
Kansas Univ., Lawrence. Center for Russian and East European Studies.

2000-00-00

73p.

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Guides - Classroom - Teacher (052)

Curriculum Enrichment; Foreign Countries; High Schools; *International Relations; Korean War; *Models; *Modern History; Primary Sources; *World Affairs; *World History

Cold War; United States; USSR

Realizing that the Cold War is a topic that often is neglected as time runs short at the end of a school year, a group of University of Kansas (Lawrence) educators sought to create effective classroom materials for secondary/community college instructors to teach about the Cold War. The group's main goal was to create a flexible model that encouraged study of the topic for the amount of time available. This Cold War learning packet provides materials and directions to guide students through a research and decision-making activity. Following a brief review of the Cold War period, the materials in the packet lead students to analyze a key Cold War event from both a Soviet and U.S. point of view, using a variety of primary sources. The key event is analyzed using the packet's Cold War Def Con model. The students decide to what level of conflict the event brought the superpowers. The final analysis phase uses this understanding and places the key event into the context of the entire time period, through a series of questions, including, "Who Won?" Included in the learning packet is one event example about the Korean War and copies of primary source documents for the appropriate categories. The packet includes a suggested performance assessment; extension ideas; the Def Con Model; an overview of the Cold War; a timeline of key Cold War events; a Cold War glossary; an extensive Cold War bibliography; instructions to students; various activities; and primary sources (reading materials). (BT)
A learning packet for secondary level study

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Thanks also to **Dr. Joe O'Brien**, University of Kansas Center for Teaching and Leadership, for the amazing conversations that resulted in the original concept for this Learning Packet, and helping the group develop their ideas towards the final model.
ABOUT THE LEARNING PACKET
INTRODUCTION TO "WHO WON THE COLD WAR?"

THE PURPOSE OF THE LEARNING PACKET

In June 2000, an exceptional group of educators gathered at the University of Kansas to create classroom materials for secondary/community college instructors to effectively present the Cold War. Our group represented strategic sectors of the educational community—teachers, presidential library education directors, and Title VI National Resource Center Outreach Coordinators. Realizing that the Cold War is one of those topics that usually gets clipped short at the end of the school (if it's handled at all), the group's top goal was to create a flexible model, to encourage making the study as long or short as the time allows.

The resulting Cold War Learning Packet provides materials and directions to guide students through a research and decision-making activity. Following a brief review of the Cold War period, the materials lead students to analyze a key Cold War event through both Soviet and US points of view, using primary sources in a variety of categories. This key event is then plugged into our Cold War "Def Con" model, in order to decide to what conflict level the event brought the superpowers. The final analysis places this understanding of that key event into the context of the entire time period, through a series of questions, including, "Who Won?"

Included in the learning packet will be one event example—the Korean War—with copies of primary source documents in the appropriate categories. From this, the teacher can teach the Korean War as a representative key event of the Cold War, or choose another key event and do the research to find appropriate primary source documents for the Soviet and US points of view.

"Who Won the Cold War?" takes seemingly isolated events and ties them into the flow and continuity of history. It also dares to ask the question: Is the Cold War really over?

WHY TEACH ABOUT THE COLD WAR?

- It was one of the most important conflicts in world history, lasting over 50 years, costing untold amounts of money, and affecting every person's life.
- Its effects reach from the past into the future and encompasses
  - power
  - foreign and domestic policy
  - science and technology
  - arts and popular culture
  - world and national security
  - economies
  - education
  - opportunities gained and lost

WHY USE "WHO WON THE COLD WAR" LEARNING PACKET?

This easy-to-use package provides the teacher with a grade 9-12 curriculum that:
- Is aligned with Kansas standards and National History and Social Studies standards
- Is a ready-to-use local performance assessment for individuals and groups
- Affords flexible user-friendly lesson plans that can be easily adapted for short lessons, longer units, block scheduling, and assessment needs
- Fits curriculum needs for World History, US History, Government, and Geography courses, with extension suggestions for integrating creative writing, literature, science, and technology
- Focuses on critical thinking skills
- Can be easily applied to reading comprehension, writing, problem solving, and integrated curriculums
- Lends itself to use in inclusive classrooms
- Provides opportunity for thematic units
- Provides a structure for student-directed research
- And makes accessible a hopelessly complicated era in a clear and manageable format
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TEACHER FOR “WHO WON THE COLD WAR?”

LEARNING PACKET CONTENTS: INFORMATION, RESOURCES, TEACHING MODEL

- Cold War overview
- Timeline
- Glossary
- Chillin’ Chart

Learning Packet key event example: The Korean War

- Primary Resources—from the Soviet and US points of view:
  - Popular Culture
  - Military Industrial Complex (includes Technology, Economics, Military Action)
  - Politics / Ideology
  - International / Decolonization
  - Environment

- Extension ideas and materials

TO USE AS A COMPREHENSIVE UNIT

1. Cold War Overview
   A bulleted synopsis of the Cold War, Timeline, and Glossary are included to refresh your knowledge of the time period and enable you to pursue this learning packet. You may wish to use the overview with your advanced students as well, for a review of the big picture.

2. Choose one or more key events for your study.
   Use the Timeline resource for ideas.

3. Examine the “Chillin’ Chart” to decide which categories are appropriate
   The Chillin’ Chart is designed as a comprehensive list of Cold War study categories. Decide which categories you will use for the key event(s) you have chosen. This list may change as you look for primary sources! The vital factor for determining categories is POV (point of view)—you need primary sources to look at the key events from the point of view both of the US and the Soviet sides.

4. Find primary source documents for your key event. Where?
   - Start with the resources in this packet, such as the bibliography and Cold War Web Sites lists.
   - For help with locating primary source documents representing the Soviet POV, we suggest you contact the Title VI National Resource Center Outreach Coordinators involved in this project, or those in the Russia / East Europe area nearest to your location.

5. Student-directed research
   Students may work in groups or individually to examine the primary source documents in a given category. They should summarize the POV of each side, answer any questions included with the primary documents.

6. Complete the Chillin’ Chart.
   Students present findings and fill in all categories of the Chillin’ Chart used for the key Cold War event.

7. Determine the Def Con Level of the Key Event
   Using the Def Con definitions (page 5), students should rate how close to a “hot” war this key event brought the Cold War.

8. Conclusions
   Have the students hypothesize about the entire Cold War period: How close to a “hot” war did it ever get? Was there a winner in this war? Is the Cold War over?

9. Interdisciplinary extensions
   Further explore the effects of the Cold War on films, literature, art, music, science and technology, economics, sports, etc., using the ideas included. What is the difference in the post-Cold War period?
SUGGESTED PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

1. Choose a Cold War Key Event.
2. Will the assessment be performed in groups or by individuals?
3. Assign the Chillin’ Chart Category (or more than one) with corresponding points of view.
   Suggestion: use one category, with both sides of the story.
4. The students should individually decide the Def Con level of the situation, which may be different,
   based on the category they are analyzing. The performance is based on their assessment choice and
   defense of their position.
5. Possible assessment forms: writing an in-class essay or a play, creating an advertisement for the
   event and Def Con level they have decided on, etc.

EXTENSION IDEAS: TAKING THE COLD WAR INTO NEW DIRECTIONS

ORAL HISTORIES

Everyone knows people who have lived through the key events of the Cold War. Interview several who
took part in the Korean War or Vietnam conflict, or who remember the Cuban Missile Crisis. Talk to
parents or other adults about growing up in the 50s or 60s—did they practice Civil Defense Drills, were
they afraid of the Soviets using a nuclear weapon, did they have different amounts of fear at different
times? How did they feel about Russian or Chinese people? Were they paranoid about nuclear
annihilation? Ask an adult who has traveled abroad if they know what is in their CIA file (it is available
to anyone through the Freedom of Information Act).

WHAT IF

Imagine what would have happened if one situation had changed in the Cold War. For example, what if
Truman had not fired MacArthur and he had decided to drop bombs on China in order to win the war in
Korea?

LOCAL EFFECTS

How has the Cold War, past and present, affected your local community? What industries, activities, and
attitudes prevail because of the influence of the conflict among nations?
- Use the Personal Interview Form included in the packet for collecting anecdotal data

LANGUAGE ARTS ENRICHMENT

- Study the literature of the Cold War:
- Study the media, propaganda, and films of the Cold War: James Bond

SCIENCE ENRICHMENT

- Examine the Cold War’s effects on the environment:
  - In “BRAVO tests,” we used US soldiers as guinea pigs in the Southwest US.
  - Study nuclear plants—how do they work, how are they constructed, where is the danger?

THERMONUCLEAR JEOPARDY

- Use Jeopardy-style questions regarding the Cold War categories used in this packet.
THE DEF CON MODEL

As students examine Cold War incidents or events they will be asked to evaluate each event according to the Defense Readiness Condition [DEF CON] scale of the US military. Students will determine which state of readiness they would require of US forces if they were Commander-in-Chief. In this game of brinksmanship, students must remember that the USSR also has defense readiness levels and will most likely respond accordingly. A teacher might want to divide the class into groups, one US and one Soviet, to evaluate each Cold War event. After careful evaluation, each side could determine its own DEF CON level, but they must be aware that moving to DEF CON 1 means thermonuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union.

Defense readiness conditions [DEF CONs] describe the stages of alert or readiness between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified commands. The DEF CONs are graduated to match various military events by degree of severity. The five conditions are as follows:

DEF CON 5 = Normal peacetime readiness
DEF CON 4 = Normal, increased intelligence and strengthened security measures
DEF CON 3 = Increase in force readiness above normal readiness
DEF CON 2 = Further increase in force readiness, but less than the maximum readiness
DEF CON 1 = Maximum force readiness

After the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs] additional levels, Emergency Conditions [EMERGCONs], were added for response to a missile attack. In the event of an EMERGCON all other forces would automatically go to DEF CON 1.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the US Strategic Air Command was placed on DEF CON 2. B-52's armed with nuclear weapons were on airborne alert and ready to strike targets inside the USSR. In October 1973, when Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israel, US forces went to DEF CON 3 alert status, because of possible intervention by the Soviet Union was feared. US forces went back to DEF CON 1 in mid-November 1973.

THE FIVE DEF CON LEVELS FOR THIS EXERCISE
DEF CON 5 = lowest level of conflict, involving culture, sport, other civilian acts only
DEF CON 4 = propaganda battles carried out by governments
DEF CON 3 = conflicts involving new technologies, military preparedness, space exploration
DEF CON 2 = actual military conflict through “proxy wars” (“low intensity conflict”/ LIC)
DEF CON 1 = thermonuclear war

Example of the Def Con Model:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Def Con 5</th>
<th>Def Con 4</th>
<th>Def Con 3</th>
<th>Def Con 2</th>
<th>Def Con 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sputnik launched</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US stops wheat sales to USSR 1980</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycott of the LA Olympics</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INFORMATION: OVERVIEW OF THE COLD WAR

WHAT DOES THE TERM “COLD WAR” MEAN?
- This clash of ideologies was not a “war” in the strict military sense. It was a “war” of ideas between the US and USSR, with the actual intermittent “low-intensity conflicts” fought indirectly through proxy allies with an enduring state of tension.
- The terminology included a division of countries into: First World (Western democratic nations, led by US) vs. Second World (Communist Bloc, led by USSR).
- The global ramifications of this clash were felt by many Third World (underdeveloped/emerging) nations, who often became the proxy nations for the Cold Warriors.

WHEN WAS THE COLD WAR?
- The roots of the Cold War go as far back as the end of WWI, with the Bolshevik Revolution and Wilson’s Fourteen Points. This clash of ideologies put the two emerging 20th century powers at loggerheads as they grew into their positions of power.
- Cold War events began immediately following WWII, with the spheres of influence that arose in Europe.
- The “end” of the Cold War is pegged at the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, which followed the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe. There are events after 1991 where the US and Russia collaborate (the MIR space station), as well as those which continue conflict (NATO action in the Balkans).

WHO WERE THE PLAYERS?
- US = representative capitalism (ideals of freedom + free enterprise)
  “Allies”: Western Europe and NATO, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Canada
- USSR = authoritarian socialism (ideals of egalitarianism + state ownership of the means of production)
  “Allies”: Warsaw Pact nations, China (to mid-60s), Cuba (from early 60s)
- Assorted Third World players (ex. Chile, Zaire, Angola, Egypt), non-aligned countries (ex. India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Egypt), and countries who chose not to participate (ex. Finland, Austria, Switzerland)
- US/USSR leaders:
  USSR/Russia: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko (the gerentocracy), Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin

WHY STUDY THE COLD WAR?
- The “continuing” Cold War shapes our world today.
- The legacy of the major Cold War events shapes our future.
- The Cold War permeates every aspect of human existence, including popular culture, technology, politics, military, environment, economics, and more.
- Worldwide phenomenon: all nations have been influenced by the Cold War, either through alignment or non-alignment. It encompasses global history in the last half of the 20th century (and beyond).

IS IT OVER?
- Did it really end with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989???
- Did it really end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union???
- Are current world conflicts part of a continuing Cold War???
- If the Cold War is over, who won??? Are you sure?
RESOURCES:
TIMELINE OF KEY COLD WAR EVENTS

PRE-COLD WAR PERIOD
1917 US involvement in WWI in Europe
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia
1918 Wilson’s Fourteen Points
1919 Treaty of Versailles ends WWI.
“Red Scare” in US
The Communist International (Comintern) established
1920 US Congress rejects the League of Nations, ushering in a period of isolationism in the US
1929 Beginning of global economic depression, providing Soviet propaganda regarding the dangers of capitalism
1933 FDR recognizes the Soviet government in USSR
1939-41 Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland, Baltic States, and Romania (aka Bessarabia); Soviet attack on Finland; Soviet economic support of German war effort.
1941 Germany attacks the Soviet Union
1942 Tehran Summit of the Grand Alliance (US, USSR, GB)

TRANSITIONAL YEAR
1945 Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt meet at Yalta
V-E Day (end of WWII)
UN Charter signed in San Francisco
Stalin, Churchill/Attlee meet in Potsdam
US drops Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
V-J Day

COLD WAR PERIOD
1946 ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Interpreter and Computer) dedicated (revealed to the public)
Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri
1947 Truman Doctrine announced to Congress
Marshall Plan initiated
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) established
1948 Berlin Blockade and airlift
Truman recognizes the state of Israel
Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia
Tito-Stalin split leads to expulsion Yugoslavia from Cominform
Division of Germany
Chinese Communists come to power
Formation of NATO and formation of CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)
1949 Soviets detonate their first Atomic Bomb in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan
1950 Korean War begins
1951 Ethel and Julius Rosenberg convicted of selling spy secrets to the USSR
1952 US explodes first hydrogen bomb in the Marshall Islands
First British Atomic Bomb test
Eisenhower elected President
1953 Stalin’s death
Korean War armistice
Labor unrest in East Berlin
Khrushchev comes to power in USSR
1955 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) formed
1956 Khrushchev gives his “Secret Speech” to the Twentieth Party Congress, leading to “destalinization” in the Soviet Union
Cominform dissolved
Poznan workers revolt demanding “Bread and Freedom” (June) which led to change of Polish party leadership and liberalization of communist system in Poland (Oct. 1956).

Hungarian uprising, followed by Soviet army entering Budapest

1957 US underground nuclear test near Las Vegas
Soviets launch the first artificial satellite: Sputnik

1958 NASA created

1959 Castro comes to power in Cuba
Khrushchev visits US

1960 French Atomic Bomb test
US U2 plane shot down over USSR
Kennedy wins US Presidential election

1961 Soviets launch the first man in space (Yuri Gargarin)
Bay of Pigs conflict
Alan Shepard launched into space
Berlin Wall erected
JFK recommends that Americans build fallout shelters
Soviet’s detonate megabomb (circa 58 megatons)

1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
1963 US and USSR establish “hotline” connection
Kennedy visits Berlin (“Ich bin ein Berliner”)
US, GB, and USSR sign nuclear test ban treaty
Kennedy killed; Johnson assumes US Presidency

1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution approved by US Congress granting President Johnson authority to send US troops to South Vietnam
China explodes first Atomic Bomb
Khrushchev expelled from office; Brezhnev becomes CPSU General Secretary

1967 Six Day War

1968 Viet Cong start Tet Offensive
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty signed by US, GB, and USSR (agreed not to transfer nuclear technologies to other nations)
“Prague Spring,” followed by Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops entering Czechoslovakia (August)
Nixon elected President
Brezhnev assumes sole power in USSR

1969 Paris Peace Talks (four party)
First stage of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
First man on the moon (Apollo 11)
Soviet-Chinese border conflict on the Ussuri River
Member states of the Warsaw Pact conference on European security
Lin Piao succeeds Mao Zedong
Biggest anti-war demonstration in DC

1970 US ping-pong team arrives in China (“Ping-Pong Diplomacy”)
Polish workers revolt against price increases in Polish port cities (Dec.), leading to a change in Polish party leadership, a root of the Solidarity movement 1980-81.

1971 Nixon visits China
US and USSR sign biological weapons treaty

1972 SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) between US and USSR

1973 Vietnam peace treaty / US troops withdraw from Vietnam
Oil producers raise prices

1974 India detonates first nuclear bomb
Nixon resigns; replaced by Ford

1975 End of the Vietnam War
Khmer Rouge comes to power in Cambodia (until 1979)
US-Apollo and USSR-Soyuz link up in orbit
Helsinki Accords signed by leaders of 35 countries, including US and USSR
1976  
Carter wins election
Polish workers revolt against another price increase (June), another root of Solidarity

1979  
US and China begin establishment of diplomatic ties
"Weapons for hostages" US Embassy in Iran
Three Mile Island nuclear plant meltdown
Soviets invade Afghanistan
SALT II treaty signed (but not ratified by US Senate)

1980  
US stops wheat sales to USSR
US and allies boycott the Moscow Olympics
Lech Walesa leads strikes in Gdansk Shipyard, government concedes establishment of Solidarity independent trade union (Aug)
Yugoslav leader Tito dies; replaced by collective leadership
Reagan elected President

1981  
Space shuttle Columbia launched (first re-usable space vehicle)
Martial law declared in Poland (December 13), Solidarity banned
US imposes sanctions on USSR and Poland

1982  
Brezhnev dies; replaced by Andropov
Reagan outlines Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars")
"The Day After" airs on US television
Martial law formally lifted in Poland

1983  
Andropov dies; replaced by Chernenko
LA Olympics boycotted by all Eastern bloc except for Romania
Chernenko dies; replaced by Gorbachev (March)
USSR announces moratorium on nuclear testing

1984  
Melttdown and fire occur at Chernobyl nuclear plant, Ukraine
Challenger space shuttle goes down
Soviets begin construction of MIR space station

1985  
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev (first arms accord calling for elimination of entire class of weapons)
Gorbachev announces several reforms of Soviet economy (plus the social reforms in glasnost' and perestroika)

1988  
Ten thousand demonstrate in Prague on the 20th anniversary of the WTO invasion (August)
Bush wins election

1989  
Full retreat of Soviet forces from Afghanistan
Polish roundtable negotiations (February-April)
Solidarity sweeps first free elections for Polish Parliament (June)
First majority non-communist government in Poland (September)
Collapses of communist regimes follow in Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania
Fall of the Berlin Wall (November)
Romanian Communist Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife are arrested, tried, and executed (December)
Vaclav Havel elected president of Czechoslovakia (December)

1990  
First free elections in Hungary and East Germany (March)
Free election in Bulgaria (June)
Reunification of Germany (October 3)
Delegates from NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization meet and sign treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Delegates from 34 European and North American states meet in Paris to sign "Charter for a New Europe"

1991  
START treaty—US and USSR sign Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (July)
Warsaw Treaty Organization officially dissolved (July)
Failed coup against Gorbachev leads to his being ousted (August 19); official resignation (December 25)
Dissolution of the Soviet Union (December 25)
RESOURCES:
COLD WAR GLOSSARY

This is a sampling of the glossary at the CNN Cold War site. The complete listing can be found at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/glossary/am.index.html


-A-

ABM
Antiballistic missiles, designed to detect and intercept incoming nuclear missiles.

Arms race
Competitive buildup of nuclear weapons between the United States and Soviet Union that began after the Soviets exploded their first atomic weapon on August 29, 1949—ending the US nuclear monopoly.

Atlas
Developed in the 1960s, these intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were housed in deep underground concrete silos built to withstand a nuclear attack.

Atomic bomb
First nuclear weapon used in wartime, by the United States on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945; an A-bomb explosion is created by the splitting of atomic nuclei and results in a huge release of energy.

-B-

B-52
Strategic US heavy bomber with nuclear capacity, powered by eight turbojet engines; its range is extended by in-flight refueling. B-52s were the mainstay of US nuclear forces in the 1950s.

Baghdad Pact
Middle Eastern defense pact established in 1955 by Great Britain, Turkey and Iraq; would later include the United States, Iran and Pakistan.

Baikonur Cosmodrome
Soviet missile-testing facility where rockets, spacecraft and satellites are launched; located in current-day Kazakhstan.

Bay of Pigs
Landing area on Cuba's south coast where an American-organized invasion by Cuban exiles was defeated by Fidel Castro’s government forces April 17-20, 1961.

Beatlemania
Frenzy over the 1964 US arrival of the British pop group The Beatles, whose music and style loosened American culture from the constraints of the 1950s.

Berlin airlift
Successful effort by the United States and Britain to ship by air 2.3 million tons of supplies to the residents of the Western-controlled sectors of Berlin from June 1948 to May 1949, in response to a Soviet blockade of all land and canal routes to the divided city.
**Bolsheviks**
Precursor to the Russian Communist Party, they seized power in Russia in October 1918 under Lenin's leadership.

**Bomber gap**
In the 1950s a number of US military officials warned about a "bomber gap," alleging the Soviet Union had more planes than the United States that were capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

**Broken arrow**
Any incident that includes the seizure, theft, loss or accidental destruction of a nuclear device.

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**Checkpoint Charlie**
Border site between East and West Berlin where US and Soviet tanks faced each other in a tense standoff in October 1961 before both sides withdrew.

**CIA**
Central Intelligence Agency, established in 1947 by Truman; conducts US intelligence and counterintelligence missions overseas.

**Civil rights movement**
Mass movement for political, social and economic equality by African Americans during the 1960s, mostly in the segregated cities of the Southern United States.

**COMECON**

**COMINFORM**
International communist information bureau established by Stalin in 1947; dissolved by Khrushchev in 1956.

**Containment**
Policy established by the Truman administration in 1947 to contain Soviet influence to what it was at the end of World War II.

**Cruise**
US missiles that use wings, a turbofan and computerized maps to fly like an airplane to its target; can fly at altitudes of 50 feet.

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**DEFCON**
System of defense conditions used by the US military, ranging from DEFCON 5, the lowest state of alert, to DEFCON 1, indicating war.

**Detente**
A thaw in Cold War relations between the United States and Soviet Union from 1969-1975, highlighted by the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaty and the Helsinki Accords.

**DMZ**
Demilitarized zone between North and South Korea since 1953, when the Korean War ended. It is one of the most heavily fortified borders in the world, often described as the last frontier of the Cold War.
Eisenhower Doctrine
Pledge by Eisenhower in 1957 to provide military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern country fighting communism.

Fallout shelter
Underground concrete structures, often stocked with food and water supplies, designed to withstand fallout from a nuclear attack; popular in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.

First strike capability
The capacity to launch a nuclear strike without fear of a nuclear counterattack from the enemy; the United States enjoyed first strike capability over the Soviet Union until the late 1950s.

Flexible response
The US policy of maintaining both conventional and nuclear forces to have flexibility in dealing with communist threats.

GDR
German Democratic Republic, or East Germany; it was proclaimed in October 1949 and encompassed the Soviet occupation zone in postwar Germany.

Hollywood Ten
Members of the Screen Actors Guild who refused to answer questions before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1947, during the height of US anti-communist hysteria.

Hot line
Direct phone line between Washington and Moscow established after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Hydrogen bomb
First tested in 1952 by the United States and in 1953 by the Soviets; a nuclear weapon hundreds of times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

IRBM
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; can reach targets between 600 and 3,500 miles away.

Iron Curtain
Term used by Churchill in 1946 to describe the growing East-West divide in postwar Europe between communist and democratic nations.
Jupiter
Class of US intermediate-range ballistic missiles developed in the 1950s by a team led by Werner Von Braun, who developed V-I and V-2 rockets for Nazi Germany.

KOMSOMOL
Communist organization for Soviet youths aged 14 to 28; patterned after the Communist Party, its goals were to indoctrinate and train future members.

Limited Test Ban Treaty
1963 agreement signed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union that prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, space and underwater.

Los Alamos
US nuclear research and testing facility in the New Mexico desert where the world's first atomic bomb was developed during World War II.

MAD
Mutual assured destruction, a Cold War theory in which the United States and Soviet Union each used its ability to launch a nuclear counterattack to deter a first strike from the other side.

Manhattan Project
Code name for US and British development of the first atomic bomb; it began in 1944 at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Marshall Plan
Postwar European recovery plan organized by US Secretary of State George Marshall that was also intended to bolster Western democracy; nearly $13 billion was spent from 1948-1952.

Massive retaliation
Eisenhower administration policy that pledged US attacks in response to Soviet expansion; relied heavily on nuclear, rather than conventional, military forces.

McCarthyism
US campaign to root out communists in government and society during the late 1940s and 1950s led by Sen. Joseph McCarthy; accusations were often based on rumors and half-truths.

MIRV
Multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle; first deployed in the 1960s, MIRV technology enabled missiles to carry a number of warheads aimed at separate targets.

Missile gap
Charges by critics of the Eisenhower administration that the United States had fallen behind the Soviet Union in the production of nuclear missiles, especially intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
US intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a range of 5,000 miles and 10 warheads, each with an explosive yield of 500 kilotons.

-N-

National Defense Education Act
After the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the United States began spending $2 billion a year on higher education in an effort to win the "brain race" with the Soviets.

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, begun in 1949 as a military and political alliance of European nations and the United States and Canada designed to protect Western Europe from a Soviet attack.

NORAD
Formed in 1958 by the United States and Canada and based in Colorado, the North American Aerospace Defense Command monitors the skies for an attack on the continent.

NSC-68
Written in 1950 by the US State Department's Paul Nitze, National Security Council Report 68 predicted the Soviets could launch a nuclear attack on the United States by 1954 and recommended an increase in US spending for nuclear and conventional arms.

Nuclear winter
Theory that, immediately following a major nuclear war, radioactive smoke and dust would fill the atmosphere, blocking sunlight, lowering temperatures and destroying agriculture.

-O-

Open Skies
Proposal by Eisenhower to let the superpowers see each other's military blueprints and installations and place reconnaissance units in each other's territory. Khrushchev's rejection led to the US deployment of the U-2 spy plane.

Operation Ivy
On November 1, 1952, the world entered the thermonuclear era with the US detonation of the first hydrogen bomb; its force was equivalent to more than 10 million tons of TNT—1,000 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb.

-P-

Peaceful coexistence
Term used by Khrushchev in 1963 to describe a situation in which the United States and Soviet Union would continue to compete economically and politically without launching a thermonuclear war.

People's Liberation Army
Welcomed in Beijing as heroes in 1949 after the revolution in China, the country's armed forces were reorganized in the 1960s—a move that led to the Cultural Revolution.

Ping-Pong diplomacy
After the United States lifted travel restrictions to China in 1971, Beijing invited a US table-tennis team to play in China. The visit helped improve ties between the two countries and led in part to Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China.
Polaris
The first submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), they were developed by the United States and were soon replaced by the more advanced Poseidon missiles. Britain, though, chose to rely on upgraded Polaris missiles.

Politburo
Executive committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Potsdam
Third wartime meeting of the Big Three Alliance leaders, Churchill, Truman and Stalin; the conference highlighted East-West differences on Poland, the occupation of Germany and German reparations as the war drew to a close.

Prague Spring
Brief period of political reform and freedom in Czechoslovakia in 1968 under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek; it ended in August 1968 with Dubcek's arrest and the massing of 650,000 Soviet-backed troops in the country.

-R-

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Started by the United States in the early 1950s in an effort to reach the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the service moved its headquarters from Munich to Prague in 1995 and now transmits 700 hours of programming weekly in 23 languages.

RB-47
US warplane shot down in 1960 after it allegedly entered Soviet airspace. A year later, after Kennedy's election, Khrushchev released the plane's pilots.

Red Army
Armed forces of the Soviet Union, formed after the Bolshevik revolution from the rebel Red Guards and the ruins of the Imperial Army.

Redstone
Surface-to-surface ballistic missile developed by Werner Von Braun's team and tested successfully in August 1953; with a range of 500 miles, it was used to lift the first US astronaut into space.

-S-

SALT
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in the late 1960s and '70s that led to the signing of the SALT accords in 1972 by Nixon and Brezhnev; SALT I limited each country's ballistic missile defense and froze the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

SDI
Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (1983), also known as "Star Wars," called for a land- or space-based shield against a nuclear attack. Although SDI was criticized as unfeasible and in violation of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Congress approved billions of dollars for development.
SEATO
Created after the Korean War to contain communism, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization lacked British and French support and proved ineffective during the Vietnam War. It was disbanded after the victory of communist North Vietnam over the US-backed South.

Second strike capability
A country's ability to launch a nuclear counterattack if it survives a first strike; it was believed to be a key to deterrence.

Silent majority
Term used by Nixon in a 1969 address, referring to the 70 to 75 percent of the US population that polls showed had confidence in him despite highly visible protests against US involvement in the Vietnam War.

Solidarity
A free Trade Union formed mid-August 1980, which turned into a national movement to democratize the communist system; crushed by imposition of martial law, mid-December 1981, surviving underground to take power in Poland, fall 1989.

Space race
Battle between the United States and the Soviet Union for dominance in outer space.

Sputnik
First artificial Earth satellite, it was launched by Moscow in 1957 and sparked US fears of Soviet dominance in technology and outer space. It led to the creation of NASA and the space race.

SS-4
Type of Soviet ballistic missile positioned in Cuba that set off the Cuban Missile Crisis.

SS-20
Soviet missile with a limited range of 5,000 miles, it was capable of attacking China, the Mideast, South Asia and Western Europe. It was eliminated by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at a Washington Summit on December 8, 1987.

Stasi
East German secret police; it kept files on 5 million East Germans --a third of the population -- and infiltrated the West German military and government.

-T-

Tehran Conference
November 1943 meeting between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, where the Allies agreed to open a Western front against Nazi Germany to take pressure off the Soviets.

Thermonuclear device
Also known as a hydrogen bomb, or H-bomb, it can be hundreds of thousands of times more powerful than an atomic bomb and can cause death and destruction for miles around. Radioactive contamination could last for years and be carried around the world.

38th parallel
Dividing line between North and South Korea first established to separate Soviet and US occupation zones after Japan's defeat in 1945; the Korean War began in 1950 after North Korean communists crossed the parallel into South Korea.
**Truman Doctrine**
First established in 1947 after Britain no longer could afford to provide anti-communist aid to Greece and Turkey, it pledged to provide US military and economic aid to any nation threatened by communism.

**TU-95**
Soviet jet bomber capable of delivering a nuclear device to the United States; 10 of the bombers were displayed for the West at the 1955 Moscow Air Show.

**U-2**
Spy plane capable of taking pictures from as high as 80,000 feet; it was heavily used for US intelligence gathering before the development of satellite reconnaissance in the 1970s.

**Virgin Lands**
Campaign launched by Khrushchev to cultivate Soviet grasslands in central Asia; Khrushchev boasted the Soviets would overtake the Americans in wheat production.

**Vladivostok**
Signed by Ford and Brezhnev in 1974, the Vladivostok accords set a limit of 2,400 for the total offensive nuclear weapons each side could possess.

**War of the Trousers**
Influence of Western fashion on the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early '60s was evident in the popularity of "narrow trousers." Special patrols were organized to root out such influences.

**Warsaw Pact**
Soviet-led Eastern European defense organization established in Warsaw, Poland, on May 14, 1955; the alliance countered the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

**White guards**
Anti-Bolshevik forces who lost the Russian Civil War to the Reds; they included monarchists, constitutional democrats and socialists.

**Yalta**
Second meeting of the Big Three leaders, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt; they met in the southern Russian town of Yalta February 4-11, 1945, to discuss the occupation of postwar Germany and Eastern Europe.

**Zero Option**
Western German peace movement proposal -- later adopted by the Reagan administration -- that called for the ban of all European intermediate-range nuclear forces.
RESOURCES:

COLD WAR BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bold items in list are highly recommended! For a great overall view, start with the John L. Gaddis book and go from there.


_____ , China’s Road to the Korean War (1994).


Francis Fukuyama, Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995). (Fukuyama is the author of The End of History.)

John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1997).


Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War (1988).
Susan M. Hartmann, *The Home Front and Beyond, American Women in the 1940s* (1982).


Hoa Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” *China Quarterly*, 121 (1990), 94-114.


Nam G. Kim, *From Enemies to Allies* (1997) (Japan).


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Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson* (1972).


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RESOURCES:
COLD WAR WEB SITES

Korean War - [http://www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/korea/large/index.htm] - Project Whistlestop's complete collection of President Truman's papers and archives from the Truman Presidential Library.


CNN - Cold War - [http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/] - Special pages on Cold War themes (culture, technology, espionage, the bomb); a “Knowledge Bank” of people profiles, chronologies, maps and historical documents; games; an "Educator's Guide." An extensive site. Produced by CNN.


Cold War Museum - [http://www.coldwar.org/] - dedicated to education, preservation, and research on the global, ideological, and political confrontations between East and West from the end of World War II to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.


Cold War Policies 1945-1991 - [http://ac.acusd.edu/History/20th/coldwar0.html] - includes information on all aspects of the Cold War from Yalta to glasnost' and beyond. Includes a collection of maps. Hosted by the Department of History at the University of San Diego and maintained by Steve Schoenherr.

Open Society Archives - [http://www.osa.ceu.hu/a] - research institution focusing on Communism and the Cold War, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, in the period after World War II. Maintained at the Central European University in Budapest.

The Cold War Texts and Archives - [http://history.hanover.edu/20th/coldwar.htm] - Primary and secondary texts from and on US and Soviet leaders. Hosted by the Department of History at Hanover College.


The American 1950s - [http://www.english.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/home.html] - The literature and culture of the American 1950s. From Alan Filreis of the University of Pennsylvania.


Cold War: Postwar Estrangement - [http://sunsite.unc.edu/expo/soviet.exhibit/coldwar.html] - Images of primary documents from the Soviet Archives Exhibit of the University of North Carolina's WWW EXPO.

Yahoo!'s Cold War Pages - [http://dir.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/History/20th_Century/Cold_War/]

Hot Links on the Cold War - [http://www.stmartin.edu/~dprice/cold.war.htm].

Early Warning Connection - [http://www.creativexposure.com/earlywng/index.htm] - attempt to make it easier for everyone interested in Early Warning history to find the resources that are available.

The Moosylvania Page - [http://www.speakeasy.org/~ohh/moose.htm] Explores the "incredible combination of political commentary, silly animation, rapid-fire delivery and horrible puns" of Rocky and Bullwinkle cartoons.
INSTRUCTIONS TO STUDENTS:

*WHO WON THE COLD WAR?*

**PART I: Participate in a research / decision making activity**
- You will be given the Chillin' Chart, a blank form with the following headings: Popular Culture, Politics / Ideology, International, Environment, and Military Industrial Complex.
- Your teacher will assign you one of these listed categories to research. You will analyze primary sources from both the Soviet and the US points of view.
- Your mission is to analyze and to share both perspectives and points of view on your category with the class. Remember that you will be called upon to justify your positions.
- You can complete the entire form as others share from their assigned categories.

**PART II: Use the Def Con model**
- Now you must make an important decision about this key Cold War event, based on the category information on the Chillin' Chart.
- Choose the Def Con rating and write a justification essay to your teacher's specifications defending your choice.
  
    —OR—

- Choose the Def Con rating and defend your choice in a five- minute speech. Clearly justify your evaluation of this key event position.

**PART III: Closure**
- Did this round of the Cold War have a clear winner? If so, who won, and why? If not, why was there not a clear winner?
- What are some of the long-term effects of this Cold War event? Check the different categories on your Chillin' Chart to draw your conclusions.
- Does this Cold War event have remaining effects today?
- How has current international popular culture been influenced by this Cold War event? Examples:
  - Korean War—presence of 38,000 US troops in Korea today, US refusal to sign the international ban on land mines because of US land mines there;
  - Sputnik—higher education federal funding to study technology and Russian culture;
  - Cuban Missile Crisis—the Elian Gonzales incident in 2000;
  - Czechoslovakia 1968—anti-Russian sentiment in Central Europe, abandoned military bases, problems with housing for remaining Russian military after the break-up of the Warsaw Pact;
  - Nicaragua—cheaper bananas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Popular Culture</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>USSR Point of View</th>
<th>US Point of View</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics / Ideology</td>
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**THE CHILLIN' CHART**
### THE CHILLIN' CHART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Point of View</th>
<th>Military Industrial Complex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Chillin' Chart Definitions:

- **Popular Culture**
  The humanities—films, television, art, music, literature, history, even fashion make up popular culture. How many ways can you think of in which politics has affected society throughout history?

- **Politics / Ideology**
  Remember that ideology is the philosophical stance of your country. It is what is viewed as worthwhile and an integral part of what makes your country tick. This ideology is reflected in how your country governs itself or its political system. Keep this in mind as you analyze both the US and the USSR primary source documents.

- **International**
  What was going on in the rest of the world? How did other countries view the Cold War and each superpowers' role in the conflict? Did they take sides—how did they choose?

- **Environment**
  What was the effect of this key Cold War event on the environment? Did anyone take this potential result into account?

- **Military Industrial Complex**
  - Military actions
  - Technology (most of it was military-related)
  - Economics: what was the effect of military spending on each side?
LET'S PLAY COLD WAR JEOPARDY!
Here are some sample Cold War Jeopardy questions. There is room at the end to add some of your own.

AND THE ANSWER IS...
I was the Russian spy who was exchanged for G. Francis Powers.
This river was the dividing line between North Korea and the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.).
I was the Russian leader who was called the "Butcher of Budapest."
My organization and I helped bring an end to communism in Poland in 1989.
These are the two Russian words used to define the Gorbachev era.
I made "Redbook" more than a magazine.
My political manipulation of the US and USSR allowed me to dam my country.
I was the first woman in space.
I was the first US president to visit the USSR.
I was a Russian leader, still known for "the period of stagnation."
I was a Soviet Foreign Minister, but now I have Georgia on my mind.
These islands are a point of contention between Russia and Japan.
I heightened the Cold War by landing my plane on Red Square in May 1987.
I bombed as a defense expert so I turned to peace work.
This Beatles Song was especially popular for Soviets.
This hamburger chain used a mock Russian beauty pageant to sell its burgers.
This is the dividing line between North and South Korea.
This was the border/dividing line between East and West Berlin.
This was the political divide between the East and the West during the Cold War.
I was the leader of North Korea during the time of the Korean "War."
I have been the leader of Cuba since 1959.
I was the leader of Egypt who nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, sparking a world crisis.
I was the leader of Yugoslavia who clashed with Stalin.

WHAT IS THE QUESTION?
Who was Abel?
What is the Yalu?
Who was Andropov?
What was Solidarity and who was Lech Walesa?
What are glasnost' and perestroika?
Who was Mao?
Who was Nassar?
Who was Tereshkova?
Who was Nixon?
Who was Brezhnev?
Who is Schevardnadze?
What are the Kurile Islands?
Who is Matthew Rust?
Who was Andrei Sakharov?
What is "Back in the USSR?"
What is Wendy's?
What is the 38th parallel?
What was the Berlin Wall?
What was the "Iron Curtain?"
Who was Kim Il-Sung?
Who is Fidel Castro?
Who was Gamul Abdul Nasser?
Who was Josip Broz, or "Tito?"
This was the year of both the Hungarian uprising and the Suez Crisis.
This was the year of both Stalin's death and the Korean Armistice.
This was the year of the Bay of Pigs crisis and the construction of the Berlin Wall.

I starred as the bad guy in the classic Cold War film, “Dr Strangelove, or How I learned to love the bomb.”
I starred as the hero submarine captain in the 1990 film, “Hunt for Red October.”

Russia fought this country in what is considered their parallel to the US’ Vietnam.
This military status is abbreviated Def Con.

This was the name of the first dog in space.
This is the name of the film in which Patrick Swayze leads his high school classmates to resist the Russian invasion of the US.
This is the name of the Richard Burton film where he played a spy who wished to retire.

I was the famous U2 pilot who was shot down while spying on the USSR.
This was the site of the first official Soviet nuclear test in 1949.
This was the name of the cathedral blown up by Stalin in order to build the Palace of Soviets in central Moscow.
In 1947, this mainframe computer, used to plot trajectories and distances for artillery, was a precursor to the concept of the Internet.

When was 1956?
When was 1953?
What was 1961?
Who was Peter Sellers?
Who is Sean Connery?
What is Afghanistan?
What is “Defensive Condition?”
Who was “Laika?”
What is “Red Dawn?”
What is “The Spy Who Came in from the Cold?”
Who was Francis Gary Powers?
Where is Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan?
What was/is the Church of the Savior?
What is ENIAC?
PERSONAL INTERVIEW GUIDE

Subject of Interview: ____________________________________________
Person (s) Interviewed: __________________________________________
Date: __________________________________________________________

1. Before conducting the interview make sure you have researched the topic of the interview. If the person (s) to be interviewed appear to be mistaken on public facts, such as specific dates/times, do not dwell on it. After decades of time items such as specific time and day may not be completely accurate. Remember, the purpose of the interview is to expose the personal experience of the person (s) interviewed.

2. Prior to the interview it would be considered common courtesy to send a brief note reminding the persons (s) to be interviewed of your appointment and subject to be discussed. This will give them the time to recall experiences of the past and perhaps primary documents.

3. At the time of the interview make sure you have a clear idea of what you wish to find out. Specific questions are good but there are times during the course of an interview when information completely off the subject could arise. Stay on the subject! Be polite and redirect the person (s) on to the subject. One of the best ways to achieve this is by asking a new question.

4. If you find yourself in an interview that is out of your control (i.e., the person interviewed will not cooperate, or appears to be incompetent) politely rap up the questioning and excuse yourself from the interview.

5. After the interview has been completed it would be advised to send a “Thank You” to the person (s) you have interviewed. You may need to talk with them again. Leave the door open.
WHO WON THE COLD WAR?

DOCUMENTS FOR CHILLIN' CHART CATEGORIES: KOREAN WAR

AS OF NOVEMBER 13, 2001

INTRODUCTION TO THE KOREAN WAR
From the Truman Presidential Library Archives with map inserts

CHILLIN' CHART CATEGORIES:

CULTURE
- History Textbook readings about the Korean War: US and USSR textbooks
- Guided looking at a painting: gaining perspective (USSR)
- Popular Culture: Films about the Cold War and other examples (US)
- *Pravda*, Soviet newspaper, article from June 27, 1950 (USSR)

ENVIRONMENT
- *Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea* by Kathryn Weathersby (USSR)
- Telegram from USSR Charge d'Affaires in Korea, S.P. Suzdalev, to V.M. Molotov on June 1, 1953 (USSR)

MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX:
- TECHNOLOGY

ECONOMICS
- Truman request for appropriations to Congress (US)
- Kim II Sung requests aid from Stalin (USSR)

MILITARY
- Truman message to Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
- Kim II Sung requests military support from Stalin (USSR)

POLITICS/IDEOLOGY/PROPAGANDA
- Excerpt from Molotov’s Memoirs and *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War* (USSR)
- Excerpts from Truman address (US)
- Cartoons from *UE News*, the newspaper of the United Electrical Workers Union (US)
- Soviet political poster (USSR)
- Laws of the State of Washington, 1951: Subversive Activities Act (US)

INTERNATIONAL
- US State Department Central Files on India’s Internal and Foreign Affairs 1945-1954
- Connection between Stalin (USSR) and Nehru (India)—US Dept. of State summary (US)
- Ciphered telegram from Roshchin (USSR Ambassador—China) to Filipov [Stalin] (USSR)

32
INTRODUCTION TO THE KOREAN WAR

from the Truman Presidential Library compilation of Truman's Papers

On June 25, 1950, 75,000 Soviet-armed North Korean troops dashed across the 38th parallel of the divided Korean peninsula. As news of the Communist attack on the US-backed Republic of Korea (ROK) trickled into Washington, DC, members of the Truman administration assembled to formulate a response. Everyone assumed that the Kremlin has masterminded the offensive. "Korea," President Truman told White House aide George M. Elsey, "is the Greece of Far East Asia. If we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any next steps. But if we just stand by...There is no telling what they'll do."

This volume of the White House records affords an opportunity to recreate and analyze one of the most dramatic and important crises of the Cold War. The papers of George Elsey, Dean Acheson, Charles S. Murphy, and others provide insight into the thinking of the White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key members of Congress on the origins of the Korean conflict from June through November 1950. They help explain the administration's decision to defend South Korea, its reading of Soviet and Communist Chinese intentions, its policies toward the United Nations (UN), and its decision to cross the 38th parallel and attempt to reunite the war-torn nation. Finally, the documents show how the president opted against asking Congress for a declaration of war, an exercise of authority that contributed to an ongoing redefinition of America's constitutional system of checks and balances.

US intervention in Korea actually began in 1945, during the closing days of the Second World War, when Washington and Moscow drew a line at the 38th parallel and jointly occupied the peninsula. From 1945 through 1950 the former Japanese colony became a pawn of Cold War politics. During this critical stage, US officials threw their support behind the conservative leadership of the South Korean Syngman Rhee, blessing his regime with diplomatic recognition and economic and military aid. At the same time the Communist leader Kim II Sung fastened his authoritarian grip over North Korea. As American and Soviet forces withdrew in 1949 and 1950, the two Korean leaders—each a devout nationalist—claimed exclusive legitimacy, vowed to reunify their homeland, and sanctioned a routine exchange of cross border skirmishes.

Although the Korean War can be viewed as having been originally a civil war, the North Korean invasion of June 1950 provoked a major international crisis. It took place in the context of the growing Soviet-American antagonism generated by an array of issues, including Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe, US reconstruction policies in Western Europe, and a flurry of crises in Iran, Greece, Turkey, Berlin, China and elsewhere. On the Korean peninsula, Kim II Sung's troops fought with Soviet tanks and arms. And in public forums both Moscow and Beijing accused the ROK of provoking the conflict and openly cheered the North Korean cause.

White House officials, including the president, hurried back from the weekend to Washington on Sunday, June 25 to be briefed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and other State and Defense Department officials. Huddled together at Blair House, Truman's quarters as the White House underwent renovation, they laid plans for assisting South Korean forces. At a second Blair House meeting the following evening, as news of the ROK's political and military collapse filtered in, the president agreed to the deployment of US air and naval power in Korea, to order the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to seal off possible conflict with the People's Republic of China, and to increase military aid to the Philippines and French Indochina. Although Truman consulted with congressional leaders the following day, and continued to do so throughout the conflict, he chose not to seek a declaration of war, an initiative that would be criticized most harshly in the wake of later military setbacks.

As the administration escalated American military intervention, the White House and other government spokespersons avoided direct accusations of Soviet aggression. Directives to the
Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), General Douglas MacArthur, specifically warned against provoking the Soviets and Chinese, and limited military action above the 38th parallel. Still, US military involvement deepened, and on June 30 President Truman deployed the first American ground forces. The administration also developed plans to seek supplemental defense appropriations and to substantially increase military aid to anti-Communist allies around the globe. Soviet denunciations of US actions intensified, but since the USSR had boycotted the United Nations in protest of its refusal to seat the People’s Republic of China, it could not veto UN resolutions passed on June 25 and June 27 that condemned North Korea’s aggressions and asked members to assist the ROK.

Historians debate the degree of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the initial stages of the war. In recent years, the availability of official sources in the former Soviet Union, and to a greater extent in the People’s Republic of China, has increased. The new materials, by no means a complete record, appear to confirm the previously published memoirs of former Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev that stated that Stalin had given Kim II Sung advance approval for the invasion, but had considered the project to be primarily a North Korean undertaking. Surprised by Washington’s strong response, and wishing to avoid a great power confrontation, Stalin lost enthusiasm for the adventure. On the other hand, Mao Zedong’s (Mao Tse-tung’s) recently released cables to Stalin, Kim II Sung, and his Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) suggest that Moscow’s on-again, off-again policies embittered the Chinese Communist leader. The redispach of US forces to neighboring Korea most likely raised security concerns in Beijing, where support for Asian revolutionaries was already considered a noble cause.

In the tense, crisis-filled atmosphere of the summer and fall of 1950 it may be fair to say that none of the participants accurately predicted the outcome of their decisions. By mid-July the American-led UN forces had stabilized their hold at Pusan at the southern tip of the peninsula and began to slowly push back the assault. Then on September 15 General MacArthur executed a brilliant amphibious landing at Inchon, along South Korea’s northwest coast, and trapped invading forces. As confidence grew through the summer and fall the administration rethought its strategy of restoring the prewar status quo. Although General MacArthur acted as a forceful advocate of a border war, he ultimately acted in strict accordance with the president’s directives. In early September, President Truman signed the top secret NSC 81, reprinted in this collection, which called for UN troops to continue their march above the 38th parallel. After the UN General Assembly passed a supportive resolution on October 7, MacArthur launched his forward offensive.

As MacArthur’s troops punched north, Mao implemented plans to intervene on North Korea’s behalf. Zhou Enlai notified the government of India, which since July had been advocating a negotiated settlement of the war, that further UN advances would provoke a Chinese military response. Summaries of the famous MacArthur-Truman conference at Wake Island in mid-October, also included in this volume, demonstrate that the general nonetheless remained supremely confident of US military power and discounted the chances of Chinese intervention. The fighting would be over by Thanksgiving, he told Truman, and then the work toward postwar rehabilitation could begin.

MacArthur arrived at the North Korean capital of Pyong Yang on October 19 brimming with confidence, and bantered with newsmen about the disintegration of the enemy’s forces. Then, at the battle of Unsan during the first week of November, two Chinese divisions inflicted major casualties on ROK and US troops. Mysteriously, the Chinese quickly withdrew, leaving MacArthur unshaken in his belief that the war’s end was at hand. Two weeks later the People’s Republic unleashed the full fury of its military might, and UN and US troops retreated chaotically down the peninsula. Both sides suffered massive casualties.

In analyzing the Korean War, historians have grappled with a number of complex questions. One set of questions centers on the origins of the war. Did the Korean War spring from global, Soviet-engineered Communist aggression? Or did its sources lie in a Korean civil war? Did Soviet leaders plan and order the North Korean attack? Did they give the “green light”? Or did their North Korean allies initiate the
conflict? What exactly was China's role and why did it intervene in the fall of 1950? Why did the United Nations take action? Was the military operation to stop the North Korean invasion truly an international undertaking—or primarily a US effort?

A second set of questions focuses on decision making in Washington. Why did the Truman administration intervene? Should the United States have intervened? What US interests were at stake? Who made key decisions in the Truman administration during the height of the crises? Did President Truman maintain control of policy making? Or did subordinates such as General MacArthur and Secretary of State Acheson lead the process?

What role did Congress and public opinion play? Did the administration carefully study the ramifications of US intervention? Or did they rush to simplistic conclusions and make hurried, ill-considered decisions? Why did Truman change war goals—that is, why did he order American troops above the 38th parallel? Why did US officials so badly misread Chinese intentions?

Over 38,000 Americans lost their lives in the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, and over two million Koreans perished. The conflict escalated Soviet-American tensions and made irrelevant, after Chinese intervention, any talk of US accommodation with the People's Republic of China. It extended US political and military around the world, including French Indochina and Southeast Asia. In the United States, it generated an expensive military build-up and helped fuel the anti-Communist hysteria and McCarthyism of the early 1950s. In domestic politics, the long, agonizing war proved disastrous to President Truman and was probably critical to the Republican capture of the White House in the 1952 elections.

Still in today's post-cold war world, the divided Korean peninsula remains a political tinderbox and a destabilizing factor in international affairs. Often referred to as "the forgotten war," the Korean War has cast an immense shadow over the second half of the twentieth century.
THE KOREAN WAR

In Korea, UN and American policy was put to the test. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek had agreed that Korea should be "free and independent." At the Potsdam Conference in 1945 the 38°1' parallel of latitude had been designated as the dividing line in Korea between Russian occupation forces on the north and American occupation forces on the south. This arrangement continued until 1948-1949 when occupation forces of both powers were withdrawn, and the affairs of the country were left to the Republic of Korea in the south and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in the north. The governmental division of the country resulted from UN inability to bring about the unification of North and South Korea during the occupation period, on terms satisfactory to the occupying powers.

On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded South Korea. On June 27 as a result of a special session of the UN Security Council, boycotted by Russia, UN members were called upon to resist this aggression, and President Truman, with the overwhelming support of the country on the issue, promptly responded. To keep a dangerous situation from becoming worse, the President had already ordered the seventh fleet to prevent hostilities between Chinese Nationalists and communist forces. Thus began a three-years' conflict between the UN, chiefly supported by the United States, on the one side, and the Communists of Korea, assisted actively after November, 1950 by Communist China, and less directly from the beginning by Russia, on the other. The intervention of Red Chinese troops in the war prevented a complete UN victory, and finally produced a costly see-saw war in the vicinity of the 38th parallel.

As losses mounted and victory seemed no nearer, complaints arose in the United States that the UN forces were not allowed to win. In a sense this was true. The Truman administration, as well as the British government and other UN participants in the war, believed that an attack across the Yalu River into Manchuria—the Red Chinese "sanctuary"—would lead to an all-out war with Red China and probably to a general world war. Because he did not agree with the decision to stay south of the Yalu River, and because he voiced his dissent publicly, General MacArthur, in charge of UN operations in Korea, was removed from his command by President Truman. This action, in the spring of 1951, caused a memorable emotional outburst on the part of MacArthur's defenders in the United States, an outburst which reached a climax when the general delivered an eloquent address before a joint session of Congress.

During the election campaign of 1952, Republicans made much of "bungling" in Korea, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican presidential candidate, promised that, if elected, he would go immediately to Korea. Elected, he made the trip. Early in his administration (July 27, 1953), the long-drawn-out armistice negotiations were brought to a close and the war was halted at the 38th parallel. This result was far from satisfactory. Korea was divided as before, and President Syngman Rhee of South Korea looked impatiently toward a resumption of hostilities as that all Korea might come under his government.

However unsatisfactory the results may have been, the UN at least had shown it could and would resist aggression. It seemed clear that, but for the action that had been taken, the Communists would have gained control of all Korea. The Eisenhower, like the Truman administration, did not question the basic soundness of the course the United States has taken; nevertheless, with 157,530 American casualties, including 54,246 dead, as a result of the war, it was obvious that the UN had no painless remedies for the evils and ailments of the world.
CULTURE: COMPARISON OF HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

SOVIET TEXT

From The History of the USSR: The Epoch of Socialism (1917–1961) textbook (Printing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1964), pp. 315, 516. Translated by Lyne Tumlinson, Outreach Coordinator for the University of Kansas Center for Russian and East European Studies.

THE KOREAN WAR

Creation of Anti-Soviet War Blocs / Transition of American Imperialism to Open Acts of Aggression

In the summer of 1950, American imperialism shifted from preparation of force to direct acts of aggression. In June 1950, the American imperialists and the puppet regime of South Korea unleashed war on the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (KNR). The USA simultaneously occupied the territory of the KNR and the island of Taiwan.

In July 1950, the USA succeeded in passing an illegal resolution in the UN Security Council, in which those governments agreed to recommend to members of the UN to send troops to Korea. In this manner, the USA used the flag of the UN to pursue its own hostile acts. The aggression of the USA against Korea raised indignation and protest from the side of the world’s democratic forces. The Soviet Union and a myriad of other countries demanded the immediate cessation of war in Korea and the exit of foreign troops from Korean soil.

NUCLEAR ARMS

The USSR’s Fight for Reduction and Prohibition of Atomic Bombs / Movement of Supporters of Peace

The Soviet administration more than once brought a proposal to the UN about general reduction of weapons and prohibition of using atomic energy for the goals of war. Regardless of the resistance of international reactionary circles to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, represented at the UN, this proposal was accepted in the resolution of December 1946 about the principles of universal regulation and reduction of arms and weapon capability. In November 1947, a resolution directed against propagating new war was also accepted by the UN General Assembly. However, the practical fulfillment of these resolutions was foiled by the western powers. Nonetheless the USSR continued a stubborn fight for arms reduction and the ban of atomic weapons. The Soviet delegation to the UN took with them a series of vital proposals, including the suggestion to conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace among the countries of the USSR, the USA, China, England, and France.

The Soviet Union and the socialist camps’ policy of peace and friendship among peoples met active support from a wide span of people in various countries. On the other side, the aggressive politics of the USA and those governments connected with it by military and political pacts, pushed more and more serious opposition every year against everyone.

In the post-war period, a mass movement in defense of peace gradually developed based on intensifying international relations and threats of new war. This movement encircled hundreds of millions of people, from various views and beliefs.

The elevation and development of movements of peace movements became an important factor in the fight against the aggressive plans of imperialist circles.
MASSACRE IN KOREA (1951)
MASSACRE IN KOREA (1951)

WHAT’S YOUR PERCEPTION?

1. What do you see?
2. What do you feel about what you see?
3. What do you know about what you see?
4. Do you know who is the artist? What is the artist’s message?
5. Whose point of view does this painting represent? Why do you think so?
6. List other questions you might have your students answer from looking at this painting:

OTHERS’ PERCEPTIONS:

1. From the Online Picasso Project <http://www.tamu.edu/mocl/picasso/tour/t51.html> by Dr. Enrique Mallen, Texas A&M University

   January 18, 1951: Picasso paints Massacre en Corée, a political statement about American intervention in Korea. The painting represents a deliberate effort, in its subject matter and realistic treatment, to meet the demands made on him by the Communist Party.

   "On the right a group of anonymous, modern, visored, armored figures under the command of an officer with a sword are about to shoot a captive group of naked women over on the left, some of them pregnant, some of them with small children. The picture is almost monochromatic as Guernica." (O'Brian, Patrick. Pablo Picasso, A Biography. (1994). New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 402.)

2. Art critics have called it “low-grade Stalinist propaganda” and “one of the worst Picassos ever painted.”


   His art expanded to include ... such “overtly political paintings as Massacre in Korea (1951), an atypical, propagandistic piece denouncing American involvement in the Korean War.

   “Picasso went on, in early 1951, to produce what Utley calls his ‘first openly didactic painting in support of a Soviet political position.’

   “In fact, Massacre in Korea, depicting soldiers firing on a group of naked women, is considered of marginal artistic value due to its overwrought ideological message.”

4. In 1993, Nirvana organized a benefit show to raise awareness about the rapes and other human rights violations that were being perpetrated against women and girls in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. The t-shirts that were created for the benefit were limited to a 2000 unit press based upon an agreement made with the estate of Pablo Picasso. The front features a reproduction of Picasso's Massacre in Korea 18 January/1951 and the back features the names of all the bands who participated in the concert, which include Nirvana, L7, Disposable Heroes of Hiphoprisy, and the Breeders. The t-shirt may be seen at:
   http://www.homealive.org/auction/auction.html
Picasso's Party Line

A new book suggests that Picasso's commitment to the Communist Party—and the Soviet cause—was much greater than previously thought

By Hugh Eakin

When Pablo Picasso applied for a visa to the United States in 1950, it threw State Department and FBI officials into full alert. The purpose of the artist's visit—his first ever to the United States—was to lead 12 delegates from the Congrès Mondial des Partisans de la Paix (World Congress of Peace Partisans) to Washington in an effort to persuade President Truman to ban the atomic bomb. The peace congress, which had been founded a year earlier in Paris and Prague, had already been identified as a powerful Communist front. More important, Picasso himself was considered a leading member of the French Communist Party and had been monitored by the FBI since 1944. After consulting the American embassies in Moscow and Paris, as well as members of Congress and the FBI, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee denied visas for the entire delegation.

Picasso's dove was the ubiquitous symbol of the peace movement, appearing on postage stamps in the Soviet Union (above) as well as on posters, T-shirts, scarves, and mugs.

Collection of Gertje Utley

Picasso as a Cold Warrior for the Evil Empire?

Although the artist's membership in the Communist Party in the late 1940s and early '50s is well known, it has been largely ignored by scholars as a casual flirtation, with slight, if any, bearing on his art. Picasso's work did not adhere to the dictates of Socialist Realist esthetics and was for the most part not even considered appropriate for exhibition in the Soviet Union. Besides, his market and his most important admirers were in the bourgeois West. How could he have become a weapon in the anti-American arsenal assembled by Stalin's ruthless culture czar Andrei Zhdanov?

The little-known visa incident is only one of many striking examples of Picasso's political activism recorded in Gertje Utley's Pablo Picasso: The Communist Years, published this month by Yale University Press. Picasso joined the French Communists in 1944, at the age of 63, and remained an unwavering party member for the rest of his life—through the exposure of the evils of Stalinism, the brutal Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the subsequent desertion of many other French intellectuals with whom he had become politically active.

At the height of his involvement, his activities included debriefings by top party apparatchiks, trips around Europe to promote the international peace movement, and donations of large sums of money—often in the form of artworks—to dozens of Communist-supported causes. (Picasso supported numerous party and party-affiliated initiatives through his dealer Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler, including, for example, gifts of 2.5 million and 3 million francs in 1955 and 1956, respectively, for an annual party event.) His art expanded to include numerous party posters, on-demand sketches for the party newspaper, L'Humanité; and such overtly political paintings as Massacre in Korea (1951), an atypical, propagandistic piece denouncing American involvement in the Korean War. He even gave his daughter the name Paloma, Spanish for dove, after the Communist peace crusade adopted his drawing of the bird as its international symbol.

"For students of Picasso, the decade right after World War II has often been considered less interesting," says Utley, an independent art historian who stumbled on the subject a decade ago as a Ph.D. student at New York University's Institute of Fine Arts. "People generally look at his paintings first, and that period, simply in terms of painting, isn't that exciting." Spurred on by William Rubin, the distinguished Picasso scholar and director emeritus of painting and sculpture at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, she found there was much more to the story. "It was precisely the period of his most active commitment to the Communist Party," says Utley, who was born in Berlin and had a successful career in public relations in Paris before going on to pursue art history in London and New York. "Quite a bit of time went into traveling for the party and filling the constant demands placed on him. And when you see the variety of his creative work at the time—ceramics, lithographs, and party posters—it fits very well with his political preoccupations."

With the help of her dissertation advisers—Kirk Varnedoe, chief curator at the Museum of Modern Art, and Robert Rosenblum, New York University professor and curator at the Guggenheim Museum—and the guidance of Tony
Judt, a New York University historian and expert on French Communism, Utley turned the topic into a doctoral thesis of more than 700 pages in 1997.

Poring over the voluminous boxes of uncatalogued correspondence in the archives of Paris's Musée Picasso, as well as many other sources, she discovered extensive evidence of Picasso's political activities and friendships. She interviewed more than 20 of his friends, including leading French Communist writers and painters, who had known the artist in the early postwar period. She also obtained Picasso's 187-page FBI file through the Freedom of Information Act. Finally, she examined the circumstances surrounding thousands of Picasso's works, from the simplest peace dove to Guernica, to consider how and to what extent the artist's political engagement affected his muse. This research effort was distilled into the 260 pages of the new book, which traces Picasso's Communist engagement from his youthful encounters with radical social movements to his twilight years as an inactive but still loyal party member.

Picasso joined the Communist Party just as it was entering the period of its greatest influence on French cultural life. The Communist leader Maurice Thorez had been allowed to return from exile in the Soviet Union, and from 1945 to '47, Communists participated in the French government. The excesses of Stalinism had been obscured by the wartime suffering of the Soviet people and their heroic victory over the Nazis, while the G.I. Bill and later the Marshall Plan had resulted in what to some in France seemed a new kind of "occupation" by an imperialist United States. Among the adherents and fellow travelers who were drawn to the antifascist and anti-American party line were such cultural luminaries as the writers Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir and the artists Fernand Léger, Henri Matisse, and Tristan Tzara.

Picasso biographer John Richardson, who knew the artist well and was in Paris just after the war, says, "Intellectuals espoused Communism because it was the respectable thing to do. It was, as it were, politically correct."

For Picasso, Utley observes, there were also strong personal motives. The artist considered his acceptance into the party the logical conclusion of everything his life had stood for. Born in Málaga in 1881, he was exposed to anarchist and pacifist movements as a teenager in Barcelona, well before he settled in Paris in 1904. While the extent of these encounters is still debated by scholars, by the start of World War I, Picasso had developed the lifelong antipathy to armed conflict that would play out in his energetic efforts for the Communist-sponsored peace movement. The Spanish Civil War turned him into a Franco hater and antifascist, a stance that as early as 1936 earned him the title of pintor marxista (Marxist painter) in the Spanish press. Although Picasso never read Marx and had very little knowledge of what was actually happening in the Soviet Union, Utley says, his membership in the party reflected a deep-rooted commitment to Communist ideals. "He was a real believer in the basic tenets," she notes, "even if he was convinced he could be a Communist without following everything."

Picasso's 1944 entrance into the party was an epochal event that the Communists put to immediate use. Embraced by the leadership, Picasso was soon being instructed in party matters by Thorez himself and guided into cultural militancy by his friends Louis Aragon and Paul Eluard. Although he was not expected to perform daily party functions or attend routine cell meetings, Picasso was given a prominent place in such Communist initiatives as the Nationale Front des Arts and the France--U.S.S.R. Committee. From 1947, when he settled in the Communist-ruled town of Vallauris with his companion Françoise Gilot, he became host to, among others, the Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg and Georges Tabaraud, the editor of the party newspaper Patriote de Nice, which Picasso himself supported financially. He was also enlisted in international efforts, like signing a letter to President Truman protesting the NATO pact, supporting the American Communist Party, and according to one account, denouncing the U.S. government's arrest of the Hollywood Ten in 1950.

Most important, Utley argues, Picasso quickly became one of the leading figures in the Communist-led peace movement. This activity is significant in light of the role played by the movement in the early years of the Cold War. Although ostensibly created independently by intellectuals to combat nuclear armaments, the international initiative was, in fact, an orchestrated effort by Soviet commissar Zhdanov to create what Utley calls "an actively political organ in support of Soviet foreign policy, the most powerful nonmilitary weapon that the Soviet Union set up to confront NATO." Involved from the beginning, Picasso agreed to attend the inaugural conference of the movement in 1948 in Wroclaw, Poland, despite his hatred of travel and fear of flying (it was his first ride in an airplane). In 1949 he attended a similar congress in Rome, and after his delegation was denied entry to the United States in 1950, he traveled to another congress in Sheffield, England, where he gave a speech. In November of that year Picasso received the Stalin Peace Prize from the Soviet government in recognition of his efforts.
Picasso churned out numerous sketches and posters for party causes, including portraits of Thorez and Ehrenburg, a controversial newspaper drawing of Stalin at the time of the Soviet leader's death, in 1953, and idealized sketches of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg a year after their execution in the United States for divulging nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union. Picasso's iconic dove, reworked countless times by the artist, became ubiquitous in the peace movement and even appeared on postage stamps in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. So popular was the dove image in the 1950s that the CIA-backed Paix et Liberté movement targeted it for caricature in anti-Communist propaganda campaigns.

In the United States, where Picasso's reputation had reached new heights shortly before the war, the artist's political activities were taken seriously by the government. As early as 1945, shortly after the bureau opened its file on the artist, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover personally contacted the American embassy in Paris to request further information on Picasso, and the United States Office of Cable and Radio Censorship was instructed to report to the bureau cables to and from the artist. Among the jumble of information and rumors collected in the FBI file is a 1950 entry that goes so far as to accuse the artist of spying for the Soviet Union, a charge that was never substantiated.

The American press, Utley shows, responded to Picasso's politics with a combination of bemusement and dismay. Initially, his opinions were dismissed as those of a political naif. But as the Cold War alignment hardened in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the artist was increasingly criticized for his party work. In 1949 an article in ARTnews attacked Picasso as a "staunch poster-designer and part-time propagandist." A year later, the New York Times derided his "fat little pigeons." By 1954 the New York Sunday Mirror had stated that "before the red bug bit him Picasso was the greatest artist of our time." According to Utley, Picasso's Communism may have encouraged the general decline of his reputation in America in the 1950s and turned off some of his American buyers.

Still, even during the years of his greatest political involvement, Picasso never followed the party-endorsed Socialist Realist style in his art. Although they were admired by some of the party intellectuals, his paintings, with their deformed figures, were generally considered inappropriate for digestion by the Communist rank and file and were not reproduced in Communist newspapers. At the Wroclaw conference, Picasso was even attacked for his decadent style by Alexander Fadeyev, president of the Union of Soviet Writers. But Picasso resisted making esthetic accommodations to Communist orthodoxy. "In Russia, they hated his work but liked his politics," Gilot recalls. "In America, they hated his politics but liked his work. When he came back from the Wroclaw conference, he said, 'I'm hated everywhere, I like it that way!'"

Nonetheless, Utley says, Picasso took the party criticisms seriously, and a good deal of his work during this period embraced—in its own way—the social ideas and themes of the Communist cause. The artist's preoccupation in the 1940s and '50s with the simple handcraft of ceramics and the multiple-production possibilities of lithography, she suggests, related to his conscious desire to close the gap between high art and the masses. His party posters were designed to be cheaply copied, and he even considered ways to have his paintings reproduced, to increase their accessibility. Although many of these efforts were ultimately fruitless—collectors were always the first to snap up any Picasso works, including the posters—they gave the partisan press an opportunity to cast the famous artist as a man of the people. "Picasso's work and life among the potters," Utley writes, "was also a goldmine for Communist writers. It allowed them to counter the adverse image of Picasso the Communist millionaire with that of the simplicity of his life in Vallauris."

But perhaps the greatest testaments to Picasso's political loyalty, Utley argues, were his unwillingness to criticize the French party and his continued support even after Soviet politics had become distasteful to many former Communist intellectuals. For example, despite his own reservations about the party's increasingly rigid Socialist Realist orthodoxy, Picasso refused to sign a 1948 letter by a group of leading Communist writers asking the party to loosen its cultural stance. The party's dogmatic approach to culture became more severe in 1950, when Thorez left the leadership and the most hardline factions took over. Instead of curtailing his party activities, Picasso went on, in early 1951, to produce what Utley calls his "first openly didactic painting in support of a Soviet political position."

In fact, Massacre in Korea, depicting soldiers firing on a group of naked women, is considered of marginal artistic value due to its overwrought ideological message. (Richardson calls it "one of the worst Picassos ever painted.") The artist was widely attacked in the party for his portrait of a young and unheroic Stalin in Les Lettres Françaises after the leader's death, yet he did not sever his Communist ties. Even after the Soviet invasion of
Picasso refused to join many other French Communist intellectuals in denouncing the aggression, for which he was harshly criticized in an open letter by the great Polish writer Czeslaw Milosz. But the artist—following the example of such party stalwarts as his close friend, the Communist writer Hélène Parmelin—was unmoved.

"If he had entered the party out of any kind of opportunism, he would have had so many opportunities to leave," says Utley. "When Thorez left for the Soviet Union, or when Stalin was exposed, he could have easily said, 'That's enough!' If he had had no more interest attached to it, why didn't he quit in '56? That would have been the most propitious moment. The fact that he remained in the party must have been for a very personal commitment."

Utley's portrayal of Picasso as a loyal partisan, carefully guided by party leaders, has raised provocative questions for scholars of the artist, who have been more attuned to his protean artistic output and unbridled individualism. According to Richardson, Utley "has made sense of a very murky period—difficult and mysterious—in Picasso's life. Her conclusion that Picasso was committed to Communism, although he had no idea what Communism really was about, is compelling. Here is this man who hated any form of discipline or orthodoxy yet was surprisingly loyal and, in so far as he could, toed the party line."

Patricia Leighten, professor of art history at Duke University and a scholar of Picasso's political life before World War I, says that this kind of study is invaluable in "revisiting certain issues and seeing the artist as a historical figure. There has been a desire on the part of critics to examine his work in isolation, a reluctance to put Picasso in the broader European social and cultural context of his times." For Leighten, the artist's adherence to Communism is a natural extension of his embrace of anarchist and pacifist ideas in the first decades of the century. "My feeling is that his early anarchism informs his whole engagement with leftist," she says. "It does not mean that every work he did was political, much less anarchist, but it does add crucial information to our understanding."

Some who knew Picasso during the postwar period are skeptical about giving fresh scrutiny to his political activities. In an interview from Paris with ARTnews, the artist's close friend Pierre Daix, an art critic and historian who was a leading party member in the 1940s and '50s and the editor of Les Lettres Françaises, questions whether there is much to add to what is already known. "I don't think there are new things here," says Daix, who wrote about the artist's Communist years in his 1977 biography, La Vie de peintre de Pablo Picasso. "All of his activities with the party, all of that was already clear. Picasso joined the Communist Party under circumstances that are well known, and we know the rest of the story. There is no mystery, no secrets." Daix does note, however, that scholars are beginning to devote more attention to Picasso's drawings and posters for the party, as in the exhibition "Picasso and the Press," which was assembled by the Musée Picasso in Antibes last year and recently traveled to Paris for a festival celebrating the 70th anniversary of the newspaper L'Humanité.

Gilot, who lived with Picasso during his most active years in the party and is now based in New York, cautions not to read too much into the artist's Communist ties. "To make a big thing out of it is wrong," she says. "In his mind, he wanted not to be simply a privileged person, a very well known painter. He wanted to be with the people. But I don't think it went much further than that." She acknowledges that Picasso's prestige was enormously important to the Communist leadership—"It was a nice name to drop"—but doubts that the party ever really attempted to indoctrinate the artist. "It was difficult to influence or manipulate a man like him. He never followed exactly the party line."

But as Utley's book suggests, it was precisely Picasso's unique position—that he was so popular in the West and rarely doctrinaire in his own work—that gave him such a powerful role in the cultural dimension of the Cold War. "Thorez realized this best," Utley says. "Let him alone, he serves us best when he is seen in Europe and America as happy among us, and paints as a man."

Years later, Picasso's friend Ehrenburg would come to his own conclusions about the aging artist, who, après tout, remained as devoted to the Communist Party as ever. In his 1966 memoirs (in a passage Utley does not cite), Ehrenburg writes: "Hundreds of millions of people know and love Picasso only through the doves. The snobs sneer at those people. Picasso's detractors accuse him of having sought an easy success. Yet the peace doves are closely connected with all the rest of his work, the minotaurs and the goats, the old men and the girls.... Of course it is impossible to know Picasso by the dove alone, but one has to be a Picasso to make such a dove."

Hugh Eakin is a senior editor of ARTnews.

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I. FILMS ABOUT THE COLD WAR:

The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear weapons quickly became part of the arsenal of the cold war. The Americans' monopoly was broken by the Russians (the Americans blamed Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for selling their atomic secrets to the Russians and promptly executed them—an event well covered in the documentary Atomic Café) thus beginning the nuclear arms race and with it the theory of nuclear deterrence. According to this theory the possession of nuclear weapons deterred the enemy from attacking because enough weapons could be protected from an enemy to guarantee a retaliation of such destructiveness that the enemy would not contemplate it to begin with. The ultimate reductio ad absurdum of nuclear deterrence theory was the strategy of "M.A.D." or mutual assured destruction which meant that not only could one inflict great damage on an attacking enemy but even totally destroy the enemy as a functioning society. To allay public fears about nuclear weapons and the sanity of deterrence theory the United States government during the 1950s and 1960s made army training and public propaganda films, which served to misinform and confuse rather than enlighten the public as to the true dangers they faced. The recent documentary film Atomic Café (1983) presents extracts from these official films to give a good idea of the spirit of the times during the height of the cold war.

Kubrick's classic satire about the insanity of nuclear deterrence is Dr. Strangelove, or How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb (1964) in which Kubrick brilliantly and wittily links sex, the extreme right wing fear of fluoridation of the water supply and communist conspiracies, and the danger of technology getting out of control to the problem of the arms race and nuclear deterrence. Kubrick's fanciful "Doomsday Machine" has become the nuclear winter described by Carl Sagan and others.

The fear of nuclear attack or invasion by communists became part of American popular culture in the form of many science fiction and horror movies of the 1950s. The fear of invasion or attack by the Russians was transferred to an attack by aliens from outer space. A classic low-budget example of this is Don Siegel's The Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956).

Cold War Films
- Martin Ritt, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold (1965)
- The fear of Russian attack of invasion is transferred to outer space: Don Siegel, The Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956)
- Ritt, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold (1965) 1 hr 48 min.

Cold War Westerns
- Ford, Rio Grande (1950)
- Fred Zinneman, High Noon (1952)
- Steinbeck/Kazan, Viva Zapata! (1952)
- George Englund, The Ugly American (1958)
- John Sturges, The Magnificent Seven (1960)
The "M.A.D.ness" of Nuclear Deterrence:
(from Facets' online catalog description)

Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove or: How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb, Hawk Films, 1963, 102 mins.

This great black comedy stars Peter Sellers as the wheelchair-bound nuclear scientist plotting a scheme to attack Russia's nuclear targets with nuclear bombs. Very funny and very frightening, Dr Strangelove also stars Sterling Hayden as US Air Force Commander Jack D. Ripper, and George C. Scott as Joint Chief of Staff "Buck" Turgidson.

Veljko Bulajic's Atomic War Bride, 1966, 84 min.
This Cold War curiosity follows a couple whose plans for marriage are greatly inconvenienced by an impending nuclear war. Darkly satirical, the film takes some surprisingly strong (for a production made behind the Iron Curtain) jabs at the ineptitude of government and military authorities. Somewhat in the vein of Dr. Strangelove, this unusual feature captures the fear of its era. Also known as War and Rat. Dubbed in English.

Films about the Fear of Communism (invaders from outer space, horror films)
- Robert Wise, The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951)
- William Cameron Menzies, Invaders from Mars (1953)
- Don Siegel, The Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956)

Christian Cold War Movies
- Cecil B. De Mille, The Ten Commandments (1956)
- Mervyn LeRoy, Quo Vadis (1951)

The Korean War
Robert Altman's film about conscripted American doctors during the Korean War uses black comedy and innovative camera work to show the bloody but boring routine of army hospital life and to criticize the mindless and irritating discipline of the military. M*A*S*H* (1970, 1hr 56 min.) is set in the Korean War but it was made in 1970 during the Vietnam War, so in some respects it is a film just as much about the latter as the former war.

Other Korean War Films
- Sam Fuller, The Steel Helmet (1951) 1hr 26
- Lewis Milestone, Pork Chop Hill (1959) 1 hr 37
- Mark Robson, The Bridges at Toko-Ri (1954)

2. OTHER MEDIA

MUSIC

Jazz
- Bill Evans "Peace Peace" (1958)
- Charles Mingus, "Prayer for Passive Resistance" (1960)

Political Satire
- Tom Lehrer, "That Was the Year that Was" (1965)
ART

Picasso "War and Peace" (1951) and "Massacre in Korea" (1951)

WAR CORRESPONDENTS


ORAL HISTORY


LITERATURE

Spy Novels
- Ian Fleming and James Bond
- John Le Carré and Smiley

War Novels

Cold War Dystopia
- George Orwell's vision of a society in perpetual war:
On This Day

This event took place on June 27, 1950, and was reported in the New York Times the following day.

Read the full text of the article or other headlines from the day.

TRUMAN ORDERS U.S. AIR, NAVY UNITS TO FIGHT IN AID OF KOREA; U.N. COUNCIL SUPPORTS HIM; OUR FLYERS IN ACTION; FLEET GUARDS FORMOSA

Truman Orders U.S. Air, Navy Units To Fight In Aid Of Korea; U.N. Council Supports Him; Our Fliers In Action; Fleet Guards Formosa
Bid Made to Russia

President Asks Moscow to Act to Terminate Fighting in Korea

Chiang Told To Halt

U.S. Directs Him to Stop Blows at Reds--Will Reinforce Manila

President Orders War Aid to Korea

By ANTHONY LEVIERO

Special to The New York Times

Washington, June 27--President Truman announced today that he had ordered United States air and naval forces to fight with South Korea's Army. He said this country took the action, as a member of the United Nations, to enforce the cease-fire order issued by the Security Council Sunday night.

Then acting independently of the United Nations, in a move to assure this country's security, the Chief Executive ordered Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble to form a protective cordon around Formosa to prevent its invasion by Communist Chinese forces.

Along with these fateful decisions, Mr. Truman also ordered an increase of our forces based in the Philippine Republic, as well as more speedy military assistance to that country and to the French and Vietnam forces that are fighting Communist armies in Indo-China.

After he had started these moves that might mean a decided turn toward peace or a general war, the President sent Ambassador Alan G. Kirk to the Russian Foreign Office in Moscow to request the Soviet Union to use its good offices to end the hostilities. This was an obvious proffer of an opportunity for Russia to end the crisis before her own forces might get involved.

Door Opened for Russia

In the capital this was regarded as being at once a possible face-saving device for Russia in a showdown crisis and a feeler to determine her intentions.

The decisions amounted to a showdown in the "cold war" with Russia, in which this country has at last decided to begin shooting in a limited area. Yet all the decisions followed a carefully worked out formula of action within the framework of the United Nations, as well as unilateral moves that avoided any direct provocation of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Truman based the decision to fight for the...
Mr. Truman based the decision to fight for the South Koreans entirely on the Security Council resolution which called upon all members of the United Nations to help carry it out. And at the Pentagon it was explained that our air and naval forces would fight only below the Thirty-eighth Parallel line that divides South Korea from the Russian-sponsored North Korea.

"The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution," Mr. Truman stated. "In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support."

Russia Is Not Mentioned

Mr. Truman carefully avoided mentioning Russia in his statement. He pivoted today's great shift in United States foreign policy on a conclusion that the "cold war" had passed from an uneasy passive stage to "armed invasion and war." He blamed "communism."

"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war," he said. "It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

President Truman took the unusual action of virtually ordering the Chinese National Government to cease its air and sea operations against the Chinese mainland. He tersely stated that the Seventh Fleet will see that this is done, adding that the future status of Formosa would have to await peace in the Pacific or a peace settlement with Japan, or United Nations action.

In many major speeches Mr. Truman has not hesitated to name Russia as the country that had obstructed peace efforts in the United Nations through her use of the veto or the boycotting of its meetings.

In military parlance, the term "cover and support" used by Mr. Truman as missions for our forces means that they would seek to destroy any North Korea air, ground or sea forces, as well as their installations, that are encountered below the Thirty-eighth Parallel. They would do the same in support of any counter-offensive that the South Korea forces might be able to mount.

Thus the complexion of the Korean situation was changed overnight. Yesterday officials were inclined to see South Korea, with her small, poorly equipped forces, as good as lost. It was acknowledged, as President Syngman Rhee of South Korea had complained, that aid in the form of munitions and supplies was "too little and too late."

Victory Is Seen for South

Today the view was that American air and naval forces could assure overwhelming superiority to South Korea and bring victory, unless, of course, Russia similarly aided North Korea.

The decisions were made last night in Blair House and before the night was over the coded action orders were being radioed to Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo and to other pertinent places. The formula encompassing all the action, it was learned authoritatively, began to take shape Sunday night in the
first Blair House conference and it was custom-tailored for the resolution that the United States representative was directed to introduce in the Security Council meeting that night.

The correlated diplomatic action in Moscow was announced this afternoon by the State Department. Ambassador Kirk delivered a note, the text of which was not published.

Lincoln White, State Department press officer said:

"The Embassy asked that the Soviet Government use its influence with the North Korean authorities for the withdrawal of the invading forces and the cessation of hostilities."

President Truman was gratified with markedly good reaction that followed news of his decisions. There was typical bipartisan support as in other great emergencies that have faced the country, and Mr. Truman was particularly pleased with the message he received from Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York, his opponent in the Presidential race of 1948. He promptly sent a grateful reply. As one White House official expressed it, "there was a wonderful closing of ranks."

The unity on the political front was more than matched among the high civilian and military leaders of the nation who made the recommendations for action. Mr. Truman, before he even left his home in Independence, Mo., on Sunday to cope with the crisis, had formed a determination to do something drastic, something that would be neither appeasement nor merely passive. Both Defense and State Department officials, it was learned, worked with great harmony and easy agreement on the recommendations that were drawn up to meet his basic requirements.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson was said to have been a strong hand in working out the diplomatic requirements, both as to Moscow and the Security Council, and in urging the use of force. Those at the fateful council with the President in his home at Blair House last night were the same that met with him Sunday, after his hurried return from Independence.

They were Mr. Acheson, Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, and Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State; Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense; Gen. Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; Frank C. Pace Jr., Secretary of the Army; Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force; and Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy.

The proposed actions—air and naval support for South Korea to enforce the United Nations resolution and the decision on Formosa establishing unilaterally a line of United States defense in the Western Pacific—were already familiar. Mr. Truman canvassed the situation once again from every possible angle and then made his decisions. That, in brief, was the story of the meeting as told by one familiar with it.

This morning Secretary Johnson, Stephen T. Early, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and General Bradley and Collins went to the President's office before 10 A.M., and apparently reported that the orders had gone out.

Then in mid-morning, before the announcement was made to the world, Mr. Truman summoned Congressional leaders and members of the committees dealing with foreign affairs in the Senate and the House. There were Republicans and Democrats, including Speaker Sam Rayburn, Senator W. Scott Lucas, the Senate Majority Leader, and Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and John Kee, his opposite
number in the House.

Secretary Johnson said, as the President's statement indicated, that none of our ground troops would be committed in the Korean conflict.

President Truman, as if to inspire confidence and calm in public, walked instead of drove to Blair House.

He lunched with his Cabinet. Eight were present, Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor, being out of town.

Statement on Korea

Washington, June 27--The text of President Truman's statement today on Korea:

In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the Thirty-eighth Parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.

In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.

It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the associated states in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.
Soviet Report: Pravda Article

Pravda, 27 June 1950

ARTICLE: Report from the Headquarters of the People's Army of the Korean People's Democratic Republic

Peking, 27 June. (TASS) According to the report from headquarters of the People's Army of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the troops of the People's army and security detachments of the republic proceeded 10-15 kilometers into the territory of South Korea at 1500 hours (3:00 p.m.) on 25 June. Towards morning of 26 June, a section moved 20-25 kilometers to the south of the 38th parallel.

In these battles, the troops of the People's army and security detachments of the republic liberated fully the South Yenbek district with cities Kaeson, Deyangan, and the adjoining region of Ongin, Kavven, Rikhang, and Surentkhan.

"Our troops on the peninsula of Ongin," the report said, "are concluding the annihilation of the remaining forces of the beaten adversaries and they are capitulating."

Other parts of our forces liberated Donduchen and continue to attack in the region of Idenpu.

In the region of the southern province of Kavven, our forces liberated the towns of Pkhevhan, Hongch'on and Chumunjin. Our units approached within one kilometer of Ch'unch'on and, having surrounded the Ch'unch'on adversarial forces, they are destroying them and forcing the capitulation.

The naval forces of the republic sank one ship of the adversary, which had invaded the territorial waters of North Korea.

Now the military of the People's army and the security detachments of the republic are entering a fierce battle to destroy the strong resistance of the enemy and move forward at a rapid pace. Everywhere in the freed cities and villages, the local population greet the troops of the People's army and security detachments, who are liberating the people from the reactionary police regime. Temporary people's committees, which were dissolved from reactions, were established.

Other headlines on the same page in Pravda include:

The Announcement of the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic

The Population of South Korea Greets the People's Army Warriors

Makartur on the Situation in Korea (from the United Press in Tokyo, byline New York), with a subtitle, Announcement of Truman

To the Session of the Members of the (UN) Security Council (translation forthcoming)
Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea
by Kathryn Weathersby

In January 1998 the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun published excerpts from a collection of documents purportedly obtained from the Russian Presidential Archive (known formally as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) by its Moscow-based reporter, Yasuo Naito. These remarkable documents provide the first Soviet evidence yet to emerge regarding the longstanding allegations that the United States employed bacteriological weapons during the Korean War. Sankei Shimbun subsequently agreed to make the documents available to scholars, and the Cold War International History Project has translated for their first-time publication in English. (Click on the document links for the full documents.)

The circumstances under which these documents were obtained are unusual. Because the Presidential Archive does not allow researchers to make photocopies, the texts were copied by hand and subsequently re-typed. We therefore do not have such tell-tale signs of authenticity as seals, stamps or signatures that a photocopy can provide. Furthermore, since the documents have not been formally released, we do not have their archival citations. Nor do we know the selection criteria of the person who collected them.

In these regrettable circumstances, how do we evaluate the authenticity of the new evidence? Until the Presidential Archive begins granting access to its important holdings through regular channels rather than through the ad hoc arrangements it has used thus far, we must rely on textual analysis and our experience working in other Russian archives. Are the contents of the documents persuasive enough to overcome the skepticism raised by their irregular provenance? Their style and form do not raise suspicion. The specifics of persons, dates and events are consistent with evidence available from a wide array of other sources. As is apparent from the documents, their contents are so complex and interwoven that it would have been extremely difficult to forge them. In short, the sources are credible.

They are, however, fragmentary. The contents address—and appear to answer—the key question of the veracity of the allegations, but far more documentation, particularly from China, is needed to give a full account of this massive propaganda campaign. In a related article, Milton Leitenberg discusses the history of the allegations and analyzes the disclosures made in these new sources. This commentary examines the context in which these documents originated, discussing not only what they reveal about the Soviet/Chinese/North Korean campaign falsely to accuse the U.S. of using bacteriological weapons in Korea, but also about the power struggle within the Soviet leadership after Stalin's death, the determination of the new leadership to distance itself from Stalin's foreign policy, and the impact of these developments on Moscow's relations with China and North Korea.
In connection with the illness of Kim Il Sung, I was received by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Labor Party of Korea, Pak Chang-ok. After listening to the recommendation of the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU for Kim Il Sung about the desirability of curtailing the campaign for unmasking the Americans' use of bacteriological weapons in Korea and China, Pak Chang-ok expressed great surprise at the actions and positions of [Soviet ambassador] V.N. Razuvaev. Pak Chang-ok stated the following: "We were convinced that everything was known in Moscow. We thought that setting off this campaign would give great assistance to the cause of the struggle against American imperialism." In his turn, Pak Chang-ok did not exclude the possibility that the bombs and containers were thrown from Chinese planes, and [that] there were no infections.

At the end of the conversation, Pak Chang-ok expressed gratitude for the information presented and assured [me] that as soon as Kim Il Sung's health situation improves, he will inform him of the recommendation of the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Suzdalev
Press release, dated July 24, 1950, announcing the President's official request to Congress for a supplemental appropriation to the defense budget of almost 10.5 billion dollars as outlined in the President's message of July 19, 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House Central Files-Official File.

ECONOMICS

US INFO

DOCKYALE RELEASE

JULY 24, 1950

The President today transmitted to the Congress supplemental estimates of appropriation for the fiscal year 1951 amounting to $10,500,000,000 for the Department of Defense. The request for additional funds is based on the President's message of July 19, 1950, on the situation in Korea.

In his letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives transmitting the request, the President stated: "The purpose of these supplemental estimates is two-fold: first, to meet the immediate situation in Korea; and second, to provide for an early but orderly build-up of our military forces to a state of readiness designed to deter further acts of aggression.

The additional requirements for Korea provided for in these estimates are urgently needed and will receive the first priority in the execution of the program recommended therein. This situation is still fluid, however, in the course of the year it may be necessary to make some program changes. For this reason I am requesting authority to approve, at any time, any single appropriation by transfer from one appropriation to another. This will also permit any desirable adjustments in the size or build-up pace contemplated by these estimates. With respect to this last aspect of the requirement, it is my intention that the expansion of the forces will be done in an orderly, efficient, and economical fashion while maintaining the needed flexibility to meet changing conditions.

The supplemental estimates is divided as follows:

- Army
  - $4,000 million
- Navy and Marine Corps
  - $2,000 million
- Air Force
  - $4,500 million
- Establishment-Wide Activities
  - $50 million

The revised estimates call for an increase in the planned fiscal year-end strength of military personnel of about 60,000.

Of the total estimate transmitted to the Congress today, $1,500,000,000 is for military pay, clothing and allowances, and $9,000,000,000 for military plants and equipment, including the construction of major facilities, such as bases, training, gun and ship, aircraft, equipment, amounts to $47,844,900,000; construction, $181,000,000; and bases, guns, field artillery, electronics and other military equipment.

In connection with the supplemental estimate, actions are being taken to accelerate the delivery of equipment, to procure additional facilities, to move up installation-wide activities, and to accelerate the delivery of field artillery, electronics and other equipment.
Stalin suggests that they proceed to business and asks what will be the questions.

Kim II Sung says that after the liberation of Korea by Soviet troops, the Soviet Government and the Soviet Army rendered aid to Korea in the matter of economic development, in the matter of the development of Korea along the democratic path, and that the Korean government understands that without further economic and cultural aid from the Soviet Union it will be difficult for the DPRK to restore and develop its national economy and culture. The assistance of the Soviet Union is required for the further development of the Korean economy and culture.

Stalin asks what kind of aid.

Kim II Sung answers--economic and cultural.

Stalin asks what precisely is needed.

Kim II Sung says that they have confirmed a two year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy. They need economic assistance to fulfill this plan and to strengthen the foundation of the economy. They need machines, equipment and spare parts for industry, communications, transport and also for other branches of the national economy. They also need technical assistance: sending Soviet specialists to Korea, drafting plans for the construction of new objects (factories and plants), conducting geological exploratory work.

Stalin asks what kind of objects?

Kim answers, e.g., irrigation structures at Anju, the construction of which they have now moved toward, but they do not have enough specialists, and also the restoration and completion of the Seisin metallurgical plant, repair of the Sufun hydroelectric plant and others.

Stalin asks if there is iron ore in Korea.

Kim answers that there is very much iron ore in Korea.

Stalin says that it is possible to render this assistance, and it is also possible to provide specialists.

Kim indicates that until now trade between the two countries has been conducted successfully, but in the future, for the fulfillment of the two year plan, they need to import from the Soviet Union equipment, steam engines, electric locomotives, spare parts and equipment for the textile industry. But exports from Korea will not cover the imports, therefore they need credit from the Soviet government.

Stalin says "Fine" and asks in what amount they need credit.

Kim answers from 40 to 50 million American dollars.

Stalin--fine, what else?

Kim II Sung answers that for convenient transport and for strengthening the economic ties between our countries it is necessary to build a railroad from Aoji to Kraskino.

Stalin asks where this is and how many kilometers is the distance of this railroad.

Shtykov reports that this railroad should be built from the station at Kraskino (Soviet territory) to the station at Aoji (Korean territory) for a total distance of 58 km, of which 10 km is on the territory of Korea and 48 km is on the territory of the USSR.

Stalin says that we will think about it and asks if there are some more questions.

Kim II Sung indicates the necessity of establishing air communications between Korea and USSR and says that they do not yet have their own transport planes and no pilots, but an air link is needed.

Stalin asks aren't there Russian planes in Korea.
Kim answers that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops Soviet aviation units and planes were not left in Korea. He indicates that they now have begun the preparation of their own pilots.

Stalin asks if they have their own planes.

Shtykov reports that they have their own training aviation regiment and they have training and military planes, but they do not have transport planes.

Stalin asks how many planes they have.

Shtykov answers that they have 48 military and 19 training planes.

Stalin indicates that we now have fewer planes in a regiment, that we have lowered the number of planes in a regiment and asks what other questions they have.

(FURTHER ON IN THE DOCUMENT)

Kim says that it is necessary to conclude an agreement on all the above-indicated questions, specifically about economic cooperation and the broadening of trade, a trade agreement, an agreement about technical assistance from the Soviet Union and about cultural ties.

Stalin asks if Kim has thought about credit or a loan.

Kim answers that he has thought about it and that they want to receive credit.

Stalin asks if credit will be given in the amount of 50 million dollars, then it will be paid back from 1951 until 1954.

Stalin asks when will credit be paid.

Kim answers that it will be paid beginning with 1951 to 1954.

Stalin asks how they want to receive credit, at one time or in installments over the course of 1949, 1950, 1951.

Kim answers that they wish to receive credit in 1949. If this is not possible for some reason, then in the course of 1949 and the first half of 1950.

Stalin indicates that we cannot do this. You need machines, but machines must be ordered and manufactured. This requires time.

Kim indicates that they need automobiles, steam engines, equipment for the textile industry, and oil, and that it is hoped that they would receive this during this year.

Stalin asks if they have any people who can begin work on drafting these agreements.

Kim answers that they have such people.

Stalin asks if they can give credit in the sum of 200 million rubles, i.e. 40 million dollars. We would give more, but now we are not able.

Kim says that they agree.
Personal message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated July 31, 1950, to Douglas MacArthur outlining placement of atomic bomb components on Guam according to previously approved plans. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Files.

In accordance with previously-approved long-range plans, formulated prior to the Korean incident, for dispersed storage of non-nuclear components for atomic bombs, 10 such components will be placed in storage on Guam. The proposed date of completion of the movement is 12 August 1950. After receipt of technical components, requiring 72 hours, plus Presidential decision authorizing use, would be necessary before atomic bombs could be employed.
Kim says that in the south of Korea there are still American troops and that intrigues against North Korea by the reactionaries are increasing, that they have infantry troops but sea defense almost does not exist. The help of the Soviet Union is needed in this.

Stalin asks how many American troops are in South Korea.
Kim answers that there are up to 20,000 men.
Shtykov—approximately 15-20 thousand men.

Stalin asks if there is a national Korean army in the south.
Kim answers that there is, the number is around 60,000 men.

Stalin asks if this number includes only regular army or also police.
Kim answers that it includes only regular army.

Stalin asks which army is stronger—north or south.

Pak Hon-yong answers that the northern army is stronger.

Stalin says that it is possible to render assistance in this, and that Korea needs to have military planes.

Stalin asks are they penetrating into the South Korean army, do they have their own people there?
Pak Hon-yong answers that they are penetrating, but so far they are not revealing themselves there.

Stalin says that this is correct, that it is not necessary to reveal themselves now and indicates that the southerners also, apparently, are sending their people into the army of the north and that they need [to exercise] caution.

Stalin asks what has happened along the 38th parallel. Is it true that several points have fallen to the southerners and have been seized, and then these points were taken back?
Kim answers that they are taking into account that the southerners can send their own people into the [North Korean] army, and that they are taking the necessary measures. Kim reported that there was a clash with the southerners in Kangwon province at the 38th parallel. Their police were not sufficiently armed at that time. When regular units approached, the southerners retreated.

Stalin asks—did they drive away the southerners or did they leave themselves.
Kim answers that as a result of the battle they drove away the southerners, threw them across the border of the country.

Stalin asks if they have a military school.
Kim answers that they do.

Kim says that they have a military school, but no military academy and that among the officer corps of the Korean army there is no one who has completed a military academy. He asks permission to send Korean officers to the Military Academy of the USSR for training.

Stalin asks wasn't there such permission.
Kim answers that there was not.
Stalin says that it is possible to permit it.
POLITICS/IDEOLOGY

US TEXT

Excerpts from *Harry Truman's Radio and Television Address to the American People* on the situation in Korea, July 19, 1950.

This attack has made it clear, beyond all doubt, that the international Communist movement is willing to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. An act of aggression such as this creates a very real danger to the security of all free nations.

The attack upon Korea was an outright breach of the peace and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. By their actions in Korea, Communist leaders have demonstrated their contempt for the basic moral principles on which the United Nations is founded. This is a direct challenge to the efforts of the free nations to build the kind of world in which men can live in freedom and peace.

This challenge has been presented squarely. We must meet it squarely.

It is important for all of us to understand the essential facts as to how the situation in Korea came about.

Before and during World War II, Korea was subject to Japanese rule. When the fighting stopped, it was agreed that troops of the Soviet Union would accept the surrender of the Japanese soldiers in the northern part of Korea, and that American forces would accept the surrender of the Japanese in the southern part. For this purpose, the 38th parallel was used as the dividing line.

Later, the United Nations sought to establish Korea as a free and independent nation. A commission was sent out to supervise a free election in the whole of Korea. However, this election was held only in the southern part of the country, because the Soviet Union refused to permit an election for this purpose to be held in the northern part. Indeed, the Soviet authorities even refused to permit the United Nations Commission to visit northern Korea.

Nevertheless, the United Nations decided to go ahead where it could. In August 1948 the Republic of Korea was established as a free and independent nation in that part of Korea south of the 38th parallel.

In December 1949, the Soviet Union stated that it had withdrawn its troops from northern Korea and that a local government had been established there. However, the Communist authorities never have permitted the United Nations observers to visit northern Korea to see what was going on behind that part of the Iron Curtain.

It was from that area, where the Communist authorities have been unwilling to let the outside world see what was going on, that the attack was launched against the Republic of Korea on June 25th. That attack came without provocation and without warning. It was an act of raw aggression, without a shadow of justification.

I repeat that it was an act of raw aggression. It had no justification whatever.

The Communist invasion was launched in great force, with planes, tanks, and artillery. The size of the attack, and the speed with which it was followed up, make it perfectly plain that it had been plotted long in advance.

The principal effort to help the Koreans preserve their independence, and to help the United Nations restore peace, has been made by the United States. We have sent land, sea, and air forces to assist in these operations. We have done this because we know that what is at stake here is nothing less than our own national security and the peace of the world.

Our country stands before the world and example of how free men, under God can build a community of neighbors, working together for the good of all.

That is the goal we seek not only for ourselves, but for all people. We believe that freedom and peace are essential if men are to live as our Creator intended us to live. It is this faith that has guided us in the past and it is this faith that will fortify us in the stern days ahead.

**WHAT** was the ideology of the US circa 1950?

**LIST** three key points to support your analysis.
**SOVIET TEXT**

Excerpts from *Molotov Remembers* (1941)

I was sent back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Stalin's death. In the first year we decided to work out a proposal to stop the Korean War. The situation was developing in a way not in our interest. It was pressed on us by the Koreans themselves. Stalin said it was impossible to avoid the question of a united Korea.

We prepared a draft proposal on the German question, and besides that I raised the Korean question.


It was Asia, with its simmering revolutionary nationalism, that taught Stalin a lesson: you can make the revolutionary process serve your foreign policy, but only at your own risk and with serious, unintended consequences. Soon dramatic developments in the Far East forced Stalin in a way he perhaps had never expected or planned.

On Sunday, June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded South Korea in an attempt to reunify the country by force. “The North Koreans wanted to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet,” Khrushchev recalled. Molotov remembered that the Korean War “was pressed on us by the Koreans themselves. Stalin said it was impossible to avoid the national question of a united Korea.” The most dangerous conflict of the Cold War, which the West interpreted as blatant, Soviet-made aggression, a possible prelude to invasion in Europe, was not Stalin’s brainchild. Yet the Kremlin leader supported North Korea’s aggression, since he decided it would advance the geopolitical position of the Soviet Union in the Far East and strengthen the prestige of the USSR as a revolutionary vanguard.

Since the spring of 1949 Kim II Sung, the leader of the North Korean revolutionary puppet regime, had begged Stalin for this blessing in initiating a “reunification of Korea,” after the example set by the Chinese Communists in their civil war against the Guomindang. Stalin argued against this, but gradually he conceded. On January 30, 1950, after one particularly emotional plea from the impatient Kim, Stalin signaled to the Soviet representative in Pyongyang, Terenty Shtykov, his agreement to see the North Korean Communist and look upon his proposal favorably. “Such big business regarding South Korea,” he wrote to Shtykov, “requires serious preparation.” According to this classified Soviet account, Stalin still had “reservations” about the North Korean invasion, but “did not object in principle.” Kim arrived in Moscow at the end of March and stayed until April, arguing to Stalin that the regime of South Korea was weak militarily and politically, and that the “revolutionary situation” in South Korea was ripe. Massive discontent with the government of Syngman Rhee, supported by the United States, the ever-present “fifth column,” and the low combat readiness of the Southern army all seemed to guarantee a quick and painless success.

After the meeting Stalin ordered the immediate fulfillment of all North Korean demands for arms and ammunition.

The main roots of Kim’s aggression lay in the artificial division of the country and the simmering civil war on the Korean peninsula. Yet Kim could not start the war without Stalin’s agreement and Soviet supplies, training, and planning. Stalin’s calculations, as well as Kim’s, were responsible for this tragedy.

**WHAT** was the ideology of the USSR circa 1950?

**LIST** three key points to support your analysis.
These cartoons appeared in the newspaper of the United Electrical Workers union, the *UE News*.

**7 August 1952**

**HERE'S A BED WITHOUT LEGS ESPECIALLY MADE FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE AFRAID OF REDS UNDER THEIR BEDS**

**14 March 1950**

**LIE DOWN AND RELAX, MR. WHIMPLE... WE'D LIKE YOU TO ANSWER A FEW QUESTIONS...**
The Soviet art of propaganda posters was marked by a return to Social Realism in the Post-World War II period, with Stalin once again becoming the focus. The High Stalinist Period (1946-53) revealed images of utopian harmony. Revolutionary fervor returned in the 60s, fanned by the Cold War and the Space Race, and this was reflected in more heroic and satirical images.

"The goal of capitalism is always singular—exploitation, oppression, war—that the poverty and ruin of the populous bring him maximum profit!"
Document #40

Laws of the State of Washington, 1951

CHAPTER 254.
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ACT.

AN ACT to be known as the "Subversive Activities Act," defining the crime of sedition and of being a subversive person or organization and prescribing the punishment and penalties thereof; relating to the loyalty of candidates for public office and prescribing procedures of filing for election to public office; relating to the loyalty of officers and employees of the state or of any political subdivision thereof; prescribing procedures and providing for employment and discharge thereof; providing for the appointment of a special assistant attorney general, prescribing the duties thereof; making an appropriation; and declaring an emergency.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of this act:

"Subversive organization" means any organization which engages in or advocates, abets, advises, or teaches . . . activities intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of government of the United States, or of the State of Washington, or of any political subdivision of either of them, by revolution, force, or violence. . . .

"Subversive person" means any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission . . . of any act intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter the constitutional form of government of the United States, or of the State of Washington, or of any political subdivision of either of them, by revolution, force, or violence; or who is a member of a subversive organization. . . .

SEC. 2. It shall be a felony for any person knowingly and willfully to . . . assist in the formation or participate in the management or to contribute to the support of any subversive organization . . . knowing said organization to be a subversive organization. . . . Any person upon a plea of guilty or upon conviction of violating any provisions of this section shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both, at the discretion of the court.

SEC. 3. It shall be a felony for any person after June 1, 1951 to become or . . . remain a member of a subversive organization . . . knowing said organization to be a subversive organization. . . . Any person upon a plea of guilty or upon conviction of violating any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, at the discretion of the
SEC. 4. Any person who shall be convicted or shall plead guilty of violating any of the provisions of sections two and three of this act, in addition to all other penalties, shall . . . be barred from

(a) holding any office, elective or appointive, . . . or employment by the government of the state of Washington or of any agency thereof . . . ;

(b) filing or standing for election to any public office in the state of Washington; or

(c) voting in any election held in this state.

SEC. 5. It shall be unlawful for any subversive organization . . . to exist or function in the state of Washington and any organization which by a court . . . is found to have violated the provisions of this section shall be dissolved. . . . All funds, books, records and files and all other property of any organization found to have violated the provisions of this section shall be seized by the state of Washington, the funds to be deposited in the state treasury and the books, records, files and other property to be turned over to the attorney general of Washington . . . .

SEC. 12. Every person and every . . . agency of the state of Washington or any political subdivision thereof, who or which appoints or employs . . . public officials or employees shall establish . . . procedures designed to ascertain whether any [state employee] is a subversive person. In securing any facts necessary to ascertain the information herein required, the applicant shall be required to sign a written statement containing answers to such inquiries as may be material. . . .

SEC. 14. Every person who, on June 1, 1951, shall be in the employ of the state of Washington or of any political subdivision thereof . . . shall be required . . . to make a written statement . . . that he or she is not a subversive person as defined in this act. . . . Such statements shall be prepared . . . by every person and every board, commission, council, department, court or other agency of the state of Washington or any subdivision thereof . . . . Any such person failing or refusing to [sign] such a statement or who admits he is a subversive person as defined in this act shall immediately be discharged.

SEC. 15. Reasonable grounds on all the evidence to believe that any person is a subversive person, as defined in this act, shall be cause for discharge from any appointive office or other position . . . in the government of . . . this state, or of any county, municipality or other political subdivision of this state. . . . Any person discharged under the provisions of this act shall have the right within thirty days thereafter to appeal to the superior court . . . as to whether or not the discharge was justified under the provisions of this act. . . . Any person appealing to the superior court may be entitled to trial by jury if he or she so elects.

SEC. 16. No person shall become a candidate for election under the laws of the state of Washington to any public office whatsoever in this state, unless he or she shall file an affidavit that he or she is not a subversive person as defined in this act. . . .

SEC. 21. There is hereby appropriated from the general fund to the attorney general the sum of fifty thousand dollars . . . for the purposes of carrying out this act. [This section was vetoed by Governor Arthur Langlie, who wished to minimize public spending and taxes.]

SEC. 22. This act is vitally necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety,
and shall take effect immediately.


Approved by the Governor March 19, 1951, with the exception of the sections . . . which are vetoed.

Laws of the State of Washington, 1955

CHAPTER 377.

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES-OATH.

AN ACT relating to subversive activities; requiring state, county and municipal employers to ask employees under oath concerning memberships in the communist party or other subversive groups; and amending . . . chapter 254, Laws of 1951 . . .

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:

SECTION 1. Section 12, chapter 254, Laws of 1951 [is] amended to read as follows:

Every person and every . . . agency of the state of Washington or any political subdivision thereof, who or which appoints or employs . . . public officials or employees shall establish . . . procedures designed to ascertain whether any [state employee] is a subversive person. In securing any facts necessary to ascertain the information herein required, the applicant shall be required to sign a written statement containing answers to such inquiries as may be material. . . . Every such [state agency] shall require every employee or applicant for employment to state under oath whether or not he or she is a member of the communist party or other subversive organization, and refusal to answer on any grounds shall be cause for immediate termination of such employee's employment or for refusal to accept his or her application for employment . . .

SEC. 4. The communist party is a subversive organization . . . and membership in the communist party is a subversive activity thereunder.


Approved by the Governor March 21, 1955.
Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files—India: Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1954

1950–1954

"... provides a rich and detailed account of India in the crucial decade following the Second World War. With reports on virtually every aspect of Indian internal and foreign affairs and candid, often incisive, portraits of Indian leaders, the records are an essential source for any serious scholar working on South Asia for the period. And, given India's key role in the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement during this period, it will be an invaluable source to those working on global conflict in the early years of the cold war."

—Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., Temple Professor of the Humanities in Government and Asian Studies, University of Texas at Austin

From 1947 until 1964, India was led by Jawaharlal Nehru, a charismatic prime minister from a nationally prominent family. As much as anyone could, Nehru bridged centuries-old divisions of religion, language, and caste to pursue his vision of a land free from poverty and the international hostilities that gripped most developed nations. Complementing Nehru, other able but more pragmatic Congress Party leaders took tough measures to enforce the nation's political unity. With this strong leadership, the Congress Party made an unusually successful transition from revolutionary force to stable political institution. For anyone interested in political science, international relations, Third World studies, South Asian affairs, or the history of India, the Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files authoritatively document the Nehru era through 1954.

The State Department watched vigilantly as the world's largest democracy evolved politically. The constitution of January 26, 1950, guaranteed the right to vote to more than 173 million adult citizens. In the first parliamentary elections in 1952, the Congress Party won 45 percent of the popular vote to gain 362 of 489 seats in the powerful lower house.

At the national level, the Congress Party under Nehru's guidance was secular and centrist. But at the state level, the party incorporated divergent viewpoints. State Department observers reported intra-party disagreements on unrest in Bengal and elsewhere that caused the prime minister and other party leaders to labor hard to maintain national party unity and party dominance in the states. Traditional religious, language, and caste differences tore the social fabric, and the Communist Party was growing stronger. The Central Files reveal how the Preventive Detention Act legalized harsh responses to Communist advances in Madras and other localities.

Eighty percent of the electorate was illiterate and impoverished when India's National Planning Commission initiated its first Five-Year Plan for economic development in 1950. Rural development was a priority. Despite the expenditure of $3.7 billion of public funds from 1951 to 1955 and a substantial increase in food-grain production, food shortages continued. Rapid population growth of five to six million a year, compounded by monsoon failures in 1952 and 1953, led to a doubling of food imports. Requests for U.S. food, economic, and technical aid are amply documented in the Central Files.

India resisted U.S. efforts to persuade it to join the bloc of nations that opposed communism. Inspired by Nehru, India became a model for other Third World nations in Asia and Africa who were determined to maintain their neutrality in the cold war. Materials in the Central Files cover Nehru's plea for other Asian nations to stay neutral in any war, Nehru's appraisals of Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward peace, and views of U.S. officials on relations between China and India. Nonaligned India played a useful intermediary role in U.S. relations with Korea during the Korean War and with China during the 1950–1954 period.

Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files is the definitive source of American diplomatic reporting on political, economic, and social developments throughout the world. For a full description of the series, see SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & AREA STUDIES.
International - Nehru's Summer of 1950
Korean War Mediation Attempt

Excerpts from Sec. of State, Dean Acheson and State Dept. Daily Opinion Summaries.

Mr. Bonnet then referred to the exchange of notes between Nehru and Stalin and asked whether we intended to make a reply to the note. I said that we were preparing a reply but that, of course, we wished to see the Korean case decided on its merits in the United Nations or the Security Council rather than be tied in with extraneous issues such as the admission of the Chinese Communists to the Security Council.

I added that we were firmly convinced that the Korean affair should be handled by the United Nations and that the issue should be kept localised.

Dean Acheson's conversation with French Ambassador Bonnet, July 17, 1950

DAILY OPINION SUMMARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 1417
July 21, 1950

KOREA

Attention remains centered on American rejection of mediation by India on Soviet "terms", with strong support for the US position continuing. Some other discussion is accorded the diplomatic aspects of the war, chiefly Formosa.

Most commentators believe that Nehru was motivated by "good intentions" and "good faith" in seeking to mediate the Korean conflict, but it is generally agreed that to negotiate on the reported Soviet terms would be "appeasement in its most despicable form" (Balt. Sun, N.Y. Times, Ogaha World-Herald, Wash. Post). The Columbus Dispatch, however, believes that Nehru's gesture is a "hopeful sign" because it indicates that India's sympathies "are with us".

Peter Lisagor (Chic. News), meanwhile, contends that the State Dept. "has found itself in the position of having to explain to the world—and particularly to Asians—why peace in Korea on Soviet terms is unacceptable". Lisagor suggests that the US should have tried to "head off" Nehru before he made his move and enabled the Soviet Union to appear "peace-seeking".

Philippe Talbot (Chic. News) cautions that the US does not have wholehearted support from Asians for resisting Communism in areas other than Korea. Many Asian leaders, he says, believe the US is "backing horses that can't run". James Reston (N.Y. Times), discussing the "outburst" of diplomatic activity occasioned by the need to "localize" the Korean war, observes, "The degree of support for the Korean policy of the US within the non-Communist world has been large, but there has been no such support for Wash.'s Formosa policy, its Indochina policy or its Communist China policy".

70
No. 1418  
KOREA  
July 24, 1950

While the US position on Nehru's mediation effort continues to draw strong support, some commentators fear the rejection of Nehru's offer may have adverse effects on the minds of Asian people, and urge that the UN fight against aggression be stressed in counterpropaganda. There is increased talk of the need for a "genuine" UN force, though most commentators accept the fact the US will have to bear the "brunt" of the fighting.

The Wash. Star finds it "unfortunate" that Nehru has been unable to agree with the US view on mediation, warning that because of Nehru's great influence in Asia, the propaganda results may be "harmful to us". A similar view is presented by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the N.Y. Post, the latter emphasizing a general theme: "There was not one word in the Stalin-Nehru exchange to alter the fundamental fact that the Soviet Union is the author of an act of inexcusable aggression".

What is the International outlook of the US circa 1950?

List three key points to support your analysis.
Document 12: Ciphered telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin], 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao to Stalin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25199

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 12:15 3.10.1950

TO FILIPPOV [STALIN]

I report the answer of MAO ZEDONG to your [telegram] No. 4581:

"I received your telegram of 1.10.50 [1 October 1950]. We originally planned to move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel. However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to retreat.

In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large [kraine bol'shim].

Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send out troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).

Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy. Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war. We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place, to talk over this matter with you and to report the situation in China and Korea.

We await your reply.

MAO ZEDONG 2.10.50"

1. In our view MAO ZEDONG's answer is indicative of a change in the original position of the Chinese leadership on the Korean question. It contradicts the earlier appraisal, which was repeatedly expressed in conversations of MAO ZEDONG with YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and] LIU SHAOQI with me, which
were reported at the time. In these conversations, it was noted by them that the people and the PLA [People's Liberation Army] are ready to help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to defeat the American troops, regarding them as weaker than the Japanese.

2. The Chinese government undoubtedly could send to Korea not only five-six battle ready divisions, but even more. It goes without saying that these Chinese troops are in need of some technical equipping in antitank weapons and to some extent in artillery. The reasons for the changes in the position of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It is possible to suppose that it has been influenced by the international situation, the worsening of the position in Korea, [and] the intrigues of the Anglo-American bloc through [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] NEHRU, who has urged the Chinese toward patience and abstention [from intervention] in order to avoid catastrophe.

ROSHCHIN

No. 2270 3.10

[Deciphered by] Araushkin 12.50 3.10 [12.50 p.m. 3 October]
[Typed by] Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10 [1.20 p.m. 3 October]
[Typed in] 10 copies [copies no.] 9-10 -(to file)

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, listy 105-106; translation by Kathryn Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov.]
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