What Kind of Citizen is Philosophy for Children Educating? What Kind of Citizen Should it be Educating?

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Philosophy for Children (henceforth P4C) is a program and a pedagogy for teaching philosophy in k-12 school that was first developed by Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp. The P4C approach is generally presented as a valuable form of education for democratic citizenship. This relationship is so obvious that it often remains underdeveloped: P4C is constructed with the goal of developing children to be critical thinkers and to know how to dialogue with others, which are also hallmarks of what is wanted in the citizens of our democracies. The objective of this article is to explore and deepen this connection by analyzing how it has been developed in the literature of the P4C movement. What emerges from this study is that there are differences of opinions as to why P4C is an appropriate kind of education for democracy. From the texts analyzed, three pedagogies stood out in that regard: Deweyan pedagogy, critical pedagogy, and pedagogy of interruption. I analyze the different visions of P4C as a democratic education in each of these, present the different criticisms they offer to P4C in that regard, and propose how P4C may answer these criticisms. I conclude with the importance of practitioners being aware of the different perspectives that encompass P4C concerning its role for education for democratic citizenship.

Introduction

Philosophy for Children (henceforth P4C) is a movement that was founded by Matthew Lipman, in collaboration with Ann Margaret Sharp, with the goal of bringing philosophy into the schools. The pedagogy used in P4C is the community of philosophical inquiry (henceforth CPI). Although P4C has grown in different branches over time and has spread geographically all over the world, there are certain core ideas to the general movement: a) children are able to do and will benefit from doing...
philosophy; b) philosophy is, firstly, an activity; it is not about learning philosophical theories but about philosophizing; c) this activity is better undertaken with others; d) the role of the animator is to create a space where children can philosophize with one another by ensuring that the rules and steps of the inquiry are respected. 4 One of the main reasons advanced for introducing philosophy into schools is that P4C educates children to become democratic citizens (see for example D’Olimpio & Teschers, 2016; Gagnon & Yergeau, 2016; Glaser, 2017; Golding, 2010; Gregory, Haynes, & Murris, 2017; Hannam & Echeverria, 2009; Michaud & Välitalo, 2017; Nussbaum, 2010; Sharp, 1991/2017). As Pablo Cevallos-Estrellas and Brynhildur Sigurdardottir (2000) state: “There seems to be a general consensus among those who work with Philosophy for Children (P4C) that one of the main virtues of the Community of Inquiry (COI) as a teaching methodology is that it fosters democratic behaviours in students” (p. 45). The relationship between P4C and education for democratic citizenship is, to a certain extent, obvious. For instance, P4C aims to develop characteristics that we hope citizens of a democracy will have, such critical thinking and dialogical skills.

The relationship between P4C and the development of these characteristics is not as evident as it may seem at first sight. It is therefore the goal of this text to present, deepen, and clarify the different facets of this relationship. To achieve this, the article is based on theoretical texts written by thinkers in the P4C movement who propose a well-detailed, developed, and clear argument on the relationship between P4C and democratic education. I do not pretend that this paper offers an exhaustive overview of the texts written on this topic. Rather, it aims to situate some of the main perspectives regarding the relationships between P4C and democratic education. Three perspectives stand out in the P4C literature: one based on Dewey, another on critical pedagogy, and the last on a theory I have labelled ‘the pedagogy of interruption.’

In the first section I explain what kind of democratic education P4C authors opposed, which allows us to begin delineating what kind of democratic education the P4C movement is in favour of. I then present the three theories (Deweyan pedagogy, critical pedagogy, and pedagogy of interruption) and the relationship they posit between P4C and democratic education. This article presents an analysis of different views regarding what kind of democratic education P4C should be. In showing how each of the theories advances a criticism about the belief that P4C is a complete or adequate form of democratic education, this article explores critiques that claim P4C is not as complete a form of democratic education as some may think. For each of these criticisms, I look at how P4C can respond to them or can be adapted to do so. I conclude with some remarks on the role and the limits of P4C in education for democratic citizenship.

The Kind of Democratic Education P4C is Not

Like many discussions of democratic education (Parker, 2003; Westheimer, 2015; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004), P4C authors often start or situate their vision by contrasting a “good” democratic education to a “bad” one. This is not surprising, as democracy is inherently a contested notion (Dworkin, 1985; Lakoff, 2002; Maclure, 2016). Beginning to define the “wrong” form of democratic

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4 I refer here to the P4C pedagogy and not to the novels and accompanying guides written by Lipman or Sharp.
education also permits us to begin to delineate what is “right.” It is therefore appropriate to first present the kind of education and democracy that P4C authors reject.

One of the main pedagogies to which P4C authors are opposed is ‘traditional education.’ A key element of the traditional vision is that education is a top-down process, which means that the teacher transmits the knowledge to the students. The desired qualities in the students in this model are thus to be obedient, docile, to listen and to memorize the knowledge that is taught. This knowledge is not to be created by the activities of the students, it has been settled in the past and should not be transformed – it can only be transformed by competent persons who have learned the traditions which, de facto, excludes children. In that sense, education is firstly conservative as it aims to shape newcomers based on the model of the past. Progress is possible, but it has to be achieved cautiously by a careful examination of the changes proposed in the face of the truths or practices that have previously existed. Traditional education values ‘traditions.’

In the traditional education perspective, education for democratic citizenship is not something that should be practised in schools or by non-adults. Individuals can only be citizens when they have acquired the knowledge considered as essential: “Presumably the more content that schools can get students to store away now, the more schools can maximize their future capacity for autonomy.” (Bleazby, 2006, p. 33) Education should only be a preparation for future citizenship. If there is civic education, it will be characterized by transmission of the knowledge considered important (Burgh, 2014), such as the history of the students’ country or the political structure of their government (Cevallos-Estarellas & Sigurdardottir, 2000; Lipman, 1998). Consequently, traditional education does not aim to bring children to act collectively to create knowledge or to act upon reality. (Glina, 2007; Para Contreras & Medin Fuenmayor, 2007) Contrary to this, P4C emphasizes the idea that democratic education has to be the practice of democracy, and that knowledge is created through students’ interactions. Furthermore, anything can be discussed in CPI; knowledge is not fixed by traditions a priori.

P4C authors also reject the idea that life is defined firstly through the law that the strongest win. According to this belief, society is a group of individual citizens who think first about themselves and about improving their life by being better than others. A political system fitted to this society is one that permits such a way of life and such social relationships as much as possible, without interfering, which permits individuals to follow their personal interests and creates the possibility of a meritocracy (Bleazby, 2006; Leleux, 2008). This worldview tends to see democracy as firstly a political system defined, for example, by the ability to vote, respect for individuals’ rights, and separation of the different branches of the government (Cevallos-Estarellas & Sigurdardottir, 2000). This political structure is there to ensure citizens’ freedom from interference by government or by other citizens. Therefore, the correct education is one based on these principles: an education that values individual performance, self-sufficiency, independence, and the ability to strive amid social competition. By

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5 For a clear presentation of the traditional model of education as presented in this text as well as in the P4C literature, refer to the first chapter of Experience and Education by John Dewey (1938). An interesting argument in favor of traditional education and less caricatured can be found in Hannah Arendt’s text “The Crisis of Education” (1961) in In Between Past and Future. For a more contemporary presentation and defense of traditional education, see: Les Conditions de l’éducation by Marie-Claude Blais, Marcel Gauchet and Dominique Ottavi (2008), and “Le devoir de transmission Culturelle et les responsabilités qu’il nous impose” in La Dure Ecole by Normand Baillargeon (2016).
contrast, the concepts of cooperation and care are inseparable from P4C, as this pedagogy seeks to create an environment in which students think and act together but are also respectful of and attentive to one another.

A final point in this section is the rejection, by P4C authors, of debate as an essential discursive method of education. In a debate, individuals are pitted against each other and each seeks to make their position win. It is an either/or game: either you win, or you lose. Truth is then established *a priori* by the participants and is not expected to change during their encounter. Again, cooperation is at the heart of P4C, as is the belief that truths will develop in the encounters during the dialogue, which is co-constructed between the individuals, not fixed at the outset.

In this section, I presented a few ideas with regard to democratic education, citizenship and democracy that P4C authors often mention and contest. These ideas provide some points of comparison from which to start delineating the form of democracy and education that P4C favors. It is clear that the three pedagogies discussed below (Deweyan pedagogy, critical pedagogy, pedagogy of interruption) are all opposed to the ideas presented in this section regarding democracy, citizenship and education. However, although they have this point in common, they all have a different view about how P4C should be understood and about what kinds of citizens it should educate. This is what we will examine in the next three sections.

**Deweyan Pedagogy**

The thinking of Dewey has been very influential in the development of P4C (Bleazby, 2009; Daniel, 1998; Golding, 2010). His thinking has certainly been one of the main philosophical foundations of the movement. As Gregory and Granger (2012) state: “Since Dewey’s time the figure of the Child as Philosopher has been variously articulated and advocated in what has become the Philosophy for Children movement, [footnote 6] for which Dewey is widely considered a seminal figure” (Gregory & Granger, 2012, p. 6). The claim that P4C is an adequate form of democratic education is best supported through the Deweyan philosophy.

One of the core concepts of Dewey’s philosophy is the concept of ‘interaction’. Reality is defined by the constant interactions between different elements and organisms. Human beings are also defined through their interactions with their natural and social environment and it is through these interactions that knowledge is created, refined or changed. Knowledge permits a better adaptation and transformation of the environment, where an “inadequate” knowledge impedes such adaptation and transformation. As Bleazby states: “If the application of an idea brings about its intended consequences, it is true” (p. 457). Inquiry is a means, but a special one, to pass from a problematic situation to a more satisfying one:

For Dewey, the capacity for meaningfully reconstructing experiences is the capacity for reflective thinking or inquiry. Inquiry is the capacity to reflect on the situation, so as to articulate the problem, formulate a desired end, develop and implement a means to bring about this desired end, and internalize successful means so as they can be used for the efficient reconstruction of future experience. (Bleazby, 2006, p. 39)

Human beings can and should engage in such reconstruction of their experiences with the world and with others. In this sense, inquiry permits individuals to grow, to increase the quality of present and
future experience (Dewey, 1938). In any case, knowledge, beliefs and principles are fallible; they do not have an eternal \textit{a priori} value, they will be changed, transformed, refined or rejected through new experience experimentation or inquiry. Even the nature of inquiry may change according to new circumstances or findings.

These ideas are connected to a certain vision of social organization, which is well presented by Gregory (2004),

A group of people brought together by their collective stake in clarifying and dealing with a common problem or opportunity and using a process of collaborative inquiry to arrive at collective practical judgments is what the early pragmatists meant by social democracy, for which political democracy—the separation of government powers, universal enfranchisement, the protections in the Bill of Rights, our rules and standards of evidence, etc.—was necessary but not sufficient. A social democracy is a self-transforming community. It is a culture in which the means of intelligent organic reconstruction have been made into collective habits, including the habit of being critical of the status quo (e.g.: being inquisitive about claims of injustice) and of turning to group inquiry to solve the problems and realize the possibilities uncovered by doing so. Social democracy is thus a potential attribute, not only and not primarily of nations, but of all kinds of communities: families, schools, universities, religious groups, and corporations. (p. 164)

Therefore, democracy is not a form of government that is separate from the everyday lives of individuals and the group to which they belong, but rather a principle that structures the entire society. It is, as Kennedy (2014) put it, a “direct democracy” (p. 6, italics original) in the sense that individuals participate in the decisions and organization of their different groups. Furthermore, we can talk of this democracy as a way of life, a form of being defined by attitudes, habits, beliefs and emotions that influence the lives of the citizens on a daily basis. For example, the citizen should be able to reflect on his experiences and society, to act with others, to conduct inquiry, to dialogue, to be self-correcting and to transform reality. These habits and attitudes shall not be practiced in specific conditions, but rather in all social environments, which of course includes schools, as noted by Gregory (2004). To Dewey and to thinkers referring to him, the only manner in which one can educate democratic individuals is by giving all students an education in which they practise the attitudes, skills and habits proper to democratic life. In that sense, in the Deweyan pedagogy there is no difference between a good education and a democratic education: the habits of inquiry, good thinking, and a search for meaning are the same habits that characterize a democratic form of social life.

The claim that P4C is a special form of education for democratic citizenship is best supported and understood through Dewey’s ideas. As has been made clear from the preceding, inquiry, according to Dewey, is a central component of human lives regarding their relationships with their natural or social environment. Therefore, P4C, by developing the skills and attitudes required by inquiry, is a form of democratic education in the pragmatist view. A few examples of these skills and attitudes that P4C seeks to explicitly and intentionally develop are critical, creative, and caring thinking, self-correction, seeking reasons to sustain arguments, being vigilant with regard to weak reasoning, contextualizing ideas, using examples and counter-examples to illustrate a point or to induce reflection, and so on. In summary, most—if not all—of the skills that P4C aims to develop are related to students’ capacity to
engage in inquiry. The function of the facilitator in P4C is not to teach these skills as in a traditional pedagogy nor is it to transmit specific knowledge regarding the subject discussed, but rather to create a space in which the students can practise these skills and engage in inquiry on subjects that interest them. The facilitator function is to ensure that the procedures of the inquiry are respected and that it makes progress. With that objective, the teacher invites the students to make use of certain skills relating to the stage of inquiry they have reached at that point.

This presentation of the skills that develop in the participants during a CPI is incomplete: as in the pragmatist theory, P4C is impossible to disconnect from a communal process. We cannot think about P4C nor Deweyan pedagogy in terms of a separation or dualism between the individual and the community, but rather in terms of their inseparable and ongoing interaction. Thinking or inquiring in P4C is never done alone, it is always done with others. Consequently, P4C enables development of the social attitudes and behaviours needed in democratic life: listening to others, experiencing equality, building ideas based on what has been said in discussion, changing ideas in the face of new arguments, considering views that contradict one’s own beliefs, co-constructing meaning, engaging in dialogue vs. debate, seeking consensus, giving others a chance to speak, integrating the skills of the facilitator, being sensitive to the well-being of the participants in the community of inquiry, and so on. Again, the point to note is that P4C provides students with the experience of deliberative democracy and that education toward democratic life is the experience of democracy itself. (Burgh, 2014; Lipman, 1998).

In addition to the link between the practice of the community of inquiry and democratic habits, others have also noted the content of the philosophical communities of inquiry and, namely, philosophical concepts. Engaging with philosophical concepts permits students to have a richer and better democratic life because, as Lipman (1998) points out, democracy is constructed from philosophical concepts that are “highly controversial notions such as truth, justice and freedom, each lacking a satisfactory definition, yet apparently essential to that desirable state of affairs which democracies promise to be.” (p. 6). Kennedy (2014) sees in communities of philosophical inquiry the most complete form of “dialogic schooling,” which permits students to “pursue the ongoing clarification of belief and the interrogation of philosophical assumptions that promises a reconstruction of epistemological and ontological convictions that better match an emergent future” (p. 6). In addition to offering a place to practise and learn democratic habits, the CPI also creates a space where participants can question, discuss, and clarify concepts that are socially and politically fundamental and, we can imagine, provide the opportunity to make them meaningful.

So, there are many reasons to maintain the claims that there are indeed many relationships between Dewey’s philosophy, democratic education and, P4C. However, there is a common criticism among authors regarding the connection between P4C and Dewey’s ideas. One of the core principles of Dewey’s philosophy is action and experimentation on reality or the environment. This means firstly that inquiry is the result of a perplexing or problematic situation. That is, the environment is the source of the inquiry. Secondly, inquiry can only be significant to the extent that it enters into contact with

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6 For an extensive list of skills that P4C seeks to develop in participants, refer to the book by Michel Sasseville and Mathieu Gagnon (2012), *Penser ensemble à l'école: des outils pour l'observation d'une communauté de recherche philosophique en action*.

7 See Clinton Golding (2017) and Gregory (2007) for a clear presentation of the different stages of an inquiry in P4C.
reality; only through this contact can these conclusions be validated, rejected, or redefined. Furthermore, the pragmatist citizen engages with others in the transformation of his social life. The pragmatist citizen not only reflects but also participates in resolving problems in his various communities. However, there is nothing in the theory of P4C that implies such a connection to the individual’s environment. Like Cevallos-Estarellas and Sigurdardottir, we can say that “[i]n the description of the COI […] is nothing that requires the participants to act out, in the larger community, what they deliberate in the COI.” (p. 56). In a similar sense, Gregory mentions that there is no need for a community of philosophical inquiry to extend to “shared governance or collective decision-making over many aspects of community life”. (p. 171). This missing link between P4C and collective action on reality has also been noted by Bleazby (2006), Glina (2006), Glaser (2017) and Burgh (2014).

Although many authors noted this missing element required for P4C to be a complete form of pragmatist democracy, all claimed that there is nothing theoretically impeding the P4C practitioner from expanding communities of philosophical inquiries to collective projects (Gregory, 2004; Kizel, 2016). That said, if such a connection between P4C and practice is possible, it is not necessary, according to the general theory of P4C that appears in the literature. However, according to Dewey’s theory, without such a connection, P4C cannot be considered a complete form of democratic education, although it does clearly present some of the essential characteristics in that regard.

One way to answer this criticism would be to say that the environment proper to the CPI is philosophy itself, and that it is with this environment that individuals interact and transform. However, this point cannot be convincing when we think of Dewey’s idea regarding social and democratic life, which incontestably implies an interaction with these environments in all their dimensions. Lipman offers an interesting answer to this criticism in an interview with Gregory (2000) where he suggests that it may not be the goal of P4C to lead to action:

It’s not clear to me that the individual who graduates from the community that has reached a conclusion is thereby obliged to engage in an action which sustains the values arrived at. It is not uncontroversial to claim that there must be, or there ought to be a direction that the veteran of the community of inquiry is encouraged to take, in terms of action, as a result of the settlement that took place within the community—that it must be clearly spelled out what the community members are supposed to do, in terms of radical activity of some sort. (p. 4)

Lipman advanced the hypothesis that P4C should remain separated from social activism. He appeared to acknowledge the criticism that P4C is mainly a theoretical activity but, in a non-dogmatic formula, suggested that it should stay that way and that this should not be seen as a shortcoming. However, all the authors previously cited who have criticized P4C on for that reason propose to transform P4C in some way in order to bring participants to interact with their social environment.
Another link between P4C and democratic education can be found in critical pedagogy (Accorinti, 2002; Kohan, 2018; Para Contreras & Medin Fuenmayor, 2007). This link seems to be a logical one, as mentioned in the previous section, there being many connections between Dewey’s ideas and critical pedagogy. For example, both critical pedagogy and Dewey consider that traditional education—what Paulo Freire (1970) calls the banking model of education—is wrong, that knowledge has to be constructed, and that education should not aim firstly to make children memorize facts, but rather induce them to think by themselves and with others. Both schools of thought consider education to be rooted in the life of the participants, that dialogue is a central tool of good education, and that the functioning of the classroom should be democratic, co-constructed by teachers and students.

However, although the connection between P4C and Dewey is quite clear, the connection is not as obvious between the former and critical pedagogy. Although inquiry, interaction, and dialogue are also hallmarks of critical pedagogy, they are understood differently than in Dewey’s perspective because they cannot be disconnected from another concept: “power relationships.” Human reality is intrinsically defined by a separation between oppressors and oppressed, by injustices and alienation. Furthermore, it cannot be disconnected from a political, economic and social system that creates, perpetuates or increases inequalities. Knowledge cannot be dissociated from that reality: either it participates in the creation of a more egalitarian society in which all individuals are respected and can flourish, or it works to maintain the status quo and, therefore, the perpetuation of inequalities. There is no such thing as “neutral” or “objective” knowledge: knowledge is always irremediably political. Oppressed persons are called upon to overcome their position and their alienation in order to free themselves by engaging with others to transform their reality, although oppressors too are called upon to participate in such an endeavour (Burbules & Berk, 1999; Freire, 1970, 2001; Potvin, 2015).

What kind of democratic society and citizenship follow from this philosophy? As mentioned above, a democratic society is a society in which individuals have the opportunity to work together to overcome social problems they face. It is a society driven by the concept of equality, which means that it seeks to diminish the divide between oppressors and oppressed and create an environment where all individuals can experience freedom. As the democratic society is an ideal, a utopia (Accorinti, 2002) that is never realized, it is a perpetual movement of citizens, groups, and communities that work together toward that ideal to deal with social and environmental problems. The citizen of that society is conscious of the unjust social structure, is willing to engage in its transformation, and, to this end, is able to work with others.

Following these initial connections, we can remark that we can perform the same critique of P4C from a critical-pedagogy point of view as that from Dewey’s perspective: P4C is, first of all, a discursive activity, which is not in its essence bound to act or, better said, to interact with the participants’ environment. However, the critical-pedagogy critique of P4C is more radical. At the heart of critical pedagogy is a commitment to work toward a better, less alienating, freer, and more egalitarian world. Therefore, it is not enough for education to bring individuals to reflect on philosophical concepts and

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to act together to alter their environment, it also must aim to induce them to become conscious of the different webs of oppression in which they are embedded and to work toward a less alienating world.

It is not obvious how this idea can be integrated into P4C. Hence, neutrality is certainly an important principle for the facilitator of a P4C session, in the sense that he should not take a stance regarding the subject discussed. His role is defined by the methodology of CPI: he must ensure that the process of inquiry is respected and that the participants use the appropriate skills and attitudes. The facilitator is “pedagogically strong but philosophically self-effacing; isn’t teaching what to think but how to think; exchanges content expertise to procedural expertise” (Gregory, 2008, p. 10, italics original). Therefore, if the facilitator takes a stance regarding injustice or oppression, he contravenes with this principle; he would have a particular answer to the question discussed and would tend to lead the inquiry in a certain direction.

Chetty’s (2014, 2018) criticism is in the same line, although he goes a step further. He points out that one issue of P4C is the representativeness of the different minorities and social groups inside a discussion. It is possible that a classroom may constitute a homogenous group of students in terms of race and social class, which may have the consequence that certain positions or perspectives representing marginalized or oppressed groups will not be addressed in a CPI. Furthermore, he argues that P4C inscribes itself within a history that has legitimized a certain view of democracy, philosophy, and reasonableness, concepts that were constructed by a certain group of people and setting aside others. P4C would therefore be fostering injustices and biases rather than working to reduce them.

I believe that the first answer to these criticisms would be to make facilitators conscious of how biases, social injustices, and discrimination interplay with the various facets of their animation of a CPI. This could lead them to choose specific stimulus to address this issue. One standard way to start a CPI is through a stimulus (a Lipman novel in the classical method), which leads students to develop questions, then to choose one and to discuss it. Facilitators could therefore choose a stimulus in relation to oppression or marginalized people. The next solution appears to be more problematic: how should a facilitator intervene in the discussion to address this dimension? To what point should he press students to address the perspectives of marginalized groups? There is here a tension that has to be accepted I believe, more than it can be resolved, but facilitators conscious of this tension and other related ones appear to be indispensable.

**Pedagogy of Interruption**

Although I call this section Pedagogy of Interruption, this third pedagogy does not have a well-established name and other names could have been used. That said, the word “interruption” does, in my view, capture a core element of that pedagogy. In contrast with the two theories discussed previously, acting or transforming reality is not a central goal of the pedagogy of interruption. Education is rather about creating conditions that permit the uniqueness of individuals to emerge, which requires interrupting the normal flow of classroom life, activities, and thinking. Therefore, the teacher’s role is not to achieve anything, in the sense of having to teach knowledge or skills, but about making space and, more importantly, time for subjectivity, uniqueness, and meaning to come to light. “[E]ducation, if it is aimed at the subject-ness of children and young people, is fundamentally of an interruptive nature. Education is an interruption of desires, an interruption of being-with-oneself, an
interruption of identity” (Biesta, 2017, p. 431). This is not an individualistic process, as it fundamentally requires others in order to occur; others place our self in question and in doubt and address us as though we couldn’t be replaced by anyone else. As Biesta (2017) puts it, the other is “someone I am in communication with, someone who speaks to me, who addresses me, who touches me, who asks for me or, in a phrase from Levinas (1989 p. 195), someone who calls ‘upon the unique within me’ ” (p. 426). Dialogue is then defined by perplexity, self-doubt and, interrogation, not by the objective of finding a solution to a problem, reaching a consensus, or transforming social conditions.

Another core principle of the pedagogy of interruption concerns the danger of giving a definition of the essence of a human being. Such a definition would necessarily exclude other forms of being by characterizing it as non-human. For example, in claiming that the essence of a human is or should be defined by critical thinking, we are, by the same token, setting aside other ways of being human. The goal of education in that sense is not firstly to create a specific kind of individual, but to create opportunities for humans to develop, which, as mentioned, does imply relationships with others.

If humans cannot be defined by specific characteristics, so democratic citizens cannot be defined by identifying these characteristics. It is from this perspective that Vansieleghem (2005) criticizes the democratic claims of P4C.

My fear is that the current consensus over the idea of Philosophy for Children excludes other ways of thinking about education and democracy. My suspicion is that the activity of thinking and dialogue as it is conceived by Philosophy for Children cannot be a basis for democracy and freedom simply because it is determined in advance by a specific kind of thinking and acting in accordance with roles that we are expected to fulfil: namely, being autonomous, critical, creative and communicative citizens. Other possibilities are excluded. It is on the strength of these considerations that I surmise that Philosophy for Children has a political agenda and functions as a vehicle to develop that agenda as well. (p. 20.)

Thus, the traditional goals often assigned to P4C, such as developing certain kinds of skills, knowledge, and thinking, which are often connected to democratic education, are problematic to Vansieleghem. They are problematic because they reduce the different possibilities and implications of living in a democracy.

To support her thinking, Vansieleghem (2005) refers to Hannah Arendt and her concepts of thinking and natality. “According to Arendt, freedom resides in natality, and the responsibility to respond to the appearance of something or someone new is what she has called ‘thinking.’ This kind of thinking cannot be acquired in conventional ways; it is not a capacity for reflective problem-solving, or a skill or a strategy: rather it is a search for meaning” (p. 21). Further, “The specific character of thinking is that it arises out of a ‘genuine experience’ and that it interrupts all doing, all activities…. [Experience is] something that embarrasses us, that puts us into doubt, that confuses us and causes perplexity” (p. 27). What is important here is to see the shift of perspective that Vansieleghem and Biesta make regarding the classical view of P4C and CPI as inquiries defined by specific steps that should lead from a question to a conclusion or judgment. It is also a shift of perspective regarding what thinking means: thinking cannot be understood only and firstly by the use of certain skills.

Engaging in philosophy with young people should not, in this theory, be about learning skills but rather about creating a space where children can meet each other, be bewildered by ideas, and experience their own uniqueness. Therefore, a CPI should be one of these educational spaces
“characterized by its interruptive nature, but also by the quality of suspension: of slowing down, of giving time, of providing forms where children and young people can meet themselves and the world, and engage with the question of the desired and the desirable” (Biesta, 2017, p. 426). The link between P4C, democracy, and democratic education must be along the lines of extending what it means to engage in philosophy, to live in a democracy and to be a democratic citizen.

Vansieleghem and Biesta do not reject P4C per se, but rather aim to illuminate dimensions of what it means to educate and to philosophize that, in a certain view of P4C, may remain hidden. They offer us an opportunity to displace our viewpoint on P4C: to see it not only as an inquiry that starts from uncertainty but moves through argumentation, clarification of concepts, and critical thinking to a reasonable judgment. This change of perspective is, at the same time, a change in the end and the value of P4C; it is what we hope to achieve by practising it in the classroom and what we consider to be the merits of such practice. The goal of a CPI would therefore not only be to move forward in a discussion and to resolve puzzlement, but rather to accept being immobile and dwelling in puzzlement. This dimension is not something disconnected from the practice of philosophy but is, rather, always a possibility: a possibility to tackle questions that have not been considered, hear arguments or points of view that place our beliefs in question, and live for some time with puzzlement about certain ideas. I would even suggest that P4C sessions may be one of the rare moments in a classroom that generates a significant pause in the weekly activities to create a space for such reflection (Michaud, 2013). This does not mean that a CPI should not be a process that aims to advance in the resolution of a question, but it does mean that it should not be seen as a failure if such a process does not occur.

Conclusion

P4C is often advanced as an appropriate pedagogy for democratic citizenship education. To clarify this idea, this article looked at how authors in the P4C movement have developed that claim. I have first shown that there is an agreement regarding what kind of citizenship education P4C is not. In summary, in P4C, such education is not seen as a remote goal for adulthood but rather as something that can be experienced from a young age. Furthermore, P4C is not based on the view that reality is composed of individuals who are in competition with each other, but founded on the principle of cooperation.

However, beyond this agreement on what kind of citizenship education P4C is not, there are disagreements regarding how P4C should be understood as a democratic education. Three pedagogies stand out as structuring the subject: Deweyan pedagogy, critical pedagogy and the pedagogy of interruption. Each pedagogy offers a different perspective on how P4C should be practised as a right form of democratic education.

One consequence of this study for P4C practitioners is that they should be aware of the different perspectives regarding the links between P4C and democratic education, which implies understanding the theoretical background of each position. I do not think that practitioners have to make a choice

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9 Vansieleghem clearly discusses the relationship between P4C and democratic education in the article I refer to, whereas such relationship is not clearly formulated in Biesta’s text on P4C. However, I do think it is fair to say that Biesta’s thinking toward P4C is in the same line as Vansieleghem and, therefore, that he points toward a similar critique of P4C as a form of democratic citizenship education.
between the three pedagogies presented in this text. In my view, at least two of them are naturally attached to P4C practice. Because of its history, P4C is closely linked to Dewey, and, therefore, his ideas are embedded within it. P4C is, in that sense, a microcosm wherein pupils can experience an essential form of democratic life: communal inquiry and all the skills, habits, and attitudes required by it. A CPI is as such a form of democratic education, but it can also lead to another dimension: the discussion of fundamental social concepts such as freedom, equality, and democracy. The main point for a practitioner regarding this first perspective would be to understand how the practice of P4C is related to a certain form of democratic education. Yet the nature of a CPI is such that this form of democratic education is always on the fringe of another form of democratic education, related to the pedagogy of interruption. Hence, a core principle of the Deweyan pedagogy as it has been used in P4C is that the inquiry is fundamentally a process of moving forward from a problem to a reasonable judgment. But, because of the complexity of philosophical problems and their fundamental openness, it is always possible that the discussion will stagnate. To avoid this situation, P4C authors (e.g. Gregory, 2007) state the necessity of defining the stages of a CPI, as this permits clarification of how and whether a discussion can progress and, according to Clinton Golding (2017), it “address[es] one of the most common problems P4C practitioners face: the ‘Are we getting anywhere?’ problem” (p. 66). However, it is exactly the “not getting anywhere” that thinkers such as Biesta and Vansieghem value. In other words, although P4C is structured on the idea that inquiry will progress, it is always possible that the discussion will be stuck in the complexity of a philosophical issue or concept. Following the pedagogy of interruption perspective, I propose that this non-progression should not be seen as a failure of the discussion, but rather as an opportunity to experience another facet of democratic education. This does not mean that one does not aim to make progress in a CPI but rather that one may not see what there is to gain in these moments in which the inquiry appears to go nowhere.

If Deweyan pedagogy and the pedagogy of interruption are, as I believe, essential parts of P4C, it is different for critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogy challenges the core principle of the CPI that the role of the facilitator is to be neutral regarding the subject discussed and to ensure that the process of the inquiry is respected. For critical pedagogy, democratic education requires taking a stance regarding oppression, injustice, and inequities that exist in society. Chetty goes further, suggesting that P4C is itself structured to perpetuate certain injustices. It is however possible to see how this perspective may be integrated into P4C. First, P4C could simply offer a space to reflect on sexism or poverty, for example, without the facilitator having to advance an agenda during the discussion. This space can be easily created by choosing specific stimuli (texts, videos, etc.) to this end. The facilitator could go even further by selecting stimuli that aim to bring the participants to acknowledge a certain view of a social problem. Although I do not believe that pure “neutrality” exists, there is a problem here regarding the principles that underlie P4C. I want to suggest that the facilitator should at least be conscious of this problem and of how issues of race, gender, class and other forms of discrimination may interplay in his practice. Without such an awareness, an important dimension of democratic education will remain hidden.

These adaptations are not too complicated to include in P4C: they remain more about a certain awareness for the facilitator regarding its possibilities and shortfalls relating to democratic education. However, the criticism from the Deweyan and critical pedagogy perspective that it does not include action on the social environment will likely have a more important impact on P4C practice. One possible answer to this criticism would be to simply acknowledge that P4C is not a complete form of
democratic education and, therefore, that it should rely on other pedagogies to overcome that limitation. Another answer would be to see how student interactions with their environment could be integrated into the practice of P4C. These two options would require empirical research to determine how they would impact the practice of P4C and the democratic education of the students. Despite this shortcoming, it would be a mistake to allow this to overshadow what P4C does so well for democratic education in schools.

References


**About the Author**

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