This collection of articles includes: "Introduction: Discourse Analysis Today" (Dagmar Schue and M.D. Lopez-Maestre); "The Metaphorical and Metonymic Understanding of the Trinitarian Dogma" (Antonio Barcelona); "Symmetry as Conceptual Metaphor in Walker's The Color Purple" (Elena Tapia); "And She's Like It's Terrible, Like: Spoken Discourse, Grammar and Corpus Analysis" (Svenja Adolphs and Ronald Carter); "The Meaning of Genetics" (Svenja Adolphs, Craig Hamilton, and Brigitte Nerlich); "Repeat after Me: The Value of Replication" (Ronald Macaulay); "Sociolinguistics, Cognitivism and Discursive Psychology" (Jonathan Potter and Derek Edwards); "The Role of Cohesive Devices as Textual Constraints on Relevance: A Discourse-as-Process" (Ana Isabel Moreno); "Synonyms in Action: A Case Study" (Rebecca Clift); "A Century of News Discourse" (Allan Bell); and "Students' Discourse on Immigration Attitudes and Ideological Values: A Critical View" (Maria D. Lopez-Maestre and Dagmar Schue-Lottgen). (Papers contain references.) (SM)
Discourse Analysis Today

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Introduction:

Discourse Analysis Today

In our call for papers for this special volume, we invited contributions from a variety of approaches within Discourse Analysis, such as: Critical Discourse Analysis; Critical Linguistics; Social Psychology; Discursive Psychology; Conversation Analysis; Pragmatics; Cultural-generic Analysis; Stylistics; Discourse Styles; Corpus Linguistics; Language and Ideology, etc. A sign of how lively the field has become nowadays is the large amount of proposals received and the wide variety of articles sent.

Within the broad range of fields offered, the contributors that have made this volume possible cover the following theoretical approaches: Cognitive theories, Cognitive Psychology, Corpus Linguistics, Sociolinguistics, Discursive Psychology, Conversation Analysis, Media Discourse Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis.

In line with one of the main characteristics of Discourse Analysis—its interdisciplinary nature—the articles included in this volume also provide a wide ranging approach to issues in the field, illustrating different views and methodologies. There are papers dealing with different aspects, including some which present quite polemical views on theories relevant to Discourse Analysis.

As editors to a volume dealing with these innovative research fields, it has been a pleasure to offer our readers this rich variety of approaches as well as interesting topics and research issues. Thus, we hope not only to fulfil the academic expectations of our readers but also to contribute to the accomplishment of a twofold purpose:

i) to raise new and interesting research questions on discourse analysis; and
ii) to raise our readers' awareness of the relevance of these academic issues for the improvement of intercultural relations.

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The articles selected have been ordered according to the main theoretical fields they are based on. The first two articles share a cognitive approach. The authors apply cognitive semantics and cognitive psychology to the study of metaphors in different contexts.

The following section presents two articles that carry out research within the field of corpus linguistics. The first one explores the relationship between language and spoken discourse, and the latter links corpus linguistics to the study of the public understanding of the meaning of ‘genetics’.

Two articles compose the section on sociolinguistics. In one the importance of replication in social research is highlighted, whereas in the other, the reader is introduced to discursive psychology, questioning certain cognitive approaches by directing the focus onto the construction of cognition within people’s practices.

The section dealing with conversation analysis contributes two articles, thus enhancing the reader’s understanding of the role cohesive devices play on the one hand, and on the other the role that synonyms play in discourse and interaction.

The fifth section is devoted to the analysis of two varieties of language or discourse styles: News media and academic discourse on immigration. In one article the development of news discourse in the 20th century is explored. In the other, a group of students’ discourse on immigration is examined from a CDA point of view, paying special attention to the interrelation of language and ideology in texts.

Finally, we would like to thank the reviewers for their thorough and careful work. Any infelicities that remain are, of course, our own. We are also very grateful for the interest shown by our contributors, and thanks to their investigations we hope to encourage further publications in this field.

I. COGNITIVE THEORY
A. Barcelona, in his paper “The Metaphorical and Metonymic Understanding of the Trinitarian Dogma” states that the mystery of the Holy Trinity is a belief upon which the faith of all Christians rests, as St Caesarius of Arles declared in one of his sermons (see Catechism of the Catholic Church, henceforth C.C., p. 55). According to the author, these words provide sufficient reasons to make a study of the limited understanding of this mystery an extremely interesting task. The first reason is its very centrality to Christian faith. The second reason is its transcendental nature, which simply baffles human logic: how can three be one, and one three? The fact that it is above human logic does not mean that there is no coherence at all in it. In fact, as the author claims, there is a mysterious internal coherence in this belief, a weak glimpse of which we obtain through the language of the biblical passages which contain God’s revelation of the mystery to the sacred writers.

In this essay, he studies the metaphorico-metonymic network that underlies the formulation of the Trinitarian dogma and the language of some of the biblical passages that led
to it. The article starts with the description of some of the main metaphors and metonymies that are used in the formulation of the dogma and in the preceding scriptural passages. Instead of analysing just the formulation of the dogma as crystallised in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, the basically metaphorico-metonymic structure of the theological discussion and elucidation of the dogma is studied. Since the fact of analysing all or even just a representative subset of the main theological contributions to this discussion throughout history would go far beyond the bounds of this essay, the relevant sections of the recent Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994), as an authoritative compendium of the dogmatic teachings of the Catholic Church have been chosen. The author sets out to identify the fundamental metaphors and metonymies whose interaction constitutes the dogma, and suggests how it could be made somewhat coherent at the figurative level, even if still not intelligible from a logical-referential standpoint. The author, however, emphasises that the suggestions given in part 3 should only be taken as the way in which one could analogically imagine, but by no means explain, how God can be one and three. Finally, the implications of the coherence of these metaphors for the problems of truth and the understanding of religious language in general will be discussed.

The description and analysis of metaphor and metonymy in this essay have been performed in the spirit of cognitive semantics. The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic tenets of the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy, as developed over the past two decades by writers like Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987, 1990, 1993), Lakoff and Turner (1989), Turner (1987, 1991), as well as by Kövecses (e.g. 1990), Gibbs (1994), and many others. This essay is then a semantic study, not a theological essay.

From the perspective of cognitive psychology on symmetry in aesthetics and cognition, Elena Tapia analyses three types of the conceptual metaphor of embodied symmetry in Alice Walker’s novel, The Color Purple. It is argued that it is the reader’s tacit familiarity with symmetry and its comforting pervasiveness in the novel that enables Walker to present the unmentionable and the abominable by adeptly rocking the readers between the poles of conceptual symmetry. An analysis of the various projections of conceptual symmetry in the novel shows how disparate elements and features such as the oft-criticized stereotypy of the characters in The Color Purple (see Harris, 1984; Puissant, 1993; Watkins, 1986) are examples of conceptual symmetries and asymmetries. A careful examination discovers that the asymmetries are employed by the author to disrupt conventional ways of thinking and to force the audience beyond passive readership. Conceptual asymmetries in The Color Purple engage readers, leading them to rediscover individual character histories and motives, or in epistemological terms (Michael Leyton, 1992), to seek causal explanations for the asymmetries. Thus, the degree of involvement in seeking the causal explanation correlates with the reader’s aesthetic response. Under a theory of conceptual metaphor, readers of The Color Purple engage in interpreting each asymmetry to discover its history.
II. CORPUS LINGUISTICS

Svenja Adolphs and Ronald Carter explore the relationship between language and spoken discourse within the context of corpus linguistics. In particular they make use of the CANCODE spoken English corpus, a five-million-word computerised language corpus, which has been carefully collected and sociolinguistically-profiled with reference to a range of different speech genres and with an emphasis on everyday communication. This corpus has also been designed with the particular aim of relating grammatical and lexical choice to variation in social context and is also used in connection with a range of teaching projects, being especially concerned with differences between spoken and written language (Bex 1996, Carter and McCarthy, 1997; Carter, Hughes and McCarthy, 2000). Data collected for the CANCODE project is classified along two main axes according to context type and interaction type. Combining these two axes of categorization, a matrix of twelve text types is provided. This is important since it makes it possible to study the situations in which the text types might be found.

An extract from the CANCODE corpus is used in order to explore the provenance, distribution and function of the word *like* in spoken English. In particular, the aim is to provide a description of the functions of *like* for a forthcoming grammar of English. (Carter and McCarthy, forthcoming). Once *like* has been examined as a discourse marker, and its grammatical functions within extracts from CANCODE considered as well, the authors point out that a corpus-informed grammar of English, which illustrates the extent to which *like* functions across sentence boundaries and across speaking turns needs to find appropriate ways of highlighting such features for learners of English. In many respects, the description goes beyond the conventional limits of grammar and becomes an exemplification of discourse grammar. A corpus-informed spoken grammar is always to some degree pushing towards the establishment of new boundaries for a ‘discourse’ grammar. (McCarthy, 2001).

Svenja Adolphs, Craig Hamilton and Brigitte Nerlich in their paper “The meaning of genetics” claim that corpus linguistics has long asked questions about how meaning is created and changed in the public sphere through language use. While research into the public understanding of genetics has expanded, matters relating to biotechnology have seized the public’s attention. To link corpus linguistics to the study of the public understanding of science, they apply methods from corpus linguistics and cognitive linguistics. To study how people talk about genetics, the authors analyse the meaning of the words *gene, genes, genetic, genetics,* and *genetically* as found in various spoken and written corpora. Recent advances in corpus linguistics have highlighted the importance of syntagmatic relations in language use. In order to describe the nature of individual units of meaning, the authors apply four parameters: (1) colligation, (2) collocation, (3) semantic preference, and (4) semantic prosody (Sinclair 1996). The corpus linguistic approach they follow is complemented by a cognitive linguistic view of figurative language use.

As this paper shows, a cognitive linguistic approach to semantics can be bolstered by the use of corpus linguistics. These combined methods yield a new understanding of gene talk in its
various aspects. The fact that the semantic prosodies for words based on the lemma *GENE* are often negative in the corpora studied highlights conceptual issues underlying current debates surrounding biotechnology. Moreover, the substantial use of metaphors in gene talk reinforces the view that metaphors are ubiquitous in everyday language. Given the complexity of genetic science and the invisible nature of genes, it is hard to talk about *genes* literally. This suggests that meanings cannot be removed from pragmatic contexts (i.e. where gene talk occurs) or from lexical contexts (i.e. the words found before or after the word under analysis). This paper shows that a combination of methods from corpus and cognitive linguistics enables us to understand the meaning of *genetics* and "why it means what it means when people talk about genes".

III. SOCIOLINGUISTICS
From a sociolinguistic perspective, Ronald Macaulay focusses on the necessity of replication for research in sociolinguistics in his paper "Repeat after me: the value of replication". Due to the fact that investigation of discourse variation must examine samples of talk in action, the use of a specific feature is locally determined, and thus, Macaulay states that any conclusions drawn from a single study may give an unreliable indication of a more widespread difference. The author illustrates this with comments on how the findings of several studies found no validation in further research. The present paper examines certain claims made about sociolinguistic differences in discourse style and provides the reader with examples of replication. In two cases the results obtained are sufficiently convincing to provide tentative sociolinguistic generalizations whereas, in another, the findings show the danger of jumping to premature conclusions. Any conclusions about a linguistic variable based on a single sample collected by a single technique are vulnerable to refutation. Herein Macaulay sees the progress of science. He concludes that "we need replications of all important earlier investigations to help strengthen or undermine confidence in their results and that will be to the benefit of the discipline of sociolinguistics. These are two powerful reasons for asking the same question more than once".

Jonathan Potter and Derek Edwards contribute to this volume with a rather polemical article on "Sociolinguistics, Cognitivism and Discursive Psychology". In this article, the question of how work on sociolinguistics should be related to social theory and in particular the assumptions about cognition underpinning that relation, are discussed.

A discursive psychological approach to issues of cognition is illustrated by a reworking of M. Stubb's (1997) review of work on the topics of racist discourse, courtroom interaction, scientific writing and sexism. Discursive psychology questions an approach to 'cognition' as a collection of more or less stable inner entities and processes. Instead, these authors focus on the construction and orientation of 'mental phenomena' in people's practices.

In their article, Potter and Edwards first try to demonstrate that the substantive claims about the relation between language and cognition may be questioned. Second, they try to show that previous analyses draw on an under-theorized cognitivist image of the relation: between the
inner stuff of cognition and the observable phenomena of talk and texts. Third, they try to show that this inner stuff is itself rarely theorized specifically (using the technical apparatus of social cognition, for example) but is alluded to by the use of certain metaphors. For these reasons, they suggest that analysts will benefit from adopting a stance that presupposes neither cognition nor reality but addresses both as they are constructed and oriented to in discourse. "This path may seem to duck some of the big concerns of social theory, but we believe it to be interesting, analytically coherent, and fruitful".

IV. CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

The purpose of Ana Moreno’s paper on “The Role of Cohesive Devices as Textual Constraints on Relevance: A Discourse-as-Process View” is to show how and which cohesive features play an important role in helping the reader perceive relevance and coherence when a text is approached in the process of reading by drawing on Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Blakemore, 1987, 1992) and taking insights from Sinclair’s (1993) model of written text structure. The position that this paper takes, following Sinclair (1992, 1993), differs from the previously mentioned views of cohesive items, in that instead of emphasizing the role of these elements in a text analyzed by the researcher as a finished product, the focus is placed on their role as elements of the interactive apparatus of the language in the process of interpretation of the text. The study looks at the role of cohesive devices both in establishing the relevance of a new sentence and in helping readers to retrieve the most cost-effective contextual assumptions in the actual process of reading. Given this framework, the present study attempts to determine which cohesive mechanisms of a given text are more likely to help potential readers to make sense of a discourse-as-process. With this aim, a comment article from The Guardian Unlimited consisting of 60 coherence units is analyzed by a group of 25 subjects. The results show that, in most cases, the cohesive resources that contribute to the perception of the discourse relevance and coherence of this text at each juncture deal only with discourse meaning derived from whole sentences, larger fragments of text, or occasionally, certain simple clauses linked paratactically, and they do much more than effect a tenuous connection between isolated constituents of sentences.

The author concludes that the model proposed by Sinclair (1993) is nowadays the most explanatory in accounting for those text elements that contribute to our perception as readers of discourse coherence and structure. More importantly, she argues that this model is highly consistent with a cognitive view of discourse interpretation. This, in A. Moreno’s opinion, gives it even more support, because a cognitive view of the role of cohesive items in the perception of relevance, and therefore coherence, seems much more convincing than previous accounts.

In “Synonyms in action: a case study”, Rebecca Clift discusses the contribution that a rigorously empirical methodology—such as that of conversation analysis (CA)—can offer to deal with one of the abiding concerns in the highly theoretical domain of linguistic semantics
— the issue of synonymy. By taking some familiar examples of items which would appear to be differentiable by straightforward means — by reference to the speakers who use them, or by reference to other contexts of use — the author attempts to establish the differences between lexical items which appear to have the same meaning. Establishing this, however, proves anything but straightforward and certainly beyond what introspection and intuition can furnish. Therefore, the author argues that it is CA’s concern with action — and specifically, with what Schegioff has identified as the position and composition of a turn-at-talk — which provides for the possibility of identifying differences between items. An investigation of two items commonly held to be synonyms — actually and in fact — shows the considerable interactional distinctions between them lying in the different actions in which each is implicated.

The investigation carried out in this paper throws some light on the interactional differences between two items which are often regarded as synonymous. What is central to the analysis provided here, and missing from other linguistic accounts with their focus on meaning, is of course an account of the action within which a given lexical item is embedded. This article suggests that it is only by preserving lexical items in their contexts of use — in their turns and those turns in their sequences — for the purposes of analysis, that the researcher can really start to lever open the distinctions which the term ‘synonymy’ collapses.

V. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
A. Bell in his article “A Century of News Discourse” traces the development of news discourse across the 20th century through a case study of the coverage of three expeditions to the South Pole: Captain Scott in 1912, Sir Edmund Hillary in 1958, and Peter Hillary in 1999. Three related issues are examined within the framework of how the news about the three expeditions reached New Zealand media. Thus, this article illustrates how technology has changed the time and place dimensions of news delivery; the consequent and concomitant shifts in news presentation; and associated changes in how humans have understood time and place. The author argues that news values remain the same at a broad level across the century, but different in detail. The focus on nationalism is obtrusive, but shifting. In news practice, the deadline and the scoop drive the news in all three periods, but the scooping medium shifts from press to radio to television. Five outstanding features evidence the development: i) the lapse between an event and its reporting shrinks exponentially from months to hours to minutes; ii) the design of newspaper front pages changes radically; iii) news language compresses; iv) there are social impacts, newsworthily figures receive closer exposure; and v) the audience is cast in a more voyeuristic role.

The article that closes this volume “Students’ discourse on immigration: attitudes and ideological values. A critical view” by the editors adopts an interdisciplinary approach based on Critical Discourse Analysis and Discursive Psychology — two disciplines primarily concerned with the attitude-discourse-representation relationship. These two fields provide us with the main
theoretical and methodological tenets for our analysis, since in our opinion both offer a particularly useful approach for studying attitude analysis within discourse analysis. These two approaches are also particularly relevant since they both share the commitment to highlight the (re)production f.i. of racism and other ideological values in discursive activities.

Following this direction, we study the academic discourse of a group of students who were asked to express their ideas on immigration. In particular, we explore the discourse on immigration of a group of students of English Philology at the University of Murcia during the academic year 2001-2002. It is our aim to examine how attitudes are constructed around the topic of immigration, how these attitudes are discursively expressed (that is, how attitudes are constructed through their discourse practices), and what effects this type of discourse has on the other-representation of immigrants.

A significant finding of the article has been the unravelling of how ideas uncounsciously assumed to be “politically correct”, in fact cover highly racist and xenophobic attitudes to the phenomenon of immigration. Our paper shows how xenophobic attitudes still have not been overcome but are more than ever present in the discourse of the students who took part in the research conducted.

DAGMAR SCHEU-LOTTGEN

MARÍA D. LÓPEZ-MAESTRE

Issue Editors
The Metaphorical and Metonymic Understanding of the Trinitarian Dogma

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ABSTRACT
Written in the spirit of cognitive semantics, the paper is an attempt at analysing the limited understanding by Christian believers of the Trinitarian dogma as presented in biblical and theological texts. Though ultimately an insoluble mystery for human reason, the dogma can be shown to have a measure of metaphorical and metonymic coherence. At the same time, the paper claims that human access to transcendent notions is, in a deep sense, inevitably metaphorical, and consists of an elaborate network of mappings of human-sized notions onto the domain of the divine. This network is claimed to be a manifestation of the root metaphor GOD~HUMAN. The author further claims that the opposite root metaphor, HUMAN~GOD, constitutes one of the warrants, together with divine inspiration and the context provided by Revelation, of the truth of statements about God made on the basis of the first root metaphor.

KEYWORDS: cognitive semantics, religious discourse, mapping, metaphor, metonymy, theology, truth, trinitarian dogma, root metaphor, metaphorico-metonymic coherence.

I. INTRODUCTION
The mystery of the Holy Trinity is a belief upon which the faith of all Christians rests, as St Caesarius of Arles declared in one of his sermons (see Catechism of the Catholic Church, henceforth C.C., p. 55). All Christians are “baptised in the name of the Father, and of the Son,

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and of the Holy Spirit; not in their names, for there is only one God [...] the most Holy Trinity" (ibid.). This is "the central mystery of Christian faith and life [...] the mystery of God in himself. It is therefore the source of all other mysteries of faith, the light that enlightens them" (ibid., p. 56). "God has left some traces of his Trinitarian being" in his 'eikonomia', that is his works, but "his inmost Being as Holy Trinity is a mystery that is inaccessible to reason alone" (ibid.).

These words provide sufficient reasons to make a study of our limited understanding of this mystery an extremely interesting task. The first reason is its very centrality to our faith. The second reason is its transcendent nature, which simply baffles human logic: how can three be one and one three? But the fact that it is above human logic does not mean that there is no coherence at all in it. In fact, there is a mysterious internal coherence in this belief, a weak glimpse of which we get through the language of the biblical passages which contain God's revelation of the mystery to the sacred writers. This coherence may only be glimpsed, as if from an immense distance, thanks to the metaphorical and metonymic abilities of human beings. The Bible uses some basic metaphors and metonyms to talk about God, exploiting some of them in unheard of ways. Christian theological reflection on most doctrinal issues has since the earliest times worked to a very large extent within the conceptual networks established by these metaphors and metonyms, and has exploited them in new ways or used other metaphors and metonyms from the stock offered by the culture and language of the theological writer. The trinitarian dogma, as fixed by the first ecumenical council at Nicaea and by the second ecumenical council at Constantinople, reiterates these metaphors and metonyms.

This is hardly surprising, in view of the highly figurative character of religious language in general. Religious language has to be figurative because it deals with conceptual domains and entities which are not conceptually and linguistically apprehensible in an immediate, direct way. Therefore, when discussing religious experiences or religious concepts, the person of faith, or the theologian, has to use metaphor and metonymy, which are cognitive models that help humans to conceptualise experiences which are not what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) termed 'emergent concepts', i.e. nonmetaphorical gestalt concepts emerging from direct experiences, such as 'object', 'up', 'down', 'person', 'container', 'here', etc. After all, this situation does not apply only to religious language, but to other special types of language, like scientific language; and, given our cognitive makeup, the use of metaphors and metonyms is advantageous to theology, science, and any other explanatory enterprises (Mac Cormac, 1976). In fact, the use of metaphor and metonymy is pervasive in all sorts of language, including ordinary language (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

In this essay I will study the metaphorico-metonymic network that underlies the formulation of the Trinitarian dogma and the language of some of the biblical passages that led to it. I will begin with the description of some of the main metaphors and metonyms that are used in the formulation of the dogma and in the preceding scriptural passages. Instead of analysing just the formulation of the dogma as crystallised in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, I will also study the basically metaphorico-metonymic structure of the theological
discussion and elucidation of the dogma. Since the fact of analysing all or even just a representative subset of the main theological contributions to this discussion throughout history would go far beyond the bounds of this essay, I have chosen the relevant sections of the recent Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994), as an authoritative compendium of the dogmatic teachings of the Catholic Church. Then I will attempt to identify the fundamental metaphors and metonymies whose interaction constitutes the dogma, and will simply suggest how it could be made somewhat coherent at the figurative level, even if still not intelligible from a logical-referential standpoint. However, the suggestions given in part 3 should only be taken as the way in which one could analogically imagine, but by no means explain, how God can be one and three. Finally I will discuss the implications of the coherence of these metaphors for the problems of truth and the understanding of religious language in general.

The description and analysis of metaphor and metonymy in this essay has been done in the spirit of cognitive semantics. The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic tenets of the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy, as developed over the past two decades by writers like Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987, 1990, 1993), Lakoff and Turner (1989), Turner (1987, 1991), as well as by Kövecses (e.g. 1990), Gibbs (1994), and many others.

This essay is then a semantic study, not a theological essay. But since I am a Roman Catholic it should be clear that I will ultimately be writing from my faith. I am not an aloof external observer of the dogma. I am an active believer in it. This means that I have written this study not only as a modest contribution to cognitive semantics but even more as a manifestation of faith. I follow here St Augustine’s admonition, expressed at the beginning of De Trinitate, to mistrust those Christians that, when writing about God “consider it beneath their dignity to begin with faith, and who are led into error by their immature and perverted love of reason” (quoted in Muller 1990: xiv).

II. METAPHORS AND METONYMIES IN THE TRINITARIAN DOGMA

In my view there are two basic ‘root metaphors’, to use Mac Cormac’s term, in the scriptural revelation and in the theological formulation of this dogma: the metaphor in which people are understood in terms of what we may know about God, and the metaphor in which God is understood in terms of human concepts. These metaphors can respectively be referred to as HUMAN—GOD and GOD—HUMAN. A root metaphor “serves as the basic assumption underlying the way in which we describe the entire enterprise of science or religion” (Mac Cormac 1976: xiii-xiv). Root metaphors are hypothetical suggestions about the nature of the world (ibid.3). That is, on the one hand, there is a mapping from what we know about God onto certain aspects of men (HUMAN—GOD). This metaphorical mapping is prompted by Revelation, when we are told that man was made in the image of God himself. On the other hand, there is a more widespread mapping, GOD—HUMAN, which maps human-based conceptual categories onto categories in the
domain of the divine, as a way of partially understanding the latter; this metaphor is present in the very language of the Scripture, which uses human categories to convey what God has revealed about Himself, and obviously, too, in the corresponding theological language. Both root metaphors can be understood (i.e. each is a successful metaphor) because there seems to exist in many cultures a yet more abstract root metaphor whereby aspects of lower forms of being are understood in terms of aspects of higher forms of being, and vice versa. The overarching root metaphor in question is what Lakoff and Turner (1989: 170-181) call ‘THE GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR’. The two root metaphors that we have distinguished up till now could also be regarded, therefore, as two different manifestations of this more abstract root metaphor.

These two root metaphors will be discussed again at the end of the essay, but it should be clear now that they are not mere variants of each other, since they map different semantic structures. Of the two, by far the one which plays the most relevant role in Scripture and theology, and which is manifested in a greater number of minor metaphors is GOD-HUMAN, but HUMAN-GOD guides in an essential way the insights gained from it, as will be demonstrated later.

II. 1 Submappings in GOD-HUMAN

The manifestations of this root metaphor are a number of submappings. All of these submappings are in themselves subordinate metaphors, and the term ‘metaphor’ will also be used for them. A hypothesis that, more or less explicitly, an important group of cognitive linguists sustain today, is that most, if not all, human abstract categories are at least in part understood metaphorically in terms of non-metaphorical, human-centred, spatial concepts like verticality, front-back orientation, source, path, goal, point, etc., or in terms of concepts which can themselves be shown to be ultimately comprehended, at least in part, as spatial configurations, like area, container, object, etc. (Lakoff 1990, 1993, Turner 1991, Johnson, 1987). For example, the notion of love is in part understood metaphorically in terms of spatial notions like that of container and substance, as in I am full of love; see Kövecses 1990. And notions like those of the various types of interpersonal relationships, and most abstract notions, are also often understood metaphorically in spatial terms. Take as an example the notion of power, understood in terms of vertical spatial orientation: John has power over all of us, He’s at the top, etc.; or an abstract notion like that of event, especially action, which is often understood as spatial movement, as in John is on his way to success (see Lakoff 1990, 1993). Obviously, purely spatial interpersonal relationships do not tend to be constructed metaphorically: John is near Peter. The abstract notion of the human person is also normally understood metaphorically in terms of containers (see Kövecses 1990). However, other components of our notion of a human person, like experientially direct bodily concepts such as those of body parts are of course normally understood nonmetaphorically; but these are also often mapped onto God, as when we talk of God’s hands or eyes, or heart.

Most of the human categories identified in the present study as metaphorically mapped onto the domain of the divine are among those for whose ultimately spatial character those
linguists have provided abundant evidence. Therefore, the ultimately spatial character of so many of these categories cannot be in principle a distinctive classificatory criterion, since most of them display it to a greater or lesser degree: the source domains of the groups of metaphors established below are most of them in some degree spatially understood. Thus in principle most of these human source domains discovered in the submappings of GOD–HUMAN should be included in the space-based group of concepts by the classification in Table 1 below. However, the table creates a group for source concepts directly understood in spatial terms (verticality, container, etc.) which, as we shall see, are often mapped directly onto the domain of the divine. And it then creates three special groups: one for abstract notions, another for the human person, and another for human interpersonal relationships.

The reason for setting aside these three special groups is that these groups of source concepts are particularly relevant in the constitution of the trinitarian dogma, as will become evident in the ensuing discussion. Interpersonal relationships are treated as a special group because of the large stock of source concepts they provide for the dogma, but they could also have been included in the group of concepts related to the human person. On the other hand, some of the categories that are not included in the group of source concepts pertaining to the human person could equally have been included in them, like action, which can be regarded as an aspect of people. And the abstract notion of personhood can also be assigned to the group of source abstract concepts, which includes action, existence, etc.

Table 1: Human conceptual source domains metaphorically mapped onto the domain of the divine

| Experiential folk notions of tri-dimensional space as source domains | verticality, place, movement, container, boundary, light, etc. |
| Metaphorically understood abstract notions as source domains | existence, being, essence or substance, time, events, action, causation, etc. |
| Metaphorical and non-metaphorical notions of the human person as source domains | personhood, emotions, bodily life, etc. |
| Metaphorical and non-metaphorical notions of human interpersonal relationships as source domains | power, authority, status, family relationships (father/mother, son), love (as a relationship), language and communication, groups of individuals, social roles |

II.2. Submappings in GOD–HUMAN with experiential models of spatial concepts as source domains
I present and briefly discuss below some examples where the source domain is a strictly spatial domain, like those of tri-dimensional space and movement, or a domain, like physical entities and size, whose conceptualisation presupposes the spatial domain.

II.2.1 Verticality
In the Nicene Creed (henceforth, N.C.) we read that Jesus “came down from Heaven”, and in
the Gospels (e.g. Mk 16: 19) we know that he “was taken up into heaven”. This concept is used to partially comprehend the notion of Heaven as ‘God’s place’, and of God as ‘being up’. There are a number of conventional metaphors in which the up pole of the verticality axis is mapped onto positive concepts like ‘goodness’, ‘power’, ‘social status’, ‘intelligence’, ‘spirituality’, etc., which help make this mapping to the divine comprehensible.

II.2.2 Place
In the same passages, Heaven is conceived of as a place in space (“from/up into Heaven”). But we know from other biblical passages that Heaven is not necessarily tied up with spatial co-ordinates.

II.2.3 Movement in space
The same passages, and many others, map the notion of movement in space, with the associated notions of source and destination, onto the divine: the Holy Spirit “proceeds from the Father and the Son” (N.C.), Jesus is “going to the Father” (Jn 14:28), He will “send” to the Apostles the Advocate “from the Father, the Spirit of Truth who comes from the Father” (Jn 15: 26).

II.2.4 Containers and boundaries
The container image-schema (Johnson 1987) is fundamental in the conceptualisation of the Holy Trinity, since, as we shall see later, the Holy Persons are conceived of as containers and so is the Trinity itself. But it is pervasive in the biblical and religious language about the divine, for example, when Heaven itself is viewed as a container (“into Heaven”). And allied to the notion of container is that of boundary, or limit, as when St Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of the “infinite co-naturality of three infinites” (C.C.: 61). The notion of infinitude is understood metaphorically as a lack of spatial boundaries, and this metaphorical notion is itself, within GOD–HUMAN, mapped to God.

II.2.5 Physical entities, size
The concept of physical entity is an ‘emergent concept’, which has nonetheless a spatial configuration. This is why it has been included in this section. One of its subordinate categories, ‘person’, will be commented upon later. An important spatial dimension of physical entities is size, which is mapped directly onto the notion of ‘importance, status’ and the latter onto the divine in Jn 14: 28, when Jesus says: "the Father is greater than me”.

II.2.6 Light
This is another concept in this group. Light occurs in space and should thus be regarded as a spatial phenomenon. It is often treated metaphorically as a physical entity which can move or be transferred, or measured, as when we say: The light went out, or There is too much light here. Light and dark can also be personified, and stand for Good and Evil. This ontological metaphor
makes it easy to understand the mapping onto Christ of a personified Light, like when He is treated as the Light in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel, as in Jn, 1: 9 ("The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into the world")

II. 3. Submappings in GOD-HUMAN with experiential models of abstract, non-emergent concepts, as source domains.

This, admittedly heterogeneous, group of submappings includes human abstract notions, themselves metaphorically and metonymically understood, which are mapped, as source domains, onto the target domain of the divine. This is only a representative subset of all the abstract notions that are used to talk about God, assembled on the basis of their occurrence in scriptural and theological texts about the Holy Trinity. Given their large number, I will give a few examples of each and will only offer a brief comment on the most relevant cases.

II.3.1 Abstract notions in general (viewed as physical entities of some kind)

Abstract notions are commonly conceptualised as physical entities, and this is reflected in everyday language (Johnson 1987, Lakoff and Johnson, Kövecses 1990). Grace and truth, for example are conceptualised as physical entities of which the Father’s only Son is “full” (Jn 1: 14) and which we have all received “from his fullness” (Jn 1: 16). A special subtype of this ontological metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) is when it is at the same time a personification metaphor, for example, when we say that “I was guided by love”. This ability to personify abstract notions is carried over to the discussion of, for example, God’s attributes: in the Old Testament (henceforth, O.T.) we find in later writings a consistent personification of God’s wisdom, which is said to share God’s throne, and be omniscient (Gerard 1995: 1287).

An abstract notion like that of love is used by St John to give us the most fundamental insight about God’s nature: God is love (Jn 4: 8,16):

II.3.2 Existence

This notion is often metaphorically understood as a location in space (Lakoff 1990, 1993). Therefore, the existential interpretation of be in Jn 1: 1 (“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God ...”), or in the Council of Florence’s formulation, “The Holy Spirit is eternally from Father and son ...” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, henceforth, C.C.), maps our metaphorically understood notion of existence onto the notion of God’s existence.

II.3.3 Being

The same and other passages are more appropriately interpreted theologically as referring not only to existence but also, and more appropriately, to ‘being’ in the purely ontological sense. This ontological notion of being, which was borrowed into early Christian theology from contemporary Greek philosophy (see Kelly, Ch. 1) is probably an abstraction metaphorically
derived from the notion of spatiotemporal existence, which constitutes its experiential grounding. This human philosophical notion is predicated of God.

II.3.4 Essence and substance
We saw above how truth and grace are conceptualised as physical substances. But there is an abstract sense of the term, denoting something like ‘essential component’. This philosophical notion, which was incorporated into Christian theology from Greek philosophy, is probably a metaphorical projection from the experiential notion of a mass object. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) talk about the metaphor ESSENCE IS MATERIAL SUBSTANCE as underlying Aristotle’s notion of essence. The metaphorical understanding of the notions is present in the Nicene Creed: “true God from true God, begotten, not made, of one Being with the Father”, where of, which has a partitive value, evokes the idea of a material component. It is also present in theological discussions of the trinitarian dogma that talk about the consubstantiality of the three divine Persons (C.C. 57-59).

II.3.5 Time
Time is to a large extent conceived of as space (Lakoff 1990, 1993). This metaphorical notion of time is projected onto the notion of time as applied to God. For instance, eternity is conceived of as ‘boundless time’: The N.C. says that Jesus is “eternally begotten of the Father” (C.C., 47).

II.3.6 Events, action and causation
Divine-related events, divine action, and divine causation, are understood in terms of human-related events, action and causation. And human-related events, action and causation are in large part understood metaphorically via a series of mappings from the spatial domains of movement and forces, which make up a coherent pattern called by Lakoff (1990, 1993) the event structure metaphor. This metaphor conceptualises causes as forces, changes as movements, and actions as self-propelled movements. It is clearly at work in expressions like “through Him (Christ) all things were made” (N.C.), or “[...] the blood of Christ, who, through the eternal Spirit, offered himself without blemish to God” (Hebrews 9: 14). They are consistent with this metaphorical understanding of action, in which means or instruments (even if they have a personal character) are metaphorically understood as paths to a purpose (which is regarded as a location).

If divine action is understood via this metaphor, so is causation, but in a special elaboration of it: causation is progeneration (Turner 1987). This is obvious in biblical passages telling us that God is the father of all creatures, and it explains in part why a family role like that of father is mapped onto God.

Causation is also frequently understood as a spatial source: “True God from true God” and, “[...] the Holy Spirit [...] , who proceeds from the father and the Son” (N.C.). Also when the 6th Council of Toledo (638 A.D.) declared that the Father is “the source and origin of the whole divinity” (C.C., page 58).
One of the special cases (what Lakoff 1993 calls ‘a dual’) of the event structure metaphor regards events and actions as physical entities which can be acquired (as in I gave my son a hug, or Take my word)\(^{10}\). In any case, the ‘objectification’ of events and actions, and of many abstract notions, is a common metaphor in many languages (just consider eventive nouns like dance, destruction, or fall), which occurs independently from, but which is consistent with, the event structure metaphor. It is not uncommon for some of these objectified events to be personified (cf. expressions like I saw the face of Death, or artistic conventions like that of representing victory as a woman). This tendency explains why God’s word (his linguistic action) is often personified in the O.T., a personification which paves the way for the later understanding of the real personal character of the Word in the Holy Trinity (see Gerard: 1471), as revealed in the New Testament (henceforth N.T.).

II.3.7 Life

This is a concept that is partly understood by means of a number of metaphors, among them life–journey (Lakoff and Turner 1989). The concept of ‘living being’ is an emergent concept, but the abstract notion of life is, at least in part, metaphorical. This human metaphorical notion of life is itself mapped onto the infinitely more mysterious notion of God’s life, as in Jn 1: 3-4: “What has come into being in him was life, and the life was the light of all people”. A usual metaphor for life is life–light. The preceding passage makes use of this metaphor to tell us something about God’s life (and about life in general). Our human concept of life is also mapped onto the new (spiritual) life received through Baptism: “Baptism gives us the grace of new birth in God the father” (I Corinthians 12: 3).

II.3.8 Grace

The theological notion of grace derives from the human notion of grace as gratuitous help or favour, special benefit. This human notion is metaphorically understood as an object, usually a mass object, which can be given, as is shown by the preceding quotation. See the earlier note about Greg Johnson’s study of grace.

Similar remarks could be made about other metaphorically understood human abstract concepts which are often used to talk about God or some aspect of Him, like knowledge and understanding, mind, similarity, plans and purposes, etc.

II.4. Submappings in God–human with experiential folk models of the human person as source domains: personhood, emotions, bodily life

This is a special group of submappings which could in part have been included in the preceding group, since notions of personhood are abstract notions. Both folk and philosophical notions of personhood ultimately depend on some basic metaphors. The fundamental metaphor is PERSON–CONTAINER, whereby persons are understood as bare containers for their mental and
emotional life. This metaphorical understanding of personhood is projected onto the understanding of the divine Persons. There are numerous examples of this. St John, referring to Jesus, says: "From his fullness we have all received, grace upon grace" (Jn 1: 16). He later reports Jesus as saying: "The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own; but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father is in me" (Jn:14: 10-12). See also Jn.16. The C.C (p. 60) says: "We do not confess three Gods, but one God in three persons". So the divine 'substance' (as Christian theology has used this term since Patristic times) is all of it in three different metaphorical containers.

The metaphor HEART—LOCUS OF EMOTIONS is closely allied to PERSON—CONTAINER. When we say that someone is close to our heart, we are conceptualising emotions as being located in a container (which is also inside the person-container). Emotional categories are an important part of models of personhood. This metaphorical location of emotions is also used by St John: "It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father's heart, who has made him known" (Jn 1: 18).

Other non-physical attributes of personhood such as volition, or mental life are also frequently mapped onto God. But even bodily attributes of the person are mapped onto God, as when we are told that God's hand is in everything, or that He can see everything, etc.

II.5. Submappings in GOD—HUMAN with experiential folk models of human interpersonal relationships (especially family relationships) as source domains

II.5.1 Power, authority and status

These closely intertwined notions are often understood in terms of spatial metaphors, typically with verticality and size as source domains, and their metaphorical understanding is mapped onto the divine. When Jesus says "[...] the Father is greater than me [...] I will no longer talk much with you, for the ruler of this world is coming. He has no power over me; but I do as the Father has commanded me" (Jn 14: 28-31), the basically metaphorical concepts of power, status and authority, which can, of course, be expressed by means of synchronically non-metaphorical expressions like command or power, are mapped onto the realm of the divine. Notice that Christ, "true God from true God", "came down from Heaven", and the Father spoke from heaven in Christ's baptism and transfiguration (Mt 3: 17; 17: 5). On the other hand, Christ, after his resurrection, is "seated at the right hand of the Father" (N.C.). This last quotation is a metaphorically and metonymically complex anthropomorphic image of power and status, which is mapped onto the divine".

Human notions in the domain of power and status, like that of 'Lord', 'King', or 'Glory' are also very frequently mapped onto the divine, as is well known, both in Scripture and in theological writing.

II.5.2. Family relationships

The human notion of family is projected onto the notion of the Holy Trinity. The human notion
of fatherhood is a source domain to gain some understanding about the nature of the First Person of the Holy Trinity, and about His relationship to the Second Person. The notion of sonship is a source domain to grasp an essential truth about the nature of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity and His relationship to the First Person. Part of what we know about human fatherhood and sonship can thus be analogically applied to God the Father and God the Son and to their relationship: progenation of son by father, and sharing of son in father’s nature (as when we say, “my father died, but he still lives in me”), mutual love, obedience of son to father, etc. There are multiple N.T. passages where this parent-son relationship is revealed. Some of the most significant of them are Jesus’ Baptism (“A voice from heaven said, ‘This is my Son, the Beloved, with whom I am well pleased’” (Mt 3:17)); His Transfiguration (Mt 17:5); Peter’s confession (Mt 16:17); and Jesus’ formal statement of His divine Sonship before the high priests (Lk 22:70).

The notion of fatherhood is also used to refer to the relationship between God and his other creatures. The metaphor highlights here the fact “that God is the first origin of everything and transcendent authority; and that he is at the same time goodness and loving care for all his children” (C.C., 57).

The notion of motherhood can also be mapped onto God, as in Is 66:13 (“As a mother comforts her child, so I will comfort you”), to emphasise “God’s immanence, the intimacy between Creator and creature” (C.C., 57). Some feminist theologies, like Sally McFague’s (McFague 1986), have proposed to replace the God-Father metaphor by the God-Mother one, as more appealing and beneficial to our modern world. But, despite the many advantages of her proposal, I believe there is no need to eliminate more traditional metaphorical models of God. It may simply be sufficient to emphasise the projection of maternal concepts onto God, and add them to our stock of theological metaphors. No single metaphor will ever account for God’s incommensurability; it may even be dangerous to concentrate on a single image, or just a few of them (Van Noppen, 1996). But I agree with McFague on her claim that we constantly need to find new ways to conceptualise God in an ever changing society.

The concepts of husband or bridegroom have also been applied to God by various O.T. texts (see C.C., 84, section 370).

II.5.3 Human love (as an interpersonal relationship)
We are here concerned with the mapping of the interpersonal aspect of the human notion of love, rather than of its intrapersonal, emotional aspect, onto the interaction among the divine persons and onto the interaction of God with His creatures. We are told in numerous biblical passages and by numerous ecclesiastical documents and writers that the Father and the Son love each other and the Holy Spirit, who equally loves them, and that God loves us and all His other creatures. We are also told that God is love in the first letter of St John (4:8, 16). “By sending his only Son and the Spirit of Love in the fullness of time, God has revealed his innermost secret: God himself is an eternal exchange of love” (C.C.: 54). Our notion of God’s love can only be
(poorly) comprehended in an analogical way from our experience of human love. And so the Bible gives numerous examples in which the Lord’s love for Israel is compared to a father’s love for his son, to the bridegroom’s for his beloved, to a mother’s for her children, to a husband’s for his wife (C.C.: 53).

II.5.4 Language and communication
Whenever we are told that God ‘in general’ and any one of the Divine Persons spoke, we are assuming a human model of communication as a source domain mapped onto God. The N.C. says that the Holy Spirit “hath spoken through the Prophets”, and Jesus said to the Apostles that the Spirit of truth “will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come” (Jn 16: 13); the Father spoke during the Baptism of Christ and His Transfiguration, God spoke to Moses, God speaks to each of us...

Even when Christian theology tries to elucidate the real nature of God’s communicative activity, it has to resort to human categories of communication like those of ‘word’ and ‘utterance’, as source domains used to talk about the transcendental Word and Utterance: “Through all the words of Sacred Scripture, God speaks only one single Word, his one Utterance in which he expresses himself completely” (C.C.. p. 29).

II.5.6 Groups of individuals
Groups of people, like groups of entities in general, are often metaphorically conceptualised as containers. This partly metaphorical human notion of groups of people is transferred to the Holy Trinity, who is also regarded as a container: “O my God, Trinity whom I adore, help me forget myself entirely so as to establish myself in you” (Prayer of Blessed Elizabeth of the Trinity, C.C.: 62).

II.5.7 Social roles
We have already commented above how God, especially the Father and Jesus Christ, is understood as King, and as Lord, entitled to receive glory. But other humanly created social roles are mapped onto some of the divine Persons. The Holy Spirit is often called ‘Paraclete’, a Greek term which was translated into Latin as ‘Advocate’ (‘Ad-vocatus’), that is, the one whom one calls to one’s side. This expression has normally been (metonymically) translated into modern languages as ‘Consoler’ (C.C.: 160). Christ and the Holy Spirit are often called ‘Teachers’: in Catechesis it is Christ that teaches through the lips of the Catechist (C.C.: 95). And it is the Holy Spirit that teaches us to pray (C.C.: 564). The Holy Spirit is the “principal author” of Holy Scripture (C.C.: 72). He is also an envoy, as we know when Jesus Christ promises to send him.

II.6. Submappings used to illustrate the dogma
Of the submappings in the root metaphor under study, some of the most relevant ones in the
structure of the dogma are the personification of God’s linguistic action as His Word, the personification of Christ as the Light, the mapping of the parent-child relationship onto God, and the mapping onto Him of the notion of spatial movement. These submetaphors have been used to illustrate the dogma, especially at the time when it was being formed (see Kelly 1968: chapters 4, 5, 9 and 10).

The following section is an attempt at showing how some of these submetaphors can be used to illustrate the mysterious coherence of the dogma.

III. METAPHORICO-METONYMIC COHERENCE IN THE DOGMA
The preceding survey of human source domains and divine target domains contains just a small subset of the many submappings in GOD–HUMAN that underlie some of the key biblical passages where the trinitarian mystery is revealed, and the formulation and discussion of the dogma. The purpose of the survey was to show the enormous richness of this root metaphor, but no attempt was made to discuss the way in which these submappings can be used to illustrate at a purely figurative level our (very limited) understanding of the mystery of the Holy Trinity. This is the purpose of the following section. Of course, the mystery is and will always remain a mystery, but revelation and theological reflection over it have at least given it some degree of figurative coherence, which has been arrived at on the basis of those submappings, and which might constitute a figurative illustration of the mysterious coherence of this dogma, the mystery of God’s pluralistic simplicity. In any case, it should be stressed that what is presented below are just a number of suggestions to illustrate analogically, in an imaginative way, the Christian belief that though apparently contradictory, the propositions in the dogma have to be compatible, because they are based on what God revealed to us about Himself. However, the proposals below are based on some of the theographic metaphors studied so far, which are themselves just mere imaginative attempts at coming to terms with a Reality that ultimately surpasses us. Therefore they do not constitute an explanation of the dogma, which would certainly be a pointless task. They are just some of the possible ways of exploiting some of the most frequently used submetaphors in the formulation of the dogma, namely, those listed in II.6 above. As we shall see presently, the apparent figurative coherence of these various submappings with the dogma and with each other, can be achieved principally by proposing a series of metonymies (III.1 below). The attempts at illustrating the dogma by means of these metaphors without recourse to the metonymies are shown in III.2. to be less fruitful.

III. 1. Metonymies
In my view, the submetaphors in II.6 can be made more coherent with the dogma and with each other by applying to them several specific instantiations of the part-for-part general metonymic type studied by Radden and Kövecses (in press). These linguists propose two general types of

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conceptual relationships: a) the relationship between a whole ICM\textsuperscript{12} or part of it; b) the relationship between two parts of an ICM. These relationships can give rise to three general types of metonymies: a part of an ICM for the whole of it, the whole of an ICM for a part of it, and a part of an ICM for another part of the same ICM. These general types of metonymies can be instantiated in several specific subtypes. For instance, the part for whole type can be instantiated by metonymies where a part of a thing stands for the whole thing, by member-for-category metonymies, etc.; the whole for part type is instantiated by metonymies where the whole of a thing stands for a part of it, by metonymies where the whole event stands for a part of the event, etc.; the part for part type is instantiated by agent for action and by action for agent metonymies, by instrument for action metonymies, etc. Radden & Kövecses offer numerous examples of each kind.

It is not easy to decide exactly which of the specific instantiations proposed by Radden and Kövecses the relationships below fit into, but to me it is obvious that these are cases that respond to their general metonymic relationship ‘part-and-part’ and to the general metonymic type ‘part for part’. The metonymy-generating relationships in question are:

- The relationship between God and His word, his linguistic action.
- The relationship between a light and its radiance.
- The relationship between a parent and her/his offspring.
- The relationship between the initial or the final point of a path and the mover along this path.

Let us explicate our proposals.

God utters His word and then His word can stand for Him. There exists a specific metonymic relationship between action and agent, whereby one can stand for the other. We are concerned here with the case in which the action (the word) would stand for the agent (God). We have numerous conventional examples in many languages of this specific action-for-agent metonymy. Just think of deverbals denoting agents which have as their lexical morpheme a verb denoting an action: writer, speaker. We can also often use referring expressions where the agent is identified by his action: The man that helped you has come (to refer to someone whose foremost characteristic in your personal experience of him was the help he provided to you). In an extreme figurative mapping, at once metaphorical and metonymic, we often simply nominalise the action, without any agentive inflectional morpheme, and use the nominalisation to refer to the agent typically characterised, in a given context where background knowledge is shared by speaker and listener, by that action: Your help came (meaning, in a metonymic abbreviation, ‘the person that helped you’). Note that the action refers to the whole of the agent, not just to an aspect of it, although the agent is experientially known and mentally accessible only or principally from the perspective of his specific action.

Similarly, God’s word can stand in our minds for the whole of God himself. This
metonymic substitution of the action for the whole of the agent might provide a metonymic bridge between the oneness of God and the fact that both the First and the Second Person are wholly God.

There is also a metonymic relationship between causes and effects. We are interested here in what in fact appears to be the more common metonymic kind arising in this relationship: effect for cause (see Radden and Kövecses, *ibid*). The relationship between a light-cause and the light that it brings about is an instance of the cause and effect relationship. The cases in which the light stands for its source is an instance of the effect for cause metonymic kind. Just think of the frequent use in English of the noun *light* to denote a match, which is a light-source, or when we ask a friend to bring some ‘lights’ (referring to some torches) to an evening party on the beach, or when we say *Turn on/off the light* (what is actually turned on or off is the electric power which brings about light). Similarly, if God is the cause of all Light (He is Light himself) and gives off Light, His light can metonymically stand for the whole of God Himself.

It is not clear in which type of metonymic relationship of those proposed by Radden and Kövecses the relationship between a parent and his/her offspring should be included. But the fact is that the offspring are often conceptualised from the perspective of their parents, typically from the perspective of their father, and especially by those that do not have yet any direct personal acquaintance with the children. The very conventions of naming normally use the father’s name (the family name or last name) as the distinctive name for the children. We normally refer to someone whose name we do not know, or whose father is for some reason a particularly relevant piece of information to highlight, as *the son of...* And very often, too, we colloquially substitute the father (or the mother) fully for the child as a way of referring to the child. We may say *Here comes Archie* to refer to Archie’s son, even though he has a different forename. So it is with the Second Person. He came to be known as the *Son of God*. The concept ‘God’ is a distinguishing attribute in the expression, and it overshadows the concept ‘son’. Therefore the whole of God metonymically stands for ‘Son of God’, and the Son is thus called ‘God’.

There is finally a metonymic connection between the initial and the final point in a path and the mover along this path. Expressions like *The London train* can refer to the train bound for or coming from London. We are concerned here with the metonymy in which the initial point in the path stands for the mover along the path. Among other cases of this metonymy we can cite the numerous examples in which we foreground the origin of a mover, as when we say *The student that came from Durham*, to refer to a student whose name we do not know, but whose provenance we do know. An extreme case would be the colloquial cases in which a locative expression is used with personal reference, somewhat like a personal name: *Reading is sitting over there*, referring to someone that comes from Reading. Similarly if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, both of whom are God, He proceeds from God. And God, the initial point of His path can wholly stand metonymically for him.

In fact, in the realm of the divine, these four metonymies could be regarded as special cases of the container-and-contained metonymic relationship, which, in Radden and Kövecses’
view, can also yield two types of part for part metonymies: contained for container (as in their example The milk tipped over for the ‘The milk container tipped over’), or container for contained (as in John ate the whole box (of chocolates)). As we have seen, the metaphorical conception of people as containers is also mapped onto the Divine Persons. The Father is regarded as a container for His Word, His Light, His Son, and His Spirit. The Word and the Light that, being contained in the Father, come out of Him, can stand for Him. The Father is God. So His Word and His Light can stand for God; that is, God, the Container, can be mentally accessed and identified via His Word and His Light, the Contained. In fact, the Word and the Light become in this way a name for the whole of God, just as your help became a name for someone characterised by helping you, or just as light (radiance) becomes a name for a lightsource. These metonymies become so entrenched that they create a conceptual network in which Word or Light can be identified as, in fact equated with, God: the whole of God is His Word and the whole of God is His Light. And yet, if we move out of the metonymy, the Father is still different from His Word and His Light, much as the speaker is different from his word or a light-cause from its radiance. This is what Sabellianism, an early heresy in the history of the Church, failed to realise (Kelly 1968: 123), when, in an attempt to preserve the oneness of God against possible polytheistic deviations, it asserted that it had been the Father that had become incarnate as Christ, and had died and resurrected.

The Word for God and the Light for God metonymies can thus also be regarded as contained-for-container metonymies. The other two metonymies proposed above can be regarded as instances of the container-for-contained metonymic pattern. The Father-Container can stand for His Son-Content. The Father is God. Therefore the Son-Content can be mentally accessed and identified via His Father-Container, who is the one God, and can thus be called, not Father, but the Father’s name, which is that of ‘the one God’. And as before, the metonymy creates a conceptual network that leads to the identification of Son and God: The Son is the whole of God. However, outside the metonymy, the Father is still different from the Son.

Finally it is quite frequent for a container to be the initial point of the path followed by a mover. In the case of the Second Person this initial point is the Father. In the case of the Holy Spirit, there are two initial points, because He proceeds from the Father and the Son, both of whom are one God, as we know from the preceding metonymies. Therefore the Initial Point-Containers, each of whom is the whole of God, can stand for the mover. The mover, the Holy Spirit, can be mentally accessed and identified via these initial points, and can thus be called, not the Father or the Son, but their name, which is ‘the whole of God’. Again, the metonymy creates a conceptual world that leads to the equation between origin (God) and mover (the Spirit), just as Reading could be identified with someone from Reading. The Holy Spirit is the whole of God. But again, if the metonymy is not activated, the Holy Spirit remains clearly differentiated from both the Father and the Son.
III. 2. Metaphorical coherence

The submappings selected in 1.6 can also be given some strictly metaphorical coherence with each other without necessarily taking recourse to the above metonymies by noting that the notion of container is claimed to operate in all of them. But the coherence of each of them with the dogma is less convincing without the metonymies.

The PERSON–CONTAINER metaphor is closely allied to a set of other metaphors that are also applied to the divine. Each of the Divine Persons is conceived of as a container, and God himself, the Divine Being, is also conceived of as a container. We gave earlier, when dealing with the mapping onto the divine of the human notion of person, some examples of the conceptualisation of the Father and the Second Person as containers. The following passage is an example of the same mapping onto the Holy Spirit (Jn 3:6): “What is born of the flesh is flesh and what is born of Spirit is spirit”. The Father has Grace, Truth and Life (which, as we saw above, are metaphorically physical substances) ‘inside’ Him, and offers them to us in Jesus. After Jesus’ Rising they are given to us by the Holy Spirit, who, being wholly God, as we know from the metonymies, and consubstantial with the Father and the Son, also has grace, truth and life in Him.

The notions of uttering speech, of giving off light, of progeneration, of emotions (in this case, love), of moral attributes (grace, truth and ‘true’ life in this case), and of spatial origin are all closely connected, as we can see, to that of container. This is so because the utterer, the parent, the experiencer of an emotion or the bearer of an attribute, can be regarded as a container, with words, offspring, emotions and attributes as the content coming out of it. And the beginning of a path may be precisely the container from which the mover comes out. Thus these metaphorical conceptualisations, which, as we saw in section II, are frequently mapped onto God, are all consistent with the conceptualisation of the person as a container.

The sharing of the container image-schema (see Johnson 1987) by most of these concepts is one of the facts that might explain why Christian theology has been able to identify the Word with the Son and the Light (that comes from the Light-Source) as names for the Second Person, Jesus Christ, and why it has been able to recognise the role of the Father as the origin of the Trinity and of the Godhead.

In the case of linguistic action, the words are distinct from the utterer, and via conventional metaphor, they can be conceptualised as physical entities, even personified. This capacity for personifying actions and events allows us to understand the fact that the Word of God can be a Person. At the same time, thanks to the metonymic relationship between word and utterer discussed above, the Word can come to be conceptualised as wholly God, and the metaphysical substance that ‘fills’ the Word as a Person is the whole divine substance. The Word is thus a Person, distinct from the Father, and at the same time, wholly God, with the whole of the Godhead in Him. And since we know from Scripture that God is eternal, the Word is likewise eternal.

The N.C. says that Jesus Christ is “Light from Light”. This noun phrase (itself based,
among other sources, on the use of the term *Light* in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel) has to be metaphorically grasped. The Light-Source is metaphorically understood as a container and/or as the point of origin of a path traversed by the Light-Radiance. This metaphorical understanding has always been exploited since the earliest times in Christian Theology (see Kelly 1968: Ch 3) to illustrate figuratively how the Second Person can be different from the First, and at the same time be exactly like it, that is, have the same divine substance. The radiance is different from the light, so the theological argument goes, but at the same time it is no less light than the light-source; similar arguments were derived from other images, like the one that contrasted the source and the river (both of which were fully water).

The N.C. says that our Lord Jesus Christ is “eternally begotten of the Father”, but that He is “begotten, not made, of one Being with the Father”. The notion of progneration is perfectly consistent with that of container, as we said above, since, at least the mother is literally a container out of which the child comes into the world. Even fathers can be regarded metaphorically as containers “out of which” their offspring comes into the world, as when a father says that his child has been born of him. In any case, our source domain knowledge of human progneration includes the specification that a parent hands down to his child his genetic heritage, so that it may be said that both share some of their ‘essential’ characteristics. This transmission of physical features is metaphorically mapped onto the communication of metaphysical ‘features’ by the Father to his Son, which is known as the consubstantiality between Father and Son: both are equally and totally God. This consubstantiality is the same that we have metonymically deduced for the Word. This may be one of the reasons why we know that the Word is another name for the Son.

But there is, among many others, one part of our knowledge of human progneration that cannot be projected onto the divine generation of the Son. We find here a cancellation of the epistemic entailment of the parental metaphor, since begetting someone implies bringing that person into existence; however, we are told that the Son is also eternal. This part of the mapping is blocked by our knowledge of the relationship between these Persons. We know, from various biblical passages, especially from the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, that the Son and the Word had always been and existed, that they are eternal, like the Father. We also know this as a metaphorical entailment of the mapping of the notion of light onto the eternal Light: if the Light-Source is eternal, then its radiance is eternal, because the radiance is simultaneous with the light. And in any case we would know it from the metonymic inferences discussed above that identify the Son and the Word as God Himself, with all His attributes, eternity among them. Therefore this is one of the many cases that might be cited in which our metaphorical account of the mystery is at odds with what we know through Revelation about the Divine Persons. In terms of the cognitive theory of metaphor, we would say that one of the submappings in the mapping from the source domain of parenthood onto the target domain of the Holy Trinity is blocked by what we know about the inherent structure of the target. This blockage is predicted by the Invariance Hypothesis (Lakoff 1990, 1993). An alternative figurative way to illustrate (but by
no means explain!) how the eternal Father is Father (thus origin) and how at the same time the Son is eternal, consists of reasoning from the father-for-son metonymy suggested earlier: if the Son is metonymically equated with God, then He must also have all of God's attributes, including eternity.

The metaphorical understanding of the 'spiritation', as some theological texts termed it, from the Father and the Son that generates the Holy Spirit depends on the mapping of the domains of persons, emotions and personal attributes onto the relationships among the Divine Persons. But these source domains are themselves metaphorical and are understood in terms of spatial movement, containers, and physical entities. Our Christian theology tells us that the Holy Spirit “proceeds eternally from both [i.e. from Father and Son] as from one principle and through one spiration” (Council of Florence, as quoted in C.C., p. 58)\(^3\). We are also told by the N.C. that the Holy Spirit “proceeds from the Father and the Son”, and is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. These sentences express fundamental truths about a mysterious reality beyond our grasp. The only way in which we can gain some (poor) understanding of these truths is by using our ability for conceptual projection. Therefore we understand that the Father and the Son, thanks to their mutual love, cause the Holy Spirit to be eternally. But how do we actually understand this 'causing to be'? The metaphorical expression in the Council of Florence gives us a clue. We map the domains of containers and spatial movement onto human persons, emotions and attributes, and these onto the Divine Persons. People are metaphorical containers for their attributes and emotions; these attributes and emotions are substances that can remain in the person-containers or come out of them.

In the mapping onto the Divine Persons of this metaphorical model of personhood, a further possible submapping from the logic of containers and substances is exploited. The substances in a container can be projected out of them and move towards the same point in space where they mix into a new substance. In the Council of Florence’s formulation the source containers appear to be two people simultaneously exhaling a breath (spiration), these two breaths mixing together in space into a new breath. These source containers are mapped onto the Father and the Son, the source breaths onto their attributes and ‘emotions’ (Eternity, Love, Wisdom, Grace, i.e. their Divine Nature, which, as we know, is wholly in both Father and Son), and the resultant new breath onto the metaphysical substance of the Holy Spirit. Again, an important part of our knowledge of the source domain is prevented from mapping onto the Holy Trinity, since the breath exhaled by the two people would have to be exactly identical, and what is more, it would have to be the same breath: the Holy Spirit is wholly consubstantial with Father and Son. Furthermore, the two breaths and their conjunction would have to be eternal. Perhaps a better illustration of the relationship between the first two Person-Containers and the Spirit might be the one suggested by the origin-for-mover metonymy proposed earlier.

All of the preceding suggestions have sought to make the submappings of GOD\textsubscript{HUMAN} listed in II.6 somewhat more compatible at a figurative level with the propositions in the dogma, especially by means of the metonymies proposed. However, Gómez Caffarena (1966: 308)
makes another proposal, which does not require any additional metonymy. He draws on the
submapping, already noted in section II, of a personified notion of love (‘Love’) onto God. If
God is Love, as St John says, then it seems ‘reasonable’ to think that He in His immense, eternal
Solitude is not entirely alone, but that He has a sort of intimate, interpersonal Life, where Love
can operate. Then God has used our own family concepts of ‘father’, ‘son’ to reveal something
of His intimate Life to us. This proposal, again, is not an explanation, and it is not intended as
such, but it is really attractive for today’s man: it brings God closer to us, helping us feel
comfort, rather than awe in His presence.

IV. CONCLUSION: FIGURATIVE VS. LOGICAL-REFERENTIAL COHERENCE AND
THE HUMAN–GOD METAPHOR
The language of faith draws on human experience. This is what we have seen so far in this essay.
We have surveyed a representative subset of the human-sized concepts, many of them
metaphorical, that are projected onto the realm of the divine in an effort to grasp some important
truths about God, or a least their essential aspects. This grounding on human experience and
human cognitive structures has also been the ‘strategy’ of Revelation since the earliest times,
even if at the same time it made us conscious of the unbridgeable gap cognitively separating us
from God.

We have seen that the metonymies and metaphors that can principally, and only partially,
illustrate the dogma of the Holy Trinity are relatively consistent with each other, and that they
allow us to perform some inferences, especially metonymic inferences, that might reconcile, on
a figurative plane, propositions that are incompatible on the logical-referential level. The
remarkable thing about this figurative bridging of logical incompatibilities is that we carry it out
every day, unconsciously, and effortlessly, given the pervasiveness of metaphorical and
metonymic categorisation and reasoning, as Lakoff, Johnson, Kövecses and many other linguists
have demonstrated. Science, on the other hand, also uses these imaginative resources to gain new
insights for which it still lacks precise concepts and language, as Mac Cormac (1976, 1985) and
Soskice (1985) have shown. Therefore religious language is by no means alone in needing to
use figurative language and in its frequent use of metaphorical and metonymic reasoning.

But religious language, even more than ordinary or scientific language, is inherently
metaphorical and/or metonymic, and it is normally doubly figurative. The reason for claiming
that religious language is inherently metaphorical is that the mere fact of talking about God by
using human language and categories, constitutes in itself a conceptual mapping of our cognitive
structure onto the divine. We often express in our everyday life concepts that are comprehended
nonmetaphorically, in their own terms. In Lakoff’s or in Johnson’s view, these are basic bodily-
‘periphery’, etc.), and other experientially ‘emergent’ ones; and we use them both in ordinary
and in scientific or poetic language. But whenever we use even these nonmetaphorical concepts

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to talk about God, we are carrying out a metaphorical mapping of a human cognitive domain onto God, the Wholly Other. We cannot comprehend God in His own terms, because He is not apprehensible by our mind; we can only know about Him what He has revealed, and elaborate on this Revelation. But our manner of accessing this knowledge is inevitably metaphorical and/or metonymic (Soskice 1985: 96), i.e., by projecting our human categories onto Him.

The reason for the statement that religious language is doubly metaphorical is that a large part of our concepts, even some fundamental ones like person, cause, or time (Lakoff 1990, 1993) are themselves understood at least in part metaphorically or metonymically, so that when religious discourse (inevitably) maps human concepts onto the domain of the divine, it often maps onto it the mappings by means of which the human source concept is understood. Even when common human terms are used in Revelation in unprecedented senses (Van Noppen 1996), these new senses are grasped thanks to the mediation of established metaphorical correspondences, like the new sense in the N.T. of word (the Word), whose comprehension was doubtless facilitated, as we claimed earlier, by the human ability to personify actions.

It is important to point out, however, that this does not mean that man is in any way a model for God. Quite the opposite. There are numerous aspects of human experience that simply are incompatible with what we know about God. For example, when we are told that God is 'Father' we apply our human experience of fathers, but not all of it can be applied, because our experience of them also tells us that human parents are fallible and can disfigure the face of fatherhood and motherhood (C.C., 57). This part of the mapping would be blocked by the Invariance Constraint. It was claimed earlier that this constraint also accounted for the limitations of the fatherhood metaphor as an illustration of the relationship between the First and the Second Persons, in that 'begetting' could not presuppose 'bringing into existence' in the generation of the Son by the Father.

The fact that we can only glimpse what God is by using imaginative cognitive mechanisms does not mean that either Revelation or Dogma are not true, or that they are only true in a figurative sense. Anything we say about God is a mapping of our cognitive categories onto God, even if that statement is a dogmatic statement, or even if it is contained in Revelation, which has been cast in human concepts and language. However, for Christian believers, these statements, no matter their ultimate metaphoricity, are literally true. Our comprehension of those truths is largely metaphorical and metonymic, but the truths are such, independently from the way we can mentally access them. Of course, owing precisely to the ontological chasm separating us from God, our comprehension of those truths will always be imperfect.

There is an old discussion on the truth-value of metaphorical statements, a discussion which cannot simply be conducted in purely logical-positivist terms, as Soskice has stressed (Soskice 1985: Ch 6 and 7 and p. 148). Their truth-value may be assessed in a way relative to the specific context of utterance and the background knowledge and goals of speakers and listeners (Soskice 1985: 5ff, Mac Cormac 1976: vii, 48), not on objectivist terms (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 170-185). In any case, there are at least three warrants for the truth of statements
about God.

The first of these is what I called earlier the HUMAN-GOD metaphor. This metaphor has a biblical basis. The Bible tells us that man was created in the image of God (Genesis, 1:27). In this metaphor, what is known about God, no matter how imperfectly, can be mapped onto man, except for what is not compatible with our experiential knowledge of men (for example, we are not purely spiritual, eternal, almighty, or free from sin). The metaphor predicts then that man’s cognitive capacity, including our ability to find commonality in disparate concepts, that is, our metaphorical and metonymic ability, must reflect in a very limited way some aspect of God’s nature. Therefore, metaphorically- or metonymically-based statements about God made in dogmatics or in theology on the basis of Revelation, have in principle the potentiality to provide true insights about God’s nature, even though these insights will at best be a mere glimpse of it.

The HUMAN-GOD metaphor implies much more: if man is not a possible model for God, God is really a model for man. In a mysterious way, the model of notions like progeneration, family, love, life, light, etc. is ultimately the Father’s parenthood, the community of Life in the Holy Trinity, Their Love, Their Life, Their Light. Thus, we can understand metaphorically (GOD-HUMAN) and very imperfectly what it is for the Father to eternally beget the Son, but we can be certain that this eternal divine progeneration is the origin and standard of human progeneration (C.C., 57). Therefore, there has to be some mysteriously profound truth to a statement that regards God as a father, as a mother, or as a loving husband.

These images have a biblical basis. But we could suggest others that would also have the potential of providing true insights. We may want to conceptualise God as the deepest layer of our being, as in Robinson’s famous metaphor (Robinson 1963), and so doubtless say something potentially true about God.

We have an ontological connection with God, which we can only account for in a figurative way, by saying that He is our model (a model whose features we can just perceive hazily) and we His image. That is why I speak of the HUMAN-GOD metaphor. As images, we can safely assume that our features somehow, though very imperfectly, correspond to those of our model, and in this way form in our mind a very imperfect, yet approximate, image of our model. This is why I speak of the HUMAN-GOD root metaphor as a warrant for the GOD-HUMAN root metaphor.

The second warrant, the most important of the three for a believer, is the guidance of the Holy Spirit, who will guide the Church in its pursuit of truth and the statements about God’s nature proposed by each believer.

In principle the HUMAN-GOD metaphor and the inspiration of the Spirit are supposed to lead plausibility to statements about God. However, these statements, inevitably metaphorical, also have to be confronted with what is known about God through the rest of Revelation and dogmatics, and they have to be consistent with it and with the knowledge gained from other metaphors and metonymies firmly established in the theological teachings of the Church. This is the third warrant for the truth of a theological statement, which constitutes a filter against
erroneous theories that may seek to describe God in terms that contradict what God has actually revealed about Himself in Scripture or in dogmatics. An example was Arius’ heresy, which misunderstood the traditional interpretation of the preformation metaphor and sought to map the complete human notion of fatherhood onto the generation of the Son by the Father, with the result that he claimed that the Son had had a beginning and thus was not eternal, and ultimately not divine either (Kelly 1968: 227-231).

Whenever a proposition is made about the Divine, a traditional theological attitude should also be observed. It is implicit in my claim that any theological proposition about God is always to some degree metaphorical because God’s infiniteness cannot really be modelled by our mental categories and by our experience. This theological attitude is the apophatic stance. No matter how sophisticated a theological theory is, it will always fail to fully explain God, to really be able to say what God is. An important difference between scientific and theographic metaphors is, incidentally, that scientific metaphors can eventually be proved or disproved to provide real insights into the object of inquiry, whereas theographic metaphors always have to be formulated apophatically. Cognitive semantics, which has emphasised the metaphorical nature of a very large part of human conceptual networks, including scientific ones, provides a compatible linguistic methodology for apophatic theology (Boeve and Feyaerts 1996).

NOTES

1 According to Gómez Caffarena (1966: 307), medieval theologians, though fully conscious of the impossibility to explain the mystery in logical terms, tried nonetheless to show that the coexistence of the three Realities, or Persons, of God, in one inseparable Being was not completely contradictory, if they are regarded as three Relative Realities subsisting in the perfect unity of God’s Absolute Reality, and following a certain order of ‘procession’, but not a temporal one. St Augustine’s earlier treatise is closer to the New Testament, as it is based on St John’s use of the term Word (Logos, Verbum) to refer to the Second Person, who has thus, as Augustine suggests, an intellectual origin in the Father, whereas Spirit (Pneuma, Spiritus) is often used in the New Testament in connection with love. A unitary Reality can only be differentiated internally on account of the two main spiritual activities, namely, understanding and loving. Thus the Son, according to Augustine, proceeds intellectually from the Father, and the Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son through love and intellect. Augustine’s doctrine has been accepted by the Church, but not dogmatically. However, all of these speculations are bound to fail, and they are also metaphorical, because they map human concepts like ‘love’, ‘reality’, etc. onto the divine. It may be more interesting, rather than trying to explain the mystery, to bring it closer to us by exploiting the time-honoured metaphors that have been used to illustrate some of its aspects, or by suggesting new ones, provided they are not used to make claims incompatible with the Church’s dogmatic tradition.

2 But the extent of this pervasiveness depends on the particular conception of metaphor one adheres to. In Lakoff and Johnson’s view, and in the present writer’s, even some cases of conventionalised metaphors would be regarded as metaphors, and not as literal language. For a discussion of this issue, see Mac Cormac 1985: 57-71, and Traugott 1985: 17-57.
1 One may disagree, even as a Roman Catholic, with some of the positions defended by the Catechism on certain moral issues, but as far as the main dogmas of our faith are concerned, the Catechism simply repeats the traditional doctrine of the Church, which every Roman Catholic is supposed to share and accept freely.

4 Mac Cormac says that root metaphors lead to myths, but in my view they can be part of Revelation. Revealed truths may sometimes be mediated by myths (as in some Old Testament narratives), and certainly revealed in metaphorical language and cognitively accessed by means of metaphorical projection (see part 4 below). But the truths themselves, are by no means ‘mythical’, if by this term we mean ‘fictional’.

5 The fact that this projection from God is part of our faith does not make it any less a metaphor, since by means of it a domain is partially understood in terms of another domain. We will discuss at the end of the essay the subject of the truth of these mappings.

6 THE GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, as proposed by Lakoff and Turner (chapter 4) basically consists in a very abstract metaphor, the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor, whose mappings are guided or motivated by two entrenched cultural models, namely, THE BASIC CHAIN OF BEING and THE NATURE OF THINGS (which are themselves combined into ‘the Extended Great Chain’), and by the pragmatic maxim of quantity. There is no space here for a detailed exposition of each of these ingredients, but the GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR explains a large number of mappings in which lower order forms of being and their attributes can be mapped to higher forms of being and their attributes, and vice versa: people as animals, animals as people, things as people, natural phenomena as animals; it also explains the mappings that cannot occur.

7 The English version of the Nicene Creed is the one reproduced in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, p. 47-48.

8 I owe to one of my anonymous reviewers a plausible source for this use of light by St John: LIGHT IS A CONVENTIONAL METAPHOR FOR THE GOOD. This property (and thus its metaphorical counterpart LIGHT) metonymically stands for the person that carries the property: GOD/JESUS. In my view, perhaps even the GOOD AS LIGHT metaphor is metonymically based, since there is a conventional association between light and positive evaluation in most cultures.

9 Greg Johnson’s contribution to the L.A.U.D. Symposium on metaphor and religion (Johnson, Greg 1996), elucidates the Christian concept of grace as the gift of God’s presence. As a gift, grace is then metaphorically conceptualized as a physical entity which can be given. G. Johnson presents grace as conceptualized via the ‘moral accounting metaphor’ studied by Mark Johnson (1993), which maps the exchange of goods onto moral interaction. G. Johnson’s study thus lends support to my claim that grace is, like so many other abstract notions, metaphorically understood as a physical entity.

10 An anonymous reviewer of this essay suggested that it is more accurate to say that events and actions are often treated metaphorically in these expressions as the handling of objects, rather than as objects acquired. Unfortunately, she did not adduce any examples that justified that claim. In any case, Lakoff’s view seems to be quite consistent with the often observed fact that action verbs are often replaced by periphrases consisting of verbs such as have, take, give, receive, and an eventive noun: have a walk, take a blow, etc., in English and other languages.

11 The experiential basis of this image is metonymic: people that regularly appear physically close to powerful people usually derive from them a sense of power and status; therefore, closeness to powerful people stands for power. On the other hand, the right hand has had since biblical times an association with positive evaluation; the basis for this symbolism is probably also metonymic, since the right hand is the more useful and thus valuable hand. On the basis of all of these metonymies, the rich gestalt image of being seated (by implication, on a throne or on a prominent seat) at the right hand of a powerful person, becomes a conventional metaphor for the concepts of being
in favour with a powerful person and sharing in his power.

12 ICM stands for 'Idealised Cognitive Model' in Lakoff’s terminology (1987). We have ICMs for countless events, situations and abstract constructs: ICMs for travelling, for apologising, for emotions and categories, etc.

13 The statement that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (filioque) did not appear in the Creed confessed in 381 at Constantinople. It means that there is an ontological, not temporal, 'order of procession' according to which the Father first communicates His substance with the Son, and then, the Spirit proceeds from both. It was dogmatically confessed by Pope St Leo I and gradually introduced into the N.C. by Latin liturgy between the 8th and the 11th centuries. This is even today a point of disagreement with the Orthodox Churches, who claim, as the Eastern Christian tradition had always done, that the Holy Spirit comes from the Father through the Son. As Gómez Caffarena states (1966: 307) this disagreement appears today as a terminological rather than as a serious theological dispute, perhaps owing to a different elaboration of the same metaphor. Both accounts should be regarded as complementary (C.C. 59).

14 It must be pointed out that neither Soskice nor Mac Cormac, nor Van Noppen, also quoted in this essay, subscribe to Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor; however their accounts of scientific and religious metaphor are very illuminating.

ABBREVIATIONS

| C.C.     | Catechism of the Catholic Church | Mt | Matthew
| Jn      | John                          | N.C. | Nicene Creed
| Mk      | Mark                          | O.T. | Old Testament

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Symmetry as Conceptual Metaphor in Walker’s *The Color Purple*

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ABSTRACT
The author analyzes three types of the conceptual metaphor of embodied symmetry in Alice Walker’s novel, *The color purple* (1982). These metaphorical projections, perceived as equilibrium and its breakage in abstract phenomena, enable readers to reexamine issues of race, non-traditional families, and gender roles. The dis/equilibrium emerges in the novel’s epistolary structure. Biological equilibrium breaks in incidents of rape and incest. Walker creates characters in the novel through default-concept opposites of black/white, submissive/dominant, male/female and others. These contraries foreground issues of race and gender. The novel’s asymmetries engage readers, leading them to rethink individual character histories and motives. The removal of objects (e.g., rape, mothers deprived of children) suggests conceptual asymmetry and alerts readers to parallel themes of sexual and racial oppression. Subjugation—sometimes subtle, sometimes blatant—manifests in simple oppositions. In epistemological terms, readers seek causal explanations for the asymmetries of the narrative, interpreting each to recover its history.

KEYWORDS: embodied symmetry, conceptual metaphor, narrative, causality, race, gender, class, asymmetry-seeking

Considering the many unconventional elements that comprise the novel, *The color purple* (1982), one might conclude that Alice Walker had written a bad novel, a chaotic and disjointed novel. The action of the novel spans forty years, enough passage of time for moviemakers in the novel’s

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film version to mark the decades in screen captions. The settings of the novel span continents, from the American South to a tribal village in Africa. These two locations and the characters inhabiting them are presented to the reader through letters written mostly in African-American Vernacular English, a dialect many find difficult to understand. We might find the epistolary structure of the novel tenuous, with its broad expanse of time and space, and its letters never reaching their recipients or arriving too late for reply. The narrative line of The color purple convolutes when events in the characters’ lives break traditional expectations of familial relations. The nuclear family disintegrates when mothers are separated from their children. Protagonist Celie’s father, for example, gives away two of her children at birth; Sugar Avery has not seen her children in thirty years; Sofia’s lengthy jail term and maid’s work at the mayor’s house prevent her from being with her children; and the missionary’s wife cannot bear children. Expected biological relations are also violated when Celie’s father, Pa, rapes and sexually abuses her, and again when Squeak’s uncle, the white jailer, rapes her. Conventional expectations of marriage are broken when Mr. brings his blues-singing mistress, Sugar “Shug” Avery, home to be nursed back to health by his wife, Celie. Although the novel is about family and relationships, Walker represents few conventionally. Indeed, keeping track of who is the father of whom, the child of whom, or the mate of whom is often difficult.

In spite of the gumbo of incongruent narrative elements, The color purple is not an inferior novel. It is a highly-acclaimed work of art, a Pulitzer prize winning book. How is it that the admiring reader of The color purple can derive a sense of order and aesthetic pleasure from the potential narrative chaos described above? In this paper I argue that it is the readers’ tacit familiarity with symmetry and its comforting pervasiveness in the novel that enable Walker to present the unmentionable and the abominable to accepting readers by adeptly rocking them between the poles of conceptual symmetry.

An analysis of the various projections of conceptual symmetry in the novel reveals an architecture of conceits that causes readers to think about issues of race, gender and family in new ways. I will show that disparate elements such as those mentioned above and features such as the oft-criticized stereotypy of the characters in The color purple (see Harris, 1984; Puissant, 1993; Watkins, 1986) are examples of conceptual symmetries and asymmetries (henceforward, a/symmetries). At first glance, the novel might appear to simplify characters and issues. On careful examination, however, we can discover that the a/symmetries are employed by the author to disrupt conventional ways of thinking and to force the audience beyond passive readership (see Hooks, 1991: 56; Mariani, 1991). In interviews, Walker has talked about how she has purposely used stereotypes to induce black men and women “to think about conflicts of gender as well as race” (qtd. in Birkett, 1991: 126). To jar her readers, she intentionally uses a socio-politically loaded word such as “mammy” juxtaposed with a defiant, non-domestic black female like The color purple’s Sofia to “subvert the discourse of plantation kinship” (Selzer, 1995: 74). Some a/symmetries, I propose, are deliberately crafted by Walker, while others are perceived by readers —as human beings inclined cognitively to detect complexities in their surrounding environment.
A common cognitive response, notes Mark Turner in *Reading minds: The study of English in the age of cognitive science*, is to recognize asymmetry and to attempt to understand why a prevalent symmetry has broken down (1991: 92). A basic cognitive response exercised in our environments translates to the aesthetic field, such that if we stop to consider an asymmetry in a line of poetry, or in the composition of a painting, we look for a causal explanation for that asymmetry. Thus, the degree of involvement in seeking the causal explanation correlates with our aesthetic response.

Michael Leyton in *Symmetry, causality, mind* (1992), discusses how the mind uses a/symmetry to seek causal explanation and to recover history from the shape of objects. He presents a number of cases illustrating that when objects have symmetry in the present, “one cannot deduce a past that is any different from it” (Leyton, 1992: 8). If the artist creates only symmetrical objects, the observer cannot deduce a past that is any different from the present symmetry. In *The color purple*, symmetrical and asymmetrical relations can be considered as objects created as art for the novel. As such, the relations are projections of a/symmetry which can be construed in the novel’s structure, characterizations, and plot.

I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 Conceptual symmetry and asymmetry
Cognitive scientists and psychologists have for many years made explanatory connections between bodily symmetry, cognition, and aesthetics (see Berlyne, 1971; Johnson, 1987; Leyton, 1992; Turner, 1991; Weyl, 1952). Turner, for example, in analyzing the verbal art of poetry in form and content (1986; 1991) explains that artists frequently create a type of disorder, a breakage of symmetry to cause readers to focus on particular aspects of their work. Turner writes, “We try to understand why a prevalent symmetry breaks down: when we have accounted for information by understanding it as generally symmetrical, we need a special account for those places where the prevalent symmetry breaks” (1992: 92). Correspondingly, to analyze several paintings, Leyton employs a theory of cognition, which posits that “[t]he mind assigns to shape a causal history explaining how the shape was formed” (1992: 2). The aesthetic response to an artwork, according to Leyton, is “the evaluation of [a] causal explanation” (1992: 581). Once discovered by experimental psychologists, the phenomenon of “complexity-seeking,” or what Leyton more narrowly calls “asymmetry-seeking,” was soon connected to art and aesthetics.

In the following sections, I describe embodied bilateral symmetry and its connection to asymmetry-seeking.

1.1.1 Embodied bilateral symmetry
Turner explicated embodied bilateral symmetry and its link to the underlying cognitive processes in which we perceive symmetry:
We have a felt, schematic, embodied understanding of bilateral symmetry, and we employ this schematic understanding constantly, moment to moment, in every aspect of our existence, to make sense of our world and to interact with it... This schematic understanding operates across modes of perception, activity, and imagination. (1991: 70)

In all instances, we move from our specific understanding of bodily symmetry to a generic and metaphorical application of that symmetry. This is a basic cognitive process or basic metaphor, GENERIC IS SPECIFIC (Turner, 1991: 70). Through this conceptual metaphor, we comprehend that the bilateral symmetry we experience specifically can be applied to various literary relations in a text. Below, following Turner (1991), I describe various metaphorical projections of symmetry.

1.1.2 Polar opposites, equilibrium, and stasis
When humans conceive of opposites, we are projecting our embodied bilateral symmetry onto ideas and entities. Contraries such as black and white, weak and strong, “are called ‘polar’ opposites because we conceive of them metaphorically as end points (or ‘poles’) of a spatial line segment that has a metaphoric equilibrium equidistant from each pole” (Turner, 1991: 79). We also tend to think of change as metaphorical movement along that imagined linear scale. We expect, owing to this metaphor, a balance of the two extremes of the scale and can anticipate change if the equilibrium is disturbed. Equilibrium or stasis may be defined as a state of rest when there is neither motion nor development due to the equal action of opposing forces. An entity, concept, or relation, which is metaphorically symmetrical, does not, by itself, have stasis, spatiality, or bilaterality; but any of these features can be metaphorically projected.

1.1.3 Automorphism
Automorphism is a mapping of elements, a structure-preserving mapping of elements to themselves, such that each element has a corresponding symmetry. It is a mathematical concept, which is not metaphorically bilaterally symmetrical, but which can be construed as such because it is an conceptual artifact of our embodied symmetry. A set or group of automorphisms can be viewed as a mirror world. A group of mapped automorphisms might also be viewed as a copy or an inverse copy.

1.2 Aesthetics and cognition
1.2.1 ASymmetry, causal explanation, and the recovery of history
Leyton (1992) has studied how symmetry and the mind work in aesthetics and cognition. Leyton’s work does not start with embodied bilateral symmetry, as does Turner (1991), but rather with the observation that humans seek out asymmetries as a cognitive response. Leyton remarks that humans are confined to the present. He posits that “all cognitive activity proceeds via the recovery of the past from objects in the present. Cognitive activity of any type is, on close
examination, the determination of the past” (Leyton, 1992: 2). From the objects in our present, we attempt to recover history. One might say, then, that asymmetry is the memory that processes leave on objects. In recovering the history of an object, we seek causal explanation for the present shape of the object. If an object has a regular shape, if it is symmetrical, we can infer no past. However, if an object, for example, the fender of a car, is dented (i.e., asymmetrical), we seek a causal explanation for that dent; perhaps the car collided with a garage, a deer, or a cyclist?

Leyton explains the “Asymmetry-Seeking Principle” and supports it with evidence from research in experimental psychology from the 1950s and 1960s on rats and humans. He reviews research from experimental psychology, which demonstrates that individuals and rats have a preferred level of environmental complexity which they seek and which they find appetitive (Leyton, 1992: 569-571; 575-576). According to Leyton, that which people consider to be the “artistic content” of a work is the “process-history” they recover from it, and “...the aesthetic response to an artwork is a response to the causal explanation assigned to the work’s shape-structure, i.e., to the asymmetries in the work” (1992: 477). Thus, an artwork is an object from which we can not only draw enjoyment, but also from which we can extract a maximal amount of history. If artworks were purely symmetrical, the inference of history would be prevented. Totally symmetrical artworks would be equally boring.

1.2.2 Political prisoners and the removal of objects

In his final chapter, “Political Prisoners,” Leyton illustrates how the Asymmetry-Seeking Principle applies to the history-recovery problem for political prisoners, slaves, and refugees (1992: 585-604). Political prisoners, for example, live in cells from which all objects, indications of the past, have been removed by the subjugators. Leyton describes the history-recovery problem:

Each of us is completely confined to the present—and thus the present is, in a very real sense, a prison that isolates us from the past. It is only from the contents of this prison that we might be able to infer prior events. In particular, since we are confined to the present, we are separated even from our own past. And, thus, it is only by examination of the objects within this prison that we can discover what we ourselves have undergone. (1992: 586)

Political prisoners, slaves, and refugees cannot build up any external memory because, when objects are removed, the past cannot be reconstructed. The removal of objects creates a perceived asymmetry; it may manifest in the form of the exile or extermination of persons, the taking or destruction of physical objects, or in the wresting of abstract concepts such as dignity, honor, and identity.

Bridging Turner’s work on conceptual symmetry to that of Leyton on asymmetry-seeking and the recovery of history, I will now examine the various metaphorical projections of asymmetry in The color purple.
II. METAPHORICAL PROJECTIONS OF SYMMETRY IN THE COLOR PURPLE

Conceptual asymmetries in The color purple engage readers, leading them to rediscover individual character histories and motives, or in Leyton’s epistemological terms, to seek causal explanations for the asymmetries. Literary critics have discerned in the relations and themes in The color purple what they have referred to variously as “duality,” “doubleness,” and “parallels.” Berlant, for example, considers the narrative of The color purple to have been accomplished with an “aesthetic/symbolic logic”; that logic uses “correlates” and “conventional links which map race relations to gender and also race relations to class” (1988: 833). Selzer’s thesis is that Walker uses two narrative strategies to link class and race: “an embedded narrative line on the post-colonial perspective” and “a carefully elaborated trope” which links family relations to race relations (1995: 68). Through what Selzer calls a “layered narrative line, Walker’s text is capable of another form of ‘doubleness’—an ability to signify upon itself” (1995: 80) \(^1\). Each of these various literary techniques detected in The color purple is underpinned by conceptual a/symmetry.

II.1 Epistolary structure and biological dis/equilibrium

Embodied bilateral symmetry and the related experience of our perception of equilibrium allow us to find order in the narrative structure of The color purple. Symmetry is the basis of the structure of the novel in the expected exchange of Celie’s letters to God and of her sister Nettie’s letters from Africa addressed to Celie. In the epistolary form, as in most types of symmetry, there is an “expectation of continuation” (Turner, 1991: 92). That epistolary structure is a frame, an idealized cognitive model of communication. Based on that model, we expect a coming and going of information. Celie initially writes to God and prays that he is listening, but this correspondence is static in that God never acknowledges her pleas and queries. In Celie’s first letters to God, we learn that Pa, the man she believes to be her biological father, has raped her many times. She bears two children by him and he gives them both away soon after they are born. Celie initially writes to God because Pa forbids her to tell anyone else who sired her children. Thus, the father’s violent and incestuous act upsets the biological balance and is the impetus for the novel’s beginning, as shown in its epigraph: “You better not never tell nobody but God. It’d kill your mammy” (Purple: 1). The expected symmetry of the epistolary is broken by a disturbance of the biological equilibrium. Biological disequilibrium, or incest, is the catalyst for Celie’s letters and, thus, for the development of the novel’s action.

Biological disequilibrium functions significantly to drive character development in Celie, and in Squeak, Harpo’s second wife. Squeak, a young woman of mixed race, is timid and meek as her name implies. In an attempt to free Sofia from her jail term, Squeak leaves the private sphere of home and ventures to the public sphere to talk to her uncle, the white jailer. Her uncle rapes her “denying their kinship in the very act of perverting it” (Selzer, 1995: 75). Having suffered the rape and the racial and political injustice at the hands of her own family member,
Squeak radically transforms. After the rape, she insists on being called her birth name, Mary Agnes; she begins to sing professionally (flouting her former sobriquet); and she no longer tolerates her Harpo’s domination. The incestuous act by Squeak’s white jailer-uncle tips the balance of equilibrium at several levels. It exposes the myth of family solidarity, revealing that solidarity does not cross mixed blood lines. As uncle, he betrays the myth of the protective patriarch as one to whom the “weaker” female could appeal. In a similar hierarchical vein, his act in the position of jailer reveals that even the Law, conventionally an equalizer, is not only untrustworthy but also abusive. At each of these levels, conventional expectations are shattered and tradition is broken.

II.2 The dis/equilibrium of presence and absence

In addition to biological equilibrium, another type of metaphoric equilibrium is at play in The color purple. This second type of equilibrium is a by-product of the bilateral epistolary structure, which by definition requires the contraposition of presence and absence (see Williams, 1989). In other words, it is possible to perceive metaphorical equilibrium and disequilibrium in certain relations when entities are either present or absent.

The antithesis of presence/absence is strong in the novel. The first example is the abstract notion of the removal of self. Various critics have written about Celie’s act of writing as self-construction (Berlant, 1988; Hooks, 1988; Williams, 1989), self-preservation or for self-knowledge (Hall, 1993; Williams, 1989), and as a means for Celie to regain her free use of language as expression of the self (Birkett, 1991; Froula, 1986). Berlant, for example, comments that Pa, in raping Celie, removes from her her sense of self (1988: 838), as shown in the first words of the novel when Celie crosses out “I am” to replace it with “I have always been a good girl” [emphasis added] (Purple: 1). Indeed, much of the novel is about Celie’s search for her lost identity. Celie’s search for who she is is further complicated with a second grave contrast of presence and absence. This begins when, shortly after their birth, Pa takes away and sells the two children Celie bore him. They are absent from her life for several decades until she discovers that they were adopted by the African-American missionaries with whom Nettie lives in Africa. Despite being kin, Pa sells Celie’s babies away no differently than the slave owners sold the children of their slaves away.

Pa, as subjugator, deprives Celie of still more. He intentionally keeps traces of her identity from her—the significant details of her own history. After many years, she learns that Pa was not her biological father and, thus, that her children by him, although the product of rape, were not the product of incest. She learns also that her biological father had been a well-to-do farmer who was lynched by envious whites and that, upon her mother’s death, she should have inherited a farmhouse, land, and a general store. Much like slave owners, Pa has a pattern of securing sexual relations through economic domination (see Berlant, 1988).

It is nearly impossible for Celie to know her own personal history or who she is because
all of the objects of significance to her are removed from her presence. These "objects" are her own human rights, her children, and knowing her father's own history, one of both racial and class oppression because of his prosperity and real wealth. Without these artifacts of a history external to her, Celie cannot share external memory with others, cannot know who she is nor gain any power. Celie's plight is much like that of the political prisoners of whom Leyton speaks, stripped of any trace of their identities (1992: 585-604). Her history of sexual oppression parallels the history of slavery and race relations in America. With the artifacts of Celie's history absent, she cannot infer her past.

The opposing forces of presence and absence are nowhere more apparent than in Celie's husband's hiding of all of Nettie's letters to her. Mr. ______, the man to whom Pa gives Celie in marriage, is just as abusive and controlling as he. (Walker gives Mr. ______ no name throughout the novel to signify his lowliness.) In Mr. ______'s house, Celie lives no better than a slave: cleaning his house, caring for his unruly, hateful children, serving his sexual needs, and suffering his verbal and physical beatings. Sister Nettie leaves for Africa essentially to avoid Mr. ______'s lecherous clutches. Before Nettie goes, Celie makes her promise to write, and she replies that only death would keep her from it. Decades pass. With the letters cruelly appropriated by Mr. ______, Celie can only believe that her sister is dead. Thus, Celie believes she has lost her last connection with her own history.

A key asymmetry in the narrative occurs when Mr. ______ begins to intercept the letters. Shug helps Celie find the hidden letters, and Mr. ______ knows they are aware of his deception. Celie, infuriated with Mr. ______ and empowered with some knowledge of her past, moves to Memphis to live with Shug. Not long after, she learns that Mr. ______ has become very ill, driven nearly insane by visions. His house falls into disrepair and, although once a vain man, he no longer takes care of himself. Sofia tells Celie Mr. ______ only improved after Harpo told him to return the rest of Nettie's letters, saying, "You know meanness kill..." (Purple: 231). The metaphoric equilibrium of the epistolary frame is regained only when Mr. ______ returns Nettie's letters to Celie. With that action, he regains full health and becomes a kinder person. At this point, in fact, all Mr. ______'s previous stereotypically and traditionally male characteristics invert—a typical reaction in the symmetry of opposing forces. The domineering, non-domestic, wife-abusing man, Mr. ______, once redeemed, cleans house, sews shirts, shares recipes, "wonders," "asts," (asks) and even cries (Purple: 229-231; 289).

Mr. ______'s redemption is a classic trope, which can be traced to the Greek philosopher Anaximander (c. 611-c. 547 BC). Anaximander, discussing natural philosophy, posited that opposites interact with each other in the constant motion of a primary source (apeiron). In metaphorical language, he said that the opposites encroach on one another and thus repay one another's "injustices" over a period of time ("Anaximander"). Walker's Mr. ______, so stereotypically brutish, inverts comically to an almost stereotypically sensitive-female persona. This inversion is not without design. The gender dimension to this inversion shows that equilibrium as a cognitive resolving force extends to resolve a series of polar imbalances.
systematically. The return of the letters signals the return to metaphoric equilibrium. Giving Celie her letters also lays the ground for resolution in the lives of the other characters.

II.3 Polar opposites, characterization, and gender roles
Another type of symmetry metaphorically projected in *The color purple* involves polar opposites. Walker creates physical and psychological characterization in the novel through traditional and default-concept opposites. A productive way for Walker to invert paradigms based on racial stereotypy or gender stereotypy is to use polar opposites frequently. (Mr. _____’s redemption and subsequent “inversion” is an effective example.) When opposing values are switched, Turner notes, “...our interactions with the environment are definitely altered” (1991: 72). This means that when we are habituated to conventional thought and paradigms, or, in this case, particular opposites, extremes cause us to re-examine. What is sometimes perceived as male-bashing in *The color purple* (see Pouissant, 1993) is the deliberate use of stereotypes as diametrical opposites to force readers to react and to think differently about the roles the characters play.

For instance, in the various dyads or couples in the novel, polar characteristics are emphasized, at times exaggerated: Shug is very beautiful; Celie is very ugly. Sofia is very large; Harpo is very small. Celie is very domestic; Shug is very worldly. Table 1 shows characteristics of traditional gender roles. In *The color purple*, we find that conflict arises for the characters when a particular quality she or he possesses is not one which conventionally is assigned to that gender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Female</strong></th>
<th><strong>Male</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>submissive (subjagates, fights)</td>
<td>dominant (obedient, does not fight)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private (domestic, tends children)</td>
<td>public (worldly, owns capital, conducts business)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weak</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small size</td>
<td>large size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uneducated</td>
<td>educated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ugly</td>
<td>beautiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one mate</td>
<td>many mates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, that Sofia possesses a much larger body than her husband Harpo is a source of great conflict for him. It is exactly when we find a female characterized by one of the features in the right-hand column of Table 1 (traditional male qualities) that antithesis occurs in the novel. Sofia is a large woman who would rather fix the roof of her house while her husband takes care of the children (*Purple*: 62-63). Independent and strong, she has interests that are traditionally male, such as wanting to be a pall bearer at her mother’s funeral (*Purple*: 216). Harpo is a small man, who throughout the novel is depicted as the more domestic of the pair. That the small-large opposition weighs on Harpo’s mind is evident when at one point he eats obsessively in order to make himself as large as Sofia (*Purple*: 63-64). Although the pair clearly cares for each other,
Harpo is disturbed that he does not fit the traditional male expectations of large size and physical and mental dominance of his wife. Sofia physically fights with Harpo after he first attempts to beat her into submission. Harpo’s binge-eating is an unsuccessful attempt at achieving physical dominance over Sofia. When Sofia eventually moves out, Harpo begins a relationship with Squeak, a small woman, not outspoken (as her name indicates), and one whom he can dominate, at least for a while.

Sofia is a threat to the traditional paradigm not only for gender, but also for race. She has the traditional qualities of the male gender which cause her problems in her own race, but because “she is bound to live her life and be herself no matter what” (Purple: 276), those same traditionally male qualities which lead her to resist sexual oppression in the private sphere accompany her as she resists racial oppression within the public sphere (Berlant, 1988: 462). Sofia is unsuited for the “mammy” role in her own home and in the home of the Mayor (Selzer, 1995: 74). Sofia replies, “Hell no,” at the mayor’s wife’s inquiry as to whether she would like to be her maid and care for her children (Purple: 90). The mayor and his men savagely beat Sofia for her lack of subservience. They further dominate her by giving her a fifteen-year jail term. She is released from her imprisonment only to become the maid of the mayor’s wife.

Because Sofia so blatantly breaks traditional gender and race paradigms, she suffers the most of all characters. Men and women of her race seek to oppress her for her “manliness” while the whites essentially make her a political prisoner whose spirit they attempt to crush (Berlant, 1988: 462). The mapping of race and sexual oppression is easily perceived through the polar opposites of Sofia’s character.

The dyads of Celie and Pa and Celie and Mr. _____ also clearly illustrate gender roles portrayed in polar opposites. Pa and Mr. _____’s dominating and controlling ways have been described above in the discussion of equilibrium. Both men seek to keep women in submission, to keep them in the private sphere where they can clean house, tend children, and serve the men’s sexual needs. These men have many mates, but the women should only have one mate. Celie, before loving Shug and recovering her history through the letters, exhibits all the traits on the left-hand side of Table 1. She is the perfect traditional opposite for her dominating Pa and husband. She is so submissive that other female characters, who must feign obedience, refer to Celie saying, “I act like I’m you. I jump right up and do just what they say” (Purple: 93). Celie is very domestic and very unworldly, at first not even knowing “where Africa at”. She is kept from an education by being “needed” at home, but also because the traditional gender role dictates that “If women learn too much no man will want them” (Purple: 161).

Celic and Shug are exact opposites as well. Shug is beautiful, strong, feisty, articulate, financially independent, sexually aggressive, and worldly. Celie initially has none of these traits. The gender roles begin to blur, however, under Shug’s influence for, in Mr. _____’s words, “Sofia and Shug not like men...but they not like women either” (Purple: 276). Shug disrupts the traditional paradigm because she is like a man and like a woman and also because she is bisexual and polygamous. She is a fascinating paradox for those men and women with traditional views.
who love her. Since Shug possesses both male and female traits, she creates a kind of synergism in the lives of those she touches. Her ambiguous gender role makes obvious and laughable the rigid male-female gender roles of the other characters.

II.4 The automorphic world of the African Olinka
A third type of metaphorical projection of symmetry in *The color purple* is the conceptual mapping of the African tribal world of the Olinka to protagonist Celie’s American South. That Africa is a mirror world, or inversion, and a reflex of our understanding of symmetry. The set of parts and the relations which interest us in Celie’s American South are just those which conceptually map onto the Olinka tribe with whom Celie’s sister Nettie lives as a missionary. These correspondences represent automorphism, the structure-preserving mapping of elements to themselves. These familial and gender relations also map onto to racial tensions between the Europeans and the Olinka and to the responses of subjugation and submission brought on by colonialist domination and exploitation of African resources.

Selzer (1995) has recognized how Walker carefully embeds the narrative with race and class contextual information. Berlant (1988) points to the importance of Nettie working as a missionary in Africa because Nettie’s position permits an entrance to the familial and private sphere while at the same time shedding light on colonial and capitalist expansion in Africa. Williams similarly identifies the “elaborately parallel experiences of racism and sexism” in the plots of the two sisters’ fundamentally different lives (1989: 280-281). Although Africa originally held for Nettie a mythical and magical nature of her origins, the longer she lives with the Olinka, the more similarities she notices between the traditional ways of men and women on either continent. Nettie, disillusioned, writes Celie the following:

> There is a way that men speak to women that reminds me too much of Pa. They listen just long enough to issue instructions. They don’t even look at women when they are speaking...The women also do not “look in a man’s face”...a brazen thing to do...They look instead at his feet or knees...Again, it is our own behavior around Pa. (*Purple*: 168)

Nettie observes that the same traditionally gendered roles of submission and dominance exist in the Olinka culture. Nettie must slowly unlearn the myth of Africa the missionaries taught her. She discovers the Olinka world is a flawed paradise where “the mothers of the tribe collude with the patriarchs in the exploitation of their daughters” (Birkett, 1991: 142). To her dismay, she learns that in the Olinka patriarchal system, girls are also not believed worthy of educating because “[a] girl is nothing to herself; only to her husband can she become something” and that Olinka men do not want an educated wife, for “who wants a wife who knows everything her husband knows?” (*Purple*: 161-162; 176). These Olinka adages echo those Celie and Nettie hear in the American South, when Pa declares, “If women learn too much no man will want them.”

The patriarchal subjugation of man over woman maps to the race relations of white over...
black. The same elements map between the African Olinka and the European colonizers and capitalists, with the Europeans taking on the stereotypically male traits. Table 2 shows polar opposites in the Olinka world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional roles (female/black)</th>
<th>Traditional roles (male/white)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>Europeans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>submissive (obedient; don’t fight when Europeans deforest roofleaf)</td>
<td>dominant (subjugate, control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uneducated</td>
<td>educated (missionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generous (offer food, hospitality)</td>
<td>greedy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traditional gender roles between Olinka men and women, for example, the submissive-dominant and uneducated-educated oppositions, map to Celie and Nettie’s experience in the American South. The automorphic Olinka world is a set of elements matched for gender, race, and class relations in the American South.

Through automorphism, many events in the Olinka world evoke parallel events in Celie’s world. These are metaphorical projections of symmetry. From Africa, Nettie’s letters describe how the Olinka worship a type of vegetation, the roofleaf, as God. The roofleaf is an essential part of their belief system and is their livelihood. In spite of the plant’s significance to the tribe, the British rubber company levels their homes and deforest their beloved roofleaf tree forest to build a road through the Olinka village. The villagers do not resist; rather, they generously offer food, drink and hospitality to their subjugators. When the roofleaf is destroyed, the tribe is then forced to purchase tin from the British to have roofs over their heads. The general Olinka reaction is submissive; the abuse is accepted with no resistance. (Some Olinka do, however, join the mbeles, a separatist group living deep in the jungle.) The removal of the roofleaf is the act of the subjugator for capitalistic gain. This act has its race-class parallel in the lynching of Celie’s biological father by whites because of his capitalistic success. Berlant (1988) notes that the “racial inferiority and subhumanity” of blacks are invoked and serve as justification enough for whites —be they colonialists or southerners— to usurp resources. These class issues are not as overt as other relations in The color purple because they are embedded within or mapped onto the context of family and gender relations.

Curiously, or, rather, automorphically, at the same time that the British are deforesting the Olinka lands, Celie, in the American South, learns that she has inherited a house, farm land, and a general store from her biological father. Celie visits her property to find it covered in row upon row of blossoming trees. When the Olinka world is being destroyed, its inverse, Celie’s world, is coming into fruition. Celie, once a “poor, ugly, untalented woman,” — in the words of Mr. — at story’s end, is financially, personally, and creatively free.

After many years, family members physically and spiritually reunite. Celie’s two children return from Africa with Nettie and her husband Samuel, the missionary (who married her after his first wife died). Shug visits her children, whom she has not seen in thirty years. Harpo, Sofia,
Celie, Mr. _____, and Shug are all reunited as well, not as mates but as friends sharing in the mutual upbringing of each family's small children. Thus, the traditionally gendered functions of father and mother are blended. As Froula notes, the "formerly rigid family lines become fluid" (642).

Celie, at the end of the novel, is explaining the Olinka creation beliefs to Mr. ______. Some Olinka believe that white and black (or any groups with differences — Celie hypothesizes perhaps the "two-headed" versus "one-headed folks" of the future) will perpetually vie for dominance (Purple: 281-282). The oppressed group, "the serpent," will then be crushed by the dominant group. Celie recounts, "...some of the Olinka peoples believe life will just go on and on like this forever" (Purple: 282). Celie continues within the alternate view:

But some of 'em don't think like this. They think, after the biggest of the white folks no longer on earth, the only way to stop making somebody the serpent is for everybody to accept everybody else as a child of God, or one mother's children, no matter what they look like or how they act. (Purple: 282)

Celie's simply-worded rendering of the creation myth reveals that some Olinka believe that the pattern of oppression will not repeat endlessly. In this view, the stereotyped lines will disintegrate in favor of everyone caring for and accepting everyone's children as though they were "one mother's children."

The inverse world of the Olinka metaphorically represents the possibility of endless repetition of categorizations in opposition to each other. The return of all of Celie's family members from Africa and the reuniting of all the families and former tormentors might have been just another cycle in the endless repetition if the members of the group like Squeak, Mr. ______, and Celie were not transformed individuals. Furthermore, Walker would have us believe, this group has the hope of not repeating the cycle of oppression, because its membership comprises complex and ambiguous characters like Sofia and Shug who blur the rigid lines of categorization.

III. CONCLUSION
Conceptual asymmetry is pervasive throughout The color purple. In its various metaphorical projections, asymmetry bids the reader's examination. The many asymmetric relations of race, gender, family, and class in the novel cause the reader to ask why such asymmetries exist. The process of recovering the history or seeking a causal explanation for the asymmetries is a common cognitive response. It is something we humans unconsciously do every day and many times throughout the day. Fortunately for us, recovering the process-history of an object is linked to aesthetic pleasure and to survival. Under a theory of conceptual metaphor, readers of The color purple engage in interpreting each asymmetry to discover its history. With themes of sexual and racial oppression, it is important to have an awareness of the conceptual asymmetry involved in the removal of objects. The symmetry which results from the removal of objects deprives
individuals of indications of their past; without them, they cannot deduce a past any different than the present. Leyton best explains the significance of having objects of one's personal history present for examination:

People and cultures who have a long history of being subjugators possess vast amounts of external memory that has been obtained at the expense of those whom they have subjugated. Thus, for example, colonial powers have amassed their considerable external memory at the expense of colonies, men have amassed theirs at the expense of women, and whites at the expense of blacks. (1992: 593)

External memory is simply history. If we examine history books, we will find Leyton’s words to ring true. Walker said in interviews that she wanted to write an historical novel, one which “starts not with the taking of lands, or births, or battles, and deaths of Great Men, but with one woman asking another for her underwear” (1983: 356). In The color purple, Walker has written an historical novel, but not because in it one woman asks another for her underwear, rather because of numerous other asymmetries equally worthy of investigating.

NOTES
1 Signifying is used here in the sense of the African-American verbal art of indirection. Signifying is often used as the “recognition and attribution of some implicit content or function which is obscured by the surface content of function” (Mitchell-Kernan, 317-18).

REFERENCES


And she's like it's terrible, like:
Spoken Discourse, Grammar and Corpus Analysis

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"Perhaps the greatest single event in the history of linguistics was the invention of the tape
recorder, which for the first time has captured natural conversation and made it accessible to
systematic study."

Michael Halliday (1994) «Introduction» to An Introduction to Functional
Grammar (2nd Ed) p. xxiii

ABSTRACT
This paper argues for the importance of teaching frequent words in English and for using
computer corpora as a guide to decisions over which words to teach. The article contains a case
study of a word which is frequent in both written and spoken English but more frequent in
spoken English. The use of a spoken corpus raises complex questions concerning the teaching
of grammar, especially frequent words in a ‘discourse grammar’ and these are discussed in
relation to evidence of contexts of use, the needs of the learner and the use of authentic language
data in the foreign language classroom.

KEYWORDS: teaching, frequent words, computer corpora, spoken corpus, discourse grammar,
contexts of use

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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper our aim is to explore the relationship between language and discourse, especially spoken discourse and applications of such work within the context of English Language Studies. We examine data from a five-million-word computerised language corpus — the CANCODE spoken English corpus. [CANCODE stands for ‘Cambridge and Nottingham Corpus of Discourse in English’]. The corpus was developed at the University of Nottingham, UK between 1994 and 2001, and was funded by Cambridge University Press ©, with whom sole copyright resides. The spoken data were recorded in a wide variety of mostly informal settings across the islands of Britain and Ireland and then transcribed and stored in computer-readable form.

1.1. What is a computerised language corpus?
A computerised language corpus is a collection of texts stored in electronic format. Information about the language in the corpus is made accessible through software designed to analyse patterns of language. For example, computerised language corpora can give information about the frequency of words in the corpus, the most common partnerships formed by the words with other words, the different uses of such patterns in speech and writing and the different grammatical structures found in different varieties in the corpus such as newspaper or legal language.

Most language corpora in the world are assembled with the aim of making statements about language which can be statistically supported. Examples in English are the 400m word Bank of English, held at the University of Birmingham, UK and the 100m word British National Corpus (BNC). These and other corpora have proved invaluable in the construction of authentic reference materials such as dictionaries for learners of English. Both these corpora contain spoken samples but contain mainly written data and there is still a tendency for written language to predominate in computerised corpora because such data are so much easier to collect.

In spite of trends to ever larger, multi-million-word corpora and associated quantitative analysis, in the case of CANCODE the main aim has been to construct a corpus which can allow both quantitative and qualitative investigation. The data have been carefully collected and sociolinguistically-profiled with reference to a range of different speech genres and with an emphasis on everyday communication. The corpus has been designed with a particular aim of relating grammatical and lexical choice to variation in social context and is also used in connection with a range of teaching projects, being especially concerned with differences between spoken and written language (Bex 1996, Carter and McCarthy, 1997; Carter, Hughes and McCarthy, 2000). What all these corpora have in common is a concern with language as it is really used. They reinforce a tradition of examining how language is authentically and actually used rather than *armchair* conceptions of language use in which a linguist tests hypotheses based on made-up or invented examples.
II. TYPES OF SPEECH IN THE CORPUS
The data collected for the CANCODE project were classified along two main axes according to CONTEXT TYPE and INTERACTION TYPE. The axes were selected with the aim of providing frameworks which are neither too broad nor too narrow. The classification scheme emerged both pre- and post-hoc in that the researchers had presuppositions concerning the contexts in which they wanted to have evidence of language use and yet had to develop the categories in response to the emerging data bank. There were no prior conceptions concerning instances of creative language use since that was not a primary concern of the project in its earliest stages.

II.1. Context type
This axis of categorization reflects the interpersonal relationships that hold between speakers. Four broad types were identified: intimate, socialising, professional and transactional. (A fifth somewhat narrower category embracing pedagogic contexts to support the teaching and learning underpinning of CANCODE is not considered here). The categories embrace both dyadic and multi-party conversations. In multi-party conversations in particular it was initially thought to be problematic that relationships, especially changing relationships or relationships affected by new members joining the group, might be difficult to monitor, but a strong tendency has existed for speakers to converge towards one interaction type in their linguistic behaviour. For example, two intimates sharing a common place of work will adopt a ‘professional’ attitude in the company of colleagues. To safeguard against possible misinterpretation by the analyst, information on speaker relationships is provided in the majority of cases by the person contributing the data to the corpus. An assessment of speakers’ own goals thus remains central to the analysis.

An intimate relationship is a private relationship which typically (but not exclusively) centres round cohabitation and where speakers can be assumed to be linguistically most ‘off-guard’. All participants in a conversation must belong to the intimate sphere for the text to be categorized thus. So, for example, a conversation between two or more intimates and the family doctor on a home visit will not be ‘intimate’ but ‘transactional’.

The professional category refers to the relationship that holds between people who are interacting as part of their regular daily work. The speakers in a professional encounter need not be peers but they do need to share either a profession or a regular place of work. So-called ‘casual’ talk at work is also included in this category, based on the assumption that colleagues retain the same professional interpersonal relationships whether they are discussing work matters or not. Of course, it is recognized that colleagues can also be friends in which case their conversations could be classed as ‘socialising’.

An important characteristic of the transactional category is that often there is no previous relationship established between speakers. If the ‘intimate’ relationship is the most private, the ‘transactional’ is the most public —which is one of the reasons why transactional data is
relatively easy to acquire. The transactional category includes job interviews, asking a passer-by for information, goods and service encounters and so on.

Typical contexts for socialising are recreational settings such as sports clubs and pubs, as well as political, environmental, religious and other group meetings. Note, however, that it is the relationship between speakers, that is, their wish to communicate at this level, which qualifies data for inclusion in the category, and not the particular environment in which the recording is made. So, for example, a married couple engaged in private conversation in a pub will remain ‘intimate’. Two couples in a similar setting, however, are more likely to conform to a ‘socialising’ text.

Although there are points of overlap between categories, the relationship categories do represent, albeit roughly, a cline of ‘private’ to ‘public’ speech, with the intimate and transactional categories respectively at each end of the cline. The ‘professional’ category is more public than the ‘socialising’ category, which in turn is more public than intimate.

Along the axis of interaction type distinctions were made between data that are predominantly collaborative and those that are non-collaborative and, further, for the collaborative type, those which are task-oriented and those which are not.

Non-collaborative texts are those in which one speaker dominates significantly, supported by back-channelling from the other speaker(s). Typically, the dominant speaker in these texts is relating an event, telling a joke, giving instructions or explanations or professional presentations. On one level, of course, these exchanges are also collaborative, but there is a level at which they resemble narration or the unilinear, asymmetrical transfer of information, rather than dialogue. The blanket term adopted to account for such an interaction type is information provision.

The two other interaction types classified represent more collaborative, interactive and symmetrical speech encounters. Collaborative idea involves the interactive sharing of thoughts, opinions, and attitudes, while the category of collaborative task, as the term implies, is reserved for task-oriented communication.

Overall, interaction type texts have proved more difficult to categorize because of the embedding of one context-type within another. Category membership is thus allocated according to the activity that is dominant in each conversation. A significantly more detailed account of the CANCODE corpus and its design may be found in McCarthy (1998) where the dangers inherent in reifying the categories are also fully acknowledged.

Combining the two axes of categorization provides a matrix of twelve text types as can be seen in Figure 1, which also suggests some situations in which the text types might be found.
III. DEVELOPING RESEARCH AND CLASSROOM APPLICATIONS: THE EXAMPLE OF LIKE

There are many applications of this research. One of the main applications to English Language Studies of this kind of computerised corpus is to help us to identify features of spoken grammar in English which have not been previously identified in any systematic way because the evidence used for most descriptions has been written English.

Here is an extract from the CANCODE corpus with the context for the talk exchange indicated. The extract is one of several used in order to explore the provenance, distribution and function of the word like in spoken English. In particular the aim is to provide a description of the functions of like for a forthcoming grammar of English. (Carter and McCarthy, forthcoming) The grammar integrates examples from both written and spoken sources and parallel corpora are compared in order to describe differences and distinctions between spoken and written contexts. In this instance the word and its grammatical properties and functions are of particular interest because it is over five times more frequent in spoken English than in written English. It should be remembered too that most grammars of English illustrate particular grammatical forms by means of sentences and with only minimal reference to a range of different speech genres and different types of social interaction. Often, however, and this is especially the case in spoken contexts, a stretch of dialogue is needed in order fully to illustrate the meaning of items across speaking terms. In the case of like, like emerges as a kind of discourse marker organising the patterning of discourse and marking the nature of the interaction between the speakers.

III.1. LIKE as discourse marker

III.1.1 Reported Speech

One of the more frequent uses of like in spoken English is to mark direct speech. This is a relatively recent phenomenon but it is extensive, the corpus reveals, in the speech of younger, (usually under 30 years of age) speakers. Like stands in the place of ‘said that’ plus quoted
speech'. As such it often introduces speech reports. In his study of CANCODE data McCarthy (1998:161) finds that ‘[…] in the narrative texts in the CANCODE corpus, speech reports are overwhelmingly direct speech, and with reporting verbs in past simple (said, told) or historical present says.’ One of the reasons for this is to add to the ‘vividness’ and ‘real-time staging’ (ibid) of the discourse. Furthermore, replicating direct speech adds to the authenticity of a narrative. The extracts below, all drawn from the CANCODE corpus illustrate this. They both involve the recount of a narrative. Extract 1 is drawn from a conversation between three female friends while the speakers in extract two are a couple in their twenties. (Strictly speaking, the interaction-type is information provision, although it can be argued that narratives regularly do more than provide information and narrative itself, as a speech genre, regularly gets embedded into other contexts and genres of speech).

The first extract shows the speech reporting function of the word *like*. A group of three women in their twenties are discussing previous events. The conversation centres around an inflatable chair.

**Extract 1**

<SO2> I was having this hideous party last weekend and there was a blow up chair so I sat in it for a bit. I was feeling really antisocial and just really wanted to go home. And Jane and Benny had made me come cos it's this Denise and oh er she's a hairdresser and she had a lot of hairdressers friends. All dressed really smartly and standing round not saying anything.
<SO1> Jane it?
<SO2> No Jane's friend Denise.
<SO1> Oh right.
<SO2> So Jane made me come because she she'd agreed to go and so she was like "I don't want to go there and there are all these hairdressers and me and Benny."
[laughter]
<SO2> And that was that. It was really shit and I wish I hadn't agreed to do it. Sat in the chair. After five minutes I was like "Yeah, Party" and singing. Making suggestions [laughter]
<SO2> Suddenly became the life and soul after sitting there.
<SO1> Barmy.
[laughter]
<SO1> An anti anti social chair. Maybe I'll get one.
[laughs]
<SO1> They're just so ugly.
<SO3> They are hideous.

The word *like* is used here to report the speech of other people, as well as that of the speakers themselves. The goal of the conversation is to entertain the other speakers and to keep the conversation flowing. Other elements that add to this goal and to the vividness of the conversation are the use of strong evaluative statements (‘It was really shit’, ‘they are hideous’) and the embedding of creativity in the narrative (‘An anti anti social chair’).

In the next extract the speakers are talking about ‘Robin’, an acquaintance who is in the
habit of wearing his earphones when speaking to other people.

Extract 2

<S02> But I've found erm I got this tiny little radio that I strap on to my my my collar and then it's got earphones. You know it's a tiny little thing. And so I have that on all day. So from sort of six seven in the morning I'm listening to the radio until five six in the evening. And the day seems to go a lot better.
<S01> Mm.
<S02> Er the driver must think I'm absolutely insane cos half the time I'll be walking and I'll suddenly just burst out laughing or+
<S01> [laughs]
<S02> you can see me chuckling away. I mean I've got to the point where I really look forward to
<S01> Pity you'll end up like Robin. God he comes round and erm he comes in and he he's got his ear plugs in cos he's been cycling and he stands on the doorstep going you know that really sort of intense kind of oh
<S02> Mm.
<S01> And you say "Alright Robin how ya doing?" And he's like "Ohright" And you're sort of talking to him. You just think "Take your sodding ear plugs out. And he comes in the house with them. He's still got his ear plugs in.
<S02> Really?
<S01> And he's sort of talking to you and you think "My God man you can hardly converse. You're totally unaware of people as it is. And he's got his ear plugs in.
<S02> Yeah.

The story itself has what Egging and Slade (1997:237) following Plum (1988) call the character of an 'anecdote' which involves 'the retelling of events with a prosody of evaluation running throughout to make the story worth telling'. The use of the word like in this extract alternates with other ways of speech and thought reporting ('and you say...', 'and he's like...', 'and you think...'). Again the rather informal use of the word like is accompanied by other features of informal spoken discourse that we find in particular in the socio-cultural and intimate categories. These are further discussed below.

III.2. Other discourse functions of like

Here is another extract from the corpus which illustrates other functions of the word. The context is intimate and the interaction-type is collaborative idea.

(A young couple, mid-twenties, at home. <S01> male (27); <S02> female (25))

<S01> So what did you do today? Apart from watch loads of adverts and
<S02> No what did what did you do today?
<S01> What did I do today. Erm oh. Had a good day today actually. Got loads of stuff sorted out. Finished loads of odds and ends.
<S02> Did you. Like what?
<S01> Like my programme. Finished that off.
<S02> Which programme?
<S01> The computer. He says that `erm there was a load che= got a list of checks (sighs) I'll start again. There's a check list of things I should have done for this programme.
<S02> Right.
<S01> And er I didn't get it. I didn't either didn't pick one up or I didn't
<S02> You weren't there. (laughs)
<S01> Or I wasn't there. Yeah. So I passed it but I missed a couple of like... really stupid things off.

There are a number of interesting features of the behaviour of the word like in this extract. Like here has a fundamentally analogising function. It functions to suggest points of comparison or exemplification even if those comparisons and examples are not actually drawn upon. In such cases, as in the final line in the above extract, like also operates to mark a pause before a statement. The analogising function of like is also manifested in phrases such as like what? which serves to prompt examples and illustration as in the fourth and fifth lines above.

One reason why the word like cannot be examined wholly in single sentence or utterance frameworks is that the extent to which the use of the word is overlaid by other grammatical patterns may easily escape attention. For example it is interesting to note how in this example like co-occurs with two other core features of spoken grammar: ellipsis and vague language.

*Ellipsis* is a grammatical feature in which, most commonly subjects or subjects and verbs are not employed because we can assume that our listeners know and/or understand what we mean. It is a marked feature of spoken English grammar. (see Wilson, 2000). For example:

*Didn't know that film was on tonight.* (I)

*Sounds good to me. (It, That)*

*Lots of things to tell you about the trip to Barcelona. (There are)*

*A: Are you going to Leeds this weekend?*  
*B: Yes, I must. (go to Leeds this weekend)*

Vague language (see Channell, 1994) includes words and phrases such as *thing, stuff, I mean or so, or something, or anything, or whatever, sort of, kind of.* Vague language softens expressions so that they do not appear too direct or unduly authoritative and assertive. When we interact with others there are times where it is necessary to give accurate and precise information; in many informal contexts, however, speakers prefer to convey information which is softened in some way, although such vagueness is often wrongly taken as a sign of careless thinking or sloppy expression. A more accurate term should therefore be *purposefully vague language.* For further discussion, see Eggings and Slade, (1997); Cameron, (2001).

<SO1> do you think it is affected by your faith, like you were saying you [<S 02> mm] have kind of moral standards of not, like hooliganising and things I mean do you think that's because of of your faith or do you think that's because well because of society or whatever?
In the case of *like* in these examples it is immediately noticeable that *like* shares the same communicative territory as these forms.

<SO1> What did I do today. Erm oh. Had a good day today actually. Got loads of stuff sorted out.
Finished loads of odds and ends.
<SO2> Did you. *Like* what?
<SO1> *Like* my programme. Finished mat off.
<SO2> Which programme?

*Like* co-occurs with ellipted forms such as *had a good day today actually, got loads of stuff sorted out, finished that* and with vague words and phrases such as *loads of, stuff* and, to a lesser extent, *odds and ends*. The corpus also reveals that in terms of social interaction *like* has a particular provenance in more informal encounters of the socialising and intimate type. Corpus evidence reveals a significantly lower count of uses of *like* as a discourse marker in the more formal contexts associated with professional and transactional contexts. This leads, however, to the *applied* linguistic question of how far this kind of information can be patterned into a grammar of English, especially a grammar of English directed primarily at advanced learners of English. How much information do learners need concerning contextual usage or are the broad categories of spoken and written sufficient for most purposes?

The following extract from a new grammar of English is in a first draft form. But it illustrates, we hope, something of the extent to which descriptions of grammar need to go to provide a detailed account of the lexico-grammar of words which have significant functions and distributions in a corpus of naturally-occurring language. It will be seen that it been decided at this stage not to provide more detailed contextual information but such levels of description are being kept under review as the grammar is further trialled with learners of English throughout the world.

Extract from *The Cambridge Advanced Grammar of English* (forthcoming) (first draft)

1. Grammatical roles of *like*

1. *Like* is used as a preposition which means ‘similar to’. As a preposition it often occurs with verbs of sensation such as look, sound, feel, taste, seem.

*That* looks *like* a winner
*It* tastes *like* an alcoholic drink
*People* *like* him should be put away in prison.

2. *Like* is used as a conjunction.

*The manager* *has involved the staff* in *the decision* *like* a good manager *should* *do.*
3. *Like* is also a common verb for the expression of preferences and desires. It is very frequently used with personal pronouns.

*Do you like strawberries or not?*
*Would you like to go to Italy?*
*Actually, I rather like the idea.*

4. *Like* is used as a suffix. In such uses it normally forms a hyphenated structure.

*She looked ill and was wearing a ghost-like cream cloak.*

2. **Like** as discourse marker

5. *Like* is very commonly used in informal spoken English. One of its most frequent uses is as a marker of reported speech, especially where the report involves a personal reaction or response.

*So this bloke, he was drunk, came up to me and I'm like 'Go away, I don't want to dance'. And my mum's like non-stop three or four times 'Come and tell your grandma about your holiday'.*

6. One of the most frequent uses of *like* in spoken English is to focus attention usually by giving or requesting an example.

*The first thing that runs through your mind is like meningitis, isn't it?*

7. *Like* can be placed at the end of a clause or sentence in order to qualify a preceding statement. It also functions to indicate that the words chosen may not be appropriate or adequate.

*Then she out of the car all of a sudden like and this bike hit her right in the back. It was a shattering, frightening like.*

8. When examples are asked for, a common structure in English conversation is *like what.*

*A: What did you get up to today?*
*B: Not a lot. There were a few computer things going on*
*A: Like what?*

9. In some cases *like* acts as a 'filler', enabling the speaker to pause to think what to say next or to rephrase something.

*They think that like by now we should be married and if we were married then it's ok like to get on with your life and do what you want.*

10. *Like* can be placed at the end of a clause or sentence in order to qualify a preceding statement. It also indicates that the words chosen may not be appropriate.

*Then she got out of the car all of a sudden like and this bike hit her right in the back. It was a shattering, frightening experience like.*
11. Like is also used in the structure (it + verb 'to be'+ like, a phrase which introduces an example or analogy of some kind. The structure is normally followed by a clause or an-ing form.

It's like if you go to another country you always get muddled up with the currency in the first few days. Like when I go to the doctors there's always loads of people in the surgery breathing germs all over you.

12. Like is commonly used in spoken English with other vague expressions such as stuff sort of, something.

When we were living there as students, we'd have parties and stuff like that.

Like [extract from The Cambridge Grammar of English, CUP, 2004/5; for a class text see Carter, Hughes and McCarthy, Exploring Grammar in Context, CUP, 2000]

CONCLUSION
A grammar of English which is corpus-informed, based on both written and spoken examples and which illustrates the extent to which like functions across sentence boundaries and across speaking turns needs to find appropriate ways of highlighting such features for learners of English. In many respects the description goes beyond the conventional limits of grammar and becomes an exemplification of discourse grammar. A corpus-informed spoken grammar is always to some degree pushing towards the establishment of new boundaries for a 'discourse' grammar (McCarthy, 2001).

REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING


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The Meaning of Genetics

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ABSTRACT
Research into the public understanding of genetics has greatly expanded lately. At the same time matters relating to biotechnology have seized the public’s attention. Corpus linguistics has long asked questions about how meaning is created and changed in the public sphere through language use. However, linking corpus linguistics to the study of the public understanding of science is something too few have done. To correct this trend, we apply methods from corpus linguistics and cognitive linguistics to study how people talk about genetics. We do so by analysing the meaning of words like gene, genes, genetic, genetics, and genetically as found in various spoken and written corpora. Specifically, we examine how they take on certain (e.g. figurative) connotations and modulate in context.

KEYWORDS: Corpus linguistics, cognitive linguistics, gene talk, meaning change, context

I. INTRODUCTION
Access to multi-million word spoken and written corpora along with the development of sophisticated software tools to facilitate linguistic analysis has revolutionised language description over the past two decades. The description of word meaning through the analysis

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of concordance lines is an area that has developed most rapidly with the advance of computing resources and corpus evidence. While this type of methodology has become common practice in the field of lexicography, it has more recently been used in areas such as critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2000) and in the study of language and ideology (Stubbs, 1996). The advantage of using this technique in such contexts lies in the unmediated nature of corpus data which allows the analyst to tap into the way certain words are used in real-life contexts.

However, despite the interest in genetics in many different fields now, a precise analysis of what people mean by genes and other related words has yet to take place. Of course, as Lindsey (2001:3) argues, there is a difference between “gene talk” and “genetic communication”. Whereas gene talk refers to the discussion of genes in lay contexts (i.e. contexts excluding scientists), genetic communication refers to the discussion of genes by professionals (i.e. medical geneticists, biologists and so on). Lindsey’s point is that context can influence meaning, especially if various social groups have various different definitions about genes and other related words. It is for this reason that corpus linguistics, which can reveal in which context a word is used and how, offers a substantial benefit to linguists who study language in a variety of social contexts. But if corpus linguistics offers a sound method for a research project like this, one may ask why words like gene merit closer attention. We hold that gene talk is a fitting topic of analysis because it pervades our culture at present. After all, between 1953 and 2003, the fiftieth anniversary of discovery of DNA’s ‘double helix’ structure (Dobzhansky, 1966; Leek, 1962; Osmundsen, 1961, 1964)⁴, there have been tremendous changes in genetic science. Breakthroughs would include deciphering in the 1950s and 1960s what Watson and Crick called the human genetic ‘code’ (quoted in Nelkin, 2001:557) to cloning Dolly the sheep in 1997 or reporting the results of the Human Genome Project in 2000 and 2001 (Nerlich et al., 2002; Nerlich & Dingwall, in press). However, despite these breakthroughs, our relation to biotechnology seems ambivalent, fluctuating between hope and fear (see Smart, 2003, in press), and our language reflects this.

Our hypothesis is that the connotations associated with the lemma GENE will tend to be negative in the corpus data we study. We say this because public attitudes towards biotechnology, especially in Europe, are mostly negative (Marris et al., 2001). Additionally, advances in biotechnology frequently receive sceptical treatment in the media (Bauer & Gaskell, 2002). Non-governmental organizations opposed to developments in biotechnology, for example, have been very successful in having the debate framed conceptually on their terms rather than on the terms of the biotech industry (Hamilton, in press). In contrast, other genetic interventions intended to heal, cure, or prevent disease seem to be regarded as more positive developments. Somewhere in between would be the issue of the genetic modification of food although that too can swing either way². In order to test our hypothesis, we aim to find out if one of the root causes for negative connotations can be found in the semantics of
gene, genes, genetic, genetics, and genetically as those words are used differently by different people.

Our purpose is to highlight meaning patterns in the way that certain terms related to the field of genetics are used in context. In essence, there is no better laboratory for studying people’s understanding of genetic science than looking directly at the relevant words themselves. In what follows, we first briefly discuss one of the methodologies developed in the area of corpus linguistics to describe the meaning of a lexical item and provide an overview of the corpora we have chosen for our analysis. Then, in the analysis itself we concentrate on various parts of the lemma GENE. Finally, the results of our analysis are contextualised in the wider perspective of the emergence of meaning in various types of discourse. Where meanings are metaphorical, we argue that this is partly motivated by an underlying system of conceptual metaphors that structure human thinking and acting, and partly by the culture we live in or the culture within which these meanings emerge (Zinken et al., in press).

II. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE UNIT OF MEANING
Recent advances in corpus linguistics have highlighted the importance of syntagmatic relations in language use. Sinclair (1996) points out that it is difficult to ascribe meaning to individual words as strong patterns of co-occurrence with other words or classes of lexical items suggest that units of meaning are “largely phrasal” (1996:82). In order to describe the nature of individual units of meaning, Sinclair (1996) suggests four parameters: (1) colligation, (2) collocation, (3) semantic preference, and (4) semantic prosody. Colligation, the first parameter, describes the co-occurrence of grammatical choices. Grammatical patterning around a particular word accounts for the “variation” of a phrase, which “gives the phrase its essential flexibility, so that it can fit into the surrounding co-text” (Sinclair, 1996: 83). The notion of collocation, the second parameter, refers to the attraction between individual lexical items that regularly co-occur. For example, one of the main collocates of the adjective “genetic” is “engineering”.

There are a number of statistical procedures that can be used to account for lexical attraction. Such methods tend to compare the expected frequency with which two words co-occur in a corpus with the actual frequency of co-occurrence. Two of the statistical measurements that have become common tools to calculate lexical attraction are the T-score and Mutual Information. Due to the limited space of this article we will not be able to discuss these measurements in detail but we assume that the higher these two scores are, the stronger the indication that there exists a non-accidental relationship between the search word and its collocate.
The third of Sinclair’s parameters is the “semantic preference” (Sinclair, 1996:86), a semantic abstraction of the prominent collocates of a lexical item or expression. Sinclair (1996:86) states: “This new criterion is another stage removed from the actual words in the text, just as collocation is one stage more abstract than collocation. But it captures more of the patterning than the others”. For example in his discussion of the expression “the naked eye”, Sinclair finds that most of the verbs and adjectives preceding this expression show a semantic preference of “vision”. The verbs “see” and “seen” regularly occur in usage in the environment of “the naked eye”.

Sinclair’s (1996) fourth criterion in the description of the units of meaning is the “semantic prosody”. In a discussion of semantic prosodies and irony, Louw (1993:157) argues that “evidence is emerging that departures in speech or writing from the expected profiles of semantic prosodies, if they are not intended as ironic, may mark the speaker’s real attitude even where s/he is at pains to conceal it”. Semantic prosodies, then, are associations with certain lexical connotations which are not easily detected by intuition. For example, Louw (1993:159) writes: “the habitual collocates of the form set in are capable of colouring it, so it can no longer be seen in isolation from its semantic prosody, which is established through the semantic consistency of its subjects”. Louw’s concept of “colouring”, with regard to semantic prosodies, refers to what is seen as either a word’s negative or positive semantic prosody. For instance, the word “happen” consistently takes a negative prosody (Sinclair, 1991). That is, bad things rather than good things appear to “happen”. Stubbs (1995, 1996) and Sinclair (1991) both study lexical items that collocate with negative events, such as the word “cause” or “set in”. Concordance searches of such items reveal that most of the nouns immediately following or preceding these verbs are negative, such as “bad weather”, “epidemic”, etc. The fact that these items are recurrent in the concordance search is significant, as is the overall semantic field, or semantic preference they are related to.

Sinclair’s criteria for describing the ‘unit of meaning’ of a lexical item then allow the analyst to include aspects of word meaning that help reveal conceptions about the area of genetics which were previously only open to speculation. In our analysis of the terminology associated with genetics we feel it is important to include a range of forms of this lemma as the individual items can show differences in the meaning profile as analysed within the framework outlined above. Based on the British National Corpus (BNC) we have identified the five most frequent items of this lemma: gene, genes, genetic, genetically and genetics. Our analysis is based on three corpora which are further described below.

III. DESCRIPTION OF CORPUS DATA
In order to gauge attitudes towards the terminology most closely related to the lexical item gene, we have chosen to study concordance output in three different corpora of contemporary
spoken and written English: The Bank of English, the British National Corpus and the CANCODE corpus.

The Bank of English is a collaborative project between COBUILD and the University of Birmingham. It is one of the largest existing corpora to date and has mainly been used to inform dictionary design and lexicographical research. While more data continues to be added to this corpus, the latest release (January 2002) comprised 450 million words of spoken and written data. The majority of texts in this corpus originate from after 1990. The written component consists of texts from a variety of different sources including newspapers, fiction and non-fiction books, reports, letters, and magazines. The spoken part of the corpus is made up of everyday conversation, as well as radio broadcasts and a range of more formal spoken contexts, such as interviews and meetings.

The data for the British National Corpus (BNC) were collected in the early 1990s and it now consists of 100 million words of spoken and written British English. The written part of the corpus accounts for 90% of the overall number of words and includes amongst other texts, newspaper extracts, journals, popular fiction, and academic books. The remaining 10% form the spoken part of the corpus and include informal conversation by a wide range of speakers, radio broadcast data and formal meetings.

The Cambridge and Nottingham Corpus of Discourse in English (CANCODE) is a collaborative project between the University of Nottingham and Cambridge University Press. The main phase of data collection took place between 1994 and 1999 with a focus on gathering conversations from a variety of discourse contexts and speech genres. The 5 million word corpus consists exclusively of conversational data which were carefully selected to include adult speakers of different ages, sex, social backgrounds and levels of education. The corpus itself has been organized according to five context types which represent a cline of formality. The framework of categorisation is based on the relationship that holds between the speakers in the dyadic and multi-party conversations in the corpus. These types of relationships fall into five broad categories which were identified at the outset and subsequently refined: intimate, socio-cultural, professional, transactional, and pedagogic. These categories were found to be largely exclusive while being comprehensive at the same time. In the intimate category the distance between the speakers is at a minimum, such as in interactions between partners or family members. The socio-cultural category implies the voluntary interaction between speakers that seek each other’s company for the sake of the interaction itself. The relationship between the speakers is usually marked by friendship and is thus not as close as that between speakers in the intimate category. Typical venues for this type of interaction are social gatherings, birthday parties, sports clubs, and voluntary group meetings. The professional category refers to the relationship that holds between people who are interacting as part of their regular daily work. As such, this category only applies to interactions where all speakers are part of the professional context. The
transactional category embraces interactions in which the speakers do not previously know one another. The purpose behind transactional conversations is usually related to a need on the part of the hearer or the speaker. As such, the conversations aim to satisfy a particular transactional goal, such as buying and selling for example. The pedagogic category was set up to include any conversation in which the relationship between the speakers was defined by the pedagogic context. A range of tutorials, seminars and lectures were included.

We will draw on all of the three corpora outlined above in our analysis. They combine to a useful sample of spoken and written British English used in the 1990s. The respective classification schemes that have been applied to these corpora allow the analyst to make some statements about context specific use of the lexical items under discussion.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The individual lexical items in the lemma GENE were chosen according to frequency criteria. An initial frequency count in the British National Corpus revealed the following figures:

Gene: 2237
Genes: 2069
Genetic: 1823
Genetically: 335
Genetics: 302

The nouns gene and genes are clearly the most frequent representations of this lemma. They are closely followed by the adjective genetic. The frequency drops sharply when we consider the adverb genetically. The noun genetics has the lowest frequency.

While the British National Corpus offers us a general picture of frequencies, we can turn to the CANCODE corpus to analyse frequencies according to different conversational contexts.

*Figure 1: Frequencies of the lemma GENE as found in the CANCODE corpus*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>intimate</th>
<th>socio-cultural</th>
<th>professional</th>
<th>transactional</th>
<th>pedagogic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gene</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genetic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genetically</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genetics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These frequency results are interesting as they give us an indication of the types of situations in which people discuss genetics. While we would expect these figures to be high in the
pedagogic category, taking into account that a number of recorded interactions were medical and biology lectures and seminars, it is interesting to note that the area of genetics is also being discussed in interactions between close friends and partners. It is exactly this type of social sphere where unmediated recorded conversations can offer us insights into public attitudes to genetics and we will return to this aspect below.

If we consider the concordance lines taken from the intimate and the pedagogic category, it becomes clear that the collocations are different between the two. In the intimate category the adjective genetic pre-modifies the nouns mutation, programming and experiment and there is some evidence of a negative prosody in this sample (e.g. 'mutation', 'vile and foul genetic experiment'). The examples taken from the pedagogic category collocate with material and pool, and although they display a semantic prosody of negative events (e.g. viruses, abnormalities and failure), there seems to be no personal opinion included in them.

Intimate:

> It could be a genetic mutation.
> same way that red hair was genetic programming which has skipped a
> But a genetic experiment cloning a naturally c
> f a mouse is vile and a foul genetic experiment.
> just saying that it could be genetic programming.
> Well they come out the same genetic they come out the same /

Pedagogic:

you and I carry DNA as our genetic material and it's double-stranded
Three K Bs of genetic material.
the way viruses carry their genetic material.
If we get a change in genetic pool this can lead to a failure
Viruses consist of some genetic material whether it be RNA or
abnormalities or changes in genetic pool.

We then considered the respective units of meaning of the chosen lexical items when we looked at the British National Corpus and the Bank of English. Here our analysis starts with the two most frequent items, the nouns gene and genes. Both often occur as modifiers in complex noun phrases or as part of compound nouns (e.g. gene pool, gene therapy, gene activity, snail genes, genes code, etc.). In this form they tend to be used as extended metaphors, an issue to which we will return later. The contexts in which both nouns are found are almost always scientific which is mirrored by the semantic preference of biomedical vocabulary as shown in the examples taken from the BNC below:
Gene 62, encoding the 140k protein, lies coupling a promoter region of a gene expressed in cancer cells with a screening of the EMBL3 gene bank with terminal Eco RI fragments controlled by one or even two gene patterns in the DNA originated as 'own' chromosomal genes. by the function of normal cellular genes. of alga genes and Chlorophydra genes coincide the chromosome which has no genes and by which the chromosome

The same tendency emerges from an analysis of the 10 most significant collocates of the lexical items under discussion. The results in the table below are based on a sub-sample of the Bank of English which is available for demonstration searches on-line. All results are based on T-score analyses.

*Figure 2: Ten Most Significant Lexical Collocates for the Lemma GENE based on the Coubuild Direct on-line collocation sampler*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collocates</th>
<th>gene</th>
<th>genes</th>
<th>genetic</th>
<th>genetically</th>
<th>genetics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>hackman</td>
<td>human</td>
<td>engineering</td>
<td>engineered</td>
<td>biology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>therapy</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>material</td>
<td>modified</td>
<td>research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>kelly</td>
<td>cells</td>
<td>defects</td>
<td>programmed</td>
<td>human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>responsible</td>
<td>cell</td>
<td>research</td>
<td>been</td>
<td>biochemistry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>sarazen</td>
<td>specific</td>
<td>disease</td>
<td>have</td>
<td>molecular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>gene</td>
<td>disease</td>
<td>make</td>
<td>determined</td>
<td>behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>cancer</td>
<td>language</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>food</td>
<td>cancer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>scientists</td>
<td>cause</td>
<td>factors</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>disease</td>
<td>inherit</td>
<td>environmental</td>
<td>foods</td>
<td>microbiology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>called</td>
<td>inserted</td>
<td>differences</td>
<td>cells</td>
<td>genetics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, while collocations and semantic preferences of these words tend to merely give an indication of the general contexts in which items of this lemma are used, certain aspects of the negative semantic prosody are already becoming apparent at this stage. This aspect is realised in collocates such as cancer and disease. It should also be noted that one of the collocates of the word genes in the table above is the lexical item cause which, as Stubbs (1995) demonstrates, has a strongly negative semantic prosody, hinting at the pervasive popular belief that genes 'cause' disease or behaviour, a mistaken belief commonly referred to as 'genetic determinism' (Dennett, 2003).

A closer look at the concordance output reveals the general trend towards this prosody. It is interesting to note, however, that this trend is much more prominent with the lexical items genetic and genetically compared to gene, genes and genetics which display a more neutral, scientific semantic prosody. The concordance lines below which are taken from the BNC illustrate this:
concept of mutation which was a random genetic change
examples of these are the inherited genetic diseases such as
female was therefore a solution to a genetic conflict
the shadow of genetic injustice
tumours, accidents, genetic problems and meningitis can
become handicapped not because it is genetically abnormal or have a
will organise consumer boycotts of genetically engineered foods
apply to morality issues surrounding genetically engineered organisms
not yet fat but genetically programmed for early
transmitted between genetically susceptible people

We can see from these concordance lines a general negative semantic prosody which emerges from surrounding vocabulary such as conflict, injustice and abnormalities. If we consider the nouns gene, genes and genetics on the other hand, the contexts remain more neutral overall as illustrated in the following concordance lines:

controlled by one or even two gene patterns in the DNA
Two related zinc finger (ZNF) gene clusters from the pericentromeric
Expansions of the gene 62 promoter sequences

powerful way of studying how genes affect development
electronic database of human genes, so doctors around the world
that they have gets two normal genes, one from each parent

the principles of genetics.
learn about the structure, physiology, genetics and other properties
and an enormous growth of genetics took place and indeed is

Space limitations mean we can only list here a very small sample of what reflects the overall patterns found in the concordance output most clearly. The concordance lines highlight the more neutral tone in the contexts where the items gene(s) and genetics are being used. Our data suggest the latter is used in more general contexts rather than in very specific medical or biological types of discourse.

Overall, we can say that the semantic prosody is closely related to the grammatical role of the particular lexical item of this lemma. The adjective genetic and the adverb genetically give rise to a range of processes that reinforce the negative semantic prosody, such as genetic modification or genetically engineered. We would therefore argue that while there is a neutral, scientific voice to the discourse related to genetics in certain contexts, there are at the same time negative prosodies which are particularly prominent in the use of the lexical items genetic and genetically. The extract below illustrates this. It is taken from the
CANCODE corpus and shows a young couple discussing one of the aspects in the debate surrounding genetics:

<S01> I mean what he said was Yes I could agree with it. I'm not into altering natures like watching animals being...
<S02> Like genetically altered. Yeah.
<S01> yeah that's That I don't go with. If you get bad ones then+
<S02> Yeah.
<S01> +you're meant to have bad ones+ 
<S02> Mm.
<S01> +in life. That's what makes life life isn't it? I mean it is sad when it's children but it is a, it's been like this forever. And you start altering that then that is not on to me. But yet I don't want to be told+ 
<S02> Yeah.
<S01> +over, and about the crops and things. And he said, and he said about you know "Buy them in the shops these. Always look for organically grown as well". And I said to your dad "Everybody should be". And I said "Oh yeah. People with not much money are certainly gonna go and+
<S02> Yeah.
<S01> +look for organically grown stuff", "It only costs a few pence more". I thought "And the rest". You know stuff is so dear.
<S02> Yeah.

Here we see a representation of a negative attitude towards the process of genetic altering in a stretch of ongoing discourse which is conveyed in a series of statements of opinion (e.g. 'I'm not into altering natures', 'That I don't go with'). A good deal of research has been done on public opinion in Europe regarding genetics and biotechnology (Durant et al. 1998; Wagner, et al. 2002), with men tending to favour genetic modification and biotechnology more than women, although attitudes across Europe can vary. In northern Europe, which includes the United Kingdom, people tend to have lower opinions about genetic and biotechnologies while in southern Europe, which includes France and Italy, people tend to have higher opinions of these technologies. The attitudes expressed above in the conversation thus reflect opinions common among Europeans today.

V. METAPHRORS
We mentioned in our introduction some of the rapid breakthroughs seen over the last fifty years in genetic biotechnology. However, although new scientific developments may constantly change how we view technology, there is conceptual continuity as far as genes are concerned. This comes in the form of the metaphors used to describe DNA (and by extension, the human genome) for the last four decades or so. Here the corpus linguistic approach is complemented by a cognitive linguistic view of figurative language use. Some of
the most pervasive and enduring metaphors for the human genome and DNA include the following conceptual domains (Pollack, 1994; Ridley, 2000)⁠⁠⁠⁠:

DNA/ THE HUMAN GENOME IS A LANGUAGE
DNA/ THE HUMAN GENOME IS A CODE
DNA/ THE HUMAN GENOME IS A MAP
DNA/ THE HUMAN GENOME IS A TEXT
DNA/ THE HUMAN GENOME IS A BOOK
DNA/ THE HUMAN GENOME IS A BIBLE (HOLY BOOK)
DNA/ THE HUMAN GENOME IS THE BOOK OF LIFE

Even the subcomponents of DNA have been conceptualised metaphorically, and this since the very beginnings of modern genetics in the 1950s (Bygrave, 2002):

BASES ARE LETTERS
CODONS [FOUR-LETTER GROUPINGS] ARE WORDS
GENES ARE SENTENCES
CHROMOSOMES ARE CHAPTERS

For four decades these metaphors have been remarkably stable despite changes in genetic science. These textual source domains entail that to understand genes or DNA one must be able to read, since reading in this case is metaphorical for comprehension. To read the book of life is thus to understand the function and expression of genes in organisms. The reading metaphor first originated in the decision to name the four bases of DNA. Adenine, guanine, thymine and cytosine were then represented by the letters A, G, T, and C. The fortuitous choice to represent bases by the first letters of their scientific names made it easier for metaphors to take hold in genetics that exploit our everyday knowledge of reading, books and codes. If the DNA bases had been represented by numbers, the whole metaphor system surrounding genetics might have looked different. Even the title of the 1997 film, Gattaca, was no doubt inspired by the letters used to stand for the four DNA bases.

However, it should be stressed that the reading metaphor also pre-dates the discovery of DNA. It ties in with the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING (Sweetser, 1990:38) on the one hand, and has been used in western culture to elevate the knowledge achieved by the natural sciences to the status of that represented in the holy book of the Bible (at least since Francis Bacon and Galileo Galilei) on the other hand. For physical vision to refer to mental "intellection", as Sweetser (1990: 38) suggests in her classic analysis of this pattern, we must map a physical domain onto a mental domain. For example, to say "I see what you mean" to indicate "I know what you mean" is just one of the many linguistic manifestations
of the KNOWING IS SEEING conceptual metaphor. If to see DNA is to know DNA, then to read it physically is to understand it mentally. As Sweetser documents, the semantic shift from the physical to the mental that our perceptual verbs reveal offers solid evidence for the pervasive nature of this cognitive act in language. That is, polysemy is often motivated rather than arbitrary. There are good reasons, in other words, for using see when meaning know. With regard to genes, therefore, we fully understand why in June 2000 the then Vice President of the United States Al Gore compared the human genetic code to the Nazi secret code in relation to diseases like cancer (i.e. the enemy): “With the completion of the Human Genome, we are on the verge of cracking another enemy’s secret code” (quoted in Annas 2000:775, note 79). Gore’s statement implies that diseases hide in a secret code, which is bad, and that cracking that code may mean finding a cure for diseases, which is good. This is an assumption based fundamentally upon the KNOWING IS SEEING conceptual metaphor.

As for our hypothesis about negative semantic prosody for words akin to genes, there does seem to be ample support for this hypothesis from evidence in the metaphors in which these words are embedded. Consider, for instance, the following examples from the three corpora we have studied:

- genetic alchemy
- genetic control
- the DNA genetic control centre
- genetic engineering
- genetic manipulation
- genetic fingerprinting
- the shadow of genetic injustice
- burdened with their genetic lot
- risks of genetic pollution
- genetic discourse meets environmental discourse
- exact genetic replicas
- just an automaton driven by his genetic predisposition
- man-made genetic time bombs

As we noted earlier, the grammatical function of the adjective genetic seems to influence the negative semantic prosodies seen above. As Aristotle noted long ago, epithets (i.e. adjectives) could be metaphoric (Rhetoric 1405a:169), so we need not be surprised to find figurative phrases prompted by the adjective ‘genetic’ here. If genetically manipulated organisms are typically imagined as un-natural, artificially produced, robot-like creatures who evoke various stereotypes in literature and film, from Frankenstein to the Attack of the Clones in Star Wars (Nerlich, Dingwall & Clarke, 1999), then the metaphors serve a purpose.
As someone in one corpus put it, “Perhaps it was a genetic thing”, whereby they may have meant to refer to something that caused a certain effect (e.g. cancer). If genes are that which cause life forms to exist, then understanding genes in causal terms makes sense. But as Sinclair (1991) discovered with his analysis of “happen”, the term is generally used in such a way to provide it with a semantic prosody that is negative. In general, the same is true with words based on the lemma GENE.

The negative semantic prosody for the adjective genetic is also found for the adverb genetically. In the corpora, genetically seems to collocate with less-than-favourable words such as:

- genetically controlled
- genetically defined
- genetically determined
- genetically manipulated
- genetically mapped
- genetically modified
- genetically altered
- genetically based inferiority
- genetically handicapped
- genetically predetermined
- genetically programmed
- genetically engineered

The clash between the natural and the artificial here could not be clearer. The “natural” in this case referring to something that is not controlled, manipulated, modified, altered, programmed, or engineered by human beings. All deviation from what is “natural” strikes us as dangerous, base, or something to be avoided. When we sense that something is out of our hands or that we can’t do much about it, this implies that we are what we are because our genes determine who we are and so all human agency is removed from life. For these reasons we posit that there are negative connotations with the terms in the list above. Nobody will have any concern for a bridge that was “mechanically engineered” because of what we take the nature of engineering to be. However, when engineering meets biology, then concerns spring up because a tomato that is “genetically engineered” is perhaps something to reconsider before dinner.

The semantic prosody, therefore, reflects a limit of acceptability, especially since what genetically immediately precedes is not often a positive term in its own right. We accept the fact that cars are engineered, but we have a harder time accepting the fact that tomatoes too can also be engineered. From expecting things like cars, bridges, machines,
computers, and so on to be humanly engineered, we have moved into a situation where we find that things which we did not expect to find engineered, such as viruses, food, crops, organisms, microbes, microorganisms, and farm animals, are in fact engineered in the way that a car is engineered today. This shift, from the natural to the artificial, points to the clash referred to earlier and relates directly to our understanding of control. As Nelkin (2001: 556) states, “Through metaphors, genetics can seem to be a source of salvation or a means of exploitation or control”, although we should note that control can be seen in a negative and positive light. After all, it is perhaps desirable to ‘control’ the gene for Huntingdon’s disease, for example.

There are, of course, a few exceptions from time to time where semantic prosody is concerned and there are cases where the semantic prosody may not appear to be negative:

- genetic endowment
- genetic richness
- genetic diversity
- genetically pure
- genetically purer
- genetically superior
- gene therapy
- gene pool
- genes might have been nature’s gift
- desirable genes

These instances seem to suggest a positive prosody given the collocates with the lemma GENE. But, at closer inspection some have rather negative connotations in certain contexts. Genetic purity and genetic superiority are concepts that, in the context of eugenics, are unattractive. Some of these connotations may not be directly visible in the corpus because the corpora are less than 20 years old. But they come with the words as their ideological baggage from a time when genetic purity and genetic superiority were pursued by various states around the world, most memorably the Nazi state.

To understand in detail the source of our ambivalence towards genetic biotechnology, we need look no further than our very words: those based on the lemma GENE seem so often to be negative rather than positive. However, what Louw (1993: 159) would call “colouring” can occur in exceptional cases where the semantic prosody, say, for genetic is more positive than negative, as in genetic richness. And so, although the semantics tend to be more negative than positive, it is not impossible to get positive semantic prosodies when gene talk occurs. One reason for the occasional exception would have to be the rhetoric surrounding biotechnology. As Lina Hellsten (2002:5) remarks:
The public debates on biotechnology and biodiversity are thoroughly metaphorised. Cloning is constantly discussed as if it dealt with the mass production of commodities, either producing lousy copies of the original or perfect products. The Human Genome Project is expected to reveal the secrets of life, but it is also opposed by warnings of science playing God—depending on the underlying views on the goal of this science's journey. Similarly, the conservation of biodiversity is constantly discussed in terms of the common heritage of the human kind, richness that should be preserved for future generations. This richness is sometimes defined as gold, treasuries, and jewels but sometimes also as values and complex relations—depending on the underlying views on 'nature' as either a store of commodities or a dynamic network of processes.

In other words, there are good reasons for feeling ambivalent about what we are talking about when we are talking about genes. Those with a favourable view of genetic science might more frequently use positive meanings, whereas those with more doubts about the benefits of genetic science might more frequently use negative meanings. What our research shows, however, is that the champions of biotechnology have their work cut out for them given the fact that the words themselves used for genetic science tend more often than not to strike us as negative rather than positive.

VI. CONCLUSION

As we have shown, a cognitive linguistic approach to semantics can be bolstered by the use of corpus linguistics. Our combined methods yield a new understanding of gene talk in all of its various aspects. That the semantic prosodies for words based on the lemma GENE are often negative in the corpora that we have studied highlights conceptual issues underlying current debates surrounding biotechnology. Moreover, the substantial use of metaphors in gene talk reinforces our view that metaphors are ubiquitous in everyday language. Given the complexity of genetic science and the invisible nature of genes, it is hard to talk about genes literally. This suggests that context counts where semantic prosodies are concerned. Meanings cannot be removed from pragmatic contexts (i.e. where gene talk occurs) or from lexical contexts (i.e. the words found before or after the word under analysis). As most of our data come from the 1990s we could only provide a synchronic snapshot of how the lemma GENE was used at a time when genetic breakthroughs revolutionised our understanding of life, and of the meaning of life, during the last decade or so. It would be interesting to analyse the diachronic changes in the uses and meanings of gene over time, from the 1960s, when genetic science had its first scientific and popular peak to the 1990s, when it had its second, but this will have to wait for another time. We hope to have shown, however, that combining methods from corpus and cognitive linguistics enables us to see what genetics means and why it means what it means when people talk about genes. As we found, to try to talk about
genes in a positive manner is not easy. Those trying to sell biotechnology or genetic science might wish to keep this mind.

NOTES

1 For more examples, see Condit (1999).

2 For more information on public attitudes towards GM food and designer babies, please see Turner (in prep.) and Townsend & Clarke (in prep.).

3 See Stubbs (1995) for a discussion of using statistical analyses in the area of corpus linguistics.

4 Please see Stubbs (1996) for a discussion of this issue.

5 For a detailed description of this corpus, please see Burnard (1995) and Aston & Burnard (1998).

6 The corpus was sponsored by Cambridge University Press with whom sole copyright resides.

7 For a comprehensive description of the CANCODE corpus, please see McCarthy (1998).

8 For a more detailed description of these categories, see Adolphs & Carter in this volume.

9 It is important to highlight that the instances summarised in this table were drawn from a range of different conversations in the respective categories. We recognise, however, that our observations are limited to a small set of instances found in the corpus and that too much should not be claimed for them until further evidence is gathered.

10 As so often with 'dead metaphors', the metaphorical roots and ramifications of such terms only resurface in jokes, such as the one heard on 7 October 2001 on a popular BBC Radio 4 News Quiz. Somebody jokingly said on that programme that scientists had deciphered the genome of a plague virus which contained almost as many letters as the BBC's complaints department.

REFERENCES


Repeat after Me: The Value of Replication

RONALD MACAULAY
Pitzer College

ABSTRACT
The past forty years have seen a variety of sociolinguistic investigations, producing interesting results. However, there is always a risk that some of these results may have given a misleading picture of the situation because of a design flaw in the project or some effect of ignored factors. One way of testing any claims is through a replication of the original study. This paper examines three claims made about discourse variation, showing how separate studies can either support or challenge those claims.

KEYWORDS: Sociolinguistic methodology, discourse variation, Scottish dialects

One of the goals of linguistic theory is to identify universal characteristics of language (Chomsky 1965). These universals can be phonetic (Laver 1994), phonological (Jakobson 1941), morphological (Croft 1990) or syntactic (Greenberg 1963). Few scholars may be concerned with lexical universals, though the use of lexicostatistics in glottochronology assumes that some lexical items are basic to all languages. In semantics and pragmatics (e.g., Grice 1975; Brown and Levinson 1987) there has been a search for general principles. In sociolinguistics, however, the main interest has been in universal principles of linguistic change (Labov 1994). There has been less interest in other general principles of sociolinguistic variation, except for claims about gender differences.

Because investigation of discourse variation must examine samples of talk in action, the use of a specific feature is locally determined, and thus any conclusion from a specific data set may not generalize to other situations. For this reason, any conclusions drawn from a single

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study may give an unreliable indication of a more widespread difference. A salutary example is the claim that men interrupt women more than women interrupt men. This view gained an early impetus from an article by Zimmerman and West (1975), and was often taken to be an established fact (Aries 1987; Holmes 1991; Rosenblum 1986). A critical review of the relevant studies (James and Clarke 1993) up to that date, however, found that "such a conclusion is incorrect; the majority of studies have found no significant difference between the sexes in this respect" (1993: 309). A similar review of research (James and Drakich 1993) found no basis for the widely held view that women talk more than men. Such assessments are vitally important to a field such as sociolinguistics because it is only through convergence of results from replications of earlier studies or evidence from studies using different samples or different methodology that we can have any confidence in the results (Campbell and Fiske 1959).

Munroe and Munroe (1991: 164) have emphasized the need for replication in anthropology:

> Replicative undertakings, which are not prized in anthropology, nevertheless must occupy a central place in comparative investigations, just as they do in other scientific activities.

They cite the following passage from Campbell (1969: 427.428):

> Because we social scientists have less ability [than physical scientists] to achieve experimental isolation, because we have good reason to expect our treatment effects to interact significantly with a wide variety of social factors many of which we have not yet mapped, we have much greater needs for replication experiments than do the physical sciences.

Because so many uncontrollable factors affect the quality of speech recorded in sociolinguistic investigations (see, for example, the papers in Eckert and Rickford 2001), it is crucial to compare results from different studies to determine which findings are candidates for generalization to a wider population, even though it will seldom be possible to replicate any investigation exactly (Dow 1987).

There is a good example that illustrates this problem. When Fowler (1986) attempted an exact replication of Labov’s New York department store survey (Labov 1966: 63-89), she had to replace the lowest-rated store, S. Klein because it had gone out of business (Labov 1994: 87-94). This was particularly unfortunate because May’s, the replacement store, showed “a dramatic increase” (Labov 1994: 90) over the figures from S. Klein in the original survey. It is impossible to tell whether this would have been the same if S. Klein were still in business. Thus, even an attempt to replicate an earlier study may not be easy. Most sociolinguistic investigations, however, are not designed as exact replications of previous studies, so there will be much greater differences in the methodology employed. Nevertheless, convergence of results from very different kinds of studies will help to give greater force to individual findings.

The present paper examines certain claims made about sociolinguistic differences in discourse style. The first is one made by Barbara Johnstone (1990; 1993) with regard to the
difference between men and women in their ways of telling stories. Johnstone based her claims on 68 stories collected in Fort Wayne, Indiana by students in her classes over the period 1981-1985. The age of the story-tellers ranged from fourteen to sixty-four. Thirty-five of the story-tellers were female and twenty-four male. The examples I will be using for comparison come from more diverse examples of language recorded under a variety of circumstances in different parts of Scotland. Johnstone’s narrators were “white, middle-class, urban mid-westerners” (1993: 67). The Scottish examples come from both working-class and middle-class speakers. The two sets of data are consequently very different and thus any convergence of results should strengthen any conclusions drawn from them.

One of Johnstone’s findings refers to a difference in extrathematic details. She describes extrathematic as follows:

> Many Fort Wayne personal experience stories include far more detail than should, from the point of view of strict relevance, be necessary, detail which turns out to have no bearing on the narrative core at all.

*Johnstone (1990: 91)*

One difference in extrathematic detail that Johnstone (1993: 73) notices refers to places and names:

> While the men specify place and time more often than do the women, the women use personal names more than twice as often as do the men.

This was something I had noted in comparing interviews with a Dundee woman, Bella K. and her brother Len M. (Macaulay 1996). I examined the frequency with which they used different kinds of noun types. The results are shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Len (people)</th>
<th>Len (physical objects)</th>
<th>Bella (people)</th>
<th>Bella (physical objects)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freq. (n)</td>
<td>26.5 (335)</td>
<td>24.6 (310)</td>
<td>34.2 (432)</td>
<td>35.1 (443)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Freq. = per 1,000 words]

I had expected that in Belle’s interview there would be more references to people than to physical objects and in Len’s more references to physical objects than to people but the results are slightly in the opposite direction. It can be seen that Bella uses both kinds of nouns more frequently than Len. There is, however, one category which Len uses six times as frequently as Bella and that is proper nouns referring to places, as can be seen in Table 2. Since much of Len’s narrative refers to his wartime experiences as a soldier in North Africa and as a prisoner-of-war in Italy and Germany, it is hardly surprising that geographical names should feature largely in his interview but it is not only that which makes the difference. Len refers to the city of Dundee by name 35 times, compared with only 13 mentions by Bella in a transcript of equal length.
Table 2: Frequency of proper nouns referring to places

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Len</th>
<th>Bella</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Freq. = per 1,000 words]

In an examination of same-sex dyadic conversations recorded in Glasgow in 1997 (Stuart-Smith 1999, 2003) as part of a study of linguistic change in Britain (Foulkes and Docherty 1999), I looked at the use of proper names. In this sample, there were two age groups: adolescents aged 13-14 and adults aged 40 and over, and approximately equal numbers of males and females, and middle-class and working-class speakers. In the conversations, the adolescents talk a lot about their friends, but there are differences between the girls and the boys. Table 3 gives the frequency with which people are named in the adolescent conversations:

Table 3: Named references to people in Glasgow adolescent conversations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Refs. to boys</th>
<th>Refs. to girls</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n) freq.</td>
<td>(n) freq.</td>
<td>(n) freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class adolescents</td>
<td>154 7.0</td>
<td>240 10.9</td>
<td>394 9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class adolescents</td>
<td>216 10.2</td>
<td>303 14.4</td>
<td>519 24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All girls</td>
<td>203 8.4</td>
<td>496 20.6</td>
<td>699 29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All boys</td>
<td>167 8.8</td>
<td>47 2.5</td>
<td>214 11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Freq. = per 1,000 words]

Table 3 shows both social class and gender differences. References to named people in the working-class conversations (24.6 per 1,000 words) are more than twice as frequent as those in the middle-class conversations (10.9 per 1,000 words) (p. < .05). More strikingly, the girls name people (29.0 per 1,000 words) almost three times as frequently as the boys (11.3 per 1,000 words) (p. < .001). It is also clear that while both boys and girls name boys with about the same frequency, girls name other girls much more frequently (20.6 per thousand words) than boys name girls (2.5 per thousand words) (p. < .001). This can be seen also in the use of pronouns, as shown in Table 4:

Table 4: Use of personal pronouns by Glasgow adolescents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>he</th>
<th>she</th>
<th>we</th>
<th>you</th>
<th>they</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n) freq.</td>
<td>(n) freq.</td>
<td>(n) freq.</td>
<td>(n) freq.</td>
<td>(n) freq.</td>
<td>(n) freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>1754 72.8</td>
<td>454 18.8</td>
<td>737 30.6</td>
<td>218 9.0</td>
<td>614 25.5</td>
<td>208 8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>933 49.2</td>
<td>370 19.5</td>
<td>125 6.6</td>
<td>174 9.2</td>
<td>716 37.8</td>
<td>281 14.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[* Includes all forms of the pronoun, e.g., I, me, mine, etc.]

It can be seen from Table 4 that while both girls and boys use forms of the pronoun he equally frequently, the girls use forms of the pronoun she (30.6 per 1,000 words) almost five times more frequently than the boys (6.6 per 1,000 words) (p. < .001). Added to this is the more frequent use
of the first person pronoun *I* by girls, so that it is clear that girls talk a lot more about girls than either boys or girls talk about boys.

A similar pattern emerges with the adults as can be seen in Table 5.

*Table 5: Named references to people in Glasgow adult conversations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refs. to men</th>
<th>Refs. to women</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>freq.</td>
<td>(n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class adults</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class adults</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen from Table 5 that there are essentially no differences between the two social classes but the gender differences are even greater than among the adolescents, with the men making very few references to named people (2.6 per 1,000 words) compared with the women (9.7 per 1,000 words) (p.< .05), and the women naming other women twice as frequently (6.6 per 1,000 words) as they name men (3.1 per 1,000 words) (p.< .001). The differences in adult pronoun use are shown in Table 6.

*Table 6: Use of personal pronouns by Glasgow adults*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>he</th>
<th>she</th>
<th>we</th>
<th>you</th>
<th>they</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>freq.</td>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>freq.</td>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>freq.</td>
<td>(n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (2538)</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (1476)</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen from Table 6 that the women use the personal pronoun *he* (10.1 per 1,000 words) almost twice as often as the men (6.9 per 1,000 words) and the pronoun *she* four times as frequently (20.2 vs. 5.2). The combined totals of the two pronouns for women are 30.3 and 12.1 for the men) (p.< .001). These differences are all the more striking in that there are only minor differences in the use of the other pronouns, including the first person pronoun *I*. Since the conversations were unstructured and open-ended, the similarity in the use of pronouns other than *he* and *she* between the two groups is almost more remarkable than their differences in the use of the gender-specific pronouns.

*Table 7: Named references to places in Glasgow adolescent conversations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(n)</th>
<th>freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class adolescents</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class adolescents</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All girls</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All boys</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Freq. = per 1,000 words]
The implication of Tables 3-6 is that in the Glasgow sessions, both with adolescents and adults, the females talk about people more than the males do. What about named references to places? Table 7 gives the figures for named references to physical locations in the adolescent conversations.

It can be seen in Table 7 that the working-class adolescents name places slightly more frequently than the middle-class adolescents, but the gender difference is greater, with the boys naming places (5.44 per 1,000 words) more than twice as frequently as the girls (2.45 per 1,000 words) (p.<.05). The gender differences are even greater among the adults, as can be seen in Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8: Named references to places in adult conversations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the adolescents, the social class differences are not important, but the men name places (18.2 per 1,000 words) almost three times as often as the women (6.66 per 1,000 words) (p.<.05).

Looking at the conversations as a whole it is possible to identify those parts where the participants are talking about other people. There is an interpretative aspect here since it is not always easy to tell when one topic ends and another begins. The figures in Tables 9 and 10 are based upon word counts of the proportion of each session devoted to the discussion of people known to the speakers. As with the numbers in Tables 4 and 6 this excludes discussion of public figures such as footballers or musicians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Proportion of talk about people in Glasgow adolescent conversations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class adolescents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class adolescents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All boys</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gender differences are even more marked by a comparison of the individual sessions. In one conversation between two middle-class girls 88% is devoted to discussing their peers and teachers, and in the two conversations by working-class girls the proportion is 75%. In contrast, among the boys the highest proportion is 38% in one of the conversations between middle-class boys and in one of the working-class boys' conversations the proportion is only 7%.

A similar range is seen in the adult conversations, as shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Proportion of talk about people in Glasgow adult conversations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class adults</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class adults</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The range among the women is from 63% to 13% and among the men from 25% to 5%.

The quantitative differences can be illustrated with clear examples. The first is from an interview I recorded with Ella Laidlaw, a working-class woman, in Ayr. In a story she told about how she had missed an important examination by playing truant the attention to names is clear.

(1) so when the teacher asked where we were before the exam started

"Please miss"
it was Miss Sadler
she died last week tae
saw her death in the paper
"Please miss Ella Dunlop Alice Croft Janie Stardie" and some other body
I cannae mind who the other lassie was -- oh Ellen Connel
"are away to the Carnegie Library"
she says "Are they?"
so she phoned Mr Reid the janitor
and she sent him to Carnegie Library for us

Truly this is a complete list of characters, all named, including even the janitor. Note that Ella is concerned when she cannot remember the other girl's name after more than fifty years even though it would obviously mean nothing to me. Her use of names contrasts with that of Andrew Sinclair, a coal miner, I also interviewed in Ayr. Ella Laidlaw uses the names of people she knows with a frequency of 8.1 per thousand words, Andrew Sinclair with a frequency of only 1.98 per thousand words. His son, his son-in-law, and his wife are not named when they are mentioned. On the other hand, he is very particular about naming places. In the interview, he names places with a frequency of 8.27 per thousand words, in contrast to EL's 5.5 per thousand words. The example in (2) shows his concern about where people live but not what they are called. He is talking about a man he met in Canada when he was there during the war while he was a merchant seaman.

(2) he was manager of a munitions factory in Canada
and he belonged here to Kilmarnock here
in fact he told me he'd worked in Ayr town hall here in the-- in the for the Council here in the old town of Ayr

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and I always remembered the last time I spoke to him before I left
he used to say "I'll write home and tell my sister" he says
"a fine looking lassie herself"
I'll put in a word for you"
she stayed in Williams Street in Kilmarnock
but I never ever went to see her or anything like that

Neither the man nor the lassie is named, but the street is.

Thus the claim that Johnstone (1993:73) made that women make more frequent reference
to people and men to places is supported by evidence from quite independent studies. This does
not make it a sociolinguistic universal but shows that the finding was not totally idiosyncratic.

The second area that I wish to deal with is the discourse marker *you know*. There are two
claims that have been made about the use of *you know*. One is that it is used more frequently by
working-class speakers (Stubbe and Holmes 1995), and the other that it is used more frequently
by women than by men (Fishman 1978, 1980; Östman 1981). In examining the use of *you know*
in the set of Ayr interviews (Macaulay 1991) and the Glasgow conversations, I found no
difference between the middle-class and the working-class speakers in the frequency with which
they used *you know* (Macaulay 2002). However, I did find considerable gender differences in
Glasgow, as shown in Table 11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>(n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class women</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>(151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class men</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>(68 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class women</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>(245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class men</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>(79 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class girls</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>(18 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class boys</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class girls</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class boys</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Social class and gender differences in the use of *you know* in Glasgow

The Glasgow women use *you know* with a frequency of 8.33 in contrast to the Glasgow men’s
frequency of 4.48. This difference is consistent with results reported by Fishman (1978, 1980)
and Östman (1981), but not with Holmes (1986), who found no gender differences in her sample.
The Glasgow adults have a total of 548 instances with a frequency of 6.48 per thousand words;
the adolescents have 37 instances, with a frequency of 0.86. Whatever it is that leads to the use
of *you know* in peer conversations of this kind it does not seem to be well established in Glasgow
at the age of fourteen.

Erman (1993) in an examination of the use of *you know* in the London-Lund Corpus found
that men used *you know* more frequently than women. Erman gives figures to show that more
examples of you know were produced by males (198) than by females (148), but she does not give figures on the actual amount of speech produced by males and females, and it is likely that the men produced more speech in the samples Erman examined. In order to investigate this further I calculated the frequencies on the basis of the published transcripts.

The transcribed portions of the London-Lund Corpus (Svantvik and Quirk 1980) are not easy to analyze in terms of individual speakers because the contribution of each speaker is not tabulated separately. Instead, Svantvik and Quirk present 5,000 word samples of 34 sessions which may contain from one to six speakers. It is, however, possible to separate out the contributions of men and women, with an approximate estimate of the number of words contributed by each gender, though it has to be stressed that these are not exact figures. There is a gender imbalance with men providing approximately 107,500 words (63%) of the total 170,000 and women approximately 62,500 (37%). There are 10 sessions in which only men speak and 4 in which the speakers all are women. The remainder are mixed-sex. I made a handcount of the use of you know in the LLC transcripts. According to my count the overall frequency of you know is 4.28 but the men use you know with a frequency of 3.35 compared with a frequency of 5.87 for the women. Thus, I did not find confirmation of Erman’s claim.

Holmes (1986: 14) and Erman (1993: 228) found a greater use of you know in same-sex interactions than in mixed-sex ones, so I looked at this in the LLC corpus. My analysis of the 34 conversations of the London-Lund corpus confirms the view that you know is more likely to occur in same-sex sessions. In the twenty mixed-sex sessions the frequency of you know is only 3.79 compared with 5.06 in same-sex sessions. So the claim that you know is more frequent in same-sex conversations is supported. However, the gender difference persists. In mixed-sex sessions the men use you know with a frequency of 3.14 compared with the women’s frequency of 4.75. In the same-sex sessions the differences are even greater with the men using you know with a frequency of 3.64 compared with the women’s frequency of 8.25. The London-Lund sessions thus support the claim that you know is more frequently used by women than by men.

In the case of you know, replication has not produced a clear picture of its use. The results of several studies show that the use of you know varies greatly in that some speakers use it very frequently while others from a similar background or of the same gender use it rarely. This makes generalizations about its use hazardous until we have much more evidence available, and it would be wise not to be tempted into drawing conclusions about the significance of its use until we have a clearer idea of the situation. Thus, you know is a good example of a feature that needs further attention before any generalizations can be solidly established.

My third example comes from two examples of my own work. In analyzing the Ayr interviews (Macaulay 1991) I found what was to me a surprising difference in the use of derived adverbs in -ly by the two social classes. The figures are given in Table 12.
Table 12: Relative frequency of derivative adverbs in -ly in Ayr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower-class</th>
<th>Middle-class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manner</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time/Freq.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>really</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[freq. = per 1,000 words]

The middle-class speakers used these adverbs more than three times as often as the lower-class speakers (p.< .001), which was an unexpected result. I attempted an explanation of this difference (Macaulay 1995) but I was troubled by the anxiety that the results might have been a consequence of addressee effect (Bell 1984). Consequently, when I examined the Glasgow transcripts of conversations between friends, I was interested to see whether that same kind of picture might emerge. The results are shown in Table 13.

Table 13: Relative frequency of derivative adverbs in -ly in Glasgow (adults)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working-class</th>
<th>Middle-class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manner</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time/Freq.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>really</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>4.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[freq. = per 1,000 words]

It can be seen from Table 13 that the same pattern occurs with the middle-class speakers using these adverbs more than twice as often as the working-class speakers (p.< .001). Given the difference in the ways in which the materials were recorded, it is unlikely that the results were seriously affected by the methodology. The use of adverbs is thus an example of a question that might repay further exploration with other samples to find out whether this social class difference in the use of adverbs is found elsewhere.

There is, as far as I know, no comparable study of adverbs but Kroch (1995), in his study of upper class Philadelphia speech found that upper class men were more likely than upper class women or upper middle-class men to use ‘intensifying adverbs’ (e.g., very, extremely) though the results were not statistically significant. This is consistent with my findings from the Ayr study (Macaulay 1991: 131) and Glasgow (Macaulay 2002). Table 14 shows the figures for the frequency of very in Ayr and Glasgow.
Table 14: Relative frequency of very in Ayr and Glasgow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower-class</th>
<th></th>
<th>Middle-class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayr</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[freq. = per 1,000 words]

The social class difference in the use of very in the Glasgow sample is even more striking than that in Ayr and is highly significant (p < .001). Half of the working-class Glasgow adults do not use very even once. Kroch did not investigate the speech of other social class groups, so his study does not replicate the Ayr or Glasgow studies, but the results seem to be consistent with mine.

Three examples of replication have been examined in this paper. The first and third of them may be sufficiently convincing to provide tentative sociolinguistic generalizations, while the second example (you know) shows the danger of jumping to premature conclusions. But it is not just examples of discourse variation like these that can benefit from replication. We know how speech samples are affected by genre (Macaulay 2001) and style (Eckert and Rickford 2001). Any conclusions about a linguistic variable based on a single sample collected by a single technique are vulnerable to refutation. That is how science progresses. We need replications of all important earlier investigations to help strengthen or undermine confidence in their results and that will be to the benefit of the discipline of sociolinguistics.

These are two powerful reasons for asking the same question more than once. Striking results tend to get cited more often and come to seem well-established even when the actual evidence is not overwhelming. Zimmerman and West's (1975) article on interruptions cited earlier is one example. As Brenneis and Macaulay pointed out:

In the reporting of sex differences, no news is not good news; it is not news of any kind, and neither tenure nor promotion will follow from the reporting of negative results.  

* Brenneis and Macaulay (1996: 75)

Consequently, probably more people still believe that there is strong evidence that men interrupt women more than women interrupt men, despite the review by (James and Clarke 1993). A more distressing example is the influence of Basil Bernstein. It is seldom mentioned that many of Bernstein's claims were based on a tiny sample of adolescent boys recorded under far from optimal circumstances (Bernstein 1962), yet his results were often generalized as evidence of social class differences for the total population. An investigation of the kinds of features Bernstein examined in a different sample of speakers (Macaulay, in prep.) shows that there is support for only two of his claims (adverbs, passives) and that these do not justify the conclusions Bernstein drew from them. This does not necessarily mean that Bernstein was wrong but it does challenge the evidence for his claims.

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Similarly, while there is an understandable interest in linguistic change, it is also remarkable that some features which might be candidates for change have not changed (Macaulay 1988). It is only rarely that researchers carry out a real time investigation of linguistic change as was the case in Montréal with the 1971 Sankoff and Cedergren corpus (Sankoff and Sankoff, 1973). The Sankoff-Cedergren corpus consists of 60 interviews with French speakers in Montréal in 1971; in 1984 these speakers were interviewed again, with the addition of 12 younger speakers (Thibault and Vincent, 1990). Dubois (1993) and Vincent (1993) were able to trace certain features to see which had changed and which remained stable over this period. More examples of this kind of replication would be very welcome.

NOTES:

1 In Table 3 and in Table 5 references to public figures such as footballers or actors are not included.

2 All references to statistical significance are based on the Mann-Whitney nonparametric test.

3 The pronoun *it* was not included in Tables 4 and 6 because *it* has other functions in addition to being an anaphoric pronoun. It is consequently difficult to draw conclusions about reference from the raw figures. For what they are worth, the frequencies of *it* are: Boys 26.55, Girls 23.74, Men 28.47, Women 33.95.

4 The Ayr sample is badly unbalanced for gender so it is not possible to draw conclusions about gender differences.

5 The frequency for the Glasgow adults is almost identical to that found by Holmes (1986:13) for informal contexts, namely 6.9 per thousand words. Although Holmes’ corpus is much smaller (30,000), the similarity of frequency is interesting.

6 The frequency of *very* in the 34 conversations of the London-Lund corpus is 4.92, (based on Svartvik, Eeg-Olofsson, Forsboda, Orestrom, and Thavenius 1982: 44). This is consistent with the middle-class status of the London-Lund speakers.

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Sociolinguistics, Cognitivism, and Discursive Psychology

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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the broad question of how work in sociolinguistics should be related to social theory, and in particular the assumptions about cognition that can underpin that relation. A discursive psychological approach to issues of cognition is pressed and illustrated by a reworking of Stubb’s review of work on language and cognition. A discursive psychological approach is offered to the topics of racist discourse, courtroom interaction, scientific writing, and sexism. Discursive psychology rejects the approach to ‘cognition’ as a collection of more or less stable inner entities and processes. Instead the focus is on the way ‘mental phenomena’ are both constructed and oriented to in people’s practices.

KEYWORDS: Conversation analysis, cognition, courtroom interaction, scientific discourse, discourse, sociolinguistics, racism, sexism

How can sociolinguistics be related to social theory? This is a complicated question for a range of reasons. Obviously what one understands to fall under the purview of sociolinguistics is one issue; precisely which social theory we are talking about is another. A further complication is

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whether we consider the relation between sociolinguistics and social theory to be additive or agonistic. For example, on the one hand, van Dijk’s (1997) volumes on discourse studies map out an additive approach where various topics — ideology, semantics, register, cognitive representation, and so on — are treated as complementary modules that can be articulated together to contribute to a larger picture. On the other hand, some strands of ethnomethodological conversation analysis provide instead a wholesale respecification of topics, methods and questions. In conversation analysis, for example, the attempt is often not to relate institutions, as prior existing and clearly identifiable phenomena, with the more ephemeral waxing and waning of talk; rather institutional realities are treated as constituted in talk in a variety of ways as participants construct and orient to institutional goals and identities (Drew & Sorjonen 1997; Heritage 1997).

In this chapter we will be taking on a discursive psychological perspective, which itself draws heavily on ethnomethodological conversation analysis. So we will be pressing respecification rather than addition in the relation between sociolinguistics and social theory. That is, rather than joining up pieces of an existing jigsaw more neatly we will be attempting to paint a rather different picture. However, we wish to avoid simply reiterating the kinds of arguments about the role of social categories and social context in analysis that have been developed in this area by Sacks (1992), Schegloff (1997) and others. Instead, we will focus in particular on the topic of cognition and its role in sociolinguistics and social theory. Our aim will be to show how the additive model breaks down when considering cognition, and therefore to provide further support for a general respecification.

Much of sociolinguistics has developed against a backdrop of linguistic and sociological themes, and has therefore had little need to develop a formulated and explicit account of cognition. Nevertheless, it is common to find some version of ‘perceptual-cognitivism’ assumed in sociolinguistic research; that is, the idea that human activities are performed on the basis of cognitive processes of some kind acting on perceptual input, and governing behavioural output. Where cognition is addressed more explicitly, such as in the field of discourse processes (Graesser et al. 1997), the standard conceptions of cognitive psychology have often been adopted unchanged, with the research task treated as relating two things: features of language (grammar, lexical items, etc.) and inner cognitive processes.

Ironically, as sociolinguists look toward social theory, they are often dealing with perspectives that make the very same cognitivist assumptions. Other contributors to this volume have drawn on theorists such as Habermas and Bourdieu who, in the course of developing broad social theories, make a number of consequential assumptions about cognitive representations and processes. We do not have time or space here to map out these assumptions in any detail; but we hope to at least show that this would be a fruitful enterprise and that our arguments would have broader implications for those theories.

We are, obviously, aware of the huge research literature in cognitive psychology, cognitive science and social cognition that takes a perspective very different from our own. And,
of course, the literature in discourse processes, including a range of contributions to van Dijk (1997) also makes starkly different cognitivist assumptions to the one we have developed. In the course of a range of publications, our argument has been that, for the most part, the research reported in this literature has not tested cognitivism against alternatives; rather, cognitivism has been presupposed in the detail of research practices. It is striking, for example, that much cognitive psychology uses discursive materials (as both ‘input’ and ‘output’) but ignores their specifically discursive features. Put another way, cognitive psychology has overwhelmingly worked with a view of discourse untouched by (the later) Wittgenstein and Sacks. Discourse is treated as an abstract logical and referential system — language — rather than a locally managed, action oriented, co-constructed resource.

Part of the difficulty is that theoretical assumptions have become sedimented into method. For the most part, cognitive psychological methods (using experiments, vignettes, questionnaires and so on) act as a systematic machinery for wiping out the practical, indexical, reflexive features of discourse that discursive psychologists argue are fundamental. We have not space here for surveying the arguments for and against these claims — for some examples in the cognitive psychological domains of language, memory and attribution see the debates expressed and described in Conway, 1992; Edwards and Potter 1993 1999; Schmid and Fiedler 1999. The general point we would take from this work is that the nature of discourse is inadequately theorized, and this inadequacy will cause problems for any sociolinguist attempting to simply bolt on a cognitive ‘level of analysis’ to a linguistic one.

In this chapter we will take a discursive psychological approach to cognition (Edwards 1997; Edwards & Potter 1992; Potter & Edwards in press). This will involve neither assuming the theorizing of current cognitive psychology nor presupposing an implicit perceptual cognitivism. Discursive psychology provides an alternative theorization of both language and cognition. Instead of considering ‘language’ an abstract object with systemic properties, the focus is on texts and talk in social practices (discourse). Instead of considering ‘cognition’ as a collection of more or less technical inner entities and processes, the focus is on how mental phenomena are both constructed and oriented to in people’s practices. Discursive psychology starts with action and understands the use of words, modalities, metaphors, and so on in terms of the way that talk and texts are oriented to action. Likewise, it treats the huge thesaurus of mentalistic terms that people have available to them as a resource for doing action: persuading, justifying, accounting, flirting and so on. In this ambition, it blends into, and draws on, a range of work in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (e.g. Coulter 1990; Goodwin & Goodwin 1996 1997; Lynch & Bogen 1996; Peräkylä 1995; Suchman 1987).

A central feature of discursive psychology is its co-ordinated reworking of the manner in which both cognition and reality (or better, ‘cognition’ and ‘reality’) are dealt with analytically (Edwards 1997; Potter 1996). Its caution against literal readings of cognitive descriptions is paralleled by its caution against literal readings of external worldly descriptions. In effect, both the mental world and the rest of reality are reformulated as discursive
constructions. This is not to claim that nothing exists under the skull or out in the world, but that research on talk and texts as a medium for action will get into tangles by starting with the objects formulated and oriented to in talk and relating the talk to those objects. The reward for this radical conceptual reformulation is analytic coherence.

What we mean by ‘analytic coherence’ is a situation where talk and texts are no longer being compared to ‘the world’ and ‘cognitive objects’ in a way which obscures the comparison’s dependence on prior, but largely hidden, discursive constructions of those entities by researchers. Instead, talk and texts are studied in their own right for how they are constructed and organized, and their orientation to action, whether they involve descriptions of actions (‘flirting’), situations (‘a bar’), persons (‘my wife’), or cognitive states (‘jealous’) (Edwards 1998; Potter 1998a). Moreover, such descriptions work with close inferential relations between (what would traditionally be understood as) inner and outer realms (Potter et al. 1993). Describing an ‘angry feeling’ can be part of establishing the nature of an event as problematic; describing details of a person’s ‘insensitivity’ can be part of establishing and justifying the speaker’s ‘anger’. These interrelationships are crucial in interaction, and yet they are just the kinds of relations that are broken up in many of the research methods of traditional cognitive psychology. The kind of analytic coherence that we are trying to achieve will allow those relations to be mapped out.

The rest of this chapter undertakes two closely related tasks. First, it will consider the way that cognition has been conceptualized in sociolinguistic work. Second, it will show the way that cognition is reconceptualized in discursive psychology. Our general argument will be against sociolinguistics adopting an uncritical cognitivism either directly, or in its embedding in broader social theories.

Clearly the question of how cognition has been dealt with in sociolinguistics is a very broad one with a range of different answers. We have chosen to approach it by focusing on Michael Stubbs’s (1997) chapter on language, experience and cognition in the recent Handbook of Sociolinguistics. One reason for this is that it is a high quality statement by a major figure in a major collection. Another is that he gives detailed examples from four important topic areas (racism, courtrooms, science and sexism) to illustrate his case. It thus provides an opportunity for some detailed reworking of our own. We hope that this will be taken as a compliment to the sophistication of Stubbs’s work and that it will be apparent that our argumentative exposition is designed to make the issues as clear as possible. At the same time we are aware that Stubbs’s chapter is not representative of all sociolinguistics, and that our arguments are much more in tune with other strands of work. With each of Stubbs’s examples we will attempt to show how it can be understood in terms of discursive psychology rather than taken in cognitivist terms as evidence of cognitive processes and entities lying behind the talk.
I. SOCIOlinguistics AND COGNITION

Stubbs's chapter starts by highlighting potential trouble in dealing with cognition; he shows acute awareness of a range of dangers in framing the relation between language and cognition. Despite this, he does not find it easy to escape from cognitivist stories. Like us he emphasises the need to go beyond language structure to focus on language use. However, his general conceptualization of the issue is a more traditionally cognitivist one. He is concerned with 'relationships between language, thought, and culture' (1997: 358) and with the way in which 'language mediates experience' (1997: 364, emphasis in original). He is happy to assert that for most of us, at least some of the time 'language influences thought' and the question is 'the linguistic mechanisms at work' (1997: 364, emphasis in original).

Note the way that Stubbs cannot rid himself of the picture of some kind of influence processes taking place between two different realms. He does not himself mark the distinction at the surface of the skull —but that is very much the taken-for-granted currency of cognitivism. For discursive psychology, instead of starting with a relation between realms, the question is how cognitive terms and orientations figure in interaction. This is not merely an arbitrary analytic preference on our behalf; what we have tried to document over the past few years is the way that ignoring the practical use of cognitivist discourse leads to a range of consequential confusions.

Stubbs explores four areas for considering language-thought relations: racist discourse, courtroom discourse, science and sexism. Let us consider them in turn.

I.1. Racist Discourse

Stubbs's argument concerns the role of new terms (such as scheinasyllanten, a German word for 'apparent/sham political asylum seekers') in sustaining and encouraging racism. Such 'lexical creations crystallize thoughts, make them easy to refer to, presuppose the existence of such things, and therefore facilitate stereotyped reactions' (1997: 366). As Stubbs would probably be the first to admit, examples of this kind do not demonstrate an influence process from language to thought. Yet, not only does it not demonstrate the phenomenon, the example presupposes it. It assumes that there are such things as racist thoughts that may be 'crystallized' or 'referred to' by particular terms and lead to 'stereotyped' (itself a term from cognitive social psychology) reactions. Part of what gives such constructions their suasive character is the fact that the discourse of thinking is itself amenable to both cognitive and non-cognitive uses. If you ask someone what their thoughts are on some topic you will most likely get, and most likely expect to get, a collection of discursive claims and propositions. They will be rather unlikely to tell you about fleeting images, short-term memory stores or activations in the PN neourones.

The problem with such examples is that they can be understood perfectly sensibly in discursive rather than cognitive terms. For example, we do not have to speculate about entities and processes under the skulls of Germans using the term scheinasyllanten to appreciate that it provides both description and evaluation in a compact package which is likely to facilitate
making racist claims and, as Stubbs notes, presupposes the very existence of such people. The point is that *scheinasylanien* can be understood from a discursive psychological perspective as a descriptive term with a range of racist uses (although discursive psychologists would, of course, wish to study those uses rather than speculate about them in the abstract or by way of made up examples). Any cognitive consequences would have to be established, and this would surely involve going beyond the everyday cognitive thesaurus of words such as ‘thinking’, metaphors such as ‘crystallizing’, and the semi-technical linguistic detritus of academic disciplines which includes terms such as ‘stereotyped’.

It is not that issues of cognition are irrelevant for the study of racism; far from it. Talk and writing about issues of race, discrimination, and related matters is suffused with cognitive concerns. However, a discursive psychological perspective takes these as its topic. For example, the notion of ‘attitude’ is a technical concept in social psychology; yet, when someone is talking about race it may be a direct practical concern as to whether they are treated as having ‘racist attitudes’. Wetherell and Potter (1992) studied the way in which middle class Pākehā (white) New Zealanders made critical claims about minority groups. One way to produce such claims is as elaborate, vivid description where evaluations are carefully tied to the (constructed) evaluative object, and treated as intersubjective or corroborated, rather than delivered as features of the speaker’s own psychology. Speakers are here avoiding the discourse of ‘attitudes’ and its emphasis on potentially culpable individual preferences (Potter 1998b).

More generally, Wetherell and Potter (1992) mapped out the way a wide range of psychological notions — influence, information processing, stereotypes, and the notion of prejudice itself — became elements in the production and management of talk about race. Note the way this inverts the conventional practice in social research. Instead of trying to understand racist talk and action in terms of cognition, it is showing how racist talk and action can be sustained using cognitive notions. Far from cognitive notions being required to do adequate analysis, the analysis is facilitated by focusing on situated practices rather than cognition, where cognitive categories and concerns feature as part of those practices, as ways of talking, and of doing things with words.

### I.2. Courtroom Reality Construction

The second topic area is courtroom discourse, and in particular the construction of reality in courts. Stubbs is interested in ‘cases where lexical choices create frames of reference with their own internal logic, and influence perception and memory’ (1997: 366). For example, he cites work by Dazeal (1980) on the language of a trial where a doctor had been accused of manslaughter for performing a late abortion. This emphasised the significance of descriptions — *the foetus was aborted* vs. *the baby was murdered* — for the outcome. And he cites Loftus and Palmer’s (1974) famous study where people shown a film of a traffic accident gave different descriptions according to terms in the questions about it such as *hit, collide, smash and bump*.
For example, people who were asked about the cars *smashing* into each other were more likely to say that they saw broken glass on the road.

Picking up from Loftus and Palmer (1974), Stubbs searched a large (120 million) data base of words to extract 'the most frequent collocates of words in the lexical field of “hit”’ (1997: 367). This identifies varied, often metaphorical, uses of *hit* (*earthquake, hard, jackpot, recession*) while *smash* tends to connote crime and violence (*bottles, glass, looted, window, windscreens*) — although in this list only *looted* seems to strongly support the argument. Stubbs's conclusion is that recurrent wordings can 'fix and transmit cultural meanings... encode stereotypes and shared assumptions' (1997: 368). Again, the ambiguity over the cognitive status of 'meanings,' 'stereotypes,' and 'assumptions' contributes to the sense that the argument has implications for relations between language and cognition, while not spelling out what such implications are. Our point is that the plausibility of such arguments falls away when they are examined in detail.

More significantly, the phenomena discussed here are very much the province of discursive psychology. The studies by both Danet (1980) and Loftus and Palmer (1974) show the world-constructive and consequential role that descriptions play in actions. However, showing that descriptions are world-constructive and consequential is not the same as demonstrating that any particular cognitive processes or entities are involved. Most importantly, we do not need to know about any such entities or processes to find the important phenomena, to study them, and to identify their implications. The analytic preference of discursive psychology is to study the use of descriptions in natural discourse, where their involvement with particular actions is more easily identified, and the temptation to abstraction into linguistics, in one direction, and cognition in another, is more easily resisted. Let us try and illustrate this with an example of our own.

In the following case a suspect/interviewee ‘A’ is telling a police officer ‘B’ of his involvement in a fight. The interviewee has been accused of starting the fight by ‘punching’ another man on the head. (See also Edwards 1997: 244-5). The issue at stake here is, roughly, why did A ‘punch him in the head?’ (Data from Auburn et al. 1995: 375).

```
1 A: 'cos I was off dancing and I was just dancing around and I was
2 dancing with this girl and like I've just clipped this boy's head
3 (1.0) and as I as I've clipped him I've gone oh sorry mate
4 B: when you say 've clipped by accident d'you mean

5 A: yeah well I'm not gonna hit someone on the head on purpose am I
6 B: Yeah
7 A: and he's come across all like that and I've gone all right there's
8 no need to be like that and he pushed me so we just started fighting
9 and his mates got up and there was about four of them I think
```

In this example we are not faced with relations between single words and particular outcomes, as with the Loftus and Palmer study, nor do we have abstract statistics of collocation,
as in Stubbs own study. Rather we have a sequence where one term (punched) is used by a police officer, and other terms (clipped, hit) are used by the suspect. Considering these terms in their sequential location allows us to examine how A’s action is played out through the alternation of event descriptions. A’s re-formulation of his action from punch to clip, and the explicit contrast between clip and hit (line 5), are part of his activity of disclaiming responsibility. Clip alternates with punch and hit to downgrade the contact made, as well as its deliberateness, and thereby reduce the attributional implication that it was enough to cause a fight, and for him to be responsible for that fight. These empirical, interactional details show the way the participants themselves are drawing causal inferences from event descriptions.

It is important to be clear here. It may seem that we too have drifted down a cognitivist path when we talk of the participants ‘drawing causal inferences’. Yet we are treating causal inferences as an activity done, and oriented to, in discourse—an activity done in the first instance by participants. It is handled and managed, as a participants’ concern, through circumstantial descriptions such as ‘just dancing around’, ‘just clipped’, the narrated apology ‘oh sorry mate’ (lines 1-3), and the direct causal invocations ‘by accident’ and ‘on purpose’ (lines 4 and 5). Thus we are committed to the implications of intentionality that follow from the identification of activities in discourse. Yet we are not committed to a cognitivist account of intentions, an account that treats them as mental events preceding talk and action. Such an account would be susceptible to Wittgensteinian criticisms of approaches that take intention as a referent for an inner state (Anscombe 1957; Coulter 1990; Wittgenstein 1980). Nor are we committed to a cognitivist account of inferences. While it is no doubt true, and indeed necessary, that the participants here have brains, neurones, lattices of connecting axons and so on. We do not need to assume that there is any particular representation or process in cognitive stuff, however technically specified, that counts as a ‘causal inference’ (some biocomputer symbolization of an ‘if x then y’ variety, perhaps).

Furthermore, we do not need to make a judgement about particular cognitive states to explain the interaction here. The identification of actions and inferences depends on an analysis of discourse and the various orientations displayed in it. Note, for instance, how B picks up the causal implication of A’s use of the word clip in line 4, and how A ratifies that implication in line 5. Thus discursive psychology draws on the same analytic resources provided by the sequential, recipient organized nature of interaction that have been used so successfully by conversation analysts (Heritage 1995). For more developed analyses of examples of this kind, see Edwards (1997).

I.3. Scientific Reality Construction

Stubbs describes science as an area ‘where concepts and syntax seem to have developed together’ and where ‘this development is amenable to empirical text analysis’ (1997: 369). He leans heavily on Halliday and Martin’s (1993) study of scientific language, which he describes
... from two clear facts. (1) Scientific and everyday language are very different: e.g., it is well known that certain syntactic features, such as passive and nominalization, are common in scientific language. (2) Scientific and everyday world views are very different, indeed science often rejects common-sense understandings.

Stubbs (1997: 369)

What Halliday and Martin are taken to be attempting is a 'functional' account of scientific discourse, but not one that is functional in the manner of discursive psychology. It is functional in that it is 'looking for a cognitive explanation of the heavily nominalized style of science' (1997: 369, emphasis added).

We have a range of problems with Halliday and Martin's (1993) study and Stubbs's use of it. However, the important issue here is what is being claimed about language and cognition, and in particular the influence of the latter on the former. Let us put to one side the implications for the historical development of scientific discourse that arise from this account. For if the heavily nominalized style of science is to be explained as a consequence of thinking scientifically then it would be important to demonstrate that it was not merely imported from legal discourse. Historical studies have suggested that scientists such as Robert Boyle looked to the law for models of empirical justification in the mid-seventeenth century (Shapin and Shaffer 1985). Do some of the stylistic features of scientific writing reflect this disciplinary emigration? Do they reflect the legalistic, judgmental nature of scientific publishing decisions where a jury of one's peers has become modern peer review? That would be a consequential line of research for verifying these claims. However, that is not an enterprise that we are able to tackle here. Moreover, the difficulties we have with Halliday and Martin are more direct.

First, take the two 'clear facts'. The way they are constructed to set language over against views and understandings, makes it seem that what is being described are straightforward parallels between language and cognition. Yet, as we noted in the previous sections, terms such as view and understanding allude to cognition, but in their normal use are not equivalent to the sorts of mental processes and representations that are the currency of cognitive psychology. They are cognitive by innuendo only; they do not rely on cognitive objects or processes as understood by cognitive psychologists understand them, to make sense.

Second, the 'clear facts' themselves are far from clear. Halliday and Martin (1993) studied scientific texts, formal writing, and compare this to a generic, rather under-specified everyday language. The trouble here is that scientific language is far from confined to formal texts. Studies of scientific discourse have found that there are wide differences between the way scientists talk at the lab bench, or when they are interviewed by sociologists, and how they write in journal articles (e.g. Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Lynch 1985; Myers 1990). When scientists are talking to one another about experiments, observations and colleagues, their talk is not suffused with passives and nominalizations. Note the significance of this. If the role of scientific language was
cognitive, emerging out of and sustaining scientific thinking, we would expect this form of talk, this register, to be involved when scientists are practicing science itself rather than (merely) representing it in formal written reports.

From a discursive psychological perspective we can ask why it might be that this particular kind of language is used in scientific articles. Put another way, can we identify plausible practical reasons for this kind of writing? Two complementary possibilities have been suggested (Potter, 1996). First, the impersonality provided by passivisation and nominalization may reduce conflict in an area of life where conflict is commonplace or even essential, and where it could considerably distract from the business at hand. Second, such constructions enable descriptions to be produced which minimize the actions and commitments of the writer; the scientist becomes almost a bystander while the data take on a textual life of their own, agents which are able to point, show or imply. That is, the formal discourse of scientific articles is rhetorically oriented to constructing the factual out-there-ness of scientific phenomena. This suggests that the character of scientific writing is at least as plausibly explained by its interactional and persuasive role than by any congruence with the cognitions of individual scientists when they are designing experiments, developing theories and so on.

This leads to a further problem with Halliday and Martin’s (1993) ‘clear facts’. Although the formal writing of scientists may be very different from the kind of informal talk that takes place in a telephone call between friends, it is similar, in certain ways, to other areas of non-scientific discourse. For example, a search through a year’s US radio and television news on CD-ROM shows that passive constructions such as ‘it was believed’ are commonplace. Potter (1996) has suggested that the detailed operation of these constructions may be to do with the complex set of issues surrounding fact construction, footing and accountability that arise in news reporting. Such constructions report beliefs, which may be crucial to the general news narrative, while avoiding potentially problematic attributions of that belief either to the news organization or its agents, or to possibly interested parties to the story. The detail is less important here than the broad point that when considering constructions such as these in context, as parts of narrative, as attending to issues of accountability, as managing concerns with footing, we can start to identify specific activities that are being done which make sense of why they take the form that they do, in the context that they appear. What seemed on superficial examination to be an esoteric discourse of science may be better understood as a generic discursive form for constructing talk and texts in complex social settings. An appeal to some cognitive realm beyond that is unnecessary and misleading.

1.4. Sexism

Stubbs’ final example is rather less developed than the other three. Even though it is presented as a further exploration of relations between language and cognition, it mainly describes frequencies of usage of words such as his vs. theirs, or boy vs. girl in spoken English and
children's literature. Again, the inferences about the role of cognition are made more by implication or assumption, than by spelled out argument about identifiable cognitive entities, states and processes. For example, Stubbs writes that sexist language 'uses lexical and grammatical resources to represent the world from the point of view of the male' (1997: 370). This alludes to the perceptual cognitivism, but does not spell out the 'point of view' metaphor. It is not unusual for such metaphors to be used to highlight certain features of practices without buying a specific mental ontology.

As before, we should emphasise that our concern is not that the distribution of constructions such as his and theirs is not important; the point is how it is important. Is it through its influence on some inner stuff —e.g. mental stereotypes, prototypes, representations— or is it necessary to go beyond that to study the involvement of particular constructions in practices? For discursive psychological work on sexism, the focus has been more on the way accounts are constructed to simultaneously present unequal employment situations as natural and inevitable, and to present the speaker as caring and egalitarian. That is, the concern has been with the practical role of discourse. Let us illustrate this with some examples.

Wetherell, Stiven and Potter (1987) studied the way men talked about women's career opportunities during open-ended interviews. In contrast to much previous work on this topic, the attempt was not to understand how what was said might be a clue to some underlying cognitive entity —an attitude or stereotype of women's' career advancement. Rather, the interviews gave them the opportunity to provide extended descriptions, explanations and judgements as they dealt with a range of questions and comments from the interviewer. Close analysis of the interviews found a regular pattern. On the one hand, the men supported the principle of women's career opportunities and attacked discrimination based on gender. On the other hand, the men offered a wide range of practical reasons for the failure of women to reach full employment equality, including references to such concerns as childcare, tradition, and emotional unsuitability to stressful work. Note the significance of this pattern. These men have the ability to affirm both support for women's' employment equality (in principle) and support for continued inequality (because of important practical concerns). They could be 'unequal egalitarians', supporting the unequal status quo yet displaying themselves as non-sexist through their abstract support of egalitarian principles.

Take another discursive study in this tradition. Gill (1993) studied the way radio controllers' accounted for the low representation of female DJs when interviewed about the topic. Her findings repeated the general pattern in the Wetherell et al. (1987) study; the controllers supported the principle of equality yet drew on an elaborate repertoire of practical reasons for not appointing more women DJs. However, in this study the participants were describing their own recruitment practices rather than addressing hypothetical examples. It is notable that they constructed accounts to present the lack of recruitment as a product of external factors rather than their own desires: for example, few women apply, women do not have the appropriate skills, or listeners do not like women's 'shrill' voices.
In both of these studies the focus was one the way accounts were built to make a situation of inequality appear natural, inevitable or at least justifiable. Neither focuses on the particular terms used. However, Speer and Potter (2000) studied talk that drew on potentially heterosexist terms (queer, butch, dyke). They showed the way that speakers attend, in a range of different ways, to potentially negative implications. These speakers were simultaneously managing issues of identity and assigning blame and responsibility. Their conclusion is that psychological work on heterosexism tends to obscure such flexible discursive practices and reify such discourse phenomena into stable, causal attitudes within individuals. For us, the interest is in the way a cognitivist account of this discourse becomes problematic when the practical and action oriented nature of the talk is allowed to enter the research. These studies start to show the value of studying sexism in terms of a range of practical tasks that people are performing with their talk and texts.

Cognitivism has the same dangers in research on sexism as in the work on racism. It risks reducing a social phenomenon, sustained through a range of practices, to features of individual psychological operation. This is a complex area in which there are deep and delicate issues to do with the management of analytic and political concerns (see Edwards, 2003; Kitzinger & Frith 1999; Wetherell 1998; Wetherell & Potter 1992). Our view is that cognitivism is likely to compound the confusions here.

II. SOCIOLINGUISTICS, COGNITIVISM AND DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY
We hope that Michael Stubbs’s will not mind us using his handbook chapter in this way. It allowed us to deal with one of the most up-to-date and canonical examples of the manner in which sociolinguists deal with cognition. We have attempted to do three things with it. First, we have tried to demonstrate that the substantive claims about the relation between language and cognition can, in every case, be questioned. Second, we have tried to show that the writing draws on an under-theorized cognitivist image of the relations between the inner stuff of cognition and the observable phenomena of talk and texts. Third, we have tried to show that this inner stuff is itself rarely theorized specifically (using the technical apparatus of social cognition, for example) but is alluded to by the use of metaphors such as ‘crystallize’ and ambiguous terms such as ‘thinking’. More generally, we have tried to take the four topics, which Stubbs treats as paradigms for cognitive interpretation, and show how the phenomena can be, and have been, traceable to a discursive psychological analysis in terms of the involvement of discursive constructions in practices.

What lessons do we draw from this for sociolinguistics? There is an interesting parallel here with arguments about cognitivism in psychology. One of the features of psychological research methods is that although they are so dependent on discourse, they break that discourse up into vignettes, tick boxes and so on. That is, they systematically strip off the indexical, rhetorical features of discourse that discursive psychologists, and other researchers in the
conversation analytic and ethnomethodological tradition, have shown to be fundamental. Once talk is separated from its action orientations in this way it becomes much easier to treat it as an expression of underlying cognitive processes and states. Without dealing with them in detail, there is a danger that traditional collocation and distributional techniques, for example, can lead to cognitivist conclusions for the same reason. They take words out of their sequential and rhetorical context, thus allowing them to be more easily imagined as products of underlying cognitions.

Our wariness of cognitivism leads us to be wary also of the kinds of large-scale social theories that have been proposed as enriching sociolinguistics or connecting it to broad social and political issues.

Take Bourdieu for example. He has frequently been identified as a social theorist who can make important links to sociolinguistics. And his notion of habitus—roughly dispositions that generate practices, perceptions and attitudes—has been treated as particularly important, as has the idea that there is a specifically linguistic habitus—the particular dispositions involved in language use, including voicing, the use of the lips and so on. It might appear that the notion of habitus avoids the pitfalls of cognitivist accounts we have highlighted because of its emphasis on dispositions which are prior to, and generate, perceptions, attitudes and so on. However, his account of practice is strikingly similar to mainstream cognitive psychology where cognition is not conceptualized as restricted to explicit terms or propositions, and certainly not to conscious images or representations. Rather it presupposed that there is some psychological system that is developed over time and enables storage, processing and the generation of output.

Moreover, it is striking that, for all his emphasis on practice, Bourdieu equally gives precedence to visual perception and the role of schemata in producing 'meaning'. To illustrate these strands in his thinking we have highlighted some of the cognitivist tropes in an illustrative extract from his work:

The *perception* of the social world is the product of a double social structuring: on the 'objective' side, this *perception* is socially structured because the properties attached to agents or institutions do not make themselves available to *perception* independently, but in combinations whose probability varies widely [...] on the 'subjective' side, it is structured because the schemes of *perception* and *evaluation* ... [The] plurality of world views... is linked to plurality of points of view... [and] to all the cognitive strategies of fulfilment which produce the meaning of the objects of the social world by going directly beyond visible attributes by reference to the future or the past.

*Bourdieu (1991: 234-5)*

Bourdieu is an interesting and sometimes exciting theorist, and we are not suggesting that his work has no value for sociolinguists. However, we would caution against an uncritical adoption of some of the assumptions his work makes. In particular, it seems to end up with a surprisingly traditional notion of the psychological individual bringing their linguistic habitus to a particular social context. For the reasons developed above, we believe that such assumptions would lead to analytic incoherence if his work were uncritically bolted on to a detailed analysis
of discourse. We suggest that analysts will benefit from adopting a stance that presupposes neither cognition nor reality but addresses both as they are constructed and oriented to in discourse. This path may seem to duck some of the big concerns of social theory, but we believe it to be interesting, analytically coherent, and fruitful.

NOTES:

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The Role of Cohesive Devices as Textual Constraints on Relevance: A Discourse-as-process View

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ABSTRACT
Drawing on Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Blakemore, 1987, 1992) and taking insights from Sinclair’s (1993) model of written text structure, the purpose of this paper is to show how and which cohesive features play an important role in helping the reader perceive relevance and coherence when a text is approached in the process of reading. With this aim, a comment article from Guardian Unlimited consisting of 60 coherence units is analyzed by a group of 25 subjects. The study seeks to capture the coherence pattern perceived by a discourse community rather than by an individual researcher. The results show that in most cases the cohesive resources that contribute to the perception of the discourse relevance and coherence of this text at each juncture deal only with discourse meaning derived from whole sentences, larger fragments of text, or occasionally, certain simple clauses linked paratactically, and they do much more than effect a tenuous connection between isolated constituents of sentences.

KEYWORDS: discourse, text, reading process, coherence, relevance, cohesive devices, metadiscourse.

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I. INTRODUCTION
The present paper focuses on a written act of communication considered from the point of view of interpretation. Before presenting the theoretical model within which it will be framed, a convenient distinction will be made and justified between the concepts of written text and written discourse. Written text will be conceived of as the written record of a potential communicative event, or one meaningful part of it, where the intended mode of communication between writer and reader is the written word. Thus, a written text can be anything from a single word written on a scrap of paper to an entire novel or an academic textbook through a comment article or an e-mail exchange. In this respect, a written text is seen as the tangible written record of a potential communicative event.

This definition adds three defining elements as compared to, for instance, Cook's (1989) general definition of text. On the one hand, the feature of potential to characterize a communicative event is used because a written text is not always eventually read by the intended reader(s). In the cases where the text is not read at all, it may be said that the communicative event is not fulfilled. In the cases where a non-intended reader reads the text, the communicative event is not fulfilled exactly as envisaged by the writer. Take, for example, a research article. It may suffer various kinds of fate. Though written with the intention that it should be read by a wide audience, the text may be published or not. If published, it may be noticed or not. If noticed, it may be found interesting to read. If so, it may be read either partially or in its entirety. In either case, it may be read by intended and/or by non-intended readers and the number of readers may be very variable. It should be noted that the potential remains with the written word throughout its legible life, no matter how many times it is read. The point is that until the potential act of communication made possible through the text is fulfilled, the text-as-product can only be considered as the written record of an act of verbal expression rather than the written record of a communicative event.

This definition also considers as written texts the written records of meaningful parts of potential communicative events. This is done to include, for instance, written exchanges of non-face-to-face interaction where one or several written replies are expected. Take the case of certain types of letters or e-mail exchanges. In these cases, it may be possible to consider the first part of the exchange, that is, the initiating letter or message, as one meaningful part of the total potential communicative event. Finally, the definition excludes from the same set any written record of a potential communicative event conveyed through a mode other than the written word. An example of what would be excluded from this definition of written text is the notes for a paper to be presented orally at a conference, or the lyrics to a song. Although these texts may have been recorded in the written mode, the writer may not have conceived them to be decoded in this mode.

The notion of written discourse, on the other hand, is defined as the meaning perceived by a reader in the act of interpretation of a given written text at any moment of the interpretation process. For the last part of this definition at any moment of the interpretation process, I draw
on Sinclair's (1993: 6) suggestion that "the text at any moment is ... the sentence currently being interpreted". Just in the same way as structure is necessary in communicating meaning because we cannot say everything at once (cf. Wintner, 1986: 88), when we interpret written discourse we cannot attend to the whole text at a time. We can only attend to one short stretch of the text at any time. If a text is seen as a sequence of sentences, the sentence being interpreted is 'the likeliest unit to carry the status of text of the moment' (Sinclair, 1993: 6). From this perspective, written discourse can be viewed as a complex unit of meaning constantly evolving in the reading process.

Now, as Sinclair (1993) goes on to mention, in communicating meaning there are two basic components: that involved in creating meaning and that involved in sharing meaning. Therefore, language in use "consists in part of features which organise the sharing of meaning, as well as features which create the meaning" (Sinclair, 1993: 7). This distinction has been acknowledged by authors such as Vande Kopple (1985), who, following Williams' (1981: 47) suggestion that in the process of writing "we usually have to write on two levels", developed a very influential description of metadiscourse. According to Vande Kopple (1985: 83), on one level we expand propositional content. On the other level, the level of metadiscourse, we do not add propositional material but help our readers organize, classify, interpret, evaluate and react to such material.

The distinction also reminds us of what M.A.K. Halliday has shown repeatedly in his work, that when we use language, we nearly always work toward fulfilling the three macro-functions of language. That is, we try to give expression to our experience, to interact with our audience, and to organize our expression into a cohesive and coherent text. In other words, Halliday (1973) asserts that we try to convey what are essentially three different kinds of meaning, which he calls ideational, interpersonal, and textual. The ideational elements could also be called representational or informational. Interpersonal meanings would allow us to reveal our personalities, to evaluate and react to the ideational material, and would also include forms of interaction and social interplay with other participants in the communicative event. Textual elements would enable the speaker or writer to organize what he is saying in such a way that it makes sense in the context and fulfils its function as a message (cf. Vande Kopple, 1985: 86). Each text is an integrated expression of these three kinds of meanings.

Drawing on Sinclair (1993: 7), I would like to show how, both in their interpersonal and textual function, metadiscourse elements are part of the interactive apparatus of the language, that progressively determine the status of previous text in relation to the current sentence. They both serve to give independence to the sentence and help to perceive it as relevant. However, for obvious reasons of space limitation, the focus will be narrowed down to one set of elements within the textual component of metadiscourse: those approximately corresponding in function to the cohesive devices acknowledged by Halliday and Hasan (1976): reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction and lexical cohesion. This will leave aside metadiscourse elements of the interpersonal type.
A lot of attention has been paid to cohesive devices, especially since Halliday and Hasan (1976) described them in the most comprehensive and widely available account. Since then, most models of cohesion in English have attempted to account for the explicit linguistic devices used in texts to signal relations between sentences. Their main objective has been to explain the principles that govern the well formedness, the unity and connectivity of texts by looking at the different kinds of ties established within texts and the relations they express. However, stating that the mere repetition of items in texts, or the use of synonyms or superordinates, and so on, contribute to our perception of the text as coherent does not seem very convincing. In addition, in most of these models texts seem to have been approached as products rather than processes. In other words, analysts seem to have treated texts as objects of research, which could be read and reread as many times as necessary in order to identify the different types of cohesive tie.

The position that this paper takes, following Sinclair (1992, 1993), differs from the previously mentioned views of cohesive items in that, instead of emphasizing the role of these elements in a text analyzed by the researcher as a finished product, the focus will be on their role as elements of the interactive apparatus of the language in the process of interpretation of the text. The major reason for changing the perspective is that ordinary users of the language are more likely to approach texts as processes rather than as products. Although ordinary users of the language are likely to be unaware of the kind of analysis reported here, researching this other side of the coin could be more relevant for communicative participants other than linguists or would-be linguists.

The model proposed here advocates a study of the role of these elements in the perception of relevance and, therefore, coherence in the process of interpretation of discourse. Its ultimate purpose is to determine which textual features of a given text are more likely to help potential readers to make sense of a discourse-as-process. That is, the present study will try to identify those textual elements that help readers to achieve optimal relevance (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986) at each successive text of the moment in relation to the growing meaning derived from processing previous text. They will then be accounted for as textual constraints on relevance, that is, as text pointers that help readers to select relevant contextual assumptions brought to bear on the interpretation of current discourse. A sentence will be said to be relevant if it conveys relevant information and relevance will be defined, following Blakemore (1987: 111), in terms of a relationship between propositions.

This study will then attempt to contribute to answering the intriguing question of what helps readers to perceive a piece of text as coherent. If coherence at a given point in a text is understood as a relation between linguistic units (Blakemore, 1987: 111), then being able to perceive the relevance of a text segment at that point in the process of reading may contribute to perceiving the text as coherent at that point. In connection with this aim, I would like to confirm Sinclair's (1993) suggestion that only a relatively small number of the textual features normally accounted for in cohesion analyses play a crucial role in helping the reader both perceive the relevance of each successive sentence, or text of the moment, and eventually, the
coherence of the whole text. I believe that this may have important implications, for instance, for the design of reading and testing tasks that focus on this aspect of text comprehension (cf. Moreno 1998a). However, the type of research reported in the present paper will in principle differ from Sinclair's (1993) and Moreno's (1998a) in that the study will attempt to capture the coherence pattern perceived from a text by a group of individuals rather than by an individual reader/researcher.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The model of text structure proposed by Sinclair (1993) is based on the assumption that when the reader moves on to processing the following sentence and focuses on its interpretation, the linguistic properties of the previous sentence are discarded and only what it expresses is retained. "It is no longer a linguistic entity, but a part of shared knowledge" (Sinclair, 1993: 9). Hence the present distinction between the text, the tangible linguistic object, and the discourse, the meaning generated from interpreting the text, seems to be consistent with Sinclair's view of the reading process.

If we agree that a text can be qualified as coherent when it is perceived as unified and meaningful to a particular reader, then it can be said that a written text achieves all its potential of unity and meaningfulness, that is, all its potential of being perceived as coherent, when the process of interpretation reaches its end, as envisaged by the writer. However, readers do not need to wait until they have finished reading the whole written product to try and make sense of the text. Competent readers will attempt to make sense of the discourse from the very moment the reading process begins, and—if motivation and interest endures—may continue doing so at every stage in the reading process. In other words, accomplished readers will attempt to retrieve discourse meaning as they come across subsequent textual units in their search for relevance.

The idea of relevance was first proposed by Grice (1975: 46) as one of the four maxims of the cooperative principle, a general principle of communication known and applied by all human beings. Although Grice used his theory mainly to account for the language of conversation, the basic tenet of his theory may be adapted to account for what happens in the process of interpretation of written language in such a way that we can assert that readers expect texts to be a co-operative effort and to progress in a rational manner. And if texts are to be rational, they must consist of sentences that are in some way connected to each other. What guarantees this connection is what he calls the co-operative principle, and one of the four maxims that comprise this principle is the maxim of relation: be relevant.

One problem with Grice's theory is that it gives no indication of how speakers may be relevant, that is, of how a given utterance is perceived as relevant by the hearer. Sperber and Wilson (1986) attempt to answer this question in a more detailed way. They argue that an explanation of utterance interpretation must be based on a general cognitive theory of
information processing. For the same reason, it should be possible to consider an explanation of sentence interpretation (the equivalent minimal unit of coherence in written language) from the same general theory. Thus I will be using the terms reader, writer and sentence in places where authors such as Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Blakemore (1992) would use hearer, speaker, and utterance respectively. The basic idea underlying their principle of relevance is that in processing information, people generally aim to bring about the greatest improvement to their overall representation of the world for the least cost in processing. Following this line of reasoning, we could say that readers go ahead and interpret every sentence in the expectation that it will interact with their existing assumptions to yield a contextual effect (i.e., a new assumption).

A contextual effect is defined as the impact of a new item of information on an existing representation of the world. Sperber and Wilson (1986) identify three ways in which a new item of information may have a contextual effect: 1) It may allow the derivation of a contextual implication, thereby allowing readers to add assumptions to their existing representation of the world; 2) It may provide further evidence for, and hence strengthen, an existing assumption; and 3) It may contradict an existing assumption. In this latter case, the reader may decide to abandon the existing assumption in favour of the information that has been presented to him. When an item of information has a contextual effect in a given context, Sperber and Wilson say it is relevant in that context.

For the notion of context, I draw on Blakemore’s (1992) view of context as a psychological construct. According to her definition, derived from Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) theory of relevance, the context is the set of assumptions that are brought to bear in interpreting a given sentence. Contextual assumptions may be derived from different sources: from direct observation (i.e., from the situational context), through the interpretation of the preceding text (i.e., from the co-text), or from information stored in memory (i.e., from background knowledge, be it cultural or interpersonal). On processing a new item of information the role of contextual assumptions would be to combine with the assumption derived from interpreting the sentence in question (or text of the moment) as premises in an argument. Thus establishing the relevance of the new assumption would involve inference. It would involve the interaction of existing assumptions with the new assumption. Therefore, the relevance of a new assumption would depend on the context in which it is processed.

One important question is which principle readers follow to choose the particular contextual assumptions they bring to bear on the interpretation of a new sentence. For, logically speaking, any of their beliefs and assumptions may be brought to bear. In answer to this question, Sperber & Wilson (1986) argue that intuitively, it is clear that the greater the impact a proposition has on the readers’ representation of the world the greater its relevance. Also, accessing contextual assumptions and using them to derive contextual effects involves a cost, and the cost of deriving contextual effects in a small, easily accessible context will be less than the cost of obtaining them from a larger, less accessible context. Of course, there are other
factors that may also affect the effort made in achieving relevance, such as the readers' interpreting ability, their level of concentration, their interest, their emotional states, and so on. Let us assume for a moment that we are dealing with very motivated competent readers. Thus, readers who are searching for relevance at every text of the moment will process each new item of information in the context that yields a maximum contextual effect for the minimum cost in processing. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), what the writer does is manipulate the readers' search for relevance. Obviously, it is in the interest of these readers that the writer should produce a sentence whose interpretation calls for less processing effort than any other sentence that s/he could have made. But equally, given that writers wish to communicate with potential readers, it is in their interest to make their sentences as easily understood as possible. This means that readers are entitled to interpret every sentence on the assumption that writers have tried to give them adequate contextual effects for the minimum necessary processing, or, in other words, that writers have aimed at optimal relevance.

In written text, the most easily accessible contextual assumptions are those derived from the preceding text, and in particular those still stored in the readers' short-term memory. As Blakemore (1987: 112) suggests, the most easily accessible assumption at any stage of the reading process is likely to be the one derived from the immediately preceding sentence. This assumption made by readers and writers in their cooperative effort to communicate facilitates the interpretation process in such a way that readers can assume that the new sentence should be interpreted at least in the context provided by the assumption derived from the preceding sentence, which in its turn has been interpreted in the context generated from interpreting its preceding sentence, and so on. Or to put it in a way parallel to Sinclair's (1993) terms, we might say that readers can assume that the text of the moment can be interpreted at least in relation to the meaning derived from the text of the past. In this sense we may say that readers can trust the text of the past to a great extent in order to achieve relevance at any text of the moment (cf. Sinclair, 1992). I say to a great extent because readers, of course, may and actually do use other sources of meaning as well as that derived from previous text (see above).

The picture of discourse which, according to Blakemore (1987: 122), emerges from this relevance-based framework is one in which the interpretation of a sentence (that is, its propositional content and its contextual effects) contributes toward the context for interpreting subsequent sentences. That is, as discourse proceeds, readers are provided with a gradually changing background against which new information is processed. As Blakemore explains, interpreting a sentence involves more than identifying the proposition it expresses. It also involves working out the consequences of adding it to the readers' existing assumptions, or, in other words, working out its relevance (cf. increment, Brazil, 1995).

In Blakemore's view, two utterances may be connected in coherent discourse in either of two ways:

Either in virtue of the fact that the interpretation of the first may include propositions used in
establishing the relevance of the second, or in virtue of the fact that a proposition conveyed by one is affected by the interpretation of the other. In either case we might say that the relevance of one is somehow dependent on the interpretation of the other.

Blakemore (1987: 122)

Given the role of inference in establishing the contextual effects of a proposition, Blakemore (1987) suggests that it should not be surprising that expressions that instruct the reader to establish an inferential connection between two segments of discourse may be used to indicate how the proposition they introduce is to be interpreted as relevant. Thus expressions like so, after all and moreover can be used to express relationships of dependent relevance. In this sense, expressions such as these can be considered as semantic constraints on relevance. But not only do these expressions have a role in pragmatic interpretation (in helping to perceive dependent relevance), their role is also important in helping the writer optimize relevance in accordance with the Principle of Relevance. In other words, they allow writers to make sure that their readers select the most effective contextual assumptions in their search for relevance at minimal processing cost.

In this sense, cohesive mechanisms, the object of the present research, can be considered as constraints on relevance for both types of coherence. This paper will look at the role of cohesive devices both in establishing the relevance of a new sentence and in helping readers to retrieve the most cost-effective contextual assumptions in the actual process of reading. Given this framework, the present study will attempt to determine which cohesive mechanisms of a given text are more likely to help potential readers to make sense of a discourse-as-process, i.e. to perceive the relevance of each new text of the moment and ultimately to perceive the coherence of the entire text.

III. DESIGN OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Just as a text-as-product can experience various fates, there may be different reasons for wanting to process a text, i.e. for retrieving discourse meaning, and, therefore, for improving one's representation of the world. For example, a text can be processed for pleasure, to kill the time, or for the sake of learning new things. On the other hand, a text may be read for practical reasons, whether for personal or for work purposes (e.g. to be able to plan an evening out, to know how to cook a dish, to be able to repair some technical apparatus). A text may also be read for social reasons (e.g. to have something to talk about). Or it may be processed for study purposes (e.g. to learn about a given field and be able to show one's improved knowledge about it). Another possible reason for approaching a text is for research purposes (e.g. when the text is processed by a linguist as an object of analysis). In addition, a text can be read for its general ideas or to find specific information (cf. Nuttall, 1982: 2).

The important implication from there being such a variety of reasons for reading a text is that there may be multiple resulting discourses even from reading the same text, depending
on the reader’s motivation to read it. Furthermore, even for readers with similar purposes, interpretation of the same text may vary depending on the context in which the text is processed—not only on the assumptions derived from interpreting the previous discourse but also on other assumptions derived from memory (e.g. previous knowledge of the subject matter) and the other factors mentioned above.

Thus, if so many different discourses can be derived from a single text, studying the textual features more likely to contribute to perceiving a text unit as relevant seems an almost impossible task for at least two main reasons: 1) Because the perception of this property is ultimately subjective. That is, a text unit may be meaningful—and thus may contribute to improving one person’s representation of the world—in a way that another person does not have the necessary knowledge or level of concentration to make sense of. 2) Because the perception of this property depends on the reader’s ultimate aim in reading the text. In other words, a reader may not have perceived the relevance of a coherence unit or the coherence of the whole text because this may not have been the reason for approaching the text.

In addition, it is well known that there is more to the perception of relevance than the presence of explicit cohesive devices in a text. That is, there are other factors that contribute to this perception which have nothing to do with textual features. Take, for instance, a reader’s assumptions about the likely sequences of discourse functions derived from memory and acquired on the basis of previous discourse processing experience. In a situation in which every single reader will have had different experiences of reading, it does not seem sensible even to attempt to research the question. However, being aware of the fact that the role of cohesive devices in perceiving relevance is partial, it may be worthwhile investigating which of these textual features are more likely to contribute to our perception of relevance, if we take certain precautions. In order to design the most appropriate research strategy for this study, a number of considerations about the reading process were taken into account.

III.1. Research strategy

One problem derived from the subjectivity factor is that measuring the relevance and coherence of a piece of discourse is a very difficult task. The first question that rapidly arose is the following. When can we say that a person has made sense of a text? In relation to the writer’s intentions, to an intended reader’s interpretation, to a non-intended reader’s interpretation, to a researcher’s interpretation, to some standard of coherence? For the purposes of this research, the most adequate answer seemed to be the last alternative. As Cook (1989: 7) points out, “in practice we find that discourse is usually perceived as such by groups, rather than individuals”. However, this solution posed a further problem: How could a standard of coherence be established? The solution given to this problem in the present study was to assume that the coherence of a text could be established by abstracting away from the particular appreciation of any individual subject (including the researcher herself) to capture instead the pattern of
coherence perceived by the majority of a group of individuals. Consequently, the present study attempted to capture the standard of coherence of a given authentic written text as perceived by a group of individuals in their communicative role as readers of the same text.

III.2. The subjects
It also seemed sensible for this study to control for certain factors which are known to determine the discourse meaning actually derived from a text. One such factor was the receiver or the type of reader, with all the factors that this may bring along: previous knowledge of the subject matter, previous reading experience, language proficiency level, motivation and so on. Thus the present study focussed on a well-defined group of readers: the discourse community of Spanish advanced learners of English at the University of León interested to some extent in the description of the English Language.

Two groups of learners were used in the study. The first group was made up of seven doctoral students taking a course in Cohesion in English, which was used as part of the pilot study on which the final study was designed. Actually, one of these students wrote a paper discussing his interpretation of the text (Pérez Álvarez, 2001). The final study was carried out with a second group of 25 undergraduate students taking a course in Contemporary Descriptive Models of English (taught in the third year of English Philology but also taken by students in the fourth year). Both groups were characterized as potentially non-intended readers of the targeted text. Both groups had been provided with a short introduction to the role and type of cohesive devices based on both Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) account and Sinclair’s (1993) view of cohesive devices, using examples from a variety of sources.

The reason for choosing this type of reader lies in the researcher’s interest in making the results of the present study applicable to English as a foreign language reading situations, both in English for Specific Purposes and General English. As is frequently the case with many of the texts now used in most EFL learning and assessment situations, learners are required to approach authentic texts that were not in principle intended for them. Thus the study results both in relation to the pattern of coherence perceived and the textual elements that help to perceive it might be extrapolated to readers of this kind but not to others for the reasons argued above.

III.3. The data
The selected text, drawn from the Internet, is a comment article from Guardian Unlimited consisting of 60 coherent units (56 sentences) and representing typical argumentative written text. The appendix offers a segmented version of the text. The original version can be found on the website provided in the references section (Moriarty, 1999). The reader of this paper is recommended to read the whole text before starting to read the following section. It should be noted that the text elements presented in parentheses and preceded by an asterisk were not part
of the original text.

The reasons for choosing this text lay both in its topic and its length. On the one hand, the topic of the article, "a pilot scheme consisting in returning examination papers to the original candidates", was relevant in the context of the teaching unit on Education that the subjects were experiencing in one of their courses, Lengua Inglesa III, at the time the empirical work was being carried out. And it was one of the texts that the students in this course would have to summarize. This way, the study would not interfere unnecessarily with their courses and students would find the kind of analysis done useful for their academic purposes. On the other hand, since the study would have to be based on only one complete text, the selected article had to meet at least two requirements. It had to be long enough to yield sufficient material for analysis. But more importantly, it had to be short enough so as to be manageable for an analysis as complex as the one proposed here with student subjects.

III.4. The procedure: a discourse-as-process view of the text
Since another determining factor in perceiving text coherence may be the purpose for reading the text, the present paper also attempted to control for this factor. This was achieved by setting up a clear expected outcome for the subjects to produce as a result of the reading task. The required outcome in this case was a written summary of the text. Having to carry out this task was considered as an incentive for the reader to understand the text as best as possible at every point. It was assumed that understanding the text well would involve appreciating the relationship between each new sentence and previous discourse. This skill was considered crucial in establishing a hierarchy of text units so necessary for summarizing the text, i.e. for distinguishing main points from secondary details. It was assumed that in order for the subjects to perceive these relationships, they would have to read the text in great detail.

Obviously, in order to complete the summary task, the subjects would have to read the text various times. However, for the purposes of this research, only the interpretation taking place during the first detailed reading of the text was taken into account. Setting up the task of summarizing the text was then only used by the research design as a stimulus for a detailed reading that would make it possible to control for the confounding factor of purpose of reading. Another confounding factor was the difficulty of the text in terms of vocabulary and structures. To control for this factor the subjects were provided with a glossary with the most predictably difficult items.

The procedure for obtaining the data was the following. The subjects were first presented with the original text so that they could have access to its visual features. The title and subtitle of the text, considered as important elements of the text in generating expectations about the content and purpose of the whole article, were discussed with the subjects. However, since these two units seemed to stand on a different hierarchical level in relation to the core text, they were excluded from detailed analysis. Thus it was the first sentence of the core text that was taken as
the first unit of coherence for focussed attention.

Then the subjects were asked to do a number of interpretation tasks. To make sure all subjects focussed on intersentential relations rather than intrasentential relations (cf. Hyde, 1990, 2002; Moreno, 1997, 1998b), the text was split up into its constituent coherence units. In most cases, the minimal unit of coherence corresponded with the orthographic sentence, or the clause complex (Downing and Locke, 1992), enclosed by a full stop. However, based on Sinclair’s (1993) conclusions about this issue, a few variations were introduced. Sinclair identified a number of internal acts of reference “which may suggest that we revise the original assumption that the orthographic sentence is the best minimal unit for text structure. In the text-order analysis, the sentences we choose to divide are those whose two parts behave as two separate sentences in terms of this analysis. This is a circular argument, but a satisfying one nevertheless. That is, we do not make arbitrary or intuitive divisions of sentences” (Sinclair, 1993: 19).

If we look at the clauses where Sinclair identifies internal acts of reference, they seem to be enclosed by a colon, a dash, or a comma followed by a coordinator and a reference item, or a quotation mark (Sinclair, 1993: 25-28). And it is true that these clauses seem to behave quite independently from their neighboring clause from the point of view of coherence. In fact, as Downing and Locke (1992: 283) recognize, “it may be difficult in the spoken language,..., to decide whether such combinations of clauses can be considered to constitute a clause complex, that is to say a single unit, or whether they are to be interpreted as two separate clauses”. And this may also apply to written language. Hence, the question remains, should we continue considering the pure orthographic sentence as the minimal unit of coherence or should we reconsider this concept? Sinclair’s results could be taken as suggesting that certain types of paratactic relations between clauses are used by writers to present chunks of information as quite independent from the point of view of coherence. However, this still needs to be elucidated.

For the purposes of the present study, in order not to make arbitrary or intuitive divisions of clauses within the different clause complexes in the text, it was decided to divide sentences at points where there was a colon (1, 17, 28, 41, 47, 58), a dash (20, 34), or a comma or dash followed by some cohesive device (3, 29, 31, 56 and 59), provided the following unit could stand as independent from a coherence point of view. No divisions between clauses in hypotactic or dependent relationship were made. This is the only place where the researcher had to impose her own interpretation of what could be considered as an autonomous unit from the point of view of coherence beforehand. However, this imposition was necessary to guarantee the validity of the results, i.e. to guarantee that all the subjects were observing the phenomena that the study was focusing on. Arriving at a consensus on this aspect would have constituted another study in its own right. It should be recalled that the text elements presented in parentheses and preceded by an asterisk in the segmented text were not part of the original text but are meant to represent the type of connection inferred by the subjects between text fragments (cf. appendix).

As the effort made by each subject in their search for relevance at every text of the moment might also be a source of variation, all subjects were required to make their
interpretations explicit at every stage in the text in the form of a test as illustrated below. The test asked them to read the first coherence unit in the text, (1), and then stop reading to try and see if they perceived a connection between this unit and its co-text. It was assumed that the first coherent unit would provide the most relevant assumption for interpreting the second coherence unit. Therefore in test item (1) students would only perceive a connection between coherence unit (1) and its co-text if that coherence unit were establishing a prospection. From test item (2) onwards, all types of connections were possible, both backwards and forwards.

Table 1: Sample Test Items (1 to 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nineteen ninety-nine was the year we dipped a toe in the water:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A) Can you perceive any connection between coherence unit (1) and its co-text? Yes □ No □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F) Does coherence unit (1) lead you to expect something specific in the following text? Yes □ No □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G) If this connection is explicit, circle and write down (the) prospective signal(s) that make(s) it explicit:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and you know what?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A) Can you perceive any connection between coherence unit (2) and its co-text? Yes □ No □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) If you perceive an explicit connection with previous text, circle and write down the retrospective signal(s) that make(s) it explicit:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C) If you perceive an implicit connection, provide a signal/text fragment to make it explicit:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D) In relation to which part of previous text can you perceive this connection, whether implicit or explicit?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A □ (a word) B □ (a phrase) C □ (a clause) D □ (a sentence) E □ (a larger unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E) In which sentence(s) is that part of previous text? N°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F) Does coherence unit (2) lead you to expect something specific in the following text? Yes □ No □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G) If this connection is explicit, circle and write down (the) prospective signal(s) that make(s) it explicit:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H) Does coherence unit (2) satisfy a prospection created in previous text? Yes □ No □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J) If so, in which coherence unit was the prospection created? N°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aim of this test was to guide the subjects' interpretation process at each stage of the text and to help them identify the text features of the current sentence that contributed to their achieving relevance, i.e. to their perceiving a connection of some kind in relation to previous or upcoming text at that point in the reading process. Wherever the connection between consecutive text fragments was not explicit, the subjects were questioned about the type of connection that helped them to perceive the relevance of the text at that point by making it explicit themselves by some text item. Subjects were also asked to indicate which part of the text provided them with the most cost-effective contextual assumptions to establish the relevance of the new proposition.
Thus the test was oriented to helping the students capture the following possible types of phenomena in each current sentence, either retrospective —encapsulating (anaphoric)— elements, (questions B to E), or prospective —predictive (cataphoric)— elements (questions F to G). These two phenomena had been amply acknowledged in the literature (cf. Halliday and Hasan 1976; Hyde 1990, 2002; Sinclair 1993; Tadros 1985, 1994). The subjects were also asked to observe whether the current sentence fulfilled a prospection created in a previous state of the text (questions H to I) (cf. Sinclair, 1993). To avoid giving any specific clues, they were asked to answer the same nine questions (A to I) about each new coherence unit in the text, except for unit (1) at which point only questions A) F) and G), about prospecting mechanisms, were relevant.

The reason for carrying out the process this way had to do with ensuring that every individual had made an effort to interpret the current coherence unit before attempting to interpret the next. Once every individual had specified their interpretations in writing, a round of discussions was opened to contrast the different interpretations, first in groups of five individuals made up in such a way that all groups were balanced in terms of proficiency level. Then the discussion was held open-class. The subjects were given the chance to modify their interpretation after each round of discussions. The aim was to find out whether it was possible to arrive at a consensus on the most likely interpretation at each stage of the text. It should be recalled that the main objective was to capture the coherence pattern of the text as perceived by the group rather than by each individual.

IV. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Once the data had been gathered following the previously mentioned procedure, it was the researcher’s task to arrange and classify them. The method of analysis consisted first in distinguishing explicit from implicit relations. Then it analyzed both the text features identified in the text and those inferred by the subjects. Let us now focus on the major types and subtypes of coherence mechanisms.

IV.1. Encapsulating, or retrospective, mechanisms (E)
According to Sinclair (1993), encapsulating mechanisms are those text features identified in the new sentence that somehow refer back to the meaning created by the whole of the previous sentence. “By referring to the whole of the previous sentence a new sentence uses it as part of the subject matter. This removes its discourse function, leaving only the meaning which it has created” (Sinclair, 1993: 7). It is in relation to this area where clear links could be established between Blakemore’s (1987) view of relevance and coherence, and Sinclair’s (1993) account of the encapsulating mechanisms used in perceiving text structure, and therefore, coherence. As
will be recalled, Blakemore (1987) states that two utterances may be connected in coherent discourse in either of two ways.

IV.1.1. Relevance of content
One type of coherence arises when information made available by the interpretation of one segment of discourse is used in establishing the propositional content of the next (Blakemore, 1987: 112). I propose to call this type relevance of content to distinguish it from what I will refer to as relevance of relational function (see below).

IV.1.1.a. Encapsulating deictic act
Relevance of content closely relates to what Sinclair (1993) terms deictic acts, which certainly is the area where the mechanism of encapsulation is better appreciated. From the examples he includes under this category (Sinclair, 1993: 11-12), it is possible to infer that deictic acts include phenomena such as reference items and lexical cohesive items, sometimes used in combination. Let me show this by means of an example taken from the text analyzed, where the numbering in brackets shows the corresponding coherence units.

(39) In my day, I was expected to annotate scripts to explain my marks to the chief examiner. (40) Remove that requirement, and the examining process will only appear to be more open, while in fact retaining an almost smug inscrutability.

It is clear that there is one segment in the second sentence, that requirement, whose interpretation is affected by the interpretation of another segment of previous discourse. In other words, we can say that in order to establish part of the content of the second proposition we need to use the propositional meaning created by the interpretation of previous text. That is to say, we need to bring to bear an assumption derived from having interpreted a previous segment of text. And, in this case, the segment of previous text that provides the reader with the most relevant assumption, derived from interpreting semantic content, is the previous sentence: i.e. the requirement that in her day, the author was expected to annotate scripts to explain her marks to the chief examiner.

Thus this example shows quite clearly that the encapsulated text is the whole of the previous sentence. However, not all examples of relevance of content seem so clear as this. In fact, Sinclair (1993) opens an interesting debate that is especially relevant in the two areas of cohesion included in his framework under the category of deictic acts, namely, reference and lexical cohesion. The debate refers to a possible distinction between the process of encapsulation and what Sinclair identifies as point-to-point cohesion. According to Sinclair (1993), there are other kinds of cohesion that refer to less than a sentence, and these are not regarded as textual in nature. To clarify this distinction terminologically speaking, I propose to call the process of true encapsulation textual cohesion, as opposed to point-to-point cohesion.
Point-to-point cohesion may be said to occur in cases where a pronoun can be related back to a noun phrase earlier in the text, and can be said to refer to it. This kind of pattern is clearly of frequent occurrence, and is the basis of most accounts of cohesion and the focus of many tasks in teaching reading discourse skills. It includes the rich field of lexical cohesion, where the recurrence of a word or phrase, or the occurrence of something reminiscent of a previous item is noted. Each constituent of these patterns is less than one sentence long; normally a word or phrase, or at most a clause (Sinclair, 1993: 8).

Since one of the first studies where this type of items was discussed at length is Halliday and Hasan (1976), let me show one simple and trivial example that they take from a cookery book to illustrate what Sinclair seems to call point-to-point cohesion:


According to Halliday and Hasan (1976: 3), “it is clear that they in the second sentence refers back to (is anaphoric to) the six cooking apples in the first sentence. This anaphoric function of them gives cohesion to the two sentences, so that we interpret them as a whole; the two sentences together constitute a text. Or rather, they form part of the same text since there may be more of it to follow”. And later they go on to say that “the meaning of the cohesive relation between them and six cooking apples is that they refer to the same thing. The two items are identical in reference, or co-referential. So, in this case, what provides the texture is the co-referentiality of them and six cooking apples” (Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 3). This is the way the authors analyze most cases of cohesion, other than conjunction:

... where the cohesive item is something like he or one, which coheres by direct reference to, or substitution for, another item the presupposed element is typically a specific item in the immediately preceding sentence [...] Characteristically these instances also tend to form cohesive chains, sequences in which it, for example, refers back to the immediately preceding sentence —but to another it in that sentence, and it is necessary to go back three, four or more sentences, stepping across a whole sequence of its, before finding the substantial element.

Halliday & Hasan (1976: 15)

As has been noted, in Sinclair’s (1993) view, these cases of cohesion are not regarded as textual in nature. According to him, textual cohesion deals “only with sentences or, occasionally, clause complexes, or even longer stretches of text, and it does much more than effect a tenuous connection between isolated constituents of sentences. It is the process of encapsulation, and it reclassifies a previous sentence or text by demoting it into an element of the structure of the new sentence” (Sinclair, 1993: 9). A clear example of the process of encapsulation has been discussed at the top of this section (39-40), where it was easy to observe how the meaning of the first sentence, (39), had been demoted into the direct object of the first clause in sentence (40).
As Sinclair (1993: 8) claims, "failure to appreciate the distinction between these two types of cohesion has hampered the development of models of text structure". The model of text that he puts forward "has no place for retention of the actual words and phrases of text so that such connections between text items could be established" (Sinclair, 1993: 8). The model I advocate also adopts the same perspective. However, it reconsider some cases that might be considered as point-to-point cohesion by Sinclair.

Let us take fragment [1] again:


In my view, it is possible to appreciate a mechanism of encapsulation as defined by Sinclair, i.e., by perceiving a cohesive relation between them and the meaning created by interpreting the whole of the previous sentence. The best way to see this is by trying to visualize the state in which the six cooking apples that them refers back to are when we put them into the fireproof dish: are they the same six cooking apples that we originally took to be washed and cored or are they six cooking apples already washed and cored? When the group of 25 subjects were asked this question during their short course they unanimously answered that the six cooking apples that we need to put into the fireproof dish, according to the recipe, should already be washed and cored.

Thus it is possible to suggest that in this case the relevance is provided in this respect by the fact that the interpretation of them is affected by the interpretation of the semantic content of the whole previous sentence, not only by the interpretation of the phrase six cooking apples, as Halliday and Hasan suggest. Thus, this case of them would be analyzed in our methodological framework as a case of textual cohesion because it encapsulates the meaning created by the whole of the previous sentence.

This departure from previous analyses pertains specifically to cases of cohesion such as the one illustrated by [1], where reference occurs, and some cases of lexical cohesion. If we relate this position to the relevance-based framework, it may be said that the personal pronoun them in [1] functions as a constraint on relevance. It allows the writer to make sure that her readers select the most effective contextual assumptions in their search for relevance at minimal processing cost. As we have suggested, in this case such a contextual assumption is derived from interpreting the semantic content of the whole preceding sentence in such a way that the second fragment of [1] is interpreted as [1B]:

[1B] Put them (the six washed and cored cooking apples) into a fireproof dish.

IV.1.1.b. Encapsulating discourse act:
A second subtype of relevance of content that I would like to propose takes place when, as well as interpreting the semantic content of the whole of a preceding coherence unit, the reader needs
to interpret the discourse act performed by it in order to establish the propositional content of a segment in the new sentence. In other words, the structure of the new sentence contains an element that reclassifies a previous discourse segment in terms of its discourse function. Examples of these signals of discourse acts may be: distinction, definition, difference, comparison, or any other encapsulating device that refers to an act performed by some segment of preceding discourse. Let us consider one example from the text:

(47) There will be logistical problems: returning all scripts will mean 13.5m papers whizzing through the postal system, for instance. Photocopying scripts sounds horrendous even to a convinced “pro-returner” like me. Proper scrutiny of the papers in school will take time, possibly precious holiday time. (51) And if the big learners here are teachers, not pupils, should they be returned at all?

The answer is yes. I believe now, as I believed last year when I wrote one of the first articles calling for this move towards long-overdue transparency and accountability, and as the authorities hold in New Zealand, that it is simply the right thing to do. The right thing overrides logistical problems. (55) Pupil neglect of the papers is beside the point.

After reading these two paragraphs of the text, if we focus our attention on the noun phrase the point in the last sentence, it is clear that it has an encapsulating function. The reader will rapidly wonder which point, to remember that the point had been made in the preceding text in the form of a rhetorical question “should they (the scripts) be returned at all?” which in its context, where problems are being described, really implies what could be expressed by a negative statement: they should not be returned at all. The answer given to this question by the author, however, cancels this negative interpretation by providing what is presented as a powerful argument: i.e. it is simply the right thing to do, and this overrides logistical problems.

Then, the last sentence, (55), retrieves by means of the encapsulating device pupil neglect of the papers a previous assumption supplied by interpreting the text at coherence unit (26), which was presented as a negative aspect (an irony) of the pilot scheme, i.e. that most of the candidates didn’t want them (i.e. the scripts). What the sentence in focus, (55), does then is discard the relevance of that assumption, (26), elaborated from (27) to (33), in relation to the point made, i.e. the question posed in coherence unit (51). Thus in order for the reader to establish the content of the noun phrase the point, s/he needs to interpret the discourse act performed by coherence unit (51) as making a point.

Finally, encapsulating discourse acts can also co-occur with other deictic acts, such as in this distinction. This reinforcement makes the encapsulation process easier to perceive.

IV.1.2. Relevance of relational function (Encapsulating logical act)

The other type of coherence arises when the information made available by one discourse segment is used in establishing the relevance of the next (Blakemore, 1987: 112). In other words,
this type of coherence arises when, on trying to establish the relevance of the new coherence unit as a whole (not simply one element in it—as in relevance of content), the reader needs to do some extra inferential work to interpret the discourse function (i.e. an implicit import) of the whole of a previous discourse unit in relation to the discourse function of the whole of the current discourse unit. That is why I refer to this type as relevance of relational function, because the extra propositions inferred from the two related discourse segments are relational, i.e. depend on each other, and they are perceived in discourse functional terms. Other terms used in the literature to describe roughly the same kind of phenomena are the following: conjunctive relations (Halliday & Hasan, 1976); semantic relations (Crombie, 1985); relational propositions (Mann and Thompson, 1986); clause relations (Winter, 1986); intersentential relations (Hyde, 1990, 2002); and coherence relations (Sanders et al., 1993).

Examples of these relational propositions are: sequence, claim-support, argument-conclusion, claim-contrast, reason-action, effect-cause, etc. Since it does not seem possible to arrive at a consensus on a universal taxonomy, I will use the terms that the subjects employed intuitively to describe their interpretations. What most authors seem to agree on is that relational propositions may be implicit or explicit. It is important to notice that it is when the relational propositions are made explicit that the encapsulation is patent, serving as a powerful textual constraint on relevance. Otherwise, the relevance of the new coherence unit can only count on the reader's inferential capacity.

If we considered this phenomenon from Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) view, then we would be considering the encapsulating mechanism effected by conjunctive items, which include expressions such as And, Yet, So and Then. However, as has been attested by Winter (1977), Crombie (1985), Hyde (1990, 2002) and Moreno (1995, 1997, 1998b, in press), there are alternative means of signalling relational propositions to the well-recognized conjunctions. These alternative means stretch right across the spectrum of sentence structure, constituting central elements such as nominal, verbal, adjectival and others items. Hyde (1990) provides a full account of these means in his study of the explicit signalling of intersentential relations as they occur in a corpus of editorials from The Guardian. Moreno (1995, 1995, 1998b) focuses on the expression of different kinds of causal expressions in a corpus of research articles to offer contrastive results between Spanish and English. Moreno (in press) identifies the full range of possibilities for the expression of intersentential causal relations in a corpus of cause-effect analytical essays.

It is precisely in most of these other alternative expressions where the mechanism of encapsulation is perceived more clearly. The main reason is that these integrated signals usually co-occur with other devices such as ellipsis, reference or lexical cohesion, which also encapsulate, making the encapsulation stronger. Consider for example the metatextual expression this is not to say identified in coherence unit (15) in the text analyzed, where the previous relevant segment of text (12-14) is encapsulated by the reference item this, establishing relevance of content. What is interesting to point out is that the subjects agreed that this

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expression was also signalling a relation of inferred consequence derived from the previous relevant discourse and that this relation was being cancelled by the negative word.

If we now consider Sinclair's (1993) analytical framework, relational propositions would approximately correspond to what he terms logical acts. And this is the term I will adopt to refer to this phenomenon in order to avoid using more extraneous terminology. I say approximately because, according to Sinclair (1993: 9), logical acts "show the use of the logical connectors and associated mechanisms such as ellipsis", but in the present analysis ellipsis is not considered under logical acts, but as a form of inferred connection, for the following reasons.

On the one hand, it is true that signals of relational propositions are also occasionally associated with ellipsis such as in connectors like as a result (i.e. 'as a result * of a previously-stated proposition'). This, in fact, has been well attested by Moreno (1997, 1998b, in press). However, in a detailed analysis of the mechanisms of coherence involved in this expression, it is possible to identify two distinctive sources of relevance which occur in combination: one which arises when the second related fragment of text is interpreted as the result of what has been stated in the previous relevant proposition, which is interpreted as the cause, thus inferring a cause-effect relational proposition. The other source of coherence arises when the elliptical element is recovered. It is then that the encapsulating mechanism is perceived. However, if we had to analyze the encapsulating elements recovered, we would say that the type of relevance they contribute to establishing has more to do with relevance of content. This type of relevance would correspond more precisely to the coherence mechanisms Sinclair terms deictic acts.

On the other hand, ellipsis may also occur in expressions that do not signal a logical act. Consider the following metatextual expression found in unit (26) in the text, the irony is. In this case, the subjects interpreted that the expression was one form of evaluation of the proposition previously stated in (6), where the pilot scheme had been first introduced and described. In fact, the students were able to establish the connection with that previously stated proposition by recovering the following textual material of the pilot scheme, which would be functioning as a post-modifier in the NP: the irony of the pilot scheme. What is important to notice in this case is that the encapsulation is not explicit, but implicit by means of ellipsis. It is only when the elliptical material is recovered, not always an easy task with student subjects, that the encapsulation is perceived. However, again, if we had to analyze the encapsulating elements recovered, of the pilot scheme, we would say that the type of coherence they contribute to establishing is relevance of content by means of reference (the) and lexical cohesion (repetition of pilot scheme). This is perhaps the major difference between the present analytical framework and Sinclair's (1993).

Sinclair (1993) proves his hypothesis about the coherence mechanism termed encapsulation, and concludes that the principal type of coherence is through encapsulation. It is so well established that in cases where there is no explicit link between sentences the default interpretation is encapsulation. Now, as Sinclair (1993) acknowledges, if encapsulation were an absolute rule, and not just a default hypothesis, then the nature of text structure would be
obvious. The current sentence would encapsulate the previous one, which in its turn had
encapsulated its predecessor, and so on back to the beginning of the text. The current sentence
would then be encapsulated in an act of reference in the next to come, and so on until the end of
the text.

As a model of text structure, I agree with Sinclair that it seems very attractive. It explains
how texts can be organized and how their dynamism may be created and fuelled. It provides the
basis for a powerful definition of coherence, and reduces cohesion to the identification of the act
of reference only. However, Sinclair (1993) introduces a variation to the default hypothesis,
which he considers as another major category of coherence: that is, prospection. This is an
alternative — but not so frequent — structure to that of retrospective encapsulation, which
Blakemore (1987) does not explicitly account for in her study.

IV.2. Prospective mechanisms (P)
In addition to encapsulating the preceding text, a sentence can make a prospection about the next
sentence, thus establishing a need for the next sentence to fulfil the prospection if coherence is
to be maintained. The sentence fulfilling the prospection does not encapsulate the prospecting
sentence. (Sinclair, 1993: 28)

So, prospection occurs where the phrasing of a sentence leads the reader to expect
something specific in the forthcoming text. Due to the precise nature of the type of relevance
established in cases of prospection, I will distinguish the following two types on the basis of
whether they are used to establish relevance of content or to establish relevance of relational
function.

IV.2.1. Relevance of content
In this variation of coherence mechanism we can perceive a similar principle to the one we could
perceive in the corresponding type of encapsulation but in the opposite direction. Blakemore
(1987, 1992) does not acknowledge the phenomenon of prospection, because she focuses on the
relevance of the current utterance in relation to meaning generated by interpreting the preceding
discourse. However, from our relevance-based perspective it should be possible to say that one
type of prospection occurs where there are text elements in the current sentence whose
propositional content is likely to be affected by the interpretation of an upcoming text fragment
in the sense that its meaning will be fully determined.

Another way of looking at this is to say that prospection occurs when there is an element
in the current sentence that gives the reader advanced warning as to the way in which the
assumptions derived from interpreting the following segment of discourse will be relevant. Thus
in prospective acts of this type, an element of the current sentence serves as a powerful constraint
on the relevance of an upcoming fragment of text. It is also important to notice that this
phenomenon implies that the word or phrase to be elucidated in the upcoming text is presented
as new to the context created in the course of interpretation. Within prospecting relevance of content it is possible to distinguish at least two types of prospecting act.

IV.2.1.a. Prospecting deictic act
The first type roughly corresponds to the phenomenon identified by Tadros (1985: 14) as enumeration. It rests on the reader interpreting the full meaning of a word or phrase (e.g. a sub-technical word such as advantages, aspects, functions, which Tadros terms the enumerable), as something to be elucidated in the following text. Tadros shows how the enumerable, or prospecting signal, is usually preceded by some kind of numeral, whether exact, such as two, or inexact, such as several that commits the writer to enumerate. However, as the text shows, the enumerable does not need to be preceded by a numeral to create a prospection. It is sometimes simply expressed in the plural. A clear example from the text is found in coherence unit (47): there will be logistical problems, which by means of the lexical word problems (a superordinate), followed by a colon, makes a prospection over a group of sentences (48-50), which specify the logistical problems prospected.

The distinguishing feature of this type of prospection from the relevance perspective rests on the fact that interpreting the semantic content of a segment of upcoming discourse will help to fully determine the meaning of the prospecting signal. This also has the effect of establishing the relevance of the next fragment of discourse. What is more, for the prospection to be fulfilled satisfactorily, the semantic interpretation derived from the following unit(s) needs to be congruent with the general semantic meaning of the prospecting signal. For instance, relevance is easily perceived at each of text units (48-50) when after interpreting their semantic content we are able to abstract away and interpret each of the events described as problems.

I have termed this first type prospecting deictic act in a general sense to include not only this type of sub-technical lexical words, or superordinates, but also other prospecting signals such as cataphoric reference items and question words, where the meaning of the prospecting item is also elucidated by interpreting the semantic content of a relevant segment of upcoming discourse. The question word, what, in coherence unit (2) in the text is a clear case. Punctuation marks such as the question mark (2) or the colon (47) would also contribute to establishing a prospection.

IV.2.1.b. Prospecting discourse act
Another common way in which this type of prospection may happen is when the current sentence contains a signal, similar to what Tadros (1985) terms advance labelling, such as let us define, whereby the “writer labels, and thereby commits himself to perform a discourse act” (Tadros, 1985: 22). In this case, the writer is committed to performing an act of definition. In other words, for the reader to fully determine the content of the element define in the current coherence unit, s/he will need to go on reading the following relevant fragment of text and interpret it as a definition. Thus, in this case too, the current sentence serves as a powerful
constraint on the relevance of the upcoming coherence unit, in that it will constrain its interpretation to a given discourse function, a definition. In fact, if the reader is to perceive the new coherent unit as relevant, s/he needs to be able to infer its discourse function as a definition. It is this inferred discourse function that needs to be congruent with the general meaning of the prospecting signal.

This type of prospection would embrace cases such as those accounted for by Sinclair (1993). One example is the introduction of quoted speech by means of attribution, as in his message, the statement or the exhortation (Sinclair, 1993: 13). Other possible signals of prospected discourse acts may be the following: consider, discuss, compare, describe, examine, mention and distinguish, as in a sentence like “It is important to distinguish between real and nominal wages” (Tadros, 1985: 22) followed by other sentences elucidating this distinction. It should be noted that the function of the following fragment of discourse is not part of a relational proposition but is just an autonomous discourse act.

The only example of a prospecting discourse act found in the text under analysis is in coherence unit (58):

(56) A few will be very interested indeed, (57) and that’s enough. (58) * (It is) A bit like voting, really: < [(59) lots of people don’t care about that either, (60) but for those who do, it’s one of the markers of a civilized world.]

After reading (58), it seems as if the writer is committed to performing an act of comparison. It is true that a comparison is made in this clause by means of the comparative preposition, like, between the situation encapsulated by elliptical material such as it is and voting. In this sense, like is encapsulating, because the reference of the comparison is found in previous text. However, the comparison is not fully determined in the clause where like occurs, since the reader does not know in what way the two members of the comparison are similar. To satisfy this, the reader will need to go on reading. In this sense, the comparative preposition is prospecting a discourse act of comparison. Reinforcing this prospection is the colon, which indicates that the fulfilment of the prospection will follow immediately.

IV.2.2. Relevance of relational function (Prospecting logical act)
Another variation of prospection that I would like to propose serves to help readers perceive the relevance of a new coherence unit by advancing the relational discourse function that will be established between the next fragment of discourse and, either the current sentence, or a previous fragment of discourse. In other words, prospecting logical acts also play an important role as textual constraints on relevance in the sense that by interpreting the current coherent unit, the reader is able to predict the relevance of the next in terms of its relational discourse function. That is, in this type of prospection some proposition (or pragmatic import) derived from interpreting the current segment of discourse is used in establishing the relevance of the
following segment of discourse by virtue of its discourse function in relation to the discourse function inferred from the current sentence or a previous one.

An interesting example from the text is in (28), the reasons are obvious, where the prospecting signal is the plural noun reasons. It is true that this case might also be analyzed as a case of enumeration (i.e. as a prospecting deictic act), in the sense that the content of the word reasons will be elucidated in the following text. That is, the reader will need to go on reading the following fragment of discourse to find the reasons enumerated. However, it also seems quite clear that interpreting the coherence unit in which the signal appears leads the reader to predict the relevance of the upcoming unit(s) in discourse functional terms. In the present case, the reader is led to interpret the following fragment of text as the reasons for the previous relevant discourse, which is then interpreted as the fact or action that will be justified. Therefore the reader infers a relational proposition of fact-explanation or action-reason, which helps him/her establish relevance of relational discourse function for the forthcoming piece of discourse.

In this particular case, what can also be observed is that the fragment of discourse from which one member of the relational proposition is inferred (i.e. the action to be justified) is in a previous independent sentence. Thus in order to perceive the relevance of the current sentence the reader needs to recover the previously stated proposition which has been omitted in the current sentence. On recovering elliptical discourse material such as for the previously stated action, a mechanism of encapsulation is clearly perceived as establishing relevance of content. So, we could say that this coherence unit is perceived as coherent by virtue of dependent relevance of relational function both retrospectively and prospectively, and by virtue of relevance of content prospectively, by means of the signal reasons.

It is in cases like these where it is possible to appreciate the role of prospecting cohesive devices as another type of constraint on the relevance of the upcoming piece of discourse. Blakemore (1987, 1992), however, does not account for this kind of relevance. Sinclair (1993) and Tadros (1985), for instance, do account for some of these prospecting signals such as examples, implications in their role as what I have called constraints on relevance of content, but they do not clearly account for their role as constraints on relevance of relational function. Hyde (1990), on his part, gives full account of this role in his discussion of cataphoric and anaphoric-cum-cataphoric intersentential relations signals which occurred in editorials from The Guardian throughout the whole spectrum of relational propositions: causal, adversative, additive and temporal.

IV.3. Units fulfilling or satisfying a prospection (S)

As Sinclair (1993) puts it, the prospective acts relevant to a sentence are made in the previous sentence. The act of prospection means that the interactive force of a sentence extends to the end of the sentence following. If we now look at this phenomenon from the relevance-based framework, we will also need to account for the relevance of the unit following a prospective act.
I would like to suggest that the relevance of that upcoming unit, which becomes the current sentence in the process of interpretation, is perceived if it satisfies the prospection made in the previous text. The prospection may be fulfilled in two ways: a) if the current sentence provides information from which to derive assumptions (in terms of semantic content or discourse act) that may be used to determine fully the content of a part of the propositional content of the coherence unit where the prospection was created, and/or b) if it provides information from which to derive a relational discourse function congruent with the relational proposition prospected in the preceding discourse. Failing this, the reader may find the discourse either unsatisfactory, incomplete or illogical.

In the case under analysis, every sentence in the rest of the paragraph following the reasons are obvious is relevant in this sense. All these sentences together are then said to fulfil the prospection. And their status in the text structure will be that of fulfilling the prospection. Let us imagine, for instance, that instead of coherence unit (28) being continued in the way it was, it had been followed by the following coherence unit: If you had two older brothers, you really don’t care about the papers. Even though the relevance of this upcoming segment of discourse, now the current text of the moment, may have been prospected by the previous coherent unit the reasons are obvious, the reader will very probably find it difficult to derive any assumption from the information contained in it that allows him/her to infer that the information is functioning as one of the prospected reasons. Therefore, the reader is bound to find the text illogical or irrational at this (invented) point. This is why I would like to stress the role of the fulfilment of a prospection as a powerful though less frequent coherence mechanism.

In this section I have introduced the main criteria used to analyze explicit coherence mechanisms and have discussed their role as textual constraints on relevance. It should be emphasized that this method of analysis was applied only to those text features identified by the subjects, whose contribution to establishing the relevance of each new sentence was discussed open-class. In summary, these text features were classified either as encapsulating (deictic act, discourse act, logical act), prospecting (deictic act, discourse act, logical act), combining both mechanisms, or fulfilling a prospection.

IV.4. Inferred encapsulation, or qualified assignments (I)

In cases where there were no clear explicit signals of the coherence mechanism, that is, in cases of implicit connections, the subjects were asked to make them explicit. These were the cases that roughly correspond to what Sinclair (1993:20) terms qualified assignments. He also suggests that, as a general rule in interpretation, in the absence of a clear indication we reverse the argument and ask what is the kind of relationship that, using all the powers of inference available, one would assume in that case. As a method for gathering data, that is exactly what the subjects were asked to do. Then the group tried to arrive at a consensus about the most reasonable interpretation in relation to the groups’ standard of coherence, which may not be the
same in other discourse communities. This recovered textual material typically signals logical acts and deictic acts of an elliptical type.

It is important to stress that the category of *ellipsis* has been treated in the present study either as a case of inferred point-to-point cohesion or inferred encapsulation since one of the characteristics of this cohesive tie is precisely that there is no text signal indicating the tie but a structural slot that needs to be recovered for relevance to be established.

In some cases the structural slot is obligatory from a syntactic viewpoint as in (23).

(23) * (Anyway) Even if he didn’t (*look over one’s shoulder, checking, commenting, re-marking if necessary), the fear that he would (*look over ones shoulder, checking, commenting, re-marking if necessary) was a great deterrent to misdemeanour.

In this case the elliptical text segment refers to a part of the wording used in the previous coherence unit (22): the predication in the clause. This would be a case of point-to-point cohesion. In other types of ellipsis, the structural slot is optional, as in (7).

(7) The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority has carried out an interim evaluation * (of the pilot scheme).

In (7), the elliptical encapsulating item did not simply refer to the part of the wording in the preceding coherence unit, (6) where the pilot scheme is first mentioned but to the whole semantic content of (6), where the pilot scheme is described in detail. Once recovered, the encapsulating devices were analyzed and classified as any other explicit encapsulating acts. If one looks at these and other cases of ellipsis closely, two types of relevance seem to arise once the elliptical material is recovered.

IV.4.1. Relevance of content (Inferred encapsulating deictic act)

One is relevance of content, as illustrated by (7), where the interpretation of one segment in the current sentence (excluding the linking word of), the pilot scheme, is affected by the interpretation of another segment of previous discourse, i.e. the whole of coherence unit (6) where the pilot scheme is described. It is this phenomenon that can be considered as really textual in nature because it involves encapsulation rather than point-to-point cohesion.

IV.4.2. Relevance of wording (Inferred point-to-point wording act)

A second subtype of relevance that I would like to propose, drawing on Halliday and Hasan (1976), takes place when, rather than recovering the semantic content of the whole preceding coherence unit, the reader needs to recover (a part of) the wording used in it in order to establish the content of the elliptical segment in the new sentence, as in the two instances of ellipsis in (23) above. As we shall see, this type of point-to-point cohesion is usually accompanied by other

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types of cohesion, such as *he* in (23), which are able to encapsulate. It is worth noting that this type of relevance would also apply to cases of substitution, although in these cases the relation is made explicit by a word such as *one* and *do*. These cases also seem to reflect point-to-point cohesion rather than true encapsulation, as will be shown.

**IV.5. Type of cohesive tie**

Once all the sentences in the text had been classified according to the type of coherence mechanism that helped the readers to perceive their relevance, the study sought to determine which type(s) of cohesive tie was/were involved in each case. One problem at this stage was to decide which taxonomy of cohesive devices to use to classify the different coherence mechanisms found. It was eventually decided to use Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) classification of cohesive devices for the simple reason that it is still the most comprehensive and widely known account of cohesive devices. Therefore, using their terminological framework would make it easier for researchers to establish comparisons between results obtained applying different but related models.

Thus, the textual features identified by the group as contributing to their perception of coherence were further classified, wherever possible, under the different categories identified by Halliday and Hasan (1976): *lexical cohesion* (i.e. repetition, synonym, superordinate, general word, related word); *substitution* (nominal, verbal, clausal) *reference* (personal, demonstrative, comparative). Logical acts were classified on a first level according to the four types of *conjunction* (additive, causal, adversative, temporal). In cases where the identified features did not fit any of these categories, further categories were added. Within conjunctive relations, further subcategories were specified but, as has been mentioned, the terminology used to name each logical relation in some cases had more to do with the subjects’ interpretation of the relational discourse functions inferred than with the categories used by any of the existing studies in the literature to avoid losing the shades of relational discourse meaning perceived. Finally, as justified above, the category of *ellipsis* was treated as a case of either inferred encapsulation or point-to-point cohesion.

**IV.6. A text-as-product view of cohesive devices**

The last stage in this research was to analyze the cohesive ties contained in the text when looked at as a product. By this I mean using a method whereby the researcher approaches the whole text as a finished product in an attempt to identify all kinds of cohesive ties that play a role in establishing connections between a text fragment and another one across sentence boundaries. Due to obvious space limitations, it was beyond the scope of this paper to classify all the different resources found. Therefore, these are only marked in the text. However, let me point out that, in order to make future comparisons possible, the identification of these devices was
carried out following Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) classification of cohesive ties as far as possible: lexical cohesion (repetition, synonyms, opposites, related words), substitution and ellipsis, reference (just endophoric) and conjunction.

V. RESULTS

The results obtained from the discourse-as-process view of textual constraints on relevance are summarized in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Explicit signal(s)</th>
<th>Type and subtype of coherence mechanism</th>
<th>Type of cohesive tie</th>
<th>Relates to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1) and&lt;br&gt;2) what?</td>
<td>E: Logical&lt;br&gt;P: Deictic</td>
<td>Additive: Positive&lt;br&gt;Reference: Question word&lt;br&gt;Punctuation: Question mark</td>
<td>1&lt;br&gt;3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1) and&lt;br&gt;2) and&lt;br&gt;3) the water</td>
<td>S: E: Logical&lt;br&gt;E: Deictic</td>
<td>Additive: Positive&lt;br&gt;Phrasal: Demonstrative reference + Lexical repetition</td>
<td>2&lt;br&gt;3&lt;br&gt;1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1) The water</td>
<td>E: Deictic</td>
<td>Phrasal: Demonstrative reference + Lexical repetition</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1) the ... return ... scripts ... to candidates</td>
<td>E: Deictic</td>
<td>Phrasal: Demonstrative reference + Lexical repetition with word class change + Synonym + Repetition</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1) *(of the pilot scheme)&lt;br&gt;2) an evaluation</td>
<td>I: Deictic&lt;br&gt;P: Deictic</td>
<td>Elliptical: Post-modifier&lt;br&gt;Lexical: Superordinate</td>
<td>6&lt;br&gt;9-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1) it</td>
<td>E: Deictic</td>
<td>Reference: Personal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1) *(about the pilot scheme)&lt;br&gt;2) * (of the pilot scheme)</td>
<td>S&lt;br&gt;I</td>
<td>Elliptical: Post-modifier</td>
<td>7&lt;br&gt;6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1) *(In other words)&lt;br&gt;2) *(of the pilot scheme)</td>
<td>S&lt;br&gt;I: Logical</td>
<td>Additive: Expository: Metaphorical paraphrase</td>
<td>7&lt;br&gt;9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1) it</td>
<td>S&lt;br&gt;E: Deictic</td>
<td>Reference: Personal</td>
<td>7&lt;br&gt;6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1) *(In fact)&lt;br&gt;2) *(in the pilot scheme)</td>
<td>I: Logical&lt;br&gt;I: Deictic</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-support&lt;br&gt;Elliptical: Post-modifier</td>
<td>9-11&lt;br&gt;6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1) *(because)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-reason</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1) *(In other words)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Inferred consequence</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1) This is not to say that</td>
<td>E: Deictic&lt;br&gt;E: Logical</td>
<td>Reference: Demonstrative Causal: (Cancellation of) inferred consequence</td>
<td>12-14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1) such a thing</td>
<td>E: Deictic</td>
<td>Phrasal: Comparative reference + Lexical general word</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1) *(because)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-reason</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1) *(examining was)</td>
<td>I: Deictic</td>
<td>Elliptical: Subject + Operator</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1) *(In other words)</td>
<td>I: logical</td>
<td>Additive: Expository: Paraphrase</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1) And * (And = but)</td>
<td>E: Logical</td>
<td>Adversative: Proper</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>1) *(because)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-reason</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>1) At least 2) that + he did</td>
<td>E: Logical</td>
<td>Adversative: Corrective Causal: Same meaning: Demonstrative reference + Personal reference + Lexical general verb</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>1) *(Anyway) 2) he 3) did *(loom over one's shoulder...) 4) he 5) would *(loom over one's shoulder...)</td>
<td>I: Logical E: Deictic I (PP): Wording E: Deictic I (PP): Wording</td>
<td>Adversative: Dismissive Causal: Personal reference + Predicator ellipsis Causal: Personal reference + Predicator ellipsis</td>
<td>21-22 21-22 Predication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1) But 2) ~cr / more 3) *(than the chief examiner looming over...)</td>
<td>E: Logical E: Deictic I: Deictic</td>
<td>Adversative: Contrastive Reference: Comparative Elliptical: Comparative clause</td>
<td>21-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>1) *(Returning the marked scripts... is)</td>
<td>I: Deictic</td>
<td>Elliptical: Subject + Operator</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>2) *(of the pilot scheme) 3) *(in spite of...) having been offered the scripts</td>
<td>I: Deictic E: Logical E: Deictic</td>
<td>Elliptical: Post-modifier Adversative: Proper Causal: Inferred meaning</td>
<td>6 24-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>1) *(As a matter of fact)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-support</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>1)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>1) and 2) that</td>
<td>S E: Logical E: Deictic</td>
<td>Additive: Positive Reference: Demonstrative</td>
<td>28 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>1) *(By contrast) 2) Interest in the papers is generated</td>
<td>I: Logical E: Deictic</td>
<td>Adversative: Contrastive Causal: Opposite meaning (situation)</td>
<td>28-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>2) and * (and = but) 3) then *(then = that)</td>
<td>E: Logical E: Deictic</td>
<td>Adversative: Proper Reference: Demonstrative</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>1) *(because) 2) If</td>
<td>I: Logical E: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-support Causal: Reversed polarity conditional</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>1) also</td>
<td>E: Logical</td>
<td>Additive: Positive</td>
<td>26-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>1) *(this is)</td>
<td>I: Deictic</td>
<td>Elliptical: Subject + Operator</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>1) *(because)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-support</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>1) Actually, 2) this</td>
<td>E: Logical</td>
<td>Additive: Avowal</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>1) *(because)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-reason</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>1) *(In fact)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-support</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>1) that requirement</td>
<td>E: Deictic</td>
<td>Phrasal: Demonstrative reference + Lexical superordinate</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>1) If* *(If = while) 2) candidates didn't care about the scripts</td>
<td>E: Logical</td>
<td>Adversative: Proper</td>
<td>26-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>1) *(As a matter of fact)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-support</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>1) Of course *(Of course = this is natural)</td>
<td>I: Deictic</td>
<td>Elliptical: Subject + Operator</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>1) *(because)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-support</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>1) *(However) 2) Better than 3) knowing what they got *(which is the best learning tool a teacher can...)</td>
<td>I: Logical  E: Deictic  E: Deictic</td>
<td>Adversative: Proper Reference: Comparative Causal: Inferred meaning</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>1) *(So) 2) this</td>
<td>I: Logical  E: Deictic</td>
<td>Causal: Inferred consequence Reference: Demonstrative</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>1) problems: 2) *(with the process of returning the scripts to candidates)</td>
<td>P: Deictic  I: Deictic</td>
<td>Lexical: Superordinate + Punctuation: Colon Elliptical: Post-modifier</td>
<td>48-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>1) 2) for instance</td>
<td>S  E: Logical</td>
<td>Additive: Exemplificatory</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>1) 2) S</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>1) 2) S</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>1) And 2) if 3) the big learners are teachers, not pupils</td>
<td>E: Logical  E: Logical  E: Deictic</td>
<td>Additive: Positive Causal: Conditional Causal: Inferred meaning</td>
<td>47-50 41-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>1) *(However) 2) *(to this question) 3) *(they should be returned)</td>
<td>I: Logical  I: Discourse  I: Deictic</td>
<td>Adversative: Proper Elliptical: Post-modifier Elliptical: Clause</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>1) *(because)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-reason</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>1) *(And) 2) The right thing</td>
<td>I: Logical  E: Deictic</td>
<td>Additive: Positive Phrasal: Demonstrative reference + Lexical repetition</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>3) problems</td>
<td>E: Deictic</td>
<td>Lexical: Superordinate</td>
<td>48-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) * (On the other hand / Also)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Additive: Positive</td>
<td>53-54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) pupil neglect of the papers</td>
<td>E: Deictic</td>
<td>Phrasal: Lexical synonym + Synonym with word class change + Synonym Phrasal: Demonstrative reference + Lexical superordinate</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) the point</td>
<td>E: Deictic + Discourse</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>1) * (because)</td>
<td>I: Logical</td>
<td>Causal: Claim-support</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>1) and that</td>
<td>E: Deictic</td>
<td>Additive: Positive Reference: Demonstrative</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>1) * (It is) like like</td>
<td>I: Deictic E: Deictic P: Discourse P: Deictic</td>
<td>Elliptical: Subject + Operator Reference: Comparative Reference: Comparative Punctuation: Colon</td>
<td>56-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>1) 2) that</td>
<td>S PP: Deictic PP: Deictic</td>
<td>Reference: Demonstrative Reference: Comparative adverb Adversative: Proper Demonstrative reference + Nominal ellipsis Ellipsis or Substitution: Verbal Predicate in (59) Noun in (58)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) either</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) it</td>
<td>PP: Deictic</td>
<td>Reference: Personal</td>
<td>Noun in (58)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first column indicates the number of the coherence unit being analyzed. The second column indicates which signal(s) were reported to make the connection between the current unit and its co-text explicit. In cases where the connection is implicit, the results show in brackets and preceded by an asterisk which signal(s) were provided by the subjects to make the connection explicit. The third column first specifies the type of coherence mechanism perceived (E = encapsulation, I = inferred connection, PP = point-to-point cohesion, P = prospection, EP = encapsulation-cum-prospection, S = satisfaction or fulfilment of prospection). What comes after the colon specifies the subtype of mechanism involved on the basis of the type of relevance perceived: (Deictic / Discourse = relevance of content; Logical = relevance of relational function, Wording = relevance of wording). The fourth column shows the type of cohesive tie identified. The fifth column indicates in relation to which part of the co-text the connection is established. This may be specified by: the number(s) of the encapsulated or prospected coherence unit(s); the number of the coherence unit where the prospection was created; or, when the related element is smaller than a clause, its grammatical function in the clause.

These text features can be observed in their full context in the segmented text found in the appendix. They appear in bold type. The underlined items can be considered as the other text-as-product cohesive mechanisms. Thus, although they may contribute to the perception of
superficial cohesion in the text, they are not essential to perceiving its coherence and text structure at least by these subjects. This does not of course mean that the cohesive signals identified in this paper as textual constraints on relevance from a discourse-as-process perspective would not also be identified as cohesive signals from a text-as-product perspective. It is most probable that a text-as-product view would have identified almost all these cases too, except for most of the inferred items.

Table 3 offers a summary of the coherence mechanisms affecting each coherence unit in the text that account for the coherence of this text as perceived by the subjects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coherence mechanism</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Number of coherence unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inferred encapsulation</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 27, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 52, 53, 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encapsulation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>5, 6, 8, 15, 16, 20, 22, 32, 34, 37, 40, 41, 51, 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encapsulation + Inferred E.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>24, 26, 31, 33, 35, 38, 46, 54, 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encapsulation + Inferred E. + Point-to-point cohesion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encapsulation + Prospection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encapsulation + Inferred E. + Prospection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>28, 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferred E. + Prospection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>37, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfillment of prospection</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1, 29, 49, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfillment of prospection + Encapsulation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4, 11, 30, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfillment of prospection + Inferred E.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>9, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfillment of prospection + Point-to-point cohesion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfillment of prospection + Encapsulation + Inferred point-to-point cohesion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. DISCUSSION

The first finding worth noting is the fact that the subjects were able to perceive a connection of some kind between each new unit of coherence and its co-text. In cases where they could not identify an explicit textual item marking the connection, the subjects were able to make the relation explicit by inserting some kind of textual element. As 88% of the subjects reported in a post-test questionnaire, having to make this interpretation task explicit was very useful in helping them to perceive the coherence of the text at each juncture. Thus, it has been possible to assign all coherence units to one of the coherence mechanisms listed in table 3, some of which are combinations. In this sense, the framework proposed can be considered as satisfactory in accounting for the coherence pattern of this text. Let us now comment on the most salient findings, referring especially to those cases that have been difficult to classify.

VI.1. Inferred encapsulation

In this particular text, the percentage of inferred encapsulations that account for coherence on their own is relatively high (32.2%). So, if it were possible to establish a correlation between the degree of implicitness of coherence relations in a text and the level of difficulty in perceiving
the coherence of its discourse, the difficulty in perceiving the coherence of this text might be said to be in principle relatively high. And so it was, as the majority (80%) of subjects acknowledged. However, after the group discussion it was possible to arrive at a consensus on most cases without much difficulty. This points to the existence of a standard of coherence shared by this discourse community that goes beyond the presence or absence of explicit signals.

VI.1.1. Overlay revisited (Inferred additive expository logical act by means of a paraphrase)

A number of cases that deserve special attention are what Sinclair (1993) could have termed overlay within his methodological framework. In overlay "there is no obvious act of reference in a sentence with respect to the one before it, and yet the two appear to be closely connected—in fact, they are often almost paraphrases of each other. In such cases the new sentence takes the place of the old" (Sinclair, 1993: 17). For instance, coherence unit (10) was interpreted as a metaphorical paraphrase of (9), and (19) was interpreted as a paraphrase of (18). Let us consider the relation between (19) and (18).

(17) I examined for years: (18) the most gruelling job in the world, requiring painstaking effort and concentration to sustain standards justly for 300 scripts in three weeks. (19) Conscientious marking is a killer.

Both coherence units, (18) and (19), refer to the process of examining/marking done in a conscientious/painstakingly way to say that this task was the most gruelling job/a killer. It is interesting to notice how there is no single element in sentence (19) that may be said to encapsulate the whole of the previous sentence on its own, leaving the rest of the sentence to develop meaning further. In this case, the whole sentence paraphrases the previous one without making the discourse advance at this point. The second sentence is simply another way of expressing the same idea perhaps to strengthen, more or less forcefully, the assumption derived from coherence unit (18), as could be explained from the relevance framework. In fact, when the subjects analyzed this relationship, they unanimously agreed that they could perceive an expository additive relation, which they could make explicit by means of a conjunct such as in other words.

Now, if we agree that an additive relation of this kind is a logical relation, as many accounts of cohesion do (Halliday & Hasan, 1976), then we could say that the relation between these two coherence units is just another case of an inferred logical act. If we use a phrase like in other words, or an equivalent expression such as let me express this in other words, then we may be able to see this as a case of implicit encapsulation, this being the explicit encapsulating item. Thus, this interpretation saves us from having to interpret this phenomenon as an exception (Sinclair, 1993: 16), but rather as a qualified statement. This way Sinclair's model may be made even more powerful in accounting for discourse coherence than it looks, because it would reduce the number of exceptions.
A smaller number of inferred encapsulations have been perceived in combination with other types of coherence mechanism such as: encapsulation (13.6%); encapsulation and inferred point-to-point cohesion (1.7%); encapsulation and prospection (3.4%); prospection (3.4%); and fulfilment of prospection (3.4%). That is, although there was enough evidence in the text to account for the relevance of some coherence units by virtue of explicit mechanisms, the subjects were still able to infer other connections. This might be interpreted as the subjects’ need to reinforce relevance in order to make better sense of the text at that point in the interpretation of the discourse.

VI.2. Encapsulation

As far as explicit encapsulation is concerned, it was easy to classify all acts according to the type of relevance they contributed to establishing (deictic, discourse, or logical). Furthermore, most of the cases of encapsulation could be classified under any of the categories of cohesive tie established a priori by the method described above. However, there were some problems with certain deictic devices that led me to create new categories that supplemented the well-recognized categories of reference and lexical cohesion. It should be noted that on some occasions these two categories occur in combination in the form of a nominal phrase (cf. Examples (5), (16), (54) and (55)).

VI.2.1. Encapsulating clausal deictic act

The first new category is what I have termed clausal deictic act because the text segment of the current sentence that is affected by the interpretation of the semantic content of a previous fragment of text is not realized lexico-grammatically by a reference item and/or a lexical item but by a whole clause. Various subtypes of encapsulating clauses have been noted according to the type of meaning they convey in relation to previous discourse.

VI.2.1.a. Similar meaning (similar meaning clause)

This type occurs when a clause in the current sentence expresses meaning similar to the meaning retrieved from a previous text segment in order to develop it further. One example can be observed in the relationship between the following two sentences, which both serve to open two different paragraphs in the text.

(26) The irony, of course, that having been offered their scripts, most of the candidates didn’t want them.

(41) If candidates didn’t care about the scripts, 71% of staff cared a great deal;

In (41) the propositional content expressed by the seemingly conditional clause candidates didn’t care about the scripts can be considered as a clausal rephrase of the semantic content expressed in (26)—excluding other metatextual elements both textual and interpersonal,
such as: *the irony is, of course, and having been offered their scripts*. However, it is important to highlight the distinction between *overlay*, or, in my view, inferred additive expository logical act, and the present type of deictic act. The former rests on the interpretation of a relational proposition between two related discourse segments, and the latter rests on the interpretation of the semantic content of a previous segment of text. In the former it is the whole current coherence unit that may be said to paraphrase the whole of the previous coherence unit. By contrast, in the latter only one element in the current coherence unit—a clause—encapsulates a previously stated proposition. The rest of the coherence unit is used to develop mutually shared meaning further. In other words, while in the logical act the whole sentence paraphrases the previous one without making the discourse advance at that point in terms of propositional meaning, in the deictic act there are other elements in the same coherence unit that convey new assumptions.

It is true that lexical point-to-point cohesion is involved in the clausal deictic act under consideration, such as repetition by means of *candidates* and *scripts* (notice that *them* in (26) refers back to *scripts* in the same sentence), and synonymy by means of *care* (referring back to *want*). However, what helped the subjects to perceive the relevance of sentence (41) was the appreciation that a whole idea previously stated in (26) was taken up again by (41) and was reused as part of the propositional content of (41). In fact, the subjects observed that this whole idea was used again to retrieve the relevant context in which introducing information such as 71% of staff cared a great deal was perceived as something totally unexpected. It is interesting to notice how, in spite of there being a typical marker of a conditional relation *if*, the subjects interpreted this relation as an adversative proper one and they even provided an alternative signal such as *while*. Since the subordinate clause encapsulates the whole of a previously stated proposition, the adversative proper relation in (41) is analyzed as intersentential rather than intrasentential, therefore contributing to the subjects’ perception of textual coherence.

6.2.1.b. Inferred meaning (Inferred meaning clause)

An interesting variation of clausal deictic act occurs when a clause in the current coherent unit is interpreted as conveying meaning that may be inferred from a previous segment, and that meaning is further developed in the current sentence. This can be observed in the relationship between (51) and the whole of a previous paragraph (41-46).

(41-46) If candidates didn’t care about the scripts, 71% of staff cared a great deal: 82% agreed that access to the scripts would help with teaching the syllabus in the coming year. Well of course. Knowing exactly where the last candidates got it wrong is the best learning tool a teacher can have to improve performance next year. Better than knowing what they got is knowing why they got it. If any government wants to conjure up massive whole school improvement, this is the magic wand.

(51) And if the big learners here are teachers, not pupils, should they be returned at all?
It is worth noting how coherence unit (51) encapsulates the meaning created by paragraph (41-46). However, in this case instead of rephrasing the semantic meaning conveyed by that previous fragment of discourse in a straightforward way, the author takes up the meaning conveyed by the whole of that paragraph and expresses it in the form of an inference, or interpretation, that may be derived from it on the following assumption: the fact that those who have learned from the pilot scheme are those to whom it was not in principle addressed is negative. However, this assumption is not made explicit in the text. It needs to be brought to bear by the reader, and it is the writer who manipulates the retrieval of that assumption by means of persuasion. The persuasive strategy here was easy to perceive.

Adding this inferential assumption to a sequence of negative points (stated from (48) to (50), cf. the segmented text in the appendix) makes it clear to the reader that the fact that the big learners here are teachers, not pupils should also be interpreted as a problem or negative point. That is, by using an inferential rephrase in the appropriate place the author has managed to make accessible to the reader the most relevant assumptions the reader needs to bring to bear in order to interpret that assumption as another negative point which makes it easier for the reader to accept the authors’ new point in coherence unit (51): should the scripts be returned at all?

VI.2.1.c. Opposite meaning (opposite meaning clause)
Another variation of clausal deictic act occurs when a clause in the current coherence unit expresses the opposite meaning to the meaning conveyed in the whole of a previous fragment of discourse in order to develop it further. This has taken two forms in the text: A) by expressing the opposite situation; and B) by expressing an opposite instance.

A) Opposite situation: If we look at the connection between (31) and previous discourse, it will be easy to realize that a clause in (31), i.e. interest in the papers is generated, expresses the opposite situation to that expressed in (28). In other words, this clause serves to introduce the reason(s) for the opposite situation expressed in (28), i.e. the reason(s) why students were interested in viewing the papers. The rest of the clause, by doing badly, then develops that reason.

(28) The reasons * (why most of the students did not want to view the scripts) are obvious: if you did well, you really don’t care about the papers — and that goes for doing well unexpectedly, as well as having the satisfaction of achieving just what you expected. (31) Interest in the papers is generated by doing badly, (32) and then only if it surprises you.

B) Opposite instance: A clear example of the second variation can be seen in the relationship between (33) and (32):
(31) Interest in the papers is generated by doing badly, (32) and then only if it surprises you. (33) If you partied all year, or had a personal crisis, then you will have done badly but you won't need to see the papers to see why.

In (33) we observe that the propositional content expressed by you partied all year, or had a personal crisis conveys two instances which contradict or oppose the claim made in (32) doing badly surprises you. In other words, the two instances provided by the conditional clause compound express events that would not allow anybody to be surprised at doing badly. It is possible to state that clause compound (33) encapsulates previous meaning because it does not really add new propositional material. It just presents it on a more specific level by means of an instance, or instances. In addition, the two events change the polarity of the proposition in relation to which they are relevant. The encapsulation could, in fact, be paraphrased in more general terms as: if it does not surprise you or otherwise. This is what allows us to analyze the conditional relation as one of reversed polarity (cf. Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 259). This is also why the conditional relation can be considered as intersentential rather than intrasentential: because it really serves to link the propositional content of the claim made in the matrix clause of (33) to the propositional content of (32) by means of a reversed polarity conditional relation, therefore crossing over sentence boundaries.

This relationship of opposite meaning would be parallel to the relationship of lexical opposition identified in most accounts of cohesion but there would be an important difference. While lexical opposition normally operates at the lexical level to establish a point-to-point relation between two words or phrases, in which the meaning of one of the members of the pair conveys the opposite meaning to the other member, opposite meaning clausal cohesion would operate at the propositional level. That is, the semantic relation would be similar but it would be between two propositions, each of which would be on opposite sides of the antonymic scale, whether on the same or different degree of generality.

Now, despite there being enough evidence of the process of encapsulation between (33) and (32), the predominant relationship that the subjects perceived between these two coherence units was one inferred logical relation of support-claim. As they reported, unit (33) was interpreted as offering support to the claim expressed by (32), which in its turn encapsulates (31).

VI.3. Textual versus Point-to-point cohesion
Let us now go back to the open debate about the role of point-to-point cohesion in helping to establish the relevance of text fragments by looking at the data provided by this text. There are some cases identified by the subjects as really crucial that might be considered as cases of point-to-point cohesion. For instance, it might be said that the phrase the water in (4) refers back to
the NP the water in (1). However, the present model has reconsidered some of these cases in the following way.

By virtue of relevance theory, the reader will bring to bear the most cost-effective assumptions on the interpretation of the current sentence. In written language, these are most likely to be derived from the immediately preceding text. As we have also said, the reader does not usually retain the linguistic properties of previous text but the meaning created by it in the form of assumptions. By virtue of the cooperative principle, the writer can rely on the fact that the reader will retain the meaning conveyed so far by her discourse to some extent. So much so that it will not be necessary to remind the reader of all the assumptions already shared at every point in the text. From this perspective, it may be said that phrases such as the water in (4) and (5) also function as textual constraints on relevance. They act as pointers that help readers to retrieve whatever previous assumptions are needed for the interpretation of the new sentence, not just the meaning created by the repeated phrase in previous text.

In fact, when the subjects of this study were asked about the assumptions they had used in interpreting sentence (5), for instance, they acknowledged that the repetition of the phrase the water did not make them think of water in general but the water to which the author had referred metaphorically as the water in which we dipped a toe in 1999, where the sharks didn’t bite and which was not freezing. Thus, the new sentence was seen as a sentence that reuses—encapsulates—the ideas created in (1–4), to develop them further by means of identification, in such way that it helps to resolve the metaphor, a device that may have been used to attract the reader’s attention. In other words, what the readers of this study seem to have interpreted on reading (5) is that:

(5) The water [in which we dipped a toe in 1999, where the sharks didn’t bite and which was not freezing] was the great scary ocean of returning examination papers to candidates.

There are other cases where the encapsulation does not seem to affect the whole of the previous relevant piece of text but only a smaller part. For instance, the encapsulation effected by the combination of deictic acts observed in (6) by means of the...return of...scripts...to candidates seems to operate only over the meaning created by returning examination papers to candidates in (5).

(5) The water was the great scary ocean of returning examination papers to candidates.

(6) This year saw the pilot scheme, with three different models for GCSE and at A level, for the copying and return of all scripts in 10 syllabuses, allowing centres to decide how to release the copied scripts to candidates.
However, on closer inspection of (5), it is precisely this part of the text that contributes new propositional meaning in the coherence unit. All the rest is metadiscourse material. On the one hand, there is the NP *the water*, whose metadiscourse function is of a textual type, since it encapsulates backwards. On the other hand, there is the NP containing *the great scary ocean*, which is part of a metaphorical phrase used by the writer to show her attitude towards the new propositional meaning conveyed in the post-modifier. Thus, this metaphorical phrase also contains metadiscourse material of an interpersonal type. The process of encapsulation at (6) seems to have operated at least on the new propositional meaning generated by interpreting (5). In the method section, I have already discussed the point-to-point cohesive effect of ellipsis such as the two cases in (23) in relation to (21) in the sense that the elliptical material recovered only refers to one part of the wording used to express the new propositional content of the related fragment of text, thus establishing relevance of wording.

(21) —the chief examiner always loomed over one’s shoulder, checking, commenting, re-marking if necessary. (22) At least, I think that’s what he did. (23) Even if he didn’t, the fear that he would was a great deterrent to misdemeanour.

This seems to point to the working conclusion that this type of ellipsis cannot on its own establish true encapsulation. If encapsulation is perceived, it should be attributed instead to the textual role of the reference personal pronoun *he*. From our relevance perspective, it could now be understood that when the reader approaches the interpretation of *he*, s/he does not only relate it to the phrase *the chief examiner* mentioned in (21), but to the assumption generated by the interpretation of the whole of (21-22), along the following lines:

(23) Even if *he* [the chief examiner whom at least I think always loomed over one’s shoulder, checking, commenting, re-marking if necessary] didn’t *[look over one’s shoulder, checking, commenting, re-marking if necessary]*, the fear that *he* [the chief examiner whom at least I think always loomed over one’s shoulder, checking, commenting, re-marking if necessary] would *[look over one’s shoulder, checking, commenting, re-marking if necessary]* was a great deterrent to misdemeanour.

I presume that the same may occur with substitution, though I cannot find clear evidence in this text. The only possible case is *do* in (60). However, this is an ambiguous case, since it might be considered as an emphatic auxiliary *do* followed by ellipsis or a true substitute. In any case it would be carrying out point-to-point cohesion. Another point-to-point cohesive signal in this clause would be *those*, which —together with *do*— is by the way the only case of point-to-point cohesion identified by the subjects as really textual. In this coherence unit, though, the most powerful coherence mechanism perceived in relation to previous discourse was the explicit
encapsulation established by the adversative logical signal but, as well as the fact that this clause was also contributing to satisfying the prospection created in (58).

A different case, which should not be confused with substitution, is what happens with the general verb do, as in (22). This general verb can be considered as a general lexical word, which in the combination he did that manages to encapsulate the semantic meaning of the whole of (21) by means of deictic acts that establish relevance of content. In any case, again the most powerful coherence mechanism perceived in (22) is the explicit encapsulation effected by the adversative corrective signal at least. And if we look at the data in detail, there is no single coherence unit whose relevance is perceived through point-to-point cohesion signals only. If these do occur, there is always a more powerful device at work to establish relevance, as in (60). Another case of combination of devices that is not considered by Halliday and Hasan (1976), for instance, is what we find in (24) in relation to (21-23):

(24) But how much simpler and more thorough *(than the chief examiner looming over one's shoulder...) is the returning of marked scripts to the original writers.

The authors analyze the occurrence of the comparative forms -er and more as cases of indirect anaphoric reference. They state that “particular comparison, like general comparison, is also referential; there must be a standard of reference by which one thing is said to be superior, equal or inferior in quality and quantity” (Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 81). And in fact their referent, though indirect, is easy to identify in the previous text, (21-23). What I would like to claim is that this type of comparison also involves the phenomenon of standard ellipsis (cf. Quirk & Greenbaum, 1985: 888), and that this type of ellipsis is really textual since it helps to establish relevance of content encapsulating the whole of the meaning created by a previous fragment of discourse. It is not merely establishing relevance of wording.

VI.4. Prospection

It is interesting to note that the textual role of none of the coherence units in the text structure can be accounted for exclusively on the basis of prospection. In all cases prospection co-occurs either with encapsulation, as in (2), or encapsulation and inferred encapsulation as in (28), or inferred encapsulation only, as in (7) and (47). This seems logical as the places where prospection might be expected as the exclusive coherence mechanism would be in the first coherence unit of a text, or in the first unit of a totally independent segment of the text, as may happen when the subject changes completely (cf. Sinclair, 1993: 14). However, prospection occurred in this text at points where it was also possible to perceive a connection between the prospecting coherence unit and previous discourse by virtue of some encapsulating device, whether explicit or not.
The only remarkable feature worth mentioning is that there have been cases where the prospecting word to be elucidated in upcoming discourse is not expressed in a plural form. It is simply presented as new to the context in an indefinite noun phrase, such as an evaluation in unit (7). According to the group interpretation, on reading coherence unit (7), the writer seemed to be committed to specifying the contents of such an evaluation in the following text. In fact, coherence units (9-11) were perceived as satisfying the prospect created in (7).

It is worth pointing out that from a text-as-product view it might be said that coherence units (26), (34), (41), and (47) also serve to satisfy the prospect created in (7). However, when the subjects had to analyze the relevance of these new units they had forgotten that a prospect had been created in (7). In any case, they were able to connect them with other units in the text by means of encapsulation. For instance, the students were able to perceive encapsulation over (6) at coherence units (26) and (47). It should be recalled that unit (6) introduces the major topic of the text, the pilot scheme. Thus, although the subjects could not state that these coherence units really fulfilled the prospect generated at (7), they did perceive the fact that both coherence units were conveying a form of evaluation of the pilot scheme.

VI.4.1. The role of questions in the text

Questions have been considered as the most obvious ways of creating prospections (cf. Sinclair, 1993: 12). And this is true in this text too. For example, the one question that clearly does this is in coherence unit (2), and you know what? From our relevance-based framework, it might be said that the question may have been introduced to establish the relevance of the following piece of discourse (3-4) by means of the prospect that it creates. This could also be interpreted as an attempt to engage the reader in the reading process, but it was clearly understood by the subjects that it would be the writer who would fulfill the prospect created.

However, not all questions in the text are used in this way. For instance, coherence unit (8), how was it for you?, was expressed as a question too. But it was obvious that in this type of written communication the reader could not respond immediately to the writer's message. Nor could the writer answer for the reader. Thus, it cannot be said that a prospect is created at this point. What is interesting to note is that this question is placed after a unit that does create a prospect, (7), but (8) does not serve to fulfill it. In cases like this we are faced with a phenomenon that may be termed interpolation in the sense that the interpolated sentence occurs after a prospect but is not at least part of the fulfillment of the prospect. Therefore, the prospect created in the previous unit remains (cf. insertion sequences in Schegloff, 1972). In fact, readers need to wait until coherence unit (9) to see at least part of the prospect fulfilled. The interpolated question at (8) is a novelist's cliché said by one of the partners after an act of sexual intercourse, and is here used to make a silly journalistic joke. It creates the assumption that the reader of this text had participated in the same pilot scheme as the writer is describing. This may be perceived as an attempt by the writer to engage the readers more actively in the communication process by asking them to evaluate their own experience of the pilot scheme. It
is interesting to note how the writer adapts a cliché from the same domain “did the earth move for you?” at coherence unit (10) to restate the general evaluation of the pilot scheme made at coherence unit (9), which clinches the intention of the writer at coherence unit (8).

On the other hand, both coherence units (16) and (51), though expressed in the form of a question, were understood as rhetorical questions, i.e. forceful statements which had the form of a question but which did not expect an answer. They were functioning as negative statements rather than questions. Thus, for instance, (16) might be reformulated as I would not say such a thing. Likewise, in coherence unit (51) the question should they be returned at all? was understood as a negative statement meaning they should not be returned at all.

VI.5. Fulfilment of prospection + encapsulation

Twelve coherence units in the text serve to fulfil a prospection (20.33%). In almost half of these cases, though, encapsulation seems to coexist with the fulfilment of a prospection, such as in coherence units (4), (11), (30), (48) and (60). If this were really the case, we would have found evidence to contradict Sinclair’s claim (1993: 12) that “a sentence cannot simultaneously fulfil a prospection and encapsulate the utterance that makes the prospection. The former requires maintenance of the discourse function of the previous utterance, and the latter requires the cancellation of that discourse function”. However, on closer inspection, we shall realize that the reason for this co-existence is that in the present analytical framework each of the coherence units in a rhetorical routine fulfilling a prospection created in previous discourse has been classified as such, i.e. as fulfilling a prospection. Sinclair, by contrast, only seems to classify the first sentence in the rhetorical routine satisfying the prospection as prospected.

In any case, it is worth noting that the encapsulated coherence unit in these cases was not the coherence unit that had created the prospection. For instance, there is additive logical encapsulation between (3) and (4), and the two coherence units together can be said to fulfil the prospection created in (2). So (4) was classified both as encapsulating over (3) and fulfilling the prospection created in (2). The same happens with the following: (11) in relation to (6) and (7); (30) in relation to (29) and (28); and (60) in relation to (59) and (58). But in neither case does the scope of the prospection coincide with the scope of the encapsulation. From this perspective, one possible way to adapt Sinclair’s words so as to improve the explanatory power of this analytical framework might be to state the following: the coherence unit (or the first coherence unit in a rhetorical routine) fulfilling a prospection cannot simultaneously fulfil the prospection and encapsulate the utterance that makes the prospection.

Even so, there is one exceptional case that does not seem to comply with this norm. For example, coherence unit (47) makes a prospection over a group of sentences (48-50), which enumerate logistical problems advanced by means of the lexical superordinate problems (an enumerable). If we now take (48), this sentence clearly encapsulates over (47), by means of the
conjunct *for instance*, which might be paraphrased as "an example of these logistical problems that there will be is", whose scope is the whole of the previous sentence.

This exactly corresponds to what Tadros identified as a typical phenomenon in prediction: "following a prediction of enumeration sequencing signals (*firstly, finally, one, next, further*, etc.) are one of the means whereby we can recognize the different heads" of the predicted members (Tadros, 1985: 20). These cases might be considered as exceptions in the sense that the enumerating signals do not seem to cancel the prospecting function of the coherence unit creating the prospection. They only serve to organize the textual material used to fulfil it. In any case, it is also important to notice that the scope of the encapsulation does not coincide with the scope of the prospection.

Also worth noting are cases where a discourse fragment fulfils a prospection created in a previous sentence, but encapsulates discourse generated by a different piece of text to that which created the prospection. For instance, coherence units (9-11) serve to satisfy the prospection created in (7). However, units (9) and (11) also seem to encapsulate previous discourse meaning —that generated by (6), at least— in both cases. So, again, although the fulfilment of a prospection and encapsulation may co-exist in the same current coherence unit, the sentences fulfilling the prospection do not encapsulate the utterance making the prospection. Having analyzed all types of textual cohesive ties in the text, and discussed cases of difficult classification, table 4 summarizes the major mechanisms identified in the text as truly textual, bearing in mind that some of them occur in further combinations, as table 3 shows above.
Table 4: Textual mechanisms of coherence identified in the text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coherence mechanism</th>
<th>Subtype</th>
<th>Cohesive tie</th>
<th>Subtype</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance of content</td>
<td>Deictic acts</td>
<td>Reference + Lexical</td>
<td>Encapsulation</td>
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<td>• Demonstrative + Repetition</td>
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<td>• Demonstrative + Repetition with word class change + Synonym + Repetition</td>
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<td>• Demonstrative + Superordinate</td>
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<td>• Synonym + Synonym with word class change + Synonym</td>
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<td>• Personal + General word + Demonstrative</td>
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<td>• Superordinate</td>
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<td>Relevance of relational function</td>
<td>Discourse acts</td>
<td>Logical acts</td>
<td>Clausal</td>
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<td>Phrasal Reference + Lexical</td>
<td>Additive</td>
<td>• Same meaning (Demonstrative + Personal + General verb)</td>
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<td>• Similar meaning</td>
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<td>• Inferred meaning</td>
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<td>• Exemplificatory</td>
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<td>• (Cancellation of) Inferred consequence</td>
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<td>• Conditional</td>
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<td>• Contrastive</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance of content</th>
<th>Deictic acts</th>
<th>Elliptical</th>
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<td>• Subject + Operator</td>
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<td>• Comparative clause</td>
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**Encapsulation + inferred encapsulation**

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<th>• Comparative word + Comparative clause</th>
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**Encapsulation + inferred point-to-point cohesion**

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**Encapsulation + prospection**

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<th>Logical acts</th>
<th>Causal</th>
<th>• Action-reason</th>
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**Prospection**

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<td>Discourse acts</td>
<td>• Comparative</td>
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**Fulfilment of prospection**
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The present paper has determined which features of a given text have an important role in helping a discourse community of undergraduate student subjects to perceive the relevance and coherence of the text in the process of reading. It has also shown how these expressions serve both the writer and the readers as textual constraints to optimize relevance in accordance with the Principle of Relevance. The results clearly show that there are many cases of point-to-point cohesion that cannot be regarded as textual in nature in the sense that they were not essential to account for the relevance of each successive text of the moment. By contrast, there are a number of cohesive resources that deal only with discourse meaning derived from entire sentences, larger fragments of text or, occasionally, certain simple clauses linked paratactically, and they do much more than effect a tenuous connection between isolated constituents of sentences. This validates the reformulation of Sinclair’s (1993: 19) hypothesis about text structure.

What seems clear is that in the discourse perceived from this text by the group of subjects at least one coherence mechanism was identified to relate every current coherence unit to its context. There was in most current units at least one encapsulating mechanism, whether explicit, inferred, or both. As well as this, there were very few cases of point-to-point cohesion. However, these did not seem to account for relevance by themselves. There was always a more powerful mechanism to account for coherence at that point. There were also a number of prospections. The only current coherence units where encapsulation did not occur were the following: the first sentence in the text and those fulfilling a prospection. In the latter cases, however, this norm only seemed to apply consistently to those coherence units that initiate the rhetorical routine satisfying the prospection because there were some encapsulations between the coherence units within the same rhetorical routine.

The metadiscourse items identified or inferred, which are part of the interactive apparatus of the language, may be allocated a textual role in that they serve to give independence to the sentence, and occasionally the clause. They helped to progressively determine the status of previous or upcoming text in relation to the current coherent unit (cf. Sinclair, 1993: 7). That is why it is possible to confirm that these metadiscourse elements serve to give independence to a coherence unit and also help to perceive it as relevant.

The results from this study support Sinclair’s suggestion that considering the purely orthographic sentence, i.e. the clause complex enclosed by a full stop, as the minimal unit for text structure may have to be revised slightly. The present analysis identified clauses in paratactic relationships within several clause complexes that proved to be autonomous from a coherence point of view. They were separated from a neighboring clause by a colon, a dash, or a comma or dash followed by some cohesive device. However, the analysis of the connection between these clauses and previous or upcoming discourse identified logical acts establishing relevance of function and/or deictic acts, or discourse acts, establishing relevance of content, usually in connection with the meaning conveyed by the other clause in the same clause.
complex. In this sense, the full stop should not be considered as the only adequate indicator of a coherence unit. There may be other indicators of a coherence unit, such as the colon, the dash, or the comma or dash followed by some cohesive device that might also be adequate. The question to be elucidated is in which circunstances this may happen.

If we accept this redefinition of minimal coherence unit, which does not correspond strictly with the orthographic sentence, it might be more adequate to relate the concept of text of the moment—which is very useful from the point of view of discourse interpretation—directly to the concept of minimal coherence unit, instead of relating it to the abstract theoretical construct of sentence. The problem again is to find out how the minimal coherence unit is enclosed in actual written discourse. Further studies should then focus on this definition on the basis of more evidence. However, this is not bad news. As Hyde puts it: “Discourse analysis is (for the moment at least) not so much interested in the definition of a sentence in structural, system terms as investigating where and why writers place full-stops (in written texts)” (Hyde, 1990: 188). Why not colons, semicolons, dashes, and commas followed by some cohesive device too? “This point of view focuses more on chunking than on structure, that is to say, on how much information is loaded on to a given format” (Hyde, 1990: 188).

As has been noted in the discussion, in order to establish relevance, meaning was not always derived from the immediately preceding coherence unit only but also from other parts of the text. In view of the data, I would suggest reformulating Sinclair’s hypothesis by saying that the encapsulation process does not operate necessarily only over the previous sentence, or rather the meaning created by it, but over the most relevant information stored in the reader’s mind. In written discourse, as we have seen, the most relevant information is usually the information derived from the previous coherence unit which is stored in the reader’s short-term memory. But the text has shown examples where the relevant fragment of text from which meaning was retrieved was a larger immediately preceding fragment, although the immediately preceding coherence unit was at least part of the referent, such as (26-33) in connection with (34). On the other hand, the study has also shown that, in order for the subjects to perceive relevance, meaning was also derived from other parts of the text which had been stored somewhere in the reader’s short-term memory, such as (26) and (51) together with (53-54) in connection with (55).

The only problems that arise in terms of the encapsulation hypothesis are at coherence units (41) and (47), which are both the beginning of a paragraph. In both cases, it was quite obvious to the subjects that there was no connection with the immediately preceding sentence or even paragraph. At (41), a connection could be established in relation to coherence units (26-33) in the sense that it presented an unexpected result in relation to the meaning developed in a previous but not immediately preceding paragraph. At coherence unit (47), the connection was established with sentence (6). Therefore, in this case the encapsulation neither scoped over at least the immediately preceding coherence unit or fragment.

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It could be argued that the problems here do not really have to do with the analytical scheme but with the subjects’ capacity to perceive the text structure. The point is that, for whatever reason, the subjects had forgotten that a clear prospecton had been established at coherence unit (7), where it was announced that an evaluation of the pilot scheme was going to be made. Had they maintained that prospecton open throughout the text, they would have perceived some of the upcoming paragraphs as fulfilling that prospecton. Looking at the text from hindsight, it could be interpreted that the paragraphs starting at coherence units (9), (26), (34), (41), and (47) fulfill such a prospecton in the sense that they present evaluative material about the pilot scheme introduced at coherence unit (6). And that may account for the discontinuity of the encapsulation process at some of these places, some of which were found problematic. One reason why the subjects might have forgotten the prospecton may have had to do with the fact that the analysis was carried out in various sessions for unavoidable practical reasons. Thus when the subjects approached the text in subsequent sessions their short-term memories may have been weakened. A clear implication for further studies of this kind is that the text used should be shorter so that it may be dealt with in just one session.

The model proposed by Sinclair (1993) was based on one single text, just as this is, and it may need some refinement as more discourse units and genres are analyzed. However, I believe that this model is nowadays the most explanatory in accounting for those text elements that contribute to our perception as readers of discourse coherence and structure. It may also be applicable to other types of text with little adaptation. Thus table 4, which does not intend to be exhaustive, might serve as a good basis on which to build the model further. More importantly, this model is highly consistent with a cognitive view of discourse interpretation. This, in my opinion, gives it even more support, because a cognitive view of the role of cohesive items in the perception of relevance, and therefore coherence, seems much more convincing than previous accounts.

Lastly, the reader of this article may not have perceived the coherence of the text that we have analyzed in the same way as has been reported here. But that does not invalidate my argument because that is likely to have happened. As has been suggested, there may be multiple discourses from a single text. I would invite the readers of this paper to try and do the same test to find out which text features help them to make sense of the text at every stage and to check whether their interpretation is similar or differs from the one reported here. What I can guarantee, after my experience of using the outlined model of text structure and coherence with advanced undergraduate students of English Philology and doctoral students for about five years now, is that they find it highly explanatory and convincing. What is more important, students consider it as very clarifying in their understanding of coherence and how interpretation of written discourse works.
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REFERENCES


Appendix

Segmented text

Exam scripts pilot gets top marks for effort

The verdict on returning examination papers to students? Fairly good, room for improvement

Hilary Moriarty
Tuesday November 23, 1999
The Guardian

(1) Nineteen ninety-nine was the year we dipped a toe in the water:

(2) and you know what? <

(3) [The sharks didn't bite,

(4) and the water wasn't freezing.]

(5) The water was the great scary ocean of returning examination papers to candidates.

(6) This year saw the pilot scheme, with three different models for GCSE and at A level, for the copying and return of all scripts in 10 syllabuses, allowing centres to decide how to release the copied scripts to candidates.

(7) The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority has carried out an interim evaluation * (of the pilot scheme). <

(8) “How was it for you?”

(9) [The great news * (about the pilot scheme) is that there seems to be general approval for the principle of returning the scripts. -

(10) * (In other words) The earth may not have moved, but the world didn’t come to a standstill either.

(11) It was OK.]

(12) * (In fact) Not surprisingly, most of the people involved * (in the pilot scheme) felt that returning the scripts made the examination system more transparent and examiners more accountable.
(13) * (because) Sometimes you don’t need to tell people to work better, you just tell them there’s an audience for what they produce.

(14) * (In other words) Knowing that whatever was done to the papers would be seen in the outside world must have been salutory.

(15) This is not to say that examiners were sloppy before.

(16) Would I say such a thing? (= I would not say such a thing)

(17) * (because) I examined for years:

(18) * (examining was) the most gruelling job in the world, requiring painstaking effort and concentration to sustain standards justly for 300 scripts in three weeks.

(19) * (In other words) Conscientious marking is a killer.

(20) * (And = but) And examiners never did work in an irresponsible vacuum —

(21) * (because) the chief examiner always loomed over one’s shoulder, checking, commenting, re-marking if necessary.

(22) At least, I think that’s what he did.

(23) * (Anyway) Even if he didn’t, the fear that he would was a great deterrent to misdemeanour.

(24) But how much simpler and more thorough * (than the chief examiner looming over one’s shoulder...) is the returning of marked scripts to the original writers.

(25) * (Returning the marked scripts... is) Real accountability.

(26) The irony * (of the pilot scheme) is, of course, that * (in spite of) having been offered their scripts, most of the candidates didn’t want them.

(27) * (As a matter of fact) Staff in the centres reported the percentage of students “very interested” in viewing the scripts as about 12%, with a further 27% only “fairly interested”.

(28) The reasons * (why most of the students did not want to view the scripts) are obvious: <

(29) [if you did well, you really don’t care about the papers —

(30) and that goes for doing well unexpectedly, as well as having the satisfaction of achieving just what you expected.]
(31) * (By contrast) Interest in the papers is generated by doing badly.

(32) * (and = but; then = that) and then only if it surprises you.

(33) * (because) If you partied all year, or had a personal crisis, then you will have done badly but you won’t need to see the papers to see why.

(34) The interim report indicates also that pupils needed teachers to decode what they saw.

(35) * (this is) small wonder, if the rumours are right and examiners were virtually forbidden to write on the scripts for fear of litigation from insulted students.

(36) * (because) Without some sort of written explanatory commentary, candidates might well find the scripts “more meaningful when interpreted by their teacher”.

(37) Actually, if the pilot scheme is judged successful and more scripts are returned in the future, this is an area where practice must be improved.

(38) * (because) Particularly in arts subjects, where marking is notoriously subjective, the examiner’s commentary is vital evidence.

(39) * (In fact) In my day, I was expected to annotate scripts to explain my marks to the chief examiner.

(40) Remove that requirement, and the examining process will only appear to be more open, while in fact retaining an almost smug inscrutability.

(41) * (If = While) If candidates didn’t care about the scripts, 71% of staff cared a great deal:

(42) * (As a matter of fact) 82% * agreed that access to the scripts would help with teaching the syllabus in the coming year.

(43) * (Of course = this is natural) Well of course.

(44) * (because) Knowing exactly where the last candidates got it wrong is the best learning tool a teacher can have to improve performance next year.

(45) * (However) Better than knowing what they got is knowing why they got it.

(46) * (So) If any government wants to conjure up massive whole school improvement, this is the magic wand.
(47) There will be logistical problems * (with the process of returning the scripts to candidates): <

(48) [returning all scripts will mean 13.5m papers whizzing through the postal system, for instance.

(49) Photocopying scripts sounds horrendous even to a convinced “pro-retumer” like me.

(50) Proper scrutiny of the papers in school will take time, possibly precious holiday time.]

(51) And if the big learners here are teachers, not pupils, should they be returned at all? * (= with all these problems, it looks as if they should not be returned at all)

(52) * (However) The answer (to this question) is yes (they should be returned).

(53) * (because) I believe now, as I believed last year when I wrote one of the first articles calling for this move towards long-overdue transparency and accountability, and as the authorities hold in New Zealand, that it is simply the right thing to do.

(54) * (And) The right thing overrides logistical problems.

(55) Pupil neglect of the papers is beside the point. * (= is not relevant to the question)

(56) * (because) A few * will be very interested indeed,

(57) and that’s enough.

(58) * (It is) A bit like voting, really: <

(59) [lots of people don’t care about that either,

(60) but for those * (people) who do * (care), it’s one of the markers of a civilised world.]
Synonyms in Action: A Case Study

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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses what the methods of conversation analysis (CA) might have to offer the study of linguistic synonymy. It takes as a case study two items commonly held to be synonyms—'actually' and 'in fact'—and shows considerable differences between the two in their interactional implementation: they are implicated in the prosecution of differing courses of action. Such cases argue that it is analytically more profitable to consider what a lexical item does in the context of talk than what it means.

KEYWORDS: synonymy, conversation analysis (CA), actually, in fact.

I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I discuss what a rigorously empirical methodology—that of conversation analysis (CA)—has to offer one of the abiding concerns in the highly theoretical domain of linguistic semantics—the issue of synonymy. How can we begin to establish the differences between lexical items which appear to have the same meaning? I begin by taking some familiar examples of items which would appear to be differentiable by straightforward means—by reference to the speakers who use them, or by reference to other contexts of use. Establishing the latter, however, proves anything but straightforward and certainly beyond what introspection and intuition can furnish. I argue that it is CA's concern with action—and specifically, what Schegloff has identified as the position and composition of a turn-at-talk—which provides for the possibility

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of identifying differences between items. An investigation of two items commonly held to be synonyms—actually and in fact—shows the considerable interactional distinctions between them lying in the different actions in which each is implicated. Such cases argue that it is more profitable to consider what a lexical item does in the context of talk than what it means.

II. ON SYNONYMY
There are, it seems, no perfect synonyms: many apparent synonyms differ with respect to the speech communities which use them, or the terms with which they collocate, or degrees of formality. So, to take some familiar examples, autumn and fall differ because the former is used in British English, the latter in American English; lunch and dinner are regional variants in British English for referring to the midday meal; rancid collocates with butter and bacon, while stale collocates with other types of food; hi is the informal version of hello, and so on. The above distinctions are surely grossly apparent, and available to anyone who (in the case of the first two examples) makes the transition from one speech community to another or (in the latter two) is simply a competent user of the language. In other words, they are determinable by reference to either the populations who use them or the contexts of their use. This much would seem to be utterly uncontroversial. And yet: what I shall suggest in what follows is that how synonyms differ in many cases is anything but grossly apparent, and that ‘the contexts of their use’ may go far beyond issues of collocation or register; indeed, that it is only by dint of empirical investigation into the interactional contexts of their use that we can establish the distinctions between them. Even in the case of what I have just called ‘grossly apparent’ distinctions, empirical investigation has provided some startling findings that can subvert intuition. The simplest—and most striking—case in point is that relating to the near-synonyms given above, hello and hi. What can any methodology add to the characterisation of the difference between them as lying in ‘degrees of formality’? Well, work in CA has indeed added to what we know about the contexts of their use. Precisely this distinction is broached in Schegloff’s (1986) examination of the beginnings of phone conversations. In his discussion of the first speaking turn in a phone call, Schegloff found that, in his corpus of 450 calls, speakers’ first turn when picking up the phone is recurrently ‘Hello’. By contrast, it is in the following context (from Schegloff, 1986:121) that ‘hi’ is deployed in this turn (arrowed):

Mom: Terrific, listen, I’ll call you back.
Ed: O.K.
Mom: All right, in about one minute.

((ring))
Ed: Hi.
Mom: Hello there. I just got some more coffee. We um went to see the Rineholts last night.
The context for ‘hi’ here is clearly what Schegloff characterises as ‘call you right back’ circumstances (1986:121) in which two parties conclude one conversation with the agreement that one will call back having done some specified task. When the phone rings at a time compatible with the task having been done, the answerer may produce ‘hi’ instead of ‘hello’ to display ‘super-confidence’ in the identity of the caller. The difference between ‘hello’ and ‘hi’ in such contexts—responses to the ringing phone—is that between displaying that one does not, or does, know who is calling. The alternative to the ‘hi’ option in such contexts, Schegloff notes, is ‘yeah/yes’; he goes on to note, therefore, that ‘hi’ is a variant (contextually specified) of ‘yeah’ rather than of ‘hello’ (ibid.) Now the finding that ‘yeah’ and ‘hi’ are variants, rather than—in this context—‘hello’ and ‘hi’, seems to me one which lies beyond our powers of introspection, and only reachable by the sort of exquisitely detailed attention to context across a wide set of parallel cases shown in this study. What analysis across a set of cases makes possible is the specification of the action being prosecuted in the turn to which the object of attention belongs; thus one deviant case in a corpus of around 500 calls led Schegloff to establish that the hello which provides the first turn in a telephone encounter was not, as might be assumed, a greeting, but in fact the answer to the summons of the ringing phone (Schegloff, 1967, 1968); ‘hi’ and ‘yeah’ are thus forms of answers rather than forms of greetings. Crucial to this analysis is the understanding of how the position of a turn—in such cases, after the ringing of a phone—as well as its composition (Schegloff, 1995a:196) is critical to establishing the action it performs. In what follows I shall argue that it is in its concern with action that CA has the most to offer linguistics, and I offer here a case in point.

III. ‘ACTUALLY’ AND ‘IN FACT’ AS SYNONYMS

In the course of conducting research on the adverbial marker actually in English talk-in-interaction (which appeared as Clift, 2001), it became clear that existing work recurrently treated actually as virtually synonymous with in fact, with one rendered in terms of the other for dictionary definitions: thus, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines actually as ‘in act or in fact; really’; etymologically, ‘in act or fact’ is recorded as early as the sixteenth century (Onions, 1966; Partridge, 1965). More recently, pragmatic research on actually (Smith and Jucker, 2000) focusing on propositional attitudes also examines in fact; and a historical account of the development of in fact briefly touches on the development of actually as a so-called ‘discourse marker’ (Schwenter and Traugott, 2000). Consistent with their focus on the modification of propositional attitudes—and specifically the negotiation of discrepant attitudes—Smith and Jucker claim that in fact ‘appears to negotiate the strength of claims on the floor’ (2000:216), specifically upgrading and strengthening a claim made. Schwenter and Traugott propose a similar use: that in fact can be used ‘for the purpose of strengthening (a) rhetorical stance at that point in the discourse’ (2000:22). Both of these proposals appear reasonable and perfectly consistent with interactional data; it would seem, moreover, that in the
following, *in fact* could well be substituted for *actually* with little difference in meaning:

(1) (H(X)C-1-1-3:2; P=Phil; L=Lesley)

1P—> She'll come home...h in FACT I think she’s staying
    home then...h[hh

2L [Yes.

What remains to be established, however, is what precisely *in fact* does here that *actually* could not; how, in other words, *actually* and *in fact* differ in their interactional implementation within sequences of action.

IV. POSITIONING MATTERS: THE CASE OF ‘ACTUALLY’

My purpose in investigating *actually* was different from previous studies in its focus on the placement of *actually* in a turn and the position of that turn within a wider interactional sequence. It emerged that both of these factors—placement in a turn, and position in sequence—was highly consequential for the action being prosecuted. In three sequential environments—informings, repair and topic movement—the placement of *actually* prosecuted a distinct action when placed at the beginning of a turn or turn-constructional unit from when placed at the end. Turn-constructional units (henceforth TCUs) are the components of which turns are composed; they may comprise sentences, clauses, lexical items or non-lexical features such as response cries (Goffman, 1981:116) and ‘can constitute possibly complete turns; on their possible completion, transition to a next speaker becomes relevant (although not necessarily accomplished)’ (Schegloff, 1996:55; see Schegloff, 1996, for a discussion of how speakers recognize possible TCU beginnings and ends). So, for example, in the environment of what I called topic movement (Clift, 2001), the placement of *actually* was seen to be consequential for whether the speaker is initiating topic *change*, as in (2) and (3), or topic *shift* (Maynard, 1980), as in (4) and (5) (*actually*-marked turns are arrowed):

(2)
(C:43:1; BBC Radio 4 ‘Start the Week’; S=Sue Wilson, TV Producer; M=Melvyn Bragg, interviewer. S is the producer of a TV drama series set in some science laboratories; she has just explained how the Cavendish laboratory at Cambridge organizes open days for school pupils)

1S (h)And that's very good because (.) they
2 do that at the end of summer term so before these youngsters
3 [in the fourth form have made their choice, en the idea is—
4M [mm
5S =if you turn them on to the excitement of Physics perhaps
6 those g[h]irsl will then make a decision to do Physics at A:

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level. En then go on en do it,

( )

I'm very touched by your belief in the improve- possibilities of tele- television
actually,
...hh well I think the point is that you can't really
do it as a documentary, (I mean) first of all, television IS
the media isn't it...

(HXI: 5:1; L=Lesley; M=Mum)

.hhh Oh: hello I've just bin watching the film on:
Channel Four. Have you- are you seeing it
[What is it.

(0.4)

man who's got to get rid'v a turkey. p.hhh and:
eighty four pounds to a poor family for Christmas:
Oh: hhh-[hn

[An' he's having the most awful difficulty:
heh heh
[Oh:. Yah. We've js c'm in fr'm church actual[ly

[Oh have you:

Mm:

(4)
(C: 28:1. J=Julia, M=Mary. J has brought some books to give M, which she is now sorting through. M's daughter Vanessa has been ill, which is why M has refused Vanessa's offer to cook lunch.).

(h)EI haven't bought any for a long ti- I've had a clear
out. Ex you (see) Jane Grigson English Food. (0.2) That
Margaret Costa's is a classic, they've reprinted it now.

[Oh well

Vanessa'd probably love that.

(0.4)
[I must tell her that. She probably knows anyway. She's
[Yes, now.

always reading books on cookery.
[D'you want (.) uh- (.) does she just
read cookbooks,

(0.3)
She cook[ks.

(0.2)
Yea:s. (0.2) Yes,=
Actually today, she was (0.1) had a (0.8) complicated lunch

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packed, a- [uh- planned.  
[Mm.]

(0.4)

And I said firmly (0.2) no:-

(0.1)

Uh huh.

(5)
(C.28:1; J=Julia, M=Mary, C=Carrie. M has been complaining about highlights in her hair looking like ‘blobs’. J is trying to think of the name of a good hair colourist she has heard of)

[You see, I want the very fine ones and mine
2  just=
3J  [Mm.
4M  =does great lumps.
5  (0.4)
6M  [I mean I’ve got lumps here,=
7C?  ([Hehehe)
8J  =Well that’s- (0.6) you don’t kn- uh- she’s called Jo::
9  somebody who’s a:: (.) she’s (1.4) got a salon in London, she
10  does only colouring, and [she’s-
11M  [Really?
12J  Oh yes::: (0.9) And she’s [(said to----)
...
(15 lines omitted, during which M’s husband arrives, offering a drink, and then leaves)

28J  [No, (she) says you
29  shouldn’t do: this (front). (.) She’s- she’s called in someone,
30  she’s an expert
31M  [Does she have strands that show,
32  
33J  Yeah:::
34M  [Actually: (.) a girl in John Lewis’s was pinning up a
35  skirt for me: [recently,
36J  [Yes,
37  (0.4)
38M  I bought a s- a suit in the sale.
39  (0.8)
40M  U:hm, (0.8) and, (0.3) I was looking down on her head, I mean
41  you know she was about twenty seven, (0.5) fairish... She had
42  [thickish strands, but they “[h]ooked (.) magnificent=
43J  =Yes: well that is the thing “Mary”...

In both (2) and (3), actually is placed at the end of a TCU, and in these cases a turn, which introduces a change of topic, such that the turn to which it is appended introduces a topic disjunctive with what preceded it. In (2) the actually-tagged turn (from lls.9-11) does not orient
to the prior turn, instead introducing a new topic. In (3) Lesley has clearly embarked on a description of the film which, judging by 19, she has not finished by the time Mum has responded in 1.11. Lesley’s *oh*-marked—and overlapping—response to Mum’s announcement in 1.11 (talk about the church service is continued subsequently) confirms the change to a new topic.

By contrast to these two *actually* placed TCU- and turn-finally, in (4) and (5) *actually* is placed at the beginning of a TCU and turn; in this position it serves as a ‘touch-off marker’ (Sacks, 1992a:761; 1992b:88-92; Schegloff, 1992:1330). In marking a shift of topical direction triggered by prior talk, *actually* in this position serves to launch a story; the character with which it invests its TCU—that of an observation or anecdote that has just been triggered—serves to suggest that it is something in the prior talk which has served as that trigger. Thus within the general domain of topic movement, the position of *actually* in the TCU and turn has implications for the kind of movement—change or shift—is thereby signalled.

Examining data with respect to the *actions* being performed allows us to identify very clearly those distinctions between lexical items which appear synonymous. Thus the data collected for *in fact* yielded no instances of *in fact* which were implicated in topic shift or topic change, like *actually*. In this way one whole domain of activity is provided for with *actually* that is not available to *in fact*.

V. ‘ACTUALLY’ AND ‘IN FACT’ IN SEQUENCES OF ACTION

Just as the positioning of *actually* was seen to be consequential in the environment of topic movement, so was it equally relevant to the other two environments investigated: informings and self-repairs. Thus in self-repairs, in TCU-final position, *actually* marks its TCU as a parenthetical insert:

(6)  
(H:1:1; L=Lesley, F=Foster. L has rung up F to check that there will be no Sunday school that week.)

1F    T's & group service'n the evening whi[ch is very suitable=  
2L    [Yes.  
3F    =f'youngsters.  
4     ( )  
5L    Yes.=I js s-u thought I'd check=  
6F    =M[n].  
7L    [In case there wz a: msprin:]l. *(Again.)*  
8F    [Yes no no we're havin:g  
9→   ehm: (0.4) w'l I'm away actually b't uh: it's just a group  
10   Sundg,  
11L   Yes.

Here, an explanation of what will happen on Sunday in 1.8 is abandoned as Foster repairs an
implication, attached to 'we', that he will be there in the actually-marked TCU; 'but' marks his reversion to the original point, of which he then produces an amended version. The resumption of his original explanation gives the actually-marked TCU its parenthetical character, without which the following TCU would appear disjunctive.

In TCU-initial position, by contrast, actually launches a new topical trajectory:

(7)
(C:1:1. G=Gill, A=Alice, M=Mike, H=Harriet. The bathroom wall has been stripped ready for redecorating, and parts are crumbling off)

1G If- ↑when you wash your hair, (0.3) try not to: (0.6)
2A Why ↑↑what do l do no: w,
3G [swish::: (0.8) too much (0.2) of the wa:: ll, (0.2)
4 off (;) into the bath,
5 (0.5)
6A ↑↑DQ::N":" :
7 (0.4)
8G No l mean at the minute.
9 (0.8)
10A I ↑don't though. =
11G =Cos l just cleaned the bath, yet again.
12 (0.4)
13A Well ↑I cleaned the bath the other day and it's still uhm
14 coming off,
15 (0.1)
16G Well I kno:w, (0.2) but try not to swish the shower around the
17 walls.
18 (1)
19A You end up having a bath and coming out more dirty than you
20 went in. =
21G =(-->) brown bits.
22 (0.8)
23A Yea::h.
24 (1.2)
25A Happened when I washed my face the other day anyway.
26 (1.4)
27G→ Well I've been up and rcleared- actually he's miraculous at
28 cleaning up.
29 (0.9)
30M Yes he is.
31G [He cleans up better than anybody we've f ever had.
32H [Really.

In (7) Gill's actually-marked TCU forms part of a response to a challenging complaint in lls.19-20 by Alice over the state of the bathroom. This complaint itself follows from Alice's own
apparent understanding of lls.1 and 3-4 as a complaint against her, and Gill’s subsequent attempts, never fully accepted, in l.8 to persuade her that she has misunderstood, and in l.16-17 to clarify what she originally said. Gill’s first response to the complaint is an apparent attempt, in l.21, through a hearably affiliative description, to sympathize—one which, judging by Alice’s agreement in l.23 and subsequent mitigation in l.25, does indeed secure a partial backing down. However, the initial projection adumbrated by this beginning of l.27 is that Gill is meeting Alice’s challenge (‘well’ here again signalling a potential upcoming objection to the prior turn) by detailing her own possible attempt to clean the bathroom. Given that Gill was beginning to say, in what clearly amounts to a counter move, and in what may be a reiteration of some of the substance of her l.l.l, ‘well I’ve been up and recleaned...’ it is possible to conjecture that she is thereby ‘reminded’ that there was relatively little to do as ‘he’s miraculous at cleaning up’. The product of that reminder represents a shift away from the potential counter challenge towards a summary assessment designed to elicit agreement—which it duly gets, at least from Mike—and potentially termination of the sequence. Thus the actually-prefaced TCU serves to propose a new topical line, one taken up, if not by Alice, by two others present.

Again, a striking feature of the in fact data is its absence in self-repair. Another look at (1) confirms that Phil is not replacing what he has just said with the in fact-marked TCU, but adding to it:

(1)  (H(X)C-1-1-3:2; P=Phil; L=Lesley)

1P→ She’ll come home .hhh in FACT I think she’s staying
home thgn .hh|hh
2L  [Yes.

Thus ‘she’ll come home’ is not deleted by in fact, as the TCU-tagged actually serves to delete part of its prior TCU in (6), but here added to. Indeed, the in fact data set as a whole shows that, far from displaying the disjunctive qualities of actually, in fact serves to link one TCU—the TCU to which it is appended, in initial position—back to the one before it:

(8)  (H(X)C-1-1-3:2; L=Lesley; P=Phil)
1L  [Well ‘s anything you c’n (.) we c’n do:
let us know.
2P   .phh Uhm:: (. ) ng I think we’re: sorta (.) fairly
3→ well organized in FACT uh .hh Vanessa’s:: uhm (0.9)
4  Vanessa’s: home:: for a few- .hh few days shg. :hhhh
5  I don’t know she v-she had :: a week’s holiday: (0.2)
6  that she had t’take before the end a’th’year I think’n
7  she dec’d t’take it this weekend:so she’s .hhh here—

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Thus in both of the above extracts, in fact is TCU-initial, but not turn-initial; one (in 9) or more (in 8) TCUs occupy the turn before it. It would seem, then, that in fact is designed specifically to occupy a position after the first TCU of a turn. What are the implications, then, for the actions in which it is deployed, and how does this compare with what we know about actually? Recall that both topic movement and self-repair make use of actually but not in fact. The environment in which both seem to be implicated is informings, and it is this to which we now turn.

V.1. ‘Actually’ in informings

In contrast to what we have seen of the position of in fact, actually may be placed, not just TCU-finally and -initially, but also turn-finally (as in 10) and -initially (as in 11):

(10)  (H:(2)H7&−2:2; L=Lesley; G=Gwen)

1L. An’ he’s just had a fortnight with his mother,
2G Yes’s?
3  (0.5)
4L. An’ he’s going off to have a- a week with his sister:
5 an’ you know there’s a third grandchild do you?
6  ()
7G Ah:::m (·) n:no I we only aware of two
8→ actually.
9L. [Mm:. There’s a third one,
10  ()
11G Well with Helen.
12  (0.7)
13L. “I s’poze so;”
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(11) (H:HU&-3;1; G=Gordon; D=Dana)

1G How are you.
2 (0.5)
3D I'm okay
4G [.t pilk
5 (.)
6G .pk Good,
7 (0.5)
8D→ Actually I'm not but (.) the(h)re we go: =
9G [.h hh
10G =.hhh ehnh:hh .hh But (.) yih (.) you are but you're
11 not .hh[h (sniff) Hey listen I'm sorry about last=
12D (Right)
13G =nighh, .hm hh
14D [Mm:
15G [.km.tch I didn't think your mum would go (0.5), pt.k
over the top, hh

Nowhere are the differing consequences of placement so strikingly illustrated as in the context of informing. In TCU-final position, actually is an explicit marker of informing — thus in (10), a question which is built to prefer 'yes' (see Schegloff, 1988 on preference), gets a 'no' answer. In TCU-initial position, by contrast, actually serves to indicate a 'change of mind': a revision of the speaker’s own prior turn. With respect to positioning, it is with this instantiation of actually that in fact bears some comparison; but by the same token, it is also this which allows us to see the distinctions in use very clearly.

V.2. 'In fact' as tagging a subsequent TCU
The most obvious difference, suggested by the earlier observation that in fact is not used in self-repair, but confirmed by the sort of case represented by (11), is that in fact does not seek to replace what it follows, as does actually in (11). In being placed turn-initially, actually serves to revise — indeed reverse — the stance taken up in the prior turn. The position of in fact —TCU-but not turn-initial — gives it no such scope over prior turn, but serves, as we have noted, to link its TCU to its predecessor. And, as we noted with respect to (1), the in fact-marked TCU seems in some sense to add to its prior; the following cases show very clearly that in fact introduces an upgrade on what is offered in the first TCU of the turn:

(12) (HX:2.2; D=Dana; M=Mark; D asks after Mark’s daughter)
1D [Yeh b't wgh] where is she

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2D now Mark?
3M [She's still at York she's: she's: gone back to
4 York University to do 'er Ph.D., whi[ch is another .]
5D [Yes,
6M three years well(.) bit'll be another two years,=]
7D =[Yeh?]
8M -=[huhuhuh uh:: before she gets that?h .huhuh huh:::m
9 (0.2) .p.huhuh huhAnd she's: uh::: sh' seems pretty
10→ happy up the're (0.2) fact very happy..h[hhhh
11D [Oh goo:.Id.

(13) (H5:3; M=Mike; L=Lesley)

1M [Beck (. you know (.) the wather
2 is not v(h)ery (.) promising
3L [huh (0.2) No::: Okay,h[h
4M [They
5 promise us snow here thjs afternoon(------------)=
6L [Oh:: No: we've got]=
7M =[(--)
8L =We::: haven' got snow[here,
9M [No
10 (0.2)
11L→ .huh In fact we've got blue sky outs[iide
12M [Rihght aw::
13 hu-hu .hh B't I thi:nk you:- you kno::w? you never
14 know do you.

In (12), 'pretty happy' is upgraded to 'very happy', the upgrade signalled by the in fact which follows it; in (13) 'We haven' got snow here' upgraded in a similar manner to 'we've got blue sky outside' —the positive 'blue sky' constituting a stronger case than the negative 'no snow' for Lesley to contrast with Mike's claim about snow in his area. In both of the above cases, the in fact-tagged TCU follows a slight pause: an opportunity for the recipient to respond to the first claim made. In (12) there is no response, in (13) a minimal one in overlap ('No' at 1.9) before the end of Lesley's turn. The in fact-tagged TCU may be seen in both cases as an upgrade in response to the lack of engaged uptake by the recipient, and the speaker's attempt to buttress the case originally made in the initial TCU in order to pursue a more engaged response. The subsequent uptake by the recipients of the in fact-tagged TCU duly indicates an embrace of the claim being made².

V.3. 'In fact' in intensifying action
In deploying 'in fact' to herald the upgrade of a claim made in a prior TCU, speakers are thus

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able to intensify the action being formed up in a turn. Thus in (12) and (13) claims are escalated; and in the following two fragments, the in fact-tagged turns serve to step up the degree of reassurance being done by the speaker:

(14)  
(H(X):9:1; M=Moira; L=Lesley)

1M  Lgs I just wanted a 'sa:y .hhhhh eh: m::: t I'm sorry
2  about what I heard about (: ) an' I'm not being nosey
3  is there anything I c'n do: or (: ) can I help in any
4  way o:::r would you: rather not] talk about it. ]
5L  [eh::: h .heh heh ]What about [the bu::ngelar ]
6  (0.2)
7M  .t Yes
8  ()
9L  Uhhh! .hh (: ) No::: It's very kind of you: h
10→ Ng::: .hh In fact (: ) we thought it wz killingly
11  funny really,
12  (0.4)
13M  Oh: good.

(15)  
(HS/88:1:5:5; R=Rob; L=Lesley. R. and L. are comparing experiences of a class they both teach; L. has been commiserating ,with R., with respect to the tight space in the class)

44R  Oh [T] do feel|better I thought it wz me being a lousy=
45L  [.tlk .hhh ]
46R  =te[a:che]r
47L→  [h .hhh [Oh ng: eh in fact I've not missed .hhhh ah
48  being there= (0.3) much at all: this ter:[m, ] becau=
49R  [(Ye:[s)
50L  =u-uh:mm I use t'get e- (: ) .hhhh really quite deTpressed
51  ↓in that staff room,

In both fragments, the in fact speaker (as it happens, the same speaker in each case) responds with some force to a proposal made by the other. In (14) Moira has phoned to offer Lesley help after a burglary, but hedges her offer with a proposal that she might 'rather not talk about it'. After clarifying the business which Moira —displaying an orientation to the potential delicacy of the situation— has left inexplicit ('what I heard about', 1.2), Lesley first produces an exclamation, then a counter to Moira's proposal and an appreciation ('Uhhhh! No::: It's very kind of you', 1.9), before reiterating the counter and then producing the in fact-tagged upgrade. The upgrade serves not just to contradict what was proposed but to completely subvert it; far from the burglary being something too distressing to discuss, 'we thought it wz killingly funny
really’ (l10-11). This same subversive property of the in fact-tagged TCU is evident in (15), where Rob has produced a self-deprecation in lls. 44-6 and Lesley — in conformity with the preference for disagreement with a prior self-deprecation (Schegloff, 1988) — moves with alacrity to contradict it. Her oh-prefaced ‘no’ serves to contradict his stance with considerable vehemence, marking strong disagreement (Heritage, 2002). This disagreement — in conformity with the sequence-expansion relevance of such actions in general (see Schegloff, 1995b) — is followed by in fact, introducing a claim designed to further reassure Rob and undermine his claim regarding his own capabilities: Lesley’s own negative experience of the same place.

Extracts (13), (14) and (15) all show in fact-tagged TCUs as operating in the environment of ‘no’-type responses. In each the speaker’s in fact follows a first item which takes a counterpositional stance to a prior speaker’s turn (although as (15) shows, this need not necessarily be an antagonistic one). Indeed, returning to (8) and (9), reproduced in excerpted form here, we can see that they, too, are similar cases:

(8) (H)(X)C-1-1-2; L=Lesley; P=Phil
1L [Well ‘s anything you c’n (.) we c’n do:
  let us know.
2P .phh Uh:m:. (.) no I think we’re: sorta (.) fairly
3→ well organized in FACT uh .hh Vanessa’s:. uh:m (0.9)
4 Vanessa’s: home:: for a few-.hh hh few days

(9) (from Schegloff, 1996:57; TG:4:35; B=Bee; A=Ava)
1B Eh-yih have anybuddy: thet uh?: (1.2) I would know from
2 the English deper’mint there?
3A Mm-mh. Teh! i don’t think so.
4B °Oh, =<Did they geh ridda Kuhleznik yet hh
5A→ No in fact I know somebuddy who has huh now.

Extract (8) shows the declination of an offer of help; (9) displays a negative answer to a question. Both again are expanded responses in the environment of dispreferred actions. As Schegloff notes with respect to (9), Ava’s ‘no’ in l.5 also risks being heard as the second rejection of a topic proffer from Bee (the first occurring at l.1, the second at l.4) and its prosodic delivery is thus designed to interdict such a hearing (Schegloff, 1996:58) and so provide for another TCU. The design of the turn, and the placement of in fact, may thus be seen to be sensitive not just to turn-organisational but also to sequence-organisational factors: the position of a lexical item within a turn and the position of that turn within its wider sequence is criterial to what any item is understood to be doing. Thus in the exception to the cases cited above, where the in fact-tagged turn is not in the environment of a ‘no’-type turn, we see that the in fact-tagged TCU is produced some way into an account which is offered as an answer to a question.
Unlike the cases in extracts (8) and (9), and (13) to (15), the speaker’s upgrade is not motivated by the necessity to build a counter-position to an interlocutor’s stance; it is instead part of an answer to an inquiry about the whereabouts (and, by implication, wellbeing) of the other’s offspring. Mark’s upgrade in 1.10 from ‘pretty happy’ to ‘very happy’ gets a highly affiliative receipt token from Deena, ‘oh good’, marking her receipt of the answer to her question. Note that Mark’s response is possibly complete earlier, at 1.8 after ‘…before she gets that’, but Deena does not respond at this point. Given Deena’s withholding of a response here, and, as we have noted, after ‘pretty happy up there’ (1.10), it would seem that Mark’s upgrade is designed to secure just the sort of receipt it does indeed get. And in the example from which (1) is taken we can also see that the wider sequential context of the placement of in fact shows the TCU to which it is appended doing the job of reassurance; it comes, at 1.15, in response to the offer of help discussed with reference to extract (8), after a first in fact-tagged TCU at 1.3:

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What these examples show us, then, is that in each case, *in fact* marks an intensification of the action being formed up by the speaker. Furthermore, it is only upon examination of those actions within their wider sequences that we can apprehend the interactional work in which this item is implicated.

VI. POSITION AND COMPOSITION AS UNDERMINING SYNONYMY

I hope to have given some sense now of the interactional differences between two items which are often regarded as synonymous. Those differences, as we have seen, may initially be identified with reference to the position of each in a turn-at-talk, and the composition of that turn. The position of both *actually* and *in fact* was seen to be highly consequential for the action being performed by the turn inhabited by each, and for the subsequent trajectory of the talk. However, while — except for cases of self-repair — it is common for *actually* to be placed at the beginning or ends of turns as well as TCUs, this was not the case for *in fact*, which is routinely placed at the beginning of TCUs but not at the beginnings of turns. *In fact* is thus used to preface subsequent, rather than initial, TCUs in a turn (see Schegloff, 1996, for a detailed discussion of the relationship between TCUs in a turn). As a device for intensifying action, *in fact* may thus be seen as performing very different actions from *actually*. It is, for example, conspicuously absent from the environments of self-repair and topic movement inhabited by *actually*.

What is central to the analysis provided here, and missing from linguistic accounts with their focus on meaning, is of course an account of the *action* within which a given lexical item is embedded. This suggests that it is only by preserving lexical items in their contexts of use — in their turns and those turns in their sequences — for the purposes of analysis, that we can really start to lever open the distinctions which the term ‘synonymy’ collapses. If we abstract out of those contexts into sentences or utterances, it may make sense to talk of similarities or differences of meaning; but this is ultimately to neglect the interactional projects of the participants themselves, who use linguistic items to do things rather than for what they mean.
NOTES

1 The fact that the ‘is’ of in fact is not identifiable by the transcriber and so not on the transcription only serves to emphasise how the action being performed makes what is said recognisable as ‘in fact’ despite part of that item being ‘missing’. The importance of positioning—here, the placement of ‘fact’ between a first item and its upgrade—is again underlined.

2 Both (12) and (13) share another similarity, which is that in each case before the in fact speaker produces the TCU which will subsequently be upgraded by in fact, s/he starts to produce a claim which is aborted in its telling in order to downgrade what is said; it is the downgrade which subsequently gets upgraded by the in fact-marked TCU. So in (12), Mark starts a TCU ‘And she’s uh:is: before self-repairing to ‘sh’s:seems’, and Lesley in (13) starts a TCU ‘No: we’ve got’ before self-repairing to ‘We haven’t got’: the product of the self-repair is hearably weaker than what was starting to be said. The eventual case that is made is thus made incrementally in contrast to a case which is strong from the outset.

3 Heritage proposes that ‘oh’-prefaced assessments, such as this one, index the speaker’s stance of epistemic independence from the assessment to which it is responsive. He notes that in his data set he found no instances of ‘oh’-prefaced disagreeing turns which were first disagreements and only such turns as were disagreements with prior disagreements; he remarks that the significance of ‘oh’-prefacing in disagreement contexts is unambiguously one of escalation and intensification of disagreement (xx...). The above ‘oh’-prefacing is, however, to a disagreement in first position. But in this position it only serves to underline Heritage’s observation: if ‘oh’-prefaced disagreements are routinely deployed in second position, the ‘oh’-prefacing here proposes the escalation of an earlier claim even though this was not formulated. It thereby further upgrades the disagreement which follows.

4 Schegloff also notes of this extract that the in fact construction here: ‘(in common with many “actually” and “as a matter of fact” constructions) serves to relate the TCU which it initiates to its predecessor; this practice can be used to indicate that what follows has a contemporary relevance to the speaker other than that created by the question just asked, and that what it is about has reality “factoricity” independent of the circumstance prompting the talk which it introduces. Its effect is often to register a so-called “coincidence” (Schegloff, 1996:63). The “coincidence”-like property of actually only holds for certain contexts, as discussed in Clift (2001); in informants when the negative polarity of a first pair part is subverted by the positive polarity of its second. In the case of in fact, this property does indeed appear to be more salient. In the following extract, the speaker verbalises this sense of coincidence (“at the moment as we speak’, 1.12):

H:2.03:3
18 [That that, that’s good it well it’s useful tuh
19 have a co:nta:ct y’know [even if it doesn’t] come to anything=
2L [O h I think so.]
3L =I c’n () I c’n I-I () I still kno:w (.) several people in
print’nd hhh hh
5L [Yes I’m s u r e ]you’ve go:at f a r m-
7S [they’re getti:] [they’re getti]:n
8L throw out as well so I mean that— that w’d be quite useful
9L f(h)or him as well you know .h(hhh
10L [Yes:.
11S→ A:nd u-and an in fact I have a- (0.9) a friend in, in mind
12 at the moment as you speak, .tch who’s uh .hhh just’ recently
13 lost his job he wz a (0.3) f’nance director...t.hhh (.)
14 in th’printing industry eed been in print about I don’ kno:w
15L [‘Oh—
16 (.)
17S twenty fi:ve (0.3) odd years I s’poze ‘(b[ut]’ .tch.hhhhhhh
18L [Yes.
19S So there it i:s.

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It has only been possible here to give the briefest of overviews, concentrating on but one sequential position of in fact: that as TCU-initial but not turn-initial. There are of course other possibilities for the placement of in fact that lie beyond the scope of the current paper.

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APPENDIX: Transcription conventions

The transcripts are notated according to the system developed by Gail Jefferson, with the following conventions (adapted from Ochs et al. 1996:461-5):

[ Separate left square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with utterances by different speakers, indicates a point of overlap onset.

] Separate right square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with utterances by different speakers indicates a point at which two overlapping utterances both end, where one ends while the other continues, or simultaneous moments in overlaps which continue:

J So you'd like to go first [Well that's] [very]=
L [Oh [first or second]=

= Equal signs ordinarily come in pairs -- one at the end of a line and another at the start of the next line or one shortly thereafter. They are used to indicate two things:

(1) If the two lines of transcription connected by the signs are by the same speaker, then here was a single, continuous utterance with no break or pause, which was broken up in order to accommodate the placement of overlapping talk:

M If I've got to park (.) in a tricky position [and I look fit=] [Yep.
A
M =enough and I think (0.3) uh I drive out and I think no way am I
(2) If the lines connected by the signs are by different speakers, then the second followed the first with no discernible silence between them, or was 'latched' to it.

M So actually it's an idea you know,=
A =Well if it just saves you walk- when YOU're (.) NOT well.

(0.5) Numbers in parentheses indicate silence, represented in tenths of a second. Silences may be marked either within turns or between them.

(.) A dot in parentheses indicates a 'micropause', ordinarily less than 2/10ths of a second.

These options are represented below:

V No.:.
(0.7)
M Uh: and sometimes I really (0.3) if I have to walk for a hundred

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yards I think oh "god" (0.2) you know (...) I can't do this...

The punctuation marks indicate intonation. The period indicates a falling, or final intonation contour, not necessarily the end of a sentence. A question mark indicates a rising intonation, not necessarily a question, and a comma indicates ‘continuing’ intonation, not necessarily a clause boundary.

Colons are used to indicate prolongation or stretching of the sound preceding them. The more colons, the longer the stretching. On the other hand, graphically stretching a word on the page by inserting blank spaces between the letters of the word does not indicate how it was pronounced; it is used to allow alignment with overlapping talk. Thus:

- A hyphen after a word or part of a word indicates a cut-off or self-interruptions, often done with a glottal or dental stop.

**word** Underlining is used to indicate some form of stress or emphasis, either by increased loudness or higher pitch.

**WORD** Especially loud talk relative to that which surrounds it may be indicated by upper case.

"word" The degree signs indicate that the talk between them is markedly softer than the talk around them.

↑↓ The up or down arrows mark particularly emphatic rises or falls in pitch.

>word< The combination of ‘more than’ and ‘less than’ symbols indicates that the talk between them is compressed or rushed.

hh Hearable aspiration is shown where it occurs in the talk by the letter ‘h’: the more ‘h’s, the more aspiration.

..hh If the aspiration is an inhalation it is preceded by a dot.

£word£ Word or words enclosed by pound sterling signs indicate the word is articulated through a hearably smiling voice.
A Century of News Discourse*

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ABSTRACT
This paper traces the development of news discourse across the 20th century through a case study of the coverage of three expeditions to the South Pole: Captain Scott in 1912, Sir Edmund Hillary in 1958, and Peter Hillary in 1999. The way the news about the three expeditions reached New Zealand media serves as a framework and an illustration to examine three related issues: how technology has changed the time and place dimensions of news delivery; the consequent and concomitant shifts in news presentation; and associated changes in how humans have understood time and place. News values remain the same at a broad level across the century, but different in detail. Nationalism is obtrusive, but its focus shifts. In news practice, the deadline and the scoop drive the news in all three periods, but the scooping medium shifts from press to radio to television. The lapse between an event and its reporting shrinks exponentially from months to hours to minutes. The design of newspaper front pages changes radically, and news language compresses. There are social impacts, with newsworthy figures receiving closer exposure and the audience being cast in a more voyeuristic role.

KEYWORDS: News discourse, Language change, News technology, News presentation, Time and place reorganisation, Globalisation, Antarctica, South Pole, Scott

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I take the media reporting of three expeditions to the South Pole as a case study in the development of news discourse across the 20th century. The expeditions are those under Captain Scott (1910-13), Sir Edmund Hillary (1956-58), and Peter Hillary (1998-99). They are parallel stories of exploration and hardship, spaced across the beginning, middle and end of the 20th century. I treat them and the way their news reached the world as a framework and an illustration to examine three related issues in the globalisation of international communication:

1. how technology changed the time and place dimensions of news delivery across the 20th century (e.g. how fast the news is received, and through what medium)
2. the consequent and concomitant shifts in news presentation (e.g. written versus live broadcast coverage)
3. associated changes in how humans have understood time and place across the century — that is, the reorganisation of time and place in late modernity (Giddens 1991; Bell 1999).

The remote location of Antarctica offers a specific advantage to these case studies: it stretches to the limits the technologies of communication and transport of the particular era, thus illustrating the boundaries of what is possible in news communication at the different periods. It also limits access to the news event to one (or few) reporting sources so that we can pinpoint the channel and timing of news despatch in a way which is becoming increasingly difficult in a world with multiple lines of news transmission.

The data for these case studies consist of New Zealand media coverage of the outcomes of the three polar expeditions. Antarctica is a very present place to New Zealanders. The country is located half way between the South Pole and the equator (Figure 1), and administers a sector of the Antarctic continent. Antarctica is the nearest land to the south of New Zealand, which has always been the main departure point for expeditions, and remains so today for the United States operation there.

In the early 20th century the South Pole was the last discovery left to make. At the time of Scott’s expedition, most of the shape of the Antarctic continent was still unknown. A map published in the issue of the New Zealand Herald which reported Scott’s death (1913) was able to show less than a quarter of the continent’s coastline. It is a place that remains the most isolated on earth even today. The US polar station is cut off physically for half the year even by air transport because temperatures at the surface are too cold for aircraft to take off.

Geographically, the pole is the place of all 360 degrees of longitude (here you can “walk around the world” in a few steps). It is therefore also the location of all time zones — and of no time zone. It is the place of biblical day lengths, where a year is literally as a day, with the sun rising and setting once a year. It is, then, a place which shatters our conventional measures of time.

The paper’s theme is the way in which time and place are being re-configured in
contemporary society, and the role played in that process by changing communications technology, journalistic practice and news language. When is a defining characteristic of the nature of news, a major compulsion in news gathering procedures, and a determinant of the structure of news discourse (Bell 1995). News time is time in relation to place: what matters is the fastest news from the most distant—or most important—place (cf Schudson 1987). I will track the changes in technology and the reorganisation of time/place across the 20th century, using the coverage of these three polar expeditions as timepoints.

Figure 1: Map of Antarctica
I. CAPTAIN SCOTT: 1912/1913

The British expedition led by Captain Robert Falcon Scott reached the South Pole on 18 January 1912. They hauled their own sledges 1000 miles across the world’s severest environment from their base in McMurdo Sound on the edge of the Antarctic continent south of New Zealand. They found that the Norwegian Roald Amundsen had reached the pole just a month before them.

On the return journey Scott and his party died short of their base, the last of them on or after 29 March 1912. They were found eight months later by a search party sent out as soon as the passing of the Antarctic winter allowed travel. The relief party also found the detailed diary which Scott kept nearly to the last to tell the story of the calamitous journey.

News of their gaining the pole and eventual fate did not reach the rest of the world until a year after it happened. In February 1913, the expedition’s relief ship Terra Nova put in to a small New Zealand coastal town and telegraphed the news in secret to London. Local reporters pursuing the story were rebuffed. The news was then circulated from London and published in the world’s newspapers on 12 February 1913, including in the New Zealand Herald, the country’s largest daily. This became the archetypal late-imperial story of heroism for Britain and the Empire, which stood on the verge of the Great War that would signal the end of their pre-eminence.

In 1913 the New Zealand Herald was a broadsheet (an A2-sized page), and it remains in that format in the 21st century. It tends to conservatism in editorial stance, copy and design, and used to aptly sum up its own self-image as “a quality newspaper with a popular readership”. The Herald reported the fate of Scott’s expedition on 12 February 1913. The front page of that issue (Figure 2) carries the same masthead in the same type as is used today, but the rest of the page is totally different — eight columns of small-type classified advertisements. Some of these are the eternal announcements of human life which still run today — births, deaths, marriages; jobs wanted or vacant; possessions lost and found. Others are characteristic of an earlier age than our own — shipping news and domestics wanted.

The advertisements carry through the first six pages of the paper. News begins on page 7 and in this issue is dominated by the Scott story. There are some two pages of coverage, nearly half the news hole, split into a score of short pieces with headlines such as:

HOW FIVE BRAVE EXPLORERS DIED
HEROES LIE BURIED WHERE THEY DIED:
A TENT THEIR ONLY SHROUD
CAPTAIN SCOTT’S LAST MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC
The stories cover the search for Scott’s party, reaction from other Antarctic explorers such as Amundsen, background on earlier expeditions, commentary on the fatalities. Two characteristics of the coverage appear here which are echoed again in the stories later in the century —first, the imperial geography of news, by which the information was telegraphed secretly to London from New Zealand, released in London, and only then transmitted back for publication in the New Zealand press. Second is the motif of the waiting wife —on 12 February Katherine Scott was on a ship between San Francisco and New Zealand, coming to meet her husband on his return. She did not receive the news of his death till a week after it was public, when the ship came close enough to one of the Pacific islands to receive telegraph transmissions.

So we have here a “what-a-story” in Tuchman’s terms (1978), dominating the news of the day —although not of course bumping the advertisements off the front page. In terms of the categories of news discourse which I use to analyse stories (see Bell 1991, 1998; cf van Dijk 1988), all the central elements of time, place, actors, action, and so forth are present. So are the ancillary components of news as shown in the headlines over individual stories:

Followup—consequences, reaction:

DEAD MEN’S EFFECTS
EXPLORERS DUMBFOUNDED: POLE-WINNERS’ SYMPATHY
EMPIRE’S GREAT LOSS: RESOLUTIONS OF SYMPATHY

Commentary—context, evaluation, expectations:

CAUSES OF THE DISASTER
TERRA NOVA DUE AT LYTTLETON TODAY

Background—previous episodes, history

A STRIKING ANALOGY: CAPTAIN COOK AND CAPTAIN SCOTT
ANTARCTIC’S DEATH ROLL: A LIGHT RECORD

The most obvious differences to a modern newspaper are visual —the absence of illustration, the small type even for headlines, the maintenance of column structure, and so on. What differs from later news discourse structure is that in 1913 the information was scattered among a myriad of short stories, as illustrated by the above headlines. Each sub-event has a separate story, which contemporary coverage in this kind of newspaper would now tend incorporate into fewer, longer stories. All the information is there, and the categories of the discourse are the same, but the way they are realized and structured has shifted.

Turning from the general tenor of the paper and its coverage in 1913, we can focus on the specifics of the ‘lead story, particularly its headlines (Figure 3). There are 10 decks of headlines —not something one would see in a newspaper at the start of the 21st century.¹ This is an extreme example because of the scale of the story, but five decks were not uncommon in the
Herald at this period. As can be seen by the examples above, here the headlines are telling the story. In some cases they refer to other, sidebar stories separate from the story above which they are placed. By contrast the modern headline usually derives entirely from the lead sentence of the story below it (Bell 1991), and certainly not from any information beyond the body copy of that story. That is, there is a qualitative shift in this aspect of news discourse structure across the century, from multiple decks of headlines outlining the story, to 1-3 headlines which are derivable from the lead sentence, with the story being told in the body copy.

Figure 3: NZ Herald, 12th February 1913, p. 8
The first striking thing in these headlines is an omission—they do not tell us that Scott reached the South Pole. No headline anywhere in the coverage in fact says that he reached his goal. The story is in the party’s perishing—and it has remained so, as we shall see in the coverage of subsequent expeditions.2

In terms of the time structure of news stories (Bell 1995), these 10 headlines themselves form an inverted pyramid of time, beginning with the most recent situation in the first two decks, going back to the most distant chronological event in the fifth deck, then working chronologically through the subsequent sequence of events towards the present in the remaining decks. Let us assume that a contemporary newspaper would run a 10-deck headline like this. How would today’s headline writer edit these into contemporary style?

DEATH IN ANTARCTIC

I think the modern headline editor would have no problem with this, it could as easily be used today as a century ago.

FATE OF CAPT. SCOTT AND PARTY

The honorific Capt. would be deleted. There was a move during the first half of the 20th century away from such official, military or hierarchical titles, and towards a greater democracy of newsworthiness (Bell 1991). The abbreviation Capt. is also archaic, and party in this sense falls into disuse during the century. While Edmund Hillary’s expedition is still referenced as a “party” in 1958 (see below), the Herald’s coverage of Peter Hillary’s 1999 expedition refers to the group and Hillary’s team-mates. It uses party but only in historical reference to Scott’s expedition. There is thus an intertextuality here which refers to Scott using the vocabulary of reporting in his own era not the labelling current a century later.

THRILLING OFFICIAL NARRATIVE

This is an impossible headline nowadays—lexically because thrilling and narrative (meaning “news story”) are both words of an earlier era, but more strikingly because of a shift in media and public consciousness. A century later thrilling and official can only be heard as mutually contradictory or ironical. Perhaps more tellingly, the concept of official narrative has shifted its significance. In 1913 it self-presents as the authoritative account of what really happened. The many stories about the Scott expedition published by the Herald on this day are sourced as “copyrighted official accounts”, the description clearly intended to reinforce their authority. In the 21st century such a labelling characterizes one voice—the official—among others. After a century of growing media and public scepticism towards official accounts, the undertone is that the “official line or story” is to be regarded with suspicion. There has been a sea-change here in public and media attitudes towards authority and news sources.
MISFORTUNE Follows MISFORTUNE
   Too “soft” a headline for the press nowadays. It lacks hard facts, the repetition of misfortune wastes words, and the word is in any case too long. Linguistically it is the antithesis of modern headlining.

EVANS DIES FROM ACCIDENT
   This would be made more specific, the multisyllabic word would again be rejected, and the temporal conjunction replace the resultative, because the temporal sequence is now taken to imply the causation – “Evans dies after fall”.

OATES SEVERELY FROSTBITTEN
   Severely would be deleted as unnecessary detail.

DIES THAT OTHERS MIGHT PROCEED
   This sentence would become rather “dies to save others”. The complementizer that plus subjunctive is archaic, giving way to the infinitive as a purpose clausal structure. Proceed again is 19th century lexicon – “continue” or “keep going” would be preferred.

IN A BLIZZARD FOR NINE DAYS
   Modern headlines do not start with a preposition, and this one would need a verb – “stranded” perhaps. The rather static in would be replaced with more of an indication of agency – “by”. The article goes, and the preposition in the time adverbial is not required. The end result would be no shorter, but much more action-oriented and dramatic – “stranded nine days by blizzard”.

SHORTAGE OF FUEL AND FOOD
   As a headline, this has too many words to be contemporary. Fuel and food would be combined as “supplies”.

A DEPOT ONLY ELEVEN MILES AWAY
   Again, the article would go (even though in this case there is some semantic loss – the zero article could be reconstructed as definite not indefinite: “the depot”). Perhaps a verb would be introduced, and the order might be flipped to keep the locational focus on Scott rather than the depot –“(stranded) just 11 miles from depot”

Looking at the changes our mythical modern headline editor would have made, we can see both linguistic and social shifts:

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* The ideological frame has changed—there is no longer just the "official narrative", but the official becomes one account among others.
* The discourse structure has moved from multiple decked headlines which almost tell the story, to single, short, telegraphic headlines which summarize the lead sentence.
* The lexicon has moved on. Some words strike as archaic less than 100 years later, for others length makes them out of place in a headline and they are replaced by shorter, punchier items.
* The syntax also has tightened. Function words drop out, there is a shift to emphasise action and agency through "by" and the introduction of verbs. An entire clausal structure ("that" + subjunctive) has become obsolete.

Journalistically speaking, the news has become harder, the language tighter.

II. SIR EDMUND HILLARY: 1958

In 1957 the British began an expedition to make the first crossing of Antarctica by land. It left from the opposite side of the continent, south of South America, headed for the South Pole, and on to what was now called "Scott Base", on McMurdo Sound, south of New Zealand (see Figure 1). There was a support expedition from the New Zealand side of the continent. This headed south from Scott Base preparing the route for the British group which would be coming the other way. The support group of New Zealanders was led by Sir Edmund Hillary, the first person—with Norgay Tensing—to climb Mt Everest (in 1953).

The British side of the expedition made slow going. Hillary continued south, driving modified New Zealand farm tractors and laying supplies for the British to pick up on their way north. He eventually decided that instead of turning back as planned, he would keep going and reach the Pole himself. This he did on 3 January 1958, the first overland expedition since Scott, and therefore only the third ever. The British party arrived at the Pole some time later and in due course completed the crossing of Antarctica along the route Hillary had prospected.

Like Scott, the New Zealanders knew they were in sight of the Pole because of signs of human presence, but they were neither surprised nor disappointed to see the buildings that made up the American polar station. The group camped, slept, and were awoken on the morning after their arrival by a welcoming party of Americans who drove out to receive them and then hosted them at the polar station. The first news reached the world on radio that same evening. The next morning, 4 January 1958, it was the lead story in the New Zealand Herald. That same day the explorers flew back to Scott Base.

I cannot be sure which was the first medium to disseminate the news of Edmund Hillary reaching the pole. By 1958 the century had reached the era of electronic media, so the durable archive of hard copy had given way to the ephemera of often unrecorded radio broadcasting. This was however the period when radio ruled in New Zealand (television had not yet started), and
I assume that radio was the first medium to carry the news. Hillary reached the pole at 8pm at night, and reported the arrival by radio to Scott Base. He was interviewed by radio at the pole by a reporter back in McMurdo Sound. The news was relayed to Wellington, New Zealand's capital city. The then Prime Minister Walter Nash recorded a message of congratulations which was radioed to Scott Base and on to the American polar station, where Hillary and his companions heard it next morning.

I have not yet located any archival recordings of radio coverage. At this time there was still no independent radio news service in New Zealand, only distribution of government communiques. The main New Zealand stations were still relaying the BBC World Service news from London. It is therefore possible that the old imperial lines of communication meant that this very local news story was —like Scott's— first broadcast back to New Zealand from the mother country.

In the middle of the 20th century, the press was still an important breaker of news, even though radio had been added. New Zealand newspapers covered the story, which was received in Wellington from Scott Base and sent out on the NZ Press Association wire around New Zealand and the world at 10.19pm on Friday 3 January. But even in New Zealand it was not strictly speaking front page news.

In 1958 remarkably little has changed on the front page of the Herald since 1913. The masthead is the same, as one would expect, but so are the front-page classifieds, eight solid columns of small type —births, deaths, marriages, home helpers wanted, farm employees wanted— although the shipping news has gone. The type is tidier and more symmetrical, but still small. The main news still starts on page 8, and here things look different. There are photographs, and headlines run across several columns. But there is much less coverage of this story than of Scott —about a third of a page. This partly reflects the increasing taming of Antártica, which now has airfields and the South Pole base. Advances in transport have changed the perception as well as the time lag. It also reflects that this story does not involve the death of the hero —that much of news values remains constant.

The headlines and copy run across 3-5 columns (Figure 4). There is a three-deck headline. The contents of the top two headlines can be derived entirely from the lead paragraph. Interestingly, the third headline comes from the lead paragraph of the second story (under ONE DRUM OF FUEL LEFT). In fact the lead story after the first two paragraphs is entirely background about Hillary's expedition, and the new news is carried in the adjacent shorter story. This probably came about because the copy for the long story was already set when news of Hillary's arrival broke in the newsroom after 10pm. This would have been shortly before the Herald's city edition was put to bed, and after the deadline for the rural edition. Thus the new news ended up being carried hastily in a short secondary story. But the main difference to 1913 is that the news is in print next day rather than next year.
Sir Edmund and Party Reach Pole

FIRST TEAM OVERLAND SINCE SCOTT

Final March of 70 Miles In One Day

Sir Edmund Hillary and his party of four men and three tractors arrived last night at the South Pole—the first party to reach the Pole by land since Captain Scott made his tragic five-month journey of years ago.

A New Zealand Princess accompanied them, received in Auckland at 10.15 p.m. local time. "Arrived at Pole!" It was the end of a cold, hazardous 1,200-mile haul along the Ross Ice Shelf, up Elephant Glacier and over the treacherous, crevassed polar plateau.

Since the party left base Camp 1 on December 18, they had faced the challenge of the Pole itself, the New Zealand party on the south side of the Pole. They crossed the 180th meridian and reached the Pole on December 20, 1957. Their leader, Edmund Hillary, was on the south side of the Pole.

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In 1958 we can see the extent to which the disastrous Scott expedition has dominated media and public perception of Antarctic exploration. Scott figures in the headline and lead, and the classic 1912 photograph of his five-man party at the pole is the main illustration. Ironically, this is the only on-the-spot shot. The photographs of the 1958 expedition members are archival, studio mugshots. Photographs of Hillary’s team actually at the pole could in 1958 not be electronically transmitted or physically flown out in time.

The top headline reads as slightly old-fashioned with its Sir Edmund and Party (compare this to the 1999 headline for Peter Hillary: Hillary’s trekkers). The second deck has crisp, tight, modern phrasing, while the third strikes as dated and rather wordy with two prepositions and an article. With the internationalization of measurement, 70 miles would now be given in kilometres.

The late breaking story means that much of the detail was carried on the next news day, Monday 6 January (no Sunday papers in New Zealand in 1958). That day published detail on Hillary’s arrival at the pole, with a raft of subsidiary stories, including interesting cross-cultural contrasts noted in the explorers’ reception by the inhabitants of the polar station —Each American had at least one still camera and often a movie as well.

The national and imperial overtones of the arrival were strong, but rather differently inflected from Scott’s day. The British press was reported as somewhat lamenting the coverage given to Hillary’s achievement, which was supposed to be a sideshow to the main British crossing party. The French and American press did not have that problem. The accounts make it clear that Hillary had acted with a certain post-imperial independent-mindedness in deciding to head for the pole himself.

By 1958 we have moved from the era of communications which could take months to one which takes at most hours from the end of the earth. This is a qualitative shift, and it accompanies a shift in means of transport that enables Hillary and his crew to fly back in hours over the land they have laboured months to cross. In the discourse structure of the press coverage we can see the shift to fewer headlines, which are derived from the story leads rather than telling the story themselves. The syntax is more recognizably modern in its tightness, and the lexicon is crisp, although there are still some hang-overs from an earlier era. The front page remains 19th century in content and appearance.

III. PETER HILLARY: 1999

Another 41 years later, on 26 January 1999, the three-person Iridium Ice Trek arrived at the pole. They took 84 days to pull their sleds nearly 1500 km from Scott Base. Their explicit aim was to recreate Scott’s man-hauled journey to the pole, and to complete the trek back. Their leader was Peter Hillary, Sir Edmund’s son and a significant mountaineer and adventurer in his own right. There is video footage of Peter speaking from the top of Everest on a mobile phone to Sir Edmund, and in May 2002 he climbed Everest again as part of a documentary to commemorate 50 years since his father’s original climb.
The 1999 polar expedition was named for its sponsor, the ill-fated communications company Iridium. The team recorded a video diary of the journey as they went, and Peter Hillary commentated the daily progress of the expedition by satellite phone to the media. Their arrival at the pole was videoed by Americans living at the polar station. The next day they flew back to Scott Base, having already decided to abandon the return journey on foot because of hardship and the lateness of the season.

The expedition arrived at the Pole at 5.17pm, and the world heard of their arrival within minutes. An hour after they got there, Peter Hillary was sitting on a sledge at the South Pole doing a live audio-interview on television and talking to his wife back home in New Zealand. The main television evening news programmes in New Zealand go to air at 6pm. Early in this night’s programme, One Network News (on the channel which has most of the New Zealand audience) announced that Hillary was about to arrive at the pole and carried an interview with their reporter at Scott Base. At 6.20pm, a third of the way into the hour-long programme, news of the arrival was confirmed and one of the two news anchors conducted a live telephone interview with Hillary:

_John Hawkesby (news anchor)_

Returning now to the Iridium ice trekkers
and news they have finally reached the South Pole.
It’s been one of the toughest treks in history
through one of the world’s most hostile environments.
But after eight-four days and nearly fifteen hundred kilometres
the Iridium ice trekkers have finally achieved their goal.

_Judy Bailey (news anchor)_

Along the way Peter Hillary, Eric Phillips and Jon Muir have conquered bad weather, illness and frostbite.
But within the last hour they’ve put all that behind them, reaching the world’s southernmost point.
And joining us now live by phone from the South Pole is Peter Hillary:
Peter, congratulations to you all. Has it been worth it?

_Peter Hillary_

Oh look it’s – I must say having got here – ah - to the South Pole – everything seems worth it,
Judy.
I’m sitting on my sled at exactly ninety degrees south, it’s nearly thirty degrees below zero, but
I wouldn’t – I wouldn’t want to be anywhere else.
It’s just fantastic.

_Bailey_  Peter, how are you going to celebrate this wonderful achievement down there?
Hillary  Well I must say I think under different circumstances it could be very difficult but the Americans at the South Pole station have been most hospitable.
   About a hundred of them came out and cheered us as we arrived at the pole and they’ve given us a wonderful meal.
   They’re making us feel very very much at home.
   Look it’s un — I don’t think it’s going to be any difficulty whatsoever.
   It’s just wonderful to be here.

Bailey  Wonderful.

Here we are in a different era — obviously different from 1913, but also from 1958. As Hillary says several times in the interview, he is sitting at the Pole talking live to New Zealand. The story is done in the manner of a scoop (the two main news channels in New Zealand are intensely competitive). This is treated as a what-a-story — that is, the general rules of coverage are broken, and even for live interviews this one is very unpredictable. The coverage gives the impression that the timing of the expedition’s arrival may even have been orchestrated for television, or at least that Hillary was urged to get there in time so this could be carried live, because by the next night the story would be dead.

Nationalism runs strong in the story. The woman anchor, Judy Bailey, has in any case a tendency to assume — or be attributed with — a mother-of-the-nation role. Here she enthuses over Hillary’s achievement, lets her hands fall to the desk in delighted emphasis, over-smiles, and exhausts the lexicon of ingroup self-congratulation (she and Hillary produce wonderful four times in the last few lines of the transcript above).

The Pole — one of the most hostile environments on earth — is also domesticated in this coverage, a feature which was already present in 1958 when Edmund Hillary’s team was described having a meal and shower at the polar station. This is encapsulated in Peter Hillary’s phrasing about the hospitality of the Americans at the station — They’re making us feel very very much at home.

The domestication deepens later in the news programme when the other news anchor, John Hawkesby, does a live interview with both Peter Hillary at the pole (by phone) and his wife, Yvonne Oomen, live on camera at home in New Zealand. This is an extreme example of the private mingling with the public (cf Giddens 1991):

Hawkesby  Peter’s able to listen to you at the moment.
   Would you like — do you mind us eavesdropping if you just like to say to him —

Oomen  Oh no, that’s fine.
   Darling, congratulations, I’m so proud of you.
   It’s just wonderful.
Hillary
Oh look, I’m delighted to be here and I’m – I’m – ah – just glad to be talking to you ~ in fact I’ve –
I partially did it for you too darling.

Oomen
I know, I know.

Publicly-oriented cliches — *delighted to be here* echoes Hillary’s repeated phrasings throughout the interview— mix with the very private: *I partially did it for you too darling – I know, I know.* There are catches in the couple’s voices as they address each other direct. The sense of voyeurism becomes acute, and during the interview Hawkesby himself refers three times to this embarrassment. He eventually closes the interview with a quip about the lawns at home needing mowing, which both neatly defuses the tension and again counterpoints the public arena with the domestic.

The coverage casts Yvonne Oomen in the waiting wife role, just as was Kathleen Scott at the beginning of the century. It is a role she is clearly prepared to play, while it is equally evident from her on-air performance that she is a capable and independent woman (as was Kathleen Scott, according to the biographies).

The domestication intensified the following night during the half-hour magazine programme (“Holmes”) which follows the news at 7pm on Television One. On this night the programme was devoted entirely to this story. The family — Oomen, their son and Sir Edmund— gathered in the studio for a live televised conversation with Peter Hillary and his two companions, now having flown back to Scott Base. There is delayed video footage of the three explorers’ arrival at the pole and their reception by the Americans the previous evening. TV1 makes a lot of play —in the manner of commercial media— that this is the world’s first live television interview to be broadcast from Antarctica.

We can see the domestication of the most remote place on earth by means of a technology which makes people who are there appear, live and co-present on screen, with those who are comfortably at home. This leads to a different kind of coverage. The interviews are largely lacking in informational content. They abound in cliches, focussing on the phatic and affective. In one sense this eradicates the sense of distance and inaccessibility which was (literally) inescapable for Scott, who had no way out except to walk. Peter Hillary by contrast decides to cancel his intended return trek because it is too late in the season and flies back to base. However, the hostility of the environment and its ability to dominate humans is still present in the explorers’ comments about their trek.

After the television bonanza, the press coverage is scarcely worth talking about, and this is obviously what the *Herald* thought too. The story in the next morning’s paper is a very routine one, with a few column inches at the bottom of the front page. The front page is now the *Herald*’s lead news page (and has been for decades). The masthead is the same but larger. Stories have single headlines, and the crisp tight wording of contemporary news style. There are photos, and teasers for the rest of the day’s contents. In short, it looks a thoroughly up-to-date front page.
Transport plan OK but cash questions

Hillary's trekkers set a special pole

Irradiated food may soon be on menu for consumers
The press in 1999 was very aware of being scooped by electronic media, and reduced its own coverage accordingly. The headline in the story is oddly tangential, a followup type of headline, indicative of the Herald struggling to find an angle that the broadcast media have not already covered. Clearly no photos of Hillary’s arrival at the pole had come through in time for use before deadline the previous night—we are not yet in the era of fully real-time communication. Nevertheless, the headline and the scoop can be seen operating as news drivers at both ends of the century, from the era of the press to the era of television.

IV. CONCLUSION
These three cases are revealing about change and continuity in time and place, and their relationship across the 20th century. News values are the same at a macro level while different at the micro level. Nationalism for example is obtrusive in all three cases, but its object shifts from the self-assured, late-imperial character of the British Empire at the start of the 20th century, to a New Zealand versus Britain clash in the middle of the century as the ex-colony flexes its independence, to the rather brashly media-driven celebration of a local hero at the end of the 20th century. The waiting wife is part of both scenarios, showing that the underlying domestic construction of such undertakings has changed little over the century.

However, the way in which the person of the waiting wife has to behave has changed, along with the positioning of the audience, as part of the social impact of the reorganisation of time and space. For the newsworthy, exposure is now closer and more real—Yvonne Oomen is much more under scrutiny than Kathleen Scott was. For the audience, we are more voyeuristic, intruding on private lives in real time, not with the distancing of interview and the timelapse until publication. We are close up, but still of course at a distance. The hostile environment is presented as domesticated, and domestic life is introduced into the life of the expedition.

News practice also shows a mix of change and continuity. The deadline and the scoop drive the news in all three periods, but the scooping medium changes from press to radio to television. The press is there in each case, but cast in a changing role as its ability to be first with the news is lost. There is time compression, with the lapse between an event and its reporting shrinking exponentially from months to hours to minutes. The immediacy of the coverage grows in another sense, with the move from the arm’s-length character of print reporting, through radio’s ability to carry the voices of newsmakers, to television’s display of events “as if you were there”. True live coverage is not quite achieved in 1999—the arrival at the pole could not be telecast live. What we actually see is a live interview filmed a day later from back at base. And there is a shift from the official handout to the live interview as the basis of news, and from trust in the official handout to reliance on directly media-sourced information.

Accompanying these shifts is a change in news presentation, discourse and language. Newspaper design changes radically, most notably from the placement of classified advertisements to news on the front page. Cross-column headlines and text increase (in part with
the technological shift from letterpress to offset), and photographs become the norm. The type size increases. Story structure is reconfigured with the shift from multiple headlines. There is linguistic compression, especially in the headlines, with function words dropped and the option for shorter, sharper lexical items. Some vocabulary is left behind as archaic. Thus the drive to linguistic compression which has characterized the development of news discourse for more than a century continues to be a major force in changing news language.

NOTES:

* An earlier version of this paper was published as Bell (2002), and a shorter version as Bell (in press). Acknowledgement is made to the New Zealand Herald for kind permission to reproduce the excerpts used in the paper.

1 These kinds of headlines do, in fact, still exist, but only in eccentric, hyper-elite newspapers such as the *Wall Street Journal*. Here standard headlining practice includes several decks, and full sentences rather than the reduced syntax normally associated with modern “headline”.

2 Among the many ironies of the expedition is that Scott ensured his immortality in Antarctic exploration by dying. If he had lived and returned, he would have been the man who came second to Amundsen. As it was, his “martyrdom” completely overshadowed Amundsen’s successful expedition in both popular and historical exposure—to the extent, for example, that it did not occur to me until well advanced in this project that Amundsen would have arguably been the more apt case for comparative purposes than Scott. Amundsen’s news of attaining the pole was transmitted within three months of the event, when his ship arrived in Hobart, Tasmania, on 7 March 1912.
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Students’ Discourse on Immigration
Attitudes and Ideological Values:
A Critical View

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Abstract
Following an approach based on Critical Discourse Analysis and Discursive Psychology, in this paper we study the academic discourse of a group of students who were asked to express their ideas on immigration. In particular, we explore the discourse on immigration of a group of students of English Philology at the University of Murcia during the academic year 2001-2002. It is our aim to examine how attitudes are constructed around the topic of immigration, how these attitudes are discursively expressed (that is, how attitudes are constructed through their discourse practices), and what effects this type of discourse has on the other-representation of immigrants. A significant finding of the article has been the unravelling of how ideas uncounsciously assumed to be “politically correct”, in fact cover highly racist and xenophobic attitudes to the phenomenon of immigration. Our paper shows how xenophobic attitudes still have not been overcome but are more than ever present in the discourse of the students who took part in the research conducted.

KEYWORDS: discourse, attitudes, representation, power, ideology, critical discourse analysis, discursive psychology.

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I. INTRODUCTION
How does discourse serve to promote ideas, represent social movements and reinforce ideologies? How does language reveal the unconscious/conscious attitudes of speakers which are the outcome of a major socio-psychological phenomenon such as immigration? Critical Discourse Analysis and Discursive Psychology will help us to analyse and respond to these and other related aspects of the relationship attitudes-discourse-representation in connection with the phenomenon of immigration. In particular, this article presents an exploration into the attitudes conveyed through the discoursal representation of immigration in the essays of a group of students who were asked to write on this issue.

Immigration, as a sociocultural phenomena, is a topic of importance in contemporary society. The so called first world countries are the chosen destination of many immigrants who want to escape poverty and achieve better living conditions. Europe is a dream destination. Indeed, immigration has become so widespread throughout Europe that it is now one of the main phenomena shared by most western countries.

Unfortunately immigration and xenophobic attitudes often go hand in hand. Phobias, as it is well known, are feelings of irrational fear and revulsion against something perceived as dangerous and threatening. The phenomenon of immigration is particularly prone to xenophobia, the fear of the unknown, since it entails the rejection of everything foreign or different to those surroundings we consider familiar. “Culture shock” is the term used by psychologists (Adler quoted by Brown, 1986) to refer to individuals’ frightful encounters with foreign lifestyles.

Frequently immigrants are received with distrust. In the words of one of our students “immigration and its continuous increase seems to be looming like an ever-expanding ivy over the first world”. Through this ideologically-charged metaphor, the student has unconsciously characterized what seems to be a general feeling of threat towards traditional roles and values, posed by immigrants.

These xenophobic attitudes may be more or less overt. In fact, the policies of democratic countries proclaim tolerance and empathy among cultures and people. In this sense, xenophobic attitudes and, even more so explicit xenophobic behaviour and policies are viewed as “politically incorrect”. In theory, there should be an increase in tolerance and acceptance at least by the “educated” segments of society. However in practice, xenophobic attitudes are not overcome but are more than ever present in various discourses. Analyses of sociocultural discourse, such as political speeches, radio debates or news reports have revealed that these discourses not only fail to disperse societies’ feelings of threat but, rather they do just the opposite, they promote and increase feelings of xenophobia. The stress given to ‘mass immigration’ and cultural differences enhances the fear of “invading” foreigners who come to “take what is ours” -again in the words of one of our students.

In this paper, we show the findings of a study carried out on the academic discourse of a group of students who expressed their ideas on immigration. In particular, we explore the discourse on immigration of a group of students of English Philology at the University of Murcia.
during the academic year 2001-2002. In particular, we are interested in examining the following: how attitudes are constructed around the topic of immigration, how these attitudes are discursively expressed (that is, how attitudes are constructed through their discourse practices), and what effects this type of discourse has on the other-representation of immigrants.

With this purpose in mind, we follow an interdisciplinary approach based on Critical Discourse Analysis and Discursive Psychology—two disciplines primarily concerned with the attitude-discourse-representation relationship. These two fields provide us with the main theoretical and methodological tenets for our analysis, since in our opinion both offer a particularly relevant approach for studying attitude within discourse analysis.

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
As mentioned above, this article is based on the approach to language study Critical Linguistics (CL) or, as it is better known nowadays, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Like most analysts within this field, we acknowledge the social character of all discourse and are interested in exploring the connection between language, power and ideology in texts.

This tradition of analytic enquiry can be traced back to the work on critical linguistics carried out during the 1970s by Roger Fowler and his associates at the University of East Anglia, Norwich. In particular, the term critical linguistics was first used in its currently accepted sense as the title of the concluding chapter of the book Language and Control (1979) written by Roger Fowler, Robert Hodge, Gunther Kress, and Tony Trew. Since the publication of this volume and Language as Ideology, the other book which is said to outline the critical linguistic 'manifesto' (Kress and Hodge, 1979), there has been a steady output of research within this field.

Nowadays, the terms CL and CDA are used interchangeably. According to R. Wodak, “in recent times it seems that the term CDA is preferred and is used to denote the theory formerly identified as CL” (Wodak, 2001:1). Hodge and Kress also stress that “critical linguistics has tended to merge with critical discourse analysis, which subsumes the account of linguistic forms of CL into a broader account of discursive processes” (Hodge and Kress, 1993:159).

A critical linguistic approach to language analysis means—in the words of R. Fowler—“an enquiry into the relations between signs, meanings and the social and historical conditions which govern the semiotic structure of discourse, using a particular kind of linguistic analysis” (Fowler, 1991b:5). In a similar vein, Hodge and Kress state: “Critical linguistics is a theory of language whose aim [is] to provide an illuminating account of verbal language as a social phenomenon, especially for the use of critical theorists ... who [want] to explore social and political forces and processes as they act through and on texts and forms of discourse” (Hodge and Kress, 1988: vii).

CL is “critical” in the sense that it intends to be not just a method of applied language analysis but also: “a critique of the structures and goals of a society which has impregnated its
language with social meanings, many of which we regard as negative, dehumanising and restrictive in their effects” (Fowler and Kress, 1979: 196). It must be noted that the words “critical” and “critique” do not essentially carry the negative connotations of carping and complaint that seem to inhabit their popular usage. The adjective “critical” emphasises and directs our attention to the hermeneutic and political side of this type of analysis.

The primary aim of these linguists is to use linguistic analysis to expose misrepresentation and discrimination in a variety of modes of public discourse: critical readings of newspapers, political propaganda, official documents, regulations, formal genres such as the interview etc. Topics examined include sexism, racism, inequality in education, employment, the courts and so on.

Critical linguists reject the mimetic view of language as a value-free, transparent medium reflecting reality. All representation is mediated, moulded by the value-systems that are ingrained in the medium (language in this case) used for representation (Fowler, 1996: 4). Language as an integrated form of social behaviour will be inevitably and inextricably tied up with the sociopolitical context in which it functions. Language is not used in a contextless vacuum; rather, it is used in a host of discourse contexts, contexts which are impregnated with the ideology of social systems and institutions. Because language operates within this social dimension it must, of necessity reflect, and some would argue, construct ideology (Simpson 1993:6).

In addition it is to be noted that critical linguists see language as a form of social control. For critical linguists “language serves to confirm and consolidate the organisations which shape it, being used to manipulate people, to establish and maintain them in economically convenient roles and statuses, to maintain the power of state agencies, corporations and other institutions” (Fowler and Kress, 1979: 190). As Van Leeuwen points out CDA “is, or should be, concerned with ... discourse as the instrument of power and control as well as with discourse as the instrument of the social construction of reality” (Theo van Leeuwen, 1993:193).

An essential component of the critical linguistic creed is then the conviction that language reproduces ideology. It must be noted that by ideology critical linguists do not mean a set of ideas which are false, beliefs which betray a ‘distorted consciousness’ and are therefore politically undesirable. For critical linguists ideology has to do with “the ways in which what we say and think interacts with society. An ideology therefore derives from the taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs and value-systems which are shared collectively by social groups” (Simpson, 1993: 5). The prime focus of critical linguistics is therefore to explore these “value systems and sets of beliefs which reside in texts; to explore, in other words, ideology in language” (Simpson, 1993: 5).

Another issue arising from the critical linguistic rationale concerns the way in which dominant ideologies become ingrained in everyday discourse. They become rationalised as ‘common-sense’ assumptions about the way things are and the way things should be. A process of naturalization takes place, to the extent that people are often no longer aware of the
hierarchies and systems which shape their social interaction (Simpson, 1993:6).

Fairclough offers the following useful illustration of one type of naturalisation: the conventions for a traditional type of consultation between doctors and patients embody “common sense” assumptions which treat authority and hierarchy as natural — (the doctor knows about medicine and the patient doesn’t; the doctor is in a position to determine how a health problem should be dealt with and the patient isn’t; it is right (and “natural”) that the doctor should make decisions and control the course of the consultation and of the treatment, and that the patient should comply and cooperate — and soon. (Fairclough, 1989: 2). Ideology, Fairclough goes on to argue, is embedded in the language used to structure this type of social encounter. By foregrounding the linguistic code employed in such contexts, analysts can ‘demystify’ and ‘denaturalise’ what normally passes us by as real-time participants in everyday interaction. Critical linguists believe that “using appropriate linguistic tools, and referring to relevant historical and social contexts, ideology, normally hidden through the habitualization of discourse, can be brought to the surface for inspection. In this way, critical linguistics can shed light on social and political processes” (Fowler, 1991b: 90).

One must realise too, that a too direct relationship between linguistic forms and ideology shouldn’t be assumed. Earlier work in CL was criticised because of this. In recent times, a more complex view of ideological processes has been advocated. In the words of R. Fowler: “the theory of critical linguistics acknowledges that there is lack of invariance between linguistic structures and their significances. [...] Significance (ideology) cannot simply be read off the linguistic forms that description has identified in the text because the same form (nominalisation, for example) has different significances in different contexts (scientific writing versus regulations, for example). This is the whole point of our insistence on the diacritic inseparability of two concepts language and society that happen to be separately lexicalised in English (Kress, 1985b: 1) the reason for Halliday’s use of portmanteau words such as ‘sociosemantic’” (Fowler, 1996:9).

J. J. Weber summarises by saying that “critical stylisticians have learnt from past mistakes: they insist that the relationship between language and ideology is complex and indirect, that other (social, historical, cultural, intertextual) factors which determine the meanings of particular language items for the reader have to be taken into account, that ideologies should be associated with cultural schemata rather than with individual language items and, finally, that ideologies, which in earlier studies were often assumed to be simple, unitary and static, in fact tend to be far more complex, dynamic and full of internal contradictions” (Weber, 1996:4-5). As Ruth Wodak states CDA attempts to uncover contradictions and dilemmas, therefore the analysis must be self-reflective, interpretative, open, dynamic and subject to change.

For CL as well as CDA analysts, the instrumentality of the model is reformative. According to Van Dijk “their hope, if occasionally illusory, is change through critical understanding” (Van Dijk, 1993b:252). The goal of the analysis is admittedly and ultimately political: intended for social change. “Critical stylisticians ... see their own role as being
demystificatory: to unmask ideologies, to denaturalise common-sense assumptions and, ultimately, to enable and empower readers” (Weber, 1996: 4). Carmen Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard also emphasise the political side of the analysis. For them “CDA is essentially political in intent with its practitioners acting upon the world in order to transform it and thereby help create a world where people are not discriminated against because of sex, colour, creed, age or social class” (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996:xii).

According to Van Dijk, CDA is mainly concerned with power enactment by means of discourse production and its reception. So CDA distinguishes between two dimensions: the enactment, expression or legitimation of dominance in the production of various structures of discourse and the functions, consequences and results of such structures for the minds of the recipients. The discursive (re)production of power results from social cognitions of the powerful, whereas the situated discourse results in social cognitions. Understanding and explaining ‘power-relevant’ discourse structures involves the reconstruction of the social and cognitive processes of their production. Discursive selection will, therefore, not only transmit the speakers’ identification with the dominant social group, but will construct an other-representation thus maintaining the speakers’ power position. This is particularly relevant for our study, since our informants are members of the dominant ethnic group and we are going to examine if their discursive practices re-inforce their dominant social position.

We have also mentioned the study of the attitudes of our students through their discoursal practices, as part of our aim. We do not consider attitude to be a description of a pre-existing mental state. For us attitude is viewed as a series of speech acts produced in a particular context for a particular purpose. We believe that attitudes should be analysed through talk (and not isolated utterances), because this offers a greater scope to perform different kinds of acts during speech. Our analysis of attitudes will then rely upon the point of view shown by the speakers’ disposition towards the topic as it is constructed through their discursive practices.

This perspective links a discursive approach to discursive psychology. Derek Edwards takes the cognitivist construction of scripts and respecifies it in terms of practical, situated accomplishments in interaction, that is script formulations. Hence, the orderliness of action and interaction is accomplished both in interaction and for interaction. Rather than scripts existing in a cognitive mental space, they are viewed as inseparable part of the action.

This supports the view of method and theory as bound together. Cognitivism makes cognitive processes primary and that coupled with experimental methods leads them away from the kinds of practices people take part in. As an alternative, Edwards proposes discursive psychology as a principled, theoretically grounded reason for addressing topics by focusing on action—how cognitive notions are constructed, managed and oriented in action. The discursive psychologist asks: What does ‘memory’ do in some forms of interaction? How is a version of the past constructed to sustain some action? How is an evaluation built up so as to assign blame to a minority group and how is an evaluation used to persuade someone to do something? In discursive psychology, interaction becomes the fundamental site for studying cognition.
Whereas in traditional cognitivism there is a ‘reality’, stimulus conditions and cognitions—something computing inside the actors—in discursive psychology this is inverted, activity is treated as primary, reality and cognition secondary. The focus is on what people are doing and how in the course of their practices they produce versions of reality and cognition. Inversion is necessary when one studies activity instead of behaviour. Activity is inextricable from categories, formulations and orientations of the actors. This methodological inversion makes situated practices primary and enriches psychology because it introduces history, culture, a wide range of realities and a huge population of psychological entities and processes.

Discursive researchers (Billig; Van Dijk, Wetherell and Potter etc.) have investigated racist and sexist discourse. These studies are interested in ideology as it is instatiated in ordinary talk. It will be enough to point out that this type of discursive psychological approach serves as the theoretical framework for our objectives to analyse the students’ discursive construction of their disposition towards immigration and to study some forms of discourse at work in a context where, eventually, the presentation of others’ selves is vital to the crediting and discrediting of different ethnic groups in co-existence.

III. METHODOLOGY
The first part of our analysis is essentially quantitative. It consists in the identification of a number of “variables” which reflect the attitude of our students. These variables were identified in essays our students were asked to write. The arguments related to these attitudinal variables were subsequently gathered and quantified. This quantification process is of the utmost importance since it allows us to deduce what the dominant attitudes on the topic in question are.

The findings are also examined from a qualitative point of view. It is our aim to reveal the linguistic and stylistic strategies deployed in the discursive formulation of our informants’ attitudes and their other-representation of immigrants. We pay particular attention to the consideration of linguistic features in connection with contextual social practices.

III.1. Informants
The informants who took part in our study were 140 English Philology students from the University of Murcia. 39 male and 101 female, aged between 19 and 22. This project and workshop was carried out during the academic year 2001-2002, as part of their classwork for the subject Cultural Studies—a compulsory third year subject.

It must be noticed that ours is a “convenience sample”. As a convenience sample no statistical claims to generalization are made. The findings are therefore to be restricted to the population under investigation, i.e. the students in the research.

It must also be noted that, for the purpose of data collection, the students were divided into ten groups of 14 students each.
III.2. Procedure
Each group of informants was asked to carry out a brainstorming activity on the theme of immigration, followed later by a short debate on how to structure and organise the task of writing an essay on the topic.

They were then asked to write an extended essay, as a group activity. These essays provided us with the written data with which to analyse the discursive formulation of the attitudes previously expressed.

The main arguments mentioned by our students were subsequently gathered under the “attitudinal variables” that we are going to explore in the next section.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the brainstorming activity and the essays they wrote later the students basically considered immigration in connection to historical, economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. The findings are presented in the following three tables:

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When we examine table 1 it is interesting to see that students justified the phenomenon of immigration considering:

- **Historical factors:**
  - Spanish emigration SV1
  - Colonial exploitation SV2

- **Economic factors:**
  - Desire to improve living conditions SV3
Needs due to poverty and corruption in home countries SV4
Political factors:
Question of human rights SV5
Criticism of capitalism SV6

A quantitative analysis of table 1 reveals that most groups, 10 out of 14, justify immigration considering the immigrants' need to escape poverty and corruption in home countries SV4. A desire to improve living conditions SV3 is mentioned by 7 groups. In contrast, criticism of capitalism SV6 is only considered by two groups. Immigration as the result of colonial exploitation SV2 is mentioned by 4 groups and immigration as a question of human rights SV5 is only revindicated by 2 groups.

Less than half of the groups related the Spanish emigration SV1 to European countries in search for better jobs with Spain being a target country of immigration nowadays.

Table 2: attitudes in favour of immigration (pros.)

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Opinions in favour of immigration were related to:
The benefits obtained from economic factors:
Increase in birth-rate SV7
Economic benefits for host countries SV8
Opportunity to provide social aid SV9
And the benefits obtained from a cultural dimension:
Benefits of multi-cultural society SV 10
Cultural integration SV 11
Increase in tolerance SV 12
Open mindedness SV 13
A quantitative examination of table 2, with the attitudes in favour of immigration, shows that the economic and (socio)cultural dimensions provide most of the arguments. It is interesting to see how the variable economic benefits for the host countries SV8 is the argument most frequently given, being mentioned by 11 groups out of 14.

The cultural dimension is also considered. Here 8 groups believed that a multicultural-society SV10 can be beneficial, just half of the groups considered that cultural integration can be positive SV11. Only 5 groups believed that immigration can contribute to “open mindedness” SV13 and just 3 groups thought that immigration can bring about an increase in tolerance SV12.

When we look at the discourse the students used, we can see how the second variable colonial exploitation SV2 is presented in the words of one of our students as the “source of the problem”, therefore it appears lexicalised as such in the first paragraph of most essays. Immigration is conceptualised as a problem, a problem in need of solution. Students considered immigration as being the result of

“colonial policies that exploit unstable countries ... since they lack infrastructures”

In this case the nominalization “colonial policies” omits the agents in the process. The responsibility is placed on others —maybe an amorphous entity comprising politicians and multinational companies. Nothing can be done to help. It is the responsibility of those countries who “ruled their colonies as a master rules his slave” or “corrupt rulers” SV4. The blame is put on both home and host countries' policies. The students however provided no information about these policies. No details were given about historical, geographical facts etc.

Colonial exploitation SV2 is often presented in connection with the desire to improve living conditions SV3, which in turn is linked to immigration as a consequence of poverty and corruption SV4. One group of students wrote:

“natural resources are not profited by undemocratic countries, but their wealth distributed among multinational companies”.

These three variables are used as a chain-argument: the home countries were exploited as colonies and nowadays corrupt leaders continue to aggravate the populations' poverty. It is interesting to see how corruption in home countries is considered a major cause for immigration, being one of the arguments most frequently mentioned. In this way, the blame is being put on the immigrants themselves. External exploitation is connected to their own internal failure as a society to manage their resources.

Though the immigrants' need to improve their standard of living and to escape from poverty SV3/SV4 are the arguments most frequently presented as a justification for the phenomenon of immigration, only in two essays is the suffering of immigrants mentioned. In
one essay, the students referred to immigrants as victims:

“victims of the unfair economic world system ... just poor desperate people looking for a better life ... what everybody looks for”

Words with powerful evocative connotations such as victims, unfair, poor, desperate are used, in this case, to highlight the suffering of immigrants as human beings. In the other essay referred to above, the students identified with the immigrants by saying that:

“we would also emigrate if we saw our children starving and desperation killed us slowly”.

A note of sympathy and compassion can also be identified in connection with the variable Spanish emigration SV1. This historical variable is often used to justify the need for immigration in the introductory paragraph of the essays. A parallelism is sometimes established with political oppression in Spain during General Franco's regime and political oppression in immigrants' home countries. In an attempt to identify with immigrants, students wrote sentences like:

“how soon we have forgotten that... we were the ones...”,
“we just do not remember that our own family was also immigrant some time”.

Though quite similar, the first expression, with the emphasis on “how soon” seems to accuse people of how quickly they forget, whereas the second one sounds more like an excuse for the same fact.

It must be pointed out that the two essays mentioned above and the expressions related to Spanish emigration were the only attempts we found at identifying with the immigrants. Only on these occasions did the discourse of “them” become the discourse of “us”. As we shall see later, this is just occasional. Generally the predominant discourse is the confrontational discourse of them vs us; the distance is kept and no attempt is made at seeing the phenomenon from “their” point of view.

Within the political dimension only one group of students considered immigration as a question of human rights SV5. Surprisingly this was mentioned only after dealing with immigrants being blamed on the increase in crime. The argument, in fact, goes like this:

“some immigrants commit crime, but that even though it is a question of human rights, every human being should have the right to live their life in the best possible conditions”.

It almost sounds as if “human rights” was thus presented as an afterthought or as an
ex-cause for admitting the fact that immigrants are guilty of an increase in criminal offences.

Criticism of capitalism SV6 has also been scarcely dealt with. Only 2 groups point towards capitalism as one of the major causes for immigration:

"the world is run by, and solely for the benefit of rich western countries and giant multilateral corporations"

(politicians) "see it as a slow but progressive undercapitalization of their own nations".

In both essays it is argued that capitalism in Western society is not interested in an economic strengthening of underdeveloped countries, since that could lead to a loss of control and dominance. Later on, we will come back to the notion of "dominance" which seems to come up recurrently as a generalized conscious or unconscious fear.

Almost all essays refer to the economic benefits for host countries SV8 as the main argument in favour of immigration. It is significant how economic benefits are considered by an overwhelming majority as the main "positive" outcome of immigration. The emphasis on the economic benefits for the host countries is not only the most frequent but also the most developed argument. In this sense, immigration is viewed as "positive" mainly in connection with the economic benefits host countries can "obtain" from immigrants. Immigration is considered a business transaction, not a question of human rights and human beings. Indeed, economic benefits are to be expected as the result of this transaction.

Two groups referred to the benefits that could be obtained from the increase in birth-rate SV7. The students wrote:

"well-regulated immigration endorses an almost never-ending flow of cheap manpower ... linked to national wealth ... guarantees the continuity of social welfare (in countries) with ridiculous birth-rates",

"they engross the population rate ... and bring a lot of young people able to work".

According to sentences like these, the immigrant must be young and fit to work. Immigration is good as long as the people entering the country are in good condition to work. They must be willing to do "donkey-work". Immigrants must also be willing to accept hard agricultural jobs, i.e. "in the fields" This idea of immigrants providing "cheap manpower" is firmly established in most essays. In one of the sentences previously cited, we have seen how the student referred to immigration "as an almost never-ending flow of cheap manpower". The use of the word "cheap" in this sentence is particularly preoccupying since it takes for granted that immigrants must be willing to accept worse working conditions than the native population. Economic exploitation is thus naturalized and taken for granted. What is particularly revealing
is the tacit acceptance of this and how this is presented as a justification for immigration. Immigration is, thus, considered a “business” benefit—a benefit based on exploitation and humiliation. An apparently positive attitude—an argument—in favour of immigration—in fact hides a “naturalized” racist attitude.

On top of that, the economic benefits of immigration (for host countries) SV8 are welcome but almost always immediately criticised when considering the “dangers” of “mass immigration” and the illegal conditions of some immigrants. It is interesting how the students referred to “their” illegal conditions and “their lack of integration”. These nominalizations, as in other cases before, put the blame on them. The responsibility is shifted on to them. They are responsible for their illegal conditions and their lack of integration.

The latent feeling of threat and menace posed by immigrants is reflected in the fact that students often relate “economic benefit” to fears of an “increase in unemployment”:

“Immigrants carrying out the work in the fields. ...people speculate that immigrants increase Spanish unemployment”.

An unspecific subject such as people is used with the verb speculate. The real agents in the process are thus obscured.

The social dimension SV9 was only considered from a positive point of view by one group of students. For this group, immigration meant an opportunity to develop social organisations that may help immigrants overcome their problems. This was good in itself. No other argument in favour of social contact could be found.

From the perspective of the cultural dimension SV10, the benefits of multi-culturalism were quite frequently mentioned, though in a very vague and abstract way. “Cultural merging” was positively assessed as it was thought to provide the opportunity to acquire important values such as “respect and tolerance”. Multiculturalism was in most cases associated with liberal policies and youth subculture.

Cultural integration SV11 was only considered to be positive by half the groups. It appears in most essays in relation to the alternative of assimilation NSV2. In this sense, our society is seen as attempting to impose assimilation on immigrants. In many cases, the solution is thought to be the immigrants’ voluntary integration. However, many groups considered that there were too many cultural differences that rendered the process impossible. Integration was generally seen as handicapped or just impossible because of the difficulties that cultural differences entail. It is worth mentioning how integration is considered a one-way process. Instead of being a two-way process, it is seen as unilateral action on the part of the immigrant. Not only do they have to integrate, but they have to be “willing” to do so as well. The use of the word voluntary is significant. It has to be a voluntary integration. In addition, it is considered difficult or impossible. The nominalization “cultural differences” is the excuse given. Comments like these reveal an “unconscious” racist attitude on the part of the students. We shall deal with
this in more detail when we consider the negative views towards immigration. The variables increase in tolerance SV12 and the notion of open-mindedness SV13 are mostly seen as potential positive outcomes of multiculturalism. In one case is tolerance envisioned as the key solution, or better still, the premise for a peaceful ethnic coexistence:

"Thank God a majority of people still believe in a world without "apartheid" where coexistence of different human beings is possible".

As if it could be anything else!! Here a difficult coexistence is taken for granted. As in previously mentioned cases, there is a naturalization process whereby it is assumed — without further questioning — that coexistence is by nature difficult. The danger with sentences like these resides in the presuppositions they imply. Such presuppositions convey a telling perspective on peaceful multiethnic coexistence. Why should the coexistence of human beings even be questioned?

So far we have analysed the arguments that the students gave to justify the phenomenon of immigration as well as the arguments they put forward in favour of immigration. In contrast with table 3, these are supposed to encompass the most positive attitudes — the most sympathetic and favourable viewpoints towards immigration. However, our comments have shown how they are not as positive as one may have expected from a social group that most certainly should not feel economically threatened or whose identity might be jeopardized by multicultural contact. Just the opposite has occurred. The arguments given in favour of immigration cover a naturalized and deep-rooted racist/problematic view of immigration. Rather than being positive they are covertly xenophobic. This is interesting since we know that the students thought their essays were "politically correct". Racist attitudes have been naturalized to the extent that the students were not aware of them.

Table 3 presents the "overtly" negative attitudes towards immigration. They are related to immigration "allegedly" "causing" cultural social, economic and political "problems":

Cultural problems:
- No integration NSV1
- Difficulties for the assimilation by host society NSV 2
- Ideological clash NSV3
- Religious threat NSV 4
- Differences due to cultural conflicts NSV 5
- Lack of tolerance NSV 6

Social problems:
- Increase in crime and violence NSV 7
- Increase in xenophobia NSV 8
- Problems inherent to low-class immigration NSV 9
(Immigrants as the source of) social conflicts NSV 10

Economic problems:
Unemployment NSV 11
Demographic problems NSV 12
Undercapitalization of Western countries NSV 13
Economic distribution NSV 14

Political problems:
Illegality NSV 15; (Problems related to illegal immigration)
Rise in far-right policies NSV 16

Table 3: negative attitudes towards immigration (cons.)

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The overtly negative attitudes against immigration are overwhelmingly more numerous. The numbers are quite telling. The quantitative examination of the third table reveals that most groups (6) give at least 6 arguments for the problematic view of immigration, only one group offers 5, 5 groups list 7 opinions and 2 groups mention 8 negative aspects.

Most arguments (6) belong to the cultural dimension, among which the immigrants' lack of integration NSV1, the difficulties for assimilation by the host community NSV2, the ideological clash NSV3 and cultural conflicts NSV5 are the arguments most frequently chosen. The social and economic dimensions receive the same number of variables. The arguments that appear most often are the problem of unemployment in western countries NSV11 and the increase of xenophobia NSV8. Within the political dimension, the problem of immigrants' illegality NSV15 is of greater concern than the rise of far-right political wings NSV16.

When we examine how the negative aspects of immigration are discursively formulated, we can see how within the category of cultural problems encountered, half the groups refer to problems related to integration: No integration NSV1. In most essays, this is related to the immigrants' unwillingness to integrate. Again, it is a problem caused by them. The students
wrote:

“they do not integrate, they do not want to because they create isolated groups”,
“they continue with their customs”,
“their maintenance of cultural differences lead to an ideological clash”.

In these sentences we can see how the discourse of exclusion shapes all these expressions. The use of the pronoun *they* is ideologically charged, marking the difference between *them* and *us*, and in doing so identifying *them* as outsiders. Although no details are given in support of the claims being made, the students wrote “they do not integrate”. This expression doesn't leave room for others trying. A dangerous discourse of generalization is exploited here. Modality is also prominent. The immigrants' unwillingness to integrate is presented as an accomplished fact, not questioned in any sense. The use of the verb “want” is very explicit in this case. Their “voluntary rejection” is related to their creation of “isolated” groups. The word “isolated” is also interesting in this context particularly for the negative connotations it conveys. The groups they intentionally “create” are depicted, as the word “isolated” means, as being set apart, cut off from society, separated. Impossibility of contact is, thus, implicitly assumed.

The difficulties for assimilation by host countries NSV2 are also mentioned. Assimilation is considered as the solution for their lack of integration. It is interesting how a dangerous equation, assimilation — integration, is established. In one essay, the students wrote: “When in Rome, do as the Romans do”. In this case, the traditionally transmitted cultural knowledge and authority behind proverbs is adduced as justification for (racist) attitudes. This is more dangerous since the ideological power of proverbs often passes by unquestioned.

In other essays, as if immigration was a disease susceptible of being cured assimilation is viewed as the remedy for what they considered as NSV 3 an ideological clash, which in turn is seen as a major cause for xenophobia NSV 8:

“as far as ideology is concerned there is a lot of rejection, hatred ... xenophobia in one word.”,
“... an ideology so far-fetched from ours, even medieval in some aspects, that cannot be accepted in democratic societies and must lead to a clash of ideas and beliefs...”,

It is interesting how metaphors of distance are used here. Ideology is “far”-(fetched). As on a road, it “leads” inevitably to confrontation and antagonism. Not only do pronouns emphasize the distance between *them* and *us*, but metaphors seem to impose “mental frontiers” that are not crossed. Modality, through the use of the verbs can and must, reinforces the process and points towards the inevitable nature of the process: the ideological clash. This war metaphor confirms
the antagonistic view that students have of immigrants. As in a battle, immigration provokes a "clash of ideas and beliefs ...". This discourse of confrontation is also reflected in the way immigrants are viewed as enemies, posing a threat, a menace to the general population. This antagonistic view is also reflected in immigration being perceived as a religious threat NSV 4.

One group warns about the difficulty of accepting other ideologies. According to the students, there are things that are easier said than done. Tolerance works in theory, but:

"none of these theoretical positions are easy to put into practice".

Through the the use of a scientific terminology, human beings are coldly related to theoretical parameters—as in an experiment racial relations are difficult to put into practice. To justify these difficulties, they give the example of how catholic religious processions in the city of Cartagena (Murcia, Spain) were once interrupted by Moroccans. Apparently the immigrants had "claimed" that the processions were "an offence to their religion". Here the blame is put on Moroccans in general. The group is not identified. They don't say if it was a minority, a particular group etc.. As seen before, the emphasis is placed on differences—in this case religious differences. They are different—at the same time an imbued artificial "sameness" is imposed on all of us.

Differences between cultures are also perceived as generating cultural conflicts NSV 5:

"cultural differences increase the feeling of xenophobia and violence",
"fights increase in the streets, everyday"

Cultural differences are perceived as being the cause of fights. An incident in El Ejido is mentioned in support of this claim. The incident in question was an episode of ethnic violence which took place in this village in Almeria (Southern Spain). As a result of this, there was a violent confrontation between the locals and the immigrants. Even though this was an isolated episode of racial violence, students had the impression that "fights increase every day". As we have seen, with the El Ejido and Cartagena incidents, the rhetorical strategy of exemplification is given in support of this fallacious reasoning. The adverb "everyday" is used to reinforce the message. This adverb of frequency seems to enhance, augment if possible, the value of the word increase. Fights are perceived to take place, not occasionally but everyday.

One group criticises our society for its lack of tolerance NSV 6. Lack of tolerance is frequently directly related to an increase in crime and violence NSV 7. Even though the intolerant attitude of our society is criticised it is immediately excused by the:

"fact that crime has increased",
"immigrants are widely rejected, a situation which is corroborated by the amount of immigrants arrested (49% in Murcia last year)"
“immigration = insecurity = delinquency”.

This alleged increase in violence is also adduced to justify the increase in xenophobia NSV 8 in our society. It is seen as a negative consequence of immigration. An increase in immigration means an increase in crime which in turn entails an increase in xenophobia. However, the students wrote:

“people have reasons for their negative and rejecting point of view”,

Here xenophobia is justified: There are “reasons” for it. There are “motives, causes, justifications”. According to its dictionary definition, the word reason can be related to “sense, a sensible conduct, what is right or practicable”. Reason also implies exercising our intellectual faculty. In this way, there seems to be not an “emotional” but an “intellectual” justification for certain xenophobic attitudes. In our opinion, the use of the word “reason” is ideologically charged, since it has the power of justifying and admitting as reasonable what cannot be justified at all.

Contrary to this “intellectual” side of xenophobia, it is interesting how there is an emotional side to it. The power of emotions is also resorted to since xenophobia is seen as “the result of a psychological fear”. Immigration is seen as provoking “neurosis”: a psychological fear. This image is very evocative as it appeals to emotions —emotions that are difficult to control:

“though we are narrow-minded and selfish, people fear that our society may lose control”

If there is something the students perceived as being in need of control that is immigration.

Within this context two other variables were mentioned. Immigration is said to cause demographic problems NSV 12 and the rise of far-right NSV 16 policies. Since it is argued that xenophobia is the consequence of a “mass invasion” by immigrants, it is also seen as leading to radical policies, to rejection and hatred among extreme conservative movements. This chain of criteria is grounded in sentences like (immigration being):

“a menace for the integrity of society”
“a threat for the host culture”
“concerns over immigration has contributed to the rise of the far-right, such as for example Le Pen in France”

In these sentences, the discourse of confrontation is more than ever present. Immigration is
portrayed as an *invasion*, a *threat*, a *menace*, something to be *feared*. It is because of this antagonistic view that what is perceived as “mass immigration” is a source of great concern. The more immigrants come, the worse the situation will get, and so they state that:

“the constant, increasing flow is a threat for the dominance of western societies”

Immigration is seen as an unstoppable river, a *flow* constantly increasing *threatening* to *flood* the surrounding areas with people. In one essay, the students referred in particular:

“to the millions that fill western Europe”

Although the style is clumsy, the container metaphor serves its purpose perfectly. It is clear how the host countries are perceived as containers to the point of being filled by immigrants, almost overflowing with millions of *them* who are threatening to wash away our identity and social dominance. Through the container metaphor the immigrant is always *outside*, whereas the local population is *inside*. This is coherent with the discourse of exclusion and segregation that we have seen before, as was the case with the use of the pronouns *we* vs *they* etc.

It is also coherent with the expression *host countries*, which presents the immigrant as being a mere guest in the country he/she goes to. The locals are the *landlords* and the immigrants the *guests*. The implications are clear: the landlord has full right to the property, resources etc., while the immigrant is just ‘invited to share a bit of this property’. The connotative implications of the word *host*, implying a courteous welcoming attitude almost seem ironic in this context.

These discursive practices are also consistent with other expressions where, as with the *landlord/guest* dualism, the local population is always put first, given priority whereas the immigrant is presented as a second-class citizen:

“conservatives want to grant the native population priority”
“others may say they are justified in preserving jobs for the locals”

According to the logic of the source domain, the landlord always has rights over wealth, possessions —jobs in this case. It is quite “logical” that jobs should be reserved for the proprietors, who should have first pick and only leave what they do not want to the invited *guests*.

Fears related to the problem of unemployment were often voiced in this context. In fact the “problem” of unemployment was the main and most explicit argument against immigration NSV 11:

“Due to unemployment, immigration becomes a threat”
the “economic problem of how to distribute jobs”
“there are not enough jobs”
“the lack of jobs implies a threat”

This taken for granted threat appears in most essays. However, on a minor scale it must be noted that students recognize that most problems are related to the difficulties inherent to low-class immigration NSV 9. Social conflicts are also acknowledged as being the result of immigrants’ unprovided basic needs NSV 10.

In line with the antagonistic view of immigration, reflected in the metaphors IMMIGRATION IS AN ENEMY, IMMIGRATION IS A WAR, IMMIGRANTS ARE OUTSIDE, loss of dominance is a constant preoccupation. Immigration is viewed as a threat to dominance, in need of control:

“the constant, increasing flow is a threat for the dominance of western societies”,

Out of this way of reasoning, the students are aware of their cultural dominance, of western societies’ political dominance and they mirror the fear of a loss of identity and loss of superiority due “to the millions that fill western Europe”. In this sense, immigration must be controlled. In their own words: control of immigration “could possibly have positive effects”. Legal and controlled immigration is felt to be the only positive way of dealing with this phenomenon: “that controlled may be not so bad as it seems”. Here the presupposition is clear: immigration is bad.

Among the economic problems, the “undercapitalization of Western countries” NSV 13 is hardly commented upon and the problems derived from “unfair” economic distribution NSV 14 are only mentioned twice. Both variables are again envisioned from the point of view of loss of dominance, since there is fear that providing economic aid to underdeveloped countries might imply an economic loss of power.

Loss of economic power —Loss of dominance/primacy: These are terrible fears for western societies, afraid of being ideologically, culturally and what seems worse, economically “swallowed” or “damaged” by the “mass of immigrants” entering the country: “it may lead to the breakdown of countries” —the students wrote. This invasion brings about political problems whereby the immigrants’ illegal conditions NSV 15 only worsens the whole “conflict”. This word is indicative of the students basic perception of what immigration involves. In all essays immigration is basically conceptualised as a problem. This is the most common view on immigration. In all essays, we find expressions like: “immigration is

a problem
a conflict
a task to solve
a nuisance

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What is worrying is the taken for granted admittance that it is problem. No one casts a doubt on the issue. There has been a naturalization process whereby immigration is simply viewed as a "problem", with no clear solution:

"a so controversial issue"
"it so polemic and complex that no one agrees what to do"
"no easy solution, both sides feel threatened"
"increasing difficulties without an obvious solution"
"help for those countries will be no easy solution"
"multiculturalism deserves an effort from all of us"

This last example is particularly meaningful. What at first sight could be considered as a good comment, in fact, hides a not so positive attitude. It is worth noticing that the student wrote "deserves an effort" and not "deserves applause", or "enthusiasm". Multiculturalism is naturally perceived as something which deserves strenuous physical or mental exertion: an effort. In this way multiculturalism is seen, in a negative light, as something inherently difficult and hard to achieve. This is related to the view of immigration as a problem.

V. CONCLUSION

The discussion of the data has shown how a naturalized problematic view of immigration prevails. In the essays of our students, immigration is conceptualized as a problem—a problem for the host society from political, economic, social and cultural dimensions.

We have also seen how immigration is basically considered in a negative light. Through metaphors, lexical choices, modality, pronouns and other linguistic features, a negative view is put forward. Of course there are contradictions, as ideology is not a single unitary phenomenon, but we can say that the dominant view is mainly negative, as we have seen in tables 1, 2, and 3. Negative attitudes outweigh the positive ones.

Immigration has also been found to be viewed in antagonistic terms. Along with the antagonistic view of immigration, reflected in the metaphors IMMIGRATION IS AN ENEMY, IMMIGRATION IS A WAR, IMMIGRANTS ARE OUTSIDE, loss of dominance has been a constant preoccupation in the essays of the students. Likewise, due to this antagonistic attitude, differences are perceived as unsurmountable, with very little attempt being made to perceive the issue from the others’ point of view.

Our informants' arguments and discursive strategies must also be viewed in terms of other utterances, that is, to speeches, debate and conversations previously listened on by or taken part in by our informants. Their attitudes as well as their discourses do not stand alone and isolated, but are a response to other discourses. The discursive strategies and most significantly the
rhetoric features might be traced back to a general socio-political stress on immigration as a major problem.

The rhetorical analysis of argumentation can reveal what is being taken for granted as common-sense. This perspective will finally serve to explain the other-representation constructed. In short, immigrants are portrayed as enemies; potential economic help and a threat. The vision of immigrants as a menace relies on two main factors: their mass arrival and their differences. Clearly, it is a discrediting image of immigrants.

A most significant finding is, therefore, the ethnocentric view, as immigration and immigrants are dealt with for what they are and for what they mean for our society. The informants' hardly ever consider the topic from the immigrants' point of view, but rather emphasize the implications that immigration has for our society. Hardly any importance is given to the problems encountered by the immigrants in the host community. The lack of solutions offered, openly hints towards a resigned attitude.

It seems that in our pre-dominantly pragmatic, progressive, productive and competitive society, immigration is positive as long as it implies economic benefits and is restricted to those areas where the host economy is in need of labour. In our students' essays, immigrants are perceived as a threat, as an invasion of "different" people, neither easy to control nor to understand.

These findings highlight the importance of raising the critical awareness of our students to social and political ideologies encoded in texts, since our students were convinced of having written essays that were politically correct. Our students were totally unaware of them having expressed xenophobic attitudes. Indeed, a critical reading of texts, a healthy procedure of vigilance, a responsive and responsible attitude should be encouraged and promoted. Teachers and educational institutions should raise the critical awareness of students, drawing their attention to the ideological implications of the discourse they use. Such critical awareness can ultimately lead to social change, since it opens up the possibility of alternative constructions of reality.

NOTES

1 Sentences or phrases marked with quotation marks were taken from our students' essays. It must be noticed that mistakes (grammar, vocabulary, style etc.) have been left uncorrected.

2 In one case the citizens' appreciation of immigrants providing cheap labour is treated with irony, in particular in connection to the increase-of-crime (SV7) variable: "have come to steal what is ours .... do the jobs we all refuse. Is that stealing?". This is an interesting example of how ideology is complex and often contradictory, since in the same text we can find opposite views coexisting together.
Here it is interesting to point out that NSV 8, increase of xenophobia, is almost always related to conservative policies, described as being “rooted in society”.

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