UNESCO
Strengthening Teacher Education in Pakistan
USAID Contract – 391-A-00-06-01062-00
Strategic Framework for Teacher Education
And Professional Development PAKISTAN
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And Professional Development

PAKISTAN

Sponsors

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNESCO

United States Agency for International Development
USAID

2006
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Pakistan has been well advised over the past decade by local, international and donor agencies alike of what is not working with regard to its public teaching system and its provision of professional development for teachers (see comprehensive bibliography). The issues of lack of accountability, lack of incentives, little hope of a career track, and motivation are all highlighted as problems confronting teachers. Moreover, these issues appear to be widespread resulting from the failure of the system itself (led by government institutions) which over the years has struggled to cater to one of the largest cadre of employees in the country. Coupled with the proliferation of teacher training institutions in the last decade (over 200) that have also been observed to be ineffective, service delivery appears to be currently fated. Some grand attempts have been made at improving the professional development institutions such as the ADB program in the mid 1990’s that supported the establishment of the Provincial Institutes of Teacher Education (PITEs) and other outposts of training. However, programs like this one resulted more in the installment of infrastructure than improvement of quality education. In fact, a majority of projects and programs implemented over the years have unfortunately directed their energies at addressing the symptoms of the problems rather than correcting the root causes. The approach of asking the “institution” or the government in this case to solve its problems is inherently flawed when the institution is part of the problem—a problem that cannot be simply solved through the provision of hours upon hours of pre-service and in-service training programs off the shelf.

Senge (1990) discusses an organizational concept of ‘burden shifting’. This concept is defined as an underlying problem in organizations that generates symptoms that demand attention. Senge argues that the underlying problem is difficult to address in these situations either because it is obscure or costly to confront. Hence, the burden of the problem is shifted to other solutions that are well meaning and ‘easy fixes which seem extremely efficient’. Senge’s management principle is applicable in education development in Pakistan. In this case, poor social indicators specifically those related to education have demanded attention if not by the Federal Government, then by external agencies. Pakistan’s inherited problem of centralist control and lack of commitment or adherence to public policies for improved education could be characterized as its underlying problem. In Pakistan, the donor community has stepped in and set benchmarks for the improvement of student enrolments, literacy rates, teacher training programs and school buildings to address the symptoms of poor quality of education and its delivery. Solutions that address only the symptoms of a problem, not fundamental cause, tend to have short-term benefits at best. In the long-term, the problem resurfaces and there is increased pressure for symptomatic response. Meanwhile, the capability for fundamental solutions can atrophy. The broader implication of burden shifting in development is clear. All the financing and the external technical assistance possible cannot and will not make very much of a difference. Only when root problems are addressed in development can fundamental changes have much of a lasting effect. Chubb and Moe’s (1990) argument that institutions cannot solve problems alone sometimes because they are part of the problem is arguably applicable to Pakistan.

The purpose of the preparation of a Strategic Framework for Teacher Education and Professional Development, as stated below, is an attempt to develop a policy framework that captures the problems at the root and turn them into policy points for dialogue and action. In turn, the comprehensive review of Pakistan’s experiences in teacher education reform will hopefully help the Government pave a constructive way forward. It is hoped that the strategic framework will contribute to the current national education policy review (2005-Present) that is concerned with paving the way toward a practical and yet innovative policy for teacher education in Pakistan. A commitment to policy reform, however, is something that the strategic framework cannot enforce.

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\(^1\) See Annex I for statistical data on teachers in Pakistan.
Purpose Statement:
The purpose of the Strategic Framework is to review past attempts at teacher education reform, assess current policies and practices and develop a framework that transforms the root problems into policy points for dialogue and action.

The development of the Strategic Framework has been supported under a grant funded by USAID. The overarching project was executed between USAID and UNESCO in 2005 and is expected to run for three years. The project is entitled “Strengthening Teacher Education in Pakistan through the development of a Strategic Framework for Policy Dialogue, Coordination, and National Standards for Teacher Certification and Accreditation.” The project goal is stated below.

UNESCO Project Goal:
The principle objective of the UNESCO overarching project is to improve the quality and professional development of teachers and teacher training institutions in Pakistan through the development of a strategic framework for 1) policy formulation and dialogue with a view to building consensus and mobilizing support for teacher education; 2) effective coordination of interventions in teacher education, including field-based teacher education activities; and 3) standard-setting for teacher certification and accreditation.

The key aim of the project is stated in UNESCO’s proposal summary, “a key element of this [project] is to move away from the traditional notion of teacher training to the broader concept of teacher professional development. This requires a transformation of the policies and processes that support the teachers’ professional development.”

The Situation Analysis and the Strategic Framework are not meant to merely represent another deficit study of the system of teacher education and professional development. Instead, it is hoped that the provocative nature of these documents together with well thought out guidelines will stimulate further dialogue and policy review which hopefully will lead to improvements in new generations of policy and practice.

UNESCO appreciates the cooperation and support of many individuals consulted for the development of this framework throughout the country. Pakistan has a wealth of education professionals who are committed to the purpose of improving education throughout the country.

UNESCO
Islamabad
September 2006
Acronyms

ADB  Asian Development Bank
AED  Academy of Educational Development
AIOU  Allama Iqbal Open University
AJK  Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AKF  Aga Khan Foundation
AKU  Aga Khan University
ALCEC  Alif-Laila Children Educational Complex
AusAid  Australian Agency for International Development
BCEW  Bureau of Curriculum and Extension Wing
BIMDTC  Balochistan Instructional Material Development and Training Cell
BoC  Bureau of Curriculum
BPEP  Balochistan Primary Education Program
CBF  Capacity Building Fund
CE  Certificate in Education
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency
CMS  Community Model Schools
CPD  Continuous Professional Development
CRDC  Curriculum Research Development Center
CT  Certificate of Teaching
CTSC  Cluster Training and Support Center
DCTE  Directorate of Curriculum and Teacher Education
DFID  Department For International Development
DTC  Drawing Teaching Certificate
DTSC  District Training and Support Center
EC  European Commission
ECE  Early Childhood Education
EEC  Education Extension Center
EFA  Education For All
EMIS  Education Management Information System
ESR  Education Sector Reforms
ESRA  Education Sector Reform Assistance
ETRC  Education Technology Resource Centers
FANA  Federally Administered Northern Areas
FATA  Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBTD  Field-Based Teacher Development
FCU  Federal Coordinating Unit
DSD  Directorate of Staff Development
GTZ  Germany Agency for Technical Cooperation
GCE  Government Colleges of Education
GCET  Government College of Elementary Training
GECE  Government Elementary College of Education
GoB  Government of Balochistan
GoNWFP  Government of NWFP
GoP  Government of Pakistan
GPI  Government Polytechnic Institution
GoS  Government of Sindh
HM  Head Mistress
Objective of the Framework:

*To support and inform policy making, planning, implementation and evaluation of teacher education and professional development in Pakistan*

Introduction

The importance of ‘good governance’ in any social sector framework cannot be overemphasized. The different levels of authority with regard to fiscal, political, and administrative concerns, the rules and regulations laid down for interaction between the various levels, the mechanisms followed to implement policy designs, and the linkages between the involved actors are all key underlying issues that determine the success of any policy.

It is common to find well-crafted and coherent policy designs failing to attain desired results in developing counties. Pakistan is no exception. Despite having taken a significant number of initiatives in a quest to further its Teacher Professional Development (TPD) objectives, progress remains less than satisfactory. While a number of studies have been undertaken to analyze Pakistan’s TPD initiatives, few efforts have attempted to look at the issue more holistically by studying the underlying governance structures. Moreover, most analyses have treated TT and teacher management as two distinct sub-sectors, often failing to examine the necessary linkages between the two under the overarching concept of TPD.

This strategic framework attempts to analyze and guide governance of TPD in Pakistan. The hypothesis is that improvements in the way the sector is managed and financed could provide the foundation for enhancement in the quality and student learning outcomes. Given that much of the current governance issues are closely tied to the devolved power structures introduced in the country, the analysis is conducted in light of the devolution framework. **Section I** provides an overview of international experiences with regard to governance of TPD. **Section II** focuses on various policies dealing with TPD related governance issues. **Section III** highlights the institutional and functional issues in Pakistan’s TPD sub-sector, while **Section IV** discusses financial governance issues. **Section V** underscores governance concerns in linking TPD with improved learning outcomes. **Section VI** discusses the implications of lack of good governance in Pakistan. **Section VII** presents policy guidelines guiding principles and a policy matrix for teacher education and professional development.
SECTION I Governance of TPD: A review of international experiences

A review of international experiences highlights some important governance issues with regard to TPD. For the most part, one finds that policies and official promulgations from all countries highlight the importance of TPD in general, as well as the need to ensure robust governance patterns to implement policies. However, beyond macro level policies, specific mechanisms to ensure ‘good governance’ vary immensely across countries.

MUSTER\textsuperscript{2} country experiences show that an overall political and bureaucratic will is imperative for progressive reforms to be made in TPD. The South African example, where TPD modalities have been altered as part of a broader reform process, underscores the point that unless bureaucratic channels of functioning are streamlined, well-meaning mechanisms, which might even be successful in countries with good governance practices, are liable to fail (Parker 2002).

1.1 Level of decentralization

The debate on the gains from centralized versus decentralized systems of governance with regard to TPD remains unresolved. Some developed countries with robust TPD frameworks remain highly centralized. New Zealand is an interesting case where the local governments have no role in teacher education and the Central Ministry of Education is responsible for all facets of TPD. In England, the Secretary of State for Education and Skills at the Center is in charge of ensuring the existence of TT facilities. In fact, school inspection to ensure quality standards of TT is the primary responsibility of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Schools in England In other countries such as Uganda, effective decentralization has led to positive dividends as far as teacher management and TT issues are concerned (Hartwell et al. 2003).

Literature from the reviewed cases suggests that while decentralization could allow for the gap between service providers and consumers to be narrowed down, decentralized accountability and functioning can have a negative impact if there is a weak chain of command, incompetence and inadequate infrastructure (Lewin and Stuart 2003).

1.2 Clarity in institutional and individual responsibilities

More than the level of decentralization, what seems to have a direct impact on the quality of TPD are clearly defined linkages and responsibilities legislated through policy frameworks.

In a number of cases, the linkages between various actors mandated to manage TPD are either not well defined or lack coordination. Moreover, there is an inherent problem of lack of clearly defined lines of authority between various tiers of government. In Africa, while devolution frameworks exist, much of the actual authority still remains concentrated at the Center. In Zanzibar for example, the DEOs are functional, but have limited operational autonomy in the face of constant interference from the relevant Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training Zanzibar 2005). In some African countries, control over TT is ambiguous and ends up being a subsidiary function of a Ministry or a line department with no clearly defined roles and responsibilities at the lower tiers of government (Lewin and Stuart 2003). By contrast, in success stories such as Japan and England while functionaries responsible for various

\textsuperscript{2} The Multi-Site Teacher Education Research Project (MUSTER) focused on primary education in Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa and Trinidad and Tobago.
facets of TT are not always relevant, their roles are much better defined (“England: Initial teacher training”; Nohara 1997).

Among the African cases reviewed, in all countries with the exception of Uganda, training colleges are completely isolated both intellectually as well as physically from the school environment. Colleges are uneasily placed in the educational hierarchy, often between Ministries, Higher Education institutions and schools (Lewin and Stuart 2003; Hartwell et al. 2003). Lack of clarity in governance structures impacts their functional efficiency.

1.3 Financial governance of TPD

Literature on financial governance of TPD is relatively scant. Again, one is hard pressed to determine any common pattern of financial management across countries. While many seem to be functioning in a centralized manner, some countries have requested the school systems or districts to generate and manage their own funds for TPD activities.

In Zanzibar, as in most developing countries, the central government is the major source of education funding. However, much of the funding is channeled towards access issues and salary expenditures. Community and parent contribution have also been suggested as means to fund TPD in Zanzibar, but how these will be administered is unclear (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, Zanzibar 2005).

In Benin, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal a trend has emerged of allowing schools greater autonomy in resource management, though the changes are less prevalent in legislation. Since 2001-2002, Benin has engaged in transferring financial resources directly from the central level to the schools. Guinea had already undertaken similar reforms in the mid-90s by providing a menu of bulk resources to finance the implementation of the improvement proposals. Although official amendments have been issued, principals still resort to requesting parents to contribute to the school’s financing through PTA and other fees and recruit teachers from the community, who are paid small stipends, due to lack of funds (Grauwe, 2004).

In the US, financial governance weaknesses are as rampant. Only a handful of states (second tier of government in the US) have clearly marked budget lines for TPD (National Conference of State Legislators, undated). Lack of adequate spending on TPD can easily be concealed, as in the absence of separate budget lines, embedded expenditures are difficult to determine. Moreover, in the US, quasi-federal systems directly inject money into school systems according to program priorities, irrespective of the requirements, and in isolation from the broader state level TPD framework (National Conference of State Legislatures undated).

There seems to be no optimal level of decentralization in financial management. Even in Benin, Guinea, Mali and Senegal, despite decentralization, all four countries still struggle with a lack of resources, which is exacerbated with two management related factors. First, resources made available by the central level typically are accompanied by tight budget lines. Even these are based often on previsions made by the offices and schools. Second, the government normally does not account for the characteristics and needs of each district and its schools when planning the level of aid (Grauwe 2004). In MUSTER countries decentralization of the budgetary framework was found to add an additional layer of bureaucracy (Lewin and Stuart 2003).
Research does however point to the need to clearly link budgetary mechanisms with the responsible Ministry’s framework.

1.4 Donor interventions in TPD
The donor community has played a vital role in enhancing TT in the developing world. That their programs have benefited is the case beyond any doubt. However, the key issue is lack of sustainability in donor-funded projects.

Donor experiences suggest the need to make any interventions part of the country’s strategic TPD framework rather than conducting projects in isolation. Moreover, simply providing financial resources is not enough. Rather there is a need to ensure improved management of funds with clearly defined deliverables to ensure timely disbursement in a transparent manner. Uganda has ensured sustainability of its education reforms by making them a part of the budgetary framework which promises commitment from the government and increases its capacity to takeover the recurrent expenses of the project, even after donor support dries out (Engels 2001). In other cases, even successful programs have had significant sustainability related problems. In Guinea, the World Bank’s Learning Innovation Loan (LIL) led to superb quantitative gains to meet the acute teacher shortages in the country. However, while new teachers were produced, no career paths were specified for them. Unless donor support is ensured to devise a mechanism to ensure career growth, gains under the project could be compromised significantly (Association for the Development of Education in Africa, “Guinea” 2005).

1.5 Private Sector role in TPD
The role of the private sector varies from country to country but is usually well understood in developed countries. It is not unusual to see the private sector providing TT as well as reading material and guides for teachers in developed countries (Ministry of Education, “National Education Conference” 2006). In the developing world, the private sector role is usually limited both due to lack of importance accorded to the non-government sector in policy as well as capacity constraints (Ministry of Education, “National Education Conference”, 2006). Most of the African cases reviewed have marginal roles for the private sector. Uganda is an exception, where the private sector has been formally co-opted and is a major reason for the success of the country’s TPD initiatives (Engels 2001).

1.6 Teacher motivation and quality assessment
Drawing a linkage between pre-service and INSET and career development is essential to ensure teacher motivation, which in turn enhances teacher performance and thus impacts learning outcomes positively. Such a link is absent in developing countries. In cases where teacher management mechanisms are inefficient, one often finds low remuneration for teachers and career paths de-linked from professional qualifications or performance. Teacher unions however, have proved to be a valuable source in ensuring presence of incentive regimes for teachers and their existence is considered to be a strength of the TPD framework (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, Zanzibar 2005).

On the issue of TPD assessments, all reviewed developing countries follow mostly quantitative assessment indicators. South Africa is an exception and has undertaken creation of a holistic
performance assessment system which tracks progress on qualitative issues (Parker, 2002). While this is surely a step forward, given pervasive governance lapses, achieving the desired outcomes is highly challenging. Literature also suggests an endemic lack of capacity to conduct regular monitoring in the developing world. Lack of staff and resources are the most obvious reasons for irregular monitoring and appraisal procedures. Other reasons include greater number of teachers per inspector (in one Senegalese district, four inspectors supervise nearly 400 teachers); tougher mandate of district offices (they have to exercise control and provide support); lack of strategic planning; and changing profile of teachers with the latter having less training and fewer qualifications than was the case before (Grauwe 2004; Lewin and Stuart 2003).

Africa has experienced irregular inspections, with no quality control, leading to poor teacher performances. However, in Benin, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal efforts are being undertaken to reform inspection services. In Mali, the offices now focus on giving advice rather than traditional inspecting. In Benin, clustering is practiced to discuss pedagogical and other matters (Grauwe 2004).

England’s example suggests the benefit from allowing a dedicated functionary to be responsible for quality control of TT and teacher assessments. In England, the Office of Standards in Education, a non-ministerial government department, performs this task (“England: Initial teacher training” undated).
SECTION II Governance of TPD: Revisiting Policy pronouncements

Pakistan has no overarching policy framework, which specifically addresses TPD. Instead, TPD issues are covered in various education policies, of which there has been no dearth. While the primary focus of the education policies has naturally remained on enhancing access to education, TPD has been covered in most of the policy pronouncements. Broadly, the policy statements are contained in various Commission and ‘Conference’ reports, Five Year Plans, National Education Policies, other nationally applicable reform documents, and provincial level policy pronouncements. Only those documents containing text relevant to governance of TPD are mentioned below.

2.1 Commission and ‘Conference’ Reports
The very first National Education Conference 1947 did mention the need to institute ‘first-rate’ TTIs but never outlined any plan in detail. It did however rest the responsibility of TT and ensuring adequate scales of salary with the provincial government. The National Plan of Educational Development 1951-57 emphasized the need ‘to provide for more training institutions’, specifying the numbers and funds for the initiative. The report on the Commission on National Education 1959 focused mainly on teacher administration issues, but did broadly point to the need to institute a mechanism for teacher assessments. The 1959 plan also provisioned for expenditure on inspectorial staff, but without pointing to the mechanisms for ensuring effectiveness of the initiative (GoP, Matrix of previous policies 2006).

2.2 Five Year Plans
The First Five Year Plan 1955-60 set an ambitious target to increase the number of trained primary school teachers. The plan also dealt with management issues including contemplating “the possibility of constituting local school management committees and district advisory boards ……elected by members of the community…” (Bengali 1999). The committees were to consult with area education officers on teacher selection, among other issues. The country’s second five year plan, 1960-65 categorically acknowledged that “no increase was registered in the number of trained teachers at the primary level” (Bengali 1999). A major factor responsible for this of course was that policies, while providing broad goals did not specify, or necessitate subsequent action to formulate a specific governance plan to achieve the objectives. In the seventh five year plan, teacher recruitment was discussed in some detail basically reflecting the need to increase supply of teachers to attain the objective of ‘one teacher and one room for every class’ (Bengali 1999). Recruitment was relaxed to untrained teachers without PTCs. The Plan also suggested that salaries were to be determined according to qualifications of hired teachers. The eighth five year plan, 1993-98 emphasized the need to improve quality of teachers through better pre-service and in-service training and further to improve efficiency of the system by “better supervision and with the involvement of local community” (Bengali 1999). How this was to be achieved was again a question mark.
2.3 National Education Policies

Two national education policies deliberated the issue of governance in TPD at great length. The 1979 National Education Policy set out the aims of education as well as an implementation strategy. Specifically on governance of TPD, the policy was self-critical. It provisioned for the formation of an Academy of Educational Planning and Management as well as strengthening existing structures for TPD (MoE “National Education Policy 1979”, 1979). Rather shockingly, it also called for the setting up of an admissions committee in all teacher education institutes whose task was to select candidates who were “strongly committed to Pakistan’s ideology” [emphasis added]. The policy also acknowledged the confusion between the roles of various entities providing in-service training and set up a national committee to reconcile their roles. It also emphasized the need to have complementary roles for the suggested institutes, but left the question of how this would be achieved unanswered (MoE “National Education Policy 1979).

The latest national education policy, 1998-2010 was a major step forward as far as according importance to TPD issues is concerned. TPD was tackled in great detail, with a self-critique of the existing system and clear implementation plans including provisions to improve governance related issues. The Policy was categorical in acknowledging a disconnect between various implementation mechanisms used in the past and their desired impact. The Policy highlighted politicisation of appointments, the acute lack of supervision of TPD, the absence of any single policy framework to guide TPD, and the like. The policy also provided detailed implementation mechanisms, including formation of National Institute of Teacher Training (NITE) to train teacher trainers based in TTIs, and incentives in terms of stipends for teachers to work in rural areas (MoE “National Education Policy 1998-2010” 1998). However, again there was no mention of how NITE would be governed and how its own capacity will be generated. Moreover, the implementation plan left out solutions to the major governance related problems it raised. Like previous policies, the 1998-2010 policy also stressed upon the need to keep teacher unions depoliticised (MoE “National Education Policy 1998-2010” 1998).

Currently, a review process of the 1998-2010 policy is underway. The green papers that have been produced as part of the review are candid in acknowledging the governance related problems with regard to TPD (MoE, “National Education Conference” 2006). The key questions put out by the green papers on various issues are truly ones, which if answered could provide clues towards better management of TPD. The Green papers deliberate upon the optimal role of various tiers of government in TPD, the role of teachers in school management and key deficiencies in the TPD framework. The problem again is that vague or diluted responses to such questions in the past have left governance issues at the micro-level largely unsettled. There is no guarantee that the review process would fare any better.

2.3.1 Education Sector Reforms

The Education Sector Reforms 2002-2006 were introduced to devise an implementation mechanism for the National Education Policy 1998-2010s recommendations. The ESR action plan provides specific sets of actions to upgrade teacher qualifications, implementation of the National Education Assessment System (NEAS), and the setting up of Tehsil/Teacher Resource Centers (Jamil 2004; MoE, “National Education Conference” 2006). The latter were designed to provide decentralized in-service training to teachers and were to be managed by a board of
selected professionals. Moreover, the plan provisioned for Rs.2500 million for setting up 500 TRCs, but the source of their recurrent expenditures was not provided (Jamil 2004).

2.4 Education for All Plan 2015
Under the Education for All Plan’s Universal Primary Education component, the plan discusses TPD issues in detail. Like most other policies, major policy initiatives are proposed without the accompanying management and institutional details. For instance, pre-service TT reforms and replication of mobile TT programs is recommended without thrashing out the actors responsible, the channel to be followed to institute the change across provinces, and the like. The Plan has also suggested introducing new methodologies for teaching but what mechanisms could be put in place to ensure this is not deliberated upon (Jamil 2004).

2.5 Local Government Ordinance 2001
In 2001, the Federal Government promulgated the Local Government Ordinance, which introduced a detailed mechanism to devolve powers from the federal and provincial governments to the newly established district authorities across sectors, including education. The devolution plan provides a detailed plan, delineating responsibilities to various actors relevant to the TPD framework. The LGO now guides the relationship between various tiers of government across sectors and sub-sectors, including TPD. Under the plan, the federal government maintains the overall policy formulation role, the responsibility for devising curricula, setting teacher pay scales, defining requirements of teacher credentials and providing the broad vision for TPD. The provincial government is actually in charge of TT activities and ensuring quality of education, including qualification criteria of teachers. Teacher management issues and service delivery has been devolved to the district level (GoP, “Local Government Ordinance” 2001).

2.6 Provincial Policy Pronouncements
Traditionally, bulk of the TPD policy direction came from national policies. Provinces accorded little importance to TPD in the past. Recently however, donor pressure has forced provinces to focus attention on TPD and related governance issues. Today, quality of education, including TPD is the key area of focus of almost all provincial reforms. Balochistan is the only exception, as the province’s education priorities include TPD only as a secondary function and barely touch upon governance issues, expect recognizing the failure of the current functioning.

In the absence of separate provincial TPD policy, the issue is covered in a number of reforms, five-year plans, or even specific frameworks designed to address TPD issues. Most provincial plans are identical to national documents in their formulations. While they are candid in acknowledging governance failures in management of TPD and highlight the specific areas, which need attention, they hardly touch upon the mechanisms through which positive change would be ensured.

The NWFP five-year education sector plan presents lofty aims without paying much attention to how effectiveness in the functioning of new initiatives will be achieved. In order to ensure better governance structures the plan calls for policies on teacher recruitment and posting, building capacity in a number of TPD related areas, incorporating all TPD activities under a district plan, enhancing community participation, and the like (Department of Schools and Literacy NWFP, 2006). Again, the mechanism for ensuring these, the complementarity between district and
provincial plans, the division of TPD funds between the province and district to fulfil the plan, and sustainability of donor funding remains unclear. The Sindh Education Plan produced in 2005 is a comprehensive document looking at all aspects of education, clearly defining roles for various provincial and district actors, setting clear priorities with heavy emphasis on education quality and implementational issues. However, on TPD while it outlines a broad plan to improve TT, and TT material no mechanism to ensure its implementation is provided (Education and Literacy Department 2005). The Punjab Education Service Delivery Reform Program 2003-2006 also entertained educational governance and TPD (under the quality component) as its key focus areas. The Plan, unlike most other programs, provides specific measures to improve governance through better teacher management and quality control and is perhaps the most thorough document out of the provincial strategies reviewed (“Directorate of Staff Development” 2006; World Bank Education Sector Punjab 2004).

2.7 Educational Policymaking In Pakistan: Key Issues

As is evident, Pakistan has had a plethora of educational policy pronouncements through National and Provincial Policies, five year plans, Commission Reports, and the devolution plan. There is still no comprehensive vision or single policy on TPD, which approaches the issue holistically. While TPD issues have been discussed in almost all National Policies, much of the governance related pronouncements either focus on broad and largely vague statements with no management mechanism provided. Governance issues related to teacher motivation, assessments, receive little attention in policy frameworks.

Next, there seems to be a stark absence of any attempt to synchronize the various policies and program initiatives with regard to TPD. Interestingly, every policy begins by criticizing the previous plans, conducting a critique of the system, and then providing what the formulators believed was the way forward to ensure positive change (Bengali 1999). None of the policies and plans actually suggest in any detail how they complement the objectives in the previous pronouncements (Bengali 1999). Provincial policies seem to be designed in complete isolation from frameworks designed at the federal level. Even if national level policies did provision for a certain change in the TPD governance mechanism, provincial uptake and implementation strategy greatly varies and often disregards or overlaps with mechanisms instituted at the other tiers of government.

2.7.1 Stakeholder involvement in policymaking

Pakistan has made remarkable progress in opening up its policy-making mechanism to non-governmental stakeholders. Traditionally, most national and provincial policies were formulated by a handful of government designated ‘experts’ in a closed-door environment. However, in recent years there has been a pleasant shift towards involving a broad representation of stakeholders in policy making. The ESR was formulated after an extensive consultative process, which brought provinces, educational practitioners, and managers together to provide input to the policy makers. The LGO 2001 education sector priorities were also formed after a consultative process at the federal and provincial level (Ministry of Education 2003). The ongoing review of the 1998-2010 policy is perhaps the most consultative policy making process in the education sector. A number of national and provincial workshops have been arranged to receive input (GoP, “National Education Conference” 2006).
While these are steps in the positive direction, in order to further improve policy designs with regard to TPD, a systematic process to involve teachers and teaching organizations, especially those based in rural areas, must be mandated (Jamil 2004). Currently, most consultative sessions are held in major cities and inputs are only received in time-bound meetings. Moreover, there must be a mechanism to ensure maximum uptake from stakeholder input which is presently solely at the discretion of policy makers.

2.7.2 Instituting policy change

In theory, the Constitution of Pakistan provides considerable leeway to Federal and Provincial governments to amend or introduce policies. The Federal and Provincial Cabinets have the authority to approve policies (GoP, “Constitution” 1973). The Rules of Business under the 1973 Constitution are even more relaxed, by virtue of which even relevant ministries can initiate policy changes or devise new policy pronouncements (GoP, “Constitution” 1973). Moreover, in concurrent subjects such as education, provinces, irrespective of national policy formulations can, at any time, devise their own policies or amend priorities within the overall national vision. For instance, a formal link between pre-service and in-service training could be made through the 1998-2010 National Policy Review, or could be instituted in any province by a decision by the provincial ministry. In fact, some of the provinces have been revising their TPD policy frameworks extremely frequently. The excessive changes in provincial TPD frameworks in Punjab in the recent past suggest the relative ease through which such alterations could be instituted. Finally, post-2001 devolution, districts have been handed down the task of defining their own priorities across sectors, and within sectors. However, districts do not have the authority to alter policies devised at the provincial or federal level.

While the above is true for macro-level policies and frameworks, the ability to alter existing rules and regulations enacted under the Constitution is highly constrained. Amendments are made, parallel structures are brought in, existing structures are bypassed, new domains are explored, but the old structures are never removed altogether (USAID 2005). For instance, the Civil Services Act is of immense importance for teacher management. The excessively cumbersome protocols under the Act have caused tremendous inefficiency within functioning of TPD, but the Act has not been removed. It has however been bypassed or circumvented through various means. This is the usual way to deal with all such existing rules and regulations.
SECTION III Institutional and functional management of TPD

The lack of specific detail on the management of TPD issues in various policies has led to coordination issues among various tiers of government and with other stakeholders like the donor community and the private sector. Moreover, in the absence of a well-coordinated framework linkage between various institutions and actors mandated to manage TPD across the country has been formed in an ad hoc, and often confusing manner. This chapter aims to elaborate on various governance related issues with regard to the institutional and management framework that surrounds TPD in Pakistan: (i) inter-tier coordination, (ii) linkages between various institutions set up to manage TPD across the three tiers of government, (iii) coordination with the donor community, and (iv) management of the private sector.

3.1 Inter-tier coordination

According to the constitution of Pakistan, education is a concurrent subject falling under the jurisdiction of both the federal and provincial governments. Although the LGO 2001 provisioned for a devolved set-up, giving districts administrative and financial autonomy over matters of education, TT remained a provincial subject. However, larger TPD issues like teacher management, part of recruitment responsibilities, and service delivery of local level training fell under the jurisdiction of districts (Jamil 2004).

3.1.1 Coordination between federal and provincial tiers

In the pre-devolved set-up, the federal government was responsible for the overall policy formulation, financial allocations, and curriculum development while the provinces were responsible for implementation of TPD activities. In reality, the TPD framework remained highly centralized. Hayes highlighted the unclear division of roles between the federal and provincial governments and the obsession of the former to maintain control over TPD relevant activities: “The provinces have no independent authority of their own….in the event of a conflict between the laws of the central government and those of the provinces, the authority of the central government takes precedence” (Hayes 1987).

The constant tension between the Center and provinces has led to adversarial relationships, with the provinces resenting interference from the federal government. In some cases, the provinces have even begun to question the need for a Federal Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education, “National Education Conference” 2006). Moreover, they have begun to employ policies, which undermine the federal government’s regulations. For example, Punjab and NWFP have instituted policies to hire teachers on contract basis rather than through the Civil Services (World Bank and DFID, “Management Study” 2005; World Bank and DFID, “Reform Study” 2005). By virtue of this, provinces determine salary structures, which leave the federally established civil servants’ pay scales redundant. In other cases, such as the ESR, the federal writ is not binding on the provinces and is often disregarded (USAID 2005). These and many such initiatives have created a dichotomy between federal vision and provincial implementation.

One major structural flaw, which impedes inter-tier coordination, is that the Education Departments at each tier are structured according to levels of schooling rather than various thematic functions they are required to perform (UNESCO and USAID 2005). Such a structure does not allow for rationalization of responsibilities and often leads to neglect of certain essential
TPD related activities. In order to break away from such bottlenecks, systems rely on the government’s direct writ to expedite needed initiatives, for example directly through the Provincial Chief Minister’s orders. While the provinces are often blamed for deliberately ignoring the federal writ, it is in large part institutional failure that has led provinces to bypass existing mechanisms and look for quick fix solutions.

3.1.2 Coordination between provincial and district tiers
The post-devolution set-up presents a nightmare, as there is virtually no inter-tier coordination in governing TPD across the country. Under the devolved set-up, the provinces have become equally obsessed with retaining tight control over district activities and are not willing to provide districts autonomy. For one, the complexity of the rules and varying interpretations across provinces and districts imply that the delineation of TPD relevant roles between provinces and districts remains unclear.

Furthermore, the level and pace of decentralization of decision-making processes has varied considerably among provinces and even among districts within a province (Aga Khan University and DfID 2003). The districts have been made part of TPD (especially TT) activities on an ad hoc and disparate basis. Therefore, while provincial policies pan across districts, the actual role played by districts in TPD varies from district to district. No formal binding agreement between the two tiers of government on the division of responsibilities exists.

Provinces have managed to maintain centralized control through a number of channels. A disconnect at the district level is present between politically elected district representatives and civil servants appointed by the provincial government (Open Society Institute 2004). The civil servants are susceptible to provincial pressure and thus often end up being at odds with district representatives. Moreover, the province interferes regularly in teacher appointments, transfers, selection for teachers for TT, and other such activities falling under the district’s mandate (World Bank and DFID, “Management Study” 2005; World Bank and DFID, “Reform Study” 2005).

Provinces can also manipulate their legislative powers to undermine the authority of the districts. Punjab and NWFP\(^3\) have done so by instituting a ban on teacher transfers at the pretext that these are politically motivated. It is ironic that the very provincial figures that exert pressure on teacher management decisions also institute a mechanism to redress the situation, the latter restricting the authority of the districts to manage teachers as envisioned under the devolved set-up. Moreover, while districts can recruit elementary school teachers, it is the provincial government that decides when recruitment drives are to take place. Additional sanctioned posts are also managed by the district but can only be utilized after approval from the province (World Bank and DFID, “Management Study” 2005; World Bank and DFID, “Reform Study” 2005). In NWFP, secondary school teachers remain under the direct control of the provincial government, unlike other provinces.

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\(^3\) The ban in NWFP was later reversed.
3.1.2.1 The political angle of interference

Apart from the obsession to maintain centralized control, political motives are the major factor leading to interference from the province. Political interference largely affects teacher management issues, as influencing teacher-training concerns is hardly politically expedient. Political representatives, in order to cater to their constituencies, often seek to influence teacher recruitment, transfer, and discipline issues. Weak policy frameworks and lack of adequate governance structures makes recruitment and transfer mechanisms, as well as protocols to act against undisciplined teachers more susceptible to political pressure. There are numerous examples of cases where actions against teachers had to be revoked in the face of political pressure. Political interference is most rampant in NWFP. It is common for unqualified, but politically connected teachers to be posted in district schools across the province (Department of Schools and Literacy NWFP 2006; World Bank, “Reform Study” NWFP 2005). In Sindh, political expediencies have led to establishment of an enormous number of schools, with the result that the province is currently facing an acute shortage of teachers (Alam 2006).

Box 1: Politicization of teacher unions

Teacher unions in Pakistan have become highly politicised. In NWFP, for example, each political party is reported to have its own teacher union wing (World Bank and DFID, “Reform Study” NWFP 2005). The strength of the Punjab Teacher Union (PTU) alone is about 70,000 (World Bank and DFID, “Management Study” Punjab 2005). Moreover, separate unions have sprung up for every level of schooling and even representing teachers of particular subjects. In some districts of Punjab, there is even talk about forming of a contract teachers’ union (World Bank and DFID, “Management Study” Punjab 2005).

While unions have not had much of an impact on TT per se, politically backed unions are the major actors resisting meritocracy on issues relating to teacher management. In one instance, in Rawalpindi the teacher union organized two strikes against a DEO who tried to take disciplinary action against a head-teacher and managed to have the decision reversed (World Bank and DFID, “Management Study” Punjab 2005). In NWFP the plan to institute a management cadre in the education sector, a welcome move from the governance point of view, was floated and approved some time ago but resistance from teacher unions has not allowed the plan to be implemented (Department of Schools and Literacy NWFP, 2006).

In Sindh, a measure of the problems created by teacher unions is the fact that the provincial government recently banned all teacher unions and inducted a provincial monitoring cell in order to check union rallies and punish dissenters (Dawn July 26, 2006). However, given the unions’ political backing and the weak governance structures such a ban is unlikely to yield desired results. Unions could threaten EDOs against taking any action. Moreover, given the difficulties in taking disciplinary action, let alone removing civil servants from service, it is unlikely that any dissenters will be punished severely.

Table: Reasons for No Action Taken to Hold Teachers Accountable (NWFP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Weak legislation for effective enforcement</th>
<th>Teachers well-connected/political interference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1.3 Inter-provincial coordination
Even between provinces, coordination on TPD issues is completely absent. Provinces function in complete isolation from each other on TT and management concerns. Even the physical contact of provincial TT decision makers remains limited to one or two annual federally arranged meetings (AED 2004).

While a ‘one size fits all’ is not recommended, given distinct provincial contexts, numerous studies have stressed upon the need for some uniformity in TT management in order to develop linkages across provinces, which would assist federal policy makers to produce a nationally relevant policy framework as well as allow for cross-province complementarity on various aspects of TPD (see Annex II).

3.2 Governance and the institutional setting
As is clear from the previous section, the link between devolution of powers and improving quality of education through adequate TPD is hardly understood. Each tier is obsessed with maintaining centralized control over TPD in general and TT in particular. The lack of inter-tier coordination has led to institutional arrangements for TPD (especially TT), which are contradictory, overlapping and misunderstood, resulting in weak management coordination among various actors within the TPD framework. A large number of functionaries are responsible for dealing with various aspects of TT, with no single controlling body being in charge (CIDA and AKF Canada 1998). Confusion also exists in the roles of individual actors responsible for managing broader teacher management issues (see Annex III).

3.2.1 Governance implications of the TT institutional clutter
Each province has its own TT management structure, largely driven by frequent ad hoc interventions, either through policy reforms or donor intervention. As it currently stands, even the nomenclatures used for identical training bodies vary across provinces. Even through the governance issues confronting provinces are similar, the disconnect between institutional arrangements and nomenclatures does not allow for any overarching framework for TT.

Table 1: Nomenclatures of pre and in-service training bodies by province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>Balochistan</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In-Service</strong></td>
<td>BCEW, PITE, REEC, TRC, DETRC</td>
<td>BoC, PITE, TRC</td>
<td>PITE, TRC</td>
<td>DSD, PITE, GCET, DTSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Service</strong></td>
<td>BCEW, PITE, CE, Dept. of Education in Universities</td>
<td>GCEE, Department of Education</td>
<td>RITE (DCTE), IER, GCPE, Agro-Technical Teacher Training College, Department of Education</td>
<td>UoE, GCET</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BCEW: Bureau of Curriculum & Extension Wing
DCTE: Directorate of Curriculum & Teacher Education
DETROC: Divisional/District Educational Technology and Recourse Centers
Furthermore, the necessity for academic linkages between provincial apex bodies across provinces is completely ignored. The apex bodies only have tenuous administrative linkages (Kardar 2005). Within a province, the apex bodies and TTIs like GCET/GECE/CEs and TRCs/TOs are also missing active linkages with the result that no information sharing and feedback to influence policy designs is taking place (Jamil 2004). Moreover, the linkage between TRCs/TOs and GCET/GECE/RITEs remains unclear as the former falls under the line management of the districts while the latter is managed through the provincial apex body (UNESCO and USAID 2005). Management of TRCs/TOs presents a stark example of the lack of clearly defined inter-tier responsibilities. In Punjab and Balochistan the UoE and PITE have equipped TRCs/TOs through the provincial mandate. In NWFP and Sindh, the EDO-Education at the District level has performed this task (Jamil 2004). In essence, the general lack of coordination between the provincial and district tiers exacerbates the institutional disconnect.

3.2.1.1 Sindh
In Sindh, while the PITE and BCEW (the two main training providers) share training staff and facilities, there is no collaboration among the two in designing trainings and ensuring that their functions do not overlap (AED “Performance-Gap” undated). The two remain independent, reporting separately to the Provincial Secretary of Education, without needing to report on their linkages. Another institutional anomaly in the case of Sindh is the overlapping role of the Universities offering B.Ed and M.Ed and BCEW in curriculum development. While the latter is in charge of coordinating with the federal government on TT curriculum issues, for university curricula, the federal government bypasses the BCEW and channels curricula through the HEC directly (AED, “Performance-Gap” undated; USAID 2005). Furthermore, the Universities are free to modify the syllabi in their implementation. Therefore, no standardization of training curricula is possible. This leads to varying quality of TT within the province, let alone across provinces, making the task of quality control virtually impossible. Finally, in Sindh, there is considerable duplication of work between CE and University departments. Moreover, the EDO Colleges is only linked to CE and not to the university managing the CEIs (see Annex IV).

3.2.1.2 Balochistan
In Balochistan, PITE is formally controlled by BoC (AED, “Performance-Gap”, undated). The role of the PITE and indeed the utility of its existence are questionable given that the BoC performs identical functions. An indication of the institute’s redundancy is the fact that the provincial government makes no allocations for PITE’s functioning (AED 2005). Instead, BoC funds the institution on an assignment-to-assignment basis, pointing to an absence of a regular training program (Kardar 2005). The lack of federal-provincial linkage in the case of Balochistan is exposed by the fact that the provincial BoC collaborates with the Federal Ministry’s Curriculum Wing only when its participation is invited (AED “Performance-Gap” undated).
Therefore, in most cases the TT curriculum has virtually no input from the province and thus, lacks ownership among authorities in Balochistan. Finally, the link between universities offering teacher education degrees and TTIs remains extremely tenuous (see Annex IV).

3.2.1.3 NWFP
The NWFP TT sub-sector is in total flux. The Provincial government has acknowledged the overlap, and lack of clarity and legal backing for the responsibilities of DCITE and PITE (Department of Schools and Literacy NWFP 2006). There are now proposals to change the nomenclature and mandate of the PITE, either to make it a body that offers management training to education managers or one that provides a resource base for other institutions (Department of Schools and Literacy NWFP 2006). What remains clear is that in its current form, PITE is adding little value to TT in the province.

Moreover, the provincial government had closed half of the 20 RITES, the principal pre-service training providers, while training was suspended in the other 10 for a period of three years (AED 2005). From a governance point of view, it remained unclear as to how the lower tiers of training (GCEs/TRCs) would be affected by this move, how, if at all the overall management structure would be altered to compensate for this move, and what impact would such a move have on school based teacher management issues like the availability of trained teachers. In addition, no link exists between the Universities offering B.Ed and M.Ed and the rest of the TT framework (see Annex IV).

3.2.1.4 Punjab
Punjab has been guilty of introducing frequent ad hoc interventions in TT set-ups. Having introduced the provincial ESR, the government is currently in the midst of yet another restructuring of the TPD framework (Directorate of Staff Development, “Presentation”, 2006). Admittedly however, post-LGO 2001, the Punjab government has taken significant steps in rationalizing its TPD structure and realizing the need to implement a system rather than a set of de-linked institutions. The DSD, mandated to be the apex in-service training body has approached TPD as a holistic concept, provisioning for mechanisms for accountability, monitoring and evaluation and follow-up in addition to providing training (“Directorate of Staff Development” 2006; Directorate of Staff Development, “Quality Assurance” undated). However, while the reform has made tremendous progress on conceptual grounds, governance issues still remain largely unresolved. An institutional disconnect is still apparent as the GCETs are affiliated with the UoE but are also mandated to undertake INSET, thus having to fall under the concurrent jurisdiction of UoE and DSD (Jamil 2004). No mechanism has been devised to ensure smooth management of this dual responsibility, causing much confusion in functioning of the GCETs.

The great variation in organization and management of the functionaries responsible for TT across the country has negative implications for uniform policy making as well as quality of teacher education. Existing planning and management frameworks largely ignore the need for reforms to improve functioning at the institutional level. As Kardar has rightly pointed out, “an efficient institutional framework requires coherence and clarity in the roles and functions of these diverse TT units. Therefore, the government needs to appraise seriously the entire TT...
landscape for evolving a holistic policy.....and the organizational set up to be mandated this task” (Kardar 2005).

3.2.2 Confusion over individual responsibilities
While the devolution plan has spelt out various responsibilities for relevant actors regarding TPD, confusion still remains on the precise roles of officials with regard to both TT and broader teacher management issues.

At the Provincial level, the Additional Secretaries Academic and Training of the DoE are the focal points for TT. However, their roles overlap considerably with various federal level actors. With regard to districts, the DO Academic and Training is responsible for TT coordination (which is limited to nominating course participants) (Kardar 2005). The disparate implementation of the regulations provided for in the devolution plan is apparent in the case of TT. A significant disconnect exists between official plans and practice on ground. To cite an example, the district of Karachi has completely left out the DO Training and Standards from its education department hierarchy, as illustrated by the schematics in Annex V. How TT activities are being monitored, or if the district is even playing any role in TT remains unclear.

On the issue of teacher management, the LGO 2001 devolves all authority for teachers up to the secondary level to the district governments. In the pre-devolution period, the DEO was in charge of teacher supervision and assessments. The DEO was assisted by DDEOs at the Tehsil level, AEOs at the markaz level, and LCs at the Union Council level. Currently, the EDO (education) has the overall supervisory authority, with the ADOs, DDEOs and AEOs actually mandated to perform supervision and assessment tasks. While the above is clear on paper, in reality precise job descriptions are absent and the roles tasked to each individual post remain unclear. Not only that, but surveys in Punjab and NWFP have found antagonism between various actors tasked to play overlapping or duplicating roles. The tension between ADOs and LCs is one such example (World Bank and DFID, “Management Study,” 2005; World Bank and DFID, “Reform Study” 2005). Much of the confusion arises because the roles of the above mentioned actors have not been realigned in light of the devolution framework. This task is impeded by the fact that even district education departments are structured along levels of schooling, which makes it difficult to divide responsibilities thematically.
Inefficient management, overlapping functions, lack of coordination, among other factors have resulted in the unit cost of TT being 25.5 times higher than training a secondary school student, which is substantially higher than the global average of 7.6 times (Davies, 1997). Moreover, given the absence of any uniformity in TT management, the unit cost of TTIs varies tremendously across districts. No obvious factors explain the huge variation in the following table. Moreover, what is equally important is to see that an overwhelming majority of the expenditure goes towards salaries, leaving non-salary expenditures as distant second in most cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Non-salary</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Unit Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GECE Pishin</td>
<td>53,04,927 (84%)</td>
<td>10,25,290 (16%)</td>
<td>63,28,217</td>
<td>1,09,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GECE Qasimabad</td>
<td>88,34,700 (99%)</td>
<td>1,05,600 (1%)</td>
<td>89,40,300</td>
<td>85,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GECE DGK</td>
<td>65,24,925 (97.50%)</td>
<td>1,65,328 (2.50)</td>
<td>66,90,253</td>
<td>21,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GECE Umerabad</td>
<td>11,14,307 (60%)</td>
<td>7,78,891 (40%)</td>
<td>18,83,198</td>
<td>15,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.3 Donor coordination issues

Donor driven projects were initiated in a big way in the 1990s largely as a result of donor emphasis on the issue and the donor community’s view that the government was not doing enough in this sphere. Since the 1990s, a large number of donor initiatives have sought to tackle various aspects of TPD. All of these have been essentially supply driven as it is the donor community, and not the government, that has set benchmarks for the improvement of TT programs (Hatfield 2001).

Perhaps the single biggest governance related failing of donor initiatives is their lack of integration with the broader TPD framework existing in the country. Donor projects usually have short-term vision. While they do deliberate upon governance mechanisms, these are restricted to issues bearing direct relevance to project outputs. Therefore, donor initiatives have an inherent sustainability problem and often lack ownership with the government authorities (Jamil 2004). Consequently, a large number of well-meaning projects fail to leave any permanent impact on the TPD framework within the country.

In a study that analyses major TPD related donor projects in Pakistan, majority of the projects were found to be unsustainable, both due to lack of integration within the policy framework and the overall low priority accorded to TPD by the government (USAID, 2005). The study shows that programs where close collaboration with the government is established have a better chance of being sustainable. The most pertinent example that exposes the sustainability problem is the fate of the PITEs initially created under the ADB’s TTP project as apex provincial bodies. While the TTP completion report stressed upon the need for the government to institutionalize all project components in the TPD framework, no mechanism to do so was agreed upon with the government. Financing and capacity constraints were not addressed either (ADB “Teacher Training Project” 2002). The end result was that each province dealt with the PITEs in a different way and as already discussed they are virtually defunct in some at least two provinces.
The only consolation is that PITEs have survived one way or the other. In most donor projects, the entire initiative ceases to exist once donor support disappears.

Apart from lack of integration within the TPD framework, even coordination and linkages among various donor projects ongoing at a particular time is lacking. In the past, donor overlap has frequently resulted in duplication of activities. For instance in Khairpur district, three different agencies trained primary school teachers simultaneously in 2005, in some cases trainees being the same teachers and head teachers. In another district in Sindh, head teachers, LCs, and supervisors attended identical trainings five times (Kardar 2005).

Donor initiatives in the past have been so far removed from the provincial TPD frameworks that no information on the trainings conducted under various initiatives were maintained in public records. Neither the Bureaus nor the district governments were mandated to do so (Kardar 2005). Today, there is hardly any information on the number of teachers trained and the kind of disciplines particular teachers were trained in. In essence, there is no way to track capacity development of individuals and schools over time, a fact that also impacts planning of training frameworks and selection of students for trainings.

The lack of integration of donor initiatives presents a major governance issue. For one, given the thin resource allocation to non-salary expenditures regarding TT, provincial governments have to alter mandates of institutes created under donor initiatives, often creating overlapping and unclear objectives which do not fit in within the existing set-up. In cases where donor support only entails providing training (and not infrastructure development), the public sector is unable to continue the training exercises, creating an implementation vacuum.

In order to redress the donor coordination problem, a welcome step is the activation of a Planning Wing at the Federal MoE (UNESCO and USAID 2005). Recently, donors have started channeling projects through this Wing. However, the impact of such a unit is likely to be marginal unless coordination issues are also resolved at the provincial and district levels, where the projects are actually implemented. Slowly donors are also beginning to coordinate with individual provinces. Punjab has taken the lead on instituting such coordination.

3.4 Governance and private sector involvement

There is virtually no defined mechanism to manage TT in the private sector. Here, more than an implementation failure, the problem is the lack of any clear policy framework either at the national or provincial level to regulate the private sector’s role in TT. While almost every recent education policy accords importance to the need to forge PPPs, there is no movement on the urgent need to regulate private sector training initiatives. No government entity exists with a primary mandate to ensure regulation of the private sector. The presently existing incentive structure in place to attract private sector support is largely geared towards enhancing access to education and does not focus on TPD issues.

The government functionaries responsible for luring the private sector to support public initiatives in TT (but not regulate the sector) are the federally managed National Education Foundations and its provincial counterparts (AKU and DFID 2003). Currently, the NEF does little more than adding yet another layer to the institutional maze. There is no rationalization of
responsibilities between the NEF and PEFs. The EFs follow no set mechanism to select particular partners, determine the extent of their involvement, or deal with quality control and other management related issues. Each partnership is concluded under different terms and conditions. While some partnerships between EFs and non-governmental TTIs function in collaboration with existing public institutions like PITEs, others are completely independent and their relationship with institutions and officials responsible for TT remains unclear (Ministry of Education, “Public-Private” 2004). In some districts in Punjab for example, NGOs have been tasked to conduct school-based TT with little attention being paid to their linkage with the wider TT framework (Khan 2002). Moreover, some provincial EFs have developed in house training capacity. The recently restructured Punjab EF and the Sindh EF have done so (Hatfield 2006; Jamil 2004). Again, its linkage with TTI remains tenuous.

While the progress on the PPP front has been modest, the private sector TTIs have witnessed a tremendous increase in strength through independent initiatives. In the absence of any regulation, the private sector TTIs have been highly flexible in their admission criteria (Jamil 2004). Moreover, private sector trainings are a series of one-off events rather than a continuous ongoing process with formal milestones (UNESCO and USAID 2005). Also, there are no rigorous rules on professional qualifications and thus no incentives to have any set criterion for teacher recruitment in private schools. Lack of quality control in the private sphere combined with the varying qualification criteria in the public sector has ensured absence of any uniform national criterion for TT resulting in quality attrition (Jamil 2004).

The public sector, rather than forming a regulatory framework to ensure across the board standardization, sees the private sector as undermining the public role in TT. Such a debate cannot be resolved unless there are common standards to which both the public and private sector providers adhere (Jamil 2004). There is an urgent need to develop clear guidelines for the regulation of private sector TT providers and to develop a robust implementation mechanism to put an end to ad hoc practices.

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4 The Punjab EF has been the most successful. It currently has 13 active PPPs to conduct TT (Hatfield 2006).
SECTION IV  Financial Governance of TPD

4.1 Management of TPD expenditures

Pre-devolution, provinces were responsible for allocating funds towards TPD. The provinces transferred funds to districts against specific schemes/activities through PC-1s approved at the provincial level. Given that there was no specific allocation for TPD in the provincial budgets, it remains unclear which budget line item was used to fund TPD activities in the pre-devolution era.

Recently, provinces have begun to put TT as a separate budget line item. However, provinces continue to treat broader TPD related expenses differently in their budgets. After the LGO was enacted, Sindh used its annual development budget to finance TT projects, but has now switched the expense to the non-development head (Kardar 2005). Balochistan, on the other hand, has no provision for INSET in its budget and INSET activities in the province are solely run on donor support (Kardar 2005). As already discussed, such a modus operandi has severe implications for long-term sustainability. NWFP maintains salaries as part of provincial allocations, while salaries do not appear in Sindh and Punjab education budgets (DFID and UNESCO 2006). Lack of uniform treatment of TPD expenses is a serious concern, as it does not allow for accurate comparisons, monitoring of trends, and long term planning. Such information is essential to be able to measure outcomes against use of financial resources.

Even when resources are available, capacity for adequate resource utilization is severely lacking. Since salary heads are more or less utilized, the overall low utilization rates reflect low use of the non-salary component of recurrent expenditure, from which TPD activities are funded (DFID and UNESCO 2006). For example, in 2002-03 and 2003-04, the allocation of Rs. 50 million for TT in Sindh training program remained (Kardar 2005). Low resource utilization capacity also suggests that a mere increase in available resources would not resolve the financial issues. Rather, it is necessary to ensure good financial governance to allow an efficient financial management system to evolve.

Table 2: Budget allocations for TT, Sindh (Rs.million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP 122 (76.34)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 622 (60.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Development</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td>(DG Budgets (Not utilized)</td>
<td>(Not utilized)</td>
<td>(HTs Training)</td>
<td>(Being Advertised)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Budget Books, Finance Department Government of Sindh (quoted in Kardar, 2005)

Capacity constraints also impede proper information gathering, compiling and reporting. This problem is especially acute at the district level. Currently, while expenditure records are maintained at the district level, capacity issues result in production of low quality reports, which are often contradictory, or completely illegible. Moreover, no consistent financial reporting mechanism is in place across districts and provinces with the result that district financial education data is not reported systematically to the provincial government (DFID and UNESCO 2006). A case study of Pakpattan district revealed that while grants under ESR in the amount of Rs. 6.317 million were provided for TT, provision of learning material and district/tehsil resource centres, the district had no information on the expenditure against these (Ministry of Education, “Fiscal Devolution” 2003).
4.2 Inter-tier tensions

TPD related financial management suffers from the same ad hoc-ism and confusion that is prevalent in the institutional domain. The fiscal decentralization process initiated through the LGO 2001 is still not complete. Consequently, guidelines, roles and responsibilities with regard to transfer and utilization of funds are ambiguous.

The 2001 devolution plan has muddled the demarcation of financial responsibilities for TPD between provinces and districts. Since TT is a provincial subject, all TT financing is to flow through the provincial budget. However, teacher management related expenses are to be born by the districts, the extent of which depends entirely on priorities of individual districts. While the financial arrangements are well-defined, there remains a grave lack of understanding of the specific financial roles, procedures, and reporting mechanisms at the district level (DFID and UNESCO 2006).

A good indication of the post-devolution problems in managing financial resources at the district level is that the EDO (E)s, who are responsible for local level education often do not have access to complete information on the educational expenditures in their district, as some of the information is maintained by provinces and the rest by various departments at the local level (e.g. EDO Works). The situation is similar at the provincial level where Education Secretaries have no method to track the extent and direction of education expenditure (DFID and UNESCO 2006).

Moreover, in an interesting development, the MPAs/MNAs have now been formally added in the official financial decision making structure at the district level, without prescribing any linkages between them and the district officials (see Annex VI). The reason for this is unclear. However, what is obvious is that these political representatives would exert additional pressure on the districts to divert education resources towards politically beneficial brick and mortar issues and away from TPD concerns.

4.2.1 Provincial Hegemony

The concern about provinces being obsessed with maintaining centralized control is as relevant to financial governance as it is to the institutional domain. Provinces continue to create bureaucratic hurdles in fiscal decentralization, thus preventing districts from acquiring complete financial autonomy. Provinces still retain control of a number of allocations, which fall under district control as per the LGO. This includes control over considerable non-salary district education allocations and expenditures (DFID and UNESCO 2006). Decisions regarding alterations in the size of the recurrent expenditure pie remain with the province as well. No formula for proportion of resources for quality enhancement related development expenditure exists either (Ministry of Education 2003).

Post-devolution, problems with regard to transfer of funds to districts are commonplace. The delay in transfer of funds is largely a result of cumbersome procedures introduced under the LGO as well as the fact that all provincial finance departments are reluctant to release funds to the district level. In their perception even the EDOs are not professionally trained to handle funds (Khan, 2002). Delay in fund transfers has previously forced districts to move non-salary
resources to cover salaries, thus undermining any possibility of sustained TPD activities. One such instance was when the Government of Balochistan failed to release salary expenditures to districts. Moreover, salary increases- a federal decision- was not matched by an increase in district allocations, again resulting in a decrease in non-salary expenses (which include TPD expenditure) (DFID and UNESCO 2006).

In a welcome development, a Devolution Support Program has been undertaken in Punjab at the behest of the federal government which seeks to develop institutional capacity at the district level to ensure complete fiscal decentralization as envisioned in the devolution plan. The program is still ongoing, but in large part its success depends on the political will of the provincial government to allow complete financial autonomy to districts.

4.3 Ensuring financial sustainability

Most of the existing policies suggest various funding mechanisms including budgetary support as well as donor assistance to implement their plans to enhance TPD related governance. However, given that policy priorities switch frequently at the federal and provincial levels and inflow of resources for a certain priority is not often consistent, such a presumption raises sustainability concerns. Even when funds are available, poor financial governance in terms of slow disbursements cause resource supply gluts. All policies however refrain from discussing how they plan to ensure continued financial support.

The NWFP Education Plan, for example, plans to fulfil TPD and related governance expenditures through government budgets as well as DBS and project support from donors. The plan acknowledges that resources needed to fund the plan would be greater than currently available and suggests that the NWFP recurrent budget, particularly in non-salary items must be increased to 10% of the salary budgets (Department of Schools and Literacy NWFP 2006). In an environment where resource flow is uncertain and inefficient, presuming enhanced availability of funds raises sustainability concerns.

Finally, little effort has been made to harmonize donor monitoring even in cases when they operate within the ESR framework where a common set of indicators has been agreed upon. Provinces must have processes in place under which donors could utilize as mechanisms to fund initiatives. A positive example is Punjab where the PRMP is helping to allow donors to enter under the provincial ESRP (DFID and UNESCO 2006).
SECTION V  Governance of TPD and improved learning outcomes:
Exploring the link

The institutional failings of the TPD framework impact larger issues of educational development. After all the entire purpose of creating an efficient TPD framework is to positively impact student learning outcomes. In an environment marked by weak governance, it is highly unlikely that the downstream impact of TPD is being realized. This could be a result of lack of any relevance of the TT framework to classroom learning, absence of a positive relationship between the teacher, students and community, or lack of effective quality control of the TPD framework.

5.1 Relevance of TT to classroom learning
Much of the TT in Pakistan remains irrelevant to the classroom where trainees are to employ their skills. Different functionaries are responsible for developing curricula, printing textbooks, and delivering trainings (CIDA and AKF Canada 1998). At the provincial level, departments are responsible for dealing with school-based issues for particular school levels, and have no linkage with TT activities. Active linkages between training bodies and schools where trainees are employed are also missing. Moreover, no mechanism exists in order to facilitate such linkages (Jamil 2004).

One potential linkage between TT and the classroom could be made through the Curriculum Wing of the Federal MoE, as it is responsible for designing curricula for public sector TTIs as well as schools. Notwithstanding, TT curricula are seldom developed with school curricula in mind. In addition, even though public sector TTIs follow the same curricula in principle, varying interpretations and training capacities across provinces result in considerable adaptation (AED, “Performance-Gap” undated). Also, since the degree awarding universities modify curricula to conform to university standards and the private sector is completely deregulated, their relevance to the classroom is entirely dependent upon the curricula being followed. Most often, TT curricula reflect the comfort level of the training bodies with a particular curriculum rather than the need to complement school curricula. This is especially true for the private sector.

Moreover, pre and in-service training are not linked. While pre-service training is still guided by some broad direction, INSET is divorced of any policy framework and is conducted in a completely ad hoc manner. One reason for the lack of focus on INSET is the weak governance that surrounds HR practices in provinces. The provinces have been unable to devise any scientific HR practices (Kardar 2005). Moreover, the linkage between pre-service and in-service training remains exceptionally weak. The idea of their integration led the Bureaus to take over pre-service training colleges, which was a welcome step. However, the integrated scheme was diluted due to the quantitative increase in education and the resultant fact that no set-up could cope with the workload (AED, “Performance-Gap” undated). Developments thereafter have resulted in the current scenario where by and large different institutions are conducting pre-service and in-service training, with little linkage between them. In the absence of a government mechanism, teachers have individually resorted to available sources of training and upgraded their qualifications, but with no consistency in curricula and quality of training. The result is highly diversified learning outcomes.
Furthermore, individual linkages between teacher and teacher trainers are also essential in order to ensure that training actually impacts learning outcomes. However, in the current set-up neither is any follow-up mechanism between teachers and trainers available, nor is it possible given the frequent transfers of teachers and trainers and the lack of any resources allocated for such follow-up activities. Moreover, usually, school principals or head teachers are appointed to TTIs as punishment and thus remain disinterested in performing their job (AED 2006; UNESCO and USAID 2005). Consequently, their disinterest in following up with their trainees is natural. The absence of any feedback loop also implies that problems in implementing the acquired knowledge would likely remain unresolved.

Next, no existing policy framework allows for teacher input on training needs and preferred methodologies. The importance of head teachers/teachers as drivers of change in educational quality is largely ignored. Head teachers are a vital source who could play an effective role in TPD planning, encouraging and managing teachers, local communities as well as other relevant stakeholders. Studies have shown school outcomes to be positive in cases where head teachers play a key role in overall school improvement (Khan 2002). Such a mechanism if established could be vital in linking school based teaching experiences with needs in TT courses. A prerequisite to ensuring this however, is building capacity and providing legal backing to head teachers. As already mentioned, currently, the entire TPD approach is top-down. Teachers are sometimes not even informed of changes in TT set-ups.

5.1.1 Teacher management and motivation

The linkage between TT and school-based learning is dependent not only on institutional linkages, but also with teacher management and level of teacher motivation. One constraint to the teachers’ ability to translate training into better outcomes is the lack of rationalization in teacher supply and demand. The 1998-2010 policy acknowledges the lack of any effective relationship between teacher supply and demand. It states: “TT is carried out without a viable policy and planning framework, resulting in imbalances between the demand and supply situation” (“National Education Policy 1998-2010” 1998). Interestingly, one the one hand, the National Policy estimates a surplus of about 65,000 professionally qualified yet unemployed teachers in Pakistan (AED, “Performance-Gap” undated). Yet Sindh Province is facing an acute shortage of teachers (Alam 2006). Lack of teacher rationalization is also rampant in some districts of Punjab (Ministry of Education 2003). Much of the problem is a result of weak inter-tier coordination.

Lack of rationalization of teacher supply implies that either teachers remain unemployed, or they are often forced to teach subjects they have no expertise in. For instance, it is common to witness subject specialist teachers teaching subjects they are completely unfamiliar with. In other cases, teachers may be required to teach multiple grades simultaneously (CIDA and AKF Canada 1998). Given that TTIs in Pakistan do not provide any training in multi grade teaching, this practice automatically undermines the linkage between training and classroom learning. In Punjab, most of the teaching staff hired under the contract based recruitment system has had to teach multiple grades due to large number of unfilled vacancies (World Bank, “Management Study” Punjab 2005). None of them were trained to do so.
Another major problem is the frequent and ad hoc transfers of teachers, impacting teachers’ long term planning as well as depriving them of adequate time to impact student learning. It is usual for transfers to take place in an abrupt manner in the middle of the academic year (World Bank and DfID Management Study 2005; World Bank and DfID Reform Study 2005. On the other extreme are complete bans on teacher transfers, as is the case in Punjab and NWFP, which also ends up undermining the possibility of rationalizing the teacher force (UNESCO and USAID 2005). In large part such developments are a result of political pressure on district authorities. Even the ban on transfers is meant to insulate teacher deployment from political pressure. In order to provide teachers with an opportunity to translate TT into improved teaching practices, political interference must be curbed and a transparent and merit based system ought to be instituted via official policy shifts (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2004). Again, such a move assumes complementarity across the tiers of government as teacher management issues are dealt concurrently at all three tiers.

Next, there are hardly any incentives for teachers to change the traditional way of teaching. Few opportunities exist for teachers to continue growing in a regular and systematic way. Career growth opportunities are slow in the case of regular teachers and non-existent for contract teachers. Moreover, promotions are solely based on seniority rather than on teaching performance and professional competence (Jamil 2004). Therefore, while there are incentives to upgrade ones’ qualifications for salary hikes, the utility of attending trainings ends at that point. Teachers do not gain any added advantage by implementing newly learned methods of teaching.

Finally, the need for a conducive teaching environment in schools is essential. Currently, teachers are trained in TT centers which are equipped with modern gadgetry and have adequate facilities (AED, “Performance-Gap” undated; UNESCO and USAID 2005). This variation ignores the reality of the school culture and acts as a demoralizing factor for teachers who must return to their run-down teaching environments. While deliberating upon issues related to improving school environments is outside the scope of this paper, policy makers must look into the seriously.

In light of the above, it is no surprise that The National Survey of Schools found no relationship between INSET and quality of teaching, suggesting that much of the TT imparted is irrelevant to classroom based learning (Warwick and Reimers 1995). Other surveys conducted in Punjab and NWFP also suggest a weak linkage between TT and quality of teaching (World Bank and DfID Management Study 2005; World Bank and DfID Reform Study 2005).

5.2 Relationship between the teacher, school and community
Community participation has been globally recognized as a driver for positive change with respect to improved learning outcomes. The role of communities is key in creating active linkages between the school, teachers and community. In Pakistan, SMCs have been encouraged as part of the education sector reform in order to make this link. Today, SMCs exist in majority of the districts across the country. However, while SMCs exist on paper, most of them remain dysfunctional. In Peshawar, all SMCs have failed because they have absolutely no say in school affairs. The story is similar in Multan where the SMCs themselves are not aware of their roles. In

\footnotesize{SMCs were formally known as PTAs. In NWFP, however, the PTA nomenclature is still used.}
Quetta, the SMCs have been hijacked by influentials who are using these committees to establish their authority (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2004).

The major reason for the below par performance of SMCs is a lack of clearly defined mandate and great variation in their roles across districts and provinces. The role of the community in general remains marginalized as they lack any clear direction of the roles and responsibilities with respect to TPD (Khan 2002; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2004). The apathy of the SMCs is again a result of structures having been put in place, which are not clearly understood and where political will to activate them is lacking. Despite laying emphasis on the need to involve SMCs, neither provincial nor district authorities have developed any overarching framework for their involvement.

Among the SMCs that are functional, whether due to official support or community initiatives, most are tasked to look after school management issues. The only teacher management related task they perform is to ensure teacher discipline, albeit without any powers to penalize undisciplined teachers apart from referring the matter to the relevant district authority via the cumbersome bureaucratic channel (Khan 2002). In an NWFP based survey, only 3% of surveyed PTAs suggested that they were effective in monitoring teachers (World Bank, “Reform Study” NWFP 2005). Lack of enforcement powers was the major reason for their failure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Spot Cheeks</th>
<th>Have no powers to initiate any action</th>
<th>File a complaint with the relevant authority</th>
<th>Discuss issue with relevant teacher</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, “Reform Study” NWFP 2005

Interestingly, in some exceptional cases, SMCs have even been authorized to hire new teachers from their own resources (Khan 2002). Why some districts allow this while the majority does not, how this fits in the overall provincial and district policies for teacher recruitment, and whether the effect of such ad hoc measures on teacher rationalization are comprehended remains unclear. Similarly, while TT falls outside the purview of SMCs, in some districts committees have the leeway to arrange for TT through NGOs, but can neither force teachers to attend, nor to implement what they have learnt in classes (Khan 2002). Moreover, such trainings are conducted in complete isolation from public sector trainings.

If SMCs are to assist in forging positive bottom-up pressure, they need a broader mandate including TPD management as well as enforcement powers to back their mandate. However, it is pertinent to mention here that expanded powers for SMCs on some issues could potentially become volatile. For instance, specifically with regard to teacher monitoring and discipline, teachers are sure to resent an additional monitoring layer, which, if backed by enforcement powers, would be much more stringent and meaningful than the public mechanism which is highly inefficient (Khan 2002).
Finally, any measure to widen SMCs’ purview must be preceded by capacity building exercises to make SMC members capable of performing various TPD relevant functions (Khan 2002; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2004). Until such capacity development takes place, it is unlikely that SMCs will be able to influence teaching practices and teacher management issues. Moreover, any such mechanism must be backed by a political will to activate SMCs and allow them to function independently to fulfill the roles envisioned for them in policy designs. The key issue is operational autonomy, which is currently lacking.

5.3 The Qualitative Aspect of TPD
Quality control of TT and an effective assessment mechanism is essential in order to maximize TPD’s impact on learning outcomes. Without attention to qualitative issues, optimal outcomes are unlikely to be achieved. Any accountability mechanism that is developed must also include quality control of both teacher trainers and teachers teaching in schools. Teaching practice must be thoroughly supervised according to set guidelines and a trainee’s performance communicated through an established feedback loop. Again, governance concerns remain pertinent to mechanisms designed to ensure quality along the TPD supply chain.

5.3.1 Quality of TT
Quality of teaching is compromised from the very beginning. No progress has been made on the policy design to institute a separate cadre of teacher trainers (AED 2006). Currently, trainers are senior school teachers and could be posted in schools, training institutes as well as against management positions within the bureaucratic hierarchy. As for inductees into TTIs, they are often those who have not been able to secure admission elsewhere and choose teaching as a last resort (AED 2006). In the absence of any incentive mechanism to attract high quality students to the teaching profession, low quality students would continue to constitute bulk of the teaching cadre.

With regard to quality assessment of teacher education, the principals of TT colleges have the primary responsibility to monitor trainers. However, what they are assessing trainer performance against is unclear given that trainers have no job descriptions or performance benchmarks. In practice, college principals hardly invest time in fulfilling their assessment responsibility. A major flaw in the assessment mechanism is that apart from the annual ACRs, which are filled in the traditional manner with no requirement to assess quality concerns, principals are not required to report on the quality of training (AED 2004). None of the provinces has any information feedback loop within the TPD set-up, resulting in virtually nil quality control.

Furthermore, the entire quality control chain remains incomplete until the heads of the TT colleges, who are supposed to provide vision to the institutes, are evaluated. The controllers of TTIs are responsible for this task but they never engage in such assessments. Their visits to colleges are strictly for administrative purposes (AED 2004).

For the first time, UoE Punjab is looking to develop teams of master trainers and education managers to evaluate UCEs regularly (AED 2006). The linkage between these teams of master trainers, and principals and controllers of UCEs, who are otherwise responsible for monitoring, remains unclear. Such clarity on roles and an implementation plan, as well as capacity
development of the selected master trainers will be essential to ensure the plan’s effectiveness. In principal however, the initiative is a positive move, which ought to be replicated in other provinces.

5.3.2 School based quality assessments
The second leg of quality assurance is management of teaching quality at the school level. Again, a robust mechanism to assess teaching quality is a necessary pre-requisite. In Pakistan’s case, school based monitoring remains patchy. Moreover, monitoring is entirely quantitative in nature.

5.3.2.1 Implementation impediments
The ADOs are entrusted with the task of monitoring schools at the district level. There are severe capacity and infrastructural constraints district authorities confront in fulfilling monitoring obligations. Post-devolution, district staff is highly overburdened and spends most of its time in bureaucratic chores. Lack of transportation facility is a major constraint as is shortage of office equipment necessary to record monitoring remarks (World Bank, “Management Study” 2005). In a number of cases, while visits are recorded, information sharing with higher tiers of government is sketchy. Responsibilities like monitoring suffer, both quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Moreover, district officials are appointed officers who do not necessarily have the professional capacity to assess quality of teaching practices. In addition, district officials have acute shortage of financial resources given the low priority accorded to TPD, and more specifically due to the low share of non-salary expenses in the overall allocations (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2004; DfID and UNESCO 2006). The end result is that monitoring and assessment of teachers is sporadic and is mostly conducted in response to specific complaints or aligned with political preferences.

5.3.2.2 Lack of focus on qualitative concerns
Perhaps an even greater concern than the logistical and capacity problems surrounding teacher assessments is that conceptually they are focused on quantitative benchmarks. For the inspectoral staff, conducting assessments of teaching practices is just one of the responsibilities in the overall school based monitoring terms of reference (World Bank and DfID Management Study 2005; World Bank and DfID Reform Study 2005). No separate mechanism for teacher assessment exists.

Currently, efficiency of the system is measured against the number of visits made to a school by monitors, the level of teacher attendance, punctuality and the like. Even targeted monitoring initiatives like the Punjab Chief Minister’s monitoring unit use quantitative benchmarks (World Bank, “Management Study” Punjab 2005). Similarly, the ESR, under which a comprehensive set of indicators was developed to assess the impact of TPD initiatives relies on percentages of trained teachers, teacher present and sanctioned staff strength, and the like (DfID and UNESCO 2006). No province has managed to successfully implement any indicator-based system to evaluate quality of TT. Surveys have found that even teachers remain uncomfortable with the idea of third party evaluations to track student-learning outcomes and prefer teaching standards to be judged by student performance in public exams, where success is determined by comparative strength in rote learning (World Bank and DfID 2005). In the absence of any qualitative benchmarks or assessment methodologies, assessment exercises provide meaningless
observations and fail to provide any valuable feedback for improvements in the TPD framework. The following tables highlight the nature of monitoring visits in Punjab and NWFP. The lack of focus on qualitative assessments is apparent.

Table 4: Nature of supervisory visits in NWFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Duration of Visit</th>
<th>Tasks performed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Up to 30 minutes</td>
<td>Up to 1 hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>Up to 30 minutes</td>
<td>Up to 1 hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Up to 30 minutes</td>
<td>Up to 1 hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, “Reform Study” NWFP 2005

Table 5: Nature of supervisory visits in Punjab

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Duration of Visit</th>
<th>Tasks performed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Up to 30 minutes</td>
<td>Up to 1 hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>Up to 30 minutes</td>
<td>Up to 1 hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Up to 30 minutes</td>
<td>Up to 1 hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION VI Root causes versus quick fix solutions: The classic governance dilemma

Weak policy frameworks, cumbersome mechanisms surrounding TPD, and an implementation failure presents authorities with a classic governance dilemma: whether to strive to redress the underlying problems in the system or to implement measures that help to sidetrack institutional bottlenecks and provide quick fix solutions, regardless of their impact on long term institutional development.

Senge (1990) discusses an organizational concept of ‘burden shifting’, which is an underlying problem in organizations that generates symptoms demanding attention. Since the underlying problem is difficult to address either because it is obscure or costly to confront, the burden is shifted to relatively painless solutions, which seem extremely efficient. Senge’s management principle is applicable to TPD management in Pakistan.

Viewing the concept at a macro level, opting for quick fixes becomes natural in cases where an endemic governance failure has been acknowledged and where the belief of the possibility of rectifying the system bottlenecks has all but disappeared. In Pakistan’s case, an increasing number of TPD related initiatives have begun to circumvent the established framework precisely for this reason.

For example, the Chief Minister’s monitoring unit set up in Punjab to ensure teacher discipline reports directly to his Secretariat and is provided with adequate facilities to conduct supervisory tasks (World Bank, “Management Study” 2005). The units’ efficient functioning is taken as an achievement by the government. In reality such moves present governance nightmares as they bypass the entire existing institutional structure. How such a body fits into the existing set-up, what relation it has to the educational bureaucracy and how, if at all, will it be institutionalised over the long run are questions that are hardly contemplated. The result of course is that both the Unit as well as district officials (ADO, DDEO, LC) mandated to conduct supervision under the existing set-up now perform duplicate tasks without any coordination.

Punjab and NWFP’s move to introduce contract based hiring of teachers is another example. This move was meant to find a way out of the cumbersome processes involved in managing teachers under the Civil Servants Act. Specifically, it provided governments with a means to act swiftly against teachers under conditions relatively insulated from political pressure, something that was not possible within existing mechanisms.

The contract system was a positive move in many ways. However, it created two parallel teacher management systems, with no inter-linkage. Moreover, it made the federally set salary scale redundant as provinces determine their own salary and increment structures.

A failure of the writ of law is reflected by the fact that education managers in NWFP deducted teachers’ salaries as punishments for indiscipline, in outright violation of the law prohibiting any such measures. In fact, head teachers pointed to salary deduction as an effective method of disciplining teachers in a provincial survey (World Bank, “Reform Study” 2005). It can be
reasonably assumed that their action was spurred by the lack of any practical recourse in the face of difficult procedures and political pressure to penalize teachers for indiscipline. More serious than the illegal action itself is the fact that higher authorities tolerate such measures, a clear indication of their acknowledgement of the governance failure, which necessitates such moves.

The earlier discussed issue of SMCs being allowed to hire teachers and arrange for trainings is also falls outside their mandate and was allowed on a case-to-case basis to activate the otherwise defunct teacher management and training mechanism in the specific areas.

Solutions that address only the symptoms of a problem, instead of the root causes, tend to have short-term benefits at best. The problem inevitably recurs, with increased pressure for symptomatic response on the one hand and continuously weakening capability for fundamental solutions on the other (Hatfield 2001). The broader implication of burden shifting in development is clear. Only when root problems are addressed can fundamental changes have a lasting impact. In all likelihood, the parallel structures instituted within the TPD framework will further reduce the credibility and quality of the government TPD framework (UNESCO and USAID 2005).

Governance concerns are central to the entire TPD framework. Good governance requires well-defined systems and mechanisms, clearly articulated roles and jurisdictions, credibility, capacity, and financial resources. In Pakistan, there are serious coordination issues among various tiers of government, and with donors and the private sector. Moreover, the TPD framework is marked by institutional confusion, overlapping and duplicating roles, and weak human and financial capacity.

The lack of a holistic approach to TPD, and treating TT in isolation from broader teacher management issues has also led to an absence of any strong linkage between TT and school based learning, between the teacher, school and community as well as extremely weak quality control mechanisms. The situation is exacerbated by non-transparent teacher recruitment and deployment as well as lack of structured career growth patterns for teachers. While there are substantial success stories, these remain limited to specific programs/initiatives and weak governance structures have not allowed these to be replicated on a wider scale.

Unfortunately, various authorities are increasingly moving forward by circumventing existing mechanisms and establishing parallel frameworks, which while providing short-term relief; undermine the possibility of achieving sustainable improvements in the system. Perhaps the single most important issue is to generate the political will to address underlying causes of persistent failures within the TPD framework, rather than continuing to deal with mere symptoms. This puts tackling governance concerns on top of the agenda.
SECTION VII    Policy Guidelines

The way forward in redressing weak governance structures is well known. Voluminous literature exists with recommendations on the measures required to alter failing institutional mechanisms, most of them providing similar, if not identical suggestions. The key is to generate the political will at the national level, and across various tiers of government to institute the necessary changes in governance structures, which are often difficult, given the extensive scope of the task and the political fall-out. However, until such political will is generated and translated into action, there is little scope for addressing underlying causes that weaken the TPD framework.

7.1 Policy formulation

• An overarching policy framework specifically designed to address TPD issues in a holistic manner should be prepared at the federal level, with input from province and district governments, as well as educational practitioners.

• Effective communication of policy priorities and more importantly the implementation methods must be made a priority. Currently, even the policies that do discuss TPD in detail, do not deal with governance issues that continue to cause perpetual failures in the ability to achieve desired outcomes.

• Policy guidelines should be developed for INSET, whether through an overall TPD policy framework or separately to make it a continuous rather than ad hoc procedure.

• Any policy pronouncement on TPD must ensure that the linkage between quality of education and the devolution framework is understood at both the provincial and district levels.

7.2 Inter-tier coordination

• On a conceptual level, a major constraint is the continuing obsession of the federal and provincial tiers to maintain centralized control over TPD. Until the provinces allow administrative and financial autonomy to the districts, there is little chance of enhanced inter-tier coordination and clear division of responsibilities between the various tiers.

• Inter-tier division of responsibilities in all aspects of TPD must be clarified and formal inter-tier agreements reached to ensure complementarity in the functioning of various bodies responsible for TPD. Each and every aspect, including pre and in service training, private sector involvement, school based teacher management, and the like must be clearly defined.

• Frequent national, provincial and district level dialogues should be formalized and must involve communities, teachers and political representatives.
7.3 Institutional-functioning

- Coordination and physical interaction between provincial apex TT bodies should be enhanced. The TPTE could take the lead by mandating frequent meetings. Most important is the need to ensure the academic rather than administrative nature of their interaction.

- The confusion about the roles of provincial apex TT bodies must be removed and a clearly spelt out jurisdiction must be specified by the provinces in order to ensure that national and provincial institutional arrangements are aligned. Moreover, a uniform terminology should be agreed upon to ensure consistency in institutional benchmarking across the country.

- The link between provincial apex bodies and lower level TTIs as well as degree offering universities should be strengthened. The linkages of the entire TPD institutional set-up must be specified for each province so that overlapping or duplicating roles could be avoided. More importantly, there needs to be an information sharing and feedback loop within the TPD framework as well as a periodic indicator based institutional performance appraisal conducted by independent parties. The feedback loop must include a linkage between trainers and trainees’ employed in schools. Establishing a separate cadre for teacher trainers could facilitate such follow-up.

- It is imperative that a continuum is formalized between pre-service and INSET. A primary TT policy could be part of the overall TPD policy framework. The role of the apex TT bodies is crucial in this regard.

- TRCs should ideally be union council or markaz based, rather than district based, to ensure better teacher support.

- The need to develop a separate cadre of teacher educators has been stressed upon time and again. A dedicated institution to train teacher educators ought to be set-up. Given the need for standard training practices and cross-province compatibility, such a functionary should be placed at the federal level and should train teacher educators as a regular exercise. Teacher educators’ training methodologies and curriculum must be designed in coordination with provincial bureaus and TTIs.

- A suggestion has also been floated to give the curriculum development responsibilities to an autonomous National Curriculum board whose functioning is linked with the textbook boards, bureaus of curriculum, TTIs, as well as the recommended functionary handling teacher educators’ training.

- Education departments across the three tiers of must be reconstituted according to thematic linkages rather than levels of schooling. Such an action must be taken concurrently across the three tiers.
7.4 Donor programs

- Donors must be forced to situate programs within the existing TPD framework. The initiative to channel all donor support through the Planning Wing at the Federal MoE is a positive one and must be replicated at the provincial levels.

- Federal or provincial requests for donor support must be situated within long term plans to improve TT and teacher management. Maximum emphasis should be accorded to making donor programs demand driven.

7.5 Private sector regulation

- Private sector regulation is a necessity, both in terms of investment and quality of TT. The NEFs or any other federal body should be mandated to develop regulatory standards for the private sector and should also be given enforcement powers to ensure compliance. In this regard, strong coordination between NEF and its provincial counterparts is an imperative. Moreover, PPPs on TT must be situated within the existing TPD framework and should not be one-off events conducted in isolation.

7.6 Financial management

- Fiscal decentralization process must be completed and districts must be provided complete financial autonomy.

- There is an urgent need to build capacity of the districts to ensure uniform financial management and reporting. Additionally, a functional mechanism to ensure continuous reporting to the provincial government must be in place.

- Given the acute shortage of resources at the district level and the high salary requirements due to rigid salary structures of provincial employees inherited by the district, it is impossible for the districts to finance TT. Therefore, either the province has to centralize TT and simply implement it through EDO (training) in the District government, or it could transfer all TPD funding to the district government according to a criteria set by the province. In the latter model, the province would only have a broad oversight and provide guidelines for the activity. Another option could be for the province to match district expenditure on TT born either by the development or the recurrent budget. This could be done for a particular aspect of TPD, even if other provincial programs are running to cover other aspects of TPD (Kardar 2005).

7.7 Teacher management and quality issues

- A periodic teacher rationalization exercise must be conducted by all provinces and a publicized criteria based selection and deployment system must be worked out. Punjab’s contract based recruiting has been rather successful in limiting unmerited recruitment and deployment and could be used as an example. However, teachers’ must be transferable, unlike in the Punjab. Without the transfer option or the option to recruit in the middle of the academic year, teacher rationalization is not possible. This brings the importance of instituting policies to insulate mechanisms from political pressure to the forefront.
• Surveys in NWFP and Punjab have shown that teacher discipline and motivation is better when teachers are placed within their area of residence (World Bank, “Management Study”, 2005; World Bank, “Reform Study”, 2005). Therefore, the teacher appointments should be union council or tehsil cadre to make their radius of appointment smaller. Moreover, the policy could vary from district to district at least in the initial transition phase.

• Although measuring indicators to assess quality of TPD is challenging and costly, there is a need to develop these in order to effectively track the impact of TPD initiatives on learning outcomes.

• A uniform performance appraisal mechanism must be devised for each province and its implementation ensured. Given that district officials are already overburdened and are unlikely to be able to perform this task efficiently, alternate means to conduct this exercise should be developed. These could include putting head teachers in charge or having independently created bodies with the capacity to carry out such appraisals given the responsibility. The appraisals would be valuable to the recommended information feedback loop.

• The importance of head teachers in enhancing the quality of teaching cannot be overemphasized. Head teachers must be accorded a substantial role and backed by enforcement powers to ensure improved learning outcomes. Given the difficulty of the supervisory staff to conduct M&E, head teachers are a valuable resource that could be used to assess teaching practices. Pressure on district officials could be eased and the quality of assessments improved if head teachers (as well as heads of TTIs) are trained in assessing teacher practices in a meaningful manner. No such program exists at the moment. In order to ensure consistency in assessment practices, such training could be conducted at the federal level, perhaps through a dedicated functionary. Once this is managed, district officials could be allowed to hold head teachers responsible for the learning outcomes in their school. Such monitoring should be conducted through of a criteria-based evaluation mechanism.

• A mechanism to gain periodic teacher input on the kind of INSET required and the teaching methodologies preferred must be instituted, perhaps through a district level needs based exercise. For this it is necessary to maintain an adequate database of the information collected, which raises the need for capacity building at the local level.

• There is also a need to deliberate upon mechanisms for instituting a formal relationship with the teacher unions. Learning from international experiences, a formula based on mutual interest should be developed which allows for positive interaction.

7.8 Community involvement
• The SMCs/PTAs are toothless bodies and will not be able to impact teacher management unless enforcement powers are provided.
• The role of SMCs should be expanded to include a TT mandate. If it is done, it is imperative that their role is situated within the existing institutional hierarchy to ensure that they do not add an additional layer of institutions responsible for training.

• Any move to expand the mandate of SMCs has to be preceded by capacity building, through an established and uniform capacity building program. Private sector participation in strengthening SMC capacity could be utilized as is being done in some districts of the country.

• The key is to have a set, province wide mandate for SMCs and uniform powers across the board. In other words, SMCs should officially be part of the district hierarchy developed to ensure efficient teacher management.
Section VIII  Guiding Principles for Teacher Education and Professional Development

1. Teacher Education Policies should effectively utilize existing teacher education institutions;

2. National Policies and Provincial Policies should be harmonized with clear roles and responsibilities delineated;

3. Professional development for education managers should be formalized. (For example: PITE’s in all provinces could become an Academy for Management Training as it is planned in NWFP to serve a function similar to National Institutes of Public Administration (NIPA);

4. Teacher policy review should be institutionalized through a joint national and provincial board;

5. Standards are not Terms of Reference. They are indicators by which performance can be measured;

6. Teacher Education and professional development is not an isolated function within the Ministry of Education. It has to be linked to the system at large including curriculum development;

7. Recruitment and personnel issues related to teachers need to be de-politicized;

8. The terminology of “teacher training” should be replaced with “teacher education and professional development” to represent a holistic support mechanism to teachers as professionals;

9. INSET and PRESET should be linked and time spent in professional development should be counted as credits towards a career path for the teacher;

10. Teaching performance standards should be agreed in coordination with the Federal Ministry of Education and notified by provinces for all vertical education programs including public, private and religious schools;

11. The teacher education system should be more “demand” driven. Planners should survey teacher needs and coordinate with teacher educators in terms of annual training plans. A tracking system should be put in place to identify what types of education teachers receive throughout their career.
Section IX  Conceptual Framework

The schematic below illustrates a conceptual framework for TPD, which could potentially help streamline the institutional set-up for TT as well as ensure coordination among the various actors responsible for TPD. The framework seeks to resituate existing structures rather than creating new ones, as past programs have sought to do. This is in line with the thrust of our argument throughout the strategic framework.

A Technical Panel for Teacher Education (TPTE), National Institute of Teacher Education (NITE) and an autonomous curriculum body would provide federal oversight to the TPD framework. Unlike its original formulation, the conceptual framework envisions TPTE as being placed outside the Curriculum Wing of the MoE, but having its initial mandate of advising TTIs on policy formulation and development plans, and formation of standards for TT (ADB, “Teacher Training” 2002). Suggestions for an autonomous curriculum body, independent from the MoE have already been floated in existing literature with the aim of developing a robust linkage between curriculum development for teacher education and school curricula. The NITE also needs to fulfill its original mandate of providing quality training to teacher trainers around the country. The NITE, as a national level body would help induce some level of uniformity in the quality and methodology of training across provinces.

At the provincial tier, one apex body ought to be responsible for dealing directly with the three federal level functionaries. The provincial body would be responsible for the entire coordination of TT in the province as well as coordination with the Federal autonomous curriculum body to ensure provincial input into the curriculum. This is essential in order for provinces to develop ownership in TT and school curricula, which is currently lacking.

Institutions providing pre-service training ought to coordinate with each other, as will institutes responsible for providing INSET. Most important is the need for a robust linkage between the pre-service training and INSET, which we envision could be attained through an information feedback loop, which includes feedback from all TTIs. School based learning and management issues will also be linked with the entire system through the information feedback loop. The feedback will be utilized by the apex body to improve the TPD environment within the province as well as to communicate any necessary changes in the national TPD framework to the federal bodies.

Finally, continuous quality appraisals are envisioned at each level of TT, both for pre-service training as well as INSET. The appraisals should ideally be conducted by the provincial apex body.
Conceptual Framework For Teacher Education and Professional Development

TPTE  <->  Autonomous Federal Curriculum body  <->  NITE

Apex Provincial TT body
(Coordinating TT & dealing with curriculum)

In-service
Provincial level
INSET
TTI

Union Council
Markaz cadre
TTI

Pre-service
Colleges of teacher education
Degree awarding
Universities

School

Quality appraisals

Monitoring

Teacher management issues

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Section X  Teacher Education and Professional Development  
Policy Guideline Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Policy formulation</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Develop a workable policy and strategic framework for TPD, with an accreditation and certification scheme (engage further research on appropriate accreditation and certification mechanisms for Pakistan);  
- Develop minimum requirements for resourcing institutes with regard to staffing, infrastructure and organization in conjunction with the respective heads of these institutes;  
- The credentialing of teacher education programs should be transferred to an independent body (engage further research on the role of an independent licensing body);  
- Uniform work requirements, in terms of teaching and supervision loads, should also be developed;  
- A Technical Panel for Teacher Education (TPTE) should be established in order to influence policies and organize teachers’ professional interests and coordinate policy and planning initiatives.  
\textit{Representation of qualified teachers should be mandatory in the formation and revision of educational policies.} | Preparation of policy should be coordinated from the Federal level with input from province and district governments and education practitioners.  
Consultations with HEC required to map lines of responsibility with policies related to certification and accreditation.  
\textit{MoE, AEPAM, FDE, UNESCO}  
\textit{Donor Support: CIDA, USAID} |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2 Inter-tier coordination</th>
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| - Clarify inter-tier division responsibilities of TPD through appropriate notification/legislation according to the Devolution framework.  
- Formalize inter-tier agreements to ensure complementarity in the functioning of various bodies responsible for TPD including province and district management and financial coordination. Each and every aspect, including pre and in service teacher education, private sector involvement, school based teacher management, etc. must be clearly defined. (MOE engagement with BOCEs in Sindh and Balochistan, DSD in Punjab and DCTE in NWFP would be critical to begin to harmonize roles and responsibilities and develop standards.)  
- Frequent national, provincial and district level dialogues should be formalized and must involve communities, teachers and political representatives. TPTE could take the lead by mandating frequent consultations to ensure an academic agenda as well as administrative. TPTE could also support provincial discussions on roles of provincial TT bodies;  
- The staff of training outposts including heads should be involved in the development of a concrete vision and workable goals for these institutions; | Consultations with NRB might be required to clarify legal gaps with regard to inter-tier relationship and provision of teacher education.  
FDE could coordinate various dialogues to develop a workable structure for coordination of teacher education.  
MOE, AEPAM, FDE, UNESCO |
vision and workable goals for these institutions;

- The link between provincial apex bodies and lower level TTIs as well as degree offering universities should be strengthened. The linkages of the entire TPD institutional set-up must be specified for each province so that overlapping or duplicating roles could be avoided.
- Develop a feedback loop within the TPD framework as well as a periodic, indicator based institutional performance appraisal conducted by independent parties. The feedback loop must include a linkage between trainers and trainees’ employed in schools. Establishing a separate cadre for teacher trainers could facilitate such follow-up.
- It is imperative that a continuum is formalized between pre-service and INSET. A primary TT policy could be part of the overall TPD policy framework. The role of the apex TT bodies is crucial in this regard.
- TRCs should ideally be union council or markaz based, rather than district based, to ensure better teacher support.

3. **Teacher Quality (Academic)**

- **Proactive Up-to-Date Curriculum:** Courses should be designed around requirements and needs expressed by the teacher themselves. Revision of pre-service and in-service curricula, with a focus on improving and enhancing content knowledge and pedagogical skills of the teacher trainees is also required. Integration of subject knowledge with teaching skills has also been recommended.
- **In-Service Programs:** Training should be based on teacher requirements. Teachers’ needs should be first assessed by induction tests, and groups formed according to their scores. These groups should be then brought up and trained from their current level. There should be refresher courses every 3 to 5 years. Institutional linkages with an innovative college should be explored globally to train elementary teachers for the purposes of faculty in-service development, faculty exchanges and further training.
  a. **Pre-Service & In-Service Trainings:** Trainings to focus on improving teachers’ resource management skills, promoting group work and activity based learning as part of the learning experience, encouraging them to use no/low cost materials as teaching aids where appropriate and supporting capacity building co-curricular activities for the pupils. Training should also prepare teachers for multi-grade teaching.
  b. The most preferred approach to teaching for elementary level students is the “activity approach” with focus on the pupil and activity based learning process. Computer along with training on other technological aids should be made compulsory and a high priority for all teacher programs. It has been suggested that a separate cadre of teacher educators should be established, linked to elementary schools, who can be trained on the job to be adult educators and researchers in elementary schools practice and subject areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Support:</th>
<th>CIDA, USAID</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Government (sponsorship through UNICEF for Punjab Teacher training initiatives)</td>
<td>World Bank/USAID to coordinate with provincial departments of education on engagement of studies on effectiveness of training within ESR support initiatives.</td>
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</table>
4. **Teacher Quality (Management)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>•</strong> A periodic teacher rationalization exercise must be conducted by all provinces and publicized criteria based selection and deployment system must be planned. Punjab’s contract based recruiting has been successful in limiting unmerited recruitment and deployment and could be used as an example. However, teachers’ must be transferable, unlike in the Punjab. Without the transfer option or the option to recruit in the middle of the academic year, teacher rationalization is not possible. This brings the importance of instituting policies to insulate mechanisms from political pressure to the forefront.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>•</strong> Surveys in NWFP and Punjab have shown that teacher discipline and motivation are better when teachers are placed within their area of residence (World Bank, “Management Study”, 2005; World Bank, “Reform Study”, 2005). Therefore, the teacher appointments should be union council or tehsil cadre to make their radius of appointment smaller. The policy could vary from district to district at least in the initial transition phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>•</strong> All teaching programs should emphasize developing a list of a core set of competencies among the teachers (both pre and in-service) to prepare them adequately for classroom teaching and to make them effective and professional educators. On the basis of these core competencies a performance appraisal system can be devised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>•</strong> <strong>Proper Recruitment Practices:</strong> Selection of teachers should be merit-based. Schools should select teachers based on a minimum qualification of intermediate and satisfactory performance on a selection test based on the teacher’s core competencies (World Bank, “Balochistan Education” 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>•</strong> <strong>Healthy School Support Structure:</strong> Newly trained and inducted teachers as well as those already working require peer and school support to continue their professional and personal development. Encouragement, guidance and a healthy working environment can add tremendous value to a teachers output and commitment. There is a need to foster a culture of critical reflection among the teaching faculty of schools. School management should be responsive and accommodating towards the needs of their teaching staff and give them due respect and assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>•</strong> Set up provincial databases linked to a central repository to maintain up to date records of the teachers, their qualifications, trainings, current enrollment and other relevant statistics. This would aid in tracking teacher resources and help make informed management decisions. The central database can be installed at the federal regulatory body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>•</strong> <strong>Infrastructure:</strong> Most of the teacher training institutes throughout the country are in dire need of repair and modifications. In order to provide a decent working environment for both teacher educators and trainees alike, a nationwide renovation of the institutes should be undertaken. As part</td>
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of these exercise science labs, teaching materials, aids and IT equipment should be upgraded and/or made available\(^6\).

- There is a need to develop a separate cadre of teacher educators. A dedicated institution to train teacher educators could be set-up. Given the need for standard training practices and cross-province compatibility, such a functionary should be placed at the federal level and should train teacher educators as a regular exercise. Teacher educators’ training methodologies and curriculum must be designed in coordination with provincial bureaus and TTIs and must be linked to national curriculum to be taught in the schools.

- A suggestion has also been floated to give the curriculum development responsibilities to an autonomous National Curriculum board whose functioning is linked with the textbook boards, bureaus of curriculum, TTIs, as well as the recommended functionary handling teacher educators’ training.

- A mechanism to gain periodic teacher input on the kind of INSET required and the teaching methodologies preferred must be instituted, perhaps through a district level needs based exercise. For this it is necessary to maintain an adequate database of the information collected, which raises the need for capacity building at the local level.

- There is also a need to deliberate mechanisms for instituting a formal relationship with the teacher unions. Learning from international experiences, a formula based on mutual interest should be developed which allows for positive interaction.

5. **Financial Management of Teacher Education**

- Fiscal decentralization process must be completed and districts must be provided complete financial autonomy.

- There is an urgent need to build capacity of the districts to ensure uniform financial management and reporting. Additionally, a functional mechanism to ensure continuous reporting to the provincial government must be in place.

- Given the acute shortage of resources at the district level and the high salary requirements due to rigid salary structures of provincial employees inherited by the district, it is impossible for the districts to finance TT. Either the province has to centralize TT and simply implement it through EDO (training) in the District government, or it could transfer all TPD funding to the district government according to a criteria set by the province. In the latter model, the province would only have a broad oversight and provide guidelines for the activity. Another option could be for the province to match district expenditure on TT born either by the development or the recurrent budget. This could be done for a particular aspect of TPD, even if other provincial programs are running to

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\(^6\) Detailed recommendations on Infrastructure, Organization and Instructional Capacity are available in Furniss, 2005.
cover other aspects of TPD.

- Offer incentives to teachers in accordance to their need and the stage of their career. Such incentives can be monetary (salary increase, allowances, and benefits). They can also include subsidized housing, food, transportation facilities, professional training, teacher guides, textbooks, personal notebooks, location, and recognition of performance. Match up incentives according to the needs and stage of the teacher. Ensure sustenance of incentives. Start a program to provide loans to teachers on low mark ups and soft terms. If contract based, those teachers that perform well can be hired as permanent employees to acknowledge their value and services.

- **Supply of Textbooks and Teacher Resource Material:** All teacher-training institutes complain of insufficient allocations for procuring quality textbooks, teacher learning references, resource materials, library books, education journals and other required supplementary materials. The MoE should allocate sufficient funds to the institutes so that they can be able to procure items according to their needs. Donors should also come forward and help the institutes overcome some of these constraints as part of their assistance in improving teacher education.

### 6. Monitoring and Evaluation

- Systematic follow up with teachers after trainings is central to their professional development (UNESCO 2006). Their performance in classroom should be regularly assessed by the principal and other senior teachers to evaluate the quality of their training, their subject knowledge as well as their classroom delivery and management skills.

- A performance based teacher evaluation and compensation system is required to motivate the teachers to strive towards excellence. Promotions should be linked with teacher’s capabilities rather than seniority. Additionally there should be an institutional performance appraisal system to monitor institutional accomplishment against set curricular objectives and goals. Perhaps what is needed is setting up of a monitoring wing within each teacher-training institute, under the administrative supervision of the federal regulatory body, to monitor, ensure and assist with quality control. This wing among other things would also drive the institutional management to regularly introducing new and cutting edge teaching techniques for teacher training.

- Although measuring indicators to assess quality of TPD is challenging and costly, there is a need to develop these in order to effectively track the impact of TPD initiatives on learning outcomes.

- A uniform performance appraisal mechanism must be devised for each province and its implementation ensured. Given that district officials are already overburdened and are unlikely to be able to perform this task efficiently, alternate means to conduct this exercise should be developed. These could include putting head teachers in charge or having independently created bodies with the capacity to carry out such appraisals given the responsibility. The appraisals would be valuable to the recommended information feedback loop.

- The importance of head teachers in enhancing the quality of teaching cannot be overemphasized.
Head teachers must be accorded a substantial role and backed by enforcement powers to ensure improved learning outcomes. Given the difficulty of the supervisory staff to conduct M&E, head teachers are a valuable resource that could be used to assess teaching practices. Pressure on district officials could be eased and the quality of assessments improved if head teachers (as well as heads of TTIs) are trained in assessing teacher practices in a meaningful manner. No such program exists at the moment. In order to ensure consistency in assessment practices, such training could be conducted at the federal level, perhaps through a dedicated functionary. Once this is managed, district officials could be allowed to hold head teachers responsible for the learning outcomes in their school. Such monitoring should be conducted through of a criteria-based evaluation mechanism.

7. Community Involvement
   - The role of SMCs should be expanded to include monitoring of teachers attendance and support. If it is done, it is imperative that their role is situated within the existing institutional hierarchy to ensure that they do not add an additional layer of institutions responsible for training
   - Any move to expand the mandate of SMCs has to be preceded by capacity building, through an established and uniform capacity building program. Private sector participation in strengthening SMC capacity could be utilized as is being done in some districts of the country
   - The key is to have a set, province wide mandate for SMCs and uniform powers across the board. In other words, SMCs should officially be part of the district hierarchy developed to ensure efficient teacher management

8. Private Sector Regulation
   - Private sector regulation is a necessity, both in terms of investment and quality of TT. The NEFs or any other federal body should be mandated to develop regulatory standards for the private sector and should also be given enforcement powers to ensure compliance. In this regard, strong coordination between NEF and its provincial counterparts is an imperative. Moreover, PPPs on TT must be situated within the existing TPD framework and should not be one-off events conducted in isolation.
   - Public teacher education programming should also reach out to private and religious school educators. Selection of trainees should be open to include educators from these sectors.

9. Donor Support
   - Donors must be forced to situate programs within the existing TPD framework. The initiative to channel all donor support through the Planning Wing at the Federal MoE is a positive one and must be replicated at the provincial levels.
   - Federal or provincial requests for donor support must be situated within long term plans to improve TT and teacher management. Maximum emphasis should be accorded to making donor programs demand driven.
   - Sub committee of donors to meet and coordinate support on Teacher Education

Coordination with MOE, and provincial departments of education is necessary.
In agreement with the Federal, Provincial and District governments, the MOE should begin to write specific activities around these policy guidelines. A Logical Framework Matrix might be one exercise that could be conducted. The logframe could be a useful planning tool for realizing achievement of these guidelines/objectives.
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**Sindh**


Dawn the Internet Edition. (July 26, 2006). **Karachi: Hamida warns against protest over ban.**
Annexure
Annex I

Brief note on the teacher workforce in Pakistan

Public Sector:
The capacity constraints of the TT framework in the country are compounded by the sheer size of the teaching cadre. Approximately 629,674 teachers are currently serving in the country’s public sector education institutions.

- Punjab accounts for 47.43 percent of the total, with 298,665 teachers employed in the province;
- The Sindh teaching cadre is 139,959 (22.22%);
- NWFP’s cadre is 97,173 (15.43%) strong;
- Balochistan’s cadre comprises of 40,551 (6.43%) teachers
- AJK employs 23,594 (3.74%), FATA’s teaching cadre’s strength is 18,442 (2.92%),
- FANA’s strength is 4,942 (0.78%), while ICT’s cadre comprises 6,348 (1%) teachers (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005; Kardar 2005).

The change in the size of the teaching cadre shows an interesting pattern along a timeline. The number of public sector teachers grew steadily from independence till the end of the 1980s. The largest increase was witnessed from 1979-80 to 1989-90, when the cadre’s strength increased from 364,687 to 696,911 (Ministry of Education, “Facts and figures” 2004). Thereafter, a decline in the teaching workforce has taken place, bringing the number down to the current level (629,674).

Disaggregating the teaching force by levels of schooling reveals that primary schools house half of the total teaching cadre. They account for 314,712 teachers (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). Middle schools employ 109,327 teachers (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). High schools house 162,430 teachers in total, while 23,849 teachers are employed in the higher-secondary schools (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). Females account for 36.12% of the total teaching force at the primary level. The percentage is 47.94% for the middle school level, 32.5% for the high school level, and 39.07% for the higher-secondary level. A further disaggregation confirms that Punjab employs substantially higher number of teachers at all levels of schooling than the other provinces/regions (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005).

Table 1: No. of teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province District</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Primary Schools</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>High Schools</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>8573</td>
<td>12107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>23594</td>
<td>4334</td>
<td>6810</td>
<td>9550</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNESCO: Strategic Framework for Teacher Education and Professional Development--Pakistan
Almost all (99%) teachers employed have an academic qualification. Moreover, majority of the teachers in the public sector have received some form of training. The following table reflects the proportion of trained teachers in the public sector.

Table 2: Percentage of Teachers (Public) with Professional Qualification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Qualification</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-Ed</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-Ed</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Trained</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untrained</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Information</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shami et al., “National education” 2005

According to the Pakistan Education Statistics 2003-04, the country’s pupil to teacher ratio stands at 29 pupils per student. In Punjab, the ratio is slightly higher at 31, and in NWFP it is still higher at 33. For Sindh the ratio stands at 25, while for Balochistan it is 22 (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). Notwithstanding, non-governmental reports such as the UNDP Human Development Report has suggested a much higher pupil to teacher ratio for the country. In 2000, the Report put Pakistan’s pupil to student ratio at 44, which compared unfavorably with most other regional countries (United National Development Program, “Human Development” 2000).

Table 3: Pupil Teacher Ratio, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran, Islamic Republic</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Pakistan’s pupil to teacher ratio is the highest at the primary school level. The ratio stands at 33 (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). At 22, the ratio for middle schools is the lowest (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). For high schools and higher-secondary schools,
the ratio stands at 26 and 27 pupils per teacher respectively (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). Among the four major provinces, the primary schools pupil to teacher ratio for Balochistan is the lowest at 27 (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). The highest ratio is NWFP’s with each teacher, on average accounting for 40 students (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). For middle schools, Balochistan has the lowest ratio at 13 while Punjab’s ratio at 25 is the highest (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). At the high school level, Sindh performs the best, with each teacher on average accounting for 19 students (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). To the contrary, in Punjab, the ratio is as high as 31 (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005). For the higher-secondary schools, Sindh has the lowest ratio at 24 while Punjab’s ratio remains the highest at 33 (Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005).

Table 4: Pupil to teacher ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province District</th>
<th>Pupil to Teacher Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANA</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shami et al., “Pakistan education” 2005

Private sector:
In the private (non-government) sector, the teaching cadre is burgeoning. In 2002-03, the private sector (excluding non-formal education, NEF teachers and NCHD teachers) constituted an 86,240 large teaching force at the primary level, 66,901 (77.57%) of which were female (Ministry of Education, “Facts and figures” 2004). The figure for middle schools is 126,900, 92,600 (72.97%) of them being females (Shami et al., “National education” 2005). At the secondary level, the private sector teaching cadre strength is 107,457, 76,615 (71.3%) of which are female (Ministry of Education, “Facts and figures” 2004).

The above provides an interesting contrast with the trend in the public sector. While the majority of teachers in the public schools are hosted at the primary level, in the private sector the number of middle and secondary school teachers is higher than that for primary schools. Another major difference is the gender composition, which heavily favors females in the private sector but males remain dominant (in terms of numbers) in the public sector.

Data on non-government schools in NWFP only partly confirms to the private sector’s national level statistics. A total of 51,692 teachers are employed in the province’s private sector, with the number of middle school and high school teachers being much higher than that for primary schools (Directorate of Schools & Literacy, “Statistical Report” 2005).
However, unlike the national average, females do not dominate NWFP’s private sector education. Apart from the primary level, where females account for 51.91% of the total cadre, males have a slightly higher representation than females at the middle, high, and higher-secondary levels (Directorate of Schools & Literacy, “Statistical Report” 2005). The pupil to teacher ratio for NWFP private schools stands at an impressive 16.65 (Directorate of Schools & Literacy, “Statistical Report” 2005).

Table 5: No. of teachers in non-government schools in NWFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>5254</td>
<td>5672</td>
<td>10926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Schools</td>
<td>8998</td>
<td>8415</td>
<td>17413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Schools</td>
<td>9838</td>
<td>7667</td>
<td>17505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher School</td>
<td>2978</td>
<td>2870</td>
<td>5848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27068</strong></td>
<td><strong>24624</strong></td>
<td><strong>51692</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Directorate of Schools & Literacy, “Statistical Report” 2005
Federal vision
Following are the TT schemes envisioned by the Federal MoE’s Curriculum Wing. The schemes were devised in 1996, under the TTP project.

- The Diploma in Education – DIP.Ed. – (10+3) or (12+1) the standard Elementary teaching qualification;
- The Bachelor of Education – B.Ed. – covering both Elementary and Secondary either (12+3) or (14+1½);
- The Master of Education – M.Ed. – (15+1½);
- The Master of Arts in Education – M.A.(Ed.) – (14+2);
- Postgraduate Certificates, such as the Post Graduate Certificate in Teacher Education PGCTE; the Post Graduate Certificate in Educational Technology PGCET; the Post Graduate Certificate in Educational Management PGCEM; and postgraduate diplomas;
- Higher degrees in education, such as M.Phil, and Ph.D.

Current provincial programs
Not withstanding the federal schemes, following are the programs currently being offered under provincial oversight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courses</th>
<th>Entry Qualification</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Preparation for Teaching</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PTC (10+1)</td>
<td>S.S.C. (10)</td>
<td>1 academic year</td>
<td>I-V</td>
<td>GECEs(Sindh) GECEs (Balochistan) RITEs (NWFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT (12+1)</td>
<td>Intermediate (12)</td>
<td>1 academic year</td>
<td>VI-VIII</td>
<td>GECEs(Sindh) GECEs (Balochistan) RITEs (NWFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Ed.(14+1)</td>
<td>B.A./B.Sc.</td>
<td>1 academic year</td>
<td>IX-X</td>
<td>College of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc.Ed(12+3)</td>
<td>Intermediate (Science)</td>
<td>3 academic year</td>
<td>IX-X</td>
<td>University College of Education, IERs, University Department of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.Ed.</td>
<td>B.Ed.</td>
<td>1 academic year</td>
<td>IX-X + Teacher Education, supervision, Administration</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A.Ed.</td>
<td>B.A./B.Sc.</td>
<td>1 academic year</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex III

Inter-tier responsibilities under the devolved set-up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Government</th>
<th>Federal</th>
<th>Provincial</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Tehsil</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Community [SMC]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Pay</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Recruitment</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Transfer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation of Private Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P=primary responsibility; S=secondary responsibility; SH=shared responsibility*

Source: Winkler and Hatfield 2002
Annex IV
Provincial Organisation charts for Teacher Professional Development in Pakistan
* Government College of Elementary Education (Pre-service teacher training)
** In-service Teacher Training
NWFP

Education Minister

Secretary Education NWFP

Higher Education Commission

Provincial Institute of Teacher Education **(PITE)

Directorate of Curriculum & Teacher Education (DCTE)

* RITES (20)
GC (Phy. Edu.)
(Agro-Technical Training College)

Peshawar University

Department of Education (B. Ed, M. Ed)

* Regional Institute of Teacher Education (Pre-service teacher training)
** In-service teacher training
Source: AED, 2006

SINDH

Education Minister

Secretary Education

Higher Education Commission

Universities

EDO Colleges

Bureau of Curriculum (BoC)

Provincial Institute of Teacher Education **(PITE)

* GECEs (W)
* GECEs (M)

Department of Education (B. Ed, M. Ed)

Colleges of Education (B. Ed, M. Ed)

* Government Elementary College of Education (Pre-service teacher training)
** In-service teacher training

Source: AED, 2006
Annex V

Policy-implementation disconnect in the Sindh devolution framework: The case of Karachi district

District Education Department
(District Karachi)

Executive District Officer Education (B-20)

District Officer
Sports (B-18)

District Officer
(SEMIS & Planning (B-19)

District Officer
Colleges (B-19)

District Officer
Technical (B-19)

District Officer
Private (B-18)

District Officer
Secondary Female (B-19)

District Officer
Secondary Male (B-19)

District Officer
Elementary Female (B-19)

District Officer
Elementary Male (B-19)

Asst. District Officer
Elementary Female (B-19)

Asst. District Officer
Elementary Male (B-19)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-19)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-19)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-16)

Asst. District Officer
Technical (B-18)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-18)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-18)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-17/18)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-17/18)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-17/18)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-16)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-16)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-16)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-15)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-15)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-15)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-14)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-14)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-14)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-13)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-13)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-13)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-12)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-12)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-12)

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Private (B-11)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-11)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-11)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-10)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-10)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-10)

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Private (B-9)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-9)

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Private (B-8)

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Secondary Male (B-8)

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Secondary Female (B-8)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-7)

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Secondary Male (B-7)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-7)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-6)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-6)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-6)

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Private (B-5)

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Secondary Male (B-5)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-5)

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Private (B-4)

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Secondary Male (B-4)

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Secondary Female (B-4)

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Private (B-3)

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Secondary Male (B-3)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-3)

Asst. District Officer
Private (B-2)

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Secondary Male (B-2)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-2)

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Private (B-1)

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Secondary Male (B-1)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Female (B-1)

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Private (B-0)

Asst. District Officer
Secondary Male (B-0)
Annex VI
District Structure for Financial Decision-Making

DCO
Principal
Accounting Officer
Presents ADP & Schemes for approval

EDO Finance
Makes the budget
Prioritizes schemes

EDO Literacy
Develops schemes
Is usually the EFA Focal Points

EDO Education
Makes proposals

DEO (Elementary)
Only a signing authority

DEO (Secondary)
Only a signing authority

DDEO
Releases salaries

Head Teacher
(Primary/Elementary)
Utilizes SMC grant

Head Teacher
(High School)
Prepares school budget in consultation with teachers

SMC
Monitors SMC funds for repairs & maintenance, educational materials

MNA/MPA
New entry has independent role

NAZIM
Chairs DCC

Naib Nazims

Councilors

Source: Ministry of Education, 2003