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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the normative role of civic education in responding to war, and in preparing society for the possibility of peace. The paper describes changes in the conceptualization of citizenship in times of conflict. It notes that during wartime, democratic societies tend to transform their notion of citizenship to a militaristic one that is termed here belligerent citizenship. The paper examines the role of public education in response to these social challenges. It makes the case for an educational response to belligerent democracy from various perspectives, situated within the contemporary theoretical discussion of patriotic education. Based on Amy Gutmann's democratic education theory, the paper maintains that the foremost role of public education is to foster basic democratic principles, such as equal opportunity and liberty. It points out that in wartime, the education system has to fulfill this role through opposing the mainstream conception of citizenship, employing radical, critical ways of interpreting and realizing these aims. Includes 45 notes. (BT)

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**RADICALIZING DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION:
UNITY AND DISSENT IN WARTIME**

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In the summer of 2002, Israeli students took their final exams toward a high-school diploma. At 17 or 18, just before gaining their voting rights and beginning their military service, the civic studies exam confronted them with the question: “explain why conscientious objection is subversive.”

The students were presented with the conclusion, veiling a demand to condemn soldiers who refuse to serve in the occupied territories. At a culminating point of their civic education, they were expected to explain why opposing the decisions of a democratic government, in the context of war, is treacherous.¹

This article explores the normative role of civic education in responding to war, and in preparing society for the possibility of peace. It starts out by describing changes in the conceptualization of citizenship in times of conflict. During wartime, democratic societies tend to transform their notion of citizenship to a militaristic one that is termed here “belligerent citizenship”. This notion of citizenship reflects the militaristic inclinations of society at war, and is made to support the public endurance in wartime. However, it also hinders tolerance, marginalizes and silences various individuals and groups, and impedes the consideration of alternative political futures.

Next, I examine the role of public education in response to these social challenges. The case for an educational response to belligerent democracy is made from various perspectives, and is situated within the contemporary theoretical discussion of patriotic education. Based on Gutmann’s democratic education theory, I maintain that the foremost role of public education is to foster basic democratic principles (such as equal

For many discussions on the topic, and suggestions on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Suzanne Dovi, Mariah Zeisberg, and Eran Ben Porath. Meron Benvenisti has supported me through the writing of an earlier version of this paper, and the participants of “The Morning After Peace” group have helped me clarify my points on the topic. Another version of this paper was presented at the Annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (Miami 2003) and I thank the participants for their helpful comments.

¹ The Israeli high court, in contrast, did recognize the history of political philosophical argumentations in its verdict against selective conscientious objection. The judges referred to various perspectives, most prominently to Michael Walzer (*Obligations: Essay on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship* 1970), to conclude that selective objection was not acceptable in the Israeli military context. See High Court of Justice case number 7622/02, October 23, 2002.

opportunity and liberty). In wartime, the education system has to fulfill this role through *opposing* the mainstream conception of citizenship. To achieve that, public education has to maintain its focus on the democratic aims of civic education – civic equality, exposure to diversity and tolerance – but it has to employ radical, critical ways of interpreting and realizing these aims.

I. Belligerent Citizenship

When a democracy enters a period of war, the basic assumptions upon which its social order is constructed are distorted. Civic freedoms, long held as guaranteed, are suddenly limited. Political alliances shift. One of the most significant changes for the purpose of public civic education is the shift from an open, democratic conception of citizenship to a narrow conception of belligerent citizenship.

The belligerent conceptualization of citizenship emerges as a response to perceived threats to individuals' lives and national security. It is distinctly characterized by three key features: emphasis on citizens' contribution to the country rather than on voluntary participation; support for social unity and patriotism over diversity; and consequently, the discouragement of deliberation.²

The focus of civic participation during periods of conflict or security threats shifts from the open and voluntary to the directed and mandated. The measure of civic participation is no longer civic engagement, but the readiness to contribute to the war and the survival effort, and possibly to risk one's life for the sake of the country.³ In a country like Israel where military service is compulsory, volunteering for combat service is considered the utmost civic virtue.⁴

²See Gad Barzilai, *Democracy in Time of War: Conflict and Consensus in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1992) (Hebrew); Baruch Kimmerling, *The Interrupted System: Israeli Civilians in War and Routine Times* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1993).

³See a variety of examples to this claim in Yael Tamir, "Pro Patria Mori: Death and the State," in *The Morality of Nationalism*, ed. R. Mckim and J. McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). For the historical American context, see Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1999).

⁴For the Israeli context, see, e.g., Yitzhak Galnur, *The Beginning of Israeli Democracy* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1985), 309 ff. (Hebrew); Orit Ichilov, "Patterns of Functioning of a Citizen in a Democracy," in Orit Ichilov, ed., *Education for Citizenship in a Democracy* (Tel Aviv: Masada and Tel Aviv University, 1993) (Hebrew). This change in the construction of civic participation is less significant to the theory of civic

A second distinctive feature of belligerent citizenship is an overpowering form of patriotic unity. A sense of solidarity, unity and a common cause are regarded by political psychologists as part of the required attitudes for enduring an intractable conflict. "The purpose of beliefs of unity is to provide a sense that all members of the society support the goals of the conflict and their leaders. They act to strengthen the solidarity and stability... a lack of unity, on the other hand, creates polarization and internal tensions that hamper the struggle with the enemy."⁵

The third feature of belligerent citizenship is the suppression of deliberation. By and large, deliberation is far less encouraged in a state of war than in other times, or than what democratic models aspire for. Deliberation and disagreement are widely regarded as threats to the security effort, and the more the security threat becomes real and pressing, the narrower are the limits of the acceptable in public discussions. In situations of a protracted conflict, the public agenda tends to be focused around security issues, and a vast range of opinions is deemed unreasonable or irrelevant. Hence there are fewer subjects that are perceived as worthy of public discussion, and fewer perspectives that are regarded as adequate.

Democratic conceptions of citizenship are concerned with coordinating the relations between individual and state, with a focus on limiting the state's power and realizing individuals' rights.⁶ Both the 'aggregative' and the 'deliberative' models focus "on the *process* of decision-making to which the ideal of democracy refers."⁷ While the first model is more procedural, it is still strongly dependant upon the substantive diversity of opinion. If all or most citizens express the same preferences, the process loses much of its appeal. The deliberative model "associates democracy with open discussion and the exchange of views leading to agreed-upon policies."⁸ This model too lies on the hidden assumptions that the polity offers an open public space, proper means of communication as well as the motivation to communicate, an acceptable range of opinions and a variety of issues to deliberate on. When some of these factors are suppressed by the public's

education, mainly because education is a non-voluntary system, and therefore it will mostly remain in the background for the rest of the discussion.

⁵ Daniel Bar-Tal, *Obstacles on the Path toward Peace* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1996), 24 (Hebrew).

⁶ See for example the critical description by Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1992), chapter 3. Benhabib stresses the need for a richer social space created through a 'discursive model.'

⁷ Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 18.

response to perceived threats (for this purpose it is the perception of threat and not its reality that matters), the democratic ideal becomes subordinate to the survival of the state.

Belligerent citizenship is not dichotomically distinct from democratic citizenship. The move from one to the other does not happen overnight. Rather it is a gradual closing of options, an uneven process of narrowing down perceptions, a slippery slope, if you will, from the wide-open democratic entrance to the funnel to its authoritarian closed end.

Although the concept of belligerent citizenship is based on the Israeli experience, there is strong preliminary evidence that it accords with the contemporary American circumstances as well.⁹ In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the social intolerance toward American Muslims grew significantly. One study concluded that after the attacks, Americans were “rallying around each other, concerned and even distrustful of some groups of foreigners [mainly Muslim and Arab Americans]. This is a kind of patriotism of mutual support...”¹⁰ In addition the suppression of most deviating opinions is clearly seen in the American public sphere after September 11.¹¹ The support for the president surged,¹² and various venues of public debate grew reluctant to expressing criticism for the administration’s decisions.¹³ The new or renewed sense of patriotism, solidarity and unity, which some cherish as a positive “change of heart”¹⁴, can also account for a diminished support for free speech, for the widespread reluctance to condemn the loss of civil liberties, and for the low-key public deliberation over the aims and means of the war waged on terror. It seems that the security concerns can account at least in part to the

⁸ Ibid., p. 22.

⁹ See Dubnick M.J., “Postscripts for a ‘State of War’: Public Administration and Civil Liberties after September 11,” *Public Administration Review* vol. 62 (September 2002): 86-91.

¹⁰ Michael Traugott and others, “How Americans Responded: A Study of Public Reactions to 9/11/01,” *Political Science & Politics*, XXXV no. 3 (2002): 511-516, at 516.

¹¹ For an account on how the security discourse in America undermines basic civil liberties, see Bruce Shapiro, “All in the Name of Security,” *The Nation* (October 21, 2001): 20-21.

¹² Reaching a Gallup poll 90% approval on September 21-22.

¹³ See Preliminary findings in Brian J. Gaines, “Where’s the Rally?” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Volume XXXV:3 (September 2002): 531-6. See also Bird R.K. and Brandt E.B., “Academic Freedom and 9/11: How The War On Terrorism Threatens Free Speech On Campus,” *Communication Law and Policy*, vol. 7 no. 4, (October 2002): 431-459.

¹⁴ See Theda Skocpol, “will 9/11 and the War on Terror Revitalize American Civic Democracy?” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Volume XXXV:3 (September 2002): 537-540; Stanley B. Greenberg “‘we’ – not ‘me’: Public Opinion and the Return of the Government.” *The American Prospect* December 17, 25-27.

general indifference in the American public to the threats that the war on terror poses to American democracy.

Some evidence to valuing patriotic unity over free speech could be traced in the academic world. In January 2003, the University of California at Berkeley refused to allow a fundraising appeal for the Emma Goldman Papers Project, because the appeal quoted Goldman on the suppression of free speech and her opposition to war (writing during the first world war, and before she was deported to Russia.)¹⁵ Even before the war in Iraq began, the winds of war created much caution at the various educational levels: “After complaints that the children of soldiers were upset by anti-war comments at school, Maine's top education official warned teachers to be careful of what they say in class about a possible invasion of Iraq.”¹⁶

Belligerent citizenship is advantageous for a society in times of war, for it helps the citizens endure the hard times and respond to them constructively. The belief in unity induces a sense of common fate, belonging, and closeness. The external threats create a feeling of “we are all in it together”, “united we stand” or in the Israeli version, “we are all Jews”. However, it comes at a high cost. First, this unity is thin, elusive and exclusionary, and therefore cultivates intolerance toward various subgroups. It alienates members of groups that are not properly represented in the public political discourse. This cost is borne mainly by minorities, who are excluded from the national solidarity or refuse to participate in its rites of patriotism. It is also borne by democracy itself. Second, this type of social unity and solidarity comes at the cost of political stagnation – an inability to envision and support change in the political circumstances. This stagnation is partly a result of a narrowed public sphere, and a public agenda that is so rigorously devoted to security issues that it tends to neglect or postpone most all social matters; and partly it is a consequence of the suppression of dissenting perspectives.

Consider the Israeli case as an illustration of these drawbacks. Taking a second look at the Israeli version of unity, we are not really “all Jews.” Some (over 18%) are

¹⁵ Dean Murphy, “Old Words on War Stirring A New Dispute”, *New York Times* January 14, 2003, A1. The decision was later reversed.

Muslim and Christian Palestinians; others are of a variety of denominations and nationalities. Not all Israeli citizens share the burdens of military service; hence not all have a chance to be considered good citizens. Israeli Belligerent Citizenship marginalizes groups that are exempt from military service – such as most Palestinian citizens, women, and disabled youth. Conscientious objectors are widely considered to be beyond the pale. Moreover, the thin veil of unity, which obscures social divisions among the Israeli Jewish public, makes it difficult to create a meaningful public space. Members of various groups find that the cultural and social issues relevant to them are not reflected in the public sphere, because it is mainly devoted to security matters. Dissimilarities between groups that could be valuable and fruitful are minimized or ignored, and social problems that should have been publicly addressed are put off to “better days.”

The sense of national unity and solidarity stand all of these exclusions, and maintains such a strong place in the public ethos and debate that it can effectively curtail the claims of excluded groups. The concept of unity has a very simple control mechanism over the public debate, expressed by Arato in a highly critical article of the Bush administration after September 11: “if he wins this fight, we win. If he loses it, we lose”.¹⁷

II. How is this an Educational Matter?

How, if at all, should the education system ideally respond to the patriotic surge, and to the demand that it reflects this form of patriotism in its curriculum and other activities?

Ideally, it could be claimed, the education system is not to respond at all. The general neglect of the questions discussed here in the political and educational theoretical literature may suggest that many theorists would endorse this position, or at least unwittingly act according to its premise. Circumstantial political demands or public claims on the education system should not, it can be argued, affect the goals of the public education system, as molded through generations of theory and practice.

¹⁶ Quoted from a report at cnn.com, accessed Friday, February 28, 2003.

¹⁷ Andrew Arato, “*Minima Politica* After September 11,” *Constellations* vol. 9 no. 1 (2002): 46-52, at 47.

Or should they? I would like to suggest that there are three cases to be made for the public education system's obligation to respond to the circumstances of war: a practical one, a political one and a normative one.

The political case for an educational response to war is based on the processes of decision making characteristic to the education system. The goals of the public education system, generally as well as in the (significant) field of civic education, result from political deliberation and negotiation among administrators, communities, educational professionals and other interested parties. The public is deeply involved in the process – in the United States this involvement is reflected in the elections to and participation in school boards, local education boards and PTAs. To properly reflect the public opinion is thus to do justice to the democratic political process which ideally characterizes the public education system. This is not an unrestricted process, and there are further issues to consider beyond the expressed contemporary public opinions (as will be argued below). But the socio-political significance of education and the processes that inform it should be acknowledged in the curriculum through references to significant social matters.

The practical case for responding educationally to the reconceptualization of citizenship in times of war, is the case made from effectiveness. If the education system chooses to ignore changes in social circumstances that occur in the society that it was created to serve, it stands the risk of losing its social relevance. This is a problem for fields other than civic education as well – vocational education is the most apparent one, with some schools still teaching professions that lost their market value years ago. But civic education too could turn into empty slogans if it fails to respond to the changing conditions that society faces. Changes in the perceived vulnerability of the state, social debates about proper responses to attacks, a protracted conflict or “war on terrorism” with no limited goals or expiration date, create new challenges. The education system has to face those challenges in order for its civic education to remain pertinent to society.

Most prominently, the education system has to respond to the challenges raised by wartime for in such times society stands the risk of losing touch with its moral boundaries and principled political structure. This normative case for responding to war not only supplements the other two arguments, but overrides them when they do not converge. Wartime often poses unexpected threats to democracy; it can alter and distort the contents of the “national character” and transform, not necessarily to the better, the common social goals. If democratic education theorists are correct in assuming that the *raison d’être* of a publicly funded universal education system is preserving bedrock democratic values (as will be argued shortly), then guiding the education system through wartime is a crucial task for political and educational theorists.

Civic education is a moral and political role of the education system. Inasmuch as it is a political project, the system can be expected to correspond with changing social circumstances. Waves of immigration may create new needs for lessons in multiculturalism or tolerance; rising racism can be the backdrop for further efforts to teach about shared humanity and possibilities for coexistence. These examples come to demonstrate the delicate relations between the social circumstances and how they bare on the educational system on the one hand, and the enduring values that inform the education system unchangingly on the other. The education system must respond to the changing challenges, varying demands and weaknesses in society, new ways in which values are broken or trivialized. But the response must correspond not only with the social environment but also with the core values that validate the system as a public institution: upholding the values that enable society to persevere, and most prominently the fundamental democratic values. This is the requirement of education as a moral project.

Some may argue that allowing changing political circumstances to influence what we teach in schools is a step that may open the door for crude political intervention in the public education system. Some may be concerned that it would make it possible for social or political leaders to point at the weakening status of the family, for example, to

make a case for teaching “family values” (in their conservative sense); or that the surge in patriotism should lead to a civic studies curriculum that rejects dissent.

More generally it could be argued that allowing social conditions to affect civic studies can lead to an education system encumbered by rival political views about how to respond to social circumstances. Changing family styles can equally justify a reflection of alternative ways of living in the curriculum, or to a renewed effort to strengthen the traditional family forms. A wave of racism can logically lead to teaching tolerance, or to representing racist perspectives in the classroom.

These concerns are by and large justified. Educators face these problems every day, when world and local events infiltrate the classroom. Political actors influence the decision making processes pertaining to education through a variety of institutions, including schools boards, local and national legislatures, and the courts. The political nature of education is an ongoing reality, and in many ways this should be celebrated rather than lamented (but this is a separate matter). What we should look for, then, are not methods of depoliticizing education but rather guidelines for suitable political and civic educational responses. A normatively desirable response would correspond with a variety of voices heard in the surrounding society, as well as voices that are silenced or unheard. But those voices should not, ideally, echo in an empty room. The education system should engage them in an educational process designed to uphold basic enduring principles. Merely reflecting opinions and voices strips the education system of its position as a moral institution based on a commitment to democracy. Ignoring significant social circumstances – and war definitely is one such case – may detach the education system from society and diminish its relevance. The appropriate response to war, as well as to other major events and conditions, should be based on a principled engagement with the widest range of social views.

How does the education system commonly respond to belligerent citizenship and the social circumstances of war? The vague entity called “the public” expects from the education system to correspond with the revamped notions conceptions of citizenship and nationality. More specifically, the institutions in charge of the curriculum and pedagogy employed in schools – committees, school boards, and administrators on various levels –

pressure the school system to produce citizens who are more committed to the public good, willing to contribute to their country, enthusiastic about sacrificing time, effort and possibly their lives for the homeland.

During world War II, the Education Policies Committee in the U.S announced at the opening section of a booklet published in 1943: “Long range values... must be subordinated to the life-and-death needs of today and tomorrow.”¹⁸

The common response in the Israeli education system is to uncritically reflect the alleged national solidarity, and to teach the belligerent form of citizenship through the history and civic studies curricula, the celebration of holidays, and many other methods. Many, though not all, of the responses in the American public sphere and public education system point to the same direction.¹⁹

The espousal of belligerent citizenship by the public schooling system is perilous, for it impedes democratic justice, as well as replicating the circumstances of conflict. In the United States, viewed against the background of a decline in civic engagement since the previous decade, it generates concern regarding the stability of American democracy. But what happens when patriotism threatens to silence such concerns in the name of national security? Let us take a look at the relations of patriotism and civic education.

III. Patriotic and Democratic Education

Walzer maintains that the function of the schools in a multicultural and tolerant society of immigrants is to educate for political citizenship of the state, and not for national citizenship. This view is criticized by proponents of patriotic education, who support the installment of a special sense of identification with one’s country and compatriots, which in some cases inclines one to give them prior consideration. Installing

¹⁸ Education Policies Commission, *What The Schools Should Teach in Wartime* (Washington, D.C, 1943), p. 3.

¹⁹ See Henry A. Giroux, “Democracy, Freedom, and Justice after September 11th: Rethinking the Role of Educators and the Politics of Schooling,” *The Teachers College Record*, vol. 104, no. 6 (2002): 1138-1162.

such sentiments can be a consequence of teaching “noble, moralizing history.”²⁰ Authors from Richard Rorty to William Galston, from Arthur Schlesinger and Robert Fullinwider to Eamonn Callan²¹ have argued for teaching patriotism in public schools, mainly through the history curriculum. The main idea is that future citizens must learn to love and honor their country if they are to become good members of society, if they are to defend it when necessary, if they are to give it precedence over their own or their group’s narrower interests. Arguments that come from a liberal background and support the teaching of patriotism in the public education system generally argue the following: We need to teach students that they (we) have special obligations towards our compatriots because we share the same political fate. Our decisions and choices, because of the nature of democracy, influence the lives and opportunities of those who share our nationality. This liberal argument, I believe, validates the teaching of proper deliberative skills, but it does not add up to a satisfactory justification for teaching patriotism, neither from the logical nor from the sociological perspective. Logically speaking, if decisions taken by any individual in a specific group affect the other members of the group, they need to learn to coordinate their choices, to be tolerant to dissent, to listen to other opinions in the group. They may need to learn to give voice to other members who are not initially heard. There may be a need to limit the scope of decisions so that certain elements which are crucial to individual well-being – let’s call them basic rights – are not steamrolled over in the process of decision making. But all this can be satisfied through learning the processes and principles of democracy, and by ensuring the adequate functioning of the democratic institutions. No sentiment must come into the picture, and no preference has to be given to the members of the group – the compatriots – in terms of personal affiliation, love or brotherhood.

²⁰ William Galston, “Civic education in the liberal state,” in A. Rorty, ed., *Philosophers on Education: Historical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 471. Published earlier in N. Rosenblum, ed., *Liberalism and the Moral Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

²¹ Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Arthur Schlesinger, *The Disuniting of America* (New York, Norton 1992); Robert Fullinwider “Patriotic History,” in Robert Fullinwider (ed.) *Multiculturalism and Public Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press 1996); Eamonn Callan, *Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

On the social level, too, the justification from mutual effect does not suffice. Actions taken by certain nation-states, or groups inside them, can and do influence many others who are not invited to be part of the decision making process. The easiest case to make here is the environmental case: decisions regarding deforestation, pollution of the seas or air, genetic modification of foods, or financing the research and development of new medications, can be detrimental or beneficial to non-members as well as to members of the nation-state who makes the call on these issues. Deciding to wage a war is another obvious example of a decision that have a significant effect mostly on the lives of those people who could not be part of the deliberation (if it took place) and the decision.

Another argument for teaching patriotism in schools is put forth by Eamonn Callan, who argues that patriotism is the basis of the feeling of trust among fellow-citizens, a trust that facilitates the stability of democratic institutions. The more modest version of patriotic history, as advocated by Callan, calls for a more critical teaching of history, but still maintains the aim of establishing a basis of trust and special preference toward one's compatriots.

The main question we are left with after the discussions on patriotic education is: how compatible is patriotism with justice and democracy? And when they collide, under conditions of war, which is to take precedence?

There may indeed be certain versions of national sentiment, or patriotism, that are compatible with justice. David Miller describes such version of nationalism that he regards as coinciding with the basic requirements of both democratic values and principles of justice. Gutmann describes democratic education as opposing blind patriotism, and converging with the love of country inasmuch as this love manifests a commitment to defend democratic ideals.²² Tamir offers a liberal version of nationalism that enables citizens and educators a nationalist sentiment that does not clash with liberal democratic ideal.²³

It is unclear if these versions of national sentiment correspond with the needs that underline patriotism. The persistence of the more crude and supremacist versions of

²² Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton University Press 1999), p. 312.

²³ Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton University Press 1993).

patriotism and nationalism suggest that maybe the tamed versions cannot suffice as a unifying notion of common purpose. And of course, as both Tamir and Miller (and many others) recognize, nationalism as such is dependant upon context, and is expressed and interpreted differently in any group at any given historical period.

And wartime creates further challenges to the possibility of convergence among civic education, patriotic education (or the inculcation of national sentiments) and democratic education. The fundamental challenge that wartime presents to the education system is that of preserving democratic commitments. Surges in patriotism and changes in its expressions cannot be the basis for educational change, because they do not manifest changes in the moral or political basis for schooling. Culture can be represented, including national culture, but the uncritical espousal of patriotic unity does disservice to civic and democratic educational goals.

Patriotism, Gutmann reminds us, “is a sentiment rather than a moral perspective.”²⁴ To properly respond to this sentiment in the context of education, theorists should not (and usually do not) defend it in its basic expression of “my country, right or wrong”. This would create a risk of uncritical acceptance of wrongful actions by the state. “A democratic education opposes this kind of patriotism when it encourages students to think about their collective lives in morally principled terms,”²⁵ and when “its curriculum encourages students to think critically, in moral terms.”²⁶ It is clear, therefore, that democratic education is not dependant entirely on social consensus. Rather it is derived from democratic principles and commitments, which provide the basis and the moral limits for educational practices. Patriotism as an educational aim cannot evade these basic moral boundaries, and at its best it should offer ways of interpreting and manifesting them.²⁷ When democracy is widely endorsed in society, the teaching of patriotism can

²⁴ Ibid, 312.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Amy Gutmann, “Civic Minimalism, Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism: Where does Democratic Education Stand in Relation to Each?” in *Moral and Political Education* ed. Stephen Macedo and Yael Tamir (Nomos XLIII, New York University Press 2002): 23-57, 49.

²⁷ See for example K. Anthony Appiah, “Cosmopolitan Patriots,” in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press 1996), 22.

easily be achieved in compliance with democratic principles.²⁸ But in wartime the emerging forms of oppressive patriotism threaten to *substitute* basic democratic principles as guidelines for civic education. The next section discussed a normative educational response.

IV. Radicalizing Democratic Education

Educational theory should focus its attention on the tendency of the public education system to reflect and replicate the social responses to war, and mainly belligerent citizenship. Two challenging consequences of this tendency are intolerance, and the lack of vision regarding society's future. I suggest that the proper response of the public education system to the social circumstances of wartime should not be designed to accommodate but rather to oppose the mainstream notion of belligerent citizenship.

Many authors agree that a main argument of publicly funded education is the ability of such system to cultivate attitudes and skills necessary for the preservation of democracy.²⁹ Since the circumstances of national conflict, along with their social consequences, imperil democracy in many ways, it is public educators' role to encourage democracy in the face of these threats. How should this challenge be met? My answer will be based on the principles of democratic education, modified by radical perspectives on education as a subversive action.

Let me begin by considering the aims of democratic education as portrayed in Amy Gutmann's influential theory. The primary aim of public education in a democracy, according to Gutmann, is to educate children for free and equal citizenship. This aim is to be realized through deliberation on the contents of public education, limited by

²⁸ As can be seen in the careful analysis by Robert K. Fullinwider, "Patriotic History," in *Public Education in a Multicultural Society* ed. Robert K. Fullinwider (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 203-230.

²⁹ See for example Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton University Press 1999); Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" *Ethics* 105 no. 3 (1995): 468-496; William Galston, *Liberal Purposes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Iris Marion Young, "Mothers, Citizenship and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values," *Ethics* vol. 105, no. 3 (1995): 535-556.

democratic values. Democratic education is committed to “principles that, in the face of our social disagreement, help us judge (a) who should have authority to make decisions about education, and (b) what the moral boundaries of that authority are.”³⁰ The moral boundaries that Gutmann sets throughout her work are the boundaries of basic democratic values, particularly civic equality. The social context in which Gutmann contemplates her ideas is one of “social disagreement”. The contemporary literature on civic education is largely concerned with the search for ways to accommodate, foster and limit diversity in a social reality of pluralism. Gutmann asks: “How can civic education in a liberal democracy give social diversity its due?”³¹ She maintains that “Schooling that is publicly mandated... may legitimately pursue civic purposes, which include... tolerance and mutual respect”.³² Democratic education is therefore committed to positively respond to circumstances of diversity in a democratic society. But in wartime the situation is often that of a repressive unity, not of an expressed diversity of opinion (ethnic and other forms of diversity persist, but are often blanketed with the unifying notion of common fate). The community may express an expectation of the education system to represent unity rather than diversity.

Is this necessarily a negative possibility? What if belligerent patriotic unity is what most parents want for their children, and the majority, or the mainstream of society expects the education system to cultivate this notion of patriotism? Here too the theory of democratic education reminds us that the expectation of parents and communities cannot replace the public education system’s commitment to basic democratic principles. Uncritical patriotic education stands the risk of promoting “parochialism and injustice.”³³

In her response to multicultural critiques of democratic education, Gutmann supports a politics of recognition that is “based on respect for individuals and their equal rights as citizens,”³⁴ as well as curricular recognition of cultures, and tolerance of diverse perspectives on moral and religious issues. This normative description is embedded in

³⁰ Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 11.

³¹ Amy Gutmann, “Civic Education and Social Diversity,” *Ethics* 105 no. 3 (1995): 557-579, at 557.

³² Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 292.

³³ Amy Gutmann, “Challenges of Multiculturalism in Democratic Education,” *Philosophy of Education Yearbook 1995*.

³⁴ *Democratic Education*, 306.

social circumstances in which the public agenda is vast enough to accommodate a variety of issues, therefore creating the need to educate citizens to tolerate differing standpoints. Similarly, Macedo maintains that support for tolerance, which he describes as a basic civic value, can and should be achieved through exposure to diversity, even at the cost of having to impose such exposure on opponents of “bedrock political values.”³⁵ Gutmann emphasizes that “democratic education grants citizens discretion over how to interpret the demand of civic education”, but for her, too, this discretion cannot supersede the basic principles of democracy. When parents oppose to teaching their children a democratic, civic curricula (as in the *Mozert* case), they “do not have a general right to override otherwise legitimate democratic decisions concerning the schooling of their children.”³⁶ It is therefore the school’s commitment to democracy that takes precedence over any demand made by specific parents or groups – and, I would add, even by the social majority or mainstream – regarding the civic education of children.

In the social circumstances of wartime, the public education system may need to impose exposure to diversity, along with the cultivation of other basic democratic values, not only on small radical groups but on a growing part of mainstream society as well. The cases Macedo and Gutmann offer for imposing “bedrock political values” or “basic democratic principles” on marginal groups in a democratic society apply also to circumstances when these values are questioned or rejected by the mainstream. Based on the claim that democratic principles should apply to all citizens, and therefore can justifiably be imposed on those who would prefer not to expose their children to them, we can begin to construct a normative educational response to belligerent citizenship.

The public education system should be committed to the principles of democracy, not to majority rule or parental authority; therefore it should continue to exercise its commitment to democracy through denying belligerent citizenship and opposing its undemocratic messages. Essentially, the type of unity that is associated with belligerent citizenship is inimical to democratic deliberation, to critical thought, and to the possibility of tolerance and inclusion. A thin but resilient blanket of solidarity is suppressing the

³⁵ Stephen Macedo, “Liberal Civic Education,” 485.

³⁶ Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 294.

social reality of diversity and pluralism, addressed – among others – in Gutmann’s writings. The public agenda is narrowed down to questions of national security, and certain religious and cultural perspectives are deemed threats to national security. What follows is an exclusion of various groups, and political stagnation. A radical interpretation of the aims of democratic education can potentially offer the most relevant response to these problems. In other words, the focus of liberal theorists on civic equality, educational diversity and tolerance is crucial in the context of war. Nonetheless, the presiding interpretation of these aims may be too weak when the social circumstances are not hospitable for democracy. This is where the radicalized notion of democracy advocated by radical democrats such as Freire, Giroux and McLaren should be employed.³⁷ To keep its commitment to democratic principles, public education should foster critical notions of civic education, and encourage educators to assume the role of public intellectuals committed to democratic principles rather than to majority perspectives.

Why, then, should we not – when confronted with circumstances of war – abandon liberal democratic perspectives on education in favor of radical democratic perspectives? Democratic educational theories do not lose their relevance in times of war. To the contrary – their emphasis on civic equality, recognition of differences, and “reciprocity beyond borders”³⁸ gain more relevance when democracy is threatened. In addition, the tendency of radical theories to lump together criticism against hyper-individualism, capitalism and globalization, regardless of its theoretical value, is less effective a tool for opposing militaristic and undemocratic social attitudes. It is the educational *tools* that radical democratic theorists offer that can strengthen the pursuit of democratic justice as Gutmann and other liberal democratic theorists define it. In other words, public educators should in times of war continue to endorse *principles* of democratic education, but they must use radical *tools* to implement them. Such coalition of perspectives could enable the emergence of new forms of diversity, giving voice to

³⁷ Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1970); *Pedagogy of Hope* (New York: Continuum, 1994); Henry A. Giroux, *Border crossings: cultural workers and the politics of education* (New York, London: Routledge, 1992); Peter McLaren and Peter Leonard, *Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).

subgroups oppressed by the social circumstances of war, and allow students, teachers and the wider public to envision a different political future.

V. Expansive Education

How do we bring the normative ideal to bear on what the school and state do? Walzer asserts in regard to Israel that "...perhaps a unified 'civics' curriculum, which would teach the values of democracy, pluralism, and toleration and be imposed on all the different state-run schools—Arab and Jewish, secular and religious."³⁹ But he reserves this option to the time when the international conflict would be over, and it might be (just a little) more realistic. Assuming that it may still take a while before lasting peace is achieved in the region, as well as in other parts of the world, schools should find ways to grapple with the needs generated by a protracted conflict.

How should the aims of democratic education be interpreted in the context of war? How is the education system to foster and promote democratic values, attitudes and skills in the face not of diversity or even intolerance, but of paralyzing, patriotic unity of opinion, which is widely regarded as essential to national survival? It is hard to assume that recognition and tolerance will be readily cultivated in the classroom in times of war. They still remain desirable, even urgently needed attitudes; but to promote them, along with other democratic values and attitudes, educators may need to act in ways more radical than deliberating and teaching an inclusive curriculum.

As Giroux reminds us, it is the role of educators to "provide spaces of resistance within the public schools... while simultaneously providing the knowledge and skills that enlarge their sense of the social and their possibilities as viable agents capable of expanding and deepening democratic public life."⁴⁰ To fulfill the liberal demand for civic equality, educators should create spaces of resistance in public schools. Actively supporting the expression of a variety of standpoints, rather than plainly responding to

³⁸ Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 309.

³⁹ Michael Walzer, *On Toleration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 43.

their implied existence in the public and educational arenas, would be an effective practice of manifesting the students' civic equality. It would demonstrate a resistance to the exclusion of individuals and groups by the security-dominated, solidarity-oriented public sphere.

The radicalization of the liberal demand for civic equality and tolerance requires educators to oppose the social tendency to narrow the borders of the public agenda. Part of what enables the perpetuation of belligerent unity is the reduction of the public agenda to questions of security, which are expected to be solved by military and administrative professionals. Here too the role of teachers – as educators and as public intellectuals – is to resist the attenuation of the public sphere and the public agenda by creating a zone of vivid democratic life within the classroom. The discussion of issues other than those relevant to security is emancipatory, for it reclaims politics as a sphere of “political judgments and value choices.”⁴¹ It makes room for a multiplicity of perspectives on a variety of questions, and gives voice to those whose perspectives and interests are being silenced by the overpowering claims of national security. In such times there is great urgency “to inculcate the values necessary for the perpetuation of democratic institutions.”⁴² But this task has to be performed in *opposition* to the social tide. Gutmann claims that “Teaching tolerance, mutual respect and deliberation... supports the widest range of social diversity that is consistent with the ongoing pursuit of liberal democratic justice.”⁴³ When justice is narrowly conceived of in conflictual terms, when society tends to accept polarized notions of humanity and inhumanity as justifications for war, then the pursuit of democratic justice is no longer a peaceful mission.

The threat that society and public education face in times of war is not solely that of intolerance, but also the lack of vision of the future. “Politics devoid of vision,” Giroux warns us, “degenerates into... a repressive notion of patriotism.” Therefore, “democracy

⁴⁰ Henry A. Giroux, “Democracy, Freedom, and Justice after September 11th”, 1155.

⁴¹ Cornelius Castoridas, “Institution and Autonomy,” in *A Critical Sense: Interviews with Intellectuals* ed. Peter Osborne (New York, Routledge: 1996), 8.

⁴² Michael W. McConnell, “Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values are Ill-Served by Democratic Control of School,” in *Moral and Political Education*: 87-146, at 87.

⁴³ Amy Gutmann, “Civic Education and Social Diversity,” at 579.

has to be struggled over,”⁴⁴ and this struggle should become the central role of the public education system in times of war. How we turn this theoretical claim into informed reality? Educators, as teachers and public intellectuals, should structure their classes as forums for public deliberation, encouraging both a diversity of issues and a diversity of voices, to resist the tyranny of the monolithic public sphere. To envision a different future, different questions must be asked, and differing answers should be tolerated to the largest extent possible. Envisioning a future of peace entails questioning the basic assumptions of war as well as the social acceptance of these assumptions. It entails the development of critical thought that is limited only by the most broad and most basic democratic political values, rather than by the contingencies of public opinion.

When faced by the further challenges that wartime generates, the education system should resort to the principles and tools of expansive education. This standpoint addresses the need to strengthen democracy and oppose the tide of uncritical oppressive patriotism, while allowing for a variety of patriotic manifestations to coexist in the minds of future citizens and in the micro public sphere of the school.

In Israel, the Center for Education Technology, which develops curricular materials for the ministry of education, is currently working on a new civic studies curriculum.⁴⁵ One possible theme for the high school curriculum is one that I title “50 ways to love your country.” Its main aim is to include as many informed and aware manifestations of *amor di patria* under the proper heading of patriotism. In American terms, both the ROTC volunteer and the conscientious objector, the soldier and the protestor, should be assessed for their aims and for what they are striving to defend rather than by the crude and narrow definitions of belligerent citizenship. The education system should work at preserving the broadest possible sense of patriotism in the face of narrowing tolerance of the public debate. Theorists and public intellectuals should strive to complicate the near-consensual conception of love of country as willingness to die for it with more varied notions of service to one’s country.

⁴⁴ Giroux, “Democracy, Freedom, and Justice after September 11th,” 1152.

⁴⁵ For which I serve as an academic advisor.


And how will the country be defended, some may ask? Can't the discussion offered here be regarded as merely an intellectual exercise, which would at best be ridiculed by the mobilized public sphere, and at worst put the country's safety at risk by encouraging youth to question the policies rather than contributing to the war effort?

The possibility of ridicule and rejection always exists when one aims at opposing the social tide. Proponents of ridiculed oppositional educational policies, such as desegregation, were being mocked and shouted at on their way to school. But the justice of the radical policy managed to overpower the mainstream belief that racial segregation was the only possible way (at least at the proclaimed level).

As to the concern that the teaching of critical thought could lead to a decline in volunteerism, consequently endangering the survival of the country, I suspect that the power of education – although I dearly believe in it – is not significant enough when other social institutions do not join in. When the political debate is focused on manifestations of patriotic unity, and the public sphere is swarmed with expressions of belligerent citizenship, there should be little concern about the inclination of youngsters to enlist. Schools can preserve a thicker sense of patriotism, a stronger commitment to democracy, and hopefully encourage some citizens and future citizens to think again about the policies that affect their lives. Some students may choose to defend their country when their government calls them; other may choose to defend their country against their government. Schools alone can support the persistence of social values, but they cannot change policies and attitudes by themselves. If other social institutions or groups join in the effort to expand the public agenda, to accept various forms of patriotism, and possibly to envision a different future – then maybe the joined forces can promote the cause of peace.



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