ARTS-BASED RESEARCH: TROJAN HORSES AND SHIBBOLETHS

THE LIABILITIES OF A HYBRID RESEARCH APPROACH. WHAT HATH EISNER WROUGHT?

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The term “arts-based research” has been debated for some time now. In an article strongly in favor of this approach Bean (2007) identifies three species: “Research on the arts (italics in the original) (art history, visual and cultural studies, media studies etc.)...Research for the arts, refers to research into applied techniques, materials and tools used in the creation of art...Research in the arts, or practice-based research…” (p. 81). Bean continues:

not surprisingly, it is this definition and approach to research that has created both enthusiasm and debate within the annals of scholarly research. It is also a more radical intervention into the more traditional and limiting research methodologies that do not seek to …challenge the held assumptions of the scholarly research practice in the academy (p. 81).

In this essay I propose to continue the debate on the third species of arts-based research by pointing out that there is a fundamental disjunction between the research that artists
do and the research that social scientists do, and that to call both activities “research” does a disservice to both groups of practitioners. The ultimate irony is that although arts-based research is supposed to question the standard scholarly research practice of the academy, it originated in that very same academy. I support my claim with reference to the foundational work of Eisner.

I suggest that Eisner envisioned and promoted the model of arts-based research not so much as a subversion of scholarly research practice, but as a way of helping fine arts practitioners and educators to achieve legitimacy in the academy. Eisner’s benign intention may well have been to promote the arts in the academy and perhaps to spearhead an invasion, by the arts, of the social sciences. In other words, his suggestion that the arts be used as a form of inquiry in the social sciences was a way of conquering new disciplinary territory for art educators and fine artists. The advance guard of this invasion force were research projects that purported to be “research” but were sometimes just “art.” I refer to such projects as “Trojan horses.”

Another abuse typical of arts-based research (though not restricted to it entirely) is the coining of phrases and terms that help to identify tribal allegiances. So, for example, use of a term such as “visual culture” has invariably set off turf wars as different interest groups vie for sole possession (see Efland, 2004). Such contested terms I refer to as “shibboleths”: tell-tale terms that immediately separate one group from another.

The practice of normative science

A key idea in the discussion that follows is that the term “research” is grounded in normative science and is founded on a positivistic epistemology. This is my reference point for the legitimate use of the term “research.” Science is cumulative, fallible, always tentative, but governed by method and must always satisfy its audience with demonstrable evidence. This evidence is collected via a process called research. A very useful thumbnail definition of normative science is provided by van den Berg (1996).
The traditional liberal case for dialogue as a way to resolve differences of opinion rests on the notion of Reason, an attribute supposedly shared by all humans. By virtue of this shared attribute we are able to argue out points of disagreement with one another and, in some cases reach a consensus that rests neither on force nor fraud, nor on any appeals to a Higher Authority. In a few instances these consensuses came to be so widely accepted as to be well-nigh universal. This does not mean... that they were in any sense written in stone. Rather it meant that, for the time being, virtually all those consulted were in agreement. In fact, in some domains widely accepted routines and procedures were worked out, always tentative agreements themselves, for amending, adjusting or overturning such universal consensus. Let us call the collection of such substantive and procedural agreements “science” (p. 6).

**The practice of art**

The practice of art and science differ in important ways: where science relies on method and evidence, the arts are not so constrained. Where science is forbidden the use of force or fraud, the arts sometimes stray into this area as a way of establishing credibility.

It is abundantly clear that the practice of the arts requires great discipline and the application of rational thought to solve the artist’s self-selected problems. I do not subscribe to the notion of the artist as an emotive neurotic. The artist uses rationality to solve problems, and to synthesize and analyze information. However, our expectations of, and interactions with the artistic product ought to be very different from our expectations of the fruits of science.

Significantly, the practitioners of normative science build very directly on the work of those who went before. As Newton said, “If I see so far, it is because I am standing on the shoulders of giants.” This is not the case for artists. Where the Newtonian model was superseded by Einstein’s vision, relativity is now challenged by String theory. But this is not what happens in the arts. In fact, it is meaningless to talk about “progress” or cumulative developments in the arts, for Bach coexists with...
Coltrane, and John Cage is not an improvement or a negation of Mozart. Art is not “progressive”; artworks exist within an inclusive universe where appropriations take place, but no author “disproves” another, no visual artist “falsifies” the work of another.

Above all, when we respond to an artwork, we do not ask, “Why should I believe this?” in the same way that we do when a physicist tells us that the building blocks of the physical world are made up largely of empty space. We give assent to scientific findings through the cogency of the argument that is made and the sort of proof offered by the researcher, in the assurance that the researcher has used the methods prescribed by the scientific community. When we respond to an artwork, we do not care too much about the methods used. The main issue is simply, does the work move us, get us to think, or elucidate something in the world or in our souls? Rembrandt makes no propositional claims about human life, but he does succeed in many cases in touching us and adding to our understanding of human fate. Toni Morrison does not present an empirical thesis on the vicissitudes of race; she plunges us into an experience, which may or may not give us the feel and smell of a certain kind of fate. Artists prove nothing rigorously or scientifically, and are not expected to do so. They are free to persuade, to seduce, to frighten and annoy, and they can use whatever procedural means they wish.

Scientists and researchers are in the business of demonstrating and convincing their audiences using conventional, agreed-upon methods. Some of their theories may aggravate and astound, but that is not their principal aim. The aim of research is to arrive at increasingly accurate descriptions of phenomena, and increasingly accurate predictions about the way the world works—and will work—and among the objects of scientific study are human beings.

**Definitions of key terms:**
*Shibboleth, Trojan horse Shibboleth.*

A Shibboleth is a device for distinguishing one in-group member from another. The original story is in the Old Testament. Shibboleth is the test word used by the men of Gilead to iden-
tify the escaping Ephraimites, who pronounced the initial (sh) as (s): “Then said they unto him, ‘Say now Shibboleth’ and he said, ‘Sibboleth’ for he could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him” (Judges 12:4-6).

Thus, by extension, a shibboleth is any term or concept which establishes a rupture between groups. Doris Salcedo’s recent show at the London Tate Gallery, dramatizes the essentially divisive effect of a shibboleth. The artist calls her work Shibboleth and it consists of a long crack in the floor of a gallery. The crack effectively divides spectators into two camps.

There are as many abstract shibboleths as concrete ones. In art education, a common shibboleth nowadays is the idea that popular culture should be the basis for art education in the schools. This has created some interesting fault lines between the so-called elitists such as Smith (1991), who cling to notions of excellence in art, and the populists, such as Tavin, who deny the long-held distinction between “high art” and popular art and who lump all visual materials together as products of culture. Another preeminent shibboleth in art education is the acceptance and use of postmodern terminology. The occurrence of such terms in an academic paper will help to establish for the reader to which of many possible tribes the writer belongs.

**Example of shibboleths in art education literature:**

*Tavin’s attack on the use of the term “aesthetic.”*

We find a clear instance of a shibboleth in art education discourse, in Tavin’s (2007) take-no-prisoners critique of the term “aesthetic.” Though he is not writing about arts-based research per se, I would be surprised if he did not embrace the notion of unseating the hoary old traditions of social science research and replacing them with a more inclusive paradigm of research, one that empowers the irrational as well as the rational investigator. As a way of clearing the decks for a new world order, he mounts a full-bore attack on the term “aesthetic.” He suggests that from here on in, if one uses the term at all, one should write it with a line through it—“aesthetic”–so as to indicate to the reader that the term is “under erasure” for unimaginable sins against the common good, “…ensuring
that it never speaks for itself…” (p. 43) and thereby facilitating the emancipation of our students from centuries of tyranny. (Alas, there does not seem to be any way of making the same point in spoken discourse.)

Tavin sets himself up as St. George, and his dragon is that ancient monster, the term “aesthetic.” Tavin delivers a punishing attack on its advocates, accusing them of everything from elitism to aiding and abetting the institutions of class privilege and colonialism. Given the trailing tentacles of malignancy that attend on this term, those delusional folks who still use it need to turn from the path of perdition, says Tavin, and frame the word in such a way that its evil influence is neutralized:

the discourse of aesthetics as a good, useful and necessary component of art education is a self-legitimating magic show, and the idea that we can simply cleanse the term of its unwanted muck and use it whatever way we want is a tautological illusion (p. 43).

Tavin’s exhortation to the masses of art educators, his suggestion that when using the term we always write it in the fashion he prescribes, turns the shibboleth into something more—a talisman, in fact, a magical object that defends the person against evil influences. “Aesthetic” works against postmodern heresy in the same way that a crucifix works against a vampire; the old guard aestheticians will utter cries of pain as they are forced to look on the mark of the risen postmodernist. Tavin’s newly minted shibboleth serves the function of any such device. It sorts everyone into two camps: the true believers and the apostates, and it makes it possible to tell at a glance how and if the ranks of the “true believers” are growing or not. To date, I have not seen much indication in the literature that Tavin’s mystic sign has many adherents.

**Trojan horse.**

Homer tells how the Greeks made a show of leaving the besieged city of Troy. Behind them they left a huge horse made of wood. The Trojans were heartened to see the Greeks leave and in their celebrations, dragged the great horse inside the gates of Troy. That night, the Greek soldiers hidden inside
emerged, and initiated the fall of the city. Thus, a Trojan horse is any construction which appears to be one thing, but is, in fact, another: a trap, a cunning device which effectively destroys those who accept it on the basis of its superficial qualities.

**Example: Sokal’s social theory “horse” containing within it, an enraged physicist.**

The prize for the best and most effective academic Trojan horse goes to Sokal (1996), a physicist. He published an article, “The transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity,” in the prestigious journal *Social Text*, a journal that prided itself on the publication of current, cutting-edge articles on social theory and literary criticism. Sokal’s argument was staunchly anti-positivist. He maintained that due to the intellectual hegemony of Enlightenment thinkers, we run the risk of believing in the existence of an observable “real” world. He cited Lacan, Lyotard and Kristeva lavishly and used their impenetrable prose to support the argument that objective knowledge of the physical world is simply a foolish conceit—a product of the benighted positivists. Sokal also used his background as a physicist to support his argument. Once *Social Text* had published the work, he informed them that the article was nonsense from start to finish, especially his discussion of physics.

How had Sokal succeeded so well in making such a desirable hollow horse? He had done three things: one, he had used the jargon of physics and mathematics (in a meaningless fashion as it turns out) but the editors and reviewers, not being informed on this topic, had not caught wind of this subterfuge and had been impressed by his rigor. Two, he had invoked many of the great figures of postmodernism in support of his argument. And three, he had energetically attacked the arch enemies of postmodernism: the Enlightenment, positivism, and rationality. What made the success of his attack all the sweeter was that he was, apparently, a “convert” to postmodernism, a sinner come to the path of righteousness, one who accepted the dogmas and high priests of postmodernism, after a life of sin as a scientist.
Sokal constructed his devastating trap because he was increasingly disturbed by the prevailing view in social theory circles that all forms of knowledge and methodological investigation were simply a set of unique discourses, each of which was as credible as any other. This sort of irrationalism disturbed Sokal greatly, as he was (and is) a positivist who believes in the scientific method and who cannot swallow the radical relativism that underlies much of what passes for postmodern thought. In addition, he was upset by the mindless way that the great French intellectuals (Baudrillard, Deleuze, Guattari and Lyotard) used scientific concepts and principles without understanding them.

Sokal designed his Trojan horse as a way of sending some crack troops into what he considered a bastion of intellectual swindlers. The effects of this careful prank created widespread embarrassment for the journal and for its adherents. All this must have been highly satisfying to Sokal, who, a year later co-authored a book that further developed his argument against relativism, postmodernism and the irrational veneration of abstruse theory.

Pollitt (1996), writing in The Nation magazine, explains how it was that the editors and the reviewers for Social Text came to publish Sokal’s article.

Indeed, the comedy of the Sokal incident is that it suggests that even the postmodernists don’t really understand one another’s writing and make their way through the text by moving from one familiar name or notion to the next like a frog jumping across a murky pond by way of lily pads: ‘Lacan… performativity… Judith Butler… scandal… (en)gendering (w)holeness… Lunch!’ (p. 9).

**Eisner’s Horse, arts-based research**

Eisner created a Trojan horse with far wider impact than Sokal’s when he suggested the need for arts-based research because in so doing, he was suggesting a research paradigm that would engender much publication and “research.” He continued by arguing for the benefits of cross-fertilization be-
tween the social sciences and the visual arts. Such a union would create more effective methods of presenting social science research and might even suggest some new research approaches to social scientists.

I do not claim to be among the first to note difficulties with the concept of arts-based research. We have already noted that Bean (2007) acknowledges that this is a contested subject. Another example of the ongoing debate is found in a document published by the University of British Columbia (UBC) Hampton Fund Research Grant 2004-2006 (Leggo, n.d.), which identifies arts-based research.

As arts-based researchers incorporate visual, performative, poetic, musical, and narrative forms of inquiry in their innovative research projects, they expand the limits of social science research practices, and investigate how these arts-based forms of inquiry can be utilized, represented, and published for academic, professional, and public audiences.

Although significant work has already occurred at UBC, ongoing critical challenges for this emerging field of research methodology suggest that a) arts-based research is under-theorized, naïve, and narcissistic; b) arts-based research is neither good research nor good art; c) arts-based researchers do not make enough connections with the pure disciplines; and d) arts-based researchers do not adequately communicate their research results.

In this discussion I focus on item “b” above: the notion that arts-based research is neither good research nor good art.

**Eisner’s aims and motivation**

Eisner (1995) suggested that researchers in education ought to borrow more from the arts as possible ways of presenting their findings. He championed arts-based research as a means of dramatizing the particularities that are so much a part of the educational scene. He argued as well that artworks are a preeminent way of generating empathy in the observer/reader. He reasoned that such empathy and iconic precision
would help to increase the effect of educational research. He sums up his case for the arts as a research tool:

…works of art make the obscure vivid and make empathy possible. Second, they direct our attention to individuality and locate in the particular what is general or universal. Third, they possess a sense of wholeness, a coherence, a kind of organic unity that makes both aesthetic experience and credibility possible… (p. 4).

He continues by arguing for the mutual benefits of cross-fertilization among the social sciences and the arts.

We academics have made such a sharp differentiation between art and science that we believe that social science has nothing to do with art. This view not only reveals a parochial conception of art, it reveals a distorted view of science. It is a view that does not serve educational research well (p. 5).

Eisner’s intentions in pushing hard for this hybrid of art and social science were noble indeed: he wanted to create the groundwork for more effective, more convincing educational research. But my guess is that there was another, more pragmatic reason for his adopting the term “arts-based research,” a term that he first deployed as President of the American Educational Research Association (AERA), one of the flagship educational organizations in North America. The majority of educational researchers were, and are, academics wedded to colleges and universities. One of the basic ways of advancing in such institutions is by doing “research” and disseminating it.

Traditionally, the term “research” was restricted to the social and hard sciences and to anyone involved in traditional empirical work, testing hypotheses, working on theories, etc. Eisner saw that it would be a great boon to academics with training in the arts if they could frame their studio practice as “research” and have their hard-nosed colleagues in the social sciences and the physical sciences accept it as such. So, Eisner’s aims were twofold: first, he wanted to legitimize the activities of artistic individuals—painters, sculptors, and others who work in
the arts—by giving such activity the name “research.” Second, he wanted to shift the basis for judging the utility of research from the propositional truth that could be derived from the research to its “credibility.” The key to the difference between arts-based research and “standard” social science research is that arts-based research makes no claims for empirical truth or replicability. It can only offer the promise of “credibility,” that is, the work will seem believable. No empirical proof for any claims or observations is needed. In effect, Eisner created a Trojan horse of no mean proportions, called arts-based research: something that appeared to be educational research on the surface, but that relied on an art form for its method and content.

In the wrong hands this approach impoverishes both the practice of educational research and the practice of the arts. For, by getting rid of the traditional requirement that anything called research must use agreed-upon methods and rely on empirical demonstration and verifiable information in order to make its case, Eisner threw open the door to flimsy, and in some cases, politicized social science research and flimsy art.

**Phillips’ critique: weak social science.**

Phillips (1995) does a particularly good job of questioning Eisner’s position as an advocate for arts-based research. Although Phillips has no quarrel with Eisner’s characterization of the arts as especially good at generating empathy, insight, and vivid characterization of specific events and people, he is not in the least convinced that social science research would benefit from an infusion of art-like methodology. He points out that it is undeniable that “artistic thinking” can justifiably be defined as “possessing intelligent judgment and insightfulness” (p. 73) and that such traits are doubtless equally valuable when addressed to educational research. However, when Eisner attributes “intelligent judgment” to painters and social scientists alike, Phillips claims that Eisner fudges the huge difference in the way these two professions function. The exercise of intelligent judgment in a sociologist is nothing like the exercise of the same trait in an artist.
Citing Dewey, Phillips notes that art and literature are certainly examples of “inquiry,” but in no way are they research in the sense of a methodical examination of a well-framed problem that hopes to demonstrate the truth or falsity of a claim. The greatest difference between artists and social scientists is in their approach to their topics of interest.

…the researcher will be sensitive to the constraints that nature (in the guise of the phenomena being investigated) imposes upon his or her hypotheses. In a manner of speaking, the researcher will regard the story that he or she wants to tell as being less important than the one waiting to be told by that nature; but in the arts the situation is reversed, for example, neither Mozart nor Pollock...faced in the same way as scientists do, constraints about the contents of the beliefs that they were expressing, for they were free to express whatever they wished... In making this general point I do not deny the obvious one made by the constructivists, namely that in some sense knowledge is a human creation… the point is that it is a constrained creation… (p. 75).

I would add here that the sorts of constraints faced by artists are utterly different from those which underlie the practice of social science. Artistic constraints are idiosyncratic and can shift at a whim, when the occasion, the subject and the artist’s mood warrant. The constraints for research are fixed, more ponderous, and one cannot change the rules of the research game without making a rational, even empirically grounded argument for such a change. Once the merits of the argument have been weighed, there may well be a consensus that supports such a change. But research constraints are established within the research community, while artists are free to change their way of operating with or without the permission of the larger artistic community. This means in effect that there could be almost as many “artistic methods” as there are artists.

Last, Phillips makes an excellent point in the matter of the “discourse of science and art.” Some advocates of arts-based research, he predicts, will try to smooth over the dramatic differences between science research and art that I have em-
phasized. They will claim (Denzin, 1995) that research and art are simply two separate discourses about reality and, as discourses, both have equal standing. Not so, says Phillips, for to equate the discourse of art and research is to ignore some fundamental differences, one of them being the rational and consensual nature of research and the irrational and idiosyncratic nature of artistic discourse. Just because scientific findings are not certain (as any scientist worthy of the name will admit) does not put both discourses on the same level. This is like saying that as operating rooms are not perfectly sterile one might as well operate in a sewer. Degrees of difference do matter, and even though a rational investigation of the world is flawed and uncertain, it is certainly more credible than an artistic approach that unashamedly privileges the creator’s point of view.

Thus, Phillips’ commentary shows the ways in which Eisner’s claims for the utility and attractiveness of arts-based research are deeply flawed. And from this flawed notion spring Trojan horses of all sorts, for example, the use of bad poetry to substantiate a piece of educational research.

**Piirto’s critique: weak art.**

There can be no doubt that Eisner’s call for using arts-based methodologies had a wide impact. Piirto (2002) was influenced by Eisner’s model for a new way of doing research. But, as her article demonstrates, she has had second and third thoughts about the exercise of art as a research method when one has no real ability or skill in the art selected. Piirto (2002) wonders how her weakness as a poet made for weakness in her research. She is concerned with the fact that when one indulges in arts-based research, one may well end up with neither research worthy of the name, nor art of any caliber. Piirto cites Greene (1996), a noted educational researcher, whose opinion was that some of what passes for arts-based research is constructed out of work that is “art-like but not art” (p. 433). In other words, the art fails some of the rudimentary tests for art in terms of the skill and mastery of the researcher using the art form. Piirto is disturbed by the fact that educational researchers seem to have a cavalier attitude towards the use of art forms. Thus, so-called researchers

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feel free to use poems as a way of presenting their research, yet all too often these same researchers have no training in writing poetry, with the inevitable result that the poems they produce are inferior.

Example of a political Trojan horse: Arts-based on the outside, partisan on the inside.

Trojan horses are not hard to find in art educational research, in part due to the prevalence of arts-based research. So, for example, we have Springgay’s (2008) article, “Corporeal pedagogy and contemporary visual art.” In prose worthy of Judith Butler—an academic hailed for the notion that clarity of language is an oppressive tool of demagogues—Springgay informs us that she will discuss a video essay on Israel-Palestine, as a:

space of inter-embodiment thereby bearing the marks of sense memories that do not traditionally find their way into media expression. Inter-embodiment poses that the construction of the body and the production of body knowledge is not created within a single autonomous subject but rather that body knowledge and bodies are created in the intermingling and relationality between bodies (p. 18).

Springgay uses stills from a video essay by a Canadian artist b.h yael, called The Palestine Trilogy. Interspersed among the dense thickets of verbiage of the quality and richness noted above, are stills from the video essay showing Palestinian political demonstrators, marchers demanding an end to the security fence, and other staples of Palestinian political activism. Throughout, Springgay continues to belabor the language with her observations about inter-embodiment and pedagogical practice. It seems odd that with all her emphasis on “the intermingling and relationality of bodies, there are no illustrations of, nor any mention of one of the most telling examples of inter-embodiment, or perhaps intra-embodiment: the suicide bomber. Surely here, with this vile cultural practice, one has a fine opportunity to speak about corporeal participation.
This essay is as good an example of a Trojan horse as one could find. Springgay presents a tortuous case for “…being in the making of something different… It is the giving over of the self, the affective openness to the other, and the indeterminableness of becoming that is at the heart of a corporeal pedagogy” (p. 23). How corporeal pedagogy is illustrated with stills from a video that is apparently a one-sided presentation about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a complete mystery. This article, with its significant disconnect between the turgid text and the well-rehearsed iconography of “the occupation,” would seem to be more of a pretext for advancing a political agenda than an informative academic exercise illustrating the meaning of “corporeal pedagogy.” So, this article, with its emphasis on arts-based pedagogy and its impenetrable language, is not a purveyor of social science truths and claims, but the carrier of a blatantly political agenda.

Conclusion

We have examined two deceptive objects intended in one case to embarrass and in the other to subvert a field. Sokal’s subversive essay is a Trojan horse that targeted the field of social theory and literary theory, and succeeded in showing it up for silly and ignorant dabbling in science. Eisner’s call for arts-based research is a hollow steed that targets the social sciences and tries to soften them up so that they will become more hospitable to the practice of the arts. Sokal spoke with the authority of a scientist and warned the world of the abuses of science in the service of literary criticism and theory. Sokal is no political conservative, but he jealously guards the distinction between normative science, governed by notions of method and evidence, and the free-for-all of postmodern irrationalism, a world where dropping the right name makes your claims credible a priori. Eisner also speaks with the authority of his discipline: he is an educational researcher of high standing holding a prestigious post at a prestigious university. His suggestion that the social sciences adopt arts-based methods of research pushes the discourse towards an irrational and totally subjective vision of empirical work, one that is highly compatible with the practice of the arts, but not anything that will provide credible, trustworthy, and generalizable informa-
tion. In order to push the field in this direction, he constructs a wonderful steed that he claims will help educational researchers to do their work better, arrive at clearer and more credible conclusions, and in general, aid in the search for understanding the place of the arts in the schools. But, crouched inside these promises of “better research” is the specter of untrammeled, irrational, anarchic artistry. Eisner’s hopeful vision of integrating artistic method into educational research was certainly motivated by the best intentions, but it has sometimes spawned work that fails as educational research and as art, and that, in some cases, permits the substitution of propaganda for information.

So, Eisner’s suggestion that we incorporate the arts into our reports of research findings comes to grief on twin perils: The Scylla of insufficient social science methods and the Charybdis of artistic incompetence. (Scylla and Charybdis were two sea monsters that Ulysses encountered on his voyage home to Ithaca. Scylla had six heads and lived on one side of a narrow strait, and Charybdis lived at the bottom of a whirlpool on the other side of the same strait. Ulysses had to guide his ship between these two perils.) In this worst of all possible scenarios, whom should an ill-researched and artless presentation impress? Learning to be an artist/poet/writer is a tough order, and learning to do adequate social science research is also demanding. Thus, the net result of Eisner’s plea for arts-based research is to make the practice of credible research even more difficult than it has been in the past, for the researcher must gain mastery of not one, but two demanding disciplines. As noted, this situation leads to the production of work that endangers the credibility of educational research and the practice of art per se. Wearing a veneer of social science, the horse is pulled into the social science camp, but once the social scientists have gone to sleep, the artists creep out and declare themselves scientists and take over the camp.

In the final analysis the scientist needs the loyal opposition of the artist, and vice versa. But nothing is gained by confusing the two categories to the extent that one can no longer tell one from the other.
References


