Cothematic Intertextuality in a Sociocognitive Discourse-Analytical Perspective

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Abstract

The present study seeks to revisit the concept of intertextuality as integrated into a sociocognitive discourse-analytical perspective, whereby intertextual meanings can be explicated via semantic macropropositions, mental representations, event models, and pragmatic context models. The study’s significance derives from its scholarly endeavour to demonstrate how the semantic and rhetorical meanings of intertextuality are cognitively explicable in relation to their relevant macro social/societal structures in McGrath and McGrath’s (2007) *The Dawkins Delusion*? as a polemical response to Richard Dawkins’ (2006) *The God Delusion*. Three research questions have been posed: (1) What are the cothematic intertextual links that globally constitute the discourse(s) drawn upon in *The Dawkins Delusion*? (2) How to explain the intertextual local meanings constructed and generated by their relevant event models in the same book? (3) What are the context model’s constraints that control the production and reception of the intertextual local meanings and relate them to macro social/societal structures? Methodologically, the study subjects Thibault’s (1991) notion of “cothematic intertextuality” to the sociocognitive approach presented in critical discourse studies. The data analysis has demonstrated how the global and local intertextual meanings holding between two sets of textbook data have been cognitively mediated and related to significant social/societal macrostructures.

Keywords: Context model, cothematic intertextuality, critical discourse studies, event models, macropropositions, sociocognitive approach

Introduction

The concept of intertextuality is credited to Julia Kristeva’s two seminal premises: (i) any text is constructed out of a quotation mosaic and (ii) any text serves to absorb and transform another (Kristeva, 1986). Kristeva’s premises constitute the first systematic theory of intertextuality, with her attempt to synergize Saussurean and Bakhtinian theories of language and literature, respectively (Allen, 2000). But, here, Kristeva seemed to be more concerned with Bakhtin’s (1981) significant notion of “social heteroglossia” as the language’s potential to contain many voices that materialize at utterance/text level, and hence the dialogicity inherent in language(s). Crucial about Bakhtin’s social heteroglossia is the potential for exemplifying language’s intertextual (or dialogic) nature which unfailingly materializes by serving two speakers in a single utterance.

Notwithstanding a plethora of research on intertextuality (see below), to date the concept of intertextuality has not been examined through the lens of van Dijk’s (2008, 2009a, 2009b) sociocognitive approach in a way that projects the concept as a practice with cognitive relevance to the macrostructures of social/societal representations. The current study derives its significance from its being a demonstration of how the semantic and rhetorical meanings of intertextuality are cognitively explicable based on their relevant macro social/societal structures in McGrath and McGrath’s (2007) The Dawkins Delusion? Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine as a polemical response to Richard Dawkins’ (2006) The God Delusion.

Towards capturing the current research significance, three related research questions are put forward: (1) What are the cothematic intertextual links that globally constitute the discourse(s) drawn upon in The Dawkins Delusion? (2) How to explain the intertextual local meanings constructed and generated by their relevant event models in the same book? (3) What are the context model’s constraints that control the production and reception of the intertextual local meanings and relate them to macro social/societal structures? On addressing these questions, the following hypothesis may be (dis-)proven: Tackling intertextuality in a sociocognitive discourse-analytical perspective may demonstrate how the cognitive aspects of text producers and recipients (e.g., mental representations, event models, and context models) can probe the interface between the micro semantic and rhetorical (local) meanings of intertextuality and their relevant macro social and societal structures (e.g., individual social actors and situated interactions as well as groups and institutions, power relations, and educational practices).

The remainder of the current study unfolds in six sections. Section two surveys the relevant review of literature. Section three outlines the theoretical framework adopted in the present study. Section four offers the study’s methodology. Section five presents the data analysis. Section six is a discussion of the main findings. Section seven concludes the present study with an overall summary of the research point and its originality.

Literature Review

Following the Bakhtinian influence of social heteroglossia and dialogicity (Bakhtin, 1981), most of the research conducted on intertextuality from a discourse-analytical perspective has been concerned with probing the interface between the intertextual and the social, but with scant heed to cognition; this may boil down to the inaccurate commonplace assumption that the relationship between language/discourse and society is straightforward. This is especially so among the (critical) discourse analysts and theorists who advocate the sociologically oriented

One classic study on intertextuality was conducted by de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981), who presented the notion as falling among the seven standards of textuality. Adopting a procedural approach, the two authors focused on factors constituting the interdependencies between the production and reception of a text, depending on the participants’ knowledge of other previously encountered texts. The study recognized the utility of the concept of knowledge mediation and its role in securing the temporal processing between the use of one text and the use of a prior one. Reproducing a similar recognition, Giuffrè (2017) used the same procedural approach to demonstrate the intertextual workings across different text types, literary, scientific, and conversational.

Investigating intertextuality within the ambit of critical discourse analysis (CDA) has been influenced by the general scope of CDA itself as being distinctive in its view of the link between language and society as well as the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Obviously, the critical approach of CDA was then focused on the language-society relationship that presupposed the conspicuous absence of the cognitive component mediating both micro-linguistic structure and macro-social structure – perhaps except for van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach (see below).

In a bid to bridge the gap between CDA and language cognition, O’Halloran (2003) paid particular attention to the interpretation stage of CDA. But O’Halloran has been limited to the traditional field of cognitive linguistics, especially in relation to the psycholinguistic evidence for inference generation, ideal-reader construction, and relevance theory; further, his investigation has been confined to how news textual data could mystify what is reported. Indeed, this dimension of cognitive linguistics to CDA has not been applied to explaining intertextuality in the scope of CDA.

Although the frameworks of text linguistics and CDA have contributed to the study of intertextuality, they both cannot be considered to have investigated intertextual meanings on the sociocognitive grounds of discourse, particularly at the level of ideological representations and societal structures. The theoretical framework presented in the coming section is an endeavour to bridge such a gap in the literature on intertextuality.

**Theoretical Framework**

Before explaining how intertextuality can be integrated into van Dijk’s sociocognitive discourse-analytical approach, one needs to present significant aspects of intertextuality. Indeed, one finds Thibault’s (1991) notion of “cothematic intertextuality” fitting the present theoretical framework. The rationale for this is twofold. First, generally, Thibault’s notion departs from the classic “isomorphic or one-to-one fit between text and discourse” (Thibault, 1991, p. 120); second, in tackling this notion, Thibault has emphasized the ideological component of the social agents enacting intertextual meanings and their heteroglossic nature. Therefore, Thibault’s “cothematic intertextuality” can be analysed in a sociocognitive perspective.
In what follows, the first subsection elucidates Thibault’s conceptualization of intertextuality as being “cothematic,” and the second outlines how such conceptualization can be integrated into van Dijk’s (2008, 2009a, 2009b) sociocognitive approach.

Cothematic Intertextuality

Drawing on Vološinov (1973) and Bakhtin (1981), Thibault (1991) explicates the concept of intertextuality by probing the text-discourse heteroglossic relations:

A particular text is […] the material site of a plurality of heteroglossically related social discourses and their voicings. Specific texts, therefore, both instantiate and realize the heteroglossic relations of alliance, conflict, opposition, and co-optation among discursive positioned-practices in the social formation. (Thibault, 1991, p. 120)

Further, Thibault posits the caveat that intertextuality should not be viewed as positivistically recoverable from “antecedent source texts”; but, rather, there should be a distinction between what Frow (1986) describes as “weak” and “strong” forms of intertextuality; that is, between “thematic allusion on the one hand and an explicit, extended, verbally and structurally close reference on the other” (Frow, 1986, p. 156, cited in Thibault, 1991, p. 135).

This may explain why Thibault, in developing his theory of intertextuality, has adapted Lemke’s (1990) topically oriented notion of “thematic formation,” which is formed out of “[t]he web of semantic relationships among different thematic items”; and, as the former explains, a thematic item is that element of a “thematic pattern” which can be expressed across all different texts and genres. Thibault (1991) managed to develop a critical model that explains intertextual links as being “cothematic”; that is, two or more texts are presumed to share “lexico-semantic and ideational-grammatical meaning relations from the lexico-grammatical resources of language” (p. 136). Thus, intertextual thematic meaning can be construed on the basis of “typical patterns of combination and co-occurrence” of such lexico-grammatical resources enacted by what Lemke (1995) describes as “social agents.” At this point, there seems to be an ideological component of the “social agents” enacting the kind of meanings and practices realized in the heteroglossic social discourses in one text or another.

Here, subjective in nature, this ideological component of social agents can be explained in cognitive terms; or, more specifically, the agents’ mental representations, event models, and pragmatic context models as models of subjective representations of the relevant linguistic patterns that construe Thibault’s intertextuality – hence the methodological potential for investigating intertextuality from a sociocognitive discourse-analytical perspective.

The Sociocognitive Discourse-Analytical Approach to Intertextuality

The value of cognition for interpreting discursive and societal structures can be recognized in van Dijk’s (2014) account of how the sociocognitive approach contributes to the field of CDS:

A socio-cognitive theory assumes that social structures need to be interpreted and represented cognitively and that such mental representations affect the cognitive processes involved in the production and interpretation of discourse. The same principle holds true for the reverse relationship, namely how discourse is able to affect social structure – namely through the mental representations of language users as social actors. (p. 122)
According to this approach, then, discursive structures – including (inter)textual structure – and societal structures should be cognitively mediated. Towards this end, van Dijk heeds cognitive-structure aspects, namely, macropropositions, mental representations, event models, and context models.

In his sociocognitive approach, van Dijk explains the notion of context and its multidisciplinary complexity (van Dijk, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). To van Dijk (2008), context is not a form of “objective condition”; rather, it is an (inter)subjective construct “designed and ongoingly updated in interaction by participants as members of groups and communities” (p. x). Therefore, van Dijk considers the psychological concept of “mental models,” which “subjectively represent or construct situations, both those we talk about as well as those in which we talk about” (Van Dijk, 2009a, p. 6, emphasis in original). However, mental models of specific events “are not entirely personal”; rather, they also have “important social, intersubjective dimensions” due to the socialization of language users who have acquired “various kinds of shared knowledge and other beliefs” (Van Dijk, 2009a, p. 6, italics in original).

The concept of “mental models” has been utilized by van Dijk (2009b) in explaining “pragmatic context models” and their close bearings on discourse as being “specific mental models of subjective representations (definitions) of the relevant properties of communicative situations, controlling discourse processing and adapting discourse to the social environment so that it is situationally appropriate” (Van Dijk, 2009b, p. 65). An essential part of the relevant properties of communicative situations is what van Dijk (2009b, p. 68) technically terms the “semantic macrostructures” of discourse, or “global meanings, topics or themes,” which are “characteristically expressed in titles, abstracts, summaries and announcements” and can be formally recognized as “macropropositions.”

Indeed, such semantic macrostructures, or macropropositions, can be taken as a discursive medium for the realization of Thibault’s (1991) cothematic intertextual links, being construed based on “the typical patterns of combination and co-occurrence of lexico-semantic and ideational-grammatical items” (see above). This is especially so since the local meanings of such typical patterns are crucial to the context of (inter)textual meanings, mainly for two reasons: (i) “local meanings are a function of the selection made by speakers/writers in their mental models of events or their more general knowledge and ideologies”; (ii) “they [local meanings] are the kind of information that […] most directly influences the mental models, and hence the opinions and attitudes of recipients” (Van Dijk, 2009b, p. 69).

Here, it can be argued that explaining the local meanings of the semantic macrostructures can contribute to understanding Lemke’s (1995) “thematic formation” as being “recurrent patterns of semantic relations,” potentially utilized by social agents in representing specific topics in and across texts on a cothematically intertextual level of meanings. These meanings can take two forms. The first form comprises subjective or personal aspects of meaning, in that they reflect the recent event models stored in the short-term episodic memory of language users, who are in turn controlled by the context models adapting cothematically intertextual forms to the communicative purposes of events and/or situations. The second form comprises social and societal aspects of meaning associated, respectively, with (a) the micro social situation in terms of its action and actors with various roles (communicative, social, occupational, political, etc.) and (b) the macro structures of the groups and institutions as well as their socially shared representations and ideologies (see van Dijk, 2008, 2009a, 2009b).
Now, having proposed the sociocognitive discourse-analytical framework of explicating cothematic intertextuality, it is time to outline the methodology adopted in the present study.

**Methodology**

This section is devoted to discussing the research data employed for the analysis of cothematic intertextuality and the methodological procedure followed towards conducting this form of analysis.

**Data**

The present study utilizes two sets of data. The first is the primary set of data, being the target of cothetically intertextual analysis; it is a book written by Alister McGrath and Joanna McGrath: *The Dawkins Delusion? Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine*. The book was published in 2007 by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (SPCK), four chapters, 78 pages. Significantly, the book has been mainly authored by Professor Alister McGrath of Oxford University, as a critical response to the anti-religion arguments marshalled by Professor Richard Dawkins, Oxford University, in his book *The God Delusion*. Hence, this book is taken here as the second set of data. It was published in 2006 by Black Swan, 10 chapters, 463 pages.

It is worth mentioning that, although having two authors, *The Dawkins Delusion?* is written in the first person referring to the main author, Alister McGrath; and, therefore, throughout the analysis below, only the main author is referred to. Perhaps, one more reason why the main author is exclusively focused in the analysis can be ascribed to the fact that it is the main author who is ideologically opposed to Richard Dawkins; this is being so on account of the contextual information related to Alister McGrath himself, as an ex-atheist who later converted to Christianity.

**Procedure**

The methodological procedure followed in the present study proceeded at the three stages typical of the sociocognitive discourse-analytical approach. The first stage addresses the first research question raised in the introduction: What are the cothematic intertextual links that globally constitute the discourse(s) drawn upon in *The Dawkins Delusion*?? At this stage, the cothetically intertextual macropropositions were inferred and described throughout the whole book (*The Dawkins Delusion??*). These macropropositions have been inferred based on their being the global meanings constituting Alister McGrath’s anti-Dawkins’ discourse as being realized in the book title and chapter titles; therefore, the phrasing of the macropropositions has been conditioned by their being intertextually co-thematic with the main topics in Dawkins’ *The God Delusion*.

The second procedural stage of analysis addresses the second question: How to explain the intertextual local meanings constructed and generated by their relevant event models in the same book? This stage is concerned with the semantic analysis of the local meanings found in McGrath’s *The Dawkins Delusion?* as functionally related to the selections consciously made by McGrath – or even by Dawkins as manifestly quoted by McGrath himself – in his mental models of events or his more general knowledge of religion and atheism as well as his ideologies and biases for or against them; thus, McGrath’s intertextual links with Dawkins have been demonstrated to be cognitively mediated through such models of events in a way that can be
correlated with other macro social structures, including the social representations and institutional frameworks associated with both religion and atheism.

The third, and last, stage of analysis addresses the third question: What are the context model’s constraints that control the production and reception of the intertextual local meanings and relate them to relevant macro social/societal structures? This stage tackled the context models pertaining to McGrath and Dawkins, mainly by focusing on the schema-based categories of spatiotemporal settings, situated actions, and participants controlling the production and reception of the (cothematically) intertextual forms of local meanings in *The Dawkins Delusion*?.

The current stage has demonstrated how both the discursive meanings of cothematic intertextuality and the macro social structures of social, ideological, and institutional representations can be cognitively mediated by the two polarized context models of religion and atheism.

**Data Analysis**

This is the analysis section where cothematic intertextuality between *The Dawkins Delusion*? and *The God Delusion* is examined at three complementary levels: (i) cothetically intertextual macropropositions, (ii) intertextual forms of local meanings and their relevant event models, and (iii) authorial context models and their constraints on these intertextual forms of local meanings.

**Cothetically Intertextual Macropropositions**

At the level of semantic macrostructures, the whole book of *The Dawkins Delusion*? can be summarized in four macropropositions that are cothetically intertextual with *The God Delusion*:

1. M1 Dawkins is under the delusion that there is a form of God delusion due to his atheist fundamentalism and denial of the divine.
2. M2 Dawkins’ delusion consists in his premise that faith is both infantile and irrational.
3. M3 Science is limited and there is no warfare of science and religion.
4. M4 Dawkins has got misconceptions about religion.

M1 amounts to the overall macroproposition throughout the whole book, simply because it captures the meaning of its full title: *The Dawkins Delusion? Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine*. Obviously, the main title manifests a direct intertextual link to Richard Dawkins’ (2006) *The God Delusion*; and thus Dawkins’ textbook can be reckoned to be the trigger for producing the book under analysis. Whereas this may initially spell out the fact that the intertextual component is guaranteed in this case, the cognitive workings underlying this case of explicit intertextuality warrants an investigation of the former book’s subtitle. The subtitle “Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine” signals the author’s judgmental position with reference to Dawkins’ “atheist fundamentalism” that denies “the divine” in absolute terms. Notice how the negatively connotated term “fundamentalism” reflects Dawkins’ uncritical rejection of all forms of religion. At this point, the author has developed a mental model of attacking Dawkins’ proposal of atheism.

Indeed, the author’s latter mental model is expressed through the rest of the macropropositions above, yet with different events in focus. For example, M2 is more specific in referential scope compared to M1, with the former developing Dawkins’ delusion into the premise that Dawkins asserts that faith be both “infantile” and “irrational” (Chap. 1, pp. 2-6).
McGrath’s intertextual link to Dawkins’ premise marks the author’s critical stance towards the latter’s “favoured dogmas and distortions” about “Christian theology” (p. 6). Thus, the content of M2 reflects the author’s pro-religion mental model of defending Christianity. Moving to M3, the author seems to shift to Dawkins’ mental model of the science-over-religion event. The event has been countered by McGrath’s propositional content about the non-existence of a warfare of science and religion. At this point there emerges a clash of mental event models between the two authors, which sets the scene for intertextuality: whereas Dawkins reiterates the expression “the power of science,” McGrath consistently refers to “the spiritual power of Christianity” and “the power of religious faith.” The latter set of expressions has been introduced in reaction to Dawkins’ former set; and this has created a dialogic effect, which can be viewed as being (i) a trace of the authors’ clashing mental event models of defending Christian belief versus attacking all forms of religion and (ii) an instantiation of the wider-scale opposing ideologies of religion and atheism.

The last macroproposition of M4 presents a topic with the thematic focus of describing Dawkins as having “misconceptions” about religion. Thus, M4 seems to be a specification of M3, with the former emphasizing religion as misconstrued by Dawkins. This macroproposition summarizes Chapter three in McGrath’s book, titled “What Are the Origins of Religion?” Of course the whole chapter forms an intertextual link that is cothematic with Chapter five in Dawkins’ book, titled “The Roots of Religion.” It can be assumed here that both chapters count as an intertextual syntagm, which strongly features the same clashing mental event models of both authors – defending Christian belief versus attacking all forms of religion – in a way that underscores the cognitive dissonance holding between the two authors.

Thus, at the macropropositional level, the cothematic intertextuality holding between The Dawkins Delusion? and The God Delusion seems to be predicated on a clash of mental event models between the two authors, namely, defending Christian belief versus attacking all forms of religion. The coming subsection focuses on the semantic and rhetorical local meanings, subsumed under the four macropropositions identified above, and their mental model of events.

**Intertextual Local Meanings and their Event Models**

At the local semantic-rhetorical level of McGrath’s introduction to The Dawkins Delusion?, one may examine the author’s micro forms of intertextuality with The God Delusion. In the introduction, there are four such intertextuality forms: relexicalization, rhetorical contrast, and presupposition.

Relexicalization is encountered in the two expressions of “Dawkins” in the main title and “atheist fundamentalism” in the subtitle. The significance of these two lexical choices can be ascribed to the intertextual function they serve. On a paradigmatic plane, choosing the item “Dawkins” relexicalizes the item “God” in Dawkins’ title, “The God Delusion,” which negates the presence of the complex concept of “God delusion,” except in the mind of Dawkins himself. Thus, plausibly, this type of relexicalization-bound intertextuality is an attempt to remodel Dawkins’ mental representation of God as a delusion in the minds of those who believe in the existence of God. Further, selecting the expression “atheist fundamentalism” relexicalizes Dawkins’ reiterated expression of “religious fundamentalism.” Thereupon, the intertextual link between the two books arises from two clashing event models: one is related to the violent acts practiced by religious fundamentalists of all sorts – e.g., the Islamist attackers of the Twin
Towers in the US in 9/11 – and the other to Dawkins’ indiscriminately aggressive rhetoric against all kinds of religion.

Indeed, the intertextual forms of relexicalization (“Dawkins” and “atheist fundamentalism”) appearing in the book title can be said to contribute to the organization of all local meanings of intertextuality in the rest of the book; this means that these two intertextual forms may cognitively impact on the information of the macronodes of the mental models of the readers of this book. In other words, the intertextual links evoked by these lexical choices may activate or form mental models of certain events that would direct the reader towards developing a critical conceptualization of *The God Delusion*; and this is precisely what the author of *The Dawkins Delusion?* aspires to achieve. In his introduction, the author has made explicit that his purpose of writing the book is to effect “a critical engagement with the arguments set out in *The God Delusion*” (2007, p. xiii).

The second form of intertextuality is the rhetorical contrast between Dawkins as the “scientific popularizer” and Dawkins as the “atheist polemicist”; such a contrast can be found in McGrath’s first two paragraphs in his introduction to the book. In the first paragraph, McGrath refers to Dawkins as an author of *The Selfish Gene* (1976), and labelled the author as “one of the most successful and skilful scientific popularizers”; thus, McGrath constructed a favourable event model of a scientist who managed to make his specialization (evolutionary biology) “accessible and interesting to a new generation of readers.” This may evoke a positive intertextual reference to Dawkins as an evolutionary biologist. But, moving to the second paragraph, a rhetorical shift of contrast transpires, with McGrath referring to Dawkins as an author of *The God Delusion* (2006), who, because of such a work, has become “the world’s most high-profile atheist polemicist.” Using these negative epithets of Dawkins, as the author of *The God Delusion*, McGrath formed an unfavourable event model of a different situation about Dawkins as an atheist who has polemically directed “a withering criticism against every form of religion.” Here, an important implication arises from the expression “every form of religion,” namely, Dawkins’ failure to develop a critical evaluation of “religion” as a concept, mainly because of his sweeping generalization about all religions. This intertextual reference to Dawkins, the “atheist polemicist,” has cognitively prepared the religious reader to form an unfavourable event model of Dawkins.

The third form of intertextuality with Dawkins’ *The God Delusion* at the level of the local meanings of McGrath’s introduction is presupposition. The main form of presuppositional intertextuality can be found in the following statement: “Though an atheist, Gould was absolutely clear that the natural sciences […] were consistent with both atheism and conventional religious belief.” The statement presupposes that pre-eminent atheists, who share the same scientific specialization as Dawkins, do not share Dawkins’ event model of advocating science-religion incompatibility. Clearly, this presuppositional meaning is highly intertextual with Dawkins, especially in view of the fact, stated by McGrath in the introduction, that Stephen Jay Gould is Dawkins’ American colleague, who is specialized in evolutionary biology at Oxford University.

Now, for the sake of offering a comprehensive analysis of McGrath’s local-meaning forms of the intertextuality cothematic with *The God Delusion*, there should be a focus on the pragmatic context models controlling these micro forms as well as mediating them and other macro forms of social and societal structures.
Polarized Context Models and the Intertextuality of Religiosity and Atheism

At this point of analysis, scrutinizing the context model that McGrath draws on – as opposed to the context model drawn upon by Dawkins in the production of The God Delusion – in producing the above discursive forms of cothematic intertextuality can aid in explaining such forms. This is feasible should there be an investigation of the various constraints of the context models controlling the different locally semantic and rhetorical forms of cothematic intertextuality in The Dawkins Delusion?. From the clashing mental representations and event models identified above, there seems to be a conceptual polarization of two context models associated with McGrath as the author of The Dawkins Delusion? and Dawkins as the author of The God Delusion: religiosity and atheism. Each context model seems to emerge in a form of schema-based categories. There are three such categories: (i) spatiotemporal setting, (ii) communicative action, and (iii) participants (identities, roles, relations, goals, knowledge, and ideologies); the three categories are presented contrastively here in a way that accentuates the context models’ constraints on the forms of cothematic intertextuality indicated earlier above.

As regards spatiotemporal settings, all the previous forms of cothematic intertextuality in The Dawkins Delusion? have a definite place and time. The place is an intellectual medium represented by a published book and the time is 2007. Both elements are intertextually significant, in that they materially frame McGrath’s polemical response towards Dawkins’ The God Delusion. Again, along the same parameter of spatiotemporal setting, the latter book is itself a concrete intellectual medium with the time frame 2006. It is through this category of spatiotemporal setting that the semantic and rhetorical forms of cothematic intertextuality have been textually enabled in one communicative action; and this is the second schema-based category to be discussed here.

McGrath’s The Dawkins Delusion? can be described as being the communicative action of publishing a book in response to Dawkins’ The God Delusion. The action is being performed through the two pivotal speech acts of defending Christian belief and attacking Dawkins’ version of atheist fundamentalism. Both speech acts run in cothematic intertextuality with Dawkins’ speech acts in the communicative event of publishing The Dawkins Delusion?: declaring the non-existence of God and attacking all forms of religion. Further, McGrath’s current communicative action has been controlled at the macro societal structure of the Society for Promoting Christian Belief as a publication house whereby the institutional enablement of the whole action was practically possible. Significantly, this macro societal aspect is a manifestation of how the whole communicative action is an instantiation of the socially shared representation of the religious ideology of Christian belief.

Now, moving to the last category of participants as part of the present polarized context models controlling cothematic intertextuality, it can be argued that McGrath and Dawkins have three various significant roles (communicative, social, and occupational). First, apropos the communicative role, McGrath is the producer of The Dawkins Delusion? as a book, whose main purpose is to criticize Dawkins, specifically as the author of The God Delusion. Notice that, in the introduction to The Dawkins Delusion?, McGrath has made evaluative intertextual references to two communicative roles of Dawkins. One relates to Dawkins as the author of The Selfish Gene (1976), and it has the positive label of being “one of the most successful and skilful scientific popularizers”; the other relates to Dawkins as the author of The God Delusion (2006), and it has the negative label of “atheist polemicist.” Second, regarding the social role, whereas
McGrath is a Christian who studied Christian theology and consequently bases his social values on such a discipline, Dawkins is a pronounced atheist whose hostile approach to faith and believers in God is no secret.

Third, the occupational roles associated with the two participants have also controlled the forms of co thematic intertextuality in *The Dawkins Delusion?*. Whilst both McGrath and Dawkins are professorially affiliated to the same university, Oxford University, each has a distinct career with individual occupational interests. McGrath is Professor of Historical Theology and Dawkins is Professor of Evolutionary Biology; and thus each has his own peculiar epistemological background on the topic of “religion” and its relation to “science”; and this may explain why McGrath has initially decided to author a whole book in reply to Dawkins’ religiously offensive book of *The God Delusion*. Reverting to the intertextual macropropositions inferred from *The Dawkins Delusion?*, one may realize how the explicit references made to Dawkins reflect his ideological assumptions about how limited science is and the non-existence of warfare between religion and science, and above all about Dawkins’ “misconceptions” about religion itself.

**Findings and Discussion**

The above section of analysis has empirically implemented three procedural stages: (i) inferring and describing cothematic intertextual macropropositions throughout the whole book of McGrath’s *The Dawkins Delusion?*; (ii) conducting the semantic analysis of the local meanings found in the same book as functionally related to the selections consciously made by McGrath; (iii) tackling the context models pertaining to McGrath and Dawkins by highlighting the schema-based categories of spatiotemporal settings, situated actions, and participants controlling the production and reception of the (cothetically) intertextual forms of local meanings in *The Dawkins Delusion?*.

In *The Dawkins Delusion?*, the first stage of the inferential extraction of intertextual macropropositions was analytically focused on addressing the first research question (What are the co thematic intertextual links that globally constitute the discourse(s) drawn upon in *The Dawkins Delusion?*?). This analysis stage tackled those macro topics which are co thematic with the topics in *The God Delusion*, including the titles of the two books; both titles were presented as the overall co thematic intertextual macropropositions. The other subsidiary macropropositions projected the co thematic intertextual links of science as being limited in scope and reconcilable with religion, as well as Dawkins’ “misconceptions” about religion and his generalization about the “evil” nature of all religions. Indeed, these co thematic macropropositions were shown to express the general ideological principles of anti-atheism, and thus religiosity, but have been intertextually applied to Dawkins’ *The God Delusion*. Also, crucially, the same intertextual macropropositions were demonstrated to express the overall contents of the mental models of events in the introduction to McGrath’s *The Dawkins Delusion?*; and here the second stage of the sociocognitive discourse-analytical analysis of co thematic intertextuality began to take shape: intertextual local meanings and their mental event models.

At the second stage of local semantic analysis, analytic focus was laid on addressing the second research question (How to explain the intertextual local meanings constructed and generated by their relevant event models in the same book?). This stage investigated the introduction to *The Dawkins Delusion?* as a summary of the whole conceptual framework of the book, and thus it served to condense all the essential local-meaning forms affecting and affected
by the event models of the author. In the analysis, there have been three forms of local semantic and rhetorical meanings, viz. relexicalization, rhetorical contrast, and presupposition. Crucial about all three forms are the event models referred to in *The Dawkins Delusion?* and their intertextuality with *The God Delusion*. For instance, with respect to relexicalization, there emerged McGrath’s mental representation of remodelling the “God delusion” as the “Dawkins delusion” in a way that emphasizes conceptual intertextuality with *The God Delusion*. Also, the rhetorical contrast highlighted between Dawkins as a scientific popularizer and Dawkins as an atheist polemicist was demonstrated to correspond to the two event models of authoring *The Selfish Gene* (1976) and *The God Delusion* (2006), respectively. These two event models have been conducive to the perception of Dawkins as a rational scientist degenerated into a fundamentalist atheist by means of two distinct intertextual references to the authorial identity of Dawkins.

At the third, and final, analysis stage of tackling the context models pertaining to McGrath and Dawkins, analytic focus has shifted towards addressing the third research question (What are the context model’s constraints that control the production and reception of the intertextual local meanings and relate them to macro social/societal structures?). This stage was specifically concerned with probing the context models controlling the production and reception of the various local meanings of cothematic intertextuality. The two context models of both authors, McGrath and Dawkins, have been analysed in terms of the schema-based categories of spatiotemporal setting, communicative action, and participants. At this point of analysis, the various settings of intertextual forms, the overall communicative actions of both authors as well as the participants’ different identities, roles, goals, knowledge, and ideologies have been drawn upon so that these intertextual forms and their corresponding macro social/societal structures can be cognitively mediated. With this form of analysis, two conceptually polarized context models have been revealed: first, McGrath’s context model of religiosity, socially instantiated in the ideology of and knowledge about Christian belief; second, Dawkins’ context model of atheism, socially instantiated in the ideology and knowledge about Darwinism and its scientific ramifications in the discipline of evolutionary biology.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, it can be said that the present study has contributed to the analysis of the classic concept of intertextuality as a well-established commingling of Kristeva’s blending of Saussurean and Bakhtinian theories of language and literature. In the present context of research, this contribution has been made possible and feasible with two methodological dimensions of theory and practice. The first methodological dimension has been concerned with elucidating the nature of intertextuality by highlighting Thibault’s (1991) concept of “cothematic intertextuality,” which is construable on the basis of certain lexico-grammatical patterns of combination and co-occurrence. The second dimension has integrated the concept of cothematic intertextuality into van Dijk’s (2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2014) discourse-analytical sociocognitive approach; this has procedurally operated at three complementary stages of analysis: (i) extracting (and describing) the inferentially and cothetically intertextual macropropositions from McGrath’s book, *The Dawkins Delusion?*; (ii) attempting a semantic analysis of the local meanings found in the same book as functionally related to McGrath’s conscious intertextual selections; (iii) explaining the pragmatic context models associated with both McGrath and Dawkins by highlighting the schema-based categories of spatiotemporal settings, situated
actions, and participants controlling the production and reception of the (cothetically) intertextual forms of local meanings in *The Dawkins Delusion*.

Indeed, the originality of present study can be said to emanate from the synergy of the two methodological dimensions outline above; it is through this synergy that the cothetic intertextuality holding between the two sets of data began to enter into the wider discourse-analytical framework of the sociocognitive approach initiated and developed by van Dijk. Now, one is in a safe position to argue that both dimensions have empirically proven the current research hypothesis (formulated earlier above) in a way that stresses the need for a novel sociocognitive conceptualization of the traditional concept of intertextuality as a cothetic construct that should transcend the limits of descriptive text linguistics and the methodological confines of CDA/CDS.

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