Images of Ideology: Social and Cognitive Sense

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ABSTRACT

It would be difficult to preserve the achievements of the civilization and to discuss the future of humanity beyond the structure of ideological knowledge. The objective vision of reality implies the involvement of ideological dimension into the structure of human thoughts and actions as a precondition for national, state and cultural identity and for the movement toward the new humanistic social paradigm that would include the traditions of reasonableness, progress and the capability to “differentiate” between reasonableness and instrumental rationality which, when mixed, make social reflection inadequate to the purposes of social creativity. To what extent are the images of ideology “filled” with social and cognitive tools? What do the images of ideology reflect: reality, knowledge or myth? The authors of this study aim to give answers to these and to other questions.

KEYWORDS

Sociology of the Future, Social Subjectness, Social Thought, Methodological Approaches, Methodological Turn

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Introduction

If the images of ideology are to be understood as the things that are perceived or as the things that are supposed to be, the question arises how the image correlates with the normative ideological scheme. The advantage and the peculiar feature of the image are that it includes socially orientating guidelines associated with the possibility to generalize (general and particular ideas) the social experience (of groups or of individuals). To what extent are the images of ideology “filled” with social and cognitive tools? What do the images of ideology reflect: reality, knowledge or myth?

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Assuming that life is cognition in the process of the continuous exchange of senses between different spheres (Kasavin and Shchavelev, 2004) the images of ideology can be regarded as the phenomenon of everyday consciousness that is generated in the course of routine existence. But then what are the principal differences between images of ideology and the common sense? May it not blur the boundaries between human perception of one's everyday life and his idea of himself as a social and political subject? May it not be that the images of ideology represent an effort to break away from the routine, to hover over one's everyday life at the same time remaining perceivable, recognizable, possessing properties of triviality?

Learning the lesson from the origins of ideology it is difficult to forbear mentioning that the separation between science and ideology that occurred in the 19th century ignores the social essence of the human being thus creating foundations for marginalization of ideology. The attempts to reduce ideology to myth become scientifically justified. The language of ideology has greatly suffered from the "large contributions" made by the superimposed situational political senses that were not related to the context of the real life at the level of utilitarianism, at the level of reducing the variety of ideological ideas to some easily recognizable specimens (Marxism as a teaching on the class struggle).

Ideology does not need the authoritativeness of science in as much as it is introduced as and possesses the potential of the dialog; it fulfills social functions that differ from those performed by science. Social and cognitive map of ideology creates the basis for huge analytical and scientific opportunities which have been readily accepted by S.G. Kara-Murza (2002). The study belonging to English researcher R. Smith “The History of the Human Sciences” highlights that the moral project of the Enlightenment, the progress achieved due to the science about man, was fraught with the contradictions it failed to resolve. Those individuals who believed in progress and at the same time were looking for certain scientifically substantiated social laws and those who were convinced that individual freedom and dignity existed have never denied but rather ascertained the individual freedom of actions (Smith, 2003).

The authors of this study believe that the reaction to this contradiction came as ideological creativity which aberration from the postulates of science represented the mode of perceiving reality where the individual (collective) freedom joins the idea of knowledge (transformation, preservation or reproduction of reality). The thought about the cognitive (perceptive) sense of ideology in the era of the end of ideology became a fashionable and often an axiomatic argument for considering ideology as the irrational mythological knowledge piggybacking on the authority of science at best. This helped the enlightened public represent “the end” of ideology as a historical reality.

**Methodology**

By contrast to the theorists of deideologization, there is an opinion that if ideology disappears then there will be no moral arguments for social progress. If human society is to be perceived as a result of the common reasonable interest of self-preservation then there can be no doubt that ideology performs the functions of identification, of establishing the sense of stability and security. Talking about the nature of the authentic knowledge one should not get too
skeptical about the irrationality and mythologization of ideology. These are the ideas of different order.

Ideology emerged as an effort to rationalize and simultaneously to evaluate life replacing the existing religious and metaphysical concepts in the era of modernity. Inasmuch as the genesis of ideology was initiated by the ideas of progress, of improving social life, of protecting the rights and dignity of man, ideological knowledge is associated with the ability to overcome false consciousness abiding by some certain principles of thoughts and activities. As for ideological epistemes they are characterized by the fundamental idea that the social order takes its place in the cosmos. In ideological consciousness we find the value of knowledge as the thing that creates our ideas about the proper way of life. If at the level of mass consciousness the knowledge is archaic then it is possible to say that there is a genetic connection between science and ideology as the world outlook system that emerged during the era when people turned to reason and to self-positing which has been proven by A.M. Rutkevich in his analysis of the ideology of conservatism that seems to be very far from knowledge and is supposedly interrelated with traditions only (Rutkevich, 1999).

It is a well-known fact that classical ideologies have emerged within the framework of the project of the Enlightenment, although they have never been mere responses to its ideas. Generally speaking, ideologies cannot be reduced to the interests of one social group; it is for a good reason that the authenticity of an ideology is traditionally evaluated by its proximity to the social ideal. It should be remembered that the basis of any ideology is formed of the fundamental scientific ideas. Thus, liberalism takes its origins not only in law but also in social knowledge. It involves the problems of facts and values that were latent in physics of the 18th century. Even supposedly irrational nationalism did not escape scientific justifications being nurtured by the achievement of biological and social sciences (concept of natural selection, social differentiation and organic solidarity).

The theory of human nature is the quintessence of ideology. Egoist or altruist nature of man predetermines the adoption of the ideas of social justice, freedom, order. Ideologies are aimed at redirecting the knowledge of an individual in such a manner that the harmony of personality and society should be achieved based on the priority of either collectivist or individualist principles, liberal freedom or communitarian order. For the most part, the end of ideology is associated with the concept of ideology as false consciousness which started from recognizing the fact that there was in ideology some minor part of irrational and indefinite (Kara-Murza, 2002) and was accomplished in the works of the representatives of Frankfurt School T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer by criticizing the total domination of reason and by representing ideology as a powerful instrument for alienating man from nature and from other people.

Post-modernity deprives ideology of the right to legitimatize the immanent characteristics of the modern society: the end of ideology implies the refusal of rational legitimization of the ideas or social order and allows for irrationality and spontaneity of human existence. It seems that the concept of value neutrality ceased to exist in modern science and became a part of ideology understood and described as the “archive” of errors of humanity. Going back to the problem of investigating social and cognitive potential of ideology it would not be difficult to draw a conclusion that ideology does not employ the force of
conviction but it rather applies the mechanisms of superimposition. This thought finds its finalization in the opinions of M. Foucault on the nature of the repressive knowledge which seems to proceed from the official discourse, from synoptic society that uses ideologically neutral expressions for ideological indoctrination of personality. The authors of this study believe that the thesis of the repressive character of ideology carries over the notion of ideological violence to all forms of ideology without any exception as an act of non-reflexive social knowledge associated with the sense regression of ideology (Žižek, 2003).

Results

Ideological knowledge is of a prescriptive nature in the sense that it suggests the schemes of individual participation in collective social practices. Why there is no need for clear conceptual constructs, for distinguishing formal and informal knowledge? Ideology sets the schemes of typification that can serve as the generalized guidelines in situations of actualizing one’s own life experience. The very things that are considered to represent the disadvantages of ideology (polysemantc character, vagueness) are natural when applied to the contexts of everyday life and they maintain some distance from daily life as a non-transparent routine that foredooms an individual to a certain social profile, to the submissiveness to the superimposed environment.

Absence of ideology does not make the world less problematic. In the first place the cultural and anthropological problems of humanity come to the top including such things as transition from barbarity to vulgarity, extolment of action as pure activity that is not fraught with any higher idea. The image of modern man as a mass consumer that acts spontaneously is beyond the framework of ideological knowledge. Prescriptive nature of ideology includes mandatory senses, social sanctions as the tools for bringing the individuals to the admissible ideological agreements or disagreements of opinions. This intention is implemented through ideological conventions of social life according to the proportion of the ideological sphere in the social order. If ideology “keeps silent” then social aggression comes to the fore associated with the behavior aimed at the destruction of “the conventional” at a cost of losing the integrity of existence. The images of ideology direct a man at the things that are known and that correlate well with the practices and structures of everyday life. The image is constructed applying the logic of reproduction describing conceptual and emotional structures that are expressed through the images of anxiety, care, fear, wishes and that are included as immanent in the structure of everyday existence.

S. Žižek, a fashionable philosopher, believes that ideology imposes the conditions of total reflection and results in the fact that a man would absolve oneself of the responsibility for one’s own statements on the grounds that he is just an instrument of ideology (Žižek, 2003). Thus, ideology reproduces the scheme of self-legitimatization which can be considered true assuming that ideology has the property of being total. Indeed, the authors of this study believe that ideologization has some “empty” spaces even under the conditions when the ideology is nationalized and the ideological indoctrination is massive which is proven by the dualism of the world of the people who used to live during the era of socialism. Russian researcher Yu.A. Levada noted that in the traditional Soviet society identification was in fact not only the principal but also the only
one means to express the connections of man with the social system (General sociology, 2006). In other words, ideology predetermined some certain behavioral pattern while the relations of “kinship” were externally perceived as peripheral but still used to affect personal and collective choice.

In this context the fragmented, non-hierarchical nature of the images of ideology encompasses hopes for rehabilitating the cognitive horizons, the faith in definite world order as a man perceives the multidimensionality of the existing problems. The specified dynamism of images of ideology tells of the relativity, of relativism of their sense boundaries: the things which are seen as something unshakeable and regular in classical ideology can be represented in ideological image as the expression of projective strivings and the conditions of human soul.

The component ratios of knowledge and faith in ideology change continuously depending on and in accordance with the criterion of utility. Therefore, it is possible to talk about the emergence of unreflective knowledge, about the ideology being banned from the sphere of science or about its drift into the sphere of subjective preferences. In such escapism from cognition there occurs a collision of ideological norms when the problematic situation is resolved by non-ideological arguments. The images of ideology are not aimed at obtaining authentic knowledge; they fill the flawed empty spaces of human existence with the relevant ideological awareness.

Ideology defined by K. Marx as false consciousness distorted by social interest is not valued half as high as non-ideological knowledge free from any class interest and equaled to scientific knowledge. Such an approach to ideology as to false consciousness is also practiced within the framework of sociology of knowledge of K. Mannheim for whom the functional meaning of ideology is still knowledge, though the distorted one, and in reality it is intended to preserve the existing order and to help eliminate social disproportions (Mannheim, 1994). So, does it mean that the existence of ideology excludes cognitive interest? Any attempt to decipher the false nature of ideology raises a question of who should come as a critic of ideology: a man in the street or an ideological vis-à-vis? The point of departure in philosophical cognition is the idea of reason. In the images of ideology it loses its total significance transforming into the ideas about a good society. Such prosaic expression of ideology cannot be perceived scientifically.

The relativism of the definition of “the good society” implies ambiguity in understanding ideology depriving it of its normative and theoretical senses in their classical versions (Fedotova, 2005). It is obvious that the humble part played by the images of ideology in the formation of the social integration concept constructs is either a response to the preponderance of science in ideology or it represents, according to M. Horkheimer, the total irrationality of reason. The range of problems of one's own life makes the consumer who possesses the image of ideology search for the things there that are in conformity with his own understanding of life. In the end, according to V.G. Fedotova, the standard of ideology becomes lower because the objectives to achieve the ideal society are no longer set and pursued (Fedotova, 2005).

Ideology ceases to be the objective knowledge; its images are dynamic and they do not aim to plan the future. As regards the images, the ratio of knowledge becomes relativist because now it represents the way to resolve the systemic contradictions biographically. Noting that the images are ephemeral, fluid and unstable it can be safely said that they are deprived of conceptual foundations.
Of course, classical ideology would never openly accept these motives. The severe irony of the situation is that the discourse of imagination is now allowed (Žižek, 2006). Thus here we face the fact that the things which used be considered empirical and casual in classical ideology come to the front line now. This brings us back to the idea of the subject of ideological image as the self-projection of an individual. If this raises any concerns this trend can be explained by the movement for freedom from the fundamental principles that are perceived as the guidelines for the desirable action. The knowledge becomes a powerless reflection, external reflection, which does not affect the actions of the subjects. This absurdity of sense, according to S. Žižek, is an effort to explain the gap that exists between ideological images and everyday practices of people. S. Žižek speaks about symbolization of knowledge, about the deactivation of the enlightened formula for criticizing the ideology that endowed knowledge with freedom (Žižek, 2006).

The image of ideology has no connections with cultural traditions. Ideology becomes a tool for social rationalization in terms of the criterion of the adjustability and adaptation to the new conditions. It may be that the discussion about the end of ideology rather represents the need than the estimation of the conditions required for the existence of ideology. Obviously, this can be explained by the facts that the images of ideology can feature reductionism, delimitation of the mythologized space. The dramatics of ideological situation in Russian society show that the critique is exercised from “classical” perspectives irrespective of the fact that the discussion drifts to the context of reflection about the foundations of the existence of ideology.

The crisis of the society of political correctness in the West, the liberal scheme that leads to the destruction of the state and the society through legitimization of the co-existence of different social and cultural worlds make it necessary to admit that without the knowledge, without conscious reflection the ideology is becoming deinstitutionalized and ensures neither personal rights nor personal responsibility any longer. Thus, ideology is lacking rationality to possess veracity. In fact, the images are not connected with any definite interests; they are the movable landmarks and cannot contain the knowledge that would make it possible to reach the advocated norms or values at some moments of life.

In this case a simple answer cannot be provided. It is obvious that the role of knowledge becomes less significant when the interests are de-individualized and are not attached to any particular social order. Within the multiplicity of ideological images the decisive significance belongs to either risks or opportunities related to the ideological choice; and while during the preceding classical era knowledge was associated with progress now the most valuable good possessed by ideology is represented by the sameness or identity of the individual which is not associated with social co-operation.

The compromised role of ideology and the blurred boundaries of ideological sphere eliminate the idea of knowledge in ideology. Individuals use to classify themselves, estimate their opportunities in similar manner based on the availability of some certain professional and intellectual skills without correlating their hopes with ideology anyhow. To understand the images of ideology the Marxist interpretation of ideology as the false consciousness built on the knowledge distorted by class interest would not be adequate. The image
of ideology consists of floating guidelines associated with different interests. The very image is a result of the conventional procedure. It may be said that the image of ideology makes its reflection incomprehensible, accepted uncritically. To be more precise, here we face the fact that, by contrast to classical ideology, in this case there is no coercion to cognition. Evidently, what we have here is just an attempt at finding the alternative to the collisions of the subject (Habermas, 2003).

The Kantian situation of man’s self-positing as an empirical object in the world of the everyday routine and as “transcendental” in the world of ideology is abandoned. Thanks to the disappearance of this dual positioning the image is not measured by the potential of knowledge which can be applied, actualized or not actualized by an individual. The thoughts about the harm of violence, according to S. Žižek, do not prevent the enactment of violence (Žižek, 2003). Under the modern conditions the self-sufficiency of an acting man is not associated with knowledge of with its productive growth. The will to definite action makes the foundations for the images of ideology.

This thesis captures the transition from ideology of knowledge to ideology of action. Analyzing the ideological situation it is important to note that the discourse of reason is rooted in the points where monologue reasoning is limited which makes the distinguishing feature and the representation of classical ideologies. It is clear that, on the one hand, the image of ideology produces disciplinary effect in line with the scheme suggested by M. Foucault; on the other hand, the image includes striving to freedom, to enhancing the sphere of actions and activities, to expansion of interests.

Knowledge in the image features symbolism and is aimed at sense interpretations. When we say that there is a striving for political centrism in Russia we probably have in mind that the variety of the ideological worlds is in need of integration, of some convergence at the point pertaining the protection of the interests of the state and personality. M. Foucault highlighted that the key to personal political mindset of some philosopher should be searched for not among his ideas, but in his philosophy as the idea of life (Foucault, 2002); similarly, the understanding of the image should be sought for in the very epos of the subject in some definite social context. Classical ideology was considered to be a mechanism for producing the truth because it had authoritative effects. The system of images of ideology creates obstacles on the way of manipulations with ideology, although in this case there is a trend for ideological pantophagy, ideological chaos. This assumption makes for reflection and understanding of such essential feature of Russian ideological life as the lack of systemic ideological boundaries.

Neither Russian communists nor liberals can boast of their achievements in ideological programming. There are no groups in society who could concentrate, reflect, self-posit in their collective practices the abovementioned ideological stances. If ideological images make no affectations of authenticity and, consequently, cannot be recognized as true or false then the “objectively existing” world is set free from ideological perceptions.

There is an obvious renunciation of postulating “the best” of the worlds through ideological knowledge. The images of ideology are designed for identifying the degree of rationality as a scheme of rationalization of the irrational life plans. The images of ideology replace self-consciousness of ideology
which has been captive of the paradigm of power for quite a long time. The language of ideology is used for innovative perception of one’s own world (Habermas, 2003). In short, by contrast to classical ideology the images of the ideology are focused on understanding one’s own self, the individual who takes pain to acquire one’s own social profile. The language of ideology is treated as the medium that creates the conditions for self-expression or for the differentiated approach to the events.

Discussion

Ideological indifferentism that has been widely adopted by Russian society is the consequence of the fact that most Russian citizens have switched to other languages of self-expression and, consequently, that the language of ideology is used only by the politically motivated strata of society. The sense horizons are actualized by each group by means of other languages (art, technology or even substandard lexicon). Under the conditions of hermeneutic social life ideological knowledge loses its practical significance and can only be used as an identifier for finding one’s own kin which is a weak factor or otherwise it is aimed at realizing one’s own life schemes by means of the language of ideology. A.F. Losev notes that the image embodies both the ones who generalize and the ones who are being generalized; that the images are the forms of something; he also reveals two levels demonstrating the difference and highlights that in imagery there is a one inseparable whole which can be reconsidered, reinterpreted every time anew because of the unlimited conceptual charge of the symbols (or symbolic knowledge that forms their basis) (Losev, 1976).

Characterizing the cognitive potential of the images of ideology we cannot sever it from the intellectual climate of the epoch. Thus, modern society faces the monopoly of the experts who can “thrust” upon the mass consciousness a lot of incoherent statements destroying the logic and the common sense (Kara-Murza, 2002). It seems possible that the language of ideology is a type of a filter on the way of implanting the incoherent discourse. Such new ideas as “market economy”, “globalization”, “corporation” are sifted through the deeply rooted ideological concepts which make it possible to create the certainty effect in the course of rationalizing the events, in the process of controlling the emerging challenges.

It may well be that here we face the fact that in the non-ideological space the impulses emitted by so-called objective expert knowledge would require more convincing justifications for the people who are the adepts of the transcendental (higher) ideas. The images of ideology, as it has been already noticed elsewhere, capture the transition from the ideal to the good. Developing this thought it is possible to maintain that the knowledge “recovered” from the image of ideology is aimed at preservation, at the improvement, but it never goes away from the real for the sake of the ideal. Considering the dilemma between the knowledge and the truth that has been superimposed by psychoanalysis which separates the objective knowledge from the subjective truth S. Žižek highlights that ideology is doomed to bear a disguise of the truth (Žižek, 2003). He also notes that the image implies the compromise between the sublimity of ideology and the prosaic nature of everyday life.

The images of ideology do not instigate a man to radical actions, inasmuch as they rather reconcile him with the conditions of life and provide the
opportunity for avoiding straightforward solutions. By contrast to classical variant of ideology that strives to break all connections “with everything and everyone”, the images of ideology pursue the line of moderatism and of the strict limits for the things that a man can do in the name of ideological postulates. Due to this reason the bearers of the images of ideology can keep “to the letter” of the ideology and find the ways to satisfy the wishes that are at variance with the ideology without feeling any guilt. Thus at this level the subject can leave the vicious circle of the disparity between ideology and life; and it seems that the cognitive purposes of the images of ideology allow for misapprehension, for deformation of the sense of ideology due to the continuous floatation of the idea.

The image of ideology does not require any additional interpretation, inasmuch as it is given to the individual from within and not from without. Thus, considering the images of ideology it is possible to draw the conclusion that social and cognitive sense of the images of ideology represents aberration from classical ideology that claims to possess the truth similar to or maybe even superseding that of science. Second, this moderatism, this speculation for the fall makes it possible to introduce social semantic parameters, eliminate the differences between the subjective truth and the objective knowledge. With the image of ideology the truth withdraws into the shadow, the knowledge is evaluated based on the prescriptive principles of being used in the real life situations and it is deprived of discourse utopia (Heller and Niqueux, 2003).

By contrast to the ideologies that are closed upon themselves and claim a monopoly of absolute truth, the images of ideology do not pretend to systemic rationalization that would be capable of supporting eschatological expectations. The knowledge obtained in the images of ideology is of referential nature providing the opportunity to discover the similarity of the situations and to bring routine to the ideological assumptions. Description of the images of ideology is associated with the negation of the utopian ideal, of social demonization and asceticism. The things that can be verified through rational methods demonstrate the drift into the sphere of ideological images. In the 20th century thanks to the theory of the end of ideology the problem of ideological consciousness gave birth to the nominalistic interpretation of ideology. But it is one thing to admit that ideology came to an end and it is quite another to undertake the search in the spirit of the concept of universalism of human differences and the relativism of ideological relations deduced from them.

The idea of the cognitive significance of the images of ideology is related to self-reflection of the forms of sociality. Modern philosophical thought never doubts the fact that human phenomena are historical. This way of cognition, of thinking, makes it possible to see in the images of ideology not the deformation of or aberration from the initial sense but it nurtures the conviction that under the conditions of the relativism of values the cognitive significance of the images of ideology represents the opportunity for authentic perception of the present. This interest in the images of ideology which is, at the first glance, a consequence of psychology and relativism emanates from the social guideline senses. And instead of paying greater attention to opportunities of the language of ideology to express the things that are distinctly recognized as consciousness (Descartes and Locke principle) the question arises about the clarity of the language purified from the influences of transcendental senses and conventionally connected with the structures of everyday life.
Within ideology there is a point of identification of the things logically required and the things that are real. In this sense ideology is a logical expression of the principle of harmony. The basis for the existence of ideological images is represented by Leibnitzian monadology which assuming the unification of the agent of rationality (Smith, 2003) should logically precede all speculative experience. In other words, no matter how perfect the images of ideology are assumed to be, whether related to anthropology, expression or cultural context, the philosophical sense is represented by the reality of the human spirit of reasonableness that makes the foundations for both collective ideologies and personified images of ideology.

Developing such alternatives to ideology as science and technology is a proof of the erosion of the traditional perception of ideology. Given all mentioned above it can be noted that the images of ideology contain the knowledge that in terms of its practical significance supersede scientific and technological argumentations. This is explained by the fact that the modern ideologies cannot claim to dominate by means of reproducing the mechanism of knowledge which was never doubted by O. Habermas (2014). The existing contradiction between the authority of science and technology on the one hand and the growth of the irrational in mass consciousness on the other hand can be interpreted within the framework of ideological discourse as a consequence of imposing upon science the functions that are alien to it.

In all, ever revealing subjective nature of knowledge and brining the truth beyond the boundaries of ideology render, at the first glance, the problem of cognition of the images of ideology senseless. These remarks address the fact that whatever the interests of the individual they are reinforced by the will to knowledge because it is only through knowledge that some definite power can be declared. M. Foucault eliminated the differences between the idea of will to knowledge and the idea of will to power that seem to be intrinsic to all discourses and he does not pay any attention to the strivings of the individual for continuous self-perception of the subject who is reflectively forlorn and metaphysically lonely (Habermas, 2003). The images of ideology do not need universalist comprehension, they do not contain knowledge which could become an incentive for action being the expression of the extremity of elementary social reflection. It may be that this is exactly why the normalizing and disciplinary influence of power that penetrates into everyday routine is refuted in practical relations in ideology by the fact that it allows the subject who stands apart from the power to affect the object (one’s own everyday life) successfully.

Thus, if the ideology is to be analyzed at metatheoretical level, the relativism of the images of ideology can only depend on social and cultural context and can contain the elements of spontaneity relative to the object of collective and individual action. It has already been mentioned that, by contrast to the reflection of social and classical knowledge that is aimed at objectivity, the images of ideology remain being diagnostic with regard to the epoch when they function. It is not worthwhile to search for some attributes of classical rationalism here. The analysis of the images of ideology may only require that the objectivist illusion should disappear or that genealogy of knowledge should be applied as the method that is in conformity with the principal assumption of ideological production.
The principle thing in describing the images of ideology is to avoid the failure of relativist self-refutation. The unrecognized knowledge is nothing else but the influence of the life contexts on the moods of the possessors of ideological images. M. Foucault has described a “horror” system, the congested practices of power and the technologies of the dominance of truth. Similar moments related to the images of ideology refute this assumption because in the sphere of ideological images the ideology becomes subjective even though it often occurs at the cost of relativism of ideological concepts. Noting that Russian society is now experiencing the conditions of ideological fragmentariness it is possible to describe this period as the period of the search for the new constituting principles of ideology, of turning back to the truth of ideology. The knowledge captured at the level of ideological images makes it possible to hope that there are opportunities for never repeating ideological totalitarianism, for never developing any extra stilted arguments for the discredited ideological practices.

The new ideological system may emerge as a consequence of the interconnection, intercrossing of different images of ideology. As regards any objection to the ideological eclectics it is worthwhile considering that not a single social movement in the world have been initiated by ideology in its unadulterated form; that ideology, even when it encompasses the masses and becomes a real power, goes through the period of correction, of adaptation to the imperatives of everyday life. The authors believe that the personal level of social creativity is associated with the transition to the reflecting society (Volkov, 2015), which, by contrast to the scheme suggested by S. Žižek, should be based on the ideology as on the system of humanistic values that instigate social cooperation and creativity.

In fact, ideology does not possess self-sufficient significance. It is probable that the state of the wandering metaphor that characterizes the modern Russian ideological thought now will reveal the demand for the consolidated efforts in this sphere forgotten by the society. It may also be assumed that under the conditions when the old ideological systems are compromised and impotent their modifications and some hybrid specimens will emerge (social-liberalism, national-liberalism, national-bolshevism) and then it will make sense to talk about the specimens of ideology as of the manifestation of the fact that the society is open to such ideological innovations. However, there is no reason to be too optimistic about it and to consider this process accomplished or as such that has spontaneous dimensions uncontrollable by social reflection.

Thus, going back to the assumption about the specimens of ideology as the condition of ideological uncertainty of the modern world one should rely upon the faith in social progress notwithstanding any declarations that the progress is fast becoming a tradition that ruins modernity (Beck, 2000). If all the prejudices pertaining “predetermination” and “hierarchy” are put aside, its amazing ability to instill in men the ideas about the development based on one’s own talents and abiding by the laws of social reason cannot be surpassed easily. That is, notwithstanding the apparent discrepancy between the concept of re-ideologization and the conceptual constructs of the society of knowledge, post-industrial society as the society of moral paradigm (New postindustrial wave in the West, 2009) the ideological system can reveal more truth than socially motivated theories. An American critically thinking social scientist C.W. Mills anticipated even as early as in the 60s that the promises of sociology to make us
all competent are fading at the background of the necessity to develop our reasoning in order to perceive clearly what happens in this world and within us (Mills, 2001).

Conclusions

It has to be mentioned that being concerned with socially meaningful issues only is a consequence of the idolization of “scientific” social facts that by no means reinforce the ability to orientate oneself in the world in line with the moral and social values. Ideology cannot be separated from science under the conditions of the new cultural and social challenges; and considering the prospective development of ideology one should not avoid solving the issue of how we can overcome the negative consequences of social transformations within the framework of the universalist humanistic interpretation of human capabilities (Wallerstein, 2003).

Whoever undertakes to negate the significance of ideology has to admit that beyond the structure of ideological knowledge it would be very difficult to preserve the achievements of the civilization or to discuss the future of humanity. Objective vision of reality implies that ideological dimension should be included in the structures of human actions and reasoning as the preconditions for national, state and cultural identity and for the progressive movement toward the new humanistic social paradigm that includes the traditions of reasonableness, progress and the capability to “distinguish” reasonableness from instrumental rationality the combination of which makes social reflection inadequate to the purposes of social creativity. The analysis of social and cognitive potential of the images of ideology evokes the idea about the transition from “image” thinking to the implementation of the principle of the freedom of personal creativity as the fundamental ideological value (Volkov, 1995).

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