The Memphis Restructuring Initiative (MRI) was an attempt at comprehensive school reform in Tennessee that ended with a whimper. Its downfall seems to involve some sort of "schismogenesis" or "inversion," in which many teachers violently reacted against being overworked and overwhelmed, culminating in the easy discarding of 8 years of reform with hardly a tear shed. Although it is possible that a flaw existed within the reforms themselves, it is more likely that it existed in how reform progress swelled or "brought to scale." With specific reference to the reform models used, perhaps it was some admixture of administrative fiat and nostalgia that proximally realized the end. Another element involved in the demise of the reforms may have been a kind of silence that is engendered when "people think they are always right, whether in their machines or their ideas." This absence or dialogue or "dialectic" may have proven to be the final action that ended the reforms. Things might have turned out more positively if communication involved less dependence upon the technicalities of doing reform and incorporating a more encompassing approach. (Contains 61 references and 4 figures.) (RT)

by
Louis A. Franceschini III
University of Memphis

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L. A. Franceschini III

The tendency of educational development to proceed by way of reaction from one thing to another, to adopt for one year, or a term of seven years, this or that new study or method of teaching and then as abruptly to swing over to some new educational gospel, would be impossible if teachers were moved by their own independent intelligence. The willingness of teachers, especially of those occupying administrative positions, to become submerged in the routine details of their callings, to expend the bulk of their energies upon forms and rules and regulations, and reports, and percentages, is another example of the absence of intellectual vitality. If teachers were possessed by the spirit of an abiding student of education, this spirit would find some way of breaking through the mesh and coil of circumstances and would find expression for itself.

John Dewey, 1904, "The Relation of Theory to Practice."

We live in an age of abstractions, of bureaus and machines, of absolute ideas and crude messianism. We suffocate among people who think they are always right, whether in their machines or in their ideas. And for all those who can live only in an atmosphere of human dialogue ... this silence is the end of the world.

Albert Camus, 1964, "Neither Victims nor Executioners."

I. A JOURNALISTIC INTRODUCTION

A. A "RETURN TO NORMALCY" AND A FAILURE TO "BREAK THE MOLD"

When new Superintendent Johnnie B. Watson announced that he was ready to "pull the plug" on that which had made his district "Exhibit A in the push for comprehensive school reform" (Viadero, July 2001), he was effectively showing the door to a whole educational era that his predecessor had not only ushered in but wholeheartedly embraced. Still, it was only with mild surprise that some greeted Watson's announcement; for he had "at least seem[ed] ready for a change" several months before (Cashiola, November, 2000). "I suppose during her tenure was the time for that ... ," he was quoted as saying: the "her" an unnamed reference to former Superintendent Gerry House, the ambiguous "that" perhaps a veiled index of his displeasure. "If we could just stop experimenting and let the teachers teach. Some of the old things we did
weren't so bad. Let's keep the good and walk away from the rest" (Watson, quoted in Cashiola, November 2000).

Somewhat less opacity, however, attended the views of Watson's former boss, House's predecessor, and now two-time Memphis Mayor W. W. Herenton. Literally within days of the departing House's resignation, the Mayor was campaigning for a takeover of the district to make matters, in his words, more "effective, efficient, and responsive" (quoted in Branston, February 2000a; see also Baker, February 2000; Edmondson, Fontenay, & Anderson, January 2000; Fontenay, January 2000). That plan proving to be legislatively improbable, however (Dries et al., January 2000), Herenton then backed the then-interim Watson for permanent Superintendent, thus prompting the other, searched-for, out-of-town candidates immediately to withdraw (Edmondson, August 2000; September 2000). These others neither knowledgeable about nor having the mettle for the Memphis challenge, according to Herenton, only the local Watson could "calm the turbulent waters that the House administration had imposed .... Administrators and teachers either retired early or just really threw their hands up in frustration because of th[ose] reform measures" (quoted in Edmondson, August 2000).

And yet, no such histrionics were on display at the moment of final reckoning on June 18th, 2001. School now weeks out of session, thus it happened that the Memphis Board of Education meeting was sparsely attended, its agenda correlative short, and what followed commensurately swift: first, Watson's pronouncement of judgment, then an anticlimactic call for the evidence, and finally, a moving on to a set of unspecified "best practices" (Edmondson, June 2001; Edmondson & Erskine, June 2001; Erskine, July 2001). As to the "models" that were said to contain these, both they and their nationally-acclaimed sponsor -- a winner of multiple awards and Superintendent of the Year in 1999 (Anderson, December 1999b; Anderson, February, 1999; Garlington, September, 1998) -- were found wanting by Memphis standards and hence, without qualification and for good, dismissed.

Yet admitted even by Superintendent House's own supporters -- and even by House herself (Anderson, April 2000; Kushma, August 1999; Richard, February 2001) -- was that her "bold plans for school restructuring" (Stringfield, Ross, & Smith, 1996) had failed to "break the mold" on standardized achievement tests system wide (Anderson & Edmondson, January 2000;
Branston, January 1997; Branston, February, 2000b; Cashiola, November 2000; Ross, August 2001). While the Superintendent's "models" did appear to have a positive impact on at least some schools, to at least some degree (Anderson, March 1999; Anderson, June 2000; Commercial Appeal Editorial, June 2001; Olsen, May, 1998; Ross, et al., 1997; Ross et al., 1998; Ross et al., 1999), such riders tended to get lost in a thrust and parry of dueling statistics that had accumulated over time: the thrust coming from studies done by House's university-based research team; the parry drawn from reports generated by the district's own Office of Research or issued by the State itself.

B. CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS OF THE MRI'S "EFFECTIVENESS"

For example, in June 1998 -- or just past "mile three" in the MRI "marathon" (Stringfield & Ross, 1997; also House, 2000) -- reported by the Memphis Commercial Appeal was a district-driven, internal review of House's "track record" that showed "Memphis City Schools' test scores have remained flat or gone down during Supt. Gerry House's six-year tenure as the district's top teacher" (Anderson, June 1998b). In rapid response came a "letter to the editor" from a leader of the external research team that chided the paper (and the district research office) for "neglect[ing] to tell the more important part of the story" (Stringfield, July 1998). In the writer's view, because (a) an international group of experts would not have come to Memphis had they not believed our efforts "were anything other than state of the art"; because (b) one his own colleagues, "spoke in Washington about the Memphis restructuring initiative" and "[p]eople all over the country believe Memphis's efforts are among the most promising"; and because (c) that indications were "that Memphis's plan is starting to pay off" at a select 25 of the district's elementary schools -- but apparently at none of its middle and high schools -- the story was objectionable. Rather than kick against the goad of "scaling up" (Hatch, 2000; Stringfield & Datnow, 1998) he admonished his Memphis audience that "[n]ow would be an excellent time to get behind the Memphis City Schools and Supt. House, and help push forward. Your children deserve no less" (Stringfield, July 1998).

Two years later, the same sorts of anomalous accounts appeared, only in different order of publication. Given front-page coverage and banner headlines, the new word from the external

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1 See the addendum for more about this team.
research team was that it had now found that "Memphis elementary schools that adopted new ways of teaching in the mid-1990s are showing more academic progress than schools that waited several years to make the change" and that the aforementioned subset of schools -- now down from 25 sites to 23 -- "outperformed the cumulative academic gains of 839 elementaries statewide" (Anderson, June 2000). About six weeks later, however, the Nashville Bureau of the Commercial Appeal brought seemingly contradictory news that was, to say the least, disconcerting: that (a) fully "[t]wenty-six of the 48 public schools identified by the state Friday as low-performing and in need of help are in the Memphis City Schools system"; that (b) schools which "don't improve substantially could be placed on probation"; and that (c), absent sufficient improvement, ultimately "their school system could face a state takeover" (Locker & Turner, July 2000; Commercial Appeal Editorial, July 2000). Indeed, that the trouble in River City seems not to abated but, if anything, has deepened since was suggested by even more discomfiting news from the same source. Issued in the fall of 2001, a recent update of state-identified "low-performing" schools in the Memphis City Schools now places their number at 64 of 98 Tennessee institutions, up from more than half (54%) to almost two-thirds (65%) of the list (Locker & Erskine, September 2001; also Branston, 2002; Casiola, October 2001).

C. HOUSE'S LEADERSHIP AND SOME GROWING DOUBTS

However, if these mixed messages tended to befog the issue of the reforms' efficacy, they seemed also to render the public increasingly of "two minds" about their primary patron -- Superintendent House herself. A self-described "visionary" (Reel, June 1991; also, Perrusquia, June 1991) who was later to be described by others as so "goal-oriented" as to have "routinely worked 70-hour weeks" (citation in Anderson, April 2000), Dr. N. Gerry House quickly emerged as the front runner in Memphis's first-ever national search for a district Superintendent and just as quickly began leveraging the felt need for change that had swept her into appointment (Christion, January 1992; Risher, February 1992). With reformist plans and agendas locally abounding (Waters, June 1992) -- one of them including a bid for housing one or more of the NASDC "lighthouse schools" described under the Goals 2000 aegis (Brosnan, August 1991; Reel, July 1991) -- there were everywhere nods of assent as the new Superintendent indefatigably attended this meeting or that function, insisting "the old ways were not working"
(Christion, May 1992; Waters, May 1992; also Alberg quoted in Anderson, May 1998) and that new ways must be discovered.

1. FOLLOWERSHIP PROBLEMS: TEACHERS

Among such "new ways" -- and within the Memphis Restructuring Initiative (MRI) there were several (Hess, 1999; Hill et al., 2000; Christion, December 1994) -- what were to be collectively called "the models" ultimately became the centerpiece (Commercial Appeal uncredited news story, February 1998). But hardly had the decision to do them become public (Derks, February 1995; Christion, April 1995; Commercial Appeal uncredited news story, May 1995) than did indications of a disgruntled teaching force and of an uncomprehending Memphis-at-large begin to surface. Planning initially to include only some 10 to 15 sites in a first cohort, the district nevertheless decided to "scale up" that number to 34, given schools' greater-than-expected interest in the models and the level of "understanding and ... evidence of faculty and community support" exhibited. (Commercial Appeal uncredited news story, May 1995). However, a rather unsettling index of the depth of that "understanding" and "support" emerged only days later when some 700 teachers learned in an assembly that they would be required not only to undergo summer training but also sign a contract addendum or transfer to another school. Apparently taken aback by these demands, many teachers "voiced second thoughts and obvious anger," according to a Commercial Appeal account; and one teacher in particular "drew applause when he told the teachers gathered ... 'In the dark, we voted for the program. Having shed light on the program, we can vote again'" (Derks, May 1995).

2. FOLLOWERSHIP PROBLEMS: THE GENERAL PUBLIC

While most teachers seemed to have been quickly and for different reasons mollified (Derks, June 1995a, 1995b), yet a similar lack of information, if not a similar voicing of "second thoughts," was observed among the public when it was later that year more formally canvassed. In a Commercial Appeal poll of 591 Memphis adults, only 12% even recognized the name "New American Schools Development Corporation," compared with numbers in excess of 50% who were familiar with other district concerns. Moreover, as to the impact of the Superintendent's reforms enacted heretofore, an aggregate 72% of respondents saw only "dubious progress" when asked if the district's schools were getting better, staying about the same, or getting worse. In
response to that question, the optimistic (19.8%) were outstripped by the pessimistic (39.7%) by a nearly two-to-one margin (Davis, October 1995).

3. WILL THE "REAL" GERRY HOUSE PLEASE STAND?

Although no such "reform" issues were addressed in later public referenda, whatever expressions of ambivalence there were in 1995 can yet be seen to have carried through to the end of House's tenure, ultimately settling on the Superintendent herself. Asking that "the real Gerry House please stand" (Chang, July 2001), one Memphis professor of business and economics observed that while this national Superintendent of Year for 1999 had "managed a large inner-city school district without major scandals, ushered in a number of major reforms, and improved the performance of some schools," still he wondered aloud why it was that Memphians "continue to see poor test scores coming out of the Memphis City Schools." How, he asked, "can a superintendent who failed to improve test scores earn so much admiration from her peers?"

Similar but somewhat more personal notes were struck by a local news analyst who referred to House as "a wine-and-cheese Superintendent in a cold-cuts town" (Branston, February 2000b). On the one hand, he noted, she "played well to wealthy, highly educated people and seemed most comfortable with them." But on the other, he opined, "surrounded by a palace guard," she tended to insulate herself from contact with persons of lesser station and to "let others face the press and take the heat" when standard operating procedures went conspicuously awry.

More than merely "a palace guard," it would have nevertheless seemed to have required a small army to "take the heat" that confronted Superintendent House in late 1999, only weeks before the announcement of her surprise resignation. Convinced that their individual and anonymous complaints had been ineffectual, then did literally "hundreds of city teachers jam ... school board headquarters ... to tell board members they're overworked and overwhelmed" (Anderson, November 1999; also Anderson, December 1999a; Commercial Appeal Editorial, November 1999). Unruffled and apparently unmoved, however, the Superintendent offered only that "lagging test scores in city schools leave no room for the faint-hearted" and merely conceded that she would "convene a committee ... to decide" whether their problems warranted redress. The teachers feeling that the Superintendent had still failed to hear them, a rejoinder from one of
their number -- "I love to teach - just let me do it," -- was, as happened in that 1995 meeting years earlier, "nearly drowned out by thundering applause" (Anderson, November 1999).

D. "TRICKS" RELATIVE TO "LESSONS LEARNED"

1. MEMPHIS PAROCHIALISM

Ironically enough, the cautionary, practitioner-directed advice recently offered in Colgan's (2002) recent "Memphis Blues" is consistent with the wished-for point of the description preceding: namely, that when it comes to the Memphis experience with Comprehensive School Reform Models (CSRM) "determining what lessons to learn from the district's experience can be tricky" (p. 10). If, indeed, the success or failure of such models is to a large extent contingent on the district's "operating environment" (Berends et al., 2001; Berends et al., 2002; Bodilly, 1998; Bodilly et al., 1998; NAS, 2002b), then the rather idiosyncratic nature of the Memphis context would seem to undercut a simple transfer of those lessons to other places. While the Memphis district is, like its sister NAS "jurisdictions," a large urban one beset with all of the usual problems, still the city of Memphis in which it is situated is not a Los Angeles, Philadelphia, or Miami-Dade, but rather a far less cosmopolitan, more parochial place. Much like a small American town, it tends to be, as Sommerfeld (January 1998) noted in her Quality Counts piece on Memphis, "suspicious of outsiders" and their influence (see, also, Branston, August 2000; Cashiola, October 2000). Perhaps because of this insular tendency, it is also one historically given to political bossism and cronyism -- not for nothing did the great W. C. Handy immortalize the so-called "Red Snapper," former Memphis mayor Edward Hull "Boss" Crump, in the original "Memphis Blues" (Crawford, 1976).

2. THE POLITICS OF RACE

Relatedly, there is also Memphis's situatedness in the American South, and all that that locale evokes. Although only slightly less blunted by the influx of other ethnicities, the prominence of the issue of "race" in Memphis is such that it makes its way to almost every other matter of civic interest, school reform included. Seeming only to compound her own "outsider" status was that Superintendent House's appeal was largely to those constituencies most resembling those of her Chapel Hill-Carboro home district -- the white, the better educated, and
the more affluent -- and not to those of lesser social station who seem naturally to gravitate
towards a plain-folks individual like "just Johnnie B." Watson (Branston, October 2000; Erskine
& Edmondson, September 2000). Indeed, the fact that Watson does not have a doctorate might
be considered, in some Memphis quarters, a selling point on his resumé.

3. CONFLICTING "RESEARCH-BASED" ACCOUNTS

Yet, these idiosyncracies aside, what undoubtedly makes Memphis most "tricky" vis à vis
the subject of "lessons learned" with CSRM{s is the contradictory accounts of "effectiveness"
rendered by the university-based research team anointed by House, the district team in Watson's
employ, and, included for good measure, the RAND education team contracted by the New
American Schools (NAS). The most sanguine of the three, the university-based team fixates
strongly on elementary schools, employs a shifting baseline of "non-restructuring" schools as its
counterfactual, and uses school-level data that, for all of its "value-added" precision, tends to
gloss confounding issues related to student mobility and teacher "reactivity" (Traub, 1999). By
far the most negative and pilloried of the trio (Colgate, 2002; McLean, 2001, NAS, 2002b), the
district team looks at all schools, controls for possible mobility effects, but "pocket-vetoed" in
attempting to acquire student-level data from Dr. William Sanders (personal communication
Calaway, 2001), relies on more traditional measures and tends to skirt critical issues of
implementation (Calaway, 2001). Finally and, so to speak, "splitting the difference," the RAND
team considers both "implementation and performance" (Berends et al., 2001) but only in NAS
schools and only over two years. While using the same "value-added" data as Ross et al. (2001)
-- subject again to the same sort of student mobility issues -- RAND's use of it as a stable
baseline and its factoring in of upper-level schools suggests a picture brighter than that painted
by the district but decidedly more gray than that rendered by the university-based analysts.

E. PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT ACCOUNT

While the present paper cannot hope to engage these reports on a technical level, what it
does hope to do is move back and forth between them as accounts and in that "dialectical tacking
between the most local of local detail and the most global of global structure" (Geertz, 1983, p.
69) to shed light on the some of paradoxes attending them. In similar fashion, it seeks to
illuminate the nature of that "leadership" deemed essential to success by all three reckonings but
which is so often so vaguely defined by them. With respect to both matters, it intends to evoke a body of social, largely organizational, thinking that Fullan (1993) has called "new paradigm," others "multi frame" (Bolman & Deal, 1991a, 1991b, 1997) and still others "fifth generational" (Handy, 1995, p. 34) and to make use of two complementary ways of mapping this new-found conceptual territory: the first way, a more "ideographic" approach that proceeds from Charles Hampden-Turner's "dilemma theory" (e.g., Hampden-Turner 1971, 1981, 1990; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2002); the second way, a more "nomothetic" one directed at the elusive construct of "effectiveness" and developed by Robert Quinn and his colleagues -- the so-called "Competing Values Framework" (e.g., Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Faerman & Quinn, 1985; Hart & Quinn, 1993; Quinn, 1988; Quinn, 1996; Quinn, Thompson, Faerman, & McGrath 1996; Spreitzer & Quinn, 2001).

II. AMENDING FAULTY MAPS OF CHANGE: HAMPDEN-TURNER'S "DILEMMA THEORY"

A. THE PROBLEM OF SEEING THE FOREST AND THE TREES

In a classic essay on "Getting Reform Right," Fullan and Miles (1992) indicated that perhaps the chief reason that so many so often got reform wrong was their "faulty maps of change" (p. 745). While the dubious propositions underwriting such "maps" are, in their view, several, perhaps the most basic of these errors is a "'hyperrationalization' of reform" (Fullan & Miles, 1992, following Wise, 1977) that grievously underestimates both the complexity and the difficulty of continuous improvement. Say Fullan and Miles, it is hard enough to accomplish what they (and others) have called "first-order" changes in the various bits and pieces of reform. "[A]ll the more daunting," they aver, are those that hope for changes in "school culture, teacher/student relationships, and values and expectations of the system," changes that are, in sum, both "[d]eeper and second-order" in character (p. 746).

Grounded on some of the aforementioned "new paradigm" literature -- most typically that part of it highlighting chaos, complexity, and evolutionary theories of change -- Fullan (1993, 1999) has since attempted to counter the several errors in many educators' "faulty maps" by articulating some propositions of his own. Noting that these "must go together as a set," Fullan (1993, p. 21) avers that these diverse propositions of his "only have power in combination"
(Fullan, 1999, p. 29), for individually they are not themselves "the map" but the coordinates of a larger pattern that concerns one's ability to work with polar opposites: simultaneously pushing for change while allowing self-learning to unfold; being prepared for a journey of uncertainty; seeing problems as sources of creative resolution; having a vision but not being blinded by it; valuing the individual and the group; incorporating centralizing and decentralizing forces; being internally cohesive but externally oriented; valuing personal change agentry as a route to system change. (Fullan, 1993, p. 40)

By "honoring opposites simultaneously" (Fullan, 1993, p. 36), consideration of each of these themes or "coordinates" in isolation may be useful in effecting movement or "first-order change." Complexity is involved but it is largely of the type that Fullan, following Senge (1990), refers to as "detailed" and that entails "identifying all the variables that could influence a problem (Fullan, 1993, p. 20). However, if it is, in fact, "systemic" or "second order change" that is sought then not "detailed" but rather "[d]ynamic complexity ... [becomes] ... the real territory of change" (p. 20) -- that sort of change insisting that attention, attention must be paid not just serially, with respect to individual "coordinates" but also holistically, with regard to each coordinate's relationship to every other coordinate, as well as to the map overall.

Evoking these sorts of distinctions help to explain why reforming even the above-mentioned bits and pieces of a system, while "seemingly simple" (Fullan & Miles, 1992, p. 746), is hard; and why effecting so-called "deeper" change -- change that goes to the nature of the system itself -- is both rarer and exponentially more difficult. Amounting to a kind of "rocket science" (Fullan, 1999, p. 5), such "second-order change" would seem then to require an appropriately new order of thought: a "shift of mind" that Senge (1990, pp. 68-92) himself has called "the fifth discipline," that others have referred to as "double-loop" (Argyris & Schön, 1996) or "deutero-learning," (Bateson, 1972), and still others have denoted as "encompassing reason" (Hampden-Turner, 1981, 1990; May, 1969; Tillich 1959). Appropriate to the sort of "dynamic complexity" discussed by Fullan (1993) and Senge (1990), this "encompassing reason" is so called because, at one level, it thinks in terms of "circles of influence" (Senge, 1990, p. 75), after the manner of a cybernetic feedback loop. At another level, however, such reason may be suitably labeled "encompassing" because it "encompasses alternatives and answers not in terms
either/or but of both/and" (Hampden-Turner, 1981, p. 59). More holistic and dialectical than that to which we are accustomed, such thinking perfects for Senge (1990) "the art of seeing the forest and the trees" (pp. 127-135).

B. GRAPHIC ENABLERS: HAMPDEN-TURNER'S "DILEMMA" MAPPING

To enable this kind of "seeing," it is Senge's more abstract wont (1990) to sketch several recurring, system archetypes (pp. 378-390) upon which he maps certain illustrative case studies. For the same purposes but proceeding from a more "therapeutic" background, Charles Hampden-Turner's approach is to begin by surfacing particular "dilemmas" -- be they personalistic and existential or organizational and corporate -- and then mapping these onto a cybernetic loop having several dimensions. When several such dilemmas are under examination at one time, the result is a "multi-axis chart" that consists of several lines in simultaneous opposition. When the resolution of one particular dilemma in the set is sought, the gestalt is decomposed and the tool of choice becomes the "dual axis chart." On charts such as these, four points have been traditional: two points in extremis -- the one being "top heavy" (9/1) and the other "lop sided" (1/9) -- that privilege one horn of the dilemma over another; a third that represents a position of "compromise" or appeasement (5/5) that inauthentically papers over the conflict; and a fourth, point of "synergy" (10/10) in which the values associated with the two horns dovetail in a "wisdom of finest fit" (Hampden-Turner, 1981, p. 161).

1. MAPPING DILEMMAS: THE MULTI-AXIS CHART

That such methods are applicable to educational issues has been demonstrated by Hampden-Turner himself in addressing "the hoary old controversy between 'traditional' educators with authorities transmitting knowledge versus 'progressive' educators who encourage the natural initiative and noble savagery of students" (p. 151; also pp. 210-211). As may be seen in Figure 1, a multi-axis rendering of the problem shows the college or school traditionally a) designing curricula, b) abstracting concepts, c) subjecting these to doubt and questioning d) and transmitting these to students authoritatively, e) for purposes of analysis and individual enlightenment/excellence. To fulfill such purposes optimally, however, requires that schools or colleges complete the circuit, says Hampden-Turner. This they may do by embracing such progressive and opposing values as 1) adapting curricula to student interests/needs in 2)
addressing concrete problems that enable 3) the forging of individual convictions 4) and the "leading out" of latent capacities 5) so that personally-wrought syntheses may emerge and serve the common weal (see Figure 1).

2. MAPPING DILEMMAS: THE DUAL-AXIS CHART

Yet decomposing this "virtuous circle" into its various "binary pairs" promotes closer examination of and reflection upon its particulars: namely, (a-1) designing/adapting; (b-2) abstracting/concretizing; (c-3) questioning/convincing; (d-4) transmitting/educing; (e-5) analyzing/synthesizing; and (f-6) individually excelling/socially contributing. The latter pair taken as an example and graphed in dual-axis fashion (see Figure 2), the result suggests to Hampden-Turner (1981) that inflating the value of personal excellence conduces to a top-heavy (9/1) kind of "19th century individualism," wherein students are "graded linearly and invidiously compared" and "grade-grubbing [is] rampant." In reverse image, however, it is Hampden-Turner's observation that the deflation of "excellence" in lop-sided (1/9) fashion is hardly to be preferred, since this excessive privileging of communalism tends to make a kind of balkanization or "[g]roupiness predominant." However, when both values operate "synergically" (9/9), "[g]roups reward their most excellent members who reward their groups," according to Hampden-Turner, and there is a sort of normed or "organized individuality" (p. 211). Therein, one value alternately "frames" the other or conversely acts as "ground" to the other's "figure" (Hampden-Turner, 1990, pp. 121-125, 147-148).

C. MAPPING THE DILEMMA OF THE "MEMPHIS BLUES"

Via the use of a dual axis chart, mapping yet another recurrent educational dilemma -- one outlined in Levin's (1992, [1978]) "Why isn't Educational Research More Useful?" and later elaborated by Husén (1988) -- may help illuminate why "learning lessons" from the Memphis CSR accounts has proven to be so "tricky" (Colgate, 2002). In the domain of educational politics, something like Hampden-Turner's (9/9) "synergy" would seem to obtain when the interaction of researchers and decision-makers generates "a climate of opinion" (Kennedy, 1999) that invites what may be termed "enlightened" educational policy (Weiss, 1979) and/or "reflective practice" (Schön, 1983). However, it is the view of both Levin and Husén that certain differences that are "natural" and "intrinsic" (Levin, 1992, p. 77) to the two parties make this
"synergic" outcome more exception than rule, and thus also conspire to make educational research, to varying degrees, seem "useless." Asserting that some of these naturally-occurring differences owe significantly to the incentive structures and constraints under which the two groups operate, still what both Levin and Husén take to be most inhibiting to these minds meeting may have less to with present externalities than with prior enculturation: the fact that researchers and policy makers adhere to competing "value-orientations" (Husén, 1988, p. 175) as a result of their being, as students of Heidegger might say, differently "constituted" or "enworlded" (Dreyfus, 1991, especially pp. 10-29; Lemay & Pitts, 1994, especially pp. 44-53).

Using John Holland's "theory of careers" to study academic disciplines, Smart, Feldman, and Ethington (2000) have provided a quite useful account both of what these "value orientations" or "two cultures" (Husén, 1988, p. 175) entail as well as some index of their social-psychological distance from one another. In Holland's theory, the myriad of occupations and academic majors are categorized into six broad "environments" that differentially attract persons of six "types" of abilities and interests. Arraying these "environments" and "types" around a hexagon, Holland suggests that those in contiguous relationship share characteristics and are thus in some measure compatible. Quite incompatible, however, are those "environments" and their corresponding person-types at two removes along the hexagon; for these represent ways of thinking, behaving, and -- above all -- valuing that are profoundly opposed.

1. THE "KNOWLEDGE" ORIENTATION OF RESEARCHERS

In grouping majors, "educational research" Smart, Feldman, and Ethington (2000) have construed as largely attracting "I-type" or "Investigative" individuals. As described in Holland’s theory, such persons generally

prefer activities that entail the observational, symbolic, systematic, and creative investigation of ... phenomena ... and they avoid persuasive, social, and repetitive activities. These behavioral tendencies of Investigative people lead, in turn, to the acquisition of scientific and mathematical competencies and to a deficit in leadership abilities. Investigative people perceive themselves as cautious, complex, curious, independent, precise, rational, and scholarly, and they value the development of the acquisition of knowledge. (p. 36)
2. THE "POWER" ORIENTATION OF POLICY-MAKERS

Poles apart on Holland's hexagon, however, these "knowledge-seeking" individuals are yet apt to find themselves at sea if not at odds with so-called "E-type" or Enterprising persons -- the "movers and shakers" and, more often than not, the very policy makers to whom they are beholden and must report. Having no particular interest in knowledge per se, yet not at all insensitive to what it can represent and/or secure, such "power-seeking" enterprising types conversely prefer activities that involve the manipulation of others to attain organizational goals or economic gain, and ... avoid scientific, intellectual, or abstruse activities. These behavioral tendencies of Enterprising individuals lead, in turn, to an acquisition of leadership, interpersonal, speaking, and persuasive competencies and to a deficit in scientific ability. Enterprising people perceive themselves as aggressive, ambitious, [and] domineering ... and they value material accomplishment and social status. (p. 37)

D. CHARTING THE TWO EXTREMES

1. THE (1/9) EXTREME -- "PROPAGANDA"

When these two divergent "value-orientations" are charted in Hampden-Turner fashion -- the interest in "knowledge" that marks the Investigator on the "x" axis and the "power" or "action" preferred by the Enterpriser on the "y" -- what results are three points that fall short of the aforementioned "synergic" one and thus suggest different linkages of educational policy and practice that are, to differing degrees, "useless" (see Figure 3). As Levin (1992 [1978]) himself points out, "knowledge" undercut by "power" (1/9) gives rise to a lop-sided "propaganda" (p. 77), with investigators figuratively, if not literally, placed "under the gun" by the decision-maker's restrictions. Under this scenario, says Levin, researchers could be "required to address a specific list of problems," "given rigid deadlines for reporting results," "requested to write their ... reports for the non-specialist" and "coerced into presenting only those findings that are politically acceptable" (p. 77). Although possible, such a scenario would be nevertheless infeasible, in Levin's view, for to adopt the policies that issue under these terms "would so corrupt the research process that it would no longer be useful for making decisions" (p.77). Moreover, the long-run impact of such maneuvering would be ultimately self-defeating, says Levin, with the public continually finding itself burned by the policies themselves and thus
gradually coming to recognize such research for what it is: merely a "propaganda activity of the State with no credibility beyond that" (p. 77).

2. THE (9/1) EXTREME -- "THAT ED SCHOOL STUFF"

Conversely and at the other extreme may be placed those research/policy linkages in which researchers feel themselves to be under no "gun" at all. Often snubbed by practitioners as "that Ed School stuff" (Weiss, 1995; also Datnow, 1999) what emerges under this aegis are accounts that are "top-heavy" (9/1) with idiosyncratic questions opaque to practitioners' agendas, answers that come too late to be of genuine assistance, implications that are all but unactionable, and with all of the above swathed in an impenetrable jargon that only the authors and their immediate colleagues have the Rosetta Stone to decode. While such research may indeed have method in it, it is nevertheless madness from the public's perspective and thus like its (1/9) counterpart is equally self-defeating. Failing as it must to improve practice, such research erodes the confidence of funders and inclines them to put their dollars elsewhere. Often having little confidence in research in the first place, practitioners may see in it their prophecies self-fulfilled and thus, over time, may also become ever less disposed to snap to and take notice when "research says."

3. MARKING THE (5/5) COMPROMISES

a) THE "HALF-FULL" ACCOUNT OF THE EXTERNAL TEAM

While not quite so pernicious but "useless" still are those policy/practice linkages that attempt to play to both orientations but in so "compromised" (5/5) a fashion that neither interest - knowledge or power -- is fully served. In deference to the knowledge orientation, such research "tells the truth" but only "mostly," as Huck Finn once said of his creator, "the story," indeed, but not "the whole story." Yet what in the first place prompts such ellipses and glosses are its concession to "power," a capitulation that would seem to be one part self-deception and another part wish-fulfillment. While the "wish" may be born of a desire to stay in good graces, or in business, or, more simply, employed, the motivation is unimportant as the end result is the same: an account that "satisfices" but ultimately does not satisfy, that raises just as many questions as it answers, and that, while preaching to the converted, merely confuses the uncommitted. In this
regard, the acknowledged "tricky" accounts that have surfaced about Memphis may be a case in point.

At present, the word from the head of the external research team studying the MRI is that what really "doomed the initiative was former superintendent Gerry House's mandate that all Memphis schools adopt reform models. Even schools that were already showing success and had highly satisfied teachers and parents were required to come on board" (Ross, August 2001). Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Superintendent may herself have been provoked -- or at least not slowed -- in her efforts by her external research team's own overly sanguine interpretation of findings: a kind of reading that Hatch (2000) has generically referred to as "half-full accounts" of the CSRM literature. In Hatch's view, such "half-full" accounts are characterized by two rhetorical gestures: first, they tend to "focus on accomplishments, trumpet achievements, and make bold claims about the future" (p. 340); and second, they implicitly or explicitly press for "scaling up" -- "the Holy Grail of educational reform" (p. 339) -- despite perceptible signals that "many of the conditions needed ... are not yet in place" (p. 351). While Hatch allows that such accounts may in the short run be benign, over the long haul they may just as "likely lead to the conclusion that the CSRD Program is failing" and prompt "an inevitable backlash against the schools, designs, and proponents of these initiatives" (p. 351).

Involved with the MRI by their own admission "literally ... before schools were aware that options were about to be offered to them" (Ross et al., 2001, p. 340), the external research team could thus not have helped to witness the problems that quickly surfaced, that only multiplied throughout initiative's "scale up," and that finally and explosively erupted when in late November 1999 those "hundreds of teachers" (Anderson, November 1999) packed themselves into the Memphis City Schools auditorium to protest. Yet, in their accounts, there is little about the "second thoughts and obvious anger" (Derks, May 1995) that followed hard upon the district's initial decision to more than double the number of schools involved. Rather, the picture they present suggests having to restrain schools' enthusiasm by winnowing through 58 applications and "deciding to restrict the number of schools that would participate the 1st year to about 30" (Ross et al., 2001, p. 340). Moreover, although it seems to have very early observed (Datnow, 2000) that schools' adoption of models proceeded in an often hasty, ill-informed, and "political" way, apparently the gravity of such flaws in "how schools choose externally-
developed reform models" (Datnow, 1999) does not seem to have been fully appreciated until well into the MRI and thus to have been afforded even ampler opportunity to be fruitless and multiply.

Yet despite these problems and the additional fact that, according to a Education Week article, "the academic experts got an earful" when they asked the first two cohorts of Memphis teachers about the reforms (Olsen, April, 1997; Nunnery et al., 1997), still the dominant tenor of the external team's reporting remained upbeat. In an article published nearly a year later, one such expert with ties to the external team opined: "When people ask me 'Where is an urban system that has a vision of where it's going and a plausible plan of how it's going to get there?' then Memphis would be at the top of my list (Slavin quoted in Sommerfeld, January 1998). Optimistically cited in the same article, the head of the external team observed how few Memphis teachers had asked for reassignment to schools better suited to their philosophies, apparently failing to consider that teachers may not have wished to move for any number of other reasons. And yet the article significantly goes on to note that

Not everyone is so upbeat. One reformer who works with the district and asked not to be identified says that it is still at heart an old-fashioned, immobile bureaucracy. Though the Superintendent is committed to change, enough of her troops are not, so the status quo prevails, this observer says. New teachers enter with enthusiasm but quickly adapt to an organizational culture of inertia....

Too often, the reformer says, she hears teachers express pride that their schools have the second-best test scores in the city, while overlooking the fact that even the best schools are performing poorly compared with the rest of the state and the nation. (quoted in Sommerfeld, January 1998)

Not wishing to allow teachers to "overlook the fact," the district itself, as noted in the introduction, released a June 1998 report that documented the poor overall performance but that was also, as also noted in the introduction, frowned upon by one of the external team's most prominent members. Because the report's global assessment obscured the fact that some gains had been found at 25 elementary schools, it had, in his view, done a disservice to "one of the most promising reform efforts in the nation, and one of the most discussed around the world." Just as the experiment was, in his words, "starting to pay off," here there seemed to be this
reluctance about the need "to get behind Supt. House, and help push forward" (Stringfield, 1998).

Yet much more than diffidence was expressed when the fourth, last, and most recalcitrant cohort of Memphis schools were forced to adopt models during the 1998-99 school year and reacted with much more than the previously heard "earful" (Olson, April 1997). Arguably because their voices were more strident and politically louder than those of their lower-performing predecessors were the external team finally to take note of some "relaxing a bit in terms of zeal" and to declare how "[t]hings were starting to deteriorate, even in the fall of 1999" (Ross, quoted in Viadero, 2001). In any case, what the external team had viewed as a slow and steady climb in "value-added" test scores, even they had to admit "dropped dramatically" in the MRI's fifth and final year (Colgate, 2002, p. 14). Although the team continues "to study why" and "speculates that one reason might be that a new superintendent was on the way" (Colgate, 2002, p. 14), what most observers in Memphis agree was a "surprise resignation" (see, for example, Baker, February 2000) make the grounds for this inference more than a little tenuous.

b) THE DISTRICT TEAM AND "LEGITIMATORY RESEARCH"

At the same time, to say that the external team's "half full" account of the MRI is open to interpretation is certainly not to say that district's own account (Calaway, 2001) is definitive. Indeed, that the Watson administration may itself think otherwise is suggested not only by the manner of the report's introduction -- the verdict preceding the evidence -- but also by the Superintendent's own statements made after its release. For example, in the Education Week article that broke the national story, the decision as Watson presents it is one based only "in part ... on a six month's study." As to the remainder, that he ascribes to his personal observations of "parents and teachers" whose numbers are not disclosed but who "everywhere [he] went" volunteered that "the reform models were not working." From there, he says, proceeding by his own lights, under his own steam, and according to his own system of weights and measures, "I just put the objective evidence together with the subjective, anecdotal evidence and made a professional decision" (quoted in Viadero, July 2001).

Yet precisely what metric and how much weight Watson may have used in his bookkeeping suddenly became somewhat less clear when, November last, it was finally his turn.
to deal with the stigma of low-performance and the threat of State takeover. When a local representative to the State Board of Education suggested that Memphis students be held to lower standards, Watson cried high-poverty, incomparability, and vigorously agreed. "I'm all for accountability," Watson said. "But ... we need to stop letting half-baked standardized testing determine what we teach and how we teach. It's controlling the school system." (quoted in Edmondson, November 2001a; also November 2001b). Perhaps reminded of his earlier decision, the Superintendent backpedaled within days but not before at least one news analyst noted the discrepancy: for wasn't it "in an effort to raise test scores" and "in favor of a more standardized curriculum" that "Watson himself unilaterally threw out his predecessor Gerry House's free-lancing 'reforms'" (Branston, November 2002)?

When coupled with the before-the-fact opinions expressed by the present Superintendent and the Memphis mayor who endorsed him, such after-the-fact questions like these would seem to suggest that while the conduct of the research may have been one thing, its rationale may have been another. Although not quite "propaganda," key to understanding this "compromise" may reside less in examining its substance than investigating its form and function -- a function that the Australian researcher Keeves (1988) has called "legitimatory."

Unlike genres of research that are explicitly change-oriented -- action research and participatory research for example -- Keeves's "legitimatory research" is contrastingly taken up with issues of institutional continuity and stability, or, as has been said here in Memphis, with "calming troubled waters" (Herenton quoted in Edmondson, August 2000). Thus focused, says Keeves (1988), the fundamental aim of such research is "to maintain the existing structure of an educational organization" and to ensure "continuance of its existing policies and practices" (p. 148). The usual subject of such research being "the operation of the organization," the typical guise under which the research emerges is therefore, according to Keeves, "an "evaluation study, since the need for evaluation is widely acknowledged on the grounds of accountability" (p. 148). That end plausible but the means to it technical, thus subsequently and perforce engaged are persons with "competence in research" (p. 148). However, given the slippage between "espoused" goals of the research and those "in use" (Argyris & Schön, 1996), the persons of choice are ordinarily those "employed by the educational organization," says Keeves, "so that the organization maintains control over the entire investigation"(p. 148).
As in Levin's (1992 [1978]) discussion of "propaganda," it may be possible for the organizational powers-that-be to influence the research process at any one or more of several points -- question formulation, data gathering and so on. Yet characteristic of the "legitimatory research" documented by Keeves is the control by elites exercised at the point of research dissemination. Having, so to speak, "final cut," such elites are first of all able to dictate when the research appears, so as "to optimize the impact that the findings may have on the legitimation of a particular policy or practice" (p. 148). More important, however, such elites have dominion over what appears and the form of that appearance. Rather than full disclosure, according to Keeves, it is the norm for "legitimatory research" to be published in a way that does not "enable both the methods of investigation and the inferences drawn from the research to be examined critically and challenged." (p. 148). Rather, he says,

[the reports are commonly only circulated in summary form on the grounds that likely readers are interested only in the main conclusions of the investigation, and would not be interested in examining the evidence in any detail. (p. 148; also p. 150)]

Both form and timing acting in concert, then, legitimatory research is published in such as way as to limit discussion and constrain analysis. Indeed, attempts to "critique" such research would seem, paradoxically, only to strengthen it; for, by taking it seriously and at face value, one lends such "research" credence, effectively serving to "legitimate the legitimation"!

Grounded in Keeves's description -- not to mention behavior on the part of the Memphis administration that is at least open to question -- this writer's first-person experiences as party to the district's evaluation of CSRMs suggest to him that what was afoot was indeed "legitimation" for purposes previously defined. Without telling too many "tales out of school," however, my turning to accounts associated with the New American Schools (NAS) and dealing with its attempts to cope with the "Memphis Blues" (Colgan, 2002) may adequately illustrate some of the "compromises" entailed.

On the substantive side of things, an unpublished draft of a recent NAS policy statement (2002a) alludes to a good-faith attempt by NAS to work with the Memphis district upon hearing of its evaluation. Much as we in-house researchers had earlier and on our own concluded, with
its over 160 cases, Memphis would seem to provide an ideal environment for investigating issues of model implementation and effectiveness in at least two respects. First, such an investigation would be able to proceed in a more "fine-grained" way than RAND had been able to do, since RAND's studies had been thus far scattered across several "jurisdictions" (Berends, et al., 2002 shows this). Second, with the former Superintendent gone and thus no pressure from on high, there might be secured an account that was fuller, more candid, and thus more instructive to other districts and schools just starting down the CSRM path.

Although the meeting between NAS and the district administration was facilitated by a former State Commissioner of Education who hailed from the city (NAS, 2002a), the result was a variant of what others experienced when they attempted to talk with district: a rebuff justified on the grounds that Watson's decision might be "tainted" (quoted in Viadero, July 2001). Presumably, however, NAS was able to secure enough leverage to perform a set of site-by-site case studies of NAS affiliated schools, but the findings they allude to seem to advance the knowledge-base little past the "works if implemented; implementation variable" idea voiced by Olsen (April, 1999).

Even so, NAS's school-by-school analysis would seem to sidestep the mixing of "hot, lukewarm, and ice cold" implementations that emerged in the Memphis City School report and that, in effect, proved what was already well-established before the study's commencement: that on the whole, district scores on standardized tests were either stagnant or declining. The need for at least one research question addressing the implementation and performance of schools-within-models rather than just schools-between-models has been suggested in the "McLean report" (McLean, 2001), the NAS-commissioned technical critique of the Memphis study. Yet, given Superintendent Watson's observation of problems "everywhere [he] went" and his of method putting together "the objective evidence with the subjective anecdotal evidence" (Watson quoted in Viadero, July 2001), it is to be doubted that the question, even if raised, would have passed an initial vetting.

On this more technical side of things, the "McLean report" (McLean, 2001) takes apart the Memphis report question-by-question and at its best points out some omissions that are the mainstay of "legitimatory research" but are anathema when the standard is "disciplined inquiry"
(Cronbach & Suppes, 1969). Where the former has a scientific patina designed to bar all holds, the latter "has a texture that displays the raw materials ... and the local processes by which they were compressed and rearranged" (pp. 15-16) -- no holds barred. Promised the district research team were many more reporting opportunities than ever materialized and thus was much more material placed in tabular and graphical form than was ever properly shared. Although finally unrealized, the evaluative intent to "improve not prove," as McLean (2001, p. 10) puts it, nevertheless did quicken in the report, attempting to break through what Dewey (1904) called "the mesh and coil of circumstances."

F. A "SYNERGIC" REMEDY PROPOSED TOO LATE

At Superintendent House's own request -- during, in fact, what proved to be the final months of her tenure -- the Office of Research and Evaluation began exploring various approaches to organizational and leadership development that could be used district-wide. Although the immediate stimulus for this search was the promotion of "customer satisfaction," noted at that time were linkages between Quinn's Competing Values Framework, the Total Quality Management approach that the Superintendent favored (Cameron & Whetten, 1996; Cameron & Quinn, 1999) and emergent dilemmas in the school restructuring literature observed by Hill and Celio (1998), Conley (1991, 1999), Elmore (1990), and Rowan (1990). In the form of an "html-based" presentation to the then-Superintendent and her Executive Staff, thus it was then pointed out that a

recurrent theme in the school restructuring literature is the uniquely "conflicted" nature of the reform. "Rather than consisting of a set of coherent demands for change," as Brian Rowan (1990) observed, "the restructuring movement instead consists of varying reform initiatives, which in the aggregate, contain conflicting accounts of what is wrong with schools and conflicting proposals about how school structures should be changed."

Much more recently and in much greater detail, Hill and Celio (1998) have devoted an entire volume to discussing "the political and ideological hot-buttons" that separate camps of would-be reformers intent on "fixing urban schools." In common cause against a system of schooling grown excessively "bureaucratic" and insular, each of the various reform camps can be seen to appeal to a preferred culture/leadership style in the competing values framework.
On the assumption that the Memphis district would -- models or no -- be interested in developmental concerns, these ideas about "competing values" were translated into "general questions about comprehensive school reform" and used in a survey of all Memphis schools, during the course of the evaluation (Calaway, 2001). Because district personnel have warned me against any unauthorized reporting of the results, Quinn's Competing Values Framework will be used instead as tool for understanding the former Superintendent's approach to leadership and the reasons why many Memphians were driven to ask "Will the Real Gerry House Please Stand" (Chang, July 2000).

II. AMENDING FAULTY MAPS OF CHANGE:
QUINN'S "COMPETING VALUES FRAMEWORK"

A. THE ISSUES OF SCHOOL AND LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS

If, indeed, the "Holy Grail" of the CSRM reform movement has been "scaling up" (Hatch, 2000), in large part driving that quest have been "years of research on the qualities of schools that are effective" (Glennan, 1998, p. 72). In a recent review of all those years, Reynolds and Teddlie (2000) state that they "do not know of a study that has not shown that leadership is important within effective schools" (p. 141). This said, it would thus seem to come as no surprise that, with respect to CSRM, a more recent RAND study should conclude that "without strong district leadership" and, even more importantly, "without strong principal leadership" that design implementation lags (Kirby et al., 2001). What is, nevertheless, quite surprising about this, more recent RAND analysis is that such leadership proved to be so critical, emerging, in the authors' words, as "the single most predictor in the models, both at the teacher level and at the school level" (p. xvi).

Schools that reported having strong principal leaders had implementation levels over a standard deviation above schools at the sample average. In addition, individual teachers' beliefs about principal leadership were important in explaining in-school variance in implementation. Our findings suggest that effective and supportive principal leaders are likely to both increase and deepen implementation at a school.... [I]f most or all of the teachers at a school view the principal as a strong leader, this will likely lead to reduced variance within a school and help the design become more schoolwide.... [In sum], the crucial role that principal leadership plays with respect to implementation should not be overlooked when adopting and implementing whole-school reforms. (p. 72)
Sensitive to the general importance of "effective schools" having "effective leadership," the House administration therefore offered training to both principals and central office staff, much of it based on the ideas of consultant Philip Schlechty (1991, 1997). However, what never seemed to emerge in such training was a definition of either "effectiveness" or "leadership" that was theory-driven and clear, as well as measurable and widely-shared. As long as these two constructs remained glitteringly unspecified, the idea of truly becoming a "an urban district with a vision of where's it going and a plausible plan of how of it's going to get there" (Slavin quoted in Sommerfeld, January 1998) seemed forever to be stuck in neutral. After revisiting materials that district had already circulated via the Schlechty group -- materials that had, in fact, prominently featured the Fullan and Miles (1992) article on "faulty maps" as inhibitors of change -- it was recommended to the House administration that some use be made of a model that was not only consistent with much of the "new paradigm" management literature (Fullan, 1993), but that was also by design a "perceptual map" (Kashigan, 1986, p. 416) of the "effectiveness" territory -- Quinn's "Competing Values Framework.

B. QUINN'S "PERCEPTUAL MAP" OF THE EFFECTIVENESS CONSTRUCT

Struck by a literature described as so "fragmented, noncumulative, and frequently downright confusing" (Cameron & Whetten, 1983, p. 1) as to lead at least one theorist to declare "a moratorium on all studies of ... books on ... and chapters on organizational effectiveness" (Goodman, cited in Cameron & Whetten, 1983, p. 4), Quinn and his colleagues determined to "get to the assumptions behind the studies and perhaps make sense of what was causing the confusion" (1988, p. 47). To this end, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) acquired a comprehensive list of effectiveness criteria developed by Campbell (1977) and, after some tweaking and winnowing, submitted a final set of 17 criteria to some 45 organizational theorists and researchers. Subsequently examined using multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique, the resulting pairs of criteria that the experts produced seemed to Quinn and Rohrbaugh to constitute a "space" that could be largely described in terms of three more basic "dimensions."

Dividing that space in two, the first of these dimensions was thought by Quinn and Rohrbaugh to define a continuum anchored in the values of centralization, integration, and control but progressively giving way to the opposing values of decentralization, differentiation,
and flexibility. Dividing the space again and horizontally, a second dimension appeared to them to range between an internal orientation on the one hand to an external orientation on the other. Making the picture truly three-dimensional, a third axis sliced the four cells created by the intersection of the previous two into eight (2 x 2 x 2) wedges. Sometimes omitted for simplicity's sake, the dimension was taken to represent the particular means employed and the ends sought after in each of the four primary domains or "quadrants" (see Figure 4 for a summary).

1. THE "RATIONAL GOAL" MODEL AND THE "TASKMASTER" LEADER

As Quinn (1984; also Quinn, Spreitzer, & Hart, 1992) has himself observed, there is a strong isomorphism between his own four-quadrant model or framework and Parsons's (1956) quartet of "functional requisites," rendered in the acronym "AGIL." Thus, in Quinn's Quadrant One, the organization seeks "direction" (a means) to increase "productivity" (an end) vis-à-vis some task. Defined by a centralized approach that is nevertheless open to the environment, Quadrant One is equivalent to Parsons's "G" -- goal-directedness -- and denotes for Quinn a theorizing about organization that he calls the "rational goal model." The leader whose long suit resides in this quadrant is referred to by Quinn as a "Taskmaster."

2. THE "INTERNAL PROCESSES" MODEL AND THE "ANALYZER" LEADER

In his Quadrant Two, issues of internal maintenance come to the fore. As means, the organization sets up "monitoring" mechanisms to ensure that all of its parts work dependably, in a clockwork, "coordinated" fashion. The focus inward and the approach centralized, Quadrant Two is equivalent to Parsons's "I" -- integration -- and suggests to Quinn an "internal processes" way of thinking about organization and a leadership persona that he dubs "the Analyzer."

3. THE "HUMAN RELATIONS" MODEL AND THE "MOTIVATOR" LEADER

In Quinn's Quadrant Three, the focus shifts from the organization's autonomic nervous system to its voluntary one -- that is, to the individuals populating the organization. Therein, care, consideration, and concern for the "mentoring" of such individuals are a means to the end of "facilitating" productive interpersonal action. The orientation is again reflexive but far more
socially accommodating; thus Quadrant Three is equivalent to Parsons's "L" -- latency -- and recalls for Quinn the "human relations" school of organizational thought. Dictating that effectiveness entails moving people, this school seems to cry out for a psychologically sensitive approach to leading: one that Quinn personifies as "the Motivator."

4. THE "OPEN SYSTEMS" MODEL AND THE "VISIONARY" LEADER

Finally, in Quinn's Quadrant Four, the "human intelligence" developed previously enables heightened "innovativeness" (a means) so that the organization can continue to acquire -- or "broker" -- needed resources (an end). Here, it almost goes without saying that the focus is outward, the general orientation decentralized, and the end result equivalent to Parsons's "A" -- adaptability. Thus described, the organizational approach recalls the "open systems model" of fairly recent development and denotes a leadership style that is similarly "cutting edge" -- according to Quinn, "the Visionary" manner of leadership.

C. COMPETING ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS/LEADERSHIP ROLES

Whether conceived of as the constituents of "effectiveness" or as a set of "requirements that must be met ... by any social system if it is to survive" (Timasheff & Theodorson, 1979, p. 258), all four of these both Quinn and Parsons would seem to agree must work together or, in Hampden-Turner's (1981) language, must operate "synergically." Yet, what is less obviously observed in Parson's inductively-derived AGIL schema is readily seen in Quinn's deductively-established, four-cell framework: that certain of their "constituents" or "functional requisites" conflict. Diagonally situated, the emphatic "task" orientation of Quinn's Quadrant One (Parsons's "G") opposes the high "person" or "group maintenance" orientation in Quinn's Quadrant Three (Parsons' "L"). Similarly, the heavy focus on stability, efficiency and tight-coupling in Quinn's Quadrant Two (Parsons's "I") militates against the strong press for growth, variety, and loose-coupling in Quinn's Quadrant Four (Parsons' "A). Without the kind of "rocket science" of the chaos and complexity theory championed in Fullan's (1993, 1999) Change Forces texts, the picture of "effective" organization presented in Quinn's "Framework" suggests one similar to that of Ralph Stacey (1996), who, according to Fullan (1999), "captures the essence of complexity theory in these words:"
All organizations are paradoxes. They are powerfully pulled towards stability by the forces of integration, maintenance controls, human desires for security and certainty, and adaptation to the environment on the one hand. They are powerfully pulled to the opposite extreme of unstable equilibrium by the forces of and decentralization, human desires for excitement and innovation, and isolation from the environment.

If an organization gives in to the pull to stability it fails because it becomes ossified and cannot change easily. If it gives in to the state of instability it disintegrates. Success lies in sustaining an organization in the borders between stability and instability. This is a state of chaos, a difficult-to-maintain dissipative structure. (Stacey quoted in Fullan, p. 4)

Understanding organizations as entities subject to "contrary pulls" or "competing values" helps to explain why the "transformational reform efforts" discussed by Murphy and Louis (1994) involved principals who operated from a posture of "simultaneous 'top down-ness' and 'bottom up-ness'" (quoted in Reynolds & Teddlie, 2000, p. 147) and why, as well, the actions of the accomplished "heads" studied by Day and his colleagues (2000) seemed to constitute a series of trials "to reconcile the irreconcilable" (p. 157). According to Day and his associates, such "heads" consistently "moved beyond a narrow rational, managerial view of their role to a more holistic, value-led approach guided by personal experience and professional preference" (p. 176). When observed at the level of the school-as-organization, these heads were seen to "manage ... tensions between dependency and autonomy, between caution and courage, between maintenance and development"; but when viewed by the researchers from a more existential perspective, these heads appeared to be at one and the same time "managing their own personal and professional selves" (p. 178).

D. THE PARADOX OF THE "REAL" GERRY HOUSE

When understood in terms of "the 'competing values' theoretical framework" -- a suggestion made by Day et al. themselves (2000, pp. 168-9) -- the "values-led contingency leadership" model they propose may also help to settle the question of the "real Gerry House" (Chang, July 2000): the single individual thought by some to be "one of the best schools leaders in Memphis's recent history" (Chang, July 2000) and yet perceived by others to have so "failed to manage the human and physical resources of the system" (Herenton, quoted in Edmondson,
August 2000) that she also failed to secure city-wide support, across-the-board improvement, and long-lasting reform.

1. SUPERINTENDENT HOUSE, THE STRONG "VISIONARY"

In a city described above as "suspicious of outsiders," (Sommerfeld, January 1998), House's position as the first-ever "national" candidate to be selected as district Superintendent may have rendered her perennially the "outsider's outsider" among Memphians. Nevertheless, she used her quite considerable skills to "play well" (Branston, February 2000b) to a whole range of constituencies that were, or at least were perceived to be, "external" to the system: namely, "wealthy, highly educated people ... ; [specific] school board members ... ; the New American Schools reform group; ... professional associations" and so on. Announcing herself to be such (Reel, June 1991), she enacted precisely Quinn's "visionary" approach to leadership and correlatively attempted to bring about "an urban system with a vision of where it's going" (Slavin quoted in Sommerfeld, January, 1998). Opening up communications with both the local university and the academic community at large, she relentlessly pursued innovation after innovation (Christion, December 1994; Hess, 1999), among them school-based decision making; "lifelong," content, and performance standards; "authentic" or performance assessment; multi-cultural and multi-ethnic curricula; dissemination and use of "21st Century" technologies; establishment of a "state-of-the-art" teaching and learning "academy"; "restructuring" and "downsizing" of the administrative hierarchy; "clustering" of schools; "in-and-back" administrative rotation of school personnel; and all this and more beyond her signature adoption of 18 different "whole school" reform models. Many of these reforms being "resource-hungry," House often attempted to "broker" into the system new sources of funding through the establishment of Partners in Public Education (PIPE) and the pursuit of high-profile grants like the Urban Systemic Initiative which netted the district roughly $15 million (see Schlechty, 1997). As a result of all these efforts, she correspondingly "brokered into" or "conferred upon" the district a heightened legitimacy and a national prominence that reflected well not only upon herself and her district but also upon the future of public education as a whole.
2. SUPERINTENDENT HOUSE, THE POWERFUL "TASKMASTER"

Given the obvious magnitude of the effort, to say that this Superintendent was merely "goal-directed" (Anderson, June 1998a) may be something of an understatement. More fitting may be Quinn's description of the "Taskmaster" leader who assumes "a 'hands-on role with a strong focus on ... getting the job done today" (Hart & Quinn, 1993, p. 553) and who sees the world "through [a] lens of personal control" (Spreitzer & Quinn, 2001, p. 19). Valuing strongly what Spreitzer and Quinn (2001) have recently defined as "impact," these Taskmaster leaders see themselves as making a difference. They do not experience what psychologists call a sense of "learned helplessness"; they see themselves as active participants in shaping the direction of the larger system in which they are embedded. Consequently, they believe they can challenge existing organizational mindsets and push organizational boundaries. (p. 17)

Thus, throughout her tenure and in much more than just a "symbolic" way (Bolman & Deal, 1991a, 1991b, 1997), Superintendent House was ever at the ready, seeking whatever "pulpit" she could find to give passionate testimony to her most deeply-held, most non-negotiable conviction: that "all" students not only could but must achieve to be fully productive citizens and workers for the 21st Century. "In education," she noted in an exit interview, "you can always find some students doing well in some schools. Our mission was for all children in all schools to do well." (quoted in Anderson, April 2000). To those who might find that thought unthinkable, House's quick rejoinder was, "If you don't believe in it, you don't belong in an urban district." To those who were in some way critical of her, she merely offered, "that every leader has his detractors" and that, for the sake of the children, "I did what I did ... and held people accountable." (House quoted in Anderson, April 2000).

As has been noted by some of the Superintendent's closest associates, this passionate intensity also spilled over into her daily routine. Doubtless familiar with how grueling high-profile positions in educational administration can be, the former state Commissioner of Education stated that House "stood it for eight years" (quoted in Anderson & Edmondson, January, 2000). But if the job was tough, Gerry House was, too. The most recent of the Superintendent's executive assistants claimed to have left her position because of House's "routinely worked 70-hour weeks" and the ensuing "difficulty keeping up with House's frenetic
pace" (quoted in Anderson & Edmondson, January, 2000). Said the assistant, "For 2 1/2 years I waited for that woman to collapse, and she never did.... She just went from one meeting to the next and from one plane to the next. She barely got a cold" (quoted in Anderson & Edmondson, January, 2000). Yet, an altogether different kind of toughness was recalled by her Associate Superintendent for Business Affairs, thinking back on his personal interview for the position. "She asked these questions, and they weren't easy questions," he said. "And when I thought 'OK, she's asked all she can ask,' she asked more" (quoted in Anderson, April 2000).

3. SUPERINTENDENT HOUSE, THE INDIFFERENT "ANALYZER"

Yet it may well have been this very tendency to "ask more" -- in effect, to overplay the role of "Visionary" to an audience of "external" stakeholders and to so wring to excess the "Taskmaster" persona that a string of personal assistants had to bow out -- that may have been the genesis of the "second" Superintendent House. What external constituencies saw, encouraged, and rewarded as being exceptionally "innovative" could also be and often was seen from a contrastingly "internal" perspective as being destabilizing, inefficient, and undisciplined. Proceeding from this "internal process" perspective, thus the Mayor asserted that this "other" Superintendent House had left "troubled waters" in her wake by "failing to manage ... resources" (Edmondson, August 2000) after the typical manner of the "Analyzer" leader. While such an "Analyzer" might expect that a laundry list of initiatives and 18 reform models might place her in the national spotlight, she might also see how the backstage logistics of it all might place her a bind. Quite unlike her "Visionary" counterpart, thus the Analyzer leader might reason that with so many "reforms," none of them are likely to be properly resourced. In a still worse scenario, she might also hypothesize that with high rates of intra-district student mobility, student achievement scores might be more likely to suffer than improve over time. With no uniform curriculum but whole congeries of educational philosophies and instructional methods, thus might highly mobile students -- typically the most disadvantaged -- end up increasingly disadvantaged by having constantly to play "catch up." In sum, precisely concerned about problems of "coordination" and the need to "monitor" closely whether goals were, in fact, being achieved, the Analyzer leader might look askance at the substance of the "half full" account and think long and hard about the imponderables of "scaling up."
4. SUPERINTENDENT HOUSE, THE WEAK "MOTIVATOR"

Yet coming from a more "human relations" perspective, the "emotionally intelligent" (Goleman, 1995) "Motivator" leader might frame these issues in less cerebral and more visceral terms -- her province not "processes" but feelings, her emphasis not "technique" but meaning. Even less enamored of the brinkmanship that the "Taskmaster" approach tends to invite, her preference is for listening and eliciting solutions, not for talking and imposing them. When improvement goals are not met, rather than the Taskmaster's jumping to conclusions about subordinates' "incompetence" and "resistance," the "Motivator" leader might not be so quick to rush to judgment. For one thing, she might feel, such sub-par performance may entail "real problems of implementation, such as diffuse objectives, lack of technical skill, or insufficient resources for change" (Fullan & Miles, 1992, p. 748). For another, she might intuit that blaming "converts everything into a matter of 'attitude'" (p. 748), it oversimplifies and forestalls an authentic search for solutions; because it effectively makes "others" the problem, it often merely compounds these "others'" confusion and frustration.

That the MRI did indeed have such "real problems of implementation" -- particularly with respect to matters of professional development and the modeling of new methods (Bol et al., 1998; also Nunnery et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1998) -- has not only been faithfully documented by external researchers throughout its run but has also been confirmed by the internal team even at its end (Calaway, 2001). Apparently unaddressed, or at least under-addressed, yet these recurrent problems with "mentoring" may have only been magnified by the Superintendent's inclination to always play the "Taskmaster" and never the "Motivator"; her frequent setting forth of her own demands but seldom accommodating those of others; her fixation on what they, the teachers and principals, owed the children, but not on what she, their leader, owed them. While it was rare for an external account of the MRI to even hint at the intensity and volatility of these "facilitation" issues, fortunately at least one did. Visiting Memphis at intervals from 1997 to 1998 (Hill et al., 2000, p. xvii), a team of Brookings researchers observed a reform initiative that, while highly touted, yet seemed both tenuous and threatened: tenuous, because it appeared to them that pervasively "teachers and principals express fatigue and feel underappreciated" (p. 154); "threatened," because even that soft support
was apparently contingent on a quick and continuous rise in "test scores." That these feelings of "fatigue" and "underappreciation" might ultimately explode -- as they seem to have done in the teachers' revolt of November 1999 -- the Brookings team may not have been able to foresee. However, in linking the ebb and flow of "test scores" to the containment of such feelings, these researchers -- in light of subsequent events and an arguably "legitimatory" account of preceding ones -- proved to be more than prescient indeed.

E. ORGANIZATIONAL IMBALANCES, "SCHISMOGENESIS," AND REVERSALS

While the winding down of the MRI may be attributed to some "advance word" of the Superintendent's resignation, an account rooted in the dynamism of Quinn's Competing Values Model suggests a path of continued devolution even had she remained. For rather than the simultaneously-maintained "contrary pulls" in the "transformational reform efforts" observed by Murphy and Louis (1994), instead of the orchestration of diverse tensions witnessed by Day and his associates (2000) in the "post-transformational" leadership styles of the most effective British heads (pp. 158-178), there was both in the overall effort as well as in the manner of its prime mover an increasing privileging of one set of "goods" over others, a growing pull towards these "strange attractors" and not those, an imbalance that effected not a "synergy -- the whole serving the parts and vice versa -- but a kind of "schismogenesis" (Bateson, 1972) or self-stoking "split in the structure of ideas." As explained by Quinn (1988):

> [S]chismogenesis, perceptual splits, and strange loops. All these suggest that when a value in the realm of social action is ideologically split off from its opposite and pursued in an obsessive fashion, some kind of ... inversion may take place. Systems begin to lose necessary positive tensions, often entering into vicious circles of decreasing effectiveness. When this occurs, people often increase their commitment to the value that is already being emphasized ... [with] catastrophic outcomes. (pp. 106-107)

1. TWO HEALTHY EMPHASES

In an entirely useful and profoundly healthy way, both the MRI and Superintendent House's "externally-focused" leadership style helped to drag the district -- more often than not kicking and screaming -- out of the insularity and encapsulation to which it had grown comfortably accustomed. Taking aim at the downside of Quinn's "internal processes model,"

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House's "visioning" sought to undermine the sort of bureaucratic bloat and aforementioned "culture of inertia" (citation in Sommerfeld, January 1998) to which it had been historically given. At the same time, her "missioning" and high sense of task sought to offset the "laxity and negligence" (Quinn, 1996, p. 53) reflected in the comments of teachers who crowed about having "the second-best test scores in the city" but failed to see that even the system's "best" was none too good (citation in Sommerfeld, January 1998). Quite correctly, House "the Taskmaster" railed against this sort of pedagogical self-satisfaction that with such great facility simply wrote off failure to poverty and bad parenting and, as a consequence, also wrote off the children, condemning them to a second-rate future (Edmonson & Anderson, January 2000). That she "did what she did" for their sakes (House quoted in Anderson, April, 2000) is a statement true beyond a shadow of a doubt and will doubtless redound always to her credit.

2. TWO UNHEALTHY EXTREMES

And yet another statement true beyond a shadow of doubt is that, absent the intentions of this "good" Superintendent House, the MRI was, in the last analysis, a failure. Like the protagonists of the ancient Greek plays, House deployed all of her creativity and near-boundless energy to rage against the constraints and givens of what by all accounts was, and by all accounts remains, a troubled system. Like them, too, however, she nevertheless overshot the mark, missing what Hampden-Turner (1981) has called "the winning value-combination" (p. 18). As a result, both she and the district began experiencing what the tragedians called "peripetia" -- the classic "reversal of fortune" that spins out into "catastrophe."

a) AN "OPEN SYSTEM" BECOME "TUMULTOUS ANARCHY"

Organizationally speaking, what may have looked from the outside-in as a highly "innovative" system was from the inside-out becoming something akin to a "tumultuous anarchy": Quinn's (1988, 1995) name for social forms in which the values pertinent to the "open systems model" are inflated and go into a kind of "runaway." Unchecked by the ballast of the "internal processes" regime, therein the "open systems" emphasis "on insight, innovation, and change turn turn into premature responsiveness and disastrous experimentation, while "[c]oncern for external support, resource acquisition, and growth turn into ... expediency and ... opportunism."

As opposed to the "standard operating procedures" within the more garden-variety, "internal
processes" setting, Quinn observes that in an contrastingly "anarchic" one, "administrators ... show no interest in continuity and control of the work flow" (p. 54).

b) A "RATIONAL GOAL" APPROACH BECOME "HYPERRATIONALIZED"

Only compounding these sorts of problems, however, was the Superintendent's diffidence about matters of "human relations" -- a diffidence that had her characteristically operating at arm's length from people's day-to-day concerns and the system's assorted troubles. When such troubles did arise, some supernumerary was dispatched to fall on his sword; when teachers had "issues," they typically got the Superintendent's replies either second-hand or "live on tape" (Branston, February 2000b; Derks, May 1995). Among such teachers and some administrators as well, what was finally manifest as "fatigue" and "underappreciation" (Hill et al., 2000) -- or as less charitably described by the Mayor as a "throwing up of hands" (Edmondson, August 2000) -- may be viewed as their unedited reactions to an overemphasis of task and the beginnings of what Quinn calls "the oppressive sweatshop."

A perversion of the "rational goal model" and a "hyperrationalization" indeed (Datnow, 2000, p. 367), this "sweatshop" approach so fixates on the notion of "impact" (Spreitzer & Quinn, 2001) that signs of "perpetual exertion and human exhaustion," and "symptoms of burnout" are legion (Quinn, 1995, p. 54). These follow, says Quinn, because a "[c]oncern for goal clarification, authority, and decisiveness" is allowed to become overweening and thus "an emphasis on strict regulation and blind dogma" is effectively the result. As more "progressive" management theories dictate, there may, of course, be some deference paid to such "human relations" notions as "empowerment," "high involvement," "quality circles," and the like; yet what's within that velvet glove makes very clear the nature of "the handwriting ... on the wall" (Memphis principal cited in Datnow, 2000, p. 361): "There is no room for individual differences; the boss has the final say" (Quinn, 1995, p. 54).

IV. CONCLUSION

That some sort of "schismogenesis" or "inversion" may have occurred in Memphis is suggested not only by the violent reaction of so many teachers to being "overworked and
overwhelmed" (Anderson, November 1999) but also by the ease with which eight years of "reform" were discarded with hardly a shed tear. Yet, as with all things about the Memphis experience, it is perhaps a bit "tricky" to say that this was because of some flaw intrinsic to the "reforms" themselves (Mirel, 2001; Sack, January 2002; Viadero, November 2001). Rather, the flaw may have resided less in what was attempted than in how, not necessarily in the "reforms" themselves but the manner in which their progress was swelled -- or as the reformers themselves might say -- brought "to scale" (Hatch 2000; Stringfield & Datnow, 1998).

With specific reference to "the models," perhaps it was some admixture of administrative fiat and nostalgia that proximally sealed their fate. But perhaps it was, in some ultimate sense, a kind of "silence" that undid them, a silence that issues when "people think they are always right, whether in their machines or their ideas." For the models, then, and in several senses, this "silence," this absence of dialogue or "dialectic," may indeed have proven to be "the end of the world" (Camus, 1964). As we look forward to yet another such world's commencing, we may have only to begin talking and reasoning amongst ourselves in a different, less "technical," more "encompassing" manner. For by such means, we may, as this paper has tried to show, inhibit "reforming, again, and again, and again" (Cuban, 1990) and enable instead "the spirit of an abiding student of education" to break through "the mesh and coil of circumstances and .... find expression for itself" (Dewey, 1904).
ADDENDUM (03/29/02)

A week before AERA Convention, 2002, Professor Steve Ross and I exchanged a series of fast and furious emails that initially generated some heat but that ultimately shed more light on the knowledge-for-policy "dilemma" as faced by what I have referred to (somewhat in error) as the "external" research team.

Very much in keeping with Superintendent House's externally-focused, "visionary" leadership style, she did -- again, to her credit -- refurbish bridges between the district and the wider academic culture: bridges that, in my opinion, had often been too little used and had suffered not a little disrepair during her predecessor's administration. In any case, as a result of House's efforts, both district personnel -- my "internals" -- and university-based personnel -- my "externals" -- found themselves working together on a number of projects. Although district staff were, as I have been quoted as saying elsewhere, largely "out of the loop" on the models, there was, nevertheless, some between-groups interchange on matters like articulating district-level standards, organizing and administering performance assessments, and the occasional piecing together of data sets for use in studies mounted by the university but conducted on the district's behalf.

For reasons that are not clear, however, this heretofore cordial working relationship between the Superintendent and the university-based research team ended abruptly about two calendar years into the Memphis CSRM initiative or roughly "the morning the tents folded on ICSEI [International Congress of School Effectiveness and Improvement] in Jan. 1997," according to Professor Ross. While Ross does concede that he "was too idealistic about the early results" of the initiative and also agrees that "his research did have the effect of fueling the administration's scale up," he nevertheless staunchly maintains that he had "NO INFLUENCE or say on district policies after January 1997." Indeed, after March 1997, Dr. Ross states that he was never again invited back to one of Superintendent House's Executive Staff meetings: a fact which appeared to have had substantive ramifications for the initiative itself and methodological ones for its further study by Ross and company.
At a substantive level, it was Ross's observation "that many of the schools (especially after cohort 1) were very estranged from the district and saw the whole thing as top-down." Thus, Ross asserts that he was actually and vocally opposed to further scale up since he "saw both Option[al] schools and resistant Title I schools" -- in other words, those schools constituting the majority of the 3rd (97-98) and 4th (98-99) MRI cohorts -- "as dooming the initiative." Consistent with the observations made by Hill et al. (2000) during 1997-98, with Finnan and Meza's forthcoming secondary analysis of Accelerated School Project (ASP) perceptual data collected by the district (Calaway, 2000), and with some of my own working analyses of this same district data set in toto, Ross states that he also has "loads of data from 1998-1999 where teachers in focus groups and surveys were disenchanted and saying they were actively resisting the models." However, with Ross himself effectively "out of the loop" in media res, there was no action that he could have taken, he maintains, other than to continue on as best as he could, independent of the district and the vicissitudes of its policies. Absent an internal, district-level forum, "my only voice was in my research papers and the CA," Ross says.

Another reason that Ross offers for being against district-wide scale up concerns "the case of the disappearing control group" -- a methodological problem with which district-associated researchers were ultimately forced to contend (Calaway, 2001) but for which they were so unhelpfully "critiqued" (MacLean, 2001). Clearly, when only a few schools in the MRI were migrating from what Ross and company call "non-restructured" to "restructured" status, the university-based research team had only to make minor adjustments to maintain the integrity of their original treatment/control group design (albeit not without some loss of statistical power). Equally clear, however, is the logical impossibility of continuing in this vein as the MRI moved absolutely "to scale." Thus, note Ross et al. (2001), "the fact that in 1998-1999 virtually every Memphis City School had become associated with a whole school reform model will require future long-term analyses of the effects of these reforms to modify the current design and analysis structure" (p. 328).

How Professor Ross might have himself played out ensuing rounds of "what's my [base]line" with his value-added data, he does not tell me (and neither, I might add, does Professor McLean). What Ross does tell me, surprisingly enough, is that he feels lucky to have any data at all! Subsequent to the mysterious falling out of January 1997, according to Ross, the
District was ill-disposed to share with him "even a byte" of its store of student-level data. Thus, says Ross, it was out of a kind of desperation that he turned to Professor William Sanders "went to value-added [data] and used 'case-studies.'" "Sanders saved us," he avers: a bit of an odd statement, I feel, since the team's use of "value-added" data has been heretofore presented in the literature as pertinent to issues of precision, not simple availability. Whether this be a matter of scientific "happy accident" or what Kaplan [in the Conduct of Inquiry] has referred to as an instance of "reconstructed scientific logic," I leave for Professors Ross and Sanders to explain and for their readership to judge.

In the interim, I will continue to mull over one of my own rare flashes of insight attending this "very large, naturally occurring experiment" (Ross et al., 2001, p. 343) -- namely, the dynamic of a potentially "very large, naturally occurring" negative correlation that marks the growth of an inverse relationship between the scope of the MRI's national renown and the extent of its local impact and/or authenticity.

Film at eleven,

Lou Franceschini
REFERENCES


Viadero, D. (July 11, 2001) Memphis scraps redesign models in all its schools. Education Week, XX, 42, (pp. 1, 19).


FIGURE 1
MULTI-AXIS CHART OF PROGRESSIVIST / TRADITIONALIST
EDUCATIONAL DILEMMA*

- a. The college designs curricula...
- b. of abstract concepts...
- c. subjected to doubt and questioning...
- d. and transmitted authoritatively to students
- e. for purposes of intellectual analysis
- f. and individual enlightenment/excellence

1. It adapts these to student needs and interests...
2. and addresses concrete problems...
3. to enable the forging of personal convictions...
4. and the "leading out" of latent capacities...
5. so that personally-wrought syntheses may emerge...
6. and serve the common good.

FIGURE 2
DUAL-AXIS CHART OF
INDIVIDUALISM/COMMUNALISM DILEMMA*

TOP-HEAVY
"19th-Century individualism. Students graded linearly and invidiously compared. Grade-grubbing rampant"
(9/1)

SYNERGY:
"Organized Individuality. Groups award their most excellent members who reward their groups."
(10/10)

LOP-SIDED:
"Groupiness predominant. 'Grinds,' 'swots,' and deviants punished socially."
(1/9)

COOPERATION - COMMUNITY

*adapted from Hampden-Turner, 1981, p. 211
FIGURE 3
DUAL-AXIS* CHART OF POLICY/PRACTICE
LINKAGES
(after Levin, 1992 [1978]; Husén, 1988)

TOP HEAVY (9/1)
"ED SCHOOL STUFF"
(Weiss, 1995)

SYNERGY (10/10)
"ENLIGHTENED" POLICY/
"REFLECTIVE" PRACTICE
(Weiss, 1979; Schön, 1983)

COMPROMISE (5/5)
"HALF-FULL ACCOUNTS"
(Hatch, 2000)

COMPROMISE (5/5)
"LEGITIMATORY RESEARCH"
(Keeves, 1988)

LOP-SIDED (1/9)
"PROPAGANDA"
Levin 1992, [1978]

FIGURE 4
QUINN'S COMPETING VALUES FRAMEWORK

DECENTRALIZED & FLEXIBLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNAL FOCUS</th>
<th>EXTERNAL FOCUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td><strong>MODEL:</strong> INTERNAL PROCESSES</td>
<td><strong>MODEL:</strong> RATIONAL GOAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEM ORIENTATION: &quot;rational-closed type&quot;</td>
<td>SYSTEM ORIENTATION: &quot;rational-open type&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCTIONAL REQUISITE &quot;integration&quot;</td>
<td>FUNCTIONAL REQUISITE &quot;goal directedness&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF INFLATED: &quot;frozen bureaucracy&quot;</td>
<td>IF INFLATED: &quot;oppressive sweat-shop&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEADERSHIP TYPE:</strong> ANALYZER</td>
<td><strong>LEADERSHIP TYPE:</strong> TASKMASTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCTIONS/ROLES: &quot;monitor&quot; &quot;coordinator&quot;</td>
<td>FUNCTIONS/ROLES: &quot;director&quot; &quot;producer&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CULTURE TYPE:</strong> HIERARCHY</td>
<td><strong>CULTURE TYPE:</strong> MARKET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA: Efficiency, Timeliness, Smooth Functioning</td>
<td>EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA: Goal Achievement, Market Share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEANS/ENDS DYNAMIC</strong></td>
<td><strong>MEANS/ENDS DYNAMIC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control fosters efficiency.</td>
<td>Competition fosters productivity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CENTRALIZED & CONTROLLED

HUMAN RELATIONS
SYSTEM ORIENTATION: "natural-closed type"
FUNCTIONAL REQUISITE "latency"
IF INFLATED: "irresponsible country-club"

MODEL:
LEADERSHIP TYPE: MOTIVATOR
FUNCTIONS/ROLES: "facilitator" "mentor"
CULTURE TYPE: CLAN
EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA: Cohesion, Morale, Human Resources
MEANS/ENDS DYNAMIC
Participation fosters commitment.

OPEN SYSTEMS
SYSTEM ORIENTATION: "natural-open type"
FUNCTIONAL REQUISITE "adaptation"
IF INFLATED: "tumultous anarchy"

LEADERSHIP TYPE: VISIONARY
FUNCTIONS/ROLES: "innovator" "broker"
CULTURE TYPE: ADHOCRACY
EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA: Creativity, Growth, Cutting-Edge Output
MEANS/ENDS DYNAMIC
Innovation fosters new resources.

INTERNAL PROCESSES
SYSTEM ORIENTATION: "rational-closed type"
FUNCTIONAL REQUISITE "integration"
IF INFLATED: "frozen bureaucracy"

LEADERSHIP TYPE: ANALYZER
FUNCTIONS/ROLES: "monitor" "coordinator"
CULTURE TYPE: HIERARCHY
EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA: Efficiency, Timeliness, Smooth Functioning
MEANS/ENDS DYNAMIC
Control fosters efficiency.

RATIONAL GOAL
SYSTEM ORIENTATION: "rational-open type"
FUNCTIONAL REQUISITE "goal directedness"
IF INFLATED: "oppressive sweat-shop"

LEADERSHIP TYPE: TASKMASTER
FUNCTIONS/ROLES: "director" "producer"
CULTURE TYPE: MARKET
EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA: Goal Achievement, Market Share
MEANS/ENDS DYNAMIC
Competition fosters productivity.

INTERNAL FOCUS

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