contemporary Chilean media.

My most fortuitous find was that of a box of thirty-year-old newspapers left at the curb outside of a neighbor's house. Its owner, recently deceased, had maintained a collection of hundreds of newspapers and news magazines from Salvador Allende's Socialist government in 1970 through the Pinochet dictatorship until the return to democracy in 1990. Possessing such a collection was grounds for torture and assassination during the dictatorship, and copies of these can normally only be viewed on microfiche at the National Archives. This collection was an invaluable resource.

All of these sources formed the basis for my senior thesis, "The Mass Media and Political Socialization: Chile, 1970-2000." Additional touches that lent authentic Chilean flavor to the paper were epigraphs by Chile's political protest band, *Los Prisioneros*; political cartoons about Pinochet's repression of the media; and copies of the best examples of propaganda and censorship from the newspaper collection.

This project was only possible thorough studying abroad, and it was only by personally being in Chile that I understood its significance. The books and studies I found at the Chilean libraries are not available in the United States; the newspaper articles and photographs allowed me to see for myself the changing character of the Chilean press over the past 30 years; and the personal interviews conducted with journalists and scholars demonstrated to me that this subject is not merely of academic interest but of personal experience to those who have lived through it.

The Mass Media and Political Socialization: Chile, 1970–2000

La tele y la radio dicen que les ofrecen la gran oportunidad

—Los Prisioneros, “La Gran oportunidad”

The relationship between political values and political behaviors has been investigated since Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba published their empirical study of five countries’ cases, *The Civic Culture*, in 1959. In it they argue that cultural factors influence citizens’ political attitudes and democratic development.¹ The process by which citizens adopt and develop political attitudes is called political socialization, or political learning, and numerous scholars since Almond and Verba have suggested possible sources of this socialization.

While the question of sources of political learning is important in itself, it becomes even more significant insofar as political learning may direct political behavior, or in Almond’s words, “Political culture reveals the patterns of orientation to political action.”² Therefore, we might by extension argue that by determining the sources of political attitudes we may make predictions about citizens’ political behaviors. The purpose of this project is to determine what role one particular variable, the mass media, has played in the political socialization and democratic transition of one country, Chile. We will examine this singular case in the context of other countries’ cases and hope to draw generalizable conclusions about the media as a tool of political socialization and indicator of political behavior.

The media were chosen as the subject of this investigation for several reasons. First because, as one source describes, the media are “the principal means through which citizens and their elected representatives communicate in their reciprocal efforts to inform and influence.”³ Second, surprisingly little analysis has been conducted concerning the relationship between the mass media and political attitudes. As Gunther and Mughan write,

The literature in political science is notable for the general absence of rigorous comparative analyses of the mutually influencing interaction between the flow of political information...and the basic democratic character of political regimes and individual political attitudes and behaviors.⁴

Furthermore, any such analysis that exists is usually limited to study of developed countries, but “the understanding of the press’ function in the process of [political] opening and democratic transition is scarce.”⁵

From the outset, however, we must consider two preliminary limitations to this study. First, we acknowledge that the mass media are only one variable that may affect political socialization.⁶ As previously noted, scholars have suggested and studied numerous other factors in the process of political learning. Second, the emphasis of this investigation will be on the print media, although other media will also be considered as appropriate. The press is the oldest of the mass media and is therefore the subject of the largest body of scholarly research to date in comparison with other mass media.⁷

T h e o r e t i c a l F r a m e w o r k

Before we begin to analyze the relationship between the media and political attitudes and behaviors in Chile, we must first consider the larger body of scholarly work on this subject in order to generate a framework within which we may consider the Chilean case. The primary considerations pertinent to this project are the means by which the media may influence political socialization and the extent to which the media participate in political socialization.

M e a n s b y w h i c h t h e m e d i a i n f l u e n c e p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i z a t i o n

Scholarly arguments consider two basic premises to this end: that the character of the media itself may promote or hinder socialization to a particular type of regime and/or that the media influence citizens' opinions on specific issues.

The traditional view is that the media serve the interests of each regime type. According to this model, the media under authoritarian regimes are characterized as "puppets" under strict governmental control that provide highly selective flows of information to the public in order to manipulate popular opinion. The media under democratic regimes, in turn, would be characterized by a concept known as "civic journalism." This describes a set of qualities that the media, according to its proponents, should possess if they are to promote democracy in a society: journalistic freedom, independence, and plurality would be several examples.^{8,9} Within this framework the media function as "the new representatives of the citizens,"¹⁰ presenting and legitimating citizen viewpoints in the public sphere much as political parties do.¹¹ This conception of "civic journalism" sees the liberalization of the media as crucial in the development of democratic attitudes on an individual level to bring about a substantive change on the national level.¹² As one scholar explains, the media play an important role in the development of democracy since they are the primary means by which individuals acquire information

and are exposed to alternative opinions on an issue; therefore, “the cultivation of diversity and pluralism in the media is an essential condition of the development of...democracy.”¹³

In advanced democracies the media, practicing civic journalism, may also ensure that checks and balances are in place, playing the role of “key guarantors of accountability and popular control of government.”¹⁴ Two characteristics of democratic media ensure that information disseminated by the media serves to check government power rather than magnify it: first, freedom of the press and of speech allows citizens to publish diverse points of view as well as to take issue with their government. Second, the media are protected from direct political control, and media pluralism is institutionalized.¹⁵ Carlos Filgueira argues that civic journalism applied within an authoritarian context would force the regime at least to enter into a dialogue with those other viewpoints¹⁶ and thereby hopefully open the possibility of democratic transition.

Scholars also cite the content of the media as a factor in their potential to socialize their consumers. Heriberto Muraro cites investigative journalism and presentation of public opinion statistics as two key ways in which the media may promote democracy,¹⁷ while Gunther and Mughan note the media’s power to teach, set the agenda, prime viewers, and frame issues as critical in their democratic influence.¹⁸ According to their argument, the media may or may not change the public’s fundamental political attitudes and behaviors directly, but they can exert influence through agenda-setting. Essentially, “the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”¹⁹

E x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e m e d i a p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i z a t i o n

Throughout the twentieth century the mass media have become increasingly significant as a source of political information, at first because of the spread of literacy and then because of advances in technology.²⁰ One scholar contends that “important changes in the structure of the media...significantly affect the degree to which media effects can have an impact on politics.”²¹ One such structural characteristic is the economic alignment of the media,²² and another is the type of medium consumed (press, radio, television),²³ both of which will be considered in this project.

The Chilean Case

In addition to the above theoretical framework, we must also examine factors particular to Chile's case in order to study the relationship between the mass media and political socialization in that country. For example, we will consider how the Chilean media's character changed over time in relation to the country's dynamic political sphere. From a democratically-elected socialist government, through a strict authoritarian dictatorship, and now in the re-democratization process, the Chilean media have existed under conditions at each extreme of the political spectrum.

We must also consider economic variables that shaped the role of the media during and since the dictatorship. As Sunkel and Tironi argue,

A focus on political dynamics alone would not explain the evolution of the media system during the seventeen years of authoritarian rule. Nor is it possible to account for the participation of the media in the democratization process exclusively in terms of political liberalization.²⁴

Therefore, attention will also be given to Chile's changing economic landscape and how those variables may have affected the media's impact on political values.

Hypotheses

As suggested previously, political attitudes have a direct influence on political behavior. Therefore, shifts in the variables considered in this project—the character of the media, the content of the media, the amount consumed of the media, or in mitigating factors—may have important implications for political attitudes and subsequent political behavior.

Based on this assumption, it is logical to hypothesize that in general, if Chileans consume media that promote democratic values, all other variables being controlled, they are more likely to be socialized to democratic principles and therefore more likely to participate politically than those who do not. By the same argument, if Chileans consume media that do not promote democratic values, they are less likely to be socialized to democratic principles and less likely to participate politically. If we press the argument further, we hypothesize that if Chileans consume media that promote undemocratic values, they are more likely to be socialized to undemocratic principles. Discounting the presence of other mitigating factors, the media will exert more influence depending on the amount and frequency that they are consumed.

The Ambivalent Role of the Media Under Salvador Allende and Augusto Pinochet, 1970–73

Yo soy un tranquilo y pacífico extremista

— Los Prisioneros, “El Extremista”

While Chile had been considered Latin America’s most stable democracy until 1973, deep divisions between the country’s three political parties disposed the nation to a volatility that eventually resulted in a violent coup d’etat.²⁵ In this chapter we will consider the role of the mass media before and immediately following this pivotal point in Chile’s political history. By comparing the character and role of the media under the Marxist Unidad Popular regime to its function under the nascent military dictatorship we find the clearest conception of its variant nature under diametrically opposed regime types.

The Media under the Unidad Popular, 1970–73

Salvador Allende of the Marxist Unidad Popular (UP) party won the 1970 presidential election with only 36.2 percent of the popular vote, and while his initial attempts to revive Chile’s economy found success initially, he soon faced strong opposition from those in the political right whose power and position were threatened. The mass media in Chile mirrored this political polarization as each significant political party owned or was closely linked with a newspaper or magazine. As one scholar describes, “During the three years of the UP government, the political effervescence of the era was clearly reflected in the mass media. Until the coup, different media that responded to distinct political and ideological tendencies coexisted, those which where either openly for or against the UP.”²⁶

By the time that the UP assumed power in 1970, the political press had significantly increased in importance, and alongside the traditional ideological media there emerged several publications at the extreme ends of the political spectrum that were oriented toward political confrontation.²⁷ The diverse and belligerent viewpoints these publications published fueled an ambiance of subjectivity and polarization that primed Chilean society for the violent overthrow that was to come three years after Allende assumed the presidency.²⁸ Here we will examine the characteristics of the leftist and rightist media in turn.

Left-leaning media

Allende himself claimed to promote journalistic integrity, declaring to a corps of journalists congregated to observe the eighty-sixth anniversary of *La Unión* newspaper that he would “guarantee the absolute freedom of the press” and asked only that they would “report objectively, in keeping with ethical journalism.”²⁹ He subtly critiqued right-leaning media conglomerates for their capitalistic concentration of the media and purposeful distribution of disinformation designed to discredit his government.³⁰

Despite Allende’s spoken commitment to freedom of the press, in deed he proved to be more interested in promoting liberties for those media that supported his government while discouraging media pluralism if it threatened his political agenda. His particular target was *El Mercurio*, the oldest daily newspaper in South America and a staunchly rightist publication owned by the Edwards family. He levied special taxes against *El Mercurio* and slapped it with the Interior Security law, which permitted the president to prohibit free expression in any medium determined to be disruptive of national security.³¹ Some sources also suggest that Allende approved certain measures of aggression and violence against *El Mercurio* journalists and photographers³²

Right-leaning media

The primary function of the rightist media under the UP was to act as a destabilizing agent, “creating an ambiance so that important sectors of the citizenry would accept the acceleration of a crisis and its outcome. The great strategy was to undermine, by way of all of the mass media, the government’s foundations of legitimacy.”³³ According to a study performed by the Universidad Pontificia Católica de Chile the three main campaigns waged against the UP by the right-leaning media were based on the threat to freedom of expression, the threat of economic instability, and the threat posed to civil peace.³⁴

In 1955 the University of Chicago sent economists funded by the Agency for International Development to Santiago as part of “Project Chile”³⁵; these economists, including Milton Freedman, were proponents of the neo-liberal economic model. *El Mercurio* was responsible for diffusing the economic policy initiatives of these so-called “Chicago Boys” throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s as they sought to undermine Allende’s socialist experiment.³⁶ Eventually the Chicago Boys and their Chilean understudies suggested in *El Mercurio* columns that an authoritarian society could provide a controlled laboratory environment in which to test their neoliberal theories.³⁷

The other tactic *El Mercurio* employed in its campaign against the UP was to create a general sense of impending threat and chaos, priming Chilean society for the upcoming military coup d'état. Rightist publications cast the UP as a "deteriorating authority" and attempted to generate public alarm by depicting a state of national catastrophe, emphasizing instances of violence as a sign of a looming threat to personal safety.³⁸ By undermining the UP's stability and thus its ability to establish a national politic, the rightist press sought to demonstrate the current regime's inability to address the country's political and economic needs. In July of 1973 an *El Mercurio* editorial called for military intervention.³⁹

The Media during the Coup, 1973

Early on the morning of September 11, 1973, when Allende had just arrived at the presidential palace La Moneda, the sound of Kitty Hawk bombers overhead signaled the demise of Chile's socialist experiment. By the end of the day Allende and dozens of his loyalists were dead, a glimpse of what would become in the following seventeen years one of the most violent dictatorships in Latin American history. Convinced that only deep-seated change could "purge Chile of its political demons," Augusto Pinochet oversaw the torture and assassination of politicians, labor leaders, students, intellectuals, journalists, and all who had been part of the UP.⁴⁰

The role of *El Mercurio* in the days and months immediately following the coup was vital to the military junta's success. As one scholar notes, "The events that followed September 11 dissolved any doubt as to the importance of *El Mercurio* as a publication that establishes the nation's agenda."⁴¹ In the new authoritarian regime the mass media could only echo the government's official stance, "explaining the rationale behind the government's measures and reviving the past's painful memories in order to legitimize the new government order."⁴²

The military junta's domination of the mass media was swift and complete. At the time of the coup on September 11, leftist newspapers and radio stations were bombed and their employees detained or killed immediately. The military junta's band no. 15, released on September 11, declared that

the government junta desires to control the public opinion about these national events.... For this reason it has seen fit to exercise a strict censorship of the press. The press, radio stations, and television channels are advised that any information given to the public that has not been

approved by the government junta will be subject to immediate intervention by the Armed Forces.⁴³

These bands were first published in *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*, the only newspapers allowed to circulate immediately after the coup and both owned by the ultra-rightist Edwards family. Both of these newspapers served as the military junta's spokespeople, publishing official declarations while under strict government censorship.⁴⁴

El Mercurio had been priming the Chilean populace to fear the leftist threat to national security and well-being, but now with all veneer of professional objectivity wiped away in the coup's aftermath it resorted to characterizing all UP sympathizers as "extremists," modified by such adjectives as "violent," "armed," and "communist," in order to justify the military's aggression against them.⁴⁵ These words—repeated in headlines, articles, and photo captions throughout each issue—projected an image of leftists as generators of violence, chaos, aggression against individuals, and sinister collectivity.⁴⁶ On September 13, the first day that it was published after the coup, *El Mercurio* ran a list of 95 individuals associated with the UP, demanding that they turn themselves in to the military junta.⁴⁷

During the course of the next year, this dismantling of the political press resulted in the elimination of all newspapers and magazines with UP or leftist ties. Not only were leftists prohibited from publishing their own newspapers but they were unable to be acknowledged in any publication, except as "the enemy of the state, societal cancer, or the cause of the chaos and annihilation of Chilean values."⁴⁸ The offices and presses of *El Siglo*, *Ultima Hora*, *Puro Chile*, *Clarín*, and *El Diario Color* were bombed by the Armed Forces, while in the cases of *La Nación*, *Quimantú*, and many others, the government assumed authority over the publication and modified it to serve its own purposes.⁴⁹ Newspapers such as *Tribuna* and *La Prensa* were forced to close because of political and economic pressures.⁵⁰

Even those publications that did not incur the military junta's wrath took careful measures to prevent that from occurring. The "most effective and dangerous" form of censorship practiced during the dictatorship was self-censorship resulting from the fear of repressive measures. As Lidia Baltra Montaner described the situation at the time,

Many times the self-censorship began with the information source, then it continues with the journalist, then with his boss. Finally they publish a totally mutilated version of the story or they don't even publish it at all.⁵¹

In 1975 the president of the College of Journalists declared that self-censorship had allowed for the normalization of freedom of the press⁵²; in other words, that the press had so effectively censored itself that no further measures were necessary.

The Media and Political Attitudes

Little empirical data is available regarding the mass media and citizens' political values during this period of Chile's history; however, one study conducted in Chile sought to determine the relationship between media dependency and political perceptions in an ideologically-monopolized media environment. Its director, Pablo Halpern, proposes that the impact of media messages on audience perceptions is a function of the degree of audience dependence on mass media sources for information. Chile during the dictatorship provided an ideal context within which to test this hypothesis.

Means by which the media influence political socialization

As described above, the media under the UP regime took an active role in seeking to influence political attitudes, accusing and discrediting one another on the basis of political ideology, but there is no evidence that these exchanges persuaded the newspapers' readers to feel differently than they had previously. Once within the authoritarian context, scholars contend that the likelihood of persuasion diminishes further, since "the oppositional media construct a discourse within the parameters imposed by [the authoritarian system]. They share the authoritarian agenda and echo the authoritarian society,"⁵³ not advocating an alternative viewpoint whatsoever.

Extent to which the media influence political socialization

A wide variety of factors should be considered in determining the extent to which the media under the UP and in the early years of the dictatorship may have socialized their consumers. As noted in the theoretical framework, a person's susceptibility to media influence depends on his own disposition and resultant selective exposure, selective perception, and selective retention.⁵⁴ Especially in the case of Chile's politically stratified media under the UP, it seems unlikely that a reader would choose not only to read but to believe and accept the propaganda published by the opposition lambasting his personal political views.

This is where Halpern's study comes to bear. According to Halpern's study, a person's susceptibility to media influence depends on his perception of the media's credibility and his dependence on it for political information.

Halpern expected minimal impact on political perceptions in Chile, where the official media had low credibility due to severe governmental controls. Given his theory regarding media dependence, however, “the media, regardless of their political orientation in an authoritarian political system, would have an impact on political perceptions, given the condition of media dependency.”⁵⁵

Halpern’s study found that the greater the dependence of leftists on pro-government mass media sources for political information, the more rightist their political perceptions. This correlation held when controlled for age, gender, education, income, and all of these variables together.⁵⁶ This would lead us to conclude that regardless of leftists’ skepticism of the rightist press’ credibility, their dependence on rightist media for political information indeed altered their political opinions.

Mitigating factors

Halpern acknowledges the impossibility of controlling for all potential confounding variables in determining sources of political perceptions, but he offers several theories as to likely mitigating factors. His study indicates that the higher a person’s dependence on non-mass media sources of political information, the less rightist his political opinions,⁵⁷ raising the question of what the alternative sources of political information are. When the variable of “interest in politics” was added, no significant changes in correlation occurred.⁵⁸ He does, however, note that access to opposition media is limited by both financial and educational barriers, and that the opposition media “did not provide functional alternatives for political information for large segments of the population.”⁵⁹

The Media during the Dictatorship, 1975–88

Deja la inercia de los 70, Ya viene la voz de los 80

— Los Prisioneros, “La Voz de los 80”

The mass media under the military junta’s control in the months immediately following the coup d’état assumed a war-time character, drawing sweeping caricatures of leftists as “los malos” and junta-supporters as “los buenos” in the war against the socialist threat. As Munizaga describes, “In this first stabilization phase the communications politic had the characteristics of a war-time politic whose goal is psychological action against the Marxist-Leninist adversary.”⁶⁰ During this early stage of the dictatorship, they pursued a primarily negative media campaign, silencing critics through repressive measures and maintaining strict control over what was published or aired in the mass media.

In following years, as the junta sought to achieve a viable, sustainable dictatorship in the person of Augusto Pinochet, the media could no longer function in this negative role. Instead, the media needed to foment the long-term agenda of the regime by explaining and diffusing its policies to the Chilean populace⁶¹ and by sustaining the support of moneyed rightist groups that formed the economic base of the regime.⁶²

In this chapter we will explore the interaction of the military regime's discourse and the nascent opposition media's protest on Chileans' political values.

Structure of the Media

It is impossible to understand the political role of the media during this period without discussing the economic structural changes that Chile was undergoing simultaneously. Led by the Chicago Boys' neoliberal theorists, Pinochet's economic advisors launched a sweeping privatization effort that left a great percentage of state-owned media in the hands of private investors.⁶³ Only private companies, people with ties to the new regime who did not appear to be linked to political organizations, provincial newspapers, state-owned media, and the Catholic press were allowed access to the communications market.⁶⁴

The change in media structure and economic liberalization had several important implications for the role of the mass media in political socialization, especially in regards to freedom of the press, the opposition media, and the media as an economic venture instead of a political player. The first two will be treated in this chapter and the third in the following chapter.

Content of the Media

Government Discourse and the Rightist Media

Despite the military junta's overt repressive measures against the leftist media, the regime continued to tout its commitment to freedom of expression as a constitutional right. The period of strict censorship and control over the media was justified by the temporary "state of emergency" and the junta promised a future "return to normalcy."⁶⁵ In February of 1975 Pinochet spoke to the Association of Journalists about the government's concern for informational freedoms, relegating media restrictions to the past:

I want to make clear that if during the current government's first months there were some restrictions placed on the press, today we may indicate that there exists complete freedom of expression without restrictions besides those imposed by ethics or common sense.⁶⁶

In practice, however, the leftist media were still completely outlawed, and the rightist media languished under self-censorship and fear of government retribution. Although the right-leaning media had attempted to tolerate the inconsistencies between a liberal discourse and authoritarian practices, the dialogue between the media and the government was slowly deteriorating. Rightist communications' representatives resisted the regime's proposed constitutional amendments that would allow such governmental privileges as prior censorship and the compulsion of journalists to reveal their sources.⁶⁷ In order to maintain the support of rightist communications conglomerates, the military junta needed to find a delicate balance between state control and freedom of expression within the media.⁶⁸

Permitting some media liberties, then, served a double purpose: to pacify the rightist media, and also to allow increased antagonism on the part of the press towards the political left. As Filgueira and Nohlen argue, the junta's increasing tolerance of press liberties was an issue of expediency, not preference.

It would be an error to maintain that in Chile the permissiveness toward the press was a result of the military government's basically positive attitude towards freedom of expression. It was a necessity of a revolutionary system, with a clear objective to motivate, which made use of a small opening in the freedom of the press to confront the opposition.⁶⁹

This tenuous tension existed until the *Estado de Sitio*, enacted in November of 1984 to disassemble the communications and information system created during the prior years by the independent and opposition media. Twenty-four hours after the declaration, all opposition magazines were closed indefinitely except for *Hoy*, which was subjected to strict government censorship.⁷⁰ All mass media were prohibited from

...diffusing information, interviews, commentary, declarations, insertions, reports, photographs, images, and all other forms of expression regarding facts that could directly or indirectly provoke alarm in the populace, alter the civic peace, or affect the normalcy of national activities.⁷¹

This *Estado de Sitio* lasted until May of 1985, when the situation began to normalize and most of the opposition publications reappeared.⁷²

The Leftist Media

The neoliberal economic boom ushered in a relaxation of political repression towards the media and the beginnings of an opposition press in 1976 by such interested groups as marginalized journalists, churches, study

centers, and political parties.⁷³ The unofficial mass media belonged almost exclusively to sectors of the Christian Democrat party and the Catholic Church, while the unofficial micro-media consisted of such publications as *Solidaridad*, founded by Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez as an internal local-church bulletin, and the magazine *La Bicicleta*. By 1977 the military regime had legalized the publication of other unofficial media, such as *APSI*, *Análisis*, and *Haciendo Camino*. This period of legalization of the press culminated with the Constitution of 1980, which guaranteed that “Every person has the right to found, edit, and maintain newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals.”⁷⁴

The combination of this new constitutional right to establish unofficial press and the new neoliberal economic model led to an explosion of new publications. Simultaneously, the established unofficial media began to venture increasingly into the political sphere.⁷⁵ By 1983 the national political situation had gradually evolved to allow for voices of dissent to be heard. The symbol of the times was the magazine *Cauce*, founded to express social democratic thought but which evolved into a publication of denouncements. The founding of *Fortín Mapocho* completed the establishment of a block of aggressive opposition press that was a novelty in the post-1973 media system.⁷⁶

The new “independent journalism” was characterized by certain traits that ultimately contributed to a growing social climate of renovation and change. For example, the periodicals sought to represent the Chilean populace excluded or ignored by the official information system and provided contra-information to the version of reality presented in the official publications.

The unofficial media “represented the face of critique and opposition with respect to the government’s official discourse”⁷⁷ and achieved an “authentic communication space, where the seeds of a renovated, democratic, and participative concept of journalistic practices were planted, along with a dimension of commitment and social responsibility within the media.”⁷⁸ American photojournalist Helen Hughes worked for *Solidaridad* during the dictatorship and spent five days in prison for photographing a protest. She describes living under “constant tension” in those years but believed that the opposition media’s cause was worth the danger. “The regime had an interest in covering up what people were going through, what was really going on. My work was part of not letting those things slide away.”⁷⁹

Reyes Matta notes a further distinction between the official and unofficial media, that of their journalistic professionalism. The sharp decline in the quality of such official newspapers such as *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera* was

apparent, as official media were marked by control, censorship, and direct and indirect political and economic pressures. Journalism as a career was removed from the university curriculum, degrading the level of social prestige it had achieved. Independent journalism, however, obtained “fresher, more illuminating information of higher impact and professional quality than those developed by magazines and newspapers subscribed to the official system.”⁸⁰ The alternative media “had tried to rescue not only the truth but also the possibility of delivering it professionally.”⁸¹ This professionalism was seen in the following of particular themes across several issues, the advertisement for other unofficial publications in the unofficial media, and the joint effort between various unofficial media (an unofficial radio station following up on an unofficial newspaper’s article).⁸²

One particular disadvantage that the unofficial media had during this time, however, was that the level of modernization that the official media had achieved was unattainable for them. While the official media underwent changes that allowed them to meet a growing consumer demand, the unofficial media were left publishing weekly or biweekly newsrags that couldn’t compete in the same market with the official media. The result of this process was that “the communications system was made undoubtedly more complex and less accessible for the unofficial publications.”⁸³

These new media achieved a significant circulation which, when coupled with the economic boom, attracted advertisers and led the media to in turn modernize and invest in their means of production.⁸⁴ The increase in circulation figures renewed the military government’s resistance to media that undermined its authority.⁸⁵ As the director of *Solidaridad* observed,

The government’s censorship had to be lifted in order to conduct any politics in the country, but that also allowed other sectors to speak up. And as they began to speak, it was very difficult for the government to quiet them, so the only option that the government had was to repress them.⁸⁶

This repression took the form of the *Estado de Sitio*, discussed in the previous section. As Matta explains, the *Estado de Sitio* achieved a certain degree of social demobilization by attacking the entire communicational system that had been created on the basis of dissidence and opposition.⁸⁷ However, the government’s efforts were not as concentrated or as drastic as they had been in 1973, and the optimism generated in the brief years of press freedoms remained intact despite the governmental repression.

The Media since Chile's Return to Democracy, 1988–Present

El momento ha llegado, Vamos a declarar independencia cultural

—Los Prisioneros, “Independencia cultural”

The media were active agents of change in Chile's redemocratization process, a power made possible by their modernization in the mid-1980s. Tironi and Sunkel argue that the media's “modernization, promoted by the military regime's own economic strategy, had a liberalizing impact much more profound than that of the marginal opposition media” because they encountered difficulty in maintaining their commitment to modernity and progress without distancing themselves from the incongruities between economic liberties and political repression.⁸⁸ The media therefore pressured the regime to lift its political controls, which had “weakened the credibility of the media” and “reduced their possibilities for expansion.”⁸⁹ It was this liberalization and *apertura* in the media that allowed space for the debate and critique that eventually brought about the demise of Pinochet's dictatorship. In this chapter we will examine the role of the media in bringing about the end of the dictatorship's as well as their function in Chile's ensuing democratic consolidation.

The Demise of the Dictatorship

The liberalizing impact of the media is best seen in two landmark events: Pope John Paul's visit in 1987 and in the televised “Franja de Si/No” that preceded the 1988 national plebiscite which would determine whether or not Pinochet would remain in power. Over the course of the decade the television had moved from the margins of media outlets to the dominant source of information for much of the country. Each side of the political debate wielded this new power to engage the public in a way not seen before.

The television's importance in Chile's political sphere had first been noted with Pope John Paul II's visit in 1987, during which time the pope issued a fervent call for the recovery of Chile's democratic transitions. Television stations were called on to guarantee that the various public meetings and ceremonies of the pope would be open to the whole country. The church expected that this would be done with respect and without distorting the meaning of the pope's words. However, studies that evaluated the television's coverage of the pope's visit denounced the channels most closely tied to the military regime for “manipulating” the meaning of the events and “using them for political purposes.”⁹⁰ According to Tironi, the pope's visit marked the beginning of an *apertura* in Chilean television and thereby in the authoritarian order itself: “The pope's

presence served to justify the appearance of opposition political leaders on television and initiated a dialogue among them. It created a dialogue and mutual tolerance that was propitious for the transition to democracy."⁹¹

The media were also instrumental in the success of the October 5, 1988 plebiscite. By agreeing to hold the plebiscite, the military regime accepted a number of stipulations meant to ensure its fairness and democratic legitimacy ("Yes" meant that Pinochet would continue as dictator, and "No" meant that elections would be convened). One of these was that each side of the Yes/No debate would receive a free fifteen-minute television slot during each of the thirty days prior to the plebiscite for the use of political propaganda. These television slots were not expected to attract large audiences, but they in fact had a great impact on the outcome of the election and the subsequent return to democracy.⁹²

The "Yes" campaign highlighted the military regime's achievements while emphasizing the danger and risk that the society would run if the opposition came into power.⁹³ The "No" campaign's strategy was not in fact to change public opinion since the majority of the society was already amenable to this option. Instead it sought to "overcome widespread feelings of resignation and despair, born out of fear and skepticism, so that individuals would act in a manner congruent with their opinions and aspirations."⁹⁴

In the end, 54.7 percent of Chileans voted "No," 43 percent voted "Yes," and 2.3 percent cast blank or null ballots. A study conducted the month after the plebiscite compared the percentage of the populace who regularly watched these fifteen-minute television spots to whether they voted "Yes" or "No." The study found that 90 percent of all those surveyed had watched the campaign spots regularly. Of those who voted "Yes" to continuing under Pinochet, 89.5 percent regularly watched the spots; of those who voted "No," 96 percent regularly watched them; and of those who did not vote in the plebiscite or who had cast null ballots, 84 percent had regularly watched them.⁹⁵ This leads to the conclusion that those who regularly watched the nightly television spots were more likely to have voted, and they were also more likely to vote "No" against Pinochet remaining in power.

The Media During the Democratic Transition

The character of the media itself changed little in the early years of democratic transition. As Tironi argues, the reason for this is that

prior to changes in the political realm, the communications system had already completed its own transition: the process of modernization

transformed it from a system based on the printed word, dependent on the state, and strongly politicized to one based on television, in private hands, self-financed, and oriented toward entertainment or news.⁹⁶

In the Chilean case, then, we find that the modernization of the media system was a causal factor in bringing about the political transition, whereas the converse has been true in many other pre-democratic societies.⁹⁷

While the media may have played these more overt roles in the return to democracy in Chile, certain characteristics of the media continued to undermine the realization of a true civic journalism in the country. These were the persistence of anti-democratic values in the rightist press, the disappearance of the opposition press, the de-politicization of the press, and the limited freedom of expression. The majority of these were products of political or economic factors that will be discussed in the following section.

Effects of Political Pressures on the Media

The media across the political spectrum continued to experience limitations to their freedom of expression. Dermota argues that this is a normal function of political leaders seeking to influence their citizenry: "From Portales to Pinochet, from Alessandri to Allende, governments have tried to restrict citizen access to power by means of control and dominion over the press. The new government did not change this."⁹⁸ This delimitation of press freedom was seen in continued self-censorship for fear of government reproach as well as a general shift away from political themes in the media.

An explanation for this may be that Chilean society was still deeply divided politically. As one Chilean television-journalist wrote at the time, "Everyone is terrified of being in disagreement. It's unlikely that journalists can achieve their function as 'the fourth estate' in such a polarized society: every question is seen as an attack."⁹⁹ The government also discouraged investigative reporting out of fear of undermining the nascent democracy.

The years following Pinochet's regime saw the death of audacious journalism in general. To be inquisitive and to question was suddenly considered unacceptable for fear of toppling the new democracy.¹⁰⁰

New laws were enacted so that harming someone's "honor" was no longer a civil offence but a crime. The most famous case of this occurred in 1999 when one of Chile's last investigative journalists, Alejandra Matus, went into exile in the United States to avoid prosecution. Chilean police attempted to

arrest her for the book she had recently published, *The Black Book of Chilean Justice*, which outlines abuses of power in the Chilean justice system.¹⁰¹

Rather than resist government pressures the Chilean media have primarily responded by in large by depoliticizing. The media most affected by the democratic transition were those that had been most heavily politicized, especially “those that were unable to distance themselves from the political realm at a time when the public was increasingly viewing politics in negative terms.”¹⁰² Some (including *Fortín Mapocho* and *Cauce*) disappeared altogether, while others (*La Epoca*, *Hoy*, and *Apsi*) redefined themselves according to non-political criteria in the late 1990s. This sudden disappearance of the vast majority of the opposition media that helped bring about Pinochet’s downfall has been a source of scholarly speculation since the democratic transition.

Dermota proposes twelve reasons for the disappearance of these opposition media: the end of foreign subsidies, journalistic fatigue, their failure to depoliticize, that the politicians returning from exile wanted to be acknowledged in *El Mercurio* instead of in the opposition media, the loss of readership, the loss of an “enemy,” the new government’s disapproval of any medium that was not perfectly aligned with its politic, the new government’s refusal to financially assist the opposition media, the inability to secure advertisers, their directors’ lack of business savvy, the market economy, and the inequality between their resources and those of the large media conglomerates.¹⁰³

Sunkel explores the implications of the resulting concentration of the media between two conglomerates, *El Mercurio* and *Copesa*. He notes that the peculiarity of Chile’s case is not the economic concentration of its media (this occurs in both developed and underdeveloped countries around the globe), but rather that this economic concentration is highly centralized and also defined by a single ideology. This concentration is centered in Santiago, with the only true “local” markets existing in Chile’s southernmost regions.¹⁰⁴ The “ideological monopoly,” as Sunkel describes it, is the entertainment industry’s, which relegates cultural diversity and politics to the media margins.¹⁰⁵

Lightening of the Debate

In the process of democratic consolidation the media have steadily drifted (or steered themselves) away from political themes. In previous sections we noted that this may be in response to government reproach of those media whose politic is not strictly aligned with that of the governments, as well as the growing demand on the part of the Chilean populace for more entertainment-driven media. A recent study of Chile’s tabloid culture found that a

vehement distaste for politics is common among readers of *La Cuarta*. The study's author assigns such recalcitrance towards politics to be residual from the era of the Unidad Popular and the early years of the dictatorship.

The political role that the press played in that era isn't remembered in a positive light by these readers. Instead it brings to mind a traumatic time when politics were the center of discord and antagonism, an activity that leads to social dissolution. It's because of that traumatic memory that the readers appreciate *La Cuarta's* effort to situate itself at the margin of the political conflict.¹⁰⁶

University of Chile historian Fernando Ramirez Morales addresses the media's role in agenda-setting and believes that the media have traded the "great discourses" of Latin America regarding equality, freedom, and peace, for the trivial tabloid topics of sex, scandal, rumored homosexuality, etc.¹⁰⁷ He is concerned not by what is being published in the press now but rather by what is not being published. For example, *El Mercurio* has been openly discussing human rights abuses perpetrated under Pinochet on its front page, but Ramirez Morales notes that current issues, such as the destruction of Chile's forests and the marginalization of indigenous people, are not covered:

The function of the mass media is to manipulate the public agenda according to the owners' interests. By discussing the issue of human rights abuses, now long past, have the media not found another way to disorient the public? They give the impression of freedom of expression, but they deliberately avoid today's issues, the ones that the media's owners have a stake in.¹⁰⁸

Scholars are currently debating whether the media initiated their shift in character to this tabloid culture or whether they are simply responding to a public demand. Tironi and Sunkel argue for the former, saying that unlike their role during the democratic transition when they actively promoted political change, the media's current function is "to modify public opinion in accord with the requisites of democratic normalcy."¹⁰⁹ Conversely, another author argues that the media are solely concerned with their ratings and that the subjects they treat are selected with concern for the public's reception.¹¹⁰

In the following chapter we will utilize data from several surveys to evaluate the relationship between political values and media consumption during the time period 1990-98 and draw conclusions about the effect of media on political socialization based on our earlier hypotheses.

Civic Journalism in Principle and Praxis

Entrego el corazón optimista

—Los Prisioneros, “Pa Pa Pa”

The theoretical framework within which we have examined the question of the media’s role in political socialization is that of civic journalism. As defined above, civic journalism entails a set of qualities that the media should possess in order to promote democracy in a society. These qualities are grounded in journalistic freedom, independence, and plurality. In our investigation of Chile’s media across the thirty years since Allende and the Unidad Popular were in power, through Pinochet’s dictatorship, and now under democracy, we have noted the incidence of various indicators of civic journalism. In this section we will evaluate the current state of Chile’s media against the concept of civic journalism and propose various ways in which the media must develop if they are to support democratic consolidation.

Much of our investigation centered on the *vaivenes* of the media’s freedom of expression since 1970 because, as Cole writes, “Freedom of the press is a function of political development; they are inextricably interlocked.”¹¹¹ Therefore, the media’s right to freedom of expression is an indicator of functioning democracy and the promotion of democratic values. A challenge to the free exercise of this right in the Chilean context, however, is that it is not foundational to Chilean society. As Dermota words it,

In Chile freedom of expression is considered a ‘good idea’ and something that is worth fighting for, but it is not the fundamental and organizing principle of the society; it’s the frosting on the cake but not the cake itself, whereas in the United States, freedom of expression is the eggs, the flour, and the cake pan.¹¹²

Another related function of the media in a democratic society is agenda-setting. Filgueira and Nohlen argue that the liberalization of Chile’s media in the 1980s allowed it play this role by creating the possibility of dialogue with the regime and allowing a forum for public opinion to be expressed.¹¹³ Munizaga questioned the ability of any media under the dictatorship, even those in the opposition, to offer a true alternative discourse to that of the regime since even the opposition media had to work within the parameters of an authoritarian system.¹¹⁴ Considering the Chilean media’s shift towards lighter topics since the democratic transition, Ramírez questions whether in contemporary Chile the media is responsible for setting the agenda, or whether they simply reflect the market’s demands. Given all of the evidence cited that

the economy, not political turbulence, now drives the media, it seems that the media have shied away from their agenda-setting potential and have instead opted to follow the pesos. As Colombian advocate of civic journalism Ana Maria Miralles argues, the media must “construct a strategic discourse that allows problems to be defined and included in the public agenda.”¹¹⁵

Dermota argues that economic and political pressures not only prevent the media from leveraging the amount of influence that they could within a democratic context, but that their amount of influence has decreased dramatically in the ten years of democracy, even as greater freedoms imply that the opposite should have occurred.

The fact that journalism at the end of the dictatorship was more pluralistic and perhaps even more suited for the democratic era than contemporary journalism indicates that journalists have sufficient talent and courage to play an important role in the promotion of democracy. But the media conglomerates and politicians disallow the possibility that the press would act as the Fourth Estate that advocates the good of the citizenry.¹¹⁶

Another critic of Chile's current media structure complains that that Chile, along with almost every Latin American country except Colombia and Argentina, has neglected to develop any kind of civic journalism in practice or even in theory, as only one university in all of Chile has made teaching civic journalism part of its degree program.¹¹⁷ And, he argues, in the current national situation in which universities fail to include the tenets of civic journalism in their professional development of journalists, newspapers are subject to the fickleness of publicity and the economy, ideological interests drive the groups that finance the media, and public shareholding in the media is absent, it is unlikely that a true civic journalism will ever develop.¹¹⁸

While most scholars involved in the debate about the role of Chile's media in the country's political arena agree that its civic character is found wanting, some still hold out hope for its political potential. Ramírez cites as a positive development the popularity of pseudo-investigative reports such as “Contacto” and “Informe” that air on public television stations and garner huge audiences.¹¹⁹ The development of new media such as the internet will also have important implications as candidates and ideologues harness this technology for their political purposes, much as television became an increasingly important political tool in Chile as it achieved greater acceptance of the thirty years of our study.

An idealistic Chilean journalism student holds out this same hope for his profession: “Civic journalism could develop in our country as a civil form

of democratization, a recovery of the public space that legitimately belongs to the public.”¹²⁰

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Footnotes

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³ Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan, “The Media in Democratic and Non-democratic Regimes: A Multilevel Perspective” in *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000), 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Carlos H. Filgueira and Dieter Nohlen, “La Prensa en los Procesos de Transición en Europa y América Latina,” in *Prensa y Transición Democrática: Europa y América Latina*, eds. Carlos Filgueira and Dieter Nohlen (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1994), 11. (Author’s translation)

⁶ Francisca Ortega Frei and Eduardo Saffirio Suarez, “Medios de comunicación: Nuevos agentes de intermediación política” in *Medios de Comunicación, Democracia y Poder*, eds. William Hofmeister and Josef Thesing (Buenos Aires: CIEDLA, 1995), 19.

⁷ Miguel Casas, Richard Cole, and Patricia Richardson, *Communication in Latin America: Journalism, Mass Media, and Society*, ed. Richard Cole (Wilmington: SR, 1996), xiii.

⁸ Denis McQuail, “Teoría social y evaluación del comportamiento de los medios de comunicación” in *La Prensa: Del autoritarismo a la libertad*, eds. Claudio Duran et al (Santiago: ILET, 1989), 22–3.

⁹ Gunther and Mughan, 7.

¹⁰ Frei and Saffirio Suárez, 24.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹² Sallie Hughes, “Culture Clash in the Newsroom: News Media Transformation in a Liberalizing Regime,” (Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association International Congress, Miami: 18 March 2000), 12–13.

¹³ John B. Thompson, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1995), 257.

¹⁴ Gunther and Mughan, 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Filgueira and Nohlen, 25.

¹⁷ Heriberto Muraro, *Políticos, periodistas y ciudadanos* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), 29 and 89.

¹⁸ Gunther and Mughan, 16–17.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Gunther and Mughan, 3.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

- ²² Denis McQuail, 18.
- ²³ Frei and Saffirio Suárez, 27.
- ²⁴ Guillermo Sunkel and Eugenio Tironi, "The Modernization of Communications: The Media in the Transition to Democracy in Chile" in *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000), 165.
- ²⁵ Louis W. Goodman, "Chilean Citizens and Chilean Democracy" in *Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2001), 209.
- ²⁶ Sergio Contardo Egaña et al, *La Prensa y los tribunales militares* (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1998), 8. (Author's translation)
- ²⁷ Guillermo Sunkel and Eugenio Tironi, "The Modernization of Communications: The Media in the Transition to Democracy in Chile," in *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000), 168.
- ²⁸ María Isabel Castillo and Elizabeth Lira, *Psicología de la Amenaza Política y el Miedo* (Santiago: ILAS, 1991), 99.
- ²⁹ Salvador Allende, *De cara a la verdad: Diálogos con la prensa* (Santiago: IELCO, 1993), 185. (Author's translation)
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 206.
- ³¹ Dermota, 47.
- ³² Tomás MacHale, *Poder político y comunicación en Chile: Marzo a Septiembre de 1973* (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1977), 59–60.
- ³³ Castillo and Lira, 91 (Author's translation).
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ³⁵ Dermota, 29–30.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 33–4.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 43.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 93. (Author's translation)
- ³⁹ It is worth mentioning that the United State's Central Intelligence Agency gave 1.6 million dollars to El Mercurio to run its negative campaign against the UP (Dermota, 49).
- ⁴⁰ Goodman, 212.
- ⁴¹ Dermota, 55. (Author's translation)
- ⁴² Giselle Munizaga, *Políticas de comunicación bajo regimenes autoritarios: El Caso de Chile*. (Santiago: CENECA, 1984), 14.
- ⁴³ El Mercurio 9/13/73, 8. (Author's translation) See Appendix for El Mercurio's and La Tercera's coverage of the coup d'etat and detentions of the UP "extremists."
- ⁴⁴ Contardo Egaña, 10–11.
- ⁴⁵ Dermota, 48.
- ⁴⁶ Castillo and Lira, 95.
- ⁴⁷ El Mercurio, 9/13/73, 8.
- ⁴⁸ Munizaga, 6. (Author's translation)
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.
- ⁵⁰ Arturo Navarro, "El Sistema de prensa bajo el regimen militar: 1973–1986" in *La Prensa: Del autoritarismo a la libertad*, eds. Claudio Duran, Fernando Reyes Matta, and Carlos Ruiz (Santiago: Tamarcos, 1989), 128.
- ⁵¹ Baltra Montaner, Lidia. *Atentados a la libertad de información y a los medios de comunicación en Chile: 1973–1987* (Santiago: CENECA, 1988), 12. (Author's translation)

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- ⁵³ Pablo Halpern et al., *Media Dependency and Political Perceptions in an Authoritarian Political System: The Case of Chile's Left* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993), 33.
- ⁵⁴ Gunther and Mughan, 22.
- ⁵⁵ Halpern, 3.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., 20.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., 28.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., 29.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., 32.
- ⁶⁰ Giselle Munizaga, *Políticas de comunicación bajo regimenes autoritarios: El Caso de Chile* (Santiago: CENECA, 1984), 24. (Author's translation)
- ⁶¹ Ibid., 36.
- ⁶² Ibid., 26.
- ⁶³ Ken Dermota, *Chile inédito: el periodismo bajo democracia* (Santiago: Ediciones B, 2002), 60.
- ⁶⁴ Arturo Navarro, "El Sistema de prensa bajo el regimen militar: 1973–1986" in *La Prensa: Del autoritarismo a la libertad*, eds. Claudio Duran, Fernando Reyes Matta, and Carlos Ruiz (Santiago: Tamarcos, 1989), 128–9.
- ⁶⁵ Munizaga, 31. (Author's translation)
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., 28. (Author's translation)
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., 32–3.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid., 25.
- ⁶⁹ Carlos Filgueira and Dieter Nohlen, "La Prensa en los Procesos de Transición en Europa y América Latina" in *Prensa y Transición Democrática: Europa y América Latina*, eds. Carlos Filgueira and Dieter Nohlen (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1994), 22. (Author's translation).
- ⁷⁰ Sergio Contardo Egaña et al, *La Prensa y los tribunales militares* (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1998), 25.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., 26–7. (Author's translation)
- ⁷² Navarro, 133.
- ⁷³ Dermota, 61.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid., 130. (Author's translation)
- ⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ Munizaga, 51. (Author's translation)
- ⁷⁸ Reyes Matta and Richards, 15. (Author's translation)
- ⁷⁹ Helen Hughes, personal interview (Santiago: July 7, 2003).
- ⁸⁰ Reyes Matta and Richards, 20. (Author's translation)
- ⁸¹ Ibid., 16. (Author's translation)
- ⁸² Ibid., 30.
- ⁸³ Arturo Navarro, 133. (Author's translation)
- ⁸⁴ Ibid., 130–1.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid., 132.
- ⁸⁶ Reyes Matta and Richards, 19. (Author's translation)
- ⁸⁷ Ibid., 30.
- ⁸⁸ Guillermo Sunkel and Eugenio Tironi, "The Modernization of Communications: The Media in the Transition to Democracy in Chile," in *Democracy and the Media: A*

Comparative Perspective, eds. Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000), 178.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 179.

⁹¹ Ibid., 180.

⁹² Ibid., 181.

⁹³ María Isabel Castillo and Elizabeth Lira, *Psicología de la Amenaza Política y el Miedo* (Santiago: ILAS, 1991), 162.

⁹⁴ Sunkel and Tironi, 183.

⁹⁵ *Reseña de Medios 24: Los Temas del debate* (Santiago: Secretaria de Comunicación y Cultura, 1994), 18.

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⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 170. (Author's translation)

⁹⁹ Ibid., 173. (Author's translation)

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 171. (Author's translation)

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 179.

¹⁰² Sunkel and Tironi, 186.

¹⁰³ Dermota, 72.

¹⁰⁴ Geofferoy and Sunkel, 116.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 114–5.

¹⁰⁶ Guillermo Sunkel, *La Prensa sensacionalista y los sectores populares* (Santiago: Norma, 2001), 101–2.

¹⁰⁷ Fernando Ramírez Morales, personal interview (Santiago: July 7, 2003). (Author's translation)

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. (Author's translation)

¹⁰⁹ Sunkel and Tironi, 190.

¹¹⁰ Francisca Ortega Frei, "Síntesis de la discusión: Medios de comunicación en la democratización," in *Los Medios de comunicación en Chile* (Santiago: KAS, 1999), 79.

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¹¹² Ken Dermota, *Chile inédito: el periodismo bajo democracia* (Santiago: Ediciones B, 2002), 193. (Author's translation)

¹¹³ Carlos H. Filgueira and Dieter Nohlen, "La prensa en los procesos de transición en Europa y América Latina" in *Prensa y Transición Democrática: Europa y América Latina*, eds. Carlos H. Filgueira and Dieter Nohlen (Madrid: Iberamericana, 1994), 25.

¹¹⁴ Giselle Munizaga, *Políticas de comunicación bajo regimenes autoritarios: El Caso de Chile*. (Santiago: CENECA, 1984), 51.

¹¹⁵ Ana María Miralles, *Periodismo, Opinión Pública, y Agenda Ciudadana* (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2001), 60. (Author's translation)

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Postscript

While I valued my semester in Chile at the time, now, two years later, I am ever more aware of the far-reaching benefits of having lived and studied abroad. The language skills, cultural sensitivity, and academic resourcefulness that I acquired while in Chile are everyday necessities at the SHOah Foundation. I matured both personally and intellectually during that semester, learning to maneuver in a wholly-different context than that which I had known. I plan to begin graduate school next year in order to build and draw upon the experiences of my semester abroad and to make new contributions to the fields of International Affairs and Latin American Studies. The aggregate product of my semester in Chile, however, is not quantifiable in terms of my personal character or by what I have to offer to employers or academia. I know that after spending a semester abroad I am changed, and for the better.