The US Occupation and Japan’s New Democracy

by Ruriko Kumano

Introduction

Education, in my view, is in part a process through which important national values are imparted from one generation to the next. I was raised in affluent postwar Japan, and schooled, like others of my generation, to despise the use of military force and every form of physical confrontation. The pacifist ideal of peace was taught as an overriding value. I was told that as long as Japan maintained its pacifism, the Japanese people would live in peace forever. My generation were raised without a clear sense of duty to defend our homeland—we did not identify such words as “patriotism,” “loyalty,” and “national defense” with positive values. Why? Postwar education in Japan, the product of the seven–year US occupation after WWII, emphasizes pacifism and democracy. I came to United States for my graduate studies in order to study how contemporary Japanese education has been shaped by the American occupation’s educational reforms.

During the US Occupation of Japan (1945–1952), a victorious America attempted to reform Japanese education by replacing Japan’s tradition system of values with one that promoted American democratic values. The United States had considered the source of Japan’s militarism to lie in the selfless loyalty and love of country that many older Japanese had valued. They wanted to replace these older values with new ones that would ensure a more pacifist outlook. Thus, in the name of democratization and pacification, Japan lost some important aspects of its cultural heritage. But why did the United States want to eliminate these natural sentiments from the Japanese psyche? And what was the cost of these changes?

This paper focuses on the first four months of the Occupation when Japan’s first postwar education minister, Maeda Tamon, attempted to change education in the direction of a new democratic Japan. Maeda, Japan’s preeminent liberal at the time, took the position of minister of education on August 18, 1945, before the Allied Occupation officially began. In his first two months, he quickly initiated a number of educational reforms without interference from American officials. He wanted these reforms not only to meet American expectations but also to preserve what he believed to be the unique aspect of Japanese culture—the emperor system. However, Maeda’s understanding of the word “democracy” differed dramatically from what America wanted, and this difference incited the US to intervene with a different set of educational reforms. This paper examines Maeda’s efforts, and the US reaction to them.

The Occupation

On July 26, 1945, the Allied powers, who were by this time absolutely certain of victory, issued the Potsdam Declaration which made the following demands on Imperial Japan: (1) punishment for “those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest,” (2) complete dismantlement of Japan’s war–making powers, and (3) establishment of “freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights.”

The Potsdam Declaration was unambiguous—the Allied powers urged the Japanese to surrender unconditionally now or face “utter destruction.” But because it failed to specify the fate of the emperor, the Japanese government feared that surrender might end the emperor’s life. The Japanese government chose to respond with “mokusatsu”—a deliberately vague but fateful word that literally means “kill by silence”— until the Allied powers guaranteed the emperor’s safety.

Unfortunately, the Allied powers interpreted Japanese silence, with tragic consequences, as a rejection of the declaration. President Harry S. Truman issued an order to drop the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945; two hundred thousand died. On August 8, the Soviet Union, which had maintained a neutrality pact with Japan, saw a chance to expand its territorial possessions and declared war. Nearly one million Soviet troops crossed the Siberian border into Manchuria (Manchuko) and began massacring Japanese soldiers and civilians. On August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, killing one hundred and twenty thousand. On August 15, 1945, the emperor’s own voice, broadcast over the radio, urged his loyal subjects to surrender.

A vanquished Japan was to be occupied by the Allied powers “until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration [were] achieved.” President Truman designated US Army General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Thus, MacArthur was granted absolute power over Japan, though in effect he used the Japanese government to rule the nation.

Ostensibly, the Allied powers jointly occupied Japan, but it was the United States that in reality monopolized every sphere of influence. When Britain and the Soviet Union also insisted on participating in the Occupation, the United States grudgingly agreed to establish the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. The Far Eastern Commission met regularly in Washington to guide MacArthur in matters of basic policy. The Allied Council for Japan—composed of representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the British Commonwealth—also conferred regularly in Tokyo to supervise MacArthur. However, the various members of this bickering multinational body could seldom agree, and they were, in any case, powerless to act without United States’ approval.

The United States wanted to make sure that Japan would never again threaten the national security of neighboring Asian countries and the interests of the United States. American officials believed that for Japan to become a peace–loving member of the world...
community, it had to be transformed into a democratic country—a change that required not only dismantling Japan’s prewar political system but also effecting a complete reorientation of the thinking and values of the Japanese people. MacArthur and his staff in Tokyo (collectively called GHQ) understood the immensity of their task; after all, reforms would have lasting power only if Japanese citizens understood them, embraced them, and passed them on to the next generation. MacArthur believed he first had to destroy what lay at the foundation of Japan’s nationalistic militarism: passionate patriotism based on the belief that the emperor was the divine father to the Japanese people. A new foundation—democracy— would be laid through educational reform.

Maeda Tamon Becomes Minister of Education

On August 15, 1945, Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro announced that Japan had accepted the unconditional surrender under one condition: that the emperor continues to rule Japan. Accordingly, Education Minister Ota Kozo issued special instructions to prefectural governors and school principals stating that people should devote their hearts and souls to “guarding the fundamental character of the Japanese Empire” because only such an attitude would show fidelity to the emperor. Following Japan’s surrender, the Japanese government attempted to maintain social cohesion by trying to preserve kokutai (national polity, i.e., the emperor system). Prince Higashikuni Naruhiiko, the first postwar prime minister, formed a cabinet on August 17, 1945, and appointed Maeda Tamon to be the first postwar education minister.

The Prime Minister Higashikuni announced that his cabinet’s mission was three-fold: to maintain kokutai, to comply with the Potsdam Declaration, and to observe the Imperial Rescript on Surrender which Emperor Hirohito announced on the radio on August 15, 1945. The entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishable beauty of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it… foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so as ye may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial state and keep pace with the progress of the world.

This rescript, unofficially the emperor’s wish for his subjects, served as the fundamental policy for the postwar Japanese government. Education Minister Maeda applied the government policy to his educational policy and announced it at a press conference on August 18.

The foundation of Japanese education cannot exist without the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education. MacArthur’s policy was to continue this prewar educational purpose. While the Japanese government was determined to preserve the emperor system and its educational philosophy, MacArthur had a plan to eliminate both.

MacArthur’s Plans for Spiritual Disarmament

While MacArthur was well informed about US policy, his decisions during the Occupation were largely based on his staff’s advice. His most trusted advisor, Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, had been MacArthur’s military secretary and the chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch since 1943.

Fellers’ perceptions of Japanese personalities during the war formed Japan’s postwar reform plan. Less than one month before Japan’s surrender, Feller’s Psychological Warfare Branch published a report entitled “Youth: Pawn of the Militarists,” which explained that Shinto, Japan’s indigenous religion, was the spiritual foundation for emperor worship. The report quoted Daniel C. Holtom, a prominent expert on Shinto.

Psychological disarmament of Japan will be confronted by the fact that in the schools and other agencies of official propaganda there exists a definite Shinto education inimical to the peace of the world.

Holtom emphasized the connection between Shinto and Japanese nationalism and interpreted the wartime rhetoric of Shinto as the engine of war—a view that was highly influential in the Occupation’s response to Shinto. At MacArthur’s headquarters in the Philippines, Fellers submitted a memorandum, dated August 15, 1945, for establishing the Information Dissemination Section, which was to 1) encourage cooperation from the Japanese, 2) “assist in orderly transition from war to peace,” and 3) assist in removing the influence of militarism and “Japanese concepts which oppose democratic principles.” Before leaving for Japan, MacArthur authorized the plan and appointed Feller the chief of the section.

On August 30, General MacArthur arrived on the Atsugi Airfield near Yokohama. On September 2, 1945, the Japanese delegates signed the terms of the surrender on the USS Missouri, which was stationed in Tokyo Bay. MacArthur said that the Occupation was the “opportunity” for “a race, long stunted by ancient concepts of mythological teaching,” that needed to be uplifted by “practical demonstrations of Christian ideals.” MacArthur ruled Japan with evangelistic fervor.

Maeda Begins His Reforms

During the first few months of the Occupation, MacArthur let the Ministry of Education initiate reforms “unless and until this prove[s] to be ineffective or insincere.”
Maeda recalled:

For about a month following my appointment as Minister of Education, we were permitted a comparatively free hand, with a minimum of restraints being employed, due largely to the fact that the Occupation authorities themselves had at this time not yet completely established their own policy.  

Soon after the Occupation began, Bonner Fellers requested a meeting with Maeda.  Maeda later wrote about the interview: He asked me where attention ought to be centered in the field of education. I replied that I wished to give most attention to establishing Civics education throughout the period of compulsory education and throughout the higher schools, and added that unfortunately there was in the Japanese language no word exactly suitable for translating “Civics.”

Fellers agreed with him and said, “Please proceed with it.”

On September 15, 1945, Maeda issued “The Educational Plan for Building the New Japan,” the first comprehensive policy on Japanese education; it reflected both the Japanese cabinet’s policy as well as his own ideas for postwar Japan. The main policies were as follows:

1. The maintenance of the structure of the Imperial State
2. Compliance with the Imperial Rescript on Surrender
3. The promotion of scientific education
4. The creation of a peaceful state by eliminating all militaristic thoughts
5. The construction of a new ethical Japan through the cultivation of religious sensibilities
6. The improvement of culture through a comprehensive program of adult education.

Maeda did not forget to reemphasize the importance of preserving kokutai: “[E]fforts will be made for safeguarding and maintaining the structure of the Imperial State.” Indeed earlier, on September 9, he had given a speech that was broadcast on the radio in which he said,

The real strength of Japan’s national polity was revealed at the end of the war: Once the emperor called for stopping the war, the Japanese followed the emperor’s order despite differences in opinions. Thus, the most important thing we have to keep in mind was to guard our kokutai.

In order to balance the old with the new, Maeda established as a top priority “the advancement of scientific education.” It was an obvious reaction to the American use of the atomic bombs, which had exposed the scientific gap between the two countries. Hiding the political reason for his preoccupation with science education, Maeda urged that Japan “should root its foundation in an eternal search for truth, in purely scientific thoughts.” He lamented that “recent moral decay (among the Japanese people) had to be remedied by our sincere obedience to the Rescript on Education.”

After all, the document claimed that the harmonious relationship among the people and their loyalty to the emperor were the most important virtues for happiness and the prosperity of Japan.

**Maeda as a “Liberal” Japanese**

US State Department officials trusted Maeda as a “liberal” and expected him to carry out radical reforms in line with American objectives. Charles A. Beard, a prominent historian, wrote a letter on August 19, 1945, to President Truman’s White House secretary in which he mentioned his 1922 meeting with Maeda in Japan. He praised Maeda as “a friend of the United States” and suggested that the liaison officer between MacArthur’s staff and the Ministry of Education obtain information about Maeda’s character and history. The White House forwarded the letter to the State Department and the War Department. It turned out that GHQ’s first chief educational officer, Harold Henderson, was already well acquainted with Maeda. Prior to the war, until it started in 1941, Maeda was director of the Japan Institute and of the Japanese Cultural Library in New York, where Henderson, a professor of Japanese at Columbia University, was a frequent visitor.

During the war, Henderson had been a specialist in propaganda leaflets and a member of Bonner Fellers’ leaflet executive committee in the Southwest Pacific campaigns. Fellers selected Henderson to be a member of the Information Dissemination Section and assigned him with the task of making contact with his prewar Japanese friends.

Soon after Maeda’s educational policies were publicized on September 15, Henderson, now chief of GHQ’s Educational Section, informed Maeda that he, Henderson, would be a liaison between the Ministry of Education and GHQ. Referring to the newspaper accounts on Maeda’s policies, Henderson said that GHQ was satisfied with Maeda’s plan and encouraged him to continue his work in the same direction. Henderson also told Maeda that GHQ did not intend to issue directives pertaining to education but rather to handle everything by means of personal conferences between the two of them.

On September 22, 1945, the Information Dissemination Section was reorganized as the Civil Information and Education Section (CI & E). Colonel (soon Brigadier General) Ken Dyke became the head of CI & E and put Henderson in charge of the Division of Education, Religion, and Monuments. Dyke and Henderson preferred to work behind the scenes with Maeda, whom Henderson trusted to take the proper initiative as a Japanese liberal. Henderson told Maeda about what SCAP and the US government wanted to be done in the schools and asked him to make his own decisions.

**Differences Emerge**

On October 4, 1945, SCAP issued the Civil Liberties Directive and ordered the Japanese government to abrogate “restrictions
on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government. 

MacArthur also ordered the Japanese government to release political prisoners, the majority of whom were hardcore socialists or communists, whom the Japanese government considered the destroyers of kokutai. This directive shocked the Higashikuni cabinet. The next day, the Higashikuni cabinet resigned because it failed to comprehend the Allied demands.

It was urgent for the Japanese government to find leading figures "who could work in harmony with" SCAP and who would be able to fathom SCAP’s expectations. The incumbent Japanese leaders proposed to MacArthur that Shidehara Kijuro, a 73-year-old former foreign minister (1929–31) known to be a pacifist, become the next prime minister. MacArthur approved the recommendation that Shidehara form a cabinet in which Maeda would remain as the education minister because Maeda was considered “a political liberal.” The new cabinet declared that “democratic politics” be established. This was the Japanese government’s first use of the term “democracy.” Shidehara stated that Japanese politics had respected the people’s will, as evidenced in the first provision of the Charter Oath of 1868, which the Emperor Meiji had declared as the basic policy of the newly established nation. “Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion.” Shidehara added that “based on this spirit of the Charter Oath, the Japanese government aimed to establish democratic politics by respecting people’s basic rights and recovering completely freedom of speech, assembly, and association.”

Maeda also started to use the word “democracy,” by which he meant that “sovereignty resides in His Majesty. We, subjects, have been allowed to participate in the governing of the Empire….This is a special nature of the Japanese-style democracy.” In Maeda’s “Japanese-style democracy,” loyalty and patriotism were still encouraged.

We must respect our indigenous values: loyalty and patriotism. These values will be truly fulfilled with the development and perfection of democracy, which is based on respect for individuality. It seems loyalty, patriotism, and democracy are incompatible, but they are actually ostensibly supportive of each other. Democratic education has to be based on Japanese indigenous culture.

Maeda’s idea of democracy was a desperate attempt to hold on to the imperial rule while complying with the Allied demand for popular sovereignty and power.

One week after the issue of the Civil Liberty Directive, MacArthur demanded specific reforms from the Shidehara cabinet in a “Statement to the Japanese Government Concerning Required Reforms,” in which MacArthur aimed at education:

The opening of the schools to more liberal education—that the people may shape their future progress from factual knowledge and benefit from an understanding of a system under which government becomes the servant rather than the master of the people.

MacArthur’s demand indicated that Maeda’s “Japanese-style democracy,” in which the emperor was the ruler, was far from the American-style democracy of popular sovereignty.

**US Evaluation of Maeda’s Reforms**

The Research and Analysis (R & A) Branch of the State Department scrutinized Maeda’s reforms in a report dated October 5, 1945. Maeda’s reforms had three areas of focus: “preservation of the national polity, expansion of scientific education, and elimination of military training and wartime doctrines.” Although appealing words such as “science,” “non-military,” and “peace” were integral to Maeda’s reform policy, R & A dismissed Maeda’s gesture as being “only the use of other expressions to describe the same situation.” If Maeda truly intended to change education, why had he not yet come up with a proposal to “revise the courses in Japanese ethics and history” by eliminating doctrines that had been “the backbone of nationalist education”? R & A concluded that Japanese policymakers would continue to perpetuate “the philosophy of militant nationalism” to the detriment of American policy and feared that such a conservative view would be a formidable obstacle to freedom of education as well as to the elimination of the “religio–nationalist interpretation of Japanese mythology and the glorification of militarism” from educational curricula. It recommended the use of “external pressures” or the “force of combined student–faculty demands.” Otherwise, it foresaw no real change.

**Direct Action from the GHQ**

Henderson visited Maeda once again in mid-October and told him that “The other day…we agreed to let everything connected with education be carried out by conferences between us, but Washington now says that such a casual arrangement will never do.” With apologies, Henderson handed him an outline of the directive of October 22, 1945, which ordered not only that educational content, personnel, and facilities be critically examined in accordance with the Occupation’s specified policies but also that the Ministry of Education submit reports “describing in detail all action taken to comply with the provisions” of the directive. A week later, SCAP issued the October 30, 1945, directive, which established the procedures for purging undesirable teachers.

**The United States Launches the Spiritual Disarmament of the Japanese**

On December 15, 1945, MacArthur prohibited the dissemination of Shinto doctrines and other religions in all educational institutions supported by public funds. He also banned “Kokutai no Hongi” (The Cardinal Principles of Kokutai), published by the Ministry of Education in 1937, which defined the principles of national polity. The Ministry of Education complied with the Shinto directives, with one exception; the prohibition on shrine worship did not explicitly include the Imperial Palace, so pupils and teachers
continued to line up and bow deeply in the palace’s direction.\textsuperscript{79} This deliberate flouting of SCAP’s directives only increased the severity of American reforms.

On December 31, 1945, SCAP issued the fourth directive, which prohibited \textit{shushin} (teaching morals), Japanese history, and geography in school until SCAP granted resumption.\textsuperscript{80} The last blow came when Emperor Hirohito denied his divinity in his New Year’s Day address.

The ties between us and our people…do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine…. Love of the family and love of the country are especially strong in this country. With more of this devotion should we now work towards love of mankind\textsuperscript{81}

MacArthur, relieved to see Japan’s “pagan” belief system rectified, commented that the emperor’s statement pleased him because the emperor undertook “a leading part in the democratization of his people. He squarely takes his stand for the future along liberal lines.”\textsuperscript{82}

It was actually Maeda who wrote the emperor’s statement.\textsuperscript{83} On December 23, 1945, Prime Minister Shidehara told Maeda that an influential American urged him to have the emperor issue a statement disavowing the emperor’s divinity.\textsuperscript{84} Shidehara asked Maeda to prepare the emperor’s address.\textsuperscript{85} Concurring with the idea, Maeda said to Shidehara that after the surrender, people were lethargic and did not know what they should do, so it would be good for the emperor to sweep away the mysterious clouds about him and declare that he was with the people.\textsuperscript{86} Maeda had expressed his opinion on this issue during a Diet session at the beginning of December 1945 when one diet member asked Education Minister Maeda whether or not the emperor was \textit{kami} (“god”), Maeda answered:

There is a difference between “kami” in Japanese and “god” in English. I think that Japanese “kami” is not equivalent to the Christian concept of “God” as the Almighty and the Creator. Although Japanese “kami” includes divinity, its emphasis is more on having the highest position. If you ask me whether the emperor is “god” in the Western sense, the emperor is not. But if “kami” is strictly interpreted in Japanese concept from ancient time, the emperor is a “kami.”\textsuperscript{87}

On January 4, 1946, Maeda reassured the prefectural governors and the heads of all schools that the Emperor’s “human declaration” did not change the relationship between the emperor and his subjects.

The unique relationship between the Sovereign and his subjects in our country does not consist in imaginary myths and legends…we may realize the close relationship between the Sovereign and his subjects; that is, the Sovereign and his subjects belong to one family. I am deeply impressed by the magnanimity of His Majesty’s will and our desire to serve him devotedly cannot but be augmented ever more.\textsuperscript{88}

That same day, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to dissolve “militaristic and ultra–nationalistic organizations” and to remove all elements undesirable for the growth of democracy from government and other public offices.\textsuperscript{89} This directive hit the Shidehara cabinet hard since some cabinet members, including Maeda, came under the categories mentioned in the directive.\textsuperscript{90} When he was governor of Niigata prefecture during the war, Maeda held the post of branch chief of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which in the directive was categorized as “militaristic nationalism and aggressive influential terroristic or secret patriotic society.”\textsuperscript{91}

Although some US officials in the State Department were reluctant to purge him, Maeda had to go.\textsuperscript{92} Given Maeda’s consistent adherence to the status quo, he was not popular among the Occupation authorities. For example, Elliott R. Thorpe, the former chief of counter-intelligence for MacArthur, stated, “We made the mistake of initially using a reactionary named Maeda as education minister.”\textsuperscript{93} Maeda formally resigned from the cabinet on January 13, 1946, and was forbidden to hold a public office for five years.\textsuperscript{94}

\textbf{Conclusion}

During the first few months of the Occupation, SCAP carefully watched the Japanese government–initiated reforms while preparing to implement its own policies. Maeda was a touchstone for SCAP to see what a “liberal” Japanese would do. Ultimately, Maeda’s addresses and reforms revealed that his concept of democracy was far from that of the United States. What Maeda wished to keep—the emperor system and people’s loyalty to the emperor—was what the United States wanted to remove. Concluding that the Japanese government did not understand democracy and that the Japanese could not change from within, SCAP issued directives that destroyed everything Maeda so ardently wanted to keep intact.

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**NEWSPAPERS**
Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo)
Nippon Times (Tokyo)

**ENDNOTES**
1 Throughout the paper, I have followed the Japanese convention in which the family name precedes the given name (thus, for example, Maeda’s full name is Maeda Tamon). This rule is reversed in identifying the authors of publications: I followed the Western order for authors of all publications both in English and Japanese.
2 For a full text, see SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, 2: 413.
3 SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, 2: 413.
4 Peter Duus, Modern Japan, 2nd ed., 245.
6 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 30; Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey, 325.
7 Duus, Modern Japan, 247.
8 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 1.
9 James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State to Max Grassli, Charge d’Affaires ad interim of Switzerland, “Reply by Secretary of State to Japanese Qualified Acceptance” August 11, 1945 in Political Reorientation of Japan, 2: 415.
10 James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State to Max Grassli, Charge d’Affaires ad interim of Switzerland, “Secretary of State Byrnes’ Reply of August 14, 1945” in Political Reorientation of Japan, 2: 418; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 32.
14 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 147.

16 Prime Minister Higashikuni’s press interview in Asahi Shim bun, August 30, 1945; Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 146.

17 “Mr. Maeda Tamon, as Education Minister,” Asahi Shim bun, August 19, 1945.

18 Prime Minister Higashikuni’s press interview in Asahi Shim bun, August 30, 1945.


20 Asahi Shim bun, August 19, 1945, quoted in Eichi Suzuki, Kyoiku gyosei, 160. (My translation).

21 Kobayashi, Society, Schools, and Progress in Japan, 54.


23 For objectives and actual activities of the Psychological Warfare Branch, see Bonner F. Fellers, “Forward” to United States, Army Forces, Pacific, Psychological Warfare Branch, OMS, GHQ, PWB: Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area (1945), Pacific Rare Folio, Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at Manoa.

24 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, 280.


29 Nippon Times, August 29, 1945; Orr, “Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan,” 76.

30 “Instrument of Surrender” in Political Reorientation of Japan, 2: 419.


32 Arundel Del Re and M. A. Piacentini to SCAP, GHQ, CI&E, “Preliminary Report on Measures Pertaining to the Cultural Re—education of Japan” October 3, 1945, p.1; box 20, Joseph C. Trainor papers, Hoover Institution Archives. A CI & E report stated that “directives are used only when it is judged that Japanese efforts are out of line with or controvert general Occupational policies” in SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, 1:136.


36 Tamon Maeda “Seiji to minshushugi [Politics and democracy]” in Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito, 100–101.


40 Asahi Shim bun, September 10, 1945; Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito, pp.67–74. (My translation).


42 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 161.

43 Tamon Maeda, “Seinen gakuto ni tsugu [Message for the youth],” in Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito, 73, quoted in Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 162.


46 Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 116, notes 79 (Mayo quoted Beard’s letter that Maeda “had been converted to Christianity by a Quaker missionary in Japan and was active in Christian work” p.116). However, I have not encountered any documents that substantiate the fact that Maeda converted to Christianity.)


49 Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 147; Research and Analysis Branch, “Analysis of the Shidehara Cabinet,” p. 5.

50 Maeda Tamon, Sanso seishi, 216; Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 84.
51 Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 84.
56 Mayo, “Psychological Disarmament,” 91.
57 Political Reorientation of Japan, 2: 463–465.
58 Henry Oinas–Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility, 16.
61 Research and Analysis Branch, “Analysis of Shidehara Cabinet,” October 12, 1945, p.5.
62 “Prime Minister Shidehara declared his administrative policies,” Asahi Shimbun, October 10, 1945.
63 “Prime Minister Shidehara declared his administrative policies,” Asahi Shimbun, October 10, 1945.
65 “Prime Minister Shidehara declared his administrative policies,” Asahi Shimbun, October 10. 1945. (My translation).
66 Maeda’s speech on October 15, in Sengo nihon kyoku shiryo shusei vol.1, Haisen to kyoku no minshaka (Tokyo: Sanichi shobo, 1982), 123. (My translation).
67 Tamon Maeda, Sanso seisshi, 40. (My translation).
69 United States, Department of States, Interim Research and Intelligence, Research and Analysis Branch, “Japanese Post-War Education Policies,” October 5, 1945, p.1, File 097.3 Z1092 No. 3266 in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part II Postwar Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia.
71 “Japanese Post–War Education in Japan,” p. 3.
72 “Japanese Post–War Education in Japan,” p. 3.
74 Maeda, “The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan,” 415.
75 Maeda, “The Direction of Postwar Education in Japan,” 415.
77 SCAP, CI & E, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, 2: 29–30; Japan’s Modern Educational System, 229.
79 Nishi, Unconditional Democracy, 171.
80 Japan’s Modern Educational System, 229–230; Education in the New Japan, 2: 36–39
82 “General MacArthur’s Comment on Imperial Rescript of January 1, 1946,” in SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, 2: 471.
83 The principle source here is Tamon Maeda “Ningen sengen no uchi soto” [Inside and Outside the Human declaration] in Maeda Tamon sono bun so no hito, 75–87.
84 Mr. R.H. Blyth, a professor at the Gakushuin (the Peers School) and a tutor of the crown Prince, acted as informal liaison between the Imperial Household and CI & E, GHQ. See Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952, 265, 317–319; Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy, 237.
85 Maeda, Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito, 76.
86 Maeda, Maeda Tamonsono bun sono hito, 77.
87 Maeda, Maeda Tamon sono bun sono hito, 82.
88 Education in the New Japan, 2: 157–158.
92 Mayo stated that Gordon T. Bowles, the author of the US educational reform plan, had “confidence in Maeda’s essential liberalism and was critical of the latter decision to purge him” in Mayo, Psychological Disarmament, 116.
94 Mieko Kamiya to Hidefumi Kurosawa, September 15, 1974, a letter in Hidefumi Kurosawa, Sengo kyoku no genrju o motomete, 228.