

# The Ramsay Centre and 'Western Civilisation'

An attempt at historical perspective

A reaction to Martin Davies' paper (this issue)

**Andrew G. Bonnell**

University of Queensland

Martin Davies' paper seeks to vindicate the efforts of the Ramsay Centre to fund courses in 'Western Civilisation' at selected Australian universities. He begins by lamenting the rejection of vast amounts of philanthropic money for the humanities, and all too quickly dismisses the stated grounds for the Australian National University's decision to decline a deal with the Ramsay Centre: 'The issue of academic autonomy has been raised as a reason, but this is, at best, ostensible', Davies writes. He then goes on to defend the concept of courses in Western civilisation more generally.

Davies' account of the ANU's decision not to enter into an arrangement with the Ramsay Centre is flawed. (It should also be clarified that the ANU was not being offered \$3 billion, as Davies' text might suggest - this sum refers to the total wealth of the Ramsay Foundation, not the amount the Ramsay program at ANU would have cost.) Davies relies heavily on the coverage in the Murdoch press, which used the incident as an opportunity to hyperventilate for some weeks in a familiar 'culture wars' mode, but conspicuously failed to engage with the issues of university autonomy and academic freedom. Sadly, the term 'academic freedom' is altogether absent from Davies' essay, although the 'Ramsay Centre's very explicit unwillingness to commit to the principle of academic freedom' was central to the decision by the ANU's leadership to withdraw from talks with Ramsay (Evans,

2018). Davies' argument relies not only on the proposition that the ANU's Vice-Chancellor and Chancellor were being disingenuous in their public statements on university autonomy and academic freedom, but also on the argument that Tony Abbott, former Prime Minister and Ramsay Board member, did not mean what he wrote in his now-notorious April 2018 *Quadrant* article, which frankly argued that the Centre's program should take a specific, explicitly right-wing, ideological position ('not merely about Western civilisation but in favour of it'), and should remain under the control of the Ramsay Board to ensure that its purposes were not subverted by academics (Evans 2018; Evans & Schmidt, 2018; Abbott 2018).

A reader visiting from another planet might conclude from Davies' paper that the ANU had been capricious and perverse in refusing a munificent philanthropic donation for the humanities. This overlooks the fact that a number of quite serious people at the ANU had felt an obligation to explore the proposal and its potential benefits in good faith and had invested significant effort in the process over a number of months before the unacceptable nature of the Ramsay Board's position became clear. It also overlooks the fact that a number of Australian universities have welcomed philanthropic donations in the humanities, including in areas that could be classified as falling under the category of 'Western civilisation'; for example, the Hansen chair and lectureships in History at

the University of Melbourne, and a named chair in classics in my own School at the University of Queensland. These endowments have not been controversial, but they have not come with the kinds of strings that trailed behind the Ramsay centre proposals.

There is a wider debate to be had about 'philanthropy': it should supplement, not replace, more sustainable public funding. Taxation of the wealthy should not be voluntary (and suggestions that a private health entrepreneur like the late Paul Ramsay was able to extract billions of dollars from the pockets of the sick, infirm, and dying is a sad commentary on Australia's public health policies, which have diverted large sums to the private for-profit sector in place of improved funding for public health provision). And 'philanthropy' has sometimes been a cover for corporate propaganda in the United States. But as things stand, Australian universities currently have a strong bias in favour of receiving more philanthropic donations, rather than fewer, and they run large-scale campaigns to attract more private funding. So, it is implausible for Davies to suggest that the ANU made the decision to reject Ramsay funding lightly. It is also worth noting that the ANU Vice-Chancellor Brian Schmidt (the only Nobel Prize winner ever to hold the position of VC of an Australian university) revealed that he consulted the vice-chancellors of Cambridge and Oxford Universities and the Presidents of Yale and Berkeley on the Ramsay proposal 'and they agreed it was manifestly not appropriate for ANU to have done that [agree to the Ramsay proposal], based on our understanding of this course' (Visontay, 2018).

If one makes the assumption (so far, counterfactual) that the Ramsay Centre and its Board are able to meet the threshold tests of commitments to university autonomy and academic freedom, there are still many practical questions to be resolved (for example, the duration of funding for programs and the prospect of funding being withdrawn after eight years). A university and its academic board would also have to consider the academic merits of a program defined as 'Western Civilisation'.

In the rest of this paper, I will briefly address a number of relevant points: firstly, the concept 'Western Civilisation' has its own, comparatively recent, history, and needs to be viewed in its own historical context; secondly, the term 'civilisation' has relatively little utility as a unit of scholarly analysis; thirdly, proponents of an academic program on (or for) 'Western Civilisation' are operating with a reified and artificially unified concept that breaks up under closer examination; fourthly, that some of the advocacy for a 'Western Civilisation' program betrays an animus against the modern, secular, public university.

Before the 1930s, intellectual discourse about the relationship between European culture and the United States tended to emphasise difference, rather than commonalities, between the two. 'European Anti-Americanism' was highly prevalent among cultural conservatives and left-leaning critics of capitalism alike, while intellectuals in the United States felt an attachment to concepts of American exceptionalism. Only in the 1920s did American writers start to develop concepts of a common 'North Atlantic Civilisation', with the United States conceived of as a putative leader of the 'Western world' and American universities began to introduce courses on 'Western Civ' (Saldern, 2017).

Prior to the First World War, Europeans themselves did not necessarily see themselves as belonging to a single 'civilisation'. As is well documented, nineteenth-century German cultural conservatives tended to contrast the profundity and inwardness of German *Kultur* with superficial and materialistic Western (especially French) civilisation (Elias, 1978; Ringer, 1969). The idea of an antithesis between German *Kultur* and French/Western civilisation found heartfelt expression in the book *Considerations of an Unpolitical Man* by the great German novelist Thomas Mann (Mann, 1919). Mann later modified his views (and abandoned his distaste for democratic politics) under the impact of the rise of Nazism. Such opposition to any notion of belonging to a unified Western civilisation was not confined to Germany: one of the most influential intellectual currents in nineteenth-century Russia was Slavophile thought (which later informed political pan-Slavism), which posited a fundamental antithesis between Orthodox Russian culture and Western European modernity (Walicki, 1979; 1989 [1975]). In the research and teaching of history in European universities, national histories tended to predominate during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rather than pan-European perspectives on the past.

In the late 1920s, along with the appearance of books with titles like *The Giant of the Western World: America and Europe in a North Atlantic Civilisation* (by F. Miller and H. Hill, 1930, cited in Saldern 2017), universities in the United States started to teach 'Western Civilisation' courses, in which European history was integrated into 'a grand, common European-American narrative' (Saldern, 2017, p. 22). It has been suggested that 'Western Civilisation' was invented at Columbia University in 1919 (Allardyce, 1982). The heyday of the 'Western Civ' course in United States universities was from the 1920s to the 1960s, a product of the rise of liberal internationalism in the United States in this period and a desire to assert

American democratic values in the face of the rise of 'totalitarianism' in much of Europe, as well as educational reforms such as the emphasis on a common generalist core as a counterbalance to more specialist research training (from different perspectives, see Allardyce, 1982; Segal, 2000). The Dean of Columbia summed up the objectives of the 'Contemporary Civ' course, as it was initially known, as promoting liberal opinion, acculturating the young and producing a 'citizen who shall be safe for democracy' (Allardyce, 1982, p.707). The 'Western Civ' course was committed to what Herbert Butterfield was starting to call a 'Whig conception of history': history moved in a discernible, progressive direction until it ends in our present state of things. 'Western Civ' history depicted history as the progressive unfolding of freedom in the West, culminating in the constitution of the United States.

During the Cold War, this took on an added political inflection, conveyed in the common tag used to describe 'Western Civ' courses: 'From Plato to NATO'.

However, not long after the end of the Second World War, 'Western Civ' courses started to fray at the edges. Well before the student movement of the 1960s,

Harvard academics started to question the Eurocentric nature of the 'Western Civ' course in a decolonising world (Allardyce, 1982). The 'Western Civ' course not only seemed increasingly anachronistic by the 1960s, its place at the centre of a 'general education' undergraduate curriculum was increasingly undermined by the rise of electives, specialisation, and an emphasis on equipping students to research history themselves instead of learning a prescribed narrative (Allardyce, 1982).

It was during the apogee of the 'Western Civilisation' course in the United States, that the British historian Arnold Toynbee undertook his ambitious, if not heroic, attempt to write world history as the history of a succession of 'civilisations' in his *A Study of History* (1934-1964), which eventually comprised twelve volumes, including an atlas and gazetteer volume and a final volume entitled *Reconsiderations* (a reply to his numerous critics). Toynbee constructed a schematic pattern of the genesis, growth, breakdown and disintegration of civilisations. Toynbee argued that civilisations were the most meaningful unit of historical study, and that there had been 21 of them in recorded

human history, culminating in Western civilisation (even if Toynbee seems to have had an ambivalent view of the latter and a pessimistic view of its trajectory). Toynbee's work was subjected to trenchant criticism in his own time, notably by the distinguished Dutch historian Pieter Geyl, who accused Toynbee of being more a prophet than a historian (Geyl, 1970 [1955]; 1967 [1961]). For all his erudition, Toynbee's volumes are largely unread today by historians – his concept of the civilisation as a unit of analysis for history has not been a fertile one. Hardly any historian has chosen to follow Toynbee to the heights of his meta-historical God's-eye vantage point. Since the 1960s, historians have studied societies, rather than 'civilisations', and Toynbee's system has not spoken to the concerns of subsequent scholars.

The reception and ultimate non-reception of Toynbee

---

**...much innovative historical work in the last two decades has focussed on the transnational and global dimension of history, and on the interconnections and mutual influences between disparate cultures. Against the backdrop of the new global history, the idea of a delimited Western civilisation now seems parochial.**

---

raise the question of the utility of the concept of 'civilisation' as a unit of historical study. Furthermore, if Toynbee was able to chastise many of his contemporary historians for what he considered a comparatively parochial focus on national histories, much innovative historical work in the last two decades

has focussed on the transnational and global dimension of history, and on the interconnections and mutual influences between disparate cultures. Against the backdrop of the new global history, the idea of a delimited Western civilisation now seems parochial.

As late as 1965, Hugh Trevor-Roper could begin a book (for a popular illustrated history series) on *The Rise of Christian Europe* by dismissing students' emerging interest in the history of Africa before European conquest with the words: 'Then indeed we may neglect our own history and amuse ourselves with the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe' (Trevor-Roper, 1965, p. 9). At the same time as Trevor-Roper was writing these words, Geoffrey Barraclough, himself an expert in medieval German history, published a series of lectures on the new field of contemporary history, in which he identified the revolt of Asia and Africa against European hegemony as probably the most significant theme of the twentieth century:

The resurgence of Asia and Africa has given a quality to contemporary history different from anything that has gone before; the collapse of empire is one

of its themes, but the other, and more significant, is the advance of the peoples of Asia and Africa – and, more slowly, but no less surely, of Latin America – to a place of new dignity in the world (Barraclough, 1967 [1964], p. 198).

Of these two opinions, it is Barraclough's that has proven to be the more prescient, and more fruitful for subsequent historical research in the last half century. In contrast, Trevor-Roper's comments seem shocking today, not just for their casual racism, but for their wilful embrace of ignorance about the world outside Europe. Despite such conservatism in parts of the history profession, we have learned far more about the 'gyrations' of peoples outside Europe in the last half-century, and few practising historians would advocate returning to Trevor-Roper's more obscurantist views.

If historians today mostly find the term 'civilisation' too wide and diffuse to operationalise for analytical purposes (and at the same time, potentially exclusionary of other cultures and societies), advocates of a revival of 'Western Civ' programs are undeterred by such scholarly scruples. As suggested above, there is a tendency by advocates of projects like the Ramsay Centre to deploy a reified and totalising concept of 'Western Civilisation', despite the vast contradictions such a sweeping construct has to include within itself.

The term 'Western Civilisation' started to make a comeback, not among historians, but among the US political science establishment, as its leaders sought a role for themselves after the end of the Cold War. In 1993, the prominent political scientist Samuel Huntington published an article in the high-profile journal *Foreign Affairs* which proclaimed that 'global politics' would henceforth be dominated by a 'clash of civilisations', which was replacing the previous existential conflict between capitalist democracy and communism. For Huntington, the world consisted of about eight (or seven, or maybe nine) discrete civilisations, whose differing cultural identities would necessarily lead to irreconcilable conflicts. The main conflict would be between the 'West' and 'Islam' (Huntington, 1993). Huntington's thesis gained intense publicity, and his John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies attracted enormous funding from the right-wing Olin Foundation, boosting the influence of his views and their popularity among American neo-conservatives (Mayer, 2016). Huntington's views came under sustained criticism, however, from writers, including the late Edward Said (2001), who queried the perpetuation of a binary 'West versus the rest' view of the world in the post-Cold War global environment, the essentialising depiction of cultural difference as opposed to an

appreciation of the internal complexity of cultures and their mutual interactions and influences over centuries. Since Huntington's essay, the controversial revival of the term 'Western Civilisation' has been associated with neo-conservative politics and a Manichaean view of an inevitable clash between the 'West' and the 'Islamic world'. It is useful to know where this term has been before we turn to its use in the Ramsay Centre debate.

A programmatic essay on 'Western Civilisation' by Greg Melleuish of the University of Wollongong published on the Ramsay Centre website begins with some very sensible observations, including that the term 'Western civilisation does not really appear on the scene until the twentieth century and is largely an American creation'. He also notes that the term 'Western civilisation' does not have a single fixed meaning but can be used in a number of different ways' (Melleuish, 2018, p. 1). Melleuish also allows that: 'Civilisations are not hermits' but encounter each other and are subject to the reciprocal influences of other 'civilisations' (Melleuish, 2018, pp. 2-3). However, by the end of the brief essay, Melleuish writes in a way that seems to attribute agency and even a kind of personhood to the West, raising the question of whether the 'West had an inbuilt inferiority complex', for example, while the West is also characterised as curious and open to new ideas (Melleuish, 2018, pp. 8-9). Interestingly, Melleuish discusses 'civilisation' in terms of what he calls 'cultural patterning', bracketing out factors such as economics or political power. But it is highly questionable that one can understand the trajectories of European and North American history without analysing the influence of these factors.

Martin Davies also prefers to focus on what he calls 'Western thinking', rather than the material historical dimensions of the rise of Western societies (which may, on closer examination, turn out to be less edifying). He also acknowledges that Western civilisation is 'not as simple as a single narrative of White Men Rule' and that it has interacted with other civilisations. But while Davies is willing to jettison a straw-man version of a "Dead White Males" view of history', he still wishes to defend a concept of 'Western civilisation' as a more or less unified phenomenon, which he insists on investing with essentially positive characteristics (preferable to alternatives, such as Islamic State or North Korea). He concludes: 'It is possible to buy-into the idea that there is a narrative of Western civilisation worth celebrating, and there is certainly good reason to celebrate western reasoning. Indeed, there is probably no other game in town.' But is it the purpose of higher education to 'celebrate' its object of study, or to

understand it better, and is it in keeping with the legacy of the Enlightenment, which Davies specifically praises, to do so uncritically?

In focussing on 'Western thinking', conservative intellectual supporters of the Ramsay Centre present a positive view of a progressive narrative of Western civilisation (although there is also a culturally pessimistic ultra-conservative counter-narrative, as we shall see below). Conservative British historian (and outspoken 'Brexitteer') Robert Tombs defines Western civilisation as 'the sum total of our laws, our values, our arts, our institutions, of the habits of mind and heart that enable us to live, fairly harmoniously, together ...' (Tombs, 2018). While Tombs acknowledges the complexity of defining Western civilisation, he comes down on the side of those who argue for the existence of a 'bedrock'

or 'core' of 'ideas, practices and institutions'. There have been forces within the West that have rejected these core values – Tombs mentions 'the Bolsheviks and the Nazis' – but the influence of such movements on the course of history has been short-lived.

Thus, Tombs is effectively suggesting that one can sort the history of Europe and North America into a progressive core (from ancient Greece to the middle ages, the rule of law, the scientific method, the Enlightenment, etc.) and negative phenomena which are a priori defined as outside and against Western civilisation. It is a return to the kind of Whig conception of history diagnosed by Herbert Butterfield in the 1930s.

The boosters of the Ramsay Centre celebrate a reified version of the history of 'Western Civilisation', with a narrative of stately progress from the classical Greeks to medieval Christendom, through to the Reformation and the Enlightenment. One wonders, however, how sincere the enthusiasm is for the Reformation and the Enlightenment among some of the ultra-conservative Catholics among the Ramsay cheer squad, such as Tony Abbott and Bella d'Abrera, the in-house expert on 'Western Civilisation' for the corporate advocacy 'think-tank', the Institute for Public Affairs. Can one simultaneously embrace, say, the Spanish Inquisition (the subject of d'Abrera's PhD) and celebrate Voltaire, who excoriated the Inquisition in his *Candide*, raged against the torture and execution of the Huguenot Jean Calas in 1763 as a result of religious prejudice, devoting three years to the campaign to have the conviction quashed (Besterman, 1969), and adopted

the motto '*écrasez l'infâme*' – 'crush the infamous thing', referring to the bigotry of the Church? That the enthusiasm of the Ramsay Centre for the Enlightenment is somewhat tempered in practice is illustrated by their apparent reluctance to subscribe to precepts of academic freedom, and the wish of the Ramsay Centre to monitor teaching in their sponsored programs to ensure that teaching staff do not overstep the allowable bounds of criticism in relation to the history of the West.

In a historical version of the 'is-ought problem' formulated by the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, some advocates for the Ramsay Centre construe the success of Western European countries and North America in achieving economic and imperial/military hegemony over much of the non-European world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as proof of the ethical

---

**That the enthusiasm of the Ramsay Centre  
for the Enlightenment is somewhat  
tempered in practice is illustrated by  
their apparent reluctance to subscribe to  
precepts of academic freedom...**

---

or normative superiority of the West over the rest. (For examples of the insistence that the historical success of the West demonstrates its normative superiority over other civilisations, one could cite numerous, repetitive

op-eds in the Murdoch press by conservative education commentator Kevin Donnelly).

Historians and social scientists have devoted much intellectual labour to accounting for the economic dynamism leading to industrialisation and then the imposition of Western imperial rule over most of Africa and much of Asia. Explanations include analyses of ecological and geographical factors, the co-existence of political decentralisation and diverse state structures with the 'normative pacification' enabled by the institutions of Christendom, the rise of merchant capital and urban self-government, the imposition of an unequal system of exchange relations after the early modern European incursions into the New World, and the successful application of military technology. Revisionist writers like John M. Hobson (2004) and Andre Gunder Frank (1998) have sought to challenge Eurocentric models of explanation by drawing attention to the technological and economic achievements of China and other parts of Asia, which were successfully appropriated by Europeans. Jürgen Osterhammel's magisterial global history of the nineteenth-century 'transformation of the world' stresses the vitality and richness of Asian cultures and societies, and the degree to which their development was comparable to Europe before the 'great divergence' of the first half of the nineteenth century, which saw the extension

of European dominance. This divergence was due to a complex multiplicity of factors, including Europe's primacy in the exploitation of fossil fuel energy sources, the role of legal systems, and cultural and political barriers to technology diffusion in non-European societies, among others (Osterhammel, 2009). Equating the successful imposition of European power over non-European parts of the world with ethical or normative superiority would underplay the role of violence in this process, and would understate the significance of slavery, the destruction of indigenous societies, economic exploitation, the opium trade (a mainstay of Britain's imperial economy in Asia in the early nineteenth century), and other fundamental characteristics of European expansion. The Ramsay curriculum allows little space to consider such factors, and too much discussion of them in classes (while consistent with the critical legacy of the Enlightenment) might lead to sanctions and withdrawal of funding, in the light of Abbott's insistence on a favourable portrayal of Western civilisation.

Martin Davies, a philosopher, cites the success of analytic philosophy as a proof of the superior qualities of Western civilisation. I was personally interested to see this, as one of my colleagues at the University of Queensland, Joel Katzav, another philosopher, has been researching the history of the rise of analytic philosophy, and attributes its dominance in the academy not to its innate superiority over other kinds of philosophy, but to the notable success of analytic philosophers in the mid-twentieth century in gaining control of key philosophy departments and journals, and monopolising them, thereby marginalising other traditions of philosophy, both Western and non-Western (especially Indian) (Katzav 2017; 2018). What one reader might consider to be a narrative of intellectual superiority, another may construe as a history of the sectarian and monopolistic exercise of power, this time in the academic sphere.

Questions of norms and values loom large in the statements of proponents of the Ramsay Centre, such as Tony Abbott and Kevin Donnelly, who stress the fundamental role of knowledge about the Christian origins of Western civilisation in the proposed academic program. One of the themes that emerges clearly from discussions with people associated with the Ramsay Centre (including at a recent symposium on 'The Liberal Arts in the 21st Century' in Brisbane on 17 September 2018 hosted by the University of Queensland's Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities) is a clear tension between a conception of a US-style 'liberal arts' education, which puts a strong emphasis on the

formation of students' values, and the more research-oriented, more 'scientific' mode of education of the post-Wilhelm von Humboldt modern secular university, which puts a priority on disciplinary training and equipping students to discover new knowledge as well as learning about existing bodies of knowledge. On the 'Indicative Curriculum' displayed on the Ramsay website (Ramsay Centre n.d. [2018]), there is a sample set of courses, nearly all of which are comprised of lists of 'Great Books' of the Western tradition (and one course, out of 18, on comparative literature which includes a few non-Western authors). Only one course lists what could be called works of 'secondary literature', which is a unit on the 'History of Ideas', and which mostly consists of older canonical texts in the field (by authors such as Arthur Lovejoy, Thomas Kuhn, and others). Almost the only recent secondary work a student would encounter as a set reading is Brad Gregory's *The Unintended Reformation* (2012). Gregory's book is a highly polemical take on Western culture and thought since the Protestant Reformation, which he blames for disrupting the harmony of the Western Christian world and ultimately for a number of phenomena of which he disapproves, including the modern secular university. Gregory argues from what Mark Lilla has characterised as a 'theoconservative' position (Lilla, 2012), which is profoundly anti-modernist, and which ends up calling for a reversal of the secularisation of the academy (see the review by Kathleen Crowther (2012) on this point).

As Gregory's book is the only text published this century to be listed on the Ramsay Centre's curriculum web-page, it is not too far-fetched to see it as a potentially programmatic manifesto for the Ramsay project. If Gregory's theoconservative manifesto is the most recent book listed there, the oldest texts are the works of Homer, *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*. It is to Homer that we owe the story of the Trojan Horse, the notorious 'Greek gift', which the defenders of Troy were tricked into hauling through their city gates. At the time of writing, the theoconservative backers of the Ramsay Centre have parked their Trojan Horses outside the gates of two of our secular public universities (the University of Sydney and the University of Queensland), and are negotiating to be allowed inside. If Tony Abbott and Brad Gregory are trustworthy guides, their mission is to try to 'unsecularise' the university and wind back half a millennium of free thought. No wonder the Australian National University couldn't get the Ramsay Board to sign a pledge to commit to academic freedom.

**Andrew Bonnell is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Queensland, Australia, and National Vice-President (Academic Staff) of the NTEU. His research interests include modern German and European history.**

**Contact: a.bonnell@uq.edu.au**

## References

- Abbott, T. (2018). Paul Ramsay's Vision for Australia, *Quadrant*, April. Retrieved from <https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2018/04/paul-ramsays-vision-australia/> dated 24 May.
- Allardyce, G. (1982). The Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course, *American Historical Review*, 87(3), 695-725.
- Barracough, G. (1967 [1964]). *An Introduction to Contemporary History*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Besterman, T. (1969). *Voltaire*, London and Harlow, Longmans.
- Crowther, K. (2012). Review of Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society, H-HRE, H-Net reviews, September. Retrieved from <https://networks.h-net.org/node/15337/reviews/15467/crowther-gregory-unintended-reformation-how-religious-revolution>
- Elias, N. (1978). *The Civilizing Process. The History of Manners* (trans. B. Jephcott), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Evans, G. (2018). Maintaining Universities' raison d'être: Meeting the challenge, Inaugural Chancellor's Oration, *11th National Conference on University Governance: The Challenge of Change for Australian Universities*, University Chancellor's Council (UCC), Adelaide, 4 October. Retrieved from <http://www.gevans.org/speeches/Speech668.html>
- Evans, G. & Schmidt, B. (2018). VC's Update – our viewpoints on Ramsay. 25 June. Retrieved from <http://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/vcs-update-our-viewpoints-on-ramsay>
- Frank, A. G. (1998). *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Geyl, P. (1967 [1961]). *Encounters in History*, London: Fontana/ Collins.
- Geyl, P. (1970 [1955]). *Debates with Historians*, London: Fontana/ Collins.
- Gregory, B. S. (2012). *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hobson, J.M. (2004). *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel (1993) 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Summer.
- Katzav, J. (2017). The Disappearance of Modern Indian Philosophy from *Mind* and the *Philosophical Review*, 25 January. Retrieved from <http://digressionsimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/2017/01/the-disappearance-of-modern-indian-philosophy-from-mind-and-the-philosophical-review.html>.
- Katzav, J. (2018). Analytic Philosophy, 1925-1969: Emergence, Management and Nature, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 26(6), 1197-1221.
- Lilla, M. (2012). Blame it on the Reformation, *The New Republic*, 14 September. Retrieved from <https://newrepublic.com/article/107211/wittenberg-wal-mart>
- Mann, T. (1919). *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag.
- Mayer, J. (2016). *Dark Money*, Brunswick, Victoria: Scribe.
- Melleuish, G. (2018). 'Western Civilisation', on website of The Ramsay Centre. Retrieved from <https://www.ramsaycentre.org/professor-greg-melleuish-political-scientist-and-historian-at-the-university-of-wollongong-explores-the-question-what-is-western-civilisation/western-civilisation-gm-002/>
- Osterhammel, J. (2009). *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Munich: C.H. Beck.
- Ramsay Centre (n.d. [2018]). *Indicative Curriculum: BA (Western Civilisation)*. Retrieved from <https://www.ramsaycentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Indicative-Curriculum-BA-Western-Civilisation-updated.pdf>
- Ringer, F. (1969). *The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 1890-1933*, Cambridge MA: Harvard UP.
- Said, Edward. (2001) 'The Clash of Ignorance', *The Nation*, 4 October.
- Saldern, A. von (2017). Benchmark Europe: Liberalism and Cultural Nationalism in the United States, 1900-1930, *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute (Washington DC)* 60, Spring, 5-24.
- Segal, D.A. (2000). 'Western Civ' and the Staging of History in American Higher Education, *American Historical Review*, 105(3), 770-805.
- Tombs, R. (2018). Liberals are undermining western civilisation, on website of The Ramsay Centre. Retrieved from <https://www.ramsaycentre.org/liberals-undermining-western-civilisation/>
- Trevor-Roper, H. (1965). *The Rise of Christian Europe*, London: Thames and Hudson.
- Visontay, E. (2018). Oxbridge, Yale backed ANU's Ramsay stance, *The Australian* (Higher Education supplement), 10 October.
- Walicki, A. (1979). *A History of Russian Thought. From the Enlightenment to Marxism* (trans. H. Andrews-Rusiecka), Stanford CA: Stanford UP.
- Walicki, A. (1989. [1975]) *The Slavophile Controversy*, Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press.