TEMPERED DREAMS: ALAINE LOCKE AS PLURALIST AND PRAGMATIST

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The main difficulty of the race question does not lie so much in the actual condition of blacks as it does in the mental attitude of the whites.¹

INTRODUCTION

On November 25, 1944, the same year Gunnar Myrdal’s study *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*² was published, professor of philosophy at Howard University Alain LeRoy Locke (1885–1954), presided over the twenty-fourth annual meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies, chairing a symposium on “Diversity Within National Unity.”³ Identifying the theme as “democratic attitudes and values,” Locke reminded the group that “behind the barriers of race and of culture groups and of sects” there is the “value of the individual” as the “psychological core of the democratic attitude.” Locke, who attempted throughout his life to negotiate space for the development of individual and group identities, observed that the “social creed” of democracy did not abolish individual preference or choice, but it did “outlaw all prejudice and discrimination based on arbitrary attitudes toward groups as such.”⁴

Calling on teachers of social studies to address intergroup relations as crucial to America’s future, Locke and four other scholars proposed content and strategies for teaching social studies in ways that could lead to greater racial understanding and reconciliation. This call was consistent with Myrdal’s landmark recommendations for the role of education. In fact, Locke’s symposium followed Myrdal’s more general conclusions to some of their practical educational consequences. In his shrewd analyses of educational opportunities, his sustained support for the artistry of the Harlem Renaissance, and his prescient warnings against national aspirations in pursuit of global domination, Locke did much more than chronicle the “Negro Achievements” acknowledged in Myrdal’s study.⁵

Locke was a member of Myrdal’s planning committee, and three of Locke’s works are cited in “Negro Achievements,” chapter 44 of the 45 chapters in *An American Dilemma*. These citations include Locke’s *Negro Art: Past and Present* (1936), *The Negro and His Music* (1936) and *The New Negro: An Interpretation* (1925). While noting Locke’s contributions to the Harlem Renaissance, Myrdal made no mention of Locke’s philosophical contributions to value theory and cultural pluralism. Drawing upon theoretical constructs of race and ethnicity from various scholarly disciplines, Myrdal did not cite Locke as a philosopher at all. This is unfortunate since Locke’s philosophy provides

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unique perspectives relating to the national tensions Myrdal identified in his landmark study.6

Locke’s value pluralism and cultural pluralism7 explicitly honored racial group affiliation in a nation threatened by such identifications. Distinct from contemporaries like John Dewey who tended to emphasize the centrality of reason “in negotiating inter-group conflict,” Locke’s theory of value emphasized feeling references, attitudes, and values in intercultural communication.8 Locke’s value theory, articulated in his doctoral dissertation in 1918 and still evolving in his 1935 essay “Values and Imperatives,” attempted to ground Socratic categories of beauty, truth, goodness, and Godliness in the lives of various peoples in different places at different times.9 In his formulation of value pluralism, Locke integrated insights from psychology, anthropology, and comparative cultural history to place individuals within intricately expanding communities of ascription and affiliation. Anchoring values in feeling modes or feeling references, Locke saw a major task of the philosopher and educator as one of helping students and citizens better understand the function of values within various communities and the emotional commonalities inherent in value formation.

Building on his experience as an African American practicing philosophy in a racist nation, Locke also examined value communities and value differences within what he called the “fictional” categories of race and ethnicity. Personal experiences with barriers to pluralism led him to acknowledge and address the enduring power of racism woven tightly into the national fabric as part of his own evolving philosophy. In this essay, I will examine Locke’s experiences, reasoning, and rhetoric as they deepen challenges to accepted notions of race, education, and democracy. I will also connect Locke’s insights to the recent Supreme Court decision on voluntary school integration policies. Finally, I will argue that Locke’s pluralism and pragmatism provide justification for continuing explorations at the intersection of art, race, education, and democracy as integral to philosophy of education.

EXPERIENCE: LIVING THROUGH BARRIERS TO PLURALISM

After being named a Rhodes Scholar, Locke wrote to his mother, “I am not a race problem.” However, his understanding of race as a personal “liability” was quickly sharpened by his Rhodes experiences.10 The first African American Rhodes Scholar, Locke was denied admission by five Oxford colleges and shunned by Southern Rhodes Scholars in his class. Learning the “social salience of race” first hand, he determined to make the “ethnic fictions” of minority groups useful to them. Locke believed that “modern civilization” with its common standards of living, institutions, and civic heritage would “not tolerate separateness.” Arguing that the price of separatism was subordination, Locke called on the “American Negro” not to abandon group identity or to reify it, but to use it to stimulate race pride. Both human similarity and human diversity were to be judged, not as real or
essential, but as functional. While teaching philosophy at Howard University, Locke found editorial voice in The New Negro, a testament to the literary and aesthetic achievements of the Harlem Renaissance. Citing Nietzsche’s concept of “transvaluation,” Locke envisioned a transposition of the artistic and cultural contributions of Negro artists extending to “the role of the Negro in larger social affairs brought about by new instances of artistic excellence in Harlem.”

According to Horace Meyer Kallen, speaking at Locke’s memorial on Saturday, October 29, 1955, Locke’s evolution from value pluralism to cultural pluralism began around 1906 or 1907 when Kallen, then assistant to George Santayana, introduced the term in a class where Locke was a student. Kallen defined cultural pluralism as both a “working hypothesis” and an “ideal” affirming the primacy of differences as well as the right to differences. Kallen asserted that “difference” viewed as the basis of friendship might foster “untrammeled communication” rather than violence. While he saw his colleague Locke as a monist by temperament, Kallen believed that “pluralism and particularism imposed their reality upon Locke by the exigent harshness of experience.” But the pluralism that “imposed its reality” upon Locke was not the same as the cultural pluralism Kallen coined at the turn of the century. Kallen’s guiding metaphor for cultural pluralism was the nation as orchestra with each ethnic group contributing its own unique and distinctive tone and timbre. Locke’s guiding metaphor was visual[] a prism breaking light into many hues without destroying the light itself. In all likelihood, had Locke used the orchestral metaphor, he would have explicitly recognized racist exclusions, dangers, and risks associated with African American tones and timbres.

While Kallen did not address distinctions between race and ethnicity in his early conceptualization of cultural pluralism, he did note that color constituted a “problem” only when viewed in racist terms and he acknowledged Locke’s attempts to view cultural and spiritual production as a path to racial recognition and parity. Citing two essays, “Values and Imperatives” (1935) and “Pluralism and Ideological Peace” (1947), Kallen found in Locke’s philosophy of life a “view of human relations…bound to become more and more the hope and desire of the great majority of the peoples of the world.”

**Reasoning: Thinking Through Barriers to Pluralism**

Locke himself was not always so sanguine about the “peoples” of the nation, let alone “the peoples of the world.” Writing for The Journal of Negro Education in 1935, Locke argued for legal appeal and court action to counteract the “separate but equal” doctrine upholding school segregation. He cautioned that since social reform usually occurred in “jagged breaks, sudden advances, and inevitable set-backs of reaction,” the “program of gradualism” was a fallacy. Locke outlined three possible courses of action for African Americans: (1) pursue “approved” education for a chosen profession in the hopes that effort would be rewarded, (2) remain within the sphere of activity
for a specific racial, cultural, or ethnic group, or (3) challenge the assumptions of both assimilation and segregation in an attempt to construct democratic, cosmopolitan, and collaborative cultural groups.  

Locke believed that battles in education, which entailed either the equitable sharing of tax dollars for shared schools or equal accommodations for black and white students, would hinge on the school budget. He reasoned that schools would “pay a price for prejudice,” but not the full price economic parity would require, “for one of the main but concealed reasons for discrimination lodges in the idea that the Negro is not entitled to the same educational facilities as the white community.” Finding the courts more amenable to reasoned argument than parochial and political entities, Locke viewed even adverse rulings as useful in raising “the matter from the category of a vague social grievance to that of a public wrong.”

Despite the disadvantages of “mixed schools,” including “indifferent pedagogic attention from white teachers,” Locke believed that the advantages of integrated schools outweighed the disadvantages. Since “considerable and intimate association” between races already occurred within communities under conditions disadvantageous “to both groups,” Locke saw school as the “logical and perhaps the only effective instrument for corrective treatment of the situation.” School was a venue where “white or non-Negro students” might have positive associations with their African American peers.

Over seventy years later, writing amicus briefs for the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision on voluntary school desegregation cases in Louisville and Seattle, social science researchers Amy Stuart Wells, Jacquelyn Duran, and Terrenda White argued that, given segregated housing, worship, and social circles, public schools today are often the only places for meaningful, positive student “interactions with people of other races.” In addition, as Locke had hoped, they found that increased contact with people of other “races” or intergroup contact had long-term effects on both racial attitudes and societal structures (such as greater housing integration). With early intergroup experiences, students were more likely to be border crossers in their adult lives. Graduates in their studies reported that what they learned about getting along with people of different backgrounds “could not be learned from textbooks or films…they had to be in these schools on a daily basis, walking through the halls…”

Wells et al. argued that efforts to allow school children to cross racial boundaries “continue to be, the closest we have come as a society to trying to break down these barriers.” They suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision to curtail or restrict voluntary desegregation policies was “short sighted and irresponsible,” and they had strong reservations about Justice Kennedy proposals for “locating new school sites between racially distinct neighborhoods, redrawing school attendance zones, or targeting recruitment of students or faculty to schools of choice.” Sociologists Salvatore Saporito and
Deenesh Sohoni’s research using school, district, and neighborhood census data supports this reservation. Saporito and Sohoni have concluded that race-based classifications and restrictions may be necessary to reduce racial segregation given an increase in school voucher and choice programs.\textsuperscript{20} If Saporito and Sohoni’s conclusions are sound, the court’s ruling may guarantee fewer intergroup interactions and less understanding via shared educational experiences. Leaving the unequal funding issue unaddressed, this court decision may also fail to foster “positive associations” within public school settings, leaving both of Locke’s hopes for education unrealized.\textsuperscript{21}

Locke, the pragmatist, viewed even legal setbacks as potentially useful in the long term in bringing “public wrongs” to public attention. He also viewed short-term hardships as acceptable in the service of long-term goals. For example, hardships in the public school experiences of African American students and teachers were acceptable as an unfortunate but necessary prelude to greater racial parity. Locke argued that mixed schools, while less comfortable, would help condition non-white students to the stresses of the adult community. To address inevitable tensions, Locke called for “social education” as a crucial curricular addition.\textsuperscript{22} In 1944, amidst increased racial strife, Locke again challenged educators to bring clarity to issues of race.\textsuperscript{23}

While advocating proactive educational measures, Locke portrayed social responses to the “American race problem” as following a typical path “from philanthropic, paternalistic approaches and techniques of amelioration to reformist liberal sponsorship.” Then, after protest, self-assertion, and increased chauvinism, Locke claimed that a “realistic” interracial movement must “become intercultural, and transform itself into committees for amity and unity, with respect to all religious, and national as well as racial minorities.” Acknowledging the contributions of philanthropic organizations, including Carnegie Corporation sponsors with whom he had just collaborated, Locke also criticized such efforts as “one of the oldest and most conservative fronts of the racial situation.” He exhorted foundations to “think, talk and act so that every move creates a lessening rather than a deepening of the great interracial divide.”\textsuperscript{24}

Richard Bernstein has described the “primary legacy of the pragmatic tradition” as one of “practical commitment” to “reflective intelligence” as Dewey defined it: “the sum total of impulses, habits, emotions, records, and discoveries which forecast what is desirable and undesirable in future possibilities and which contrive ingeniously on behalf of imagined good.”\textsuperscript{25} A reflective intelligence, a capacity to “think, talk, and act” in the service of “imagined good” so central to the pragmatic tradition is evident in the way Locke used rhetoric to exhort schools and foundations to pursue greater racial parity. It is also clear in Locke’s support for the aesthetic accomplishments of the Harlem Renaissance. His rhetoric supported democratic community
building in response to race-based barriers to pluralism in both educational and aesthetic realms.

**Rhetoric: Speaking Through Barriers to Pluralism**

Robert Danisch has identified Locke’s style as epideictic, with its classical civic rhetorical displays, its careful use of praise and blame to expose values supporting community standards of excellence, and its emphasis on negotiation and transformation. Locke used his understanding of race-conscious aesthetics and his skill in deploying race-conscious rhetoric to promote pluralism as a crucial aspect of democratic living.26 As Bernstein has noted, in pragmatist thought, human life is shaped and reshaped by social practices. The themes of community and communication are central to the pragmatic vision. A community comes to be seen as “ours,” rather than “nature’s,” when we view it as “shaped” rather than “found.”27 Danisch has lamented that Locke’s “ancillary place in the development of pragmatist thought” misses the distinctive contributions of Locke’s treatment of race and his consideration of the “social function of art in creating community.”28

In Danisch’s analysis, Locke’s epideictic rhetoric addresses both “political-economic maldistribution” and “cultural misrecognition” using artistic expression, education, and the creation of public places for negotiating contributions of competing value systems.29 Since the effectiveness of epideictic rhetoric as civic discourse is dependent upon spaces for conversation about competing values and social visions, one of Locke’s unique contributions is his commitment to the practice of art as part of the display of social alternatives. In a realm that Myrdal labeled “economically subsidiary,” Locke found creative affirmation of heretofore lost traditions. He also saw possibilities for community-supported education with space for the formation of group identity and racial pride.

Locke supported aesthetic developments in Harlem as precursors to a public sphere wherein rhetorical processes could be used to weigh the relative merits of competing value systems. Seeing stable, universalistic, unchanging values as dangerous fictions, like the dangerous fictions of immutable race and ethnicity, Locke called for democratic exchanges in the creation of less rigid fictions based on both cultural reciprocity and shared humanity. This kind of democratic exchange, so highly valued by Locke’s pragmatist contemporaries, required that pluralism be “robust” enough to do justice to the “tangled quality of our experience.”30 Locke believed that philosophers of education, as intellectuals, could help citizens make sense of the imperatives motivating experience by revealing the “diversity of values, the functional adaptations of values to specific conditions, and the commonalities that unite different value systems.”31

Locke’s rejection of first principles in value determinations, his call for ongoing individual and community negotiation of values, and his use of epideictic rhetoric were natural outgrowths of his first major philosophical
work. Up until his death in 1954, Locke elaborated his theory of value in an expanding spiral, developing a philosophy of cultural pluralism within and among nations. This pluralistic cosmopolitan ideal did not preclude race-consciousness for dominated groups. The pragmatist Locke, well aware of constraints and consequences, deemed race pride a practical necessity in the stimulation of “collective activity” necessary for cultural, political, and economic equality within a nation shaped by the institution of slavery. Like Dewey, he held out hope for “a coherent view of nature and man based upon facts consonant with science and actual social conditions.”\textsuperscript{33} If pluralism entailed the risk of fragmentation and vulnerability to manipulative power, then this actual social condition could be recognized and addressed through group solidarity and racial pride.

Even so, the cosmopolitan pluralist Locke envisioned a time when artists would not be restricted by the need to self-consciously defend their race. Rather, all voices would have space and place to participate freely in the construction of national, civic identity. While Locke did not specify tactics for creating such places or negotiating across cultural differences, he did point to the efficacy of art and language in place of violence and intolerance.

In the pragmatist spirit, eschewing reified epistemological and metaphysical dichotomies, Locke called for introspection as well as ongoing negotiation with other races, cultures, and sects to keep race pride and race consciousness fluid. He advocated self-critique as well as self-expression in the aesthetic realm. Hoping to deepen the insights of the Harlem Renaissance while extending their reach to broader publics, Locke described the 1920s and 30s as containing elements of “pride without poise, vision without true perspective, self-esteem without the necessary tempering of full self-understanding.”\textsuperscript{34} Locke encouraged artists to attempt the “necessary alchemy” to portray “Negro life and experience in all the arts but with a third dimension of universalized common-denominator humanity.” He dared artists to write about the ambivalences of the Negro upper classes, about the dilemmas of intra-group prejudice and rivalry, about the dramatic inner paradoxes of mixed heritage or the tragic break between the Negro elite and the Negro masses, or the conflict between integration and vested-interest separatism in the present-day life of the Negro.

Locke called these “great themes” treated like “family skeletons” when they could “shine brightly as the Aladdin’s lamps that they really are.”\textsuperscript{35}

Locke envisioned an aesthetic consciousness strong enough to break external tyrannies of prejudice and internal tyrannies of self-censorship in the service of race parity and eventually ideological peace. His theory of valuation, with its respect for the distinctiveness of groups as well as individuals pushed notions of freedom and equality beyond the boundaries of provincial and
hegemonic value systems. His support for the Harlem Renaissance extended the power of reconceptualized “beauty” beyond a single set of ideals and beyond the aesthetic realm. Making full use of his life experiences, his rationality, and his rhetoric, Locke, along with W.E.B. DuBois, Zora Neale Hurston, Carter Woodson, Marcus Garvey, Richard Wright, Jessi Fauset, and Nella Larsen, helped to redefine the meaning of “Negro” through cultural, aesthetic expression as well as intellectual projects.36

CONCLUSION

Locke’s epideictic rhetoric in praise of pluralism was tempered by his deeply personal understanding of the arduous paths leading from race pride, through social and political backlashes, to an appreciation of differences essential to democratic ways of living. In the summer of 1944, Locke wrote:

If we can ever generally establish through education the implemented belief that “no one nation and no one race can and shall dominate the earth,” we will have broken the intellectual backbone of prejudice and certainly, so far as education is concerned, will have laid an intellectual foundation for effective democracy.37

This framing of race, education, and democracy includes traces of Locke’s value theory and cultural pluralism. Human tendencies to value absolutism and value tyranny, in Locke’s value theory, lead all too often to notions of national and racial superiority. These values, anchored in human feeling references shape belief and drive action. They are not separate from cognition, but part of the “intellectual backbone” supporting prejudice and unwarranted certainty. The role of education is to lay a different “intellectual foundation,” one that recognizes values embraced by members of racial, ethnic, cultural groups as worthy of democratic discussion. Affirming differences in the expression of values and similarities in shared feeling references, Locke seeks a basis for ongoing democratic discourse. In this discourse, pretensions to supremacy of race and nation are identified and addressed. Thus, he begins and ends with educational efforts to temper national and racial beliefs, diminishing the dangers of hubris and domination. In a single sentence, Locke captures his hopes for “implemented beliefs” in the service of cultural pluralism and ideological peace as well as his confidence in education as central to this implementation.

Compare Locke’s formulation in the sentence above with one of Myrdal’s concluding sentences in An American Dilemma. After documenting hundreds of ways “the Negro in America” had been systematically denied “the elemental civil and political rights of formal democracy,” Myrdal claims,

If the Negro could become finally integrated into modern democracy, all mankind would be given faith again[,] it would have reason to believe that peace, progress and order are feasible. And
America would have a spiritual power many times stronger than all her financial and military resources, the power of the trust and support of all good people on earth. America is free to choose whether the Negro shall remain her liability or become her opportunity.\(^38\)

In Myrdal’s formulation, racial integration in the United States does not lead to Locke’s notion of tempered national identity; instead, Myrdal promises spiritual powers, greater even than military and monetary might, leading to increased international support and trust. Where Myrdal emphasizes the possibility of increased spiritual strength, Locke emphasizes the need to counteract domination through education. Where Myrdal appeals to the nation’s sense of pride and international prestige, Locke identifies prejudice and certainty as problems in national and international arenas. Where Myrdal emphasizes a general freedom to choose, Locke emphasizes education for deliberative democracy.

How is it that Locke’s tempered vision with its integration of pluralism and pragmatism is not more widely acknowledged? It is true that Locke’s worldview, integrating insights from psychology, anthropology, and cultural history as well as classical philosophy, pluralism, and pragmatism, does not fit comfortably into a single conceptual category. He did not publish many pieces that have been classified as “philosophical.” But in his disciplinary boundary crossings, Locke resembles the philosophical pragmatist who does not believe that “philosophy can or should be some sort of superscience or even a distinctive discipline with its own well-defined set of problems.”\(^39\) Locke does not offer a promise of scientific or philosophical certainties. Locke does offer reflective appreciation for human expressions of beauty, truth, and goodness as well as careful, interdisciplinary examinations of the tyrannies that prevent such appreciation. Perhaps Locke is a philosopher better suited for a human race more at home with its manifold embodiments and capacities.

In Locke’s philosophical pluralism, values act as imperatives to actions. Without ongoing negotiation, values can lead to the tyranny of absolutism and rigid socio-cultural hierarchies. In Locke’s philosophical pragmatism, fluid racial and ethnic “fictions” created as we negotiate our value differences can help to refine our democratic sensibilities. Without ongoing negotiation, they can also crystallize into dangerous absolutisms and rigid essentialisms.\(^40\) In Locke’s world view, philosophers of education have the responsibility and the privilege of revealing values as imperatives, exploring the ways values function in our society, and using language to break the inner tyrannies and protective silences of our own time. Locke’s guiding pluralism, tempered by the pragmatists’ careful consideration of lived consequences, provides justification for ongoing negotiations at the intersection of art, race, education, and democracy as integral to philosophy of education.\(^41\)

2. Under the auspices of the Carnegie Corporation, Myrdal was asked to direct a “comprehensive study of the Negro in the United States, to be undertaken in a wholly objective and dispassionate way as a social phenomenon.” Despite this call for dispassion, Myrdal concluded after 1,439 pages of documentation that “the American Negro problem is a problem in the heart of the American” (emphasis in original). He called racism in the United States “nothing more and nothing less than a century-long lag of public morals.” Ibid., 24.


5. Throughout this essay, I have deliberately integrated phrases excerpted from Locke’s writings to provide a sense of his rhetorical style.

6. One of the tensions identified is between freedom and equality in the American Creed. According to Myrdal, the American Creed is a social ethos and political creed “made conscious to everyone in American society” and characterized as: a “unity of ideals” within “diversity of culture,” “equality of all men,” “freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and racial tolerance,” respect for the “essential dignity of individual human beings” and “inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and fair opportunity.” Myrdal, *American Dilemma*, 4 and 8.

7. Locke sometimes described his cultural pluralism as a “cultural relativism” that entailed learning to view one’s own culture as “relative” to other cultures. Such a view was an essential element of ideological peace in democratic societies. See Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Ideological Peace,” in *Freedom and Experience: Essays Presented to Horace M. Kallen*, ed. Milton Konvitz and Sidney Hook (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1947).


13. Ibid., 126 and 127.

14. Alain Locke, “The Dilemma of Segregation,” *The Journal of Negro Education* 4, no. 3 (1935): 406–11, 407. Locke argued against reliance on political alternatives, noting that the court system had through “the machinery of appeal more reliable access to a wider circle of public opinion beyond the local community and a firmer tradition of impartiality” (408).


17. Ibid., 411.


19. Ibid., 14, 17, and 2.


21. Some scholars have argued, as did Locke, that the way out of *de facto* separate but unequal schools is not necessarily through racial integration legislation, but through “educational adequacy” lawsuits arguing for the equitable funding of educational resources as the test of our commitment to the *Brown* decision. See, for example, Michael A. Rebell, “Equal Opportunity and the Courts,” *Phi Delta Kappan* 89, no. 6 (2008): 432–9.


24. Ibid., 400, 401, 402, and 404.


29. Ibid., 123.


35. Ibid., 394.


39. This description is taken from Bernstein’s characterization of the quintessential pragmatist in *Philosophical Profiles*, 17–8.

40. For a more extensive discussion of Locke’s views on absolutism see Terrance Macmullan, “Challenges to Cultural Diversity: Absolutism, Democracy, and Alain Locke’s Value Relativism,” *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 19, no. 2 (2005): 129–59. Locke argued, “Broadening our cultural values and tempering our orthodoxies is of infinitely more service to enlarged democracy than direct praise and advocacy of democracy itself. For until broadened by relativism and reconstructed accordingly, our current democratic traditions and practice are not ready for world-wide application.” Ibid., 130.