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ABSTRACT

The International Communication section of the proceedings contains the following 15 selected papers: "'News Aid', the New Aid: A Case Study of Cambodia" (J. L. Clarke); "Development of Public and Private Broadcasting in Post-Communist Estonia: 1991-1996" (Max V. Grubb); "Revealing and Repenting South Korea's Vietnam Massacre: A Frame Analysis of a Korean News Weekly's Engagement in Public Deliberation" (Nam-Doo Kim); "Echoes in Cyberspace: Searching for Civic-Minded Participation in the Online Forums of 'BBC MUNDO,' 'Chosun Ilbo,' and 'The New York Times'" (Maria E. Len-Rios, Jaeyung Park, and Dharma Adhikari); "Going Global: Choosing the Newspapers We'll Need To Read in the Digital Age" (Richard R. Gross); "The Private and Government Sides of Tanzanian Journalists" (Jyotika Ramaprasad); "Readers' Grievance Columns as Aids in the Development of India" (David W. Bulla); "Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions in Japan and the United States: Cultural Values in the Interpretation of Free Speech" (Yuri Obata and Robert Trager); "Redefining Local News: How Daily Newspapers Reflect Their Communities' International Connections" (Beverly Horvit); "Rooted in Nations, Blossoming in Globalization? A Fresh Look at the Discourse of an Alternative News Agency in the Age of Interdependence" (Jennifer Rauch); "The Death of Diana: A Multi-Nation Study of News Values and Practices" (Anne Cooper-Chen, Margie Comrie, Tsutomu Kanayama, and Kaarle Nordenstreng); "Freedom of the Press: A World System Perspective" (Shelton A. Gunaratne); "Criss-Crossing Perspectives: Assessing Press Freedom and Press Responsibility in Germany and the United States" (Horst Pottker and Kenneth Starck); "The Shrinking World of Network News" (Daniel Riffe and Arianne Budianto); and "Revising the 'Determinants of International News Coverage in the U.S. Media': A Replication and Expansion of the 1987 Research on How the U.S. News Media Cover World Events" (Kuang-Kuo Chang and Tien-tsung Lee). (RS)

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'News aid', the new aid: a case study of Cambodia

Submitted to the International Communication Division for the 2001 AEJMC Convention

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INTRODUCTION

Aid has since the early 1960s been a permanent feature of relations between rich and poor countries. The ostensible aim is to enable those with surplus resources to improve the lifestyle of those lacking them. The result is often good, but there have been strong criticisms that many aid programmes do not do work very efficiently, or even at all, and in some cases may do harm. During the Cold War the two superpowers bought political support with aid: the United States helped governments which abused human rights but provided a bulwark against the spread of communism, while the Soviet Union financed huge high-profile projects to gain recognition where smaller ones would have been more appropriate. A further criticism of aid was that projects were sometimes designed to bring direct benefit to the donor rather than the recipient by, for example, requiring the employment of the donor country's personnel and machinery on a project which was not very useful locally. Yet another criticism was that short term relief may engender dependency on handouts and fail to stimulate progress. (Bovard, 1986).

The end of the Cold War produced a change in aid-giving as the Eastern European and ex-Soviet areas became recipients of support from the Western nations and required help rather different from that needed by developing countries. The new aid recipients were already developed, and needed help to change to something like other systems in Western Europe and America. At the same time, efforts were being made on the part of donors to address some of the criticisms of aid and be more responsible in ensuring its effectiveness. One of the new features of aid coming from both these changes was a desire to support 'good governance', that is, to provide help which would encourage the establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions. One target area for this kind of aid has been the news media, where funding and technical support has been given to help establish and encourage a diversity of voices to support democratic institutions.

Foreign assistance for the news media is not new. Hamilton & Krimsky (1998: 87-88) point out that a free press was one of the requirements for the defeated nations after World War II, but that efforts to encourage such systems, by the Americans at least, were 'haphazard and limited' and tended to be propelled by the notion that the United States had the best press system in the world rather than by a desire to help others. Since

1991, however, support for the news media has become a staple of donation by the Western nations not only to Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union but to developing nations in other areas, and specialised agencies have appeared. Few studies have been concerned with this type of aid, and those that have focus on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where the lion's share of funding has been disbursed. This research looks at the case of Cambodia, the one Asian country which has been grappling with the transition from communism to a more Western style of government, though at a level of development far behind the East Europeans and ex-Soviets. The aim is to determine the extent and type of such aid as well as the identity of the donors and the recipients and to examine some of its results.

ASSISTANCE TO THE NEWS MEDIA: GENERAL

One trend in aid donation over the last decade has been the move away from aid given directly by governments to the use as intermediaries of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) for disbursing funds and implementing projects. Thus the number of NGOs has proliferated: The Economist (2000) reports that there are 25,000 international NGOs in 1995 and vast numbers of domestic ones, the figure in America being about 2 million and in Russia, where none existed before 1991, about 65,000. Most NGOs are 'minnows', as The Economist puts it, but many, especially in the Western world, are large corporation-like organisations which have worldwide operations and command huge revenues. International organisations, such as the branches of the United Nations, may play a similar role, that is, taking on aid projects on behalf of governments. The leader in news media terms is the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), which parlayed its championing of a 'new world information order' in the 1970s into supporting freedom of the press in developing nations in the 1990s.

A 1999 report by the British Council (1999) on aid to the media listed in Europe alone 18 funding agencies and 64 organisations, including universities, that were working in training or in an advisory capacity. In the United States, the Agency for International Development (USAID) ran its own professional media programme from 1995 to 1999 and now gives funding for this purpose to NGOs such as ProMedia, run by the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX), a non-profit organisation. Others include the Independent Journalism Foundation (IJF), the Washington-based International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), the California-based Internews, and so on. Funding has also come from private institutions such as the Knight Foundation and

MacArthur Foundation, which also strongly support efforts to bring about good governance. Specialist organisations may receive support from a wide variety of sources: Internews lists on its website 55 funders, including USAID and two other government agencies, several individuals, a number of foundations and the UN Children's Fund, UNICEF. Internews runs programmes in the former Soviet Union, Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa and the US itself. In Europe a number of governments provide news aid either directly, like the Danish Foreign Ministry, through its aid arm Danida, and the French foreign and culture ministries, or indirectly, like the German government's donations via the various German political party foundations. Ausaid, the Australian government's aid arm, has its own projects.

The changed nature of aid donation has not eliminated criticisms. Many of the old problems remain with traditional forms of aid (see for example Dynes, 2000), and at the same time overall aid funding has been reduced. The new situation with its plethora of NGOs has also come in for criticism. The Economist (2000) finds that in competing for funding, NGOs may try to please donors more than recipients, or to get publicity for themselves. The Economist sees as ideal NGOs which are 'small, efficient and inspirational groups with great achievements: the best will employ local people, keep foreign expertise to a minimum, attempt precise goals... and think deeply about the long-term impact of their work'. But as groups expand they can fall into bad ways because they are not accountable to anyone:

> Critics... suspect that some aid groups are used to propagate western values, as Christian missionaries did in the 19th century. Many NGOs, lacking any base in the local population and with their money coming from outside, simply try to impose their ideas without debate. For example, they often work to promote women's or children's interests as defined by western societies, winning funds easily but causing social disruption on the ground.

The Economist makes several further points. NGOs may operate in too narrow an area and lose sight of the bigger picture, they may conflict with other aid providers, and their Western personnel may alter local market situations and create resentment because of their relative wealth. Their work can even challenge the sovereignty of local

governments. The Economist says that a good NGO will disband when its job is done, and suggests that many do not.

The only academic survey done specifically on aid to the news is Becker and Lowrey's (2000) examination of the Knight International Press Fellowship Program, which has operated since 1994 and sent American journalists to serve as trainers all over the world. Becker and Lowrey found that in general the Knight Fellows had an impact on individual journalists and on institutions in the host countries, especially where they had more contact with students. Froehlich (2000) is more concerned about the problem of providing 'Western' media education in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, typifying it as 'colonial'. She wonders if the imposition of such democratic measures may circumvent the learning process, which took Western Europe so much longer. Hamilton & Krimsky (1998: 87) comment on the many journalism aid workers, mostly American, behind the former iron curtain, 'who bump into each other with the same journalism gospel tucked under their arms: "Democracy is impossible without a free and commercially viable media".' Yet, the authors point out (p. 89), there are problems in implementing this:

> A truly independent press, in the financial and editorial sense, is more difficult to create than a market economy, because a self-supporting media system requires a free-market system as a precondition. Without the means to earn its own way through advertising and profit-making ventures, a press must be linked to special interest – such as a government, a party or a narrow business concern.

Thus while the donor seeks to impose the philosophy of press freedom, the nation may not have the background to cope with it; and recipients often just want the money to produce their news product. There are further problems in deciding whether to provide large-scale facilities such as printing presses or computer systems, in whether or not to give donations to governments (which might use the money to control journalists) and in finding the kind of aid that encourages self-sufficiency. Hamilton & Krimsky (1998: 92) find that the best kind of aid is know-how, in the form of 'technical assistance'. This can be given to help with such matters as management, community needs for news and specialised reporting. The best means of getting it across is to concentrate on 'limited,

concrete goals'. The results of such aid may not be great or immediately visible, but it can be very effective when it is aimed at 'helping rather than directing'. A list of requirements is given: aid must be culturally sensitive, which requires 'experimentation'; others besides journalists must be trained in media skills, particularly government officials; more assistance must be given to areas other than the formerly communist part of Europe and the Soviet Union; and assistance needs to be given in the long term rather than as a quick fix, allowing providers to understand local conditions.

Other issues have been raised by donors. In a paper summarising the conference 'How the media can promote democracy: exploring the impact of media training in transitional and developing countries', sponsored by the British Council and the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, d'Arcy & Maine (1997) refer to a number of problem areas. Projects should be preceded by a needs analysis, preferably done in the field; linguistic and cultural misunderstandings could arise between donor and recipient; local partners are needed but it is difficult to find the right ones; it is important that aid be long-term and that local trainers should be recruited; Western models are not always appropriate; the political situation, especially where journalists fear government oppression, may make it hard to provide aid, and all levels of news as well as relevant officials should be trained; often there are inadequate resources, and journalists find it hard to get free time to attend sessions. Like Hamilton & Krimsky, they stress the need for long-term commitment and major local involvement.

In judging aid to the news media in Cambodia, then, a number of areas of concern can be discerned. The older problems of how to make aid more than a 'quick fix' and how to make it more beneficial to the recipient remain a challenge. A number of actions have been suggested, but have aid providers taken them on board and formulated proper policies to implement them? Other general problems can be expected. Is aid being coordinated, or does duplication or contradiction exist? Are aid providers, even aid funders, in competition with each other, and do they fight to work in nations considered more 'important' to their home countries' concerns? And, finally, after a decade of such aid, is there any evidence that it is helpful?

With these questions in mind, the study now turns to the case of Cambodia.

METHODOLOGY

Two methods were used. One was a trawl for literature on the subject. This turned up a surprisingly large amount of information on the Internet, where most aid organisations publish their reports. The other was interviewing and observing in Cambodia, done on trips to Phnom Penh in January and August 2000. Visits were made to interview representatives at local offices of organisations involved in aid to the news, and to interview recipients in news organisations.

AID TO THE NEWS MEDIA IN CAMBODIA

Background

Cambodia's current democratic system of government came about as a result of the Paris Peace Accords, which ended the 12-year civil and international war in 1991. The agreements provided for the United Nations to supervise the country's first elections in May 1993. Freedom of the press was part of the remit of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), a military and administrative force which arrived in Cambodia in 1992 and stayed until the completion of the elections. Press freedom is guaranteed in the constitution which was passed subsequently by the coalition Royal Government of Cambodia. The constitutional provision has been given more detail by the 1995 Press Law, though there is no specific legislation to cover the broadcast media. A sub-decree to provide more detail on vague areas of the Press Law has been drafted but not yet passed.

The number of news organisations in Cambodia has expanded phenomenally in the last decade. In 1991 there were four newspapers, one radio station, one television station and a national news agency, all part of the government. In 1992 several new, private newspapers opened, and in 1993 more print media appeared and some new private but party-linked broadcasters went on air. By the time of the election that year there were about 20 news organisations altogether. By mid-1994 there were around 50. Last year around 230 were registered with the Ministry of Information. It is acknowledged that many do not publish regularly or even at all, but it is still estimated that 40 or 50 are extant, perhaps half that number current, and the rest are all news media which have

appeared at some time or other and disappeared through lack of funding or other problems.

Press freedom was welcomed by Cambodians after the more restrictive regimes of earlier governments: the 1979-1991 Soviet communist-style system of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK; renamed the State of Cambodia, SoC, in 1989), the 1975-1978 rule of the Khmer Rouge, when only party media existed, and before that the Khmer Republic of Lon Nol from 1970 to 1975 and from 1953-1970 the leadership of Norodom Sihanouk, the former king who is now once again king. These two earlier periods were characterised by alternating periods of relative freedom and crackdowns and, latterly, by suppression due to the civil war. The press that emerged after 1991 relied largely on the established patterns of these pre-Khmer Rouge days, when highly opinionated 4-page single-sheet broadsheets were the normal style of the news, though in the post-1990 period a few better-financed publications have been more modern in style. Another characteristic of pre-Khmer Rouge days, the persecution of journalists, also returned: between 1992 and late 1998 six journalists were killed and a number of others injured. No attacks have been reported since 1998, however.

The whole Cambodian economy, held back by years of war, relies heavily on foreign aid in all sectors. The Consultative Group for Cambodia, chaired by the World Bank, pledged a total of US$548 million to the country in May 2000 for the next year (Cambodian GDP for 1998, according to the World Bank, was US$2.9 billion). The Consultative Group comprises 18 donor countries, the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the Asian Development Bank and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The group emphasised the need for good governance, though did not mention the news media specifically as part of this (World Bank, 2000). It is difficult to ascertain levels of assistance to the news media, partly because some organisations like to keep them secret and partly because it is difficult to tease out specific amounts from mixed projects. However, news aid is certainly only a small proportion of total aid.

News aid to Cambodia

Aid to help development of the news before 1991 was very limited. None at all was identified before the establishment of the PRK in 1979, though it is likely that journalists received fellowships and went on some training programmes in the 1960s

and early 1970s. During the twelve years of the PRK/SoC, aid came from the Soviet bloc. Journalists were sent for training and education in Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, some on programmes of political and journalistic training and some on entirely different courses. The national news agency, then known as SPK, was supposed to be part of an interlocking socialist bloc news agency system (Marston, 1996: 210). Some of the journalists trained in the PRK/SoC period took senior positions after 1991, as did some of the pre-1975 journalists (Clarke, 1995).

Foreign assistance was already under way when the peace accords were signed in October 1991. UNESCO sent its regional communications adviser to conduct a needs assessment early that year and he produced recommendations that included courses for print and broadcast journalists, the development of national radio, and training for media professionals outside the news (UNESCO, 1993: 30-31). Phnom Penh's first course in journalism, however, was taught in October 1991 by Susan Aitkin, an Australian journalist who had been approached for help when she visited as a correspondent for The Canberra Times in September 1989. Back home she arranged funding from a number of Australian organisations and, with the help of a Cambodia-based journalist colleague, Sue Downie, set up the four-week programme. There was an enthusiastic response, and 26 journalists were enrolled. The classes were designed to be of immediate use. They concentrated on basic skills, and part of the time in class was spent working on the daily copy of SPK. Speedy translation between Khmer and English enabled the students to work in their own language (Aitkin, 1991).[1] In this pioneering role, Aitkin became a major influence on the development of journalism in Cambodia.

When UNTAC was formed it took over several ministries, but sovereignty was in the hands of a four-way Supreme National Council formed by SoC and the three resistance groups who had opposed it until 1991: the Khmer Rouge, the royalist FUNCINPEC and the nationalist Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The UN authority was given a mandate by the Paris accords over the media to ensure 'a neutral political environment for free and fair elections' (Marston, 1999: 175). The UNTAC Information & Education Division began preparing a 'Media Charter' to provide a legal framework for a free press to take precedence over a press law which had been passed by SoC in

[1] The information in this paragraph is also based on interviews with Susan Aitkin and Susan Downie.

April 1992, but '[i]n the process of meetings with journalists, political representatives, and UNTAC legal staff, the Media Charter ended up becoming a watered-down set of "Media guidelines," which did not claim to have the force of law, but did serve as a basis for Information/Education Division discussion with the media about what was and was not appropriate' (Marston, 1999: 177). The Division tried to set up a media association towards the end of 1992, but 'the most conspicuous obstacle was the absence of any "independent" media in Cambodia' (Marston, 1996: 210). When a party formed by a section of the KPNLF set up a bulletin which opposed SoC, it faced harassment, and an UNTAC information officer accompanied staff to help bring in a small printing press from the Thai border by truck (Marston, 1999: 178).

Faced with these difficulties, UNTAC itself became involved in the news media. The Information & Education Division began in the second half of 1992 producing video clips for the government (in practice, SoC) television station, and then acquired its own radio studio to produce material for broadcast over SoC facilities. Eventually UNTAC set up its own radio station, which was a spectacular success in bringing people to the 1993 polls (Zhou, 1994). The staff of the Information & Education Division monitored the media, visiting the offices of news organisations (Marston, 1999: 180). UNTAC also distributed, with Japanese support, secondhand radios throughout the country (Marston, 1999: 188).

Meanwhile, Susan Aitkin went on pressing for funding and running courses. She joined forces with UNESCO, becoming its information officer in Phnom Penh. The UN body became increasingly active in training journalists and others working in the media. Courses were again directed towards basic skills, but were also designed to make participants aware of major issues of the day: human rights, the huge problem of land mines, the environment and Cambodia's cultural heritage. UNESCO worked with the Australian government aid agency, then called AIDAB, and its Danish counterpart, Danida, who funded various courses. Training was also arranged by UNESCO at the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (AIBD) in Malaysia and the Northern Territory University in Australia. UNESCO's flagship media project was to set up the Cambodia Communication Institute (CCI) with funding from Danida and the French government and the involvement of a number of other agencies (UNESCO, 1994; Brown, 1997a).

UNESCO's training reached the masses. In the year to October 1994 it put on 37 courses involving 590 attendees from Agence Khmère de Presse (AKP, the new name of SPK), six broadcast stations, 22 local newspapers, five foreign news organisations, 12 government ministries and other bodies and 21 non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Funding came from AIDAB, the United States Information Service (USIS), the French embassy, Danida, the American media organisation The Freedom Forum and the Centre Canadien d'Etude et Coopération Internationale. The courses were all short and specific in nature, though UNESCO's overall recommendation was that media education should become part of the school curriculum and that a degree course should eventually be taught at the university (UNESCO, 1994). UNESCO's key plan came to fruition in 1995 with the setting up within the Ministry of Information of the CCI under the directorship of Sek Barisoth, a former journalist who had previously worked with UNESCO. In the ensuing years CCI carried out a thorough survey of the training needs of the Cambodian media (Brown, 1997b and 1997c). However, the completion of the project was hindered by a change of personnel at UNESCO and a 1997 coup which split the government. The report seems never to have been used.

CCI has continued to cater mainly to working journalists, with many short courses in various aspects of journalism from basic skills to specialities such as AIDS coverage and election reporting. Early in 2000 a year-long part-time course was set up with help from The Freedom Forum with a curriculum designed by Crispin Maslog, a retired Filipino journalism professor hired by UNESCO. The course has proved very popular. One of the characteristics of CCI is its cooperation with other aid agencies in putting on courses. Fifteen local, foreign and international NGOs and governmental agencies are mentioned in its literature, including besides those already mentioned the Friedrich Nauman Foundation, the Singapore National Union of Journalists, the Thomson Foundation of Britain and UNDP. Recently the Canadian government-funded NGO Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) has been putting on courses for radio journalists, partly in cooperation with CCI. There have also been donations and help from individuals and private organisaitons. The Institute says it provided 32 courses in 1998 and 26 in 1999, the slowdown being partly due to the introduction of the one-year course.

Other organisations also began moving into the field with separate programmes. The French government, which has worked at times with UNESCO, set up a journalism course at the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP) in 1992, initially training working journalists in French. After two years it was incorporated into the French course in the Languages Department and made an elective for third- and fourth-year students of French at the university, taking up 200 hours of teaching in each year. Student numbers have been between 10 and 15 a year. Links have been set up with French journalism schools, and the Ecole Supèrieure de Journalisme (ESJ) at Lille has sent trainers and hosted Cambodian students. Some of the graduates have been employed on Rendezvous, a French-funded week-night magazine programme on the government television station, TVK, where further training is provided both on-the-job and during visits to France. One of the team is now in charge of the university course.[2]

The Indochina Media Memorial Foundation (IMMF), established in Britain in 1991 by a Vietnam War photographer to commemorate journalists who had died in the region since 1945, has also been prominent in offering training. In 1993 the group set up an office in Bangkok run by resident foreign journalists, and their aim was to train their counterparts in the region. Like UNESCO, IMMF has worked with many partners, including The Asia Foundation (TAF, an American NGO which relies largely on funding from the US Agency for International Development), AusAID (the new name of the Australian government aid arm), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Danida, The Freedom Forum, the Japan Foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF, one of the German party organisations), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Thomson Foundation, the UN Environment Programme and USIS. IMMF's first course, in basic journalism, took place in Bangkok in 1994 and nine more have been conducted since then, covering photojournalism, business and economic reporting, environmental reporting and programmes for specific news organisations. Courses last three weeks, take place mostly in Thailand and are attended usually by 16 people, whose expenses are paid. Up

[2] Information from interviews with the Centre Cultural Français, Phnom Penh, and Hubert Colombeau, adviser to Rendezvous.

to the beginning of 2000, 40 Cambodian journalists from 25 local and international news organisations had been on IMMF courses.[3]

At about the same time more training was developing through a number of other organisations. The Khmer Journalists Association (KJA), set up with the help of UNESCO and other aid bodies in 1994, planned to put on its own sessions. The association was receiving funds from TAF, and asked for a grant for the projected programme. At the same time, an American friend of Cambodia, Bernard Krisher, a former journalist himself, was setting up a desktop publishing course at RUPP and was asking for TAF help as well as soliciting the donation of computers and other equipment from his adoptive country Japan. As the KJA was becoming increasingly polarised between supporters of the two opposed ruling parties, it was decided to set up a joint programme. TAF supplied funding for the courses, which began in April 1995 under Mike Fowler, an American trainer, who wrote a course and gradually handed it over to Chhour Sokheang, a Khmer ex-journalist employed by TAF, and several highly experienced journalists working part-time. The KJA itself was rendered moribund by the split so dropped out of the picture. Krisher continued until 2000 to support and solicit support for the desktop operation. With the end of the 8th course in April last year, 444 students had graduated with a TAF/RUPP diploma. However, in recent courses only 40 per cent of attendees have been working journalists; 20-30 per cent are university students and the rest NGO personnel. In 2000 KAF also helped to support an undergraduate programme at RUPP, and the first degree course started in September with Mike Fowler, now a Knight Fellow, as one of the trainers. CCI has recently shed its Ministry of Information ties and is to move near the university. Some cooperation or at least coordination is expected.[4]

Another target of aid has been the Women's Media Centre (WMC), which was set up in 1995 with core funding from TAF, who continue with support. Fourteen organisations altogether have become involved, however: UNICEF pays the main expenses; Unesco paid for the transmitter for Radio WMC FM 102, which started up in 1999; UNICEF

[3] Information from Sarah McLean, IMMF Project Director, by post and e-mail.

and the Australian and British embassies helped set up the studio and Japanese aid supplied equipment. Technical and production support has been provided by experts funded by Australia, OSB of Ireland and Forum CYD of Sweden. Danida has also made donations to WMC. Help to make radio and video programmes has come from UNICEF, the British embassy and others, and journalists have been trained by IMMF and IMPACS as well as by private broadcasters in Thailand.

It is clear that there are many aid organisations working with the news media in Cambodia: altogether some 40 different organisations have been found to be involved in some way, from donations of computers and other equipment to funding whole courses or setting up studios. It is difficult to find out exactly how much is being spent, but it is clear that there are only a few major spenders. The largest donor in terms of size of funding is probably the Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA, which has put up and equipped a new building for the government television station TVK at a cost of US$13 million, though all equipment was Japanese and so may have cost less in practice. This is not all for journalism, but TVK has a sizeable newsroom. The largest contributor to journalism per se must be UNESCO, especially in terms of its support for CCI, which may have amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars over the years. However, no figures for expenditure are available. TAF spends about $35,000-$40,000 a year on its university project, plus its commitments to the WMC and media projects for other organisations. Although most projects require sizeable funding, in some cases donors have found ways to produce a good effect with little input. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, for example, refused to give any money to a new Club for Cambodian Journalists that was mooted last year, but provided its offices for meetings and its staff for coordination. The club was successfully set up, and can truthfully say it is independent of the KAF.

OVERVIEW: BENEFITS AND PROBLEMS

The most surprising result of this survey is the large number of aid donors in this sector, even in such a small country as Cambodia, which has a population of only about 11

[4] Information in this parragraph is from interviews with Jon Summers, TAF representative in Phnom Penh, Chhour Sokheang, TAF program officer in Phnom Penh, and Mike Fowler, and from e-mail correspondence with Bernard Krisher.

million. Also surprising is the sheer number of different projects that are being run by these organisations, and the number of organisations working on each project. The help given has reached a wide range of journalists and news organisations. Sek Barisoth, director of CCI, says the institute has trained nearly all the journalists in Phnom Penh.[5] Certainly there has been some improvement in journalistic standards, at least, according to the 'Western' model. Barisoth and others point to the greater professionalism of one of the major newspapers, Koh Santhepheap, which has less opinion and sensationalism than it used to and now sends its journalists to CCI for training where before it refused. Several examples of the publication even in pro-government papers of stories critical of officials have been noted. Donors have been careful to heed criticisms, and have made efforts to provide not only short, basic courses but training in a range of areas of the news in some depth as well as longer-term education. The government has in general welcomed efforts to bring greater professionalism to the news media, usually in the hope that this will stop inaccurate reporting.

Editors have good things to say about training. Kathleen Hayes of the Phnom Penh Post praised the overseas courses such as those run by IMMF in particular, because they generate enthusiasm. She felt that journalists got the most out of contacts with other journalists: 'The benefits of a seminar are usually meeting other people rather than the journalism training'.[6] Pen Samitthy, editor of the biggest newspaper, the daily Raksmei Kampuchea, has sent reporters to CCI and other workshops, and one to the TAF course at RUPP. He said, 'Reporters are better than before. In all sections the articles are better, more professional. I spend less time correcting, and the reporters understand better than before how to be professional.'[7] Reach Sambath of Agence France Presse, one of the RUPP trainers who has obtained a scholarship to Columbia University for an MA in journalism, noted that opinion had generally moved off the front page and given way to reporting.[8]

However, there is still some dissatisfaction with professional standards. One major problem is the difficulty of making money in the news business. Even Raksmei Kampuchea, which is listed in the weekly monitor The Mirror as top in attracting

[5] Interview with Sek Barisoth.
[6] Interview with Kathleen Hayes, 11 January 2000.
[7] Interview with Pen Samitthy, 10 January 2000.
[8] Interview with Reach Sambath, 15 January 2000.

advertising, has had to cut back on staff, and now has fewer reporters than it had in 1993. Journalists are paid so little that the temptation to blackmail people with embarrassing stories or to accept bribes is very strong. 'They need money… to buy food for their kids', Barisoth said. Kathleen Hayes was particularly worried about another consequence of lack of profitability in the news: the tendency to seek or force political patronage. Although some say this phenomenon has decreased since the 1998 election because fewer politicians are willing to pay news organisations, it still exists. Sambath said some ethical problems were the fault of journalists' unwillingness to improve knowledge: 'They use blackmail or their own opinion and don't come to study'. Ker Munthit of the Associated Press, the other RUPP trainer who is currently at Columbia University, said at a KAF editors' conference in Siem Reap last year: 'The reality is that many Cambodian journalists have taken freedom for granted and are not afraid of violating [the] code of ethics to unfairly attack and inflict harm [on] individuals… Except for a very few among them who live up to high professional standards, Cambodian newspapers in general have failed to fulfill their role as providers of accurate information to the public.' He also said blackmail and bribery existed, and criticised self-censorship on television news.[9] Munthit and Hayes both said training would help the situation.

One problem lies in bringing older journalists into training sessions. Samitthy said that the five members of his staff who were trained in the Soviet bloc in PRK/SoC days were not required to go on courses but 'told to read books and have meetings'. Even if the standards of these journalists are high, there is potential for conflict with the younger, more recently trained group. Leng Sochea of the Ministry of Information's Press Department bemoaned the fact that while working journalists tend to go on courses, proprietors and senior business managers, who controlled the tone of publications, often did not. He suggested that anyone who registered a news organisation should be required to provide evidence of having had training.[10] This is one of the provisions of the mooted Press Law subdecree. Another group of journalists who to some extent are left out of training are those on the opposition newspapers. These papers are still fearful of political retaliation and they keep small staffs whose identities are usually not revealed. Some of the senior editors have attended training,

[9] Information from the KAF website, June 2000.

[10] Interview with Leng Sochea, Phnom Penh, January 2000.

however. Hayes felt that training in running a business would help managements organise their financial affairs.

The points made by d'Arcy and Mayne mentioned earlier on seem to be very relevant, and most are being addressed in the Cambodia situation. One problem has been in training government officials in the media. Courses so far have trained a few but not all and there has been no further interest. Certainly there is some potential, if not actual, overlap and competition among aid organisations. The KAF specifically mentioned this in its decision to move away from itself providing or providing for training. No one else thought this a problem, but it is clear for instance that IMMF and CCI work in the same area, and that CCI's one-year course stands as a rival to RUPP's, and both to the new degree course. This has not been a problem so far because demand has been high, but when the market is saturated and jobs become even more difficult to get than they are now it may become difficult to find students. Already there seem to be too many students for the jobs available, and certainly for the number of well-paid jobs in the field. Aid donors too seem to be competing for the same work. IMPACS has moved in where others have moved out and filled in gaps, but it presents some competition for the more established organisations. TAF and Bernard Krisher were also to some extent in competition over the RUPP course. In November 2000 IMPACS invited many of the main donors of news aid to a workshop. The discussion touched on many areas, and at least it was an opportunity for all to hear what others were doing though no specific cooperation was arranged. Not all major donors were present.

One of the concerns mentioned at the top of this paper was that aid tended to provide a quick fix for a crisis situation but to discourage moving towards independence. This is clearly a problem in Cambodia. CCI has received a new lease of life with five years of funding from UNESCO now assured, but that is not for ever. The TAF course may not find so many takers once the university course is well established, and the French are having difficulty with their own course because there are so few Khmers with good enough French language skills. The RUPP degree course needs a great deal more funding in order to be able to pay decent salaries to teaching staff, but may also have difficulty recruiting students of a high enough calibre for a degree, the general education system still being inadequate. All courses are still entirely, or almost entirely, dependent on foreign or international aid for their survival. Having started, it would be

unfair to pull out now. The main organisations are not mooting such a move, though their commitments are of necessity short-term at any given time.

Another criticism of aid was that it may benefit the donor as much as the recipient. This matter has been addressed to some extent in that funds are now being disbursed via a number of different routes, bringing many more aid organisations into the picture. This in turn makes the situation much more complex and confusing. It is often difficult to discern the extent of benefit to the donor, and even more difficult to decide whether such benefit is excessive. Perhaps in the sense that Cambodia will remain dependent on assistance for the foreseeable future, thus guaranteeing a place for aid providers, donors can rely on keeping their jobs. However, jobs for foreigners are very few, most being short-term, and more Cambodians are being trained to fill their plces. Few donors provide actual equipment: the Japanese are the only group who concentrate on this area, and Japan is a famous provider of the electronic and communications quipment they supply as aid. In theory, according to one Japanese aid worker, items can be bought from anywhere, but usually it does come from Japan. However, the aid to Cambodia is too small to be a major source of income for manufacturers, and the Japanese have been successful in turning over the television station to Cambodians.

However, the deeper issues remain problematic. The low level of development and the depth of poverty at least make news a luxury for most Cambodians, the market economy is very fragile, and progress towards liberal democracy is far from assured given the more restrictive situation in many of the other countries of the region. It is not clear if Cambodia will be able to develop and support a liberal press system. Televison news is already almost entirely in pro-government hands, and broadcasters from other parties have consistently been refused permission to operate since the 1997 coup. However, strident opposition newspapers continue to publish and be popular, if only in Phnom Penh (television signals can be received countrywide).

The broader question posed by Froehlich as well as by Hamilton & Krimsky of whether the 'Western' style of media is appropriate is extremely difficult, especially because senior Cambodian journalists have trained under three different regimes: authoritarian, communist and, more recently, liberal. The first Khmer newspaper only appeared in 1936, so there is no single, longstanding tradition of Khmerness in the news media. However, the important question is whether the 'Western' style is being imposed or whether Khmers themselves are being allowed to find their own direction. Western

trainers are few in number and mostly on brief visits or short-term courses, and they are usually well experienced in the region and in Camboda itself. They are hardly likely to alter the local market place or even cause resentment, though such effects were much in evidence during the UNTAC period when large numbers of highly paid UN personnel were in Phnom Penh. The use of regional expertise to help the news media is common, with trainers from Singapore, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the Philippines and so on, though they too tend to be Western trained and teach in the Western style. However, given the shakiness of the freedom of Cambodia's news media, there is little time for the experimentation recommended by Hamilton & Krimsky to find more appropriate ways of addressing this issue.

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DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BROADCASTING

IN POST-COMMUNIST ESTONIA: 1991-1996

A Paper Presented to the

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RUNNING HEAD: DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BROADCASTING

ABSTRACT

DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BROADCASTING IN POST-COMMUNIST ESTONIA: 1991-1996

The world in the last decade experienced the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism in Eastern Europe. This research utilized a case study and historical approach to examine the development of independent broadcast media in post-communist Estonia. The implications drawn from this study are that post-Communist broadcast system transformations are complex, particularly when the developing private broadcast system has to compete with the public system for audiences, advertising revenue, and programming.

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DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BROADCASTING IN POST-COMMUNIST ESTONIA: 1991-1996

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism in Eastern Europe left many of the resultant republics with remnants of the old communist broadcast media structure. The transition to democratic and marketplace institutions challenged these newly independent countries, specifically the restructuring of their state broadcast systems and at the same time providing an environment for the development of a private broadcast media. Encumbered with the vestiges of a state-managed economic, political, and social system, these countries experienced conflicts between the inherited institutions and the new developing organizations (Frentzel-Zagorska, 1993, p 177).

Among the many items of business confronting the post-Soviet and former Eastern European communist nations was determining the new role of the previous state operated broadcast media, while providing for the development of a parallel private broadcast media structure. It was particularly challenging for the former Soviet republics since their broadcast media system had been entangled with and controlled from Moscow. This environment provided an excellent opportunity to examine this transitional period of these newly independent nations. It was the first time in world history where a transition from communism to democracy was occurring and the outcome was unclear (Dalton, 1996, p 1).

Utilizing a case study approach, this research examined the initial years in the restructuring of Estonia's former state-owned and operated broadcast media and the concurrent development of a private broadcast system. Estonia gained its independence from the Soviet

Union in 1991. Resolute in reforming its political, economic and social system, Estonia pursed a course that sought to convert its former Soviet state controlled broadcast media to a public broadcasting system. In addition, Estonia saw the development and growth of private broadcasting. For this study, the primary guiding question was: What has been the overall effect of political and economic reforms, in terms of converting the state broadcasting into a public broadcasting system and the development of private broadcasting?

Literature Review

Review of Literature on Post-Communist Mass Media Transformations

Research on the political and economic changes of mass media systems in post-communist Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet republics involved various aspects of the transition itself, and the role of the mass media in these transformations. Early studies provided sketches of various media at the onset of democratization in 1991 (Hester, Reybold, and Conger. 1992) and snapshots of journalistic activities and the challenges in Eastern and Central Europe during democratization (Hester and Reybold, 1993). Oleg Manaev (1993) noted that despite democratization there had been no change in the Belarussian mass media's political and economic status. Based on the principle of social management, the mass media still remained dependent on government authorities.

Transformation in the mass media systems of post-Communist countries were examined through an analysis of East Germany's media system as unification and democratization occurred (Robinson, 1995). Mollison (1998) observed that improvements and dramatic increases in broadcast competition and freedom in Romania were attributed to the "development of alternative networks, access to Western-style programming and production techniques, the rise

of private, independent broadcasters, and the international exchange of broadcast content" (p 127). Barriers and limitations to changes in mass media systems were observed in studies of the Ukraine, Hungary and Germany (Pryliuk, 1993). In observations concerning media and change in Hungary, Kováts & Whiting (1995) concluded that creating democratic institutions were difficult when a people's history and socialization did not include the expectations and assumptions needed to accomplish it.

A policy analysis was conducted by Peter Humphreys (1994) in which he examined the development of German media policies since 1945, including the imposition, upon unification, of West Germany's pluralistic media policies and system on East Germany. While studying the process of change in a mass media system, Kleinwaechter (1997) examined the transition of broadcasting in Eastern and Central Europe. The mass media's role in political and economic development was studied in Romania and in a comparison of Brazilian and Eastern European mass media (Gross, 1996). Further, the role and effect of the mass media in forming public opinion in Romania was investigated, noting that the media's efforts produced mixed results (Gross, 1993).

A comparison was made of the mass media's role in the process of democratic transition in Brazil and Eastern Europe (Busato, 1993, Gross, 1996). Descriptions of media developments in the newly independent post-Communist countries were provided by Janice Overlock (1996), offering a brief description of the number and programming of radio and television stations and developing broadcast laws. Using Poland, Hungary, and Russia as his focus, John Downing (1996) examined the multiple roles of the media in the political, economic, and cultural transitions taking place between 1990 - 1995. While studying the rapid changes occurring in

Bulgaria's media structure, Ognianova (1996) discovered that the prescriptive concepts of authoritarian, libertarian, Communist, social responsibility and democratic socialist coexist. The media developments in post-communist Bulgaria were examined leading to the development of a descriptive transitional press concept

As one of the new post-Soviet nations, Estonia's transformation was significantly different from that of the Eastern European nations, because its political and economic structures were highly integrated with the Soviet Union. One major focus of this transformation concerned its broadcasting system.

Estonia

Estonia shares borders in the east with Russia and in the south with Latvia. It is situated on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea and bounded in the north by the Gulf of Finland. The northern most of the three Baltic Republics, Estonia is larger than Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, or Switzerland. By comparison, its is approximately the size of New Hampshire and Vermont combined (Cannon & Hough, 1995).

The Soviet Union occupied Estonia from June 1940 to August 1991, with a brief German occupation during WWII. Before this, Estonia had experienced over 20 years of independence from Czarist Russia. Under Soviet occupation, the Soviet Union controlled Estonia's mass media system and served the purposes of the Communist Party. During this period, Estonian mass media operated under the Lenin doctrine that the media must serve as collective propagandist, collective agitator, and collective organizer (McNair, 1991).

In August 1991, upon gaining its independence from the Soviet Union, Estonia immediately began changing the political and economic system imposed upon them by the

Soviets. Left with the remnants of a fifty-year communist political system and centrally planned economy, Estonia proceeded to restore its democracy with a new democratic constitution and institutions. The development of independent broadcast media began with protections provided for by the new constitution, ratified in June 1992, guaranteeing freedom of the speech and of the press. Section 45 of the Estonian Constitution secured the right to freely circulate ideas, opinions, persuasions and other information by word, print, picture and other means.

It was an environment that saw the transition from a state owned and operated broadcast media to a public broadcasting system, while experiencing the development of a private broadcast system.

Research Questions

Like many of the newly independent post-Soviet countries and post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, Estonia restructured and changed its political and economic systems. Unlike post-Communist Eastern Europe, Estonia had the burden of shedding the shackles of fifty years of Soviet occupation and control. An important part of this transformation was the democratization and privatization of its broadcast media system. The following research question guided this investigation:

- What has been the overall effect of political and economic reforms, in terms of converting the state broadcasting into a public broadcasting system and the development of private broadcasting?

Methodology

A case study approach was adopted since it focuses on understanding the dynamics existing within a single environment or setting (Arneson, 1993). This offered the advantage of

triangulating sources of information, including personal interviews, newspaper reports, documents, and independent reports (Feagin et al, 1991). Estonia was chosen as a case study since it was recognized as the most advanced of the newly democratic states of the post-Soviet countries (Barnard, 1997). The period under study was from independence in 1991 to 1996.

The method used to study Estonia's broadcast system was historical. Historical research furnished a "contextual foundation for identifying and understanding" (Arneson, 1993, p 163) issues and problems of the subject under examination. Primary sources were used such as government documents, private papers, and newspaper articles, in conjunction with interviews to provide a historical view of the problem or experience of a situation. Close examination and comparison of information gathered through primary sources contributed to establishing credibility and authenticity (Smith, 1981).

Purposeful sampling methods were used to select informants for in-depth interviews. For this study a snowball sampling method was used to recruit informants (Babbie, 1992). The nature of the research concerning Estonia's broadcast media system necessarily included accounting for all groups and interests that sought to influence its development. This included the following actors: government officials, members of parliament, former and current public and private broadcast owners and operators, broadcast interest groups or associations, and other interested parties such as journalists and consultants (Humphreys, 1994, p 6-7). (see appendix)

<u>Treatment of the Data</u>

Qualitative methods generate a tremendous amount of data. The information provides depth and detail on the research topic through direct quotation and description of situations,

events, and interactions. Analysis of the data collected in Estonia was enhanced by the constant review that occurred during the comparing and contrasting of information (Patton, 1987).

Results

Upon its independence, Estonia immediately sought to democratize its institutions and convert to a market economy. Hagi Shein (personal communication, December 1996), managing director of Eesti Televisioon, noted that one of the first things in this process was the transition of Eesti Televisioon and Eesti Raadio to public broadcasting, one that would serve the interest of Estonian citizens.

Eesti Public Broadcasting

Eesti Televisioon: Estonian Public Television

When independence was achieved, there were four state-operated television stations that Estonians could receive: Eesti Televisioon (ETV), Ostankino Televisions (KTV I), Russian Television (KTV II), and St Petersburg Television. The Ostankino (Central TV 1) and Russian (Central TV 2) television stations were national channels that originated out of Moscow. The St Petersburg channel was a local area station serving the region. All three of these Russian-language television stations shared transmitters with ETV in Estonia (M. Hunt, personal communication, December 1996). The coverage of these television stations in Estonia varied. Lindstro'm (1995) noted in his research that only 7500 people in Estonia could not receive any channel. Estonians living in Northern Estonia could receive Finnish TV, and Swedish TV was accessible to Estonian's living on the islands. Latvian TV reached Estonians in Southern Estonia.

The Ostankino, Russian, and St. Petersburg television stations continued to broadcast on transmitters in Estonia for the first two years of independence (TV companies compete for

Russian air-time, 1993). The majority of the audiences in Estonia watched Eesti Televisioon (ETV), while the majority of the non-Estonians watched Ostankino (Hoyer et al. (1993). By May 1993, the Russian and St Petersburg television stations had discontinued transmitting in Estonia due to a lack of funds for transmission charges (TV Companies Compete for Russian Air-Time, 1993). Ostankino TV also discontinued broadcasting in Estonia in early 1994 because of the transmitter costs involved (Ostankino TV Channel Axed, 1994; 25 million rubles or $23,000 USD a month, Källu, 1993).

Eesti Televisioon (ETV) was launched in 1955 (Hoyer et al., 1993). At independence, Eesti Televisioon[1] and Eesti Raadio were operated as separate entities (H. Shein, personal communication, December 1996). Peeter Sookruus (personal communication, December 1996), managing director of Eesti Raadio, noted that state television and state radio had existed together until 1989 when they were separated. The number employed by Eesti Televisioon when the country gained its independence was more than 1,000 (Casperson, 1997). The station broadcast primarily in the Estonian language and covered almost the entire country . This contrasted with the limited coverage of the private commercial television stations that appeared later.

Subsidized primarily by the state during Soviet occupation, commercial advertising was introduced on the station during the 1970's. Advertising at that time came from "wealthy state enterprises or different cultural events. The TV audience especially laughed at the poor quality and low-production levels of these commercials. Income was relatively small and constituted, even in 1990, only around 2 percent of the total budget" (Hunt, personal communication,

[1] To prevent confusion, from this point Estonian government owned television will be referred to as public television. The previous reference of State Television refers to the Soviet approach to broadcasting where the broadcast media were state owned and operated, serving as a tool to promote and preserve the interest of the state. Estonian government owned radio will be referred to as public radio. Generally public television and public radio

December 1996). Eesti Televisioon continued to sell advertising after independence, which helped to provide revenue, albeit small at first, at a time when government resources were very limited (Hunt, personal communication, December 1996). However, as Estonia's market economy developed and grew, advertising revenues increased significantly each year and by 1996 it constituted almost 34% of Eesti Televisioon's revenues (Eesti Televisioon on Glance, 1996). Advertising on both public television and public radio caused considerable tension between public and private broadcasters (R. Lang, personal communication, November 1996). This issue was significant during the drafting of Estonia's Broadcast Law.

During the early period of independence, the number of employees of Eesti Televisioon decreased from over 1000 to about 640 people (H. Shein, personal communication, December 1996). Part of the decrease occurred, in part, to cut costs and increase productivity during a time when the Estonian government's financial resources were very limited. Another aspect of the decrease in personnel at Eesti Televisioon, and also Eesti Raadio, was the attrition due to employees leaving for better paying jobs in private broadcasting. Nele Laanejare (personal communication, November 1996), Chief-Editor of Estonia's newest television station , TV1 , observed that she and others were approached by private broadcasters and offered better wages.

Eesti Raadio: Estonian Public Radio

State radio consisted of three channels at the time of independence. Eesti Raadio had been established after German occupation in 1944 (E. Kokkota, personal communication, May 1998). The second Estonian radio station, Vikerraadio (Rainbow Radio) began broadcasting news and music in 1967 (Hoyer et al, 1993). The third Estonian radio station, Stereoraadio began broadcasting in 1986. All three stations at the time of independence were broadcasting primarily

serve the public's interest rather than the state.

in Estonian, although Eesti Raadio had broadcast some Russian language news and programs (E. Kokkota, personal communication, May 1998).

Eesti Raadio at the time of independence had more than 800 employees.[2] As with Eesti Televisioon, Eesti Raadio had commercials on the stations since the 1970s (Hunt, personal communication, December 1996). In addition, Eesti Raadio also rented transmitters from Eesti Telekom. Herkki Haldre (personal communication, December 1996) was appointed by the Riigikogu in 1992 as managing director of Eesti Raadio. With Estonia's economy in poor shape, his idea to the Riigikogu was for Estonian public radio to create and develop a new commercial channel, Raadio 2. Once it was successfully operating, according to Haldre's plan, this radio station would be sold off, generating badly needed revenue for renovating the public radio archives and Estonia's antiquated transmitter system. *The Baltic Independent* noted that

> Mr. Haldre believes that R2 will eventually help to finance the building of a network of Western-style transmitters to replace the Russian ultra short transmitters which are used at the moment; the 100 million kroons needed for the project will come, it is hoped from the privatization of R2 once it has built up a large enough audience. (Barne, 1993)

Raadio 2 began broadcasting in May 1993. At the time Haldre (personal communication, December 1996) used the establishment of commercial public Raadio 2 as an opportunity to clear commercials off the other two public radio stations, distinguishing them as public compared to the new commercial public station. The new Raadio 2 was targeted at young people with pop and rock music, talk shows, and news programming.

[2] Estonian state radio refers to the organization that operated the three stations at independence, Eesti Raadio, Vikeraadio, and Stereoraadio. After May 1993, the Estonian public stations were Vikeraadio, Klassikaraadio, Raadio 2 and Raadio 4. Stereoraadio had merged and become Klassikaraadio. Eesti Raadio had merged with Vikeraadio. Both Raadio 2 and Raadio 4 started broadcasting in May 1993.

As managing director of Estonian public radio, Haldre (personal communication, December 1996) also established in May 1993, Raadio 4, a Russian language station. Before that there had been only about two hours of Russian language programming on the stations. Because of the large Russian minority population in Estonia, he felt it necessary to provide a Russian language station geared to this population. Haldre stated that "what surprised me most was that I was accused later by a commission of Parliament of wasting tax payers' money" on Raadio 4. However, since Estonia's population was composed of 30% Russians he felt that "you had to serve them with programming."

The primary goal of Raadio 4 was to "give information and news about changes and activities in Estonian society and cultural life" (Eesti Raadio, 1996). It was a 24-hour a day channel serving the Russian-speaking population with programs, also for Byelorussian, Ukrainian, and Armenian minorities. Raadio 4 also carried advertising as a means to finance its operations.

Estonian public radio's other two stations were the original Vikerraadio and Klassikaraadio. Vikerraadio's (Rainbow) programming represented traditional public broadcasting fare, including literary adaptations and radio drama, thematic discussions, children's programs and music. Every hour, Vikerraadio had newscasts, with longer news programs broadcast four times a day. The station broadcast 19.5 hours a day with 37% of the population listening daily (Eesti Radio, 1996).

Klassikaraadio (classical radio) broadcast for 9 hours a day with a daily listenership of 1.3%. The channel programed classical music and broadcast live concerts, operas, and other musical events for listeners. All four channels covered the whole country. In addition to its four

channels, Eesti Raadio had a "commitment to record, produce, preserve, and distribute Estonian music and other recordings of cultural and historical value" (Eesti Radio, 1996). Eesti Raadio had a considerable archive of recorded programs, concerts, and music dating back to just after WWII. Unfortunately, bombing destroyed materials recorded before the war. At the time of this study, Eesti Raadio was in the process of dubbing onto compact disc materials from its archives to help preserve an important part of Estonian culture (I. Hausmann, personal communication, December 1996).

As with television, tensions concerning advertising also occurred between Eesti Raadio and the new private commercial radio broadcasters, especially with the development of Raadio 2. Private broadcasters felt that they should not have to compete with public broadcasting for advertising dollars. In 1992, they organized to form the Eesti Ringhaalinguites Liit (Association of Estonian Broadcasters [AEB]), representing the interests of private broadcasters before government and non-government organizations (Radio in Estonia Shows Endurance, 1997). In essence, according to AEB Managing Director Urmas Loit (personal communication, November 1996), " public broadcasters have started to act like a private broadcaster" in that they competed for advertising dollars and broadcast entertainment programming, yet were subsidized by the state. What caused further irritation was the consideration that tax dollars paid by private broadcasters went to help subsidize public broadcasting with which they competed for advertising dollars (R. Lang, personal communication, November 1996).

The Riigikogu's Culture Commission sought to resolve the frictions between the public and private radio broadcasters by investigating the issues concerning advertising. The particular issue under investigation was that Estonian public radio, particular Raadio 2, was using "its

subsidized status to offer advertising to audiences and at prices with which local commercial stations cannot compete" (Barne, 1993). The commission issued regulations in June 1993 that were in effect until a law on mass media was enacted by The Riigikogu. The regulations issued by the Culture Commission limited the content of programming, available airtime, and format of the advertisements aired on Raadio 2 (Barne, 1993).

The commission cut the permissible commercial airtime on Raadio 2 from 16% down to 5%. Originally the commission had set the limit at 7%, but Sulev Alajõe, Chairman of the Culture Commission indicated that it was changed to 5% "in order to make it easier for [private] local stations to survive" (Barnes, 1993). Rein Lang, owner of AS Trio Ltd., found the action meaningless since it set the percentage for total airtime and not for each hour. Lang observed "that since no one would want to advertise during the night, state radio can still use 14 percent of prime time for advertisements" (Barnes, 1993). He also felt the commission should have regulated the rates that Eesti Raadio charged for commercials. The advertising issue continued to cause friction while the broadcast law was drafted and after its enactment. As of 1996, 80% of Estonian public radio's budget came from state subsidies, while advertising income from Raadio 2 and Raadio 4 made up the other 20% (P. Sookruus, personal communication, December 1996).

In addition to the advertising issues, Estonian public radio also had to rent its transmitters and, in the process, experienced a number of increases in fees from Eesti Telekom (M. Hunt, personal communication, December 1996). This contrasted with private radio broadcasters who, for the most part, owned their own transmitters. Haldre noted that "Telekom's transmission charges have rocketed since Parliament approved Eesti Raadio's annual budget last spring" (Drew, 1993). According to Peeter Sookruus (personal communication, December 1996)

managing director of Eesti Raadio, fees for transmitters made-up almost 40% of the budget. At that time, Eesti Raadio was looking at cutbacks in its programming and other services. In 1996, Eesti Telekom raised its fees for transmission 18.5% (Transmitting Rates to Raised, 1997). Thus, in addition to the tensions with private broadcasters, Eesti Raadio was faced with tension with government ministries over the rising costs of transmission fees.

By the end of 1996, Eesti Raadio had grown to four national radio stations. During the period after independence, Eesti Raadio had added Raadio 2, a popular music station targeted at young audiences, and Raadio 4, a Russian-language radio station with a mixture of music, news, and information programming. Eesti Raadio stations easily dominated local private radio broadcasters with a combined weekly listenership of 63% compared to all local private radio's 27% (Baltic Media Book, 1996).[3] Subsidized by the government, Eesti Raadio supplemented its budget through advertising revenues from Raadio 2 and Raadio 4. The result was that private broadcasters were indignant about a public radio broadcasting system that competed with them for listeners and advertising dollars.

Estonian Private Broadcasting: Early Development, Licensing and Regulation

After Estonia gained its independence, there were no established laws to guide it in issuing and regulating licenses to radio and television stations. Until the 1994 Broadcast Law, the Ministry of Culture and Education[4] oversaw broadcasting in Estonia via government acts. The process for receiving a license was two-fold. A person desiring a radio or television station had to apply for a frequency from the Ministry of Transport and Communication and then a broadcast license from the Ministry of Culture and Education (M. Laur, personal

[3] Ten percent of weekly radio listening occurred with stations outside Estonia.
[4] The Ministry of Culture and Education was a combined ministry under the Mart Laar government. In 1995, Prime

communication, November 1996). Haldre (personal communication, December 1996) noted that to obtain a broadcast license from the Ministry of Culture and Education, a prospective licensee had to provide information on intended programming, other proposed activities, and investment and control of the proposed station. The process for obtaining a broadcast license remained the same after enactment of the 1994 Broadcast Law.

According to Vello Lään (personal communication, May 1998), the process for approving Raadio Tartu, the first local commercial station to go on-the-air after independence, began in 1990 while Estonia was still under the control of the Soviet Union. This station, located in a university city 190 km from Tallinn, was founded and originally supported by the city of Tartu, the County Council, and Eesti Raadio (V. Lään, personal communication, May 1998). Due to the cost of operating this station, it was eventually privatized. Other community stations popped up in various regions, but eventually they either were privatized or went off-the-air (Radio in Estonia Shows Endurance, 1997).

The first 'private' radio commercial license was issued to Raadio KUKU. As the first independent private radio station, Raadio KUKU began airing in Tallinn in March 1992, six months after Estonia gained its independence. Owned by three Estonians who formed the company, AS Trio Ltd., the station was dependent on advertising dollars. Its programming consisted of popular Western music and talk (Lang, personal communication, November 1996). Raadio KUKU was considered to have an ACE format (Adult Contemporary European) and was known for its slogan, 'Radio for the thinking person.' The station also broadcast commentary, news, and news analysis. The owners of Raadio KUKU, AS Trio Ltd., networked the station with others they owned in Tartu, Viljandi, and Paide. These stations carried Raadio KUKU's

Minister Tiit Vahi separated the ministry into two, Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Education.

programming for a majority of the broadcast day and inserted only one or two hours of local programs (Radio in Estonia Shows Endurance, 1997).

Seven months after Raadio KUKU began broadcasting, AS Trio Ltd. in November 1992, also developed and put on-the-air Raadio Tallinn, now Raadio 100, a private commercial Russian language radio station. The station was made possible with a grant from the Open Estonia Foundation, funded by the Soros Foundation. Raadio 100 was located in Tallinn and reached 50 kilometers outside the city. It broadcast 24 hours a day with live daytime programming and music by satellite at night. Raadio 100 was described as a mainstream station with a commitment to public service that included offering "a range of cultural programmes from fairytales for children through special classic and jazz music hours" (Raadio 100, 1996). Interestingly, Raadio 100 (1996) indicated that

> Information service in Estonia are [sic] largely fractured along ethnic and political lines. Radio 100 is an expedition. We are independent of state or political control. We strive to avoid taking an editorial position in our main task of providing information to the Russian-speaking community. Political rivals from all sections of society meet for live debates in our studios.

Raadio 100 was joined by a sister station in Narva in September 1995 operating on the same frequency, 100. Narva is located in Northeastern Estonia, at its border with Russia. The Narva station aired the Tallinn Raadio 100's programming plus some local production.

Radio stations have appeared and disappeared during the first five years of independence. Early development of Estonia's market economy occurred in its major cities, principally Tallinn in northern Estonia, and to a lesser degree Tartu. The rural areas and smaller cities, particularly

in southern Estonia, lagged in the development of a market economy. Thus, limited advertising revenues in these areas made it difficult for local radio stations to survive financially.

Some stations, such as Raadio KUKU, united to form networks across the country to increase reach and advertising potential. Three large music stations created "nation-wide networks using regional licenses . . . Raadio UUNO [owned by AS Trio Ltd.], B3 [owned by AS Is-Music Studio], and Raadio Love [owned by Woodlinger International]" (Radio in Estonia Shows Endurance, 1997).

Television licenses began to be issued when the transmitters and frequencies broadcasting the Russian and St Petersburg stations became available. Both stations had ceased their broadcasts in Estonia due to the costs of Eesti Telekom transmission fees. In the spring of 1993, nine television companies bid for the two channels that were soon to be available. Since the rules for dispersing the channels were not clear, seven companies, all domestically financed, organized against the other two companies, which were foreign financed. They demanded that the decision concerning the channels not be made until after a broadcast law was adopted (TV Companies Compete for Russian Air-Time, 1993). The Estonian broadcasters indicated that "they are guarding the interests of viewers against the inflow of low-grade American programmes" (TV Companies Compete for Russian Air-Time, 1993, p 3) expected to be brought in by foreign investment.

Ignoring the demands of Estonian broadcasters, the ministry granted the commercial television licenses in May 1993. However, these licenses were only valid until the adoption of a broadcast law, but not beyond December 31, 1993. However, since no law was enacted by December, the licenses were extended until there was a broadcast law. At that time, commercial

television channels would have to resubmit plans on programming, investment, and proposed activities to obtain a new license (Trummel, 1993).

Along with the licensing, the Ministry of Culture and Education responded to domestic broadcast concerns with several regulations to guard against the possibility of all day broadcasting of low-quality Western programming. The regulations were in effect until a broadcast law was enacted. "The amount of foreign produced programmes must not exceed 30 percent, and 10 percent of all programming must be bought from local film producers. All programming ventures must at least be 51 percent owned by an Estonian enterprise" (Källu, 1993, p B7). According to then Minister of Culture and Education Paul-Eerik Rummo, the ownership provision was "a move at maintaining control over foreign capital in the Estonian media" (p B7).

Actually, the licenses for the first private commercial television stations went to three television companies, two of which shared the same transmission system. Licenses were granted in May 1993 to RTV (Estonian Commercial Television), EVTV (Estonian Video and Swedish Kinnevik group), and Kanal Kaks (AS Taska) (Trummel, 1993). All three companies were Estonian owned, but the latter two included foreign stockholders and or financing. Under the temporary licenses granted these companies, RTV and EVTV shared the same frequency operating on 20 transmitters with access to over 90% of the population. The transmission system and frequency assigned to Kanal Kaks involved five transmitters which could only be received in Northern Estonia, reaching about 60% of the country's population (Tammerk, 1994).

The first private television broadcasts did not actually occur until July 31, 1993 when RTV went on-the-air and August 1 when EVTV started its broadcasts. RTV and EVTV

broadcast programming at different times, on the same frequency, using the same transmitters rented from state owned Eesti Telekom. RTV aired programming on Saturday and Sunday mornings, filling the time with family oriented shows. EVTV broadcast seven nights a week from 8pm to 11pm airing soap operas, talk shows, feature films, and news. Western shows on EVTV included *E-Street, Miami Vice, Rescue 911,* and *Equalizer* (Oll, 1993).

Kanal Kaks was launched on October 1, 1993 by Ilmar Taska, an Estonian born Hollywood producer (Herbert, 1994). At first the station only had enough staff and programs to broadcast on the weekends. However, by January 1994, Kanal Kaks expanded its broadcasts to every day (Trummel, 1994). A major portion of Kanal Kaks broadcasts of three and a half hours of nightly programming were dominated by films, many of which were European and American movies. In addition, *The Baltic Independent* noted that "Taska has enchanted viewers by resurrecting Estonian films that had not been shown for years" (Herbert, 1994, p 8).

One interesting snag for Kanal Kaks came a few months after it had begun its broadcast when it decided to discontinue the Russian dubbed and Estonian subtitled soap opera *Santa Barbara*. Kanal Kaks northern coverage area at the time included the region where the majority of Estonia's Russian minorities resided. The station was besieged with letters and calls from disgruntled viewers. Taska recounted that the demand was so great that "some Russians even told us that they would go collecting money themselves to have it translated" (Herbert, 1994, p 8). The Russian voice-over, *Santa Barbara,* was brought back within a short period of time and was still on-the-air in 1996.

Conclusion

The challenges confronting Estonia epitomize those that confront post-Communist nations seeking to democratize their broadcast media systems. The following conclusions can be drawn from this study's findings.

The political and economic changes of a Communist state-owned and operated broadcast system result in short-term solutions with long-term consequences.

The results of this historical study reveal the complexities involved in changing post-Communist broadcast media systems. In renovating the broadcasting infrastructure there is the issue of deciding what to do with the state owned and operated broadcast stations and transmitting facilities. The transformation of state broadcast systems into public broadcast media is complicated by the lack of a developed private broadcasting structure to meet the immediate needs of the population. Without established private broadcast media, the previous state-owned, now public broadcasting, system may choose to offer entertainment programming, in addition to educational and cultural material, in order to serve the needs of viewers. Also, since government financial resources are limited during this early period, these public stations are permitted to supplement their budgets with advertising revenues.

The problem with this arrangement is that it is difficult to change once it is established. Public broadcasting stations would find it hard to give up their favored position with audiences and the revenues produced by advertising. In addition, since most public broadcasters are part of the original state broadcast system, they have established influential positions and know where to lobby the parliament and government to maintain the status quo, especially in the enactment of broadcast legislation.

In transforming state broadcast systems into public broadcast media, post-Communist countries need clearly to determine and define their new role in society. Policymakers in post-Communist countries also need to understand the consequences of supplementing public broadcasting government subsidies with commercial advertising. While these short term solutions address immediate needs for viewers in society and public broadcasters, it creates long-term problems in the development and growth of independent private broadcast media.

Unlike public broadcasters, private broadcasters in post-Communist countries do not have an established infrastructure to facilitate their development. They must build studios and transmission systems, acquire programming, and staff their stations. Unfortunately, this takes money that private broadcasters lack. They therefore rely on foreign investment or partners to assist them. In addition, the lack of a mature market economy is a further complication since there are little advertising dollars available to support private broadcasting stations. What little money there is, private broadcasters fiercely compete with others to acquire. Also, private broadcasters lack the skills used to develop advertising revenue by teaching budding businesses how to market by advertising in this new economy.

On top of all this, the growth of private broadcasting is inhibited by competition from an established public broadcasting system. The established public broadcasting system competes with developing private broadcast media for audiences and advertising dollars. However, public broadcasters compete unfairly since they benefit from an established infrastructure and audience and from government subsidies. Due to this arrangement the development and growth of an independent private broadcast media is inhibited and suffers. Public broadcasting easily dominates the private sector in resources and audiences.

The implication that can be drawn from this study is that post-Communist broadcast system transformations are complex, especially considering the formidable challenges confronting the country as it revamps both its political and economic system. It is extremely difficult for countries that have scarce resources to implement major change efforts. Policy makers are caught in a very difficult and awkward position of dealing with the present while looking to the long-term

Recommendations For Future Research

Historical research should be conducted on other post-Communist broadcast systems, in order to compare and contrast their development. Research on the other Baltic States, Latvia and Lithuania, especially would be relevant since these countries shared the same fifty-year experience of Soviet occupation. It would help to contrast how each Baltic State approached the transformation of their broadcast media and to compare their developments. In addition, research on the other Baltic States could also serve to contrast each country's political and cultural differences, and what influences these had on the reform and development of their respective broadcast systems.

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Appendix

Participants Interviewed For This Study

Eelmaa, Epp. Operations Manager, Kanal Kaks (Channel 2 TV). Interviewed December 1996.

Hausmann, Ilona. Eesti Raadio, International Relations Department. Interviewed December 1996.

Haldre, Herkki. Advisor, Hanasbank. Radio consultant. Past Director of Eesti Raadio. Interviewed December 1996.

Holmberg, Simon. Deputy Director, Baltic Media Centre. Interviewed December 1996. Telephone interview May 1998.

Hunt, Margus. Marketing Director, Eesti Telekom (Estonian Telephone Company Limited). Interviewed November and December 1996.

Jõesaar, Andres. Vice-President, TV3. Interviewed December 1996.

Kokkota, Evelin. Information Assistant, United States Information Service, American Embassy, Tallinn, Estonia. Interviewed November 1996.

Laanejare, Nele. Chief Editor at new television station TV1. Interviewed November 1996.

Lään, Vello. Director, Raadio Tartu. Past Director of Estonian State Radio. Telephone Interview. May 1998.

Lang, Rein. President and General Manager, AS Trio Ltd. Raadio Kuku. Interviewed November 1996.

Laur, Marju. Vice Head Department of Post and Telecommunications, Ministry of Transport and Communications. Past Deputy Ministry of Culture. Interviewed November and December 1996.

Laurinstin, Marju.. Professor, Tartu University. Interviewed December 1996.

Loit, Urmas. Managing Director, Eesti Ringhaalingute Liit (Association of Estonian Broadcasters). Interviewed November 1996.

Middleton, Victoria. Public Affairs Officer, United States Information Service, American Embassy, Tallinn, Estonia. Interviewed November 1996.

Palts, Tõnis. CEO and Chairman, AS Levicom. Interviewed December 1996.

Rebané, Raul. Deputy Director General, Editor-in-Chief, Eesti Televisioon. Interviewed December 1996.

Ricci, Raymond. Director, Love Raadio. Interviewed November and December 1996.

Rummo, Paul-Eerik. Member of Parliament. Chair Broadcast Council. Past Minister of Culture. Interviewed December 1996.

Shein, Hagi. Director General, Eesti Televisioon. Interviewed November and December 1996.

Sinisalu, Hando. General Manager, *Eesti Päevaleht*. Radio consultant. Interviewed November and December 1996.

Sookruus, Peeter. Director General, Eesti Raadio. Interviewed December 1996.

Tammerk, Tarmu. Editor-at-Large, *The Baltic Times,* (formerly *The Baltic Independent*). Managing Director, Eesti Ajalehtede Liit (Estonian Newspaper Association). Interviewed December 1996.

Taska, Ilmar. Chairman, Kanal Kaks (Channel 2 TV). Interviewed December 1996.

Veidemann, Rein. Advisor for Literature and Media. Past Member of Parliament. Past Chair of Broadcast Council. Interviewed December 1996.

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REVEALING AND REPENTING SOUTH KOREA'S VIETNAM MASSACRE: A FRAME ANALYSIS OF A KOREAN NEWS WEEKLY'S ENGAGEMENT IN PUBLIC DELIBERATION.

A paper submitted to International Communication Division at the 2001 AEJMC conference

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- Abstract -

A Korean weekly *Hankyoreh21* ran an apology campaign after it uncovered South Korean army's civilian killings in Vietnam War. This paper compares between the anti-campaign public discourse and the weekly's media discourse through frame analysis. Based on a distinction between a core theme and criterion sub-themes, I identified the opposition between core themes of *dishonored veterans* and *victims' eyes*. Specifically, a set of duels between the sub-themes anchored in specific value criteria were found. Further considerations to the symbolic resources employed and their implications are given.

Revealing and Repenting South Korea's Vietnam Massacre: A frame analysis of a Korean news weekly's engagement in public deliberation.

Nam-Doo Kim (Journalism)

1. Introduction

This is a case study illuminating the activities of *Hankyoreh 21*, a progressive Korean news weekly magazine, which uncovered long-hidden atrocities by the Korean military during the Vietnam War and ran a one-year-long fundraising campaign in the name of "repentance." Interesting in this case is that the Korean media not only delivered some shocking news stories but also engaged in public deliberations by striking upon people's historically and culturally ingrained sense of what is right and moral.

In early May 1999, *Hanykyoreh 21* published a news story that revealed the killings of civilians by the Korean military during the Vietnam War. Soo-Jung Koo, a woman correspondent in Ho Chi Minh City, covered the alleged war crimes issue. About two months later, this magazine featured follow-up stories and launched a campaign entitled "Donate to Repent," which was intended to make an apology for Koreans' wrongdoings and to build medical facilities in a Vietnamese rural area hardest-hit by Korean troops in the war. With one exception of *Hankyoreh Daily* which backed its sister weekly's editorial line, few Korean media paid attention to the issue. Dozens of civic groups, however, espoused the campaign and joined several activities to help Vietnamese villagers still in a bad situation.

This campaign did not draw only laudatory remarks from the Korean people. On the contrary, because the news stories were overwhelmingly shocking to them, *Hankyoreh21* witnessed a series of heated disputes over the war crimes issue. While the mainstream

media in Korea shunned covering the hot-potato issue, its inflammable nature was most obvious in wrangles by an online populace whose concern was posted on many electronic bulletin boards. A host of opponents, despite the existence of the supporters for the campaign, loudly voiced their displeasure with Koo and *Hankyoreh21* for several reasons that they thought serious.

This problem was partly incurred by the magazine's unusual "activeness," somewhat against the general trend of modern journalism, represented as objectivity and balancing, by which news media distance themselves from muddy world affairs and hold a detached position without engagement in political debates (Schudson, 1996). In contrast, the Korean weekly which volunteered as a "moral engager" during the campaign confronted a situation where it was urgent for the campaigners to advance some compelling argument in front of the doubting audiences, some of which were unfriendly to them.

Given all of these, this study is concerned with the analysis of the hostile public responses and the Korean media's discourse strategy. First, what types of public discourse were getting in the way of the campaign's success, or, making it difficult for Korean audiences to embrace the cause of the campaign? And second, what types of media discourse did the campaigners produce to overcome those difficulties? Prior to dealing with these questions, I will give a more detailed background of Koo's initial coverage of the Vietnam massacre and *Hankyoreh21*'s subsequent activities.

2. The initial uncovering of South Korea's dark legacy in Vietnam

The United States was not the sole foreign country that sent military forces to the front lines during the Vietnam War; South Korea also did. The Korean government

wholeheartedly supported U.S.-backed South Vietnam, afraid that Washington might withdraw American troops stationed in South Korea. From 1964 through 1971, Korea dispatched a total of 312,853 combat personnel to the Vietnamese battlefield. By the end of the war in January 1973, 4960 Korean soldiers had been killed and roughly 100,000 combatants were injured (Koo, September 2, 1999a).

The deaths and wounds created by the war were far more serious for the Vietnamese people. The official war record document says that the "valiant" Korean warriors killed as many as 41,450 enemy soldiers, called the "Viet Cong." The unbalanced death toll figures between the two countries may give a hint at some of the atrocities committed by the "Daihans," the nickname for Korean soldiers. What they really did there, however, has been unheard for a long time, unlike the widely known Mai Lai Massacre, where 504 Vietnamese villagers were killed at the command of a U.S. first lieutenant.

On May 6, 1999, *Hanykyoreh 21* published a news story titled "Terrifying Korean Soldiers," where the author, Koo, cited the War Crimes Report, published by the Vietnamese Politburo, on the atrocities of the Korean army in the Vietnam War. The document reported numerous cases of Daihans' brutal civilian killings that took place mostly in the central area of Vietnam, which was considered a Viet Cong-dominated area. To root out the nests of Viet Cong, according to the report, Korean troops captured rural villages, summarily convicted the villagers, and destroyed whole communities.

About four months later, on September 2, 1999, the news magazine featured several Vietnam massacre stories under the cover title of "The Secret Tragedy of Vietnam." This time, correspondent Koo visited many of the areas where the Korean army was stationed during the war. She confirmed the War Crimes Report by interviewing about 100

Vietnamese survivors who gave their horror stories. For instance, a man who had left fingers and right toes injured by gun-fire, looked for his wife only to find her naked body, abandoned after she was gang-raped and shot dead by Korean soldiers. A boy had to hide in an underground tunnel all night, holding his breath and listening to the dying cries of his mother, her legs cur off by a bomb in front of the tunnel entrance. A father witnessed his seven year-old and three year-old children blown into pieces by a hand grenade and tearfully buried their torn remains. Later Koo even argued that there were some 80 cases of mass killings by Koreans, with the total death toll being up to 9,000 (March 9, 2000).

Along with the uncovering of the Koreans' alleged atrocities, *Hankyoreh21* launched a campaign named "Donate to Repent" and ran a series of campaign articles for a year. These included follow-up Vietnamese victim testimonies, Vietnamese local responses to the Koreans' repentance movement, Korean veterans' responses, several veterans' confessions about the dark past, dozens of Korean NGOs' assistance activities, several intellectuals' endorsement opinions, many readers' letters, and relays of foreign media's oversea coverage of the massacre issue, etc.

The campaign, however, enraged many Korean veterans claming that the magazine sullied the reputation of soldiers who sacrificed their lives for the country. On June 27, 2000, about 2,400 veterans joined a protest rally in front of the Seoul office of *Hankyoreh Daily* and *Hankyoreh21*. Some of protestors raided the office, burned heaps of papers, smashed windows, and set fire to cars (*Hankyoreh Daily*, 2000, June 28). The veterans' protest served as a moment for the campaign issue to be more widely known to the Korean public. Many Korean media reported the veterans' act of violence, although their

coverage was largely, following Iyengar's (1991) term, "episodic." Many online forums sizzled talking about the war crime issue for a while (*Hankyoreh21*, 2000a, September 9).

3. Data collecting and methodology

During the campaign there arose, sometimes emotion-charged, disagreements with the way the issue was covered by the campaigners. However, because few other media in Korea covered this issue, the crisscrossed wrangling remained largely "underground." To identify some of the polemic in documented forms, I mainly relied on three resources: (1) *Hankyoreh 21*'s published articles during the campaign, (2) some online messages, which were posted on an electronic bulletin board provided by a computer mediated communication (CMC) company in Korea, and, additionally, (3) the coverage of the issue by major overseas news media, such as *the Associated Press* and *Reuters*, which came out after Koo's initial coverage.

At first, *Hankyoreh 21* offered the most useful material not only for the analysis of its own position but also for that of opponents' views; the magazine quoted several types of counterarguments to refute them in its argumentative discourse. I collected 155 web-based news articles from *Hankyoreh21*'s website (www.hani.co.kr/h21) during a period ranging from May 16, 1999, to September 6, 2000. The first date matches the publication date of the 256th issue of the magazine, when the first Vietnamese victims' story was published. The last date is when the news weekly announced the ending of the campaign in its 325th issue. Since the campaign officially began on October 28, 1999 (280th issue), this data includes 10 more articles published prior to the beginning day. The number largely matches the number of actual articles in print version with an exception: the readers' letters to the editor were consolidated issue by issue.

Second, as aforementioned, online forums offered a barometer of the ordinary citizens' concerns about the sensitive issue, though most of them seemed to come from younger members rather the average Korean citizens. Korea witnessed an exponential growth of her CMC industry in the late 1990s (Lee, 2000). Until the mid-1990s, Korean telecommunication companies provided only textual online service based on their own closed networks. Three major CMC companies, *Hitel*, *Chollian*, and *Nownuri* have been since then providing quite a number of information services syndicated by news media, publishers, merchants, businesses, political parties, NGOs, etc., as well as offering bulletin boards and chat rooms for numerous online users and user groups. Most online users now have access to the textual online service and the Internet both. The number of the Internet users reached 14 million, approximating a third of the whole population in South Korea, as of June in 2000 (National Computerization Agency, 2000). Given this, the presence of "netizens" becomes increasingly a significant phenomenon in Korea.

For data gathering, I chose an electronic bulletin board named *Plaza*, which is provided by *Nownuri* (www.nownuri.net), a major textual online and Internet service company in Korea. Of many *Nownuri* bulletin boards, *Plaza* is regarded by users as a general public forum. Particularly, the forum board allows any kind of topics and opinions to be posted by and accessible to Internet users, even non-member users. Given the general availability of *Plaza*, I decided to collect online material from this bulletin board. Although far from being a representative sample of "the Net opinion," this data was expected to show typical responses of the Korean public concerned with the issue.

Plaza keeps posted messages for one year and offers some search functions using keywords in a title, member identity, posted date, etc. To determine the range of

messages relevant to the analysis, I conducted ten sessions of Korean keyword searches – equivalent to the English words "Vietnam," "massacre," "civilian killing," "Korean army," "war," "mercenary," "defoliant," and "*Hankyoreh*." In Korean, those were *bet-nam* and *wol-nam* (Vietnam), *hak-sal* (massacre), *yang-min* (civilian, largely used in the context of civilian killing), *han-guk-gun* and *kuk-gun* (Korean army), *chon-jaeng* (war), *yong-byong* (mercenary), *ko-yop-je* (defoliant), and *han-kyo-reh* (a part of *Hankyoreh21*). Then I excluded the messages with no explicit comment on the issue itself. The final number of messages amounted to 179.

For data analysis, I relied upon a concept of *frame*. Frame is, as Mabry (in press) noted, indeed a complex concept that functions as a root metaphor about the symbolic representation of social reality. The concept has been applied to human communications and mass communications studies both, creating scattered conceptualizations (Entman, 1993). When it comes to the political communication playground, Nelson and Willey (in press) lists major categories of frames: collective action frames, decision frames, news frames, and issue frames. Whereas the credit for collective action frames largely belongs to sociologists, especially constructionist social movement theorists such as Gamson (1992) and Snow and Benford (1988), decision frames represent a very different species coming from cognitive psychological research (for example, Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). News frames and issue frames are other species relevant to media frame studies. According to Nilson & Willey, the news frames can structure nearly every kind of stories, while issue frames are, though not content-specific, and usually originate from the sources outside the media. General news frames include the "strategic" or "game" frame for campaign coverage (Patterson, 1993) and the "episodic" versus "thematic" frames for

social issue coverage (Iyengar, 1991). The issue frame approach can be applied to any type of communication text, although much of the issue frame studies concerns the analysis of media text.

The conceptualization of frame here begins with Pan and Kosicki's idea (1993) that every news story has a "theme," which functions as the central organizing idea. According to them, a theme is "an idea that connects different semantic elements of a story into a coherent whole" (p.59). Thus a frame can be thought to be some central organizing ideas, which can be stated as theme(s). Reese (in press), however, warns that merging frame analysis with theme identification might unduly narrow the focus and obscure some underlying principles. Saying that "content is only the tip of a very big iceberg," he views frames as some deep-level principles that structure social world and that are socially shared and persistent over time. Here Reese seems to touch upon another idea: a powerful frame has a potential for "resonance" with part of a cultural legacy within a political culture, as several constructionist movement theorists noted (Gamson, 1992; Snow & Benford, 1988). In particular, Gamson stresses the need of an activist group located within a repressive mainstream culture to strategically integrate "symbolic resources" intended to construct a potent protestor discourse. Media discourse, popular wisdom, and experiential knowledge comprises symbolic resources, echoing both dominant cultural themes and dialectical counter themes, available to the grass roots.

In contrast, Tankard and his fellows (1991) highlight the measurement issue of media frames. They suggest a measurement procedure to identify a media frame within a specific topic area, aiming at looking for frames in terms of pro- and anti- positions that are being presented in news stories. Despite the Tankard's warning about the possibility

of frame identifications by a researcher's "fiat," noteworthy for this study is that they assumed that frames find their most explicit expression in a polarized argumentative context. This idea seems useful for frame analysis here, because *Hankryoreh21*'s faming strategy can be best understood in the context of controversy, or, the duel between the campaigners' framing practices and some of the public responses hostile to them.

Given all of theses, I set up four principles of frame analysis in a qualitative style. (1) This study adopts the issue frame approach because it enables to extract some content-specific frames from both a specific media text and online textual messages. (2) This research attempts to find some vital themes from the media and online text on a collective level rather than on an idiosyncratic, individual message unit level. Particularly, the characteristics of online users' textual framing are likely to match the features that Iorio and Huxman (1999) identified from ordinary citizens' framing practices of pubic issues – linking, collapsing, and colorizing. These characteristics suggest some difficulty in a rigid form of content analysis of online user messages. (3) This analysis aims at reconstructing a set of adversarial frames between the pro- and anti- campaign side in an argumentative context. Lastly, (4) I will make an effort to identify some symbolic resources exploited by framers to build their potent frames.

To strike a balance between the subtle, deep dimensions of "socially shared meaning" and, on the other hand, the concrete, empirical level of "the pros and cons arguments in a dispute," I distinguish a common-factor frame from multiple and specific sub-frames: (1) a *core theme frame*, which includes an overarching central idea, and (2) *criterion sub-theme frames*, which share the basic assumptions in the core theme frame but develop some ramifications exploiting specific cultural values.

One vital function of a core theme frame lies in its own "problem definition," termed by Entman (1993) as one initial component in causal reasoning process involving a media frame. A problem definition can determine what is problematic in a discussion and thereby can set a boundary by which some questions are deemed acceptable and other questions are made irrelevant or out of sight (Hall et al., 1978). A discussant may disagree with specific argument from a core theme frame, but he/she may remain still with the "problematic" of the frame.

Sub-theme frames apply some abstract values as criteria to specific arguments in accordance with the core theme. Shah, Domke, and Wakcman (in press) who follows the political psychology tradition highlight the aspect of "value-framing" offered by media discourse. They conceive of framing in terms of the different sets of values that provide an underlying rationale for particular policy. Following their fashion, criterion sub-themes can be thought to provide specific value-priorities based on which moral or practical evaluations can be made and, therefore, the primary problem definition is reaffirmed and a certain recommendation is derived through its own "closed circuit."

My analysis here will remain a brief qualitative style, reserving more rigid form of analysis for future development. Collecting online messages was originally intended for another small research which analyzed the characteristics of online debates. I primarily divided them into pro- and con- campaign position as well as neutral/mixed one. Of 179 online messages, 57 were classified as pro-campaigner messages, 84 as anti-campaigner ones, and 38 as mixed/neutral ones. For the purpose of this study, I used only anti-campaigner and mixed/neutral messages. For frame analysis, I read all the classified messages again to identify, at first, a common problem definition within each side, and

then, any specific criterion theme emerging from each document. Additionally, I recorded examples of symbolic resources such as personal military knowledge until I could generalize them. The same fashion was applied to the analysis of *Hankyoreh21*'s stories.

One important limitation to the analysis is that I did not seek a chronological development of the public debate between the two sides. Few anti-campaign online contributors knew much of *Hankroreh21*'s subsequent articles. Many campaign supporters who personally read those articles indeed played a role of delivering the campaigners' message. Since only a few of online users posted their messages multiple times, it was hard to find a persuasion effect on personal level. Instead *Plaza* fit better the purpose of mapping the discursive conflicts between the pros and cons arguments.

4. Antagonistic challenges

The themes and their related value-criteria varied across the rank and file of the anti-campaign alliance. The arguments in online messages quite often overlapped each other, collapsed multiple topics into one argument, and colorized with their personal styles. Despite this, I was able to categorize criterion sub-themes, which are presented below. All the quotes from online messages and most of *Hankyoreh21*'s articles were translated from Korean text by the author. When quoting an online user, I followed the usual way the Korean media currently does; I specified the contributor's *Nownuri* member ID, but not his/her real name. Since *Nownuri* allows both English and Korean languages in creating member ID, in some cases Korean letters were used without translation.

(1) Credibility-related criterion theme: "Nothing but a blown-up fiction"

One of the typical responses from the anti-campaign online messages was a strong doubt about the creditability of the stories uncovering Koreans' atrocious actions in the war. Many antagonists blasted Koo and *Hankyoreh 21*, saying that the Vietnamese interviewees' stories were nothing but a one-sided, exaggerated, unconfirmed, and low-class-fiction claim. Her stories became a target of much criticism, roughly for two reasons: the failure to balance between Vietnamese and Korean veterans' claims, and the abuse of a strong, emotional, biased language privileging the Vietnamese view.

In an interview with a U.S. news magazine *Newsweek*, Myung-Shin Chae, the first commander of Korean troops in the Vietnam War, argued that the claim that thousands of innocent people were massacred by the Korean army is based on communist propaganda. (*Newsweek*, April 2, 2000). Many complaints over Koo's coverage began with the criticism that she did not give a consideration to the Korean veterans' view, which would thus supposedly to constitute a whole story, and that, therefore, she violated the balancing norm, one of the vital modern journalistic values.

> Is it common sensical to interview the other party in covering such a sensitive issue? What kind of a quality press in the Western world is doing anything like reporting such an irresponsible story? (setra, posted on April 26, 2000, titled "Hankyoreh's attitude toward the Vietnam War")

The language that Koo employed in her description of the Korean soldiers' actions also spawned a controversy. The Korean word *yangmin-haksal*, translated into English word for word as 'mass killing of civilians,' has actually a stronger sense than the English word "massacre"; *yangmin* implies the goodness of people without a connection to any political, especially communist, ideology, and *haksal* suggests the malicious nature of mass killings. Some critics asserted that such inordinate terms should be replaced with

more moderate terms such as "civilian damage" (*Hankyoreh21*, September 9, 2000). Similarly, a number of online messages voiced that the general description and wording in Koo's stories were too emotional and sensational to be deemed good journalistic work.

Even a few intellectuals more sympathetic to the campaigners expressed their concerns about this "excessiveness." For instance, in a human rights conference on Korea's Che-ju Island, held in late February 2000, a law professor advised the correspondent to give a fuller consideration of both the Vietnamese and Korean sides, and to use more moderate terms than *yangmin-haksal* (Hwang, March 9, 2000). This type of criticism, although most of it was intermingled with other types of blame, assumed in its pure form the priority of modern journalistic values such as objectivity and impartiality. Drawing on this criterion, opponents tried to label the activism of the campaigners as an example of amateurism and sensationalism.

> *Hankyoreh21*, far beyond raising an issue, went so far as to presumptuously dishonor 300,000 Korean veterans who've been through Vietnam, saying something like terrifying atrocities, apology, compensation, and restoration of conscientiousness, based only on one-sided testimonies given by Vietnamese locals....It's nothing but amateurism and sensationalism, which is conflicting not only with the honor of 300,000 veterans, but also with the national interest and prestige. Is *Hankyoreh*'s strutting self-complacency more precious than the honor and interest of the 300,000 veterans and the Republic of Korea? (무랑루즈, June 30, 2000, "<Repurposed> About the so-called Vietnam massacre")

(2) War conduct-related criterion theme: "War-driven killings for survival"

One of the most common counterarguments pointed at the campaigners concerned the peculiar situation of the Vietnam War. "How do you know if those killed were civilians or not?" Myung-Shin Chae was cited as saying against Koo's massacre stories in a *Hankyoreh21*'s interview article (Cho, December 16, 1999). Many Vietnam-

returnees made a shared plea, saying that they had to kill everyone that they thought an enemy in "the war without a front." They brought up a few reasons for their protest: the Viet Cong guerillas did not wear uniforms. Still worse, according to the veterans, many Vietnamese peasants actually collaborated with the enemy and their fellow soldiers were killed by some seeming civilians, resulting in an irresistible rage beyond their control. One veteran interviewee, for example, described the reality of the war by saying,

> In our eyes, all Vietnamese people seemed guerillas. It wasn't a war where two sides in uniforms were fighting each other. We suspected civilians were the food suppliers for the Viet Cong or the intelligence agents. We couldn't trust the presence of a purely good citizen. Even kids and girls were among suspects. Kids used to follow us around, saying "Daihans"; then we patted them on their heads. All of sudden one of them threw a grenade at us and disappeared into the jungle like a wind. The same was true of girls. (Ko, December 30, 1999)

A host of online messages posted on *Plaza* also shared this point. They tapped into their knowledge of the Vietnam War, some of which came from their personal belief, personal acquaintances, and especially personal experiences during military service. In Korea where most of young males have military duty for a certain period, a person who has finished his "barracks life" is apt to make sense of the reality of the Vietnam War, or of any war in general, based on his recall of what he had been through in the service. Some online material, though all of it was not against the campaign, advanced that the Korean soldiers in Vietnam had no choice but to pull the trigger in such a situation. Furthermore, a few messages were enraged at the young woman journalist without any military-related background. She, they argued, was too ignorant of war-related knowledge to distinguish between the war-driven killing and blood-hungry slaying.

> In a war situation like that…if I had been one of them in Vietnam, facing an enemy group adopting Maoism-based guerrilla strategies… could I really tell civilians from Viet Congs calmly? ... I would've pulled the trigger like they did. (iceless, June 30, 2000, "Vietnam War and people's personal belief")

> In a guerrilla war where a baby-carrying mother or a seven year-old kid in a road is throwing a grenade, who is an enemy and who is a civilian? Have you ever fought in the battlefield at that time? Just think about the risky business where your life is at stake. (으뜸 id지, June 28, 2000, "Does the defoliant-damaged veterans group suck?")

For those who had been through military service and were resentful of Koo's stories, their rhetorical questions of "What if you had been there?" and "Do you really know what a war is?" paved the way for the justification of whatever action Korean soldiers took in the Vietnamese jungle. Their concentration on the desperate guerrilla warfare, however, was less an unparalleled peculiarity of the Vietnam War than an extrapolation, though extreme, from the nature of war in general. This is evidenced by the several comments sharing the notion that every war involves a death toll of civilians.

> Such a kind of reflex-based retaliation is what happens in any battlefield. Isn't there a hidden conspiracy in aggrandizing such a likely occurrence? (Sbnow597, June 29, 2000, "<Repurposed> A forged Vietnam massacre theory.")

By depicting civilian killings as a war-driven behavior caused by self-defense or reflex retaliation as part of human instinct, this type of argument brings to the fore the war-specific, situation-related values. Since the imperative of self-defense is predicated as a paramount value in a life-or-death business, every conduct on the battlefield has its own justification, and even an inordinate retaliation is tolerated because of its situational motive or needs. To evoke the desperate situation that Korean combatants fought on Vietnamese soil as vividly as possible was the antagonists' essential rhetorical strategy.

(3) National bond-related criterion theme: "Our debt to the benefactors"

The comments from challengers on the terrible war reality accompanied quite often the articulation of "our debt" to Korean veterans, saying, "We owe them something because their sacrifice made possible the next generation's well being." In this context, Korean troops were largely portrayed as "our fathers." Several online messages sympathetic to Korean veterans were from those whose fathers had actually been to Vietnam. A number of historical explanations and exemplars were brought to highlight the self-sacrifice and contribution made by Korean soldiers, and such words as "fathers" and "elder brothers" were used to presuppose an enlarged family relationship between the veterans and other Koreans.

To illuminate the veterans' self-sacrifice, sometimes figures were quoted; as many as 5,000 were killed; far more were disabled, and nearly 30,000 veterans are now suffering from various defoliant-related diseases, which they are passing down to their children; a number of Korean survivors are being haunted by their nightmare painful memories, and so on. Another topic touching upon the veterans' sacrifice was that Korea did not give sufficient reward to the veterans despite their life-risking job. A few online commentators resented the fact that the Korean private soldiers in Vietnam got paid far less than what the U.S. counterpart combatants earned, because the then-government of Korea took away a large portion of the money that the U.S. funded for the Korean soldiers' pay.

> The money Korean soldiers got paid for their life-risking job was just 150 bucks a month. It was far less than the 750 bucks that went to U.S. soldiers. Supposedly Korean veterans should've received the same amount of money, but the Korean government snatched 80% of their monthly pay on the way and sent only 20% to them without their agreement. The Korean government

initiated a variety of national projects and Korea made a big economic development (stius, June 30, 2000, "Civilian killings in Vietnam War?").

In addition, a horde of the anti-campaign members were concerned that the returnees from Vietnam had received very little in reward for their life-risking work. They faulted the Korean government for giving the veterans ill treatment and voiced that up to now the country has granted them nothing but a badge and a bit of pension, given for their paucity, not for their merit.

The emphasis on the veterans' self-sacrifice had an obverse side of a coin: stressing their contributions together. Many South Koreans believe that their government sent its military forces to Vietnam to erase the possibility that Washington might withdraw the U.S. troops stationed in Korea. In this scenario, if the withdrawal had really happened, the national security of South Korea would have been seriously threatened by North Korea. Although the credibility of this view is occasionally challenged, it is still a popular version of South Korea history (*Hankyoreh21*, September 9, 2000). Also widely known is that the then-government of Korea, in return for its military involvement, received a lot of financial assistance from Washington, with many Korean businesses enjoying good times during the war period. Most veterans believe that their sacrifice offered a cornerstone for the speedy economic growth during the 1970s in Korea, and their claims are widely accepted among most Koreans. The counterarguments mixing Korean veterans' sacrifice and contribution often led to more or less emotion-filled blaming of Koo and her supporters for their ungratefulness to *our* fathers, who made possible the national wealth that Koreans enjoy now.

By portraying the Korean veterans as national benefactors who did not get their due reward, this type of argumentation runs toward a conclusion: Our fathers who were sent

into the Vietnamese jungle are the real *victims*. So labeling them as murderers would be unfair and unbearable; those so-called "apology campaigners" are wrongfully doing so.

> Has Soo-Jung Koo participated in the Vietnam War? Isn't it she who's enjoying the fruit of richness awarded in return for their fighting and for the blood they shed in the past? How can she dare to say such a thing? How dare to call veterans murderers? Has she ever tried to understand their miserableness when they are called criminals not by foreigners but by Koreans? Has she ever tried to share their pain from defoliant-related diseases? And saying Korean veterans are killers? Our fathers are criminals? ... At least, a family member shouldn't say something like 'my father is a murderer.' (kaiowa, June 29, 2000, "Korean troop's Vietnamese killing.")

Accepting the feeling of "indebtedness" involves the debtor's moral sense including the homage to, and if necessary, the protection of the benefactors; even if the Korean veterans did something terrible in the past, according to this moral criterion, we Koreans should champion them against those who are dishonoring them. By embellishing the sacrifice by the Korean soldiers in Vietnam, and embedding in their statements the blood relationship between them and younger Korean generations, nearly all anti-Koo online material privileged the values of a debtor's morality based on the national bond.

> A question hit me. Without them [Korean veterans], I wondered, was it possible for us to be well off as much as we are now? Maybe they are terrible foes in Vietnamese eyes, but they surely deserve our respect.... The returnees from the Vietnam War, they are not those we can turn our back on, but those we should recognize, embrace, and protect. (dacca, June 29, 2000, "After watching a TV program about the Vietnam War.")

(4) Utilitarian criterion theme: "No gains from bringing up bygones"

The last sub-theme was not so common among the online textual messages, but was found in some of *Hankyoreh 21*'s articles. The crux of this argument concerned the de facto utility of bringing to light more than thirty-year-old occurrences. Some critics

asserted that this issue would poison the friendly relationship between South Korea and Vietnam and, on a practical level, the activities of Vietnam-based Korean businesses and the security of Koreans living in Vietnam. In an interview with *Hankyoreh 21*, Yong-Bang Yu, a Korean consul general in Ho Chi Minh City, said,

> What comes next after the killings by Koreans is made public here [Vietnam] again and again? Just think of the difficulties of Koreans and Korean businesses in Vietnam caused by the issue...Do you know how much agony Korean local businesses feel in dealing with the cultural difference? ... What's the point of recalling the bygones at this moment? We're already witnessing labor disputes in workshops run by Koreans these days. On top of that, the massacre issue is stirring up the hatred toward Koreans among the Vietnamese locals....*What's the worth of uncovering such a matter, which even the Vietnamese government is hiding?* (Italicized by the author, Yu, December 16, 1999).

The last question mentioned above was particularly poignant to the apology campaigners. Several news stories in *Hankyoreh21* reported that the massacre issue was drawing strong local attention in Vietnam. Several Vietnamese media relayed Koo's revelation stories, and a news weekly magazine in Vietnam went so far as to suggest a co-campaign in both countries, although the magazine soon cancelled the proposal (Koo, October 14, 1999). The Vietnamese government, however, did not want this issue to reverberate beyond its control, and tried to restrain the Vietnamese media from spreading the issue around the country (Ko, January 27, 2000).

In a *Reuters*' special report, the Foreign Ministry of Vietnam was quoted as saying in a statement concerning this matter, "With humanitarian and peaceful neighborly traditions, it is Vietnam's policy to close the past and open the future...." This article offered an explanation for the response, by citing a Vietnam expert Carl Thayer. He said,

> In their [the Vietnamese] view, the Vietnam War was a war launched by a wicked [American] government. Koreans, Thais and Australians were all lackeys... It is easier to point the propaganda finger at one enemy, several only clouds the issue... Hanoi also did not want historical baggage to weigh it down as it sought aid and investment from the region. (Yates, January 10, 2000)

Whatever reason Vietnam had for her refusal to dwell on the matter, some critics expressed anxieties over the expected harmful results caused by the campaign recalling Korea's dark past. They also questioned the reason for making a fuss in the name of apology, which was not what Vietnam had asked for. Although rare in the online arguments, a few messages mentioned the same rhetorical question as Yu raised.

This view takes up a lay version of utilitarian thinking, in the sense that gains and losses are calculated and checked against each other to reach a final result. In this scheme, while no concrete gains are visible, there are obvious losses in speaking out about the disgraceful past to the Vietnamese people, or the whole of global citizens. The expected losses can be stated abstractly as harming the national interests, which include keeping a good image of Koreans in Vietnam, and before the whole world. A few online messages revealed their antipathy to Koo, who was presumed to have sold the national honor for her personal success. Mixed with a journalism-based criticism, they blamed Koo's stories for threatening the national honor and interests.

(5) The synthesis: a core theme of "Dishonored veterans"

The four criterion sub-themes stated above were usually intermingled. Since these themes and accompanying value-criteria were easily managed into harmony with others, many online critics hostile to the news weekly employed the elements of the sub-theme frames to corroborate their arguments. Virtually all of these charges against Koo and her

fellows shared one essential understanding of what campaigners were doing: hurting and dishonoring the veterans, who are also war victims in the eyes of opponents. The polemicists interpreted that the apology call was intended to unfairly blame and dishonor the Vietnam-returnees, by overstating their wrongdoings in the war. Thus the whole big picture drawn by the challengers, or, the core theme, can be titled with the *Dishonored Veterans* frame. This frame was supported by all of the sub-theme frames accompanying their judgmental criteria. Below is an online argument showing how the author of the message sewed together the threads of "blown-up fiction," "war-driven killings," and "our debt to benefactors" sub-themes to build his argument effectively.

> Korean veterans were also victims no less than the Vietnamese. We have been given the economic bounty at the cost of the blood and sweat they shed. But veterans have lived without getting a due reward for what they had done. In these circumstances - far from a least consideration of their situation – *Hankyoreh21* has been consistent only in its unfair coverage. Based on a mere manuscript by a female reporter, who is without any military knowledge, the magazine poured out such stories as "Gee, behold the terrifying atrocities by Korean troops." (무랑루즈, June 30, 2000, "<Repurposed> About the alleged Vietnam massacre.")

5. Engaging in a moral battle

Given the public responses hostile to the apology campaign, *Hankyoreh21*'s subsequent articles during the campaign period can be thought as endeavors to outsmart the components of the *Dishonored Veteran* frame in an argumentative context. Therefore, the campaigners' framing strategies will be also presented in two steps. First, four sub-theme frames identifiable in the campaigner discourse will be presented, largely involving the same criterion as those in the anti-campaign sub-themes, as defense against the brunt of the polemicists. Next, the campaigner's essential framing strategy will be

treated as a proposal of "frame shift," by which those defensive sub-themes can be integrated into an alternative core theme frame attaching more aggressive meaning to those sub-themes.

(1) Credibility-related defense theme: "It's a confirmed truth"

As already mentioned, Koo's initial stories relying on the War Crimes Report and Vietnamese testimonies were blamed for their one-sidedness and unconfirmed nature. One important effort by *Hankyoreh21*, therefore, was to prove its stories by securing Korean veterans' remorseful confessions to their part in the civilian killing. During the campaign, this weekly delivered several times the veterans' regrets over the "overreactions" during their military operations. Several veterans acknowledged that they had killed villagers who were unlikely to be Viet Cong guerillas and agreed that they had heard of rampant civilian killings by Korean soldiers. The veterans' recall of their dark past was largely juxtaposed with spot coverage of where the tragedy had happened.

One great success for the magazine was an exclusive interview with a retired colonel Ki-Tae Kim, who was a captain commanding a company during the Vietnam War. He testified that he ordered his men to kill Vietnamese peasants and even shot them himself in early 1966 (Hwang, April 27, 2000). This magazine also featured a cover story about two veterans who had been in a company nicknamed "Killers," now suffering from their guilty feelings (Hwang, June 10, 2000). Another story uncovered a secret probe by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency into the Korean army's war crimes in Vietnam, shortly after the Vietnam War ended (Ko, May 4, 2000). Additionally, *Hankyoreh21* publicized a report of the Korean troops' brutality which was written by two U.S. citizens

in 1972. The disclosure of the report was intended to evidence the Koreans' war crimes, viewed from a third person's eyes (*Hankyoreh21*, February 3, 2000).

(2) War conduct-related defense theme: "unworkable situation ethics"

Hankyoreh21 several times accepted the claim that Korean veterans were other victims that the "dirty war" itself had created. As aforementioned, the Korean veterans' common excuses for their "overreactions" contained comments on the madness and savagery of the war, which were beyond an individual's control. This description implied that much of the misbehavior by Korean troops was not ascribable to them. In the announcement article notifying of the launch of the fundraising campaign, the campaigners accepted the rhetoric of "Both were sacrificial lambs."

> Many veterans who were involved in civilian killings are still alive. Among them, someone went so far as to become crippled because of his nightmare memory and guilty feeling. Beyond a surface distinction between who offended and who were hurt, this century witnessed a tragedy in which everyone involved was a victim. Now *Hankyoreh21* begins a campaign to help the Vietnamese families hurt by Korean troops (October 28, 1999)

Despite this admittance, *Hankyoreh21* contradicted the claim that the civilian killings were far from Korean soldiers' fault. This magazine published a series of endorsement commentaries written by liberal or progressive intellectuals during the campaign. A few of those volunteered as refuters against the justifications of Korean soldiers' actions based on self-defense or irresistible war psychology. For instance, a Korean professor argued that, even if the civilian killings were caused by unintentional or casual mistakes, that does not nullify the war crime per se. Furthermore, according to him, there is a substantial suspicion that the killings were done systematically with a sinister motive.

More serious is a suspicion that the Vietnam massacre took place, not by an accidental or during-the-battle killing, but by intentional, systematic, and organized action. Many of those killed were peasants, seniors, pregnant women, monks, wives and young kids, in a word, unarmed civilians... In many cases, the killing was not about the death of countrymen near a belligerent action. The target for mass killings was often a whole village, which was not in the vicinity of a military operation area. (Kang, March 2, 2000).

(3) Enlightenment-based defense theme: "Our debt to the wrong history"

Facing the most troubling resistance of the mental indebtedness to Vietnam-returnees, *Hankyoreh21* struggled to neutralize the appeal that Korean veterans were just another victims in the terrible war. As aforementioned, the exemplars of self-sacrifice and contribution by the veterans resonated with the popular belief that the Korean government intervened in the Vietnam War for national security and financial resources. Several professors and intellectuals doubted and refuted this myth by political, economic, or moral standards. Although not denying that Korean veterans made some contribution to Korea's economy, they generally downplayed the belief that the military intervention in the Vietnam War laid a foundation for the economic growth of Korea.

I cannot but have a fundamental doubt about the notion that Korea economically benefited from her military intervention in Vietnam. Through the Vietnam War, Korea secured the economic 'gain' of less than a billion dollars. What did Korea lost? 5,000 men were killed, 10,000 were injured, and 20,000 were victimized because of the defoliant. On top of the life damage beyond calculation, Korea comes to bear the burden of the dishonorable civilian killings. (Han, May 4, 2000)

Alongside this criticism, the campaigners accepted the claims of victimized Korean veterans, but tried to change their implied meaning. According to the modified version,

Korean veterans are truly victims, but in the sense that Jong-Hui Park, the military-originated leader in Korea during the 1960s and 1970s, made an absurd decision to sacrifice Korean youths in the Vietnam War, even though the war was caused by the arrogant U.S. government. This endeavor meant placing the Koreans' misbehavior in a broader historical context. Several columns by Korean and foreign intellectuals gave an explanation of the Vietnam War with eyes critical of the U.S. hegemony in world order. In this fashion, this magazine tried to redirect some of the emotion-charged censure pointed at the campaigners, who were supposedly giving additional pain to the veterans in the name of apology.

> Recently it turned out the decision of sending a Korean contingent to Vietnam was made by Jong-Hui Park's volunteering. A politician who had a sober mind couldn't have the slightest intention to sacrifice the young lives of his countrymen to a remote war, when even a directly concerned country shuns doling so. Nevertheless, the decision was made. As a result, our youngsters had to hear at first that they were 'the mercenaries of the U.S.,' then had to bear the stigma of 'the civilian killers,' and finally had to become 'defoliant victims' after they returned alive. (Jin, July 26, 2000)

> We should be cautious not to miss the point that more fundamental responsibility for Korean troops' atrocities is traced back to the U.S.'s Vietnam strategy. The Korean soldiers, without their knowing the characteristics of Vietnam War, were driven by the madness of war and became perpetrators in the war of invasion. (M. Kim, July 13, 2000)

In this fashion, the campaigners suggested that the political leaders in Korea and the U.S. government were really the big wrongdoers to blame for the madness of Korean soldiers. But *Hankyoreh21*'s editorial staff advanced, sometimes in euphemism, that the circumstances did not justify "our" wrongdoings. In other words, they acknowledged that Korean soldiers went to Vietnam, regardless of their intention, and were overwhelmed by the madness of war. But, according to them, Korean veterans still have a moral obligation

of making an apology because it was they who killed innocent civilians, as was suggested by a veteran's letter.

> ... That's right. We [veterans] couldn't help doing what we actually did in the war. But what we didn't notice at that time was that the war was numbing our mind and driving us into madness... Don't be upset, my friends. It was wrong in the first place to go to a war we shouldn't have gone to. We didn't know such truth then and only thought we were fighting bravely to protect the national honor and free democracy.... Unfortunately we were indeed forced to hate without any reason some people as much as we loved our country. We must admit that there exist Vietnamese victims living in misery and pain, generation to generation, as a result of the absurd hatred (Y. Kim, August 23, 2000).

(4) Utilitarian defense theme: "no apologies, no gains"

In late 1999, *Hankyoreh21* relayed a few of Vietnamese local media's and their audiences' responses to a Korean media's uncovering of the innocent deaths on their own soil. As aforementioned, some criticisms of the campaign concerned the arousal of anti-Korean feelings among Vietnamese people. In contrast to the worry expressed by some Koreans living in Vietnam, however, the magazine told a very different story:

> It is not exactly the 'civilian killings by Korean soldiers' that is the issue in Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese people are touched that Koreans voluntarily and honestly made an issue of their past to repent and have made an apology. It is more meaningful because this issue was something that even the Vietnamese media never paid attention to. Vietnamese are surprised to hear that a 'Donate to Repent' campaign is going on in Korea. (Ko, December 16, 1999)

Koo's repeated laudatory remarks on the calmness and friendliness of Vietnamese survivors in her initial and follow-up stories maintained a similarly tone. There was another Vietnamese gift for the fundraising campaigners to prop up their version of reality; the Vietnamese Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Vietnamese ambassador to

Korea sent an appreciation letter to *Hankyoreh21*'s editorial staff (July 19, 2000; August 29, 2000). Additionally, *Hankyoreh21* tried to redirect the concern about the spread of anti-Korean Vietnamese feelings in a reverse direction. The article cited above warned in its last sentence that, if Korean government fails to make a sincere apology to the Vietnamese people, their initial appreciation might someday really turn into a hailstorm of indignation unmanageable by the Korean government.

> Many of the Vietnamese families bereaved of those who were killed by Korean troops, though not all of them, claim that the Korean government should make apologies and pay compensation. No matter that the Vietnamese government says 'Shut the past,' they just can't do so. Are Korean officials in the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry really believing the political rhetoric by the Vietnamese government? What the two Ministries really have to "shut" is not the past, but their void word play. (Ko, December 16, 1999)

6. Frame shift: "our wrongdoings from the eyes of the victims we used to be"

The defensive arguments categorized above, however, do not by themselves change an essential question that the *Dishonored Veterans* frame privileged in an argumentative context: whether or not *Hankyoreh21* sullied the reputation of the Korean survivors from Vietnam. Even if the campaigners were equipped with substantial counterarguments to disprove the opponents' claims, this does not mean they were able to change the circumstances where a certain "problematic" could be established. Rather, they needed a new problematic, within which all of their sub themes could be rearranged to corroborate a new core theme. They had one, which I name the *Victims' Eyes* frame.

The beginning point to find this frame is to identify the three most frequent Korean keywords in *Hankyoreh21*'s campaign articles – "comfort girls" (*Wi-an-boo*), *No-Gun-Ri*, and *Kwang-Ju*. These three keywords stand for civilian harm caused by a Japanese, an

American, and even a Korean military force. All of those instances evoke some of the most popular memories concerning the victimized history of modern Korea.

"Comfort girls" refer to those who were forced to serve Japanese soldiers as sex slaves during the Japanese imperialist era. From 1910 through 1945, Korea was a colony of Japan. When the Pacific War broke out, most young Korean males were drafted to fight and work for the war, while many Korean girls had to accept the shameful job without their consent. In early 1990s, a group of female old women who revealed they had been comfort girls in the Pacific War sued the Japanese government, demanding it to make an apology and compensation for its past war crimes. But Japan denied the existence of any forced prostitution during the imperialist era and refused to apologize for the alleged crimes. This event refreshed the Koreans' recall of their painful past and aroused anti-Japan feelings among the general Korean public.

In 1999, the same year as the "Donate to Repent" campaign started, *No-Gun-Ri* became a new keyword, representing another war crime committed by the U.S. army in the Korea War, where China-backed North Korea and U.S.-backed South Korea fought against each other from 1950 through 1953. On September 29, 1999, The *Associated Press* published a breaking news story that, early in the Korea War, a group of U.S. soldiers machine-gunned hundred of South Korean refugees in a rural countryside, called *No-Gun-Ri*. A dozen of American veterans of the Korea War confirmed the long-rejected claims of Korean survivors that about 300 civilians were shot to death on the spot. Their confession story was promptly relayed to most Korean media, leading to sensitive public responses. This news report offered the Korean public a refreshing moment to recall its painful past in "the forgotten war."

Kwang-Ju, a city name in Korea, accounted, during much of the late 1980s, for some radical democracy theory-based struggles against the military-originated government. In 1980, *Kwang-Ju* city witnessed a strong protest against a coup d'etat, by which a few military leaders gained political power in Korea. The military leaders labeled the *Kwang-Ju* protestors as rioters, and many of them finally were killed when Korean air-borne troops brutally put down their demonstration. Despite the control of the press, this tragedy was made known by word of mouth, and it turned into a catalyst spawning a variety of radical political ideologies and democratic protestor movements, not otherwise easy in a country with a long anti-communist tradition.

The three popular memories of a series of historical sufferings in (South) Korea were the most essential symbolic resources that *Hankyoreh 21* exploited to justify the campaign and to penetrate the firewall of Koreans' national bond-based feelings. By citing the tragedies, the wounds, and the historical baggage still lingering in Korean history, this news magazine identified the essential similarity between the Korean cases and the Vietnamese one, since both the tragedies concerned harm to the innocent people caused by a military force. In this fashion, the campaigners introduced the Vietnamese victims' experiences in the context of the victimized history of Korea, and suggested a view of the Vietnam massacre in the eyes of victims, both Koreans and Vietnamese.

Hankyoreh21's framing strategy was obvious in the several reports about the ex-comfort girls' passionate endorsement of the fundraising campaign. A news report titled "The 'comfort girl' grandmothers join the campaign" commented,

> In spite of their old age, the grandmothers are still fighting to secure any possible close examination of the comfort girl issue, as well as apology, compensation, and the regain of their impaired honor. After their long-time tearful struggles and endeavors, they reached a belief in no

> war in any case. They came to realize, from their experiences, that the wound of innocent victims due to the Vietnam War is far from a letting-time-goes-by or an untouchable matter, so much as their own wound is not. (November 11, 1999)

In respect to the war crime issue of *No-Gun-Ri*, the campaigners took advantage of a fortuitous coincidence. The moment when the *No-Gun-Ri* slaughter was made known to the Korean public came shortly after the apology campaign had started. Most Korean media promptly relayed the *AP*'s exclusive story, drawing sensitive public attention, and Korean government swiftly decided to launch a probe into the alleged massacre by the U.S. military. Since the two war crimes by American and Korean soldiers had a commonality of civilian killing by a foreign military, *Hankyoreh21* tapped into the publicity of the *No-Gun-Ri* issue and advanced an argument likening one to the other.

> The Korean troops did the same thing in Vietnam as the U.S. army has done in *No-Gun-Ri*. As the U.S. soldiers' atrocity is becoming a public agenda after dozens of years, the same Korean soldiers' brutality is coming out from under the surface after 24 years since the ending of the Vietnam War....The Vietnam War Crimes Report estimates that 5,000 lives were killed in dozens of '*No-Gun-Ri*' in Vietnam (September 28, 1999).

The tragedy of *Kwang-Ju* in1980 was also mentioned as another example of civilian killings by even the same country's troops. This case was cited to indicate the brutality of a war-driven situation, the difficulty between the good citizens and the "rioters," and an instance of the military-originated dark legacy of the Vietnam War in Korea.

> Had there been a sincere apology for and the repudiation of the wrong history of the Vietnam killings made, the *Kwang-ju* slaughter in 1980 would not have been possible. To prevent any second *Kwang-Ju* tragedy, and to qualify our nation as a member of civilized societies in the new 21st century, it is necessary to make a sincere apology and to repudiate the wrongful past (Kang, March 2, 2000).

Admittedly, it was not quantitatively a majority of campaign stories that included explicit comments on comfort girls, *No-Gun-Ri*, and/or *Kwang-Ju*. A considerable part of the campaign-related stories concerned other topics such as the follow-up confirmation of alleged civilian killings. But it seems obvious that linking Korean-War-harm cases to the Vietnamese counterpart was most effective framing strategy, at least for supporters. Most of the readers' letters to the magazine editors contained this concern. This suggests the compelling interpretation of the massacre issue within the *Victims' Eyes* frame.

> If we're not asking to uncover the truth about this issue [Vietnam massacre], but are just letting time go by till we forget about that, we are no different from the Japanese saying that there was nothing like the institution in charge of comfort girls in the Japanese colonization era; we learn nothing from the U.S. government, which sent a commission to investigate the truth of the *No-Gun-Ri* tragedy. (Nam, March 16, 2000)

> But more surprising is why my country is not taking any action toward Vietnam, while making a complaint to the United States.... When we recognize our wrongdoings in the past, apologize for them, and make up our mind not to make the same mistake again, that's when Korea is advancing toward a better world. (J. Kim, March 9, 2000).

These readers' responses show how to dismiss the troubling war peculiarity- or mental indebtedness-based antagonist claims. On the vantage ground of the *Victims' Eyes* frame, the sub-themes that the campaigners used to defend their position were sometimes colorized with a strong moral tone. Facing the claims that there was no mark between civilians and enemies in the Vietnamese village, the campaigners neutralized its poignancy by recalling the similarities in *No-Gun-Ri* and *Kwang-Ju*. Confronting the critics saying that the campaigners were threatening the national interest, *Hankyoreh21* advanced that the campaign, intended to upgrade the national morality in front of the global community, would benefit the Korean victims who are still demanding apologies

from the foreign offenders. Integrated into the *Victims' Eyes* frame, the reinvigorated sub-themes converged into a strong moral evaluation pointing at the anti-campaigners: it's a "double standard" to say something different when we are victims and then offenders.

> Similarly in the Korean War, the North Korean troops and civilians were not different ethnically; there was always a chance that some North Korean soldiers were among the refugees. In this case, could we give an indulgence to the U.S. soldiers who killed innocent civilians on the grounds of situation logic? (Kang, March 2, 2000).

> Now our [*Hankyoreh21*'s] clear statement seems even a little cliché; we should uncover Vietnam tragedy to rightly advance a solution to the comfort girl issue, to rightly demand the compensation for the *No-Gun-Ri* massacre. (Ko, June 30, 2000).

> Some people are applying a double standard when approaching our issue [*No-Gun-Ri* massacre], and in turn the Vietnam War civilian killing issue. Likewise, there are youngsters who are shunning the matter by saying 'We were just unfortunate,' 'That's what happens in a war.'(*Hankyoreh21*, September 9, 2000).

7. Discussion

The purpose of this study concerned the identification of (1) types of public discourse, which was in the way for the success of the apology campaign, and that of (2) framing strategies utilized by the campaigners. In the analysis, I identified two sets of four criterion sub-themes, which concerned a series of controversies in an argumentative context: a set of duels between the sub-themes of (1) "a blown-up fiction" versus "a confirmed truth," (2) "war-driven killings for survival" versus "unworkable situation ethics," (3) "our debt to the benefactors" versus "our debt to the wrong history," and (4) "no gains from bring up bygones" versus "no apologies, no gains."

The antagonistic responses can be best understood when they are placed within a core theme frame of *Dishonored Veterans*. They presupposed that the campaigners were dishonoring and blaming Korean veterans, and all of the four criterion sub-themes played their role in beefing up this core theme. According to them, the so-called massacre story is largely not true, and even when there is some truth in it, it is morally right for "good Koreans" to champion the Vietnam returnees. Remarkable is that many of the anti-Koo feelings came from the symbolic resources of military-related experiential knowledge largely shared by young Korean males, who have a civic duty of military service for a certain term for their country. Aside from discussing some possible factual errors in her stories, some doubters were uncomfortable with the single fact that Koo had no Vietnam War-related background nor any military service. Moreover, the "real" locus of responsibility for the Korean soldiers' wrongdoing was often complicated by the introduction of the "blamable" Korean government and the U.S. government. While a host of people argued that there are other "bigger wrongdoers," some of them thought that Koo was unfairly depicting Korean veterans as cruel murderers; others supported the campaigners because they seemed to enlighten the Korean public.

To tackle these problems, *Hankyoreh21*'s campaigners actively utilized another kind of symbolic resources: the popular memories of historical sufferings in modern Korea, illustrated by tragedies in which innocent civilians were harmed or killed by Japanese, American, or even Korean troops. The keywords of comfort girls, *No-Gun-Ri*, and *Kwang-Ju* stood for those memories, based on which the Korean magazine built its core theme frame of *Victims' Eyes*. The presence of this frame can be evidenced by most of the campaign supporters' letters which shared a strong moral involvement with the frame,

aligned to a rhetorical catchphrase: "We should make ourselves better than those whom we blame for what they did to us."

Therefore, the overall confrontation between the "*Dishonored Veterans*" and the "*Victims' Eyes*" frame gives a hint about the deep-level conflicting nature of political culture in Korea. On one side, there are the collective experiences of military service by most of the young Korean males. Sometimes coupled with the anti-communist and cold war ideologies, such experiential knowledge is likely to nourish a somewhat tolerant attitude toward the violence, masculinity, savagery, and sometimes madness of war, as well as the acceptance of authority without reason. On the other side, there are the popular memories of recent tragedies in the turbulence of modern Korea still not unified. These memories sometimes encourage sensitivity to the pain and wounds of historical victims, as well as moral indignation against offenders.

The "Donate to Repent" campaign ended on September 9, 2000, roughly one year after it had started. Avoiding the hot-potato issue, the Korean government did not officially acknowledge the alleged massacre as true, nor did it make a decision to launch a probe into the issue, in contrast to another case of civilian killings in *No-Gun-Ri*. No politician, no major corporation made a donation. The amount of money collected by the deadline came to 110,000,000 *won*, which is less than 100,000 dollars. No less than 10,000 Korean citizens, however, contributed to the fund despite the dispute (*Hankyoeh21*, 2000b, September 9). Given the fact that few other Korean media paid attention to the issue, *Hankyoreh 21* was at least successful in setting a public agenda, although all of its audience did not agree with its editorial line.

All in all, by volunteering as a moral engager, this news magazine seems to make a significant contribution, aside from the material achievement of fundraising. This weekly magazine, for the first time, delivered an alternative version of the war reality in the eyes of the Vietnamese "pure victims," to seek, based on victimized historical experiences, a new form of solidarity other than some imagined blood-ties in Korean society. Although there have been some "good" American and Korean films about the Vietnam War, most of them covered the agony of offenders, not victims. Koo's initial stories, although part of the reason for their being a target of much criticism, showed unusual war reality, viewed from the position of Vietnamese victims. Even though *Hankyoreh21*'s frame suggestions and rhetorical strategies were unlikely to be a total success to convert the majority of the opponents into supporters, its audience was given a chance to engage in a serious public deliberation as to the contested moral values.

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Echoes in Cyberspace:

Searching for Civic-Minded Participation in the Online Forums of *BBC MUNDO, Chosun Ilbo,* and *The New York Times*

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Abstract

This paper examines whether media-sponsored online discussion forums contribute to civic-minded participation, utilization of personal and community knowledge, and whether participation is related to the structure of the forum and interactivity. Content analysis of *The New York Times'* Abuzz (U.S.A.) forum, BBC MUNDO's "Foros" (U.K.) and the *Chosun Ilbo*'s Forum Chosun (South Korea) showed that participation is related to the structure of the forum, and that media-sponsored online forums do not appear to contribute to civic-minded participation, or to the utilization of common knowledge.

Echoes in Cyberspace:

Searching for Civic-Minded Participation in the Online Forums of

BBC MUNDO, Chosun Ilbo, and *The New York Times*

The relationship between news media and public participation in the democratic process has long been a recurring theme in social science scholarship. It all began, perhaps, in the 1920s with Lippmann's distrust of the public and the media's ability to serve democracy, and his advocacy of an elite club of policymakers and experts to take care of public affairs (Simpson & Boggs, 1999). Ever since, the role of media in civic participation has become the focus of a large number of studies (e.g. Bennet, 1986; Conway, 1991; Crotty, 1991; Flanigan & Zingale, 1991; McLeod et al., 1999). Scholars have also suggested that news media promote negativism, (Chaffee, Zhou, & Leshner, 1994; Moy, Pfau, & Kahlor, 1999), mainstream thought and homogeneity, with limited feedback mechanisms, inadequate space for participation or alternative experiences (Ellul,1965; Hunter, 1991).

However, with the advent of the Internet, attention has shifted to new media's interactive capability, its potential to enhance participation, and accommodate the plurality of experiences (Bucy, D'Angelo, & Newhagen, 1997; Harms & Dickens, 1996). Yet, few studies have looked at the participatory potential of online news media's interactive features, and scholarship on the forms of knowledge use vis-à-vis the news media is limited to normative discourse. Building on past studies, this paper examines if civic-minded participation is related to the structure of the media-sponsored online forums[1], and to the quality and forms of knowledge and deliberation used therein. First, a review of the

[1] Samples of postings were drawn from BBC MUNDO Spanish Foros page, a controlled forum, Forum Chosun, a semi-controlled forum, and the *New York Times'* Abuzz, an open forum. The Spanish Foros pages contain moderated responses and comments on questions about a particular issue raised by the BBC staff, and usually it takes hours for these responses to be posted, and a majority of them do not appear (Light & Rogers, 1999). Typically, those who post messages are identified by their name and country of origin. Forum Chosun is established in the online edition of *Chosun Ilbo*, the oldest, elite, "establishment" newspaper of record in South Korea (Heuvel & Dennis, 1993). Basically, Forum Chosun accepts all letters from its audience and allows them to be posted verbatim. Its etiquette policy, which warns of even eliminating postings containing pseudonyms, usage of other persons' names, baseless slander, or personal attacks does not seem to be observed for it is not entirely lacking in such language and behaviors. Forum Chosun does not have pre-determined topic categories, which allows for participants' free choice. It is quite interactive in that it allows the "reply" function to other postings. But it does not seem to publish postings in a timely fashion. The *New York Times'* "Abuzz," self-described as "an interactive knowledge sharing community" posts messages on "as is" basis, and questions and comments are posted in real-time. An introduction on the site reads that Abuzz, which contains more that 100 subject categories, is "as open as each member wants it to be, no more, no less," however, it notes, community moderators work with members to help ensure quality discussions. Samples were drawn from "International News" category of Abuzz.

literature is offered that explores the nature of knowledge. This is followed by an examination of discourse and a review of studies that examine the concept of interactivity in online forums. Then, research questions, hypotheses, and a description of the method used to analyze the three international forums follow. Results suggest forum structure and culture influence the level of interactivity and discussion.

Literature Review

Forms of Knowledge

Scholars have shied away from providing an all-encompassing definition of knowledge owing to its complex nature. However, most agree that truth, acceptance, and justification comprise knowledge (Lehrer, 1990), and that knowledge's value is based on its credibly, rarity, lack of redundancy, meaningfulness, and its potential to surprise the user (Broadley et al., 1999; Dawkins, 1999; Rashi, 1993). Davenport (1997) elaborated the relationship among data, information and knowledge by noting that data constitute simple observations, whereas information is data endowed with relevance and purpose. Knowledge, according to Davenport, is valuable information originating from human thought processes.

Historically, the debate on the nature of knowledge pitted *epistemology*, how man knows, against *metaphysics*, what is real. Classical epistemology (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, etc.) emphasized ways of knowing and reality as posited in the object of knowledge. Aristotle and Plato's ways of knowing are still employed to identify logical, ethical and emotional forms of reasoning, and examine argument validity and quality (Grice & Skinner, 1995; Koch, 1998). Artistotle's three forms of proof (logical, ethical and emotional) have also been related to argument quality with levels of their use dependent on understanding of and knowledge about the audience (Griffin, 1997). Extensions of these classical works are used today in textbooks to demonstrate knowledge may be generated through thoughtful deliberations or endangered by fallacious reasoning (Grice & Skinner, 1995; Koch, 1998).

Cultural studies also address conceptualizations of how knowledge is acquired. For instance, Carey (1992) distinguished between "transmission" and "ritual" views of communication to explain the social and participatory dimensions of communication and knowledge. The transmission view (Carey,

1992; p. 15) is defined by the terms "imparting," "sending," "transmitting," or "giving information to others." The ritual view, typically ignored in Western scholarship, (Carey, 1992; p. 15) is defined by terms such as "sharing," "participation," "association," "fellowship," and "the possession of common faith." It is "a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed (Carey, 1992; p. 23)." In line with Carey's argument, online forums can be interpreted as sites of "communion" or "participation" where "sharing of common faith," or knowledge and understanding takes place -- though the nature of such participation and sharing may differ from offline participation given the highly fragmenting nature of the Internet.

The discourse on sociology of knowledge presents the dichotomy of expert or scientific knowledge and common knowledge (Busch, 1978). Berger and Luckmann (1967) pointed out that the sociology of knowledge ignored subjective knowledge generated by distinct societies or communities and called for focusing on the study of knowledge embedded in common sense, and the institutions and machineries active within a society. Their theory is relevant to our inquiry in that participatory democracy, which demands active deliberation, may not be fully realized unless knowledge conditions are liberalized. Demanding specialized knowledge from the public for such deliberations is too stringent a condition. Media produce and disseminate information or knowledge, constructed in the form of language. Hence, in media analysis, language has become the primary object of study of social construction of reality. Habermas (1971, p.194) underscored this when he wrote:

> Reality is constituted in a framework that is the form of life of communicating groups and is organized through ordinary language. What is real is that which can be experienced according to the interpretations of a prevailing symbol system.

Thus the study of language, or media content, may not reveal the entire truth about the social, economic and ideological forces in our lives, but it helps examine particular versions of truth.

In sum, this study examines the nature of knowledge used by media-sponsored online forum participants. Concepts from philosophy and rhetoric reveal knowledge can be used in emotional, ethical and logical arguments. Knowledge can also be conceptualized as expert knowledge derived from

institutions such as the mass media, academia, literature, or from common knowledge or experience. Carey's concepts provide conditions for whether knowledge is "received" or "created," suggesting that interactivity (dialogue) would be associated with greater feelings of group identity.

Public Discourse Online and Electronic Democracy

The relationship between public discourse and democracy has been widely discussed from the perspectives of the news media's failure to provide a public sphere, and new media's potential (Huang, 1997; Morris & Ogan, 1996; Papacharissi, 1999). This section reviews these issues and addresses the conflicting arguments, supporting the potential for civic participation in media-sponsored forums.

The concept of public discourse is closely tied to the democratic ideals of civic participation in public affairs. Dewey (1927) argued that inquiry and communication are the bases for a democratic society -- extolling the merits of group decision-making over that of a single authority. Habermas (1991) believed the public sphere was a domain where public opinion was formed through rational public debate. Both Dewey and Habermas agreed that informed and rational public discussion represented the best of the democratic tradition.

The importance of public discussion and the public sphere is better understood in the context of civic participation. Allen (1995) said theories of democracy can be placed on a continuum based on the degree of civic participation. At one extreme, elitist theory acknowledges the existence of leaders and elitist groups as information providers. On the other end, community-based theory emphasizes the role of community and participatory deliberation. Allen argued that the press should find creative ways to activate readers and not merely serve to inform citizens. Similarly, Dykers (1995) valued the importance of participation in civic dialogue:

> If we understand the educational function of debate, of interacting with someone who views the world a bit differently than do we, then we can become alarmed that citizens who do not join in a robust public conversation, who watch rather than participate, are handicapped citizens who have lost important opportunities to educate themselves (p.16).

Participation in civic dialogue indeed helps people reach mutual understanding even when their interests, cultural frameworks, and languages conflict (Yankelovich, 1991).

Such ideas, however, have hardly been realized in the practice of democracy or in the performance of journalism. Hunter (1991) pointed out the American news media's failure to provide the environment for public discussion to take place. Despite the existence of the general mass, he argued, the news media make the public reticent by mainly portraying voices of the elites. Furthermore, Yankelovich (1991) argued citizens must have "public judgment," not "mass opinion," which requires individuals to deliberate social issues deeply, work through, and then establish firm, stable, and responsible stances. Whether new media provides a new public sphere for civic dialogue is an issue of a bitter tug-of-war.

New media has been said to enhance democracy, creating new outlets for voters to obtain information and to interact with each other, politicians and the press. Stein (1994) said that electronic publishing produces more news, more opinion exchange, and more knowledge delivered in a timely fashion, allowing for improved democracy.

Many cases have illustrated how the Internet can be used in the political arena. Ross Perot, the 1992 and 1996 U.S. presidential Reform Party candidate, developed the "electronic town hall," and his party's members nominated their candidate by voting online (Browning, 1997). In 1996, listservs were established for the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary and media organizations channeled considerable resources to online ventures, opening new spaces for voter-media-candidate communication (Bucy, D'Angelo, & Newhagen, 1997). Browning (1997) noted that cybercasts of congressional committee hearings with chat rooms were made available for citizens to pose questions to committee members. Huang (1997) found that electronic bulletin board systems in China allowed for the "seeds of democracy," through information exchange. In fact, new media's capacity to promote civic involvement stems from making it easier to participate (Corrado, 1996; Kovach, 1992), and decentralizing control over communication.

However, effects of the Internet on civic dialogue and engagement are not all positive. The new media do not instantaneously guarantee a fair, representative, and egalitarian public sphere (Papacharissi,

1999). First, high cost of Internet access prevents citizens from less developed countries and lower socio-economic backgrounds from joining in online communication, thus distorting discussion by limiting it to a select few whom public policy decision-makers may listen to (Fulk et al., 1996). Hill and Hughes (1998) showed that online political discourse was dominated by a few conservatives even though liberals were the online majority. Thus, the discourse may be still dominated by a few extremist groups or individuals (Papacharissi, 1999).

The reliability of information online is another challenge. Online information providers are likely to be anonymous and provide propaganda created by certain interest groups. Because exchange of context online is no substitute for face-to-face meeting, Papacharissi (1999) asserted rational argument can rarely prevail and consensus achievement is not possible. Internet users also tend to be absorbed in their own interests and obtaining only information relevant to those interests (Merritt, 1995). Therefore, the number of people virtual opinions can reach may become more diverse, but may also become smaller as the Internet becomes more fragmented (Papacharissi, 1999).

To summarize, the potential for online media to provide an arena for civic participation and discussion is possible, but depends in part on the available structure of new media to allow for civic dialogue, public access to all citizens, and the willingness or ability to openly participate.

<u>Interactivity and Online Discussion Forums</u>

Although cost, access, and experience are barriers to participation on the Internet around the world, more than half, or 56 percent of the U.S. adult population is now online (Jesdanun, 2001). A study by NetValue (Legard, 2000) showed 31 percent of South Korean and British households were online. An eMarketer report (O'Brien, 2001) showed percentages of households with PCs in Latin America ranged between 3 and 10 percent. Further research by the Newspaper Association of America (Runett, 2000) showed that use of the Internet for news has significantly increased across all U.S. age groups between 1997 and 2000, and particularly among those between 18 and 34 years old. Twenty-three percent of 18 to 34 year olds claim to access news online. Another study by the Pew Research Center for The People

and the Press (2000) found that one-third of Americans received their news from online sources at least once a week compared to one-fifth in 1998.

According to some, online publishing provides opportunities for interactivity (Peng, Tham, & Xiaoming, 1999) and for journalists and readers to engage in online dialogue (Morris & Ogan, 1996; Valovic, 1995). However, there are questions as to just what constitutes interactivity (Aoki, 2000), and how involved journalists should be with readers (Light & Rogers, 1999; Schultz, 2000; Valovic, 1995).

Schultz (1999) considered the availability of interactive tools in online U.S. newspapers as signs of interactivity. These tools included posted e-mail addresses on the news Web site, live chats, online polls and surveys, online forums, and bulletin boards. Rafaeli and Sudweeks (1997) examined interactivity in populations of Bitnet, Usenet, and Compuserve groups. They wrote, "Interactivity describes and prescribes the manner in which conversational interaction as an iterative process leads to jointly produced meaning. Interactivity merges *speaking* with *listening* [n.p.]."

Aoki (2000) delineated two types of interactivity – interacting *with* the Web, and interacting *through* the Web. Interacting with the Web connotes users' control and "the user's ability to interact with Web Servers or its databases through hyperlinks embedded in a Web page, search engines, and multimedia capabilities (p. 3)." Interacting through the Web refers to the interaction between the user and other Web users, the content publisher or provider. Aoki described this as interaction through the use of "e-mail links, message boards or discussion forums, chat rooms, Web telephone, and video conferencing (p. 3)."

Interactivity *through* the Web is more likely to lead to civic participation, although studies of online forums and interactivity in online newspapers show that this is not necessarily the case. Schultz (1999) conducted a content analysis of 100 online U.S. newspapers and learned only 33 percent offered forums, and that overall the mean interactivity score for all newspapers was 4.1 (on a 0-15 scale). Larger newspapers were more likely to offer online forums. Peng et al. (1999) analyzed 80 newspapers and also found that one-third of readers reported interacting with news staff or other readers in forums or live

chats. Chan-Olmstead and Park (2000) content analyzed 300 TV station Web sites and discovered less than 10 percent offered forums and 9 percent offered chat rooms.

Light (1999) examined 14 users' expectations of three online news sites and found that their expectations were tied to impressions of the medium offline (newspaper, television or pure Internet site). She also noted that required registration to participate in forums led to user frustration and nonparticipation. Examination of the page "hits" logs revealed just 3 percent of logged visitors, and none of the 14 participants in her study, visited the forum. Logs also showed that 80 percent of participants visited the Web site only once.

Schultz (2000) surveyed readers of *The New York Times* online edition and online journalists, and found that particular people tended to dominate forums, that the average number of forum postings per person was 25, that interactions were lively, and that few participants felt they received feedback from the paper. Light and Rogers (1999) sent an e-mail questionnaire to participants and non-participants of the *Guardian*'s 1997 political Web site and found people participated in forums to put forth their opinions, disagree, endorse a viewpoint, move the discussion forward, or to ask for information. Those not participating cited lack of time as the main reason. Use of a celebrity columnist was not a big draw for respondents. Other studies (Valovic, 1995) suggested use of an online moderator may suppress the critical nature of participation, although in some specialized forums presence of "experts" may enhance discussion.

Riley, Keough, Christiansen, Meilich, and Pierson (1998) argued that use of tactics by newspapers to increase participation online can be seen as a conflict of interest and as more of a marketing tool to produce a form of "colonization" rather than true participation in a community. The authors' finding that reporters were averse to corresponding with readers by e-mail was also discovered by Schultz (2000).

Rafaeli and Sudweeks (1997) studied the nature of participation in CMC groups and found that interactive messages contained more self-disclosure, humor and use of first-person personal pronouns. Sixty percent of messages were from people who posted only once, and those who contributed most

heavily provided reactive – not interactive – statements. The study did not provide support for the notion that interactivity led to civic engagement.

To summarize, studies showed only one-third of U.S. newspapers and perhaps 10 percent of TV stations offer forums. Studies of forum participants from British media showed participants accounted for a small percentage of online newsreaders and that control over forum participation may decrease participation. Studies of CMC forums showed participants were more likely to self-disclose and use plural first-person pronouns. Findings also showed that those who participated the most were more reactive than participatory.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The literature leads us to pose three research questions, and three hypotheses for investigation related to knowledge, civic participation and online forums.[2]

Research Questions

The literature contains little information on the use of knowledge in online forums. To better understand the types of knowledge used and the methods with which knowledge is presented in online forums, the following research questions were formed.

RQ1: How is knowledge most often communicated in a media-sponsored forum? By way of ritual or transmission ?

This research question is based on Carey's (1992) notion of one-way communication transmission and ritual dialogue. In the forum, simply posting one's opinion would be associated with transmission of knowledge, but referring to another's posting, endorsing a viewpoint, disagreeing with another person, and asking a question are attempts to share and associate with other members in the creation of knowledge.

[2] We acknowledge that the level of interactivity may be influenced by factors other than structural or dialogic interactivity. The three sites were also embedded in cultural codes for communication due to differences in language, which undoubtedly affect interaction. However, our study examines whether interaction differs between the three sites based on interactive factors despite mediating effects of culture. Issues of cultural differences that may have affected findings are presented in the discussion section.

RQ2: What type of knowledge is used most in a media-sponsored forum? Expert or common knowledge?

Media-sponsored forums allow users to find and apply "expert" knowledge available from the newspaper or TV Web site. Participatory knowledge, from the sociology of knowledge perspective, would suggest that common knowledge may prevail over use of institutional/expert knowledge.

RQ3: How do people use knowledge and reasoning in a media-sponsored forum?

This general research question relates to early notions of argument quality and three forms of proof – logical, emotional and ethical (Grice & Skinner, 1995). If expert knowledge is used, arguments should tend to be more logical in nature, whereas common knowledge may tend to fit the categories of emotional or ethical arguments

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are based on Rafaeli and Sudweeks' (1997) notion of interactivity as "conversational interaction" merging "speaking with listening." We expect findings from the more interactive sites, NYT's "Abuzz" and *Chosun Ilbo*'s "Forum Chosun" to more closely mirror characteristics found from other interactive forums than BBC MUNDO's "Foros."

H1: The more interactive the media-sponsored forum, the greater the number of people who will be engaged.

Rafaeli and Sudweeks (1997) found that about 60 percent of messages came from people who only posted once when examining Bitnet, Usenet, and Compuserve discussion groups. This hypothesis tests whether there are differences among the three sites' structural ability to provide interactivity and how many users contributed more than once.

The last two hypotheses are tests of whether findings by Rafaeli and Sudweeks' (1997), that more interactive messages contained more self-disclosure and use of first-person plural pronouns, can be applied to the realm of media-sponsored forums.

H2: The more interactive the media-sponsored forum, the more self-disclosure will be provided.

H3: The more interactive the media-sponsored forum, the more first person plural pronouns will be used.

Methodology

The Forums

Three online forums established in three news media organizations' online versions were examined. They are NYT's "Abuzz," BBC MUNDO's "Foros," and *Chosun Ilbo*'s "Forum Chosun." *The New York Times* is one of the most highly regarded papers in the world, BBC is a renowned British public broadcast network, and *Chosun Ilbo* is the oldest, elite, "establishment" newspaper of record in South Korea (Heuvel & Dennis, 1993). Abuzz is in English, BCC MUNDO "Foros" (hereafter MUNDO) is in Spanish, and Forum Chosun is in the Korean language.

Sampling

To minimize variation of posting content, the authors selected postings concerning international issues. Three coders, who were native speakers of English, Spanish, and Korean, read a sample of postings in each forum (Abuzz, n = 155; MUNDO, n = 133; and Forum Chosun, n = 111). Data from Abuzz were collected on March 25, 2001, under the subcategories of "International News" and "New Interactions" on its Web site (Abuzz.com).

Data from MUNDO (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/Spanish/forums/default.stm) were collected between February and March 2001 from BBC's Web site and represented postings submitted from May 2, 2000, to March 23, 2001. All postings from 13 closed forums available on the MUNDO page on February 11, 2001, and data from four open forums on the same site on March 23, 2001 were included.

Data from Forum Chosun were collected on March 21, 2001 from its data archive (http://brd2.chosun.com/mbbs/BbsList?tb=FORUM01) with the earliest posting published on March 1, 2001. Although a variety of international issues are being discussed on Forum Chosun, the authors chose reunification between South and North Korea as the most prominent issue. All Forum Chosun data were drawn by using the keywords "North Korea" and "reunification." Data of each forum were obtained randomly with sampling percentages ranging from 17 to 26.

Coding Categories and Conceptual Definitions

The unit of analysis for this study was the entire posting, or each posted message regardless of how many times a participant posted (for a listing of coding categories, see Appendix A). Coding categories were used to represent variables of interest. The concepts were:

Ritual or Transmission Knowledge. Identification of levels of ritual or transmission knowledge where derived from findings on user motivations (Light and Rogers, 1999). If a posting simply showed *expression of one's opinion*, it represented *transmission* knowledge. If a posting revealed the participant was disagreeing with another poster's opinion, endorsing the viewpoint of another poster, asking for information or referring to a previous message, it was counted as *ritual* type of knowledge.

Expert and Common Knowledge. Knowledge was conceptualized by the types of arguments and reasoning participants used in their postings. *Expert knowledge* was conceptualized as postings that contained arguments using reasoning from print media, television, and expert sources (politicians, academics, etc.). *Common knowledge* encompassed knowledge using reasoning by personal example, friends, family, or the local community.

Reasoning. Examining reasoning, included determining what types of arguments participants were using in their postings. To examine this we borrowed concepts from rhetoric to determine if reasoning was logical, emotional, or ethical. And if it was logical, we examined whether faulty reasoning may have been used. Koch (1998) identified several types of faulty reasoning: *reasoning by time order*, which supposes that because one thing happened before the other it was the cause of the other; *reasoning by redefining the problem* refers to reasoning by which a person is changing the focus of a debate or an argument; and r*easoning by consequence*, reasoning by which a person argues that if one thing happens, there will be a domino effect (slipperly slope).

The *reasoning by emotion* variable was coded as reasoning lacking logic, but indicating satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

Reasoning by moral judgment referred to reasoning that took into account a judgment of what was good or bad about a person or situation.

Reasoning by ethics of freedom and self-determination variable referred to reasoning based on the spirit of democracy or freedom of speech.

Engagement. This concept was coded as the number of times an individual participant posted messages more than once to the forum. Several studies (Light, 1999: Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997) have shown that few participants may participate more than once. By examining this concept using a random sample, it also reflects that engagement is represented by more than three consecutive exchanges, but represents exchanges over days, weeks, or months.

Self-disclosure. This concept was coded as specific instances in which participants revealed personal information about themselves, "e.g., I am a student at the University of Sussex." This revelation of self-disclosure had to be more than merely identifying one's opinion or issue stance.

First-person plural pronouns. These were coded as depending on the language's (English, Spanish, Korean) use of these forms. In English, this was coded as instances of using the words "we," "our," and "us." In Spanish, it included "nosotros," "nuestro," and verb forms including the "-amos," "-emos," or "-imos," suffixes. This was also done for the Korean language.

Coders were trained in content analysis techniques prior to data collection and a coding manual was developed. Coders met twice to discuss the nature of their coding techniques to attain uniformity in coding across the three sites. Intercoder reliability was calculated on 15% of the sample data using one independent coder each for the two non-English samples. Intercoder reliability for MUNDO was 90.4% and for Forum Chosun was 90.5%. When using Holsti's formula, about 90% or above is the recommended reliability coefficient (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997).

Results

Overall descriptive statistics (see Appendix B, Table 1) show that 40% of the messages examined were from Abuzz, 33% from MUNDO, and 28% from the Forum Chosun. Message postings were longer on Forum Chosun (M=198) than Abuzz (M=126) and MUNDO (M=55).

Topics in all the discussion groups were of international nature, but were also localized by region (see Appendix B, Table 2). The majority of postings examined from Abuzz concerned Republican

Tactics, the Middle East and Foreign Aid. Postings to MUNDO focused on Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista liberation movement in Chiapas, the Middle East, and trying former dictator Augusto Pinochet. Forum Chosun postings related to North Korea and South Korea's president's actions, U.S. political policy toward the region and South Korean defense policy.

In addition, 68% of those posting to MUNDO identified themselves as Latin American, 14% as U.S. citizens, 11% as European, and 6% as Canadian.[3] Those posting to Abuzz and the Forum Chosun were not identified by country of origin.

Ritual or Transmission of Knowledge

Results (see Appendix C, Table 3) showed that all of the postings to MUNDO (100%) and most of Forum Chosun's (99%) were simple descriptions, while only three-quarters (77%) of postings to Abuzz were simple descriptions. A greater percentage of the Abuzz postings contained disagreements (26%), while more postings to Forum Chosun contained more statements endorsing a viewpoint (16%). The greater interactive nature of the Abuzz is evident in that 32.9% of respondents asked for information, and 33.5% of postings referred to a previous posting. Forum Chosun contained only 1.8% of postings that asked for information, and 11.7% that referred to a previous message. None of the postings on BBC's forum contained questions to other posters or references to a message posted directly before it. It appears that ritual knowledge may be created on the Abuzz, but is less likely on Forum Chosun and MUNDO.

Expert or Common Knowledge

Table 4 (see Appendix C) provides comparisons of types of knowledge used by the participants of these three forums. There were no differences in the use of personal knowledge among the forums, but participants of the MUNDO forum used more arguments containing examples from their friends, family or community – relying more often on common knowledge. Participants of the Abuzz and Chosun forums were more likely to use arguments that contained evidence from expert sources (the print media, broadcast media or individual expert sources).

[3] This is an option in the MUNDO posting submission form.

Reasoning

Message postings were examined as to whether arguments contained characteristics associated with fallacious reasoning, emotional, moral or ethical judgments. There were no differences among the forums in use of redefining the problem or use of argument by consequence (slippery slope). However, those posting to Forum Chosun were more likely to use arguments by time order (19%), and emotional judgment (37%). Those posting to MUNDO were more likely to use moral judgments (82%) than posters of the other two groups.

Engagement

Hypothesis 1 stated that the more interactive the forum, the more engaged the participants would be. The Abuzz forum was found to be more interactive, Chosun in the middle, and MUNDO the least interactive. It was expected then, that a greater percentage of those posting to the Abuzz forums would have posted messages more than once. This was indeed the case -- 68.3% of the 155 "Abuzz" postings were by discussants who posted twice or more. Findings showed that 39.7% of the people who posted messages to Forum Chosun posted more than once. For MUNDO, only 5% posted more than once.

Self-Disclosure

The second hypothesis stated that the more interactive the forum, the greater the amount of self-disclosure should be found by participants. The data showed there were no significant differences among the forums (See Appendix D, Table 6).

First-Person Plurals

Data partially supported Hypothesis 3 (See Appendix D, Table 6). The hypothesis suggested that the more interactive the forum, the more likely it would be that participants would use first-person plurals. Although 20% of postings to Abuzz contained use of first-person plurals, more than twice the amount on Forum Chosun, 30% of postings to MUNDO's forum contained first-person plurals. This finding was unexpected as Rafaeli and Sudweek's (1997) research found that interactive messages contained significantly more messages containing first-person plurals.

Discussion

This study's purpose was to examine whether media-sponsored online forums contributed to civic participation, utilization of personal and community knowledge, and whether participation is related to the structure and interactivity. Forums of two different media types (two newspapers and one public broadcast station), located in three countries (Great Britain, Korea and the United States), and in three different languages (Spanish, Korean, and English) were examined.

Indeed, it appears that media-sponsored online forums do not necessarily provoke the type of deliberation that would lead to civic participation, supporting findings from the study of nonmedia-sponsored forums (Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997). The level of interactivity seemed to be related to the structure of the forums, with controlled (BBC's MUNDO) and semi-controlled environments (Forum Chosun) containing less dialogue among participants.

The level of interactivity (dialogue) does not appear to be related to more common knowledge as would be expected as theoretically surmised. Community or common knowledge was used and expressed in the MUNDO forums particularly because the topics posed by the site's administrators were related to specific Latin American communities. Topics related to the Zapatista liberation movement in Chiapas, Mexico, the trial of Augusto Pinochet, and corruption in Latin America. This led participants from Mexico, Chile and other countries to contribute experiences from their communities. The international diversity of participants, however, may also have led to more use of community knowledge. Use of expert sources by members of Abuzz and Forum Chosun may reflect lack of direct experience with issues discussed in the forums.

Moral judgments were also found more often in MUNDO's forums. Analysis of the message texts revealed this may have been due to topic selections -- whether Augusto Pinochet should be tried, whether the leader of the liberation movement in Mexico should remove his mask, and whether the Pope should retire. Postings on Forum Chosun were found to be more emotional. Again, this may also be related to the topic, as the dominant topics were related to the tension in relations between North and South Korea.

Research findings do suggest that engagement does seem related to structural interactivity, as the less controlled participation was, the more likely participants were to have posted to the forum more than once.

Self-disclosure did not seem related to interactivity. Although most MUNDO posters included their complete names and the country and city they resided in (while in the other two forums they did not), this was probably because the BBC requested the information and because most participants were from outside Great Britain. Participants to Forum Chosun were most probably from South Korea (as participation required knowledge of the language), and participants to the Abuzz forum from the United States. MUNDO participants may have felt less inhibited posting to a foreign media outlet on controversial subjects. It may also be that media in the participants' countries do not provide this outlet.

Lastly, use of first-person plurals was not exclusively related to the level of interactivity and forum structure. Although Forum Chosun was more interactive than MUNDO, there was more use of first-personal plurals in the MUNDO forum. This may partially be explained by language differences. In the Korean language, the subject is often omitted, yet implied. In the Spanish language, use of first-person plurals are also attached to verb forms in the manner of using terms such as –amos, –imos, and –emos. On examination of use of first-person plurals, their use did not typically refer to the collectivity of those participating in the forum, but to the communities or groups to which the participants belonged.

Findings suggested that topic is an important factor relating to the kind of participation and knowledge used in discussions of international news. Future studies should further explore how topic is related to the types of knowledge used, and what types of topics might lead to more civic participation. Information about the kind of topics that lead to civic participation could be used by media companies to enhance forum features. In addition, media companies may want to consider how their forum structures may limit dialogue and participation. Media companies could devise means to provide posters the opportunity to channel their viewpoints to community leaders who could address the issues, thus adding value and incentive to participant involvement.

The limitations of this study are that comparisons across the forums cannot be made directly without understanding that regional, cultural and language differences affecting interaction on the forums. Instead of serving as a limitation, however, we believe that it serves as a strength by providing a broader perspective in which to interpret the potential for media-sponsored interactivity. Obviously the forums offer participants an incentive to become involved with the media and present their points of view. From a practical perspective, the MUNDO forum offers a place for participants from other countries to express their views and read views of others when few or none of the media in their countries provide such outlets.

Another limitation to this study is that it examines civic participation in online forums of renowned international media outlets. These outlets were chosen because the authors were interested in international news issues and the sharing of cross-cultural common knowledge. However, civic participation may be cultivated best by smaller localized media forums where the opportunity to truly effect change may be greater.

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Appendix A

V1. ID Number: A serial number of all postings
Code 1 through Code 000

V2. Name of News Media
Code 1 = *The New York Times*
Code 2 = BBC
Code 3 = *Chosun Ilbo*

V3. Number of Total Words
Code 1 through Code 000

V4. Dominant Topic

V5. Dominant Impression of Argument
Code 1 = Simple description
Code 2 = Strong persuasion

Type of Posting

V7. Posting Simply Expressing One's Opinion
Code 1 = Yes Code 0 = No

V8. Posting Disagreeing w/ Others' Opinion
Code 1 = Yes Code 0 = No

V9. Posting Endorsing A View
Code 1 = Yes Code 0 = No

V10. Posting Asking for Information
Code 1 = Yes Code 0 = No

Type of Reasoning & Reasoning Category:

V11. Reasoning by Personal Experience
Code 1 through Code 00

V12. Reasoning from Friend, Family, Local Community
Code 1 through Code 00

V14. Reasoning by Print Media
Code 1 through Code 00

V15. Reasoning by TV
Code 1 through Code 00

V17. Reasoning by Expert
Code 1 through Code 00

V18. Reasoning by Time Order
Code 1 through Code 00

V20. Reasoning by Redefining the Problem
Code 1 through Code 00

V21. Reasoning by Consequence
Code 1 through Code 00

V22. Reasoning by Emotional Judgment
Code 1 through Code 00

V23. Reasoning by Moral Judgment:
Code 1 through Code 00

V24. Reasoning by Ethics of Freedom and Self-Determination
Code 1 through Code 00

V25. Reasoning – Heard About, Other
Code 1 through Code 00

V26. Self-Disclosure?
Code 1 = Yes Code 00 = No

V27. Reference to Previous Message?
Code 1 = Yes Code 00 = No

V28. Use of First Person Plurals "We" or "Us"?
Code 1 = Yes Code 00 = No

V29. Criticize the Media?
Code 1 = Yes Code 00 = No

Appendix B

Table 1. Total Frequency and Number of Words

Forum	Postings Examined	Number of Words in A Posting		
		Minimum	Maximum	Mean
NYT Abuzz	155	2	720	126
BBC MUNDO	133	4	268	55
Forum Chosun	111	22	816	198

Table 2. Topic Areas of Three Forums

NYT Abuzz	Freq.(%)	BBC MUNDO	Freq.(%)	Forum Chosun	Freq.(%)
Republican Tactics	44 (28.4)	Zapatistas	19 (14.3)	South Korean President	30 (27.0)
Enclosing Palestenians	28 (18.1)	Middle East	18 (13.5)	US Politics	23 (20.7)
Foreign Aid	24 (15.5)	Pinochet	17 (12.8)	Defense Policy	10 (9.0)
Hillary Divorce?	22 (14.2)	Cloning	12 (9.0)	Economic Aid	10 (9.0)
Bush & Economy	13 (8.4)	Plan Columbia	11 (8.3)	Domestic Politics	9 (8.1)
Foot and Mouth Disease	10 (6.5)	Bush or Gore	7 (5.3)	Ideological Debate	8 (7.2)
Clinton Secrets	8 (5.2)	Homo Conception	6 (4.5)	South-North Exchange	6 (5.4)
Casino Capitalism	3 (1.9)	Corruption in LA	6 (4.5)	North Korean President	5 (4.5)
Letters from Israel	2 (1.3)	Food	6 (4.5)	Foreign Policy	5 (4.5)
US Balkan Policy	1 (.6)	The Pope	5 (3.8)	Korean News Media	2 (1.8)
		Argentina	5 (3.8)	Surrendered North Koreans	2 (1.8)
		Global Warming	4 (3.0)	North Korean Propaganda	1 (.9)
		Olympic Spirit	4 (3.0)		
		Environmental Disasters	4 (3.0)		
		Elian	4 (3.0)		
		United Nations	3 (2.3)		
		Internet in LA	2 (1.5)		
Total	155(100%)		133(100%)		111(100%)

Appendix C

Table 3. Ritual Knowledge vs. Transmission of Knowledge

Type	NYT Abuzz	BBC MUNDO	Forum Chosun	χ2	sig.
Simple Expression				56.821	.000***
None	35 (22.6%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (.009%)		
More than once	120 (77.4%)	133 (100.0%)	110 (99.1%)		
Disagreeing with others				31.525	.000***
None	115 (74.2%)	130 (97.7%)	95 (85.6%)		
More than once	40 (25.8%)	3 (2.3%)	16 (14.4%)		
Endorsing A View				16.483	.000***
None	137 (88.4%)	131 (98.5%)	93 (83.8%)		
More than once	18 (11.6%)	2 (1.5%)	18 (16.2%)		
Asking Information				84.875	.000***
None	104 (67.1%)	133 (100.0%)	109 (98.2%)		
More than once	51 (32.9%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (1.8%)		
Reference to Previous Message				61.442	.000***
None	103 (66.5%)	133 (100.0%)	98 (88.3%)		
More than once	52 (33.5%)	0 (0.0%)	13 (11.7%)		

***<.001

Table 4. Expert Knowledge vs. Common Knowledge

Type	NYT Abuzz	BBC MUNDO	Forum Chosun	χ2	sig.
By Personal Example				4.451	.108
None	141 (91.0%)	122 (91.7%)	108 (97.3%)		
More than once	14 (9.0%)	11 (8.3%)	3 (2.7%)		
By Friend, Family or Community				18.834	.000***
None	144 (92.9%)	110 (82.7%)	109 (98.2%)		
More than once	11 (7.1%)	23 (17.3%)	2 (1.8%)		
By Print Media				29.496	.000***
None	133 (85.8%)	133 (100.0%)	87 (78.4%)		
More than once	22 (14.2%)	0 (0.0%)	24 (21.6%)		
By Broadcast Media				11.243	.004**
None	142 (91.6%)	133 (100.0%)	105 (94.6%)		
More than once	13 (8.4%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (5.4%)		
By Expert				11.725	.003**
None	129 (83.2%)	127 (95.5%)	93 (83.8%)		
More than once	26 (16.8%)	6 (4.5%)	18 (16.2%)		

<.01, *<.001

Appendix D

Table 5. Types of Reasoning

Type	NYT Abuzz	BBC MUNDO	Forum Chosun	χ2	sig.
Time Order				19.955	.000***
None	150 (96.8%)	123 (92.5%)	90 (81.1%)		
More than once	5 (3.2%)	10 (7.5%)	21 (18.9%)		
Redefining the Problem				.969	.616
None	140 (90.3%)	122 (91.7%)	104 (93.7%)		
More than once	15 (9.7%)	11 (8.3%)	7 (6.3%)		
Consequence				5.043	.080
None	148 (95.5%)	124 (93.2%)	98 (88.3%)		
More than once	7 (4.5%)	9 (6.8%)	13 (11.7%)		
Emotional Judgment				51.393	.000***
None	150 (96.8%)	110 (82.7%)	70 (63.1%)		
More than once	5 (3.2%)	23 (17.3%)	41 (36.9%)		
Moral Judgment				197.180	.000***
None	132 (85.2%)	24 (18.0%)	104 (93.7%)		
More than once	23 (14.8%)	109 (82.0%)	7 (6.3%)		
Ethics of Freedom or Self-determination				21.594	.000***
None	151 (97.4%)	112 (84.2%)	107 (96.4%)		
More than once	4 (2.6%)	21 (15.8%)	4 (3.6%)		

***<.001

Table 6. Participatory Features

Type	NYT Abuzz	BBC MUNDO	Forum Chosun	χ2	sig.
Self-disclosure				1.642	.440
None	146 (94.2%)	120 (90.2%)	103 (92.8%)		
More than once	9 (5.8%)	13 (9.8%)	8 (7.2%)		
1st Person Plurals				21.767	.000***
None	124 (80.0%)	93 (69.9%)	104 (93.7%)		
More than once	31 (20.0%)	40 (30.1%)	7 (6.3%)		
Posting Contribution				43.545	.000***
Once	49 (59.8%)	119 (94.4%)	35 (60.3%)		
More than once	33 (40.2%)	7 (5.6%)	23 (39.7%)		

***<.001

Internat'l

Going Global: Choosing the Newspapers We'll Need to Read in the Digital Age

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Abstract

Author reviewed surveys of elite newspapers and gathered new data from international journalists regarding which newspapers are regarded as the current "elite." Respondents were queried regarding criteria for their choices. Respondents were also surveyed regarding the quality of online versions of newspapers and credibility of the medium in the first known survey of its kind. The findings reveal some shifts in newspaper preferences, large differences in criteria from landmark surveys and ambivalence toward online newspapers.

Introduction

Beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth century and continuing throughout the twentieth century, newspapers have served as the prestige medium through which news and information have been disseminated to the public, serving as "the mirror of society" (Hayman, p. 103). Most peoples of the world can lay claim to at least one newspaper that serves as its "newspaper of record," a "national" newspaper. A select few newspapers have become more than that: they have served as arbiters of important issues in *world* politics and diplomacy and, when those measures failed, of war.

Journalism historian John Merrill refers to this group of newspapers, the reach of which "extends beyond the borders of their country," as "The Elite Press" (Merrill, 1968, p. 7). He argues that "global-elite dailies offer readers responsible, in-depth content" (1968, p. 8). These papers, says Merrill, serve as "an oasis of thoughtful international newspapers" in the midst of "a worldwide desert of mass, too often crass newspaper mediocrity" (Merrill, 1999, p. 13).

These are the newspapers that find their way early each day to the front steps of Washington's White House, London's No.10 Downing Street, The Elysee Palace in Paris, The Kremlin and the other "houses" where world decision makers reside. These newspapers are the few studied by world leaders and diplomats in the world's corridors of power, examined as eagerly for policy clues and diplomatic cues by the world ruling class as they are for authoritative information by the people ruled. They are the "must see" journals among the leaders in their fields and the "must own" journals in the world's great libraries and universities.

Even for those unacquainted with landmark studies like those of Merrill and Schramm (1959), these newspapers' names are as familiar as the names of the cities where they are published, evocative of the historic events they have chronicled. They have included *The New York Times, Le Monde* of Paris, *The Times* and *The Guardian* of London, Moscow's *Pravda, Neue Zurcher Zeitung* of Zurich, Madrid's *ABC* and Beijing's *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily). Though as we shall see the list has changed, these names and others call to mind the landmark events of the twentieth century and represent the tradition of journalism that sometimes describes the profession as "the first draft of history."

Yet, even in this global age, the initial recordings of world events are not artifacts culled by media archaeologists to paint a picture of a Luddite world that soon will no longer exist (Stephenson, 1964). Especially in the developing world, they remain vital because through them "...is disseminated either the thoughtful, pluralistic, and sophisticated dialogue of a free society, or the necessary social and political guidance of the closed society" (Merrill, 1968, p. 11).

For this reason, if for no other, it is necessary that we revisit the world's press elite on occasion to determine its health and the progress of its mission. The reader is reminded that much of the following discussion reflects the analysis of previous researchers, not necessarily the views or findings of the author.

Background

What makes a newspaper great?

What is it that makes a particular newspaper "elite" and have those criteria changed over the years? Merrill's 1968 study summarizes five years of research. The volume defines and ranks the then-great elite dailies and discusses what makes them *global* elites. Forty daily newspapers from around the world are profiled as well. Merrill's admittedly subjective 1968 criteria, distilled from survey responses and reiterated in 1999, postulates global elite dailies have the following characteristics:

- seriousness of tone
- influence among world opinion leaders
- linguistic sophistication
- exemplars of quality for other journalists
- concern for "high" culture (1968, p. 28; 1999, p. 13)

In 1968, Merrill's elite dailies were said to offer depth of coverage in areas that include politics and foreign affairs, economics and business, science, the arts and humanities. In addition, such dailies are "packaged to project this seriousness through typography, design and graphics" (Merrill, 1999, p. 13).

Echoing Schramm (1959), Merrill asserts that the elite newspapers of the world, synonymous with great, "...tend to focus on the big events of the day; and they try to

treat these larger events at greater length than do other newspapers" (Schramm, 1959 in Merrill, 1968, p. 27).

In "The Elite Press: Great Newspapers of the World," Merrill synthesized the findings of many surveys of the world's press conducted over several decades to construct what he termed an *Elite Press Pyramid* (1968, pp. 44-45).

This pyramid consisted of, in increasing number, primary (n=10), secondary (20), tertiary (30) and 'near' elite (40) status newspapers. The Merrill pyramid was in his words "...constructed largely on the basis of the recurrence of certain names (newspapers)" among the respondents of those surveys of the world press studied by Merrill for his book (1968, p. 42).

Among the studies considered by Merrill in constructing his pyramid was a 1961 *Saturday Review* survey of the faculties of the 46 university journalism schools accredited by the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication AEJMC, (Tebbell, 1961). Also considered was Merrill's own 1964 study of a 26-member panel of American international communication scholars, and his survey of 185 editors worldwide (Merrill, 1964). Merrill's evaluation, based on these and other surveys, indicates that in 1968 these were the 10 best newspapers in the world from among 100 included in the final pyramid (Merrill, 1968, p. 45):

1. *The New York Times* (U.S.A.)
2. *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* (Switzerland)
3. *Le Monde* (France)
4. *The Guardian* (England)
5. *The Times* (England)
6. *Pravda* (U.S.S.R.)
7. *Renmin Ribao* (China)
8. *Borba* (Yugoslavia)
9. *Osservatore Romano* (Vatican City)
10. *ABC* (Spain)

What strikes one immediately about this list is how much it is a product of its time: The Cold War. Four (*The New York Times, Le Monde, The Guardian,* and *The Times*) are from former Western-bloc nations and three (*Pravda, Renmin Ribao* and

Borba) from former communist or Eastern-bloc nations. A fourth (*ABC*) published under state press freedom restrictions, and two (*Neue Zurcher Zeitung* and *Osservatore Romano*) were ostensibly neutral. In deciding how to compile his pyramid list of global elite dailies, Merrill had this to say:

> "Naturally, I have not had any consistent contact with these global papers. But I have made it my business to keep up with informed *reputations* (emphasis mine) of leading newspapers. Although I don't read Munich's *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* myself, I do read *about* it and its standing among specialists. I talk with people who depend on European papers for credible news and opinion. I see the paper in government offices, in libraries around the world and in universities. I also see it quoted by thoughtful journals, by other journalists and academicians, by politicians and other opinion leaders, and what's more: I see it alluded to whenever someone wants to present informed, sophisticated newspaper opinion from a particular country" (Merrill, 2000).

A journalist writing about higher education does not have to attend Harvard or Columbia, Oxford or Cambridge to identify them as elite universities: they are known to be great. Similarly, according to Merrill, it is not necessary to read all great newspapers to have a sense of the best of them. In compiling such a list, reputation is clearly important and the resulting list of the "best" newspapers is therefore clearly subjective. Still, while reputation matters, there are other criteria that can be applied to "elite" newspapers.

What Makes a Paper "Elite"?

The criteria for determining which of the world's newspapers rank among the "elite" can be as varied as the purposes of the individuals who have undertaken the evaluation task and the time period during which the evaluation was done. Merrill (1964, 1968, 1999) and Schramm before him (1959) crafted criteria which, in themselves, appear "elite," designed to appeal to a largely academic audience. Edward L. Bernays, often cited as the "father of public relations" and no doubt conscious of the importance of name-recognition for his purposes, included "degree of familiarity" among his criteria when he surveyed 1,596 U.S. daily newspaper publishers (Bernays, 1961). Tebbell (1961) wrote for an upscale but more populist vehicle, the *Saturday Review*. His article reported the results of a *Review* survey of the deans, full professors and associate

professors affiliated with the 46 schools then accredited by the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, AEJMC. It was restricted to domestic newspapers with a circulation exceeding 100,000. The resulting "top ten list" yielded quality journalism with populist appeal and included *The Milwaukee Journal*, the *Louisville Courier-Journal* and *The (Baltimore) Sun*.

Even acknowledging the differing criteria, survey methods, purpose, scope and time periods during which these studies were conducted, some common elements denoting the "elite" are common to all the surveys. An "elite" newspaper is one that seeks to cover a wide variety of news events and offers equally varied and sophisticated analysis and commentary to place that news coverage in a global context. An assignment editor at such a newspaper might begin with the question: "What of importance has happened in the *world*?" and the editorial page editor "What does that event mean for my country *and for the world*?"

One Day in the Life of an "Elite" Daily

To illustrate the point, consider the Tuesday, October 17, 2000 national edition of *The New York Times*, the paper most often identified in surveys as the finest of the world's "elite" dailies (Bernays, 1961; Tebbell, 1961, 1962; Merrill, 1968, 1999). In that day's edition, chosen by the author at random, the front page carried stories (author's descriptions) accompanying the following headlines, from left to right:

Above the fold:

- "(Presidential) Campaigns Set a Brisk, Focused TV Pace"
- "Yemenis Now Say That Ship Blast Was Criminal Act"
- "Cease-Fire Eludes Mideast Leaders In A Day Of Talks"
- "Inquiry Into Moneymaking At the Dominican Consulate"
- "Heating Oil Squeeze Might Be Overstated"

Below the fold:

- "Many Churches Slow To Accept Government Money to Help Poor"
- "Can Arafat Turn It (Mideast violence) Off?"
- "Finding Secrets to Weight Loss"

On the *Times* editorial page that day were the following editorials:

- "The Terrorist Threat at Sea," an editorial about risks facing the American military in foreign ports;
- "Confusion on Child Health Coverage," an explanation about a change in New York State's health care plan for children of low-income families;
- "A Reassuring Scorecard for Affirmative Action," the analysis of a report on the benefits of preferential employment and school admission practices.

On the *Times* famed OpEd page October 17, 2000 were:

- "Where U.S. Power is Beside the Point," an opinion piece on American Middle East policy by an Egyptian Middle East expert;
- "The Wrong Answer," a commentary by *Times* reporter Thomas L. Friedman on the foreign policy stances of the candidates in the 2000 Presidential election; and
- "An Ode to Pork," a humorous essay on the tendency of the American Congress to spend vast sums on pet local projects during election years.

Assuming this is typical of each day's *New York Times*, does the reader of *this* study have to *read* the newspaper just described to conclude the *Times* has variety in its news coverage, seeks to place that coverage in a global context and offers sophisticated analysis and commentary? The author thinks not.

The edition just described also serves to highlight other characteristics of global elite dailies as identified by Merrill. Such papers are generally *serious* in tone and tend to eschew sensational or merely popular content (Merrill, 1999). Elite dailies are well informed in areas of significant importance and concern: international relations and diplomacy, politics and science, culture and intercultural issues. Peek more deeply into global elite dailies and you also find substantial and equally serious coverage of the humanities and the arts: books, music and painting to name but a few.

The Contemporary Elite Newspaper: Everything Old is New Again

The elite paper as first described by Schramm and later Merrill has a national, but more importantly global, appeal. It takes a generally serious and rational approach to its

job, demonstrates concern for cultural issues and is well written. Moreover, it is packaged to project this "serious" approach through its typography, layout and a general aesthetic. As an example of this latter point, the *New York Times* became a *cause celebre* when it was decided in 1999 to begin using color photography on its front page. Th decision itself became news.

Aesthetics aside, the elite paper has a credible mission, an institutional "concept." At the *Times*, for example, the concept is embodied in its famous boxed phrase "All the News That's Fit to Print" which runs in a box to the left of the page one masthead.

A major component of the very concept of an elite newspaper is a commitment throughout to high quality reportage. The criteria for virtually all previous surveys stipulate that reportage be offered to the reader with a fundamental sense of social responsibility that celebrates basic human rights and advocates reasonable positions irrespective of the paper's political leaning. The elite paper serves a *leadership* role, which may account for the concern world leaders have about the daily utterances of global elite dailies.

In the West according to the Merrill criteria, elite newspapers must have a maximum degree of editorial freedom that reflects the region's liberal democratic orientation. There it is believed that the elite newspaper must function autonomously from the government of the nation in which it is published. Journalists who work for newspapers published in more authoritarian nations sometimes challenge this latter characteristic. A Chinese journalist interviewed for this article insists *Renmin Ribao* is a present-day elite daily, though that newspaper no longer appears on more recent surveys of the world's elite. Tellingly, the journalist asked that he be unnamed.

The "elite" newspaper's reputation has not been built on sensationalism or prurience, claim a consensus of previous researchers. In fact, a newspaper's quality may improve considerably over its beginnings, but a lesser reputation may prove hard to shake. Witness the volatile fortunes of a newspaper like the *Los Angeles Times* (Gross, Craft, Cameron, Antecol, 1999), the reputation of which seems to rise and fall with each new internal problem or fluctuation in circulation. There is the highly popular *USA Today* which, despite improvements, remains held in relatively low esteem due to its supermarket-checkout-stand-like beginnings and splashy graphic appearance.

Continuing in this high-minded vein, the "elite" newspaper does not publish unsubstantiated material nor does it concern itself with the eccentricities of personality. A true *global* elite newspaper differs from a high quality *national* newspaper in that it has less concern for offering readers stories of purely local interest or large doses of the merely popular. The *global* elite newspaper may offer *populist* content, but it largely avoids the *popular*, unless it offers a larger lesson.

The Content of the Elite Newspaper

How does it "read"? The writing styles of elite newspapers are as unique and institutionalized as the papers often are themselves. Certain newspapers are so unique in writing style that there is a recognized *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal* story lead writing style (The Missouri Group, 2000). While elite papers may differ in style, their tone is always dignified as opposed to breezy, serious without being ponderous. The content of elite newspapers is crafted with an eye to informing readers, to synthesizing knowledge about the events reported in their pages. Elite papers serve as a sort of continuing liberal arts education for their readership, not a running compendium of the fashionable, flashy or short-lived. While often entertaining, they are not entertainment.

A concern for the news and points of view emanating from other nations is a recurring theme among global elite dailies. How does an oil production shortage in Saudi Arabia affect the fortunes of the homeowner in Topeka, Kansas and of the shopkeeper in Teheran? What are the root causes of the continuing problems of sub-Saharan Africa and how might these affect the global economy? What can be done to mend the schism between India and Pakistan before it erupts into a potentially global conflagration? Why support a "one-China" policy with respect to the return of Taiwan to the communist Mandarins in Beijing?

Elite daily stories about medical advances, the loss of rain forest acreage in Brazil, the latest Booker Prize-winning novel or a London restaging of "Hamlet" appear in greater depth than might stories about a Hollywood killing or a sex scandal involving a television evangelist. It is to be remembered, however, that in avoiding prurience, the elite daily is not puritan; in being elite, it does not intend to be elitist. The elite paper

employs a sophisticated, well-educated editorial staff that takes its calling seriously, both with respect to the reporting of national events and affairs, and of their potential global ramifications. Reporters and editors at such papers work hard to help readers make connections among seemingly unrelated world events and to synthesize this knowledge for use in the reader's own daily life and thought.

The Popular Press: a Contrast in Substance and Style

Whereas elite newspapers may be regarded by some as a "class" medium, the vast majority of the world's newspapers remain essentially a "mass" medium, according to its critics (Merrill, 1968, 1999). In recent years, particularly with the availability of online news services, the mass-targeted newspaper has come to be regarded by some scholars as a "dying" medium. We shall see that this is not yet the case. Still, mass consumer newspapers offer less breadth of coverage and less depth of analysis than do elite newspapers. Implicit in this is the notion that the average newspaper is compiled with little respect for the intellectual and critical abilities of its audience.

According to Merrill (1968, p.3), journalism's many critics sometimes express the belief that the field is afflicted with a version of Gresham's Law: bad, that is "popular," newspapers tend to drive out good, that is "more intelligent," newspapers. In fact, what happens is that the proliferation of mass newspapers has little effect on the survival of elite "class" papers other than to prevent them from increasing in number. Why? Quite simply, the carrying capacity of a reading audience is limited, both by the amount of time available to read any newspaper and that audience's ability to absorb and retain the information to which it is exposed. In this way, online newspapers may one day become a viable competitor for the readers of elite newspapers, more so than have mass hardcopy newspapers that were never favored by members of the audience for elite papers.

How can the reader distinguish between elite and mass newspapers? Circulation is an inadequate measure. The circulation of an "elite" paper, such as *The New York Times* in a large market like New York, will obviously exceed that of its equally "elite" paper in a smaller market, like the highly regarded *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* of Zurich. Similarly, a mass-market paper like *USA Today* will have a circulation that exceeds that of *The Times.*

A more useful starting place may be reputation. What does this mean? For the purposes of determining elite newspapers, let us consider this to mean *stature over time.*

A More Recent Evaluation

In addition to his own exhaustive surveys and 1968 book, all mentioned earlier, Merrill recently completed another far less ambitious survey (1999), the results of which were published in "The Global Elite," an article that appeared in *IPI Report*. The *IPI Report*, recently renamed *Global Journalist*, is the quarterly magazine of the International Press Institute of Vienna, Austria.

Given the 20-year span of time that had elapsed, it is interesting to compare Merrill's top ten list of 1968 with that reported in 1999 (1968, pp. 44-45; 1999, p. 15):

The 1968 List:

1. *The New York Times* (U.S.A.)
2. *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* (Switzerland)
3. *Le Monde* (France)
4. *The Guardian* (England)
5. *The Times* (England)
6. *Pravda* (USSR)
7. *Ren-min Ribao* (China)
8. *Borba* (Yugoslavia)
9. *Osservatore Romano* (Vatican City)
10. *ABC* (Spain)

The 1999 List (with the 1968 ranking in parentheses):

1. *The New York Times* (USA) (1)
2. *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* (Switzerland) (2)
3. *The Washington Post* (USA) (unranked)
4. *The Independent* (England) (unranked)
5. *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Germany) (unranked)
6. *Le Monde* (France) (3)
7. *Asahi Shimbun* (Japan) (unranked)

8. *Los Angeles Times* (USA) (unranked)
9. *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (Germany) (unranked)
10. *El Pais* (Spain) (unranked)

Only the top two papers, *The New York Times* and *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* held their rank (1 and 2 respectively), a third *Le Monde* dropped in the rankings (from #3 to #6) and the remaining seven of the top ten had not even appeared in the 1968 top ten list.

Why have the rankings shifted so violently if consistency over time is one of the hallmarks of the elite press club? One reason obvious that is geopolitics. Two of the papers, *Pravda* of the former-USSR and *Borba* of Yugoslavia were from a Communist world that no longer exists as a legitimate political competitor to Western Liberal Democracy. A third, *Renmin Ribao*, continues to be state-sanctioned, but in a China whose communism must appear with a much smaller "c" given the nation's tilt toward Western-style free market economics.

The rise in the fortunes of *The Washington Post* can be accounted for by the ever-increasing importance of events in Washington on the world scene. Perhaps, however, the *Post's* rise in stature is a "reward" for its singular coverage of one of the most gripping stories of the last third of the twentieth century: the 1974 Watergate break-in and subsequent toppling of the Nixon presidency. This latter is an intriguing possibility since, respondents to Merrill's 1999 survey indicated that "press freedom" was an important component of their evaluation and ranking.

The importance of press freedom as a consideration for inclusion may have been the case with *El Pais*, now a well-respected journal in post-Franco Spain. Perhaps the liberal *Asahi Shimbun* has risen to prominence on the coattails of Japan's economy, now the second largest in the world. Or perhaps it is a function of its needling of the powers that be in a politically conservative Japan whose other influential journal, the *Mainichi Shimbun*, has long supported the conservative cause.

Surely, the two German papers now appearing on the list (*Sueddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine*), reflect the world political weight of a reunified, democratic Germany. In the United States, the rise in the fortunes of the *Los Angeles Times* acknowledge improvement in the paper, and its rise to status as a national journal worthy

of mention in the same breath as that "other" *Times*. Too, since 1968, the paper's circulation area has been a region of continuing opportunity, economic growth and an explosion in the ethnic diversity experienced at the beginning of the twentieth century on the "other" coast.

These observations aside, it should also be noted that, methodologically, neither the 1980 survey nor the 1999 assessment sampled the number or range of opinion leaders as did the survey for the 1968 book.

Considering the entire list of paper's chosen as being among the top rank of the world's elite, there was, of course, some variation of opinion as to which of the newspapers should be included, but there emerged general agreement as to which papers belonged in the club.

Taking together all three Merrill surveys along with similar studies, the same newspapers have in general remained at the top of the list. The only exceptions are those not being published at the time the most recent (pre-1999) Merrill survey was completed or those that made large strides toward greatness only in recent years.

In alphabetical order, the following 20 newspapers have consistently placed high in evaluations and rank ordering of newspapers performed by Merrill and other researchers:

- *Asahi Shimbun* (Japan)
- *The Christian Science Monitor* (USA)
- *Corriere della Sera* (Italy)
- *Daily Telegraph* (England)
- *El Norte* (Mexico)
- *El Pais* (Spain)
- *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Germany)
- *The Globe & Mail* (Canada)
- *The Guardian* (England)
- *The Independent* (England)
- *Le Monde* (France)
- *Los Angeles Times* (USA)
- *Melbourne Age* (Australia)

- *The Miami Herald* (USA)
- *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* (Switzerland)
- *The New York Times* (USA)
- *O Estado de Sao Paulo* (Brazil)
- *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Germany)
- *The Wall Street Journal* (USA)
- *The Washington Post* (USA)

Among others commonly mentioned were *Al Ahram* (Egypt), *Excelsior* (Mexico), (*Le Figaro* and *Liberacion* (France), the *Mainichi Shimbun* (Japan), *Straits Times* Singapore), *The Times* (Britain), and *The Times of India.*

This expanded listing offers insights that cannot be gleaned from the top ten lists. The papers named represent somewhat more geographic breadth with the inclusion of Australia (*Melbourne Age*), Canada (*The Globe & Mail*), Italy (*Corriere della Sera*), Mexico (*El Norte*) and South America (*O Estado de Sao Paulo*). The mention of *The Christian Science Monitor*, along with the inclusion of the above papers suggests that respondents may be placing greater emphasis on foreign coverage. This is especially interesting in light of the concern expressed by many American newspaper professionals that their readers have little interest in foreign affairs. This concern is bolstered by the relative absence of meaningful foreign policy debate in recent American election campaigns and, as demonstrated by reader surveys, the low demand and readership of foreign news sections in American papers.

The Geography of Elite Journalism

Despite the broader reach of the expanded list noted above, the true elite club in Merrill's 1999 survey seems wholly representative of liberal democracy, and almost exclusively Western and white. Absent from the elite newspaper lists are representatives of the Muslim world, from the vast expanses of Africa and continental Asia, from Scandanavia and Latin America.

The reason for the absence of papers from these parts of the world could be the simple recognition that there are no quality papers being produced in these places. But the true reason may in fact be more related to politics: these regions, hence their newspapers, *have no global impact*. The geopolitical shift in the post-Cold War balance of power between 1968 and 1999 resulted in an elite press list absent any representation from nations of the former Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc and China. Similarly, the relative political impotence of Africa, Asia and Latin America results in the exclusion of papers from these nations as shapers of world opinion.

This is not to suggest that quality newspapers are found only where political fortune smiles, in America and Western Europe at the moment. There are many national papers of high standards and quality: in the Latin world, there is *El Mercurio* of Chile, *La Nacion* of Costa Rica and *El Commercio* of Peru. *The Hindu* of India is a fine journal, as are *Helsingen Sanomat* of Finland and *Dagens Nyheter* of Sweden. Given the smaller spotlights these nations represent on the world stage, the exclusion of their newspapers from elite status makes political sense, but may also be a comment about the state of the world's journalism, that evaluating it has become somewhat political.

This leads to an interesting feature concerning the characteristics of "elite" newspapers. In all the studies of what constitutes an elite paper, among all of the responses gathered over the decades in surveys by Merrill and other journalism historians and academicians, no one has ever suggested that an elite newspaper is one that should be ethical or have high moral purpose.

True, it is difficult to measure "ethics" in the printed content of a newspaper or determine that its editorial board and staff members are possessed of "high moral purpose." Perhaps it can be assumed that a newspaper that has the appropriate superficial characteristics -- serious content, broad coverage, graphic excellence – can be assumed to have a pure soul to go along with its body. Do recall that "press freedom" was mentioned as being necessary, but this is not the same as ethics. The tradition of liberal democracy values freedom, hence individualism. But, surely there may be instances when individuality for the journalist or newspaper publisher can clash with practicing ethical behavior and exercising high moral purpose. Witness how, in the political world, nations

can express concern for human rights, but still relate comfortably with nations that do not adhere to the practice of respecting human rights.

The notion of the "elite" newspaper as it has been defined to this time is *prima facie* exclusionary because these certain *national* characteristics seem requisite: 1) a successful economy that ensures sufficient capital to craft and distribute quality newspapers; 2) a well-developed educational system to ensure literacy; 3) an international language, that is the paper in question can be read, and its contents understood and talked about. For all practical purposes, that means the paper is in English or has an English edition. French, the other official language of the United Nations, and perhaps Spanish, are acceptable as well.

With these preconditions to elite status, how can an elite press take hold in recently developing or underdeveloped nations?

In assessing what constitutes an elite newspaper, students of the medium have generally sought the responses and opinions of the *consumers*. They have queried readers of the papers or at least of those who know the journals by their reputation: world leaders in politics and government, science, the arts and humanities. But does questioning *elite readers* result in an accurate representation of what constitutes an *elite newspaper*? What would the originators of the newspapers, journalists, single out as the world's finest newspapers? Is the "elite press" simply the press read by an elite class? Or is the elite press intended to single out the finest examples of newspapering? Would a list of the world's best newspapers compiled by contemporary *journalists* worldwide look similar to such a list compiled by previous researchers?

Methodology

Sample and Interview Procedures

The author sought to answer this question on May 2, 2000 by surveying journalists from around the world present at the annual Congress of the International Press Institute in Boston, Massachusetts.

Founded in 1950, the Vienna, Austria-based International Press Institute was born out of a 1947 UNESCO Report that called for "an international institute of press and information" that would serve as "a research center on technical and professional problems." Though the Report made no mention of the importance of journalistic accuracy or of press freedom, these issues have become the focus of the IPI. Today, it's membership of approximately 2,000 publishers, editors, producers and reporters represents more than 110 nations. The IPI sponsors publication of a quarterly magazine and a weekly radio broadcast on international journalism issues, and monitors the condition of journalism and journalists worldwide.

Boston hosted approximately 500 attendees from 80 nations. This gathering was the Fiftieth Anniversary Congress and the occasion for the naming of 50 Press Freedom Heroes selected by a Commission of the IPI. Profiles of the heroes were published as a special edition of the *IPI Report* (International Press Institute, 2000).

The author attended the Congress in his capacity as then-Managing Editor of the *IPI Report*. The magazine has since changed its name to *Global Journalist*. Because of the unique nature of the organization, its membership, and the particular purpose of the 50th Anniversary meeting of the IPI, the Convention represented a unique opportunity to poll in one place a worldwide sample of distinguished journalists, editors and publishers on their choices for the world's elite newspapers.

Research Questions

The survey was conducted to gather data regarding three questions:

1) Rank-order the world's three best newspapers and indicate in which medium (hardcopy or online) you read them;
2) Identify the criteria used to make these choices;
3) Identify which online news sources you consider credible.

Of the 350 journalists present at the May 2 meeting at which the survey was conducted, 106 (30.3%) responded. The respondents represented a wide variety of journalist positions, from reporters on daily newspapers and foreign correspondents to distinguished editors and publishers, many of whom are well known internationally.

Several respondents were included among the International Press Institute's distinguished 50 Press Freedom Heroes. Though a majority were from North America and Western Europe, representation from Africa, Latin and South America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Scandanavia and continental Asia far exceeded that normally found in similar studies.

Findings and Discussion

Summary results reveal some similarities, and substantial differences, from previous assessments of the world's elite papers. While *The New York Times* with 55 percent of first-place votes and a 69.8 percent top three ranking was the overwhelming choice among these journalists as the world's finest newspaper, the remainder of the top ten list is different from that in previous studies.

The following top ten rankings are based on the percentage of votes for the paper as being among the top three. This percentage as a function of the total number of votes cast is indicated in parentheses, along with the *n*. When a lower-ranked paper was accorded more *first place* votes than the paper ranked immediately above, this is indicated with an asterisk*.

Journalists' list of worlds "elite" newspapers 2000:

1) *The New York Times* (USA) (69.8, *n*=74)
2) *The Washington Post* (USA) (24.5, *n*=26)
3) *Financial Times* (England) (22.0, *n*=23)*
4) *The Wall Street Journal* (USA) (16.9, *n*=18)
5) *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* (Switzerland) (13.2, *n*=14)
6) *International Herald Tribune* (Paris edition) (12.3, *n*=13)*
7) *The Guardian* (England) (12.3, *n*=13)

   (NOTE: *The Guardian* received the identical number of first-to-third place votes, but fewer first-place votes that the *Tribune*)
8) *Los Angeles Times* (USA) (4.7, *n*=5)
9) *Le Monde* (France) (4.7, *n*=5)

(NOTE: the *Los Angeles Times* received the identical number of first-to-third place votes, but fewer first-place votes that *The Guardian*)

10) *El Pais* (Spain) (3.7, n=4)

Ranked behind *El Pais* were, in order: England's *The Economist* (which regards itself as a newspaper), *Frankfurter Allgemeine* of Germany and America's *USA Today*.

There are several striking features of this listing. While it is not especially surprising to find that *The New York Times* heads the list, it is the choice of a far greater margin than in previous surveys. This could suggest that the *Times* is well established as the newspaper of record among professionals or that the paper has become the commonly accepted *international* newspaper of record.

As in Merrill's 1999 ranking among "consumers," *The Washington Post* has earned similar high praise among journalists, placing second. Though they may be regarded as surprise additions to the top ten list, London's *Financial Times* and America's *The Wall Street Journal* have long been regarded as "journalists'" newspapers: very well written, with broad, timely and insightful coverage, particularly of economic issues. Subjective observations aside, one can only speculate why *The Washington Post*, the *Financial Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* receive such high marks from journalists. It may reflect the end of the Cold War and globalization, particularly in the economic sphere. Perhaps these papers have long been regarded this highly among journalists and previous polls did not tap their assessments. Only consistent polling over time of a similar sample of international journalists can provide an answer this question.

The *International Herald Tribune* appears infrequently in previous polls. Its choice by a group of journalists with considerable experience as foreign correspondents may reflect the paper's availability in areas where competitors do not or cannot reach or the fondness foreign correspondents feel for a familiar journal in an unfamiliar place.

Neue Zurcher Zeitung (#5), *The Guardian* (#7), *Le Monde* (#9) and *El Pais* (#10) continue to occupy their accustomed place in the top ten ranks. The *Los Angeles Times* appears to have become as well regarded among journalists as among consumers, placing eighth both in this survey and the one conducted in 1999 by Merrill.

Though not placing in the top ten, it is interesting to note that *USA Today* received several mentions. Whether this is a function of the paper's true assessment among journalists or a marketing success – it is widely available free to the mobile journalism profession on planes and in hotels worldwide – is difficult to determine. That it has earned a significant number of mentions from journalists makes the future standing of *USA Today* worth watching.

While the list offers some insight into how journalists rank the world's press, the process offers other salient points. Aside from the newspapers highly ranked and/or receiving multiple mentions, a total of 57 newspapers were ranked among the world's top three. Most of these received only one or two mentions from the 106 respondents, but the sheer number and geographic variety are notable. Included are familiar papers present in other surveys, like *The Independent,* Canada's *The Globe & Mail* and The *Daily Telegraph*. But also present are *The Irish Times*, Korea's *Chosun Ilbo*, Japan's *Yomiuri* and *The Hindu* of India.

Perhaps most surprising was the number of well-regarded national papers included by the journalists in their "best of" lists. These included the respected *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, *The Dallas Morning News* and *The Miami Herald*. That papers such as these are receiving attention is important, in part because these papers and others like them serve constituencies that are heavily minority and multi-cultural.

Why the Best?

In comparison with the findings of Merrill and others who have conducted surveys among newspaper consumers, this sample of journalists offered different criteria for ranking elite newspapers. The reader will recall the criteria offered by respondents to Merrill's original survey were:

- seriousness of tone
- influence among world opinion leaders
- linguistic sophistication
- exemplars for other journalists
- concern for "high" culture

Though some previous studies did include journalist respondents, those queried were more often consumers of the news, world opinion leaders in their respective fields, not professional journalists.

This sample of IPI journalist respondents offered a somewhat different set of evaluation criteria. The characteristics they used in choosing their top-ranked papers were, in order of the number of mentions:

- credibility
- breadth of coverage
- reliability and accuracy of information
- depth of reporting
- informed analysis

Any journalist would recognize this as the list of the essential characteristics of "good" journalism. Because the respondents are themselves all journalists, it is not surprising that the values of journalism would form the basis for their responses. This could also help account for the fact that less prestigious papers earned mention in the rankings of this group: these characteristics can be present in both quality regional papers and those of international stature like *The New York Times*. It is interesting to note the different standards by which practitioners of the craft and consumers of the product evaluate newspaper quality. This sample of journalists, for example, offered little concern for how influential a paper was thought to be, or of how sophisticated it was in either language or tone.

The Online Issue

The availability of a good sample of well-regarded journalists from around the world gathering in Boston in May, 2000 also offered a fine opportunity to seek an initial assessment of the use and impact of online (Internet) editions of newspapers and their use, or non-use, by international journalists. In requesting the ranking of newspapers, the respondents were asked if they read the papers they chose in hardcopy or online form.

The overwhelming number of respondents said they read the hardcopy editions of their chosen papers. The lone newspaper that seemed to have a large online following

among the journalist-respondents was *The New York Times*, the online edition of which is now in its fifth year of "publication." Of the near-70 percent that chose it as the world's best newspaper, 22.4 percent said they read the *Times* online. No other paper approached this level of online readership.

This may be attributed to the journalists' response to another of the survey questions, specifically did they consider online editions *as credible* as hardcopy editions. Only a third of the respondents considered online editions equally credible, over one-half not as credible and the remainder had no opinion. Given the overwhelming choice of *The New York Times* as the world's best newspaper based on essentially "good journalism" criteria, it is plausible to suggest that it is *The Times'* online edition which comes to mind among those who find online editions as credible as hardcopy.

This aside, the readership of electronic editions was scattered at best. Online editions do not yet seem to have the penetration levels of hardcopy editions. This may seem counterintuitive since it should be easier to access an electronic edition on one's desktop or laptop computer than find a hardcopy edition in the remote corners of the world.

There are many possible explanations for this finding. Many of the respondents were journalists from developing nations. Perhaps it is because their work places lack the access to online editions or, if they work independently, the respondents lacked the personal resources, read "money," to obtain access. In simpler terms, the question of online access and credibility is premature because the penetration of online editions is still limited by availability and economics.

Conclusions

In comparing the findings of the author's recent survey of International Press Institute journalists with previous elite press surveys, the following observations can be noted:

1) As in previous surveys, this ranking by the International Press Institute's journalists (editors and publishers) accords *The New York Times* singular high

esteem as the world's best newspaper. Further, it outdistanced competitors by a wider margin than in previous surveys.

2) The premiere position of that one newspaper aside, the remaining papers in the top ten (and beyond) represent more breadth in terms of world geography. Newspapers of two continents rarely represented, Australia and South America, appear in the top 20 with *Melbourne Age* and the *O Estado de Sao Paulo* respectively. *The Globe and Mail* and *El Norte* represent Canada and Mexico, two nations that have long existed in the information as well as cultural shadow of the United States. While a disproportionate number of paper's from Western Europe have replaced representatives from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Japan's respected *Asahi Shimbun* has crept into the top 20 to represent Asia. Other papers from Asia (the Singapore *Straits Times* and India's *The Hindu*), the Middle East (Egypt's *El Ahram*) and a second from Mexico (*Excelsior*) earned mentions. *The Christian Science Monitor* again places in the top 20, attesting to the concern of the respondents for international affairs coverage. While these results may simply be an artifact of the sample or of this survey, it may also signal a more even-handed consideration of the quality of the *world's* press by the fraternity of world journalists.
3) Significantly, the reasons chosen by the IPI respondents for their choices differ completely from those offered by respondents to other surveys. Samples chosen earlier and more representative of a broader array of professions (government, education, science and the humanities as well as journalism) had a penchant for considerations seemingly more a matter of *class*: seriousness, influence, sophisticated language, 'high' culture. These in opposition to the wholly journalist-selected values: credibility, breadth, reliability, depth and informed analysis.
4) The "online issue" appears to not yet be an issue. While most of the papers highly ranked and mentioned are available in online editions, their readership is not high and, with the exception of *The New York Times*, neither is their perceived credibility. Many of the journalists responding to this latest survey

are residents of developing nations where computer and Internet access can be difficult. Even in highly developed Japan, Internet access is currently below 10 million users. The findings of this latest survey suggest it is likely to be some time before online editions become serious threats to replace the hardcopy newspaper, notwithstanding technophiles' enthusiasm for the potential of the Internet.

5) While there is less change at the top of the list, there appears to be considerable churn in the middle and lower portions of the top 20, and among other papers mentioned. Surely, the shift in political fortunes toward Western-style liberal democracy is a factor. Gone not only are the papers of the Eastern bloc, but also Western European voices such as *The Guardian* and The Vatican's *Osservatoire Romano*.

Lengthy speculation might be written about the reasoning and meaning of the results of surveys such as those reviewed here. Some may conclude they represent a meaningful barometer of the state of newspapers or of the profession of journalism worldwide. Others may see the hand of politics reflected in these selections. To one disdainful commentator, such lists were little more than "horse raceish."

The author finds a degree of truth in each of these points of view. There is an additional consideration. There may be represented in this latest survey a shift away from class considerations in determining the quality of information made available to the world's peoples. Indeed, future students of the world's press may find a classification like "elite" to be itself an artifact of a privileged world that has long been uniformly wealthy, white, well-educated and Western.

The subtle, yet important, finding of this latest survey of the world's newspapers may be that information is becoming *less* elitist in its tone, and *more available* to an increasingly democratized world and its less homogenized, more diverse peoples.

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The Private and Government Sides of Tanzanian Journalists

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The Private and Government Sides of Tanzanian Journalists

Abstract

Against the backdrop of the evolution of Tanzania's political and economic systems from the controlled to the liberal, this paper presents the concomitant evolution of Tanzania's media from colonial and indigenous government control to private ownership. While the history of the media is interesting in and of itself, it is presented also to demonstrate the changing nature of ownership influences—government, party and private—on the Tanzanian media. This, in turn, serves as a backdrop for the empirical portion of this paper.

Using type of ownership (private, party or government) as a classifying variable, the paper then captures Tanzanian journalists' current demographic, work related, and opinion profile with regard to the importance of their jobs, their journalistic freedom, and private and government media traits. The historical influences on Tanzanian media are apparent particularly in journalists attribution of traits to government and private media: the former will unify and develop the country, the latter will develop an informed citizenry but also be sensationalistic and unethical. Interestingly, the traits ascribed to government and private media were related to ownership of place of employment of the respondents.

The Private and Government Sides of Tanzanian Journalists

Abandoning the authoritarian political systems and socialist economic policies they had adopted after their liberation in the 1960s from European colonial controls, some African countries began to experiment, in the 1990s, with democratic political systems and economic liberalization (Morna, 1995). One of the principal objectives of this reform movement was freedom of the press. This scenario also played out in the East African country of Tanzania.

The evolution of Tanzania's political and economic systems from the controlled to the liberal, since colonial times through the post-independence years to the current days, is the backdrop for this paper. Against this backdrop, the paper presents the concomitant evolution of Tanzania's media from colonial and indigenous government control to private ownership.

Using type of ownership (private, party or government) as a classifying variable, the paper then presents and interprets the results of an empirical study of Tanzanian journalists. This empirical study captures Tanzanian journalists' current demographic, work related, and opinion profile with regard to the importance of their jobs, their journalistic freedom, and private and government media traits.

The first section of the paper, addressing its historical purpose, is solely descriptive in nature. The second section, addressing the empirical study, offers and answers research questions based on quantitative and qualitative results.

Political and Economic Background of Tanzania

Tanzania is the generic name of the 1964 union of mainland Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which is composed of the main island of Unguja and its sister island, Pemba, in the Indian Ocean. Before that, Tanganyika had become a German colony in 1884, and later been incorporated into German East Africa, and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba had been declared British protectorates in 1890. In 1918, at the end of the First World War, the German forces had surrendered and Tanganyika was placed under a League of Nations mandate, with the United Kingdom as the administering power. In 1946, Tanganyika had become a UN Trust Territory, still under British rule ("Tanzania: Introductory Survey," 1998).

Under colonial rule, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were largely agrarian, producing raw materials and crops like cotton, coffee, sisal and cloves to meet demand in Europe. Unlike neighboring Kenya, Tanzania did not stimulate industrialization even in the depression years of the 1930s. By 1945, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were incorporated into the world capitalist system as suppliers of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods (Coulson, 1982).

Despite the fact that Tanzanians struggled against a colonial government for political and economic freedom, as well as press freedom, when freedom came to Tanzania, the country chose control over freedom in all three realms.

Zanzibar received freedom in 1963, and Tanganyika in 1961 under the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)[1] led by Julius K. Nyerere who became Prime Minister of Tanganyika and, in 1962, Tanzania's first President. In terms of the political system, Tanzania's July 1965 constitution provided for a one-party state.[2] On the economic front, the country adopted the socialist path to development, encoded in the *Arusha Declaration* of February 5, 1967. Emphasizing the modernization of the rural sector, the declaration directed that all major means of production would be publicly owned to promote the principle of ujamaa (Konde, 1984). Ujamaa translated into "familyhood," a system of villages organized by traditional African and socialist principles, and was the idea that society is an extension of the family.

Assessments of the political system of one party rule are mixed. They include mention of abuses: political dissidence was crushed, whether within the party ("Tanzania: Introductory Survey," 1998) or outside, and political excesses were widely reported, especially on the island of Zanzibar (Amnesty International, 2000). According to Konde (1984), however, one party rule was not imposed on the Tanzanian people; it was the people themselves who voted overwhelmingly for one party rule under Nyerere's leadership. Nyerere himself was able to achieve a tribal unity unrivalled in the rest of Africa as well as high literacy for Tanzanians. In a personal interview (1999), *Daily News* Deputy Managing Editor Wilson Kaigarula put it thus: "If Nyerere had not put the system of free education in place, we would have been herding cattle and goats."

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[1]TANU was created in 1954.

Assessments of the impact of the economic organization of the country, however, are singular. Socialism resulted in economic disaster for the country ("Time to Wake Up," 1998; Wallengren, 1997; Costello, 1996; Ransdell, 1995). Tanzania is today one of the poorest and most aid-dependent countries in all of Africa ("Tanzania: Introductory Survey," 1998; "Time to Wake Up", 1998), with a per capita income estimated at $250 per month (http://www.worldbank.org/afr/tz2.htm, 2001), and a foreign debt burden of over $8 billion ("Time to Wake Up," 1998).

In the last decade and more, whether out of self-realization or pressure from the outside, Tanzania began to address these political and economic issues, as well as press issues. It introduced economic austerity measures in the mid-1980s in response to IMF demands, and further accelerated economic liberalization in the '90s. It launched a multiparty political system on July 1, 1992, and announced elections for 1995. Since the 1995 election when CCM, the ruling party under the one-party system, won, Tanzania has held a second election in October 2000, albeit with the same results. While these political and economic changes have not been without problems, they have brought with them press freedom, and today, despite teething problems, Tanzania enjoys a freer press climate than ever before in its history.

Media History

Print Media

Colonial control and the concomitant spread of missionary activity and white settlers were the major influencing factors in place during the birth and initial development of the press in Tanzania. The early press therefore was marked by both government (colonial) and private (missionary and white settler as well as independent) ownership but with little tension between the two given the similarity of goals and audiences.

In the colonial period, the early twentieth century saw the advent of official government news sheets focusing on the colonial administration. Before that, news sheets, privately owned and published by Christian missionaries, and focusing on missionary work, were in circulation in Tanganyika as early as 1888. The first new sheets were the *Msimulizi* (Newsbearer), launched in

[2]In Tanzania's history to date, TANU, later Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), formed in 1972 by merging TANU and the Afro-Shirazi party of Zanzibar, has always been the ruling party.

1888, followed in 1894 by *Habari za Mwezi* (News of the month). A third, *Pwani na Bara* (Coast and Hinterland), appeared a little later in 1910 (Nordenstreng & Ng'wanakilala, 1987; Konde, 1984). According to Nordenstreng and Ng'wanakilala (1987),"the Missionaries were instrumental in publishing most of these sheets" (p. 34), and there was a very convenient balance of power between the missionaries and the administrators. Privately owned white settler news sheets were also in circulation, the most notorious one being the German weekly (by 1908, a bi-weekly) *Zeitung*, established around 1899. It advocated the rights of German settlers in Tanganyika, propagating strong anti-African sentiments (Nordenstreng & Ng'wanakilala, 1987). Even though the missionary papers also catered to Africans who were educated in the missions as well as to Asians, the early press in Tanzania was largely for the European community. Most other private newspapers too, during the early part of the twentieth century, catered to the European community, including the *Tanganyika Standard*, launched in 1930 on an invitation from the Tanganyika governor (Kilimwiko & Mapunda, 1998).

During the late eighteenth and very early nineteenth century then, given a private press, whether missionary, white settler, or independent, that catered mostly to their needs, the colonial government offered little resistance. But the spread of private ownership of the press to indigenous groups—party and non-party—for nationalist causes changed this.

Until about the 1940s, the colonial hold on the mass media was so tight that anyone else who sought to start his own paper was discouraged (Konde, 1984). In particular, the colonial regime did not encourage the establishment of nationalist newspapers, and even missionary pamphlets and news sheets were watched to see that they did not contain material on freedom and justice for African natives (Konde, 1984). Also, attempts to start privately owned, indigenous papers in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s were daunted by illiteracy and economic problems (Konde, 1984).

One of the first among early indigenous (African-owned) newspapers was the *Kwetu*, a weekly journal in English and Swahili, which was started by Erica Fiah in 1937. The voice of Tanganyika's African community, the *Kwetu* spawned other newspapers in different parts of the country, including multilingual papers such as the *Tanganyika Opinion* (1939) and the *Tanganyika Herald* (1941), providing a forum for expressing African grievances and promoting the social, economic and political interests of native Africans (Scotton, 1978). Surprisingly, the

British appeared to welcome the arrival of *Kwetu*. "Despite criticism of Fiah's political activities, the British actually gave *Kwetu* substantial support" (Scotton, 1978, p. 4) because they felt that Africans were bound to want a paper of their own and considered this a good beginning. *Kwetu* also provided valuable reading for the British officials. However, during the war, *Kwetu* did have some run-ins with the administration and was warned that legal action was being considered on grounds of libel (Scotton, 1978).

The post World War II period marked a rise in (TANU-sponsored) Tanzanian nationalism. In turn, the colonial government mobilized radio and English newspapers like the *Tanganyika Standard* to influence public opinion against TANU (Konde, 1984). This was met on the indigenous side by a rise in the number of nationalist publications, both party and non-party. The first and most important among these was the TANU-sponsored *Mwafrika*, marking the beginning of the African nationalist press. *Mwafrika* was started by Robert Makange in 1956, two years after TANU was formed.[3] It ran into trouble time and again, and was actually the first African newspaper in Tanganyika against which a sedition charge was brought. Makange and others were jailed, and served six months in prison (Scotton, 1978). A year later, in 1957, TANU launched "*Sauti ya Tanu*" (Voice of Tanu), also considered to mark the beginning of the nationalist press. *Sauti ya Tanu* contained party news in English and Swahili as well as statements on policy by Nyerere. After independence, this news letter developed into *Uhuru* and the *Nationalist* (Konde, 1984). In 1959, TANU leaders, under Nyerere's Chairmanship, launched the National Times Press with the goal of publishing an English daily, a Swahili daily and a Gujarati weekly. *The National Times*, an English newspaper under Nyerere's editorship, was launched, but it was undercapitalized and its equipment was outdated so the attempt was short lived (Ainslie, 1968).

As the political climate began to change, the Catholic press, which had remained largely insulated from the nationalist movement, also made a policy shift. The Catholic bishops felt that the paper had a duty to educate people not just in religious matters, but also about social,

[3]There are conflicting accounts of whether *Mwafrika* was TANU-sponsored or TANU-owned. Makange however *was* a party member and the paper did have strong TANU links.

political, and economic issues according to the teachings of the church. Therefore *Kiongozi*, which editorialized in May 1955 that "It is not the work of religion to interfere with politics" (Scotton, 1978) was by 1957 publishing TANU news, running an interview with a TANU official, and putting Nyerere's photograph on the front page. Subsequently, it became an open supporter of TANU. In 1959, its circulation climbed up to over 25,000 (Scotton, 1978).

Kiongozi received some indirect threats by way of calls from British officials, but no real direct warnings (Scotton, 1978). The colonial government however persecuted nationalist papers, especially the TANU-sponsored ones. The British even launched a libel case in 1958 against Nyerere, accusing him of criminal libel against the district commissioners of Musoma and Songea (Konde, 1984).

Among the non-party affiliated private papers, in the 1950s, were *Zuhra*,[4] a weekly in English and Swahili, [not anti-government, according to Scotton (1978) though it sometimes showed anti-colonial sympathies], the conservative *Bukya na Gandi* started in Bukoba in Northern Tanganyika, and *Tanganyika Mypa* also in Bukoba (Ainslie, 1968).

Several local newspapers run by district councils, native authorities and growers' co-operatives also came into existence in pre-independence Tanganyika. More than 20 were established with government support, apparently to encourage interest in local affairs. Many other ventures did not survive long: *Mwangaza*, a daily, lasted only a year due to financial problems, *Baragumu* was taken over by the Nation Media Group in 1960, and *Mamba Leo* folded by 1962 (Ainslie, 1968. See also Ochs, 1986).

Early post-independence Tanzania, of the 1960s, had four daily newspapers (Mytton, 1968): the *Standard*, a conservative, English-language paper; *Ngurumo*, a cheaper Swahili tabloid; *Uhuru*, the TANU-owned Swahili paper, a weekly from its founding in 1961 to 1964 [described by its current chief editor, Saidi Nguba, as the paper the leadership and the people in the country now rely on (1999, personal interview)], and the *Nationalist*, an English language paper founded by TANU in 1964 as a tabloid (it became a daily later) (Konde, 1984).

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[4]There are conflicting accounts about who started this paper. According to Ainslie (1968), it was started by Robert Makange, later editor of *Mwafrika*. According to Scotton (1978), it was owned by an Asian, Mr. Machado Plantan, and edited by a politically active poet Mathias Mnyampala.

The struggle with the colonial government over private ownership of papers, both party and non-party, particularly by indigenous groups for nationalist causes, did not prevent these same indigenous groups from controlling the press in post-independence Tanzania. Within the framework of the non-democratic political and socialist economic system Tanzania had adopted after independence, Tanzanian leaders soon enlisted the media to help with national unity and development. The role of the press under ujamaa was clearly articulated in Nyerere's message on the occasion of the nationalization, in 1972, of the *Standard* (Konde, 1984). The take-over would benefit peasants and workers and allay suspicions that this English-language newspaper served the interests of foreign owners. The press would be free to report, to comment on, and to criticize any faults in society, without government restriction, but only when it reflected essential values of socialist democracy and respected decisions reached by the majority.

Nyerere merged the *Standard* with the *Nationalist* to form *Daily News*, beginning the 'Tanzanization' of the press (Ng'wanakilala, 1981). The mid-1970s to the mid-1980s were mainly represented by the dailies *Daily News* (government owned) and *Uhuru* (party owned), and their respective sister weeklies *Sunday News* and *Mzalendo,* and *Mfanyakazi*, a weekly workers' paper. The government news agency Shihata was also launched in 1976.[5] For the most part, the state and ruling-party owned newspapers enjoyed a virtual monopoly until the mid-1980s.

Assessments of the press under this political and economic organization of the country vary. Some believe that Tanzania had no official censorship and did allow freedom of press, the press was critical of government, and when it was subdued, it was for legitimate reasons (Konde, 1984; Ochs, 1986). Others believe that the government's silence in providing information was a form of censorship (Tegambwage, 1990), objectivity was sacrificed, and many editors and journalists became government mouthpieces with the result that "Tanzania emerged as a nation, but without a press of its own" (Ng'wanakilala, 1981, p. 17).

It was only after the 1985 resignation of Nyerere as President and a change in leadership that was to move the country to greater liberalization that the first post-independence private

[5]During the author's visit to Tanzania in fall 1999, Shihata was being closed down.

newspaper was started. After a short-lived attempt by *Africa Baraza* in March 1987,[6] *Business Times*, published by Business Times Limited and targeted at the business and financial community, became the first privately owned English weekly in 1988, followed in the same year, by the bimonthly, *Family Mirror*, described by its current executive director, A. Macha, as having been "on the forefront to bring democracy, multiparty democracy in Tanzania" (1999, personal interview).

The liberalized environment of the early 1990s, and announcement of multi-party elections in 1992, led to the growth of a number of private newspapers and magazines. In February 1992, two more private weekly newspapers, the English-language *Express* and the Swahili-language *Mwananchi* were launched, followed in 1993 by *Majira*, owned by Business Times Limited, and characterized by its executive editor, Sammy Makilla, as one of the first to challenge the ruling party on its pages (1999, personal interview). In 1995, a new, independent English-language daily newspaper, *The Guardian*, owned by The Guardian Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of IPP Ltd. (one of the largest media groups in Tanzania) and the leading newspaper publishing company in Tanzania today, was launched, ending the 30-year monopoly of the state-owned *Daily News*. Puri (1995) described the date as "a historic [one] in the history of Tanzania's print media" (p. 41). *Daily News'* Kaigarula, however, believes that private competition has not hurt them because people now buy two papers and the international community banks on the *Daily News* (1999, personal interview).

In the five years after the introduction of the multiparty system, in a new spirit of pluralistic democracy, Tanzania had 100 registered newspapers ("World Press," 1997).[7] While economic hardships forced the closure of several publications, today Tanzania still has about nine dailies

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[6]*Africa Baraza* contained a story criticizing corruption under Nyerere's presidency in its first issue. Within hours after it was printed, the first copies were seized by the police (Hachten, 1993).

[7]The new spirit of liberalization is also evident in the number of journalism organizations that uphold the rights of journalists. These include the Tanzania Association of Journalists (TAJA) in existence on and off since 1963, but in a 1984 assessment by Konde (1984) not really effective in representing journalistic grievances; Journalists Environmental Association of Tanzania; Association of Journalists and Media Workers; the Media Institute of Southern Africa Tanzania Chapter; Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA); Commonwealth Journalists Association (CJA), Tanzania Chapter; Commonwealth Press Union (CPU); and Eastern Africa Media Institute (EAMI) (Kilimwiko & Mapunda, 1998). A number of press clubs have also sprung up including ones in Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza, Mbeya, Tanga, and Morogoro. A Media Council has also been set up with the objective of assisting the media to be free (Ngaiza, 1999, personal interview)

and fifteen non-dailies in English and Kishwahili, remarkable despite the fact that these newspapers are urban-based when the majority of the population is rural (Kilimwiko & Mapunda, 1998). With the advent of the Internet in Africa, many of these newspapers are also available online. About a dozen more periodicals are distributed, some owned by various political parties (http://www.ijnet.org/Profile/Africa/Tanzania/media.html, 2001).

In Tanzania today, private newspapers outnumber government and party newspapers. The large private newspapers are *The Guardian*, *Business Times* and *Majira*. The government and party (CCM) papers, also with comparably large circulations, are *Daily News* and *Uhuru* respectively.[8]

Zanzibar has a press history that is as lengthy as any in East Africa but no newspapers of any note today. Asians—especially Indians and Arabs—were active in the press. At the turn of the twentieth century, the weekly *Samachar*, published in English and Gujarati, pursued what later became a pro-Pakistani line, while *The Zanzibar Voice*, founded in 1922, favored the Indian Congress Party. *Afrika Kwetu,* in English and Swahili, was a pro-British voice. *Al Falaq*, published by the Arab Association, and *Al-Nandha* were both strongly anti-government. By the late 1960s however, all these papers were gone or were dying (Ochs, 1986). The only major publications today are two Swahili weeklies: *Nuru*, the official publication of the Zanzibar government, and *Jukwaa*, owned by a politician-businessman (Kilimwiko & Mapunda, 1998).

While *Daily News*' Kaigarula says that there is no interference from the government in his paper (1999, personal interview), some control of the press in one form or another still exists. Masha (1997) argued that the controls of a one-party regime have stayed in place because multipartyism came to Tanzania only due to strong external forces that had to be accommodated; laws restrictive of political and press freedoms still exist and their repeal is necessary to realize the new vision of a pluralistic society. The restrictive Newspaper Act of 1976 is still in existence and, according to Kuringe Monge, news editor at CTN, still hinders press freedom (1999, personal interview). The Tanzania Information Services (TIS), the government's information arm, licenses newspapers and has the power to ban them through ministers if they do not heed

[8]Circulation figures for many publications are contradictory. For example, Kilimwiko and Mapunda (1998) place the circulation of *Daily News* at 15,000 and *Uhuru* at 14,000, while "Tanzania: An Introductory Survey" (1998) places the same newspapers' circulations at 50,000 and 100,000 respectively. Similarly, circulation figures for private newspapers also vary.

warnings (Mwaffisi, 1999, personal interview). Similarly, the Broadcasting Service Act of 1993, which led to the establishment of the Tanzanian Broadcasting Corporation (TBC),which provides broadcast licenses, also gave TBC unfettered powers to curtail freedom of the media (Kinyenge, 1998). According to Idrisi Lugulu, editor of *Democrat*, even though the government is not very strict, "the tools are still intact" (1999, personal interview). There is also lack of access to information from government (Makilla, 1999, personal interview), and self censorship is still practiced (Mwakisyala, 1999, personal interview).

Some argue that there is reason for the controls and point to unprofessional conduct on the media's part. According to Kasoma (1997), the newly independent media in Africa and their respective governments have developed a confrontational relationship, and the responsibility for this lies with the media. The media's unprofessional conduct or 'recklessness' (p. 296), including the use of newspapers as political opposition, bad advocacy journalism, and the overuse of anonymous sources, as well as the absence of a self-regulatory system, has resulted in imposition by the government of restrictions on the media to create responsibility on their part.

Whatever the truth may be, the evidence is that the long-standing struggle between the private and government sides of Tanzanian media still continues. It began in colonial times, with print media, but continued in early post-independence Tanzania too under indigenous control and exists, even in these more liberal times, admittedly on a smaller scale, not only in print but also in broadcast media.

Broadcast Media

Radio: Like other modern mass media in Africa, radio broadcasting in Tanzania is also a colonial legacy, tracing its beginnings to 1951 (Ng'wanakilala, 1981). Initial trial broadcasts, with modest technical equipment, transmitted only to the Dar es Salaam area and content was predominantly news about Europe and colonial government propaganda to acculturate Tanzanians into European civilization. In 1956, the broadcasting operation was constituted as a public corporation, the Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC), modeled after the BBC, with nationwide reach. The experiment was so successful that there were about 72,000 receivers in use by 1960, with a listenership of 377,000 (Ng'wanakilala, 1981).

However, expansion of radio into a mass medium did not begin until after independence in 1961. As Tanzania adopted a one-party political system, the country's new nationalist leadership began to make TBC and its operational philosophy compatible with its nascent sociopolitical ideology. In particular, the colonial administration's effective use of radio for propaganda led the Tanzanian government to utilize the medium for its development programs. TBC was placed under the control of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in 1965, and named Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD). Since then, according to Lederbogen (1992), RTD has been an instrument of socialization and propaganda.[9]

Until the end of the 1980s, RTD, with its External Service, National Service, Commercial Service and School Service, was the sole broadcaster within Tanzania. Tanzania opened up the airwaves in 1993 following liberalization, allowing emergence of private radio stations, including a missionary station.

The private radio stations mostly carry foreign news with a small percentage of local news. Many of these stations do not produce their own news due to low budgets and the high cost of production (Hamizi, 1999, personal interview). According to TBC Registrar Florence Hamizi, there are no restrictions on number of news bulletins for private radio (and television) stations, but they are required to link up once a day with Radio Tanzania for news, and all stations must be FM. Also, these stations are free to broadcast without censorship though monitoring of content is done (Hamizi, 1999, personal inteview), and laws do restrict their geographical coverage (Kilimwiko & Mapunda, 1998).

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[9]RTD was assigned the following tasks:

- To inform the people of what is happening in and outside the country, so that with an informed mind, Tanzanians can make rational decisions affecting their lives.
- To educate the people on effective ways of eradicating illiteracy, poverty, and disease.
- To safeguard the independence, peace, security, and unity of the nation.
- To mobilize and motivate the people in the implementation of the policy of Ujamaa and self-reliance.
- To participate in the liberation of Africa by supporting liberation movements and countering imperialist propaganda.
- To foster cooperation among African countries in the economic, social, and political fields with a view to bring about total African unity.
- To support the policies of good neighborliness, non-alignment, and all efforts geared at creating new world economic and information order in the interest of poor nations.
- To promote peace and justice in the world (Lederbogen, 1992, p. 49).

The most popular private radio station is Radio One (IPP owned) broadcasting music, drama, local and foreign news (Tanzania: Press Overview, 2000). According to Chief Editor E. Kahunaranga, Radio Tanzania also underwent changes with liberalization (1999, personal interview). News is more people than government personality centered, there is a greater freedom to criticize, and no government official intervenes in Radio Tanzania's day-to-day operations. Also, Kahunaranga believes that Radio Tanzania "exudes authority" because government statements are brought to it. He estimates that 90% of the people in rural areas depend on Radio Tanzania. On the island, Sauti ya Tanzania Zanzibar (Voice of Zanzibar) is owned by the Zanzibar government.

Today, there are two government radio stations in Tanzania, one in Zanzibar and one on the mainland, no party owned stations, and 13 (Hamizi, 1999, personal interview) private stations including a missionary station. The number of radio sets went up from 11.8 million in 1995 and 12.5 million in 1996 to 15 million in 1997, covering 87.5% of the population by 1997 (http://www.econewsafrica.org/panos/Tanzania.html, 2001).

Television: Until 1992, Television Zanzibar (TVZ), owned by the Zanzibar island government, was the only television station in Tanzania; mainland Tanzania did not have a TV station. TVZ began broadcasting in 1971 as an educational medium. In 1973, Zanzibar inaugurated the first color television on the African continent (Konde, 1984).

With the introduction of liberalization, private television stations began to be built in Tanzania (Onyango-Obbo, 1996). Today, Multichoice, a South African-based pay satellite television, is also available to subscribers. The leading private television station is IPP-owned Independent Television (ITV), the only station linked by satellite to all of Africa. It is received in five regions including Dar es Salaam, Arusha, and Kilimanjaro. Other private stations on the mainland are Dar es Salaam Television (DTV) broadcasting in Swahili and English, Coastal Television Network (CTN), which according to its managing director, Mehmood Mawji, was the first to go on air on mainland Tanzania in 1994 (1999, personal interview), and Cable Entertainment Network (CEN). According to TBC's Hamizi (1999, personal interview), there are seven over the air television stations in Tanzania, of which two are in Morogoro and one in Mbeya, and 14 paid cable channels.

Stations are monitored through physical examination for violation of transmitter power restrictions. Some restrictions on foreign ownership also exist. On March 15, 2000 after three months of test transmission, Television Tanzania (TVT), the state-owned television station on the mainland, went on the air (Mwaffisi, April 14, 2000, personal communication). According to the Media Institute of Southern Africa, the number of television receivers increased from 500,000 in 1995 to 650,000 in 1997, reaching about 19% of the population (http://www.econewsafrica.org/panos/Tanzania.html, 2001).

Current Media Dynamics

This historical review indicates that the Tanzanian media are certainly in a time of transition. Additionally, the historical dichotomy of government-private influences, albeit in varying measure at different times, has created some interesting contradictions confirmed in the personal interviews. The media are working towards greater freedom but also exercising some caution in testing the boundaries of this freedom. They want freedom, but they also want responsibility. They are accepting their new role in forming a fully informed citizenry, but they also retain a vestige of the national development role they were socialized under. They have young, new journalists who have joined the profession under newer ideas of press freedom, but this cadre coexists with an older guard trained under the socialist press philosophy. The groups however are not perfectly aligned respectively with allegiance to a free press versus a socialist press; many in the older guard chafed at restrictions and many in the newer accept a certain role for the press in national development. Nor do the groups align perfectly with private and government media respectively. In fact, there is an interesting movement of journalists between government, party, and private media outlets.[10] Both groups have members who still use caution in their expression of views about the government and its control of the press. And in both groups there is serious need for journalistic training exacerbated by the increased demand for journalists in new media outlets in face of inadequate training facilities.

This is an interesting time in Tanzanian media to capture the profile of media workers in the tradition of journalist surveys. This tradition had its beginnings in the three major U.S. journalist surveys, the first conducted by Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman in 1971, and the second and

[10] This movement also occurs between training institutions and the media with several cross-appointments between the two.

third by Weaver and Wilhoit in 1982-83 and 1992 (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996). This work has been replicated, with and without modifications, across the world (Weaver, 1998), and is based on the assumption that journalistic profiles are related to coverage (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996).

Though no comparison with previous times is possible because of the dearth of data on Tanzanian journalists, in presenting a current demographic, work related, and opinion profile of these journalists, this paper establishes benchmarks for future comparisons. Because of the history of government and private influences, the profile is presented by type of ownership of place of employment. Ownership is divided not only into government and private, but also party, because the party press has had a major role in the country's press history. Given these ownership influences, the paper also presents how journalists from private, party, and government owned media view private and government media in terms of such journalistic traits as credibility, accuracy, and competence.

Research Questions

1. What is Tanzanian journalists' current demographic, work related, and opinion profile with regard to choice of profession and assessment of press freedom? Does this differ by type of ownership (private, party or government) of place of employment?
2. Do Tanzanian journalists ascribe traits to media based on type of ownership of the media? That is, what are Tanzanian journalists' opinions with regard to which media, private or government, exhibit certain traits—credibility, competence, sensationalism, etc.?
3. Does Tanzanian journalists' ascription of these traits depend upon the type of ownership of their workplace? That is, do their opinions depend on the type of media, private, party, or government, they work for?

Method

Using a questionnaire, the study conducted a cross-sectional survey of Tanzanian journalists, over a two-week period in Fall 1999.[11] The questionnaire was administered in English[12] to a

[11] To conduct research in Tanzania, government permission is necessary. When permission is received, a Tanzanian is assigned to the researcher. The person assigned to this researcher was part of the media establishment, well known to most of the office holders and to many journalists, and of considerable assistance in working out the logistics of doing such research in Tanzania. This person was not always present with the researcher, particularly once the researcher knew the lay of the land and the people.

[12] The researcher had planned to translate the questionnaire into Swahili but several African and Tanzanian contacts advised against it given the level of English language facility among journalists in Tanzania.

convenience sample of 142 journalists[13] in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's media center, major city and former capital,[14] and in Zanzibar. In Dar es Salaam, the researcher personally visited,[15] about three times on average, the media outlets these journalists worked for. Together the three visits included a meeting with the editor or delegate, an interview with the same person (on tape except in a few cases where discomfort with taping was expressed), dropping questionnaires off for this person to distribute to the news staff,[16] and picking up completed questionnaires. The researcher did not visit the media in Zanzibar personally; instead a person assigned to assist her distributed and collected these questionnaires. The 142 journalists in the sample represent 16 media outlets (11 private, 1 party, and 4 government; some media groups, others single) covering almost all the major media in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar.

Private print media included The Guardian Limited, which owns *The Guardian*, a daily English broadsheet and other English dailies/weeklies such as the *Sunday Observer*, *Financial Times*, and *Daily Mail*, as well as several smaller daily and weekly Swahili tabloids. The Habari Corporation which publishes the English daily, the *African*, as well as the Swahili daily *Mtanzania* and several smaller Swahili weekly publications; Nation Media Group which publishes the English weekly *The East African*; *The Democrat*, a Swahili weekly tabloid, owned by Dar es Salaam Television; the English weekly *Business Times* and the Swahili daily tabloid *Majira* both published by Business Times Limited; and *Mfanyakazi* (a workers'/trade union

[13]It was difficult to ascertain the total number of journalists in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar for several reasons including the transient nature of some staff. Kilimwiko and Mapunda (1998) provide these numbers but the author was often told by the Dar es Salaam media that these numbers had changed or were duplicative because the same staff worked for several papers within a media group. The author tried to get an estimate from each media outlet, but this proved to be quite difficult in most cases. A very rough calculation based on these estimates, when provided, and numbers from Kilimwako and Mapunda places the total number of full-timers, part-timers, freelancers, production staff, etc., at 450 in the media outlets where the author collected data.

[14]The capital has been moved to Dodoma but the transition is not complete leaving Dar es Salaam still the center of much government activity.

[15]Because of its lack of a research tradition (most people are not used to completing questionnaires or participating in research), personal contact is extremely important in Tanzania. Telephone and mail contact does not result in a significant response rate. The personal contact reassured the staff that an independent researcher from the United States who had nothing to do with the Tanzanian government was conducting the research.

[16]This was the only way to access the news staff partly because of the bureaucracy and partly because this enabled distribution of the questionnaire to part-timers who were not always present when the researcher visited. Though not every member of each staff would receive a questionnaire, the researcher requested a wide distribution within each media outlet or group. Sometimes, the researcher, still on the premises conducting an interview, would witness the staff completing the questionnaires in their cubicles.

biweekly Swahili newspaper); as well as Press Services Tanzania, a subsidiary of IPP Limited set up in 1994 and the only privately owned news agency in Tanzania (has correspondents in all of Tanzania's 20 regions). Private broadcast media included Dar es Salaam Television, Independent Television and Coastal Television Network. The party press was represented by *Uhuru*, a Swahili daily tabloid and the official publication of CCM.

Government print media included Tanzania Standard Newspapers which publishes the English *Daily News* and *Sunday News*, and *Nuru*, a Swahili bi-monthly and the official publication of the Zanzibar government. Government broadcast media included Radio Tanzania and Sauti Ya Tanzania Zanzibar.

Questionnaire development went through several iterations based on the literature and in consultation with a few African contacts. The questionnaire began with measures of work background and details including ownership of organization worked for, and ended with measures of demographic information. Some of the work background questions were open-ended, e.g., job title and place where practical training was received. Attitudinal measures included two items (developed by the researcher) followed by a five-point Likert scale measuring how respondents viewed their journalistic jobs; and one item (also developed for this study) rating press freedom on a 10-point scale to capture variance. These three items were supplemented with these qualitative questions, the first and last being modified versions of Weaver and Wilhoit (1996) questions: Why did you become a journalist? Define "freedom of the press and broadcast media." What do you consider the most significant limits on your freedom as a journalist?

A set of 15 traits of news media were presented and respondents were asked to assess whether private or government media were more likely to have these characteristics. Most of these traits are original to this study, with two based on ideas from Grosswiler (1997).

For the quantitative questions, percentages, means, and chi-square statistics were calculated. The taped personal interviews were transcribed, read several times by the researcher and an assistant, and used to identify recurring themes and quotes. Answers to the open-ended and qualitative questions were carefully categorized by the researcher and an assistant.

Findings

Altogether, 142 questionnaires were completed; of these, three were incomplete and therefore discarded leaving 139 usable questionnaires.[17] The demographic and work related profiles are presented as descriptive data only, the opinion profile and analysis of media traits attribution are based on statistical tests.

About 73% of journalists surveyed worked for private media, 7% for the party paper, *Uhuru*, and 20% for government media.

Demographic Background

Seventy percent of the respondents were male and 25% female (Table 1). For private and party media, a greater percent of the respondents were male, while for government media, male and female respondents were more equally distributed (Table 2). Respondents' age ranged from 23 to 60 years with most (74%) being less than 40 years old. Mean age was 36 with party paper respondents being the oldest.

Ninety-one of the respondents had gone beyond a high school education. Nine percent had completed high school, 51% had some college, and the remaining had completed college with 23% holding a bachelor's degree, 5% a master's degree, 12% a vocational/technical qualification, and 1% (one respondent) a doctoral degree. The respondent with the doctoral degree worked for the private media, and all party paper respondents had an education beyond high school.

While 57% of all those with a college education studied journalism, 3% studied radio-television, and 12% studied both. Other areas of college study included Education (5%), Statistics, Economics or Politics (3%), Administration and/or International Relations (3%), Business/Finance (3%) Language and Literature (2%), and Law, Library and Information Science or a general BA degree (2%). Analysis by workplace ownership was not done for area of study in college because of the large number of categories; for religion; and for tribe and political party affiliation because most respondents did not indicate a value for these variables.

Of the respondents, 68% were Christian, 26% were Muslim, and 2% Moravian/Buddhist; 3% said they had no religious affiliation. As many as 22 out of about 120 Tanzanian tribes were

[17]Numbers in the following description may not always add up to 139 because each variable had a different number of missing values.

represented in the sample, providing a glimpse of the tribal diversity of Tanzania. However, quite a few respondents (32%) indicated no tribal affiliation. Additionally, 8% considered themselves Tanzanian, while 11% emphasized their African identity.[18] A large majority (84%) also indicated that they were not affiliated with any political party.[19] Of those indicating affiliation, most (13%) were affiliated with the ruling party, CCM.

Work Background

Many of the journalists in this study were from private, print media, reflecting the number of such media in Tanzania. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents were employed in print media organizations and 23% worked with broadcast media. The party press was represented only in print, the private media respondents were mostly (83%) from the print media, and the government media respondents came about equally from print and broadcast.

Eighty-seven percent of the respondents had joined their organization after 1992 when multipartyism was announced. Exactly 97% of the respondents from private media and about 70% of the respondents from government media, but only 30% of the respondents from the party paper had joined their organization after 1992.

About 87% of the respondents worked full time while 13% worked part time; none of the respondents from the party paper worked part time. Number of years of work experience in media ranged from one to forty years, with a majority (72%) having worked for ten years or less in the profession. Mean number of years worked was largest (17 years) for the party paper and smallest (7 years) for government media.

Many of the respondents had received training before (60%) and during (80%) the job. The proportion of those receiving training before and during the job was about equal for private, party, and government media. For pre-job training, 33% were trained at domestic educational institutions. Of these, the majority (23%) had trained at the Tanzania School of Journalism, 4% at the St. Augustine University of Tanzania (formerly Nyegezi Social Training Center), and 6% at other domestic institutions. Ten percent were trained in domestic in-house or other media

[18]One of President Nyerere's greatest legacies is the abolition of tribalism in Tanzania. Some respondents repeatedly told the researcher that their affiliation is with their fellow Tanzanians not their tribe. This might have been a sensitive question.

[19]This might have been a sensitive question in a country where multipartyism is new.

programs, 2% through domestic workshops, and 4% at international educational institutions. For during-job training, 13% trained at domestic educational institutions; of these, about half (7%) were trained at the Tanzania School of Journalism. Seventeen percent received such training in-house or at other media organizations, 11% through domestic workshops, and 8% had trained at international educational institutions. Where the training was received and the primary job responsibilities of respondents were not analyzed by ownership of workplace because of the large number of categories. These quantitative results do not really capture the Tanzanian situation with respect to the training of journalists because respondents included their educational training in the open-ended question. Most respondents who were interviewed personally pointed to a severe lack of training facilities and training.

News reporting was the primary current work responsibility for 69% (n = 95). Other responsibilities included sub editing, feature editing, production and photography. About 7% held senior executive positions such as managing editor, deputy managing editor and executive editor. For their past jobs too, most listed "reporting" as their primary area of work with similar other titles (sub editing, feature editing, etc.) reported by the remaining respondents.

Mean income was 168,355 Tanzanian shillings (approximately US$ 212) per month. Less than 7% (n = 6) of respondents had a monthly income of 500,000 or more Tanzanian shillings (approximately US $630). The mean income was about 90, 000 shillings ($114) for government media respondents, and about 180,000 shillings ($226) for party and private media respondents each.

Opinion Profile: Pursuit of Profession and Tanzanian Press Freedom

Tanzanian journalists were in journalism because they wanted to be. Respondents did not subscribe to the view that their employment as a journalist "is only a job" (their mean score was 2 where a lower score indicates that their employment is **not** "only a job"). Respondents also sought a job in journalism because they believed that the media play an important role in people's lives (mean = 1.28). The combined mean for these job view statements was 1.66 indicating that the journalists were deliberate in picking their profession. There were no significant differences in job view between respondents from the three types of media, private, party and government. The personal interviews reinforced the importance of journalism to the

respondents. *Majira* executive editor Makilla's (1999, interview) commitment was clear: "I think if I wanted to start again I would become a journalist again.... I've been a journalist for the last 26 years. I don't think I'll change ever."

Respondent reasons, given in answer to the qualitative question, fell into the following themes in decreasing order of frequency of occurrence: what I can do through journalism, personal reasons, important role journalism plays in society, personal benefits, economic reasons, and miscellaneous. Respondents mentioned typical reasons such as to educate and inform people, but they also mentioned reasons such as to participate in reform as well as because the media were an important development tool. Personal reasons frequently included the mention that they had always wanted to be a journalist, for example, ("was in my heart for a very long time since I was too young;" "my childhood dream.... My mother used to ask me what I would like to become [and I'd reply] people who 'talk' in the radio;" and "the only job I can enjoy."

Respondents rated their press freedom 5.42, at almost dead center, on a 10-point scale. Interestingly, the party mean (3.1) differed from the mean for the private (5.5) and government (5.8) media ($F = 4.8$; $p. = .01$). Also, respondents perceived they had considerable freedom to select and to emphasize certain aspects of stories (mean = 2 for both). The means did not differ significantly by ownership of media. There was no doubt in the personal interviews that interviewees felt that the country had made considerable progress in press freedoms. Almost every journalist interviewed expressed the comparatively greater freedom the media now had to write about the government, even criticize it, to give more than a token paragraph to the opposition, and to question government policy. Interestingly, age was significantly related with their freedom rating: older journalists believed Tanzania had greater freedom ($r=.42$; $p. = .00$). The journalists agreed that there was need for Tanzanian citizens to hear several voices. On the whole, the overwhelming feeling among the media cadre in Tanzania was that liberalization is the right move and that "the future is very bright."

A vast majority of the responses to the open ended question defined press freedom with typical and expected answers such as freedom to report without intervention. Interestingly, however, many of these respondents mentioned that freedom came with responsibility, i.e.,

freedom should be within the bounds of law and ethics including accuracy in reporting. Some believed that freedom should be limited by the need to safeguard the country's interests and should exist "without endangering national security" or "within the limits of socially agreed rules of the game."

The need to consider ethical constraints was also mentioned in the responses to the question about limits on freedom. These two freedom related questions—define press freedom and describe limits on it—elicited certain themes interchangeably and repeatedly. Another common theme between the two sets of answers was that journalists should have "Freedom to write without fear or favour." The limits on journalistic freedom specifically mentioned the fear of being jailed, intimidation, and harassment.

Other limits reported by respondents included considerable mention of laws such as the Newspaper Act, lack of access to information particularly from the government ("there is no culture for public office leaders of [sic] treating journalists as one of the key contributors [to] the country's progress" and "an apprehensive political leadership that sees the media as enemies"), the tyranny of rule by owners who have their own agendas and connections that they do not want to hurt, lack of decision making power, bureaucracy, and shortage of journalistic tools. In personal interviews, some of these themes resonated too. For example, some government media respondents indicated that the private media were not really independent, but instead hostage to the business interests and friendships of their owners (Nguba, 1999, personal interview; Mwakisyala, 1999, personal interview).

Opinions about Traits of Private and Government Media

The percent of respondents who considered the private media to be analytic (77%), to be a vocal critic of government policy (93%), to support political pluralism (82%), to provide balanced political coverage (76%), and to reflect views of the common public (80%) was larger than the percent of respondents who considered government media to possess these traits (significant chi-square values, $p. < .05$, for all these variables) (Table 3).[20]

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[20]For this question as a whole, some respondents answered 'both,' 'neither,' 'it depends,' and such. The frequency of such responses was very small in most cases and therefore they were left out of this analysis. A few exceptions existed for the response 'both,' and these are noted in the footnotes to the analysis.

A greater percent also considered the private media to reflect views of the wealthy (77%), to focus on sensational news (87%), and to stir up ethnic and religious separatist conflict (84%) (significant chi-square values, p. < .05, for all these variables). These themes, particularly "focus on sensationalism," was found in the personal interviews too, specially among government and party media respondents who considered themselves more responsible. For example, Mwaffisi, formerly with state-owned TIS and now with Television Tanzania (TVT) regretted the "loss of ethics" (1999, personal interview), and *Daily News'* Kaigarula indicated a rise in the "gutter press" (1999, personal interview). TBC registrar Hamizi (1999, personal interview) spoke about how freedom could lead to "trashy" newspapers.

Different from the above findings, a greater percent considered government media as likely to help unify the country[21] (76%), contribute to the country's development (67%), and focus on cultural and intellectual issues (61%) (significant chi-square values, p. < .05, for all these variables).

For the other traits—credibility, professional competence, accuracy, and provide positive coverage in general—the percent of respondents did not significantly differ with regard to which media—government or private—they considered to have these traits.

Workplace Ownership and Traits Ascribed to Private and Government Media

In the analysis to see if workplace ownership was related to traits ascribed to private and government media, respondents were divided into private, party and government. Given the importance of the party, CCM, in the political history of Tanzania, and its centrality to the government, the interest lay in finding out where not only private and government media views fell but also where party media views fell: on the side of private or government media?

For the traits vocal critic of government, reflect views of wealthy, support political pluralism, stir up ethnic conflict, and focus on sensational news, there was no association between ownership affiliation and ascription of the trait to government or private media indicating that where the respondents worked was not related to their beliefs about which media—government or private—had these traits.

[21] 11.5% said both government and private media have this trait. For the next trait, contribute to country's development, 21.6% said both.

For the traits credibility, professional competence, accuracy, and positive coverage in general, more private media respondents said that private media had these traits while more government respondents attributed these traits to government media. More party media respondents also attributed these traits to government media (significant chi-square values, $p < .05$, for all these variables) (Table 4).

For help unify the country, contribute to country's development, and focus on cultural and intellectual issues, almost all government respondents believed the government media served these functions (significant chi-square values, $p < .05$, for these variables). For unify the country, a relatively large percent of private media respondents ascribed the trait to government media; and for the other two traits, they were about equally divided in ascribing these traits to private and government media. The party media respondents again attributed these traits to government media. (significant chi-square values, $p < .05$, for all these variables).

For analysis, balanced political coverage and reflecting views of the common people, more private respondents believed the private media had these traits, while more government respondents believed they had these traits. For these traits, party paper respondents' views were similar to those of private media respondents (significant chi-square values, $p < .05$, for these variables).

Discussion

In answer to the first research question, these are some generalizations about Tanzanian journalists. Tanzanian journalists were primarily male but had a considerable number of female colleagues. They were generally young to middle-aged, and largely Christian with several Muslim colleagues. Only a third (40%) of the respondents had completed college. Given that this figure includes journalists with diplomas, college education among journalists does not appear to be widespread. Those who did attend college, studied for the profession, i.e., they studied journalism.

While college education was not widespread, quite a few journalists were getting some combination of education and training. A majority of the respondents received training before entering the profession, some as part of their education and, a small number (2.2%), through workshops. A small percent also pretrained abroad. The percentage of those who trained abroad

was larger for training received once they had joined journalism reflecting possibly the opportunities available through foreign non-governmental organizations interested in developing Tanzanian journalism. Most of the respondents received some type of training after they took up their journalistic jobs.

Altogether, journalism education in Tanzania needs strengthening by way of more degree programs. Journalism education (not always a degree program) is available in the Tanzania School of Journalism, St. Augustine University of Tanzania, Maarifa Media Trust (training wing of Habari Corporation), Kivukoni Academy of Social Sciences and Dar es Salaam School of Journalism, but the major university—University of Dar es Salaam—does not have a journalism program.

While salaries were low, and tools to practice journalism not readily available, Tanzanian journalists were committed to the profession; they chose it deliberately and they believed that the media play an important part in people's lives.

Possibly due to the tremendous increase Tanzania has seen in media outlets with the advance of political and press freedoms, most of the Tanzanian journalists had worked for less than ten years and a small percent worked only part-time. Tanzanian journalists rating of press freedom in Tanzania was neither positive nor negative. The longer the journalists had worked in the profession, the higher they rated their freedom. This press freedom rating therefore possibly reflects real progress in freedom for the senior journalists, the reality of the current transitional period for the junior journalists, and the scope for growth in freedom for all journalists. Interestingly, they indicated considerable freedom to select stories and emphasize aspects of stories. At the same time, they recognized the limits on their freedoms particularly the legal apparatus and lack of access to information from government. They also acknowledged the fear of intimidation and harassment from government, but did not spare the owners whose interests also impinged on respondents' journalistic freedom. But overall, they considered the future to be bright.

Except for some variables, respondents from the three types of media—private, party, and government--did not differ much. The few noticeable differences were the greater percent of females in government media, the large number of private media respondents in print, and the

somewhat older (in age and longevity with the outlet) party paper respondents who also were all educated beyond high school and were all full-time. One of the more interesting differences was that party paper respondents rated press freedom in Tanzania significantly lower than did private and government media respondents. While this had something to do with the Tanzanian political and media history of party dominance, the results with regard to media traits appears to be related to Tanzania's post-independence history of government control with a defined socialist role for the press.

In answer to the second research question, a greater percent of Tanzanian journalists believed that private media had these traits--analysis, critics of government policy, supporters of political pluralism and such, but also sensationalism and stir up ethnic and religious separatist conflict--as compared with the percent who believed government media had them. On the other hand, they believed that government media would help unify the country and develop it.

The characteristics aligned with government and private media respectively appear to fit well into the framework of a libertarian view of a private press and a socialist and developing country view of a government press. A private press given its freedom from at least direct government control is thought to be more able to criticize the government and support the government approved but still recent political pluralism in Tanzania, and to be more balanced when it came to the coverage of politics and the public. But a free press is not always a responsible press with the result that certain unworthy traits such as sensationalism and stirring conflict are also associated with it, made possible by this very freedom. A government press, on the other hand, is considered to be the one to advance the national development imperative, to unify the country.

These views are an interesting carryover of the socialization Tanzanian journalists experienced for decades wherein they learned that the government press will advance the country's collectivistic goal of national development unlike the private press which is more likely to succumb to external influences detrimental to a country's growth. Collectivism is a central African thought found to permeate even media thinking. Roser and Brown (1986) found that almost two-thirds of the respondents agreed that governments should ensure that the media assist in national development. Grosswiler (1997) and Pauli (1999) too found a leaning towards collectivistic goals among Tanzanian and Kenyan journalists respectively.

Interestingly, while respondents expressed need for freedom of responsibility, in the personal interviews several government and party newspaper editors expressed concern about what they saw to be a tendency to be sensational and unethical among private papers. But when the researcher mentioned this to a private newspaper editor, his response was "Not much, they are not all that much sensationalist. That must be coming from the—[sic] either party or government newspapers"(Idrisi Lugulu, *Democrat* editor, 1999, personal interview). This influence of ownership of place of work on views about government and private media was apparent even more in the quantitative analysis of views by place of work.

In answer to the third research question, private media respondents believed they had the positive characteristics of credibility, professional competence, accuracy, and positive coverage in general, while the government media believed they had these characteristics; party paper respondents sided with the government. For focus on cultural and intellectual issues, contribute to the country's development, and unify the country, results were similar; however the private media were somewhat divided on this, with more than half believing that the government media served these functions. For balanced political coverage, analysis, and reflection of interests of the common people, the results were similar, except that the party paper respondents sided with the private media.

But these results, along with those presented without partitioning by ownership, point to a certain honest recognition among these journalists of political and press realities. For example, while they fought over the traits associated with a free press, the development characteristics—help unify country, contribute to country's development, and focus on cultural and intellectual issues—were conceded by at least half and sometimes more of the private media respondents to the government media. The party press seemed to take a middle stand giving the development characteristics as well as credibility, competence, accuracy, and positive coverage, traits that both a controlled and a free press can claim, to the government press (the government press in fact argued quite vehemently in the personal interviews that they were credible, responsible, accurate, and competent in face of the sensationalistic coverage by the new, untrained private press), but also giving the traits aligned with a free press—political coverage, analysis, and reflection of interests of the common people—to the private press.

The varied political, economic, and press influences including the government, party and private ownership of the press on the Tanzanian media are then still present in the current profile and opinions of Tanzanian journalists. It has been said that Tanzanian journalism is of a "third" kind, blending these influences (Grosswiler, 1997). We may add that Tanzanian journalists are also of a third kind, working through these different influences and attempting to arrive at a certain resolution among them. How the Tanzanian media and its journalists develop in the 21st century will be an interesting media watching exercise. For the time being, Tanzania continues to present a somewhat unique and therefore very interesting palette of media influences, media people, and media.

Limitations and Contributions

The study focuses on a country, Tanzania, which is at a very interesting and exciting juncture in its political, economic, and press development. It is also a country that has suffered from research neglect. And finally it is a country not like any other in Africa in terms of the path to development it adopted with a concomitant declared role for the press, the lack of tribal conflict, and the level of literacy.

The study also makes a contribution by providing an up to date history of the press, which also sets the backdrop for understanding the current media situation.

The study presents a current demographic and work profile of Tanzanian journalists establishing benchmarks that will enable future researchers to track changes over time. The study points out, through this profile, areas of need for the further development of a democratic and free press in Tanzania to enable the Tanzanian government, aid agencies and others interested in Tanzanian development to formulate strategies.

The study traces the influence of workplace ownership, not on media content as is the tradition of such research, but on journalist opinions with regard to private and government media traits, essentially a new approach to the study of media. This opens up several possibilities for study of media in similar countries.

Finally, the study combines quantitative and qualitative (open-ended questions as well as personal interviews) methods to provide a well-rounded view of Tanzanian media.

The study however has some limitations, primarily its use of a convenience sample. This resulted in a varying number of private, government, party, broadcast and print media being captured in the sample and a varying number of media persons from each media outlet filling out the questionnaire. Also, the author was unable to personally visit Zanzibar so while questionnaires were completed in Zanzibar, interviews were conducted only with mainlanders. The author's data collection on the mainland was restricted to Dar es Salaam. The conditions under which research has to be carried out in Tanzania contributed to this as did the loss of a week of time because the researcher's arrival (planned weeks in advance) coincided with the passing of Nyerere and the closing of most offices for about a week.

Table 1
Distribution of Respondents by Demographic and Work Related Variables

	N	(%)	
Gender	35	(26.5)	
Female	97	(73.5)	
Male			
Religion	88	(68.2)	
Christian	34	(26.4)	
Muslim	7	(2.3)	
Moravian/Buddhist	4	(3.1)	
None			
Education	11	(8.6)	
School	117	(91.4)	
College (including diplomas)			
Major in College	66	(56.9)	
Journalism	4	(3.4)	
Radio-TV	14	(12.1)	
Both	26	(27.6)	
Other/Not Applicable			
Quantity Work	116	(86.6)	
Full-time	18	(13.4)	
Part-time			
Organization Nature	101	(72.7)	
Private	28	(20.1)	
Government	10	(7.2)	
Party			
Media Type	107	(77.0)	
Print	32	(23.0)	
Broadcast			
Received Pre-job Training in Journalism	84	(60.4)	
Yes	55	(39.6)	
No			
Received During-job Training in Journalism	110	(80.3)	
Yes	19	(19.7)	
No			
Year Joined	18	(12.9)	
Pre 1993	120	(86.3)	
Post 1992			10
Mean Years Worked in Journalism			36
Mean Age (years)			168,355
Mean Monthly Income (Shillings)			212
Mean Monthly Income (Dollars)			

Table 2

Distribution of Respondents by Demographic and Work Related Variables, by Ownership

	Private		Government		Party	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Total	101	(72.7)	28	(20.1)	10	(7.2)
Gender						
Female	22	(23.2)	12	(42.9)	1	(11.1)
Male	73	(76.8)	16	(57.1)	8	(88.9)
Education						
Some School/Completed School	8	(8.7)	3	(11.1)	0	(0.0)
Some College/Completed College (including diplomas)	84	(91.3)	24	(88.9)	9	(100.0)
Media Type						
Print	84	(83.2)	13	(46.4)	10	(100.0)
Broadcast	17	(16.8)	15	(53.6)	0	(0.0)
Year Organization Joined						
Pre–1992	3	(3.0)	8	(29.6)	7	(70.0)
Post-1992	98	(97.0)	19	(70.4)	3	(30.0)
Quantity Work						
Full-time	85	(86.7)	21	(80.8)	10	(100.0)
Part-time	13	(13.3)	5	(19.2)	0	(0.0)
Received Pre-job Training in Journalism						
Yes	63	(62.4)	15	(53.6)	6	(60.0)
No	38	(37.6)	13	(46.4)	4	(40.0)
Received During-job Training in Journalism						
Yes	82	(82.0)	19	(70.4)	9	(90.0)
No	18	(18.0)	8	(29.6)	1	(10.0)
Mean Age	35.4		33.8		43	
Mean Years Worked in Journalism	9.4		7.2		17.5	
Mean Monthly Income						
(Tanzanian Shillings)	188848		90291		181500	
(U.S. Dollars)	238		114		229	

Table 3
Distribution of Respondents by Media to Which Traits were Ascribed

	N	%
Analysis*		
Private	87	(77.0)
Government	26	(23.0)
Vocal Critic of Government Policy*		
Private	113	(92.6)
Government	9	(7.4)
Support Political Pluralism*		
Private	90	(81.8)
Government	20	(18.2)
Provide Balanced Political Coverage*		
Private	88	(75.8)
Government	28	(24.2)
Reflect Views of Common People*		
Private	92	(80.0)
Government	23	(20.0)
Reflect Views of Wealthy*		
Private	83	(76.8)
Government	25	(23.2)
Focus on Sensational News*		
Private	99	(86.8)
Government	23	(13.2)
Stir Ethnic, Religious, Separatist Conflict*		
Private	80	(84.2)
Government	15	(15.8)
Help Unify Country*		
Private	26	(23.9)
Government	83	(76.1)
Contribute to Country's Development*		
Private	30	(32.6)
Government	62	(67.4)
Focus on Cultural and Intellectual Issues*		
Private	41	(39.0)
Government	64	(61.0)
Credibility		
Private	61	(54.0)
Government	52	(46.0)

Table 3: Continued

	N	%
Professional Competence		
Private	52	(44.4)
Government	65	(55.6)
Accuracy		
Private	52	(48.1)
Government	56	(51.9)
Provide Positive Coverage in General		
Private	60	(54.5)
Government	50	(45.5)

*Significant chi-square values, $p < .05$.
In some cases, respondents circled both private and government or did not circle either of the choices. The latter response (did not circle any) was very infrequent. The former (circled both) was less than 10 percent of the respondents for all but "Help unify the country" (13%), "Contribute to country's development" (24%), and "Focus on cultural and intellectual issues" (10%).

Table 4
Distribution of Respondents by Where Employed and Media to Which Traits were Ascribed

	Organization Nature (Where Employed)					
	Private		Government		Party	
	N	**%**	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**
Vocal Critic of Government Policy						
Private	82	(93.2)	21	(87.5)	9	(100.0)
Government	6	(6.8)	3	(12.5)	0	(0.0)
Reflect Views of Wealthy						
Private	60	(77.9)	15	(71.4)	8	(88.9)
Government	17	(22.1)	6	(28.6)	1	(11.1)
Support Political Pluralism						
Private	67	(83.8)	14	(70.0)	8	(88.9)
Government	13	(16.3)	6	(30.0)	1	(11.1)
Stir Ethnic, Religious, Separatist Conflict						
Private	56	(84.8)	16	(76.2)	7	(100.0)
Government	10	(15.2)	5	(23.8)	0	(0.0)
Focus on Sensational News						
Private	71	(86.6)	18	(85.7)	9	(90.0)
Government	11	(13.4)	3	(14.3)	1	(10.0)
Credibility*						
Private	57	(68.7)	3	(15.0)	1	(11.1)
Government	26	(31.3)	17	(85.0)	8	(88.9)
Professional Competence*						
Private	47	(57.3)	3	(12.5)	1	(10.0)
Government	35	(42.7)	21	(87.5)	9	(90.0)
Accuracy*						
Private	48	(62.3)	1	(4.8)	2	(22.2)
Government	29	(37.7)	20	(95.2)	7	(77.8)
Provide Positive Coverage in General*						
Private	52	(65.0)	5	(25.0)	3	(33.3)
Government	28	(35.0)	15	(75.0)	6	(66.7)
Help Unify Country*						
Private	24	(30.8)	2	(10.0)	0	(0.0)
Government	54	(69.2)	18	(90.0)	10	(100.0)
Contribute to Country's Development*						
Private	29	(46.0)	1	(5.0)	0	(0.0)
Government	34	(54.0)	19	(95.0)	8	(100.0)

Table 4: Continued

	Organization Nature (Where Employed)					
	Private		Government		Party	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Focus on Cultural and Intellectual Issues*						
Private	37	(46.8)	2	(11.1)	2	(28.6)
Government	42	(53.2)	16	(88.9)	5	(71.4)
Analysis*						
Private	70	(86.4)	11	(47.8)	5	(62.5)
Government	11	(13.6)	12	(52.2)	3	(37.5)
Provide Balanced Political Coverage*						
Private	79	(90.8)	4	(20.0)	5	(55.6)
Government	8	(9.2)	16	(80.0)	4	(44.4)
Reflect Views of Common People*						
Private	76	(91.6)	8	(38.1)	7	(70.0)
Government	7	(8.4)	13	(61.9)	3	(30.0)

*Significant chi-square values, $p < .05$.
In some cases, respondents circled both private and government or did not circle either of the choices. The latter response (did not circle any) was very infrequent. The former (circled both) was less than 10 percent of the respondents for all but "Help unify the country" (13%), "Contribute to country's development" (24%), and "Focus on cultural and intellectual issues" (10%).

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READERS' GRIEVANCE COLUMNS AS AIDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA

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"There have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere an intellectually active people." – John Stuart Mill, from *On Liberty*

"The sole aim of journalism should be service." – Mohandas K. Gandhi

"The tools of social inquiry will be clumsy as long as they are forged in places and under conditions remote from contemporary events." – John Dewey, from *The Public and its Problems*

Introduction

Imagine newspapers where readers do not read them merely to have facts and images poured into their heads. Imagine newspapers where reporters and editors are not the only actors who determine what issues need to be discussed in public. Imagine papers where readers are not mere consumers, but are in fact participants in a dialogue on public issues. Imagine newspapers where readers openly lodge complaints against the powers that be and *expect* some sort of action to be taken in response to these complaints.

The place to find such newspapers is not in the United States or Great Britain. Rather, it is in India, a democracy only a half-century old, a land of many languages, a high degree of stratification, diverse people, highly centralized government, relatively low government revenues, political instability, pervasive poverty and a high level of governmental corruption. This paper will examine how newspapers in India engage citizens to converse with their government through the publication of readers' grievance columns. It will explain how Indian newspapers help create an atmosphere of open-ness that is vital to the development of that fragile, expanding democracy.

First, however, let's look at some of the theoretic underpinnings of participatory journalism, which occurs in Indian newspaper without any encouragement from media critics or academics, and with development in India. One would expect a relatively poor, overpopulated, developing South Asian nation with a tradition of English speaking and British education would depend on Western models of development. India, in many ways, has followed both the British and American model, developing both its industrial-technological base while building a political infrastructure that, in theory, is modeled on representative democracy. Yet dependency theory doesn't totally apply in this case, but

because India has not precisely imitated those Western countries. Rather, India has a checkered history of development in both the economic and political sphere.

A critical context

Both British and U.S. newspapers have long traditions of including letters to the editors in the columns of their papers, but letters to the editors are seen as opportunities for citizens to voice – vent – their concerns. Readers do not expect responsive action to be taken to the problems raised in these letters. In fact, it is taken as a given that responsive action will not be undertaken by the objects of criticism. In other words, newspapers function as amplifiers that allow citizens to yell in public. There is little sense that any conversation is taking place between citizens and powerful institutions, especially government. Likewise, American radio has a history of consumer-oriented shows in which listeners call broadcasters who listen to their complaints and provide cautionary advice. Such consumer action shows are repositories of information about businesses that rip off consumers with shady schemes, unfair practices and inadequate service. Burgeoning consumer action reporting is also occurring on the Internet. Consumer-action.org and the federal government's on-line version of the Consumer Action Handbook are examples of this. Local television news is also getting into the consumer action game.

In American journalism it has been assumed by researchers of media effects that the audience tends to be passive and that newspapers manipulate readers. Newspapers are major power brokers because they determine the subjects of public discussion and they shape that discussion. In other words, media messages matter because of the relationship

between newspapers and their readers, a relationship in which the papers give and the readers take. "A long line of media research has argued that mass media serve simply to transmit the ideas of the dominant groups in society to the mass of the population," write social construct theorists David Croteau and William Hoynes (262). The authors argue for what they term an "active audience"; that is, readers who are intelligent and autonomous. They say that readers have individual and collective interpretation of newspapers' messages. The writers also believe readers will undertake political action if they become outraged enough. In the U.S. this protest is directed at the media or government. Croteau and Hoynes describe the characteristics of active readers. Such characteristics were assumed in the last decade when American newspapers have undertaken a movement toward a kind of journalism in which the central purpose of the newspaper has been redefined. The new definition allows for a conversation to take place between citizens and major social institutions, though the structure of newspaper has to be altered for true dialogue to occur. Newspapers have to be receptive. They cannot merely transmit and then ignore feedback from citizens.

New York University journalism and mass communications professor Jay Rosen, a leading proponent of what in the United States is called civic or public journalism, asks in the title of his latest book, *what are journalists for?* It's a relevant question, but one that should be slightly reworded for this manuscript. The new question is: *what are newspapers for?* Are newspapers adversaries of the powers that be, or are they detached mirrors of society? The answer to both is yes, since it is clear that newspapers both set or shape the agenda of public debate and then consciously or unconsciously pull back from that debate and let the principals contend for resolution. "Journalists do not join the

parade because their jobs is to report on the parade" (Rosen 281). It's kind of an odd public service – dance – that the newspapers perform, to observe, report and step back during the discussion phase.

Yet is there any room in the world of newspapers for something else? Again, the answer is yes, especially in an increasingly diverse media world. Newspapers do not have to merely be adversaries or mirrors. They can do something *for* citizens. Citizens want something from their newspapers, primarily information, but what sort of information? Citizens want beneficial information – data that illuminates, explains, describes, narrates, persuades, cautions and, in a progressive society, builds. Newspapers suggest the parameters of a public debate, giving us the proposed policies and the available feasible alternatives. They ask tough questions of the high and mighty. They remember the low and humble.

Perhaps more importantly, citizens are more likely to look at everyday problems as well as structural problems. They go beyond a crisis journalism that focuses on meteorological disaster, war, disease and famine – what Len Downie calls "the ideology of mainstream journalism: Where there is conflict, there is news. When there is no conflict, there is no news"(Fallows 264). As American journalist James Reston once noted, newspapers are better at revolution than evolution. It is precisely these evolutionary sociological conditions for which civic journalism prompts dialogue. Indeed, civic journalism fosters a sense or participation in democracy. As educator and philosopher John Dewey argued in the 1920s, the process of democratic self-rule is as important as getting the appropriate, efficient result (Fallows 237). "Representative government must at least seem to be founded on public interests," Dewey added. "The

days are past when government can be carried on without any pretense of ascertaining the wishes of the governed" (Dewey 181). Thus, civic journalism provides a democratic press with the role of engaging both government and citizens by providing a channel of communication between both.

Newspapers, in a progressive, building society, can be vehicles for developing that society. That is to say, newspapers, in providing information for citizens and a context for that information, can function as agents for social change. Or, as Professor Rosen puts it, newspapers can strengthen democracy by reconnecting citizens and politics (289). Writers and editors are not mere witnesses; they can be participants in social evolution by printing citizens' concerns and by investigating those concerns. "We may be observers, but we are not totally disinterested observers," says novelist and journalist Robert MacNeil, the anchor of PBS's "News Hour" television show. "We are not social engineers, but each one of us has a stake in the health of democracy" (Rosen 285). Newspapers are not just capitalist enterprises. They exist in a world where political, economic, social and cultural factors combine to form the commonwealth, and that commonwealth matters.

This participatory-caretaker understanding was certainly the case in American newspaper history at the time of the American Revolution. That participatory tradition – far different from the professional-adversarial role of the late 20th century – continued well into the early years of the Republic. It is true that newspapers should be leaders on complicated issues that need rigorous interrogation before a course of action can be undertaken. Walter Lippmann's advocacy of newspapers that distilled complicated issues for the citizens of the country remains as vital now as when he first proposed the idea in the 1920s in his book *Public Opinion*. Yet, at the same time, if reporters as specialists

spend all their time talking to the experts and one another, then they exclude ordinary citizens from the conversation.

In essence, public journalism changes the orientation of the three shareholders in communication. It holds that newspapers function as intermediaries between citizens and government, not as mere innocent bystanders. This journalistic diplomacy enables citizens to be more closely connected to their government and its policies while encouraging government to respond to and solve problems that citizens have identified. A three-way discourse takes place with newspapers, in a sense, functioning as telephone operators who shuttle information back and forth between primary parties.

Traditional communication model

Government → Newspapers → Citizens (top down)

Civic model

Citizens → Newspapers → Government (interactive)

← ←

That is, citizens call on newspapers – the media – to address the tough problems of society. "They turn to us as one source," says *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot* editor Cole Campbell says, "but not necessarily an exalted one, in piecing together their sense of the world" (Rosen 279). Many readers of newspapers expect their dialogue with the papers not to merely be venting, but to affect change. Clearly, letters to the editor and op-ed columns provide such an opportunity for dialogue in American newspapers.

In inviting citizens to express themselves in their pages, newspapers foster freedom of expression and initiate a challenge to politicians to respond to citizens'

concerns. Furthermore, by allowing readers to choose topics for discussion, papers encourage citizens to help set political agenda. This free dialogue goes against the grain of America's republican elite political tradition and Lippmann's insider journalistic tradition. Elsewhere in the world, though, theorists are more open to such a concept. For example, the South American philosopher Paul Freire speaks to it in his book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Freire says that free speech "is not the privilege of some few men, but the right of every man. Consequently, no one can say a true word alone – nor can he say it for another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words" (Freire 76). Jan Servaes points out that a participatory model also changes the nature of communications from commercial to public: "One is no longer attempting to create a need for the information one is disseminating, but one is rather disseminating information for which there is a need" (Servaes 89). In other words, a government must respond to its citizens, not dictate – or act indifferently or passively. Furthermore, the complaint columns change the usual top-down relationship of communications. Instead, readers begin to share in the determination of significant social issues.

Research questions

1. What are the purposes of newspapers?
2. What is the purpose of grievance columns?
3. How effective are grievance columns in eliciting government responses?
4. How does government see grievance columns?
5. How do newspapers see grievance columns?
6. What is the future of grievance columns in Indian newspapers?

Other theories

It would be incomplete to merely look at grievance columns only under the aegis of civic journalism. These complaint columns also are examples of media being used as agents of change (Rogers 133). They have affected attitudes over time, prompting expectations of government responsiveness while citizens negotiate how much to depend on the state to make practical changes in their lives. Readers' grievance columns are based on the "right to communicate" guaranteed in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Padhy172). This feeds directly into development media theory. The five characteristics of development theory which apply to India include: (1) media promote national development; (2) media freedom is limited by economic priorities and social goals – meaning the government can censor if it deems censorship necessary; (3) media focus on national language and culture; (4) media connect to news in other developing nations, and (5) responsibility and freedom co-exist for the journalist (Padhy 172-73).

Rogers' diffusion-of-technology approach also has application here. In the last 20 years, the press has rapidly expanded in India because of improvements in print technology. This has increased the number of readers and newspapers have looked for attractive features for their readers. Grievance columns, one such feature, are popular because they give readers a sense of empowerment. Grievance columns also continue what communication scholars Uma Narula and W. Barnett Pearce call the Gandhian Metamodel of development. Gandhi, in addition to being an attorney, politician and religious leader, was also a newspaper editor. He felt that journalism's real value was service to the people. "Consistent with his emphasis on nonviolent techniques of

persuasion and conversion, Gandhi, and his plan [for development, largely socialistic and democratic], stressed interpersonal channels and oral communication," write Narula and Pearce (68). Gandhi's model finds government in an advisory role, the press in a service role and citizens communicating with one another and then back up to the government through directly or through the press. For Gandhi the purpose of such a communication paradigm included raising consciousness about exploitation, injustice and poverty (Narula and Pearce 70).

Grievance columns, according to editors and scholars interviewed for this paper, come out of this model. Indian media has a history of open-ness and dissent, while at the same cooperating with government development plans (Raman and Pubby interviews). As Dr. Krushna Singh Padhy of Berhampur University notes, Indians gather information about the government from newspapers, and "their effective participation and desired role in the political system depend on their attitudes and values which can, to some extent, be moulded, shaped and influenced by the press. Free exchange of ideas and free debates are an essential part of the government of a free country" (64). It is also worth mentioning that Gandhi thought newspapers could be used as channels through which the inclusion of the untouchables could be championed (Narula and Pearce 71). It is unclear if grievance columns achieve the goal of consciousness-raising about Indian social and economic stratification. Rather, the columns appear to focus on issues of relevance to the middle and upper classes – communications and urban transportation.

The rural poor that the Gandhi model focuses on seem to be excluded here. However, because the newspapers examined in this research come from major cities and English-language papers, this examination excludes those newspapers written in regional

languages that serve rural areas. These papers circulate to the majority of Indian newspaper readers.

Grievance columns fundamentally change the democratic paradigm of the relationship between government and citizens. In a republican democracy like the United States, citizens express their concerns to their representatives (members of the House of Representatives, Senate and President, as well as similar government officials on state and local levels) often through personal correspondence (mail, E-mail, phone call) – although there are no guarantees that the various government officials will respond to citizens' concerns. In India the line of communications is mediated by the newspapers and, therefore, is a public – or civic – activity.

Furthermore, because the columns stimulate a democratic ethos through vital interpersonal communication, they also help to sustain development. A developing nation cannot sustain social and economic change without political nurturing. Grievance columns help acclimatize Indians to democratic culture. They also address a communications gap in a developing society. Indeed, the Indian government has admitted that its development plans lack "adequate redressal channels for public grievances" (Narula 143). This is especially important when public opinion of government bureaucracies is low, especially in urban centers were planners find the development and maintenance of infrastructure such a daunting task.

These columns also suggest on one level a basic distrust of the government by the Indian people, while on another level a basic dependency. As Narula and Pearce suggest, Indian citizens have settled into a "learned dependency" on developers who act often unconcerned about their grievances (21). This paradox seems to result from an often-

balky transition from a traditional to a modern technological and industrial society. It also speaks to systematic problems with bureaucracies. And it is worth remembering that this is occurring in a country where many citizens cling to social and cultural mores that resist change.

This paper would be remiss if it failed to mention that newspapers in India today have a more dominant role in the culture of the country than newspapers in the U.S. Television has supplanted newspapers and radio as the dominant medium, with the Internet adding another competitor to the media world. Because India lags behind the U.S. in terms of technological development, newspapers still have a significant role to play in the development of democratic habitus in the subcontinent. Add this to the fact that the current generation of newspapers primarily came out of the Independence era and you have a state of affairs in Indian media in which participatory political energy is rather high. The readers' grievance columns popular in so many Indian newspapers mirrors the relative political energy that exists at the personal level – something that is generally long lost in the U.S., although the Internet originally seemed to offer some hope in that area.

Grievance columns in India

In the 53-year-old democracy of India, reader response occurs on a much more transactional basis than in the United States. Readers' grievance columns in Indian newspapers enhance democracy by forcing government to respond to the social ills. These columns elicit government responses to citizens' grievances about social ills – including irregular disposal of garbage, extensive electrical blackouts, poor telephone service, sewer problems during monsoon, lack of bus shelters during sweltering summer heat,

inadequate garbage disposal, road conditions, traffic woes, inadequate train stops and irregular bus service. Grievances also are addressed to businesses about consumers' problems – including goods, services, unfair business practices, indifferent attitudes to complaints, exploitation of consumers, environmentally unfriendly products and misleading advertising (Shah).

Because of the popularity of these columns, the government or business attempts to provide feedback that offers solutions to citizens' complaints. The feedback comes in the form of open letters written by the appropriate government official in the very same grievance column.

"The idea of column itself has roots in the original work of the Indian Press Commission of 1954 (modeled after the Royal Press Commission of the U.K.)," says Anantha Babbili, Rogers Chair of Studies in Journalism at the University of Western Ontario. Babbili says that the impulse for the grievance columns goes back even further. "The journalistic rigor of Indian journalists actually caught the colonial rulers by surprise in the early 1800s and later," he observes. "Bengal and Madras became the pivotal centers of dissent masquerading as submission. In the middle of it all, the editors of prominent newspapers felt that the reader was not to be forgotten ... These columns gave the colonial rulers and Indian observers a reading of the pulse of the nation in political terms. Later, they became a measure of social dissent against Indian social ethos and corruption." (Babbili). Pritee Shah, director of the Consumer Education and Research Centre in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, says readers' grievance columns were introduced "as a promotional avenue" for newspapers in the aftermath of independence (Shah).

Indian journalists Dr. I. Arul Aram emphasized the importance of empowering readers. "It is the opinion as the reader sees it, just as the editorial gives an opinion as the editor sees it," said Aram, a journalism instructor at Columbia University in New York. Mumbai reporter Manjeet Kripalani says that the grievance columns reflect a society that is fond of letter writing. "Indians are prolific letter writers, and there are people who spend their lives writing letters to the editor – especially retired people, especially old, civic-minded uncles," Kripalani said.

These columns occur in an environment of political instability – India's current ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has a very slim coalition – where "governments cannot be trusted to be custodians" of citizens' interests and values (Ali 3). These grievance columns operate along the lines of public or civic journalism. That is, they encourage readers to participate in democracy and to spur the mechanisms of government to take positive action. Yet they also have a hidden agenda: These complaint columns help develop democracy in a nation that is near the beginning of its democratic journey. India gained its independence from Great Britain in 1947 and has experienced extensive growing pains in its attempt to be a Western-style democracy with what late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi – who actually silenced the press in the late 1970s – called Indian characteristics. It is the thesis of this paper that these readers' grievances columns implicitly foster a democratic tradition by making the Indian press watchdogs of government. In effect, the columns "enable people to articulate their needs for social development" (Narula and Pearce 70). The Gandhian plan emphasized "personal examples" in citizens' dialogue with the government (71) and readers' grievance columns are an example of such personal communication that attempts to make a transaction in the

public sphere. Grievance columns came out of the spirit of community development that started with India's first five-year plan for economic development (1951-56).

Australian political scholar Robin Jeffrey says a public sphere exists in India that fosters action. Newspapers, he writes, provide "growing numbers of people to acquire the means and confidence to air grievances, demand remedies, organize action" (Jeffrey 216). Such grievances are made in the complaint columns examined here from *The Times of India's* Mumbai edition, *The Times of India's* (Delhi) online edition (*timesofindia.com*) and *The New Indian Express'* Chennai edition. *The Times of India* reports an aggregate daily circulation of 3.9 million and *The New Indian Express* 2.8 million (Singh 11; also see Audit Bureau of Circulations Web site URL below). The online paper, *timesofindia.com*, does not provide readership totals.

As is the dominant pattern in India, these are national dailies that have regional or local editions. The newspapers do not provide breakdowns of circulation of their regional editions. However, it is worth noting that the Indian press reached 22 percent of the population in 1997, though that figure climbed to 48 percent in urban centers. Demographically, the '97 National Readership Survey showed that 83 percent of those in the upper socioeconomic group read daily papers – which means that the lower a citizen is in terms of SES, the less likely he or she will read a newspaper, although many people have the daily paper read to them. There were 4,890 newspapers in India '97; 2,202 were written in Hindi, 2,335 in regional languages and 353 in English (Singh 11). However, these numbers are a bit misleading. In 1997, dailies had 43 million readers, with 13.8 million (32 percent) reading English-language papers, and total advertising revenue for the nation's press primarily landed in English papers (72 percent). Moreover, the press

has retained its popularity despite the diffusion of satellite television. The '97 survey found that newspapers still contain the majority of media advertising dollars.

Politically, Indian newspapers tend to reinforce local sympathies. The papers in Marxist Kerala and West Bengal are much further to the left than the advertising-savvy papers of the Northwest, especially those in Mumbai with its motion picture industry and banking interests. Accordingly, *The Times of India* is a pro-capitalist newspaper that tends to be centrist on political matters. The paper focuses on financial news. Meanwhile, *The Indian Express* is much more political than *The Times*. It opposes the long-time ruling Congress Party and criticized the government of Indira Gandhi, which tried to curb press freedoms, and now fancies itself a pro-capitalist, right-of-center newspaper. *The Indian Express* also tends to be interested in matters of religion and is sympathetic to the fundamentalist BJP that lead the ruling coalition in Parliament.

The non-English papers, which reach the highest percentage of Indian readers, are "owned by local capitalists who seek national (and international) advertising revenues, tend to validate ideas of Indian nationhood, even as they may simultaneously assert the honour of their own region and language" (Sing "Advertising" 2). Since these small family-owned newspapers reach the greatest number of readers, they may offer the best indicator of how much of a factor the grievance habit is in Indian society.

All newspapers in India are regulated by the Indian Press Council, which sets media standards and responds to public questions about journalistic practices. It makes recommendations about how newspapers and electronic media ought to operate, but it does not have enforcement powers.

Complaint columns combine with letters to the editors, special sections that promote education, reporters' observational columns (one of the most popular in this vein is S. Krishnan's Tuesday response-to-the-readers column in *The Hindu*) and Internet forums to create a critical, democratic atmosphere in a traditional society that maintains rigidly structured strata and a paternalistic world view.

For the purposes of providing a comparison, grievance columns for three days from *The Times of India* and *The New Indian Express* and two days from the on-line version of *timesofindia.com* were analyzed (see table below). Samples were taken as close as possible to the same time of year to account for similar weather-related issues. *The Times of India* columns were published July 29, Aug. 9 and Sept. 1, 2000. *The New Indian Express* columns were published Sept. 12, Sept 19 and Oct. 3, 2000. The *timesofindia.com* columns first appeared Aug. 19 and Oct. 2000. (Note that the online grievance column appears just once every two months. The archives for the timesofindia.com stop with July 2000. Thus, the third sample only includes two columns.)

The New Indian Express had 25 letters over the course of these three days. The largest percentage of letters was about bus service (20 percent). The lowest percentage concerned passports and international travel (4 percent). There were only two letters from the government in response to previous grievances.

The Times of India had 53 letters for the three-day sample, including six responses from the government. Telephone complaints represented the highest percentage of letters (26 percent). Passports, encroachments (unlicensed street vendors), education, passports and miscellaneous each represented 2 percent.

The *timesofindia.com* columns contained 14 letters for its two-day sample, with one letter being a response from the government. With so few letters, it was more difficult to detect patterns. Bus, phone, water, power and financial complaints were most common with two letters each.

A couple of trends are worth noting. First, telephone complaints were the most frequent grievances made by the readers at 21 percent, followed by bus at 14 percent and roads at 12 percent. Government feedback was fourth at 11 percent. The high number of phone problems shows the diffusion of telephones in India. As Rogers noted in 1989, most of the country's telephones are located in urban areas where only about a quarter of the population lives. "The nation's average annual telephone bill is much higher than the $240 annual per capita income of its population" (Rogers 181). Thus, this is an indicator that the grievance letters generally come from those in the upper half of the socio-economic spectrum and also reflects something problematic: namely that the development of this democratic habit does not touch the lives of many Indians. In other words, as Paul Hartmann *et al.* put it, "we should beware of regarding all progressive change as unproblematic" (255). Meanwhile, the prevalence of bus and road problems reflects the extent of public transport in Indian society. It is also interesting to note that three categories – bus, phone and road complaints – make up nearly 50 percent of the grievances, and that these three represent two major elements of modern development, communications and transportation.

Furthermore, it is curious how few letters were devoted to such vital development issues as water and pollution problems – and that not a single letter dealt with a health concern, although a Feb. 20, 2001 letter in the *Times of India* with the proliferation of

slums. These low water and pollution figures may represent the difference in monsoon seasons – in Mumbai it starts in June and in Chennai in October – and how the samples may have missed their annual effect on the various regional population centers. Yet it is also clear that these low totals for water, pollution and power – as well as the absence of health service, poverty and inequality complaints – reflects the urban and higher socioeconomic status of the readers. Moreover, it points to the weakness of relying on English-language newspapers as sources of Indian civic journalism. A study of smaller papers in Hindi and regional languages might well present a different picture. Furthermore, a study of Indian radio and homespun papers among the poor would also show a different story.

Action Please

The title of the column in *New Indian Express* of Chennai (Madras) is revealing. It is an imperative, yet it has a pleading, urgent tone. It speaks to the paradox of dissent and dependency. Citizens of Chennai live with these problems and the newspaper provides a means for voicing discontent.

The grievance column in *The New Indian Express* takes up an entire page of the news section of the paper. Called "Action Please," the column appears once a week, on Tuesdays. The page is split into three sections: (1) complaint letters written by Madras citizens; (2) feedback written by government officials, and (3) photographs of various places in the city where public problems exist. At the end of the letters from citizens, the newspaper provides a paragraph that tells readers how to send a complaint to the paper. The newspaper accepts both E-mail and regular mail. Jemima Raman, who edits the page, says the letters are placed on the page on a first-come, first-serve basis. Raman also says

that many letters are barely legible and have to be re-written. She says that more than a quarter of the letters have to be "drastically" re-written for spelling and grammar. "*The New Indian Express* has a Tamil-language paper receives grievance letters which are in Tamil," she says. (Raman interview). This points to the need to analyze content of regional-language grievance columns to see what issues matter to non-English speakers.

The Oct. 3, 2000, edition of *The New Indian Express* carried "Action Please" on page 7 of the news section. The letters were divided into eight categories of concern: (1) Tamil Nadu Electricity Board; (2) Post Office; (3) Telephones; (4) Railways; (5) Metropolitan Transport Company (buses); (6) Metrowater; (7) Traffic, and (8) Miscellaneous. Let's look at some of the complaints in this issue of *The New Indian Express*. One of the postal letters was from a person named Va-Ra-He, a correspondent for "Flash News." Va-Ra-He is complaining about postal workers giving names and addresses of residents in exchange for money. The writer notes that this is a violation of privacy and illegal. In the telephone section of the column, writers complain about not having a working phone or phone line. They have filed official complaints with the phone company, but nothing has been done about their problem.

In a railways letter a reader observes that putting management of the trains on a computer will not necessarily mean they operate on time. The citizen points to systematic scheduling conflicts that computerization alone cannot solve. Another citizen, writing in the Metrowater section of the page, notes that residents of the Dasarathapurum section of Madras have had no water from the government-owned pipeline since February. The writer adds that area wells are empty and that water shipped in by lorries once a week is inadequate for the demand. Further down the page, a traffic letter complains about a

Chennai Corporation garbage lorry that makes its rounds on a heavily traveled road during rush hour. The writer says that this makes traffic even worse and suggests that the government change the time of garbage collection on that road. In another item, in the miscellaneous section, a writer expresses surprise that tuberculosis patients at the Tambaram Sanatorium are allowed out of the facility in the evenings. The writer is troubled that TB patients can "squat on road sides and at the bus stop daily, talking, coughing and spitting." The citizen asks the authorities to investigate.

In the feedback section, government bureaucrats counter with a range of responses from the previous Tuesdays' complaints. Some answers offer detailed explanations of what's the matter. Others provide concise explanations of how problems have been solved. Other responses simply state facts and lets the paper's readers decide if what is being done about a problem is sufficient. Sometimes readers who have lodged complaints write in the feedback section to describe action taken by the government. For example, V.E. Venkayaramani writes: "I was pleasantly surprised when top CMDA Officials descended on my house for a visual testimony of my woes published in the issue dated August 8 ... Two months later, except for promises, nothing has been done by he CMDA." Similarly, in the "Action Please" column of Sept. 12, 2000, a writer named K. Ramakrishnan chastised the municipal telephone for failing to properly fix his telephone line. "Will the authorities ensure a long lasting solution next time?"

"Action Now" letter writers tend to subtly praise the newspapers for printing their complaints as a sort of contrast to the critical tone expressed toward government negligence, incompetence and corruption. They also are forward thinking. Almost every letter ends with a question that expects future action.

The tone of these columns covers a range from laudatory to critical. They tend to present a formal tone, though colloquialisms are not uncommon. Politeness abounds. One phrase predominates: "I request the authorities to do the needful." However, some writers will use sarcasm. Note the tone in this letter complaining about the post office: "I was informed, by none other than Director General of Posts, that any printed matter, including book packets and pattern or sample packets, can be sent by 'book-post.' " The reader goes on to lecture the postal director about how to issue guidelines for mailing certain items.

Other examples

The *Times of India's* Mumbia (Bombay) edition includes a "Readers' Grievances" column each day except Sunday on page 2 of the newspaper. In its May 8, 2000 edition, the *Times* includes a letter from Tejkumar Dikshit that it titled "Responsive MTNL." The letter writer is following up to a letter he wrote to the grievance column in May. He had complained about how the telephone company had addressed him on a bill. After his first letter appeared in the Times, an accounts officer for Mumbai Telephone called saying the error had been corrected. The citizen also received a letter from Mumbai Telephone apologizing. The second letter to the newspaper lauds MTNL for its responsiveness.

Two-thirds of *Times of India (*Bombay edition) letters are about transportation and communication (trains, roads, buses, phones and post office). This emphasis on transportation and communication reflects the problems of an urban society. Also indicates a need for maintenance of infrastructure, another development issue. Since wealth is greater in Bombay, issues of development for the poor are less prevalent – only a combined 8 percent for pollution, water, power, crime and education. Also, the newspaper is English-language, not Hindi or Marathi (national and regional language,

respectively). Furthermore, English-language papers are read by a more literate, higher SES group (See Table II below).

The government does not respond to all complaints in a public manner. Frequently, citizens try a variety of channels before resorting to sending a letter to the editor of the grievance column. N.K. Verma, writing in the *Times of India's* New Delhi edition of Oct. 16, 2000, describes how he has written and phoned the Delhi Transit Corporation authorities several times about injuries he received in a bus accident. Verma is seeking compensation for medical treatment expenses. "It is now more than two months," he writes, "but I have not received any justice from the DTC despite several written and telephonic reminders. Will the DTC authorities settle my claim without any further delay?"

Similarly, in the Aug. 19, 2000, edition of the same paper, Dinesh Kumar Nagpal complains about not getting his final paycheck and other compensations after retiring from Maharshi Dayanand University. Two and a half years have elapsed since he left the university. "I have been running from pillar to post," he states, "but it is regrettable that this is the treatment one gets after serving the esteemed organization like the universities. Will the concerned authorities look into the matter?" Nagpal notes that he has made "many registered requests" and writing several letters asking about his compensation. He says the university has made no response to his grievance.

Some of the letters openly suspect government officials of corruption. Jeroo Fernandes, writing in the June 15 *Times of India*, claims police in the Gokhale Road section of Bombay "freely accept bribes" to look the other way when local businesses use a one-way street to test ride motor scooters. This writer does not ask a question of the

government; instead, he accuses the police of malfeasance. Another letter, written by A.N. Sequeria on March 9 in the *Times*, chastises Central Railway for not implementing a campaign against the spitting of betel juice on its trains. "I suggest that stringent measures be taken against the offenders," Sequeira writes.

A secondary message in these columns intersects with dependency theory: if Western democracy and capitalism offer a paradigm for society, then India ought to adapt Western solutions to practical problems. Yet I also think these grievance columns go well beyond the standard fare of British or American letters to the editor. These columns describe a problem straightforwardly, precisely and concisely. Then they expect a government response. In effect, the government finds itself in the position of having to be responsive, at least in making inquiries and replying to the grievances in writing. For example, in the following excerpt from *The Times of India*, a railway official announces a response to a grievance about a rail stop: "Apropos the grievance of Swarnalatha Suresh, ... we would like to state that from September 1 Virar-bound train no. 527 originating from Lower Parel at 4.15 p.m. will halt at Elphinston Road." Direct action is the result of the reader's complaint. The turnaround time was two weeks.

Responsiveness

Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu says journalists are in a kind of political no man's land. He observes: "Journalists occupy an ambiguous position in the political world, in which they are very influential actors but not full-fledged members" (4). In America and Europe this is largely the state of affairs, and it may be no better in India. Complaint columns in Indian papers do not guarantee government responsiveness. Furthermore, no research has been done to determine the effectiveness of government solutions. Just

because a bureaucrat writes a response to a newspaper does not mean a problem has been solved. Solutions may also be short term. The problems themselves are presented as unconnected situations, when in fact there may be plausible system connections that deserve in-depth analysis. Yet while there is no evidence that these sundry problems are affecting anything like political cohesion among Indian newspaper readers, it is clear that grievance columns create a critical pathos in a fledgling democracy. The critical tradition, while not the end all and be all of political confrontation and dissent, offers a start to political engagement. Grievance columns are open invitations to active, exacting, rigorous debate. They beg, demand a response from government and they assume a government that would not respond unless prodded to do so.

Freedom of expression is only valuable if citizens feel that their speech has practical value. Venting alone is not enough. Speech that stirs the political world is valuable speech. It is the first step in political dialogue. It begins to move a democracy away from the Lippmannite media world where we have the "impression that politics is for professionals, a bit like high-level competitive sports with their split between athletes and spectators" (Bourdeiu 8).

It is not clear how much of an impact these grievance columns have on the various levels of government (federal, state and municipal). Government officials do respond to many of the complaints, though not all. "The local government takes them seriously," Professor Babbili says, "since politics are now so fragile in terms of keeping one party in power. At least there will be a pretense that these columns are being taken seriously" (Babbili). Solutions are usually short term, not long term. The various problems – and their root causes – do not tend to go away permanently. Yet the sources contacted in this

study were confident that without grievance columns, aggrieved citizens would be totally ignored by governmental bureaucracies. "The telephone complaints are attended to immediately after publishing the complaints," Raman says. "It takes ages otherwise."

Often the responses show the give and take between consumer and bureaucracy. In the Feb. 17, 2001 edition of the the *Times of India*, a bureaucrat in the Central Railway in Mumbai responded to a letter of Feb. 2, 2001, that complained about the time a certain train route took. The reader wanted a reduction in the time of the route of 20 minutes. The bureaucrat said that was impossible, but that five minutes could be cut. Likewise, an April 2, 2001 response by a Central Railway employee points to improvement in rail service in the Navi Mumbai sector. The government response is both defensive and promotional. It claims that the inclusion of seven new trains has resulted in punctuality 97 percent of the time, "an all-time record."

Vipin Pubby, the editor of the *Indian Express's* Ahmedabad edition, says his paper discontinued its grievance column two years ago. The column, which appeared once a week on the third page of the metro supplement, was stopped because of government apathy. Readership and letter writing volume were high, Pubby reports, but the government was so unresponsive that "reporters had to chase government officials for their responses and there was a general shortage of staff" (Pubby). He notes that the readers' grievance letters produced so many good story ideas that his staff has not exhausted the list of ideas two years later. The Ahmedabad editor says that he will resume the column when his publisher provides him with more staff. Thus, the real effects may appear to be hard to ascertain at this time, but they are real enough.

Shah, who monitors consumer affairs in Ahmedabad, says multinational corporations respond quickly and "go head over shoulders to appease the aggrieved customer of goods and services. The government takes its own time in even acknowledging such letters ... Some of the government departments have now formalized their responses and send one formatted 'model' letter saying that complaint is under 'due consideration' or 'active consideration' from this or that department or ministry." She says businesses tend to respond directly to the consumers and much of that interaction never sees print. "Some grievance columns publisher the readers' grievances only," she observes, "and do not pursue the opportunity of obtaining and publishing the manufacturers-service providers' response. Their utility, therefore, is limited and in the long run they are not so effective in redressing the readers' grievances" (Shah).

What do newspapers get out of turning over valuable (potentially commercial) space to these complaint letters columns? The answer is readers. The complaint columns are seen as devices to build up readership – as well as credibility. "Readers' grievances may not be commercially viable," Raman says, "but they definitely are the most popular column in the paper" (Raman). A newspaper that prints complaint columns also builds rapport with citizens, and it is a win-win proposition for Indian dailies. They serve what is perceived by the public to be a vital need while building readership; they also are under no obligation to follow up with more in-depth investigative reports. In the columns the newspapers generally refrain from printing the names of individual bureaucrats, except for top-ranking officials. Generally, the columns use the euphemism "authorities" when referring to the government. The newspaper editors also utilize spot-checking to make sure that citizens' letters are based in fact.

While grievance columns may not directly come out of what is traditionally thought of as development communications, they are tools in the development of a democratic tradition in a developing country. The democratic habit is not learned over night. India's socio-economic conditions both hinder and foster the development of democracy. Stratification, overpopulation, poverty, instability, corruption, incompetence and sectarianism all challenge democracy in India. On the other hand a familiarity with Western (largely British) values and an attraction to the underdog nurture certain democratic attitudes. The fact that India has two Marxist regional governments – in Kerela and West Bengal – also indicates a political diversity not found in much of the world. A willingness to explore a wide spectrum of political ideas makes India uniquely democratic in the era of globalism. It is also true that India is somewhat divided politically. The Northwest part of the country, with its largest cities having strong commercial interests, is more conservative and less critical of the political and economic infrastructure, while the Southern part of the country tends to be more liberal and more critical.

In some ways it is ironic that grievance columns are unintended examples of civic journalism. Where American advocates of civic journalism deal with a barrage of criticism from the mainstream press, India newspapers practice this modest form of public journalism with little or nor argument from government or citizens. The closest thing Americans have to these grievance columns are the consumer affairs talk shows on AM and public radio. Perhaps this difference points to the fact that America is an affluent consumer-based society that expects a certain level of competence and efficiency from government while India is an impoverished, developing society where government

corruption and malpractice is expected. Furthermore, Americans complain loudly if some service is provided inefficiently. Americans tend to let consumer choice dictate change. Indians, it would seem, need instruments like the grievance columns to effect change.

But what does the government get out of these columns? After all, India has a checked history of press freedom. The Press Council Act of 1975 legalized state censorship of the press under the aegis of socialism. A governmental press commission was established in 1980 to examine the role of the press in Indian society, especially in terms of development and democracy. The commission concluded that "a newspaper was essentially a public utility and whatever be the precise form of ownership of newspapers, the exercise of ownership rights had to be subject to some measure of restraint and regulation" (Parthasarathy 178). Manipulation and control, then, have had a place in Indian press history. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the Indian government today sees these grievance columns in utilitarian terms – namely, as potential aids in economic and social development. "In Chennai the government officials seem quite keen to rectify the problems," Raman says. "The authorities inform the public as to what went wrong and how they solved it" (Raman). Using these columns as engines of responsive public relations, the government has a captive audience to which it sends the message that the government is the friend of the common citizen. Even if local government has difficulty maintaining the telephone operations or building shelters for bus passengers during monsoon, it has an open channel for sending out messages that have the potential to build confidence in developmental programs and policies. Why else would the government even pay attention to these readers' complaints? Perhaps government officials see grievance feedback as a valuable route for reaching out to citizens.

The genesis of these columns perhaps comes from the fact that journalists in India during the 20^{th} century saw themselves as nation builders. They were in the vanguard of the independence movement, close allies to Mohandas K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Gandhi himself edited a magazine for 14 years and consistently wrote pieces in South African and Indian newspapers. "One of the objects of a newspaper," Gandhi said, "is to understand the popular feeling and give expression to it; another is to arouse among the people certain desirable sentiments; and the third is fearlessly to express popular defects" (Padhy 79). Indian journalists in the 20^{th} century saw themselves as activists and agents of change. They felt like they had a chip in the game of building the new democratic India.

Furthermore, Indian newspapers, especially those outside the two major power centers of Bombay and Delhi, have tended to be more critical of government. At the same time, those papers tend to champion causes of the people. Furthermore, the journalism practiced by those papers that run grievance columns fits in well with Owais Aslam Ali's definition of development journalism. Ali points to the following key features of development journalism: (1) it stresses "the educational function of news, by raising the awareness of events and issues"; and (2) it produces "stories about social needs or problems in the hope of stirring government into action" (Ali 2).

The letter-writing habit is finding a home on the Internet too. The All India Consumer Education Society (AICES) publishes consumers' grievances on its Web site. AICES says that it deals with "various areas of inefficiency of the public sector" – including electrical supply, telephone service, insurance, pending criminal cases, non-performance assets of banks and rent control. AICES has the following aims and objectives:

- To promote awareness among consumers about their rights
- To educate consumers in fighting out their cases
- To write columns in newspapers and magazines on topics relating to consumer rights
- To organize seminars and lectures on consumerism in the developed society
- To publish books on consumer topics
- To fight cases on behalf of members before various courts
- To fight against corruption and injustice
- To open schools and colleges on a no-profit, no-loss basis
- To look after the welfare of orphaned children
- To fight against unauthorized construction and encroachments on government lands
- To educate consumers on environmental laws
- To educate society regarding sex education
- To create awareness of diseases like AIDS
- To organize seminars and workshops for training and development of human resources activities and counseling activities in India and abroad
- To file writ petition in court in the interest of the general public

The following is an example of a grievance letter that appears on the AICES consumer forum. It is written similar in style and tone as newspaper grievance columns. The letter is unedited and the URL is provided at the bottom (AICES):

Complaint against STG, New Delhi

by Vikas Vikas

Hi all,

The STG south EX centre accepts fees for the Sun certification Exam. The day i deposited the fee for the exam it was Rs. 3400. after a week Sun increased the fee to Rs. 7000. Now STG is asking all of students the balance amount of Rs. 3600. Our argument is that the day we deposited the fee it was Rs. 3400 and so there is no reason for us to pay the Rs. 3600 for the same. What do you say??? Please send me the address of consumer forum in delhi. I want to take my case to consumer forum.

Thanks

Posted on Dec 9, 2000, 8:10 AM

(http://network54.com/Hide/Forum/message?forumid=15046&messageid=976378219)

Conclusion

Indian newspapers that run grievance columns build readership, hold government accountable and establish a channel for citizens-government dialogue. It is a unique example of public journalism and a model that Western civic journalism advocates would do well to investigate further. Perhaps the grievances aired by citizens do not get at chronic problems – particularly poverty and stratification – that underlie government malpractice, negligence and incompetence, but they stimulate public debate. Everyday freedom of expression should not be taken lightly when the democratic itch is far from being universal. Since India is the world's second most populated country, its newspapers speak to a significant portion of the world's people. Its journalistic practices have implications for media outside India's borders. As India begins its journey as a democratic-capitalist entity in a global village, the government's way of communicating its destiny to its people offers a case study in public relations. Grievance columns may seem quaint and relics of a bygone era. They may be nothing more than a panacea for surface problems. They may do little directly for the health and education of the great majority of the Indian people. They may offer readers more of a chance to vent than for government or corporations to act expeditiously, efficiently and consistently. However, their popularity affords the state and businesses the opportunity to transmit an array of messages to a large segment of society, and these messages have the potential to improve the lot of the ordinary Indian.

Still, their most important function is to make the various levels of Indian government less passive and more responsive to the many needs of the Indian people. While American media and their critics argue about the exact relationship of press to

audience in civic journalism, Indian newspapers have a tradition of allowing readers to petition their government for grievances in a most public way. Indian journalism, while representing a country at a different place in its socio-economic development than the U.S., does point the way to an interactivity that is rare anywhere else in the world. It also points the way to something completely different from traditional Western journalism with its emphasis on exclusive coverage of political and economic elites and the rituals of public life. Instead, the focus is on problem solving and on goading government to remedy everyday social ills. It provides fertile ground of the development of a watchdog press that engages government in a serious discussion of issues that are significant to the citizens of India. By practicing such a brand of public journalism, newspapers "make the multitude aware – and this is the constructive side of the consumerism that newspapers bear – that the police are not supposed to beat them and that they are ways of making it hot for them if they do" (Jeffrey 223).

In the long run, it is not clear how long readers' grievance columns will continue to serve society in India. "Because of the changing character of newspapers and readers' needs and tastes, most newspapers are either doing away with such grievance columns or giving them a smaller space to make room for other features," Shah notes. She says that television and the Internet are offering new outlets for citizens to vent grievances. This competition from new media may cause the number of reader complaint letters to dwindle in newspapers.

This study is far from complete. It points the way to further research into this matter. It would benefit from on-the-ground research in several Indian cities – and in rural areas where the highest percentage of readers are located. Newspaper staff, citizens and

government officials should be interviewed there to further explore the history and purpose of grievance columns. A rigorous measurement of the degree of response is essential, as is determining how much editors and reporters follow up the letters that raise the most serious problems.

Reviewing institutional literature on the history of various Indian newspapers would add to the study. The collection of several months or years worth of grievance columns could provide a better estimation of how often the government responds to citizens' letters. This study also suggests a similar study might be done into the history and nature of Indian letters to the editors and to online forums. Furthermore, research should be undertaken to see if the rural poor of India have similar vehicles for self-expression. The grievance columns examined here come from urban centers where education levels and material wealth are relatively higher. Finally, a more in-depth review of the history of the Indian press – beginning with Jeffrey's 1999 book and his several scholarly articles on the subject – would provide a firmer footing for the civic journalism framework which governs this study.

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Tables

Table I -- Grievance column letters

Newspaper: *The Times of India* (Mumbai)

Number of issues: 3.
Letter totals: 25.
Dates: July 29, Aug. 9 and Sept. 1, 2000.

Postal	Bus	Rail	Financ.	Pollu.	Roads	Phone	Power	Passport	Miscell.	Water	Feedback
3	5	3	2	2	3	3	0	1	0	0	3
12%	20%	12%	8%	8%	12%	12%	0%	4%	0%	0%	12%

Newspaper: *The New Indian Express* (Chennai)

Number of issues: 3.
Letter totals: 53.
Dates: Sept. 12, Sept. 19 and Oct. 3, 2000.

Postal	Bus	Rail	Financ.	Pollu.	Roads	Phone	Power	Passport	Miscell.	Water	Feedback
4	6	3	5	2	6	14	1	1	2	3	6
9%	12%	7%	5%	5%	7%	27%	2%	2%	5%	7%	12%

Newspaper: *timesofindia.com* (Delhi)

Number of issues: 2.
Letter totals: 14.
Dates: Aug. 19 and Oct. 16, 2000.

Postal	Bus	Rail	Financ.	Pollu.	Roads	Phone	Power	Passport	Miscell.	Water	Feedback
1	2	0	2	0	2	2	1	1	0	2	1
7%	14.5%	0%	14.5%	0%	7%	14.5%	14.5%	7%	0%	14.5%	7%

Column totals:

8	13	6	9	4	11	19	2	3	2	5	10
9%	14%	7%	10%	4%	12%	21%	2%	3%	2%	5%	11%

Table II -- Analysis of grievance columns (*Times* only)

The sample comes from 12 issues of *The Times of India* from Jan. 8, 2000 to Sept. 6, 2000.

N (number of letters) = 77.

Story breakdown:

Trains = 18%
Roads = 17%
Buses = 17%
Telephones = 10%
Feedback = 8%
Banking = 8%
Postal = 4%
Pollution = 4%
Passports = 3%
Crime = 3%
Hawkers = 3%
Water = 1%
Power = 1%
Education = 1%
Auto Rickshaws = 1%

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Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions in Japan and the United States: Cultural Values in the Interpretation of Free Speech

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Abstract

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Although United States and Japanese constitutions guarantee freedom of speech, obscenity is not protected in either country. However, how the two countries' courts define "obscenity" and the values they use to decide if sexually explicit material is protected differ markedly. This paper discusses the differences in obscenity decisions between the United States and Japan, focusing on the Japanese cultural context, to consider how societal traditions influence, create and become manifest in different interpretations of freedom of expression.

Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions in Japan and the United States: Cultural Values in the Interpretation of Free Speech

As Justice William Brennan said in *Roth v. United States*, sex is "one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern."[1] However, sexually explicit material causes controversy. In contemporary developed societies, sexual expression can be an important component of public art and literature. Despite this, most countries ban obscene material, but not all for the same reasons. Some countries regulate obscenity because it is considered immoral, others because most of their inhabitants find it highly offensive and still others because of the physical and psychological harm it is believed to cause.[2] The United States bases its obscenity regulations on erotic materials' offensiveness. Japan also is concerned with the invidious nature of pornography, but its focus is "the tranquility of the community and the protection of its values ... related to sexuality and gender relations."[3]

Japan and the United States guarantee their citizens a wide range of free speech, but both limit sexual expression — obscene material is banned and, in the United States, indecency is restricted. This conflict between individual expression and government constraints is an archetypal example of courts giving societal concerns preference over individual expression. Courts accomplish this in part by how broadly or narrowly they define "obscene." The Japanese Supreme Court has defined "obscene" more expansively than has its American counterpart. Each country's cultural values help explain this disparity.

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[1] 345 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
[2] *See* FRED R. BERGER, PORNOGRAPHY, SEX, AND CENSORSHIP, IN FREEDOM, RIGHTS AND PORNOGRAPHY: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS 132, 133 (1991).

This paper compares key obscenity decisions in Japan and the United States. Although both countries accept freedom of speech as a fundamental human right, both regulate obscenity, but in significantly different ways. For instance, the most current obscenity decision in Japan, a 1999 ruling regarding a book containing Robert Mapplethorpe photographs, suggests that the artistic value of Mapplethorpe's work does not override the Japanese Supreme Court's obscenity definition.[4] The United States Supreme Court has held that a work containing serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value cannot be found obscene.[5]

This wide swath cut through sexually explicit material by Japanese courts may seem crude and unsophisticated to those inculcated with western liberalism and First Amendment theory. A non-Western society's traditions and customs may differ from those of the United States and Europe, although they share goals of regulating behavior to achieve a peaceful society. It would be arrogant to assume the United States' interpretation of basic human rights is the only acceptable one. Other democratic countries may see rights in different ways, ways that are correct for their societies.

Although its society had been highly westernized by the end of the 20th century, Japan retains its own cultural values and customs developed over the country's long history that allowed Japanese society to grow in unique way. Japan's judicial system takes a different approach to regulating society than do, for example, United States courts. This paper posits that a society's cultural and

[3] Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., *The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First Amendment: Disentangling Culture, Community, and Freedom of Expression*, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 905, 964.
[4] Tsuchiya v. Japan, 1670 Hanrei jiho, 3-7 (Sup.Ct., Feb. 23, 1999).

historical context is a necessary prism for viewing the country's legal decisions, and understanding other countries' judicial perspectives may allow the United States to look critically at its own court rulings. As Harvard law professor Mary Ann Glendon has said, "American thinking about rights and welfare would benefit from examining the experiences of other liberal democracies, and [we should consider] ... the insights that might emerge from such a comparative analysis."[6] In particular, such comparative analyses of other countries' interpretations of expressive rights may have some applicability to free speech questions in the United States. Judge Guido Calabresi wrote, "Many countries have adopted forms of judicial review .... [H]ow they have dealt with problems analogous to ours can be very useful to us when we face difficult constitutional issues."[7]

Obscenity may not be the only issue appropriate for a comparative analysis of a country's tolerance for freedom of expression. But it is a pertinent topic for examining free speech in a Japanese society that is rife with freely available erotic material yet has severe legal limitations on sexually explicit content. This contrast reflects a Japan caught between sustaining traditional cultural values and continuing a process of westernizing its postwar society.

<u>The historical development of obscenity law in the United States</u>

America was not concerned with regulating erotic material until the late 19th century. Before then, American society considered religious blasphemy and

[5] Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
[6] Mary Ann Glendon, *Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions*, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 519-20 (1992).
[7] United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).

heresy as more obscene than sexual expression.[8] In the last 125 years United States courts have held that certain sexually explicit material that is obscene and therefore not protected under the First Amendment. During the last 30 years courts have defined obscenity as material is patently offensive under contemporary community standards and lacks serious social value. The Supreme Court established this standard in *Miller v. California*[9] after a century of American courts struggling to define obscenity.

States began determining what sexual material would not be protected after Congress adopted the Comstock Act of 1873, making it illegal to mail obscene publications.[10] Not having American judicial precedents to follow, state courts looked to English common law. Most used a rule from the English decision *Regina v. Hicklin* that essentially defined obscenity, even for adults, as material having a "tendency" to harm minors.[11] United States courts commonly held that if even a portion of a publication met the *Hicklin* test, the entire publication was obscene. The *Hicklin* rule remained dominant in America into the 1930s. For example, in 1930 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the state's highest court, used the *Hicklin* approach to find D. H. Lawrence's novel *Lady Chatterly's Lover* obscene.[12] The court based its decision on its review of only certain passages in the novel, not considering the novel's literary qualities.

[8] FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 6-8 (1976).
[9] 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
[10] An Act for the Suppression of the Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral Use ch. 258 (1973) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461).
[11] Lord Chief Justice Cockburn said the test of whether material is obscene is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360, 371 (Eng. 1868). The *Hicklin* test, then, focused on the effect selected passages would have on the most susceptible people in society, including young children.
[12] Commonwealth v. Delacey, 171 N.E. 455 (Mass. 1930).

Federal courts also used the *Hicklin* test for obscenity. For example, federal district judge criticized, but applied, the *Hicklin* test as early as 1913, saying it would "reduce our treatment of sex to the standards of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few."[13] Not until 1932 did a federal court reject *Hicklin*.[14] When United States customs officials stopped importation of James Joyce's novel *Ulysses*, a federal district court said the work had to be viewed in its entirety.[15] The court ruled that the novel was literary art so could not be found obscene. The *Ulysses* court's definition was less sweeping than the *Hicklin* test, although not as speech-protective as the current test: "[Material is obscene if it] tends to stir the sex impulses or lead to sexually impure and lustful thoughts ... when judged as a whole ...."[16] A federal appellate court upholding the *Ulysses* decision agreed that material must be considered in its entirety.[17] The district court also refused to apply the "most susceptible person" standard, instead determining the book's impact on an "average person."[18]

Both the *Hicklin* and *Ulysses* decisions focused on a recipient's thoughts. This approach carried through to the Supreme Court's first obscenity decision, *Roth v. United States*.[19] In *Roth*, the Court, through Justice William Brennan's opinion, said, "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance — unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing

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[13] United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).

[14] Some courts used the *Hicklin* test into the 1950s. See, e.g., United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951) (considering selected portions of Henry Miller's *Tropic of Cancer* and *Tropic of Capricorn*, to determine the novels were obscene), *aff'd sub nom.*, Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953).

[15] United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), *aff'd sub nom.*, United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d. 705 (2d Cir. 1934).

[16] *Id.* at 184.

[17] United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d at 707.

[18] United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. at 184.

climate of opinion — have the full protection of the [First Amendment] guarantees."[20] But Brennan also said that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."[21] The Court specifically rejected the *Hicklin* test.[22] In its place, the Court defined "obscenity" as material which "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" and considering "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole," finds "appeals to prurient interest," that is, appeals to thoughts about sex.[23] *Roth* makes clear that isolated portions of a work cannot make the entire work obscene. However, the Court continued 75 years of judicial holdings that works causing their audience to think sexual thoughts could be beyond First Amendment protection.

Lower courts quickly applied *Roth*. For example, the United States Postmaster General determined that federal law[24] prevented mailing the unexpurgated version of *Lady Chatterly's Lover*.[25] Relying on *Roth*, a federal

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19 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
20 *Id.* at 484.
21 *Id.*
22 The Court said *Hicklin* was "unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press." *Id.* at 489.
23 *Id.* at 487, 489.
24 18 U.S.C. § 1461.
25 A federal judge described the book as follows:

> The book is almost as much a polemic as a novel.
>
> In it Lawrence was expressing his deep and bitter dissatisfaction with what he believed were the stultifying effects of advancing industrialization and his own somewhat obscure philosophic remedy of a return to 'naturalness'. He attacks what he considered to be the evil effects of industrialization upon the wholesome and natural life of all classes in England. In his view this was having disastrous consequences on English society and on the English countryside. It had resulted in devitalization of the upper classes of society and debasement of the lower classes. One result, as he saw it, was the corrosion of both the emotional and physical sides of man as expressed in his sexual relationships which had become increasingly artificial and unwholesome.

district court found the novel had literary merit, D. H. Lawrence was a major English author, the book's American publisher was "reputable ... with a good list which includes a number of distinguished writers and serious works" and the novel was not promoted with "the leer of the sensualist."[26] The court said there was no question about Lawrence's honesty, sincerity of purpose or artistic integrity.[27] The court said that the portrayal of sex in art or science was not in itself sufficient reason to deny that material First Amendment protection.

The novel develops the contrasts and conflicts in characters under these influences.

The plot is relatively simple.

Constance Chatterly is married to a baronet, returned from the first world war paralyzed from the waist down. She is physically frustrated and dissatisfied with the artificiality and sterility of her life and of the society in which she moves. Her husband, immersed in himself, seeks compensation for his own frustrations in the writing of superficial and brittle fiction and in the exploitation of his coal mining properties, a symbol of the creeping industrial blight. Failing to find satisfaction in an affair with a man in her husband's circle, Constance Chatterley finds herself increasingly restless and unhappy. Her husband half-heartedly urges her to have a child by another man whom he will treat as his heir. Repelled by the suggestion that she casually beget a child, she is drawn to Mellors, the gamekeeper, sprung from the working class who, having achieved a measure of spiritual and intellectual independence, is a prototype of Lawrence's natural man. They establish a deeply passionate and tender relationship which is described at length and in detail. At the conclusion she is pregnant and plans to obtain a divorce and marry the gamekeeper.

This plot serves as a vehicle through which Lawrence develops his basic theme of contrast between his own philosophy and the sterile and debased society which he attacks. Most of the characters are prototypes. The plot and theme are meticulously worked out with honesty and sincerity.

The book is replete with fine writing and with descriptive passages of rate beauty. There is no doubt of its literary merit.

It contains a number of passages describing sexual intercourse in great detail with complete candor and realism. Four-letter Anglo-Saxon words are used with some frequency.

These passages and this language understandably will shock the sensitive minded. Be that as it may, these passages are relevant to the plot and to the development of the characters and of their lives as Lawrence unfolds them. The language which shocks, except in a rare instance or two, is not inconsistent with character, situation or thme.

Grove Press v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
[26] *Id.* at 496, 497.

Therefore, the court held, the novel could not be found obscene. A federal appellate court, in upholding the district court's decision, also relied on *Roth*.[28] The appellate court said taken as a whole the novel, which the court acknowledged had drawn much critical acclaim, did not appeal to the "prurient interest," and thus was not obscene.

At the same time, the Supreme Court considered a New York State effort to ban a movie of *Lady Chatterly's Lover*. The Court said New York was trying "to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture advocates an idea — that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior."[29] The Court said, "the First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas."[30]

The Supreme Court amended and added to its *Roth* obscenity definition in considering if *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure*, a 1749 erotic novel commonly known as *Fanny Hill*, was obscene. The Court said to be obscene material first had to be "patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters." Second, "the dominant theme of the material" had to appeal to the "prurient interest in sex." Third, and most important, the material had to be shown to be "utterly without redeeming social value."[31] The Court said although portions of

[27] *Id.*
[28] Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
[29] Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
[30] *Id.*
[31] A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (plurality opinion).

Fanny Hill are sexually explicit, taken as a whole the work was not "unqualifiedly worthless."[32]

Neither the Supreme Court itself nor lower courts found the *Roth-Memoirs* definition of obscenity to be adequate. In 1973, with several new justices who had not been on the Court for the two earlier cases, the Supreme Court agreed on a definition that remains in place nearly 30 years later. In *Miller v. California*, the Court said to be found obscene material would have to meet each portion of a three-part test:

> "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ..., (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."[33]

In *Miller*, then, the Court made the locus of review a local rather than a national one.[34] It also changed the *Roth* test protecting material with even the slightest redeeming social importance [35] to a standard of lacking serious social value, allowing the government to sweep more material into the category of "obscene." In *Pope v. Illinois*, the Court clarified that the first two parts of the *Miller* test were to be determined by community standards, but that criteria for determining if a work had serious social value were to be assessed by a

[32] *Id.* at 419.
[33] 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
[34] The Court once explicitly had adopted a national standard. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). It was in *Jacobellis* that Justice Potter Stewart showed his frustration with trying to define obscenity by saying, "I know it when I see it." *Id.* at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).

"reasonable person" test, making those criteria consistent throughout the country.[36]

The current definition of obscenity in the United States, then, is sexually explicit material that a community finds patently offensive and that does not have serious social value. The goal is preventing the public from being exposed to highly offensive erotic depictions. But the courts' stated focus is not social values or morality. Generally, the legal system has accomplished its purpose. Sexually explicit material is not an intrinsic part of American society. The situation differs in Japan, where courts use a different rationale for limiting obscene material and use a broader definition of obscenity than in America, but where pornography is more commonplace than in the United States.

The historical development of Japanese obscenity law

The Anglo-American concept of obscenity law grew under the influence of religious perspectives.[37] Japanese obscenity law does not have an explicit religious grounding such as the role Christian ethics played in the West. Rather, in Japan's premodern society sexually explicit materials were not strictly regulated. For instance, *Shunga*,[38] a popular form of sexual expression, was a part of popular culture until the modernization of Japan occurred in the late 19th century.

[35] The Court said the "utterly without redeeming social value"standard created "a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof." *Id.* at 22.
[36] 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
[37] RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, 14-17, 63 (1992).
[38] Drawings that depict explicit sexual acts between man and woman. It is also called warai-e (picture for laugh) or makura-e (picture of pillow). See MIKIO UJIIE, *EDO NO SEIFUZOKU: WARAI TO JOHSHI NO EROSU* [Sex Culture in the Edo Era: Eroticism of Life and Death] 58 (1998).

Japan first regulated obscenity in 1880.[39] The country's Penal Code required fines for anyone displaying or selling in public harmful materials, including books, circulars, booklet, pictures, photographs and lewd objects.[40] Adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, marking the beginning of Japan's modernization, allowed further limitations on the explicitness of erotic expression in popular culture. Since the Meiji Constitution did not guarantee free speech, obscenity could be regulated without concern for an individual's right of expression.[41]

Free speech was not guaranteed in Japan until adoption of its post-World War II constitution in 1946. During the occupation period after World War II, the Allied Forces asked the Japanese government to revise its pre-war constitution. The government and certain non-governmental organizations submitted several constitutional drafts.[42] Ultimately, however the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers in the Pacific ("SCAP") drafted a constitution that was imposed on the country without approval by the Japanese government or people.[43] The constitution became the bedrock of Japan's transformation to a democratic society.

The new constitution explicitly protected a number of enumerated civil rights and renounced war as a method of spreading Japan's influence. Article 21 of the constitution (1) guarantees freedom of assembly, association, speech,

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39 TAKUYA HASEGAWA, WAISETSU SHUPPAN NO REKISHI [The History of Obscene Publications] (1978).
40 *Id.*
41 KENSUKE NISHIGAITO, KENPO FOR BEGINNERS [Constitution for Beginners] (1997).
42 A draft by the Constitutional Research Association, a group of Japanese scholars, became the framework for the final constitution prepared by the Government Section of SCAP. *See* Sylvia Brown Hamano, *Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese Constitution and Human Rights*, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415 (1999).
43 HASEGAWA MASAYASU, NIHON NO KENPO [Japanese Constitution] 17 (3rd ed., 1995).

press and other forms of expression, (2) prohibits censorship and (3) assures the privacy of communication.[44] The constitution took effect in 1947.[45]

Although freedom of expression has been guaranteed more than 50 years in Japan, the Penal Code continued to regulate. The Penal Code calls for imprisonment or forced labor as a penalty for producing, importing or distributing obscene material.[46] Local ordinances, ministry and industry standards, and media self-regulation also restrict materials considered as detrimental to good morals and manners.[47]

In addition to the Penal Code, article 21 of the Customs Standard Law of 1910 permits governmental prior restraint. This permits the Japanese Customs Bureau to search and seize printed materials the bureau contends may be harmful to public order and public morals.[48] The most recent Japanese Supreme Court decision regarding obscenity, a case involving a book of Robert Mapplethorpe photographs, grew out of a Customs Bureau seizure in 1992. Japanese courts have upheld the constitutionality of prior restraint of sexually explicit material, basing their decisions on protecting public welfare.[49] Sexually explicit materials are seen as offending ordinary people's sense of sexual modesty. Courts also see the sale of obscene publications as possibly leading to disregard for sexual morality and sexual order in society.

44 YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA, HYOGEN NO JIYU II [Freedom of Expression II] (1983).
45 LAWRENCE WARD BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY (1984).
46 *See* OKUDAIRA, *supra* note 44.
47 *See* BEER, *supra* note 45.
48 *See id.*
49 The notion of public welfare found in Articles 12 and 13 of the Japanese Constitution is interpreted as maintaining a minimum level of morality regarding sexuality necessary to the social order.

The first case in which the Japanese Supreme Court applied the post-war constitution to an obscenity case involved *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. In 1950, local authorities attempted to stop the novel's distribution by prosecuting the book's Japanese translator and publisher for violating Penal Code Article 175.[50] The Tokyo District Court ruled in 1952 that the novel was not similar to traditionally obscene publications in Japan.[51] Although the court said some sections of the novel might be considered obscene, the entire work was not defined as pornographic because it was literature. Interestingly, this lower court decision finding the novel was not obscene because of its literary value[52] is in opposition to Japanese Supreme Court decisions that have rejected this perspective for nearly half a century.

The Tokyo Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, refusing to find that the novel's literary nature saved it from being obscene. Both the translator and publisher were convicted and fined. According to the ruling, although the ideology and tolerance of sex in society changes from time to time, a consistent moral standard existed in Japan to protect the privacy of sexual activity. When the moral sense of a majority of people regarding obscene materials becomes dulled, the courts should exercise their responsibility of returning this moral standard to society, the court said.[53] Thus, when a publication seems to abuse the moral standard, it might be considered obscene.

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[50] *See* BEER, *supra* note 45. Article 175 of the Penal Code prohibits selling or distributing an "obscene writing, picture, or other object." Japanese Criminal Code, art. 175 (cited in Krotoszynski, *supra* note 3, at 965).
[51] *See* BEER, *supra* note 45.
[52] HASEGAWA, *supra* note 39.
[53] *Id.*

In this sense, the court implied that literature, as well as pornography with no societal values, could be found obscene.[54]

The appellate court suggested several standards for defining obscenity in Japan. First, the court said obscene publications are materials that arouse and stimulate sexual desire, offend the normal sense of shame and run counter to the proper concept of sexual morality.[55] Second, an artistic work, including literature, could be identified as an obscene publication unless the artistic element mitigates the material's offensiveness. In the *Lady Chatterly's Lover* case, the Court of Appeals held that neither its literary qualities nor the seriousness of its portrayal of sex was enough to void a finding of obscenity.[56]

In 1957 Japan's Supreme Court upheld the Appeals Court decision. The Supreme Court relied on a definition of obscenity established by its predecessor, the Court of Cassation. That court said material is obscene if it "unnecessarily excites or stimulates sexual desire, injures the normal sense of embarrassment commonly present in a normal ordinary person, and runs counter to the good moral concept pertaining to sexual matters."[57] The Supreme Court reviewed twelve separate passages in *Lady Chatterly's Lover* and determined they met the definition of obscenity. The court recognized that the novel had literary attributes. However, the court said the cited sections were "too bold, detailed, and realistic," and said that "art, even art, does not have the special privilege of

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[54] YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA ET AL., SEI HYOGEN NO JIYU [Freedom of Sexual Expression] (1986).
[55] *See* BEER, *supra* note 45.
[56] *Id.*
[57] Judgment Upon Case of Translation and Publication of Lady Chatterly's Lover and Article 175 of the Penal Code, Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality No. 2 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1958) (decided Mar. 13, 1957), reprinted in John M. Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan: Selected Supreme Court Decisions, 1948-60, at 3 (Ikeda Masaaki et al. trans., 1964).

presenting obscene matters to the public."[58] Citing Article 12 of the Japanese constitution, the court said freedom of expression could be limited in order to protect the "public welfare."[59] Thus, the court said, publications threatening the public's peace and tranquility may be restricted.[60]

The *Lady Chatterly's Lover* decision established the framework for defining obscenity in post-war Japan. The *Lady Chatterly's* definition remains in place today: Obscenity is any material that arouses and stimulates sexual desire, offends the normal sense of shame and runs counter to the proper concept of sexual morality.[61] Although the Supreme Court suggested the artistic element of a publication may reduce the offensiveness of obscenity, it would be very unusual for the court to find an artistic work could meet that standard to prevent its being found an obscene publication. In Lawrence's novel, neither the nature of the work nor the seriousness of its portrayal of sex was considered substantial enough to override the work's obscenity, according to the Japanese Supreme Court.[62]

The *Lady Chatterley's Lover* decision also determined the perspectives of community standards Japanese society should follow to restrict obscenity. The Court claimed the community standard was based on the social wisdom the Japanese society was supposed to achieve. The standard was based on a consciousness beyond normal collective thought, a consciousness that courts could not allow individuals to negate even if they do not agree with it. Although

58 Krotoszynski, *supra* note 3, at 966.
59 MASUKOMI HANREI ROPPO [Case and Statute Book of Media Law] 215-21 (Hideo Shimizu et al. eds, 1999).
60 *Id.*
61 *Id.*

such social consciousness changes from time to time and place to place, the court said, society has a limit of tolerance regarding public discussion of sexual activities.[63]

Three years later, a translator and publisher were prosecuted under Penal Code Article 175 for releasing *Histoire de Juliette ou les Prosperite du Vice* by *Marquis de Sade.* The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the work had literary merit and therefore was not obscene. The court relied on its *Lady Chatterly's Lover* decision in saying, "When writings of artistic and intellectual merit are obscene, then to make them the object of penalties in order to uphold order and healthy customs in sexual life is of benefit to the life of the whole nation."[64] The Court said the sexual scenes in the publication were offensive enough to stimulate sexual desire and thus legally obscene.[65] However, one of the dissenting justices, Kotaro Irokawa, argued that although the publication was considered lewd, as long as the public wanted it as an entertainment, the publication should have been considered to have some social value, which would prevent it from being found obscene.[66]

The Japanese Supreme Court later attempted to clarify its definition of obscenity. In 1972, the court considered if a novel, *Yojohan fusuma no shitabari,* was obscene.[67] In the *Yojohan* case, the Tokyo District Court confirmed that Penal Code Article 175 did not violate the Japanese constitution. The court followed the

[62] *Id.*
[63] *Id.*
[64] *Id.*
[65] *Id.*
[66] *Id.*
[67] Nosaka et al. v. Japan, and Nakagawa et al. v. Japan, 34 Keishu (No. 6) 433 (Sup. Ct., 2nd P.B., November 28, 1980).

Lady Chatterly's Lover and *de Sade* precedents in deciding that the publication at issue presented sexual conduct in a lewd way so as to stimulate sexual desire. The court defined an obscene publication as one offensive to an average person, that is, one whose morality typifies modern Japanese society.[68]

The Japanese Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision. In its ruling, the Supreme Court provided five criteria for assessing if a work taken as a whole is obscene: (1) the relative boldness and general style of its depiction of sexual behavior, (2) the proportion of the work used for sexual description, (3) the relationship in a literary work between sexual descriptions and the intellectual content of the story, (4) the degree to which artistry and intellectual content mitigate the sexual excitement induced by the writing and (5) the relationship of sexual portrayals to the structure and narrative of the story.[69] Applying the detailed criteria, the Supreme Court in 1980 refused to reverse the lower courts, and found the novel to be an obscene publication.[70]

In 1985, the Japanese Supreme Court upheld provisions of the Customs Tariff Law forbidding importation of materials that "injure the public morals." The Customs Service had intercepted several 8mm films the government claimed violated the law. The Court cited its *Lady Chatterly's Lover* and *de Sade* decisions and stated, "[W]hen viewed from the standpoint of maintaining and securing sound sexual morals in our country, prevention of the unnecessary influx of matters of obscene expression from abroad is in conformity with the public welfare." This case, however, created a split within the court. Four of the

[68] LAWRENCE WARD BEER & HIROSHI ITO, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 1970 THROUGH 1990 (1996).
[69] BEER, *supra* note 45 at 353.

court's 15 justices dissented, agreeing with the district court's decision that the "public welfare" standard was too vague under the constitution's protection for freedom of expression in Article 21.[71]

Aside from the Customs Service case, from 1980 to 1999, the Japanese Supreme Court made no significant obscenity decision. However, what had changed within those two decades was that Japanese society tolerated, perhaps even encouraged, open distribution and consumption of pornographic materials. Although the *Lady Chatterley's Lover* decision and its progeny still stand as precedent, more explicit representations of sexual activities in mass publication, such as in popular magazines and videos, began appearing in the 1990s. Until 1991, government censorship prohibited the depiction of pubic hair. But in the last decade the Japanese government began permitting distribution of photographs that include public hair. Although such a change created controversy, frontal nudity has become more commonplace despite being defined as obscene under Supreme Court decisions.[72]

Recently, the Japanese Supreme Court had another opportunity to consider if literary or artistic value should be considered in determining if a work is obscene. In 1999 the court was confronted with a case based on a book of photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe, an American photographer whose work includes homoerotic pictures. The plaintiff, a Tokyo businessman who tried to import the book from the United States in 1992, filed a lawsuit against the

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[70] OKUDAIRA ET AL., *supra* note 54.

[71] Judgment Upon Case of Constitutionality on Customs Inspection, Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan upon Questions of Constitutionality No. 20 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1985) (decided Dec. 12, 1984), *reprinted in* BEER & ITO, *supra* note 68, at 453.

[72] ANNE ALLISON, PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED DESIRES: MOTHERS, COMICS AND CENSORSHIP IN JAPAN 149 (1996).

Japanese government and the customs inspectors who seized the book.[73] The customs inspectors identified the book as prohibited material because it corrupts public morals.[74]

The Supreme Court, upholding lower court rulings in favor of the customs inspectors, said the book was obscene because it contained photographs unnaturally emphasizing male genitals.[75] The court said the book included unnatural depictions of naked bodies. The court said obscene pictures were bound together to make a book, but that did not preclude the book from being considered obscene because it could harm public morals.[76] The Court made clear that the *Lady Chatterly's Lover* decision still stands as the determinate of obscenity, despite the change in social acceptance of pornography in Japan.

Two dissenting justice said social change did warrant reconsidering the court's obscenity definition. In a joint statement, Chief Justice Yukinobu Ozaki and Justice Toshifumi Motohara said that ideas about obscenity have changed markedly in Japan. Recent popular magazines sold in Japan feature photographs of nudity, including pubic hair, they said. The Mapplethorpe book, already on sale in Japan when the plaintiff attempted to bring it into the country,[77] might not be considered obscene in late 20th century Japan, the two justices said. Under such circumstances, the dissenters said, it amounted to government censorship for customs inspectors to decide the book was obscene. Those who were not

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73 *Supreme Court Upholds Ban on 'Obscene' Gay Photo Book*, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS (last modified Sept. 11, 2000) <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?TS=968701...1&Fmt=3&Sid=1&Idx=2&Deli=1&RQT=309&Dtp=1>.
74 Shimizu et al., *supra* note 59.
75 *Id.*
76 *Id.* at 222.
77 Tsuchiya v. Japan, 1670 Hanrei jiho, 3-7 (Sup.Ct., Feb. 23, 1999); *Supreme Court Upholds Ban, supra* note 73.

legal experts could not properly make a finding of obscenity.[78] The purpose of the publication and Mapplethorpe's artistic reputation should have been considered in determining if the book was obscene, the two justices said. The dissenters concluded that the book should not be found to be obscene.[79]

It may be that the cases involving 8mm films and the book of Mapplethorpe photographs reflect the Supreme Court's unwillingness to permit public displays of human genitals and its determination to continue finding such depictions to be obscene. [80] However, not since 1980 has the court had before it a case involving literature the government argued is obscene, so the court has not had an opportunity to reconsider protecting material with serious social value.[81]

Contrasting approaches to obscenity in Japan and the United States

The Japanese and United States supreme courts have taken different approaches to deciding obscenity cases. Both countries' constitutions guarantee freedom of expression, and both courts hold that obscene material is outside free speech protections. But Japan's definition of obscenity is broader than the definition used by United States courts, including material with social value that would not be found obscene in America. These differences in interpreting what sexually explicit material should be protected reflect the different cultural values rooted in each country's history.

78 Shimizu et al., *supra* note 59, at 222; *Supreme Court Upholds Ban*, *supra* note 73.
79 Tsuchiya v. Japan, 1670 Hanrei jiho, 3-7 (Sup.Ct., Feb. 23, 1999); Shimizu et al., *supra* note 59.
80 *See* ALLISON *supra* note 72.
81 This may be because the government has shifted its concern for sexually explicit material meant for adults to a concern with Internet pornography, to which minors have access, and child pornography. For example, in 1999 Japan adopted a law prohibiting the production, distribution or sale of child pornography. This law is called the Law for Punishing Acts Related to Child Prostitution and Child

In the United States, support for free speech often is grounded in two theories, i.e., marketplace of ideas, including self-fulfillment, and self-governance.[82] Erotic expression may be defended as contributing to the marketplace of ideas, allowing people to be exposed to a variety of views as part of a search for truth. Similarly, sexually explicit material may contribute to some people's search for self-fulfillment as they try to realize their unique potential as a human being.[83] Because every individual is unique, the premise of this approach to free speech is that no authority should decide what would contribute to an individual's search for truth.[84]

Japan's judicial decisions show more concern with self-governance than supporting a marketplace of ideas with its attendant concern for self-realization. This may be in part because Japanese tradition is less concerned with a search for truth than is the case in America. In western culture there is a clear concept of the existence of truth and evil, a concept fundamentally originating in Christianity.[85] However, Christianity has never been a strong religious influence in Japanese society.[86]

Before the modernization of Japan, the country was rather tolerant to sexual expression.[87] The long tradition of Confucianism in Japan recognized sex only as a generative function. Members of higher classes in Samurai culture respected such a belief, but they were not strictly prohibited from searching for

Pornography, and for Protecting Children. The English translation is based on a preliminary version of the law. *See* The Ministry of Justice <http://www.moj.go.jp/English/CRAB/law01./htm>.
[82] *See* Krotoszynski, *supra* note 3.
[83] *Id.*
[84] *Id.*
[85] POSNER, *supra* note 37.
[86] HAYASHI HIDEHIKO, MIDARA NO KOZO [Structure of Japanese Eroticism] 33-34, 40 (2000).

sexual pleasure through various activities, including prostitution. At the same time, in the lower classes of society sexual activities were enjoyed through systematized community rules.[88] In general, there was social acceptance of sexual expression in pre-modern Japanese society.[89]

Western influences as part of the rise of modernization in Japan changed these societal systems.[90] Regional customs and traditions regarding sexual expression were considered primitive and thus obstacles to modernization.[91] Therefore, traditional restraint from Christian ethics were incorporated into Japanese law[92] and used as ideological tools to restrict sexual expression and control the sense of moral order in westernizing Japanese society.

Additionally, the Japanese concept of *Dotoku*, or public welfare, should be considered as one of the main concepts in understanding Japan's legal approach to obscenity. Public welfare stems from *Dotoku*, the traditional Japanese concept that emphasizes the importance of rules and order within a community more

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[87] KAWAMURA KUNIMITSU KINDAI NO SEKUSHUARITI [Sexuality in Modernism] (1998).

[88] M. FURUKAWA, SEIYOUKA IZEN NO NIHONJIN NO SEKUSHUARITI WA DONOYOUNA MONODATTAKA [Japanese Sexuality before Westernization], *in* Baishun suru Nippon 227-31(M. Miyachi & J Nishikawa eds., 1995).

[89] A recent publication has disputed this point of view. Atsushi Oyano claims that historical facts do not necessarily indicate there was a tolerance of, or a more relaxed attitude toward, sexual expression and sexual activities in the Edo period. He states that the movement to idealize the tolerance of sexual activities during the Edo period has been overemphasized by feminist theorists who believe there was a successful women's rights movement in the Edo period to criticize the view of sexual activities in current Japanese society. He also claims there is no evidence to prove that the "holiness" of prostitutes was accepted by the public in the Edo period, a claim some feminist scholars make to support their argument of public tolerance of sexual activities in the Edo period. ATSUSHI OYANO, EDO GENSO HIHAN [Criticism of the Illusions of the Edo Period] (2000).

[90] HAYASHI, *supra* note 86; UJIIE MIKITO, EDO NO SEIFUZOKU 205 (1998)

[91] SHINJI MIYADAI ET AL., SABU KARUCHA SHINWA KAITAI [Deconstruction of the Myth of Subculture] 214 (2000).

[92] UJIIE, *supra* note 90, at 204.

than individual rights and freedom.[93] *Dotoku* is said to be a moral standard emerging from different religious beliefs and customs that reflect natural and cultural environments throughout Japanese history.[94] The notion's main concern is that peace and tranquility are more important than individual freedom. Japanese court decisions seem to be based more on protecting the public welfare than individuals' civil rights[95] because, unlike western ethics, *Dotoku* sanctions group control.[96] *Dotoku* requires individuals to limit their own freedom for the sake of the community.[97] In this sense, it is acceptable to allow Supreme Court decisions and governmental regulations to limit freedom of expression.

The question is what standards authoritative bodies use to decide what is good or bad for the community. An important issue in this regard is the sense of aesthetics in Japanese history. *Dotoku* does not rely exclusively on one religious tradition but rather is a combination of perspectives emerging from different religious and cultural paradigms. It is a discourse guiding individuals' lives through aesthetics, a role religion plays in the West.[98] This emphasis on aesthetics is one of the most important perspectives in Japanese philosophy.[99]

Japanese author Shuzo Kuki, explains that aesthetics, or "*Iki*," is a unique concept of consciousness in Japan that cannot easily be translated or explained outside of its own cultural setting. *Iki* is a sense of aesthetics that determines the

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93 RYOTARO SHIBA & DONAL KEEN, NIHONJIN TO NIHON BUNKA [The Japanese and Japanese Culture] 119-26 (2000).
94 *Id.*at 114-40.
95 OKUDAIRA, *supra* note 44.
96 SHIBA & KEEN, *supra* note 93.
97 *Id.* at 124.
98 MICHITARO TADA, SHINPEN NO NIHON BUNKA [Japanese culture of everyday life] 26 (2000).
99 SHUZO KUKI, IKI NO KOZO [Structure of Japanese Esprit] (1930).

quality of culture from chic and fulfilling to crude and vulgar.[100] Kuki says *"Iki"* is a realization of spirituality the Japanese knew in premodern times,[101] and by experiencing spirituality from its distant past current Japanese society is able to retain cultural values. These values include a belief that a sense of wisdom rules society that is beyond any individual's control. This may be similar to what the Japanese Supreme Court has called an "expected higher consciousness in Japanese culture that cannot be compromised or negotiated."[102] This higher consciousness Kuki discusses and the Supreme Court notes refers to the sense of wisdom in Japanese society. In addition to *"Iki," "Dotoku"* may be called *"Shakai Tsunen no Kihan"* ("standard for social feeling").[103]

Obscene material — with or without literary value — is an anathema to *"Dotoku."* The Japanese Supreme Court has defined obscenity broadly in an attempt to eliminate material with a deleterious effect on society's morals. The means have been criticized,[104] but the goal remains important to the Japanese judiciary.

Conclusion

Donald Keen, a prominent scholar of Japanese culture has said Japanese society throughout its history seems to have feelings of both love and hate, or of acceptance and resistance, toward the West.[105] Japanese cultural values have developed by integrating foreign cultures into its indigenous culture. The

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100 *Id.*
101 *Id.*
102 Shimizu et al., *supra* note 59.
103 *Id.*
104 *See* Krotoszynski, *supra* note 3, at 967 & n.306.

development of the Japanese legal system also has taken this route. The modern Japanese judicial system often has borrowed from western legal systems during the country's modernization. Keen suggests that although Japanese society accepts western processes, it does not necessarily accept the supporting philosophies.[106] A system can be applied to a society as a tool, but the country may not necessarily adopt the historical rationales behind the system.

Japan's adoption of a constitution based on a United States model took this approach. Post-war Japanese society's being based on a western democratic philosophy does not mean cultural values developed over two millennia were rejected in the process of westernization. The Supreme Court's obscenity decisions show the survival of traditional Japanese cultural values.

The Japanese Supreme Court will face obscenity cases in the future and once more will have to consider important issues. Should the Japanese constitution's protection of free speech force the court to narrow its obscenity definition so as to protect more material? Should social values in sexually explicit material prevent a finding of obscenity? Should the court use changes in Japanese society's acceptance of erotic material to justify altering the judiciary's obscenity definition? Indeed, does the court's apparent ignoring of social reality diminish the court's authoritative power in maintaining social order?

Harry Clor wrote:

> In an ideal system of legal control, that perfectly suited to the needs of modern society, wise men would solemnly weigh three considerations: the moral evils of obscenity, the virtues of art and the requirements of

[105] SHIBA & KEEN, *supra* note 93, at 24.

> public consensus in a regime of rational liberty. Each consideration would be given its full weight in the light of the common good. No work which is grossly obscene would ever be publicly circulated in society. No work which is not obscene would be ever censored. Good or useful literature would always be free to circulate and, encouraged by an organized community aware of distinctions between the noble and the base, it would flourish. Public opinion would be fully respected, but it would also be elevated, both morally and aesthetically. [107]

Wise people need not follow the footsteps of western legal tradition; rather, what they need to do is recognize their own cultural values and incorporate them into their society's present environment. It is clear that the United States' concept of free speech is not currently acceptable to the Japanese judiciary — at least where explicitly erotic material is concerned. Two millennia of Japanese history have inculcated social values that do not lend themselves to adopting the American approach to sexual expression.

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[106] *Id.* at 120-40.
[107] HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: CENSORSHIP IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 272 (1969).

Redefining Local News: How Daily Newspapers Reflect Their Communities' International Connections

A paper presented to the International Division at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication annual conference in Washington, D.C., on Aug. 6, 2001.

Abstract: Because more than 10 percent of those living in the United States were born elsewhere, one might think it easy to show readers how international news affects their lives. This content analysis examines the cover-to-cover content of 10 newspapers from June 29-July 26, 1998, to determine if the content reflects their communities' global ties. On average, the newspapers ran less than one international-related story a day that offered readers information on their community's global connections.

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Local, local, local. Proximity often seems to be the No. 1 criteria for what makes the front page of the United States' daily newspapers. If the news occurred elsewhere in the world, it usually receives less coverage and, certainly, less coverage on the front page. John Maxwell Hamilton says old-fashioned definitions of news dictate that to an editor in Kansas City, for example, "The farther it is from Kansas City, the less it is news."[1] So, when does the local have a global connection? When do members of a local community have a vested, tangible interest in what occurs half way across the world? And how often -- and where -- does a local newspaper explain that international connection to its readers?

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 28.4 million people living in the United States in 2000 -- about 10.4 percent of the total population -- were born elsewhere.[2] Of those, 51 percent were born in Latin America, 25.5 percent in Asia and 15.3 percent in Europe. Certainly, many of these individuals have connections and interests that extend beyond the borders of the United States. Some of these individuals -- about 5 million in 1996 -- were living in the United States' illegally,[3] while about 10.5 million were legal permanent residents.[4] In any case, their presence affects the United States culturally and economically, and, one could argue, also helps to redefine what is local news as communities become more and more diverse and more connected to the world beyond the United States' borders.

[1] John Maxwell Hamilton, "Foreign Affairs at Home: Far Too Few Reporters and Editors Try to Trace World Events to Main Street America," *Nieman Reports*, Fall 1991, pp. 9-10.
[2] Lisa Lollock (2001), The Foreign Born Population in the United States: March 2000, Current Population reports, P20-534, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C., p. 1.
[3] U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Illegal Alien Resident Population," http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/illegalalien/index.htm.

Are American newspaper editors paying attention to their communities' changing demographics? Do their news pages seem to reflect how global news, issues and cultures are becoming local? Most international news studies focus on the elite press and how many international datelines appear in the first news section. This study will not. Instead, it will focus on small and midsize papers, how well they have stressed their local-global connections and to what extent their news coverage seems to reflect an understanding of where the residents of their states were born.

Literature Review

Most studies that examine the international news coverage of American newspapers focus on the amount and quality of such news in the United States' elite press.[5] Other scholars have compared the amount of coverage of Canada and Mexico in U.S. newspapers with the amount of U.S. coverage in those countries' media.[6] A few researchers have examined the amount of international coverage in mainstream American newspapers, but their work did not

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[4] U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1998, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 2000, p.

[5] See for example Gerald W. Hopple, (1982), "International News Coverage in Two Elite Newspapers," *Journal of Communication* 32(1): 61-74; Daniel Riffe, Charles F. Aust, Ted C. Jones, Barbara Shoemake and Shyam Sundar, (1994), "The shrinking foreign newshole of the New York Times," *Newspaper Research Journal* 15(3): 74-89; Michael Emery, (1989), "An Endangered Species: The International Newshole," *Gannett Center Journal* 3(4):151-64; W. James Potter, "News from three worlds in prestige U.S. newspapers," *Journalism Quarterly*, Spring 1987, 64: 73-81; Joseph Epstein, "The degradation of the New York Times," *Commentary*, May 1994, 97 (5): 34-40.

[6] Jim A. Hart (1963), "The Flow of News between the United States and Canada," *Journalism Quarterly* 40:70-74; Roy E. Blackwood, (1987), "International News Photos in U.S. and Canadian Papers," *Journalism Quarterly* 64:195-199; Melissa A. Johnson, (1997), "Predicting news flow from Mexico," *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 74(2): 315-331; Denis Wu Haoming, (1998), "Geographic distance and U.S. newspaper coverage of Canada and Mexico," *Gazette* 60(3): 253-264; and Vernone M. Sparkes, (1978), "The Flow of News Between Canada and the United States," *Journalism Quarterly* 55(2): 260-268.

focus exclusively on those newspapers.[7] Some media critics and journalists are convinced, however, that the amount of international news coverage in the United States' small and midsize papers is inadequate and, unfortunately, on the decline.[8] Said Edward Seaton, editor in chief of *The Manhattan* (Kan.) *Mercury* and past president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors:

> The elite newspapers, like *The New York Times, The Washington Post* and *The Wall Street Journal*, offer wonderful coverage of the world to an elite readership highly interested in foreign policy. Perhaps 50 other daily newspapers do a reasonably good job, at least covering the part of the world most connected to their regions. ... Then there are the rest of us, 1,550 dailies – many of whose editors seem to believe readers aren't interested in international news and, apparently, don't have a need for it. Ten inches about mayhem is often their norm.[9]

If one were to examine the newspapers Seaton is concerned about, what would one find? In 1970, Gerbner and Marvanyi found that nine U.S. newspapers they studied published an average of about 25 international news items, taking up an average of 518 column inches, each day.[10] More recently, Hess found that on a typical day in 1989, 20 American newspapers published an average of 4.5 international-dateline stories.[11] Overall, studies have indicated that anywhere from 10.2 percent in 1971 to less than 3 percent of the news space in the 1990s is

[7] Stephen Hess, *International News & Foreign Correspondents,* Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1996; George Gerbner and George Marvanyi, "The Many Worlds of the World's Press," *Journal of Communication*, Winter 1977, pp. 52-66; and John A. Lent, "International News in United States Media: Myths, Stereotypes and Realities," a paper presented at the "New Trends in Teaching Asia Workshop," Temple University's Ambler Campus, October 1975.
[8] Peter Arnett, "Goodbye, World," *American Journalism Review,* November 1998, pp. 50-67; and Edward Seaton, "The Diminishing Use of Foreign News Reporting," May 26, 1998 speech before the International Press Institute, found at http://www.asne.org/ideas/seatonmoscow.htm.
[9] Seaton.
[10] Gerbner and Marvanyi.
[11] Hess, p. 93.

devoted to international news.[12] Most of the content analyses have focused on the international news appearing on the front pages and in the first general news section of the news pages. They have not concerned themselves with a newspaper's sports or lifestyles sections, for example.

What also troubles some researchers is the prevalence of news briefs and the limited number of analytical stories appearing in American newspapers.[13] The proportion of news stories that are thematic vs. episodic is important because of how consumers process news. Neuman, Just and Crigler have found that episodic reports, which focus on the day's "breaking news," are less meaningful and memorable to readers than thematic reports, which provide more context and analysis.[14] Other media critics denounce the tendency for negative news stories to predominate international news coverage,[15] particularly in coverage of the developing world.[16]

What researchers have not examined, however, is how much newspaper editors choose to tell their readers about their communities' global connections. Although devotees of international news coverage often lament what they perceive to be an overzealous emphasis on "local" news, little research has been undertaken to determine how many international-related but local stories appear in the United States' local newspapers. Instead, trade publications are full of exhortations to editors to stress those local connections, especially

[12] Seaton and Emery.
[13] Hess, pp. 90-97.
[14] Russell W. Neuman, Marion R. Just and Ann N. Crigler, *Common Knowledge: news and the construction of political meaning*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
[15] Arnett.
[16] Mark D. Alleyne, *International Power and International Communication*. New York: St. Martin's, 1995.

economic ones, and not to forsake international news.[17] Geoff Seamans, for example, tells his fellow editorial writers:

> The Cold War has ended, but the United States – which is to say again, our readers – continues to have vital interests throughout the world. If anything, those interests are intensifying as the old economic order gives way to the new era of globalization.
>
> Despite our limitations, in other words, many of us have an obligation to comment at least occasionally on the international issues of the day.[18]

For his part, Alvin Shuster has argued that international reporting has become even more important. "With Americans paying less attention to what's going on in the world, it is easier to justify cutting back international coverage. Diminished coverage, in turn, feeds the lack of interest and compounds it."[19]

The Research Questions

Do American newspaper editors seem to be listening? How much of their content shows readers the linkages between world events and cultures, and life at home? Based on the literature review, the following research questions will be examined for small and midsize newspapers:

1) How much of the newspapers' international-related news coverage provides their readers with information about local-global connections?

2) Where -- in which sections of the newspaper, that is -- are such stories most likely to be found?

[17] See, for example, Richard Mial, "Keep eye on the world," *The Masthead*, Winter 1997, pp. 23-24; Hamilton, "Foreign Affairs at Home"; and Richard Lambert, "Business News and International Reporting," *Media Studies Journal*, Spring/Summer 1999, pp. 78-81.
[18] Geoff Seamans, "Crash course on the world," *The Masthead*, Summer 1998, 50 (2): 21.
[19] Alvin Shuster, "The foreign report – even more vital," *Nieman Reports*, Summer 1997, 51(2): 21-22.

3) Similarly, for what kinds of subjects are newspaper editors most likely show their readers global connections?

4) Are international-related stories that report a global connection more or less likely than other international-related stories to be episodic or thematic?

5) Are newspapers with a more diverse circulation area more likely to publish local news with international connections?

6) Finally, does the international news coverage seem to reflect the international composition of each newspaper's state?

Methodology

Ten newspapers were chosen for the study based on a stratified random sample from the American Society of Newspaper Editors' records. Three midsize (circulation 100,001 to 250,000), three small (circulation of 50,001 to 100,000) and four smaller newspapers (circulation 25,001 to 50,000) were chosen. The midsize newspapers were *The Post and Courier* of Charleston, S.C., the *Providence* (R.I.) *Journal* and the *Richmond Times-Dispatch*. The small papers were *The Journal Gazette* from Fort Wayne, Ind., the *Reno Gazette-Journal* and the *Quad-City Times*, published in Davenport, Iowa. The smallest newspapers in the study were *The Dothan* (Ala.) *Eagle*, the *Leader-Telegram* from Eau Claire, Wis., *The News-Gazette* from Champaign-Urbana, Ill., and the *Sun* from Bremerton, Wash.

Full copies of the June 29 to July 26, 1998, newspapers were coded.[20] Unlike past studies that only examined stories with international datelines, this study was more expansive. All newspaper stories that involved international affairs or international-related issues were

coded for all sections of the newspapers. The content analysis therefore included, for example, locally written stories that related the community to the world, national stories about U.S. foreign policy and sports stories about the World Cup, Wimbledon and so forth. The four-week time period was selected by the American Society of Newspaper Editors with the cooperation of the Associated Press because this study was part of a larger study examining how the newspaper editors chose to use AP's international content.[21]

Among the variables coded for each story were the date, page, section, primary subject area, approximate story length, whether the story was episodic or thematic, the byline, and whether the story included mention of a local angle. With the exception of the local angle variable, the categories were based on those used by Hess.[22] The subject categories were accident/disaster, combat/political violence, crime, culture, diplomacy, domestic government, economics, health/science/environment, human interest, human rights, immigration and sports. Hess' category of combat was expanded to include political violence within a country, and his science/environment category was broadened to include health news. The immigration category was added at the request of the ASNE, which commissioned the original study.

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[20] Three editions of one of the larger newspapers were not available, as were two editions of one of the smaller newspapers. Because of the large sample size -- 5,572 international-related news items were coded as part of a fuller study -- the missing data are not expected to seriously affect the results.
[21] Beverly Horvit, "How 10 American newspapers and the AP covered the world: A content analysis of June 29, 1998, to July 26, 1998," a paper presented to the International Division of the Association for Education in Mass Communication and Journalism at its annual convention, August 1999, New Orleans, La.
[22] Hess, pp. 115-117.

A single coder analyzed the data. To test the consistency of the coding, a sample of 10 percent of the newspapers' first A sections was examined after the study was completed. There was a 95 percent match between the international stories coded for the study and those coded for the reliability check. Across variables, the level of consistency was 92 percent.

In addition to analyzing the newspapers' content, data were gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service about the diversity of each newspaper's readership area, as well as the number of individuals in their respective states who were born in other countries. Each newspaper was then assigned an international-diversity "score" that represented a weighted average of the following: the percentage of foreign-born residents in its state, the percentage of Census respondents in its county who indicated they were of Asian dissent, and the percentage of Census respondents in the newspaper's county who said they were Hispanic or Latino. The statistics related to the specific county were weighted to count twice as much as the state statistics to account for the likelihood that many of the foreign-born residents live in more urban areas, not necessarily the readership areas of the newspapers in the study. The percentage of foreign-born residents was calculated with data from the *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1998*, on the number of people naturalized, the number of nonimmigrants admitted to the United States, the number of refugees and asylees granted permanent resident status, and the number of immigrants admitted.[23] The U.S. Census Bureau's Census 2000 Redistricting

[23] U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1998, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C. 2000, pp. 71-77, 118, 164-167, and 184-185.

Data was used to determine the percentage of residents in each newspaper's county of publication who said they were either Asian or Hispanic. The international-diversity score was then compared with the international content of the newspapers.

Findings

Q1: How much of the newspapers' international-related news coverage provides their readers with information about the local-global connections?

During the four-week study, the 10 newspapers published 3,293 articles with international datelines, or an average of nearly 12 items a day per newspaper. Although that average may seem high, it includes news items in all sections of the newspaper, including sports, for example. In the general news (first A) sections of the 10 newspapers, the number of international-datelined stories represented between 15 percent and 24 percent of the news hole.[24] Of those articles throughout the newspaper with international datelines, 40, or a little more than 1 percent, contained a reference to the newspaper's local community.

In addition, another 185 international-related articles displayed throughout the newspapers were written in the United States. Those articles gave readers information about international issues, events or cultures and connected that information to the local communities. Unfortunately, the 225 total stories with global-local connections represent the equivalent of less than one story a day per newspaper.

[24] To approximate how much of the newshole in the first A section was devoted to international vs. national news, both types of content were measured in a random sample of 20 percent of the newspapers' general news sections.

Going cover to cover Where stories with international and local ties were played	
Section	**No. of stories**
General news (first A section)	55 (21 on Page One)
Metro/Local	47
Lifestyles/features	46
Sports	42
Business	24
Opinion	11

Q2: Where -- in which sections of the newspaper, that is -- are stories with local-global connections most likely to be found?

Although most content analyses of international news coverage have focused on the general news, or first A, sections of the newspapers, it is clear from this study that international-related stories are sprinkled throughout the newspapers. Of the 225 stories that linked international issues to the local communities, 55, or about 24 percent, were published in the newspapers' first A sections. Of those, 21 stories appeared on Page One. The two largest newspapers in the study, *The Providence Journal* and the *Richmond Times-Dispatch,* both put five such stories on their front pages. Four newspapers ran one front-page story during the month connecting the local and the global, and two newspapers – in Eau Claire, Wis., and Champaign-Urbana, Ill. -- ran none at all. In addition to the stories in the first A section, between 42 and 47 international-related stories with local mentions also appeared in the sports, lifestyles/features and metro/local sections.

Given the emphasis some media critics have placed on stressing to readers how important international events are to Americans' pocketbooks, one might be surprised to

see that only 24 such stories were published in the newspapers' business sections. However, as will be discussed later, economic issues were the third most-frequently reported subjects for international-related stories with local connections -- behind human interest and sports stories. In addition, eight stories that appeared in the first A sections, as opposed to the business section, dealt primarily with economic issues.

The section in which the fewest efforts were made to help readers connect their local communities with international affairs was the opinion section. Only 11 columns or editorials related the international to the local, and those only appeared in four of the 10 newspapers. (Letters to the editor were not coded.)

Q3: For what kinds of subjects are newspaper editors most likely to show readers their global connections?

When the news editors were choosing from the smorgasbord of the AP wire, the subject that received by far the most attention over the four-week period was sports, which accounted for more than 23 percent of all the international-dateline material. Of course, one must keep in mind, though, that the four weeks of the study coincided with such major sporting events as the World Cup, the British Open, Wimbledon and the Tour de France. The next most popular stories among editors were about domestic governments abroad and diplomatic efforts.

However, when it came to publishing international-related stories that mentioned the local communities, the editors' priorities were different. The vast majority, a little more than 75 percent, of such stories were written by the newspapers' own staff members; a little more

than 18 percent of the articles were provided by the wire services. It is unclear whether the newspapers actively solicited those stories, whether the editors chose the stories based on their local connections or whether the editors asked local reporters to insert local information into the wire stories.

Regardless, the subject matter differed from the international-dateline material. Although sports still received a relatively large share of the attention at nearly 20 percent, the number of sports stories was eclipsed by human interest stories, usually articles about individuals within the communities who had global interests. Fifty-seven human interest stories were published. Sports was second with 43 stories. Economics and culture were the next most frequent categories, with 41 and 37 stories respectively. No other topics accounted for more than 6 percent of those stories in which global and local connections were made explicit.

What international-related events or issues did the newspapers' editors believe merited using local resources to cover? The answer ranges from the World Cup in France to the tobacco industry in Brazil to the effect of an earthquake in the Azores on a local church, a touching story in the *Providence Journal.*

Among the larger papers, local staffers at *The* (Charleston) *Post and Courier* wrote articles about the director of a local arts festival trying to get permission from Chinese authorities to produce a Chinese opera, a community's ties to Sierra Leone, and how the community showed hospitality to an international ship crew stranded at the local port.

Business writers at the *Providence Journal* noted when overseas firms were interested -- or not -- in doing business in the local communities. Columnists recounted their adventures abroad and what they learned, for example, during a bicycle tour of Vietnam (*The Post and Courier*) or during a day in France's wine country (*Providence Journal*). The Providence paper also reported on a study that found immigrants to the United States are worth the investment and, once a week, offered a full page catering to its Spanish-speaking readers called *Pagina Latina.* The same newspaper showed how an issue in Washington could strike close to home: It noted that 3,000 Liberians in Rhode Island could be deported thanks to new legislation. In the world of sports, the *Providence Journal* also offered a first-person account from a local golf pro about the British Open.

For its part, the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* sent a reporter to Brazil to cover its tobacco industry and compare Brazil's challenges with that of the Virginia. The results received prominent coverage on the newspaper's front page and even produced a column in the lifestyles section. The same newspaper reported how a local university planned to open a branch in Qatar. Other stories in the *Times-Dispatch* profiled individuals in the community who had substantial experience abroad: a Realtor who teachers German, the international president of B'nai B'rith, a professor who organizes classes in Russia and so forth.

Although the small newspapers did not produce as much locally written copy with an international flavor as did the larger papers, there were some notable stories. The *Quad-City Times*, for example, ran a profile on a Kenyan runner competing in a local

race, and *The Journal Gazette* localized its coverage of the world's AIDS conference in Geneva by talking to an expert from the University of Indiana. While the *Quad-City Times* published a story about local families taking in Russian orphans, the *Reno Gazette-Journal* wrote about local families adopting children from Siberia. On the economic front, the *Gazette-Journal* took care to explain how local businesses were affected by the U.S. trade deficit, which was fueled in part by Asia's financial troubles. The same newspaper published a story about the economic crisis' impact on international students in the community. In addition, the *Journal Gazette* of Fort Wayne, Ind., published several articles written by its Washington staff that included information about the local U.S. senator's work on international relations and foreign policy.

The smallest papers ran fewer locally written articles related to the rest of the world, but they were not oblivious to global concerns and cultures. The *Sun* of Bremerton, Wash., offered a feature story about a summer resident with an opera career in Europe. The same newspaper also showed how international affairs can affect local family life by writing about the role fathers play when wives go abroad -- to Bosnia, for example -- on a military tour of duty. The Champaign-Urbana paper noted when a former local basketball star was being recruited for international competition and when police officers from Russia came to the local university for training.

Although the editors and reporters of the smaller papers did not put as much emphasis on these kinds of stories, it was clear that global connections do exist in each community. Perhaps the editors can expand their sense of what's newsworthy by

comparing their coverage to one another and by examining the government's statistics on their readership areas, to be discussed later.

Q4: Are international-related stories that report a global connection more or less likely than other international-related stories to be episodic or thematic?

Overall, a little more than 83 percent of all the international-dateline stories published during the four-week period were episodic accounts. Most of those stories, then, focused on describing a breaking-news event in another country. A little less than 17 percent were thematic. That is to say that only about 17 percent of the international-dateline stories were analytical or in-depth articles that helped explain an issue, culture or trend. When the newspapers were producing their own international-related stories or choosing stories that mentioned local angles, however, those stories were more likely to be explanatory. A little more than 48 percent of stories that indicated linkages between the local and global were thematic, while a little more than 51 percent were episodic.

Q5: Are newspapers with a more diverse circulation area more likely to publish local news with international connections?

To answer this question, an international-diversity score was calculated that reflected both the number of foreign-born residents in the newspapers' states, as well as the number of Asian and Hispanic residents in their counties of publication. Of the ten papers, two had international-diversity scores greater than 5: the *Reno Gazette-Journal* (14.24) and the *Providence* (R.I.) *Journal* (7.27). In the *Gazette-Journal's* case, the score reflects the large percentage of Hispanics in Washoe County, Nev., (16.58 percent), compared with the other newspapers' readership areas, as well as Nevada's high percentage of foreign-born residents

Calculating the International-Diversity Score				
Newspaper	**State's % of foreign-born**	**County's Asian %**	**County's Hispanic %**	**Int'l-Diversity Score**
Reno Gazette-Journal, Washoe County, Nev.	29.49	4.28	16.58	14.24
Providence Journal, Providence County, R.I.	3.79	2.9	13.39	7.27
News-Gazette, Champaign County, Ill.	5.64	6.45	2.9	4.87
The Sun, Kitsap County, Wash.	5.8	4.39	4.14	4.57
The Journal Gazette, Allen County, Indiana	1.74	1.4	4.18	2.58
Quad-City Times, Scott County, Iowa	1.36	1.58	4.06	2.53
Richmond Times-Dispatch, Independent City of Richmond, Va.	4.06	1.25	2.57	2.34
Leader-Telegram, Eau Claire County, Wisc.	1.9	3.66	1	2.24
Post and Courier, Charleston County, S.C.	2.05	1.12	2.4	1.82
Dothan Eagle, Houston County, Ala.	1.19	0.62	1.26	0.99

(29.49 percent). Providence County, R.I., has a similarly high percentage of Hispanic residents at 13.4 percent of the population. The newspaper with the lowest international-diversity score was the *Dothan* (Ala.) *Eagle* (0.99), where fewer than 2 percent of Houston County's population was either Asian or Hispanic.

If one compares the newspapers' International-Diversity Scores with the number of international-related stories that mention local connections, there appears to be little

Thinking globally
Comparing the International-Diversity Score with the number of international-related stories that mention local connections

Newspaper (IDS rank in parentheses)	**Int'l Datelines**	**U.S. datelines**	**Total**
Providence (R.I.) Journal (2)	11	30	41
Richmond (Va.) *Times-Dispatch (7)*	7	30	37
The Post and Courier (Charleston, S.C.) **(9)**	5	22	27
Quad-City Times (Davenport, Iowa) **(6)**	5	20	25
The Sun (Bremerton, Wash.) *(4)*	2	21	23
The News-Gazette (Champaign-Urbana, Ill.) **(3)**	5	16	21
The Journal Gazette (Fort Wayne, Ind.) **(5)**	0	18	18
Reno (Nev.) *Gazette-Journal (1)*	1	15	16
The Dothan (Ala.) *Eagle (10)*	2	7	9
Leader-Telegram (Eau Claire, Wis.) **(8)**	2	6	8
Total	**40**	**185**	**225**

connection. Rather, the three largest circulation newspapers -- the *Providence Journal, Richmond Times-Dispatch* and Charleston *Post and Courier* -- offered readers the most stories with international-local connections. The size of those newspapers' staffs and news holes may have more to do with the number of international-related stories than the community's international connections. On the other hand, much smaller newspapers such as *The Sun* of Bremerton, Wash., and the *News Gazette* of Champaign-Urbana, Ill., managed to offer their readers a fair number of international-related stories that mentioned global connections. In the future, a regression analysis would offer a more precise and efficient way of predicting news coverage by controlling for such variables as newspaper size, ethnic populations and foreign-born residents.

Q6: Finally, does the international news coverage by region and country seem to reflect the international composition of each newspaper's state?

To answer this question, one must first examine the regions of the world from which the foreign-born residents in the newspapers' circulation areas came. For nine of the 10 newspapers' states, the most predominant region of birth was Western Europe, which accounted for anywhere from 42 percent to 72 percent of foreign-born residents in the states in question. The exception was Nevada, where only 33 percent of the foreign-born residents were born in Western Europe, compared with 43 percent born in Asia. In eight of the 10 newspapers' states, Asia was the second-most frequent source of foreign-born residents, and Latin America was the third-most frequent birthplace. Besides Nevada, the exception was Rhode Island, where only 16.8 percent of the foreign-born residents were from Asia, compared to 21.8 percent from Nevada.

Did the newspapers' coverage reflect their states' international connections in that Western Europe, Asia and the Americas received more international news coverage than the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Africa? Certainly, the 10 newspapers devoted more of their international news coverage to Western Europe than to any other region during this four-week period. Those findings are consistent with past studies showing the tendency of American media to over-cover Western Europe. Although some have criticized that tendency and its contribution to an imbalanced news flow worldwide, it could be that the newspaper editors are indeed choosing the news in which their readers are most interested. According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service's 1998 Statistical Yearbook, more than 15,000

Foreign-born residents and international news coverage						
Paper	**Region** % of foreign-born residents born there (% of international news coverage) Bold indicates where rankings differ for birthplace vs. percentage of coverage					
	Africa	**Americas**	**Asia**	**E. Europe**	**Mideast**	**W. Europe**
Alabama's *Dothan Eagle*	1.0 (6.6%)	18.6 (10.7%)	20.8 (25.2%)	1.7 (15.1%)	1.7 (6.6%)	56.3 (35.7%)
News-Gazette of Champaign, Ill.	0.7 (9.0%)	**25.3 (10.2%)**	**23.7 (19.2%)**	2.0 (17.4%)	1.2 (9.0%)	47.0 (35.3%)
The Journal Gazette of Fort Wayne, Ind.	0.7 (8.9%)	22.2 (8.4%)	29.5 (26.6%)	1.4 (15.0%)	0.6 (10.2%)	45.6 (31.0%)
Iowa's *Quad-City Times*	0.9 (6.1%)	**21.4 (9.4%)**	29.8 (23.9%)	**2.9 (16.7%)**	0.7 (4.4%)	44.4 (39.4%)
Nevada's *Reno Gazette Journal*	0.2 (9.4%)	**22.4 (11.0%)**	43.0 (31.8%)	**0.3 (15.5%)**	0.8 (6.9%)	33.2 (25.3%)
Providence (R.I.) Journal	1.0 (8.9%)	**21.8 (8.4%)**	**16.8 (22.7%)**	1.4 (9.9%)	1.2 (9.4%)	57.8 (40.9%)
South Carolina's *Post and Courier*	0.8 (8.6%)	**12.7 (8.9%)**	13.0 (21.3%)	**0.9 (16.9%)**	0.6 (10.8%)	72.1 (33.5%)
Virginia's *Richmond Times Dispatch*	0.6 (8.1%)	**19.8 (10.1%)**	22.9 (28.0%)	**1.7 (15.9%)**	1.0 (9.2%)	54.0 (28.8%)
Washington's *The Sun*	0.5 (7.1%)	11.3 (8.7%)	41.4 (22.2%)	3.8 (15.1%)	1.0 (7.9%)	42.0 (38.9%)
Wisconsin's *Leader-Telegram* in Eau Claire	0.74 (8.3%)	20.4 (10.8%)	22.9 (29.2%)	1.6 (10.8%)	0.9 (4.2%)	53.4 (36.7%)

Germans and citizens of the United Kingdom were living in the small state of Alabama then. In Illinois, 82,000 Britons, nearly 61,000 Germans and 29,000 French citizens were taking up temporary residency. In short, tens of thousands of Western Europeans -- more than from any other region in the world -- live in the 10 states whose newspapers were examined in this study. (An earlier study of the same data showed that the newspaper editors' chose news from Western Europe in even greater proportion than that supplied by the Associated Press.) By the same token, fewer of the 10 states' residents were born in the Middle East and in Africa, and the coverage of those regions is dramatically less than the coverage of the other regions.

The data show a few exceptions, though, in newspaper editors' tendency to rank news from different regions of the world, however coincidentally, in the same order as the international birthplaces of their states' foreign-born residents. In Illinois, for example, more than a fourth of the foreign-born residents were born in Latin America, and yet the Americas received less news coverage (10.2 percent) than did Asia, which received a little more than 19 percent of the international news coverage and was the birthplace of about 24 percent of the foreign-born residents. In the editors' defense, only 2.9 percent of the residents of their county were Hispanic, compared with 6.45 percent of Asian descent. More interesting exceptions were the news judgments at the Nevada newspaper to give the Middle East much more coverage than the Americas, even though nearly 17 percent of the *Reno Gazette-Journal's* county was Hispanic. Less than 3 percent of the state's residents were born in the Middle East. Of course, one might argue that the news from the Middle East during this period was more significant to the United States' strategic interests and, therefore, more important to readers,

but one could just as easily suggest that readers might find news from "home" more interesting and that news geographically closer to home has importance, as well.

In addition to examining international news coverage by region, perhaps it makes even more sense to see whether the newspaper editors are selecting news about the countries from which most of their international residents hail. Some oversights seem apparent. Although more than 16 percent of Washoe County, Nev., where the *Reno Gazette-Journal* is published, is Hispanic, Mexico was not among the top-ten most frequently reported on countries in that newspaper. That omission is even more remarkable given that more than 101,000 residents of Nevada were born in Mexico. Perhaps that newspaper would do well to keep in mind its very apparent international connections.

Conclusions/Suggestions for Further Research

Those editors who believe their readers are not concerned about events abroad should take note of the work of their peers. Even at the papers with circulations under 50,000, reporters found examples of ways in which the local community had a reason to care about the world beyond. Although editors at the larger papers published more stories in absolute numbers that showed readers their global connections, even editors at smaller papers found international-related stories worth expending time and energy to tell. And, although some scholars and journalists would criticize the newspapers for running so few of such stories – fewer than one a day per newspaper – the substance of many of the stories is worth noting. Nearly half of the stories with international/local connections were thematic stories, which

should be more memorable and meaningful to readers than the much more numerous international stories that do not contain any obvious local relevance.

Furthermore, an examination of the stories should make it clear to all editors that local connections to international news do exist. If they had any doubt, they should examine the Census data for their own counties and states. Nearly one in 10 of the United States' residents was born elsewhere. For their part, researchers should also note the amount of international-related news and features that appear throughout a newspaper – not just those stories that appear on Page One or in the first A section. Some might argue, of course, that the most substantive news appears on Page One and in the general news section. However, one should not discount the opportunities present in other parts of the newspaper to educate American readers about ways in which their lives or those of their neighbors intersect with events, issues and cultures originating elsewhere. When it comes to business news, for example, John Maxwell Hamilton argues that "readers need to understand the impact of global economics on their home turf and may be especially eager to pay for and tune in news that explains how complex their world is becoming."[25] The *Richmond Times-Dispatch* series on the tobacco industry in Brazil seems to be a prime example of the type of news consumers need.

Although the 10 newspapers included in the study were randomly selected, they are not necessarily representative of all American newspapers their size. More local news related to global events and issues might be reported, for example, in newspapers from states bordering Mexico such as Texas, New Mexico and California. None of those states

[25] Hamilton, p. 10.

was represented in this study. Some past research has suggested that cultural and geographic proximity can be factors in news coverage.[26] A regression analysis might very well help isolate the impact of foreign-born populations, racial diversity and what is provided by the wire services on the news judgments made by editors.

Another obvious limitation with the study is the time frame. Four weeks in the summer cannot be considered representative of a newspaper's coverage for an entire year. The original time frame was dependent on the cooperation of the newspapers and Associated Press because the purpose of a larger study, reported elsewhere,[27] was to compare the AP's offerings with those used by the newspapers. Future research should examine an even wider cross-section of newspapers over a longer period.

Despite its limitations, this study offers a much-needed look at the localization of international issues in some mainstream American papers. Although the elite press is often praised for its international coverage, many Americans do not read the *New York Times* or *Washington Post.* Instead, they may be more likely to turn to their hometown newspaper. This research helps quantify how much coverage -- and about what kinds of issues – those readers are exposed to and about how they might be helped to draw connections between what happens globally and their own communities. Newspaper editors who try to emulate the work of their peers, as reported here, might even find themselves covering -- and reaching -- a wider cross-section of their communities and, hence, expanding their readership.

[26] Johnson, 1997, and Haoming, 1998.
[27] Horvit, "How 10 American newspapers and the AP covered the world."

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Rooted in Nations, Blossoming in Globalization?

A fresh look at the discourse of an alternative news agency in the age of interdependence

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Introduction

Mass communication scholars have long sought to understand the role news agencies play in determining the nature, volume and direction of information flows across the globe. Originated in the 19th century in the West, where they became essential agents in the processes of modernization and globalization, news agencies represent "communication appropriate to the informational and relational needs of the state, capital and civic society in modernity" (Boyd-Barrett, 1996). The dominant worldwide agencies for most of the 20th century have been the "Big Four" (the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters and Agence France Presse) that filter news through the perspectives, assumptions and interests of their individual journalists, management and home nations in the developed North.

The resulting imbalances in international reporting, which are particularly significant to the needs and identities of developing nations, propelled the founding of the alternative news agency Inter Press Service in 1964, with the explicit mission of providing news content from a Southern perspective. Funded largely by Western civil society organizations such as UNESCO, the Ford Foundation and the International Development Cooperation, the IPS effectively represents the redistribution of capital and technology resources from the wealthy North to the poorer South. Thus, it is historically associated with the dependency paradigm that emerged in the mid-1960s and culminated in calls by developing nations, scholars and international non-governmental organizations such as UNESCO for a new world order (Masmaudi, 1979; Boyd-Barrett, 1996). Considering its roots in dependency theory and the New World Information and Communication Order debate, however, is IPS an anachronism—or do rising globalization and interdependency make it more relevant than ever?

While existing research on the output of news agencies has been dominated by quantitative methods—especially content analysis—some scholars propose that qualitative approaches such as discourse analysis may offer more profound and more interesting insights into the nature of news stories than can be obtained by the crude counting of articles or inches and the systematic grouping of content into sets of predetermined categories (Galtung and Vincent, 1992). What's more: those who do use discourse analysis have neglected news agencies, as Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (1998) suggest, because their original texts can be somewhat more difficult to access than the discourses available in other genres.

Thus, the present paper offers a qualitative investigation on the compelling topic of international news agency content. The first section will briefly discuss the role of wire services in the context of globalization, review previous literature comparing the content provided by dominant and alternative agencies, and introduce the mission of Inter Press Service (IPS). The second, and major, section will analyze the discourse by which the Associated Press (AP) and IPS frame certain issues, in order to determine whether the Southern agency's news stories are demonstrably different from the Northern one's—answering the question of whether IPS content indeed does provide an alternative to AP content. The third section will discuss the findings of this discourse analysis and relate them to the larger issues facing the alternative news agency in its quest to inform the core of events at the periphery.

A shift in communication paradigms

In the second half of the 20th century, communication scholars witnessed a shift away from modernization, a view that has been criticized for its linearity, positivism, neglect of social context, conservatism and technological determinism. Debates about dependency theory, capitalist exploitation and cultural imperialism that once focused on sender- and media-centric models—the mechanistic diffusion model of powerful effects in which communication is "something one does to another" (Servaes, 1999)—have made way for multiplicity, organicism, participatory models, and an understanding that all societies are dependent to some extent on others. Globalization theory explains this new world order in terms such as time-space compression, the rise of networks over hierarchies, and complex connectivity that "links the myriad small everyday actions of millions with the fates of distant, unknown others" (Tomlinson, 1999).

This shift, however, has posed a challenge for the key institutions of modernity: capitalism, industrialism, urbanism, the nation-state system and, especially, mass communication. Modern media organizations such as international news agencies are inherently hierarchical, bureaucratic, sender-oriented and centralized. The routines of news production tend by necessity to reinforce, for example, positivism through the doctrine of objectivity, conservatism through use of official sources, and neglect of social context through the imperative of brevity. Standard definitions of what constitutes news also influence reporting decisions and bias content. Thus, news reporting is still, for the most part, something that one does to another.

Previous studies on global news content

Research on the worldwide flow of news has generally found that news agencies are a paramount source of news for the average newspaper, that coverage tends to focus on only a few dominant countries, and that editors do very little editing of stories from news agencies (Galtung, 1992). A stream of studies have found that when Northern news agencies report on the South, they typically concentrate on violence, conflict, natural disasters and politics (Giffard, 1998; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1985, Wilhoit & Weaver, 1983). Such findings underscore the need for better understanding and in-depth analyses, by a variety of methods, of agency content.

Existing literature indicates that "the information gap and uneven news flow between developed core countries and developing peripheral countries is not diminishing and that 'bad news' about the Third World is an enduring fact," notes Schiff (1996) in his study of the Associated Press' bureaus and U.S. interests. He continues:

> "Despite some disagreement then, scholars have repeatedly found that international coverage is geographically biased, skewed, homogeneous, concentrated and consonant, and most researchers have found that geographically there are consistent newsmakers, privileged news locations, hot spots and invisible areas. Explanations for regional bias and for the lack of diversity among major media usually focus on the cultural biases, news values and commercial incentives of the gatekeepers (...) International news coverage by core-country news services would be expected to remain

focused on areas where the economic and political interests of the core countries are most at stake." (Schiff, 1996)

Despite the shifts in the communication paradigm and effects of economic and cultural globalization on how large media organizations do business across nations, scholars such as Schiff have not identified a corresponding change in the content or structure of news agencies like the Associated Press.

The information domination by Northern agencies, often called "one-way flow," has affected journalists and readers alike: quantitative imbalance of news, unequal distribution of resources, de facto hegemony, lack of information on developing countries, persistence of colonial-era practices, alienation and messages ill-suited for their audiences (Masmaudi, 1984). And, as one scholar has noted, dependence on the North American journalism model and transnational news agencies fosters cultural imperialism in that the Latin American press sees the news through foreign eyes (Reyes Matta, 1979).

More recently, researchers have explicitly linked the international news systems to the developing identities of nation-states, noting that Western domination seems to "obstruct the ability of new Southern nation states to contribute to the representation of their national image and national interests in Northern media markets, with potentially enormous implications for politics and the economy" (Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen, 1998).

A mission of resistance

Numerous attempts have been made to deal with these imbalances over the past 30 years. For instance, the Inter Press Service was launched with a goal of reporting on events and global processes affecting the economic, social and political development of people and nations, especially in the South.[1] It is now roughly the sixth largest international news agency. Headquartered in Rome, the non-profit agency maintains bureaux in 41 countries but "has no national or political base, and pursues the objective of equal gender representation and balanced representation of ethnic diversity and geographical distribution" (IPS, 2000).

A belief in information as a public service, not a commodity, makes IPS exceptional; these are not the global media missionaries who Herman and McChesney (1998) describe as denying any "social, moral and political obligations beyond the pursuit of profit." Considering that the benefits to society of a well-developed public sphere are externalities that do not sell well (Herman & McChesney, 1998), it is unsurprising to find this organization operates on a shoestring budget.

IPS qualifies as one of the groups or cultural bodies that resist global corporate ideology by virtue of expounding alternative analyses and visions, that are poorly funded, and that have little leverage in the mass media (Herman & McChesney, 1998). The news agency can, in fact, be understood as a form of resistance, described by Foucault, that questions not only the way knowledge—in this case, news—circulates and functions but

[1] Although terms employed to draw regional comparisons--East-West, North-South, core/center-periphery, or First World-Third World—often imply undue similarities and obscure obvious differences, they are applied here for distinguishing between the "developing" nations which are the raison d'être of Inter Press Service reportage and the "developed" nations whose perspective is associated with the Associated Press, et al. Additionally, "North" and "South" are the terms preferred by IPS.

also how social identities are constructed. Foucault's discussion of the subject and power also illuminates the shift in IPS's mission from a NWICO-esque attack on a group or class of nations to an attack on the organization and technique of international news gathering and distribution systems—an expression of the *"régime du savoir"* (Foucault, 1993).

Its pro-social agenda and its aim of breaking the Northern news monopoly also have cast doubt upon the validity of Inter Press Service news coverage, which some seem to characterize as "PR for the Third World." C. Anthony Giffard, a long-time scholar of the alternative agency and a member of its board of directors, writes:

> "To Westerners, IPS argues that its focus on the Third World does not mean that it is biased against the West, and that its news services are every bit as objective as those of the major agencies, differing only in the topics and themes they emphasize. Nevertheless, criticism in some quarters of the agency's perceived ideological orientation meant that when IPS tried to break into Western markets, particularly in the United States, it ran into a political storm" (1989).

Another writer points out IPS's roots in NWICO as a liability and the source of its alienation from mass audiences of the information mainstream:

> "The discourse of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), and the specific demands it put upon international print and television news agencies, lingers in the consciousness of news agency journalists (...) like a sort of vaguely recalled bad dream involving totalitarian governments and annoying academics trying to wrest control of the international news agenda" (Paterson).

Although Third-World-originated news has been criticized as biased, communication researchers have found the copy produced by Inter Press Service to be both critical and balanced (Ogan & Rush 1985).

IPS: Has it been a true alternative?

Due perhaps to perceived bias, as well as to the fact that news agency stories are often not credited in bylines, it is difficult both to track which media pick up Inter Press Service copy (Giffard,1998) and to determine what readers it reaches—although its clients are primarily comprised of non-governmental and media organizations (IPS, 2000).

Previous studies of IPS news have, as noted earlier, relied largely on quantitative techniques. For instance, Ogan and Rush (1985) found in a content analysis that IPS stories had a different substance and geographic focus than Western news agencies, better analyzed the development process, and represented a higher percentage of critical sources than any major wire service. Their examination of the topics, sources and development news represented in IPS coverage showed that the agency's output included little news of disaster, conflict or crime; yet, they concluded that this coverage did not significantly differ from the Associated Press's because the alternative agency still emphasized political and economic topics, relied mostly on government sources, and underrepresented development concerns (Ogan & Rush, 1985). This led the two scholars to ponder that "Maybe no newspaper (even in the Third World) wants a steady diet of rural agricultural

development (...) maybe there are universal news values--either inherent to man or imposed upon him by the Western media" (1985).

On the other hand, annual analyses of IPS copy undertaken by Giffard since 1991 have demonstrated some support for IPS's alternative orientation. In these studies, two-thirds of IPS reports typically carried datelines of cities in developing countries, compared to less than 50 percent of AP and Reuters reports, and the actors and sources in IPS reports were twice as likely to be from the South as the North (Giffard, 1998). A 1993 survey by the same center found that IPS offered significantly more stories on culture, development, the environment, human rights and social issues than did the AP or Reuters, whose filings showed more emphasis on crime, the military, politics and violence (Giffard, 1998)—the "coups and earthquakes" that regularly attract mainstream news attention.

The present study supplements these prior content analyses with qualitative means that shed additional light on how the discourse produced by Inter Press Service differs from that of the Associated Press.

Comparing Southern news in the North

The goals of Inter Press Service since its inception have included promoting news and information flows among developing nations and distributing news about the South to clients in industrialized nations of the North (Giffard, 1989). Having established horizontal communications, the agency recently turned its attention to the latter goal of enhancing its network for a reverse news flow with peripheral perspectives that supplement the "Big Four" (Giffard, 1998). It is this aspect of IPS activities that will be appraised here vis-à-vis the AP. Discussion here will focus on the IPS content that is both available and identifiable from the researchers' position in the center.

The two contemporary events chosen for exploration both exemplify issues related broadly to modernization and globalization:

- First, ratifications of 1997 Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse emissions, the most significant international environmental treaty since the 1993 "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro. The protocol seeks a 5 percent reduction, between 2008 and 2012, from 1990 levels of greenhouse gases. Subsequent ratifications of the treaty were the subject of heated debate in 1998, especially in the United States; the Bush Administration rejected the treaty in March 2001. This issue presents an appealing case study since, as Giffard suggests, the global environmental movement is a main priority for Inter Press Service and a topic for which it aims to provide supplementary coverage to the AP; and
- the "Southern Summit" of Group of 77 nations that convened in Cuba in April 2000. It is named for 77 underdeveloped and non-aligned countries that came together in 1964 through common membership in the United Nations. Now numbering more than 100 nations, the group's common interest is pressing for a better deal from rich countries of the world, mainly in the North. The call for a New International Economic Order, which "produced a torrent of words but little effective action," was an expression of this (Sklair, 1995).

Methodology

Stories on the Southern Summit and Kyoto Protocol ratifications from both agencies were collected via a search of Lexis-Nexis (for a period of one year surrounding each event) since, as noted previously, it is difficult to identify when IPS-originated copy appears in publication. The keywords used were "Group of 77" and "Cuba" in the first case and "Kyoto" and "Protocol" in the second. These articles are examined through the methods of discourse analysis, which several mass communication researchers have offered as a useful approach to the study of news agency content (Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen, 1996; Galtung & Vincent, 1992)

While standard terminology and methods are relatively lacking in discourse analysis, the present study draws on concepts of syntax, script, theme and rhetoric and elaborated in the work of Teun Van Dijk and of Zhongdang Pan and Gerald Kosicki. It will look at how the texts are constructed—and their contexts signaled—by the main topics, headlines, actors, source attributions, lexical choices, and other properties of the stories. The unit of analysis is the overall discourse for each event, since these properties are not limited to one sentence or story but characterize sequences of clauses, sentences, or whole texts (Van Dijk, 1988).

In the inverted pyramid of journalism—evident in all the stories of both agencies in this study—syntax may describe the structure of headline, lead, episodes, background and closure. The headline is the "most salient cue to activate certain semantically related concepts in reader's minds"; the lead is the next most important device, suggesting a particular perspective to view the event reported (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Syntax will thus be investigated first in each case study—although, of course, the categories of syntax, script, theme and rhetoric cannot entirely be isolated from one another.

The script category designates the way news discourse is organized, a generic version of which is the familiar "five Ws and one H": who, what, when, where, why and how (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). "Who" refers here to the actors, "what" to the actions, "when" to the inclusion of present or background information, and "where" to the dateline; "why" and "how" are famously neglected in wire stories, including these.

The thematic category focuses here on headlines and leads, which perform a summary function. The headline of a news text essentially states a hypothesis or theme that subsequent examples, quotes and background information all serve to illustrate (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). In this study, the headlines will be cited in full along with representative fragments of the leads, so that readers can compare these themes and see examples of the news agencies' language for themselves.

The final category, rhetoric, recognizes that journalists use devices such as metaphors, catchphrases and depictions as a sort of shorthand, and to invoke images and increase the salience of their points (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

A global political issue

This discourse analysis will examine the six Inter Press Service stories and six Associated Press stories regarding the Group of 77's Southern Summit in Cuba. The AP printed five stories (314-541 words per story) with four different bylines during the period April 7-14, 2000 using these headlines:

- Gadhafi, Arafat, Korean leader to attend summit in Cuba
- World leaders traveling to Havana for Third World summit
- World leaders compete with Elian for attention during summit
- Leaders of poor nations arrive in Havana for major summit
- Cuban minister blasts U.S. embargo's impact on health sector

IPS ran six stories (741-835 words per story) with two different bylines during the period February 10 – April 11, 2000 under the following headlines:

- G-77 summit to hammer out common positions
- Opposition to seek backing at G-77 summit
- G-77 summit preparations in final stretch
- G-77 summit to push more South-South collaboration
- Officials gather for South Summit in Cuba
- Cuban dissidents seek G-77 support at South Summit

These headlines offer a logical starting point to this discourse analysis.

Syntax The IPS headlines, which suggest what the editors' consider the main point of the stories, depict the event's purpose as one of unity and consensus: dissidents/opposition seek support/backing, "officials gather" to "hammer out common positions" and "push for collaboration." Some of the IPS leads recognize that realistically such consensus could be "difficult" or "drag on."

Five of the six AP headlines and leads focus on "leaders of poor nations" and "world leaders," with one of these explicitly naming Moammar Gadhafi of Libya, Yasser Arafat of Palestine, and Kim Yong Nam of North Korea, and the sixth headline again frames the summit in terms of U.S. foreign policy: "Cuban minister blasts U.S. embargo (...)." The AP, thus, does not identify the goals of the Southern Summit in any of its headlines or leads, but positions controversial world leaders, especially those threatening to U.S. foreign policy, as major actors in this discourse. Even though their role in the event is not discussed, the attendance of Gadhafi, Arafat and Kim is noted in most of AP's leads and in one headline, but nowhere in any of the IPS coverage.

One AP headline puts Elian Gonzalez, who at that time was still with his Miami relatives, on equal footing with national leaders, who "compete with Elian for attention during summit." The first 11 of 15 sentences in this AP story dwell on the boy, with the lead stating that Gadhafi, Arafat and "even President Fidel Castro will be competing with a 6-year-old boy for attention this week during a summit of world leaders from developing nations" (Snow, 2000). It continues, "Although a few posters promoting the summit have been put up over the past week, they cannot compete with the ones of Elian with his sad and confused eyes looking down on motorists passing on Havana's thoroughfares, demanding, 'Bring back our son!'" (Snow, 2000). Another AP lead continues this theme: "After focusing virtually all its energy on the fight to bring 6-year-old Elian Gonzalez back to his communist homeland, Cuba on Saturday was switching at least some of its attention to a summit of world leaders from developing nations," (Sequera, 2000).

Script As a whole, IPS coverage of this political issue presents the United Nations, nation-states and their representatives as primary actors in development efforts; these

include UNCTAD, UNDP, G-77 chair, and the "Castro Administration" (Cuban foreign ministers, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights, the Cuban Chamber of Commerce and organizing committee, etc.). In the case of two of these IPS stories, the range of actors extends beyond the circle of officialdom to include a "moderate opposition group" within Cuba, the non-governmental organization Doctors without Borders, and an "umbrella group" of activists.

Throughout the text, the AP also presents Fidel Castro, the G-77 chair, Cuban foreign ministers and a Cuban public health minister as primary actors, as well as U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, in an article of which half is devoted to the Gonzalez case. Six-year-old Gonzalez is an actor in half of the AP stories but none of the IPS stories. Interestingly, the IPS never voices "Fidel Castro" as subject or object of a sentence, merely as an adjective for "administration." The AP quotes the Cuban leader directly once and, notably, as distracted from the Southern summit by the Gonzalez case; the quote places the meeting at the bottom of Castro's agenda: "The one thing that I have not been able to dedicate time to is this summit." One of the other few quotes of a Cuban representative that the AP selected is noteworthy, as it seems to disparage Southern nations: "the meeting will, with all seriousness,{...}".

The alternative news agency forges a more complex identity through multiple voices for peripheral nations such as Cuba. In two IPS stories, the agency prominently identifies representatives of the Cuban people other than Castro and his administration, thus speaking of Cuban dissident groups pursuing the freedom of expression, association and movement their nation lacks. Three of the IPS stories also construct Cuba as a leading, cooperative force for change in the South, with one reporting that there are "4,359 Cuban technicians, professionals and specialists providing their services in 90 nations" in development programs—assistance that the nation does not charge for, despite its poverty—as well as pan-Caribbean medical brigades and scholarships for student from 120 countries to attend Cuban universities (Grogg, 2000).

Such coverage is not filtered through the eyes of the U.S. government, which in this sample of stories is quoted by the AP nearly as frequently as officials from developing countries. The AP does represent Cuba's contribution to Southern development once, in a story whose lead says that "Cuba has overcome a costly U.S. trade embargo to provide its citizens one of the world's best health systems, dispatch medical teams to impoverished nations and train thousands of Third World doctors" (Anderson, 2000), although the laudatory tone of the text conflicts with the headline accorded it: "Cuban minister blasts U.S. embargo's impact on health sector," using a strong verb that much exaggerates the minister's subsequent comments.

For both agencies, the events are located in Cuba, the host nation of the summit. The IPS discourse involves primarily, but not entirely, present events. Given that the length of IPS articles is almost twice that of AP filings, the IPS texts also have more ample space to put globalization issues in a more complex and historical context. IPS draws on background information regarding international NGO activities, citing the G-77's founding in 1967, the UN General Assembly of 1970, the Non-Aligned Movement, the founding of UNCTAD in 1964... AP journalists, with more space constraints, tend to neglect the past events that help explain the how and why of development.

Theme The issues addressed at the Southern Summit are described in these six IPS articles as political, economic and social rights: a collective action platform, access to markets, financing, health, education, research, South-South co-operation. The theme of consensus developed by IPS headlines is neglected by the AP, which in fact quotes the G-77 chair in a manner that could be read as portraying a lack of unity: "We [Southern nations] have not been able to talk with each other." The goals voiced by IPS are a "new North-South dialogue," a "humane New World Order" and a new international economic system that includes developing countries, structural adjustment and effective participation—all inclusive and forward-looking yet reminiscent of former calls for NWICO et al. by the developing world

For the AP, these goals are similar—promoting relations among Third World nations, improving North-South relations, increasing investment in the knowledge economy, attending to the needs of the poor—yet are on occasion painted in passive ("winning" debt relief) and threatening ("demanding a greater share of the world's power and wealth") terms which also revive the power inequalities that fed the NWICO debate. Some of the AP headlines and leads suggest a theme of world leaders gathering to attack U.S. policies, which is carried out through the focus on leaders hostile towards the United States and the preponderant quotes of U.S. government sources throughout the body of the text.

Rhetoric The Inter Press Service constructs developing nations in terms of the usual broad hemispherical and economic generalizations: North vs. South, developing vs. industrialized, rich vs. poor. Certain details in the text elaborate on the unequal power between these binary groups: "North demands predominate," for example. The Associated Press uses these binary oppositions frequently as well as the obsolete shorthand term "Third World," the original meaning of which derives from a Cold-War context, which is nowhere used by the Inter Press Service. Whereas IPS describes the Cuban regime as "socialist," the AP labels it "communist."

A global environmental issue

Although Western journalists by and large stake their credibility on the notion that they are objective and ideologically neutral, this discourse analysis of AP coverage of the Southern Summit suggests the contrary. The focus of this study, however, is not the agencies' political leanings per se but their dispositions towards the South and globalization issues, as evidenced in the news discourse they construct. Since it could still be argued that an event 1) hosted by the Castro administration and 2) uniting nations that have been critical of the United States presents a particularly loaded case study and might not necessarily be representative of news agencies' general stance towards Southern nations and globalization issues, this paper will also analyze a second event on an additional topic: the environment.

This discourse study of the five Inter Press Service stories and two Associated Press stories on the Kyoto treaty ratifications generated in 1998 will look at how the news is constructed by the syntax, script, theme and rhetoric, just as the Group of 77 texts were analyzed. The AP disseminated two stories (526 and 788 words per story) with two different bylines during the period November 12-14, 1998, under the following headlines:

- Global Warming Summit sets year 2000 deadline for clearing key hurdles
- U.S. said read to sign global-warming treaty

Five IPS stories (904-1599 words per story) with three different bylines ran with these headlines from February 10 to April 11, 1998:

- U.S. signs protocol on greenhouse gases
- Developing countries cutting greenhouse emissions
- UNEP mobilizes insurance industry
- Rough ride ahead for climate treaty
- U.S. to postpone ratification of Kyoto protocol

Syntax In this instance, there is a slight contradiction between the AP headline that says the United States is "said ready to sign" the Kyoto treaty and its lead that notes the nation has signed the protocol, "hoping to spur further progress on details of the treat in negotiations under way in Argentina" (Hebert, 1998). We learn several lines later, however, that this signing was "largely symbolic"[2] and that opponents denounced the signing. The lead for the same moment within this event is more direct about U.S. opposition, announcing that "The United States today signed the Kyoto treaty to cut emissions of greenhouse gases, but top officials said there were no immediate plans to submit the treat for ratification to a hostile, Republican-led Senate" (Lobe, 1998).

The second AP headline states that the "Global Warming Summit" (a meeting of the United Nations) has set a deadline for "clearing hurdles," then the lead of the story describes how "weary" delegates concluded their "all-night struggle" (Cormier, 1998). Thus, the only actors on this issue specified by the AP are the United States and U.N. delegates (at a meeting attended by U.S. representatives). By contrast, the headlines and leads in the related IPS discourse include a story in which developing nations achieve success as they "cut greenhouse emissions," and another in which the U.N. Environment Program "mobilizes" the insurance industry to play an active role in supporting the treaty.

From their most salient cues—headlines and leads—alone, AP stories give readers the impression that the United States is taking a stand on global warming. IPS, however, offers an additional story whose summary elements explain that the United States postponed ratification of the Kyoto Protocol for several months until "key industrializing poor countries agree to 'meaningful participation' in the protocol" (Lobe, 1998). The battle against global climate change is cast in very different lights by this syntax: a multiplicity of actors with both past achievements and "rough rides ahead" in IPS discourse, and simply two actors (the United States and United Nations) who sign treaties and face hurdles in the AP discourse.

Script Among the most notable differences between the two agencies' coverage of U.S. ratification is that AP downplays U.S. opposition to the treaty's conditions, delaying mention of this sentiment until several lines into the text. Several "staunch" opponents and one U.S. treaty-backer—all from the U.S. Congress—are quoted in the AP stories; the agency lets only one person outside the U.S. government sphere speak. The discourse here is thus not very balanced, per one of reporters' own standards. This stands in stark contrast

[2] As of that date, the Kyoto pact had been signed by 57 nations but ratified by one.

to the dozen or so representatives of other countries and members of nongovernmental organizations sought out by IPS. By reporting from the U.S. perspective, the AP neglects the leading role some developing nations have taken in reducing greenhouse emissions and presents the Southern nations as reactors, not actors—thus discounting the efforts of environmental activist groups. On the other hand, IPS quotes members of Ozone Action, Greenpeace, Union of Concerned Scientists and other nongovernmental organizations. IPS also emphasizes U.S. hostility to the environmental protocol in both a headline and a lead, of two separate stories.

While the AP discourse identifies the problem of global warming with pollution from developing countries—as does the U.S. government—it does not report on the Washington-based National Environmental Trust study, released during this same time period, that found developing countries had done more to reduce fossil-fuel subsidies than industrialized nations (Knight, 1998). This signals the dominant agency's failure either to acknowledge positive signs of change or to construct Southern nations as offering possible solutions.

Theme The alternative news agency details the U.S. role in global pollution: by far the world's biggest producer of carbon dioxide, producing almost 25 percent of all greenhouse gases, etc. The AP theme obscures this fact, as it only notes that the United States is the leading polluter in the context of China and India promising to take over that lead. In AP's only other reference to U.S. responsibility, a single sentence in the second half of one story, it describes the nation as having been criticized by others for failing to curb greenhouse gases. Thus, the Western agency poses its nation of origin as a lesser player in the creation and reduction of global warming than IPS does.

Rhetoric The AP uses the same binary terms in this environmental coverage as it did in the political coverage: nations are either "industrialized" or "developing" (to what, one might ask… is the status of "industrialized" their only option?). Unlike in its G-77 discourse, Inter Press Service eschews "Northern" and "Southern," in favor of simply "Western," in texts regarding the Kyoto treaty.

Summary of discourse analysis

The professional aim of objectivity, in the pursuit of public credibility, is embedded in the texts produced by news agencies; thus, coverage of events such as the G-77 meeting and the Kyoto protocol ratification is not grossly biased. Both IPS and AP writers adhere to the same journalistic practices of the inverted pyramid, attribution of statements, omniscient narrator, etc. that are standard elements of the news systems' particular way of collecting and establishing facts.

The reliance of Inter Press Service journalists on these narrative and newsgathering techniques, however, does not result in their total legitimization of the status quo. For example, the IPS articles in this sample tend to posit globalization issues not as exclusively Southern problems but as shared by all nations. The agency seems to succeed in producing discourse that offers a meaningfully alternative view on globalization, in both style and substance: with a more balanced geographic focus, better analysis of development processes, and greater use of critical sources.

The domination of U.S. interests in Associated Press texts does obstruct the representation of Southern interests, echoing Boyd-Barrett's concern (1996). The AP's use of obsolete classifications such as "Third World," for example, may signal underlying assumptions that "often guide practice of those who make and carry out the policies which have led to so little actual economic growth (...)" (Sklair, 1995).

Since the nature of real-world events, the reporting practices of journalists, and the constraints on news gathering all change over time and space, the characteristics found in this small sample cannot be assumed to describe IPS or AP coverage as a whole. For instance, coverage dealing more specifically with issues and processes might exhibit somewhat different qualities than these event-oriented stories on two meetings. This micro-level analysis can, however, suggest certain patterns of discourse that may be present in texts related to globalization issues other than the G-77 meeting or Kyoto protocol ratification. And, the fact that IPS, despite its limited financial resources, produced more stories and longer stories than the Associated Press surrounding both events indicates that these particular issues rank higher on the non-profit agency's agenda than on the commercial one's.

Making a conscious—and conscientious—transition

While Inter Press Service has had no significant impact on structures of global media systems and poses no challenge to the major news agencies, it demonstrates certain decentralizing and de-Westernizing tendencies in both its content and structure that are not evident the Associated Press. IPS has developed a form of news content grounded in the hierarchical, objective, dependent world of its past that nonetheless fosters a new type of more networked, connected and multidirectional communication. As one agency document states, globalization brings with it a "mushrooming of threats to humankind at the individual and social levels (...) and the threats know no geographic or cultural boundaries. They range from environmental pollution, through the collapse of welfare values to the denial of basic human rights" (in Giffard, 1998).

The imperative of understanding ecological issues and events at a global level is a particularly good example of how the old order is breaking down, as Tomlinson notes, because environmental hazards cannot be contained within national boundaries and require cooperation at levels both above and below the nation-state (1991). As globalization transforms the entire world in this and other aspects, Western wire services eventually may have to recognize both globalization's challenges to their traditional, spatially limited definitions of news and that Southern interests may no longer be distinguished from Northern ones.

In other words, IPS is not an anachronism and appears to be reconceiving itself in terms of globalization, complex connectivity and multiplicity. Or, perhaps the more accurate proposition is that the global landscape has shifted to such an extent as to give one the impression that IPS has moved, when in fact it was ahead of the interdependency game all along. The alternative news agency inhabits an intriguing place in the current paradigm shift and seems to position itself, along with other non-governmental organizations, in both local and global contexts.

Representatives of nongovernmental organizations play a particularly large role as sources in both of the discourses analyzed here—reflecting the agency's global

communication objectives of linking NGOs from South and North, using NGOs in the South as privileged sources of news for the media of the North, and helping NGOs of the South improve their presence in the North (in Giffard, 1998). As IPS explains in an online document:

> "[NGOs] have developed as important (and increasingly major) actors, both within the societies in which they operate and in an international context. They have characterised themselves by vitality, flexibility and adaptability, and have gained widespread recognition for their work with the poor and the oppressed. NGOs are a visible expression of 'civil society.' They are now well down the road of rapid transition from small and often marginalised organisations toward a recognised role as international players on the global scene (...) their activities can, and should be, reported—that is, NGOs are a legitimate 'source' of news" (IPS, 2000).

The fact that these organizations also comprise a large portion of the niche audience for IPS news copy may, of course, explain their substantial presence in its discourse. By embracing NGOs as both sources and audiences, IPS edges towards greater inclusion than commercial news agencies. Nonetheless, NGOs are really the only element of civil society that participate in these discourses; indigenous, community and faith groups—who are not prominent among IPS subscribers—are left out.

What potential, then, does IPS hold for reaching and informing Western audiences about globalization issues? If this question refers to the mass audiences with which mainstream news agencies connect via publication of copy in newspapers, then the answer is likely "very little." As has already been noted, IPS copy rarely travels that route. Scholars and journalists alike have noted, however, that the masses whom the media have traditionally sought are eroding, relatively quickly, into niche audiences. This may be just as well, since faith in the power of mass media to affect change has also been battered (Beltran, 2000).

Information technology also offers new opportunities that are well suited to the development news agency's goal of group-to-group networking. Inter Press Service has in recent years launched several IT initiatives such as an online database service for media, non-governmental organizations and research centers; a daily Internet newsletter; and Web sites highlighting ecological concerns and socio-cultural activities in the periphery (IPS, 2000). Although the benefits and economies of investing in the necessary equipment may or may not outweigh the expense–it's impossible to predict—IT's potential for mobilizing large numbers and provoking public interest (Herman & McChesney, 1998). The implications of the digital age for nonprofit media organizations such as IPS are too extensive to discuss here, but certainly suggest areas worthy of further exploration.

Instead of lamenting the futility of IPS vying with the Associated Press for a bigger slice of the old turf, then, critics of one-way flow may find greater promise in the agency's staking a claim to this new territory—both fragmented and interconnected—of globalization, which is "opening up new lines of communication between different groups, and constructing new spaces for the building of mutuality, without suggesting that the world is shrinking into a single, harmonious village" (Curran & Park, 2000).

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THE DEATH OF DIANA:

A MULTI-NATION STUDY OF NEWS VALUES AND PRACTICES

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Abstract

Princess Diana's death, ranked as the top news story of 1997, presents a perfect case study for comparing various countries' treatment of news. This study looked at front pages of two newspapers each from Brazil, Finland, Japan, New Zealand and the United States from Sept. 1 (the first day of coverage) to Sept. 7 (the day of the funeral). It found that neither cultural nor geographic proximity, both extrinsic factors, explained coverage (distant Brazil's far outstripped nearby Finland's). It argues that affinity between a nation's culture and an event's intrinsic nature can better explain coverage.

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THE DEATH OF DIANA:

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I. INTRODUCTION

Hospital officials in Paris announced the death of Princess Diana at 6 a.m. Sunday, Aug. 31, 1997, or in the first minutes of Sunday morning Eastern U.S. time. News of the auto accident had been broadcast earlier, but the finality of her death shocked the world. From the announcement of Diana's death to her funeral on Sept. 7, 1997, much of the world's media obsessively followed the saga--surely one of the world's top post-war news phenomena.

For 1997, 119 newspaper, radio, TV and news agency editors in 43 countries outside the United States named it as the year's #1 story. Within the United States, 190 Associated Press newspaper editors and news directors chose it as #1 among both U.S. and international stories ("Birth and death. . ." 1997). According to Kevin Noblet, then deputy international editor at the AP, "Our members and [overseas] subscribers couldn't get enough. The information [on the Diana story] couldn't be too minute. We gave them reams and reams" (personal communication, Feb. 4, 1998).

In the United States, a Pew Research Center survey found that "nine in 10 Americans paid attention to Diana's violent death and the aftermath" ("A year after. . ." 1998). James Fallows, former editor of US News and World Report, told the National Press Club that "the cover with Princess Di was our largest selling ever. Those with political leaders were the worst selling" (NPR Nov. 16, 1997).

Morrow (1997, 39) sees a "professional duty to wonder about the sources and dynamics of such dramatic mass emotion [as the Diana story]." The academy responded with symposia and courses (Wilson 1998). Critiques of the Diana story's media dynamics concentrated on the orgiastic

frenzy of the mainstream media (Marvin 1998; Callan and Frank 1997; Morrow 1997; Sharkey 1997). Soul searching and self-criticism occurred not only in the United States, but around the world. For example, about the same amount of Diana coverage consisted of media criticism in Germany (23% of paragraphs) as in the United States (26%)(Eicholz 1998).

Purpose. But in a different vein, international researchers can make positive use of the story as a high-profile case study with a clear time frame. The Diana story is multifaceted, enabling us to elaborate on particular aspects of news creation; and it is big enough to have made news all over the world, enabling multi-nation comparison. This study will look cross-culturally at the death and funeral of the princess and events in between to discern consonance of news values and practices.

II. RELATED STUDIES

"Our goal in comparative research," asserts Edelstein (1982, 76), "is looking for commonalities but expecting differences." However, comparisons across cultures have numerous pitfalls, with the result that "theory is scant in the comparative field," concluded Schramm (Edelstein 1982, 11). Ten years later, Stevenson (1992, 549) reiterated the "confusion over theory and method" in the international field. Today the issue persists.

Much research on news practices and news values is U.S.-based. One such line of research explores the factors that propel a category of event, such as foreign disasters, into news in U.S. media (See Van Belle 2000 for a review of such research and new analysis.) Few studies have taken a global approach, thus limiting the building of comparative theory. The common approach to comparative news content involves a dichotomy (Lange 1984, Soderland and Schmidt 1986, Atwood 1987, Kirat 1989). Indeed, Chang et al. (1996) found that about half of such comparisons (65 of 131) involved just two countries. Increasing the number of countries can result in more meaningful conclusions,

given equivalence of concepts.

Chang et al. (1996) found numerous other problems with 25 years of published comparative international communication studies. Researchers must take care to study comparable social units, use variables that apply meaningfully to all the units and end up with comparable indicators of the variables (Chang et al 1996, 5). Comparing images of the "modern woman" in the People's Daily (China) and the Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, for example, would violate all three principles.

Multi-nation studies

When news researchers attend to equivalence, they often hold space and time constant, resulting in an equivalent "universe of events" (Rosengren 1977) from which gatekeepers may choose. By implication, "something" in the culture accounts for differing news selection. According to Hofstede (1984), who defined cultures as "nations," cultures differ on five dimensions: individualism/ collectivism, low/ high context, low/ high uncertainty avoidance, low/ high power distance and low/ high masculinity.

Early studies of this type used newspapers. As a criterion of equivalence, Kayser (1953) chose circulation size in selecting 17 dailies to study during one week in March 1951. Despite social non-equivalence (circulations were large in China for different reasons than in France) and differing newsholes, all 17 covered the week's major story: the Korean war.

Schramm (1959) himself carried out one of the earliest theory-based comparative content studies when he looked at elite newspapers' varying news judgement on a single day. On Nov. 2, 1956, British and French planes attacked Egypt (the Suez crisis) and Soviet tanks invaded Hungary. To compensate for varying newshole size, he looked at the daily newspapers' front pages only. Schramm concluded that, in the heat of the moment, the world's gatekeepers erroneously focused on the more spectacular *coflict*, the Suez attack (in fact, the Soviet invasion of Hungary had longer-

lasting implications). The gatekeepers agreed, based on shared news values.

News values

In selecting stories for their readers, journalists intuitively apply "agreed-upon news values," which "have become fairly predictable" (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 111). Indeed, U.S. journalism textbooks (Baskette, Sissors and Brooks 1982; Dennis and Ismach 1981) list more or less the same values: *prominence/importance; human interest*; *conflict/controversy; the unusual* (the deviant); *timeliness* (nowadays a given, in contrast to the past) ; and *proximity*.

A combination of values raises the newsworthiness of stories. Without *human interest* (such as a romance) or *deviance*, the everyday activities of *prominent* persons--attending a benefit concert, cutting the ribbon at a child-care center--do not constitute major news. The death of Diana combines the values of *prominence* and *human interest* with normative and statistical *deviance*.

Statistical deviance is defined as "things that are unusual (either good or bad)" (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 47). Normative deviance is defined as "ideas or events that break norms or laws" (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 48). Both normative and statistical deviance change over time. In the early days of the automobile, probably the first fatal accidents made national news, but no longer. Years ago, rape stories were too normatively deviant even to be publishable, but today, to make national news, the story "must include salacious details or involve prominent people" (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 48).

Intrinsic/ extrinsic factors

Although *proximity* is listed as a news value in journalism textbooks, it differs from those discussed above, all of which are intrinsic to the event and relate to **what** happened. *Proximity*, by contrast, is a **where** factor. *Proximity* derives from journalists' intuitive understanding that "where" something happened makes a difference. Traditionally the factor has meant geographic distance from

the location of a domestic news medium's prime audience; however, when used in comparative international research, it can refer to cultural, economic OR geographic distance from another country.

Measures used to study an intrinsic factor like *prominence* could include the number of deaths in a disaster. By contrast, measures used to study an extrinsic factor like *proximity*--distance from Japan to England, the number of U.S. tourists going to France --do not evaluate the event itself.

Geographic proximity. Wu (1998, 253) in reviewing studies of geographic proximity, concluded that "the more distant a country is, the less it will be covered," but found many nuances and contradictions within that generalization. Van Belle (2000) found that for disaster coverage, only geographic distance--not number of deaths, U.S. tourists, English language usage, per capita GDP, military power, press freedom or democracy--related to TV and New York Times coverage.

With comparative theory-building as a goal, U.S. case studies alone tell us virtually nothing. Rosengren's classic 1977 study of comparing election coverage during the 1960s in three nations' newspapers found varying influences of geographic distance: more in East Germany and Sweden, almost none in England. But consider how perceptions of distance have changed since the 1960s!

Like Rosengren, Chang, Lau and Hao (2000), carried out a multi-nation study of regional neighbors in Southeast Asia. Analyzing TV broadcasts, the authors found little influence of geographic proximity. When it came to news, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines "kept each other at a distance." (Chang, Lau and Hao 2000, 510). The position of a nation at the core in the world system--such as the United States--commands coverage more than geographic proximity.

Social/cultural proximity. As heirs to the work of Galtung and Ruge (1965), various studies have tested social/cultural proximity. Adams (1986) found numbers of tourists to a country to be significantly related to disaster coverge by U.S. television, while Van Belle (2000, 60) found, in a

more precisely constructed study, that "the *U.S. Tourists* variable only seems to matter with major disasters"--not ALL disasters. Language can also be used as a measure of cultural proximity, but Van Belle (2000) found no statistical significance in his analysis; U.S. media are not more likely to cover disasters in English-using nations.

Hofstede (1984), who defined culture as "nation," developed four dimensions of cultural variability through analysis of 116,000 questionnaires involving 40 countries.. Although the surveys of employees of a large international organization (IBM) date back to 1968 and 1972, the dimensions --for which each nation can be scored--remain useful in comparative research. In a given group of nations, we can see patterns of cultural distances.

Power distance refers to societies' responses to inequalities of prestige, wealth or power, since "different societies put different weights on status inconsistency" (Hofstede 1984, 65); subordinates' efforts to reduce distance from superiors balance with superiors' efforts to increase that distance. **Uncertainty avoidance** refers to the laws, religions, rituals and technologies that societies develop to cope with uncertainty about the future; the score is "related to anxiety, need for security and dependence on experts" (Hofstede 1984, 110). **Individualism** in a social setting refers to "the relationship between the individual and the collectivity" and in a corporate setting to "the importance of time for personal life" versus "the importance of being trained by the company" (Hofstede 1984, 148). **Masculinity** refers to societies' decisions about whether "biological differences between the sexes should or should not have implications for their roles in social activities" (Hofstede 1984, 176).

News routines

A glance at any local newspaper will show that funeral/ obituary notices do not rank as deviant news. As non-deviant events, deaths occupy a special section or column that never appears on page 1. Often urban families must purchase a newspaper "death ad," so non-deviant is the

death/funeral of an ordinary city dweller. If other news values mark the death-- violence, prominence --then the funeral that follows (Real 2000) might rate as a news story.

The sociological view of news work stresses the value to journlists of planned news events--press conferences, daily briefings, photo opportunities, junkets--as a way of organizing their time. As Schudson (1986, 2) states, journalists "seek coincident and convenient news." Thus news of funerals, when combined with celebrity status, has more in common with press conferences than with deviant events, such as a fatal accident.

Given the constraints of time in putting out a paper (Tuchman 1977), a guaranteed page 1 event that gatekeepers know about in advance helps the organization deploy its resources efficiently. Some large newspapers had to move extra reporters and photographers to London to cover Diana's funeral, while smaller papers simply had to plan space for material they knew wire or other services would provide.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

With Schramm (1959) as inspiration, the present study will look at newspaper front pages from various nations. Conscious that most comparative studies have "failed to provide any theory" and made "little attempt to build on previous work" (Chang et al. 1996, 7), this study will investigate cross-cultural news judgements through three hypotheses and three research questions.

H1. All countries' media will carry the Princess Diana story.
Enough universality exists in news values that the combination of four or (in the case of geographically proximate nations) five values will guarantee the story's high profile (Dennis and Ismach 1981). The four values are human interest, prominence, statistical deviance and normative deviance.

H2. In all countries' media, variations will occur in the story's seven-day duration.
Following Schramm (1959), we can predict that all countries will cover the accident and funeral. We can infer consonance of news practices if volume of coverage declines between thetwo events, which represent deviance and routinization.

RQ1. Will deviance or routinization have more relation to volume of coverage?
"Deviance" is defined as coverage on the day after the fatal accident. "Routinization" is defined as coverage on the day of the funeral. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) acknowledge both factors--one a news value and the other a news practice. Since no previous study has explored their relative strength, we use a question form rather than hypothesis.

RQ2. Will geographic proximity be related to volume of coverage?
For U.S. media, geographic proximity had the sole influence on coverage (Van Belle 2000). By contrast, Chang, Lau and Hau (2000) found no such influence in four Asian TV systems. During the 1960s, Rosengren (1977) found varying influences of geographic distance in three European nations' newspapers. Given these contradictory results, we use a question rather than hypothesis.

H3. Cultural (national) proximity defined as language will <u>not</u> be related to volume of coverage.
Culture can, for practical purposes, be defined as a nation (Hofstede 1984). Following Van Belle (2000), who found no relation between English languge usage and nations covered, we can predict that English-speaking nations will not give greater coverage to the English princess than other nations.

RQ3. Will cultural (national) proximity defined in multi-dimensional terms be related to volume of coverage?
When defined as "number of U.S. tourists," cultural proximity does influence U.S.coverage (Adams 1986; VanBelle 2000). But that measure is too simplistic and, moreover, inappropriate for studies of many nations, the poorer of which send few tourists abroad. Culture, a complex concept, varies on four dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity. No previous multi-nation study has used the Hofstede (1984) indices to indicate cultural proximity.

III. METHOD

Use of a single news event, such as the death of Diana, for multi-nation analysis has a distinct advantage: variations in coverage will result from contextual factors. By contrast, variations in multiple news events, such as disasters, "must, in some way, be controlled for in any analysis of contextual factors" (Van Belle 2000, 59). Thus Van Belle (2000, 64) calls for "a research design that is well suited for separating event-related factors from context-related factors."

The five nations in this study are located in five different corners of the globe. They are, with populations, area and Hofstede (1984) cultural dimension scores noted:

		Power	Indiv.	Uncert.	Masc.
Brazil	158 million/ 3,286,470 sq.mi.	69	38	76	49
Finland	5 million/ 130,119 sq.mi.	33	63	59	26
Japan	124.5 million/ 145,856 sq.mi.	54	46	92	95
New Zealand	3.3 million/ 103,736 sq.mi.	22	79	49	58
U.S.	248.7 million/ 3,787,425 sq.mi.	40	91	46	62
Great Britain	(location of Diana story)	35	89	35	66

Cultural proximity was defined as a nation between1 and 10 points away from Great Britain on the Hofstede (1984) dimensions. Clearly the United States, which ranked 5 points away in power distance, 2 points away in individualism and 4 points away in masculinity --as well as 11 points away in uncertainty avoidance-- was the only nation culturally close to Great Britain.

All five nations have advertising-based print media. The author included two newspapers from each nation, while recognizing that more would have increased the study's generalizabillity. Circulations and audience characteristics are:

Brazil
Globo- national, upper and middle class, 300,000 weekday circulation
Jornal do Brasil-national, upper and middle class, 90,000 weekday circulation

Finland
Helsingin Sanomat-national, a.m., prestige, 470,000 circulation
Aamulehti- quality provincial a.m., 130,000 circulation

Japan
Asahi Shimbun-prestige, national, 12.7 million circulation
Yomiuri Shimbun-respected, world's largest-14.4 million circulation

New Zealand
Dominion-Wellington (capital) a.m., respected, 66,000 circulation
Evening Standard-quality provincial a.m., 24,700 circulation

United States
New York Times-prestige a.m., 1.1 million local/national circulation
Columbus Dispatch-Ohio capital a.m., respected, 500,000 circulation

The macro-ordinate unit of analysis was page 1 of broadsheet-size (not tabloid) publications. Papers may vary in number of total pages, but every day every newspaper has one and only one front page. The placement of a story on page 1 judgements about its news values.

he micro-ordinate unit was the square centimeter of coverage about Diana. All coverage--text (stories and headlines), photographs and other material (e.g., indexes to inside coverage)--was measured in square centimeters for each day. The newshole for each broadsheet was also measured; the percentage devoted to Diana was then calculated. Newshole was defined as non-advertising space minus flag. If a newspaper, in addition to page 1 coverage on Diana, added an all-Diana second front page (as in New Zealand), the coverage was counted as 100%. However, a special supplement was not counted as a front page.

Because the death of Diana was not announced until 6 a.m. Europen time Sunday, Aug. 31, Sunday morning newspapers in most of the world did not carry the news. The first reports appeared in editions of Sept. 1. Reports of the funeral appeared in most of the world on Sept. 7. The study analyzed two front pages for each of these seven days for each of the five countries-- 14 x 5 or 70 newspaper pages. After the daily percentages of newsholes were calculated, the seven days' percentages were averaged for each newspaper. Coverage intensity was subjectively described as ***acknowledgement*** (an average of less than 30% of page 1 newshole) ; ***interest*** (30-50%); and ***saturation*** (more than 50%).

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

From the announcement of Princess Diana's death on August 31, 1997, to her funeral on Sept. 7, front pages of the world's press diligently followed the story. Table 1 gives a comprehensive

description of all 70 front pages in this study, with coverage divided into photographs and text/headlines. Data extracted from Table 1 will be used to address the hypotheses and answer the research questions.

H1. All countries' media will carry the Diana story.

SUPPORTED. Table 1 shows that indeed all 10 newspapers in the study carried the story, ranging from a minimum of five days of Page 1 coverage (Asahi Shimbun) to a maximum of seven days of coverage.

H2. In all countries, variations will occur in the story's seven-day duration.

SUPPORTED. Figure 1 shows troughs of coverage between the accident and Princess Diana's funeral in all countries. Table 1 shows that midway between the accident and funeral, on Sept. 4, four newspapers--those from Finland and Japan--had no page 1 coverage of any kind, while four others had minimal coverage (less than 20%) on Sept. 4: both U.S. newspapers, the Evening Standard of New Zealand and Jornal do Brasil.

RQ1. Will deviance or routinization have more relation to volume of coverage?

DEVIANCE. Table 2, which averages coverage for each country, shows that attention to the accident (Day 1), an unexpected, deviant event, outweighed attention to the funeral (Day 7), a planned event, in four of the five countries studied. Whatever the level of attention to the accident--60%, 70% or 80%--the funeral got much less. Technically, New Zealand breaks the pattern.. However, we should note that New Zealand's coverage of the accident, at 90.7%, dwarfs all other countries' accident coverage. Intrinsic newsworthiness galvanizes gatekeepers worldwide.

RQ2. Will geographic proximity be related to volume of coverage?

NO. The countries' reactions fall into three levels: ***acknowledgement*** (an average of less than 30% of page 1 newshole) by all four newspapers from Finland and Japan ; ***interest*** (30-50%)

by both papers from the United States; and ***saturation*** (more than 50%) by all four papers from New Zealand and Brazil. (See the italicized percentages on Table 1.) Thus the country farthest away, New Zealand, had the most coverage, while the closest country, Finland, had the least. Van Belle's (2000) finding for the United States does not hold for other countries, but Van Belle is supported in that the United States stands midway from Great Britian in both miles and coverage compared to the other four nations.

H3. Cultural (national) proximity defined as language will not be related to volume of coverage. PARTIALLY SUPPORTED.Brazil has saturationcoverage but no language tie with England, a finding that supports the hypothesis. The United States has a language tie, but exhibits merely an interest in the story, also supporting the hypothesis. However, New Zealand has both a language tie and saturation coverage, contrary to the hypothesis.. Thus, unllike Van Belle (2000), who found no relation between English languge usage and nations covered, language plays some role in the Diana story.

RQ3. Will cultural (national) proximity defined in multi-dimensional terms be related to volume of coverage? NO. The only country defined as close to Great Britain on the Hofstede (1984) dimensions --the United States--did not exhibit obsessive coverage. Brazil and New Zealand had higher volumes of coverage than did the United States.

Table 1. The Diana Story:
Page 1 Text vs. Photographs, September 1-7. 1997

Brazil	**Globo:** Page 1 newshole = 1,525 cm²			**Jornal do Brazil:** Page 1 newshole = 1,575 cm²		
	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)
9/1	802.5	210.0	1,012.5 (66.4%)	742.5	759.0	1,501.5 (95.3%)
9/2	515.5	351.0	866.5 (56.8%)	802.0	759.0	1,561.0 (99.1%)
9/3	486.0	405.0	891.0 (58.4%)	371.0	247.5	618.5 (39.3%)
9/4	418.5	323.2	741.7 (48.6%)	0	57.8	57.8 (3.7%)
9/5	620.0	150.7	770.7 (50.5%)	513.0	129.0	642.0 (40.8%)
9/6	1,012.5	300.0	1,312.5 (86.1%)	462.0	271.5	733.5 (46.6%)
9/7	687.5	401.5	1,089.0 (71.4%)	759.0	273.3	1,032.3 (65.5%)
Total	*4,542.5 cm²*	*2,141.4 cm²*	*6,683.9 cm² (Av. 62.6%)*	*3,649.5 cm²*	*2,497.1 cm²*	*6,146.6 cm² (Av. 55.8%)*

Finland	**Helsingen Sanomat:** Page 1 newshole = 1,824 cm²			**Aamulehti:** Page 1 newshole = 1,795 cm²		
	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)
9/1	586.0	561.0	1,147.0 (62.9%)	962.0	430.0	1,392.0 (77.5%)
9/2	39.0	141.0	180.0 (9.9%)	864.0	393.0	1,257.0 (70.0%)
9/3	0	45.0	45.0 (2.5%)	0	20.0	20.0 (1.1%)
9/4	0	0	0 (0 %)	0	0	0 (0 %)
9/5	0	69.0	69.0 (3.8%)	0	40.0	40.0 (2.2%)
9/6	0	39.0	39.0 (2.1%)	0	15.0	15.0 (0.8%)
9/7	581.0	613.0	1,194.0 (65.5%)	438.0	225.0	663.0 (36.9%)
Total	*1,206.9 cm²*	*1,468 cm²*	*2,674.0 cm² (Av. 20.9%)*	*2,264.0 cm²*	*1,123.0 cm²*	*3,387.0 cm² (Av. 27.0%)*

Japan	**Yomiuri Shimbun:** Page 1 newshole = 1,241.25 cm²			**Asahi Shimbun:** Page 1 newshole = 1,386.75 cm²		
	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)
9/1	580.00	247.00	827.0 (66.6%)	212.00	780.00	992.00 (71.5%)
9/2	0	68.25	68.25 (5.5%)	0	98.00	98.00 (7.1%)
9/3	0	105.00	105.0 (8.5%)	288.75	56.25	345.00 (24.9%)
9/4	0	0	0 (0 %)	0	0	0 (0 %)
9/5	0	8.50	8.5 (0.7%)	0	0	0 (0 %)
9/6	0	157.25	157.25 (12.7%)	0	106.75	106.75 (7.7%)
9/7	318.00	290.25	608.25 (49.0%)	311.50	282.25	593.75 (42.8%)
Total	*898.00 cm²*	*876.25 cm²*	*1,774.25 cm² (Av. 20.4%)*	*812.25 cm²*	*1,323.25 cm²*	*2,135.50 cm² (Av. 22.0%)*

New Zealand	Dominion: Page 1 newshole = 1,800 cm²			Evening Standard: Page 1 newshole = 1,950 cm²		
	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)
9/1	1,800.00	0	1,800.00 (100.0%)	795.50	792.50	1,588.00 (81.4%)
9/2	606.50	298.50	905.00 (50.3%)	294.50	731.00	1,025.50 (52.6%)
9/3	315.00	606.75	921.75 (51.2%)	306.00	414.75	720.75 (37.0%)
9/4	429.50	623.50	1,053.00 (58.5%)	120.00	222.25	342.25 (17.6%)
9/5	494.00	372.00	866.00 (48.1%)	331.50	378.00	709.50 (36.4%)
9/6	667.25	652.75	1,320.00 (73.3%)	262.50	731.25	993.75 (51.0%)
9/8*	1,800.00	0	1,800.00 (100.0%)	1950.00	0	1,950.00 (100.0%)
Total	*6,112.25 cm²*	*2,553.50 cm²*	*8,665.75 cm² (Av. 68.8%)*	*4,060.00 cm²*	*3,269.75 cm²*	*7,329.75 cm² (Av. 53.7%)*

* No newspapers published on 9/7.

U.S.A.	New York Times: Page 1 newshole = 1,625 cm²			Columbus Dispatch: Page 1 newshole = 1,584 cm²		
	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)	Photos (cm²)	Heds,Text (cm²)	Total (cm²,%)
9/1	479.00	456.00	935.00 (57.5%)	560.00	405.75	965.75 (61.0%)
9/2	225.75	301.75	527.50 (32.5%)	262.50	439.50	702.00 (44.3%)
9/3	0	220.00	220.00 (13.5%)	333.50	241.25	574.75 (36.3%)
9/4	40.00	213.00	253.00 (15.6%)	0	150.00	150.00 (9.5%)
9/5	203.50	151.50	355.00 (21.8%)	405.75	136.00	541.75 (34.2%)
9/6	236.00	297.00	533.00 (32.8%)	0	135.00	135.00 (8.5%)
9/7	442.50	276.50	719.00 (44.2%)	543.75	319.00	862.75 (54.5%)
Total	*1,626.75 cm²*	*1,915.75 cm²*	*3,542.50 cm² (Av. 31.1%)*	*2,105.50 cm²*	*1,826.50 cm²*	*3932.00 cm² (Av.35.5%)*

Table 2. The Diana Story:
Page 1 Accident vs. Funeral Coverage

BRAZIL	Globo	Jornal do Brazil	*Total av. %*
9/1 Accident	66.4 %	95.3 %	*80.9 %*
9/7 Funeral	71.4 %	65.5 %	*68.5 %*

FINLAND	Helsingen Sanomat	Aamulehti	*Total av. %*
9/1 Accident	62.9 %	77.5 %	*70.2 %*
9/7 Funeral	65.5 %	36.9 %	*51.2 %*

JAPAN	Yomiuri Shimbun	Asahi Shimbun	*Total av. %*
9/1 Accident	66.6 %	71.5 %	*69.1 %*
9/7 Funeral	49.0 %	42.8 %	*45.9 %*

NEW ZEALAND	Dominion	Evening Standard	*Total av. %*
9/1 Accident	100.0 %	81.4 %	*90.7 %*
9/8* Funeral	100.0 %	100.0 %	*100.0 %*

* No papers published on 9/7.

U.S.A.	New York Times	Columbus Dispatch	*Total av. %*
9/1 Accident	57.5 %	61.0 %	*59.3 %*
9/7 Funeral	44.2 %	54.5 %	*49.4 %*

Figure 1. The Diana Story:
Proportions of Page 1 Newshole, Sept. 1-7, 1997





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

D. New Zealand



E. United States



V. CONCLUSIONS

This study of five farflung nations' newspapers discovered some of the "commonalities" that Edelstein (1982, 76) found elusive, as well as the differences that he told us to expect. Diana's death emerged as a story that no page 1 editor could refuse, as well as one that had a common pattern of peaks and troughs of coverage.

Although five countries makes for a limited universe, the two newspapers in each of the nations studied showed surprising consonance (both fell into the same saturation/ interest/ acknowledgement categories). Culturally, the newspapers seem to reflect the same millieu and differ from other nations.

But the most important commonality was the finding that news values (deviance, defined as the unexpected auto accident that killed Princess Diana) universally had a stronger relation to coverage than news practices (routinization, defined as the advance-notice funeral). Even though such unexpected stories may mean more work (e.g., redoing page 1), intrinsic newsworthiness galvanizes gatekeepers worldwide. This finding contributes in a small way to cross-cultural theory-building begun in 1959 by Schramm.

This study's second contribution relates to the extrinsic factor of cultural proximity. It has discarded a measure inappropriate for comparative studies--number of tourists--and substituted a better one. The Hofstede (1984) factors not only work for both developed and developing countries, but they define cultural proximity as multi-dimensional, which it surely is, rather than uni-dimensional.

Even so, the four Hofstede (1984) dimensions probably do not fully capture a nation's cullture, since they are derived from work-related values. Or possibly, dating as they do from 30 years ago, they do not reflect all countries' cultures accurately today. Intuitively, one would place New

Zealand as culturally close to Great Britain and predict high coverage of the Diana story. New Zealand has Queen Elizabeth as its head of state and a population 87% British- descended. The English-speaking United States is, of course, also a former British colony, but its diversity would seem to have weakend the bond with the mother country. However, Hofstede, based on the four-dimension scores, presents us with U.S./U.K. twins.

And what about Brazil? This study's third contribution rests on the insight that affinities between a nation and the event can be more important than affinities between a nation and the location of an event--not "where" but "what." We must put the intrinsic factors back on a par with extrinsic factors in developing a theory of comparative news selection. Indeed, the extrinsic factors of geographic and cultural proximity--which had some relation to coverage in previous U.S. studies (Van Belle 2000, Adams 1986)--did not apppear to explain coverage when we looked at five countries (although language seemed to have some relation).

Clearly, something in the Diana story resonates with Brazilians in a way different from the reception in Finland and Japan. Brazil, the only country in South America ruled by a monarchy (1822-1889), covers its former royal family extensively. Moreover, Brazilians found in the Diana story many elements of the popular telenovela genre (Kottak 1990). The media entertainment/ media news connection would make for an intriguing future multi-nation TV study. Can ratings of certain types of non-news programs predict the nature of news content?

Another future Diana study could analyze newspaper graphics.The Appendix, a display of front pages, presents a surprising variety of approaches to the accident story--from regal respectfulness in New Zealand to views of the accident scene in Japan. (Both the Yomirui and Asahi featured page 1 photos of the twisted death car, while none of the other eight front pages did so.) While the monarchy in Japan commands media respect that verges on lap-dog journalism, such

treatment does not translate into deference toward a *gaijin* (outside) monarchy.

Finally, the content of page 1 stories, headlines and captions could be analyzed for included/ excluded facts and themes. Did any countries' papers note Diana's neglect of using her seat belt? How was Dodi al Fayed treated? (His name did not appear in any headline in any of this study's 70 front pages.) The researcher hopes to add more nations' newspapers, including some from the Arab world, in a future project.

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THE DOMINION

MONDAY SEPTEMBER 1 1997

APPENDIX PAGE 1 COVERAGE - THE DEATH OF DIANA

讀賣新聞
THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN
9月1日 月曜日
第43589号
読売新聞社

ダイアナさん事故死

深夜のパリ、車激突

36歳 交際中の富豪も

死亡したダイアナ元英皇太子妃



カメラマンに追跡され

英王室「深いショック」

英皇太子が遺体付き添い

医療費

きょうから窓口負担増

サラリーマンは2倍に

患者窓口負担の主な改定内容

首相訪中後 ガイドライン決着



天気

編集手帳

ダイアナさん死亡ニュース

HELSINGIN SANOMAT

Maanantaina 1. syyskuuta 1997

A
Sivut 3 –

Walesin prinsessan viimeinen kotimatka

EPA

Prinsessa Dianan arkku kannettiin ulos pariisilaisesta Pitié-Salpêtrièren sairaalasta [illegible]

Prinsessa Dianan elämä päättyi kuolonkolariin Pariisissa

Poliisi tutkii paparazzien osuutta tapahtumiin

Prinsessa Diana 1961–1997

Heinäkuussa otetussa kuvassa prinsessa Diana valmistautuu puhumaan maamiinojen vaaroista Kuninkaallisessa maantieteellisessä seurassa Lontoossa.

JUHA SAINIO
Helsingin Sanomat

MARKKU SAKSA

PARIISI/LONTOO–Britannian suosituimman kuninkaallisen, prinsessa Dianan tarunhohtoinen elämä sai traagisen päätöksen sunnuntaiaamuna, kun prinsessa menehtyi rajussa autokolarissa rakastettunsa Dodi al-Fayedin kanssa.

Dianaa ja al-Fayedia kuljettanut auto murskaantui maantiesillan alla Pariisin keskustassa, kun se pakeni skandaaleihin erikoistuneita valokuvaajia, "paparazzeja". Pariisin rikospoliisi tutkii valokuvaajien osuutta onnettomuuteen ja Dianan asianajaja kertoi harkitsevansa syytteitä paparazzeja vastaan.

Auton kuljettaja ja al-Fayed menehtyivät onnettomuudessa välittömästi, mutta pahoin loukkaantunutta Dianaa yritettiin pelastaa pitkään pariisilaisessa sairaalassa. Prinsessa kuoli lääkäreiden ponnisteluista huolimatta kello 4 sunnuntaiaamuna.

Tieto 36-vuotiaan prinsessan kuolemasta otettiin sekä Britanniassa että Ranskassa vastaan tyrmistyneinä. Prinsessa Dianan asunnon, Kensingtonin palatsin edustalle virtasi varhaisesta aamusta lähtien tuhansia surevia ihmisiä jättämään rakastamalleen prinsessalle viimeisen tervehdyksen.

Pariisissa ihmiset toivat kukkia onnettomuuspaikalle, sairaalan eteen ja Britannian lähetystöön.

Britannian hovi sai surunvalittelmja prinsessan kuolemasta maailman jokaiselta laidalta.

Sivut C 1 ja C 2

Maailman viha kohdistui paparazzikuvaajiin

Helsingin Sanomat

Maailman viha kohdistui sunnuntaina julkisuuden henkilöitä jahtaaviin niin sanottuihin paparazzi-valokuvaajiin, sillä prinsessa Dianan autonkuljettaja menetti autonsa hallinnan paetessaan heitä pitkin Pariisin katuja.

Paparazzit ovat vainonneet Dianaa vuosikausia, ja esimerkiksi Dianan veli Spencerin jaarli sekä Dianan miesystävän Dodi al-Fayedin isä Mohamed al-Fayed syyttivät heitä hänen kuolemastaan.

Paparazzit ujuttautuvat keinoja kaihtamatta julkkisten lähelle ja myyvät kuvansa parhaiten maksaville. Kuolevan Dianan kuvista pyydettiin sunnuntaina miljoonia markkoja, mutta esimerkiksi Britannian ostetuin skandaalilehti News of the World kieltäyi ostamasta niitä.

Sivut C 1 ja C 2

Mestari Mäkinen juhli taas Jyväskylässä

Helsingin Sanomat

ESKO SALA / HS

Tommi Mäkinen otti uransa kymmenennen MM-rallien osakisavoiton Jyväskylässä.

JYVÄSKYLÄ–Ralliautoilun kymmenes MM-osakisa päättyi hallitsevan maailmanmestarin Tommi Mäkisen juhlaan. Hän voitti Jyväskylässä neljännen kerran peräkkäin ja johtaa MM-sarjaa jo 18 pisteellä. Mäkisen uhkaajat Espanjan Carlos Sainz ja Skotlannin Colin McRae keskeyttivät.

Sivut D 1 ja D 2

Ruotsi kovistelee EU:ta idän lisäydinvoimasta

MATTI HUUSKONEN
Helsingin Sanomat

Ruotsi penää EU:n kantaa lisäydinvoiman rakentamiseen entiseen Itä-Eurooppaan. Ruotsi epäilee EU:n komissiota linjanmuutoksesta ja uusien ydinvoimaloiden hiljaisesta hyväksymisestä. Maa on jättänyt EU:n Tacis-avustusohjelman johtajalle asiasta kirjelmän.

Ruotsi vaatii komissiota vastaamaan epäilyihin. Lisäksi se tiedustelee, aikooko komissio esittää ministerineuvostolle periaatekeskustelua EU:n ydinturvarahojen käytöstä.

EU:n Tacis- ja Phare-ohjelmien kautta kulkee lähes puolet lännen Itä-Euroopan ydinturvaan suuntaamasta avusta. Kaikkiaan avustukset lähentelevät kymmentä miljardia markkaa, mistä Suomen osuus on prosentti eli runsaat 90 miljoonaa markkaa.

Muista auttajista suurimpia on Itä-Euroopan kehityspankin ydinturvarahasto NSA. Rahasto on vaatinut avunsaajia siirtymään läntiseen lupakäytäntöön ja sulkemaan voimaloita. Sopimukset eivät ole pitäneet, mikä voi vaikeuttaa erityisesti Bulgarian pääsyä EU:n jäseneksi.

Sivu B 11

IVO ja PVO sopivat kantaverkosta Sivu B 11

MAANANTAI

Ammattikouluja harvennettu ennätysmäärä

Ammatillisia oppilaitoksia harvennettiin 1990-luvun säästöpaineissa ronskilla kädellä, ilman etukäteissuunnittelua. Lakkautusuhan alla yhdistäminen oli houkutteleva vaihtoehto, ja yritysmaailmasta lainattu fuusiomalli vähensi opinahjojen määrää noin 150:llä. Osa pakkoliitoksista on jo purkautunut. Yhdistämällä ei saavutettukaan suuria säästöjä.

Kotimaa, sivu A 5

Jari Sillanpää

Sillanpää menestyy musikaalitähtenä Seinäjoella

Suosion huipulla paistatteleva iskelmälaulaja Jari Sillanpää tekee Seinäjoen kaupunginteatterin Aspects of Love -musikaalissa uuden aluevaltauksen. "Ensi-illan jälkeen on ilo kertoa, että Jari Sillanpäästä, jos hän itse niin haluaa, tulee musikaalien tähti ja näyttelijä. Hän jo melkein on", kirjoittaa Juh- [illegible]

Kulttuuri, sivu C 6

Suomi vain tarkkailijana miinakokouksessa

Suomi osallistuu vain tarkkailijana tänään maanantaina Oslossa alkavaan yli sadan maan kokoukseen, jonka päämäärä on saada aikaan maailmanlaajuinen miinat kieltävä sopimus. Suomi ei usko niin sanottuun Ottawan prosessiin, jossa suuri joukko maita on sitoutunut maamiinojen kieltoon. Suomalaisten osallistujien mukaan todellisia tuloksia ja sitovia sopimuksia syntyy vain Geneven aseriisuntaprosessissa.

Ulkomaat, sivu C 3

Merirosvous elää uutta nousukautta

Merirosvot eivät suinkaan ole vain tarunhohtoisten kirjojen tai elokuvien aihe joltain menneiltä vuosisadoilta. Lontoossa sijaitsevan kansainvälisen merenkulkuyhdistyksen (IMB) mukaan viime vuonna kirjattiin 224 erilaista merirosvoustapausta. Kasvu on selvää verrattuna esimerkiksi vuoteen 1994, jolloin kirjattiin vain 90 tapausta.

Ulkomaat, sivu C 3

TÄNÄÄN

TERÇA-FEIRA, JUNTO COM O GLOBO, 'MEMÓRIAS DE UM SARGENTO DE MILÍCIAS', DE MANUEL A. DE ALMEIDA

O GLOBO

Fundador: IRINEU MARINHO — RIO DE JANEIRO, DOMINGO, 7 DE SETEMBRO DE [illegible] — Presidente: ROBERTO MARINHO

NESTA EDIÇÃO, CADERNO ESPECIAL

Marcha silenciosa por Diana

Em crítica à monarquia, irmão diz que Di não precisava de títulos para ganhar os corações



O PRÍNCIPE CHARLES, Harry, Charles Spencer, William e Philip acompanham o caixão entre o Palácio de Saint James e a Abadia de Westminster: filhos choraram na homenagem de Elton John

• Os britânicos acompanharam ontem, numa Londres paralisada e silenciosa, o funeral da princesa Diana. Em cerimônia nunca vista na História da Inglaterra, mais de dois milhões de pessoas (segundo a BBC) se aglomeraram no trajeto feito pela carruagem que levava o caixão. Os filhos da princesa, William e Harry, lideraram o cortejo, de cabeças baixas, ao lado do pai.

Milimetricamente programada, a cerimônia começou com uma atitude inédita da família real: de pé, no meio da rua, eles esperaram o corpo passar em frente ao Palácio de Buckingham, onde pela primeira vez a bandeira foi hasteada a meio pau. Mas isso não diminuiu o rancor do irmão de Diana, Charles Spencer. Na missa, ele mandou duros recados à monarquia.

— Diana não precisava de títulos para ganhar o coração das pessoas — afirmou Spencer, que prometeu continuar mostrando aos sobrinhos o mundo além do Palácio de Buckingham.

Sobre William recaem as esperanças de renovação da monarquia. Pesquisa divulgada ontem mostra que 54% dos britânicos querem que Charles renuncie ao trono em favor do filho. O primogênito de Diana, seu irmão Harry e a rainha choraram ao ouvir a música cantada por Elton John em Westminster. Nas ruas, a multidão fez um minuto de silêncio e se despediu de Diana com um pranto contido e flores.

Fla pode virar empresa por US$ 200 milhões

• O Flamengo S.A. está próximo, afirma Renato Maurício Prado. Os dirigentes negociam com o Banco Garantia o maior contrato de clubes do futebol brasileiro: US$ 200 milhões em dez anos. Mas o Fla [illegible] se tornar em[illegible] e romper o patrocínio [illegible] Petrobras. — Página 52

2ª EDIÇÃO

R$ 2,00

CHICO

REVISTA DA TV

Lavínia Vlasak enfrenta Glória Pires em 'Anjo mau', a nova novela das seis, que estréia amanhã na Rede Globo

LAVÍNIA VLASAK: [illegible]

JORNAL DA FAMÍLIA

Nos desenhos, a imagem do Brasil sonhado pelas crianças

SEGUNDO CADERNO

Livro reúne a obra do poeta tropicalista Torquato Neto

PLANETA GLOBO

Como as meninas festejam os 15 anos

MORAR BEM

Imóvel: estrangeiros estão de olho no SFI

BOA CHANCE

A carreira atrás dos balcões de fast-food

"All the News That's Fit to Print"

The New York Times

Late Edition

: Today, early clouds yielding to some sun. High 83. Tonight, clear. Low 70. Tomorrow, sun, humid. High 88. Yesterday, high 83, low 67. Details, page B5.

VOL. CXLVI . . . No. 50,902 NEW YORK, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997 60 CENTS

Charles Accompanies Diana Back Home to a Grieving Britain



Reuters

Diana's coffin arrived at Northolt air base near London yesterday. Escorting it, below, was Prince Charles, who left Pitié-Salpêtrière hospital earlier with Diana's sisters, Lady Sarah McCorquodale, left, and Lady Jane Fellowes, and behind them President Jacques Chirac and his wife, Bernadette.

Agence France-Presse

MILITARY IS HOPING TO TEST-FIRE LASER AGAINST SATELLITE

FIRST SUCH EFFORT BY U.S.

But Permission May Be Denied Because Experiment Could Start a New Arms Race

By WILLIAM J. BROAD

The developers of the nation's most powerful military laser are seeking permission to fire the laser's beam into space at a $60 million Air Force satellite in what military officials say would be the first test of its kind.

The test, planned for September, would be a major step toward perfecting a weapon that could demolish satellites and other spacecraft, an ability that the Pentagon regards as crucial in time of war.

But advocates of arms control say the test is likely to set off a race for new space weapons that will ultimately endanger the nation's own satellites. And the maker of the satellite, which is owned by the Air Force, says that the craft still has years of useful life and that its destruction would be a foolish waste.

The military wants an anti-satellite weapon mainly to stop enemies with orbital cameras from spying on American weapons and troops during combat. For years, the United States dominated space-based reconnaissance, but recently other countries and even private companies have begun efforts to loft their own spy satellites, with the companies seeking to market high-quality satellite photos.

The United States has no demonstrated way of shooting down satellites, though experts speculate that it may have secret ways that could work in an emergency. In theory, a laser weapon would allow the United States to dominate the world of orbital reconnaissance at least for a while.

The laser, installed at a sprawling base in the New Mexico desert, is run by the Army. The planned test would have it strike the Air Force satellite, an experimental craft designed to improve ways to track missiles, to see what it takes to destroy it. The Air Force says it no longer needs the satellite and plans to switch it off, despite the maker's protests.

On Thursday, military officials met at the Pentagon to review the laser plan but came to no decision on whether to approve it. A final go-ahead would probably have to come from the Secretary of Defense, probably in concert with the White House.

Some military officials say permission is likely, but others say the test may be canceled on political grounds. And though experts say the laser test would break no domestic laws or international treaties, the effort is still highly controversial.

Congressional critics and arms-control groups have long campaigned against firing the powerful laser at space targets, an idea much

Continued on Page A12

Fighting Back Tears, Tony Blair Talks of Nation's Shock

By WARREN HOGE

LONDON, Aug. 31 — Prince Charles brought the body of Diana, Princess of Wales, home tonight to a nation convulsed with grief over her death in a high-speed car crash in Paris early today.

The 36-year-old Princess was fatally injured and her millionaire admirer, Emad Mohamed al-Fayed, 41, was killed when their chauffeur-driven Mercedes-Benz tried to speed away from photographers pursuing on motorcycles, the police said. The car crashed into the wall of an underpass by the side of the Seine.

She was declared dead at 4 A.M. Paris time, a moment noted somberly on the BBC with the playing of the national anthem and the installation of a visual backdrop with a black-framed picture of Diana beaming her beguiling smile and the stark dates 1961-1997 beneath.

"She was the people's princess," said Prime Minister Tony Blair, "and that's how she will stay, how she will remain, in our hearts and in our memories forever." He choked back tears as he spoke with reporters outside the 12th-century stone church he attends in his parliamentary district in Sedgefield.

"I feel, like everyone else in this country today, utterly devastated," he said. "We are today a nation in a state of shock."

The Princess's two sons, William, 15, the second in line to the throne, and his brother, Harry, 12, attended church services near the royal holiday estate in Balmoral, Scotland, with their father, the Queen and the Queen Mother. The boys appeared subdued but controlled only hours after Prince Charles had awoken them to tell them of their mother's death.

In a conversation with her best friend in the British press, Richard Kay, the royal correspondent of The Daily Mail, just hours before she dined with Mr. Fayed on Saturday evening at the Ritz Hotel in Paris, Diana said she was scheduled to see her sons in London tonight.

"I'm coming home tomorrow and the boys will be back from Scotland in the evening," she told Mr. Kay, according to early editions of the paper available tonight. "I will have a few days with them before they're back at school."

Mr. Kay also reported that she had said she planned to withdraw from public life in November.

"She would then, she said, be able to live as she always wanted to live," Mr. Kay wrote, "not as an icon — how she hated to be called one — but as a private person."

After the service Prince Charles boarded the Queen's jet in Aberdeen and, taking with him Diana's two sisters, Lady Jane Fellowes and

Continued on Page A6

Police Investigating Photographers' Actions

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

PARIS, Aug. 31 — The French police opened a criminal investigation today to determine whether a chase by seven photographers on motorcycles was responsible for the car crash here that killed Diana, Princess of Wales, and her companion, the Harrods heir Emad Mohammed al-Fayed, shortly after midnight. This evening, Prince Charles, the heir to the British throne and Diana's husband until their marriage ended in divorce a year ago, flew here from Scotland and sadly accepted her body, in a plain wooden coffin, from President Jacques Chirac at Pitié-Salpêtrière university hospital, near the Sorbonne.

With Diana's two sisters, Lady Jane Fellowes and Lady Sarah McCorquodale, Charles then flew back to a shocked and grieving Britain with the body.

The police did not identify the photographers except by their nationalities, six French and one Macedonian, all said to be commercial free-lance photographers working on commission for photographic agencies. After questioning them all night, the authorities placed all seven in formal detention, which allows them to be held for 48 hours without charges. The police were said to have seized several rolls of their film.

"The inquiry will establish in more detail the role that these people may have played in the cause of the accident and how they behaved at the site," a statement by the Paris prosecutor's office said.

Legal experts said that detectives would look into whether the motorcycle pursuit had contributed to the accident, and whether the pursuers had violated French laws requiring immediate witnesses of an accident to try to give aid on the scene.

Some reports said that the first photographers on the scene had snapped pictures instead.

Mr. Fayed, 41, who had been linked romantically with Diana for several weeks, died instantly at 12:35 A.M., the police said, when the powerful black Mercedes-Benz 600 sedan they were riding from dinner at the Ritz Hotel to an apartment in the fashionable 16th arrondissement smashed into the wall of a tunnel by the Seine and was reduced to a compressed mass of twisted glass and metal.

The driver, an employee of the

Continued on Page A6

MORE ON THE DEATHS

Associated Press

GAINS PUT UNIONS AT TURNING POINT, MANY EXPERTS SAY

STRONGEST IN 2 DECADES

Labor Federation Is Pumping Money to Recruit Members and Halt Slide in Ranks

By STEVEN GREENHOUSE

With the United Parcel Service settlement seen as a major triumph and an omen of future success, union leaders and many experts say the labor movement is in its strongest position in nearly a generation and is poised to increase its membership after a two-decade decline.

This Labor Day might be a watershed moment for unions, some experts say, because the 15-day U.P.S. strike created a surge of sympathy for unions as many of the efforts at revitalization pushed by John J. Sweeney, the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s president, have taken root.

The labor federation, with 13 million members, is spending $20 million a year on organizing new members, up from $2.5 million a year in the early 1990's, and several unions that had essentially stopped organizing have started pumping money and staff into recruiting new members. Hundreds of college graduates are signing on as union organizers, while a new generation of labor leaders in their 40's has emerged, far more interested in shaking up and expanding the labor movement than were the crusty old leaders who dominated labor in the 1980's.

"Things are better for labor than they've been in a very long time," said Tom Juravich, director of the Labor Relations and Research Center at the University of Massachusetts. "The mood is fundamentally different from just two or three years ago, when there was a sense of hopelessness."

As part of Mr. Sweeney's push to reverse labor's slide, there is a surge in union organizing, including campaigns to unionize 16,000 teachers and school aides in Dallas, 20,000 strawberry workers in California, 35,000 apple workers in Washington State, 70,000 home health care workers in the Los Angeles area and 110,000 employees at Federal Express.

Labor has recently scored some of its biggest victories in two decades, among them unionizing 5,000 mechanics at Continental Airlines and 30,000 government workers in Maryland.

There have, of course, been major defeats, too, most notably losing an election two weeks ago to represent more than 5,000 textile workers at a dozen North Carolina factories owned by Fieldcrest Cannon. And despite the new confidence within labor, some critics assert that all the activity aimed at reversing labor's decline has generated little but sound and fury because it has failed to increase labor's bottom line: the number of Americans belonging to

Continued on Page A13

Only Employment For Many in Europe Is Part-Time Work

By EDMUND L. ANDREWS

PARIS — Tabienne Rogard just started a job as an executive secretary at one of France's biggest food companies. But she is not excited: This will be her 10th job in four years, and she already knows she will be looking for work again in six months.

"I used to think that if I was very good and very involved, that I could stay with the company," said Ms. Rogard, who is 32 and a single mother. "But no. There is no possibility. With this job, I am replacing a woman who is having a baby. When she comes back, I leave."

Ms. Rogard is at the center of a broad shift in the way Europeans work: the rapid decline of the traditional full-time job. Temporary jobs, part-time work and other forms of nontraditional employment — long anathema to European unions and governments — have become by far the most important source of new jobs across the Continent.

Indeed, although the recent United Parcel Service strike focused attention on the use of part-timers in the United States, the global trend is quite different. The proportion of part-time workers in the United States has been steady at about 18 percent for more than a decade. But the proportion is higher in many

INSIDE

Mexican Crisis Averted

Government delegates stepped back from a planned protest and recognized an opposition ceremony inaugurating the new Congress. Page A3.

King Maneuvers in Cambodia

Once again, King Norodom Sihanouk is ruling by his wits, trying to find the balance between powerful forces that threaten Cambodia. Page A4.

Giants and Jets Both Win

In impressive debuts for coaches Jim Fassel and Bill Parcells, the Giants beat Philadelphia, 31-17, and the Jets beat Seattle, 41-3. Page C1.

Mattingly Takes a Bow

With 55,707 fans and a lot of his old jerseys on hand, the Yankees retired Don Mattingly's No. 23 in a ceremony at Yankee Stadium. Page C1.

On the Internet: www.nytimes.com

Profits From Casino Help an Indian Tribe Reclaim Its History

By JUDITH H. DOBRZYNSKI

LEDYARD, Conn. — History books may now have to acknowledge what Theresa H. Bell, a member of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, has always felt in her heart: The Pequots did not disappear in the 17th century when, ravaged by the combination of a war with the colonists and smallpox, measles and other European diseases, the tribe supposedly succumbed to European woodlands of southeastern Connecticut seem to say. And the secrets archeologists are unraveling here bring vindication to a group that was sometimes derided in the 1970's for seeking Federal recognition as a tribe, the purest Pequot being a one-eighth Pequot, and the accompanying right to operate a casino.

Now, profits from Foxwoods, the Pequots' 24-hour-a-day casino, are paying for a $135 million museum and research center to house evidence found mere footsteps away. $1 million has been spent on the dig itself.

The findings unearthed by archeologists suggest that the Pequots not only endured but also maintained many native practices — what they ate, how they cooked, how many family members lived together and more — through at least the 18th century.

"We knew there had to be a story underneath the ground that hadn't been told," said Ms. Bell, granddaughter of Elizabeth George [illegible], who pressed the dispersed [illegible] ern Pequot nation. "This just proves what our oral history says."

The evidence backing Ms. Bell comes from the discovery of the trace remnants of a fortified Pequot village, probably built in 1670 and abandoned in 1675, and several 18th-century dwellings.

There are fragments of wampum, nuts, flint, tools, the oldest peach pit in the Northeast (probably) and much else. The biggest treasure is an earthenware cooking pot, as big as a pumpkin, pieced together from

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A WORLD SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE

By

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Note: The author presented this paper to the International Communication Division at the annual convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Washington, DC, Aug. 7, 2001.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A WORLD SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE

Abstract / The world system theory can provide a refreshingly different perspective of global press freedom. The starting point of assessing press freedom should be the world system, not the "atomistic" nation-state, because one cannot understand the part without knowing the whole, which is more than the sum of the parts. This essay proposes the application of a revised formulation of the world system theory—which presumes a capitalist world-economy dominated by three competing center-clusters each associated with a dependent hinterland of peripheral economic clusters—to examine global press freedom. It proposes a three-tiered typology for measuring press freedom at the world system, state, and individual levels. It suggests that press freedom indices should factor in the power of the center clusters, themselves led by a hegemon cluster, to flood the hinterlands technologically with a barrage of information-communication.

Keywords / Freedom of opinion and expression, press freedom, right to communicate, world system

[MS: 9,000 words]

The structural-functionalist modernization paradigm, better known as the dominant paradigm, identified media participation, with accompanying press freedom, as another facet of development (Burrowes, 1996). Wallerstein (1974) turned the tables around when he challenged the basic presumption of the dominant paradigm: that nation-states changed in parallel lines from tradition to modernity. Applying the method of historical social science, Wallerstein theorized that the world system as a whole reflected a given stage of development, and that the part, i.e., the nation state, was not independent of the whole. Yet, researchers have continued to measure press freedom using criteria solely internal to a state.

Gunaratne (2001a) has proposed a world system model that provides researchers a new framework for mapping press freedom in the world. The proposed model requires linking the notion of press freedom to global forces, such as the ability of center-clusters to flood the periphery-clusters with a barrage of information-communication notwithstanding the domestic restrictions within a state. So conceived, Gunaratne argues, the measurement of press freedom should include the accessibility of information from exogenous sources.

Moreover, if one were to presume the libertarian concept—"a free flow of information unimpeded by any intervention by any nation" (Hachten, 1999, p.21)—as the best expression of press freedom, then research must also address the issue of global press freedom vis-à-vis the vast volume of government-sponsored global information flow (e.g., Voice of America, Radio Moscow, Radio Beijing, Deutsche Welle, BBC,

Radio France Internationale). For more than half a century, transnational radio has been "a key instrument of international political communication" (Hachten, 1999, p. 113). Some 1,600 short-wave stations broadcast from 160 countries. Although the "freedom principle" (Merrill, 2000a) debars government from assuming the functions of the Fourth Estate, press-freedom advocates hardly raise an eyebrow at government-run media at the international level. As Pillai (1999-2000) points out, "The desire to control unfavorable information is common to governments everywhere, only the degree of control differs" (p. 198). This desire is far more apparent at the world-system level.

Gunaratne (2001a) has proposed a reformulation of the world system theory as follows: The modern world-economy comprises three competing center-clusters, each of which has a dependent hinterland of periphery-clusters. The relative power of the three center-clusters—North American Free Trade Agreement, the European Union, and the Asian-Pacific economic powers—is unequal. Among these is a hegemon cluster, NAFTA, led by a global state that has more power on the world system than any other. The relative power of the global states within the center-clusters, as well as those within the periphery-clusters, is also unequal. The global information and communication flow most likely follows the pattern of this triadized center-hinterland structure

Gunaratne (2001a) argues that the essential requirement is to move the research focus away from the atom (i.e., the nation-state) to the whole (i.e., the world system). Thus any analysis of global communication, including the mapping of press freedom, should move in descending order from the world-economy to the center-clusters and their respective hinterlands—the periphery-clusters, and only then to the global-states within each of the clusters. This approach recognizes the call for future press-freedom studies to

"acknowledge more fully—both at the level of theory and in the research design—the increasingly global character of interlocking power relations" (Burrowes, 1996, p. 25). It also pays attention to the increasing internationalization of research in journalism as "the media contexts within which journalism is practised assume global proportions" (Tumber, Bromley & Zelizer, 2000, p. 6). Moreover, it is consistent with the deductive method of social science, and is particularly appropriate for evaluating a structural theory. Gunaratne's revised world system model is the outcome of his previous attempts to apply macro theory to media analysis (Gunaratne, 2001b, 2001c).

Concept of Press Freedom

The Library of Congress Online Catalog lists some1,870 titles on freedom of the press. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that the number of journal articles on the subject would by far exceed that number. However, such a popular subject still remains without a universally accepted operational definition.

It has been the tendency in the West to associate press freedom with the characteristics of Siebert's so-called libertarian theory of the press or the CHAOS—competition, heterogeneity, autonomy, openness, and selfishness—paradigm (Merrill, 2000a). Stein (1966) does exactly that when he describes a free press as one that "acts as a market place where ideas, opinions and theories are served up to citizens for their acceptance or rejection" without a government censor hanging "over the shoulder of the editorial writer" (p. 11). Powe (1991) says that "editorial autonomy from government" and "inability of government to dictate coverage" enable the press to perform its Fourth

Estate role—"a role more secure than the nebulous and inconsistent possibilities in the public's right to know" (p. 285).

The purpose of a libertarian press is "to inform, entertain, [and] sell—but chiefly to help discover truth, and to check on government" (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956, p.7). Within this context, the press enjoys negative rights to publish as it pleases with no concomitant responsibilities. Peterson's formulation of the social responsibility theory of the press, following the Hutchins Commission report,[1] retains the first three tasks of a libertarian press but contends that the chief purpose of the press is "to raise conflict to the plane of discussion" (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956, p.7). This approach, therefore, looks at press freedom as a positive right that entails concomitant responsibilities.

The Hutchins Commission (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947) also observed: "Freedom of the press is not a fixed and isolated value, the same in every society and in all times. It is a function within a society and must vary with the social context" (p. 12). Hocking (1947), in one of the five special studies done for the commission, emphasized the very point that the concept of the free press "cannot mean the same in every society and at all times" (p. 194). If this were the case, then measuring freedom of the press on the basis of a set of criteria relevant to one society at a given time is bound to produce questionable results. This view agrees with the contemporary debate on relating press freedom to Asian values and other social values outside Western society. As Philippine journalist Amando Doronila points out: "While democracy and

[1] A five-page abstract of the Hutchins Commission report, as well as a sample of press reactions following the release of the report in July 1947, appears in a double-issue of Nieman Reports (Winter 1999 and Spring 2000), which contains a selection of "outstanding writing" published in Nieman Reports during the last half of the 20th century.

freedom of the press are inseparable notions, one cannot assume these twin notions take the same focus in Asia as in North American and Western European democracies" (in Williams & Rich, 2000, p.xi). Burrowes (1997), who used the Liberian context to test Stevens' (1971) propositions linking press freedom to cultural homogeneity and economic development, came to a similar conclusion. Burrowes' study "highlighted the importance of cross-national testing of propositions to avoid premature generalizing on the basis of conditions that are unique to certain periods and societies" (p. 341).

Freedom House, however, has been conducting press freedom surveys worldwide since 1979 classifying the media as free, partly free, or not free depending on the "degree to which each country permits the free flow of information" (Table 1). It claims that the survey uses universal criteria starting with the most "universal unit of concern: the individual" (Sussman, 2000, p. 9). Freedom House asserts that it merely applies the basic thrust of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (i.e., "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression") in assessing press freedom.

> The operative word for [the Freedom House] survey is everyone. All states, from the most democratic to the most authoritarian, are committed to this doctrine [Article 19] through the U.N. system. To deny that doctrine is to deny the universality of information freedom—a basic human right. We recognize that cultural distinctions or economic under-development may limit the volume of the news flows within a country. But these or other arguments are not acceptable explanations for outright centralized (governmental) control of the content of news and information. (Sussman, 2000, p. 9)

Freedom House's view of press freedom is identical to that of the 1981 Declaration of Talloires, which ends with the statement: "Press freedom is a basic human right." This declaration was a Western response to the clamor for a New World Information and Communication Order. Nordenstreng (1999), however, argues that under international law, the subject and "owner" of the "right to freedom of opinion and expression"—a right that "carries with it duties and responsibilities"—is the individual, not the press or media organizations (p. 256). Thus Nordenstreng makes a distinction between freedom of the press and freedom of individual expression thereby contending that press freedom is not a human right. Cullen and Lu (1998) agree that although these two concepts are similar, the differences between the two "sometimes find themselves in opposition" (p. 157).

In this regard, one needs to remember the Hutchins Commission's (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947) view that "freedom of speech and freedom of the press were moral rights" (p. 9) that carried with it "accepted moral duties" (p. 10). White and Leigh (1946), who authored the report on international communication as part of the work of the commission, urged the press to initiate "the widest possible exchange of objectively realistic information—true information, not merely more information" (p. 2). They balked at the idea of simply writing "the First Amendment into international law" to allow "the unhindered flow of information" because that "may merely replace ignorance with prejudice and distortion rather than with understanding" (p. 2). They called on governments and private agencies to share "the task of stimulating understanding among people through mass-communication media" (p. 16). Thus they failed to see eye-to-eye

with the libertarian concept of a negative press freedom and even saw a role for the government in news dissemination.

The commission was careful to point out that in the 1790s when the U.S. Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the constitution—came into force, "anybody with anything to say had comparatively little difficulty in getting it published" because "the man whose opinions were not represented could start a publication of his own" (p. 14). Thus the First Amendment aimed to protect the press from government censorship. A communication revolution had changed those circumstances with the press being transformed into "big business" resulting in the right of free public expression losing "its earlier reality" (p. 15). Furthermore, concentration of ownership had limited the "variety of sources of news and opinion" (p. 17), and the freedom of the press could remain "a right of those who publish only if it incorporates into itself the right of the citizen and the public interest" (p. 18). These observations make it abundantly clear, that the commission did not consider freedom of the press a human right in the American social context of the mid-20th century. Coincidentally, in 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognized "the right to freedom of opinion and expression" as a human right (Article 19). However, the UDHR did not specifically mention freedom of the press.

Contemporary scholars have reiterated the preceding views on the press in relation to the time the First Amendment was written, during which time the bourgeois state came to power and the terms <u>media</u> and <u>the press</u> meant the same. "The press was understood as the printing press, not as the newspaper press, so that freedom of the press was thought of in the same terms as freedom of speech ... The press was a tool that

citizens used to speak and some of this speech was public" (Nerone, 1995, p. 156). The same scholar points out: "The press itself has become globalized. It is no longer only the nation-state out of which the press operates that most significantly determines journalistic practice" (p. 160). Moreover, the "press no longer performs the same functions that it did" (p. 175) during the late 1940s when the Hutchins Commission described the emerging conception of freedom of the press as follows:

> As with all freedom, press freedom means freedom from and also freedom for.
>
> A free press is free from compulsions from whatever source, governmental or social, external or internal. From compulsions, not from pressures: for no press can be free from pressures except in a moribund society empty of contending forces and beliefs. These pressures, however, if they are persistent and distorting—as financial, clerical, popular, institutional pressures may become—approach compulsions; and something is then lost from effective freedom, which the press and its public must unite to restore.
>
> A free press is free for the expression of opinion in all its phases. It is free for the achievement of those goals of press service on which its own ideals and the requirements of the community combine and which existing techniques make possible. For these ends it must have full command of technical resources, financial strength, reasonable access to sources of information at home and abroad, and the necessary facilities for bringing information to the national market. The press must grow to the measure of this market.

> For the press there is a third aspect of freedom. The free press must be free to all who have something worth saying to the public, since the essential object for which a free press is valued is that ideas deserving a public hearing shall have a public hearing. (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947, pp. 128-129; Hocking, 1947, p. 228)

The Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947) further argued that the founding fathers bracketed freedom of the press with freedom of speech because the press was at first hardly more than a means for extending the speaker's audience (p. 107). While exhorting that the "government must set limits upon its capacity to interfere with, regulate, control, or suppress the voices of the press or to manipulate the data on which public judgment is formed" (p. 116), the commission also opined that the government "may and should enter the field of press comment and news supply, not as displacing private enterprise, but as a supplementary source" (p. 128).

More than 30 years later, the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (MacBride Report, 1980) pointed out the need to devote special attention "to obstacles and restrictions [that] derive from the concentration of media ownership, public or private, from commercial influences on the press and broadcasting, or from private or governmental advertising" (Recommendation 57). The report also drew attention to the 1952 Convention on the International Right of Correction (Recommendation 48), thereby expressing its desire to place the right to communicate at the world system level. The concept of the right to communicate includes the right to be informed, the right to inform, the right to privacy, and the right to participate in public communication (Recommendation 54). Gunaratne (1998) has

elaborated on the parallels between the views of the Hutchins Commission and the MacBride Commission on press freedom and responsibility. For example, both commissions recommended minority access and international cooperation regarding the picture of life presented in the media.

Two decades after the MacBride Report, the concentration of media ownership has become more pronounced as a result of the U.S.-led worldwide promotion of free-market philosophy. At the beginning of the 21st century, the global media market has come under the domination of a dozen or so mega-media conglomerates, including AOL Time Warner (CNN), AT&T Broadband, Bertelsmann, Disney (ABC), General Electric (NBC), News Corp. (Fox TV), Sony (Columbia Pictures), Viacom (CBS), and Vivendi-Universal. They dominate many aspects of mass media: newspapers, magazines, books, radio, broadcast television, cable systems and programming, movies, music recordings, video cassettes, and online services (Bagdikian, 2000; McChesney, 1998 Thussu, 2000). Freedom of the press, contrary to what the framers of the First Amendment most likely had in mind, has moved away from the individual to the media conglomerates. Those in media management implicitly acknowledge this as when Neuharth (1998) says: "We in the media have to remind the public that the First Amendment is not just for our protection, but for theirs" (p. 530). Schwartz (1992) adopts a similar stance when he posits that the framers of the First Amendment provided a separate protection for freedom of the press to give "an institutional role for publishers and editors to criticize government and public officials to ensure that they would act properly in the exercise of their powers" (p. 133).

Measuring Press Freedom

Globalization in the information era calls for a more accurate measurement of press freedom that encompasses the world system, not just the individual states. Van Belle (2000) claimed that "a readily available, comprehensive data set that measured global press freedom over an extended temporal domain" (p. 137) did not exist before he compiled an empirical measure of the press freedom of states for the period 1948-1995. What did exist were a few cross-sectional studies from the early 1960s (Banks & Textor, 1963; Nixon 1960, 1965), the empirical studies of Lowenstein (1970) and Kent (1972), and a collection of data from Freedom House that began in 1979. Some were short descriptive summaries of press freedom, such as those of the International Press Institute and Inter American Press Association. Lee (1991) refers to these as "descriptive, journalistic and in many cases subjective case analyses of press situations in individual countries" (p. 154).

Van Belle (2000) used descriptive summaries such as those of the IPI annual report "along with country reports by area experts and historical documents pertaining to the country or the region" to code "the freedom and effectiveness of the press for all states" from 1948 to 1995 (p. 138). He identified as <u>free</u> those states where "the news media are capable of functioning as an arena of political competition." He identified as <u>controlled</u> those states where the government directly controlled the press. In between these two, he identified two other categories: <u>imperfectly free</u>, where "press freedom is compromised by corruption or unofficial influence"; and <u>restricted</u>, where the press "is not capable of functioning as an arena of political competition or debate" though not directly controlled by the government. As a reliability check, he compared the data he

derived to the available Freedom House data. Van Belle explained, "In the process of coding this data, it became clear that in terms of the ability of the press to function freely and independently of the government, the data seem to form a natural dichotomy" (p. 141).

Nixon (1960) used a panel of three judges to appraise press freedom in 85 nations primarily on the basis of the two main IPI surveys of the 1950s (IPI, 1955; IPI 1959). He derived a five-way classification of press systems based on the degree of government controls. In a follow-up study of 117 countries (Nixon, 1965), he used a panel of "five experts who could evaluate the situation in each country on the basis of their own knowledge" (p. 6) and place that country on a 9-point scale of press freedom.

Lowenstein (1970), who used 23 factors to develop his Press Independence and Critical Ability index, claimed that PICA could measure press freedom "probably with a good deal of accuracy" (p. 139). Furthermore, he asserted: "If one agrees that press freedom is closely bound up with democracy, in the Western sense, then one must pay special attention to the predictive capacity of a system for measuring press freedom" (p. 139). Using Lowenstein's data for 94 countries, Kent (1972) narrowly focused on aspects of government control to find the "unidimensionality" of 15 variables, including libel laws, licensing, government advertising, and government subsidies. Because these two researchers followed the modernization paradigm then in vogue, they too failed to go beyond the endogenous factors within the "atomistic" state.

Weaver, Buddenbaum and Fair (1985), in their study of 134 countries comparing data for 1950 and1979, also determined press freedom on the basis of the degree of government control of the press. They took into account "only those restrictions initiated

by the government of a country" without considering "the actual flow of diversity of opinions and ideas within the mass media of a country" although they presumed "an inverse correlation between the degree of government control and such diversity" (pp. 108-109). To determine press freedom in 1950, they used Schramm and Carter's (1960) Guttman scale, which included items on government ownership of newspapers, economic pressures by government on the media, political censorship, restrictions on criticism of government policies, and government ownership of broadcasting. To determine press freedom in 1979, they relied on Freedom House's classification, which took into account government ownership of the media, government censorship, restrictions on criticism, and other forms of government pressure on the media.

Freedom House has classified the press and broadcasting systems in countries into free, partly free, and not free categories since 1979. It started assigning numerical scores to each country from 1994 onward using four criteria that it claimed were founded on Article 19 of UDHR (Table 1). Other organizations, such as the International Press Institute, the World Association of Newspapers, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and Reporters sans Frontieres have used qualitative criteria to determine worldwide press freedom.

Freedom House measures only the extent to which the endogenous print and broadcast media can keep their content free from the influence of laws and regulations, political pressures and controls, and economic influences. It gives a score of 0 to 15 to each of the two types of media in relation to each of these three criteria. A fourth criterion, repressive actions, is scored 0 to 5 for each of the two media types. Thus the maximum possible score for a country is 100, with 0-30 defined as free, 31-60 as partly

free, and 61-100 as not free. Freedom House admits that its survey is not a measure of press responsibility.

Discussion

The major "scientific" studies on press freedom outlined above, as well as the annual Freedom House surveys, show numerous shortcomings when examined through the world system perspective.

First, almost all of the press freedom surveys begin with an aggregate of states to make generalizations about the world. This individualistic approach places emphasis on the "atomistic" nation state as if each state were independent of the world system. In the informational era, globalization has transformed the erstwhile nation states into global states. If we concede this transformation, it becomes apparent that despite endogenous press restrictions, citizens may have the capacity "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas"—a human right enshrined in Article 19 of the UDHR—via exogenous media that are generally not subject to state control (e.g., short-wave and satellite broadcasts, global print media, and global new media, including digital HDTV broadcasting linking the Internet, mobile phones, and other telecommunication devices). A press freedom index is incomplete and inaccurate without factoring in people's ability to access exogenous media.[2] Press freedom surveys should begin with the world system and only then derive the presence of states because the totality—the world system—is more than the sum of the states.

[2] The permissiveness on allowing citizens access to exogenous media varies at the state level. Myanmar, North Korea, and Afghanistan are examples of the most restrictive. Malaysia, for example, does not censor the Internet.

Second, almost all of the press freedom surveys have been primarily concerned with assessing the two traditional endogenous media: print and broadcasting. They largely exclude exogenous media that people can access despite the pressures and compulsions on the endogenous print and broadcast media. For example, Freedom House has consistently ranked only three Asian countries—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—as "free" for the seven-year period 1994-2000 (Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3). From the world system perspective, such an assessment may not be entirely accurate. In South Asia, although Sri Lanka has resorted to continual censorship on news relating to the communal civil war since 1982, the Tamil rebels have established a global communication network of exogenous media to inform themselves and their supporters worldwide. Even though the government has power over the public broadcasting system and the most well established newspaper group, Sri Lanka also has a vigorous opposition press and private broadcasting companies. The people are free to access exogenous media. In Southeast Asia, Singapore citizens have access to a multitude of exogenous media despite the docile endogenous media, and the citizenry are perhaps much better informed than those in many "free" countries.

Third, almost all the surveys cited presume that press freedom is primarily freedom from government. As pointed out already, those who framed the U.S. Constitution thought of freedom of the press as an extension of the individual's freedom of speech that should be protected from government clampdown. In 1791, when the First Amendment stipulated that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," the press meant the printing press, not the newspaper press that eventually evolved into conglomerates. Thus the constitutionally protected freedom of

the press is an individual right, not a conglomerate right. As the Hutchins Commission has pointed out, press freedom in the contemporary context is a moral right that entails responsibilities on behalf of the citizens—the real "owners" of that freedom. Although Freedom House surveys refer to press freedom as an individual human right, the empirical reality of the moment is that it has long ceased to be so. An ideological bias becomes apparent when press freedom surveys originating in the West continue to slight the pressures and influence of commercial interests on the press while emphasizing those of the government. Meadows (2001) cites the "extraordinary concentration of media ownership in Australia" that has led to the "construction of the audience as consumers rather than as citizens" (p. 6), thereby serving commercial interests. Global concentration of the media clearly shows commercial pressures approaching the level of compulsions, as the Hutchins Commission warned. Referring to the phenomenon of "invisible censorship," Thom (1999) says that readers in the Western world may never know the extent of press "restrictions based on what publishers are willing to print and what advertisers are willing to support" (p. 31). A more careful assessment of the "compulsions" imposed by commercial, institutional, and other interests is vital to construct a more accurate index of press or media freedom.

Finally, if we continue to have faith in freedom of the press as an individual human right, then our starting point should be the assessment of that freedom at the world system level. What is freedom of the press for the world as a single unit? If a free press means freedom from government interference, to what extent are the governments in the center-clusters and the hinterland-clusters involved in world information dissemination? Whose pressures and compulsions do the conglomerates that dominate the world's

information-communication flow follow? Do the global mass media provide a voice for the majority of mankind in a world democracy? Scholars should put aside ideological bias to find an answer to the question posed in the second sentence of this paragraph.

Conclusion

This essay should not be construed as a justification of covert or overt government censorship. The essay agrees with the Hutchins Commission's view that while pressures on the press are inevitable in a dynamic society, letting those pressures—whether from governmental or commercial interests—transform into compulsions would obstruct the practice of democracy. Therefore, the essay draws attention to the need for assessing press freedom more objectively and accurately by paying greater attention to non-governmental compulsions. Measuring press freedom requires a clear definition of the press. In the late 18th century, the press meant only one medium: print. Today, it includes broadcast and online media as well.

The assessment in the preceding section forces us to re-examine the question of the centrality of "press freedom" in democratic governance. At the dawn of the 21st century, when the mainstream "press" has become the equivalent of the media conglomerates, doubts arise about its claim to be the unwritten Fourth Estate. Commercial compulsions on media content, as much as governmental compulsions, are present both at the world system level and the nation-state level. Thus the assessment of press/media freedom is incomplete without considering everyone's freedom of opinion and expression (i.e., right to communicate) for revitalizing democracy at both levels.

The purpose of freedom of the press, as explained in this essay, is to engender an informed public for active participation in democratic government. Freedom House has determined that 18 countries have the greatest press freedom in the world (Table 1). These comprise two large countries—the United States and Germany—nine small countries of Western Europe, three small Caribbean countries, two small Pacific island nations, as well as Australia and New Zealand. If we were to hypothesize that political participation (as reflected in voter turnout at national elections) is highest in countries with the highest press freedom (as defined and measured by Freedom House), the data in Table 2 fail to confirm it. No statistically significant correlation exists between these two variables for the first-tier free-press countries ($r = -0.26$; $p = .34$), the combined first-and second-tier free-press countries ($r = 0.06$; $p = .69$), or the totality of all countries ($r = -0.02$; $p = .83$). However, a statistically significant correlation does exit between press freedom (as defined and measured by Freedom House) and the Human Development Index for both the combined first-and second-tier free-press countries ($r = -0.49$; $p = .00$) and the totality of all countries ($r = -0.53$; $p = .00$). Merrill (2000b) asserts, "In the freest press systems in the world, there is not an encouraging sign of significant voter turnout. … And there is little evidence that the press is doing anything to increase voting or participate in government generally" (p. 198).

In the absence of evidence supporting an association between "press/media freedom" and democratic participation, it is imperative to re-define this concept to include the elements of the individual's right to communicate both at the world-system and the nation-state levels. This approach requires measuring "press/media freedom" at

three levels: the world system, the nation-state, and the individual, as illustrated in Figure 1:[3]

Figure 1
Typology for measuring press/media freedom

Level of analysis	*Level of freedom*		
	Low	Moderate	High
World system			
Nation-state			
Individual			

At the world system level, the criteria for measuring press-freedom should include government involvement and interference in the mass media, the technological ability of center-clusters to dominate the global information flow, as well as the compulsions of the commercial conglomerates that affect media content. At the nation-state level, the criteria should include both governmental and commercial compulsions on content of the endogenous media, as well as the degree of accessibility of exogenous media. At the individual level, the criterion should be Article 19 of UDHR: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” A major question to ask in devising such measures should be: How well are the people informed about local, national and international developments

[3] I am grateful to Professor Kurt Kent, University of Florida, for suggesting this typology after reading the draft of this essay. I also wish to acknowledge improvements suggested by Associate Professor Charles

for meaningful political participation in a global democracy? Measurement of press/media freedom without relating it to democratic participation is a mere academic or ideological exercise.

From another perspective, researchers can make a conceptual distinction of the tripartite system—media, journalism, and publics—that has emerged as a result of professionalization of journalism and the cultivation of the notion of editorial independence. As originally conceived, press/media freedom, an extension of the individual freedom of speech, meant the unhindered circulation of opinion and expression within the bounds of common law. However, journalism has over time "professionalized" opinion and expression. Hartley (2000) identifies professional journalism as "redaction" (p. 44). Press freedom indices have mostly, though imperfectly, focused on the pressures and compulsions on redaction, the equivalent of the contemporary "press." The world system theory offers a framework to examine the nature and impact of redaction itself. Is redaction tied to the peculiarities of an "atomistic" nation state, or is it a universal practice, or is it both? To what extent has redaction itself limited the unhindered circulation of opinion and expression despite the availability of desktop publishing, talkback, or online interaction? Do the global media conglomerates, which thrive on market-driven journalism, limit the cultivation of different models of redaction (e.g., developmental journalism, public journalism)? These and similar questions should enable us to shift the investigation of press freedom from a "Eurocentric" to a "humanocentric" focus.

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Table 1
Freedom House Press Freedom Indicators 1994-2000
with data on voter turnout and HDI standing

"0" denotes most freedom; "100" denotes least; ".." indicates that no value was assigned that year; "VT" denotes voter turnout at latest elections; "HDI" denotes Human Development Index

Free (First Tier) 0-15

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Average	VT (%)	HDI 1998
Norway	10	8	5	5	5	5	5	**6.1**	78	0.934
New Zealand	8	8	6	6	6	8	8	**7.1**	90	0.903
Bahamas	18	8	7	7	7	7	7	**8.7**	68	0.844
Belgium	7	7	10	10	10	9	9	**8.9**	91	0.925
Switzerland	11	10	8	9	8	8	8	**8.9**	43	0.915
Australia	9	7	8	10	10	10	10	**9.1**	95	0.929
Denmark	11	9	9	9	9	9	9	**9.3**	86	0.911
Nauru	20	18	6	6	6	6	6	**9.7**	..	..
Luxembourg	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	**10.3**	86	0.908
Sweden	11	10	10	10	10	10	11	**10.3**	81	0.926
Marshall Is.	18	19	8	8	8	8	8	**11.0**	..	..
Iceland	14	12	12	12	12	12	12	**12.3**	84	0.927
United States	12	12	14	14	12	13	13	**12.9**	36	0.929
St. Lucia	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	**13.0**	66	0.728
Jamaica	23	18	11	11	11	11	11	**13.7**	65	0.735
Austria	19	18	12	12	12	12	12	**13.9**	80	0.908
Germany	11	18	21	11	11	13	13	**14.0**	82	0.911
Netherlands	14	18	14	14	14	14	14	**14.6**	73	0.925

Free (Second Tier) 16-30

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Average	VT	HDI
Canada	13	18	23	11	11	16	14	**15.1**	69	0.935
Finland	17	15	15	15	15	15	15	**15.3**	65	0.917
St. Vincent & Grenadines	22	12	16	16	16	16	16	**16.3**	..	0.738
Solomon Is.	22	18	13	14	14	16	18	**16.4**	64	0.614
Dominica	20	16	16	16	16	16	16	**16.6**	75	0.793
Barbados	17	19	16	..	16	16	16	**16.7**	63	0.858
Costa Rica	16	21	18	16	16	16	16	**17.0**	70	0.797
Portugal	18	16	17	17	17	17	17	**17.0**	62	0.864
Spain	14	23	17	19	17	21	18	**18.4**	77	0.899
Ireland	16	15	18	19	21	20	21	**18.6**	66	0.907
St. Kitts & Nevis	21	19	18	18	18	18	18	**18.6**	68	0.798
Bolivia	20	17	17	20	18	18	22	**18.9**	70	0.643
Malta	27	24	17	17	17	17	17	**19.4**	95	0.865
Kiribati	26	24	18	18	17	17	17	**19.6**	..	..
Cyprus	30	24	16	18	18	16	16	**19.7**	93	0.886
Czechia	20	21	19	19	19	20	20	**19.7**	74	0.843
Japan	21	20	21	20	19	19	19	**19.9**	59	0.924
Grenada	22	20	20	20	20	20	20	**20.3**	57	0.785
United	24	22	22	22	21	20	20	**21.6**	72	0.918

Kingdom										
Estonia	28	25	24	22	20	20	20	**22.7**	57	0.801
Lithuania	30	29	25	20	17	18	20	**22.7**	53	0.789
Latvia	29	29	21	21	21	21	24	**23.7**	72	0.771
Mauritius	30	30	25	25	20	20	17	**23.9**	80	0.761
Micronesia	25	23	23	23	26	26	24	**24.3**	..	..
Belize	29	22	25	25	25	25	25	**25.1**	90	0.777
Poland	30	29	21	27	25	25	19	**25.1**	48	0.814
France	19	27	30	26	26	27	24	**25.6**	71	0.917
Guyana	41	28	26	26	22	22	22	**26.7**	98	0.709
Korea, South	29	28	22	25	28	28	27	**26.7**	64	0.854
Taiwan	29	30	30	28	25	25	21	**26.9**	..	..
Uruguay	23	25	25	29	30	30	29	**27.3**	92	0.825
Papua New Guinea	25	23	30	30	28	28	28	**27.4**	81	0.542
Italy	25	30	30	27	27	28	27	**27.7**	83	0.903
Trinidad & Tobago	29	25	26	30	28	28	28	**27.7**	63	0.793
Botswana	19	28	30	30	30	30	28	**27.9**	77	0.593
Chile	30	30	28	30	27	27	27	**28.4**	86	0.826
Panama	27	22	30	30	30	30	30	**28.4**	76	0.776
Greece	30	26	29	27	30	30	30	**28.9**	76	0.875
Israel	30	30	30	28	28	28	30	**29.1**	79	0.883
South Africa	38	30	30	27	28	28	25	**29.4**	89	0.697
Namibia	23	23	30	30	30	38	34	**29.7**	63	0.632
Samoa	30	29	28	28	28	31	34	**29.7**	86	0.711

Partly Free (First Tier) 31-45

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Average	VT	HDI
Slovenia	40	37	27	28	27	27	27	**30.4**	74	0.861
Benin	34	31	31	30	30	30	30	**30.9**	70	0.411
Brazil	27	30	30	30	32	35	33	**31.0**	..	0.747
Hungary	30	38	34	31	28	28	30	**31.3**	56	0.817
Dominican Rep.	27	35	38	32	30	30	30	**31.7**	66	0.729
Mali	43	52	24	24	30	27	26	**32.3**	22	0.38
Cape Verde	34	32	32	32	32	33	32	**32.4**	77	0.688
Hong Kong	30	30	30	41	..	..	..	**32.8**	..	0.872
Argentina	29	29	31	31	36	41	41	**34.0**	81	0.837
Mongolia	40	41	34	34	34	30	29	**34.6**	88	0.628
Venezuela	30	49	31	32	33	33	34	**34.6**	..	0.77
Surinam	43	45	31	31	31	31	31	**34.7**	67	0.766
Madagascar	45	44	32	32	32	32	32	**35.6**	..	0.483
Thailand	54	49	31	34	31	30	30	**37.0**	62	0.745
Tonga	35	37	35	41	39	39	36	**37.4**	..	..
Ecuador	23	41	38	40	40	40	44	**38.0**	..	0.722
Burkina Faso	40	37	37	37	39	39	40	**38.4**	45	0.303
Sao Tome & Principe	52	34	48	48	30	30	27	**38.4**	65	0.547
Macedonia	..	34	36	33	44	42	42	**38.5**	73	0.763
Senegal	56	48	31	37	33	33	33	**38.7**	39	0.416
Bulgaria	43	39	46	44	36	39	30	**39.6**	68	0.772
Comoros	44	46	35	38	38	38	40	**39.9**	20	0.51
Antigua & Barbuda	28	35	35	46	46	46	46	**40.3**	64	0.833

Philippines	55	46	46	46	30	30	30	**40.4**	79	0.744
India	38	49	48	40	37	37	42	**41.6**	60	0.563
Malawi	41	43	36	38	40	42	52	**41.7**	92	0.385
Slovakia	47	55	41	49	47	30	30	**42.7**	84	0.825
Vanuatu	45	54	42	42	42	42	44	**44.4**	75	0.623
El Salvador	41	32	41	53	53	53	40	**44.7**	89	0.696

Partly Free (Second Tier) 46-60

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Average	VT	HDI
Nicaragua	56	53	44	44	40	40	40	**45.3**	77	0.631
Uganda	84	38	38	38	40	40	40	**45.4**	59	0.409
Honduras	55	45	34	47	47	48	48	**46.3**	73	0.653
Romania	55	50	49	47	39	44	44	**46.9**	76	0.77
Ukraine	44	42	39	49	49	50	60	**47.6**	70	0.744
Mozambique	61	54	36	50	48	48	48	**49.3**	80	0.341
Paraguay	41	56	52	52	52	47	51	**50.1**	80	0.736
Seychelles	44	57	50	50	50	50	50	**50.1**	87	0.786
Tanzania	60	49	49	49	48	51	49	**50.7**	77	0.415
Kuwait	67	70	42	44	44	45	48	**51.4**	80	0.836
Morocco	59	53	48	51	51	51	49	**51.7**	58	0.589
Sri Lanka	43	41	46	54	50	58	70	**51.7**	76	0.733
Gabon	58	52	49	50	50	52	55	**52.3**	..	0.592
Guinea-Bissau	48	50	49	57	57	57	56	**53.4**	80	0.331
Jordan	52	48	45	48	60	65	57	**53.6**	47	0.721
Mexico	60	54	52	52	54	54	50	**53.7**	57	0.784
Russia	40	55	58	53	53	59	60	**54.0**	62	0.771
Lebanon	46	56	46	46	62	62	61	**54.1**	44	0.735
Moldova	41	47	62	57	58	56	58	**54.1**	72	0.7
Colombia	49	48	54	55	55	60	59	**54.3**	45	0.764
Bangladesh	52	49	49	57	57	59	60	**54.7**	74	0.461
Lesotho	47	52	55	58	58	59	56	**55.0**	74	0.569
Armenia	52	57	56	56	56	56	57	**55.7**	52	0.721
Nepal	53	54	52	56	59	59	59	**56.0**	66	0.474
Guatemala	59	60	56	56	59	60	54	**57.7**	54	0.619
Fiji	55	56	57	60	60	59	58	**57.9**	75	0.769
Kyrgyzstan	49	52	60	61	64	64	61	**58.7**	61	0.706
Zimbabwe	48	59	56	57	61	64	67	**58.9**	57	0.555
Pakistan	58	59	60	54	58	60	64	**59.0**	35	0.522
Zambia	50	61	60	61	60	62	62	**59.4**	40	0.42
Gambia	24	63	62	65	65	70	70	**59.9**	69	0.396
Djibouti	71	58	52	52	62	62	63	**60.0**	57	0.447
Peru	58	57	60	56	59	63	67	**60.0**	63	0.737

Not Free (First Tier) 61-75

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Average	VT	HDI
Croatia	56	56	58	63	63	63	63	**60.3**	..	0.795
Georgia	73	70	68	55	56	57	47	**60.9**	68	0.762
Cambodia	50	60	65	65	65	62	61	**61.1**	..	0.512
Ghana	63	62	62	59	60	61	61	**61.1**	65	0.556
Qatar	64	64	62	53	62	62	62	**61.3**	..	0.819
Haiti	87	51	59	59	59	58	58	**61.6**	31	0.44
Niger	61	61	54	63	63	68	62	**61.7**	..	0.293
Congo	59	53	52	45	72	75	77	**61.9**	..	0.43

(Brazzaville)										
Albania	53	67	71	75	56	56	56	**62.0**	73	0.713
Kenya	60	52	62	59	63	70	70	**62.3**	65	0.508
Ethiopia	73	59	57	62	62	64	62	**62.7**	85	0.309
Malaysia	58	64	61	61	61	66	70	**63.0**	..	0.772
Kazakhstan	60	61	62	64	66	68	68	**64.1**	63	0.754
Singapore	60	65	61	66	66	66	66	**64.3**	41	0.881
Bahrain	60	57	60	66	66	69	75	**64.7**	..	0.82
Central African Rep.	80	65	65	65	60	60	60	**65.0**	..	0.371
Yemen	55	63	68	68	68	68	68	**65.4**	61	0.448
Indonesia	58	71	74	77	77	53	49	**65.6**	93	0.67
Laos	70	68	62	62	66	66	66	**65.7**	99	0.484
Maldives	68	62	68	65	66	66	65	**65.7**	74	0.725
Guinea	63	66	61	63	69	71	71	**66.3**	62	0.394
Turkey	59	73	74	65	69	69	58	**66.7**	87	0.732
Bosnia & Herzegovina	70	72	76	71	74	56	56	**67.9**	..	..
Bhutan	66	62	62	65	65	80	76	**68.0**	..	0.483
Palestine	..	94	58	63	65	65	65	**68.3**	..	..
Tunisia	59	64	70	70	74	74	74	**69.3**	92	0.703
Oman	68	69	62	67	75	75	71	**69.6**	..	0.73
Eritrea	80	68	68	68	69	68	68	**69.9**	..	0.408
Vietnam	71	68	68	69	71	71	75	**70.4**	100	0.671
Cote d'Ivoire	61	63	74	74	74	74	74	**70.6**	71	0.42
Mauritania	68	77	71	71	71	71	67	**70.9**	39	0.451
Rwanda	63	..	74	74	71	72	72	**71.0**	..	0.382
Liberia	80	71	70	70	70	70	67	**71.1**	..	..
Azerbaijan	70	69	69	74	74	73	70	**71.3**	86	0.722
Brunei Darussalam	66	73	74	74	74	74	74	72.7	..	0.848
Swaziland	72	73	69	69	75	75	77	**72.9**	..	0.655
Nigeria	57	69	92	93	93	55	53	**73.1**	41	0.439
Togo	85	67	70	70	73	73	74	**73.1**	..	0.471
Angola	74	68	69	74	74	74	80	**73.3**	91	0.405
Egypt	75	81	80	70	69	69	69	**73.3**	48	0.623
Chad	87	72	72	72	70	75	72	**74.3**	49	0.367
Syria	75	75	75	75	74	74	73	**74.4**	82	0.66

Not Free (Second Tier) 76-100

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Average	VT	HDI
Cameroon	79	78	72	72	77	77	77	**76.0**	76	0.528
United Arab Emirates	75	77	76	76	76	76	76	**76.0**	..	0.81
Belarus	66	67	70	85	90	80	80	**76.9**	..	0.781
Equatorial Guinea	76	74	78	78	78	78	78	77.1	95	0.555
Saudi Arabia	71	76	62	80	80	85	90	77.7	..	0.747
Iran	81	83	80	80	78	76	68	**78.0**	83	0.709
Sierra Leone	81	72	75	75	80	80	85	**78.3**	50	0.252
Uzbekistan	85	79	75	76	76	79	83	**79.0**	93	0.686
Yugoslavia (FR)	86	87	77	75	75	81	81	**80.3**	..	..
China	89	83	83	83	81	81	80	**82.9**	..	0.706
Sudan	88	76	80	85	85	85	85	**83.4**	55	0.477

Turkmenistan	89	84	84	84	84	85	86	**85.1**	99	0.704
Burundi	88	88	85	85	85	83	83	**85.3**	91	0.321
Somalia	..	..	79	86	86	88	88	**85.4**	..	..
Congo (Kinshasa)	88	85	84	84	84	90	90	**86.4**	..	0.507
Libya	87	85	89	90	90	92	90	**89.0**	..	0.76
Algeria	83	99	99	99	97	83	83	**91.9**	66	0.683
Cuba	96	90	90	95	95	94	94	**93.4**	98	0.783
Tajikistan	93	93	96	95	94	94	94	**94.1**	..	0.663
Afghanistan	..	90	90	100	100	100	90	**95.0**	..	..
Korea, North	90	92	100	100	100	100	100	**97.4**	..	..
Myanmar	90	99	99	99	99	97	100	**97.6**	..	0.585
Iraq	99	100	100	100	100	98	98	**99.3**	94	0.583
Total	8625	8717	8579	8917	8744	8775	8721			
Count	188	190	192	191	191	191	186			
Average	45.87	45.88	44.68	46.16	45.78	45.94	46.89			

Sources: Freedom House, and Human Development Report 2000

Table 2
Correlation of Press Freedom Indicators (PFI) average for 1994-2000 with Voter Turnout (VT) at last elections, and with Human Development Index (HDI) 1998

Country Group	PFI and VT	PFI and HDI	VT and HDI
	Pearson *r* and *p* value		
Free (First Tier)	-0.257 p= .34	-0.307 p= .25	0.234 p= .38
Free (First and Second Tiers)	0.056 p= .69	-0.492 ***p= .00***	0.017 p= .91
Partly Free (First Tier)	0.17 p= .43	-0.151 p= .44	0.453 ***p= .03***
Partly Free (First and Second Tiers)	-0.103 p= .45	-0.175 p= .18	0.251 p= .06
Not Free (First Tier)	0.045 p= .83	-0.125 p= .45	0.183 p= .39
Not Free (First and Second Tiers)	0.302 p= .08	0.066 p= .62	0.267 p= .12
All countries	-0.018 p= .83	-0.531 ***p= .00***	0.227 ***p= .01***

Figure 1

South Asia: Press Freedom 1994-2000

Free 0-30; partly free 31-60; not free 61-100 (Source: Freedom House)



Figure 2

Southeast Asia: Press Freedom 1994-2000

Free 0-30; partly free 31-60; not free 61-100 (Source: Freedom House)



Figure 3

East Asia: Press Freedom 1994-2000

Free 0-30; partly free 31-60; not free 61-100 (Source: Freedom House)



Criss-Crossing Perspectives: Assessing Press Freedom and Press Responsibility in Germany and the United States

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ABSTRACT: This paper presents views of two media scholars--one from Germany, one from the United States--on press freedom and press responsibility. The goal was to make an assessment of their own press systems but also to attempt to learn from the other. The German perspective argues for more press freedom in Germany; the North American perspective maintains the need for more press responsibility in the United States. Authors conclude that insights about one's own press system can be gained from considering factors in other systems.

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Criss-Crossing Perspectives: Assessing Press Freedom and Press Responsibility in Germany and the United States

Introduction

This paper presents views of two media scholars--one from Germany and the other from the United States--on the issue of press freedom and press responsibility. The goal of both was to make an assessment of their own press systems but also to attempt to learn from the other.

Part I imparts a German perspective on press freedom and press responsibility in the Federal Republic of Germany with particular focus on the German Press Council. Part II deals with the same issues in the United States from a U.S. perspective. The last two parts turn the tables. Part III presents a rejoinder to Part II from a German perspective, while Part IV assesses Part I from a U.S. perspective.

In general, the German perspective argues for more press freedom in Germany, while the North American perspective maintains the need for more press responsibility in the United States.

PART I
A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE
ON PRESS FREEDOM AND PRESS RESPONSIBILITY IN GERMANY

In the Federal Republic of Germany, a series of legislatively designed institutions of media control exists to strengthen the social responsibility of journalists, necessarily reducing somewhat the freedom of expression guaranteed in Article 5 of the Basic Law. For example, a "Bundesprüfstelle" (federal testing office) prohibits the circulation of child-endangering writings. And both the public/official and the private/commercial broadcaster are being societally supervised through legally prescribed committees (broadcast councils, state media institutions). The strongest content restrictions of media freedom that the German Law knows are statutory offenses such as propaganda for anti-constitutional organizations, public call to resistance against the state authority, denigration of authorities and symbols of the state or the public denial of the National Socialist genocide of European Jews. Satirical expression of opinion are exempt.

In a liberal constitutional state, these legal precautions must remain largely formal. That applies particularly to Germany, whose democratic tradition is comparatively weak and which had the fatal experience of nearly total state control over journalism in the entire country from 1933-45 as well as from 1949-89 in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). For good reasons, for example, an indexing of daily newspapers or political periodicals is not possible through the "Bundesprüfstelle." The German constitution gives media freedom the highest status, placing it at a frontal position in the catalog of inviolable basic rights (Art. 5, BL). And from the

beginning, the federal constitutional court has valued this right extraordinarily highly in balancing it with competing rights such as protection of the individual because of the fundamental importance of a free public discussion for democracy. Some legally trained observers are, however, concerned that the value of media freedom in German law in the 50 years since the foundation of the Federal Republic, above all in balance with the protection of the individual, has fallen. (Schweizer, 1996).

Between the necessary restraint of the state concerning media control on the one hand and the widening cultural demand for social responsibility in journalism on the other hand, a regulatory loophole develops in liberal democracies. It becomes still wider through commercial interest in extensive use of media freedom. This gaping void explains why, in Germany as in other western countries, unofficial institutions have developed that make an effort to remind journalists of their social responsibility and to oblige them to compliance with their professional ethics. There is a distinction to be made between institutions of voluntary self-control (press councils) and public/consumer organizations. One can also mention here critical media journalism, that is, media criticism of media performance that, however, is institutional to a lesser extent.

Self-control as exemplified by the German Press Council

Where media -- traditionally like the press or since the mid-1980s like commercial broadcasting -- function as private enterprises, institutions of voluntary self-control have been called to life. They are supposed to forestall criticism of the media by strengthening professionalism and social responsibility among journalists, artists, advertisers and other public professions.

Press and film have been organized from the beginning as private enterprise in the Federal Republic of Germany. Next to the Voluntary Self-control of the Film Enterprise (FSK), the German Press Council is the oldest and most well-known institution of media self-control that is, above all, important for the journalistic profession. Later institutions (German Ad Council, Voluntary Self-Control Television [FSF/VPRT]) oriented themselves on the model of press self-control.

Duties and Goals

At its foundation, four duties were placed upon the German Press Council (www.presserat.de). Externally, it was supposed to

1. defend the constitutionally guaranteed press freedom against official intervention and actual limitation and secure the unhindered access to news sources, as well as

2. represent the interests of the press against politics and in public, particularly regarding pertinent legal issues.

Internally, the Press Council was supposed to

3. ascertain and redress abuses in the press and journalism as well as

4. critically observe the development of press structures and work against the formation of monopolies threatening variety in the press.

According to statutes of the sponsoring association--which were adopted three decades after its founding--the Press Council should

1. ascertain abuses in the press and work towards their remedy,

2. review complaints about individual newspapers, magazines or news services and adopt . . . notices of censure and reprimands in justified cases,

3. give recommendations and guidelines for journalistic work,

4. stand up for unhindered access to news sources,

5. take steps in agreement with the supporting organizations against developments that could endanger the free information and formation of opinion of citizens (*Jahrbuch 1987*, 1988).

From the beginning, the decisive goal of the Press Council was to protect the freedom and respect of the press externally, while internal abuses or failings are avoided or at least reduced.

Origin and Development

The German Press Council was founded Nov. 20, 1956, by representatives of newspaper publishers and newspaper reporters. The triggering moment was the March 1952 draft of the Adenauer government for a federal press law that intended a supervision of newspapers through "Landespresseausschüsse" (state press committees). The German Journalists' Association (DJV) and the Federal Association of German Newspaper Publishers (BDZV) were in agreement that a certain self-regulation was necessary to ward off state control. Two other groups later joined the newspaper publishers and editors. They were the Association of German Magazine Publishers (VDZ) on the business side and the German Journalists' Union in the industrial trade union IG Print and Paper (today the Industrial Trade Union for the Media [IG Medien]--Journalism Section). In 1959 an agenda was agreed upon that, in the main, still applies today. In these early years, Press Council activities took place primarily in the public arena. It successfully promoted standardization of the press law of the federal states and the protection of press freedom in the emergency legislation of June 24, 1968.

Over the course of time, however, interest shifted to internal, or professional concerns. In 1970, a special commission was created for the handling of complaints against the press. Two years later this effort grew into a Complaints Committee with its own procedural order. In 1973 the Press Council published its "Publicistic Principles" as guidelines for the actions of journalists. Since then the Press Code has been expanded as experience and need demanded and has been supplemented with the "Guidelines for Publishers and Journalists." In 1976, the

Bundestag (Lower House of the German Parliament) passed a law that the independence of the Complaints Committee should be protected through the allocation of public funds. At this time, the work of the Press Council became increasingly overshadowed by internal conflicts between sponsoring organizations, half of which represent employee interests and the other half employer interests.

When Alfred Neven-Dumont, who was president of the sponsoring organization "Federal Association of German Newspaper Publishers" (BDZV), refused to publish a reprimand issued by the Complaints Committee in his Cologne *Express* in 1981, thereby openly coming into conflict with Principle 16 of the Press Code, representatives of both organizations terminated their council work and suspended their mandate. The Press Council remained unable to function for four years until it was possible in 1985 to reach a consensus over the reform of the statutes and complaints procedure and to oblige publishers to publish reprimands. At the same time, it was decided to interpose a "Sponsoring Association of the German Press Council" in order to build more independence of press self-control from the four sponsoring organizations and their conflicts. The organizational and financial responsibilities passed over to this sponsoring association. Since the successful reanimation in 1985, the complaints work of the Press Council has taken place continuously. Presently the Complaints Committee meets five times a year. In addition, the Press Council takes positions on flagrant journalistic shortcomings--such as the television interviews with the gangsters during the Gladbeck hostage drama of 1988. Thus, in 1999 it repeatedly criticized a proposed extension of data protection that would limit journalistic work.

The Press Council continuously reports about its activities in yearbooks edited by the sponsoring association that in recent years have been circulated widely. Complaints are summarized, though only as anonymous sketches of complaint content, decision and the reasons for the decision.

Sponsors and Committees

The four sponsoring organizations (DJV, IG Medien, BDZV, VDZ) have as their purposes to support both press freedom in the Federal Republic of Germany and a positive image for the German press. Each sponsoring organization sends five representatives to the Plenum of the Press Council, half of whose 20 honorary members are active in publishing while the other half are active in journalism. From among its members, the Plenum chooses the speaker and the deputy speaker of the Press Council; the office of the speaker changes annually. Furthermore, the Plenum selects from its membership 10 members of the Complaints Committee, half of whom work primarily in publishing and the other half primarily in journalism. In the interest of the continuity of the complaints work, the chair of the Complaints Committee can serve for an unlimited period of time in that office (currently, Manfred Protze). The German Press Council,

as a nationally relevant institution, maintains its business office in the old federal capital of Bonn. There the full-time director (currently, attorney Lutz Tillmanns) with a staff of five is responsible for public information efforts and administrative details. The annual budget of the German Press Council presently amounts to about 450,000 DM (about $200,000 US). About 40 percent of the funds come from public resources and 60 percent from the four sponsoring organizations.

Principles of Conduct for Journalists

The German Press Council adheres closely to a Press Code in resolving disputes. The code, originally adopted in 1973 and revised in 1997, has been formulated to embody the professional ethics of the press. Sixteen principles make up the code, dealing with such issues as accuracy, privacy, confidentiality and human rights. (See Appendix A for the Council's 16 Principles of Conduct for Journalists.)

The 16 Principles are supplemented by 36 guidelines, of which alone 18 pertain to Principles 2, 8 and 11, while Principles 9 and 10 are not made concrete through guidelines. To give an example, Guideline 12.1 reads, "When reporting on crimes, the suspect's or perpetrator's religious, ethnic or other minority membership will only be mentioned if this information is directly relevant to the event. It must be particularly born in mind that any such mention could awaken prejudices against groups in need of protection." Such specific examples are necessary so that the complaints committee can determine the justification of complaints. Several guidelines refer to the duty of journalists to "careful assessment of the considerations and property and interests" (e.g., Guideline 5.1 "Confidentiality").

To journalistic professional ethics, whose importance the preamble of the German Press Code stresses, belongs especially the consideration between the demands of quality, which arise out of the professional duty to the independent production of public opinion, and the prohibitions of the universal morality (Pöttker, 1999). In the pragmatically realized Press Code, professional and universal standards of journalistic conduct become confused without a clear structural concept. And on top of that, contributing to the confusion in this single, comprehensive codification of journalistic professional ethics in Germany is the fact that the reporting of catastrophes, crime and medical topics are expressly considered while other, not-less-ethically-sensitive subject areas such as war, economic or travel reporting remain unmentioned.

Complaints Procedures and Activity

Anyone can lodge a complaint to the Press Council provides, and the council itself can initiate a proceeding. Complaints must be written. The accused publication may address the complaint before it goes to the council's Complaints Committee. Council deliberations are conducted in private. Where findings are found in favor of the complainant, offending

publications are expected to publish the results. (See Appendix B for Complaint Procedures of the German Press Council.)

As reported in the *Schwarz-Weiss Buch* (1996), the German Press Council decided 823 complaints cases between 1985-95. Of these, 578 occurred from 1990-95. The 575 cases decided during this period were distributed as follows:

Year	No. of Cases	%
1990	105	18.3
1991	102	17.7
1992	60	10.4
1993	99	17.2
1994	102	17.7
1995	107	18.6
Totals	575	99.9

During this time period, little fluctuation took place in the number of cases coming to the Press Council.

The decisions in the 575 cases were distributed as follows:

Disposition	No. of Cases	%
Unfounded	248	43.1
Justified--no steps taken	37	6.4
Justified with advice notice	96	16.7
Justified with notice of censure	104	18.1
Justified with no public reprimand	23	4.0
Justified with public reprimand	67	11.7
Total	575	100.0

There is also no discernible trend in the individual decision categories. Nearly 50 percent (43.1) of the complaints were deemed to be unfounded, that is, without merit.

An examination of the decisions in terms of the 16 principles of the Press Code from 1990-95 reveals this distribution of the cases:

Principles (See Appendix A for the 16 Principles of Conduct)	%
1. duty to the truth, human rights	5.9
2. accuracy	24.9
3. duty to corrections	2.0
4. prohibition of dishonest/dubious information gathering	2.6
5. confidentiality requirement	0.4
6. protection of sources	0.3
7. editorial independence	3.6
8. privacy of the individual	18.3
9. prohibition of unsubstantiated accusations	8.6
10. protection of moral/religious views	3.5
11. refraining from sensationalism	3.0
12. prohibition of discrimination	16.0
13. prohibition against pre-judgment in ongoing legal cases	7.4
14. refraining from sensationalism in medical reporting	1.7
15. integrity	0.1
16. publish reprimand	0.
No reference to Press Code	1.7

Clearly, three issues--accuracy (Principle 2) privacy (Principle 8) and discrimination (Principle 12)--comprise well over half (59.2%) of the total number of complaints. German journalists, on the other hand, are seldom accused of a violation of specific professional norms such as protecting informants (Principle 6) or integrity in the selection of information (Principal 15). Presumably, this has less to do with these job-specific norms being adhered to as far as possible and more with the fact that these norms are little known and their functional sense is little understood in the political culture of Germany, in which the journalistic profession has all along enjoyed no high esteem. In addition, that the portion of cases handled involving Principle 7 (division of reporting and advertising) amounted to only 3.6 percent in the period from 1990-95 as compared to 10.4 percent from 1985-89 can hardly be explained by the assumption that journalists in recent years have adhered more strongly to the distinction between reporting and advertising. The reverse would seem to be the case. That is, the decline of complaints involving reporting and advertising may be explained by a diminishing sensibility of journalists toward the public. (*Schwarz-Weiss Buch*, 1990; *Schwarz-Weiss Buch*, 1996).

That the Press Council does not always demand the publication of reprimands has less to do with a diminishing severity of the relevant violations of professional ethics and social

responsibility as with the apprehension of the Complaints Committee that, with publication, the negative consequences of the breach of the norm, such as with an injury to the personal sphere of the represented person, could repeatedly occur. Although most newspapers and magazines have obliged themselves to reprinting reprimands through their associations according to Principal 16 of the Press Code, it occasionally happens that public reprimands are not published by the publication concerned. Such a refusal--moreover involving the chair of the German Newspaper Publishers' Association--led in 1981 to the complaints work of the council having to be suspended for four years because of conflicts between the sponsoring organizations of publishers on the one side and of journalists on the other.

Press Council Outreach

While public reprimands of the relevant newspapers and magazines are being published as a rule, their general announcement still leaves something to be desired. They are being published primarily by the association publications of the sponsoring organizations. At the same time, detailed information about the discussions and decisions of voluntary self-control would be important to a broader, non-professional public in order to oblige the professional behavior of journalists to its social responsibility.

There are certain efforts from the Press Council to make itself and its work better known. A consulting position for public relations has been set up in the management of the Press Council. In addition, the Press Council has recently begun financing projects intended to gain more public credibility and with it more influence for its media-political positions and activities--above all, the defense of press freedom under the sponsoring organizations. In November 1999 this selective public relations work showed its first success: at a carefully prepared press conference in Berlin, the director of the Press Council had expressed concern that a new data protection law conceptualized by the federal interior minister would unduly restrict press freedom. The interior minister modified the bill in a way that it would no longer force media companies to comply with outside requirements. Instead, it would provide for self-appointed data protection representatives from among the publishers and broadcasters. That data protection in media companies thus remains a matter of voluntary self-control is, as far as that goes, a success of the public information efforts of the Press Council since news from the press conference for once actually found its way onto the front pages of the greater-regional German daily newspapers.

Compared with media-political activities, the Press Council makes little effort to bring before the public its complaints work aimed to promote socially responsible journalism. Up to now, the council has not been successful in publishing a regular news service in order to educate the public continuously and concretely about serious, standing complaints cases as well as decisions of general interest and the reasons for those decisions. It limits itself to what is the

most necessary according to the complaints procedure, namely frugal reports about issued public reprimands directed to interested (trade) publications and persons who might be involved. The costs of a continuous news service that could make the likewise continuous complaints work more transparent would only amount to a fraction (5 percent at the most) of the total budget of the Press Council. The limited interest among the sponsoring organizations in the transparency of the occasionally contentious complaints work concretely manifests itself in the exclusion of the public from complaints proceedings. On that score, the voluntary self-control of journalism, in which a kind of class jurisdiction of this public profession is not seldom seen, remains far behind even the regular jurisdiction in Germany.

Critique

The main shortcoming of voluntary self-control of journalism is seen almost unanimously as a lack of effectiveness of the complaints work. Because it time and again comes to obvious, sometimes crass failings of journalism, above all in the general moral sense, the Press Code and voluntary self-control of journalism are made out to be virtually ineffective in the eyes of the general public, but also in the (more or less scientific) trade literature. The metaphor of the Press Council as a "toothless tiger" suggests that the origin of this ineffectiveness is to be sought in the too-limited sanction possibilities of the Press Council. Thus, voluntary self-control is being compared with the law and its institutionalized sanction apparatus.

However, no one claims an ineffectiveness of the law only because it constantly deals with offenses against the norms of the penal code. The occurrence of crime does not make criminal law superfluous. In order to verify its effectiveness or ineffectiveness, one would have to know how much and what crime there would be without laws and courts. This naturally cannot be known. Similarly, ineffectiveness of voluntary self-control of journalism through the German Press Council can only be established through a comparison with the extent of the journalistic failings that would ensue without Press Code and complaints proceedings. Since this comparison is also impossible, the assertion of the ineffectiveness of voluntary self-control through the German Press Council cannot be fundamentally substantiated.

Further, the analogy between law and voluntary self-control appears misleading because from its beginning the Press Council was less concerned with sanctions as with preventing state control by avoiding spectacular failings of journalism. Thus viewed, voluntary self-control is a preventative measure against censure as the toughest sanction that can hit journalism from the outside. In this mechanism lies voluntary self-control's chance for effectiveness – a chance that is based on fear of sanction only in a mediated sense, but that is immediately based on the insight of publishers and journalists into the ominous consequences for the media business and for journalism should voluntary self-control fail.

Strengthening this insight will require optimal transparency of the functional mechanism of voluntary self-control as well as of the socio-economic structures in which it is embedded. Thus viewed, the reason voluntary self-control of journalism appears little effective is not a lack of sanction authority, but the lack of transparency and publicity of the complaints work – as far as the thesis of a lack of effectiveness applies at all.

That the public relations work of the Press Council, at least what concerns the complaints, is so cautious may not be allowed to rest last on the strong influence of the four sponsoring organizations. These sponsoring associations confront each other--occasionally also in the Complaints Committee--as representatives of employer and employee interests. The goal of not allowing the resulting conflicts to become public may be a motive for the restrained public relations work of the German Press Council concerning its complaints activities. In order to be able to ease dependence on the sponsoring organizations and intensify the public relations work, an expansion of the sponsorship in the direction of social participation stands to reason. Why not, according to British, Swedish, Swiss or American role models, also include independent representatives of the extra-professional public, lawyers or scientists, for instance, as well as representatives of other relevant groups, say, of churches or cultural associations, on the committees of the Press Council? A broader member base would certainly raise the recognition value of the Press Council and Press Code as well as relieve the complaints work of otherwise motivated disputes between the professional associations that still today bear the weight of voluntary self-control of journalism in Germany alone.

PART II

A U.S. PERSPECTIVE

ON PRESS FREEDOM AND PRESS RESPONSIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Though speaking of Russia, Winston Churchill easily could have been talking about the relationship between press freedom and social responsibility in the United States when he said, "It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."

The key to this mystery--which existed long before Churchill and which defies a definitive resolution--involves the balance between a press that is free and a press that is socially responsible. While it may be difficult to agree on definitions of freedom and responsibility, the real question becomes: What is the appropriate balance between press freedom and social responsibility?

Nearly as important as this question are related questions: Who is entitled to press freedom? How is press freedom attained? maintained? preserved? What constitutes social responsibility? If press freedom and social responsibility are related--which is the argument of this article--to whom is the press socially responsible? For what is the press responsible? How can the press be responsible? Can the press be forced to be responsible?

Doubtless there are other questions. The purpose here is not to identify all of the potentially perplexing issues associated with press freedom and social responsibility. Nor is it to provide all the answers. Instead, the intent is more modest: to explore the coexistence of the concepts of press freedom and social responsibility in the United States with emphasis on contemporary events but with some reference to historical origin. Several methods to enforce social responsibility without damaging press freedom will be explored. These efforts have included press councils, codes of ethics, ombudsmen and, more recently, public (or civic) journalism. Such efforts, as will be shown, have met with limited success.

Context

Champions of press freedom often stake out extreme positions. They take an absolutist view, quoting the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (adopted 1791): "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ." Complete autonomy, the position holds, rests in the hands of the press.

The same extreme stance often characterizes the position of those who advocate that the press be more socially responsible. They argue the First Amendment really means that the first allegiance is to profit taking, that commercial engines drive the press, determine content and lead toward monopolization. As press critic A. J. Liebling commented, "Freedom of the press is for those who own one."

In some ways, it is easier to argue one of these extreme positions. A middle ground risks being characterized as indecisive. But freedom and responsibility are inseparable. They are dueling concepts which bring into play the most fundamental of human and social relationships, that is, the relationship of the individual to society. That is the core issue that the U. S. press--and other institutions, for that matter, since historical and cultural factors are at work--has been struggling with for many years.

Communication scholars in the U.S. generally agree that the U.S. press operated for nearly 250 years according to libertarian principles. These principles, as elaborated in a now-classic though dated treatise by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, upheld the supremacy of the individual and saw the press not only as "a partner in the search for truth" (1956, p. 3) but as a check on government.

Siebert, Peterson and Schramm actually developed their propositions from a long-neglected and controversial report issued almost a decade earlier, *A Free and Responsible Press* (Leigh, 1947), known also as the Hutchins Report, after its chairman, Robert M. Hutchins, then chancellor of the University of Chicago. As with vintage wine, age has smiled upon this report. It has become increasingly influential. The early neglect and controversy emanated from the fact that the report was drawn up by prominent intellectuals and scholars without press

representation. The irony is that the report was financed by Henry R. Luce of the Time magazine empire.

Influenced by events leading up to and through the Second World War, the Hutchins Report recognized the important role of the press in a democracy, arguing that "the relative power of the press carries with it relatively great obligations" (1947, p. vii). The most enduring part of the report came in the form of five requirements for a free society. These are (Leigh, 1947, pp. 20-29):

1. a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning;
2. a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism;
3. the projection of a representative picture of the constituent groups in the society;
4. the presentation and clarification of the goals and values of the society; and
5. full access to the day's intelligence.

Unrealistic? Unachievable? Impractical? Utopian? Idealistic? Visionary? Yes, all these, and probably more. The value of the requirements lies not in their attainment but in their pursuit. As noted by Oscar Wilde, "Progress is the realization of utopias."

In assessing performance, the Hutchins Report found the U.S. press lacking. The report called on the press to be more accountable. It suggested this could be achieved in a variety of ways with emphasis on self-regulation (as opposed to government intervention). It cited the need for more professionalization, improved journalism education and the establishment of centers of advanced study and research. In many respects, professional associations and academic institutions have responded positively to the challenges posed in the report. To cite a few examples: establishment of accreditation standards for journalism education (see Web site of the Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass Communications at http://www.ukans.edu/~acejmc/) and sponsorship of training and research programs by such groups as the American Press Institute (http://www.newspaper.org/), the Poynter Institute (http://www.poynter.org/index.htm) and the Freedom Forum (http://www.freedomforum.org/).

But are these responses enough? In a way, the answer lies in the press' reaction to the Commission's recommendation to establish "a new and independent agency to appraise and report annually upon the performance of the press" (Leigh, 1947, p. 100). This antipathy--even hostility--to systematic and formal criticism has always been the Achilles heel of the U.S. press. This is the flash point at which the free press clashes with social responsibility. And it is the reason the U.S. press falls far short and always will of meeting the Hutchins Commission's ideals of press requirements for a free society.

Engaging Social Responsibility

An agency to assess press performance in the U.S. did endure a short life a few years ago. Its tombstone stands as one of several attempts to conjoin freedom and responsibility.

Designed to promote fair and accurate reporting and to promote press freedom, the National News Council (formally known as the Council on Press Responsibility and Press Freedom) came into being in 1973 (Klaidman and Beauchamp, 1987). Its purpose was to examine complaints about performance of national news media. The Council's survival depended on private funding and cooperation from national news media. Both proved to be insufficient. The news media which depend on sources for information often did want to provide it about themselves. This included such major media as the New York Times, Chicago Tribune and NBC. Through its 11-year struggle, (it was dissolved in 1984), the Council produced a modest record of accomplishment. It issued decisions in 242 complaints that came to it. Most--120--upheld the news media, while only a third--82--were found warranted in whole or in part. The Council dismissed 37 complaints, and three were withdrawn by complainants.

In retrospect, a national press council was probably a bad idea for the United States. The nation, unlike, say, Great Britain, is too diverse and too large for such a council to be effective. More successful have been several community and state press councils. The Minnesota News Council, founded in 1971, has been highly successful. (For information about the Minnesota News Council, see http://www.mtn.org/~newscncl/.)

A longer tradition in the attempt to promote responsible performance through self-regulation has been the adoption of codes of ethics (Smith, 1999). The first such code by a professional association was drawn up in 1922 by the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Originally, it was called Canons of Journalism but in 1975 was revised and renamed Statement of Principles (see http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm). These days most professional associations (for example, Society of Professional Journalists, Associated Press Managing Editors, Radio-Television News Directors) as well as individual media organizations have adopted such codes. The codes perhaps are the most significant and widespread of efforts of the press to regulate itself. While serving a useful purpose by articulating goals and standards of performance, the codes have a major weakness: Except in cases where a specific organization can discipline its own employees, there is no means of enforcing professional association standards. Thus, codes of professional ethics remain largely empty rhetoric.

Another enduring yet limited endeavor by the U.S. press to affirm responsible performance has been the concept of the ombudsman. Sweden pioneered this concept nearly two centuries ago. It calls for establishment of an office that represents individuals in dealing with an organization whether it be government, a university or, for that matter, a news organization. In the United States, the *Louisville* (Kentucky) *Courier-Journal* was the first newspaper to establish an ombudsman position. That occurred in 1967. Over the years the concept has never approached a full-blown movement. The number of news ombudsmen in the U.S., as reflected in membership of the Organization of News Ombudsmen, founded in 1980, has hovered in

recent years around 40. Overall, the organization currently has approximately 70 active and associate members which includes about a dozen ombudsmen from other countries. (See the organization's Web site at http://www5.infi.net/ono/.) Despite criticisms of being primarily an extension of the public relations efforts of a news organization, ombudsmen have demonstrated some success in helping media be more responsive and responsible to the public (Starck and Eisele, 1999).

The last effort that will be discussed here to promote socially responsible performance on the part of the media is also the latest attempt. It is called public (or civic) journalism. Though still vague in its conceptualization and highly controversial, public journalism has emerged into something of a mini-movement. (Hodges, 1996). It was spawned by The Pew Center for Civic Journalism (http://www.pewcenter.org/index.php3). It calls on the press to take an aggressively active stance in engaging the audience in democratic discourse. The traditional doctrines of objectivity and detachment give way to media efforts to engage the audience, even to the extent of sponsoring public discussions of pertinent issues. Critics say this results in media going beyond reporting news and creating it.

Perhaps the best philosophical justification of public journalism comes from the notion of communitarianism. A leader in the communitarian movement, Amitai Etzioni, asserts that the time has arrived in the United States to correct an imbalance between rights and responsibilities. Among the aims of communitarianism is recognition that:

> the preservation of individuality depends on the active maintenance of the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for others as well as self-respect; where we acquire a lively sense of our personal and civic responsibilities, along with an appreciation of our own rights and the rights of others; where we develop the skills of self-government as well as the habit of governing ourselves and learn to serve others--not just self (1994, pp. 253-254)

The connection between individual rights and social responsibilities seems so obvious. How could it be otherwise? And how could it be otherwise for those institutions, such as the press, which individuals collectively have created? The constant challenge is to avoid uncompromising positions and to strive for an appropriate balance between rights and responsibilities.

Finally

Public journalism, along with press councils, codes of ethics, ombudsmen, and other courses of action, such as expanded letters to the editor and opinion columns, appear to be leading the U.S. press toward more socially responsible performance. Each approach has yielded minimal to modest success.

An underlying part of this continuing search has been the moral development of a profession. Ethics have emerged as a critical component in journalistic practices (Starck, 2001).

In reality, it is difficult to think of a journalistic decision that does not involve an ethical consideration. As a result, U.S. scholars and many professionals increasingly are arguing for greater presence of ethics in the classroom and the newsroom. As several scholars argue, professional ethics requires journalists to be equipped with the ability to exercise moral reasoning in making daily on-the-job decisions (Christians, Fackler, Rotzoll and McKee, 2001).

At stake is public credibility, accountability and acceptability of the news media. Indeed, the future of democracy may be at stake. Institutionally, society has assigned news media the task of providing communication channels and information vital to self-governance. It is a moral and public responsibility the news media cannot escape. Tension between the precepts of press freedom and social responsibility is inevitable. It is desirable. The alternatives are not.

PART III

A REJOINDER TO PART II FROM A GERMANY PERSPECTIVE

Fundamental Differences Between the United States and Germany

Unlike in the United States, where the press has operated on liberal principles for 250 years, the long and deeply rooted tradition of press freedom is missing from journalism in Germany. Until the attempt at a civil-democratic revolution in the year 1848, a more or less sharp censure prevailed in the states of the German federation that was partly revived after the failure of this attempt. The worst setback for press freedom in the development of Germany was the Nationalist-Socialist regime from 1933-1945. As the Hutchins Report appeared in the United States in order to remind the press of its social responsibility, the press in the German western zones, still licensed by the victorious allied powers of the Second World War, was about to gain freedom of expression and information as guaranteed by Article 5 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. In East Germany until 1989, the media were subject to strict state guidance in the sense of a deliberate anti-liberal ideology, including direct post-publication censorship. Before that there was a phase of comprehensive, legally anchored press freedom only between 1918 and 1933, which was, of course, de facto continuously threatened by a restorative state authority. In Germany, then, journalism has enjoyed a press freedom similar to that of the United States for only the past decade.

In Germany, with its long phase of state control, the argument of social, cultural or political responsibility of journalism was notoriously abused in order to push through ideologies and special interests by means of the media. In German society, the understanding of press freedom in a democracy and of the essential principle of public opinion cannot be directly compared to similar ideas in the United States. Characteristic of this difference is that media controls, as with media ethics, can become a muzzle.

Proponents of (self-)control of journalism in Germany still tend to compare themselves with courts, hence with institutions of the law of order becoming effective through sanction and

rule rather then being understood as integrated parts of the social steering resources of public opinion that relies on the consciousness of all those involved in media communication, including that of the public. Through a strategy aimed at effectiveness through public opinion and public involvement, the beginnings of a social control of journalism can benefit from corresponding activities in the United States.

Learning from America

The delayed reaction to the Hutchins Report shows that also in the United States the relationship of public opinion and the social responsibility of journalism was not immediately apparent. The meaning of the Hutchins Report that emerged was that journalists, from a professional standpoint, must possess a sense of social responsibility which, in turn, is regulated through the public rather than through the courts. In the United States during the five decades since 1947, the question of what is good or bad, allowed or not allowed in journalism is not determined by intellectual elites but by the public. Both the evolving institution of ombudsmen and the movement for a public or civic journalism which--though not without their own critics--are shaped by the idea of media regulation as an open process in which a significant segment of the public participates.

Whereas the idea of media control can limit itself to punishment for the violation of fixed codes of conduct through press councils and judicial authorities, as in Germany, new approaches, such as ombudsmen and civic/public journalism, can inspire new models. Obviously such devices cannot simply be copied but must be adapted to local conditions. Since the phrase "public/civic journalism" merely reinforces tautologically the principle of public opinion (Is there then also a "non-public" journalism?), I will concentrate on the approach of the ombudsman.

Although the ombudsman concept stems from northern Europe and is not only practiced in the relationship of the citizens to the state but also to the media in several European countries, no press publishing company or broadcasting station active in Germany employs an ombudsman. To change this, a suitable media-political promotion would be helpful that, together with a part of the necessary means, could also assure the necessary independence of the ombudspersons.

The Free State of Bavaria, for example, today pays 1,000 DM (about $450 US) monthly to every member of the state media council, which is supposed to monitor the programs of commercial radio and television stations and whose activity takes place de facto and is largely unobserved and ineffective. Maybe this sum of 600,000 DM (about $270,000 US) annually would be more effectively spent if a group of journalism-knowledgeable ombudspersons at large Bavarian media companies were to assess regularly the activities of these stations. That such ombudspersons would work more effectively than the press council is virtually certain because their deliberations would be more easily accepted by the press and broadcast professionals and

more easily understood by the public. With this example, it is not being claimed that ombudspersons are an alternative to press councils. Ombudspersons can be established, as in the United States, as a supplement in efforts to promote responsible performance.

Perhaps the failure to have press ombudsmen in Germany is not a lack of means but mainly of knowledge and understanding of the concept. Even among German-speaking communications scholars, inadequate and false ideas about an ombudsman's role circulate. For example, one erroneous view is that the ombudsman is solely responsible for the external relationships of a media company but not for criticism of internal proceedings. That up to now no ombudspersons have been employed in Germany may also be connected to the traditional assumption that there is a fundamental contradiction between journalistic ethos and commercial considerations. It is therefore difficult for media companies to envision a more or less independent ombudsperson as an interactive connection to the public while at the same time media critics might regard the ombudsperson as just one more commercially motivated measure.

In the United States, where media goals to produce socially necessary information as well as to make a profit are not considered incompatible, at least 40 ombudspersons have been continuously active for three decades. This has occurred in spite of the lack of clear empirical evidence that ombudsmen are seen as beneficial by the media, which after all pay the ombudspersons, as well as by critical readers, who express their trust through questions and complaints. That the 40 American ombudspersons do not simply fulfill an alibi-function to the legitimizing of the media business is evident in the work of my co-author. He equates journalistic professionalism with social responsibility and, in fact, himself is an ombudsman.

Out of the modest but unmistakable success of the media ombudspersons in the United States, something can be learned in at least two ways. First, there is the chance to strengthen in journalism the sense of the general social and moral claims from the public regarding the media. Second, there is the chance to strengthen in the public the sense of the special duty of journalism, that is, the cultivation of public opinion. This special duty does not always allow itself to agree with the general morality yet belongs, in a complicated way, to the responsibility of journalists to society. To discuss journalistic responsibility to society is important in Germany where there is a traditional lack of awareness of the social function of journalism to mediate divisions in society and to permit individuals the possibility of participation in societal concerns. For this reason, the ombudsman appears to be an exemplary institution for Germany

To advise others across cultural borders what they can learn from their own experience is a risk that can be construed as arrogant. I therefore limit myself to a brief observation that, in principle, not only concerns the United States but also Germany because there is a tradition of federal diversity in both countries. Is not the effort legitimate, in such centrifugal cultures, perhaps even necessary, to strive for universally valid regulatory measures? That is, how are

press freedom and journalistic responsibility separated yet protected from one another? What criteria should journalists apply in specific instances in achieving the necessary balance between conflcting principles? It may be that journalistic duties, along with professional ethos, present themselves differently in those former colonized territories which today depend on economic development above all else to eliminate human misery and are striving to achieve the levels of development of many of today's highly complex industrial and service societies. Doubtless, the United States and Germany belong to the modern part of the world in which questions about what journalists should and may do are answered the same or at least in a similar way. Whether journalistic rules of behavior are being (or can be) followed in a country with higher professional mobility might not in the least depend on how unified and transportable these rules are. A journalist who has developed certain work routines on the basis of standards accepted in, say, Minnesota, should be able to retain and apply those principles through subsequent positions on the east or west coasts. The necessity to have to re-accustom oneself in this or similar situations on the grounds of different standards brings with it orientational uncertainty and weakens the binding force of the standards altogether.

That the German press code claims validity without competition regarding journalists in all regions and implicitly in all media is, in my opinion, a strength of the extra-legal self-regulation of journalism aimed at social responsibility in this country. That could possibly be worth considering for the movement which supports more social responsibility of journalism in the United States. In every other respect, especially in terms of public acceptance, the diverse activities for the self-control of journalism in the United States, which can be based on a long democratic tradition, appear to me exemplary for Germany.

PART IV

A REJOINDER TO PART I FROM A U.S. PERSPECTIVE

Differences Yet Similarities

While a democracy requires a free press, a free press does not assure a democracy. What assures a democracy is a press that not only exercises its freedom but also conducts itself in a socially responsible way. To this extent, democracies the world over share a common bond. Nowhere does the proposition that press freedom must be balanced with social responsibility manifest itself more clearly than in the relationship of the press to government.

If people become so upset with the press that they want someone to intervene, to whom can they turn? Like-minded individuals? Perhaps, though such alliances are hard to establish. The media themselves? Hardly likely, especially if the media fail to be responsive in the first place. The government? Possibly, especially if that's the only recourse.

For democracies based on free market principles where information is simply another commodity for sale--like shoe polish or toothpaste, the proper course of action can present a

quandary. Information providers must accommodate market demands yet at the same time meet the particular demands imposed on news media in a democracy. Is it even possible to serve two such masters--and to do so effectively?

More than a few societies have wagered that it is not only possible but preferable to other political-economic arrangements. It certainly is possible, but there is a caveat: Such an arrangement depends on media managers not only being accountable to owners and stockholders but also to the public. Of course, the outcome of this arrangement won't be known except in the long run, and remember it was John Maynard Keynes who quipped, "In the long run . . . we are all dead."

The path of press accountability taken by both the United States and Germany calls primarily for the press to regulate itself with minimal intervention by the courts or government. Approaches to the press regulating itself in the two countries have been different and have met with limited success.

My comments center on my co-author's paper on social responsibility and press controls in Germany and his discussion of the work of the German Press Council. One might ask why press experts in one country are offering an assessment of the press of another country. Anyone familiar with more than one culture can answer the question: To know your own culture, you must be acquainted with at least one other culture. The same, we believe, applies to press systems; to know your own press system, you must know about others. The late Marshall McLuhan put it another way. The Canadian media guru said his northern vantage point gave him a better perspective on the United States than if he had been immersed in the U.S. media culture.

When it comes to the press, the United States and Germany have much in common. The Hutchins Commission Report (see elsewhere in this paper) dealt with a number of issues pertinent for any modern nation struggling with efforts to balance a market economy with democracy. A number of these issues came up at a 1997 symposium in Champagne-Urbana, Illinois (USA), commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Hutchins Report. Among scholars assessing the impact of the report was Kaarle Nordenstreng of Finland. He extracted from symposium discussions several persistent themes prompted by the Hutchins Report. There were two specific themes: "(1) media as vehicles of public interest *vs.* media as commodities and (2) media diversity *vs.* media concentration," and three other themes "with a general--even eternal character: (3) truth, (4) democracy and (5) freedom and responsibility" (1998, p. 433).

Indeed, these themes emerge paramount in any society boasting a free press, a market economy and a democratic state. Other social issues impact these enduring press concerns, including the effects of an increasingly interrelated global economy, development of new communication technologies and growing multiculturalism.

While similarities in such societies may be evident, differences may be more dramatic, depending on local circumstances. A reunified Germany has existed only a little more than a decade, and the amalgam of east and west has triggered its own conflicts. Taking into account the events of World War II, the press of Germany clearly does not have the traditions accruing from the United States' more than 200 years of independence.

Tools for Social Responsibility

Methods of self-regulation to bring about responsible press performance have met with varying degrees of success throughout the world. Indeed, some methods, for example, press councils, have been co-opted by government authorities to serve their own interests. Such instances obviously are not acceptable and, in fact, cannot even be considered in the category of self-regulatory measures.

Any tools to promote accountability have a double edge. Even the ombudsman concept has an inherent flaw, namely, that in most cases ombudspersons are not entirely independent of the organization which they presumably appraise. Window dressing assuredly applies to more than one news organization that has established an ombudsman position.

Because certain arrangements carry the possibility of negative or less than ideal consequences should not invoke a blanket condemnation of well-intentioned efforts. Maybe the particular attempt--whether it be a news council, an ombudsman, or even a civic/public journalism project--needs to be modified or replaced by a different effort. While motives may always be suspect, attempts by the press to meet its obligation of being socially and not only financially accountable must not cease. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, the press system in a market-oriented democracy may be the worst press system anywhere--except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.

News media in the United States and Germany engage in a delicate juggling act. While it is necessary to show profits, the news organization must also demonstrate fulfillment of its special role in a democracy. These goals can be achieved only if the organization manages to create and maintain a bond with its community. That means both pleasing and displeasing the community for the measure of democracy is the extent to which discourse invites disagreement and fosters compromise.

There is no single path to social responsibility. News councils are not a panacea. Nor is the ombudsman. Or self-appointed media watchdogs. While there is no single answer to the accountability question, it is surprising that so few news organizations have an institutionalized method--other than the bottom line--of assuring its audience that it is as accountable for its services as, say, a physician or a department store.

Institutionalized press responsibility in Germany flows mainly from the German Press Council. The council was established in 1956 after the government threatened to regulate the

press. Self-regulation was preferable, and major news organizations came together to create the council. That it is alive and functioning after 44 years is a tribute to its utility. It would be inappropriate to characterize the council and its record as a stunning success or a magnificent failure. A dispute among the press organizations comprising the council crippled the council from 1978-85. But it has come back strongly, though some call it a "toothless tiger," which seems an ill-fitting metaphor. In journalistic parlance, "watchdog" would seem to be the more appropriate characterization.

While a National News Council (known as the Council on Press Responsibility and Press Freedom) in the United States did not fare very well (it operated from 1973-84; see elsewhere in text for details), the German Press Council has compiled what has to be termed an enviable record. Over the years it has acted on hundreds of complaints, even though it and its deliberations have had limited public visibility. In the process, the council has developed a number of precedent-type cases ranging from privacy issues to discrimination in news coverage, from accuracy to human rights. Analysis of such cases produces data that are useful in helping to establish standards of performance for the press. In the United States, there are some who maintain that articulated standards are not desirable and only serve to restrain or control. Without controls of some sort, freedom tramples upon other freedoms.

An important component of the German Press Council is its Press Code. These 16 principles--essentially a code of ethics--are guidelines for journalists as well as for the press council in its deliberations. The principles do not stand by themselves. Each is elaborated with examples or elaborated guidelines. For example, journalists are not to use dishonest methods in acquiring information; a guideline says "journalists must identify themselves," but recognizes that "undercover research may be justifiable in individual cases."

A single code of ethics agreed to by press organizations makes good sense. In the United States, numerous codes produce a haze of standards that go largely ignored.

A drawback of the German Press Council is that it is not well known. The reason is ironic. The council, while acting in the public interest, does not consider itself in the public interest. The council's meeting are closed, though it publicly announces decisions and periodically publishes compilations of its activities. The council's effectiveness surely would be expanded if it adopted the principles of transparency that the press requires of government agencies. Opening the council to the public would enhance its credibility as well as its legitimacy.

The struggle to balance press freedom and press responsibility is as complex as the search for justice and equality.

In one of his plays, Norwegian social critic and playwright Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906) tackled many of the fundamental issues--truth, freedom, responsibility--addressed in the

Hutchins Commission Report. In the drama, "An Enemy of the People," the doctor (Stockmann) has discovered a deadly health hazard in the community which, if revealed, also would threaten the town's economy. When the local newspaper (the *People's Messenger*) refuses to publish the information, the doctor expresses amazement that such news would be withheld.

"You are editor," says the doctor, "and I suppose it's the editor that controls a paper."

"No, it's the subscribers, doctor," asserts the printer (Aslaksen) , who adds, "It's public opinion, the enlightened majority, the house-owners, and all the rest. It's *they* who control a paper."

In the next and final act, the doctor, soon to be declared an enemy of the people, declares " . . . that the common man, the ignorant, undeveloped member of society, has the same right to sanction and to condemn, to counsel and to govern, as the intellectually distinguished few" (Buck, 1951).

Oddly and, from a journalistic perspective, sadly, it is the doctor--not the journalist--who provides eloquent testimony to the special responsibility that news media have to all of society.

CONCLUSION

This paper set out to explore cross perceptions by two mass media scholars concerning press freedom and press responsibility in their respective press systems, Germany and the United States. One scholar surveyed the issues in his native land, Germany, with an emphasis on the German Press Council. The other scholar examined press freedom and responsibility in the United States. Both focused on self-regulatory measures. Then each offered a rejoinder to the other.

On a continuum with press freedom at one end and press responsibility at the other, the discourse found both sets of arguments leaning toward a middle ground. That is, the German perspective argued for more press freedom in Germany, while the North American perspective maintained the need for more press responsibility in the United States. While not generalizable, findings suggest that valuable insights about one' s own press system can be gained from becoming familiar with at least one other press system.

APPENDIX A

The German Press Council's Principles of Conduct for Journalists

1. Respect for the truth, observance of human rights and accurate informing of the public are the overriding principles of the press.

2. The publication of specific news and information in word and picture must be carefully checked with respect to accuracy in the light of existing circumstances. Its sense must not be distorted or falsified by editing, title or picture captions. Documents must be accurately reproduced. Unconfirmed reports, rumors or assumptions must be quoted as such. When reproducing symbolic photographs, it must be clear from the caption that these are not documentary pictures.

3. Published news or assertions which subsequently turn out to be incorrect must be rectified in an appropriate manner by the publication concerned.

4. Dishonest methods must not be used to acquire news, information or pictures.

5. Confidentiality is to be adhered to in principle.

6. All those employed by the press shall observe professional secrecy, make full use of the right to refuse to give evidence and shall not disclose the identity of informants without their express consent.

7. The responsibility of the press towards the general public requires that editorial publications not be influenced by the private and business interests of third parties. Publishers and editors must reject any attempts of this nature and make a clear distinction between editorial texts and publications for commercial reasons.

8. The press shall respect the private life and intimate sphere of persons. If, however, the private behavior of a person touches upon public interests, such information then may be reported. Care must be taken to ensure that the personal rights of uninvolved persons are not violated.

9. It is contrary to journalistic decorum to publish unfounded claims and accusations, particularly those likely to injure personal dignity.

10. Publication in word and image which could seriously offend the moral or religious feelings of a group of persons, in form or content, is irreconcilable with the responsibility of the press.

11. The press will refrain from an inappropriate sensational portrayal of violence and brutality. The protection of young persons is to be given consideration in reports.

12. There must be no discrimination against a person on racial, ethnic, religious, social or national grounds or because of his/her sex.

13. Reports on cases or investigations which are still before the courts must be free from prejudice. For this reason, before and during legal proceedings, all comment, both in portrayal and headline, must avoid being one-sided or prejudicial. An accused person must not be described as guilty before final judgement has been passed.

14. Reports on medical matters should not be of an unnecessarily sensationalist nature since they might lead to unfounded fears or hopes on the part of some readers. Research findings which are still at an early stage should not be portrayed as if they were conclusive or almost conclusive.

15. The acceptance or granting of privileges of any kind which could possibly influence the freedom of decision on the part of publishers and editors are irreconcilable with the prestige, independence and responsibilities of the press. Anyone accepting bribes for the dissemination of news acts in a dishonorable and unprofessional manner.

16. It is considered fair reporting when a public reprimand issued by the German Press Council is published, especially by the newspapers or magazines concerned.

(adopted December 12, 1973, and revised September 17, 1997)

APPENDIX B

Complaint Procedures of the German Press Council

The German Press Council complaints procedure provides for the following:

√ Anyone can complain about publications or processes in the German press to the Press Council. The Press Council itself can also initiate a complaint proceeding.

√ As a rule, a Complaints Committee handles complaints. In cases of fundamental significance or at the request of several of its members, the Complaints Committee can hand the proceeding over to the Plenum of the Press Council.

√ A complaint must be in written form and provide documentation (as a rule, the criticized press publication) concerning the complaint.

√ The newspaper or magazine to which the complaint pertains retains the opportunity to respond in written form and to make up for the criticism before the next meeting of the Complaints Committee.

√ Unfounded complaints can be rejected by the chair of the Complaints Committee before continuation of the proceedings.

√ Complaints are not handled, as a rule, as long as the decision could influence the outcome of an ongoing investigation or court proceedings.

√ The committee responsible will verbally deliberate about complaints that are not obviously unfounded in a meeting to which the complainant, the defending party and witnesses may be invited. Decisions can also be reached in the absence of the invited parties and without a statement from the defending party.

√ The public is barred from verbal deliberations about complaints. Only members of the Press Council, directors and legal advisors of the sponsoring organizations or employees of the sponsoring association may be present.

√ A complaint can be rejected as unfounded. If it is decided that it is legitimate, an advice notice, a notice of censure or a reprimand can be pronounced. Decisions must be justified.

√ Reprimands are to be published by the publication concerned as well as by the trade publications of the four sponsoring organizations. The obligation to publish may be waived by the Press Council if the protection of the party involved requires it.

√ Decisions about complaints are, as a rule, indisputable. Minority votes in the committee responsible can be made public after prompt announcement of decisions.

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International Division

The Shrinking World of Network News

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The Shrinking World of Network News

Daniel Schorr, foreign correspondent and member of Edward R. Murrow's legendary CBS News team, once wrote:

> Increasingly, we depend for our view of the world on television. Television has the money and the resources, but television, in its ratings race, can only go so far in trying to force-feed its audience with foreign news.[1]

That was 1979. One wonders how Schorr would have assessed television's role as a "window on the world" after hearing that CBS moved in late 1998 to close all but its London, Moscow, Tel Aviv and Tokyo bureaus, and that ABC and NBC were downsizing their overseas bureaus and, with CBS, exploring buying CNN world coverage.[2] Did those moves signal an abrupt change or the end of a long process?

To address that question, this study looks at 31 years (1970-2000) of foreign news coverage on ABC, CBS and NBC.

Background

Growing global interdependence would seem to make it a truism that what happens in Hong Kong has repercussions on "Main Street, U.S.A."[3] But even if international news should be more important than ever before, the American "diet" of international fare seems destined to be cut, rather than enriched.[4] Print media have succumbed; studies show a "shrinking foreign newshole," even in elite newspapers.[5] Chris Lavin, world editor at the ***St. Petersburg Times***, blames a "subtle business dynamic" that "marginalizes" international news.[6]

What about network news? The factors blamed for declining newspaper foreign news coverage—cost and perceived audience disinterest—also seem likely to affect television news and gatekeeping decisions about what to include and exclude.[7] The "round-the-clock" accessibility of

cable network news choices for those viewers who are interested in international news may also be a factor.

Cost: Foreign correspondence costs hundreds of thousands of dollars, and not just for travel and salary. ***The Washington Post's*** Jonathan Randal remembers network correspondents and camera crews who were willing to commit resources to getting the news. "They had a lot of money, they weren't shy about spending it and the results were terrific."[8]

Former CBS correspondent Mitchell Krauss agreed: "It's become incredibly more expensive to maintain bureaus. Now there are offices in London, Moscow, Tel Aviv and Tokyo. That's it."[9] Kaplan argued, "(I)t is far easier and, above all, cheaper" to find alternatives to employing journalists with the "necessary specialized backgrounds to staff foreign bureaus."[10] One alternative, of course, was the avenue explored back in 1998 by ABC, CBS and NBC with CNN.

But critics say these alternatives to "on the ground" reporting change the nature of news judgment, from correspondent-controlled to producer- or anchor-controlled decision making. "We have far too few news gatherers and far too many news processors.........there [is] a shell of correspondents who pretend to cover the globe," according to Joe Foote of Arizona State University.[11]

Audience Interest and Cable Alternatives: Of course, viewer interest and high ratings would make cost moot. But according to an Associated Press analysis, Americans have lost interest in world news. International news was "a natural place to look" (to cut costs) in the 1990s, as Americans' interest "turned inward toward O.J. Simpson and presidential sex scandals."[12] But a 1998 Pew Center report warned that the continuing decline in viewership of nightly network news signaled a waning "public appetite" for national and international news.[13]

April 2000 Pew data characterize "event-driven audiences" to support that warning: 64% of Americans report following international events only when something important happens (only a third pay attention most of the time), and half say they follow national events only when something important happens. In fact, when all the networks' daily news offerings—morning programs, nightly newscasts and news magazines—are combined, ABC, CBS and NBC claim regular viewership by only 51% of the audience, a 6% drop in two years but 11% higher than the 40% combined audience for CNN, CNBC, MSNBC and Fox. That dominance vanishes when specialty cable like ESPN and TWC are added, yielding regular viewership of these six cable offerings by 61% of the audience.[14]

Among those who are interested and who do not go online for news (one in three do at least once a week), the networks of choice are these "round-the-clock" cable alternatives: Pew respondents indicated April 2000 "regular" viewership of news operations like C-Span (4%), CNBC (13%), MSNBC (11%), Fox (17%) and CNN (21%), while the so-called "Big Three" (ABC, CBS and NBC) nightly newscasts draw only 30%--just half of the 60% reporting regular viewership in May 1993.[15] Some data, however, suggest that these cable news networks may also be affected by changing viewer tastes. Pew data showed CNN being viewed regularly by 21% of those polled in April 2000, a drop from 26% in 1996 and 35% in 1993. But even that drop is relative: asked where they'd turn for news of domestic terrorism, respondents indicated—by a two-to-one margin—that they'd turn to cable TV, primarily CNN.[16]

CBS's Mitchell Krauss also believes that Americans' "attention spans have gone down, down, down. If the United States stays in Somalia three weeks, people say, 'Bring the boys home.'"[17] Hamilton and Krimsky complained of news "formulas that stress the-world-doesn't--matter-to-us-parochialism."[18]

Of course, critics have long blamed news media for "contributing to the rising level of ignorance about the world that scares American educators and civic leaders."[19] ***Time*'s** Thomas Griffith wrote over 30 years ago that American newspaper editors "assume that Americans are weary of unsolvable problems in unpronounceable places."[20] Former SPJ president Paul Davis wrote in 1989 that, "Networks have cut back on foreign bureaus, wire services have reduced foreign staffing, many world-class newspapers have shrunk their distant staffs, and there is little complaint from the viewers and readers."[21]

But if Americans were thought to be disinterested in international news 10-30 years ago, they may not have been "armed" to express that disinterest by "roaming" as they are today. The 2000 Pew survey revealed that more Americans than ever—62% compared to 56% in 1998—say they watch the news with a remote control in hand, "ready to dispatch uninteresting stories."[22]

The response of broadcast gatekeepers to changing audience tastes? Certainly not to provide more "uninteresting stories," one assumes.

According to Scott and Gobetz, who explored the increase in "soft news" in network newscasts, "(E)conomic pressures can swing news gates open and closed because of anticipated preferences of the audience." Profit is maximized when editorial decisions are in line with viewer preferences.[23]

Scott and Gobetz suggest further that changing preferences may be viewed in terms of pleasure-seeking models[24] or uses and gratifications.[25] Indeed, a considerable body of research has identified an array of motivations for viewing network news[26] in general, and choosing among specific networks in particular.[27]

While researchers may be able to catalog motives and needs, network officials work on a much simpler model, according to producer and correspondent Leslie Cockburn. "I don't think

Americans are less interested [in foreign news]," she said. "[Producers] are less willing to take risks on stories." Sensational domestic stories are guaranteed to draw, so those stories are chosen over foreign news. Cockburn believes that editors and producers must work even harder to ensure that foreign news survives the onslaught of "ratings-grabbing, sensational domestic stories designed to tap audience preferences."[28]

Ed Turner, former CNN executive, adds that, "It's also cheaper and easier to use more entertainment-driven news rather than complex international stories."[29] CNN contributing correspondent Garrick Utley said editors and producers in this environment find themselves forced to justify international coverage. "Unless we can see the market value of international news, we are fighting a losing battle."[30]

Observers complain, as a result, that television networks devote only half as much time to international news as they did before 1989,[31] when network coverage peaked with the end of the Cold War.[32]

Previous Studies

Content analyses have examined the proportion of the television "newshole" devoted to international coverage. For example, Almaney found only 16% of 1969 news was foreign news, and 21% qualified as "international news" (also involving the U.S.).[33] Many researchers would view this combined 37% (16% and 21%) as representing "international news."

Other studies have utilized a multiple-year perspective, though seldom documenting change over time. Larson and Hardy operationalized international news as including at least a mention of another nation in their study of 1972-1975 network coverage; the three networks' proportions of international news ranged from 35% to 39%.[34] Larson looked at 1972-1981 network coverage and found a nightly average of 40% of items in the 1,000 newscasts dealt with

international affairs content.[35] Hester's study of 1972-1976 network coverage found volume of foreign news ranging from 18.3% to 26.9%, yielding a five-year average of 21.72%.[36]

Weaver et al. added 1977-1981 data to Hester's 1972-1976 data, discovering that 25% of covered news events occurred at the United Nations or outside the U.S. They failed to discover a trend in the 10-year period.[37] In 1989, Whitney et al. looked at May 1982-April 1984 network coverage, finding only 33.6% of news was international.[38]

Gonzenbach, Arant and Stevenson's 1991 examination of 18 years (1972-1989) of network news found "a small but steady increase" in amount of international coverage, particularly when the United States was involved. Consistent with Larson's 1972-1981 content analysis, roughly 40% "deals either with other countries (what we have called foreign news) or with activities of the United States that involve other countries (international news)." That 40% breaks down to 19-21% "foreign news" and 16-20% international.

Perhaps equally relevant, given critical emphasis on "entertainment-driven" network news, their study documented that "soft news" received less play in international than in domestic news, while "disruption" ("coups and earthquakes" bad news) was emphasized more in international news. The researchers did not, however, report hard/soft trends over time, and concluded that: "(N)etwork TV coverage of the world at the end of the 1980s was similar to the TV world at the beginning of the 1970s."[39]

On the other hand, Scott and Gobetz's 1972-1987 focus on "hard" versus "soft" news—regardless whether domestic or international—did find a significant trend of increased use of soft news, even though soft news constituted a relatively small part of the overall newscast.[40]

Research Objectives and Questions

This study seeks to update what we know about the changing coverage of the world by nightly network news, applying the same measures across an extended period. Though our goal was to examine trends in sheer quantity of world news coverage in a single longitudinal study, we also explored secondary questions about the quality of news coverage.

For example, given past debate over inequities in foreign news coverage, particularly of the Third World, has ("coups and earthquakes") "bad news"[41] continued to dominate? Similarly, has the trend toward increased overall use of soft news, documented by Scott and Gobetz during the 1972-1987 period, occurred within international news specifically?

Method

Using the ***Television News Index and Abstracts***, coders examined nightly newscasts on ABC, CBS and NBC for four constructed weeks (Monday through Friday only) per year (1970-2000). A Monday was randomly selected from all Mondays in each quarter (e.g., January-March, April-June, etc.), a Tuesday was selected, until four constructed weeks per year were selected. The sample was stratified by quarter to help guard against seasonal variation that might, in a purely random sample, distort the results.[42]

In total, 20 randomly selected dates for each of the 31 years were coded, for a total 620 dates and 1,860 newscasts. Composite agreement among coders[43] reached .90 and .94 in reliability tests.[44] Coders coded all items in all three networks' newscasts, with an "item" operationally defined as having a distinct beginning time and a boldfaced, capped headline in the ***Index***. "International" news items were items on events outside the United States, regardless whether U.S. interests or actors were involved.

While the coders initially employed a 25-category coding scheme for story topic, those categories were collapsed for the purposes of this longitudinal analysis into three broad topics:

Hard news: politics, defense and military conflicts between nations, diplomatic relations, social policies, changing demographics, agriculture and economic news.

Bad news: most closely akin to the "coups and earthquakes" bad news, this category included civil conflicts, accidents and natural disasters, and obituaries.

Soft news: religion, sports, the arts, science and technology, media and general human interest.

A non-parametric test for trend using a simple measure of correlation was used.[45] First, ranks were assigned to years, with the most recent ranked "1" (i.e., 2000 was "1," and 1970 was "31"). Additional ranks were assigned reflecting prevalence of key variables (e.g., the year with the most international items was "1"). Spearman's rho was computed between ranks. As a result, positive values of rho (between zero and 1) indicate increasing trends, and negative values (between zero and -1) indicate decreasing trends. The farther rho is from zero, the stronger the positive or negative trend and the more likely it is statistically significant.

Findings and Discussion

The four-constructed week per year sample located 24,794 ***Index*** entries. ABC yielded 8,080 items, CBS yielded 8,671 and NBC 8,043. Table 1 shows that the average number of items sampled per year for the three networks was 260.6 for ABC (with the 31 year range including a low of 186 and a high of 477), 279.7 for CBS (range 153 to 504), and 259.5 for NBC (range 149 to 506).

The focus of this paper is primarily on describing changing levels of international coverage across the 31 years. Those changes are indicated by gross comparisons among the number of

sampled stories per year (e.g., ABC's 237 in 1970). Alternatively, each annual total might be divided by 20 to yield an average per newscast (e.g., ABC's 237 in 1970 means that year's 20 newscasts averaged 11.85 items per night; NBC's 149 sampled items in 2000 indicates that year's 20 newscasts averaged 7.45 items per night).

Some year-to-year comparisons might be of interest (e.g., 1970's ABC total of 237 compared to the 1971 total of 225), and individual between-year changes might be significant. But 30 between-year contrasts can be summarized with a single statistic that assesses overall patterns or trends.

Thus, annual totals sampled were used to compute trend scores. Significant negative values of rho for the "n" columns in Table 1 show, for all three networks, trends toward fewer and fewer items per sample year. Rho for ABC is -.75, for CBS it is -.87, and for NBC it is -.90 ($p<.001$). What these strong negative coefficients indicate is a shrinking broadcast newshole, or that network news was covering less, in terms of number of items per newscast. Fewer items during a 30-minute newscast, of course, meant longer items.

Table 1 also includes data on percentages of domestic and international news coverage within those totals. ABC was "the leader" in world coverage, with an annual average of 29.1% of its items devoted to international news across the 31 years. On average, only a fourth of items on CBS (25.4%) and NBC (24.5%) each year were international news.

When trend scores are computed across 31 years for the annual percentages of international news, the values for all three networks are significant and negative. That means that, in addition to providing fewer items per newscast, there was a trend toward a smaller percentage of items that were international. The broadcast newshole was shrinking and foreign news content was shrinking within it.

Table 2 examines only international news and breaks it into three general categories of "hard news," "soft news" and "bad news." A quick glance indicates that the data support the observations of Gonzenbach, Arant and Stevenson,[46] and Scott and Gobetz,[47] that soft news was a relatively minor part of the international news package, and was certainly less prevalent than bad news. Table 2 data show that, across the 31 years, soft news averaged about 12%-13% for all three networks, while bad news averaged from 29% to 31%. In some years, however, bad news constituted as much as half of the news items.

Once again, however, the values of rho are compelling. Those trend scores show that, for all three networks, both bad news and soft news increased significantly across the three decades of the study. While Table 1 showed that foreign news was becoming more rare in the network package, the proportion of that foreign news that was soft news and "coups and earthquakes" bad new was increasing. If, as Gonzenbach, Arant and Stevenson concluded, "(N)etwork TV coverage of the world at the end of the 1980s was similar to the TV world at the beginning of the 1970s,"[48] the 1970-2000 data in Table 2 indicate that network television's "window on the world" revealed a very different world by the end of the 1990s.

Two caveats are in order, though. First, the significant negative correlations indicating declining hard news coverage are, of course, not independent of the two positive correlations for bad and soft news coverage. Second, as clear as the significant correlations are, assessment of the annual percentages must be tempered. Because of the declining numbers of items reported in Table 1, many of the Table 2 percentages, particularly in the last half dozen years, are based on small numbers of cases. For example, in 2000, 21.1% of NBC's 19 sampled items were soft news. That means that only four such items were located in the entire 20 sampled NBC newscasts for that year.

Finally, Table 3 examines just the subset of the networks' international news items coming out of the developing nations, those nations often referred to in the past as the Third World,[49] to explore how much of that coverage is bad news. Since the publication of Mort Rosenblum's 1979 book, ***Coups and Earthquakes,*** Western and American news coverage of those nations has often been criticized as concentrating on disruption and the sensational.[50]

The data in Table 3 show that bad news ranged from as little as 10% of news items from Third World nations (ABC in 2000), to as high as two-thirds of items in other years (ABC in 1995 and NBC in 1999). Again, because of the overall decline in international coverage noted in Table 1 and the fact that bad news constituted only about a third of all international items (as in Table 2), these Table 3 percentages are often based on small numbers of cases (the sample located only 12 news items in 1995 ABC coverage that were about the Third World; the 1999 NBC percentage is based only on nine cases).

Mindful of that caveat, we nonetheless computed values of rho to test for trend. For all three networks, the 31-year trend was toward increasing prevalence of bad news among the decreasing number of news items coming out of the Third World. The window on the world may have been shrinking, but there was always room for coups and earthquakes from the Third World.

Conclusions

There are obvious limitations to this study. It examined only the Big Three U.S. networks—ABC, CBS and NBC. It fails to examine the international news content of the growing number of alternatives (CNN, etc.) to the Big Three, an examination that might answer the question of how those alternatives complement the Big Three and vice versa, or whether declining international coverage might characterize their news operations as well. The study's reliance on the ***Index*** arguably precludes a determination of whether the international news

coverage which <u>does</u> come through the networks' window on the world might be better than in the past in terms of depth and understanding. Indeed, it acknowledges that fewer items in a newscast mean longer items, but the study does not examine airtime devoted to international news. The operational definitions of "hard," "soft" and "bad news" are open to question, as is the study's use—for consistency purposes—of a "Third World" nation designation. Finally, the dual trends to fewer items and fewer international items leave small numbers of cases in the late 1990s that make some trend analyses tricky.

Nonetheless, the breadth of the longitudinal design and the depth of the 20-newscast-per-network-per-year sample are, we believe, major strengths of the study.

Former CBS and NBC News correspondent Marvin Kalb once described an urgent call from CBS anchor Walter Cronkite asking Kalb to do a piece explaining the 1968 Russian move on Czechoslovakia. Cronkite told Kalb that the Czechoslovakia story was the "single most important story we've got on the news tonight" and that he should "take as much time as you like.........Nothing is more important. You've got to explain to the American people why they invaded Czechoslovakia. I mean, take a minute."[51]

Kalb's anecdote reminds us of the constraints faced by television news producers trying to provide comprehensive coverage of a complex world. In most cases, the length or time of the broadcast "newshole" is fixed, regardless what happens in the world that day. Stories judged to be more important push less important stories off the nightly news.

It is easy to argue, then, that the picture of reality provided by ABC, CBS and NBC must of necessity be an imperfect or incomplete one. There is only so much time.

But time is only one factor. To paraphrase some of the criticisms quoted earlier, "risk" is another factor. Producers don't gamble on international news ("unsolvable problems in

unpronounceable places") when it is easier to air "ratings-grabbing, sensational domestic stories designed to tap audience preferences," preferences for "entertainment-driven news rather than complex international stories."

Yet each time an international news event takes Americans "by surprise," each time Americans ask themselves "Where is that?" and each time Americans misjudge the importance of an overseas event for the people affected by it, the imperfect and incomplete picture of the world provided by the media becomes an issue. Whether newspapers are available to complement that picture for those who can access them; whether round-the-clock operations like CNN are available; and whether on-line resources are available; the Big Three television networks continue nonetheless to provide a window on the world for four of ten Americans.

During the last 31 years, all three networks have reduced the number of news items aired on the nightly newscast. These fewer items are, obviously, given more airtime. But fewer individual, discrete news events are covered. Within that smaller array of event-items, the proportion devoted to international news has been decreasing significantly as well. Moreover, the "quality" of the international news picture is changing as well, with dual trends toward more soft news and more bad news within the overall (shrinking) international array, and particularly in the slim portion of the news devoted to the Third World.

If this study failed to defuse the argument that American networks are sliding into provincialism by providing an increasingly narrow window on the world, it has provided a wide-angle, highly precise longitudinal view of that slide, and has shown the shrinking broadcast newshole phenomenon to be more complex than meets the eye.

Notes

[1] Daniel Schorr, "The Clouded Window," *WORLD*, 1979. Transcript of PBS program, produced by WGBH Boston.
[2] Associated Press, "ABC, CBS, NBC, Downsizing Overseas Bureaus, Discuss Shared Efforts with CNN." *The Freedom Forum Online* Oct. 27, 1998. At www.freedomforum.org/professional/1998/10/27downsize.asp.
[3] John Maxwell Hamilton, *Main Street America and the Third World* (Cabin John, Maryland: Seven Locks Press, 1986). See also Daniel Riffe, "Linking International News to U.S. Interests: A Content Analysis," *International Communication Bulletin* (Spring 1996)31:3-4:14-18.
[4] One study showed that only 39% of international news stories included an explicit linkage to U.S. interests, thereby presumably making those stories more meaningful for readers. See Daniel Riffe, "Linking International News to U.S. Interests," 1996.
[5] Daniel Riffe, Charles Aust, Ted Jones, Barbara Shoemake and Shyam Sundar, "The Shrinking Foreign Newshole of the New York Times," *Newspaper Research Journal* 15 (1994):74-88. See also Michael Emery, "An Endangered Species: The International Newshole," *Gannett Center Journal*, 1989, pp. 151-164.
[6] Phyllis Lyons, "Making World News Matter in Hometown Daily USA," *The Freedom Forum Online* Dec. 8, 1998. At www.freedomforum.org/international/1998/12/8asne.asp.
[7] Pamela Shoemaker, "Media Gatekeeping," in Michael B. Salwen and Don W. Stacks (eds.) *An Integrated Approach to Communication Theory and Research* (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), pp. 79-92
[8] Associated Press, "ABC, CBS, NBC, Downsizing Overseas Bureaus," 1998.
[9] Tim Feran, "Drop in World Coverage Troubles Ex-Newsman," *Columbus* (Ohio) *Dispatch*, May 13, 1998, p. 9E.
[10] Frank L. Kaplan, "The Plight of Foreign News in the U.S. Mass Media: An Assessment," *Gazette*, 1979, pp. 233-243
[11] Lisa Chan, "CNN's Utley Says TV Reporters Still Matter," *The Freedom Forum Online* Nov. 24, 1998. At www.freedomforum.org/professional/1998/11/24utley.asp.
[12] Associated Press, "ABC, CBS, NBC, Downsizing Overseas Bureaus," 1998.
[13] The Pew Research Center, "Internet News Takes Off," 1998, http://www.people-press.org/med984rpt.htm.
[14] The Pew Research Center, "Internet Sapping Broadcast News Audience," 2000, http://www.people-press.org/media00rpt.htm.
[15] The Pew Research Center, "Internet Sapping Broadcast News Audience," 2000.
[16] The Pew Research Center, "Internet Sapping Broadcast News Audience," 2000.
[17] Feran, "Drop in World Coverage Troubles Ex-Newsman," 1998.
[18] John Maxwell Hamilton and George A. Krimsky, "'Juju' News from Abroad," *Gannett Center Journal*, 1989, pp. 137-150.
[19] Emery, "An Endangered Species," 1989. See also George E. Padgett, "Americans Lag Behind in International-intercultural Coverage," Editor & Publisher, July 11, 1992, pp. 48, 33.
[20] Kaplan, "The Plight of Foreign News," 1979, p. 234.
[21] Padgett, "Americans Lag Behind," 1992, p. 48.
[22] The Pew Center, "Internet Sapping Broadcast Audience," 2000.
[23] David K. Scott and Robert H. Gobetz, "Hard News/Soft News Content of the National Broadcast Networks, 1972-1987," *Journalism Quarterly*, 69 (1992):406-412.
[24] William Stephenson, *The Play Theory of Mass Communication* (New Brunswick, N.J.:Transaction, 1988).
[25] See, for example, Lawrence A. Wenner, "The Nature of News Gratifications," in Karl Rosengren and Lawrence A. Wenner (eds.) *Media Gratifications Research* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1985) pp. 171-295.
[26] See: Alan M. Rubin and Elizabeth M. Perse, "Audience Activity and Television News Gratifications," *Communication Research*, 14 (1987):58-84; and Alan M. Rubin, "An Examination of Television Viewing Motivations," *Communication Research*, 8 (1981):141-165.
[27] See Philip A. Palmgreen, Lawrence A. Wenner and J.D. Rayburn II, "Relations Between Gratifications Sought and Obtained: A Study of Television News," *Communication Research*, 7 (1980):161-192; and "Gratification Discrepancies and News Program Choice," *Communication Research*, 8 (1981):451-478.

[28] Ruth O'Brien, "Offer More Foreign News, Author Advises Editors, Producers," *The Freedom Forum Online* June 12, 1998. At www.freedomforum.org/professional/1998/6/12cockburn.asp.
[29] Associated Press, "ABC, CBS, NBC, Downsizing Overseas Bureaus," 1998.
[30] Joan Mower, "News From Overseas Matters Because That's Where Crises Are," *The Freedom Forum Online* April 6, 1998. At www.freedomforum.org/international/1998/4/6overseas.asp.
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[40] David K. Scott and Robert H. Gobetz, "Hard News/Soft News Content of the National Broadcast Networks, 1972-1987," *Journalism Quarterly*, 69 (1992):406-412..
[41] Mort Rosenblum, *Coups and Earthquakes: Reporting the World for America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).
[42] Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy, Jason Nagovan and Larry Burkum, "The Effectiveness of Simple and Stratified Random Sampling in Broadcast News Content Analysis," *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 1996, 73:159-168.
[43] Ole Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 137-140.
[44] Those coefficients reflect coders' initial application of a 25-category topic scheme, but there is no reason to anticipate that the "collapsed" system used here—hard, soft, and bad news—would in any way decrease that reliability.
[45] Jean Gibbons, *Nonparametric Methods for Quantitative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976) p. 295; Gerhard Tintner, *Econometrics* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1952) pp. 211-215.
[46] Gonzenbach, Arant and Stevenson, "The World of U.S. Network Television News," 1991.
[47] Scott and Gobetz, "Hard News/Soft News Content of the National Broadcast Networks," 1992.
[48] Gonzenbach, Arant and Stevenson, "The World of U.S. Network Television News," 1991.
[49] During the 31 years encompassed by this study's design, major changes have occurred that affect the "typologies" used to categorize nations (e.g., the rapid economic development of Pacific Rim countries, the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, the reunification of Germany). Despite these changes, we chose for consistency and comparison purposes to adhere in this study to the World Bank categorization of Third World and developing nations that was in place during the early 1970s. See B. Jones, "African Development Hopes Dashed," The New York Times, Jan. 25, 1976, section 3, p. 17.
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Table 1
Percentage of ABC, CBS and NBC Nightly News Items Devoted to Domestic And International Events, 1970-2000

Network:

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Domestic/International			Domestic/International			Domestic/International		
Year	%	%	(n)	%	%	(n)	%	%	(n)
1970	61.6	38.4	(237)	69.7	30.3	(317)	69.8	30.2	(321)
1971	65.3	34.7	(225)	70.5	29.5	(336)	68.0	32.0	(334)
1972	62.2	37.8	(259)	70.9	29.1	(334)	64.2	35.8	(313)
1973	77.3	22.7	(321)	77.6	22.4	(343)	75.7	24.3	(342)
1974	80.1	19.9	(463)	81.7	18.3	(504)	81.0	19.0	(506)
1975	68.1	31.9	(304)	64.7	35.3	(331)	66.7	33.3	(294)
1976	77.0	23.0	(387)	76.1	23.9	(385)	76.4	23.6	(335)
1977	75.6	24.4	(270)	81.8	18.2	(319)	81.8	18.2	(275)
1978	73.0	27.0	(477)	71.8	28.2	(486)	72.4	27.6	(479)
1979	68.0	32.0	(291)	71.2	28.8	(278)	68.7	31.3	(249)
1980	66.7	33.3	(282)	69.8	30.2	(285)	68.7	31.3	(246)
1981	60.1	39.9	(301)	68.2	31.8	(280)	70.3	29.7	(279)
1982	61.9	38.1	(310)	73.6	26.4	(276)	75.3	24.7	(288)
1983	70.6	29.4	(289)	76.9	23.1	(290)	73.1	26.9	(286)
1984	69.1	30.9	(233)	75.4	24.6	(260)	73.8	26.3	(240)
1985	65.5	34.5	(220)	70.1	29.9	(281)	71.4	28.6	(231)
1986	64.7	35.3	(207)	69.9	30.1	(276)	65.0	35.0	(260)
1987	69.0	31.0	(226)	71.3	28.7	(244)	70.0	30.0	(227)
1988	69.3	30.7	(231)	71.0	29.0	(241)	71.0	29.0	(200)
1989	61.8	38.2	(254)	67.4	32.6	(236)	69.3	30.7	(254)
1990	65.1	34.9	(232)	68.6	31.4	(223)	71.1	28.9	(225)
1991	69.0	31.0	(203)	71.2	28.8	(153)	69.0	31.0	(158)
1992	70.5	29.5	(210)	78.9	21.1	(185)	84.0	16.0	(169)
1993	76.3	23.7	(198)	81.7	18.3	(191)	83.6	16.4	(220)
1994	74.4	25.6	(215)	77.4	22.6	(226)	80.4	19.6	(245)
1995	75.8	24.2	(198)	77.8	22.2	(221)	83.7	16.3	(221)
1996	82.0	18.0	(239)	82.2	17.8	(236)	88.7	11.3	(195)
1997	73.2	26.8	(220)	81.7	18.3	(224)	89.8	10.2	(186)
1998	82.0	18.0	(194)	80.5	19.5	(257)	86.9	13.1	(160)
1999	83.3	16.7	(186)	81.8	18.2	(214)	82.7	17.3	(156)
2000	78.6	21.2	(198)	80.3	19.7	(239)	87.2	12.8	(149)
rho =		*-.43*	*-.75*		*-.44*	*-.87*		*-.60*	*-.90*
p =		.02	.001		.01	.001		.001	.001

Table 2
Percentages of Hard, Bad and Soft International News
On ABC, CBS and NBC News, by Year, 1970-2000

Network:	ABC				CBS				NBC			
	hard %	bad %	soft %	(n)	hard %	bad %	soft %	(n)	hard %	bad %	soft %	(n)
Year												
1970	69.3	25.0	5.7	(88)	71.9	20.8	7.3	(96)	74.2	19.6	6.2	(97)
1971	73.0	21.6	5.4	(74)	64.2	23.2	12.6	(95)	70.8	21.7	7.5	(106)
1972	71.3	18.1	10.6	(94)	69.5	19.5	11.0	(82)	68.8	15.6	15.6	(109)
1973	75.3	19.2	5.5	(73)	81.8	14.3	3.9	(77)	80.7	9.6	9.6	(83)
1974	73.9	19.6	6.5	(92)	70.7	21.7	7.6	(92)	83.3	12.5	4.2	(96)
1975	71.1	25.8	3.1	(97)	64.1	30.8	5.1	(117)	73.4	22.3	4.3	(94)
1976	60.7	31.5	7.9	(89)	53.3	43.5	3.3	(92)	62.0	30.4	7.6	(79)
1977	63.6	30.3	6.1	(66)	58.6	36.2	5.2	(58)	62.0	28.0	10.0	(50)
1978	60.5	21.7	17.8	(129)	63.5	24.8	11.7	(137)	59.1	26.5	14.4	(132)
1979	66.7	24.7	8.6	(93)	65.0	28.8	6.3	(80)	65.4	24.4	10.3	(78)
1980	66.3	16.3	17.4	(92)	69.9	24.1	6.0	(83)	72.0	20.0	8.0	(75)
1981	60.5	26.3	13.2	(114)	62.1	32.2	5.7	(87)	61.7	28.4	9.9	(81)
1982	65.5	24.1	10.3	(116)	71.2	19.2	9.6	(73)	65.7	31.4	2.9	(70)
1983	54.1	34.1	11.8	(85)	58.2	35.8	6.0	(67)	57.3	29.3	13.3	(75)
1984	60.9	23.2	15.9	(69)	59.4	26.6	14.1	(64)	59.7	27.4	12.9	(62)
1985	55.6	27.8	16.7	(72)	44.4	39.5	16.0	(81)	53.8	27.7	18.5	(65)
1986	37.1	40.0	22.9	(70)	40.2	41.5	18.3	(82)	42.2	41.1	16.7	(90)
1987	57.4	26.5	16.2	(68)	48.6	38.6	12.9	(70)	55.2	29.9	14.9	(67)
1988	62.0	26.8	11.3	(71)	59.4	24.6	15.9	(69)	48.2	35.7	16.1	(56)
1989	52.1	37.5	10.4	(96)	50.6	37.7	11.7	(77)	57.7	38.5	3.8	(78)
1990	57.1	36.4	6.5	(77)	58.0	30.4	11.6	(69)	65.5	26.6	7.8	(64)
1991	77.8	20.6	1.6	(63)	84.1	11.4	4.5	(44)	71.4	18.4	10.2	(49)
1992	46.8	45.2	8.1	(62)	48.7	35.9	15.4	(39)	37.0	44.4	18.5	(27)
1993	55.3	40.4	4.3	(47)	42.9	48.6	8.6	(35)	50.0	36.1	13.9	(36)
1994	47.3	45.5	7.3	(55)	47.1	41.2	11.8	(51)	43.8	41.7	14.6	(48)
1995	41.7	50.0	8.3	(48)	55.1	36.7	8.2	(49)	47.2	50.0	2.8	(36)
1996	44.2	34.9	20.9	(43)	38.1	40.5	21.4	(42)	36.4	45.5	18.2	(22)
1997	25.4	57.6	16.9	(59)	19.5	53.7	26.8	(41)	47.4	26.3	26.3	(19)
1998	48.6	22.9	28.6	(35)	48.0	26.0	26.0	(50)	42.9	19.0	38.1	(21)
1999	35.5	35.5	29.0	(31)	43.6	33.3	23.1	(39)	33.3	51.9	14.8	(27)
2000	50.0	16.7	33.3	(42)	44.7	36.2	19.1	(47)	52.6	26.3	21.1	(19)
rho =	***-.795***	***.498***	***.461***		***-.731***	***.506***	***.633***		***-.806***	***.533***	***.533***	
p =	.001	.004	.009		.001	.004	.001		.001	.002	.002	

Table 3
Percentage of "Bad News" in ABC, CBS, and NBC
News from Third World, By Year, 1970-2000

Network:

	ABC		CBS		NBC	
	Bad News		Bad News		Bad News	
Year	%	(n)	%	(n)	%	(n)
1970	17.90	(56)	16.10	(56)	17.20	(58)
1971	13.30	(45)	17.60	(51)	16.10	(56)
1972	18.20	(44)	20.90	(43)	17.00	(47)
1973	23.20	(56)	17.90	(56)	15.20	(46)
1974	13.50	(52)	18.40	(49)	10.30	(68)
1975	14.70	(34)	25.50	(47)	20.50	(39)
1976	26.20	(61)	38.90	(72)	21.40	(56)
1977	33.30	(33)	33.30	(30)	24.00	(25)
1978	27.30	(66)	25.60	(78)	30.70	(75)
1979	30.00	(50)	26.40	(53)	23.10	(39)
1980	18.00	(50)	18.80	(48)	19.10	(47)
1981	16.70	(48)	25.00	(32)	15.60	(32)
1982	26.40	(53)	19.00	(42)	28.90	(38)
1983	32.50	(40)	36.40	(33)	33.30	(42)
1984	28.60	(42)	29.30	(41)	22.20	(36)
1985	31.80	(22)	52.00	(25)	39.10	(23)
1986	48.00	(25)	45.20	(31)	40.50	(42)
1987	34.90	(43)	45.20	(42)	38.60	(44)
1988	36.10	(36)	30.80	(39)	42.40	(33)
1989	39.50	(38)	42.90	(28)	46.20	(26)
1990	40.00	(20)	30.00	(30)	23.50	(17)
1991	20.60	(34)	16.00	(25)	18.50	(27)
1992	50.00	(24)	41.70	(24)	57.10	(14)
1993	25.00	(16)	40.00	(15)	30.80	(13)
1994	43.50	(23)	31.60	(19)	31.60	(19)
1995	66.70	(12)	28.60	(14)	36.40	(11)
1996	31.30	(16)	35.30	(17)	40.00	(10)
1997	58.80	(17)	60.00	(15)	30.00	(10)
1998	38.50	(13)	33.30	(24)	33.30	(9)
1999	58.30	(12)	64.30	(14)	66.70	(9)
2000	10.00	(20)	29.60	(27)	11.10	(9)
rho =	***.597***	***-.833***	***.585***	***-.875***	***.569***	***-.887***
p =	.0001	.0001	.001	.0001	.001	.0001

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rho =	*.597*	**(.833)**	*.585*	**(.875)**	*.569*	**(.887)**
p =	.0001	.0001	.001	.0001	.001	.0001

Revising the "Determinants of International News Coverage in the U.S. Media": A Replication and Expansion of the 1987 Research on How the U.S. News Media Cover World Events

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Abstract

This paper is a replication of a significant study in international news coverage published in 1987 by Chang and colleagues, which examined the selection criteria of world news events by the U.S. news media. With more recent data, the present study concludes that the once highly significant variable of normative deviance has diminished in its predicting power. U.S. involvement and threats to the U.S. became the two strongest predictors for coverage in both newspapers and TV network broadcasts. Press freedom has emerged as a strong predictor for TV news coverage. Additionally, an event-driven perspective appears to be more important than context-driven perspective as world news determinants. The findings suggest a swift in how U.S. news media cover international events over time.

Introduction

Since the inception of the concept of the New World Information Order (NWIO), much research has contributed to the understanding of international information flow and news coverage of world events (Gerbner, Mowlana, & Nordenstreng, 1993). A highly influential study was published in 1987 by Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger, which theoretically outlines the determinants of international news by the U.S. media. They investigated seven predictive variables that may influence how the U.S. news media selected international events to cover. Significant predictors, according to Chang and colleagues, included normative deviance of an event, relevance to the United States, potential for social changes, and geographic distance. Poor determinants were: language affinity, press freedom, and economic system.

The present study replicates Chang et al's study as well expands its theoretical and methodological scope. Since the publication of the original study, the world has become a different place because of the fall of communism (except China, although it is on its way to adopt democracy and a free market system). World news coverage patterns in the post-Cold War era may considerably differ. In other words, the international news determinants proposed by Chang and associates may have changed significantly. Also, the growing economic and trade activities between U.S. and a number of nations have changed since 1987, which may have influenced how the U.S. media select which world events to cover. At the same time, the present study attempts to fill a number of theoretical and methodological voids, some of which were suggested by Chang et al. themselves. Thus, a new examination, with both new data and additional methods, of U.S. media's selection criteria for international events is in order.

It is important to point that this study, like the original, does not attempt to measure how editors in the U.S. news media decide which international event to cover. Such investigation should be approached by surveying the gatekeepers, and it has been conducted by a number of scholars, including Chang and his colleagues themselves (Chang & Lee, 1992, 1993; Chang, 1998). Content analysis remains an important tool to determine what is out there for the audience to consume (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998). Therefore, this method of inquiry is still widely utilized by international communication research (e.g., Wu, 2000).

Literature Review

The United States, among developed nationals, has long been accused of unfair and unbalanced news coverage of international events since the outset of the so-called New World Information Order proposed by third world countries. Notable criticism includes insufficient stories about those countries, and negative depiction of them if there is any coverage. Accordingly, these disadvantaged nationals have demanded that the Western news media provide a more adequate "quantitative presentation" and "qualitative interpretation" (Gerbner, Mowlana, & Nordenstreng, 1993).

Over the past decades, numerous investigations into the empirical patterns of international information flow in the U.S. and worldwide have engendered a rich well of literature with a variety of theoretical and methodological bases. For instance, Riffe and Shaw (1982) confirmed that most news stories in the U.S. about the Third World are negatively oriented, concentrating on political crises and upheavals. Hart (1963) suggested that Canadian newspapers are more than their U.S. counterparts to devote more space to its neighbor in North America. Likewise, British dailies are more likely to cover U.S. events than the U.S. press to cover the United Kingdom (Hart, 1966).

A landmark study of this subject was conducted by Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger and published in 1987. This study synthesized previous research and built them into a more coherent theoretical framework. There were a few important but less systematic studies published earlier. For example, Galtung and Ruge (1965) outlined and investigated the impact of 12 determinants on the newsworthiness of global affairs. They concluded that events were likely to receive coverage if they were frequent, innovative, relevant, consonant, scarce, compositional or referent to elite nations. Rosengren (1974)

introduced and examined the following concepts: cultural affinity or physical proximity of the events, the level of predictability of the event, and the level of salience of the event. In an earlier study, Rosengren (1970) urged using both intra-media and extra-media data for more accurate description and analysis.

With a political economy approach, Ostgaard (1965) argued that controls of information internally (media ownership and self-censorship) or externally (government regular or censorship) as barriers to information outflow would influence information exchange among nations. Hester (1971, 1973), approaching from an aspect of international relations, indicated that in addition to factors implicit in the new criteria (such as news simplification and identification, and sensationalization), the hierarchy of nations, news confrontations, and economic and cultural associations among nations were potential predictors of international news coverage. The hierarchy of nations was decided by factors such as the length of existence of a sovereign nation, economic development, population, and physical size. Economic association, according to Hester, refers primarily to international trade, and cultural affinity relates to a shared language.

In their 1987 research, Chang and his colleagues integrated all the factors in previous studies and grouped them into two categories: the context-oriented and event-oriented aspects of news selection. The context-oriented approach takes into account of such factors as kinship between countries (e.g., geographical distance and whether they share the same language). On the other hand, the event-orientation concept theorizes that the news characteristics (such as level of deviance) of an event carries more weight in U.S. news media's selection decision than external (contextual) factors such as kinship between U.S. and the country where an event occurred.

Chang and associates conceptualized and operationalized seven independent variables to test their predictive power on whether a news event was covered or not. Their goal was to discriminate and compare the predictive power of such variables: 1) non-native defiance of an event: 2) relevance to the United States; 3) potential for social change; 4) geographic distance; 5) language affinity; 6) press freedom; and 7) economic system. Using a discriminant analysis, they found that the first four independent variables were strong indicators for international news in either the New York Times or three major TV networks' evening news, while the last three variables were insignificant.

Additionally, they found some variations in the salience of those deciding factors between the Times and the Big Three networks. Relevance to the U.S. was the greatest discriminant for news choices in the flagship daily, followed by potential for social changes and normative deviance. On the other hand, normative deviance accounted most for news selections in the three television networks, preceding factors of relevance to the U.S. and geographic proximity. Given the outcomes, Chang and associates argued that the event-driving perspective with its implicit characteristics (simply the news criteria), was more prominent than its contextual counterpart in terms of determining why and how a particular international event was covered or not.

In another related study conducted years later, Chang and Lee (1992) unveiled the filtering process of international news events by directly surveying gatekeepers (news editors) of 279 newspapers of various sizes. The authors specifically examined how editors' perception of the importance of 12 news criteria may have influenced their selection international events. The 12 factors were: 1) threat of the event to the United States; 2) threat of events to the world; 3) reader's interest; 4) timeliness; 5) U.S.

involvement; 6) loss or lives or property; 7) human interest; 8) cultural relevance to the United States; 9) U.S. trade relations; 10) physical distance for the United States; 11) military strength of country; 12) economic development of country. The first five factors were rated "very important" by their respondents in terms of news election criteria. Loss of lives or property, human interest and cultural relevance were considered "important" by considerably fewer editors, who deem trade relations, physical distance, economic development and military strength as unimportant. Such findings were congruent with those of Chang's previous study: contextual factors were of less importance in the U.S. news media's selection of international events.

The interesting concept of deviance was generated by an earlier study by the same set of authors. They defined deviance as "a result of some act, the breaking of some norm." The normative definition of deviance therefore connoted negativity for an individual or society. They argued that this construct, which underpins the criteria of newsworthiness for both domestic and international news reporting, was positively correlated to the likelihood of being selected for coverage. In their own words: "not only are deviant people and event often considered newsworthy, but deviance is itself an integral part of the newsworthiness definition." The more deviant an event is, the morel likely it would be covered by the news media.

Although the 1987 study by Chang et al., as well as a few other research, has offered evidence an insight into why and how certain global affairs were selected for coverage in U.S. media, it did not include information or analysis of the coverage of selected events: the newshole size and location of those stories. Thus, in addition to investigating whether there has been an over time change in terms of the nature of stories

of international events that appear in the U.S. media, the present study also includes newshole assignments (the location or/and length of each story) in our analyses.

Hypothesis and Research Question

In Chang et al's original study, significant determinants for selection included relevance to the U.S., normative deviance, potential for social change and geographic distance. By contrast, determinants that were not significant were press freedom, economic system and language affinity. However, the world has changed dramatically over the past few decades, such as in terms of much closer economic ties between countries (e.g., the Euro currency) and a different political landscape in Eastern Europe (e.g., Russia and Germany). New attitudes and approaches adopted by the U.S. government and journalists toward the salience of world affairs may have changed accordingly. Therefore, the present study re-examines all the factors laid out by the original research by Chang and associates. Also, the present study tests whether the best predictor, deviance, in the original study remains the strongest determinant with more recent data. In addition, the present study incorporated an additional variable in its analyses: newshole, namely the length and/or location of the news coverage of selected world events. Three research questions and one hypothesis were generated:

RQ1: Which factors best determined whether a world event was covered.

H1: Normative deviance would remain a strong determinant for world events selection by newspapers and television networks.

RQ2: Do the two newspapers (the New York Times and Washington Post) cover

world events differently in terms of length or page location?

RQ3: Do the three TV networks cover world event differently in terms of length or order?

Method

Sampling procedure

The present research examined international news coverage in two leading U.S. newspapers (the New York Times and Washington Post) and three television networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) in 1994, which is one newspaper (the Washington Post) than what the original Chang et al study used. The population of content included all news events covered or not covered in those two major types of news media. Chang and associates' 1987 study examined news content of 1984, which was exactly 10 years older than the current data.

Chang and colleagues used Keesing's Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events in 1984, and the present study used the 1994 version of the same publication, as well as their sampling method, to maintain consistency. A total of 176 non-U.S. events were selected in the present study, and 24 of which were randomly selected to test inter-coder reliability, which turned out to be 82% using Scott's Pi. As for the news stories themselves, the present study followed the original research and obtained them from the same sources.

Major differences between the original and present study

While the original study investigated only one dichotomous dependent variable (whether an event was covered by the U.S. news media or not), the present study examined the coverage and non-coverage of an event, as well as the location or length of a story. In other words, unlike the original study with only one dependent variable (whether an event was covered in the U.S.), this present study has two variables: whether an event was covered or not, and the relevant importance of placement (location, length, or order of newscast).

Another difference between the original and present study is the coding and statistical treatment of independent variables. While using a dichotomous variable as the dependent variable in a discriminant analysis is correct, using independent variables that are dichotomous is less than ideal statistically, and may not be satisfactory conceptually. The original study treated relevance to the U.S. as a dichotomous variable, which is changed in the present research. Specifically, relevance to the U.S. was expanded into two variables (which are measured as interval rather than dichotomous variables): threat of event to the U.S. and non-threatening events. Similarly, the variable of economic system in the original study was expanded into two variables: trade relations and economic development.

This present study also added one variables: loss of lives or property, and change the name of "social change deviance" to "national change deviance."

Conceptual and operational definitions of new variables

Relevance to the United State. An event's relevance to the U.S. was one of the independent variable in Chang and associates' 1987 study. They determined whether an event was relevant to the U.S. or not as a dichotomous variable. However, in additional to the statistical reason mentioned earlier (that independent variables in a discriminant analysis should not be dichotomous), the present study argues that whether an event would threaten the national interest may influence how a news media outlet determines its newsworthiness. Thus, two new categories about relevance were generated.

Threatening event relevant to the U.S.. An event was defined as threatening to the U.S. if the occurrence of such event would negatively influence the national interest, welfare or image of the U.S. economically, politically or militarily. For instance, an Asian or European economic crisis could post potential threats to the health of the U.S. economy. This variable was measured on a 4-point scale: 1) no threat (not any action being in progress); 2) low treat (little discussion by political leaders on how to deal with it); 3) moderate threat (much discussion by political leaders on how to handle); and 4) high treat (retaliatory or protective laws or actions being initiated or taken).

Non-threatening event relevant to the U.S. This type of event is defined as relevant to the interest of the U.S. but in a positive or neutral manner (versus negative or threatening). It is also measured by a 4-point scale: 1) no involvement (in the U.S. is not mentioned in the story; 2) low involvement (if the U.S. appeared after the 5th paragraph in the text or after the 5th in order in a newscast); 3) high involvement (if the U.S. appeared in the first 2-5 paragraph or order of a newscast); and 4) very high involvement (if the U.S. appeared in the headline or news lead).

Economic system. A country's economic system may not have much to do its trade relations with the U.S. One may argue that the U.S. news media may pay more attention a country whose trade connection with the U.S. is close, regardless of how rich this country is. Also, a rich country, which by definition is influence in international politics, may not have a close trading tie to the U.S. Therefore, the old category was expanded and alternated into two new ones.

Trade relations of the foreign country with the United States. This construct was determined by the ranking of trade partnership with the U.S., which is based on the trade records issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce from 1993 (Barton, 1993). The trade relationship variable was measured on a 4-point scale: 4) very close, if the country ranked among the top 10 partners of the U.S.; 3) moderate close, if the country's rank is among 10-25; 2) close: if it is ranked 26-50; and 1) not close, if it is ranked below top 50.

Economic development of the nation. Economic development, which often initiates political change in a country, serves as a key indicator for a country's development. The degree of economic development of a nation, based on the World Bank record in 1993, was measured on a 4-point scale: 4) high-income country; 3) upper-income country; 2) middle-income country; and 1) low-income country.

Lost of lives and property in human or natural disaster. Apparently such event was included in the "potential for social change" category in the original study because it may change the status quo of a particular society. However, one may argue that a political movement is very different in nature from a flood. Also, as stated earlier, natural disasters abroad are frequently covered by the U.S. news media. Therefore, such events

deserve their own category. The old category was renamed as "*National Change Deviance*." The loss of lives and property variable was measured on a 5-point scale: 5) very severe, 4) severe, 3) moderate, 2) low, and 1) none.

Statistical Procedure

To test RQ1 (which variables determined coverage), a discriminant analysis was run, which followed the procedure of the original article. This same technique was used to test the hypothesis as well.

To answer RQ2 and 3, correlations, Chi-square tests, t-tests and ANOVAs were conducted to compare differences between two or three types of news media.

Findings

Tables 1 and 2 show the pooled within-group correlation matrix for the 10 independent variables used in the discriminant analysis. Most of the coefficients are small enough that inter-dependency is not a concern. Tow moderate coefficients are seen between potential for national change deviance and normal deviance (.73 for newspapers and .74 for television networks), and between press freedom and economic development (.54 and .55). Chang and colleagues in their 1987 study reported a very similar pattern in terms of correlation. They also found greater coefficients between potential for social change deviance and normal deviance (.56 and .57), and between press freedom and economic system (.56 and .56).

Table 3 reveals the means for the explanatory variables for the world events that were and were not covered in the U.S. media. This table shows that most means have a

higher intensity for covered events than non-covered ones for both newspapers and television networks. Also, all means have a lower intensity for not covered events than covered ones in both types of media. Tables 4 and 5 report the findings of discriminant analyses for newspapers and TV.

The chi-square tests for the group means (group centroids) of newspapers and TV networks are statistically significant (Chi-sq = 123.194 and 115.591 for newspapers and TV respectively), with $p. < .001$. This indicates the two groups of events (covered and not covered) do not have identical means and are highly differentiated from each other in the discriminant function. In other words, those factors found statistically significant are good predictors of news coverage of world events in U.S. news media.

Unexpectedly, normative deviance, which was the strongest determinant (.79) in the original study, turned out to be not as influential. Therefore, H1 was not supported.

For RQ1, two independent variables are significant for both newspapers and television networks: threat of events to the U.S. a non-threatening events. Two other variables that contribute to the discriminant function for newspapers are: potential for national change deviance and loss of lives or property. For television newscast, the additional significant variables are: press freedom and geographic proximity.

In the present study, the single most important explanatory variable for both newspaper and TV is non-threatening events to the U.S. Threat of event is the second most determinant for both types of media.

Tables 4 and 5 show the discriminant function coefficients for explanatory variables in the coverage in both types of media. For RQ1, non-threatening events relevant to the U.S. contributed the most to the discriminant function for newspapers,

followed by treat of events, potential for national change, and loss of lives and property. In the original study, relevance to the U.S. was also the strongest predictor, followed by potential for social change and normative deviance in the New York Time's coverage. By comparison, in the present study non-threatening events relevant to the U.S. is also the best determinant for network broadcast, followed by threat of event, press freedom, and geographic proximity. In the original study, the best determinant for TV news coverage was normative deviance, followed by relevance to the U.S. and geographic distance.

To test RQ2 and 3, chi-square tests show that there was no difference in page location assignment between the two newspapers ($p = .26$) or the three networks ($p = .477$). Specifically, the NYT reported 44 (25%) out of the total 176 events, and assigned 9 events to the front page, 31 to the international section, and 4 to the business section. In comparison, the Post covered 26 events, assigned 10 to the front page, 14 to the international section, and two to its business section. Among the TV networks, ABC selected 13 out of the 176 events, NBC covered only 9, while CBS chose 14.

In terms of the order of newscast, ABC assigned 5 events to be its lead stories, two to the second, zero to the third, one of the 8^{th}, and one to the 10^{th} story of the day. NBC had three as its headline, two to the second, one of the third, two to the fifth, one of the 8^{th}, and zero to the 10^{th}. CBS used six was its first story, three to the second, one as the 5^{th}, one as the 8t6h, and three as the 10^{th}. No statistically significant difference was found.

However, there is significant difference in the length of selected news events between the two newspapers ($t = -2.571$, $p = .012$). The Post is more likely than the Times to have a longer piece (1,016.50 vs. 656.55 words per story on average). The

ANOVA test showed no difference in the length of time given to covered events among the three television networks ($F = .227$. $p = .799$).

Discussion

The results as a whole differ much from those of the original study. First of all, the importance of the variable of normative deviance has changed over the years (1984 to 1994). One possible explanation is what deviance is may have switched over time. Another possibility is that a great number of countries have experienced social and political disorders between 1984 and 1994, and the huge number of such events has made each of them seem trivial to the U.S. media. One example is how fast the Japanese change their prime ministers, and such changes have become a routine and thus U.S. journalists may not find them interesting.

One more explanation for the difference between the two studies is a methodological one. The current study had some change in the level of measurement (such as not using a dichotomous variable and including more and new variables). Such difference may change the relative weigh of each variable.

The findings of the present study is in fact a lot more similar to those of a later study by Chang and Lee (1992), a survey of U.S. news editors. That study listed 12 selection criteria. It is interesting but not surprising to see that U.S. involvement and threat of event to the U.S. as the top two factors considered "very important" those editors who were surveyed. These are the same two most significant determinants for newspapers and TV networks in the present study. It is perfectly logical that when the U.S. is involved in any international event, either threatening or non-threatening, such

events will become prominent and newsworthy in the eyes of the news media in this country.

Loss of lives or property, the next most important factor ranked by surveyed editors, is also found significant in the present study between the two newspapers. Since the world went through a lot of political and social change between 1984 and 1994, naturally many lives and properties were lost or damaged in the growing confrontations and destructions in various countries.

An interesting thing was found in the comparison of Chang et al's 1987 study and the 1992 survey. Two key determinants (potential for social change and normative deviance) in the 1987 study were not included in Chang and Lee's survey.

Press freedom is found a significant factor in the present study. It functions as the central brain that influences the government's control of information inflow and outflow. The degree of press freedom may not only affect how much access to information domestic and foreign reporters would have, but also influence how they would behave on their job. Lack of press freedom indicates that the US. media may become hesitant to dispatch their news crew to certain countries where these reporters' lives and freedom may be in danger.

As for geographic proximity, considering the fact that news outlets care more about the bottom line, fewer news outlets are willing to maintain a news bureau in many countries. With a limited budget, television news editors have to decide on which countries or territories to locate their correspondents permanently or parachute them when needed. As a result, geographical proximate countries are more feasible to be covered.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the above analyses, the international news determinants have changed and differed to a certain degree from those of the original study published in 1987. The once highly significant factor (normative deviance) was dropped from the discriminant function in the present study, while other variables carried more predictive power. Nevertheless, the present study reveals a similarity to the initial research: the selected world events seem more likely to be event driven (threatening or non-threatening events) rather than context-oriented (e.g., language affinity). For example, all four significant determinants for newspapers are event-oriented: non-threatening events, threat of events, potential for national change, and loss of lives or property. However, two context-oriented variables, trade relations and economic development, are gaining strength.

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Table 1. Pooled Within-Groups Correlation Matrix for Newspapers (the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*).

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	-									
2	-.59	-								
3	.03	-.12	-							
4	.15	.06	.09	-						
5	-.03	-.18	.73	.12	-					
6	-.15	-.15	-.06	-.08	-.04	-				
7	.07	.19	.003	-.10	-.06	.40				
8	-.09	-.02	-.02	-.01	.03	.40	.23	-		
9	-.09	-.13	-.18	-.10	-.02	.54	.38	.30	-	
10	.04	-.13	.18	-.04	.20	.23	.07	.01	.07	-

Variables:
1. Threat of event to the U.S.
2. Non-threatening events
3. National change deviance
4. Loss of lives or property
5. Normative deviance
6. Press freedom
7. Geographic proximity
8. Trade relations
9. Economic development
10. Language affinity

Table 2. Pooled Within-Groups Correlation Matrix for Television Networks (ABC, CBS and NBC)

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	-									
2	-.66	-								
3	.12	-.01	-							
4	.22	-.14	.12	-						
5	.05	-.08	.74	.13	-					
6	-.15	-.14	-.07	-.09	-.06	-				
7	.07	.18	.01	-.08	-.05	.41				
8	-.07	-.002	-.02	-.01	.02	.40	.24	-		
9	-.13	-.18	-.19	-.11	-.03	.55	.37	.31	-	
10	.04	-.12	.17	-.13	.20	.23	.07	.01	.07	-

Variables:
1. Threat of event to the U.S.
2. Non-threatening events
3. National change deviance
4. Loss of lives or property
5. Normative deviance
6. Press freedom
7. Geographic proximity
8. Trade relations
9. Economic development
10. Language affinity

Table 3. Group means for Newspapers and Television Networks

	Newspapers		TV Networks	
	Covered	Not covered	Covered	Not covered
1	2.02	1.04	2.21	1.34 -
2	2.26	1.09	2.79	1.20
3	3.31	2.66	2.92	2.76
4	1.36	1.13	1.21	1.16
5	2.64	2.18	2.00	2.27
6	1.56	1.76	1.38	1.74
7	2.67	2.45	2.92	2.46
8	1.22	1.24	1.13	1.25
9	1.36	1.50	1.50	1.47
10	2.89	3.22	3.33	3.15

Variables:
1. Threat of event to the U.S.: 4-point scale (1-4)
2. Non-threatening events: 4-point scale (1-4)
3. National change deviance: 4-point scale (1-4)
4. Loss of lives or property: 5-point scale (1-5)
5. Normative deviance: 4-point scale (1-4)
6. Press freedom: 3-point scale (1-3)
7. Geographic proximity: 4-point scale (1-4)
8. Trade relations: 4-point scale (1-4)
9. Economic development: 4-point scale (1-4)
10. Language affinity: 3-point scale (1-3)

Table 4. Determinants of International Events Selection for Newspapers

Variables	Standardized Coefficients	F-value	d.f.	p.-value
Non-threatening events involveing the U.S.	.66	113.10	264	.0005
Threat of events to the U.S.	.40	101.35	264	.0005
National Change -deviance	.29	9.06	264	.003
Loss of lives or property	.09	7.30	364	.007
Normative deviance	.05	3.39	364	.067

Table 5. Determinants of International Events Selection for TV Networks

Variables	Standardized Coefficients	F-value	d.f.	p.-value
Non-threatening events involveing the U.S.	.994	114.18	397	.000
Threat of events to the U.S.	.04	60.007	397	.000
Press freedom	-.30	5.516	397	.019
Geographic proximity	-.01	4.431	397	.036
Trade relations	-.08	1.124	397	.290
Normative deviance	-.22	.684	397	.409

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