Jaspers' Concept of the University

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ABSTRACT

The paper has a threefold purpose. The first is simply expository: it outlines and explicates the general character of Jaspers' notion of the idea of the university, and seeks to do so in such a way as to make this notion more readily intelligible to readers unfamiliar with Jaspers' philosophy as a whole. To this end, it elucidates the essential content of the notion, clarifies what is meant here by the term "idea", illumines the essential philosophic foundations upon which Jaspers' discussion is based and traces out the systematic structure of his position.

Secondly, the paper states a number of basic objections to Jaspers' view, and in most cases, through the extrapolation of his explicit remarks, is able to suggest how Jaspers himself might have responded to these objections. The purpose of this discussion, however, is not principally to resolve the issues raised, but simply to open the way for genuine debate.

Thirdly, throughout the paper the attempt is made, both explicitly and implicitly, to establish the relevance of Jaspers' work to current university problems. This is accomplished on two levels: the first emphasises the importance per se of continued reflection on the idea of the university as the means of gaining needed clarity regarding both the true nature and mission of the university and the ultimate significance of our commitment to this institution; and the second indicates how Jaspers' particular judgements concerning this first matter bear directly upon more specific issues, e.g. the relation of teaching and research, academic standards, university autonomy, the essential responsibilities of professors and students, etc.

Implicit to this threefold intention is the conviction that philosophic reflection on the idea of the university is vital to the institution's authentic existence, and that Jaspers' own work in this area is at present unrivalled in its breadth of vision and profundity. It is thus hoped that the paper will lead its readers to a more serious consideration of Jaspers' work, and from there, once they perceive what is really at stake, to a reflection on the issue itself - the idea of the university.

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RESUME

Le concept de l'Université chez Karl Jaspers

Cette étude a trois buts. Le premier en est de présentation: il s'agit de présenter et d'expliquer la notion jasperienne de l'Université, qui sera ainsi plus accessible au lecteur qui serait peu familier avec la philosophie de Jaspers. A cette fin, l'auteur éclaire le contenu essentiel de la notion, clarifie ce qu'il entend ici par le mot "concept", éclaire les fondements philosophiques essentiels à la base de la contribution de Jaspers et mentionne la structure systématique de sa pensée.

Deuxièmement, l'étude pose quelques objections fondamentales à la vue jasperienne, puis par extrapolation tente de suggérer comment Jaspers lui-même aurait répondu à ces objections. Cependant, l'intérêt principal de cette discussion n'est pas de résoudre les questions soulevées, mais simplement d'ouvrir la voie à un débat véritable.

Enfin troisièmement, l'étude essaie, à la fois explicitement et implicitement, de démontrer la pertinence de l'œuvre de Jaspers aux problèmes actuels de l'université. Ceci est accompli sur deux plans: le premier met l'accent sur l'importance en tant que telle d'une réflexion continue sur le concept de l'Université comme moyen d'éclaircir la nature et la mission réelle de l'Université ainsi que le sens final de notre rôle dans cette institution; le second indique comment les recherches particulières de Jaspers à ce sujet se rapportent à des questions plus spécifiques comme par exemple l'instruction par rapport à la recherche, la qualité de l'enseignement, l'autonomie de l'université, et les responsabilités essentielles des professeurs et des étudiants.

Il y a, sous-jacent à ces trois buts, une conviction que la réflexion philosophique sur le concept de l'université est vitale pour l'existence réelle de cette institution et que l'œuvre de Jaspers sur ce sujet est actuellement sans égale par l'étendue de sa vision et sa profondeur. On espère donc que cet article conduira le lecteur à un examen plus sérieux de l'œuvre de Jaspers, ainsi qu'à une interrogation fondamentale sur le concept de l'Université.

“'The future of our universities, so far as a chance is given them, rests on the renewal of their originative spirit.'

—Jaspers

Introduction

Among philosophers of world-standing, none has devoted more attention to the question of the idea of the university than Karl Jaspers. His publications include three full-length books on the subject and a dozen or so articles. Yet, despite its copiousness, this work has remained largely without effect. Not only have Jaspers' basic prescriptions not been followed, but the writings themselves have seldom been carefully studied. Today, their lack of influence is almost total.

This state of affairs is surely unfortunate. For it takes no special wisdom to perceive that the university is presently adrift, without a cultural or philosophic rudder. And it is precisely this lack of direction which Jaspers has sought to confront in a radical and sys-
systematic way. Yet it is also understandable that his efforts in this regard should have been neglected. For we have become so preoccupied with the mechanics of running the university that philosophic reflection of the sort which Jaspers has pursued tends to be dismissed out of hand as unpractical and self-indulgent. Hence, we face the discouraging and somewhat ironic circumstance that what is most needed within the university, i.e. an extensive philosophic self-examination, is just what is thought there to be gratuitous and ineffectual. The neglect of Jaspers' work is thus rooted in the same refusal to reflect which lies at the base of the university's present disorientation.

In the face of this situation, however, a philosophic elucidation of the idea of the university is by itself an inadequate remedy. The record of Jaspers' failure is sufficient testimony to this fact. What is needed in addition is an explicit effort to demonstrate the essential relationship between our philosophic judgements and the concrete life of the university. It must be shown that an elucidation of the idea of the university is not errant speculation, but a necessary foundation for the university's authentic existence: that unless, on the basis of such elucidation, the idea of the university is made effectively alive, the university itself in any true sense will cease to exist. To point this out is to make clear the primacy of philosophic labour over the practical concerns of simply operating the institution. Finding solutions to problems of this latter sort, although indispensable, is secondary to the explicit clarification of the idea of the university and to the deliberate revival of the power of this idea in all aspects of university life. If there is a basic shortcoming to Jaspers' own work, it is that he takes this relation of primacy for granted, and thus does not explicitly defend it with the force that our present situation demands. The casual reader is thereby confirmed in the prejudice that this sort of work is mere speculation, divorced from any "real" issues. In the light of this, it would be a measure of the success of any substantive explication of Jaspers' concept of the university that it be able to dispel such prejudice and thence to open the way for a genuine consideration of the idea of the university itself.

In the following discussion, I shall assume a threefold task. The first will be simply to outline the essential features of Jaspers' concept of the university against the background of his philosophy as a whole. This will serve to bring this material together for the first time in a concise and systematic way, making Jaspers' position more readily intelligible to those unfamiliar with the main body of his thought. I shall then go on to indicate briefly how this concept relates fundamentally to the university's authentic existence. This will provide it, so to speak, with an existential justification. And finally, I shall offer a few selective criticisms of Jaspers' particular understanding of the idea of the university, not so as to refute it, but merely to indicate contentious points around which subsequent discussions might be oriented. As a whole, this study is not intended to convert the reader to Jaspers' position. It is offered simply in the hope that it might serve in a small way to rekindle a genuine interest in philosophic reflection on the idea of the university. For without a secure grounding in such reflection, all our practical enterprise, despite our good intentions, dissolves into little more than administrative busy work.

Jaspers on the Idea of the University

Jaspers' explicit analysis of the idea of the university is tied inextricably to a broader philosophic base, to fundamental decisions concerning the nature of man, human knowledge and
community. It is only in terms of this base that the analysis itself is fully intelligible and defensible. Yet, in mapping out the idea of the university, Jaspers treats this foundational material, if at all, only in a brief and rather cryptic way. For this reason, there is still room for a straightforward exposition of his discussion.

I shall begin with two preliminary clarifications: the first concerns Jaspers’ particular use of the term “idea” and thus pertains to the general significance which he gives to the expression “idea of the university”; and the second centres upon what it means to reflect philosophically upon this idea. These clarifications, although somewhat technical, will give us an initial foothold within Jaspers’ discussion as a whole.

Although he concerns himself directly with the idea of the university, Jaspers nowhere states explicitly all that he means in this context by the expression “idea”. The reader is thus forced to construct the full sense of this term by gleaning from the whole of Jaspers’ writings. On this basis, it would seem that he intends the term in a threefold but unified way: it has for him at once a normative, an ontological and a concrete significance. This threefold usage, moreover, is to a limited extent reminiscent of both the Kantian and the Hegelian notions of idea. For like Kant, Jaspers understands the idea as a regulative principle or guide, yet one which does not denote a closed object of knowledge. And like Hegel, he understands the idea as a rational ideal and a standard of truth, as well as an essentially self-reflexive and historical reality. The details of this usage, however, need to be more fully explicated.

Jaspers’ normative employment of the term “idea” in this context is the one that is most familiar and the closest to common sense. For when one hears the expression “idea of the university”, it calls most readily to mind questions concerning the archetype or the standard of perfection. The term “idea” is equated here with “ideal” so that the expression as a whole is interpreted to mean the conception of the university in its highest perfection, that of the goal or standard to be realised or aimed at. Insofar as it is an ideal, which means for Jaspers something essentially rational, the idea of the university is unconditioned and timeless (zeitlos, ewig). Yet, this aspect of its nature is inevitably compromised and transformed by limitations intrinsic to the idea’s concrete and cognitive realisation. As an ideal, then, the idea is always an elusive end.

This first meaning of “idea” has an ontological obverse. For as well as the ideal, “idea” denotes here the true being of the university as such. Accordingly, when we speak of the idea of the university, we do not presuppose an object to which the idea must be made to conform. On the contrary, by unfolding the idea abstractly, we delimit a though-content by which the object itself is judged as to its truth. A true (or authentic) university, then, is one that fulfils the idea of the university. Similarly, the institution which falls short of the idea in any essential way is, strictly speaking, not a university. In this sense, then, the idea for Jaspers is ante res.

And yet, in Jaspers’ view, the idea is only complete as idea in its historical concretisation. For it is, he says, a product of spirit (Geist), and as such is essentially a synthesis of the universal with the historical and concrete. This constitutes the ultimate meaning of the idea for Jaspers, that to which the other senses must finally be related. It is only as a changing historical process in which the universal and the particular are intrinsically united that the idea truly is; and it is only in terms of this process that the idea can be properly grasped. Hence, for Jaspers, a knowledge of the idea, even in its “pure” or “timeless” aspect, is medi-
ated by an awareness of its actuality in the empirical world; and the complete idea itself has no separate existence which wholly transcends the particularity of that actuality. In its fullest sense, then, the idea is not an abstraction or mental construct, but an historical reality in which the universal is immanent and through which alone it exists.

If our prime concern were strictly Jaspers-scholarship, a great deal more would have to be said here regarding this notion of the idea. For our own purposes, however, only some basic points need to be further clarified. These concern the idea as it relates to Jaspers' concept of spirit and thence to the specific nature of the idea as an historical process.

The term "spirit" names for Jaspers a particular mode of man's being and an active relation to the world. It signifies for him the unified and reflexive self-activity of man which strives for clarity and systematic wholeness and is guided in this by "ideas" which man himself brings to realisation. Jaspers writes:

... Spirit is the totality of intelligible thought, action and feeling... moved by ideas which bring everything into clarity and connection. [It] is the comprehensive reality of activity which is actualised by itself and by what it encounters in a world which is always given yet always being changed. It is the process of fusing and reconstructing all totalities in a present which is never finished yet always fulfilled.

Like man's empirical being, spirit is temporal and actual (wirklich); and like consciousness as such, it is interior (innerlich) and reflexive. Yet, "it comes from a different source, and is more, than both of these."

The relation of spirit, so conceived, to Jaspers' notion of the idea is a direct one. The self-activity of spirit is such as to realise totality (Ganzheit), where totality is the character of ideas: ideas are self-contained "wholes" or "unities", ordered within themselves, and effected by spirit. As these unities, moreover, ideas have two essential moments. They are realised in interiority (Innerlichkeit), which means that they become reflexively known, interiority being spirit's self-understanding; and they are realised equally in empirical reality, becoming immanent there as self-enclosed "horizons" or "worlds". These two moments are intrinsically united in the fulness of the complete idea. Accordingly, the process of bringing the idea to realisation is itself a double movement. It is at once the labour of spirit to bring about the idea in actuality and the development of spirit's self-understanding. This double movement is also circular. Spirit comes to understand itself (and thence the idea) in and through its effort to realise the idea concretely, and yet this effort is itself guided by a pre-given awareness of the idea. Thus, Jaspers writes: "Spirit is a grasping of itself, a working upon itself through denial and approval. It produces itself [as idea] by struggling with itself."

We are now in a position to discern the full nature of the idea more clearly. It is, for Jaspers, a "concrete universal", which means here a self-elucidating and self-developing totality that is immanent in empirical reality as a closed "world". This totality is an effective (wirksames) whole which organises, limits and determines the concrete life of the university. It thus constitutes both a real historical unity in which we participate and a frame of reference within which our thinking and acting concerning the university proceed. As such, the idea is neither merely subjective nor objective, but an horizon which embraces both and is no less real than either.

It is not possible, nor is it necessary, to deal here with all of the implications of this con-
ception of the idea. I should like, however, simply to list four of them which bear more or less directly upon an understanding of the meaning of Jaspers' project itself. Firstly, as a concrete universal, the idea is not a timeless abstraction that remains forever constant. For even though it has an essential timeless aspect, the concrete and the temporal are never merely extrinsic or accidental to it as such. So regarded, then, the idea is something essentially open-ended, being determined and re-determined, illumined and re-illumined in a new form as the historical activity of spirit unfolds. Secondly, the nature of spirit is such as to gather everything into the unity of the idea strictly as a part of the whole. Hence, at this level, the individual can have no independent reality. "As spirit", Jaspers writes, "the individual is not yet himself, but the unity of a contingent individual with the necessary [concrete] universal."12 Thus, when one reflects on the idea, the individual can be considered only as an "instance" and a "member", and never as existentially unique. Thirdly, since the activity of spirit is a transforming process which embraces the subject/object dichotomy, the truth of spirit (and of the idea) cannot at root be a matter of correctness, the traditional adaequatio rei et intellectus through a fixed concept. On the contrary, truth at this level is interpreted by Jaspers strictly in terms of spirit's coherent self-realisation. "Truth," he writes, "is what produces [bewirkt] wholeness,"13 i.e. the activity of spirit as guided by the idea which spirit itself brings forth and in which it participates. In this context, then, proof and confirmation are matters of self-affirmation and coherent unity: spirit proves itself (bewährt sich) and confirms (bestätigt) the idea precisely by realising itself in and through the idea, thereby making itself actual as a reflexive and coherent whole. Accordingly, to reinterpret a previous point, the true university is simply an instance of the idea as truly realised, i.e. of the concrete universal; whereas an inauthentic university is one lacking in "spiritual" coherence and self-awareness. Fourthly, because the idea constitutes a real horizon of action and thought, it cannot itself be made directly a closed object of knowledge. We are always within the idea, as it were, and thus cannot merely set it forth as a matter to be scrutinised. In a strict sense, then, the idea is not objectively knowable. Rather, it can only be understood from within in and through the non-conceptual awareness (Innewerden) that pertains to the self-realising activity of spirit as such.14

It is in the light of this last-named fact that the discursive analysis of the idea must be interpreted. For if, in the first instance, our understanding of the idea is a non-conceptual awareness of a non-objective reality, then the effort to set forth the idea objectively in determinate categories will inevitably fall short of the idea's real nature. This is a consequence which Jaspers accepts for his own discussion. Philosophic elucidation makes of the idea an object of research, explicating it in terms of concepts which only approximate the idea's living reality. Thus, for example, one is led to speak of the idea as having three "aspects" or to think of it as a mental construct, when in fact it is a unified whole and something actual.

Given this general view, philosophic reflection on the idea of the university nevertheless has its own proper character and import. In the first place, it must clarify the idea in its three aspects, setting out in an integrated way the normative, ontological and concrete significance. Such a procedure, however, departs from either a purely rationalist or an empiricist approach. On the one hand, philosophy cannot restrict itself wholly to abstract speculation on the idea, for this ignores the concrete and degenerates into a fanciful Schwärmerei. Yet, at the same time, it cannot limit itself to describing concrete conditions,
for this loses touch with (or implicitly denies) the idea in its timeless and ideal element. Philosophic reflection on the university must proceed from out of the historical situation, attending both to the concrete and the timeless aspects of the idea and setting out the nature of both their actual and their historically optimal unification.

So interpreted, Jaspers’ elucidation of the idea of the university has an essential, practical import. For it serves to establish a goal (albeit as an “infinite” task) toward which all activities concerning the university as such are to be geared. “To map out the idea of the university means to orient ourselves by an ideal which we can never more than approximate.” Implicit to this “mapping” and “orientation” is a notion of “criticism”: the theoretical measurement of the present reality in the light of the ideal, and the labour to realise the ideal within that reality. This entails in turn a constant va et vient between the historical “is” (which both constitutes the university’s present reality and delimits the range of its immanent proper possibilities) and the timeless “ought” (which gives the university its ultimate direction). The “is” and “ought” are held, as it were, in a dialectical tension within the unity of the complete idea, a unity which is in constant transition. And the activity of criticism can itself be a facet of this movement.

To Jaspers, however, reflection on the idea of the university has a still deeper significance. As we have seen, the complete idea is not an external objectivity separate from human being. Rather, it constitutes a fundamental possibility of spirit and Existenzz, and is thus something rooted in what man is and what he can make of himself. “The university,” writes Jaspers, “is the corporate realisation of man’s basic determination to know.” As such, it is a deliberate human creation, arising from the essential nature of man and representing a mode of man’s self-determination. Yet man also participates in the idea of the university and from this idea takes his bearings within the world. In this, then, there is a mutual relatedness: man determines the idea of the university in accord with his nature through an act of self-determination, and the idea of the university, as constituting a particular life-order, determines man. From this perspective, philosophic reflection on the idea of the university brings into view both the nature of man and the nature of the university in their fundamental interrelation. Thus, it is at once an inquiry after the essence of an institution and a facet of man’s self-knowledge.

With these preliminary clarifications out of the way, Jaspers’ delineation of the idea of the university can be considered directly. In this regard, I shall focus only upon a few key topics, either ones which Jaspers himself has emphasised or ones that seem to me especially pertinent to our present situation. They are: (a) the conception of knowledge and its relation to the university; (b) education to culture; (c) academic freedom; (d) the functions of the university; and (e) the university’s institutional existence. I shall consider each of these in turn.

(a) The essential relation of our prevailing conception of knowledge to the idea of the university has already been intimated. As we have seen, Jaspers characterises the university generally as “the corporate realisation of our basic determination to know”. In this view, then, the idea of the university must be understood proximally and for the most part in terms of an overall conception of knowledge. What this imports, however, needs to be carefully unfolded.

By a “conception of knowledge” Jaspers intends here a determination of the nature, scope and limits of knowledge, together with an understanding of the procedures by which genuine knowledge is secured. Such a conception is worked out, moreover, in terms of a
vision of the nature of man and of his place in the scheme of things. Hence, to ground the idea of the university upon such a conception means for Jaspers two things straightway. Firstly, it means that the university is an institution which has its origin and justification located in the very nature of man. It is from out of that nature as denoting an entity which of its essence seeks knowledge that the university arises and is supported. Secondly, it implies that as man's prevailing conception of knowledge changes so too does the idea of the university. Indeed, the complete meaning of the idea is transformed with the history of knowledge itself.

Thus, to understand Jaspers’ particular delineation of the idea of the university, it is first necessary to recall some essentials from his overall conception of knowledge. Within the limits of the present study, this account can only be schematic. I shall focus, therefore, only upon what pertains directly to the idea of the university. Unfortunately, however, in discussing the question of knowledge, Jaspers' own use of key terms is not univocal. The expressions “science” and “philosophy”, for example, in relation to which the specific meaning of knowledge itself is plotted, have for him more than one determination. For our purposes, these need to be sorted out.

In speaking of science, Jaspers distinguishes a broad and narrow sense of the term, as well as contrasting the ancient and modern conceptions. These distinctions are not without some overlapping. The Greek conception of science, in Jaspers’ view, is one of a methodical, cogently certain and universally valid form of cognition. Historically, this conception has served as the basis for all further determinations; hence, science as such is for Jaspers essentially Greek. (It follows then that the university itself, to the extent that it stands in the service of science, is Greek in origin and conception.)

Modern thinking extends the Greek view of science in a decisive way. To begin with, it differentiates a broad and a narrow conception. Upon the broad conception, as Jaspers sees it, science has the following characteristics: It is a form of cognition that proceeds in a deliberate and methodic way, being aware of the nature of the method it employs and the limits of its application. So regarded, science is both self-critical and self-regulating. In this broad view, scientific learning is also said to be impelled by reason, according to which it seeks both to be comprehensive and to organise its truths into an ultimate unity. On the basis of reason, moreover, science has an essential concern for the rational communication of its findings and for an economy of explanation. It is nevertheless guided in its movement by a respect for empirical fact. In general, then, the scientific attitude is marked by a constant methodic questioning, an openness to criticism, a search for the ultimate integration and cogency of its results and a persistent attention to new situations in experience. Thus, Jaspers summarises: “Science in this wider sense includes any clear understanding obtained through rational or conceptual means ... [It] is identical with the area of lucid self-knowledge.”

Science in the narrower, and to Jaspers, more common, sense is the truly decisive modern conception. For the limited purposes of the present discussion, its basic characteristics may simply be listed. As with the broader view, science narrowly conceived is methodic, cogent and self-critical. Moreover, it seeks explanatory simplicity and the systematic integration and rational communication of its findings, as well as being attentive to all empirical conditions which may serve to verify or confute it. To this conception, Jaspers adds five further distinguishing marks. (1) Science in the narrow view is motivated by the will
to know all that is knowable. Borrowing a Kantian distinction, Jaspers suggests that there are no limits (Schranken) to scientific investigation within the sphere of the objectively knowable, yet it does have boundaries (Grenze) beyond which it cannot trespass.  

The essence of science in this conception lies in research, in the extension and deepening of knowledge. (2) The essence of science in this conception lies in research, in the extension and deepening of knowledge. (3) Research, moreover, is fundamentally speculative and is thereby distinguished from either pragmatic invention or from a strictly utilitarian pursuit. (4) The findings of science, so conceived, have universal validity; that is to say, within their sphere of reference and the bounds of their methodology, scientific results hold always and everywhere for any possible rational being. (5) Yet, in a threefold way, these results are nevertheless essentially provisional and incomplete. Firstly, science always emerges within historically changing horizons of interpretation, which yield in turn different analyses of the things that are and different conceptions of truth. It therefore requires in each horizon a correspondingly different kind of viewing and questioning of its objects. Science is also subject to fresh experience and experiment, testing new hypotheses, revising and replacing past results. And thirdly, scientific research, because of the spatial and temporal infinity of the reality it explores, is endless (endlos).

The preceding discussion, although schematic, should suffice to delineate the essentials of Jaspers' conception of science. This conception must now be integrated with his understanding of philosophy. For Jaspers, science and philosophy taken together account for all clear and rational awareness of truth: they comprise the full domain of "lucid self-knowledge". So conceived, philosophy itself is scientific in the broader sense: it is methodic, cogent, self-critical, grasps the nature and limits of its method, seeks to organise its truths into a unity and is rooted in the soil of experience to which it always-returns. Yet, in being scientific, philosophy itself is not a science in the strict (narrow) sense. For it yields no universally valid results, nor any objective knowledge. Rather, it evokes and elucidates a non-conceptual, non-objective awareness from out of the essentially self-illumining activity of historical Existenz. Through this awareness, moreover, it seeks to discern something of the nature of being qua being, of man as such and of the world as a whole. Science narrowly conceived, on the contrary, treats only of objects or realms of objectivity that appear within the world and does so from a disinterested vantage point removed from life.

On this basis, Jaspers fixes the reciprocal relation between science and philosophy in the following way.  

Scientific knowledge is universally valid, yet essentially relative to some specific and delimited domain of objectivity. It is not absolute, for it does not illumine being itself, nor fill our lives with an unconditional value, and is universally valid only in terms of its objective horizon. Its truths, however, are demonstrable and can be used as principles of deduction. Philosophic awareness, on the other hand, is absolute in its historicity, insofar as it does elucidate being itself and fulfill life; yet it is relative in its communication, insofar as it unavoidably is thought and confirmed there objectively. Moreover, it fails to yield universally valid and coercive knowledge, for its matter does not belong to the realm of the objectively knowable. Philosophic truths are thus not strictly provable, but can only be evoked and elucidated.

In this contrast, then, philosophy is thought to limit the pretensions of science to absoluteness, and science, to limit the pretensions of philosophy to coercive knowledge. In addition, science depends upon philosophy to assist in its self-criticism and self-clarification; while philosophy, as having an essential reference to empirical being, is serviced by the advance of scientific knowledge.
Implicit in the foregoing account of science and philosophy is Jaspers' conception of knowledge. In the broadest sense, knowledge is for him any clear, rational understanding, and is thus equivalent to science in the wide meaning. This equivalence is evidenced in the terms themselves: *Wissen* = *Wissenschaft*; science is an affair of knowledge and knowledge is scientific. Yet Jaspers commonly employs a more restricted conception of knowledge. Following Kant, he limits genuine knowledge to that of the objective appearance of things in the world (not of their being, nor of being itself, nor of the world as a whole). Such cognition transpires only within the subject/object dichotomy and involves the presentation (*Vorstellen*) of the object to the knowing subject by means of determinate categories and concepts. Strictly speaking, then, only science in the narrow sense yields such knowledge.

Jaspers relates his conceptions of science, philosophy and knowledge to the university in a number of ways. Firstly, as I have already suggested, the university for Jaspers is specifically instituted to serve knowledge, which means here to serve science in the broad sense. So conceived, the university in all its aspects is to be guided by the spirit of science, this spirit being decisive throughout university life. Secondly, to the extent that the spirit of science has its ultimate origin in ancient Greek thinking, the university itself is essentially Western. Strictly speaking, then, the true university can appear in a non-Western culture only with the importation of the Western scientific outlook. Thirdly, insofar as the essence of science lies in research, it is as a matter of fact the affair of a dedicated few. The university accordingly is not to be fitted for mass-life, but is to be the preserve of the minority committed to research.

In addition to these implications, there are three further ways in which Jaspers' conception of knowledge (science) relates directly to the university that need here to be discussed in more detail. They are: the questions of communication, the unity of knowledge and the division of disciplines.

Although I have not spoken of it before, communication plays an essential role in Jaspers' philosophy. Departing from the common conception, he rejects the view that communication is the mere external expression of thought and thence that it is something secondary to thinking itself. He affirms, to the contrary, that truth only comes to genuine awareness in and through communication, outside of which it cannot be conceived. Communication is thus essential to thought as the sole medium in which it realises its truth. The implications of this doctrine for the university are clear. The necessity for communication makes requisite a community of scholars, a forum for debate and interchange. Only within such a context can the search for truth be effectively carried out. As dedicated to that search, the life of the university demands genuine communication. And where that fails, the university itself degenerates.

Jaspers' formulation of the idea of the university is also determined by his vision of the unity of knowledge. The notion of this unity is for Jaspers a philosophic idea in the Kantian sense, i.e. an ideal limit guiding all inquiry, but not itself an object of investigation. This means that research is guided by the ideal of a unified systematic of knowledge, although it never produces a final system. This ideal arises from the very nature of reason itself, which seeks inherently to attain to the unconditioned and to unite all that analysis tends to divide. It is in virtue of this ideal, moreover, that all claims to knowledge and all levels of truth can be assessed *en tout* and given their proper weight. This in turn is both a demand for, and a justification of, the bringing together of all disciplines and faculties within one institution.
The commitment to the ideal goal of a unified systematic of knowledge provides the university with its common spirit and integral sense. Where that commitment fails, the university itself is left with only an external administrative unity and a parochial commitment to rigour and progress within each separate discipline. As a result, Jaspers laments, "the university becomes an aggregate, an intellectual department store."

This disintegration is today a fact of university life. It has its origin, Jaspers suggests, in three conditions: in the schism between the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften; in the need to train individuals for differing professions; and in the mere physical expansion of the university itself. To effect a reunification of the university, Jaspers proposes that "the whole content of modern knowledge and research must be integrated." The first concrete steps toward accomplishing this immense task are these: the university must re-establish a proper ordering and hierarchy within the sciences, separating and elevating the basic sciences from the auxiliary ones; and secondly, it must place its emphasis upon instruction through research as a unifying force, rather than upon mere factual or technical instruction, which is divisive. In this, then, there must be a certain amount of house cleaning and therapeutic pruning.

Within the university, the proper classification and division of disciplines should arise from the systematic of knowledge itself, from the manner in which at any given time we relate to and interpret the world. This does not mean that we divide the world in fact, or that we yield up the ideal of an ultimate unity. Rather, to delineate the sciences (and thence the disciplines) means to differentiate and distribute topics from a methodological or categorial point of view in terms of our prevailing conception of the differing spheres of objectivity. Such work, Jaspers admits, is imprecise and tenuous; but it can be carried out more effectively than is presently being done.

In speaking of the relation of science to the university, Jaspers does not fail to connect his discussion with the present historical conditions which the university confronts. His remarks in this regard have both a negative and a positive aspect, referring both to what must be overcome and to what must be accommodated. The negative aspect concerns the spirit of science and its present corruption, which Jaspers sees as having three general facets. The first of these I have already mentioned. There is presently a crisis in the sciences stemming from our failure to unify them into a comprehensive view. This crisis is essentially one of meaning, that the significance of science in general has come into question and with it the very foundations of knowledge. Where this occurs, moreover, the value of the sciences tends to be located wholly with their technical utility. In the life of the university, this crisis has a twofold impact. It results in a general disintegration of the university's spiritual unity, and in the precedence of science as a working enterprise in the service of technology over science as free, self-regulating research. The second facet of the corruption of science is more dangerous. It pertains to the failure of science to recognise its proper limits, a failure which Jaspers labels "scientism". With scientism, science (or one area of science) is absolutised, giving it false province over the whole of truth. This in turn presumes an uncritical faith in the reputed solidity of scientific results, without recognising their essential relativity. Taken to its extreme, however, this faith transforms into an hostility toward true science; that is, it refuses to undertake any self-criticism and deliberately ignores both the intrinsic and accidental shortcomings of science. At this point, scientism becomes "fanaticism". Both levels of this corruption are clearly destructive of the authentic life of
the university. For they stand in the way of a true systematic of science and thence of the university’s proper organisation, as well as militating against free communication and the open exchange of ideas. More conspicuous, however, is the third facet of the corruption of science, for this stems from the mass-life of the university itself. Under the conditions of mass-life, science, which is intrinsically an affair of the few, is adapted to the crowd. This adaption has a number of familiar, but little remarked, consequences. The emphasis in the life of the university shifts from the pervasive commitment to the pure search for truth to the formulation of teachable dogma to be learnt by rote. Moreover, the value of science is held to lie in its practical utilisable results, so that the technician takes precedence over the true scientist. In short, Jaspers observes, by adapting science to the crowd the university becomes a high school instead of an institute of higher learning.

Although the university must seek to overcome the present corruption of science, science itself has one historical manifestation which the university must seek to accommodate, i.e. technology. In Jaspers’ view, technology is not simply the totality of the most efficient means of production and human activity which are developed from out of scientific research. In a very real sense, it constitutes as well the surroundings in which man for the most part lives and which affect him in his very being. Technology is thus inextricably united with the essential interrelation between what man makes of his world and what directly or indirectly he makes of himself. It is in the light of this that Jaspers proposes for the university a faculty of technology. Technology as a discipline is for him autonomous, having a relation to the basic sciences analogous to that of medicine. This means that “it has its own independent area of existence and practical task,” but “is grounded intrinsically and pedagogically in the basic sciences.” To institute a faculty of technology means first that the university assimilates the functions of the Technische Hochschule. These include specialised training in advanced technical skills (e.g. engineering, architecture, etc.) and research into the development of technical theory and into the practical utilisation of scientific results. This assimilation has the consequence of bringing technical investigation to its proper place within the cosmos of knowledge, as well as eliminating the need for duplicating in a separate institution the sciences relevant to technology, e.g. physics, chemistry, mathematics. A technological faculty, moreover, would bring technology itself within the purview of philosophic education, from which its metaphysical foundations and consequences could be investigated. “All told, both university and technical institutes stand to profit from unification. The university would grow richer, more inclusive and more modern. Its basic problems would be infused with new life. Conversely, the technological world would become more contemplative as the problem of its meaning becomes a matter of serious concern.”

Before leaving the question of knowledge, it is necessary to take up one final issue: the place of knowledge in relation to the nature of man. In Jaspers’ view, knowledge and being are in man intimately related. Indeed, for any entity having the character of Existenz “to be” and “to know” are inseparable. For the being of such an entity is rooted in the realisation of its projected possibilities, which entails in the widest sense a knowledge of oneself and one’s world. All Existenz has this knowledge as such, if only as “a vague average understanding” (Heidegger). Moreover, insofar as Existenz exists only through reason, man’s will to know strives toward the unconditioned. Two important points follow from this notion. Firstly, for Jaspers, the nature of man is not something fixed and given, but is realised in
and through *Existenz*. Hence, his being develops with his developing (self) awareness. Secondly, the search for knowledge takes on the character of an absolute, for it is intrinsic to man's very nature. It is a search, moreover, that has its own inner dynamic, pressing forth toward total comprehensiveness.

It is against this background that Jaspers' notions of cultural education and academic freedom must be set. They are given their intelligibility and justification from it.

(b) Jaspers writes of culture in the following terms:

Culture is an acquired state. That man is cultured who has been shaped by a given historical ideal. A coherent system of associations, gestures, values, ways of putting things, and abilities have become second nature to him.\(^{33}\)

What this means can be quickly unfolded.

Within the limits of historical *Existenz*, man is a self-making or self-constituting entity. Thus, what he is in his very being can be molded or shaped, and the rational self-awareness of his *Existenz*, cultivated. Cultural education is for Jaspers the deliberate process of such molding and cultivation. This view is mirrored to some extent in the German language itself. German has two words for culture: *Kultur*, which harks back to the Latin verb *colere* meaning “to till” or “cultivate”; and *Bildung*, which is also a word for “education”, deriving from the German verb *bilden* meaning “to shape or form”. To speak of *Bildung* and *Kultur* thus imports straightway the sense of shaping and cultivation. For Jaspers, however, the cultural-educative process has ontological significance, since it concerns man in his very being as self-making. It is effected, moreover, from the perspective of a particular historical *Weltanschauung* and with the intention of making a certain general comportment (*Verhalten*) second nature. In this way, cultural education aims at a particular *weltanschaulich* ideal, preparing each individual to be a member of society. How Jaspers understands this in concrete terms can be briefly stated.

Cultural education in the university takes the form of scholarly and scientific discipline. It gives a certain rigorous form and direction to one's self-making, until this free, reasonable comportment becomes "second nature". Thus, it does not consist in the transmission of particular knowledge, nor in instruction regarding refined taste.\(^{34}\) It is rather a particular sort of training, "a formative process aiming at meaningful freedom."\(^{35}\) The ideal in this process is that of the judicious, free, self-developing and self-realising reasonable man. This amounts, then, to the transformation of man in accord with reason, wherein lies also human integrity. Jaspers' notion thus unites the Enlightenment ideal of the free rational man with the existential concept of self-making.

The university educates to culture, not through a special programme, but through training in the specific sciences. Jaspers sees this training as twofold, being served in differing but complimentary ways by the liberal arts (*Geisteswissenschaften*) and the natural sciences. "The liberal arts," he writes, "are valuable educationally because they allow a realisation of the substance of the human past, a participation in tradition, a knowledge of the breadth of human possibilities."\(^{36}\) The emphasis here is upon the humanistic ideal and, as it were, a particular *geistige* orientation. The natural sciences, on the other hand, give *training in methodic procedure and exact observation, instilling a sense of rigour and discipline. Taken together, these fulfill the requirements of culture in Jaspers' sense of this term."

(c) We may now turn our attention to the question of academic freedom. It was this
question above all which first motivated Jaspers’ writing on the university. A number of things concerning it need to be sorted out.

Academic freedom means for Jaspers in the first instance both *Lernfreiheit* and *Lehrfreiheit*, the freedom of study and the freedom to teach. The student is to have complete freedom, *at his own risk*, to take whatever courses and to study in whatever areas he chooses; and both student and teacher are to have the freedom of thought and research. Similarly, the teacher is to be free to teach whatever he wishes in respect of both topic and content, subject only to the standards of rigour in his discipline. Concomitant with this, for Jaspers, is the notion of university autonomy. Despite the origin of its means and sanction, the university is to govern its own affairs, free from external interference. Yet, at the same time, it must refrain from an active participation in partisan politics, maintaining, as it were, a supranational status. Politics enter the university only as an object of research, not as an actual struggle. “It is,” Jaspers writes, “a human right that man be allowed somewhere to pursue truth unconditionally and for its own sake.”

For this pursuit is intrinsic to the being of all men *qua* men. It has, moreover, its own necessities and inner dynamic, and can thus only be harmed by external coercion. The fact that state and society concede to provide an institution for this pursuit is a sign of social health. Yet this concession entails its own responsibilities. For the right to seek truth, if assumed, entails the duty to do so honestly and unbiasedly. “Academic freedom is a privilege which entails the *obligation* [to seek for and] to teach truth, in defiance of anyone outside or inside the university who wishes to curtail it.”

(d) In Jaspers’ view, the functions of the university are threefold: to carry out research (*forschen*); to educate (*bilden, erziehen*); and to instruct (*lehren, unterrichten*). Of these three, research is the most fundamental, for it is related most directly to man’s basic will to know. The others, although important, are ancillary to this. Hence, they must be understood and evaluated from the perspective of the primacy of research.

According to Jaspers, research work involves three factors. The first of these is the preparatory labour of becoming a journeyman in one’s discipline, the learning of the craft. “Work in this narrower sense consists of learning and practicing, widening one’s realm of knowledge and mastering methods.” Thus, it includes the extension of one’s general familiarity in the subject area, the development of a sense of disciplined procedure, the mastery of the tools and methods of research, and training in the logic of question and answer. In addition to this basic labour, research work also requires a sense of meaning and direction. To this end, it must be able to seize intuitively upon ideas of a general sort which will serve to organise and regulate the course of its development. It must also be inseminated by acts of creative insight, giving itself new impetus and a new course. Yet the possibility of such input demands of the researcher a deep involvement in his work; for although it is rooted in inspiration, a new input is not something accidental. The third factor in research work falls under the heading of “intellectual conscience”. It amounts generally to a constant vigilance over the direction and significance of one’s labour and one’s creative impulses. Specifically, this involves relating one’s insights to the whole structure of one’s discipline and ultimately to the unity of knowledge itself. It means as well following up the implications of a line of thought, striving for continuity against arbitrary disruptions in one’s research and seeking the greatest possible comprehensiveness.

As I have already suggested, Jaspers argues for the centrality of research in university
life. His argument has three facets: the relation of research to science; the interrelation of teaching and research; and the necessity of research to professional training.

In Jaspers' view, research cannot continue successfully in abstraction from the systematic of science itself. He writes: “The meaning and creative perpetuation of research can only be preserved if it maintains a lively exchange with the whole of knowledge.” Where the sciences are removed from this unifying relation, they experience a crisis in their foundation; for the ultimate meaning of their activities cannot be discerned. Hence, despite the possibility of technical achievements, a true advance of science is not possible where each is pursued in isolation from the other. It is on this basis, then, that Jaspers argues for the institutional unification of research endeavours within the university.

Research is also intimately related to the university's teaching functions. From the faculty's perspective, this is so in a number of ways. Firstly, an involvement in research gives one's teaching the freshness and vitality that comes only from creative contact with a discipline. Moreover, it is research which is to provide the substance of what is to be taught. Conversely, teaching serves to stimulate research, yielding new insights and challenges from the teacher-student interchange. It is also essential to research as a forum for the necessary communication of truth. From the student's perspective, the unity of teaching and research allows a participation in the spirit of research. Through the reports of the teacher and an active involvement in the teacher's projects, the student is brought into contact with the real process of discovery. And it is this process, after all, which is the proper focus of higher learning.

Research also provides a necessary foundation for professional training. It does so in general, for it imbues the student with a proper sense of the scientific outlook. This means first that he is familiarised with methodic, disciplined procedures, which in turn cultivates in him an active intellect and a skill at grasping and posing questions. Moreover, it means that the student is made sensitive to the unity of knowledge and will thus seek an ultimate integration beyond that of his limited specialty. With the vantage of this integration, he will then be able to concern himself professionally with the whole man and with the human condition as a unitary phenomenon. He thereby avoids both the temptation of fragmentary analysis and the risk of absolutising one particular perspective. The student's access to research, however, does not amount to a "general education" along side of his area of specialisation. Since research depends upon a relation to the whole, it should be effectively alive throughout the length and breadth of university studies. Talk of "general education" only serves to conceal the true relation which each and every discipline has to the unity of knowledge. This whole matter of the relation of research to professional training is summarised by Jaspers in the following terms:

Preparation for [the] professions is unthinking and inhuman if it fails to relate us to the whole and to develop our perceptiveness, to show the wide scope of knowledge or to make us think philosophically. Deficiencies in professional routine which are bound to exist at the time when the degree is conferred can be eliminated with practice. Basic deficiencies in scholarly and scientific training are irremediable.

The second function of the university, that of education to culture, has already been discussed. I shall add to what I have said only three additional points. Firstly, since such education aims at an historical ideal, it is dependent upon prevailing world-views and forms
of social organisation. Changes in educational outlook parallel the general changes which a nation undergoes in its history. Secondly, education to culture is a process of Socratic learning. The student is helped to give birth to his own powers and abilities in accord with a cultural ideal. The emphasis here is upon freedom tempered by a respect for standards. Thirdly, education to culture is not a “humanistic” education, if by this one means the teaching of general “results” and the reflection upon “higher” things. It is “humanistic” only in the sense that it involves the whole man and thereby enhances his proper humanity. And this arises only from disciplined scholarship and research.

The third function of the university is instruction, the transmission of learning at the highest levels. This occurs within three contexts: in lectures, in laboratories and seminars, and in discussions. Jaspers defends the lecture format, not for its efficiency in transmitting its content, but for the overall sense it conveys. He writes: “The lecturer himself presents this content in such a way as to suggest the total context which motivates his scholarship. Through his tone, his gestures, the real presence of his thinking, the lecturer can convey the ‘feel’ of his subject . . . . The lecture situation evokes something from the teacher which would remain hidden without it.”

Ideally, the lecture should enable the student to participate indirectly in the process of research. The material is presented to him so as to elicit that process, while the student is compelled to think along with the lecturer. In this way, both the details and the spirit of a quest for knowledge are conveyed. Yet, only a professor who regards lectures as a genuine part of his work can make them successful in this way.

Laboratories and seminars provide the student with concrete practice in research. It is here especially that he learns to master the techniques and methods of his discipline, and becomes acquainted directly with the subject matter and the elements of learning. Here too a student may follow his own insights, extending his understanding through his own initiative. “Textbook knowledge is only incidently referred to and briefly reviewed in class so as to make the student aware where he has to fill in gaps on his own. The essential factor is to train one’s perceptions through personal collaboration on the frontiers of knowledge.”

Instruction can also take the form of discussion. In this context, student and teacher should meet on an equal footing, striving together to deal with problems and difficulties that arise in research. This in turn serves to fulfil for both the inescapable need for communication.

On the question of instruction, one last point needs to be mentioned here. It concerns the level of difficulty at which instruction is to be carried out. In regard to this, Jaspers writes: “Lectures and seminars which are slightly over the student’s head and so spur him on to increased effort are better than full comprehension purchased as the price of oversimplification.” This must be understood, however, against the background of two other remarks. “All [students],” Jaspers writes, “are working under a standard which no one entirely satisfies;” and “independent reading and study . . . must compliment formal classroom work from the very start.” These remarks imply a different conception of instruction than the one commonly held. Rather than imparting basic information, instruction for Jaspers serves as a means to draw the student beyond himself. Accordingly, its demands are very high.

The final aspect of Jaspers’ work to be discussed here is his elucidation of the university’s institutional existence. I shall limit my remarks on this matter to the more important highlights. These include: the necessity for an institution; the failure of the institution to
live up to its ideal; the "human factor"; the relation of the university to the state; and the university's supranational character.

It is alone within the framework of an institution that the idea of the university becomes concrete and the university's tasks are properly fulfilled. "The university," Jaspers writes, "exists only to the extent that it is institutionalised." Indeed, the idea of the university is the idea of an institution. It is the institution which provides the requisite materials for teaching and research, the laboratories, libraries, lecture halls, etc. It also serves to house all the various disciplines, making communication and cooperation among them feasible. As an institution, moreover, the university provides a necessary quiet space where reflection and thought can be pursued free from external distractions. And it serves ultimately as the corporate embodiment of the unity of knowledge.

The university as an institution can fail to live up to its idea for a number of reasons. 

Firstly, there is the fact that the abstract idea (ideal) in itself is infinite and unconditioned, while its institutional reality is finite and restricted. "'Institution' necessarily implies compromises. The ideal is never perfectly realised." Secondly, not only is the institution limited in its fulfilment of the ideal, but it also has inherent tendencies which run counter to the ideal directly. Jaspers names three of these. There is a tendency for the status quo in all areas of institutional life to become reified and recalcitrant. In academic work itself, in administrative and pedagogic procedures, in the division of disciplines and labour, etc. what is and has been tends to be viewed as something fixed and final. There is also a tendency within the university for the institution to be regarded as an end in itself, rather than as a means to facilitate the quest for knowledge. Where this occurs, the requirements of research give way more and more to those of administration. The institutional life of the university also tends to favour the competent but second best, the ones who accommodate themselves readily to its order and mean. The exceptional and the innovative find this order confining, and thus pose a threat to it. Thirdly, the university may also fail to live up to its ideal in respect of its teaching function. For the translation of true thought and research into teachable form tends to impoverish its intellectual vitality. And the demands of teaching necessitate the artificial division of subject matters, which then imposes itself upon the unity of knowledge. Fourthly, within the university, the unlimited freedom of teaching and research can paradoxically be detrimental to the realisation of the ideal. For it can encourage among university members a narrowness and isolation. "Everybody leaves everyone else greater liberties so as to be entitled to them himself and to be safe from the meddling of others." In this way, communication and debate are restricted. And fifthly, there exists the whole matter of appointments and promotions as an area in which the institution may fall short of the ideal. The imponderables which surround this matter and the foibles of the people involved make decisions precarious and the ideal elusive. For this reason, Jaspers is willing to support the supervision of appointments by a third party.

The third aspect of the university's institutional existence to be discussed here is the so-called "human factor". It is this aspect which Jaspers rightly elevates above all else. For the university is instituted originally to serve man in his quest for knowledge, and its success depends ultimately upon the people who participate in it. It is necessary to keep these facts clearly in mind, for the prevailing tendency is to the contrary, i.e. to forget them by placing the institution itself ahead of its authentic participants and by believing that institutional dictates can accomplish all things. In the face of this tendency, Jaspers emphasises three
points: that the only proper justification for the university as an institution is its service to the quest for knowledge; that it is the people alone who instill life into the university, the one's who commit themselves to the search for truth; and that what really matters in the university cannot be forcibly legislated, but must be allowed to grow "organically". Respect for the institution itself is necessary, for the institution is the permanent locus and support for the idea of the university. But "the vitality of the university depends on persons, not institutions, which are no more than a physical prerequisite.**54**

With respect to the university's institutional existence, we must also take note here of Jaspers' discussion of the relation of the university to the state. Concerning this relation, he writes: "The university exists through the good graces of the body politic. Its existence is dependent upon political considerations . . . . No state intolerant of any restriction on its power for fear of the consequences of a pure search for truth, will ever allow a genuine university to exist."**55** It is the state which supports and protects the university, providing it with resources, exempting it from state control and guarding it from other external interferences. This in turn presumes on the part of the state a recognition of the value of the unhampered search for truth: "it feels that the pure service of truth somewhere within its own orbit serves its own interests." The university is accepted thereby as the intellectual conscience of a nation, yet one whose link with reality is through knowledge rather than action. "Value judgements and practical action are suspended in favour of the ideal of pure truth." It is this disinterestedness which separates the life of the university decisively from the *vita activa.*

When viewed in relation to the state, the university is clearly in a dependent position. It commands no forces, nor manipulates any political powers; and if it did, this would be fatal to its integrity. Thus, in the inevitable conflicts which arise between state and university, the university can appeal only to reason in its defence. "It controls the state through the power of truth, not of force."**56** It is the task of the university to make a case for itself, to define and clarify its own idea, defending this against public confusion and prejudice. And where it fails to carry out this process of self-elucidation and justification, it fails to live up to its own idea.

A final point to be mentioned here concerning the university's institutional existence is its supranational character. Although universities look to individual nation states for their support, they derive their meaning and justification from the transcendent ideal of a pure search for truth. Their commitment to this search should not be diverted by partisan nationalistic ties. Whenever nationalism is allowed to invade the institution, its authentic life inevitably suffers.

Enough of the details of Jaspers' elucidation of the idea of the university have now been sketched to give a sense of the general thrust of his position. In this regard, I have tried to emphasise the unity of his thinking as it builds upon his conception of human knowledge and being. What other details might here be added (e.g. concerning admissions, examinations, administrative structures, etc.) could easily be fitted into this framework. Yet, rather than pursuing the matter further, it is more important now that we attempt to gain some perspective on Jaspers' work. And this can best be accomplished through defence and criticism.
In Defence of Jaspers

It is not my intention here to argue in direct support of Jaspers' particular understanding of the university as though it represented the complete and final truth on the matter. But I do wish to defend very briefly his general approach to the question. I wish to indicate that any attempt to understand the idea of the university must begin from a conception of the nature of knowledge in its relation to human being; and that the authentic existence of the university must be grounded upon this understanding taken as an effective guide. In this way, I hope to provide a vindication, not only of Jaspers' general project, but in principle of the very task of reflecting philosophically on the university.

Jaspers makes clear the importance of a conception of knowledge to the idea of the university when he speaks of the university as "the corporate realisation of man's basic determination to know." This remark states what is for him a basic fact: that the university, regardless of whatever corruptions or diversions it undergoes over time and regardless of how its particular functions come to be specified, is an institution given over to the service of knowledge, the pursuit of knowledge being bound up with the nature of man. This is hardly a contentious claim. It merely affirms what need be acknowledged in any thinking about the university whatever; namely, that as an institution the university has its immediate origin in man's basic desire (or need) to acquire, preserve and transmit knowledge. However, beyond this self-evident claim, it is also held that the prevailing idea of knowledge understood in terms of its essential relation to man should be wholly decisive with respect to the conception and institution of the university. In other words, the idea of the university and its institutional reality are at any given time to be guided by, and constructed around, the prevailing conception of knowledge, which includes as well a notion of man's essential nature qua knower. Upon reflection, however, even this is not an overly contentious claim. For it merely serves to emphasise the essential relation that obtains between means and ends. If the most basic "end" of the university is by definition the service of human knowledge, then the means to its realisation (i.e. the idea of the university in Jaspers' full sense of this term) must be determined from out of the nature of this end. Hence, the conception and realisation of the university receive their basic directive from the nature of human knowledge both qua knowledge and qua human. Within this framework, however, room is still left for widely conflicting notions of what the university should be.57

The present situation makes it necessary to stress as well the importance of philosophic reflection per se upon the idea of the university and to indicate the relevance of this reflection for university life. On one level, economic restraints and the difficulties accompanying these tend now to divert our attention away from first order problems and to divide it amongst a multitude of practical affairs. As a result, philosophic questions are relegated to a level of secondary importance. However, there is also a widespread tendency to regard philosophic reflection on its own account as something inessential. Thus, at best, it is invoked in a marginal and piecemeal way in the discussion of particular issues; and at worst, it is rejected outright as errant speculation irrelevant to "real life". In any case, the importance of philosophic reflection to the university's existence is today dramatically understated.

Jaspers' writing on the university seeks implicitly to reclaim for philosophic reflection its proper position and value. In the first place, it attempts to revive within the university
the basic moral force which philosophy has traditionally had. For it demands, by its own example, that each person involved in university life give an account of the ultimate basis and meaning of his conduct. In this manner, it exacts from each a sense of self-awareness and a responsibility for self-justification. Secondly, Jaspers’ writing serves to combat the basic fragmentation that derives from having lost sight of first principles and origins, of that which provides the ultimate theoretical foundation for the university. It is philosophic reflection alone that can elucidate this foundation, giving an overall theoretical sense and support to institutional life and clarifying the transcendent implications of its concrete problems. And thirdly, as noted before, philosophic reflection fixes the ideal toward which all action relevant to the university as such must be oriented. It sets out the essential characteristics of the true university and delineates thereby the primary goals of university life. Viewed overall, then, philosophic reflection is demanded to make of the institution an authentic self-aware and self-determining university. Where such reflection is ignored or only paid lip-service, the university remains blind and ultimately founders; and where it is rejected outright, the university becomes a sham.58

Points of Contention:

Thus far, my treatment of Jaspers’ work has been limited to exposition, clarification and support; it remains now to face the matter of criticism. In this regard, two preliminary remarks are necessary. Firstly, specific objections to Jaspers’ work must be considered with a view to the entirety of his conception of the university and the foundation upon which this is built. For it is in terms of this structure as a whole that Jaspers’ particular philosophic decisions concerning the university have been made. Secondly, the specific objections that I raise here (and in some cases deal with) are only those which seem to me the most obvious; I make no claim for their exhaustiveness.

The first of the objections to be noted concerns an apparent lacuna in Jaspers’ discussion. Despite its comprehensiveness and detail, it nowhere provides the reader with specific curriculum suggestions. One is thus left in the dark concerning the form which a university education should take, or what, according to Jaspers, the programme of a typical student might be. Upon closer reflection, however, this omission can be given a definite rationale. To set out specific curriculum proposals would contradict the basic principles of *Lernfreiheit* and *Lehrfreiheit*. It would be to instruct the student as to what he must learn and the teacher as to what he must teach. Jaspers, of course, recognises that science itself makes its own intrinsic demands which regulate the nature of the true university and impose themselves upon student and teacher alike. Yet, in terms of the particular path which each one pursues, both student and teacher must have complete freedom of choice. To be sure, this freedom is prevented from becoming licence by the demands of rigour and cogency intrinsic to each discipline, which the community of scholars itself is charged to maintain. Yet, within the scope of these demands, both student and teacher are free to sink or swim.59

The attitude just expressed exposes Jaspers to a second objection. It might be argued that his conception of the university is too “aristocratic”, for it excludes from the institution all but the best, who are the fewest. The university becomes then a domain of special privilege, which as such should have no place in an ostensibly democratic society. Jaspers
himself regards this objection as being twofold: one aspect pertains to the principle of intellectual aristocracy itself, and the other, to the toleration by society of the minority which this principle involves. He takes up each aspect in turn.

In dealing with the first, Jaspers quotes with approval a remark from Abraham Flexner's *Universities: American, English, German*. It reads: "Democracy is a social and political, not an intellectual possibility, beyond the fact that to the aristocracy of the intellect every individual should be eligible on the basis of ability without regard to any other consideration whatever." The search for truth is of such a nature that it is intrinsically an "aristocratic" affair. Commitment to it is always rare and confined to a minority. Yet this minority has only an intellectual (or "spiritual") criterion for membership, and is drawn from all social strata. Its members possess, Jaspers writes, "a freedom which grows into the responsibility of continuous self-elevation." This, however, is not a matter of superior endowment; "but merely that of an urge towards real knowledge, and with that, of a venturing and conscientious attention to the demands of one's studies." And these qualities may appear in anyone.

In regard to the second aspect of this objection (i.e. that society should not have to reserve and support a place for a privileged minority), Jaspers is no less decisive. He argues first that the freedom to search for truth is a human right, one which a free society must respect and provide for, even though only a minority of its members has the inclination or the ability to exercise this right fully. And it is both an aspect of academic freedom and a sign of social health that this right is recognised and actively supported. Jaspers also argues that the perpetuation and advancement of human knowledge that is achieved in the university, as well as the epochal (self) awareness that it cultivates, are of general social benefit and use. The search for truth, then, although justified as an end in itself, is not without external, social import. With this latter argument, however, Jaspers implicitly acknowledges that the objection here is really a utilitarian one: that society objects to bearing the burden of cost for an institution whose material and quantifiable benefits to the public are marginal or unclear. The university is thus thought to be "privileged", for it receives public money, but does not seem to pay back in kind. To confront this utilitarian bias, it is insufficient to offer counter-evidence of a utilitarian sort (and Jaspers does so only secondarily). What is needed instead is both a precise clarification of the real nature of the university's "privilege" and a defence of the right to search for truth with all its ancillary requirements and restrictions.

Jaspers' work is also open to a number of objections which centre around the questions of teaching and research. Although I shall consider each separately, they are not unrelated in their import.

The first of these objections concerns Jaspers' belief that teaching and research are inextricably united: that to be a good teacher one must be involved in research and vice versa. The contrary view is to see no essential connection between these activities, and in the extreme, to regard them as conflicting. A defence of this contrary view is usually two-pronged. One first cites the empirical evidence, listing the great scholars who at the same time are reputed to be poor teachers, and then goes on to indicate the different and incompatible requirements of each activity. Lying at the base of this disagreement are differing conceptions of what it means to teach in the university. Those who separate teaching and research tend to view all teaching as the transmission of basic information about a
subject matter; thus, teaching becomes equated here wholly with scholastic instruction. The
demands of such instruction (e.g. clarity, simplicity and compendiousness) are then shown
to be different from those of research (e.g. vision, profundity and initiative), and not likely
to be met in the same person. For Jaspers, however, this conception of teaching, and the
dichotomy it supports, is unacceptable. Scholastic instruction, he argues, has its proper
place in the high school, and where it is found within the university, it has only a subordi-
nate function.63 Teaching within the university should be geared to the basic quest which
ideally motivates both instructor and student, the unhampered search for knowledge guided
by the goals of unity and rigour. This quest must permeate the whole activity of the uni-
versity. With respect to teaching, then, it determines the intellectual substance to be com-
municated and the spirit in which this communication is offered. According to Jaspers,
only one who is experienced in research can carry out this teaching function properly,
giving life to the material he presents and transmitting with it a sense of what it truly means
to seek knowledge.

The preceding objection leads directly to a second point. Jaspers' conception of teaching
and research, it could be maintained, although suitable to a graduate school, is too demand-
ing and unstructured for an undergraduate institution. Indeed, his entire discussion of the
idea of the university ignores the graduate/undergraduate distinction altogether. In one
respect, such an objection is apposite. Jaspers does in fact demand of the university in
general what we expect, if at all, only from a graduate school. This, however, serves merely
to make apparent the ramifications of Jaspers' ideal. To realise the true university on Jaspers'
terms would demand a restructuring of education that would reach into the high schools. A
student coming to the university for the first time should have a firm basis in scholastic
instruction upon which to build. For Jaspers, however, it is not the function of the university
to provide this. The university is an institute of higher learning, and not a high school. (Yet
the latter, it would seem, is what undergraduate education has become.)

Another possible objection to Jaspers' conception of teaching and research is the charge
of narrowness. It might be claimed that his views are appropriate only to work in the hu-
manities. For in the natural sciences, the need for extensive basic instruction seems more
pressing, and the gap between this instruction and advanced research appears much greater.
Within this sphere, then, Jaspers' ideal of student/teacher co-operation would be unfeasible.
Such an objection, however, is based upon too restricted a view of Jaspers' position. In the
first place, he would no doubt acknowledge differences between what is demanded and
what is possible within the scope of each discipline (although the rigid natural sciences/
humanities dichotomy is not one he would accept). Moreover, the vision of the teacher
leading the students through his own research, although assuredly the paradigm, is not
exclusive of all else. And as a paradigm it does admit of degrees approaching it. Departures
from the ideal, however, must be allowed only where necessary and, even then, reluctantly.

A more serious objection to Jaspers' notion of research concerns the claim that there is
indeed a pure search for truth, removed from value judgements and commitments to
action. It is upon this claim, we recall, that Jaspers separates university life from practical
affairs. Such a claim, however, is open to question in a number of respects. Two of these
are ways which Jaspers himself acknowledges, and thus does not regard as decisive. The
pure search for truth presumes its own inherent value, and hence is not wholly without
valuational factors. Moreover, philosophic reflection for Jaspers is an aspect of this search
that is bound up inextricably with existential commitments. To these points, however, one could add further queries of a similar sort. It might be argued, for example, that the very location and selection of problems in the course of scientific activity is value laden, since what is taken up as worthy of investigation is thereby deemed valuable. It might also be claimed that there are active components in all scientific knowing, which serve to root all such awareness (and not just philosophy) in the soil of existential commitment. Yet it is very likely that Jaspers would not regard any of these claims as sufficient to refute the ideal of a pure search for truth; after all, he never does maintain that science must be wertlos. But he does affirm that science, at least in the narrow sense, is wertfrei, i.e. that it affirms no moral valuations and "is free from all deceptions owing to the interest of the will." Yet one can even call this sense of neutrality into question. For it might be argued that pure research in the natural sciences always has practical consequences and uses (and hence implicit values) which the researcher cannot disregard or be removed from. Similarly, depending upon where one stands on the "objectivity" question, it could be argued that research in the social sciences either offers results which have value implications in terms of social manipulation, or that value judgements are themselves a necessary part of such research. Either way, the "purity" of the investigation is called into question.

This whole matter of a pure search for truth is clearly one that requires a solid treatment in its own right, especially if the issue of university autonomy is to be decided. In the light of the preceding queries, one cannot draw any secure conclusions from Jaspers' own discussion, which remains problematic at this point. Within the limits of the present study, however, it is not possible to examine the question in proper depth. Suffice it then merely to acknowledge the pressing need for such an examination, insofar as the question bears, not only upon the issue of university autonomy as such, but also upon a host of related matters (e.g. contract research, government funding, the university as a political force, etc.). It must be decided whether it is legitimate to speak at all of a pure search for truth, and if not, whether there is then no sound theoretical basis for the university's neutrality as both a right and a duty.

A final objection pertaining to the whole matter of teaching and research concerns Jaspers' notion of research as it relates to the university's unifying spirit. Most thinkers would agree with Jaspers that the essence of what we now call science is research, and that the essence of all research lies in methodology. Yet, granting this, some might still call into question his view that all science can and must be geared to a unity of knowledge. The basis of this questioning would reside with a different interpretation of the meaning of methodology and research. Methodology in the sciences, it might be argued, is not simply a way of proceeding, but is also the opening of a sphere of objectivity in which alone a particular procedure is effective. As research, every science is founded upon the delineation of such a sphere and is thus a specialised science. Indeed, the essence of science as methodic research lies in this specialisation. Specialisation, therefore, is not the result, but the necessary ground of the process of research. But if this is so, then the demand for a systematic unity of the sciences is contrary to the demand by which science as research gains mastery of its work. Hence, the spirit of unity cannot be effectively alive in research itself, but only imposed ab extra. On these terms, then, a unity of the sciences can only be an abstract and rigid unity of the relation of methodologies and spheres of objectivity, not an original unity of the intellectual disciplines themselves. Accordingly, the theoretical unity of the univer-
sity, as rooted in the unity of science itself, can only have this same abstract character.

In order to achieve a genuine unity of the science of the sort which Jaspers postulates, it would be necessary to rethink the very nature of science itself, which in our time would amount to nothing less than a revision of the whole way we view the world. Only upon such a revision would an organic, theoretically based unity of the university be possible. Yet to consider such a revision necessary implies that modern science is somehow on the wrong track, or that it suffers a crisis of meaning and a failure of self-understanding. Given the record of its theoretical and technical successes, this may be a very difficult view to defend. In the age of science, the judgements of philosophy are not well received.

A less obstruse objection to Jaspers' work concerns his discussion of the relation of the university to society. Jaspers, it seems, fails to appreciate fully the economic side of this relation, i.e. that for us the university is a "state capitalist" enterprise entrenched in a whole system of economic interconnections. This entrenchment, which militates against the notion of university neutrality and independence, has both a primary and a secondary aspect. The university appears first as an academic business, a producer of knowledge commodities (i.e. courses, degrees, research papers, books, trained personnel and advice) for sale on the public market. It is thus bound by market conditions and must justify itself in terms of market demands. The university has in addition a number of secondary connections. It represents a substantial capital investment in land, buildings, libraries, research facilities, etc.; it serves as a buffer for an already overflooded labour market; and it serves to maintain a variety of support industries and services. The apparent shortcoming to Jaspers' analysis is that he seems to treat these economic relations rather glibly, and does not indicate with sufficient clarity how we might actually deal with them in any programme of genuine reform.

In regard to this objection, two points might be raised in Jaspers' defence. Firstly, it is clear that any adequate discussion of the university's economic dependence must deal directly with particular, concrete cases, and not be limited to generalities, which are vague and imprecise. What is taken for glibness in Jaspers' work is, I think, a recognition on his part that his own general statements on the question are in themselves of only minimal value. For when he speaks to this issue directly (and he does do so), Jaspers focuses upon the German situation alone and in fact treats of it in some detail. Thus, the charge that he skirts the issue altogether is not well-founded. Secondly, this whole matter of economic dependence must itself be placed in proper perspective. It is no doubt true that economic considerations will limit what goals the university can hope to realise; but these considerations must never themselves determine what the goals are. The university as an academic business is no university at all. We must also guard against the tendency to let our concern for the economics of the university (which in itself is quite justified) become a sort of "economism" and thence an ideology. When this occurs, we tend to regard monetary input as the only real determining factor in university life. This then prevents us from establishing what our real priorities should be or from understanding what the best means for achieving them are. We are pulled and pushed at the mercy of economic conditions, not because it is absolutely necessary, but because we have narrowed our thinking to the point where we cannot see around them. If Jaspers can help us to move away from this pattern, to develop an alternative vision, then he does us a service.

There is a further objection to Jaspers' work which stands outside of all the particular
difficulties mentioned thus far. It concerns the status of his project as a whole. The question runs: Can the idea of the university, even when approached in a systematic and comprehensive way, be given adequate treatment in abstraction from the more basic task of elucidating the ontological roots of our present situation? This is not simply a question of whether the treatment of the idea of the university is to be tied to a larger social critique. That, I think, goes without saying. For we cannot understand the university as a social institution without a critical understanding of society as a whole. Nor is it simply a question of giving the idea of the university a deeper philosophic base by grounding it in a theory of knowledge and human being. For that too is in fact demanded by the concept itself. What is really being asked here is whether our thinking about the university must receive its determination from a more original reflection, one that elucidates the present situation as a whole in terms of its ground in being and *Existenz*. And the answer to this question, which could only be adequately justified by working the matter out in full, is quite simply, "yes". Without a foundation in original reflection every discussion of the university remains on the surface. To be fair to Jaspers, however, it must be said that he does attempt such reflection. But unfortunately, he never places his discussion of the university decisively within its bounds. To this extent, then, his work never gets fully to the roots of the matter at hand.

The last of my critical remarks is not so much an objection to Jaspers' work as it is a confession of doubt. My uncertainty here is the obvious one: Is there a real possibility of effectively recovering the idea of the university and accomplishing the needed revitalisation of its institutional life? Time and again, Jaspers himself emphasises the importance of the "human factor" in this. "All university life," he writes, "depends upon the nature of the people participating in it." Hence, any genuine reform of the university will rest ultimately with them, with a fundamental change in their thought and action. Yet the failure of Jaspers' own efforts to effect such a change is not encouraging. In view of it, one can hardly expect that people will come to reflect seriously upon the idea of the university or that this idea in its ideal element will be taken up as an effective guide and standard, not at least until the real necessity for radical philosophic reflection is brought home more convincingly. Yet, granting this as a possibility, an additional problem remains. Can the idea of the university be effectively recovered and the needed reform carried out in a way that does not itself contradict the end that is sought? One may be hopeful, but one can hardly be optimistic.

Conclusion:

It is not my intention to conclude this discussion with a final reckoning of its subject matter, a sort of "what is living and what is dead" in Jaspers' concept of the university. Such a procedure would be inappropriate here in two respects. In the first place, it would serve to encourage the same sort of fragmentation that marks a failure of thought in general. It would thereby tend to sustain, rather than to confront, the university's present disintegration. Secondly, Jaspers' thinking on the university does not itself permit of a piecemeal approach. For if one accepts or rejects a particular assertion, one must accept or reject as well Jaspers' reasons for affirming it; and this leads inevitably into the whole fabric and foundation of his position. Thus, there can be no simple accounting of Jaspers'
claims, no straightforward check-list of what is true and false among them. On the contrary, what is required here by way of a genuine critique is nothing less than a confrontation of philosophy with philosophy, one which would challenge Jaspers' whole conception of the university at its root. Only in this way can we carry on a dialogue with Jaspers which moves on his own level.

Such a project, however, is much beyond the limited tasks of the present discussion. No more can be done at this late stage that simply to reaffirm the need for continued reflection on the idea of the university. It is through such reflection that the ideal will be kept vividly before us as guide to authentic conduct.

We are deeply committed to this ideal which has given meaning to our life; yet we lack the necessary strength to speak of it with the enthusiasm it deserves. We know that truth, striving all around us to be seen and recognized, will live or perish with our ability to realise the ideal of the university in its ever-changing forms.70

Notes

1. See bibliog. p. 41 (With respect to citation, I have preferred to give the English translation of Jaspers' works whenever available. Otherwise, I have cited the German original and provided my own translation.)

2. Writing in 1953, Jaspers himself acknowledged the widespread ineffectualness of his essays on the university (see "Philosophical Autobiography" in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. P.A. Schilpp [La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1957], pp. 45-46). The publication of an additional book and several articles since that time has done nothing to alter the situation.


5. See e.g., Philosophische Aufsätze, (Frankfurt: Fischer-Bücherei, 1967), p. 91. Although the idea is said to be "timeless", it is not for that reason outside the temporal process (see Von der Wahrheit, p. 613 and infra pp. 16-18).

6. See The Idea of the University, pp. 70-74 and infra, p. 29; see also infra pp. 16-17.


11. See Von der Wahrheit, p. 613.

12. Ibid., p. 81.


15. The Idea of the University, p. 3.

16. Ibid., p. 3.

18. For a useful elucidation and critique of Jaspers' notion of the relation of science, philosophy and knowledge see James Collins, "Jaspers on Science and Philosophy," in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, pp. 115-140. I have devoted slightly more attention to this matter than the theme of the present paper demands in order to compensate for the extreme terseness of Jaspers' own discussion (cf. The Idea of the University, pp. 7-27). Nevertheless, I have still been forced to pass over possible discrepancies in Jaspers' own account and to withhold final judgement upon the tenability of his position as a whole.


20. See The Idea of the University, p. 134 and infra, p. 22.


22. The Idea of the University, p. 12.


25. See Von der Wahrheit, pp. 587-589 and 971; The Idea of the University, p. 63.

26. The Idea of the University, p. 88.

27. Ibid., p. 88.


30. For Jaspers' most comprehensive discussion of technology see The Origin and Goal of History, pp. 96ff.

31. The Idea of the University, p. 95.

32. Ibid., pp. 95-96.

33. Ibid., p. 30.

34. It does not transmit a Weltanschaung in the sense of a specific set of beliefs and theories. It is weltanschaulich only insofar as it encourages a general type of comportment toward the world. Jaspers' notion of culture is thus to be contrasted with all closed, content-centred conceptions (cf. e.g. Ortega y Gasset, Mission of the University, trans. Howard Lee Nostrand [New York: Norton & Co., 1966], pp. 69-81).

35. The Idea of the University, p. 52.

36. Ibid., p. 33.

37. A twofold difficulty arises in this regard. Firstly, Lehrfreiheit presupposes the integrity of those teachers involved in a discipline to apply its standards of rigour conscientiously to themselves without prejudice or external coercion. Secondly, there are some disciplines (e.g. philosophy) in which there is fundamental disagreement as to what these standards are. Hence, depending upon his view of these standards, what is liberty to one may be licence to another.

38. The Idea of the University, p. 1.

39. Ibid., p. 1, my italics and addition.

40. Ibid., p. 41.

41. Ibid., p. 44.

42. It must be noted here that Jaspers regards university teaching only marginally as scholastic instruction and more centrally as an apprentice-craftsman relation in the process of research (cf. infra pp. 33-34).

43. See supra p. 22.

44. The Idea of the University, p. 47.

45. See supra p. 25.

46. The Idea of the University, p. 57.

47. Ibid., p. 58.
48. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
49. Ibid., p. 61.
50. Ibid., p. 60.
51. Ibid., p. 70.
52. Ibid., p. 73.
53. See Ibid., p. 71. One wonders whether this is consistent with the thrust of the rest of his argument, and whether, given the poor record of past German governments in this regard, it can be considered a wise concession.
54. Ibid., p. 77.
55. Ibid., p. 121.
56. Ibid., p. 124.
57. Drawing upon Jaspers' analysis, one could make the following claims concerning this issue as it pertains to our current situation: (1) The present prevailing conception of knowledge is faulty, for it favours disunity and overestimates the value of particular sciences. (2) This conception, however, is actually embodied in the contemporary university, which thus manifests internal disunity and a tendency toward scientism. (3) The relation between this prevailing conception of knowledge and the current life of the university needs to be unfolded explicitly and properly understood. (4) Ultimately, however, this prevailing conception of knowledge itself must be rethought and revised, stressing the ideal of unity and the correct scope and limit of each science. (5) And finally, the idea of the university, and thence university life itself, must be adjusted to this revised conception of knowledge.
58. In Jaspers’ view, the most startling example of the university severed from its philosophical roots is that of the German university during the Nazi period (see “The Rededication of German Scholarship,” trans. M. Zuckerkandl in The American Scholar, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1945, pp. 180-188.). It is clear that Jaspers' writing on the university has been strongly affected by this experience.
59. On Jaspers’ own terms, one may nevertheless adduce some general principles concerning curriculum. The true student and researcher will seek an interdisciplinary knowledge, working toward a comprehensive vision of the whole. For this accords with the demands of science itself and with the intrinsic nature of the genuine will to know. A concern for specialised knowledge, if held to the exclusion of all else, is detrimental to the life of the university. It must be tempered by a concern for unity. Nevertheless, since science has no single methodology, a student is best advised to begin by concentrating upon one discipline, learning its methods and perspectives first. This will give him a foundation upon which to build.
60. The Idea of the University, p. 128.
63. On this question, Jaspers writes: “The basic difference between high school and university is that in high schools the teacher must teach all the students entrusted to him. In the university, however, he has no such obligation. University education is meant for a number of selected people who are filled with a very special intellectual zeal and have sufficient mental equipment to do the work. In effect, the people who attend the university are an average group of people who have been able to acquire the necessary preparation.” (The Idea of the University, p. 59). He also writes: “There is certainly a place for scholastic instruction, for learning in its narrower sense, and for practice in methods [in the university]. But the student is free to choose how extensively he wants to participate in this instruction, and when he can get on with books alone, without the benefit of teachers.” (Ibid., p. 54).
64. See Von der Wahrheit, pp. 322-323.
65. The basis for this objection is to be found in Martin Heidegger, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, Holzwege, 6 Aufl. (Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1972), pp. 69-104, esp. 76-80.
66. This is not to be confused with the Marxist (or pseudo-Marxist) analysis of the university which gained currency in North America during the late 1960’s. For a summary and critique of that analysis see Robert Paul Wolff, The Ideal of the University (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 44-47.
67. See e.g., Chapter X of Die Idee der Universität, Berlin: Springer, 1946. This chapter has been
omitted from the English translation. See also *Die Idee der Universität, für die gegenwärtigen Situation entworfen von Karl Jaspers und Kurt Rossman*, Berlin: Springer, 1961. None of this text has been translated.

68. E.g. *Man and the Modern Age."


70. Ibid., p. 135.

**Bibliography**

A comprehensive bibliography of Jaspers' writings, including those on higher education, can be found in:


Jaspers' Writings on Higher Education

*Die Idee der Universität.*

Berlin: Springer, 1923 (81 pp.)


*Die Idee der Universität.*

Berlin: Springer 1946 (132 pp.)


*Die Idee der Universität, für die gegenwärtigen Situation entworfen von Karl Jaspers und Kurt Rossmann*. Berlin: Springer, 1961 (250 pp.)

*Although these books bear the same title, they are neither the same work in different editions, nor the first text twice revised. Each, according to Jaspers, is a separate project cast from the ground of new experience.

**In the present study, I have focused largely upon this text, as it is the only major work by Jaspers on the university that is available in English translation. To my knowledge, none of his major works in this area have been translated into French.