The author reviews historical attempts—mostly by European thinkers—to characterize modernity and its relationship to play. He discusses ideas from Friederich Schiller to Brian Sutton-Smith, all to set the ground for a theory of play in the modern world. Emphasizing the ideas of Max Weber—in particular his theory of rationalization and its importance for expressive culture—the author explores the value of rationality to a theory of play. He defines play more broadly than as a pastime and learning aid for children or a rough-and-tumble developmental tool in the evolution of mammals. Instead, he bases it more squarely on his concept of “emotional destinations.” In the process, he looks at kinds of play not often considered in play studies, such as professional sports and official festivals, and finds play not just a ubiquitous biological phenomena but also an essential social activity. Key words: emotional destinations; Max Weber; modernity; play and the modern world; rationalization

Can we characterize the modern world—at least the versions that were created by European societies during the Renaissance and that have continued to develop over several centuries? To be sure, many scholars have attempted to make such a characterization (Kahler 1956; Nisbet 1966; Berman 1982; Tarnas 1991; Wagner 1994). And the influential sociologist Max Weber, who identified a profound shift in the way people organize their lives, offered one of the greatest attempts.

Weber saw in the modernizing of the West a process of rationalization, an increasingly systematic and calculating approach to thought and behavior (Weber 1958c; 1964). Individuals in their daily habits express this more hesitant, reflective approach, and so do social groups and cultures. Many of society’s important institutions—economic, political, scientific, educational, and legal—exhibit essentially this same pattern, in which people focus on specific goals and ascertain the best practices, or means, for achieving them. Ways of behaving become strategies that are continually evaluated and revised; and human invention—and intervention—replaces godly design. Weber remained uncertain
whether this goal-oriented, calculating approach would transform a softer, more expressive social life—areas involving sex, love, family, art, and play. Would these also become organized in regimented, technically focused ways? Or would they maintain their traditional functions as counterbalances—and points of resistance—to officially sponsored practices in politics, economics, and education?

I want to revisit Weber’s thesis as it pertains to current notions about play. In this context, I describe Weber’s theory of rationalization, including his understanding of its dangers and its implications for expressive culture. Next, I present the contributions of some classic play theorists who explore the role of rationality in play. Some of these theorists tout the value of rational control. Others champion disorderly thought and sensuality. My discussion focuses on the three levels of rationality that Weber identified: individual, social, and cultural. Finally, I attempt to provide a general theory of how rationality operates in contemporary play. For this purpose, I develop the concept of “emotional destinations,” which I hold serve as end-points of rational calculation.

**Reason, Rationalization, and Weber**

Weber, considered by some the last “universal genius of the social sciences” (Wrong 1970, 1), made significant contributions to studies in history, politics, economics, religion, education, and law. He remains especially important in sociology where scholars recognize him as a key figure in the development of their discipline. Born in 1864 and dying in 1920, he lived during a period when Germany was unifying politically and expanding its military and industrial powers. Much of this expansion Weber, as one of his country’s most prominent academics, supported fully. However, he also brooded about the character of Europe’s quickly changing societies and wondered what lay ahead for any country committed strongly to economic growth, military aggression, and bureaucratic efficiency. Regimentation, steadfast goal orientation, and practicality may be useful to any group trying to enhance its place in an industrializing world, but do these also block its members from realizing the joys of living?

Weber’s vision of society can be located in a much more extended tradition of rationalist and idealist thought, one that stretches from Plato to the present day (Wilson 1983). Representatives of this tradition emphasize the role of reasoning—and of reason-tinged experience—in human affairs. Such accounts contrast the ability of individuals to behave rationally to the dictates
of the body and to the feelings (in extreme cases, passions) that result from them (Solomon 1993).

When individuals behave rationally, they consciously control behavior. They are able to pause at what they are doing, even to stop it entirely. They can decide not to act at all. They can also look beyond their immediate circumstances—perhaps to events that happened days or years ago—to discover guidelines for action. Most importantly perhaps, they can reformulate those events as abstract beliefs or principles, cognitive models to be applied at the discretion of the user. We think that, because humans are the creators of at least some of these cognitive frameworks, they have some ability to modify them. Reasoning people have powers of choice and deliberation. Their capacities in this regard exceed, we believe, those of other creatures. Rationalist philosophers praise the well-examined life. They celebrate the decision making, agency, and freedom of the human condition.

Extensive development of this idea lies beyond the scope of this essay. However, I must acknowledge here Weber’s debt to the eighteenth century’s Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, we cannot know the world directly, either through reasoning or sense perception. But we can know something of this world or, at least, of its appearances to us. We know this by relying on our inherent abilities to conceptualize—and thus impute order to—worldly happenings. In other words, the human mind is active and creative rather than passive (Tarnas 1991). Mentality establishes the meaningful world within which people live and make moral choices.

In his writing, Weber supports this philosophical tradition. But he extends Kant’s thinking by emphasizing the degree to which individuals use their own ideas as frameworks to organize and manage experience (Freund 1969). These value orientations are learned rather than innate. Furthermore, and crucially, Weber considers beliefs and values to be social and cultural as well as individual matters. Human communities establish the terms by which their members live. People think and feel in ways that align with their circumstances. And they are attentive especially to activities that advance their self-interest and support their relationships with others.

Significantly, Weber saw rationality in historical terms, and he focused on the increasing importance of a style of reasoning in Western culture that combined the making of scientific knowledge, technical development, and bureaucratic management (Loewith 1970; Freund 1969). That broader concern with the changing character and role of reason in human history was central
for eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers, who believed that successively refined combinations of logic and science might produce ever-better societies. It was critical as well in the nineteenth-century idealist philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who argued that the changing practices of societies reflect the working out in history of God’s unfolding logic. Karl Marx, who replaced Hegel’s spiritual focus with his own materialist theme, emphasized this same quality of progressive self-consciousness, one produced dialectically through conflict and synthesis. Whatever their differences, these thinkers shared the view that people know much about the workings of the world. Reason is the agency of change, even the engine of revolution.

Although Weber incorporates many aspects of Marx’s materialist thesis, he stresses that changing values are also important sources of change. In the first instance, this means that individuals themselves fall under the influence of their own beliefs about rationality as a proper source of self-governance. In the case of the modern West, a new style of thinking and feeling—coldly calculating and technocratic in spirit—becomes prominent. However, thinking style is not merely a personal, psychological matter but also an element of culture itself. New, publicly acclaimed ideas—about what humans should be and do—rule the day. Finally, and for Weber most importantly, rationalization represents an incorporation of these idea systems into political, economic, and technical arrangements. In other words, rationalization is a vast social process that develops in ways that most people have little ability to control. Specifically, human relationships take the shape of capitalism, a bourgeois lifestyle, and ascetic religion (Loewith 1970). Experience undergoes restrictive formatting. A discussion of Weber’s treatment of the three levels of rational development—individual, cultural, and social—follows.

Rationality as a Pattern of Individual Action

To distinguish the modern era from earlier times, Weber (1964) identified four ways in which individuals manage their behavior. Although all four patterns are found in every age, two of these—the “traditional” and the “affectual”—prevail (and find cultural support) in premodern societies. As the name implies, traditional action manifests well-accepted, or taken-for-granted, beliefs passed through the generations. Affectual action is similar, if more psychophysical, in its foundations. Here, expression arises from deeply established feelings. Both feature behaviors that flow out from commitments understood to lie beyond the powers of conscious inspection. Individuals express themselves, sometimes without consciously considering the implications of what they do and say. In
traditional societies, life is not infrequently a shared wailing, rejoicing, and roaring (Spariosu 1989).

By contrast, “value-rational” and the “instrumental-rational” actions are examples of future-oriented thinking, where individuals identify particular goals or principles and manufacture action strategies for meeting these. Value rationality focuses on actuating the terms of strongly held beliefs. A person committed in this way—let us say a soldier preparing for battle—does not rush forward in a blind passion. Instead, he considers thoroughly the implications of what he is about to do. In some circumstances, it means readying himself to sacrifice his life.

Instrumental rationality, the type that dominates Weber’s writing about modernity, is an even more calculating style. Here, no commitments—whether to ends or to means—are sacrosanct. Individuals identify goals and refine their pursuit of them. However, they recognize that these goals are temporary and that they may quickly abandon them for other goals. Transitory personal commitments—better understood as expressions of interests rather than of values—serve as the sounding boards for effective behavior. At every point, a calculating, technical spirit prevails.

**Rationality as a Cultural Pattern**

Surely, individuals in every age seek the best means for accomplishing their ambitions. After all, societies need effective ways to deal with the vagaries of weather, to grow crops, to hunt and herd animals, prevent and treat disease, defeat their enemies, and appease the sacred. The resulting practices, like those of a shaman trying to flush spirits from their hiding places, can be seen as rational. What distinguishes the modern world from earlier times, then, is the degree to which frameworks of interpretation become public, a process that includes the possibility of their being criticized and amended by all members of a group.

Rationalist philosophy, in which thinkers hold some theories logically superior to others (that is, as instances of better thinking), displays these changes well. Rationalism dominates modern science, in which communities of trained researchers agree about the standards for gathering some kinds of information (verifiable sense data or facts) and for incorporating these into logic-based theories. Both science and philosophy, then, eschew private subjective visions (such as the fascinating notions of the shaman). Instead, individuals and societies seek to govern themselves by well-wrought, transparent principles. Ideally, groups state these principles in writing and circulate them widely. Individuals celebrate their abilities to make, modify, and adjudicate publicly acknowledged rules. An
idea with vast implications—that the world is essentially an orderly place whose qualities are revealed by systematic observation and analysis and that progress occurs by the same terms—takes hold.

**Rationality as a Pattern of Social Organization**

Such changes have implications for the ways individuals interact with one another and build relationships. In premodern societies, individuals tended to see themselves as the living representatives of ancient groups—families, communities, and tribes—the pasts and futures of which stood beyond their reckoning. By contrast, modern societies establish individuals as relatively independent agents who are responsible for managing their own affairs (Kahler 1956). These individuals take it upon themselves to associate—that is, to enter into intentionally designed collectivities that center on the interests of those involved.

Working people’s associations (guilds and unions), joint-stock corporations, parliamentary legislatures, recreational clubs, and even religious congregations become prominent. These are gatherings of dispersed people who find it in their interest to join, however temporarily, with like-minded others. Contracts (highly specified, usually written agreements about what two or more parties will do for one another) replace ties based on older notions of personal obligation or fealty. Leaders come to depend on the legality people recognize in these arrangements (Weber 1958a).

Weber’s insight was to understand how these social arrangements, which perhaps initially met the needs of their members, might become more complex, stiffen, and expand their sphere of control. Famously, he described some of these more formalized organizations as “bureaucracies.” Basing his analysis on the German civil service of the early twentieth century, he showed how organizations in various institutional sectors tend to develop as highly coordinated administrative pyramids with strict chains of command, specialized jobs controlled by the organization (not the job holder), written rules, and impersonal relations.

**Dangers of Rationalization**

For the most part, Weber approved of this regimented and principled pattern of social organization, at least when he compared it to the systems of favoritism, scheming, and predatory exploitation that marked earlier centuries. However, Weber (1958a) recognized that overemphasis on organizational rules and proce-
dures ("formal" rationality) sometimes interferes with achievement of the very
goals for which the organization was founded ("substantive rationality"). Top-
down patterns of decision making may disregard the insights of subordinates,
impersonal relations may violate basic human needs for response and respect,
written rules may be too rigid, and bureaucratic ritualism may take precedence
over problem solving (see also Ritzer 1994). In such cases, the organization itself
becomes the goal to be maintained. Organizations exist for their own purposes,
not for the needs or interests of their participants. More darkly, widespread com-
mitment to this style of organization means society itself becomes an "iron cage"
(Weber 1958b). Under such terms, human endeavor is restricted and technically
focused, often on goals set by others. More than this, a spirit of asceticism pre-
vails—not just in the rising capitalist economy but also in the distinctive pattern
of religion that supports these practices.

By contrast, traditional societies honored deep and abiding relationships
and proclaimed the importance of collective emotions. They stressed immer-
sion in communities—and in the sacred sources of these—that effectively tran-
scended generations. Mystic involvement, sometimes tinged with eroticism, was
accepted (Weber 1963; Mitzman 1971). Such a world knew ecstasy, a condition
of rapture that defies rational comprehension and control. For these reasons,
Weber saw in these societies a recognition of the ongoing importance of love and
other forms of human bonding. However, modern culture has become rational
and technocratic in spirit. It values long-term striving by isolated individuals
and temporary, provisional alliances. Surely, people need something more.

Richard Tarnas (1991) emphasizes what he calls the "two cultures" of
modernity. I have so far stressed one of them, the scientific-technocratic culture.
The second is the romantic culture, which celebrates human experience in its
widest dimensions, including powerful emotions. This tradition is associated
with the work of poets, visual artists, musicians, and novelists during the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Such accounts emphasize that thinking is
not confined to exploits of formal rationality, that subjectivity mixes thought
and feeling, and that the best sources of happiness stand beyond the boundaries
of individual control. As we have seen, Weber worried that the first of these two
visions would weaken, or disfigure, the second.

I should mention still another danger resulting from the modern mentality.
As I have noted, modernism exalts the ability of individuals to create systems of
belief and behavior and to live by them. However, the same human abilities to
create and analyze lead to criticizing, and sometimes destroying, the systems that
have been created. Marshall Berman (1982) emphasizes this in his account of
the trajectory of modernism, *All That is Solid Melts into Air*. When people center
their faith on their own abilities to construct—and deconstruct—the world, the
artificiality and transitory quality of social and cultural systems becomes appar-
ent. Nothing stands for long; little gets revered. What matters most becomes the
capacity to devise and control. Here again, a technocratic spirit—freed from any
deeper commitment that bonds the human community—prevails. Meaningful-
ness devolves into practical advance.

Weber’s account suggests, if not fully explicates, this danger. He described
the rule-by-principle that exists at the personal, cultural, and social levels. He was
concerned especially with the ways in which large social organizations (follow-
ing their own instrumental logics) put their own interests above those of their
members and, more generally, color personal and public life. But he was also
aware of the power of cultural logics (as in the key example of Protestantism) to
alter those organizations and, indeed, to rearrange the entire spectrum of daily
life. Nevertheless, he recognized the importance of value-bearing individuals
in shaping history. In other words, patterns at each level may challenge patterns
at others. And he understood, profoundly, that a purely technical spirit—which
regards the world merely as something to manipulate—threatens the very pros-
ppect of orderly, stable, and comforting existence.

**The Rationalization of Expressive Behavior**

According to his wife and biographer Marianne, Weber had ambitions to write
a sociology embracing all the arts (Marianne Weber 1975). One portion of that
project, a study of Western music, saw publication after his death (Weber 1958c).
Significantly, this work focuses on rational-technical changes that led to major
shifts in how people create and play music.

These changes, which happened over several centuries, included the mov-
ing and then fixing of tones in the octave to permit an almost mathematical
approach to harmony. A written system of notation also proved important. This
notation allowed composers to become separated from players and conductors.
At the same time, musical instruments became more standardized and easier to
tune. Taken together, these developments meant that large groups of musicians
could now play complicated compositions under the direction of a nonplaying
leader. Older traditions had emphasized the improvisations of small groups; now
playing became a closely regulated interpretation of the printed page.

This commitment to technique appeared also in visual art, where new ideas about perspective—essentially, a graphical arrangement of objects in a scene based on their relationship to the artist’s line of sight—became prominent during the Renaissance. Similarly, architects explored the technical possibilities of stone arches (and their support systems) to produce towering structures. The principles behind these new developments could be taught. Refinements could be introduced. Styles of buildings and of paintings and of performances remained no longer rooted to the contexts—or people—that first inspired them. Now art, like economics or politics, could be colonized.

I should emphasize that the modern world has gone through many changes since Weber died in 1920. Social scientists commonly describe contemporary industrial society as “advanced” or “postmodern” (Wagner 1994). A critic can counter Weber’s focus on orchestral music with discussions of jazz, rock, and rap. Contemporary dance celebrates improvisation. Visual art has moved past the perspectival focus and fabulous technical accomplishments of a prephotographic age to explore wide avenues of human commentary. Extreme sports provide alternatives to the highly organized, rule-bound, and team-based activities of the last century. Individual expression in food, fashion, sexuality, and even religion finds more acceptance now. These themes of pluralism, rapid change, and personal experience cannot be denied. Still, Weber’s worry remains: Are the most subjectively based, fanciful forms of human expression amenable to the modern forces of calculation and control?

Theories of Play and Rationality

Weber was not the first to explore the character and implications of rationality, nor its connections to expressive life. Others, including some who focused directly on play, offer some insight. As Wendy Russell and Emily Ryall (2015) emphasize, in Western civilization, concern with the relationship between play and reason extends back at least as far as the Classical Greeks. In the hands of the Sophists, reason was a weapon of playful debate, one used to confound, trick, or bully an opponent. Such a worldview celebrated contest and might. The other side of reason—and key to the modern transition—was its role in establishing unifying frameworks, in play as “elsewhere.” For Plato, reason gave form to human enterprise. The proper end point of dialectic was not competi-
tive triumph but the construction of publicly recognized forms of knowledge.

I wish to comment briefly on some important theories that have explored the relationship between play and rational control. I have organized the discussion at the levels Weber himself specified, that is, as individual rationality, cultural rationality, and social rationality. As I indicate, there is substantial variation in these treatments. Some theories stress how rational calculation shapes play and, in some cases, creates its end product. Others show how play defies that controlling impulse. Only some approaches extend Weber’s concerns by describing how large, bureaucratic social organizations co-opt individual playfulness. But all address the tension between conceptual logic and the non-rational irregularities and effusions that are elemental to play.

**Play as Individual Rationality**

**Schiller’s Play Impulse.** The German poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller was one of the first play theorists to address—and to attempt to reconcile—some of the modern tensions I have described. Schiller’s *On the Aesthetic Education of Man,* first published in 1795, sought to connect individuals’ rational commitments to their equally powerful urges to express themselves as sensual creatures. Schiller (1965) called these often-competing desires the “formal impulse” and the “sensuous impulse.” Much as Kant argued, Schiller claimed that rational thinking and its products express individuals’ quests to impose orderly form on the world. Without the ability to fit occurrences into patterns of abstract conception, he thought, existence was just a series of physical urgencies.

But for Schiller, abstract conception was sterile unless it was tied to the actualities of physical behavior, which tested the worth of those ideas. Famously then, Schiller posited another innate drive, the “play impulse.” This third impulse serves to mediate, or temper, the other two. When we play, we cast up orderly, reasonable visions for living and explore their implications sensuously.

Students of play should remember Schiller’s contribution because he neither demeans sensuality nor subordinates it entirely to reason. Play arises from an abundance of exuberant energy; it honors the terms of the sense impulse, which expands the territories of personal involvement. That quest for life is balanced by the form impulse’s demands for “shape.” When we play, we create “living shape.” The highest expressions of this involve the quest for beauty. Seen in this light, play is an aesthetic as well as expressive pursuit, which leads to the creation—and appreciation—of perfected ways of living.

**Freud’s Theory of the Psyche in Conflict.** Sigmund Freud con-
sidered much more fully the tension Schiller addressed between the psycho-
physical energies of life and cognitive-symbolic commitments. Although Freud 
shared Schiller’s interest in art, beauty, and aesthetic realization, he recognized 
that living fully involves much more. At one level, humans are intelligent, prac-
tical creatures who deal with everyday challenges. At another, they abide by 
internalized moral demands. At another still, they find themselves driven by 
deep-seated urges and desires, perhaps instinctual in character. This means the 
psyche never settles but continually confronts these different kinds of commit-
ments, which operate at different levels of awareness.

It is sometimes said of Freud that he was both the culmination of the 
Enlightenment and the onset of its decline. The therapeutic tradition that he 
founded emphasizes the role of reason in private life. Freud placed personal 
concerns, tensions, and ambiguities in rationally ordered systems of explanation. 
Psychoanalysts emphasize language-based understandings. But Freud’s legacy 
also includes the idea that the tensions he described cannot be resolved com-
pletely, that much of psychic life operates below the surface, and that ambiguity 
is endemic to the human condition. We ride the energies of life and death, sex 
and aggression—and manage these in any reasonable way we can.

Freud’s theory of play speaks to these issues. Originally, Freud interpreted 
play as a kind of wish fulfillment. When people play, they cast up images of pos-
sible ways of living. These images are not only fantasied but also inhabited and 
then pushed forward through concrete actions (Freud 1958). Behaviors pop up 
or out, as in jokes or slips of the tongues, and escape moral censorship. However, 
in a later writing, Freud (1967) altered his theory.

In that second take, Freud asserted that much more than the desire for 
instinctual gratification (the terms of which he called the pleasure principle) 
guides play. Quite the opposite, some play features instinctual renunciation, a 
withholding of satisfaction or, at least, a drawing out of the tension before the 
satisfaction is achieved. Even more significantly, Freud posited that ego control 
may be a source of satisfaction in its own right. That is to say, we enjoy our abili-
ties to operate according to our own rational plans. These feelings of control go 
“beyond the pleasure principle,” as his book’s title declares.

Piaget’s Fascination with Conceptual Form. As I have indi-
cated, the rationalist tradition celebrates the role of thinking in establish-
ings guidelines for living. Jean Piaget addressed directly how these thinking 
activities become firm structures for thought and what role play has in this 
development. For Piaget (1966b), mental frameworks, or schemas, do not
arise of their own accord. Instead, they reflect bodily changes in the developing person, social involvements, and, especially, challenges presented by environmental contexts. Children address these challenges by trial and error, by creating mental strategies and exploring the implications of these in concrete behaviors. They tend to remember effective strategies, try them again, and refine them as situations demand.

Piaget argued that this process of determining the best responses to environments features two poles of mental operation. The first of these is “assimilation,” the trying out or application of psychologically generated strategies in an attempt to assert the actor’s will in a given situation. The second is “accommodation,” the adjustment or re-creation of those strategies as dictated by the environment’s response. The character of this process of assertion and adjustment alters as a child ages. Bodily (and largely nonconceptualized) relationships during the earliest years lead to patterns that are dominated increasingly by cognition. Ultimately, abstract thought finds its own sphere of relatively stable relations.

Play behaviors follow this same pattern—from bodily to symbolic, private to public, simple to complex. Famously, and controversially, Piaget (1962) argued that play (at least in its most fundamental expressions) exemplifies pure assimilation, behavior conducted only for the psychic satisfaction of the player. The child acts for the pleasure of acting, handles for the sake of handling. At this level, practice or manipulation is play’s primary focus. However, later and more social kinds of play, especially games, feature more complicated involvement. Practice games (like those I mentioned) lead to symbolic games (such as forms of collective pretense) and then to games with rules. Negotiating the terms and application of these rules, essentially the challenge of morality itself, Piaget presents as a key element of childhood—and of play (Piaget 1966a).

In Piaget’s view, then, people play to develop and refine strategies for living. We discover these in the same way we discover morality, through assertion, adjustment, and negotiation. Although pleasure assists and sustains, rational judgment is the more profound guide—and outcome—of these explorations.

Contemporary Theories. Psychologists who study play continue to address—and attempt to reconcile—the sensual and the rational. The distinguished, German-born, American developmental psychologist Erik Erikson (1963) focused on the role of the ego in the challenges people face as they move through life. Each of these (eight) major life challenges highlights a distinctive emotional issue. For Erikson, failure to resolve any challenge at its appropriate time hampers subsequent development. Generally, he views development as a
project of self-awareness, a ceaseless commitment of the person to create and sustain understandings about his or her character, capabilities, and placement in the world.

Consistently, Erikson (1963) describes play as “a function of the ego, an attempt to synchronize the bodily and social processes with the self” (211). When children play, they create scenarios that allow them to consider profound concepts like time, space, gravity, bodily drives, and other forms of causation. Small children center these explorations on “autocosmic” play, essentially regulation of body and mind; older children express themselves in the “microsphere,” the proximate world of toys and other familiar objects; still later explorations occur in the “macrosphere,” the complicated social world that the player occupies with other persons. In these ways, Erikson aligns himself with the Freudian rationalists. Positive self-estimations (related both to competence and to connection) are the outcomes of well-fashioned understandings about how to operate in the world. Play helps people form these understandings.

Also important is Jerome Bruner’s attempt to get beyond the merely rational. For Bruner (1986a), mental activity is not simply a quest to establish correct or fixed visions of the world. Instead, it is a more thorough-going pattern of involvement in the world, a moving forward in ever-changing situations. In this process, two kinds of mental orientation are pertinent. The first is what Bruner calls “paradigmatic” thought. This is the style of thinking most commonly associated with the rationalist tradition: orderly, consistent, and bound by carefully imposed logic. In contrast to this (Piagetian) vision, Bruner emphasizes “narrative” thought. This style is more image based, improvisational, and ambiguous.

Bruner’s (1986b) theory of play centers on this second, or narrative, pattern. Players may be thinking hard when they play, but their energy focuses on casting up visions and exploring the implications of these in relatively consequence-free ways. Participants exteriorize their private visions, sometimes in collective dramas with other children. Pointedly, the process of doing this is more important than the activity’s outcome. The circumstances that players create—and then the responses that they make to the challenges arising from those circumstances—are the true context of learning. Seen in this light, development arises more from assertive involvement in environments than from age-based readiness.

Other psychologists and education scholars as well (Singer and Singer 1990; Paley 2005) have proposed that play expresses fluid, image-based patterns of mind. To be sure, imaginative play honors the role of reason in human affairs; but those reasoning processes emphasize the activity of meaning making more
than they do any fixed conclusions. They incorporate image-based thinking. And abilities to understand and respond to other people are just as important as abilities to express and assert.

Brian Sutton-Smith takes a different approach when he opposes what he calls the “idealization” of play (Sutton-Smith 1997; Sutton-Smith and Kelly-Byrne 1984a, 1984b). Many kinds of play seem to defy canons of orderliness, civility, morally rectitude, and careful management. Intentionally, players destabilize the affairs of the world, sometimes even those of the little play worlds they create. Children find in play an opportunity to be aggressive, rude, lascivious, and otherwise adventurous. They flout authority. These improprieties, or so they seem to adults, are forms of resistance, rebellion, and self-expression. Players learn the boundaries of the world by testing them. Self-awareness comes from opposition and dissolution as much as from identification and inclusion (Henricks 2009).

Nevertheless, this pattern of disorderly play must not be seen as entirely unmindful or nonrational. Rather, participants seek to impose their own mental schemes on otherness. They willfully provoke response. And disorderly play honors most the ability of participants to dissemble the logics held sacred by others. One major subtheme of the rationalist tradition—the prospect of reason dismantling its own creations and showing these to be artifices—appears fully on display. In other words, foolery, festivity, and rebellion may be as rational as carefully laid, unifying plans.

**Play as Cultural Rationality**

**Huizinga’s Rationally Regulated Agon.** In the tradition of the Romance, Schiller focused on personal experience, albeit as one element of social life. Good societies are those that promote refined feelings. Johan Huizinga approached these cultural issues more directly. In his classic *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture*, Huizinga (1955) argued that play serves as a principal vehicle of social expression and even of public creativity. Historically, or more precisely in the preindustrial era, public play provided opportunities for adults to explore various possibilities for living, including some that were customarily forbidden. Freed from ordinary consequences and forms of censure, players addressed the challenges of unfamiliar roles and relationships. Some of this activity might be frivolous, but some—often associated with particular religious festivals—explored the deepest forms of meaning.

Huizinga’s special interest was the *agon*, or regulated social contest. For
much of history, contests of this sort—riddling contests, song duels, public debates, philosophical symposia, military tournaments, legal wrangling, artistic shows, sporting events—allowed individuals and groups, addressing one another as equals, to compete and, through that competition, to employ strategies for thinking and behaving. However, rationally established rules—to which the participants consented—tempered such personal expression and gave it direction. Huizinga emphasizes that these contests were usually displays of or in something (such as a valued skill or belief). Likewise, they were often for something (such as a prize or honorific status). Whether as participants or as viewers, individuals became more conscious of their society’s ideals. They witnessed the emergence of new practices and styles of relationship. And, perhaps most importantly, they honored the principle that good societies are those that permit their members periods of effervescent, interactive engagement.

Like Weber, Huizinga worried about the modern society he saw rising around him, especially as exemplified by massive state governments, rampant commercialism, industrialism, and a growing bourgeois sensibility. As he saw it, play in this industrialized setting had become specialized, even “sterile.” Formal organizations now regulated public activities, commonly in ways that reflected the interests of nonplaying sponsors. The worst examples—huge parades, rallies, festivals, and sports—were those he termed “false play.” He deemed them false because they no longer fostered the creativity of the participants themselves. Instead, businesses and governments coordinated the meanings of such events. Huizinga’s worries were well founded: As he wrote *Homo Ludens* during the 1930s, totalitarianism was spreading rapidly across Europe. In earlier times, play had been the province of communities of people who gathered in socially protected settings. Now instrumental, display-oriented play was the dominant public form.

Huizinga’s work can be read as a general critique of modernism and especially of the malignancies of both instrumental and value rationality. However, I wish to emphasize that he shared the view of Schiller and other idealists that play, like other forms of creativity, is mindful (Huizinga 1955). Play is not just physical exuberance; it is an opportunity to reconsider some of life’s most serious matters including holiness itself. Lawyers, philosophers, and theologians in their debates play as urgently as determined footballers or romping children. Moreover, play benefits from—indeed, depends on—frameworks of reasonable rules that define the ends of its action and ensure the proper means for pursuing them, as well as impose many other restrictions on its participants. Having
reached agreements about the entitlement to participate—the costuming, equipment, physical space, timing, and stakes—players explore the implications of contest in a world strategically arranged.

Caillois’s Revision. French anthropologist and litterateur Roger Caillois offers the most important emendation of Huizinga’s thesis. Although Caillois (2001a, 2001b) shared many of Huizinga’s concerns about the decline of the play spirit in the modern era, he insisted on broadening his predecessor’s view of play. One part of that broadening meant rethinking the commitment to play. As I noted, Huizinga emphasizes the role of the agon in history. Caillois (2001b) acknowledges this but adds three other types of play: alea (that is, games of chance), mimicry (imaginative role performance), and ilinx (pursuit of turbulence, even vertigo). Because these are nonreducible, they challenge the prospect for a unitary theory of play. Furthermore, Caillois’s typology provides the basis for his distinction between the play styles of traditional and modern societies.

Influenced by Freud and surrealism, Caillois argued that humans have deep-seated desires to behave in nonutilitarian, nonrational ways. They may even seek their own degradation and death (Caillois 2003). Said differently, players wish to move past the boundaries of conventional order and propriety, perhaps to encounter the powerful forces that swirl around them and shape the world. Some forms of play—specifically, ilinx and mimicry—do so directly. Their participants actively seek the disorderly and improbable. They plunge themselves into situations they cannot control or, at least, that require them to adjust themselves continually to the events they encounter. As Caillois (2001b) sees it, only some forms of play are rule bound. Others defy rule making and its pretense of human control.

Caillois develops the idea that play varies in its rules in his well-known distinction between paidia and ludus. The first kind of play seems carefree, improvisational, turbulent, and unpredictable. Ludic forms, by contrast, are game-like—that is, their activity is regulated by “arbitrary, imperative, and purposively tedious conventions” (2001b, 13). Despite this slightly pejorative description, Caillois does not believe ludus inferior to paidia. Rather, the arbitrary restrictions of games that challenge players in ways they would not encounter by themselves foster complicated, collective participation and facilitate the comparison of results. In a sense, ludus extends and refines the play spirit.

Such ideas are central in Caillois’s descriptions of how traditional and modern societies differ: traditional societies emphasize mimicry and ilinx; arbitrary rules are less important; attention centers on participation in—and interpretation
of—physical, cultural, and cosmic forces. Modern societies, in contrast, stress agon, particularly in combination with alea, or chance. Games based on these principles encourage individuals and collectivities to find their places in broader social communities and to display qualities of skill and character. Instrumental rationality, or strategies for achieving goals, play a key role.

**Other Visions of Cultural Play.** Caillois’s extension of Huizinga’s thesis highlights the relationship of rationally conceived rules of play. For Huizinga, rules are essential for the combinations of cooperation and competition that occur in the agon. Honoring these public agreements is the basis of worthy play. Caillois accepts much of this, but he also stresses play’s darker, more disorderly spirit. Other scholars have also explored this distinction. I have noted that qualities of rebellion, conflict, turbulence, and uncompromised expression are prominent in the Freudian tradition and in Sutton-Smith’s writing. As Mihai Spariosu (1989, 1997) argues, these qualities also dominate pre-Socratic views of play, Nietzsche’s resurrection of them, and contemporary postmodernism’s handling of them. Such theories emphasize the dismantling or opening of logics more than they do their refinement and application.

Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 1984) has explored the uses of play to develop counterworlds that stand beside the realm of ordinary affairs. In contrast to official rituals sponsored by authorities, unofficial festivals like carnivals allow people to engage with things normally repressed. As the word carnival itself makes plain, materiality or flesh trumps spirituality, bestiality upends human pretense, and disorder reigns—all of which fits Bakhtin’s wider theory of cultural meaning, which emphasizes how different individuals maintain their own perspectives and interact dialogically.

I should mention a few additional, anthropological theorists. Don Handleman (1998) has contrasted a “top-down” style of play, in which participants enter a world of unsettled cosmic forces with a “bottom-up,” or humanly energized and evaluated, style. The second style Handleman finds more common to modern Western societies. Victor Turner (1969) develops ideas of antistructure and liminality in his theory of how traditional societies maintain ritualized settings for alternative experiences, collective bonding, and status transformation. Clifford Geertz (1973) stresses how collective, “deep” play grants expression to socially submerged (and defiantly nonrational) themes.

Rachel Shields (2015) summarizes these turbulent, rebellious views of play. As she puts it: “Play might be . . . what exists when we allow our thoughts to become as patternless or formless as possible, that excess of mental activity that
spontaneously interrupts rational thinking like a whirling burst of pure thought energy” (305). Play is restless and uncontained, and it expresses chance-based associations—bodily, psychoneural, social, and cultural. Indeed, consciousness itself is a kind of play, which we cannot control but which we rely on to grant the world its seeming reality. Once again, this view aligns with postmodern philosophies that challenge the premise that modernity tightens and restricts meaning (Weber’s worry). Instead, meaning is opening, expanding, and otherwise becoming ambiguous (Henricks 2001).

Other play scholars (Roberts, Arth, and Bush 1959; Whiting and Whiting 1975; Roopnarine, Johnson, and Hooper 1994) have maintained the opposite view that play (and especially children’s play) tends to reproduce the major beliefs and values of a host society. Each society, they argue, seems to play in its own fashion. Players develop ideas and skills useful for functioning in broad contexts. Play centers on the tensions and challenges found in routine social existence. Through play, individuals explore the implications of these problems and their possible solutions.

Although the two versions of cultural play—countermending force and reproduction or mirror—seem different, they are connected by the sense that play events usually exhibit discernable logics. Sometimes, these events play out major societal commitments in rule-bound and socially rewarded ways. But even rebellious or antinomian events may be energized by prevailing cultural patterns, which function as targets of rebellion or resistance. Much as Caillois suggests, players sometimes express the darkest forms of compulsion. They willfully leap from their own control. But for play to be fully public or cultural rather than purely personal, it requires some framework of understanding that gives coherence to the wildest kinds of ranting, escapade, aggression, and lust. To that extent, nonrationality succumbs to rational devising.

**Play as Social Rationality**

**Mead’s Focus on Intersubjective Awareness.** Sociologist George Herbert Mead is a key reference for those wishing to understand the origins of social mindedness. Like his better-known counterpart psychologist William James, Mead represented the American philosophical tradition of pragmatism, which combines elements of German idealism with those of utilitarianism and practical ambition. For Mead (1964), humans pursue personal interests within a context of “self,” that is, in terms of their broader assessment of how they stand in communities of others who know, judge, and care about them.
How do people develop these judgments? In Mead’s account, people rely on publicly shared symbols, which they use both to communicate their intentions and to interpret the responses of others. Pertinent here are forms of language as well as nonverbal gestures, displays, and props. Although other people’s thinking processes are hidden from us, we can know something of them by attending to their symbolized expressions. And based on our understanding that they—or people like them—are likely to respond to any particular action we take, we craft behaviors effectively. Indeed, our thinking processes may be described as an internalized conversation of gestures, a playing out in our minds of how others will react if we say and do one thing rather than another.

For Mead (1964), play is an important part of this symbol-learning process. What he calls the “play stage” is the time in life when children learn to “take the role of the other,” that is, to imagine how a person situated differently from them might interpret the world and act within it. When children play mother or fire fighter, they assume unusual perspectives. They may switch from one role to another as they play or create dialogues between their characters. They even sometimes play themselves in these scenarios. By such devices, the self is shown to be a social construct, which reflects both the perspectives of others, especially toward the self as object (i.e., “me”), and reasonable possibilities for action, expressing the self as subject (i.e., “I”).

The game stage involves a more complicated level of self-awareness. Individuals form some sense of what an entire group—composed of those playing many different roles—expects. As in baseball, there are many interrelated positions on the field, and those holding these positions are expected to coordinate their actions. Any skilled player knows the likely chain of occurrences when particular actions begin. They also acknowledge their broader obligations to the group as a whole and to the judgments the group can make about them. Play in general is the laboratory where complicated understandings like these are developed.

Mead extends his theory to include even broader and more abstract self-estimations, which are formed when many group experiences are aggregated. As we age, most of us gain some sense of how society sees us—or how other people in general do. However complex these estimations may be, they are founded on pragmatism’s intersubjective judgment (relying on shared symbols) and practical calculations of accomplishment in situations. Instrumental rationality is critical not only to these general processes but also to play as its training ground.

develops some aspects of Mead’s rationalism. Goffman sees social life as an information game in which participants manage their behaviors more or less well. Players use the game to advance their interests. However, Goffman adamantly distinguished his approach from the “game theory” of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Whereas game theory concerns the production of the best “moves” by partisans who try to maximize their self-interest in limited contexts, Goffman (1961) asks the question of how the limited identities of players relate to their general identities as persons.

A key element of social life concerns the attempts by individuals to maintain an idealized—and relatively consistent—identity in front of others (Goffman 1967). Differently from Mead, Goffman stresses that we use our knowledge of symbol systems to manipulate the subjective states of others, especially that we try to dictate what (we think) they know about us. So understood, social interaction becomes an exercise in managing impressions, one in which we offer displays to others and interpret their responses. For Goffman as for Mead, skills developed in play are crucial for these exercises. But Goffman’s distinctive approach emphasizes how social situations function as play worlds, which have their own membership criteria, conceptions of time and space, specialized purposes, skills, equipment, costumes, and—especially—rules of operation. These rules effectively transform situations by defining what is relevant or irrelevant and even how interruptions from the outside world should be handled.

Thus, play worlds appear as fragile social constructions with semi-permeable boundaries. To enter one of these settings and operate effectively typically requires accepting the event’s guiding terms, or “frame” (Goffman 1974). In other words, play worlds are circumstances of their own sorts (Simmel 1950). When individuals encounter one another, they immediately try to discern what kind of situation contains them. Having figured it out, they try to match their private logics to the cultural logic of the event itself. The play that follows, essentially a process of learning where one fits, seems intensely rational in spirit.

Vygotsky’s Social Psychology. Although Mead, Simmel, and Goffman all emphasize intersubjective exchange, it assumes even more importance for Lev S. Vygotsky. In childhood development, Vygotsky (1978) explains, the young do not advance themselves by private calculation alone. Rather, they are led forward by their engagement in activities with others. Vygotsky sees this engagement as a dialogue featuring mutually acknowledged patterns of challenge and response.

Vygotsky’s (1976) theory of play differs from those I have discussed in that he offers a wider range of motives for why play occurs. For him, pointedly, play
should not be seen as a pursuit of pleasure, because many other activities are also organized toward this end. However, Vygotsky also rejects what he calls the “intellectualization of play.” Rather, and closer to Freud’s spirit than to Piaget’s, Vygotsky sees play as a strategy of “wish fulfillment.” When people play, they confront their own desires and frustrations. They attempt to do things at levels they have not reached before. To help them do so, play frees their imagination—players create and inhabit new kinds of circumstances.

Once again, Vygotsky brings an interactive, social perspective to these matters. Children play together and help one another advance through forms of competition and cooperation. However, older people (such as teachers and parents) may also be useful in setting and rewarding challenges. Commonly, these challenges are advanced by rules that function both as constraints and as guidelines. Rules also help children develop impulse control and teach them about the reality of otherness. For these reasons, many therapists find Vygotsky’s approach to be especially valuable (Winnicott 1971; Schaefer 1992; Holzman 2008).

Status, Power, and Division. For the most part, these theories describe play in settings where people operate as equals. Through intersubjective exchanges, groups develop ideas about their general character and about the respective placements of their members. Players negotiate identity through self-initiated claims and challenges. Rules help everyone envision the common enterprise and determine the latitudes of cooperation and competition.

Of course, egalitarianism and dialogical exchange are only a part of social life. As Weber worried, large organizations—committed to specific goals, highly formalized in their operating principles, and supported by members whose lives depend on their continuance—are common features of the modern world. Some of these organizations, as Huizinga decried, have moved into the realm of recreation and play. This means that nonplayers may effectively control the activity, including its purposes and meaning. It also acknowledges that play settings may feature many different roles and that these roles may be arranged hierarchically.

The question of how societies distribute valued resources was fundamental to Marx and to modern-day Marxian critical theory and conflict theory (Henricks 2006). For its part, Marxian sociology has centered on economic patterns in industrial societies, including the rise of a class system that arranges individuals and families in more or less advantageous roles. Other institutions—such as religion, politics, health care, and education—are organized in ways that reinforce economic relationships. Those who enjoy high economic standing tend to associate with those who enjoy privileged access to other resources. And
Educational institutions and community life, for example, provide access to jobs. Opportunities for play and recreation align with other social benefits. Thorstein Veblen (1934) offers the classic account: access to play entails access to time, space, equipment, companions, and knowledge. When people gather in the arenas of play, they affirm the collective standing of the participants as peers. They dramatize their commitment to values that have been fundamental to the group's development and current standing. In Veblen's account of the industrial elite, this meant commitments to competition, predation, and bounty. Critically, participants display to others their ability to comport themselves correctly.

I have elsewhere (Henricks 1991) described this in even more general terms. Historically, play and games have functioned as “identity ceremonies.” That is, only some kinds of people have been allowed to play particular kinds of games at some times and places with (and before) specific kinds of others. Especially in publically celebrated settings, participants—individuals as well as groups—are granted opportunities to display their qualities and connections. Attention focuses on specific skills, values, team alliances, community support, and psychological characteristics. In modernizing societies, attention shifts from an emphasis on participation and bonding to one on personal achievement. Success at play is sometimes held to be an indicator of other kinds of social success, including capacities for leadership and social mobility.

Play and Social Bonding. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu emphasizes the social purposes of play—and especially its use in solidifying community membership. In Distinction, Bourdieu (1984) argues that recreational patterns reflect both the characteristics of the society-wide class system as well as how people operate in small status communities. The French whom Bourdieu studied understood well that they could not adopt the pastimes of the wealthy, but they felt little resentment because they focused on their own engagement in local communities with similarly situated others. Such communities, according to Bourdieu, had their own preferred styles of food, music, hobbies, sports, television shows, physical appearance, and romantic association. Within a particular social placement or habitus, individuals acquired a specific taste or feel for living there and found status and affiliation within the limited terms offered. In such ways, distinction assumed a more specialized focus.

Informal interaction—at playgrounds, bars, clubs, community centers, and similar settings—has always been key to play studies. Ideally, most play scholars believe, participants manage their own behavior in such settings. However, a wider sociological perspective generates questions about how these oppor-
tunities become available, organized, and publicized (Henricks 2015a). More pointedly, who sponsors them—and why? By controlling these processes, organizations like schools, businesses, and nation-states may dictate many aspects of play, forming representative teams and conducting organized competitions.

Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard (1979), who studied the rise of rugby football in British public schools during the early nineteenth century, offer a classic analysis of play and social bonding. Originally, recreation for boys in boarding schools tended to be private or small-group escapes from authority that centered on activities like field sports, card games, and drinking contests. In addition, bullying of younger and weaker students was commonplace. Schools initially organized intramural sports like football to redirect student energy and aggression, develop cooperation and loyalty within resident houses, and cultivate skills pertinent to collective accomplishment. Through such measures, a goal-oriented and much more ascetic approach to physical experience replaced the prevailing view of leisure as self-centered diversion and idleness. Competitions between schools underscored these measures.

Other institutions followed suit. The muscular Christianity movement of the late nineteenth century (which included the YMCA) attempted to reconcile the traditional division of body and spirit. Physical activity, properly conceived and managed, might serve God. The Olympics movement offered something similar for nations, company teams, military sports, and the community-based teams of towns and cities. In an age of expanding and increasingly mobile populations, industrialization, and relatively anonymous urban conditions, play united dispersed populations under the banner of these organizers. Elaborate rule systems; specialized, technical, and highly coordinated behaviors; and hierarchies of nonplaying regulators all aligned with the social requirements of an emerging business culture. An ethic of “fair play” and “sportsmanship” articulated conditions of mutual respect, competition, self-discipline, and other dimensions of a new civility. These ideas ruled playing fields.

**Implications for Contemporary Play**

I have attempted to show that play—whether in its specifically modern setting or some other context—centers on a tension between different ways of relating to the world. To recall one side of Schiller’s dualism, there is something very basic, precultural, and nonlogical in the desire to play. Players want to feel themselves
moving through circumstances, discovering new challenges at every turn. They relish disorder and unpredictability. They improvise. They display themselves irreverently and impulsively. Play expresses the optimism of creatures who believe they can encounter difficulties, manage these in satisfactory ways, and emerge unscathed (Sutton-Smith 1999). Who would declare this exuberance for life rational in its foundations?

Schiller equally believes, as we have seen, that play also expresses people’s desire to give shape to the world so they can operate assuredly within it. Often this means organizing personal behavior toward goals. Players want to see what they can accomplish—and to learn what accomplishment of every sort means. Given this ambition, they do not abandon themselves to external forces; they try to impose their own visions on these forces. Moreover, to repeat Caillois’s distinction, players intentionally subject paidia (essentially, the celebration of the improbable and the spontaneous) to the purposely tedious conventions of ludus. They do this partly to elevate their commitment by introducing complicated, mentally imposed schemes. But they do it also so that other people can join them in acts of cooperation and competition.

When either of these qualities proves absent, play falters. Without the artifice of ludus, play becomes aimless indulgence. Bound too tightly by ludus, play evokes joyless consternation. At worst—to return to Huizinga for a moment—regimentation renders play sterile. Every act of play features some level of balance between these two, ludus and paidia.

Themes of Modern Play

Based on my reading of these theorists, I have come to the conclusion that modern societies are associated especially with a particular style of play. This style features rational control, whether by individual players or by organizations, and it is framed by carefully devised cultural controls. Let me specify some qualities of this kind of play (see also Henricks 2006).

Modern Play Has an Active, Manipulative Character. Players try to impose their own action strategies on the world to see what changes they can produce. We understand this activity to be humanly engineered, or “bottom-up,” to use the terminology of Handelman (1992). People push the action forward, instead of allowing external forces to carry them along. They willfully go places and do things. This principle applies even to relatively passive engagements like those with amusement park rides, in sightseeing excursions, and at sports events and concerts. At such times, people choose their activities
and companions, shout, throw their hands in the air, stand, and display symbols of engagement while encouraging others to do the same. To that extent, they do not inhabit but instead “create” the event.

Modern Play Exhibits Order Making. As Huizinga emphasizes, people create clear structures—or frameworks—of rules within which play occurs. Tests and competitions require commitment to these rules and social cooperation. Those involved esteem fair play and sportsmanship, and they culturally devalue intransigence and destruction—as in refusals to participate or despoliations of the creations of others. They do not respect spoilsports, cheaters, and tricksters, however clever and amusing such players seem; in short, everyone should just play nice.

These qualities are displayed prominently at large public events where even viewers are expected to conform to established spectator roles. Typically, this means entering and exiting at appropriate times, finding an assigned seat, not blocking the views of others, remaining quiet at times and becoming noisy at others, and otherwise directing their attention appropriately. Modern players occupy designated places and operate from these shared conventions.

Modern Play is Instrumental. Play’s goals include not only the specific end states of the behavior itself but also consequences that extend beyond the event. Players seek formal rewards and recognitions as well as vaguer personal benefits like enhanced social regard, self-esteem, enhanced fitness, and improved skills. By contrast, we do not usually consider directionless indulgence (lolling about on a weekend morning) and passive consumption (listening to and viewing the performances of others) to be play. Most grandly, we hold play to be progressive and developmental (Sutton-Smith 1997). Most of us who play music, dance, paint, practice sports, cook, or engage in other forms of “serious leisure,” recognize this. Commonly, we want to finish an activity or make a product. More than that, we want to feel that we are getting better at what we do. Play may be a process, but even the process can be evaluated as more or less successful. Modern play features photos, trophies, certificates, journal entries, and other markers of achievement.

Modern Play Features Institutionalized Games. Once again, games draw out play by layering it with difficult-to-reach goals and by introducing complicated restrictions. They give the event a linear quality, a direction, by identifying the specific sequences of its actions, which they denote as “moves” or “plays.” These plays may be counted up or otherwise aggregated, and players subordinate their subjective impulses (in extreme cases, whims) to
make such moves. Institutionalization—as the movement toward increasingly broad cultural acceptance of the activity—creates possibilities for wide ranges of people to participate meaningfully and to compare their accomplishments. Thus, we are able to tell other people about past play activities—perhaps an evening playing bridge, a visit to a theater, or even a morning at a flea market. They will have some sense of what we have done and prove capable of judging our accomplishments; indeed, they may feel comfortable joining us the next time we undertake such play.

**Modern Play Has a Technical Emphasis.** Individuals focus on the best strategies for reaching the goals—personal or game based—I have noted. They envision play as a process of the advancement and development of skills. Better techniques—on display, perhaps, in sports or video games—lead to success and to access to higher levels of play. Individuals hire tutors and consult books, magazines, and websites; they prize physical and mental capability; they devalue moral, aesthetic, and spiritual exploration. In return, they hone their skills and perfect supreme abilities, like expert chess players, for example, who come to recognize a long series of potential moves and countermoves; or baseball players who capitalize on hand-eye coordination; or flea marketers who develop an “eye” for hidden treasures and can bargain adroitly.

To be sure, my summary stresses the degree to which modern societies emphasize a particular style of play. This summary applies best to the play of modern adults and to the highly organized play these adults supervise for children. Our media-driven consumer culture abets such play and encourages people to seek ever-greater accomplishments, ever-better abilities, and ever-thrilling experiences. Play becomes something we need to be good at. Public events—spectator sports, concerts, and theatrical presentations—dramatize these needs.

None of this denies the critical importance of Caillois’s paidia. At bottom, play features disorder, improvisation, unpredictability, impulsiveness, and irreverence. The excitement generated by such confusion proves fundamental to the sense that one is at play. And risky, compulsive, and even dark play are elements of a postmodern culture that offers people—if, primarily, as individuals or as small groups—opportunities for illicit drug use, unfettered sex, frenetic gambling, extreme sports, survivalist adventure, and other forms of risky behavior. Even overcontrolled modern play cannot banish its improbable, nonrational elements. But can it contain or manage them by rational calculation?
If play’s charm, or at least a substantial portion of it, derives from the elements I just mentioned, will these qualities allow it to resist rational control? Or is it possible to make the production of improbability and excitement routine through carefully devised settings and procedures?

In play studies, scholars usually see emotional satisfaction as an accompaniment or by-product of play’s pleasure. They agree that play is fun (Henricks 2015), but they do not typically identify these feelings as the goal of play. Instead, they emphasize play’s more rational or instrumental qualities. Players, they say, center their attention on concrete behaviors—hopping from one rock to another, hitting a ball, or singing a song. Frequently, they try to do their best, even to “win.” In other words, their play focuses on actions and their implications. Fun is the feeling that results from producing these moves and from meeting one’s standards for success and involvement.

My point is this: the prospect of “having fun” or “having a good time” is surely a key motivation for players, at least in their more informal and privately managed endeavors. As play scholars Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (2000) and Scott Eberle (2014) emphasize, psychic engagement and satisfaction are not uncomplicated. Such experience is generated by a combination of occurrences, both external (that is, deriving from the situation itself) and internal (from the commitments and capabilities of the participants). Moreover, and as Eberle maintains, engagement is not a static condition but one that moves through various types and intensities of awareness.

Eberle contends that playful engagement is understood best as a spiral or vortex, a process that defies clear direction or control by players. Participants move and respond to the movements they sense around them. They encounter different feelings, comprehensions, and capabilities—anticipation, surprise, pleasure, understanding, strength, and poise. They explore different levels or dimensions of these feelings. Thus, Eberle says, play deepens awareness. But the process by which this occurs—like the charm of play itself—remains unclear.

I do not dispute this view, especially as a vision for the best forms of play, but I also emphasize the ways in which play activities can be manufactured by rational calculation. To help me make this distinction, I wish to identify three stages of play corresponding to activities before, during, and after the event itself. Each of these stages exhibits a choice (essentially, an opportunity to assert consciously applied control) by those involved. Each stage features conflicts about
who will make this choice. And characteristic emotions express each player’s engagement with these artificially established challenges, rules, and rewards.

**Before the Event**

According to many play scholars, play is encouraged by an open-minded, appetitive disposition (Henricks 2015a). These scholars use different words to describe this readiness. I use the term “curiosity.” Ideally, players want to play, and they approach it with enthusiasm.

Of course, participants are not always so motivated. Like gawky teenagers, many have to be dragged onto the dance floor. Social pressure can be extreme. The embarrassment that comes from not playing (and thus resisting the group) may be worse than submitting to the group’s demands. In any case, the decision to get involved (What will happen if I play or do not play?) comes from a conscious calculation.

Motivation to participate can also be “sweetened” through the introduction of challenges, boasts, dares, and stakes, which make the activity more consequential for participants (Goffman 1961). In effect, these call into question the wider standing of the group member. Those who participate—and do well—improve their status. Play organizers may also suggest challenges to physical safety, such as jumps from high places or physical aggression. These challenges must be set strategically. Stakes set too high discourage players or, if accepted, block the fun. Stakes set too low are seen as boring or childish.

In informal play, participants commonly propose their own stakes and consequences. Formally organized versions of play tend to have consequences known in advance. We understand ceremonial recognitions, trophies, jackpots, bragging rights, and so forth to be outcomes of big games. Groups as well as individuals ponder these outcomes and find motivation in them. That is, an entire school, community or nation may vest itself in the success of an upcoming event. These consequences may be advertised widely, and players clearly know what they are getting into.

In sum, anticipation about what will happen during the event mixes with—and is heightened by—clearly identified terms and incentives. Most of us look forward to important parties, dances, sports contests, theatrical productions, and similar events. We imagine all the things that will happen there. We wonder how we will do and what the consequences of our actions will be. But the content of these imaginings may be shaped well in advance.

As I have noted, we can attribute some of this to culturally established
expectations (for what a dance or ball game should be). Groups and organizations determine some (who gathers participants, motivates them, and tells them how they should act). And some is a matter of individual expectations based on prior experiences. Whatever the source, players rarely wander into events naively. They anticipate the logics at play and integrate them with their own expectations. The stage is set long before the actors arrive.

**During the Event**

Some play events are improvisational, even haphazard. But many others rely on formal frameworks. As in Huizinga’s (1955) vision of the “magic circle,” players create boundaries to keep the outside world from intruding. Recalling some of these limits, we note that play often employs special understandings of time that distinguish the event’s time from outside, or clock, time. Physical barriers, like walls and curtains, may help participants focus, and so may lighting and seating arrangements. Some events may employ odd costumes and equipment that would be deemed irrelevant or silly in other settings. They may use special language, music, or other sounds. Most importantly, the activity’s directed behavior—its goals and the accepted procedures to reach them—mark the event as different from other spheres of life. Players signify their commitment to the event by expressions of readiness like vows, shouts, and physical gestures. These sights and sounds help create the game’s “reality.”

Anyone who has visited a casino has some sense of these devices. Casinos are typically clock free and have winding, carpeted pathways hedged with blinking, chiming machines. Uniformed attendants (coordinated by others at remote surveillance stations) ensure that patrons behave courteously and support a general feeling of festiveness. Day and night have no meaning in such a place. Similarly, guests at an amusement park may be transported collectively to the grounds from satellite lots, moved along carefully designed pathways, and subjected to strategically placed sights, sounds, and smells before they are ushered into preferred locations where someone offers to take their photographs. Meanwhile, friendly guides see that park rules are maintained and that miscreants are removed.

Once again, players—and nonplaying organizers—make conscious, sometimes highly calculated decisions to establish a play setting with distinctive characteristics. Frequently, this setting—again, think of a theater, concert hall, or ball park—already exists. Indeed, the prospect of entering the environment is an important element of the player’s anticipation. The actual experience of
being there features many additional occurrences that the participants have not imagined and have no ability to control.

Nevertheless, glorious settings do not by themselves guarantee that participants will have satisfying experiences. After all, play is a specific type of behavior, one that involves distinctive challenges and responses. The ensuing game, drama, or concert may or may not be a good one. Recall Csikszentmihalyi’s (2000) theory of engagement, or flow, which emphasizes the relationship between technical challenges of the situation at hand (measured perhaps by the difficulty level of a mountain climb or the ability of a tennis player across the net) and the skill of the player. Too much difficulty creates worry or anxiety; it distracts players from the tasks at hand. Too little challenge is boring.

This suggests that challenges may be crafted quite specifically and directed at specific players. Think of the different apparatus at a public playground, the increasing challenges of a video game, or the growing difficulty in crosswords or Sudoku puzzles. Age-graded youth sports commonly employ different-sized fields, goals, balls, and playing conventions. Most of these circumstances are determined, by consciously applied logics, well in advance of play.

Erving Goffman (1961) discusses such matters—essentially, how to manufacture a “good game”—as a process of generating an uncertain outcome. Ideally, uncertainty is accomplished by the kinds of matching—or mismatching—I mentioned at public playgrounds, in video games, or with puzzles. But other means may be needed. For example, handicapping (such as having more players on one team or requiring one side to play with a physical disadvantage) attempts to equalize play. So does the setting of odds in betting or games of chance. In short, players must believe in their own prospects for success, but that success must not come too easily or cheaply.

As we have seen, games function to draw out moments of play by giving them direction and continuity. The results of individual play segments—hands of cards, innings of games, rolls of dice, and so forth—add up. And, we should note, there are devices to make the last stages of the game the most meaningful of all. Cumulative scoring makes comebacks possible, as do increased betting limits and double-or-nothing wagering. Well-constructed play discourages quitting.

The question with play is always: how will its action move forward? As we have seen, in the case of paidia, the answer is very unclear. Improbability and spontaneity reign. But collective play—at least in its modern context—tends to have clear ordering procedures, which determine who gets to do what next. The choices here focus how to administer the event.
The first choices determine the start and stop sequences in the action, which is the point of rules about turns or moves. Through stated procedures, each player knows when he or she gets to deal, roll the dice, bat, and so forth. A second issue involves who controls the sequences in the action. Typically, groups agree that some individuals will function as leaders who tell others what to do.

A third problem relates to administering rules. Who decides when violations have occurred and determines what to do about them? Fourth, and finally, comes the question of determining a conclusion, of who declares when the game is over, especially when only some of the participants agree about what has happened.

I could list other problems, but my argument should be evident. People’s experiences of play are routinely guided by carefully constructed rules and regulations. These conditions allow players and spectators both to understand end states (when a particular play, or the game itself, finishes) and processes (whether the play proceeds properly). Play events fluctuate, often quite systematically, between tense but expectant feelings of instability, improbability, and confusion and momentary resolutions of these feelings in pauses, rests, or points of stability.

The emotions we experience at play express our awareness of these changing situations. In my view (Henricks 2015b), the exploration of disorder—involving the players’ sense of improbability and their confusion, difficulties, and excitement—can feel like fun. The sense that order has been restored—during the various rest points when players realize what just happened and then reenergize themselves—feels exhilarating. Both the exploration and the exhilaration are amenable to rational preparation. Both operate within clear latitudes of expectation. We know that a carnival ride ends when the machine stops and the operator ushers us out. When we are defeated at bat, we know to trudge back to the bench; when we are more successful, we know to move to new stations on the diamond. And we understand all these as temporary predicaments, which will soon change because of new challenges and obligations. But these challenges are not unanticipated. Usually, we are playing by design.

After the Event
The end of the play event produces similar awarenesses and feelings. Ideally, these emotions center on what I call “gratification” (Henricks 2015b)—the sense that participants, whether individually or collectively, have produced a good time. At this point, enough time exists to assess how one did, whether this involves the counting of winnings, the totaling of scores, or tallying some other,
vaguer markers. That satisfaction—or dissatisfaction—depends on expectations developed before and during the event. Positive emotions come from meeting or exceeding these expectations. Negative feelings result from the failure to meet them.

Once again, fellow participants and event organizers reinforce these feelings by showing their interest, offering rewards, or proclaiming a job well done. There may be opportunities to calibrate and share—physical memorabilia, photos, congratulatory messages, formal expressions of gratitude from the hosts. Many establishments have gift shops.

Although the sports event may be considered over at this point, exiting the venue commonly involves discussions of the possibility for repeating, or even enhancing, such experiences on a subsequent visit. There may be coupons, discounts, and other significata that guarantee advanced standing upon a return. Organizations place visitors on mailing lists. Social-network sites broadcast accounts of the event, plot potential new expeditions, and rally comrades.

**Emotional Destinations**

I have been describing procedures relevant to entering, inhabiting, and exiting play events. For each of these stages, an appropriate set of actions can be outlined. Individuals enter these occasions with images of what they will encounter. They also have ideas of what they hope to derive from that situation. Occasionally, what they get is the sense of competitive triumph and its attendant social and cultural rewards—trophies, prizes, money, and enhanced prestige. More commonly perhaps, they accomplish something more personal—they have a sense of overcoming their fears, of building their fitness and character, of doing better than they had done before. At other times still, they simply enjoy the companionship—and support—of like-minded others. They wish to be in their midst and feel their energy.

But it is also the case that people are motivated by the prospect of having fun. To be sure, this pattern of emotional satisfaction can not easily be separated from the other feelings I have just described. But it can be isolated analytically; that is, it can be identified as an accomplishment of its own sort. Indeed, often we are asked by friends and family whether an event we attended—a party, dance, or game—was fun or whether we ourselves had fun. Those asking such questions—much as they may care for us—do not desire a detailed account of what happened at the event. Recollections of a few highlights will do because they truly want an emotional summation. Fun events are worth repeating. They
justify all the expense—the money, time, preparation, and anxiety—that formed part of the experience. They help others decide whether or not to join us next time. They become the memories we treasure.

Although some portion of fun is happenstance—a transpiring of things that cannot be anticipated—I am arguing that the groundwork for fun is typically prepared, organized, and reproduced by processes constructed well in advance of the fun seeker’s experience. Activities pertinent to sporting events, casinos, cruises, amusement parks, hotels, restaurants, department store sales, holiday festivities, all may be advertised as rare, sometimes unprecedented, events. On the basis of these expectations, participants prepare themselves by making appropriate purchases, readying their appearance, absorbing promotional literature, and gathering companions. With visions of a good time, they enter and occupy settings designed to produce the effects advertised. Hosts, guides, and other directors ensure that participants have the proper experiences. And departure from the event features its own procedures for thanking, remembering, and planning.

I call these processes of management and control the construction of “emotional destinations.” Once again, my approach stresses that emotions are not simply by-products of play. Emotions also function as play’s rewards, motivators, and end states. We hold visions of achieving such in our minds. We go to a ball park anticipating the excitement of physical collision; we attend concert halls seeking the elevating sonority of the music we encounter. We hope to find amusement at the parks so named. Such settings may or may not prove to be the “Happiest Place on Earth,” as Disneyland itself daringly claims, but most inform us that we will be pleased with what we find.

Enticed by these visions, many of us work fifty weeks a year, save what we can, and head off to the theme park, tropical isle, casino, or big game of our dreams. We will spend all we have and prepare for a return visit. That next time, we will possess the advanced standing of one who has been there before, a sophisticated insider who has a favorite hotel room, restaurant, menu item, and tanning location. We thus transform an impersonal place—one concocted for the millions—into our own.

Recall that Weber emphasizes two forms of rational action—value rationality (carefully considered commitment to cherished beliefs and moral precepts) and instrumental rationality (fascination with practical achievement). He thinks the latter to be the dominant modern form. Large businesses and governments co-opt this focus on effectiveness, efficiency, and improvement to push them-
selves—and, of course, their personnel—toward ever-increasing productivity. There is no culmination to such achievement, only soulless striving. Rationalization proves a steady and cold wind.

But emotional experience, as I have argued, can also be an end of instrumental rationality. What Weber called “affectual” action—which he saw as deeply centered compulsion—can be made more conscious and become a clearly envisioned goal of carefully controlled action. These yearnings are not the sources of action but rather their completions. We want to possess these feelings and manage them if only within the highly limited and quite momentary setting that the play provides. We do not want the fright of a haunted house or the thrill of a sky dive to have real consequences. Instead, we wish to have, and to savor, these feelings with the knowledge that we can manage them when real-life challenges arise. That players seek this acquaintance with their fundamental emotions lies at the root of Sutton-Smith’s theories.

For Weber—and for Huizinga—it proves to be crucial how these visions for living are established and maintained. At one level, the commitment to instrumental rationality is itself problematic, even for individuals themselves. When play is too rationally controlled, it languishes. At these times, the activity becomes exercise, practice, or work. Dogged by the way accomplishments are measured and skills built, we sometimes disavow the fun of the play activities. Even more sadly, perhaps, our efforts to find fun may be so narrowly focused that we eliminate the irregularities essential to having fun. Each morning before work finds us at the same exercise station doing the same mindless reps. On weekends, we go to the casino wearing the same lucky shirt, play the same games, and sit at the same table. Sharply focused, highly controlled repetition has its place—it may even lead to success—but play offers more.

As Caillois stressed, play in modern societies often takes the form of ludus, of articulated action. Games—checkers, softball, video games, even waltzes—regulate (and regularize) activity. At their best, ludic forms inspire us to address challenges otherwise unimaginable. They allow us to engage with others on agreed terms. Referring to these terms, we assess our accomplishments and communicate them to others. We commit ourselves to these activities, perhaps trying to become better at them. In doing so, whatever our intent, we clearly inhabit forms that are not our own inventions. Instead, they are expressions of cultural rationality, prefashioned systems of knowledge, skill, and value that move people in established directions. The modern world may praise us for accomplishment in such games. But the expert in tennis,
golf, or poker—as Huizinga maintains—plays only in a restricted sense.

Who would dispute our right to commit ourselves to carefully devised and technically focused formats? At least we are doing what we wish—and we can start and stop the activity any time we want. It is worrisome when organizations or other nonplaying agents take control. Then play becomes “false,” to use Huizinga’s term. The framework—and meaning—of the event gets set by others. Activity devolves into technical achievement, acceptance of authority, and emotional alignment. Goals are comprehended; terms of play, delineated; interests identified and pursued. But these changes are not, at least initially, devised by the players. Rather, the “interests” appear when people realize it is to their advantage to participate, that such play somehow advances their standing in the sponsoring group or organization.

Only the shrillest, or perhaps most romantic, of critics would insist that play always take the form of nonrational indulgence. As Schiller himself stressed, play joins that effervescent spirit with consciously imposed formats. Rationality is not the enemy of play but rather a contributor to it. It becomes dangerous only when the form-giving enterprise overwhelms the boundaries of the play and turns it into an extension of ordinary, work-based living. Instrumental rationality has provided wonderful advances in the practical arenas of science, medicine, economics, and politics. It colors other cultural domains as well. And most of us marvel at the accomplishments of highly trained sports persons and performing artists. But our adoration of technical competence should not occlude an awareness of play’s historical function to enable people to explore the widest implications of personal and public existence. This means experiencing—and feeling—the multifold possibilities of living. Understanding this joins together Weber, Huizinga, Caillois, Sutton-Smith, and most of the other great commentators on human expression.

References

lated by Richard Nice.


