

# THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL RESTARTS



**LESSONS  
FROM FOUR  
INDIANAPOLIS  
SCHOOLS**



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## Executive Summary

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As districts across the country search for ways to turn around their lowest-performing schools, a growing number are partnering with external providers—often charter operators—to implement “restarts.” These providers receive operational autonomy and bring their own approach to schooling, positioning them to implement deep and meaningful changes. The school continues to serve the same community, and the provider contractually commits to raising student performance outcomes.

Restarts are appealing, but do they deliver on their promise? This report draws on data from four restarts in Indianapolis Public Schools (IPS) to identify successes and lessons learned for the field.

### About the Study

This report analyzes how enrollment, demographic, and student performance data changed at the restarts over time, and how those changes compared to other low-performing IPS schools in which the district was making significant improvement efforts. The research team also interviewed representatives from the district, restart operators, and The Mind Trust, a local education organization that played a key role in developing the Innovation Schools framework under which restarts operate. These interviews furthered the research team's understanding of the processes, challenges, and opportunities that restarts offer.

## Findings

The analyses and interviews described above led to five findings:

- 1. Enrollment trends offer positive signs.** Increases in both reenrollment rates and overall enrollment at the restarted schools suggest strong parent satisfaction. Moreover, the data show that the schools are mostly enrolling the same mix of students as before the restart.
- 2. Performance data from the longest-running restart suggest the possibility of large gains over time.** The impact of IPS's restarts on student performance outcomes has been mixed overall. However, at the first restart, begun in 2015–16, the average schoolwide growth score has increased each year in both ELA and math. Over three years, the score has increased by a total of more than 15 percentiles in both subjects.
- 3. Anecdotal evidence highlights the difficulty of restarting struggling schools.** The first three restarts from this study encountered substantial community concern, causing leaders to spend more time and energy than they anticipated communicating with families and community partners and hiring new staff. IPS has since hired a family and community engagement manager to help elevate community voice in the restart process. Even if they are serving students with a similar level of need, many charter operators acknowledge that restarting a chronically low-performing school entails challenges that starting a new school from the ground up does not.
- 4. Access to facilities provides districts a powerful enticement.** School operators noted that the

restart model offered them access to a low-cost facility. Without that, they may have not been able to open a school at all; with it, they were willing to pursue the difficult option of restart.

- 5. Disconnected data systems hamper evaluation.** District and charter operators generally “own” their data and seldom use the same data systems, making it difficult for operators—both district and charter—or researchers to evaluate initiatives. There are clear gaps in data systems as districts cease to be the sole providers of public education in a city.

## Recommendations

The findings support three recommendations for districts, states, and policymakers:

- 1. Engage the school community early and honestly.** So long as districts continue to pursue restarts, they should put as much thought and energy as possible into real and authentic community engagement from the very beginning.
- 2. Use your assets.** Access to district resources, such as facilities and local tax dollars, may push high-potential operators to work with districts in new and impactful ways, including taking responsibility for the difficult task of transforming chronically low-performing schools.
- 3. Build infrastructures that can support systems of schools across a city.** As more operators share responsibility for enrolling students in the same geography, city leaders must update their data infrastructures to serve students and families more seamlessly.



## The Impact of School Restarts: Lessons from Four Indianapolis Schools

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As districts struggle to turn around chronically low-performing schools, they frequently fail—in part because they fail to fundamentally change how the school operates. But districts also want to avoid closing struggling schools; neighborhood schools often sit at the heart of a community, and nearby excellent schools rarely, if ever, have enough empty seats to accommodate displaced students.

As districts across the country search for ways to turn around their lowest-performing schools, a growing number are partnering with external providers—often charter operators—to implement “restarts.” These providers receive operational autonomy and bring their own approach to schooling, positioning

them to implement deep and meaningful changes. The school continues to serve the same community, and the provider contractually commits to raising student performance outcomes.

Restarts are appealing, but do they deliver on their promise? This report draws on data from four restarts in Indianapolis Public Schools (IPS) to identify successes and lessons learned for the field. The research base is thin, and the results mixed (see Appendix A—Literature Review, page 24). This report aims to add to the field’s understanding by drawing on data from four Indianapolis restarts to evaluate their impact on student enrollment, mobility, demographics, and performance.

## Sparking Innovation in Indianapolis Public Schools

Indianapolis Public Schools (IPS) struggled to support high student achievement for many years. In 2013–14, of the 75 IPS schools that the state rated, 54 percent earned a D or worse.<sup>1</sup> Of those, 11 schools had received an F rating for two consecutive years, and their student test scores demonstrated low, no, or negative growth.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, the threat of state takeover loomed. The previous year, the Indiana Department of Education handed responsibility for four IPS schools over to private operators after the district failed to turn them around.<sup>3</sup>

It was against this backdrop that IPS's leadership began to change. IPS school board elections in 2012 and 2014 ushered in a number of new members. In 2013, Dr. Lewis Ferebee replaced the superintendent of eight years.<sup>4</sup> In March 2014, state legislators passed House Bill 1321, which allowed IPS to create Innovation Network Schools with greater flexibility to operate differently. With the support of the school board and other partners, Ferebee put the law into action.<sup>5</sup>

### Innovation Network Schools Offer Freedom and Support

Innovation Network Schools include district and charter schools, and both benefit from participating.<sup>6</sup> District schools receive greater autonomy, including autonomy over staff compensation, the school calendar, staffing positions, hiring criteria, and instructional practices. Meanwhile, Innovation status gives charter schools the ability to establish a more formal relationship with the district and gain access to several key district resources, including transportation and food services, and sometimes facilities as well. All Innovation schools, including district and charter, must organize a nonprofit board to oversee school operations and abide by all local, state, and federal laws, including those regarding special education and non-discrimination.

Innovation schools “combine the freedoms and flexibilities of successful autonomous schools with the financial support and services of a district

school,” said Brandon Brown, CEO of The Mind Trust, an Indianapolis education organization that played a key role in developing the Innovation schools idea.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, student performance at Innovation schools falls under the district for state accountability purposes, encouraging IPS to collaborate with strong operators.

There are four kinds of Innovation schools, which vary in terms of management and their pathway to Innovation school status (see Figure 1, page 5):

1. Existing or new **charter schools** can apply to become Innovation schools;
2. **New IPS district schools** can apply to start as Innovation schools;
3. **Existing IPS district schools** can convert to Innovation schools if they demonstrate strong leadership capacity and the current staff members want to convert; and
4. The district can partner with an **external operator** to restart a chronically low-performing district school, which then becomes an Innovation school.

The number of Innovation schools in IPS grew from five schools in 2015–16 to 20 schools in 2018–19 (see Figure 2, page 5).

### Restart Schools

IPS selected some of the district's lowest-performing schools for restart. By contracting with high-potential operators, IPS aimed to turn the schools around and give their students better options, while also allowing the district to maintain ultimate oversight of the schools.


Restarts differ most notably from other Innovation schools in three areas:

- \* **Facilities.** Restart charter operators have access to district facilities at the same cost as district-operated schools; other charters with Innovation status do not necessarily get that.
- \* **Zoned charters.** Unlike other charter schools in Indiana, restarts must give preference to students within residential boundaries. Hence, rather than opting into a restarted school, students zoned for

**FIGURE 1. OVERVIEW OF INNOVATION SCHOOLS**

	Type of Innovation School			
	Charters	New District	District Conversions	Restarts
Key School Characteristics	* New or existing charter schools	* New district schools	* Existing district schools, converted of own choosing	* Chronically low-performing district schools * External operator runs school
Benefits to operator	* Partnership with district, including access to some district services, like low-cost facilities and transportation	* Greater autonomy	* Greater autonomy	* Access to district facilities without lease or building costs * Access to IPS enrollment/students * Accountability clock reset

**FIGURE 2. GROWTH OF INNOVATION SCHOOLS**



the school are automatically enrolled unless they opt out. If space remains after accounting for zoned students, students zoned for other schools may also enroll.

\* **Accountability reset.** Since restarts are ultimately new schools, the accountability clock

resets—meaning state ratings before the restart do not apply. Moreover, beginning in 2019–20, restarts will not receive a rating for the first three years unless they request otherwise.<sup>8</sup> However, the restarted school must provide a timeline that outlines annual targets for academic improvements.

## WHAT'S DIFFERENT *INSIDE* A RESTARTED SCHOOL?

According to the operators featured in this report, the answer is—everything. The restart operators not only brought in new leadership teams and governance structures, but also renovated and re-branded buildings, introduced new curricula (including a bilingual program at one), adjusted the school day and calendar, and implemented new discipline policies and practices. Though existing teachers had an opportunity to re-apply for their positions, few did, and the restart operators hired a mostly new—if not entirely new—teaching staff. In addition, the operators invited parents into their buildings to see how they had changed in an effort to reset their relationship with families. Ultimately, the operators all aimed for the schools to both look and feel completely different, even as they continued to serve many of the same students.

## Analysis: Making Sense of the Data

Early research on Innovation schools shows promising results. Stanford's Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO) compared the learning growth that Indianapolis students attending different kinds of schools—including Innovation schools and traditional public schools—made relative to state averages.<sup>9</sup> The results show that in the most recent school year included in the study (2016–17), students attending traditional public schools made significantly less growth than the state average learning gains. In contrast, students attending Innovation schools made learning gains similar to the state average.<sup>10</sup> The published research, however, lumps all Innovation schools together in one category, so it's not possible to isolate the impact of restarts separately.

The rest of this report does just that, focusing on the first four Innovation restart schools—Phalen Leadership Academy @ 103 (PLA @ 103), Global Preparatory Academy (Global Prep), Kindezi Academy (Kindezi), and Ignite Achievement Academy (Ignite). It aims to identify successes and lessons useful for future restarts in IPS and elsewhere (for more on these four schools, see Figure 3, page 7

and “The Same, but Different,” page 7).<sup>11</sup> The study focuses on three research questions:

1. How have restarts affected student **enrollment and mobility**?
2. How have restarts affected student **demographics**?
3. How have restarts affected student **performance outcomes**?

To answer these questions, the research team received various student-level data from the Indiana Department of Education, including enrollment, demographic, and student performance data. The team then analyzed the data to observe how the metrics changed at each school since the restart began. In addition, the team compiled data across restart schools and compared them to other low-performing district schools where IPS was making significant improvement efforts, including four “priority schools” and four schools belonging to one of the district’s transformation zones (see “About the Comparison Schools,” page 8). The rest of this section presents the findings from those analyses.

**FIGURE 3. INDIANAPOLIS RESTARTS AS OF 2017–18 SCHOOL YEAR**

School Name	Previous School	Grades Served	First Year of Restart
PLA @ 103	Francis Scott Key 103	Pre K–6*	2015–16
Global Prep	Riverside 44	Pre K–6	2016–17
Kindezi	Joyce Kilmer 69	K–6	2016–17
Ignite	Elder Diggs 42	K–6	2017–18

\*In 2016–17, PLA @ 103 also served grade 7 (but not in subsequent years).

### THE SAME, BUT DIFFERENT

Though all are restarts, the governance structure and transition process differed for the schools featured in this report (see table below).

The first restart, PLA @ 103, began in 2015–16 and is technically still a district school using the same school ID as the school it replaced, Francis Scott Key 103. In contrast, the other restarts are all charter schools that the mayor’s Office of Education Innovation authorizes. As part of PLA’s agreement with IPS, it receives a management fee to operate the school *in addition* to its regular per-pupil funding, something no other restart receives (or will receive).<sup>12</sup>

Global Prep and Kindezi are phasing in as charter operators. Although they operate all grades within their respective buildings, only grades K–2 restarted as charter schools with a new school ID, because of restrictions in the charter contracts they received from their authorizer before IPS selected them as restart operators. IPS now has a contract with them to run the remaining grades as district schools under the original school IDs. Each year the charter side of the schools expands by one grade, while the district side of the schools shrinks by one grade so that all grades will eventually fall under the charter operator. But both IPS and the operators say the division between the district and charter sides of these schools is largely on paper, with little difference in practice between the two school sides. Both PLA @ 103 and Ignite restarted the whole school at once.

School Name	Governance	Transition Process
PLA @ 103	Contract	Whole school
Global Prep	Charter	Phase-in
Kindezi	Charter	Phase-in
Ignite	Charter	Whole school

## ABOUT THE COMPARISON SCHOOLS

For each of the analyses in this report, we compared the results of the restarted schools to Priority schools and schools belonging to the district's Transformation Zones.<sup>13</sup>

- \* **"Priority school"** is a federal designation meant to include the lowest 5 percent of Title I schools in each state, as defined by the state. All the Priority schools analyzed in this study had received an F rating from the state for two consecutive years and demonstrated low, no, or negative growth. These schools receive greater attention from the district, and often additional operating flexibility and resources to help them improve. Our comparison group includes the four schools designated as Priority schools beginning in the 2015–16 school year serving grades K–8.<sup>14</sup> All four of the restarted schools in this study were also designated as Priority schools (though they are not included in the Priority schools analysis).
- \* **IPS's Transformation Zones** include a struggling high school and a small set of feeder schools for which the district develops and implements a transformation strategy focused on district-led turnaround supports (rather than contracting with third parties to run the school). It launched in 2015–16 and represents the other major turnaround intervention IPS implemented aside from the Innovation Schools Network. Our analysis includes four Transformation Zone schools serving grades K–8 during the study period.<sup>15</sup>

## RESEARCH QUESTION 1. How have restarts affected student enrollment and mobility?

Restarts aim to give students who are attending or zoned for a failing school a better education. To meet that goal, however, those same students must actually enroll in the restarted school. We therefore examined the extent to which students eligible to reenroll at a restarted school did so, and how reenrollment rates have changed at the restarted schools over time.<sup>16</sup>

### RESTARTS REACHED JUST OVER HALF OF ELIGIBLE STUDENTS

For this measure, eligible students are defined as students who were enrolled at the school right before the restart began and were not in a terminal grade (the last grade the school serves). Restart success can be measured in part by the percentage of eligible students who reenrolled at the restarted schools and could therefore benefit from the intervention. Across the four restarts, 55 percent of

eligible students returned to the restarted school in year 1. As Figure 4 (page 9) shows, however, reenrollment rates were much lower at PLA @ 103 (35.8 percent) compared with the other three restarts (57.1 percent to 64.1 percent).

While a 55 percent reenrollment rate may seem low, looking back at the three years leading up to each restart shows that it was about average, and that reenrollment rates actually increased at Global Prep and Kindezi in year 1 (see Figure 5, page 10). Meanwhile at PLA @ 103, the reenrollment rate decreased by less in year 1 than it had the previous year.

### MORE RECENT ENROLLMENT TRENDS POSITIVE

Looking beyond year 1, reenrollment rates have increased at all three of the restarts that have at least two years of data; at two of the restarts, the rates increased by double digits. Reenrollment averaged 47 percent in the two years before Phalen @ 103 restarted. It surpassed 70 percent for each of the two most recent years (2016–17 and 2017–18)—an increase of more than 20 points (and double its

**FIGURE 4. REENROLLMENT OF ELIGIBLE\* STUDENTS IN RESTARTED SCHOOLS, YEAR 1**

School	Baseline Year	Students Eligible to Reenroll at End of Baseline Year	Eligible Students Who Did Reenroll in Year 1 of Restart	Percentage of Eligible Students Who Did Reenroll in Year 1 of Restart
Francis Scott Key / PLA @ 103	2014–15	299	107	35.8%
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	2015–16	401	257	64.1%
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	2015–16	296	177	59.8%
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	2016–17	354	202	57.1%
<b>All Restarts</b>		<b>1,350</b>	<b>743</b>	<b>55.0%</b>

\*The percentage of students who were enrolled at the school in the baseline year and were not in a terminal grade.

year 1 reenrollment rate). At Global Prep, reenrollment rates rose from about 50 percent to more than 65 percent. These increases were larger than both comparable schools and district-wide trends over the study period (see Figure 6, page 11).

At the same time, overall enrollment has increased at all four of the restarted schools, reversing

a negative trend in the years leading up to the restart (see Figure 7, page 11). In contrast, enrollment in Transformation Zone and Priority schools has largely remained steady for schools that remained open. (One school in the Transformation Zone restarted in 2018–19, and another closed.)

**SUMMARY: IMPACT ON STUDENT ENROLLMENT AND MOBILITY**

- \* Across the restarts, 55 percent of eligible students reenrolled in year 1, about equal to schools’ average reenrollment rate in the three years preceding restart.
- \* Reenrollment rates at all three restarts with two or more years of data have increased compared with the three years leading up to the restart, two of them by double digits.
- \* Overall enrollment at each of the restarted schools has increased, reversing a decline in enrollment before the restart.

**FIGURE 5. PERCENTAGE OF ELIGIBLE STUDENTS REENROLLING YEAR-OVER-YEAR IN RESTARTS VS. COMPARISON SCHOOLS, THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2017-18**

	Pre-Restart			Post-Restart			Change		
	-3 Years	-2 Years	-1 Years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	3-Yr Pre-Restart Avg.	Most Recent Year	Change
Francis Scott Key / PLA @ 103	N/A*	52.6%	41.0%	35.8%	72.0%	70.3%	46.8%	70.3%	23.5%
		N=344	N=410	N=299	N=379	N=408			
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	49.3%	49.8%	51.2%	64.1%	65.9%		50.1%	65.9%	15.8%
	N=430	N=404	N=373	N=401	N=495				
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	55.0%	52.8%	54.1%	59.8%	57.6%		54.0%	57.6%	3.6%
	N=422	N=390	N=338	N=296	N=349				
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	63.0%	56.7%	60.0%	57.1%			59.9%	57.1%	-2.8%
	N=511	N=492	N=492	N=354					
All Restarts	56.2%	53.2%	51.9%	55.0%			53.8%	55.0%**	1.3%
	N=1363	N=1630	N=1613	N=1350					
Transformation Zone Schools	N/A*	66.3%	63.7%	63.3%	67.9%	71.5%	65.0%	71.5%	6.5%
		N=2295	N=2358	N=2045	N=1943	N=2203			
Priority Schools	N/A*	65.4%	62.6%	63.8%	65.8%	67.5%	64.0%	67.5%	3.4%
		N=1808	N=1883	N=1800	N=1673	N=1653			

\*We did not have access to the 2011-12 enrollment data needed to calculate these reenrollment rates.

\*\*Based on most recent year for which all schools have data (Y1), rather than an average of the rows above.

Key	Change > 0, <=5 pts.	Change > 5, <=10 pts.	Change > 10, <=15 pts.	Change > 15 pts.
		Change < 0, >=-5 pts.	Change < -5, >=-10 pts.	Change < -10, >=-15 pts.

**FIGURE 6. PERCENTAGE OF ELIGIBLE STUDENTS REENROLLING AT THE SAME SCHOOL YEAR-OVER-YEAR, ALL PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN IPS, 2013-18**

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Not avail.	69.7%	70.9%	71.4%	73.2%	74.1%

Key	Increase compared to previous year
	Decrease compared to previous year

**FIGURE 7. CHANGE IN STUDENT ENROLLMENT, RESTARTS VS. COMPARISON SCHOOLS, THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2018–19**

	Pre-Restart			Post-Restart				Change		
	-3 Years	-2 Years	-1 Years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	3-Yr Pre-Restart Avg.	Most Recent Year	Change
Francis Scott Key / PLA @ 103	296	527	341	383	448	461	451	388	451	63
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	494	421	421	527	549	673		445	673	228
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	459	376	323	372	387	395		386	395	9
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	534	517	481	501	534			511	534	23
All Restarts	1783	1841	1566	1783	1918			1730	1918*	188
Transformation Zone Schools	3070	2924	2894	2407	2598	2462	1949**	2963	1949**	-1,014
Priority Schools	1925	2112	1933	1954	1837	1939	1716	1990	1716	-274

\*Based on most recent year for which all schools have data (Y1), rather than an average of the rows above.

\*\*In 2018–19, one Transformation Zone school (Wendell Phillips) restarted as an Innovation school and another (George Washington Jr. High School) closed, accounting for much of the decline in enrollment across Transformation Zone schools that year.

Key		Increase in enrollment compared to previous year
		Decrease in enrollment compared to previous year

## RESEARCH QUESTION 2. How have restarts affected student demographics?

If restarts continue to serve the same students and neighborhoods, they should enroll a similar mix of students as the previous school unless the neighborhood is also changing. Significant changes in subgroup representation would suggest that the restart may be attracting particular types of students, or that other groups may be discouraged from enrolling. Hence, we examined how the students who reenrolled at the restarted school in the first year of the restart resembled (or did not resemble) the mix of students enrolled the year before the restart. We also analyzed how student demographics at the restarted schools changed over time.

### STAYERS MOSTLY RESEMBLE STUDENT BODY BEFORE RESTART

Eligible students who reenrolled in the restarted schools (“Stayers”) largely exhibited the same characteristics as all students eligible to reenroll at the school the year before the restart (see Figure 8, page 13), indicating that the restarts were not more likely to recruit or retain any particular kinds of students. The percentage of Stayers who identified as black or Hispanic, qualified for free or reduced-priced lunch, or had limited English proficiency were all within 1.6 percentage points of the broader student body in the baseline year.

### DISTRICT RETAINED SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS AT TWO RESTARTS

The data contain, however, one notable exception: Across the restarted schools—largely due to two of the schools—just 13.2 percent of Stayers were in special education, compared with 17.8 percent of all students enrolled in the baseline year—a difference of 4.6 percentage points. That difference was more than twice that of any other subgroup (see Appendix B, page 25). At PLA @ 103, students in special education made up 22 percent of students eligible

to reenroll the year before the school restarted, but they were just 11 percent of Stayers—a decrease of 50 percent. Similarly, students in special education at Ignite represented 22 percent of students eligible to reenroll, but only 13 percent of Stayers—a decrease of 9 percentage points.

According to district staff, the shift mostly reflects the fact that IPS retained control of the special education programs at those schools—self-contained classrooms serving students with some of the greatest needs, including life skills classes for older students and developmental pre-K—rather than any decisions the new operators made. One such program moved from Phalen @ 103 to another IPS school. Meanwhile, the two programs at Ignite continued in the building, but remained part of IPS’s local education agency, the legal entity responsible for the students and implementing their individualized education programs.

### CHANGES IN STUDENT DEMOGRAPHICS AT RESTARTS MOSTLY FOLLOW CITYWIDE TRENDS OVER TIME

Figure 9 (page 13) considers how student demographics have changed throughout the restarted schools over time. It shows where student enrollment at each restart and comparison group rose or fell by more than 10 percentage points *beyond* the change across all public schools located in the IPS boundaries.<sup>17</sup> For example, at Kindezi, the percentage of black students enrolled in the three years prior to the restart through 2018–19 decreased by 7.3 percentage points, while it decreased by 4 percentage points across all public schools in the IPS boundaries over the same period, for a net change of 3.3 percentage points (see Appendix C1, page 26). Since 3.3 is less than 10, an “o” appears in that cell.

Changes in student demographics at restarted schools closely track other public schools in the area, as is evident in the many cells marked “o” in Figure 9 (see also Appendix C, page 26).<sup>18</sup>

**FIGURE 8. STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS ALL RESTARTS, ALL STUDENTS IN THE BASELINE YEAR VS. REENROLLED STUDENTS (“STAYERS”) IN YEAR 1**

Student Subgroup	Percent of All Students Enrolled Baseline Year (N=1303)	Percent of Reenrolled Students (“Stayers”), Year 1 (N=743)	Change (Percentage Points)
Black	76.4%	77.8%	1.4%
Hispanic	15.0%	15.5%	0.4%
Free & Reduced-Price Lunch	84.5%	86.1%	1.6%
Limited English Proficiency	6.2%	6.6%	0.4%
Special Education	17.8%	13.2%	-4.6%

**Notes**

- If demographic data were not available for a particular student in the baseline year, we used the demographic data for the same student from year 1.
- Number of students captured in Figure 8 does not match the number in Figure 4 because demographic data were not available for some students for whom we had enrollment data.

**FIGURE 9. CHANGE IN STUDENT DEMOGRAPHICS AT SCHOOL ABOVE CHANGE ACROSS ALL PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE IPS BOUNDARIES, THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2018–19**

	Black	Hispanic	FRL	ELL	SPED
Francis Scott Key / PLA @ 103	o	o	o	o	-
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	-	+	-	+	o
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	o	o	o	o	o
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	o	o	o	o	o
All Restarts	o	o	o	o	o
Transformation Zone Schools*	o	o	o	+	o
Priority Schools	o	o	o	o	o

\*In 2018–19, one Transformation Zone school (Wendell Phillips) restarted as an Innovation school and another (George Washington Jr. High School) closed, so calculations for Transformation Zone schools in 2018–19 do not include them.

Key	+	Change in student representation increased $\geq 10$ pts. above change across all public schools in the IPS boundaries
	-	Change in student representation decreased $\geq 10$ pts. above change across all public schools in the IPS boundaries

But there are two notable exceptions. First, the percentage of students in special education has decreased by a larger amount at PLA @ 103 (see Figure 9, page 13, and Appendix C, Figure C9, page 30). As noted earlier, however, that decrease likely reflects the fact that the school previously housed a center for students with special needs.

Second, at Global Prep, school leaders have intentionally recruited Hispanic students to attend its dual-language program. As a result, the percentage of Hispanic and ELL students has increased at Global Prep by larger amounts than at other schools, while the percentage of black students has decreased by a larger amount (see Figure 9, page 13 and Appendix C, page 26). Since overall student enrollment also increased at Global Prep, however, the *number* of black students did not change as dramatically. In fact, more black students enrolled in the first two years following the restart than in the baseline year. The percentage of students qualifying for free and reduced-priced lunch also increased substantially at Global Prep as student enrollment grew and student demographics have shifted more broadly.

#### SUMMARY: RESTARTS AND STUDENT DEMOGRAPHICS

- \* Stayers largely resembled the demographic make-up of all students eligible to reenroll at the restarted schools in the baseline year.
- \* Changes in student demographics at restarted schools have largely followed citywide trends, except when the district moved or retained responsibility for centers for students with special needs that had been located within a restarted school, or when the school intentionally recruited students of a different demographic.

#### A LINGERING QUESTION: ARE NEIGHBORHOOD STUDENTS ENROLLING IN THE RESTARTS AT THE SAME RATES?

The research team had also hoped to answer another question related to enrollment and mobility: Are the restarted schools continuing to serve students from the same neighborhoods? School choice options for students residing in IPS have been increasing over the past decade, however. In 2011–12, three years before the first restart began, there were just 16 charter schools in Indianapolis. IPS also had about a dozen magnet schools. By 2019–20, families could choose from among 38 charter schools, 18 Innovation schools, and 32 district “choice” programs open to students across the district for the 2019–20 school year.<sup>19</sup>

With the increased opportunities for students to go somewhere other than their zoned school, differences in the percentage of students from a particular catchment area enrolled in a neighborhood school may not reflect changes in parents’ attitudes about the school, but rather changes in the options available to them. Our analysis of Research Question 2 shows, however, that with few exceptions, the demographic make-up of the students enrolled at the restarted schools is similar to that before the restart, suggesting that the schools largely pull students from the same neighborhoods.

### RESEARCH QUESTION 3. How have restarts affected student performance outcomes?

The ultimate goal of any restart is to improve the performance outcomes of the students who attend the school above what they would have achieved academically at the original school. To that end, the research team analyzed student growth percentiles (SGP). SGPs assign students a score from 1 to 99, indicating how much growth the student made relative to students performing similarly at the end of the previous school year (per the state exam). For example, a student who receives an SGP of 50 made more growth than 50 percent of students performing similarly at the end of the previous school year.

Indiana students receive an SGP in grades 4–8 so long as they take the state exam each year.

For this study, we analyzed how the mean SGP<sup>20</sup> for students who reenrolled at the restarted schools (“Stayers”) compared to those who were eligible to stay, but chose to leave (“Leavers”), as well as how the mean SGP changed for all students attending the schools year-over-year.<sup>21</sup>

#### STAYERS AND LEAVERS BOTH DEMONSTRATED GROWTH

Figure 10 shows how mean SGPs changed among Stayers and Leavers with SGP data in the baseline year and year 1. Stayers’ mean SGP generally increased in year 1, improving an average of 6.7

**FIGURE 10. CHANGE IN MEAN SGP, STAYERS V. LEAVERS, BASELINE TO YEAR 1**

		Change in Mean SGP from Baseline to Year 1	
		ELA	Math
PLA @ 10	Stayers	11	-0.9
	Leavers	27.3*	20.6*
	Stayers-Leavers	-16.3	-21.5
Global Prep	Stayers	12.9*	13.2*
	Leavers	7.1	23.1*
	Stayers-Leavers	5.8	-9.9
Kindezi	Stayers	1	11.2
	Leavers	12.3	11.1
	Stayers-Leavers	-11.3	0.1
Ignite	Stayers	4.1	-11.6*
	Leavers	14.2	10.1
	Stayers-Leavers	-10.2	-21.7
All Restarts	Stayers	6.7*	3.3
	Leavers	15.4*	16.6*
	Stayers-Leavers	-8.7	-13.2*

**Note.** “Stayers” defined as students eligible to reenroll at the end of the baseline year who did reenroll. To be included in the dataset, Stayers also had to have an SGP in the baseline year and in year 1. In addition, their SGP score in year 1 had to be linked to the restarted school. In contrast, “Leavers” were eligible to reenroll at the end of the baseline year, but did not reenroll. They also had to have SGP data for the baseline year and year 1, though their SGP in year 1 could not be linked to the restarted school.

<b>Key</b>	*	Change is significant at $p < 0.05$
	Green	Change within group is positive / Change of Stayers is larger than change of Leavers
	Orange	Change within group is negative / Change of Stayers is less than change of Leavers

percentiles in ELA and 3.3 percentiles in math across the restarts, although only the gains in ELA were statistically significant. Leavers made even larger gains, however, improving by an average of 15.4 and 16.6 percentiles in ELA and math, respectively; both were statistically significant. The difference between the gains Leavers made compared to Stayers (the difference-in-difference) was also statistically significant, though not the difference in ELA gains. (For additional detail, see Appendices D1 and D2, page 31.)

Analyzing data for Stayers and Leavers with two years of post-restart growth data<sup>22</sup> shows that both groups improved their mean SGPs in ELA and math, though the gains were larger (and significant)

for Leavers in ELA and larger (and significant) for Stayers in math (see Figure 11, below). Overall, the impact of restarts on mean SGP of Stayers is unclear. Stayers demonstrated growth after the restart, but so did Leavers, and the difference between their growth (difference-in-differences) was not significant after two years. (For additional detail, see Appendices D3 and D4, page 32).

### SCHOOLWIDE GROWTH ACROSS RESTARTS UNEVEN, WITH STRONGEST POSITIVE RESULTS AT PLA @ 103

Year-over-year changes in mean SGP at the school level were also mixed (see Figures 12 and 13, pages 17 and 18, respectively). The strongest positive

**FIGURE 11. CHANGE IN MEAN SGP, STAYERS VS. LEAVERS, BASELINE TO YEAR 2**

		Change in Average SGP from Baseline to Year 2	
		ELA	Math
PLA @ 103	Stayers	13.5	28.6
	Leavers	13.8	24.6*
	Stayers-Leavers	-0.3	3.9
Global Prep	Stayers	-2.4	27.8*
	Leavers	16.3	36.4*
	Stayers-Leavers	-18.7	-8.6
Kindezi	Stayers	12.3	27.6*
	Leavers	10.1	20.7
	Stayers-Leavers	2.2	6.9
All Restarts	Stayers	4.4	27.9*
	Leavers	13.3*	26.1
	Stayers-Leavers	-8.9	1.8

**Note.** “Stayers” defined as students eligible to reenroll at the end of the baseline year who did reenroll. To be included in the dataset, Stayers also had to have an SGP in the baseline year, year 1, and year 2. In addition, their SGP scores in year 1 and year 2 had to be linked to the restarted school. In contrast, “Leavers” were eligible to reenroll at the end of the baseline year, but did not reenroll. They also had to have SGP data for the baseline year, year 1, and year 2, though their SGP scores in year 1 and year 2 could not be linked to the restarted school.

<b>Key</b>	*	Change is significant at $p < 0.05$
		Change within group is positive / Change of Stayers is larger than change of Leavers
		Change within group is negative / Change of Stayers is less than change of Leavers

**FIGURE 12. CHANGE IN MEAN ELA SGP, RESTARTS VS. COMPARISON SCHOOLS, THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2017–18**

	Pre-Restart			Post-Restart			Change Over Time		
	-3 Years	-2 Years	-1 Years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3*	3-Yr Baseline Average	Most Recent Restart Year	Change
Francis Scott Key / PLA	30.8 N=109	35.4 N=85	36.1 N=69	41.3 N=95	43.4 N=144	51.3 N=142	34.1	51.3	17.2
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	45.2 N=120	36.7 N=110	43.6 N=144	52.7 N=153	40.3 N=162				41.8
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	41.6 N=142	42.3 N=116	40.9 N=113	36.1 N=114	38.1 N=135		41.6	38.1	-3.6
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	38.0 N=156	46.7 N=156	43.8 N=146	45.6 N=187			42.8	45.6	2.8
All Restarts	39.1 N=527	41.2 N=467	41.9 N=472	44.9 N=549			40.7	44.9*	4.1
Transformation Zone Schools	39.2 N=1396	35.7 N=1311	39.4 N=1105	45.4 N=1002	43.3 N=1079	42.0 N=1042	38.1	42.0	3.9
Priority Schools	41.4 N=629	49.0 N=593	49.9 N=624	42.8 N=621	44.4 N=657	40.1 N=805	46.8	40.1	-6.7

\*Based on most recent year for which all schools have data (Y1), rather than an average of the rows above.

Key	Change > 0, <=5 pts.	Change > 5, <=10 pts.	Change > 10, <=15 pts.	Change >15 pts.
		Change < 0, >=-5 pts.	Change < -5, >=-10 pts.	Change < -10, >=-15 pts.

**FIGURE 13. CHANGE IN MEAN MATH SGP, RESTARTS VS. COMPARISON SCHOOLS, THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2017–18**

	Pre-Restart			Post-Restart			Change Over Time		
	-3 Years	-2 Years	-1 Years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3*	3-Yr Baseline Average	Most Recent Restart Year	Change
Francis Scott Key / PLA	26.2 N=112	30.6 N=83	22.5 N=70	23.3 N=95	45.7 N=139	43.7 N=144	26.4	43.7	17.2
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	41.2 N=122	27.1 N=110	34.1 N=145	43.1 N=154	51.8 N=170				
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	42.3 N=146	35.1 N=124	29.7 N=117	30.7 N=116	29.5 N=141		35.7	29.5	-6.2
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	32.8 N=161	30.0 N=163	40.1 N=147	23.6 N=191			34.3	23.6	-10.7
All Restarts	35.9 N=541	30.8 N=480	33.2 N=479	30.4 N=556			33.3	30.4*	-2.8
Transformation Zone Schools	40.5 N=1414	34.4 N=1349	38.1 N=1164	44.5 N=1022	38.0 N=1120	43.6 N=1086	37.7	43.6	5.9
Priority Schools	41.7 N=620	49.6 N=613	43.7 N=635	34.4 N=633	34.9 N=654	41.8 N=821			

\*Based on most recent year for which all schools have data (Y1), rather than an average of the rows above.

Key	Change > 0, <=5 pts.	Change > 5, <=10 pts.	Change > 10, <=15 pts.	Change >15 pts.
		Change < 0, >=-5 pts.	Change < -5, >=-10 pts.	Change < -10, >=-15 pts.

results come from PLA @ 103, where the restart has been in place longest. By 2017–18, the mean SGP there increased by more than 17 percentiles in both ELA and math compared with the three-year average pre-restart.<sup>23</sup> Global Prep also made large gains in math in 2017–18, increasing more than 17 percentiles. After strong ELA growth in year 1, however, Global Prep’s mean SGP dropped from 52.7 to 40.3. Ignite made modest gains in ELA, but experienced declines in math growth since restarting, and growth declined at Kindezi in both subjects.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, Transformation Zone and Priority schools have had mixed results.

#### SUMMARY: RESTARTS AND STUDENT PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES

- \* Overall, the impact of restarts on the mean SGP of Stayers is unclear. Stayers demonstrated growth after the restart, but so did Leavers, and the difference between their growth was not significant after two years.
- \* Year-over-year growth has varied across restarts, but gains have been largest and most consistent at Phalen @ 103, where the restart has been in place longest.

#### BALANCING IMPACT AND COST

Impact on student outcomes is always the top priority when developing a school improvement initiative. But school improvement efforts can only persist if they are funded sustainably. How much does IPS invest in its restarts, and where does the funding come from?

There are no continuing costs to IPS for most of the restarts themselves. The one exception is Phalen @ 103, where IPS pays an annual management fee of about 10 percent of per-pupil revenue. IPS will not pay management fees to other operators, so these costs will not grow. In addition, however, philanthropic dollars contribute about \$500,000 annually for the salaries and benefits of several district-level staff positions supporting Innovation Schools (including not only restarts, but new, charter, and conversion schools). The district plans to absorb these costs eventually, though it is not clear when.

The other interventions included in this study also incur costs, though it is not always easy to pin down the amounts or sources, which may vary from year to year. For example, IPS has applied for and received state grant funding to support its Transformation schools. In 2018–19, this grant funding gave Transformation schools about \$160,000 each. Similarly, Priority schools are eligible for some state and federal grants that target school improvement efforts.

In addition, several schools in the Transformation Zone receive a “strategic supplement” each year from the district’s General Fund. The supplement is not specific to Transformation Zone schools, however; any district school with a highly transient student population that is also undergoing an intervention is eligible. And as with Innovation schools, private funders have also supported Transformation Zone schools financially, including paying for consulting support for some schools. Since those funds did not flow through the district, though, IPS has no way of tracking them.

These examples lead to a few takeaways. First, most improvement efforts require some amount of additional funding, if only in the beginning. Second, private dollars often play a key role. However, it can be difficult to compare costs across initiatives because those costs are seldom tracked in a consistent way, and some dollars do not flow through the district. Ultimately, though, districts must be able to fund an initiative through regular per-pupil funding to sustain it over the long term.

## Discussion: Considering the Data in the Broader Context

This study aimed to identify successes and lessons useful for future IPS school improvement efforts, as well as the efforts of others using or considering the restart model. Recognizing that the four restarts we analyzed for this study are all relatively new, we find the following:

**1. Enrollment trends offer positive signs.** Increases in both reenrollment rates and overall enrollment suggest strong parent satisfaction with the restarted school. Moreover, the data show that the schools are mostly enrolling the same kinds of students they enrolled before the restart, suggesting that the intervention is largely reaching the students it was designed to help.

**2. Performance data from longest-running restart suggest the possibility of large gains over time.** The impact of IPS's restarts on student performance have been mixed overall, with student growth improving in some schools and subjects, but not in others. However, the longest-running restart—PLA @ 103—offers reasons to be optimistic. The schoolwide mean SGPs in both ELA and math have increased each year, for a change of more than 15 percentiles in each subject compared with the three-year baseline. If PLA @ 103 can sustain these gains and other restarts can replicate them, they would provide strong evidence to support the restart model's efficacy in IPS.

**3. Anecdotal evidence highlights the difficulty of restarting struggling schools.** Restarts are unlike most other school improvement efforts in that they bring an entirely new operator into an established school community. Hence, in addition to addressing the deep structural challenges a struggling school faces in instructional quality and school culture, the operators must also negotiate a major governance transition with teachers, parents, and students.

The restarts at PLA @ 103, Global Prep, and Kindezi all encountered significant community concern, causing leaders to spend more time and energy than they anticipated in communicating with families and

community partners (see “The Road to Restart,” pages 21–22). School leaders also had to recruit and hire far more teachers than they had hoped because only one of the original teachers from any of those schools reapplied for her job.

Many charter operators acknowledge that dramatically changing a school's culture is much more difficult with hundreds of students in multiple grades than in a new school growing just one grade at a time. Both IPS and restart leaders have learned valuable lessons from these experiences—several of which improved the transition process for Ignite. Nonetheless, many still consider restarting a chronically low-performing school to be much more difficult than starting a school from the ground up, even if they serve students with the same level of need.

**4. Access to facilities gives districts a powerful enticement.** If restarts are so difficult, then why did the operators in this study decide to take on the challenge? For one, they all have an unwavering commitment to serving the students of Indianapolis and meeting student needs wherever they exist. As these operators prepared to open new schools, those needs were greatest in the schools designated for restart. Moreover, all the restart operators had participated in paid, yearlong fellowships with The Mind Trust to help them lead Innovation schools, and The Mind Trust was now asking them to answer the district's call for restarts.

At the same time, the operators also noted that the restart model offered a precious commodity—access to a low-cost facility—and that without access to that facility, they may have not been able to open a school at all; with it, they were willing to pursue the difficult option of restart.

**5. Disconnected data systems hamper evaluation.** For this project, the research team was fortunate to work with IPS and the Indiana Department of Education, which holds state test results for every public school student in the state, and to whom all operators must report many key metrics using a consistent format. Had the department denied the team's data request, it would have had to establish data-sharing agreements with each of the dozens of charter operators in the city, and even then, the

data would have likely arrived in a variety of forms. Similarly, IPS could not have conducted this analysis without also requesting data from the state or coordinating multiple charter operators. As districts cease to be the sole providers of public education in a city, clear gaps in data systems are emerging.

As so often happens in studies like this one, the analysis also led to new questions requiring more information. For example, why did parents choose to enroll in the restarted schools if they did not yet have evidence of operator success? Similarly, why did other parents choose to enroll their children in a different school, and how did they decide where to

enroll them? What are the longer term effects of the restarts on student outcomes, both for the students enrolled at the schools when the restart happened, as well as the students who enrolled (or chose to enroll elsewhere) over time? And what are the implications of these findings on the way a district should approach their chronically low-performing schools? In the future, interviews with parents and students would provide important insights, in addition to analyzing the same data over a longer period of time and additional student and school performance metrics.

## THE ROAD TO RESTART

The road to restart in IPS was a bumpy one at first. Restarts were a new tool, and the Innovation Network Schools model was a new governance structure. Many parents did not know what to make of the effort, and the district struggled with how best to communicate with parents and incorporate their voices into the restart process.

As a result, the first restarts struggled to earn deep and authentic community buy-in. According to school leaders, many parents and teachers did not initially understand what it meant to be an Innovation school or why their school was targeted for restart, which in turn fueled misinformation. Many parents felt like the restart was something done to them, rather than something they chose, even when state takeover was the most likely alternative, school leaders said. And in the first three restarts, only one teacher reapplied for her job, a setback for operators who had hoped to retain a core group of teachers.

### *Changing Course at IPS*

The new leader of a restarted school arguably plays the most influential role communicating with and reaching out to the school community during the transition period. The district also has a role, however, and IPS recognized that it had misstepped along the way. After difficult rollouts in the first two rounds, it hired a family and community engagement manager to focus specifically on elevating community voice in the restart process. Her initial work aimed to systematize parts of the restart process so that the rationale behind different decisions would be more transparent, to provide opportunities for community members to ask questions (and vent) early on so they could move quickly to problem-solving, and to work with community groups who could lead difficult but necessary conversations.

As IPS began the process of restarting Elder Diggs 42, community investment was a primary focus for it and its restarting partner, Ignite Achievement Academy. Once the school community learned in January that the restart was likely, Ignite's founders and IPS representatives began hosting town hall meetings at the school and at other community venues, like churches, and listening to parents,

*(continued on next page)*

## **THE ROAD TO RESTART** *(continued from previous page)*

community members, advocacy leaders, and others in the school community. Attendance grew with each meeting, allowing community members to ask questions and dispel misinformation. These efforts culminated with a community “Back to School Block Party” where dozens of families came out for fellowship, to meet the staff, and to enroll.

### ***Winning Neighborhood Support***

Meanwhile, leaders at the first three restarts worked to reintroduce themselves to the community and persuade families to consider their neighborhood schools. For example, PLA was announced as the new operator of Francis Scott Key @ 103 in March. In April, it hosted its first community event to offer families a chance to talk with school staff directly as rumors swirled in the neighborhood. Throughout the spring, PLA also held office hours from its space within 103 open to anyone.

Over the summer, PLA improved the building, including mending fencing, replacing playground equipment, painting walls, and remodeling bathrooms. When the cosmetic work was done in July, PLA invited families back into the building for a “reveal,” showing how much was already different (and better) at the school. PLA then held another event in August to welcome students and their families back.

Though the details differ at each school, the goal was the same: reset the school’s relationship with the community and show how good the restart was for students and families.



KIMBERLY FARMER ON UNSPLASH

## Recommendations for District, Cities, and States

It will take more time to know the full impact of IPS's restarted Innovation schools. But even the first few years offer lessons for other districts, cities, and states adopting the restart model:

**1. Engage the school community early and honestly.** Districts pursuing restarts should always put as much energy as possible into real and authentic community engagement from the very beginning. The experience of IPS and others repeatedly highlights the difference it makes when a school community supports a restart.<sup>25</sup> Though community engagement will vary from place to place, the *School Restart Authorization Process Guide* outlines two main steps.<sup>26</sup> First, conduct a broad community conversation about the vision for student success and commit to a comprehensive intervention for low-performing schools (including restarts) as a way to build support for and a sense of urgency around the need for dramatic change. Second, clearly define the role for community members in selecting a new operator. Members of the community do not need to choose the new operator, but the district gives them clear expectations and opportunities to share concerns and generate solutions. As the IPS example demonstrates, it is often best for the district to take a step back and let individuals and organizations that have credibility with families and the neighborhood lead this work.

**2. Use your assets.** Examples abound of districts and charter operators at odds with each other.<sup>27</sup> And many of the most contentious fights center on school siting and access to district facilities. IPS's Innovation schools strategy represents a different approach: partnership. IPS needed high-quality operators to transform its lowest-performing schools, and it was willing to give them access to facilities at

the same rate as its own schools to do so. Although this exchange may seem like an obvious solution, it is still an outlier nationally. Districts should take this opportunity to use their assets in partnering with nonprofit operators to meet their students' needs.

**3. Build infrastructures that can support systems of schools across a city.** Indianapolis is just one of a growing number of cities where nonprofit operators now enroll a substantial percentage of public school students. In 2016–17, for example, charter schools enrolled at least 20 percent of public-school students in nearly 60 cities.<sup>28</sup> As more operators share responsibility for enrolling students in the same area, cities must update their infrastructures to serve students and families more seamlessly. More specifically, this report highlighted the need for data systems that allow districts, operators and other education champions to track students across different school types so they can identify what's working and what's not.

## Conclusion

Chronically low-performing schools are an all-too-familiar challenge with too few solutions. Presented with the options of closing its lowest-performing schools or implementing a district turnaround, IPS instead proposed a new option—restart. Since then, charter operators have taken the helm of six schools the district once ran.

At this point, it is not yet clear what impact IPS's restarts will have on student performance outcomes. But the district's first restart within the Innovation Schools Network offers reason for optimism, and even as policymakers wait to see how IPS's restarts perform over time, their experience offers keen insights and lessons for other districts interested in pursuing the same "third option."

## Appendix A. Literature Review

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Most restart studies evaluate their impact on student performance, with mixed conclusions. Using matched samples for students in 11 charter restarts in New Orleans and one in Boston, a 2016 study concluded that charter restarts were more effective than other less-aggressive improvement efforts, and that students who passively enroll in charters (by virtue of already being enrolled at the restarted school) benefit on a scale equal to students who apply to charters by lottery.<sup>29</sup> Another 2016 study also matched students in restarted schools with similar students in other low-performing schools, and it too found that charter restarts in New Orleans led to student gains.<sup>30</sup> However, their research concluded that the opposite was true of restarts in Baton Rouge. The authors attributed the contrast to differences in the quality of the restarted school.

Similarly, a three-year evaluation of Philadelphia's Renaissance Schools Initiative determined that most of the restarts operated by Mastery Charter Schools and ASPIRA Schools were on track to make dramatic improvements within five to six years, though performance at several other charter restarts was inconsistent.<sup>31</sup> But an evaluation of Tennessee's Achievement School District using a

difference-in-differences approach found that restarts had either no effect on student achievement, or, in some cases, a negative effect.<sup>32</sup>

Restarts generally intend not just to improve student performance, but to do so for a very specific group of students—those enrolled in a failing school. Yet several studies examining student reenrollment in restarts show that reenrollment rates can vary widely. In a study of five charter-to-charter restarts, reenrollment rates ranged from 40 percent to 90 percent.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, reenrollment rates at a series of Chicago restarts that the Academy or Urban School Leadership (AUSL) operates ranged from 57 percent to 77 percent.<sup>34</sup> Meanwhile, Wolford et al. (2013) found that reenrollment in Philadelphia's charter restarts was about 80 percent, and the percentage of English language learners decreased by a small but statistically significant amount, while the percentage of students with an IEP increased by a small but statistically significant amount. Reenrollment rates were lower in New Orleans and Baton Rouge—48 percent and 59 percent respectively—but the demographics of students who reenrolled and those who did not were not substantially different (Bross et al., 2016).

## Appendix B. Reenrollment Rates by Student Subgroups

Francis Scott Key 103 / Phalen Leadership Academy @ 103			
Student Subgroup	Percent of Eligible Students, Baseline (N=299)	Percent of Reenrolled Students, Beginning Year 1 (N=107)	Change (Percentage Points)
Black	80.7%	82.2%	1.5
Hispanic	10.7%	11.2%	0.5
Free & Reduced Lunch	87.9%	88.8%	0.0
Limited English Proficiency	7.9%	9.3%	1.4
Special Education	22.4%	11.2%	-10.3
Previously Retained	7.9%	8.4%	0.5
Riverside 44 / Global Preparatory Academy			
Student Subgroup	Percent of Student Body, Baseline (N=401)	Percent of Reenrolled Students, Beginning Year 1 (N=257)	Change (Percentage Points)
Black	66.8%	65.4%	-1.4
Hispanic	24.2%	25.7%	1.5
Free & Reduced Lunch	82.3%	85.6%	3.3
Limited English Proficiency	12.5%	12.8%	0.3
Special Education	14.0%	12.5%	-1.5
Previously Retained	2.6%	2.7%	0.1
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi Academy			
Student Subgroup	Percent of Student Body, Baseline (N=296)	Percent of Reenrolled Students, Beginning Year 1 (N=177)	Change (Percentage Points)
Black	85.7%	88.1%	2.4
Hispanic	9.8%	9.6%	-0.2
Free & Reduced Lunch	86.4%	84.7%	-1.7
Limited English Proficiency	3.5%	3.4%	-0.1
Special Education	12.9%	15.3%	2.4
Previously Retained	7.3%	8.5%	1.2
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite Achievement Academy			
Student Subgroup	Percent of Student Body, Baseline (N=314)	Percent of Reenrolled Students, Beginning Year (N=202)	Change (Percentage Points)
Black	76.0%	82.2%	6.2%
Hispanic	12.9%	9.9%	-3.0%
Free & Reduced Lunch	82.5%	86.6%	4.2%
Limited English Proficiency	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Special Education	22.2%	13.4%	-8.9%
Previously Retained	8.2%	7.9%	-0.3%

## Appendix C. Student Demographics

**FIGURE C1. PERCENTAGE OF BLACK STUDENTS, RESTARTS VS. COMPARISON SCHOOLS  
THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2018–19**

	Pre-Restart			Post-Restart				Change Over Time		
	-3 Years	-2 Years	-1 Years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	3-Yr Pre-Restart Avg.	Most Recent Restart Year	Change
Francis Scott Key 103/ PLA @ 103	82.1% N=296	62.8% N=527	78.0% N=341	83.3% N=383	78.8% N=448	75.3% N=461	76.7% N=451	74.3%	76.7%	2.4%
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	79.8% N=494	74.8% N=421	63.7% N=421	59.6% N=527	53.7% N=549	45.8% N=673		72.7%	45.8%	-27.0%
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	94.1% N=459	89.9% N=376	90.1% N=323	86.8% N=372	84.0% N=387	84.1% N=395		91.4%	84.1%	-7.3%
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	86.0% N=534	81.8% N=517	79.4% N=481	78.2% N=501	83.7% N=534			82.4%	83.7%	1.3%
All Restarts	85.7% N=1783	76.4% N=1841	77.1% N=1566	75.6% N=1783	74.0% N=1918			79.7%	74.0%*	-5.7%
Transformation Zone Schools**	55.2% N=3070	54.6% N=2924	54.3% N=2894	48.4% N=2407	48.6% N=2598	44.8% N=2462	44.9% N=1949	54.7%	44.9%	-9.8%
Priority Schools	61.9% N=1925	61.1% N=2112	57.3% N=1933	56.1% N=1954	55.9% N=1837	59.1% N=1939	57.2% N=1716	60.1%	57.2%	-2.8%

\*\*Based on most recent year for which all schools have data (Y2), rather than an average of the rows above.

\*\*In 2018–19, one Transformation Zone school (Wendell Phillips) restarted as an Innovation school and another (George Washington Jr. High School) closed, accounting for much of the decline in enrollment across Transformation Zone schools that year.

Key	Change > 0, <=5 pts.	Change > 5, <=10 pts.	Change > 10, <=15 pts.	Change >15 pts.
		Change < 0, >=-5 pts.	Change < -5, >=-10 pts.	Change < -10, >=-15 pts.

**FIGURE C2. PERCENTAGE OF BLACK STUDENTS ACROSS ALL PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN IPS BOUNDARIES, 2013–19**

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
54.5%	53.8%	52.4%	51.8%	51.2%	50.3%	48.7%

Key	Increase compared to previous year	Decrease compared to previous year
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**FIGURE C3. PERCENTAGE OF HISPANIC STUDENTS, RESTARTS VS. COMPARISON SCHOOLS, THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2018–19**

	Pre-Restart			Post-Restart				Change Over Time		
	-3 Years	-2 Years	-1 Years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	3-Yr Pre-Restart Avg.	Most Recent Restart Year	Change
Francis Scott Key 103/ PLA @ 103	10.5% N=296	14.4% N=527	11.7% N=341	9.7% N=383	12.3% N=448	17.6% N=461	17.1% N=451	12.2%	17.1%	4.9%
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	7.9% N=494	11.9% N=421	25.4% N=421	27.3% N=527	34.4% N=549	41.3% N=673		15.1%	41.3%	26.2%
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	1.3% N=459	2.1% N=376	5.6% N=323	9.9% N=372	10.3% N=387	11.6% N=395		3.0%	11.6%	8.6%
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	6.0% N=534	9.5% N=517	10.8% N=481	11.0% N=501	9.9% N=534			8.8%	9.9%	1.2%
All Restarts	6.1% N=1783	9.9% N=1841	13.9% N=1566	15.3% N=1783	17.6% N=1918			10.0%	17.6%*	7.6%
Transformation Zone Schools**	21.4% N=3070	24.6% N=2924	23.0% N=2894	30.7% N=2407	33.1% N=2598	34.4% N=2462	36.4% N=1949	23.0%	36.4%	13.4%
Priority Schools	23.4% N=1925	25.1% N=2112	29.8% N=1933	27.7% N=1954	29.9% N=1837	27.8% N=1939	29.6% N=1716	26.1%	29.6%	3.5%

\*Based on most recent year for which all schools have data (Y2), rather than an average of the rows above.

\*\*In 2018–19, one Transformation Zone school (Wendell Phillips) restarted as an Innovation school and another (George Washington Jr. High School) closed, accounting for much of the decline in enrollment across Transformation Zone schools that year.

Key	Change > 0, <=5 pts.	Change > 5, <=10 pts.	Change > 10, <=15 pts.	Change >15 pts.
		Change < 0, >=-5 pts.	Change < -5, >=-10 pts.	Change < -10, >=-15 pts.

**FIGURE C4. PERCENTAGE OF HISPANIC STUDENTS ACROSS ALL PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN IPS BOUNDARIES, 2013–19**

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
17.6%	19.0%	20.3%	21.5%	22.6%	23.7%	23.7%

Key	Increase compared to previous year	Decrease compared to previous year
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**FIGURE C5. PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS QUALIFYING FOR FREE OR REDUCED-PRICED LUNCH, RESTARTS VS. COMPARISON SCHOOLS, THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2018-19**

	Pre-Restart			Post-Restart				Change Over Time		
	-3 Years	-2 Years	-1 Years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	3-Yr Pre-Restart Avg.	Most Recent Restart Year	Change
Francis Scott Key 103/ PLA @ 103	85.5% N=296	78.6% N=527	83.9% N=341	74.4% N=383	40.8% N=448	60.7% N=461	78.3% N=451	82.6%	78.3%	-4.4%
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	80.4% N=494	79.1% N=421	84.6% N=421	69.6% N=527	75.2% N=549	64.9% N=673		81.3%	64.9%	-16.4%
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	83.4% N=459	83.8% N=376	86.1% N=323	82.3% N=372	82.4% N=387	74.4% N=395		84.4%	74.4%	-10.0%
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	83.0% N=534	78.5% N=517	83.2% N=481	98.8% N=501	85.6% N=534			81.5%	85.6%	4.0%
All Restarts	82.8% N=1783	79.7% N=1841	84.3% N=1566	81.5% N=1783	71.5% N=1918			82.3%	71.5%*	-10.7%
Transformation Zone Schools**	86.5% N=3070	83.8% N=2924	75.8% N=2894	77.8% N=2407	73.6% N=2598	78.0% N=2462	71.5% N=1949	82.1%	71.5%	-10.6%
Priority Schools	87.4% N=1925	90.7% N=2112	79.6% N=1933	76.4% N=1954	75.4% N=1837	77.6% N=1939	71.8% N=1716	85.9%	71.8%	-14.1%

\*Based on most recent year for which all schools have data (Y2), rather than an average of the rows above.

\*\*In 201819, one Transformation Zone school (Wendell Phillips) restarted as an Innovation school and another (George Washington Jr. High School) closed, accounting for much of the decline in enrollment across Transformation Zone schools that year.

Key	Change > 0, <=5 pts.	Change > 5, <=10 pts.	Change > 10, <=15 pts.	Change >15 pts.
		Change < 0, >=-5 pts.	Change < -5, >=-10 pts.	Change < -10, >=-15 pts.

**FIGURE C4. PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS QUALIFYING FOR FREE OR REDUCED-PRICE LUNCH ACROSS ALL PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN IPS BOUNDARIES, 2013-19**

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
82.0%	80.4%	77.2%	72.8%	69.3%	76.3%	71.8%

Key	Increase compared to previous year	Decrease compared to previous year
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**FIGURE C7. PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY, RESTARTS VS. COMPARISON SCHOOLS, THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2017–18**

	Pre-Restart			Post-Restart				Change Over Time		
	-3 Years	-2 Years	-1 Years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	3-Yr Pre-Restart Avg.	Most Recent Restart Year	Change
Francis Scott Key 103/ PLA @ 103	7.4% N=296	4.6% N=527	9.1% N=341	5.0% N=383	8.3% N=448	13.9% N=461	14.6% N=451	7.0%	14.6%	7.6%
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	2.0% N=494	4.3% N=421	10.7% N=421	15.7% N=527	23.5% N=549	29.0% N=673		5.7%	29.0%	23.3%
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	0.7% N=459	0.5% N=376	2.2% N=323	3.8% N=372	6.5% N=387	8.4% N=395		1.1%	8.4%	7.2%
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	1.1% N=534	6.0% N=517	5.8% N=481	8.6% N=501	8.2% N=534			4.3%	8.2%	3.9%
All Restarts	2.3% N=1783	4.1% N=1841	7.1% N=1566	8.9% N=1783	12.3% N=1918			4.5%	12.3%*	7.8%
Transformation Zone Schools**	14.0% N=3070	16.1% N=2924	15.3% N=2894	19.3% N=2407	22.2% N=2598	24.9% N=2462	29.8% N=1949	15.1%	29.8%	14.6%
Priority Schools	19.0% N=1925	20.3% N=2112	24.7% N=1933	20.2% N=1954	19.8% N=1837	19.6% N=1939	20.8% N=1716	21.4%	20.8%	-0.5%

\*Based on most recent year for which all schools have data (Y2), rather than an average of the rows above.

\*\*In 2018–19, one Transformation Zone school (Wendell Phillips) restarted as an Innovation school and another (George Washington Jr. High School) closed, accounting for much of the decline in enrollment across Transformation Zone schools that year.

Key	Change > 0, <=5 pts.	Change > 5, <=10 pts.	Change > 10, <=15 pts.	Change >15 pts.
		Change < 0, >=-5 pts.	Change < -5, >=-10 pts.	Change < -10, >=-15 pts.

**FIGURE C8. PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY ACROSS ALL PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN IPS BOUNDARIES, 2013–19**

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
11.7%	12.8%	15.5%	12.9%	12.5%	14.5%	16.2%

Key	Increase compared to previous year	Decrease compared to previous year
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**FIGURE C9. PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS QUALIFYING FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION, RESTARTS V. COMPARISON SCHOOLS, THREE YEARS PRE-RESTART THROUGH 2018-19**

	Pre-Restart			Post-Restart				Change Over Time		
	-3 Years	-2 Years	-1 Years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	3-Yr Pre-Restart Avg.	Most Recent Restart Year	Change
Francis Scott Key 103/ PLA @ 103	21.6% N=296	38.7% N=527	20.8% N=341	8.4% N=383	12.3% N=448	11.9% N=461	9.3% N=451	27.1%	9.3%	-17.7%
Riverside 44 / Global Prep	18.0% N=494	16.6% N=421	16.6% N=421	12.5% N=527	16.8% N=549	14.1% N=673		17.1%	14.1%	-3.0%
Joyce Kilmer 69 / Kindezi	17.4% N=459	17.3% N=376	16.4% N=323	11.0% N=372	14.7% N=387	14.4% N=395		17.0%	14.4%	-2.6%
Elder Diggs 42 / Ignite	23.4% N=534	19.1% N=517	23.1% N=481	17.4% N=501	15.4% N=534			21.9%	15.4%	-6.5%
All Restarts	20.1% N=1783	23.8% N=1841	19.5% N=1566	12.7% N=1783	14.9% N=1918			21.1%	14.9%*	-6.2%
Transformation Zone Schools**	21.8% N=3070	20.0% N=2924	23.5% N=2894	18.4% N=2407	18.1% N=2598	17.1% N=2462	16.9% N=1949	21.8%	16.9%	-4.9%
Priority Schools	18.0% N=1925	17.1% N=2112	16.2% N=1933	16.8% N=1954	14.8% N=1837	17.2% N=1939	15.2% N=1716	17.1%	15.2%	-1.9%

\*Based on most recent year for which all schools have data (Y2), rather than an average of the rows above.

\*\*In 2018-19, one Transformation Zone school (Wendell Phillips) restarted as an Innovation school and another (George Washington Jr. High School) closed, accounting for much of the decline in enrollment across Transformation Zone schools that year.

Key	Change > 0, <=5 pts.	Change > 5, <=10 pts.	Change > 10, <=15 pts.	Change >15 pts.
		Change < 0, >=-5 pts.	Change < -5, >=-10 pts.	Change < -10, >=-15 pts.

**FIGURE C10. PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS QUALIFYING FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION ACROSS ALL PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN IPS BOUNDARIES, 2013-19**

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
17.4%	17.5%	18.1%	16.3%	16.0%	16.7%	15.1%

Key	Increase compared to previous year	Decrease compared to previous year
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## Appendix D. Historical Student Proficiency

**FIGURE D1. CHANGE IN MEAN STUDENT GROWTH PERCENTILES, STAYERS VS. LEAVERS, BASELINE YEAR TO YEAR 1, ELA**

	PLA @ 103			Global Prep			Kindezi			Ignite			All Restarts		
	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff
	N=12	N=24		N=54	N=23		N=40	N=24		N=56	N=17		N=162	N=88	
Baseline	36.4	33.7		45.4	40.6		38.3	40.2		42.8	30.9		42.0	36.7	
Y1	47.4	60.9		58.2	47.7		39.2	52.5		46.8	45.2		48.8	52.1	
Change from baseline to Y1	11.0	27.3*	-16.3	12.9*	7.1	5.8	1.0	12.3	-11.3	4.1	14.2	-10.2	6.7*	15.4*	-8.7
p-value	0.300	0.002*	0.121	0.023*	0.391	0.540	0.874	0.151	0.246	0.431	0.127	0.307	0.030*	0.000*	0.081

**FIGURE D2. CHANGE IN MEAN STUDENT GROWTH PERCENTILES, STAYERS VS. LEAVERS, BASELINE YEAR TO YEAR 1, MATH**

	PLA @ 103			Global Prep			Kindezi			Ignite			All Restarts		
	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff
	N=11	N=22		N=55	N=23		N=43	N=24		N=56	N=17		N=165	N=86	
Baseline	23.2	19.1		33.8	27.8		23.6	29.2		33.1	33.4		30.2	27.1	
Y1	22.3	39.8		47.0	50.9		34.8	40.3		21.4	43.5		33.5	43.7	
Change from baseline to Y1	-0.9	20.6*	-21.5	13.2*	23.1*	-9.9	11.2	11.1	0.1	-11.6*	10.1	-21.7	3.3	16.6*	-13.2*
p-value	0.928	0.016*	0.112	0.016*	0.004*	0.319	0.051	0.084	0.992	0.012*	0.316	0.068	0.266	0.000*	0.008*

**Note.** “Stayers” defined as students eligible to reenroll at the end of the baseline year who did reenroll. To be included in the dataset, Stayers also had to have an SGP in the baseline year and Year 1. In addition, their SGP score in year 1 had to be linked to the restarted school. In contrast, “Leavers” were eligible to reenroll at the end of the baseline year, but did not reenroll. They also had to have SGP data for the baseline year and year 1, though their SGP in year 1 could not be linked to the restarted school.

Key	*	Change within group / difference in change between groups is significant at $p < 0.05$
		Change within group is positive / Change of Stayers is larger than change of Leavers
		Change within group is negative / Change of Stayers is less than change of Leavers

**FIGURE D3. CHANGE IN MEAN STUDENT GROWTH PERCENTILES, STAYERS VS. LEAVERS, BASELINE YEAR TO YEAR 2, ELA**

	PLA @ 103			Global Prep			Kindezi			All Restarts		
	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff
	N=8	N=16		N=25	N=10		N=12	N=12		N=45	N=38	
Mean SGP Baseline	30.4	29.8		43.7	28.5		31.1	37.8		38.0	31.9	
Mean SGP Y1	46.4	59.8		56.4	58.1		35.8	50.0		49.1	56.2	
Mean SGP Y2	43.9	43.6		41.3	44.8		43.3	47.8		42.3	45.2	
Change from baseline to Y1	16.0	30.0*	-14.0	12.7	29.6*	-16.9	4.8	12.3	-7.5	11.2	24.3*	-13.1
p-value	0.220	0.006*	0.237	0.140	0.017*	0.245	0.667	0.337	0.614	0.068	0.000*	0.111
Change from Y1 to Y2	-2.5	-16.2	13.7	-15.1	-13.3	-1.8	7.5	-2.2	9.7	-6.8	-11.0*	4.2
p-value	0.867	0.115	0.401	0.061	0.317	0.907	0.522	0.835	0.537	0.255	0.000*	0.640
Change from baseline to Y2	13.5	13.8	-0.3	-2.4	16.3	-18.7	12.3	10.1	2.2	4.4	13.3*	-8.9
p-value	0.312	0.180	0.983	0.779	0.163	0.230	0.275	0.370	0.899	0.462	0.032*	0.329

**FIGURE D4. CHANGE IN MEAN STUDENT GROWTH PERCENTILES, STAYERS VS. LEAVERS, BASELINE YEAR TO YEAR 2, MATH**

	PLA @ 103			Global Prep			Kindezi			All Restarts		
	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff	Stayers	Leavers	Diff-in-Diff
	N=7	N=16		N=25	N=9		N=14	N=13		N=46	N=38	
Mean SGP Baseline	28.6	18.4		27.6	24.8		25.1	27.0		27.0	22.8	
Mean SGP Y1	13.4	36.6		55.0	58.3		30.4	39.6		41.2	42.8	
Mean SGP Y2	57.1	43.0		55.4	61.2		52.7	47.7		54.9	48.9	
Change from baseline to Y1	-15.1	18.2	-33.3	27.4*	33.6*	-6.2	5.2	12.6	-7.4	14.2*	19.9*	-5.8
p-value	0.221	0.082	0.059	0.000*	0.017*	0.663	0.552	0.165	0.520	0.011*	0.001*	0.456
Change from Y1 to Y2	43.7*	6.4	37.3*	0.5	2.9	-2.4	22.4*	8.1	14.3	13.7*	6.2	7.6
p-value	0.005*	0.589	0.045*	0.949	0.839	0.865	0.032*	0.466	0.401	0.019*	0.195	0.428
Change from baseline to Y2	28.6	24.6*	3.9	27.8*	36.4*	-8.6	27.6*	20.7	6.9	27.9*	26.1	1.8
p-value	0.073	0.014*	0.804	0.001*	0.004*	0.540	0.010*	0.057	0.635	0.000*	0.051	0.822

Note. “Stayers” defined as students eligible to reenroll at the end of the baseline year who did reenroll. To be included in the dataset, Stayers also had to have an SGP in the baseline year, year 1, and year 2. In addition, their SGP scores in year 1 and year 2 had to be linked to the restarted school. In contrast, “Leavers” were eligible to reenroll at the end of the baseline year, but did not reenroll. They also had to have SGP data for the baseline year, year 1, and year 2, though their SGP scores in year 1 and year 2 could not be linked to the restarted school.

Key	*	Change within group / difference in change between groups is significant at $p < 0.05$
		Change within group is positive / Change of Stayers is larger than change of Leavers
		Change within group is negative / Change of Stayers is less than change of Leavers

## Notes

1. Elliott, S. (2014, November 5). Indiana sees a big jump in A-rated schools. *Chalkbeat*. Retrieved from <https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/in/2014/11/05/indiana-sees-a-big-jump-in-a-rated-schools/>.
2. Elliott, Scott. (2014, Feb. 27). These are the 11 IPS schools Ferebee is most worried about. *Chalkbeat*. Retrieved from <https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/in/2014/02/27/these-are-the-11-ips-schools-ferebee-is-most-worried-about/>.
3. Stokes, K. (2012). The numbers are in: How many students at Indianapolis takeover schools will remain in the district. *StateImpact Indiana*. Retrieved from <https://indianapublicmedia.org/stateimpact/2012/02/22/the-numbers-are-in-how-many-students-at-indianapolis-takeover-schools-will-remain-in-the-district/>.
4. Dr. Ferebee went on to become chancellor of District of Columbia Public Schools in December 2018.
5. Indiana General Assembly. (2014). Actions for House Bill 1321. Retrieved from <https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2014/bills/house/1321#document-febo5680>.
6. Indianapolis Public Schools. Innovation Network Schools. Retrieved from [https://www.myips.org/cms/lib/IN01906626/Centricity/Domain/10172/Innovation\\_Explained\\_flyer.compressed.pdf](https://www.myips.org/cms/lib/IN01906626/Centricity/Domain/10172/Innovation_Explained_flyer.compressed.pdf).
7. The Mind Trust. (n.d.). Innovation Network Schools. Retrieved from <http://www.themindtrust.org/growing-great-schools/innovation-network-schools/>.
8. Per HB 1630, which went into effect on June 30, 2019. Previously, restarted schools received a grade based on growth only (rather than growth *and* proficiency).
9. Center for Research on Education Outcomes. (2019). *City study 2019: Indianapolis*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Retrieved from [https://cityschools.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj10771/f/indianapolis\\_slide\\_deck\\_final.pdf](https://cityschools.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj10771/f/indianapolis_slide_deck_final.pdf).
10. The study also found that charter schools in Indianapolis made significantly better learning gains than the state.
11. IPS began two more restarts in 2018–19, Matchbook Learning @ School 63 and URBAN ACT @ School 14. They are not featured in this report because they did not have any academic data available at the time of this writing.
12. The size of the fee varies, but has generally been about 10 percent of per-pupil funding.
13. Since the restarted schools serve elementary and middle grades, we excluded all Priority and Transformation schools serving only high school grades.
14. A fifth K–8 school was designated as a Priority school in 2015–16 and restarted in 2018–19.
15. Note: The publisher of this report, Public Impact, has provided support to some of IPS’s Transformation Zone schools through its Opportunity Culture initiative.
16. Figures include all such students at Riverside 44/Global Prep and Joyce Kilmer 69/Kindezi, rather than just students in the grades that phased in.
17. Several school districts fall at least partially within the Indianapolis city boundaries, though IPS is the largest. Our calculations for all public schools within the IPS boundaries therefore include all IPS district-run schools and all charter schools located within the IPS boundaries.
18. Across Indianapolis, the percentage of black students and FRL students decreased during the study period, and the percentage of Hispanic students and students with limited English proficiency (LEP) increased. See Appendix C.
19. Charter schools that are also Innovation schools included in the Innovation school count. Current offerings from Enroll Indy available at <https://find.enrollindy.org/>.
20. We chose to use the mean SGP instead of the median SGP so we could apply standard statistical tests (t-tests). The analyses using both the mean and median SGPs followed the same general trends, however.
21. We chose to focus on growth rather than proficiency because the state test changed during the study period, causing a drop in proficiency rates. SGPs are also a more sensitive metric, and hence able to show smaller changes than proficiency, for which there are only two options (pass or did not pass).
22. Fewer students had two years of post-restart growth data, so while all of the students captured in Figure 11 (baseline to year 2 analysis) are also included in Figure 10 (baseline to year 1 analysis), some students in Figure 10 are not included in Figure 11.
23. PLA @ 103 also earned an “A” in the state’s accountability system in 2016–17 and 2017–18 based on its growth.
24. Kindezi and Global Prep have not received an accountability grade from the state since restarting. Ignite received a “C” in 2017–18 based on growth.
25. See for example: Doyle, D., & Field, T. (2013). *The role of charter restarts in school reform: Honoring our commitments to students and public accountability*. Chapel Hill, NC: Public Impact, and Washington, DC: NewSchools Venture Fund. Retrieved from [http://www.newschools.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/the\\_role\\_of\\_charter\\_restarts\\_in\\_school\\_reform.pdf](http://www.newschools.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/the_role_of_charter_restarts_in_school_reform.pdf).
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34. These schools were not charter restarts (they remained under the governance of the district), but AUSL effectively operated the schools under a different set of guidelines. For more on Chicago restarts, see: de la Torre, M., Gerdeman, R. D., Jagesic, S., Meyers, C., Samonowics, M., & Sebastian, J. (2012, February). *Turning around low-performing schools in Chicago*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Consortium on Chicago School Research; and Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research. Retrieved from: <https://consortium.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/2018-10/12CCSRTurnAround-3.pdf>