School-based planning for instructional improvement has been a major national education reform focus for over 2 decades. However, many efforts proposed to put schools in charge of their own instructional operations delivered only increased discretion rather than real autonomy over internal operations, such as budgeting. In 1997, New York City introduced the Performance-Driven Budgeting (PDB) initiative to link school-based budgeting with efforts to improve student and school performance. This paper is a condensation of the final report on the PDB implementation study. Data were collected from (1) interviews with senior staff at the central administration, the school district, and the case-study schools; (2) document reviews; and (3) surveys of school-planning team members. After 3 years of study, it was concluded that the central administration transferred primary authority for planning and budgeting to the schools. The initiative produced a new budgeting system in which school-level decision-making is driving change upward through district and central-administration levels. The impact of PDB included a small but significant increase in elementary student test scores compared with non-PDB schools. Current economic problems and political hostility are factors that can affect PDB adversely, especially in low-performing schools. (RT)
An Implementation Study
of
Performance Driven Budgeting
in the
New York City Public Schools

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Introduction

School-based planning for instructional improvement has been a major national education reform focus for more than two decades. During the '70s and '80s, various school-based management efforts proposed to put schools in charge of some of their own instructional operations. But these efforts delivered increased discretion rather than real autonomy; most school-based management schools received only a modicum of power over issues marginal to instructional improvement, and were rarely granted any autonomy in budgeting.

During the '90s, districts across the country began experiments in school-based budgeting. As the research of the Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform suggests, districts developed a variety of schemes to decentralize budgeting to their schools. Again, what resulted was increased discretion over mostly marginal expenditures.

New York City's Performance-Driven Budgeting (PDB) initiative, introduced in 1997, generated a new element in school-based planning for instructional improvement, the explicit link between school-based budgeting and efforts to improve student and school performance.

New York University's Institute for Education & Social Policy (IESP) was selected to conduct an independent evaluation of the first phase of PDB implementation, from 1997 to 2000, and to assess its effect on academic performance. The implementation study identified the underlying theory at the core of PDB: schools will improve student academic performance if they control all the components of their instructional planning, particularly budgeting.

If, as our findings suggest, the PDB pilot schools achieved greater academic gains than other schools, the PDB initiative may become an exemplar for other urban systems of how to make schools more academically effective by moving control over instructional planning and budgeting to the school level.

New York City is a large school district, with 1.1 million students in 1100-1200 schools, with a $13 billion annual budget. Prior to the implementation of PDB, New York had a unique tri-level governance structure in which the Central administration (hereafter "Central") provided allocations to 32 community school districts (hereafter "sub-districts") which had instructional and operational authority for the elementary and middle schools in their geographic area. The sub-districts were key players in the financial operation of the school system. In February 1997, six of the sub-districts (Districts 2, 9, 13, 19, 20 and 22) — all the sub-districts that volunteered — were asked to pilot the first phase of a projected three- to five-year PDB implementation process.

Our implementation study used both qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative component included structured interviews with a variety of senior staff at the Central and sub-district levels and in six PDB schools; observations of meetings of participants at these three levels; focus groups and informal interviews; and analyses of documents from the three levels. In each year of the study, IESP conducted a structured survey of planning team members in 23 of the 61 pilot schools from the four early-implementing sub-districts, and, in the last year, in twelve schools in the remaining two sub-districts.
Our companion study, not discussed here, assessed the impact of PDB on student academic performance. The impact study compared change in student performance in the PDB pilot elementary schools with change in student performance in the non-PDB New York City elementary schools.

This paper is a condensation of the final report on the implementation study. 4

The PDB Initiative

In 1996, then-Chancellor Rudolph Crew defined the goal of PDB as “provid[ing] local educators with increased control and flexibility over the use of resources so that they [can] engage in more creative program development, more effective problem solving, and more efficient use of resources to improve student performance.” To Crew, PDB was a key component of a performance-driven school system that:

- defines clear standards for student learning;
- identifies educational strategies for all students to meet these standards;
- aligns all resources, policies and practices to carry out these strategies;
- tracks results; and
- uses the data to drive continuous improvement and holds the entire system accountable for student performance.

To achieve the PDB goal, Chancellor Crew declared, the entire system must focus on improving classroom instruction. Decisions about improving instruction must be made at the school level, involve all school constituencies, and be supported by the community school district and by the Central administration. Furthermore, making decisions at the school level necessitates a redefinition of “relationships and decision-making authority so that decisions about the use of resources are directly linked to effective instructional strategies and improved student achievement.” Consequently, the hierarchical relationships and top-down authority that characterized the New York City school system had to change.

Evaluation methodology and data sources

The evaluation traced a fluid effort, across three and a half years and three levels of the school system, to operationalize the PDB concept. Because implementation of PDB did not follow a detailed work plan, the evaluation design had to adapt as implementation plans evolved. For example, one major shift — to a field-based approach — required an equally major shift in the evaluation’s emphasis. Further, the development of universal school-level instructional planning and mandated school planning teams, efforts that paralleled and interconnected with the PDB initiative, presented a compelling argument for incorporating those efforts into the evaluation as well.

The evaluation set out to discover what participants at all three levels thought PDB was and would look like if it were operating successfully, and what changes they thought were needed for successful PDB implementation. This led to the development of an analytical framework of seven areas of policy and practice that must change to make school-based instructional planning and budgeting successful:
An Implementation Study of Performance Driven Budgeting in the New York City Public Schools

- moving authority in budgeting, personnel and instructional planning to the school level;
- restructuring resource allocation policies and practices to support school level instructional planning and budgeting;
- providing information schools need for planning and budgeting;
- developing capacity to support school planning;
- creating less hierarchical decision-making relationships and structures;
- establishing effective accountability and public reporting mechanisms; and
- creating a culture supportive of school-decision-making and continuous school improvement.

The evaluation then explored whether the levels above the schools – the sub-districts and Central – were creating these necessary conditions for successful school planning and budgeting, and whether and to what extent the pilot schools were engaged in planning and budgeting.

The qualitative component of the evaluation (See Table 1) consisted of:

- **203 interviews over three years.** IESP conducted structured interviews with senior staff at the Central and sub-district levels and in six PDB case study schools, and with focus groups of planning team members. Central staff interviewed at least annually included the deputy chancellor for operations, the chief financial officer, and senior executives in budgeting, finance, human resources, instruction, assessment and accountability and technology. Sub-district superintendents and directors of operations in all six PDB districts were interviewed at least annually, as were the principals of one school in each district. IESP also conducted informal interviews with a variety of PDB participants at all three levels.

- **136 observations of meetings of participants over three years.** Observations included confidential meetings of Central staff involved in PDB activities, and of district staff with principals and other school participants, as well as citywide and districtwide meetings. In the PDB schools, IESP observed school planning team meetings as well as occasional staff meetings, PTA meetings and planning retreats.

- **Document review.** Documents included memoranda, internal correspondence, publications and archival materials from Central; annual sub-district and school instructional improvement plans; and system-wide budgeting and public reporting documents for the 1996-97 through 1999-00 school years, including Central's allocation memoranda, Annual School Reports, School-Based Budget Reports, School-Based Expenditure Reports and Chancellor's Budget Requests.

The quantitative component of the evaluation consisted of:

- **271 surveys of school planning team members.** In April and May of each year of the study (1998 - 2000), IESP conducted a structured survey of planning team members in 23 of the 61 pilot schools from the four early-implementing sub-districts, and, in the last year, in twelve schools in the remaining two sub-districts. 7 Within this sample of 23 schools, principals, teachers and parents serving on the school planning team
were asked to participate in the annual survey. The self-administered surveys were mailed to the principal, teacher's union representative, and PA/PTA president, as well as to additional, randomly selected parents (one) and teachers (three) on the planning teams of the 23 schools in the sample. (See Table 2)

- **School planning team member database.** To analyze school planning team size and composition, IESP constructed a three-year database of all team members in the 23 pilot schools in the sample. The source for the first two years of data was an IESP-developed school information form completed by all 23 schools. The source for the third year was the Board of Education's 1999-00 SLT Survey #1. (See Table 3)

- **Principal turnover database.** To analyze principal turnover rates, IESP constructed a three-year database of the numbers of schools and principals in PDB districts from information provided by the directors of operations of the six PDB sub-districts. (See Table 4)

**Summary of findings**

Prior to implementation of PDB, most school planning and budgeting decisions were made by sub-districts or by Central. Schools were rarely responsible for making their own key instructional and budgeting decisions. However, once PDB was initiated, the hierarchical command-and-control style of instructional planning and budgeting began to shift. Our first year evaluation found that participants throughout the school system defined three transformations as essential for successful PDB implementation:

- Central had to move control over resource allocation and instructional planning decisions to the sub-districts and schools, and transform itself into a comprehensive internal service organization.

- Sub-districts had to move considerable control over budgeting, staffing and instructional planning to schools, while developing their role as facilitator, trainer and supporter of school-based planning and budgeting.

- Schools had to take on the multiple challenges of self-management, while embracing and carrying out their new powers.

After three years of study, our broad conclusion is that Central succeeded in operationalizing PDB in a number of ways. Specifically, Central:

- transferred primary authority for planning and budgeting decisions to the schools;

- established the school planning team as the key planning and budgeting unit;

- created and implemented a framework for school instructional planning;

- developed and implemented a school budgeting system (Galaxy) built on school planning decisions; and

- took initial steps to develop the capacity to make this new approach work.

These successes involved major shifts in policies and practices. The following sections summarize our findings about how considerably policies, procedures and practices at Central, the sub-districts and schools have shifted to allow, and support, school-based instructional planning and budgeting.
Changes in accountability and decision-making authority
Major changes in school accountability and decision-making authority aided the implementation of PDB. Under pressure from Chancellor Crew and Mayor Giuliani, the state legislature passed a school governance law in late 1996 that virtually eliminated the role of the community school boards, strengthened the line of authority from chancellor to superintendent to principal, gave Central the authority to impose uniform standards on sub-districts and schools, mandated school-level budgeting and school planning teams, enhanced Central's ability to hold school and sub-district personnel accountable for school performance, and established the principal as the formal educational and administrative leader of the school.

One result of the legislative mandate for planning teams in every school was the establishment of the school team as the key systemic planning and budgeting unit of the system. The School Leadership Team (SLT) Plan, promulgated by Chancellor Crew in late 1998, gave school teams the authority to make instructional planning and budgeting decisions, and formalized and standardized the planning process throughout all city schools.

The PDB pilot schools established SLTs from existing school planning teams. On average, teams doubled their parent membership over the three year period, so that they became fairly well balanced between parents and staff. These SLTs had a stable, experienced core membership, and often made important instructional decisions for their schools. However, under the new accountability arrangement, principals alone were held responsible for student outcomes. Therefore, principals were clearly the key decision-makers at the school level, while SLTs played, at best, an influential supporting role.

Additionally, Central strengthened public accountability by compiling, analyzing and widely disseminating comprehensive performance and financial data for every school and sub-district and for the system as a whole, in its annual issuance of Annual School Reports and School Based Expenditure Reports.

Changes in planning for instructional improvement
Central established a new framework for school instructional planning. The CEP planning system, mandated for all schools and sub-districts, included a broad set of instructional planning tools – a Comprehensive Educational Plan (CEP) for schools, a District Comprehensive Educational Plan (DCEP) for sub-districts, a school self-assessment tool (PASS) and an early childhood literacy assessment system (ECLAS). The CEP and the other elements of this system were designed to help SLTs focus on analyzing their school's needs and recognizing instructional problems. Central also provided schools with considerable student demographic and outcome data, in a variety of disaggregated formats, to help them understand student needs and plan instructional interventions that would improve student outcomes.

Participation by schools and sub-districts in the CEP planning system was universal. Although there were numerous complaints about the CEP, it received high marks as a planning tool from all the pilot school principals we interviewed. One principal said, "It's very good. We didn't like it originally. Now I like it. It keeps you grounded because it's a public document." Another said that the CEP "unites the school to think about what you have to do." When schools managed to use the CEP planning system effectively, they helped create
a “conversation about how to reach children with different needs,” as one teacher put it. Our research also indicated, however, that the CEP system can become a compliance-driven, mechanical process that fails to investigate core instructional problems or propose meaningful improvements.

Interventions and accountability measures imposed on schools by sub-districts and Central also limited schools’ ability to plan for instructional improvement. When their planning efforts were not too constrained by these interventions—or by very late state budgets or significant staff turnover—many PDB pilot schools seemed able to use the CEP planning system to improve instruction and student outcomes.

Changes in school budgeting

Central substantially increased sub-district and school control and flexibility over budgeting and spending by making major improvements in the Central budget allocation process, and by issuing timely allocations two years in a row in spite of chronically late state budgets. Central also decentralized fiscal responsibility to the sub-districts, using a differentiated approach to determine which sub-districts were capable of more autonomous operation, and which sub-districts needed monitoring and assistance to carry out their new budgeting authority. In addition, Central decentralized some functions, thereby increasing sub-district/school control over system resources by over 8%.

Finally, Central developed Galaxy, a powerful school-based budgeting tool that is forcing fundamental changes in the system’s highly centralized operations. Central first tried to create a new budgeting system through a traditional centralized planning approach but, after sharp protest from sub-district personnel, shifted its planning model to what became known as the Core Group strategy. This Core Group of field-based experts defined its primary task as the design and development of a budgeting system that would allow schools to manage their money in support of their instructional plans.

In order to carry out the many complicated fiscal, operational and administrative changes that the Galaxy system required, Central created a high-level task force called the Galaxy Steering Committee, chaired by the Chief Financial Officer. Thorny technology issues, for example, that might have been lost in turf battles were resolved fairly quickly because the Core Group Leader, the Galaxy Project Manager, and the system’s Chief Financial Officer and Chief Technology Officer, as well as other Central financial managers, all sat on the committee.

The Galaxy Steering Committee’s most arduous task was managing the difficult transition from the original (June 1999) Sketchpad version of Galaxy, which had no direct link to Central’s financial and personnel systems, to a fully-linked and fully-functional Galaxy system. Establishing these linkages was extraordinarily complex and contentious in large part because a new accounting system was introduced at the same time that Galaxy was scheduled for linkage to the old accounting system. The collision resulting from the simultaneous introduction of the two new systems caused huge problems, including delays in establishing linkages between Galaxy and other Central systems, such as payroll and personnel.
The chaos and confusion that ensued frustrated principals and SLT members, as well as sub-district personnel, across all PDB schools and sub-districts. Eventually, the Galaxy Steering Committee resolved the most significant systemic conflicts between traditional Central procedures and the requirements of bottom-up budgeting. But it was not able to prevent the schools and sub-districts piloting Galaxy from severe buffeting during the conversion to Galaxy. Still, after a very trying year, by mid-2000 the Galaxy system was functioning well, and 192 schools in five of the six pilot sub-districts were able to create and manage their budgets.14

The changes that Galaxy generated in the PDB sub-districts were even more dramatic than the changes the Galaxy Steering Committee pushed through Central. When combined with the effect of Central's improved budgeting and purchasing processes and its devolution of greater fiscal responsibility to the sub-districts, Galaxy greatly increased sub-district control and flexibility over its resources. Sub-district administrators could more effectively shape allocations to their schools to reflect sub-district priorities and programmatic strategies. Sub-districts could determine the degree of autonomy to grant their schools, on a school-by-school basis. Faced with the challenges and the opportunities Galaxy offered, many sub-district staffs began to shift their role from rule-enforcer to problem-solver – for problems that had traditionally prevented schools from matching their resources to their plans.

The changes Galaxy generated in the pilot schools were equally dramatic. Using Galaxy, schools are able to see their entire allocation and can budget and spend their money flexibly,15 “matching [our] dollars to our needs,” as one principal told us. Under Galaxy, schools get dollars, not budget lines or positions.16 The allocations schools receive represent almost all funds — tax levy and reimbursable, general education and special education, personnel and non-personnel — that sub-districts control, not marginal pots of discretionary money. School planners are able to combine multiple funding sources to split-fund staff; hire people full-time, part-time or on a per-session or per diem basis; and move money between and among personnel and non-personnel categories, activities and programs. Complicated funding source rules and efficiency measures are built into the Galaxy system, as is sub-district oversight.17 Budget modifications can be approved in a day, not weeks or months. And, once approved, schools can make and track purchases on line without need for further approval. Using Galaxy helped many pilot schools become more efficient financial managers.18

Under the guidance of the Core Group, Galaxy implementation expanded during 2000-2001 from five Phase I sub-districts to an additional fifteen sub-districts. In the summer of 2001, these twenty sub-districts aggregated the budgets of their 580 schools19 into sub-district budgets totaling $2.9 billion. As the 2001-02 school year began, two-thirds of New York City's elementary and middle schools, educating half a million children, had their own budgets to manage.

Implications

The implementation of PDB was, by many standards, successful. Most school planners in the PDB pilot schools defined the effect of PDB on student learning positively.20 Moreover, the impact study shows that there was a slight, but statistically significant, increase in student test scores in the PDB pilot elementary schools, compared to non-PDB New York City elementary schools.
The shift from a top-down, hierarchical planning and budgeting system to one in which schools increasingly drive instructional planning and operational budgeting, signals the possible emergence of a new budgeting paradigm in the New York City school system. Whether it becomes a permanent change — to a new bottom-up, performance-driven budgeting system — depends on the extent to which system leadership supports the institutionalization of PDB, and particularly of Galaxy, and provides the support and resources necessary to keep it vital.

Concerns about capacity

One major concern is about sub-districts and schools developing the different capacities they need in a performance-driven system. Some PDB sub-districts clearly developed one key capacity — the ability to continually assess their schools' performance and academic outcomes — and have taken steps to encourage and support their schools' improvement efforts. Yet many sub-districts — PDB and non-PDB alike — that house the bulk of the city's low-performing schools have not yet developed the capacity to assess school performance and to help their low performing schools improve.

Even before the current crippling economic reality, the city's low performing schools bore the brunt of the school system's endemic failure to recruit, train and retain a sufficient supply of effective teachers and principals. Low performing schools that cannot hire teachers and principals with the knowledge and experience to guide school planning efforts have little capacity to implement PDB. Moreover, many low performing schools have very high staff turnover, which forces them into a repetitive cycle of constant staff training without the ability to establish the core of experience necessary for effective planning and budgeting. (See Table 4) Of particular concern, especially for low performing schools, is that the school system's chronic resource deprivation will become much more severe, given recession-reduced city and state budgets and a local economic crisis generated by the events of September 11th.

These problems, especially acute in low performing schools throughout the city, reach epidemic proportions in those sub-districts with a large number of low performing schools. What we fear is that in many, if not most, of the system's low performing schools, current teacher and principal capacity issues will render PDB ineffective.

Concerns about the political context

At the macro political level, the consistent attacks on the school system and its personnel by much of the city's political leadership have resulted in systemic leadership instability, defensiveness and a lack of sufficient educational resources. It has also intensified the growing personnel crisis.

Chronically late budgets, resulting from a dysfunctional state political process, exacerbate these problems. Schools cannot plan effectively without knowing what their next-year's budget will be. The practice of producing consistently late state budgets violates this most essential pre-condition for successful PDB implementation. While Central cannot control how late the state budget will be, it can take that hazard into consideration, as happened when Central issued two timely budgets in June 1998 and June 1999. It is technically possible for Central to issue preliminary district allocations, recalibrating them once the state budget is passed. However, a stable and non-destructive political climate is a precondition for such fiscal forecasting to have an acceptable range of risk.
An Implementation Study of Performance Driven Budgeting in the New York City Public Schools

There is also concern, suggested in our first year evaluation report, that a new chancellor committed to differing notions of reform could reverse the important changes Central had initiated under Chancellor Crew. PDB was conceived as an effort to transform the systemic functions of instruction and finance by lodging planning and budgeting at the school level. If system leadership does not support this transformation, PDB may be reduced to a tool schools use to mechanically budget what sub-districts and Central have decided they should do.

Conclusion

PDB represents an effort to replace a hierarchical instruction and budgeting system with a decision-making system in which school decisions drive instructional planning and budgeting. PDB’s theory of change states that student achievement will improve if schools are given significant control over their resources and their instructional planning.

Our implementation evaluation found that the PDB initiative produced a new budgeting system in which school-level decision-making is driving change upward through the sub-district and Central fiscal systems. In addition, Central’s new CEP planning system is contributing to improving instructional planning in the entire system. The PDB impact study also found initial indications that student academic outcomes in the elementary schools implementing PDB have improved compared to the elementary schools in the non-PDB sub-districts.

We believe that the PDB initiative provides other school systems with important lessons on how to make schools more academically effective by moving significant control over instructional planning and budgeting to the school level.

Endnotes


2 Support for the evaluation was provided by Pew Charitable Trusts and an anonymous funder.

3 Two of the six sub-districts (Districts 9 and 20) were not expected to begin implementing PDB until the 1998-99 school year.

4 The technical reports on both studies can be obtained from IESP at 212-998-5880 or iesp@nyu.edu. They may also be downloaded from www.nyu.edu/iesp.


6 Ibid.

7 For the first two years of the study, we also conducted interviews, observations, document collection and surveys in thirteen pilot high schools and three high school superintendencies participating in PDB, as well as in four comparison schools in two non-PDB sub-districts. See Siegel, D. et al. (1998, November). First Annual Report: Evaluation of the Performance Driven Budgeting Initiative of the New York City Board of Education. New York City: NYU Institute for Education & Social Policy; and Siegel, D. et al (2000, May). Second Annual Report: Evaluation of the Performance Driven Budgeting Initiative of the New York City Board of Education. New York City: NYU Institute for Education & Social Policy.

8 Analysis of our database of planning team members in 23 pilot schools indicates that, from 1997-98 to 1999-00, the average number of parents on school planning teams doubled from 3.2 to 6.4 parents, and the average team size increased from 10.7 to 13.5 members.
Sixty percent of the parents, 68% of the teachers and 73% of the principals who responded to the third year (2000) survey indicated that they had been serving on their school planning team for three or more years. Further, 57% of the parents, 85% of the teachers and 40% of the principals indicated that they had been in their school for six or more years.

Fifty-five percent of the respondents to the 2000 survey indicated that their team’s deliberations “always had a direct impact on actual decisions at the school level.”

Ninety-six percent of the respondents to the 2000 survey indicated that the principal was “very influential in deciding how money is budgeted. Fifty-four percent indicated that the planning team was very influential, while 43% indicated parents, and 35% indicated teachers, were very influential.

For example, from the end of the 1998-99 school year to the beginning of the 2000-01 school year, one-third of the PDB schools had new principals. The rate of principal turnover was roughly twice as high in higher-needs districts as it was in lower-needs districts.

The Core Group consisted of the directors of operations of the six PDB sub-districts, plus two directors of operations from other sub-districts.

The sixth sub-district, District 22, decided to continue to use its own well-developed school budgeting system instead of Galaxy and dropped out of Phase I Galaxy implementation in September 1999.

Eighty-eight percent of the school planning team members from schools using Galaxy who responded to our 2000 survey indicated that Galaxy had increased budgeting flexibility “a lot” (39%) or “somewhat” (49%).

For example, a school planner told us, “Rather than being allocated ten school aide positions, which means we have to hire ten school aides, now we are given money to support ten aides. However, we use it as we see fit. We don’t get budget lines. We get dollars. We might decide to use it to hire a paraprofessional or a teacher or a staff developer.”

“For example,” one principal said, “we didn’t need our English as a Second Language [ESL] teacher for an entire day, so we had her do [preparation period] coverage as well. We were able to split-fund the position very easily between ESL and basic tax levy money. We were able to maximize our money because we can see all our funding sources and create the positions we need from multiple funding sources.”

A principal explained, “Before Galaxy, we'd spend money in categories because it had to be spent. Not so with Galaxy. With contracted services, I can't get my budget projection to the penny. But when I get a better idea of the cost, I can remove the excess money from that category and put it into something else.”

These schools operated a total of 728 “Galaxy organizations” – sub-schools, houses and academies that sub-districts set up as separate budgeting entities.

More than 60% of the 89 PDB team members who responded to the third year (2000) survey indicated that, after three years of participation in the initiative, their school was “a better place for student learning”; only 5% said it was “a worse place for student learning.”

These critical staff capacity problems in low-performing schools have led to solutions that impose scripted instructional programs on low-performing schools.


The city administration’s failure to negotiate timely contracts with the principals’ and teachers’ unions, combined with its propensity to make the school system and its practitioners into constant targets of attack, created a bunker mentality that diminished morale throughout the city's schools.
Table 1: Data Collection

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<th></th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Number (%) of surveys returned:</th>
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<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>87 (66%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>95 (66%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>89 (60%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>271 (64%)</td>
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Table 2: PDB pilot, survey sample and case study schools

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<tr>
<th>PDB Pilot schools:</th>
<th>Schools in the survey sample:</th>
<th>Schools in the case study:</th>
<th>Years in the study:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Early-implementing sub-districts (1997-98):</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>District 13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>District 19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub total</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Later-implementing sub-districts (1998-99):</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 9</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 20</td>
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<td>Sub total</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
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Table 3: Size and composition of school planning teams in PDB pilot schools

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<th></th>
<th>1997-98:</th>
<th>1998-99:</th>
<th>1999-00:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Average number of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>parents on team</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>teachers on team</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>Average number of</td>
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<tr>
<td>principals/others</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average team size</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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Table 4: Principal turnover rates in the PDB sub-districts

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of PDB schools, June 1999:</th>
<th>Number of PDB schools, Sept. 2000:</th>
<th>Number (percent) of new principals, June 1999 - Sept. 2000:*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>67 (35%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total number of new principals for both years, divided by the number of schools in June 1999, times 100.

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<tr>
<td>Author(s):</td>
<td>Dorothy E. Siegel, Norm Fruchter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Source:</td>
<td>Institute for Education and Social Policy, New York University, Steinhardt School of Education</td>
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