This paper analyzes the politics of a fund established to support the development of urban children and youth outside of traditional classrooms. It examines the fund's effectiveness in establishing after school programs that provide safety, opportunities to connect with adults, and engagement with communities and evaluates implications for urban education. Information comes from the evaluation of year 2 of this 10-year effort through observations, focus groups, interviews with program directors and staff, meetings with administrators and various officials, document review, budget analysis, and small group meetings with similar types of grantees. Youth evaluators conducted observations and focus groups with year 1 program participants. Overall, it was easier to create safe programs, provide opportunities for connecting with caring adults, and empower youth to become involved in communities than it was to create a governance structure for youth development that could function within municipal government. The legislation established a secure source of funding for a long period of time and authorized youth to participate on an equal basis with adults but did not establish a governance structure. The outcome of the second year was that thousands of children and youth benefited from a wide variety of programs despite the politics. (Contains 13 references.) (SM)
After School Programs, Implications for Urban Education

AERA

DRAFT VERSION - comments welcome and appreciated

I. History

The Bayview Fund for Youth Development [a pseudonym] is a case study of a fund created to support the full development of children and youth outside of traditional classrooms. It was the product of a grass-roots movement that put an initiative on the ballot that designated a percentage of the annual city budget to fund programs for children and youth ages for a ten year period. In year two, this amounted to approximately $6 million. The global purpose of this initiative was youth development - to ensure that young people in Bayview were not left behind in the technological revolution that was benefiting children in richer communities in the area.

Although the initiative was originally stimulated by three studies of poverty and youth violence produced between 1988 and 1996¹, it is important to note that the deficit model was not at work here. By the third report the focus had shifted from fear of youth violence to “positive youth development.” Citing the role of the Black Community Crusade for Children in this concept, the report defined it as follows:

As a concept, “youth development” goes beyond correcting bad behaviors or preventing risky ones; it means more than merely adding “programs” to the current landscape of youth services.... It means promoting attitudes and activities that the community wants for young people.

The report acknowledged that the youth themselves are authorities on youth development. According to the report, “Youth have wisdom to impart, gained negotiating the tough world

¹These studies cannot be identified because they would disclose the identity of the city, but the author will discuss various aspects of the studies in more detail upon request.
into which they were born.” In terms of governance, the report called for a “youth development roundtable” to be responsible for coordinating efforts for youth in the city that “must be intergovernmental and representative of stakeholders. In terms of policy and funding, the report called for a ten-to-fifteen year commitment.

Secure a dedicated funding stream to be augmented and administered by the youth development roundtable... Capture a portion of resources already being spent on youth by local government and private organizations, and pool these funds with new resources (from budget set-asides, taxes, federal, state and foundation funds).

A “dedicated funding stream” is exactly what the BFYD established. Five months after the third report was produced an initiative was brought to the voters. It was the result of the hard work of a small group of community activities who wrote the initiative and the efforts of hundreds of people of all ages who collected signatures to get it on the November ballot. In the ballot measure there were few references to the issues of “latch key” children, youth violence, and substance abuse that dominated the national agenda on after school programs (Denson, 2000; Riley, 1994; Fax and Newman, 1997; Richardson, et al, 1998; Posner and Vandell, 1994; Department of Education, 1998; Trousdale, 2000; Carnegie Task Force on Youth Development and Community Programs, 1992). To the contrary, the purpose of this initiative was to make this city a better place in which children could grow and youth would come of age primarily in terms of safety, community engagement, and connections to caring adults.

II. Methods of Analysis

The purposes of this paper are:

1) to analyze the policy and politics of the fund;

Although the BFYD provided funding for several organizations that served children 0-5, most of the programs focused on youth ages 6-21. Because the standards of evaluation are quite different for these two age groups, this paper will focus on programs for youth ages 0-5. Please see Frank and Walker-Moffat (AERA 2001) for more information about the evaluation of programs for children ages 0-5.
2) to analyze how effective the fund was in establishing programs that provided safety, opportunities for young people to connect with adults, and engaged them with their communities in the second year of funding; and

3) to analyze the implications for urban education.

The primary source of information was the evaluation of year 2 made public in September 2000. According to the legislation, a Citizens' Committee for the Fund (CCF) was required to submit an "annual independent process outcome evaluation" every year to the City Council. The evaluators were hired in November to evaluate the fund for year 2, which had begun in July of 1999 and would end on June 30, 2000. Their contract ended in September 2000. The evaluators were also asked to evaluate retrospectively the grants from the previous year that had gone directly to youth grantmakers to give to other youth. The evaluation in year 2 included: two observations by adult evaluators, focus groups, introductory and exit interviews with program directors conducted at the program sites, informal interviews with project staff, meetings with administrators, elected officials, appointed officials, a document review, a budget analysis to learn how much of the grants were going to direct services, and small group meetings with similar types of grantees to discuss and provide feedback on what was learned.

Data on the effectiveness of the fund in establishing programs that provided safety, connection to caring adults, and community engagement was derived by youth evaluators also. Eight young people were selected and trained to conduct youth-to-youth evaluations. The youth evaluators conducted focus groups with participants in all first year programs that served kids ages 6 and older. After the focus groups, the youth evaluators thought that the youth had more to say, but had been intimidated by the presence of adults at the focus groups. They selected six agencies and in teams of two interviewed three participants in each agency. They developed interview protocols that consisted of fifteen questions that they had developed themselves, practiced, pre-tested, and fine tuned to make sure that they were asking the questions that were appropriate and not repetitive. The youth evaluators
then decided that they wanted the opportunity to experience the programs as if they were active participants. They conducted participant-observations in ten agencies. They presented their findings to the Citizens Committee for the Fund (CCF), and displayed their findings on posters that they placed on easels out city of the City Council’s chambers and stood next to during a city council meeting. The youth evaluators’ findings were substantiated by a survey of 708 randomly selected youth participants in the programs.

III. The Policy

Funding

As called for in the third report on youth development, the legislation secured a "dedicated" source of funding from the city for ten years for programs for children and youth. The legislation mandated that approximately 3% of the city’s unrestricted fund would go to direct services for young people age 0 – 20 for the next 10 years. The measure could be re-authorized either by a simple majority vote of the city council or by being placed on the ballot the November before the sunset date. The legislation further stipulated that these funds would increase, not replace, existing appropriations for children and youth every year. To ensure this was the case the amount spent on parks and recreation at the time the legislation was written in 1995, approximately $12 million, was set as a base minimum, to be leveraged by the Bayview Fund for Children at the fund’s discretion. The legislation specifically limited administrative costs to 5% of the total fund, and allowed 3% for the independent evaluation that it required annually. The fund did not allow for the purchase of equipment, property, housing, or planning grants.

Governance

In lieu of a “youth development roundtable” that was intergovernmental and included representatives of all stakeholders, as called for in the third report on youth development, the legislation required the mayor to appoint a twenty-member Citizens’ Committee for the Fund (CCF) to implement the fund. In recognition of the authority of
youth on youth development issues, the legislation stipulated that half of the members of this committee were to be youth under the age of 21. The newly elected Mayor, however, appointed only two adults and two youth. The city manager, who worked closely with the mayor, decided that elected city council members would appoint the rest from their districts. Primary stakeholders were noticeably absent from the CCF, particularly those who had written the legislation, conducted the earlier studies on youth development, and represented the community based agencies that were expected to implement the fund. Instead, all of the members were political appointees, serving without pay. In general, the committee members shared a genuine dedication to the improvement of life in Bayview for children and youth.

**Master Plan**

One of the first actions of the CCF was to coordinate the development of a master plan. An open process – basically a free-for-all for ideas - was established. This was the first, and only opportunity to date, for the directors of community based agencies to influence the fund’s policy. According to those who participated in the forum, it was a frustrating exercise in political compromise. The content of the legislation and the intent of the reports on youth development were watered down. One of the few areas of consensus was the priority given to youth empowerment. This resulted in setting aside twenty percent of the fund for “youth-sponsored-grants” that were to be administered, allocated, and evaluated by youth grant makers. The agencies that received this funding were expected to train the youth in grant making and grant writing. A pilot program was set up for year 1. The youth grant makers were not required to meet the same outcomes set for youth development as follows.

The master plan defined the outcomes that were expected to result from the fund during the first five years of its existence:

1) connection to caring adults;

2) safe places
3) literacy
4) cultural and physical activities
5) child care and child development
6) young children ready to learn
7) job training and work
8) community engagement
10) successful transition from juvenile justice

Of these, three were salient in the legislation, the master plan, and the request for proposals for year 2:
1. Safe places;
2. Connection to caring adults;
3. Community engagement.

III. Effectiveness of the Fund

Types of programs funded

During year 2 the BFYD distributed $6 million. 90 proposals for funding were submitted. 25 were selected. Altogether the agencies provided 380 programs activities. There were an estimated 6,000 participants, of whom 4,360 were verified as unduplicated. This amounted to approximately $1,000 per child and an estimated $16,000 per program, the funding ranged from $20,000 to $700,000 per agency. The activities were diverse. Parents or youngsters seeking a particular type of after-school program, should have been able to find them. Approximately 16% of the programs were in the arts – including street opera, lessons in how to burn CDs and art classes for the hearing impaired. Most were located in rough neighborhoods. Approximately 14% of the programs were in leadership development, and 11% in community service. Other programs focused on such diverse areas as: health and mentoring services for sexually questioning youth, advocacy and political activism for people who identified as Asian, literacy programs based in the
libraries for pre-school children, a program that combined boxing with gardening and tutoring, transitional services for youth leaving foster care, employment training, science programs, chess classes for native Americans, midnight basketball for girls, youth chorus, computer training, tennis, and community health outreach for poor young women.

Program participants were representative of the Bayview population that identified as black or African American, Asian and Pacific Islander, Latino or Hispanic, according to the 1990 census and public school data. It was over-representative of the group that identified as native American, and unrepresentative of those who identified as white or European.

Safety

In terms of the goals of the fund, it was successful in providing safe programs. Safety is the *sine qua non* of after-school programs, regardless of whether the programs are in urban areas or rural ones, interior, border or coastal parts of the United States. The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation found in McAllen, Texas that poor parents were more concerned about their children's safety than academic performance because they believed "that until children felt safer in their own neighborhoods, their academic performances would never improve" (Seymour, 1998, p.6). According to a 1998 summary of urban after-school programs, "a growing number of parents recognize that their children need a safe place to spend non-school time,” (ERIC, 1998, p.1).

The youth evaluators found that, by and large, the BFYD programs were safe in most regards. It is interesting to note that the youth evaluators seemed to measure the safety of the program according to how comfortable and relaxed the participants appeared to be. At one program two youth evaluators noted,

The participants looked very comfortable in their surroundings. The youth's personal belongings could be safer by putting [them] in a locker. Physically they are safe and mentally it is safe. Everyone felt very safe because they were familiar with the surroundings.

Three other youth evaluators described another program as "pretty safe" because "they all felt easy and comfortable." At another project, a youth evaluator said, "The participants
definitely felt safe. They looked very comfortable... They didn’t look like they had a care in the world while they were there.”

The role of adults in creating a sense of physical safety was also noted by the youth evaluators. One youth evaluator noted how.

The kids were very safe in the classroom where they held their meeting. Other staff members at the school were looking out for them when they took their break. These other staff members were not a part of the program, but they still watched out for the kids at the program.

The youth evaluators also recorded how safe they felt during their participant-observation, and who was responsible for that sense of safety. In an outdoor tennis program, two evaluators observed the role of parents and staff in creating a sense of safety:

It’s extremely safe. Parents were there ensuring that. We personally felt very safe. Lot’s of staff made sure of that. But they could have done a better job with the youths’ personal belongings.

At one site, a youth evaluator indicated that safety was excessive:

It was very hard to get in without authorization. Even with authorization it’s hard to get in. We tried to get in the building, but couldn’t without going through two other buildings. It’s almost a deterrent.

In interviews with three participants at each program site, the youth evaluators asked directly, “Is the program a safe place to be?” While all of the answers were “yes,” most differed as to why. One person said, “I don’t get hurt here.” At another site, one youngster said, “No one messes with you. They got rats though.” At a third site, one young person said, “They help you. I could be in a gang, but instead I’m here.” At that same site, two other youngsters answered very differently. One said, “yes because there are Asian people around.” Another said, “yes because it is upstairs.” The downstairs of this building opened onto a very busy street with low income, boarded up and deteriorating store fronts.
Getting to and from the site was a concern of some of the youth. One explained that her program was safe because “there are lots of adults. They watch us. They give us rides home in the van.”

Some regarded safety from a psychological perspective, “They created a non-judgmental environment. I used to be shy and quiet. They brought that out of me.” Another said, “Definitely it’s a safe place. It’s so comfortable and safe. They tell us not to be ashamed of what we say.”

In a more formal way, the adult evaluation team defined safety as physical, psychological, and material. Physical safety meant that the kids were not afraid of being beaten up, touched in an unwanted way, and had not been involved in or witnessed physical fights often while at the project site. Psychological safety meant the young people are free from harassment (sexual or racial). Material safety was defined by knowing that one’s belonging are safe.

The principle tool for measuring these variables was a survey that was distributed to all of the agencies who received grants from the fund in year 2. Approximately half of the 1,450 surveys that were mailed out to youth participants ages 10-21 were returned. Of those 708 that were returned, 101 were eliminated because they included children younger than ten years of age who we did not think were old enough to fill out a survey on their own.

The youth survey verified that the programs funded by BFYD were indeed safe places for young people to be. A remarkable 82% of the youth who participated in the programs funded by the Bayview Fund in year 2 claimed that the programs were the safest place for them to be in terms of fear of “getting beaten up.” The young people reported that they got into more physical fights and saw more physical fights at school and in their neighborhood than in the program. However, 19% of those who identified as Native American observed a physical fight at the program site one or two times in the past thirty days, indicating that there was at least one fight at the program site that many participants
had observed. About 80% of the total participants said that they “never or almost never” feared that they would be harassed at the program site. However, it must be noted for further inquiry that several of the youth who identified themselves as white or European American, feared they would be harassed at the program site either “all the time” or “very often.” In comparison, few of the other youth expressed this fear. Although there were only 7 youth who identified themselves as white or European that were captured by the survey, it should also be noted that only 1.5% of the participants identified as white or European. Evidently this group was not targeted by the legislation or by the community agencies that provided programs, suggesting that their inclusion was not a priority.

Approximately two-thirds of the youth in all ethnic groups believed that their stuff was safe at the program site.

**Connection to Caring Adults**

The youth evaluators found strong connections to caring adults had been established at most of the program sites they visited. Connection to caring adults was defined as the accessibility of adults who the youth can talk to about their personal problems, and whether or not there are any adults at the program site who the youth believe really care about them.

Two youth evaluators wrote:

The youth are able to discuss their ideas [with] the adults freely without feeling scared or intimidated

At another site, two youth evaluators found:

Great connection. Staff wasn’t just staff, they were close friends. Many staff members were around the same age as the youth. They could have done a better job on encouraging and listening to the youth. The youth did listen to each other. They could have done a better job on encouraging and listening to the youth. The youth did listen to each other. They did kind of badly because they did not learn things from adults, but they were real good when they were hanging out with the staff and at sharing opinions. The youth express their feelings a lot.

Another youth evaluator wrote:
The youth seem to be able to talk with the adult staff person for help. The youth were able to get along with the staff because they trusted the staff. They seem to be able to talk to staff about personal issues and thoughts or other things as if the staff was their friends.

At another site, the evaluators wrote:

we sensed a trust existed between the youth and staff.

In some cases the youth evaluators offered advice:

There is a great sense of trust between the teacher and students. The students listen to their teacher’s instructions and comments without any doubt that she is telling the truth. I can see that they feel really comfortable around their teacher from the way they run to her for help. She is friendly and gives them criticism in a gentle way. However, she should take the initiative to walk around and help her students.

In individual interviews, the youth participants openly discussed the connection they made with caring adults at the program sites with the youth evaluators. The youth evaluators asked if the participants felt comfortable coming to the program when they need help. The answers were always “yes,” but the reasons differed. At one site, one person said “because nobody bothers me [there.]” Another basically said the same, “feel comfortable, ain’t nobody gonna do nothin.” Another said, because the caring adult told her, “I’ll always be there for you.” A third said, because [the adult] understands and doesn’t jump to conclusions.” At another site, one youngster said, “the director is easy to talk to.”

Asked if the staff are supportive of their needs, one participant answered, “Nobody is mean. Nobody holds grudges against me.” Another said, “They always listen to what I have to say.” In another program one participant said, “you have their home number. We can talk to them about any personal things.” Another person said, “they get really happy when you achieve something.” At another site, one person said, “I can talk to them about my family issues.” Another said, “the staff are confidants.” At another site, one young woman said, “whenever I need them they are there for me.” A young woman explained that she is pregnant. “It was not planned. They are helping me plan out my pregnancy.”
Another young woman said, "they will support me if like someone calls me a dyke they will pull to the side and talk to me."

It is not just the adults who are helpful. The youth clearly talk to their peers as well. One person said, "this is where we come. We check-in, talk to each other and give each other as much support as we can." Another said, "the people who work here are our age, so they are easy to talk to. We are close to them."

The above answers indicate how much young people need a caring adult to talk to, even if they have someone at home that they can talk to about personal challenges. Approximately 90% of the program participants stated that they had someone at home who they could talk to. This is not a surprising result in that children who participate in after school programs are often there because a caring adult in the home learned about the program and got their children involved. 72% of the participants found a caring adult at the project sites.

It is interesting to note the differences amongst self-identified groups. 35% of the youth who identified themselves as Asian or Pacific Islanders did not have any adults at home to talk to about personal problems. Almost 70% of self-identified Native Americans did not have any adult at school to talk to about personal problems, compared to less than half of members of other ethnic groups.

It is also interesting to note a level of alienation among participants. 7% of the total population reported that there were no adults anywhere who they could talk to about their personal problems. This same 7% reported significantly more fights in school, but not in their neighborhoods or at the program site. The alienation of 7% of the participants is a problem. The reason why connection to caring adults was a stated objective in the policy was that it was assumed that young people without such connections would benefit from them. These findings indicate the need for a child or teen counselor or psychologist to work with the various agencies to help reach alienated youngsters and to address their specific needs.
Community Engagement

The concept of "community engagement" is an adult concept. In truth, it may be an idea that was created by academics for abstract reasons. Few of the young people, including the youth evaluators, understood what it meant. Informed that "community engagement" was a priority of the fund, the youth evaluators decided to ask participants, "does the program encourage you to do something for your community?" Many of the answers were non-sequitors, suggesting that neither the youth evaluator nor the participant understood the concept. One person answered, "I baby-sit." Another said, "sometimes they will ask me where I live." Those who did understand the question appeared to have participated in programs that organized service activities. One such person responded, "we do community service like food drives."

Performances offered an opportunity to engage in the community. According to a youth evaluator, one group's "community involvement is going out and performing in front of people. They go to different places and perform the skit that the young kids write." Another group is a clown troupe. According to their youth evaluator, "These youth perform at many different places, like schools, parks and festivals." All of these places are parts of their community.

Although the youth grantmaker programs were not expected to increase "community engagement," an increase in community engagement was more evident in their programs than in others. Youth evaluators noted that,

The youth are very much involved with the community. They look at projects that can benefit the community by assessing the community's needs. This program tries to help improve the community by giving grants that the youth think will benefit the community.

At another program the evaluators wrote:

Their community involvement is youth initiated efforts to improve their neighborhood. They get to learn about other cultures through the different programs they fund. They are also involved in making decisions that impact the community they serve.
A better indicator of increased engagement in activities outside of the home appeared to be the answers to the question, “If this program didn’t exist, where would you be?” The following answers suggest that these programs provided a positive alternative to negative activities:

- Cussing out my mamma
- Homeless or living with my baby’s daddy
- Living at a relative’s house or homeless
- I would be on the phone.
- I would be home watching TV.
- I would be home playing video games.
- I would be on the corner, somewhere else or in a stressful relationship.
- Girl, I would be broke. I would probably be hella scared to voice my opinion, or be on the streets.
- I would probably be stealing cars, selling drugs or back at a foster care or even in [a youth authority detention center]
- Nowhere.

For the adult evaluators – three of whom had doctorates, two of whom had masters degrees, and two recent, or soon-to-be graduates from major research universities – “community engagement” was easily understood. It was roughly defined as the youth becoming more interested in their neighborhood or the location of a self-selected group, and doing more things to make this place a better place in which to live.

The fund is successful in increasing community engagement by this definition. 75% of the participants said that they are more interested in knowing things about their community as a result of the program. 67% said they were doing more things to make their community a better place in which to live. Only 8% said that they did not participate in any community oriented activities.

The BFYD succeeded in creating programs that provided activities in places where young people felt they were safe physically and psychologically, and their belongings were safe also. The BFYD succeeded in creating programs that enabled youth to connect with caring adults. The BFYD succeeded in creating programs that introduced young people to the concept of community and why it was important to be involved in their neighborhoods or with a group that shares their identity. What is remarkable is that this occurred in spite of a failure of governance on the part of the fund.
IV. The Politics of the Fund for Youth Development

The difference between theory and practice is reality. The reality of the BFYD for youth development was the politics that operated in lieu of leadership.

The report on youth development that preceded the legislation that created the BFYD claimed that youth development needed three things: a dedicated stream of funding, respect for youth’s opinions, and governance that was “intergovernmental and representative of stake-holders.” In year 2 the BFYD met the first two objectives, but failed on the third. Almost every adult who was involved in a position of potential leadership either quit or was removed by the end of year 2.

Governance

From the beginning the evaluators tried to map the flow of connections and power in the fund. What they found was a power vacuum. There was no center. Because elected officials were not involved in the initiative process that created the BFYD legislation, and the initiative was designed with a distinct spirit of distrust for the city government, there was a vacuum of leadership from elected officials when the initiative passed by a wide margin. This resulted in a rudderless fund of approximately $6 million annually.

The mayor kept a remarkable distance from the fund – never once recognizing it publicly. Given that urban education reform was high on the nation’s agenda, and this mayor had a national reputation that he had staked on urban renewal and education reform, this position was surprising. The closest that the mayor ever got to the fund was the peripheral involvement of the city manager, a person widely regarded as his right-hand man.

During the first year, the fund was managed by three different people. The most competent was a non-practicing lawyer in human services, one of the affiliated offices of the city manager, who was asked to coordinate the fund’s activities in addition to his full-time case-load of work for a few months. This lawyer was one of the original contributors
to the third report on youth development that spawned the BFYD initiative. He was replaced as coordinator of the fund at the end of year 1 when the city manager decided to contract a newly created organization to run the fund.

The new organization that was chosen to administer the fund asked a local foundation to be the fiscal agent for the fund because the legislation required that organizations have at least two years of tax records. The new organization had received a large grant from a national foundation to establish connections between the public schools, health organizations, and community based organizations. According to the lawyer in human services, and the co-presidents of the CCF, it was thought that the Bayview Fund for Youth Development could leverage these funds to help to pay for additional costs to administer the fund and for planning costs that were not allowed under the legislation. However, the national foundation refused to allow any of its funding to go towards the BFYD. Furthermore, the national foundation demanded that the organization distance itself from the BFYD because the BFYD was taking up too much of the director’s time.

Constricted by the limitation on funding (5%) allowed by the legislation for administration, there was a limited budget with which to hire experienced people to direct the fund. The director of the new organization hired a young man who had a master’s degree in a related field, but who had little administrative experience, as the new director. The new director hired a staff of two, both of whom were young adults. Each one had minimal experience and no training in this area. Throughout this year administrative staff simply did not have the level of experience, age, or education to assert authority.

The new director hired the evaluation team to conduct an outside evaluation. In order to get this contract for the evaluation, the director strongly suggested that they should subcontract another organization to direct the youth evaluators. The evaluators did so, but by January it was obvious that this was a one person organization that had no previous experience on this scale, and, indeed, had violated several aspects of the child labor laws.
The subcontract was terminated, and the youth evaluators became an intricate part of the evaluation team.

In February the new director of the BFYD resigned for personal reasons, leaving his assistant as the temporary director. His assistant had worked as an assistant for one non-profit organization, but had more experience as a waiter. This person remained the director until June when he quit to go to graduate school. His assistant, a person who had previously served as a secretary, became the director of the fund and remained in this position through the duration of the evaluators’ contract that lasted through September 2000.

In April the lawyer from human services, who was the one city employee who continued to represent the city in all business regarding the fund, was told that the city manager was taking over the fund from that point onward. At a public meeting in May, the city manager pointedly told this same person, who had continued to participate in the meetings and day-to-day running of the fund, that he was no longer involved in the fund and would not allow him to speak at the meeting. Despite this assertion of authority, the city manager never participated in any aspect of the day-to-day management of the fund, never attended a single fund meeting, and did not appoint anyone to represent him.

After the new organization returned the contract to administer the fund to the city manager, the director of the new organization was fired and the city manager announced that the fund would be placed directly under the administration of the fiscal agent. The CCF voted unanimously to deny this appointment because it was evident that the local foundation did not want to direct the BFYD. Representatives of the foundation never attended any of the CCF or other public meetings about the fund. At this point the city manager declared that according to the legislation, the administration of the fund fell under the rubric of the city manager's office. Therefore, the vote of the CCF was a moot point. The local foundation reluctantly accepted the position of administrator under the conditions that the city would handle all of the contracts and monitoring of the fund. Since there was
no city employee authorized to work on the fund, and it would take considerable manpower
to generate, review, manage, and monitor hundreds of contracts, it was unclear who would
perform this job. The foundation officer who had been in charge of writing checks for the
BFYD under the former arrangement and was now, ostensibly, in charge of the fund,
rarely attended any meetings and never met with any grantees. After less then a month of
being in charge of the administration of the fund, he decided it was time to find a new
career. Coincidently, the local foundation had just purchased from the city a building on
city hall’s property that had been renovated recently with city funds.

It appeared to the outside evaluators that the CCF was struggling with the city
manager’s office for authority over the fund. At a public meeting of the city council, one
of the most vocal members of the CCF stood up, stated that she represented the CCF, and
declared that placing the administration of the fund in the hands of the local foundation was
"a marriage made in heaven." Her position and those held by other active members of the
CCF were up for renewal at the end of year 2.

The failure of governance in this case study raises several important questions.
Assuming that a power vacuum does not typically exist year after year in such a politically
active city, the key question that emerged was, in whose vested interest was it to have a
power vacuum? The sub-question that follows is: Where do kids fit into all this?
(Ormsby, 2000) Was it a coincidence that the leadership of the fund existed in a vacuum,
even after three years? Was it a coincidence that a fund for children and youth that was
worth approximately $6 million, an amount that would increase as the city’s General
Purpose Fund increased, and could have been immediately linked to another $12 million,
was ignored by a mayor with a national reputation staked on urban educational reform?
Was it possible that it was in the vested interests of the mayor, the city council members,
and the community based agencies who benefited directly from the fund to allow this
vacuum to continue?
Leadership might have occurred spontaneously among the grantees, but was assiduously avoided. Grantees were never given the chance to come together to create their own leadership after the early debacles. Grantees were only brought together by the administration at bidding conferences to learn about the grant process for the following year.

Politics of Attendance

In addition to conflicts of interest arising that were unknown to members of the evaluation team, some of the grantees were very upset at the evaluators’ efforts to collect unduplicated attendance records. The evaluators tried to establish a single method for recording the participation of youth in these programs. Based on prior experience, the evaluation team decided to make the recording of attendance the crux of data collection. The agencies were asked to record the participation of young people using their first and last initials followed by their birth dates. This would enable the evaluators to eliminate duplications. The evaluators also asked for a list of services and activities that the agencies implemented each quarter and the number of participants in each. After meeting with every lead agency and reviewing existing attendance records, the evaluators decided that this was the most feasible method for establishing base line data for future outcome evaluations. This was announced at the first general meeting with the grantees in December, one month after the evaluators had been hired.

This announcement was challenged by a seasoned community activist, the director of the agency that had received the most funding to date—$1.7 million in all, including 100% of funding that was distributed in phase 1 and 85% of the funding distributed in phase 2 for youth sponsored grants in year one, totaling over $1 million, and 70% of the funding distributed to youth sponsored grants in year two. This director declared that the evaluators were trying to establish a method to identify participants, and suggested that this information would be used by the government in nefarious ways. This suggestion bothered many of the directors of agencies who catered to gay, lesbian, sexually
questioning youth, the children of undocumented immigrants, and those who included kids from outside of Bayview in their programs. It also bothered those who had not been keeping good attendance records, and those who had exaggerated the number of children and youth as beneficiaries of their programs. After the meeting, the director of the highly funded agency went up to the assistant to the director of evaluation and said, “don’t you know that the last person who asked for this same information was dead within 6 days?” Subsequently, he called the directors of several of the newly funded agencies causing many of them to withdraw their pledge to comply with this method of data collection.

In the end, most agencies complied to a certain extent with efforts to collect attendance data. The efforts were delayed, however, from January until April. This resulted in a tremendous discrepancy between the number of participants that were verified as unduplicated — 4,360, and the number self-reported by the agencies for the year — 18,700. Of those who submitted both sets of data for the same period of time, there was a huge discrepancy between the two, suggesting that self-reported attendance data is not reliable.

Refunding

Ultimately, several of the organizations that exceeded expectations in terms of the quality of their programs, the numbers of verified participants, and their cooperation with the evaluation team were not refunded. Several agencies that had lesser quality programs in terms of achieving the objectives that they themselves had identified in their proposals, questionable or no data on attendance, and, in one case, no evidence of the existence of their program, were refunded.

Sabotage

After the final report had been submitted in three volumes, and presented at a public meeting of the CCF in September 2000, after the contract period for the evaluation had ended and the evaluation team had dispersed, a letter signed by one of the CCF members, the director of the fund (the former secretary), and the head of the local foundation that had
taken over the administration of the fund requested the removal of all references to budgets, administration, and accountability. All three volumes of the final evaluation were returned with red lines drawn through it in its entirety. The detailed editing had been done by the lawyer from human services.

A draft version had been submitted and approved by the CCF a month earlier, and the sections on budgets, administration and accountability were the same sections that that were in the mid-year report. It was made clear, and distributed in writing to all concerned in January, that these sections were part of the data protocols that would be used in the final report. The protocols had been approved by the administration and the CCF at the beginning of the evaluation. The director of evaluation made some changes, but the evaluation team refused to remove all references to budgets, accountability, and administration. The agency that employed the evaluators was told that they would not be paid the final installment on the contract until the all references were removed. Changes were made by other employees of the agency who had not been on the evaluation team, and were reviewed by the director of the evaluation. Yet, the evaluation was never made available to the public. The problem with the evaluation was that it was intended to be a political product. Because it provided data on the real numbers of beneficiaries and per capita costs, it threatened the interests of those who were benefiting from the absence of leadership. It also damaged the egos of some of the individuals who had worked hard to keep the fund going. As in all volunteer work, ego plays a primary role when there are no salaries.

It is quite possible that the politics that surrounded and reverberated throughout the fund were unique to Bayview. However, the questions that such a situation raises are germane to youth development efforts elsewhere: Where can leaders in youth development come from when guerilla warfare exists amongst the adults? How can a fair evaluation of funds designated for children and youth be conducted in a highly charged political context?
VI. **Implications for Urban Education**

The goal of the BFYD was youth development. The objectives to achieve this goal were the creation of programs for youth that provided safety, connection to caring adults, and community engagement. It was believed that in order to achieve this goal and meet these objectives there needed to be a dedicated source of funding, governance that was representative of stakeholders, and the involvement of youth as authorities on their own development. The evaluation of Year 2 of the BFYD indicated that it was easier to create safe programs, to provide opportunities for making connections with caring adults, and to empower youth so that they became more aware, if not involved, in their "community," than it was to create a governance structure for youth development that could function within municipal government.

The legislation established a secure source of funding for a long period of time. It authorized youth to participate on an equal basis with adults. However, the legislation failed to establish a governance structure as envisioned in the third report on youth development. It was not the concept of youth development that failed, or even the people involved who failed to do their jobs, it was the failure of the political will to make the fund work as it was envisioned. Why this was this case can only be assumed. It is assumed that the vested interests of those involved were served by the vacuum in leadership. With no one in charge, politicians could not be blamed or held responsible for any problems. The community based agencies could receive funding without being held accountable. Ironically, no one could take credit for the remarkable success in creating programs that provided safety, connection to caring adults, and community engagement.

The amazing outcome of year 2 was that thousands of youth and children of Bayview did benefit from many wonderful programs in spite of the politics. Obtaining a source of dedicated funding from city taxes is a viable source of funding for community based agencies offering programs to children and youth. Including youth as authorities on youth, at least as evaluators, is highly successful. But, just because there is funding does
not mean there is leadership. Without a roundtable on youth development that is representative of all stakeholders, a fund is nothing more than a source of salaries and funding for “after-school” programs. The value of these after-school programs in providing safe places for children and youth should not be underestimated, but efforts to improve the administration of these programs may be sabotaged because people are afraid of accountability. A final lesson learned is to never underestimate the importance of respecting the egos of unpaid volunteers who are involved in community-based work.

With several years of secured funding left, the fund is still at an early stage of development. Whether or not the fund will achieve the outcomes that it was designed to achieve over the long run will reflect the level of trust established amongst elected officials, the administrators of the fund, the grantees, and the evaluators. As it now stands, there is no leadership or authority in the fund. Furthermore, there is a lack of ownership on the part of elected officials. These issues hinder the ability of to overcome a history of fear amongst community-based organizations. Unless these issues are addressed, there is a strong likelihood that the fund will ultimately fail, as Sid Gardner (1989) described in an article aptly entitled “Failure by Fragmentation,”

We are ultimately failing our children not only because we haven’t invested in them, but also because as communities we have failed to work together to hold ourselves accountable for the substantial resources we do invest and for the outcomes of our most vulnerable residents.

References


23


Ormsby, Colin. 2000. Personal communication with the author.


III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (FROM NON-ERIC SOURCE):

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or, if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents that cannot be made available through EDRS.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publisher/Distributor:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. REFERRAL OF ERIC TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER:

If the right to grant this reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. WHERE TO SEND THIS FORM:

Send this form to the following ERIC Clearinghouse:

University of Maryland
ERIC Clearinghouse on Assessment and Evaluation
1129 Shriver Laboratory
College Park, MD 20742
Attn: Acquisitions

However, if solicited by the ERIC Facility, or if making an unsolicited contribution to ERIC, return this form (and the document being contributed) to:

ERIC Processing and Reference Facility
1100 West Street, 2nd Floor
Laurel, Maryland 20707-3598

Telephone: 301-497-4080
Toll Free: 800-799-3742
FAX: 301-953-0263
e-mail: ericfac@inet.ed.gov
WWW: http://ericfac.piccard.csc.com

F-088 (Rev. 9/97)
Previous versions of this form are obsolete.