Education as an Ethical Concern in the Global Era

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Abstract
This article examines the issue of the ethical status of education, particularly as related to individual dignity and freedom. We select cases that have been described in fine detail by social science—the education of girls and the education of all children within counter-hegemonic movements. These cases involve issues of access to equitable and high quality education. Such issues arise when cultural norms and political exigencies place restrictions on who can attend various types of schools, if any, and when students cannot render their own judgments about particular worldviews espoused by their religious, cultural, and sociopolitical communities. We examine recently developed philosophical frameworks that can provide a reasonable respect for cultural traditions and the rights of individuals to shape their own destinies. Then we apply two such frameworks (Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s) to the cases and discuss the relative merits of each.

Keywords
social sciences, philosophy, international education, ethical values, freedom, human dignity

Cover Page Footnote
This paper was originally presented at the 2014 conference of the Midwest Comparative and International Education Society. We are grateful to the conference organizers and audience for their helpful and thoughtful suggestions.
Globalization, as defined by Anthony Giddens (1990, p. 64), involves “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.” This intensification of relations has made people more aware than ever of the diversity and complexity of social life in general and educational practices in particular, thanks in large part to the work of scholars of international and comparative education (Arnove, 2013). Such awareness produces two countervailing tendencies in thought and action about educational practices. On the one hand, scholars have helped us understand and sympathize with the systematic cultural and social sources of this diversity, which makes us in turn hesitant to judge and to intervene in such practices. On the other, such awareness may arouse moral intuitions that lead us to believe that sometimes there is cause for judgment about and intervention into these practices, even though we may not have a clear understanding of why. In this article, we point out and begin to explore the philosophical resources that have been developed in the last twenty years or so that can help us reach normative judgments about global and international educational policies and practices in light of a detailed and sympathetic understanding of the circumstances in which they occur. To do so, we first report two cases of educational exclusion based on sophisticated contextual research. Second, we note a variety of recent philosophical perspectives that may be helpful in analyzing the normative status of such cases, focusing on two in particular—that of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.

Third, we analyze the cases using these perspectives and consider how one might decide which perspectives would best apply when the conclusions of the analyses are different. Our intention is not to render final and complete normative judgments about these cases or about the philosophical perspectives under consideration. Rather,
we hope to make the reader aware of resources and methods of analysis that may be relevant to reaching such judgments.

Below we examine two cases—the education of girls and the education of children within counterhegemonic social movements—to illustrate the challenges involved in formulating normative judgments about education policies and practices, while taking into account local cultural and sociopolitical contexts. After providing brief sketches of the complex issues involved in these cases, we elaborate philosophical frameworks, apply them to the cases, and reflect on that application.

Exemplary Cases

The following cases raise socio-culturally complex and normative issues that nations and localities confront in distributing educational opportunities for all.

The Education of Girls

In Inexcusable Absence: Why 60 Million Girls Still Aren’t in School and What to Do about It, Maureen Lewis and Marlaine Lockheed (2006) note that among the many exclusions of children, such as for ethnicity, race, location (urban-rural), socioeconomic status, and caste, gender represents a “second burden.” All such factors influence who attends school and how differently situated children fare with regard to academic achievement and life chances, that is, subsequent income, occupation, political power, and social status.

Lewis and Lockheed (2006) briefly describe examples of the types of girls who remain out of school or have not completed it “nearly two decades after the worldwide declaration of ‘Education for All’”:

Meera, 8, lives with her family on a sidewalk in New Delhi, India. During the day she roams major intersections, her infant sister hanging from her hip, begging drivers for coins . . . She does not go to a school. In a few years she will be married off to a stranger. She will have six children, one of whom will go to school. Or she will die young, possibly immolated in a kitchen fire for having brought with her an insufficient dowry. (p. 1)

Wambuni, 14, goes to boarding school because no secondary school is available in her Kenyan village. But she will soon be expelled from school because she is pregnant, having been raped at school by boy students from another tribe, who considered it a mere prank. (p. 2)

Others, however, have been able to defy the odds against their attending and completing schooling:

Indrani, 10, is the daughter of illiterate parents living in rural Bangladesh. She goes to school. Her older sister is finishing secondary school and plans to work in the garment factory in the market center. While her mother was betrothed at 12, her parents have decided their daughters must finish school before marrying. (p. 2)

These examples illustrate various factors cited by Lewis and Lockheed (2006) that create either barriers or opportunities for girls to attend schools and to complete...
their education. One set of constraining factors is cultural norms that relate to the purity of girls, whose honor reflects on that of the family and kinship groups. Closely associated with these norms is a realistic concern with the safety of girls, especially if schools are located far away from home. Sexual harassment and rape are, unfortunately, not uncommon occurrences. In addition, the need for girls to assist with domestic chores and to provide a source of income are involved in family decisions to keep daughters at home. Furthermore, labor market demand for girls enters into families’ cost-benefit considerations as to whether to send girls to higher levels of education systems. Government policies also affect whether or not adequate resources are provided for girls to gain access to and stay in school. For example, one reason why families may send their daughters to school involves not only the distance required to travel to schools but also the availability of bathrooms, especially for adolescent girls, both of which are likely to result from government decisions about the location and amenities of schools.

Despite these many obstacles and challenges, and in contexts as dangerous as Afghanistan, where schools and girls are targets for deadly attacks by the Taliban, parents often send their daughters to school. They will do so if nearby schools respect local values and offer an education that is for both the soul and the world. Careful ethnographic study of local contexts and their traditions, as conducted by Dana Burde (2014), shows that community-based schools operating in mosques with mullahs as teachers had a “stunning effect on children’s academic participation and performance and have tremendous potential for reducing existing inequities in access and gender participation in rural areas in Afghanistan” (p.144). Religious schools offer a safe haven, where both girls and boys can acquire literacy skills and the basic foundation for continuing education in the public education system (for further discussion on literacy skills, see Street, 1995).

What is occurring in Afghanistan is but one instance of how traditional education institutions may accord with universal norms advocating full human rights for females. Depending on the interaction of global, national, and local forces, schools, whatever their origins, may or may not open opportunities for both boys and girls to continue with their education and be able to determine more promising futures for themselves and their communities (see, for example, Hoechner, 2015).

In light of this and other research, there is a complex interaction between family, locality, school, culture, religion, economy, and government policy that determines whether, and to what extent, girls are able to attend school. But despite this complexity, girls remain disadvantaged in their opportunities for school attendance and completion.

**Education within Counterhegemonic Social Movements**

Threats to religious and cultural norms or collective social identities pertain to educational opportunities and outcomes not only for girls but also for children in general. An especially interesting set of challenges arises with regard to grassroots sociopolitical movements that challenge the existing power structure of a society and its education system, which is viewed as a mechanism for maintaining an unequal and unjust society. Such “counterhegemonic” movements may establish their own school systems and also may try to establish autonomous self-governing regions, as with the Zapatista Movement in Chiapas, Mexico. The schools under Zapatista control in Chiapas, as well as those established by the Landless Workers’ Movement in Brazil,
favor using the consciousness-raising pedagogy of the late Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. His “pedagogy of the oppressed” involves a problem solving approach in which educators and students work together to name the forces that have prevented individual and collective self-realization; the philosophical underpinning of this pedagogy is designed to stimulate historically oppressed people to take action to create more democratic and egalitarian societies (Freire, 2000).

Such action inevitably leads to hostile reactions from the government. Within the counterhegemonic movements, therefore, it is not surprising to find a tendency to draw a boundary around those within the beleaguered community and to become exclusionary of outsiders. Juan Berumen (2014), for example, points out that elders teach the children of Zapatista households not to affiliate with children from non-Zapatista families. The counterhegemonic schools established by these sociopolitical movements, in teaching the particular ideology of their movements, run the risk of becoming vehicles for indoctrinating students into a particular worldview, which will close off additional ways of seeing oneself in relation to others (Schugurensky & Madjidi, 2008, p. 119).

The Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores rurais Sem Terra or MST), founded in 1984, offers a particularly interesting case of the tensions inherent in a progressive movement attempting to democratize the economy and polity using egalitarian land rights and an emancipatory education system. Since its inception in 1984, MST has become the most extensive grassroots movement in Latin America, with a membership of more than 1.5 million in 23 of the 26 states in Brazil. In conjunction with its organizing activities to gain land titles for the formerly dispossessed, it has created a wide network of approximately 2,500 schools (grades 1-8) with over 150,000 children and over 1,200 teachers (many trained by the MST). The movement teaches adult literacy classes and operates secondary technical schools with an agrarian focus and a Popular University of Social Movements (PUSM) named after a renowned Brazilian Marxist Scholar, Florestan Fernandes (ALAI, 2005; Caldart and the Movement of Landless Workers, 2012; McCowan & Puggian, 2010; and Motta, 2014).

According to Roseli Salete Caldart and the Movement of Landless Workers (2012):

Our schools promote values that are different from the anti-human capitalist society, especially in its neoliberal version: individualism, consumerism, and egoism. Our values include solidarity, doing things for others, the capacity to be angry at injustice and suffering, the satisfaction of being part of a working class, a confidence in the process to construct one’s own destiny and overcoming our inferiority complex, commitment to collective values and a belief in humanity. There are also major challenges, including overcoming macho and racist attitudes, respecting differences and helping those with special needs. (p. 78)

These are noble goals indeed. Yet, it is also necessary to be alert to the possibilities that in the very process of producing a “new social subject,” MST locks children into predetermined roles within a bounded community and into one way of viewing the world through a particular ideological lens. The following statement underscores the concerns with a tendency toward pedagogical practices that appear to contradict essential Freirean principles of an emancipatory education:
We need to pay attention to childhood among the Landless and the pedagogical *carré* that is devoted to children. It is significant the children have adopted the name *Sem Terra* (Landless) to call themselves *Sem Terrinha* (little people without land). The suffix -*inha* in Portuguese is an expression of affection and size. This expresses a feeling that we too want to be part of the Landless movement, but we don’t want to stop being children. But we’re not just children, we’re *Sem Terrinha*! We are *Sem Terrinha* with love. That is how we want to be cared for by the Movement. The demand for love and care is a universal right of children and young people in education. (Caldart and the Movement of Landless Workers, 2012, p. 82)

**Philosophical Frameworks**

These cases of the educational exclusion of girls and of children in counterhegemonic movements are contextually complex, and they demand a normative response to determine whether those within these societies and elsewhere have a moral obligation to accept or intervene in the policies and practices they include. The traditional western approaches to morality have tended to be both universalistic and comprehensive. John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism, Immanuel Kant’s deontological (non-consequentialist) ethics, and Aristotle’s virtue ethics, for example, propose standards for moral judgment and action that apply to all human beings, or are universal. This universalism is a feature that is required for making judgments about those who live in other societies and cultures. Moreover, these approaches are also comprehensive in their application, that is, they render universal judgments about all possible actions, policies, and practices and do not make room for individuals or cultures to reach different judgments about some aspects of their own lives.

This comprehensive characteristic of the traditional approaches led some social scientists in the early twentieth century (e.g., Ruth Benedict, 1934) to adopt a culturally relative approach to morality. On this account, an act is morally right or wrong just insofar as the culture of the person who judges that act deems it to be right or wrong. This relativistic doctrine seems to authorize cultures to make their own judgments of morality and thus seems superficially to express respect for those cultures. But on closer examination, it does no such thing. Instead, it holds that the members of one culture that judge an action or practice to be wrong are justified in condemning the members of another culture who engage in that action or practice, and if the members of the first culture believe it right to oppress or even kill the members of the second culture as a result, the members of the first culture are morally justified in doing so. In other words and despite initial appearances, cultural relativism does not make respect for others a universal obligation. What is needed for respecting others is a universalistic not a relativistic doctrine. But, seemingly, these traditional universal western models are also comprehensive and provide no room for the agency and judgment of individuals or cultures.

However, these two characteristics of the traditional western approaches to morality—universality and comprehensiveness—do not logically imply one another. That is, a moral doctrine can be comprehensive in that it specifies evaluations of all possible actions, but it need not, therefore, hold that these evaluations are correct for all moral agents, but only, for example, for the members of a particular community. In
other words, a doctrine can be comprehensive but not universal. Similarly, a doctrine can hold that certain values are universal but that other values rightly depend on the judgments that individuals or communities make. Such a doctrine is universal but not comprehensive.

In fact, this latter approach to morality has been of interest to several philosophers in the west since the middle of the twentieth century until today. Indeed, this approach offers a potentially attractive way of thinking about moral issues that arise across cultures, like those in the cases we have described. This approach holds that some values are universal and thus that a society or person that violates those values is subject to moral condemnation and possibly to external intervention. However, it also holds that other values are rightfully subject to the judgments of each person or each culture, and thus it respects the judgments that persons or cultures make about those values as long as those persons or societies do not violate a universal value in expressing or pursuing those values.

The philosophers who have developed versions of this approach include John Rawls, Amy Gutmann, Amartya Sen, and Martha Nussbaum. Rawls (1993) labels his approach political liberalism, which aims to determine a society-wide political consensus about justice that nevertheless allows individuals to reach judgments about values that are not implicated in justice. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) call their approach deliberative democracy, and it permits disagreement about some social values about which citizens are not yet able to agree and authorizes communities and individuals to make judgments about values that do not affect the society’s ability to deliberate democratically about matters of collective concern. Both Sen (2009) and Nussbaum (2006) have developed different versions of what they call the capabilities approach. For Sen, the capabilities that matter are those that very generally enable people to be and do what they have reason to value, but beyond distributing those capabilities in ways that are not patently unjust, societies, he holds, are able to determine democratically their own conceptions of justice. For Nussbaum, there are ten specific central capabilities that all societies are obliged to distribute to their citizens up to a particular threshold, although societies have the ability to realize those capabilities in multiple ways, and the capabilities themselves enable individuals to make their own judgments about the use of the capabilities and aspects of their lives that do not affect the societies’ ability to distribute the capabilities justly.

The Philosophies of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum

Although the approaches of Rawls and Gutmann are important and powerful in their own ways and can be used appropriately to analyze cases that raise normative issues in specific contexts, in the remainder of this paper we will focus on the work of Sen and Nussbaum, in significant part because that work was developed explicitly in and for the international context. We will first describe each approach in turn and then consider their application to the cases we have described above.

Sen (1999) first developed the capability approach as a critique of the utilitarian normative basis of traditional western economics and its use in policies aimed at the development and improvement of societies, particularly those in the developing world. Traditional western economics aims at the maximization of the sum total of preference satisfaction experienced by human beings. Sen observed, however, that some preferences are adapted to the severely deprived situations in which some people find themselves. Such adaptive preferences do not reflect people’s moral judgments about
their lives but rather their resignation to make the best of a terrible situation. As a result, people’s satisfactions do not necessarily reflect what is morally good or right, and the maximization of satisfaction does not necessarily indicate that the morally best arrangements have been achieved. Instead, Sen suggested, what has more salient and universal normative value to people is whether they have the capabilities to be and do what they have reason to value, and that this concept is more appropriate as a general criterion of social development than traditional economists’ maximization of satisfaction as measured by national income. Although human capabilities to do and be what they have reason to value are Sen’s basis for normative judgment, he does not think it appropriate to spell out in detail what specific capabilities should be developed in all societies for two reasons. First, he argued, there is universal agreement about what specific deprivations of capabilities constitute genuine injustices—such things as high mortality rates, severe political oppression, extreme deprivation of civil rights, starvation, grinding poverty, and so on. Under these and other conditions, people are manifestly not free to pursue lives that they have reason to value. People in any culture, he says, perceive the injustice of such circumstances, and thus people have a universal and intuitive sense of injustice that identifies specific arrangements and circumstances that are to be condemned, avoided, and corrected. But, second, there is no universal agreement about the ideals for which all societies should strive (Sen, 2009). Rather, such constructive accounts of justice are to be developed by people in particular societies deliberating collectively about what makes the most sense to pursue, given their particular beliefs, practices, and circumstances. In this way, Sen’s conception of ethical value is universal but not comprehensive.

Nussbaum (2006), by contrast, does believe that there are specific capabilities that can be universally agreed on and that, therefore, all societies should pursue at least up to a threshold of adequacy. These capabilities fall into ten general categories: (1) life; (2) bodily health; (3) bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination, and thought; (5) emotions; (6) practical reason; (7) affiliation; (8) other species; (9) play; and (10) control over one’s environment, both political and material. This list of central human capabilities is the result of cross-cultural discussions about what is necessary for people to live a life of dignity. It is revisable in light of further thought and discussion; that is, other capabilities may be added, some may be deleted from the list, and some may be described differently. Nevertheless, Nussbaum asserts that humans subscribe to a universal conception of the capabilities that are of normative importance. Some of what individual persons value may not appear on this list, and people are to be free not to exercise particular capabilities on the list if they judge them to be unimportant to realizing their individual conceptions of the good. But societies have a universal moral obligation to develop the central capabilities of all their citizens, whether individual citizens choose to exercise them or not. Nussbaum characterizes her approach as a type of Rawlsian political liberalism, in that it provides a foundation for all people to use in developing and pursuing their own conceptions of the good, a foundation that constitutes a partial and limited universal conception of normative values that leaves people free to judge what else is valuable beyond these specific capabilities. Thus, Nussbaum, too, holds a conception of ethical value that is universal but not comprehensive.

The Application of the Philosophies to the Exemplary Cases
Both Nussbaum and Sen judge that the educational deprivation of girls described above violates universal values, but for somewhat different reasons that imply significantly different normative responses. Sen (1999) sees girls’ deprivation from a basic education as, first, inherently a form of patent injustice. To him, any reasonable human being would find the extreme forms of educational deprivation described above to be obviously and intuitively unjust in themselves. And beyond this, such educational deprivations are empirically connected to other forms of patent injustice, such as poverty, political oppression, and high child mortality. Thus, the extreme forms of educational deprivation for girls are both directly and indirectly unjust. And they, therefore, provide an important curtailment of people’s freedom to do and be what they have reason to value. For Sen, the normatively appropriate response to such deprivation is, first, to provide girls the basic education that is inherently required by our universal sense of injustice and, second, to provide beyond that forms of education that will prevent or correct other patent forms of injustice.

For Nussbaum (2006), there is an educational dimension of all the central capabilities in her list. For example, human beings must learn how to preserve their lives and to take care of their bodies because for our species such activities do not occur spontaneously and innately. Thus, even for the capabilities that seem most dependent on the provision of material resources, there is a clear educational component that involves individuals learning to use those resources successfully. For that reason, educational deprivation, although not the only source of the failure to develop people’s central capabilities, is arguably the most significant in that it affects all of the capabilities needed to live lives with dignity. Thus, the denial of basic education as well as the more sophisticated forms of education needed; for example, to develop imagination and practical reason represent widely ramified forms of injustice. For Nussbaum, the normatively appropriate response goes beyond the provision of Sen’s basic and instrumentally valuable forms of education. Rather, it includes the provision of a highly sophisticated education to all, an education that, among other things, develops their capabilities for citizenship, their ability to formulate arguments, their deep knowledge of and empathy with others who have different ways of living, and their narrative imaginations (Nussbaum, 2010).

It may be that we have overstated the educational differences between Sen and Nussbaum. Sen does think there are reasons to educate for more than basic literacy, and Nussbaum is sensitive to cultural differences. But Sen also emphasizes the importance of giving those from diverse societies the right to shape democratically their own ways of life, including their own ways of education. And Nussbaum seems to provide a much more robust (and therefore invasive) account of the universal values involved in justice, including the values that apply to societies’ educational provisions.

This difference in perspectives also creates distinctive approaches to the cases of education in counterhegemonic social movements. The critical issues for Sen are, first, whether the education provided encompasses what is required to correct the inherent and instrumental sources of injustice that children and their families confront and, second, whether the elements of the education provided that go beyond these basics have been democratically determined by the community. On the one hand, it appears that the education provided by the Zapatistas and the Landless Workers’ Movement, because of its basis in Freire’s thinking, is likely to include what is universally acknowledged to be needed to overcome educational injustice. For example, liberatory literacy and a basic and impartial understanding of how the natural and social worlds
operate in these contexts are likely to be included in such education. However, further investigation is necessary to determine whether this appearance is confirmed in reality. On the other hand, in both movements the ideological education provided goes beyond these basics. For Sen, the crucial issue is whether the content of that ideological education has been democratically determined by the relevant community. The segregation of Zapatista children from others does not by itself provide an answer about whether the content and process of such education are democratically determined. After all, Sen argues that educational systems may and should be different as long as they are not patently unjust and as long as they reflect the open deliberation of the community. Here, too, additional investigation is needed to ascertain how the nature of the education provided to these children was decided upon originally and how it now can be changed. If such decision and control procedures are sufficiently democratic, the resulting ideological education satisfies Sen’s normative requirements, but if they are not, a corrective response is appropriate.

Nussbaum would take a more critical perspective on these instances of counterhegemonic education. The Freirean aspects of education in these cases would meet many of Nussbaum’s requirements for an education for human dignity, in particular the expectation that the education helps to produce self-regard and a critical, inquiring perspective on the world. Nussbaum, however, would be concerned about the tendencies of these kinds of education to produce an unquestioning acceptance of an ideology and an unfamiliarity with the ideas, understandings, and aspirations of those outside of one’s immediate community. The central capabilities require people to be reasonably critical of their own community’s assumptions and to adopt their own conceptions of the good in light of their understanding of a reasonable range of alternatives for acting and judging. But here, too, these characterizations are only logical possibilities that follow from the extant descriptions of these movements and their approaches to education. An empirical examination of the particular issues of interest to Nussbaum would be important for reaching a final conclusion about the normative acceptability of such an education. This examination would inquire into whether and how the education provided engages and develops each of the ten central capabilities and whether there are aspects of how the education is provided that tend to discourage the sort of independent thinking and self-determination that is the hallmark of Nussbaum’s education for human dignity.

A Brief Reflection on the Perspectives

Despite these differences in Sen’s and Nussbaum’s perspectives on justice and education, they both have a genuine regard for the empirical. For them, normative analysis is not an armchair activity, but rather one that requires careful investigation of empirical events and normative practices. Such investigation is something that requires the skills of both social scientists and philosophers.

Philosophical theories can be powerful sources of normative analysis for two reasons. First, the best of such perspectives offers a wide view of the issues that are involved in the formation of normative judgments, one not limited to the interests that may happen to occur to particular persons or in particular communities. Second, philosophical perspectives usually consider what may be persuasively justified to others, not only what appears intuitively right to individuals or societies. For example, Sen has argued persuasively that normative value is not only a matter of what people have and what satisfactions they experience but also of what people can be or do. In fact, he
contends that something that one has or experiences is valuable only to the extent that it affects what one can be or do (Sen, 1999). In that way, he has widened the normative perspective of, for example, classical economics to include concerns about not only possessions and satisfactions but also opportunities and capabilities. Following this lead, Martha Nussbaum, while working on the issues that women experience in India and other developing nations, argued that there are specific capability deprivations that women confront and that must be corrected in order to achieve justice. Here, too, traditional ideas about what is of normative value have been widened to include particular capabilities, not just capabilities in general, as Sen had done. Both Sen and Nussbaum have provided powerful arguments for such expansions of our ideas about normative value.

However, it is important to notice that these expansions were made in specific contexts, the context of classical economics for Sen and the context of women’s maltreatment for Nussbaum. As a result, neither perspective should be reasonably understood as generating an all-purpose conception of justice that is detachable from specific contexts. Indeed, we suggest that these and other perspectives on justice have just such contextual strengths and limitations. As a result, none of these perspectives—those of Sen and Nussbaum as well as others we have not elaborated on here, such as Rawls and Gutmann—should be understood as legitimately making final and context-free claims about what is normatively valuable. Therefore, the criterion they must meet is whether they provide plausible sources of enlightenment about particular normative problems, not whether they are true for all times and places. In other words, these perspectives at best provide possibly useful tools of analysis for particular normative issues, and we must judge whether they are useful for the particular problems we confront. Thus, Nussbaum’s perspective may be particularly helpful in understanding and responding to issues of the dignity and fair treatment of women and girls because of the context in which that perspective was developed. Sen’s, by contrast, is particularly helpful in understanding and responding to issues of cultural freedom because the economic practices against which his theory was developed violates the freedom of individuals and cultures to live lives they have reason to value.

In light of these reflections, the value of an awareness of the detailed social and cultural context of a particular policy or practice to normative analysis is twofold. First, it helps determine the appropriateness and applicability of a particular philosophical perspective to the issues at hand. That is, the context in which a philosophical perspective was developed should reasonably match the context and content of the policy or practice to be judged normatively. And, second, an awareness of the social and cultural context is a source of the factual premises upon which such perspectives are to be deployed in analyzing those issues. Thus, recent philosophical work can help flesh out and justify our moral intuitions about the globalizing world if our awareness of the context is fully operative in determining what philosophical perspective we bring to bear and what features of the context we use in reaching our considered judgments about that context.
References


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