This collection of curriculum projects considers the change and modernization of China. The following 15 projects are in the collection: "Globalization in China" (Allan Cooper); "Religion and Identity in Contemporary China" (Wade H. Dazey); "China and the West: A Global Context for Chinese Immigration to the United States" (Jennifer de Forest); "How Ping Pong Helped Open 'Windows' in China: Images Depicting the History of United States-China Relations since 1970" (Kenneth B. Ebert); "Regarding the Problem of Newborn Piglets in Winter' by Chen Rong" (Nancy Gannon); "Chinese Impressions" (Michael M. Gunter); "The Opium War: Comparing Competing Historical Narratives" (Pete Hammer); "Human Rights in China" (Ken Hung); "Goals, Objectives, and Assumptions Regarding the Teaching of Intercultural Communication" (Charles Korn); "What's a Person To Think about China?????" (Michael Monley); "China: Population Analysis and Mapping" (Lallie Scott); "China: Tradition and Transformation" (Bonnie Mae Smith); "Analysis of Visuals from China" (Brenda Smith); "Chinese Views on Human Rights" (Stephen Sossaman); and "China: A Population Case Study" (Mack Van Allen). (BT)
2000 FULBRIGHT-HAYS SUMMER SEMINARS ABROAD PROGRAM

China: Tradition and Transformation

Curriculum Projects

Compiled by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations on behalf of the United States Department of Education in fulfillment of Fulbright-Hays requirements.

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Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar to China, 2000

Curriculum Project
of
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GLOBALIZATION IN CHINA

This curriculum project was prepared for my World Geography and Human Society class at Otterbein College, a course that meets a college-wide social science option for all students at the College. The purpose of the project is to highlight the growing influence of Western culture in China at the beginning of the 21st century.

Introduction

The project begins with a general overview of China as an example of a non-Western culture, citing historical events that depict China's efforts to resist the cultural and political influence of the West during the past 200 years.

A pair of women's shoes from the days when women bound their feet, purchased from the Ghost Market in Beijing, are passed around to the class. There is a brief overview of how traditional Chinese culture affected women and gender relations.

A copy of Mao's Red Book, printed in Chinese in 1966 (and purchased in Beijing) is then distributed. There is a discussion of how the communist revolution altered the role of women and gender relations in China during the 20th century, and how the Chinese Communist Party has exercised political control over China since 1946.

A 5-minute video from China's MTV equivalent, showing China's top ten videos from March 2000, is shown to the class to depict the similarities in teen culture that China shares with the USA. Most of these videos are performed by women artists, and there follows a brief analysis of how the role of women has continued to change from the days of bound feet and the Communist Revolution.
SLIDE PRESENTATION FROM SUMMER SEMINAR

The remainder of the class centers around explanations and descriptions related to 140 slides shared from the Summer Seminar. A summary of each slide is offered below:

1. Highway rush hour scene in Beijing with road signs in Chinese and English.

2. A picture of the Continental Grand Hotel, where we resided in Beijing, again with signs in Chinese and English.

3. Skyscrapers over Beijing.

4. Skyscrapers over Beijing.

5. A gardener watering grass.

6. Street scene in Beijing - cars, bikes, scooters, pedestrians, buses, rickshaws, etc.

7. Skyscraper.

8. Pepsi billboard.

9. McDonalds.

10. Another McDonalds.

11. Street scene - rickshaws, bikes, cars.

12. McDonalds at Tiananmen Square.

13. Tiananmen Square monument.

14. Tiananmen Square.

15. Tiananmen Square monument.

16. Tiananmen Square.

17. Mao’s mausoleum.

18. Entrance to Forbidden City.

19. Sign in English inside Forbidden City.

20. Chinese woman in Western attire inside Forbidden City.
21. Sign describing the Palace Museum in English language.
22. Chinese tourists inside Forbidden City.
23. Gardens inside Forbidden City.
27. Caltex office.
28. TGIF restaurant.
29. Dominos Pizza restaurant.
30. KFC in Beijing.
31. Billboard ad for Legend computers.
32. Starbucks cafe.
33. Billboard ad for Coca Cola.
34. McDonalds.
35. Another McDonalds.
36. Pizza Hut.
37. Young women in Western attire holding hands.
38. Chinese youth at phone booth.
39. Popeye Chicken.
40. Baskin Robbins.
41. Toilet hole in floor at Beijing Normal University.
42. College coed at BNU in Western attire with headphones.
43. Skyscraper in Beijing.
44. Rickshaw driver asleep.
45. Bike cart.
46. Skyscrapers in Beijing.
47. Magazine stand in Beijing.
48. Statue of Confucius.
52. Statue of Maitreya in Lama Temple in Beijing.
53-56. Lama Temple.
59. Billboard depicting European woman selling beauty products.
60. TV Tower in Beijing.
61-63. Views from TV Tower.
64. Bus with Coca Cola sign.
65. Woman on bike with daughter.
66. McDonalds.
67-72. Summer Palace scenes.
73-77. Scenes from the Great Wall.
78. Young Chinese woman at Great Wall talking on cellphone.
79. Xian caves.
80-81. Emperor’s Mausoleum at Xian.
82-87. Terra Cotta warriors.
88-89. Street scenes at Xian.
90. Car accident in Xian.
91. Street scene in Xian.
92. Woman holding baby.
93. Monument of Buddha in Xian.
94. Street scene in Xian.
95. Kenny Rogers Roasted Chicken sign in Xian.
96-102. Rural scenes near Guilen.
103. Rock marking visit to Guilen by President Bill Clinton.
104. Warning sign for tourists (in English) in Guilen.
105. Boy with monkey on head in Guilen Park.
109. Little girl helping to build sidewalk.
110-126. Li River scenes.
127-128. Shanghai skyline.
129. Colonial architecture in Shanghai.
130. Pudang modernistic skyline.
131-134. Ancient village outside Shanghai.
135-140. Skyline of Hong Kong.
Religion and Identity in Contemporary China

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Religion and Identity in Contemporary China
Curriculum Unit with Selected Bibliography

Description and Rationale

What is the situation of religion in the Peoples' Republic of China today? Is there a Chinese religion? Or, are there simply many religions in China? What, if anything, marks these religions as “Chinese?” Is there religious freedom in any way comparable to that in the United States? Or, are all religious beliefs and practices systematically suppressed? What is the government’s policy on religion? What is the government’s actual practice? Is religion a vital force in China today? Or, is religion only an irrelevant cultural remnant preserved like a museum piece in the modern socialist state? Why are some young Chinese puzzled when asked about their religion, replying that they are not sure what religion, if any, they have? What does this suggest about our definition of “religion?” Finally, what role—if any—does religion play in shaping the identity of modern Chinese?

The curriculum unit outlined below is being developed to address these and similar questions for students taking an introductory course in Eastern Religions at the University of Wisconsin, Whitewater. What follows is a progress report on this unit that is still under development. When implemented in the 2001-02 academic year it will enhance an existing course, “Introduction to Eastern Religions,” by giving students an overview of the current status of religion in the Peoples’ Republic of China.

The “Eastern Religions” course has been taught for many years and includes a standard overview of the major religions of India, China, and Japan. I am one of two professors at UW-Whitewater who regularly teach the course. In the past my sections have tended to emphasize the classical tradition, particularly with respect to China. This emphasis reflected my own graduate work in Religious Studies at a time when there was little contact with mainland China, and when most courses and books focused on the classical, elite philosophies.
The new unit on contemporary Chinese religion will build on an abbreviated version of my old China unit that began with an overview of Chinese cultural history, and went on to describe the teachings of classical Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. The contemporary China unit will incorporate new approaches and new learning objectives as well as new material.

First I will present the well-known model of religion proposed by Ninian Smart. This model will help students understand that religions are complex, and that they are worldviews with multiple interrelated aspects. Beliefs and formal doctrines are only one aspect. There are also ritual, narrative, emotional, ethical, organizational, material, political, and economic aspects—all inextricably interrelated to form the complex phenomenon we know as religion. Each of these eight aspects, or dimensions, of religion will be illustrated in the unit with examples drawn from contemporary China.

To help students understand the relationship between the individual and a religious tradition, I will present a second model that shows there are stages of religious, or spiritual, growth. This model will, no doubt, be challenging to students in that it discloses not only how religious traditions are internalized by individuals, that is, how individuals become identified with a religious group. It also shows how the individual’s faith grows and is transformed in the process, as conventional beliefs and practices of a religious tradition are reevaluated by the maturing individual and seen from a new perspective.

I have a number of specific learning objectives with respect to religion in contemporary China, as implied by the questions in the opening paragraph. The first is to have students gain an appreciation for the existence of diverse religious traditions in China today, while also learning to recognize certain enduring characteristics these Chinese religions share. Students will learn that contemporary Chinese religious diversity includes the five officially recognized religions (Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism), the traditional beliefs and practices of the Han majority (such as annual
festival and domestic rites), the beliefs and practices of over fifty recognized minority groups, and the politically-charged and controversial beliefs and practices of various religious organizations, sects, and movements not recognized—or even proscribed—by the government. This presentation of religious diversity will lead naturally to a description of the official government policy toward religions, and an exploration of the issue of religious freedom in China today.

Another objective of the unit is to explore the role of the family in Chinese religion and culture. For example, what is the importance of the family for character formation in modern China? And how has the demographic transition to single-child families changed the dynamics of the family and the character formation of children? An enduring characteristic of Chinese culture and religion has been the importance placed on the multi-generational family and on maintaining harmonious, hierarchical relationships within and between generations. The ancestor cult, or veneration of ancestor spirits, is one reflection of this in Chinese religions. Another is the sometimes submissive, sometimes rebellious, attitude of common Chinese toward political authority viewed as either a benevolent, or a corrupt, parent. Traditionally the parent-child relationship has served as the implicit model for the state and for state authority, whether in imperial China or in the modern People’s Republic under Communist Party leadership. Do contemporary Chinese religions reinforce this political model? And, if so, what are the implications of this model for China’s future?

An essential fact of modern China’s is its rapid pace of economic growth and the development of its infrastructure. This has already led to an improved standard of living for millions of middle-class Chinese, especially in the coastal cities. Nevertheless, it has also led to social changes that have jeopardized the economic security of many others. Will religious organizations have a role to play in meeting the immediate needs of those left behind by these economic and social transformations?

Prior to my participation in the 2000 Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar in China I had had no personal experience in the Peoples’ Republic of China. I had, however, traveled
fairly extensively in India and had visited Japan several times. During my travels to and from India I had also enjoyed a stay of a few days in Hong Kong. Thus my first exposure to actual life in China this past summer fulfilled a real gap in my experience of Asia. The summer seminar enlarged my understanding of modern China greatly, but also increased my curiosity about contemporary religious practice there. Unfortunately I could only glimpse something of the externals of religious practice through my brief but suggestive visits to churches, mosques, and temples. Lectures by various professors and informal talks with young Chinese and their families were suggestive, but left many aspects of religious life in contemporary unexplained. During the past few months since my visit to the PRC I have been reading more about religion in contemporary China and have tried to understand its connection with themes and issues in traditional Chinese culture.

The design of this unit takes advantage of my own—albeit limited—firsthand experience in China. I have planned the lecture topics to address some of the specific questions I have had about religion in China today, while giving a descriptive overview of the situation of religion in contemporary China generally. Lectures will be illustrated with photographic slides, and will draw on academic readings, such as those listed below, plus relevant newspaper and magazine articles. I believe students learn best when formal lecture material can be tied to personal experiences of the instructor and illustrated with appropriate visual images.

The following outline is a brief sketch of the topics and approaches I intend to follow when I next teach the course during the 2001-02 academic year. In the process of further reading and reflection I will certainly amend and elaborate on these topics. This is natural and will reflect my own growing understanding of religion in contemporary China as well my desire to include material relevant to new issues that may arise in connection with current events or trends in popular culture (such as the on-going media attention given to the Chinese government’s treatment of the Falun Gong sect or the surprising popularity of the recent film “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon.”). Titles for the sections are descriptive, but in some instances I have chosen subtitles that I believe reflect popular misunderstandings and stereotypes about Chinese religions. This is for the purpose of
to reassess their understanding of China and Chinese religion, and will spark in students an interest in the role religion plays in shaping individual and group identity...whether Chinese or their own.

Unit Outline

1. Religion and Identity: I will present and discuss two models for understanding the complexity of religious traditions and how aspects, or dimensions, of religion are internalized by individual believers to form a sense of personal and cultural identity. (For references to works explicating the two theories, please see the bibliographic entries at the end of this curriculum project under the names of the scholars mentioned.)

- Dimensions of the Sacred (as formulated by Ninian Smart)
  - Doctrinal or Philosophical Dimension
  - The Ritual Dimension
  - The Mythic or Narrative Dimension
  - The Experiential and Emotional Dimension
  - The Ethical and Legal Dimension
  - The Social Dimension
  - The Material Dimension
  - The Political Dimension
  - The Economic Dimension

- Six Stages of Faith (as developed by James W. Fowler)
  - Intuitive-Projective
  - Mythic-Literal
  - Synthetic-Conventional
  - Individuative-Reflective
  - Conjunctive
  - Universalizing

2. An Overview of Chinese Cultural History and The Elite traditions in Pre-Modern China

- The Three Scholarly Traditions (sanjia) of Former Imperial China
  - Confucianism
  - Daoism
  - Buddhism
3. Official, Organized Religion in China Today

- The Five Religions Recognized by the Government of the P.R.C. and the Five National Associations related to them:
  - Daoism: The Chinese Daoist Association
  - Buddhism: The Chinese Buddhist Association
  - Islam: The Chinese Islamic Association
  - Protestantism: The Three-Self Patriotic Movement
  - Catholicism: The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association

4. Religion workers: The Bureaucratic Hierarchy and State Regulation of Religion

  - The Five National, or Patriotic, Associations
  - The Religious Affairs Bureau (zhong jiao ju) of the State Council
  - The United Front Department
  - The Central Office of the Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Office of the State Council

5. Popular and Ethnic Religion in China Today (This often overlaps with both Official and Unofficial Religion)

- Chinese “Popular Religion” (Not part of organized religion, but tolerated or even subsidized by the government):
  - General Beliefs and Practices Shared by both the educated elites and the common people:
    - religious festivals and holidays, ancestor rites.
    - 100 Chinese gods: the city god, the god of the hearth, the god of wealth, and so on.
  - Folk Beliefs and Practices Of the common people among the Han majority

- Religion and Religious Practices of the Ethnic Minorities
  - What constitutes an ethnic minority? Or a minority religion?
  - Are the ethnic minorities being protected or exploited?
  - What are the limits to diversity in a united front, or in a united country?
6. Unofficial Religion in China Today

- Unofficial Religious Groups (Proscribed groups not recognized by the Government of the P.R.C.):
  - Underground Catholic groups with priests and bishops loyal to Rome
  - The “house church” movement among Protestant Christians
  - Various sects labeled by the government as “superstitious cults” including modern groups such as Falun Gong and Yiguan Dao, plus more traditional practices such as Qi Gong and feng shui.

7. All in the Family: the Role of the Family in Chinese Religion and Culture

- The Chinese family and family systems theory in psychology.
- Ancestor Veneration
- The Family as the Model for the State

8. Socialism with Chinese Characteristics:

- The evolution of socialist ideals: From Mo Zi to Mao and Beyond
  - Universal Love
  - The welfare of the group over that of the individual
  - Unity, harmony, and prosperity
- Is socialism a worldview that will replace religion in China?
- The economic transformation today in China: From Mao to Big Macs, and from bikes to Buicks. But, does the Chinese safety net have holes?

9. Religion with Chinese Characteristics:

  Ideology, Legitimacy and Identity
  The future role of religion in China
  Being “Chinese” in the Global Community
List of Selected Books on Religion in China


World History
China & the West: A Global Context for Chinese Immigration to the United States.

Rationale
To understand the patterns of migration that have created the America, we must also understand the economic, social and political histories of Asia. This curriculum places Chinese migration to America in its global context.

Content Goals:

• Students will understand how interaction in the 1700's and 1800's set the tone for Chinese-Western relations in the Modern era.
• Students understand the complexity of immigration.
• Students will become aware of the prevalence of institutionalized racism in California history.
• Students will understand the affect of global events on the lives of Chinese-Americans in the first half of the 20th century.
• Students will understand the increasing interdependence the world in the 20th century.

Skill Goals:

• Students will apply a theoretical framework to understand complex phenomenon.
• Students will practice primary document analysis.
• Students will be challenged to think globally to recognize patterns of cause and effect.

Instructional Plan Overview:
Note that this curriculum was designed to be taught in 5, 80-minute blocks.
Day 1-2
• Give background lecture China & The West.

Day 3-4
• Share & discuss Harry Kitano and Roger Daniel's Paradigm for Understanding Immigration
• Have students read and dissect primary documents using a set of guiding questions.

Day 5
• Gin Hawk Club Essay discussion.
Days 1-2
Lecture Notes: China & the West
(Note: These notes are meant as a guideline and can easily be adapted to highlight other events in the history of early interaction.)

You may want to begin with the following essential Question—How did interactions in the 1700’s and 1800’s set the tone for Chinese-Western relations in the Modern era?

I. Westerners arrive in Asia

Westerners head to Asia seeking spices, trade partners, and Christian converts. Portuguese arrive in India in 1498, in China in 1514, in Japan in 1543. Because the Portuguese did not have a commodity to offer in trade, they frequently resorted to piracy—Ming Chinese dubbed them “ocean devils”. It was rumored that the Portuguese bought child slaves to feast upon. The Dutch and English, also seeking to do business with the Chinese, soon followed the Portuguese.

II. The Ming Navy

You may want to give students background on the Ming Navy. In the second half of the 15th century the Chinese built vast treasure ships. However, in 1500 a law was passed forbidding the building of ships with more than 2 masts. Then, in 1521 the fleet of treasure ships is burned. Why did China pull back just as European nations were launching outward? Many contrast the Chinese and European patterns of exploration by pointing to the “Competition Factor”. In short, China was a vast area ruled by one Emperor whose decrees were absolute and there was no other Asian nation capable of filling the power vacuum China left. In contrast, Europe consisted of many competing nations. There was never a time when exploration was completely halted.

When Europeans did begin to trickle into China, their ships were dramatically smaller than China’s treasure ships. As a result, the Chinese saw early arrivals as inconsequential. Furthermore, China’s traditionally vulnerable border is to the north. Indeed, the Ming had seized power from Mongol invaders who had entered China from the north. Thus, invasion from the ocean was unexpected.

PRIMARY SOURCE #1 = Picture comparing Chinese and European ships. (I like to make an overhead of this).

III. China’s self-perception

The Chinese viewed their kingdom as the center of the world. This perception is clearly reflected in the characters for China: 中国. The first is central, the second Kingdom.
China's dominant relationship with outlying kingdoms further reinforced China's view that it was the center of the world. Vassal kings had kowtow to the emperor and paid tribute. The Chinese expected the same deference from Europeans. This made for some very interesting interactions when the Chinese and British Empires came into contact.

The arrogance of both the Chinese and British empires of this period is exemplified in the story of Lord Macartney who was sent to China in 1793. King George III sent Lord MacCartney, to demand free trade of Emperor Chien Long. As can be seen in his letter of response to this request, Chien Long was clearly contemptuous of British demands and arrogantly dismissed requests for trade.

**PRIMARY SOURCE #2 = Chien Long's letter to King George. (This and many more great China resources available at: http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/mainframe.htm)**

IV. Chinese-British Trade in the 18th & 19th centuries

Trade in the late 1700's, early 1800's clearly favored China. As Chien Long expressed, the British had nothing the Chinese wanted. In contrast, the British were addicted to tea both as a drink and as a taxable import. The resulting massive trade imbalance between the Chinese and British meant the British had to pay for tea in cash. (You can take a few interesting tangents here to point out the world’s increasing interconnectedness. For example, the tea tax is part of the global trade patterns that result in the Boston Tea Party. Also, because tea is so light British traders use “China” as ballast in ships– white porcelain becomes all the rage in England. Finally, you may want to discuss finite v. renewable resources).

For the British and other Westerners the bottom line is that they need a viable trade item. The British seized upon the idea of growing poppies in the “Jewel of their Empire”, India. They processed it into opium and imported it into China. Following their example, Americans joined in and initiated the Turkish opium trade. (One of the most successful, sailing a fast Baltimore Cutter, is Edward Delano– FDR’s maternal Grandfather. American opium profits have been traced to: the financing of the transcontinental RR, funding of Alex. G. Bell, & the endowment of Princeton University). The Manchu emperor responded to the dumping of cheap opium onto the Chinese market by appointing a drug czar, Lin Zexu, to enforce an already existing drug ban. The British and Americans responded by smuggling the opium into China. By 1835 there were 2 million Opium addicts in China. Ultimately, this led to the Opium War between China & GB (1839-1842).

Ask students to recall China’s attitude expressed by Emperor Chien Long in his letter to King George. The Emperor declared that there was no need for western technology. Partly as a result of this attitude toward outside ideas, China missed
the Industrial Revolution. The English, armed with better ships outfitted with canons, defeated the Chinese in the Opium War. As a result, the Chinese were forced to accept the first of many “unequal treaties” with western nations. This marked a major shift in power and was the beginning of imperialism in China.

**PRIMARY SOURCE #3 = The Treaty of Nanking**
(You may want to highlight the ideas of Extrateritorialism and Most Favored Nation status. Available at: http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/mainframe.htm)

By the end of the 1800’s China was severely weakened. Students should consider the following events keeping in mind that just 100 years earlier trade with the west favored China. In 1871 Russia invaded the Ili region of China and Muslim states in the area made a bid for independence. Successful in halting this movement, the Chinese were emboldened to challenge the French occupation of Vietnam. The Chinese were woefully overpowered and the French forced them to decline any claim of suzerainty over Vietnam. In 1886 the British occupied Burma and in 1887 the Chinese ceded Macao to the Portuguese. The final humiliation came in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895: a former tributary beat China, the kingdom that was eponymously the center of the world.

V. China’s internal crisis
On the heels of The Opium War China experienced an internal crisis. Her population was skyrocketing.

1650 = 150 million  
1800 = 300 million  
Late 1800’s = 450 million  

To compound problems, the Qing Dynasty was in Crisis. China did not have enough officials to govern such large numbers and the opium trade had sapped the country of its wealth. Under Empress Dowager financial abuse was widespread and she struggled just to maintain power. She was unable to address the problems facing China, public works were neglected and by 1849 the Grand Canal was impassable. The government was reduced to selling official posts to raise capital. To make matters worse, in 1852 the Yellow River flooded causing widespread famine and the Taiping rebels were gaining momentum. (You may want to point out that the flooding on the Huang He is a classic sign of dynastic decline. When nature is out of balance it indicates decay of the leader and the loss of the mandate of heaven). In 1911 China’s Imperial System collapsed & 4000 years of dynastic rule ended. In 1911 China devolved into warlord states with a titular government in Beijing. Frustrated with ineffective government & western exploitation a revolutionary movement began to grow.
VI. Revolutionary Movements
During this period, frustrated with their ineffective government and enraged by continuous foreign invasion, revolutionary movements began to build. These movements crystallized when, in 1919, as a condition of the Treaty of Versailles, the Japanese were granted Shandong. On May 4th, 1919, in response to Versailles the people exploded and, inspired by faculty and student demonstrations at Beijing University, the Chinese population was politicized. A new Chinese nationalism grew and gained strength. There was contempt among intellectuals for traditional China and her inability to modernize, militarize, and industrialize. There was always the nagging question: why had the Japanese succeeded where China had not? There was a cry for “New Culture”. The New Culture Movement included a call for revision of the Chinese language, and the adoption of Science and Democracy.

VII. New Leaders Emerge
China needed new leadership. The urban population was politicized and the peasantry, suffering from floods, famine, and high taxes, were ready for revolution. In 1919 Sun Yat Sen formed the Guomindong (KMT) and, inspired by the Russian Revolution, in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) coalesced. Led by Chiang Kai Shek after the death of Sun Yat Sen, the KMT army fought their way north, and in 1926 established the capital in Nanking, reunifying China. (This is referred to as both “the Northern Expedition” and “The nationalist Revolution”). After their success the KMT broke all relations with the CCP and in 1927 began a brutal suppression of communists. This repression led the Communists to undertake the legendary “Long March” to Yenan, an isolated and unwanted region of China. Here the CCP forged their identity and their strategy, “The Mass Line”. The Mass Line includes the advocacy of literacy, land reform, and strong opposition to the Japanese. The Japanese invaded China in 1937 and brutally attacked the people of Nanking in what has come to be called “the Rape of Nanking”.

23
Days 3-4
Share & discuss Harry Kitano and Roger Daniel's *Paradigm for Understanding Immigration*

Immigration is both an individual and an international event. For the purposes of our study we will borrow historians Harry Kitano and Roger Daniel’s paradigm; found in the introduction to their 1988 book *Asian Americans: Emerging Minorities*.

Kitano and Daniels’ assert immigration is created by interactions among the following elements: motivation for migration, reactions of the host society, adaptive patterns of migrants, time of immigration, and conditions in the homeland. Immigration can be effectively studied, they say, by considering:

- Factors internal to the ethnic group
- Factors in the host society that will influence the adaptation of immigrant groups

Before providing students Kitano and Daniels’ “factors” you may want to challenge them to create lists of their own. They can then compare their ideas to Kitano and Daniels’ listed below.

I. Factors internal to the ethnic group

1. Historical circumstances, including motivations for migration, goals and expectations.
2. Demographic factors, such as age, number, sex ratio, education, training and skills.
3. Cultural factors, including language, values, social class background, urban-rural experiences, religion and life-styles.
4. Family and community cohesion, resources, power, and alternative opportunities.
5. Home country factors, such as power, stage of development, and status of mother country.

II. Factors in the host society that will influence the adaptation of immigrant groups

1. Governmental policies.
2. The raising of barriers, including prejudice and discrimination.
3. The relationship of the host nation to the mother country.
4. The reaction of other ethnic groups.

After reviewing Kitano and Daniels' factors students can be challenged to consider the content of the previous classes. You may want to ask: from your knowledge of East Asia and considering Kitano and Daniels’ paradigm for immigration, what can you predict
about Chinese immigration? Students may conjecture widespread, corruption and poverty acted as an immigration “push”. With a little prompting they should also realize that the California Gold Rush would act as a “pull”. You may want to share with students that the Chinese name for California is “golden mountain”: 金山

Keeping in mind the paradigm of immigration above, students can dive into the study of immigration. Students should come to understand the primary and fundamental role early Chinese immigrants played in the development of America’s West. Note that Ronald Takaki’s book Strangers from a Different Shore is an excellent source on this topic.

You may want to give students some or all of the following history of Chinese in America.

• The Pull of Hawaii’s Sugar Plantations

White American men went to Hawaii in the 1830’s to create sugar plantations. Students should be reminded that Hawaii was a thriving kingdom well before America annexed it. Students should be asked to comment on the American compulsion to clear lands for fear that it will “lie in waste”. Plantation owners originally employed native Hawaiians to clear the land and work their fields, but soon deemed them “inefficient”. Because they had other means of survival and their own communities, Hawaiians were “difficult to control”. Thus, plantation owners went looking for a new source of labor. Students should be shown a map of the Pacific Rim and asked: if you were a plantation owner, knowing what you do of conditions in East Asia in the 1830’s, where would you go for labor? Students may predict that plantation owners sent labor recruiters first to China. Recall conditions in China at this time were harsh and by the end of the 1830’s China was embroiled in the Opium War with Britain. Furthermore, the Chinese have a history of immigration. Despite Ming and Qing Dynasty laws forbidding immigration, the “Chinese Diaspora” resulted in large Chinese communities all over South East Asia. Initially most immigrants to Hawaii were from the province of Guandong where the people were suffering as the result of explosive population growth. (Recall the discussion of China’s “internal crisis”). In 1787 the population of Guandong was 16 million, by 1850 is was 28 million: an increase of 76%.

Students should be introduced to the conditions under which Chinese emigrated. Most were poor and unable to pay for their own passage. If a man sailed as a contract laborer to a specific plantation his transport was “free”. “Free” because while he did not pay for his ticket he did sign a contract that made him an indentured servant for anywhere from one to three years. Other Chinese men used the credit ticket system to fund their trip. In this system a broker (frequently a Chinese already in America) paid for the man’s passage and required repayment at a steep interest rate. A few adventurous merchants did fund their own travel.

It is important for students to notice that virtually all early immigrants were men.

Students should be prodded to recall the role of women in Confucian tradition and asked
how Confucianism could affect immigration patterns. In her book, Chinese Women of America, Judy Yung points out that according to the “three obediences” a Chinese woman first obeyed her father, then her husband, and finally her eldest son. Furthermore, Yung reminds us, Chinese women were encouraged to take the example of Boji (ca. 580 BCE) to heart. Even when trapped in a fire, Boji did not leave her home— it would not have been proper for her to go out unchaperoned. The not too subtle message is that Chinese women were expected to remain at home— ultimately, it will be her responsibility to care for her husband’s aging parents. You may want to ask students to consider how having no women present will affect early Chinese American communities.

• The Pull of California’s Gold Rush
Like all other immigrants to California after the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill, Chinese came full of hope. Initially Chinese were welcomed as they provided labor to work the mines. While some tried to stake their own plots they found that they were provided little protection by the authorities and were vulnerable to violence and robbery. Some Chinese found the only plots they could work undisturbed were either extremely remote or virtually barren. Facing the conditions, many Chinese abandoned the search for gold and made a living providing services to the miners as cooks, or laundrymen. Students should be challenged to consider why, despite a rising tide of racism, these jobs were open to Chinese men. Cooking and laundering are traditionally women’s work: white men were not bothered if Chinese men did women’s work.

The gold rush caused a flood of people into California. Consider the following data on the growth of the Chinese in California. In 1849, 325 Chinese emigrated to California. In 1850, 450 more came. In 1851, 2716 Chinese arrived. Then, in 1852, 20,026 Chinese emigrated to California. By 1870 there were 63,000 Chinese living in the United States: 77% were in California. The Chinese accounted for 25% of California’s entire workforce in 1877: 45% of them live in “Dai Fou”, literally “Big City”, or San Francisco. Other large Chinese settlements were in Sacramento, or “Yee Fou”, “Second City” and Stockton, or “Sam Fou”, “Third City”.

• The Transcontinental Railroad
California’s gold rush came to an abrupt halt and many Chinese were left with no way to make a living. Vulnerable and in dire need of an income, many signed on with the Central Pacific Railroad (CPR) to lay track for the transcontinental line out of Sacramento. By 1865, CPR employed 12,000 Chinese men. CPR managers were ruthless and forced Chinese laborers to work through the bitter winter of 1866. The CPR had a historically generous deal with the government that granted them land alongside the track they laid. Thus, they wanted to meet the company laying track from the other coast as far east as possible. Forced to live and work in the freezing tunnels many Chinese laborers died in the winter of 1866. Appalled by conditions, the Chinese workers organized and went on strike. The CPR responded by imprisoning them in camps with no provisions. The Chinese finally gave in when the CPR began importing black workers from the east coast. It is important that students do not only see the Chinese workers as victims. While they were unfairly treated, they also fought for their rights. In 1869, when the two ends of the transcontinental railroad were connected at Promontory Point
Utah, the laborers were released. Not even allowed to ride the trains back west, most walked to San Francisco. San Francisco, with a rich supply of cheap labor, soon became a center of industry and by 1872, 50% of the men working in San Francisco’s factories were Chinese.

• Ethnic Enclaves
As we discussed earlier, the Gold Rush caught the imagination of both people living across the expanse of America and the expanse of the Pacific Ocean. As the number of Chinese in San Francisco grew in the mid-1800’s a population large enough to support an urban neighborhood coalesced. The population was also large enough to support Chinese businesses, especially groceries and restaurants. To provide products for the retailers, businessmen, sensing opportunity, became importers. To serve those making disposable income and to satisfy a new taste among the rich white population for Chinese exotica, the first Chinese art importer opened his gallery in 1866. By 1884 a large enough number of Chinese children, 35, were in residence in Chinatown to necessitate the opening of a Chinese school. The school explicitly taught children Confucian traditions in an effort to prepare them to return to China. Students should be asked to consider how Confucian values will “fit” in America. How will they challenge a more Americanized second generation? Or, third generation? Or, fourth generation? Students should consider what allows some traditions to endure while others disappear.

After the Gold Rush Chinatown became a manufacturing center and the site of factories producing a variety of products: clothes, shoes, and cigars. Chinatown also offered a place of respite for all Asian migrant farm workers. Unfortunately, many came to Chinatown with hard-earned wages, visited the brothels and gambling houses, and left broke.

It should be stressed with students that Chinatown was internally regulated. Adopting a form of communal governance from China, residents formed District Associations. Member in each association came from the same region in China. The associations helped newcomers, provided assistance to those in need, and developed into Chinatown’s de facto governing body. In 1862, six Chinese District Associations formed the Chinese Six Companies, also known as the Chinese Benevolent Association. The Chinese Six Companies represented California’s Chinese population. They challenged discriminatory laws by hiring liberal white lawyers and fought unequal treatment.

It is important that students realize the racism in California against Chinese was systemic and not just expressed in individual acts. This can be made clear through the analysis of a series of primary documents. Students can prepare for this work with an introduction to the analysis of primary documents. (For this purpose you may want to use the guidelines suggested by the Library of Congress. This methodology is available online at: learning.loc.gov/ammem/ndlpedu/lessons/psources/studqsts.html. Briefly, it introduces students to various forms of sources: primary, secondary, photos, oral testimony, etc. It also offers questions students can ask that guide the dissection of primary sources.) Some of the sources you may choose to ask students to review include: The Burlingame-Seward Treaty, The Page Act, The Chinese Exclusion Act, The Cubic Air Ordinance,
The Scott Act, The Geary Act, and The Gentlemen’s Agreement. (PRIMARY SOURCE #4-
Many more are available online at the Library of Congress’ “American Memory” site:
www.ammem.com. U.C. Berkeley also has a project to put resources on the web at
www.itp.berkeley.edu/~asam121/timeline.html. An excerpt of the Chinese Exclusion
Act is appended).

Day 5
The Gin Hawk Club Essay Contest

In 1936 the Gin Hawk Club of New York sponsored an essay contest for Chinese
Americans. They asked entrants to answer the question “Does my future lie in China or
America?” (PRIMARY SOURCE #10-11: Essays originally appeared in Chinese Digest in
May 1936. Copies are appended).

Before reading the winners of the contest, students can consider the implications of the
question. What does the question reveal about opportunities for Chinese Americans in
the 1930’s? Furthermore, students should consider what is occurring in China in 1936
and speculate on whether this will color the winners’ responses.

The essays are invaluable documents as they cut to the heart of what it meant to be a
Chinese American in the first half of the century. They personalize world history and the
intimate connection between China and America.

28
PRIMARY SOURCES

World History
China & the West: A Global Context for Chinese Immigration to the United States.

PRIMARY SOURCE #1 = Picture comparing Chinese and European ships.
PRIMARY SOURCE #2 = Chien Long's letter to King George
PRIMARY SOURCE #3 = The Treaty of Nanking
PRIMARY SOURCE #4 = Text of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act
PRIMARY SOURCE #5-6: Gin Hawk club Essays
PRIMARY SOURCE #2
Two Edicts From The Emperor
September 1793, On The Occasion Of Lord Macartney's Mission To China

(a)
You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have dispatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial. Your Envoy has crossed the seas and paid his respects at my Court on the anniversary of my birthday. To show your devotion, you have also sent offerings of your country's produce.

I have perused your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is couched reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy. In consideration of the fact that your Ambassador and his deputy have come a long way with your memorial and tribute, I have shown them high favour and have allowed them to be introduced into my presence. To manifest my indulgence, I have entertained them at a banquet and made them numerous gifts. I have also caused presents to be forwarded to the Naval Commander and six hundred of his officers and men, although they did not come to Peking, so that they too may share in my all-embracing kindness.

As to your entreaty to send one of your nationals to be accredited to my Celestial Court and to be in control of your country's trade with China, this request is contrary to all usage of my dynasty and cannot possibly be entertained. It is true that Europeans, in the service of the dynasty, have been permitted to live at Peking, but they are compelled to adopt Chinese dress, they are strictly confined to their own precincts and are never permitted to return home. You are presumably familiar with our dynastic regulations. Your proposed Envoy to my Court could not be placed in a position similar to that of European officials in Peking who are forbidden to leave China, nor could he, on the other hand, be allowed liberty of movement and the privilege of corresponding with his own country; so that you would gain nothing by his residence in our midst.

Moreover, Our Celestial dynasty possesses vast territories, and tribute missions from the dependencies are provided for by the Department for Tributary States, which ministers to their wants and exercises strict control over their movements. It would be quite impossible to leave them to their own devices. Supposing that your Envoy should come to our court, his language and national dress differ from that of our people, and there would be no place in which he might reside. It may be suggested that he might imitate the Europeans permanently resident in Peking and adopt the dress and customs of China, but, it has never been our dynasty's wish to force people to do things unseemly and inconvenient. Besides, supposing I sent an Ambassador to reside in your country, how could you possibly make for him the requisite arrangements? Europe consists of many other nations besides your own: if each and all demanded to be represented at our Court, how could we possibly consent? The thing is utterly impracticable. How can our dynasty alter its whole procedure and regulations, established for more than a century, in order to meet your individual views? If it be said that your object is to exercise control over your country's trade, your nationals have had full liberty to trade at Canton for many a year,
and have received the greatest consideration at our hands. Missions have been sent by Portugal and Italy, preferring similar requests. The Throne appreciated their sincerity and loaded them with favours, besides authorizing measures to facilitate their trade with China. You are no doubt aware that, when my Canton merchant, Wu Chaoping, was in debt to the foreign ships, I made the Viceroy advance the monies due, out of the provincial treasury, and ordered him to punish the culprit severely. Why then should foreign nations advance this utterly unreasonable request to be represented at my Court? Peking is nearly 10,000 li from Canton, and at such a distance what possible control could any British representative exercise?

If you assert that your reverence for Our Celestial dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy might become, nothing would be gained thereby.

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated unto every country under Heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. This then is my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my Court, a request contrary to our dynastic usage, which would only result in inconvenience to yourself. I have expounded my wishes in detail and have commanded your tribute Envoys to leave in peace on their homeward journey. It behoves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in the future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter. Besides making gifts (of which I enclose a list) to each member of your Mission, I confer upon you, O King, valuable presents in excess of the number usually bestowed on such occasions, including silks and curios--a list of which is likewise enclosed. Do you reverently receive them and take note of my tender goodwill towards you! A special mandate.

You, O King from afar, have yearned after the blessings of our civilization, and in your eagerness to come into touch with our converting influence have sent an Embassy across the sea bearing a memorial. I have already taken note of your respectful spirit of submission, have treated your mission with extreme favour and loaded it with gifts, besides issuing a mandate to you, O King, and honouring you with the bestowal of valuable presents. Thus has my indulgence been manifested. Yesterday your Ambassador petitioned my Ministers to memorialize me regarding your trade with China, but his proposal is not consistent with our dynastic usage and cannot be entertained. Hiterto, all European nations, including your own country's
barbarian merchants, have carried on their trade with Our Celestial Empire at Canton. Such has been the procedure for many years, although Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce. But as the tea, silk, and porcelain which the Celestial Empire produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to yourselves, we have permitted, as a signal mark of favour, that foreign hongs* should be established at Canton, so that your wants might be supplied and your country thus participate in our beneficence. But your Ambassador has now put forward new requests which completely fail to recognize the Throne's principle to "treat strangers from afar with indulgence," and to exercise a pacifying control over barbarian tribes, the world over. Moreover, our dynasty, swaying the myriad races of the globe, extends the same benevolence towards all. Your England is not the only nation trading at Canton. If other nations, following your bad example, wrongfully importune my ear with further impossible requests, how will it be possible for me to treat them with easy indulgence? Nevertheless, I do not forget the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your inexcusable ignorance of the usages of Our Celestial Empire. I have consequently commanded my Ministers to enlighten your Ambassador on the subject, and have ordered the departure of the mission. But I have doubts that, after your Envoy's return he may fail to acquaint you with my view in detail or that he may be lacking in lucidity, so that I shall now proceed to take your requests one by one and to issue my mandate on each question separately. In this way you will, I trust, comprehend my meaning.

1. Your Ambassador requests facilities for ships of your nation to call at Ningpo, Chusan, Tientsin and other places for purposes of trade. Until now trade with European nations has always been conducted at Macao, where the foreign hongs are established to store and sell foreign merchandise. Your nation has obediently complied with this regulation for years past without raising any objection. In none of the other ports named have hongs been established, so that even if your vessels were to proceed thither, they would have no means of disposing of their cargoes. Furthermore, no interpreters are available, so you would have no means of explaining your wants, and nothing but general inconvenience would result. For the future, as in the past, I decree that your request is refused and that the trade shall be limited to Macao.

2. The request that your merchants may establish a repository in the capital of my Empire for the storing and sale of your produce is even more impracticable than the last. My capital is the hub and centre about which all quarters of the globe revolve. Its ordinances are most august and its laws are strict in the extreme. The subjects of our dependencies have never been allowed to open places of business in Peking. Foreign trade has hitherto been conducted at Macao, because it is conveniently near the sea, and therefore an important gathering place for the ships of all nations sailing to and from. If warehouses were established in Peking, the remoteness of your country lying far to the northwest of my capital, would render transport extremely difficult. Possessing facilities at Macao, you now ask for further privileges at Peking, although our dynasty observes the severest
restrictions respecting the admission of foreigners within it boundaries, and has never permitted the subjects of dependencies to cross the Empire's barriers and settle at will amongst the Chinese people. This request is also refused.

3. Regarding your nation's worship of the Lord of Heaven, it is the same religion as that of other European nations. Ever since the beginning of history, sage Emperors and wise rulers have bestowed on China a moral system and inculcated a code, which from time immemorial has been religiously observed by the myriads of my subjects. There has been no hankering after heterodox doctrines. Even the European (missionary) officials in my capital are forbidden to hold intercourse with Chinese subjects; they are restricted within the limits of their appointed residences, and may not go about propagating their religion. The distinction between Chinese and barbarian is most strict, and your Ambassador's request that barbarians shall be given full liberty to disseminate their religion is utterly unreasonable.

It may be, O King, that the above proposals have been wantonly made by your Ambassador on his own responsibility, or perhaps you yourself are ignorant of our dynastic regulations and had no intention of transgressing them when you expressed these wild ideas and hopes. I have ever shown the greatest condescension to the tribute missions of all States which sincerely yearn after the blessings of civilization, so as to manifest my kindly indulgence. I have even gone out of my way to grant any requests which were in any way consistent with Chinese usage. Above all, upon you, who live in a remote and inaccessible region, far across the spaces of ocean, but who have shown your submissive loyalty by sending this tribute mission, I have heaped benefits far in excess of those accorded to other nations. But the demands presented by your Embassy are not only a contradiction of dynastic tradition, but would be utterly unproductive of good result to yourself, besides being quite impracticable. I have accordingly stated the facts to you in detail, and it is your bounden duty reverently to appreciate my feelings and to obey these instructions henceforward for all time, so that you may enjoy the blessings of perpetual peace. If, after the receipt of this explicit decree, you lightly give ear to the representations of your subordinates and allow your barbarian merchants to proceed to Chekiang and Tientsin, with the object of landing and trading there, the ordinances of my Celestial Empire are strict in the extreme, and the local officials, both civil and military, are bound reverently to obey the law of the land. Should your vessels touch shore, your merchants will assuredly never be permitted to land or to reside there, but will be subject to instant expulsion. In that event your barbarian merchants will have had a long journey for nothing. Do not say that you were not warned in due time! Tremblingly obey and show no negligence! A special mandate!
PRIMARY SOURCE #3
The Treaty Of Nanking Aug. 1842

Article I
There shall henceforth be Peace and Friendship between ...(England and China) and between their respective Subjects, who shall enjoy full security and protection for their persons and property within the Dominions of the other.

Article II
His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees that British Subjects, with their families and establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the purpose of carrying on their commercial pursuits, without molestation or restraint at the Cities and Towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai, and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., will appoint Superintendents or Consular Officers, to reside at each of the above-named Cities or Towns, to be the medium of communication between the Chinese Authorities and the said Merchants, and to see that the just Duties and other Dues of the Chinese Government as hereafter provided for, are duly discharged by Her Britannic Majesty's Subjects.

Article III
It being obviously necessary and desirable, that British Subjects should have some Port whereat they may careen and refit their Ships, when required, and keep Stores for that purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., the Island of Hong-Kong, to be possessed in perpetuity by her Britannic Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors, and to be governed by such Laws and Regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., shall see fit to direct.

Article V
The Government of China having compelled the British Merchants trading at Canton to deal exclusively with certain Chinese Merchants called Hong merchants (or Cohong) who had been licensed by the Chinese Government for that purpose, the Emperor of China agrees to abolish that practice in future at all Ports where British Merchants may reside, and to permit them to carry on their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please, and His Imperial Majesty further agrees to pay to the British Government the sum of Three Millions of Dollars, on account of Debts due to British Subjects by some of the said Hong Merchants (or Cohong) who have become insolvent, and who owe very large sums of money to Subjects of Her Britannic Majesty.

Article VII
It is agreed that the Total amount of Twenty-one Millions of Dollars, described in the three preceding Articles, shall be paid as follows:
Six Millions immediately. Six Millions in 1843... Five Millions in 1844... Four Millions in 1845...
Article IX
The Emperor of China agrees to publish and promulgate, under his Imperial Sign Manual and Seal, a full and entire amnesty and act of indemnity, to all Subjects of China on account of their having resided under, or having had dealings and intercourse with, or having entered the Service of Her Britannic Majesty, or of Her Majesty's Officers, and His Imperial Majesty further engages to release all Chinese Subjects who may be at this moment in confinement for similar reasons.

Article X
His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to establish all the Ports which are by the 2nd Article of this Treaty to be thrown open for the resort of British Merchants, a fair and regular Tariff of Export and Import Customs and other Dues, which Tariff shall be publicly notified and promulgated for general information, and the Emperor further engages, that when British Merchandise shall have once paid at any of the said Ports the regulated Customs and Dues agreeable to the Tariff, to be hereafter fixed, such Merchandise may be conveyed by Chinese Merchants, to any Province or City in the interior of the Empire of China on paying further amount as Transit Duties which shall not exceed ___ percent on the tariff value of such goods. (Note: Tariff schedules were not settled at this time. The tariff rates on various goods were fixed after further discussions; they averaged about five percent.)

Important Additional Privileges Granted to Foreigners in Subsequent Treaties
Most Favored Nation Status (Article VIII of the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue, between China and Great Britain, signed October 8, 1843)

The Emperor of China, having been graciously pleased to grant to all foreign Countries whose Subjects, or Citizens, have hitherto traded at Canton the privilege of resorting for purposes of Trade to the other four Ports of Fuchow, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai, on the same terms as the English, it is further agreed, that should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any of the Subjects or Citizens of such Foreign Countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended to and enjoyed by British Subjects; but it is to be understood that demands or requests are not, on this plea, to be unnecessarily brought forward.
PRIMARY SOURCE #4

Text of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act
Forty-Seventh Congress, Session I. 1882

Whereas, in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory thereof: Therefore, be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the expiration of ninety days next after the passage of this act, and until the expiration of ten years next after the passage of this act, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be, and the same is hereby, suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to come, or, having so come after the expiration of said ninety days, to remain within the United States.

SEC. 2. That the master of any vessel who shall knowingly bring within the United States on such vessel, and land or permit to be landed, and Chinese laborer, from any foreign port of place, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars for each and every such Chinese laborer so brought, and may be also imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year.

SEC. 8. That the master of any vessel arriving in the United States from any foreign port or place shall, at the same time he delivers a manifest of the cargo, and if there be no cargo, then at the time of making a report of the entry of vessel pursuant to the law, in addition to the other matter required to be reported, and before landing, or permitting to land, any Chinese passengers, deliver and report to the collector of customs of the district in which such vessels shall have arrived a separate list of all Chinese passengers taken on board his vessel at any foreign port or place, and all such passengers on board the vessel at that time. Such list shall show the names of such passengers (and if accredited officers of the Chinese Government traveling on the business of that government, or their servants, with a note of such facts), and the name and other particulars, as shown by their respective certificates; and such list shall be sworn to by the master in the manner required by law in relation to the manifest of the cargo. Any willful refusal or neglect of any such master to comply with the provisions of this section shall incur the same penalties and forfeiture as are provided for a refusal or neglect to report and deliver a manifest of cargo.

SEC. 11. That any person who shall knowingly bring into or cause to be brought into the United States by land, or who shall knowingly aid or abet the same, or aid or abet the landing in the United States from any vessel of any Chinese person not lawfully entitled to enter the United States, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year.

SEC. 14. That hereafter no State court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.

SEC. 15. That the words "Chinese laborers", whenever used in this act, shall be construed to mean both skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining.

Approved, May 6, 1882.
Throughout the early years of the life of any American-born Chinese, he or she is constantly confronted with an important problem, the decision of which will inevitably influence, if not determine his or her future happiness and success. The problem has been well-expressed in the question: "Does My Future Lie in China or America?"

Having been born in America (Roxbury, Mass., 1915), I, too, have been haunted with this problem. Which road should I choose? Which is more advantageous? Which road would lead to more happiness and greater success?

After having given this fundamental problem some thought, I have found that it really resolves itself into four minor problems: First, that of allegiance or patriotism, or race; second, that of service; third, that of employment; and, finally, that of civilization, or culture. Without a consideration of these four significant problems, I believe an answer to the main problem is quite incomplete and inadequate. I propose, therefore, to discuss them as fully as the limited length of this essay will permit.

In determining whether my future is to be in China or America, I have naturally come to ponder the question: To which of these two countries do I owe allegiance? Which country am I obliged to serve?

Ever since I can remember, I have been taught by my parents, by my Chinese friends, and by my teacher in Chinese school, that I must be patriotic to China. They have said: "You should be proud of China's four thousand years of glorious and continuous history, of her four hundred million population, and of her superior culture and civilization. You must be thankful for the traditions and customs you have inherited as a member of the yellow race. What is more, you would not be living if it were not for your ancestors and parents who are Chinese. Most certainly, then, you are obliged to render service to China, especially in these days of need and stress and humiliation. Don't you realize that the Chinese are mocked at, trodden upon, disrespected, and even spit upon? Haven't you yourself been called degrading names? Have you no face, no sense of shame, no honor? How can you possibly think of staying in America to serve it?"

Now, I do not wish to contradict or oppose these assertions as being unsound. Somehow, however, I feel there is another side to the picture. I owe much pride and gratitude to America for the principles of liberty and equality which it upholds, for the protection its government has given me, and for its schools and institutions in which I have participated. Without them, I certainly would not be what I am now. If Americans have called me names, so have the Chinese who speak of me scornfully as being a "native" (t'oa jee doy) and as knowing nothing of things Chinese.

True, many regard me highly because I am a junior at Harvard; but I can say without ostentation that my American friends also respect me as a student. In fact, they give me more respect because I am Chinese. Whatever I do in school and college in the way of extra-curricular activities or of attaining high grades, I am given much more credit and popularity than an American would receive if he did the same things. Being a
Chinese among American friends, then, is a sort of advantage. There are, then, two sides of the picture: I am certainly as much indebted to America as I am to China.

If this is true, then I should serve both equally; but is this possible if I choose a future that lies in America? Certainly, one cannot help China by building a bridge or opening a factory in America; one cannot serve China by curing American patients; one is not aiding China by practicing his principles of government, sociology, or economics in America. It is true, however, that almost every overseas Chinese who has entered college is studying in one of these fields. They all evidently are planning their futures in China; but could we justly condemn them as showing no allegiance to China if they later decided to stay in America to put their studies into practice? I think not, provided they serve China in some other way.

I mean to say that even though one practices his profession in America, he can still serve China by building up a good impression of the Chinese among Americans, by spreading goodwill and clearing up misunderstandings, by interesting the Americans in the Chinese through personal contacts or otherwise, and, if necessary, by contributing generously to the financing of worthy enterprises in China. These are services of inestimable value. These are services which may be even more worthy than the services of those who do their life work in China. It is possible, then, to pay the debt one owes to China and show one's allegiance to Chinese even while living in America.

What of those who would like to find a life-work in America? What are the opportunities for employment? Is it to be contended that a Chinese will be welcomed into American employment as cordially as into positions in China? The facts seem to indicate the opposite. Chinese students have indubitably found it difficult to get employment, to say nothing of getting the more elevated and higher-paying positions.

My brother, a graduate of M.I.T. last year, failed to receive a single favorable reply from different companies to which he sent letters of application for employment. He has returned to China and now has a position with the Nanking government. What shall I say to this? I can say my brother was merely fortunate, as he himself admits in his letter. He was lucky to have a sister who is married to someone connected with the government. In other words, he was given a "pull" up the ladder, a necessary force which most overseas Chinese do not have.

In his last letter, my brother warned me that positions are so few that even men with Ph.D.'s and M.S.'s and M.A.'s are without work. It is evident, then, that employment is hard to get anywhere; in America, perhaps because of the color line; in China because jobs are scarce. The color line, however, does not entirely prevent the American-born Chinese from getting jobs. The chances are small, to be sure, but as in China, there are some opportunities open to certain fortunate people. It cannot be said, therefore, that it is impossible for Chinese American youths to obtain remunerative positions in either China or America.

If there are possibilities for profitable employment in both countries, then I see no reason why I should not choose a future for myself in America if it happens that I like it better here, or if I happen to be acclimated to the modes of life and social environment here. True, if I receive employment in China, it would almost surely be one of the large coastal cities where there are modern conveniences such as electric lights, running water, quick transportation, and means of sanitary and healthful living. The two civilizations can
hardly be said to be conflicting in the material sense, except in minor details. The real harmful conflict is between the two different cultures, the two different outlooks upon life, which, together with the language difficulty, will tend to bring social estrangement to the returning overseas Chinese, whether boy or girl.

If I am to spend my future in China, there must come a time when I shall have to make contacts there. Years of lonesomeness will intervene before I shall be able to speak Mandarin or Cantonese with considerable fluency. Even then, I am afraid my endeavors to make real intimate friendships will fall short of their goals and will merely end in casual acquaintanceships. I have been brought up to live by Christian ideals, by liberal attitudes, and by an optimistic outlook on life.

I think I shall be able to make few close relationships with the young men and women of China, for their background is of utilitarian ideals, conservative attitudes, and of a fatalistic outlook upon life. When these two cultures conflict and clash, the inevitable result is either social estrangement, or a yielding of one culture to the other, a process which is sure to engender much unhappiness, discontent, and despondency.

I have not, perhaps, expressed this point clearly; but I can say that I feel the clash of cultures within me even now, because I live with my father and I contact many Chinese friends who represent the pure Chinese culture. My relatives are also of a different background than myself, and they all advise that I make friends, not for friendship's sake, but with a hope that they will help me get a job sometime. They object openly or become suspicious when I am seen walking with a girl. They pour contempt upon religion, especially upon Christianity, and fail to see the preciousness and value of the individual life. This culture and attitude is contrary to mine, and I fear that I shall be unhappy in the process of yielding to it.

With the conclusion, then, that I owe America as much allegiance as I do China; that it is possible to serve China while living in America; that remunerative employment, though scarce, is not impossible for me to obtain in either China or America; and that I would avoid the unhappiness and social estrangement due to conflicting cultures by staying in America; I think no one could justly accuse me of being unwise if I chose a course of life whose future lies here in America.

When the conquest of new territory in the United States had stretched to the limits of the Pacific, the old adage of "Go West, Young Man" no longer became applicable to the American youth. Through necessity the modern generation concentrated on the intense development of natural resources and greater industrialization. As the population multiplied, competition for jobs increased, and when the world depression set in the unemployment situation grew acute, resulting in the accentuated distaste for Oriental rivalry in every type of work. As a result the present generation of American-born Chinese absorbed a bitter diet of racial prejudice.

I have learned to acknowledge that the better jobs are not available to me and that the advancement of my career is consequently limited in this fair land. As I express my desire to return to China to create a career, however, I am constantly being reminded that I am American as American can be, that I shall deplore China's lower standard of living, that the chaos of China's government offers me no promise of economic security. In other words I shall be leaping from the proverbial frying pan into the fire, for in the United States I am at least assured a decent livelihood. As proof of this contention they bring to my notice numerous cases of American-born Chinese who have spun the wheel of chance in old Cathay and have returned to the States sadly disillusioned. These arguments have been impressive, but somehow I refuse to be convinced. And, it is for me "Go Further West, Young Man." Yes, across the Pacific and to China.

What then constitutes the lure that beckons me to return, for I'm certainly not a vagabond of impractical hankerings? It is certain that I'm not planning to return just for the pleasure jaunt, for I'm not financially equipped to tour the Orient. Again, I'm not an idealist who responds to the hue and cry of the propagandist, for impassioned slogans, such as "Make the world safe for Democracy," "Your country needs you," etc., leave me coldly unresponsive.

You may condemn me as lacking in patriotism. From one viewpoint, yes. From mine, no, for I am of the belief that I can be of greater service to China by being methodically practical instead of resorting to oratorical displays of vehemence or meaningless pledges of unflinching loyalty. After all, words are cheap.

My patriotism is of a different hue and texture. It was built on the mound of shame. The ridicule heaped upon the Chinese race has long fermented within my soul. I have concluded that we, the younger generation, have nothing to be proud of except the time-worn accomplishments of our ancient ancestors, that we have been living in the shadow of these glories, hoping that these arts and literature of the past will justify our present. Sad, but true, they do not. To live under such illusions is to lead the life of a parasite.

No, I'm not such an egotist to think that my mere presence in China would change its history. In fact, I'm not even aspiring for political prominence as thousands of American-trained graduates have hoped, only to be disappointed to the degree that henceforth they could only find fault with the Nationalist government. I, for one, do not intend cynically to denounce the policies of the Republic. I must confess that the more I
learn, the greater I'm aware what a pittance is my knowledge. Numbered among my shortcomings are the intricacies of diplomatic strategy. I'm a layman, and a layman has no business in politics.

You might ask, how are you going to help save China? My policy is not sensational. My deeds will not be heralded in headlines, and my name will not go down in history as a hero of China. I merely intend to become a good citizen of the great Republic. I shall support the Nationalist government, which is now gaining strength with each succeeding day. I shall accept the national policies. I shall place the welfare of the nation above my own. In other words, I shall do my part.

To be more concrete in my theory, I must explain that I believe a nation is as strong as she is economically progressive. In this measure of value, China is relatively destitute. Her industries are unborn, her resources are yet underground, her people are jobless and starving. This must all be changed, for China can never arouse from her lethargy without constructing a stable economic foundation. It is impossible for a nation to rise politically when she stands upon an economic base of quicksand that sucks her down instead of holding her up.

I realize that China cannot be changed from an agrarian populace to that of an industrialized state within a decade, not even a lifetime. It will take many lifetimes. It follows that I, nor any other person, can singly bring about any impressive progress. It will take hundreds of thousands, millions of young men with vision to build for the future, to start the wheels of industries, to weave a cobweb of railroads and highways across the expanse of all Cathay, to educate everyone in a common language, to send out a fleet of trading vessels, to develop the internal resources, to build a richer life for one and all. Then and only then can the present generation of Chinese really "save their faces." Then and then only will China be truly powerful and respected. It matters not whether capitalism, socialism or communism provides the means of motivation. It only matters that the goal, China's salvation, is accomplished.

I am willing to accept an inconspicuous part in the construction of a new nation. To me and those overseas Chinese with an American background, an American spirit of aggressiveness, an American "go-getter" enthusiasm, China is the land of opportunity. Every vocation is an open field, indeed, every vocation is a "gold mine" for those who have the courage to dare pioneer the industrialization of China.

Perhaps I've been speaking too optimistically in vague generalization. Perhaps I have neglected to emphasize that one must specialize in some distinct field, that one must have a command of the Chinese language, that one must be brave enough to triumph in the hour of adversity. Perhaps I have not made clear that pioneering is no playground for weaklings, especially in the present predicament of having imperialistic Japan as a cutthroat neighbor. China's bed of roses also promises many thorns.

Space will not permit a detailed dissertation on a subject on which volumes can be written. We cannot treat here effectively the various phases of life in America or life in China. It is a greater subject than can be discussed in such restricted space. I can only be dogmatic in my viewpoints and hope that they are coherently comprehensive. And so, it is for me, "Go Further West, Young Man."

Kaye Hong, "Does My Future Lie in China or America?" Chinese Digest, pg. 3, 14, May 22, 1936.

Fulbright Hays Summer Seminar in China: 2000 Curriculum Project

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"How Ping Pong Helped Open Windows in China"
Images Depicting the History of United States-China Relations Since 1970

A Curriculum Project/Report
for the
Fulbright Hays Summer Seminar in China 2000

by
Kenneth B. Ebert
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Introduction

In April 1971, the United States Table Tennis team traveled to the People's Republic of China (PRC) to play the Chinese team. This was the first official United States delegation to visit China since the two countries began their twenty-year feud in 1950. This bitter rivalry saw the United States and the PRC break diplomatic relations, engage in military conflict, close all economic, academic and cultural channels, and promote ideologies that were diametrically opposed.¹ Several months after the visit by the table tennis team, in February 1972, President Richard Nixon landed in China to meet with Mao Tse-tung. From this meeting, the Shanghai Communiqué was issued with a pledge by the two countries to try to develop a working relationship with each other. As the tennis team landed in China and began "Ping Pong" diplomacy I was 20 years old and half way through my undergraduate studies. I had no idea that China would play a significant role in my life, let alone that in July 2000 I would visit China as a participant in the Fulbright Hays Summer Seminar Program and, like the members of the U.S. Table Tennis team, would walk on the Great Wall of China.

Personal Interest

Looking back 30 years, I still remember the first images of China that were broadcast to Americans; the streets empty of cars and filled with bicycles. It was a mysterious looking country and even though there have been many changes during the last 30 years, it still remains mysterious in many ways. As I prepared for my trip to Beijing, I reflected on all the ways China has crossed my life and the path that led me to participate in this seminar. In the 1970's, I had friends living in Washington D.C. and not long after President Nixon’s visit, went with them to the National Zoo to see Hsing-Hsing and Ling-Ling, the Pandas given by China as a gesture of good will to honor President Nixon’s visit. They were such a curious site and helped contribute to my interest in learning more about China. In the late 1970's, I took courses in Chinese history as part of my graduate studies and benefited from being at Michigan State University, where Dr. Warren Cohen, one of the foremost experts on China, directed the Asian Studies Center. Through my course work and seminars sponsored by the center, I bolstered my knowledge about China.

In 1980, I became an international student adviser at Michigan State University where I had the good fortune to work with some of the first Chinese Students and Scholars who came to study in the United States. Today, we take for granted the presence of Chinese international students. Hundreds of

¹ Perspectives on United States-China Relations.” A summary report of the conference “U.S. – China Relations: Where Do We Go From Here?” convened by the National Committee on United States – China Relations; September 1999. New York: National Committee on United States – China Relations. pp1.
thousands of Chinese students have studied on our college and university campuses in the past 20 years but in 1981, the numbers were limited to a very few who literally were pioneers, part of an experiment that has helped bring China and the United States closer together. In the fifteen years that I worked with Chinese students, I increased my knowledge about China and Chinese culture. The more I learned the more I yearned to visit China. I also watched and felt the anguish of Chinese students as they watched from afar the 1989 student demonstrations in Tian'anmen Square and the Spring of Hope come to a tragic end. Many of these students had participated in these demonstrations through fax messages of support and phone calls, and now they mourned the deaths of students killed by military action. Through this, I began to understand how much of an impact the United States was having on China - at least Chinese students - and how quickly the relationship between China and the U.S., which seemed to be progressing smoothly, could turn stormy.

Eight years after Tian'anmen, on October 1, 1997, I stood on Victoria Peak in Hong Kong watching the fireworks being set off in the harbor as part of Hong Kong's first celebration of National Day, just three months after reverting to Chinese control. This visit whet my appetite for more immersion into Chinese culture and was just a sample of what I was to experience during the Fulbright Hays seminar, which proved to an incredible adventure and a wonderful learning experience.

As a participant in the 2000 Fulbright Hays Summer Seminar in China, I traveled to Beijing, Xi'an, Guilin and Shanghai, met many Chinese people, and learned about Chinese culture, history, society, and education. As I traveled through China, I also saw many signs of the way that the U.S. and China were crossing. McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Hard Rock Café, Starbucks, New Balance stores, and advertisements for such U.S. companies as Buick, Coca Cola, Pepsi, Microsoft, Sun Systems, and Motorola, provided an interesting contrast to the seminars about Chinese history, culture, and society, and the site visits to such traditional symbols of China as The Great Wall, Tian'anmen Square and The Forbidden Palace. During the seminar, I was amazed to see such a preponderance of signs reflecting United States involvement in China. On one hand, in our seminars, our professors were teaching us about the long history of China and Chinese traditions and how change was slow in China. On the other hand, it seemed that we were seeing changes taking place at break neck speed right before our eyes.

As a result of this experience, I have come away with a greater appreciation for China and the Chinese, the old and the new. I also gained an appreciation for those involved in trying to maintain the relationship shared by the United States and China. This must not be easy, for while the relationship seems set on a course, it is fragile and the course is not yet firmly established, with obstacles rearing their heads from time to time. Eleven years ago, in 1989, there was Tian'anmen Square. In 1999 NATO bombs hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Each time, the relationship was struck a sharp blow, but it survived due to the hard work of those on each side who see the importance of having the United States and China working with each other rather than reverting to those dark ages between 1950 and 1970.

In addition to appreciation, I also came away with many questions and an interest in learning more about how the relationship between the U.S. and China had evolved over these last three decades and how U.S. interests are becoming more visible in China. Consequently, I chose to examine the development of U.S.-China relations over the past thirty years for my curriculum project be developing a slide program, complemented by readings that highlight certain development and the role of important people. My goal in doing this is to develop a semester long course on U.S. - China relations which I will teach at The Albany Academy during the Fall 2001. However, I have designed this so that teachers of courses on World or American History or U.S. China Relations can use elements of the project to examine and discuss the individuals and events that shaped the development, as well as the history of this relationship and issues that are significant in U.S. - China relations. In the slides, images
are provided to highlight such topics as the aforementioned "Ping Pong" Diplomacy, President Nixon's visit, Panda Diplomacy, Deng-Xiao-ping's reforms, the start of formal relations, International Educational Exchange, Tian'anmen Square, the Jiang-Clinton years, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, and the Permanent Trade Relations Bill. In addition, such issues as the Taiwan question, Human Rights, and Tibet are included.

In the discussion and research lessons that are suggested, my hope is that students can - either individually or in groups, probe into various aspects of the U.S.-China relationship. I also strongly recommend that schools near colleges and universities where Chinese students are studying will bring these students in as "cultural consultants" to help students learn more about Chinese culture and how these students view the developments in China today. Cultural consultants can be invaluable in providing direct personal and first hand perspectives for students and can complement this and other lesson plans.

In offering this project, I believe it is important to share the sage advice given to our group by our scholar escort, Professor Craig Canning of William and Mary College, at the outset of the seminar during one of first lectures. Professor Canning presented us with ten propositions about China that proved very helpful as the seminar progressed. These included:

1. In dealing with China, expect contradictions and complexities
2. China is more than China
3. China is less than China
4. Hong Kong and Taiwan are exerting tremendous influence on the Mainland China - especially neighboring provinces and regions.

Professor Canning also advised us to "Be skeptical of all propositions about China" - including all those that he presented. I believe these propositions are very relevant for students because, as I found throughout the seminar, there are many contradictions in China and in U.S. China relations. During the seminar, we heard about central control and how strong the Communist Party was, but we saw strong forces of capitalism at work. We saw strong images of traditional China outlined by new symbols of the U.S. and other Western countries. We saw elderly people following traditional customs and young people moving in new directions. We saw old and new complementing and clashing. We heard and read anti-American commentary but found ourselves and many U.S. ideas being embraced.

I believe the lesson plans and course as outlined can be very useful to learning more about the relationship between the U.S. and China, and to seeing how much the U.S. is playing a role in developing a new China. But I encourage you to consider Dr. Canning's propositions as you progress and be open to new ideas and change. This is especially relevant since it was this concept that helped bring the table tennis team to China in 1971, China and the U.S. to a working relationship, and, ultimately, me to the Great Wall of China. I hope these lesson plans and project prove useful.

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2 Craig Channing, Pre Departure Briefing for "2000 Fulbright Summer Seminar on Chinese History and Culture, "Understanding China Today: Ten Propositions". Full list of ten propositions included in readings.
Curriculum Project

“How Ping Pong Helped Open Windows™ in China”

Images Depicting the History of United States-China Relations Since 1970

Slide 1. Title page

Slide 2. Map of China

Lesson:
To start, students can research information about China, including:

- Population and Size
- Name of China’s President
- How long the PRC has been established
- Form of government
- Annual GNP
- Capitol and Major cities
- Neighboring Countries
- Culture and customs – foods, language, music, religions, literature, movies, etc.

- After making the list for China, students can do the same list for the United States and then compare the lists
- A good source of information about China is the Embassy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) web site: http://www.china-embassy.org. For history on China (and U.S. - China Relations), try such sites as the National Committee on U.S. - China Relations at http://www.ncuscr.org or the John Fairbanks Memorial Virtual History Library - http://www.cnd.org:8012/fairbank/prc.html.
- You may wish to obtain and view “Dances with the Dragon”, a documentary film dealing with contemporary US-China relations. The web site for the film is http://www.ssim.net/. The producers indicate on this site that the film covers a variety of complex issues, including trade "deficits, the opening of Chinese markets, human rights and intellectual property rights, as well as the cultural impact of imports like McDonald's and the movie Titanic into China and made-in-China goods into the U.S.”. There are also many other films about China to be viewed. NCUSCR can provide some ideas on these.
- There are many sites on the Internet where students can see pictures of China. One such site for a tour of China is http://www.china-tourism.net/beijing/tiananmen.htm. Also included in the slides for this project are images of “The Forbidden City”, “the Terra Cotta Warriors”, “The Great Wall of China”, and "Confucius", all of which could be subjects for further research by students.

A note about "Cultural Consultants": Cultural Consultants are individuals who are indigenous members of a culture and who have moved to the United States to live, work, or study. These individuals can represent their country and culture for the class, providing first hand perspectives. International students at nearby colleges or universities can be excellent cultural consultants since they typically have not been away from their home for long and have also learned something about the United States during their studies. Many colleges and universities have organized "international speakers bureaus" that use students as resources for the purpose of talking to local schools. Such programs also ensure that students have good English skills, too. A Chinese student can talk about Chinese culture, customs, current events, etc. It may be a good idea to bring them in before starting this...
lesson plan, but they would be valuable at any time. For more information about this, I would be glad to help you. You may contact me, Kenneth Ebert, at The Albany Academy, 518-465-1461 (ebertk@albany-academy.org).

Slide 3. 1971: "Ping Pong Diplomacy"

Lesson:
- Have students learn about what this was and why it was so significant.
- Students can discuss how this came about, who participated, what happened, and the state of U.S.-China relations prior to the visit by the U.S. Table Tennis Team to China.
- Have students read Pam Ramsey's "The Ping Pong Diplomacy" for a personal perspective. It is included in the readings packet and at the website, http://www.sdtta.com/pp%5Fdiplomacy.html. The picture for slide 3 is also at this site.

Further research:
- Students can find more information in the suggested readings and texts, in the library or on the Internet about "Ping Pong Diplomacy". They can also research what events caused the severing of diplomatic ties between China and the United States in 1949 and what occurred between then and 1971.

Slide 4. 1972: "Nixon and Mao meet in China"

Lesson:
- The PBS film, "Nixon's China Game" is a good starting point for examining how this visit between President Richard Nixon and Mao Tse-tung came about.
- Today, we take for granted U.S.-China relations even though they are still fragile. Have students discuss why this was so significant an event and what was discussed and decided.

Further research:
- Students can find more information in the library or on the Internet about President Nixon's visit, where they can do research on the life and presidency of Richard Nixon. Some questions to consider might be "what kind of president was he?" "What also was happening in the United States at the time of his visit?" "What happened after his re-election in 1972?" "How does history view President Nixon?"
- Similarly, students may wish to do further research on Mao Tse-tung and China in the early 1970's. Who was Mao? How did he become so important? At the time of the meeting with President Nixon, China was in the midst of its "Cultural Revolution". What was this and what was its impact?


Lesson:
- The PBS film, "Nixon's China Game" will also shed light on the role that Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai played to ensure that the United States and China would work toward developing more favorable relations with each other.
- Discuss the "Shanghai Communiqué" and its significance. Students can read the excerpt in the reading packet. Why was this such an important development?
Further research:
- Students can find more information in the library or on the Internet about Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai. Who were they? What roles did they play in developing U.S.-China relations? How did they come to their positions? How does history view them?

Slides 6 & 17.
6. 1972: "Panda Diplomacy"

Lesson:
- In April 1972, Hsing-Hsing and Ling-Ling arrived at the National Zoo in Washington, DC as a gesture of goodwill in commemoration of President Nixon’s visit to China. They were an immediate success with the public and this was a significant act at such an early stage of the relationship between the U.S. and China. Discuss what role the Pandas played in promoting U.S.-China relations. Why was this such a significant act? Why were they so popular and what goodwill did they help promote? In December 2000, the Chinese government lent two new Pandas to the National Zoo to replace Hsing-Hsing and Ling-Ling, who had died during the 1990s. Mei Xiang and Tian Tian were officially introduced to the United States public in January 2001.

Further Research:
- Students can do research on the lives of Hsing-Hsing and Ling-Ling, as well as do research about other Pandas in the United States. The Friends of the National Zoo (FONZ) web site is an excellent source for more information about Panda research, Hsing-Hsing and Ling-Ling, and the new Pandas, Mei-Xiang and Tian-Tian. For school near Washington, D.C., a field trip would allow for a visit to the Pandas.

Slides 7 & 8. 1979:
7. "Normalization of Relations"
8. "Deng Xiao-ping”

Lesson:
- On January 1, 1979, President Jimmy Carter of the United States announced that the U.S. was granting formal diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, thereby "normalizing" relations. What did this mean?
- Have students read "President Carter's Statement on Normalization of Relations with China", and the "Texts of statements from U.S., China and Taiwan. What do these say about the new relationship?
- Beside the U.S. and China, what other country was affected directly by this action?
- How did this impact relations between the U.S. and China? What new developments could this offer?
- Shortly after this, Deng Xiao-ping, of China visited the United States. How was his visit received?
- In discussing Deng Xiao-ping, his role in promoting economic reforms in China can also be examined. Deng Xiao-ping, who died in 1997, is credited with opening China by putting into place his own policies for the economic development of China. He engineered important reforms in almost all aspects of China's political and economic life. Recently, The Tiananmen Papers, a book on the Chinese government response to the Tian’anmen Square demonstration, has been published in the United States and places responsibility for a military response with Deng. A question to consider is “how does this juxtapose with his image as a reformer?”
Further Research:

- Students may wish to do further research on the process of "normalization". This may also be a good time to discuss Taiwan and its relationship with the United States and China, although this topic is covered later in this plan.
- Students may also wish to do research on Deng Xiao-ping. What was his role in Mao’s government and in the revolution? What reform policies did he initiate/ what were the short-term and long-term implications of these policies? A website for students to consider in researching Deng is http://www.who2.com/dengxiaoping.html

Slides 9 & 10.


Lesson

- Shortly after normalization of relations, educational exchange programs began between China and the United States. Initially only a small stream of students participated in these exchanges, which were usually government-sponsored. Today, while such official exchange programs as the Fulbright-Hays Program continue to sponsor students and scholars, there is a free flow of individual students traveling in both directions. The number of Chinese students in the United States has exploded in the past twenty years. Students can do research on how many students and scholars from China are studying in the United States. [According to the most recent statistics published in Open Doors, an annual report on international education published by the Institute of International Education, there were 54,466 Chinese students and 13,229 scholars in the United States in 2000. (http://www.opendoorsweb.org/index.html)]

Further Research and Discussion:

- Students can discuss what impact educational diplomacy is having on U.S. – China relations. What are the benefits and drawbacks of educational exchanges?
- Many Americans decry the fact that many Chinese students and scholars stay in the United States after completing studies, thus taking jobs away from Americans. Is this a problem? What jobs so these students and scholars take?
- Have a “cultural consultant” come to the classroom and explain why s/he came to the U.S. to study.
- Go to the library site of Open Doors (http://www.opendoorsweb.org/library.htm) to learn more about the economic impact of international students in the U.S. and why students study here.

Slides 11 & 12. 1989:

11. "Tian'anmen Square, Princess of Democracy"
12. "Tian'anmen Square"

Lesson:

- In the Spring 1989, students from Beijing universities began a series of demonstrations to honor the memory of Hu Yaobang, who had recently died. The demonstrations continued through May and students began to call for political changes. On June 3 and 4, 1989, the Chinese Army was called in to end the demonstrations resulting in hundreds of people being killed and wounded. In the aftermath, U.S. – China relations were seriously put on hold and challenged. It was not until Presidents Clinton and Jiang came into office that progress was made again in U.S. -China relations.
- Recent publication of The Tian’anmen Papers has provided some new insights on how the military action was approved, although the Chinese government has disavowed their authenticity. Have
students research this event and the aftermath. Students can compare this demonstration and the Chinese response to similar event in the United States. Does the U.S. have similar events that compare in any way to what occurred at Tian'anmen Square? How are these similar or different?

- Also students can research and discuss the significance of the location where the demonstrations were held. Why was Tian'anmen Square chosen? What is the importance of the square in Chinese history?


Lesson:
- From 1992 through 2000, Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin have served as presidents of their countries. In 1997 and 1998, Presidents Jiang and Clinton exchanged visits. During their tenure as leaders, much progress has been made in U.S.-China relations. Today, while many issues of disagreement remain the United States has a very visible presence in China and both China and the United States have dedicated themselves to a continuing dialogue.
- Discuss Mr. Clinton's trip to China. Read his remarks to the students at Beining University in the reading packet. Students can view the trip at the web site, http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/China) and see what President Clinton and the First Family did during their trip to China.
- Discuss what changes took place in U.S.-China relations during President Clinton's presidency.
- Students can also examine the changes that have occurred in China during President Jiang's visit. Read his views on U.S.-China relations in the reading packet, and what his thoughts are on such topics as Human Rights and Taiwan.

Further Research:
- During this period, in July, 1997, China took control over Hong Kong, and in October 1999, China celebrated its 50th anniversary. Students may wish to research these events and their significance. Another research topic might be the history of the civil war leading to the founding of the PRC.

Slide 14 & 15.
- 14. 1999: "NATO Bombs Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia"
- 15. 1999: "Chinese Students Stage Protests at U.S. Embassy in Beijing"

Lesson:
- In May 1999, NATO planes, which were bombing Yugoslavia during the Kosovo campaign, dropped bombs on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. President Clinton and NATO claimed it was an accident, based on erroneous maps that showed a warehouse on that location. President Jiang said it was not a mistake and the Chinese strongly protested to Washington and in the United Nations. In Beijing, students staged protests and laid siege to the U.S. Embassy, throwing rocks and marching for four days. U.S. Consulates and Embassies in other locations in China and around the world were also scenes of protests.
- Have students research and discuss this incident. Was it an accident? There was no break in U.S.-China relations. What does this say about the strength of relationship?
Lessons:

• Even before the passage of PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade Relations) with China, American companies were making their presence known in China. Now, American corporations are poised to take advantage of the open markets in China. McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken and other fast food franchises are expanding throughout China. Windows, Sun and Intel are among the hi-tech companies with major investments in China. Cosmetics and clothing for women are being represented by Estee Lauder and Nine West to mention just a couple of U.S. companies. Nike and New Balance have made a strong presence in China and Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola are waging a China version of "cola wars".

• Discuss the implications of PNTR and why it is such a controversial issue. Who supported it and who opposed it in the United States? Why? What are the implications of PNTR in China? Why were "pro-democratic" forces in China so supportive of PNTR?

• Read the article in the packet on "Cola Wars" and "Passage of PNTR" for information. Have students contact U.S. companies that are doing business in China to request information about their China plans and how China's laws and culture affect the way they conduct business to what they are doing.

• Possibly view "Dances with the Dragon" for further insights on these topics and have students discuss.

Lessons:

• There are many issues to be resolved between the United States and China. Perhaps the foremost is status of Taiwan. This has been an issue since the PRC was founded in 1949. These two slides are pictures of two Taiwanese leaders – Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan's first President and Chen Shui-bian, the current President of Taiwan.

• How does Taiwan affect U.S. China relations? The "Shanghai Communiqué" recognized that the U.S. and China could agree to disagree on the Taiwan issue – but can this last indefinitely?

• China holds firmly to a "One China Policy". Discuss this with students. What does this mean? What are its implications – for Taiwan; for U.S. – China relations?

• Today, Chen Shui-bian has suggested that China should not view Taiwan as part of Mainland China but has stopped short of calling for full independence. How does the Beijing government respond to this?

• The U.S. has military and strategic defense agreements with Taiwan and a promise to defend Taiwan if China attacks. How does this agreement affect U.S. – China relations?

Further Research:

• Students can do further research on a number of issues related to Taiwan, including Chiang Kai-shek and the history of Taiwan. Students may also wish to learn more about Taiwan in the process.
Many Taiwanese students also are studying in the U.S. While down 5.8% from 1999, there still are 29,234 Taiwanese students in the U.S., the fifth largest group according to the Open Doors report (http://www.opendoorsweb.org/Lead%20Stories/international_studs.htm). You may wish to have a Taiwanese student come to your class as a "cultural consultant" to talk about Taiwan.

Slide 23 - 25. U.S. - China Issues
23. "U.S. - China Issues: Tibet"

Lesson:
In addition to Taiwan, there are many other issues that remain unresolved between the United States and China. Tibet, Human Rights, and Copyright and Intellectual Property issues are just a few.

- **Tibet**: have students research and discuss the history of China in Tibet. The Chinese claim that Tibet has always been a part of China and respect Tibet as an autonomous but not independent region. What does this mean? What is China's response to the Dalai Lama who calls for Tibet to be recognized as an independent country? What is the American feeling about this issue?

- **Human Rights**: Next to Taiwan, this is probably the biggest problem facing U.S. - China Relations. President Jiang Zemin says that China's internal affairs are no one's business but their own and that the United States should take care of their own human rights problems. President Clinton spoke strongly on behalf of human rights during his speeches in China in 1998 and this theme has been reiterated frequently. The issue of Human Rights weighed heavily in the PNTR debate. The Tian'anmen Square situation only highlighted this issue and in recent years many dissidents like Harry Wu, Wang Dan, among others have been placed into the international spotlight, and raised questions about human rights in China. There are many resources to examine about Human Rights - Amnesty International, Human Rights in China, among others and students can do research on these.

- While not simply a U.S. - China issue, **women's rights** is another topic which students may wish to explore. Mao said that "women hold up half the sky" but today many women in China feel that they are not being given credit or reward due their status as equals. In 1995, First Lady Hillary Clinton spoke to the United Nations Women's Conference and called for sweeping changes in the way China treats women. Many women in China received this call favorably but they see change coming slowly. During the Fulbright seminar, we heard a great deal about the status of women in China. Some of this year's participants were researching projects on women in China and curriculum projects from earlier Fulbrighters are in ERIC. These may be worth examining for lesson plans.

- **Copyright and Intellectual Property issues** also are a problem for U.S. - China relations. The United States and China have differing views on the intellectual property laws and while there has been a crackdown of sorts in China on pirating of movies, CD's, copyrights, etc., there remains much to be resolved. Students can research and discuss this issue. What is at issue here and why is this important? Are the similar issues in the United States? What impact will developments like NAPSTER and the Internet do to intellectual property and copyright laws - in the U.S. and China? How do students view this?
Lesson:

- See notes on Slide 2.

Slide 30. 2000: "Educational Diplomacy (3) - U.S Fulbrighter at the Great Wall"

Lesson

- This slide shows me standing on the Great Wall of China. The lesson here is that the world is forever changing and unpredictable. History changed as a result of “Ping Pong Diplomacy”. There have been many results of this – one being that 29 years after the U.S. Table Tennis Team first went to China, I followed in their footsteps and walked along the Great Wall of China. Among the lessons to be learned from this is that we should strive to be open to opportunities and change. It makes life a little more uncertain at times, but also more enjoyable. The seminar in China was a highlight of my life. I learned a great deal about China, U.S.–China relations and myself as a result; I also made many new friends who enriched my life. I am looking forward to teaching the course I have developed on U.S.–China Relations and returning some day to China. I also hope this project provides teachers and students with some valuable ideas for studying about China and U.S.-China Relations.
"How Ping Pong Helped Open Windows™ in China"
Images Depicting the History of U.S. - Relations Since 1970

Ping Pong Diplomacy

In April, 1971, the U.S. Table Tennis Team visited China at the invitation of Chou En Lai. This visit started China and the United States toward establishing diplomatic relations.

Nixon and Mao meet in China

In February, 1972, President Richard Nixon visited China to meet with Mao Tse-tung. This event was a seminal moment in Sino-American Relations.
Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai

Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai played pivotal roles in ensuring that early U.S.-China initiatives established a positive tone. Their work on the "Shanghai Communiqué" allowed for the United States and China to agree to disagree, yet move forward.

1979: Normalization of Relations

On January 1, 1979, President Jimmy Carter announced normalization of relations between the U.S. and China. Later that year, Deng Xiao-ping visited the United States; the first Chinese leader to make a state visit to the United States.

Panda Diplomacy, 1972

In April, 1972, Hsing-Hsing and Ling-Ling arrived at the National Zoo in Washington, DC as a gesture of goodwill in commemoration of President Nixon's visit to China. They immensely helped U.S.-China relations.

Deng Xiao-ping

In the late 1970's, Deng Xiao-ping moved China away from Mao’s programs with major economic initiatives that helped bring major reforms to China.

In 1980, the first Chinese students and scholars enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities. Today, many are helping to improve U.S.-China relations.

1980-2001: Educational Exchanges: U.S. Students and Scholars in China


June, 1989: Tian'anmen Square

The picture seen around the world: One brave man faces down Army tanks outside Tian'anmen Square.

1989: Tian'anmen Square Princess of Democracy

The United States has had major impacts on China - the student demonstrations at Tian'anmen Square included the raising of a Chinese "Statue of Liberty"
1992-2000: Presidents Clinton and Jiang
Presidents Clinton and Jiang meet in China, 1998

1999: Students Protest at U.S. Embassy over NATO Bombing

May, 1999, Chinese students staged protests and threw rocks at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing after the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia was bombed.

1999: NATO Bombs Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia

May, 7 1999: NATO bombs destroyed the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia.

2000: "PTNR"

President Clinton signed the PTNR into law in the Fall, 2000. U.S. - China trade relations have opened China's doors to many U.S. companies and a wide variety of U.S. products.
“Panda Diplomacy 2000”

Mei Xiang and Tian Tian are getting used to their new homes in Washington’s National Zoo.

U.S. in China
McChina

McDonald's has restaurants throughout China. There are over 50 in Beijing alone, including the biggest one in China.

U.S. in China
Windows™ in China

Bill Gates Brings Microsoft to China

U.S. in China: “Cola Wars” in China

“Cola Wars” in China

Pepsi

60
U.S. China Issues: Taiwan

In 1949, the United States recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s government in Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. Today, while formally recognizing the PRC as the China’s official government, the U.S. provides military and economic support to Taiwan.

U.S. China Issues: Tibet

One of the issues dividing China and the United States is the question of Tibet. In the United States, many are calling for China to recognize Tibetan independence.

U.S. - China Issues: Taiwan

Chen Shui-bian is Taiwan’s first non-Nationalist Party president. He has challenged Beijing’s idea of “One China”. In January, 2001, he stated this is not an issue” under Taiwan’s constitution.”

U.S. China Issues: Human Rights

Human rights is still a major dividing issue between China and the United States. Chinese dissidents, such as Wang Dan, a student leader at Tian’anmen Square, have been the focus of much debate in the U.S. and between the two countries.
U.S. China Issues: Intellectual Property

Coming to agreement on differences in copyright and intellectual property laws has been one of the challenges the U.S. and China face.

Chinese History: The Terra Cotta Warriors

The Terra Cotta Army of China's first Emperor, Qin Shi Huang-di, was discovered outside Xi'an in 1974, more than 2000 years after Qin's reign. Over 8,000 individual statues have been found.

Chinese History: The Great Wall of China

The Great Wall of China is one of China's great treasures.

Chinese History: Confucius
Chinese History:
The Forbidden Palace

2000: Fulbrighter at the
Great Wall of China
How Ping Pong Helped Open Windows in China
Images Depicting the History of United States-China Relations Since 1970

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1. Documents

1. "President Carter's Statement on Normalization of Relational with China", January 1, 1979 (New York Times; included in briefing packet prepared by the National Committee on United States-China Relations (NCUSCR) for Fulbright Hays Summer Seminar in China 2000)
2. Texts from Statements from U.S., China and Taiwan, January 1, 1979. (Reuters; NCUSCR Briefing Packet)
3. Text of "U.S. China Joint Communiqué", August 17, 1982 (NCUSCR Briefing Packet)

2. Readings Included

12. "Fifty Years"; Roy Rowan, Fortune; October 11, 1999. (NCUSCR Briefing Packet)

### 3. Additional Suggested Readings


### 4. Some Suggested Web Sites

By going to various search engines and typing "U.S.-China Relations" and "Sino-American Relations", I found many viable sites for information. In addition to those noted in the above reading list, several that I reviewed on these and other related topics are listed here:

- [http://newton.uor.edu/Departments&Programs/AsianStudiesDept/china-us.html](http://newton.uor.edu/Departments&Programs/AsianStudiesDept/china-us.html). University of Redlands hosted site with sources for all kinds of Internet connections related to Sino-American relations


http://www.state.gov/www/current/debate/china.html. Web site for U.S. State Department on China; it includes, among other useful items, an archive of speeches and papers by President Clinton and other U.S. officials, and a detailed presentation of the Clinton's trip to China in 1998, with pictures- which can be found directly at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/China.


http://www.insidechina.com/special/20anniv/20anniv2b.php3#pingpong. Inside China Today's special section on the evolution of normalized Sino-U.S. relations, which covers the Cold War to the present day. It provides a good overview of issues from perspective of staff writers of Inside China Today

http://www.sdtta.com/pp%5Fdiplomacy.html (site of Pam Ramsey's article on "Ping Pong Diplomacy")


Documents and Readings
China is pulsing with a new refrain: "I don't want power or rights. I just want money." Everyone, it seems, is out to strike it rich. Fortunes are now pursued with the same singleminded enthusiasm that once characterized political campaigns against landlords and rightists or mass mobilizations to wipe out sparrows and build backyard steel furnaces. Freed from the shackles of socialist control, a pent-up economic energy has been released and the economy is roaring—growth has averaged 9 percent a year for more than a decade and hit 13 percent in both 1992 and 1993.

The character of China's economic growth is reflected in the audaciously exuberant lifestyles of some young nouveaux riches. Fashions among the young are moving from stylish to nearly outlandish. Privately run restaurants are popping up, as the Chinese say, like bamboo shoots after a spring rain. In Guangzhou, the rich and adventurous can dine on meals sprinkled with 24-carat gold, presented, the manager insists, as a contribution to the development of China's culinary arts. Private demonstrations in the spring of 1989 had a limited repertoire of songs—the "Internationale" and an occasional "Ode to Joy" or "We Shall Overcome"—patrons at the karaoke bars that can be found even in distant towns in Xinjiang and Tibet are belting out popular favorites from Hong Kong and Taiwan as well as the old tributes to Mao. Displays of affection are becoming commonplace, as is prostitution. In the South, successful businessmen from the mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are taking second wives—known colloquially "black market wives" (heibie jun). Economically, many Chinese are doing well. One old friend, a Western-trained lawyer, recently left her $150/month at a State-controlled company to join a joint-venture firm. She is working harder than she ever worked before, but is earning paid a Hong Kong lawyer's salary, many times her previous earnings. Much of her extra money goes to savings she wants to send her children to school in the United States. Another friend, a doctor of traditional Chinese medicine, has taken an extended leave from his State-run clinic to sell construction materials in Shanghai's thriving Pudong Area. His business is growing exponentially. Construction materials shipped from the South rarely stay in his warehouse for longer than a day, and he has a well-used truck and several tricycle carts to deliver his goods. He drives a motor scooter, communicates by "beeper," and reinvests almost every penny he makes.

Some are doing extraordinarily well. Several years ago, a 20-year-old friend from Beijing teamed up with a few colleagues to form a new taxi company. With three years, she had entered the ranks of...
China’s new millionaires. According to press reports, a few years ago a 23-year-old from Wenzhou started an airline and became an instant millionaire. He now wears a Rolex watch, an expensive suit, and gold jewelry. Similarly, a young Beijing man reportedly borrowed ¥200,000, purchased land-use rights in the South, and sold the rights to a Hong Kong developer for ¥200,000. In three months, he made what would have taken 75 years to earn at his former ¥200/month job in a State-run firm.

Not everyone is getting rich from hard work, however. Every coastal town has its story of the barely literate peasant, an early enthusiast of the stock market, who made millions in a matter of months. In Hangzhou, I watched one morning as several early winners drove up in expensive Western cars to spend the day in the trading office’s place of honor, a private room with sofas and refreshments. I waited outside with hundreds of hopefuls who studied the electronic postings and placed their “bets” after calculating the day’s trend. For some, playing the market has become a full-time occupation.

Good and bad

The optimism fueled by economic growth, concentrated as it is along China’s coast, makes it easy to forget that under the philosophy of letting some get rich first, life for those at the bottom is still a bitter struggle. In his book China’s Environmental Crisis, Vaclav Smil suggests that while purchasing power parity estimates put China’s per capita GDP at $1,300 in 1988, perhaps 100 million rural residents do not have enough food for a vigorous and healthy life. In recent years, excessive local taxation has been a persistent rural complaint, and in some places the extra tax money has been used to construct new buildings for local officials. Environmental damage is extensive, and some of the best farmland is being taken out of cultivation to build housing and factories. Only a quarter of China’s rural population has access to tap water.

Even in areas that are part of China’s economic miracle, the good and the bad are often mixed together. Just as Deng Xiaoping asserted that they were mixed together among the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989, major economic transitions are messy and unsettling in any society, and some of China’s problems are endemic to any nation undergoing rapid development. For example, the mass migration of people from the countryside to the city, informally estimated to involve 70-100 million China, is a trend common to many developing countries. Despite the strains these migrants place on city services, Chinese cities do not currently contain the sprawling slums typical of many parts of the world.

Lost values

At the heart of the uncertainty is a crisis in values. It is now axiomatic that few in China believe in Deng Xiaoping’s “four cardinal principles”—Marxist-Leninist Mao Zedong thought, the leadership of the Communist Party, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and a socialist system. But what new values, beyond the pursuit of wealth, will replace the old? The fear that so many Chinese express of luan, or chaos, reflects not only unease over the possibility of violent unrest and a breakdown of government. The fear is more immediate and personal than that. Many are uncertain about their place in the new society.

Chinese values, both Confucian and communist, have been fundamentally based on a correct ordering and hierarchy of human relations. In the hierarchy of occupations, the scholar was honored, the merchant and soldier scorned. In Confucian China, four relations were basic—between ruler and ruled, father and son, husband and wife, and friend and friend. Everyone knew where he or she stood in the hierarchy, and one’s place carried with it fixed standards of how one behaved toward others and how others behaved toward him. Thus, in a vil-

The phenomenon of young women from the countryside working in factories for 14 or more hours a day is also typical of rapid industrialization. Chinese assert that the young laborers work voluntarily, earn more money in a month than they would in six in the countryside, and are learning new skills that will bring them into the modern world. But “modern” China is also seeing the reappearance of traditional social trends the communists had sought to wipe out. Begging, for example, is on the rise, and frequent reports of thriving businesses in the sale of women suggest not only that the phenomenon is growing, but that the government lacks the will or means to stop it.

If China’s economic surge is more turbulent than most, it is because the population, now approaching 1.2 billion, is huge, the gap between rich and poor is extreme, and the pace of change is both rapid and dramatic. Underlying the great economic boom is tremendous uncertainty—over whether and how long the new prosperity will last, over what will happen following the death of Deng Xiaoping, and over how society will be restructured in the aftermath.

The latest trend among China’s young nouveaux riches is to own a dog. 

Photo courtesy of Anne Stevenson-Yung

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lough not far from Beijing, an elderly peasant was able to sing to me from memory the lengthy song the villagers had sung to his unseen bride as she stepped from her sedan chair into his family's courtyard. The song introduced her to everyone in her new family and to every member of the village, specifying each one's place in the hierarchy and how to treat each properly.

While the communist revolution overturned the old hierarchies, it introduced a new, even more elaborate hierarchical structure. In communist ideology, a worker or poor peasant was good. Capitalists, rightists, counter-revolutionaries, and intellectuals were bad. Being tarred with a "bad" class label could result in execution, labor reform, demotion, or social ostracism, depending on where in the hierarchy one's label fell. Individuals and families with bad labels used to expend considerable time and energy negotiating for better classifications.

The advantage of the system, however unjust it might have appeared to those outside China, was the certainty and security it provided. Individual identity derived from one's place in the hierarchy; in knowing one's place, one also knew the rules of individual behavior and could reasonably predict what treatment to expect from others.

With China's economic reforms and opening to the West, the communist hierarchy has gone topsy-turvy. Entrepreneurs, now officially celebrated, were maligned under both Confucianism and communism, and many Chinese, particularly intellectuals, retain a residual distrust of anyone who makes the pursuit of wealth a paramount goal, particularly when money is made not through productive activities but through trade, speculation, or gambling on the stock market. A penchant for egalitarianism and simple behavior that to Western eyes appears explicitly forbidden is permitted. Thus, behavior that to Western eyes appears corrupt may in China merely be pushing not explicitly permitted.

With social relationships in disarray, the rules of behavior are in a similar state of disorder. The problem is compounded by the rudimentary state of China's legal system, and the determination of many to get around the rules that do exist. In the past, Chinese used to say that everything that was not explicitly permitted was forbidden; now everything that is not explicitly forbidden is permitted. Thus, behavior that to Western eyes appears corrupt may in China merely be pushing as close to the forbidden as one dares.

Rising corruption

Corruption, by nature, tends to be covert and is thus vexingly difficult to measure. But there seems little doubt that in Western and Chinese eyes alike, corruption in China is on the rise. In recent months, as I sat in hotel coffeeshops in China, I overheard negotiations for the sale of stolen cars, and friends have told me of large parking lots of such cars guarded by the People's Liberation Army. Though it is sometimes difficult to gauge just what constitutes corruption, especially in a culture in which personal relationships are paramount, everyone would agree that selling tainted hypodermic needles or marketing talcum powder as an antibiotic is corrupt. So is the manager of a Shanghai taxi company who took his drivers' salaries without permission and invested the money—unsuccessfully—in the stock market. The kickback that have to be given in order to get bank loans or persuade an enterprise to do business with one company rather than another are common forms of corruption in today's China (see p.21). The cost of government banquets, where officials lavishly at taxpayer expense, was officially calculated last year at 183-86 billion (nearly $15 billion at 5.8:1)—half the estimated cost of building the Three Gorges dam and more than the combined annual government expenditure on education, culture, science, and health care.

While Chinese are fond of blaming corruption on Western influence—the result of opening the door and letting the "flies in—and compare China today to the robber baron period in the United States, the more likely roots of present-day corruption are within the Chinese system itself. Brewer Stone, a professor of political science at Dartmouth College, makes a persuasive argument that official corruption in China today has two primary sources. The personalized rule that characterizes the Chinese political system, including the prevailing patron-client relationship and the guanxi—a web of connections—upon which Chinese rely to get things done is one. The second is government decentralization, which has put more power in the hands of greater numbers of local leaders, with a concomitant increase in possibilities for abuse.

The problem of corruption has grown since Deng Xiaoping's trip south in early 1992. Although Beijing still pays lip ser-
vice to the need for separation of official administrative duties from the pursuit of profit-making ventures, shrinking centralization have forced government agencies at all levels into business. Required to earn a good portion of their own budgets, government organizations everywhere are hurrying into the fast-and-loose world of private business.

Similarly, Deng's call for all of China to emulate the South has contributed to the spread of corruption. "Before, only officials had the chance to be corrupt," Chinese say. "Now everyone does."

Licentious black gangs are springing up in coastal and interior China, involved in everything from fencing stolen cars, selling drugs, and running guns to organizing prostitution rings and smuggling people overseas. In some cases, State security organs allegedly are also involved in or willing to overlook such illegal activities. A recent report in ASIA Inc. points to active involvement of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Public Security Bureau (PSB) in the operation of Shanghai karaoke bars where gangs conduct business and prostitution thrives.

Chaos and opportunity

Some Chinese, particularly in the South, assert that the luau that Western

Some Chinese have begun searching for an alternative system of values to give meaning and order to their lives.

analysis posit as one of several possibilities following the death of Deng has already begun. When human relationships have been turned upside down and almost anything goes, luau is at hand.

Some believe that the new economic drive is part of the doomsday mentality typically seen in China in the waning years of a dynasty. As the dynasty slides unpredictably toward its end, its legitimacy sapped and its control slipping, uncertain citizens—bad and good alike—struggle to grab what they can while the getting is good. Money has to be made quickly, and by any means, before chaos progresses to the point where nothing is possible or before order is restored and opportunities vanish. While many Chinese recognize that the development of an impartial legal system, properly respected and imposed, would establish new rules and thus contribute to the reestablishment of order, many freewheeling businesspeople do not welcome the constraints of a legal system.

In the midst of the perceived luau, some Chinese have begun searching for an alternative system of values to give meaning and order to their lives. Many are sincere in their quest. But even the search for new values is sometimes tainted by the dominant preoccupation with getting rich.

Confucianism, for example, is being revived and Confucian temples are being rebuilt, partly because of the perception that the economic success of Asia's "four little dragons"—Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore—rests upon
the Confucian ethic. Believe in Confucianism, the reasoning goes, and China itself, the biggest dragon, might finally awake. South China, meanwhile, is seeing a Buddhist revival, and Buddhist temples that were once sight-seeing stops for tourists are now filled with local Chinese. Many, though, are praying for prosperity and a son, rather than enlightenment.

Christianity, too, is attracting converts, both Catholic and Protestant, and Christian churches are filled to overflowing. Unofficial figures put the number of Christians at 75 million, more than 20 times the figure in 1949. But for some, the turn to Christianity has a utilitarian, rather than spiritual, cast. Westerners are Christian and wealthy. Maybe Christianity will make Chinese prosperous, too.

Succession fears

China's doomsday mentality is linked to the impending death of its paramount but unofficial leader, Deng Xiaoping. The frail Deng, the last of the heroic Long March generation who struggled to bring the communists to victory, and the last of the leaders who stood with Mao atop Tiananmen to declare the establishment of the People's Republic, is the thread of legitimacy holding Chinese together.

For Chinese and Westerners alike, this is a time of great danger and great opportunity.

While he nearly lost his legitimacy after the events of June 1989, he reclaimed it in early 1992 by reasserting the primacy of economic reform and calling on all of China to emulate the Special Economic Zones of the South.

His passing is likely to be unsettling, just as the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong were in 1976. There is a tacit agreement between the rulers and the ruled in China today that in return for the right to pursue wealth with few constraints, past actions of Deng and his associates, such as the decision to bring in strikes and sporadic outbursts of violence that will slow or stop the rapid growth.

Western analysts are similarly unable to predict what will happen in China following Deng's death, most Chinese have an immediate response: they do not know. Their greatest fear is that the huan that they see in the breakdown of orderly human relationships will spread—that power struggles in Beijing will so weaken central control that discontent could become manifest in strikes and sporadic outbursts of violence that will slow or stop the rapid growth.

Western businesses are similarly unable to predict what will happen, and most suggest several scenarios are possible. The most optimistic is the Taiwan model, in which economic growth continues relatively smoothly, accompanied finally by gradual political reform. The least likely, is a reassertion of tight central control over both the economy and individual behavior while the center attempts to maintain a relatively high rate of economic growth. The scenario most feared by people inside China is the possibility of government immobilization and a consequent spread of huan.

What lessons does the situation in China hold for Western businesspeople? For Chinese and Westerners alike, this is a time of great danger and great opportunity. Just as the good and the bad are mixed together in economic reform, so are they represented in the foreigners who come to make their fortunes in China. The rules of behavior are different in China, and little can be done without a web of close personal connections and the support of government officials. But getting to know and understand business counterparts and developing mutual trust is necessary a lengthy process, especially during a period of great transition.
DEFINING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

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Presented to the Asia Society and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
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April 12, 2000
U.S. policy toward China is likely to become a major foreign policy issue in this, the Y2K election year. There is nothing unusual about this: directly or indirectly, China policy has been an issue in the elections of 1948, 1952, 1960, 1964, 1968, 1980, and 1992. To debate our relations with China is the norm in our political process, not the exception. This is because few countries have captured America's attention more completely than China; and few relationships have been more volatile or more difficult to manage.

This year, the debate appears to be revolving around two broad issues -- as well as a host of specific ones. The two broad issues are:

- How should we define our relationship with China? What kind of country is it? What kind of dealings can we appropriately have with Beijing?
- How should we promote our interests with China? What approaches will be most effective? What kind of strategy should we adopt toward Beijing?

Defining the relationship

The two main presidential candidates -- Al Gore and George W. Bush -- have already presented different views on how to define the U.S.-China relationship. The Gore campaign will presumably defend the Clinton Administration's vision of a "constructive strategic partnership" with China. George W. Bush, in contrast, regularly says that he regards China as a strategic competitor, not a strategic partner.

To a significant degree, the two candidates are talking past each other on this point. The Clinton Administration never declared that China is already a strategic partner of the United States. Rather, in the joint statement issued at the end of Jiang Zemin's visit to Washington in 1997, the two sides agreed to "build toward" such a relationship -- leaving the constructive strategic partnership as a goal to be pursued, not a fact to be celebrated. It is one of the many mysteries of this Administration's public diplomacy that it persistently allows its critics to mischaracterize this crucial aspect of its policy.

Still, despite this important qualification, there is a real difference here. One candidate, reflecting the views of one group of American China specialists, believes that American and Chinese interests diverge to the point that competition, or even conflict, is inevitable. Another candidate, and another group of China specialists, believes that the two sides share enough common interests that a cooperative relationship -- if not a particularly warm one -- is still conceivable.
Both sides in this debate invoke influential theories of international politics to support their views. The pessimists portray China as a rising power, and warn that there is a strong likelihood of a clash of ambitions between a rising power like China and a status quo power like the United States. They also argue that, if China remains an authoritarian system, or even if it begins a program of democratic political reform, it is likely to experience a rise of nationalism that will make its international behavior far less cooperative, especially on sensitive issues like Taiwan.

In contrast, the optimists invoke the processes of interdependence and globalization. They note that, for two decades, China has been embarked on a program of reform and opening that is tying it inextricably into the international economy, and that its commitment to joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) will make those connections even broader and deeper. This, in turn, gives both the government in Beijing and business interests across the country a powerful stake in maintaining the international commercial relationships that will keep the economy humming, businesses profitable, and ordinary citizens satisfied. The optimists also point out that China has, in the post-Mao era, been willing to join a wide range of international regimes and organizations -- including those that its leaders previously denounced as illegitimate. These, in turn, provide binding rules that, to some degree, China will be obliged to honor if it wishes to be a respected member of the international community.

So who is "right" -- the optimists or the pessimists? Those who hold to theories of realpolitik, or those who believe in liberal theories of international affairs? Those who stress the power of nationalism, or those who believe in the power of interdependence? The fact is that they are both right, at least to a degree. Today, the U.S.-China relationship contains elements of both cooperation, competition, and potential conflict. And looking ahead, there are positive trends that promote competition, and negative trends that may give rise to conflict.

Thus, U.S.-China relations are virtually impossible to summarize in a single word or phrase, whether "partner" or "competitor." About ten years ago, I became notorious in China for describing U.S.-China relations at that time as "neither friend nor foe." Today, I might modify that description to say that the two countries are both potential friends and potential foes -- and everything in between.

One possibility that is not in the cards, however, is an alliance, or even a quasi-alliance, between the two countries. We have no common enemy, as we did in the latter part of the Cold War. We have no mutual security commitment, either tacit or formal. Nor do we share enough values to support that kind of relationship. The unlikelihood of a U.S.-China alliance enables critics of the Clinton Administration to mischaracterize its China policy in a second way -- by portraying the concept of a "constructive strategic partnership" as tantamount to an alliance because of its inclusion of the ambiguous word "strategic." Once again, it is one of the failings of
the Clinton Administration's public diplomacy that it allows the critics to present this mischaracterization without any refutation.

But if we are not about to form an alliance with China, that still leaves open many other possible relationships. Depending on what aspect one examines, the U.S.-China relationship can be located at virtually every other point along the spectrum from cooperation to conflict.

The worrisome fact is that our two countries are indeed potential adversaries, both militarily and politically. It is conceivable, although not especially likely, that we could engage in military conflict in the South China Seas, if China were to attack the territories or military forces of one of our friends or allies, and if we were to come to that country's defense. Somewhat more dangerous is the prospect of a military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, if the North began to collapse, South Korean and U.S. forces began to enter the territory of the DPRK, and China intervened to preserve a separate buffer state along its northeast border.

But the most probable cause for confrontation would be, of course, Taiwan. The recent presidential elections on the island have altered the situation in both positive and negative ways. The good news is that the various parties in the dispute -- China, the U.S., and the new government-elect on Taiwan -- increasingly agree that a formal declaration of independence by the island is neither necessary nor desirable. The bad news is that, as the issue increasingly changes from independence to unification, the gap between Taiwan and the mainland is widening. People on Taiwan are increasingly unwilling to commit themselves to unification as the pre-determined outcome of any negotiation with the mainland. The government in Beijing seems to believe that the use of force is as useful an instrument for compelling unification as it is for deterring independence. And the U.S. is correctly, committed to helping Taiwan defend itself from an attempt by Beijing to impose its will unilaterally. That is why the Taiwan issue could, indeed, once again be the cause of a military confrontation between the United States and China.

Moreover, from the Chinese perspective, our two countries are not simply potential military adversaries, but are already political adversaries. There is a widely-shared view in China, dating from the early 1990s, that the U.S. has hostile intentions toward China. In this view, the U.S. feels threatened by the rise of Chinese power. The U.S. wants to keep China weak and prevent its rise as a major power, through a triple policy of "containment, subversion, and fragmentation." The American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was widely seen in China as a symbol of this aspect of U.S. policy -- just as the brutal Chinese suppression of the antigovernment demonstrations in the spring of 1989 was viewed in the U.S. as emblematic of the repressive features of Chinese domestic policies.
But despite these tendencies toward an adversarial relationship, the United States and China are simultaneously collaborators on other dimensions. We are, to begin with, significant economic partners. The trade and investment relations between the two sides are extensive, and will become even greater as China enters the WTO. In general, these relationships are mutually beneficial, even though particular interests in each country will be hurt by the economic relocations and adjustments caused by flows of goods and capital. These mutually beneficial economic relations give the two countries a major stake in a stable bilateral relationship.

China and the U.S. also collaborate strategically to some degree. In particular, we are working together to defuse the situation on the Korean peninsula. To be sure, some in the U.S. would like North Korea to collapse, while most in China want to preserve it as a separate buffer state. Our two governments have also differed from time to time on the most appropriate strategies and tactics to employ toward Pyongyang. But the fact remains that neither of us wants the resumption of armed conflict on the peninsula, and that both governments want to encourage North Korea to launch a long-overdue program of economic reform, political liberalization, and commercial interdependence with the rest of the world.

China and the U.S. could also be partners in other areas, particularly the management of transnational issues. One of the most promising trends of the last several years has been the gradual convergence of Chinese and American views on the undesirability not only of transnational crime and terrorism, but also on the dangers of environmental pollution and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. So far, our collaboration is more tacit than active, but it could provide the basis for a stable and productive relationship.

Somewhere near the midpoint of the spectrum between conflict and cooperation, China and the U.S. are also competitors, again in both the strategic and economic realms. Economically, the modernization of the Chinese economy through a strategy of integration with the rest of the world will make Chinese products more competitive with American goods, on both Chinese, American, and third country markets. Strategically, we presently have divergent visions of international norms, and are competing for support in the international marketplace of ideas. Our two countries define human rights very differently. We place different degrees of emphasis on the concept of national sovereignty. We therefore have different attitudes toward humanitarian intervention. We also will differ with China, as with other developing countries, as we work to establish labor and environmental standards in the next round of the WTO negotiations. And Beijing and Washington have different views of the suitability of military alliances in the post-Cold War world.

So, China and the U.S. are simultaneously partners, competitors, and potential adversaries. In this sense, both those who describe our relationship as a “strategic
partnership" and those who characterize our interactions as "strategic competition" are partially right, and partially wrong.

And yet, although the present situation is highly complex, I believe that the Clinton Administration was profoundly correct in stating that our goal for the future should be to build toward a constructive strategic partnership with China. Clearly, that would be preferable to strategic competition, let alone to strategic enmity.

This is not to say that the task will be easy; even less is it to say that the responsibility is America's alone. But it was an act of great vision and statesmanship for the two leaders to agree that, despite their differences over trade, Taiwan, and human rights, and a host of other issues, their people would be better served by a cooperative relationship than by an adversarial one.

Defining a strategy

That leads to the second broad issue that will feature in this year's presidential elections: what kind of strategy is appropriate to our relationship with China? The challenge is not only to devise a strategy that is well-suited to the complexities of the present, but also one that has the best chance of moving U.S.-China relations in the directions that we would prefer. Just as we have been offered a false choice between "partnership" and "competition," so too have we often been presented with the misleading alternatives of "engagement" and "containment."

I think it is increasingly well understood that each of these alternatives is seriously flawed. "Engagement" simply implies that we should be dealing with the Chinese on a regular and proactive basis, rather than ignoring them or trying to isolate them. In that sense, the Clinton Administration's decision to adopt the policy of "comprehensive engagement" in late 1993 was a wise alternative to its previous exclusive focus on human rights and its refusal to engage in high level dialogue with Chinese leaders until the human rights situation had improved. But to say that we should "engage" with the Chinese begs a host of other questions. What should the goals of our "engagement" be? And what strategies should our engagement with China embody? Do we engage China to threaten it, hecter it, mollify it, cooperate with it, or what?

The concept of "containment" is, of course, drawn from the rhetoric of the early Cold War. It was clearly appropriate as a strategy for dealing with a Soviet Union that did not accept economic interdependence with the West, and appeared to be engaged in a concerted effort to build an ideologically-oriented empire by military means. Such is not the case with China, which is already extensively interdependent with the West, and which does not (with the exception of Taiwan and the South China Seas) appear to have military ambitions against its neighbors. Not only is...
containment therefore inappropriate as a way for the U.S. to deal with China, but it would be opposed by America’s allies in the region, whose support would be necessary for its implementation.

Wise policy analysts have, therefore, looked for an alternative to both the vague policy of engagement and the inappropriate policy of containment. Too often, however, they have tended to see these two strategies as opposite approaches that can be somehow blended or compromised, and have developed such neologisms as “constrainment” and “congagement” to describe the resulting mix. But in fact, engagement and containment do not lie at opposite ends of the same spectrum. The opposite of engagement is not containment, but rather disengagement: a refusal to participate in the normal range of economic, diplomatic, and social exchanges with China. The opposite of containment is not engagement, but appeasement: the attempt to deal with an ambitious rising power not by rejecting its demands, but by trying to accommodate them. We are, therefore, talking about two distinct dimensions of policy here, not just one.

But this realization will still not produce an adequate policy. We need to consider more dimensions to policy than simply whether to ignore China or to engage it, whether to appease China or to contain it. Given the complexity of our relationship with China, given our desire not simply to accept that complexity but to promote cooperation, and given the uncertainties as to whether or not we can succeed, our strategy must be multi-faceted in a way that is hard to summarize in a single word, neologism or not.

Let me suggest the following elements that I think should be parts of that multi-faceted policy:

- Reassurance. We need to reassure China -- and here I am referring even more to the Chinese people than their leaders -- that we wish them well. We need to convince them that we are not trying to keep them down, but would welcome their success. We are not trying to exclude them from the international community, but to integrate them into it. We favor political reform and respect for human rights, but we are not trying to promote instability or chaos in China. We want to see a peaceful and mutually agreeable solution to the Taiwan question, but would endorse unification if that is indeed the solution that emerges from such a process. We will maintain our alliance with Japan, but that alliance is not targeted against China. Most basically, we want a cooperative relationship -- indeed (dare I say it?) we want a constructive strategic partnership -- with the prosperous, democratic, just, and stable China that we hope will emerge after a few more decades of growth and reform.
Integration. As just noted, we want to further integrate China into the international community. This means far more than just "engagement" in bilateral dialogue with China. It means bringing China into rules-based international regimes and institutions. China has made great strides in that direction. It has subscribed to most of the major non-proliferation regimes, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has now signed both of the major international covenants on human rights. It is becoming part of the international environmental regime. The conclusion of the process of bringing China into the World Trade Organization -- which should be seen not as a "club" of liberal democracies, but as the rules-based regime that governs international trade and investment -- would be further progress along these lines.

Enforcement. As China joins international regimes and institutions, we and the rest of the international community have the right to expect greater compliance with them. This is not to say that China's performance will be perfect, just as Europe's and America's is not. But Beijing should clearly evince a willingness to conform with its international obligations. In turn, promoting that compliance can be seen as a kind of enforcement of international norms. Sometimes this can be done through international mechanisms, such as the dispute-resolution mechanisms of the WTO. Sometimes it will involve economic sanctions by like-minded countries. Sometimes it will involve criticism of China's conduct in international fora. Defining the appropriate response to violations of international norms and laws will always be a challenge. But it will be more effective if it is clearly portrayed as upholding multilateral international obligations that China has undertaken, rather than as imposing unilateral American preferences on Beijing.

Cooperation. We should show a sincere willingness to work together with China -- not only to advance common interests, but also to narrow differences on both bilateral and multilateral issues. Without compromising our interest in the full range of human rights, and without refraining from criticizing China's shortcomings in the appropriate ways, we can still work with China to promote some aspects of human rights, especially poverty alleviation, the rule of law, administrative reform, and other aspects of good governance. We can also try to narrow our differences on the emerging issues in the international community, especially the conditions under which humanitarian intervention is an appropriate response to severe internal problems in third countries.

Strength. If we are to deter China from challenging vital American interests, let alone to prevail in any confrontation, we must remain strong. Our Chinese colleagues frequently tell us that China feels less able to challenge America's international leadership today than it did several years ago.
because of America's self-evident strength. Chinese analysts are concluding that the world is not becoming multipolar as quickly as they once believed, and that China therefore has little choice but to work within the present international order led by the United States. Frankly, that change in Chinese calculations is a welcome development from the American perspective. But we should learn from Chinese strategists that national strength must be comprehensive: we must remain strong not just militarily but also politically and economically as well.

- Wisdom. Thus, if we are to deter China from challenging vital American interests, we must also maintain sound alliances and partnerships with our friends, especially in Asia. This requires that we manage our other key bilateral relationships, especially with Japan, in a more consultative manner. It also is another argument for welcoming China into the WTO, as any other policy would not attract much sympathy or support elsewhere in Asia. Similarly, if we wish to integrate China into an international community in which the U.S. plays a leading role, then the rules of that community must embody a broad international consensus, as opposed to simply reflecting the interests of the United States and a few other developed countries. Creating these kinds of legitimate international regimes will also demand less unilateralism and more consultation.

Summary

In short:

- Our present relationship with China combines elements of cooperation, competition, and potential conflict.

- For the future, our objective should indeed be to build toward a constructive strategic partnership -- i.e., a cooperative relationship with China.

- That, in turn, requires a strategy with far more elements than are captured by words such as "engagement" and "containment." It requires a blend of reassurance regarding our ultimate intentions with regard to China, integration of China into the emerging international community, efforts to ensure that China lives up to the norms and rules of that community, and cooperation with China where our interests converge.

- A successful policy toward China can also not be seen as a purely bilateral matter. It also requires that we remain strong both economically and militarily, that we maintain close relations with friends and allies, and above
all that we exercise our international responsibilities with sensitivity and wisdom.

None of this will guarantee a cooperative relationship with China. But if we do become strategic competitors, let alone strategic rivals or adversaries, I want future generations of historians to say that the responsibility for that tragic outcome rested not with the United States, but with China.
Fifty years after China's civil war ended, a former *Life* magazine correspondent who witnessed it revisits four cities conquered by Mao's peasant army. He found a country transformed—at least as much by capitalism as by communism.

by Roy Rowan

Shenyang

Communist conquerors, in bronze, form a background for teenagers (left), whose energy is a far cry from the sadness of a young evacuee in 1948.

On a blustery October day five decades ago, Mao Zedong proclaimed, "China has stood up." Thus began the People's Republic of China.

From 1945 to 1949, as a transportation officer for the United Nations in central China and then as a correspondent for *Life* magazine, I witnessed much of China's civil war. During most of that time, the Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, clung to the big population centers, while the Communists, led by Mao, infiltrated the countryside. Mao boasted that eventually the cities would "fall like ripe melons." Starting in late 1948, his prophecy came true: Chiang's four Nationalist strongholds—Shenyang (then known as Mukden), Xuzhou, Taiyuan, and Nanjing—all fell.

I was in the four cities while they were under siege: Few people, Chinese or foreign, saw as much as I did of this awful conflict that brought death and suffering to millions of Chinese. The war was terrible to witness. But for me that period also began a lifelong connection to China in particular and to Asia in general.

China in the 1940s was an exasperating place. Transportation and communication were primitive. Most roads were ruts worn into existence by a 2,000-year procession of wheelbarrows and mule carts. With patience and shouting, you might get through on the phone to Nanjing or Beijing. But calling any other city, particularly those under siege, was like trying to telephone Mars. The only way to find out what was going on was to hitch rides with the Civil Air Transport planes piloted by General Claire Chennault's former Flying Tigers. Their destinations and cargo depended on the vicissitudes of the war. On one flight it was 63 Trappist monks accompanied by eight cows. On another it was 200 orphans being flown out of harm's way.

Landing on the hacked-out dirt runways, sometimes with the fat-bellied C-46s loaded to the ceiling with high explosives, was more than a little unnerving. It was on one such flight that I happened to land in Shenyang just as it was falling to the Communists—and so was the only
foreign correspondent present to report on that turning point.

Over the past 50 years I've often wondered how Shenyang and the other three cities fared under Mao and his successors. During
the war Mao had written a poem describing how Genghis Khan
and China's early rulers were uncultured. "These men belong to
the past," he wrote. "Only today are there men of feeling." The
Great Helmsman may have been a man of feeling, but he was also
as tough and tyrannical as any emperor. Mao consolidated his
power in brutal fashion, killing or destroying millions of class en-
emies. Then there was the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s,
in which tens of millions starved; the Hundred Flowers Camp-
paign, which decimated intellectual life; and the decade-long Cul-
tural Revolution, which brought China to the edge of chaos.

Since the economic reform era began under Deng Xiaoping
in 1979, I had seen how coastal China—Beijing and Shanghai—
had been transformed. But what had happened to the four for-
mer Nationalist strongholds? Nanjing is a prominent city, but the
other three are off the beaten path: When was the last time you
saw an article datelined Xuzhou? I feared—or maybe hoped—
that change had passed them by. This summer, accompanied by
photographer Fritz Hoffmann, I set out to revisit the four cities.
Here is what I found.

Shenyang—October 1948

"This is a ghost city," I cabled Life on a freezing autumn after
noon when Communist General Lin Piao's soldiers were about to
march in unopposed. "Freezing blasts of wind whistle down the
broad empty thoroughfares. Shop fronts and even some of the
pillboxes vacated by their Nationalist machine gunners, ar
boarded up...."

Ghost city no more: From one million destitute people the

Shenyang has swelled to a population of 6.5 million. Some residents are obviously affluent and not averse to being seen in skin-tight Ralph Lauren jeans or Gucci ties. Traffic jams lock taxis, buses, and bikes in a honking mishmash.

A few landmarks from the 1940s remain. The 100-foot-high Soviet victory obelisk, erected in 1945 and topped with a Russian tank, even now guards the railroad station, itself still a magnet for the desperate. In 1948 the station was jammed with civilians and soldiers selling their belongings to buy a rail ticket to safety. Today it doesn't look that different; it's filled with stalls selling TVs and radios to the new middle class.

Traffic jams lock taxis, buses, and bikes in a honking mishmash.

The Shenyang Petrochemical Corporation, on the edge of town. Since 1988, with the establishment of the Economic and Technological Development Zone, Shenyang has been trying to replace its dirty old industries with clean new companies. The zone's pristine glass-and-concrete plants are a far cry from the production line in 1940s Taiyuan.
lost amid the development; skyscrapers sprout everywhere.

One of the fastest-expanding Taiwanese firms, President, is a low-tech concern that makes dehydrated soup noodles. Chou Ching Mao, the company's president, demonstrated how a $25 million assembly line, operated by a handful of white-smocked workers, can turn out 20 tons of the convenience food every day. Chou plans to double the size of the plant next year—but not the size of his bare-bones work force. That's the problem. The new, mostly foreign-financed plants are cleaner and more profitable than the massively overstaffed state-run factories, but they do not employ nearly as many people. The number of laid-off workers in the city, estimated at 400,000, is growing steadily. Street protests among the jobless are common, though so far peaceful. Anxious to get the unemployed back to work, or at least to keep them quiet, state employment agencies offer retraining classes, while the Workers' Cultural Palace provides such diversions as disco dancing—starting at dawn.

More surprising to me is the influx of big Asian corporations. The number of pioneering Americans is a matter of numbers; the number of workers, business in China. The number of foreign-financed plants is growing steadily. These companies are setting up for the long term, with a view to the future. This is clearly a place in a rush to modernize.

Prosperity is inching in. The city's new supermarkets, air-conditioned, are small but well-stocked with packaged foods. Vegetables, and meat, some of it from as far away as New Zealand. There's a 15-minute wait for a seat in the Kentucky Fried Chicken. The Caterpillar plant, which assembles hydraulic excavators for sale in China, represents a $2 billion investment. Its joint venture partner, Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group, holds a 15% interest and helped recruit the 300 workers. "I can't tell you how proud I am of the quality of the machinery we are producing here," says Roger Spencer, 55, quality resources manager of the sprawling, spotless Caterpillar factory. "You train these workers once.

But Xuzhou also retains a keen sense of its past. There is a beautiful museum of Han dynasty arts (Xuzhou was the capital of the Han dynasty for over five centuries). The museum of the Battle of Huai-Hai, also a museum of modern times. There's a 15-minute visit to the site of the battle, where 250,000 Chinese soldiers fought against the Nationalists. When I left in November 1948, it was suffering the effects of the Battle of Huai-Hai, one of the biggest of all time, and the Nationalists were sweeping up people from the refugee-packed streets to dig trenches and patch the city's protective walls. Trucks, mule carts, and rickshaws filled with wounded soldiers struggled in from the battlefront, 25 miles east.

Xuzhou today is not as modern as Shenyang, and there are not as many skyscrapers as in Nanjing or Taiyuan. Compared with these cities, more of its older buildings have survived, making it more resonant of the China I used to know. Until recently it didn't even have regular air service. For all that, Xuzhou is a far different place from the panicked city of 250,000 I left. It's now a modern metropolis of more than 1.5 million, with "growth" as its catchwords. "Our annual GDP exceeds $7 billion," brags Wang Xilong, therd, 57-year-old Communist Party chief, whose brisk manner and sharply pressed blue suit give him the mien of an American CEO.

City officials have big plans, speaking grandly of an "Euro-Asia land bridge," a proposed highway stretching from Xuzhou through Siberia to Amsterdam. Giving the city its biggest economic boost is the Jin Shan Qiao (Golden Garden Bridge) Development Zone. In it are Japanese, German, and American (Kodak, Rockwell, and Caterpillar) factories. An entire village, called Long Tan Gardens, has been built for foreign executives; it looks like a new housing development in Anywhere, U.S.A.

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munist rifle fire 500 yards away.

There are three villages named Zhou Zhuan within 30 miles of one another. Bumping over pitted dirt roads, we went (naturally) to the two wrong ones first. Finally, at the foot of Yellow Dragon Hill, some 25 miles east of Xuzhou, we found the Zhou Zhuan where I had spent the most terrifying night of my life.

This hinterland produces 80% of China's soybean powder and lots of garlic, but little else. Compared with the transformation of Xuzhou, little seemed changed in Zhou Zhuan. Ducks, chickens, pigs, and bare-bottomed children scampered through the muddy streets lined with thatch-roofed dwellings. At least the village is at peace. Fifty-one years ago the place was deserted and ringed with tanks, trenches, and mud pillboxes.

Fritz and I climbed the rocky hill where I had encountered Lieutenant General Li Mi, commander of the Nationalists' 13th Army Group, directing artillery fire. About 100 soldiers had been sprawled over the craggy slope eating their evening bowls of rice, weapons in their laps. Now quarry workers below were turning this hill into gravel; in a year or two it won't exist.

Reaching the top of the hill, I remembered watching the battle as the sun dipped below the horizon and Li shouted curt commands into a field phone. Ahead of the artillery, the 37mm guns on Li's tanks cut red streaks through the blackness. Occasional flares lit the sky. My reverie was abruptly interrupted when the quarry workers set off a succession of dynamite blasts—a vivid, deafening reminder of what China's civil war sounded like.

Taiyuan—December 1948

As I walk through the glitzy Shanxi Grand Hotel lobby, a child eager to practice English stops me. "My name is Simon. I'm 8 years old," says the crew-cut boy. Then he hands me his printed calling card—including his e-mail address.

What a difference half a century makes! When I was last here, this old walled capital of Shanxi province had been under siege for five months. Children were starving, not chatting up foreigners in a second language. Food was so scarce that when a man dropped dead, two women, I was told, claimed him as their husband. They both wanted his body to eat.

Taiyuan was an important target because of its huge arsenal. But the shells for its weapons, as well as the sacks of rice needed to feed the soldiers, had to be parachuted in because the surrounding hills were honeycombed with Communist gun emplacements. Sometimes American mercenary pilots would drop half their loads from the air, then try to land their lightened aircraft. The trick was to zoom in, jam on the brakes, dump the cargo, and then take off before Communist mortars could target the plane. That's how I got to Taiyuan the first time.

The old airstrip is now a children's playground, with brightly painted swings and slides. The plump children and their robust parents are living proof that cannibalism is no longer on the menu; restaurants brim with food and customers. The city's massive North Gate, through which Mao's troops poured, has been preserved as a landmark of the Communist victory; as in most Chinese cities, though, the ancient walls that once ringed the city are
either rubble or gone altogether.

Unlike Shenyang, which embraced economic reform at an early stage, Taiyuan was slow in moving to capitalism; unlike Xuzhou, Taiyuan was not a transportation hub; and unlike Nanjing, it was not politically important. Taiyuan therefore sat out much of the tumult of China's rush to the market. In some ways, this has been a blessing. With its broad, tree-lined boulevards, Taiyuan is more inviting than Shenyang or Xuzhou, where new factories pop up even in old, established neighborhoods. But here, too, the Communist economic legacy is being dismantled.

After the civil war, the new government converted the former arsenal into a plant belonging to the state-owned Taiyuan Heavy Machinery Group. It became a classic example of a state-owned enterprise, with dozens of product lines. The company, known as TZ, now encompasses 20 enterprises employing 30,000 workers. Annual sales are $120 million; officials won't say whether it makes money. Its plants, spread over almost five square kilometers, make everything from giant cranes, which are currently being used for building the Yangtze River dams, to satellite-launching towers (which I was not permitted to see).

"Until 1997 everything here was government-planned," says TZ's senior engineer and vice general manager, Tang Bao Ren. "But the company has since been decentralized, and the number of workers is being reduced." Then, realizing he was talking to a capitalist, he added brightly, "Today our workers can even buy TZ shares or..."

The losing side

Marshal Yan displays the cyanide pills he vowed to use if the Communists took Taiyuan. They did; he didn't.
Few foreigners live in this sweltering, bustling interior city of three million. Even so, TZ has managed to establish 11 joint ventures, three of them with American companies: Harnischfeger (mining shovels), Morgoil (oil-film bearings), and ESCO (wear-resistant blades for mining and earthmoving equipment).

Mark Mallory, general manager of ESCO's mineral-processing division, started talking to TZ about a joint venture in 1995 when it had become clear that a seven-year licensing agreement with his company, based in Portland, Ore., wasn't working. The phone never rang, said Mallory. The Chinese engineers didn't understand how to use our equipment. But they were too embarrassed to ask.

Negotiations dragged on for two years, but in 1998 the joint venture, in which ESCO has a 51% interest, poured its first manganese steel castings. That happened on the night Fred McBane, a gruff, good-natured 42-year ESCO veteran, was sent over to organize the place. "Nothing worked," growls McBane.

"All the valves and burners were shot. There were 32,000 tons of junk lying around. And I kept finding hideaways where workers were sleeping." His description sounded to me like the old Taiyuan.

McBane is still there and still grumbling; the city government is still earnestly working to attract more private enterprises. "I believe in communism, but we can learn some things from capitalism," says the dapper first deputy mayor, Cai Zhong, who can press the flesh as well as any ward heeler.

Taiyuan's chief attraction is its rich deposits of coal, iron and...
and gypsum; there may be considerable natural gas reserves as well. But you have to wonder whether the city fathers quite have the hang of this capitalist thing. Smiling portraits of officially designated "model workers" line the main thoroughfare. And the major stumbling point in the ESCO negotiations was that TZ wanted the right to decide how many workers the plant should have, and who—not the kind of thing any sensible business is willing to delegate. ESCO finally got its way.

Still, there are signs that Taiyuan is joining the long march to the market. Most of the billboards on Welcome Chairman Mao Street now advertise consumer products. The twin towers of the almost completed Shanxi International Trade Center will top out at 42 stories, dwarfing the twin pagodas of the Monastery of Endless Happiness, which dominated the skyline in 1948. A shiny new $25 million joint venture Coca-Cola bottling plant is producing 400,000 24-bottle cases a month for local consumption. Street-level capitalism is thriving, with flimsy vendor stalls wedged between all the new steel and brick structures. Another profitable small business is to set up billiard tables near the job sites; construction workers like to shoot pool at the end of the day.

One building that hasn't changed in centuries is the provincial governor's headquarters. I went there in 1948 to interview Marshal Yan Xishan, who had 90,000 troops under his command, including 400 vagabond Japanese soldiers left over from World War II. Suffering from diabetes as well as from the Communists' gradual encroachment, the 66-year-old looked exhausted. "See these?" he asked, pointing to a cardboard shoebox filled with 500 white potassium cyanide capsules. "They are for my 500 commanders to swallow if the Communists capture Taiyuan." Before closing the box, he pointed to a single black capsule: "That one's for me." Shortly before the city fell, the old marshal flew away, eventually joining Chiang in Taiwan. He died there of a heart attack in 1960—without the bitter taste of potassium cyanide in his mouth.

Nanjing—April 1949

By the early spring Communist troops had reached the outskirts of Nanjing, the Nationalist capital that had been so brutalized under the Japanese occupation. Chiang had resigned on Jan. 21 and turned the government over to Vice President Li Zongren, who pleaded with Mao for peace—"even," he declared, "if it means my being boiled in oil." Mao instead ordered his troops to attack. With the Communists advancing on all fronts, Nanjing was in panic. Cursing, fighting, and bribing, residents surged aboard any boat or train that would carry them. Well, some things haven't changed. Boarding a train in Nanjing this summer, I found the wild pushing and shoving almost as bad as in April 1949.

"Happily, I wasn't born yet when the city suffered those terrible convulsions," said Yu Yong Je, the 43-year-old manager of the Panda Electronics Group. His company was almost transplanted to Taiwan during the mass evacuation. "All of our factory equipment was down on the dock waiting to be loaded on a ship," he says. "But the workers refused to go."

Though Nanjing is a city with an eye on the future, in a nod to the past a soldier visits the home of Sun Yat-sen (pictured behind him).

The capital of Jiangsu province, Nanjing now has five million people, more than four times its population during the civil war. Jin Zhong Qing, the vice governor, says Jiangsu has attracted 125 FORTUNE 500 companies. The city is not on the conventional foreign tourist route, but busloads of schoolchildren come from all over China to climb the 300 gleaming white stone steps up Purple Mountain. At the top they gaze at the crypt holding the remains of Sun Yat-sen—the man who overthrew the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and founded the Republic of China. (Both Taiwan, whose formal name is the Republic of China, and the mainland, which is the People's Republic, lay claim to Sun's legacy.)

Today Nanjing is one of the most livable cities in China, with many parks, tree-shaded streets, and terraced apartments. It is also booming. Large quantities of goods move in and out of the same Yangtze River docks where fearful citizens tried to escape 50 years ago. "You get unloaded here too quick to have any fun," complains Constance Xyristaslis, chief engineer of the Greek freighter Aris, perhaps referring to the seedy massage parlors that hire some of the young women laid off by the state-owned factories. "There's always another ship waiting for your berth."

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My most vivid memory of Nanjing is of the day before the Communists walked in. Daylight had done nothing to lift the dark and desperate mood of the city. At Sun Yat-sen Circle, where young lovers now snuggle together at night, the throngs of shouting, arm-waving moneychangers had dwindled to a few. At the old Ming Palace Airport (where the Jincheng motorcycle factory now churns out engines for Japanese Suzukis as well as for its own bikes), salvage crews were melting down the wings of wrecked Chinese air force planes to make aluminum kitchen utensils. "Instead of beating swords into plowshares," I wrote in my notebook, "the Chinese are converting American war surplus into pots and pans. Wouldn't that piss off American taxpayers?" That evening Nanjing lay quiet. Street lights still flickered wanly until the 11 P.M. curfew, then blinked out. A few rifle-toting gendarmes wearing shabby black uniforms roamed the deserted streets.

It was 3:30 in the morning on April 22, 1949, when the Communist attack began. The defending artillery batteries fired a few perfunctory shots. That was all. Mao's shock troops jammed onto barges and struck from across the Yangtze. "The river rang with the silvery notes of bugles," exulted the Communist radio. The Nationalist capital now belonged to Mao Zedong, as the rest of China soon would.
Final WTO Obstacles Fall

China last month cleared its last major hurdles before WTO accession. The agreement signed with the European Union on May 19 and, most importantly, the passage of the China Trade Bill by the US House of Representatives mean accession is in sight.

Despite predictions of a knife-edge vote, the House of Representatives on May 24 approved the bill by a 237-197 majority. Political leaders from both countries breathed a sigh of relief as they hailed the bill's passage.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin said: "I believe that early settlement of PNTR status ... is in the fundamental interests of both countries and is the common aspiration of both their peoples."

US President Bill Clinton said: "Today the House of Representatives has taken a historic step towards continued prosperity in America, reform in China and peace in the world."

While labor supporters in the States continued to raise fears of job losses among American workers, business interests were generally delighted.

"We feel strongly that the people of the United States and China will enjoy greater prosperity and security [thanks to PNTR/WTO], which will help to build a larger, better political relationship in the future," Patrick Powers, Director of China Operations for the US China Business Council, told CIB.

The only downside on the Chinese side was anger at the trade bill's provision for the establishment of a congressional human rights monitoring body for China. This was added as a trade-off to persuade wavering representatives who leaned towards the argument that trade was an effective tool to influence Chinese government policy.

Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Hu Chusheng said this was an attempt to use human rights to interfere in China's internal affairs and to damage China's interests, which was unacceptable to the Chinese government.

"We urge the US side to correct its wrongdoing so as to ensure a healthy and smooth development of Sino-US economic cooperation and trade," he said.
Since the 1989 crackdown on student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, human rights have bedeviled U.S.-Chinese relations. However, the past decade reveals nascent trends toward openness in China that may provide the foundation for stronger protection of rights. Without abandoning concern for the present state of human rights in China, the United States must reshape its policy to support these trends. Sanctions will have little success at this stage, and the annual renewal of most favored nation (MFN) status should be abandoned in favor of permanent MFN for China once it meets the requirements for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The official dialogue on human rights should add economic and social rights to the agenda to give the Chinese a greater stake in cooperation. Most important, assistance should be provided to support reforms in the government sector as well as in emerging Chinese civil society.

By Catharin E. Dalpino

As the tenth anniversary of the crackdown on student protestors in Tiananmen Square approaches, Beijing's nervousness is obvious. The government has quelled activity that appears to challenge the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), notably the attempts of a small group of activists to establish an opposition party. It has also tightened control on some social and religious groups whose broadening membership could metastasize into political movements. In response, the United States has redoubled its efforts to censure China in the international community. These initiatives, such as the unsuccessful sponsorship of a China resolution at the annual meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), have symbolic value but little effect on Beijing's human rights performance. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade increased bilateral tensions, and Beijing hastened to suspend the U.S.-Chinese dialogue on human rights. American policymakers should use this hiatus to reassess U.S. human rights policy toward China.

Since the Chinese government's suppression of the Tiananmen Square movement, the United States and China have, with few exceptions, held opposing positions on human rights issues. The American policy community has been locked into a zero-sum debate on China, which is broadly (but inadequately) defined as engagement versus isolation and carrots versus sticks. Both these dynamics were at play in the attempt to link human rights with trade in 1993-94. This effort foundered equally because of Beijing's refusal to yield to demands for improvements and American business opposition to the linkage.

China's seeming intransigence is rooted in more than the regime's determination to maintain political control. Washington and Beijing disagree on issues of both priority and proportion in human rights. American concerns about Chinese human rights include religious and reproductive rights, but the overwhelming focus remains on the right to political expression and activity. In contrast, Beijing gives highest priority to raising the living standards of its citizens, on which the party's popular support now depends. Exacerbating the difference in priorities, some Americans believe China should follow the path of the Soviet bloc in the 1980s, when political change preceded economic reform and led to the collapse of communism. The Chinese government and many ordinary Chinese stress the negative outcomes of that transition: economic chaos in Russia and communal violence in the former Yugoslavia.

Some Chinese are also bewildered by the growing emphasis of human rights in U.S.-Chinese relations after the cold war. The U.S.-Chinese rapprochement took place during the last years of the Cultural Revolution, but Washington did not protest the widespread abuses of Maoist rule at that time. By U.S. count, approximately 2,000 political prisoners remain in China, 7 percent of whom were imprisoned during the Tiananmen crackdown. But during the Anti-Rightist campaign of the late 1950s, more than 800,000 Chinese were sentenced to "reform through labor" for political crimes. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, 400,000 people were jailed for political offenses, and one out of every three Chinese inmates was a political prisoner. This problem of proportion puzzles even ordinary Chinese. Although the shift in U.S. policy toward greater priority on rights is found in numerous countries, Beijing regards the heightened U.S. concern for rights as an attempt to undermine Chinese prestige and power in the international community.

Suspicious about the underlying motives of U.S. human rights policy are not confined to old-guard ideologues who waged anti-Western campaigns decades ago. They are evidence of a wide vein in the Chinese psyche which has been ambivalent about
close relations with the West since the Opium Wars of the 1840s. Many Americans were startled when Peking University students, who had been the standard bearers in Tiananmen Square, probed for the "hidden agenda" behind U.S. human rights policy during President Clinton's address there last year. More significantly, the anti-American demonstrations in the wake of the Belgrade embassy bombing were based in the Chinese university population. Because of the Tiananmen Square movement and the replica of the Statue of Liberty brandished at that time, the American public had been inclined—incorrectly—to view Chinese students as uniformly pro-American.

Ironically, Washington and Beijing have found themselves to be strange bedfellows on some international human rights issues. Last summer the United States and China were in a slim minority of governments opposing the draft treaty for an International Criminal Court, albeit for different reasons. Last month, the two countries attempted to block a resolution at the UNHRC calling for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty.

Is Civil Society Emerging?
The polarization of human rights issues in U.S.-Chinese relations often obscures the fact that both the Chinese state and society are in a process of incremental but remarkable change, which has afforded ordinary citizens unprecedented personal freedom, although it doesn't promise an immediate transition to democracy. Much of this change is unofficial and undeclared. It can be attributed to the effects of the economic reforms introduced in China in 1979, and more recently to rapid economic growth. During the past twenty years, an embryonic nongovernmental sector has emerged in China and become progressively more dense. To date, however, this phenomenon bears little resemblance to Western concepts of civil society, which stress assertive institutions that confront as well as cooperate with government authorities. Nor does it resemble civil society groups in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, which developed for the explicit purpose of challenging Leninist rule.

Instead, private citizens are forming voluntary organizations which seek to address social needs that are underfunded or ignored by the state. These include care of the disabled, environmental protection, help for battered women, and eradication of illiteracy. Some social service groups are cautiously acquiring advocacy functions and are even sought by government officials and legislators for their views on policy reform. In contrast to the Tiananmen Square demonstrators, many activists in China today take an instrumental rather than ideological approach, seeking to modify state-society relations to give citizens a more active role in social and economic policy.

The Chinese government's response to this phenomenon is ambivalent. The government recognizes that national development goals cannot be met through official action alone, and even acknowledges that nongovernmental groups may be more efficient in some roles. During the floods along the Yangtze River last year, civil society organizations played a pivotal role in delivering assistance; raising relief funds; and coordinating government agencies, private donors, and volunteers. But the government is also mindful of the potential power of a strong civil society and seeks to regulate it. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) allowed the greatest autonomy are those which are perceived to be the least threatening to the regime. New regulations promulgated last year could impose further restrictions on NGOs, although some Chinese observers believe that the law aims to outlaw new political parties and will have little real impact on non-political groups.

A similar phenomenon has been observed in the Chinese media, particularly in the print sector, where rapid privatization has brought striking improvements in press freedom over the past two decades. As with NGOs, the press is subject to control, which can be (and often is) tightened in times of political tension. However, the growth and multiplicity of media in China raise doubts of whether the government could reestablish the degree of control it maintained in the Mao era—& even in the 1980s.

Accountability: The New Legitimacy
Just as Chinese society has been affected by economic reform, so too has the state been forced to rethink its role in national affairs and its relations to citizens. Market reform has laid bare the weakness of a state structure originally designed to support a command economy and totalitarian rule. While Americans focus on political freedoms for Chinese citizens, the Chinese focus on national and local corruption, which is perceived to be rising. In the judicial sector, the number of judges and staff members convicted of abusing power in China more than doubled from 1997 to 1998. Prosecutors censured police more than 70,000 times last year for detaining people beyond the legal time limit. In response to the apparent upsurge in corruption, "soft" checks on government are emerging. For example, the National People's Congress (NPC) has established a committee to scrutinize the government's draft budgets, which have heretofore been sent to the legislature for pro forma approval. To qualify under the changing definition of political legitimacy, which involves more transparent and accountable rule, the party itself has mounted an anti-corruption campaign.
Signs of positive change in the formal system are seen in both the legislative and legal sectors. The NPC is becoming more professional and more vocal, although it is not yet a counterweight to executive power. NPC deputies have never overturned a government bill outright, but their voting records indicate increasing independence. In 1992, after legislators voting against the Three Gorges Dam project were silenced by the chair, they resorted to handing out pamphlets in the corridor. In 1995, more than a third of the deputies voted against the government’s banking law. Changes in criminal procedure law have strengthened the rights of defendants. New administrative laws permit citizens to sue the state for abuse of authority, and from 1996 to 1997 citizen-state lawsuits rose by 48 percent. Two-thirds of the judgments in those cases were decided in favor of citizen-plaintiffs.

The introduction of elections in Chinese villages has drawn the greatest international attention. Villagers committees, which oversee local projects but are not official government bodies, are directly elected in the majority of China’s one million villages. Candidates need not be CCP members, and the percentage of nonparty committee members is growing. Although some Americans see village elections as a harbinger for broader democratic change in China, their value at present is in offering citizens more accountable local leadership, curbing corruption, and exercising the vote.

A Multi-Dimensional Policy
For most of this decade, debate on China policy in the United States has centered on whether human rights is an appropriate objective, rather than on the efficacy of the U.S. approach to rights improvement. Wearyed by annual disputes over renewal of China’s MFN status, which is implicitly tied to human rights, policymakers have little time for more in-depth debate. However, an effective policy must match initiatives and responses with current trends and opportunities in China. The broad human rights agenda should:

1. Lengthen the time horizon in assessing human rights progress in China and in formulating policies to improve rights. Human rights advocacy is inclined to take the pulse of societies under authoritarian rule on a daily basis. This may enable the international community to halt or prevent abuses when it has the leverage to do so. However, this approach skims the surface of political change, often missing significant developments, and leads to unwitting exaggeration of trends in either direction. Western observers are quick to declare a “Beijing spring” when repression seems to ease on small groups of vocal individuals, or to decry a return to totalitarianism when the government tightens control on these same groups.

Moreover, a policy which is limited to the short term fails to grasp the paradoxical nature of political change in countries experimenting with liberalization. For example, new regulations on nongovernmental groups are both an attempt to control China’s growing civil society and an acknowledgement that the NGO sector has become a permanent player in the Chinese system. And while village elections stoke the hopes of Americans for democratic change, they also further the Maoist goal of making China’s rural sector self-sufficient, to relieve the central government of administrative burdens. The pulse of societies under authoritarian rule on a daily basis. This may enable the

2. Focus policy goals on the long-term, but tailor policy instruments to current conditions and opportunities. The American debate on human rights in China confuses form with substance, and focuses on means with little attention to ends. For example, the question has seldom been raised of whether the gains that sanctions might optimally produce would contribute to lasting political change in China. President Clinton’s 1993 executive order, which formally linked renewal of China’s MFN to human rights improvements, imposed conditions which focused mainly on individual political prisoners: accounting for imprisoned dissidents, refraining from their use in prison labor, and allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross to evaluate their condition. These were admirable humanitarian objectives, but it is doubtful whether they would have improved even the short-term political environment. Because sanctions are rarely effective in promoting internal political change, even the threat of human rights sanctions should be downplayed. To do so, the annual debate over MFN should be abandoned in favor of permanent status for China once it institutes reforms necessary for it to join the WTO. Such economic reforms will support greater political openness, although they are not sufficient in themselves to bring it about.
Conversely, many human rights groups and policymakers view assistance to China, even for reform efforts, as capitulation to Beijing. Administration initiatives on rule of law and civil society programs for China have consistently failed to gain congressional support. But at this stage of China's political development, when U.S. policy should focus on building the scaffolding for a better rights regime, a more calibrated and constructive approach is essential.

3. Pay attention to reformers from within as well as to high-profile dissidents. U.S. policymakers and human rights groups tend to champion a few Chinese individuals outside the system who articulate Western values on democracy and human rights, in the belief that they are the future leaders of a more democratic China. Apart from the unlikeliness of this assumption, policymakers interested only in formal opposition will overlook the need to create a broader political culture which will allow competition. History has shown that authoritarian regimes which are liberalizing will tolerate dissent from within long before they will risk opening the political system to formal opposition. Signs of this internal opening are increasingly apparent in China and should be reinforced.

Beyond concern for avowed dissidents, the United States should support reformers within the Chinese bureaucracy and the growing cadre of national and local politicians who openly debate government priorities. However, with the present volatility of U.S.-Chinese relations, and the particular sensitivity of human rights, the brass-band approach of an "official" assistance program will invite backlash from the Chinese government and citizens alike. Instead, funds should be made available to American nongovernmental organizations with long experience in China for low-profile programs to support reform across the Chinese system. A handful of American NGOs are pursuing these goals, but they require significantly more funding to promote change in a country as large and complex as China. Training for the judiciary and government agencies which implement local electoral reforms, exchanges between U.S. congressmen and younger generation NPC deputies, and training for Chinese NGO leaders are all possible at this time. The aim of such policies should not necessarily be to strengthen anti-regime forces, but to increase the regime's tolerance for dissent from within and the ability of NGOs to function with greater autonomy. To open this window, however, Americans must eschew a monolithic view of the Chinese system and resist the temptation to dismiss all official institutions as rubber stamps.

4. To engage the Chinese more effectively, work from a broader definition of human rights, and stress instrumental as well as ideological approaches to political change. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the United States has attempted to foster an official bilateral dialogue on human rights with little success. Momentum has been difficult to maintain because the framework for discussion is based on American concepts of rights. The talks are viewed by Beijing as a concession to Washington, to be granted or withheld according to short-term political considerations. A decade of dialogue has failed because China has so little stake in it. Two measures are needed to increase China's investment in these talks.

First, human rights issues should be embedded in a broader discussion of social concerns important to both sides. Washington need not abandon its interest in political rights, but it should agree to discuss areas of economic and social rights which affect citizen-state relations as well. These include environmental protection, health care, and women's rights, all of which attract growing citizen activism and advocacy in China. These additions will introduce a subtext of popular participation in policymaking. This expanded dialogue should be packaged as a Common Agenda, similar to discussions the United States holds with Japan, South Africa, and Ukraine on a range of social issues. Placing human rights in this broader context will also demonstrate American concern for ordinary Chinese citizens as well as for outspoken political activists.

Where possible, the human rights dialogue should also open a second track to include nongovernmental participants. China has expressed willingness to conduct NGO dialogues on human rights in the past, although Beijing likely intended these as substitutes for government discussion. In any track-two activity, the United States should not insist on perfect symmetry. China will want to involve intellectuals and groups who are closer to the state than their American counterparts. However, a dialogue promoting citizen links will help insulate human rights discussion from the hazards of official bilateral politics. A policy that supports indigenous trends toward openness will give both Chinese and Americans a greater stake in human rights cooperation and harbors a far greater chance of success.

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The views expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the trustees.
Since the Mao era, human rights in China have improved, but they still fall far short of international standards. The rulers perpetuate their power by practicing what we might call a moderate level of repression, adhering to the old Chinese adage 'Kill a chicken to warn all the monkeys.'

Human Rights, Repression, and "Stability"

JAMES D. SEYMOUR

The Chinese government's attitude toward human rights is based on at least two premises. First, it insists that because nation-states are sovereign entities, outside interference in domestic issues such as human rights is generally impermissible. Second, although token homage is paid to the idea of transcendent human rights principles, paramount are economic ("subsistence") rights, to which political rights are secondary.

Among other countries there is a fair degree of consensus that human rights have international standing and that economic and political rights are equally important and are not to be prioritized. These various rights have been embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. China has signed both treaties, but it has not ratified, or especially lived up to, either.

The covenants begin with the mandate "All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.... The States Parties to the present Covenant...shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination." Beijing has sometimes been at the forefront of efforts to implement this provision in other parts of the world, but it has always denied its applicability to Hong Kong, Taiwan, or to the non-ethnic-Chinese parts of the People's Republic.

Tibet would appear to be especially eligible for self-determination (the region had never been directly ruled by ethnic Chinese before the Communist military takeover in the 1950s), but China, backed by supportive domestic public opinion, is strongly committed to retaining it. The Chinese government enforces its control in Tibet with highly repressive methods that prevent unauthorized political expression. Even religion is carefully controlled. As a Communist official in Tibet recently noted, "It is important to ensure that temples are submissive to the government. If the government can control one lama [religious figure], it can control one temple; if it can control one temple, it can control the public." Political imprisonment in Tibet runs at approximately 50 to 100 times the rate in China proper. Under the circumstances, the Tibetans have been relatively quiescent.

There is also a high rate of political imprisonment among the Turkic peoples of northwest China (for whom independence is even less likely). The Turkic groups, who populate the vast Xinjiang region, have been more violently restive than the Tibetans.

Although the 53-article civil and political rights covenant covers a vast array of specific rights, the general thrust of the instrument is that people have the right to self-government and the right to free access to information on the basis of which they are to educate themselves on political matters. China's leaders have always rejected this concept and have felt free to imprison people who share with others unorthodox ideas and "state secrets" (that is, information the rulers do not want the public to have).

What is the state then of economic and social rights in China? Is Beijing's argument that civil
and political rights are less important than (and counterproductive to) the realization of “subsistence rights” only an excuse to perpetuate the leaders’ power?

Sub-subsistence Standards

The government appears to have made meaningful efforts to meet certain provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). For example, although serious problems remain in the area of women’s rights (Article 3), steps have been taken to improve the situation. One’s right to work (Article 6) was taken seriously in the past, but today economic reforms have presented new challenges, and the dismantling of state enterprises has created considerable unemployment.

Some provisions of the ICESCR are largely ignored. For example, safe and healthy working conditions (Article 7) are often absent. The right to form free trade unions (Article 8) is totally denied, with would-be labor organizers imprisoned or forced into exile. In recent years many labor activists have been charged with such offenses as attempting to overthrow the government or (if they have had meetings with the international labor movement) “illegally providing intelligence.”

A notable example is the case of a group of union organizers recently active in the midwestern city of Tianshui. The organizers had argued that workers were being laid off from state enterprises partly because the administrators were so corrupt that insufficient funds were available to pay the workers. The group was convicted of “subversion” and in July sentenced to terms of up to 10 years. Their leader, Guo Xinmin, is said to have been tortured.

The right to “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (Article 12) is a distant dream, with medical insurance hopelessly inadequate and provisions for the mentally ill primitive and inhumane. Good health care is rarely available locally and is beyond the financial reach of most Chinese.

Article 14 of the covenant calls for compulsory primary education and universal secondary education; neither is available in China. Secondary education is a privilege enjoyed only by a small minority, and a substantial percentage of Chinese children fail to develop newspaper-level reading skills. Indeed, when it comes to children, China’s human rights record is especially abysmal. The government reports only 2 percent of school-age children do not attend school, but this figure is believed to be unrealistically low. Millions of migrant children are usually ineligible for school entrance, which is in violation of Article 9 of the ICESCR. Most are allowed to become laborers, usually working under exploitive and substandard conditions. (The degree of exploitation of child labor that exists in, for example, South Asia, is not seen in China, but Chinese conditions are much worse than in many third world countries, including neighboring Vietnam.) The most egregious situation is that of orphans. There are many abandoned children, usually girls—a result of the government’s one-child policy and the social preference for sons. In 1996 the New York–based Human Rights Watch published a shocking report detailing how such children in state institutions had been abused and sometimes deliberately allowed to starve to death.2

On the general issue of poverty, China has made some progress. The hope was to eliminate it by the year 2000, but that effort has fallen short, and it is now admitted that at least 20 million people will remain below China’s low poverty line ($75 per year). Poverty as defined internationally is, of course, much more widespread, entitling us to question whether the suspension of political rights has been effective in terms of raising Chinese living standards, and to ask whether a more accountable and responsive political system might not do the job better.

Of course, poverty is found in most Asian countries, including those that are democratic, but China is different in that government is an integral part of the problem. True, labor mobility is greater than during the Mao era, but many workers and peasants still may not legally leave their hometowns, a situation analogous to serfdom. Of course, many do move, but they are then subject to harassment by local governments, which also conspire with employers to keep wages low and circumvent national laws on working conditions. This helps keep down the costs in the towns’ and villages’ own enterprises. Labor is virtually bought and sold by local governments. Sometimes workers borrow from prospective employers to pay for the required government work permits, in effect making them bonded labor. This means a mistreated worker can-

THE COSTS OF "STABILITY"

The views of China's rulers on sovereignty and "subsistence rights" underpin their skeptical attitude toward other human rights. But they also have one additional concern, namely, that the country needs, above all, stability. For example, freedom of religion is curbed because of the memory of various times in Chinese history when religious and political upheaval went hand in hand. Religious believers who show too much independence or militancy run the risk of persecution.

This summer saw a prime example of how alarmed the authorities can become over a spiritual movement that is perceived to be getting out of hand. The Falun Gong (Buddhist Law) sect, whose faith has elements of Buddhism, Taoism, and Qigong (physical and breathing exercises), mounted mass demonstrations in 30 cities around the country. The government mobilized the media to attack the group, and then outlawed it. The party has always sought to place all religions under its control. Until now it has been largely successful; Buddhism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism all have their official "legitimized" religious organizations. The challenge of Falun Gong, if not overcome, could spell the end to the Communists' religious monopoly. And that, they fear, could be the first step to losing their monopoly over politics.

The need to avoid chaos is widely felt, and many Chinese are persuaded by the state's insistence that curbing freedom is necessary to ensure stability. The past is often pointed to: China experienced civil war and two world wars during the first half of the twentieth century, and from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s there was the tumultuous Cultural Revolution. It is easy to persuade the Chinese that anything that threatens stability is to be eschewed, and that "Western-style" elections might be disorderly, with potentially destabilizing outcomes.

Of course, it is dictatorship that is unstable, for it disallows the frequent adjustments elections provide, thus making earth-shaking (albeit infrequent) upheavals all the more likely. And to some extent the prophecy of tumult is self-fulfilling. After all, it was not the demonstrating students at Tiananmen Square who effected the bloodshed of 1989, but the government. For many weeks that spring, students and workers peacefully protested government policies and the lack of democracy. Then, on June 4, as many as 2,000 Beijing citizens were killed by the army, and 7,000 were injured. Many were arrested, and hundreds who participated in the Tiananmen movement remain in prison to this day. One man recently released from confinement is the former liberal official Bao Tong; he has called for an official reevaluation of the events of that year. "If the 1989 killings are not condemned," Bao noted this June, "China is unlikely to fundamentally achieve long-term political stability." Thus, the idea that stability and human rights are connected is gaining adherents.

The events of 1989 marked a watershed in China's political development. China's leaders learned from the debacle that they cannot preserve their power if they grant too much—or too little—freedom. Yet any direct challenge to the Communist Party now results in swift, draconian punishment. All efforts to form opposition parties have been repressed, with at least seven leaders of the fledgling China Democracy Party imprisoned within the past year. That party has been outlawed by the authorities, and anyone involved runs the risk of being imprisoned for the vague "crime" of "endangering state security."

At the same time, information and ideas flow much more freely today than they did from the 1950s to the 1980s. Furthermore, China's leaders appear to have discovered that benefits can accrue to them if they address public discontent. Thus, many of the demands of the Tiananmen demonstrators have been met: inflation was brought under control, steps were taken to institute the rule of law (with at least some abusive officials prosecuted), and many aging party leaders (Mao's cronies) left the scene.

That information flows more freely than before is less because the authorities want it this way than because they cannot stop it. New media (tape recordings, faxes, the Internet) are much harder to control than the press and the airwaves. Still, the government tries. The authorities are constantly seeking out and blocking politically unacceptable Internet sites such as Falun Gong's. This spring Shanghai authorities closed 300 local Internet cafés. Hundreds of others in Shanghai and other cities...
not quit without losing his or her deposit and back wages, creating enormous potential for abuse. Labor discontent is an especially sensitive issue because workers traditionally have been deemed the Communists' main base of mass support. Worker disaffection in the form of union organizing is not only a crime but a challenge to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" principle and thus to the legitimacy of the regime.

**Crime and Punishment**

With such economic deprivation, and with the glaring inequalities of wealth and poverty, crime in China has, unsurprisingly, been on the rise. The problem has prompted occasional "crackdowns," with widespread arrests and imprisonment after the most casual—if any—judicial proceedings. China's prison system is notorious, although perhaps not all its notoriety is deserved. How does China's prison system measure up in terms of international standards, and what are those standards?

Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although China has not ratified that convention, the country fully acceded to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishments in 1988. According to Article 2 of that convention, authorities have an international obligation to take "effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture" in any territory under their jurisdiction. The Chinese government has sent somewhat mixed signals as to whether such treatment is condoned. The official line is that it is not. Nonetheless, torture has persisted, and sometimes results in death directly, or through suicide by inmates who cannot withstand the treatment. In one recent case an inmate drowned himself because he could not endure the electric shocks and other forms of torture that were being administered to him. The government revealed that 126 prisoners died as the result of torture in 1993, and 115 died in 1994.

China has the world's largest prison system. That is not surprising, since it also has the world's largest population. Although the rate of imprisonment in the 1950s may have been high by world standards, the prisoner population, which peaked in the late 1950s, has since declined. Today China has about 1,250 prison units, probably fewer than half the number that existed in the late 1950s. They hold about 2 million prisoners (mostly common criminals), which is not an extraordinarily large number. In Stalin's time, the population of the Soviet gulag averaged around 3 million (mostly political prisoners), or 2 percent of the national population. That figure is more than 10 times the current overall rate in China, where only about 0.17 percent of the population is imprisoned. By comparison, Taiwan imprisons people at a rate of 0.19 percent, and the United States rate is 0.44 percent. In other words, the United States imprisons people at more than double the Chinese rate.

Capital punishment is a different story. Of course, it has not been clearly established internationally that capital punishment violates human rights, but the world trend appears to be toward eliminating the death penalty. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights opposes the practice, and many countries have stopped executing people. Even China—where the execution of criminals receives widespread public support—has seen the beginning of some opposition, and the government claims that the number of executions is declining. Nonetheless, far more judicial executions occur in China than in any other country. In 1998 Amnesty International counted 1,067 executions, doubtless only a fraction of the total. The death penalty is meted out erratically, often for relatively minor crimes, such as fraud, tax evasion, and pimping (while those responsible for the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, for example, remain beyond the reach of the law).

Most convicts, of course, are not executed but end up in the "labor reform" system. While the size of the labor reform system may not be outrageous for a country with China's population, what often is outrageous are the atrocious conditions in the penal institutions (especially the less-well-run ones) and the fact that many inmates do not belong there at all. A small number are imprisoned for political reasons; many more are victims of other miscarriages of justice. This is because the judicial system is so slipshod that many innocents are convicted, and many minor offenders are given heavy sentences. In 1998 one province found that during a three-month period there had been 14,993 miscarriages of justice; 4,701 judges were charged with corruption or dereliction of duty in that province alone.

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remain in operation, but only under tight police supervision. These steps were prompted by fears of what might happen on the tenth anniversary of the June 4, 1989 crackdown.

OF CHICKENS AND MONKEYS

Although by international standards the human rights situation in China appears poor, most Chinese think more in terms of conditions now; they realize that human rights violations were far greater during the Mao era.¹ Not only has the reality improved, but the government also has come much closer to accepting international human rights norms than was conceivable before 1980. There has been considerable effort to establish the rule of law and a court system, and some acceptance of the idea that rulers do not have the right to do anything they want in the face of international agreements to the contrary. Although this does not yet extend to the point at which citizens can, in the name of an international human rights convention, challenge government action, the seeds for such action seem to have been planted.

Furthermore, Chinese society is far more pluralistic than ever before. No longer does the government monopolize employment, education, and culture. Unauthorized groups now abound, such as Falun Gong and the thriving gay and lesbian subculture. And although the press is not free, a large "gray market" for books and magazines exists that seems largely beyond the reach of the censors, despite the generally chilly political climate that has prevailed in recent years. Now and then the author-

³Information about human rights conditions in China is available from Human Rights in China (www.hrichina.org), Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org), and Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org). For Hong Kong, see Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor (www.hkhrm.org.hk).

ities may insist on the destruction of an entire run of a magazine, or they may suspend the operations of a publishing house and require its leaders to undergo "rectification" and write "self-criticisms"—chilling reminders of common practices of the Mao era.

But public thirst for dissident literature is insatiable, and publishers have devised a host of tactics to meet the demand and survive. For example, because magazines are more tightly restrained than books, monthlies call themselves "book magazines." When a publication is repressed, alternative outlets are not hard to find, and political critics manage to be heard. Often they express themselves in circuitous ways, such as praising the international legal action against the former ruler of Chile, Augusto Pinochet. (When a writer comments that human rights violators like Pinochet "cannot rest peacefully," readers immediately see what the author wishes to imply.) However, the line between the permissible and impermissible is unclear and changes from time to time and place to place. Thus some writers find themselves on the wrong side of that line, and pay the price of imprisonment.

Furthermore, being a cultural figure offers no protection if one strays from engaging in "culture" as the state narrowly defines it. This spring Yan Zhengxue, a painter from Beijing, and two writers from Shanghai, Jiang Tanwen and Li Cunrong, asked to be allowed to demonstrate against corruption; permission was denied. After attending a meeting of the outlawed China Democracy Party they were arrested and charged with endangering state security.

In short, since the Mao era, human rights in China have improved, but they still fall far short of international standards. The rulers perpetuate their power by practicing what we might call a moderate level of repression, adhering to the old Chinese adage "Kill a chicken to warn all the monkeys."
In Beijing Students' Worldview, Jordan Rules

By ELISABETH ROSENTHAL

BEIJING -- It was class time at Beijing University, but at 10 Monday morning seven guys in shorts and T-shirts crowded around a color TV in dorm room 511, a spare cement cubicle decorated with three metal bunkbeds and yesterday's laundry. Nine student "shareholders" had bought the TV last month in anticipation of just such an occasion, and now hoots and jeers filled the air.

"Aya, that Malone he plays dirty."

"Nice ball. Go Rodman!"

"They're losing with three minutes to go. I can't stand it. Hit me with a hammer!"

Minutes later, half a world away, the Chicago Bulls clinched their sixth National Basketball Association championship with a final basket with only five seconds to play. The students jumped to their feet and began a refrain: "Qiao Dan, Qiao Dan, Qiao Dan."

Qiao Dan, of course, is Michael Jordan. Sure, Bill Clinton, President of the world's most powerful nation, is about to visit China. But to the Chinese, Michael Jordan remains America's king.

Clinton's state visit this month has brought out citizens' interest in all things American, from books to clothes to movie stars. But these all seem like passing fancies compared to the intense passion that Chinese, especially young Chinese, have developed for Michael Jordan and American basketball.

"Michael Jordan is much more famous than Clinton here," said Cheng Qian, 20,
a Bulls fan and shareholder in the TV set who is a management major at Beijing University.

The Chinese have named him kongzhong feiren -- "space flier." In the last week, businessmen, retired teachers, students and government officials have all paused to watch him, live on state-run television, as he led the Chicago Bulls to their 4-2 series victory over the Utah Jazz.

When Beijing Meilande Information Company recently asked 1,000 Chinese to name the best-known Americans ever, Michael Jordan came in second, trailing Thomas Edison by just a few percentage points. Behind him were Albert Einstein, Mark Twain and Bill Gates.

On the sidewalks of Jianguomenwai Avenue, vendors sell Michael Jordan posters. In department stores, Michael Jordan books and calendars sit beside those featuring Hong Kong movie stars and the late Chairman Mao.

"Of all American things, basketball is the most popular," said Li Fa, a junior, who could not join the crowd in 511 because he is a Jazz fan. "Everyone knows Michael Jordan."

State television began broadcasting prerecorded N.B.A. games in the early 1990's, and recently switched to live broadcasts. Today, Chinese viewers had three opportunities to see the final playoff game, which the Bulls won 87-86. The first was live at 7:30 A.M., then a taped game at 9 A.M. for late risers, and a replay at 9 P.M.

Chinese are hard pressed to say why they so adore the Bulls and Michael Jordan, who scored 45 points in the final game and was named Most Valuable Player.

"I don't know -- because of his skill, and because he alone carries half of the Chicago team," said Li Qixing, 20, another of the TV's shareholders.

American basketball is certainly more colorful than the home-grown variant, where the People's Liberation Army's August 1 team (named for the day the Army was founded) is the reigning champion. In skill and in entertainment value, Chinese players are no match for the likes of Dennis Rodman, who played the game with much of his hair dyed green.

Said Han Bai, a junior, sitting on his bunk bed in jeans and a T-shirt, "I couldn't accept this from a Chinese player, but he's an American so we expect it."

And American sportscasts have other attractions.

The students who gathered in 511 on this steamy morning, ooched when they saw Leonardo DiCaprio, star of "Titanic," sitting at courtside. And, in a room full of male college juniors, the Jazz's cheerleaders, dancing in black leotards, got the thumbs up as well. Heads nodded in approval as Cheng Qian opined, "In this way, the Jazz are better than the Bulls."
The late John King Fairbank, a renowned historian of China at Harvard University, argued that Deng was the first Chinese leader for centuries to open the country's doors on his own initiative. The result was a radical break from a walled-in mentality and the Soviet model of a centralized economy.

China copied the Soviet model from the 1950s to the late 1970s. The basic assumptions of the model, wrote Fairbank, were that the ratio of capital to output was fixed, foreign trade was unimportant, and the production of consumer goods for export to secure foreign capital was not necessary. It followed that the way to industrialize was to invest as much as possible and consume as little as possible. In other words, heavy industry would build future prosperity while consumer goods would delay it. This model had brought the Chinese economy to its knees by the time Deng re-emerged from political oblivion in the late 1970s.

Centralization was not only imposed on the economic front, but also on the way people acted. Everyone was told to "draw a line" between socialism and capitalism. In daily life, it was a sin for people to wear fashionable clothes. Hence the notorious "colourless" image of Chinese people, who wore grey or blue uniforms for all occasions. During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to...
1976, a nationwide process of ideological remoulding forced people to believe in what they were taught, not in what they saw.

With Deng at the helm, however, class struggle gave way to economic reform. He replaced the slogan of “Politics in command” with “Seek truth from facts.”

In short, ideology and zeal gave way to pragmatic economic thinking. Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” helped to free China from autarky.

China became basically self-sufficient in oil supply in 1965. Production at the five model factories in the oil industry in early 1956. (front left) Wang Jinxi, Ma Deren, Xiong Xingzi, Xue Guobang, Zhu Yongzhong.

A parade of models of furnaces from the provinces passes through Tiananmen Square in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward, a mass movement aimed at raising steel production to the level of the West within 15 years.

The earthquake that hit the city of Tangshan on 28 July 1976 killed 240,000 people. It was the worst earthquake ever recorded in China.
1949 The People's Republic of China was founded.
1950 The Korean War broke out.
1952 Mao Zedong launched the "Anti-corruption, anti-waste and anti-bureaucracy" campaign.
1953 China started its first Five-Year Plan, focusing on 156 industrial projects supported by the former Soviet Union.
1954 First Constitution passed. Cotton cloth rationed.
1955 Premier Zhou Enlai proposed the famous foreign policy of "seeking what is common while putting aside differences."
1956 Deng Xiaoping was elected as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Mao Zedong described the United States as a "paper tiger."
1957 Economist Ma Yinchu warned China would have a population of 2.6 billion in 50 years.
1958 The "Great Leap Forward" commenced.
1959 The Daqing Oilfield was discovered.
1960 China faced a grain crisis. China launched its first long-range ground-to-ground missile.
1961 China began construction of a nuclear energy industry.
1962 Armed clashes between China and India broke out. Deng Xiaoping proposed his famous saying: "It does not matter if a cat is white or black as long as it catches mice."
1963 China became self-reliant in oil supply.
1964 China exploded its first nuclear bomb.
1966 The 10-year "Cultural Revolution" began.
1967 China exploded its first hydrogen bomb. Pu Yi, China's last emperor, died at the age of 61.
1968 Most members of the intelligentsia were sent to work in the countryside.
1969 China and the former Soviet Union clashed on Zhenbao island. China claimed it had become a "debtorless" country. President Liu Shaoqi died as a result of politically motivated persecution.
1970 China sent its first satellite into orbit.
1971 The first American table-tennis team visited China in what was called the "Ping-Pong Diplomacy."
1972 China and Japan normalized diplomatic relations. President Nixon made the first high level US visit to China since 1949.
1973 Deng Xiaoping was restored as vice premier. China borrowed money from Western countries for the first time.
1974 The Terracotta Army was discovered in Xi'an Shaanxi Province. Mao Zedong proposed his "Three Worlds" concept, referring to the US and Soviet Union as the First World, Japan, Western Europe and Canada as the second, and Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America and Africa as the third.
1975 Deng Xiaoping took charge of the State Council, China's cabinet.
1976 The "Cultural Revolution" ended. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai died. Tangshan suffered an earthquake in which 240,000 people died.
1978 China began its historic market-oriented reform. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held to adopt the policy of reform.
1979 China and the US established diplomatic relations. China promulgated its first law guiding foreign direct investment. Border wars broke out with Viet Nam.
1980 Hu Yaobang was elected general secretary of the Communist Party, while Zhao Ziyang was elected premier. China set up four special economic zones on the southeast coast.
1981 Construction began on Gezhouba Dam, the largest functional dam on the Yangtze River.
1982 The State Council reduced the number of vice premiers from 13 to 2. The Communist Party reduced its staff by 17.3 per cent. China launched a carrier rocket from a submarine. The Constitution was amended.
1984 China and Britain concluded an agreement on the handover of Hong Kong in 1997. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China was set up. The construction of a nuclear power plant in Guangdong Province began.
1985 China streamlined its military by 1 million. China established the Great Wall Station in the Antarctic.
1986 China applied to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The first exports of Chinese civilian aircraft were made. The Law on Bankruptcy was implemented on a trial basis.

1987 Hu Yaobang resigned from his post. China and Portugal agreed on the terms for handover of Macau in 1999. The country's divorce rate exceeded 1 per cent for the first time.

1988 Hainan island became a province. The first test-tube baby was born.

1989 Hu Yaobang died. A period of political turmoil ensued, but was soon terminated.

1990 China announced the Hong Kong Basic Law. The 11th Asian Games were held in Beijing. Shanghai's Pudong Area was made a special development zone.


1992 Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed China's opening policy in his famous "southern trip" to Guangdong Province.

1993 Vice Premier Zhu Rongji took charge of the central bank and proposed 16 stringent policies to curb a potential bubble economy. Beijing was defeated by Sidney in its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games.

1994 China unified its dual-track foreign exchange rate system, joined the International Chamber of Commerce, and failed to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

1995 President Jiang Zemin proposed eight principles for the peaceful reunification of the mainland and Taiwan. The country's longest railway was completed, running 2,536 kilometres from Beijing to Kowloon.

1996 Minsheng Banking Co., China's first private bank, was set up. Tung Chee-hwa became the first chief executive officer of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

1997 Deng Xiaoping died. Hong Kong returned to China. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China agreed to cut the military presence along their borders.

1998 A great flood on the Yangtze River caused 166 billion yuan worth of economic losses.
From 18 to 22 December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened to adopt the historic program of market reform. Chen Yun (left), and Deng Xiaoping.

For example, the central government no longer gave orders on such trivial things as how many shoes or pins a factory should produce.

The change from a centralized to a market-oriented economy reached a new stage in March 1999 when China revised its Constitution to recognize private business as an indispensable part of the economy.

Along with the market reform has gone the victory of individualism over utopian egalitarianism. In some ways, personal freedoms are greater than they have ever been.

Twenty-one years have passed since 1978, and China has never been stronger in the world political and economic arena. Mao Zedong, the core of China’s first generation of leaders, unified China’s mainland, Deng Xiaoping, the core of the second generation, consolidated it. Where Mao was romantic, Deng was pragmatic.

Deng was also quick to acknowledge the errors of the government. He ordered the Rehabilitation Campaign in the early 1980s to restore the reputation of millions wrongly judged of crimes during the Cultural Revolution. Both Mao and Deng hated bureaucracy and tried to curb it, but the main task seems to have been left to President Jiang Zemin, the core of the third generation of leaders. How far he succeeds in this is sure to have a profound influence on China’s development in the 21st century.
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The first half of 1999 was a bad time for the concept of "constructive strategic partnership"—in both the United States and in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Instead of promoting such a partnership, events served to highlight the significant, and in many cases growing, differences between Washington and Beijing. In April, the Clinton administration and the Chinese government failed to reach an agreement on the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) despite significant concessions by the Chinese side. On May 8, an American B-2 bomber mistakenly destroyed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, a tragedy many Chinese believe was a deliberate act intended to punish China for its opposition to the NATO intervention in Kosovo and more generally to intimidate the PRC. Finally, in July, Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui precipitated new tensions and endangered the fragile cross-Strait dialogue by insisting that Taiwan and the PRC deal with one another on a "special state-to-state" basis, a formula Beijing equates with Taiwanese independence.

These events (and others like Washington's March 1999 attempt to have Beijing condemned by the UN Human Rights Commission) highlight key problems—trade friction, China’s fear of U.S. “hegemony,” and Taiwan—that will need to be carefully managed by policy makers in both Washington and Beijing. Both sides have an overwhelming, long-term national interest in insuring that bilateral ties do not degenerate into open hostility or a new Cold War. On the U.S. side, several commonly held misconceptions about the U.S.-China relationship hamper a proper prioritizing of issues. The principal misconceptions are:

Misconception #1: China will soon be a superpower. The reality is that China’s military remains plagued by weaknesses. These deficiencies include outdated equipment and a force structure that will impair Beijing’s ability to project significant power at great distances from its shores for many years to come, though the PRC’s capacity to affect U.S. interests closer to its borders (including Taiwan) is growing. The PRC is modernizing its nuclear weapons and missiles, but its nuclear capability remains small, especially in comparison with that of the United States, and continuation of its minimal deterrence strategy is very much in U.S. interests. If it grows too preoccupied with China’s very measured military modernization, America risks overcompensating with containment-oriented policies that would fuel a regional arms race. reduce China’s
incentives to integrate itself into the international system, and prevent Washington and Beijing from cooperating in areas of mutual interest.

**Misconception #2: America has been the loser in U.S.-China relations.**
In fact, when examining the broad trends of the last 30 years, the United States has gained tremendously from the normalization of relations with the PRC. Beijing no longer supports insurgent movements in neighboring countries, it has moderated its once indiscriminate arms exports, and the PRC has become increasingly integrated in, and compliant with, international arms control regimes, most recently the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). All of this has helped enhance both American and regional security. While the U.S.-China economic relationship has yet to reach its full potential, mainly because of high protectionist barriers in the PRC, it is not the case that the U.S. economy has been damaged, or American jobs lost, because of trade with China. And, if Washington and Beijing can reach a WTO accession agreement on terms very close to those the Clinton administration turned down in April 1999, many of the market barriers that so disadvantage American business will come down over a comparatively short period of time.

**Misconception #3: Taiwan has been the loser.** Taiwan lost most formal international recognition as a result of the U.S.-PRC normalization of 1978/79. However, in nearly every other respect—including economic development, democracy, and human rights—Taiwan has thrived, largely by dint of the hard work of the people on the island. U.S. security obligations have contributed to the maintenance of peace across the Strait for the last two decades. Though these obligations have their ambiguities, and some clarification is possible, some efforts to achieve greater clarity could inadvertently spark greater conflict.

**Misconception #4: Human rights conditions in China have not improved.** The Communist Party continues its gradual and erratic retreat from the private lives of ordinary Chinese who, largely as a result of rising incomes, enjoy freedoms and access to information unprecedented in their own history. Although direct, organized opposition to the Party is tirelessly suppressed, China is experiencing significant political changes—i.e. grassroots participation, greater scope for policy debate, and slowly improving rule of law—but such changes are still poorly institutionalized. Many Chinese—particularly political dissidents and ethnic and religious minorities—continue to suffer human rights abuses. Nonetheless, the overall trend is positive.

All of the above misconceptions draw attention away from the genuine problems in the U.S.-China relationship that do need to be the focus of U.S. leadership attention:
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1) Decreasing commitment, in both the PRC and Taiwan, to the status quo: The return of Hong Kong and Macao to Chinese sovereignty, along with an increasingly separate identity on Taiwan, is making the PRC more anxious to make progress on reunification. Taiwan, meanwhile, seeks to delay reunification indefinitely (at least until the PRC democratizes and raises living standards). This volatile mix of diverging time frames and somewhat ambiguous U.S. obligations to defend Taiwan is the greatest challenge facing the U.S.-China relationship.

2) PRC unease with U.S. global predominance: China desires a "multipolar" world where America is somewhat restrained by other major powers. But the reality is that the world is growing more "unipolar" as there is no significant counterweight to the United States. China has watched with alarm as Washington has adopted an increasingly interventionist foreign policy and seems less willing, as in Kosovo, to gain the approval of the United Nations Security Council (where Beijing has a veto) before taking military action. Fear of being humiliated by a "hegemonic" United States is causing Beijing to seek checks on American power by strengthening ties to Russia and others with similar concerns. Furthermore, Beijing will marginally increase its commitment to defense modernization, but without fundamentally overturning the priority accorded to domestic economic modernization.

3) Diverging views between Beijing and Washington on how to preserve security in the post-Cold War era: Closely related to China’s fear of an unrestrained United States is the PRC's rejection of the idea that America's bilateral and multilateral security alliances help promote stability. While such alliances form the bedrock of the U.S. security architecture, China views these structures, particularly the newly-strengthened U.S.-Japan Alliance, as a means to perpetuate U.S. domination at China's expense. Such gaps increase the difficulties for Washington and Beijing to accommodate one another on key strategic issues, such as the benefits of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Effectively managing bilateral relations will require considerable effort by both the United States and China. Recommendations for America include:

1) Have an effectively organized Executive Branch that devotes sufficient attention to the relationship. During the first term of the Clinton presidency, there was little top-level contact between the two
sides and Washington pursued a "laundry list" of issues with no clear prioritization. Future administrations should make summits and senior-level exchanges more routine, institutionalize a vice president-premier exchange structure similar to the former Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, and work more closely with internationalists in Congress to develop Capitol Hill leadership on China policy. There is no substitute for the president paying attention to this issue and placing someone firmly in charge of the policy on a day-to-day basis.

2) Reestablish a realistic strategic rationale for the relationship, even if this means downgrading expectations. Beijing and Washington should explicitly acknowledge the mixed nature of the relationship, work on areas of parallel interest (such as maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia), and try to prevent incompatible interests from degrading into confrontation. In addition, the United States should continue to encourage Beijing to join more multilateral economic and security organizations and find ways to foster mutual confidence among the United States, China, and Japan. Strengthening military-to-military exchanges and dialogue with the People's Liberation Army will be important for avoiding an East Asian arms race. A central U.S. objective should be to minimize the incentives for Beijing to move away from its current nuclear doctrine of minimal deterrence and pledge of no first use. China's continued emphasis on economic development over ideological or military priorities is profoundly in U.S. interests. Securing China's entry into the WTO is an example of how the United States can work to create an environment in which Beijing continues to give priority to economic development and greater interaction with the global community, while promoting its own economic objectives simultaneously.

3) Do more to promote cross-Strait exchanges while maintaining a firm commitment to a "One China" policy. The United States must maintain a policy of "double deterrence"—deterring the use of force by Beijing and deterring provocative unilateral moves toward de jure independence by Taipei. The currently suspended cross-Strait dialogue has so far failed to enhance cross-Strait stability and Washington may find it needs to be bolder in asserting its interests in positive cross-Strait interaction. Such efforts could include more "track II" diplomacy. Bringing both Taiwan and the PRC into the WTO will help. At the same time, the United States, particularly Congress, should resist the urge to "fix" the framework provided by the Three Communiqués with China and the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which has proven robust and flexible over the past two-plus decades. Proposals like the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (S. 693) are particularly unwise because explicitly upgrading the U.S.-
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Taiwan military relationship would heighten the PRC's sense that its window of opportunity for future reunification is forever closing. Further, such legislation would undermine the basis on which Sino-American normalization occurred twenty years ago and, contrary to the legislation's intent, would increase the chances of military confrontation. A better way for Washington to proceed would be to explicitly oppose any unilateral efforts on either side of the Strait to change the political status quo.

4) Encourage positive change in China, but not regime transformation. The United States should give credit for the important economic, social, and political changes that have occurred in China and should pursue human rights issues using multilateral organizations and venues. American efforts should focus on working with the Chinese to establish legal and civic organizations that make gradual political change possible. The United States cannot be an effective advocate for human rights when it devotes virtually no money to programs aimed at fostering China's social and economic development or to disaster relief.
Introduction

The first half of 1999 was a pivotal and counterproductive period in U.S.-China relations. It was a time that served neither American long-term interests nor those of the People's Republic of China (PRC). For both Washington and Beijing, developments conspired to call into question the very notion of working toward a “constructive strategic partnership” in the 21st century that Presidents Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin set as their long-term goal at the 1997 Washington summit and reiterated thereafter. If the United States and China can work out terms for Beijing’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) before year’s end, this is to be desired. But, nonetheless, the Sino-American relationship is troubled.

The purpose of this monograph is not to call for revitalization of the now tattered (in both capitals) “constructive strategic partnership.” Rather, it is a call to recognize three things: 1) U.S. and Chinese strategic interests are mightily involved in their relationship and those interests are mixed for both nations, with some overlapping, some parallel, and some diverging; 2) past U.S. policy has had a great deal more success than generally has been acknowledged; and 3) both countries must manage bilateral ties more effectively in the future than they have done over the last year.

In April 1999, the Clinton administration invited Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji to Washington to work toward WTO entry for Beijing. After having extracted startling trade concessions that created enormous opposition in China, and President Clinton having said that failure to reach an agreement would be an “inexplicable mistake,” the administration then sent Zhu packing without an agreement. The president wanted more concessions and to raise U.S. trade barriers—particularly in the anti-dumping and textile areas. Bill Clinton also was unsure Congress would support permanent normal trade relations (NTR) with Beijing and he was loath to alienate labor union support Vice President Al Gore would need in his year 2000 run for the presidency.

The following month, after having weakened President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji at home by rejecting a trade deal for which they went far out on a limb with domestic constituencies, on May 8 the United States/NATO mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade, further undermining Chinese faith in cooperation with America and feeding latent anti-Americanism. The fact that the B-2 stealth aircraft took off from Missouri and hit the embassy with several pieces of precision-guided ordnance made it almost inconceivable to the Chinese man on the street who marvels at U.S. technology that the strike was an "accident." Americans make a huge mistake if they think the popular outrage in China over the embassy bombing was simply contrived by the Beijing leadership, though the regime did use demonstrations to try to enhance its domestic position and its leverage over Washington.

Also in May, the Shelby Committee's (Senate) "Report on Impacts to U.S. National Security of Advanced Satellite Technology Exports to the People's Republic of China, and the Report on the PRC's Efforts to Influence U.S. Policy"\(^2\) alleged a pattern of damaging technology leakage and a three-volume report from the Cox Committee (House), "U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People's Republic of China."\(^3\) alleged a long-term and large-scale PRC effort to divert and steal military, dual-use, and civilian U.S. technology. Losses and diversions were said to include design information on nuclear warheads and anti-submarine, missile, guidance, and aviation-related technology and hardware as well as high-performance computers.

While the Cox and Shelby reports were valuable in identifying large deficiencies in American counterintelligence procedures, an independent CIA damage assessment (and subsequent review led by Admiral David Jeremiah) indicated there was great uncertainty about what may actually have been lost, whether or not the information was sufficient to lead to improved weapons, and over what time period such information and hardware might be deployed in actual systems.\(^4\) The Shelby and Cox reports also underscored the fact that Beijing acquires valuable information from other suppliers around the world through a wide variety of open and clandestine channels. It is very difficult, therefore, to disentangle what Beijing may have discovered on its own, acquired from non-American sources, or obtained from the United States, and what U.S. acquisitions were from open, as opposed to classified, sources. Furthermore, it is unclear when, if ever, design knowledge will be translated into actual, deployed military systems—a cookbook doesn't make a great cook. In any event, these accumulated accusations and resultant tightening of U.S. export controls served to further undermine the concept of constructive strategic partnership in China. The bottom line of all these congressional inquiries for Beijing was that the PRC increasingly was being viewed in Washington as the emerging rival of the United States.
China’s 1999 actions (and actions taken earlier) also have undermined the notion of strategic partnership in America, espionage charges aside. Images of Chinese police standing passively by as demonstrators pelted the American Embassy in Beijing with rocks and flammable materials and burned the Counsel General’s residence in Chengdu, Sichuan, in the wake of the embassy bombing were extremely corrosive. These images simply reinforced popular attitudes; a recent poll indicates 57 percent of Americans viewed China in threatening terms even before the anti-American demonstrations. Further solidifying the image of Chinese government complicity in the post-bombing anti-American demonstrations were editorials in People’s Daily describing the mistaken American destruction of the Chinese Embassy and the death of three Chinese civilians as a “barbaric crime rarely seen in the history of international relations.” The video images of hostile demonstrators, combined with the propaganda apparatus’ invective against the United States asserting that the bombing was “intentional,” served to intensify the skepticism of Americans.

Perhaps more significantly for the long term, however, was the widening gap in the two countries’ strategic perspectives. For Beijing, the April 23-25 50th NATO anniversary conclave in Washington and NATO’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia, combined with the Japanese Diet’s passage April 27 of legislation to implement the strengthened U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, signaled an evolving doctrine in which human rights concerns could provide justification for interventions that violated traditional norms of state sovereignty. And, U.S alliances would be the instruments of such intervention, not necessarily the UN Security Council where China has a veto. Beijing’s denunciation of both NATO and the fortified U.S.-Japan Security Alliance goes to the heart of the U.S. vision of a post-Cold War security structure.

In the United States, the notion that strategic interests were converging was severely damaged as well. The combination of a gradual missile buildup in the area of the Taiwan Strait, combined with increasingly strident denunciation of Washington’s desire to deploy theater and national missile defenses, has America and China on yet another collision course.

Not only did 1999 bring a heightened sense of strategic friction, the channels of both official and unofficial “track II” discussion of these issues were constricted considerably. Beijing’s immediate response to the mistaken embassy bombing was to suspend bilateral discussions of proliferation and human rights, to postpone a broad range of “track II” exchanges, and to suspend U.S. Navy port calls to Hong Kong, further
weakening the notion of “constructive strategic partnership.” For its part, Washington postponed Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s planned June visit to the PRC; other official interactions were cancelled or postponed as well, including scheduled visits to China by Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Robert Cassidy, and Chicago Mayor Richard Daley. It is hard to argue that the two sides are moving toward a strategic partnership when they cannot even discuss the issues that divide them, though in the summer of 1999 gradual steps were made to reinvigorate dialogue channels.

The roots of these developments extend in all directions. For one, in both Beijing and Washington there has emerged a tighter linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy since the Cold War’s end. This tighter linkage reflects the end of the Cold War’s disciplining effect on domestic forces: somewhat weaker domestic executive leadership in both countries: and the proliferation of domestic groups able to exert influence over foreign affairs in both Washington and Beijing. As a consequence, less careful attention has been given to defining long-term interests. Further, priorities among competing interests (security, economics, and human rights) have become blurred, particularly in the United States. And finally, competing political forces in each nation use the Sino-American relationship’s demonstrable difficulties and shortcomings to gain advantage in the contest for domestic power.

In the United States, particularly given that the year 2000 elections will determine control of both the White House and Congress, China policy has become a litmus test issue for the activists in both the Republican and Democratic parties. In China, previous losers in economic reform, a military hungry for more resources, and the propaganda and control apparatuses see their chance for gains. All in all, both societies are in a circumstance in which the logic of domestic struggle works against a coherent, long-term strategy in dealing with each other. In both societies, there is an increasing propensity to view one another as peer competitors, rivals, or threats. The most immoderate elements in both societies find their greatest allies in one another.

This monograph primarily addresses the shortcomings in American thinking about China and the management of policy toward the PRC. Nonetheless, more productive U.S.-China relations are not the sole responsibility of Washington. Unless Beijing develops a vision of East Asian and global security in which the two nations can cooperate, controls rising nationalism, deals more effectively with the people of Taiwan, and progressively moves toward rule of law, no matter how improved U.S.
management of the Sino-American relationship may become, the two nations will be headed toward more friction.

The remainder of this monograph addresses the following issues. In Part I we examine the principal misconceptions that Americans hold about the PRC and, to a lesser extent, the misconceptions about the United States that are widely held in China. In Part II, we examine the genuine problems that do exist in the U.S.-China relationship, problems to which Americans devote insufficient attention because of our preoccupation with secondary issues. And finally, in Part III, we suggest a framework for thinking about the management of the relationship in the post-Clinton era and the 21st century.
Model Martyrs and Millionaires

Young people these days are seeking inspiration not just from Bill Gates, but from some surprising heroes of an older generation

By YU SHAOWEN

Anyone who lived through the cultural revolution is familiar with the line: "The power of role models is unlimited." The slogan remains relevant, as young people continue to seek inspiration from others. The heroes of today's youth, however, are vastly different from those of their predecessors.

Twenty years ago, our teachers told us to admire members of the People's Liberation Army or communist-era do-gooders like Lei Feng, Dong Cunrui and Huang Jiguang. Foreign exemplars of patriotism (mostly from the Soviet Union) were imported as well, like Pavel Korgagin, the protagonist of Nikolai Ostrovsky's novel The Making of a Hero. But since the current era is one of relative peace and economic expansion, military heroes have become less relevant to our lives. As role models, they have faded into a blur.

In the wake of Deng Xiao-ping's reforms, China has produced two generations of young people. The majority of youth in the 1980s chose as role models scientists and men of letters. Young people in the 1990s tended instead to idolize entrepreneurs and financial magnates. The choices, of course, were heavily influenced by the broader social context and cultural atmosphere of the time. Little wonder, then, that Goldbach Conjecture, a novel about the life story of mathematician Chen Jingrun, was the most widely read book of the 1980s, while The Road Ahead, by Bill Gates, topped bestseller lists the following decade.

But youth everywhere also like to contradict conventional wisdom. True, the great wealth of people like Gates and, more recently, David Filo and Jerry Yang, the co-founders of Yahoo, continues to inspire many. But, surprise, the old revolutionaries that had been buried in the deepest recesses of our memories have also been resurrected as fashionable role models for the new generation. The very same Pavel Korgagin, a familiar name to every Chinese person over the age of 30, has made a comeback. During the past few years, a succession of theatrical productions—from the stage play Pavel Korgagin to the film The Making of a Hero to the daytime soap opera of the same title—has created a sensation in the popular media and among young people.

There is a world of difference between the faddish passions of youngsters today and the beliefs of people like me, who once held our heroes to be sacred. In these peaceful times, the word "hero" seems to have a new meaning. Last April, following the debut of the soap opera The Making of a Hero, the Beijing Youth Daily hosted an open discussion on the topic "Bill Gates and Pavel Korgagin: Who is the hero?" During the month-long debate, the newspaper published numerous articles revealing highly polarized views, particularly among youth. Materially, China's young obviously desire the commercial success represented by someone like Gates. Spiritually, however, they appear to be far from content with wealth alone. The revival of revolutionary romanticists like Korgagin caters to a need to fill this moral blank. Thus the contradiction starts to make sense. Chinese youth are fortunate to live in a relatively simple and peaceful environment. Under different circumstances, however, this tension between desires could put their willpower to a great test.

Yu Shaowen, reporter for the Beijing Youth Daily, is the author of a collection of essays called Personal Comments on Culture
One Country, Two Colas

by David Murphy

Pepsi Gets Tough in Chinese Cola War

Pepsi has decided to battle hard for a place in the Chinese mainland’s huge soft drinks market.

Coca Cola is responding to Pepsi’s marketing challenge with a billboard ad campaign aimed at young Chinese.

When Liaoning’s Fushun football club turns out for match these days, spectators don’t have as much trouble reading the crowded script on their team’s jersey. Up to recently it was quite a mouthful: “Liaoning Fushun Jianlibao Team”. But after a bitter row during which national football league sponsor Pepsi Cola threatened to sue sports management group IMG, the Liaoning side agreed to remove the name of domestic soft drinks manufacturer Jianlibao from their strip.

Chinese football league since the early 90’s. Pepsi’s action was typical of a new aggressiveness adopted by the company in the last couple of years, both in the US and international markets. Beaten into second place around the world by arch rival Coca Cola, Pepsi has decided to battle hard for a place in the Chinese mainland’s huge soft drinks market, which grows annually by around 20 percent. “Pepsi is putting a lot into China because it’s one of the last markets where they have the chance to get a decent share,” says a beverage executive.

But Coke is easily the leader in China with a market share of 33 percent according to the company, three times greater than Pepsi and well ahead of a host of local contenders including Guangzhou-based Jianlibao and Hangzhou-based Wahaha’s Future Cola. Coke is also the biggest single producer in most areas, though there are two high profile exceptions: in Beijing (where the capital’s nationalistic consumers keep the Atlanta firm in second place) and Shanghai where Coke and Pepsi are neck and neck in China’s trend setting metropolis. Between them the two multinationals control almost half of the China soft drinks market and, what the China Daily refers to as, their “hegemony” over local brands is likely to continue.

The Pepsi challenge to Coke’s leading position relies heavily on an expensive advertising, marketing and sponsorship campaign, including stumping up millions of US dollars for the Chinese football league - an unusual venture into sport for Pepsi - and TV commercials with pop stars Wang Fei, Ricky Martin and Janet Jackson. With CCTV, China’s television monopoly, paying peanuts for broadcast rights, corporate sponsorship remains the most important revenue source for mainland football. The sums involved are small by Western standards. Marlboro, which sponsored the league for five years up to Pepsi’s takeover this year, paid an annual fee of about US$ 7.5 million. Now Pepsi is reported to be paying less than Marlboro, which was forced to pay a premium as a tobacco
manufacturer. But these figures could rise sharply if more of China’s heavyweight companies start to view team sponsorship as prestigious. For example, white goods manufacturer Haier, with projected sales this year of 24 billion yuan, has displaced Proctor and Gamble as the mainland’s biggest advertiser but has so far not been heavily involved in sports sponsorship. Industry sources expect that to change soon.

In contrast to Pepsi’s high sporting profile, Coke spends very little on mainland sports sponsorship, funding such low key projects as the national under 21 football team. Instead it effectively leverages its global backing of events such as the World Cup and the Olympics through ancillary TV advertising.

Coke has also developed particularly strong partnerships in China with the Swire and Kerry Group and China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation (COFCO) and China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). It has built an effective bottling and distribution network with 23 plants around the country and keeps a tight rein on its operation, something that Pepsi failed to do in a previous incarnation in China.

In addition to its huge marketing campaign, Pepsi is also learning from the mistakes it made earlier this decade when it got burned by local partners and is now adopting strategies used by Coke. "Pepsi had more of a marketing than an operational approach and gave too much control to joint venture partners," said an industry analyst. Distribution areas were not tightly enforced and, for example, the Changchun operation was selling discounted sodas into Beijing undercutting Pepsi’s partner in the capital. After a shakeout Pepsi has decided to concentrate its efforts in Shanghai, where it has developed excellent relations with the authorities: "it's practically an arm of the city government," comments one observer sarcastically. It has also set up a network of regional representatives, modeled on Coke’s operation, to liase between local bottlers and headquarters.

But Coke - like Volkswagen in the auto sector - is so far ahead of the pack that it is unlikely to lose its strong lead. Coke’s weak point in China is its strong identification as a US brand (which is also one of its greatest strengths) and it is particularly sensitive to fluctuations in Sino-US relations. Anti-US sentiment in the wake of the bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade in May was partly blamed for a nine percent drop in China sales in the second quarter of this year, according to Douglas Ivester, chairman of Coca Cola. Mainland media are also fond of painting competition between Chinese and foreign branded consumer goods as war by other means. Viewed in those terms the Chinese brands look like they are losing the war.
On February 27, 1972, the United States and China issued a joint communiqué, the culmination of Nixon and Kissinger's historic week-long visit to the People's Republic. Kissinger had begun to draft the Shanghai Communiqué with Chou En-lai the previous October, when he met in Beijing with the Chinese prime minister to lay the groundwork for Nixon's upcoming visit. Kissinger continued to hammer out the details during the February 1972 summit, usually in late-night sessions with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua.

The communiqué pledged both countries to work for "normalization" of relations, and to expand "people-to-people contacts" and trade opportunities. In a not-so-thinly-veiled reference to the Soviet Union, the communiqué declared that neither nation "should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."

Early in the negotiations, recognizing that China and the U.S. held many irreconcilable positions, Chou En-lai proposed an unorthodox format for the communiqué. The two sides essentially agreed to disagree, each stating its views in separate paragraphs when necessary. On the thorny Vietnam issue, for example, the U.S. endorsed Nixon's latest peace plan, while China expressed firm support for the Communist proposal.

Yet despite the plan for unilateral declarations, Taiwan remained a stumbling block throughout the negotiations. While the U.S. sought improved relations with Beijing, it still officially recognized Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government on Taiwan. In fact, the U.S. had been inching toward a "two Chinas" policy for years. Only four months earlier, when the United Nations voted on whether to admit the People's Republic of China, the U.S. reversed its 20-year opposition to seating the PRC, but opposed any effort to expel Taiwan. Ultimately, the U.S. lost the fight for dual representation. The PRC gained admission to the UN, Taiwan was ousted -- and the U.S. was left to juggle relations with two countries that both saw themselves as the sole legitimate government of all of China.

The Chinese regarded the presence of American troops on Taiwan as a violation of China's sovereignty and pressed for full U.S. military withdrawal from the island. Nixon and Kissinger wanted to condition a withdrawal on enlisting China's help in ending the Vietnam War. And while China viewed its dealings with Taiwan as a strictly internal issue, to be handled as it saw fit, the Americans insisted that the Chinese resolve the Taiwan question without the use of force.

In the end, both sides made concessions. As Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, neither the U.S. nor China was willing to let the Taiwan issue become an obstacle to their emerging new relationship: "The basic theme of the Nixon trip -- and the Shanghai Communiqué -- was to put off the issue of Taiwan for the future, to enable the two nations to close the gulf of twenty years and to pursue parallel policies where their interests coincided."

The U.S. declared its "interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves," and affirmed a total U.S. military withdrawal from the island as an "ultimate objective." The U.S. also agreed to "progressively reduce its forces and military installations on
Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes," thereby giving China a stake in the abatement of the Vietnam War.

For its part, the PRC firmly rejected any "two Chinas" formulation, declaring unequivocally that "the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China" and "Taiwan is a province of China." The U.S., in deft phrasing, acknowledged "that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China," but neatly avoided the question of who should govern this "one China."

A last-minute objection by Secretary of State Rogers was similarly sidestepped. Nixon and Kissinger had deliberately kept Rogers and his staff out of the negotiations on the communiqué, and when State Department officials finally saw the text, they immediately objected. All of the United States' defense treaty partners in Asia were specifically named - except Taiwan. When Rogers managed to bring the issue to Nixon’s attention, the President was beside himself. Nixon knew he couldn’t just walk away from U.S. commitments to Taiwan without incurring the wrath of his conservative supporters back home. Nor could he afford the bad publicity if Rogers broke ranks and "leaked" to the press. Rogers managed to force the communiqué back to the negotiating table -- much to Nixon and Kissinger’s dismay -- but in the end, both sides simply dropped all references to U.S. treaty partners, rather than force the Taiwan issue.

In fact, Nixon and Kissinger went significantly further on Taiwan in their private talks with Chou than in the communiqué. As recently released notes and transcripts reveal, the Americans offered Chou extensive assurances that they intended to open full diplomatic relations with Beijing as soon as possible -- and were willing to sacrifice Taiwan to do so. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, however, Nixon was unable to carry through on these promises, and the U.S. didn’t establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC until 1979.

Yet once the Shanghai Communiqué was issued, the writing was on the wall. As journalist and China scholar James Mann has written, "... Nixon’s initiative conveyed America’s acceptance, for the first time, of the outcome of the Chinese civil war and the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. The United States stopped challenging the Chinese Communist Party’s authority to rule the country. The American acceptance (in the communiqué) and, indeed, its embrace (in Nixon’s private talks) of a one-China policy was to govern American conduct from that point onward.
"SOME NIGHTS I CANNOT SLEEP"

CHINESE PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN

BY JIANG ZEMIN

The setting was Shanghai's Xijiao Guesthouse, a shady suburban oasis once favored by Mao Zedong. The host was Jiang Zemin, taking time off from preparations for his trip to the U.S. Speaking with Time Inc. journalists, Jiang stuck mostly to stock formulations, often reading from a briefing paper. But he occasionally let loose--on human rights, music and even his family.

Excerpts from the interview:

TIME: What will China be like in ten years? Will there be more democracy?

Jiang: Since 1979, we have been trying to ensure that political restructuring and economic restructuring complement one another. Simply put, what we have to do is promote democracy and improve our legal system. Within the structure provided by the Chinese constitution, we will work to develop our democracy further and to strengthen supervision. Our purpose is to run our country according to law.

TIME: Americans care a lot about human rights. Can you explain why it is so difficult to release political dissidents like Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan? How serious a threat are they to your government?

Jiang: I believe the most fundamental human right is how to ensure that 1.2 billion Chinese people have adequate food and clothing. The rights and freedoms that our people enjoy today are unprecedented. Our consistent policy is to protect human rights according to law. Human rights and the system for the protection of human rights in China are advancing. These are the facts for everyone to see.

As for the two persons you just referred to, I don't believe they pose much of a threat to China's security and stability. They were brought to justice not because they are so-called political dissidents, but because they violated China's criminal law. Decisions on when prisoners in China's jails are released are matters for the judicial department to settle according to the law.

TIME: Should you make some gesture on human rights that would smooth discussions across the whole breadth of U.S.-China issues?

Jiang: I would like to know what you refer to specifically as a gesture. We have made it clear that we respect human rights. I studied world history and your War of Independence. I read Lincoln's Gettysburg Address about your Civil War. It was the sacred mission of the U.S. to liberate slaves in your country. In Tibet, after the Dalai Lama left the country [in 1959], we have fundamentally resolved the problem of slavery there. I believe the American people should be happy to see that.
TIME: Is there anything you can do to help resolve your political differences with Taiwan?

Jiang: As a first step, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can hold negotiations and reach agreement officially ending the state of hostility in accordance with the principle that there is only one China. We hope the Taiwan authorities will respond to our proposals seriously and enter into political talks at an early date. Under the one-China premise, anything can be discussed.

TIME: What are your expectations for your trip to the U.S.?

Jiang: The China-U.S. relationship over the past few years can be characterized like the weather--it has its ups and downs. I think that on the whole, relations are moving forward. But it is no easy task for the people of our two countries to really understand each other. If, through face-to-face meetings, our nations can deepen understanding, that will be a very important achievement. At present, Sino-American relations have a favorable opportunity for further improvement. Whether we can build a sound and stable relationship in the 21st century bears on the world's peace, stability and prosperity. Our two countries share that common responsibility. I will join President Clinton and other leaders of the United States to bring Sino-U.S. relations to a new stage of development.

TIME: But how do you see the U.S.? What's good about it, what's bad?

Jiang: The U.S. is not a country in decline, and I do not think that China and the U.S. must come into conflict with one another. The economy and trade of our two countries are highly complementary. We can and should have long-term and mutually beneficial cooperation.

TIME: Many observers were surprised by the boldness of your economic initiatives at the recent Communist Party congress. Do you see any risks in those reforms?

Jiang: The most important thing is that we will continue to adhere to the Deng Xiaoping Theory and implement the policy of reform and opening up. I would like to know specifically what you mean when you mention risks.

TIME: We were referring to the reform of bankrupt state enterprises and the fate of their workers.

Jiang: Our reform effort is to establish a modern system to reinvigorate our enterprises and let them better play a dominant role in the national economy. With reform, socialism will become even stronger. Our objective is to help the majority of large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises that are running at a loss to get rid of their problems.

In the process, we will meet with various contradictions and difficulties, but we have adopted an incremental approach. We also have established some support mechanisms, including a social security program. We enjoy the support of the vast work force and people from all walks of life.

TIME: One of the biggest threats to economic progress is rampant corruption. To what extent are you prepared to crack down, especially at high levels?

Jiang: We are firm and resolute in combating corruption. Those who abuse their power and position will be dealt with seriously according to Party rules and the laws of the country. I do not
deny that fighting corruption is a very arduous and complicated task. But we are working to implement our laws, educate our people and build our legal system. The most fundamental thing is to promote democracy so that the people can supervise the work of the officials.

TIME: Many Chinese also dislike the behavior of the children of top officials. Do you have rules about what your own children and grandchildren may and may not do?

Jiang: I have two grown children. One son has a Ph.D and a post-doctorate degree, and he is now doing research work at an institute in Shanghai. Another son studied in Germany and is working in the field of computers. I take great satisfaction that both of them behave very well and both have come back to work here in China. My grandchildren are now in primary school, and one thing that I frequently warn myself is that I should not indulge them too much.

TIME: How were you able to keep up your interest in music during the past political campaigns, when classical Chinese arts were condemned as feudal and Western arts were condemned as bourgeois?

Jiang: Fine Chinese and foreign cultural and artistic work are the shared wealth of all mankind. The absurd activities that downgraded and even destroyed fine culture and art are all erroneous.

I am the President of the People's Republic of China, but I am also an ordinary citizen, and I have my own interests and hobbies. For instance, I read Tang dynasty poems, Song dynasty lyrics, Yuan dynasty verses and some of Dante, Shakespeare, Balzac, Tolstoy and Mark Twain. All of these give me great enjoyment. I also like to listen to Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Strauss, Tchaikovsky. And I listen to some of your famous American pieces. At the beginning of this year, I read a book written by a Chinese on Mozart that related his music to the poetry of Du Mu in the Tang dynasty. I believe all fields of art are linked with one another.

TIME: How can you sleep at night knowing that you have responsibility for 1.2 billion people?

Jiang: Some nights I cannot get to sleep—for instance, when natural disasters occur. Despite modern science and technology in agriculture, we still mainly depend on how the weather goes. I owe a lot of special thanks to my wife. She does not come out to the formal activities very often, but she tends to persuade me that, after all, I have to eat and try to get some sleep because the next day I have to continue working. In the past few years, the Chinese people have scored very exciting achievements. But there are brain-breaking questions and problems for us. It's hard for me to tell what's the biggest challenge. I am an optimist and also a realist. I am very confident about the future.
THE EAST IS FED

IT'S NOODLES VS. BURGERS AS CHINA'S HOMEGROWN FAST-FOOD CHAINS ARE RISING TO REPULSE THE BIG MAC ATTACK

BY RAHUL JACOB

Honggaoliang, a new fast-food restaurant in Beijing, looks much like the burger-and-fries joints now found all over the world. With its young salesclerks dressed in caps and uniforms of a familiar red, white and yellow, the eatery seems, in fact, like a local version of McDonald's. Even the stylized H of its logo, above, bears a strong resemblance to those ubiquitous Golden Arches.

But that's where the similarities end. Instead of peddling Big Macs and Chicken McNuggets, the Honggaoliang chain is becoming a runaway success all across China by selling indigenous fare that might make Ronald McDonald turn up his nose: bowls of noodles with beef or mutton, shreds of bean curd, coriander and black mushrooms, all in a savory soup that has 18 herbs and spices. Braised Mutton Noodles, a specialty of the house, is easy on the stomach and the pocketbook: it sells for half the price of a Big Mac. Critics of Deng Xiao-ping's open-door policy seize upon Cokes and French fries as examples of the culturally corrosive "flies and mosquitoes" that have wandered in, but Honggaoliang founder Qiao Ying, 36, isn't part of that chorus. "Instead of trying to defeat McDonald's, we ought to learn from their experiences." says Qiao. "In this age of globalization, we should not wall ourselves off."

Ever since American fast-food chains came to the People's Republic about a decade ago, hordes of Chinese have lined up at McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut. That success attracted a flock of local competitors with names like Ronghua Ji (Glorious China Chicken) and California Beef Noodles, which takes its name from the American state in order to sound exotic. Nearly all of them have copied the fast-food format, though not the menus. This recipe apparently sells well from Beijing to Guangzhou: by the end of 1995, 400 Chinese fast-food chains were operating 280,000 outlets and accounting for a quarter of the $2.5 billion that Chinese spend dining out.

The boom in home-style has not, however, slowed the long march of McDonald's across China. Since it arrived just six years ago, the U.S. company has opened 84 outlets and plans 200 more by the turn of the century. The Chinese, meanwhile, are already suffering the kind of dinnertime discord all too familiar to Americans. "My 12-year-old daughter pesters us all the time to go to
McDonald's," complains a 40-something government official. "My husband and I don't like it, but we end up dining there at least once a week." When Beijing Television polled children to find out how they would like to celebrate June 1, Children's Day, four out of five said they wanted to go to McDonald's.

While Qiao waits for the youngsters to, well, grow up, he and his managers are paying close attention to their Golden Archrival. Qiao noticed, for instance, that parents were going to McDonald's first to buy burgers for their kids before coming to his outlets to buy noodles for themselves. Honggaoliang used to forbid customers from bringing in food from other places, but it quickly made an exception for Big Macs. Says Wan Niansheng, who manages the company's Wangfujing outlet in Beijing, just down the street from a you-know-what: "By being so close to McDonald's, we feel a sense of urgency. Every evening, I send our managers and staff to their outlet to observe and learn." They return with novel ideas of their own, like one for making sure that a customer's noodles stay hot. "Our rule is if a bowl sits on the table longer than five minutes, we will offer to replace it for free," says Wan.

Such inventiveness is helping Honggaoliang hold its own against western competitors. A recent survey of nine fast food outlets by a Beijing market research company found that Honggaoliang was the only Chinese fast-food restaurant that could match Pizza Hut, KFC and McDonald's in achieving 100% occupancy during peak hours. "I like the food a lot, and the price is reasonable," says diner Wang Xiaohong, 21. "Chinese food is what people can eat everyday without getting disgusted." Declares Qiao: "Our strength is in taste and in nutritional value. Western style fast-food could lead to obesity."

Qiao, who had no experience in the restaurant business, started Honggaoliang in 1994 with a modest $120,000 in capital (the name means red sorghum, a staple of his home province, Henan). Qiao now has 3,000 employees and 38 restaurants. He hopes to increase that to 1,000 outlets in four years by expanding across Asia and into Australia and the U.S. Given the popularity of Chinese takeout in places like New York and London, Qiao may eventually realize his dream of creating the first global Chinese fast-food chain. "If Chinese don't accomplish that ourselves, westerners will do it for us, just as they did with the Four Great Inventions," says Qiao, referring to paper, gunpowder, the compass and printing. "The 21st century belongs to Chinese fast-food." Now those are fighting words.

--Reported by Jaime A. FlorCruz/Beijing
The Taiwan Question in China-U.S. Relations

A. The Taiwan question is the most sensitive issue at the core of the normalization of China-U.S. relations

The Taiwan question has always been the single most important and most sensitive issue at the core of China-U.S. relations. In June 1950, U.S. President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet of U.S. Navy be sent into the Taiwan Straits, and the Thirteenth Fleet of U.S. Air Force be stationed on the Taiwan Island, undisguisedly obstructing by force the Chinese Government and people from liberating Taiwan. In December 1954, the U.S. signed the so-called Joint Defense Treaty with the Taiwan authorities, thus placing Taiwan Province of China under the protection of the U.S.

Since the very beginning, the Chinese Government and people have struggled resolutely against the U.S. illegal invasion of Taiwan, which gave a serious blow to the U.S. for its ambitious plot to separate Taiwan from Chinese territory, and upheld China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In October 1971, the 26th United Nations General Assembly passed the No. 2758 Resolution, which restored to the People's Republic of China all its legitimate rights in UN while expelling the "representatives" of the Taiwan authorities.

In February 1972, U.S. President Nixon paid a visit to China. On February 28, both China and U.S. issued the Shanghai Communiqué, in which the U.S. Government declared: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. Government does not challenge that position." In December 1978, the U.S. Government accepted the three principles of the Chinese Government on the establishment of diplomatic relations, i.e., the United States shall sever its "diplomatic relations" with the Taiwan authorities, abrogate "the Joint Defense Treaty" with Taiwan, and withdraw its military forces from Taiwan. The two countries signed and issued the "Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America". The U.S. Government stated in the Communiqués: "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." The two countries established formal diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.

B. Issues concerning U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the Theatre Missile Defense System (TMD)

In order to resolve the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese and U.S. governments held negotiations for nearly ten months and reached an agreement on August 17, 1982. On that date, the two sides issued the China-U.S. August 17 Joint Communiqué, in which the U.S. Government reiterates that it has no intention to pursue a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan", and it "does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, and it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution". However, the U.S. Government broke its word. Instead of earnestly complying with the stipulations of the Communiqué. it has repeatedly conducted actions and activities in violation of the Communiqué.

In September 1992, the U.S. Government declared that it would sell 150 F-16 high-capability fighter-jets to Taiwan. On September 3, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu summoned U.S. Ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy to the Foreign Ministry for an interview on this matter, and lodged with him the strongest protest, as instructed, to the U.S. government. On the following day, the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued a solemn statement to express extreme indignation at U.S. government's decision to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan and lodged the strongest protest, on behalf of all the nationalities in China, with the U.S. Government.

The U.S. continued to sell to Taiwan advanced weapons of various types and to proliferate sensitive military technology. "The U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1999" passed by the congress demanded the U.S. Government study the issue of including Taiwan into the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) system.

On January 21, 1999, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman expressed grave concern over the U.S. announcement of the plan to develop National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) systems, emphasizing that any country's provision of any weaponry systems, including the TMD system to Taiwan, would constitute a serious encroachment upon China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and certainly would be strongly opposed by the Chinese people.

On March 1, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman, commenting on the U.S. Defense Department's so-called "the Security Situation in the Taiwan Straits", pointed out that the report was spreading word of the so-called Chinese mainland's missile threats to Taiwan, in an attempt to mislead the public opinion and use it as an excuse for selling advanced weapons to Taiwan. Such an act by the U.S. side was a serious interference in China's internal affairs, and the Chinese side hereby expressed its strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition. In late April, the U.S. and Taiwan held the Annual Arms-sales Consultation; at which the U.S. agreed to sell long-distance early-warning radar and other advanced weaponry systems to Taiwan.

At the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense submitted to the Congress "the Report on Theatre Missile Defense Architecture Options in the Asia-Pacific Region", which once again was trying to spread word of the so-called China's missile threats to Taiwan and put forward five options of the way to bring Taiwan into the TMD system. The Chinese side made solemn representations to the U.S. side on many occasions concerning the above-mentioned moves by the U.S. and pointed out their grave harmfulness.

On August 2, 1999, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi summoned James Moriarty, Charge d'affaires ad interim of the U.S. Embassy in China and lodged a strong protest against the U.S. Government's recent announcement to sell Taiwan $550 million worth of advanced weapons and equipment including E-2T Early-warning planes and parts and equipment for F-16 Fighters. He demanded that the U.S. Government immediately cancel the above-mentioned arms sales to Taiwan.

On August 20, commenting on Lee Teng-Hui's claim that Taiwan needed to develop TMD system, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman pointed out that it would be an encroachment on China's sovereignty and a serious threat to China's national security if any country attempts to include Taiwan into the TMD system in any form. And such a move would definitely bluster the attempt at the independence of Taiwan and set obstacles for China's peaceful reunification, thus undermining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region. The Chinese Government and people stand firmly against this.
C. Lee Teng-hui's visit to the U.S. and other issues

On May 22, 1995, U.S. State Department spokesman announced formally that U.S. President Clinton had decided to allow Lee Teng-hui "to pay a private visit to the United States in the capacity of an alumnus". On May 23, the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China issued a statement, expressing great indignation and raising strong protest against the U.S. Government over its grave move that violated the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués, infringed upon China's sovereignty and interest, and obstruct the great cause of China's peaceful reunification. On the same day, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen summoned U.S. Ambassador Stapleton Roy and lodged a strong protest with him to the U.S. Government.

On May 24, Foreign Affairs Committees of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) respectively issued statements on this event, expressing astonishment and indignation at the U.S. Government's decision and supporting the strong protest lodged by the Chinese Government against the U.S. Government. On May 26, the Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that the Chinese Government had decided to postpone State Councilor and Defense Minister Chi Haotian's visit to the United States scheduled for June, and that State Councilor Li Guixian and Air Force Commander Yu Zhenwu had suspended their current visit to America. On May 28, the Chinese Government made a decision to put off the expert consultation between the two countries on "the Missile Technology Control Regime" (MTCR) and nuclear energy cooperation. In addition, the planned visits, scheduled respectively for June and July, of Robert Einhorn, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation in the Politico-Military Affairs Bureau, and John D. Holm, Director for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), were postponed as China required.

From June 7 to 11, Lee Teng-hui paid a so-called "private" visit to the United States. During his visit, he gave a political speech at Cornell University, and conducted wantonly separatist activities on various occasions with the purpose of creating "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". On June 8, at the press conference, when answering questions about the U.S. Government permission to Lee Teng-hui's visit, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang pointed out that the Chinese Government had expressed strong dissatisfaction with the U.S. Government for clinging obstinately to a wrong position. On the same day, U.S. President Clinton met with Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu at the White House and said that U.S. Government's permission of Lee Teng-hui's visit did not represent or indicate any major change or alteration in U.S. basic policy towards China, that the United States followed one China policy rather than a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan", and that the U.S. would continue its efforts to develop a "constructive relationship" with China. On June 17, the Chinese Government announced calling Ambassador Li Daoyu back home to report his work.

On August 1, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said in Brunei during his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher that there were certain principles for the development of China-U.S. relations, and these were the principles determined by the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués, the core of which was the Taiwan question, and that the Chinese side paid due attention to the recent remarks by the American side on the Taiwan Issue, and hoped that the U.S. Government would honor its commitments with practical steps.

From August 25 to 27, Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing had a consultation in Beijing with U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Turnoff. During the consultation, the American side said that the United States pursued a one-China policy, followed the three Joint Communiqués between the U.S. and China, stood against any advocacy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan", and were opposed to Taiwan's independence and Taiwan's admission into the United Nations, and that the U.S. Government would deal with the Taiwan Question with caution, and impose strict restrictions on future visits to the United States by Taiwan leaders.
On October 24, U.S. President Clinton reiterated during his meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in New York that the U.S. Government was committed to the principles enshrined in the three Joint Communiqués, that the U.S. acknowledged that there is only one China, Taiwan is a part of China, and the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China. President Clinton also stressed that the United States was against "two China's" and "one China, one Taiwan", "Taiwan independence "and Taiwan's entry into the United Nations.

In March 1996, the United States sent a task fleet composing of two aircraft carriers towards areas close to the Taiwan Straits, in an attempt to show off its military muscles, while the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was conducting a military exercise in the Straits targeting the "Taiwan independence" and the separatists. The Chinese Government made solemn representations and struggled resolutely against the United States for its above wrong doings.

D. The U.S. makes "three noes" commitment

In October 1997, during President Jiang Zemin's state visit to the United States, China and the U.S issued a Joint Statement, in which the U.S. reiterated that it adhered to its "one China" policy and the principles set forth in the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués. U.S. President Clinton and some other high-ranking U.S. Government officials reaffirmed on many occasions that the United States did not support the advocacy of "two Chinas " or "one China, one Taiwan", did not support "Taiwan independence", did not support Taiwan's bid to join the United Nations, and it would handle the issue of arms sale to Taiwan in compliance with the principles enshrined in the China-U.S. August 17 Joint Communiqué.

When U.S. President Clinton paid a state visit to China in June 1998, he publicly reiterated that the U.S. adheres to the "one China" policy and abides by the principles of the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués, and that the U.S. Government does not support the positions of "Taiwan independence", of "Two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and of Taiwan's joining any international organizations of sovereign nations.

E. The so-called "two states theory"

On July 9, 1999. Li Teng-hui flagrantly declared his "two states theory", which completely exposed his political nature of splitting the country. The Chinese Government made strong and prompt response, demanding Li Teng-hui to take back his "two states theory" and stop his activities to split up China. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government required the U.S. side scrupulously abide by the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués and its relevant commitments concerned with the Taiwan question and refrain from making any remarks or moves that would encourage the "Taiwan Independence". President Clinton and the U.S. Government have publicly reiterated on many occasions the U.S. Government's commitment to stick to its "one China" policy and to abide by the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués and the "three noes "promises, and expressed the hope that the two sides across the Taiwan straits resolve their differences peacefully and continue the cross -strait dialogue.

On July 18, 1999. President Jiang Zemin held a telephone conversation with President Clinton, who had requested the call. President Clinton said that he called to reaffirm the U.S. Government's strong commitment to its "one China" policy, emphasizing that the U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed and that the Chinese side could have full trust in all his previous remarks on the Taiwan issue. President Jiang pointed out that the Taiwan issue concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as China's peaceful reunification and the national sentiments of all Chinese people. Li Teng-hui has taken a dangerous step on the road to separating the nation by openly defining the cross-straits relations as "state to state" relations. It is a severe provocation against the universally recognized principle "one China" policy and has further exposed his political nature of deliberately dividing China's territory and sovereignty in attempt to separate Taiwan from China.
There is but one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of China. Splitting China's territory and sovereignty of China cannot be allowed under any circumstances. Our basic principle for the settlement of the Taiwan question remains to be "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems". However, we will not commit ourselves to renouncing the use of force. The reason is very clear. There are certain forces both on the island of Taiwan and in the international community, which aim to separate Taiwan from the motherland. In situations where there is move aimed at the "independence of Taiwan" and foreign force's interference in China's reunification, we will not sit back. President Jiang said that the anti-China tide was still strong in the United States, with some people continuing to support the disruption position on "Taiwan Independence" and to back up the "Pro-independence force" on the island of Taiwan. History has proved that the way the United States handles the Taiwan issue has a direct effect on the China-U.S. relations.

President Jiang expressed the hope that United States would strictly abide by the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués and honor the commitment, publicly reaffirmed by President Clinton during his visit to China in 1998 and again emphasized recently by the White House, no to support "Taiwan Independence", not to support "Two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan", and not to support Taiwan joining any international organization that requires statehood. This is of essential importance in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Straits and reviving and improving China-US relations.

On July 25, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright at the Singapore Conference of ARF Foreign Ministers and he reiterated the Chinese Government's solemn stand on the Taiwan question and its firm opposition against Lee Teng-hui's "two states theory". Secretary of State Albright reaffirmed the U.S. Government's commitment to its "One China" policy and that said it would not change this policy. She said that the Taiwan question should be settled by the Chinese people themselves both sides of the Taiwan Straits and that the U.S. hoped that this issue would be solved through peaceful means.

On September 11, President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton held an official meeting after their arrival in Auckland for the 7th Informal Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum. During the Meeting President Jiang reiterated the principled position of the Chinese Government on the Taiwan question. He said, in the past two months, the "two states theory of Lee Teng-hui had incurred strong opposition and condemnation from the entire Chinese people. President Clinton also reaffirmed that the U.S. will support the "one China" policy. Now, more than 100 countries have stated their solemn position of adherence to the "one China" policy. However, lee Teng-hui obstinately and stubbornly sticks to his separatist "two states theory". Our struggle with Lee Teng-hui is a struggle of maintaining or splitting up China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. For this question, we have no other choice. The "two states theory" of Lee Teng-hui is aimed to damage the peaceful situation across the Taiwan straits and hamper the development of the cross-strait ties, impact the improvement of the China-US relations and undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Facts have proved that Lee Teng-hui is a troublemaker and an obstacle for the improvement of the China-U.S. relations. President Jiang affirmed anew that the principles of "peaceful reunification and "one country, two systems" are China's basic approach to the solution of the Taiwan issue and we will exert our efforts for a peaceful reunification. At present the escalation of Lee Teng-hui's separatist activities of the motherland has aroused strong indignation of the whole Chinese people. In order to maintain state sovereignty and territory integrity, we will never promise to renounce the use of force in solving the Taiwan question. President Jiang said the Taiwan issue has always constituted the most prominent question in the China-U.S. relations. There are certain forces in the U.S. issue which have all along attempted to obstruct the reunification of China, meanwhile the way the United States handles the Taiwan issue has aroused the Chinese people to show their grave concern. To complete the great cause of the reunification of the motherland is not only in conformity of the interest of the Chinese people but also conducive to peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the healthy and stable development of the China-U.S. relations. President Clinton expressed that he fully understands that the Taiwan issue is of vital importance. Soon as Lee Teng-hui declared the "two states theory", he reaffirmed that the U.S.
Government will follow the "one China policy". The "two states theory" of Lee Teng-hui has caused a lot of trouble both to China and the United States and he would like to reiterate that the U.S. will honor its commitment to the "one China policy".

F. "Taiwan Relations Act" and "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act"

In April 1979, U.S. President Carter signed into law the so-called "Taiwan Relations Act", which was passed by the U.S. Congress in March. The Act brazenly states: "It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." This Act seriously breaches the fundamental principles enshrined in international law and the China-U.S. Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, encroaches upon China's sovereignty, and interferes with China's internal affairs. In essence, it provides Taiwan with "security guarantee" in a form of U.S. domestic legislation, aiming at hindering the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland of China. The Act incurred at its formation resolute objection from the Chinese Government and people.

Since 1999, the U.S. Congress has put forward numerous pro-Taiwan and anti-China bills. In March, the U.S. House and Senate adopted the so-called "20th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act".

In March and May, a few members of the U.S. Senate and House successively put forward the so-called "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act", which brazenly advocated strengthening Taiwan's military capacities, selling TMD system, submarines and other advanced weapons and equipment to Taiwan, and even establishing direct links between the U.S. and Taiwan military forces and expanding their cooperation. That was another bill, after the "Taiwan Relations Act", by which the U.S. side attempts to brazenly interfere with China's internal affairs on the Taiwan question. The Chinese side made serious representations to the U.S. Government on the matter and demanded the U.S. administration to take concrete measures to prevent the Congress from discussing and passing the Act. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesmen and the leading member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress made remarks respectively, expressing China's strong dissatisfaction with, and firm opposition to the "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" and other bills or acts concerning Taiwan. After the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives passed the revised "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" on October 26, the China once again made stern representation with the U.S. side.

On February 1, 2000 the U.S. House of Representatives adopted the aforesaid Act. On February 2, Mr. Yang Jiechi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, summoned Mr. Prueher, U.S. Ambassador to China, and lodged a stern representation with the U.S. Government over the passage by the U.S. House of Representatives of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. Mr. Yang stated that the U.S. House of Representatives, in disregard of the repeated stern representations of the Chinese side, passed on 1 February the so-called Taiwan Security Enhancement Act in an attempt to provide the so-called legal ground for the U.S. to conduct and expand military ties and exchanges with Taiwan and sell to the latter various kinds of sophisticated weaponry, equipment and technologies. In adopting the Act, the U.S. House of Representatives, aiming at creating "one China, one Taiwan" or "two Chinas", has undoubtedly violated the three China-U.S. joint communiqués and the relevant commitments made by the U.S. side, seriously infringed upon China's sovereignty and grossly interfered in China's internal affairs. The Chinese Government and people would like to express their strong indignation over and firm opposition to this.

Mr. Yang pointed out that the question of Taiwan bears on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, directly touches upon the national pride of the entire Chinese people and has always been the most important and the most sensitive issue that lies at the core of China-U.S. relations. In the China-U.S. Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, the U.S. Government makes it very clear that it recognizes that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal
government of China. There is but one China in the world and that Taiwan is part of China. Any attempt or action to disrupt China's great cause of reunification is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese Government and people and is also doomed to failure. The Chinese Government and people have the determination, the confidence and the capability to resolve the Taiwan question at an early date and realize the complete reunification of the motherland. Mr. Yang said that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, following the Taiwan Relations Act, is yet another bill concocted by a small number of pro-Taiwan and anti-China U.S. Congressmen on the question of Taiwan to deliberately hamper China's great cause of reunification. After the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act was introduced, the Chinese Government lodged stern representations with the U.S. Government, demanding the U.S. side take concrete steps to stop it from becoming law. The U.S. Government has pledged to do that. People with vision in the U.S. Senate and House have also voiced the unequivocal opposition to this bill. However, with the all-out clamoring and support of the pro-Taiwan and anti-China forces in the House, the House has gone so far as to pass this bill aimed at splitting China. Should this bill be passed and become law, it will surely abet Lee Teng-hui in pursuing the "two-state theory" and "Taiwan independence", further aggravate the tension across the Taiwan Straits, undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and seriously impair and disrupt China-U.S. relations.

Mr. Yang stressed that the Chinese side strongly demands the U.S. Government give full attention to the solemn position and demand of the Chinese Government, fully recognize the serious damage the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act could inflict, strictly abide by the three China-U.S. joint communiqués and the relevant commitments it has undertaken, and take immediate action to prevent the bill from becoming law, as the U.S. Government and President Clinton personally have pledged to do. Moreover, the U.S. side should halt immediately its sales of sophisticated weapons, equipment and technologies to Taiwan in strict accordance with the China-U.S. Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982 on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Mr. Prueher said that the U.S. Government is strongly against the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act passed by the House on 1 February. On the same day, a responsible member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NPC and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CPPCC expressed their strong position to the so-called "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives.

G. The question of U.S. support to Taiwan's accession to WHO

On December 7, 1999, in disregard of the solemn representation from the Chinese side, President Clinton signed the so-called bill supportive of Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization which asserts that the State Department shall report to the U.S. Congress on the administrative department's efforts to support Taiwan's attempt to "participate" in international organizations and the WHO in particular. Before that, President Clinton also signed the "Omnibus Appropriations Act" which stipulates that the U.S. State Department should report to the Congress every half year, on its moves in helping Taiwan squeeze into international organizations where statehood is a prerequisite.

On December 10, Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi summoned G. Eugene Martin, Charge d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy in China and lodged as instructed strong protest with the U.S. side. Yang Jiechi pointed out that according to international laws, Taiwan, a province of China, has no right at all to join international organizations that are accessible only to sovereign states. The US Government has made a clear-cut commitment to the Chinese Government and people that it will not support Taiwan in its effort to join any international organizations made up of sovereign states.

The aforesaid US motions supportive of Taiwan's "participation" of WHO and other international organizations of sovereign states are actually playing with words by using "participation" to mean "join" in an attempt to squeeze Taiwan into the above mentioned international organizations thus backing up the Taiwanese authority's action to expand "space for international activities," and to
make "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." What the US Government has done has completely violated the principles the three China-US Joint Communiqués and the US commitment hampered the cause of China's reunification and grossly trampled the norms of international relations. The Chinese Government and people hereby express their utmost indignation at and firm opposition to these motions.

Yang Jiechi emphasized, solving the Taiwan issue and reunifying the motherland has been the greatest aspiration of the entire Chinese people including the Taiwan compatriots. The Chinese Government and the people have the will and ability to accomplish the reunification of China and that is irresistible. The U.S. side is quite clear that the Taiwan issue is the most important and sensitive issue at the core of China-U.S. relations. The Chinese side solemnly demands that the United States abide by the one-China policy, the three communiqués and its commitments and correct the wrong acts by restraining from any means to support Taiwan's entry into WHO and other international organizations whose members are sovereign states. Otherwise, the U.S. should be responsible for all the serious consequences arising therefrom.
Nothing had prepared the world for the startling spectacle that happened in Peking, China in April of 1971. Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai greeted the first American delegation to set foot in the ancient Chinese capital since Mao Tse-tung took control of the land 22 years earlier. After nearly two decades of hostility towards the United States, fifteen American table tennis players and three journalists had made a breakthrough of historic proportions. One young American diplomat had clearly stated that he had joined the State Department to solve the problems of the world, and then sat analyzing the political impact of a ping-pong game. Never before in history, has a sport been used so effectively as a tool for international diplomacy.

Even though China’s invitation to America came as a complete shock, it gave the communist nation a good opportunity to take a major step under the disguise of a sporting event that required no direct contact with Washington. It also gave China the opportunity to retreat if the intended results had failed. China’s ping-pong ploy did offer the Nixon Administration a bright future of opportunities. Immediately, it promised an easing of tensions in Asia and a prospect of profitable trade relations between the two countries. This move opened the door with dealings with the Soviet Union on crucial matters such as arms control in the Middle East. Only hours after Premier Chou’s welcome of the table tennis players, President Nixon announced initiatives to trade and travel between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China.

The U.S. table tennis team was comprised from the world’s most improbable political diplomats ever. The group was lead by Graham Steenhoven, 59, a Chrysler Corp. personnel supervisor and President of the U.S. Table Tennis Association; Rufford Harrison, 40, a DuPont chemist; Tim Boggan, a University professor from New York; Jack Howard, 36, an IBM programmer from California; George Buben and his wife from Detroit; Glenn Cowan, 19, a student from Santa Monica, California; John Tannehill, 19, psychology major at Cincinnati University; Errol Resek, 29, an immigrant from the Dominican Republic and his wife Jairie; George Braithwaite, 36, a United Nations employee; Connie Sweeris, 20, a housewife from Grand Rapids, Mich.; Olga Soltesz, 17, of Orlando Florida; Judy Bochenski, 15, of Eugene, Oregon; and Dick Miles from Sports’s Illustrated and 10 times U.S. table tennis champion.

The American table tennis players, lead by team captain Jack Howard, did engage in friendly competition with their Chinese opponents at Tsinghua University. Fifty Chinese men, women and children, dressed in red jumpsuits "danced" out the tables and barriers for the matches, in full Chinese style. During the games themselves, 18,000 people watched from Peking’s magnificent Indoor Stadium, all clapping as one, all silent as one.

The Chinese were amazed and amused by the long hair, bright colored clothes and red headband of American table tennis player, Glenn Cowan. He was clearly the favorite of the crowd. The Chinese won the Men’s games 5-3 and the Women’s 5-4. Afterwards, the two teams exchanged
gifts and walked off together hand-in-hand. One thing was all too clear to the Americans ... the Chinese were trying hard NOT to embarrass the Americans by lop-sided scores.

The U.S. team paid a historical visit to the Great Wall of China, an Ancient Summer Palace outside Peking and strolled through the streets of Shanghai. They were treated like royalty from the moment they stepped foot in China, with 8-course meals and a choice of seats wherever they went. Tours of the majestic mountains and open fields of bamboo shoots were given with pleasure. The people of China were kind, but they seemed to have no emotions or personalities and dressed in dull military-like uniforms. Pictures of Mao Tse-tung were everywhere and loudspeakers played propaganda messages continuously. The Chinese made it very clear that they welcomed the "People of America" with tremendous interest and curiosity.

China did allow the American journalists, who accompanied the table tennis team, to shoot more than 10,000 feet of colored film during the visit. Voice-casts were made to the U.S. by telephone relays and there was no evidence of censorship. China had waived it's rule requiring all film to be developed and inspected. The most important message the Americans brought back with them was what their hosts got across in a subtle way: That China is a united, rational society trying to open the doors to other parts of the world.
"Understanding China Today: Ten Propositions"

Presented by Dr. Craig Channing, at the Pre-Departure Briefing for “2000 Fulbright Summer Seminar on Chinese History and Culture”.

1. In dealing with China, expect contradictions and complexities
2. China is more than China
3. China is less than China
4. Today, as in much of its past, China is a centralized, authoritarian, state - with a weak central government
5. Viewing China is like looking through a kaleidoscope
6. Although Chinese society is in a state of flux, certain cultural patterns and social characteristics persist - such as the Three Overs and the One Link"
7. Hong Kong and Taiwan are exerting tremendous influence on the mainland China - especially neighboring provinces and regions
8. China's natural environment is under great pressure
9. Of the two words comprising "Chinese Socialism", "Chinese" is by far the more important
10. Be skeptical of all propositions about China - including the previous nine.
Following is the transcript of President Carter's statement in Washington on normalizing relations with China, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of ABC News:

Good evening. I would like to read a joint communiqué which is being simultaneously issued in Peking at this very moment by the leaders of the People's Republic of China:


The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of Jan. 1, 1979.

The United States recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 and emphasize once again that both sides are prepared to reduce the danger of international military conflict. Neither side seeks hegemony - that is the dominance of one nation over others - in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any other third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American people but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and in the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on March 1, 1979."
Texts of Statements From U.S., China and Taiwan

Following are the texts of the United States statement on Taiwan, provided by the White House; the official English text of the Chinese statement on Taiwan read by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, provided by Reuters from Peking, and an unofficial English translation of the statement by President Chiang Ching-kuo of Nationalist China.

United States' Statement

As of Jan. 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. On the same date, the People's Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States of America. The United States thereby establishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

On that same date, Jan. 1, 1979, the United States of America will notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. The United States also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months.

In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations.

The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other non-governmental relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization.

The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security and economic interests and to the peace of the entire world.

China's Statement

As of Jan. 1, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations, thereby ending the prolonged abnormal relationship between them. This is an historic event in Sino-United States relations.

As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States. It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique and through their joint efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the two countries.

As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair.

At the invitation of the U.S. Government, Teng Hsiao-ping, Deputy Prime Minister of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, will pay an official visit to the United States in January 1979, with a view to further promoting the friendship between the two peoples and good relations between the two countries.

Taiwan's Statement

The decision by the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communist regime has not only seriously damaged the rights and interests of the Government and the people of the Republic of China, but has also had a tremendously adverse impact upon the free world. For all the consequences that might arise as a result of this move, the United States Government alone should bear full responsibility.

In the past few years, the United States Government has repeatedly reaffirmed its intention to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and to honor its treaty commitments. Now that it has broken the assurances and abrogated the treaty, the United States Government cannot be expected to have the confidence of any free nation in the future.

The United States, by extending diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist regime which owes its very existence to terror and suppression, is not in conformity with its professed position of safeguarding human rights and strengthening the capability of democratic nations to resist the totalitarian dictatorship.

The move is tantamount to denying the hundreds of millions of enslaved peoples on the Chinese mainland their hope for an early restoration of freedom. Viewed from whatever aspect, the move by the United States constitutes a great setback to human freedom and democratic institutions. It will be condemned by all freedom-loving and peace-seeking peoples all over the world.

Recent international events have proved that the United States' persistence of the "normalization" process with the Chinese Communist regime did not protect the security of free Asian nations, has further encouraged Communist subversion and aggressive activities and hastened the fall of Indo-China into Communist hands. The Government and the people of the Republic of China firmly believe lasting international peace and security can never be established on an unstable foundation of expediency.

Regardless of how the international situation may develop, the Republic of China, as a sovereign nation with her glorious tradition, unites all her people, civilian and military, at home and abroad, to continue her endeavors toward progress in the social, economic and political fields. The Chinese Government and the people, faithful to their national objectives and their international responsibilities, have full confidence in the future of the Republic of China.

The late President Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly instructed the Chinese people to be firm with dignity and to complete the task of national recovery and reconstruction. The Government and the people of the Republic of China have the determination and the faith which they will exert to their utmost, to work together with other free peoples in democratic countries to conquer Commocol (Communist) and the people, faithful to its aggressive policy. Henceforth, we shall be calm and firm, positive and hard-working. It is urged that all citizens cooperate fully with the Government, with one heart and one soul, united and determined to fight at this difficult moment. Under whatever circumstances, the Republic of China shall neither negotiate with the Communist Chinese regime, nor compromise with Communism, and it shall never give up its sacred task of recovering the mainland and delivering the compatriots there. This firm position shall remain unchanged.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE
TEXT OF U.S.-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE

August 17, 1982

The following is the complete English text of the U.S.-China Joint Communiqué issued by the two governments on August 17, 1982.

(1) In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic as the sole legal Government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and China were normalized.

(2) The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of United States-China relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October 1981.

(3) Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding United States-China relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.

(4) The Chinese Government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979, promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

(5) The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of United States-China differences over United States arms sales to Taiwan.
(6) Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

(7) In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two Governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue.

(8) The development of United States-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the Governments and peoples of the United States and China.

(9) In order to bring about the healthy development of United States-China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two Government reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.
WHEREAS, the Congress and the American people have expressed deep concern about the appropriateness of unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status for the People's Republic of China (China);

WHEREAS, I share the concerns of the Congress and the American people regarding this important issue, particularly with respect to China's record on human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, and trade;

WHEREAS, I have carefully weighed the advisability of conditioning China's MFN status as a means of achieving progress in these areas;

WHEREAS, I have concluded that the public interest would be served by a continuation of the waiver of the application of sections 402 (a) and (b) of the Trade Act of 1973 (19 U.S.C. 2431(a) and 2431(b)) (Act) on China's MFN status for an additional 12 months with renewal thereafter subject to the conditions below;

NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1: The Secretary of State (Secretary) shall make a recommendation to the President to extend or not to extend MFN status to China for the 12-month period beginning July 3, 1994.

(a) In making this recommendation the Secretary shall not recommend extension unless he determines that:

-- extension will substantially promote the freedom of emigration objectives of section 402 of the Act; and

-- China is complying with the 1992 bilateral agreement between the United States and China concerning prison labor.

(b) In making this recommendation the Secretary shall also determine whether China has made overall, significant progress with respect to the following:

-- taking steps to begin adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

-- releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or
detained for the non-violent expression of their political and religious beliefs,  
including such expression of beliefs in connection with the Democracy Wall and  
Tiananmen Square movements;

--- ensuring humane treatment of prisoners, such as by allowing access to prisons by international humanitarian and human rights organizations;

--- protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage; and

--- permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China.

Section 2: The Secretary shall submit his recommendation to the President before June 3, 1994.

Section 3: The Secretary, and other appropriate officials of the United States, shall pursue resolutely all legislative and executive actions to ensure that China abides by its commitments to follow fair, nondiscriminatory trade practices in dealing with U.S. businesses, and adheres to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines and parameters, and other nonproliferation commitments.

Section 4: This order does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any person or entity against the United States, its officers, or employees.

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT CLINTON’S ANNOUNCEMENT

May 26, 1994

Good afternoon. Today I would like to announce a series of important decisions regarding the United States’ policy toward China.

Our relationship with China is important to all Americans. We have significant interests in what happens there and what happens between us. China has an atomic arsenal and a vote and a veto in the UN Security Council. It is a major factor in Asian and global security. We share important interests, such as in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and in sustaining the global environment. China is also the world’s fastest-growing economy. Over $8 billion of United States’ exports to China last year supported over 150,000 American jobs.

I have received Secretary Christopher’s letter recommending, as required by last year’s executive order, reporting to me on the conditions in that executive order. He has reached a conclusion with which I agree, that the Chinese did not achieve overall significant progress in all the areas outlined in the executive order relating to human rights, even though clearly there was progress made in important areas, including the resolution of all emigration cases, the establishment of a memorandum of understanding with regard to how prison labor issues would be resolved, the adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other issues. Nevertheless, serious human rights abuses continue in China, including the arrest and detention of those who peacefully voice their opinions and the repression of Tibet’s religious and cultural traditions.

The question for us now is, given the fact that there has been some progress but that not all the requirements of the executive order were met, how can we best advance the cause of human rights and the other profound interests the United States has in our relationship with China.

I have decided that the United States should renew Most-Favored-Nation trading status toward China. This decision, I believe, offers us the best opportunity to lay the basis for long-term sustainable progress in human rights and for the advancement of our other interests with China. Extending MFN will avoid isolating China and instead will permit us to engage the Chinese with not only economic contacts but with cultural, educational, and other contacts, and with a continuing aggressive effort in human rights—an approach that I believe will make it more likely that China will play a responsible role, both at home and abroad.

I am moving, therefore, to delink human rights from the annual extension of Most-Favored-Nation trading status for China. That linkage has been constructive during the past year. But I believe, based on our aggressive contacts with the Chinese in the past several months, that we have reached the end of the usefulness of that policy, and it is time to take a new path toward the achievement of our constant objectives. We need to place our relationship into a larger and more productive framework.

In view of the continuing human rights abuses, I am extending the sanctions imposed by the United States as a result of the events in Tiananmen Square, and I am also banning the import of
munitions, principally guns and ammunition, from China. I am also pursuing a new and vigorous American program to support those in China working to advance the cause of human rights and democracy.

This program will include increased broadcasts for Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, increased support for nongovernmental organizations working on human rights in China, and the development, with American business leaders, of a voluntary set of principles for business activity in China. I don't want to be misunderstood about this. China continues to commit very serious human rights abuses. Even as we engage the Chinese on military, political, and economic issues, we intend to stay engaged with those in China who suffer from human rights abuses. The United States must remain a champion of their liberties.

I believe the question, therefore, is not whether we continue to support human rights in China but how we can best support human rights in China and advance our other very significant issues and interests. I believe we can do it by engaging the Chinese. I believe the course I have chosen gives us the best chance of success on all fronts. We will have more contacts. We will have more trade. We will have more international cooperation. We will have more intense and constant dialogue on human rights issues. We will have that in an atmosphere which gives us the chance to see China evolve as a responsible power, ever-growing not only economically, but growing in political maturity so that human rights can be observed.

To those who argue that in view of China's human rights abuses we should revoke MFN status, let me ask you the same question that I have asked myself over and over these last few weeks as I have studied this issue and consulted people of both parties who have had experience with China over many decades. Will we do more to advance the cause of human rights if China is isolated, or if our nations are engaged in a growing web of political and economic cooperation and contacts? I am persuaded that the best path for advancing freedom in China is for the United States to intensify and broaden its engagement with that nation.

I think we have to see our relations with China within the broader context of our policies in the Asian Pacific region. A region that, after all, includes our own nation. This week, we've seen encouraging developments, progress on resolving trade frictions with the Japanese, and possible progress towards stopping North Korea's nuclear program.

I am determined to see that we maintain an active role in this region, in both its dynamic economic growth, and in its security. In three decades and three wars during this century, Americans have fought and died in the Asian Pacific to advance our ideals and our security. Our destiny demands that we continue to play an active role in the region. The actions I have taken today to advance our security, to advance our prosperity, to advance our ideals, I believe are the important and appropriate ones. I believe, in other words, this is in the strategic, economic, and political interests of both the United States and China, and I am confident that over the long run this decision will prove to be the correct one.

JOINT U.S.-CHINA STATEMENT

October 29, 1997

At the invitation of President William J. Clinton of the United States of America, President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China is paying a state visit to the United States from October 26 to November 3, 1997. This is the first state visit by the President of China to the United States in twelve years. President Jiang Zemin held formal talks with President Clinton in Washington D.C. and also met with Vice President Al Gore, Congressional leaders and other American leaders. Talks also were held between Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

The two Presidents had an in-depth and productive exchange of views on the international situation, U.S.-China relations and the important opportunities and challenges facing the two countries. They agree that a sound and stable relationship between the United States and China serves the fundamental interests of both the American and Chinese peoples and is important to fulfilling their common responsibility to work for peace and prosperity in the 21st century.

They agree that while the United States and China have areas of both agreement and disagreement, they have a significant common interest and a firm common will to seize opportunities and meet challenges cooperatively, with candor and a determination to achieve concrete progress. The United States and China have major differences on the question of human rights. At the same time, they also have great potential for cooperation in maintaining global and regional peace and stability; promoting world economic growth; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; advancing Asia-Pacific regional cooperation; combating narcotics trafficking, international organized crime and terrorism; strengthening bilateral exchanges and cooperation in economic development, trade, law, environmental protection, energy, science and technology, and education and culture; as well as engaging in military exchanges.

The two Presidents are determined to build toward a constructive strategic partnership between the United States and China through increasing cooperation to meet international challenges and promote peace and development in the world. To achieve this goal, they agree to approach U.S.-China relations from a long-term perspective on the basis of the principles of the three U.S.-China joint communiques.

China stresses that the Taiwan question is the most important and sensitive central question in China-U.S. relations, and that the proper handling of this question in strict compliance with the principles set forth in the three China-U.S. joint communiques holds the key to sound and stable growth of China-U.S. relations. The United States reiterates that it adheres to its "one China" policy and the principles set forth in the three U.S.-China joint communiques.

As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the United States and China support the UN in its efforts, in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, to play a positive and effective role on global issues, including peacekeeping and the promotion of economic and social development. Both countries support efforts to reform the UN and to make the Security Council more representative, while retaining and improving its effectiveness. Stressing the need to put the UN on a firmer financial basis, both countries will participate actively in discussions on the Scale of Assessments in the UN.

As two major countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and China are ready to strengthen their cooperation to meet various challenges and make positive contributions to promoting stability and prosperity in the region. Recognizing that maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is of great importance, the two countries are working through the Four-Party Talks to help establish a durable peace on the Peninsula, and will continue consultations to this end. They also stress that it is in the interest of the two countries to maintain peace and stability in other important regions, including the Middle East, the Gulf, and South Asia.

The two Presidents agreed on a number of steps that will provide a framework for further promoting U.S.–China relations and strengthening their cooperation in international affairs.

High-Level Dialogue and Consultations

The United States and China agree to regular visits by their Presidents to each other's capitals.

They agree to a Washington-Beijing presidential communications link to facilitate direct contact.

They also agree to regular exchanges of visits by cabinet and sub-cabinet officials to consult on political, military, security and arms control issues.

Energy and Environment Cooperation

The United States and China reaffirm the importance of bilateral cooperation across the broad range of environmental issues, as evidenced by the establishment of the U.S.–China Forum on Environment and Development in March 1997.

They consider it a critical challenge to develop and efficiently use energy sources, protect the global environment, and promote environmentally sound growth and development. Accordingly, they agree to strengthen their cooperation in energy and environment through an initiative to accelerate clean energy projects and the appropriate transfer of related technologies. The principal areas of cooperation will be in clean energy, urban air pollution control and rural electrification. This initiative also will foster broader cooperation on global environment issues such as climate change, desertification and bio-diversity. China's State Planning Commission and the U.S. Energy Department have signed the U.S.–China Initiative on Energy and Environment Cooperation to promote effective cooperation in these fields, including the use of clean energy.

Economic Relations and Trade

The two Presidents are prepared to take positive and effective
measures to expand U.S.-China trade and economic ties. As both economies move into the 21st century, information technology will be critical to spurring technological innovation and improving productivity. In this regard, China indicated its intention to participate as soon as possible in the Information Technology Agreement. In addition, in the context of WTO negotiations, China will continue to make further substantial tariff reductions.

The United States and China agree that China's full participation in the multilateral trading system is in their mutual interest. To this end, they agree to intensify negotiations on market access, including tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, standards and agriculture and on implementation of WTO principles so that China can accede to the WTO on a commercially meaningful basis at the earliest possible date.

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

The United States and China agree that it is in their mutual interest to cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To this end, they each have taken the steps necessary to implement the U.S.-China Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation concluded in 1985. In addition, China's State Planning Commission and the U.S. Department of Energy have signed an Agreement of Intent to promote peaceful nuclear cooperation and research between the two countries.

Nonproliferation

The United States and China agree to work to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force at the earliest possible date. They also agree to pursue at the UN Conference on Disarmament the early start of formal negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Materials Used in Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.

The United States and China reiterate their commitment not to provide any assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and nuclear explosion programs. China has placed controls on exports of nuclear and dual-use materials and related technology and will take further measures to strengthen dual-use export controls by mid-1998. The United States will continue to enforce firm controls on the export of nuclear and dual-use materials and related technology.

As original parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States and China agree to cooperate in implementing the Convention within a multilateral framework. Both countries agree on the importance of government oversight of chemical-related exports.

The United States and China agree to build on the 1994 Joint Statement on Missile Nonproliferation. They reaffirm their respective commitments to the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Human Rights

The United States and China both recognize the positive role of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments in promoting human rights. They reiterate their commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
While the two countries have not resolved their differences on human rights, they have agreed to discuss them through dialogue at both governmental and non-governmental levels in the spirit of equality and mutual respect. The two countries agree to hold discussions on the structure and functions of an NGO forum on human rights.

Cooperation in the Field of Law

The United States and China agree that promoting cooperation in the field of law serves the interests and needs of both countries.

They will strengthen cooperation in combating international organized crime, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, counterfeiting and money laundering. To this end, they intend to establish a joint liaison group for law enforcement cooperation composed of representatives of the relevant agencies of both governments. They agree to begin consultations on mutual legal assistance aimed at concluding a mutual legal assistance agreement.

The United States and China will assign counternarcotics officers to their respective embassies on a reciprocal basis.

Recognizing the importance the United States and China each attaches to legal exchanges, they intend to establish a joint liaison group to pursue cooperative activities in this area. These may include exchanges of legal experts; training of judges and lawyers; strengthening legal information systems and the exchange of legal materials; sharing ideas about legal assistance; consulting on administrative procedures; and strengthening commercial law and arbitration.

As part of this program of legal cooperation, China's Minister of Justice will visit the United States in November 1997 at the invitation of the U.S. Attorney General.

Military-to-Military Relations

The United States and China have reached agreement on the establishment of a consultation mechanism to strengthen military maritime safety, which will enable their maritime and air forces to avoid accidents, misunderstandings or miscalculations.

They agree to share information and discuss issues related to their respective experiences in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Science and Technology, Educational and Cultural Exchanges

The U.S.-China Joint Commission on Science and Technology will continue to guide the active bilateral scientific and technological cooperation program, which involves more than 30 agreements reached since 1979, and will promote the further use of science and technology to solve national and global problems. The United States and China also will identify areas for cooperative projects using space for Earth science research and practical applications.

The United States and China will expand educational and cultural exchanges. Both Presidents believe that increased people-to-people exchanges will help cultivate long-term bilateral relations.
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President Jiang Zemin expressed his thanks to President Clinton and
the American people for their warm reception and invited President
Clinton to visit China in 1998. President Clinton accepted this
invitation with pleasure.
FACT SHEET:
Accomplishments of U.S.-China Summit

The agreements reached today by the United States and China in a broad range of areas will further cooperation toward a more stable, secure, open, and prosperous world for the 21st century.

Nonproliferation: The United States and China have a common interest in keeping weapons of mass destruction and other sophisticated weapons out of unstable regions and away from rogue states and terrorists. These weapons fuel instability, spark conflict and threaten the reliable supply of energy and secure shipping lanes.

Strengthening Controls. China has taken new, concrete steps to prevent nuclear proliferation that threaten the interests of both countries. China has:

- Promulgated for the first time strict national regulations to control exports of nuclear material, equipment and technology;
- Issued a State Council directive controlling export of dual-use items with potential nuclear use;
- Joined the Zangger Committee, an international group which coordinates international nuclear suppliers' efforts to control nuclear exports;
- Agreed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, including through personnel and scientific exchanges;
- Provided assurances addressing U.S. concerns about nuclear cooperation with Iran;
- Tightened controls over the export of chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons programs.

Regional Stability. The U.S. and China discussed the danger posed by the provision of advanced conventional weapons to Iran which threaten maritime activities and regional stability. China has agreed to take steps to address U.S. concerns. The United States will continue to monitor this issue.

Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. Subject to case-by-case licensing and ongoing U.S. monitoring, President Clinton will take action to enable U.S. companies to compete in China's nuclear power market. This will allow U.S. companies to provide energy and environment friendly technology to fill China's growing energy needs.

Human Rights: The United States and China have fundamental differences in the area of human rights. The President raised U.S. concerns about prisoners of conscience in custody for the peaceful expression of their views and about other restrictions on expression, association, religious freedom, assembly, and the protection of cultural and religious traditions of Tibet. China has taken the following actions concerning human rights:
Religious Freedom. China has invited a distinguished group of American religious leaders representing the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths to visit China to observe Chinese religious practices.

Prisoner Accounting. China has resumed cooperation with businessman and human rights activist John Kamm in his project of accounting for prisoners.

NGO FORUM. The United States and China agreed to preparatory talks establishing a Forum for U.S. and China NGOs and officials to discuss human rights issues.

United Nations Covenant. China has signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which obligates parties to promote progressive development of these rights in their societies.


Political and Security Dialogues: The United States and China have an interest in deepening the strategic dialogue between our two countries which will contribute to a secure and stable world. As part of the effort to deepen the relationship between the United States and China, the two Presidents agreed to:

Meet regularly in their respective capitals.

Authorize the Secretaries of State and Defense and the National Security Advisor and their Chinese counterparts to exchange regular visits.

Authorize subcabinet meetings on political, military, security and arms control issues to be held on a regular basis.

Establish a direct Presidential communications link.

Participate actively in UN discussions aimed at putting the UN on a sounder financial basis.

Military-to-Military Relations: The United States and China have a common interest in developing military-to-military relations in ways that minimize the chance of miscalculation, advance transparency, and strengthen communication.

Military Maritime Safety. An agreement designed to avoid incidents, miscalculation, or misunderstandings between our naval forces.

Armed Forces Exchanges. The United States and Chinese armed forces will share information regarding humanitarian crises and disaster relief with the aim of closer coordination in their reactions to such problems.

Promoting Rule of Law: The United States and China have a common interest in developing legal and judicial institutions that provide more predictability and protections both for economic interactions and for non-economic activity involving ordinary citizens.

Strengthening Legal Institutions. The United States and China agreed to establish a joint liaison group pursuing cooperation on the rule of law, including in areas such as training of judges and lawyers, exchanges of legal experts, administrative law procedures, legal aid, and commercial law and arbitration.

Cooperation in Law Enforcement: The United States and China have a common interest in cooperating against the new transnational threats of international crime, alien smuggling and narco-trafficking. The two Presidents agreed to:
--Fighting Drugs. The United States will station Drug Enforcement Administration officers in its Embassy in Beijing to work in liaison with Chinese counternarcotics agencies on cases involving violations of U.S. narcotics laws.

--Fighting Crime. The United States and China agreed to establish a joint liaison group including agencies dealing with law enforcement to strengthen efforts against international organized crime, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, counterfeiting, and money laundering.

--High Level Dialogue. At the invitation of Attorney General Reno, China's Justice Minister will visit the United States in November, accompanied by legal and law enforcement experts.

Economic Growth: The United States and China have a common interest in making global trade and investment as free, fair, and open as possible. The United States will continue to press China to provide fair access to its market. China has agreed to:

--Boeing Purchase. China has agreed to purchase 50 Boeing aircraft valued at approximately $3 billion.

--Information Technology Agreement. China has agreed to participate in the ITA (Information Technology Agreement) which cuts to zero tariffs on computers, semiconductors and telecommunications equipment.

--Financial News Services. China and the United States have reached agreement in principle on regulations governing provision of financial news services by foreign companies to Chinese clients that will allow U.S. companies to operate on acceptable terms.

Energy and the Environment: The United States and China have a common interest in promoting economic growth and protecting the environment at the same time.

--Clean Energy. The United States and China agreed on an initiative to develop clean energy projects in China through use of U.S. products and technology and to enhance research and other cooperative efforts in this field. The principal areas of cooperation will be urban air pollution control and rural electrification, and clean energy sources and energy efficiency. The initiative is an outgrowth of the U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development established during Vice President Gore's March 1997 visit to China.

Science and Technology: The United States and China have a common interest in developing the technology of the future that will spur cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as space exploration and medical research. The two countries will continue to cooperate through existing Science & Technology agreements currently in place and will undertake new cooperative projects in using space for earth science research.

END
PRESIDENT JIANG: Ladies and gentlemen, just now I've held official talks with President Clinton. The two sides have held an extensive and in-depth exchange of views on China-U.S. relations and the major international and regional issues. The talks were positive, constructive, and productive.

The successful exchange of visits between the two heads of state of China and the United States marks a new stage of growth for China-U.S. relations. This not only serves the common interests of China and the United States, but also will be of important significance to promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia Pacific and the world at large.

Peace and the development are the main themes of contemporary times. In the new historical conditions, the common interests between China and the United States are increasing, not decreasing. The foundation for cooperation between the two countries is reenforcing, not weakening.

Both sides believe that China and the United States, as the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, should continue to work together to promote peace and security in the world and the Asia Pacific in particular, to ease and eliminate all kinds of tensions and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to strengthen the efforts in protecting the environment, combating international crime, drug trafficking, and international terrorism. Our two sides have agreed to further step up cooperation and the dialogue between the two countries on major international issues.

China-U.S. relations are improving and growing. The cooperation between the two sides in many areas has made important progress. President Clinton and I have decided that China and the United States will not target the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control at each other. This demonstrates to the entire world that China and the United States are partners, not adversaries.

I hereby wish to reiterate that since the very first day when China came into possession of nuclear weapons, China has undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

President Clinton and I have reached a broad range of agreements and consensus on further increasing exchanges in cooperation between China and the United States in all areas in our bilateral relations. We have agreed to take positive steps to promote the growth of the mutually beneficial economic cooperation and trade between China and the United States and to expand the exchanges and the cooperation between the two countries in the energy, environment, scientific, educational, cultural, health, legal, and the military fields; and also to enhance the people-to-people exchanges and friendship.

We have also agreed to enhance the consultations and the cooperation between China and the United States on the issues of disarmament, arms control, and non-
proliferation. And we have issued joint statements on the BWC protocol on the question of the antipersonnel land mines and on the question of South Asia.
The Taiwan question is the most important and the most sensitive issue at the core of China-U.S. relations. We hope that the U.S. side will adhere to the principles set forth in the three China-U.S. joint communiques and the joint China-U.S. statement, as well as the relevant commitments it has made in the interest of a smooth growth of China-U.S. relations.

The improvement and the growth of China-U.S. relations have not come by easily. It is the result of the concerted efforts of the governments and people of our two countries. So we should all the more treasure this good result.

As China and the United States have different social systems, ideologies, values, and culture traditions, we have some difference of views on certain issues. However, they should not become the obstacles in the way of the growth of China-U.S. relations. The world is a colorful one. The development parts of the countries in the world should be chosen by the people of the countries concerned.

China and the United States should view and handle the bilateral relations from a long-term and strategic perspective. We should promote the growth of China-U.S. relations in the spirit of mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit, seeking common ground while putting aside differences, and developing cooperation. I believe that through the concerted efforts of both sides, we will make constant progress in the direction of building a constructive, strategic partnership between China and the United States oriented towards the 21st century.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you, Mr. President. And I also thank the Chinese people for their warm welcome to me, to my family, and to our delegation.

Over the past five years, President Jiang and I have met seven times. Mr. President, your leadership is helping us to transform our nations’ relationship for the future. Clearly, a stable, open, prosperous China, shouldering its responsibilities for a safer world is good for America. Nothing makes that point better than today’s agreement not to target our nuclear missiles at each other. We also agreed to do more to shore up stability in Asia, on the Korean Peninsula, and the Indian subcontinent.

I reaffirmed our longstanding one China policy to President Jiang and urged the pursuit of cross-strait discussions recently resumed as the best path to a peaceful resolution. In a similar vein, I urged President Jiang to assume a dialogue with the Dalai Lama in return for the recognition that Tibet is a part of China and in recognition of the unique cultural and religious heritage of that region.

I welcome the progress we made today in non-proliferation, including China’s decision to actively study joining the Missile Technology Control Regime, our joint commitment not to provide assistance to ballistic missile programs in South Asia, and President Jiang’s statement last week that China will not sell missiles to Iran.

We also welcome the steps China recently has taken to tighten nuclear export controls, to strengthen controls on the export of chemicals that can be turned into weapons, and to work jointly with us to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.

As the President said, we are also working together against international crime, drug trafficking, alien smuggling, stepping up our scientific cooperation, which already has produced remarkable breakthroughs in areas including the fight against birth defects like spina bifida. We’re helping to eradicate polio and working to predict and to mitigate national disasters. And perhaps most important over the long run, we are committed to working together on clean energy to preserve our natural environment, a matter of urgent concern to both our nations.

I am also very pleased by our cooperation on rule of law programs, from training lawyers and judges to providing legal assistance to the poor.

President Jiang and I agree on the importance of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. I regret we did not make more progress on this front, and we must...
recommit ourselves to achieving that goal on strong terms. We agree that we need to work together to avoid another round of destabilizing currency devaluations in the region and to restore economic growth.

As you can see, we are working together in many areas of cooperation. We have developed a relationship of openness and candor. When we differ, as we do from time to time, we speak openly and honestly in an effort to understand our differences and, if possible, to work toward a common approach to resolving them.

It is well known that the principal area of our difference in recent years has been over human rights questions. America recognizes and applauds China's economic and social transformation, which has expanded the rights of its citizens by lifting hundreds of millions from poverty, providing them greater access to information, giving them village elections, greater freedom to travel and to choose their own jobs, and better education for their children.

As I said again to President Jiang, we Americans also firmly believe that individual rights, including the freedom of speech, association, and religion are very important, not only to those who exercise them, but also to nations whose success in the 21st century depends upon widespread individual knowledge, creativity, free exchange, and enterprise.

Therefore, we welcome China's decision to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the recent release of several prominent political dissidents, the recent visit China graciously accorded American religious leaders, and the resumption of a human rights dialogue between China and the United States.

Earlier this morning, during my official welcome, I could hear and see the many echoes of China's past and the call of its promising future, for Tiananmen Square is an historical place. There, 100 years ago, China's quest for constitutional government was born. There, in 1919, young people rallied against foreign occupation and launched a powerful movement for China's political and cultural renewal. There, in 1976, public mourning for Zhou Enlai led to the Cultural Revolution's end and the beginning of your remarkable transformation. And there, nine years ago, Chinese citizens of all ages raised their voices for democracy.

For all of our agreements, we still disagree about the meaning of what happened then. I believe, and the American people believe, that the use of force and the tragic loss of life was wrong. I believe, and the American people believe, that freedom of speech, association, and religion are, as recognized by U.N. Charter, the right of people everywhere and should be protected by their governments.

It was to advance these rights that our Founding Fathers in our Declaration of Independence pledged our lives, our fortunes, our sacred honor. Fifty years ago, the U.N. recognized these rights as the basic freedoms of people everywhere.

The question for us now is how shall we deal with such disagreements and still succeed in the important work of deepening our friendship and our sense of mutual respect.

First, we Americans must acknowledge the painful moments in our own history when fundamental human rights were denied. We must say that we know, still, we have to continue our work to advance the dignity and freedom and equality of our own people. And, second, we must understand and respect the enormous challenges China has faced in trying to move forward against great odds with a clear memory of the setbacks suffered in past periods of instability.

Finally, it is important that whatever our disagreements over past action, China and the United States must go forward on the right side of history for the future sake of the world. The forces of history have brought us to a new age of human possibility, but our dreams can only be recognized by nations whose citizens are both responsible and free.
Mr. President, that is the future America seeks to build with China, in partnership and honest friendship.

Tomorrow, Hillary and I will visit the Great Wall. The wall's builders knew they were building a permanent monument, even if they were unable to see it finished in their lifetimes. Likewise, we know we are building a friendship that will serve our descendants well, even if we, ourselves, will not see its full development across the next century and into the new millennium. Our friendship may never be perfect -- no friendship is. But I hope it will last forever.

PRESIDENT JIANG: Now President Clinton and I are prepared to answer your questions, and now I'd like to give the first question to President Clinton.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Which one -- Chinese journalists, one of you? In the back there, yes? Yes, go ahead.

Q Thank you. I'm a correspondent with Phoenix TV of Hong Kong. In the recent Asian financial crisis, the Chinese government has pledged to maintain the value of RMB Asian currency and, thus, making positive contribution to stabilizing the situation in Asia. And this has attracted positive reaction from the international community and from the U.S. government. However, yesterday, the exchange rate between Japanese yen and the U.S. dollar dropped again to a low of 143 yen against one dollar, and which was closed at 141 yen against one dollar. So, what specific common measures are the Chinese and the U.S. government prepared to take to stabilize the financial situation in Asia and the world?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, let me agree with you. I think that China has shown great statesmanship and strength in making a strong contribution to the stability not only of the Chinese people and their economy, but the entire region, by maintaining the value of its currency.

The United States, as you know, has worked hard to try to support the stability of the Japanese yen and to help growth resume in Japan. I think that what we have agreed to do is to continue to do whatever we can to promote stability and to support policies within Japan that will restore confidence in the economy, get investment going again, and get growth going.

The key here, I believe, is for the plans to reform the financial institutions in Japan and take other steps that will get growth going and get investments going in Japan to be made. I think that, ultimately, President Jiang and I would give anything to be able to just wave a wand and have all of this go away. We are not the only actors in this drama, and a lot of this must be done by the Japanese government and the Japanese people. We can be supportive, but they have to make the right decisions.

Q My question to President Jiang and also to President Clinton is, we know that there were four dissidents in Xian who were arrested earlier and three were released, and one of them is still under detention. And I would like to know if you talked about the issue. And what about the rest of the 2,000 dissidents who are being reported as still under imprisonment right now in China? Can both of you elaborate on that? Thank you.

PRESIDENT JIANG: In our talks just now, President Clinton raised this issue. We adopt an attitude of extending very warm welcome to the visit to China by President Clinton.

As for the matter you raised, I think you are referring to the incident in Xian, and I think in China there is no question that there is no restriction whatsoever on the coverage and interview by the reporters and the correspondents within the scope of law. But as for some activities that have been detrimental or have prejudiced the security, then the local authorities should take measures to deal with them, and it is also understandable.
As for the question you raised, actually, I do not have very detailed information in this regard. But as for the latter part of your question concerning 2,000 dissidents, I think in China we have our laws. And in China's constitution, it is clearly stipulated that the Chinese citizens have the freedom of speech, but any law-breaking activities must be dealt with according to law. I think this is true in any country of rule of law. And I think China's judicial departments will deal with the matter according to law.

I want to ask that I believe that the vast majority of the correspondents and the reporters are willing to promote the friendship between China and the United States through President Clinton's visit to China this time. However, before President Clinton's visit, I read some reports from some media and newspapers saying — alleging China had been involved in so-called political contributions in the United States. I really think it very absurd and ridiculous, and I think they are sheer fabrications. China can never do such a thing and China never interferes in other country's internal affairs.

Actually, at the talks this morning, President Clinton also asked me of this question. And I told him that after hearing of such an allegation we conducted very earnest investigation into the matter. And the results of the investigation shows that there was never such a thing.

Recently, in my meetings with many foreign visitors and visiting leaders of other countries, I often said to them that as countries in the world have different social systems and values, it is something that should be allowed that they may have different understandings about one fact. And this actually, itself, is a representation and the manifestation of democracy. However, what is important is that the fact itself should not be distorted.

I'm sorry I've taken up too much of the time, and I now invite President Clinton to say a few words.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, we did discuss the questions you raised. And, of course, I made my views known about the recent detentions yesterday. On the larger question you raised, I actually made a couple of specific and practical suggestions about how we might take our dialogue farther there.

There are some people who are incarcerated now for offenses no longer on the books in China, reflecting real progress in present Chinese practice, and the Chinese, in my view — we should acknowledge that. But the question then arises is there some way that these people might be released? Is there some procedure through which we could move? There are some people imprisoned for non-violent activities in June of '89. Is there something that could be done there?

There are some other practical things we discussed, which I think it would be premature to ask the Chinese government to make a statement on now because we just have had these discussions. But I want to say to all of you that the atmosphere — whatever your position on these issues is, and particularly if you agree with me, I think you should at least appreciate the fact that we now have an atmosphere in which it is possible for us to be open and honest and in great detail about this; and that there are legitimate and honest differences in the way we look at this. But I believe that we are making progress, and I believe that we will make more.

I remember the things that I specified in my statement about that. You can see that neither one of us are shy about being strong about how we believe about this. And I think that we have them in the public debate now, we have them in the private discussions, and we just have to keep pushing forward in trying to work through it.

Q President Jiang spoke of China's position against the first use of nuclear weapons and the policy of the United States does not agree. Was this discussed in the context of negotiations on the detargeting agreement? And what are the U.S. concessions in order to obtain the detargeting agreement?
PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, the short answer to your question and the accurate one is, no, but I don't want it to be a misleading answer. That is, you well understand that our position on that issue is a product of decades of experience in a former time. We have not changed our position, nor are we prepared to do so on that.

But this was a mutual decision we made because we both felt that, number one, if we detargeted, we would completely eliminate the prospect ever of any kind of accidental launch; and, number two, we would take one more step in showing mutual confidence and trust in one another; and, number three, it would be a helpful signal as a counterweight to the recent nuclear tests in India and Pakistan. And so we agreed that it was in both our interests to do this on its own terms.

PRESIDENT JIANG: I would like to make a brief explanation. As I stated just now, President Clinton and I decided that China and the United States would not target the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control at each other. Full stop — that's a full stop. And then this demonstrates to the entire world that China and the United States are partners, not adversaries. Full stop again. (Laughter.) And then I said, I hereby reiterate that since the very first day that China came into possession of nuclear weapons, China has undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Full stop. That's my view. That's our view.

Q My question is to President Jiang. At his opening statement, President Clinton expressed appreciation of the achievements made by the Chinese government in respecting human rights. At the same time, he also said that China and the United States also had difference of views over this matter. So my question is, what is the position of the Chinese government on the human rights issue?

PRESIDENT JIANG: China and the United States have differences of views and also have common ground on the human rights issue. More than 2,000 years ago, a great thinker of China's Han Dynasty, Dong Zhongshu, once said, "Of all the living things nurtured between heaven and the Earth, the most valuable is human beings." So the Chinese nation always respects and maintains the dignity and rights of the people. Today the Chinese government solemnly commits itself to the promotion and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The United States is the most developed country in the world, with a per capita GDP approaching $30,000 U.S. dollars, while China is a developing country with a population of 1.2 billion, with a per capita GDP of less than $700 U.S. dollars. As the two countries differ in social system, ideology, historical tradition and cultural background, the two countries have different means and ways in realizing human rights and fundamental freedoms. So it's nothing strange that we may have some difference of views over some issues.

China stresses that the top priority should be given to the right to subsistence and the right to development. Meanwhile, efforts should be made to strengthen democracy and the legal system building, and to protect the economic, social, cultural, civil and the political rights of the people.

I listened very carefully to what President Clinton said just now, and I noticed that he made mention of the political disturbances happened in Tiananmen in 1989 and he also told the history of Tiananmen and told of the things that happened in Tiananmen.

With regard to the political disturbances in 1989, the Chinese people have long drawn a historical conclusion. During my visit to the United States last year and also on many international occasions, I have stated our position that with regard to the political disturbances in 1989, had the Chinese government not taken the resolute measures, then we could not have enjoyed the stability that we are enjoying today.
China is a socialist country in which its people are masters of the nation. The Chinese people can elect their own representatives to the people's congresses through direct or indirect means, and they can fully express their views and exercise their political rights. In the two decades since the reform and opening up program was started, the National People's Congress of China has adopted more than 320 laws and acts; thus, constantly strengthening the legal protection of the democracy, fundamental freedoms, and the various rights enjoyed by the Chinese people. Over the past two decades, another 200 million people in China were lifted out of poverty.

No country's human rights situation is perfect. Since the founding of new China, the fundamental changes and the tremendous achievements that have been achieved, that have been scored in the human rights conditions in China are for all to see.

I'd like to know whether President Clinton will have anything more to add.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I would like to add a comment. First of all, I think this debate and discussion today has been a healthy thing and a good thing. Secondly, I think to understand the priority that each country attaches to its own interpretation of this issue of human rights, you have to understand something of our history.

The Chinese who are here understand better than I the price paid over time at various moments in history for disruption and upheaval in China, so there is an understandable desire to have stability in the country. Every country wants stability.

Our country was founded by people who felt they were abused by royal powers — by people in power, and they wanted to protect their personal liberties by putting limits on government. And they understood — they understood clearly — that any system, because human beings are imperfect, any system can be abused.

So the question for all societies going forward into the 21st century is, which is the better gamble? If you have a lot of personal freedom, some people may abuse it. But if you are so afraid of personal freedom because of the abuse that you limit people's freedom too much, then you pay, I believe, an even greater price in a world where the whole economy is based on ideas and information and exchange and debate, and children everywhere dreaming dreams and feeling they can live their dreams out.

So I am trying to have a dialogue here that will enable both of us to move forward so that the Chinese people will get the best possible result. I believe stability in the 21st century will require high levels of freedom.

PRESIDENT JIANG: I'm sorry, I have to take up an additional five minutes. (Laughter.) So I'd like to say a few words on Dalai Lama. President Clinton is also interested in this question, in Dalai Lama. Actually, since the Dalai Lama left in 1959, earthshaking changes have taken place in Tibet.

First, the system of bureaucracy has forever become bygones. Though it is unfortunate that the disappearance of this bureaucracy was much later than the demise of bureaucracy in Europe before Renaissance. And the more than one million serfs under the rule of the Dalai Lama were liberated. In 1990 when I was in Tibet I went to visit the liberated serfs. And now the system of national autonomy is in practice in Tibet and the people there, they have their Tibetan autonomous region government.

Since I came to work in the central government I have urged the rest of the 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions to assist Tibet in its development — even including those provinces that are not very developed, such as Qinghai Province. So altogether, nearly 8 billion RMB-yuan financial resources were raised and already 62 projects have been completed in Tibet.

MORE
As for the freedom of religious belief, there is fierce* stipulations in our constitution for the protection of religious belief and this also includes in Tibet. And we have also spent a lot of money in renovating the lamasis and temples in Tibet. And we have spent $100 million RMB-yuan and one ton of gold in renovating the Budala Palace.

Just now President Clinton also mentioned the Tibetan issue and the dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Actually, as long as the Dalai Lama can publicly make the statement and a commitment that Tibet is an inalienable part of China and he must also recognize Taiwan as a province of China, then the door to dialogue and negotiation is open. Actually, we are having several channels of communications with the Dalai Lama. So I hope the Dalai Lama will make positive response in this regard.

Finally, I want to emphasize that according to China's constitution, the freedom of religious belief in Tibet, and also throughout China, is protected. But as the President of the People's Republic of China and as a communist member, a member of the communist party, I myself am an atheist. But this will by no means affect my respect for the religious freedom in Tibet.

But still, I have a question. That is, during my visit to the United States last year, and also during my previous visits to other European countries, I found that although the education in science and technology have developed to a very high level, and people are now enjoying modern civilization, but still quite a number of them have a belief in Lamaism. So this is a question that I'm still studying and still looking into. I want to find out the reason why.

I think President Clinton is a strong defender of the American interests and I am a strong defender of the Chinese interests. But despite that, we still can have very friendly exchanges of views and discussions. And I think that is democracy. And I want to stress that, actually, there are a lot of areas in which we can learn from each other.

If you agree, we will finish this. (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree, but I have - you have to let me say one thing about the Dalai Lama. (Laughter.)

First, I agree that Tibet is a part of China, an autonomous region of China. And I can understand why the acknowledgement of that would be a precondition of dialogue with the Dalai Lama. But I also believe that there are many, many Tibetans who still revere the Dalai Lama and view him as their spiritual leader.

President Jiang pointed out that he has a few followers of Tibetan Buddhism, even in the United States and Europe. But most of his followers have not given up their own religious faith. He has followers who are Christians - supporters - excuse me - not followers, supporters - who are Christians, who are Jews, who are Muslims, who believe in the unity of God and who believe he is a holy man.

But, for us, the question is not fundamentally religious; it is political. That is, we believe that other people should have the right to fully practice their religious beliefs, and that if he, in good faith, presents himself on those terms, it is a legitimate thing for China to engage him in dialogue.

And let me say something that will perhaps be unpopular with everyone. I have spent time with the Dalai Lama. I believe him to be an honest man, and I believe if he had a conversation with President Jiang, they would like each other very much. (Laughter and applause.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Beijing, People's Republic of China)

For Immediate Release June 29, 1998

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO STUDENTS AND COMMUNITY OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY

Beijing University
Beijing, People's Republic of China

10:25 A.M. (L)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Thank you. Thank you, President Chen, Chairmen Ren, Vice President Chi, Vice Minister Wei. We are delighted to be here today with a very large American delegation, including the First Lady and our daughter, who is a student at Stanford, one of the schools with which Beijing University has a relationship. We have six members of the United States Congress; the Secretary of State; Secretary of Commerce; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Chairman of our Council of Economic Advisors; Senator Sasser, our Ambassador; the National Security Advisor and my Chief of Staff, among others. I say that to illustrate the importance that the United States places on our relationship with China.

I would like to begin by congratulating all of you, the students, the faculty, the administrators, on celebrating the centennial year of your university. Gongxi, Beida. (Applause.)

As I'm sure all of you know, this campus was once home to Yenching University which was founded by American missionaries. Many of its wonderful buildings were designed by an American architect. Thousands of Americans students and professors have come here to study and teach. We feel a special kinship with you.

I am, however, grateful that this day is different in one important respect from another important occasion 79 years ago. In June of 1919, the first president of Yenching University, John Leighton Stuart, was set to deliver the very first commencement address on these very grounds. At the appointed hour, he appeared, but no students appeared. They were all out leading the May 4th Movement for China's political and cultural renewal. When I read this, I hoped that when I walked into the auditorium today, someone would be sitting here. And I thank you for being here, very much. (Applause.)

Over the last 100 years, this university has grown to more than 20,000 students. Your graduates are spread throughout China and around the world. You have built the largest university library in all of Asia. Last year, 20 percent of your graduates went abroad to study, including half of your math and science majors. And in this anniversary year, more than a million people in China, Asia, and beyond have logged on to your web site. At the dawn of a new century, this university is leading China into the future.

I come here today to talk to you, the next generation of China's leaders, about the critical importance to your future of building a strong partnership between China and the United States.

The American people deeply admire China for its thousands of years of contributions to culture and religion, to philosophy and the arts, to science and technology. We remember well our strong partnership in World War II. Now we see China at a moment in history when your glorious past is watched by your present sweeping transformation and the even greater promise of your future.

Just three decades ago, China was virtually shut off from the
enterprises that affect everything from air travel to agricultural development. You have opened your nation to trade and investment on a large scale. Today, 40,000 young Chinese study in the United States, with hundreds of thousands more learning in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America.

Your social and economic transformation has been even more remarkable, moving from a closed command economic system to a driving, increasingly market-based and driven economy, generating two decades of unprecedented growth, giving people greater freedom to travel within and outside China, to vote in village elections, to own a home, choose a job, attend a better school. As a result you have lifted literally hundreds of millions of people from poverty. Per capita income has more than doubled in the last decade. Most Chinese people are leading lives they could not have imagined just 20 years ago.

Of course, these changes have also brought disruptions in settled patterns of life and work, and have imposed enormous strains on your environment. Once every urban Chinese was guaranteed employment in a state enterprise. Now you must compete in a job market. Once a Chinese worker had only to meet the demands of a central planner in Beijing. Now the global economy means all must match the quality and creativity of the rest of the world. For those who lack the right training and skills and support, this new world can be daunting.

In the short-term, good, hardworking people -- some, at least will find themselves unemployed. And, as all of you can see, there have been enormous environmental and economic and health care costs to the development pattern and the energy use pattern of the last 20 years -- from air pollution to deforestation to acid rain and water shortage.

In the face of these challenges new systems of training and social security will have to be devised, and new environmental policies and technologies will have to be introduced with the goal of growing your economy while improving the environment. Everything I know about the intelligence, the ingenuity, the enterprise of the Chinese people and everything I have heard these last few days in my discussions with President Jiang, Prime Minister Zhu and others give me confidence that you will succeed.

As you build a new China, America wants to build a new relationship with you. We want China to be successful, secure and open, working with us for a more peaceful and prosperous world. I know there are those in China and the United States who question whether closer relations between our countries is a good thing. But everything all of us know about the way the world is changing and the challenges your generation will face tell us that our two nations will be far better off working together than apart.

The late Deng Xiaoping counseled us to seek truth from facts. At the dawn of the new century, the facts are clear. The distance between our two nations, indeed, between any nations, is shrinking. Where once an American clipper ship took months to cross from China to the United States. Today, technology has made us all virtual neighbors. From laptops to lasers, from microchips to megabytes, an information revolution is lighting the landscape of human knowledge, bringing us all closer together. Ideas, information, and money cross the planet at the stroke of a computer key, bringing with them extraordinary opportunities to create wealth, to prevent and conquer disease, to foster greater understanding among peoples of different histories and different cultures.

But we also know that this greater openness and faster change mean that problems which start beyond one nation's borders can quickly move inside them -- the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the threats of organized crime and drug trafficking, of environmental degradation, and severe economic dislocation. No nation can isolate itself from these problems, and no nation can solve them alone. We, especially the younger generations of China and the United States, must make common cause of our common challenges, so that we can, together, shape a new century of brilliant possibilities.

In the 21st century -- your century -- China and the United States will face the challenge of security in Asia. On the Korean Peninsula, where once we were adversaries, today we are working together for a permanent peace and a future freer of nuclear weapons.

On the Indian subcontinent, just as most of the rest of the
world is moving away from nuclear danger, India and Pakistan risk sparking a new arms race. We are now pursuing a common strategy to move India and Pakistan away from further testing and toward a dialogue to resolve their differences.

In the 21st century, your generation must face the challenge of stopping the spread of deadlier nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In the wrong hands or the wrong places, these weapons can threaten the peace of nations large and small. Increasingly, China and the United States agree on the importance of stopping proliferation. That is why we are beginning to act in concert to control the world’s most dangerous weapons.

In the 21st century, your generation will have to reverse the international tide of crime and drugs. Around the world, organized crime robs people of billions of dollars every year and undermines trust in government. America knows all about the devastation and despair that drugs can bring to schools and neighborhoods. With borders on more than a dozen countries, China has become a crossroad for smugglers of all kinds.

Last year, President Jiang and I asked senior Chinese and American law enforcement officials to step up our cooperation against these predators, to stop money from being laundered, to stop aliens from being cruelly smuggled, to stop currencies from being undermined by counterfeiting. Just this month, our drug enforcement agency opened an office in Beijing, and soon Chinese counternarcotics experts will be working out of Washington.

In the 21st century, your generation must make it your mission to ensure that today’s progress does not come at tomorrow’s expense. China’s rise with a toxic cost, pollutants that foul the water you drink and the air you breathe -- the cost is not only environmental, it is also serious in terms of the health consequences of your people and in terms of the drag on economic growth.

Environmental problems are also increasingly global as well as national. For example, in the near future, if present energy use patterns persist, China will overtake the United States as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the gases which are the principal cause of global warming. If the nations of the world do not reduce the gases which are causing global warming, sometime in the next century there is a serious risk of dramatic changes in climate which will change the way we live and the way we work, which could literally bury some island nations under mountains of water and undermine the economic and social fabric of nations.

We must work together. We Americans know from our own experience that it is possible to grow an economy while improving the environment. We must do that together for ourselves and for the world.

Building on the work that our Vice President, Al Gore, has done previously with the Chinese government, President Jiang and I are working together on ways to bring American clean energy technology to help improve air quality and grow the Chinese economy at the same time.

But I will say this again -- this is not on my remarks -- your generation must do more about this. This is a huge challenge for you, for the American people and for the future of the world. And it must be addressed at the university level, because political leaders will never be willing to adopt environmental measures if they believe it will lead to large-scale unemployment or more poverty. The evidence is clear that does not have to happen. You will actually have more rapid economic growth and better paying jobs, leading to higher levels of education and technology if we do this in the proper way. But you and the university, communities in China, the United States and throughout the world will have to lead the way. (Applause.)

In the 21st century your generation must also lead the challenge of an international financial system that has no respect for national borders. When stock markets fall in Hong Kong or Jakarta, the effects are no longer local; they are global. The vibrant growth of your own economy is tied closely, therefore, to the restoration of stability and growth in the Asia Pacific region.

China has steadfastly shouldered its responsibilities to the region and the world in this latest financial crisis -- helping to prevent another cycle of dangerous devaluations. We must continue to work together to counter this threat to the global financial system and to the growth and
In the 21st century, your generation will have a remarkable opportunity to bring together the talents of our scientists, doctors, engineers into a shared quest for progress. Already the breakthroughs we have achieved in our areas of joint cooperation -- in challenges from dealing with spina bifida to dealing with extreme weather conditions and earthquakes -- have proved what we can do together to change the lives of millions of people in China and the United States and around the world. Expanding our cooperation in science and technology can be one of our greatest gifts to the future.

In each of these vital areas that I have mentioned, we can clearly accomplish so much more by walking together rather than standing apart. That is why we should work to see that the productive relationship we now enjoy blossoms into a fuller partnership in the new century.

If that is to happen, it is very important that we understand each other better, that we understand both our common interest and our shared aspirations and our honest differences. I believe the kind of open, direct exchange that President Jiang and I had on Saturday at our press conference -- which I know many of you watched on television -- can both clarify and narrow our differences, and, more importantly, by allowing people to understand and debate and discuss these things can give a greater sense of confidence to our people that we can make a better future.

From the windows of the White House, where I live in Washington, D.C., the monument to our first President, George Washington, dominates the skyline. It is a very tall obelisk. But very near this large monument there is a small stone which contains these words: The United States neither established titles of nobility and royalty, nor created a hereditary system. State affairs are put to the vote of public opinion.

This created a new political situation, unprecedented from ancient times to the present. How wonderful it is. Those words were not written by an American. They were written by Xu Jiyu, governor of Fujian Province, inscribed as a gift from the government of China to our nation in 1853.

I am very grateful for that gift from China. It goes to the heart of who we are as a people -- the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the freedom to debate, to dissent, to associate, to worship without interference from the state. These are the ideals that were at the core of our founding over 220 years ago. These are the ideas that led us across our continent and onto the world stage. These are the ideals that Americans cherish today.

As I said in my press conference with President Jiang, we have an ongoing quest ourselves to live up to those ideals. The people who framed our Constitution understood that we would never achieve perfection. They said that the mission of America would always be "to form a more perfect union" -- in other words, that we would never be perfect, but we had to keep trying to do better.

The darkest moments in our history have come when we abandoned the effort to do better, when we denied freedom to our people because of their race or their religion, because there were new immigrants or because they held unpopular opinions. The best moments in our history have come when we protected the freedom of people who held unpopular opinion, or extended rights enjoyed by the many to the few who had previously been denied them, making, therefore, the promises of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution more than faded words on old parchment.

Today we do not seek to impose our vision on others, but we are convinced that certain rights are universal -- not American rights or European rights or rights for developed nations, but the birthrights of people everywhere, now enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights -- the right to be treated with dignity; the right to express one's opinions, to choose one's own leaders, to associate freely with others, and to worship, or not, freely, however one chooses.

In the last letter of his life, the author of our Declaration of Independence and our third President, Thomas Jefferson, said then that "all eyes are opening to the rights of man." I believe that in this time, at long
last, 172 years after Jefferson wrote those words, all eyes are opening to the
rights of men and women everywhere.

Over the past two decades, a rising tide of freedom has lifted
the lives of millions around the world, sweeping away failed dictatorial
systems in the Former Soviet Union, throughout Central Europe; ending a
vicious cycle of military coups and civil wars in Latin America; giving more
people in Africa the chance to make the most of their hard-won independence.
And from the Philippines to South Korea, from Thailand to Mongolia, freedom
has reached Asia's shores, powering a surge of growth and productivity.

Economic security also can be an essential element of freedom.
It is recognized in the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights. In China, you have made extraordinary strides in nurturing
that liberty, and spreading freedom from want, to be a source of strength to
your people. Incomes are up, poverty is down; people do have more choices of
jobs, and the ability to travel -- the ability to make a better life. But
true freedom includes more than economic freedom. In America, we believe it
is a concept which is indivisible.

Over the past four days, I have seen freedom in many
manifestations in China. I have seen the fresh shoots of democracy growing in
the villages of your heartland. I have visited a village that chose its own
leaders in free elections. I have also seen the cell phones, the video
players, the fax machines carrying ideas, information and images from all over
the world. I've heard people speak their minds and I have joined people in
prayer in the faith of my own choosing. In all these ways I felt a steady
breeze of freedom.

The question is, where do we go from here? How do we work
together to be on the right side of history together? More than 50 years ago, Hu Shi, one of your great political thinkers and a teacher at this university,
said these words: "Now some people say to me you must sacrifice your
individual freedom so that the nation may be free. But I reply, the struggle
for individual freedom is the struggle for the nation's freedom. The struggle
for your own character is the struggle for the nation's character."

We Americans believe Hu Shi was right. We believe and our
experience demonstrates that freedom strengthens stability and helps nations
to change.

One of our founding fathers, Benjamin Franklin, once said,
"Our critics are our friends, for they show us our faults." Now, if that is
true, there are many days in the United States when the President has more
friends than anyone else in America. (Laughter.) But it is so.

In the world we live in, this global information age, constant
improvement and change is necessary to economic opportunity and to national
strength. Therefore, the freest possible flow of information, ideas, and
opinions, and a greater respect for divergent political and religious
convictions will actually breed strength and stability going forward.

It is, therefore, profoundly in your interest, and the
world's, that young Chinese minds be free to reach the fullness of their
potential. That is the message of our time and the mandate of the new century
and the new millennium.

I hope China will more fully embrace this mandate. For all
the grandeur of your history, I believe your greatest days are still ahead.
Against great odds in the 20th century China has not only survived, it is
moving forward dramatically.

Other ancient cultures failed because they failed to change.
China has constantly proven the capacity to change and grow. Now, you must
re-imagine China again for a new century, and your generation must be at the
heart of China's regeneration.

The new century is upon us. All our sights are turned toward
the future. Now your country has known more millennia than the United States
has known centuries. Today, however, China is as young as any nation on
Earth. This new century can be the dawn of a new China, proud of your ancient
greatness, proud of what you are doing, prouder still of the tomorrows to
come. It can be a time when the world again looks to China for the vigor of
its culture, the freshness of its thinking, the eloquence of its
that is apparent in its works. It can be a time when the oldest of nations helps to make a new world.

The United States wants to work with you to make that time a reality.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

Q Mr. President, I'm very honored to be the first one to raise question. Just as you mentioned in your address, Chinese and American people should join hands and move forward together. And what is most important in this process is for us to have more exchanges.

In our view, since China is opening up in reform, we have had better understanding of the culture, history, and literature of America, and we have also learned a lot about you from the biography. And we have also learned about a lot of American Presidents. And we have also seen the movie, Titanic.

But it seems that the American people's understanding of the Chinese people is not as much as the other way around. Maybe they are only seeing China through several movies, describing the Cultural Revolution or the rural life.

So my question is, as the first President of the United States visiting China in 10 years, what do you plan to do to enhance the real understanding and the respect between our two peoples? Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I think that's a very good point. And one of the reasons that I came here was to try to -- because, as you can see, a few people come with me from the news media -- I hope that my trip would help to show a full and balanced picture of modern China to the United States, and that by coming here, it would encourage others to come here and others to participate in the life of China.

I see a young man out in the audience who introduced himself to me yesterday as the first American ever to be a law student in China. So I hope we will have many more Americans coming here to study, many more Americans coming here to do business. The First Lady this morning and the Secretary of State had a meeting on a legal project. We are doing a lot of projects together with the Chinese to help promote the rule of law. That should bring a lot more people here.

I think there is no easy answer to your question. It's something we have to work at. We just need more people involved and more kinds of contacts. And I think the more we can do that, the better.

Is there a another question?

Q Mr. President, as a Chinese, I'm very interested in the reunification of my motherland. Since 1972, progress has been made on the question of Taiwan question, but we have seen that the Americans repeatedly are selling advanced weapons to Taiwan. And to our great indignation, we have seen that the United States and Japan have renewed the U.S.-Japan security treaty. And according to some Japanese officials, this treaty even includes Taiwan Province of China. So I have to ask, if China were to send its NATO missile to Hawaii, and if China were to sign a security treaty with other countries against one part of the United States, will the United States agree to such an act; will the American people agree to such an act? (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, the United States policy is not an obstacle to the peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan. Our policy is embodied in the three communiques and in the Taiwan Relations Act. Our country recognized China and embraced a one China policy almost 20 years ago. And I reaffirmed our one China policy to President Jiang in our meetings.

Now, when the United States and China reached agreement that we would have a one China policy, we also reached agreement that the reunification would occur by peaceful means, and we have encouraged the cross-str therefor, to Taiwan must be for defensive purposes only, and that the country must not believe -- China must not believe that we are in any way trying to undermine our own one China policy. It is our policy. But we do believe it should occur -- any reunification should occur peacefully.

Now, on Japan, if you read the security agreement we signed
with Japan, I think it will be clear from its terms that the agreement is not directed against any country, but rather in support of stability in Asia. We have forces in South Korea that are designed to deter a resumption of the Korean War across the dividing line between the two Koreas. Our forces in Japan are largely designed to help us promote stability anywhere in the Asian Pacific region on short notice. But I believe that it is not fair to say that either Japan or the United States have a security relationship that is designed to contain China. Indeed, what both countries want is a security partnership with China for the 21st century.

For example, you mentioned NATO -- we have expanded NATO in Europe, but we also have made a treaty, an agreement between NATO and Russia, to prove that we are not against Russia anymore. And the most important thing NATO has done in the last five years is to work side by side with Russia to end the war in Bosnia. And I predict to you that what you see us doing with China now, working together to try to limit the tension from the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear tests, you will see more and more and more of that in the future. And I think you will see a lot of security cooperation in that area. And we can't see the agreements of today through the mirror of yesterday's conflicts.

Q Mr. President, I've very glad to have this opportunity to ask you a question. With a friendly smile you have set foot on the soil of China and you have come to the campus of Beida, so we are very excited and honored by your presence, for the Chinese people really aspire for the friendship between China and the United States on the basis of equality. As I know that before your departure from the States, you said that the reason for you to visit China is because China is too important and engagement is better than containment.

I'd like to ask you whether this sentence is kind of a commitment you made for your visit or do you have any other hidden sayings behind this smile. Do you have any other design to contain China? (Laughter and applause).

THE PRESIDENT: If I did, I wouldn't mask it behind a smile. (Laughter.) But I don't. That is, my words mean exactly what they say. We have to make a decision -- all of us do, but especially the people who live in large nations with great influence must decide how to define their greatness.

When the Soviet Union went away, Russia had to decide how to define its greatness. Would they attempt to develop the human capacity of the Russian people and work in partnership with their neighbors for a greater future, or would they remember the bad things the happened to them in the past 200 years and think the only way they could be great would be to dominate their neighbors militarily? They chose a forward course. The world is a better place.

The same thing is true with China. You will decide both in terms of your policies within your country and beyond, what does it mean that China will be a great power in the 21st century? Does it mean that you will have enormous economic success? Does it mean you will have enormous cultural influence? Does it mean that you will be able to play a large role in solving the problems of the world? Or does it mean you will be able to dominate your neighbors in some form or fashion, whether they like it or not? This is the decision that every great country has to make.

You ask me, do I really want to contain China? The answer is no. The American people have always had a very warm feeling toward China that has been interrupted from time to time when we have had problems. But if you go back through the history of our country, there's always been a feeling on the part of our people that we ought to be close to the Chinese people. And I believe that it would be far better for the people of the United States to have a partnership on equal, respectful terms with China in the 21st century than to have to spend enormous amounts of time and money trying to contain China because we disagree with what's going on beyond our borders. So I do not want that. I want a partnership. I'm not hiding another design behind a smile, it's what I really believe. (Applause.)

Because I think it's good for the American people and it's my job to do what's good for them. What's good for them is to have a good relationship with you.
going to work in Bank of China. Just now, Mr. President, you mentioned the responsibilities of the young generation of the two countries for international security, environment, and the financial stability. I think they are really important. And I think the most important thing is for the young people to be well educated. And I know, Mr. President, you love your daughter very much, and she is now studying at Stanford. So, my question is, several years ago you proposed the concept of knowledge economy -- so, my first question is, what do you think the education of higher learning, what kind of role can this play in the future knowledge economy?

And the second question is, what expectations do you have, Mr. President, for the younger generation of our two countries?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me answer the knowledge economy question first. And let me answer by telling you what I have tried to do in the United States. I have tried to create a situation in America in which the doors of universities and colleges are open to every young person who has sufficient academic achievement to get in, that there are no financial burdens of any kind. And we have not completely achieved it, but we have made a great deal of progress.

Now, why would I do that? Because I believe that the more advanced an economy becomes, the more important it is to have a higher and higher and higher percentage of people with a university education. Let me just tell you how important it is in the United States. We count our people -- everyone and we get all kinds of information on them. In the 1990 Census, younger Americans who had a college degree were overwhelmingly likely to get good jobs and have their incomes grow. Younger Americans who had two years or more of university were likely to get good jobs and have their incomes grow. Younger Americans who didn't go to university at all were likely to get jobs where their incomes declined and were much more likely to be unemployed.

And the more advanced China's economy becomes, the more that will be true of China -- the more you will need very large numbers of people getting university education and technical education. So I think it is very, very important.

Now, let me say one expectation I have for the younger generation of Americans and Chinese that has nothing to do with economics. One of the biggest threats to your future is a world which is dominated not by modern problems, but by ancient hatreds. Look around the world and see how much trouble is being caused by people who dislike each other because of their racial or their religious or their ethnic differences -- whether it's in Bosnia, or the conflict between the Indians and the Pakistanis, or in the Middle East or the tribal continents in Africa.

You look all over the world, you see these kind of problems. Young people are more open to others who are different, more interested in people who are different. And I hope young people in China and young people in America that have a good education will be a strong voice in the world against giving in to this sort of hating people or looking down on them simply because they're different.

Thank you. (Applause.)

Q Mr. President, with regard to the question of democracy, human rights and freedom, actually this is an issue of great interest to both the Chinese and American peoples. But, to be honest, our two countries have some differences over these issues. In your address just now you made a very proud review and retrospection of the history of the American democracy in human rights. And you have also made some suggestions for China. Of course, for the sincere suggestions, we welcome. But I think I recall one saying, that is we should have both criticism and self-criticism.

So now I'd like to ask you a question. Do you think that in the United States today, there are also some problems in the area of democracy, freedom, and human rights, and what your government has done in improving the situation? (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: I do, and, first of all, let me say, I never raise this question overseas in any country, not just China, without acknowledging first, that our country has had terrible problems in this area -- we will not perfect. I always say that, because I don't think it's right for any person to claim that he or she lives in a perfect country. We're all
struggling toward ideals to live a better life. So I agree with the general point you made.

Now, I will give you two examples. We still have some instances of discrimination in America -- in housing or employment or other areas based on race. And we have a system set up to deal with it, but we have not totally eliminated it. And in the last year, I have been engaging the American people in a conversation on this subject, and we have tried to identify the things that government should do, the things that the American people should do either through the local government or through other organizations, and the attitudes that should change the minds and hearts of the American people. So that's one example.

Now, let me give you another example. We have -- when I ran for President in 1992, I was in a hotel in New York City, and an American immigrant from Greece came up to me and he said, my son is 10 years old and he studies the election in school and he says I should vote for you. But he said, if I vote for you, I want you to make my son free, because my son is not really free. So I asked this man, what do you mean? And he said, well, the crime is so high in my neighborhood, there are so many guns and gangs that my son does not feel that he -- I can't let him walk to school by himself, or go across the street to play in the park. So if I vote for you, I want you to make my son free.

I think that's important, because, you see, in America, we tend to view freedom as the freedom from government abuse or from government control. That is our heritage. Our founders came here to escape the monarchy in England. But sometimes freedom requires affirmative steps by government to give everyone an equal opportunity to have an education and make a decent living and to preserve a lawful environment. So I work very hard to try to bring the crime rate down in America, and it's now lower than it has been at any time in 25 years, which means that more of our children are free. But the crime rate is still high; there is still too much violence.

So we Americans need to be sensitive not only to preserve the freedoms that we hold dear, but also to create an environment in which people can build a truly good and free life.

That's a good question. (Applause.)

Q Mr. President, you are warmly welcome to Beida. You mentioned a sentence by Mr. Xu Jiyu, but our former president once said that when the great moral is in practice, the morals, they will not contradict each other. And I don't think the individual freedom and the collective freedom will contradict each other. But in China the prosperous development of the nation is actually the free choice of our people, and it's also the result of their efforts. So I think that freedom, real freedom, should mean for the people to freely choose the way of life they like and also to develop. And I also think that only those who can really respect the freedom of others can really say that they understand what freedom means. (Applause.)

I don't know whether you agree with me or not.

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, if you believe in freedom, you have to respect the freedom of others to make another choice. And even societies that have rather radical views of individual freedom recognize limits on that freedom when it interferes with preserving other people's rights.

For example, there's one of our famous court cases which says we have freedom of speech, but no one should be free to shout the word "fire" in a crowded movie theatre where there is no fire, and cause people to stampede over each other. There's another famous court decision that says my freedom ends where the other person's nose begins, meaning that you don't have the freedom to hit someone else.

So I agree with that. People have the freedom to choose and you have to respect other people's freedom and they have the right to make decisions that are different from yours. And there will never be a time when our systems and our cultures and our choices will be completely identical. That's one of the things that makes life interesting.
ask, apart from your personal contribution to the United States, what other factors do you think important for the success of the U.S. economy? Maybe they can serve as good reference for China.

The second question is, when President Jiang Zemin visited Harvard University last year, there were a lot of students outside the hall demonstrating, so I'd like you, Mr. President, if you are in Beijing University, and if there were a lot of students outside protesting and demonstrating, what feeling would you have?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, on the United States economy, I believe that the principal role of government policy since I've been President was to, first of all, get our big government deficit -- we had a huge annual deficit in spending -- we got that under control. We're about to have the first balanced budget in 30 years. That drove interest rates down and freed up a lot of money to be invested in creating jobs in the private sector. Then the second thing we did was to expand trade a lot, so we began to sell a lot more around the world than we had before. And the third thing we did was to attempt to invest more in our people, -- in research, development, technology, and education.

Now, in addition to that, however, a lot of the credit here goes to the American people themselves. We have a very sophisticated business community; they were investing money in new technologies and in new markets and in training people. We have an environment where it's quite easy for people to start a business, and perhaps this is the area that might be most helpful to China.

I know that my wife has done a lot of work around the world in villages, trying to get credit to villagers so they could borrow money to start their own businesses, to try to take advantage of some skill they have. And we have seen this system work even in the poorest places in Africa and Latin America, where opportunity takes off.

So we have tried to make it easy in America for people to start a business, to expand a business, and to do business. And then we have also tried very, very hard to get new opportunities into areas where there were none before. And all these things together -- but especially, I give most of the credit to the people of my country. After all, a person in my position, we're supposed to have correct policies so that we create a framework within which the American people then create the future. And I think that is basically what has happened.

Now, you asked me an interesting question. Actually, I have been demonstrated against quite a lot in the United States. I told President Jiang when he was there, I was glad they demonstrated against him, so I didn't feel so lonely. (Laughter and applause.)

I'll give you a serious answer. If there were a lot of people demonstrating against me outside, suppose they were demonstrating over the question that the first gentleman asked me. Suppose they said, oh, President Clinton is trying to interfere with the peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan, and he shouldn't be selling them any weapons whatever. Well, I would try to find out what they were demonstrating against and then I would ask my host if they minded if I would go over and talk to them, or if they would mind if one or two people from the group of demonstrators could be brought to see me and they could say what is on their minds, and I could answer.

Remember what I said before about what Benjamin Franklin said -- our critics are our friends, for they show us our faults. You have asked me some very good questions today that have an element of criticism in them. They have been very helpful to me. They have helped me to understand how what I say is perceived by others -- not just in China, but around the world. They have helped me to focus on what I can do to be a more effective President for my people and for the things we believe in.

And so I feel very good that we have had this interchange. And from my point of view, the questions were far more important than my speech -- I never learn anything when I'm talking, I only learn things when I'm listening.

Thank you very much. Thank you. (Applause.)
LESSON PLAN
“Regarding the Problem of Newborn Piglets in Winter” by Chen Rong
Nancy Gannon

Objective: Students will work in groups to analyze Chen Rong’s story, focusing specifically on characterization, structure, and language.

Materials: Chen Rong’s story (from Other Voices, Other Visions, B. H. Solomon, ed.), three worksheets (attached).

Procedure:
- Students should read the story at home the night before class. They should have written a paragraph discussing their ideas on the theme of the short story.
- Students should be divided into six groups at the beginning of class. Each group should get one of the topics, so that each of the three topics is being covered by two groups (giving room to compare answers later in class).
- Students should have about twenty minutes in class to discuss the story and to answer the questions on their topic. They should discuss amongst themselves and find specific examples in the text to support any answers they give. They should be prepared to share their answers and their quotes.
- At the end of class, each group should report back to the rest of the class. The two groups that shared the same topic can discuss their different answers (if any) and the rest of the class can give input agreeing or disagreeing.

Closure: After the class has examined the specifics of characterization, structure, and language in the story, they should come back together to talk about what they thought the theme of the story was. How do these three literary elements further that theme?

Note: If students are interested in going further, they can be directed to Zhang Yimou’s film, “The Story of Qiu Ju” or Ha Jin’s book, In the Pond.
STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND TONE
"Regarding the Problem of Newborn Piglets in Winter" by Chen Rong

In your group, look at Chen Rong’s use of language, both within the dialogue and outside of it. Find examples to illustrate the different techniques she uses to further the story. Use the guidelines below as a starting point, but feel free to add other points.

HYPERBOLE

DIALOGUE

IRONY

HUMOR

DRAMATIC CONTRAST

OTHER

Final Analysis: What is the result of Chen Rong’s different uses of language? What is the final tone of the story?
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
“Regarding the Problem of Newborn Piglets in Winter” by Chen Rong

In your group, think about and discuss the way that Chen Rong structures the story. Look at the way each section of the story works on its own and in conjunction with the rest of the story. Answer the questions below.

1. Why does she not use a linear storyline? What is the benefit of sections?

2. What is the purpose of the subtitles? How do they work with the story? What is the tone of the subtitles within the narrative and outside the narrative?

3. How does each section contrast with the one directly preceding it? What effect do the sections have on each other?

Final Analysis: On the back, explain what effect Chen Rong is ultimately seeking and how the structure of her story furthers that effect.
CHARACTERIZATION STUDY
"Regarding the Problem of Newborn Piglets in Winter" by Chen Rong

In your group, look back in the story and find how Chen Rong uses characterization to develop the story and ultimately make her point. Find specific examples that illustrate the development of each of the characters. Think about and discuss the way the character looks, talks, reacts to others, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Character</th>
<th>Physical Characteristics</th>
<th>Other Characteristics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Dingfan</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Chief Jiao</td>
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<td>Ma Mingpeng</td>
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<td>Secretary Shen</td>
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<td>Grandpa Cao</td>
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<td>Xu Quan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mammy Guo</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Final Analysis: On the back, explain what the purpose is in the characters differences and the progression from first to final character.
know about the kite too, do you? Do you know about the streamers hanging from that kite?"

"Why, of course. How could I not?"

Susu ran back to embrace him and kissed him right there in the street. Then they each headed home, turning frequently, as the distance between them grew, to wave to one another.

_Translated by Lu Binghong_

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**Chen Rong**

(b. 1935)

Born in Hankow, the daughter of a judge, Chen Rong (sometimes translated as Shen Rong) left school at the age of fifteen to become a salesgirl in a bookshop after the 1949 Revolution. In 1952 she joined the staff of the *Southwest Workers' Daily* in Chonquig, and two years later she moved to Beijing in order to study Russian. Her work there as a translator at the radio station was cut short when, because of poor health, she moved to Shanxi to live with a peasant family. Having returned to Beijing in 1964, she began writing plays and novels. In a country that practices strict censorship, she continues to write fiction that is critical of governmental oppression. A member of the Chinese Writers' Association, she published “At Middle Age” in 1980, translated and published in *Seven Contemporary Chinese Women Writers* (Panda Books, 1982). This novella achieved wide recognition in China for its honest and realistic depiction of a dedicated eye surgeon, a married woman who leads a frugal and stressful life. She lives in the single small room the authorities have assigned to her, her husband, and their two small children. In spite of the fact that she does her best, working diligently at the hospital as well as at home where she is responsible for housework and child care, she experiences guilt, fearing that she is not a good wife and mother. The film *At Middle Age*, based on the novella and directed by Wang Qimin, won China's Best Film Award for 1983. While Rong's short stories frequently explore tense family situations, her fiction often takes a comic turn. Stories such as "Ten Years Deducted" and "Regarding the Problem of Newborn Piglets in Winter" (reprinted here) ridicule the absurd directives of the communist bureaucracy.
REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF NEWBORN PIGLETS IN WINTER

1. "H'mm, have you considered . . . ?"

"Silent is the night over the military harbor . . ." On the color television screen gleamed the graceful white figure of Su Xiaoming singing in her low soft voice.

"Grandma, turn it louder," the six-year-old Babe issued a command from the large soft couch she was sprawled on.

"Loud enough!" Grandma nevertheless walked over and turned the volume up slightly.

Babe suddenly jumped up and knelt on the couch. "Grandpa, can you hear?" she cried over the back of the couch.

"Don't yell. Grandpa's resting."

"Let our sailors sleep in peace . . ." the song went on.

So Grandpa slept on.

Zhang Dingfan was resting; his eyes closed, his gray hair pillowed against the sofa back and his arm limp on the armrest. After a day's hard work his wrecked nerves found repose in the lull of his own snoring.

Suddenly, a wind blew up outside and the door and the window rattled. The green velveteen curtain gave a stir.

Zhang Dingfan turned his head and uttered a sound barely audible, "H'mm."

Madam Zhang, wife of the Secretary, rose to her feet and walked over to the door and the window for a quick inspection. Both were tightly shut. Then she touched the heater; it was toasty warm. Everything seemed to be in order so she fetched a light wool blanket from the bedroom and walked toward the Secretary. Just as she was about to cover him with the blanket, Zhang Dingfan sat up with a jerk and stopped her. He turned his face toward the door and called, "Little You."

Madam Zhang, startled for a second, piped up in unison, "Mr. You, Mr. You."

In reply, a young man in his thirties came in from the anteroom.

"Get me Chief Jiao of Agriculture and Forestry."

Mr. You stepped lightly toward the table in the corner. He turned the lamp on and dialed the telephone. After he was connected to the right party, he raised the receiver, turned round and said, "Comrade Dingfan."

Zhang Dingfan rose slowly and walked toward the telephone. He seated himself in a chair before he took the receiver in his hand.

"It's me," he coughed. "Looks like it's getting colder. H'mm . . ."

Quickly, Madam Zhang turned the volume of the television set to the lowest. Poor Su Xiaoming suddenly became mute, her red lips gaping and closing soundlessly.

"Grandma, I can't hear, I can't hear," Babe protested.

"Don't fuss, Grandpa is working."

"Work is sacred; Babe stopped shouting."

"H'mm, have you considered—this sudden change in temperature and the problem of piglets in the winter—h'mm, we'd better do something. No, no, not by memorandum. First, notify every district in the county by telephone. Proceed level by level this very night. Don't let any piglet die from the cold. Then you may follow up by memorandum. Work on the draft right away."

He hung up the telephone, "These people, just like counters on an abacus—they only move when you give them a push. How can we ever achieve the Four Modernizations?"

"All right—it's all right now that you've alerted them," Madam Zhang comforted him.

"Grandma," Babe couldn't wait any longer.

The volume was once again adjusted. The singer had disappeared. With the tinkling of electronic music and sudden pop, eight modernized angels in their white tight-fitting costumes emerged on the color screen, dancing and twisting their slender waists.

"No, no, I want Su Xiaoming," Babe demanded, rolling in the sofa and kicking her feet in the air.

Zhang Dingfan bent down to pat his granddaughter's head and said cheerfully, "Why not this? The melody of youth. Very nice."
2. "We'll have wonton tonight."

Every light was burning in Chief Jiao's office, the Municipal Department of Agriculture and Forestry.

The young cadre had just finished a memorandum: "Regarding the Problem of Newborn Piglets in Winter" which he had been working on all evening. Now he was presenting it to the Chief for approval.

"No good, don't write this way." Chief Jiao quickly looked over the document and threw it on the desk. "Now, in writing a memorandum, you must avoid empty, boastful and irrelevant expressions."

He picked up the manuscript again and pointed at it, "Look here, `After the winter solstice comes the Prelude of Cold,' who doesn't know that? And here, `The development of a pig farm is a matter of great importance in promoting food production, supplies of meat to urban people, and reserve funds for the Four Modernizations of our country.' This is empty talk. Needless to say, more pigs means more money and more food. You have to use your brains to draft a memorandum."

The young cadre was totally lost—staring, wordless. "Come here, sit down. Let's discuss this. A few concrete suggestions should make this memo more practical."

Burning the midnight oil was Chief Jiao's forte. He arose from his seat vigorously, while the young cadre sat down and opened his notebook.

"Regarding newborn piglets in winter—the first problem is to protect them from the cold. Isn't that right? The condition of winterization, in general, is not sufficient. Some pig farms are equipped with straw mats and curtains etc., but most are without even this minimum protection. Such conditions are contradictory to the objective of protecting newborn piglets. So the first and most important issue here is adequate winterization, and toward that end we must adopt every feasible and effective means." Chief Jiao rambled on, pacing the floor to and fro. He rolled his eyes and thought of more to say:

"The problem of piglets in the winter is mainly that of cold and hunger. Cold is an external cause, whereas hunger, an internal one—insufficient feeding will cause decline in body temperature, which in turn will cause decrease in resistance. Therefore, the second point is to keep the little piglets well fed. That's right. Be sure to include this point—increase the proportion of dietary nutrition in pigs' feed."

Chief Jiao made sure that the young cadre had jotted down what he had just said before he came to the third point:

"Furthermore, include the disease prevention. By the way, what is the most common disease that threatens pigs in the winter? As I remember we issued a special memo to that effect last time. You may repeat it here: how to prevent the premature death of newborn piglets."

Chief Jiao walked over to the file bureau, opened the door and gleefully produced a document, "Here is a good paragraph you may copy from: 'Report promptly any case of illness to the local Veterinary Disease Prevention Division. Meantime, take proper measures in treating the infected pig, in accordance with the rules and regulations currently in effect. In case of failure to report, a severe measure of action will be taken and the rule of accountability applies to all.' Add something to the effect that it is important to carry out the objective of prevention."

"With an ache in his writing hand and a sense of relief in his heart, the young cadre peered at the Chief's thick babbling lips and could not help admiring him. "The fourth point, emphasize the importance of political enlightenment. I need not provide you with the exact wording here. Also mention the material reward. You know that helps. Now, how many points do we have now? Four? H'mm . . . ."

Chief Jiao stopped pacing the floor. The young cadre closed his notebook.

"Wait a minute. Last but not least: each level of the Party Committee should take the initiative by establishing the NEWBORN-PIGLETS-IN-THE-WINTER LEADERSHIP GROUP. Designate an assistant secretary to be in charge. Each related department should share the work responsibility. United we fight the problem. Report and follow up at regular intervals, and so on."

The young cadre bent down his head and wrote swiftly. One could hear the sound of his ball-point pen scratching the paper.
Chief Jiao stretched himself and heaved a deep breath. "That's fine, now just add a little effort on your part. A bit of polishing up will do." He looked at his watch. Eleven o'clock. "Let's go," he said while locking the desk drawer. "Time for our midnight snack. We'll have wonton tonight."

3. "There'll be words aplenty at a memorial service."

The cigarette butts piled up like a mound inside the ashtray. A ring of ashes scattered around it. The smoke, rising steadily from the tray, swirled around the room like a fog, dense and gray. Ma Mingpeng, the Secretary of the County Committee—like a fog, dense and gray, Ma Mingpeng rolled his eyes procedurally. One after another turned up in his mind which he issued over the telephone as rapidly as an electronic computer. "First, adopt appropriate measures. Second, pass it on to the memorandum from the Committee. Third, notify the Regular Committee to add more agenda on Thursday's meeting—the problem of piglets in the winter. Fourth, request the people from the Cattle Office to draft a supplementary notice based on the ideas of the City Committee and present it for further discussion at the regular meeting. Fifth, ask the Cattle Office to send someone over to inspect and collect material for a further report. A report to the City Committee should be scheduled in a few days."

Putting the receiver down, Ma Mingpeng touched his temple with his smoke-stained fingers and closed his eyes.

"All these years, what am I? How could I justify myself to the people? Secretary Ma, just think one day I might drop dead and not even a memorial service in my honor."

Ma Mingpeng opened his eyes and said with a half smile, "Rest assured Comrade, there'll be words aplenty in a memorial service."

"That's what you think. Well, I know old comrades like you are dedicated to the Revolution, not your own interests. But what could I do? You were already a cadre before the Cultural Revolution. The authorities don't have to place you in a proper position. Comrade, don't worry..." He said while looking at the desk drawer. "Time for our midnight snack. We'll have wonton tonight."

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Chen Rong

Regarding the Problem of Newborn Piglets in Winter 187

"That's fine, now just add a little effort on your part—like a fog, dense and gray. "How can I help it? I'm reaching sixty."

The telephone rang. Ma Mingpeng picked up the receiver. "What? Emergency notice from the City Committee—piglets in the winter. Eh... well, very well.

via Telephone...

...Er... well, very well...

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4. "The peasants, they can't live without a son."

"It's getting late. I say, let's call it a day. I've made up my mind today not to waste any more electricity. Go to bed early."

In the Commune Conference Room, the fire in the fireplace had been out for a long time. Light from the smoking pipes and hand-rolled cigarettes flickered now and then and made the room cozy and seemingly warmer. Shen Guigeng, the Secretary of the Commune, was conferring with the cadres from the Production Group and Political Group.

"How many working units did you say have joined the System of Contract and Accountability? The Production Group reported fifty-seven units, which I think is a blown-up figure. Nowadays the emphasis is on truthful reports. We don't need to pad the figure."

No one said anything. The Production Group Leader made a mark on his papers.

"The Safety Training Class for truck drivers will begin day after tomorrow. But the majority of units have not yet handed in the enrollment list. This calls for our immediate attention. Three people died from accidents in one month. It's a matter of life and death, not to be overlooked. Will you, Chief Yu, take charge of this matter? Send someone to check tomorrow. Those drivers know nothing about safety regulations and some don't even have a driver's license. They race down the street like mad men. If we don't do something, our commune will soon become notorious."

Secretary Shen rubbed his bloodshot eyes and changed the subject to a few "trivial matters" such as forthcoming visitors to the commune. He then turned to ask the committee members, "Is there anything you wish to say?"

The plump Big Sister Gu, a member from Planned Parenthood, asked, "What are we to do when we report to the County Committee about the enforced birthrate? The goal is set for an increase of eight out of one thousand, but ours is way over eighteen."

"That's no good. Planned Parenthood should be enforced. One more is too much."

"I know, but we can't make them do it. Our people from Planned Parenthood and doctors from the Public Health, they all dread going to the country. People point at their backs and curse them for doing such wicked things. Young wives scamper at the very sight of our white uniforms. The other day some woman hid in the closet for half a day, nearly died of suffocation."

"You should enlighten the masses."

"Enlighten them! How do you enlighten them? You just go and try. The peasants will tell you—without a son who would paint the house for me in the spring, harvest the grain for me in the autumn? These days, with the new bonus system, more labor means more money. Where would you be without manpower? They don't care if you restrict their rations, they want their son."

Secretary Shen sighed, "Ai, quite so. The peasants, they can't live without a son."

"What do you suggest we should do?"

"What to do, that's up to you. Why should we have Planned Parenthood if you ask me?"

Secretary Shen stood up, which meant the meeting was over. The roomful of people stretched and yawned and shuffled their respective chairs and stools. One after another they got up. At this moment Little Wang, the cadre of the Commune Office, entered the room.

"Secretary Shen, emergency telephone call from the County."

"Wait. Don't leave yet." Secretary Shen took the message from the cadre and looked at it. Then he said to Little Wang, "Telephone every group right away. Make sure they don't let any piglets die. Notify all of them tonight. If there is no answer by phone, you'll have to run over there. Every notice must be sent out before dawn."

Little Wang left. The roomful of people looked at one another and wondered why on earth the problem of piglets should become such a crisis.

"The County Committee telephoned to convey the message from the City Committee that we must deal with this issue of piglets in winter," Secretary Shen said as he seated himself again in his chair. "We'll have to discuss this problem and consume more electricity tonight. Let's see, all of you from the Production Group stay behind."
5. "Those city girls . . ."

The television program had already finished some time ago but a few youngsters still remained in the office. They were talking, eating watermelon seeds and teasing Grandpa Cao.

"Hi, you, lift your feet, stop throwing seeds on the floor, don’t you see I’m sweeping behind you as fast as I can?"

Grandpa Cao, holding a big broom, was sweeping the floor which was strewn with cigarette butts, watermelon seeds and dust. Panting hard, he looked fierce, as though he was about to chase them out.

"Ya. This is our Group, not your home," a youngster answered back.

"What? As long as I’m paid for doing the job, I’m in charge here. Hey, move your butt over to the fireplace, will you?"

The youngster swaggered over to the fireplace and spat out a few more watermelon seeds, "What do you know? Grandpa Cao is in charge here. Looking after a fourteen-inch black and white television set so he can just sit and watch it all day long."

"I watch television!" Grandpa Cao scoffed and glared.

"Pooh, what a disgrace. Nowadays, good-looking girls strip themselves half naked. That’s the kind of fashion for you. I bet those city girls wear no pants. If I had a daughter who exposes herself like that, I’d break her neck."

The youngsters cracked up so hard that they almost fell over.

"What’s so funny? None of you has a streak of decency left. You all want to follow the ways of those city slickers."

"You’re right. If I get a job in the city, what I’ll do first is buy myself a pair of bell-bottomed jeans and a pair of sandals. Then I’ll wear my hair long and put on a pair of toad-like dark glasses. When I come to see you, Grandpa Cao, you won’t even recognize me."

"You, I could recognize you even if you were burned to ashes! You good-for-nothing."

"Ah, you’re as good as treasures from an excavation."

6. "For the sake of the extra five dollars . . ."

The wife of Xu Quan, the Village Cadre, was awakened by the pounding on the door. "What on earth is the matter? Scaring people like this in the middle of the night," she muttered.

Xu Quan was sitting in the chair with his quilted coat over his shoulders. He fished out his tobacco box from his pocket and rolled a cigarette. He slowly answered his
wife. "A notice from the Commune: don't let any piglets die from the cold . . ."

"That's worrying for nothing. The pigs are contracted to the Guo family who are capable and clever people. Why should they let any pig die? You just come back to bed and get some sleep."

"No, I'll have to check the pigs," Xu Quan stretched an arm into the coat sleeve, "I heard this evening they're expecting piglets tonight. If anything should happen, I'll be the first one to blame."

"Look at yourself—so 'positive,' all for the sake of the extra five dollars a month. You think of it as something special, but not me," she suddenly sat up, pulling the quilt over her and becoming very agitated, "If you're really so 'positive,' try and earn more for your family. Look at our neighbor Old Du. After a couple of long trips and some secret deals, he's earned at least several thousand already and they're building a five-room brick house now."

"I won't do anything illegal."

"Is it illegal to contract the work of the rice field? Good for those who did. The price of rice is going up, plus the price for good production; one family can easily earn up to seven or eight hundred dollars. Only you, fool, hooked by the official title, have stuck with poverty. You can burn your eyes out with envy."

"It's a good thing for people to earn more. The policy nowadays is to let people prosper. What are you griping about?"

"I'm not unscrupulous. I'm only talking about you. If you were clever, you'd have put our name in at the time of signing the contract."

"Put my name in? How do I find the time? Half of my days are taken up by meetings. I'm only busy and concerned with the good of the public."

"Tut, tut, not that nonsense again. As a cadre for more than ten years, what have you done for your family? We're all in for misery with you. The good of the public indeed! You've got the whole village against you."

"You're envious. Why don't you work in the rice field yourself? Nobody's stopping you. You want to get rich by doing nothing but staying in bed. No such luck."

He pushed open the door and stepped over the threshold.

"Put on your dog-skin hat. If you get a cold, I've no money to buy medicine." A black furry object flew toward him and landed on the crook of his elbow.

He put the hat on his head and turned around, "Just leave me alone."

7. "I'll make up words to suit Whatever tune the authority picks."

In the pig-farm lights were shining brightly. Xu Quan called once before he lifted the cotton curtain. A rush of warm air greeted him.

He held his hands together and looked around. Mammy Guo's second daughter was squatting in front of the fireplace, making a fire. Mammy Guo, in a blue apron and with sleeves rolled up high, was lifting the lid of a pot in which the rice broth was cooking.

"Newborn piglets?"

"Yes, a litter of twelve, every one alive." Mammy Guo wiped off the perspiration from her forehead with her elbow. She was all smiles. She replaced the lid and wiped her hands on the apron. She then led the cadre inside.

On the warm kang, twelve tiny piglets huddled together in a bundle of round, plump and quavering bodies. A little humming noise came out from the bundle.

"Our pig farm is doing well this time," Xu Quan complimented her cheerfully.

"The group trusts us to do the job and lets us contract the pig farm. Of course, we want to do our very best. We need all the help we can get so I sent for my father from the next village."

Xu Quan saw an old man in the far corner of the room, squatting in front of a broken table and drinking wine by himself.

"Come on, have a cup," Mammy Guo brought out a wine cup.

"Ha, have you moved here with the pigs?" Xu Quan, laughing, squatted down.

"I'm worried if I'm away. It's really more convenient
staying right here with the pigs, especially early mornings and late at night.”

"Let’s drink. What a day." The old man lifted his cup.

With a lightened heart and prompted by the warm hospitality, Xu Quan lifted his cup and finished the wine in a few gulps. A current of heat came over him. Just think, twelve piglets—Mammy Guo really knows what she’s doing. He asked her about her past farm experience and her suggestions for the future.

“I just feed them—that’s all. I can’t read a single word; don’t ask me about my experience,” Mammy Guo said, quite pleased with herself.

Yes, what could she say? I have to make up my own report. H’m’m—“To carry out the System of Accountability—if every member in the Commune shares the responsibility, the cadre can be assured of success,”—pretty good—but one sentence is not enough—this wine is not bad, must be at least sixty-five per cent alcohol, better than the one I bought last time—Mammy Guo is quite a capable woman, how she mobilizes everybody, old and young, the eighty-year-old father and the school-aged daughter—isn’t this an “experience”? “Enlist all help, regardless of age or sex, in our care for the piglets”—sounds nice, but wait, how stupid can I get? This jingle is from the late fifties, no longer popular now. “Mass mobilization means massive achievement”—no good, you don’t see such slogans on newspapers anymore. I have to use new expressions, such as “United in heart and spirit, we strive for the Four Modernizations”—that’s better—one hears it broadcast eight times a day—but what category of modernization does Mammy Guo’s work fit in?—I’d better stop drinking. Tomorrow I have to report to my superior—but what shall I say about “experience”? Pooh—never mind, when the time comes, I’ll make up words to suit whatever tune the authority picks.

*Translated by Chun-Ye Shih*
CHINESE IMPRESSIONS

In the spring of 2000, I was one of sixteen U.S. educators chosen to participate in the Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar Abroad Program on "China: Tradition and Transformation." The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations administered the Seminar on behalf of the U.S. Department of Education, which paid virtually all of my expenses. In China, the Chinese Ministry of Education was my host. Although theoretically much more involved in nation-wide educational policy coordination than its U.S. counterpart, I encountered an interesting amount of diversity and decentralization while traveling in China. Indeed, I was told that the Chinese Ministry of Education had just sent out a directive for the provinces to make more decisions on their own. This was just one specific sign of China's growing decentralization that some feel will eventually lead to some type of federalism.

The itinerary centered on a 14-day stay in Beijing with site visits such as the Great Wall, Forbidden City, schools, businesses, hospitals, markets, and rural areas chosen to complement daily lectures held at Beijing Normal University. The remainder of the program included lectures and site visits in Xi’an (China’s ancient capital and location of the famous terracotta warriors), Guilin in the southeast (home to several small minorities and location of the scenic Li River), Shanghai, and Hong Kong. Although the program was very intensive and all the more difficult because of the extreme heat in China at that time of the year, I came away from the experience with a kaleidoscope of impressions.
Throw away the image of Mao-style clothing and accompanying Marxist-Leninist ideological fanaticism. From the way most people dress today in China’s cities, one would hardly know one were not in the United States. To a lesser, but still astonishing extent, this is also true for commercial activity. In the east at least, the stores are filled with consumer items, and people are buying refrigerators, air conditioners, computers, and automobiles. Although China’s west remains badly underdeveloped, it too is now the target of a development drive. On a long bus trip through the countryside north of Guilin, I encountered signs exhorting the population toward further modernization: “Daughters are also descendants,” “Fewer children, quicker prosperity,” “Preserving the land benefits the people and the country,” “Your best guarantee for (road) safety is to follow traffic regulations,” etc.

The Chinese admit that they violated basic market concepts in Mao’s time. However, the primary stage of socialism they say they currently are developing, looks a lot like capitalism. “Jumping into the sea” is a new Chinese expression that means quitting a safe, but low-paying government job to go after a risky but high-paying one in private business. Imminent membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) will have a profound impact on the Chinese economy because even in recent years it has been only partially open to international competition. Once in the WTO, China will have to open completely, fully integrate into the world capitalist economy, and play by its rules. The WTO will also bring in a lot of foreign businessmen and their money all operating under WTO rules. This will most likely accelerate the process toward even more economic success. What has led to all these historic changes?
Shortly after Mao’s death in September 1976, China initiated a policy of market reform with Chinese characteristics under previously twice-purged, but then until his death in February 1997, paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping: The four modernizations consisted of modernizing industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense.

The results have been astonishing. China now sprouts a growing middle class with disposable income larger than the entire population of the United States. Even the still huge majority in the rural areas is enjoying prosperity never before imagined. Farmers have bigger houses with a variety of styles reflecting their greater wealth and individualism. They also are buying their own tools and vehicles. The entire population has an expanding latitude of choice concerning where to live, work, and learn. The *danwei*, state units, which provided housing, welfare benefits, health care, etc., have been abolished, as well as the collective farms. Although the state still owns the land, farmers can lease it for up to 25 years which makes it practically theirs.

With the abolishment of the household registration system, people are on the move from rural to urban areas. Unthinkable earlier, many Chinese now travel simply to see their own country and far outnumber Western tourists at historical sites. Interstate-type highways are beginning to connect cities such as Beijing and Nanjing, while Beijing itself is completing its fourth ring road in an attempt to control its incredible traffic jams. Regional Chinese airlines efficiently and comfortably enable travelers to crisscross the land. Access to the Internet is opening horizons both intellectually and geographically. While some disagree, it seems that the government will be unable to stop or even want to stop these Internet inroads necessary to facilitate the continuing economic success.
Construction used to be a joke. As soon as something was built, it started to fall apart. Even now, while I was touring the Forbidden City (the emperor's palace and immediate surroundings forbidden to all but his immediate retinue) in Beijing, the Chinese-made batteries powering my audio self-guide ran out two-thirds of the way through. Several others of my fellow sightseers suffered a similar fate. I was assured, however, that soon this problem too would be corrected as the Chinese have learned that quality pays off domestically and sells abroad. In short, the people seem relaxed, open, and accessible. They are proud of what they have accomplished and believe they will be even more successful in the future. Twenty years ago none of this would have been remotely possible!

Although Chairman Mao is still honored, it is as with the Chinese gods—only at a distance. Most Chinese will readily tell you that they lost their ideological verve due to the terrible tragedies and excesses of Mao's Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and the associated revelations that Lin Biao—Mao's new number-one comrade and chosen heir—had tried to assassinate Mao and died trying to flee after a failed coup in 1971. Given the current economic progress, why should the Chinese retreat to their communist past? Indeed, to promote the incredible economic miracle, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has retreated from so many former levers of power that one may legitimately question its very future.

On the other hand, many argue that much of this economic success, in contrast to Russia, is due to the CCP maintaining the ultimate control that facilitates economic growth while preventing chaos and so-called mafia operations a la Russia today. If the Tiananmen student demonstrations in 1989 had toppled the CCP, continues this
argument, chaos would have resulted because there was no one else to take the party’s place. Today there is an implicit compact between the CCP and the Chinese population that allows for economic freedom so long as the CCP’s political rule is not challenged. The situation is not unlike Asia’s other economic dragons in Singapore and South Korea.

At the same time, however, these fantastic economic changes have precipitated a host of related problems. The reform and abolishment of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have resulted in unemployment and demands for a more reliable social safety net that is being lost with the demise of the SOEs. If the government does not do something quickly, there will be big problems. Economic development has exacerbated environmental degradation, such as the much-criticized Three Gorges Project to dam the Yangtze River. Many of the social ills present in other countries have also begun to show up in China, including homelessness, social deviancy among the youth, and a growing dearth in ethical values. There is an increasing incidence of divorce, while the one-child policy has created “little emperors and empresses” who are selfish, uncooperative with the group, and overweight. In Shanghai’s new world-class, state-of-the-art museum, I saw momentary fright, when some people from the countryside suddenly felt confused and trapped on a simple escalator that was beginning to ascend. Fortunately the guards quickly intervened and helped them onto the more conventional stairs! It is a profound contradiction, not lost on the population, that the CCP—which came to power through a revolution based on social equality—today encourages economic disparities.

Although Chinese society is in flux, certain cultural patterns and social characteristics persist. A growing youth-oriented culture, for example, still confronts “the three overs”: group over individual, age over youth, and male over female. Individual
travel remains difficult as the society is still geared to serve the group. Even restaurants make it difficult for individual customers with their usual round tables for eight or more. “The one link” or guanxi (connections) remains indispensable in a society with only an incipient judicial infrastructure. “Negotiations only begin after the contract is signed,” is a Chinese saying that illustrates how nascent a true judicial system remains. Corruption, supposedly wiped out when the Communists came to power, is today rampant again and growing. Critics remind how earlier monumental corruption demoralized the population and undermined the Nationalist government before its collapse in 1949.

On the other hand, Hong Kong—the former British colony that reverted to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997—has not only been permitted to maintain its separate capitalist system, but is also subtly influencing the mainland toward developing the rule of law and capitalist business practices. Banned on the mainland, the Falungong still operates openly in Hong Kong as do several prominent human rights advocates. Clearly Hong Kong (and Taiwan too) are posing a powerful attraction for the mainland. As Lenin himself once asked: “Who is using whom?”

United States

From the highs of mutual fascination and ping-pong diplomacy in the 1970s to the lows of disillusionment represented by the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989 and the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Sino-American relations have been little short of a roller coaster ride. Recent problems also include Taiwan, China’s military development and arms dealing, trade issues, human rights, reputed Chinese funds to help reelect President Clinton in 1996, the Cox Report accusing China of the theft of U.S. nuclear secrets, etc.
Clearly, Sino-American relations contain elements of cooperation, competition, and potential conflict. There is a strong contention in the United States, for example, that argues most-favored-nation trading rights for China should be made contingent upon Chinese acceptance of Western-style human rights. Some Chinese dissidents have even proposed democracy as the fifth modernization. Chinese president Jiang Zemin has told his American critics, however, that social, political and human rights practices grow from their own historical and cultural soil. In other words, do not tell us what to do. Before we talk about the Western concept of human rights, it is necessary to develop such primary but necessary human rights as housing, food, health, and jobs. Indeed, most Chinese human rights dissidents—who are so well known in the United States—are virtually unknown in China. U.S. Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) demanding that China accept Western standards of human rights now is out of step with what is possible and even necessary in China's current stage of development and amounts to so much grandstanding on her part. By finally granting China permanent normal trading relations, the U.S. Congress demonstrated that it had largely accepted the Chinese position.

Many Chinese feel that the United States feels threatened by the rise of Chinese power and wants to keep China weak. The accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the conflict over Kosovo in 1999 was widely seen as intentional. No Chinese could believe that such a technologically sophisticated country as the United States could make such an inadvertent error. Indeed, it is disconcerting how easily anti-American passions were aroused by the bombing and how readily many Chinese assumed the worse about the United States. Conspiracy theories abounded. One explained that the United States believed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade had given
intelligence information to the Serbs which had enabled them to down the U.S. stealth bomber. In retaliation, the United States bombed the embassy. Another theory argued that the United States was signaling its displeasure at the reputed Chinese stealing of U.S. nuclear secrets.

Even more revealing of inherent Chinese suspicions is the rationale many top Chinese students give for studying in the United States: “You are our enemy. We study you so we can better defeat you.” Although the Chinese look at the United States as a rather immature, new country compared to their history of 5,000 years, they are fascinated by U.S. technical development. They recognize that they still have much to learn, but are confident of their future.

What then does this bode for the future of Sino-American relations? Despite mutual fears and suspicions, the two have become significant economic partners. The current Chinese leadership and population have a vested interest in continuing this pattern through a strategy of economic integration with the rest of the world. Trade and investment relations can only increase once China enters the WTO. Such a win/win situation will continue to illustrate the advantages of mutual engagement, rather than hostile containment. The United States needs to reassure China that it is not trying to promote instability or chaos in China, but seeks a constructive strategic partnership that will help bring China into a rules-based international economic regime.

Although the United States must clearly maintain its military strength and the Taiwan issue still holds the potential for sparking a military confrontation, Chinese history offers certain reassuring lessons for those who fear China’s ultimate geostrategic intentions. China has never evinced a desire for world empire. A half-century before the
Europeans began their epic sea voyages around the world, for example, the Chinese admiral Zheng He led seven colossal expeditions from 1405-1433 that actually reached the Arabian peninsula and the east coast of Africa. The ships at Zheng’s disposal dwarfed in size and sophistication those of the Europeans as late as the Spanish armada in 1588. But at the height of these foreign possibilities the Chinese decided that they did not need such adventures and discontinued them on principle.

In another revealing incident 350 years later, the Chinese emperor told King George III of England’s envoys that their request for relations were “contrary to all usage of my dynasty and cannot possibly be entertained.” Neither Ming nor Xing China had any need for foreign acquisitions. Although the situation has clearly changed today, these two famous events in Chinese history still illustrate the Chinese attitude toward world hegemony: China will do better without it and thus does not seek it. The very Chinese name for China Jung Guo or Middle Kingdom still reflects this insular geostrategic preference.

The fervent years of communism, of course, represented a unique abnegation of this insular principle. For a brief time China associated itself with a messianic doctrine of world revolution and intervention that did indeed pose a serious potential geostrategic threat to the United States. This situation, however, began to be altered even in Mao’s lifetime when President Nixon visited China in 1972 and ended the twenty years of mutual fear and hatred. Today this brief, failed communist interlude of world ambitions is so passe as to be almost a ludicrous parody on present Chinese intentions.

China, of course, will continue to seek reunification with Taiwan and to maintain sovereignty over Tibet because they are considered to be part of China. Any Chinese
regime would have to take a similar position or else lose its legitimacy in the eyes of its people. China also will seek political and economic preeminence in east Asia, but by legal means of the market and legitimate statecraft. Any other great power would seek to do likewise. This, however, poses no geostrategic threat to the United States. Indeed, Chinese competition will spur the United States to better its own products and positions.

Mongolia presents a little-known, but important litmus test for the Chinese willingness to honor treaties and the rule of law, especially when they run counter to China’s immediate self interest. In the recent past China had a certain amount of legitimate claim on Mongolia. Indeed, maps made in Taiwan still occasionally show Mongolia as part of China. I have been impressed, however, how maps prominently displayed throughout China glaringly show and accept a gaping indentation in China’s northern borders where Mongolia lies. In reply to my many queries on this subject, I was repeatedly told that China respects Mongolia’s independence as guaranteed by international treaties. If China is willing to forego any claims on neighboring Mongolia, it seems likely that it will also abstain from distant foreign adventures that would geostrategically threaten legitimate U.S. interests.

Hong Kong, of course, represents a much more visible litmus test for ultimate Chinese intentions. So far, things are going fairly well. Although there is some self-censorship, there remains a thriving public debate on virtually all issues. There were howls of outrage, for example, when the mainland suggested that Hong Kong newspapers should not report on Taiwanese claims to independence or how Hong Kong does business with Taiwanese pro-independence companies. The Falungong and other Chinese human rights dissidents continue to operate openly. Amazingly, one of the judges on Hong
Kong’s High Court is chosen from a list of foreign judges from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The purpose is to maintain contacts with the common law system so different from traditional mainland Chinese legal concepts. In the future, I was told that even U.S. and Canadian judges might be considered for this role. Would the United States ever place a Chinese judge in a similar position?

Nevertheless, the world is still watching to see if China will keep its international obligation to maintain two different systems in one country. Some journalists told me, for example, that China is currently preparing sedition laws that could limit freedom of the press. Hong Kong television stations recently reduced an interview with the Dalai Lama. There also seems to be less access to government officials since the handover in July 1997. The National People’s Congress in Beijing recently overruled the Hong Kong High Court’s decision that there was no right of abode for children who lived in China but had parents who were Hong Kong citizens.

Future of the Communist Party

More than two decades of post-Mao economic reforms have transformed the Chinese society and economy beyond recognition, and removed the CCP from many areas of social, economic, cultural, and even political life, which it used to control. This process of party withdrawal will have to continue if the economic growth and success the party wants are to continue. The burgeoning disparity between one-party communist rule and a pluralistic capitalist style economy questions the very future of the communist party. Increasingly, it seems that a sophisticated economic regime is being constrained by a confining political regime that, while wanting continuing economic development and
success, will not have the prerequisites to continue to promote economic growth and still maintain itself.

Although the CCP has been able to deliver the economic goods far beyond what anyone might have previously thought possible, it is now discovering that this success is not a strong enough argument for maintaining its political dictatorship. Traditional communist ideological explanations seem irrelevant to the future, a situation that further challenges the party’s future. It as if the CCP’s very success has made it increasingly irrelevant. The general population has become increasingly dismissive of the party and more interested in alternative solutions to the country’s problems. There has been a rapid growth of quasi-independent social organizations sponsoring academic research, environmental protection and a host of other popular causes. These new groups are occupying space created by the party’s withdrawal from areas of society it formerly controlled. Even religion and superstition are proving more persuasive and attractive than traditional Marxist ideology. Remembering the origins of the Taiping rebellion in the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, as well as its own rise to power and Mao’s famous adage that “a single spark can light a prairie fire,” the regime moved quickly to ban the Falungong when it appeared to have crossed the implicit line by publishing its ideas in the United States.

In an attempt to stop the ideological rot that threatens the party’s rationale for ruling, Chinese president Jiang Zemin initiated a so-called “three representations” campaign in February 2000. The main thesis of this new presentation is that the CCP alone represents the three forces essential for China’s sustained rapid development: advanced productive forces, advanced cultural forces, and the fundamental interests of
the largest number of citizens. The party's supposed ability to best represent these three forces will lead China toward economic and political success and thus gives the party the right to rule. The three representations campaign is also designed to neutralize such extra-party groups as the Falungong and check the growth of an independent civil society that could challenge the party's future rule.

Although seemingly reasonable in tone, the three representations campaign is not likely to halt the long-term crisis of continuing communist party rule. Indeed it appears rather silly and likely to be irrelevant in the long run. This does not mean, however that the CCP is about to collapse. Although it is no longer able to inspire the Chinese people ideologically, it remains relatively too strong to be overthrown. There is no one else to take the party's place if it fell and a widespread fear of chaos if it did. These are the very ingredients that saved the party from the challenge of Tiananmen in 1989 when the other communist parties in eastern Europe were collapsing. Since then, an implicit compact has risen between the party and the population that allows economic freedom so long as party political rule is not challenged. The party is likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future, but it will continue to undergo so many changes due to the economic sea changes that will continue to take place as to be almost unrecognizable from its former self.

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The Opium War: Comparing Competing Historical Narratives

Introduction. In this lesson, which is designed for a high school world history or international relations course, students compare their textbook’s account of the Opium War with a similar account from a source used by high school students in contemporary China. In the process, students both deepen their historical understanding of the events of the Opium War and, in the words of the Standards in Historical Thinking,

"Compare competing historical narratives by contrasting different historians' choice of questions, and their use of sources reflecting different experiences, perspectives, beliefs, and points of view, and by demonstrating how an emphasis on different causes contributes to different interpretations." (National Standards for World History, National Center for History in the Schools, UCLA, 1994, p. 27)

Rationale. Throughout history, cross-cultural interactions have been complicated by the different perspectives that different parties bring to the encounter. Different perspectives result from different goals or needs, but they also result from different experiences that precede cross-cultural interactions. Previous experiences often lead the participants to perceive the same event or issue in different and often conflicting ways.

This lesson is designed to sensitize high school history students to different perspectives of the Opium War, a cross-cultural historical encounter, by showing them how contemporary Chinese historians have chosen to portray that encounter to contemporary Chinese high school students. The lesson may be used simply to enrich students’ understanding of the Opium War, or it may be used to provide background to contemporary conflicts between China and other countries. For example, teachers and students should be able to see many connections between China’s conflict with Britain, France, and other industrializing nations in the 1840s and China’s current effort to maintain its economic sovereignty as it integrates itself into the global economy early in the 21st century. The reasons for Chinese policy on contemporary trade issues should be clearer after students understand the historical context created by similar issues 150 years ago.

Resources. Reproduced on the following pages you will find nine short items related to the Opium War. They have been translated from the Illustrated Dictionary of Chinese History (Caitu Zhongguo Lishi Cidian, Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, 1995; English translation by Paul B. Jia), a reference for high school students in China. This lesson asks students to compare the Chinese account with that in their own world history textbook. I used Modern World History: Patterns of Interaction (McDougal Littell, 1999) and World History: Connections to
Students will also need a map of China that identifies as many of the following locations as possible:

- **Cities**
  - Guangzhou
  - Nanjing
  - Hong Kong
  - Fuzhou
  - Xiamen
  - Ningbo
  - Shanghai
  - Macao
  - Tianjin
  - Hankou
  - Jiujiang

- **Provinces**
  - Guangdong
  - Fujian
  - Zhejiang
  - Jiangsu
  - Guangxi
  - Zhu (Pearl)
  - Yangtze

- **Rivers**
  - Macao
  - Zhejiang
  - Jiangsu
  - Guangxi
  - Ningbo
  - Shanghai

Smaller villages and cities that are mentioned in the Chinese text are identified in relation to these cities and provinces. The map that accompanies the Prentice Hall account of the Opium War includes most of these locations; fewer are included in McDougal Littell’s map. The map at www.nationalgeographic.com/resources/ngo/maps/view/images/ chinam.jpg includes most locations.

**Essential questions.** The teacher should focus student investigation on the following questions.

- How, if at all, do the U.S. and Chinese accounts differ on dates, places, or other historical details?
- How are the two sources similar and different in their explanations for the causes of the Opium War?
- How are the two sources similar and different in their explanations for China’s defeat?
- How are their descriptions of the terms of the treaties that ended the war similar and different?
- Are there other major ways in which the two historical accounts differ?
- Is one account wrong and the other right on any particular difference? (Distinguish between facts and opinions.)
- Why do you think the two accounts are different? Why would the historians who wrote the accounts include different information or emphasize different aspects of the historical record?
- If students are also studying contemporary trade issues between China and the U.S. or other nations, what links do they see between trade conflicts of the 1840s and trade conflicts of today?

**Important concepts students can learn in this comparison.** In terms of dates, places, and historical detail, the Chinese sources and the U.S. textbooks that I used in preparing this lesson do not differ significantly. Neither do they differ significantly in their explanation of the proximate cause of the war: trade conflicts caused by China’s long-standing favorable trade balance. (The lack of disagreement on this point reflects the fact that neither source deeply examines the conflict between issues of national sovereignty and low barriers to international trade.)

Major differences between the sources begin to appear on their reasons for China’s defeat in the Opium War. U.S. textbooks generally focus on the way in which the Industrial Revolution gave European and American military forces more sophisticated weapons than China possessed. U.S. textbooks may also make reference to the decline in the governing efficiency of the Qing dynasty after 1800. The Chinese source, on the other hand, focuses exclusively on the “corruption of
the Qing dynasty government, which sabotaged the people's struggle against the British invaders and adopted a policy of compromising with Britain and begging for peace..." On one hand, this could be seen as an admirable willingness by Chinese historians to take responsibility for their own shortcomings rather than to blame the foreign invaders. On the other hand, Chinese historians see the Qing dynasty itself as a foreign force. Qing rulers originally came from Manchuria and were ethnically not Chinese. Although Manchuria has been part of China most of the time since the Qing dynasty began in the 17th century, Chinese historians are often contemptuous of the Qing's foreign origins. Anti-Qing sentiments are also consistent with the anti-feudal ideology of China's Marxist rulers after 1949. Marxist ideology sees feudalism as an earlier stage of human economic organization that must be overcome if socialism or communism is to be successfully established. As an embodiment of feudalism, the Qing dynasty is a favorite target of Chinese Marxists.

The "people's struggle against the British invaders" is probably the most interesting difference between the U.S. textbooks and the Chinese sources. Two of the nine items from the Chinese history dictionary describe spontaneous efforts of Chinese people to resist foreign invasion ("People's Resistance to the British in San Yuan Li" and "The Struggle to Resist the Entry of the British into Guangzhou"). I have never seen this information in a U.S. high school textbook account of the Opium War. Indeed, this perspective addresses one of the major concerns of many progressive U.S. history teachers and historians who criticize typical accounts of European and American imperialism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Colonized peoples are often portrayed, explicitly or implicitly, as helpless victims of the superior industrialized military forces. The courage and persistence of resistance to imperialism is seldom acknowledged. Failure to mention resistance to colonization sets the stage for later arguments, again either implied or explicit, that colonized people often accepted colonization at least half willingly because of its "modernizing" influence. To cite one example of the problems that this reasoning can produce, many people argue that an ignorance of national resistance to colonization among the Vietnamese people contributed to the underestimation among U.S. policymakers and the U.S. public of Vietnamese resistance to the U.S. war effort in the 1960s and 1970s. The more we teach our students to look at the history other people write about themselves, the more insights we gain that might lead us to more productive relations with those people.

Student comparisons of the Chinese and U.S. sources will probably also focus on the terms of the various treaties. As students sort out the similarities and differences in the accounts, terms such as "extraterritoriality," "consular jurisdiction," and "unilateral most favored nation status" should become clearer in their minds.

**Classroom activities.** Different teachers, of course, will find different ways to use the Chinese sources in their classrooms, based on various goals for student learning and the content of the courses they are teaching. I offer the following ideas as one example of classroom activities that would help students compare and contrast the Chinese sources and their U.S. textbooks.

After reading the account of the Opium War in their U.S. textbook, students could read the first two sections of the Chinese source ("The Opium War" and "The Burning of Opium at Humen"), which provide an overview of the war that is about the same length as their textbook.
account. Whether reading is done individually or in groups, in class or as homework, students could be asked to answer the essential questions listed above. The whole class could then compare notes to establish preliminary answers to the essential questions.

Following this modeling of the comparative analysis process, each of the remaining sections of the Chinese source could be assigned to a small group of students. Each group could analyze the section, answering the same essential questions as before plus others that emerged from the preliminary analysis. As each group summarizes new information in its section to the class and reports its answers to the essential questions, notes could be kept by students individually and on the classroom board. The whole class could discuss patterns that emerge from the reports. The concept of popular Chinese resistance to foreign invasion could be identified as one of the principal differences between the Chinese and U.S. sources. The implications of this difference could be discussed. Connections could be drawn between this example of European and U.S. imperialism and other examples students have studied.

To assess individual mastery of the knowledge involved in the lesson, each student could write an essay that summarizes the major differences in the two historical accounts and discusses the significance and implications of the differences.
A Chinese View of the Opium War


1. The Opium War

A war of invasion waged by the British against China from 1840 to 1842. From the end of the 18th century, the British had exported great quantities of opium into China, seriously poisoning the Chinese people. The sale of opium required that China pay a great quantity of silver abroad, which caused the Qing dynasty government financial difficulty. At the end of 1838, Emperor Daoguang sent Lin Zexu to Guangdong [a province in southern China] to ban opium. In June of the next year, Lin Zexu burned more than 2,370,000 jin of opium on the beach at Humen. In June 1840, the British invaded China. The main battlefields were in Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu provinces. The patriotic officers and soldiers, led by Lin Zexu, and the people living along the rivers and ocean coasts, such as the people of San Yuan Li, dealt heavy blows to the British invaders. However, due to the corruption of the Qing dynasty government, which sabotaged the people's struggle against the British invaders and adopted a policy of compromising with Britain and begging for peace, China suffered a defeat in the war. On August 29, 1842, the Qing dynasty government sent imperial envoy Yi Libu and Qi Ying to meet with the British envoy, Henry Pottinger, on a British gunboat floating on the river near Nanjing. There they signed the shameful Sino-British Treaty of Nanjing. From that time on, China was reduced to the status of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. The Opium War was a turning point in China's history, the beginning of Chinese modern history.

2. The Burning of Opium at Humen

In March 1839, after his arrival at Guangzhou [in Guangdong province], Lin Zexu, the imperial envoy of the Qing dynasty government, took severe measures to ban opium. The patriotic officers and soldiers, as well as the broad masses of people, supported his measures. On the one hand, Lin Zexu improved the defense works along the coast and arrested opium dealers; on the other hand, he told foreign opium dealers to turn in all their opium within three days. From April to May, British and American opium dealers were forced to turn in more than 2,370,000 jin of opium. From June 3 to June 25, all the opium collected was publicly burned on the beach at Humen. The burning of opium at Humen dealt the British invaders a heavy blow and demonstrated to the world the strong determination of the Chinese people to resist insults from abroad.
3. People's Resistance to the British in San Yuan Li

A spontaneous resistance against the British invaders by the Chinese people. On May 29, 1841, a horde of British soldiers broke into the area of San Yuan Li in the suburbs of Guangzhou. The local masses severely beat the British soldiers. Anticipating revenge by the British, the villagers gathered for a meeting in front of an ancient temple north of San Yuan Li and discussed what to do next. Early the next morning, 5,000 volunteers from 103 nearby villages launched an attack against the British at Sifang Fort. The British commander-in-chief, Hugh Gough, lead about a thousand British soldiers to fight back. The villagers lured the enemy to the Niu Lan Gang hills area, where thousands and thousands of villagers came out from all directions to kill the enemy. Nearly 50 British soldiers were killed or wounded, and the British fled in panic back to the fort. On May 31, thousands and thousands of people from more than 400 villages in Pan Yu, Nan Hai, and other counties joined the people of Sans Yuan Li and surrounded Sifang Fort. The British armed force begged Yi Shan, a Qing dynasty government official, for assistance. Yi Shan ordered the villagers to disperse and rescued the British soldiers from the siege.

4. The Struggle to Resist the Entry of the British into Guangzhou

The struggle from 1842 to 1849 by the people in Guangzhou city and the suburban areas to stop the British from entering the city. After the signing of the Nanjing Treaty in 1842, the British demanded entry to Guangzhou city, a move strongly opposed by the masses of Chinese people. In November, news traveled in Guangzhou about British insults to Chinese merchants. Later, as some British soldiers forcefully bought food and hurt people, the people of Guangzhou were offended. They burned foreign stores. The following year, Qi Ying, the imperial envoy of the Qing dynasty government, decided it was dangerous to incur the anger of the masses. So he told the British to postpone their entry into the city.

In 1846, a British envoy once again requested entry to the city. Qi Ying sent Liu Xun, the mayor, to secretly meet with the British and they agreed on a date of entry. Hearing this news, several thousand people from Guangzhou broke into the government office and burned Liu Xun's official uniform.

The next year, British gunboats fired on Guangzhou and again demanded entry to the city. Qi Ying promised entry in two years time. In 1849, British gunboats invaded by way of a provincial river in an attempt to fulfill the promise. Hundreds of thousands of people from Guangzhou, including villagers, students and scholars, gathered for demonstrations along both banks of the Zhu (Pearl) River. Finally, the British were forced to give up their demand to enter Guangzhou.
5. The Sino-British Treaty of Nanjing

The first unequal treaty in Chinese modern history that the Qing dynasty government was forced to sign by foreign invaders. It was signed on August 29, 1842, on a British gunboat on the river near Nanjing by Qi Ying and Yi Li Bu, the imperial envoys of the Qing dynasty government, and the British representative Henry Pottinger. There were 13 items in the treaty. The main items were: (1) Pay the British 21,000,000 silver dollars to cover damages suffered during the war; (2) Cede Hong Kong to the British; (3) Open the five cities of Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai to British trade; (4) Allow the tax rates paid by British merchants for importing and exporting to be decided by both the British and Chinese governments.

6. The Five Trading Ports

After the defeat in the Opium War, the Qing dynasty government was forced by the British government to sign the Sino-British Treaty of Nanjing, which required China to open five cities as trading ports. The five cities were Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai. In these five cities all imperialist powers enjoyed consular jurisdiction [meaning foreigners were subject to their own systems of justice rather than the Chinese system]. This established the precedent that imperialists could force China to open its ports, and China’s sovereignty therefore suffered severe damage.

7. The Sino-American Treaty of Wangxia

The first unequal treaty in the course of the United States invasion of China. On July 3, 1844, Caleb Cushing, the U.S. special envoy, forced Qi Ying, the Qing dynasty governor of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, to sign the treaty at Wangxia Village near Macao. The treaty had 14 items, supplemented by custom and duty regulations. The treaty provided that the United States would enjoy the same privileges as European powers, including negotiated custom taxes, access to the five trading ports, consular jurisdiction [meaning foreigners were subject to their own systems of justice rather than the Chinese system], unilateral most-favored-country status [meaning any future benefit China gave any other country would also apply to the United States], and other privileges that exceeded what the Treaty of Nanjing provided for the British. The treaty also allowed U.S. military ships to freely enter the five trading ports, and it allowed Americans to lease land and set up buildings, churches, or hospitals at the trading ports.
8. The Sino-French Treaty of Huangpu

The first unequal treaty in the course of the French invasion of China. On October 24, 1844, a French special envoy and Qi Ying, the Qing dynasty governor for Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, signed the treaty at Huangpu, in Guangzhou. The treaty had 36 items. It allowed France to enjoy negotiated custom taxes, access to the five trading ports, consular jurisdiction [meaning foreigners were subject to their own systems of justice rather than the Chinese system], unilateral most-favored-country status [meaning any future benefit China gave any other country would also apply to the France], and other privileges. The French were allowed to build churches at the trading ports. If any Chinese offended the French church, the Qing dynasty local governments were required to punish them severely. Later France forced the Qing dynasty government to lift a ban against Catholicism in China, and thus the French were allowed to do missionary work freely at the trading ports.

9. Concessions

After the Opium War, the imperialist countries forced the Qing dynasty government to provide land at trading ports for the foreigners “to stay or to do business.” In November 1845, the British obtained the first such concession in Shanghai through the Shanghai Land Leasing Regulations. The concession covered the area from north of Yangjingbang street (now called Yanan Dong Lu) to south of Lijiachang street (now called Beijing Dong Lu). In 1848, American missionaries occupied some land in the area of Hong Kou on the north bank of the Suzhou River in Shanghai, building houses there without permission. In 1863 they formally established it as an American concession. Soon after that, the Americans joined the British and shared the common concession.

In 1849, France also set up a concession in Shanghai. From then on, the concession system gradually spread to Guangzhou, Xiamen, Tianjin, Hankou, Jiujiang and other trading ports. Foreign invaders seized the administrative and judicial powers within the concessions and established a colonial system, making each concession a “country within a country.” The Chinese people struggled continuously to take back lands within concessions. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the concession system was totally demolished in China.
Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar Abroad
Curriculum Project:
Human Rights in China

Ken Hung
Human Rights in China

Goals:
1. For students to get an overview of current human rights issues in China.
2. For students to examine the Chinese government's position on human rights.
3. For students to examine possible solutions to the problem of human rights in China.

Note: the following is an excerpt from a larger unit on human rights in China.

Day One: What is a human right?
1. Write the words: “Human Rights” on the board. What is a human right? Have students brainstorm. The teacher may elect to have students write down their thoughts first and then share them with a partner before brainstorming on board.

2. Discuss that human rights can often be categorized in two ways: political and economic. Use examples from the list to categorize:
   - Political rights- ex. free speech, right to remain innocent until proven guilty, freedom of religion, assembly etc.
   - Economic rights- ex. a job, food, housing etc.

3. Have students discuss the two terms using a forced choice exercise. In a forced choice exercise, students are asked to choose from one of two statements that best matches their opinion. Students do not have to be 100% in agreement with one of the statements. The students are then asked to move to one side of the room if they agree with the first statement or move to the other side if they agree with the second. Once a student picks a side he or she may change sides; however, they must always move to a side, they may not stay in the middle. Once students have chosen sides, they are asked to explain why they chose the side that they went to and are encouraged to then respond to each other’s opinions.

   - Where would you rather live?
     A. A country where you are guaranteed political rights but no economic rights.
     B. A country where you are guaranteed economic rights but no political rights.

3. When this forced choice activity was tried out on my class, most students chose #1. Discuss how this may reflect the notion of individualism and human rights that we have in the U.S./West. For example, refer to the Bill of Rights-- would the rights mentioned herein be considered political or economic?

4. Examine Handout 1: Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Point out that in addition to political rights there are other types of rights mentioned- ex. Article 23: Right to work. Article 24: Right to rest and leisure etc. (This document is available online at http://www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm). Why would the writers of the document include all of these other forms of human rights? Have students consider how their perspective living in the U.S. may affect their answers. Does your socioeconomic position affect what you believe is a human right?

Homework: Assign Article 1: Zhu Muzhi on China's Human Rights Record (available at http://www.china-embassy.org/Cgi-Bin/Press.pl?438). Ask students to summarize the basic argument and give a response. Point out that this is an article put out by the Chinese embassy.

Day Two: Human Rights from a Chinese Perspective
1. Ask students to read each other’s homework responses. In pairs, have students find quotes that summarize main points of the Zhu Muzhi article. Make sure students get the basic arguments in these quotes:

   A. “The Chinese people hold that the country’s development itself shows that they enjoy democratic rights. This is because the Chinese people’s greatest and most pressing demand is to develop the economy, so that they will be able to fully enjoy the rights of survival and development and the country will become strong and prosperous.”
B. "...China holds that an individual's right doesn't mean everything of democracy although it is indispensable. Democracy should include the rights to act in accordance with the opinions and interests of the majority of the people.

C. "The West usually judges the conditions of democracy in some countries by the extent of individual rights instead of paying attention to whether the masses' opinions are accepted and their demands satisfied. That is why some Western states failed to see that China's rapid economic development resulted from satisfaction of the majority people's demands, which is the embodiment of democracy".

D. "The human rights situation in China should be judged in the angle of history. It is well-advised to check by comparison whether it has been improved or worsened than before, and which are principal, achievements or mistakes."

2. Read Handout 2. China by the Numbers: Portrait of a Nation. Point out economic changes to show how standard of living has increased:
   - Foreign investment has increased from 3.49 billion in 1990 to $41.67 billion in 1997.
   - In 1990, there were just 240,000 privately owned cars and buses. By 1996, the number had topped 1.4 million.

3. On the other hand, human rights violations continue:
   - More than 200,000 people are in prison without being charged or tried for a crime.
   - 2,500 people were executed in 1997 for crimes ranging from stealing a bicycle to murder.

4. For more contrast, students may examine articles on China's human rights abuses available through Amnesty international (http://www.amnesty.org). I ended up downloading several newsbriefs on China and circulating them around the room.

5. Discuss Zhu's arguments. Ask students if they agree with the Chinese embassy's definition of human rights and democracy. Students may want to examine each of the quotes more closely. In particular, students should examine the following question:
   - Do we as "the West" have the right to judge another country's standard of human rights?

Day Three and Four: Tiananmen Square
1. In recent years, the Chinese government's human rights record has come under scrutiny in large part because of the events at Tiananmen square. Give an overview of the events leading up to Tiananmen square. Lecture should include:
   - Death of Mao, Rise of Deng Xiaoping
   - 1980's- Four modernizations, growth of free market, inflation and corruption

2. Watch the documentary: Moving the Mountain (USA 1994). The video is available at most video stores or can be purchased online at amazon.com. I usually show only the middle portion of the film.

3. As students watch the movie, it may be helpful to construct a timeline of events on the blackboard:

   Narrator: Li Lu
   Student Activists: Wang Chao Hua, Wuer Kaixi, Chai Ling, Wang Dan
   Apr 22- mourning for Hu turns into rally of students for pro democracy forces, 150,000 students and protesters hold an unofficial mourning outside Hall of the People
   Apr 26- Chinese government puts out an editorial against the students
   Apr 27- Student activists vote for central leadership, goal is for govt. to open dialogue and withdraw Apr 26 editorial
   May 4- Journalists come to Beijing in order to cover Sino-Soviet summit, 3000 students start hunger strike
   May 15- Gorbechev comes but is upstaged as the media turns its attention to protests, Deng is embarrassed
   May 16- Yen Ming Fu (Director of Public Relations) talks to students
May 17th- People demonstrate around Beijing in support of students
May 18- Prime minister Li Peng attempts to speak to students-- tries to make them look bad, Premier Zhou Ziyang meets with students
May 20- Martial law is declared, Zhou Ziyang ousted from power since he supports students, 350,000 troops are deployed around Beijing
June 2- Workers stop army-- shut down subway,
June 4- 27th army attack protesters using tanks and heavy artillery, estimates of 3000 deaths

4. In order to keep students on task, the teacher may also want to have students answer the following content questions. I have found, however, that students become so engrossed in the movie that they do not need to do this.

1. What effect did the Cultural Revolution have on Li?
2. What did the students demand?
3. Why didn’t the government crack down on student at first?
4. What form of protest did the students use?
5. What happened when Gorbachev visited?
6. Why did so many people demonstrate on May 17th?
7. Why did the government agree to meet with students on May 18th? What was the result?
8. How did the government intensify their actions against the students?
9. Describe what life was like for the students on the square?
10. How did the students mobilize themselves and get support
11. Why was the “Goddess of Democracy” built?
12. What was the effect of the massacre?
13. How did the student leaders escape?
14. What do the student leaders think about the effects of Tiananmen?

Homework: Write a summary and response to the movie. Also ask students to read Article 2: For the Young, Peaceful Revolution. The article talks about Zhong Xinming, a young man in China who has grown up in a prosperous economy following Tiananmen. Ask students to consider once again Zhu’s argument. Despite the atrocities of Tiananmen, has the Chinese government done the right thing? The article can be found in the Philadelphia Inquirer (9/26/99).

Day Five: Processing

1. Have students pass around their homework assignments and read each other’s responses to the movie.

2. Have students read Handout 3: U.S. Human Rights Record in 1999. Explain that the following was taken from the Chinese embassy website (http://www.china-embassy.org/rights/ushrr99.htm). Additional information can also be found at Amnesty International’s website (http://www.amnesty.org). Point out the following:

   A. “According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the US Department of Justice in 1999, the number of American adults in prison, on probation and on parole topped 5.92 million in 1998, accounting for 3% of the total population. In all 1.82 million of them were incarcerated in state or federal prisons, more than double the figure of 744,000 reported at the end of 1985 and setting a new record.”

   B. “This year, AFP reported on February 16 that by February 15 the number of American prisoners had topped 2 million, to account for 1/4 of the world’s total, ranking the US first in the world.”

3. Using ideas from Article 2: For the Young, Peaceful Revolution and Handout 3: U.S. Human Rights Record in 1999, have the students conduct a forced choice debating whether or not they agree with the statement below:

   Should the U.S. protest China’s human rights record?
4. Follow up questions:
   - Does the U.S. have the right to impose its standard of human rights on another country?
   - Does the U.S. have a better human rights record than China?
   - Does Article 2 show that the Chinese should be more concerned with economic rather than political rights?

5. Students may wish to examine means by which the government has been cracking down on other protesters at Tiananmen (Ex. Fa Lun Gong’s protests in April 1999 and October 2000).

   - For more information on political prisoners in China, students may want the chapter entitled “China’s Gulag” in Red China Blues (Wong, Jan. Red China Blues. Toronto: Doubleday, 1996).

**Thoughts on unit:** I feel that this unit should be prefaced with a survey of Chinese history, especially that of the 19th and 20th century. Before I started this unit, I had already spent about 3 weeks going over the history of imperialism in China and the development of Communism. As a result, the students were able to draw on information we had learned-- especially in understanding the reasons why many Chinese were embracing capitalism. Moreover, this influenced the way many viewed the extent to which the U.S. should question China’s internal affairs. Many students, as outraged as they were by the events of Tiananmen, were reluctant to support the U.S. taking a strong stance against China.

**Rest of Unit (overview)**
The second/third week of the unit, I examined current problems within China. My goal was to have students question the extent to which the growth of China’s economy is something that is 100% beneficial to the Chinese. In doing so, I wanted to examine two particular issues: the resurgence of nationalism in China and the increasing disparity of wealth among China’s citizens.

**Day 6: Nationalism:** We watched scenes from a recent Nova special “Mysterious Mummies of China”. Currently, the Chinese government is obscuring efforts by anthropologists to excavate mummies in Western China with European features. I used this movie to introduce the issue of nationalism in China and to encourage students to speculate on why it has swelled in recent years (ex. growth of economy, desire of government to maintain legitimacy). For more information on nationalism in China, students may want to read “Digging Into the Future” an article in Far Eastern Economic Review: (http://www.feer.com/_0007_20/p74currents.html). This article discusses how nationalism is fueling the Chinese government’s quest to prove the existence of the Xia dynasty, believed to be the first Chinese civilization.

**Day 7: Tibet:** I gave an overview of the history of Tibet and the government’s policy toward its people. My goal was to continue the theme of human rights by examining how Chinese nationalism is fueling its (in my view) destructive policies toward the Tibetans. Herein, we read excerpts from the Philadelphia Inquirer’s series “Inside Tibet” (http://www.philly.com/packages/tibet). The series contains harrowing testimonies by protesters advocating Tibetan independence. It should be noted that the testimonies include graphic descriptions of torture. However, I highly recommend that students read the testimonies in their entirety.

**Day 8: Internal Migration:** I discussed how the recent economic changes in China are widening the gap between rich and poor. In particular, many rural areas are not reaping economic benefits, causing thousands of peasants to move to eastern cities in search of work. To illustrate this we read, “Hit the Road”, another article from the Far Eastern Economic Review. (http://www.feer.com/0005?25/p78currents.html). Afterwards, we discussed the growth of Special Economic Zones in China, where many migrants toil in sweatshops.
**Day 9-10: Sweatshops:** Students did an inventory of where the clothes they were wearing were made. As it turned out, most were made in China. We then discussed reasons why this is so, focusing on the extent to which China provides a cheap labor source attractive to the textile industry. This was followed by a discussion on sweatshops and the horrendous working conditions within many. In doing so, I tried to relate this back to the earlier discussion on human rights by having students discuss whether or not working in a sweatshop was a violation of human rights. Moreover, I wanted students to refer back to Zhu’s human rights argument—were the Chinese truly achieving economic rights if people labored under conditions prevalent in sweatshops? Finally, I wanted to bring home the issue of human rights by having students discuss the extent to which we as Americans are responsible for China’s human rights records; given that our businesses provide much of the investment that drives the economy, and given that we buy so many Chinese made products. (For ideas on how to teach about sweatshops, please refer to Bill Bigelow’s excellent article “The Human Lives Behind the Labels” in Rethinking Schools, Summer 1997, Vol. 11:4).

**Day 11: Illegal Immigration:** To gain an understanding of the illegal trafficking of immigrants, we read “Two Faced Women”, about the recently arrested smuggler Big Sister Ping. (Time, July 31, 2000). Students debated whether or not they felt Ping was a criminal, as well as the pros and cons of immigrating illegally. In doing so, I wanted students to consider whether or not this immigration reflected positively on China’s developing economy. Moreover, I wanted students to again consider the human rights dimension of this issue, in particular the degree to which American immigration policy shapes the extremes that many Chinese go through to come to the U.S.

**Day 12-13: Debate:** As a culminating project, students debated the question: Should the U.S. get involved in China’s internal affairs? In doing so, students were split into two groups, one arguing PRO and the other arguing CON. I wanted students to do this in order to have an equal number of people on both sides. However, many students were unable to simply because they wanted to debate their personal opinions. As a result, on the last day, I asked students to discuss their own opinions. In the end, about 2/3 took the opinion that the U.S. should get involved, I think because the information I gave them about China’s human rights violations (ex. Tibet, Tiananmen) resonated with them. In doing so, they seemed to come out strongly against the Communist government. The other 1/3 felt that the U.S. should not get involved. Many in this group felt that telling the Chinese government what to do would only cause the Chinese to feel they were being pushed around by the U.S..
Zhu Muzhi on China's Human Rights Record

June 25, 1997

The president of Human Rights Society of China, Zhu Muzhi, challenged the Western accusations against China's human rights record in a speech delivered to the Carlos III University of Madrid on June 25, 1997. Following are the main points of his speech entitled "China's Development and Human Rights:"

It is acknowledged by the world that China has achieved great development in recent years. But what does this development mean to the Chinese people and the world, fortune or misfortune? Some gentlemen in Western countries seem to have views just opposite to those of the Chinese people: the Chinese people regard it as a good fortune while those gentlemen take it as a disaster. Back in the years before this boom, China received little criticism and at times even some favorable comments. But after China's rapid development, more and more accusing fingers were pointed at it.

The Chinese people believe that China's development has helped the country make great achievements in human rights. For instance, nearly all Chinese people now have got enough food and clothing, that is, they enjoy the right of survival. Resulting from this, other human rights were also remarkably improved.

China takes pride in the fact that it feeds 1.2 billion people, 22 percent of the world's population, with as little as 7 percent of the world's arable land.

However, some gentlemen in the Western countries, turning a blind eye to this rare achievement, attacked China's human rights record and put forward anti-China draft resolutions seven times in succession at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, although they failed each time.

The Chinese people hold that the country's development itself shows that they enjoy more democratic rights. This is because the Chinese people's greatest and the most pressing demand is to develop the economy, so that they will be able to fully enjoy the rights of survival and development and the country will become strong and prosperous.

The economic boom is just a result of this demand and an embodiment of democracy. But Western nations view China an autocratic country. One popular view in these countries is that China's economy is developing, but it is not democratic, regarding China's economic development and democracy as two absolutely irrelevant things.

The Chinese people think that China's development has improved their life and helps secure a stable society. So it is one of the few periods of times of peace and prosperity in history.

Internationally, China's development is also beneficial to the development of other economies. It can help other nations promote trade and economic relations with China and create more jobs for themselves.

Therefore, China's development contributes to peace and stability in the world. However, some gentlemen in Western nations hold that the more China develops, the stronger its desire for expansion will be, thus threatening peace and stability of the world.
The conflicting views resulted from different positions and viewpoints. As far as human rights are concerned, some Western countries think human rights mean only political rights and they do not cover economic rights, not to say rights of survival and development.

This may be caused by the fact that some Western nations have national conditions different from those of China and many other developing countries. In their minds, food and clothing are not problems at all. They just don't know this is a question of life or death in China and other developing countries. So as an old Chinese saying goes, "The well-fed don't know how the starving suffer". It means people in different positions have entirely different feelings and demands.

On the issue of political democracy, some Western states think that democracy means every individual has the right to express views and to seek interests.

However, China holds that an individual's right doesn't mean everything of democracy although it is indispensable. Democracy should include the rights to act in accordance with the opinions and interests of the majority of people.

The West usually judges the conditions of democracy in some countries by the extent of individual rights instead of paying attention to whether the masses' opinions are accepted and their demands satisfied.

That is why some Western states failed to see that China's rapid economic development resulted from satisfaction of the majority people's demands, which is the embodiment of democracy.

The West also advocates for their model of multi-party election, separation of the three powers (the legislative, executive and judicial powers) and the parliamentary system of two houses, saying only this is democracy.

But, China believes that in view of China's specific conditions, the People's Congress system can embody more democracy because China's rapid growth in the past decades is a result of carrying out the policies, plans and programs approved by the Chinese People's Congress.

It demonstrates that the Chinese People's Congress can guarantee the demands of the masses of people are truly satisfied. The Chinese people demand rapid development. The West, which judges China by its own democratic concept and mode, naturally can not find the kind of democracy in China it preaches.

On the issue of peace and security, the Chinese people, for the sake of rapid development, badly need a peaceful and friendly international environment because China is unlikely to develop without a peaceful and friendly international environment.

The Chinese people will never be so foolish as to devastate their development by doing something which will threaten the world peace and security.

However, some Western nations, which are seeking to expand their sphere of influence, view China's development as a threat to them. They failed to see the fact that China's speedy development contributes to the world peace and security, but also. And what is more, they also failed to realize what sufferings will befall China and the world's peace and security if China wanes again.
First, the rarely vast market of China with an annual trade of nearly 300 billion U.S. dollars and millions of job opportunities would be gone, and a wave of millions of Chinese refugees surging would flow across the whole world.

The bitter dispute on human rights between China and some Western countries involves whether to respect facts, which should not be based on hearsays.

The human rights situation in China should be judged in the angle of history. It is well-advised to check by comparison whether it has been improved or worsened than before, and which are principal, achievements or mistakes.

I was born in old China. In my opinion, by comparison between today and yesterday, China's human rights situation is in heaven rather than in hell. The right of survival -- the most pressing and important demand the Chinese people long sought for -- has been gained and ensured.

But, some gentlemen in Western states often rely on isolated happenings and distorted, exaggerated and even fabricated facts to make biased comments on China's human rights. This, naturally, leads to their failure to make a correct judgment matching with real conditions.

As a research institution, we do not intend to cover up the problems in China's human rights. We acknowledged that the human rights conditions in China are not satisfactory in many ways, and some are even serious.

The most critical problem is that the Chinese people have not entirely solved the problem of food and clothing for 58 million people, who account for five percent of the Chinese population. And those who have been relieved from poverty are still not rich enough and capable of tiding over major natural calamities and disasters.

The serious violations of human rights in China, such as kidnapping and selling women and children, and labor right abuses, are still taking place in China despite severe crack down by the law-enforcing departments.

The government has made plans to solve the problems before a fixed date. For instance, the 58 million people living in poverty now will be helped out of poverty by the year 2000.

On the whole, we think that the fair estimate on the conditions of China's human rights should be that great achievements have been made although there still exist some problems, and efforts are being made to improve. China's development will make people enjoy more human rights.

It is normal for some countries to have different views on China's human rights situation because of the different national conditions. The way to solve the difference is dialogue, which will help promote the understanding between the two sides. Confrontation should not be resorted to because it will not help solve the differences but increase contradictions and disputes.

Our current visit is aimed at having dialogues with people from all corners on the basis of mutual respect and equality. Many of you may have heard the opinions of just one side, we'd like to provide you those of another side.

We do not ask them to accept our ideas. What we hope is to make them understand why and on what basis China has taken its position on human rights.
Zhong Xinming is following in his great-uncle's footsteps. But instead of backing communist promises, Zhong is drawn to capitalist dreams.

By Jonathan Lin

Rob URRN, China—Just as his great-uncle, President Liu Shao-chi, was a leading intellectual of the communist revolution, so too is Zhong Xinming, a 27-year-old college student.

While Liu was a leader in the early years of communist China, today it is Zhong who is the primary intellectual of China's current economic reform. Liu was an important figure in the early years of communist China, but today it is Zhong who is the primary intellectual of China's current economic reform.

Liu had a profound influence on the development of Chinese society, and his ideas continue to shape the country today. Liu's work has had a lasting impact on China, and his ideas continue to be studied and debated.

As such, Liu is a key figure in the study of Chinese history and politics. Liu's work has had a profound impact on China, and his ideas continue to be studied and debated.

Liu's ideas have been influential in shaping the current economic reform in China. Liu's ideas have been influential in shaping the current economic reform in China.

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On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the full text of which appears in the following pages. Following this historic act the Assembly called upon all Member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and "to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories."

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
proclaims

THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3.

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4.

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

http://www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm
Article 8.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14.

(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 15.

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16.

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17.

(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22.

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.

(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24.

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25.

(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26.
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27.

(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28.

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29.

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
China by the Numbers: Portrait of a Nation

Photo ops are one thing, but facts are another. Here's what the statistics say about progress in China—and how far the country still has to go.

The Economy

Wages may be low, but Chinese families average a staggering 25 percent savings rate. And foreign investment is booming.

Stock Exchange

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Shanghai B Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GNP per Capita (U.S.$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>40,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>3,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>28,020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreign Investments in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct foreign invest</td>
<td>$3.49</td>
<td>$40.18</td>
<td>$41.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio investment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial lending</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>23.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The People

Unlike their Western peers, most of China's Generation Xers can expect a much better life than their parents.

Population Shift

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Daily Life

- In 1990, there were just 240,700 privately owned cars and buses. By 1996 the number had topped 1.4 million.
- The number of telephones has increased from 5.5 million in 1990 to 15.1 million rural.

The Country

China is the most populous nation in the world with more than 1.2 billion people living on 3.7 million square miles.

Population in Millions

- 1-30
- 31-50
- 51 and above
Military and Government

As nuclear tensions in Asia escalate, China's role is being scrutinized. And despite the releases, human-rights abuse continues.

Human Rights
- More than 200,000 people are in prison without being charged or tried for a crime
- Thousands of Tibetan monks and nuns have been arbitrarily detained or tortured
- 2,500 people were executed in 1997 for crimes ranging from stealing a bicycle to murder

The Environment

China is finally starting to clean up decades of pollution. But rivers are filthy — and drinking water increasingly endangered.

Water Demand
- In 1990, municipal water demand was 2.3 billion cubic meters.
- By 2000, demand is projected to exceed 29 billion cubic meters.
- Water for industry is projected to increase in 2000 to 177 billion cubic meters from the 46 billion used in 1980
In San Francisco, between 1990-95, 4.1 out of every 100 murders were caused by police shootings. And not a single police officer has been sued for shooting at random in the city, though there were 1,000-2,000 complaints against local police officers each year.

In the last five years, 756 former law enforcement officials have been convicted of corruption, brutal conduct and other crimes, setting a new record in this regard. By June 1999, there had been 655 inmates in federal prisons who were formerly law enforcement officials, compared with 107 inmates in 1994, an increase of five times, according to USA Today's report on July 29, 1999.

The United States, which calls itself the "land of the free," ranks first in the world in the proportion of prisoners among its population. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the US Department of Justice in 1999, the number of American adults in prison, on probation and on parole topped 5.92 million in 1998, accounting for 3 per cent of the total population. In all 1.82 million of them were incarcerated in state or federal prisons, more than double the figure of 744,000 reported at the end of 1985 and setting a new record.

Between 1985-98, the number of prisoners in the country increased by 7.3 per cent annually. Meanwhile, the imprisonment rate went up by more than 100 per cent as the number of prisoners out of every 100,000 Americans increased from 313 to 668.

This year, AFP reported on February 16 that by February 15 the number of American prisoners had topped 2 million, to account for one-fourth of the world's total, ranking the US first in the world.

In overcrowded American prisons, inmates are mistreated and violence is commonplace. Between 1990-97, the average jail term of American prisoners increased from 22 months to 27 months, while the rate of inmates to be released dropped to 31 per cent from 37 per cent every year; the number of paroled convicts sentenced again increased by 39 per cent; and the number of new inmates rose by 4 per cent, according to a report by Chicago Tribune on March 22, 1999. By December 31, 1998, state prisons reported they were housing 13-22 per cent more convicts than their facilities were designed to accommodate. That figure was 27 per cent in federal prisons and 100 per cent in 33 state prisons.

The New York Times reported in April of 1999, that in a prison in Nassau County in the state of New York, a shockingly large number of inmates had been brutally beaten and some died as a result of abuse. None of the prison guards involved were charged with criminal behaviour.

In 1999, there were over 36,000 elderly inmates, compared with around 9,500 in the early 1980s. Over 220,000 more inmates are expected to join the ranks of the aged within 10 years.

American prisons have used a large number of inmates as labourers to generate profits. These prisoner-workers are paid between US$0.23 and US$1.15 a day, though the minimum wage set by the US Government stands at US$5.15 per hour.

The Boston Globe reported on September 26, 1999, that prisoners in 94 federal prisons under the US Department of Justice were working for a company to manufacture electronic parts, furniture, clothing and other goods. In 1998, the company generated nearly US$540 million in sales.

Some American prisons have begun to charge prisoners for imprisonment. American companies
that were looking for cheap labour abroad in the 1980s are now taking advantage of the 1.8 million prisoner-labourers at home. Two American firms have signed contracts with government departments on managing and charging nearly 100,000 inmates in over 100 jails. The two contractors would charge US$35 per prisoner per day for food and management and could earn US$12.78 million within the contract term, if the number of the prisoners would not decline, the US Insight Weekly reported in its May 4, 1999 edition.

The United States insists that there are no political prisoners in the country. But the April 29, 1999 issue of the US-based bi-monthly Workers' World reported that at least 150 political prisoners were jailed in the country. Many of them were incarcerated as a result of an FBI counter-intelligence operation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which targeted all those who took part in campaigns against oppression and Southeast Asian wars and supported the independence of Puerto Rico. Some 768 members of the Black Panther organization were arrested and jailed following the FBI operation.

The self-proclaimed freedom of the United States has always served the interests of a small number of wealthy people. In 1998, a book titled "The Buy of Congress: How Special Interests Have Stolen Your Right to Life, Liberty, & the Pursuit of Happiness" was published in the United States, exposing how the US Congress has become a tool of special interest groups.

According to the book, between 1987-96, 500 large American companies donated at least US$182 million to congressmen and US$73 million to Democratic and Republican parties.

In the same period, "donations" from major US cigarette manufacturers to congressmen and the two parties exceeded US$30 million. Health and medical companies donated US$72 million to congressmen, while the US Congress helped large and medium-sized firms reduce the cost of medical insurance for their employees.

Although gun-related tragedies have become all too common in the United States, the National Rifle Association (NRA) spent US$1.5 million over a two-month period to lobby the congressmen who bowed to the NRA and vetoed a gun control bill which was strongly favored by the majority of the American people. The veto of the bill, coupled with other practices, has soured the American people on politics, and the voting rate for the 1998 mid-term election hit a record low of 36.1 per cent. Compared with 1994, voting rates in 36 states declined, with a 4.3 per cent drop for Republican voters and a 2.1 per cent fall for Democrats.

The United States claims that it has a free press. In fact, the American media has become a propaganda machine used by the authorities to manipulate public opinion.

According to a statistical and analytical study of CNN's reports on Kosovo, among all the CNN stories on the Kosovo crisis, 68.3 per cent were one-sided with the sources of information tightly in the hands of the US officials, while 50 per cent of the reports were based on sources from the US Government, 26.5 per cent from NATO and the Kosovo Liberation Army, and 14.7 per cent from Albanian refugees in Kosovo.

A recent nationwide survey in the United States indicated that only 2 per cent of Americans believe what journalists report, just 5 per cent trust the accuracy of local TV news programmes, and 1 per cent trust radio show hosts.
Goals, Objectives, and Assumptions Regarding the Teaching

Of Intercultural Communication

Introduction

As a result of participating in the Summer 2000 Fulbright Program, China: Tradition and Transformation, my final curriculum project goal is to develop and teach an Intercultural Communication class. Based upon conducting an assiduous review of contemporaneous research findings, I have applied and extended existing concepts and theories. The course will have an "East-West" focus, using examples from China and the United States, respectively. First, I will discuss the rationale and define the assumptions or premises I will use to conceptualize a course in Intercultural Communication. Second, I will define the goals and objectives this course will be based on. Finally, I will present my extension and contribution to the literature using 17 continuums to plot out the major dimensions and indices of cultural variability. The use of continuums will allow students to understand the dialectical tensions prevalent among the dimensions of cultural variability.

Rationale

Developing an Intercultural Communication class at the community college level serves multiple goals and objectives for students. The primary goal is twofold: first, to develop an awareness of and sensitivity to culturally diverse others. Second, to help my students develop a repertoire of communication strategies and competencies they can appropriate in a myriad of cultural contexts, locally and globally. These two goals are based upon the notion that students need knowledge and skills to more effectively participate and communicate in an electronic global village. Developing intercultural competencies are also consistent with both college-wide and discipline-specific objectives to help students gain an understanding of and sensitivity to social and cultural diversity.

Assumptions

Communication: Intercultural Communication is best understood and conceptualized as a type of communication that is similar to intracultural communication. Instead of viewing intercultural communication and its underlying processes as being unique or different from other forms of communication, I will make the assumption that the underlying processes are not necessarily different, except perhaps in degree. All communication is, to some extent, intercultural in nature, as individuals are invariably unique representing
differences on cultural, demographic, and sociological levels. The degree of “interculturalness” of any given interaction is dependent upon the degree of heterogeneity or heterophily between communicators. The greater the heterogeneity between communicators, the greater the interculturalness of the interaction, the lesser the heterogeneity, or homogeneity, the interaction is less intercultural.

**Culture**: Cultures can be examined using two distinct perspectives. The first, an *emic* approach, examines a culture from within by trying to understand and ascertain cultural dimensions from the members of a particular culture. The second approach, an *etic* approach, the one to be used in this project, examines not a single culture but rather enables the comparison of one culture to another. This “inter” cultural examination and comparison is enabled by the delineation of unique dimensions or characteristics that can be used to describe and compare cultures. In short, cultures are compared using predefined dimensions of variability.

**Culture-Specific versus Cultural-General**: Additionally, this project will represent a hybrid approach of two basic approaches to the study of culture. A hybrid approach will allow a richer discovery of knowledge and a greater balance in terms of the depth and breadth of coverage. By incorporating elements of a culture-specific approach, students will learn specific, qualitative, rich data. And by incorporating elements of a culture-general approach, students will learn about broader dimensions that can be used to understand, describe, and differentiate between people representing differing cultures, ethnic groups, races, co-cultures, or other marginalized peoples. In sum, a hybrid approach enables students to explore domestic, national, international, and co-cultures.

**Learners**: This project will address three major components or outcomes of student learning: Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral. Most research suggests that introductory courses in intercultural communication solely emphasize cognitive components and outcomes. However, an ideal approach will capitalize on each component, enabling students to appropriate intercultural communication competence into their personal repertoire of communication behaviors. Communication competence will serve as a major student outcome for successful completion of the course. The three components of student learning directly relate to the three major components of communication competence: Knowledge, Motivation, and Skills. Knowledge is cognitive, motivation is affective, and skills are behavioral.

**Instructor Communicator Style**: As instructors, we need to move away from our own culture of origin and orientation and move toward what has been called a third-culture or “intercultural personhood.” This “other” orientation must be modeled in order to facilitate a student’s ability to learn and apply intercultural
awareness, sensitivity, and finally to develop intercultural competencies. This instructional style can be achieved by modeling specific examples of effective intercultural communication. For example, language usage needs to be considered. Language needs to be accurate, cogent and free from ethnocentric, racial, ethnic, gender, sexual, and other biases or stereotypes. Students will have the opportunity to explore the assumptions and perceptions of their own culture and co-culture as well as those of others.

Goals & Objectives

- To apply and extend dimensions of cultural variability.
- To define new dimensions of cultural variability.
- To conceptualize variables of culture by using an etic approach thereby allowing students to compare one culture with another using dimensions of cultural variability: A culture general approach.
- To conceptualize divergent cultures, not as diametrically opposed dichotomies, but rather as falling out on a continuum.
- To examine two cultures, the United States and China, by applying and extending existing dimensions and defining new dimensions of cultural variability: A culture specific approach.
- To conceptualize the dimensions of cultural variability based upon process and contradiction: the basic tenets of dialectical theory.
- To conceptualize intercultural communication as sharing the same underlying processes of other forms and types of communication.
- To apply real world examples from the above defined cultures.
- To recognize that the dimensions and variables used to compare one culture with another, represent general patterns of behavior; however, individual variety and exception can be found. In short, not all members of a particular culture share or manifest the general patterns of this cultural level of analysis, particularly those members who strongly identify with a co-culture of the primary or dominant culture.
To develop a greater appreciation for and awareness of other cultures (e.g. China).

To decrease our myopic ethnocentric perception - to increase our intercultural communication competencies.

**Evaluation**

As a new offering, and our first 200-level communication class in the Speech Communication/Drama discipline, I will rely heavily upon student feedback, suggestion, and other input. I plan to administer student evaluations and questionnaires with numerical and open-ended responses. Finally, I will administer a series of self-report instruments designed to assess student's cognitive, affective, and behavioral outcomes; the three major domains for human learners. As defined above, these three readily apply to the three major dimensions of communication competence: knowledge, motivation, and skills.
### An Adaptation of Hall’s Dimensions of Cultural Variability: Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Context</th>
<th>High Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous population</td>
<td>Homogeneous population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit and overt</td>
<td>Implicit and covert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information embedded in verbalized, spoken, linguistic messages</td>
<td>Information is imbedded in the non-verbal message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust and value upon the written and spoken word</td>
<td>Trust and value upon physical and social context, setting, and environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content orientation</td>
<td>Context orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value speaking; speaking is silver</td>
<td>Value listening; silence is gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions on the surface</td>
<td>Reactions often reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragile interpersonal bonds</td>
<td>Strong interpersonal bonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head-to-head</td>
<td>Heart-to-heart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth in language; truth achieved from language usage</td>
<td>Truth in belly; truth found from within self and context (Japanese Horagei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The squeaky wheel gets the oil.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The nail that sticks out gets hammered down.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Say what you mean and mean what you say.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a stronger need to be verbally explicit in a heterogeneous culture to ascertain “the truth.&quot;</td>
<td>There is less need to be verbally explicit with a homogenous culture and members need not articulate their thoughts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An Adaptation of Hall's Dimensions of Cultural Variability: Proxemics and Territoriality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USA Large Personal Space</th>
<th>CHINA Small Personal Space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large Personal Space (Proxemics &amp; Territoriality-Movable and Fixed Space)</th>
<th>Small Personal Space (Proxemics &amp; Territoriality- Movable and Fixed Space)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain large personal, invisible bubble</td>
<td>Maintain small personal, invisible bubble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use and take up greater amounts of space</td>
<td>Use and take up lesser amounts of space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred comfort level is far away, especially for men</td>
<td>Preferred comfort level is close-in for both women and men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking and assumption of proprietary rights over &quot;my turf,&quot; place, or object</td>
<td>Less use and assumption of &quot;my space&quot; or personalization of place or object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;You are invading my space-back off!&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Shared space and quarters are common in urban areas&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive &quot;dances&quot; to maintain a &quot;distant&quot; comfort zone.</td>
<td>Relaxed rules and norms regarding spatial usage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An Adaptation of Hall’s Dimensions of Cultural Variability: Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monochronic Time</th>
<th>Polychronic Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time is linear, segmented, and precise</td>
<td>Time is circular and cyclical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control time</td>
<td>Laissez-faire attitude toward time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-thing-at-a-time</td>
<td>Do many things at once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time is “tangible” and able to be manipulated</td>
<td>Time is less tangible; it just exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A stitch in time saves nine”</td>
<td>“There is a rhythm to life”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Time is money”</td>
<td>“As long as our Ying and Yang are in balance everything else will just work out”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadlines, schedules where individuals are trying to save, earn, spend, waste, and use time-cutting strategies.</td>
<td>Time is a part of the context and the world and as such merely exists as a part of a greater immutable whole.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### A Continuum of Hofstede's 4 Value Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Collectivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual goal; idiocentric</td>
<td>Group goal; allocentric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I, self, me orientation</td>
<td>We, communal, other orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis upon Independence and privacy</td>
<td>Emphasis upon dependence and belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights, rewards</td>
<td>Obligations, loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous population</td>
<td>Homogeneous population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- "God helps those who help themselves."
- "The nail that sticks out gets hammered down."
- "A gun will shoot the bird that flies higher than others."

| Popularity of self-help section of your local library/bookstore. | Payment of $ to extended-family members. |
### A Continuum of Hofstede's 4 Value Dimensions: Gender Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Masculinity</th>
<th>Femininity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental/task focus</td>
<td>Relational/people focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value things, power, and assertiveness</td>
<td>Value people, quality of life, and nurturance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit-driven</td>
<td>Climate and context sensitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Independence</td>
<td>Value Interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek status</td>
<td>Seek connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Androcentric</td>
<td>Gynocentric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly defined or differentiated sex roles with value upon ideals of masculinity.</td>
<td>Less defined sex roles with value upon androgyny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Real men don't eat quiche&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Women and men alike can be supportive, nurturing, and caring&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The prevalence of sexist language and the existence of differential salary rates between women and men, as women only make 75 cents to a man's dollar.</td>
<td>Men and women alike maintain close physical proximity, touch, hug, and hold hands; androgynous and feminine behavior and artifacts are common.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Continuum of Hofstede’s 4 Value Dimensions: Power Distance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Power Distance</th>
<th>High Power Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal distribution of and access to power</td>
<td>Unequal, inequitable power distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal distribution of power</td>
<td>Vertical distribution of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in age, sex, generation, and status are maximized</td>
<td>Differences in age, sex, status, and roles are minimized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The boss is no different than I; he or she goes to the bathroom just like me”</td>
<td>“Everything has a place and everyone has a role to play”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professors are perceived as approachable and thus can be challenged, questioned, or even be fallible.</td>
<td>Professors are perceived as elders who must be accorded much power and respect and deference in the public setting of a classroom.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### A Continuum of Hofstede’s 4 Value Dimensions: Uncertainty

- **USA**
  - **Low Uncertainty Avoidance**
  - Tolerance for and comfortable with uncertainty, ambiguity, and change
  - Demonstrate greater flexibility and ability to manage large number of possible outcomes
  - Establish many formal rules, rituals, and ceremonies; intolerant of deviant ideas, and believe in absolute truths.
  - “The uncertainty in life is a continuous hazard that must be avoided”
  - Spontaneous, informal meetings at coffeehouses, “Dutch” treats for meals.

- **CHINA**
  - **High Uncertainty Avoidance**
  - Attempt to reduce uncertainty; uncomfortable with change and new situations; avoid ambiguity
  - Need predictability and structure; avoid risk-taking
  - Establish few formal rules, tolerant of the unusual, and rely, not only on experts, but on themselves, and common sense.
  - “Life should be a dance, not a race”
  - Formal hosting and toasting @ meals; gift-giving/receiving required @ meetings.
### Kluckhohn's and Strodtbeck's 5 Value Dimensions: Activity Orientation

#### Doing Orientation

- **Value activity and doing**
- **Activity measured by external standards**
- **Americans obsession with planning as exemplified by pocket planners, palm computers, and schedules for all our daily activities**
- **"What do you do?"**
- **"No sooner said than done- so acts your man of worth."**
- **"Idle hands are the devil's workshop."**

#### Being Orientation

- **Value spontaneous and current activity**
- **Being at one with the present; living in the here and now**
- **The emphasis on meditation or contemplation found in Hindu and Buddhist religions. The custom or spending much quality time with extended family- just being with them**
- **"The individual is NOT the active agent; he or she is to remain calm, and truth eventually will make itself apparent."**
Kluckhohn’s and Strodtbeck’s 5 Value Orientations:

**Human Nature**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evil Human Nature</th>
<th>Good Human Nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People are intrinsically evil and act irrationally</td>
<td>People are intrinsically good and rational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek to control people with institutions (e.g., religious or political)</td>
<td>Culture or institutions can make people evil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing can ever be made&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Human nature is originally good&quot; &quot;In spite of everything, I still believe that people are really good at heart&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With hard work, control, and self discipline, one can overcome immorality, hedonism, and evil and achieve goodness.</td>
<td>People are intrinsically good and as long as they act in accordance with their very nature, good fate and karma will be with them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Kluckhohn's and Strodtbeck's 5 Value Orientations: Person Nature

#### Humans Control Nature
- Need to conquer and direct the forces of nature for our own advantage
- Separation from nature
- Value upon technology, change, and science as means to subjugate nature
- "Man must subdue the earth"
- "We must conquer space, tame our vast wilderness, and exploit our natural resources."
- Urgency of economic, scientific, technological, and genetic development, advancement, and manipulation of our world.

#### Humans Subject to Nature
- Need to accept that the forces of nature are beyond one's control
- Connection, oneness with nature; perception of a harmonious world
- Attempt to live in harmony with and be a part of nature
- "Human kind has not woven the web of life. We are but one thread within it..."
- The sense of life that a natural order and force is present that occurs without the influence of man. A sense of peace regarding traffic flows, adverse weather, and other natural occurrences of life.
Kluckhohn's and Strodtbeck's 5 Value Dimensions: Relational

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Collectivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value upon individual’s equal rights and control over their destiny</td>
<td>Value upon group needs and goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The squeaky wheel gets the oil&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;No matter how stout, one beam cannot support a home&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God and country entitle me to my personal rights.</td>
<td>It takes an extended family or village to raise a child.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Kluckhohn's and Strodtbeck's 5 Value Dimensions: Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USA</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future</strong></td>
<td><strong>Past</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future Time Orientation</th>
<th>Past Time Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value future and optimistic expectancy of its great promises</td>
<td>Value past events and history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value change - a save for tomorrow mentality</td>
<td>History, traditions, and religions are valued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value contemporanity and don't want to be left behind (e.g., rule of the hammer with the latest technology)</td>
<td>Time is perceived as circular in nature with events naturally recurring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“If at first you don’t succeed, try, try, and try again.”</td>
<td>“The past is as clear as a mirror, the future as dark as lacquer.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Yesterday is not ours to recover, but tomorrow is ours to win or to lose.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A tendency for individuals to not be in the “here and now” and to instead live for tomorrow.</td>
<td>China’s nationalistic pride in their 3000-year plus history - significant increases of intra-China travel and visits to cultural artifacts and sites between and among provinces by both Hans and ethnic minorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Korn’s Adaptation of Hall’s Dimensions of Cultural Variability: Contact and Touch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Contact/Touch</th>
<th>High Contact/Touch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooler Climate</td>
<td>Warmer climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less eye contact</td>
<td>More eye contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require greater proxemic zones</td>
<td>Require lesser proxemic distances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touch Avoidant</td>
<td>Touch Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Don’t touch the merchandise”</td>
<td>“Touch is symbolic and helps define the intensity of the relationship”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposite-sex touch more prevalent.</td>
<td>Same-sex touch more prevalent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Korn's Continuum of Self-Disclosure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Openness</th>
<th>Closedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-disclosure is characterized by high breadth and high depth</td>
<td>Self-disclosure is characterized by low breadth and low depth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe in the ideal of the &quot;transparent self&quot; for self-disclosive communication</td>
<td>Believe in the ideal of the &quot;opaque self&quot; for self-disclosive communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum social penetration vis-à-vis: sexuality, self-esteem, pre-marital sex, etc.</td>
<td>Minimum social penetration vis-à-vis family rules obligations, duties, and responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-affirmation, self development, and self-aggrandization via open communication; openness to self-disclosive communication and other's communication.</td>
<td>The emphasis upon self is under-valued while the emphasis upon the group, family, and relationships is valued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;We must avoid running amok&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;We are a tell it all culture; a confessional culture&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk, meta-communication, and maximum disclosure is highly valued in our personal and professional relationships.</td>
<td>Silence and implicit is understanding is valued in both personal and professional relationships.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Korn's Continuum of "Stranger" for defining Intercultural Communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Familiar</th>
<th>Unfamiliar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Uncertainty</td>
<td>High Uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Intercultural Communication Apprehension</td>
<td>High Intercultural Communication Apprehension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Intercultural Communication Competence</td>
<td>Low Intercultural Communication Competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Similarity</td>
<td>Perceived Dissimilarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relate to one another as personalized individuals</td>
<td>Relate to one another as generalized others or role occupants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Birds of a feather flock together&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Opposites attract&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk with those who are similar to or are familiar with us is easy, predictable and relatively satisfying.</td>
<td>Talk with those who are dissimilar to or are unfamiliar with us is difficult, unpredictable and relatively challenging, often with mixed results.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
China's Continuum of Tradition and Transformation:  
A Dialectic of Process & Change from Communism to Capitalism

Tradition (Communism) __________ Transformation (Capitalism)
References


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What's a Person to Think About China?

Introductory Remarks

This unit is designed for students who already have some familiarity with the changes that have occurred in China in the past twenty years: the four modernizations, Tiananmen Square, the rapid conversion of the country from a state-controlled planned economy to a market economy, and the debate over the entry of China into the World Trade Organization.

I use (and adapt) the Teachers' Curriculum Institute (TCI) materials on China: "Dynastic and Communist China," a comparison through art; "The Shifting Winds of Change," which moves students from dynastic China to the revolution, period of Soviet assistance, the Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, and the reforms of 80's under Deng Xiao Ping. Then students watch the movie "To Live" and create a storybook telling the story of the movie's one family as it experiences the changes of the last 50 years' history.

The lesson presented here is a two or three day unit that I will use in my classroom in mid-January after I complete the above sequence. It could be used in any of the standard high school social studies classes.

The specific rationale for this activity is to give students the information and the tools so that they can define their own feelings and opinions regarding current events in China and the media coverage of the "China problem." Many of the students in the San Francisco Unified School District have roots in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Within the US Chinese community there are voices supporting and condemning the governmental policies of Peoples' Republic of China, the leadership in Taiwan and the United States. The controversies revolving around campaign contributions, copyright infringement, religious persecution, sweatshops, high-tech espionage and the selling of nuclear secrets are often on the evening news. There is a constant flow of "China bashing" in the press and on the evening news. Many students admitted they felt personally attacked "as Chinese" during the Wen Ho Lee saga. Organized labor and human rights groups cry out against the exporting of jobs to China and inhuman working conditions; yet students continue to flock to the Nike Superstore and the Gap to buy the latest fashion statement though they hear that the clothes on their back may have been made with prison slave labor. On the other hand, China now will be admitted into the WTO. President Clinton has argued that the more communication the west has with China, the more China will open up and democratize. The Chinese tell us to keep out of their business.
In short, this is a very complicated situation and the perfect opportunity for students to come to terms with the complexity of this issue - to understand that, as with most issues in the modern world, it is all not black and white. I think this is especially significant in the winter of 2000 in the aftermath of the "chad controversy" where each side was adamant in its righteousness. No issue worth discussing is that simple or clear-cut. The state of US-China relations is obviously too complicated an issue for most of us, let alone high school students - but at least they can begin to sort out the differing voices they hear. The readings in the unit focus on human rights and democratization within China. The issues of Tibet and Taiwan are not discussed.

This year I am engaged in a seminar with professors from San Francisco State University and classroom teachers from other San Francisco public high schools. The seminar focuses on the requisite reading and writing skills needed for college success for those students who have not spent their high school careers in honors and advanced placement classes. Accordingly, for the Fulbright lesson I have chosen a read and summarize/synthesize activity. It is becoming increasingly obvious to me that the students I teach will try to avoid that most necessary of academic activities and that I have often accommodated them by making history "fun." I regularly provide them with very meaningful and engaging activities that bypass the need to serious reading.

Some of the reading materials have been taken from the 2000 summer seminar's briefing binder; others have been taken from local newspapers; others are from the Internet (PBS Newshour, Human Rights Watch, New York Times.) There are hundreds of sites that deal with the subject. Those included in the packet are but a handful of those that I previewed. I am sure that I will find more, better readings in the future. The articles spiral from straightforward, factual reports to abstract and theoretical essays that demand a much higher reading level. The teacher should decide how to assign the articles based on the reading level of the students. Set Z is the most difficult, U the least.

Objectives: Students will:

- demonstrate their understanding of the complexity human rights and democracy issues in China:
  - by reading and summarizing main points in a series of articles and essays;
  - by presenting these main points to group members;
  - by listening to and taking notes on points made by other group members.
- refine and define their own opinions on US attitudes and actions toward China by placing their position on a continuum of possibilities;
- further demonstrate their understanding through a writing activity.

Guiding Question: What should be the attitudes and actions of the United States toward the People's Republic of China?

Scenario
A new Secretary of State has just been confirmed and will have to come up with a China policy. The class will operate as a think tank, sift through essays, interviews, news articles and speeches, and make a presentation to the new Secretary.

This is a group activity - a jigsaw with home groups of five and expert groups of six. I am assuming a class size of 30 students - which is what my class of 34 is on any given day. Arrange students in home groups - of varying ability: six groups of five students each. Identify students in the group as Z-Y-X-W-V-U - corresponding to the reading sets for the expert group activity.
Introductory activities:

Bash and Praise China - have students in their groups come up with things they have heard people say about China today - at home or in the media: positives and negatives. Each group reports to the class. Develop a list of controversial issues in the relationship between China and the United States.

Create a continuum of possible attitudes to take toward China. Many vocal students expound throughout the year that the US should mind its own business and not have anything to do with any other country. This discussion could be lengthy. Use your discretion. The end result should be a continuum from isolation to complete engagement.

- Isolate China until it conforms to US notions of democracy and human rights.
- Work with China and encourage businesses to expand there but keep up the pressure on issues of environment, labor rights, democratic institutions, religious freedom
- Focus on the opening up of China, notice the changes that have taken place, and realize that with increased exposure to the ways of the west, the desired changes will come.
- Let China handle its own internal affairs and deal with it on an international level as with other nations.

Use this or one that students have created in the class discussion, make copies to be used at the later stage of their home group discussion.

Pre-reading activity - some terms to go over for the group as a whole. It may be necessary to do more vocabulary work with some classes or groups as they are reading in the expert groups.

AFL-CIO
Amnesty International
collective ownership
delink
exports, imports
hard-line
human rights abuses
International Declaration of Human Rights
most favored nation
nuclear proliferation
PNTR - Permanent Normal Trade Relations
political repression
retaliatory trade relationship
religious persecution
rudimentary institutions of governance
rule of law
unfair trade practices
WTO - World Trade Organization
Introductory Reading - Distribute to students President Clinton's May 26, 1997 announcement about "delinking" human rights and Most Favored Nation status. (pages 6,7) Reading this together as a class will serve as a good introduction to the ideas discussed in the reading. When I do this with the class, I will demonstrate note-taking techniques. Hand out to the students the "Student Instructions" page (5.)

Reading the Documents - If there is enough time in the period I will hand these out to students while they are still in their home groups and have them get started on silent reading and note-taking. Hand out the note-taking grid - or two (page 8) and direct the students to look for ideas that fit the listed categories. They will then be asked to complete the reading at home and come to class the next day prepared to sit in their expert groups and discuss and pool their information.

Expert Groups - I usually assume that some won't have done much reading and give up to ten minutes of silence before they discuss. Each group should select a discussion coordinator who will conduct a round-robin discussion for each category. Students add to their notes; have extra copies of the grid available. Once they have shared their information, ask them to prioritize and decide on four or five main ideas to take back to their home groups.

Home Groups - Students select a coordinator and secretary for their home group discussion. The secretary records on butcher paper the main ideas from each expert. When all groups are ready, hand out one copy of the "Foreign Policy Spectrum" (page 9.) The coordinator leads a discussion to determine what advice this group would give to the Secretary of State.

Whole Class Wrap-up Discussion - The teacher conducts a discussion with the whole class - asking various students to report on point their groups thought important and then arriving at a class consensus on where on the foreign policy spectrum the US should be.

Follow-up Activity One - A brief writing activity on writing concessives: "Although the US has some valid objections to the pace of democratization in China, closing the door and excluding China from full participation in the world business community will only impede the growth of democracy." "Although criticism of China's internal policies may hinder open trade with China, the US has the moral obligation to investigate and criticize abuses of human rights."

Having students create such "concession" statements is good practice for theses and essay writing.

Follow-up Activity Two - Have students write formal essay with thesis statement and topic sentences on the advanced placement model. Their reading and discussions should make setting up the essay quite easy.
Student Instructions for Groups - Sequence of Activities

Guiding Question: What should be the attitudes and actions of the United States toward the People's Republic of China? Your group is a task force that is going to make a recommendation to the new Secretary of State, Colin Powell.

Terms to know:
- delink
- most favored nation relationship
- exports, imports
- nuclear proliferation
- religious persecution
- human rights abuses
- hard-line
- political repression
- rule of law
- retaliatory trade
- unfair trade practices
- collective ownership
- Amnesty International
- WTO - World Trade Organization
- PNTR - Permanent Normal Trade Relations
- International Declaration of Human Rights
- rudimentary institutions of governance

Home Groups: Documents and Sheet for Note-taking.
Each member of the group will be given a packet of documents to read. Using the categories on the note-taking grid, record the most important information for the articles you have been given. Highlight, write all over the documents. Remember that you are gathering evidence for your position about US China relations.

Start reading and taking notes in class; complete the assignment at home tonight. Be ready to discuss the documents tomorrow.

Expert Groups: Find your group - all those who have read the same packet. After a ten-minute silent reading period, select a discussion coordinator.
- Each student presents to the group the ideas that he/she found most significant. Listen and add to your notes as others speak. Ask for another note sheet if needed.
- Coordinator leads a discussion to determine which are the four or five most significant points in the articles. Note them on the paper. Be sure that you understand them well enough to report back to your home group.

Home Groups: Return to home groups. Select a coordinator and secretary.
- The secretary records on butcher paper the main ideas of the group members.
- When ready, the coordinator gets from the teacher a handout entitled "Foreign Policy Spectrum" and leads the group in a discussion of foreign policy options. Try to reach consensus. Each member of the group should be able to report on the group’s discussion when called on by the teacher.

Whole Class Discussion: The teacher will now ask for reports from each group and try to arrive at a class consensus for a recommendation to the Secretary of State.
Good afternoon. Today I would like to announce a series of important decisions regarding the United States' policy toward China.

Our relationship with China is important to all Americans. We have significant interests in what happens there and what happens between us. China has an atomic arsenal and a vote and a veto in the UN Security Council. It is a major factor in Asian and global security. We share important interests, such as in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and in sustaining the global environment. China is also the world's fastest-growing economy. Over $8 billion of United States' exports to China last year supported over 150,000 American jobs.

I have received Secretary Christopher's letter recommending, as required by last year's executive order, reporting to me on the conditions in that executive order. He has reached a conclusion with which I agree, that the Chinese did not achieve overall significant progress in all the areas outlined in the executive order relating to human rights, even though clearly there was progress made in important areas, including the resolution of all emigration cases, the establishment of a memorandum of understanding with regard to how prison labor issues would be resolved, the adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other issues. Nevertheless, serious human rights abuses continue in China, including the arrest and detention of those who peacefully voice their opinions and the repression of Tibet's religious and cultural traditions.

The question for us now is, given the fact that there has been some progress but that not all the requirements of the executive order were met, how can we best advance the cause of human rights and the other profound interests the United States has in our relationship with China.

I have decided that the United States should renew Most-Favored-Nation trading status toward China. This decision, I believe, offers us the best opportunity to lay the basis for long-term sustainable progress in human rights and for the advancement of our other interests with China. Extending MFN will avoid isolating China and instead will permit us to engage the Chinese with not only economic contacts but with cultural, educational, and other contacts, and with a continuing aggressive effort in human rights—an approach that I believe will make it more likely that China will play a responsible role, both at home and abroad.

I am moving, therefore, to delink human rights from the annual extension of Most-Favored-Nation trading status for China. That linkage has been constructive during the past year. But I believe, based on our aggressive contacts with the Chinese in the past several months, that we have reached the end of the usefulness of that policy, and it is time to take a new path toward the achievement of our constant objectives. We need to place our relationship into a larger and more productive framework.

In view of the continuing human rights abuses, I am extending the sanctions imposed by the United States as a result of the events in Tiananmen Square, and I am also banning the import of
munitions, principally guns and ammunition, from China. I am also pursuing a new and vigorous American program to support those in China working to advance the cause of human rights and democracy.

This program will include increased broadcasts for Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, increased support for nongovernmental organizations working on human rights in China, and the development, with American business leaders, of a voluntary set of principles for business activity in China. I don't want to be misunderstood about this. China continues to commit very serious human rights abuses. Even as we engage the Chinese on military, political, and economic issues, we intend to stay engaged with those in China who suffer from human rights abuses. The United States must remain a champion of their liberties.

I believe the question, therefore, is not whether we continue to support human rights in China but how we can best support human rights in China and advance our other very significant issues and interests. I believe we can do it by engaging the Chinese. I believe the course I have chosen gives us the best chance of success on all fronts. We will have more contacts. We will have more trade. We will have more international cooperation. We will have more intense and constant dialogue on human rights issues. We will have that in an atmosphere which gives us the chance to see China evolve as a responsible power, ever-growing not only economically, but growing in political maturity so that human rights can be observed.

To those who argue that in view of China's human rights abuses we should revoke MFN status, let me ask you the same question that I have asked myself over and over these last few weeks as I have studied this issue and consulted people of both parties who have had experience with China over many decades. Will we do more to advance the cause of human rights if China is isolated, or if our nations are engaged in a growing web of political and economic cooperation and contacts? I am persuaded that the best path for advancing freedom in China is for the United States to intensify and broaden its engagement with that nation.

I think we have to see our relations with China within the broader context of our policies in the Asian Pacific region. A region that, after all, includes our own nation. This week, we've seen encouraging developments, progress on resolving trade frictions with the Japanese, and possible progress towards stopping North Korea's nuclear program.

I am determined to see that we maintain an active role in this region, in both its dynamic economic growth, and in its security. In three decades and three wars during this century, Americans have fought and died in the Asian Pacific to advance our ideals and our security. Our destiny demands that we continue to play an active role in the region. The actions I have taken today to advance our security, to advance our prosperity, to advance our ideals, I believe are the important and appropriate ones. I believe, in other words, this is in the strategic, economic, and political interests of both the United States and China, and I am confident that over the long run this decision will prove to be the correct one.

**US - China Relations: Note-taking Matrix**

As you read your article(s), record arguments for and against a full and open relationship with the Chinese Government. When you return to your home group, you will share the points you have recorded and will help your group decide what advice to give the Secretary of State.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Anti-China Lobby</th>
<th>The Pro-China Lobby</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reasons US should be suspicious of China</td>
<td>Chinese responses to US criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of human rights violations, lack of democracy</td>
<td>Evidence of reform and democratization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantages of a &quot;hard-line&quot; US position</td>
<td>Advantages of open US cooperation and support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Voices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**US - China Relations**  
**Foreign Policy Spectrum**

Where on this line - from A to Z - would you recommend that the US stand in its relations to the Peoples' Republic of China?

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
| Isolate China until it conforms to US notions of democracy and human rights. | Work with China and encourage businesses to expand there but keep up the pressure on issues of environment, labor rights, democratic institutions, religious freedom | Focus on the opening up of China, notice the changes that have taken place, and realize that with increased exposure to the ways of the west, the desired changes will come. | Let China handle its own internal affairs and deal with it on an international level as with other nations. |
Documents to be read for note-taking and group discussions.

There are six sets of documents to be xeroxed and distributed - one set to each member of the home groups. All those with the same document sets will meet as expert groups. Document set Z contains the most difficult reading material, set U the easiest.
Permanent NTR for China is neither merited nor necessary. It is against the US national interest. It is clear to us that Members of Congress who support PNTR are going with corporate special interests and against us, our families and futures.

**PNTR IS NOT MERITED**

1. PNTR is what the Chinese Communist regime wants most of all because it means unconditional, unlimited, permanent access for Chinese-made goods into the US market. The Chinese regime and US corporations seeking to relocate production to China want PNTR because it means an end to the current annual review of China trade and guarantees permanent, unconditional, unlimited access to the US market. That review shines a spotlight of scrutiny on an otherwise totally unaccountable Chinese regime. (Congress is not voting on whether China goes into WTO. The Clinton Administration had the authority to ok this and it already did so. The question for Congress is will Congress maintain its hand in the China issue and keep its annual China review so that when China breaks all of the WTO rules or acts in some outrageous manner, Congress has a way to deal with it.)

2. PNTR is not merited because the Chinese government's dismal and worsening record on:

   a. **Labor rights:** Independent unions are illegal in China. Trying to organize one means a long jail sentence or worse. Chinese manufacturing wages average 20 cents and hour and go as low as 13 cents are hour. The reason why US corporations are so eager for Congress to pass PNTR is that they want to take advantage of this situation. The real interest is not selling things in China because only a few elite make enough to buy much. The real interest is moving production to China. PNTR makes sure these corporations have unconditional, permanent access back into the US to sell their goods with no say by us or Congress. Already, the US trade deficit with China is over $70 billion! The International Trade Commission says PNTR would make this even worse.

   b. **Human rights:** In 1994, the Clinton Administration changed US policy, "delinking" human rights from trade policy. Their argument: free trade means more freedom in society. Yet, every year since "delinkage", human rights conditions in China have gotten worse. Separating trade and human right was a failed experiment. It must not be locked in with PNTR. Now, every democracy, free speech, labor and religious activist is either in

http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/china/talkingpts.htm

12/17/00
jail or exiled away from China. Millions of Chinese are in forced labor camps as punishment for wanting the most basic freedoms - to elect their leaders or to speak freely. The Clinton Administration destroyed the effectiveness of the annual review by delinking it from human rights and other concerns. However, before this Administration put this tool on the shelf, it was used effectively! We need to keep it for future Administrations and Congresses.

- Threats against US national security: Even with the heightened scrutiny that comes with this big vote, the Chinese regime announced in recent weeks that it will soon lose "patience" and invade Taiwan and force that democratic nation to reunite with Communist China. The US had pledged to fight on Taiwan's side if that war started. How is China ready to pick that fight? It is using the hard currency it earns by selling 42% of its total exports to the US to buy up Russian war ships and planes and to develop cutting edge military capacity. Exiled Chinese democracy activist Harry Wu, who escaped to the US after decades in the Chinese gulag, makes a key point: giving PNTR locks in a trade policy which is paying for arming a country that has threatened to attack our allies and whose military threatened the US by noting that it now had missiles that could reach the US west coast and bomb LA.

- Religious freedom: People who seek religious freedom in China are imprisoned. There are only five officially recognized religions in China, and each is tightly controlled by the government. For instance, China recognizes only the Catholic Patriotic Movement as its "Catholic Church," but that sham is not recognized by the Vatican as a Catholic Church. The Vatican believes there are as many as 10 million "underground" Catholics. In the past year several Bishops ordained and recognized by the Vatican have been detained and a long list of priests and nuns have been imprisoned. Recently, the 80-year-old Archbishop ordained by the Pope but not recognized by China disappeared. Many people believe he has been arrested again. In the past year the Chinese government has conducted severe crackdowns on Protestants. Protestant churches have been raided with followers and Bibles swept up by police. The highest holy person in the Buddhist religion is the Dalai Lama, yet no picture of him is allowed to be displayed. Indeed, many Tibetans are serving long prison terms for the crime of posting his likeness. Amnesty International reports that the hundreds of teenage girl and boy Buddhist monks jailed in Tibet face horrible abuse, from systematic rape to starvation.

- Violating all past trade, human rights, anti-prison labor, endangered species and other treaties. The Congress must not give the Chinese regime the PNTR blank check because China has shown itself to systematically break its international commitments. Congress needs to keep its hand in, given this record, to protect the US national interest.

PNTR IS NOT NECESSARY

3. PNTR is also not necessary: even if Congress opposes China PNTR, US exporters still would obtain the potential trade benefits of China's WTO accession under the 1979 US-China Agreement. Proponents of PNTR say PNTR is necessary to avoid putting US businesses at a competitive disadvantage relative to other WTO countries if China joins the WTO. This is a lie. (Offer the Member of Congress the longer Public Citizen memo on this as backup if needed.)

http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/china/talkingpts.htm 12/17/00
The November 1999 US-China WTO deal is not a separate trade agreement that somehow fails if Congress rejects PNTR. PNTR boosters have tried to confuse Congress about this: that November 1999 deal is only the US contribution to what will be the overall WTO terms under which China enters the WTO. All the other countries get everything the US negotiators got and the US gets whatever the other countries negotiators get. What the US got is already locked in and now other countries are trying to get more. Congress' vote on PNTR has NOTHING to do with this.

4. The Administration and the business boosters of PNTR do not want Congress to know about the 1979 Agreement. The 1979 Agreement automatically renews every three years and which is the basis for billions of dollars of current US-China trade. The 1979 Agreement provides US farmers and manufacturers with the identical benefits China must give all WTO nations if it joins the WTO. The 1979 Agreement unequivocally requires that the US and China "shall" grant each other "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity" they grant to any other nation (1) This means that China must give the US the same best treatment it gives any other nation. If China enters the WTO, that "best treatment" will be the WTO terms China gives other nations. Thus, claims by the Administration that U.S. goods alone would miss out on the significant tariff cuts that the Administration is touting as a key result of China's WTO entry or that US businesses would still face domestic content or performance requirements are false.

5. The U.S. could have the best of both worlds: tariff cuts and other trade benefits required if China enters the WTO and effective enforcement via US measures such as speedier domestic surge-protection, anti-dumping laws, and Section 301 which WTO forbids.

If Congress passes PNTR, the US would be required to only use the WTO to enforce China's trade commitments. WTO rules would forbid the US from ever again using the speedy and effective US unilateral trade enforcement tools such as Section 301 and the US anti-dumping laws. These are the laws on which Steelworkers jobs rely - but passing PNTR means these laws can never be used on China again. This is outrageous, because it's the trade sanctions that come under these US laws that have been the only thing that China has responded to in the past as far as cleaning up it act on trade. It makes sense: using our US laws we have the leverage of threatening to cut off an export market that takes 42% of China's goods. In the WTO we are one of 136 countries and as we have seen with assorted WTO fights with Europe, WTO dispute resolution takes at least two years (our jobs are long gone!) and is enforced by something entirely missing in China: commitment to the rule of law.

6. The US has nothing to lose by maintaining the annual review and taking a "trust but verify" approach to China trade while reviewing whether China follows its WTO commitments. The US has plenty to lose by granting PNTR: we lose use of our effective trade enforcement tools, we lose the leverage of the annual congressional review of China's record and we would face new WTO attacks on US laws by China.
Arrest Last Week of Catholic Bishop in China

By ERIK ECKHOLM

BEIJING, Sept. 17 — An 81-year-old Roman Catholic bishop in southern China, who spent a total more than 30 years in prison for his loyalty to the Vatican, was re-arrested last week, a Catholic foundation in the United States said today.

If confirmed, the latest arrest of bishop Zeng Jimgmu of Jianxi province is a particular setback for the Clinton administration and a slap in the face for the Vatican.

In early 1998, as President Clinton prepared to visit China, American officials sought Bishop Zeng's early release from a labor camp, where he had been sent in 1995 for holding unauthorized religious services.

When he was freed in May, 1998, six months before his three-year sentence expired, President Clinton and other officials called this a hopeful sign that Mr. Clinton's policy of constructive engagement with China was "bearing fruit," in the words of James R. Sasser, the AMerican ambassador to China at that time.

Since his release, Bishop Zeng, who is described as frail by associates, has reportedly been kept under virtual house arrest, with tight police surveillance.

But at midnight on Sept. 14, close to 60 security agents surrounded the bishop's house, entered it and seized him, according to Joseph Kung, head of the Cardinal Kung Foundation in Stamford Conn., which publicizes the persecution of China's so-called underground Church.

Mr. Kung said in an interview that Bishop Zeng's associates had not yet been informed why he was taken in. But Mr. Kung speculated that it was because of his continued intransigent stand against cooperating with the government-allied church. His foundation has reported the
detentions or beatings of several other pro-Vatican priests in the last few months.

The arrest report coincided with the publicized visit to China by a high Vatican official. Cardinal Roger Etchegaray's attendance at a religious conference in Beijing last week had been widely interpreted as indicating a slight thaw in relations between China and the Vatican.

Since Bishop Zeng was ordained as a priest in 1949, the year the Communists won power in China, he has been one of the most steadfast opponents of the official "patriotic" church, which accepts the supremacy of the Communist Party and rejects the Pope's right to select bishops. Between 1955 and 1995, according to the Kung Foundation, he spent more than 30 years in prison.

In the early 1990's, he became known for leading huge open-air masses on a mountaintop, attended by tens of thousands of worshipers until the authorities clamped down.

The official church has about 70 bishops and claims five million members, while Vatican officials say that from five million to ten million Chinese follow the unauthorized Roman Catholic church.

In some regions, the two groups co-exist, if uneasily, and many priests privately admit to having divided loyalties. But in regions with high concentrations of Catholics, relations between the government and the underground church are tense, according to the United States State Department's Sept. 5 report on religious freedom.

On Aug. 16, 1999, the Central Committee of the ruling Communist Party issued a document "calling on the authorities to tighten control of the official Catholic Church and to eliminate the underground Catholic Church if it does not bend to Government control," according to the State Department report.

The Vatican and China broke off relations in the early 1950's over issues of papal authority and religious freedom. The two sides have recently engaged in secret negotiations, but conciliation will be difficult since the Chinese Government does not accept foreign control over any social organization, while Roman Catholics see papal authority as a basic tenet of the faith.
China Denies Religious Repression

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Filed at 7:11 a.m. ET

BEIJING (AP) -- Defending its crackdown on the Falun Gong meditation group, Beijing on Wednesday denounced as "rumors and lies" a U.S. State Department report accusing China of stepping up repression of independent religious organizations.

A government spokesman insisted that China protects religious freedom and accused Washington of "grossly interfering" in Chinese affairs.

The Sept. 5 report, part of an annual survey of religious freedoms worldwide, came at a sensitive time as Congress considers granting permanent low tariffs for Chinese imports. The report said conditions for Falun Gong and Tibetan Buddhists had "deteriorated markedly," while Roman Catholics and other religious groups also were harassed.

"Relying solely on rumors and lies to accuse other governments and interfere in internal affairs of other countries is a mistake repeatedly made by the U.S. State Department report. This bad habit should be addressed," an unidentified spokesman for the State Administration of Religious Affairs said in remarks carried by the official Xinhua News Agency.

China's 14-month-old Falun Gong crackdown appears to be part of a broader campaign meant to tighten government ideological control. Religious and human rights groups say Catholic clergy have been arrested, Tibetan monks and nuns required to attend political classes and independent-minded scholars dismissed from government posts.
The government spokesman said the Falun Gong crackdown was necessary to stop an "evil cult."

Thousands of Falun Gong followers have been detained since the multimillion-member group was banned as a threat to communist rule. The government has released many of them, saying low-level followers were misled by Falun Gong leaders.

Human rights groups and Falun Gong activists abroad have reported a handful of deaths among followers detained by police.

The Xinhua report did not respond to the State Department's account of numerous arrests of Tibetan monks and nuns, beatings of several monks and an ongoing campaign of indoctrination meant to increase Beijing's influence in monasteries.

The spokesman acknowledged that the Tsurphu Monastery -- home of the Karmapa Lama -- one of Tibetan Buddhism's highest leaders, had been closed temporarily. But he denied that it was linked to the departure of the Karmapa, who fled to India earlier this year. The spokesman said the monastery has reopened after repairing a dilapidated fresco.

The spokesman also denied accusations in the U.S. report of stepped-up persecution of the underground Roman Catholic church.

Communist leaders ordered Catholics to renounce loyalty to the pope in the 1950s. Religious and human rights groups have reported arrests of clergy who continue to worship outside the state-monitored official Catholic church.
In a Newsmaker interview, China's Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji, discusses NATO action in Kosovo, charges of nuclear espionage, anti-China sentiments in the U.S. and human rights issues.

Anti-China atmosphere in the United States.

JIM LEHRER: You said yesterday that the failure of the United States and China to reach an agreement on trade was the result of a kind of anti-China political atmosphere in this country. What in your opinion has caused this atmosphere to come about?

PREMIER ZHU: You should know more clearly than I. I think you are in a better position than I to see what's causing the anti-China sentiment in the U.S. Because actually, the discussions for China's entry into the WTO and our bilateral trade negotiations have been proceeding along to the point where we are very close to reaching an agreement, on the verge of signing an agreement. But because of the current political atmosphere my understanding is that President Clinton feels that this would not be an opportune time to finalize it. But we are still trying our best, and we hope that at some point we will be able to at least come to some form of agreement.

China's human rights record.

JIM LEHRER: Some of the political atmosphere issues, for instance, human rights. Are you aware that among American political leaders and others, that the criticism of Chinese human rights policies covers the entire political waterfront here. Republicans, Democrats, conservatives, liberals, they all speak in one voice on this issue. Were you aware of that? Do you understand that to be the case?

PREMIER ZHU: I am fully aware of that. But I think that I should acknowledge that China still has shortcomings in its handling of human rights. But at the same time, I think that you should also be acknowledging that we have made improvements in human rights, that there have been very significant improvements in human rights and that the human rights enjoyed by the people of China right now are unprecedented. I think the problem is that you fail to see the fact that human rights in China are improving from day to day and that oftentimes you are misled because there may be some people who don't have a very good understanding of China who paint a picture where the situation seems to be getting worse from day to day.

JIM LEHRER: But there are, of course, recent specific incidents where Chinese citizens have been jailed for attempting to organize political parties, for using the Internet to express opposition to the government or trying to practice their religions, that sort of thing. And those incidents have been reported in very specific terms here in the United States, and you are aware of that. are you not, sir?

PREMIER ZHU: Of course I am aware of this. But I think that they have been greatly exaggerated. Yesterday, I met with four American religious leaders.
We talked about the issue of freedom of religion and we pointed out to me that the Catholic church and various Protestant denominations had developed in China over the course of one or two centuries. Yet at the beginning or the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, there were only about 800,000 members of these churches, whereas now the number of believers has gone up to ten million. What's more, the number of bibles printed in China each year now has reached 20 million. So how could this be possible if there were no freedom of religion?

JIM LEHRER: Does it annoy you to be asked questions about this and to be criticized by Americans?

PREMIER ZHU: Well, my job is to come here to the United States and explain China to the people of the United States in order to let them get whatever they have against China off their chest. And so I don't feel annoyed by any kind of questions that people might put to me. What really worries me is that because time is so short that it's not possible for me to put into words the true and total picture. And so I often fear that I might be misleading the American people. But at the same time, I do believe that the understanding.

JIM LEHRER: Speaking of understanding, do you understand why these kinds of issues are so important to so many Americans?

PREMIER ZHU: I think that kind of concern is very good. American people are a people of freedom and that they are a people forward looking and full of vitality. It is a very good thing for people like that to be concerned about China.

The unfortunate thing is that very few people are able to actually hear our voices, and I am grateful to you for giving me an opportunity to speak directly to the American people. But I don't know if I am doing a good job or not.

JIM LEHRER: We will leave that to the audience obviously.

Investigating the nuclear espionage charges.

On another issue related to the political atmosphere now between the United States and China, the issues of allegations having to do with nuclear technology espionage, illegal contributions to Democratic political campaigns, et cetera. You told President Clinton yesterday that China would cooperate in these investigations. Does that mean that you will allow U.S. investigators to interview members of the Chinese government?

PREMIER ZHU: Well, I need to ask this question, then. There are many issues in the United States right now which relate to China. Would the United States also be willing to let Chinese investigators come and take a look into whether or not there were people in the Chinese government who actually did these things?

JIM LEHRER: If they said yes, I would say yes to them. If they said no to us, I would say no to them.

JIM LEHRER: So you are talking about a real investigation fact, because you said something about it but that you would help the U.S. determine whether or not...
Of course, because our goal is to figure out once and for all exactly what happened. But in order to decide how we are going to check this out, we need to engage in political discussions on a basis of equality to decide how we would go about doing this.

Defining the US-China relationship.

JIM LEHRER: In a more general way, help the American people try to understand what kind of relationship China wants to have with the United States. Do you want to -- should we be friends? Should we be allies? Should we be competitors? Should we be -- what is the relationship that China wants for the United States, and why?

PREMIER ZHU: Well, as to the type of relationship that China and the United States seek to build between them, I think that this was made very clear in the exchange of visits between President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton, namely a relationship which is a constructive strategic partnership.

JIM LEHRER: But there are, there are some Americans, as you know, who believe there is something that America has to fear from China. What do you say to them?

PREMIER ZHU: I would say to them, what are you afraid of? President Clinton said the United States has about 6,000 nuclear warheads and that China has 20 or 30 of them. Actually, I honestly do not know exactly what number China has, but I would think that President Clinton may be clearer than I am about that number. So my question would be, what are you afraid of? China cannot possibly constitute a threat. And if you mean should you fear China as an economic competitor, then I should say your economy is 10 times the size of our economy. Your per capita income is 10 times our per capita income, and it would take a very

very long time for China to yet become even relatively a major economic power. And besides, even if China were to become an economic power, why should the United States fear it, because the stronger that China becomes, the bigger the market for the Americans? And you should note the fact that at the welcoming ceremony at the White House I observed that the American people love freedom and the Chinese people love peace. But the Chinese people have no history of aggression against other countries, although we have often been the victims of aggression. Of course, under no circumstances, should you take me to mean that the American people don't love peace or that the Chinese people don't love freedom. I just wanted to emphasize certain things.

JIM LEHRER: So this problem that now exists between the United States and China is a temporary thing and is not serious, and it's not going to get any worse? How would you characterize this at this particular period that you yourself have described as rather difficult when you came?

PREMIER ZHU: Well, there definitely is an anti-China current existing in the United States right now, and therefore this constitutes a rather significant obstacle to developing that friendly cooperative relationship that Presidents Jiang and Clinton spoke about, and not only is it an obstacle, but there is a danger in backtracking in this relationship. So, of course, it is a serious problem. But on the other hand, if you look at it in terms of the broad flow of history, then you would have to say that no matter what this obstacle is, it's only a small element in the course of events, and so when we arrived in Los Angeles it was pouring rain, but there was sunshine everywhere when we got to Washington so I feel that like the rain, this too will pass.
China Tightens Exercise Sect Rules

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Filed at 8:18 a.m. ET

BEIJING (AP) -- Seeking to stifle meditation sects similar to the banned Falun Gong, China published rules Friday prohibiting exercise groups from preaching religion and strictly limited their size and activities.

Teachers of the traditional Chinese exercise qigong must register and be certified by sports officials, according to a copy of the rules that appeared in the state-owned China Sports Daily.

Groups have to be small, dispersed and locally organized, the rules say. Activities with more than 200 participants require police permission.

The rules come amid a 13-month-old crackdown on the multimillion-member Falun Gong, which draws on Buddhism, Taoism and qigong and uses meditative exercises. The government has rounded up its leaders and winnowed the group's numbers but failed to break its organization.

A commentary published with the rules accused "unwholesome elements" of seizing on the rising popularity of qigong to carry out fraud, spread superstition and endangered society.

"These problems have seriously affected the normal conduct of healthful qigong activities, harming the interests of the masses," said the preamble of the "Healthful Qigong Management Regulations."

In the most pointed reference to Falun Gong, the rules prohibit

qigong groups from spreading "ignorant superstition" or the "deification of individuals." Also banned are Buddhist worship practices associated with the banned group and others like it.

Distribution of unlicensed publications, recordings and computer materials are forbidden, along with the sale of trinkets that purport to bestow divine consciousness or supernatural powers.

China's officially atheist government labeled Falun Gong an evil cult and accused it of leading some 1,600 adherents to their deaths. At least one other meditation sect, Zhong Gong, has also been banned, its leaders arrested and property confiscated.

Falun Gong denies the government accusations, claiming it promotes health and morality through a system of meditation, slow-motion exercises and beliefs drawn from Buddhism, Taoism and the sometimes unorthodox teachings of its founder, a former government grain clerk.

A new anti-cult law passed last year has already added to the government's arsenal against unofficial religious groups.

Exercise groups will not be permitted to use religious language in their teaching, be named after individuals or have the words China, Asia, world and Universe in their titles, according to the rules.

They will not be permitted to organize in state-run companies, government offices, schools, military bases and other sensitive establishments.
Trading on the misery of Chinese workers

More trade will expose the Chinese people to powerful new ideas.
- House Speaker Dennis Hastert

The Scenario painted by the president, most of Congress and big business is absolutely dazzling:
As day follows night, the normalization of trade relations with China cannot help but transform a totalitarian, Communist beast into a democracy-loving paradise of human and worker rights.

After all, what chance has any repressive regime got against the most potent one-two punch in the history of civilization — a free-market economy and the United States of America’s system of social values?

Just ask any of the 4 million Chinese factory workers who already toil for apple-pie-and-mom corporations like Wal-Mart, Nike, Timberland and RCA. Aren’t American businesses helping them find the good life?

Asking these workers about their labor and living conditions is exactly what researchers for the New York-based National Labor Committee (www.nlc-net.org) have been doing since March 1999. Their first set of findings, published earlier this month, hardly inspire confidence in an American-led conversion of China.

Consider the plastics factory worker who is one of 2,200 Chinese employed by a Taiwan contractor for a U.S. company that makes Timberland shoes, teenage girls and women under 25 handle toxic glues without using gloves in a building where the temperature in summer regularly tops 100 degrees F.

Failure to work overtime means a fine for the first and second refusal, termination for the third. After age 25, the women are fired because they are too old and “used up” to maintain the work force.

As a result, “Made in China” may be the most in-depth, unvarnished look ever at what corporate America’s presence in China really means to the folks who actually make the sneakers, clothes, toys, blouses, stereo and TVs.

A couple of lowlights:

- Working 15-hour shifts for an average wage of 19 to 25 cents per hour, employees of contractors for New Balance running shoes are locked in their dorms at 9 p.m., fined for sick days, suffer from skin rashes from toxic glues and are told to lie to U.S. company auditors.

None of the workers had ever heard of New Balance’s “Code of Conduct” for off-shore contractors.

- Earning $16.13 for their 70-hour workweek in a contractor factory that makes Timberland shoes, teenagers and women under 25 handle toxic glues without using gloves in a building where the temperature in summer regularly tops 100 degrees F.

- As day follows night, the normalization of trade relations with China cannot help but transform a totalitarian, Communist beast into a democracy-loving paradise of human and worker rights.

More trade will expose the Chinese people to powerful new ideas.

- House Speaker Dennis Hastert

“The building super assumed that we were working for a North American company and were looking for dorm space to house our workers, so we received the grand tour . . . The bunkbeds had hard wooden surfaces covered with paper thin straw mats . . . The few possessions the workers owned were hung up inside their tiny bunk space . . . The workers hung blankets or strips of torn plastic over the outside part of their bunks in order to provide a little privacy.”

What grand salary compensates for such dismal living conditions?

For working from 8 a.m. to midnight — with only two Sundays off each month — the plastics factory employees earn $27.97 a week.

According to the labor committee, that is just a bit more than one-third of what it takes in Shenzhen to buy a month’s food for a family of three.

“In many ways, U.S. companies are on the frontline of violating workers’ rights in China,” said Kernaghan in a telephone interview. “They’ve climbed into bed with a repressive regime, but, by using contractors to run the factories, they don’t have to do the dirty work themselves.”

The director of the 10-year-old National Labor Committee, Kernaghan has been involved in international workers advocacy since 1985. His research has taken him into factories owned or subsidized by U.S. corporations in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti and China.

As disturbing as conditions are in Latin America, he says, they’re a dream compared to China.

“I left the country horrified, just shaken,” he said. “It is the most repressive place I’ve ever been in.”

The committee’s 117-page report is entitled “Made in China: The Role of U.S. Companies in Denying Human and Worker Rights.” It was rushed (futilely) into print in hopes of persuading Congressional fence-sitters to vote against the bill that grants permanent trade status to China.

Because it is illegal in China for organizations such as the National Labor Committee to conduct social and economic research, the group works with “courageous” but covert Chinese nationalists as well as North Americans who pose as academics or business people.

As a result, “Made in China” may be the most in-depth, unvarnished look ever at what corporate America’s presence in China really means to the folks who actually make the sneakers, clothes, toys, blouses, stereo and TVs.

Whether a factory produces Timberland shoes or Wal-Mart’s Kathi Lee handbags in Zhongshan, Jansport backpacks in Panu Village or Alpine stereo in Qingdao, the same exploitive, unhealthy conditions prevailed in all 16 facilities the researchers visited.

Stephanie Salter is an Examiner columnist. More of her columns are online at www.examiner.com/salter/
In an exclusive interview, the President of the People’s Republic of China, Jiang Zemin, talks about human rights, the state of United States-China relations in the next century, Tibet, and Taiwan.

JIM LEHRER: Mr. President, welcome. President Clinton said yesterday that China was on the wrong side of history when it comes to the issue of human rights. Do you disagree?

PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN: Different countries have different historic tradition, cultural tradition, and level of economic development. We recognize the universality of human rights. However, each country has its own national conditions, and human rights should also fit the respective national conditions of each country.

JIM LEHRER: What do you think he meant when he said wrong side of history?

PRESIDENT JIANG: He didn’t spell it out actually. However, if one is to apply the democratic principle that you apply here in the United States, then he will -- we believe that not only in the United States but also in other countries in the world different concepts or alternatives to this issue should be allowed.

JIM LEHRER: Does it disturb you to be questioned as much as you have about human rights?

PRESIDENT JIANG: Not at all. And I believe that China does not feel that it has done anything wrong in the field of human rights. China has a tradition of 5,000 years, and different countries have their different history and culture.

The famous Chinese philosopher in ancient times, Confucius, once said isn’t it a pleasure to have friends coming from afar. I’m coming to the United States for my visit upon the invitation of President Clinton. And I have already felt that I am welcomed by majority of the American people here. I have been given a warm welcome by President Clinton and I have also got the feeling of the friendship between our two peoples. Sometimes some noise came up, this is just natural.

JIM LEHRER: The noise did not bother you?

PRESIDENT JIANG: No.

JIM LEHRER: Why not?

PRESIDENT JIANG: Because, as I pointed out earlier, I feel pride and nothing to hide deep in my mind because I believe that the task for me is to ensure that the 1.2 billion Chinese people have adequate food and clothing. However, this is no easy task.

JIM LEHRER: But is it not true, sir, that demonstrations and protests like the ones that are going on here in the United States about your visit and about China would not be tolerated in China, that they would be dispersed or the people involved would be arrested?
PRESIDENT JIANG: First of all, one should recognize that demonstrations have indeed occurred in China during different times and different periods. However, the Chinese people went on with this through their own means and their own forms.

As a friend of the American people, I believe that the United States should give serious consideration to the fact that our world is a rich and diverse one. Therefore, it's impossible to have only one mother in the world or to expect that people throughout the world would all follow the U.S. way of thinking because the difference in the different countries is so huge.

China is home to 22 percent of the world's total population. However, God has only given us 7 percent of the world's total arable land. Therefore, it's no easy task for us to feed so many people with these lands. But I'm very happy to see the development we have made in our agriculture. And, for the past few years, thanks to the help we got from the favorable climate, we also achieved bumper harvests.

JIM LEHRER: The impression from the news conference yesterday was that these differences over human rights between your country and the United States are deep and irreconcilable. Is that a correct reading?

PRESIDENT JIANG: As I pointed out earlier, it's just natural for our two countries to have some different views on this issue due to such different aspects that exist between the two countries. And the only approach to this is to work to promote mutual understanding between leaders of the two countries and peoples of the two countries so that we can gradually come closer to one another. And I am an optimist; therefore, I am full of confidence about that.

JIM LEHRER: The American press today described that news conference that you and President Clinton had yesterday as an unprecedented blunt exchange, almost a debate between the two leaders of the two most powerful nations in the world. Is that how you saw it?

PRESIDENT JIANG: I believe yesterday's press conference gave us an opportunity to express our views freely. Real good friends mean that they should treat each other with all sincerity and they will not hide any views from the other. (In English) Do you agree with that?

JIM LEHRER: But that's how you saw that yesterday, as a healthy exchange and not anything that hurt the relationship, you felt it helped the relationship?

PRESIDENT JIANG: My answer is yes. I don't think that it hurt it, the relationship. Instead our two countries, we two exchanged views in a very sincere manner. And, as far as the Chinese side is concerned, we have all along believed that we need to work to seek common ground while putting aside differences. And we need to look for as much common ground as possible.

Finding a common ground.

JIM LEHRER: What is the most important ground, the most important common ground between the United States and China as we sit here right now?
PRESIDENT JIANG: Now we are approaching the end of the 20th century and very soon we are going to bring in the next century. The United States is the most developed capitalist country in the world, whereas China is the biggest developing one in the world. And both sides share the responsibility to bring a world of peace, stability, and prosperity into the new century.

And I believe the two sides need to work to promote mutual understanding, expand common ground, strengthen cooperation, and build the future together.

JIM LEHRER: And the differences, the philosophical differences over human rights, over a way of governance, these things are not obstacles to this?

PRESIDENT JIANG: I don't believe they are insurmountable gap between us. And, as someone who studied natural science back in university, I am of the view that both nature and human society are rich, and, therefore, it's impossible that there is only one mother exists there.

And, as far as the development of the Chinese economy is concerned, ever since the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party have been convened, we have been proposing that we need to work under the theory of Deng Xiaoping to achieve the establishment of a market economy under these socialism terms. And what we are working to build is a socialist market economy.

For instance, Germany is under the social market economy. And here in the United States it is the free capitalist economy. But this by no means stand in the way of the free exchange of trade between the two countries. Nor do we have the intention of exporting our socialism with Chinese characteristics to you here.

JIM LEHRER: Explain to the average American what the current form of government is in China, how would you describe it in American terms?

PRESIDENT JIANG: In our endeavor to develop our economy, we will work to achieve a diversified form of ownership, with public ownership playing the predominant role. Under this mechanism we have the public ownership, collective ownership, private ownership, and even individual ownership.

In addition there are also joint ventures and also solely overseas planted enterprises in China. Because at present the level of economic development in China is still somewhat backward. Therefore, we need to follow Deng Xiaoping's initiative to allow some parts and some people in China to become rich first before achieving common prosperity.

JIM LEHRER: I was referring more to the political system, the governing of the country from a political point of view. How would you describe that?

PRESIDENT JIANG: With the founding of The People's Republic of China, the constitution of new China has been formulated which stipulates that the National People's Congress is the supreme power-holding organ in China.

At the same time, we also have the multiparty cooperation system with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and we also have the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. And we have our state council which serves as the executive branch.
Naturally the Chinese words of our state council carry different meaning when it is translated literally into English, for in the United States we -- that means your State Department or the department in charge of foreign affairs.

And Premier Li Peng of the State Council is concurrently one of the members of the standing committee of the Politburo of the Chinese. And I am the President of the People's Republic of China.

JIM LEHRER: As a matter of history, do you agree with those who say Communism is a fading concept, a fading philosophy of government?

PRESIDENT JIANG: As the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, ever since the day I joined the revolution, I've been cherishing the ideal to achieve Communism. And I don't believe this is a fading concept.

However, I believe it's fair to say that perhaps in the past people had too much ideals. And now we need to work under the initiative of Deng Xiaoping. And we should also follow the concept, which I would like to quote a Chinese saying which is a thousand mile journey need to start from the first step.

And, therefore, as I counted out in the report I delivered to the 15th Party Congress, we are now under the primary stage of Socialism. And, in the words of Mr. Deng Xiaoping, we are working to build a Socialism with Chinese characteristics. And this primary stage of Socialism would make also last for many years to come. And I am pragmatic about that.

JIM LEHRER: Could it possibly be too that there could be an evolving change in democracy in this human rights area that is so much trouble to the United States and others as well?

PRESIDENT JIANG: I believe most importantly there is a need for deep and mutual understanding about each other's situation. And dialogues can also be carried out on the basis of not interference in each other's internal affairs.
Group Says China to Prosecute 85 Christians

By Reuters

BEIJING (Reuters) - China has laid criminal charges against 85 members of a banned Christian church who were detained last week, a Hong Kong-based human rights group said Monday.

The 85 were among 130 members of the China Fang-cheng Church detained on August 23 in the central province of Henan, the Information Center for Human Rights & Democracy said.

The center faxed to journalists a copy of a formal arrest notice dated August 25 accusing a Fang-cheng member named Chen Zhouniu of "using an evil cult to obstruct justice" -- a charge laid against many adherents of the Falun Gong spiritual movement.

The indictments -- all but certain to lead to jail terms -- were a sign the authorities could increasingly use draconian anti-cult legislation created last year to crush Falun Gong against China's many unofficial "house churches," it said.

Local police officials in Henan's Xihua county, where the church members were detained, refused to comment on the case.

Although China's constitution enshrines freedom of religion, worship is banned outside official state-sponsored religious organizations.

MILLIONS WORSHIP AT HOME

But millions of Christians meet secretly in prayer groups, for Bible
study sessions and services in the house churches rather than join state-run, so-called "patriotic" churches which require believers to pledge their highest loyalty to the state.

The Christian house churches, illegal in China because they refuse to register with the government, have been bracketed with other groups and banned as "evil cults" in the wake of last year's crackdown on Falun Gong, diplomats said.

Falun Gong adherents have staged almost daily demonstrations in Beijing since the spiritual group was banned in July 1999.

At least 14 Chinese Christian sects were branded "evil cults" last year by Communist authorities, the human rights center said.

Also Monday, the Cardinal King Foundation, a U.S.-based advocate of the underground Chinese Catholic Church, said 24 Catholics -- a priest, a seminarian, 20 nuns and two laypersons -- were arrested last month in the southeastern province of Fujian.

The priest, Father Liu Shaozhang, was severely beaten, it said. Two of the nuns were released after paying a "large amount" of cash to the police, the foundation said in a statement.

BELIEVERS CHAFE AT STATE CURBS

Henry Chu, an American missionary detained among the 130 Fangcheng followers last month, told Reuters that the Christian underground were not cults but "Bible-based Christians."

Chu, detained at a secret worship meeting with his wife, Sandee Lin and her friend Patricia Lan -- all Taiwan-born U.S. citizens -- left China on August 26 after two days in custody.

In an interview from Taipei last week, Chu -- who said he was punched and kicked by police and fined $1,100 -- called on China to free the detained Fang-cheng Church members.

The Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy estimated Fang-cheng had about 500,000 followers. Chu said the number was much larger, but declined to give a figure.

A Fang-cheng Church statement said its members refused to join the state church because China's rules went against principles in the Bible in many areas.

The document cited government prohibitions against religious activity outside state churches, strict curbs on who can proselytize and a ban on inculcating faith in those under 18 years of age.

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-religio.html 9/4/00
2 Pro-Democracy Party Leaders Given Prison Sentences in China

By ERIK ECKHOLM

BEIJING, Dec. 6 — Two years after a crackdown began on a short-lived pro-democracy party, two more of its leaders were sentenced to prison today, bringing the number of party members imprisoned to at least 30.

These latest punishments illustrate the Communist leadership's determination to stamp out all remnants of political opposition as they prepare for the risky opening of China's economy to global competition.

One organizer of the party, the China Democracy Party, Wang Zechen, 51, was sentenced to six years on charges of subverting state power, according to the Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy, a monitoring organization in Hong Kong. Another former leader, Wang Wenjiang, a 46-year-old lawyer, was given a four-year sentence in the same court in the northeastern city of Anshan, where both men, who are not related, lived.

Wang Zechen was lauded as a hero in the late 1970's for his defiance of the "Gang of Four" — the radical Communist leaders including Mao Zedong's wife, Jiang Qing, who were blamed for the worst turmoil and persecutions of the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976.

Mr. Wang received a death sentence in 1975 after he publicly criticized a nephew of Mao who was a key supporter of the Gang of Four. Then in September 1976, Mao died, and within a month more moderate leaders arrested the Gang of Four and their close associates. Many people like Mr. Wang who tried to speak out earlier were rehabilitated and praised.

For the next 20 years, Mr. Wang kept a low profile, running a small shop in Anshan. But in early 1998, he joined with hundreds of others to promote a new, unregistered democratic party, becoming the chairman of the Liaoning Province branch.

The campaigners were pushing the limits during an apparent easing of political controls in the months surrounding President Clinton's high-profile visit to China that year. For several months, the security agencies seemed to sit back as long-quiet activists spoke up and branches of the new party multiplied.

The illusory thaw ended in no uncertain terms in late 1998, when three of the party's best-known leaders were arrested for subversion and sentenced to terms of 11, 12 and 13 years. Dozens more organizers were arrested in the months that followed, and since then no political organizing outside party auspices has been tolerated.

After several brief detentions during their year of defiant organizing, Wang Zecheng and Wang Wenjiang were both arrested for good in June 1999. In late November they were put on trial for subversion in separate proceedings in the same court, but for unknown reasons their sentences were handed down only today, according to the human rights center in Hong Kong.
May 5, 2000

Trade with China: Business Profits or Human Rights?

by Doug Bandow

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

Business profits vs. human rights. So do critics of trade with China frame the debate. But freer trade is likely to advance human rights, as well as boost business profits.

For years, Congress has voted annually on permitting "normal trading relations" with China. Now the Clinton administration is advocating permanent status (PNTR) for Beijing, which would allow China to enter the World Trade Organization.

Lobbying furiously for a yes vote is American business. Without doubt, trade with China, now about $95 billion both ways, is economically beneficial: Some 200,000 Americans are directly employed providing exports to China.

Much more would be possible with a more open economy. Western firms, investors and exporters alike, have found China to be a tough market. Companies cite rising labor costs, market access restrictions, high taxes and customs duties and corruption.

But PNTR critics don't care about increased profits. Columnist Abe Rosenthal cites "Beijing's human rights crimes." The AFL-CIO denounces Chinese labor practices (while actually worrying most about increased imports).

The Weekly Standard complains about China's "threats to attack Taiwan."

Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy worries about Chinese nuclear developments posing "a new threat to this country."

Obviously, it would be easier to grant PNTR if China was capitalist and democratic. It is neither. But the most important question is: What policy, economic integration or isolation, is most likely to move China toward capitalism and democracy?
To ask the question is to answer it. Membership in the WTO might not sweep away all of Beijing's economic restrictions, but despite determined internal opposition, the regime has made significant market-opening concessions.

As my Cato Institute colleague Mark Groombridge puts it, "A vote in favor of extending PNTR to China is a vote for reform of the Chinese economy." Indeed, the United States has received more than just promises.

Beijing has begun revamping the banking sector. Government officials are planning to relax investment and trade controls, and Chinese companies are maneuvering to better meet anticipated international competition.

Although market reforms do not guarantee greater respect for human rights, economic prosperity brought increased pressure for democracy in such countries as South Korea and Taiwan. In China itself, political decentralization and personal autonomy have been expanding. Particularly dramatic has been the growth of private associations and companies.

The communist leadership will undoubtedly resist future democratization; in fact, military and security agencies resolutely opposed the WTO accord. However, the greater people's access to the tools of freedom, such as computers, the larger the number of private power centers, such as businesses, and the increased autonomy of subordinate governments, such as the coastal trading provinces, the greater the pressure for change.

Isolation would merely give the central authorities a pretext to crack down. Notably, religious groups like Ned Graham's East Gates Ministries support continued trade with China.

Finally, while Beijing could end up as an enemy of the United States, such a result is not preordained. China threatens not America, but America's domination of East Asia. The best response would be to step back and encourage U.S. allies to defend their own interests.

Anyway, since Beijing's future is not predetermined, Washington should adopt policies, such as freer trade, more likely to encourage friendship than hostility. It is for this reason that Taiwan, despite China's persistent threats, supports Beijing's entry in the WTO.

The silliest argument against PNTR is that Chinese imports would overwhelm U.S. industry. In fact, American workers are far more productive than their Chinese counterparts.

Moreover, Beijing's manufacturing exports to the United States remain small about half the level of those from Mexico. PNTR would create far more export opportunities for American than Chinese concerns. Estimates of the likely increase in U.S. exports range up to $13 billion annually.

http://www.cato.org/dailys/05-05-00.html
There is another issue: The right to trade is a basic human right.

Fundamental to one's humanity is the freedom to peacefully exchange the product of one's labor with others. If Americans want to buy, say, toys, clothes or Christmas ornaments from Chinese rather than U.S. firms, they have a moral right to do so.

That trade should be free does not mean anything goes. Congress can rightly restrict trade with security implications: Americans need not improve the accuracy of Chinese ICBMs, for instance. And goods produced by forced labor in prison camps do not represent free trade.

Moreover, American officials should challenge Beijing to respect the rights of its citizens. U.S. taxpayers should not be forced to subsidize the Chinese government through the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corp. and foreign aid agencies.

Everyone wants a freer, more democratic China. Granting PNTR to Beijing would make that more likely.

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WASHINGTON

The big debate over China had a "Show me the money!" quality.

Big business played Daddy Warbucks.

"Grab your sales books, boys. This is the big one. There are 1.3 billion human beings who haven't bought their first toaster! What a territory."

The Entity Formerly Known as Big Labor argued the flip side. China hands Clinton and Gore were reminded, "It's the economy, stupid!"

Labor's argument to its once and future presidential candidates: The more work we give those worker bees in Beijing and Shanghai, the more drones we create in Motown and the Bronx.

One voice spoke of an element missing in the China trade story: the nation itself. Will trade with the United States under prevailing conditions help or hurt the people of that grand and ancient society, a people once so rooted in American romantic illusion by the writings of Pearl Buck and the heroics of our own Flying Tigers?

The voice was that of Rep. Nancy Pelosi, D-San Francisco. She represents many Chinese Americans in the Bay Area and is poised to assume her party's third-ranking position in Congress.

Pelosi spoke against permanent normal trade relations with China for the powerful reason that it forfeits any positive U.S role in the fight for human rights in that country. Why should Beijing's gerontocracy care what we say about its renowned repressions once we've made it clear, as we did last week on the floor of Congress, that repressions will not reduce our readiness to do business?

"I'm a free trader," she explained in her dramatic late-afternoon speech Wednesday in the moments before the trade bill was approved.

She pushed for human rights conditions in previous one-year trade deals with China — not to kill the deal, but to get China to make good on its deal.

"The goal was to get China to honor the commitment. The goal was not to lift most favored nation status, but to improve our trade relationship. But China has never complied with our trade agreements. If they did, that would make all the difference in the world."

If those pushing the deal are so confident the old men in Beijing will loosen up, why not trust but verify like President Ronald Reagan?

"If everybody thinks they will comply," she said in an interview after the 237-to-197 vote, "why not wait a year?"

Pelosi, front-runner to be elected Majority Whip if the Democrats win control of the House this November, predicts that sponsors of the historic deal, a group that includes a third of her own party caucus, will now defend it no matter what happens to the Chinese people.

"In terms of the trade issue, Congress has spoken very clearly that China will do whatever it wishes with impunity," she said. "I predict that the trade deficit will soar, the human rights violations will intensify, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will continue uncurbed. The only lever we had was permanent free trade.

"I hope I will be proven wrong."
Should China's Human Rights Record Prevent Permanent Normal Trade Relations?

April Pedersen
SpeakOut.com Staff Writer

Click on Yes or No below to tell your Representatives how you feel.

Yes

The Chinese government systematically violates human rights on a massive scale, and granting permanent normal trade relations would undermine U.S. leverage over China's human rights policies.

No

Increasing economic integration of China into the world market — not conditioning trade relations on human rights improvements — is the most effective way of advancing human rights.

Background

Since the initial warming of U.S.-China relations in the early 1970s, policymakers have had difficulty balancing conflicting U.S. policy concerns in the People's Republic of China. From Nixon to Clinton, presidents have had to reconcile security and human rights concerns with corporations' desires for expanded economic relations between the two countries. While the U.S. regularly objects to China's human rights violations, the Chinese government counters with complaints that the American concerns represent unwarranted American intrusion into its internal affairs.

In 1989 the Tiananmen Square massacre drew public attention to the inconsistent character of U.S.-China policy. A wave of public indignation with China's repressive practices forced the Bush administration to adopt a sterner posture toward human rights violations and to impose sanctions, including restrictions on bilateral and multilateral aid. But these measures have not satisfied some critics of China's human rights practices, who contend that the U.S. should apply even more rigid trade restrictions against China. Specifically, some critics insist that the U.S. government not give China "permanent normal trade relations" status, which would free China's government from an annual review of its human rights record by Congress.

Many critics say PNTR standing should be linked to improvements in China's human and labor rights practices — a policy that has been rejected by the Clinton administration. Rather than denying China normal trading status because of human rights violations, the Clinton administration has opted for a policy of "comprehensive engagement," which holds that long-term U.S. goals such as human rights improvement are more attainable through economic integration and openness than by further isolating China.

Yet Chinese human rights practices, including respect for political and labor rights, continue to fall well below internationally accepted standards. In perhaps the stickiest issue, the White House warned last week that there was little chance of PNTR for China without legislation setting up a watchdog commission to monitor Beijing's human rights practices. China, however, opposes any plans by the U.S. to monitor human rights as a condition to granting PNTR.

On One Hand...

American businesses should not be coddled at the expense of human rights. Despite expressions of concern for human rights conditions, the U.S. government has allowed narrow economic interests, particularly those of corporate investors, to guide its China policy. So far, the U.S. government has been unwilling to jeopardize U.S. economic relations by adopting stricter human rights conditions on aid and trade.

China's trade status is currently reviewed annually by Congress. By establishing permanent normal trade relations and doing away with the annual vote, the U.S. will give up its leverage over China's human rights policies. Permanent normal relations should not be granted until long-term progress is made on human rights in China.

On the Other Hand...

The United States government has no authority to sit in judgment on the human rights records of other governments, especially given the U.S. government's own complicity in some human rights violations in foreign lands.

You don't have to embrace a government or its policies to engage in trade. If trade were a beauty contest, we'd trade only with a small group of nations that mirror our own society, and would be in a virtual cold war with the rest. Furthermore, U.S. imposed trade barriers are unlikely to change the policies of China's communist leaders. The most powerful force for labor, human rights, and the environment is economic liberalization and global market forces. Growth and rising income give workers the chance to improve their lives.
History & Facts

In 1994 President Clinton officially delinked trade and human rights in China. According to Human Rights Watch, every year since "delinkage", human rights conditions in China have gotten worse.

According to Amnesty International's 1999 China Report: "Hundreds, possibly thousands, of activists and suspected opponents of the government were detained during the year. Thousands of political prisoners jailed in previous years remained imprisoned. Some had been sentenced after unfair trials, others were still held without charge or trial. ...Torture and ill-treatment remained endemic, in some cases resulting in death."

According to the U.S. State Department's 1998 China Human Rights Report: "The Government continued to commit widespread and well-documented human rights abuses, in violation of internationally accepted norms. ...Abuses included instances of extrajudicial killings, torture, and mistreatment of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy incommunicado detention, and denial of due process."
A Year Later, Chinese Officials Still Struggling to Stamp Out Falun Gong

A wave of protests as anniversary of crackdown nears

By Christopher Bodeen

WASHINGTON — China's leaders are settling in for a prolonged struggle against the banned Falun Gong sect, acknowledging in an editorial that a year of arrests, harassment and political campaigns have failed to wipe out the group.

The statement came after a burst of protests yesterday by scores of sect followers on the eve of the anniversary of a government crackdown on the Falun Gong — proving the group remains a force in China despite being targeted by one of the biggest political campaigns in years.

The group's resilience was grudgingly acknowledged in an editorial to be published today in the Communist Party's flagship People's Daily. Excerpts were carried yesterday on the official Xinhua News Agency.

"The cult will not voluntarily step down from the historical stage," Xinhua quoted the article as saying. "The fight against Falun Gong will be a "long-lasting, complicated and acute struggle," it said, and pledged to crack down on members with a "firm hand."

A media smear campaign, the jailings of thousands of members and pressure on followers to renounce ties to the group have thinned Falun Gong's ranks. But the group has continued to launch defiant protests, mounting the most sustained public challenge to the Communist Party in 31 years.

In Beijing yesterday, scores of Falun Gong followers raised banners in Tiananmen Square, prompting a frenzied response by police who swarmed on groups of protesters, wresting away banners and knocking them to the ground.

Police dragged protesters by the arms or clothes — middle-aged women and children among them. One officer locked his arms around a woman's neck, pulling her away.

More than 100 Falun Gong members were detained during the protest, a 10-minute explosion of seemingly coordinated action across the vast plaza.

That the protests happened — and in such numbers — was particularly impressive in the face of police alertness in the days before yesterday's anniversary on the crackdown on Falun Gong.

One year ago today, security agents detained dozens of key Falun Gong organizers. Sect followers, tipped off by fellow members in the upper ranks of the communist government, responded with mass protests. Two days later, Chinese leaders outlawed Falun Gong, declaring it a public menace.

Police have picked up at least 200 practitioners from Tiananmen Square every day for the past week, according to a Communist Party official involved in security work.

Police in Beijing and other cities have watched airports and railroad and bus stations to prevent followers from reaching the capital, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The government has branded Falun Gong an unprecedented threat to communist rule and accused the group of cheating followers and causing 1,500 deaths, mostly of followers it maintains refused medical treatment in accordance with what it claims are the group's teachings.

Founded eight years ago, Falun Gong attracted millions of followers with its blend of slow-motion exercises, meditation and ideas drawn from Buddhism, Taoism and its founder.

Followers arrested in recent days have refused to tell officers their names or hometowns, making it difficult for police to file the proper arrest forms, the party official said.

Instead, police have commandeered a stadium in western Beijing to hold those detained until their hometowns can be determined and they can be shipped off to local detention centers, the official said.

Demonstrators were detained by police as they tried to enter Tiananmen Square.
"Since the Mao era, human rights in China have improved, but they still fall far short of international standards. The rulers perpetuate their power by practicing what we might call a moderate level of repression, adhering to the old Chinese adage 'Kill a chicken to warn all the monkeys.'"

**Human Rights, Repression, and "Stability"**

JAMES D. SEYMOUR

The Chinese government's attitude toward human rights is based on at least two premises. First, it insists that because nation-states are sovereign entities, outside interference in domestic issues such as human rights is generally impermissible. Second, although token homage is paid to the idea of transcendent human rights principles, paramount are economic ("subsistence") rights, to which political rights are secondary.

Among other countries there is a fair degree of consensus that human rights have international standing and that economic and political rights are equally important and are not to be prioritized. These various rights have been embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. China has signed both treaties, but it has not ratified, or especially lived up to, either.

The covenants begin with the mandate "All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. . . . The States Parties to the present Covenant. . . shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination." Beijing has sometimes been at the forefront of efforts to implement this provision in other parts of the world, but it has always denied its applicability to Hong Kong, Taiwan, or to the non-ethnic-Chinese parts of the People's Republic.

Tibet would appear to be especially eligible for self-determination (the region had never been directly ruled by ethnic Chinese before the Communist military takeover in the 1950s), but China, backed by supportive domestic public opinion, is strongly committed to retaining it. The Chinese government enforces its control in Tibet with highly repressive methods that prevent unauthorized political expression. Even religion is carefully controlled. As a Communist official in Tibet recently noted, "It is important to ensure that temples are submissive to the government. If the government can control one lama [religious figure], it can control one temple; if it can control one temple, it can control the public." Political imprisonment in Tibet runs at approximately 50 to 100 times the rate in China proper. Under the circumstances, the Tibetans have been relatively quiescent.

There is also a high rate of political imprisonment among the Turkic peoples of northwest China (for whom independence is even less likely). The Turkic groups, who populate the vast Xinjiang region, have been more violently restive than the Tibetans.

Although the 53-article civil and political rights covenant covers a vast array of specific rights, the general thrust of the instrument is that people have the right to self-government and the right to free access to information on the basis of which they are to educate themselves on political matters. China's leaders have always rejected this concept and have felt free to imprison people who share with others unorthodox ideas and "state secrets" (that is, information the rulers do not want the public to have).

What is the state then of economic and social rights in China? Is Beijing's argument that civil
and political rights are less important than (and counterproductive to) the realization of "subsistence rights" only an excuse to perpetuate the leaders' power?

**SUB-SUBSISTENCE STANDARDS**

The government appears to have made meaningful efforts to meet certain provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). For example, although serious problems remain in the area of women's rights (Article 3), steps have been taken to improve the situation. One's right to work (Article 6) was taken seriously in the past, but today economic reforms have presented new challenges, and the dismantling of state enterprises has created considerable unemployment.

Some provisions of the ICESCR are largely ignored. For example, safe and healthy working conditions (Article 7) are often absent. The right to form free trade unions (Article 8) is totally denied, with would-be labor organizers imprisoned or forced into exile. In recent years, many labor activists have been charged with such offenses as attempting to overthrow the government or (if they have had meetings with the international labor movement) "illegally providing intelligence."

A notable example is the case of a group of union organizers recently active in the midwestern city of Tianshui. The organizers had argued that workers were being laid off from state enterprises partly because the administrators were so corrupt that insufficient funds were available to pay the workers. The group was convicted of "subversion" and in July sentenced to terms of up to 10 years. Their leader, Guo Xinmin, is said to have been tortured.

The right to "the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" (Article 12) is a distant dream, with medical insurance hopelessly inadequate and provisions for the mentally ill primitive and inhumane. Good health care is rarely available locally and is beyond the financial reach of most Chinese.

Article 14 of the covenant calls for compulsory primary education and universal secondary education; neither is available in China. Secondary education is a privilege enjoyed only by a small minority, and a substantial percentage of Chinese children fail to develop newspaper-level reading skills. Indeed, when it comes to children, China's human rights record is especially abysmal. The government reports only 2 percent of school-age children do not attend school, but this figure is believed to be unrealistically low. Millions of migrant children are usually ineligible for school entrance, which is in violation of Article 9 of the ICESCR. Most are allowed to become laborers, usually working under exploitative and substandard conditions.

(The degree of exploitation of child labor that exists in, for example, South Asia, is not seen in China, but Chinese conditions are much worse than in many third world countries, including neighboring Vietnam.) The most egregious situation is that of orphans. There are many abandoned children, usually girls—a result of the government's one-child policy and the social preference for sons. In 1996 the New York–based Human Rights Watch published a shocking report detailing how such children in state institutions had been abused and sometimes deliberately allowed to starve to death.2

On the general issue of poverty, China has made some progress. The hope was to eliminate it by the year 2000, but that effort has fallen short, and it is now admitted that at least 20 million people will remain below China's low poverty line ($75 per year). Poverty as defined internationally is, of course, much more widespread, entitling us to question whether the suspension of political rights has been effective in terms of raising Chinese living standards, and to ask whether a more accountable and responsive political system might not do the job better.

Of course, poverty is found in most Asian countries, including those that are democratic, but China is different in that government is an integral part of the problem. True, labor mobility is greater than during the Mao era, but many workers and peasants still may not legally leave their homelands, a situation analogous to serfdom. Of course, many do move, but they are then subject to harassment by local governments, which also conspire with employers to keep wages low and circumvent national laws on working conditions. This helps keep down the costs in the towns' and villages' own enterprises. Labor is virtually bought and sold by local governments. Sometimes workers borrow from prospective employers to pay for the required government work permits, in effect making them bonded labor. This means a mistreated worker can-

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THE COSTS OF "STABILITY"

The views of China's rulers on sovereignty and "subsistence rights" underpin their skeptical attitude toward other human rights. But they also have one additional concern, namely, that the country needs, above all, stability. For example, freedom of religion is curbed because of the memory of various times in Chinese history when religious and political upheaval went hand in hand. Religious believers who show too much independence or militancy run the risk of persecution.

This summer saw a prime example of how alarmed the authorities can become over a spiritual movement that is perceived to be getting out of hand. The Falun Gong (Buddhist Law) sect, whose faith has elements of Buddhism, Taoism, and Qigong (physical and breathing exercises), mounted mass demonstrations in 30 cities around the country. The government mobilized the media to attack the group, and then outlawed it. The party has always sought to place all religions under its control. Until now it has been largely successful; Buddhism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism all have their official "legitimized" religious organizations. The challenge of Falun Gong, if not overcome, could spell the end to the Communists' religious monopoly: And that, they fear, could be the first step to losing their monopoly over politics.

The need to avoid chaos is widely felt, and many Chinese are persuaded by the state's insistence that curbing freedom is necessary to ensure stability. The past is often pointed to: China experienced civil war and two world wars during the first half of the twentieth century; and from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s there was the tumultuous Cultural Revolution. It is easy to persuade the Chinese that anything that threatens stability is to be eschewed, and that "Western-style" elections might be disorderly, with potentially destabilizing outcomes.

Of course, it is dictatorship that is unstable, for it disallows the frequent adjustments elections provide, thus making earth-shaking (albeit infrequent) upheavals all the more likely. And to some extent the prophecy of tumult is self-fulfilling. After all, it was not the demonstrating students at Tiananmen Square who effected the bloodshed of 1989, but the government. For many weeks that spring, students and workers peacefully protested government policies and the lack of democracy. Then, on June 4, as many as 2,000 Beijing citizens were killed by the army, and 7,000 were injured. Many were arrested, and hundreds who participated in the Tiananmen movement remain in prison to this day. One man recently released from confinement is the former liberal official Bao Tong; he has called for an official reevaluation of the events of that year. "If the 1989 killings are not condemned," Bao noted this June, "China is unlikely to fundamentally achieve long-term political stability." Thus, the idea that stability and human rights are connected is gaining adherents.

The events of 1989 marked a watershed in China's political development. China's leaders learned from the debacle that they cannot preserve their power if they grant too much—or too little—freedom. Yet any direct challenge to the Communist Party now results in swift, draconian punishment. All efforts to form opposition parties have been repressed, with at least seven leaders of the fledgling China Democracy Party imprisoned within the past year. That party has been outlawed by the authorities, and anyone involved runs the risk of being imprisoned for the vague "crime" of "endangering state security." 4

At the same time, information and ideas flow much more freely today than they did from the 1950s to the 1980s. Furthermore, China's leaders appear to have discovered that benefits can accrue to them if they address public discontent. Thus, many of the demands of the Tiananmen demonstrators have been met: inflation was brought under control, steps were taken to institute the rule of law (with at least some abusive officials prosecuted), and many aging party leaders (Mao's cronies) left the scene.

That information flows more freely than before is less because the authorities want it this way than because they cannot stop it. New media (tape recordings, faxes, the Internet) are much harder to control than the press and the airwaves. Still, the government tries. The authorities are constantly seeking out and blocking politically unacceptable Internet sites such as Falun Gong's. This spring, Shanghai authorities closed 300 local Internet cafes. Hundreds of others in Shanghai and other cities

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"China permits the existence of a few "democratic parties and groups." In general they operate under tight Communist supervision, although some did become a bit unruly in the late 1980s. See James D. Seymour, China's Satellite Parties (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1987)."
not quit without losing his or her deposit and back wages, creating enormous potential for abuse. Labor discontent is an especially sensitive issue because workers traditionally have been deemed the Communists' main base of mass support. Worker disaffection in the form of union organizing is not only a crime but a challenge to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" principle and thus to the legitimacy of the regime.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

With such economic deprivation, and with the glaring inequalities of wealth and poverty, crime in China has, unsurprisingly, been on the rise. The problem has prompted occasional "crackdowns," with widespread arrests and imprisonment after the most casual—if any—judicial proceedings. China's prison system is notorious, although perhaps not all its notoriety is deserved. How does China's prison system measure up in terms of international standards, and what are those standards?

Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although China has not ratified that convention, the country fully acceded to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishments in 1988. According to Article 2 of that convention, authorities have an international obligation to take "effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture" in any territory under their jurisdiction. The Chinese government has sent somewhat mixed signals as to whether such treatment is condoned. The official line is that it is not. Nonetheless, torture has persisted, and sometimes results in death directly, or through suicide by inmates who cannot withstand the treatment. In one recent case an inmate drowned himself because he could not endure the electric shocks and other forms of torture that were being administered to him. The government revealed that 126 prisoners died as the result of torture in 1993, and 115 died in 1994.

China has the world's largest prison system. That is not surprising, since it also has the world's largest population. Although the rate of imprisonment in the 1950s may have been high by world standards, the prisoner population, which peaked in the late 1950s, has since declined. Today China has about 1,250 prison units, probably fewer than half the number that existed in the late 1950s. They hold about 2 million prisoners (mostly common criminals), which is not an extraordinarily large number. In Stalin's time, the population of the Soviet gulag averaged around 3 million (mostly political prisoners), or 2 percent of the national population. That figure is more than 10 times the current overall rate in China, where only about 0.17 percent of the population is imprisoned. By comparison, Taiwan imprisons people at a rate of 0.19 percent, and the United States rate is 0.44 percent. In other words, the United States imprisons people at more than double the Chinese rate.

Capital punishment is a different story. Of course, it has not been clearly established internationally that capital punishment violates human rights, but the world trend appears to be toward eliminating the death penalty. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights opposes the practice, and many countries have stopped executing people. Even China—where the execution of criminals receives widespread public support—has seen the beginning of some opposition, and the government claims that the number of executions is declining. Nonetheless, far more judicial executions occur in China than in any other country. In 1998 Amnesty International counted 1,067 executions, doubtless only a fraction of the total. The death penalty is meted out erratically, often for relatively minor crimes, such as fraud, tax evasion, and pimping (while those responsible for the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, for example, remain beyond the reach of the law).

Most convicts, of course, are not executed but end up in the "labor reform" system. While the size of the labor reform system may not be outrageous for a country with China's population, what often is outrageous are the atrocious conditions in the penal institutions (especially the less-well-run ones) and the fact that many inmates do not belong there at all. A small number are imprisoned for political reasons; many more are victims of other miscarriages of justice. This is because the judicial system is so slipshod that many innocents are convicted, and many minor offenders are given heavy sentences. In 1998 one province found that during a three-month period there had been 14,993 miscarriages of justice; 4,701 judges were charged with corruption or dereliction of duty in that province alone.

remain in operation, but only under tight police supervision. These steps were prompted by fears of what might happen on the tenth anniversary of the June 4, 1989 crackdown.

OF CHICKENS AND MONKEYS

Although by international standards the human rights situation in China appears poor, most Chinese think more in terms of conditions now; they realize that human rights violations were far greater during the Mao era. Not only has the reality improved, but the government also has come much closer to accepting international human rights norms than was conceivable before 1980. There has been considerable effort to establish the rule of law and a court system, and some acceptance of the idea that rulers do not have the right to do anything they want in the face of international agreements to the contrary. Although this does not yet extend to the point at which citizens can, in the name of an international human rights convention, challenge government action, the seeds for such action seem to have been planted.

Furthermore, Chinese society is far more pluralistic than ever before. No longer does the government monopolize employment, education, and culture. Unauthorized groups now abound, such as Falun Gong and the thriving gay and lesbian subculture. And although the press is not free, a large “gray market” for books and magazines exists that seems largely beyond the reach of the censors, despite the generally chilly political climate that has prevailed in recent years. Now and then the authorities may insist on the destruction of an entire run of a magazine, or they may suspend the operations of a publishing house and require its leaders to undergo “rectification” and write “self-criticisms”—chilling reminders of common practices of the Mao era.

But public thirst for dissident literature is insatiable, and publishers have devised a host of tactics to meet the demand and survive. For example, because magazines are more tightly restrained than books, monthlies call themselves “book magazines.” When a publication is repressed, alternative outlets are not hard to find, and political critics manage to be heard. Often they express themselves in circuitous ways, such as praising the international legal action against the former ruler of Chile, Augusto Pinochet. (When a writer comments that human rights violators like Pinochet “cannot rest peacefully,” readers immediately see what the author wishes to imply.) However, the line between the permissible and impermissible is unclear and changes from time to time and place to place. Thus some writers find themselves on the wrong side of that line, and pay the price of imprisonment.

Furthermore, being a cultural figure offers no protection if one strays from engaging in “culture” as the state narrowly defines it. This spring Yan Zhengxue, a painter from Beijing, and two writers from Shanghai, Jiang Tanwen and Li Cunrong, asked to be allowed to demonstrate against corruption; permission was denied. After attending a meeting of the outlawed China Democracy Party they were arrested and charged with endangering state security.

In short, since the Mao era, human rights in China have improved, but they still fall far short of international standards. The rulers perpetuate their power by practicing what we might call a moderate level of repression, adhering to the old Chinese adage “Kill a chicken to warn all the monkeys.”

\*Information about human rights conditions in China is available from Human Rights in China (www.hrichina.org), Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org), and Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org). For Hong Kong, see Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor (www.hkhrm.org.hk).
A Year Later, Chinese Officials Still Struggling to Stamp Out Falun Gong

By Christopher Bodeen

ASSOCIATED PRESS

BEIJING — China's leaders are settling in for a prolonged struggle against the banned Falun Gong sect, acknowledging in an official editorial that a year of arrests, harassment and political campaigns have failed to wipe out the group.

The statement came after a burst of protests yesterday by scores of sect followers on the eve of the anniversary of a government crackdown on the Falun Gong — proving the group remains a force in China despite being targeted by one of the biggest political campaigns in years.

The group's resilience was grudgingly acknowledged in an editorial to be published today in the Communist Party's flagship People's Daily. Excerpts were carried yesterday on the official Xinhua News Agency.

"The cult will not voluntarily step down from the historical stage," Xinhua quoted the article as saying.

The fight against Falun Gong will be a "long-lasting, complicated and acute struggle," it said, and pledged to crack down on members with a "firm hand."

A media smear campaign, the jailings of thousands of members and pressure on followers to renounce ties to the group have thinned Falun Gong's ranks. But the group has continued to launch defiant protests, mounting the most sustained public challenge to the Communist Party in 51 years.

In Beijing yesterday, scores of Falun Gong followers raised banners in Tiananmen Square, prompting a frenzied response by police who swarmed on groups of protesters, wresting away banners and knocking them to the ground.

Police dragged protesters by the arms or clothes — middle-aged women and children among them. One officer locked his arms around a woman's neck, pulling her away.

More than 100 Falun Gong members were detained during the protest, a 10-minute explosion of seemingly coordinated action across the vast plaza.

That the protests happened — and in such numbers — was particularly impressive in the face of police alertness in the days before yesterday's anniversary on the crackdown on Falun Gong.

One year ago today, security agents detained dozens of key Falun Gong organizers. Sect followers, tipped off by fellow members in the upper ranks of the communist government, responded with mass protests. Two days later, Chinese leaders outlawed Falun Gong, declaring it a public menace.

Police have picked up at least 200 practitioners from Tiananmen Square every day for the past week, according to a Communist Party official involved in security work.

Police in Beijing and other cities have watched airports and railroad and bus stations to prevent followers from reaching the capital, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The government has branded Falun Gong an unprecedented threat to communist rule and accused the group of cheating followers and causing 1,500 deaths, mostly of followers it maintains refused medical treatment in accordance with what it claims are the group's teachings.

Founded eight years ago, Falun Gong attracted millions of followers with its blend of slow-motion exercises, meditation and ideas drawn from Buddhism, Taoism and its founder.

Followers arrested in recent days have refused to tell officers their names or hometowns, making it difficult for police to file the proper arrest forms, the party official said.

Instead, police have commandeered a stadium in western Beijing to hold those detained until their hometowns can be determined and they can be shipped off to local detention centers, the official said.
Those who hate Falun Dafa see it as a throwback to China's past of poverty, superstition and fatalism.

"The 'Master' (Falun Gong founder Li Hong Zhi) is a master con-man," notes one bitter diatribe posted on a Chinese-language chat line.

"Too bad so many fools get taken in by his deviltry. Some Americans would love it if all Chinese fell under (his) spell . . . America would then do its high-tech, China would forever remain far behind and the Americans could manipulate us however they wanted."

Those who love Falun Dafa, on the other hand, see it as a moral lifeboat in a sea of depravity.

"Give it a try while overcoming genuine hardships or tribulations," urges a doctoral student in computer science at the University of Toronto who says Falun Gong practice has transformed him.

Quoting Master Li, he notes, "When it looks impossible and is said impossible, you give it a try and then see if it is possible. If you really make it, you will find, 'After passing the shady willow trees, there will be bright flowers and another village ahead.'"

Those who wonder why there is so much fuss about Falun Dafa believe that pragmatism and democracy constitute the best road leading toward a good society.

But from the perspective of history, one can see the potential for growing hatred, clashes and bloodshed between the Communist authorities and the passionate adherents of Falun Gong — clashes that could lead to a repeat of China's disintegration that happened under a yellow sky two millennia ago.
Is China Democratizing?

Minxin Pei

IGNORANCE AND REALITY

A key factor influencing America's China policy and dividing American opinions is the evolution of the Chinese political system. Critics of the Clinton administration's China policy argue that, despite two decades of market reforms, the Chinese political system has not only remained repressive and undemocratic but has become a threat to the world's democracies. Pointing to Beijing's political repression, religious persecution, alleged proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, and unfair trade practices, they call for a hard-line response.

China's refusal to make substantive concessions on human rights has made it difficult for the administration to defend its stance. Clinton has been unable to offer evidence that engagement has yielded results on human rights, nor has he made a persuasive case that the Chinese political system is evolving in a more open direction. The administration's defense that current China policy is in the United States' long-term strategic interests has proved a poor match for ideological and passionate attacks from members of Congress and the media. Daily headlines and routine allegations of Beijing's misdeeds have battered the policy.

A major cause of the raging debate on U.S. China policy is lack of understanding of the profound political changes in China over the last two decades. In the past, ignorance of Chinese political realities has led to erroneous assessments of China's prospects, and it is now endangering China policy in Clinton's second term. As Beijing's third-generation leaders, exemplified by President Jiang Zemin, have fully assumed power, the United States must reexamine the Chinese political system and develop a more realistic evaluation of its potential for progress.

In American public discourse, political reform has a narrow meaning democratization. American politicians and news media measure the progress of political reform in other countries against a single yardstick—the holding of free and open elections. But while democratization may be one element of reform, it is not the only one, especially in countries lacking the most rudimentary institutions of governance.

Both in the West and in developing countries, history shows that political reform has three essential components: establishment of norms governing elite politics; restructuring of basic institutions governing relations among parts of the state, such as the division of power among the government's different branches; and strengthening of the institutions of political participation. Countries that follow that sequence are also better bets to consolidate reform and to experience less instability because the success of one reform makes the next more likely.

KINDER AND GENTLER POLITICS
(paraphrase of this part of the article)

Deng effectively reduced the level of tension among the elite political leaders, so that those who lost in power struggles need not fear long prison sentences or death. He set a mandatory retirement age and term limits for party and government officials to reduce the influence of the aging revolutionaries resistant to change. The effect has been the creation of a ruling elite with college educations and similar social experience and political outlook. Debilitating generational conflict—a regular feature of Mao's regime—has all but disappeared. Gone too is the bitter ideological debate that plagued Chinese politics in the early 1980's. Deng's reforms have contributed to the stable transition of power from his generation to the new leadership of Jiang Zemin.
One of the most important political developments of the Deng era was the rise of the National People's Congress (NPC) from a rubber stamp to a potential challenger to the CCP's monopoly of power. In recent years, the NPC has asserted its prerogatives as China's supreme lawmaking body. Although it has not directly confronted the CCP on key legislative proposals, members of the NPC now sponsor their own bills, actively debate and amend proposed legislation, and occasionally hold up or vote against important bills. Having the power to confirm or reject the CCP's nominees for senior executives, the NPC recently embarrassed the party by casting a large number of negative votes. During the March 1995 session, a third of the deputies publicly opposed the nomination of a Politburo member for vice premier. Signaling their dissatisfaction with rising crime and corruption, 32 percent of NPC deputies voted against the annual report of the Supreme Court, and 40 percent gave a thumbs-down to the annual report of the supreme procurator in the March 1997 session.

In the provinces, the rift between the legislature and the CCP is more visible in personnel matters. Limited competitive "selections" were introduced in the provinces in 1988, which allowed deputies of provincial people's congresses to nominate their own candidates to compete with the CCP's choices. Although provincial legislatures routinely confirmed the CCP's nominees for governorships and vice governorships, deputies in local people's congresses sometimes rejected the nominations of senior provincial officials and chose write-in candidates instead. According to figures from 20 provinces, 15 percent of the write-in candidates were elected to senior provincial positions.

The growing independence of the NPC has given the institution more credibility. A poll in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in late 1994 found that citizens increasingly viewed the NPC as a channel for expressing their grievances. When asked whom they would approach to lodge a complaint, 22 percent said the deputies of the People's Congress, an increase from 13 percent in 1988.

The NPC has benefited from the general trends of political evolution under way since the late 1970s. The decentralization of power within the regime allowed the NPC to claim a legitimate role in legislation. The appointment of several political heavyweights as chairmen of its Standing Committee gave the NPC extra bargaining power within ruling circles. The situation is similar in the provinces, as many retired provincial party secretaries and governors assumed the chairmanships of provincial people's congresses. Of the chairmen of the 30 provincial congresses in 1996, nine were former first CCP secretaries, three were former governors, and eleven were deputy CCP secretaries. The rapid growth of the NPC's permanent professional staff from fewer than 20 in 1978 to more than 2,000 in 1990 has greatly enhanced the institution's technical ability to write legislation.

The profile of the deputies serving the NPC has changed since 1978 as well. The number of nonparty deputies rose slightly between 1978 and 1993. The average deputy selected in 1993 was relatively young (53 years old) and well educated (69 percent had college degrees). More important, the combined representation by soldiers, peasants, and workers, who provided the base of support for the CCP, declined from almost 62 percent in 1978 to less than 30 percent in 1993. Meanwhile, intellectuals and government officials jumped from 28 percent to 50 percent of the congress, reflecting the enhanced status of professionals and technocrats under Deng.
Another significant development was the set of legal reforms launched by the regime to prevent a repeat of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and lay the legal foundations of a market economy. The NPC passed 175 laws between 1978 and 1994, and local people's congresses enacted another 3,000. On paper, Chinese laws borrow extensively from Western legal doctrines, concepts, procedures, and terminology. Undeterred by the poor enforcement of the law (only half the legal judgments in commercial disputes are enforced), an increasing number of Chinese citizens and businesspeople have turned to the legal system to protect their property and personal rights.

Chinese courts have experienced a rapid rise in three types of cases: commercial litigation over contract disputes, administrative litigation against the government, and civil litigation. From 1986 to 1996, commercial litigation cases increased 387 percent, lawsuits against the government 12,483 percent, and civil lawsuits 212 percent. Judging by opinion polls from the mid-1990s, a relatively strong sense of rights, especially property rights, among the Chinese people appears to be assisting legal reform. In a 1993 poll of 5,455 respondents in six provinces, 78 percent agreed with the statement, “Private property is sacred and must not be violated,” and 77 percent disagreed with the statement, “In a lawsuit involving an individual and a collective entity, the judgment should favor the latter.” When asked “whether the police could continue to detain a person for the sake of public safety even though they were unable to determine his guilt,” 47 percent opposed detention, and only 28 percent supported it.

The legal system will continue to grow as an institutional rival to the CCP. Current trends suggest that limited legal reforms will even accelerate. The implementation of an extensive body of law has not only created an institutional legal framework but has benefited important groups—private entrepreneurs, foreign investors, an expanding middle class—who would likely resist any reversal of the trend.

Another favorable factor is the rapid growth of a professional legal community. The number of lawyers in China rose from 31,000 in 1988 to 90,000 in 1995. Although the 1,625 private law firms in 1995 accounted for only 22 percent of all law firms, their growth in recent years has been impressive, averaging 500 annually in 1994 and 1995 and accounting for about 70 percent of the new law firms formed. Not only does this signal the rising independence of the legal community, but the for-profit nature of these firms may spur them to advocate their clients' rights aggressively.

The legal system is likely to become a critical arena in which the CCP's authority can be indirectly challenged and checked before the initiation of competitive elections. Unlike a competitive election or multiparty system, which would threaten the CCP's rule, gradual legal reforms pose no immediate danger to the party's power and may even serve some of its short-term interests. But as legal institutions develop, Beijing's program of limited legal reform has the potential to evolve from a system of law into a rule of law.

REVISING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

The most challenging aspect of political reform in post-Mao China was the restructuring of relations between the state and society and the establishment of institutions of democratic participation. Progress in democratic reform was conspicuously lagging, with the exception of semi-open village elections. But relations between the government and its people have changed dramatically. A new social contract seems to have emerged, whose essence is the redefinition of the scope of the state's power and of citizens' freedom. Although never explicitly articulated, the new social contract abolished most curbs on the personal and economic freedom of ordinary citizens in exchange for their tacit acceptance of the CCP's authority. Although the formula of "personal freedom for CCP authority" was repeatedly challenged by the dissidents and nearly overturned during the nationwide democracy movement in the spring of 1989, it seems to have stuck, at least temporarily, in the 1990s.
The data on political repression are evidence of the enforcement of this contract. In the Deng era, the government significantly reduced its repression while maintaining pressure on a relatively small community of determined dissidents who defied the formula. Although the CCP's strategic shift from mass to selective repression has produced a dramatic drop in the general level of repression, it has not gained the regime any credit with the international community because its new strategy has targeted the most visible dissidents, such as Wei Jingsheng, who have been embraced by Western media and politicians. Table 4 shows overall trends for political repression in China. The higher the proportion of political prisoners in the jail population, the more severe political repression is assumed to be.

Table 4's data, collected by leading Chinese sociologists from Shaanxi province in northwestern China, show that the Chinese prison system before Deng resembled Stalin's gulags. Between 1953 and 1975, some 26 to 39 percent of the prison inmates were classified as counterrevolutionaries. The percentage of counterrevolutionaries in the national prison population dropped from 13 percent in 1980 to 0.5 percent in 1989. "Counterrevolutionary" crimes were legally abolished last year. Official figures reported that as of early 1997, Chinese jails housed 2,026 inmates convicted of "crimes of endangering national security," representing 0.46 percent of the prison population.

### Why No Democracy?

Despite China's notable progress in restoring elite norms, establishing legal institutions, and maintaining a new social contract, its leaders have strongly resisted democratic reforms. This resistance stems from their fear for China as well as for their own positions, and from knowledge of the party's weakness.

Chinese leaders are acutely aware of the present system's fragility. The power and roles of the different parts of the state remain poorly defined, and political institutions designed to resolve conflicts remain inadequate or nonexistent. Opening up the political process to mass democratic participation is viewed as a recipe for chaos.

Judging from the Soviet experience, China's anxiety is not completely unjustified. It is commonly believed that Mikhail Gorbachev's fatal error was starting with political reform instead of economic reform. But this interpretation of the Soviet collapse misses the most important point: Gorbachev's political reform strategy was flawed in itself because he opened up politics to democratic participation before he could implement, let alone consolidate, constitutional reforms that would establish the institutions to govern democratic participation. Thus, the first priority of the political forces his democratic reforms unleashed was not to find common ground within a constitutional framework but to overthrow the existing system. Chinese leaders fear they would risk a Soviet-style collapse if they initiated democratic reforms before reinvigorating current constitutional institutions.

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Source: Li Xueyi and Li Pu, eds., Chinese Social Development Report.
Then, too, Chinese leaders recognize the organizational decline of the CCP. While it is the world's largest political party, with 3.4 million grassroots party cells and 58 million members in 1997, it is hardly the soundest. Politically, the scars of Tiananmen have not healed, and when they do they will challenge the CCP's internal unity and may force a reassessment of Deng's legacy. The CCP is also governing a society radically different from the one at the end of the Cultural Revolution—a society much less dependent on the state and the party, more open to new values, and less susceptible to traditional ideological appeals.

More important, market reforms have begun to erode the CCP's organizational integrity in various economic sectors. A top party official admitted in 1994 that 35 percent of the workshops in state-owned enterprises did not have a single CCP member. The party has been unable to establish a significant presence in the emerging private sector. According to a 1994 survey of 3,092 foreign joint ventures or wholly-owned firms in 34 economic development zones, the CCP had set up party cells in only 704 firms.

Among the 2.78 million semiprivate township-village enterprises in 1995, the CCP had an organized presence in only 8.6 percent. It was even less successful in penetrating domestically owned private firms. A 1995 survey of 2,500 in Zhejiang province showed that less than one percent had party cells. Among the 70,000 rural joint-stock firms, 77 percent did not have a single CCP member.

The most serious crisis faced by the CCP, however, is the decay of its rural organizations. The dismantling of the people's communes from 1980 to 1982 dealt a severe blow to the CCP in the countryside. On paper, the CCP has 26 million members in 900,000 rural party cells. In reality, the CCP rural organization is in disarray. Official data show that 8 percent of the village party cells “could not function” or “had collapsed” and that 60 percent were “mediocre.”

Chinese workers' new mobility and the new labor market have contributed to this decline. Economic liberalization has created unprecedented opportunities for rural residents, while social liberalization has lifted restraints on leaving a job and moving around China. Tight budget constraints have kept the CCP from allocating more resources to its rural organizational infrastructure, making careers inside the party less attractive. Today a village CCP chief is paid 1,000 yuan, about $120, a year. Most young, capable CCP members have left villages for jobs in cities. The ones who remain behind are older, poorly educated, and less knowledgeable about the market economy. Official statistics from 1995 show that only 12 percent of the party village chiefs were under 35 and that half the party members in rural areas were illiterate or had only an elementary school education. A study by the CCP's Organization Department in Hubei, Anhui, Shanxi, and Qinghai provinces in 1995 showed that a large majority of CCP village chiefs were old-fashioned farmers incapable of leading villagers in a market economy.

The CCP's decline is a leading source of tension in rural areas. If it continues, it will further reduce the party's ability to secure the support of the peasantry, and therefore to govern. Already it has been blamed for widespread corruption, lawlessness, and disputes between the party and the peasants. Official surveys in 1995 in the less-developed provinces Guizhou and Sichuan reported that relationships between local officials and the masses were "tense" and "relatively tense" in 60 to 70 percent of the counties and districts. In numerous instances, angry peasants have murdered local officials or burned their houses.

Despite small signs of progress, Beijing will continue to resist democracy.
In the short run, the CCP's decay in the villages makes it harder for it to govern. The ruling party in fast-growing authoritarian regimes must establish a solid base of support among conservative peasants and mobilize them to counter the democratic opposition in urban areas, especially during semicompetitive elections. Reliable rural support gives the party considerable security and obviates the need to resort to brute force against the opposition. In the long run, the CCP's lack of rural support will make it difficult for it to manage democratic reforms.

Thus the Chinese leadership will continue to resist democracy. Their top priority is to strengthen the party and continue cautious political reforms that will enhance the state's ability to manage the challenges created by China's rapid economic development. Beijing is more likely to push reforms that will improve China's legal and representative institutions. Recent changes in Beijing suggest that its leaders may be moving in that direction. President Jiang Zemin's recent proclamation on "rule according to law" may indicate the leadership's commitment to legal reform. The tax system implemented in 1994 ushered in a new era of relations between the central government and the provinces. Additional economic initiatives, such as integration of the national market, privatization of state-owned enterprises, health care programs, pensions, and welfare reforms, are expected to define this relationship further.

But the acceleration of political reform should not be expected to result in a rapid expansion of democratic participation. Until Chinese leaders feel confident about the durability of their political system, they are unlikely to open it to popular participation. In the meantime, they may initiate minor democratic experiments at the grassroots level, such as the expansion of semi-open elections to small towns.

Such small steps toward democratization will not impress American critics. Even though a U.S. policy of engagement will be the most critical external factor for China's political reform, the Clinton administration and its successors will continue to have great difficulty convincing the public that their policy is producing the desired effects.
China: Population Analysis and Mapping

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Audience: High school (11-12) or university students.

Time required: 8 hours in class including about
4 hours lecture and discussion with short video and
4 hours mapping and worksheet completion

Objectives:
The student will utilize statistics, graphs, and articles available on the
world wide web to
1. acquire an overview of China's demographic indicators
2. map dependency ratios by province
3. analyze China's population pyramids to determine
   future dependency ratios
4. examine population growth variations between urban and rural areas
   in China

National Geography Standards addressed:
Standard 1. How to use maps and other geographic representations,
tools, and technologies to acquire, process, and report information
from a spatial perspective.
Standard 3. How to analyze the spatial organization of people, places,
and environments on Earth's surface.
Standard 9. The characteristics, distribution, and migration of human
populations on Earth's surface.

Materials:
1. Access to world wide web.
2. Christian Science Monitor video on China, "The One Child Family
   Policy" segment.
3. Definition list
4. Outline maps of China's provinces (provided)
5. WWW and other references (provided in Bibliography)
6. Calculator
7. Colored pencils

Background and terms:
Earth's current population is just over 6 billion people. Over one fifth of
those people live in the world's most populous country--China. China's
population at the end of the year 2000 is estimated to be just under 1.3 billion
people. That number is the official goal of the Chinese government who wants
to see that their tough family planning policies have been successful. China
will have completed the year 2000 census, the fifth census undertaken since
the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, by January 2001 (8).
While there is some question as to how accurate the count will be (5), the government's goal of low growth will probably be met. However, this does not mean that China's family planning policies will disappear or that the population growth will stop. The policies may be more stringently enforced, although in a less coercive manner in keeping with China's more open society. The previous uneven enforcement may become more uniform and extend to China's ethnic minorities, who have so far been fairly free from birth quotas. One of the keys to the country's success in population control since 1990 has been a surge in family planning clinics where reproductive health is emphasized (8). Hopefully, this less draconian approach will become available in the poorer provinces of western China where most of the country's ethnic minorities reside.

One of the most difficult segments of the population to be counted will be China's "floating population." These are peasants who have illegally migrated from the countryside into China's cities to escape unemployment due to the current agricultural recession or to closing of state-run enterprises. Estimates place their numbers at 80-100 million, making this the largest internal migration in world history. Because these migrants have violated China's hukou system which requires residency permits, they fear fines or forced return to the countryside. Such fears exist despite the government's promise that no one will be punished as a result of information acquired during the census (5). Regardless of the success of the census, rural to urban migration will clearly impact the current internal distribution of China's population over the next two to three decades.

The purpose of this project is to examine on-line demographic data to reach conclusions about China's future population growth. While growth for the country as a whole will be slow, averaging less than 1%, it will have implications both for the country's increasingly large cohort of retired workers and for the future of Chinese cities, which will be home to ever larger numbers of people.

Terms to understand:
Numbers in parenthesis refer to Bibliography citations where definitions can be located. Also, most human geography textbooks define these terms.
- crude birth rate (4)
- crude death rate (4)
- dependency ratio (1)
- natural increase rate (4)
- population momentum (7)
- population pyramid (4, 6)
- replacement fertility rate (4, 7)
- total fertility rate (4, 7)

Procedure:
1. Introduce China's population and census 2000.
3. Review definitions, access (and print) citations 1, 10, 11, and 12 from the web. Respond to Worksheet 2.
4. Extend discussion based on answers in worksheets.

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Worksheet 1
After viewing video, respond to the following questions.

1. Describe China's one child family policy.

2. How is the policy enforced?

3. Why are urban couples more accepting of the policy than rural couples? (List at least five reasons.)

(Cover these answers when xeroxing worksheet.)

a. less living space in urban areas
   OPTIONAL EXTENSION: In 1993, the median useable living space per person in Shanghai (the city featured in the video) was 9.9 square meters. How "big" is this area? (Convert to feet if necessary to visualize this size.) What area in your home is comparable? How many square feet or meters are in your home? Divide this by the number of people living in your home, and state the average living space per person in your home. Compare this with the figure for Shanghai.

b. pensions available in urban areas so children not relied upon by aging parents

c. son preference more likely in rural areas

d. rural couples need help on farms

e. rural couples rely on children in old age (no pensions)

f. other implied reasons: urban couples work outside home
   urban areas more expensive
   family planning services more accessible in cities
   one child policy enforcement is easier in urban areas
Worksheet 2
After examining data and graphs from web sites 1, 10, 11, 12, (provided here), respond to the following questions.

1. Fill in the blanks based on the IDB Summary Demographic Data for China.
   a. China's crude birth rate will ___________ over the next 25 years from ___ in 2000 to ___ in 2025. However, China's crude death rate will ___________ from ___ in 2000 to ___ in 2025. This means that the rate of natural increase will ___________ from ___% in 2000 to ___% in 2025.
   b. China's growth rate (rate of natural increase) was highest during the decade from _____ to ______. China's population growth is projected to become negative, that is, population will begin to decline beginning in ______.
   OPTIONAL EXTENSION: What is the historical/political context for China's tremendous growth between 1960-1970?
   c. Females outnumber males in China's population beginning at about age _____ in 2000 and at about age _____ in 2025. The difference between the numbers of males versus females in China below the ages named above ___________ in 2025 than in 2000.

2. Use the outline map and Table 4-7 Population Age Composition and Dependency Ratio by Region to show China's dependency ratios by province. You need only to refer to the column labeled “Dependency Ratio” from Table 4-7 to complete this part of the worksheet.
   a. Subtract the lowest dependency ratio from the highest to state the range of dependency ratios.
   ___________
   b. We will use 3 equal intervals to show variations in dependency ratios so divide the number above by 3.
   ___________
c. Add the number above to the lowest dependency ratio to get the first interval. Do the same for the 2nd and 3rd intervals.

Interval 1: _____ to _____

Interval 2: _____ to _____

Interval 3: _____ to _____

d. Select a different color for each of the 3 intervals and shade the provinces on the outline map according to which interval that province's dependency ratio falls in.

e. Describe below the regional variations in dependency ratios that you observe on your map.

f. State below the relationship between dependency ratios and a region's social service needs. (Consider needs of younger cohorts versus older cohorts and the ability of the productive age groups, 15-64, to provide for those needs.)

3. Refer to the Population Pyramid Summary for China (2025) and to the IDB Summary Demographic Data for China midyear population by age and sex (2025) to complete the next part of the worksheet.

a. Calculate the dependency ratio for all of China for the year 2025.

Dependents age 0-14 ____________ thousand

Dependents age 65 and over ____________ thousand

Total dependents ____________ thousand

Productive age 15-64 ____________ thousand

Dependency ratio ____________ %

(Total number of dependents divided by total productive x 100)
b. In 1998 China's dependency ratio was 46.50%. How does the dependency ratio change by 2025? Why? (Which cohorts show the greatest increase in numbers? What accounts for this?)

c. The dependency ratio can be directly calculated, as you did above, or it can be deduced by examining a population pyramid. (Actually, it can be relatively accurately calculated directly from a population pyramid.) Compare the population pyramids for 2025 and for 2050 and state how you would expect the dependency ratio to change and why it will change.

d. OPTIONAL EXTENSION: Mark on the population pyramids when the one child policy went into effect (1980). You must consider the base date of the pyramid, the date the one child policy went into effect, and the age of the cohort whose reproductive decisions were most affected by the one child policy. Record your observations of the change in the pyramid shape due to the one child policy. Why is there an abrupt increase in population about 20-25 years after 1980? This is the perfect example of positive population momentum and explains, in part, why China's population will continue to increase. Positive momentum also depends on longer life expectancy. Population momentum can be further examined by referring to number 7 in the Bibliography.

4. Examine the four pyramids in the International Brief to discuss (or write) answers to the following questions.
   a. Do the 1990 urban vs rural pyramids indicate closer adherence to the one child policy by urban residents, as claimed in the video? How can you tell?

   b. Deduce and compare dependency ratios for urban vs rural areas in 1990 and 2025. Extend your analysis to what you would expect in 2050.

   c. How do sex ratios vary in urban vs rural areas for 1990 and 2025?

   d. The note below the pyramids states that China's urban population is growing in part through "in-migration and reclassification of rural places as urban." Find out the criteria for changing the classification of a place. Find out the relative contribution to urban growth of in-migration versus reclassification. Let me know what you find out.
Bibliography

1. China Statistics Bureau web site. http://www.stats.gov.cn/yearbook/1999/d07e.htm (Table 4-7: Population Age Composition & Dependency Ratio by Region provided here.)


IDB Summary Demographic Data for China

Demographic Indicators: 2000 and 2025

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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths per 1,000 population</td>
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<td>Annual rate of growth (percent)</td>
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Midyear Population Estimates and Average Annual Period Growth Rates: 1950 to 2050

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Midyear Population, by Age and Sex: 2000 and 2025

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8 339
Complete map legend by writing dependency ratio intervals in the blanks above and assigning a different color to each interval. See the map on page 15 for an example.
4-7 POPULATION AGE COMPOSITION AND DEPENDANCY RATIO BY REGION

Data in this table are obtained from the Sample Survey on Population Changes in 1998. The sampling fraction is 1.01U.

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a) The dependency ratio refers to the proportion of the number of people aged 0-14 and 65 and over to the number of people aged 15-64. The children refers to the people aged 0-14, and the aged refers to the people aged 65 and over.
Population Pyramid Summary for China

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.
Old Age Security Reform in China

China is undertaking a major revamping of its old age security system because it is faced with a falling proportion of workers to pensioners, declining income replacement levels, precarious funding, and diminishing coverage of the labor force under the current system. China is reforming its urban old age security system and introducing a new system for the rural population.

Reforming the Urban System

Reform of the urban old age pension system, while still evolving, addresses both funding and benefits. A regionally-based pension pool system is replacing the work unit as the focal point of the old age security system. Until recently, each enterprise provided benefits to its retirees, covering the costs from current operating funds. Now, pension pools are being formed for administrative areas (usually counties or cities; a few at the higher prefecture or province level). Work units contribute to the pools on the basis of their total wage bills, and the pools assume responsibility for

China faces a declining ratio of workers to pensioners as number of pensioners increases

China's large cohort of young urban workers will be at or near retirement by 2025

Urban population by age and sex

Note: China's urban population is growing through natural population increase, in-migration, and reclassification of rural places as urban.
payment of benefits. By the end of 1994, about two-thirds (19 million) of pensioners and half (83 million) the urban work force were covered by the new pools.

A network of social security offices is being established to administer the reformed system. These offices, which will service retirees from a large number of enterprises, are expected to be more efficient than the former decentralized system.

Pension financing is being diversified, with the employer (work unit) no longer the sole contributor to the pension fund. Employees now also make contributions, and the government is to contribute as needed in its role as pension guarantor. Presently, employers contribute 15 percent or more of total payroll. Employees are now contributing only 1 to 3 percent of wage income, but the rate is gradually increasing by 1 percent every 2 years. As the employee contribution rate rises, the employer’s rate is to fall until each is contributing roughly 50 percent of total premium costs.

The system of benefits also is changing, as multiple plans replace the single defined benefit plan. The multiple plans seek a balance between incentives for participation and social equity. The specifics of each type of plan and the combination of plans available to workers vary across regions. In general, three types of plans are emerging:

- The basic pension plan pays benefits based on the average local wage (an equalizing characteristic of the benefit formula) and years of qualified service (an incentive aspect of the plan). Retirees receive a percentage of the local average wage prevailing in the year prior to retirement.

- The supplementary pension plan is similar to occupational pension plans in developed countries. This defined benefit plan takes into consideration

Note: China’s rural population is declining through out-migration and reclassification of rural places as urban.
Off farm employment in collective and private enterprises is expanding in rural China

The individual worker's earnings and the number of years of qualified service. In most cases, maximum and minimum wage levels are imposed to introduce an equalizing element to this pension as well.

The basic and supplementary pensions are adjusted annually for inflation. In addition, pensions are raised as labor productivity increases.

- The third type of plan is a compulsory savings plan. Contributions go into a special individual bank account. At retirement, monthly payments are disbursed from the principal and interest built up in this account with payments based on the accumulation and average life expectancy at retirement.

Pools vary in the distinction made between those who retired under the old system, workers hired under the old system, and workers hired under the new system. Nevertheless, all pools are required to honor previous obligations to existing retirees.

Worker coverage is more comprehensive under the new system. Unlike the old system which covered only State workers and employees of some urban collectives, the new system is slowly being opened up to workers in other rapidly growing urban sectors—foreign-funded enterprises, private enterprises and the self-employed.

The new system is partially funded, replacing the former pay-as-you-go system. The current contribution rates are intended to generate an annual surplus equivalent to about 10 percent of benefit payments in anticipation of rising costs as the reformed system matures and China's population ages.

Expanding the Rural Old Age Security System

In rural areas, only local government employees, including State teachers and employees of State farms, are eligible for the pension programs described above.

In an attempt to redress the imbalance in the provision of old age insurance between urban and rural workers, the central government has designed and is promoting a special pension insurance program for rural areas. The program is a voluntary savings plan (defined contribution and fully funded) targeted at individuals with rural household registration (farmers, employees of rural enterprises, and the rural self-employed) between 20 and 60 years of age. Individuals may contribute between 2 and 20 yuan per month to be placed in a special bank account. Local governments and rural enterprises have the option of matching a percentage of the participant's contribution. Pension payments begin at age 60 based on contributions and accrued interest.

Sustainability of the Reformed Urban System

The reformed urban system offers generous benefits with high income replacement ratios and with retirement at age 50 for women (age 55 for some women) and age 60 for men. As China's population ages, the working population supporting the system will be shrinking proportionately to retirees: the ratio of population ages 20-59 to those 60 and over is projected to decline from the current 6.7 to 5.0 in 2010 and 2.7 in 2025. The pension system will be paying benefits to more people for longer periods of time as life expectancy continues to increase. By the year 2025, life expectancy at age 60 will increase by over 4 years. Despite these demographics, Chinese officials have steered clear of any discussion of reduction in benefits.

For the new system to remain financially sound, it is imperative that all participants meet their obligations and that funds are profitably invested. Some firms and individuals are reluctant to join the new compulsory pension pools because of concerns over the adequacy of funding for current and future obligations. Currently, nearly one out of four participating enterprises, primarily loss-making state enterprises, needs government assistance in paying premiums.

Also serving to undermine confidence in the system are reported instances where local governments have invested pension funds under their control in risky development projects or used them to cover budgetary shortfalls. Given the underdevelopment of financial markets in China, safe and profitable investments are few.
What Next?

Several government leaders advocate moving pools up from the lower levels to the province and eventually the national level in order to maximize the benefits of risk sharing and facilitate the development of labor markets. However, substantial regional variation in salary levels and in the inherited obligations and relative burden under the former system hinder expansion of pools.

While the reformed pension system embraces more workers, it is still largely limited to the urban labor force, which comprises just 27 percent of China's total labor force. The remaining 73 percent only have the option of contributing to the voluntary savings plan. Some regions are considering expanding coverage to the growing number of laborers employed in rural enterprises and to migrant laborers in urban areas that lack urban residency status (currently excluded from most urban pension pools).

Workers per Retiree for Provinces of China: 1993

- Funding for this study is provided by the Office of the Demography of Aging, National Institute on Aging.
- Population projections were modeled at the International Programs Center, Population Division, Bureau of the Census. Other data are from China State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China 1995.

For further information, contact Loraine A. West at 301-457-1362.
China...

Tradition

and

Transformation

A four-to-five week study
of Chinese beliefs, arts, and accomplishments
culminating in a modern-day
Chinese New Year celebration and dinner
followed by traditional song, dance, and theatre
Adaptable for high school English/Theatre Arts students, grades 10-12

by Fulbright-Hayes participant to China, Summer 2000

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Unit Overview

This four-to-five week study should acquaint high school English students with Chinese beliefs, arts, and accomplishments, past and present. Geared for students grades 10-12 in required or elective English courses, the unit promotes hands-on activities adaptable to various learning styles and levels. Incorporating independent study, response journals, collaborative work, and instructional sharing, the unit utilizes a variety of instructional tools, and is compatible with most state standards requirements in the humanities, specifically theatre arts and world literature. The unit, which is divided into five sections -- “Let’s Discover China,” “Let’s Share and Compare,” “Let’s Learn From Authors and Shared Concepts,” “Let’s Celebrate Chinese New Year,” and “Let’s Produce” --culminates in two major projects of experiential learning which involve all class members.

Unit Goals

Students will develop a broader knowledge base of and appreciation for:
1. Chinese inventions and accomplishments;
2. Chinese art, architecture and crafts;
3. Chinese customs and beliefs, such as
   a. The five elements which create the Chinese focus of the universe;
   b. Confucianism, Daoism (Taoism), and Buddhism; and
   c. Common Chinese signs and symbols;
4. Selections of Chinese literature from various time periods;
5. Chinese festivals, specifically Chinese New Year on January 24, 2001, as they recreate the celebration in decorations, customs, dress, and food;
6. Traditional Chinese performing arts, in the process of blocking, student directing, costuming, and producing part of the one-act play, Treasures of the Orient by Harding and Lantz, to be performed for various classes in the lower grades, and community.

Unit Objectives

1. To discover additional research methods and sources;
2. To become more self-motivated and more able to work collaboratively;
3. To be able to make more educational connections among authors of various eras and among cultures;
4. To improve verbal responses as well as the quality and quantity of journal responses;
5. To broaden understanding of a specific culture, its people, events and ideas;
6. To learn more about theatre production in the communicating of a culture’s story.

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Before Unit Begins

1. Locate copies of all literature selections in the unit; order books if needed (e.g. Asian-American Literature: An Anthology);

2. Create one transparency of each outline map (China and the United States) in Appendixes A and B;

3. Sign up to use the media center for Days 2, 3, 4, and Days 10, 11;

4. Copy pages 5 and 6 of this unit, cut into strips and place into envelope; add or adjust for class ability and size;

5. Locate large map of China to use in room throughout unit;

6. Have on hand as many balls of yarn (in red, gold, and black if possible) as you have groups, for Day 8;

7. Locate copies of Confucius' essays “On Learning,” and “On Ethics”; run one per student for Day 9;

8. Arrange for field trip on Day 13 according to school policy;

9. Create bulletin board on the unit’s theme in red, black, and gold and set up book/resource display (see bibliography);

10. Apply for permission for a two-hour (or more) block of time to celebrate Chinese New Year in classroom on Day 16;

11. Arrange for yearbook and newspaper coverage for Day 16;

12. Have thank you letters ready for class to sign on Day 17;

13. Order video China for Day 4 and 17;

14. Check chapter numbers of locally available theatre arts text for blocking section for Day 19; make arrangements to use books if necessary;

15. Order one script per class member of whatever play you’ve chosen;

16. Prepare the prompt book for “Water Dragon” or whatever play chosen.

17. Arrange use of any and all rooms needed for this project if any part of the project is done outside the regular classroom;

18. Arrange with office to pay all royalties and production costs; make plans for how food costs in unit will be shared;

19. Arrange with community patrons who may have authentic Chinese arts, crafts, or costumes to lend for the class display;

20. Determine evaluation procedures to be used in unit (Appendix F).
Unit Lesson Plans
Day 1 - “Let’s Discover China”

1. Before students enter, have the following quote written on the board or on a poster: “To change your language, you must change your life.”
   Derek Walcott, Nobel Prize-winning poet
   
   a. Discuss, eliciting as many responses as possible;
   b. Then create a parody of the quote, reversing it to read: “To change your life, you must change your language.”
   c. Guide students to analyze differences between the original and the parody and how “language” may mean more than just spoken or written words;
   d. In their response journals, have students write a short reaction to the original quote or to the parody, justifying their choice in terms of broad-based learning potential;

2. Instructor introduces a transparency of an outline map of China (Appendix A), initiating student discussion on the geography and demographics of the country, e.g. location, size, population, lay of the land, etc.; after several minutes' feedback, place an overlay of an outline map of the United States (in the same scale; see Appendix B) and initiate a discussion regarding comparisons and contrasts;

3. Instructor then shares introductory remarks, giving unit overview and goals (see pages 1, 2, 3 of unit);

4. Media Center Scavenger Hunt
   a. In groups of four, list (for ten minutes) in journal as many Chinese discoveries or inventions as you can; choose a leader to share your group’s list with the whole class; other groups add to list as they listen;
   b. Students draw one of the following slips from an envelope or basket; write or tape slip into journal; then list below it, questions that arise regarding that topic; these questions become the students’ research aim; for example, if the drawn slip says “abacus,” sample questions underneath that might be:
Is a particular person credited with inventing the abacus?
When was it invented?
Where?
For what purpose?
How does it work?
How long does it take to learn to use the abacus?
Of what are/were they made?
Were their restrictions on its usage?
Is it still used? If so, how?

C. Copy the following scavenger hunt choices and cut them into strips; adjust the number and type of items needed to fit your class size and ability level; add if needed:

- Feng Shui
- (Chinese) bridges
- Chinese painting
- Chinese sculpture
- the five elements
- the compass
- Family life in China
- Education in China
- Forces of the Universe
- Confucius
- Traditional Chinese signs and symbols
- writing, printing, paper

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The Chinese calendar  the abacus

Chinese festivals  silk

gunpowder  clocks

the seismograph  Buddhism

canals  (Chinese) legal system

Chinese architecture  Chinese opera

The Forbidden City  Chinese history

The Terracotta Warriors

Chinese crafts  Chinese games

other inventions
Day 2 and 3 - “Let’s Discover China” continued

1. Review; share, recording others’ work thus far in own journal;
2. Work time in media center on scavenger hunt topic;
   in journals, record answers and sources for answers.

Day 4 - “Let’s Share and Compare”

1. Before class, hang large map of China in room;
2. Share any topics remaining;
3. Students transfer basic information from their research to gold “coin”
   (Appendix C), placing the coins on the map of China in the
   approximate location that applies;
4. Have students do a quick comparison between what they learned
   through their research and what they had listed in their journals
   on the first day of the unit (refer to 4a, page 4 of this unit);
5. Video showing of China, Part I (see bibliography for address, use
   similar video available to you, or invite a traveler who has been to China to share
   pictures, story, slides of journey); following thirty-minute video, students
   respond in journal to the following question: How does what
   you’ve learned about China in the past few days compare and/or
   contrast with what you knew of China before that?
6. Assign for Day 5 the individual study of the short story “On
   Listening,” by Maxine Hong Kingston (available in Asian-American
   Literature: An Anthology, pages 539-41).

Day 5 - “Let’s Learn From Chinese-American Authors”

1. Begin class with traditional “gossip” game: instructor whispers a short phrase
   to one student who then passes it quickly to next student and so forth
   around the room until the last student shares aloud what he/she heard; the
   outcome will no doubt be quite different from the original which should
   then solicit a short discussion on the importance of listening for effective
   communication with one another within a culture, but most especially
   among cultures;
2. Relate class discussion to assignment, Kingston’s story “On Listening,” using
   additional discussion questions and writing topic on page 541 of Anthology;
3. Working in groups, students then record in their journals the basic
   information about the selection, using following format:
Title:  
Author:  
Setting (time and place):  
Type of Literature:  
Main Characters (and something about them):  
Short Synopsis (plot):  
Main Idea:  
Theme:  
Individual Response to Selection:  

Sample questions to guide individual responses -  
How did I react to the selection? Why?  
If I could talk with the author what would I ask him/her?  
If I could talk with a character, what would I ask him/her?  
If I could be a character, which one would I want to be and why?  
What did I learn from this selection that may stay with me?  
How did this selection help me to see life from a different viewpoint?  
How can I relate this learning to my life experience?  

4. Assign for individual study the poem “Foreign Ways” by Diana Chang  
(Asian American Literature: An Anthology, pages 495-496).  

Day 6 - “Let’s Learn From Chinese-American Authors”  

1. Open class with a discussion of the word “foreign”: What does it mean to you?  
Have you ever been in a place that you considered foreign? If so, where?  
How did you feel? How were you treated? How did you treat others?  
Have you ever sensed that another felt they were “foreign” in a place or event that you considered common or everyday? If so, where?  
What did you do to alleviate their feelings, to help them overcome those feelings?  
What is the difference between foreign and international?  
The denotation? The connotation?  

2. Following discussion, students respond to above questions in their journals;
3. Direct students to the second part of stanza two (top of page 496); in their groups of three to four, discuss the line “...the body giving the person away betrays a mind of its own...”; groups share ideas with class.

4. Students record basic information on selection (see Day 5 #3);


Day 7 - “Let’s Learn from Chinese-American Authors”

1. Initial class discussion: How many of you are the only girls in your family? Only boys? Some (or one) of each? What, if any, challenges have you felt because of gender differences within your family? Do you feel that girls are preferred over boys in your family? In our culture? Boys over girls? Why or why not?

2. Students each write six questions in journal based on Jade Snow Wong’s short story “Forgiveness From Heaven”; share all questions within group; groups choose the best four questions within the group, rewrite those four on straight-edged paper, pass clockwise to next group who answer as a group, signing their names also; group receives the grade;

3. Students work on journal work for selection (see Day 5 #3), paying particular attention in the individual response portion to the story’s last sentence; (see also optional suggestions on page 335 of Anthology);

4. Ask students: Has anyone ever heard of the children’s story “The Boy Who Cried Wolf”? Be prepared tomorrow to retell the members of your group the story of “The Boy Who Cried Wolf”; locate a copy if you need one.

Day 8 - “Let’s Learn from Shared Concepts”

1. As a class, review the three selections of literature studied thus far, looking for common threads and meanings;

2. Combine two groups each into larger groups of eight or so; hand each group a ball of yarn; person with the yarn begins retelling the children’s tale of “The Boy Who Cried Wolf,” then tosses it to another group member who continues the tale, and thus back and forth across the group until the story
is told; all group members must be included before the second time around; when story is completed, group discusses how this children’s tale relates to yesterday’s selection (see Day 7);

3. Instructor then directs group members to the Chinese book The Wolf is Coming (see bibliography; book may be read aloud so students can see the traditional Chinese art work and characters);

4. Class discussion: In retelling the story, did your group add any characteristics that you believe to be American? If so, what? In hearing the story from the book, could you determine any Chinese characteristics? Yes or no? Why or why not? Is the story cross-cultural? If yes, what elements seem to transcend all cultures and generational differences? Is it a story you think you may tell your family if you choose to have one? Why or why not?

5. What other stories, myths, tales, or ideas occur in both Chinese and American cultures (or other cultures as well)? Be prepared to share at least one with your group tomorrow (Hint: the Cinderella story is cross-cultural, but others may be found through media center and internet sources);

6. On own, students enter basic information about selection in journal (Day 5 #3);

7. To each student, distribute copies of Confucius’ essays “On Ethics,” and “On Learning” (Appendix D); read on own for tomorrow.

Day 9 - “Let’s Learn Shared Concepts from Confucius”

1. Begin class by asking students to share other stories, myths, tales, or ideas that appear in more than one culture; record on board and in journal (see Day 8 #5); direct students’ attention to the book in the classroom display, Chinese Cinderella, by Adeline Yen Mah and share the story and/or a piece of jewelry illustrating the symbol of the broken gold fish(Appendix E);

2. In study groups of 3-4, students are challenged to make relevant connections between the cross-cultural stories, myths, tales, or ideas they know and the assignment for today, two of Confucius’ essays: “On Learning,” and “On Ethics” (or others appropriate to your situation); on essay handout, students highlight the main idea of each paragraph; group then narrows
those highlighted statements to three to five major statements on learning and three to five major statements on ethics; by group consensus, places a star by the most important statement of the five; shares with class; class discusses if the starred statements are ideas that are cross cultural, (e.g. see first line of essay "On Ethics");

3. Journal work on essays (see Day 5) to focus on individual response to Confucius' writing, e.g. Do you agree with Confucian beliefs? Why or why not?

To whom do you believe he was addressing his ideas?

In what ways might his writing be different if written now?

What images does he use to make his points? How does that fit traditional China?

Do you sense the presence of wit or irony in the essay (if you do, give examples)?

What Confucian ideas from these essays will you take with you into your life? Why?

4. Pass out student permission slips for field trip to Chinese restaurant kitchen to learn of Chinese New Year food preparation; set deadline for slips;

(Adjust to fit your school's field trip policy; if a field trip such as this is not possible, invite community adults or parents into classroom for a demonstration of Chinese New Year food preparation).

Day 10 - "Let's Celebrate Chinese New Year"

1. Introduction: Each culture has its specific and special celebrations. The traditional celebration of most significance to the Chinese is Chinese New Year. If we were to create a traditional Chinese New Year celebration in this room, what would we need, and need to know? Brainstorm on board, until the "wh" questions have been covered (who, what, when, where, why, how);

2. Students write in journals the questions that need answering before they can recreate this event; (Sample questions may be, but are not limited to, the following: What is the purpose for this celebration? Who celebrates this event? Where is it celebrated yet today? When does it take place? How is this date determined? How many days does it last? What special event occurs at the end of the New Year celebration? What is its significance? Are there particular customs that
must be followed before the actual holiday? If so, what? What are the traditional
decorations for this celebration? In what colors or designs? How do they prepare the
food for this celebration? What food dishes are traditional? What food dishes will be
possible for us to prepare? Do they dress in special colors or types of clothing? Are
gifts given? If so, what? In what numbers? Colors? To whom? By whom?

3. Once the guiding questions have been determined, divide the work among
group members, and using resources in the room, from the media center,
from their experience, or other as designated by instructor, write answers
to questions in journals as they discover them (see bibliography for ideas);

4. Assignment: discover and record in journal how to create a Chinese New Year
celebration in our classroom; apply information from day 2, 3, 4 of unit.

Day 11 - “Let’s Celebrate Chinese New Year” continued

1. Review; check on permission slips;

2. Group work time to collaborate on findings related to a Chinese New Year
celebration; add to and/or delete in journal entries as needed for accuracy;
(students must be able to verify findings and give sources);

3. Two from each group move clockwise to the next group to share and
corroborate findings; if there are many groups, have them move at least
once more; return to group; adjust group findings as necessary;

4. As a class, narrow the responsibilities (e.g. decorations, food, customs,
entertainment or activities, etc.) to a workable number; students volunteer
or are appointed to one area of responsibility based on ability levels and
learning styles, and continue work and research on that area as needed;

5. Set deadlines and date for the celebration; (schedule the class celebration date as
close to the real Chinese New Year as possible to lend authenticity to the class event;
check calendar for exact date).
Day 12 - “Let’s Celebrate Chinese New Year” continued

1. Review, check progress; answer questions; troubleshoot;
2. Students meet in groups based on responsibilities related to creating the Chinese New Year; set daily goals; fill in daily individual work plan (Appendix F); list supplies needed and set mini-deadlines for group work;
3. Work time on class celebration of Chinese New Year; instructor moves from group to group as needed;
4. Remind students of field trip or of guest presenter(s) the next class day.

Day 13 - “Let’s Celebrate Chinese Cooking”

1. Gather and check permission slips;
2. Field trip to Chinese restaurant kitchen (or guest presentation in class) to learn, first-hand, the foods and food preparation required for a traditional Chinese New Year celebration.

Day 14 - “Let’s Celebrate Chinese New Year” continued

1. Students respond in journals to yesterday’s class event, showing what they learned;
2. Group and individual work time on responsibilities required to create in class a traditional Chinese New Year celebration; instructor meets with each group;
3. INSTRUCTOR PLEASE NOTE: As soon as the activities and entertainment group “discovers” that theatrical performances, special dances and sometimes acrobatics (even stilt-walkers) are popular during the Lantern Festival at the close of the Chinese New Year celebration, guide the class into “Water Dragon,” the third selection, from the script Treasures of the Orient by Harding and Lantz (or other appropriate theatrical piece to be produced and performed by the class), distributing scripts to class members (see bibliography).
Day 15 - “Let’s Celebrate Chinese New Year” continued

1. On daily goal sheet, students set plans for the day; turn in;
2. Group and individual work time on responsibilities required to create in class a traditional Chinese New Year celebration; instructor meets with groups.

Day 16 - “Class Celebration of Traditional Chinese New Year”

1. Students fulfill various responsibilities within the two-hour block of time (see page 3 of Unit), to include preparation, presentation, and cleanup;
2. Welcome yearbook and or/newspaper coverage of the event;
3. Students serve as instructors for the invited elementary and/or middle school grades who visit the decorated room, sample the goodies, and learn from the high school students the customs, foods, and gifts synonymous with this holiday; (please note: allow as much time as needed for your particular situation; visits from other classes may need to be schedules at various times).

Day 17 - “Evaluation of Class Celebration of Chinese New Year”

1. Students evaluate the experience of celebrating Chinese New Year in their journals, documenting what went well, what could have gone better and what they learned about this culture that they did not know prior to this experience;
2. Send Thank you letters from the class to whomever assisted in the project; all students sign; mail;
3. Part II of video China (thirty minutes) including the portion on the Chinese, or Beijing Opera (or another one available to you which focuses on this subject);
4. Distribute short script, Treasures of the Orient, by Harding and Luntz; students study it on their own for next class day; set reading aim: to make connections between what they’ve learned and what they read.
Day 18 - “Let’s Learn More About Theatre, Chinese, Too”

1. Recap unit’s goals and objectives;

2. Have students volunteer to read parts of, or assign temporary roles for, section three of Treasures of the Orient, “Water Dragon,” pages 23-32; read script aloud in class;

3. Follow with class discussion of how this musical play blends movement, melody, and imaginative scenery; guide students to relate this to what they learned on Days 2, 3, 4 of unit;

4. As students work on the basic information of the selection in their journals, ask them to think about which responsibilities they would be interested in assuming, e.g. movement (blocking and choreography), melody (sound tech crew, singers), or imaginative scenery (sketching plan for set design, executing set design, painting, etc.);

5. At end of journal entry on this selection, have students list the onstage roles and/or offstage work for which they know they can be responsible;

6. Share with the full class; adapt and change and reposition until the play production assignments are complete and all students have volunteered for or been assigned the onstage and/or offstage work appropriate for their ability levels and learning styles; options are the onstage roles (see page 3 of script), lights, sound effects, costuming, makeup, blocking, scene design, scene painting, props, promotion and programs, production details, and other responsibilities as designated by the instructor.

Day 19 - “Let’s Learn More About Theatre, Chinese, Too”

1. Review yesterday’s work; adapt positions as needed (some instructors will choose to have formal tryouts for the onstage roles; do whatever works best for you and your situation);

2. Review the concept of, and symbols used in, blocking as needed (see chapter in text Basic Drama Projects or another drama text);
3. Divide theatrical piece into scenes or natural breaks; assign groups of two or three students to each section; provide the prompt book pages for each;  
4. Group work on blocking (movement) for assigned scene.

Day 20 - “Let’s Learn More About Theatre, Chinese, Too”

1. Blocking review:  
2. One person from each small group moves clockwise to the next group, another person counter-clockwise to another group; new groups now review each other’s blocking to determine if the movement from scene to scene will flow meaningfully;  
3. Adapt as needed for maximum effect.

Day 21 - “Let’s Learn More About Theatre, Chinese, Too”

1. Assign roles; students with onstage roles, highlight their speaking lines in one color and their movement in another color; students with production roles, meet in those teams to work on those responsibilities (see chapter 24 and 27 of Basic Drama Projects);  
2. Instructor moves from group to group as needed;  
3. When the blocking is set, create stage area in classroom, or make arrangements to move to stage area to walk through scenes; change as needed.

Day 22 - “Let’s Learn More About Theatre, Chinese, Too”

1. Students rehearse theatrical piece; groups who created the blocking for that particular scene become the directors for that scene;  
2. Sound effects crew finalizes plan;  
3. Light crew finalizes plan;  
4. Costume crew and makeup crew, working together, finalize plans (see appropriate chapters in drama texts);  
5. Production and promotion crew finalizes plans, double checks deadlines, writes and sends publicity; checks to see that royalty has been paid, etc.
Instructor please note: The following schedule is only a suggestion; adapt and/or adjust to fit yours and your students' ability levels, learning styles, scheduling needs, and circumstances.

Day 23 - “Let’s Learn More About Drama, Chinese, Too”

Rehearsal and work day on production.

Day 24 - “Let’s Learn More About Drama, Chinese, Too”

Rehearsal and work day on production.

Day 25 - “Let’s Learn More About Drama, Chinese, Too”

Rehearsal and work day on production; from memory.

Day 26 - “Let’s Learn More About Drama, Chinese, Too”

Rehearsal and work day on production; add scenery.

Day 27 - “Let’s Learn More About Drama, Chinese, Too”

Rehearsal and work day on production; add props.

Day 28 - “Let’s Learn More About Drama, Chinese, Too”

Rehearsal and work day on production; add costumes.

Day 29 - “Let’s Learn More About Drama, Chinese, Too”

1. Rehearsal and work day on production; add lights.
2. Fit in as many rehearsals as needed; polish, polish, polish.

Day 30 - “Let’s Learn More About Drama, Chinese, Too”

Final dress rehearsal; all of the above plus makeup.
Day 31 – “Let’s Produce”

In recognition of the Lantern Festival at the culmination of the Chinese New Year celebration, the theatre arts (or English) class of School presents the production of “The Water Dragon” for elementary and/or middle school students. A production for the parents and community is also recommended. Please note: if possible, schedule this short production as part of the Chinese New Year celebration demonstrated by the high school students.

Final Day of Unit

1. Share Diana Chang’s poem “A Theory About Dancing” (Anthology, pages 551-553);
2. Discuss how her image of dancing compares to life experience, with particular emphasis on her last stanza: “It all happens here, now, in the bone.” Journal response to your agreement or disagreement with her theory, giving examples to prove your point;
3. Then show how this quote applies (or does not apply) to entire unit, incorporating Derek Walcott’s quote (or the parody of it from Day 1 of the Unit);
4. In a two-page journal entry or more, students evaluate the unit on China: Tradition and Transformation by creating in their journals, responses to questions such as:

   How has this unit on China changed your understanding of that culture?

   Has it anyway provided you with a different “language” whereby your understanding of the world has broadened? If so, how? If not, why not?

   What do you now know that you did not know at the unit’s beginning?

   Of all the things you learned about China’s tradition and transformation, what surprised you the most? Why?

   What selection of the unit was most meaningful to you?

   What activity worked best for you in the unit? Why?

   What did not work as well? Why?

   What improvements do you recommend for another time? it?

5. Students leave journals with instructor.
Appendix A

Outline Map of China
Appendix B

Outline Map of the United States
Appendix C

Pattern for Ancient "Coin"
Appendix D

Design of Broken, Gold Fish, Symbolic of Chinese Cinderella Story
Appendix E

Daily Project Work Plan for Individuals

Project: Chinese New Year Celebration/Theatre

Daily Learning Plan for ____________________________
(Student Name)

On this date_____________________________________

What I will have accomplished for this project
by the end of the period: _______________________
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________
_____________________________________________

Where I will be working on these goals________
_____________________________________________

Daily plan completed Yes________ No________
(Initialed by student)
## Appendix F

Adapt as needed for students’ ability levels, learning styles, and circumstances

### Rubrics for Evaluation of Student Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meets Expectations</th>
<th>Exceeds Expectations</th>
<th>Does Not Meet Expectations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Focused, coherent work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Logical presentation of ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Use of clear, convincing details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Connections are smooth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Word choice is precise, effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Awareness of audience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Legibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Reasonably free from errors</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Collaboration level</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Deadlines met</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Comments:
Bibliography

* Starred items are in the classroom display and may be used as resource;


* Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. People’s Republic of China, n.d.


Analysis of Visuals from China
(Adapted from the National Archives and the Maryland Historical Society)
Brenda Smith, Social Studies Supervisor
Colorado Springs School District 11

Objectives:
1. Students know how to use the processes and resources of historical inquiry.
2. Students know that religious and philosophical ideas have been powerful forces throughout history.
3. Students apply thinking skills to their reading, writing, speaking, listening, and viewing.

Assessment:
Teacher Observation

Scoring Guide:
Content Criteria includes but is not limited to:
* Used simple, clear, and organized technical style and format in completing the analysis sheet
* Content of answers shows depth of thought and evidence of analysis
* Followed directions
* Organized and easy to follow answers

Resources:
See attached analysis sheet

Lesson Vocabulary:
Primary Source
Inference

Procedures:
1. Using a photograph or portrait of your choice, distribute copies to students. See attached examples of visual groups.
2. Distribute the visual analysis sheet to student to complete.
3. Review the answers with students or have them work in a group.
Technology Connections:
  Web connections to acquire photos and portraits to reproduce
  National Archives and Records Administration Archival
  Information Locator http://www.nara.gov/nara/nail.htm
  Asia Society http://www.asiasociety.org
  Asian Studies Resources
  http://www.cc.colorado.edu/library/course/ID/asiapac.html

Reflections:
  The teachers should model how to analyze a visual before the students
  are asked to do so on their own. Any type of visual may be used (i.e. photos,
  paintings, portraits, posters, postcards, etc.)
Visual Analysis Sheet

Title (if there is one): __________________  Collection: __________________  
Type of Visual: __________________________

Warm-Up

Sketch the main elements of the visual in the box below.

NW  
SW

NE  
SE

Imagine the entire picture is divided into four equal segments. Describe each quarter.

North West:
- Objects:
- Activities:
- People:

North East:
- Objects:
- Activities:
- People:

South West:
- Objects:
- Activities:
- People:

South East:
- Objects:
- Activities:
- People:

Study the visual. What clues can be found about the location and date of the visual?

1. What are the main messages of the visual? What were your clues?
2. What are the secondary messages of the picture? What were your clues?
3. What is the MOST important historical information this source provides?
4. What questions does this visual raise in your mind?
5. Where would you find the answers to the questions raised in your mind?
6. Write a caption for the visual.
Beijing 2000 in the rain

Elementary School 2000

To market 2000
Rice growing and shipping 2000

Transportation - 2000 - Shanghai
Members of the 9th Infantry in a tea shop in China.
Boxer Rebellion 1900

Notice: Coca-Cola is a popular drink in the busy area of Beijing.

Warning: McDonald's is a common place to eat in the business district.
Chinese Views on Human Rights

Objectives

Students will better understand
1. What China considers basic human rights
2. the difficulties inherent in stating absolute principles
3. the extent to which fundamental beliefs are partly shaped by specific economic and cultural conditions
4. how clashing fundamental views can interfere with international cooperation and peace
5. her or his own position on human rights

Overview

This exercise asks students to evaluate several human rights stances without identifying their sources, and then reveals which is the fundamental Chinese position.

Time

This exercise requires three class hours (the first two emphasizing student activity), and student research and small group collaboration outside of class between the first and second classes.

Teachers without three hours for this can use the web sites in other ways to present the Chinese view of human rights.

Class one

1. The teacher presents and the class discusses fundamental issues before considering the Chinese and U.S. attitudes.

*The concept of human rights:* those most fundamental rights which should be considered universal and inalienable, rights that transcend any era, culture, form of government, or ideology.

Some students will probably consider (at least before discussion) the Ten Commandments, the "golden rule," and perhaps one or two other religious injunctions as universal and inalienable.

*The difficulties inherent in looking for "absolutes"* that are not legitimately subject to modification, relativism, local conditions.
Does the commandment against killing forbid capital punishment, war, self defense, and cattle farming?

The conflict between universal rights on the one hand, and the authority of national sovereignty, religious belief, and cultural practice. Does one country, or an international organization like the United Nations, have the right to withhold trade, isolate a country diplomatically and culturally, or militarily intervene in another country because it perceives gross human rights violations?

So that the class fully understands the complexity and difficulty of this question, the teacher should be prepared to ask Socratic questions if the class too blithely accepts a simplistic view.

A class that accepts without debate non-interference might be asked about the worst cases: genocide in Rwanda, chattel slavery in the Sudan, the oppression of women in Afghanistan, and the Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians.

A class that readily accepts intervention without debate might be asked about hypothetical foreign actions in response to human rights issues in the U.S., e.g. the execution of mentally retarded prisoners and prisoners who committed crimes as children, the imprisonment without trial of some immigrants, the imprisonment of some citizens whose religions lead them to actions the government considers child endangerment (e.g. refusing medical treatment).

The need to present principles, like state laws, in very general phrasing, acknowledging that details, special cases, unforeseen conditions, and practical exceptions will inevitably have to be settled later.

The United Nations promulgated in 1948 a Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This document is not international law, but a statement of principles, a sort of wish list describing the world as it should someday be. The nations that have signed onto the UDHR agree to support those principles and work towards their fulfillment. Unfortunately, many nations routinely violate one provision or another, despite having signed the declaration.

2. Discuss Article 1 of the U.S. Bill of Rights.

See if the class thinks that these rights should indeed be considered universal. The teacher might note some of the exceptions, limitations, and practical interpretations accepted in the United States.
For example, courts have held that free speech rights do not protect shouting fire in a crowded theater when there is no fire (the classic example), advising young men not to accept being drafted into military service, libel, slander, false testimony in a trial, forgery, child pornography, incitement to riot, verbal threats, false advertising, sharing corporate inside information, conspiring to commit a crime, etc.

3. Ask students to select one of the following as a worthy addition to our Bill of Rights. Tell them to respond to the basic ideas, not the specific wording. Each student should also identify any that she or he opposes as pernicious. Give them no more than five minutes to make their choices to insure getting their fundamental feelings before those are more fully scrutinized.

Do not identify the source of these ideas, although they are noted parenthetically here for the teacher's use. Note that for the sake of class discussion, the wording here has been modified.

The ideas:

a. Everyone has the right to be provided with food, shelter, clothing and education. (the four basic human rights in the current view of the People's Republic of China).

b. Everyone has the right to erect religious displays (e.g. nativity scenes) and to conduct religious observations (e.g. prayers in class and before football games) on public property and in public institutions. (some U.S. conservatives)

c. Everyone has the right to a job that pays enough to provide his or her family with an existence above the poverty level and with adequate medical services. (UDHR).

d. Because of the inherent right to life, no one shall be subjected to the death penalty. (some U.S. liberals).

4. Poll the class for their responses and put the "scores" on the board.

After the inevitable expressions of disbelief and the challenging remarks students will make, organize the class into four groups, each to advocate for one principle. If the class showed little difference of opinion, form these groups at random; a class with a few advocates for each of the four principles can be divided more in keeping with their real positions.
5. Assign each group the task of researching support for their position, rewording the principle as they think necessary to preserve the meaning while acknowledging both practical problems and likely objections. Each group should also prepare one challenging question to be asked of each other group.

Class Two

1. Have each group present a five minute pitch to the class as a whole advocating that their assigned principle be added to the Constitution, and then present each group with the three questions prepared by the other groups (but not revealed until now).

2. Repoll the students to see to what extent individuals or the class in general might have changed their opinions.

Class Three

To enable students' greater understanding of the Chinese position, present the class with information about current Chinese practices and statements about each position.

Explain why a poor country with tenuous central government control would emphasize essential human needs (e.g., food, clothing, shelter) while restricting political freedoms that industrialized nations in the west take for granted (e.g., freedom of speech, trial by a jury of one's peers, freedom of assembly and association).

Identify the primary Chinese actions which are criticized as human rights abuses: suppression of dissidents, the occupation of Tibet, the suppression of some religious activities, and the use of prison labor.

Note that the Chinese constitution recognizes freedom of religion, but only for established religions, not for fringe or new religions, which the Chinese government suspects have hidden political motivations, or at least potential political effects. The repression of the Falun Gong (or Falun Dafa) movement apparently arises from the government's distrust of any mass organization, not from the specific religious ideas of the group. Some of your students might note parallels in U.S. government attitudes towards “cults” in this country (e.g. Waco).

Explain the ways China has for millennia valued the interests and needs of social groups above those of the individual. Confucianism infused the culture well before Communism triumphed in 1949.
Outline the Chinese government’s (and others’) criticism of human rights violations in the United States.

Note that the U. S. Senate’s finally granting Permanent Trade Relations status (sometimes called Most Favored Nation status) to China in the year 2000 came after a long and bitter debate, part of which involved objection to China’s human rights record.

Note that human rights issues are often, sincerely or not, raised in debates about U.S. policy. American businesses.

Starter Web Sites

*The Universal Declaration of Human Rights:*  
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html

*The Chinese government on human rights:*  
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/c2714.html

*Amnesty International on China (the 2000 Annual Report):*  

*The Falun Gong’s official site:*  
www.clearwisdom.net

Stephen Sossaman  
Department of English  
Westfield State College  
Westfield MA 01086
Introduction: The People’s Republic of China is a country that supports one-fifth of the world’s population, and one of the world’s most rapid economic growth rates over the decade of the nineteen nineties. As such, China is ideally suited as a case study for environmental pressures that result from a large human population experiencing a fairly rapid increase in material lifestyle. This curriculum unit will have students examine a key aspect of our twenty-first century environmental dilemma - human population growth. With respect to human population growth, both social and physical impacts will be examined. This unit is intended to be useful for both the Global or World Cultures teacher who is teaching a larger unit on China and the Environmental Studies teacher who wishes to use a concrete case study following the consideration of the related issues in class.

Methodological Considerations: Methodological suggestion will be made throughout this unit. The methodological suggestions will consider critical thinking skills, multiple intelligence strategies and proficiency test skill requirements. (The last consideration is based on the most recent incarnation of the Ohio High School Qualifying Exam. This exam will include social studies skill-based questions such as inferential chart interpretation and reading comprehension. Beginning with the class of 2002, all Ohio students will be required to pass an exam in five academic areas in order to receive a high school diploma. Although each state deals with academic accountability issues differently, an increasing number of states are recognizing the importance of testing for skills as well as information.)

Objectives:

- Students will demonstrate that they can apply general concepts and principles of human population growth to China.
- Students will demonstrate that they can draw connections between China’s population and other related issues.
- Using data compiled on China’s population dynamics and “one-couple, one-child” policy, students will successfully perform at least three critical thinking and/or proficiency skill activities.

Section One: The Dynamics of Human Population Growth and China

Introduction: It wasn’t until the early 1800’s that human beings topped one billion individuals. In less than the next 200 years, we managed a six-fold growth in our numbers, reaching 6 billion individuals at some point during 1998. During this same period, China’s population increased from 200 million to 1.2 billion people. Today, one out of every five human beings is Chinese. Of all of the issues China faces moving into the new millennium, few are as important as human population growth.
Controlling Generalization: For a high school student to make sense of China's population and related social issues, he or she must first understand certain principles of population growth. The first section will examine issues relevant to China from the following human population generalizations:

- Population growth is a resource use rather than a space-related problem. More people use more resources and create more waste.
- Three factors interact to determine a country or regions future population numbers: population growth rate, fertility rate and the age at which women have babies. If reliable data exists for these factors, one can project with a high degree of accuracy future population growth patterns for the affected country or region.
- Presently, human population growth is really a tale of two stories. Developed countries are now experiencing little or even negative population growth. Developing countries are experiencing robust and sometimes-overwhelming population growth. Yet, paradoxically, the greatest environmental impact of population growth comes from those countries with the slowest growth rates.
- The growth of any biological species is limited by the capability of the environment to provide the resources necessary for survival. This limitation is referred to as the environment's carrying capacity for the species in question.

Lesson one: Density and space

Step one: This lesson is designed to get the students to understand that human population growth is not a space-related problem. Ask the students to suggest a visual way to represent the problem of human population growth. Many of the students will probably suggest a picture that shows people competing for space similar to the editorial cartoon shown below.
Ask the students to consider the concept of “the American Dream.” Have the students generate a list of things that would be part of this dream. Controlling one’s own space will no doubt appear somewhere on this list. Since China is the focus of this unit, have the students calculate how much of China’s 9,596,960 sq. km. (about 3.7 million sq.mi.) would be needed to provide a family of three a standard, upper-middle class house American for all of China’s population. (The family size of three is selected because it will permit a convenient segway for a later discussion of China’s one-child family policy. Obviously, the point of this exercise is not to suggest that the Chinese share with Americans the same material aspirations or family values. It is simply an exercise that requires the students to apply another academic discipline (arithmetic) to social studies and apply critical thinking skills to the result of their calculation. Ultimately, the students should gain an understanding of how land space relates to human population.)

Step two: Take the results of the calculation performed in step one and place it in on a map of China. This is done by first having the students compare the area of their housing calculation to the actual land area of China. Express this comparison as a percentage. The students do not need to be absolutely exact on the next step. Have the students estimate the area that would be required for American style, suburb housing.

The more hands on the exercise can be made, the more likely it will be that students will grasp the significance of the generalization regarding human population and land space. Have the students reconfigure the area of China on their map in the form of a quadrilateral. (This can be done be using the map’s scale to configure a quadrilateral comprising the same number of square miles found in China. To skip this step simply use the map and quadrilateral provided below.) This should be done on standard colored paper or any decorative paper or stickers. They can then calculate the exact area indicated by the percentage calculation done in step one. Using scissors and an adhesive, if necessary, have the students place their cut out on the map of China that you originally provided. Allow the students to inject their personalities and tastes into their creation. Encourage them to cut and configure on their map the housing percentage paper any way they wish.
Area of quadrilateral keyed to above made: enlarge proportionally
Step three: Distribute the Population Density: Comparing Two Nations handout. In groups of three or four students, have the students compare the population density maps to a physical features map for each country. Have the students generate a list of factors that could influence how the human population of the two countries decided to distribute itself. (Note that despite China's massive expansive of little used land, China has only 7% of the world's arable land.)
Note that the above map of China uses city spellings that differ on today's maps. If not already taught, this might be a good opportunity to pause momentarily to discuss the method of spelling Chinese names and places in Roman letters.

**Step four:** Frequently, people draw erroneous conclusions about population density and wealth. A country must have access to resources to be wealthy. It must also be able to organize resources into a productive form; that is, the society must possess managerial skills. China is a resource rich country. It is also attempting to acquire managerial skills necessary to organize these resources in a productive manner. Have the students examine the *Population Density and Per GNP 2000* chart. Then have them read the essay by Paul and Anne Erlich found at www.2think.org/tpc.shtml.

### Population Density AND * GNP 2000

**Selected Countries**

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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>$750</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>$29,240</td>
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</table>

Source: PRB, 2000 World Population Data Sheet
Lesson two: Show me the numbers

Step one: Fundamental to any discussion of human population growth is an understanding of the implication of geometric growth. (This is also referred to in the population business as exponential growth.) Identify the growth rate of anything, and given the principle governing geometric growth, one can determine how long it will take any number to double. For obvious reasons, growth percentages are usually charted with their corresponding doubling times. A geometric growth pattern will always give itself away because it eventual forms a J-curve when charted. What is so insidious about this is that early in the progression the devastating implications of this pattern of growth go virtually unnoticed. I tell my students, “Small numbers that double create small numbers, but big numbers that double create big numbers.” At first, this may sound silly, but consider: one doubles to two and two to four, but one billion doubles to two billion and two billion to four billions. If the number of years necessary for a doubling to occur is constant, it is obvious that the environmental impact of adding 1.2 billion more people (China’s next doubling) will be far greater than simply doubling from 60 million to 120 million people (China’s first doubling in the first millennium, A.D.) The following diagram shows the J-curve growth pattern for human population.

![World Population Growth, 10,000 B.C to Present](image)

To get students to understand the implications of geometric growth use one of the following exercises:

*Exercise one:* Present the problem of the lily pad. The state creates a lake for public recreational use. In this lake, biologists introduce a single lily pad plant. There is one problem. The lily pad is biologically capable of doubling each day. Ask the students the following questions. If the lake is completely covered with lily pads in thirty days (and thus rendered useless, at least for humans), on what day is the lake half covered? On what day is the lake ideally suited for human recreational use, i.e., swimming and fishing? What would
be the reaction of the lake’s users if someone suggested that the lily pads posed a future threat to the health of the lake? On what day would the impending disaster be likely perceived by a significant number of the lake’s users? What generalizations can be made about the plight of the lake and the issue of human population growth? (Come back to this illustration during the discussion of China’s one-child policy. Using the analogy of the lily pad and the lake, ask the students to speculate as to what day China’s policy-makers may have viewed themselves when they implemented this forceful family planning policy.)

Exercise two: The following exercise also graphically demonstrates the doubling power of geometric growth and expresses it in a form that is appealing to teenagers—money.

**CALENDAR Riddle**

At the current rate of growth, about 2%, the world’s population will double approximately every 35 years. Doubling a small number over and over soon means we are doubling ever larger numbers. 1977’s 4 billion will double to 8 billion in the year 2012 if current growth patterns continue. This riddle helps to illustrate the concept of exponential growth (an increase at a constant rate per year or other unit of time) and its implications for problem-solving in the future.

---

A father complained that his son’s allowance of $5 per week was too much. The son replied, "Okay, Dad. How about this? You give me a penny for the first day of the month, 2C for the next, 4C for the next, 8C for the next, and so on for every day of the month." The father, thinking he had a foolish son, readily consented.

Which, indeed, was the more clever? (See reverse side of page.)

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>1</th>
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<td>1.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Day 9</td>
<td>2.56</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The son’s allowance day-to-day growth:

Day 10: 5.12
Day 11: 10.24
Day 12: 20.48
Day 13: 40.96
Day 14: 81.92
Day 15: 163.84
Day 16: 327.68
Day 17: 655.36
Day 18: 1,310.72
Day 19: 2,621.44
Day 20: 5,242.88
Day 21: 10,485.76
Day 22: 20,971.52
Day 23: 41,943.04
Day 24: 83,886.08
Day 25: 167,772.16
Day 26: 335,544.32
Day 27: 671,088.64
Day 28: 1,342,177.28
Day 29: 2,684,354.56
Day 30: 5,368,709.12
Day 31: $10,737,418.24

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Exercise three: If some students are still adrift, try pointing out that the same principles apply to investing. Give me an annual growth rate for my investments and I can predict when my money will double. In investing, the geometric growth pattern is called compounding. Every financial website has a calculator that will allow the students to quickly test the effect of different growth rates on various amount of money. (To reinforce the small/big implication of doubling, ask the students the following question. Assume that you invest your $10,000 dollars and I invest my $10 million dollars at the same time. If we both receive a 10% return on our investment, we will both double our money in 7.2 years. Who will be better off? Why?)

The following chart can serve as a quick reference for growth rates and doubling time. Ask the students to research China’s most recent population growth rate and then using the chart determine when China’s next population doubling will occur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATE OF POPULATION INCREASE (PERCENT PER YEAR)</th>
<th>TIME TAKEN TO DOUBLE POPULATION (NUMBER OF YEARS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>6,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

He who has not played with compound interest calculations is generally surprised at how rapidly a sum of money (or a population) increases at even the most modest rate of interest. The above table will help in appreciating the implications of different rates of population growth among the various peoples of the world.

Step two: A second factor influencing future human population growth is fertility rate. Fertility rate is the average number of children women will have during their childbearing years. A fertility rate of 2.1 is generally considered to be a zero population growth number. Have the students research China’s current fertility rate and population growth rate. The Population Reference Bureau provides the best source available for this information. Hard copies of their data can be obtained by writing to them at 1875 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 520, Washington, DC 20009-5728. The organization also maintains an excellent web site at www.prb.org.

The students will discover a seeming contradiction when they research this data. China currently has a fertility rate of 1.8, but a population growth rate of 0.9% and therefore a corresponding population doubling occurring in 79 years. Hopefully, some of the students will notice that the first statistic indicates that China should expect a decline in population resulting from a fertility rate that is below that necessary for replacement. Yet, China still has a positive growth rate. Why? This is fertile ground for some serious critical thinking utilizing the population by age diagram presented above. Basically, the question is answered this way. For a society to reach a steady state with respect to its population all of the children who where product of a larger than replacement fertility pattern must complete their child rearing years before this steady state will be realized. That is why population projects that assume an immediate zero population growth pattern, i.e., ZPG equaling 2.1, will show human population growth increasing from its current level of 6 billion to somewhere in the range of 9 to 10 billion by 2050. At this point, if a ZPG fertility pattern persists, human population will reach a steady state. What then are the demographic implications for China? China’s population will most certainly grow in the near term. (It is interesting to note that the Population Reference Bureau projects China’s population growing from its current level of 1.265 billion to 1.591 billion by 2025, and then declining to 1.365 billion by 2050. The two data charts are provided below and my help constructing a critical thinking activity.)

### Countries with the Most People

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. China</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. China</td>
<td>1,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. India</td>
<td>853</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. India</td>
<td>1,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. United States</td>
<td>251</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Nigeria</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Indonesia</td>
<td>189</td>
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<td>5. Indonesia</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Brazil</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Pakistan</td>
<td>281</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Japan</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Brazil</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Pakistan</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td>10. Mexico</td>
<td>143</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Mexico</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td>11. Iran</td>
<td>141</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Germany</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>12. Ethiopia</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Italy</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td>15. Egypt</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Information Please Almanac, Population Reference Bureau.
Step three: A third factor influencing the rate at which a country’s population will grow is the age at which women have babies. Technologically advanced, affluent nations tend to see women delay marriage and childbearing decisions. Women in agriculturally based, poorer nations tend to marry and bear children early, frequently in their teens. (It should also be noted that women in the economically advanced societies have significantly lower fertility rates than their counterparts in agricultural societies. Why? For the former, children are high maintenance and an economic liability well into their twenties. For the latter, children are quickly integrated into the family’s economic activities and are, therefore - at least in the shore run - experienced as an economic assets contributing to the families productive well being. The availability of reliable contraception is a second reason for fertility difference. PRB data shows 83% of Chinese women using some method of contraception. As point of comparison, contraception utilization are as follows for Germany (85%), United States (76%) and Japan (64%).)

Have the students test the effect of early childbearing years on a society’s rate of growth. Compare two childbearing patterns. Society one will have all women having three children each at ages 13, 14 and 15. Society two will have all women also having three children each over consecutive beginning years at age 24. Have your students calculate the total number of individuals that will be produced in their respective societies over a two hundred year period. The exercise involves only a few arithmetic skills and an ability to devise an attack strategy. If one wishes to simplify the exercise a bit, try the following suggestions. Assume a single woman society as your start point. Also, calculate all the children in the middle year of the sequence. The woman in society one will have her three babies at year 14 and her three babies will have their babies at year 28 and so on. Likewise, the woman in society two will have her babies at year 25 and her babies will have their babies at year 50 in this progression. Instruct the students to divide each generation’s product by two before calculating the size of the next generation. This is necessary in order to account for the male babies born to each generation of women. (Remember, the purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the magnitude of the difference between the age at which women have babies, and not the absolute number of that difference.) The calculation should look as follows:
3 Child Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>births</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>6.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>10.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>15.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>22.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>34.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>51.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>76.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>115.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>172.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>259.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>389.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198</td>
<td>583.86</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,746.57</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5 Child Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>births</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>6.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>10.13</td>
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<td>125</td>
<td>15.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>22.78</td>
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<td>175</td>
<td>34.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>51.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>147.77</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China is in the process of conducting an extensive census. Data compiled from this census should shed light on current age of birth related trends for China.
Lesson three: A tale of two stories

Step one: Handout *World Population Growth: 1750 – 2100*. Ask the students to explain what this chart suggests. (According to a *National Geographic* 1998 issue on human population growth, 98 percent of growth occurs in the developing world.) Ask the students to explain why this chart might be appropriately titled *Two Human Population Growths: a tale of stories*. In small groups, have the students generate a list of population-related characteristics and problems that one might find in both a developed and developing country. One can prime the thought-pump by suggesting some characteristics or problems. Here are a few suggestions: infant mortality rate, levels of urban air pollution, levels of teenage suicide, level of stress related illnesses, and leading causes of death. It is hard for the mid-range student to think of things without a prompt. Use travel or geographic magazines with picture to provide these requisite prompts.

Source: Population Reference Bureau
Step two: China is a country that has experienced one of the most rapid rates of economic growth over the decade of the nineties. (Between 1953 and 1989, China's economy grew tenfold. Throughout the decade of the nineties official government GDP estimates show a 9% plus annual growth rate.) It is also a country that, because of its family planning policies started in the late nineteen seventies, has a population growth pattern that seems to contradict the population growth distinction examined in Step one of this lesson. Have students interpret the charts shown below. Ask the students to write a short essay explaining where they think China fits on this developed/ developing country continuum.

Note that the slowing population growth rate and a low infant mortality rate suggests a pattern seen in developed countries, but pyramid shaped population age distribution and a rapid economic growth rate is more indicative of the economy of a developing country. Ask the students to speculate as to reasons for this contradiction. The most important reason is China's population policy since 1978. This issue will be examined later in this unit.

Projected population growth: a world perspective

![Annual World Population Change: 1950-2050](image)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base 5-10-00.
Four countries have been selected for the purposes of this comparison. Germany represents a mature, economically developed society. Afghanistan is undisputedly a struggling, developing country. China is included because it is the focus of this curriculum unit and the United States is included because it represents a frame of reference from which students will make their analytical judgements.

**Population growth and fertility rates compared** (July 1999 est.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Growth Rates</th>
<th>Fertility Rates</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>3.95%</td>
<td>5.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.77%</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source of date: [www.geographic.com](http://www.geographic.com) / list of countries)
Below is a detailed account for the decline China's population growth rate. Have students research the growth rate for the similar time period for the other countries in this comparison and then graph their results.

Rate of population growth in China since 1962

Source: Population Reference Bureau

Age and sex distribution for the compared countries

Population Pyramid Summary for Germany

Population Pyramid Summary for China

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.
Here is a more detailed account of China's population distribution developed in the 1990 Census. Look for an update of this information when China releases the result of its 2000 Census. The data for this census was gathered between November 1st and the 15th.

Data - Population

China's Total Population by Sex and Age, Census 1990

This population pyramid from the 1990 census tells the dramatic story of China's population history for several decades. For instance, one can see China's "baby boom" which peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It started in the 1950 with those generations that - in 1990 - were 35 to 40 years of age. Then the demographic disaster of the "Great Leap Forward" cut down the cohorts to half their size.

The number of people that were 28 to 31 years of age in 1990 (that is, they were born between 1959 and 1963) is substantially smaller than the generations before and afterwards. This severe "cut" in China's age structure is due to the deficit of birth during the Great Leap Forward. It is well known that during severe famine years fertility declines sharply. After the Great Leap Forward births rapidly increased again. The largest cohorts were 16 and 26 years of age in 1990 - that is they were born between 1974 and 1978.

Then the Chinese family planning program obviously took effect. The birth cohorts rapidly declined. Those children, that were between 4 and 11 in 1990, belonged to the smallest birth cohorts after the baby boom. They were born between 1978 and 1985.

At the bottom of the Chinese population pyramid one can again see large cohorts, that were born between 1985 and 1990. They are almost as large as the birth cohorts during the "baby boom" years. However, these large number of birth are just the "echo effect" of the baby boom between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. The large baby boom generation had their (first) children - and despite the fact, that each couple should have had only one child, the total number of births was high, because of the large number of parents. (In fact the average fertility during the early 1990s was more than two children).

(Source: www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/CChinaFood/data/pop/p-23e-m.htm)
Infant mortality rate – deaths per 1,000 live births

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>140.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>136.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>132.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>129.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>126.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>194</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>6.22</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>196</td>
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<td>40.84</td>
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<td>Hong Kong</td>
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<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GDP growth rate for the compared countries

Comparing the economic activity between developed and developing countries is fairly straight forward. Drawing valid inferences from the data is a little more tricky. Suffice it to say, mature, developed economies tend to grow at a plodding 2 or 3 percent. Developing economies can be quite volatile, going through dramatic periods of boom and bust. There can also be considerable unevenness between different developing economies. For example, China did quite well over the decade of the nineties, its economy growing at an annual 9% or 7% plus range. At any rate, students can research and interpret the data on this topic. Here are a few useful sources for economic data.

1. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, U.S. Census Bureau (R 317.3 Stat)

There are also a number of websites presenting economic data. Many of these sources draw on the same data bases.

Lesson four: No tree grows to the sky

Every species on the plant has its growth limited by two things. The limitation known as a species’ innate capacity for reproduction. This is a biological limitation. For example, human beings can only reproduce once every ten or eleven months and grizzly bears can only reproduce once every two years. Species generally reproduce at their innate capacity limits. Human beings are the single except. We reproduce far below our innate capacity for reproduction, and yet have experienced a seemingly limitless capability to grow our population. So far, we have been able to do this because of our ability to modify our environment.
The second limitation on a species' growth is its environment's carrying capacity. The carrying capacity is simply the largest number of a given species that a habitat can support indefinitely. All species compete for food, shelter and reproductive space. This is done within an environment that provides a relatively fixed set of resources within which this drama can be carried out. As noted above, humans can modify their environment and effectively expand environmental assets or reduce environmental liabilities. China's Three Gorges Dam is a superb example of one human project doing both. (The Dam will store water and generate electricity, on the one hand, and eliminate devastating floods on the other.) It also allows use to compete more effectively with other species who need the same resources, but frequently in different was. The key question is whether there are limits to this unique characteristic of human ingenuity and, thus, our ability to effectively expand our environment's carrying capacity.

With respect to human beings, this is a two-pronged question: We live both a quantitative and qualitative existence. The student may be engaged in a discussion that leads to this conclusion by simply writing the following biblical admonishment on the overhead: "Man doeth not live on bread alone."

The quantitative aspect of carrying capacity can be disposed of quickly. When a species exceeds its environment's carrying capacity factors such as famine, disease and reproductive impediments stop the species growth and frequently leads to a significant decline in the species size. The following diagram depicts this concept.
Ask the students whether they think this is a pattern likely to be experienced by humans. If so, would they expect to see it in China first since China has the largest world population? Actually, this is a tough issue for high school students to consider. Students should be forced to qualify their answers and to engage in some if/then thinking. Hopefully, the students will reach the conclusion that this pattern of geometric expansion followed by a precipitous collapse in human population may only be likely in the poorest regions of the world. After all, we are not simply puppets to our biological impulses.

More likely than a quick and devastating population crash is a slow grinding erosion of the qualitative aspects of human existence. Congested living environments, contracting natural amenities and increasing levels of stress: these and others of that ilk represent the more likely challenges for future generation due to increasing human population. China is in an interesting position with respect to this issue. Instead of experiencing this phenomenon from a position of unparalleled material affluence, like the United States, the Chinese - with millions of people for the first time attaining a middle class standard of living – may well perceive this as an improvement. After all, the qualitative dimension of this problem is subjective, and the subjective assessment of anything is based on past experiences.

Note: This may seem like much to do in order to get students to understand what probably seems like an obvious generalization, that is, places to put 6 billion, or even 10 billion people (the projected population by 2050) is not central to the population issue. Let me assure you that students don’t understand the significance of this generalization unless a concerted effort is made to actively engage them in the process of demonstrating it visually. Hopefully, at least one flickering point of light in your class will ask, “Well if it ain’t space, then what is it that makes more people such a big deal.” This will give you an opportunity to introduce the idea that the real issue of more people involves resource use and waste creation. With respect to China and its 1.2 billion population, this double pronged consideration is central to so many public policy issues in the twenty-first century.

Section Two: Three social considerations of population growth in China

Introduction: In 1949, when the Communist Party came to power, China’s population was 540 million people. Under Mao Zedong, the government promoted a rapid growth policy. Mao argued that “every stomach comes with two hands.” These were hands necessary for economic growth. “When there are more people picking up firewood,” Mao reasoned, “then there will be a bigger fire.” By the mid 60’s China’s population growth rate was 2.85%. This translated into a doubling time of 24 years. Even Mao recognized that his rapid population growth policy was a disastrous. In the early 70’s, a two-child per family policy was adopted. Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping became China’s new leader. In 1979, Deng announced China’s new “one-couple, one-child” policy. The policy was an ambitious effort to place a break on its exploding population and struck at the heart of the oldest cultural constant in China - the family.

Controlling Generalizations: Public policy never occurs in a vacuum. Section two of this curriculum project will test this assumption. In the process, the following generalizations will be examined.
Two factors influence a society’s ability to implement a family planning strategy: the cultural imperatives surrounding the value of children, gender and human life in general, and the range of available and effective contraceptive techniques.

Population control policies will frequently have unintended social consequences.

Lesson one: one child is enough

Step one: In its initial form, China’s “one-couple, one-child” relied on four methods on implementation:

- Incentives: Couples who signed a one-child pledge got better housing and medical care, plus pay increases.
- Penalties: Couples who didn’t comply were heavily fined and often lost their jobs.
- Peer pressure: Neighborhood groups policed the size of local families. Couples who had more than one child were shunned by their peers.
- Education: Posters throughout the country preached the benefits of one-child families. Local officials and volunteers distributed contraceptives and advised couples on birth control. (Source: Scholastic Update, September 18, 1987)

Have the students consider the effectiveness of each of the methods. Have the students design posters promoting the virtues of the one-child policy.

Step two: China’s one-child policy is not without its vocal detractors who have described it as draconian. Its opponents claim that there is a heavy reliance on abortion, forced sterilization and infanticide to insure compliance. As with any controversial issue that is values-driven, determining the truth is very difficult.

Have the students read the following positions on the “one-couple, one child” policy. Asked the students to do the following:

- Determine whether the writer or speaker favors or opposes the “one-couple, one-child” policy.
- Explain the writer or speakers point of view.
- Speculate as to the source of the document or position of the speaker.
- Assume that they are taking testimony in legislative hearings that will ultimately lead to a re-examination of this family planning policy. Have them devise a method to evaluate the contradictory information.
- Construct questions that would provide additional information that help them make a more informed and, hopefully, wiser decision.

testimony one

China has always held that concepts of human rights are a product of historical development, closely related to social, political and economic conditions, as well as individual nation’s particular history, culture and concepts. The realization ...of human rights is a historical process. A citizen’s right of choice in reproduction is also part of the process.

The great changes in the world population situation in the mid-twentieth century, the rapid world population growth and the severe consequence ensuing have aroused increasing
attention from the international community and various countries. The contradiction between population on one hand and survival and development on the other is especially sharp in developing countries with a fast population growth. Irrational international economic order, stagnant economic and social development, and the pressure of a large population have continually widened the gap between developed and developing countries in terms of welfare and living condition, increasing rather than decreasing the number of those living below the poverty line....

China’s family planning policies and programs combine citizens’ rights and duties, joining the interest of the individual with those of society. These conform to the basic principles outlined at the various international population conferences and have been established on the basis of the relationship of interpersonal interests under socialism. Never in any country are rights and duties absolute...There are no duties apart from rights, or rights apart from duties. When there is a conflict between social needs and individual interests, a means has to be sought to mediate it. This is something that government in every sovereign country is doing. As China has a larger population, the Chinese government has to limit the number of births of its citizens. This is a duty incumbent on each citizen as it serves the purpose of making the whole nation prosperous, and it is not proceeding from the private interest of some individual. This is wholly justifiable and entirely consistent with the moral concepts of Chinese society.

testimony two

Dr. Wong: In the hospital, you can see the women suffer and have pain for this one-child policy. It is only for this one-child policy that they came to the hospital, like they are coming to jail. They kill her baby, and they make her suffer. They make her heart break. This happens every day in China—every day.

Chair: ...Are you from a large or a small city or a rural area? The reason for asking the question is that I have been told that the one-child policy is not enforced equally throughout the whole country.

Dr. Wong: Yes. In different cities there is a difference...My city has three million people. My workplace is connected just by boat with the countryside, so my patients are less from the countryside than the city. Also the provinces are different. In the center of China in some places in the poor provinces, it is more crude. They force more. In Shanghai and Guangdong near the east coast, it is much more gentle, but they are much cleverer, because sometimes they promise you something you can have. But in the countryside, there is no offer. They just do it. It is very hard....

Senator Harradine: Do you have any idea of the number of abortions you performed?

Dr. Wong: For less than three months it was an everyday job. Over three months, every week I would do something like 10 in my shift.

Senator Harradine: Where forced sterilizations, the insertion of the intra-uterine devices and the like part of the practice?
Dr. Wong: Yes, less a practice – this is compulsory. They have to do it. If the couple have two children, one of them has to be sterilized, otherwise you cannot get medicare assistance or education assistance and accommodation too.

Senator Coney: What would happen to a doctor or hospital which refused to carry out the policy?

Dr. Wong: If you refused, you would go to jail. (Earlier in his testimony, Dr. Wong claimed that one hospital administrator had been executed for providing false certification for the birth of a couple’s second child.)

testimony three

The most pervasive environmental-related myth about China is that couples are allowed to have only one child. But in truth the one-child policy has long been more slogan than reality...The Party was forced by popular resistance to back off from the policy – another example of social unrest driving government decisions.

Today the one-child family is all but unheard of in rural China, where nearly three out of four Chinese live....It seems that the only Chinese who do adhere to the one-child target are urban dwellers – especially those who work directly for the government and thus can be easily monitored, and penalize through the withholding of salaries, promotion, and the like.

All of which casts strong doubt on official claims regarding China’s population: that Chinese women average only two births each; that the population will not reach 1.5 billion until 2030; that it will peak at 1.6 billion in 2046. Although some newly affluent families are, in the familiar demographic pattern, having fewer children, the gross numbers are almost certainly greater. The truth is that no one knows exactly how big China’s population is, or how fast it is growing.

Population growth is probably China’s most important environmental issue, because it magnifies all others. For example, China ranks near the very bottom in global comparisons of per capita supplies of arable land, fresh water, and forests.

Everywhere I visited, I noticed that China felt crowded. How could it not? China’s population is five times that of the United States, even though the two countries occupy roughly the same amount of land area. But since deserts and mountains make the western half of China inhospitable to human settlement, 90 percent of its population lives in the east. Imagine, then, almost nine times as many people living east of the Mississippi as live there in real life. That is everyday reality in China.

testimony four

The policy isn’t working. The reasons: (1) Members of the baby-boom generation of the early 1960’s have reached childbearing age. (2) Many couples bribe officials to have a second child – or hide out during the last months of pregnancy. (3) China doesn’t have a nationwide welfare and pension program to take care of the elderly. As a result, most Chinese look to their children for support when they grow old. And they want to have lots of kids to ensure a comfortable old age.
The new freedoms Chinese enjoy under [China's economic] reforms have also [added to the opposition]. Now that rural families can go into business for themselves, they want more farmhands. That means more children.

testimony five

In China, small families have been mandatory for more than a generation. In theory, China's fertility rate has fallen below replacement level, to 1.7-1.8 births per woman. That is almost certainly an underestimate: China plans the production of the vaccines given to babies on the assumption that 25 million more children are born each year than the official figures show. Even that would leave this huge country with a fertility rate slightly above America's. Moreover, in cities, and especially in Shanghai, one-child families have been the norm for more than 20 years; so the government has softened the policy. When both partners in a marriage are only children, they are allowed a second baby.

How many will take advantage of that? Several other Asian countries—richer than China, admittedly—have fertility rates about as low as southern Europe. (Several southern European countries have fertility rates that are below replacement.) In South Korea, the proportion of women in their early 40s with only a single child rose from 9.9% in 1993 to 13.1% in 1997. South Korea's fertility rate fell from 1.54 in 1997 to 1.42 in 1998. Even without a government to bully them into it, many Korean women seem to have adopted their own one-child policy.

Testimony sources:

3. Atlantic Monthly, November 1997, pages 105 to 108
4. Scholastic Update, September 18, 1987, page 23

Lesson two: The first rule of ecology is that everything is connected to everything else

This lesson is designed to examine some of unintended or difficult to manage consequences of the ‘one-couple, one-child’ policy. The three problems have been selected. These problems are the imbalance between male and female children, the impact of one child families on a group-oriented culture and the difficult of policy compliance with China's massive floating population. The summary that follows will give the student a quick introduction to the problem.

In groups of three to five have the students form research/production teams. They should first research their assigned problem. After completing their research, the groups should imagine a situation and write a script for a fifteen minute documentary film on the topic. Have the students examine the structure of a 60 Minutes or 20/20 piece. This can be used as a model for their script. Finally, have the students video tape their documentary and present the finished product to the class. Since there are three topics and the students are in groups of three to five, there will probably be two documentaries on each topic. The lesson can be
concluded by comparing the parallel productions and analyzing their respective research and production decisions.

Too many men: China’s one-child family has resulted in a population imbalance between males and females. As in many countries, a cultural bias exists in China in favor of male children. In 1990, it was estimated that there were 114 boys for every 100 girls for the one-child policy generation. Recent studies suggest the problem is getting worse, with figures release in January 1999 putting the ratio of men to women at 120 to 100. This disparity translates into one million excess marriage age males every year beginning in 2020.

The projection contains serious implication ... for China. First, the unmarried men will not be linked to society by wives and children. In addition, they likely will be poorer than average, since wealthy men presumably will have advantages in the competition for women. Millions of poor and disconnected bachelors will pose threats to social order and even national stability... As they search for better prospects, they may set off waves of migration around the globe. Meanwhile, the status of women may not improve. Brides may simply be seen as valued commodities, and many women may be forced into prostitution. (Source: Jeff Nesmith, Cox News Service)

Other issues involve missing female children. It has been claimed that many female infants have been aborted, abandoned or even deliberately killed so the family could have another child, hopefully a boy. It is suspected that others have dealt with the population restrictions by simply not reporting the birth of new babies.

Little emperors and empresses: There is increasing evidence that China’s single child families are created a generation of extremely self-centered, pampered children. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as to as the “4-2-1 problem.” The reference is to four grandparents and two parents focusing all of the family’s attention on one child. Furthermore, single children will be denied the socializing experience gained from sharing attention with siblings and cousins. Traditionally, Chinese culture has placed a strong emphasis on family and the role of the individual within the group. The Chinese are now worried that the one-child policy will have an unintended consequence of undermining the cultural underpinnings of Chinese society.

Health experts are concerned that doting parents and grandparents are promoting negative health habits amongst their spoiled progeny. Fast food restaurants such as McDonald’s are becoming increasingly popular in China. Parents and grandparents are becoming increasingly more likely to indulge their only child’s changing tastes. In addition to this, schools have reduced emphasis on physical activity while increasing time spent on academic pursuits. Obesity amongst children is becoming a more visible problem in China today. In the years to come, China will have to devote more health care resources to deal with the ailments of this unhealthy lifestyle.

The floating population: Booming economic growth in China’s coastal provinces and an increasing unwillingness or inability of the government to enforce registration and work permit restrictions, has resulted in massive migrations from China’s agricultural hinterland. Agricultural reforms started in 1978 have resulted in significant productivity increases and a massive labor displacement.
Average grain yields grew from about 2.5 tons per hectare in 1978 to some 4.1 tons per hectare in 1993. Mechanization and modernization of China’s agriculture created a huge excess labor force. Millions of farmers now live on very small pieces of land that are sufficient to survive, but too small for modern agricultural production. China’s huge rural population is linked to an economic activity, which could be accomplished by a fraction of the current agricultural labor force. In fact, it was estimated that in 1994 China had a surplus of about 200 million agricultural workers. (Source: IIASA Arguments – Trends in Urbanization, www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaUrbanization/argu/trends/trendshremd-10.htm)

This massive movement of people has been referred to as China’s floating population. The phenomenon has created special problems for China and its one-child policy. It also has resulted in prejudices amongst urbanites, creating an atmosphere of suspicion and fear. The floating population threatens the stability so cherished in Chinese society.

Note: Recently, China has modified its population policy. China has 55 ethnic minorities that comprise about 7% of the population. This portion of the population has no family size restrictions placed on it. Just recently, the government announced a loosening of the family size policy for urban residents. Couples who are both products of a single child family may now have two children. Beginning in 1987, for parents living in rural areas, a second child is allowed if the first child is female. Further, to attempt to combat the bias in favor of a male child, females are now permitted to carry the family name into marriage.

While on my 2000 Fulbright – Hays Seminar, we took one foray into the countryside. From our base city of Guilin, we spent the day driving to the Yao ethnic group country seat of Ziyuan in the Guangxi Autonomous Region. Once we left the main road we spent several hours driving through an agricultural landscape of terraced rice fields. As our trip progressed, our scholar-escort, Craig Canning, pointed out the government’s effort to address the issue of one-child families and cultural bias favoring males. Scattered on our route were hand-painted slogans on walls and the sides of buildings. Some of the slogans were as follows:

- Fewer children, quicker prosperity
- Daughters are descendants, too
- Daughters and sons are the same
- Giving birth to boys and girls is natural

No doubt persuasion was heavily relied upon here since this was an ethnic minority community and, therefore, not subject to the one-child restriction. Nonetheless, attitudes about the sole family being female seems to be changing amongst majority Han population who are subject to one-child restrictions. This shifting attitude about female children, interestingly, relies on a stereotype attributed to women. Several of the people with whom we spoke expressed a belief that having a daughter might not be the mark of bad luck once thought. Why? Women will be more responsive caretakers for the elderly. With only one descendant, those having daughters may well end up with the better part of this bargain.
Section Three: Human populations’ physical impact

Lesson one:

More people use more resources and create more waste. The students have examined this generalization earlier in the unit. This section is designed to give the generalization legs - Chinese legs, that is. Included below are articles taken from the China Daily, the official government newspaper of China. These articles appeared in the paper during the month of July, 2000 and indicate current environmental issues that the government of China has chosen to emphasize. (Notice that all of these issues exist because of pressure human beings placed on China’s limited physical resources.)

Have the students research which environmental issues are of concern to Americans. Point out that privately owned news outlets are the opinion makers in our country. Compare and contrast our concerns with those of the Chinese government. Ask the students to draw conclusions about the role that population plays in these issues. Obviously, China has more people and Americans are more affluent. Revisit the earlier generalization that societal affluence tends to reduce family sizes. Try to get the students to understand that greater societal wealth allows individuals to have a much larger environmental impact. (The metaphor of an environmental footprint works well here.) Land use issues may result from very a large human population living in a relatively compact geographic area. Those same issues may also be due to a smaller, affluent population who can magnify its impact in a given geographic area. Both situations may result in the same phenomenon, but for very different reasons. And, therefore, the respective policy solutions may be very different.

CHINA DAILY

Tax cut to promote ‘green’ cars

Government urges producers to clean up their acts in line with new rules

By GONG ZHENGZHENG
China Daily staff

The central government’s recent announcement that it will cut consumption taxes added to the market-price of vehicles with lower exhaust emissions demonstrates its commitment to promoting the production and consumption of environmentally friendly vehicles. According to the announcement by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and the Ministry of Finance, tax bills for automobile manufacturers whose products satisfy the European II emission standard (Euro II) will decrease by 30 percent. The products include sedans, sports vehicles and mini-buses.

Auto manufacturers must apply to the SAT and the ministry for a tax cut and must pass strict emission tests from the State Administration of Machine-Building Industry (SAMI) and the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), said SAT official Tan Congjun yesterday.

“The tax cut is designed to urge domestic vehicle manufacturers to upgrade their emission-reducing technologies and make more environmentally friendly vehicles,” Tan said.

The preferential tax policy is a positive contribution to the country’s attempt to control automobile emission pollution, especially in big cities, Tan said.

Many cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, have already implemented strict automobile emission regulations to alleviate mounting air pollution.

All vehicles in the country will be required to meet the European I emission standard by the end of this year and Euro II by 2005, said SEPA sources.

“The tax cut will significantly benefit the sustainable development of the country’s fledging automobile industry,” said Du Fangci, an official from the SAMI.

The industry is committed to producing more environmentally friendly automobiles, Du said.

The government’s announcement came about four months after 16 domestic auto manufacturers appealed to the government to cut the tax added to vehicles when they are sold by half this year and to cancel it by 2001.

Auto manufacturers, including the Changchun-based First Automotive Works in northeast China’s Jilin Province, the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp and the Tianjin Automotive Industry (Group) Co Ltd, also suggested that the government remove arbitrary charges and fees imposed on vehicle users.

Since 1994, the government has slashed a 3 to 8 percent tax onto the price of a vehicle, depending on the level of its exhaust emissions.

Industrial analysts said the tax cut is a step in the right direction, but that it will not greatly affect the prices of vehicles on the domestic market.
Roof of world heats up

Geologist: Climate shifts threaten western plateau

By HE SHENG
China Daily staff

The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, one of the most geologically volatile regions in the world, is becoming increasingly warm, scientists say.

In an article published in the Beijing-based Science Times, Shi Yafeng, a geologist specializing in glaciers on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, warned that this "roof of the world" may change significantly as a result of human activity. Shi issued his warning after years of observation on climate shifts.

His prediction: a quick, major thaw of the metre thick tjale (the eternal frozen soil) of the plateau and a speeding up of the retreat of the more than 460,000 glaciers.

Meanwhile, the dryness of the plateau climate that began at the end of the 19th century, may continue until about 2050 before any increase in rainfall.

"All these factors will significantly transfigure what the plateau looks like today," said Shi, an academician with the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

"At one point, it would bring good to people, such as the increase in rainfall near the end of this century. But before that we'll probably have many more problems," he added.

Shi said sensitive atmospheric conditions, thin air and high altitudes make the plateau's climate susceptible to change.

For these expected changes, Shi blames the global greenhouse effect that, arguably, has raised Earth's average temperature over the past 100 years.

After comparing temperature variations on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to worldwide averages, he concluded that the plateau's climate is susceptible to human activity. Shi issued his warming after years of observation on climate shifts.

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After comparing temperature variations on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to worldwide averages, he concluded that the plateau's temperatures have risen steadily at a faster rate than the world average.

This finding, he said, shows that the plateau is warming at a faster rate than people once thought, he said.

With the planet industrializing and its rain forests diminishing, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased 32 per cent in the past 200 years, Shi said.

And studies of the ice core under the Antarctic by the Vostok Observatory suggest that in the past 400,000 years atmospheric carbon dioxide has never been higher than 300 ppmv (part per million volume).

With an annual increase rate of 1.5 ppmv, the carbon dioxide will surely exceed that ceiling before 2050 in the Antarctic, Shi said.

"That will inevitably drive up the overall temperature on Earth," said Shi, who is basing his predictions on temperature variation models from the U.N.-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Over the past century, average global temperatures have grown by 0.7 C, and many geologists believe the past decade was the hottest for 1,000 years.

Ding Lihui, the panel's climate science co-chair, told China Daily that the panel believes temperatures worldwide will go up 2.5 degrees this century and stay there.

Huang Ronghui, a Chinese scientist with the academy's Institute of Aerophysics, also agreed that the globe is warming.

The warming trends appear particularly severe in China. Huang said in the past two decades temperatures have risen sharpest in the Republic of Mongolia and China's west. Ding said that the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is among these areas.

Shi suggests in his article that statistics collected by 97 observatories across the plateau in the past 50 years show a per decade temperature increase of 0.16 degrees from 1955 to 1996. And the per decade increase in winter temperature during this period was 0.32 degrees, higher than the average for the northern hemisphere.

The British-based Hadley Centre, which predicts climate changes, expects the temperature on the plateau to rise 3 degrees by 2100.

"If that happens, and I think it will, it would be the fastest warming process in 1,000 years," Shi said.

With the warming of the climate, the eternal "tjale," a 1.35 million square-kilometre subface ice mass that is 10 to 200 metres thick, will thaw.

Li Xin and Cheng Guodong, two Chinese geologists specializing in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, released findings last year that the lower level of the tjale is rising at 160 metres per degree.

It is predicted that the eternal tjale will decrease by 8 per cent in 10 years, 19 per cent in 50 years and 58 per cent in 100 years. "That is still a conservative prediction as they set the temperature variation rather low," Shi said. "It would not be a surprise that a large amount of the tjale has thawed by the end of the century."

This melting could cause problems for the engineering and construction of buildings, roads, railways and water projects above the tjale, Shi warned.

For example, the construction of the railway linking Lhasa, capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, and Xining, capital of Qinghai Province, would need to be re-appraised.

The railway project has been discussed for decades but has not yet begun because of concerns about bleak weather and complicated topography.

Now scientists and engineers must take climate into account as well.

Another warming effect: the thawing of glaciers, the main water source supplying rivers originating on the plateau, will seriously affect runoff, Shi said.

Shi said there are 469,298 glaciers on the plateau, which supports 44,700 cubic kilometres of water and feeds the major rivers such as the Yangtze and the Yellow.

"If there was an expansion of glaciers in certain areas on the plateau in the 1970s, the overall tendency for now is retreat," Shi said.

Based on the temperature variation model, he expects glaciers to shrink by 45 per cent by 2100.

The ocean glacier in southeastern Tibet is likely to shrink by 75 per cent. This shrinkage would quickly diminish run-off.

"Unlike rainfall, the glacier plays a much more stable role in feeding the rivers," Shi said. "It's like a reservoir. In the early period, the water supply for the rivers rises; as time goes by, the supply will abruptly fall."

Shi argued that Central Asia, including the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, is in a hot, dry period 10 years ago. And the retreat of glaciers and inland lakes are symptoms that have become more and more evident.

Research on Qinghai Lake, the largest on the plateau, shows that the lake level dropped in the 1990s.

The question for now is when the climate will change again. "The statistics we have gathered so far are not enough to take us to that point," Shi said. "More extensive, continued observations and analysis should be done — and now."
Clean up our cities, use more hydro power

By PANG DAQING

From 1990 to 1999, the installed capacity of thermal power in China doubled. This increase has obviously improved China's electricity supply, better satisfying the huge, rising demands of economic development and daily life.

Unfortunately, as a result, the environment is being polluted at an unprecedented rate.

The main pollutants from coal-driven power generation are sulphur dioxide and aerosols. Statistics show the sulphur dioxide from coal-driven power plants is 85 per cent of the total sulphur dioxide in China. In 1998, emissions of sulphur dioxide came to 21 million tons, and those of aerosols to 14 million tons.

According to the World Health Organization’s evaluation of 272 cities in 54 countries in 1998, 31 of the 50 most seriously polluted ones were in China. Among the world’s 10 most polluted cities, seven were in China.

In recent years, areas affected by acid rain, caused mainly by sulphur dioxide, have expanded rapidly, affecting more than 30 per cent of China’s total land.

Declines of cash crops, forests and human health caused by acid rain have reached 117 billion yuan (US$14.1 billion), which is 1.9 per cent of China’s GDP.

Around 80 per cent of urban dwellers live in a more or less polluted environment. The continually worsening environment not only affects the quality of life, but also endangers people’s health. According to a report from the International Lung Cancer Association, China’s incidence of lung cancer rose from the fourth in the 1970s to number one at present.

Based on expert predictions, China’s installed thermal power capacity could reach 220 million kilowatts by 2000, representing 75.79 per cent of the nation’s total installed capacity. It is known that the energy efficiency of thermal power generation is low compared to hydropower and nuclear power generation.

Thermal power’s efficiency is low due to outdated methods of coal mining, processing and transportation as well as the methods of routing electricity to end-users. China’s efficiency is on average 10 per cent lower than that of advanced countries such as Japan and the United States.

Coal is another issue. The proportion of coal among world energy sources has dropped from 62 per cent in 1910 to the present 23 per cent.

Yet, China’s proportion of burning coal for power still remains around 70 per cent despite the efforts China has made in replacing the coal with other energy resources during the past few years.

China’s solar energy, wind power and small-scale hydropower, which are all environmentally friendly, have the largest potential for development. However, the installed hydropower capacity makes only 24 per cent of China’s total installed power capacity.

In 1997, China began to log an electricity surplus. On the East China grid, the means for 3 million kilowatts a year were put into operation between 1996 and 1998. Although the energy consumption is still low, this grid and others will see a long-term surge in demand.

To ensure that our society and economy develop soundly, we suggest as follows:

- Step up efforts to pass laws and regulations to limit the development of thermal power. Solid efforts should be made to reduce thermal power’s 70-per-cent dominance in the power industry.
- Priority should be given to develop solar and wind power. Attention should be paid to their research and usefulness.
- Develop medium-scale and small-scale hydropower using proven technology and local resources.

Unlike large hydropower projects, which are usually characterized by long construction periods as well as human relocation and flood threats, small projects can work well in hilly rural areas. By the end of 1999 the installed capacity of small-scale hydropower was only 29 per cent of its potential in China.

A Chinese proverb says, “If a man is not far-sighted, he is bound to encounter dilemmas in the near future.” It is now high time to adopt substantial measures to check the worsening of our environment.

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Save environment, save ourselves

The amount of bad news about our environment is mind-boggling. We paid for a costly development effort only to learn that we cannot stand against nature. Although the costs of progress may be worthwhile, the aggressive sandstorms that have battered Beijing this year seem to be a revenge of nature. For all the dust storms and the encroaching deserts on the capital, we learn that they are but a warning: It is time we protected the environment. Now there are concerted efforts to restore our bleeding environment.

Ledged gas is banned in major cities. Heavy polluters such as small paper mills threatening water systems are ordered to close. Garbage treatment has become a major concern of city administrations. Logging along main rivers is prohibited. Even cultivated land is being returned to grass and forests.

Most recently, environmental authorities urged industrial pollutant dischargers as well as major cities to meet national environmental standards by year's end. A 1996 State Council decree set the deadline. "The environmental situation of our country is still quite severe," said last year's national environmental report. The situation would have been far worse had we not acted. We are at least reducing the momentum of deterioration.

Latest statistics from the State Environmental Protection Administration revealed more than 85 per cent of the pollutant-releasing industries had satisfied State environmental requirements by the end of April. Environmental departments call this "decisive progress." It is, but the battle is not over. And the hardest part is yet to come.

Of the 18,000 major pollutant dischargers, who are responsible for 65 per cent of pollution nationwide, more than one-fourth still operates below national standards. The proportion in West China is higher than 50 per cent. Pollutant-releasing enterprises have to be transformed or shut down in order to meet State standards. Inadequate funding, obsolete facilities and technologies as well as stability concerns make it hard for many firms to continue.

Most big-and-old polluters fall in the category of technologically backward, resource-wasting, low product quality and heavily polluting enterprises the government has vowed to eliminate. Many of them are at the same time money-losers. Closing them down not only reduces pollution, but also facilitates efforts to restructure the economy. The emerging social security network will help alleviate pains over job-losses.

Harnessing pollution is particularly imperative for the country's western regions. This is not only because they hold the headwaters of almost all the country's major rivers in an ecologically fragile balance. More important, they are in the beginning of a major development upsurge, which, if abused, may result in irreparable environmental damages.

All governments and people of western provinces and regions are dying to catch up with their eastern cousins who have thrived in the new market economy, but not at the expense of environmental degradation. Unless we all set our eyes on long-term outcomes, it is very possible that our hard-earned achievements in some areas will be offset by further losses in others.
Lesson two: A case study of people and water

Eminent English scholar and film producer, James Burke once commented, “If you can organize water, you can organize anything.” Certainly, the organization of water to enhance its productive capacity and reduce its destructive force has been a constant theme throughout much of Chinese history. This is truer today that ever before.

China’s major rivers are the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River), the Huang Ho (Yellow River), the Songhua (Sungari River), the Xi Jiang (Pearl River), the Hai He/Luan He, and the Liao He/Hiao He. Their combined drainage area covers some 4.39 million square kilometers or some 46% of China’s territory. More than 80% of the population and the cultivated land area are located in the plains along the middle and lower reaches of these rivers.

(Source: IIASA Arguments Trends, www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFoodfarguitrends/trend_60.htm)

Nowhere in China has the struggle of man versus water been so dramatically played out than on the Yangtze River. The Yangtze has been the source for life for countless Chinese. It has also been the source for unimaginable sorrow resulting from devastating floods that, over the years, have destroyed millions of dollars in property and claimed thousands of lives. (In 1998 flooding on the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers left over 3,000 people dead and millions of homeless refugees.) China is now engaged in one of the most ambitious engineering projects ever undertaken by humans. The Three Gorges Dam – slated for completion in 2004 – will be 607 feet high and 1.3 miles wide. The Dam will control flooding and generate one-tenth of China’s current electrical demand. It will also form a 370 mile reservoir that will flood one of the world’s truly spiritual natural places, the Yangtze’s Three Gorges. Whether this massive undertaking will ultimately be deemed heroic or hubris remains to be seen. One thing beyond dispute, it is China’s rapid economic growth and large human population that has made this project seemingly indispensable.

The students can conclude this unit by examining the issues surrounding the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. An excellent lesson has been written by Marianne Kenney. Ms. Kenny is employed by the Colorado Department of Education and was a 1999 China Fulbright Scholar. Her lesson appears in the 1999 Tradition and Transformation Curriculum Projects. The lesson along with all of the curriculum projects from past China seminars can be accessed through ERIC (www.edrs.com). Its locator number is ED442700

Final note: If I still have your attention, you will have noticed that many of the activities confront the student with critical thinking questions. Furthermore, an effort has been made to encourage the students to generate their own follow-up question. This reflects a teaching bias I developed over a thirty-two year public school career. The bias was best expressed by something E E Cummings in an introduction to one of his works of poetry. Cummings wrote: “Always the most beautiful answer who asks a more beautiful question.”
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