This document reports on findings that describe the characteristics of delinquent males and the resources available to them for social skills building in the Washington, D.C. area. The study looked at the types of delinquent behavior found among boys living in the three most violent neighborhoods in Washington, and the role played by families, schools, churches, and youth-serving organizations in helping them. It also identified where and when violence involving children was taking. Finding few differences between violent juvenile offenders in D.C. and those in other cities, the study concluded that its findings could be used as a catalyst for new initiatives to reduce juvenile violence in the District. Since the research was completed the District has reorganized its funding delivery system for juvenile justice and delinquency prevention efforts. As a result, partnerships have been formed and enhanced resources are available for youth-serving agencies to develop new policies, practices, and service delivery programs. (Contains 3 tables, 4 figures, and 35 references.)

(Author/JDM)
Violent Neighborhoods, Violent Kids

Marcia R. Chaiken

Faced with precipitously rising rates of youth violence in the Nation's Capital, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in 1995 funded congressionally mandated research on juvenile violence in the District of Columbia. The research was intended to examine this trend and recommend potential means for reducing violence among youth in DC. One part of the research, carried out by The Urban Institute, focused on identifying where and when violence involving children was taking place in the District. Other studies, completed by the Institute of Law and Justice (ILJ), sought to describe DC's juvenile justice system and to examine the characteristics of children in three areas in the city identified by The Urban Institute as having the highest rates of juvenile homicide and violence.

This Bulletin presents the findings of research conducted by LINC1 which examined the types of delinquent behavior found among boys living in the three most violent neighborhoods in DC and the role of basic institutions such as families, schools, churches, and youth-serving organizations in those boys' lives. As set forth in detail below, the findings of LINC's research (referred to in this Bulletin as "the LINC Study" or "the study") are based on statistical analyses of data collected by ILJ in interviews with a random sample of boys. Findings are also based on LINC's interviews of administrators and staff members of national youth-serving organizations with regional offices in DC and local organizations that receive funds for delinquency prevention. Written materials provided by these organizations were also used as sources of information.

The LINC study was based on theory and prior research from two scientific disciplines: criminology and youth development. Criminologists recognize that although many people, including children, break laws, only a few become persistent offenders who commit numerous serious crimes. Research on youth development indicates that even under the worst conditions, many children and adolescents are resilient and, given an opportunity to learn and practice social skills, most can become productive and self-sufficient adults. The LINC research concentrated on determining the characteristics of the DC boys who were delinquent and identifying resources for social skill building available to these boys.

1LINC is a small interdisciplinary research center founded in 1989 and based in Alexandria, VA. Recent and ongoing LINC projects include evaluations of health services programs for underserved children, substance abuse prevention programs, and programs for hard-to-reach populations. LINC has also completed research on law enforcement tactics and community actions for reducing crime and supporting sound child and adolescent development.
The nature of many of LINC's findings will not surprise practitioners, policymakers, and researchers familiar with patterns of juvenile violence and the deep problems plaguing the Nation's Capital. LINC found, for instance, that the majority of adolescent boys in the study sample have basic needs that are unmet. Many are unsupervised and unsupported by families, schools, and community organizations that could teach them skills needed to lead productive lives. The most seriously delinquent boys, the study found, are alienated—even from other youth in the neighborhood—and struggling to earn money (both legally and illegally).

LINC also found several barriers to effective delivery of youth services in DC. Unlike many cities that have made progress fighting juvenile violence, DC has too few adults actively working with and guiding youth in its most dangerous neighborhoods. Given significant cuts in funding and other resources, youth-serving organizations in DC have been forced to compete for the scarce resources that remain available.

Notwithstanding such discouraging findings, LINC believes that conditions in DC—even in the worst neighborhoods—can improve. It found, for example, that a large percentage (22 percent) of adolescent boys in violent neighborhoods in DC resist committing any criminal acts. Even among boys who are delinquent, most limit themselves to relatively less serious patterns of delinquency (i.e., theft and other property crimes or occasional fights). Some of the most seriously delinquent children in DC (e.g., those who have committed a robbery) are reaching out to adults for guidance. LINC also found that hundreds of adults living in DC are willing to be trained to meet the basic developmental needs of delinquent youth.

The findings of the LINC study and LINC's subsequent comparison of DC with other cities in the Nation raise several policy implications. To involve more adults in youth development and improve conditions for youth in DC, the District will need to devote additional resources to the development of leadership, coordination, and strategic planning for youth. Based on studies of other cities' responses to crime, violence, and juvenile delinquency, LINC suggests specific actions that need to be taken for DC to address, and eventually reduce, problems with crime, violence, and juvenile delinquency.

### Study Design and Methods

The LINC Study was accomplished through the use of two main research methods: analysis of self-reported data and analysis of data concerning youth services available in DC.

Each research method is described in detail below.

#### Analysis of Self-Reported Data

Research staff from Howard University and ILJ administered a lengthy questionnaire to a random sample of 213 boys who, in the summer of 1996, were living in one of the three census tracts in Washington, DC, identified as having the highest rates of juvenile violence during the previous 3 years. The sample, the questionnaire, and LINC's analysis of the boys' responses are described below.

The **sample**. The random sample included 213 boys ages 13 to 17, 98 percent of whom identified themselves as black or African American. ILJ and Howard University's process of recruiting boys for interviews and selecting the study sample involved several steps. First, a team of researchers from Howard University in mid-1996 canvassed the three census tracts and completed a form describing the physical conditions (for example, presence of graffiti or trash) of each block face. They also interviewed a member of each household to identify any boys living there between the ages of 13 and 17. Team members generally operated in pairs and discussed the project with whoever answered the door. In particular, they asked about the number and ages of boys in the household, explained the $15 payment available to any eligible youth who successfully completed an interview (pointing out that only one boy per household could participate), and distributed a flyer about the project.

This approach succeeded in letting the community know about the survey, however, information about the number of boys in each household was generally not forthcoming. Community members were suspicious of the team's inquiries and frequently informed team members that no eligible

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2 Such seriously delinquent children also typically commit many burglaries, assaults, or other property crimes, or are involved in selling drugs.

3 A description of the methods used to identify these census tracts appears in The Urban Institute's 1997 report Patterns of Violent Crimes Committed Against Juveniles in the District of Columbia (Gouvis, Johnson, and Roth, 1997).

4 The term "block face" refers to one side of a street between two cross-streets or intersections.
The questionnaire. In mid-1996, Howard University and ILJ research staff conducted one-on-one interviews of each boy in the study sample. During these interviews, which typically lasted 2½ hours, the researchers administered a lengthy and detailed questionnaire and recorded each boy's answers to the questions. The 70-page questionnaire, written and designed by Drs. Beverly R. Fletcher and Louis E. Wright, Jr., of Howard University, incorporated items from questionnaires previously designed and fielded as part of OJJDP-funded studies of delinquent behavior, including a parallel effort completed in Los Angeles, CA. The results of reliability analysis indicated that boys in the study sample responded in a consistent and truthful manner. In addition, the patterns of delinquency and other offenses reported by DC boys closely resembled those reported by boys in previous studies, suggesting that the DC boys were neither more nor less truthful than other boys interviewed about delinquent acts or other juvenile offenses they might have committed.

The questionnaire sought information on the following subjects:

- Personal matters, including age, race, and ethnicity; whether the boys had fathered children or been responsible for any pregnancies; what schools they attended; and whether they held a job.
- Participation in afterschool activities, including school programs or clubs, athletics, youth organizations, religious groups, or any other community activities.
- Adult supervision received (especially during afterschool hours).
- Emotions, including any feelings of isolation.
- Involvement in crime, delinquency, or gangs (during lifetime and within the 6-month period prior to the interview).

Data analysis. After research staff administered and recorded answers to the questionnaires, LINC analyzed the boys' responses. The primary statistical methods used to analyze responses were descriptive techniques (such as generating measures of dispersion and central tendency) and analysis of variance. LINC used the latter method to determine whether differences between the groups of boys in the study sample were real or simply the result of chance. This Bulletin reports only those findings that are statistically significant at the 5-percent level or better (meaning that at least 95 percent of the time, differences are not due to chance).

Analysis of Youth Services Data

The second research method utilized in LINC's study was the analysis of information concerning youth services available in DC. LINC gathered this information in two ways: by interviewing administrators and staff of youth-serving organizations and by reviewing documentation provided by these organizations. The types of organizations contacted and the procedures used to secure information are described below.

Organizations contacted. When selecting organizations, LINC's primary source was the Resource Directory of Youth Services in the District of Columbia (prepared in July 1994 by the Mayor's Youth Initiative), which lists and describes 618 programs for DC youth. Seventy-two programs in the
LINC collected data about youth services by conducting a telephone survey to update the Resource Directory discussed above.

Gathering written materials. In addition to seeking verbal responses from administrators during interviews and calls, LINC asked about the availability of written materials on such issues as geographic areas served, programmatic activities provided, participant characteristics, and coalitions with which the organizations were working. At the end of each interview, LINC reviewed with the respondent a list of written materials to be furnished. Materials were then either provided immediately or mailed to LINC.

Findings

The findings in this study fall into three broad categories: patterns of delinquency, supervision and activities of the boys during and after school, and barriers to effective delivery of youth services in DC. Findings under each category are presented below.

Patterns of Delinquency

Even among the relatively homogeneous group of boys in the study sample (all adolescent boys from three predominantly poor and predominantly African American DC neighborhoods), the study found significant distinctions based on the type of delinquency, if any, the boys were involved in and additional characteristics. In examining patterns of delinquency, the LINC study considered both the level of involvement in delinquency (delinquency category) and the effect of the following factors: drug dealing, age, employment, feelings of social isolation, gang membership, and substance abuse.

LINC's findings reveal patterns of delinquency among adolescent boys in DC that are very similar to those among youth in other cities. Consistent with the findings of previous research, for example, LINC found that a small percentage of offenders are responsible for a large proportion of the crime in DC's most violent neighborhoods (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972; Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; and Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1998). As explained in greater detail in the "Comparative Analysis" section of this study, boys living in the "Comparative Analysis" section of this study, boys living in theDC neighborhoods were more likely to be involved in violent acts, especially youth living in the neighborhoods.

Figure 2: Percentage of All Juvenile Offenses Committed by Different Groups

![Graph showing percentage of juvenile offenses committed by different groups.]

Note: Juvenile offenses include both delinquent acts (which are crimes if committed by adults) and status offenses (such as drinking and truancy).
this Bulletin, however, DC's responses to juvenile crime and violence were found to differ significantly from those implemented in other cities that have successfully reduced levels of juvenile crime and violence.

Delinquency category. LINC found that a large proportion of the crime in the three study neighborhoods was committed by a small percentage of boys in the sample. In particular, it found that the robber category (representing only 7 percent of boys in the sample) was responsible for 36.2 percent of all reported delinquent acts in the three study neighborhoods (figure 2). This same small group committed close to one-fourth (20.5 percent) of all juvenile assaults in the three neighborhoods (figure 3). Fighters, by contrast, committed only 10.6 percent of juvenile assaults. The data also showed that robbers on average assaulted 12 people each year (about 6 times as many as the fighters).

As shown in figure 4, boys in the robber category were responsible for close to half (44 percent) of all drug deals committed by boys in the study sample during the 6-month period preceding the study. The robbers also committed almost half (44 percent) of all property crimes completed by boys in the sample during the same time period.

Drug dealing. In examining patterns of delinquency, the LINC study found that most boys involved in selling drugs were less violent than those engaged in other criminal activities. Consistent with prior research, the study also found that many different types of youth (as opposed to any one stereotypical drug dealer) are involved in selling drugs (Chalken and Johnson, 1988).

While the dealers, as noted above, reported committing assaults infrequently, property offenders/drug dealers reported being very active offenders, with each on average committing more than 55 delinquent acts during the 6-month period preceding the interview. This group, however, committed approximately 50-percent fewer assaults than the fighters and approximately 60-percent fewer assaults than the dealers.

The category responsible for the greatest number of violent crimes in the study neighborhoods was the property offenders. These boys—who do not deal drugs but are involved in theft, auto theft, vandalism, and other property crimes—represented about one-third (31.9 percent) of all boys interviewed and reported committing, on average, eight assaults or other violent crimes each year. While the property offenders committed fewer crimes on average than the robbers (most of whom commit more than 80 each year), they outnumber the robbers by about 4 to 1 and therefore, as a group, commit many more acts of violence. In addition, property offenders as a group were found to commit a total of about twice as many property offenses as the property offenders/drug dealers.

18 Note that this section describes findings on all boys who reported dealing drugs (whether dealers, property offenders/drug dealers, or robbers). The "dealers" category, by contrast, includes boys in the sample whose only reported criminal activity was drug dealing. Therefore, even though most robbers reported being very active drug sellers, they are considered robbers rather than dealers, because their reported criminal activity involves a whole spectrum of crimes, including robbery.
from their peers. More than half (52.6 percent) agreed with the statement, "I usually keep to myself because I am not like other people my age." The most seriously delinquent boys were most likely to agree with this statement, with 77 percent of the robbers agreeing or strongly agreeing with it and none strongly disagreeing. By contrast, less than half (41.4 percent) of the fighters agreed with the statement, and 20 percent strongly disagreed. Although adolescents typically have concerns about fitting in, the robbers seemed to have more extreme concerns.

**Gang membership.** While stories about gang wars dramatically portrayed by the media may suggest that gang membership is rampant in high-crime neighborhoods in the United States, only 15 percent of boys in this study reported ever having joined a gang. The likelihood of joining a gang was somewhat higher for the more delinquent boys. Less than 9 percent of the good kids and the fighters had ever joined a gang, compared with one-third of the robbers. Dealers were also likely to have been gang members, with 30 percent reporting gang membership at some time.

Consistent with findings in other cities, this study showed that gang membership in the three neighborhoods examined lasted a relatively short time (between 1 and 2 years) (Loeber, Huizinga, and Thornberry, 1996). Of the boys who reported ever having joined a gang, only 4.2 percent reported still being members at the time they were interviewed.

The study also found that neither the length of time that a boy belonged to a gang nor any current gang membership was related to the seriousness of delinquency, if any, that the boy was committing. Robbers were no more likely than less delinquent boys to be current gang members.

Although studies in other cities suggest that boys commit more crimes when they belong to gangs (Thornberry and Burch, 1997), this study found that boys who were still gang members at the time of their interviews committed essentially the same number of assaults and other crimes in the weeks immediately before the interview as did nongang members.

**Substance abuse.** Notwithstanding a widespread belief that drug use is high among all adolescents who engage in delinquent behavior, the use of illegal drugs (other than marijuana) has played little part in the pattern of delinquency among youth in the District. The use of crack or heroin was rare among boys in the study sample, as it is for youth in other cities across the Nation (Riley, 1997). None of the boys interviewed reported ever having used psychedelics or hallucinogens, crack or any other type of cocaine, or heroin. Only five boys (2.3 percent of the sample) reported having tried phencyclidine (PCP or "angel dust"), tranquilizers, or barbiturates. One boy stated that he had taken amphetamines, and one reported prior use of an inhalant (such as aerosols or glue). These findings are consistent with research findings around the country (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1997).

Although LINC found that few boys in the sample used illegal drugs other than marijuana, it found that a relatively high proportion used alcohol and/or marijuana. Approximately 30 percent of the study sample reported drinking beer or wine without adult permission, 18 percent reported drinking hard liquor without adult permission, and approximately one-third reported using marijuana.

Alcohol and marijuana use was found to be much more prevalent among seriously delinquent boys (table 2). Only 7 percent of the good kids and 7 percent of the fighters reported drinking hard liquor without adult permission, compared with 12 percent of the property offenders, 30 percent of the dealers, 39 percent of the property offenders/drug dealers, and 60 percent of the robbers. Overall, a greater number of boys reported drinking wine or beer without adult permission than hard liquor, and once again, the more delinquent boys were more likely to do so. Slightly more than 10 percent of the good kids and fighters, approximately one-third of the dealers and property offenders, and more than half of the property offender/drug dealers and robbers reported drinking beer or wine without adult permission.

Similarly, marijuana use was reported by 11 percent of the good kids, 27 percent
of the property offenders, 70 percent of the property offenders/drug dealers, and 80 percent of the robbers. The dealers reported the greatest use of marijuana, at 90 percent; the fighters reported the least use, at 7 percent.

Although the study generally found a strong association between using hard liquor or marijuana and committing delinquent acts generally (with boys who used hard liquor committing a significantly greater number of all types of delinquent acts, including violent crimes, and those who used marijuana committing more property crimes and drug deals), it found no such relationship between the use of marijuana and the commission of violent crimes. Marijuana users, for example, reported committing more assaults, on average, than the boys who did not use marijuana, but these differences were not statistically significant.

The LINC study also found that drinking alcohol (of any type) without adult permission or using marijuana increased a boy's likelihood of getting a girl pregnant. Slightly more than 12 percent of the boys interviewed said that they had impregnated a girl. Of these, 58 percent reported having used marijuana. Marijuana users were more than twice as likely to get a girl pregnant as nonusers: by their own report, 8 percent of the nonusers and approximately 20 percent of the users had been responsible for a pregnancy. Findings for boys who reported drinking beer or wine without adult permission were almost the same as for boys who reported using marijuana. Nineteen percent of those who had used beer or wine without adult permission (and only 9 percent of those who had not) were responsible for a pregnancy.

The likelihood of getting a girl pregnant was even greater for boys who drank hard liquor. Although less than 9 percent of those who did not drink hard liquor reported getting a girl pregnant, 28 percent of the boys who drank hard liquor were responsible for a pregnancy.

Considering the different delinquency categories of boys in the study sample, dealers were the most likely to cause a pregnancy (30 percent responsible for a pregnancy), closely followed by property offenders and robbers (27 percent of boys in these groups responsible for a pregnancy). Fighters, the least likely to drink, were also the least likely to report having gotten a girl pregnant (only 7.3 percent reported being responsible for a pregnancy).

### Supervision and Activities

The Urban Institute's previous analysis of youth crime focused on when and where offenses by DC youth were taking place (Gouvis, Johnson, and Roth, 1997). LINC's analysis, by contrast, sought to understand the nature and extent of supervision received by boys in areas where youth crime was relatively rampant and determine what policy implications arose from the study's findings on supervision. In considering how boys in the study sample were occupied during and after school, LINC examined activities that the boys participated in and programs available to them through schools and youth-serving organizations in the community. LINC's findings on supervision and activities are presented in the following sections.

**Adult supervision after school.** Boys in the study sample reported having adults in their lives who care about them and want to be there for them. Ninety-two percent reported having an adult other than a parent who cares "a lot" about them, and more than one-quarter (28 percent) named a caring adult in their lives (other than a member of their immediate family) as the adult to whom they felt closest. For most, this adult was either a godparent or a member of the boy's extended family (e.g., a grandparent or other close relative). The next most frequently mentioned person was an adult acting as a mentor. Several boys named leaders in local youth organizations as caring adults.

Notwithstanding the presence of caring adults in their lives, boys in DC are most likely to encounter violence—as either offenders or victims—during the hours immediately before and after school (Gouvis, Johnson, and Roth, 1997). LINC's findings, based on its interviews of boys in the study sample, suggest one probable cause for violence during these hours: lack of adult supervision. In particular, LINC found that the vast majority of boys (75 percent) spend the after-school hours unsupervised by an adult 1 or more days each week, and almost half (48 percent) never receive adult supervision during the after-school hours.

The relatively few boys who reported being supervised by an adult every day after school (23 percent of the sample) tended to be less delinquent than those who received little or no adult supervision.

### Table 2: Percentage of Boys Who Reported Using Hard Liquor or Marijuana, by Delinquency Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delinquency Category</th>
<th>Percentage Who Drank Hard Liquor</th>
<th>Percentage Who Used Marijuana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good kids</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property offenders</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property offenders/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug dealers</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbers</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in the afterschool hours. Forty percent of the good kids—as opposed to 20 percent of the robbers—were supervised by an adult every day after school.

For boys in the study sample, spending the afterschool hours in a location known to their parents or guardians was even more important than spending that time with an adult present. Of the good kids, only 8.7 percent reported that their primary caregiver rarely or never knew where they were during the afterschool hours. By contrast, 15 percent of the fighters, 18 percent of property offender/drug dealers, 22 percent of property offenders, 30 percent of the dealers, and 33 percent of the robbers reported having primary caregivers who rarely or never knew where they were during that time period.

**Afterschool activities.** Boys in the study sample reported participating in different types of afterschool activities. LINC considered the relationship, if any, between participation in these activities and the likelihood that a boy would become involved in delinquency.

**Athletics.** Fifty-two percent of boys in the sample reported participating in sports during the afterschool hours. The sports most frequently mentioned by boys were football (35 percent participated) and basketball (17 percent participated). The study showed no relationship, however, between participation in these or any other sports and the likelihood that a boy would become involved in delinquency. In other words, good kids, fighters, dealers, property offenders, property offenders/drug dealers, and robbers were equally likely to participate in athletic activities.

Participation in school sports appeared to have one positive effect. The number of drug deals made by boys participating in sports was significantly lower than the number made by nonparticipants. Football players, in particular, were less likely to sell drugs than boys who did not play football, with 19 percent of football players and 29 percent of nonfootball players reporting that they sold drugs. On the other hand, delinquent boys who played school basketball reported committing, on average, almost four times more property crimes than those who did not play school basketball and twice as many delinquent acts overall as nonbasketball players. While less involved in drug dealing, football players reported committing, on average, approximately twice as many property crimes as boys who did not play football. Although football players reported committing more assaults than boys who did not play football, the differences were not significant.

**Music groups.** Approximately 10 percent of boys in the sample reported participating in a school band or choir during the afterschool hours. Good kids were slightly more likely to participate in these activities than the more delinquent boys: approximately 17 percent of good kids participated, compared with 10 percent of fighters and dealers and 6 percent of property offenders. No difference in rates of assaults, drug deals, property offenses, or overall delinquent acts was found based on a boy’s participation in band or choir.

**Clubs that focus on building cognitive or social skills.** Almost one-quarter (23.5 percent) of boys in the sample reported participating in clubs or other organizations that focus on building cognitive, social, or vocational skills. These groups included math and computer clubs, radio and television broadcast clubs, cooking and catering clubs, art and drama clubs, and groups that concentrate on promoting civic responsibility and providing community services (such as Concerned Black Men and student government organizations).

Several studies have demonstrated that afterschool activities designed to increase students’ cognitive or social skills and provide opportunities for community service are effective at preventing delinquency (Lipsey, 1992; Sherman et al., 1997; Tolan and Guerra, 1994). In examining the effect of these activities and the types of boys who participated in them, LINC found that good kids were not significantly more likely to participate in these activities than boys in the other delinquency categories. LINC also found, however, that boys involved in these clubs reported fewer delinquent acts, with participants committing, on average, approximately five times fewer property crimes and six times fewer delinquent acts. Boys involved in these activities also reported committing fewer assaults on average, but participation was not found to be a statistically significant factor in such lower rates of assault.

**Activities available through schools during school hours.** Many cities that have experienced an increase in youth violence have implemented school-based violence prevention programs. According to adolescents in the study sample, however, very few or no such programs exist in their neighborhood schools. When asked if they knew of school programs or services designed to help students solve problems without violence, approximately two-thirds answered “no.” Of the one-third who reported knowing of such a program, about half (16 percent of the total sample) either could not identify a specific program or named a program that no one else identified.

Approximately 6 percent of those boys who knew of a violence prevention program mentioned the Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) program and substance abuse programs such as DARE. A

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8 Like the relationship between employment and delinquent behavior (see footnote 13), the study draws no conclusion as to whether the relationship between playing football or basketball and committing property crimes is coincidental or causal.

9 For reports on different types of school-based violence intervention programs, see Violence in American Schools (Elliott, Hamburg, and Williams, 1998).
small number of boys mentioned programs run by particular counselors or teachers, peer programs, conflict resolution programs, and mediation. The study found no relationship between boys' identification of school-based violence prevention programs and their level of delinquency.

Suspension and expulsion. Although youth crime peaks in the afterschool hours, school hours in DC are also a prime time for violence, according to The Urban Institute. This has not been true in other cities (Snyder and Sickmund, 1995). Violence during school hours, The Urban Institute found, may not necessarily occur on school grounds, but in areas surrounding schools (Gouvis, Johnson, and Roth, 1997).

Findings in LINC's study indicate that high rates of suspension and expulsion in DC schools may be contributing to high rates of violence during school hours. The majority of boys in the sample (76 percent), for example, reported having been suspended from school at least once. Even among the good kids, more than half (57 percent) had been suspended at least once. All of the dealers and almost all (91 percent) of the property offenders/drug dealers had been suspended at least once.

Expulsion rates were also high in the three study neighborhoods: more than 20 percent of the boys interviewed reported having been expelled from school. In addition, LINC found a strong association between expulsion and delinquent behavior. Although only 8 percent of the good kids and 12 percent of the fighters had been expelled, 40 percent of the dealers and 40 percent of the robbers had been expelled.

For the 6-month period prior to the interview, the number of delinquent acts reported by boys who had been suspended was, on average, more than three times that of boys who had never been suspended. The boys who, at the time of the interview, said that they were not in school reported committing, on average, more than four times the number of delinquent acts during the preceding 6 months as did the boys who were attending school at the time of the interview.

Activities available through youth-serving organizations. According to written materials provided by youth-serving organizations, many such organizations in DC focus on delinquency prevention and skill building. An update of the 1994 Resource Directory of Youth Services in the District of Columbia (updated by ILJ for this study) lists more than 50 organizations in or adjacent to the three neighborhoods examined in this study (table 3). Almost half of these organizations described themselves as providing services for delinquency prevention or intervention, and approximately 30 percent specified approaches for supporting the development of life skills, parenting skills, and other skills found to prevent delinquency. Only 24 percent of the boys in the study sample reported participating in the activities or programs of any such community organization.

LINC also found that community centers and youth service agencies in the District are failing to engage adolescent boys in afterschool activities. Although these centers and agencies constitute approximately one-half of the youth services agencies listed for the neighborhoods in which the boys lived, less than 4 percent of the boys said that they had participated in activities provided by a DC community center or youth agency.

Eighty percent of boys in the study sample were unable to name a single neighborhood organization with programs designed to help youth solve problems without resorting to violence. Less than 4 percent named a community center or city youth service organization. Although the resource directory lists several churches and other religious organizations in each of the three neighborhoods, only 1 percent of the boys named a church group. The organization identified by the largest number of boys (9 percent) was the Boys & Girls Club.

According to the boys' responses, affiliates of national youth organizations (such as Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Boy Scouts of America, the National 4-H Council, and Big Brothers Big Sisters of America) reached a substantially greater proportion of boys than purely local, community-based organizations. Affiliates of national youth organizations may have been a local affiliate of a national youth-serving organization at some time in the past, whether the organizations were affiliated with a national organization or not. For example, the organization named by the most boys (27 percent) was the Boys Club. However, unlike those in other cities (that are affiliated with the national organization), some Boys Clubs in DC are independent and share only the name—and not the programs, services, or staff training—of the national organization. Moreover, at the time of their interviews, only 14 percent of the boys were still Boys Club members.

In recent years, major national youth organizations, including Boys & Girls Clubs and others discussed in this section, have developed programs tailored to reaching youth in inner-city areas and providing them with the types of opportunities that
organizations.

The information is based on programs launched in the DC area are de-
derating with them (Chaiken, 1998b). Areas when police are responsive to coop-
are more likely to operate safely in these areas, rather than cooperating with them (Chaiken, 1998b).

Efforts of nationally affiliated organizations launched in the DC area are de-
scribed below. The information is based on written materials submitted by the organizations.

♦ Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater Washing-
aton has provided outreach programs in
five DC Club locations and in housing
developments located in neighborhoods
with high poverty and crime rates. Pro-
gams provided by these affiliates of the
national organization include Keystone
Clubs (designed to present opportuni-
ties for teen boys to develop productive
leadership skills) and, until DC funds
were cut, Smart Moves (a delinquency
prevention program for younger adoles-
cents that is firmly grounded in research
on adolescent development).

♦ U.S. Department of Agriculture 4–H
and Youth Development Service, one
of the first national organizations to
base programming for at-risk youth on
research on adolescent development,
provides skill development programs for
teens in schools located in high-crime
areas. While funding was available, it also
sponsored project HIPS (Helping Indi-

dividual Prostitutes to Survive), an out-
reach program for teen prostitutes that
included a 24-hour hotline and a van
sent out on weekend nights (from 10 p.m.
to 6 a.m.) to provide vital information
about available services.

♦ Boy Scouts of America, National Capital
Area Council, has made an effort to re-
cruit boys from kindergarten to grade 12
attending schools in underserved neigh-
borhoods. Through this new outreach—
and longstanding programs such as
Learning for Life—the local Boy Scouts
council provides important opportuni-
ties for youth to develop social skills.

♦ Big Brothers of the National Capital
Area sponsors “Bigs in Blue,” a volun-
teer program in which DC Metropolitan
Police officers serve as Big Brothers for
at-risk children in the District.

Barriers to Delivery of
Youth Services

In analyzing data collected from admin-
istrators and staff of youth-serving organi-

zations, LINC found two primary barriers
to the effective delivery of youth services
in the District: a lack of coordination be-
tween the DC local government and youth-
serving organizations/agencies in the area
and an excess number of inactive coalitions
intended to head efforts to improve youth
services in DC.

The “Comparative Analysis” section
below discusses other barriers to the ef-
fective delivery of youth services by com-
paring DC with other cities and evaluating
how well the District is delivering services
and programs to youth.

Lack of coordination. In Washington,
DC, the LINC study found, local govern-
ment agencies are involved in very few
coordinated efforts to address the prob-
lems of juvenile crime, delinquency, and
violence. LINC’s analysis showed that juve-
nile justice and other local government
agencies in nearby Northern Virginia and
suburban Maryland are working closely
with local youth organizations in those
areas, but that DC’s government agencies
are trying to provide youth programs
themselves, rather than cooperating with
youth organizations experienced in pro-
grams and services to youth.

LINC found that the DC Metropolitan
Police Department (MPD) staffs eight of
its own Boys Clubhouses. These clubs are
maintained through grants and other non-
profit funding sources, but salaries and
benefits of officers working at the clubs
are paid by the MPD. As DC’s budget
shrinks or suffers cuts, services such as
these—dependent on local funds—will
shrink or disappear as well. As part of this
study, ILJ conducted a survey of youth ser-

found, 15 percent of the services available
in 1994 (92 out of 620) had vanished.

Inactive coalitions. This is not the first
study to recognize a lack of collaboration
among DC agencies and organizations. Re-

spondents in interviews carried out by
LINC as part of this research, in fact, com-
monly mentioned that they, the Federal
Government, and various other national
organizations had separately sponsored
coalitions or task forces to spearhead ef-
forts to pull youth-serving organizations
in DC together. Because many agencies and
organizations sponsoring coalitions in DC
have been unaware of one another’s efforts,
DC has many coalitions, each with a rela-
tively small number of participants and
most of which have failed to produce ef-

fective action plans. In addition, LINC
found, these coalitions often duplicate
one another’s efforts and goals.

For example, the Office of Justice Pro-
grams (OJP) in 1993 funded a limited num-
ber of cities to form coalitions to prevent
violence. Coalitions formed include the DC
Pulling American Communities Together
(PACT) Project, which brought a subset of
DC agencies together to discuss gaps in
services and design a strategic plan for
addressing those gaps. A high priority of
DC PACT was “to coordinate resources
and share information on local and federal
anti-violence efforts” (DC PACT, Undated).
Join Together, a Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation-funded project that was
founded in 1991 and is based in the Boston
University School of Public Health, was
formed to help communities bring about
concerted action to prevent violence and
substance abuse. With additional funding
from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, DC has been one of Join
Together’s local cities. Kids Count, funded
by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, was
designed to support communities around
the Nation, including DC, to measure and
report on the status of children (including
their involvement in violence and drug
use) in order to promote public action on
behalf of children locally.

Although the efforts of PACT, Join To-
gether, and Kids Count have resulted in
highly visible coalitions and concerted
strategies in places other than Washington, DC, few administrators interviewed in DC knew about these three organizations' approaches, and none of the respondents were aware of more than one of the approaches. Staff involved in bringing these approaches to fruition in DC found the experience disheartening because of key agencies' unwillingness to cooperate.

**Comparative Analysis**

**Process**

After analyzing the data collected from boys in the study sample and from youth-serving organizations, LINC compared its findings with those of studies of youth crime and responses to youth violence in other cities. At the time of the DC study, the author was involved in research on youth programs and violence prevention in several cities around the Nation. Twelve of these cities (each of which had been the subject of previous research) were selected for comparison. Three (Arlington, TX; Bristol, CT; and Spokane, WA) were selected by a panel of experts for their exemplary approaches to youth crime and violence prevention; four (Eureka, CA; Pocatello, ID; Rapid City, SD; and Redding, CA) had been involved in an ongoing partnership of law enforcement agencies and researchers sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ); and five (Beaufort and Summerville, SC; Philadelphia, PA; and Salinas and San Jose, CA) were cities in which a new violence intervention project (VIP) had recently been piloted by the Girl Scouts of America and evaluated by LINC. The approaches to preventing youth violence and furnishing safe places for youth during the after-school hours that were used in these 12 cities provided an instructive contrast to the approaches employed in DC.

The comparison was carried out with two questions in mind: (1) whether the relatively high rates of youth violence in DC were attributable to differences in patterns of delinquency among DC boys; and (2) whether the high rates of youth violence were a product of the way that DC organizations have dealt with children, especially adolescent boys.

Patterns of youth delinquency in different cities have been the subject of criminological inquiry for more than 50 years. Research in the area has included seminal studies in Denver, CO (Huizinga, 1998), Philadelphia, PA (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972), Pittsburgh, PA (Browning and Loeben, 1999), and Rochester, NY (Thornberry and Burch, 1997). As discussed above, the fundamental patterns of delinquency among DC boys are very similar to those found among boys in other cities. For example, most DC boys reported committing at least some minor acts of delinquency involving defiance of authorities (such as drinking alcohol without adult permission). As findings in other studies have also shown, some DC boys were delinquent fighters but limited their criminal offenses to occasional bouts of aggression. Like boys in other cities, a relatively small proportion of DC boys were the most delinquent in terms of the seriousness, spectrum, and number of crimes they committed.

Given the similarities between boys in DC and boys in other cities, LINC considered whether the role of DC agencies and organizations could be a factor in the higher rates of violence among DC youth.

**Discussion**

In completing its comparative analysis of findings in this study and findings in studies of the 12 cities listed above, LINC concluded that several obstacles stand in the way of DC's effective delivery of youth services. As a result of these obstacles, DC adolescents at the highest risk of violence and delinquency may not be receiving necessary support and services. In particular, LINC's comparative analysis revealed two barriers to the effective delivery of youth services in DC: insufficient involvement of Federal agencies and local businesses and an excess number of unaffiliated and uncoordinated organizations.

**Insufficient involvement of Federal agencies and local businesses.** LINC found that in other cities, major industries and big boysel business executives play an important part in meeting local needs— including those of youth (Chaiken, 1998b). Responding to increases in juvenile violence and crime, for example, business leaders in other communities have taken steps to ensure that the causes of the violence are understood and that measures for preventing violence and delinquency are undertaken (Chaiken, 1998b). Many have donated their time and skills or provided incentives for staff members to work with youth-serving organizations in roles ranging from serving on local boards and commissions to volunteering at local schools to leading after-school programs at community centers (Chaiken, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).

The Federal Government is the District's major industry. LINC's study found, however, that although Federal employees and elected officials may live in the District and possess valuable leadership and organizational skills that would be of help to community-based organizations, many are not personally involved in any youth-serving or other civic organizations in DC.

Several rationales have been offered by elected officials and Federal employees interviewed about this lack of involvement. Congressional leaders and staff make clear that their primary responsibility is to youth in their own States, not children in DC. Federal employees suggest—correctly or incorrectly—that there is an implicit conflict of interest in providing personal attention to organizations that may receive Federal funds for youth activities. Others say their role is to serve all of the Nation's children—rather than those in a particular city. Others offer the justification that attempts by Federal employees to bring about change in DC would be resented as interfering with home rule. Yet, from a comparative perspective, the major difference between Federal agencies and private industry is that the latter realizes an economic benefit from actively promoting strong programs for youth. In cities such as Arlington, TX, chief executive officers (CEO's) in private companies point out that by solving youth problems and reducing crime, their companies have a competitive advantage in recruiting the best and brightest employees to move to and live in the local area. They also realize that local high-quality after-school programs that attract and supervise adolescents allow employees with school-age children to work without interruptions and more productively during the hours when school is not in session. CEO's also view the good will generated by encouraging employees to play active roles in delivering services to youth as a form of capital investment.

**Excess number of unaffiliated organizations.** In many cities, the majority of organizations serving youth are members or affiliates of larger "umbrella" organizations (see, e.g., Chaiken, 1998b). For example, a city may have a large number of Boys & Girls Club programs, all of which operate under the aegis of a regional office of the Boys & Girls Clubs of America organization. Moreover, in cities such as Arlington, TX, and Spokane, WA, there is a high degree of coordination among the various umbrella organizations. Together, the organizations carve out niches of expertise, plan services to ensure that...
school-age children in all parts of the city are served, and provide a selection of interesting and educational activities for young participants to choose from. Affiliates also cooperate in citywide assessments of children's needs and support one another's fundraising activities. In cities such as Bristol, CT, these organizations work with the police department and the schools to identify youth who are getting into trouble because they are unsupervised; together, these groups have developed a plan to ensure that the identified youth are brought into at least one organization and are involved in skill-building activities.

In DC, no such cooperation is taking place. Organizations have not carved out different areas of expertise to address the multiple needs of children in the District. The ILJ update of the 1994 directory of services showed high turnover of organizations receiving funds to provide youth services. In interviews for this study, administrators in unaffiliated organizations made clear that they found it impossible to carve out a niche of expertise. To continue to exist, administrators explained, organizations needed to shift missions when funding was lost and when additional funding became available.

Program funding, LINC found, appeared to be based on hunches about the needs of children in the District rather than a common base of research. Some administrators, for example, knew about the DC Kids Count program; most did not. Some administrators described certain programs proudly as preventing delinquency by building self-esteem or through athletic activities, even though a growing body of research suggests that such programs are not effective (Tolan and Guerra, 1994). In addition, DC funding was cut for the nationally affiliated Boys & Girls Clubs' Smart Moves programs, even though these programs include components shown to reduce delinquency.

Policy Implications: What Can Be Done for Boys in DC?

Providing Early Intervention

Although the youngest boys in the sample were on average the least delinquent, some very young boys (13-year-olds) reported seriously delinquent conduct. Such conduct—together with a marked increase in the seriousness of delinquent conduct as boys get older—demonstrates a compelling need for early intervention. Many cities have met this need by offering proven programs such as Head Start and providing parenting classes and home visits to youth at high risk of delinquency (Chaiken and Huizinga, 1995).

Providing Structure and Supervision

Because of the high incidence of violence committed by or against youth during afterschool hours, many communities have focused on providing supervision and structured activities—especially for children at high risk for violence—during that time period (Chaiken, 1998b). The six recommendations below would address specific concerns relating to the lack of supervision for boys in DC during the afterschool hours.

- Bring boys under control of responsible adults. In many cities across the Nation, juvenile violence is declining (Poe-Yamagata, 1998; Fox and Zawitz, 1998). A growing number of researchers and policy analysts agree that the decline is largely attributable to concerted community efforts to bring adolescents under the control of adults who have the authority to:
  - Make and make known clear and specific rules for behavior.
  - Make and make known clear and fair sanctions for breaking these rules.
  - Apply these sanctions immediately to those who violate rules.
  - Make other youth aware of when and why particular sanctions have been applied.

- Channel energy into productive activities. Many cities have moved beyond simply controlling delinquent behavior to channeling the energy of youth into productive activities—including crime reduction activities. Under the supervision of adults skilled in guiding them, young people are taking the lead in projects such as neighborhood cleanups, vandalism and graffiti removal projects, Neighborhood Watch programs, community pride days, and cross-age tutoring and mentoring programs for younger children (Chaiken, 1998b). Recent research shows that participation in these activities reduces teen pregnancy and substance abuse more than standard educational approaches to delinquency reduction (Allen et al., 1997). Caring adults—parents, other caregivers, and staff in local unaffiliated youth organizations—provide a tremendous potential resource for controlling and guiding youth.
A growing body of research, however, also shows that not all afterschool programs are effective at preventing violence and delinquency (Tolan and Guerra, 1994). In fact, sports, one of the most widely provided afterschool activities for adolescent boys, was shown to have little or no positive effect on violence or other forms of delinquent behavior. Rather than focusing on athletic activities, therefore, policymakers may want to provide programs shown to be effective at reducing delinquent behavior (for example, programs intended to teach cognitive skills).

In attempting to channel youth's energy in a positive direction, policymakers should also aim to convince DC boys that their earning power in the long run will be higher if they pursue legal money-earning activities in their spare time. By doing so, DC may be able to use the boys' strong economic motivations as an incentive for positive rather than antisocial behavior. In Redding, CA, for example, police officers have capitalized on boys' economic motivations by giving groups of youth "COPS dollars" when they complete projects to improve their neighborhoods. Endorsed by local merchants, COPS dollars can be redeemed at restaurants and other businesses popular with community youth. As a result of this program, boys in blighted areas who used to hang out and get into trouble are removing litter, clearing up vacant lots, and creating play and recreation areas for themselves and younger children. Judging from their willingness to approach officers and ask what needs to be done in return for COPS dollars, boys—in addition to the police, businesses, and other residents—favor this approach.19

Adjust police patrols. Another action that DC may take to reduce violence and delinquency during afterschool hours is increasing the number of police patrols during the hours that area schools release students. Although one additional patrol car is not likely to have a major impact on levels of afterschool violence, several officers walking the streets and talking to students as they leave school have been effective in other cities. In Eureka, CA, for example, a growing number of assaults involving youth (including drive-by shootings near one school) were essentially eliminated after the police department appointed an experienced officer to serve as a school-based youth/ethnic liaison officer. During school hours, this officer works in partnership with administrators, counselors, and teachers to reduce truancy and other harmful behavior through a combination of teaching, counseling, and coordinated case management. During school breaks and before and after school hours, the officer patrols the streets surrounding the school and stays in radio contact with school staff monitoring school property and nearby areas.20

Other cities' patrol plans have involved not only the police, but neighbors, local business owners, and youth organizations, in an effort to minimize the chance that releasing large groups of students into the community at the same time each day will result in fights or violence (Chaiken, 1998b). Steps taken in other cities include having adults with police walkie-talkies patrol streets near schools each day during arrival and departure times, keeping students engaged in constructive afterschool activities, and transporting students directly home following these activities (by which time children's parents or other caregivers will have returned home from work) (Chaiken, 1998b).

Involve national organizations. A survey of seven national youth-serving organizations revealed that such organizations are reaching significantly larger numbers of children at high risk of violence and delinquency in cities other than DC (Chaiken, 1998b). According to the survey, nationally affiliated organizations in other cities are providing constructive activities at the very time children are most at risk for violence in most parts of the country—the afterschool hours. Increasing the involvement of the many local chapters and affiliates of national youth organizations in the District is essential to reducing youth violence and delinquency in DC.

Involve local organizations. As the Nation's Capital, Washington, DC, is home to numerous private foundations, firms, Federal agencies, and universities that have spent large sums of money on research, demonstration projects, and evaluations focused on determining what works and what does not work in preventing juvenile violence and delinquency and promoting the healthy and safe development of youth. In fighting violence and juvenile delinquency, the DC community needs to tap into the knowledge, experience, and resources of all of these organizations and enlist their support and active involvement in providing structure and supervision to youth.

Address needs of expelled and suspended students. As a result of high rates of suspension and expulsion in DC, large numbers of boys are released into the community without supervision. Without supervision and structured activities, many of these boys are committing delinquent acts. Both to protect the community and to meet the needs of expelled and suspended students, parents, school administrators, government agencies, and youth-serving organizations in DC need to explore ways to deliver safe and meaningful activities to these students during school hours. In cities such as Pocatello, ID, and Eureka, CA, youth who are removed from traditional classrooms because of disruptive behavior are placed in alternative classes with fewer students and with teachers specifically trained to address behavior problems. Rather than allowing students to wander the streets unsupervised, these communities are providing increased supervision. In Pocatello, the community is also securing and seeking the enforcement of injunctions that prohibit students from gathering together outside a school setting during school hours.

Applying Swift and Sure Sanctions

As shown by LINC's study, a small number of youth in the three DC study neighborhoods are responsible for a large proportion of the crime and violence. To combat youth violence and crime, authorities need to apply swift and sure sanctions to the city's most serious juvenile offenders. These offenders need to be identified and informed of the sanctions for specific categories of delinquent behavior (both for themselves and for any "crews," gangs, groups of friends, or other individuals who act as accessories). In addition, because serious offenders should be sanctioned immediately after committing delinquent acts, the cumbersome process of handling juveniles in courts and corrections must be streamlined.

An immediate and substantial response by the criminal justice system to delinquent acts can effectively control serious offenders' worst behavior. In Boston, MA, for example, Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies have worked together to crack down on illegal gun markets, and local agencies have made a concerted effort to identify and control the city's most violent youth (including gang members). As a result of these efforts, escalating rates of youth violence dropped precipitously. To
carry out a Boston-type effort and get serious juvenile offenders under control, DC will need the same cooperation among community groups, law enforcement officers, and juvenile justice agencies that took place in Boston and surrounding communities (Kennedy, 1998).

This type of community action presents an opportunity for DC and its police department to reorganize immediately—and for a cause that is likely to enjoy the community's full support. It also creates an opportunity for Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the U.S. Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation, to act as partners in support of the MPD. At the same time, it allows researchers who have studied effective approaches in other cities to provide practical advice to policymakers about the resources, tactics, and personnel needed to apply swift and sure sanctions to the small number of serious and violent juvenile offenders in DC. By sending a clear message that violence and the use of weapons will not be tolerated and applying sanctions immediately for delinquent acts, DC may encourage its most serious juvenile offenders and their friends to pursue noncriminal activities.

### Reducing Gun Violence

Strategies for reducing youth violence involving guns include making guns safer, making them less available, and influencing how youth use them (Mercy and Rosenberg, 1998). Although the first strategy requires technological advances, recent research has revealed a promising measure for reducing gun availability (and, in turn, reducing the number of fatalities and injuries resulting from fights or incidents involving guns) (Kennedy, 1998). Recent research has also revealed a way to affect teens' willingness to stop carrying guns. These measures are described below.

**Identify and shut down suppliers.** Working with local police departments in a number of areas, including DC, ATF has traced guns being used by youth and found that in most cities, guns are being supplied by a limited number of out-of-State gun dealers (Kennedy, 1998). Once identified, some gun suppliers have been closed down. Continued collaboration with ATF is well advised.

**Enlist the boys' help in reducing gun use.** A substantial body of research reveals that in violent neighborhoods, boys carry guns for protection primarily because other boys or men carry guns (Mercy and Rosenberg, 1998). To break this cycle of violence, policymakers need to convince boys that if they stop carrying guns, others will do so too. In neighborhoods such as Arlington, TX, youth workers have found that teens are most likely to stop carrying guns when they are involved in the process of deciding when and where police will enjoin weapon carrying, how the prohibitions will be monitored, and what sanctions will be applied for violations (Chaiken, 1998b).

In cities such as Boston, MA (Kennedy, 1998), New York, NY (Bruce Johnson, National Development & Research Institutes, Inc., 1997, personal communication), and Redding, CA, groups of boys previously involved in violence were informed by police and other juvenile justice agencies of steps that would be taken to control the entire group if any boy in the group violated any gun laws. Such crackdowns rapidly led to self-policing on the part of formerly violent groups—and a rapid reduction in the number of gun fatalities in those cities (Kennedy, 1998).

### Improving Coordination

**Between government agencies and private organizations.** Realizing that, under the current organizational structure in DC, no single agency can deal with the many aspects of youth development and the many causes of delinquency, government agencies in the city, including schools, the police department, and child welfare and protective services agencies, should work together and reach out to private organizations to address problems collectively (Chaiken, 1998b). Representatives from these agencies and organizations, as in other cities, could come together to propose and implement coordinated action plans to help both individual children in trouble and small groups of children who may be experiencing or causing problems in their neighborhoods or schools. The combined expertise of representatives from different organizations serves children and their communities well.

**Among local affiliates of national organizations.** Affiliation with national organizations sustains access to proven programs and materials designed by youth development professionals and evaluated by researchers. Executive directors of affiliates of national youth organizations typically work together on an ongoing basis to define the niche that each will fill (Chaiken, 1998b). Although they may not share specific program materials, organizations often share space, keep one another informed of emerg-

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21 Data collected by LINC as part of NIJ grant SS-U-CX-0047.

### Conclusion

As reflected by this study's findings, violence by juveniles in DC is far from random. Regular patterns exist as to where and when it takes place and what types of boys are committing violent acts. These patterns are essentially the same as those found in other cities—including many that have made major strides in reducing juvenile violence in a relatively short period of time.

With resources equal to or greater than those of cities that have implemented effective juvenile crime prevention programs, Washington, DC, should look to the success of other cities and begin implementing similar programs for its own youth. Beginning in the most violent neighborhoods, DC should develop an action plan for bringing delinquent boys under control. With violence and crime in these areas controlled, the city could then work on a more comprehensive strategy for delinquency prevention and youth development. Any such strategy, however, will require the concerted efforts of a variety of community members and organizations. Only by coordinating efforts—across agencies, organizations, schools, and even neighborhood lines—will DC address and eliminate the most serious patterns of delinquency and control the most delinquent youth.
References


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