Socratic questioning is the enactment of parrhesia—frank and fearless speech—that is the lifeblood of any democracy.

--Cornel West

We must dare to learn how to dare in order to say no to the bureaucratization of the mind to which we are exposed every day.

--Paulo Freire

In this essay I explore the ways in which the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia, defined as “frank speech and telling the truth as one sees it,” can help facilitate the development of both intellectual courage and democracy as a way of life. I want to theorize dimensions of parrhesia for the purpose of better educating a civic self-image rooted in this original democratic value, a value which could be seen to represent the symbolic basis of a democratic civic ontology. Given its indivisible association with the first principles of democratic political culture, the concept and practice of parrhesia should be of vital interest to all teachers. A sound theoretical grasp of the concept can only increase the likelihood of bringing about its practical, experiential enactment.

As one of its most prominent contemporary interpreters, Michel Foucault made the case for parrhesia’s centrality to both democracy and philosophy. Instructively for the purposes of this inquiry, he also framed parrhesia as a regulative ideal for tracing the critical attitude he saw operating throughout Western history. Echoing Foucault’s high valuation of parrhesia, I contend that a better understanding of the concept can provide insight for teachers in their efforts to educate critical and awake democratic citizens.

One way to contextualize parrhesia in contemporary American terms would be to reflect upon the moral content contained within John Dewey’s calls for teachers to live their democratic vocation as a secular religious project. His statements in this regard are remarkably aligned with the kinds of attitudes and sensibilities found in expressions of parrhesia. For when Dewey called for teachers to make education “an instrument in the active and constant suppression of the war spirit,” when he urged teachers to resist “every subtle appeal of sinister class interest,” and when he called for teachers to define themselves as the “consecrated servants of the democratic ideas,” he could have been calling for the reclamation of parrhesia as one of the organizing principles of democratic education. The associational qualities essential to democratic identity-- questioning, having a passion for public affairs, engaging
in dialogue, valuing revision and the principle of human equality, among many others—are civic traits dependent on parrhesia for their ontological fruition.

If this general framework has merit, acts of democratic citizenship that require courage and risk-taking could therefore be understood as acts emanating from parrhesiastic modes of being. At least within the Greek, Stoic and Foucaultian constructions, expressions of intellectual courage are tantamount to expressions of parrhesia. In the pages ahead, I develop parrhesia as a pedagogical motif on several levels: as a moral and intellectual ideal, a democratic teleological project, a form of praxis (with its theoretical and experiential dimensions), and as a dialectical instrument. I argue that these various levels of meaning justify parrhesia’s classification as a principle that can lend coherence and verve to the conduct of democratic pedagogy.

In section I, I examine the discursive origins and conceptual boundaries of parrhesia derived from ancient Greece. Building on this foundation, in section II, I deploy parrhesia as an educational “gold-standard” against which to measure the absence of democratic and philosophical values within NCLB as an educational ethos. In sections III and IV, from a parrhesia-informed standpoint, I interrogate two reigning narratives of U.S. national identity, its official war discourse and the myth of American “exceptionalism.” I conclude by formulating a two part rationale for parrhesia’s inclusion into the language and practice of democratic pedagogy.

I. Toward a Working Definition of Parrhesia

Parrhesia grew out of ancient Greek political culture as a subaltern, democratic emergence. As a novel cultural form it functioned as a leveler between citizens long-defined through imbalances of power. Arlene Saxonhouse outlines this core impulse:

The Athenians eulogized free speech as a practice that allowed them to express an egalitarianism that rejected hierarchy and restraints of a reverence for superiors or for the past. “To say all,” to speak freely was to uncover and thus to question what has been and to ignore the restraints of status.

In addition, unless there was a risk involved to the reputation of a speaker in terms of fines or other dangers, such speech would not qualify as parrhesiastic. According to Foucault’s account, parrhesia is not to be considered present in every situation in which sincere people utter what they consider to be their respective truths. The context of the speech must be one in which something is being risked. Foucault reinforces this point: “If there is a kind of ‘proof’ of the sincerity of the parrhesiastes, it is his courage. The fact that a speaker says something dangerous—different from what the majority believes—is a strong indication that he is a parrhesiastes.”
Socrates was a parrhesiastes--daring to ask questions to uncover the truth of things, daring to identify contradictions in his interlocutors as well as within himself, daring to interrogate the assumptions and religious claims of the powerful. But Socrates was also a parrhesiastes in daring to identify what he didn’t know—in constantly identifying the truth of his own ignorance. In this way the democratic practice of parrhesia is embedded in the Socratic ethic of “the care of the self” since, among other things, a surprisingly large part of caring for the self involves the courage to recognize what one does not know. Arguably, this interior kind of courage constitutes the basis for several of the ethical dispositions crucial to democracy—questioning, open mindedness, and the willingness to revise, to mention a few.

In ancient Greek society, of course, the dominant image of courage was not Socratic or parrhesiastic but “heroic manliness.” This conflict between two images of courage symbolizes the conflict between a philosophical and democratic image of cultural heroism, on the one hand, and a masculine, warrior-based image of cultural heroism on the other. In his genealogy of courage in the Western tradition, Paul Tillich suggests the profound stakes involved in the contest over these competing representations:

The Greek word for courage, andreia (manliness) and the Latin word fortitudo (strength) indicate the military connotation of courage. As long as the aristocracy was the group which carried arms the aristocratic and the military connotations merged. When the aristocratic tradition disintegrated and courage could be defined as the universal knowledge of what is good and evil, wisdom and courage converged and true courage became distinguished from the soldier’s courage. The courage of the dying Socrates was rational-democratic, not heroic aristocratic.8

Socrates’ heroic defiance in the service of a rational-democratic ideal, namely that he would never compromise his vocation of practicing philosophy as frank speaking in public, testifies to the complicated relationship between philosophy and democracy. Plato’s writings valorized “true” courage over a “soldier’s” courage because he wanted to challenge the Homeric masculine ideal, entwined as it was with the ethos of “might makes right.”9 In the dialogues, particularly in Laches, Socrates wants to radically critique the soldierly definition of courage and to construct in its place a species of courage that would be required to properly take care of the self. The Socratic attempt to create a revolution in morals at the level of cultural heroism may well stand as the ancient Greek equivalent of “Make love, not war!”

Today’s popular phrase “speaking truth to power,” can also usefully classified as an expression of parrhesia in action. Sara Monoson identifies some of the reasons why parrhesia ought to be regarded as intrinsic to democratic culture:
Parrhesia is consistently and closely associated with two things: criticism and truth telling. To speak with parrhesia was to confront, oppose, or find fault with another individual or a popular view in the spirit of illuminating what is right and best. Parrhesia implied, therefore, a claim on the part of the speaker to be capable of assessing a situation and pronouncing judgment upon it. This implication of intellectual autonomy was so much a part of the word’s meaning that we find it made quite explicit: speaking with parrhesia is equated with ‘telling the truth as one sees it’. This truth claim did not, it needs to be stressed, entail any assertion of a view’s alignment with an absolute, transcendent standard.10

Extending Monoson’s outline, parrhesia could be interpreted as both a secular and provisional form of truth, representing a relation to truth that Socrates wanted to keep open for revision in light of changing circumstances. For Socrates, parrhesia was generally articulated to mean giving an honest account of one’s beliefs. Without such frank speaking between persons the existence of philosophic dialogue couldn’t exist. The charge against Socrates for “corrupting the youth”—for teaching others by example about the value of practicing a parrhesia-informed critical philosophy-- demonstrates the fact that acts of parrhesia were treated with intense ambivalence in ancient Athens. In the Apology Plato has Socrates predict that were he ever executed it would be due to his militant commitment to parrhesia—the basis of his radical philosophical mission.11

Another way to understand parrhesia is to define it in contrast to our contemporary notion of “free speech.” Parrhesia was never understood as a legal right in ancient Greece. As a speech-act regarding one’s relationship to a perceived truth, parrhesia constitutes a type of action. When we appreciate the action-oriented dimension of parrhesia, we’re in a better position to appreciate the distinction between negative and positive conceptions of freedom. This distinction is crucial because it speaks to the principle that citizenship education involves much more than passively acquiring mechanical knowledge about the existence of formal rights. Rather, democratic civic education must involve the active development of selfhood, learning to judge and to choose, and learning to develop the courage to express one’s true beliefs and thus enact one’s freedom. Without parrhesia, education as the practice of freedom makes no sense. It would distort the meaning of parrhesia and squander its pedagogical potential to conceive of it as something identical to the modern codified right of “free speech.”
II. Parrhesia, NCLBism and the Care of the Self.

As an ethical ideal, parrhesia can help to fortify the intellectual courage teachers need to resist or denounce aspects of an educational order that presents itself as eminently reasonable but is irrational at its core. Understood in this manner, parrhesia can function as a vehicle to criticize those instrumental forms of common sense that ignore or rationalize the omission of civic and self development from the curriculum. As one practical effect of this common sense, I sometimes have students (at all levels) ask me if they can use “I” in their essays. The recurrence of the question is symptomatic of a closing of the educational universe in which students learn through a dismal “null curriculum” that their subjectivity, their own self and civic development, simply doesn’t matter. Yet, let us assume that the curricular recognition of human beings as human beings “beyond the numbers” is eminently reasonable: as a dialectical instrument, parrhesia can be used to intensify the contradiction between these opposing conceptions of rationality in education.

In criticizing NCLB I am criticizing the underlying ethos that preceded its statutory inception in 2002. For example, as a dominant ideology, what might be called NCLBism can be seen as operative in Raymond Callahan’s 1962 classic *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*. Callahan shows how a robust business vocabulary and ethos were integrated into the vocational identities of school administrators during the 1900-10 period. His book reads like a present day commentary on the defining tensions of our own educational culture, paralyzed as it is between the frequently contradictory values of democracy and commerce. Parrhesia emerges as a counterpoise which teachers could introduce to expose the spiritual bankruptcy of any education-as-schooling not anchored in democratic, person-centered approaches.

There are striking resemblances between the imperatives of NCLB, with its overvaluation of measurable knowledge and test-taking careerism, and those sophistic forms of education that Socrates and Plato spent their lives railing against. In its reliance on extrinsic rewards to motivate the young, and in abandoning any pretense of promoting self or civic development, the sophistic roots of NCLB are laid bare. The defining purpose of teaching for the sophists, embodied in the figure of Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, was to initiate the young into an ethos of “might makes right” and “the end justifies the means.” Such an ethos clashed with the Socratic ethic of dialogic questioning as a process vital to the care of the self. In caring more about exerting power over others through clever rhetoric and argumentation, the sophists had no intention of participating as honest partners in a mutual search for the truth. The sophists, in wedding truth to power, revealed their status as genuine anti-parrhesiasts. For Socrates, the “new” purpose for education was precisely to take care of the self. A crucial part of this enterprise was to turn parrhesia inward and choose to be a “truth-teller rather than as a living being who is false to himself.”

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In Plato’s dialogue *Laches*, the subject under discussion is the problem of defining courage and who is best equipped to educate the young to be courageous and worthy persons. The *Laches* permits us to focus on the ways in which parrhesia is shown to be a crucial element in the project of caring for the self.

One of Laches’ early speeches (188c-189) refers to two very different types of people he has heard over the years make speeches in public or private. Whether one type of speaker attracts him or repulses him, the decisive factor for Laches is if he can sense a gap between what a person says (logos) and what they do (erga). The one thing everyone agrees with about Socrates is that his interlocutors never perceive a gap between his words and his deeds. Foucault’s analysis of Socratic parrhesia in the *Laches* links parrhesia intrinsically to the caring of the self. Foucault further develops the difference between the sophist and the philosopher:

Socrates is able to use rational, ethically valuable, fine, and beautiful discourse; but unlike the sophist, he can use *parrhesia* and speak frankly because what he says accords exactly with what he thinks, and what he thinks accords exactly with what he does. And so Socrates—who is truly free and courageous—can therefore function as a parrhesiatic figure.

In the *Laches*, the familiar theme of “giving an account of oneself” is once again attributed to Socrates as the starting point for education. Given the broad definitions of parrhesia advanced so far, it is not difficult to grasp why Socrates invoked its qualities in order to clarify the task of “taking care of the self.” Here the meaning of parrhesia is extended beyond telling the truth about one’s perception of social reality, as would be the case, for example, of expressions of parrhesia in the assembly regarding political matters. With Socratic pedagogy there is a move toward an examination of one’s interiority in which one’s biography become subject to parrhesiatic interpretation, in dialogue with others. As Foucault observes:

*Bios* is the focus of Socratic parrhesia. The aim of the Socratic parrhesiastic activity, then, is to lead the interlocutor to the choice of that kind of life (bios) that will be in Dorian-harmonic accord with logos, virtue, courage, truth....Socratic parrhesia means to disclose who you are—not your relation to future events, but your present relation to truth.

For increasing numbers of students today, the possibility of considering questions about their identity and their “present relation to truth” are questions that have been shut-down for them—a sterling example of the triumph of technical reason. The worthiest critique parrhesia might offer in regard to the ongoing problem of NCLBism, resides in its capacity to reveal the
absence of caring in relation to self and civic development this regime daily imposes.

III. Parrhesia, Official War Discourse, and the Classroom as a Public Square.

Among its other virtues, parrhesia is an ideal well suited for scrutinizing the legitimacy of the war system and its discursive strategies of rationalization. The assumption here is that the schools, largely though not exclusively through curricular omission, have for decades served as breeding grounds for reproducing compliant citizen-warriors.\(^{18}\) Now we appear to be living in a permanent war environment, and if we recognize that the legitimacy of this environment requires a justifying ideology of war, we need to recognize that such an ideology is indebted to sophisticated practices of strategic deception—official lying—as a means for securing its own legitimacy.

Hannah Arendt identified this trend in a chapter on the Pentagon Papers, in which she observed that the politics of war-making in its modern incarnation was being increasingly subordinated to the realm of public relations.\(^{19}\) Daniel Ellsberg, the figure responsible for the release of the Pentagon Papers, acted with rational-democratic courage in presenting to the New York Times and Washington Post classified state secrets about its war-time deceptions. Ellsberg’s parrhesiatic action in 1972 exposed the lies and hypocrisies not only of the Nixon administration but also the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Ellsberg’s heroic act further validated and emboldened the anti-war movement. But in an equally powerful, albeit less tangible way, his daring repudiation of the secrecy code to which he had sworn allegiance, challenged the cultural heroism of the masculine warrior-ethos.\(^{20}\)

As we have seen, one of parrhesia’s original functions was to criticize and expose authoritative deception in high places. Ellsberg’s decision thus embodies the moral values contained within parrhesia’s symbolic boundaries. Ellsberg reflects on the decades-long pattern of strategic deception he helped expose:

The American public was lied to month by month by each of these five administrations, from 1950 on. As I say, it’s a tribute to the American people that their leaders perceived that they had to be lied to. It’s no tribute to us that it was so easy to fool the public.\(^{21}\)

It is sobering to have to admit today that it remains “so easy to fool the public.” Arguably having repressed the trauma of Vietnam and its lessons, the public mind in its learned amnesia, re-performed a national repetition-compulsion—from My Lai to Abu Ghraib. While public ignorance and passivity is nothing new on the historical stage, Ellsberg’s statement should provoke us to reconsider the ways in which we can educate persons to be “less easy to fool”
as citizens of a public. It would seem that foremost on our pedagogical agendas ought to be the task of cultivating those democratic habitues and philosophical values that would not only make our students less vulnerable to manipulation by authoritative deception, but would also encourage in them a desire and willingness to become citizens of a public.

Few educational thinkers describe the types of democratic personality traits that need to be cultivated today as elegantly as William Ayers. These traits cannot easily be brought about by relying on the mechanistic knowledge ordained in conventional approaches to “learning” about “democracy.” Ayers’ charts an alternate course: “We want to teach them to take initiative, to be creative, to be imaginative, to take risks, to question authority, to wonder about the world. This means fundamentally, in a school system based on democratic values, we really believe that the full development of all is a condition for the full development of each.”

For teachers to educate the citizenship of the citizen in the best sense would mean to transgress the boundaries of the faux-rationalism now dominant within the schools. What would it mean for teachers to transgress on behalf of the democratic values? In responding to this predicament, Ayers tacitly captures the core meaning of parrhesia while linking its beneficial consequences to a conception of the classroom as a public square:

And as soon as they begin to question—“Why is it like this? Could it be otherwise?”—they are opening themselves to the possibility of stepping into the public square. And the public square doesn’t mean the New York Times, or standing up at a giant rally in Washington, D.C. The public square is where we are open to one another without filters, without masks, and in a certain sense without fear, although fear is always with us. The sense of being able to say out loud that this is not good, this is not helpful for kids, or this is not the way we ought to do it. And then we come together, naming obstacles to address, and in that way we have created a public square, which is something we create again and again, or we somehow fail to create. It’s not something that is sitting there waiting for us. It’s something you must bring to life.\(^{23}\) (my emphasis)

Here we see what could happen when the value of parrhesia is taken seriously as a pedagogical instrument of value. That is, emotionally arid and intellectually sterile classrooms could be transformed into erotic, articulate-publics-in-the-making.\(^ {24}\) Through Ayers’ vision of the classroom as a public square, it becomes more evident how the buoyant sociality of parrhesia would promote the creation of critically awake democratic personalities. With its rich inventory of democratic and philosophical associations--especially its ability to
inspire civic passion-- there is good reason to believe that parrhesia could serve today as a pedagogical “moral equivalent of war.”²⁵

IV. PARRHESIA AS AN ANTIDOTE TO AMERICAN “EXCEPTIONALISM”

In *Democracy Matters*, Cornel West theorizes parrhesia in ways that affirm its value as a pedagogical principle vital to the formation of democratic identities.²⁶ He presents a conception of national identity grounded in the contradictory values of democracy versus the “might makes right” values of imperialism. West takes aim at the myth of American exceptionalism and its symbiotic relation to the expansionist warrior ethos. Within this interpretation, the trajectory of U.S. history is driven by the unceasing clash of these opposing tendencies. One of the most compelling points West makes, echoing James Baldwin, is that in order for Americans to “achieve their country,” we must develop the courage to integrate the repressed dark-side of the national memory into our civic self-conceptions.

West praises parrhesia for its ability to bring radical scrutiny to the self-congratulatory platitudes which sustain dominant images of American identity. The mythic narratives of moral superiority and national innocence which inform American exceptionalism are predicated on the repression of public memories whose recovery would undermine the legitimacy of these very narratives. Thus, the pedagogical act of retrieving the forgotten memories of slavery, the nuclear attacks on the civilian populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, My Lai, Abu Ghraib, or other signifiers of injustice, would qualify as parrhesiatic. To avoid reproducing images of national superiority, inconvenient truths in particular need to be brought into view and integrated into the American civic self-conception. Enter parrhesia as a heuristic device for opening up questions and dialogue about these unsavory, institutionally repressed dimensions of American public life. Significantly, West offers a synthesis of parrhesia’s political dimension with that of caring for the self:

In the face of elite manipulations and lies, we must draw on the Socratic. The Socratic commitment to questioning requires a relentless self-examination and critique of institutions of authority, motivated by an endless quest for intellectual integrity and moral consistency. It is manifest in fearless speech—parrhesia—that unsettles, unnerves, and unhouses people from their uncritical sleepwalking.²⁷

West aptly defines the content of parrhesia’s pedagogical telos: a project that “unsetsles, unnerves and unhouses people from their uncritical sleepwalking.” Such a project can be directed outward toward a critique of institutions of authority or inward toward a critique of one’s own thinking. The concept thus has the advantage of functioning both as an ontological basis for democratic ideology as well as a potential critique of that selfsame ideology.
To summarize, I would like to suggest a two part justification for parrhesia’s inclusion into our pedagogical quivers. First, since one of the purposes of philosophy of education courses is to stimulate critical, independent thinking about students’ place in the world and who they are as teachers and citizens, it follows that we are talking about educating toward a specific mode of being. This mode of being can be generalized under the heading of a “democratic civic ontology” or a “democratic personality formation.” Such a formation (by whatever label) will come into being more readily if teachers were to harness the energies and devotions of parrhesia as an intellectual and moral ideal. Further, because the interrogatory qualities of parrhesia can be directed externally or internally—toward official authorities as well as toward one’s own thinking—it is dialectical owing to its capacity to highlight the complex relations that exist between the “psyche and the city.”

Secondly, parrhesia can help fulfill and integrate those dispositions which together constitute a holistic conception of democratic citizenship. The character traits that define democratic selfhood—questioning, passion for public affairs, dialogue, the capacity to revise, imagination, initiative, a sense of equality, a concern for the common good, an ability to enact positive forms of freedom—are traits derivative of parrhesia. Moreover, as a secular and provisional form of subjective truth, parrhesia appears to be in alignment with how American pragmatists have theorized conceptions of truth conducive to a pluralistic, multicultural society. These marvelous qualities and democratic purposes are sequestered within its symbolic boundaries. For all of these reasons, parrhesia represents a sound pedagogical principle for achieving democratic courage in action, a principle sorely needed today to counter the debilitating effects of a market-driven education and the dogged tenacity of the American warrior ethos.

Notes


5 It is important to note that parrhesia also found expression in the theatre and on the comic stage. “It was on the comic stage that the limits of Athenian toleration of parrhesia were pushed most aggressively.” See, Sara Monoson,


7 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 15.


10 Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, 53.


13 In portraying the sophists with a Platonic brush, I am not unmindful of alternative interpretations which have problematized this stereotype. See, Deron Boyles, “Sophistry, Dialectic, and Teacher Education: A Reinterpretation of Plato’s Meno.” Philosophy of Education 1996, 102-109.

14 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 16.


16 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 101.

17 Ibid, 101-103.


Ibid., 9-11.


West, 16.

Ibid., 39, 209-11.