Aesthetic Education:
a Korean and an Austrian Perspective

Jin Choi
Seoul National University, Korea

Thomas Sojer
University of Innsbruck, Austria

Korea and Austria: two very different schooling systems, and different approaches to educational reform. Yet for both, the renaissance of aesthetics has great potential. This paper analyses the arguments in Korea and Austria for aesthetic education. For each country, we identified a distinctive philosophical approach to meeting the individual needs and challenges of each country’s schooling system through aesthetic education — yielding some fascinating insights and resemblance: in the context of Korea, the American philosopher Jenefer Robinson is taken into account. By contrast, the situation of Austria is connected with the thoughts of the French philosopher Simone Weil. A comparison of these subtle distinctions in thought reveals the intercultural perspective of each country. The final aim of this paper is to highlight the common substance of both approaches and to suggest it as a basis for further intercultural cooperation for the revival of aesthetics within the field of comparative education.

“La beauté parle à tous les cœurs”
(Beauty speaks to all hearts)

Simone Weil, Œuvres completes

Introduction
In times of paralyzing functionalist tendencies within schooling and movement toward the standardization of learning and educational processes, a growing number of educational scientists seek alternative concepts of education. In July 2016, a Ph.D. student from South Korea and a Ph.D. student from Austria, both in the field of philosophy of education, met at an international symposium held by the University of Birmingham, on the topic of specific challenges in each country. It became obvious that on the one hand, Korean education lacked the capacity to teach moral principles relevant to today’s society, while on the other hand, Austrian education had become devoid of individuality. Independently, we were searching for philosophical concepts, which address these questions. To our pleasure, we found two concepts that, as utterly different as they were from each other, answered each case: the Korean need for morality and the Austrian
necessity for more individuality, with a plea for an increase of aesthetic education. In the context of Korea, the American philosopher Jenefer Robinson sees aesthetic education as a way to train one’s emotions to encourage moral development. The French philosopher Simone Weil urges teachers to nurture a habit of attention to creating a general climate for individual expression. Discussing the current situations of our countries and each country’s philosophy of offering aesthetic education as a common solution, we explored the potential for aesthetic education beyond the two countries and philosophical schools. Ensuing from these concepts, this paper affirms the crucial importance of aesthetic education as an alternative to formal education.

The Korean Answer: Aesthetic Education for Moral Education
Aesthetic education in Korea is being proposed as the answer to the question, “How can we become ethical and considerate human beings?” Aesthetic education is being offered as an alternative framework for moral introspection in handling an ethical problem in Korea. The rapid modernization of Korea has not been without its tensions and was accompanied by the confusion over traditional and modern values. The lethargy and helplessness into which modern Koreans tend to fall in the face of ethical dilemmas cannot be reduced to the struggle between Confucian morality and Western rationality; rather, it can be understood as an inner conflict produced by the disappearance of any ethical or moral standards that previously guided Korean society. The confusion people experience today is more related to the forced situation in which real moral concepts are disappearing and the depth of the Korean moral sensibility, anchored as they were in Confucian precepts, has diminished.

Because of this discontinuity in ethical ethos, moral actions tend to be limited to fulfilling the given duties of a social relationship and thinking that we have done what is required of us as humans. However, in the diversified and complex society that is modern Korea, moral obligations can hardly be prescribed as only that; moreover, just being faithful to these duties is not enough to solve ethical conflicts or dilemmas that we face when we have to make important decisions in life. This is because, in the world of diversified values, different notions of ‘good’ coexist and qualitative values, whose order of rank cannot be known, are intricately intertwined. Discovering a ‘single’ appropriate action for situations of ethical problems that we commonly deal with based on a single rule seems impossible and even unethical. It is necessary for us to develop a moral consciousness as one that involves people’s imagination and sublimates the ideals for life.

For this approach, I suggest the idea of a “moral imagination” as an alternative concept that can replace moral principles. Moral imagination is an awareness of one’s own existential needs and requires bodily awareness, high intelligence, and imagination, not
an absolute moral concept of what is right or wrong. Therefore, I propose that aesthetic education should be a way of expanding one’s moral imagination.

Specifically, Jenefer Robinson’s idea of “sentimental education” is used in my proposal as an appropriate educational approach for the development of a deep-seated moral sensitivity, which is based on one’s self-understanding gained through artistic experiences. According to Jenefer Robinson, the development of cognitive abilities can come from expanding one’s sentimental spectrum, not merely from learning or espousing propositional beliefs about ethics or wisdom. This sentimental expansion allows us to intervene and sympathize with our internal cognitive, emotional processes, and our external conditions in a more deliberate way.

The following first discourse aims, within the educational context of Korea, to investigate the educational assumption that art contributes to moral education in children. For this, arts education is posited as something that accompanies emotional changes that bring about aesthetic experiences; sentimental education is proposed as a possible measure for this.

Jenefer Robinson attempts to explain the cultivation of moral sensitivity through artistic experience in a more comprehensive and fundamental way, based on deeper understanding of the attributes of emotion. Robinson asserts that our ‘emotion’ is not a temporary mood, but a ‘process in change’ (Robinson, 2005, pp. 57-59): Our encounters with an object that draws our attention, such as a potentially dangerous encounter in the dark, demonstrates this ‘process in change’. It’s important to note the ‘judgement’, that is, the cognitive response of whether the phenomenon is to be feared or to be ignored, happens ‘after being surprised’. According to Robinson (2005, pp. 57-99), this response of surprise occurred before any judgement was made; however ephemeral, it is clearly caused by a ‘non-cognitive emotional appraisal’ that arose before the ‘judgement as cognitive response’.

The reaction of surprise accompanies ‘physiological responses’. These responses are automatically accompanied with non-cognitive emotional appraisals such as surprise; they occur before the state of surprise becomes classified into certain states such as fear, terror or relief. As in the previous example, when we find something in the dark we may experience physiological responses, such as the quickening of heartbeat or the dilation of pupils. Robinson proposes that this whole process, from ‘non-cognitive emotional appraisal’ to the ‘physiological responses’, the ‘cognitive assessment’ of the situation and the classification of the affect as the psychological terms, such as ‘fear’ or ‘terror’, is what we call ‘affect’ or ‘emotion’.
The above demonstrates that emotion involves non-cognitive emotional appraisal that accompanies physiological responses, as well as cognitive judgements. Therefore, if we feel a certain emotion through an artistic experience, any emotion we feel from an aesthetic experience may be explained by the series of processes proposed above. Robinson relies on facts discovered in the field of cognitive science to propose the functions of such ‘non-cognitive emotional appraisal’ and sentimental education validated by its existence.

According to Antonio Damasio, our emotions provide the natural tools for our brain and mind to evaluate the internal and external environments and adapt to them accordingly (Damasio, 2003), and are essential to keeping us alive. However, aesthetic experiences may invoke emotions within us. Of course, these emotions are not the same as those mentioned by Damasio and do not actually threaten our lives or provide a continuous and realistic sense of satisfaction. Then, how do emotions that work within aesthetic experiences arise and what educational meaning does it have?

To answer these questions, the qualities of emotion that Robinson mentioned, ‘non-cognitive emotional appraisal’ and ‘physiological responses’, become important. Robinson (2005, pp. 72-75), based on Damasio’s argument, claims that the emotional process can be started without any cognitive intervention such as rational reasoning, but rather by bodily stimuli and instantaneous mechanisms of the brain and that this process itself is what constitutes the ‘non-cognitive emotional appraisal’. Since our emotions start from this ‘non-cognitive emotional appraisal’, experiences of art may invoke emotions that accompany physiological responses. For example, even though we already know that the contents of pieces of arts are fictitious, we may already begin to show emotional responses, such as crying or feeling enraged or happy, as we recognize the events or images portrayed in the pieces of art even before we cognitively judge whether they are actual or fictional. In another example, when we appreciate a novel or movie, we may experience similar emotional responses at the same scene after a while even though we already have an (intellectual) ‘knowledge’ of its content. Thus, emotional responses may start from ‘non-cognitive emotional appraisal’ regardless of the ‘knowledge’ of something and may be accompanied by instinctive physiological, or bodily, responses.

While Damasio (1994, pp. 195-296) explains that emotion and the subsequent social behaviors, sympathy and such, are automatic mechanisms of control that not only humans but other animals also possess, he also claims that humans also have a non-automatic mechanism of control in order to survive in a more complex environment. This seems to be possible because our intelligence has developed so far that we do not merely possess such affects and feelings ourselves, but also have reached a level of remembrance where we ‘know’ that we are feeling such emotions. To rephrase, that one knows and remembers one’s own affects and feelings means that one can expect others to also have
such affects and feelings, and thereby possess the ability to prepare for and control them to some extent (Damasio, 2003, pp. 50-53). Here, what is called “knowing” or “remembering” lies beyond the meaning of common sense? It means something is imprinted on the brain because emotion accompanies non-cognitive appraisal and non-cognitive appraisal accompanies physical response, and only then can it be remembered by our body unconsciously.

Therefore, I propose that art experiences or aesthetic experiences can be opportunities for emotional experiences with an ‘educational intent’ in the area of emotional responses that can be acquired through learning. The meaning of emotions invoked by aesthetic experience is directly related to neither threats to one’s existence, satisfaction nor wellness. Although we are born with innate mechanisms of emotion for survival, individuals may learn by themselves more subtle and complicated emotional responses through acquired emotional experience. As such, it may be said that aesthetic experience can become one of these acquired experiences of emotional responses.

Such emotions are not simple ones that may be assigned to a single word such as ‘sadness’ or ‘resignation’; rather, they comprise of layers that cannot be expressed in a single word. Encounters with art lead us to a procession of emotions that cannot be captured in simple terms. This is apparent in our experience of a remarkable piece of art that we find difficult to describe in simple terms. They provide an opportunity to monitor the emotions experienced through the aesthetic experience, discern what they are and attempt to understand them (Robinson, 2005, p. 123).

Sentimental education could allow us to feel emotions that we could not before, by developing a greater level of sensitivity to more subtle emotions that the artist employs to view the world. It would enable us to process our past experiences as well as present experiences, to judge and understand them, and to evaluate our emotions and actions in a wider and deeper context. How does sentimental education then, help us develop moral sensibilities? The answer to this question may be found in the responses of a stimulated learner – the effects of sentimental education on his or her attitudes and behaviors. The learner, now with an expanded range of emotions, would be able to utilize the range to perceive the environment more sensitively and imagine more possibilities Mark Johnson (1993) names such an imagination the ‘moral imagination’. He describes moral imagination, not as a uniform application of ethical principles or rules that determine and justify moral acts as obligations, but rather as cognitive actions from ‘self-knowledge’. To exercise one’s own imagination based on a moral understanding of given circumstances is a process by which the individual comes to understand the rules’ values and limitations. Since the educational approach of sentimental education assumes that a sense of morals originates from oneself, it complements Confucian philosophy as embedded in traditional Korean culture, which claims that one’s morality is cultivated internally.
The Austrian Answer: Aesthetic education as an incubator of individuality
Since the late 1990s the Austrian educational system has been in transition. For over a decade, the need for change caused heated debates within politics and academia (Hopmann, 2016, p. 8). In the public eye, the confusing amount of different approaches abandons all persons involved in front of an impasse. Being personally affected, it urges the co-author of this paper to remember an intellectual figure, a maverick whose thought the aporia speaks to. In her days, Simone Weil fought for an utter transformation of schooling and education (Vorms, 2007, p. 159). Within the context of the Austrian school debate, the paper gives great weight to Weil’s idea of aesthetic education, discussing the relationship between the perception of beauty and learning. In addition to a specific principle of teaching, we also discuss Weil’s aesthetics postulates a philosophical basis for the Austrian educational system on the whole.

The term beauty, in Weil’s thought, is not bound to sensual judgment. Beauty is part of the three classical transcendentalis, next to truth and goodness. It is crucial to understand that the question of beauty is always a question of truth and goodness, hence a question of salvation. In fact, manifestations of evil and suffering, viewed dialectically as an effect of truth, reveal a sort of terrible beauty. Weil was interested in the relationship between aesthetics and science. Especially in mathematics, beauty lies in methods and results as an indication of truth, which has been affirmed by recent research (Chandrasekhar, 2013, pp. 50-52). Hence the analysis of beauty is an epistemological and moral enterprise. However, in contrast to the Korean case, the Austrian discourse focuses on epistemology and learning.

Simone Weil’s reception of platonic sources concerning the concept of beauty shows an idiosyncratic character highly influenced by Negative Theology (Dupré, 2004, p. 19). She regards beauty as a mystery and miracle. Not a mere attribute of matter itself, beauty exists in relation to the world of human sensitivity and diverges into reality, both tangible and other-worldly. Her writings show a strong reluctance to locate her thoughts on beauty in terms of established aesthetic concepts. Neither does she see a need to develop criteria. In this vein, she joins the ranks of intellectuals like Baudelaire, Flaubert, Gilson, Kant and Schiller, who suspect theories and rational schemes of being incapable of grasping beauty (Dupré, 2004, p. 20). Divorced from theory, she describes the experience of beauty as located between a disinterested interestedness and a purposeless purposiveness, concepts derived from Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment: real art as the incarnation of beauty contains no good other than itself and never serves as a means for an ulterior end. Despite being consequently the only true end in this world, beauty is yet transcendent (Bell, 1993, p. 269).

Caught in Plato’s cave, a man mistakes the shadows for reality. He settles himself in his comfortable fantasies by misusing his intelligence and capacity of reason to idolize
collective structures of violence (Kotva, 2015, p. 114). As an emblem of mankind, Oedipus possesses immense intellectual powers but lacks self-knowledge and insight, leading to an escalation of violence (Smith, 2001, p. 70). Beauty eludes a pervasive mechanism of this kind, which Weil calls gravité. In an other-worldly manner, the contemplation of beauty ascends into the realm of the unknown and becomes an epistemological gateway of truth, hence unveiling a self-deceiving conception of reality (Caranfa, 2010, p. 74).

The essence of Weilian anthropology and, by implication, education too, is the escape from the cave. This is the only viable solution, vigorously averting every form of collective or system and defending the principle of subsidiarity through the sanctification of the individual (Smith, 2001, p. 69). The idea of the individual is what distinguishes men from animals and elevates him from the crowd. The capacity to be different from others constitutes humanity. It is the achievement of both, religion and art, to identify and secure the significance of individuality. In increasingly secularized societies, art inherits the gateway function of religion, out of the cave, and hence becomes of major importance. In light of the aforesaid, an increase of artistic subjects within the school curricula seems advisable. Simone Weil, however, demands exactly the opposite (Tubbs, 2005, p. 300). It is not the art one chooses that will lead him out of the cave, but myriads of hidden aesthetic epiphanies in life need to be embraced. Weil’s so-called attention is the capacity to do so, in virtue of its needed passivity can be neither a product of will nor of intelligence (Caranfa, 2010, p. 66).

The faculty of attention is not specified for certain subjects but needs to be developed in every discipline and field as the very core of learning itself. Ensuing, the primary objective of education would not be to gain a specific set of knowledge and skills but to see reality as a whole by seeing beauty. According to Weil, the same perceptive faculty can be found in the tradition of prayer. In many cases, Weil does not differentiate between studying and praying; beauty, in its soteriological dimension, is always the orientation towards god.

The question of how one can gain the faculty of attention, nevertheless remains. Weil adopts a concept of Christian mystic writers: it is god who enables man to the capax Dei through desire and joy. Analogically, beauty enables the human intelligence to receive attention as a gift through desire and joy. If there is anything like a theory of aesthetic education, in consideration of Simone Weil’s strong reluctance to adopt a theory in general, it can be summarised by the following proposition: every discipline holds the capacity to become art. Through the continuous practice of attention in studying, the same presence of beauty originates. Due to that, the student can obtain a representation of individuality, which is essential to developing personalities and societies based on the individual rather than the collective (Liston, 2008, p. 389).
Education has lost its monopoly as a steward of knowledge. Wikipedia, Facebook, and Google Glass are only a few examples supporting a paradigm shift that embodies the omnipresence and accessibility of knowledge. It challenges the classical purpose of teaching and leaves open the question of what role education can play in today’s world. Applying the intellectual framework of Weil, the virtual omnipresence of knowledge creates a deceitful cave, transforming the student into an Oedipus 2.0. The daily information explosion requires a well-skilled sense of selection. Knowledge by itself is not sufficient to deal with the challenges of the complex structures of today’s multicultural world. In the context of Austria, education degenerated into a job-orientated apprenticeship. Dismissing all principles of personal development, it is in direct contravention of the Austrian enlightenment that the Habsburg had proudly implemented the national school system (Bernard, 1971, p. 12). It has been the new endeavour to transform all students into functional and productive particles within the collective of the welfare state. School and university are experienced as unavoidable stages in life, to gain credentials for a specific track of employment. Schools and universities have given up their mission to impart relevant expertise, and graduates obtain their know-how from the practice of the profession itself. The social consequences are large: although Austria finds itself in a lucky place to have the best educational system in history, OECD evaluation results have shown huge demands in terms of education, i.e. economics (Greimel-Fuhrmann, 2016, p. 252) and young unemployment (Radler, 2016, p. 25).

I argue that today’s educational utilitarianism lacks most of all of the above mentioned purposeless purposiveness introduced by Immanuel Kant, a quality being imminent only in things of beauty (Laird, 2009, p. 6). As a result, both teachers and students turn into a functional collective, depleting all powers of individualism. The study of John Hattie (Hattie, 2012, p. 34) affirms the teacher’s personality as a major player in the learning process, or, to put it in the words of Simone Weil, the teacher has to develop the countenance of waiting for the gift of attention, and embracing the individuality of himself, of the persons and things around him. The faculty of attention as singular act fails. It only bears fruit as a fundamental tone of awareness. Impossible to be taught, it only can be imitated: If the teacher’s eyes are not open for the hidden beauty outside the cave, pupils’ eyes never will be (Hadaway, 2016, p. 31).

In conclusion, the current schooling system of Austria is a systematic obliteration of individuality. School should be an incubator of individuality, which would balance the contemporary utilitarian trends. As explained, a renaissance of aesthetic education, following Simone Weil, sees the merit of the faculty of attention, and has the potential to be an essential contribution towards an alternative to the formal Austrian schooling system. Iris Murdoch reminds us how far from Simone Weil we are (p. 330) at this moment. This distance arises, to a certain extent, from Weil’s lack of immediate goal orientation,
which enables critics to condemn some ideas as not applicable to the actual needs of the classroom\textsuperscript{13}. Yet, every educational scientist who argues that a school system does not need philosophical concepts but only practical methods has not understood what is at stake. The Austrian situation is due to decades of evasion and ignorance vis-a-vis the fundamental questions of human life, as we can see by their disregard for individuality in the curriculum. A process of rethinking is urgent, as schools today are to produce the leaders of tomorrow’s world.

\textbf{Discussion and Conclusion: Global Humanism against Educational Functionalism}

The identity as a researcher demands us to always pursue intellectual honesty with an objective attitude; however, we inevitably cannot escape from certain biases attributed to our regional and theoretical backgrounds. We always unconsciously read ideas and concepts as they are framed by contingencies in one’s environment (Tan, 2016). However, the same phenomenon of increased common interest in aesthetic education in the different spatial dimensions of Central Europe and East Asia as well as in the different temporal dimensions of contemporary thinkers Jenefer Robinson and Simone Weil, who lived at the beginning of the last century, indicates a tacit international resistance against the pragmatic and functionalist education that is underscored in today’s trend of global neoliberalism. Taking account each individual context in a wider perspective by not only comparing the specific cases of each country, but also taking into consideration the historical and cultural backgrounds of these cases, we still find one fascinating resemblance: this resistance may be interpreted as an opposition against the approach of evaluating the accomplishment of the educated person in a reductive and quantitative way, and may be understood to ultimately stem from the intention to reclaim humanism in education.

From the two examples of this paper, it becomes evident, considering morality and individuality as classical humanistic values of education, that there is a strong relationship between aesthetic education and humanism. However, as the Korean case shows, aesthetic education in the Asian context demands a reorientation towards traditional Asian values, not classical European values of humanism. Still, it can be spoken of a global humanism beyond the cultural-historical humanism of the occident. Aesthetics and humanism are importantly linked together when art becomes the ultimate stronghold against the functionalism of schooling. Art in its infinite variety possesses the power to unite different cultures, social groups and ages.

If aesthetic education can provide an answer for Korea’s lack of moral orientation and Austria’s disregard for individuality, what can aesthetic education provide for the USA, China, Australia, Brazil and South Africa? With this paper, we want to encourage teachers to renew their commitment to aesthetics as an alternative to formal educational contexts.
Although official educational reforms are supine and indebted to economic interests, every school lesson can be interrupted and opened up by a conscious break-in of the arts.

**About the Authors:** Jin Choi is a Doctoral student in Philosophy of Education at Teachers College, Seoul National University, Republic of South Korea; Thomas Sojer is a Doctoral student in Christian Philosophy at the University of Lucerne, Switzerland, currently working at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Both authors contributed equally to this work. Contact: Jin Choi at zinchoi@snu.ac.kr and Thomas Sojer at thomas.sojer@uibk.ac.at

**References**


The colonial and imperialist legacy of Korea impeded on the development agendas of Korea. After gaining independence from Japan in 1945 and the end of Korean War in 1953, the rapid modernization in Korea and subsequently, of the Korean education system, brought about moral breakdown in Korean society. The Western way of learning through intellectual reasoning, and rational moral reasoning implied by it, tended to stand against the moral ethos of East Asian tradition. The habituation of proper behaviors, and the cultivation of virtue with all manners (修身), are the foundation of (moral) education and the basis of a person's character, in the Korean moral imagination. Conversely, Western moral education emphasizes detached moral reasoning and stakes moral choices on it rather than habitual demeanors instructed by convention. As the new concept of morality imported from Western education began to be increasingly accepted through the modernized school system in Korea, the moral ethos that had previously been dominant in one's moral orientation toward life has diminished tremendously. Traditionally, Koreans have a belief that our moral sense first develops with one's inner nature and ends with oneself as well. This is the basic premises of Confucian philosophy. On the other hand, modern Western understanding of morality is based on the assumption that morality, or what makes one action moral, comes from outside oneself. Moral principles, such as rational principles, exist outside somewhere or objectively, and thereby we have to accept and follow the principles as demanded. This is how our moral reasoning is required, i.e., in applying the objective moral principles to our actions.

Jenefer Robinson teaches and writes on topics in aesthetics and philosophical psychology, especially the theory of emotion. Her book, Deeper than Reason (OUP 2005) applied recent advances in emotion theory to issues in aesthetics, such as the expression of emotion in the arts, how music arouses emotions and moods, and how the emotional experience of literature and music in particular can be a mode of understanding and appreciation. Jenefer is President of the American Society for Aesthetics. Retrieved from: http://www.artsci.uc.edu/faculty-staff/listing/by_dept/philosophy.html?eid=robinsjm

One exemplifying approach in the impasse was the School Reform petition in 2011, documented in the online journal The Vienna Review: http://www.viennareview.net/news/austria/school-reform-austria-petitions-for-change (15th April 2016).

This most scandalous and offensive aspect of Weil’s thought shows a unique soteriological function of theodicy (McCullough, 2014, p. 150).

This paper postulates that there are two kinds of arts: art must be perceptible to the senses (music is to be heard, paintings are to be viewed, fragrance is to be scented), and yet there is a purely idealistic dimension to
art, an unspoken, unheard, odourless arts, like certain state of minds which contain the same presence of beauty as the perceptible arts, i.e. the beauty of a special moment. Still the latter always is in need of a man of flesh and blood, therefore I use the term incarnation.

6 Gravité describes the increasing distance between the world and god, e.g. beauty, truth and goodness. As a results false gods appear in the forms of collectives and cause violence, suffering and war.

7 « Et l’art est issu de la religion. C’est grâce à la religion et à l’arts qu’on a pu arriver à la représentation de l’individuel. » (Weil, 1959, p. 41) transl.: « and arts has its origin in religion. It is due to religion and arts that one can arrive at a representation of what is individual »

8 « Non pas essayer de les interpréter, mais les regarder jusqu’à ce que la lumière jaillisse. » (Weil, 1947, p. 136) transl.: “not to try to interpret them, but to look at them till the light suddenly dawns”.

9 Weil’s term Attention goes far beyond a common faculty of attentiveness. It is, most of all, a gift of mental insight, not a product of own efforts, although the disposition to receive the faculty of attention needs a lot of effort. Attention leads to individuality, because it is the faculty to embrace beauty, which emanates from gravité.

10 « Les lycéens, les étudiants qui aiment Dieu ne devraient jamais dire: Moi, j’aime les mathématiques ! Moi, j’aime le français ! Moi, j’aime le grec ! Ils doivent apprendre à aimer tout cela, parce que tout cela fait croître cette attention qui, orientée vers Dieu, est la substance même de la prière. » (Weil, 1950, p. 72) transl.: « School children and students who love God should never say: “For my part, I like mathematics”; “I like French”; “I like Greek.” They should learn to like all these subjects, because all of them develop that faculty of attention which, directed towards God, is the very substance of prayer. »

11 Concept: the human intelligence is able to conceive of the existence of god and enter into an interpersonal relationship with him.

12 « L’intelligence ne peut être menée que par le désir. Pour qu’il y ait désir, il faut qu’il y ait plaisir et joie. L’intelligence ne grandit et ne porte de fruits que dans la joie. La joie d’apprendre est aussi indispensable aux études que la respiration aux coureurs. » (Weil, 1950, pp. 75-76) transl.: « The intelligence can only be led by desire. For there to be desire, there must be pleasure and joy in the work. The intelligence only grows and bears fruit in joy. The joy of learning is as indispensable to study, as breathing is to running. »

13 « Les études scolaires sont un de ces champs qui enferment une perle pour laquelle cela vaut la peine de vendre tous ses biens, sans rien garder à soi, afin de pouvoir l’acheter. » (Weil, 1950, p. 80) transl.: « education contains a pearl so precious that it is worthwhile to sell all our possessions, keeping nothing for ourselves, in order to be able to acquire it »