Understanding Performance Incentives in Postsecondary State Policy:

The Case of Louisiana

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Abstract

This research examined postsecondary policy in Louisiana, which utilizes performance incentives, in order to: (a) provide clear distinctions among three commonly used types of performance incentives, and (b) use performance indicators defined in the LA GRAD Act to determine if Louisiana policy is primarily faculty oriented, state oriented, or client oriented. The author examined nuanced differences among three types of performance incentives: performance funding, performance budgeting, and performance reporting. As a case study, postsecondary performance policies in the state of Louisiana were situated in the performance incentive literature and analyzed using Burke and Associates’ (2002) models of excellence. Categorical models are applied to the LA GRAD Act and will be applied to the subsequent legislation, commonly referred to as LA GRAD Act 2.0. Understanding the LA GRAD Act’s orientation as a performance policy may help leaders of postsecondary institutions anticipate future policy directions and prepare for policy changes that will affect their institutions. This research is on-going as LA GRAD Act 2.0 was only recently passed in the 2011 legislative session.

Introduction

State legislatures are increasingly pressuring public institutions of higher education to demonstrate effectiveness and efficiency while simultaneously decreasing funding to institutions (Heller, 2006; McGuinness, 2005; Ruppert, 1997). Performance funding, budgeting, and reporting have emerged within the context of the accountability movement in higher education as a means by which states can tie funding of public colleges and universities to sets of desired outcomes (McClendon, Hearn & Deaton, 2006). In the state of Louisiana with the passage of the Louisiana Granting Resources and Autonomy for Diplomas (LA GRAD) Act (2010), public postsecondary institutions earn certain autonomies including the right to increase tuition and fees based on performance agreements between individual institutions and the state’s Board of Regents.
The LA GRAD Act (2010) is a performance based incentive program. Prior to adoption of the LA GRAD Act, Louisiana had a performance funding formula in place (Louisiana Postsecondary Education Review Commission, 2009). As the LA GRAD Act has become the dominant piece of legislation in the postsecondary policy environment, the prior formula funding measure has been altered in order to align it with the Act (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2011a; 2011b). Given the convergence of these two policies, it is important to understand the policies within a conceptual framework related to state-level performance incentives. During the 2011 legislative session, revisions were made to the LA GRAD Act through House Bill 549, the current version of the LA GRAD Act including the revisions is commonly referred to as GRAD Act 2.0 (LA GRAD Act, 2011; Office of the Governor, 2011) These revisions do not significantly alter the Act, but instead clarify the metrics on which institutions are to focus, particularly those classified as “Student Success” metrics (Office of the Governor, 2011, para. 7).

This paper examines postsecondary policy in Louisiana in order to: (a) provide clear distinctions among three commonly used types of performance incentives, and (b) use performance indicators defined in the LA GRAD Act to determine if Louisiana policy is primarily faculty oriented, state oriented, or client oriented (Burke & Associates, 2002). Performance incentives have often been categorized incorrectly as performance funding, even when they are budgeting or reporting incentives (or disincentives). Nuances of performance incentives, as they are defined in a state policy and then implemented, must be fully explored within a state's policy context if the utility of performance incentives for improving public higher education is to be well understood. Understanding the LA GRAD Act's orientation as a performance policy may help leaders of postsecondary institutions anticipate future policy directions and prepare for policy changes that will affect their institutions.

The author will begin with a brief review of the literature on state-based performance incentives for higher education institutions. Reviewing the literature will aid the author in
clarifying and defining terms in order to discuss the policy case of Louisiana. The literature also
provides the context for the application of Burke and Minassians’ (2002) typology.

**Literature on Performance Incentives in Higher Education**

The origins of state performance incentives for higher education institutions can be traced
note that as early as 1974, Tennessee began to pilot performance based funding initiatives. In
recent decades, many more states have adopted some type of performance incentive for the funding
of public postsecondary institutions (Alexander, 2000; Layzell, 1999; McGuinness, 2005; Shin
2010).

Performance funding and performance budgeting have been the typical performance
incentives included in state policies, but recently a third performance incentive (or disincentive, as
it may be) called performance reporting has been introduced (McClendon et al., 2006). In order to
understand the policies and performance incentives operating in Louisiana presently, each of these
incentives will be defined. Although performance funding, budgeting, and reporting are three
distinct types of incentives, when they are applied by state policymakers they are often mixed
within postsecondary performance policies (Burke, 2002; McClendon et al., 2006).

**Performance Funding**

Lang (2005) provides this simplified definition of performance funding:

[...] performance funding is, when stripped of management jargon, formula funding based
on outputs instead of inputs. For example, an enrolment-sensitive funding formula can be
based either on enrolments of students as degree candidates—that is, as inputs—or of
students as degree recipients—that is, outputs (p. 223).

While this definition clarifies performance funding in dichotomous terms, inputs versus outputs, it
believes the complexities of performance funding policies. Outcomes have been added as indicators of
performance in some performance funding measures, making value a consideration. Output indicators include measures such as graduation rates and number of students passing professional licensure examinations. Outcomes indicators include measures like job placement of graduates and employer satisfaction with graduates (Burke & Associates, 2002; Lang, 2005).

Whatever indicators are selected to measure institutional performance, the key component of performance funding which differentiates it from other performance incentives is the automatic allocation of resources based on some measure of adequate performance. “If a campus achieves a set target on a designated indicator, it receives a specific amount of performance money for that measure” (Burke & Associates, 2002, p. 21). In performance funding, the link between resources and results is direct; this is not the case with all performance incentives.

**Performance Budgeting**

How does performance budgeting differ from performance funding? Performance budgeting enables policymakers (e.g., governors, legislators, boards) “[...] to consider campus achievement on performance indicators as one factor in determining allocations for public campuses” (Burke & Minassians, 2003, p. 3). Performance budgeting differs from performance funding in that performance budgeting is discretionary. “The prospect of financial reward for institutional performance depends solely on the discretion of appropriators” (McClendon et al., 2006, p. 2). Because of its discretionary nature, performance budgeting is more flexible than performance funding and allows for individual campus circumstances to be considered (Burke & Associates, 2002).

While the flexibility inherent in performance budgeting can be an advantage, the degree of uncertainty about institutional rewards reduces the value of incentives to institutions (Burke & Associates, 2002). However, this same flexibility makes performance budgeting popular with state policymakers. Performance budgeting allows policymakers to consider institutional performance in
budgetary decisions, but the discretionary nature of the policies protects these same policy makers from making unpopular budget cuts to institutions that fail to perform (Burke & Minassians, 2002).

Performance Reporting

Prior to 1990 only Maryland had performance reporting measures in place (Burke & Minassians, 2002). Unlike performance funding or performance budgeting, performance reporting relies on publicity rather than purse strings. “Performance reports provide policymakers and the public indicators on institutional and state-wide performance; unlike other programs, however, performance reporting has no formal link to allocations” (McClendon et al., 2006, p. 2). Performance reporting can also be used as a disincentive. That is, institutions that perform poorly are subject to having this information published. The incentive for institutions to meet performance goals is so that they will not be viewed unfavorably when compared to other institutions.

Performance reporting can be used by policymakers to make decisions regarding budgeting or funding, although funding and budgeting measures are not a co-requisite to performance reporting (Burke & Minassians, 2002). As the author has already noted, multiple performance incentives are often used by in state postsecondary education policies, but performance reporting can exist as an incentive or disincentive independently of performance funding or budgeting. In 2003, 42 states had performance reporting policies whereas in that same year only 25 states had performance funding and 35 had performance budgeting (McClendon et al., 2006). There is some overlap, but there are also some states that have performance reporting without the other measures.

Conceptual Framework for Policy Analysis

Burke and Associates’ (2002) developed models of excellence in order to categorize types of performance policies. The models of excellence were developed specifically in reference to performance funding measures, but they can be applied to other performance-based higher
education policies. In recent years performance incentives have expanded to also include performance reporting in addition to performance funding and/or performance budgeting (McClendon et al., 2006). All of these performance policies are what the author has termed performance incentives. As was demonstrated in the review of the literature, although performance funding was the first type of performance incentive, it is no longer the only incentive used by state policymakers (Burke & Minassians, 2002; McClendon et al., 2006).

While the specific indicators related to each performance incentive vary based on the incentive used, the goals of any performance policy are similar. Higher education institutions are incentivized for achieving specified outcomes. The models of excellence are based on the indicators used to evaluate institutional performance (Burke & Associates, 2002). Because performance policies in Louisiana rely on indicators (i.e., objectives) the models of excellence are a valid framework for examining performance policies in Louisiana (Burke & Associates; Burke & Minassians, 2002).

**Defining the Models of Excellence**

The resource/reputation model is a faculty-oriented model “[…] with indicators such as institutional choice, faculty credentials, and student academic preparation” (Burke & Associates, 2002, p. 53). This model is described as a more traditional model because of its emphasis on faculty and the internal concerns of the academic community. The resource/reputation model is also described as traditional because it relies on inputs and process indicators (Burke & Minassians, 2002). Prior to performance funding and budgeting being implemented, most public postsecondary institutions were funded based on inputs such as student enrollment (Lang, 2005; Layzell, 1999). Use of inputs as indicators represents a more traditional type of funding formula.

The strategic investment/cost-benefit model is state oriented and relies on indicators such as graduation rates, intercampus cooperation, and student achievement in college as measured by test scores (Burke & Associates, 2002, p. 53). This model puts the state's financial interests at the
center and has been growing in its use. Efficiency and value are stressed in the strategic investment/cost-benefit model; states employ this model in an attempt to get the greatest return on their investment (Burke & Minassians, 2002).

The last of Burke and Associates’ (2002) models of excellence is the client-oriented model with indicators such as faculty availability, student satisfaction, and student opportunities for internships or cooperative education. Burke and Associates describe this model as emerging, but in the present context with the widespread use of student satisfaction data gathered through instruments like the National Survey of Student Engagement this model has certainly arrived (Kuh, Kinzie, Schuh, Whitt, & Associates, 2005). Burke and Minassians (2002) noted that the client-centered model has grown to include clients other than students, also considering satisfaction as reported by parents, alumni, and employers of recent graduates.

While the models of excellence are presented conceptually as discrete, in practice the models may be merged or mixed depending upon the performance indicators being used in a particular policy. Which model of excellence a performance policy fits into depends upon the indicators considered. By examining the indicators used, performance policies can be categorized into one of the models of excellence or a hybrid of multiple models (Burke & Minassians, 2002). The author will employ this strategy of indicator-based categorization to Louisiana’s postsecondary performance policies after discussing the state’s past performance funding measures and the LA GRAD Act.

**Measuring and Rewarding Performance in Louisiana**

**Evolution of Performance Funding/Budgeting**

Since 1974, the Louisiana constitution has required the Board of Regents to use formulas to distribute state funds to public postsecondary institutions. This constitutional requirement was adopted to ensure equitable distribution of state funds to public higher education institutions
throughout the state (Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, 2008). Legislation passed in 1997, required that performance budgeting be used in the funding of all state agencies (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2011b).

In the 2001 Master Plan for Public Postsecondary Education, the Louisiana Board of Regents developed a funding formula containing a core funding component, a quality improvement component, and a performance incentive component (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2001). However, the performance incentive component of this formula never received funding, so there was no incentive available to institutions that improved (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2011b). Performance funding policy existed, but performance funding as a practice did not.

A Master Plan Formula Workgroup was formed by the Board of Regents in 2005 and by 2008, they had issued the following set of recommendations related to performance funding: “focus existing and new dollars on performance and results; make the formula more sensitive to missions of institutions, recognizing different program costs in different settings; make cost metric values in the formula analysis more precise and current” (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2001b, pp. 3-4). In 2009, the Louisiana Postsecondary Education Review Commission (LAPERC) released a statement which provided even more specific provisions for performance funding. As of December 2009, the performance funding formula applied to public postsecondary institutions in Louisiana emphasized “success in undergraduate education” and provided for 25% of funding to be based on “performance components” (LAPERC, 2009). Indicators of institutional success included graduation rates and degree completion rates, and LAPERC suggested that the Board of Regents include additional outcomes measures related to degree attainment.

Prior to 2010, Louisiana’s performance initiatives for public postsecondary education can best be described performance funding or performance budgeting measures. The specifics of performance funding policy were ambiguous at best in the years prior to the adoption of the LA GRAD Act (2010). The LA GRAD Act introduced other performance incentives into the policy
landscape and resulted in revisions to the existing performance funding policy. Because of the importance of understanding how new policy influences existing policy, aligning performance funding and the LA GRAD Act will be the subject of a subsequent section.

**LA GRAD Act’s Performance Incentives**

As was previously mentioned, when the LA GRAD Act was passed in 2010, new performance incentives were introduced into the policy landscape. The stated purpose of the LA GRAD Act is to:

[... to support the state’s public postsecondary education institutions in remaining competitive and increasing their overall effectiveness and efficiency by providing that the institutions achieve specific, measurable performance objectives aimed at improving college completion and at meeting the state’s current and future workforce and economic development needs by granting the institutions limited operational autonomy and flexibility in exchange for achieving such objectives” (pp. 1-2).

The LA GRAD Act is an incentive program whereby autonomies are rewarded to public postsecondary institutions if they meet their objectives. These autonomies are financial and operational in nature. The financial component is that institutions are rewarded with the ability to incrementally increase tuition and fees until they are at a level that is consistent with other Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) public institutions. Operational autonomies include institutional ability to carry forward funds from one fiscal year to the next, greater freedom in procuring technology, and freedom from existing construction regulations (LA GRAD Act, 2010, p. 6).

In the text of the Act, institutional participation through entering into a performance agreement with the Board of Regents seems optional: “any public postsecondary institution, including professional schools, may enter into an initial performance agreement with the Board of Regents in order to be granted limited operational autonomy and flexibility [emphasis added]” (LA GRAD Act, 2010, p. 2). However, as the Board of Regents has more closely aligned the LA GRAD Act
with existing formula funding for state institutions, participation in the Act seems less and less voluntary. Alignment of the LA GRAD Act with the state’s funding formula is the subject to which the author now turns.

**Aligning Performance Funding and the LA GRAD Act**

While there is a financial component to the LA GRAD Act (2010), the Act itself was not written as a performance funding measure. Performance funding measures are characterized by direct linkages to state funding (Burke & Associates, 2002). As the LA GRAD Act is written, it only provides the possibility of additional funding that would come in the form of increased tuition revenue. The LA GRAD Act incentivizes institutions with autonomy to raise tuition and fees, but any decision to raise tuition would then be an institutional one. Institutions gain the ability to raise tuition and fees, but additional revenue is not guaranteed this way. An institution that earns the right to raise tuition, could decide not to do so.

However, in March 2011, the Louisiana Board of Regents released a document outlining proposed changes to the state’s funding formula for higher education institutions which aligns the funding formula with the LA GRAD Act.

All performance funds will be tied directly to each campus’ GRAD Act targeted student success metrics. Coupled with 10% tuition increase authority, each campus will have roughly 25% of their annual total operation budget allocated based on reaching their GRAD Act student success targets. This allows each campus to compete directly against itself based on established performance goals. An added benefit is that use of the GRAD Act provides consistent measures of performance based on campus six year agreements” (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2011b, p. 5).

According to the March 2011 document, more is at stake for institutions than just additional tuition authority. In aligning the existing state funding formula with the LA GRAD Act, state allocations will also now be one of the incentives available to institutions. It seems that the LA GRAD Act has been
transformed in the year since its passage from a voluntarily agreement between public postsecondary institutions and the Board of Regents to the new funding formula for higher education in Louisiana.

**Analysis of Performance Incentives in Louisiana**

**Funding, Budgeting, or Reporting?**

In order to understand the LA GRAD Act, it is important to situate it appropriately in the literature on performance incentives in public higher education. Three methods of rewarding or penalizing institutions for performance emerged from the literature: performance funding, performance budgeting, and performance reporting (Burke & Associates, 2002; McClendon et al., 2006; Shin, 2010). Performance reporting can be used to support performance funding or budgeting but this not necessarily always the case. In performance reporting, institutions document their performance on various indicators and such information is made available to the public and to policymakers, but there is no specified link to budgetary allocations (McClendon et al., 2006). Under performance budgeting, institutional performance may be a consideration in the allocation of funding, but it is seldom the sole factor in allocations; policymakers retain their discretionary power (Burke & Minassians, 2003). In performance funding, there is a direct link between institutional performance and state allocations. If a campus achieves its objectives, it receives funding (Burke & Associates, 2002).

Because the alignment of the LA GRAD Act with the state's funding formula has only recently taken place, it is difficult to determine how performance incentives will be used in funding decisions (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2011b). However, by examining the language of the policies that have been adopted to date, performance incentives in Louisiana can be most accurately characterized as performance reporting and performance budgeting measures. The language of the
policies is simply too ambiguous for the author to suggest that Louisiana currently has performance funding.

The autonomies granted to institutions who meet their selected benchmarks under the LA GRAD Act (2010), are a form of performance budgeting which is supported by performance reporting. Institutions report their success or failure on specific objectives to the Board of Regents (performance reporting). The Board of Regents, then grants institutions the authority to raise tuition and carry forward fiscal resources from one year to next based on performance (performance budgeting). Although discretion—the discretion to raise tuition and fees—occurs at the institutional level, discretionary increases are still part of the policy and discretionary allocation is the hallmark of performance budgeting.

With the way the Board of Regents has described their plans to align the state funding formula with the LA GRAD Act (2010), Louisiana may be moving toward performance funding, but as the policies exist presently, there is not a direct enough linkage for the measures to be considered performance funding (Burke & Associates, 200; Louisiana Board of Regents, 2011b). The alignment policy proposed by the Board of Regents has more characteristics of a performance funding measure than previous policies, but the language indicates uncertainty about exactly how much funding will be tied to performance. What does “roughly 25%” of an institution’s state allocations really mean (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2011b, p. 5)? The degree of uncertainty maintained in the policy language suggests that the Board of Regents wants the flexibility that comes with such uncertainty. As Burke and Minassians (2002) noted: “Performance budgeting offers political advantages to policymakers, which may explain its preference by state officials over performance funding….Policymakers can take credit for saying they consider performance in budgeting without provoking controversy by actually altering campus allocations” (pp. 15-16).

**Best Fit Models of Excellence**
In order to categorize performance policy in Louisiana using Burke & Associates’ (2002) models of excellence, the indicators of institutional success or effectiveness need to be examined. Section C of the LA GRAD Act (2010) lists a series of performance objectives. These performance objectives, as they are labeled in the LA GRAD Act, are what Burke & Associates refer to as indicators.

The following objectives are listed in the LA GRAD Act (2010) under Section C: increase cohort graduation and graduation productivity rates, increase the percent of program completers at all levels (undergraduate and graduate), develop partnerships with secondary schools, increase passage rates on licensure examinations, phase in increased admissions standards, and improve transfer and articulation with the community college sector (p. 2). The following table shows which model is most closely associated with each objective or indicator and is an adapted version of Burke & Minassians (2002) table used to characterize the policies in all states with performance policies. The author’s version includes only the indicators for Louisiana as listed in Section C of the LA GRAD Act.
### Louisiana GRAD Act Objectives/Burke & Minassians' Indicators and Models of Excellence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Objective</strong></th>
<th><strong>Indicator</strong></th>
<th><strong>Models</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduation rate</td>
<td>Graduation rate, 6 years</td>
<td>Strategic investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graduation productivity</td>
<td>Degree attainment</td>
<td>Strategic investment/Client centered</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partnerships with secondary education</td>
<td>K-16 Collaboration</td>
<td>Strategic investment/Client centered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensure pass rate</td>
<td>License exams, pass rates</td>
<td>Strategic investment/Client centered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raise admissions standard</td>
<td>Acceptance rate</td>
<td>Strategic investment/Client centered/Resource-reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer articulation</td>
<td>Student transfer, credit acceptance</td>
<td>Strategic investment/Client centered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Burke & Minassians (2002); LA GRAD Act (2010)*

The author has taken the language used in the LA GRAD Act (2010) and matched the objectives with Burke & Minassians' (2002) indicators and related models of excellence. All of the
objectives/indicators listed under Section C of the LA GRAD Act fit into the strategic investment model, with the majority also fitting into the client-centered model. The strategic investment model places the state's financial interests at the center and the client-centered model places the student or other client at the center (Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke & Minassians, 2002).

Given the indicators present in Louisiana performance policy, the author would characterize the state policy as primarily state centered with students as a secondary consideration. Not all of the client-centered indicators are student centered. Burke and Minassians (2002) noted that employers of recent graduates could also be clients in the client-centered model. Indicators such as degree attainment and licensure examination pass rates could be seen as both student-centered and employer centered. Graduation rates and degree attainment have figured prominently in Louisiana postsecondary policy because of Louisiana’s low percentage of college educated citizens as compared to other states, so although these outcome measures (objectives) can be viewed as client-centered, they are also state centered in this case (Louisiana Board of Regents, 2001; LA GRAD Act, 2010).

Limitations

Applying the models of excellence (Burke & Associates, 2002; Burke & Minassians, 2002) to Louisiana performance policies illuminates whose interests are being served by the policies. Although the author matched the objectives in the LA GRAD Act (2010) to the most similar indicators in the models of excellence, not all matches were exact. The work presented here should be considered exploratory for the utility of models of excellence as a framework for understanding Louisiana postsecondary performance policy. If the author were to continue this work, she would need to review the methods used in constructing the models of excellence more thoroughly to ensure that the objectives in the LA GRAD Act were indeed matched with the appropriate indicators.
LA GRAD Act 2.0

According to the Office of the Governor (2011), metrics in the LA GRAD Act related to student success are prioritized under GRAD Act 2.0.

GRAD Act 2.0 prioritizes key “Student Success” metrics so that institutions know which of the 52 metrics they should prioritize. This new law puts special emphasis on “Student Success” metrics, which include six-year graduation rates, first-to-second and second-to-third year retention rates, and overall completers, by making them required. The Governor noted that these are the key components of improving outcomes - and these are the data that schools should focus on to improve graduation rates and ensure students get the skills they need to succeed in the workforce (para. 7).

Although these metrics are referred to as student success measures, the measures have been used by the state of Louisiana to measure institutional success. As Burke & Minassians (2002) noted, client centered does not always mean student centered. The student success metrics prioritized in GRAD Act 2.0, are perhaps better labeled as client centered; also serving the interests of parents, alumni, and employers of recent college graduates.

GRAD Act 2.0 does not appear to significantly change the policy goals of the original act. However, given the enactment of the revised policy, it will be necessary for the policy analysis which has been the subject of this paper to be revisited in order for it to be complete. The author does not believe that the revisions to the LA GRAD Act that are part of GRAD Act 2.0 would substantially change her categorization of the policy as one that is a combination of performance budgeting and performance reporting or that it would significantly change the best fit models of excellence analysis.

It is possible that the language in GRAD Act 2.0 is a policy reaction to the public outcry over some of the provisions of the original LA GRAD Act, particularly requirements to raise institutional admission standards. By recasting the policy under the label of student success, policymakers may
be responding to past criticism. The language of GRAD Act 2.0 actually more closely aligns the policy with the best fit models of excellence which characterize many of the provisions of the LA GRAD Act as student centered (Burke & Minassians, 2002; LA GRAD Act 2010; 2011).

**Conclusion**

Since Tennessee first piloted performance-based funding initiatives in 1974, the use of performance indicators in the finance of higher education has been adopted by most states (Alexander, 2000; Burke & Serban, 1998; McClendon et al., 2006; Shin, 2010). Louisiana is no exception. The LA GRAD Act (2010) is the dominant public postsecondary education policy in the state. Since its adoption, previous policies have been adapted to support the LA GRAD Act.

Although the LA GRAD Act (2010) dominates the higher education policy landscape in Louisiana, because of its relative newness it is still not well understood nor will its impact on postsecondary education be known for some time. By analyzing the LA GRAD Act and describing it using existing frameworks, the Act can be better understood not only by scholars of higher education, but also by the practitioners who must apply the policy to their work in admissions, retention, teaching, outreach, and many other areas within public colleges and universities.

Performance policies now seem like a permanent fixture in public higher education. However, as the case of Louisiana illustrates, as new policies are enacted old ones may be altered to conform to the dominant policy. Understanding who or what is at the center of performance policies should enable institutions of higher education to better navigate the policy environment. While there are still uncertainties related to postsecondary performance policy in Louisiana, what has been illuminated through the course of this analysis is that uncertainty is built into the policy environment through performance budgeting. Additionally, the indicators present in the LA GRAD Act (2010) show the policy to be most concerned with state interests. By understanding the perspectives from which performance policy has been constructed, higher education institutions
and their leaders should be better able to respond to and influence postsecondary performance policy. A nuanced understanding of policy will be of continuing importance for leaders in public higher education as the LA GRAD Act continues to involve under the guidelines of GRAD Act 2.0.
References


