Liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choices between incommensurable values. In this instance, the choice appears to be between personal freedom and autonomy, on one hand, and civic virtue and good citizenship, on the other. To promote a reasonably high level of civic virtue and good citizenship, freedom and autonomy may need to be limited in appreciable ways. Likewise, to secure a high level of freedom and autonomy, liberal democratic societies will likely have to endure a scarcity of virtue. This paper argues that liberal democratic states may safely promote civic education, but only when it is based on civic pluralism, as opposed to some unitary scheme. Young citizens (at about secondary education level) could be exposed to a range of rival views of good citizenship, rather than indoctrinated into any officially prescribed view. Similarly, the workings of the current U.S. political system could be presented with explicit reference to different modes of political participation. The paper examines prominent civic and liberal theories of civic education and argues that neither is likely to provide a sufficient pool of civic capital for liberal democracies. It limits discussion to a few representative figures. The paper elaborates on the suggestion that liberal democracies are best served by civic education based on civic pluralism. Finally, it explains why (and how) the number and range of views of good citizenship presented to young citizens must be limited, even within a pluralistic scheme of civic education. Includes 73 notes. (BT)
TEACHING CITIZENSHIP: THE LIBERAL DILEMMA

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Can liberals actively promote civic virtue and the practice of good citizenship, either through government-mandated civic education or through universal national service programs, without violating their own prohibitions against state intrusion into the domain of private character? If so, can the civic education of young citizens be undertaken in such a way as to mollify legitimate concerns regarding the emergence of an invasive tutelary or educative state? If not, must liberalism forever assume a position of weakness compared with more aggressive and less scrupulous ideologies, such as totalitarian collectivism, religious fundamentalism, and more virulent forms of ethnic nationalism, which do not balk at deploying the power and prestige of the state on behalf of character-forming enterprises?¹

Taken together, these questions reveal a troubling dilemma for liberals, including civic liberals like Amy Gutmann, Stephen Macedo, and William Galston (who endorse a limited involvement of the state in promoting citizenship) and skeptical liberals like Judith Sklar, George Kateb, and Stephen Holmes (who reject any such involvement). On the one hand, if liberals balk at using government power and authority to promote civic virtue and the practice of good citizenship (as skeptical liberals do) they may inadvertently hasten the decline of liberal democratic political arrangements, along with the commitment of citizens to these arrangements.² However, if liberals support the use of the state (as civic liberals do), they may find themselves unintentionally undermining the very freedom and autonomy that liberal democratic political arrangements are designed, in large part, to preserve.³

This dilemma is not easily resolved, for liberal democratic states, like all complex communities, are constantly forced to make hard choices between incommensurable
values. In this instance, the choice appears to be between personal freedom and autonomy, on one hand, and civic virtue and good citizenship, on the other. In order to promote a reasonably high level of civic virtue and good citizenship, freedom and autonomy may need to be limited in appreciable ways. Likewise, in order to secure a very high level of freedom and autonomy, liberal democratic societies will likely have to endure a scarcity of virtue. This assumes, of course, that Rousseau’s move of collapsing the meanings of virtue and freedom is not a serious option for liberals.

Although this dilemma can not be easily resolved, or merely wished away, it can at least be made somewhat less acute by identifying and correcting a faulty (and usually unstated) premise of both skeptical and civic liberal understandings of citizenship. It seems to me that the skeptical liberals are not wrong because they exaggerate the dangers of the educative or tutelary state. Nor are the civic liberals wrong because they underestimate these dangers, or overestimate the importance of civic virtue. Rather, both may be mistaken for supposing that there is a single correct view of civic virtue that can be identified and inculcated in citizens of liberal democratic states. Indeed, an examination of major liberal theories of citizenship quickly reveals that there are numerous reasonable, decent, or acceptable ways of being a good citizen, many of which are already practiced by some, but certainly not all, liberal democratic citizens. In other words, civic pluralism is already as much a fact of liberal democratic life as cultural, ethnic, racial, and religious pluralism, although its presence may be less frequently observed.

In this paper, I argue that liberal democratic states may safely promote civic education, but only when it is based on civic pluralism, as opposed to some unitary
scheme. One fairly obvious approach would be to expose young citizens to a range of
rival views of good citizenship, its duties, and its virtues, rather than attempt to
indoctrinate them into any single officially prescribed view. The history of the Civil
War, for example, could be taught with explicit reference to different types of civic
close character, including political pragmatism (e.g., Lincoln, moderate and conservative
Republicans, War Democrats), romantic idealism (e.g., radical Republicans, Garrisonian
abolitionists), and patriotic loyalty (e.g., the vast majority of soldiers serving in the Union
armies). Similarly, the workings of the present-day American political system could be
presented with explicit reference to different modes of political participation (e.g., party
activists, passive supporters, protestors, communicators, contact specialists, etc.), and to
the particular values and virtues underwriting each of these modes.

Although such civic education would probably not begin until the secondary school
level, when students are better able to deal with moral complexity and ambiguity, as well
as with alternative interpretations of historical events and personalities, we should not
underestimate how impressionable young citizens sometimes are. Care would need to
be taken by instructors to avoid proselytizing, so students could freely explore and
evaluate different understandings of civic virtue and the practice of good citizenship. As
John Stuart Mill explains, the “philosophy of morals, of government, of law, of political
economy...” should be taught by instructors “chosen, not for the particular doctrines they
may happen to profess, but as being those who were most likely to send forth pupils
qualified in point of disposition and attainments to choose doctrines for themselves.”

Presenting several competing understandings of good citizenship and civic virtue,
rather than a single perspective, would tend to mitigate (although perhaps not completely
allay) skeptical liberal concerns about teaching character. Young citizens would, at least, be put in a position to make more autonomous judgments about what form of political participation suited their interests, passions, and temperaments, understanding also that they would be free to change their attitudes toward citizenship over the course of their lives. At the same time, this approach would help fulfill the desire of civic liberals to assume a more proactive stance toward developing civic capital -- i.e., civic virtues, attitudes, knowledge, and capacities -- for liberal democracies. Indeed, a system of civic education based on civic pluralism would produce more, and more varied, civic capital than any unitary approach. By encouraging young citizens to serve their countries and communities in a variety of different ways, civic education based on civic pluralism could enrich the service they collectively perform, making these countries and communities more resilient in the face of both normal and extraordinary political and social challenges.

The idea behind civic pluralism, then, is not to promote diversity for its own sake, or because any particular conception of the practice of citizenship (no matter how sacred, sentimental, or traditional) has a right to survive or flourish. Rather, the idea is to provide liberal democratic political institutions and practices with a reservoir of civic capital that is both wide and deep. No prudent farmer would want to stake his life or livelihood on a single variety of a single crop, which in any given season might be destroyed by pestilence, drought, or frost. Nor would any sensible mechanic want to depend on a single tool to maintain or repair complex machinery. Similarly, no society should want to depend on a single kind of citizen to deal with every kind of political problem or situation, or perform every conceivable kind of political or social labor.
Liberal democratic states need idealists and pragmatists, patriots and conscientious objectors, as well as any number of volunteers, contributors, taxpayers, voters, gadflies, activists, etc. And since no one citizen can possibly be all of these things simultaneously, or even sequentially, encouraging a division of civic labor through civic education appears to be prudent.

Preserving the possibility for citizens to choose different reasonable, decent, or acceptable ways of being a good citizen respects the autonomy of individuals, guards against civic education becoming an instrument of mass conformity and docility, and helps provide civic diversity and a kind of civic division of labor. But civic education based on civic pluralism is not a panacea. Indeed, it is highly likely that groups of citizens subscribing to different visions of what good citizenship requires, and equipped with the virtues they most admire (but which may not be universally admired), will find themselves in conflict with one another.9 We should not, for instance, expect loyal patriots to always get along with dissenters, gadflies, protestors, or iconoclastic flag burners. A higher level of social and political conflict and disagreement may be the price that must be paid for the benefits of civic pluralism. But we can not afford to ignore that price. Although civic pluralism may help resolve one dilemma, in doing so it may well deliver liberal democracies into the hands of another.

Immediately below, I examine prominent civic and skeptical liberal theories of civic education and argue that neither is likely to provide a sufficient pool of civic capital for liberal democracies. Due to the incredible proliferation of literature in this area, I will by necessity limit my discussion to a few representative figures. Then, I elaborate on my suggestion that liberal democracies are best served by civic education based on civic
pluralism. And, finally, I explain why (and how) the number and range of views of good citizenship presented to young citizens must be limited, even within a pluralistic scheme of civic education.

CIVIC LIBERALISM

During the Cold War, liberal democratic states all too often resorted to tactics inconsistent with fundamental liberal beliefs, including liberalism's commitment to personal autonomy and its longstanding distrust of state power, in order to achieve liberal democratic ends. History may or may not excuse some of these tactics which, in the United States, included the McCarthy-era witch hunts, the conduct of secret wars in South East Asia and Central America, and the support of anti-Soviet dictatorships and right-wing insurgencies around the world. Today, however, in the absence of a credible Cold War enemy, the need for such tactics would appear to have declined considerably.

Unfortunately, some liberal democratic states -- including the United States -- continue to make use of illiberal means to address social and political ills, such as terrorism, drugs and drug-related crime, chronic welfare dependency, and the perceived decline among citizens of civility, morality, and civic virtue. With reference to the latter, many academic liberals have been surprisingly willing to abandon typically liberal reservations about state-mandated moral and civic education. In doing so, they join numerous communitarian theorists and social conservatives in promoting some combination of formal schooling, service, and (in some instances) faith-based initiatives designed to shape the characters of liberal democratic citizens.
Historically, most arguments for state involvement in teaching virtue have come from non-liberal sources. Plato's elaborate system of education, propaganda, and censorship represents the archetype, although Aristotle's scheme of shared virtue has much more of a following among contemporary theorists. Civic liberals, however, reject the Platonic model, which presents the state as a constant gardener who carefully shapes the character of citizens, although they do not reject the idea of the educative state in principle. Similarly, they reject Aristotle's particular conception of shared virtue, which depicts the ideal citizen as a citizen-soldier committed to the common good of his city, although they do not reject the idea of shared virtue as such. Indeed, these civic liberals take as their mission nothing less than the reconstruction of public morality in liberal democratic states through the teaching of shared virtue.

Amy Gutmann, a leading civic liberal, presents a model of shared virtue that could not be more different from Aristotle's. Conceiving citizens as rational shoppers in a marketplace of values, purposes, and ways of life, Gutmann writes, "We educate children to be Americans who are free to choose, but we do not bias their choices (or shape their character) for the sake of moral goodness." According to Gutmann, civic education in a liberal democracy should be dedicated to the practice of "conscious social reproduction," because it is "the distinctive virtue of a democratic society, that it authorizes citizens to influence how their society reproduces itself." For this reason, civic education in a liberal democratic state must be "non-repressive," and must not restrict "rational consideration of different ways of life." Moreover, it must cultivate mental and moral virtues -- such as toleration and mutual respect -- that will allow citizens to choose rationally from among different ways of life, and enable them to engage in democratic
deliberation with fellow citizens (through which citizens take part in the shared burden of social reproduction).

Does this civic liberal approach to civic education violate liberal prohibitions against interfering with the private character of individuals? Gutmann thinks not. Since rationality supports personal freedom, and toleration and mutual respect support rationality, these two virtues can be said to be compatible with liberal freedom. For this reason, Gutmann believes that liberals can support the education of citizens in these virtues without any fear of contradiction. Even so, Gutmann concedes that we must live with an ongoing tension between personal freedom (which, for many, is liberalism's raison d'être) and civic virtue (which, for purely practical reasons, is needed to sustain liberal democratic political arrangements). This tension, she says, demands that we make some sacrifices in each, neither permitting the highest degree of individual freedom conceivable, nor insisting upon the most rigorous training in moral and civic virtue imaginable. Gutmann writes, "The question is not whether to maximize freedom or to inculcate virtue, but how to combine freedom with virtue."16

Gutmann's general point, as far as it goes, is correct. But identifying a satisfactory combination of freedom and virtue is not so easy. Gutmann's own solution is heavily weighted toward freedom, with only a very narrow band of virtues identified to promote a very specific civic practice, namely democratic deliberation. She does not propose a comprehensive scheme of moral virtue or suggest that democratic deliberation serves anything but a purely instrumental purpose. However, her approach does restrict freedom by tending to foreclose upon ways of life that refuse to accept mutual respect and toleration as primary political virtues.
Stephen Macedo, like most civic liberals, wants a more tough-minded version of liberalism or, as he puts it, “liberalism with a spine.” In other words, he wants liberalism to be a fighting ideology, capable of contending with the illiberal competition. This, in turn, causes Macedo -- like Gutmann -- to seek a balance between liberty and virtue. Macedo writes, “A prudent solicitude for the system of individual liberty does not counsel a stance of laissez-faire, but rather a willingness to intervene (gently and indirectly where possible) to promote shared liberal values and civic virtues.” Hence, while Macedo places the development of personal independence above any more specific civic ideals, he also holds open a place for schools to “promote the ideal of a broadly educated and civically engaged citizenry.”

Unlike Gutmann, who focuses her attention mainly on the virtues needed to sustain democratic deliberation, Macedo offers a more varied account of the essential qualities of good citizenship. In his first book, Liberal Virtues (1990), he presents a laundry list of liberal democratic virtues that includes “broad sympathies, self-critical reflectiveness, a willingness to experiment, to try and accept new things, self-control and active, autonomous self-development, an appreciation of inherited social ideas, an attachment and even an altruistic regard for one’s fellow liberal citizens.” To these, in Diversity and Distrust (2000), he adds tolerance, mutual respect, active cooperation among citizens, a willingness to think critically about public affairs and participate in democratic processes and in civil society, and a willingness to affirm the political authority of principles that we can publicly justify along with our reasonable fellow citizens.

This second list more closely resembles Gutmann’s account of virtue, and may represent an evolution in Macedo’s thinking. However, when these two lists are taken
together, Macedo's account of liberal citizenship seems to include the raw materials for several more focused understandings. These include the deliberative model of Gutmann (which emphasizes toleration and mutual respect), a more conventional patriotic model (which includes respect for inherited social ideas and altruism toward one's fellow citizens), a model inherited from progressive democrats such as John Dewey (which emphasizes a willingness to experiment and try new things), and an autonomy-based model (which emphasizes critical self-reflectiveness and autonomous self-development).

This is not to say that Macedo is recommending a pluralistic approach to civic education. Rather, he is attempting to combine disparate elements of what could easily be understood to be discrete conceptions of citizenship. Macedo clearly recognizes the dangers of shaping the character of individuals too narrowly. He writes, "By educating too intently for some liberal virtues, we could flatten the landscape of choice and undermine freedom's value. An education wholly dominated by the virtues of toleration and mutual respect could render pale and shallow the forms of diversity available to children."

However, Macedo is seeking a single model of liberal democratic character that can flourish in a highly pluralistic social and cultural context, rather than a plurality of models of good citizenship. He concedes that different people will as a result of personal dispositions and judgments, be more attracted to some moral and civic virtues than others, and he imagines "degenerate" character types, in which a narrow spectrum of virtues is ascendant and overwhelms the others. But he insists that all of these virtues are needed, to some extent, by non-degenerate officeholders and citizens in liberal democracies.
Given his commitment to shared virtue, it is not surprising that Macedo chooses, as his main historical model for civic education, the American common school system, which is remembered today mainly for promoting uniformity in education as a remedy for an increasingly diverse culture. Macedo, however, admires the common school system mainly for recognizing "that convergence on liberal democratic civic norms does not come about automatically, that in fact the health of our regime depends on its ability to turn people's deepest convictions -- including their religious beliefs -- in directions that are congruent with the ways of a liberal republic."25

Macedo's lack of interest in civic pluralism is characteristic of civic liberals in general. Certainly, this is so for William Galston who, like Macedo, identifies numerous specific civic virtues which, he says, must be cultivated by liberal democratic citizens. Like Macedo, Galston also appears to be combining elements of multiple conceptions of citizenship, including virtues commonly associated with distinctly liberal and civic republican models. Some of these virtues, Galston explains, apply to citizens of all states (including non-liberal and non-democratic states). These include the willingness to fight for one's country, the disposition to obey the law, and general loyalty. Galston also identifies several virtues that he says are characteristically liberal, including independence, toleration, and respect for individual excellence and accomplishments. Presumably, this last virtue involves recognition and acceptance of meritocracy. Finally, Galston identifies several democratic political virtues, including respect for the rights of others, the ability to evaluate public officials, and the ability to moderate public desires "in the face of public limits."26 It is not at all clear, however, that all of these virtues are needed by all citizens, in order to defend freedom or maintain social order. Nor is it
evident that all citizens would be capable psychologically of practicing all of these virtues all at once.

Galston argues that civic education has two important purposes in any state. First, it contributes to the formation of individuals who can function effectively in, and actively support, their political community. And second, it strengthens a particular political order (in this case, a liberal democratic political order). Galston does not do nearly enough, though, to explain how the methods of civic education in a liberal political order would differ from that in a non-liberal political order. Both would appear to rely heavily on indoctrination, moralizing, and the teaching of sentimental views of history. Galston writes, “On a practical level, very few individuals will come to embrace the core commitments of liberal society through a process of rational inquiry. If children are to be brought to accept these commitments as valid and binding, it can only be through a pedagogy that is far more rhetorical than rational.”

According to David Archard, however, the existence of religious, ethnic, cultural, and racial diversity in liberal democratic societies is problematic for Galston’s approach to civic education, because “it undermines the simple assumption that the curriculum can be constituted by a single unproblematic history, culture, or tradition.” Rather than attempting to teach a sanitized and sentimental version of a nation’s history, tradition, or culture, Archard argues that educators should teach that the history, tradition, and culture of every nation is multiple. This does not mean, however, that educators must go to the opposite extreme, presenting relentlessly critical (or “transgressive”) views of a nation’s history. As Eamonn Callan explains, this is a false dichotomy. Instead of choosing between these two extremes, he argues, one could identify a morally and emotionally
complex approach to teaching history that, somehow, is neither demeaned by
sentimentality nor undermined by alienation. Callan is somewhat vague about what this
approach to history would look like, although it would certainly need to teach young
citizens that even good and decent political ideals could be corrupted in practice, and that
this corruption is historically contingent rather than necessary.\(^3\)

But this could only really be accomplished, I think, if educators are to give both
subversive and sentimental versions of history their due. Teachers could undertake this
synthesis in advance, spoon feeding the results to students. Preferably, however, students
themselves would be involved in the process of drawing conclusions from the many
contested truths that make up a country's history. For instance, a class studying the
Vietnam War would have to consider the realpolitik perspective of the architects of
America's policy in Southeast Asia, as well as the perspectives of anti-war protestors and
patriotic volunteers (for not all of the men who fought in Vietnam were draftees). This
second option, more intellectually demanding than the first, also lends itself more to civic
pluralism, for students would be more likely to recognize that there are multiple
reasonable interpretations of history, which in turn may suggest to them different
reasonable attitudes toward the practice of citizenship.

Civic liberals like Gutmann, Macedo, and Galston, all make prudential judgments
about what qualities liberal democratic citizens need to make their political arrangements
work, although their judgments could not be more different. It seems to me, however,
that the disagreement among civic liberals regarding the content and purpose of liberal
virtue is not necessarily an obstacle to civic education. Instead, this may be an indication
that liberal democratic states should look to civic pluralism, rather than attempting to
identify or construct a single mutually agreeable view of the requirements of good
citizenship. The most potent objection to these civic liberal approaches to civic
education, therefore, is not the liberal skeptic’s concern (discussed below) that we not
unleash the fearsome power of the modern state upon the private characters of
individuals, although this is a very serious complaint. Rather, the greatest limitation of
these approaches is their obliviousness to the possibilities of civic pluralism, which may
turn out to be liberalism’s greatest strength against illiberal rivals, which deplete their
own stocks of civic capital by using the very tactics (e.g., censorship, indoctrination,
coercion) they employ to manufacture virtue.

SKEPTICAL LIBERALISM

Skeptical liberals like Holmes, Kateb, and Shklar take as their central mission not the
advocacy of any particular view of the good life, or of any particular view of good
citizenship. But this is not to say that they are ambivalent about civic character, or that
they are neutral regarding rival views of good citizenship. On the contrary, Shklar and
Kateb, at least, articulate fairly robust accounts of liberal democratic citizenship. The
crucial difference between civic and skeptical liberals is that the latter offer spirited
resistance to any and all attempts to enlist the state in character-forming enterprises.
Hence, skeptical liberals argue urgently that liberal states should not attempt to teach
civic virtue and good citizenship formally, even if doing so would appear to serve valid
liberal purposes.

Skeptical liberals offer at least four substantial objections to mandating civic
education or establishing universal service programs in liberal democratic states
although it is important to note that not all skeptical liberals would associate themselves with all of these arguments). First, some skeptical liberals argue that liberal democratic political institutions are able to function without the state defining good citizenship or directing civic education programs. According to this view, either citizens of liberal democratic states need not cultivate special civic virtues at all or else liberal political institutions themselves can provide a spontaneous and non-coercive civic education.

Stephen Holmes argues on behalf of the first version of this objection. According to him, liberal democratic political arrangements are built, quite sensibly, not on a foundation of civic virtue, but rather on an institutional artifice that includes the separation of powers and the checks and balances of the American constitutional system. Indeed, these constitutional devices were developed by the framers precisely because collective virtue could not be relied upon to protect liberty and maintain political stability. As Holmes explains, the framers believed that attempting to build a liberal order on the basis of civic virtue “…would overburden the individual conscience, force character standardization on citizens, and deprive society of an extra-political variety of selves.”

However, civic liberals typically argue that liberal democracies are justified in actively promoting specific civic virtues, precisely because these virtues are needed to sustain liberal democratic political arrangements. They reject the suggestion that liberal democratic political arrangements are, somehow, self-sustaining or that they can be maintained, as Kant once suggested, “even by a nation of devils.” As Macedo explains, “While the extent and nature of common schooling is always subject to reasonable debate, the imperatives of common civic education must be pursued somehow. We have
no reason to expect citizenship to take care of itself.”33 Similarly, Peter Berkowitz
writes, “Since human beings are not born with the self-reliance, discipline, rational
understanding, and sympathetic imagination that the making of association requires, such
individuals must themselves be made or educated.”34

George Kateb argues on behalf of the second, and more sophisticated, version of this
objection, which represents an answer to Macedo, Berkowitz, and other civic liberals.
According to Kateb, as long as liberal democratic institutions and procedures are
operating reasonably well, citizens will develop, spontaneously, the character traits
necessary to sustain them. For this reason, no special educative measures must be taken
by the liberal democratic state. Kateb argues that the chastening of political authority
under representative democratic arrangements produces at least three distinctive and
prominent moral and psychological phenomena (i.e., civic virtues and attitudes) in
societies governed by such arrangements. First, representative democratic political
arrangements tend to produce an independence of spirit (or personal autonomy) in the
face of both personal and impersonal authority.35 When every citizen views himself or
herself as the moral equal of every other, and authority itself is diffused and strictly
limited, individual citizens will tend, increasingly, to rely on themselves for crucial
judgments. Second, representative democracy tends to produce the politicization (and
democratization) of non-political relations of life, including intimate and domestic
relations.36 For instance, the language of rights may come to pervade the family lives,
not just the political lives, of citizens. And, third, representative democracy tends to
produce a sense of moral indeterminacy, although not necessarily moral relativism.37
Given free and contested elections, and denied a single source of moral and political
authority, citizens tend to develop a tolerance (or even affection) for “diversity as the source of regulated contest and competition.”

Unfortunately, Kateb’s reply to the pessimistic claims of civic liberalism may be inadequate. Numerous studies have shown that participation in civic associations in United States, which Tocqueville and many others have persuasively argued is essential for the cultivation of civic character, has been steadily declining. At the same time, public esteem for political institutions, including Congress and the Presidency, has been deteriorating. The decline in voter turnout also has been well documented, as has the miserable state of civic knowledge in the United States. It would not be unreasonable to wonder, therefore, whether liberal democratic institutions and practices, in the United States at least, have atrophied to such an extent that they can no longer be relied upon to provide citizens with adequate civic education, as skeptical liberals like Kateb continue to hope. The civic liberals, I think, get the best of this debate.

The second objection commonly made by skeptical liberals to the involvement of the state in civic education is that it would violate the moral freedom of individuals, while simultaneously increasing the power of the state beyond safe or reasonable limits. According to Judith Shklar, citizens of liberal democratic states must possess certain character traits if they are to preserve their freedom against the government. So, in “The Liberalism of Fear,” she writes, “If citizens are to act individually and in associations, especially in a democracy, to protest and block any sign of government illegality and abuse, they must have a fair share of moral courage, self-reliance, and stubbornness to assert themselves effectively.” However, Shklar completely rejects the idea of an “educative government” which deliberately “aims at creating specific kinds of character
and enforces its own beliefs."43 Any state, Shklar argues, which resorts "to collective and improbable schemes of salvation-through-schooling" would be more authoritarian than liberal.44 Indeed, interference with the character of individuals would violate the basic principles of liberalism. For this reason, she concludes, the liberal democratic state should "keep its hands off our character."45

In response to Shklar, a civic liberal could point out that liberal democracies have tended to occupy relatively small, armed camps almost constantly under siege by non-liberal and profoundly anti-liberal ways of life. As such, liberal democracies could hardly be begrudged the occasional use of illiberal methods against their enemies. As Berkowitz puts it, "If Shklar’s view were accepted, then in hard times, when public life in a liberal state becomes stagnant or rancorous, civil society lethargic, and the family embattled, the state would be obliged to sit idly by and watch helplessly from the sidelines as the wellsprings of the virtues necessary for order and liberty slowly evaporated."46 To this, however, skeptical liberals would observe, with some validity, that there is a difference between disarming oneself in the face of a dangerous adversary - - whether it be civic rot or a dangerous rival ideology -- and refusing to point a pistol at one's own head. If state involvement in character education does harm to liberal democracies, either by threatening freedom or by significantly diminishing its available civic capital, then this involvement should be prohibited, or at least strictly limited.

A civic liberal also could respond by insisting, as Macedo does, that there is a morally significant difference between persuasion and coercion. This is certainly true. No liberal would suggest that the state should, as a matter of principle, never engage in moral persuasion of any kind. Nevertheless, few liberals would endorse coercion. So wherein
lies the difference? It seems to me that the difference between persuasion, properly understood, and coercion, is that persuasion appeals to critical reason and independent judgement, while coercion attempts to eliminate choice and, thereby, annul the possibility of the exercise of critical reason and independent judgement. One can imagine forms of civic education that present to the critical reason of young citizens alternative conceptions of good citizenship, in an effort to persuade them to favor some forms over others. This is the idea behind civic pluralism. However, one could also easily imagine a form of civic education that presented to young (and impressionable) citizens a single model of good citizenship and attempted, through indoctrination, to secure their allegiance to it. Even if this model were supported with arguments and evidence, the effort would be to eliminate choice. Such coercion might be gentle, or even imperceptible (and, thus, much more dangerous), but it would be there nonetheless.

A third objection to civic liberalism invokes the rights of moral traditionalists against the liberal democratic state. Some, though not many, skeptical liberals claim that it is morally improper for liberals to impose a liberal conception of civic virtue on traditional communities (such as the Amish) even if they live within the territory of a liberal democratic state. This view, shared also by some civic liberals, like Callan, presumes that groups, especially religious groups, should have at least some autonomy in shaping the moral universe of their members, without interference from a secular state.47 As L.T. Hobhouse writes, “If, in general, education is a duty which the state has a right to enforce, there is a countervailing right of choice as to the lines of education which it would be ill to ignore....”48 This suggests, at the very least, that students might have a right to “opt out” of state-mandated civic education programs, if they or their parents
have reason to believe that such programs violate their fundamental moral beliefs or threaten their way of life.

One way around this objection would be to try to make a distinction between moral virtue and civic virtue, and allow greater latitude to the state in promoting the latter. Moral virtues would, presumably, be those which concern practices in the private sphere, while civic virtues are those that concern practices in the public sphere. Public schools, theoretically, would concern themselves with the former, while keeping their hands off of the latter. One must wonder, however, whether in practice there really are any purely political values. Some frequently invoked liberal virtues, such as tolerance, mutual respect, and the ability to make independent choices between competing goods, might be understood to undermine any number of traditional ways of life (many of them organized around religious beliefs), which arrange such goods in fixed hierarchies. Teaching these liberal virtues in public schools, and mandating attendance, might also tend to increase the likelihood that members of traditional communities would seek to exit or radically transform those communities.

It is precisely the possibility that liberal virtues like toleration will invade the private sphere that concerns critics of liberalism, who fear that many traditional ways of life could be destroyed, directly or indirectly, by the modern liberal state. The ways in which concepts of individual rights and even majority rule have colonized family life (a development that is applauded by Kateb) is at least circumstantial evidence that there can be such an effect, whether it is intended by liberals or not. Little comfort is to be gained from liberals who pledge to tolerate traditional ways of life as long as they do not presume to claim sole authority, or some kind of veto power, over the educative function.
This is akin to saying that liberals are prepared to tolerate traditional ways of life as long as they do not attempt to perpetuate themselves by using the same tools liberals themselves propose to use to perpetuate their own liberal democratic virtues, values, and political arrangements.

A civic liberal might respond by arguing that adherents to these traditional ways of life must be willing to accept a thin consensus of liberal democratic political values as a condition for participating in (and enjoying the protection of) liberal democratic political arrangements. Practices that directly violate this thin consensus would not, normally, be understood to merit protection. Along these lines, Thomas Spragens argues that the virtues of civic liberalism are not destructive of or oppressive toward religious communities within liberal democratic states, writing, “The only religious practices that would run afoul of civic liberal commitments and demands, then, would be practices which are effectively cultic.”

Spragens does not explain, exactly, what he means by “cultic.” But, one may suppose, at the very least, that he means this to entail a reluctance to allow members to exit the traditional community on their own initiative.

On this point, I think, the civic liberals generally have a stronger case. It is true that autonomy deployed in the context of politics could lead some citizens to make freer choices among different ways of life in non-political contexts. This may make some moral traditionalists and their academic defenders unhappy. However, it need not make liberals uncomfortable. No way of life has a right to exist if it is not viable, including liberalism itself. No citizen of a liberal democratic state should be forcibly denied reasonable options, either by state action or state inaction. Hence, the liberal democratic state has a positive duty to protect its members from coercion, including coercion by
parents and private associations. Nonetheless, having a duty to protect citizens from coercion does not imply that the liberal democratic state itself has the right to engage in coercive practices, even for a young citizen's own good. Although a unitary approach to civic education would run afoul of this consideration, a pluralistic approach might not.

The final argument made by some skeptical liberals is that liberal democratic states could never devise a single acceptable standard for civic education. From this perspective, citizens of liberal democratic states would be as likely to agree on a single religion to teach in schools as they would be to agree on a single conception of citizenship and civic virtue. And, given that a plurality of views of good citizenship already exists in liberal democratic societies, it may be that we should leave well enough alone. Indeed, any systematic effort to eradicate this plurality through civic education could well be dangerous and destructive to the fabric of society. Locke makes an argument like this in his "Letter Concerning Toleration," claiming that even if it were proper for the state to impose religious practices on citizens, it would not be prudent to do so, due to the discord that would inevitably result. According to Galston, Locke does not extend this prudential prohibition to moral virtues and rules as such but, rather, limits it to religious doctrines. Nonetheless, if the brute fact of religious pluralism gave Locke pause, the presence of citizens with very different views of citizenship in liberal democratic states should give liberal theorists pause, even if the passions associated with the latter are not always as strong as those associated with the former.

Even a cursory survey of leading liberal theorists writing on the topic of civic education (including the civic liberals discussed above), should be enough to show that broad agreement on the civic virtues, values, skills, and abilities needed by liberal
citizens is highly unlikely. John Rawls might contest this point, and suggest that the content of civic education could be derived, more or less, from political liberalism's overlapping consensus regarding constitutional essentials. However, establishing a consensus regarding the specific moral and political virtues required of citizens in a liberal democratic state would be much harder than establishing a modus vivendi consensus on constitutional fundamentals. Rawls himself identifies mutual trust, friendship, a sense of justice and fairness, integrity, and impartiality as vital civic virtues. But, other than to suggest, vaguely, that all citizens need these virtues if they are to have views about the common good, he does not make a very strong case for their universality.

Taken together, these four objections to state involvement in civic education, are significant and substantial. It seems to me, though, that the first and third arguments receive fairly adequate responses from civic liberals, while the second and fourth arguments do not. It does seem unlikely that a liberal democracy could easily agree on a single standard understanding of good citizenship, in spite of the assurances of Rawls, and the hopes of Gutmann, Macedo, Galston, etc. Likewise, it does appear that the involvement of the state in establishing universal national service programs or standards for a mandatory civic education curriculum would potentially increase the power and influence of the state beyond safe limits, perhaps heralding in the educative or tutelary state that skeptical liberals legitimately fear. The argument that I develop below is an attempt to provide adequate answers to the second and fourth skeptical liberal objections. It does so by showing how the liberal democratic state -- by embracing a pluralistic rather than unitary approach to civic education -- could develop civic capital without excessive
risk to personal freedom and autonomy, and without first securing broad agreement concerning the nature of good citizenship.

FACING UP TO CIVIC PLURALISM

There already are several well-known theories of civic pluralism, although none of them are associated with liberalism. The most famous (or infamous) of these theories is advanced by Plato in The Republic, where three major character types (the true guardians, the auxiliaries, and the masses) are identified and each attributed with its own characteristic moral profile. Machiavelli also shows himself to be a civic pluralist, when he distinguishes between two different conceptions of virtù, one understood as the boldness, spiritedness, or manliness of great princes, statesmen, and generals, and the other understood to be the public spiritedness or incorruptibility of ordinary citizens. And Henry David Thoreau, in his essay “On the Duty of Civil Disobedience,” identifies three different types of citizens: those who serve the state with their bodies only, those who serve the state with their intellects, and those who serve the state with their consciences.54

And these are not the only ways to classify different kinds of citizenship. One could also distinguish between idealistic, pragmatic, and apathetic citizens, or between those who serve mainly with their time and personal effort and those who serve mainly with their wallets. Another approach, commonly used by political scientists, is to imagine a series of “modes” of political participation, which ascend, roughly, from the least actively to the most actively engaged.
Lester W. Milbrath and M.L. Goel present a crude but revealing view of these modes. Specifically, they divide citizens into seven categories: 1) Apathetic inactives who do not engage in any political activity, not even voting; 2) Passive supporters who vote regularly, attend patriotic parades, pay taxes, and love their country; 3) Contact specialists who periodically contact local, state, and national officials with regard to particular public problems or concerns; 4) Communicators who keep informed about politics, regularly engage in political discussions, write letters to newspaper editors, and send support or protest messages to political leaders; 5) Party and campaign workers who work for political parties and/or political candidates, persuade others how to vote, attend meetings, give money to parties and candidates, join and support a political party, and, perhaps, even serve as a party candidate; 6) Community activists who work with others on local problems, form groups to work on problems, and maintain active membership in community organizations; and 7) Protestors who join in public street demonstrations, vigorously protest if the government does something morally wrong, attend protest meetings, and refuse to obey unjust laws. All of these modes of political participation, perhaps excluding apathetic inactives, could be reasonably said to be forms of “good citizenship,” although not everyone would agree that every activity associated with each of these modes is “good” or “admirable.”

It seems to me, therefore, that attempting to force all citizens of a liberal democracy -- or even a great number of them -- into just one of these views of citizenship is both unworkable and misguided. However, the temptation to institutionalize a single view is always present. For example, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) Civics Assessment (funded by the U.S. Department of Education) tests almost
exclusively for factual knowledge about democratic principles, the purpose of
government, political institutions, and political processes. Their model of good
citizenship appears to that of the informed voter. According to this standard, the NAEP
determined that only 22 percent of high school seniors are proficient in their
understanding of civics, while only four percent have an advanced knowledge of civics.56
Without diminishing the importance of civic knowledge, which could serve multiple
models of good citizenship, to suggest that one must score highly in such an exam to be a
good citizen is highly reductive. Consider what this view of good citizenship ignores,
namely, the virtues, values, skills, and attitudes of citizenship. The danger is not that
young citizens will be compelled to learn such civic fundamentals as which branch of
government makes laws or how members of the Supreme Court are chosen. Rather, the
risk is that a scheme of civic education based, primarily, on assessing civic knowledge
will lead young citizens to believe that this knowledge is all that good citizenship
requires. Liberal democracies need informed voters, to be sure, but they need much more
than informed voters.

Fortunately, it is possible to conceive of civic virtue and the practice of citizenship in
pluralistic terms. In doing so, we can understand liberal democratic political
arrangements to require not a single standard type of citizen, no matter how ideal, but
rather a wide range of different types, each providing its own distinct form of political
labor. As Amelie Oksenberg Rorty explains, “We are well served, both practically and
morally, by ethical diversity, by living in a community whose members have values and
priorities that are, at a habit-forming, action-guiding level, often different from our
own.”57
Ethical diversity is almost inevitable, anyway, according to Rorty, because some character traits tend to exclude one another. Psychologically, people simply are not equipped to internalize so many different competing values and virtues. As Rorty explains, “Patriotic loyalty, for instance, tends to inhibit cross-cultural empathy. The configuration of traits that constitute a markedly just person is rarely trustful; the virtues of innocence are rarely retained in the virtues of experience.”58 One could add that the moral and intellectual virtues of the self-interested consumer, described by Gutmann, would also tend to exclude or inhibit patriotic loyalty, and vice versa. In any event, it looks like the “everything but the kitchen sink” approach to civic virtue, which characterizes the civic liberalism of Macedo and Galston, runs aground on Rorty’s analysis.

Rorty identifies several advantages of moral -- and, by implication, civic -- diversity for liberal democratic states. Most importantly, she argues that different moral agendas are best achieved by different ethical types.59 This implies an ethical division of labor and suggests to me that even if the state (or public schools) could agree on the values, virtues, skills, and attitudes of liberal citizenship, and promote these and only these traits, it would be a mistake to do so. One cannot help but wonder whether the civic capital of a liberal democratic state would be dangerously depleted by standardized civic education, much as the biological resources of an ecosystem are depleted by the replacement of biologically diverse woodlands with of a single, homogenous crop. Just as in agriculture biological diversity provides for greater resistance to disease, parasites, and weather, civic diversity greater provides resistance to political, social and economic crises and
challenges. Some days we need idealists, other days pragmatists or patriots, and, on some unlucky days, we need a combination of all three.

Additionally, Rorty argues that although conflict between ethical types is highly likely, each type “depends on the functioning of the others for its own best fulfillment.” That is to say, the true flourishing of any one vision of good citizenship in a society may presuppose the existence of others. As Rorty explains, “It is safer and easier to be a full-blownd consequentialist if you know that there are enough deontologists around to prevent you from doing something awful for the sake of a distant good; similarly, it is safer and easier to insist on rectitude if you know that there are enough utilitarians around to press for the distribution of basic human goods.” One could add that it is safer to be a conscientious objector in a society where loyal patriots are not uncommon, and that it is safer to be a loyal patriot in a society that also has a few whistleblowers.

Finally, Rorty argues that constructive cooperation between ethical types does not depend on complete moral agreement on principles of justice, or upon commitments to attitudes like mutual respect or trust. Rather, it depends upon forming “active detailed habits that are the substance of those general attitudes.” Different groups of citizens would enter into common enterprises with different moral viewpoints and different objectives, but also with at least some willingness to resolve their differences together. “Other things being equal,” Rorty explains, “the ideal models projected by each moral system would enter situations from different perspectives, with a historical set of salient preoccupations. They would focus on different sorts of problems, recommend different kinds of strategies for solving them and have different criteria for their successful resolution.” For example, public defenders and prosecutors work at cross-purposes,
with different agendas, different codes of ethics, different priorities, and different presuppositions about individuals, communities, and the law. However, social order, civil liberty, and the rule of law require both. Similarly, idealistic anti-war protestors, patriotic citizen-soldiers, and pragmatic political leaders often work at cross-purposes, also with different goals, different codes of ethics, etc., but the security and integrity of countries requires all three character types.

Eamonn Callan anticipates and responds to these civic pluralist arguments by conceding that while the wrong kind of civic education may create “character standardization,” the right kind of civic education could actually preserve and promote pluralism. The right kind of civic education, according to Callan, presupposes the prior existence of pluralism and diversity in society and attempts to promote liberal democratic virtues without treading too heavily on the moral traditions of particular groups and communities. Indeed, in Callan's view, proper liberal civic education should allow people to opt out, so as not to exacerbate potential conflicts between different groups. Like most civic liberals, Callan views pluralism as a challenge to be dealt with, or an obstacle to be got around, rather than the goal of civic education. Callan writes, “The challenge of pluralism is, in part, the problem of conceiving the ends and means of civic education in a way that does not wrongly impair diversity.” However, Callan never imagines the possibility or desirability of civic pluralism, which might be nurtured both by carefully crafted civic education and by pre-existing diversity within a liberal democratic society.

According to Macedo, the private sphere of civic associations, families, churches, and other moral communities is sufficiently robust, at least in the United States, to allow
public schools to teach shared civic values without fearing for the destruction of moral diversity. However, I think that Macedo may be wrong about the relationship between state-mandated civic education and that provided by various private associations in civil society. It is not the case that a robust and diverse civil society allows for a unitary model of civic education by providing supplementary and alternative norms. Rather, a unitary model of civic education might be sufficient unto itself, edging out alternatives and, ultimately, diminishing the civic diversity of civil society. A scheme of civic education like that proposed by Gutmann might edge out conventional patriotism, while a sentimental civic education such as that endorsed by Galston might contribute to the extinction of morally indignant political heroism. In contrast, civic education modeled after civic pluralism might, indirectly, promote the development of networks of civil society. Indeed, the elements of a pluralistic model could feed into corresponding associations in civil society, where rival attitudes toward citizenship could be cultivated and reinforced.

I am inclined, therefore, to agree with Nancy Rosenblum, who argues that official sources of civic virtue -- including public schools and local governments -- are not sufficient to produce the characters of liberal democratic citizens. Instead, she explains, the “networks of civil society” also are required either to cultivate “specific democratic competencies” or to instill “general moral virtues.”68 Unlike Tocqueville and many others, however, Rosenblum emphasizes the impact of the general experience of pluralism and diversity by citizens, rather than the impact of membership in particular associations on the moral development of individuals. The experience of pluralism, in particular, awakens a sense of life’s possibilities and alternatives, rather than fixing an
individual into a single way of life, or into identification with a specific association or
group. Rosenblum is interested in “the dynamic of association, pointing out that forming,
joining, schism, and disassociation are as much part of freedom of association as the
solidity of identification and belonging.”

Rosenblum also observes, correctly, that some people have a psychological need for
strong communities and social groups, rather than the thin identity and connection
afforded by membership in a liberal society. This point should not be overlooked.
Fortunately, free societies are able to protect a multiplicity of such communities and
groups, at least those which operate within reasonable limits. This, Rosenblum hopes,
will allow liberal democracies to avoid the perils identified by skeptical liberals and
ignored, largely, by civic liberals. And, so she says, “The moral uses of pluralism
militate for expansive freedom of associations, and against a strategy of deliberately
legislating schools of virtue, by government inducements of legally mandated
congruence.”

THE LIMITS OF CIVIC PLURALISM

One important practical consideration for a civic education curriculum based on civic
pluralism is how it would be limited. Would liberals be obliged, for instance, to teach the
citizenship ethic of Nazism or Soviet-style totalitarianism? No, they would not, because
the avowed purpose of any form of liberal citizenship education -- preparing young
citizens for sovereignty within a liberal democratic framework -- would tend to rule out
forms of citizenship aggressively hostile to liberal democratic political arrangements.
However, borrowing from Joseph Raz, I would propose two more specific limits on
teaching the ethics of citizenship. Raz offers these as limits specifically designed to protect autonomy-based freedom, but they work well in this context, too. This is because any acceptable scheme of civic education must contend with the skeptical liberal objection that involvement of the state in shaping the character of young citizens interferes with personal freedom.

First, Raz suggests that autonomy requires the availability of adequate options, not of every option. Hence, schools would be under no obligation to teach every conception of citizenship, only a representative sample. Even if there were not too many different views of good citizenship to accommodate them all (and there are), the point of civic pluralism is not to ensure maximum toleration for, or maximum diversity of, different kinds of citizenship. Rather, it is to reduce legitimate liberal fears regarding the educative power of the state, and to reduce the considerable risks of civic monism. Which specific conceptions are to be taught would and should vary from country to country, and from locale to locale, depending upon the particular constitutional, political, and social histories of each place. Second, Raz argues that autonomy does not require the protection of morally bad options, particularly those that are brutally coercive and harmful to others. This would permit the rejection of options contravening Mill's "harm principle." And these rejected options, would certainly include violent and destructive political ideologies like Nazism and totalitarian collectivism.

Introducing limits derived from the value of autonomy raises at least two important questions about civic pluralism. First, is it genuinely pluralistic? And, second, is it compatible with political liberalism or only with autonomy-based versions of liberalism?
With respect to the pluralistic nature of civic pluralism, I think that the wide range of types of citizenship identified in the previous section speaks directly to that. Civic pluralism accepts modes of citizenship ranging from predominantly passive to militantly engaged. It accepts styles of citizenship that range from highly civil to extremely uncivil. And it accepts objectives of citizenship that range from the defense of self-interest to a variety of collectivist purposes. It is truly pluralistic, although it has limits and these limits have consequences.

For instance, the prohibition against coercion suggests that civic education based on civic pluralism precludes the possibility of universal national service programs, although experiential learning opportunities related to politics, civics, and citizenship could still be made optional elements of civic education curriculums. This might tend to alienate those who believe that standardization and universality are essential to the success of civic education, and that making service voluntary is a sign of civic corruption. I believe, though, that most academic liberals have gravitated to standardized models of civic education simply because they have not seriously considered the pluralistic alternative, rather than because they are committed to a unitary vision of civic life. Certainly, the willingness of Macedo and Galston to incorporate elements of rival conceptions of citizenship in their respective models suggests that they are alert to the dangers of a narrow standardization. Similarly, Gutmann’s reluctance to float a full raft of civic virtues and attitudes suggests that she may have some unarticulated doubts about standardization, too.

Regarding the compatibility of civic pluralism with political liberalism, I think that it is fair to say that civic pluralism is more compatible with political liberalism than it is
with any comprehensive view of liberalism, including those primarily concerned with autonomy. This is because it does not attempt to establish autonomy, or any other ideal, as the most valuable or morally good way of life. Rather, it claims that a degree of something like autonomy is needed by citizens to allow them to choose for themselves one of the many ways of practicing good citizenship which can help make liberal democratic political arrangements work. Civic pluralism requires that citizens learn to make more (rather than less) autonomous choices from among alternative modes of citizenship, understanding that they are free to change their primary mode of political engagement as political circumstances and their political commitments change. This may cause some citizens to prefer modes of citizenship in which a higher degree of independence is needed. But it will not necessarily make citizens in general choose a more or less demanding or engaged mode of citizenship. Many citizens may conclude that, all things considered, they would prefer to be passive supporters of a halfway decent liberal democratic regime. Others may conclude, on balance, that they would rather be party loyalists, or take an ideological leap of faith. Still others may, on occasion, choose to engage in acts of moral or political heroism, risking or even sacrificing themselves in order to prevent injustice or protect the defenseless.

Of course, there are grounds on which to disagree with this claim. One could, for instance, concede that autonomy is a necessary or desirable capability for the exercise of sovereignty by citizens in a liberal democratic state, but argue that the liberal democratic state cannot be relied upon to promote this capability without resorting to manipulation or coercion. If autonomy is just a conditional political value, one might be willing to take risks in this direction. But if autonomy is a crucial element of a comprehensive doctrine,
then the risk may be judged to be too great. Any credible response to this objection would have to go back to the claim that promoting civic pluralism is much less risky than promoting any unitary view of good citizenship. For not only would this tend to promote autonomy, but it would also avoid the hazards of character standardization discussed previously. Standardization, not the involvement of the state per se, represents the greater part of these hazards.

Alternatively, one could argue that autonomy is completely unnecessary for liberal democratic sovereignty. But this strikes me as silly, since -- in the absence of indoctrination or brainwashing -- even passive supporters or patriotic loyalists would require sufficient autonomy to decide to be passive supporters or patriotic loyalists, as well as sufficient autonomy to decide who to support or who to entrust one’s loyalty. This may, ultimately, be the crucial difference between patriotism in a liberal democratic state, and patriotism in a totalitarian or other collectivist state. The liberal democratic patriot is necessarily left much more to his or her own devices, as long as the state does not intervene to directly promote patriotic zeal as the only valid expression of good citizenship.

CONCLUSION

In all, I have made three arguments on behalf of a civic education curriculum based on civic pluralism. First, I have argued that this approach would help break the theoretical impasse between civic liberalism and skeptical liberalism. Second, I’ve argued that civic pluralism already exists in liberal democratic states, as do many other forms of pluralism -- e.g., religious, moral, economic, racial, ethnic, etc. -- and any effort
to eradicate it could be dangerous and destructive to the fabric of society. And, third, I have argued that civic pluralism actually strengthens liberal democratic political arrangements by promoting civic diversity and a civic division of labor.

However, there are still three points about civic pluralism that disturb me. First, given a system of civic education based on civic pluralism, to what extent should private schools and associations be permitted to teach their own distinctive understandings of civic virtue and citizenship? Leaving aside cults, the organizations most likely to run afoul of the limits of civic pluralism are entities like the Citadel military academy (which has historically excluded women) and the Boy Scouts (which has asserted its right to exclude homosexuals from scout master positions). Does civic pluralism force us to reevaluate these cases and tolerate the visions of citizenship that these groups promote?

Civic pluralism should not be understood necessarily to trump any established civil right. So if the courts decide that these practices represent unconstitutional infringements on the rights of women and homosexuals, then the matter of their exclusionary practices is closed. However, this does not mean, necessarily, that there are legitimate grounds for rejecting or suppressing their overall attitudes toward citizenship, even if we find some of their practices repugnant. One need not agree morally with these organizations, or want to have anything to do with them. But, as long as they do not impose their civic ideals through coercion, or deny their members free exit, we may have to tolerate them (i.e., accept their existence and right to promote their particular civic values without necessarily endorsing them or any of their policies or beliefs). Some liberals may have trouble with this conclusion, and I am not crazy about it myself. But it may, indeed, be a consequence of accepting the logic of civic pluralism.
There is also the potential problem of moral and civic incoherence. By offering a menu of different types of civic character, and different kinds of civic virtue, young citizens might very well be overwhelmed, not knowing what type to choose for themselves. Indeed, one significant cause of political apathy among liberal democratic citizens may be their sense of having too many choices and too little guidance. It is easy to opt out under these circumstances. Luckily, civic pluralism is not the same as "civic deregulation." If multiple types of good citizenship really are needed to sustain liberal democratic political arrangements, then schools should teach civics in such a way as to enhance the ability of citizens to make intelligent choices between different models, tolerate the choices of others (without necessarily approving of these choices), and understand better how different kinds of citizenship fit into a complex political system and the morally ambiguous history of a country.

Of course, widespread political apathy would undoubtedly pose problems for any society. However, even the hatred of politics, by some citizens, could serve a purpose, particularly if we assume that this hatred is not universal and operates in the context of a plurality of different civic types. Could hatred of politics even be understood as a reasonable, decent, or acceptable view of good citizenship? It obviously depends on why citizens hate politics. Ignorance, boredom, and fear are not good reasons. Moral disgust or feelings of indignation regarding the abuse or misuse of state power are somewhat better reasons. At the very least, the existence of a skeptical outlook toward politics, whatever its source, may serve as a valuable check on the potential excesses of any would-be teachers of civic virtue.
Finally, I am still concerned that a society characterized by a high degree of civic pluralism would inevitably experience a higher degree of social and political conflict, than a society where a single view of good citizenship reigns supreme. For example, one could easily imagine, in times of war or near war, citizens attracted to idealistic activism clashing with those who prefer pragmatic realism. Likewise, one could easily imagine, under such circumstances, traditional patriots misunderstanding, and disliking, both the idealists and the realists. Conflicts between these groups might be even more common in a society in which civic education was used actively to promote civic pluralism.

In response to this concern, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty would probably say that these conflicts are a small price to pay for the benefits of moral diversity. And Isaiah Berlin would probably say that no decent society would or could suppress such conflicts, or their causes. I would want to go further, though, by suggesting that the presence, in a liberal democratic state, of political and social conflicts emanating in part from the existence of civic pluralism could itself serve as a kind of civic education for citizens. It would do so, I imagine, by spontaneously fostering in many citizens an acceptance of the moral ambiguity and difficulty of politics and public affairs. I would not want to posit this acceptance as a condition for every acceptable understanding of the practice of citizenship, but I would hope that it might become an integral feature of a number of decent and reasonable ones.

1 For an extreme case, consider the words of W. Frick, Hitler’s Minister of the Interior: “The mistake of the past was for the school to train the child as an individual. This led, especially, after the war, to the destruction of nation and State. We will supplant it by a training which will sink
into the blood and flesh and cannot be uprooted for generations, a training which will fuse the
German into his nation and bind him by the closest ties to his history and the destiny of his
Magazine (October 8, 1933). Reprinted in Nazis and Fascists in Europe 1918-1945, ed. John

2 Significant accounts of civic liberalism include Judith Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in
Political Thought and Political Thinkers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 3-20;
George Kateb, "The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy," in The Inner Ocean:
Individualism and Democratic Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 37-56; and
Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995).

3 Leading articulations of civic liberalism include Amy Gutmann, "Undemocratic Education," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1989); Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987);
William Galston, "Civic Education in Liberal States," in Rosenblum (ed.); Galston, Liberal
Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991); Galston, "Public Morality and Religion in the Liberal State," PS 19 (Fall 1986), 807-
824; Stephen Macedo, Democracy and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue,
and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Peter
Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1999); Thomas Spragens, Jr., Civic Liberalism: Reflections on Our Democratic Ideals (New York:
University Press, 1986); and Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal

5 Any self-respecting historian of the Civil War would probably bristle at this oversimplification, but there is something to these distinctions. For discussion see James M. McPherson, *Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1982), 261-279.


7 A few years ago I gave a series of talks on citizenship to several social studies classes at a large, suburban New Jersey high school. The talks, which were heavily slanted toward the methods and idealism of political protest, led -- more or less directly -- to a spirited group of students picketing an unsuspecting local lumber yard, demanding that it stop selling wood harvested from tropical rain forests. It is lucky that no one was hurt, and luckier still that no one was sued. I was not invited back.


10 The perception of many academics that there is a problem with citizenship in the United States is, in this instance, reflected in the popular understanding as well. According to one recent survey, 62 percent of all Americans believe that people today have an attitude of cynicism and apathy, rather than citizenship and participation (27 percent). Fifty-seven percent believe that America’s civic life has weakened in recent years, while only 36 percent believe that it remains strong. At the same time, only 40 percent of Americans believe that their fellow citizens live up


12 Gutmann, “Undemocratic Education,” 74.

13 Gutmann, Democratic Education, 15.


15 Gutmann, “Undemocratic Education,” 73.

16 Gutmann, “Undemocratic Education,” 75.

17 Galston disagrees, and charges Gutmann with advocating a comprehensive (rather than merely political) view of liberalism in which skepticism and self-examination comprise a predetermined view of the good life. See Galston, “Civic Education in Liberal States,” 100.

18 Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, 5.

19 Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, 5.

20 Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, 239.

21 Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 271-72.

22 Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, 10-11.

23 Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, 247.

24 Macedo, Liberal Virtues, 276-77.

25 Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, 43.

26 Galston, “Civic Education in Liberal States,” 93.
27 Galston, “Civic Education in Liberal States,” 91.

28 David Archard, “Should We Teach Patriotism?” Studies in Philosophy and Education 18 (1999), 158.


30 Callan, 121.

31 Holmes, Passions and Constraints, 175.


33 Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, 230.

34 Berkowitz, 188.


44 Shklar, “An Education For America,” 78.

45 Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 235.

46 Berkowitz, 31.

47 Callan, 39.


49 Spragens, 243.


53 Rawls never explains exactly how citizens would develop these virtues, although he implies that they could be acquired spontaneously by citizens who cooperate with one another in a just (or fair) political association. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 472.

Milbrath and Goel, 18-20.


Callan, 5-6.

Callan, 10.

Callan, 12.


Rosenblum, 17.

Rosenblum, 349.

Raz, 411-12.
Rawls distinguishes, usefully, between the "autonomy of political life" and "the ethical values of autonomy, which may apply to the whole of life, both social and individual...."

However, it is not clear that autonomy functions differently depending on the sphere of human life with which it is concerned. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 78.

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