Many educators in high schools and colleges have taught about European history and politics in the context of the Cold War and the division of Europe into two blocs. The revolutionary changes in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union have made obsolete the superpower spheres of influence that divided Europe. This curriculum project contributes to a refocusing on a reunited Europe as it has emerged since 1989. The project focuses on two central European nations, Hungary and Poland, and identifies important aspects about these countries for students as they begin to explore central Europe. It provides background information about central Europe in a curriculum review and poses the following question: "What's different about Central Europe?" The project outlines five key differences between western and central Europe to guide student understanding of the history and politics of this area. It concentrates on Hungary and Poland in a comparative historical perspective. This project cites the following considerations in analyzing democratic transitions in Hungary and Poland: (1) undermining and opening the authoritarian regime; (2) legacy of the past; (3) cycle of mobilization; (4) defusing and managing the military or party apparatus; (5) negotiation; and (6) settling past accounts. The paper notes sources for teaching contemporary politics in Hungary and Poland. (Contains 14 references.) (BT)
New Approaches to Teaching European Politics: Reintroducing Central Europe

Curriculum based project developed as part of the requirements for the Fulbright-Hays Seminars Abroad Program

Hungary and Poland  June/July 2002

Philip M. Wittman  Carroll College of Montana
ABSTRACT and Summary of the Curriculum Project

Many of us as teachers in both secondary and college education have long been teaching about European history and politics in the context of the Cold War of the last 50 years and the division of Europe into two blocs. The revolutionary changes in 1989 and the astounding collapse of the Soviet Union soon thereafter have made obsolete the super powers’ spheres of influence that divided Europe. But many of us have neither adjusted our own perspective nor our teaching curriculum. For the most part we have been teaching students about Western Europe. The curriculum project that is the main focus of this report aims to make a contribution to a re-focusing on a reunited Europe as it has emerged since 1989.

Such a reorientation need not overburden teachers already burdened enough. One first step might be to integrate into our teaching curriculum a limited number of country studies from Central and/or Eastern Europe. This particular project will focus on two central European nations—Hungary and Poland—in hopes that it might contribute to narrowing down specific aspects of teaching about these countries that are most salient and perhaps most interesting to students as they begin to explore Central Europe along with their teachers.

The suggestions in this project will probably be more useful to those who teach European Politics to undergraduates but it also may be helpful for teachers of European history at the high school level. It begins with a discussion of the possible options teachers might have as they consider revamping their courses—something not taken lightly by busy teachers. Then it moves into background material on Central Europe, particularly the concept of “central Europe” and what makes central Europe different from western Europe. In other words, what defines “central Europe.”

The other sections of this curriculum project will then identify important topics that might be covered in classroom presentations and discussions in a comparative way by using Poland and Hungary as case studies. Some important topics that make for instructive comparison in the classroom include:

- failed revolutions and loss of territory
- the trauma of Nazi/Soviet occupation
- impact of imposed “communist” regimes/protest against these regimes
- the transition to democracy and its consolidation
- transformation to market economies
- integration into the European Union and the NATO security pact

These topics are quite complex and certainly the material would have to be broken down into a digestible format for the classroom. Central European history does not lack for drama and excitement, and Poland and Hungary’s stories are no exception. The topics above provide issues that students (perhaps in six groups) could research with library and internet sources. Contemporary politics and elections, as well as the process of European Union accession, can be followed on sophisticated websites. This particular project will get into greater detail on how to analyze the transition and consolidation of democracy.
Background: The Changing Idea of Europe

The professional associations in the field of European political studies are virtually unanimous now in urging those of us who teach comparative politics to begin to expand our understanding of Europe. This commitment is reflected in almost all of the new texts on the market. The title of Richard Rose’s book *What is Europe?* raises an interesting question. For him, Europe encompasses 23 countries, including six post-communist ones. British political scientists Ian Budge, Kenneth Newton, et al. in their text, *The Politics of the New Europe*, include 40 states in the “new” Europe. Thus they provide in their introduction compelling reasons for taking an even wider and more integrated approach to European politics. European problems are increasingly shared problems, they write. They cannot “be handled on anything less than an all-European basis.” They complain, as well, that “most books about European politics turn out to be books about Western Europe with a chapter or two on Central Europe and the East tacked on.” This “add on” approach is exactly the strategy used by Almond, Powell, and Dalton in their new text, *European Politics Today*. Their text basically covers the larger countries of the old Western Europe and adds Russia, Poland and Hungary.

Should eastern Europe simply be an amendment to a course on Western European politics? Of course not. The goal should be to begin the process of integrating countries that will soon be members of the European Union in their own right into the courses we teach. More problematic will be doing justice to such countries in already packed, semester-long classes on European politics. The approach taken in this curriculum review, despite the chagrin of my British colleagues, will have to be a shortening of the material on Western Europe and making room for (or adding on) the neighbors from the East—such as Poland and Hungary.

What this brief survey of how to fit Central Europe into our teaching reveals is the troublesome issue of what really constitutes the new Europe today. Of course European states and their boundaries have been expanding and contracting in a myriad number of transformations over millennia. As Rose points out: “Locating Europe on the map is a test of political values. Where we look depends upon what we are looking for.”

Looking for Central Europe

Reviving and then defining Central Europe is not as easy a task as it might seem. Central Europe has been hibernating for a good half century. As Timothy Garton Ash wrote in his *The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe*: “In Prague and Budapest, the idea of Central Europe continued to be cherished between consenting adults in private, but from the
public sphere it had vanished as completely as it had in “the West.” (179) Ash claims that “voices from Prague and Budapest” like Vaclav Havel, Gyorgy Konrad and Adam Michnik were the ones who initiated the revival of Central Europe in their political essays. And he flatly states that Central Europe is back.

Geographically speaking, Ash concedes that like Europe “no one can quite agree where Central Europe begins or ends.” Nevertheless some operational definitions have to be made. Political scientists Budge and Newton, for example, assert that central Europe “consists mainly of the western Slav nations of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Slovenia, but also includes Hungary…” (80) Jurg Steiner, a Swiss political scientist, opens his textbook on European Democracies with the recognition that the “old historical concept of Central Europe has been revived.” (xiii) Historically, he says, Czechs, Austrians and Germans were the heart of central Europe. But Steiner is not sure where to place Slovaks, Hungarians and Poles. Are they part of eastern or central Europe?

These distinctions are not just academic quibbling. They are vitally important to individual and national identity in the countries involved. Michael Roskin makes this point in his Rebirth of East Europe. Another good, recent (and very readable) historical survey of Central Europe to consult in making sense of this crucial issue in the heart of Europe is Lonnie Johnson’s book Central Europe. According to Johnson, individuals who consider themselves central Europeans clearly distinguish themselves from eastern Europeans and from the Balkan inhabitants of southeastern Europe as well.

Johnson allows for a broad definition of Central Europe that includes Austria and Germany along with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia. He suggests also a narrower definition that excludes Germany and Austria as well as the Balkans and the countries of the old Soviet Union. The narrower definition of Central Europe, as an entity between East and West, intuitively seems to make the most sense. As Johnson points out, central Europe “never inhabited the Eastern bloc and had neither historically nor culturally been part of the East.” Neither had they been fully accepted by the West.

Just as history and culture created a divide for centuries, now another way of conceiving Central Europe, Johnson reminds us, has to do with good old per capita income. Central Europe today includes those countries of higher per capita income then those to the East of them, yet still remain less developed and poorer than their Western neighbors. This is obviously the most easily grasped understanding of Central Europe—as a realm encompassing a certain level of economic development.
At the same time, as a concept rather than a set of countries measured by mid-range GNP$s, “Central Europe” has been a liberatory concept in a real sense. The very idea challenges and breaks through the old East-West dichotomy—both psychologically and otherwise. It is, in this guise, more than likely the most useful prelude to the recovery of Central Europe.

What’s Different about Central Europe?

Answering this question might easily get us into an historical minefield. As T. G. Ash points out, “every attempt to distill some ‘common sense’ of Central European history is either absurdly reductionist or invincibly vague.” (188) As teachers in the trenches, however, we are looking for common sense explanations that work in the classroom. Tim Ash’s illusive comments to the contrary, Lonnie Johnson’s history of Central Europe is a good example of a readable text that nicely provides the basics for understanding the region. From such texts one can “distill” some clear differences between Western and Central Europe that undergraduates and high school students will be able to understand. Five such differences outlined below are important background for understanding the history and politics of Central Europe that can easily be illustrated with a few overhead map projections.

1. One contrast is the process of political development in the two regions—particularly the process of state formation. The superpower states of Western Europe emerge on the western edge of the European land mass during the period of absolutist monarchies when centralization (economically and politically) is underway. Warfare among these centralizing states as well as competition among (government controlled) economic systems actually furthers centralization and with it state power. Such centralization was very much retarded in Central Europe where feudalism remained in place for a much longer period. The nobility, jealous of centralizing rulers, made it difficult for kings to gain the upper hand. In Poland, for example, individual magnates could actually veto any legislation they wished. Weak states in the east were then easy prey for powerful imperial empires like Russia or Austria.

2. Of course the predominant Slavic composition of central and eastern and south western Europe and the geographic location of different Slavic groups should be included as a teaching unit. (Hungary is unique, however.) In this region geography makes a difference for politics. For example, barriers such as the Carpathian mountains determine which nations tend to fight one another on the northern European plain or in the Danube basin.
3. The German influence in Central Europe is considerable. German tended to be the language of the court and the common language of the region. German settlers move east in considerable numbers. Some authors see this movement as a kind of invasion, but the evidence is clear that many settlers were invited into many eastern locales.

4. The political form of territorial authority in Central Europe tends to be multi-national empires. Central Europe is a mosaic of different national cultures. This characteristic of the region is both a blessing and a curse. The diversity provides variety but also breeds nationalism and warfare.

5. Central European borders lay on the religious divide in Europe between, on the one hand, Western Christianity and on the other hand Orthodox Christianity and Islam. Historically Central European states have considered themselves the protectors of Roman Christianity. Understanding Central Europe requires some knowledge of the religious tensions along this “fault line.”

Hungary and Poland in Comparative Perspective: Historical and Political Topics

For this curriculum review, we narrow our focus further to two important central European nations: Poland and Hungary. Given that these countries were in the forefront of the 1989 revolutions and now are making transitions to democracy, they serve as exemplary case studies of some import. They make for likely candidates to begin with as we expand our understanding of European politics into Central Europe. The following section compares and contrasts major historical themes and provides the background and context for understanding the contemporary efforts to consolidate democratic regimes.

Modern History as Tragedy Understanding Hungary and Poland also requires some knowledge of historical failures and traumatic occupations that shape their collective psyche to this very today. In both Hungary and Poland in the modern era, there have been a succession of revolutionary attempts to break away from imperial powers that dominated them. Both lost territory to adjacent powers. Both were losers in WWI and WWII. Both felt the heavy heel of Nazi/Soviet occupation. As Andrzej Kwapiszewski has pointed out, Polish discourse is often a regular returning to their national past, but not the recent past, given that the last two centuries have been terrible. For Hungarians, the past weighs heavily on them as well.

In the modern period Hungarians rebelled against Austria in 1703 only to fail. Another attempt in 1848 went awry as well. In 1918 Hungary, then aligned with Austria, was on the
defeated side in World War I, and for its pains Hungary lost two thirds of its territory to its neighboring countries—a cause of contention in contemporary politics today. As a puppet state of the Nazis, Hungary gained back some territory, and then joined the Nazis in their invasion of Yugoslavia and then sent troops to then sent troops to invade Russia—a miserable failure. At home the Hungarian Fascist Arrow Cross Party deported Jews to concentration camps on Nazi orders. The Germans made their final stand in Budapest as the Soviet army closed in. Budapest was literally destroyed.

Poland’s modern experience was just as traumatic if not more so. The seventeenth century saw a Swedish invasion that decimated the whole country; even worse, in the late eighteenth century a series of partitions of Poland by Austria, Prussia and Russia wiped Poland off the map as an independent nation. Over the next half century, a number of uprisings against the partitioning powers were attempted without success. WWI saw massive destruction in the Polish areas, but Poland, ruined and poverty-stricken, was resurrected and reconstituted as a state in 1918. Within a few decades, Nazi Germany had invaded Poland in search of “living room” for the German master race. Hundreds of thousands of Poles and Jews were executed, deported as slave labor, or sent to the concentration camps. Russian forces occupied and annexed eastern Poland. At the end of the war, Poland was humiliated again. Promised elections did not take place and the Western powers finally acquiesced in the maintaining of Poland as part of the Soviet bloc. Once again Poland had been was denied its independence as a nation/state.

**Hungary and Poland as Communist States**   After WWII Poland and Hungary became satellites of the Soviet Union after “liberation” by the Red Army. Both countries would soon be reconstructed as mirror images of the Soviet system. Control by the Communist Party, quite ruthless in the early Stalinist period, remained authoritarian in essence even beyond the thaw after Stalin’s death. Even as liberalization was attempted by party leaders, these trends were unable to bolster the lack of legitimacy in both countries.

In both Poland and Hungary the distinction between “state” and “nation” is very stark. The state and its laws had for so long been controlled by “others” (Austrians, Nazis and Communists) who were neither Hungarian nor Polish that the “nation” was the only depository of their trust. Alien state structures therefore had little legitimacy. Czeslaw Milosz’s work, *The Captive Mind* indeed “captures” the psychological dimension of living in a closed society. There was little opportunity to develop a civil society outside of the Communist state apparatus and its compulsory mass organizations.
Nevertheless, in Poland the Catholic Church became a persistent counterweight to the Party. In the fall of 1956 workers in Poznan took to the streets to demand better work conditions. The “Polish October” was quickly put down. The situation remained very tense, however. Party members chose a new party leader, Wladislaw Gomulka, a reformer amenable to the workers’ demands and one who favored a “Polish route” to communism. This decision was taken without Moscow’s permission, and Soviet troops were soon deployed on the borders. Polish troops made their stand in Warsaw. Negotiations began with Moscow. Only after Khrushchev arrived in Warsaw and was completely satisfied that Poland would remain loyal to the Soviet bloc, did tensions abate and violence was avoided. Such was not the outcome in Hungary.

Meanwhile in Hungary, where students were soon marching in sympathy with reformism in Poland, the challenge to Soviet control was again led from the top of the political system by another reform prime minister, Imre Nagy. Students became increasingly radical, calling for open and democratic elections and withdrawal of Soviet troops. The statue of Stalin was toppled. Violence soon broke out. Despite the valiant efforts of the Hungarian insurrection, Russian troops invaded in November of 1956, quashed the revolution, and executed Nagy. Gomulka negotiated concessions for Poland and staved off total control by the Soviet Union. Nagy was not so lucky. In 1956, both Poland and Hungary, as captive nations, had at least sent a strong message to their captors.

**Bringing Down the Iron Curtain**  The opposition in 1956 that develops in Poland and Hungary makes for dramatic history (and provides great teaching material as well)! But it was only the beginning. Strikes and demonstrations break out in the Baltic coast area of Poland in 1970-71. But this time, the demands go beyond economic ones to those that demand freedom of the press and rights to unionization. In 1976, more strikes and more workers are imprisoned. From this point on we begin to see a more differentiated complex of oppositional elements and channels of protest. The Catholic Church becomes a key actor. Intellectuals and workers forge alliances, symbolized by KOR (Committee for the Defense of Workers). The Polish Pope, Karol Wojtyla, visited his homeland in 1979 and the massive crowds and the nationalist fervor that enveloped them revealed that the Polish nation was alive and well.

Pressure on the regime continued. To spread the word, *samizdat*, the critical, underground literature of the 1980s, became quite an industry in Poland (and Hungary as well) that provided a “free” press as an alternative to the Party newspapers. The major breakthrough in Central Europe, however, was the Solidarity movement in Poland that began in the Gdansk shipyards in the summer of 1980.
On strike again, the workers (and sundry intellectuals) occupied the shipyard and refused to leave until their demands had been met. They made it clear that they were not challenging the socialist state and its Communist Party. But they remained adamant about their Twenty One Points, which included the right to form free trade unions and with it a corollary—the right to strike. These demands, of course, struck at the heart of the Communist system that reserved to itself the leading role in a centralized decision-making process. This leading role of the Communist Party could not to be abridged.

The drama of the standoff inside the shipyards (and the life story of Solidarity) is well portrayed in a short documentary film in the “A Force More Powerful” series. The title of the film is “We’ve Caught God by the Arm.” In the film we meet most of the key actors in this crucial drama—including Lech Walesa, the young electrician who carried the day. (Timothy Garton Ash’s *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* also provides a sense of immediacy that only comes from an astute participant observer. Ash’s combination of journalism and history is masterful.)

The Solidarity trade union movement, that took on the Polish Communist Party and won and then grew to ten million members strong, is the harbinger of the end of the Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. The other regimes knew this. Consequently, the Solidarity movement was suppressed and a military government declared martial law. Strikes continued to paralyze the Polish economy however. Authoritarian rule could not restrain the pressures from civil society and in 1988 General Jaruzelski finally conceded defeat. There would have to be some kind of rapprochement with Solidarity. In 1989, in the midst of desperate economic conditions, Solidarity was legalized again and the Party began roundtable talks on elections and other matters with the Solidarity leadership.

No spectacular movement was the catalyst to the collapse of Hungary’s communist system. Opposition from intellectuals never jelled to the extent it did in Poland. Nevertheless, economic and political reform had been underway for some time under the aegis of the Party. Younger party leaders were quite tolerant of a more open society in Hungary and it was such reformist leaders in the Party that actually guided the transition from communism. In Poland the breakthrough had come from a workers’ movement; in Hungary reform begins from the top among party elites. The major public breakthrough comes in 1989 with the symbolic re-interment of the remains of Imre Nagy. Thousands attended the ceremony in Budapest’s Heroes Square. By early 1989, political parties were allowed to form and the issue of free elections had been broached. Hungary also played an important role in the successive revolutions in Eastern Europe by tearing down its barbed wire fence along the border with Austria and allowing
thousands of East Germans “vacationing” in Hungary a chance to escape. Today, along the border there is left only a small portion of that fence.

The collapse of the Iron Curtain came with a rush in 1989. Timothy Garton Ash’s famous quip in Prague in November of 1989 put it all in nutshell: “In Poland it took ten years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks: perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take 10 days!” (78) It did not actually take 10 days but is was a wonderful “sound-bite.” Later in his little paperback, *The Magic Lantern* (highly recommended as a short, fascinating read for undergraduates and high school students as a starter book on the revolutions in Europe in 1989) Ash gave a eulogy for the “thing that was comprehensively installed in the newly defined territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria and in the newly created German Democratic Republic after 1949, the thing called...socialism, totalitarianism, Stalinism...real existing socialism—that thing will never walk again. And if we can no longer talk of communism we should no longer talk of Eastern Europe, at least with a capital ‘E’ for Eastern. Instead, we shall have central Europe again...and above all, individual people, nations and states.” (131)

**Analyzing the Democratic Transitions**

Every student should know something about the revolutions in central and eastern Europe in 1989 and how they progressed across central and eastern Europe. What was unusual was the incredibly short time it took for the Communist regimes to collapse. The standard line in the West was that such regimes could never allow or generate any kind of internal change given that they were regimes of total control. Yet they unraveled in record time.

Having students follow the action in a democratic transition can help to organize and make concrete what might easily be overlooked in cursory reading about the democratic transitions in Poland and Hungary (or any number of the transitions eastern Europe). The following template can be used in itself, or it can be augmented with additional questions that the instructor might devise. In general these questions will work with exits from authoritarian regimes of different kind be they communist or non-communist. The process is essentially an analytical one where questions about the process of a democratic opening are “looked for” by the students initially, with the hope at some point they may be able to devise and ask questions of their own. Done as a comparative exercise, it brings home to students the variety of routes various actors in different countries have taken.

Students will have to have access to a text or supplementary readings that will be able to provide credible answers. (See the bibliography below for some sources.) But another important aspect of doing this analysis (whether it is done as an essay assignment, a role-playing exercise,
or a group project) is the fluidity of a democratic transition and its unpredictable nature. Transitions from authoritarian regimes begin not knowing where they will end. Political democracy? A “half-way house” between democracy and authoritarianism? A more severe personalistic dictatorship? Confusion? Violent confrontations? The opening of the regime, either initiated by the regime (still) in power or the opposition usually produces a sharp increase in popular activism. The problem then is the steering of the nascent expansion of civil society in the direction of democratic procedures.

Considerations in Analyzing a Democratic Transition

I. Undermining and Opening the Authoritarian Regime

Where, when and how do divisions within the Communist regime make their appearance? Who are the hardliners? The reformers? Does the Party initiate regime change? If so who are the main actors? Or is change initiated by an oppositional group or groups in civil society? Are there significant individuals or groups or events that break the cycle of fear? Does an external crisis or particular “triggering event” drive the opening or does the opening itself initiate regime change?

II. The Legacy of the Past

How long has the authoritarian regime been in power? Has the country a long tradition of authoritarianism or being dominated by other states? Have representative institutions been in place for a period of time in the past? How long ago?

III. The Cycle of Mobilization

Does the initial thaw produce a rapid increase in popular mobilization? Are there radical groups engaging in violence? Does instability become so dangerous that hardliners can win back reformers? Are there massive demonstrations? Does the mobilization wave crest only to be followed by apathy and depoliticization? Are there signs that the middle class then regards the present regime as indispensable to retain order in society? Are workers organizations mobilized and active? Has the opposition formulated demands? Are there signs that the regime is losing legitimacy? Are there “demonstration effects” from similar protests in neighboring countries?

Who appears to be available to manage a possible transition? Are key leaders making their appearance?
IV. Defusing and Managing the Military or Party Apparatus

Does the military or Party see itself as the institution representing the interest of the nation? To what degree is the military professionalized? Extent of factionalism in the military? Is there fear of a coup attempt by the military? Might the military no longer take orders from the Communist Party? Does it appear that the Party is willing to make concessions? Or apologies? Or promises to reform in order to stay in power?

V. Negotiation

What is the extent of pacts or agreements between the opposition and the Communist regime? What issues do they cover? Does the opposition demand release of political prisoners? What concessions are made by the Party? Does the Party demand that it control the military and security apparatus? Will the Party allow authentic, democratic elections? Elections with special restrictions? Is there extensive power sharing among the groups in the negotiating process?

VI. Settling Past Accounts

Were the armed forces or secret police directly responsible for repression? Indirectly responsible? What about the magnitude of repression? To what extent can (or should) Party members or members of the security forces be held responsible for crimes?

Some concluding remarks here on analyzing transitions to democracy might be helpful and pertinent. In the “transition” literature there is a distinction between a democratic transition and democratic consolidation. The concepts on the surface appear to be and are often used as temporal periods; that is, first a transition, then consolidation at some later date. Different political scientists, however, mark these periods in surprisingly different ways. Guiseppe Di Palma sees the transition as over when an agreement on democratic rules has been reached. Thus if the opposition exits an authoritarian regime via pacts or negotiations, once all sides agree on the rules they begin to act in much different ways. As they learn to “play by the rules” the hope is that a democratic commitment and ethos develops. Other political scientists call for a series of successful elections in order to seal the transition.

Consolidation is another issue. It takes more time and requires the development of stable and reliable democratic political institutions such that they persist over time and are perceived as legitimate. One empirical marker for consolidation that has caught on is whether a newly emerging democratic regime has had political parties that have been in power and relinquish it to
another party or parties over a series of elections. This formula is then easy to verify by comparing election results over time. (Try Electionworld.org or EurActiv.com)

What about the near future of Poland and Hungary (and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe) embarking on the project of democratization? Crawford and Lijphart have charted two courses for such countries. One route retains the “legacies of the past”; the other is consonant with the “imperatives of liberalization.” The first theory assumes the persistence of the past will shape and define new institutions well into the consolidation period. Perceptions of inferiority and victimization may lead to intolerance and inability to compromise—as well as nationalism. The old elites and institutions may perpetuate the old mentality of the Communist regimes. The “imperatives of liberalization” theory is more hopeful that new institutions and strong political parties can develop to challenge the “holdover” elites and that liberalism and a cosmopolitan perspective will prevail. (See Steiner, pp. 244-248.)

Most would agree that entering the European Union and NATO would certainly be a sign that democratic consolidation has been achieved by Poland and Hungary. Both countries are on the verge of joining the EU. Why not follow their progress on a website devoted to the European Union? Type in EurActiv.com When you get to the home page click on “countries.”

Sources for Teaching Contemporary Politics in Hungary and Poland

Standard textbooks will be most useful for distilled coverage of politics today in Hungary and Poland for those interested in incorporating these countries into their teaching of European politics. Different books, of course, will provide slightly different options. The two major ones seem to be the following:

a) A complete section of the text is devoted to Central and Eastern Europe This approach is taken by Jurg Steiner in his European Democracies. One chapter covers the history of the rise and fall of Communism; another chapter focuses on democratization and “marketization.” Poland and Hungary are prominently featured in both chapters. And both chapters include theoretical sections that attempt to explain the outcomes of the revolutions of 1989 and the transitions to democracy (see the section above). These two chapters cover a lot of ground in 75 pages. This text has been around for some time. It is pitched towards lower division undergraduates.

b) Poland and Hungary can also be studied as part of a text that assembles an array of countries in one book. These comparative textbooks have a few chapters that introduce the student to Europe and some of the distinctive aspects of European politics, i.e., electoral systems, parties, and government formation. The rest of the text consists of individual country studies. A
good example here is Almond, Dalton, and Powell, *European Politics Today* (New York: Longman, 2002). The authors claim to “bridge the East/West divide” by including Russia, Poland and Hungary in their text. This sort of text, with whole chapters on Poland and Hungary, provides much more depth about the politics of these countries than is available in the Steiner text. It also has the advantage that each chapter is written by expert country specialists. These books are more costly. They are more rapidly updated, however.

**Selected Bibliography**

The following titles are mainstream enough to work for general use. They are grouped into three general categories so that comparative contrasts might be more easily made between Hungary and Poland.

1) **Readings that set the stage for the revolutions of 1989**


2) **The revolutions of 1989**


3) **The transition and consolidation of democracy and free markets**

   This is a comprehensive work on the entire Hungarian transformation from 1957 to post communism.
NOTICE

Reproduction Basis

☐ This document is covered by a signed "Reproduction Release (Blanket)" form (on file within the ERIC system), encompassing all or classes of documents from its source organization and, therefore, does not require a "Specific Document" Release form.

☒ This document is Federally-funded, or carries its own permission to reproduce, or is otherwise in the public domain and, therefore, may be reproduced by ERIC without a signed Reproduction Release form (either "Specific Document" or "Blanket").