The nature of the relevant labour and capital markets. No doubt there will be some opportunities for the private sector. The responsiveness will depend on the ease with which academic labour can be moved in and out of the capital market to expand facilities.

For a market system to work effectively, the incidence of tenure needs to be reduced. Many might suggest that the reality of the industrial relations situation has to be faced.

Academic staff are highly specialized and the demand for academic staff in certain fields is relatively inelastic. Moreover, the existence of tenure, which makes staff reductions difficult, will inhibit the flow of labour from academic tenure. Tenure is a universal condition for employment in universities. In Australia drawing aside the Institute of Advanced Studies of the University of Melbourne, almost 50% of academic staff and college lectures are tenured, and the proportion of the more senior staff (senior readers, lecturers and associate professors) who are over 97% of academic staff. Harvard is not a particularly big university. Several universities exist because they are in a favoured market position. That process does not create more university places; it creates select, high-quality institutions. Limitations with low ranking would probably not adjust enrolment to student desires. It would not seem to increase. Alternatives, a prestigious institution; could charge higher fees and other fees; more courses, become more attractive. It is interesting to observe that the prestigious institutions in the United States do not grow in numbers because Harvard is not a big university. Such universities exist because they are in a market position. That process does not create more university places; it creates select, high-quality institutions.

The incidence of tenure needs to be reduced. Many might suggest that the reality of the industrial relations situation has to be faced.

Present salary arrangements are inconsistent with a free market. I do not support the idea that salaries need to be more flexible. But, as they stand, it is almost impossible for public institutions to compete in the private sector, or even for their own staff to compete for more senior positions. Present salary arrangements are a major advantage of private institutions. If a high demand is heard to respond they will need access to capital. It may well be that their only way to raise money on the market without government guarantees, but once the government is involved the private sector is in the business of expansion or at least price-competitive. But suppose capital is reasonably accessible, so that there is some chance of expansion. The real question is the level of institutional coherence in the particular institution? A prestigious institution; would the University of Melbourne face the same, or a very high, demand? It may respond by expanding its facilities, borrowing money to do so, and when it does, it will follow this course, some low-ranking institutions, will claim to be able to do the same, to increase its market share. Additionally, a prestigious institution could charge higher fees and other fees; more courses, become more attractive. It is interesting to observe that the prestigious institutions in the United States do not grow in numbers because Harvard is not a big university. Such universities exist because they are in a market position. That process does not create more university places; it creates select, high-quality institutions. Limitations with low ranking would probably not adjust enrolment to student desires. It would not seem to increase. Alternatives, a prestigious institution; could charge higher fees and other fees; more courses, become more attractive. It is interesting to observe that the prestigious institutions in the United States do not grow in numbers because Harvard is not a big university. Such universities exist because they are in a market position. That process does not create more university places; it creates select, high-quality institutions.

In the real world the production of knowledge is likely to be a lagging indicator of some sort. Indeed, the effects on the market for academic labour are likely to be a lagging indicator of academic institutions and from the lack of market navigability and mobility among students. There is no evidence that students are greatly influenced by the objective assessments of the quality of the faculty of the particular institutions. Certainly they are not nearly mobile; indeed, there is a denouement in the lack of mobility among Australian graduate students. Let alone among undergraduates.

Unemployment, some advantages would flow from a shift to a market model. The claim, however, is that the world of higher education would be so. In fact, I believe that governments would not allow this to happen, particularly if institutions or students in marginal electoral areas were threatened.

Government intervention might also be necessary for marginal universities. For example, in a free market system, there would be considerable expansion of the number of places in medical schools. In circumstances in which medical schools are institutions, the emphasis would be on the perspective of medical schools. In medicine, schools in rural areas are institutions, the emphasis would be on the perspective of medical schools. In medicine, schools in rural areas are institutions, the emphasis would be on the perspective of medical schools.

In the real world the production of knowledge is likely to be a lagging indicator of some sort. Indeed, the effects on the market for academic labour are likely to be a lagging indicator of academic institutions and from the lack of market navigability and mobility among students. There is no evidence that students are greatly influenced by the objective assessments of the quality of the faculty of the particular institutions. Certainly they are not nearly mobile; indeed, there is a denouement in the lack of mobility among Australian graduate students. Let alone among undergraduates.

Unemployment, some advantages would flow from a shift to a market model. The claim, however, is that the world of higher education would be so. In fact, I believe that governments would not allow this to happen, particularly if institutions or students in marginal electoral areas were threatened.

Government intervention might also be necessary for marginal universities. For example, in a free market system, there would be considerable expansion of the number of places in medical schools. In circumstances in which medical schools are institutions, the emphasis would be on the perspective of medical schools. In medicine, schools in rural areas are institutions, the emphasis would be on the perspective of medical schools.
2. Changing relationships between scholars and institutions

Much of the debate on the conditions of academic employment revolves around the question of academic independence. This expression of the relationship between scholar and institution; it implies the authority of the institution and to what extent the scholar has freedom to determine what one teaches and what one researches. Given tenure, the threat of dismissal diminishes and a direct effort to modify the opinions of individual scholars. The concept of academic freedom should not be confused with that of institutional control, which is what institutions manage their affairs. Academic freedom can be preserved in institutions that are run as government departments and hence are not auto-nomous. The extent and meaning of academic freedom is, perhaps, strongest in such institutions.

Secondly, academic tenure is an attractive employment condition. Permanent employment is more desirable than employment which is terminable or for a fixed period. Most senior appointments in institutions that run outside government through the world are tenured. It is difficult to attract scholars without the offer of tenure. Nevertheless, tenure, as such, was more likely to lead to attractive terms for universities. Indeed Bond University is at present exploring what this might be. Although tenure is a key element in the relationships between institutions and their institutions, it should be emphasised that tenure is neither universal nor always attractive. Some academic staff of universities and colleges are not on the same level and there is a big gap between the numbers of tenured and non-tenured staff. Indeed, some are on the same level and there is a big gap between the numbers of tenured and non-tenured staff. Indeed, some are on the same level and there is a big gap between the numbers of tenured and non-tenured staff. Indeed, some are on the same level and there is a big gap between the numbers of tenured and non-tenured staff. Indeed, some are on the same level and there is a big gap between the numbers of tenured and non-tenured staff.

The unionisation of academic staff... is partly cause and partly effect of the development of a managerial philosophy within scholarly institutions...

In Australia, while external pressure on institutions of higher education have increased, there seems to have been no major structural changes in the organisation of the institutions. However, there has been a decline in the participation of the students, particularly in the work of the institutions. In the United Kingdom, external forces have imposed a new kind of discipline on the institutions and fundamental changes are being made in the way in which the institutions are funded. In the conditions attached to loans and in the conditions attached to government and governmental agencies. There have, however, been significant changes in the relationships between individual scholars and their institutions. During the past few years, which affect these relationships, include: the development of the institutions and the early 1970s and the subsequent changes in both and personnel and in demographic features. Generally these have been accompanied by some strengthening in the hierarchy of the institutions. This system is only one of many which are held up by many academics. This system includes those who see fewer career opportunities.

Salary loads. Temporary (three year) loads of 5, 10, 15 or 20 per cent of substantive salary should be introduced. To achieve this, performance, administrative reponsibility and the abilities of the staff as a group of institutions. This is intended to provide incentives for performance, to increase the influence of managing personal administrative responsibilities and to make it possible to attract highly qualified staff in discipline in institutions.

Outside activities. Outside professional activities should be controlled by time rather than by salary. This is a basis of a maximum of 13 approved days per quarter. This is to encourage individual academic staff to engage in consultancy and other relevant activities in order to ensure that these activities can be more widely available to the community to promote interaction with the real world experience, and to give an incentive for staff to undertake these activities.

Limited term appointments. A minimum of 10 to 20 per cent of full-time equivalent positions can be on a limited time basis of a maximum of 3 approved days per quarter. This is to encourage individual academic staff to engage in consultancy and other relevant activities in order to ensure that these activities can be more widely available to the community to promote interaction with the real world experience, and to give an incentive for staff to undertake these activities.

4. Possible changes

The report on efficiency and effectiveness which was published in September 1986, directed particular attention to the case of academic employment. It made recommendations for a package of reforms. Since then, the report has been translated to the conditions of academic promotion, which are now being implemented in the near future. Moreover, some of the recommendations have been accepted by the institutions. Nevertheless, they are worthy of careful consideration. It is important to emphasise that the reforms were conceived as a package. The changes in the conditions are accompanied by an increase in the salary scales for lecturer and senior lecturer positions. This is to increase the attractiveness of the profession. The report on efficiency and effectiveness is significant in what are larger dimensional scales. The salary loads. Temporary (three year) loads of 5, 10, 15 or 20 per cent of substantive salary should be introduced. To achieve this, performance, administrative responsibility and the abilities of the staff as a group of institutions. This is intended to provide incentives for performance, to increase the influence of managing personal administrative responsibilities and to make it possible to attract highly qualified staff in discipline in institutions.

One suggestion which has received a good deal of support is the tenure of staff at one grade lower than that of the actual appointment...
An early retirement option for Australian academics?

Ray Over
La Trobe University

Consequences of the end to growth

In 1982, the most recent year for which detailed statistics have been published, 21 per cent of professors in Australian universities were under 45 years of age, as were 38 per cent of readers and associate professors, 58 per cent of senior lecturers, and 54 per cent of lecturers. In 1985 the turnover in tenured jobs through resignation, retirement, or death was less than 5 per cent. Unless many young graduates became academics, which could occur only if new jobs are created or there is a high turnover in currently tenured posts, the median age of tenured academics will increase cumulatively until the first decade of next century, when many reach the mandatory retirement age.

Academics recruited in the 1960s were the lucky generation. By creating an ex-panding system at a time when the supply-demand relationship is quite different from what it is now, they enjoyed rapid advancement. The career development of academics recruited in the 1970s has been adversely affected by the end to university growth. In an analysis covering four decades, Over and Lascuță showed that only 4 per cent of men appointed as lecturers in 1975–1976 had advanced to a senior lectureship within seven years, in contrast to 88 per cent of the men appointed as lecturers in 1962–1964. The career asymptote for many among the recent cohort of academics will be a senior lectureship or a modest career arrest at the level of reader or chair professor.