ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN GROWTH: INTELLECTUAL COURAGE AND EXTENDING THE MORAL COMMUNITY

Bradley D. Rowe
Ohio State University

Those concerned about the extension of the moral community...must become educators.
–Bernard Rollin

[E]ducation means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth.
–John Dewey

INTRODUCTION

While the ethical dimension of human-animal relationships has become a legitimate, rich subject for contemporary moral philosophers, scholars of moral education, and to a large extent, philosophers of education, have remained surprisingly silent on this subject. The primary purpose of this essay is to illustrate the relationship between the moral standing of animals and human moral growth. First, I will briefly show how the Western philosophical tradition has both justified human dominion over nonhuman animals as well as laid the groundwork for assigning the latter with moral value. My second task is to revisit contemporary moral philosophy in order to outline the main arguments for extending the moral community to encompass nonhuman species. Then, I look to the narrative of Julie Andrzejelewski, who—through teaching, writing, and activism—remains dedicated to issues of social justice, including the ways in which human beings coexist with nonhuman beings. Drawing on her article entitled, “Teaching Animal Rights at the University: Philosophy and Practice,” I will analyze Andrzejelewski’s thought-provoking insights as a teacher of animal rights courses. These three tasks, I propose, will frame my central argument: for human moral growth, we should consider our ethical duties to nonhuman animals.

A central assumption underlying this essay is that educators should be concerned with human growth. We strive for intellectual courage to become better at critiquing, reshaping, and refining our beliefs, ideas, and practices. Hence we must continually challenge ourselves and be spearheading in our work—this is how educators grow. That is why this essay was motivated by and shaped around John Dewey’s conception of growth—the “constant expansion of horizons and consequent formation of new purposes and new responses.” To educate for human moral growth, then, means that we need to be sympathetic to what Dewey called in Democracy and Education the “intellectual hospitality” for “an active disposition to welcome points of view hitherto alien.” Just as moral philosophers have welcomed new questions...
concerning the moral relevancy of nonhuman animals, educational philosophers too should extend their thinking to welcome novel perspectives and fresh possibilities that provoke the human “capacity to grow.” If we are courageous enough to expand our moral and theoretical horizons to animals—a point of view hitherto alien for many of us, I presume—therein lies opportunities to not just illuminate but to actualize this capacity.

Expanding ethical reflection to nonhuman animals in educational philosophy is not only a new direction; it is a crucial direction as well. Some critics, however, might respond that there are other ways to cultivate human growth, suggesting that the moral status of animals is trivial when there are more important human problems to worry about. This is often the typical objection voiced against bringing nonhuman others into the realm of ethical theorizing. Now, it is beyond the scope of this work to sufficiently refute this objection; nor will I show why an attempt to defend it is a reductive theoretical move. For the sake of this essay, it is enough to say that asking who should come first—humans or animals—in our theorizing is to propose a false dilemma. Discussion of the moral standing of animals is a part of the larger project of growth. As human moral consciousness expands, all ethical problems receive renewed urgency. Thus, while I believe animals indeed have rights—rights that we, as moral agents, should honor—I also believe that one reason to discuss the moral worth of nonhumans in education is its ability to facilitate human growth.

Before I move on, I want to refer to contemporary philosophers—Andrew Light and Erin McKenna—who, working from the pragmatic tradition, offer a response (though implicit) to the aforementioned objection. In doing so, they also demonstrate why I believe philosophers of education must exhibit the courage to contemplate ethical questions concerning nonhumans:

Our lives are lived with other animals. It is implausible that anyone would deny this fact. But even given the long history of philosophical reflection on human identity, relationships, and morality, it is only recently that a critical mass of attention has focused on our possible ethical obligations to other animals. Yet this recent attention, which is producing shock waves in the public realm, is substantial; indeed, it may represent the largest expansion of the domain of moral consideration in the West since the era of debates over slavery and women’s suffrage. Its potential, if fully realized, could fundamentally change the terms of our day-to-day lives, as well as our social, political, and economic structures.

In other words, (1) philosophizing about our obligations to nonhuman animals holds grave significance in our public and private lives, and (2) the problems associated with the moral standing of animals are not just problems for
nonhumans; they are problems for humans as well. My challenge throughout this essay is to make these two points clear and convincing. I now want to explore how moral philosophy has shaped both the restriction as well as the extension of the moral community.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS

It is necessary to familiarize ourselves with a brief, though sure enough insufficient, account of the philosophical tradition concerning human moral obligations, or more truthfully, a lack thereof, toward nonhuman animals. Even though some Antiquity philosophers (notably Pythagoras, Plutarch, Porphyry, and Aristotle) treated this issue with some seriousness, the constraints of this essay require that I get straight to the point. Remaining dear to Immanuel Kant, modern philosophy has validated and advanced the view that human beings are of moral worth because we possess a unique capacity for rationality, a capacity that other creatures lack and that the foundation of our morality rests. Kant, whose influence on moral theory remains unparalleled, said that “so far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties. Animals are not self-conscious, and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man.”

It is our rationality that gives us moral standing, which must be denied to animals since they are not rational creatures. Coupled with the Judeo-Christian religious tradition of human exceptionalism (Genesis), the canonical figures in philosophy—figures revered as the finest lovers of wisdom—have essentially legitimized human dominion over the nonhuman world. And without moral status, animals serve as merely means to human ends, objects and instruments of our desire. Since this has been the norm—and at least until the late 20th century, a largely unexamined one at that—we should concern ourselves with the bold, forward-thinking exceptions, which philosophy never fails to provide.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was one of the few Enlightenment philosophers to embrace a position that brought animals into our realm of ethical contemplation based not on what separates us from them (i.e., degree of reason), but on what unites human and nonhuman. The French philosopher was undoubtedly sympathetic toward other animals, explaining why, for instance, he advocates a vegetarian diet for his students Emile and Sophie in his classic treatise on education, Emile. “It seems,” Rousseau writes, “that if I am obliged not to do any harm to my fellow man, it is less because he is a rational being than because he is a sentient being: a quality that, since it is common to both animals and men, should at least give the former the right not to be needlessly mistreated by the latter.”

Jeremy Bentham, the “father” of modern utilitarianism, was one of the first to allegorize the exploitation and abuse of animals with the exploitation and abuse of humans (specifically, black slaves) when he observed in 1789 that
it is not Kant’s rationality that motivates human beings to affirm and treat others with moral respect, but the capacity for suffering, which animals too have. Bentham famously asked, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”11 The shared capacity of sentience between human and nonhuman species would later become the foundation for a much more elaborate and consistent theoretical model in granting animals with moral status, and eventually, rights.

Over the next few pages, I offer a summation of the main contemporary approaches in grounding an ethic toward animals. My intention is not to argue in support for one particular theory. My purpose instead is to introduce the philosophies that challenge the dominant view that human beings have superior moral status. It is impossible to do justice to the diverse theoretical arguments of animal ethics, for they have not evolved under a single unified lens. Here I can only sketch the main ideas that express a prevailing commonality, which is the central question: Do we, as human moral agents, have ethical obligations to nonhuman animals?12 This question, I suggest, is provocative and instructive for philosophy of education; it is fundamental to ask in order to broaden our intellectual and moral perception.

The modern animal rights movement was born out of philosophy in the 1970’s. Since then, moral philosophers have increasingly broadened the scope of their attention to nonhuman species. Thorough in scope and methodical in logical argumentation, applied ethicists in particular have constructed arguments for the extension of the moral community based partly on Darwinian theory. Philosophers today, working from Darwin’s claim that “there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties,”13 are more knowledgeable and attuned to the many similarities between human animals and nonhuman animals. The psychological and emotional capacities that other species share with us serve as legitimate bases for moral concern. As follows, the traditional world-view of human dominion (which assumes humans and animals are categorically dissimilar, therefore humans are unquestionably superior) implodes under careful philosophical scrutiny.

From opposite theoretical camps, Peter Singer, a utilitarian, and Tom Regan, a nonconsequentialist, have worked out the seminal moral theories concerning the ethical treatment of animals. Although Singer, ever since the publication of his infamous Animal Liberation in 1975, is often heralded as the founder of the animal rights movement, his conclusions in fact do not advocate granting rights to animals, per se. Any serious discussion of his ethic should be approached in the language of “interests” rather than “rights.” Singer argues that human beings, given our choices as moral agents, need to radically rethink and ultimately change our abusive and murderous practices involving animals (such as factory farming and animal experimentation) because the consequences produce more harm than good, more pain and suffering than
pleasure and happiness. Grounded in the equal consideration of interests—that is, both human and animal interests are to be given equal deliberation—Singer contends that we should consider animal interests, which are established from the capacity for suffering, as seriously as our own interests when “the interests of every being affected by an action” can be “taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being.” For Singer, the way to judge human actions concerning animals as moral or immoral is a matter of calculating the suffering of all parties.

Like Singer, Regan believes that devoting conceptual and practical energies to an ethic for animals is not a matter of sympathy or care; it is a matter of justice. But unlike Singer, Regan, influenced by Kantian moral theory, assumes a liberal rights view in establishing his ethic for nonhuman species. Expanding Kant’s “kingdom of ends” beyond the condition of rationality, Regan maintains an unwavering deontological view that requires human moral agents to respect those animals, who, just as human beings, are “subjects-of-a-life,” that is, beings who have an “inherent value” that “fares well or ill for them” and that is independent to both the “utility” and “interests” of others. All beings who are subjects-of-a-life—a status not solely reserved for those who hold membership to the species, Homo sapiens—are conscious beings who have a life that matters to them, as they experience it. They are ends in themselves and have an “equal right to respectful treatment.” So, logically, if a nonhuman being is a subject-of-a-life, then, in order to be intelligible and consistent in our morals, we must ascribe moral value to that particular being and act toward it accordingly.

For both Regan and Singer, lines of demarcation based on species membership alone are arbitrary and simply untenable for philosophically determining which life-forms do and do not deserve our moral treatment. Both ethicists rely primarily on rationalism to support their justice-based arguments; but other theorists locate the ethical treatment of animals outside the rationalism of these approaches.

Some feminist and ecofeminist philosophers argue that neither absolute rights theory nor the utilitarian tradition embrace what an ethical theory should entail: one that accounts for the indispensable role of human emotion. Care theorists Josephine Donovan and Carol Adams do not deny that reason and logic should play their fair roles in formulating an ethic for animals. But what they do contest is the “hyper-rational” methods that the utilitarians and neo-Kantians employ—methods that reinforce a virtual reverence for reason, which, as Donovan and Adams rightfully and importantly point out, is what justified animal oppression and mistreatment in the first place. Care theorists argue that the severance of reason (of the mind) and emotion (of the body) in human morality is binary and illusory, and what is needed is a sensible ethic that encompasses the whole human being, allowing for “sympathy, empathy, love—feelings that often characterize human’s responses to
animals.” Feminist theory has offered much more than criticism of the narrow, rationalistic methods of the conventional ethicists. It has, in addition, articulated an attractive, fruitful, and necessary vision that addresses a place for the human sympathetic faculty, which frankly should never be omitted from human morality, particularly when the goal is to convince people to respect animals and treat them ethically.

The philosophical tradition, then, gives us some reason to take the moral status of animals seriously as part of expanding the moral universe. These arguments still do not show us how to prioritize our thinking about animals with respect to the problems of the continued unethical treatment and suffering of fellow human beings. Who should come first? As I discussed earlier, the conceptualization of this question is a false dilemma that limits, rather than broadens, our moral horizons. Human growth need not bow to either-or thinking. In what follows, I attempt to make explicit the connection between the extension of the moral community and human moral growth.

ANIMAL RIGHTS FOR HUMAN GROWTH

The educational endeavor, in essence, is an intrinsically moral one, between learner and educator, between pupil and exemplar. “Everything we do, then, as teachers, has moral overtones,” writes Nel Noddings. Accordingly, as moral exemplars vital to the intellectual and ethical character and development of students, educators should continually be looking for dynamic new ways to refine their moral perception. Questioning some of the most historic human assumptions and practices concerning sentient nonhumans, I submit, should qualify as such a way.

When critically pursued, the animal question reveals that what was once settled and comfortable is now the exposed and uncertain. Rethinking human customs involving other animals challenges our most routine, even slavish, behaviors—from what we eat, to the clothes we wear, to what we do for leisure and entertainment. For example, the view of Tom Regan—who says that zoos, hunting, fishing, eating meat, and wearing fur and leather are categorically immoral—compels us to acknowledge that these activities require from us at least a certain degree of reflection. The consumption habits that we tend to view as morally unproblematic in our daily lives means that someplace, somewhere a sentient animal is making (or being forced to make) the ultimate sacrifice—its life—for what are, at times, some of our most petty and vein interests (think of veal meat or fur coats). Exhibiting the “intellectual hospitality,” as Dewey wrote, to reflect on and question these interests and habits deeply challenges and disrupts our daily lives. This moment of challenge and disruption makes the animal question such an educative and
transformative venture, for in this moment, lies the opportunity for human growth.

The central way that the animal question can aim persons toward growth is that it works to alleviate what Dewey called “the most important problem of moral education”—that is, the “relationship of knowledge and conduct.” This relationship necessitates from us deep reflection and change. Human action involves thinking about, not ignoring or dismissing, routine conduct. We are to bring habits to purposeful awareness, commit them to experience, and ultimately alter any habits that are “so severed from reason that they are opposed to the conclusions of conscious deliberation.” Informed and intentional thought and action is the makeup of human agency. Once we begin to think more critically about the various human practices of animal use, we are in a better position to align conduct with our knowledge. Formerly unexamined beliefs and habits that reinforce “ruts, routine ways, with loss of freshness, openmindedness, and originality” should be transformed into new, inventive, and intelligent modes of being. These modes of being invoke a more intentional and active way of life, as opposed to a passive life of routine and “unthinking habits” that “possess us instead of our possessing them.” If unreflective, blind routine “marks an arrest of growth,” then conscious, deliberate human action marks an ascent of growth.

Echoing Dewey, Andrzejewski, who also draws on the works of Paulo Freire to ground her teaching, refers to the central role that conscious action plays in her courses. She makes two points very clear: (1) that course participants are encouraged to examine their “everyday lives” and consider the extent to which their actions are “congruent” with “stated values,” and (2) that “taking personal actions that reflect and reinforce a person’s values engenders feelings of empowerment and hope” and “are one of the most powerful forms of learning.” Andrzejewski allows a space for student voices in her writing. Consider the following comment from one of her students:

[M]y life has changed dramatically. I have been challenged in ways I could never have imagined and have met many of those challenges. I have been encouraged to ACT to make a difference. The greatest and most significant aspect has been practicing a calm, non-intrusive, non-judgmental way in which to interact and educate others.

With old beliefs threatened and old habits in jeopardy, this student did not fall into despair or apathy. Instead, learning about the confinement, exploitation, and slaughter of animals provoked motivation, which then transpired into human action—the distinctive quality of growth.
Serious ethical reflection pertaining to the lives of animals makes a person more mindful and sensitive to the implications of his or her behavior. In the class that Andrzejewski offers as a case in point, many students became more responsive and displayed more sympathetic, compassionate, and justice-oriented behavior. For example, learning that one of the most perennial ethical problems concerning the moral standing of animals is also one of the most dire threats to humankind—that is, modern intensive, industrialized confinement systems of raising animals for food, or “factory farming”—students felt motivated, some even obligated, to alter their food habits by refraining from eating meat. Applying critical thought to the practice of factory farming revealed an enormity of problematic issues. Whether from environmental concerns, self-interest health motivations, concerns for animal welfare, or perhaps learning that factory farming actually perpetuates global starvation, one outcome for one of Andrzejewski’s classes was constant: “all students worked on changing their eating habits.” The result is that food habits become much more than merely deciding what to eat based on which foods might taste good or which foods are the most convenient to eat. Instead, deciding what to eat (and what not to eat) becomes a rather nuanced and reflective choice—one informed and dependent on a number of ethical, ecological, social, and personal factors. If cultivating more thoughtful and compassionate ways of living does not constitute human moral growth, then I have to conclude that few things do. But are there any unwanted consequences in reconciling new knowledge regarding the unethical treatment of animals with one’s dietary conduct?

On the surface, changing food behavior may appear altogether desirable, perhaps even easy, but this is far from the case. Genuine growth is never effortless. Changing our lives spawns complexity, resistance, and personal turmoil. And transforming some of our most socially and privately entrenched food habits is no exception. John Robbins, heir to the ice cream company Baskin-Robbins, walked away from the riches of the family business to speak and write about the meat and dairy industries’ detrimental impact on human health and the Earth. He appreciates the difficulty in altering food habits: “When it comes to food choices, habit is stupendously powerful…. And if our habits are continually reinforced by the society around us, they can become even more powerful and alluring.”

In the case of Andrzejewski’s class, individuals who altered their deep-rooted consumption habits struggled with their choices. Students often felt marginalized and trivialized, longing for positive affirmation and support from others. Support is crucial in such profound moments of change. This is because new dietary habits, unlike the old ones, take on deep, lasting personal and social significance. As Andrzejewski writes, “only the students’ own words can express what happened in their lives”: 
One of the hardest things I’ve learned is that the people that I love the most aren’t willing to see my views or take my self-discoveries seriously. They put up a fight against their daughter and friend in order to defend meat. This is the time when I need support and when I don’t have them to turn to, I know that I have to find strength within myself.\textsuperscript{31}

This reflection is indicative of the struggle inherent to human moral growth. Those who extend ethical concern for animals and renounce culturally-dominant habits, such as meat-eating, face not only alienation, hostility, and resistance from others in their everyday lives,\textsuperscript{32} but many times experience lasting inner conflict. “It is not uncommon,” Andrzejewski writes, “for former students to let me know that they continued to make changes after the class ended,” but at the same time, “others have confided that the class made them aware of compassionate solutions but they continue to struggle with their own decisions.”\textsuperscript{33} Tom Regan sees the struggle this way:

> All of us engaged in the struggle for animal rights have a tendency to forget who we once were. Most of us once ate meat, for example, or unblinkingly dissected nonhuman animals in the lab.... Some of us hunted or fished and enjoyed that, too. The plain fact is, it is not just society that needs changing. The struggle for animal rights is also a struggle with self. What we are trying to do is transform the moral zombie society would like us to be into the morally advanced being we are capable of becoming.\textsuperscript{34}

Whether change occurs or not is important. But what is more important is that the assumptions and behavior reinforcing systems of unnecessary brutality and ecological destruction are subject to conscious deliberation—to a good amount of blinking.

**CONCLUSION: SILENCE ON THE ANIMAL QUESTION**

The animal question not only challenges human thinking; it challenges human living. What sort of challenges will emerge in our day-to-day lives if we transcend human relations in education and direct our attention to the hitherto alien? While philosophers of education tend to overlook such questions, bioethicist and distinguished professor of philosophy and animal science Bernard Rollin sees educators as the vanguards in the extension of the moral community. Rollin is one of the preeminent figures in the animal welfare and rights movement and is considered the founder of veterinary ethics. In his book, *Animal Rights and Human Morality*, he suggests that:

If it turns out that reason requires that other animals are as much within the scope of moral concern as are humans, we must view our entire history as well as all aspects of our daily lives from a new
perspective…. The comfortable sense of right and wrong, which securely governs our everyday existence, is no longer tenable, and we can no longer eat, sleep, and work in the same untroubled way.\textsuperscript{35}

For Rollin, the animal question has very real consequences. One of his veterinary students ponders the effects of extending the moral community:

\begin{quote}
If I take your teaching seriously…\textit{no part of my life is untouched}, and all parts are severely shaken. For if I ascribe moral status to animals, I must worry about the food I eat, the clothes I wear, the cosmetics I use, the drugs I take, the pets I keep, the horses I ride, the dogs I castrate and euthanize, and the research I do. The price of morality is too high – I’d rather ignore the issue.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

This student’s forthrightness should be commended, but at the same time, this reflection is a clear example of how bringing nonhumans to the fore about what constitutes moral life runs the risk of fundamentally transforming our daily lives. After all, it is so much easier, like Rollin’s student, to just “ignore the issue.”

But can philosophers of education say that the brushing aside of the animal question is wholly intentional? What may be the case is not deliberately rejecting the question, but rather a failure in recognizing that there is even a moral question to ask. “[T]he use of animals for our purposes,” writes Rollin, “without consideration of their interests is so pervasive and our dependence upon it so great, it becomes invisible to us, in much the same way that exploitation of women and minorities was invisible for too long.”\textsuperscript{37} Continuing to keep nonhuman animals absent or on the periphery of conscious thinking reinforces mindless behavior at the expense of intelligent, deliberate human action. Reaching a point of thoughtfulness and/or sensibility where it is possible to hold the predilection to intentionally ignore these ethical questions is one thing; not reaching that point due to a lack of intellectual or moral conviction is quite another.

In the end, I hope to have demonstrated that the opportunities for human moral growth are vast when we exhibit the courage to extend ethical thought to the moral status of nonhuman animals. It is clear that what was once invisible and insensible to human morality, moral philosophy has now unveiled, and the philosophy of education should account for this. Having the intellectual courage to expand the moral community, I believe, will enrich human experience, invigorate philosophical and educational dialogue, cultivate imaginative and sympathetic faculties, and promote conscious thinking and deliberate action in our everyday lives.
Notes


3 Here I am mainly referring to Peter Singer (1946–) and Tom Regan (1938–) who by no means provide the authoritative voices on animal ethics, but who are without exception the pioneering figures in applying philosophical argument for the moral status of nonhuman animals. I draw on Singer and Regan because of their past and continuing influence on ethical theory, public debate, and the animal rights movement.

4 Nel Noddings is a popular exception. See Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Using the keywords “animals,” “nonhuman,” “animal rights,” and “animal welfare,” an online search of the leading journals of philosophy of education yielded no results for articles directly related to these topics. Additionally, no articles were found using a search for “animals” in the relatively new online journal, *Ethics and Education*; and, as for the *Journal of Moral Education*, only one pertinent article was found in an online search using the keywords “animals” and “animal rights.” I also surveyed one reader and two textbooks – *A Companion to the Philosophy of Education*, ed. Randall Curren (Blackwell, 2006); *Philosophical Documents in Education*, eds. Tony W. Johnson and Ronald F. Reed (Pearson, 2008); and *Philosophical Foundations of Education*, eds. Howard A. Ozmon and Samuel M. Craver (Pearson, 2008). Unsurprisingly, in each of these texts no serious attention is devoted to philosophical thought pertaining to nonhumans.

5 Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 175.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.


I will also refer to this question as “the animal question” to limit redundancy.

Charles Darwin, “Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals,” in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 27. Both Singer and Regan draw on Darwin to support their arguments for the ethical treatment of animals based on what human beings share with nonhuman beings: largely, consciousness. In their ground-breaking treatises, both authors reference Darwin’s The Descent of Man (1871). For example, in another text, (Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. [New York: New York Review, 1990]), Singer cites this passage from Descent: “We have seen that the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention and curiosity, imitation, reason etc., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the lower animals” (206).


Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 243-244, and 279.


This is a criticism wholly welcomed by both Singer and Regan. In the preface to Animal Liberation, Singer writes, “the portrayal of those who protest against cruelty to animals as sentimental, emotional ‘animal lovers’ has had the effect of excluding the entire issue of our treatment of nonhumans from serious political and moral discussion” (ii-iii).

Noddings, Caring, 179.

Dewey, Democracy and Education, 360.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid., 48.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid., 53.

Julie Andrzejewski, “Teaching Animal Rights at the University: Philosophy and Practice,” 8. I obtained this article from TeachKind
(http://www.teachkind.org/), a nonprofit organization that distributes free materials on human education; the article was accessed at: http://www.teachkind.org/pdf/teachinganimalrights.pdf. Andrzejewski is co-director and co-developer of the “Social Responsibility” master’s degree program – an interdisciplinary effort of the college of education and departments of sociology, women’s studies, and anthropology – at St. Cloud State University.

25 Ibid.

26 Agricultural methods aside, meat-eating has long been a serious philosophical and ethical question. See, for example, Kerry S. Walters and Lisa Portmess, eds. Ethical Vegetarianism: From Pythagoras to Peter Singer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). This is a collection of primary sources advocating a vegetarian diet for moral reasons, including the writings of, to name a few, Pythagoras, Porphyry, Percy Shelley, Richard Wagner, Leo Tolstoy, Henry Salt, and Mohandas Gandhi.

27 According to the 2006 United Nations report, “Livestock’s Long Shadow,” modern industrialized systems of animal agriculture is the single largest contributor to global warming. This is largely because livestock agriculture emits not only carbon dioxide but also the greenhouse gases methane and nitrous oxide, which are 23 and 296 times more potent than the greenhouse gas our automobiles emit. The report can be accessed at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.htm. For a thought-provoking analysis of the report and what the modern meat industry means to the planet, see Jim Motavalli, “The Meat of the Matter,” The Environmental Magazine, July/August 2008, 26-33.

28 The basic idea here is that raising and feeding billions of farm animals annually for human consumption is extremely inefficient and wasteful. Motavalli (see note 27), in referencing the U.N. report, writes, “[F]ood grown for animals could be feeding people. Raising livestock consumes 90 percent of the soy crop in the U.S., 80 percent of its corn and 70 percent of its grain. David Pimentel, professor of entomology at Cornell, points out that ‘if all the grain currently fed to livestock in the U.S. was consumed directly by people, the number who could be fed is nearly 800 million’” (28). See, also, Singer, Animal Liberation, 164-166; and John Robbins, The Food Revolution: How Your Diet Can Help Save Your Life and Our World (San Francisco: Conari Press, 2001), 283-302.

29 Andrzejewski, “Teaching Animal Rights at the University,” 8.


31 Andrzejewski, “Teaching Animal Rights at the University,” 8.
This is commonly known in the vegetarian and vegan community, and occasionally it is written about. See, for example, Barbara McDonald, “‘Once You Know Something, You Can’t Not Know it’: An Empirical Look at Becoming Vegan,” *Society & Animals* 8, no. 1 (2000): 1-23. The participants in McDonald’s study, who she refers to as “marginalized individuals,” felt that the “lack of support from family and friends caused hurtful feelings” (12 and 17).

Andrzejewski, “Teaching Animal Rights at the University,” 9.

Tom Regan; quotation accessed from the Tom Regan Collection, Special Collections Department, North Carolina State University Libraries website at: http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/exhibits/regan/animalrights.htm.


Ibid.