MORAL VISION IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY

John F. Covaleskie
University of Oklahoma

Abstract
Moral formation is the core of all education, especially education for democratic citizenship. Moral formation requires, among other things, institutions with clear moral visions to which individuals can aspire. Moral clarity can be difficult in a society with broad diversity of moral commitments. In schools, the recognition of diversity has largely been dealt with by developing clear sets of rules by which behavior of students can be efficiently controlled. In contrast, the process of moral formation requires that schools become morally normative communities in which there is a core set of commitments that define them. Examples are examined that show institutions that are so constituted: The United States Marine Corps is one paradigm, and two school examples are also briefly considered (Vivian Paley and Deborah Meier).

Introduction
One of the problems, if not the problem, of every culture is how to make itself stable and self-replicating, which is to say, how to turn its children into members – the problem of moral education. This is the general form of the problem, with two variations: (1) how to keep members within the expectations of communal norms and (2) how to acculturate immigrants to membership.

Educational leadership is for this reason inherently moral leadership. If it is not moral leadership, it cannot be genuinely educational. The 2015 standards of the National Policy Board for Educational Administration (2015) are, for this reason, in some ways helpful but in other ways problematic for educational leaders committed to moral leadership. While the standards seem to be on the right track in their call for a clear vision and core values (in Standards One, Four, Seven, Nine, and Ten), there is also a strong sense that the mission and core values have more to do with utilitarian focus on academic success. This is specifically the mission identified in Standard 1a: “Develop an educational mission for the school to promote the academic success and well-being of each student” (p. 9). Similarly, 1b and 1c focus on academic achievement as the core of the school mission.
More in line with what I would take to be the central mission of democratic schools, Standard 2d calls for leaders to “Safeguard and promote the values of democracy, individual freedom and responsibility, equity, justice, community, and diversity” (p. 10). However, even this is preceded by the commitment to “Place children at the center of education and accept responsibility for each student’s academic success and well-being” (p. 10). Standard 3c says that we should “Ensure that each student has equitable access to effective teachers, learning opportunities, academic and social support, and other resources necessary for success” (p. 11).

More generally, there is an admirable attention to the need for respect for and attention to diversity, but even here note two things. First, according to Standard 3b, even “each student’s strengths, diversity, and culture” are valued primarily “as assets for teaching and learning” (p. 11). Second, and this is the real point I want to argue in what follows: diversity simpliciter is not in and of itself a virtue. Toleration must be of the right sort, at the right time, in the right ways, and for the right reasons, as Aristotle (1999) pointed out about virtue in general. Aristotle’s insight was that we can err in the pursuit of virtue in two ways: deficit or excess. In teaching for tolerance, in focusing on the respect for diversity, we address the dangers of deficit, but we are not very good at examining the limits of toleration. The very ideas of “mission” and “core values” point to the fact that some specific set of virtues and commitments – some definite moral architecture – constitutes and defines moral membership in any morally normative community. And the existence of a moral architecture implies that there are limits to tolerance because some things are intolerable. This is the concern I wish to raise in this paper.

Before getting into the analysis, I want to clarify some of the terms and context of my concern in this paper.2

**Terms and Context of the Problem**

By community, I mean units of membership that are defined politically and geographically, like nations. However, the form of the problem of making members is the same for other kinds of normative communities, such as political parties, religious organizations, civic groups like the Rotary, or advocacy groups like the National Organization of Women (Covaleskie, 2013). In addition, I am using the term immigrants metaphorically to mean not only those who physically move from one political jurisdiction to another, but also those who move from one morally normative community to another. For example, a person who changes from atheism to an evangelical church, or who changes views on an important issue like marriage equality or the right to choose, is a moral immigrant.

Moral education is arguably the central task of every culture, society, and/or group. Bringing up the young with those virtues that make good members of the group is tautologically necessary: failure to do so leads to dissolution or radical transformation of the group that so fails (Mannheim, 1928/1952; Martin, 2002, especially Chapter 3). The questions of moral education are quite similar for the military, gangs, polities both democratic and fascist (and everything in between), and churches, among many other kinds of institutions; the great differences in the moral architecture of these institutions and cultures are relatively unimportant in resolving the question of how cultures turn children (or, secondarily, outsiders) into members.

When I speak of moral architecture I mean the structure of virtues and vices that define a morally normative community. As examples of this, we can consider the vast differences between the moral architecture of the Homeric honor code and that of the justice-based moral system Socrates was explicating. The Aristotelian virtues of magnificence and magnanimity, for example, would not be counted among the Christian virtues, nor, similarly, would the Christian virtue of humility be part of Aristotle’s concept of what makes a good life. A traditional morality based in adherence to ritual and a maintenance of purity and avoidance of pollution within a chosen and specific community would be contrary to the deontological-universalism of Kant or the consequentialism of Mill. In modern society, the co-operative and collaborative morality of at least some versions of democratic politics stands in stark contrast to the competitive and individualistic virtues of capitalism.

It is not that any one of these moral architectures is superior to the others, but it is to note that people and, of course, moral communities, structure their moral world differently, with different virtues being defined differently (“justice,” for example, means many different things in different moral communities) and then also being weighted differently against each other (chastity, for example, is far more important in some religious communities than in others).

By bounded tolerance I mean to point out a fact of social life: membership in any sort of normative community (which is to say most communities) is defined by adherence to some set of norms that function, within that community, as moral norms. No matter how much diversity a community may respect and accept, however high tolerance stands in the pantheon of communal norms, all groups have some standard by which they define membership, and violation of that standard is unacceptable – intolerable. All tolerance, that is, is bounded: disputes about tolerance are always practically debates about how wide the circle of inclusion is to be.

I am suggesting that the general answer to the question of moral education requires, among other things, a bounded tolerance, and this is true for democratic societies as much as for any other. First I want to consider whether education is the correct term for what
we are considering. Then I want to consider what it means to place limits on toleration – or not to do so.

Moral Education?

I just want to pause for a moment here to question the very notion of moral education, a question that revolves strongly on the question of the meaning of education. When we speak of education, we often mean something intentional and specified, and commonly, in Western industrial societies, based in schools. That is, we often think of education as something both formalized and structured. This is, of course, false. Much of ordinary life is educational, as Dewey (1916) pointed out long ago; experiences that prepare us for further growth and development are educational (Dewey, 1933), regardless of whether they take place in school or not.

To the extent that we think of education as something structured and a matter of direct instruction, it probably makes little sense to speak of moral education, whether we confine ourselves to schooling or not. It probably makes more sense to think of fostering or modeling than “education”: what we tell children about morality and moral belief probably matters less to their moral development than what we show them is important by our own actions and demeanor (see, for example, Sizer & Sizer, 1999). Morality is certainly learned, but unless we consider living morally itself as teaching, this might not be a matter of teaching (Sizer & Sizer, 1999; Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993).

This suggests that teaching the content and demands of morality as a subject is not likely to make much of an impact on moral development. It is easy to teach children what the rules in school (and in life) are; it is difficult to get them to act accordingly with consistency. Children, when asked, can reliably describe a school’s moral code in which honesty and kindness are named as central virtues. However, this tells us nothing about whether those same children (or their teachers, for that matter) act kindly or are honest. The actual disposition to do the right thing in the right way at the right time for the right reasons (to reference Aristotle on virtue, 1116a13) is very different from merely knowing how others would like you to behave. This is the difference between rules (knowing what is expected) and norms (a personal commitment to rules as expressions of what is right or wrong). Rules can easily be taught and learned; fostering and acquiring norms is much more difficult, and much more important.

The priority of norms over rules becomes clear when we understand that mere adherence to the rules of a society will seem to suffice so far as the behavior of members is concerned, but this is a fairly narrow sense. That is, compliance with rules we do not see as binding norms tends to be dependent both on the degree of surveillance and enforcement on the one hand, and the difficulty and price of compliance or noncompliance on the other. If we are merely obeying rules we are more likely to stop obeying when we are not being observed. This is significant for polities that would be democratic, since the essence of democratic life is that we freely live by the norms of democratic life, and not as a result of constant enforcement (Covaleskie, 1995). Whatever can be said of a society that maintains order by constant supervision, we cannot say that such a polity is democratic. This is why Dewey (1916) paid so much attention to the relationship between democracy and education: democratic life depends on nurturing democratic virtue.

Nor is moral formation a matter of intellectual development, at least not intellectual development alone. For one thing, we are learning that justification of our moral decisions may well be post-hoc explanations rather than reasoned decisions (Haidt, 2006). More than that, we should note that moral reasoning as a developmental artifact as measured by Kohlberg (1984) appears to follow, not lead, moral development. That is, if morality is the predisposition to do the right thing, etc., then one faces dilemmas of the Kohlbergian kind only when one has already dispositionally become a member of a moral community.

Consider the most famous of Kohlberg’s (1981) dilemmas, the Heinz Dilemma, in which a man’s wife needs expensive medicine he cannot afford. The problem posed is whether or not he should steal the drug. It is significant that unless Heinz has first attained membership in a moral community that (1) values human life and (2) values property rights roughly equally with human life, he faces no moral dilemma. That is, he may face some practical problems, but he does not face a dilemma about what he should (morally should) do. If he does not value his wife’s life, or human life in general, he need do nothing but let her die. On the other hand, if human life has a clear moral priority over ownership rights, then Heinz also has no moral dilemma: he should do what he needs to do to obtain the drug and save her life: though he would still face the practical problems of how to successfully steal the needed drug or the money to purchase it, no moral dilemma remains. And so in a very real sense the most interesting thing about the Heinz dilemma is that it reveals how very effectively we teach our young that it is normal to value possessions as much as life itself. We probably do not mean to teach that, but teach it we do, by the way we live and legislate. Here we see one facet of our moral architecture.

Norms are so powerful precisely because they are so often invisible: they are the standards we take for granted. “We” here is a variable term. In this context it indicates members of a particular moral community. To put it another way, holding certain ideas of propriety – of virtue and vice – is constitutive of moral membership in some group. That group’s idea(s) about proper and improper, about virtue and vice, seem not only true to its members, but self-evidently so (Green, 1985). This is basically what we mean by member. How does this happen?
**Moral Clarity**

One of my daughters was briefly married to a United States Marine. I went with her to his graduation from Parris Island boot camp, and some very important elements of becoming a member of a moral community became clear to me that day.

At Parris Island, I was told, the current parade ground is substantially larger than the original. When they were doing the enlargement, they did not simply dig up the old parade ground and replace it with a new one. Instead, the old parade ground was recycled into the mix that was poured to make the new one, which now includes the old. Recruits, upon arriving at Parris Island, are informed that they may not step onto the parade ground until they have passed through the preliminary challenges they will face. They are told that the parade ground is *hallowed ground*, made so by the presence of every Marine who has ever graduated from Parris Island. They each have to earn the honor of walking on it.

The Marines are an organization built on strong norms and traditions. Marines identify, famously, as Marines. There is a tradition built up over time that goes back to the Halls of Montezuma and the shores of Tripoli, and a culture summed up in the tag line of their recruiting commercials: “The few. The proud. The Marines.” One can retire from the Marines, but one is still a Marine: there is, as the saying goes, no such thing as an ex-Marine.

Hence, the organization communicates that those who pass muster and become members are valuable for what they can contribute to the mission and identity of the organization. The testing is so rigorous, the recruit is given to understand, because the organization needs members who can do extraordinary things. Recruits will meet the demands of this testing because they want to prove worthy of this membership.

Nor are Marines (and other military organizations) alone in this sort of stern pedagogy of welcome. Gangs in many ways duplicate the regime of harsh initiation before membership is achieved and followed by a strong sense of membership and loyalty. So do many religious organization and orders. All these cases are examples of strong moral formation in precisely the sense that *individuals* begin the process, but *members* are the result of the experience. A caution is suggested by the fact that *these individuals begin the process wanting to be members*. I will return to the significance of this shortly.

This highlights an important truth about moral formation: moral membership is an individual *attainment*, but it is also a communal *achievement*. While it is individuals who meet the demands of any specific moral community, it is *often the community that creates both support networks and incentives*. More to the point, it is welcoming in precisely the sense that it makes itself attractive enough so that individuals want to belong to it. This is the aspect of moral formation that presents a real challenge to schools.

To clarify: when we speak this way of morality, we do not necessarily mean a way of life based in a religious or theological frame (though morality may be rooted in one). Morality here, however, means more broadly a code of conduct that is rooted in norms constitutive of some particular moral community – that community’s moral architecture.

**The Challenge to Moral Formation in Schools**

This is a real challenge for schools because they are compulsory, and attendance is universal. Students are not volunteers, as is the case with the military, theater groups, sports teams, gangs, civic groups, political parties, and even religion. That is, one’s presence in school in no way implies agreement with the mission of the institution, nor does it imply a shared moral vision. This, of course, is why the issue of diversity exists at all: we cannot assume that a school is a morally normative community in the sense discussed above. Regardless, I want to make the claim that, unless schools can find ways to present themselves as moral communities, they are in the business of teaching compliance, not fostering either moral agency in general or democratic citizenship in particular.

Schools clearly cannot do the total job of moral formation, but they are more likely to be successful in fostering the virtues of democratic citizenship if they are themselves clear and consistent in their practice of democratic virtues. So if schools are to be morally normative communities, the first two tasks they face are to (1) be welcoming and (2) demonstrate consistent moral clarity.

As to the first, obviously, no one is going to pay the price of admission to an institution or organization they do not wish to join. So the task is to be the sort of community that someone would aspire to join. This can be done in a number of ways: the group can hold the key to some sort of special knowledge (religion is the paradigm here); earning membership in the group may be itself a praise-and pride-worthy achievement (such as making a competitive athletic team, earning a part in a theatrical production or in an elite choir, or being selected for an honors program); the purposes of the group may be so noble that one wants to participate (again, religion is like this, as is the military or Habitat for Humanity; it is also why people make donations to groups like Doctors Without Borders); and/or belonging gives members a sense of identity (once again religion and the military, but also gangs and social organizations like Rotarians and Kiwanis, as well as professional organizations like the Consortium for the Study of Leadership and Ethics in Education or the University Council for Educational Administration). I am sure I am missing other kinds of organizations or institutions that make membership attractive and desirable, but one can see my point:
organizations and communities are welcoming, in the sense that I am using the term, when something about them makes people want to belong.

The second element is, I think, empirically if not conceptually, an aspect of the first. That is, an element of attracting members is standing for or symbolizing something seen as good, desirable, or valuable. This requires a moral clarity and consistency that can be seen and appreciated, and that one adopts as one becomes a member of that group: to be a member of a morally normative institution or community is to have adopted the moral norms of the group as one’s own.

However, the democratic polity consists of members who come to the public square from a wide variety of very different morally normative communities, and this raises questions about the limits of diversity and tolerance. That is to say, as complex democratic polities become more and more diverse, and more and more accepting (“tolerant”) of that diversity, democracy becomes more and more difficult because finding norms to warrant the rules that structure social life becomes more difficult.

The way this conflict is often theorized is to distinguish between a thick consensus and a thin consensus (Rawls, 1999). On this view a thin consensus is a set of agreements that allow a society or community to function despite deep differences on a variety of issues. The thin consensus recognizes and brackets incommensurable differences and goes forward agreeing to disagree on matters of substance while agreeing to adjudicate those differences when necessary according to an agreed-upon set of procedures. Another way of looking at the content of a thin consensus is that it is the body of beliefs and commitments that exist where the thick consensuses of the moral communities that make up the polity overlap and are congruent.

A serious problem complex democratic societies face is that some beliefs held by some members of the polity are in principle at odds with the modes of living together established by the agreed-upon procedures. There are times, that is, when the thick commitments of some communities within the polities cannot yield to the thin consensus on procedural decision-making or, alternatively, places where the thick commitments of different moral communities are totally incommensurable and without overlap. What, then, is the role of schools under these conditions, which, I would argue, are actually quite common in our history?

**Diversity and Tolerance**

So, first note that diversity and tolerance thereof are both good and necessary for democratic life. In any true democracy, there will be serious disagreements about the best way to balance competing goods (e.g., equality and individual liberty). Moral diversity will exist: there will be real and legitimate differences in views about what best looks like. Any society without disagreement about visions of a good life is oppressive; unanimity of opinion is not a sign of a healthy democracy.

What follows is that we must accord at least respect to our fellow citizens and to their ideas. Green (1994) argues that one of the central – and most difficult – requirements of democratic citizenship is to listen seriously to the ideas our fellow citizens bring into the public debate, to hear them as though their speech might be candidates for our own. His point is that one of the duties of citizenship is to recognize the co-membership of our fellow citizens in the public square – to positively affirm their full equality and legitimacy as citizens. We are not very good at this.

He goes on to point out that public speech is at the heart of democratic life and public speech becomes public not by how, when, or where it is spoken; *public speech becomes public by virtue of how it is heard.* This second point is easy to miss, but it is the more important of the two: by refusing to consider seriously the speech of others in the public square, we can deny their citizenship. Their speech becomes marginalized and non-public precisely to the extent that it is not listened to seriously. This, of course, is precisely the history of how people of color have been and are marginalized. Overt and active racism or misogyny are less prevalent today than in the past, but the system is designed to ignore these and other groups in such a way that they are marginalized and kept from having influence. This is what is meant when people refer to institutionalized racism and institutionalized sexism: the racism and sexism operate quite efficiently without needing any active racists or sexists.

This is a serious problem for democracy and points to the need for diversity and toleration (indeed, celebration) thereof.

At the same time, and paradoxically, there must be limits to what are considered tolerable expressions of opinions in the polity. When it recently happened at my university, the University of Oklahoma, that a video was released of a campus fraternity gleefully and loudly chanting racist slogans, the president of the university, David Boren, summarily dismissed them from the university on the grounds that the video showed behavior that was intolerable. And here is the point and the paradox.

What President Boren did – expel the students summarily and without due process – was probably illegal and might be overturned if challenged. And that may be part of the lesson.

In a liberal democratic polity there is a default to two states of affairs: the first is that there is a set of rules that are justified by appeal to a secular ideal of social life and public rationality; the second is that these rules and laws are enforced with *due process.* Rules so arrived at are
impersonal and rooted in thin consensus (Rawls, 1999) rather than a particular sectarian system of beliefs. Under these conditions, when someone is to be punished for some violation, the process matters, sometimes even more than the outcome. Justice is understood to be adhering to the process – not getting the right outcome – for the simple reason that we often can agree on a process without being able to agree on a just outcome.

It eventually becomes difficult to maintain the kind of norms that inspire individuals to membership. As we have seen, there is nothing soft or gentle about being a welcoming community. Many such communities are both harsh and demanding. What they have that more than compensates is a set of norms worth the commitment. Substituting the procedural forms of social life for the thick consensus of normative communities can provide a degree of social stability and conformity, but the problem with operating on a thin consensus is that there is little for people to love. Norms give meaning to rules – to life itself; without strong normation rules merely confine and coerce; they neither guide nor inspire. Commitment is impossible: there is nothing to commit to.

The root of the problem is that moral formation is a process of learning about what is right and wrong, not merely what is required and forbidden. Novices learn about what is morally significant by the reactions of those more advanced in the social practice of a given community. Dispassionate enforcement of rules through the rigid application of procedures teaches what the consequences for breaking the rules are; it does not help form a conscience precisely because it suggests that there are no norms that underlie the rules. What President Boren did was demonstrate outrage – demonstrate, that is, that a central norm of the university had been broken. This was not a question of behavior, but of identity. He did not cite violation of a rule or any part of the student conduct code. Rather, he stated that the behavior on the video was “disgraceful,” that “Real Sooners are not bigots. Real Sooners are not racists” (Query, Mar 9, 2015). This is the language of norms, of who we are, not what merely what we do. This is the language of moral formation and moral commitment – of obligation and responsibility – not of command. It is how new members learn not only what is against the rules, but what utterly violates who we are.

“We” is an interesting word, or course. It begs a serious question to say, “Real Sooners are not racists.” Who defines “real” Sooners? Clearly, at least some Sooners are racists. What weight do we give to this “real”? Who gets, in any situation, to stipulate who is included in “we,” and, perhaps more importantly, who is not?

These are the central questions in the formation of moral members of normative communities and especially of democratic polities (a large and complex example of a normative community). To return to a point made earlier, the task of democratic education is to foster a certain morality, a certain set of moral norms, a certain set of democratic virtues. This is far more difficult, and far more important, than merely teaching the procedures of democratic life or obtaining compliance with democratic rules. Citizens must commit to a set of norms; that is what makes them citizens, not just inhabitants, of a democratic polity.

While we know that there is something deeply corrosive of democracy in a failure to tolerate, respect, and accept people with deeply different views about how we should live together, the opposite is also true: failure to set boundaries to acceptable actions and, perhaps more important, attitudes is equally corrosive. Questions of appropriate limits on public expressions get trivialized and ridiculed as “political correctness,” which redefines (to the advantage of existing structures of power and oppression) the conversation about white fraternity boys gleefully engaged in racist speech. Instead of recognizing that such attitudes, not just their expression, are truly intolerable in a democratic polity or in an institution of democratic education, the conversation winds up being about political correctness and freedom of speech, rather than the racist speech itself.

Nevertheless, democracy requires that certain things just not be done. When people who occupy positions of privilege and power exercise that power and privilege to oppress and marginalize others – to read them out of the polity by refusing to hear them as fellow members – democracy is perverted and weakened. The forms of democracy might remain in place, and the procedures of democracy might continue to be followed, but we will not be in a democratic polity.

So the paradox is this: without tolerance and diversity, democracy is not democratic. However, it is equally true that tolerance, misapplied or applied too broadly will also destroy democratic life.

**Moral Vision in Education**

What then are the implications of all this for school leaders? How can a public school both properly respect diversity and create the sort of moral community that earns the commitment of potential members?

Many schools root their “discipline policies” (itself a telling phrase, as though discipline can be separated from the ordinary flow of school and classroom life) in the procedures of impersonal enforcement. Packaged discipline programs like Canter’s (1976) Assertive Discipline taught teachers to “deal with the behavior, not the child.” The implicit assumption here is that time spent in the moral formation of the young is time wasted off task.

It is in this light that we should consider President Boren’s response to the incident of racism described above. The summary expulsion, done with obvious outrage, was an educational event (for the rest of the
We were both startled by my question. He said he wasn’t really on any side.

I didn’t stop, because I was busy thinking about it myself. So I pushed. If someone is being cruel to someone else, if someone is the victim and someone the victimizer, rapist and raped, abused and abuser—can you really be neutral?”

He paused. “No,” he said, “I’m never with the abusers.” (pp. 86-87)

This is one example of confronting students with the consequences of their actions – not as a breaking of a rule, but as the violation of a norm. “What kind of person are you in the process of becoming?” This question is an inescapable part of a pedagogy of moral education. “What rule did you break?” makes very little independent contribution to this effort; too often children (and their elders) know perfectly well when they are breaking rules and what rules they are breaking. The problem is that they see no moral significance to the rule, its keeping, or its breaking. Of course, there often is no serious moral issue in a rule, but sometimes there is. Children (and their elders) must learn to make this distinction.

Working with much younger children, kindergarten teacher Vivian Paley (1993) gives us an extended look at moral education in her book You Can’t Say, You Can’t Play. This book tells the story of the year Paley saw the behavior of her students – the exclusion of some children from classroom play – as something she should (morally should) do something about. Her response begins by asking the children to share with her and their classmates what it feels like to be excluded. The children who do the exclusion are helped to understand the effects of their actions. At about the midpoint of the year, she decided to enact the rule that gives the book its title.

Her follow-up again gives us an example of moral pedagogy: similar to Meier, Paley teaches by story and by placing the students’ acts of exclusion in front of the students for their consideration. Students were not punished for their acts of exclusion. Instead, Paley led them through discussion after discussion about acts of exclusion, their effect on the children excluded, and the importance of all of the children being admitted to full membership in the class community. In Paley’s pedagogy, there actually was a focus on the rule (unlike Meier’s example), but it was a very complex focus: what Paley and her young children were doing in their discussions was to try to decide exactly what the rule meant – what exclusion was and what were its costs, and what sort of community they wanted to belong to, and what sort of members they therefore needed to be. This is what we should mean by moral pedagogy.

**Conclusion**

What I have argued here is threefold. First, education for democratic citizenship is inevitably and inescapably
moral education. If it is not moral, it does not prepare the next generation for the responsibilities of democratic citizenship. Second, moral pedagogy requires a moral architecture that is clear and foundational, that serves to guide the actions of members of the morally normative community. Without such a clear moral architecture, no group of people can be morally formative. Third, it is possible to form school communities with a strong moral architecture, which is part of what allows for individuals to aspire to and to achieve membership in moral communities. Moral pedagogy is a reflection and expression of a moral architecture, and the shape of that architecture is demonstrated precisely by the fact that we, as a moral community, recognize limits to what is acceptable – tolerable – and what is not.

Notes

1 A shorter version of this paper was presented at the 2015 20th Annual Values and Leadership Conference.

2 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments on the original draft of this paper.

References


EDITORIAL OBJECTIVES: *Values and Ethics in Educational Administration* is dedicated to promoting and disseminating a broad range of scholarly inquiry relating to the areas of values and ethics in education, and their relationship to theory and practice in school administration and leadership. The areas of values and ethics represent a promising direction for research into the practice of educational administration, and the editor is prepared to consider a wide range of disciplined empirical and conceptual works of interest to both scholars in the field as well as practitioners in the PK-12 sector.

SUBMISSION INFORMATION: All articles will be reviewed by the editor to determine their suitability for this publication. In addition, at least two additional reviewers will conduct blind reviews of the article.

MANUSCRIPT REQUIREMENTS: The initial manuscript should be submitted electronically to the editor at the email address shown below. Manuscripts should conform to APA 6th edition formatting requirements and should not identify the author(s) of the work. A separate author page should be included providing the author(s)’ details, including contact information (address and e-mail). In addition, an abstract of 100-150 words should be included, as well as up to six keywords identifying the central subjects addressed in the manuscript. Diagrams, tables, and figures should be kept at a minimum, appear in black and white, and follow the manuscript in numbered order corresponding to numbered placeholders in the text. Footnotes and Endnotes should be avoided whenever possible.

References should appear in the following format:

References and citations should be in alphabetical order, and chronological within alphabetical order. The editor reserves the right to make changes to the manuscript to ensure that it conforms to the house style. Generally, manuscripts should be between 2,500 and 5,000 words in length. Prospective author(s) must include a statement which indicates they agree to the submission of the manuscript, and that the manuscript has not been published, and is not under consideration for publication, in part or in substance, elsewhere.

The editor will communicate via the internet with the author(s) of accepted manuscripts to ensure that the final version of the article is not only acceptable with the author(s) but also complies with the journal’s established requirements and format.

PUBLICATION DETAILS: *Values and Ethics in Educational Administration* is an independently published quarterly by the University Council for Educational Administration’s Consortium for the Study of Leadership and Ethics in Education. This journal is published both in traditional hard copy format as well as on-line at [http://www.ucea.org/initiatives/ucea-centre-study-leadership-ethics/](http://www.ucea.org/initiatives/ucea-centre-study-leadership-ethics/). On-line access to the journal articles is free and copyright provisions are expected when using any information contained in an article.

EDITORIAL CONTACT INFORMATION: Address all papers, editorial correspondence, and subscription information requests to:
William C. Frick
Associate Professor
University of Oklahoma
Department of Educational Leadership & Policy Studies
Jeannine Rainbolt College of Education
820 Van Vleet Oval
201 Collings Hall
Norman, OK 73019-2041
405-325-2447 (office)
405-325-2403 (fax)
[http://www.ou.edu/education/people/william-frick](http://www.ou.edu/education/people/william-frick)