Telling Ghost Stories with the Voice of an Ogre
Deleuze, Identity, and Disruptive Pedagogies

Christian Beighton
Canterbury Christ Church University

Introduction

French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-95) was something of a cult figure among his university students in the 1970s and 1980s, “telling ghost stories with the voice of an ogre” (Jaeglé, 2005:10). More recently, academic interest in the educational possibilities of his work has grown considerably in Anglophone countries. Perhaps texts such as *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b), which discuss “things which, at the time, didn’t fully exist, and which just seemed science fiction,” have become more readable since 21st-century shifts in geo-politics, notably the events associated with 9/11 and their echoes in current affairs (Antonioli in Dosse, 2007, p. 583). However, while subsequent geopolitical events such as the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe may bear this out, this particular quote refers to Deleuze’s well-known suggestion in 1968 that his empiricism necessarily has affiliations with science fiction (Deleuze, 1994). Given such a perspective, questions remain as to whether his views can really be put to work. In other words, can the ogre for whom “every thought becomes an aggression” (ibid) really shift attention from the current focus on
outcomes to the “actual ontology” of practice (Strom, 2015, p. 10), thus informing more socially just teacher education and research?

In this article, I address this question by examining the potential of Deleuze’s “science fiction” ontology, where being is expressed in the reciprocal determination of virtual and actual (Deleuze, 1996, 179-185), to enhance social justice. For Deleuze, because everything is in constant variation, or becoming, our experience involves more than simply the sense data we commonly associate with it. This “actual” part of events only exists as part an interplay with a “virtual” component, or the driver which makes it possible. Putting this ontology to work to examine the way teacher education contributes to the normative construction of identities, I consider its potential to inform thinking about processes of pedagogical planning in the context of England’s teacher education culture(s). I argue that when planning lessons, teachers and teacher educators can choose to affirm crucial differences, or they can opt to simply engage in the reproduction of identities and outcomes. Drawing on Deleuze, I suggest that the variation grounding his virtual/actual ontology can inform the way we understand difference both between people and things as well as within them. This, in turn, frees us from thinking about identity as belonging to and defining a given subject, since given subjects no longer exist outside their relations with other things. A discussion of identity through a relational lens will then be connected to ethical and practical issues of teaching for social justice in the classroom.

Thinking Social Justice: A Glocal Perspective

The focus on the very local practice of planning as a vector of social justice is contentious. Indeed, the concept of social justice, despite being of long-standing importance to teacher educators (e.g. Sleeter, 2008 inter alia) is a “complex and multifaceted concept” (Mills., et al., 2016), understood in many different and often poorly-defined or ill-articulated ways (Boylan & Woolsey, 2015; Kaur, 2012). Critics also disagree about the precise location of the debate—namely, whether social justice should focus on macro or micropolitical issues. At the macro level, glocalization and post-national citizenship profoundly affect teaching, learning and scholarship at every level of education, from primary to higher and lifelong education (e.g., Schwarzer & Bridglall, 2015). Parochial, low-level issues of classroom practice, for example, are overshadowed by global phenomena such as (low) rates of social mobility, deprofessionalization and social fragmentation (Schuller & Watson, 2015).

Others argue that social justice thinking should shift away from such
large-scale political problems of redistributive justice toward questions of local change and the distribution of relational or emotional capital (Mills et al., 2016). Hempel-Jorgensen (2015), for example, defines social justice as that which can only be achieved in the disruption of practices which contribute to the reproduction of educational inequalities. In addition to shifting the focus from wider issues, this line of thinking supports the view that local-level pedagogies can make a limited difference to important educational social justice issues, such as the inclusion of students with diverse needs in schools (Lingard & Mills, 2007). Without denying the impact of macro-level problems, teachers and teacher educators can examine how non-diversified practices at the local level constitute barriers to meaningful student participation and undermine teachers’ responses to issues of equity and social justice (Strom & Martin, 2015).

Moreover, precisely because of this glocal, homogenizing focus, professions, including education, are involved in policing activities of an increasingly precise nature. Attempts to inculcate entrepreneurship and obedient consumer behavior through a discourse of “employability” is just one example of a development in training provided from the earliest stages of primary education. Some argue that the micro-surveillance which this training requires invites local, sporadic ripostes (Hess and Paltrinieri, 2009). In other words, low-level, guerrilla-type activity is most likely to bring more socially-just practices when linked to the institutions’ attempts to maximize or betray critical freedoms (Capeheart & Milovanovic, 2007). This recognition of the importance of lower-level practice is a strong justification for the relevance of Deleuze’s ideas in teacher education, while also raising the question of who should act and on what they should be acting—a line of inquiry leading into the role of identity and its impact on social justice classroom practices.

Identity and Linear Thinking

Deleuze’s thinking about identity is important if we are to put these ideas to work in developing more socially just pedagogies. Significant interest in identity as a concept among teacher education literature (e.g., Ryan & Bourke, 2013; Bathmaker & Avis, 2013; Boylan & Woolsey, 2015) reflects a wider questioning of identity narratives as a result of globalization and its highlighting of diversity. However, in Deleuze’s creative ontology, difference happens at the pre-individual level before things/bodies even have an identity to speak of. This poses a challenge for schooling systems built in the light of an “imagined community of the nation” (Lingard & Mills, 2007, p. 236) because it implies that the construction of identity, resilience and agency may be undesirable. For...
Deleuze, because of the essentially relational nature of things mentioned above, any attempt to define things such as personal identity in terms of the way in which they are identical or different to other things misses the point from an ethical perspective. Despite (or perhaps because of) this challenge to the doxa of education—and in particular the belief among many practitioners in the usefulness of identity, resilience and agency as concepts—increasing numbers of researchers also question whether identity can be perceived as part of the exhausted essentialist project(s) of enlightenment humanism (cf. St. Pierre, 2013; Youngblood Jackson, 2013). On this view, it is not simply our way of discussing or describing things that is at fault, but that an episteme obstructs change by fixing the way we conceive of things upstream of our experience of them, or indeed, their experience of us. Identity, on this account, is an inaccurate linear narrative which limits real possibilities for our students, feeding into neo-liberal demands for compliant drones deliberately excised of their humanity. For Deleuze the ogre, we have to do away with such limitations to have any understanding of the Heraclitan world which growls like a beast beneath our attempts to tame it (Deleuze, 1994, p. 59; Deleuze, 1997, pp. 126-135).

This analysis of identity points to linearity as a prevailing discourse reflected in the ways that key bodies, such as the United Kingdom’s Education and Training Foundation, define learners as the recipients of liquefied assets at the end of a supply chain (Beighton, 2015a). Linear approaches also define pedagogical content and reduce learning to the tools which measure it: “[y]ou will never teach anything that you cannot assess, measure or test” (IfL, 2013, p. 7). Similarly, teacher development is also described as leading teleologically from one state to the next: a “journey of becoming” (Cooper and He, 2012) may be a “lifelong experiment”, but it still involves finding “[one’s] own way of becoming and being” and “becoming [one’s] own style of inspirational teacher” (Boyd et al, 2015, p. 2). Even critical pedagogies must avoid getting “fixated” on the process of “becoming” and focus on what this becoming will actually become, according to Malott and Ford (2015, p. 109). For Deleuze, the prevalence of such majoritarian discourses are suspect for three reasons: their apparent common sense, their ontology, and their expression in processes of subjectivation, or identity-formation. These, I argue, perpetuate idealized teaching and teacher preparation practices that hinder the construction of more respectful, creative forms of education. I’d like to tease out the implications of these ideas, which I suggest are aspects of the neoliberal teaching machine, in the next few sections.
**Common Sense**

First, Deleuze asks that we be alert to the compliance of such common-sense linearity of neoliberal discourse the dominating ideology of which drives our understanding of the production of entrepreneurial subjectivities in education (Kaur, 2012). Recent shifts in capital have produced two developments significantly impacting teacher education (Beighton, 2016b). First, states and corporations have already effected a massive shift by deriving profits from speculative activities outside production (finance capital) rather than obtaining them from production itself—capital’s movement is essentially abstract, concerned with the differential relationship between time and investment, not the production and consumption of goods. For education, this means that learning is becoming a largely speculative activity of investment in the self for financial gain.

Second, the material problems of labor and its regulation have been reduced by passing both the financial costs and moral responsibility for economic crises onto individuals and nations (Edwards and Canaan, 2015). In (teacher) education this has led to an emphasis on standardization and testing, reducing many forms of education to exchanges of mass-produced, impersonal “nothing” products (Ritzer, 2013; Beighton, 2016a). However, these exchanges rely on the creativity of desire, which paranoid capital reterritorializes and directs into “fascizing, moralizing, Puritan and familialist territorialities” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 305). While creative desire is clearly a good thing for educators to foster, this same desire is also sought by capital, which has no qualms about exploiting its productivity for financial gain—and capital can only do this by turning desire into concrete products, which must be identical so that they can be mass-marketed. Identity, here, betrays the essentially productive nature of desire. If desire is essentially “deterritorializing” in that it is always creatively changing expectations, people and things, capital is always “reterritorializing” expectations, people and things to make them marketable.

Thus, in response to the question of how education supports the normative demands of a stratified society, Deleuze answers by pointing out that capital relies on the deterritorialization of desire and its frequent conflict with our own interests, and is effective because it exploits desire as a flow rather than an object, using it to create and guarantee other flows of communication, information and data technology. This deterritorialization works by capturing the production of ideas, emotions and creativity, reducing individuals to “dividuals” who are amputated of their inherent ability to change. Dehumanized and replaced by data flows of enrollment, success and achievement, subjectivities are com-
modified in small chunks and turned into cogs in a machine (Deleuze, 1995). The operation of this “learning machine” is exemplified by the modularized, itemized, bite-size curriculum packages on offer in higher education. Clearly, public policy benefits from creating such abstract subjects who are ready to embrace the values of globalization (Lappalainen, 2014). These disempowered, ideal citizens have no independence from the linguistic, technological and financial machines defining them and subjecting them to machinic enslavement (Lazzarato, 2014), and are always ready to adjust to the new circumstances created by constant economic and societal change.

**Ontology**

Importantly, for Deleuze, the linearity of common sense relies on an illusion of identity, and thus implies a particular ontology, or theory about how things come to exist. Deleuze’s ontology is characterized by variation. Variation ungrounds the concept of identity and defies the representations demanded by linearity, whose assumptions about the nature of practice and procedures fail to engage with the complex processual ontology of the work of teachers (Strom, 2015). If, as Strom argues, such ontology matters, we need to understand that Deleuze’s process philosophy itself echoes the metaphysics of Spinoza (1996) and Whitehead (1985) in that unpredictable assemblages of practices and the shifting relations of speed and slowness are the stuff of experience, not static objects (Beighton, 2013). On the contrary, “any form is precarious, since it depends on relations of force and their mutations” (Deleuze, 1986, p. 107). The precariousness of any form or structure, such as identity, seems obvious because being only makes sense in a linear universe where things are what they are, and where variation cannot introduce the unlimited possibility of new relations. So, pace Malott and Ford, becoming does not progress towards anything, because in an infinite universe anything that could become something already would have done so (Deleuze, 1983, p. 47). The illusion of a finite universe may seem useful, but its apparent, coherent identity makes it impossible to think the difference, variation and specificity of events for themselves rather than for some other, transcendent, end (Deleuze, 1994; 2004). Because it precludes the consideration of difference, the illusion of a single, stable identity is a trap betraying a lack of interest in what is emerging.

Rather than “being” some actualized thing, one becomes what one is, was, and will be in a process without fixed points or linear causality (Deleuze, 2004). Becoming affirms both directions at once, and thus the paradox of pure becoming is that of an infinite identity where all identity disappears (Deleuze, 2004, p. 4-5). Thus becoming is an impersonal,
pre-subjective and non-linear process which cannot be represented or categorized: “… there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity (...) neither are there multiple or eternal realities which would be, in turn, like essences beyond appearance” (Deleuze, 1983, 24). Because being is essentially creative, it is not guided by some higher power by which it can be measured or judged. Questions of justice are therefore ontological for Deleuze, which means that everything is an expression of the radical immanence of being. Too often, however, we fall into the disastrous habit of confusing emergent processes with static phenomena.

Consider the notion of “learner.” When we identify those in our classrooms as such, we begin to judge the kind of learner they are, what they are capable of, and what they can become. By imposing a preconceived image, we amputate their most important defining asset: the reality of their own becoming. This anachronic obsession with identity leads us to ignore the intensely multiple nature of teaching practices. It transforms fresh ideas and change into the banality of common sense. Moreover, for teachers, “good practice” is misunderstood and misapplied out of context, leading to a “pedagogy of indifference” at the local level (Lingard, 2007, p. 245), reducing teaching and learning to the application of “recipes” of “good practice”. At many levels, therefore, the narratives of identity reject specificity, variation and difference, and the ability of even so-called progressive organizations to be anything other than repressive is in doubt: “[w]hat social democracy has not given the order to fire when the poor come out of their territory or ghetto?” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 107).

**Subjectivation**

A third aspect of linearity which Deleuze’s thought underlines is the process of subjectivation, or the way in which essentially mobile bodies are turned into subjects. For Deleuze, such subjectivation lies at the center of many forms of repression, reducing individuals to packages of marketable commodity. In education, critics have pointed out the dangers of the therapeutic and confessional approaches predicted by Foucault (1976, 1984), such as reflective practice and self-evaluation, to perform compliance and quash divergence (Brunila & Siivonen, 2016). Assuming that an autonomous subject can and should carry out such self-analysis, these practices set up formulaic expectations about how teachers should behave, and often involve confessing infringements of sometimes dogmatic beliefs about learning and offering, as penance, received wisdom as reparation in the form of accepted solutions to predictable problems. Thus education is a particularly important mechanism of indoctrination of subjects into this self-disciplinary process, and schooling provides the concrete disciplinar
structures to capture and reconstruct teachers and learners who demonstrate, on a daily basis, the individual deficit and mastery necessary to invest in the self and innovate for the common good.

This biopolitical management of identity exists not to reduce inequality, but to exploit it for the benefit of an exclusive minority, putting everyone else in their debt (Lazzarato, 2011). In Deleuze’s view, reductive identity narratives, such as the “teacher for social justice” on one hand and the “resistant” or “disengaged” teacher on the other, are problematic. Not only do such narratives construct identity as an either/or subject position, but they also limit what a person, a set of practices, or even a whole system of education may become. As I have argued elsewhere (Beighton, 2016b), this construction of identity has involved a widespread double movement applicable to both teachers and learners that simultaneously establishes common grounds for subjectivity in narratives of identity and the defective or vulnerable nature of the learning subject. A serious problem for practice arises when the narratives accompanying these generalizations are applied indiscriminately, reconfiguring learners as something to be fixed in line with a set of (professional) guidelines or parameters. Since the emotionally vulnerable subject requires both our empathy and our commitment to social justice, these desirable, normative subjects must reveal themselves through pervasive technologies of identity, such as the confessional practices mentioned above and the invasive gaze of research aligned with them (Ecclestone & Brunila, 2015).

Implications for Practice

A number of positive conclusions for teacher education can be drawn from these “ghost stories” of possible becomings and their other-worldly ontology. First, Deleuze’s insistence on immanence provides us with a new justification for radically democratic forms of social organization and more socially just ways of being, teaching, and learning. Thus, pure immanence, in the form of volcanic, a-signifying, pre-individual effects at the level of desire, both constitutes and subsequently derails the homogenization of teaching practices that exclude difference and diversity, preventing the stabilization of power (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b). Thus, following Spinoza, Deleuze is less interested in the critical function of philosophy than in its creative and pragmatic ratio essendi, and notably in how these ideas play out, preferably in diverse areas of practice. His concepts have nothing to do with deconstruction, but are “exactly like a box of tools” (Deleuze, 2004. p. 208)

Perhaps the most immediately relevant use of such a toolbox in teacher education is in the planning of learning. Teacher educators
are typically asked to develop planning skills based on the assessment assumptions mentioned above, which results in pedagogy and content distant from learners’ lives and concerns. Because of this distance, we ask teachers to “personalize” learning, to make it relevant, risking trivial or even patronizing attempts to “motivate” learners by surreptitiously tacking on content and practices of tangential and instrumental value. The desirability of such linear, time-bound planning processes arguably owes more to the industrialization of mass education in the 19th century than to empirical evidence that learning actually functions this way.

Teacher education manuals, inspection practices and impact studies are replete with the pseudo-industrial logic of flowcharts, SMART targets/goals (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Reliable, Time-bound), LOs (Learning Objectives), SoWs (Schemes of Work) and cyclical reflective practice models pre-programmed and policed by the Foucaultian confessional ethos mentioned above (c.f., Deleuze, 1986). Such pre-programmed planning processes reinforce the view that the times and spaces of practice are boundaries which define learning as a disposable commodity. Although this may seem like a new way of controlling teachers and their students, the formulaic nature of such practices reflects the way that old boundaries are replaced by new ones, as virtual enclosures replace the old disciplinary constraints. Ultimately, they perform the same old job of control more cheaply and efficiently (Deleuze, 1995) to produce a “closed circuit” of control (Beighton, 2015a). These “superhighways” for the received wisdom of Initial Teacher Education are all examples of a pervasive transformation of student and teacher learning from an individualistic didactic system, with all its faults, into a massive logistical problem to be solved. More socially just education should seek to disrupt these superhighways, since they constitute such a deep and widespread problem (Hess & Paltrinieri, 2009, p. 58).

Planning practice influenced by this call for disruption would begin by seeking alternatives to transmission pedagogies. Plans which use task or problem-based learning, for example, can reflect the view that people, places and knowledge do not have uniform, stable identities, emphasizing that planning can be about inquiry and joint discovery rather than prediction and transmission. By deliberately planning in space and time for disruptive moments created by the learning process, these planning approaches show how, at a profound level, time and space can be incorporated as dynamic features rather than ignored when they threaten repetitive, production-line teaching approaches (Beighton, 2015b; Beighton, 2016c). Rather than being mere containers for human activity, time can be “unhinged,” and spaces can be “smooth” and therefore open to “nomadic” distribution, which resets their coordinates.
and reinvents their possibilities (Deleuze, 1994) as perpetual interaction ceaselessly folds and enfolds new outsides (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b). This becomes meaningful for teaching if we accept that these new possibilities disrupt our expectations and provide the basis for learning, which is not simply predicated on what we have planned for it. From the point of view of socially just pedagogies, the affirmation of this “outside” is ethical in that it allows us to make promises which evidence not just a contractual commitment to others, but also a commitment to the unknown future (Deleuze, 1983).

The impact for our understanding of justice in the planning of pedagogy can be seen in Nietzsche’s view that the fundamental law of creativity ridicules any judgment based on minor problems of pleasure or pain (Nietzsche, 1990, pp. 154-156). Existence does not imply “a sum of injustices to be expiated,” meaning that the justice of existence itself is “the law of this world” and must therefore be affirmed (Deleuze, 1983, p. 25), whatever the consequences. The sort of existence implied here is innocent in that it “justifies all that it affirms, including suffering” (Deleuze, 1983, p. 19), and so it is no easy option. But as planners, teachers and teacher educators need to understand that learning, with all its difficulties and complexities, is not a problem to be fixed or a weakness to be confessed, but an ongoing process of engagement with what is becoming. Taking the example of confessional, reflective practices above, the socially just teacher working with Deleuze would plan to counter their negative effects in their practice. Teaching would replace such formulaic deficit models with a pedagogy based on meta-critique of one’s own presuppositions and, more importantly, a creative engagement of and crucially with learners. This implies that a key part of planning is to ensure rich, multisensory environments that maximize the possible connections to be made, rather than narrow down learning possibilities.

Deleuze’s ideas cannot be put to work in teacher education or teaching settings without recognizing that they see “justice” itself as a problem, not a solution—and shamefully, humans have demonstrated historically that often, they do not even want justice. Ultimately, the exercise of thought itself lies at the heart of our tendency to seek identity within linear systems of repetition and inequality when more diverse, life-affirming options are on offer. If a democratic society “depends on the preparation of a thoughtful citizenry” (Cochran-Smith, 2004, p. 298), then likely, “change will only be embedded when people don’t just do things differently, but feel and think differently, too” (Gravells & Wallace, 2013, p. 22). Moreover, if becoming a teacher involves the same kinds of thinking dispositions as our learners (Boyd, et al, 2015, p. 2), then the ideas presented here can help disrupt default linear pedagogical narra-
tives of transmission and transfer (Strom & Martin, 2015), particularly in the thought processes of teacher educators and teachers.

The conditions of thought are essentially and necessarily creative for Deleuze, who believes that identity, as a conceptual illusion, masks thought’s essentially differential nature. However, we cannot creatively think unless we allow the thinker within to abandon the presupposed identity cliché of a Cartesian cogito. Thought, or the making of new and often aberrant connections in a witch’s flight of unpredictable, zig-zag creativity, is not some sort of grand contemplation or superior process. Rather, because becoming is immanent to thought too, it is as if thought “runs through and alienates thought in order to be the possibility of thought” (Deleuze, 2004:370).

To be worthy of this, Deleuze proposes that we think of things as events rather than sets of objects, however complex. An event for Deleuze is that which happens, a specific, singular occurrence which is both actual in that we perceive it and virtual in that it is driven by immanent variation. Deleuze’s own descriptions of teaching and learning serve as an example, since they undermine any view of learning as transfer of the recognizable, the given, or the already thought. For instance, Deleuze (1994) compares learning to swimming in the sea, as we inflect our whole bodies with the shifting waves around us. Pedagogy, therefore, involves a focus on the specific, the original and the interesting, not on generality, banality and error. This might include a “pedagogy of problems” where “do with me” replaces “do as I say” or even “do as I do.” Such pedagogies are in danger when so-called education reform prefers to hand over learning institutions to powers of control invested in bureaucratic flows of people, money and data (Deleuze, 1995), but the rhizomatic nature of things will always provide lines of flight which create new realities and possibilities to explore.

Thus, pedagogical alternatives to linear, behavioristic models of learning, such as the task-based and problem–based learning mentioned above, are more suited to the needs of teacher educators and their learners. Because they explicitly invite experimental, inquiry-based teaching and learning rather than transmission, Deleuze’s ideas are useful for “researching situations we no longer understand” (Mazzei & McCoy, 2010, p. 503). Indeed, if learning does not concern the transmission or discovery of prefabricated objects and objectives, then it can involve real problems. Living in this experimental way requires close attention to processes, both internal and external. Although very localized, such practices can claim a (micro) political edge, an experimentation with how things are playing out and “the analysis of a small event” (Lazzarato, 2009, p. 14)
If solutions to problems are not there to be transmitted or discovered, the role of the teacher, then, is of joint inquirer in the pedagogic encounter with things. For example, planning to use task-based or problem-based learning, neither of which garner much time in many generic teacher education manuals, can establish an explicit focus on practice because they seek to produce worthwhile outcomes and prioritize learner input and originality. Not only do such pedagogies encourage an encounter between teacher and student at the level of creative practice, but they allow both to explore emergent new ideas and connections in the making, which can and should be planned for at the level of curriculum design and individual session content. Crucially, this recognizes the responsibility of the participants in learning to make choices rather than simply follow the pathway dictated by linear methodology. The latter is often favored by inspection regimes, which seek accountability and comensurability above all. In line with the commodification of learning mentioned above, this teaching performance must be quantified and measured in terms of pre-established, vague criteria, which is often used to label and rebuke teachers, schools and even teaching generally for “failing” learners. More expansive approaches to learning recognize that teaching and learning are not commensurate, and that the non-homogeneous nature of learning spaces themselves, and rather than reproduce cultural givens, in professional learning contexts human beings and their collectives are “creators of new culture” (Engeström & Sannino, 2012, p. 50). This is a planning and a pedagogy based on continuity, connectivity and creativity, not identity.

Conclusion

Deleuze’s sci-fi is neither a ghost story of ineffable virtuality, nor an ogre-like warning about the dire state of things. A concern for justice exists from his very earliest (and until recently unpublished) texts where he criticizes, for example, an influential contemporary discourse of gender-neutral alterity (Deleuze, 2015, p. 253-265). However, while such writings certainly offer a critically productive way of thinking, they center around a much more fundamental spur to thought itself and therefore something much more dynamic and productive than a set of ideas to be applied. This is why Deleuze asks that we engage our inner idiot, mummy, or “spiritual automaton” (Deleuze, 2005, pp. 161-162) by seeking out affective shocks or encounters which reduce us to stuttering exhaustion as we face the chaos of the new. Moreover, Deleuze’s radically democratic post-humanism grants any form of living materiality the same ontological status, demanding a post-Cartesian belief in this...
world as one moving beyond the kind of split between mind and body represented by the statement “I think, therefore, I am.” Living with this continuous variation has “only ascetic lines,” and requires “a little herb and water” rather than anarchic, self-destructive excess (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p.109).

How can teachers and educators be worthy of the demands made on them by the essentially creative nature of all these events? The ethical responsibility to strive for social justice, on these grounds, begins not with the society of people, but to the whole ecology of things, the cosmos itself. The educator’s informed empathy proposed by Ladson-Billings (1999) becomes what Deleuze calls a “pity for the flesh” in the paintings of Francis Bacon. This is the concrete awareness of the transience of matter and our participation in both the suffering of the “Other” and in their multiplicity. It is not a ghost story, but an asceticism of the desert: “It is this extreme point that will have to be reached in order to allow a justice to prevail that will no longer be anything but Color or Light, a space that will no longer be anything but the Sahara” (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 33).

Notes

1 See www.webdeleuze.com for video recordings of this period.
2 All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.
3 Deleuze was insistent that commentators should not excise his collaborators from joint work, notably with Félix Guattari (Deleuze, 2015:82-86). My concern in this text is with concepts attributable to theses in Deleuze’ single-authored work (notably Deleuze1994 and 2004).
4 Teacher education manuals used in the UK commonly ignore non-linear pedagogies such as Task-Based Learning, Problem-Based learning or Total Physical Response (TBL, PBL, TPR) in favor of calls to apply potted psychological theories resumed under questionable generalizations such as “Behaviourism,” “Cognitivism,” “Gestalt,” or “Humanism.”
5 Heidegger and Sartre are the initial targets.

References


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