Vocational education and training in European social policy from its origins to Cedefop

Introduction

In the course of 2001, under the auspices of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) and with its support, and in collaboration with the Historical Archives of the European Communities (HAEC), a group of researchers at the University of Florence, under the guidance of the undersigned, launched a research project on vocational training policies in the context of European integration. A detailed survey was conducted not only in several libraries, including the library of Cedefop itself, but also in various European archives. Drawing on this research and the material found, we focused on our attention on certain topics and points of particular relevance:

(a) the role of vocational training in the early stages of European integration (from the Schuman Plan to the early 1960s);

(b) the more significant developments in Community policies on vocational training between the late 1960s and the early 1970s;

(c) the part played by the ESC, as well as by the Commission and Council, in the birth of Cedefop;

(d) the influence exerted by certain social partners in developing Community policies on vocational training;

(e) the activities of Cedefop from its institution up to the 1990s.

These subjects have been covered by a number of studies. The report that follows draws on the general findings of the research, but focuses on the history of Cedefop from its origins to the 1990s.

Vocational training in the early phases of European integration up to the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community

When the process of European construction began in the second half of the 1940s, some of the nations of the old continent had to confront the grave economic and social problems brought about or aggravated by the world war that had just ended, ranging from high unemployment to housing shortages, from questions of health to educational systems requiring radical reform. For most of the leaders of the European countries there was a pressing need to find solutions to those problems, and some of the continental states committed themselves to the quest for a coherent, effective response in a national environment. Here we merely need to mention the commitment of the new Labour Government in Britain, on coming to power in the summer of 1945, to the goal of creating a welfare State to meet the needs of the citizen from the cradle to the grave. Although the construction of a welfare State was expressed mainly in national policies, the same demand also became apparent as the first few steps were taken towards European integration. At certain points in their programmes, the European movements originating in the second half of the 1940s indicated the relevance of this issue and suggested solutions to the social problems, set out in the plans, which later led to the Brussels Pact and the Council of Europe (Hick, 2000). But the social question was often considered to be part of a broader process of economic reconstruction. Furthermore, it was widely felt that an adequate response could be found to demands of a social nature in a national setting. Vocational training was no exception, being perceived as one aspect of a broad

(1) The archives in question were:
a) the Historical Archives of the European Communities attached to the European University Institute (EUI) of San Domenico di Fiesole in Florence;
b) Cedefop’s archives (Thessaloniki);
c) the archives of the International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam);
d) the archives of the European Commission, Council and Economic and Social Committee (Brussels).

(2) This study has been made possible in part as a result of the collaboration of a number of institutions and people. We would first of all like to thank Cedefop and all members of its staff for their invaluable help, in particular the Director of the Centre, Mr J. van Beers, the Deputy Director, Dr S. Kouzou, Mr N. Wollschläger, Mr M. Willem, Dr S. Petersson and Dr A. Nilsson. We should also like to mention the HARE, especially Dr J.-M. Palayret, the staff of the IISH in Amsterdam, and the staff of the Archives of the Commission, Council and Economic and Social Committee, and Mrs J. Collonval and Mr J.-M. Libet in particular. The results of the research are included in the volume The

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er reform of educational systems and of the organisation of labour markets. In that general context there was one fairly significant exception: the position of Italy. Among the various major problems with which post-war Italy had to grapple was its post-war economic and social problem: the presence of a great surplus of manpower, especially in the impoverished and backward regions of southern Italy. One of the few effective remedies to that problem was emigration. Against this background, the Italian authorities focused their attention on education and the inpoverished and backward regions of Southern Europe because they felt that the process of integration might open up the labour markets of Western Europe to the Italian unemployed.

The question of vocational training could not be ignored, even though government initiatives did not often prove effective and although the problem was tackled from the national viewpoint (Romero, 1991). Another factor that could not be disregarded was the influence exerted by the Marshall Plan, and not only in the economic context since the Marshall Plan had broader implications. The emphasis placed on new forms of industrial relations and modernisation highlighted the role of the economic and social forces in the construction of an affluent society on the one hand and, on the other, the desirability of up-to-date vocational training that would enable the labour force to adapt to a modern economic system, whose point of reference was the United States. A major role was performed by what was called the ‘productivity program’ (Carew, 1987). As pointed out by David Ellwood: ‘... great emphasis was placed on collective consumption and the redemption of wartime promises of housing, education and security in work, old age and ill health. To realise those aims and maintain economies in balance was the purpose of the ‘social contracts’ which emerged almost everywhere in these years. Involving permanent negotiation between governments, employers and trade unions of a distinctly “corporatist” kind, these arrangements characterised the long boom throughout Western Europe and appeared an indispensable element in the foundation of post-war mixed economies’ (Ellwood, 1992). Although the Marshall Plan aimed to promote forms of close European cooperation, the most significant impact of these phenomena in Western European societies was mainly at a national level. The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) - the most important outcome of the initiatives developed under the European Recovery Program in the late 1940s - ultimately came to be seen as an instrument for achieving bland intergovernmental cooperation without there being any serious attempt to create a European social model (1).

As is well known, the Schuman Plan, launched in May 1950, was the true starting point for the process of European integration, especially as it stressed the functionalist approach and the objective of supranationality (2). In fact it was to lead to the development of one of the first European social policies, under which vocational training was to have a certain role. When the French authorities put forward the plan for an integrated coal and steel community, Monnet and his colleagues realised that it would have had a strong impact not just on production and the future of the coal and steel industries but also on the lives of thousands of workers in the coal and steel sector. To implement the Schuman Plan, therefore, it was advisable to secure the broad consensus of all those workers whose destiny would be so heavily influenced by the decisions of the future High Authority. Monnet and Schuman could not ignore the sombre atmosphere of the cold war and the tough opposition to Europeanists plans from the Communist parties and the unions under Communist control. In both France and Italy there were deep rifts in the workers’ movement, and the Catholic and Socialist unions were trying to persuade workers that their interests were defended not only by the Communist organisations (3). Meanwhile in West Germany the union movement, although generally taking an anti-Communist stance, was influenced by the Social Democratic Party, which had come out critically against the Schuman Plan (Ciampanti, 1995, 2001). Monnet therefore decided to involve some of the union leaders in the Paris negotiations, and certain articles of the treaty setting up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), signed in 1951, provided for the implementation of social action by the Community, although some of them were fairly vague. When the High Authority launched its activities in summer 1952, Monnet was aware that the ECSC would have to establish close, constructive relationships with the economic and social partners, including non-Communist unions, and that a broad consensus for the new Community among the iron and steel workers could be achieved only if it were to embark on

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(4) For a general view of events in the main European unions, see A. Maiello, 2002.
new and effective policies in the social environment.

In the first place the ECSC stressed the question of representation. Two union leaders, Paul Finet from Belgium and Heinz Potthoff from Germany, became members of the High Authority. Furthermore, the High Authority urged the creation of an Advisory Committee that would be made up of representatives of employers’ organisations, trade unions and associations representing consumers and ‘traders’ (Mechi, 2000).

As regards social policy, the High Authority formulated various initiatives: a) plans were launched for the construction of thousands of new housing units for coal and steel industry workers; b) studies were initiated with a view to improving safety and working conditions; c) last but not least, measures were introduced in favour of workers who might lose their jobs as a result of the High Authority’s decisions. In this respect, the ECSC had funds for relocating redundant members of the work force, and vocational training was regarded as one of the most effective instruments for this purpose (Mechi, 1994/95; 2003).

The Treaties of Rome and the first steps towards a Community policy on vocational training

Although the ECSC initiatives are normally considered to be a major step forward in the development of a European social policy within which vocational training had a significant role, the creation of the EEC and its early actions are seen as a very different story. Political leaders, diplomats and experts who played a prominent role in the negotiations that were to lead to the signing of the Treaties of Rome rejected Monnet’s proposal and the pressures brought to bear by the unions for involving the economic and social partners in defining the text of the treaties (Varsori, 1995; 1999). They adopted a very cautious attitude to the supranational approach and to the implementation of European policies, except for the creation of an effective customs union for industrial and agricultural products. Once again, Italy was a separate case: due to the gap between itself and other countries, its economic weakness and the persisting problem of southern Italy, the Italian delegates attempted to include certain clauses in the EEC treaty that provided for some form of European social policy. An internal agreement was in fact reached on certain principles, such as the advisability of solving the problem of regional imbalances. There were plans for setting up a European Social Fund (ESF), as well as a European Investment Bank. In addition, Italy’s partners accepted the principle of mobility of labour. Lastly, in the final phases of the negotiations, especially as a result of the pressures exerted by certain unions, the ‘Six’ also tackled the question of representation of the economic and social forces. Despite strong opposition from the West German delegates, the Treaties of Rome made provision for setting up an Economic and Social Committee, under the Commission and Council, which was to have a tripartite membership of representatives of employers, the trade unions and organisations representing ‘various interests’. The ESC was, however, to be an advisory body and would not be empowered to adopt measures on its own initiative (Varsori, 1995; 1999; 2000).

It is usually held that the EEC had no effective social policy from its origin in 1958 up to the early 1970s. This is only partly true. The majority of the leaders of the ‘Six’ felt that problems of a social nature ought to be tackled at national level, and in those years the Community Member States created or reinforced their own national welfare systems (Le politiche sociali in Europa, Bologna, 1999). In addition, the economy of Western Europe was passing through a period of strong, steady growth, combined with close to full employment, which in the end helped to ease social tensions (Aldcroft, 1993). Nonetheless, the social issue was not altogether neglected (see in general Degimbe, 1999). The ESC fought strenuously for recognition as an independent body that could influence the decisions of the Commission and the Council. Within the ESC the representatives of the unions proved to be particularly active, and frequent calls were made for the Community to develop an effective social policy. Very soon the ESC developed a clear concern for the connections between work and education, focusing its attention on vocational training, which was conceived as a useful instrument for improving workers’ conditions, modernising the economic system and creating closer and more effective links between the labour market and educational systems. The Italian authorities also reaffirmed their interest in drawing up some form of European social policy that might contribute towards

(*) It should be pointed out that a European vocational training policy was regarded not as an objective in its own right but as an instrument for promoting economic development.
their country’s development and help to solve the problems of southern Italy and emigration (see Petriti, 2004). In 1960 the EEC set up the ESF, although for over ten years of its life this could draw on no more than 420 million units of account. It should be borne in mind, however, that part of those funds were allocated to vocational training measures to help jobless workers, although this was implemented in the national context and without a specific Community approach emerging to the question of vocational training. In fact, Article 128 of the EEC Treaty established that it would be the task of the Council of Ministers to lay down general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy capable of contributing to the economic development of the Community (4). Discussions on implementing Article 128 were launched shortly thereafter and in March 1961 the then Commissioner for Social Affairs, Lionello Levi Sandri from Italy, said that: ‘... the demand for coordination of vocational training policies was making itself heard not only at Community level but also within the various countries having agencies and authorities with responsibility for vocational training’. And he added: ‘... In proposing several general principles designed to guide the implementation of a common policy on vocational training, the Commission aims to provide uniform guidance on the problem in every Member State’ (4). In that context the Commission was strongly supported by the ESC, which produced a series of studies on the issue (4). But not until April 1963 did the Council state those principles, and even then in very vague terms. The principles did not clarify the duties of Member States and the Community, nor did they provide a detailed description of the content of a possible European vocational training. Nevertheless, in late 1963 the EEC set up an Advisory Committee on vocational training, consisting of 36 members (each national delegation was to consist of six people, two representatives of government departments, two of the unions, two of the employers’ associations) (4). Some Member States, Italy in particular, hoped that this Advisory Committee might play a significant role in formulating effective European action in vocational training (4). In fact the Advisory Committee made an effort to develop certain specific initiatives and, for example, in 1965 set up a working group with the task of identifying the principles that should guide experts involved in vocational training in the ‘Six’ (the training of trainers) (4). In the same year the Commission concerned itself with the idea of a Community policy on vocational training, with special reference to agriculture; it should be borne in mind that only a few years earlier the EEC had launched the Common Agricultural Policy. It is significant that both the Commission and the Advisory Committee suggested greater integration in this area and the development of studies to promote a common approach by the ‘Six’ to vocational training (4). This opinion was shared by political circles in the European Parliament, and on occasions the Strasbourg Assembly pointed out the advisability of creating close contacts between the national bodies concerned with promoting vocational training (4). In fact many officials within the Community seemed to be persuaded that it was in the interests of the ‘Six’ to launch a common policy on vocational training, but their ideas were unclear and it was difficult to identify a common conceptual framework of reference; each Member State, with the possible exception of Italy, preferred to follow its own national path.

The turning point of the 1970s and the birth of Cedefop

The EEC’s attitude towards the question of social policy, and also to vocational training, underwent a radical change between the late 1960s and the early 1970s as a result of certain specific events:

- a) the student movement in May 1968, breaking out first in France and then in other European countries, highlighting the emergence of new social needs and new actors in European societies (for example the need for a radical reform of the educational system and the launching of a debate on the relations between education and labour market, the demands being put forward by groups such as students, women, etc.);
- b) a new and more active role for the unions at both national and international level (for example, the workers’ movement that featured in what was dubbed the ‘hot autumn’ of 1969 in Italy, the decision by certain Communist-inspired unions to be involved in Community moves, the creation in 1973 of the European Trade Union Confederation, etc.) (Gobin, 1997);
- c) the economic crisis from which most of

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(4) Brussels Archives de la Commission (BAC), 173/95, 2828, Information note on the work of the Economic and Social Committee, 7.3.1963.

(4) See documentation in BAC 173/95, 2828.


(4) BAC 174/95, 1045, EEC Commission’s action programmes on a common vocational training policy in general and in agriculture - Commission communication to the Council, 5.5.1965; Advisory Committee on vocational training, Opinion on the draft ‘Action programme on a common vocational training policy’, 19.3.1965.


(4) Archives of the Economic and Social Committee (AESC), 1223/1, letter from M. Germozzi to M. Berns, 22.7.1969. On the work of the ESC see in particular the paper by E. Dundovich, 2004.
the countries of Western Europe suffered in the 1970s, in particular after 1973, with the resulting rise in the rate of unemployment;

d) the first enlargement of the EEC to nations such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, characterised by areas of long-standing economic and social backwardness or dramatic de-industrialisation;

e) the fresh efforts by Italy to tackle the question of the Mezzogiorno with the help of the European Community.

One of the first results of those developments was a renewed interest in tripartite forms of social dialogue, not only at national but also at European level. In April 1970 the first tripartite conference was held in Luxembourg, attended by representatives of the unions, employers' associations, the Commission and the Labour Ministers of the ‘six’. On that occasion many delegates put forward the idea of creating a standing committee on employment, and this was in fact set up a few months later. In this context the launching of a European social policy, with the inclusion of vocational training, became an obvious topic of debate within the European Community (Guasconi, 2003).

A little earlier, in summer 1969, an eminent Italian member of the ESC, Marcello Germozzi, had made the suggestion that the ESC should concern itself with the question of vocational training (16). The subject was discussed in February 1970 by the Social Affairs Section of the ESC, and on that occasion some members of the Committee expressed the view that the Community should create a European centre for the study of vocational training. In particular the German union representative, Maria Weber, clearly expounded the reasons for that proposal: ‘... the Community’s activities on the subject of vocational training have not been as intensive or as substantial over the past few years as Community activities in other fields; vocational training, however, is a vital factor, especially in matters of employment. Certainly the Commission recommends harmonisation in matters of training, but it is difficult to harmonise something about which one knows little; it is therefore important to set up a European Institute which, along the lines of what is already being done in certain Member States, ... might help to achieve better coordination among the authorities, workers and employers’ (17). Moreover, the need for detailed research in this sector was now forcefully perceived in many Community countries, since vocational training was seen as an effective solution to many economic and social problems (unemployment, adapting to new technologies, the various relationships between social groups such as young people and women and the labour market). Furthermore, vocational training needed to be linked with the process of reform of the educational systems and tackled scientifically so as to place the emphasis on research and the exchange of information on different experiences. On this subject, it should be pointed out that in 1969 the German Federal Republic had established the Bundesinstitut fur Berufsbildungsforshung (BBF), which was to become a sort of model in this field (18). For its part the ESC, partly as a result of the initiatives brought about by Marcello Germozzi and Maria Weber, pressed on with its efforts that culminated in the proposal for the creation of a European institute for vocational training (19).

Meanwhile, between November 1970 and July 1971 the Council launched a draft action programme in vocational training with the object of revising the principles drawn up in 1963. Following a decision of the Council, the Commission was officially entrusted with the task of formulating a European policy on vocational training (20). The question was debated, for example, in late May 1971 by the Standing Committee on Employment. Maria Weber, who was a member of this body as well, confirmed that ‘... the organisation has long hoped to see the creation of a European Institute that might promote research in the domain of training and establish the framework for fruitful collaboration among national institutions. It should be possible to finance the creation of such an institute out of the Community budget’ (21). Although other members of the Committee nursed a more prudent vision, the idea that vocational training should become a subject of research and exchange of information and experience at European level started to become established, as demonstrated by the findings of certain studies promoted by the Commission in the course of 1972. For example, in a report on the activities of a study group set up by the Commission, the French expert on the Committee suggested the creation of a European centre for studies and research on the development of qualifications and educational and vocational training methods (22).
Despite all this, the Commission seemed to adopt a very cautious attitude and, in an important document produced at the end of October 1972 on preliminary measures with a view to the implementation of a common vocational training policy, the creation of a European studies centre on this theme was indicated as a remote and still vague objective (24).

Pressure for the development of a more effective European social policy came from the Paris Summit held in December 1972. For the first time European Community leaders identified the implementation of a social policy as a major objective, and the Commission was asked to launch a specific social action programme. Vocational training was an important item on the Commission's agenda. The question in general terms, as well as the creation of a European institute, were the responsibility of the Directorate General for Social Affairs and the Directorate General for Research, Science and Education. In practice, the Commission continued to adopt a cautious approach to setting up a European studies centre for vocational training. Some documents pointed out that the publication of a bulletin might be the best way of disseminating information on the subject, and it was stated that a journal of this kind might be published by a national institute and then distributed by the Community (25). Despite this, certain governments - in particular the French and Italian - displayed a growing interest in the creation of a European centre. In December 1973 the work of the Commission, including its work on the suggested European centre for vocational training, was considered by the Council of Ministers for Social Affairs; in the first part of the meeting, the document drawn up by the Commission was strongly criticised by the representatives of certain countries, with the UK delegate going so far as to reject the plan for a European centre. In fact, as explained in a Commission report: "This position seems to have arisen from a poor drafting of the Commission text ... "A common training policy cannot be implemented by the creation of a Centre". The Centre will provide operational support to the Commission, but it will be the Commission which, together with the Council, will have to implement the common vocational training policy. After a forceful intervention from President Ortoli in favour of the creation of the Centre and a proposal by the President of the Council that the words "in particular by the creation ..." be replaced by "including by the creation ...", the United Kingdom withdrew its veto. The Council's intention was certainly not to promote the creation of a body making policy choices; the future centre was merely to provide predominantly 'technical' support for the choices of the Council and Commission. It was not by chance that, on the same occasion, members of the Council pointed out the need to clarify the aims of the Centre, whereas representatives of Germany and Italy expressed the hope that the concept of education would be added to the more restricted concept of vocational training stated in the Commission document (26). At this point the Community Member States, especially in the aftermath of the grave economic crisis triggered off by the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, were determined to devise an effective social policy, and in January 1974 the Council launched its first social action programme, highlighting three basic objectives: full employment, the achievement of better living and working conditions and the involvement of the social actors in Community decisions (Degimbe, 1999; pp. 20-21, 93-116) (27). The creation of a Centre concerned with vocational training obviously followed from these objectives, and the Commission embarked on the drafting of a specific plan. In a document drawn up by DG XII, it was stated that this Centre should be a centralised unit having an operational role in the service of the Commission and be closely linked with the Commission. There were plans for setting up a 'steering committee' made up of representatives of the economic and social forces and governments, but the Directorate General was in favour of appointing a senior Commission official as the head of the Centre. It was argued on this subject that the staff of the Centre would consist of some 20 people (recruited under a contract according to a formula comparable to that of the European Cooperation Association, AEC); Brussels would be the seat of the Centre (28). It is hardly surprising that certain Commission officials hoped that the Centre would not have an independent role, and that aspect was stressed several times (29). It was felt that it should be a 'satellite' of the Commission. Nevertheless, probably because of the widely held opinions in other Commission circles, certain significant new factors were contained in the proposal that was submitted to the Council's attention in late March 1974. The Centre was now conceived 'as a body with its own le-


(25) It should be pointed out that in this climate the European union movement was also being reinforced, with the creation in 1973 of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). See Gehin, 1997; passim.


(27) BAC 64/84, 1001, Note for the attention of Mr Shanks by G. Schuster, 18.2.1974.

(28) BAC 64/84, 1001, Commission of the European Communities - Establishment of a European vocational training centre (Proposal from the Commission to the Council) COM(74)525 Final, 27.3.1974.

(29) See also the documentation in AESC, 1260/1 and 1260/2.

gal personality, which will still be very closely linked to the Community institutions and particularly to the Commission. The plan was to create a management board, made up of representatives of the unions, the employers’ associations and the Commission, and to establish a Committee consisting of national experts. The document also pointed out that the Director was to be the key element in the structure of the Centre. His terms of employment would be laid down in an ad hoc statute. The Centre would be conceived mainly as a driving force which, inter alia, would be required to act as a catalyst for the most innovatory guidelines with a view to achieving a harmonious development of vocational training in its widest sense, within the Community. Last but not least, it was hoped that the Centre would come into operation by 1975, and the costs for the first year of its activities were expected to amount to 600 000 units of account, rising to 1 450 000 for 1976 and 1 800 000 for 1977 (30). In this new vision, although continuing to be closely linked to the Commission, the Centre would gain a degree of autonomy and would be based on ‘tripartite’ management.

Other European institutions expressed their views of the project. The ESC, for its part, stated that the term ‘vocational training’ should be interpreted very broadly. As regards the Centre’s Management Board, the Committee proposed - contrary to the views of the union representatives - a quadripartite structure, i.e. the representatives of the Commission, four representatives of employers, four representatives of the unions and four representatives of various activities. In particular, it suggested that the President of the Social Affairs Section should be a member. Lastly, the Committee hoped that all its proposals on the Centre’s tasks and working methods would be brought to the attention of the Management Board of the Centre (ESC, 1975) (32). The ESC therefore proposed its own structures as a model, in an attempt to find a role for the ‘various activities’ sector. As far as the European Parliament was concerned, its observations had far more far-reaching implications: one of the points made by the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment of the Strasbourg Assembly was that the Centre should enjoy ‘autonomy and the power of initiative’, it should, however, maintain close contact with the Community institutions and should call on existing national centres to avoid overlapping and the dispersion of resources. Furthermore, in the opinion of the Parliament, it would be advisable to increase the number of representatives of social partners, and also of the national experts. Lastly, the European Assembly felt that the estimated budget would prove inadequate and expressed its surprise that the seat of the Centre had not yet been identified (34).

The whole question was reviewed by the Council in the second half of 1974. This body expressed its dissent regarding certain significant aspects of the proposals put forward by the Commission, and the text presented underwent a set of amendments to take account of its criticisms. This intervention reflected the fact that most Member States were keen to limit the powers of the Commission, placing the emphasis on the predominantly intergovernmental nature of European integration. The Council decided on a radical change to the composition of the Management Board. Representatives of national governments were added to those of the economic and social forces and the Commission. The role of the latter was reshaped, the German delegation exerting pressure on the other partners to arrive at a membership of the Board that would make it impossible for the representatives of Member States to be placed in the minority. Under this new scheme, the Committee of Experts was also eliminated. The Council confirmed, on the other hand, that the Centre would enjoy broad autonomy. There was a lively debate among Ministers on the role of the Director, with the French delegation proposing that he should be appointed by the Council, whereas the British delegation preferred him to be nominated by the Management Board. Lastly, no fewer than seven delegations were of the opinion that the Director should be chosen by the Commission from among candidates put forward by the Management Board (35). Meanwhile, the question of the seat of the new body was resolved by the choice of West Berlin. This was clearly a political decision, since it had been suggested by the Bonn Government to demonstrate that the western part of the former capital of Germany was a full part of the West (32). On 1 February 1975 the Council of Ministers was finally able to announce the decision that a European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) was to be established (36).

(32) This decision, one not taken at random, was bitterly criticised by the Soviet authorities as well as by some of the Western Communist-influenced organisations, for example the French trade union CGT.
The work of Cedefop

The early stages of Cedefop’s life did not prove to be easy. The first meeting of the Management Board did not take place until the end of October 1975, when it was held at the Kongresshalle in Berlin under the chairmanship of Mr Shanks, Director General for Social Affairs at the Commission. It was recorded in the minutes of the meeting that ‘As the Centre had not as yet any official facilities, all the preparatory work had been carried out by the Commission in spite of the limited resources at its disposal in the current climate of austerity’ (Cedefop, 1975). On this occasion certain preliminary questions were discussed and solutions found. In the first place, the Management Board identified a Dane, Carl Jørgensen, as the most suitable candidate for the office of Director. As for the seat of the Centre, the West Berlin Senate had offered a building at 22 Bundessallee, ‘free of charge for a period of 30 years’, the Berlin authorities had also declared that they were prepared to contribute a million marks towards the restructuring of the building. Most of the subsequent year was devoted to drawing up the Centre’s regulations and recruiting its staff, as well as drawing up their contracts. In the meantime, work continued on adapting the Bundessallee building to the needs of the new body. In the first few months of 1976 the Director and his two deputies had only a single room in the European Communities information centre, and it was not until March of that year that the first secretary started work. As regards the work of Cedefop, the Director and his immediate staff paid a few visits to several national institutes concerned with vocational training. They also started to establish contacts with officials in this sector in the Member States and to identify the main issues on which Cedefop was to focus, one of the Centre’s first concerns being seen as youth unemployment. There also seemed to be some uncertainty as to the tasks of Cedefop. At a meeting of the Management Board, held in July 1976, it was stated that ‘the Centre should not duplicate work already being done nor attempt to formulate national policy’ and that ‘the Centre should not give undue priority to harmonisation but pay regard to the nature and differences which do exist in the various countries’ (Cedefop, 1976a). In other words, it was feared that Cedefop was a body that would deprive national governments of powers in sectors over which States continued to consider that they had full powers. The minutes of the Management Board meetings convey a clear impression that in this initial phase the Management Board and the person to whom he was answerable, Jean Degimbe, Director General at the Commission, played the predominant role. Finally, in a meeting of the Management Board in November 1976 an effective programme of work could be drawn up for 1977. The Centre’s main objectives were:

a) the publication of a bulletin;

b) ‘to collect and process documentation and disseminate existing information’;

c) to launch studies on subjects such as youth unemployment, especially in relation to the transition from school to work - this being chosen as the main priority - women, in particular married or older women, wishing to re-enter the labour force, ‘continuous education and training’, ‘drawing up of a multilingual glossary on vocational training’, ‘establishment of comparative studies on national vocational training systems’ (Cedefop, 1976b).

This was a well-judged programme which placed the emphasis on study and research and did not try to influence national policies, nor offer a starting point for independent action by the Commission. In December 1976 Cedefop organised its first study seminar on youth unemployment, which was held at Zandvoort. In March 1977 the Centre made the permanent move to the seat in the Bundessallee (36) and in May that year the Centre published the first issue of its Bulletin. Even so, the Centre still seemed far from settling down in terms both of its objectives and its organisation. As regards this latter aspect in particular, there were serious problems with staff recruitment, for example: in early 1977 two experts were forced to withdraw from the Centre’s recruitment process, certain positions were still vacant and the availability of two grade A5 posts for translators and one secretarial post was not confirmed. In addition the Director, Carl Jørgensen, decided to tender his resignation, ending a fairly insignificant experience that had lasted about a year and a half (Cedefop, 1977) (36). Last but not least some members of the staff were starting to complain about their status, which was very different from and a good deal less favourable than...
the status enjoyed by Community officials. At the meeting of the Management Board held in September 1977, a new Director was appointed in the person of the Frenchman, Roger Faist, and Yves Corpet, the French representative of the employers’ associations, took over Jean Degimbe’s post as chairman of the Management Board. The appointment of the new Director was an important event because Faist, the former Secretary General of the Confédération Française des Travailleurs (CFDT) (37), had the primary aim of broadening out Cedefop’s work. The Centre also decided to continue to focus on the issues selected in 1975, in particular youth unemployment and a comparative analysis of the various national vocational training systems. Further study seminars were arranged, new contacts were made and there were determined efforts to improve the Cedefop Bulletin (Cedefop, 1978a). In spite of this, in the course of 1978 fresh difficulties arose, particularly from the point of view of the Centre’s organisation: further protests were made by staff members as to their legal status, the Community tried to impose certain cuts in the Centre’s budget and the Management Board expressed reservations as to some of the expenses budgeted for (Cedefop, 1978b; 1978c). It is hardly surprising, then, that the work of Cedefop came under fire from some of the European institutions.

In April 1979 a report by the European Parliament listed a series of negative comments, sustaining in particular that ‘... the Centre’s activities led to their first results only after a relative lengthy starting-up period’ and ‘... the choice of Berlin as the Centre’s seat that was made by the Council of Ministers, and the large number of members of the Management Board, have had an unfavourable role in this respect’. Furthermore, the Strasbourg Assembly suggested that Cedefop ‘... should move as far as possible in the direction of activities that might, under the current socio-economic conditions, be of practical value’. It also looked for closer cooperation between Cedefop and international centres with similar interests and with national institutions (38). These criticisms were the result of investigations conducted by the Parliament but, as Degimbe explained in a letter to the Vice President of the European Commission Henk Vredeling: ‘from the views expressed by the Parliamentarians, it is apparent that Parliament is very negative towards ESC “satellite” agencies over which it cannot exercise the same control as it does over the work of the Commission’ (39). Parliament felt that the agencies were eluding its control; this was an important issue for a body fighting tooth and nail to have its own powers and competences increased. As for Cedefop, as a consequence of these views, the Centre was careful over the next few years to cultivate closer links with the Parliament, as it had already done with the Commission, which in any case could rely on the presence of its officials on the Management Board. Certain criticisms were also made in this same period by the European Court of Auditors which, among other things, stated that in its first few years of activity Cedefop had not been able to make full use of the financial resources placed at its disposal, and that the Bulletin publication costs were seen as too high. The Centre made an effort to deal with these criticisms; for example, emphasis was placed on the publication of a ‘newsletter’ (Cedefop, 1980a; 1980b).

Despite these difficulties, between 1979 and the early 1980s there was a marked improvement in Cedefop’s activities and structures. At this point the Centre could count on a staff of some 35 people, and there was a steady rise in its budget: in 1979 Cedefop had ECU 2 790 808 at its disposal; in 1980 this figure rose to ECU 3 500 000, and in 1981 to ECU 3 736 000 (Cedefop, 1981b; 1983). The year 1982 marked a turning point in the work of the Centre. Because of the prolonged economic crisis and the growing number of unemployed, the European Community attempted to develop more effective action in vocational training, and the Commission therefore focused on two subjects: the link existing between new technologies and vocational training, and the suggestion that a project should be launched that would promote the harmonisation of vocational qualifications. The Director of Cedefop had, moreover, considered the advisability of the Centre expanding its activities over the long term (Cedefop, 1981a; 1982a). In 1982 the Centre drew up a three-year plan attempting to reconcile the new lines of intervention indicated by the Commission with the research that had been launched in the previous years (Cedefop, 1983) (40). This general trend was confirmed in 1983, especially as the suggestions put forward by the Commission were approved by the Council (Cedefop, 1984). Cedefop also aimed to reinforce all the sectors in which it was active, such as the library, information service and publications; in the latter

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(37) This suggestion had already been made by Roger Faist in 1981.
(38) BAC 511/98, 445, Draft Commission decision.
(39) The impact of the Single European Act on the social policies pursued by the Community is highlighted, for example, in Kowalsky, 2000.
(40) In 1987 the budget was ECU 6 586 000, a decrease of approximately 10 %.
(41) On the meetings held in Brussels, see the documents in the Guerra files, for instance Cedefop, 1987c.
area, in 1984 in addition to its Vocational Training journal and the Cedefop Newsletter it started up the Cedefop Flash. In the same year, the Centre brought out three issues of Vocational Training Journal in a run of 10,000, besides printing 25,000 copies of Cedefop News, which it estimated might reach over 40,000 readers. As part of the information service, in 1984 the Centre also completed a Thesaurus and started to make use of new information technologies. Cedefop was also able to use about 95% of the financial resources it had been assigned. These results were achieved in spite of the persistence of certain organisational problems: the size of the staff grew at a very slow pace (in 1984 the Centre had a staff of 42), whereas its budget rose at a rate barely sufficient to cope with the inflationary spiral in EEC countries; in 1983 its funding had been ECU 4,210,000, in 1984 ECU 4,560,000 (Cedefop, 1985a). In addition, the legal status of its staff continued to create serious difficulties, as the Community authorities displayed no intention of applying to Cedefop employees the regulations laid down for Community officials, and senior staff at the Centre seemed to be unable to influence the thinking in Brussels on this thorny issue. Lastly, during 1982 organisational problems came to a head and the Staff Committee tendered its resignation in protest against this state of affairs - a symptom of some internal conflict and disquiet among the Centre’s staff (Cedefop, 1982c; 1982d).

In 1984 Faiß’s term of office was coming to an end; the German Ernst Piehl was appointed as the new Director. Piehl, born in 1943, had graduated from the Berlin Free University. From 1969 to 1975 he was a member of the German Trade Union (DGB) research institute in Düsseldorf, before being nominated as Director of the European Youth Centre in the Council of Europe and taking up an important post in the ESC in 1980 (43). The arrival of Piehl at the head of Cedefop coincided with certain important developments in the Centre’s activities and structures. In June 1984 the European Fontainebleau Summit opened up a new phase in European construction: there was a strengthening of the Franco-German ‘couple’, and in 1985 Jacques Delors became the President of the Commission. In June of the same year, as a result of the European Council in Milan, the Community launched an intergovernmental conference that was to lead to the signature of the Single European Act. In that year Portugal and Spain became full members of the European Community. The growing resources available to the Community budget and the greater emphasis being placed on a series of social policies, the needs in this context highlighted by the enlargement towards Southern Europe and the identification of new areas of intervention by the Community were all additional factors that were to reinforce the role of Cedefop (44). In 1986 available resources in the Centre’s budget increased by approximately 50% (from ECU 4,910,000 in 1985 to ECU 7,388,000 in 1986) and the number of employees reached 54.

From the point of view of premises as well, the Centre now had new buildings and a new conference room. As regards its activities, in 1985 Cedefop approved a new three-year programme featuring its regular fields of intervention but based on decisions of the Council and the Commission. The Centre would now focus on new issues as well, for example the harmonisation of workers’ qualifications in the various Member States and the use of new technologies in vocational training, in particular information technology. The first objective gave rise to a detailed study in which many Cedefop officials were to be involved and which led to closer contacts with the national institutes and government authorities concerned with the promotion of vocational training (Cedefop, 1987) (45). The Centre could now claim that it was managing to use almost 99% of the financial resources allocated (Cedefop, 1988a). It should be borne in mind that the Community began, from 1986 onwards, to pay greater attention to vocational training, for instance by launching a number of new programmes such as Comett. This paved the way for closer contacts between the Commission and Cedefop, in particular with DG V, as can be seen from an interesting exchange of letters between the Director for Education and Training, Hywel C. Jones, and Piehl (see, for instance, Cedefop, 1987b; 1987d) (46), and the increasingly frequent meetings between Cedefop’s senior staff and Commission officials.

In spite of these positive developments which tended to strengthen the Centre’s role, these years were not without their problems and difficulties. At the time of Ernst Piehl’s appointment the Staff Committee reiterated that the people working for Cedefop had not yet succeeded in obtaining a contractual sta-
the in this field, Cedefop was keen to play a role within Cedefop. This divergent also related to the conduct of Cedefop’s activities and, as Politi wrote in a letter to Piehl: ‘... Over the past three years you have placed the emphasis on the problems of the Centre’s image and political contacts; all the departments have worked towards this objective, which has brought us great benefits: a higher budget, new posts, a more functional and comfortable headquarters, etc. This strategy has been developed at the expense of internal restructuring, the strengthening of departments, the development of information technology and the activities of research and quality control and at the price of considerable internal demotivation ... The time has come to restore the balance, otherwise we risk becoming a ‘gilded cage’, devoid of internal motivation and incapable of facing up to the challenges of 1992. The Centre is increasingly coming to resemble a ministerial cabinet, in which everyone may be called upon to do anything in response to political constraints rather than acting as a specialist European Agency offering high-level development and research services’ (Cedefop, 1988b). It is hard to decide whether Politi’s affirmations were soundly based or if they were merely an expression of differences of a personal nature. Nevertheless, in the years thereafter Politi continued with his role within Cedefop.

The fall of the Berlin wall, the launching of the political and diplomatic process that was to lead to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the renewed emphasis on the objective of economic and social cohesion and, lastly, the launch of major programmes such as Socrates, Petra, Leonardo and Phare all seemed to be factors that would promote the work of Cedefop. In 1989, the Commission set up a ‘task force’ for human resources, education, training and youth. From the outset, this body endeavoured to forge close ties with Cedefop in order to draw on the competences that the Berlin Centre had acquired (Cedefop, 1990b). While the Commission’s main aim was to make use of the experience that Cedefop had acquired in this field, Cedefop was keen to play a real part in shaping the decisions taken by the Community and it would seem that the Centre was at least partially successful in this respect. This is borne out by a note from Piehl in January 1991 following a series of meetings in Brussels between the Centre’s senior staff and the Commission. The note outlines Cedefop’s direct involvement in the Community programmes on vocational training; a further task of the Centre was to raise awareness of Community choices in this field among the various national institutions (Cedefop, 1991b). It should nevertheless be borne in mind that, for its part, the Commission reminded Cedefop that the emphasis should be placed on its ‘function of direct technical assistance to the Commission’, in other words its subordination to Brussels’ choices (Cedefop, 1990c). Furthermore, the Centre now represented a consolidated body in the panorama of Community structures. In 1988 Cedefop’s budget rose by 11 % over the previous year, by 14 % in 1989, by 7 % in 1990 and by approximately 16 % in 1991. For its part the Centre concentrated on its studies and research activities, which accounted for about 44 % of its total expenditure in 1990, compared to about 18 % for publications and approximately 22 % for translation. This trend continued in 1991, as well as over the subsequent years (Cedefop, 1990; 1991; 1992).

But ultimately German reunification and the Maastricht Treaty had radical and unforeseen consequences for Cedefop. On the occasion of the European Council held in Brussels in October 1993, the leading European body took the decision of moving the seat of the Centre. Germany was now to host the future European Central Bank, and up to this time Greece had no European organisation or institution within its territory. For obvious reasons of establishing a political equilibrium, then, the Council saw it as appropriate for Cedefop to be transferred to Thessaloniki. This sudden decision came like a bolt from the blue for the Centre and its staff. In addition, a few months later Piehl’s term of office came to an end and it became necessary to appoint a new Director who would have to cope with the transfer of the Centre over a relatively short time scale. In the spring of 1994 Johan van Rens, a Netherlands union leader, was named the new Director of Cedefop, and Stavros Skarvou, a Greek academic at the University of Thessaloniki, was appointed Deputy Director. The move from Berlin to Thessaloniki created a range of serious problems: new headquarters had to be found and, above all,
many members of the staff were unwilling to consider moving to Greece. At this point the European Union agreed to the idea of drawing up measures to encourage mobility, and those Cedefop officials who were not prepared to transfer to Thessaloniki were offered posts in European institutions elsewhere. It is significant, however, that because of the transfer and the simultaneous enlargement of the EU to three new countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden), the Centre's budget was substantially increased (by approximately 48%), so that in 1995 it amounted to ECU 16.5 million, levelling off in subsequent years to about ECU 14.5 million. There was also an increase in the number of Cedefop staff members to 79. This was accompanied by a radical change in the staff structure and, as stated in the Annual Report for 1998: 'Since 1995, 14 members of the staff have left for various reasons, 26 members have transferred to the EC Commission and other EC institutions. Two members of staff are on leave on personal grounds' (Cedefop, 1999). In 1998, 75% of the staff had been with Cedefop for less than three years, and 23% were Greek nationals. In spite of these significant changes, Cedefop tried to return rapidly to 'business as usual', and in the Annual Report for 1996 the new Director, van Rens, and the Chairman of the Management Board, Tom O’Dwyer, could state with a touch of pride: ‘... Discussion and debate on realigning the Centre’s activities, true to its commitment to do better, culminated in the Management Board approval of medium-term priorities on the basis of the lines indicated by Commissioner Cresson. The medium-term priorities set the course for the future targeted action to respond effectively to the needs for information, research and cooperation at European level in the sphere of vocational education and training. As the following report demonstrates, the Centre’s activities during 1996 reflects this transition, focusing on three main areas of work: trends in qualifications, analysis of vocational training systems and the Centre’s role as an agent for information and communication’ (Cedefop, 1997). Particularly significant was Cedefop’s obvious keenness to forge closer ties with the various Community institutions, in particular the Commission, as stressed in all the Annual Reports. This also paved the way for Cedefop’s joint involvement in a series of Commission initiatives, particularly with the Directorate-General for Education and Culture (see, for instance, Cedefop, 1999, p. 15; Cedefop, 2000, p. 9).

In 1999, partly due to the efforts of the Greek authorities, Cedefop could count on a new and modern building on the outskirts of Thessaloniki. The next year marked the 25th anniversary of its creation (Cedefop, 2001): together with the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions based in Dublin, Cedefop had been the first European agency. Set up in the mid-1970s as a result of the Community’s increasing interest in social policy, the Centre’s first years were difficult, not just because of obstacles of an organisational nature, but also because of difficulties in defining its role and its relations with Community institutions. The relationship with the Commission was crucial here and, on more than one occasion, although Brussels seemed to see Cedefop as little more than a ‘satellite’ to be called upon for studies and research, the Centre managed to gain margins of autonomy; its intention was not just to offer its own competences, but to forge autonomous relations with the social partners, national governments and Community bodies themselves, especially as regards the formulation of policies on vocational training. After the mid-1980s, Cedefop was able to take advantage not just of the extension of Community competences; as regards vocational training and the launch of a series of Community programmes, but also of the increasingly close link that had been forged between vocational training and education, and the proliferation of information tools and the demand for information, exchanges and cooperation in these fields within Europe. Nor should the trend in the European Union towards the creation of an increasing number of agencies be forgotten. Nowadays, therefore, Cedefop is a consolidated component of the EU panorama and, within its institutional limits, manages to play an autonomous role in European policies on vocational education and training, both nationally and at Community level.
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