The Publicness of the Curriculum and the Ambiguity of the Shift to Participatory Politics: The Intersection of Politics and Education Regarding “Representation”

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This paper considers the functions and effects of “representation” in politics and education. The voting age for public elections in Japan has been lowered from 20 or older to 18 or older, calling for a shift in the curriculum to the basics of political participation and competence. In this paper, while focusing on the political issues concerning the publicness of the curriculum up until now in particular, I will demonstrate experimentally that considering this problem means radically reconsidering the struggles contained in the meaning of participatory politics itself, not only the situation of representative democracy in modern society, and that it clarifies once again the covertly configured educational problems of competency.

Keywords: Curriculum; Publicness; Representation; Democracy; Participatory politics

1. Where the problem lies: increasingly transparent politics and education

On June 17th, 2015, Japan’s Revised Public Elections Act passed the Diet Upper House, and the age of suffrage, previously “20 or older”, joined that of much of the world at “18 or older”. While various issues remain, based on the meaning of the concept of “publicness” as “openness, Öffentlichkeit” allowing access by anyone (Habermas 1994; Saito 2000), the meaning reported by various media of some 2.4 million new voters is very important. In particular, given the issue of the generation gap in Japan as it faces a shrinking and aging society, encouraging the participation of young people in politics and revitalizing democracy are

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issues which have been emphasized with regards to education as well as to society and politics. For example, as Takahashi Ryōhei (who has worked, as a trustee of the NPO Rights, for the realization of 18-and-up suffrage) argues, “In order to realize politics with an eye to the future, the political and social participation of the generations which will bear responsibility for the future is essential. In this sense as well, it is urgent that we construct a youth democracy in order to reflect the voices of the young” (Takahashi/Kobayashi 2008: 70-71).

As these voices show, in order to revitalize this kind of democracy in reality, we are likely to hear more calls for the importance of participation in politics and direct reflection of voices, beyond the study of politics merely as information and knowledge. There will be further calls for opportunities and chances to “participate,” inducing greater commitment to actual politics in reality-based form, such as minors’ participation in regional plebiscites or approaches to ordinances permitting this as recently seen in various municipalities throughout Japan’s government and administration, or the mock elections and hands-on research taking place in junior high and high school classrooms. The process of cultivating the attitudes and tendencies which will motivate people to participate and act, we might even say the “abilities” and “qualities” of citizens, will become more and more a common issue of concern in the areas of politics and education.

The questioning of the phase of a certain kind of “abilities” and qualities” for participation and action appears, even viewed from overseas examples as well as those from Japan, such as “deliberation days” in the arena of politics or mini-public spaces such as “citizen juries” or “consensus conferences”, in the systematizing of the non-systematic dimension of democracy in which more direct participation in public debate is embedded (and/or in the embedding of the non-systematic dimension into the system) which is receiving a great deal of attention as both theory and practice, in the active worldwide state of the debate on the requirements of citizenship as well (Gastil/Levine 2005; Fishkin 2009). In order to address the problems of the existing representative democracy, such as opacity and hollowness, which make opinions difficult to convey, and to enhance the quality and function of the representative system, it seems that we will hear more and more calls to reflect the voices of the people as sovereigns and citizens, that is to say to increase the “transparency” between politics and people on which representation is based, through participation and action.

Elsewhere, the school curriculum configuration is also being significantly reconsidered through the lens of “abilities” and “qualities.” In particular, Japan is currently focusing less on the transfer of content or “what do you know” (representation of knowledge and information) and more on the functional aspect of the construction of ability and quality, or “what do you do.” For example, the Courses of Study issued as the national standard when constructing the Japanese curriculum have been reviewed approximately every ten years; their next revision (already issued as of March 2017 for elementary and junior high schools) includes discussion organized under the rubric of “what will [students] become able to do,” “what will they learn,” and “how will they learn”, displaying a notable shift from “knowledge” to the formation of “qualities/abilities” (Goda 2015: 7-9). This revision indicates not only a directional shift of the national standards, but also a reflection to some degree of the shifting focus of the curriculum developed in a global dimension. In the context of this global focus shift from the contents of study to the development of “competency” in the sense of “what can you do” abilities and qualities, there is a direct connection without conflict not only to learning as a citizen with an emphasis on problem-solving thought in participation
and action, but also to the need for learners and attitudes in society which address directly the social action level of human existence and life such as human strength and versatile ability, which seem at first not to require the intervention of educational intent or purposes. As the Japanese educational scholar Imai Yasuo points out, “there is an emphasis everywhere on ‘competence’ and ‘power,’ in inverse proportion to which knowledge representing the world is deemphasized” (Imai 2012: 201).

However, I want to consider once more, carefully, this intersection between politics and education which enhances transparency: we need to reconsider the fact that the functions and actions of “representation,” which has heretofore intervened between politics and people, learning and learners, have by no means disappeared. In both politics and education, with the rise of voices demanding greater transparency with regard to the “representation” used as a medium, the issue configuration and frameworks of thought of the politics concerning the publicness of the conventional curriculum, which has struggled with the hegemony of knowledge and information, also, naturally, must be redrawn to some extent. However, how will this redrawing be developed, and what new issues will present themselves? This paper focuses on the existing arguments on the publicness of the curriculum in educational theory, while addressing the problem based on the perspectives of “representation” in politics and education. Therein, I want to point out experimentally that reconsidering the publicness of the curriculum at this point in time constitutes a radical reconsideration not only of the quality and functions of representative democracy in modern society, but also of the very nature of “participatory politics,” which works toward the inclusion of formats such as participation in deliberation and debate, and that it clarifies once again the educational issue of competency hinted at there. Here, we need to consider not only the status of discussion of the publicness of the curriculum in Japan, but also the issue of the politics of the publicness of the curriculum as it develops globally. Directly addressing these issues, with reference to the responses being attempted overseas, in particular to the significance and limitations of educational theory in the US and the UK, this paper considers in detail the approach to the publicness of the curriculum and the implications of the shift to participatory politics.

2. Representation: what is questioned by the publicness of the curriculum

2.1 “This is not the world”

The concept of “representation” refers to functions or effects as a signifiant which takes the place of something or indicates it indirectly (cf. Spivak 2010). There are many Japanese translations for this word, including nuances such as “representation,” “agent,” “substitute,” “placeholder,” “re-presentation,” “recreation,” and “image.” For instance, as in the example suggested by the philosopher Richard Rorty with his “mirror-imagery,” the long history of philosophy has grappled with the “representation” which faithfully imagines the reflection of truth and actual existence as in a mirror, in order to achieve a general theory which clarifies and explains the functions and effects of this representation which reflects and substitutes for the images as knowledge before (or inside) us (Rorty 1979; Matsushita 1999). Modern school education is explained as having been established in parallel to these efforts, along with the process by which living and learning of itself is separated from society and life experience in the world, replaced by the study of “the world” re-presented and substituted by the indirect
knowledge and information represented by “representation” (Matsushita 2005: 51).

“This is not the world,” as Klaus Mollenhauer once clearly stated the basic principles of modern education. According to Mollenhauer, the world “indicated” for us as knowledge and information in the process called “education” is not in itself the real world we accept directly/incidentally as its meaning in our daily life. That is, it is a reproduction within education of the events and experiences arising from the real society and world, or an “image” or “reflection”—that is, “representation”—deliberately re-presented as education, and therefore has been questioned thus: “What should be depicted, how can it be depicted in such a way that the child’s mind is able to grasp it, and how can this be accomplished in such a way as to nurture motivation?” (Mollenhauer 1987: 91 [trans. Friesen]; cf. Imai 2004).

There has been active discussion of the publicness of the conventional curriculum in terms of the politics concerning the appropriateness and logistical accuracy of the process of copying “representation” as the contents of knowledge and information and the reception thereof; it goes without saying that this includes the issues of critical pedagogy raised by Henry A. Giroux and Michael W. Apple, as well—to draw on historical examples as well as recent theories—the various alternative school practices which attempted to educate “good rebels” against the mainstream culture, as in the research of Kenneth Teitelbaum (Teitelbaum 1993). This hegemony has been debated in general on these grounds. As Apple argues in his criticism of the official knowledge which makes itself felt in defining what has official value within the public sphere, “what counts as knowledge, who has power and how power actually functions in our daily lives, and, finally, how this determines what we see as ‘real’ and important in our institutions in general and in education in particular…[I]t is naïve to think of the school curriculum as neutral knowledge. Rather, what counts as legitimate knowledge is the result of complex power relations and struggles among identifiable class, race, gender, and religious groups” (Apple 2014: 46 ff.). That is, it is doubtful to begin with whether this “world” actually represents the real society and world accurately, but the greater problem is that, if this is not the world, whose world, for whom, and by whom is the curriculum we learn representing?

2.2 From the receiving side to the constructing side

As with the Western classical reconstruction and cultural literacy debates of America in the 1980s, notably Allan Bloom and Eric D. Hirsch Jr. (cf. Spring 1999: 78), as Apple symbolically expresses with “legitimate knowledge,” with regards to questioning the publicness of the curriculum so far, we may sum it up to the effect that the central responses and arguments have concerned discussion of the publicness of content. This is easy to understand if we remind ourselves that, while the essence of publicness is openness, it has also contained the broader meanings of “official” and “common” (Saito 2000: viii-ix). In short, what is being questioned on the basis of the publicness of the curriculum is, on the one hand, (a) how to reconstruct culture as knowledge which is “official” and “common” for people again, while the centrality of the Western historical tradition and the unity of national culture wobble mightily; and yet, elsewhere, (b) the contents of “legitimate knowledge” as a symbol of the world which is to be selectively constructed by these traditions and cultures are not, in fact, accessible and “open” to anyone and everyone. Rather, they are no more than images or reflections of the existing (mainly dominant-group) social order, and if anything they block the acceptance of the respect and difference of people from non-mainstream cultural groups,
tearing away their motivation to learn. Furthermore, the curriculum considered “common” and “official” forces on them an inferior self-image, cleverly functioning as a tool of dominance and oppression. There have been strategic attempts to drag this phenomenon once again into the light on a basis of questioning the concept of publicness.

The Japanese educationalist Sato Manabu, whose research has addressed the publicness of the curriculum, writes that “the publicness of the curriculum has first of all been expressed in the commonality of the knowledge handled in schools,” while pointing out the need for redefinition of the curriculum, too often regulated as “regions” of content, to a concept including “relatedness” in the sense of “the history of learning (the learning experience overall),” based on the more original “course of life” meaning (Sato 1996: 155, 166). The arguments regarding the publicness of content, as Sato points out, can be summed up as the freeing of the learner from the shackles of the curriculum “authority” as a representation of the so-called selectively constructed world, embedding the learner’s “authorship” into school and classroom curricula, and finally “re-editing the paradigm of authority” in the sense of the learners themselves taking back “authenticity” in the name of the curriculum (Sato 1996: 196).

Therefore, as Apple has expressed with “education and power are terms of an indissoluble couplet” (Apple 2014: 47), questioning the publicness of the curriculum meant reforming this “indissoluble couplet” by oneself transforming and remotivating from the “receiving” side to the “constructing” side. However, this process was not simply the politics of expanding and reflecting one’s own voice in the selection of contents and demanding independent participation in order to change the curriculum composition. That is, as the philosopher Charles Taylor argued on a theoretical basis of the importance of the concept of “authenticity” as in being faithful to your own original nature, it was “in order to give due recognition to the hitherto excluded” (Taylor 1994: 66) that the expansion and change of the curriculum, in order to include in its composition respect and differences among various cultural groups, have been called for. If the dominant groups “tend to entrench their hegemony by inculcating an image of inferiority in the subjugated,” first the “revision of these images” will be called for, and struggles over curricula occur because they “help in this process of revision” (Taylor 1994: 66). In this sense, revisiting the publicness of the curriculum is transformed to radically reorganizing the authority engraved in representation such as “images” and “representative effects”.

In response to this, the theorist of critical education studies Giroux argues with further awareness that the problem was how to form a critical agent with the “power” to reorganize the authority of the world’s “images” and “representative effects”. Giroux’s strategy was, in brief, to envision teachers as “transformative intellectuals” of this kind, and to reposition schools as “democratic public spheres,” thus “revitalizing the discourse of democracy” (Giroux 2005: 31, 72-73). According to Giroux, democracy needs “a language of possibility” which binds together “resistance” and “building a new social order.” Not only, we might say, are individual voices, as the “authenticity” variously referenced, not represented in the curriculum, but—as Taylor indicates—even the language to tell and represent itself is regulated and suppressed into something passive and negative, under the dominant paradigm of authority, by the assignment of a distorted representation of one’s own culture. To revise and redirect this language into something active and critical requires the provision once again of motivation and empowerment toward the possibility of transformation. Therefore, “such a
project [of the language of possibility] represents both a struggle over historical tradition as well as the construction of a new set of social relations between the subject and the wider community” (Giroux 2005: 31).

2.3 Pluralizing publicness, bypassing publicness

To make this “language of possibility” possible, as Giroux points out to some extent, it is thought even more essential to “develop counterpublic spheres as a defense and transformation of public education itself” (Giroux 1988: 213). That is, multiplying the “public sphere” in the sense of the area of relationships where the concept of publicness functions, and pluralizing publicness itself. As we saw in Taylor’s discussion earlier, logic and theories with affinities for the search for cultural representation of the origin of one’s own authentic voice in one’s own embedded world (society, community) are definitively evaluated as having a tendency to return publicness to the dimension of “collectiveness.” However, while this is correct on the one hand, by no means is it a complete understanding. Why? Because the focus is rather on “plurality” and “multiplicity,” and we can re-comprehend publicness justly opened politically (and further, in a form not cut off from the accuracy of each individual “world”) as a multiple existence in relation as well to the individual “worlds”, more so even than the collectivity of introverted cultures or traditions densely bound to these “worlds”.

Therefore, it is possible to read the plan to pursue the revision and reclamation of the cultural representation of worlds which form one’s own voices as not so much bound by collectivity (commonality) as, conversely, hinting at the need for collectivity (the name for a kind of common regulations) as the political premise supporting the various conditions which establish the concept of publicness, and thus enforcing multiple public spheres rather than just one. Regarding the public sphere, it is well known that Jürgen Habermas has depicted the public sphere formed by citizens as something distant from politics as a national function, something with an “extrapolitical” function which critically restrains the political dominance of exterior authority (Taylor 1995: 264-265). However, here the public sphere is more political in meaning, through the aspect of its critical function. According to Taylor, the public sphere must be “pluralistic” and “centrifugal”, and (in contrast to Habermas’ bourgeois principle model of sorts) cannot be a “unitary space,” as it is bound in a “maximally porous” way to politics. We must conclude that the ideal cultural space with zero politics, separate from the representation of the individual worlds we can encompass (and therefore in principle invalid with regard to representative effects) probably does not exist anywhere (cf. Fraser 1997: 79).

Even so, regardless of this kind of re-comprehension (and yet also because of it), the plan to oppositionally pluralize the areas in which the concept of publicness functions is thought to have been problematic as well. In reality, the better it works, the more publicness bypasses itself without ever reconnecting. The American philosopher John Dewey, in his famous Democracy and Education, writes that, based on the etymology of the word “interest,” “[t]he word interest suggests, etymologically, what is between, -- that which connects two things otherwise distant” (Dewey 1980: 134). However, there is no pre-established harmony between the process of being faithful to the individuality of human voices and that of the “thing between” hinted at here. This is because, as is somewhat shown in the fact that questioning the publicness of the curriculum as something common and official is back-to-back with critical responses demanding the return of authentic representation, the cohering of po-
political force based on group individual “interests” and the configuration of people’s common “interests” and construction of a more comprehensive world were arguments of different composition. From a different perspective, it is certainly important that oppositional forms of publicness be reconnected as a broader publicness, but that is not inevitably going to go well in any given context.

3. Distribution: Who takes part in the construction of representation?

3.1 Participation in representation and its paradoxes

The image of multiple publicnesses which do not overlap smoothly, as touched on by Nancy Fraser, can perhaps be understood by considering that contemporary with the history of the appearance of modern bourgeois publicness as described by Habermas among others, there were multiple publicnesses with simply incompatible classes and positions. This can easily imagined, given that “there arose a host of competing counterpublics, including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women’s publics, black publics, and working-class publics,” and “not only was there always a plurality of competing publics but the relations between bourgeois publics and other publics were always conflictual” (Fraser 1997: 75).

In addition, we can point out that the public space, as the space of publicness in which, above all, the world is represented and existing representations are recomposed and reconstructed, may be a code suited to the qualitative differences in interest as “things between,” that is the cultures and traditions of the people forming the publicness (further, the representation of better and worse values inaccurately there). As well as the code differences in language culture famously called “elaborated code” and “restricted code” by Basil Bernstein (Bernstein 1971), the widely distributed value norms and interpretation frameworks, the differences in the various codes of the space in the broadest sense, risk in one aspect making mutual exchange more difficult. In particular, in a context where people’s lifestyles and individual desires become multilayered and islanded, rather than opening new constructive paths by revolutionizing the representation of society through resistance, conversely the pluralization of publicness will make it increasingly possible for people to get by without encountering one another. In a more basic sense, the difference in these codes responds to the qualitative difference in the aspects of people’s ability and quality, further enhancing the separation between types who can and cannot participate in the public space, and if anything causing publicness to function paradoxically. Here, in the larger publicness, there is a greater focus by the problems of “representation” in its sense of “representing” on who can stand between the public spaces as they pluralize and “represent” what, in order to reconstruct representation, or further, in the interior of the multiplied public spaces, who can “represent” what and take part in the politics of the construction of representation.

Compared to the question of whose “representation” the school curriculum is, the problem and interests of who “represents” in the project of constructing and reconstructing representation are complex and hard to recognize. The problem can also be approached from the angle of who is being shut out of “participation” in this representation. For example, when oppositionally recognizing the representation of a given cultural group, it becomes that much more difficult to pick up the voices of the people who are farthest from the “power” composing the representation of the interior of that group and who were least able to represent
that representation, thus approaching the authority relationships which reinforce, rather, the dominance and oppression of the interior, close off the paths which permit access to a wider public space, and expose these people to a more “vulnerable” standpoint (Shachar 2001; cf. Reich 2002: 56-88). Based on the political scientist Saito Jun’ichi’s interpretation of Hannah Arendt, in this way “representation” represents and returns to the incommensurable “appearance as the self’s “who” in the form of the actually commensurably appearing “what” (Saito 2008: 73-75).

The important point arising from the above is that in the politics of “representation” calling for participation in the side “constructing” the curriculum, a hidden norm is already embedded in the form of the popular ability and quality to participate in the sense of “representing”. According to Fraser, “participation means being able to speak ‘in one’s own voice,’ thereby simultaneously constructing and expressing one’s cultural identity through idiom and style” (Fraser 1997: 83). However, the more skillfully “somebody” can speak in their own idiom and style, actively accessing participation in representation, the more the reconstructed representation is destined to be fixed again as “something”. Even more so when not authentic, the paradox in which representation is reinforced in an unbalanced form is also lying in wait.

3.2 “Representation” as “distributed goods”

The educational scholar Matsushita Kayo has pointed out that modern functional literacy such as that of PISA, with its focus on outcomes of thinking, judgment, and expressive capacities, focuses on “the ability to participate in society as a thoughtful citizen” while “abandoning” the conventional perspective questioning the politics of the school curriculum with regard to the aspect of content knowledge (Matsushita 2014: 155, 158). Most likely, what this trend predicts is not just that political analysis of content as “representation” will simply be less needed. By focusing on competencies like ability and quality directly connected to human existence and social behavior (and therefore not requiring “representation”), the inquiry into publicness itself, the subject of a struggle about the politics of “representation,” is hollowed out. However, if we assume from the first that the publicness of the curriculum with regard to the “representation” of knowledge as content contains a hidden norm for ability and quality for participation in the sense of the ability to “represent” or lack thereof, the redrawing of the curriculum blueprint in a way that does not require publicness leaves untouched the issue of the function and effects of “representation” at the crossroads of politics and education in the double sense of knowledge and ability.

Looked at thus, we must once again take note that the issue of the publicness of the curriculum is one which appears where the regions of “politics” and “education” mutually connect and intersect. This goes beyond the argument of the political debate over “whose knowledge” and “whose curriculum” the publicness of the curriculum is, requiring a more precise analysis. In this sense, the flip side of the resonance of the political voices inquiring about the publicness of the curriculum is the blank margins left vague in the consideration thereof so far. One reason we may call this vague is that, while the debate focuses on the political concept of “publicness,” there has not been sufficient analysis of the function carried out by the “curriculum” itself. For example, in line with the arguments put forth by Miyadera Akio, who points out that educational goods as social goods includes aspects of “distributed goods” and “distributing goods” (Miyadera 2006: 184), the curriculum has tended so far
to be considered only as “distributed goods,” without firm discussion of the publicness of the curriculum which plays a role as “distributing goods” in the sense that the results of the cultivated ability and quality are then redistributed elsewhere. To expand the discussion, we need not only to shed light on publicness as the public sphere and its conditions in the political struggle for “representation” as “distributed goods” as in the focus of the curriculum so far, but also to inquire once again into the publicness of the functions and effects of “representation” as “distributing goods.” This not only means questioning the publicness of competency in the sense of “representing” ability and quality, but also includes related issues once again questioning the meaning of “participatory politics” which offers opportunities for transparency in the distance between people and the world.

4. Representing: Questioning (from) “participatory politics”

4.1 From “representation” to “representing”

Along with the concept of “representation” in education, when we consider the system, often taken for granted, of modern representative democracy, “representing” in politics has also been a significant concept within the same modern period. This does not seem to have been taken up specifically as an issue worth of consideration in the context of modern educational criticism in Japan. However, with reference to the political debate in English-language countries, as (for instance) Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin point out, we should focus more on the indication that modern political thought has had to declare and carry out “theoretical independence” from the (mainly ancient Greek) concept of democracy based in direct citizen face-to-face assemblies and debates. According to the explanation of Ackerman et al., if anything, going beyond the face-to-face region to the “modern world with its nation-states containing in their borders millions or even billions of people,” we need to reconstruct the understanding of this kind of direct political life first, given that face-to-face democracy reached its peak in the 18th century Enlightenment and was then transformed into the theory of “representative government.” In the modern day, with “representing” taken for granted, “[w]hen we speak of ‘democracy,’ we no longer expect ordinary people to deliberate seriously before delegating the task of government to elected politicians. Only these political professionals have the time and energy to weigh the complex of facts, interest, and values called into question by modern legislation” (Ackerman, Fishkin 2004: 150).

As discussed through the previous section, the politics concerning the publicness of the curriculum demanding a rewritten “representation” in education were an attempt to take part in the political debate on construction and to reflect actively the plurality and multiplicity of individual voices. Individual voices are likewise an opportunity for resistance, giving meaning to opposition and disharmony in existing society. As Giroux argues, saying that this approach connects to “revitalizing the discourse of democracy,” they were also a radical questioning of the opaque “representing” of a hollowed-out democracy which could not appropriately reflect popular voices.

4.2 The “ability” to participate in deliberation

How, then, is “representing” in democracy actually questioned and “revitalized” when opposition and disharmony appear due to plurality and multiplicity? As noted in recent politi-
Chantal Mouffe explains the different purposes of orientation in modern democracy within this context as two systems, “deliberative” and “agonistic” types (Mouffe 2000). Our discussion benefits from reference to the difference of these two frameworks. Following Mouffe’s clear organization, the path of modern democracy has been one in which opacity in representation has been gradually eliminated by the achievement of agreement through debate, and one in which the opacity of disharmony and opposition arising from plurality and multiplicity which are difficult to represent has been accepted once again as essential for the maturity of the politics (cf. Tamura 2008). The repossession of representation, in both its meanings, aiming for an oppositional publicness in this sense is clearly deeply embedded in the “agonistic” framework, of the two. However, the oppositional plan to find opportunities for construction in discovering “disagreement” rather than achieving agreement has still not escaped the concerns about bypassing publicness which were discussed in the previous section, if the “agon/struggle” is to stop at simple “vendettas” and “enmity.”

The other framework, “deliberation,” also questions the means of “representing,” and also has its own issues. Simply put, the deliberative model includes the effort to enhance the quality of representative politics by embedding popular participatory debates into democracy, and further the attempt to change representative politics itself into directly participatory politics. If the representative system is an opaque one which does not function to reflect popular voices authentically, we can polish the “mirror” for more suitable reflection, or get rid of this annoying “mirror” between us and find a way to make our voices resonate more directly. First, let us consider the issue from the latter perspective.

(1) Benjamin R. Barber, who argues for the significance of revitalizing democracy from the latter perspective, points out the need for “an actual autonomous government by the citizens, not a representative government in the name of the citizens,” and suggests the creation of a “strong democracy,” a directly participatory politics which no longer requires the mirror of “representing,” through the use of common popular discussions and actual common action like self-standing laws and policy execution (Barber 2003: 150ff.). This suggestion means demanding direct political participation through citizen action; according to Barber, it is only this participating citizen who can deliberate, act, share, and contribute. That is, “[a]t the moment when ‘masses’ start deliberating, acting, sharing, and contributing, they cease to be masses and become citizens. Only then do they ‘participate’” (Barber 2003: 155). However, the method of creating transparency from the opacity of “representing” popular voices through the political participation of all citizens—even if the principled correctness of its point can be understood—also must be considered as adding full and active participation in political activity as a condition for citizenship and eliminating those who do not take part as “citizen[s] in posse” (Barber 2003: 228). As the Japanese political scientist Yamamoto Kei points out, “citizenship in participatory democracy can be potentially opened to anyone, but in actual fact it targets only individuals who can ‘actively participate’,” and conceals behind it from the first the principle of perfectionism regarding the full ability and quality allowing participation in deliberative politics (Yamamoto 2015: 154-156). This seems to remove the intermediate mirror of “representing,” while simply making perfect citizens into representatives (and demanding that all citizens become perfect).

(2) Next, what of the former type, which attempts to enhance the quality of representative politics? From Ackerman and Fishkin’s recommended Deliberation Day and debate-style
opinion polls on, in order to resolve in part the functional limits of the current representative system, various attempts and suggestions intended to embed popular dialogues and debates into the system and connect them complementarily are drawing more attention globally, including citizen juries, consensus conferences, planning cells and so on. While these citizens’ deliberations may include random sampling, they exist on the basis of popular “representatives” participating actively (cf. Hayakawa 2014: 93-99). However, as Fishkin points out, the popular voices reflected through deliberation do not reflect as in a “mirror” the raw, situation-specific popular opinions. They are more actively evaluated with expressions “filtered” and “refined” through the process of deliberation. This is, as it were, “what the public would think if it were able to consider the issue” (Fishkin 2009: 72). In particular, as case studies of debate-style opinion polls by randomly represented people prove empirically, “ordinary citizens have the motivation and ability for a constructive exchange of opinions, and deliberation in fact makes a significant difference to citizens’ understanding and final conclusion on an issue” (Ackerman, Fishkin 2004: 14).

However, as Fishkin considers thoughtfully, the popular voices reflected in this kind of deliberation are, as long as they are “represented,” naturally inclined to deviate from “raw polls,” and can be said to involve the serious issue of considerable differences in the resources and capital which enable “participation” to begin with, according to socioeconomic positions as well as motivation and ability (Fishkin 2009: 98, 100). In the end, with regard to the actions of behavior, thought, or expression of opinions, representation functions in this system of deliberation in the sense of the “representing” of popular participation according to norms of ability or quality, and the inevitable aporia thereof remains.

4.3 Concept 2 democracy
Elsewhere, considering this difficult issue, the arguments of Richard Posner, while of course limited by their presentation of problems regarding the political situation of the United States, are simple and straightforward, and draw our attention as we contemplate the problem of “representation” differently from the theory of deliberation-type democracy discussed previously. That is, Posner abandons idealistic deliberation, democracy depending on deliberation and the ability and quality of the people taking part therein, as unrealistic, and attempts, while passively, to avoid the issue of ability and quality itself. Rather, he admits that the function of “representing” is an “inevitable” method for people faced with differences in ability and quality. He follows through with “representing” as a means, considering the formation of relationships between political representatives such as rulers and officials and the people under their sway as a kind of market competition, and calls on people to become “political ‘consumers’” (Posner 2003).

Posner calls the deliberative democracy described by Barber and Fishkin “Concept 1 democracy.” This type of democracy, he says, is to some extent “idealistic” (as Dewey was, for instance). Its premise is that basically all adults have the right to participation based in political equality, and it demands more of its citizens’ morals and intellect: that they be well supplied with citizen spirit, direct their interest to the public rather than to profit and individuals, be educated and take part in political elections based on deliberations with fair and selfless citizens, and so on (Posner 2003: 131). Therefore, according to Posner, Concept 1 democracy is an “impossible” illusion, aiming impossibly high even with all the actual and potential power of the moral and intellectual capacity of the “average person” and the “aver-
age official” as the political elite who are their representatives (Posner 2003: 144). For example, Posner points out the political status of American citizens. “The United States is a tenaciously philistine society. Its citizens have little appetite for abstractions and little time and less inclination to devote substantial time to training themselves to become informed and public-spirited voters” (Posner 2003: 164). He goes so far as to say that “Concept 1 is, in short, utopian. Its essential utopianism is its conception of democracy as self-government,” (Posner 2003: 164), disposing of this concept with emphasis.

In response, he warmly proposes “Concept 2 democracy.” Concept 2 considers democracy not to be the politics of people and citizens themselves, but rather the governance left to representatives. However, the governors are constantly competing via the votes of the governed, and can expect to be kicked out via popular elections if they do not respond to the people’s interests and expectations (Posner 2003: 164). Concept 2 democracy includes distrust and restriction on mass participation in politics, but if improved as to increasing the competitiveness of representative elections, does not require Concept 1’s focus on “intelligence” in the sense of the ability and quality to participate. Rather, because it casts light on people’s natural “interests” (and because the very limited political participation of voting becomes the path of publicness), people are not prevented from participation by their education status: in this sense deliberative democracy is a good deal more selective, and can even be called elitist, or so Posner turns the tables (Posner 2003: 220).

The “representative” in the deliberation model is called on for greater transparency of the “representation” function between people and politics in the sense of political participation, but the problem of how to “represent” the voices of people shut out from that participation remains. However, Posner queries even this form of participatory politics, comparing it to football with the following piece of sarcasm. In short, “most of the voting public is no more seriously engaged in the political process than the audience for a football game is engaged in playing football. …The football audience is engaged, often passionately; it just isn’t engaged in the same activity as the football players” (Posner 2003: 220f.).

5. Toward the construction of the publicness of competency

5.1 Querying the publicness of competency

Posner does not overestimate the ability and quality of people as citizens. However, where his argument becomes a real threat is its glimpse of Concept 1 democracy, which encourages people to think and deliberate, as a way of making the difference between “fans” and “players” mutual and in fact sweeping it under the rug (it’s hard to imagine a football game where the fans and the players swap places). In Robert B. Westbrook’s words, Posner’s argument is close to an explanation of democracy which aims at “constricted” rather than “expansive” popular authority (cf. Westbrook 2005: 17, 199). Historically Walter Lippmann can be called typical of this; Westbrook calls this position “democratic realism.” This realism takes as its main point the stance that the ideal of democracy which presupposes “universal competence” (Lippmann 2004: 198) is an illusion, and tries deliberately to emphasize clearly the distinctions between the elite and the masses, the experts and the ordinary citizens, and the governors and the governed. William B. Stanley, who considers curriculum theory from the critical educationalist side, positions Posner’s suggestion in the rubric of
democratic realism as well. Stanley considers that it does not only reject the deliberative democracy of Barber and Dewey, but takes a polar-opposite position to the perspective of education on the revolution sought by critical educational studies, with its affinity with popular political participation (Stanley 2007: 375).

However, as “participation” in the politics of construction and reconstruction surrounding cultural representation was made a problem of competency, among all the responses and arguments of political theory in the English-language sphere, none seem to take on the issue of ability and quality in full. Further, the future blueprint drawn by ideas like Concept 2 is, if anything, further than ever from realism: 1) it overlooks the fact that people’s ability and quality are not fixed but contain opportunities for maturation and transformation, and 2) it fails to recognize the major political and social issues which cannot be solved only by driving a wedge between the representing and the represented.

If we include in our viewpoint not only the issue of cultural representation but the “public understanding of science” taken up as an issue of modern trans-science and scientific communication, it becomes very difficult indeed to establish the assumption that, based on the “lacking model” of not just knowledge but ability and quality, only the “experts,” including scientists, and the “officials” in political authority can grasp the solid “truth”—accurate “representation”—or that there is a “fair and impersonal” existence not swayed at all by individual advantage (cf. Fujigaki 2003; Fischer 2009; Imai 2015). People tend to notice that in the “participation” by which they reclaim “representation” as their own, there is great educational significance promoting the maturation and transformation of the individual and of society. This is even more the case in Japan, where an accident like that at Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Reactor constitutes a scientific problem which cannot be resolved by experts alone, becoming a problem beyond the foresight and judgment of experts and inevitably a social and public issue including the persons concerned and citizens at large, and requiring the educational transformation of people and society itself.

If, therefore, ability and quality are to become hidden norms for participation, we must, rather than passively avoiding this issue, take on the problem of publicness regarding competency head-on and discuss it thoroughly. If, above and beyond the meaning of the ability and quality to participate and represent as “distributed goods,” they are to include the aspect of “distributing goods” where many things, opportunities, and relationships are distributed, the internal truth of publicness becomes more than ever the focus. Posner describes his own ideological base as pragmatism, but Westbrook characterizes this pragmatism as libertarian conservatism (Westbrook 2005: 8). Libertarianism in politics refers to a stance in which individual freedoms are honored above all, thoroughly protecting the ownership of the individual, including the body; certainly, if we judge only on the basis of this personal ownership, ability and quality are considered in no way redistributed goods, and are not conceived of as something open, shared, or divided with all. However, as Miyadera points out, “ability” as the “proto-goods” which distributes diverse forms of goods is not in itself something each individual possesses from the outset, but is closely connected to the processes of “development” and “formation” (Miyadera 2006: 161ff.). Given this much, the perspective of consideration for the conditions which guarantee the publicness of competency to be distributed is also essential in the sense of reviving the discarded questions of publicness. At the same time, this also relates to the consideration of political theory, which tends to embed the concept of the completely mature adult as a prior condition for debate, from the aspect of edu-
cational theory. As Dewey shows in *The Public and Its Problems*, theories explaining politics and society mainly presume that the individual is a standardized adult, fixed and without matur- ing, and base their analyses on this hypothesis (Dewey 1969: 215). We will need more than ever a discussion which corrects the errors of these theories and brings together the areas of politics and education in the rubric.

5.2 Refocusing “representation”

It goes without saying that the shift to a focus on competency in the curriculum is driven and forcefully motivated not so much from within schools as by the usefulness and significance seen from global politics and society, as the exterior which makes demands of education. The global curriculum revision process, with its slant to the functional aspect of competency, not only does not require the politics of “representation” as legitimate knowledge and information, but may even find itself abandoning questions of “publicness.” However, what has been hinted at up until now is that “competency” itself contains latent functions and effects of hidden “representation,” that is the ability and quality to “represent.” To rethink the publicness of competency at the intersection of politics and education, we must re-focus on the issue of “representation” in its double meaning.

For example, an overview of the discussions outside the schools from this perspective should make clear once again that the opportunity to participate in politics and society is itself a curriculum. As Barber has stated in so many words, participatory politics even more than official systematic education, that is the act itself of participation in society and politics, is the best citizenship education for the people (Barber 2003: 235). Ackerman and Fishkin argue similarly as follows: in short “[deliberative polls and Deliberation Day] are both potentially schools of public spirit, creating social context in which citizens can discuss public problems together” (Ackerman, Fishkin 2004: 57).

However, we must not consider that the reality of popular voices has been reflected through direct experience in political participation, nor must we assume that reality in society has been learned through experiential learning imitating politics. Focusing once again on “representation” means reconsidering the functions and effects of “representation” and “representing” latent within these direct experiences. In Japan, there is newly aroused interest in studying politics more directly and experientially in the form of mock elections and mock Diets or petitions, and in popular participation and action in public debates, as education for participation. However, if we consider direct experience as “re-presented” as well (Imai 2012: 203), when deliberation in society itself is “educationalized” as citizens’ education, we need to continue focusing on the latent opaque functions and effects of “representation” therein and reconsider it carefully: what is not being “selectively” handled therein, what possibilities are being “selectively” not learned, and who is “selectively” unable to participate?

The solution proposed by Rorty in response to the philosophical tradition over-concerned with “representation” is to abandon efforts to unify everyone’s awareness and understanding, finding an “accuracy (truth)” of “representation” which would lead to a complete agreement free of contradiction or conflict, and to share experiences through continuous dialogue, attempting a resolution not through the theory of consciousness but through that of exegesis (Rorty 1979: 317ff.; cf. Rorty 1991). If we pay attention to the fact that we belong not only to a single culture, a single interest, or a specific formative community or society, then we may find a foothold in spinning out shared experiences, and the issue of the plurality of the
oppositional publicness based in cultural representation may also be somewhat resolved. However, along with this important basis for anti-representationalism, we must not throw out with the bathwater the question of what has been fought for surrounding issues of representation. Ernesto Laclau explains that “the myth of a reconciled and transparent society is simply that: a myth” (Laclau 1990: 35). As the concept of “autonomy” is established only by external intervention or interference, “absolute representation, the total transparency between the representative and the represented, means the extinction of the relationship of representation. …a permanent dislocation exists between the representative and the represented” (Laclau 1990: 38-39). As long as there is “representation,” there will always be opacity there; thus there can also be revived “autonomy” for resistance, reconstruction and revolution. As this paper has shown, along with understanding the meaning of inquiries into the publicness of the curriculum and the shift toward participatory politics, we must thoroughly consider the ambiguity contained therein as educational research.

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