Using qualitative and interpretive methodologies, this dissertation analyzed Richard Courtney's writings to interpret his basic ideas on learning through drama. It focused on later writings (1989, 1990, 1995, 1997) in which Courtney distilled ideas he had been working on for as many as 30 years. It approached Courtney's texts using dramatistic metaphors which concretized his predominantly abstract writings. These metaphors focused on finding the basic elements of a drama: the setting, the act, the actor, and the Other. Through the lenses afforded by these metaphors, the thesis examined Courtney's wide-ranging, eclectic and often imprecise ideas to distill major themes. Courtney used notions like metaphor, symbol, ritual, Being, mind, perspective, oscillation and quaternity with apparently shifting definitions and loosely circumscribed meanings. It collected and analyzed Courtney's meanings recursively, both distilling Courtney's meanings and expanding them through concrete hypothetical examples. Courtney wrote about drama in abstract terms, using notions he had garnered from other disciplines to describe the process of learning through drama. The final construction that emerged in this dissertation represents the experience of the actor/learner: it is concentric, radiating from a nub which represents the feelings and imagination of the actor. Radiating circles represent the actor's metaphoric thinking, taken here as a cognitive approach to perspectival understandings of self and others, in an existential form of learning. This construction has implications for research and education. It refers to the many dramas that take place in living interactions. It is a construction for understanding and facilitating the learning processes which take place in the dynamic interactions between people, and which inform personal awareness and understanding. Contains approximately 675 references and 24 figures. Appendixes contain sample pages from Courtney's bibliography, sample letters from him, and a photograph of Courtney. (Author/RS)
Sponsoring Committee: Professor Margot Ely, Chairperson
Professor Robert Landy
Professor Joanne Griffin

THE PLAYER AND THE PLAYING: AN INTERPRETIVE STUDY
OF RICHARD COURTNEY’S TEXTS ON LEARNING THROUGH DRAMA

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Program in Educational Theatre
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Education New York University 1999
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Drama is transformation…
When we change, we learn.
(Courtney, 1995, p. 11)

Richard Courtney has made a unique contribution to drama education by attempting to formulate the learning process inherent to drama (McLeod, 1982; Trent, 1987; Heikkinen, 1997). In this dissertation I interpret Courtney’s conceptual framework for learning through drama through analysis of his texts. The central research questions posed are:

What does an analysis of Courtney’s writings reveal about how he posits that learning occurs through doing drama?

Using the results of this analysis, what is the conceptual framework about learning inherent in Courtney’s works?

The analytic process in this dissertation has been qualitative and interpretive with the objective of clarifying understanding of Courtney’s texts in response to the research questions. The final chapters deal with Courtney’s own authorial voice.

Courtney (1995) considered a dramatic act a form of inquiry. For Courtney, drama occurs in all human action in which there is a “willing suspension of disbelief”: on the stage; in social interaction (Goffman, 1959; Burke, 1952, 1968); in society’s dramas and rituals (Geertz, 1983; Turner & Bruner, 1986; McLaren, 1986; Turner, 1992); on psychological levels (McDougall, 1991; Bolas, 1992); in education (Courtney, 1968a; Heathcote, 1984), and in therapy (Moreno, 1973; Landy, 1982).
Drama takes place in each of these fields of activity, but it is the field of drama education which assumes that drama is a tool for learning (Courtney, 1968a; Heathcote, 1984). Research in drama education has been catalyzed recently by the establishment of international conferences, institutes and a journal, at Griffith University and the University of Exeter, *inter alia*. This has energized qualitative approaches and reflexive analysis. Some believe “there has never been a better time for researching our own drama workplaces” (Errington, 1996, p. 23). Nonetheless, researchers indicate that basic questions have never been resolved. Educators lack a common vocabulary to discuss the learning process, or to critically approach concepts of sequence, progression and evaluation for drama education (O’Hara, 1996). This hampers dialogue among researchers, especially in non-English speaking countries (Heikkinen, 1997). Drama education research has documented the qualitative experience of drama projects (Vrazel and Hoffman, 1991; Taylor, 1992; Edmiston, 1991; Grady, 1995), but little has been done to explicate how learning takes place through drama. This lack of foundation for learning has meant that “wisdom that has been so painstakingly gathered by the pioneers… has often been lost or scattered… (without) building systematically on our community’s acquired knowledge” according to a British drama education researcher (Somers, 1996).

Previous studies of learning through drama have borrowed organizing frameworks from the “established disciplines of pedagogy, psychology and sociology”, without a framework for drama’s own learning mode (Rasmumssen, 1996). Drama education has also turned to external political agendas for a structure through critical research (Carroll, 1996). Another proposed framework for drama education lies in theatre studies (Cooper, 1996), but even here the complexity of the process has hindered “a critical language which can deal with such variety” (Read, 1993, p. ix.), or which can recognize performance as a genre apart from narrative or literature (Courtney, 1970; Turner, 1986; Schechner, 1988; Grimes, 1990). Drama teachers have expressed “…a pressing need… to formulate a curriculum theory” (McLeod, 1985). O’Hara (1996) argued:
The temptation must be resisted to become complacent and blinkered about what essentially are the crucial, fundamental and underpinning thorny concepts and problematic issues which remain at the heart of the drama teaching enterprise. These have not changed very much over a very long period, despite fragmented research activity, nor indeed is there any substantial evidence that these issues have been scrutinised, analysed or formulated into proposals, and followed through as research projects. Landy (1995) [sic] encapsulated the leading issues... as ‘what does one learn and how does one learn through drama?’ (p. 274)

These questions appeared in Landy’s (1975) dissertation. Landy’s research was inspired by Courtney’s (1968) book *Play, Drama and Thought*, as were the questions he asked: What does one learn and how does one learn through drama? These questions, also raised by O’Hara, have been carried forward in my work, traceable to the influence of Courtney on Landy and on myself. Landy (1998) recalled

These are essential questions. My sights were larger than just drama, just like Richard’s. I was thinking about how human beings learn and what’s important for them to know. I was making the assumption, as I think Richard did, that learning through drama was a way of learning that’s larger than any notion of literature or dramatic structure or dramatic criticism—that it’s about the mind and how the mind works. So the question how does one learn and what does one learn through drama points to a method of learning that is probably an essential factor of the human mind. [Interview]

Courtney pursued the question of learning through drama without exclusively addressing the practice of drama education which deals mainly with drama in the
classroom. Courtney’s work stems from and addresses a broader range of disciplines, many of which I discuss here.

For example, learning through drama has a basis in Dewey’s “learning by doing”, aesthetic education, progressivism, and studies of sociodramatic play (Smilansky, 1968; Erikson, 1972; Eden, 1988; Weininger, 1988). Scholars have studied the dramas of education (McLeod, 1988; Taylor, 1992; McLaren, 1993), but Courtney has been the most persistent and prolific in trying to understand the many facets of drama as a learning process (McLeod, 1982; Trent, 1987) rather than a teaching process. Courtney described himself as an “existential phenomenologist of human action” (personal communication), and frequently employed the term “dramatic metaphor” to explain how learning takes place. Courtney’s use of the term “dramatic metaphor” has roots in a broad range of ideas, drawing from Eliade’s (1971, 1987) notion of symbolic actions, Kenneth Burke’s (1952, 1968) dramatistic theory, George Herbert Mead’s (1932, 1938, 1964) philosophy of the act, and ideas about symbolic interaction (Turner, 1986). Landy (1998) agreed that

he was trying to do something the philosopher Kenneth Burke was trying to do, understand meaning in terms of the dramatic metaphor which is probably more than a metaphor. Maybe it’s a methodology. Something deeper than a metaphor, a deeper structure. And I think that’s what Burke was trying to get at, I think that’s what all philosophers try to get at, the deeper structures involved. [Interview]

Courtney also relied on ideas from the social sciences (Mead, 1964) and literature (Bakhtin, 1981; Pavel, 1986) when he wrote that drama is scientific, in that a dramatic act is an hypothesis, a “fiction to test actuality” (1995). He believed that the “as if” imagination--acting as if a scenario were true--is a primary mode of learning for all ages.

Courtney called for a philosophy to encompass the complex and multivocal nature of drama (1968b, 1970). He also adopted the term
developmental drama to describe the study of drama as a tool for learning and
development. Courtney's formulation of developmental drama drew from a range
of existing disciplines which use drama as a metaphor--anthropology,
ethnography, education, semiotics, philosophy and aesthetics. Courtney's project,
however, was to make drama itself the basic discipline. He wrote (1995) that
graduate studies in developmental drama should include the types of learning he
associated with drama: intrinsic (awareness, expression, creative problem-solving,
inventiveness, confidence and self-worth, motivation, and transfer); extrinsic;
aesthetic (felt-responses, discrimination); emotional; artistic; and social--"the
dramatic experience is a living exemplar of Buber's I and Thou." (p. 178). This
summary of Courtney's proposed curriculum did not provide unifying concepts of
drama, but a list of separate areas which pertain to drama. Several graduate
programs in Canada (University of British Columbia, University of Victoria,
University of Calgary) set up this kind of study, with dissertations that assumed
Courtney's notion, that drama is a transformational and learning process. But little
has been done to discuss what exactly the implicit and unifying concepts in
Courtney's writings are.

For the twenty years during which Courtney supervised doctoral
dissertations at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, students produced
qualitative studies that assumed drama is a learning process. However, they did
this without discussing the basic framework of how people learn through drama.
Colleague Joyce Wilkinson attributed this to the difficulty students have had in
formulating a context with which to frame Courtney's work (personal
communication, 2 October 1998). Courtney's work has also posed difficulties
because of its eclectic and intellectual orientation, an approach particularly
distinct from drama in the US which is mostly oriented toward a theatrical
product. He drew from contemporary thinking in philosophy, psychology and
semiotics, shaping actions through the lens of "life as drama" to understand the
social and personal learnings experienced through drama. While referencing the
wide range of theatrical metaphors used in other disciplines, such as anthropology
and sociology (Turner, 1992; Burke, 1968; Goffman, 1959), he attempted to place the field of drama at the center of these ideas instead of at the periphery. He accomplished this through a critique of the work of others as well as his own radical restructuring of dramatic vocabulary. Without having distilled his work into a conceptual framework, he attempted to create a dramatic orientation.

In his 1975 dissertation Landy discussed Courtney's ideas about drama “to stress a potential strength in a presently unclear conception of the dramatic imagination.” (p. 24). Landy posited that an analysis of Courtney's writing might lead to a “more fully developed conception of dramatic education.” Since then, Courtney's published writings number over one hundred. In 1996 Ross reintroduced the issue in Great Britain: “On the analogy with language learning we might develop a theory of learning in drama” (p. 49).

In the US some researchers and advocates for the arts have recently expressed an urgent need for revivifying arts education, for “securing a humane future for our children” (NEA, 1996) because “to lack an education in the arts is to be profoundly disconnected.” The nationwide initiative for arts education in the US holds that the arts develop “diverse modes of thinking and learning” (NEA, 1996). Yet, the project's benchmarks are defined as behavioral outputs, such as executing certain acting exercises (New York State Education Department, 1996). There does seem to be a discrepancy between arts teaching “to achieve full potential as human beings” and the way it is being implemented. It is this gap--between an assumption that arts, including drama, provide significant holistic learning, and the concepts employed to implement it--that was to be addressed by the field of developmental drama, which focuses on the learner's experience. If the arts are to be valuable to education, investigation is needed of how people learn through the arts, including drama. “The understanding of what the arts contribute needs a clear, well founded explanation” (NEA, 1991, p. 1).

At this juncture when educators and researchers are calling for a more focused study of how people learn through drama as well as through other artistic forms, this study has made use of existing material by studying Courtney's texts
and interpreting his conceptual framework of how people learn as actors in the processes of drama.

A Brief Biography of Richard Courtney

The following material is largely based on conversations with and notes from Courtney himself, including an unpublished manuscript of one of Courtney’s autobiographies, *The Last Polymath* (1996b) except where otherwise specified. Born in 1927 in Newmarket, Suffolk, England (Blythe-Barnard, 1997) to a working-class family, Richard Courtney early acquired a sense of his own value from his adoring mother. Courtney also developed a taste for histrionics from an intimidating schoolmaster grandfather, and a stoic appetite for work from another schoolteacher, his father (personal communication, October 1996).

Courtney’s father provided Courtney with a lifelong example of manhood, which may have contributed to Courtney’s ultimate end. Having developed gangrene in the war and refused amputation, the elder Courtney suffered stoically throughout his life with the help of his daily bottle of whiskey. Courtney, remembering his father’s life of pain, disdained acknowledging the many physical ailments which eventually besieged him. Courtney suffered his final heart attack while working at his computer, and continued to work, only to pass away when he later took a nap (personal communication, Rosemary Courtney, September 1997).

Despite humble beginnings, Courtney’s alleged intelligence brought him a scholarship to an upper class school, where nonetheless his excellent mind could not save him from the weekly humiliation of coming in last in the cross country races. He recounted how the other boys, showered and changed, cheered on while he, very chubby and panting, struggled to the finish line. His outsider role probably contributed to his advocacy of drama to help those “populations whose
self-worth is being attacked by being alienated by others and society…the disadvantaged and the highly creative” (Courtney, 1995, p. 33). He also landed a desk job during the war because he was seen as a “genius.” Courtney obtained a Bachelor’s degree at Leeds University, where he became director of the theatre group. He acted, directed and designed for the stage, including work with the BBC, but ultimately followed in his elders’ footsteps as a teacher. Although Courtney had performed and directed to acclaim, the artistic profession proved insufficiently remunerative for a young father.

Courtney adopted drama education as his specialty. Burton (Foreword in Courtney, 1996b) described Courtney in the 1950’s as a “master drama teacher who developed ‘drama across the curriculum’ in secondary schools in Yorkshire.” Courtney also created the Youth Theatre and numerous school theatres in Britain, and specialized in “residential educational drama courses for deprived teenagers in the Midlands.” These included daily after school programs of improvisation organized by the youngsters themselves, as well as full scale productions. As an instructor in arts education at Trent Park College, Courtney began a lifelong collaboration with Bishop Burton, who like Peter Slade served as a drama advisor in public schools and instituted drama education as an undergraduate course at Trent.

Courtney moved to Canada in 1967 to become a professor at the University of Victoria, and later Calgary and Toronto—though he had never earned more than a Bachelor’s degree. Perhaps in lieu of a dissertation, Courtney’s publication Play, Drama and Thought (1968) had been hailed by some as “(changing) the thinking of a whole generation of educators, particularly those in drama and the arts” (Warwick Dobson in Courtney, 1995b). Courtney established Developmental Drama as a degree program at the above-mentioned universities. During the turbulent 1960’s Courtney became the focus of political chaos at “U.Vic” where students demonstrated to retain him on the faculty despite general opposition from his own peers, many of whom had been imported from the US. Courtney progressed from his posts of drama instructor at Universities of
Victoria and Calgary, to heading graduate work in arts and education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, while cross-appointed to the Graduate Centre of Drama, University of Toronto. He brought with him Developmental Drama, his ponderous bibliography, controversial reputation and apparent charisma as a leader in the field of drama education. Courtney was introduced at an international conference with the words: “Introducing Richard Courtney in Canada is much like introducing Billy Graham in the United States--it is an overwhelming experience!” (Burton in Courtney, 1996b).

Courtney’s encounter with the US began in 1968 when he spoke at the Awards Meeting of the American Educational Theatre Association (Courtney, 1996c). This led to cooperation between the University of Victoria and the University of Washington, in exchange meetings and workshops. In the fall of 1969 Courtney began “Developmental Drama Revolving Workshops” with his wife and others, traveling up and down the West Coast for years, collaborating with US theatre associations and performing in Canada and the US. Courtney became a founding member of the National Association of Drama Therapy. Among his associations with leaders in arts education, Courtney was President of the Canadian Child and Youth Drama Association and of the Canadian Conference of the Arts during the 1970’s. Courtney worked alongside David Rockefeller and Alwin Nikolai as a member of the Board of American Councils of the Arts (1980-1984) and chaired the Task Force on Arts and Education in Canada in the 1980’s. Courtney delivered a series of television programs in New York on drama and education (1980). He was also invited for summers at the Aspen Institute to meetings of leaders in the arts, and spent time consulting in New Mexico, including two sabbaticals with Native Americans. His list of US engagements also includes a keynote speech for the National Association for Drama Therapy in San Francisco (1988) and a seminar at the Kennedy Center in collaboration with Robert Stake (1984). Other international engagements brought him to Australia, the South Seas, Europe and Asia (Burton in Courtney, 1996b). Among them was Courtney’s invitation from UNESCO to address the Theatre of
Nations in Bulgaria (1987) where he spoke on the relationship between Native American drama and the origins of tragedy.

Courtney moved to Salt Spring Island in the 1990’s, a place where his wife could find silence and his daughter, in terminal stages of pancreatic cancer, felt prepared to die. Relatively isolated by several days’ travel from anywhere, Courtney was no longer able to walk or travel due to his own physical ailments. He devoted himself to writing. In his last years Courtney continued to work on six projects at a time, sustained by some 60-100 medicinal supplements a day. But he refused to see himself as a sick man. When he died he had recently installed an elevator in his home so that he could visit his downstairs library of allegedly 10-20,000 books.

During his life Courtney was controversial--sometimes revered, sometimes hated. Courtney’s “overwhelming” and perhaps ambiguous performance as a man is over, but his writings remain, concrete evidence of who Richard Courtney was. However, no one had analyzed these works before the present dissertation. There seem to be a number of reasons for this. First of all, Courtney’s writings seem to assume an intellectual background that others in his field did not apparently share, in its wide range and demanding reading. His writings rely on his “enormous reading in philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, folklore, theatre, science, education, criticism, literature, and the humanities” (Burton in Courtney, 1996b), areas that few people in this era of specialization encompass. Courtney did not usually indicate which of the ideas he wrote about were his own and which came directly from other sources. It seemed to me, in my study of Courtney’s writings, that he was willing to take credit for whatever he could. In the following dissertation I traced a number of Courtney’s ideas to other sources. I have alluded to instances in which Courtney borrowed, took or appropriated others’ ideas—sometimes in verbatim form. But since Courtney’s own wording was often ambiguous, these actions were not obviously plagiarism. Where I concentrated more specifically on tracing such borrowings, in Chapter XI, the case seems to be clearer. Courtney never gave
precise definition to his own contribution, and was not particular about how others interpreted him (personal communication, December 1996). He intimated that he welcomed any exposure.

Perhaps another problem in analyzing Courtney's work, as described by Bishop Burton (Courtney, 1996b), is that it was theoretical--"in a different logical class--taking his practice upwards, as it were, to the principles underlying his work." In this respect Courtney's approach was unique for drama and seems not to have been digested by other writers in his field. In taking this approach Courtney may not have always been responsible, but he was daring. His aim was not precision but proliferation, and he worked as if this were true, often publishing his own books or paying for their publication (personal communication, December 1996).

According to my own study of Courtney, I suggest that another problem with Courtney's writings is a style which seems to be deliberately opaque. Courtney's self-conscious style could be characterized as British and classist, deliberately complicated and intellectual. Courtney seemed to believe (personal communication, December 1996) that this kind of writing voice facilitated his being taken seriously. In the following dissertation I have interpreted Courtney using a writing voice more characteristic of recent thinking in the US. I have deliberately chosen down-to-earth explanations to demystify Courtney's texts. For example, I point out that words like signifier and signified, which permeate Courtney's writings, are merely analytic categories which can be applied to anything, even the antics of Edina Monsoon in the British sitcom Absolutely Fabulous.

What do Courtney's writings tell us about Courtney himself? What exactly did Courtney have to say to us? What did he intend to say, and what can read about him from his writings? My study of Courtney has revealed to me some sharp contradictions between the ideas Courtney discussed and his approaches to disseminating them. These contradictions would seem to explain the controversy he engendered among his peers. While intellectually bold and often ostracized for
his contributions, Courtney did not further his own cause by exemplary ethics. Furthermore, his writing voice conveys his contradictory nature. For example while Courtney admired and borrowed from Bakhtin's (1981) notions of dialogue, in many ways Courtney's personal voice was diametrically opposed to dialogue. The comparison between Courtney's and Bakhtin's approaches occurred to me early in my analysis, but I did not include it in this dissertation because of the complexity involved in my primary task, that of distilling Courtney's precise contribution. I did suggest some of the contradictions in Courtney's work—the nature of his methodical madness is suggested in Chapter IV, where I discussed his elusive stance, fluctuating opinions and disregard for effective communication with his audience. Courtney's moral relativism emerges in Chapter XI. These suggestions, however, do not comprise the basis of my argument. In general I have not so much judged Courtney in the following pages, as tried to explain his message. That task was sufficient for one dissertation. The metaphor I used for my task, when discussing Courtney's work with him, was that I had to "wrestle his material to the ground." Courtney agreed, and chuckled.
CHAPTER II

RELATED LITERATURE

Courtney’s work on learning through drama relied on a broad range of literature, some of which is discussed in this chapter. Other relevant literature is woven into the body of the dissertation. This chapter addresses related work in aesthetic education, the arts, psychology, anthropology, sociology, theatre and drama education, which frame Courtney’s writings.

One of the avenues for Courtney’s investigations into learning through drama was the field of aesthetic education. In 1970, Courtney critiqued Langer’s aesthetic philosophy, charging that she had not adequately dealt with drama. Among Courtney’s last published books was a summary of his thinking over the years on “an aesthetic theory of drama and feeling as modes of thought” (1995, p. 19). For Courtney, drama activates the aesthetic mode (1990), teaching a “deep, rather than a surface level of meaning” (p. 26). Aesthetic education has provided other educators, presented here, a forum for discussing learning through the arts. They have been colleagues or sources for Courtney in his thinking on drama (1970, 1990, 1995).
Education and the Creative Act of World-Making

Aesthetic education posits that learning occurs through the creation of, and appreciation of, artistic worlds—"the creative act of world-making" (Collingwood, 1938; Greene, 1978; Courtney, 1990; O'Neill, 1995; Ross, 1996). Drama itself "invokes the basic, world-making principle of the agon" (Ross, 1996, p. 48), referring to the classical Greek form. Aesthetic education, by definition, recognizes that the arts provide a unique way of learning (Ross, 1981). In the act of creating an aesthetic world, the creator is also a learner. The arts provide knowledge of both the objective world, and the inner world of feelings (Witkin, 1974). "The images of art work on us directly, and in their own way. They do not depend for their aesthetic significance on their relationship with some... idea outside themselves" (Ross, 1981, p. 155). Learning through the arts is a holistic process. It occurs inwardly in the mind and imagination, rather than outwardly on the stage or canvas (Collingwood, 1938).

John Dewey (1934), who based his educational philosophy on children interacting with and making sense of their environment, proposed arts education for the sake of personal experience, choice and action. For Dewey art is by nature educational, "a device in experimentation carried on for the sake of education" (McDermott, 1973, p. 325) for "the primary root of all educative activity is in the instinctive, impulsive attitude and activities of the child, and not in the presentation and application of external material." Children learn through "numberless spontaneous activities, plays, games (and) mimic efforts" (Dewey in Courtney, 1980, p. 2). During the 60's, the educational movement of cognitivism succeeded behaviorist theories by addressing intuitive and analytical thinking, heuristic strategies, inductive learning sequences, differentiated states of consciousness, and intrinsic motivation (Bruner, 1979; Geahigan, 1992), steps toward an expanded view of learning. Although cognitivism became "fractionated and technicalized" (Bruner, 1990) by the influence of information processing and computers, certain legacies remain. Philosophical reflections on the cognitive
value of the arts, as articulated by Philip Phenix, Paul Hirst, and Harry S. Broudy (p. 11), anticipated Gardner's work on multiple intelligences (1993) by positing different kinds of learning and intelligences, and the role of the arts in intellectual development. However, these ideas did not gain prominence in mainstream education, in which the dominant paradigm for learning is information processing (Bruner, 1990).

In the 70's researchers such as Robert Stake (1975) studied art as education. Stake saw the arts as a way of "bringing our life back into contact with our culture, making it a living culture once again" (Ionesco in Esslin, 1966, p. 298). Stake developed a "responsive approach" to qualitative inquiry, studying individual expression to understand intrinsic learning rather than "the payoff." Robert Witkin (1974) worked on a conceptual framework for aesthetic learning. He believed the arts tap an "intelligence of feeling", in which "emotional and perceptual dispositions join rational presuppositions" (p. vi) to construct meaning. Witkin, along with Dewey, saw learning as adaptation--making sense of the outer world in subjective terms. "If the price of finding oneself in the world is that of losing the world in oneself, then the price is more than anyone can afford" (p. 1). The arts invoke feelings, essential for development, "The personal development of the pupil is really the whole raison d'être of arts curricula" (p. 49).

A more recent study on aesthetic learning (Ross, 1993) was based on talking with students about their art. The findings attributed generally underdeveloped aesthetic learning to the valorization of rationality and the predominant view that aesthetic learning is "wrongly believed to be purely and simply private and feelingful, and not to involve the public processes of thought, reflection and evaluation" (p. 57). Bruner (1979) pointed out that learning through the arts is often feared, because art speaks in "a grammar of metaphor, that defies the rational methods of the linguist and the psychologist" (p. 74).

Elliot Eisner (1972), like Langer (1957), wrote that art is a cognitive activity. For Eisner, art provides visionary human experiences, transforms the personal into a public form, activates our sensibilities, and provides material for
“our human potentialities” (p. 12). The artist is frequently also a social critic. Courtney also considered the aesthetic mode as a form of cognition, a definition he traced back to Kant (Courtney, 1995; Cassirer, 1981) and which is also found in Dewey, Best and Reid (below), to whom he referred beginning in 1968. This definition locates the aesthetic in everyday life, involved with judgments and discriminations used in all types of thinking.

David Best (1989) recognized the rationality of emotional experience through the arts, and in all learning. In a radical departure from the frequent mystification of the arts, Best argued that educators err by accepting positivism as the only legitimate knowing, resorting to “unintelligible metaphysical realms” to justify the arts (1996, p. 41). The arts are social and public, reflecting one’s “philosophy of mind, and of language” (p. xv). Best (1996) echoed drama educator Peter Slade’s words of 40 years earlier, saying: “It is surely only too clear how urgently needed, yet widely ignored, is such education of the emotions” (p. 52).

Louis Arnaud Reid (1989) also wrote about holistic learning, which he saw as personal meaning-making: “truth is a function, or attribute, or quality, of the mind’s living cognitive apprehension of the world. Let us use the metaphor of ‘prehension’ or cognitive grasping” (p. 13). If learning is always personal, then the arts provide a natural form of learning. Reid (1985) wrote that the “deep desire to find form in the welter of ... chaos is one of the most fundamental facts about intelligent human nature. And the delight in form, the discovery of relative cosmos from relative chaos is... an aesthetic delight” (p. 145). Art provides “acquaintance-knowledge”, following Bertrand Russell’s term, which involves “the cognitive, conative and the affective aspects of experience... functioning together” (Reid, 1985, p. 136). Artistic learning also involves doing. That is, for Reid, art does not come from a preconception. Rather it is a process both of the artist’s interaction with materials, and of the viewer’s personal encounter with the work. Thus, the language of the arts has come to be seen in terms of personal constructs, negotiated among various participants. Courtney’s view of dramatic
actions as learning constructs connects Reid’s thinking of the interactively constructed meaning of art forms to the even more interactive form of drama. These writers also posited that arts learning bridges the Western dualism between affect and cognition. This has implications for certain kinds of thinking and learning, according to recent scientific research (Goleman, 1995; LeDoux, 1996) and studies of epistemological development (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Findings in these studies indicate that affect is involved in ethical and sometimes higher level thinking. Drama therapy works directly with the blending of affect and cognition, where one can “see feelingly” (Landy, 1982, p. 113), as the blinded Duke of Gloucester sees in King Lear. One kind of affect-laden thought is found in symbols. A psychiatrist found that “the living mythological symbol (is) an ‘affect image’” perceived by feelings, that does not rely on interpretation by the mind (Campbell, 1972, p. 88). Beyond Kant’s aesthetic is the notion that images--symbols--are used for thinking and learning (Cassirer, 1946, 1953). Cassirer’s student Langer wrote extensively on symbols in the arts (1942, 1953, 1957). Symbols have since permeated the social sciences (Burke, 1968; Geertz, 1970, 1973, 1980, 1983). Fernandez’s (1986a, 1986b) study of ritual showed that people need images, or symbols, to construct whole meanings, to learn and to “deepen our participation.” For Courtney (1995) symbols and metaphors are essential to learning through drama--drama’s metaphors bring a symbolic understanding of reality (1990, p. 10)--just as metaphors are essential to thinking (Lakoff, 1983). Courtney (1995) wrote: “To think adequately (that is, to be intelligent) is to be skillful with the feelings inherent in symbols” (p. 28).

Courtney considered drama empowering, especially “for those populations whose self-worth is being attacked by being alienated from others and society”, including both the disadvantaged and the highly creative (1995, p. 33). For Maxine Greene (1978, 1995) it is imagination that empowers individuals. If teaching and learning can occur through an active imagination, instead of through passive reception, “A space of freedom may open up... a power to choose” (1987, p. 48). A lack of the arts results in limited or degrading self-perception, or a
“constriction of consciousness, a deformation of thinking and feeling” (p. 64), in more deprived schools.

These writers have developed various perspectives on how people learn through the arts, linking affect and cognition, the notion of personal constructs, and an active, exploratory form of learning. Their pedagogical values involve interaction and dialogue, rather than the “banking” concept in education (Freire, 1994), as does drama (Courtney, 1990, p. 33). Courtney made connections with these ideas that expanded ways of talking about drama.

All the World’s a Stage: Development Through Drama

Courtney’s work elaborated upon the traditions of Peter Slade, E.J. Burton, Brian Way and others discussed here who saw drama as a tool for development. Courtney’s most successful book (1968a), now in its fourth printing (1989), was an ambitious survey of the historical connections between drama and education. *Play, Drama and Thought: The Intellectual Background to Dramatic Education* shows the influence of these pioneers of drama education.

Educational drama since Peter Slade (1954) has been seen as a way of “making connections... rooted in models of the arts as integrated, socially and personally significant fora for experiencing through involvement and through witnessing” (Trowdale, 1996, p. 90). Slade compiled anecdotal observations of children doing drama in countless educational settings (1954). As a drama advisor to British public schools, he told teachers to observe spontaneous games like “running play”, and to watch “creation taking place.” Like Rousseau (1917), Slade blamed adults and society for the failure of a child; for Slade, education lies in the personal experience of students. Drama is not pretense, but an experience of sincerity and absorption.
Some of Slade’s more radical thinking opposes conventional learning theory, such as his ideas of Personal Play and Projected Play. Projected Play (1995) is the earlier stage of playing with external objects, which later becomes intellectual play with the “three Rs” (p. 3). Use of external objects is for Slade an inferior stage, compared to Personal Play, which uses the whole body and self as in sports and performance. Unlike most learning theories which consider personal enactment as preceding use of tools, Slade saw enactment as a more advanced stage of play because it yields the “Experience” which can never be taken away (p. 3). Slade privileged experience over intellect, the “whole self” over cerebral activity, and interaction over the isolated individual, the more current model. These ideas are closer to those of his contemporaries, for example Montessori (1964), than to educational currents today. Equally unconventional is Slade’s Inflow/Outflow concept. For Slade, early childhood is a time of Outflow—creative self-expression, until “the Dawn of Seriousness”, a will to learn, occurs. Thus, for Slade, self-expression precedes information gathering, and is always a prerequisite for it. Knowledge, once taken in, must also be tried out—exercised by the body and feelings through drama. The current climate that privileges information processing, following a computer model, is directly opposite to Slade’s ideas.

Slade also reinterpreted catharsis as a tool for development, considering drama an emotional education: “It offers continual opportunities for playing out evil in a legal framework … training in the emotions is one thing that has been lacking above all else” (1954, p. 73). For Slade, drama is not a single teaching method, but a way of understanding learning principles. Slade’s work was radical even for the progressive movement (Bolton, 1984). Progressivism advocated “allowing the child to generate much of the curriculum according to his creative needs” (Abbs, 1981, p. 105). However, this movement saw drama as a performance. Slade saw drama as a tool for development. Slade overlapped with Courtney’s early work, providing a major influence in the directions Courtney
would take regarding the deep connections between spontaneous drama and education.

Bishop E.J. Burton, Slade’s contemporary, also observed children learning spontaneously through drama. He saw drama as a therapy linked to a total philosophy “which brings together human potential in a completed experience.” Burton believed knowledge emerges from our actions, particularly in play or drama. Burton was a “theistic agnostic” (Courtney, 1989, p. 60) who believed in trusting the unknown to bring new significance or learning, just as modern psychology understands how learning is fed by the subconscious. “Imagination works from the known to the possible,” revealing through drama that which is imperfectly known by the mind. Burton was also a drama advisor to British schools, and wrote of the difference between “life as lived and life as analysed”, anticipating issues of qualitative research in drama. Burton’s dialogues with Courtney have been compiled in an unpublished manuscript (1996a).

Brian Way’s Development through Drama (1967) provided a best-selling manual on drama education, with the philosophical premise of developing people, not dramas. “Education is concerned with individuals; drama is concerned with the individuality of individuals, with the uniqueness of each human essence” (p. 3). For Way, drama is for developing intuition, not intellect. Intuition is essential for a rich life, but it requires training, like Spolin’s (1963) system of improvisation as training for spontaneity and intuition.

In the US, drama education was pioneered mainly by Winifred Ward (1930, 1957), Geraldine Brain Sikis (1958) and Nellie McCaslin (1990) who established creative dramatics for the classroom. Ward extended Dewey’s ideas of learning by doing to learning by dramatic doing. Creative dramatics differed from British classroom drama by working toward a theatrical product. Some critics have observed that privileging product over process has handicapped drama work in the US (Landy, 1975). An Australian noted “The growing use of simulation and gaming techniques (which are often a form of dehydrated, pre-
packaged drama) in social education programmes... is another example of the American influence in this country” (Stevenson, 1978, p. 13).

Drama as Education

Courtney’s inquiry was into how learning occurs through drama (personal communication), exploring different aspects from different perspectives: psychological, social, philosophical. Other researchers in drama education have made specific observations on their understanding of the learning process in drama. Drama expands “the parameters of what can be seen as legitimate knowledge”, allowing freedom to “experience and explore the issues of human concern and intellectual enquiry” (Carroll, 1988, p. 21). Drama is a site for constructing subjectivity (Misson, 1996), which operates “at the nexus of intelligence and emotion. Thought is given the actualising charge of feeling, while feeling is refined and strengthened by thought” (p. 11). Experimentation and rehearsal of a repertoire of behaviors is the work of constituting a self. Drama also requires empathy; understanding the feelings of others one learns to cope with life (Trinder, 1977, p. 38). Bolton (1984) considers drama as an ‘unselfing’—making the subjective objective. It is a way of objectifying one’s personal meanings.

Bolton, like other drama educators, discussed “metaxis”, which means the actor in role as a living metaphor. This seems to approximate Courtney’s term “dramatic metaphor”—drama is an expression of metaphoric activity (Courtney, 1990, p. 10). Metaxis is defined as “the state of belonging completely and simultaneously to two different, autonomous worlds: the image of reality and the reality of the image” (Boal, 1995, p. 43). This ambiguous state is in fact one of the underlying assumptions of drama therapy (Landy, 1982, 1996; Jones, 1996). If metaxis means belonging to two different worlds, this is also true of metaphor. Rituals are metaphoric performances (McLaren, 1993; Fernandez, 1977, 1986; Sapir & Crocker, 1977). A ritual performed in the present repeats an act which
occurred in mythical time (Eliade, 1954). The ritual action is a living metaphor for a sacred act located in mythical time, giving meaning to ordinary actions located in ordinary time—and enhancing the mythical meaning with sensory experience (Turner, 1974). An actor onstage evokes timeless themes with an ordinary act, by referring to a mythical theme. The idea of actor as metaphor appears throughout theatrical history, as recorded in many of Shakespeare’s plays—"life is but a poor player, who struts and frets his hour upon the stage."

Anthropologists use the metaphor of drama to describe how “social actions of various kinds acquire form through the metaphors and paradigms in their actors’ heads”—that people act according to the dramatic scripts of their own conceptual frameworks (Turner, 1974, p. 13). Thus, the “unpacking of performed meaning” (Geertz, 1983) through social science research means penetrating layers of performance. It also describes what Courtney, throughout his writings, referred to as the double, the phenomenon of existence on two levels at once, which Courtney said confers significance to human action (1990). The idea of double layers of reality corresponds to work of Ricoeur on metaphor (1979). It also has application in the human sciences. Psychology studies how people play roles in imaginary scenarios while acting in real life; in drama therapy, ‘what is fictional is also real’ (Jones, 1996, p. 10). For Geertz (1973) and Turner (1974), religion exemplifies the double. Religion is life in the ordinary world being understood in an ideological realm, reinforced by the sensory feedback from the immediate experience.

Drama’s Voice in the Classroom

Courtney’s work in drama education began with drama used in a classroom setting. Yet, even in the classroom, the basic assumptions of drama practitioners seem to be increasingly challenged by the changing educational climate. These obstacles to the practice of drama educators have been one reason
why they have been calling for a deeper understanding of education through drama.

In Great Britain, where drama has been reported to be the most popular art form in schools, Ross (1996) observes it is often being absorbed by other functions and disciplines in an environment which privileges short term cognitive goals and rote learning. Drama is sometimes perceived as being a branch of literature; often it is too “issues” based or used as an instrument for other subjects or for performance “at the expense of much of the best post-Slade, post-Way era” (p. 42). Ross deplored that by making arts teaching utilitarian, teachers fragment lessons by “intervening at every point ... to conform to their particular teaching objectives” (p. 44). These misguided practices rob drama of its “fundamental principle of artistic world-making... the sustained and concentrated play of feeling and imagination essential to the creative process.” Ross would replace the existing “theories of pseudo-education in drama” with a “theory of education in drama proper” (p. 44). Like O’Hara, Ross pointed out that basic questions about the process have not been solved. “For all its popularity with students, drama may not yet be fulfilling its singular promise in adding its own distinctive voice to what the philosopher Michael Oakeshott called, ‘the conversation of mankind’” (p. 41).

**Drama’s Other Stages**

Courtney’s early work was with classroom drama and improvisation, while his later work included ritual as performance, developing a broad definition of drama in social and psychological terms. He drew on these other disciplines to discuss drama as human action, and how learning takes place using tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1962) and various levels of awareness (Courtney, 1982b; 1995). Various social scientists have described the dramas of human life as discussed here.
A number of psychologists have researched dramatic play in children, considered an early mode of learning. Erikson (1972) called the play of a child "the infantile model of the playwright's work" (p. 133). Dramatic and socio-dramatic play, during which children learn and teach each other, are different from games which teach rules, competition and achievement. Researchers have found the absence of dramatic play detrimental to normal development (Smilansky, 1968, 1990a, 1990b; Winnicott, 1971; Piers, 1972; Murphy, 1972, Weining, 1988). Adults use drama to enact their imagined scenarios, either pathologically or to heal themselves (Johnson, 1981; Hillman, 1983; McDougall, 1991; Bollas, 1992; Moreno, 1973)—a means of learning for coping and survival. Jungian therapy uses 'theatrical logic'—"to understand the dreaming soul from within" (Hillman, 1983, p. 37). Theatrical logic means thinking in role--becoming rather than contemplating (Jung, 1959). Theatrical logic is knowledge by acquaintance. It deals with Being, for, as British critic Charles Morgan said, theatre is "the enveloping movement of the whole drama on the soul of man. We surrender and are changed" (Morgan in Geertz, 1983, p. 28).

Winnicott (1971) wrote about children playing with a transitional object that substituted for the mother, imaginative role play. This creative substitute is the beginning of culture—the child creates a cultural space, located between subjectivity and objectivity, which is essential for learning about life. For Bollas (1987), that space is aesthetic, and inherently transformative--its language is "the freedom of metaphor" (p. 15), making it inherently dramatic (Courtney, 1968a, Schechner, 1993). Drama transforms the actor, who then lives in a different role (Evreinov, 1970; Schechner, 1988). To create characters and action is to actualize one's learning in the world, expanding the self and experimenting with volition.

Emigh's (1996) study of mask dramas in Asia, and Schechner's study of performance (1993, p. 29), compared Winnicott's concept of transitional object and anthropologist Victor Turner's liminal space. The liminal space is the condition of transition between life roles, during which an individual becomes an outsider (Turner, 1974; 1982; 1986). During this gap in familiar experience the
transitional object, like the liminal space, provides an opportunity for creative drama to construct a needed meaning for coping with a difficult or socially undefined transition. Bollas (1987) emphasized that this transition entails personal transformations, a creative social learning. Emigh noted the similarity between dramatic play in the developing child and the dramatic rituals he studied in Asia. “As in the childhood play strategies, these events bridge gaps...and effect transits across the boundaries of experience” (p. 19). Writers from other disciplines have noted that it is this challenge that catalyzes creative learning in life (Burke, 1952; Bruner, 1990; Schechner, 1993).

Turner (1986) cited both Dewey and Wilhelm Dilthey as contributing to his notion of bridging gaps in experience through creative activity, in particular through theatre. For Dewey, the artist creates to compensate for the “loss of integration with the environment” (p. 37). Otto Rank (1987) also saw creativity as a personal and social adjustment, a form of learning. Moments of alienation motivate artists to create form from chaos; the individual “recurrently loses and re-establishes equilibrium with his surroundings. The moment of passage from disturbance into harmony is that of intensest life” (Turner, 1987, p. 38). Theatre for Turner “embraces ideas and images of cosmos and chaos...and uses all the sensory codes... the enacting of mythic and heroic plots drawn from oral traditions” (Turner, 1986, p. 43). The impulse for theatre comes from daily life, where we cope by finding meaning. This meaning-making activity is, for Turner and for Dewey, learning. For them, art does not come from an ideal Platonic realm “superior to vulgar human activities.” The arts, especially theatre, have “germinated in the scenes and objects of human experience” (p. 38).

The comparison between children’s learning stages and indigenous drama has been made by other researchers:

...as John Dewey, quoted in Courtney, put it: “the primary root of all educative activity is in the instinctive, impulsive attitudes and activities of
the child" This germ for learning, and indeed of challenge and intervention, are very discernible in indigenous societies, as seen in the performative arts of storytelling, moonlit games, songs and dance. (Abah, 1996, p. 256)

This comparison was also made by both Burton and Slade. Burton (1965) proposed a sociology of drama in developmental stages. The magical function of ritual, he wrote, parallels similar functions in children's play. Similar anthropological perspectives have been explored through the field of Performance Studies, which Schechner (1985) divided into two realms of inquiry: that of human behavior as a genre of performance, and that of performance as a form of interaction (p. 296). Schechner's approach to drama parallels Courtney's in that he considers drama as basically educational and transformational; both have explored ritual as a way of showing this. Courtney, however, emphasized the educational or developmental aspect, while Schechner as a theatre director emphasized performance.

These writers have understood drama to be a creative act to reconcile emotional learnings with social demands, in which learning involves transformation and expression, like Courtney's idea of transformation and learning (1989). Courtney (1990) saw drama as a medium for knowledge, and adopted the term "mediate knowledge" (personal communications, 24 February 1996, 25 July 1996, December 1996) to discuss the learning that takes place through an art form—much as Reid saw meaning-making in the encounter with art. Mediate knowledge provides a perspective on the connection between creative activity and learning, how people improvise their lives and the meanings they construct in the cultural space provided by an art form or other medium.
The Actor as Learner

Courtney had been a professional actor and director. When his search for a philosophy of drama led him to the philosophical traditions of phenomenology, he joined a personal inquiry into the phenomenological experience of acting with his scholarly forays into phenomenological psychology (personal communication, December 1996). Other perspectives on learning through drama can be gained from the words of professional actors, many of whom see their work as a quest, or search. Sarah Siddons (1775-1831), considered the finest actress in her day, combined a total absorption in role with a constant inquiry into the character (Parsons, 1909). Her own emotional receptivity provided intuitive resources for her acting. While learning the role of Lady Macbeth, she wrote, “I came to the assassination scene, when the horrors of the scene rose to a degree that made it impossible for me to get further. I snatched up my candle and hurried out of the room in a paroxysm of terror” (p. 40).

For Sarah Bernhardt (1924), self-reflexive learning was required for overcoming “ordinary feelings” with “a continuous dissection of (the) personality... the sage’s motto ‘know thyself’... has special application to the case of the actor.” The actor must shed his ego so that “his consciousness skips from age to age, from one people to another” (p. 209). Sir Laurence Olivier (Burton, 1967) maintained that a role is achieved by an effort of research and intuition. “The actor is as important as the illuminator of the human heart, he is as important as the psychiatrist or the doctor, the minister if you like” while sometimes being a scavenger of the “tiniest little bit of human circumstance.” I compare this with Cassirer’s (1953) observation: “The artist is just as much a discoverer of the forms of nature as the scientist is a discoverer of facts or natural laws” (p. 29).

The Polish director Jerzy Grotowski called his company a Theatre Laboratory, an institute for research into both the art of the actor and the art of living. This kind of philosophy has been followed by avant garde groups in New
York City, one of which was The Living Theatre. Co-founder Judith Malina (Cole & Chinoy, 1970) has described The Living Theatre’s work as learning “an extraordinary sensitivity to one another. And this we do in our everyday lives” (p. 655). Martin Buber began his theological work through involvement in the theatre (Friedman, 1969). Buber found that a great actor “does not put on masks but penetrates—surrendering his soul and winning it back again—into the center of his hero and obtains from him the secret of the personal kinesis, the union of meaning and deed peculiar to him” (p. 13). This is mysticism’s way of learning, and resembles Grotowski’s theories (1993). For Schechner (1988), acting means “to stimulate a process of self-revelation” and convert that knowledge into signs (p. 175). Ionesco considered acting as providing deep knowledge, that “each of us is all the others, that my solitude had not been real and that the actor can, better than anyone else, understand human beings by understanding himself” (Esslin, 1969). I compare these words with Burton’s: “(Drama) increases the scope of life, leading to wider experience, a greater sympathy, a cleansing from narrow and selfish attitudes” (1955, p. 85).

These actors considered their work as a study or search. For Siddons and Bernhardt, a personal search led to transcendent knowledge; for Olivier, research into the essences of human beings parallels the work of a scientist. Grotowski, Malina, Buber, Schechner and Ionesco connected acting with uncovering deeper knowledge about living. Despite the agreement among actors and educators that drama provides a unique way of knowing, O’Hara’s question yet remains: how does one learn through drama? O’Hara (1996) asked: “Is it possible indeed, in Courtney’s (1968) terms, that within a form, there may be scope for process, and that by examining a variety of forms, we might move nearer to discovering the nature of the process?” (p. 274). His question attempts to unpack the assumptions of drama educators, which have remained largely unexamined. This means addressing the processual, transactional, transitory learning experienced in drama. This was also Courtney’s search (1990).
The Research That is Drama

Looking at drama as research from a different perspective—the perspective of social science research—has attracted recent interest (Edmiston, 1996; Bolton, 1996; Somers, 1996). The idea of "drama as research", while not having been clearly defined, recognizes the parallels between drama and qualitative inquiry (Taylor, 1996). There is common agreement that drama is an experiential experiment, which reveals information about situations and participants through its unfolding. The experience of qualitative research—how the researcher learns—and that of doing drama—how the actor learns—share certain perspectives and learnings.

Both drama and qualitative research draw on reflexivity and sensitivity to the environment. Both involve risks rather than fixed methods. Both involve affective and intuitive levels, drawing on tacit knowledge. Both seek coherent meaning from multiple voices, drawing on personal and social realities as well as their respective scripts. Both employ metaphor and symbol for structuring their inquiries and for communicating their findings. For both qualitative researchers and drama practitioners, means and ends, thought and action, combine together in an unpremeditated, improvisational fashion.

For drama educators Burton (1955) and Heathcote (1984) drama means "to live through." For Dewey, "Our undergoings are experiments in varying the course of events: our active tryings are trials and tests of ourselves." Study of people's lives is a study of their dramas—dram is the root of both "experience" and "drama" (Turner, 1982). The word theory came from the Greek term for theatre; the theoria was one who viewed everyday situations and extracted truth (Lyman & Scott, 1975)—a definition that seems to fit qualitative research.

Qualitative research can be seen as a three phase process. The first phase, observation, requires a split consciousness of the self as both participant and observer, becoming "knower and known, when the same person is both" (Turner & Bruner, 1986, p. 83). "Acting appears to be very much like doing ethnography... in the attention given to the self in the en-act-ment" (p. 29). For
example, the study of ritual requires "active seeing" which is like audience training (Grimes, 1995). For Grimes, fieldwork is essentially dramatistic and requires study of both acting and drama criticism; the researcher views a drama while bringing one's own dramatic behavior to the field.

The analytic phase in qualitative research resembles drama in that both texts--fieldnotes and script--are "fields of play" with multiple realities and open-ended focus. Both invite their audiences to participate in the interpretive process. Drama's plastic possibilities of expression, employing multiple roles and changing settings, are like the wide variety of analytic--linguistic and figurative--tools that are used to make meaning in qualitative research. The rehearsal process of preparing a performance is directly analogous to analyzing research to prepare findings (Schechner, 1985). Rehearsing from a text (play script), the first step is a deconstruction like the deconstruction or coding process in qualitative research. The second step is to experiment with possible meanings through improvisation, like textual analysis through linguistic methods. The third step is to reconstruct and finally polish the finished play, like the final interpretation of qualitative researchers.

Research findings are increasingly presented via dramatic media (Denzin, 1997), "one of the last frontiers for ethnography to enter" (p. 183). This natural connection between research and drama through the performance of living data and findings suggests a need for further explication of the areas of overlap between drama and social sciences, both in the interpretation and presentation of research (Geertz, 1983). For some drama is a social science (Mienczakowski, 1994, Inglis, 1994), which "enacts man's relationship to man... fundamental to every social science" (Lyman & Scott, 1975). In fact the connection is radicalizing both disciplines.

For example, the genre of performance art (Finley, 1990; Forte, 1988; Hughes, 1990; Solomon, 1991; Margolin, 1997) is based on the notion of personal voice, rooted in feminist theory. Like qualitative research, performance art de-mystifies the text of the stage, letting the writer/actor be transparently
themselves, while performing their own narrative to convey the personal reality of the piece. For one performer “the performances themselves might be seen as a form of research” (Burnham, 1997). Unlike qualitative research, performance art is generally not committed to rigor, that is, trustworthiness. However a recent example of a more rigorous approach was the performance piece “Vagina Monologues” (Ensler, 1996), based on hundreds of interviews with women, including women from Bosnia, and the personal reflections of the performer.

Teachers may consider drama sessions with the class as research, because the process requires students to make choices and test their hypotheses in overt action. As dramas unfold, students reveal their own assumptions and learnings. Classroom drama supplies teachers with information and facilitates their dialogue with their students. Students, while improvising, have an opportunity to explore a subject through action and feelings, which gives them extra-cognitive knowledge. By improvising about an historical event, for example, they are researching its living dimensions, using their own bodies to inscribe the event in time and space. Drama provides a phenomenological perspective (Edmiston, 1996), a study of experience in the immediacy of its living ground. Drama and research are also vulnerable to the same pitfalls, such as too much control. The more conspicuous the leader in the case of drama, or the researcher in the case of the research, the more the findings will only reveal this individual. Both processes require patience and nurture that one may reap the richest fruits of one’s labor.

The implications of these parallels between drama and research illustrate that the process of drama provides a natural mode of learning. By taking their methods out of the laboratory qualitative researchers have become conscious of their processes, of collecting, analyzing and presenting findings. These methods of collecting knowledge represent a natural mode of learning, a mode that seems strikingly similar to the ways people learn through the daily dramas of their lives.
CHAPTER III

METHOD

This dissertation is a textual analysis of Courtney’s writings to elucidate his construction of the learning process inherent to drama. Analysis in the qualitative mode means to “tease out what we consider to be essential meaning in the raw data; to reduce and reorganize and combine” data (Ely et al., 1991, p. 140) in response to the research question. In qualitative research, methods are adopted according to the nature of the data; they are not dictated by a “prior agreement about ends” (Schön, 1983). Courtney wrote over a period of 45 years and drew from an eclectic range of disciplines. The adaptability of a qualitative approach proved useful for extricating, explicating and distilling the contents of these texts.

Analysis of extant texts is often called archival research. This is used in history, literary criticism and philosophy to highlight the meanings of the text/action. All qualitative research deals with texts, in the forms of interviews, logs, notes, transcriptions, or correspondence. Even “culture is a text to be interpreted; fieldnotes are a text” (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 160) which require analysis using relevant methods to understand them. Attempting to understand these texts or narratives entails the same linguistic processes as does constructing narratives. “We call this kind of understanding--of hearing the meaning of a story--hermeneutic understanding” (ib.). Thus narrative analysis applies to texts of
verbal accounts whether interpersonal discourse, historical texts, or social analysis, with the premise that narrative is a cognitive process that organizes experience (Langer, 1953, p. 261; Polkinghorne, 1988; Cortazzi, 1993; Tierney et al., 1997). For Polkinghorne, narrative is “the primary scheme by means of which human existence is rendered meaningful” (p. 11). It is a means of organizing events as well as a means of presentation. Thus “language does not have an innocent and transparent function in knowledge creation” (Polkinghorne, 1988, 158) but is used in a rhetorical fashion to tell a story and present characters. “A function of the human sciences is to read... and then interpret the texts of human experience” (Ottenberg, p. 159) for a deeper, not necessarily cause and effect, understanding. Narrative analysis is an approach shared by the human sciences; phenomenological psychologists, for example, analyze the words of patients (Polkinghorne, 1989) with methods similar to those utilized by qualitative researchers in treating their data. The basic approach to qualitative analysis is “working with data, organizing them, breaking them into manageable units, synthesizing them, searching for patterns, discovering what is important” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992, p. 153).

The first step in all qualitative research is observation and creating the log. Observation in this study began with becoming acquainted with Richard Courtney. Robert Landy, Courtney’s one-time student and colleague, reported an experience similar to my own:

He was unbelievably impressive... a comrade, a like soul, a soul mate. He made me feel all right to be the way I was. I was seen as too intellectual, too theoretical. Richard made me see that it was okay to be like that and also one suffers for being like that. I get a sense of Richard gathering a lot of searchers, who need to know it’s okay not to be like everyone else.

[Interview]
Observations also involved reading and re-reading as much of Courtney's work as possible, including many papers and articles which were not directly relevant to this study. I also corresponded with Courtney extensively (see appendix for sample letters), received feedback from Courtney on my own work, spoke with him on the phone weekly for months at a time, and spent some three weeks during 1996--the last year of Courtney's life--visiting Courtney and his wife on Salt Spring Island, British Columbia, Canada. During these visits I talked with Courtney for many hours every day, read the dissertations which he had supervised, read Courtney's unpublished work and copied some of his publications. During much of this observation I had not yet decided to write a dissertation about Courtney, but all of these activities contributed to the lens through which I eventually analyzed Courtney's writings. Since the study at hand is a textual analysis, my actual data were Courtney's books, mainly those most relevant to the topic of my research question: how do people learn through drama? These were recent books: *Play, Drama and Thought* (1989), *Re-Play* (1982), *Re-Cognizing Richard Courtney* (1988), *Drama and Intelligence: A Cognitive Theory* (1990), and *Drama and Feeling: An Aesthetic Theory* (1995).

My data also included Courtney's recent books on Shakespeare's plays, earlier articles and books. My log comprised selected texts which I keyed into computer files, enabling me to search for phrases, copy and organize sections of text. As I keyed in the log, I continued re-reading Courtney's texts to look for patterns of meaning which could help me organize my study.

As I read and re-read the log, I began to deconstruct the texts, breaking up data into meaning units. This process is called coding in qualitative research. Coding arrests the sequential logic of the data, pinpointing a moment in time in order to inspect that moment more closely (Atkinson, 1992). While the coding process selects and categorizes data, it can also expand meanings by indicating possible relationships with external frameworks. Coded sections are sorted into categories, sometimes called bins in qualitative research (Wolcott, 1994). These initial phases of selecting, sorting and labeling data involve interpretation. Such
processes are not mechanical but reflect insights as well as biases. Through self-reflexivity, being conscious of progressive layers of interpretation, one can use initial ideas as hunches and insights for further work. For example, my research question came from my initial insights into Courtney’s texts. While reading Courtney’s work and discussing it with him, I found that I understood his main bin to be learning because his various approaches—phenomenological, aesthetic, psychological and sociological, education and research—emphasize ways of coming to know. I checked this hypothesis with Courtney who agreed—“That’s good” (personal communication, December, 1996)—that it was a useful insight into the whole of his work. Initially I set up other tentative bins which I also checked with Courtney. They were: 1) the realm of the aesthetic, 2) the “as if” imagination, 3) dramatic metaphor(s) 4) use of symbols, and 5) the double. These prominent notions in Courtney’s work seemed at first to be useful bins for organizing my study. However, as I began to organize units of texts into these bins I realized that these bins could only serve as static categories. Neither the intrinsic interconnectedness of Courtney’s concepts nor the organic living meaning of drama seemed to emerge from this organizing scheme.

I also became more urgently aware of how abstract and difficult Courtney’s ideas are. While reading Courtney’s texts I often found them practically hypnotic, but when I tried to translate them into my own words—analysis by linguistic transformation—I found myself mired in circular definitions without any reference points for Courtney’s enclosed world. At that point I decided to impose a somewhat external but appropriate framework on Courtney’s works—a dramatistic framework (Burke, 1952, 1968; Kimberling, 1982). A dramatistic analysis asks: what is the setting of this drama, who is the actor, what is the act? It seemed to me that in translating Courtney’s very unique universe into a more accessible language, it would be useful to use such practical markers. As I began to work with this material, I realized that my primary task was to make Courtney’s ideas concrete. The dramatistic approach seemed to render Courtney’s elaborate narratives concrete and real. My main bins became: The Setting, The
Actor, The Act, and the Other. I sorted the bins I had already found in the data into these larger bins. I also reorganized the contents of each bin every time I began to write the chapter addressing that specific bin.

Analyzing bins and units of data entails interpretation, using hermeneutic tools like linguistic symbols (Van Maanen, 1983). Sometimes called “linguistic transformation” (Polkinghorne, 1989), this step consists of finding a meaning or explanation for the unit of text. Since qualitative methods have gone from using scientific metaphors to using “humanistic metaphors drawn largely from literature, literary criticism, history and drama (symbols, the text, performance)” (Ottenberg, 1990, p. 156) the meanings selected are often metaphors, symbols or psychological terms. The main linguistic tool I employed was metaphor. Metaphors are linguistic tools that map understanding across different fields of activity or domains, using one language to describe the experience in a different domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Metaphor analysis can mean either finding metaphors in the text, or using metaphors to interpret units of text. In later stages, metaphors can articulate themes to formulate the researcher’s synthetic interpretation. Metaphors are basic to interpretation because they are tools people often use to make meaning (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 6). Metaphors reveal assumptions and images behind world views (Ely, 1997, Morgan, 1983, Lakoff, 1993). “Different ground assumptions and the images through which they are grasped and developed thus give rise to different grounds for knowledge about the social world” (Morgan, 1983, p. 21). By invoking different world views and processes, metaphors are operational, like verbs; they provide perspectives on the way things work. Compared to the restricted perspectives of literal language, a metaphoric perspective is “aware of a wider classification of things heretofore only implicit and embedded in experience” (Fernandez, 1986, p. 178). “Metaphor is a tool that can move us away from predictable lines of seeing” to move the research forward (Ely et al., 1997, p. 113).

I used metaphors in many ways, including analyzing Courtney’s metaphors. Courtney relied heavily on metaphors from different fields to expand
his discussion of drama. For example, in his later work (1995) he frequently used
the word "oscillation", a term physicists use to describe the behavior of subatomic
particles. This metaphor has been adopted in semiotics to discuss perceptions of
meaning (Merrell, 1982, p. 56), from which field Courtney imported it to explain
meaning-making entailed in drama processes on the intrapsychic level (1995).
Oscillation is one of the metaphors I analyzed, referring to the roots of the term as
well as the different ways Courtney used it. I also created metaphors to explain
Courtney's conception of drama. For example, I found it useful to think of
Courtney's use of the metaphor of worlds as a form of "metaphysics" of drama,
while notions like oscillation are a kind of "physics" of drama. While coding and
binning Courtney's writings, I used tentative metaphors for Courtney's stance
such as "prophet", a metaphor which does not appear in my findings but helped
me to understand passages of his work like this one: "dramatic activity... stands
on the threshold of the future... occupies many of the best minds today, and it is
likely to be a pervasive method of teaching in the twenty-first century." This
phrase seems to me to lack credibility, but it does portray Courtney in a role of
"prophet", a kind of authority figure Courtney aspired to be. This stance seemed
confirmed especially by Courtney's later writings, such as The Birth of God
(1997) in which Courtney portrayed the prophet Moses as an absolute authority,
quite unlike the Hebrew understanding that "the man Moses was very humble,
more so than anyone else on the face of the earth" (Numbers 12:3). Like all
writers, Courtney seemed to tell a story of his own. Understanding Courtney's
stance helped me interpret passages, bracketing them off when they did not
contribute to the general sense of the analysis but instead contributed to an
understanding of Courtney's authorial voice.

Another tool that works across domains is pastiche. Pastiche entails
juxtaposing various selections of text in a number of ways in order to highlight
and discover meanings, so that "the multiple pieces actually open up spaces into a
full texture--a range of meanings that can coexist because of the meaning that the
form of pastiche inscribes" (Ely et al., 1997, p. 98). Pastiche breaks linear
representation, taking such forms as diagrams, "theoretical constructs... biographical data... direct quotes, multivoice accounts, collage, and the researcher's own stories and musings" (Ely et al., 1997, p. 97). While linear narrative gives the impression of a unified authoritative voice, pastiche offers greater opportunity to dialogue with pieces of the text, opening up its multiple sources and multiple possibilities. The text becomes like a "field of play", where "the separate pieces deliver new meanings." This is called *intertextuality* by Julia Kristeva (1980). When "dialogism and polyphony are recognized as modes of textual production, monophonic authority is questioned" (Clifford & Marcus, 1986, p. 15). Because Courtney's writings are dense and complex, the pastiches I created had to be relatively structured in order to yield meanings. I decided to structure these pastiches using Courtney's own techniques for structuring ideas--semiotic squares and quaternities. These methods are explained in the text as they occur. I used an adaptation of Courtney's own structures as matrices on which to create pastiches from Courtney's work in order to re-structure Courtney's meanings. Such pastiches yielded more patterns and emergent meanings.

Qualitative analysis is a recursive process in which stages are continually revisited. Still, it is useful to conceive of the next step, after deconstruction and analysis, as a re-synthesis into themes. Ely et al. (1997) use the metaphor of "lifting" themes, "sorting through the fabric of the whole for our understanding of the threads or patterns that run throughout and lifting them out--as a seamstress lifts threads with a needle--to make a general statement about them" (p. 260). Themes are interpretations which give new meaning to the data through a "process of insightful invention, discovery, disclosure" (Van Manen, p. 88). The result is "some type of higher-level synthesis" (Tesch, 1990, p. 97). The word "higher" does not imply that the data are at a lower level; in qualitative research one depends constantly on the data to ground one's interpretations. Higher means a more abstract level. The pastiches I constructed as semiotic squares yielded patterns and themes for the learning processes inherent in drama.
One layer of themes—the Setting, the Act, the Actor, the Other—came from the initial dramatistic framework. These themes served as containers for the data. As mentioned above, these themes came from a need to ground Courtney's writings in actual dramatic acts. I “poured” the data into these containers which yielded another layer of themes. For example, as I gathered material for “The Setting” bin, I found that the main theme which emerged came from Courtney's metaphor of “worlds”—people create personal worlds in which they enact their dramas. Although Courtney himself has not particularly emphasized the way he used the metaphor of worlds, it emerged in my own analysis as an important theme for the settings in which people enact their dramas. As I gathered Courtney's uses of the “worlds” metaphor, patterns emerged: personal worlds, social worlds, cultural worlds, *inter alia*. Upon reading and re-reading these bins, I found more refined patterns of meaning and of the learning processes involved in each. Thus each general theme of the dramatistic framework was a container for the texts most appropriate for that theme. Once I “poured” the data into each container, they yielded other patterns of meaning and other themes. Finally I isolated the learning processes which I had developed in each section so that I could finally condense them into a construction of Courtney's ideas about learning through drama. The final construction of learning through drama emerged from this process. I extracted all the different sections on learning from each bin, and treated them as data. I coded and binned this data from which emerged the main themes in the final construction.

Courtney's writings are often like conversations among theories—vocabularies and world views—that move back and forth across domains in exploring drama. Because of this diversity, another component of the analysis was to address Courtney's definitions, which are constantly undergoing transformation. Because of the shifting nature of these definitions, it was soon evident that I had to collect Courtney's implicit or explicit definitions from different texts, compare them and develop an analysis of them. For example, Courtney's use of "metaphor" received recursive treatment with each layer of the
dramatistic framework, developing into a full range of ideas about metaphor. Multiple and shifting definitions also emerged for symbols, for mind, for Being, and above all, for drama itself.

The most unconventional aspect of my method has been my extensive use of hypothetical examples. Courtney’s work is abstract and dense. It has an obvious need for grounding. On the other hand, most writing in the areas of drama and education is completely the opposite, as I have discussed in the introduction. The need for conceptualization of the process is what Courtney addressed. But Courtney was often criticized for being abstract and not practical. My analysis of Courtney’s contribution can only be useful if it bridges the gap between the ideas Courtney worked on and concrete practice. Therefore my task in analyzing Courtney’s work was to make it more concrete. In order to do so, I evoked or created concrete hypothetical examples. I chose and invented examples from a broad range of human events, including classroom events, movies, art history, current political events, cultural phenomena and television shows. These examples not only illustrated but also provided a mode of analysis. They helped to tease out aspects of Courtney’s ideas that are less apparent in abstract language. I adopted this broad and eclectic range of examples purposely because I see Courtney’s ideas as speaking to human activities wherever they occur. They have implications for both research and pedagogy, both the arts and the human sciences. But they are examples that Courtney himself would not have chosen. Courtney chose as examples figures such as Socrates or Hamlet, in keeping with his own cultural framework. Albeit subversively to Courtney’s own self-image, I have chosen examples to reflect a less exalted context which is also more accessible to culture in the US. For example, the theme of racism in the US pervades most of the examples I give, because I believe that the struggle over racism illustrates the deepest “drama” in the US culture. My use of examples has also entailed the very kind of divergent thinking which is required for drama students and teachers. In using divergent thinking, as in using semiotic squares, I have worked on this analysis using the very means which Courtney proposed. My
purpose was not only to “talk the talk,” but also to “walk the walk.” The examples I invented required that I create hypothetical individuals. In doing so, I used male and female pronouns alternately. Rather than reverting to the traditional male pronoun, or artificially adopting a consistently female pronoun, I chose to alternate genders in my choice of hypothetical characters.

The intended result is an interpretation rather than a critique of Courtney’s work. I refer to one of Courtney’s own teachers, Shakespearean scholar G. Wilson Knight, who wrote about the difference between interpretation and criticism. Knight (1960) wrote that criticism means “objectifying the work under consideration; the comparison of it with other similar works in order especially to show in what respects it surpasses, or falls short of, those works.”

Interpretation, on the other hand tends to merge into the work it analyses; it attempts, as far as possible, to understand its subject in the light of its own nature, employing external reference, if at all, only as a preliminary to understanding; it avoids discussion of merits, and, since its existence depends entirely on its original acceptance of the validity of the poetic unit which it claims, in some measure, to translate into discursive reasoning, it can recognize no division of ‘good’ from ‘bad’... Criticism is a judgment of vision; interpretation a reconstruction of vision. (p. 2)

Interpretation does not mean uncritical acceptance, but an attempt to understand a work on its own terms. In the case of Courtney’s writings which had not been previously analyzed by anyone else, the first task at hand was interpretation. Although I was more critical of some of Courtney’s points earlier in my analysis, I found that it was impossible to communicate my criticisms without first communicating the content of Courtney’s writings. And the latter task was complex enough. I wrote one critical piece on one of Courtney’s books (1997) which addressed specific issues within a specific context for which other literature is available. The book also referred to specific sources with which I was able to
compare Courtney’s texts. In this particular case an extant context was available and comparison was possible. The resulting critique appears as Chapter XI.

Trustworthiness

*I don’t have no use
For what you loosely call the truth

---Tina Turner

Trustworthiness refers to the fairness of research findings—whether they are true to their subject. Trustworthiness cannot be relegated to a set of procedures, rather “the entire endeavor must be grounded in ethical principles about how data are collected and analyzed, how one’s own assumptions and conclusions are checked… and how results are communicated” (Ely et al., 1991, p. 93). Guba & Lincoln (1989) call fairness the “extent to which different constructions and their underlying value structures are solicited and honored” (p. 245). Polkinghorne (1988) pointed out that science has confused the concept of validity, narrowing its meaning to refer to measuring instruments. By contrast, “in narrative research, ‘valid’ retains its ordinary meaning of well-grounded and supportable” (p. 175).

What is trustworthiness, or fairness, in analyzing an author’s texts? One aspect is fairness to the author’s own meanings—“isomorphism between constructed realities of respondents and the reconstructions attributed to them” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p.237); another aspect is fairness to the subject matter within a broader context. For a judicious treatment of Courtney’s work, a broad review of related literature from which Courtney drew was necessary. An alert
survey of the literature is part of any qualitative inquiry, but in the case of Courtney’s writings it is a trustworthiness issue. Having this foundation was important for clarifying some of the contexts and implications behind Courtney’s ideas, and for distinguishing his own contributions. I found that Courtney sometimes relied heavily on certain authors without attribution, whereas in other cases he fitted the work of others too closely to his own interpretations. I dealt with the formidable range of Courtney’s knowledge by tracing ideas to their sources wherever possible, and by emphasizing what I found to be Courtney’s unique combination of ideas. Since Courtney’s work was an effort to expand the field of educational drama, this material comes from many disciplines including philosophy, semiotics, sociology, anthropology and psychology. I read widely as a preparation for this analysis. This reading is reflected in my bibliography.

The analysis of extant texts has advantages and disadvantages for trustworthiness. “Referential adequacy” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) is an advantage—the existence of the text in a fixed form makes certain kinds of data easier to check. A disadvantage is the fixed, non-dialogical nature of the text. Because “the field” always presents itself in the same manner—pages of text that cannot be interviewed—I needed not only to decode the author’s constructs, but also to check them against other sources. These sources included peer debriefing and getting feedback from other readers. Other sources were the literature, and interviews with Courtney’s former colleagues. A recursive analysis, revisiting the data to look for fresh insights, was another way I kept my thinking moving forward.

Peer debriefing is a method of checking one’s work. This means discussing findings with a group of peers for feedback. While writing my proposal I worked with various support groups of doctoral students in the School of Education, in which each member of the group periodically distributed copies of his or her work. However during the actual writing of the dissertation—some five months—I worked alone. My main source of feedback was interviewing individuals who knew Courtney’s work. The interviews I conducted mainly
served the functions of helping me to frame Courtney’s writings, providing extra
points of view and checking my findings. While the study was a textual analysis
and my data came mainly from Courtney’s texts, interviews and informal
interviews with Courtney’s colleagues helped me deepen and strengthen my
work. I also found that discussing Courtney with some of his former friends
enabled me to move forward at points where I felt “stuck.” Such feedback
contributed to a “dialectical hermeneutic process” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989)
whereby I continually reviewed my stance and my interpretations.
Trustworthiness involves not only conscious decisions, but the less conscious
processes that come from the biases of the researcher. The stance of the researcher
should therefore be monitored from the beginning, and in successive stages of
interpretation. Guba & Lincoln (1989) called this “progressive subjectivity--the
process of monitoring the inquirer’s own developing construction” (p. 238).

Above all, trustworthiness is ensured by “rigorous subjectivity” (Wolcott,
1994), the “continuous, recursive, and, we dare say, excruciating attention to
being trustworthy” (Ely et al., 1991, p. 156). Or, said differently, trustworthiness
does not come from "promising to be perfect, but from constantly attending to our
own imperfections” (Ely, personal communication, 18 November 1997).

Stance of the Researcher

Courtney’s writings are related to a theme I have been pursuing for years.
I have been trying to understand how the process of drama affects the actor--as
healing, as learning, as empowerment--and how to apply this understanding to
practical situations. While working at the United Nations and studying for a
Masters’ in Social Sciences, I studied “culture and development”-- beginning with
an inquiry into United Nations projects on women and sanitation which raised
cultural issues. My next inquiry was into how theatre and ritual are sometimes used to heal traumatized populations such as refugees. I learned that cultural tools can teach and heal where managerial fixes fail, in reforming a broken society.

I entered the Educational Theatre Program with a similar question: how do people learn--about themselves, about life, about coping--through performing? I looked for answers in avant garde theatre, performance and historical studies, and in the work I have independently developed with homeless people. I found very few answers in the field. Most existing work concentrates on historical events, theatrical methods, or teaching approaches, but not on studying the experience of the participants. The closest work is in drama therapy, but my field is education. Many populations will never encounter therapy. Education needs to serve their many needs, while the scope of education needs to be expanded to include more interpersonal and intrapersonal, artistic and aesthetic areas. This has already been recognized in the classes in emotional education being offered in some urban areas. This kind of curriculum, based largely on Goleman's (1995) concept of emotional intelligence, uses active and reflective methods to teach emotional awareness and self-control (Yale Child Study Center, 1994a, 1994b, 1995).

My interest stems from childhood. From the age of 8 or 9 I would organize the neighborhood children around performances of Macbeth and other high dramas. I went to Bennington College for dance, and then departed for New York, to study acting and dance in professional studios. There I found a climate of quest for meaningful theatre, particularly in the avant garde. In the 60's and 70's many theatre collectives believed that personal development and theatre were inextricably linked. There was a belief that in a climate of hypocrisy--the Vietnam War and other issues--authentic reality could be created on the stage. In Manhattan, where I performed as a mime and worked in various studios, I became involved with numerous experimental groups and their ideas of inner progress and drama. Later, while suffering from a personal trauma, I found that resuming my own performances freed me of pain. I worked with my own trauma, exploring healing and learning processes through creating performances, either solo or with
children, and in more recent years in performance art. I found solutions on the intuitive level, which I understood to be a form of learning.

I also found parallels between the cultural richness across the globe and the aesthetic forms which taught me in my own art. This led me to undertake projects as an independent consultant with the homeless population, teaching drama to children and mothers, making my way through uncharted territory to work with a population about which there is little literature and basically none on arts teaching. This population has, in many cases, been socialized differently, so that even as adults my students could not sit and listen to the teacher or to each other--our classroom was never still. It was also clear that their lives had been full of challenges--physical and emotional--with few social supports. My work at the United Nations had taught me that culturally-specific solutions must be found for each situation. The poor in the US, including the homeless, differ greatly from the poor in other lands, because they have in some ways had their cultural systems taken from them (hooks, 1993). "In traditional southern black folk life, there was full recognition that the needs of the spirit had to be addressed if individuals were to be fully self-actualized" (p. 15). hooks wrote of how first with the upheaval of the South, then with the collapse of the ghetto community, customs were lost, customs like church socials and mutually supportive grieving processes, singing and verbal expressions which gave spiritual sustenance. Urban dwellers became increasingly isolated and unsupported.

From my own learning processes as an actor, I developed a format for working with coping and empowerment with homeless mothers and children from the perspective of cultural performance. I use this approach--"creating an aesthetic space"--for dramatic interventions aimed at: self-presentation and self-confidence; the use of imaginary and symbolic images for projecting issues and stories; and working on sensory and emotional awareness. Drawing on my personal learnings in this area, I encouraged my students to play with art forms, experiment and free their own emotions and inner resources through creation and action. When they remain in that "play space" or what I call the "aesthetic space", 

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not only do they produce stunning work, but it seems to have a therapeutic effect on self-reflection and self-care. Much in their environment discourages them from giving themselves permission to play. I defined my responsibility as maintaining a dialogue with my students and providing artistic and aesthetic stimuli and frameworks, for them to find ways to redefine their own selves, create their own dramatic narratives. Clearly this work which I developed independently bears striking resemblance to Courtney’s themes: symbols, metaphors, aesthetics, healing and learning are aspects of Courtney’s inquiry. Whereas Courtney has often been criticized for not being practical, I had in fact been doing work, independently, which seemed to ground these concepts in reality. My practical experience provided a form of fieldwork, from which I could understand and critique Courtney’s ideas. At a time when the fields of psychotherapy, education, semiotics and literature are exploring the boundaries of affect and cognition, the field of drama provides one of the most natural media for this inquiry. Drama provides certain kinds of learnings. As one who learns much through emotions and direct experience of art, I would like to further the discussion of the kinds of learnings that acknowledge the roles of feeling and imagination. I find in Courtney’s work a vehicle for continuing this discussion. My stance reflects my personal experiences growing up in the 60’s, my early childhood in the South of the US and an interest in underclasses which reflects political leanings. While I have found consonance between Courtney’s ideas and my own, I believe the general context Courtney employed does not serve to make his writings accessible. In this respect I have written of Courtney’s work in a context I believe is more useful, using examples that I consider more accessible than his own. For I do believe that investigations in this area can further a discourse that, for very practical reasons, needs to be addressed.
CHAPTER IV

RICHARD COURTNEY'S DRAMATIC TERRITORY:
OPENING ACT

And May I Introduce Richard Courtney?

Richard Courtney wrote about the practical field of drama in abstract terms. As differentiated from the experience of doing drama, these abstract notions about the process of drama are what Courtney called ‘different levels of discourse.’ “Richard made maps where the field didn’t even know there was a territory” according to one of his students (McLeod, personal communication, 8 January 1997). The metaphor of maps and territory is one Courtney used often and is useful for discussing his work. The domain of living drama is a territory for which Courtney designed maps or abstractions. In many cases, these abstractions dealt with intimate perspectives like the phenomenological, the intra-psychic and the interpersonal levels of experience while doing drama. In other cases the maps Courtney designed dealt with society and culture, and the larger fabrics of meaning that connect people’s lives. Underlying Courtney’s work is his assumption that dramas pervade life--all the world is a stage. This metaphor of drama as life is often called Theatrum Mundi, theatre of the world.

Courtney borrowed abstractions from a variety of fields. He worked with ideas of writers like Eliade (1963, 1971, 1987) who wrote about culture and the
Sacred, and Joseph Campbell (1949, 1974, 1980) who wrote about myth. Courtney (1990) acknowledged Bakhtin’s influence (p. 5, 48, 123, 151, 152, 157), and said “I’ve translated Bakhtin’s work on dialogue to the drama field” (personal communication, 25 November 1996). For example, Bakhtin (1981) wrote that language is “a working hypothesis for comprehending and expressing reality” (p. 61); Courtney (1990) wrote that “dramatic acts are practical hypotheses” (p. 10). Bakhtin (1981) wrote that languages “throw light on each other: one language can, after all, see itself only in the light of another language” (p. 12); Courtney (1995) wrote about feelings: “We tend to experience one in terms of another; that is we experience one in the perspective of another, and vice versa” (p. 22).

Courtney believed that what Bakhtin, Eliade, Campbell and other of his sources wrote overlapped significantly with what he called drama. For example, Courtney made extensive use of Eliade’s notion that all ritual acts have a double or metaphoric meaning representing both the sacred acts performed by the gods, and the human reality of the ritual actors. For Courtney, dramas such as rituals are metaphoric actions. Within Courtney’s inclusive metaphor of drama as life and life as drama, language, religion and symbolism became examples of dramatic thinking. Just as Bakhtin’s dialogism can be applied to the interactions between actors, other metaphors from language, religion, myth, semiotics, education, psychoanalysis and aesthetic theory provided perspectives for Courtney about learning through drama.

McLeod [Interview] called Courtney a *bricoleur*, one who works with various materials, gathering together, adapting and constructing them into his own unique architecture. Courtney did not try to consolidate an overall theory, but rather “intended that readers... make up their own minds” (1984, p. 3). His seminal work *Play, Drama and Thought* (1968a) “was not written for closure but was open-ended” (Courtney, 1984, p. 3) to offer channels of possibility and stimuli for further work. “I think the difficulty people had was that he gave so many different perspectives you ultimately didn’t know where he was coming
from” [McLeod Interview]. In looking for Courtney’s construction of learning through drama I have selected and distilled certain concepts from his writings, while leaving out many others. I have selected ideas that seem important within the framework that has taken shape.

“Richard made a map for others to follow” but it is “hard to find a program based on or one that even stems for his work--his contribution is of a different order” (McLeod, personal communication, 8 January 1997). I believe that Courtney’s contribution was to proliferate notions about drama which pointed to ways of including drama in ongoing discussions about educational processes. Courtney did not write to provide answers, but rather to offer provocative questions. Courtney (1990) described his approach as akin to

what McLuhan called a probe--a way of exploring the issues in order to lead us onward. Its ideas are meant not as ends in themselves but as means to continue exploration. What could be more appropriate in a book that addresses dramatic action? (p. 164)

Thus, “the way to see Richard’s work is to try to engage with the ideas he is trying to explore” (McLeod, personal communication, 8 January 1997) rather than to critique them as finished products. Courtney played with ideas, and intended that others take up the play. Courtney (1988) admired the ludic qualities of his friend Marshall McLuhan, McLuhan’s “shock value of verbal playfulness” and “intellectual juggling framed by the absurd” (p. 202).

There was a story Richard liked to write about... where McLuhan’s giving this lecture and the lecture goes on and then three quarters of an hour later someone stands up and says, “Professor McLuhan you said the exact opposite twenty minutes ago.” And McLuhan says: “I’m not the same person I was twenty minutes ago.” And it would be irritating. And Richard
loved all that. Richard also didn’t care that he obscured things. [McLeod interview]

Courtney’s perspectives shifted constantly. He was interested in the functions of perspectives—the way an “act” was being performed and its metacognitive message rather than in its more pedestrian content. While some might describe Courtney’s approach as lacking follow through, this was his intentional style. He valued a constantly shifting perspective that proliferated meanings, which he considered an indication of dramatic intelligence. Courtney rarely defined his own position, disliking fixity and closure. Thus his writings seem like scripts that readers as actors take up and flesh out with their own characters. They are different perspectives to try on for awhile. Courtney left it for others to make up their own minds. I discussed this with McLeod:

Mallika: I think his writing is often an elliptical form, like a script into which the reader reads a lot of their own ideas.
McLeod: And he would be pleased with that. It was entering into a dialogue. He wanted people to enter into that dialogue. That’s how he wrote. He uses the same processes as the actor, as the drama person, as the person doing drama. He was able to say, this is the process of drama. I will use the same process in my work as a theoretician. Drama’s a way of understanding. Richard was saying, if it is a way of understanding, is there a form of discourse at other levels which can be dramatic as well?

At the same time, McLeod agreed, Courtney’s writing excludes dialogue. While Courtney’s writing is elliptic, it is also often impenetrable. Where does Courtney stand? There is practically no usage of the first person singular—the “I.” Courtney’s writing is like a performance in that the audience must contribute to the meaning of the performance, while the performer remains in a separate stage world. Like an actor on a stage, Courtney was absorbed in his own role. As he
pointed the way to different ideas he implied, "This too is an act. What, after all, is reality?" It is difficult to find Courtney's own opinions or even Courtney himself in his writings.

While Courtney (1984) said of his early writings that they were deliberately open-ended (p. 3), he did outline ideas more systematically in later books (1990, 1995). Many of these ideas seem to be flirtations with, if not appropriations from, the notions of others. For example, large portions of Drama and Intelligence (1990), Drama and Feeling (1995), and Play, Drama and Thought (1968a, 1974, 1989) read like literature reviews. Courtney (1984) described his writings as a wheel whose spokes radiate outward from a single point and do not merge again. At the hub of the wheel is the idea that "spontaneous drama is a fundamental way for human beings to learn" (p. 3). The spokes are the many ideas and perspectives with which Courtney played. Making one's way back into this hub--the central message of Courtney's writings--is not straightforward, as he warned: "This may be complex or even dense ... but no one claimed that the theoretical task was simple" (p. 13).

My task in this analysis was to find his construction of how people learn through doing drama. I sought "the story being told", to construct a cohesive narrative from the webs of Courtney's abstract language. McLeod (Researching the Arts, n.d., p. 13) wrote that interpretation is a process of finding metaphors to explain the text. Since I accept this point, my task was to find metaphors to highlight the themes of Courtney's work while retaining many of Courtney's different perspectives. Mine was a postmodern performance of Courtney's abstractions and metaphors for learning through drama. Stepping into Courtney's shifting perspectives was like taking on roles and developing their meanings through enactment, which in this case entailed concrete but often hypothetical examples. Fleshing out Courtney's work through examples was a performance of Courtney's texts. Ironically, in contrast to other qualitative studies where data are concrete and the analysis abstract, here the data were abstract and the analysis required concrete, if hypothetical, scenarios of real life examples as metaphors for
the text. If Courtney wrote elliptical scripts for the actor/reader, I became that actor, interpreting the text and stage directions of Courtney’s writings as living actions.

Like dramas, Courtney’s writings cluster in nonlinear fashion, proliferating meanings without necessarily forming a logical whole (Courtney, 1990, p. 159). To contain and organize these meanings, I adapted the metaphor of a drama, or the dramatistic method (Burke, 1968). Taking a dramatistic approach in this study meant looking for the metaphorical elements of dramatic action—the setting, the actor, the action and the Other of the metaphorical drama of which Courtney wrote. Specifically, I used the metaphor of the actor to represent the person who is learning. That person acts within a metaphorical setting, and goes through metaphorical acts, the dramas that comprise learning. These are the interactive elements of a hypothetical drama. While Courtney wrote of his writings as centrifugal, diverging from a center, my approach has been centripetal, returning inward finally to the actor, the learner at the center of this holistic process, for Courtney’s approach to the term “drama” is specifically holistic: inner mental imagining (covert operations) and external embodied dramatic action (overt operations) are two sides of the same coin—*intertwined aspects of one process*. ... a total process whereby the *intentionality* of mind interacts with the external world in order to create meaning, living and knowledge. (1984, p. 13)

The hub of my wheel, then, is the internal process of the actor. The hub of Courtney's wheel was "learning through drama," the central notion about which he wrote. This chapter addresses the terms “drama” and “learning.” Courtney’s perspectives on drama entailed constant redefinition of the term drama. The problem of defining drama cannot be solved in this chapter, but the solution can
be initiated. What is drama, and where is the territory for which Courtney designed so many maps?

Finding the Dramatic Territory

Courtney's use of the word drama is like a web. Strands interconnect, turning this way and that, looping through another section and returning to catch a whole blanket of strands together. I introduce some strands of the web which I will weave recursively through the analysis. These strands connect more intricately as I progress through different layers. In much of Courtney’s work, “it is not, simply, that life is like a stage; life itself is a drama” (Courtney, 1980, p. 20). The ancient phrase that Courtney often used for this metaphor of drama as life is *theatrum mundi*, theater of the world. Landy [Interview] called this metaphor “more than a metaphor... maybe it’s a methodology.” To give an idea of the scope of ideas Courtney used in his definitions of drama, I discuss the metaphor *Theatrum Mundi* upon which Courtney relied in his forays into the dramatic territory. If drama is Courtney’s perspective on the way people learn and act in the world, dramas make up the world. Whence comes this notion of drama as life?

*Theatrum Mundi*, or Drama = Life

*Theatrum Mundi* is as ancient as the theatre itself. When Shakespeare wrote “All the world’s a stage”, he was expressing an idiom of the popular culture prevalent since at least 5th century Athens (Burns, 1972). Courtney found in Prospero’s words in *The Tempest* apt expression of this metaphor. “For Prospero, life is not simply like a theatre; it is a play we all perform. Human existence is a dramatic illusion that, like a dream, melts and dissolves” (Courtney, 1990, p. 71).

Theatre or drama not only describes the way we see life, it is also the process that
we live and act. We see life as a drama not only from the audience, but also as actors upon a common stage.

Learning has long been connected with drama (Courtney, 1968a, 1974, 1989). The Greeks derived the word theory from theatre: “To theorize meant, then, to see the world, to report on the world and more significantly, to elucidate the seen but unnoticed features of the world” (Lyman & Scott, 1975, p. 1). Frye (1990) put it succinctly when he said seeing the world was like viewing the theatre; theoria means “knowledge” (p. 243). The metaphor that life is a drama provides drama therapy with an approach for integrating the dramatic process with the processes or life (Jones, 1996; Jennings, 1993, 1994, 1995).

Psychoanalysts have analyzed life as a drama. Bollas (1987, 1992), following Freud, wrote of the experience of the self as a theatrical experience, one of a “producer and the dramatized personage employed to stage unconscious thinking” (1992, p. 13). McDougall (1991) used the metaphor more specifically when she analyzed case studies as the self-scripted dramas of her clients. Jungians use the metaphor of life as drama by seeing the therapeutic process as a process of moving through different roles that represent parts of the psyche in a quasi-mystical process called the Dionysian or theatrical logic of the psyche: “Our lives are... dramas, we are masks through which the Gods sound” (Hillman, 1983, p. 37).

Courtney (1989, 1990) referred to “theatricality”, an artistic movement that took place in reaction to theatrical realism. For theatricalists it is life that imitates drama, not vice versa. “Theatricality is a quality which makes the drama dramatic... Theatricality lifts drama out of the ordinary ... the real is turned into the symbolic” (McLeod, 1989, p. 4). Playwright/actor/director Nikolai Evreinov (1970) coined the term theatricality based on his idea that theatre is a basic human instinct, a form of metacommunication, and the medium of learning. Evreinov believed that people are compelled to drama by an instinct for transformation, a “will to theatre”, to create new realities and new characters, to escape from ordinary reality. Evreinov called theatre “pre-aesthetic” because it is about
transformation, not formation. He believed theatre cures the audience as it cures the actor. He called this theatrotherapy which is sometimes considered drama therapy’s predecessor (Burns, 1973). Antonin Artaud’s (1958) theatricalist message was based on the idea that life is the double of theatre. Ionesco, following Artaud’s footsteps, “spent a lifetime seeking, in his dreams and waking experiences, the archetypal elements of a theatrical language capable of making metaphysical statements about human existence” (Karampetsos, 1995, p. 103).

This movement is closely tied to Courtney’s ideas about learning. Courtney was especially interested in theatricalist Luigi Pirandello, who wrote plays that were interpenetrating layers of theatre and life. In Pirandello’s *Six Characters in Search of an Author*, fictional characters encounter actors who want to play their parts. The entire play is a struggle between the fiction and the reality of characters and actors, in which the fictional characters possess an urgent authenticity of feeling that the real actors lack. Fiction and reality seem to be intertwined in an infinite series of receding mirrors. For Courtney (1995) Pirandello’s plays are a metacognitive reflection about the intellectual side of drama. They illustrate “an ontology that is highly cognitive”, showing that

- cognition is a matter of perspective. Within any one dramatic world there are various subworlds that fit together like a set of Chinese boxes (p. 44)…
- A comic illusion (the human mask) hides the tragic reality of existence (the face), and both are different from judgments of emotions and feelings…
- the paradox exists. (p. 61)

Theatricalists used metaphors from theatre like masks, roles and settings to illuminate existential issues, metaphors Courtney also used to connect drama and life. Educator Jerome Bruner (1986) has also written about the instinct for dramatization, a concrete form of meaning-making (p. 64). For Bruner (1986,
drama is a form of narrative, basic to the ways people make sense of the world.

The social sciences have used the metaphor of drama as life as an analytic tool. Turner (1974) used the metaphor of Greek dramas to describe events in a Ndembu village, in which he saw Ndembu society’s inexorable social pressures in terms of the traditional Fates of Greek drama. Courtney relied on the work of anthropologists who have recognized the dramatic qualities of symbolic interactions (Cohen, 1974; Turner, 1974; Geertz, 1980, 1983). Turner (1986) named the study of dramatic and symbolic processes the “anthropology of experience.” Seeing life as a drama provides a vocabulary for discussing dynamic processes of social events (Geertz, 1983). A human event can never be an “isolated, static text... enactments are what make the text transformative... We deal here with performed texts” (Bruner, E., 1986). A “sociology of knowledge” should not be conceived in terms of static categories, but as a “social affair... an outdoor psychology” (Geertz, 1983, p. 153). Courtney drew from the writings of these social scientists in his work on formulating the process of drama as learning, using their notions of social drama, liminality, and the ways people learn through social interactions. Courtney (1988) also wrote that anthropology’s analytic approaches show how “society can be revealed by a dramaturgical and ritualistic perspective” (p. 124).

Dramaturgical and ritualist perspectives are two sociological versions of the metaphor of drama. The former in Burke’s theory of dramatism (1968), and the latter in Turner’s (1974) writings on ritual and social drama, set human events in terms of processes and not categories. An example of the dramaturgical perspective is Geertz’s analysis of Bali as a theatre state (1980) in which he documented social processes, symbols, and an ethos other than political power, “a poetics of power.” This dramaturgical perspective sees life as a theatre viewed by an audience. The ritualistic perspective views the populace as participating like actors in “the great mass ceremonies--political operas of Burgundian dimensions” (Geertz, 1983, p. 27). In order to continue to refine the understanding social
scientists gain from these dramatic metaphors, Geertz called for a collaboration between social scientists and students of theatre:

But my point is that some of those fit to judge work of this kind ought to be humanists who reputedly know something about what theater and mimesis and rhetoric are, and not just with respect to my work but to that of the whole steadily broadening stream of social analyses in which the drama analogy is, in one form or another, governing...at a time when social scientists are chattering about actors, scenes, plot, performances, and personae. (p. 27)

Courtney’s Theatrum Mundi

In Courtney’s work, drama and life sometimes seem indistinguishable: “The whole of human life is acting” (Courtney, 1977, p. 375). “Drama is the dramatic process in life as whole; drama is how we live. We act with the world from the time we are born to the moment we die” (Courtney, 1968b, p. 233). These statements imply that drama exists in every living moment. However, such a notion becomes meaningless. If drama is everything why does the term drama even exist?

It's quite useful to talk about the Theatrum Mundi idea, but there must be limits to it. Life is not a drama. To me drama is a transformation of lived experience. So there's a distortion that goes on in drama. What's the nature of that distortion? [McLeod interview]

McLeod distinguished between the philosophical notion of Theatrum Mundi and its effective application. In fact, Courtney's writings comprise many ways of expressing the distortion McLeod mentioned. For example, Courtney wrote that drama is a process born of the imagination, that the individual expresses outwardly:
Drama is being “as if.” It is a total process, internal and external, that occurs when we transform our creative imagination into acts, when we create mental fictions and express them in spontaneous play, creative drama, improvisation, role play, and theatre (Courtney, 1990, Preface).

A word of caution: in looking for definitions in Courtney’s work, one must bear in mind that Courtney drew literally from any source that made reference to the idea of drama (personal communication, October, 1996). Courtney was less interested in a precise definition of drama than in expanding the ways of talking about drama. Sometimes drama is a language that speaks in symbols, sometimes it is a means of self-presentation, sometimes it is the interaction between people’s personal meanings. Courtney used these ideas about drama and many others to discuss the way people learn through doing drama. In order to do justice to the story that Courtney is telling about drama and learning, I began my analysis by searching for the territory of drama. I analyzed the relationship of Courtney’s writings to the metaphor Theatrum Mundi. Beginning with drama = life, I generated a semiotic square to look at patterns of meaning for Courtney’s dramatic territory.

Courtney’s Circles and Squares

The following analysis used one of Courtney’s own methods for structuring his thinking. As opposed to linear thought, Courtney (1995) wrote that symbolic forms like circles, mandalas and four-sided figures like quaternities represent wholeness, unity and the transformation of energy into harmony which is also the purpose of dramatic acts (p. 58). These kinds of structures help to express the holistic nature of life. The four-sided quaternity “is as old as the human race” and has been “unrivaled as a way of understanding” for millennia (p.
59). Courtney used many examples to illustrate this way of understanding, including the following:
Plains Indian Quaternity

WEST
Introspection
Bear
Black

NORTH
Wisdom
Buffalo
White

EAST
Illumination
Eagle
Yellow

SOUTH
Innocence
Mouse
Green

The above quaternity is a map of the universe according to the Plains Indians. Whether or not they called it a quaternity, it is a four-sided scheme that appears in various forms in the Plains culture to describe its structure of truth and of reality. Courtney (1995) found that such schemes used by tribal peoples correspond to the underlying nature of drama, being holistic and encompassing rather than linear (p. 62). Like drama such quaternities involve an inner dimension, or double level of meaning. For example, turning to the north, one finds not only coldness, whiteness and the buffalo, but also wisdom. The structure shows the coexistence of the inner and outer world for the Plains Indian, in doubled or parallel quaternities. Like the wheel metaphor which Courtney used to describe his writings, circular structures like mandalas and four-sided structures like quaternities also symbolize the multifaceted wholeness of life which radiates from a center. The four-sided structure is, for Courtney (1990), a way of viewing the circle, and helps to organize it:

For Jung, the circle is the symbol of wholeness and fourfoldness is the divine’s way of surveying the circle. Brahma, standing on a huge lotus,
turns his eyes to the four directions before his work of creation. This action not only parallels "the divine quaternity" of Christianity, it also reflects the same concept in the fourfold function of consciousness: thought, feeling, intuition, and sensation.... not just metaphors for the four qualities of consciousness; they are also symbols of the necessary integration of these four functions that human beings must strive for. (p. 115)

In the following analysis based on Courtney's *Theatrum Mundi* I constructed a four-sided chart or semiotic square like the squares and quaternities which Courtney discussed extensively as forms for organizing complex holistic notions. Courtney considered such square inherently "dramatic." They structure ideas the way interpretations of dramas structure ideas, relying on internal relationships of meanings rather than relationships with terms external to their context (Knight, 1960). The audience views a drama and understands it according to the play of elements within the drama, not by categorizing the drama according to an external framework. Qualitative research also uses semiotic squares as analytic tools (Feldman, 1995) to map meanings. "Semiotics is concerned with understanding the processes by which signs come to have meaning" (p. 22). The semiotic square is useful where meanings have numerous connotations and are imprecise. The semiotic square assists in clarifying the variety of meanings. Rather than providing definitive information, a semiotic square highlights and proliferates meaning clusters. For example, a semiotic square of elemental forces could be used to map an alchemical view of the universe where any form of life can be charted in the quadrant, depending on its mixture of elemental qualities.
The above square, which I explain below, illuminates the idea of alchemy by dealing with the relationships among its internal terms, rather than classifying the notion of alchemy by comparing it with external terms.

How is a semiotic square constructed? Courtney followed Greimas (1983), generating semiotic squares by finding opposing terms (Courtney, 1990, p. 76). For example, the top term in this case is Fire, which generates its opposite notion—the bottom term Air. The other axis employs different opposing terms, Earth and Water. For Courtney, this exemplifies the process of thinking, which also travels back and forth among opposing notions to work out meanings. Thinking works through comparing, contrasting and trying out ideas against each other. This notion of thinking, so basic to Courtney’s notions about learning through drama, is explored in a later chapter. Semiotic squares have been employed in this dissertation to create pastiches, structures on which to map Courtney’s ideas and phrases.

For example on the above square I mapped, in the Fire/Earth quadrant, a volcano—a fire beneath the earth—and its temperamental equivalent in a human being—the fiery but practical Julius Caesar. The organization of these terms illustrates the idea of alchemy.
In the following square about the territory of drama I generated the axes of a square by looking for opposite terms. Beginning with Theatrum Mundi, drama = life, I constructed a continuum from Drama = Life to its opposite, Drama _ Life.

\[
\text{Drama} = \text{Life} \quad < \quad \text{Drama}_\text{Life}
\]

This continuum describes drama as an outer form. To form the other continuum I addressed the inner experience of drama. The oldest critical treatise on drama is Aristotle’s Poetics, which called drama mimesis, often translated as “imitation.” For Courtney (1989), the word “identification” is closer to the reality of drama.

Imitation occurs when \textit{specific items} of a culture are taken over… (without necessarily)… any emotional relation between the actor and the model. Differently, identification is the process, built on empathy, whereby the actor \textit{internalizes the values of the model} and is motivated to imitate. (emphasis in original) (p. 167)

For Courtney, drama involves identification and empathy with feeling and values--what he called the “identification-impersonation complex.” Courtney also wrote that drama is transformation. On the one hand, identification is an act of entering into another’s reality, on the other hand transformation is an act of changing reality. This is my own experience of drama, in that I sometimes experience acting as entering completely into another character, while at other times my experience is one of creating a new character. Martin Buber (Friedman, 1969) also found

there are two types of great actors… those who by means of their capacity for absolute receptivity and absolute imitation unite the movements of expression into a total figure, and those who… produce out of themselves … systems of expression… (p. 11).
In Courtney’s work I found both references to the experience of acting, one of entering into an existing character, and the other of creating a new character. For example, some rituals involve entering into the identity of a god, whereas many secular performances entail creating new characters. Interestingly, Bakhtin (1981) also wrote that the themes of literature are located along the poles of identity and transformation (p. 122). Since drama is about Being and is a process of transformation, this seems a natural dichotomy for writers who deal with dramatic genres. Therefore the second continuum corresponds to phrases from Courtney’s work as follows:

| Drama = Identification | Drama = Transformation |

"This act of identification and impersonation is the bedrock of all dramatic action" (Courtney, 1990, p. 21)  
"...spontaneous drama... transforms the cognitive, affective, aesthetic, and psychomotor aspects of our thought" (Courtney, 1995 Preface)

Like the first axis that ranges from drama = life to drama ≠ life, this second axial dichotomy between identification and transformation is rhetorical. I used it as a device to tease out elements of Courtney’s ideas about drama, through a conceptual and artificial division. Intuitively, I know that people use both identification and transformation at the same time, and in many different ways. For example, by playing the part of another or identifying with them, I transform...
myself. My playing of that part transforms that part. And throughout life's roles, my identification is transformed continually. Here I split these terms, using this dichotomy to organize different phrases about drama in Courtney's work. The semiotic square thus generated was a framework on which to map Courtney's phrases about drama and to locate patterns of meaning. I employed it as a rhetorical device, not to define drama once and for all, but to illuminate the territory of drama using this particular map.
Below is the same square with some of Courtney's phrases about drama. For example, Courtney discussed the god Thoth as the "masker... the dramatizer ...the ancient trickster. He was also the ancestor of Hermes, the messenger of the Greek gods, 'he who puts play into play'" (Courtney, 1990, p. 47). This notion of a dramatizer/god belongs in 3., the lower lefthand quadrant of the map, where drama is different from life, and also transforms life. Elsewhere Courtney wrote: "When we put ourselves in someone else's shoes, we try to think and act as they do. This act of identification and impersonation is the bedrock of all dramatic action." In this phrase Drama = Identification and Drama = Life, locating it in 1., the upper righthand quadrant. At the center of the square is the double world of drama, exemplified in Courtney's words: "Drama is a spontaneous human process whereby we think and act in an "as if" fiction while, simultaneously, we are engaged in a living process" (Courtney, 1995, 3).
Courtney’s words on drama, mapped in the four quadrants of this figure (Figure 3), resulted in a pastiche in the form of a semiotic square. Please see the following page:
Figure 5
Theatrum Mundi Square with Extensive Text

Drama = Life

When drama is life, life drama, the metaphoric/dramatic mode is the way cognition and intelligence function... (1990, p. 80)

We act with the world from the time we are born to the moment we die (1977, p. 223).

The whole of human life is acting (1968b, p. 375).

In life we deal with actual thoughts and acts (1990, Preface).

Imaginings are externalized in a dramatic act, (to) ...provide feedback to mind in ways it can grasp (1990, p. 54).

The dramatic world we create is a significant element in a universe of cognitive meaning. Although we ground questions of human existence in actuality, we compare the actual with the dramatic world in order to understand it (1990, p. 10).

Drama is a spontaneous human process whereby we think and act as an "as if" fiction while, simultaneously, we are engaged in a living process (1995, p. 31).

Our creative imagination and dramatic actions are experienced as a whole, and together they create meaning. They bring about the "as if" world of possibility (the fictional), which works in parallel with the actual world and is a cognitive tool for understanding it (1990, p. 9).

Drama = Identification

When we put ourselves in someone else's shoes, we try to think and act as they do. This act of identification and impersonation is the bedrock of all dramatic action...The more we do so, the more intelligence becomes a factor in our lives (1990, p. 21).

Kant permits the dramatic world to be both imitation and a free activity through analogy: this occurs in the operation of "as if," which Kant essentially sees as a way of knowing (1990, p. 47).

In drama, we deal with imagined thoughts and dramatic action as an intellectual and cognitive activity (1990, Preface).

Drama is "being as if"...we transform our creative imagination into acts (1990, Preface).

Drama = Life

Thoth, the enigmatic Egyptian god of the moon...was the "masker," the "masquer," the dramatizer, related to the ancient trickster...ancestor of Hermes, the messenger of the Greek gods, "he who puts play into play" (1990, p. 47).

In drama, we deal with imagined thoughts and dramatic action as an intellectual and cognitive activity (1990, Preface).

Drama is "being as if"...we transform our creative imagination into acts (1990, Preface).
In Figure 3 above I have italicized ideas about learning and meaning. I listed them in the following table, which is organized by quadrant:

Figure 6
Analysis of Figure 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrant or axis</th>
<th>Theme of quadrant or axis</th>
<th>Ideas about learning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Drama = Life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama = Identification</td>
<td>The dramatic act mediates between self and world.</td>
<td>dramatic action is a mediator and generates meaning; the actor is the medium that carries meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama ≠ Life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama = Identification</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>identification and impersonation develop intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Drama = Identification</td>
<td>Creative activity of a personal nature in which drama helps to know the world.</td>
<td>the “as if” imagination is a way of knowing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All of these ideas provided different perspectives on learning through drama. Of all these ideas, the last phrase taken from the center of the figure linked the terms involved, and described the dynamic central to Courtney’s argument:

Our creative imagination and dramatic actions are experienced as a whole, and together they create meaning. They bring about the “as if’ world of possibility (the fictional), which works in parallel with the actual world and is a cognitive tool for understanding it. (Courtney, 1990, p. 9)

In drama, people are involved in two worlds at once, an actual world and their own fictional world. It is the double awareness of these worlds, the juxtaposition
of the real and the fictional, that creates learning and permits the movement to transformation. The fictional world, Courtney wrote, is a “cognitive tool” for understanding the real world. By creating a fictional world, people are able to mediate their understanding of the outer world. This is the mechanism of learning central to Courtney’s work: the comparison between imagination and reality, which changes “what we know.” The actual coexists with the imagination, and identification coexists with transformation. However learning is involved with phrases at all locations of the square. Courtney used myriad formulations to pin down the process of drama as learning. These explanations can be seen as paths, roads, or even travelers coursing through the general domain or territory of drama, the semiotic square as a whole.

One must bear in mind that the state of being in the drama is different from knowing through analysis. The above square or map is an analytic tool. However the territory of drama can only be experienced through dramatic action, living through performative acts. That is the difference between the discursive knowing that I employed in writing this paragraph and the immediate knowing of the drama experience itself. Courtney called these two ways of knowing frames. The first frame of being in a drama is “significant to our feelings, intuition, and judgments (the aesthetic-cognitive), and it is also cognitive by providing deep inner meanings (personal knowing)” (Courtney, 1990, p. 38). This is the territory. The second frame of analyzing a drama provides a “knowing about”—the map which corresponds to Figure 5.

It is the task of relating these two that fell to me in writing this dissertation. I had to find “concrete hypothetical” examples to “perform Courtney’s text”—to give his words living meaning. I began this task with another semiotic square. To evoke some living meanings of the word drama, I mapped some drama experiences on the same semiotic square which was illustrated above. I refer to Figure 7 below.
**Figure 7**
The Territory of Drama

I placed these examples on this quadrant as follows:

**Figure 8**
Analysis of Figure 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrant or axis</th>
<th>Example placed on quadrant or axis</th>
<th>Note on placement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drama = Life</td>
<td>Shakespeare’s histories</td>
<td>Histories of England—&quot;real life&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Drama = Life</td>
<td>Television programming</td>
<td>Imitates life using identification and identities—from soap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Drama = Identification | Shamanic possession | The performer is possessed by the role
Romeo & Juliet | Exercises power of romantic identification |
|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------|
| **2. Drama = Life**    | **Drama = Identification** | paranoia | Identification with highly subjective (not "real") states of mind
Performance Art | Identification with highly subjective artistic interpretation |
| **Drama = Life**       | The Tempest         | Fantasy world |
| **3. Drama = Life**    | **Drama = Transformation** | *Absolutely Fabulous* - British satirical and farcical sitcom | Life is inverted, transformed and transforming through farce.
The classic figure of the fool. | Ultimate outsider who mocks society and whose critiques ultimately change it. |
| **Drama = Transformation** | Japanese Noh theatre | Highly stylized theatre, transformation by theatrical techniques, Noh theatre uses exquisitely slow movements, harsh |
This pastiche was not intended to define types of drama, but rather to play with these ideas, "improvise" them and display the range of dramas implied by the semiotic square. The interpretations are my own, for which I make no universal claims. I have constructed both pastiches to unfold and organize some major ideas involved in Courtney’s writings, and to illustrate how differently Courtney’s ideas can be “performed” with examples from living material. The two squares function like Courtney’s wheel by spinning out a variety of notions about drama. They illustrate the territory of drama.

The other notion at the hub of Courtney’s wheel is learning.

What is Learning?

This is the basic question driving this dissertation. Courtney’s explanations about learning are like pathways through the dramatic territory (Figure 5). Clearly there are a number of ways learning takes place. For Courtney, dramatic intelligence implies writing new scripts, by making use of the power of felt-meaning, perspectival agility, and complex clusters of meanings (Courtney, 1995, 28; 1990, 155; 1990, 124). Learning through drama is a form of meaning-making,
referring to the self while in interaction with others. Courtney believed drama catalyzed agency and personal choice--that people can write new scripts for their social and personal realities. These scripts are tested in interactions with others or with an audience. Courtney (1990) organized some of his ideas about learning into several typologies of learning processes (pp. 138-144) as follows. The first typology given here refers to kinds of learning, the second typology to the quality of learning.

The first typology lists the kinds of learning that come from drama: extrinsic, intrinsic, aesthetic and artistic.

- Extrinsic learning focuses on content or subject matter.
- Intrinsic learning involves metacognition, learning how to learn, and a deeper level of epistemological and ontological development. Intrinsic learning develops qualities like awareness, concentration, expression, inventiveness, problem identification and solving, confidence, social learning, negotiation, motivation and transferable skills.
- Aesthetic learning is the development of feeling, choice, judgment, and the complex functions of the imagination that operate in all types of cognition and intelligence. “Dramatic action refines raw emotion into feelings that can be controlled and expressed productively” (Courtney, 1990, p. 140). It is aesthetic learning that “creates aesthetic worlds” and develops empathy, identification, and facility with media.
- Artistic learning is the development of skill and artistry. In drama this means creating personae, dialogue and gesture, manipulating dynamics such as light/dark, sound/silence, and movement/stillness.

Potentially all four learnings can take place in drama, although it is aesthetic learning which underpins the dramatic experience (Courtney, 1990, p. 12; 1995, p. 24, p. 42, p. 56, p. 71).
Courtney's paradigm privileged intrinsic and aesthetic learning over extrinsic and artistic learning. Courtney placed little emphasis on artistic learning, since for him drama is an act of the imagination for all students, but a potential profession for very few. For Courtney (1982) drama is most useful for personal development. He established an area of study he called Developmental Drama (p. 5) "the study of transformations created by dramatic action" (Courtney, 1990, p. 1). In contrast to the notion of developmental drama, the emphasis in the US is on production of theatre (Landy, 1975) with little focus on the value of the experience for the actor, or the intrinsic and aesthetic learnings that Courtney discusses. The kind of learning least emphasized in Courtney's paradigm is extrinsic learning, although extrinsic learning seems to be the focus of drama education in the US. For example, funding seems to be most readily available for drama groups that seek to solve social problems by teaching about AIDS or sexuality. Such different approaches to drama have quite different practical implications for teaching or researching drama education. Here is an example of an emphasis on extrinsic learning.

In a hypothetical yet typical case, suppose there is a drama group--call it AIDS TEAM--which is funded to teach youngsters in a halfway house issues related to AIDS and sexuality. The participants are former drug dealers or other juvenile offenders. AIDS TEAM objective is the participants' acquisition of knowledge about AIDS and sexuality, testing this knowledge through entry and exit interviews. However, it is very likely that the participants already have a highly developed understanding of AIDS and sexuality, picked up on the street as well as through the numerous programs they have already been part of. My experience has been that youngsters who have lived by dealing drugs tend to be quick and intelligent, a reality I have found to be overlooked by many social service programs. The participants might feign a certain amount of ignorance at the beginning and reveal the extent of their knowledge at the end. But this knowledge of AIDS and sexuality would be of little importance to the participants, since it would already be familiar to them; rather, the participants
would be looking for other kinds of information. For example, the participants might be studying the AIDS TEAM to understand better how to manipulate their “handlers.” They might be studying dramatic scenes to learn more seduction techniques, or lines to use in real life situations. I suggest that a youngster who has survived dealing drugs on the street may very well have advanced dramatic intelligence—in terms of negotiating skills, projecting emotional effects such as intimidation, reading the inner intentions of others, quick reflexes and a ready repartee. It is possible, then, that intrinsic learning may be occurring on a different level than anticipated. That is, the youngsters may be gathering information at a metacognitive level to achieve their own goals. This raises the issue: if drama teachers do not have a grasp of how to recognize and understand intrinsic levels of learning, but concentrate only on extrinsic learnings, how can they know what is actually “going on”? I suggest that, to study intrinsic learnings, it will be necessary to develop analytic tools different from those used to study extrinsic learnings. Courtney’s thinking, for example, might be a step in that direction.

To continue with this hypothetical example, if cognitive outputs are not always useful, then what kinds of learnings should drama educators focus on when working with youngsters to help them find alternatives in life? I find that body awareness involved in, for example, mime, poses a developmental challenge that is useful for awareness and grounding of emotions (Henry, 1997a, b, c). Young people who have lived by their wits and suffered repeated forms of abuse have learned to shut off their feelings and body awareness, to not live in the moment. A gradual process of the intrinsic learning of self- and body-awareness poses more of a challenge, with potentially more benefits to reflectiveness and self-direction, than cognitive lessons in misdiagnosed areas, like knowledge about AIDS and sexuality -- misdiagnosed because many youngsters in this situation already have considerable knowledge. Physical and emotional self-awareness is needed for emotional control, empathy with others and deeper self-knowledge. Courtney called these intrinsic learnings. An emphasis on intrinsic learning overlaps with dramatherapy, particularly with what is called the “wellness
model.” Therapeutic goals of the wellness model are not to “fix something” that is “deviant,” but to help people develop inner qualities. The idea of intrinsic learning blurs the traditional divisions that society makes between education and therapy. In the evolving notion of drama therapy, for example, “the drama process (inherently) contains the therapy” (Jones, 1996, p. 4). If drama inherently involves learning as posited by Courtney, there should be a close relationship between therapy and learning. Extrinsic learning about AIDS and sexuality might be better taught through direct use of dialogue and verbal information.

A second typology of learning concerns the quality, or level of learning, which Courtney called the “Theory of Logical Types” (Courtney, 1990, p. 141). This theory was derived from theories of Whitehead, Russell and Bateson. The first level is “zero learning” in which one receives information—such as reading a clock to tell the time. Learning I includes the kind of learning measured by experimental psychologists, like classical conditioning, rote learning, and basic reinforcement. This learning entails simple conditioning without reflexive awareness. Learning II is learning-to-learn “through consciousness, self-consciousness and development of world view” (p. 142). Learning II includes holistic models and the complexity of self-awareness involved in dramatic acts, which facilitate “a redefinition of the self... through Learning II people are capable of developing highly complex conceptual frameworks and world views that can be applied to new situations.” For example, learning about cultural norms and one’s society might be considered Learning II. Finally Learning III entails taking new perspectives leading to new ways of thinking and the creation of new classes and mental structures... breaking down existing thought patterns... provides a kind of metaperspective on all thought, action and learning. It implies a radical reorganization of previous learning... The “I” and its role in relationship is no longer as significant as the perspective on self and its role. (Courtney, 1990, p. 143)
Learning III occurs when the actor is not concerned with defending his own ego, but can step outside of the drama and see many perspectives. Learning III encourages spontaneity and subverts existing narratives. Courtney equated Learning III with dramatic action in which “fiction takes on the characteristics of paradox. Here dramatic fiction is the model of all metaperspectives, a factor that is essential to intelligence at this level” (Courtney, 1990, p. 145).

I suggest as an example to illustrate these levels of learning the experience of entering a cave. If I enter a cave in the dark, I find that moving to the left I encounter a slimy wall, moving to the right I sense a precipice. I can only learn about the cave as I test different actions, but still cannot understand the layout of the cave nor where I am headed. This is Learning 0 and I. If there is light in the cave, I can see my way, understand the formations of stalactites and stalagmites, and grasp the underground system I have entered. This is Learning II. But if I am an experienced geologist, familiar with the terrain, and the history of the land, I can see how layers of rock have buckled, flooded and drained over millennia. I know there is a mountain above me and that subterranean rivers converging here become springs on the mountainside. I know the habits of the prehistoric peoples who used the cave 10,000 years ago and I decide to penetrate the cave further to see their paintings. I not only understand the cave as a system, I understand it in relationship with other systems of land formation, hydrothermic action and the evolution of man. This is Learning III.

Courtney saw drama as a model for any learning situation that uses different perspectives on the same situation or works with metaperspectives. Courtney considered these qualities to be intrinsically dramatic. Because an actor must keep in mind outer and inner perspectives, his own and other actors’ perspectives, and his personal perspective and that of his role, drama is essentially perspectival. Similarly, a drama has meaning insofar as viewers and actors can relate to the double reality of fiction and actual. Metaperspectives which take into account the larger picture are “dramatic.” For example, a child fights with her mother over homework and the mother wins. But if the child can see the larger
picture—which includes both learning to manipulate her mother and the greater value of doing her homework—the child has a larger perspective on the drama and can use the situation to her advantage. The child sees the drama both from the inside—where she senses her mother’s emotional reactions—and from the outside, where she understands the total picture. If the child can switch her perspectives, Courtney would say that the child’s resilience and elasticity comprise dramatic intelligence. Dramatic intelligence is the ability to switch perspectives and gain knowledge from doing so. Thus Learning III is involved with drama only insofar as the actor is fully aware of the various metaperspectives involved. This is one limitation on the claims Courtney makes for learning through drama. Drama, in Courtney’s paradigm, necessarily entails awareness and self-awareness.

There are other limitations of Courtney’s model. Courtney (1990) posited that drama can release the potential for a superior level of intelligence and learning: “It is a major assumption of this book that behind much learning lie tacit dramatic acts” that “increase our potential for intelligence” (Courtney, 1990, p. 147). This seems reasonable only insofar as drama is an internal action rather than the external work done by actors and drama educators. It is the “inner imaginative thought and the spontaneous dramatic action which results (which) is ... an essential component of all genuine education” (Courtney, 1980, p. 2). Courtney (1984) wrote that his theory of drama education grew out of the close connection, made in Play, Drama and Thought, between internal imagination and external dramatic action. The term “drama,” therefore, is inclusive not only of dramatic behavior but also of dramatic thinking—imagining, or thinking “as if”... (p. 13)

Drama is an inner imaginative act, and a spontaneous dramatic act, rather than a scripted performance.

Courtney’s ideas about drama also depend on authentic dialogue. If a drama teacher or actor is unable to engage in authentic dialogue for reasons of...
insecurity or rigidity of belief, then going through the motions of drama will not suffice to place their work within this paradigm. Similarly, there are successful teachers, mothers, lawyers, business people, and other professionals who are adept at dialogue, and develop their intellectual potential through it. These people are doing drama, according to Courtney (1990):

Dramatic transformation is inherent in parenting, social learning, learning to learn, increased differentiation, maturation, and re-creation. Developmental Drama is the study of dramatic transformation as a total educative process, and it is holistic in its effect. (p. 164)

If dramas pervade daily life, then how can I define them dramatically, in terms of a dramatistic framework of setting, actor, and act? The following chapters proceed through this framework, addressing: 1) The setting, or the actor's universe, in which learning happens; 2) the act of drama and of learning; 3) the actor or learner, and 4) dialogue, since Courtney's work is modeled on dialogue. Each layer of the analysis addresses Courtney's notions of learning through drama in a recursive movement that spirals in toward the center of the drama--the actor/learner and his own internal processes. The final chapter synthesizes the learnings involved into a metaphoric construction, and discusses the implications for creating a learning environment and for research.
This chapter addresses the first element of the dramatistic framework adopted here: the setting. In the last chapter I began my journey through Courtney’s writings by mapping a territory for drama. Based on Courtney’s metaphor of drama as life, a semiotic square served to organize a number of Courtney’s phrases about learning through drama. The center of the square produced an idea of learning through drama which is central in Courtney’s writings: people create a fictional world juxtaposed with the actual world. The larger perspective generated by this double reality produces learning:

Our creative imagination and dramatic actions... bring about the “as if” world of possibility (the fictional), which works in parallel with the actual world and is a cognitive tool for understanding it. (Courtney, 1990, p. 9)

The metaphor of “worlds” describes actual and fictional frameworks—the settings in which people create their dramas. Personal worlds are the settings which people construct for their dramas. The present chapter analyzes Courtney’s metaphor of worlds.
What is a setting? The setting on a stage is a background that shapes the action of the play. For example, in Euripides’ play *Iphigenia at Taurus*, Agamemnon’s daughter Iphigenia is located in the setting of a cave where she is supposed to preside over the human sacrifice of any men who approach the island of Taurus. The setting of this cave contains an altar for human sacrifice which plays a significant role in the drama. Its significance lies partly in its contrast to the setting of the preceding play of the cycle, *The Trojan Women*, in which women and children were the sacrificial victims. In *Iphigenia at Taurus*, Iphigenia’s brother Orestes is the ostensible sacrificial victim, as part of a revenge cycle that began when Iphigenia was thought to have been sacrificed before the Trojan War. The sacrificial altar at Taurus is a stage setting which conveys a symbolic history of significance. What is the setting for people who are involved in life dramas in Courtney’s work? People create their own dramatic worlds. They learn by comparing these imaginary worlds with the actual world. While this notion of “world” is idiomatic—people often say “you’re in your own world”, or “what world did you come from?” Courtney applied “world” deliberately, as a metaphor for personal reality. What is the source of the metaphor of “worlds”?

**The Worlds Metaphor**

One of all possible words can at a given time and place become The World. It follows that what is commonly accepted as “normal”… was once part of that infinite realm of all possible worlds. (Merrell, 1982, p. 42)

The above quotation is by semiotician Floyd Merrell, an important source for Courtney’s work. Courtney also found this metaphor of worlds in a wide range
of critical thought—"possible-world semantics, speech-act theory, and world-version epistemology" (1990, p. 16). In psychoanalysis, personal narrative is a means of creating one's own world: "Our reality is created through our fictions; to be conscious of these fictions is to gain creative access to, and participation in, the poetics or making of our psyche or soul-life" (Hillman, 1983, p. ix). Goffman (1974) traced the worlds metaphor to William James, whom Courtney quoted: "the infant... is born into Wm. James' blooming, buzzing confusion" (1988, p. 145). James (1869) turned around the question "what is real?" to the phenomenological question "when do things seem real?" James made worlds personal.

William James, 1869, in "The Perception of Reality"... gave matters a subversive phenomenological twist... Under what circumstances do we think things are real? ...the several different "worlds" that our attention and interest can make real for us, the possible subuniverses, the "orders of existence": the world of the sense, the world of scientific objects, the world of abstract philosophical truths, the worlds of myth and supernatural beliefs, the madman's world, etc. Each of these subworlds, according to James, has "its own special and separate style of existence," and "each world, whilst it is attended to, is real after its own fashion... James' crucial device, of course, was a rather scandalous play on the word "world" (or "reality"). What he meant was not the world but a particular person's current world. (Goffman, 1974, p. 2)

In the field of sociology, the notion of different worlds is an operational assumption. Sociologists think of people living in different worlds for the purposes of their study. Lawyers live in the world of law, teachers live in the world of schools and the homeless live in their world in the inner city. Unlike sociologists, philosophers from the classical tradition sought universal truths that apply to one putative world (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). More recently
philosophers acknowledge a variety of truths, or “Wittgensteinian perspectives.” Courtney’s view was like that of Wittgenstein—that each reality is true in its own context. He used the metaphor of worlds to describe coexisting truths or worlds, rendering the metaphor of worlds itself an ultimate truth, a kind of metaphysics.

This concept seems most obvious in works of art, particularly theatre productions. The “world of Peter Pan”, for example, has distinct qualities that seem normal to the audience for the length of the play. Tinkerbell and Peter Pan can fly. When Peter Pan’s shadow becomes detached from him, an impossibility in the natural world, he sews it back on with needle and thread. This world obeys different laws from the natural world, and serves different purposes from it. Flying and other anti-naturalistic touches contribute to jolting the audience out of the naturalistic world, compelling them to use their imagination which transports them to Peter Pan’s world. When Peter Pan asks the audience to clap their hands if they believe in fairies, Peter Pan is challenging the audience to act within his world, the world author J.M. Barrie has created. “An artistic representation as ‘an artistic world’ is a metaphor of existence... a self-contained and self-sustaining world” (Courtney, 1988, p. 85). The world created by a work of art expresses a metaphor for existence. In Peter Pan’s world, the perpetual youth and the lost boys see the ordinary adult world as foreign. Stevie Wonder (1976) sang “Music is a world within itself/It’s a language people understand.” Paul Ricoeur (1976) wrote “The text speaks of a possible world and of a possible way of orientating oneself within it. The dimensions of this world are properly opened up by and disclosed by the text” (p. 88). Another example of artistic worlds is the one Van Gogh created with his paintings of sunflowers. The supernatural quality of that world touches the emotions in a poignant but soaring vision. In another painting, Van Gogh’s church at Arles swells towards the viewer in an eerie and claustrophobic way conveying Van Gogh’s personal world. Van Gogh’s paintings draw the viewer into Van Gogh’s world. The metaphor of “worlds” interprets the very action of art. Artistic works create worlds.
Bakhtin (1981) organized his thinking about literature by talking about worlds, which he called chronotopes, meaning “time-space.” Bakhtin saw the worlds created by fictions as having unique dimensions, including not only time and space but also feelings and values. Courtney quoted Bakhtin (1981) as saying “The fictional world creates the text” (Courtney, 1990, p. 152), implying that for an author to create a fictional text, the author must first envision the world in which it exists. Bakhtin (1981) wrote that the author is both inside and outside of that world. This is what Courtney called a dramatic perspective, in that when people watch or act in a drama their perspectives switch between the theatrical world of illusion, and the actual world that exists alongside it. Bakhtin (1981) called the phenomenon of being inside and the outside of a fictional world a dialogue between these worlds. Bakhtin wrote “we get a mutual interaction between the world represented in the work and the world outside the work” (p. 255), evidently influencing Courtney. For Courtney this is how people learn. “We compare the actual with the dramatic world in order to understand it” (1990, p. 10)—“the ‘as if’ world of possibility (the fictional) ... works in parallel with the actual world” (1995, p. 9).

As found at the heart of Figure 5, Courtney’s process of learning through drama involves comparing fictional with actual worlds, being inside as well as outside of the fictional world. Learning occurs when musicians, artists and authors create worlds that help people see meanings. “Any art form brings about a self-contained and self-sustaining world... To the audience, the creation of an artistic world is a powerful metaphor of existence” (Courtney, 1990, p. 127). How does Courtney define “metaphor”?

Courtney’s Metaphors

In my reading of Courtney, “metaphor” may be the single most important and widely used word in his texts. Courtney’s Dictionary of Developmental
Drama (1987) devotes a full page to metaphor. Here Courtney distinguished between the common verbal usage and his own dramatic definition derived from Eliade’s (1954) work on ritual. Eliade wrote that a ritual act is a metaphor for an event in the spiritual world. For example, in ancient societies a ritual depicting a marriage represents a heavenly marriage between gods. The dramatic term metaxis, discussed in the literature section, refers to an action taking place in two different realities. A dramatic act represents both an action in the real world and an action on the stage, while an actor is both a fictional and a real person.

Verbal metaphors, according to Courtney, are “the relationship of two ideas to create new meaning” (1987, p. 82)—“a form of the mental structure of similarity... expressed in speech” (1990, p. 67). Courtney considered metaphor to be a mental operation. “Mind, through intention, is constantly seeking to know; it complicates any initial idea by similarity, and one important way it does so is with metaphor” (1990, p. 67). This introduces Courtney’s notion of thinking, that people think by comparing and contrasting ideas, “complicating” ideas, creating their opposites and playing with possibilities. This notion contrasts with a mechanistic or even naturalistic notion of mind. Courtney’s notion of mind is a restless one, whose very nature is to switch attention from one thing to another. This differs from the way psychology and fiction depict consciousness, as following an idea steadily for at least a full paragraph. In Figure 5, “we compare the actual world with the dramatic world.” People create dramatic worlds and learn by mentally stepping in and out of them. The mind works, Courtney wrote, in this “metaphoric mode”—“the metaphoric/dramatic mode is the way cognition and intelligence function” (1990, p. 80). Metaphors involve double meanings wherein “thought oscillates between the double meaning” (Courtney, 1990, p. 127). In the case of the actual and fictional worlds of personal dramas, “our attention oscillates between the actual and the fictional in such a way that they appear (falsely) to be simultaneous” (p. 137). The action of the mind is constant motion. The mind works with and creates metaphors in its restless activity to generate meanings and explain things.
Here is an example. As I write my dissertation, my mind seeks to understand the process. One moment I use the metaphor of “job”--my writing is the job I do everyday. The next moment I use the metaphor of “self-expression”--I write for personal growth. Another moment my mind sees this writing as part of a life process--I will use this material as I continue in life. Then I return to a more mundane metaphor: “task”--this is the task required for me to finish my schooling. My mind continually employs metaphors to understand this experience.

For Courtney metaphors involve feelings. The parts of the metaphor contribute felt-meanings to the significance of the whole. The juxtaposition of these parts is charged with feeling. In a traditional metaphor, “the roses in her cheeks”, I not only perceive the redness in her cheeks, I also feel sweetness and beauty conveyed by the word roses. “Two parts of a paradox are placed in conjunction; and this releases great energy, including considerable feeling power. On this view, metaphors... are heuristic devices” (1995, p. 82) For Courtney, feelings generate energy. The notion of this energetic tension in metaphor comes from Ricoeur (1976, 1979) who wrote that it is the juxtaposition of separate feelings and contexts that stimulates thought and meaning. “What is creative about the metaphor and the dramatic act is that they are iconic: they create a parallel between two feelings in one” (Courtney, 1995, p. 86). Thus, in a dramatic act, “if I metaphorise (imagine) myself as an evil policeman and you create a metaphor of yourself as a good thief, in our joint improvisation we create more felt-meaning than either of us would in isolation” (p. 23). The dramatic act creates a meaning that comes from bringing together two levels, the real and the imaginary. In this case, the two actors compound this effect by their paradoxical combinations, the evil policeman and the good thief. Courtney uses “metaphorize” to mean dramatize. Doing drama is to make metaphors. An actor plays a role, bringing together two meanings, just as a metaphor is a word that “plays the role” of another word. In Virgil’s metaphor “the rosy-fingered dawn”, the dawn plays the part of a hand with fingers. So, on a stage, an actor is a
metaphor for the part he is playing. Jennifer Saunders playing Edina Monsoon in *Absolutely Fabulous* is the metaphor for the idea Edina represents: a self-indulgent, confrontational political incorrectness and personal power. Saunders creates a living metaphor through certain actions: banging pots and pans, throwing a tantrum, pretending not to hear other people. These actions, Courtney would say, are metaphoric. A gesture is a metaphor (Courtney, 1995, p. 45). In *Leave it to Beaver* the televised Beaver is a metaphor created by the actor for a specific kind of little-boyness. In Courtney’s writings metaphor is another word for dramatization.

Metaphor is the imaginative root of dramatic action. In the mind, groups of imaginings constitute fictional worlds that have a metaphoric character; these worlds project metaphors through dramatic acts... Often mistakenly thought of as only existing in language, metaphor is inherent in human thought and can be expressed in all media. (Courtney, 1990, p. 65)

By definition, a dramatic act represents both a fiction and a reality, conveying a double meaning. Metaphor, for Courtney, means thinking double. For example, Courtney has borrowed from Victor Turner the idea that when people think of themselves in the past and in the present, they “metaphorize” themselves. They juxtapose two different pictures of themselves, one from the past and one from the present, to create a more complete understanding of themselves.

When Courtney said “the creation of an artistic world is a powerful metaphor of existence” (1990, p. 127) he equated world with metaphor. The perspective created by a world has the scope of the perspective created by a metaphor. For example, if I am a musician, I hear the world around me in terms of rhythms and melodies. I hear a symphonic roar in the sound of traffic, and a beat in city sounds. My world is music, which means that my metaphor for the world around me is music. Music is the lens through which I experience life. And, I suggest, this is like saying “my drama” is music. Personal worlds and personal
dramas both function as metaphors. But as metaphors they function differently. The metaphor of a world surrounds and envelops, while a drama has a plot, characters and motivation. A world envelops. A drama plays out. My world is that virtual reality in which I dwell. My drama entails the actions that take place in that world.

Courtney posited that each person dwells in multiple worlds, the most personal of which is one’s “dramatic world”, through which one may grasp a deep level of truth. For Courtney, all people live in different worlds in which fiction and reality overlap. For example, if I am a doctor, I live in a world of microbes and people’s illnesses, pain and health. When I go home I live in a world of murder mysteries. But Courtney’s point goes deeper. While I live in a generic doctor’s world, I create within it my own personal or dramatic world. For example, I may see myself as constantly trying to cure the sick child that I was once. Each patient I see may be metaphorized as a sick child who desperately needs help, whom I rescue. Similarly, Courtney (1980) asks, “how do we understand the external world? By creating a drama... The protagonist is our self. Other people become, in this drama the antagonist and the chorus” (p. 7). In my personal world in which I play the hero-doctor my patients play the part of the sick child. I see them as children needing help--they play their parts in my drama. This seems to imply a self-centered approach to life. But it describes Courtney’s point that, to some degree, people create personal worlds in relationship with their environment. Worlds are the metaphors people use to explain reality. Referring to the phrase at the top of Figure 5, “When drama is life, life drama, the metaphoric/dramatic mode is the way cognition and intelligence function’ (1990, p. 80). In Courtney’s work the metaphor of drama as life entails using metaphors. On the lefthand side of Figure 5: “We transform, or change, people, events and objects into mental forms with which we can deal” (1990, p. 31). “Transform” is equivalent to adopting a metaphor that gives a conceptual framework with which we can function.
Worlds in Action

In order to develop the metaphor of worlds further, I introduce the next section with an example from my own teaching. When I do drama classes with kindergartners, one of the first stages of the process as I conceive of it is to engage the imagination. Expressed differently, I encourage the children to enter into their own fictional worlds. Here I use an example from a public school where I worked as a visiting artist.

On this particular occasion, after warming up our bodies and voices, I asked the children to close their eyes and imagine what it is like to be a puppy or a kitten. I asked the children, “What do the paws feel like, how does the head move around, how do I feel when I lie down and when I slowly come to my little feet?” Through my prompting the children moved into a roomful of meowing and barking kittens and puppies, scampering around and interacting with their paws, their growls, and their purrs. The next stage, according to my method, is to encourage the development of a plot by introducing some ideas into the fictional world. In this case I suggested: “What would happen if a little bird came and told you it had lost its mother? What would you do? Who wants to be the bird?” The children understood from my approach that they had permission to make choices, so they said that the little bird had not lost its mother, but its father. Soon a large hawk was swooping down and sitting down to the dinner table with the lost bird and with the puppies and kittens and thanking them. The appearance of this scene was chaotic, clearer to the imagination of the participants than to an onlooker, but the children remained firmly in their fictional world. After 45 minutes they did not want to abandon their fictional world. When it was time to end I clapped in applause and told them they had done a great job. Two girl kittens grabbed me by the ankles and asked me to keep playing.

The children had been given permission to enter into and remain in a fictional world. It was a place where they could play and thus make their own decisions, giving form to their own ideas and feelings. As kindergartners they found this form of play natural. Their classroom teacher said to me, “This is like
therapy. We have had some social breakthroughs." I would suggest that if this is true, then it may be due not only to the freeing energy of play, but also to working with different worlds, the actual and the fictional. When I asked the children to make some decisions about the plot, they had to switch back and forth between different worlds to decide who would play what role, what they would do, and how to proceed. They were asked to move back and forth between a fictional world and the actual world. In this particular school, all the ages with which I worked engaged easily in imaginary worlds, but had more difficulty switching to metacognitive perspectives. The children didn’t want to leave their fictional worlds. This may have been because English was not their first language, so during their school day they were constantly required to adjust to someone else’s world. Perhaps they found relief in the opportunity to make their own world.

I agree with the teacher when she said that this kind of play is therapeutic. I also agree with Courtney when he emphasized that it is an important mode of learning. For Courtney, learning hinges on switching between being inside and outside of the drama. On an everyday level, this is the difference between understanding an event through the immediate experience as opposed to analyzing it, the difference between the map of drama and the dramatic territory as discussed in Chapter IV. If one lives only in the immediate experience, one is unable to distance oneself from situations. If one lives only in an analytic or distanced perspective, one does not gain the knowledge that comes from feelings, kinesthetic awareness and intuitions. Drama therapy works with this notion (Landy, 1994), as does stage work. An actor on a stage switches his awareness between an inner development of his role and his outer awareness of its effect, to gauge the best way to proceed with actions and interactions. The dramatic process entails a metacognitive perspective on the very process of learning. In order to develop their fictional world, the kindergartners were asked to step out of this world and make decisions about it. Who would play the bird? How would they negotiate? By stepping out of their world, it seemed as if the children improved their drama and better understood what they were doing. In doing so, the
kinesthetic activity of the drama was translated into an analytic frame, much as
happens in living experiences. This develops not only acting skill but
metacognitive abilities which are useful in any learning activity. Teachers who
recognize the metacognitive value of this learning can see that the drama
experience for children is more than, for example, pretending to be dogs and cats.
Doing drama involves changing perspectives and incorporating immediate
knowledge in a decision-making process. This is what McLeod [Interview] called
“dramatic knowledge”, a metacognitive understanding of a dramatic structure.
Through this example I have introduced the notion of worlds through the lens of a
class of kindergartners. Now I look at the notion of worlds through the lens of
Courtney’s writings, which contain a range of complex notions about the worlds
which people create.

A Semiotic Square of Worlds

Courtney’s writings about worlds contain different aspects. One aspect is
fiction, the world of imagination: “Forms of fiction, then, are imaginative
representations in parallel worlds” (Courtney, 1990, p. 14). Fiction becomes
significant when it is “rooted in actuality.” The value of a fictional world is that it
can be compared with the actual world, just as reading a novel gives a perspective
on everyday life. To explore Courtney’s metaphor of worlds I created a semiotic
square using the actual/fictional dichotomy as poles of the first continuum:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTUAL WORLD</th>
<th>FICTIONAL WORLD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“My actual world is the way I think about and act with the total environment as I know it to be” (Courtney, 1990, p. 35).</td>
<td>“My dramatic world is a fiction. I have created it with my imaginings and my acts” (Courtney, 1990, p. 35).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Courtney also wrote about the personal worlds of the individual and the social worlds which people create mutually. I constructed another continuum between personal worlds and social worlds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL WORLDS &lt;-&gt; SOCIAL WORLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I breathe life into things and create the &quot;world-for-me&quot; (dramatic world)&quot; (Courtney, 1990, p. 156).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Together we create the world-for-us&quot; (Courtney, 1990, p. 156).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With these two continua I constructed a semiotic square. The semiotic square enabled me to organize a variety of different phrases from Courtney's work and to look for patterns and the stories they tell.

Figure 9

[Diagram of semiotic square with the following annotations:
- Actual worlds: "the way I think and act with the total environment" (1990, p. 35).
- Personal worlds: "My dramatic world is a fiction created with my imaginings" (1990, p. 35).
- Fictional worlds: "I breathe life into things and create the world-for-me" (1990, p. 156).
- Social worlds: "Together we create the world-for-us" (1990, p. 156).]
I plotted some of Courtney's phrases about worlds on this framework in order to highlight the ways in which the worlds metaphor informs Courtney's notions about drama as a way of learning. Figure 10 is on the following page:
The actual world
where the human actor is a "mundane costumed player" (1990, p. 40).

In effect, a plurality of "worlds" is created by the infant... "blooming buzzing confusion" (1988, p. 145).

The actual world
Worlds Square

Thus appear those workaholics who make the fictions of law, business, education, medicine, and politics into social worlds that they believe in... (1990, p. 17).

The child at play and the salesman who tries to "get into the skin" of the customer, the student improvising social studies, the socialite who takes the role of the hostess at a banquet, the politician who says what he thinks the voters want to hear - all of these individuals are experimenting with the dramatic metaphor...

The world we know is not actual but dramatic. It is created out of possibilities we imagine and then act (1990, p. 71).

Actors... perform in a fictional world:
yet they have come from "ordinary" life...
the drama... provides them with knowledge about the construction of social reality and, particularly, their place within it (1988, p. 154).

As our mutual felt-meanings are established from our reciprocal actions and our feeling of unity with others, they construct our social world... (where) felt-meanings... can be transformed (1995, p. 15).

The sharing of our mutual dramatic worlds is intelligent, both cognitive and social...
When players improvise, they mutually create and intuitively recognize the relations between the molecular units of dramatic action (1990, p. 59).

Symbols... structure imaginings and the way we act... they create a social world (1990, p. 127).

Symbols... multivocal and complex... synthesize many meanings and collapse them into rich clusters from which we construct reality, both our fictional worlds and our social worlds (1990, p. 124).

A number of contemporary philosophers... have created a whole aesthetic theory for fictional worlds... they have begun to use the cognitive power of dramatic fiction (1990, p. 21).

The fiction of drama allows us to live through an alternative to rigid attitudes, giving us a world of dramatic possibility. The more we do so, the more intelligence becomes a factor in our lives (1990, p. 21).

The sharing of our mutual dramatic worlds is intelligent, both cognitive and social...
When players improvise, they mutually create and intuitively recognize the relations between the molecular units of dramatic action (1990, p. 59).

The aesthetic artistic world of theatre... communicates and creates with the audience a significant space, time and meaning (1990, p. 41).

The (aesthetic) artistic world of theatre... communicates and creates with the audience a significant space, time and meaning (1990, p. 41).

The world we know is not actual but dramatic. It is created out of possibilities we imagine and then act (1990, p. 71).

Symbols... structure imaginings and the way we act... they create a social world (1990, p. 127).

Symbols... multivocal and complex... synthesize many meanings and collapse them into rich clusters from which we construct reality, both our fictional worlds and our social worlds (1990, p. 124).

A number of contemporary philosophers... have created a whole aesthetic theory for fictional worlds... they have begun to use the cognitive power of dramatic fiction (1990, p. 21).

The fiction of drama allows us to live through an alternative to rigid attitudes, giving us a world of dramatic possibility. The more we do so, the more intelligence becomes a factor in our lives (1990, p. 21).
I placed Courtney’s phrases as follows:

**Figure 11**

**Analysis of Figure 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrant or axis</th>
<th>Theme of quadrant or axis</th>
<th>Ideas about learning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual worlds</td>
<td>The actual world, the actor is “a mundane costumed player”</td>
<td>In Courtney’s phrase, people learn as everyday actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual worlds</td>
<td>People create personal worlds to impose order on life</td>
<td>“We impose order on the chaos of the environment” through creating double worlds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal worlds</td>
<td></td>
<td>A plurality of worlds is created by the infant…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal worlds</td>
<td>Personal and social meanings</td>
<td>“The socio-aesthetic worlds: Enactments mix personal and social meanings”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social worlds</td>
<td></td>
<td>“In spontaneous play, educational drama, drama therapy, and social and related enacted worlds, the human actor is “an exploratory costumed player”--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People create personal worlds to generate learning</td>
<td>“Using the cognitive power of dramatic fiction”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal worlds</td>
<td></td>
<td>Living through dramatic fictions, alternatives to rigid possibilities, makes “intelligence a factor in our lives”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fictional worlds</td>
<td></td>
<td>The aesthetic/artistic world of theatre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual worlds</td>
<td>Coexistence of alternative worlds</td>
<td>Fictional and actual make a “cognitive gestalt”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Actual and fictional perspectives transform our knowledge and belief “so that we learn”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fictional worlds</td>
<td>A created world which is the basis for other worlds</td>
<td>The dramatic world that makes learning possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fictional worlds</td>
<td>Sharing mutually created meanings through symbols. Human actor</td>
<td>Worlds provide knowledge about the construction of social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social worlds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social worlds</td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>People create social fictional worlds and then believe they are actual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual worlds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center:</td>
<td>Religious world</td>
<td>“The ritualist is a sacred costumed player who jointly creates and communicates with others a sacred space, time, and meaning.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal &amp;</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual &amp; Fictional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dramatic world (at the Fictional world axis) is the most personal world, a basis for the following worlds. It is a fictional and personal construction of one's personal reality. The socio-fictional (Actual and Social world quadrant) world is Courtney’s perspective on society. The social-aesthetic world (Social/Personal axis) is a mutually created reality, the world of therapy, play, improvisation and drama education. Both the socio-fictional world and the artistic world (Personal & Fictional worlds quadrant) are characterized by self-presentation and self-dramatization for an audience of others. By contrast, the social-aesthetic world (Social/Personal axis) and the religious world (center) are, ideally, motivated by self-exploration and self-development. These are two kinds of performances: performing for others, and performing for oneself. In the religious world (center)
performances take the form of ritual. McLeod [Interview] said that for Courtney the rituals of the religious world are performed for an audience of a sacred Other, a deity or spirit, who is really a part of the performer's own psyche. These performances are dialogues with one's inner self. Courtney used the terms "significant" and "sacred", which indicate "otherworldly" value systems. Where does the religious world really exist—in a sacred realm? For the sake of this analysis I assume that the religious world is not a different "higher realm," but a present world of values created by people's ideas and actions such as ritual. I assume that the sacredness of symbols, for example, is a quality of meaning that has been created by people. The creation of sacred symbols and spaces comes from human interactions which involve both the personal and social, as well as the actual and the fictional. For example, the awe and majesty surrounding the Christmas story come from symbols and stories which have originated in pagan wintertime feasts (Social world), personal beliefs and feelings (Personal world), some events that are historically factual (Actual world), and some undoubtedly less than factual (Fictional world). All of these elements make up the symbols and rituals that people use to create for themselves a sense of the sacred. It is logical that the religious world appears at the center of the square. Religion has been treated by a number of writers as structurally similar to drama (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Geertz, 1973, 1983) and a powerful example of double worlds (Pavel, 1986; Eliade, 1963, 1971, 1987). Historically as well, the medieval church was the birthplace of Western theatre, and ritual has been considered by many the birthplace of all drama.

Courtney wrote (1990, p. 41) that there is always overlap between types of worlds. For example, an actor performing on a stage is in an artistic-aesthetic world, but he may also be engaged in the social-aesthetic world when he explores his personal meanings for the role he is playing. A priest performing a ritual in the religious world may be simultaneously involved in an artistic-aesthetic world. In living dramas each world overlaps with the others.
In mapping these phrases on Figure 10, I found distinctly different strands of learning through drama. Figure 11 reflects these. Beginning in the Actual worlds/Personal worlds quadrant, adult and infant create worlds to organize experience. Here, actual life is the basis of what people transform into dramas. People create fictions from their own stories in order to make sense of reality. Moving clockwise, in the next quadrant of Personal worlds/Fictional worlds, the emphasis is on the creation of a personal fictional world, what Courtney calls one’s aesthetic world. This quadrant includes Courtney’s phrase: “All exists in a concrete aesthetic world.” That which people know is located in this aesthetic world, a personal world of feelings and imagination, the two main components of Courtney’s aesthetic. Above that is a phrase that says this fictional world does not encompass everything, but the more it encompasses the more intelligent people are. For Courtney, the aesthetic world is the key to intelligence. This notion is central to the way people learn through worlds. Here is a concrete example.

Imagine an immigrant coming from a rural area in Pakistan to New York where he becomes a taxi driver. He probably comes from an extended family in Pakistan which dominates daily life and determines much of one’s personal life. What does he find in New York? A highly individualistic environment, in which there are no personal interactions except through business, night life, or personal contacts. If he is Muslim and has left a wife in Pakistan, his personal ethics prevent him from mixing with women or going to social establishments where there is liquor or dating. The world he knew, a family gathering of a tribal nature, does not exist here. Is he consigned to isolation? The way such a man would probably deal with his life is to create his own world, looking for male companions that remind him of his brothers and cousins, and for situations that would re-create the world he had in Pakistan. But to do so, he must first construct his own fictional world which may not correspond to the way other people perceive daily life in New York. He might read the Koran frequently and use his imagination to re-create an environment that helps him mediate between the
world he knew and the world to which he has come. For example, because of his tribal upbringing he may feel compelled to come to the aid of fellow taxi drivers in a manner that a more individualistic person may not. As long as he maintains his fictional world, he can have a feeling of well-being, succeed in his work, attract clients and maintain a successful Being in the world. If he loses his fictional world he will feel lost and have difficulty maintaining his life. If his fictional world goes out of control--if he loses perspective on the events he sees around him and becomes enflamed against infidels in New York--he will not be able to live successfully in these different worlds. For Courtney, such personal worlds are at once fictional and ubiquitous. The personal world is the basis for the other worlds people construct.

Reading the square clockwise: first people invent worlds to simplify and to organize the complexity of reality. As they move through life, it is precisely the ability to create worlds and find meanings, the ability to master and to stay in command of this meaning-making activity which enables people to live successfully. The creation and use of worlds is a meaning-making activity. “Being is an aesthetic meaning-giving activity in the creation of mental worlds” (Courtney, 1990, p. 124). As people engage one another in the mutual creation of worlds, symbols are developed which provide the currency for interacting with one another’s felt meanings. These mutual creations are ultimately mistaken for reality. People first create their social reality and then they often come to believe it is more real than they are. If, as Courtney says, the goal of Being is to find meaning, how do people use worlds to make meaning and to learn?

The Cognitive Value of Worlds

“The world-creating powers of imagination” (Courtney, 1990, p. 16) make possible fictional existences and worlds, “their complexity, incompleteness,
remoteness and integration within the general economy of culture.” Courtney highlighted the cognitive value of worlds, and the “intellectual qualities of dramatic action” as being the metacognitive work that reconciles and understands different, created worlds. Actual and fictional are not separate “cognitive categories” (1990, p. 18). Just as a literature professor might speak of the “truth” of a story as opposed to its “factuality”, fictional worlds have a truth or logic similar to that of reality. The fictional world of the Pakistani taxi driver was based on the logic of his actual world in Pakistan. For Courtney, the actual and the fictional work together like “a common gestalt.” People understand fictional worlds because of their experience with actual worlds, and they understand their actual world through imagining fictional worlds. Fictional worlds may be more complete, with even clearer meanings than actual worlds because they have been organized by their authors. There are two main points in the cognitive value of worlds. First, worlds are enclosing systems of meaning, that can be invented or realized to accommodate unique and complex systems of belief. Second, worlds allow for the metacognitive process of working among different worlds. Worlds enclose and protect, and they also provide alternative systems of meaning.

Courtney frequently stated that worlds are important for providing ways of understanding Being in the world, or ontological understanding. The notion of Being is a central goal for Courtney’s ideas about learning. Courtney was interested in a unifying, holistic mode of learning, not in kinds of learning which apply only to limited areas. This holistic learning involves changes in Being—involves ontology. “The prime cognitive relation to actuality of both the dramatic and the ritual worlds is ontological... alternatives to the actual person” (Courtney, 1990, p. 40). A world serves to develop one’s Being through providing a focus that permits development of depth. Limitations of a world permit depth. Dramatic worlds are intimate and suffused with felt-meaning. For example, the movie To Kill a Mockingbird is set in the South, posing a limitation on the kinds of behavior that are credible within that context. The audience expects racism and brutality, gentility and nostalgia. Across the street bitter old Mrs. Dubose sits on her porch
“with a confederate pistol on her lap”, according to the children through whose perspective the audience sees the movie. Atticus, the children’s father, bows to Mrs. Dubose as if she is a queen, saying “Looks like your garden is going to be showplace of Maycomb this year.” A character like Atticus, the lawyer who defends a black man before a hung jury, can also be developed precisely because of the limitations of the deep South. These limitations permit the character to display a level of courage that another setting would not highlight in the same way. The tension that builds up in the courtroom is heightened precisely through the sharply curtailed possibilities of that situation. The audience knows the rules of the game in the deep South. The tragedy of the black man, Tom Robinson, works because of the insurmountable obstacles he faces, just as the dignity of Tom’s family conveys all the more poignancy for the hopelessness of their position. Even the character development of a divine idiot, the demented Boo Radley who watches and protects Atticus’ children from a distance, works precisely because Boo himself is victimized by the gothic value system of the South, a value system which makes possible a sharp shift in the children’s own awareness. For them, Boo goes from being a monster who “eats raw squirrels and all the cats he can catch”, to being the hidden friend when he saves their lives. Dramatic worlds work because of the limitations of their context, limitations that permit the development of depth. Because the setting is the South, the audience tolerates a certain brutality which may seem unreasonable in, for example, Minneapolis. The entire genre of Southern Gothic novels is based on these possibilities. It is that setting which permits the development of specific characters and their Being.

Courtney’s fictional worlds are aesthetic, created through intuition, felt sensitivity, discrimination and tacit understanding. Fictional worlds are thus personal expressions of one’s Being—"who we are, who we imagine ourself to be (Being ‘as if’) and who we will become” (1990, p. 39). This formulation summarized the value Courtney assigned to personal felt-meaning. Dramatic truth is approached from the inside, is highly context-dependent, and depends on
personal experiences. "Truth lies in the player and in the playing" (1990, p. 37). Courtney's metaphor of worlds contains implicit values. It privileges personal, felt-meaning and focused, in-depth knowing. "The ontology of dramatic action is specified from within itself, through references made to it by the players. Here lies the crux of the matter" (1990, p. 45). Certain cultures emphasize this enclosed way of knowing, as opposed to Western scientific objectivity which attempts to categorize realities in relationships to external criteria. For example, the enclosed way of knowing is found on the island of Java where "the flow of subjective experience, taken in all its phenomenological immediacy, presents a microcosm of the universe generally; in the depths of the fluid interior world of thought-and-emotion they see reflected ultimate reality itself" (Geertz, 1973, p. 134). Reality is found in an enclosed, performed world. Interestingly, the same metaphor of performance that Geertz has noted on Java above, and on Bali where he analyzed the political situation as a "theatre state," is a metaphor the Indonesians themselves use. In the political and economic crisis of 1998, a "wise old man" of Indonesian politics, H. Roeslan Abdulgani, likened the situation to the wayang, or traditional shadow puppet performance of Indonesia:

To see a wayang play without a story. The puppeteer is invisible. The musicians and singers are busy fighting over the offered food. The onlookers are desperate. They pray the dawn may soon come. [New York Times, 2 June 1998, p. A4]

In this metaphor, the state is a puppet performance that never happens, though the audience devotedly and desperately waits through the night. Such theatrical metaphors portray reality through an enclosed and subjective world.

Throughout his work Courtney said that feeling gives meaning and significance. These take a central role in knowledge and learning (Courtney, 1995), mainly through Courtney's heavy reliance on Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge (p. 93). For Courtney, the individual generates and also discovers
meaning through tacit knowledge which draws on intuition and feelings. Courtney often quoted Polanyi's phrase: "We know more than we can say"--we know more than is held in our conscious mind. But what cannot be said may still be enacted and revealed through dramatic action. Like Burton's notion of making unconscious knowledge conscious through drama, Courtney discussed how self-awareness and metalevels of knowledge are generated through the act of drama. This is in contrast to the notion that we act out a script already fully formed "in our head." People create worlds from their tacit knowledge, and these worlds also help us to make meaning in a feedback process between self and the world. At the center of Figure 5: "Imaginings are externalized in a dramatic act. The dramatic act creates effects in the external world. These effects provide feedback to the mind in ways it can grasp" (1990, p. 54). Besides the imagination, other sources of worlds are myth, history, the arts and sciences. These cultural domains create worlds that are "socially fictional; they are created by many people's imaginings and actions, often over a long period of time. But they enter the actual world as acts that are socially significant, and thereby they construct social reality" (Courtney, 1990, p. 36).

The second point about the cognitive value of worlds is that they provide alternative systems of meaning. By contrasting, comparing, and changing perspectives, ideas are generated, lessons learned, and intellectual potential is developed. This process begins with children's play which functions like incipient dialogue, narrative or drama during which different worlds coexist. The key concept here is the idea of double realities. This is not a theory of duality, but a theory of similarity, a theory of the value of parallel thought processes. For example, in To Kill a Mockingbird the horrors of the deep South are only conceivable from a Northern perspective. To the Southern white men sitting on the jury, justice is being done as usual. But to the movie audience, and to the liberal family of the lawyer Atticus, the sharp comparisons between the liberal notion of honor and the Southern notion of honor deliver a riveting felt meaning. The civil rights movement, the Freedom Riders and the various legal trials that
took place in the 60’s were based on this juxtaposition. The enclosed Southern world suddenly came into view, suddenly served up brutal images which were discrepant with the rest of the United States. In the course of the civil rights movement powerful learnings took place: young blacks educated themselves with the writings of Mahatma Gandhi, even studying meditation to prepare themselves for civil disobedience. Northern whites became Freedom Riders and experienced firsthand lessons of an unequal society. Southerners learned that the greater United States could not see their point of view.

In Chapter IV I discussed some of Courtney’s ideas about learning, including the “theory of logical types” which classified different levels of learning. The metaphor of worlds engages both Learning II and Learning III. Learning about a world is learning a system of thought--Learning II. The use of metaphors and symbols belongs to Learning II. But the use of levels and metaperspectives belongs to Learning III. This refers to what McLeod called “dramatic knowledge”, the notion that understanding the structure of the drama is the crux of the learning process.

With educational drama, it is not the subject of the improvisation... but the inner workings of improvisation itself. ... In Hamlet... What interests us, and has interested human beings ever since it was first staged, is the existential matter it explores at great depth and in patterns that evoke deep responses in us. Metaphorically speaking, we look through Hamlet to ourselves and all humanity. Dramatic and theatrical learning hinges, then, on structure rather than content, on how thought/action is put together, patterned, and shaped. Dramatic learning is achieved through relations between the more or less unconscious premises and assumptions of Learning II; through consciousness that is symbolic, metaphoric, and paradoxical [learning II and III]; and through immediate action (Courtney, 1990, p. 144).
Thus, the use of worlds, the use of the actual and fictional simultaneously, is a dramatic mode of learning which involves symbols and metaphors (Learning II) and the switching between worlds (Learning III).

As we mature we learn about the fictional as well as the actual. At the metaphoric level [Learning II] we learn to work with all objects within a fictional context “as if” they are real, whereas from outside the system they are “not really real.” (Courtney, 1990, p. 145)

The "Worlds" of Pavel, Bruner and Goodman

Courtney’s (1990, 1995) main source in his worlds metaphor was Thomas Pavel (1986) who treated worlds as a crucial element of theories of fiction. Pavel sounded a

plea for richer models that include realms different from the actual world… (for) their fate is linked with the movements of populous groups that share the same ontological destiny. Fictionality cannot be understood as an individual feature: it encompasses entire realms of beings. The theory of fiction must thus turn to fictional worlds. (p. 42)

A fictional world is like a foreign colony that develops its own “unusual constitution and later comes to affect in various ways the life of the metropolis” (p. 84). People visit fictional worlds and compare them with their actual worlds. Such are the fictions of fables, prophesies and parables which map “their contents upon the actual world” (ib.). Utopian worlds are envisioned realms that are sustained by symbols and emotion. Utopias celebrate new worlds, against traditional narrative structure. Utopias represent the transformational quality of worlds. Returning to the identification/transformation dynamic, identification

The religious mind divides the universe into two regions qualitatively different: space is partitioned into sacred regions, endowed with reality in the strongest sense, and nonsacred places that lack consistency; sacred cyclical time diverges from profane time and its irreversible duration. (p. 57)

A strongly rooted identification with religious worlds differs from the transformational qualities of fictional worlds. Sacred beings obey their own rules "in the ontology of the sacred... crucially opposed to the precarious existence of the profane" (p. 60). But

while sacred worlds overflow with energy, fictional activity represent a weaker form of dual structure. The loss of energy prevents fictional games from leaping into actuality: effective grace is replaced with catharsis, revelation with interpretation, ecstasy with playfulness. As a game of make believe, fiction obeys rules and conventions; whereas belief in the myths of the community is compulsory, assent to fiction is free and clearly circumscribed in time and space. Myths, moreover, are all supposedly fixed in advance and true forever, but new fictional constructions, like new games, remain always possible. (p. 61)

In Courtney's work, both kinds of worlds are dramatic. The existence of a double reality is the essence of dramatic thought, the "metaphoric/dramatic mode"
(Courtney, 1990, p. 80), whether perceived through identification or through transformation.

Pavel referred to Nelson Goodman’s (1968, 1978, 1984) work as “restoring fiction to the framework of analytic philosophy” (Pavel, 1986, p. 75). “Read metaphorically, fictional texts are promoted by Goodman to world-version status, equivalent to the results of physics” (p. 75). Goodman’s worlds were also the basis of the worlds metaphor in the work of another educator, Jerome Bruner.

Like Courtney, Bruner (1986) wrote that there is no single real world; the ontological reality is a multitude of worlds. Referring to Goodman’s work (1978, 1984) Bruner outlined the act of world-creating as a cognitive activity. Not only artists but also scientists create worlds, as do all people in the course of their lives. Worlds are symbol systems. For Bruner, a philosophy of worlds is a serious attempt at a “philosophy of understanding.” The world-creating, hypothesis-generating, subjunctivizing activity of language and literature is for Bruner the basic tool of learning. Bruner (1986) selected the following example to illustrate the power of worlds. When the scientist Heisenberg toured the castle that is considered to have been Hamlet’s

Suddenly the walls and the ramparts speak a different language. The courtyard becomes an entire world, a dark corner reminds us of the darkness of the human soul ... No one can prove that he really lived here. But everyone knows the questions Shakespeare had him ask, the human depths he was made to reveal... (Mills in Bruner, 1986, p.45)

The world created by 400 years of performing Hamlet presents its own system of values, its characteristic coloring and depth. Worlds like this take on a reality of their own, like the setting of the cave in Iphigenia at Taurus discussed at the beginning of the chapter. The setting becomes a main protagonist in the drama.
Discussion of the Worlds Metaphor

What significance can be found in Courtney's metaphor of "worlds"? I suggest that the metaphor of worlds has certain qualities. A world contains, encloses. This does not mean that worlds are safe places. For example, George and Martha in Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? spend their lives developing worlds that are neither safe nor under control. But worlds envelop. And because they involve feelings they transform--as Sartre said, feelings change the world (Solomon, 1996). To elaborate on this, I refer to my discussion of the work of psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott in the literature section, who is often cited in connection with theatre. For Winnicott (1982), the space between the mother and child is the space that transforms, envelops and can be transmuted into different forms; it is the space where culture appears in later life. It is the psychic space where the child learns to create, and specifically create drama since that is the form which uses the self. In Winnicott’s scheme, it is the empty space, the arena of possibility shaped by the presence of the mother, that allows the child to develop. The child and the mother improvise rituals, act out dramas and expand the repertoire of their interactions. Bollas (1987) carried this further by emphasizing the silence and receptivity of the mother, who allows the child to transform realities. This is the space that develops into communicative and cultural activities. Like the mother’s presence in a young life, “The great impact [of the theatre] is neither a persuasion of the intellect nor a beguiling of the senses... It is the enveloping movement of the whole drama on the soul of man. We surrender and are changed” (Morgan in Geertz, 1983, p. 28). Drama is enveloping, like the presence of a mother. Creating drama involves creating worlds that envelop. Talented actors have the experience of being enveloped. Sarah Siddons (Parsons, 1909), wrote of how in rehearsal her roles overwhelmed and frightened her, but provided knowledge of how to move, speak and project.
The act of drama "envelops and transforms." Here is the connection writers on performance often make with shamanism, possession and trance.

The use of an environmental metaphor for drama, a world that envelops, has practical implications for understanding learning through drama. If a mother "envelops and transforms," then having a chronically depressed mother might make it difficult to transform one's own depression into more productive feelings. But if drama envelops and transforms, perhaps that is why performance, particularly self-scripted performance, seems empowering as a way of telling one's own story in one's own dramatic way. It is a means of replicating an overwhelming experience with one's own script. To understand the medium of drama as "enveloping and transforming", as entailing receptive and perhaps feminine qualities, provides a different emphasis from focusing on the actor and the role. In the former case, the medium provides the fullness of a world which encourages creative and original action, whereas the latter definition of drama as role emphasizes determinism, initiative and individualism in the more traditional and masculine mode of Western culture. If creating drama is seen as creating or evoking a world, there is an implication of creating an emotional environment through intuition and feeling.

In the US, ideas of feeling and intuition are usually considered private, relativistic and feminine, inaccessible to analysis or "cold, hard theory." But Courtney, in agreement with David Best (1985, 1992), saw feeling and intuition as part of all thought, and susceptible to public discussion through the manifestations of various media. For example, symbols are used in all media, where they are specifically used to convey felt-meanings. If symbols and feelings are commonly used for conveying meaning in public media, the feeling aspect of symbol, text and action needs to be analyzed. This notion places feeling and intuition in the mainstream of educational material, and not its the margins. Perhaps Courtney re-genders learning through drama by giving priority to felt-meaning. To consider the theatre as creating a world, like the mother in early life,
as "enveloping and transforming", allows important feminine aspects of the drama experience to emerge.
CHAPTER VI

THE HUMAN SETTING:
SOCIETY AND CULTURE

In the last chapter I examined the settings of Courtney's dramas through his metaphor of worlds. This chapter focuses on the interactive human worlds or social worlds which people generate mutually and dialogically, connecting them with others with the fabric of shared meanings—society and culture. In this view, society is a mutual creation that manifests, for example, as the worlds of law, business, and education. This chapter addresses Courtney's views on society, culture, symbols and the learning processes in each. Like the other worlds in the Worlds Square, mutually created worlds in Courtney's writings originate in the imagination, are realized by people's actions and continue to be shaped by the ways people interpret them.

People create society. It originates in our thoughts and actions, and it is maintained by them. Our inner world objectifies itself through its drama... We accept that it is real and that it is false--both at the same time. That is the dramatic paradox of society. (Courtney, 1982, p. 16)
Thus, "social life is a particular kind of fiction: an inter-active and symbolic performance. This enables each person to experience the group of which s/he is a part" (Courtney, 1988, p. 128). In Courtney’s universe there is no objective reality but rather the interaction of personal realities and mutually created meanings. These shared realities are created through dramas.

Dramatic events are essentially social…. One examines his or her own dramatic world with the eyes of the other. Identification and empathy are used by both, and impersonation adds incorporation to projection. (1990, p. 58)

Dramas involve many levels of interaction in which actors become aware of the perspectives of others involved. Dramas are also performances people create to define themselves and their worlds. “My performance today is a meta-message about what I am performing. It brings into being what is being performed. Our mutual culture, yours and mine, exists through what is created in the dynamics of the ‘here and now’” (1988, p. 142).

Society and Culture

For Courtney, society and culture are different. According to Courtney (1988) society is the more encompassing term (p. 127). By this he means society is a term of breadth, which includes within it many cultures. Cultures, on the other hand, have depth and interact more deeply with the personal realities of the people within them. Society is everywhere there are groups of people. Cultures are more specifically situations in which people are deeply connected through symbol systems.
Society

Society comprises the roles and metaphors of daily life in a general way:

We exist in a social reality which we and others create. In this social world we and others share the same selected aspects of actuality: a stock of previous experience, an existing frame of reference, handed down to us by our parents, our ancestors, and our teachers. (Courtney, 1988, p. 127)

Courtney wrote that people organize their thinking about society using metaphors of space and time, and using codified roles. For example, some people are considered “higher” than others, people are considered “inside” or “outside” of certain circles. These distinctions are invented, yet as members of a society we come to believe them. Thus, the racism of Jim Crow in the Post-bellum South claimed a hierarchical distinction between black people and white people despite the outcome of the Civil War, and the victors’ statements that people are equal. The distinctions that many people still make between the races seem to be imaginary, while the social reality they enforce is remarkably concrete. An example of the fictional/actual quality of racism is a scene from the movie To Kill a Mockingbird. Scout, a six-year old girl, naively addresses a crowd of furious white men who have gathered together late at night, bent on killing a black prisoner. They are generating a lynching furor. But Scout doesn’t understand this. She seems puzzled as to why the men are there in the middle of the night. In Scout’s own words:

“Hey, Mr. Cunningham.” The man did not hear me, it seemed.
“Hey, Mr. Cunningham. How’s your entailment gettin’ along?” My friendly overture had fallen flat. “Don’t you remember me, Mr. Cunningham? I’m Jean Louise Finch. You brought us some hickory nuts one time, remember? I go to school with Walter,” I began again. “He’s
your boy, ain’t he? Ain’t he, sir? He’s in my grade and he does right well. He’s a good boy, a real nice boy. We brought him home for dinner one time. Maybe he told you about me, I beat him up one time but he was real nice about it. Tell him hey for me, won’t you?” In a last ditch effort to make him feel at home, I was advising him “Entailments are bad,” when I slowly awoke to the fact that I was addressing the entire aggregation. The men were all looking at me, some had their mouths half open. Their attention amounted to fascination. Atticus’s mouth, even, was half-open. “Well, Atticus, I was just sayin’ to Mr. Cunningham that entailments are bad an’ all that, but you said not to worry, it takes a long time sometimes… What’s the matter?”

Atticus said nothing. I looked around and up at Mr. Cunningham, whose face was equally impassive. Then he did a peculiar thing. He squatted down and took me by both shoulders.

“I’ll tell him you said hey, little lady.” Then he straightened up and waved a big paw. “Let’s clear out,” he called. “Let’s get going boys.”

(Lee, 1960, p. 153-4)

The context Scout introduces seems to jolt the men from their mutually created drama. Their anger suddenly dissipates, their weapons fall to their sides, and they go home. The effect is as if they suddenly wake up to reality. The men were enacting a drama, sharing a mutually felt meaning generated by their racist world. It was based on distinctions they drew between individuals according to skin color, distinctions which originated in their imaginations but which had taken on the concrete implications of life and death. Scout, in an ingenuous voice like one of their own daughters, switched the predominant values of the drama to the shared feelings of families living among one another. This change highlighted two different sets of cultural values. It seemed to force the men to choose between these two sets of values. The men were acting as a social group and also embodied a specific culture.
Culture

Within society and culture dramatizations are similar but those of culture have deeper significance. Culture emphasizes the meaning given by the actor rather than the observer... a participant’s cultural acts are those which specifically aim toward the unity of human kind. (Courtney, 1988, p. 128)

Whereas society is an interactive performance based on hierarchical and inner/outer rules, culture has more personal meaning. Culture is that which has become internalized, the shared reality which has personal meaning and significance for its participants. The men in the above culture no doubt believed that all mankind should be united in racism. People are so identified with their culture that they take from it their life scripts. For example, in the Japanese culture prostitution has traditionally been elevated to an art form, as a kind of safety valve to counter the rigidity of the rest of the culture (Buruma, 1998). Thus poor children are often sold into prostitution and trained in the traditions of that work as dictated by the culture. Women who are not sold into prostitution are held to entirely different kinds of standards, also dictated by the culture. Thus women from different social strata receive the scripts from their shared culture that determine every intimate detail of their lives.

Courtney (1995) called culture “a metaphor, a means for human transactions” (p. 84). “Culture emphasizes the meaning given by the actor rather than the observer” (1988, p. 127). Culture is based on symbols, repositories of felt-meanings that have ambiguous but powerful messages. For example, the Ku Klux Klan was begun as a social fraternity which dressed in costumes for amusement. But the sheer power of its symbols--the burning crosses and white robes--helped to thrust the movement into a serious, quasi-religious framework. The white robes which resembled those used during the Inquisition, the crosses which are symbols of resurrection but in this case of death, work powerfully on
participants. Thus enactments of a powerful set of symbols established a culture, the Ku Klux Klan.

A social event has general meaning but a cultural event has a significant meaning: its human potential for the actor. He is always coming into Being. He is Becoming, and this provides significant meaning for him in relation to others. An actor’s cultural performance is reciprocal, potential and dramatic--and here lies the nub of its significant meaning. (1988, p. 128)

Members of the Ku Klux Klan found themselves increasingly identified with the symbols and dramas of the group. The individual member finds his Being through symbolic significances. The meanings created by symbolic acts need not be “true”, but they are real for the actors, like the values of white supremacy shared by the Ku Klux Klan. Within the dramas of cultures, truth is relative to the players. The significance of these “truths” comes from feeling. When a group rallies together and shares group rituals such as burning crosses, these rituals create feelings which have meanings for the members. This shared experience seems to be “truth”, and its significance is measured by how strongly it is felt. These values bind together a culture.

**Learning Through Culture**

Courtney wrote about a learning process in culture which emphasizes feelings and significance. The learning of cultural meanings has other characteristics. *What is learned?* Courtney attributed four qualities to cultural meanings: *moral, dramatic, questions of identity, and the creation of a “Being-for-others.”* The above scene outside the jail cell from *To Kill a Mockingbird* illustrates this. The scene begins with a certain definition of Being, whereby the white men are defining themselves through hatred and an abstract notion of the protection of “the virtue” of a white woman. But when the child Scout speaks in
the scene, her naive voice reminds the men of another set of values more deeply rooted in their Being: their love for their own families. At that point their Being is redefined by her speech. From a metacognitive perspective, the scene seems to be a moral tale, corresponding to Courtney’s cultural meanings as listed above, moving from a focus on hate to a focus on love. For the players within the scene, the scene is about their identity and their Beings-for-others. The scene is about what is real for the players. First one set of values seems real, then suddenly another set of values seems real. This switch creates a dramatic quality. Thus the scene invokes Courtney’s cultural meanings: moral, dramatic, questions of identity and the creation of a “Being-for-others.”

How does learning happen within culture? Courtney wrote that this kind of learning occurs through participation. Rather than through pre-meditation, the meanings of cultures are learned through active engagement. “Here is the dramatic paradox: I must commit myself to action before I can see the full significance of what I am doing. Cultural meaning leads to commitment and commitment breeds cultural meaning” (1988, p. 129). This way of learning is very much like acting in a theatrical scene, in which the meaning and feeling of the scene can only be revealed by its actual enactment. Rehearsals help actors to understand meanings of the drama, while performance conveys meanings to the audience. There is no blueprint for the scene which can convey the same meaning as the scene when it is actually performed. This is like the experience in a culture, in which the lived, embodied experience cannot be replicated by theoretical words. “To make society significant we create culture through dramatization. Then we are all dramatists. We proceed from the ‘I am’ experience, through the ‘I do’ to the ‘I create’” (ib.). Only by participating, having the “I am” experience, can people proceed to realizing their own agency, “I do”, and finally to doing with originality and significance, “I create.”

To illustrate how cultural learning can take place Courtney used the example of Dorothy Heathcote, a practitioner of educational drama. According to Courtney (1988, p. 23) Heathcote’s educational work was like the learning that
takes place in a culture. She worked by creating a double of the world—an imaginary reality—wherein the children learn by participating. By acting different roles they participate in this imaginary reality, inscribing it with their bodies and voices. Their participation calls upon them to make decisions and think “as if” they are in a different world. Heathcote’s work was distinguished by the fact that she immediately approached the children from within a role, initiating a drama without the usual instructions teachers often use in classrooms. Heathcote (1984) recognized that in order to engage in this risky process, a drama without a script, the teacher has to enter the drama through the students’ own experience—start from where they are. Doing so requires a high level of self-reflexivity, because the teacher has abdicated hierarchical power. According to Courtney,

She negotiates an exchange of power with her students: she leads them to make decisions by paying close attention to them and treating their views with respect. This is an existential attitude to human relationships but, before that can be successful, she must come to terms with herself; thus she constantly reviews her life; she sees herself in two ways—as Becoming and also through the students’ eyes. Her purpose as a teacher is to make ordinary experience significant. (Courtney, 1988, p. 24)

Heathcote’s approach as described by Courtney is to enter into the lesson at exactly the level at which the children are entering into it. Heathcote’s own writings about teaching (1984) emphasize that a teacher must learn about her own limits and the ways she can teach effectively in order to enter into such a pedagogical situation. For example, a teacher must be aware of the kind of distance she needs from students or the kind of structure she needs in order to feel comfortable.

Courtney wrote that this approach to drama education has “the same ontological and epistemological status” as ritual drama within a tribal community. Courtney believed that “already it is clear that educational drama is a most potent
tool for learning in the contemporary world” (1988, p. 137), while at the same
time it is an ancient learning strategy. Thus, Courtney wrote about tribal cultures,
mainly Native Americans, because they exemplified for him the learning process
of dramatic action.

Tribal Cultures

Tribal cultures have certain qualities which for Courtney (1988) are
intrinsically dramatic. “Tribal peoples mythologize their experience and
dramatize it in formal ritual as a strategy for learning” (p. 136). The act of
mythologizing places experience on a plane outside of time, and into an area of
significance greater than life. This is the theatrical frame. A theatre performance
is an event that collapses time, making the past present, and endows events with
significance by framing them artistically.

Tribal people of the past told their myths about the events of creation (the
fabled “beginnings”) where supernatural beings brought everything into
existence. These “beginnings” were thought to be more “real” than
everyday life, and they provided models for living. (1982, p. 19)

Tribal people live in two worlds at once, the sacred and the profane. The
quaternity which I presented in Chapter IV gives an example of these double
worlds (Courtney, 1988, p. 62):
In this scheme the four directions of the earth have spiritual significances which are as real as their physical qualities, resulting in a double world. Courtney pointed out that this double reality is essentially dramatic, just as an actor on a stage is playing an imaginary role while at the same time existing in present reality. For tribal peoples, the double reality is essential to their understanding of life. Their rituals refer to events of tremendous significance which exist in another reality. These are consolidated into symbols with complex and broad meanings. Each symbol represents the entire meaning of existence.

In tribal cultures no single thing is symbolic of another thing. Each individual thing is symbolic of existence as a whole. … total human existence from different perspectives. For the earliest times, symbols dramatized existential ideas in such all-inclusive and performative ways. (Courtney, 1990, p. 110)

For Courtney, ritual performances serve to reinforce the identity of the community and re-tell its story. People participate in rituals to learn about their Being in the society and their spiritual obligations. Tribal societies are different from contemporary societies in their homogeneity, center of power, and reference
to a sacred plane of Being. Even so, performances in contemporary society serve functions similar to those in tribal societies. For Courtney, both tribal and contemporary performances communicate the feeling life of the community. The feeling life of any community is that particular community’s understanding of its history, of the nature of life and of the interaction between the individual and society.

In tribal cultures, a ritual drama aims to communicate with a spirit or a god, an act closely allied to theatre and an indissoluble part of tribal life… But what is communicated? The mimetic dances of hunters or the intellectual verse of T.S. Eliot both significantly reflect the feeling-life of the community for which they were created. These cognitive and emotional meanings exist only in the context of feeling… The history of theatre is the story of the human race told explicitly in events, but implicitly it tells of the interaction of mind and society. (1989, p. 141)

Courtney summed up the basic attitudes of Native Americans in their tribal society with the following scheme of values, which for him are intrinsically dramatic:

Life is seen whole rather than in parts.
Human beings in mundane life are seen as highly active in spiritual life and not as passive.
Arts are expressions of the spiritual world rather than personal expression.
Time is spatial rather than linear.
Learning occurs in natural social settings rather than in schools. (1988, p. 11)

This emphasis on a holistic and spiritual universe has parallels with the dramatic process. Both drama and tribal ritual emphasize each individual’s importance in
the process, both collapse time into a spatial configuration. Both work with a
double reality, in which the work of the imagination is at least as important as
work in the actual world. Thus, when Native Americans communicate with
spirits, one could say that it is like communicating with the fictional characters in
a play. Whether or not spirits are real, it is the imagination which enables people
to actively engage with them. Similarly, a child playing the role of Snow White
must constantly refer to her imagination to maintain a believable character. “The
nature of dramatic performance in a culture reflects the cognitive universe of
those who participate in it” (1990, p.60). The structure and form of cultural
performances embody the beliefs of the culture, even more than the content of
such performances. The circular and participatory forms of performance in tribal
cultures reflect their stories more completely than does the specific narrative
being performed.

Courtney’s Cultural Narrative

Courtney devoted large portions of his books to the history of cultures and
the way drama and symbols shaped them. His seminal work *Play, Drama and
Thought* (1968a) is based on the notion that drama has always been a cultural
form of learning. I adopt the term “cultural narrative” to describe the dense
narratives that Courtney frequently used to describe learning strategies embodied
in the dramas of cultures. There are themes which link Courtney’s cultural
narratives with his discussions of tribal cultures. Both deal with symbolism that
refers to a transcendent reality or sacred world. Within ancient and tribal societies
performances are serious rituals that knit together societies. This segment of a
cultural narrative shows Courtney’s (1982) method of cross cultural comparison
in which the symbols of different cultures are seen as serving similar functions:
In Judaism, God intervenes in history. The Temple at Jerusalem was an *imago mundi*. As it was the centre of the world, it sanctified both the cosmos and cosmic life. This unification was what constituted time. The twelve loaves of bread on the table of the Temple signified the twelve months of the year, while the candelabrum with seventy branches represented the zodiac division of the seen planets into tens. In other words, like the aboriginal dance space in Australia and the Babylonian ziggurat the Temple of Jerusalem was built in dramatic imitation of the spiritual world. Whereas in Judaism God intervenes in history, Christianity goes one step further. God is incarnated as a historic being. As a result, the life, crucifixion and resurrection of Christ unify both mythological and historic events. (p. 21)

This passage illustrates two major influences on Courtney’s work: Campbell’s (1974) focus on symbols illustrated here by the use of the numbers twelve, seventy and tens; and Eliade’s (1971) focus on the two worlds of the sacred and the profane, the *imago mundi* and other imitations of the spiritual world. Courtney employed these two scholars’ work in the sphere of drama.

“Every ritual has a divine model (and performs)... the legitimization of human acts through an extrahuman model” (Eliade, 1971, p. 27). Eliade showed through many examples that life in archaic societies had to be renewed through cyclical rituals in order to erase ordinary, profane life, and renew the primacy of the sacred. The spiritual world is more real than the mundane. Another quality of rituals is that time is collapsed as pointed out in the above discussion of tribal cultures. As Eliade (1971) wrote, “through the paradox of rite, profane time and duration are suspended” (p. 35). In ceremonies around the world which re-enact the central myths of cultures like world-creation, these myths become present, in the here and now. The quality of immediacy disrupts linear time; past or future is suddenly present. In ancient cultures like Egypt there was little to contradict the felt-meaning of the collapsing of time. The world could be re-created every year.
The sum of a year’s deeds could be wiped away, instead of becoming a history. Nothing was significant except that which corresponded to mythical events: creation, and the deeds of the gods, as described by Eliade (1971). A new era began when the written word started recording history: mythical re-enactments were shown to be “false”; the creation of the world had to occur only once, and before a certain date. Yet the drama of rituals still collapses time and gives “a heightened intensity and thus creates meaning”--even in the modern rituals that are residues of the past, like bullfights and athletic games (Courtney, 1982, p. 25).

Courtney’s cultural narratives also illustrate the importance of symbolism or symbolization, which Courtney seems to equate with drama. For Courtney symbolizations are dramatic acts. When one object or action represents another, Courtney saw it as drama. He variously equated the word drama with different forms of representation to show drama’s primacy among the arts. For example, Courtney took Eliade’s example of symbolization (1971, p. 4) that a stone may be used to “dramatize” a sacred rock (Courtney, 1982, p. 23)--the word dramatize is here equated with symbolization. Elsewhere, the temple was “the dramatization of the concept of divinity as the focus of each city” (Courtney, 1989, p. 151), where dramatize applies to urban design. In another place he wrote “With the ancient tribal people, the central pillar of a dwelling had been dramatized as the cosmic axis: a sacrificial tree with seven branches symbolized the seen spheres of heaven which unified heaven and earth” (Courtney, 1982, p. 20) where dramatize seems to mean an artistic depiction, again an example from Eliade (1971). To symbolize seems to mean to dramatize. Symbols are central to culture.

Culture is structured around symbols because ambiguity makes their felt-meaning socially useful. When their ambiguities are activated by spontaneous drama, they have a great potential to encourage either order or disorder. Politicians can manipulate them to control society and, when they are placed within quasi-dramatic acts (like Hitler’s rallies and the use of the swastika), the emotional effect can be devastating. (1995, p. 26)
How did Courtney define symbols?

Symbols

Courtney’s notion of symbol is contiguous--and overlaps--with his notion of metaphor. The two notions might occupy opposite poles of a continuum stretching from metaphors as the inner generation of personal meanings, to symbols as the outer production of public meanings. On the one hand, metaphors are the “solution of an enigma: creating a change whereby two events are re-created into a whole” (Courtney, 1995, p. 23), a mental construct engaging separate ideas. “Metaphors are doubles: the “as if” makes $1 + 1 = 3$.” But on the other hand

while symbols may originate in metaphors, they signify more. They can mean various things at the same time; or different things to different people; or, a received symbolic meaning may not be a replica of an intended meaning. Symbols activated by spontaneous drama are multifaceted, imprecise, ambiguous and feeling-giving. (p. 25)

Courtney wrote of the actor thinking in metaphor while performing in symbol. “Metaphoric meaning... becomes cognitively more significant when we externalize it in acts. Then we symbolically understand reality” (Courtney, 1990, p. 10). The difference between metaphor and symbol is almost one of emphasis. Courtney emphasized the mental act of metaphors which can become physical acts. He emphasized the public nature of symbols which also reverberate inwardly for individuals. Metaphors are personal actions, symbols are public icons which contain meanings. While both deal with multiple meanings, for Courtney metaphors specifically rely on double meanings, while symbols as public events acquire more layers of meanings. Thus the same event can be both metaphor and symbol, but in Courtney’s usage the public enactment of a metaphor becomes a
symbol when it resonates with other public meanings. As with many of his terms, Courtney does not seem to feel burdened with a necessity for clearcut or mutually exclusive definitions.

Courtney's (1987) definition of symbols in his Dictionary for Developmental Drama includes the following meanings:

- signifier that is polysemic; often ambiguous; with some kind of likeness between the symbol and what is symbolized: "the meanings of symbols are labyrinthine" [Eco]; stands for an abstract notion (e.g., power, femaleness, etc.) rather than concrete entities, symbols are charged with emotion and feeling: yet they are also cognitive in that working with them is a way of knowing, metaphors convey double meanings but symbols convey more, mostly culturally derived; many are polysemic. (p. 132)

Elsewhere Courtney (1990) defined symbols as "a cognitive tool: they amplify meaning; they signify various things at the same time; and moreover, they mean different things to different people" (p. 109).

An example of a symbol is the cross, whose history Courtney (1982) gave in the following cultural narrative:

The symbol of Christ's Cross has an ancient history. The tribal Tree of Life was not merely the axis mundi; it was also the mythological prototype for all miraculous plants and trees that brought the dead to life, healed the sick and restored youth. With a snake at its base and a bird at the top it took innumerable forms, including the totem pole of the American Indian. It was the Tree of Knowledge in Paradise - also with its serpent. It became the Cross of Christian iconography to which many meanings accrued. In one, the mother of the Emperor Constantine was said to look for the wood of the Cross that was supposed to bring the dead back to life. In other
versions, the wood of the Cross had seven notches in it like the cosmic trees of the ancient tribes. (p. 21)

This account illustrates Courtney’s heavy reliance on Campbell’s (1974) work. To these symbolic meanings of the cross may be added further layers. The cross is not only a symbol of Christ, but also of the Mayan god Quetzalcoatl (Campbell, 1974). Crosses have also been associated with the four cardinal directions, with crossroads, with circles and their symbolisms, with the swastika which has gone through various symbolic uses in Asia and in Europe, and with the Egyptian symbol of fertilization, the ankh (Becker, 1997). In Christianity, the cross retains many nuances of meaning, including an alluring and powerful ambiguity reflecting at once the majesty of the church and the agony of the dying outcaste.

**Dramatic Use of Symbols**

"Being multivocal, not all inherent (symbolic) meanings are understood at any one time" and thus, for Courtney (1990) symbols are “a vague cognitive tool” which require “a high level of intelligence for (their) manipulation” (p. 110). An important method of manipulating symbols is through drama, in fact “all dramatic action can be analyzed in symbolic terms” (p. 133). Drama gives symbols external life. It is the nature of drama to make inner meanings public. The Greek tragedies of 5th century Athens most clearly exemplify this principle of extrapolating inner events of the psyche into public dramas. Oedipus and Electra originated in legends, became characters in plays and have come to signify psychological complexes, the Oedipus and Electra complexes. Other Greek characters like the Furies, Dionysos and Hecuba are thought of as archetypes, representative of individual psychic complexes.

Having lent their meanings to psychology, classical Greek tragedies also remain among the most enduring work in theatre. Bakhtin (1981) wrote that Greek society and its dramas displayed the “utter exteriority of the individual”
where “the unity of a man’s externalized wholeness (is) of a public nature… everything… internal is made corporeal and externalized” (p. 133, 135). For Bakhtin the public square or agora of 5th century Athens nurtured the high relief of Greek tragedy. Theatre historians have also attributed the success of the Greek tragedians to the public nature of Athenian life, the “performance culture of Athens where a participatory democracy played out its political and ethical concerns in an aggressively public and performative fashion” (Rehm, 1992, p. 73). While public discussion in the agora was creating the political possibilities of democracy it also made possible Greek tragedy, “a social body carrying out quite publicly the development of its mental infrastructure” (Meier, 1988, p. 4). The festivals which staged these tragedies included broad democratic gestures such as the freeing of all prisoners and public voting on the quality of plays. “Tragedy’s importance in sustaining the quality of public life… suggests the cultural survival of the Athenians depended on the courage of its people in confronting the risks of tragedy” (Euben, 1986, p. 23). Greek tragedies dramatized the dilemmas of emerging from the mythically governed universe of the gods into a universe that relied only on man. These tragedies relied on myths and legends as repositories of psychic truths (Campbell, 1974) which supplied Greek tragedians with narrative material. Greeks saw in everything a “condensed mythological event” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 135). The Greek tragedies invested these myths with “such urgency and power that, paradoxically, they transcend their local origins and speak across the centuries” (Rehm, 1992, p. 73). Greek tragedy remains a model of this type of drama where every inner event is dramatically externalized. Later literature, according to Bakhtin, distorted life by the “increasing participation in the mute and invisible spheres of existence”—the realm of psychology. This has resulted in genres such as those of Chekhov and Ibsen, pioneers of modern psychological drama. But Greek tragedies remain exemplary as a genre for their extrapolated symbolism. The role of symbols, according to Courtney (1995), is to make felt-meanings into external objects. By contrast, modern dramas tend to portray these felt-meanings realistically, as the psychological realities within individuals and
not as external objects. For Courtney, players in spontaneous dramas "feel that the symbolic meaning of their actions has the power of external reality" (p. 26) which enables these players to re-create their personal and social realities. Greek dramas highlight this transpersonal action. "A symbolic performance is a complex sign that is dynamic, ongoing, and social; it transforms the mundane into the significant --the symbolically significant" (1995, p. 35). "Through both ritual and art we learn to transform experience into symbolic truths" (p. 49). The characters in a drama are iconic representations through which felt-meanings become public objects. I do not mean to imply that Courtney preferred classical tragedies over modern drama--probably the contrary was true--but that the importance of symbolism is thrown into high relief in the case of Greek drama. In all drama,

Each figure becomes special in a particular way; that is, dramatic action has elevated it to symbolic status. In dramatic acts symbols become felt realities--fictional entities of significance in the Players' doing and Being. Symbols then become cognitive elements available to our intellectual potential. (Courtney, 1990, p. 125)

Consistent with Courtney's writings on tribal and ancient societies, symbols originally referred to the large meanings of Being, life and death, marriage and birth and individuals' relationships with the divine. These meanings have been transformed and fragmented by contemporary society, but drama still relies on the use of significant symbols. Thus dramatic events, according to Courtney, deal with questions like "Who am I? Who am I for other people?" (1990, p. 123).

Today we continue to realize our intellectual potential through representation, myth, ritual, drama, metaphor, and symbol; they remain cognitive and social acts whereby we grasp ultimate meanings. (1990, p. 110)
Thus, after seeing a serious and powerful play the audience tends to ponder the ways this drama has affected their world view. Drama by its very nature bestows symbolic meanings--the stage confers significance. Events are dramatized because they are significant, while the framing of an event on a stage increases its apparent significance.

In a general sense, all that is played is symbolic: The total dramatic action, from beginning to end, is certainly deliberate. From the myriad elements of the actual world, aspects are chosen to be transformed into the dramatic event--aspects that must have potential for significance in order to be chosen. (1990, p. 121)

Thus Lady Macbeth is portrayed washing her hands of imaginary blood. This action implies events that have gone before and after, but this symbolic action is chosen because it speaks articulately about Lady Macbeth’s inner state. When people improvise they intuitively choose powerful symbols for effect. Courtney wrote that symbols act on their own:

They float freely in the mind, one cluster linking with a second and then, at another time, with a third. Symbolic cognition (in the limited sense) appears to be the result of deep inner processes that are less rational than irrational, intuitive and even paradoxical. (1990, p. 124)

This is how symbols “behave”, as Courtney might say, in improvisations. But this action is also true in the life of cultures. Symbols operate powerfully in cultures because of their ambiguity and felt-meaning, according to Courtney. “The depth of feeling aroused… may be accounted for, at least partially, because the ambiguous power of symbols has action potentially within it” (1995, p. 27).
Symbols and Cultural Dramas

"Any complex symbol system functions as feelings... permitting clarification, systematization, and comprehension of events" (Courtney, 1995, p. 28). People in a specific culture reason through the meanings of their culture’s symbols. Thus, during witch hunts people were easily persuaded to associate women, midwives and herbal medicines with black magic. Through symbolic association, those who had been healers were easily seen as witches. Sexuality was easily associated with single women and witchcraft. Women’s sexuality was seen as threatening both when it seemed overt, as in pregnancy or sexual beauty, or when it seemed sublimated as with spinsters who were thought to have been consorting with the devil. These various images became closely linked so that many women were suspected. Trials were conducted by judges who were instructed not to look into the eyes of women, or let them say any words in their own defense, because the emotional power of women was associated with evil. As a result of these associations and symbolic clusters, during the witching years in Europe it is said that there were some cities in Germany where no women were left alive.

I give some anecdotal examples from a more contemporary culture, that of a homeless shelter where I taught drama and poetry. I found that the children I taught performed certain kinds of roles convincingly, but seemed to be unequipped with the symbolic systems to perform others. Few of the children would play “bad” roles, like the Wolf in the Three Little Pigs. Apparently they had learned from their mothers how to perform only certain roles and symbols, those of good little children that are pleasing to adults. They had been taught to convey only certain messages about themselves. Most of the children did not know their fathers. When one child announced that he loved his father, the other children giggled. But this boy was the only child who seemed to master the roles of men, for example the Hunter in Sleeping Beauty. He played a manly Hunter opposite a girl who played Sleeping Beauty, creating a convincing scene. This boy had a wider repertoire of symbols and of messages he could convey about
himself than the other boys. He had acquired a "system of symbolic meaning" about masculine values that the other boys had not. On the other hand, this particular group of youngsters dramatized in ways that seemed precocious for that age group (5-8 years). Most of the children conveyed an emotional realism that seemed sophisticated beyond their age. I hypothesize that this is because these children who live in relatively unprotected circumstances are more dependent on a single adult, their mother. They must study and manage her emotional states. I suggest that these children were more adroit at reading feelings and playing roles than children who may have less urgent need to do so. Thus, when these children played a scene from Hansel and Gretel, a story they chose frequently perhaps because in it the children defeat the evil adults, they played the parts with intensity and feeling. These children conveyed through their performances the symbol systems they knew. They knew how to convey them effectively because, I hypothesize, their lives require certain kinds of performances and certain kinds of insights into the performances of others. These performances--performing good little children, manipulating their mothers, understanding the performances of others--comprise the culture in which they live. This is a living example of the shared worlds on the lefthand side of the Worlds pastiche: "Symbols structure imaginings and the way we act. They create a social world" (1990, p. 127). I found these children, who shared a relatively cohesive set of symbols, performed together adroitly and movingly. I have found groups of children from more diverse backgrounds do not work together so readily, seemingly because they do not share the same sets of symbols.

Learning Through Symbols

How do people learn through symbols? According to Courtney, the learning involved is aesthetic which means it involves a qualitative change in thinking. Courtney wrote that this is like the "Aha" moment where something is suddenly seen in a new way. Thus, what is changed is the way of thinking, rather than what is thought of. For example, the sculptor Bernini’s statue of St. Theresa
of Avila being pierced by the love of God has a marked eroticism. Bernini took a symbol of the church, St. Theresa, and portrayed her as a sensual symbol that supported the Counter-Reformation—the Catholic Church’s reaction to the puritanical Reformation. St. Theresa had written of her mystical experiences in profoundly sensual and emotional terms, reflecting the depth of a mystic’s experience. In Bernini’s statue she becomes a symbol of the allure of the Church’s ritual and emotionalism, to counter the austerity of the Protestant movement. Bernini’s artistry endowed the anti-Protestant movement with symbolic power. An architect wrote of Bernini’s artistic campaign:

Bernini had much to do with the successful visualization of these messages… Bernini absorbs us into a palpable world of devotion, ravishes our senses, persuades us through visual testimony instead of rational argument or abstracted passion. Architecture, painting, sculpture—all the arts and every device of theatrical illusion work together to sweep us into a realm of unashamed emotionalism. We see, feel, and believe the pains of our martyrs, the wisdom of the Fathers, the greatness of the Church, the majesty of its pontiffs… The initial chill of the Counter-Reformation… is brushed aside in the seventeenth century in favor of a licentious, exciting environment of persuasion. (Kostof, 1995, p. 509)

The viewer of Bernini’s work can see Theresa and the passion of saints in an entirely new way.

Today learning is often seen as an event that takes place inside the individual, as often explained in terms of psychology. In dramatic terms learning has to do with organizing events in terms of symbols—which operate outwardly and inwardly at once. This organization is possible because symbols create feelings of “the wholeness of the interior self” (Courtney, 1995, p. 30). In other words, symbols can be a way of reintegrating fragmented parts of the psyche through projection. Anthropologist Fernandez (1986) has written that the function
of symbols is one of “returning to the whole”, just as Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969) wrote “the most eloquent metaphors refer back to the whole for significance.” Cassirer (1953) wrote of the “constitutive power of symbols” which in myth and tribal religion function to unify feelings. For Fernandez (1986) symbols are “strategies” for dealing with “societies so largely adversarial as the modern ones” (p. 162). Symbols are often considered manipulative as for example in advertising. However Fernandez wrote that “ritual complexes of symbols, the symbolic symphonies” of personal and religious thought work as unifying systems. People project their feelings onto symbols and experience through them, just as the 5th century Greeks used drama’s symbols to “carry out quite publicly the development of its mental infrastructure” (Meier, 1988, p. 4). As a recent example, I suggest that the chaotic reactions people had to the Vietnam War became crystallized around visible symbols which gave these feelings coherence. Thus the photograph of the Vietcong man being shot in the head synthesized mixed feelings of sympathy for a fierce enemy, revulsion against the American position of weakness and brutality, and a frustration at the mixture of stark realism and a sense of the absurd. As another example, in 1998 a teacher discussed how she used the sexual affair of the U.S. President with Monica Lewinsky in her classroom:

If you try to speak to a kid about an area in their life, they shut down and say, OK, Mom, OK. But you can talk about Clinton as a symbol. It’s in this other zone, and that distance lets you bring it into their world. (Gross, 1998)

The symbol permits a working out of internal issues at a safer distance. It gathers fragmented issues into a smooth whole. Courtney called symbols “cognitive tools” that amplify meanings. Courtney wrote that using symbols requires a high level of intelligence.
To think adequately (that is, to be intelligent) is to be skillful in dealing with the feelings inherent in symbols—to emphasize the feeling quality that promotes the required value system. (1995, p. 28)

It is commonly said that a major factor of intelligence is the growth of symbolic thought. (1990, p. 109)

Our real intellectual power is that we use symbolic clusters to dramatize a variety of plausible futures. (p. 124)

This intellectual capacity develops with maturation. The ability to work with symbols involves an interplay of factors, from grasping personal significance to understanding cultural significance, as well as the ability to work with media. Intellectual maturation can be framed as symbolic manipulation even without the richness of felt-meanings. Mathematics is a language of symbols, as are the languages of different sciences. However in the specifically dramatic realm, symbolic manipulation depends on a sophisticated grasp of the felt-meanings of symbols.

Martin Luther King, for example, evoked historical, biblical, mythical and contemporary symbols when he delivered his “I have a dream” speech (King, 1986). This speech has been the subject of various textual analyses (Cox, 1989; Hariman, 1989) but here I take a theatrical perspective, that King performed his message through evoking three scenes in rising and falling rhythms, rhythms learned from the cadences of his father’s countless sermons (Bennis, 1998). King accomplished this through his manipulation of symbols:

The first scene. King evoked Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: “Fivescore years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand today.” King called the Proclamation “a great beacon of light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice. It came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night of their captivity.” This grandiose image evoked mythic proportions with biblical references to the
captivity in Egypt, and the message “Let my people go.” The symbolic link between the semi-mythical Exodus from Egypt and the destiny of African Americans has survived more than thirty years. Time acquired an eternal dimension by reference to the mythical golden past. King evoked an epic scene of thousands leaving Egypt, blazing with the “searing flames of withering injustice” and the “joyous daybreak” after the long night of captivity. This is what Bakhtin (1981) called the world of the epic, the glorious past and its absolute authority, a “single inseparable whole... of authentic essence and significance” (p. 16).

The second scene drops the audience from these lofty heights: “But one hundred years later, the Negro is still not free.” King returned from the mythic realms into real time. In this real time, the promise of destiny has not been fulfilled.

So we have come here today to dramatize a shameful condition. In a sense we have come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects of our Republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir... It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check, which has come back marked ‘insufficient funds.’ (King, 1986, p. 217)

In returning to real time, King used a common symbol of bad faith, the returned check. But then King began to lift the audience again, from ordinary unfulfilled time into the idealistic, mythical realms of the first scene. He worked this action slowly, gathering the audience into a slightly rising momentum:
This is not time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism. Now is the time to make real the promises of segregation to the sunlit path of racial justice. Now is the time... (p. 218)

King not only began to lift the audience into mythical time—the sunlit path—he actually used the word “time” as he switched the time frame again. King brought time past and time future into “Now is the time.” King’s performance collapsed the greatness of promises past with an eternal present, an action which corresponds to the ritual collapsing of time. The “Now is the time” time rises from the mundane reality of a bad check to a magnificent and eternal present, the collapsed time of significance, the theatre of the here and now.

Transition. As King lifted the audience, he gathered it together by using symbols that dignified the endurance and suffering of the “Negro community.” For example:

our bodies, heavy with fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging in the motels...
some of you have come here out of excessive trials and tribulation...
fresh from narrow jail cells...
battered by the storms of persecution and staggered by the winds of police brutality.

King named these audience members “veterans of creative suffering” (p. 219). He also used symbols to strategize the coming civil rights movement. King framed his proposed strategy of biracial cooperation in Biblical and classical language:

Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our struggle on the high
plane of dignity and discipline...The marvelous new militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not lead us to a distrust of all white people... This offense we share mounted to storm the battlements of injustice must be carried forth by a biracial army. We cannot walk alone. (p. 218)

The third scene. King fully delivered on his theatrical promise as this slow rise climaxed with the famous “I have a dream” section of the speech which King was said to have improvised. This section completely lifted the audience into a semi-mythical future and set up a rhythm which united the mythic realm with real time. Beginning with “I have a dream” images, King invoked Biblical phrases like “sons of former slaves and sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood” (p. 219). As King ascended into the final section, King’s method was to translate time into space, a ritual method Eliade (1971) discussed. King accomplished this through the following rhythm:

And so let freedom ring from the prodigious hilltops of New Hampshire.
Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of New York...
Let freedom ring from the snow-capped Rockies of Colorado.
Let freedom ring from the curvaceous slopes of California...
Let freedom ring from Stone Mountain of Georgia.
Let freedom ring from Lookout Mountain of Tennessee.
Let freedom ring from every hill and molehill of Mississippi, from every mountain side, let freedom ring. (p. 220)

This exhortation, “let freedom ring”, united the audience with the speaker so that all experience a rhythmic release of energy: “Thank God Almighty, we are free at last.” King extended the mythical dimension to include contemporary American scenes. These scenes—the mighty mountains of New York, the snow-capped Rockies of Colorado—are symbols in their own right. For example, Stone
Mountain of Georgia is the home of the Ku Klux Klan. The audience moved across the vast landscapes from New Hampshire and New York to the snowy Rockies to the far coast, all symbols of “America’s promise” or the “American dream.” King evoked places, a spatial consciousness, as a climax to the precipitous time theme. King released the audience from the tensions of time into the vastness of space. King’s technique parallels Eliade’s ideas about the mythic consciousness because King spatialized images of time. He converted the frightening historical prospect of integration into images of the vast spaces of America. Hariman (1989) compared this to Eliade’s observation that “creating and maintaining the mythic consciousness requires converting time to space in order ‘to escape the anxiety of living in history’” (p. 213). This is a contemporary example of the qualities of ritual I discussed earlier. Time is collapsed, a basic characteristic of ritual and contemporary drama, and time is spatialized. Worries about “what will happen?” “how will we do it?” “what if one of them marries my daughter?” are swept up into a vast panorama of inevitable destiny. When King enumerated the landscapes in America where freedom would ring—“Let freedom ring from the Stone Mountain of Georgia”—he converted time, the historical process of integration, into space “in order to escape the anxiety of living in history.” Facts and dates are staged and blocked on the stage of a highly significant present tense. The theatrical mode of collapsing time creates an eternal present which exerts emotional power over the tense difficulties of living in ordinary time. In the ritual mode of collapsing time, events become larger than life. All this was accomplished through the use of symbols.

King’s images employ the high theatrics of contrasts, as for example in the “dark and desolate valley of segregation” as against the “sunlit path of racial justice”; “seared in the flames of withering injustice” as against “joyous daybreak to end the long night of captivity” and “lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity” (p. 176). But the important rhetorical aspect of all of these symbols is that they are more mythical than revolutionary. The audience is invited into an epic dimension, a symphony of ancient universal
images, rather than incited to tension or anger. The Biblical images of the Exodus, the epic images of the “American landscape”, have classical and monumental qualities. King’s rhetoric was more conservative than revolutionary. Because of King’s biblical and epic images, his radical message seemed inevitable because it seemed rooted in an ancient reality.

King’s speech was a rhetorical manipulation of symbols that created both a sense of moral urgency and a sense of eternal destiny. Symbols can be seen as vessels that conduct meanings between the perform and the audience. They are empty vessels, in the sense that the audience fills them with their own felt-meanings from archetypal and cultural materials. Martin Luther King’s symbols would not necessarily work with an audience in New Delhi which would not be able to recognize them or to fill them with meaning. But King’s mentor Gandhi employed his own symbols for the crowds in New Delhi. When Gandhi spoke of the untouchable caste as being “God’s children”, Gandhi invoked images which connected his own radical politics with enduring epic symbols. Hindu mythological symbols of “The Mother” have power in the Indian culture as witnessed by the range of “Mother Goddesses”, deities who may be fierce but still cause Hindus to cry “Ma! Ma!” as a child to his mother (Nikhilananda, 1977). The symbol of the relationship of child to mother pervades Hindu epic lore, as in the many stories of the baby Krishna. The Hindu audience filled Gandhi’s symbol of “God’s children” with their deeply felt meanings about mothers and children.

Symbols are created by the meanings people give them. Then they take on a life of their own: “they are established as mental entities and become highly active” (1990, p. 124). Symbols as media link inner and outer realities and are important factors in creating the aesthetic and fictional worlds discussed in Chapter V. “Through both ritual and art we learn to transform experience into symbolic truths” (1995, p. 49). These symbols become available for public use. In Courtney’s work, one of the important uses of symbols is to reconstitute or re-create social reality. Symbols are tools with which players construct the social reality in which they live. Thus, Martin Luther King manipulated symbols of
freedom and justice, placing racial freedom in the context of Biblical legend and America’s landscapes rather than in the context of Bull Connor’s violent Alabama, bequeathing America a new social reality.
The Culturalism of Jerome Bruner

Another educator who wrote about culture is Jerome Bruner (1986). Bruner has, like Courtney, made use of Turner's (1974) ideas.

As we enter more actively into the life of a culture around us, as Victor Turner remarks, we come increasingly to play parts defined by the "dramas" of that culture. Indeed, in time the young entrant into the culture comes to define his own intentions and even his own history in terms of the characteristic cultural dramas in which he plays a part--at first family dramas, but later the ones that shape the expanding circle of his activities outside the family. (pp. 66-7)

Bruner (1996) wrote about "culturalism" as the way people learn through cultures--"how human beings in cultural communities create and transform meanings" (p. 4). His ideas about culturalism have direct parallels to Courtney's work. Bruner's tenets of culturalism are parallel to some of Courtney's notions, such as Bruner's "perspectival tenet" which frames all meanings within their own specific perspectives or frames of reference (Bruner, 1996, p. 13). Bruner also listed "the constructivism tenet: The reality that we impute to the worlds we inhabit is a constructed one... reality is made, not found" (p. 13). "The interactional tenet" holds that "passing on knowledge and skill, like any human exchange, involves a subcommunity in interaction" (p. 20), similar to the ideas in this chapter. "The externalization tenet" (p. 22) addresses the way people create works of art and science as media through which people learn. Works of art reflect meaning back to participants, both creator and viewers. They are media for learning. This is identical with another strand of Courtney's works which I have only touched on so far, the learning accomplished through media especially through dramatic acts. In Figure 1 Courtney stated: "That is to say that dramatic action is a mediator, it is the dynamic between mind and the external world"
(1990, p. 54) and "The acting human being is the medium that carries meaning" (ib.). Bruner lists some more tenets of culturalism, the final being his "tenet of identity and self-esteem" which involves "the single most universal thing about human experience, the phenomenon of Self" (p. 35). This is also the goal of Courtney's cultural learning, a goal Courtney calls Being. Ideas that Courtney called learning through drama, Bruner called culturalism. I do not believe that Courtney would insist that drama has an exclusive right to these notions, but rather that drama should be included in the broad discussion of how people learn in life.
CHAPTER VII

THE ACT OF DRAMA

This chapter addresses the next dramatistic element, the act of drama itself. In previous chapters metaphors have emerged to describe the act of drama. Drama in Chapter V was an act of world-creation and in Chapter VI a symbolic interaction. An underlying theme emerges—the attempt to answer the question “what is drama?”, a question first answered with the metaphor of theatrum mundi. This chapter addresses the act of drama using metaphors which are more operational. What happens in drama?

But what happens when we externalize our imaginings through a dramatic act? ... transformation, representation, expression, symbol. That is to say that dramatic action is a mediator; it is the dynamic between mind and the external world; it is the action that generates meaning within the environment and incorporates that meaning in mind. (Courtney, 1990, p. 54)
This chapter discusses metaphors that the actor experiences and uses within the act of drama. These metaphors portray drama as metaphor, drama as symbol--including the drama of ritual, and drama as a medium.

Metaphors Revisited

When Courtney posed the question: "When is experience dramatic and when is it not?" (1990, p. 12) he answered his own question: "Drama creates meaning in a double process: When we compare the actual and the fictional. When we dramatize, we create fiction." Drama is a double process, one of creating fictional worlds which provide perspectives on the actual world. This is how people learn, according to the center of Figure 5: "Our creative imagination and dramatic actions... create meaning. They bring about the "as if" world of possibility (the fictional), which works in parallel with the actual world and is a cognitive tool for understanding it" (Courtney, 1990, p. 9). Drama acts like a metaphor with its double references, referring simultaneously to a fiction and an actuality. Like Ricoeur (1979), Courtney considered metaphors as dynamic tensions which operate between two different referents. This was also how Courtney saw the act of drama:

One essential characteristic of drama is that it has tension. It pulls between two poles: between imagining and action; and also between inner and outer. It is not, as some would have us believe, that drama is a "conflict." It is a whole where the inner dynamics both pull together and pull apart.... Always a dramatic situation is in oscillation--a tension between the parts. (1980, p. 23)

Thus the idea of drama as conflict oversimplifies the ambiguous tension within a dramatic act. This tension refers at once to a literal event and a symbolic meaning, to the actuality of actors in the here and now and to the fiction of their
imagination. “Dramatic metaphor” is the term Courtney used most often to talk about the double realities involved in the process of learning through drama. Thus I return to the subject of metaphor, in this recursive treatment of Courtney’s central concept in learning through drama.

The Dramatic Metaphor

Dramatic metaphor and action... transform an obdurate environment into a fiction with which we can deal. Those engaged in theatre play and spontaneous drama bracket off mundane life and live through a fictional “here and now”, but within an actual context. (1990, p. 73)

Dramatic metaphor is the imaginative perception and enactment of double worlds. The term metaxis described in the literature section is often used in the field of drama (Boal, 1995; Bolton, 1979) to describe the simultaneous play of an action in different worlds. An action takes place on a stage while it also takes place in an imaginary world. Courtney (1990) used the notion of metaphor to describe this quintessential quality of drama. “Aristotle’s comments in the Poetics show that metaphors are forms of dramatization. They operate so that one thing is “as if” another thing” (p. 67). This paradigm also applies to ritual.

In the ritual world, the human being as actor becomes something else—a supernatural being or god. Yet he continues to remain himself. It is the same with objects. A stone which is a sacred stone is two things: both its normal reality and a supernatural reality. Dramatization creates significant meaning, whether sacred or profane. (1982, p. 23)

To “dramatize” in Courtney’s writings can mean to represent, to symbolize or to create a metaphor. The act of drama is an act of metaphorization.
Thinking in the metaphoric mode is the core of imagining, which when expressed in action is dramatic. The child at play and the salesman who tries to “get into the skin” of the customer, the student improvising social studies, the socialite who takes the role of the hostess at a banquet, the politician who says what he thinks the voters want to hear—all of these individuals are experimenting with the dramatic metaphor. Each is engaged, as Plato and Northrop Frye have said, in the “great lie.” (1990, p. 71)

For Courtney, this is the basis for the way people learn through dramatic action.

Learning Through Metaphor

Courtney wrote that the mind functions by finding similar ideas, or metaphors. “The primary mental structure is similarity: we think in metaphors—by understanding one thing in terms of another. A concept is metaphorically structured. When this is externalized in action we use the dramatic process to express meaning through media” (1988, p. 125). For example, when a child first goes to school she may think school is like being at home, her initial metaphor. Then she finds it is more like going shopping with her mother, her second metaphor. Working through successive metaphors, she finds similarities from her previous experience which help her learn about school. “It gives us a unique frame or perspective, a way of looking at things. ... we change how we think about things or how we make sense of reality” (1990, p. 68). The child learns from her new experiences at school through metaphors which provide her with modi operandi. Throughout this process she is comparing her experience and her metaphors. It is her awareness of a split reference, a simultaneous awareness of her outer role and her inner reality, which enables her to learn. The child learns in school insofar as she is aware of her inner reality. If the school experience is
overwhelming and frightening, this precludes her awareness of her own inner life and precludes learning. Courtney defined cognition as "mental structures (concepts or schemas) that are the basis for ideas, the dynamics between them" (1990, p. 8). Mental operations that use double realities--using fiction and its "heuristic power"--are key to concept formation. This process is specifically dramatic when it entails imaginative transformations.

As an example I refer to an exercise drama teachers sometimes use. Students are asked to interview someone in their family and use these personal narratives to create a drama. In a hypothetical example, a student interviews her grandmother whom she initially regards as a troublesome old woman. This is the student's first metaphor. As the interviews begin, the grandmother narrates her arrival on Ellis Island in a lively manner. With tears in her eyes the grandmother recalls her courtship, her first job, her first child. The granddaughter listening to these stories finds new metaphors for understanding her grandmother: pioneer, young girl in a strange land, victim, heroine. In performing a drama about her grandmother's narratives, the granddaughter creates still more metaphors. For example, she might illumine herself under a spotlight as if the subject of a police interrogation, or she might cradle a small bird as a metaphor for one who has fallen out of the nest. During this process of creating metaphoric dramas the granddaughter is also making tacit comparisons with her own worlds, facilitating her learning about her own relationships with family members and her own personal ambitions. This process is cognitive and developmental, steadily changing the granddaughter's perceptions of life and of her world. Through a stream of metaphors, composed of her grandmother's narratives and her own imagination, she develops an understanding of herself and her family which acquires further depth as she dramatizes the narratives. "From an abstract perspective, metaphor's dramatic quality appears when images are transformed into imaginings" (Courtney, 1990, p. 69). In this manner, acts of creation can result in significant learning.
In the above case the student transforms images from her grandmother’s imagination into her own dramas. Her assignment has made this process conscious, but people go through similar processes unconsciously throughout their daily lives. People perceive images through empathy and identification, imaginatively transform these images into metaphors, and make the conceptual adjustments which are learning. People interpret their understandings through metaphoric actions, and also learn to interpret the actions of others. For Courtney, the ability to use metaphors is not just an aspect of intelligence, but the measure of intelligence. Metaphors function dramatically, when people imaginatively transform their perceptions, ideas and actions. Thus drama is not a process of imitation. Drama which merely imitates externals is a form of learning which consists of imitating externals. Rather, through metaphors which people use to imaginatively transform perception, understanding and intelligence develop.

For example, some teachers approach drama by teaching students to memorize lines and repeat them on a stage. A different approach is to create a drama by asking students to find their own metaphors for given topics. Liz Swados created a musical called The Hating Pot by asking youngsters of various ethnic backgrounds to plumb their own experience to find ways to express the hatred people have for different ethnic groups. By improvising from their own experiences, and thinking deeply about each other’s performances, the actors worked to understand hatred. For example, a white teenager seeing a black man with a beeper used the metaphor of drug dealer, whereas a black teenager saw the same man as a doctor. An orthodox Jewish girl had learned the metaphor that other ethnic groups were “not of her kind.” A black youngster growing up in Harlem had been taught the metaphor that all white people are racist. Swados created music and dance around the metaphors these youngsters developed which became the musical, The Hating Pot. Their drama concluded that the word “hate” is similar to the word “hurt.” Such an approach to drama is a cognitive process, as differentiated from memorizing predetermined lines coming from an author’s metaphors.
The use of metaphor shows the degree to which players have developed their intellectual potential. When players cannot use metaphor, it indicates that they do not “see the forest for the trees”... Those who can use metaphors effectively, however, have moved from literal thinking towards a multiperspective. (1990, p. 69)

For Courtney, literal thinking suffers from a lack of “dramatic intelligence”, a failure to change perspectives--which are the roles in the dramas that are involved in cognition. Courtney's approach challenges teachers who follow blueprints. His colleague John McLeod believed education should make explicit use of metaphors. McLeod suggests that current educational systems and methods are insufficient, that the nature of metaphor within drama and arts curricula must be addressed... more emphasis needs to be placed on the tacit domain. Primarily, the strategies for learning must be firmly grounded in the dramatic world. (Courtney, 1990, p. 78)

As observed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphors pervade cultural learning, from the time children pretend to be different characters at play. This process continues in professional life, religious belief and in the “games people play.” For example, a lawyer who defends a criminal must find metaphors to convey his client’s innocence, perhaps portraying the criminal as a victim of his own insanity, absolving him of responsibility for the crime. Courtney calls such uses of metaphor dramatic--they are forms of role play, whether overt or covert.

At the nub of this play/culture link lies dramatization. ...the substitution in imagination of one action for another brings about a magical result; desiring to build a temple to Buddha, but lacking the means, the Japanese
deposits a pebble before his image—"it is just the same thing." Being "as if," says Roheim, "becomes a life-long, socialized and serious attitude of primitive man, and finally in its endless ramifications gives rise to our own civilization." (1989, p. 137)

When the use of metaphor permits breakthroughs in conceptual thought, as in Learning III, metaphor is creative. "By changing the relationship between its two constituent parts, the metaphor can ... change our knowing and... enable us to re-play aspects of reality... it can give us a new perspective on events and experience" (1990, p. 70). In dramatic work operative metaphors can easily be altered. For example, a scene between a couple could be played as if the couple were on a picnic, as if the couple were in a war zone, as if the couple were in a dream, or as if the couple were reunited after many years. Enacting the scene using different metaphors expands the players’ understanding just as do the metaphors people adopt in their everyday actions.

In public dramas, the metaphors through which people project themselves can become symbols. A metaphor is a personal way of making and comprehending meaning, whereas a symbol is a more public form of expression. When people adopt a more publicly recognizable metaphor it becomes a symbol.

Drama as Symbol

The symbol is the actor himself--the person in dramatic action.... It occurs whenever the human actor makes a representation of himself in the external world, and does so in a whole way (with his self) rather than in a partial manner. In drama, we re-present ourselves in the environment symbolically. (1982, p. 6)

For example in the dramas of politics, players work to become symbols which mediate their relations with their constituency. In 1997 the President of the
United States, Bill Clinton, was said to be casting about for an enduring symbol by which he could be remembered. Therefore Clinton established a “dialogue on race”, hoping to become a symbol of improved race relations. By early 1998 it seemed Clinton would instead be remembered for a consistent pattern of adultery, via the symbol of a “semen-stained dress.” The Republican Party actively worked to convince the public that Clinton was a symbol of moral inadequacy: Clinton had encouraged perjury, Clinton had betrayed family values and Clinton had lied. Clinton worked with another set of symbols, insisting that he was only interested in “the work the American people have elected me to do.” Clinton was trying to mediate between his presidency and his constituency as a symbol of a down-to-earth worker. While politics depends on such manipulations of one’s self as symbol, public figures sometimes intensify the power of these symbols precisely by not acknowledging them. Papa Doc Duvalier, the brutal dictator of Haiti, symbolized himself as a god of Voodoo but left the illusion unspoken which enhanced powerful feelings among his constituency. For example, Papa Doc spoke in a high pitched voice and dressed in the black clothes of a Voodoo god without acknowledging he was doing so. Many Haitians were said to perceive Papa Doc as supernaturally powerful. Similarly, the public culture in the US denies the value of symbols, which perhaps intensifies their unconscious effect. Actions are dismissed as “merely symbolic” and not practical, which seems to enhance the power of symbolic manipulations. In 1998 a ceremony at Tiannamen Square was dismissed by public figures in the US as “merely symbolic” and therefore not of political weight. In fact it was precisely symbolism which conferred political power on an appearance at Tiannamen Square. The same year the movement to elevate the status of Palestine in the General Assembly at the United Nations was called by US spokespersons “merely symbolic” to defuse its importance. It was precisely its symbolism which increased Palestine’s political stature.
Learning Through Symbol

Symbols convey deeply felt meaning. Drama is to engage in hypothetical actions, trying out symbolic meanings. Drama plays with events in order to make sense of them, engaging symbolic meanings. Courtney calls this re-play.

Re-play enables us to face life experiences at a symbolic level: to engage in problem-solving in a deep personal way... Always drama provides a double meaning: the actor is himself and yet also another; the objects used are actual and also symbolic; and all exist in both everyday life and the world of "as if." (1982, p. 3)

Drama processes life experiences using symbols. For example, shortly after film director Roman Polanski’s wife was brutally stabbed to death, Polanski directed the movie Macbeth. The scene in which Macbeth kills the king was staged as a bloodbath of frantic stabbing and slashing. This seemed to be Polanski’s way of trying to make meaning of his wife’s recent tragedy on a symbolic level. The publicly shared symbolism in Macbeth transformed Polanski’s personal metaphors into a more distanced artistic event. Artists tend to expose vulnerable feelings, in order to transform them into aesthetic and more distanced events. Having been convicted of a sexual crime with a minor, Polanski proceeded to make the movie Tess about the rape of a young girl. Perhaps Polanski’s movie Death and the Maiden about a woman’s torture and revenge reflected three sides of Polanski’s own struggles: a woman had been abused and tortured (like his wife), her husband had not been there to save her (he had not been there to save his wife), and the abuser was perhaps a third aspect of Polanski’s past (in his incident with the young girl). People in everyday life use similar means to deal with the past and the future, finding vicarious or creative ways to work out troubling issues.
We “try out” possible futures and “act out” the problems of the past; as we learn, we adjust to time. Each actor is protected by re-play--after all, drama is not life--yet it is so meaningful to him that it reaches down into his inner self. (Courtney, 1982, p. 3)

For example, one approach to helping youngsters with emotional problems is for them to act out hypothetical scenes experimenting with different outcomes (Yale Child Study Center, 1994a, b). This approach gives the youngster a chance to gain control of and make choices about different responses. A youngster might act out a scene in which he is insulted, and work dramatically with his responses in order to learn to control his anger. The developmental value of this work relies on the hypothetical and symbolic--not overly realistic--nature of drama. It has been my observation that when youngsters are required to act out painful scenes from their own life the effect can be devastating. Sometimes youngsters become overwhelmed, drop out of such programs and even run away. Drama, like the other arts, is valuable when it uses symbolic and aesthetic qualities to shape and refine feelings. A key to this form of re-play is the distance afforded by symbolic actions.

Rituals

The form of drama which relies most on symbols is ritual. Rituals are performative acts, with cultural themes and subtexts that are important for the participants whose feeling states they embody in a metaphoric way... Rituals... carry meaning (“the medium is the message”) particularly symbolic meaning, and they create further symbolic, indexical or self-referential meanings that reinforce cultural values. (1989, p. 142)

Rituals are symbolic and performative actions that inherently carry meaning.

**Performative force** conveys messages powerfully, even in ordinary actions. For example, when a child is told to eat something he hates he might exaggeratedly chew, gag, choke and make other performative gestures which dramatize his unfair treatment. Performances expand meanings and their power.

An example of the power of performance is recounted by Ramon Gordon (1981) who ran a theatre group with prisoners. The first task for each newly initiated actor/prisoner was to stand on a stage before everyone and shout his name—to restore his name to himself.

It is a brand new experience; never in his life has that much positive attention been focused on him; he has never been “on stage” before. Some take as much as five or ten minutes, amid nervous giggling, fear, delaying tactics, etc., before they can shout loud and clear the simple statement of their own name. One intelligent man gave up after twenty minutes; he could not make his name heard! Many, in this first exercise, unconsciously clutch at their genitals. (p. 321)

The intimidating power of performance served to highlight the loss of personal power these prisoners felt. When asked to claim their own names from a position of power, they could not. Names were symbols of their selfhood. As these prisoners became accustomed to performing in Gordon’s troupe, a setting which some found “more real than real life” (p. 325), they learned to re-claim their names and their selves, according to Gordon. Inherently

symbolic performance builds a person’s self-image. When symbols are recreated in rituals, they reinforce the important feelings of confidence and
self-worth. When they are recreated in educational drama, these feelings underpin learning. (Courtney, 1988, p. 138)

Ritual performances are not generally directed toward an audience but usually toward someone or something of significance like a spirit, god or institution. Rituals are performed in ways that highlight significant meanings. In referring to significant meanings on a sacred level rituals exist on two levels at once:

The ritualist relates his inner thought to the external world. By performing the ritual, he attempts to re-create the elements of the environment into a significant pattern that brings about a new level of meaning--one that is intense and significant. … It has two levels of meaning: the actor and his action exist on the plane of everyday life (he does it in the here and now); and the actor and his action exist on a symbolic level (he does it within a ritualized plane that is intense and significant). (1982, p. 26)

One such secular ritual is a wedding. Weddings include patterns of significance like the crushing of a goblet or the reading of specific texts. Weddings occur on two levels: a legal level and a romantic level through which the couple hopes to invest their future with feelings that transcend the mundane. “In other words, rituals are performative codes: they contain symbolic significations and these create, interpret and negotiate human existence” (1988, p. 138).

Cultural themes. Rituals use the symbols of a specific cultural milieu. For example, Courtney’s student Peter McLaren studied the daily rituals of an inner city Catholic school. Schools use symbols to embed meanings, and structure these as rituals. “The rituals of everyday school life, like the frameworks used in educational drama, tacitly shape the learning process through the dramatic performances of those involved” (Courtney, 1988, p. 139). McLaren (1993) described a micro ritual he called “Silence and the Evil Eye” through which
teachers tried to bring students “into a state of reverence for the opening prayer”:

In their attempt to project a certain gravity of bearing, to emphasize their authorial role, and to enhance their redoubtable presence, the teachers stand motionless at the front of the class. Sometimes a tinge of anguish breaks across their brows as if they were trying to appear noble and disinterested sufferers. With eyes narrowed, arms akimbo, and legs spread out slightly to give the impression of a firmly balanced body that is capable of repelling any struggle or attempted subversion (a kind of dressed down ‘horse stance’ that you find in the martial arts), the teachers move their heads in a steady, rotating fashion, much like the automatic surveillance cameras in department stores. This self-conscious and mechanical posturing tends to reinforce the mien of seriousness of the occasion and contributes to the artificial aggrandizement of the teacher-as-mentor or teacher as an unfathomable, mysterious, and all-powerful being.

The culture McLaren studied was characterized by a struggle between the authoritative control of the teachers and the psychic pain endured by students at home, at school and in society. In the above example, the teachers adopted a ritual through which they institutionalized themselves as symbols of control. Rituals like this pervade everyday life but are more easily recognizable in institutional settings which exercise a rhythm or routine. But Courtney's use of the word ritual does not emphasize repetitiveness or routine--the emphasis is on meaning.

**Ritual meaning.** “Rituals encapsulate the norms of the culture within an emotional matrix ... In fact, mythological images are to be found almost everywhere, even if they are fragmented and disguised” (1982, p. 26). Thus, young people on the lower East Side of Manhattan, New York may come from affluent suburbs, but they hang out on the street as if in poverty, hair spiked and
colored, rings piercing much of their flesh, ritualizing their own mythologies. Their rituals, including drug taking and panhandling, seem to combine a Franciscan reverence for poverty with self-destructiveness. The rituals enact a mythology of freedom, rejection of the status quo, self-discovery or perhaps self-rejection. These rituals reinforce a commitment to a specific way of life through giving the participants a sense of felt-meaning. This occurs through direct participation and the conferring of significance on specific acts. Similarly,

Just as the Judaeo-Christian Sabbath was an act in imitation of God—"On the seventh day He rested"—so much of Christian ritual is a dramatic imitation based on the model of Jesus. Christ asked that this should occur: "For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you."... The events of Holy Week are not just remembered, they really happen...They are made present, re-presented. (1982, p. 25)

Much of Christian ritual has lost symbolic force, yet its action is still felt to take place on a sacred plane. Similarly, peoples have always commemorated significant histories with rituals.

In trying to be other than his profane self, the human being ritualizes the models given by the myths... Tribal people of the past told their myths about the events of creation (the fabled "beginnings") where supernatural beings brought everything into existence. These "beginnings" were thought to be more "real" than everyday life, and they provided models for living. (1982, p. 19)

Courtney's notions about ritual are largely influenced by Eliade's (1963, 1971, 1987) concept of the archaic. This concept emphasizes the metaphoric and meaningful aspect of ritual. It also emphasizes the collapsing of time, in which past and future are collapsed into the present.
The act, by repetition, coincides with its archetype. Act and archetype fuse and time is abolished. The performer, through the heightened intensity of unified time, breaks through into the “real.” He gives significant meaning to the inner and outer worlds through his dramatic acts. (Courtney, 1982, p. 23)

Sacred or secular, archaic or contemporary, rituals “spatialize” time——collapsing time past and future into a present performance in a visible space. This unification of time heightens the experience of reality in “the continuous present... Ritual myths collapse cosmic time into sacred time; theatre [collapses historic time into] into significant time” (1989, p. 163).

For example ritual dramas in Southeast Asia re-enact Hindu classics, such as the Mahabharatha and the Ramayana. These performances often take place throughout the night so that the audience lives through its own condensed ordeal, while experiencing the vividness of the battles, chases and love scenes. Other dance dramas of the region use elaborate and terrifying costumes to depict monstrous goddesses who interact with the audience, bringing the audience into the framework of the drama and collapsing time. During many of these rituals participants go into trance, entering a state of timelessness, merging their consciousness with the ritual reality.

Actors in both ritual or theatre break with the actual and the mundane: they emphasize the fictional which assumes the appearance of a heightened reality. Here lies the unity of theatrical, ritual and cultural actions: in each, actors give significant meaning to the action... The difference is that the ritualist does so by imitating a model whereas the stage actor does so by creating a model. (1988, p. 137)
Here is the distinction between acts of identification as acting in ritual, and acts of transformation as acting in the stage world. But “rituals do not merely reflect felt-meaning; they articulate felt-meaning and bring states of affairs into being” (1995, p. 37). “A ritual’s symbolic power effectively constructs world views” (p. 38). Rituals provide metaphysical felt-meaning.

Learning Through Ritual

Ritual is a model for Courtney’s notions of learning through drama. The process of ritual mediates. “Ritual with felt-meaning is a “psychosocial vessel” in which we, as social actors, find the balance between our inner needs and the demands of our culture” (Courtney, 1995, p. 45). The metaphor being created by the dramatic act serves as a medium on which the feeling power of the participants concentrate. Such a medium becomes a cultural vehicle. For example, when a student in cap and gown receives a diploma, the feelings of the audience concentrate on that student who is momentarily a symbol of the rite of education. If someone in the audience suddenly attacked the student, the audience would experience an attack on the values being enacted through the ceremony. The student is temporarily a medium for the felt-meaning of the graduation ceremony. Ritual actions are usually characterized by a high degree of involvement because of the concentration of feeling. “Our actions with any media, if they are pregnant with felt-meaning, have a ritual quality and, thus, we learn about both the medium and the message” (Courtney, 1995, p. 45). The architect Spiro Kostof (1995) used the word ritual to describe an aspect of architecture--its “poetry of function.”

Insofar as a building is shaped by ritual it does not simply house function, it comments on it. The pyramid of Cheops ensures the safety and long-lastingness of the pharaoh’s corpse and makes tangible to his people the hope that resides in his perpetuity. Hagia Sophia sings the ineffableness of Christian mystery in providing a space of which one user is man and the other user is unseen and unpredictable. (p. 19)
Kostof's history of architecture is a history of the felt-meanings of architecture—the ritual aspect of architecture. It shows how buildings sing, and how the people of Byzantium and Egypt understood the universe.

Rituals usually entail intense feelings which, for Courtney, are intrinsic to learning. The rituals of schooling use feelings to teach specific learning styles. Thus fear instilled by the rituals of control in education can predispose the learner to hate certain subjects. The ritual of storytelling, on the other hand, may instill a feeling of comfort in children that develops a positive learning style. Courtney quoted Erikson (1966) on the use of ritual for learning which begins in infancy when the baby and mother mutually develop rituals. As people mature, they develop rituals in interaction with groups of people. Courtney (1995) cited Erikson as saying that rituals facilitate learning to communicate, to channel raw emotions into feelings, to bond communally, to adjust socially and to establish and maintain social order (p. 47).

But the unique role of feelings in dramas and rituals is that they create the drama which brings change in the learner. Mediating between the person and their creation, feelings shape the ritual and also precipitate the change that is learning.

One function of ritual, as with all media, is to link inner and outer. This is specifically a felt-relation; it functions well or not according to the effectiveness of feelings. It is, thus, a major factor in our learning how to create aesthetic and fictional worlds. Through both ritual and art we learn to transform experience into symbolic truths. (1995, p. 49)

The creation of symbolic truths entails using feelings. For example, the AIDS quilt project is a ritual in which people have used deep feelings to create forms and symbols on the squares of the quilt. Many who participate have lost a close companion or relative to AIDS, and their struggle with grief has forged aesthetic shapes to express this struggle.
Religious rituals stimulate aesthetic, metaphysical and practical action. For example, devotees of Islam roll out their prayer rugs, ritual aesthetic objects, five times a day for their prayers. The aesthetic forms of rituals affect metaphysical beliefs, deepening feelings of participation. Inspired by the ritual of daily prayers, an Islamic fundamentalist has an experience of the truth and purity of Paradise. Fueled by the power of feelings, these aesthetic and metaphysical experiences can find outlets in concrete actions and symbols, such as the martyrdom of suicide bombings. It seems that there are no zealots as fierce as religious zealots, and no warriors more determined than those who fight holy wars. The power of religious visions and resultant intensity of feelings are fed by the aesthetic components in rituals. “Goffman says rituals are a meta-communicative system, one that symbolizes alternative domains of reality with a powerful moral force” (Courtney, 1989, p. 143). A ritual like Purim gives sustenance to Jews in times of difficulty, and seemed so threatening to Hitler that he banned the holiday. Enactment of rituals, from farewell lunches to voodoo rites, endows belief with a reality that evokes complex feelings. “Learning occurs through mediation: that is, the dynamic of the inner and outer centre upon a medium which is charged with feeling. Sufficient feeling creates a change in us and... when we transform ourselves we learn” (1995, p. 45).

What do “we learn”? The strong feelings evoked by rituals can reinforce existing beliefs, bring about conversions and facilitate courageous actions.

The symbolic power of dramatic action lies in its ability to effectively construct worldviews. It creates ideas of “the way things are.” At least partially, it legitimates the cultural order. But it can, simultaneously, provide symbolic models to change this order. (1988, p. 138)

For example, the New Testament conveys the strong feelings aroused by Jesus that converted early Christians, catalyzing for them a new vision of reality. Jesus’ ministry began with the ritual of baptism, and ended with the ritual of the Last
Supper. These rituals have developed lives and shaped stories with powerful consequences. Early Christians needed creative perceptions to take courageous personal decisions such as martyrdom. Courtney attributed the learning process in ritual to

the freeing power of similarity and ambiguity, because ritual is both present and elusive, understandable and enigmatic, personal and impersonal. It teaches us interaction, the power to bring two separate domains into a cognitive and emotional relationship. It also teaches us the power of disclosure, the value of the sudden insight or the dawning realization, the hunch or intuition, that reveals reality in its wholeness, the ground of our being. (1995, p. 48)

The rituals surrounding Christmas, for example, evoke ambiguous feelings of a timeless sense of grandeur combined with the pathos and poverty of a young mother giving birth in a stable. The wealth of the Maji and the simplicity of Joseph’s little family are two separate domains that come together in powerful symbols. These ambiguous symbols convey a profound but subtle feeling of the majesty of poverty and the ideals of Christianity. Rituals not only reinforce beliefs, but seem to cause a cascade of complex thoughts. These thoughts apparently arise through a merging of cognitive and emotional insights which seem to shed light on basic issues of Being. How can this state of mind be verified or even discussed, since it necessarily belongs to the domain of the subjective? I use an anecdotal incident from my own life, which might shed light on this kind of experience.

I spent some fourteen years of my life engaging in an unusual form of ritual: ultradistance running (Henry, 1989a & b, 1994). I call this sport a ritual because my involvement was linked with my study of meditation. Japanese Buddhism as well as Native American cultures (Nabokov, 1981) also link meditation and endurance running. Ultradistance running is roughly defined as
races marathon length and longer. I ran at least 50 such races between 1977 and 1991. Since ultradistance running engages mental and emotional endurance traditional cultures require periods of fasting, abstinence and purification in order to accomplish these unusual feats. At the time I was practicing stringent physical disciplines in connection with my study of meditation, and enjoyed a natural physical strength and health. Training for ultradistance races requires mental, emotional and physical endurance rather than speed to accustom the runner to stretches of 8, 10 or sometimes 20 hours of running. Training is essential including mental preparation. An aid to endurance is the “runner’s high” experienced by many ultradistance runners including myself, as if one is “tapping into an energy source” as is the case with many other rituals. The runner’s high actually results from the body’s own endorphins, naturally secreted pain-killing neurotransmitters. I entered my first race, 47 miles long, in excellent physical condition but with relatively little training. The race was staged like a ritual. It began at midnight and the route was lined with paper lanterns every foot or so, white paper bags filled with sand and a lighted candle. The participants, helpers and spectators were all involved in a ritualistic meditative mood. After my anxiety had worn off, I found myself exhilarated, trotting along feeling as if I were in a state of perpetual, effortless motion. I experienced the stress on my body as if it were a challenge. I found that while pain was ubiquitous, I could run through the pain so that ironically the pain seemed less important the longer I ran. My body’s resources seemed enigmatic, at once limitless and constantly limiting. The sensations I experienced seemed at once highly individualistic and part of a universal whole. My experience was highly ritualistic and solemn, transcending the physical events taking place. I experienced the race more as a metaphor or symbol than as a physical competition. Why did my experience transcend the obvious physical effort required? This seemed to be due to the qualities of ritual.

My longest races were 700 miles. They took place around a one mile loop, with our tents and equipment staked nearby, so that we ran throughout the 24 hour cycle of a day usually avoiding the heat of the afternoon. I found that after the
first three days I experienced my energy as flowing freely in harmony with the rhythms of the sun. Running through dawn, dusk and starry nights, I experienced an existence far outside of daily life. Extraordinary emotional highs flowed with philosophical and poetic thoughts. I ran these 700-mile races in Flushing Meadow Park in Queens, NY where my most vivid experiences were on the roadway leading up to the 700,000-pound Unisphere that looms over the greenery, a remainder of the 1964 World’s Fair. Many clear still nights I ran up to the Cape of Good Hope featured on the majestic continent of Africa on this gleaming silver orb of cosmic proportions. I felt the exhilaration of having traveled hundreds of miles by the sheer force of my own strength and bliss. My feelings were ambiguous, aware of the unique achievement of my own mind, body and feelings but aware of a larger source of energy, in tune with a sense of life’s unity and grandeur. Some moments I felt as if I could touch the life force which surged through me and connected me with my fellow runners on our highly personal yet universal journey. Other moments I felt the wretched tugs of pain in parts of my body I had never experienced before. The ritual experience was both comprehensible and enigmatic. It seemed to reveal reality in its wholeness, the universal ground of Being. It also felt as if this reality were ultimately a mystery. This is the most vivid example of the power of rituals from my own life. I experienced not an athletic competition but a transformative journey. My awareness of physical exertion was much less than it has been in other races I have run without the ritualistic element.

What did I learn from this ritual? I learned about my own personal power and inner resources, and the enigmatic relationship between my independent powers and the common ground of all living things. Accomplishing such a feat seemed to depend on an inner, not a physical, effort. I perceived a metaphysical sensation of unity with natural forces like the sunrise and sunset, and a sense of connection with deep forces in life. As with other rituals, my outer progress along the physical journey seemed to reinforce a sense of an inner journey. Similarly in the ritual of alchemy, alchemists believe that their progress in transmuting metals
into gold is analogous to an inner progress of transformation. Most rituals involve both a visible and an invisible process which are supposed to be analogous. I experienced an extraordinary physical exertion as a journey of learning, not of hardship.

Courtney (1995) wrote of ritual that it teaches by feelings instead of analysis, and involves both actual and implied acts which are experienced through the imagination. The active engagement of the imagination creates a sense of possibility and the future (p. 48). The learning involved is aesthetic learning. Aesthetic learning involves the comprehension and production of symbolic meaning, the imagination which creates possibility and mediation between inner and outer. Thus my experience of running through rain, sleet and golden sunrises provided an aesthetic experience fused with symbolic meanings. This ritual provided a way of seeing the world, a belief fed both by the aesthetic imagination and by the physical experience of running through the rising and the setting of the sun.

Courtney considered this function of mediation between inner and outer so important to learning that he developed the term “mediate knowledge” (personal communication, October, 1996). Drama is a medium which connects the inner and the outer, as well as connecting people and groups.

Drama as a Medium

Dramatic action serves a clear purpose in life. It is the prime mediator between our inner selves and the environment. It is a medium whereby our inner self works with the outer world and creates meanings out of it. Drama is a bridge, a filter, between the two worlds. (Courtney, 1982, p. 5) From their inner imaginings people create their worlds and their selves.

The self is a dramatic act which is at once invented by the individual, and also provides the individual with the outer reality she is learning about. Dramatic acts
make the individual into a medium, a sign that populates her own world. Media are used not only by individuals but also by groups. For example, a person who takes the role of a leader becomes a medium for a group. The group projects onto the leader sometimes mythical qualities, so that the leader becomes a medium for unifying and consolidating the group. Martin Luther King became a medium that inspired confidence in the solidarity of African Americans. A scapegoat is another kind of medium onto which a group projects its own worst fears about itself, providing an outlet for the group's antagonisms and a means for the group to avoid facing itself. For example, in a conservative and rigid culture artists might reject the values of the mainstream. The mainstream culture sees the artists as threatening group values and uses them as scapegoats. The group imagines that these artists embody the qualities that the group most fears within itself, for example sexual deviance. The main group will see "evidence" for these fears whether or not any exists. The group projects onto artists their imaginings of sexual deviance, making them scapegoats. These are some ways that people can become media for group dynamics. When an individual uses himself as a medium, mediation often has a learning or meaning-making function. For example, when a child learns how to ask for help from a teacher, he has utilized himself as a learning medium. People make of themselves media when they perform or in any way express themselves.

Media in Learning and Development

Courtney's thinking about media has an important source in the work of psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott (1982). Influenced by Melanie Klein, Winnicott wrote about the "mediate object" which relates inner reality to outer reality. A child uses a blanket, for example, as a mediate object that represents the mother when she is not present. The blanket links the child's inner life with the outer world by playing the part of the mother--"like Linus' 'security blanket,' the baby uses a cloth, a cuddle or a soft toy to develop the relation of inner and outer--the prototype of all later media" (1988, p. 82). A child's mediate object may be a
blanket, but an adult’s mediate objects acquire sophisticated forms. For example, a pianist may use the music of the piano to mediate her understanding of and relationship with the rest of the world. Similarly a person’s dramas mediate between their inner life and the outer world. “It is from Winnicott’s innovation in the developmental theory that we can say that drama provides ‘mediate knowing’: meaning centers in a medium from which subjective and objective meaning emerge” (1995, p. 117). While the use of drama as a medium occurs throughout life, Courtney was particularly interested in its appearance early in life. Courtney wrote that at about 10 months of age the mediate object takes the form of a dramatic action. “At about ten months old, this process suddenly codifies as “the primal act”: the baby acts “as if” s/he is the mother, pretends to be the mother, IS the mother” (1988, p. 82). For Courtney, the developing ability to identify with the mother and to use mediate objects culminate in this “primal act.” “Primal acts” emerge from the initial urge to dramatic action, as with Courtney’s son.

In the case of my son at this age, we observed “the primal act” when he acted “as if” he was himself going to sleep at night, in the middle of the day, by putting his head on his teddy bear, closing his eyes, saying, “Night, night!” and then roaring with laughter. We can say he was pretending or acting “as if,” or playing. We can also that this “primal act” was his first full controlled use of a medium (his self in the external world) in order to convey meaning. (1990, p. 54)

Courtney’s son learned how to use himself as a toy. The child’s laughter seemed to indicate his ironic metaperspective of seeing himself as his own toy. Courtney observed throughout his work that this ability to double one’s own perspective—step out of an action and take a metaperspective—is an important step in meaning making and learning. This is an example of the central point in Figure 5:
Our creative imagination and dramatic actions... bring about the “as if” world of possibility (the fictional), which works in parallel with the actual world and is a cognitive tool for understanding it. (1990, p. 9)

Here the child is exploring ways to make more--Ricoeur (1979) might say “surplus”--meanings. “One meaning is insufficient; it must be tested through the use of further media” (Courtney, 1990, p. 55). The child is testing out the idea of going to sleep, looking at it not only as an event he goes through at night, but as an experience on which he comments. He does this by using his imagination on conjunction with reality. He is in two worlds at once.

“The primal act” is the ground for these developments... As the first full ontological act, it is the essence of Being - the initial moment of great success when the baby has turned the inner outer, and vice versa. It is Being in the expressive mode, Being “as if,” “Being expressed in a dramatic act--“I am an airplane.” (1990, p. 55)

This represents a stage of mastery of life, transforming ordinary necessity into a deliberate and expressive action. The child has not only referred to his inner experience, he has expressed an idea about it. For Courtney, this is the basic step of creating personal worlds and switching perspectives between worlds.

Thus in spontaneous drama our imagined signs become actual: our feelings evolve into what we see and believe. When we perform spontaneously in role, we construct a fictional world that parallels the actual world--we feel that one is a metaphor for the other... we view the actual through the lens of the fictional world and vice versa. It is important to realize that this occurs whenever dramatic action is used. It happens as much in everyday life as in improvisation. (1995, p. 24-5)
Following this stage people use dramatic acts continually throughout life. They make of themselves a medium through drama which expands their understanding of and interactions with the world.

That is to say that dramatic action is a mediator; it is the dynamic between mind and the external world; it is the action that generates meaning within the environment and incorporates that meaning in mind (1990, p. 54). Dramatic action is the generic form of human mediation. It is the ontogenic ground for all other media. (1988, p. 125)

For Courtney, this use of the self is the basis of using other media. We are constantly engaged in dramatic actions which, according to Courtney (1982), lead to using other media, e.g., dramatic movement leads to dance, dramatic speech leads to literature. But most importantly, dramatic playing gives cognitive meaning--“to understand experience and reinterpret it in ways that are meaningful to us” (p. 6).

I give as an example an anecdote from my own teaching. While working as a visiting artist in a public school I introduced myself to a group of third graders and told them we would do drama. Mickey, a gregarious boy with tousled sandy hair, said “Oh no. This is weird. I feel funny. What’s drama?” Sometimes I find that children are disoriented by the opportunity drama provides to express themselves, an opportunity denied during much of the school day. Resistance is natural, so a preferred segue to a drama class is to “just do it.” I asked Mickey, “How do you feel?” Mickey said, “I feel like fainting.” I suggested “Why don’t you go ahead and faint?” Mickey plunged headlong onto the floor. I said, “Great, there you go. That’s acting. You’re doing a good job.” Mickey’s friend Jim wanted to join in: “I can do it. Look.” Jim plunged onto the floor as well. Wary lest the roomful of students would end up on the floor with concussions I said to Jim: “Show us something else. You and Mickey show us how you act a basketball game.” The two boys leaped up and began dribbling, passing, ducking, guarding
and shooting imaginary baskets. In this situation Mickey and Jim were learning media for the class. When Mickey initially sensed a vulnerability to the situation, we channeled these feelings into his own drama, giving the class a medium through which to understand my point. Mickey became a key figure. Jim grasped the significance of this role and wanted to join in. I find that good actors are often those who feel vulnerable to the various forces in a situation and are able to channel their emotional energies in a deliberate way. Drama provides a medium for the entire group, audience and actors, to channel their feelings. Public figures who are particularly effective as media are often those who experience vulnerability to, and feelings toward, the larger group. For example, Princess Diana of Great Britain emerged as a far more effective medium than her husband Prince Charles. I hypothesize that her emotional vulnerability heightened and exposed her feelings which she was able to channel into a mediational role. In the above example we channeled Mickey’s feelings into his role as a learning medium.

Drama serves to mediate between one’s inner and outer experiences, while providing the groundwork for artistic creation. The constructions people create in the aesthetic mode, as actualized through play, therapy, education and artistic experimentation, result in the inner process of learning as well as the outer process of creativity. “The knowledge gained (i.e., what is signified and what we learn) in a performance is experienced; it is specifically not discursive but tacit” (Courtney, 1995, p. 51).

One third grader I taught as a visiting artist illustrated this process of constructing and experiencing. Tim, a heavy set Asian boy with dark bangs covering his forehead, had taught himself mime. He had explored the worlds of his imagination using his own body as a medium and illustrated this process with his spontaneous performances. He began to show me glimpses of his own mime pieces from the first day of class. “Look what I can do” he said and mimed with exact precision different scenarios. For example, he was trapped in a box, the four walls closing in on him. In another mime he dove into the ocean, convincingly
diving and tossing in the currents, blowing bubbles and maneuvering in the deep sea. He said that he had taught himself these little dramas, and indeed the remarkable qualities they had could not have been taught to him. They reflected Tim’s personal concentration and imagination. Sometimes the classroom teachers became exasperated because Tim would take our classroom exercise as a point of departure and then explore movements and imaginary scenarios on his own—which delighted me and the other children. Tim’s intense concentration and natural sense of drama created living scenarios and reorganized the reality in the classroom. “The body “discovers” the action, the fitting gesture, while performing—through the medium… Knowledge gained is tacit but a feeling basis for cognition—allows us to re-play our knowing” (ib.).

Tim’s performances showed how he discovered actions. I have found that most children become unusually articulate when allowed to explore actions on their own. Usually I find that mirror exercises—in which two children mirror one another’s actions in exact symmetry—free children from self-consciousness to experiment with movement and articulate their own creations. For example, a class of first graders was introduced to me as slow and difficult, but when I asked them to do the mirror exercise they all became actively involved in following and leading one another’s actions. Some of these children, I was told, “never talked” or participated, but in this exercise they freely experimented with difficult movements at different levels and intensities. Courtney wrote that dramatic action is particularly accessible and particularly deeply felt as a mode of learning.

Spontaneous dramatic action is a form of re-cognizing—a way of knowing. The knowledge we obtain through such action becomes highly significant to us. We have experienced it, been through it, relived it. Thus we feel it; it has emotional significance for us and will be remembered. In such a way, dramatic learning is highly effective, mingling cognition and feeling into a whole experience that deeply touches the self. (1982, p. 6)
What do people learn in activities like the above mirror exercise? I maintain that these children who normally did not participate at all found a way to express themselves in a classroom setting, learning first of all that they are an integral and important part of their environment. Their actions filled up the room, their presence made a difference. In the mirror exercise children saw their actions impacting the children with whom they were working. These children explored aesthetic qualities like beauty and symmetry in their actions and worked with others to create a shared reality. They had an experience of initiating their own actions and using their own ideas. All of these qualities are important to other kinds of learning but are not necessarily emphasized in the normal protocol of the classroom. Indeed, without learning these lessons children might struggle in other areas. Dramatic action is a metaphor, a symbol and a medium, but in a holistic sense drama is an existential form of learning.

Drama as Existential Learning

In an act of drama the immediate experience--the “here and now”--is the source of knowledge and belief, involving felt-meaning. Drama brings the same kind of learning which life brings. Meaning is conveyed by the acting human--the total person. “It is the predominant existential mode. It is the unique human medium” (Courtney, 1988, p. 125). Existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre (1953, 1957) wrote that the imagination is an instrument of mediation. That which is perceived by consciousness is then transformed by the imagination, which mediates between the inner self and the outer object or situation. Thus, imagination is a medium of cognition. Sartre’s writings on consciousness, imagination and particularly emotions had an important influence on Courtney’s thought (personal communication, December 1996). Emotions mediate between the individual and the objects of attention--feelings are feelings about something. For Sartre, these emotions transform the world (Solomon, 1996)--the personal world of the individual. Sartre said that imaginings and emotions are actions, ways of working
on ourselves. Imagination, by relating emotion and knowledge, brings about an affective-cognitive synthesis: the imagination of the spectator co-ordinates the knowledge and emotion derived from perceptions and unifies them in a synthetic way. Our imagination enables us to have knowledge, emotion, and feeling about dramatic events, and to unify these in a new species of knowledge.

These ideas of Sartre’s are an important basis for Courtney’s notions about learning in drama. Existential and phenomenological notions of perception are fundamental to Courtney’s educational scheme. The importance of Sartre to Courtney’s thought stems back to Courtney’s undergraduate schooling, when Courtney first posed the question: what is the philosophy of drama? It was Courtney’s discovery of Sartre (1953) and the existential phenomenological approach to philosophy which led him to the answers he found. Courtney linked his phenomenological studies of acting with his ideas about holistic learning to arrive at his ideas about learning through drama (personal communication, October, 1996). Courtney’s notions of learning also resemble Sartre’s ideas about existentialism in the stress on personal agency and responsibility. Just as Sartre maintained that the individual always bears responsibility for his circumstance, so Courtney maintained that everyone is responsible for their own dramas, creating their own worlds and making meaning through their own environments.

The environment is important, but it does not “determine” us as some would have us believe. No matter how forceful its impact is upon us, and in some societies it can be highly repressive, human beings always have the ability to create meaning out of it... Our inner self requires the environment to provide it with materials with which to work; yet it is the inner that initiates the exchange. It does so through a dramatic act--and it is this which relates the environment to the self. (1982, p. 7)

Dramatic acts like the mirror exercises in the above example can provide a simple paradigm for more complicated actions later in life. The use of physical
movement and the commitment of voice and body to an action makes a sense of the self possible which is not always present in the classroom.

Ritologist Grimes (1990) wrote that the absence of physical participation in most learning has resulted in a decline in ethics and commitment. Learning about ethics by reading, for Grimes, does not provide the depth needed to understand ethics in action. “Narratives are not necessarily incipient actions. They can be, and often are, as Kenneth Burke suggests, substitutes for action” (p. 165). When a student reads about ethics it may satisfy his intellect but it does not teach him right action—praxis. Grimes proposed that performance-based learning provides more authentic lessons than narrative. If enactment took place, wrote Grimes, “we would have to perform, that is, do good works or do something other than write and speak in order to be religious” (p. 163). For Grimes hypocrisy is bred by the privileging of discourse over action. “We are hurried along from reading and telling stories to ethics, the realm of “imperatives.” Immediately we are made responsible for what we read, as if narrative were poised, waiting to guide our lives” (p. 164).

Grimes wrote that trying out certain actions tests a living ethos. This is also the belief of the Yale Child Study Center (1994a, b, 1995) whose work includes projects in which children try out different emotional responses in hypothetical dramatic situations. Like Courtney, Grimes maintained that the symbolic and metaphoric qualities of dramatic action provide authenticity through this hypothetical environment. Courtney (1982) also relied on Polanyi’s writings to explain how embodied action is the basis for meaning-making and learning.

“The act of extending our person” provides what Polanyi calls “personal knowledge” which is the basis of all meaning for us. “Our minds live in action.” Truth becomes the rightness of an action... Truth conceived as the rightness of an action allows for any degree of personal participation in knowing what is being known... Authentic feeling and authentic experience jointly guide all intellectual achievements. Spontaneous
dramatic action is precisely the act of extending our person as a bridge to the external world. The personal knowledge it provides is based upon the rightness of that authentic action. (p. 7)
CHAPTER VIII

THE ACTOR

This chapter takes up the next element of my dramatistic scheme, the actor. Previous chapters have touched on some of the metaphors Courtney used to define the actor. The actor is a living symbol, an active metaphor, a medium for communication and the volitional agent in his own existentialist drama. This chapter addresses the intrapsychic and interpersonal processes of an actor. Courtney used two notions, Mind and Being, to discuss these processes. Linking these two terms is Courtney’s view of the imagination as the basic human characteristic essential to all learning and knowing. This chapter deals with the actor’s Being, mind, imagination and the learning processes they involve. The discussion is framed by Courtney’s concept of holism.

The Holistic Universe

Courtney located his ideas about the self within a holistic, incessantly interactive view of life. He considered most perspectives on the self, for example the scientific perspective, only partial views of the whole reality of the self. Courtney wrote that his holistic model

assumes that the arts, science, and the social sciences are perspectives on the holistic process and that all are of relative use. Mind, brain, ecology,
ethnology, society, and culture are viewed as abstractions that can lead to a perspective of value—a partial understanding of a whole entity. (1995, p. 77)

The human being is a free agent within a holistic universe. He is not controlled by his participation in this universe. Among Courtney’s (1995) holistic principles are:

- The human being as an organismic whole rather than an aggregation of separate parts
- Unity and similarity are prior to opposition, binarism, and the digital
- Thought and action are experienced as one whole
- Feeling is inherent in all aspects of thought and action
- Humans are characterized by purpose and intention—this is to emphasize human self-choice, self-government and self-regulation.

(1995, p. 77)

All aspects of life are part of a total processual flow. “Life, the human and natural environment, and the cosmos, are viewed as processes. This is to collapse the subjective/objective dichotomy into one total ongoing movement” (ib.). The interactive dynamics of life flow together. “Thought, feeling, action, and learning are energetic: they are activated by dynamics that obviate the duality of body/mind; they work with the totality of Self (mind, brain, body) in energetic relation with the environment” (ib.). Within this environment of processual, energetic movement, people have their Being. Being is a philosophical idea that Courtney has adapted to his own dramatic universe.

Here, Being includes both consciousness and reflexivity (self-consciousness). It means both what we do and what we talk about when
we are concerned with the self; it is the “I am” related to the world... For some, Being is soul. (1990, p. 135)

Although Courtney included the deepest level of Being, the soul, he also discussed ordinary actions as Being. Essentially, Being is what people make of themselves, the selves they construct through their inner and outer actions and awareness.
Being

Players act to change...Being. One person presuppose the virtual existence of the other, which reinforces the other's Being; this, in turn, reinforces the first person's own Being. In some way, what each of the two knows is changed. This is a "knowing how to Be." (1990, p. 24)

Being is the stuff of drama. Drama plays with and develops Being. At the most obvious level, people create their Being by self-presentation as in Goffman’s (1959) notion about the role play of everyday life. Courtney (1990) used the example of Socrates to illustrate Being in drama. Socrates consciously played the role of being ignorant in order to engage others in dialogue. “In adult life the medium nearest to Being is self-presentation, similar to what Socrates does in Plato’s dialogues. But Socrates was also being ‘as if’ by dramatizing himself as ignorant” (1990, p. 56). Socrates used his imagination to place his own Being at the service of his search for knowledge, representing himself as other than he was, using himself as a medium for learning and for teaching.

As a man and as a teacher, Socrates’ essence was dialogic: It consisted of his self-presentation, his dramatization of himself as one who knows nothing. For Socrates our ontological reality is that we dramatize who we are in life; this is the nearest we can come to Being. (1990, p. 47)

For Courtney Socrates’ role play was a model for the notion that people learn through their dramas. Yet I would suggest that Socrates paid a high price for his life of education through drama. Socrates’ agility in creating his own Being seemed to have been unacceptable to his contemporaries. Socrates’ contemporaries confronted Socrates with a singular ontological challenge, which resulted in his forced suicide. Socrates was challenged not on the basis of his own deeds or his own name, like other heroes of antiquity who seek truth. Socrates had
to face an identity that others had created for him. Socrates’ enemy was the persona of himself generated by the gossip—doxa and diaboli—of others (Bruns, 1992). This enemy was non-truth fashioned into the shape of Socrates. Socrates did not survive this challenge. I suggest that if success be indicated at the very least by survival, Socrates’ method of learning through drama seems to have backfired. I find Courtney’s example of Socrates ironic because this example seems to disprove the effectiveness of learning through drama. By virtue of his special control over his own creative and intellectual powers Socrates posed such a threat to his more banal contemporaries that he paid the price of his own life. This is a high price to pay for the gifts of intellect and creativity. From this perspective, the story of Socrates seems to be a cautionary tale about the price of being a genuine teacher and learner in a hypocritical environment.

Courtney’s point of course was that Socrates was an extremely intelligent person who chose to use drama for teaching and learning. Dramatic acts, according to Courtney, create “human ontology and epistemology...and form the ground for intelligence” (1990, p. 135). Of epistemology and ontology, Courtney was mainly interested in ontology—“phenomenological ontology” (personal communication, December 1996)—personal experiences of Being and Becoming. “Who am I? Who am I for you? Who are you? Who are you for me?” (1990, p. 41).

Earlier I showed how Courtney located these questions about Being in tribal ritual as well as in contemporary theatre. These are the questions, according to Courtney, best illustrated by theatre, particularly the plays of Pirandello. As noted in Chapter IV, Courtney analyzed Pirandello’s plays as interpenetrating layers of theatre and life. Six Characters in Search of an Author is about the ambiguity between fiction and reality of characters and actors, their respective narratives interconnected as if in an infinite series of receding mirrors of reality and illusion. According to Courtney Pirandello wrote about actors and fictional characters from the following perspectives:
The (actual actors performing as) fictional backstage personnel preparing the stage for a rehearsal
The (actual actors performing as) fictional actors being themselves
The (actual actors performing as) fictional personages in a play they are rehearsing (a different play by Pirandello)
The (other actual actors performing as) fictional six characters (at a different fictional level from the personages above)
The (original actual actors, as those at 1, 2, 3 above) performing as fictional actors re-performing (rehearsing) as the fictional characters (as in 4 above)
The (actual) audience. (Courtney, 1990, p. 44)

The unraveling of this is less important in this context than to note that for Courtney (1990) Pirandello’s play is a metacognitive reflection of the intellectual side of drama, the way people understand Being. It illustrates “an ontology that is highly cognitive.”

In the world of this play, a person’s personality is known differently by others and, quite consciously, the central questions for each character become, Who am I? And who am I for other people?… Cognition is a matter of perspective. Within any one dramatic world there are various subworlds that fit together like a set of Chinese boxes. (p. 44)

The key sentence above is: “Cognition is a matter of perspective.” Pirandello used intricate perspectives to illustrate that understanding is relative to where you are standing. Dramatic knowing is attained through participating in, and then distancing oneself from, “as if” fictions. Expressed differently, this is switching between being in the drama and being outside of it. In *Six Characters* this means stepping into and out of various levels of fiction and actuality. The play exposes relationships between fictional characters and the actors who are to play them. It
engages reflections on ontology--the nature of Being. The central question in the play is: What is real?

The ontology in the world of Six Characters is highly cognitive. Pirandello himself saw his plays as a mixture of emotion and intellect. As this one proceeds, we learn of the human condition in the modern world: Being is fragmented, but multiplicity is unified when the fragments are seen as aspects of all humanity. (1990, p. 44)

This play also illustrates the relationship between Being and mind. Being informs mind--where you are and what role you play leads to understanding. At the same time mind informs Being. Mentally switching between perspectives brings knowledge about Being. Active participation in knowledge of both Being and mind is, according to Courtney, dramatic. “We, ourselves, are knowledge when we dramatize--when we are the medium of a ‘costumed player’--which exercises highly complicated skills apparently ‘without even thinking’” (1995, p. 93).

For example, the classroom joker naturally embodies her self-taught knowledge of how to be funny and subversive, without receiving instructions, without even thinking. Being in drama, or performing, entails a kind of knowing and learning which has its own logic.

- “First is thinking that results from Being--through the Being of the player... in natural forms (in play and life)”

When children play, their Being is a way of thinking in action.

- “Second is thinking that results from doing”

When a child, I shall call her Mary, makes fun of another child, Tommy, she finds that other children seem to admire her. She has learned from doing something.
• “Third is thinking that results from predictable events”

Sure of gaining others’ support, Mary thinks about ways she can improve on her wit and increase the humor and cruelty in her act. She plans how to tease Tommy.

• “Fourth is interpretative thinking”

Mary starts to see the situation from a broader perspective. She starts to see how her drama is like some fairy tales, for example Cinderella. The stepmother and stepsisters were only happy when they were making Cinderella miserable. They benefited from Cinderella. They had power over Cinderella. But that didn’t make the Prince fall in love with them.

• “Fifth and last is moral thinking” (Courtney, 1990, p. 90).

Mary, if she is bright, starts to think about her behavior in broader terms. She thinks about living in a world where people exert unfair power over other people. She begins to think morally.

These kinds of thinking range on a continuum from being inside of a drama to seeing it from the outside. At the least distanced point Mary learns to tease. At the most distanced point from action she reflects on what happened. Emotions are involved in all these “rational strings” as Courtney calls them. Courtney differentiated types of thought not according to rationality or emotion, but according to different proximities to Being--ranging from being inside the drama, to reflecting on the drama from the outside. All of these forms of thinking are “creating a hypothesis in the spheres of doing and Being in order to conduct an experiment in an intelligent way” (1990, p. 91). Playing a role is equivalent to an assumption about life. For example, playing the role of a lawyer is an
assumption about the world as a legal system. Life’s dramas test hypotheses. Mary tested her drama of teasing, and learned.

Learning and Being

“We ourselves are knowledge when we dramatize—when we are the medium of a ‘costumed player’—which exercises highly complicated skills apparently without even thinking” (Courtney, 1995, p. 93). Learning changes Being. That is,

we can say that we have learned something after acquiring knowledge that brings about a change in our thoughts and actions. We have seen that knowing is to grasp ideas so that they become part of our inner self. (1990, p. 138)

Being depends on learning. Learning depends on Being. Drama is a form of meaning-making based on Being, the self in action, a concrete embodied form of learning. “Knowing and learning are built on dramatic action. Actions interface with the environment, creating meaning for ourselves and for others… What we do affects who we are” (1990, p. 138-9). “At the nub of Being lies a relationship, between consciousness and the world” (p. 135). Thus learning can be seen as a transforming relationship with the environment. One way of Being that has been recognized by anthropologists as transformative and leading to learning is liminality.

Liminality. Courtney followed anthropologists like Victor Turner (1974) in defining liminality as a state of freedom or chaos which occurs between normative social statuses, like initiation ceremonies in tribal societies. Courtney also agreed with Turner that all drama is essentially liminal—a subjunctive state of behaving “as if” something were true, a state that combines pretending and Being. Turner (1986) said that the liminal phase is
dominantly in the subjunctive mood of culture, the mood of maybe, might be, as if, hypothesis, fantasy, conjecture, desire... Ordinary life is in the indicative mood, where we expect the invariant operation of cause and effect, of rationality and commonsense. (p. 42)

But ritual and its progeny, notably the performance arts, derive from the subjunctive liminal, reflexive, exploratory heart of social drama, where the structures of group experience (Erlebnis) are replicated, dismembered, re-membered, refashioned, and mutely or vocally made meaningful. (p. 43)

The liminal mode and what Turner (1992) later called the liminoid mode is a space of experiment that deconstructs and reconstructs the ordinary patterns of life. Courtney (1990) wrote that performance is “deeply involved in the creation of both personal and social worlds. It is always dramatic, often liminal, and mostly tacit. It is aesthetic” (p. 127).

Liminal action is performative and aesthetic. The actor generates felt-hypothesis [sic]: ‘If I hypothesize my role that way, then the resulting action is so-and-so. But if I hypothesize my role that way, it is such-and-such’... It provides tacit, personal and embodied knowing: that which is the basis of, but different from, the explicit and discursive. (Courtney, 1988, p. 134)

In another perspective on learning through Being Courtney viewed roles as the metaphors of Being.

Metaphor. The roles an individual plays are the metaphors he uses to understand and fulfill his existence.
We all have our own metaphor. We use it to express our Being, our ontological reality. Most of us are not aware what it is or even that it exists... the process of identifying our personal metaphor can be a long one. (Courtney, 1990, p. 80)

Being in drama is to engage in learning through metaphor. In Figure 5, “the creation of an artistic world is a powerful metaphor of existence” (Courtney, 1990, p. 131). The Being an individual creates through dramas serves as a metaphor for that individual. Learning through Being in drama is a metaphoric mode of learning:

When drama is life, life drama, the metaphoric/dramatic mode is the way cognition and intelligence function; it is how we deal with the environment we perceive, how we form and develop concepts, how we cope with experience as a whole, and how we do so through the stages of transformation. (Courtney, 1990, p. 80)

The metaphoric levels of drama refer to the double realities to which Courtney says people are always relating: inner-outer, actual-fictional, and the different worlds people create and inhabit, as reflected in Figure 5. Tribal as well as contemporary people live in different worlds at once. “The acknowledgment of the coexistence of realities as part of who we are is a view shared by tribal peoples performing ritual drama and all who engage in dramatic play” (1988, p. 23).

Courtney’s ideas about Being overlap significantly with his ideas about mind. Courtney wrote about five states of Being which he sometimes called states of mind: remembering, living, dreaming, fantasizing, and imagining. “Not discrete entities but rather functional modes” these states can be “transformed into intelligent acts.” These states depend on feeling which “gives meaning to the state of Being. In this sense we can say that Being is an aesthetic meaning-giving
activity in the creation of mental worlds" (1990, p. 136). Overlapping Courtney’s notion of Being is his idea of mind which includes feeling. How does Courtney define mind?

Mind

The question “how does one learn and what does one learn through drama” points to a method of learning that is probably an essential factor of the human mind. We do learn dramatically. And I think that’s what Richard tried to get at his whole life. [Landy Interview]

Courtney’s notion of mind is a construction, a “unified abstraction we create in order to deal with how people make sense of the world... whereby we can intelligently order the seeming chaos around us” (1995, p. 92). Mind is a metaphor for the location of meaning-making. Mind engages cognition to separate “truth from falsehood, develop and change concepts, assimilate information, and use mental frameworks so that we can make sense of our experiences” (1990, p. 35). Historical notions of mind include Plato’s metaphor of a winged chariot which views awareness as a freedom to fly, and the Cretan conception of mind as a labyrinth which views life as an almost impossible cipher.

Mind does not refer to the physical brain or the intellect, rather mind is a metaphor for awareness and self-awareness.

When we talk of brain cells being connected at synapses, we describe aspects of human physiology. Alternatively we can discuss “mind”, where we can picture cognition as groups of activities. The latter are worlds, one of which is our dramatic world. (1990, p. 35)
Mind comprises all that makes awareness and self-awareness possible including feelings, psychomotor functions, aesthetic perceptions and cognition. But mind is also a metaphor for life itself.

Mind is how we think: It includes the total physical self (the body) as a sign or metaphor, and refers to cognitive, affective, aesthetic, and psychomotor operations. For some, indeed, mind includes all matter and thought, even the cosmos. (1990 p. 135)

Mind sees the self acting as a character, a sign or a metaphor. Mind creates ideas about the entire cosmos. Courtney's notion of mind is an inclusive metaphor for the consciousness of an individual, both in thought and in action. "Mind is all that we think and do. It is our total consciousness: the conscious and the unconscious, and how these affect the world... Thought/action is one whole, a unified process of representation" (1989, p. 174). Like Being, mind is constantly involved with making meaning and learning. Just as "we can say that Being is an aesthetic meaning-giving activity in the creation of mental worlds" (Courtney, 1990, p. 136) this is also true of Courtney's notion of mind.

Activities of Mind

Mind, in Courtney's scheme, works in specific ways: similarity and metaphor; metonymy and differentiation; and a mechanism that Courtney calls oscillation. These activities work together as a whole, symbolized for Courtney (1995) by the quaternity or semiotic square which he called a "powerful explanatory tool" (p. 83).

Similarity and metaphor. As discussed earlier, one of the basic ways the mind works is by finding similarities or metaphors. The following discussion is a
recursive treatment of this central notion to Courtney’s work, which reappears in every layer of Courtney’s ideas.

It has often been said (falsely) that human nature, society and theatre are based upon conflict; that opposition and competition are fundamental to all human affairs. But similarities are prior to oppositions; wholes and analogues are generally prior to digital and binary structures. (Courtney, 1988, p. 131)

Courtney’s emphasis on similarity seems to be a response to the Western notions of dichotomy and opposition. As an example of his notion of similarity, Courtney described how a baby notices one object resembles another, and can be employed as a substitute for it. In this way, the baby’s comfortable blanket can play the role of the mother when she is not there. The blanket is a metaphor for the mother which assists the baby to work out his understanding of what the world is like.

This is a highly complex mode of thinking and learning: we understand one thing in terms of another… With metaphor, we work in two “worlds”: the first thing is the actual (“the real”) and the second thing is the fictional (“the not really ‘real.’”) (1988, p. 131)

Thus similarity creates metaphors. When people compare two similar things they are thinking in doubles. This is thinking dramatically, which for Courtney underpins learning.

Similars, continua and metaphor… provide the inner tension of the mundane vs. the possible… we dramatize our understandings as… metaphors: personal existence and social events, life and theatre, each are mirrors one to the other… It is this which leads to symbolic thought and
Meanings can proliferate because the gap between the two meanings to which the metaphor refers permits creative thought. Creativity can occur in the process of switching between the two referents of the metaphor. This mechanism was first noted at the center of Figure 5, in which the referents were fictional and actual worlds.

Its “leap” is the origin of creativity: to play and re-play with the inner workings of mental structures is creative: we alternate, or “switch,” between the two sides of each “double.” Metaphor is both mimetic and cognitive, as Aristotle said. It is specifically heuristic: it provides a “split reference.” (1988, p. 84)

Dramatic thought also involves differentiation or metonymy. When one differentiates parts and compares them with the whole one is using metonymy. For Courtney this awareness of part and whole is another principle mode in which the mind learns.

The Gestalt of Whole/Part: Differentiation is not built on part/part but on the oscillation between whole/part; at one moment we can “see” the whole, at another the part; and we can reverse them. (Courtney, 1995, p. 77)

Metonymy is the double awareness involved when one focuses on a part and compares it to the whole. People make sense of life by focusing on details and then trying to make sense of the whole picture. Courtney wrote that awareness in a child begins when he differentiates the face of his mother from the rest of the environment. By switching his attention between his mother’s face, the
differentiated part of his world, and the whole world of his awareness, the baby makes sense of reality. The baby starts to recognize when the mother is there and when she is absent which helps the baby to structure his world. Similarly while learning to read a child is essentially engaged in an act of pretending to read, an act of metonymy. The child finds distinct words that stand out, pieces distinct from the whole, from which concepts start to take shape. He then returns to the overall whole of a partially comprehensible printed page. As the child develops, he continues to use metonymy to learn and also as a form of expression.

"Metonymy is pure imagery... incomplete wholes revealed by the dramatic metaphor and action (which)... allow us to live with ambiguity and paradox" (1990, p. 78). The shorthand of using a part to represent a whole, like using a crown to represent a king, is the use of imagery or symbol. These abbreviated signs allow for the ambiguous meanings which emerge from metonymy and from symbolism. Like metaphor, metonymy is used in the perceptions and expressions of thought. Metaphor and metonymy underpin the process of drama.

Oscillation

Courtney's word for the incessant rhythms of life is oscillation. Just as one's thought moves back and forth to make sense of a metaphor, for Courtney all life and all awareness is in oscillation. Concepts give the illusion of concreteness and of freezing life processes which are actually in constant motion. Oscillation is masked by the fact that people conceive of themselves as living in one solid reality.

We should not think that mind and the world are merely objective things (or nominals), as analytic intelligence has taught us. We must accept the fact that process is as real as objects, that relations are as substantial as substance, and that rhythm is as much a part of our experience as the ordering of the muscles. This is specifically so in drama. (1995, p. 84)
In dealing with the double worlds of metaphors and symbols people continually and rapidly switch their attention between the referents of life's metaphors. The energy of oscillating attention generates feelings and dramas.

It is the feeling power of the dramatic metaphor that creates consciousness and self-consciousness.... Our conscious self oscillates between here and there, and now and then, as a sign. (1995, p. 23)

The energy of activity “that circulates through and unifies life” and its fluctuating felt-meaning comprises the energy of life’s dramas. Thus oscillation seems to define a kind of “physics of drama”, just as the metaphor of “worlds” seemed to define a kind of metaphysics of drama. This physics views psychic energy in oscillation as the elemental stuff of the dramatic universe. For example, an actor creates a role by constantly switching her attention back and forth between her own inner feelings and the character she is playing. According to Courtney, the gestalt of energy and matter in constant interplay pervades life and action as represented in ancient ideas about the universe, such as in ancient Hinduism. Hindu mythology holds that the universe churned itself into existence by its constant motion. One can see this metaphysical view performed in a certain dance style found on the island of Java in Indonesia, which is characterized by the dancer’s fingers trembling in constant motion. The fingers are never supposed to be static, embodying a universe which is always in motion. For Courtney, dramas are generated by this energy. Courtney wrote that it was the Greeks who broke with this ancient holistic universe by introducing the concept of opposition and warfare, but Einstein has reinstated the fundamental metaphor of similarity (1995, p. 95). Courtney wrote that when Einstein introduced the notion that matter is another form of energy, he was conceptually re-uniting the holistic universe. Where does Courtney’s notion of oscillation come from?
Courtney seems to have derived the oscillation model, as he called it, from semiotician Floyd Merrell. Merrell (1982) has explained that the term oscillation began with the “pulsations” of de Broglie’s wave/particle theory and Schrödinger’s mathematics (p. 56). Subatomic particles which are at once waves and particles are in constant motion which physicists call oscillation. Merrell has noted that this motion can be compared with postmodern notions about the nature of Being. “Now you see it, now you don’t” might describe the way particles behave. Being is equally elusive. But one never actually sees either subatomic particles or Being. One only sees evidence of their existence, the trails left behind.

There are a number of parallels between subatomic particles and Being. Both can be described in terms of energy as well as matter. Both particles and Being are holistic, constantly interacting and changing form. Just as subatomic particles move quickly through space, never occupying the same space for two consecutive moments, so do thought and awareness dart about according to Merrell. Courtney agreed with Merrell’s reasoning: “why cannot it be said that thought is, like the ultimate nature of matter-energy, oscillatory?” Through the “oscillation model” Merrell (1982) conceived that consciousness can be seen as constantly interacting with the physical world. “Everything, from sub-nuclear particles upward, oscillates between itself and the other, existence and non-existence. You cannot step into the same river twice” (p. 57). As Courtney quoted McLuhan in Chapter IV, “I am not the same person I was twenty minutes ago.”

The notion of oscillation seemed to Courtney (1968b) a useful metaphor to overcome the artificial mind/body and inner/outer dichotomies usually employed in Western parlance. None of the above states is static but rather in constant oscillation. Courtney (1995) also maintained that oscillation specifically describes the drama process and its dialogical action between reality and fiction. If oscillation is energy then “energy is what drama is” (p. 83)—interactive and integrating. “We experience life as the modulating and endlessly pulsating rhythmic transaction of all beings with each other and with the whole” (p. 84).
Having gathered up all these implications into the word oscillation, Courtney used the term “oscillation model” to describe a complex of meanings. Courtney used the word oscillation to define different aspects of the processual, non-hierarchical, creative activity of drama. Oscillation describes the way drama is shared by different actors like “an intangible object oscillating between the subjectivity of its creators” (1968b, p. 384). Courtney used oscillation to describe the way drama “oscillates between the subjectivities of dramatist, player, and audience” (1970, p. 18). In Courtney’s description of metaphors, one’s attention oscillates between imaginative structures such as roses and cheeks, to understand the metaphor of “roses in her cheeks.” The mental act of oscillation between the parts of metaphors generates energy, as discussed by Ricoeur (1979). The dramatic act is also a metaphor in which attention oscillates between self and the other, the inside and the outside, an impulse and a medium.

Thus energy is a vital life force which connects all the parts of the universe with the whole through constant oscillation. It is impossible to separate the existences of mind/body, or part/whole because the oscillation between them blurs boundaries. This describes the interconnectedness involved in all dramatic acts. The dramatic act of putting one’s self into someone else’s shoes—switching back and forth between identities—is consistent with a universe in which energy flows back and forth in constant interaction. The actor feels: “Now I am playing a character and now I am myself, now I focus on my feelings and now I focus on my fellow actor’s feelings,” his awareness oscillating back and forth. Learning is the development of one’s Being, while attention is constantly oscillating between details and the whole picture, and among different ideas. Thus the notion of oscillation is intertwined with the learning process of doing drama.

*Intrapsychically* oscillation occurs in the mind when memories, perceptions, feelings and logic interact to make sense of the world.

The senses are active, interrelated, and interacting systems. They actively co-operate with the experienced world, including other people, by
interacting in integrated activity (both actual and fictional). The world affects our senses in natural rhythms--of light, sound, air, heat, weather, the seasons, and lived organic experience. We experience life as the modulating and endlessly pulsating rhythmic transaction of all beings with each other and with the whole (1995, p. 83-4).

Consciousness and self-consciousness are achieved through this oscillation between different perspectives. Such perspectives include both one’s own and that of others, both detailed and holistic perspectives, both distanced and involved perspectives.

On the interpersonal, intentional or dialogical level, oscillation characterizes how an individual interacts with others, while oscillating between different roles. Being is in constant oscillation, but is perceived by others as a form, a static entity, a sign. Courtney like Martin Buber saw the individual as engaged in a struggle to assert his true nature which is dynamic and oscillatory in the face of the tendency of others to simplify and make static the incessant complex dynamics of Being. Ideas, words, works of art, all products of culture “bind up the Thou in the world of It” (Buber, 1958, p. 40). Courtney (1995) wrote:

The cognitive, affective, aesthetic and psychomotor are a whole with oscillating dynamics; mind tends to see others as particular signs--as beings-in-themselves--so that interpersonal relationships are a perpetual struggle to assert the fluidity of our own existence against persistent attempts by others to objectify us. (p. 80)

This notion comes from Sartre (1953). Oscillation is also an idea of existentialism.
Existentially oscillation describes a human being’s existentialist position in the uncertainty of the universe.

Oscillation became the fundamental model for existentialists who focused upon the inner life of the person. S/he was a union of more than one pair of opposites, “half angel and half beast” caught between freedom and restriction, living half in nature and half in dread of death—an idea that was deeply felt. This paradox was unified by signifying the absurdity of being human in a dispassionate universe. (1995, p. 79)

To represent these ideas in a structure compatible with his non-linear model, Courtney adopted the quaternity.

Quaternity

I have used semiotic squares and quaternities in earlier chapters to organize some of Courtney’s phrases. But Courtney mainly used such squares or quaternities to describe the multivalent processes of Being in drama, and its unified modes of meaning-making. “The fundamental two-ness of thought is the double which, when doubled (the play-within-the-play) is the quaternity. This is basic to all spontaneous dramatic acts and it rests firmly on feeling” (1995, p. 58).

The quaternity primarily represents the feelings of wholeness: unity in diversity, the transformation of energy into harmony—which is also the purpose of dramatic acts. Among contemporary scholars, Stephen C. Pepper says that the mind, rather than having a binary structure, is structured around the double. Two pairs make four world constructions…a holistic fourfold structure to thinking appears to be as old as the human race. Universally it assumed that feeling was primordial and for millennia this idea was unrivaled as a way of understanding. (1995, p. 58)
Courtney used this four-sided structure to explain the structure of the brain. The brain is divided into left and right hemispheres and upper and lower sections, but its operation involves all four sections. The following is Courtney’s (1995, p. 80) quaternity of the brain:
According to this square all thought constantly moves among the four sections of the brain, each of which contributes its specific functions to the meaning-making process. For example, the left brain provides logic and discursive thought while the right brain offers quicker insights and felt-meanings. No thought comes from any single section of the brain but oscillates among all of them. A semiotic square or quaternity is like an electric circuit board along which thought or action travels, involving four elements in rapid oscillation.

Courtney suggested using a semiotic square or quaternity to describe how people learn through Being in drama. He mapped the knowledge occurring in performance on a quaternity or semiotic square as follows. He constructed a continuum between the person speaking and the person listening and another continuum between the ostensible message being delivered and the underlying feeling or subtext of a work of art. Thus Courtney’s quaternity looks like this:
To make this notion concrete I turn to a previous example. A scene I described in *To Kill a Mockingbird* involves a young girl, Scout, speaking in naive tones to a lynch mob. Scout innocently asks the men, who are in a murderous rage, how their families are. Mapped on the above square, she is the speaker, the men are listeners. She is ostensibly speaking with formulaic courtesy, but the underlying aesthetic message is an innocent voice reminding the men of another set of values. Her speech oscillates between her own world and the world of the listeners, between the overt message and the covert message she is delivering.
I can use this quaternity to dissect the elements of her speech or to envision how the dramatic act darts back and forth within a multivalent discourse with different levels of meaning. When an actor plays Scout, that actor must be aware of the different elements of this quaternity to make her speech dramatically effective. For Courtney, the quaternity is particularly appropriate for analyzing drama because drama is, at any given moment, a dialogue between two actors, who are both dealing with double levels of meaning--2 actors × 2 levels = 4 (the quaternity). As a double of a double--the juxtaposition of two continua--the quaternity symbolizes a dramatic act. As a semiotic square it is a useful analytic tool for thinking about dramatic action. But the quaternity as a mandala is also a metaphor for multiple and holistic meanings. The quaternity of the Plains Indian, for example, is a type of mandala which expressed the unified but diverse elements of a concentric system of thought.
All thought is whole though different ideas show the emphasis of different modes of thinking. Courtney listed modes of thinking as: cognitive, affective, psycho-motor and aesthetic. For example, to think of a flower might primarily engage the aesthetic mode, while to think about going out for run might primarily involve the psychomotor mode. Courtney also described different states of mind which, like modes of thinking, overlap. I have mentioned these states in the discussion of Being: living, remembering, dreaming, fantasizing and imagining. These states interact and feed each other, except for fantasy which according to Courtney (1980) "draws off energy that could be used by other states" (p. 10). None of these states works completely alone. When people remember, for example, they also imagine. They do not recall exact events but use their imagination as well as their present living context to shape events: "Memory is
creative: what we remember is re-created according to the needs of the present" (ib.). Living in the present is also being shaped by the imagination.

Time is important in some states, for example in remembering the past, living in the present and imagining the future. But dream and fantasy deal with space rather than time. In these states time becomes scrambled. In dreaming “we work poetically. We associate past, present and future together—dream has no time sense—but we cannot distinguish between what is subjective (inner) and what is objective (outer).” While dream connects mental images, fantasy is even further from reality. “Fantasy is a dissociated state. It exists for itself. It consumes energy required by other states, yet it does not contribute to them. Fantasy becomes the predominant state for some disturbed persons” (1980, p. 10). Thus the delusions of a paranoid schizophrenic are likely to preclude learning about reality, whereas the day-dreams of an artist might make learning possible.

The Mind's Ways of Knowing and Learning

The process of drama entails specific ways for the mind to know and learn, whether they occur during overt dramatic action or occur in the mind without overt action. Prominent among these are: tacit learning, intuition, symbolic cognition and feelings, all of which are part of aesthetic learning. I suggest that one can envision these ways of thinking and learning as if they are overlapping petals of a flower. The flower represents the aesthetic mode of learning which comprises all of these. All these petals are joined at their base where they each overlap with the others, but there are some distinctions to be made among them. Each way of learning contributes to the larger notion of aesthetic learning, a notion at once subtle and complex.

Tacit knowing. For Courtney, Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge is fundamental to learning through drama—as well as to all learning. A “precognitive and unconscious level of experience” precedes all kinds of thinking and uses
intuition and feelings (1990, p. 93). Tacit knowledge comes from direct experience, and precedes discursive knowledge, as in Bertrand Russell’s distinction between knowing in an experience and knowing about it. Tacit knowledge exists in time, while discursive knowledge exists in space. As an example of this difference, I take the Christian notion of hell which has developed in different ways over the centuries. Many Christians believe that hell is known tacitly. These people believe they experience hell in their daily lives as a result of their own limitations. Hell is known in time, in the course of daily events. But writers have also written discourses about hell, for example in the discursive notion of hell articulated by Dante. Dante created a chart of hell whose levels correspond to degrees of sin. Dante’s notion exists not in time but in space as a hierarchical structure, arranged layer upon layer in a spatial scheme. In medieval cathedrals similar hierarchical layers are found in statuary, where demons grovel hierarchically below, at the feet of saints. Discursive knowledge is ordered in spatial arrangements. Tacit knowledge is experienced in time, through the fleeting experiences of life. Tacit experiences may be barely conscious, experienced at a shadowy level as are many of the thoughts experienced in drama.

Dramatic action… creates tacit knowing. Although it is unnecessary for mind to know how tacit knowing occurs, it is necessary to know that it happens, because this is what leads to an increased control over feeling. (Courtney, 1990, p. 127)

Tacit knowing constantly informs the entire Being through felt-meaning.

Intuition. Intertwined with tacit knowing is the kind of thinking which is called intuition. “Intuition remains entirely unconscious but it appears like flash…. Intuition works similarly by bypassing the cognitive…. Intuition is direct understanding. Its aim is to grasp meaning at once” (Courtney, 1990, p. 107).
With intuition the electric circuitry of mind can work on a fast track....

tuitions and insights are immediate, and they are varied: from vague
feelings to flashes of insight, from hunches to precise solutions. In the
abstract we can say that these variations are paralleled by different thought
processes: percept/image; percept/image/image cluster; and
percept/image/imagining. (1990, p. 98)

The mind’s intuitive processes enter into most thoughts and actions, but can easily
be distorted by emotional or mental distractions. Intuition is the kind of thinking
in which insights and connections are perceived quickly, apparently without a
process of logic. How does intuition operate in life and in drama?

People live their lives constantly making assumptions about what they
know. They assume things about other people, and even create their own histories
about other people acting on “information” which does not come from
observation. One of the ways people receive information is through intuition. But
often people assume they intuit knowledge which they actually invent or project
from their own psyches. Intuition is a subtle, unmanageable form of knowing
which can often be mistaken or misinterpreted. If intuition functions well in an
individual, it can be deeply insightful and useful. It has been my observation that
people who have good intuition rarely talk about their intuitive knowledge but put
it to use in immediate action. Intuition seems to operate in life the way it operates
on the stage: rapidly providing knowledge which is folded into the action. Only
intuitions that are tested as hypotheses can be confirmed as valid. Diplomacy for
example relies on intuition, as does acting. On the stage, a form of intuition is that
used in slapstick comedy in which the “proof” lies in whether the gag works.
Such intuition draws on an understanding of human nature, the specific audience,
the other players and one’s own capacity to “pull it off.” Molière employed this
kind of intuition in his highly physical comedy.
Thus we can say that intuition is a mental operation producing quick, intelligent guesses through insight. Characteristically these are dramatic and creative, telling us what is and what is not. Intuition supplies us with the identities of ideas, people, and things, and it permits us to make inferences. Whether we have good or bad insights depends on whether our intuitive processes work well or badly. (1990, p. 99)

**Symbolic cognition.** How do symbols produce learning? I have discussed how Courtney has dealt with this in a number of ways. Symbols are containers for feeling that actors and audience fill up with their own understanding. Symbols are effective on a broad social level and seem to be objective, while they rely on subjective emotions. The more powerful the feelings involved, the more solid symbols seem.

Collective symbols, with their assumed objective quality, provide social information, knowledge, or ideas as feedback to the mind. Although social symbols are empty and we fill them with meaning, once they return to the mind, they are established as mental entities and become highly active. (1990, p. 124)

Symbols are consolidated units of felt-meaning, functioning between personal feelings and an external reality. Symbols acquire a reality of their own. They seem to function "out there" while they are also powerfully functioning in people's inner reality. I revisit this dramatic notion, which is well illustrated by classical Greek drama as discussed in Chapter VI. In *Oedipus Rex* Sophocles presented an enduring model for what has subsequently come to be called the Oedipus complex. Insofar as men are believed to have an inner forbidden urge to kill their fathers and marry their mothers, they are believed to have "some of Oedipus" in their psyches. The brilliance of the classical Greek drama was in extrapolating these inner processes into characters, giving a face and voice to that
which dwells within the psyche. Sophocles created an external symbol for what
many people recognize as a universal inner reality.

The agora or marketplace of Sophocles' Athens was a public sphere (for
free men) for open discourse that seemed conducive to solid externalizations like
that of Greek drama. This sphere encouraged the externalizing and making
explicit of the emerging ideas and characters of the day (Bakhtin, 1981), an ideal
environment for giving birth to drama. Open exchanges were conducive to the
experiment of democracy. Life lived in the public square led to an unprecedented
openness of discourse and action. Bakhtin (1981) has described the public square
of ancient Athens "in which all the most elevated categories, from that of the state
to that of the revealed truth, were realized concretely and fully incarnated, made
visible and given a face" (p. 132), like the Greek tragedies where there is no
interior life but all is concretized. This is the realm of drama, where inner
thoughts are transformed into outer characters. This "unrepeatable distinctiveness
of the human image... everything corporeal and external is made more high-
spirited and intense, while everything that is (from our point of view) spiritual and
internal is made corporeal and externalized" (p. 135). Historical time was made
concrete and immediate through drama. Inner and outer thoughts were publicly
dramatized. With the loss of this public square, Bakhtin (1981) wrote that people
could no longer find a unified expression for their self-consciousness. The culture
of the public square made it possible to produce some of the most enduring plays
of Western culture because it is precisely the nature of drama to act out externally
the feelings and private meanings of the inner life. Courtney's treatment of
symbols belongs to a dramatic--not a psychological or sociological--framework.
Symbolic cognition plays with inner meanings through outer forms. This play is
driven by the nature of the symbols themselves.

Active symbols act on their own. They are not preprogrammed. Rather,
they float freely in the mind, one cluster linking with a second and then, at
another time, with a third.
appears to be the result of deep inner processes that are less rational than irrational, intuitive and even paradoxical. (Courtney, 1990, p. 124)

Symbolic cognition can take place through improvisation in which actions "'spark off' each other spontaneously, introducing active symbolic meanings they have not prepared for; one symbolic cluster activates another within the action" (1990, p. 124). Through real dialogue in which each player reacts authentically to the other, symbolic cognition can develop the knowledge of the players. "Our real intellectual power is that we use symbolic clusters to dramatize a variety of plausible futures" (1990, p. 124).

I give as an example Keith Johnstone's account of an improvised storytelling exercise. The exercise involves two actors. Actor A is supposed to start telling a story using disconnected material. Actor B is then to continue the story by connecting the pieces. Johnstone (1992) gave this example:

A: It was a cold winter's night. The wolves howled in the trees. The concert pianist adjusted his sleeves and began to play. An old lady was shoveling snow from her door…

B: … When she heard the piano the little old lady began shoveling at fantastic speed. When she reached the concert hall she cried, 'That pianist is my son!' Wolves appeared at all the windows, and the pianist sprang on to the piano, thick fur growing visibly from under his clothes. (p. 116)

Actor B gathered the separate symbols together in a story which has a ghoulish logic of its own. The symbols--old lady, wolves, concert pianist--rely on associations as well as felt-meaning to activate a story line. The symbols seem to act on their own, while obviously driven by the inner thoughts of Actor B. The result is a symbolic scene. For Courtney, feelings organize symbols.
Feeling

Feeling for Courtney is an activity, not an object or state. It is a complex activity involved in all modes of thought and action. “The feeling within dramatic action is a key aspect of the way mind works in the world” (1995, p. 92). Feeling is in constant oscillation in the continual transformation of ideas through the imagination and through dramatic actions. While the holistic quality of feeling makes it inaccessible to quantitative or precise measurement, it is active in all human learning:

Feeling is highly significant because it is inherent in mind as a whole: in tacit and explicit ways of knowing and in the dynamism and intention that oscillates between wholes and parts of the mind. (1995, p. 95)

Feeling “infuses the whole organism” and becomes the ground for all experiencing and learning. Feeling provides the basis for imagination. Creative imagination, for Courtney, is the ground for dramatization.

Feeling overlaps with emotion, but belongs to a more refined aesthetic mode which shapes discrimination, taste and sense of proportion. Emotion for Courtney is more visceral, self-involved and immediate. “Feeling is different from emotion, although the two overlap. Its cognitive aspect … approaches the core of consciousness in the form of a performative response” (1990, p. 127). Feeling monitors, responds to and shapes human performances, giving an inner sense about one’s own performance and that of others. It is the feeling basis of performance that makes performance cognitive for Courtney. In performance one senses what “feels right.”

Performance is discriminatory: We come to value this rather than that, and eventually to distinguish what we like from what we appreciate. It has to do with intelligence--the understanding of the self, and the understanding of the self in relation to others. (1990, p. 127)
Feeling informs Being, relationships and quality of thought. Feeling gives meaning and value. All of these aspects of feeling are important to the aesthetic mode. "Aesthetic thought is clustered around imagining and feeling, choice and judgment, metaphor and symbol. But feeling is what forms the ground of aesthetic thought" (1990, p. 127).

The Aesthetic Mode

The aesthetic is an activity of mind. It is a quality of our action.... The aesthetic is a particular way of knowing.... The aesthetic is specifically not a mental entity but a particular mode of operation. It is in this sense that we can say feeling is a form of knowing... As a way of knowing, the aesthetic is formed around feeling and it provides the ground for choice and judgment. (Courtney, 1988, p. 82)

Courtney's notion of aesthetic knowing originated with Kant. Kant held that when we see aesthetically we do not become swamped in conceptual grounds or consequence, but we stay with the thing itself, surrendering ourselves to the impression that pure contemplation of it arouses. Instead of analysis into parts, and their superordination and subordination for the purpose of a conceptual classification, here it is proper to grasp them all together and unify them in an overall perspective for our imagination... we focus on the value of their sheer presence as it is disclosed to intuition itself. (Cassirer, 1981, p. 309)

Kant was changing the focus of discourse from seeing beauty in external objects to acknowledging that it is through the form-giving, meaning-making sensibility of the mind that objects acquire beauty. Kant shifted the emphasis from the
external object to the internal process of the individual. Kant defined the aesthetic as an active form of comprehension in which

the passive stimulation of the emotions is translated into the excitement of their pure play. In the freedom of this play the whole passionate inner excitement of emotion is conserved; but in it the play is separated from its purely material foundations... the elements of the play compose the universal basic functions of consciousness, from which each individual psychic content issues and to which it refers back. (p. 313)

Feelings play with external objects and in doing so refer to a “universal subjectivity” or a deep innate human sense of what is real. Essential truths are intrinsically known through feelings that reflect both the personal and the universal. “The artistic feeling remains a feeling of self, but precisely as such it is at the same time a universal feeling of the world and life” (p. 319). Goethe responded to this notion of the aesthetic: “I rejoiced to learn that the art of poesy and the science of nature with its comparative method are closely related, both of them coming under one and the same power of judgment” (Cassirer, 1953, p. 30).

I introduce this background to help explain Courtney’s notion of the aesthetic. The aesthetic mode is one of the four modes of thought Courtney frequently mentioned: cognitive, affective, psycho-motor and aesthetic. All of these modes interact and overlap, but at any one moment one mode may be emphasized. The aesthetic frequently overlaps with the affective, but involves indirect rather than direct emotion. The aesthetic also overlaps with the cognitive in that feeling provides tacit knowledge. It is the aesthetic which underlies learning through drama. Aesthetic knowing is ludic and plays with reality in order to make sense of reality, but is involved in the most serious level of understanding. As discussed in Chapter V, it is the aesthetic mode which permits the creation of aesthetic worlds, and which finds meaning.
Mind dramatizes the actual in order to create the fiction of "the play world" (or "the aesthetic world"). Then the drama process creates the world for us: our spontaneous dramatizations bring symbolic actions that signify what is felt to be a double of reality. (1995, p. 56)

The insights of intuition, tacit knowing, and symbolic cognition are all based on feelings which make up the aesthetic and which, following Kant, inform most thinking. The kinds of learning which occur through the aesthetic are intrinsic, intuitive and performative. These learnings provide "learning to learn", judgment and discrimination. All of these operations rest on the basis of feeling, which is the ground for tacit learning and all mental operations (Courtney, 1988, p. 130).

The aesthetic mode is intrinsically dramatic because it works with the "as if" imagination. The "as if" imagination forms hypotheses, acts on suppositions and projects thoughts outside of the self. Thoughts become dramatic acts in performance, impersonation, social drama, ritual, play, creativity, liminal periods, ceremony, festivity, learning, and art. Liminality is a form of the aesthetic which works with the subjunctive "as if" mode. It is the aesthetic mode which permits transformation.

I give as an example of the liminal nature of aesthetic thought the work of Chaim Soutine, a Jewish expressionist painter who worked in France until he met his death at the hands of the Nazis. Soutine’s work was naive and chaotic, while verging on abstraction. At first labeled as reflecting his "disorderly upbringing in a shtetl," Soutine’s work was taken seriously when he began to treat traditional subject matter, but in his own distinct manner. An exhibit of Soutine’s work [Jewish Museum, New York City, Summer 1998] called Soutine "the very prototype of what has recently been called a ‘liminal’ figure, one at the edges of things, between categories and critical discourse." This is supported by the fact that Soutine was "hailed by numerous critics as an authentic, intuitive genius, untainted by over-intellectualized Paris aesthetics." Beyond the borders of convention, Soutine created a unique view of art in the shadow of World War II
atrocities. Soutine’s liminality transformed artistic expression through its aesthetic thought.

The aesthetic visions of a painter rely on the imagination. Kant attributed important mental operations to imagination (Courtney, 1995, p. 79). In fact, for Kantians there can be no perception at all without imagining. Imagining is also the skill inherent in image making, combining ideas and creating new ones; the inherent freedom of this act derives from (to use Sartre’s term) “the affective-cognitive synthesis.” And our imaginative capacity is an inherent precondition for negotiation, the dramatic skill of seeing others in their own terms. (Courtney, 1990, p. 19)

This introduces the most important human characteristic for Courtney: the imagination.
Imagining is the uniquely human state. (Courtney, 1980, p. 11; 1990, p. 136)

The essential human characteristic is imagination, and this is dramatic in character. (1980, p. 20)

Imagination is the human characteristic. It distinguishes man from other forms of life. No other species has been able to see so many answers to the same problem, to make large-scale suppositions, to engage in "as if" thinking, or to "put himself in someone else's place." The imaginative leap of such thinking is entirely man's prerogative, and it is this which distinguishes him from the upper primates. It is what makes man human. (1988, p. 98)

It is the imagination which creates the "as if" world of the central phrases in Figure 5. For Courtney, the perspectival agility afforded by an active imagination underpins all learning and thinking.

Human beings can suppose, postulate, create designs, invent theories, and test them out, even rejecting them if they fail. In the abstract, people can compare the possibilities of signs and symbols. (1990, p. 136)

It is the imagination which "allows us to create a double of reality" (p. 137) -- makes possible the creation of fictional aesthetic worlds through which people adjust to and learn about their environment. Imagination generates all the activities of the mind discussed so far, through "a leap between one logical class
and another that relates the actual to metaphor, metonymy, play and creation” (ib.). Imagination also creates symbols and metaphors when it takes signifiers from the environment and, via media, re-creates them subjectively; it is thus the foundation of all root metaphors.... By casting the objective as fictional, imagining is the foundation of symbol formation.

In imagining plans for the future, we set up possibilities and try them out in action, overtly or covertly, and we use eclectic elements from the other states, unifying them into new significations. By focusing on possibility, bringing about actions that are future-oriented, imagining also re-creates human meaning (1990, p. 137).

In agreement with Sartre’s phenomenology discussed in the previous chapter, Courtney held that imagination creates meaning out of the environment through a series of transformations. “We transform percepts into images; these we transform into imaginings, which we transform into acts” (1988, p. 126). These transformations are metaphors. First, people transform their perceptions into metaphors “with which we can work” (1988, p. 125). Then people create mental clusters “grouping images into imaginings and giving these imaginings new meaning through metaphorization.” Not only metaphor but metonymy and oscillation come into play as people create doubles of reality. When images are thus manipulated, they cease to be objects of the sense and become active forms. “Images as part of an imagining have become condensed and they do not function in a sensate way... meaning results from tension--between the first two ideas, and between the parts and the whole, both of which function in terms of similarity/difference” (1990, p. 68). This concept of dramatic imagination is the source of abstraction and conceptualization.
We are organizing images into patterns with which we can work. ... A visual analogy would be with a juggler tossing up dozens of balls in the air: at one moment they make one pattern, at another moment there is a different pattern. When we are imagining, we are tossing up residue of past percepts (now images) much like a juggler does his balls, and we are discerning the patterns they make. (Courtney, 1988, p. 99)

It is the process of comparing ideas, images and worlds which produces learning in drama. Transforming perceptions into images and comparing images is what Courtney (1990) calls “dramatization.”

We have seen (p. 51) that the highly complex, even mysterious, phenomenon of perception is normally transformed (dramatized) by the mind into subjective experience. What I see is transformed into what I image, and seeing and imaging have very different mental functions. (p. 97)

This entire process comprises what Courtney calls the dramatic imagination, since the dramatic act is basically
to “put oneself in someone else’s place” (which) can lead us to see both sides of a question and the tensions between them. Eventually it can lead us to envisage a whole variety of possibilities. (1980, p. 11)

Through these processes of transformation people order situations, imagine future possibilities and create new ideas. This is the core of the argument advanced so far, that people learn by comparing imaginary worlds with actual worlds. In Courtney’s notion of the imagination this becomes a model for processes occurring at the most minute and interior levels as well as in large external actions. As opposed to reductive logic, the imagination proliferates meanings. “In
other words, transformation (like metaphorization) is the making much out of little, an inherent quality of mind” (1988, p. 126). The creative mind works not through simplifying, but through complicating. “Mind, through intention, is constantly seeking to know; it complicates any initial idea” (1990, p. 67).

Courtney was interested in the dramatic act as it occurs early in life. “The child discovers that he can ‘stand for’ an object, that he in his whole self can become a symbol for some aspect of external reality” (1988, p. 103). For example, when a child pretends to be a bear he is a bear. “So he is engaged in a wholesale series of suppositions: through internal action a percept ‘becomes’ an image and his whole self ‘becomes’ the externalization of that image in a dramatic act” (ib.). But with maturity a “cognitive width” makes it possible to grasp many aspects of a concept at the same time. It includes the ability to turn the problem round, to see one facet and weigh it against another, and to relate all aspects one to another. It develops the individual capacity to see oppositions and contrasts, similarities and complexities. The actor takes another’s part, assumes within himself viewpoints, opinions, and logical processes, that are other than his own and gives them full value--and not merely is this the case for real viewpoints, opinions, and logical processes, but also for those which the thinker “makes up.” He pretends they exist. (p. 104)

Thus whereas a young child is absorbed in his pretense--is a bear--at a later age he is aware of multiple realities--being a bear, commenting on bears, being himself--at the same time.

In fact, in the higher realms of thought, most of the facets thus juggled by the mind are those of pretense--such as with abstract thinking. Then there
is no physical reality to the images (beyond the normal perceptual base) and we say, in truth, that the thinker imagines them. (ib.)

Play is dramatic, and so is the adult play with ideas.

Imaginative thoughts are by their nature “playful”: there is a tendency to “toy” with perceptual information which allows free mental experiment. Creative imagination is flexible, having an ability to mix and change thoughts and processes over a whole range of mental activity. Freud showed that creative activity is ‘a continuation and substitution for the play of childhood,’ and Einstein actually discussed his own mental processes in these terms. (ib.)

“The playing with concepts (learning) imaginatively is a necessary prerequisite before these concepts can be put into logical order and described in words” (Courtney, 1988, p. 104). For Courtney this dramatic process results in an “organic growth of intellectual activity.” Courtney wrote that when children are young they need to enact events outwardly in order to understand them, whereas later in life people can go through these enactments internally. Development makes it possible to accomplish more and more operations internally. These pretend and dramatic operations continue to be important throughout life, both internally and in the way people learn to use “masks” to enact certain roles socially, which

is most assuredly acquired when in childhood we pretend to be other people and take over their qualities; those who lack such childhood play find difficulty in social adjustment in adult life. Our early dramatic activity is the basis for pretending to be others in our covert processes, in our internal rehearsal of roles in real or imagined situations. (1988, p. 105)
The world of the dramatic imagination acknowledges that it is play on which all development depends. It is interesting to compare this idea with the *lila*, or "divine play" that is the Hindu universe. The difference is that for the Hindus we are mere toys in the hands of the gods. For Courtney (1990) we are the players, and "truth lies in the players and in the playing" (p. 10).
Spontaneous drama exists processually, medially and liminally:
It exists in time, as an aesthetic object characterized by mutuality and
dialogue. (Courtney, 1990, p. 155)

Dialogue is the focus of this chapter via the next element of my
dramatistic scheme. How does dialogue logically fit with the scheme I have been
constructing? Courtney characterized his strands of ideas on learning through
drama as centrifugal, diverging outward like the spokes of a wheel. I have been
tracing a centripetal path back inward to the person at the center of the drama and
learning process. Beginning with the setting, my path has culminated with the
topic of the actor engaged in learning. This has brought me to a logical conclusion
since this dissertation is about a person-centered form of learning. Where does the
topic of dialogue fit in?

The Necessity of Dialogue

Courtney considered dialogue the *sine qua non* of learning and of drama.
Dialogue, relatedness, mutuality, trust and what Courtney called the fiduciary
contract are the necessary conditions for drama. This perspective on learning differs from that of much learning theory which concentrates on the individual learner accumulating knowledge. For Courtney learning happens in dialogue. Other interactive learning paradigms include Bruner’s culturalism (1996), which considers learning as an interactive process that forms and reflects the social webs connecting people. Social constructivism (Salomon & Perkins, 1998) also sees learning as an interactive event in which “knowledge, understandings, and meanings gradually emerge through interaction and become distributed among those interacting rather than (being) individually constructed or possessed” (Salomon & Perkins, 1998, p. 9). Courtney called this interaction dialogue.

What is dialogue? Ideally speaking, “dialogue is how people function with others—dialogue as mutuality” (Courtney, 1990, p. 149). Courtney made the argument that any form of drama begins with a dialogue he called “the Vaunt and the Proposition.” The Vaunt is an initial theatrical statement—for example, an actor strides onstage from stage left and cries: “I am the king!” The next dramatic moment is the Proposition, which occurs when another actor strides onstage from stage right and cries: “You are a false king and I will kill you!” The Vaunt establishes the central character, the Proposition establishes the central action. This is a formal model for initiating dramatic action which is found in theatre as well as in many narrative genres.

On a deeper level, dialogue is essential to drama because drama is close to Being and Being is to be in dialogue. Courtney called Martin Buber “the father of us all” (personal communication, December, 1996) in conceptualizing the relatedness of Being. Drama is about relations. In drama the actor’s awareness includes both self-awareness and awareness of an Other. “The dynamic of the self and other-self establishes a variety of metaphoric relations: here-there, this-that, inside-outside...transformed into felt-meaning” (Courtney, 1995, p. 84). Not only relatedness but also trust is necessary for authentic drama. Trust supports drama as a “bedrock of meaning”, in Courtney’s words. Courtney used another phrase “fiduciary mode” to describe the atmosphere of solid trust necessary to sustain the
mutual meanings found in drama, meanings that constantly evolve and mutate, blurring boundaries and transforming identities. These dramatic meanings are not discrete and tidy as in logical thought. They cannot be taken as absolutes, defensible in any context. But they are meanings about the nature of people and of life, whose unfolding depends on an atmosphere of trust, on the willingness of actors and audience to “play the game”, to go along with the fiction and to suspend disbelief. For example, Richard III has its own meanings, about an evil king’s quest for power. It does not describe all kings or even a fixed category of kings. The play describes a reality of ruthless desire that audiences have recognized for hundreds of years as “true.” According to Courtney, this kind of meaning-making cannot be developed without reciprocal commitments among actors and audience, including

the mutual trust between players, who commit their Being to action, and express their Being and their knowledge in action and dialogue. This level of existential commitment to the dramatic world gives the knowing of the players a degree of certainty that allows us to accept it as a valid form of cognition. (Courtney, 1990, p. 34)

For example, I have worked with an improvisational group called “Just Say Yes”, whose method is based on the idea that improvisation is impossible without the players’ always saying yes to one another, accepting each others’ actions and building on them. The rule for improvisation in the group is: don’t say no to anything, just say yes and see what happens. This comes principally from Spolin’s (1990) improvisational techniques. Spolin taught that the only way to learn true spontaneity was to suspend all negativity, hierarchical thinking and exclusiveness. Johnstone (1992) also wrote that the operative discipline in creative improvisation is not to reject anything, but to be supportive of all actions, for “there seems no doubt that a group can make or break its members, and that it’s more powerful than the individuals in it” (p. 29). In actuality, players have
difficulty remembering this principle, which is contrary to ordinary life's games of exclusion, status, one-ups-manship and conquest. In life people usually negate the possibility of authentic dialogue with others. But creative artists of any discipline know that creativity cannot function in the company of negativity. In drama the issue is salient because dramas involve groups. Thus beyond the ethical issues of group dynamics, there is a practical reason for trust: it is the only way to mutually create. Drama is mutually created like many narrative or performative genres, similar to the way children tacitly agree on the rules of a game. "The fiduciary contract is the operational foundation for all those actions inherently dramatic in nature: storytelling, debate, dialogue, negotiation, and the like" (Courtney, 1990, p. 32).

The Actions of Dialogue

Dialogue generates the worlds that people create through actions, words and gestures. These personal worlds, as discussed in Chapter V, comprise the environments in which people enact their dramas. They are created through the communicative efforts of individuals--through what Courtney called Voice.

With any text we always arrive, finally, at the human voice (Being)... in a fictional world, that is oral and aural. 'The fictional world creates the text'... (and the author) is both outside and inside the text... this is a dramatic perspective. (Courtney, 1990, p. 152)

Voice--living speech and dramatic acts--creates dialogues which play with the environment and in doing so "conceptualize the environment in highly complex ways." The settings of life's dramas are created through Voice. As stated in Figure 4,
I identify with my breath, like Thoth I breathe life into things and create the "world-for-me." (Derrida, 1981) [dramatic world] ... But I exist in a mutual relation with another protagonist who has his own exhalation. Together we create the world-for-us," a world where our voices substitute for our Being (signify) but a world nonetheless as near to Being as we can get together. (1990, p. 156)

Voice is close to Being but different from Being. Voice is the tool of Being which projects itself into the world. Voice is the creation of Being.

Voice is the signifier of Being. It obeys it, conforms to it, yet replaces it and becomes the playing and the plaything of it. Voice is the mimic and the player. Simultaneously, it is felt to be our Being and it acts as the creative impulse in our interactions. It is many things in one. (ib.)

The Voice of each individual encounters environments which are not neutral. "What we do relates to an object that is already charged with meaning, or to a person who is in the process of valuing, choosing and judging... The process is ever fluctuating" (1990, p. 156). Courtney pointed to Bakhtin's idea that a reader and a work of art are in dialogue, in "cognitive interaction" with persons and objects that are already imbued with past and present words, acts, and meanings. Yet the utterance and the act must also "make their mark"; they must create their own values and meanings by intervening in the living process. The concepts that result strike a particular balance between the forces in their interplay; these vary from moment to moment, from player to player, and from context to context. Speech, like any act, is purposive. It directly reflects human intention. Its aim is to be assimilated into the ongoing conceptual system and then feed back to Being what is understood. (ib.)
This mechanism was encountered in Figure 5, where dramatic acts “provide feedback to mind in ways it can grasp” (1990, p. 54). The idea of this complex reality of encounters between different people with their different intentions and their different histories probably originated in the work of Martin Buber. Buber’s theology dealt with the encounter between “I and Thou” in spiritual language and on a devotional plane. Courtney saw the relevance of these ideas for drama, ideas in fact that Buber had first realized while working in theatre (Friedman, 1969). The following are some of the roots to Courtney’s thought that are found in Buber’s (1958) philosophy. Buber wrote

The Thou meets me. But I step into direct relation with it. Hence the relation means being chosen and choosing, suffering and action in one... The primary word I-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being... I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All real living is meeting. (p. 11)

The Thou, I interpret, is at once God and mankind, the God in mankind and the ordinary man in God. Authentic life does not occur except in meeting the Other. Life exists insofar as I come to meet that which exists outside of me--the Thou--which engages me in being “chosen and choosing, suffering and action.” Buber advocated relinquishing control over such encounters, engaging the Thou without reservation. No life exists in isolation, without coming into relationship with the Thou. Buber’s theology provides a significant ethical philosophy for an increasingly heterogeneous world.

Buber also considered this dialogue essential for learning, not unlike psychologists Piaget, Erikson and Winnicott, or educators like Dewey who have argued that speaking, interacting and playing with children is essential for their intellectual development. For Buber the concern is not the intellect but the soul.
The development of the soul in the child is inextricably bound up with that of the longing for the Thou, with the satisfaction and the disappointment of this longing, with the game of his experiments and the tragic seriousness of his perplexity. ... For only gradually, by entering into relations, is the latter to develop out of this primal world. (p. 28)

Buber characterized reality as Spirit. Spirit is located not within anyone or anything, but between the I and the Thou, in the space where dialogue takes place. Spirit, like the Biblical breath or word, is for Buber the reality of which all physical manifestation is mere shadow,

for in actuality speech does not abide in man, but man takes his stand in speech and talks from there; so with every word and every spirit. Spirit is not in the I, but between I and Thou. It is not like the blood that circulates in you, but like the air in which you breathe. Man lives in the spirit, if he is able to respond to his Thou. He is able to, if he enters into relation with his whole being. Only in virtue of his power to enter into relation is he able to live in the Spirit. (p. 39)

The realm of dialogue is subtle. Too strong a response to the dialogue "banishes (it) to an object." The response to dialogue must be a listening and a silence, as in T.S. Eliot’s words: "Wait without hope, for hope would be hope for the wrong thing." Buber wrote

The stronger the response the more strongly does it bind up the Thou and banish it to be an object. Only silence before the Thou—silence of all tongues, silent patience in the undivided word that precedes the formed and vocal response—leaves the Thou free, and permits man to take his stand with it in the reserve where the spirit is not manifest, but is. (p. 39)
Buber described a tacit level of learning. This level is obscured once opinions, labels and judgments enter the relationship. Then the utter spontaneity of dialogue is concretized and robbed of its pure essence. The subtle dialogical relation is constantly threatened with being "bound up in the world of It." Every achievement and every cultural object petrifies the delicate flux of dialogue between I and Thou.

Every response binds up the Thou in the world of It. That is the melancholy of man, and his greatness. For that is how knowledge comes about, a work is achieved, and image and symbol made, in the midst of living beings. (p. 40)

While Buber wrote of the spiritual realm, his ideas can be compared to more robust notions of drama--not surprisingly since Buber's ideas originally came from his work in the theatre (Friedman, 1969). I suggest that the influence on Courtney is clear from this passage written by a scholar of Buber's work:

Regarded as a species of poetry, drama is "the formation of the word as something that moves between things, the mystery of word and answer." This mystery is not one of union, harmony, or even complementarity, but of tension, for two men never mean the same thing by the words that they use and no answer is ever fully satisfactory. The result is that at each point of the dialogue, understanding and misunderstanding are interwoven. (Friedman, 1969, p. 43)

Drama in Courtney's work is a dialogue located in the space between actors, a space in which their combined imaginations mutually create a fictional reality. Drama is also a manifestation of the tensions between metaphoric referents--the different and ambiguous degrees of meaning of the participants. As Courtney wrote, "cognitive meaning lies in the dynamic between--between dynamics,
between forces, between processes--which is a tenet of post structuralism" (1990, p. 45). In Buber's work

the livingness of the speech that "takes place" in the "between," was not and could not be restricted to the artistically detached sphere of the theater alone. It illuminated for him human existence as such, and just as such became for him one of the highways leading to his classic philosophical work I and Thou. (Friedman, 1969, p. 4)

The dialogue between two actors also depends on a delicate, patient listening to the Other, as can be seen in good stage work. It requires hearing one another and taking risks at a level of authenticity and deep commitment. The learning that occurs between two actors, like between the I and the Thou, is often tacit, too subtle or fragile for articulation but essential to the ongoing action. The ego must be silent if one is to hear the Thou.

Anti-Discourse

Buber’s ideas have influenced many disciplines such as qualitative research, symbolic interactionism, transactional analysis, gestalt therapy, creative arts therapies, relational therapy and educational theory. But why does daily life remain basically anti-dialogical? Why do people not hear others, label others, and avoid authenticity? Why is it hard for actors to “just say yes” in improvisation, for teachers to truly hear their students, and for people to actually communicate taking all the risks of the living moment? Why are people unable to engage in authentic dialogue? I coin a word here to describe this phenomenon: anti-dialogue. I have found parallel notions in other fields. For example relational therapists use the word “disconnection” to describe “the psychological experience of rupture that occurs whenever a child or adult is prevented from participating in a mutually empathic and mutually empowering interaction” (Miller & Stiver, 1997, p. 65).
It is my observation that much social convention has been developed to prevent dialogue. “We know we live in a world that is not based on mutuality” (p. 49). For many people it is important to prevent dialogue because power depends on non-dialogical relations. Power over others is a political tool, an emotional weapon and also feeds the insatiable appetites of insecurity. “Indeed, by definition a dominant group is not likely to create mutually empowering relationships, else it would not remain dominant” (ib.). Further, many people believe—quite reasonably—that authenticity is okay for someone like St. Francis of Assisi, but after all we are living in the 1990’s and our reality is defined daily by the Dow Jones Industrial Average. While negotiations in the business world are sometimes dialogical, many others depend on the very psychic armor that Buber advocated shedding. In a competitive environment of conquest and aggression, the gentle voice of Martin Buber seems impractical. For example, a hypothetical monk emerges from 15 years of cloistered life where he studied theology such as that of Buber’s. Now he must adjust to ordinary urban life. This monk would find the skills he had carefully developed in the monastery to be useless, even dangerous. He who had devoted his life to breaking down his ego and developing an ever more delicate sensitivity to thoughts, feelings and his environment would be as vulnerable as a newborn baby—in the body of an adult—in this hectic, high pressure world. The monk would find anti-dialogue everywhere since, he would learn, anti-dialogue is instrumental for sustaining social and economic structures. But he would also notice that there are forms of anti-dialogue which prevent the dramas through which people learn.

To illustrate the power of anti-dialogue, I refer to the previous example of Socrates and the measures society took to end the threat posed by Socrates’ dialogues. The weapon used against Socrates’ dialogues is fairly common: gossip (Bruns, 1992). By encasing Socrates in a persona created by the common doxa and diaboli of the street, Socrates’ opponents silenced the philosopher’s own unique voice. Gossip, hearsay and stereotype are methods frequently used to overcome the threat of an original or unpredictable voice—in classrooms, in gang
warfare, in politics and in many social relations. Sociologists often say that gossip is the highest form of flattery. I suggest that gossip’s main function is to prevent dialogue. This idea was handled cleverly in an episode of Absolutely Fabulous in which the supermodel Naomi Campbell appeared. Campbell is reputed to be “difficult.” Throughout the episode Campbell appeared to the most soft-spoken, gentle, reasonable and sober person in the chaotic world of Absolutely Fabulous. Her responses to the other characters were simple and polite. Yet each time another character spoke to her, without fail that character turned away from her muttering: “She’s so difficult!” Every time someone tried to approach Campbell, they were told: “Careful, she’s being difficult!” The dichotomy between the hearsay about Campbell and her actual behavior was starkly drawn and apparently not lost upon the audience. This device highlighted what is obviously a common experience in the lives of many people.

Though most gossip is considered dangerous because it slanders, I would suggest that gossip’s menace is that it prevents dialogue. The effect of gossip is to encase an individual in an isolated world that prevents dialogue, creative responses, or the transformational processes natural in social life. It prevents the discovery of anything new. I suggest that gossip functions like the religious dogma of the medieval world or of contemporary groups like the Taliban. In these settings behavior and meanings are predetermined, so that no personal knowledge can be gained from experience. Villages in which social groups control their members through gossip, ostracism and fear function like totalitarian states and absolutist religions to prevent dialogue, experience and transformation. Dialogue is also prevented through forms of social control exercised in classrooms, in social groups and even in many therapeutic groups which purport to promote dialogue. Many such groups in fact prevent spontaneity, as in some groups in which members are expected to explain all their behavior to the other members or to obtain permission from them for daily actions. Similarly, some groups function by having members “spy” and report on others. Clearly the spontaneity, depth of experience, possibilities of new knowledge and dramatic creativity of dialogue is
prevented under these circumstances. Dialogue is also prevented through hierarchical relations which predefine behaviors and life possibilities, such as the Hindu caste system. My purpose in presenting these mechanisms of anti-dialogue is to throw into relief the aspects of dialogue which are important for learning in Courtney's scheme: spontaneity, intuition, tacit learning, transformation and many forms of meaning-making. These, Buber would say, come from the encounter with the Thou.
The Mathematics of Dialogue

Dialogue is an idea of “twoness”, a word Courtney (1995) has used (p. 57) which serves this discussion. Courtney often used numbers in a figurative way to describe his ideas as in the twoness of metaphors and the fourness of quaternities and semiotic squares. The double is a main theme throughout Courtney’s work, referring to the double referents of a metaphor, the double realities which people inhabit and the double characters of a dialogue. Courtney found the quaternity and its “fourness” to be a useful tool for discussing doubles, because a quaternity, like a semiotic square, doubles the double. Thus, two characters dealing with two realities--fictional and actual--can be analyzed using the four poles of a quaternity, as was shown in the square of Dramatic Dialogue:

In most of the quaternities and semiotic squares discussed so far, the four poles are not objective or scientific quantities, but “temporary absolutes”, parameters used for a specific analysis. They have figurative and analytic functions. For example, I generated the semiotic square Figure 1 to discuss the idea of Theatrum Mundi, drama=life. I followed Courtney’s formula for creating a semiotic square by generating opposites, beginning with the idea that drama=life which generated...
its obvious opposite—drama_life. This gave me two poles which are outer qualities of drama. I generated the other axis using inner qualities of drama. I arrived at these two poles, Identity and Transformation, from my grasp of Courtney’s work, my own inner experience of doing drama, and the fact that two other writers—Bakhtin (1981, p. 112) and Buber (Friedman, 1969, p. 11)—have characterized narrative forms like drama using the same poles, Identity and Transformation. The result was:

![Diagram](image)

I do not claim that the four poles I generated provide the definitive description of drama. They are merely “temporary absolutes”, parameters I used only for this particular exercise. This exercise is not an objective or scientific explanation of drama, it is a way to play with ideas about drama in order to generate meanings. In this way, Courtney’s interest in numbers like two’s and four’s provided ways to play with the ideas that interested him. Courtney’s interest in numbers was not scientific, but ludic. Yet this play with ideas brings insights and “important implications for cognition and thus for our understanding of intelligence” (1990, p. 151). It is in this spirit that I coined the term “Courtney’s mathematics.” I begin with Courtney’s interest in two’s.

Courtney’s Mathematics
The idea of the double character of thought is not unique to Courtney. Traditional notions of duality—the mind/body split, the inner/outer split, the reason/emotion split—all involve twoness. But these traditional notions of duality often signify opposition and exclusion. For example, the traditional reason/emotion duality considers reason and emotion to be mutually exclusive, so that the presence of emotion is considered to make reason impossible. Courtney's model of the double, by contrast, describes two coexisting, parallel realms. According to Courtney's model reason and emotion operate simultaneously—or rather in oscillation, in that the individual's attention is constantly oscillating between using emotion and using reason.

For Courtney, two-ness stems from similarity not opposition. The model for this, according to Courtney, is Buber's I and Thou, in which two characters find a mutual understanding: 1-in-2, and 2-in-1. Two characters create one meaning. But the twoness—the double—remains:

Play, dialogue and narrative teach us that (1) two frames of reference coexist but differ in space-time; (2) events can be doubles, present both as fictions and actuality, or present only as fictions (for us); (3) fictional worlds symbolically signify meanings that can affect us in our daily lives. (Courtney, 1990, p. 154)

The symbols generated in dramas are even more complex than twoness. Each symbol has various, multifaceted, imprecise felt-meanings, and each symbol dialogues with other symbols. The impact of each symbol moves the action forward. Courtney wrote of this action as "interrelating like Chinese boxes," by which he means the kinds of boxes that fit within one another. One box is swallowed up by a more encompassing box, which is enclosed in yet another box. The symbolic interactions found in dramas comprise not just two components, but many that nest within one another.
Thus, Courtney wrote, the twoness in drama represents not two ideas but two entire gestalt worlds, which dialogue by continually interacting and continually generating meanings. Two fictional worlds interact through symbolic language:

We create (fictions) around the message that is the focus of our thoughts, and that we do against a background of actual texts. Thus we create two gestalt worlds, the aesthetic world, or the play world, where creativity is self-generating; and the art world of specific, self-generating forms (theatre, music, etc.). These two fictional worlds can be pictured as dialogic, as Chinese boxes, as figure and ground, or as a continuum running from spontaneous drama to ritual and theatre (p. 153).

Courtney differentiated between the aesthetic world, the realm of the imagination, and the artistic world of solid forms of art. As an example of the difference between these two worlds, I refer to the work of a French actor, Fabrice Luccini. For Luccini drama is an act of evocation rather than of definition. Using a format which highlights the difference between the aesthetic and the artistic, Luccini evokes aesthetic worlds as he performs artistic pieces. Luccini performs solo evenings during which he recites classical poetry onstage and, through his acting, evokes worlds of meaning. His *artistic* world is structured by the poetry he recites, but his *aesthetic* world is created by his evocative style. His gestures, voice and facial expressions fill the stage with meanings that suggest an aesthetic world containing a whole stage full of characters, whereas in his artistic creation he is the only character present. These two worlds are in continual dialogue as he freshly re-creates each traditional poem. This example highlights the twoness of Courtney's conception of drama, but Courtney has also suggested some more graphic methods for depicting dialogue.
The figure and ground model. Courtney proposed that one way of depicting dialogue is through the two notions of figure and ground, in which one speaker becomes a figure against the ground of the other speaker, and then figure and ground switch as the other speaker speaks. If Speakers A and B are having a dialogue, the speech of Speaker A first creates a figure against the ground of Speaker B. The figure of Speaker A’s speech focuses on the ground like a lens, creating a perspective of Speaker B. Then figure and ground reverse, as Speaker B’s speech becomes figure against Speaker A’s ground, creating a new perspective. I give as an example a standard joke:

A: Who’s that fat noisy old bag?
B: That’s my wife.
A: Oh, I’m sorry…
B: You’re sorry! How do you think I feel? (Johnstone, 1992, p. 38)

First Speaker A is the figure against the ground which includes Speaker B. Speaker A’s figure focuses the audience’s attention on a fat, noisy, old bag. Speaker B then replaces Speaker A as figure (“That’s my wife”), giving us a new perspective on the scene which has become a respectable social situation in which Speaker A seems a rude, thoughtless person. Speaker A then provides a new figure--of compassion, remorse and pity for B. The scene becomes poignant. B then recasts the scene with irony, recasting Speaker A as a peer. The ground throughout is composed of the wife and the setting, but keeps shifting as the different figures re-create the ground, catching the other speaker within it. Each new meaning encompasses within it the previous meanings, like Courtney’s Chinese boxes.

The voice model. Another model for depicting dialogue is as a conversation between the viewer of a work of art or text being viewed. In this model the perspective keeps switching back and forth between the voice of the
viewer and that of the work, or text, each voice conceptualizing its perspective. For example, I read the newspaper and in doing so I have a dialogue with the printed page, first composing my analysis in my own voice, and then returning to the page to "hear" the voice of what is written there. Similarly while I view a performance I alternately listen to my own internal voice and its reactions, and the voice of the performer. In this way the viewer or reader constructs meaning in dialogue with the text. According to this model

the reader learns to create a book, the audience learns to create a performance, and the viewer learns to create an art work (a text) out of a work. An artist creates a painting, but when a viewer comes into a gallery he or she creates it anew. Readers, audiences, and listeners must learn to make texts by understanding a specific cultural code. Artistic learning is gaining knowledge of cultural traditions and acquiring specific skills in interpretation. (Courtney, 1990, p. 154)

In this model, the voice of both author and audience are also in dialogue with cultural codes. Individuals are in a continual process of re-coding their understanding of cultural frameworks through the text or work of art, constantly adjusting through constant learning. This is the kind of learning Courtney has called "re-play", the adjustments made through feeling, memory and perspective and new experiences. In re-play the individual re-enacts meanings, whether overtly or inwardly.

In the terms of this book, re-play is the adjustment of present learning to the Being and knowing acquired in the past; we re-learn the sensations of life the feeling of things, through each unique text. The artist learns to select and order significations to create a work of art; the percipient learns the cultural codes and skills necessary to interpret those significations; and we all learn to discriminate between our imaginative and feeling
responses. All interpretation must accept that aesthetic and artist learnings have their historic origins in dialogue and dramatic narrative... all contemporary arts grew out of the performance of narrative. (1990, p. 154)

According to this model, the continuous learning process occurring in culture is inherently dramatic. It is based on the model of re-enacting past learnings to re-create them anew. “Our cognition is not a form of dualism or dialectic but rather a nesting. It represents the continually changing comparison of voices” (p. 151).

The psychological model. What Courtney called the psychological model is the metaphoric manner of learning. Two images “interact”—that is, the viewer’s attention oscillates between two images to synthesize a new meaning. This is also the basic framework of drama I have been developing, the idea that an individual steps in and out of worlds and of dramas, and in doing so acquires a more encompassing perspective. Each new perspective proliferates yet more perspectives and new meanings.

In drama, the two referents are usually the surface and the deep meaning of the drama. Courtney (1990) gives as an example Wilson Knight’s interpretation of Macbeth (p. 62). In Knight’s play the deep level of meaning is about the struggle between profane and sacred power, while the surface level is the story of the play. Knight placed a throne on one side of the stage and the Virgin Mary on the other to reflect the surface and deep meanings. The relationship between surface and deep meanings is not causal, but double. “There is a meaning within a meaning, just as there is a face within a mask and a play within a play.” In Pirandello’s plays the coexisting realms of meaning are “Being/seeming and reality/illusion” (1990, p. 62). The logic of drama is figurative—metaphoric, metonymic, parabolic and analogic. Like parables, dramas narrate stories that convey different levels of meaning. Drama’s metaphors not only convey deeper levels, they also persuade or seduce the audience to these deeper meanings. The felt-meanings in dramas have the potential to affect deeply held beliefs. Dramas
impose their own logic on the audience, changing the audience's perceptions. That is the very nature of drama from its beginnings in ancient Athens where Sophocles used characters like Oedipus and Antigone to convey the tragic ambiguities of power and religion.


The dramatic is an advanced style of cognitive operation. The foundation of this activity is the mutuality of dialogue; it underlies all interpretation and understanding of the dramatic event. (Courtney, 1990, p. 9)

The dialogic mode is the essential dramatic medium which makes all learning possible in Courtney’s scheme. To summarize Courtney’s ideas about dialogue:

- Dialogue is a model for dramatic action that results from human intention.

- Tacitly we try to understand the other person dramatically/dialogically.

- As players who live through the text, we assume that the fictional world exists, that it has a dramatic/dialogic relation to the actual.

- The author-creator has a dramatic/dialogic relation to the phenomenon of the actual world both outside and inside the text.

- The player uses the Being/voice of the self, or of a narrator (in a novel), or of various personages (in dramatic acts), to create performances (texts) that carry communicable meanings. Players then are media--signifiers of mostly tacit signifieds. (1990, p. 157)
How do people learn through dialogue? For Courtney all learning, like all drama, is based on dialogue.

Both play and theatre parallel the genuine educative act where teacher and student meet in an act of mutuality. The two engage in an exchange: The teacher tries to see the issue from the student's point of view and the student tries to do the same with the teacher. When this occurs, the student's knowing changes and learning happens. (1990, p. 25)

Education takes place in the relationship between persons. “Real education depends on the contact of human living soul with human living soul” (John Stuart Mill in Courtney, 1988, p. 22). Courtney gave the example of a child sitting on her mother’s lap, following her mother’s finger as it points to words on the page. For Courtney, the child is not just pretending to read, but also pretending to be her mother who can read. Pretending is like taking a leap into another possibility, using the “as if” imagination. For Courtney all learning depends on this imaginative leap, which involves empathy and role play. This is an application of the mechanism whereby people create fictional worlds in order to learn. The child is constructing a fictional world, through her empathy with her mother, in which she already knows how to read. As she guesses the words on the page her guesses gradually become accurate. It is because of her feelings for her mother that she wants to know how to read. In this way feelings, empathy and imagination generate the curiosity that makes learning possible and engage the learner in “playing the game” long enough to learn all the words on the page. Where there is no sense of relationship with the material or with the environment of learning, there is little motivation to discover the task and then stick with it. In this sense all learning depends on dialogue and on the dramatic qualities of empathy, feeling and imagination.

Another important sense in which dialogue nurtures intelligence is that it develops elasticity of thought and feeling. The demands of responding in
dialogue, of continually switching perspectives, putting oneself in another’s shoes, and stepping in and out of the drama develop the agility which is, for Courtney, intelligence. “As players, our intellectual potential is constantly tested by the degree of elasticity with which function in a human context” (Courtney, 1990, p. 155). Functioning well within a dynamic, dialogic process requires acting, speaking and gesturing dialogically in relation to the environment without losing the thread of one’s own cognitive processes. This is Courtney’s idea of dramatic intelligence in which “the process is ever fluctuating” (1990, p. 156).

Courtney follows Bakhtin in this view of dialogical thought. Bakhtin wrote of the constant dialogue among languages and the living realities of individuals, in which “language is transformed from the absolute dogma it had been within the narrow framework of a sealed off and impermeable monoglossia into a working hypothesis for comprehending and expressing reality” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 61).

Agility of intelligence depends on both responding and understanding. Dialogic speech is highly context dependent. One must listen to understand and respond, because every context has its own meanings. For Courtney (1990)

Dialogue, speech, and dramatic actions only have meaning in relation to the object they refer to, the player who makes them, and the player who receives them. These interrelationships are highly complex because they apply with equal force to both protagonists. (p. 158)

Response in a dialogue entails an encounter between the subjective belief systems of the speaker and the listener. “We assimilate the total utterance of the dramatic event, and project a response into a new conceptual system. Then we have improved the potential of our intelligence (ib.). A dialogue between two protagonists changes the understanding of each. “We assimilate the total utterance of dramatic event, and project a response into a new conceptual system. Then we have improved the potential of our intelligence” (1990, p. 158). For understanding to take place, a degree of accommodation must take place between
the two belief systems, which involves the imaginations and the feelings of the protagonists. As in the schemes described above, one protagonist projects

into a specific conceptual framework, into another cognitive world, which introduces a totally new element into the world of the first protagonist. This is a dialogic interaction that is paradigmatic for dramatic interaction; it is the way we discover different perspectives and points of view. As Bakhtin tells us, “The speaker tries to get a reading on his own word, and his own conceptual system that determines the word within the alien conceptual system of the understanding receiver; he enters into dialogic relationships with certain aspects of this system. The speaker breaks through the alien conceptual horizon of the listener, constructs his own utterance on alien territory, against his, the listener’s apperceptive background.” (1990, p. 156)

What do people learn through dialogue? Courtney’s answer to this question is a recursive discussion of ideas already discussed. Dialogue is drama, so people learn perspectives, the deeper levels of “learning to learn”, and philosophies of life. People learn about Being, including the confidence and trust necessary for any learning to take place.

Dialogue is perspectival. Switching perspectives allows “two perspectives and feelings (actual and fictional) to be gained on any event, which, through comparison, constitute the sense we make of it” (1990, p. 77). Courtney wrote that this is the cognitive purpose of dialogue, a terse statement about his entire philosophy about learning through drama. Bakhtin’s influence is apparent. Bakhtin wrote that languages “throw light on each other: one language can, after all, see itself only in the light of another language” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 12). This perspectival mechanism is the central notion in Figure 5.

The unique quality of dialogue is the presence of trust, which Courtney wrote is particularly essential for generating deep meanings. “Whenever the
A player projecting a dramatic world (a fiction with its fictional objects) outside the self effectively sets in motion intersubjective behaviour; the fiduciary contract, however, precedes the intersubjective relation. (1990, p. 123)

Once a level of trust is obtained, players are able to share their own personal thought styles and their own personal logic. By projecting these into the environment, players take the risk of using a personal rather than a public language, but in doing so convey more information than they would without their personal language.

Comedy even more than tragedy gives evidence of the trust necessary for sharing meanings. Comedy usually involves vulnerability, a baring of the human foibles and weaknesses that evoke laughter. I use as an example an episode from Absolutely Fabulous, which deals with being fat. In Courtney’s language, fatness is the signified while the actor Jennifer Saunders playing Edina is the signifier.

The episode opens with Saunders trying to squeeze herself into a variety of clothes which are absurdly tight, stepping onto three different scales, shedding earrings, going to the bathroom and finally squeezing a zipper closed, layers of fat
protruding, while she shrugs “Not so bad with some jewelry!” This is a familiar scene to many woman who have struggled with weight. This construction is about the unattractiveness of fatness, the constant attempt to deceive oneself and the battle with the hard facts of the scale. In a following scene, when her daughter tells her she eats too much, drinks too much and takes no exercise, Saunders responds contemptuously, “Oh don’t be silly. It’s bound to be something more complicated than that” and “If it were that easy (to lose weight), everyone would be doing it.” Her relationship with fatness is bound up with her illusory self-image, her healthy ego and her disinterest in discipline. She begs her doctor to give her amphetamines and screams, in a tantrum: “But I want to have a heart attack!” A fantasy scene shows a manic doctor spattered with blood performing liposuction as Saunders shrinks to doll size, the disemboweling of all self-respect and corporal reality. Another construction of fatness shows a flashback of Saunders being ridiculed by an acquaintance who, 20 years older and blind in the closing scene, clutches Saunders screaming “YOU’RE FAT!” These constructions of fatness are at once painful, ridiculous and commonplace.

Sensitive to an issue shared by many fortyish females, Saunders relied on her own trust in the audience and confidence that her audience will engage with her. In doing so she exposed a number of relationships with fatness that range from the embarrassing to the absurd. I call these deep meanings because they each involve a new relationship between signifier and signified, variations on how women see themselves, sustain weight problems and avoid solutions. These are neither judgments nor solutions but perspectives. The many constructions Saunders exposed are forms of dramatic symbolism, which arise through her sharing of her fatness neuroses with an audience whom she trusts will laugh with her. Courtney highlighted that it is the fiduciary contract and the confidence it entails which permit the sharing of material which is personal, dramatic and becomes symbolic. “Dramatic symbolism derives from the contract. Establishing it is a matter of confidence in others, in oneself, in both. Confidence… is the foundation of dramatic symbolism” (Courtney, 1990, p. 123).
CHAPTER X

COURTNEY’S CONSTRUCTION OF LEARNING THROUGH DRAMA

The human drama pervades all that we do. It makes our life significant, it creates for us meaning, meaning that becomes wedded to us. (Courtney, 1982, p. 1)

This final chapter is a synthesis of the themes on learning through drama I have developed in previous chapters. My initial organizing scheme was a dramatistic framework, which permitted me to recursively develop themes from Courtney’s texts. In this chapter I synthesized Courtney’s main themes into a construction of drama as a process of learning. I have written about each theme at length. Here I look at the relationships between them, as well as their implications for teaching and for research.

Drama brings a multivalent knowing (Courtney, 1990, p. 129). Thus an appropriate structure for synthesizing Courtney’s terms is a multi-faceted gem, each facet representing a major theme which has emerged. Each facet represents one of the following major themes.

- people use their feelings and the imagination to make sense of their experiences—in a process which Courtney calls aesthetic learning
• they do this through generating metaphors which are the essence of dramas
• people learn by working with the different perspectives that emerge from these dramas
• this learning comes through a language of media, which function as symbols
• these operations contribute to an existential form of learning which is drama.

Other major terms from Courtney's work, for example Being, mind, the metaphor of worlds and oscillation, participate in these themes. The facets of this gem are, in brief: 1) feeling and imagination; 2) metaphoric thinking; 3) perspectival actions; 4) mediate knowledge; and 5) existential learning, and I add two more: 6) implications for teaching and 7) implications for research. Peering into the gem through any of its facets I can see the whole gem, but it looks different as seen through different facets which provide lenses for viewing the whole. Each facet is part of the whole, but each facet changes the whole in its own way. This is not a perfect gem but contains interesting veins and imperfections which make each facet slightly different. If I position myself at any facet, I can peer through its glazed surface to see the crystallized angles and refracted light that form the reality/illusion that is drama.

Figure 19

Drama as a Multifaceted Way of Knowing

Relationships are apparent among the facets, represented by the angles and converging lines of this prismatic gem. Some of the relationships are symmetrical
and opposing, for example whereas empathic feelings represent a knowledge known from the inside, mediate knowledge takes place between individuals—in a sense “outside” of individuals. Some are dependent or contiguous relations, for example the perspectival aspect interacts with the metaphoric aspect, in that people create metaphors which generate perspectives. The metaphoric aspect interacts with felt-meaning and imagination, which inform the meaning of—indeed create—metaphors. Being and mind are transformed through any of these facets. For example, mediate knowledge uses the transformation of Being—the individual plays different roles and becomes a medium—as its tool of learning, to transform the mind. I peer through each of these facets and find the following.

Facet 1: Feeling and Imagination

Drama entirely depends on feelings and imagination. Acts of identification and transformation, which comprised the horizontal axis of Figure 5, provide the basis of dramatic action, wherein feelings and imagination are ways of knowing. It is identification with the feelings of a role which enable the actor to play it, using his own imagination. Identifying with different points of view requires both feelings and imagination. The feelings and the imaginary worlds between people create the dramas in life. In terms of Courtney’s ideas about learning, it is precisely the receptivity to and production of felt-meaning working with imagination which generate metaphors and perspectives—transformations of reality. Feelings and imagination transform personal worlds through which people make meaning. Feelings and imagination generate the internal relations—felt-meanings—which Courtney used in his quaternities. The learning process in drama discovers that

Truth, thus, is not absolute, but resides in the player as an existing felt reality, in the playing as an emerging felt reality. (Courtney, 1995, p.11)
Feelings work directly with the imagination. Courtney (1995) wrote that drama depends on the “as if” imagination: “dramatic acts function ‘as if’--feeling asks: does it feel right?” (p. 10). In drama, feeling functions as a source of wisdom and meaning. This is the basis of aesthetic knowing. Through the feeling and imagination facet, I can view the other aspects:

- the metaphorical aspect--feeling and imagination generate metaphors which are invested with meaning;
- the perspectival aspect--feeling and imagination create worlds and roles--the perspectives that structure dramas;
- the mediate aspect--feelings and imagination permeate interactions among people creating the symbols that people use as media (including actors as symbols);
- the existential aspect--Courtney quoted Sartre (1953) that people use feelings and imagination to process their perceptions;
- the teaching aspect--according to Courtney, both teaching and learning should entail understanding the significance of feelings and imagination in people’s constructions of social realities--in history, in current events, in language and in the classroom itself;
- the research aspect--the symbols in dramas provide researchers with containers for examining the feelings and imagination involved in human actions.

Facet 2: Metaphor

Through this facet, metaphors are seen as the basis of drama. “Metaphor is the imaginative root of dramatic action” (Courtney, 1990, p. 65). Drama is the coexistence of double levels, imaginary and actual, material and spiritual, mythic and mundane expressed in the metaphoric mode. Dramatic intelligence is the
ability to work with multiple realities, using metaphors to create new understanding. This action permeates all thinking and learning. The mind constantly looks for new metaphors, which comprise new perspectives and new worlds. People compare new metaphors with those which they know. Metaphorization occurs in perception and in action when people make of themselves metaphors by adopting roles. Metaphors interact with the other remaining aspects in that

- metaphors make possible the *perspectival* aspect—metaphors generate perspectives;
- metaphors become *media* through which people learn;
- *existential* aspect—according to Courtney, metaphors configure perceptions of existence, and are, in Courtney’s definition of metaphor, the actions people take upon existence;
- the *teaching* aspect—metaphors should be explicitly addressed in the classroom, through highlighting, analyzing, and expressing the meaning-making functions of metaphors;
- the *research* aspect—Courtney recommended attention be paid to the metaphors people create and use in their realities.

**Facet 3: Perspectives**

Through the perspectival facet I focus on Courtney’s ideas about the switching of perspectives. The switch between being inside of or outside of the drama is Learning III, learning about the structure of dramatic action. Learning III is the “creation of new classes and mental structures... By breaking down existing thought patterns and opening new systems, as well as combining and recombining sets and classes of relations, it provides a kind of metaperspective on all thought and learning” (Courtney, 1990, p. 143). Learning III describes the perspectival aspect. This operation applies to “higher realms of thought... facets thus juggled by the mind are those of pretense—such as with abstract thinking” (1988, p. 104).
These mental acts of juggling and pretense enable people to grasp “many aspects of a concept at the same time. It includes the ability to turn the problem round, to see one facet and weigh it against another, and to relate all aspects one to another” just as “the actor takes another’s part, assumes within himself viewpoints, opinions, and logical processes” (ib.). Within Courtney’s paradigm, this perspectival action enables people to use personal and social worlds to achieve active and perceptual transformations such as an actor experiences through doing drama. This basis of Courtney’s paradigm provides perspectives on the other remaining facets:

- **media** in learning participate in perspectival action--media exist in the mediate space being manipulated through the switching of perspectives;
- **existential**--existence is experienced through a multitude of perspectives;
- the **teaching** aspect--exploiting the variety of perspectives in any pedagogical situation can enable students to increase their awareness, proliferate possible meanings, and find solutions to ambiguous or conflictive situations;
- as is acknowledged by qualitative research, perspectives and the situatedness of the researcher or the learner defines realities.

Facet 4: Media

Through the mediate aspect drama is a medium. Mediation, for Courtney (1987), is “the dynamic between the subjective and the objective; the self puts meaning into the medium--the medium assumes meaning from the environment--and the power of the medium unites these into a new meaningful whole that is greater than its parts” (p. 81). To mediate means “to make a link between; to make a dynamic connection; to use media to link imagining and environment” (ib.). Drama is a medium and occurs in a mediate space like a stage. Drama and ritual spatialize events, collapsing time while using and expanding the space in which they occur. Drama exists in the mediate or cultural space discussed by Winnicott (1982) and Bollas (1987), the space which originates between mother
and child. As they mature, people often spatialize their interactions by using words in everyday conversations like “I need more space” or “you’re invading my space.” These events occur not “inside” of individuals, but between them and among them. In drama, all events occur in this mediate space. The “betweenness” of dialogue as discussed by Buber and Bakhtin exists in the mediate space between people. Courtney used the term mediate knowledge to emphasize that learning comes about in dialogue, in the space that mediates between people, and through media like cultural works. “Acts always occur in interaction” (Courtney, 1995, p. 15). Monologues, for example, are supposed to come from the “inner thoughts” of the actor but are enacted in the mediating space between actor and audience. In this space people create and work with mediate objects. Media such as symbols have fluctuating meanings. Works of art mediate among people as symbols invested with felt-meaning by various participants. Similarly people serve as symbols, media for groups. For Courtney mediate learning is a significant mode. Even the learning that is supposed to take place “inside” of people relies on mediate objects--often in the form of concepts and relationships. Learning generally occurs in interaction with mediating ideas and mediating people--mediate knowledge occurs “between subjectivity and objectivity.” In drama, the subjective is made objective--inner events are externalized. So the distinction between subjective and objective dissolves, and what replaces the demarcation between them are media. Mediate knowledge interacts with the remaining facets:

- in existential learning--feelings and imagination mediate between the self and the world--all consciousness is consciousness of something (Sartre, 1953);
- implications for teaching--in shifting the emphasis away from the “banking concept” of education in which the individual learner accumulates knowledge, mediate knowledge acknowledges the use of and dialogue with mediating ideas, artifacts and other people to construct ideas, works and new realities.

For example, in a previous chapter I wrote about how a girl used the medium of her grandmother to develop a drama, a medium which elicited meanings and catalyzed thoughts and actions; and
implications for research—which benefits from a paradigm shift from studying individuals to studying the connections and mediations among people, symbols, ideas and feelings.

Facet 5: Existential Learning

I turn to the existential aspect which sees drama as an embodied, tacit way of learning and knowing as in life. This term also references the phenomenological ideas Courtney took from Sartre (1953), that people process their perceptions through the actions of feeling and imagination. These notions place the responsibility for both perception and action squarely on the individual. People create their own perceptions just as they are responsible for their own actions. I indicate this complex of issues by the theme of existential learning which includes the other themes:

- feeling and imagination are ways people mediate between the world and their existences;
- the metaphors people adopt and enact are means for people to create their own existences;
- people have their existences through specific perspectives;
- as in mediate knowledge, as Sartre wrote, consciousness is always consciousness of something, that is people are always using media to achieve awareness and self-awareness;
- implications for teaching--learning comes from life and interaction, which makes drama an important learning medium; and
- implications for research--this implies research should focus on living situations, which are the real sources of philosophies and sciences.

I have touched on the last two facets---implications for teaching and implications for research--in the preceding points. Before directly addressing these two aspects I would like to take Courtney’s construction through one last
ludic permutation. The preceding discussion suggests another structure, which can
describe the interrelationships among the themes more specifically. The multi-
faceted gem metaphor gave me a chance to elaborate on the interrelationships
among these terms. These elaborations led me to one final structure: a concentric
series of radiating--not fixed--circles which taken as a whole represent the
experience of the actor/learner:
At the center is the personal experience of feeling and imagining. “Feeling is the nub of all structures expressed in drama; in fact, feeling lies at the core of all mental operations and external acts” (Courtney, 1995, p. 54). This activity is not “inside” of the individual but radiates outward, as feelings and imaginings are continually interacting with environmental factors. For an actor, these feelings and imaginings project outwards as actors invoke the imaginary worlds that the audience experiences. In the same way, people as actors in their own dramas are always imagining, feeling and projecting their personal realities outwards while also receiving the creations of other people’s imaginations.

At the next outer layer of experience, people create metaphors and use them to form their personal worlds. Metaphors are devices in the activities of feelings and imagination. “It is the feeling power of the dramatic metaphor that creates
consciousness and self-consciousness” (Courtney, 1995, p. 23). Metaphors are the bases of drama in Courtney’s (1995) scheme. “This two-fold energy underpins dramatic action. Being “as if” is to be two-in-one: “the mask and the face”--a metaphor of oneself” (p. 55). Again, the metaphoric layer is not fixed in this position but radiates outwards and inwards interacting with the other levels of the drama experience. This metaphoric action of the mind and feelings results in the next outer layer, perspectival activity.

- People use different perspectives to relate to their metaphoric dramas. This gives them access to wider knowledge. The perspectival aspect is the basis of Courtney’s construction of learning through drama. It occurs at every level of awareness and characterizes the many different aspects of the actor’s experience in doing drama. Actors must understand the deeply personal perspective of the characters they play, the perspectives of other characters and the total perspective being created by the drama as a whole. Actors must take into account their own perspectives, those of the director, those of the playwright and those of the audience. In order to play a role, an actor needs most of all to switch perspectives. In all learning, wider and deeper perspectives are the hallmarks of wisdom and knowledge, while understanding many different perspectives comes from and contributes to maturity of feeling. Drama is perspectival. The stage acts as a lens to focus using specific perspectives.

- Mediate knowledge uses media for learning. Mediate knowledge is the way people come to know using the media around them--media which have largely been created by them and by their interactions. In this view, symbols are a quintessential medium. Their meanings constantly undergo transformation, as they are filled with the felt-meanings of participants. These felt-meanings acquire realities of their own, while in fact they are being created by the participants.
The players feel that the symbolic meaning of their actions has the power of external reality. But by changing the spontaneous drama, and thus its symbolic felt-meaning, the players attempt to re-create the social reality in which they live. (Courtney, 1995, p. 26)

Symbols are communicative media and the very currency of dramatic transactions. "A symbolic performance is a complex sign that is dynamic, ongoing and social; it transforms the mundane into the significant--the symbolically significant" (p. 35). Mediate knowledge refers to the learning that continually takes place during these transactions.

- Existential learning sums up the learning experience through the endlessly interactive and holistic processes of dramas in life.

Facet 6: Implications for Teaching

Courtney’s writings did not seem to address teachers directly but did have implications for teaching. The most important is just how complex the processes are which take place for students while they are doing drama, either in a structured or in a spontaneous mode. Like any form of play, the issues of drama are complex because of the variables involved... doubling: identifying and empathizing with others, impersonating them, thinking from their point of view and transforming our metaphoric imaginings into external symbols that create multiple meanings.... It has not been said clearly enough, for example, that teachers should ensure their learners are active--intellectually, physical and dramatically active, as Rabelais would have it. (Courtney, 1990, p. 161)

For Courtney, this mode of learning is a natural mode that relies not only on physical activity, but on the mental and affective activity of identifying with
others' points of view. All abstract thought and symbolic manipulation depends on these activities of imagination and feelings. According to Courtney, awareness of felt-meaning can help teachers become engaged in students’ thinking processes. Further, Courtney (1990) along with dramatherapists (Jennings, 1995) and educators (Yale Child Study Center, 1994a, b, 1995) believed that it is only by using feelings, as in dramatic play, that students can learn to refine or control them. Drama offers "a range of emotional experiences which, as fictions, increase (students') abilities to face and adapt to difficult emotions" (Courtney, 1990, p. 124). Courtney wrote that feelings are contained in symbols.

I illustrate this complex of activities with a hypothetical example. A teacher responds to the recent death of a student’s relative by a stray bullet, asking his students to invent a ritual. His students wish to commemorate the tragedy by bringing various made and found objects representing death and mourning to class. They place the objects in the center of a circle and observe a few moments of silence. Someone has brought a Latin American doll, La Calavera--Godmother Death. This symbol is saturated with felt-meanings which vary among cultures. Through the course of the improvised ceremony, students begin to hold conversations with La Calavera. The students decide to work on dramatic scenes with La Calavera to explore the different possibilities for cultural and personal meanings of death. They plan the general format of these scenes beforehand, deciding who should meet La Calavera, including families of soldiers from Vietnam or Kuwait, families of young people gunned down in cities, and children of AIDS victims. Students address questions to La Calavera, who is played by different students in different scenes. Some thank La Calavera for rescuing their loved ones from lives of suffering, while others demand recompense for their losses. In one scene students ask La Calavera for help and wisdom about the processes of life and death. After all, she is a deity. Within general frameworks they plan beforehand, the students work on a number of improvisations to explore the meanings of this powerful symbol. Through costumes and make up, the
students also endow the grimmer aspects of this symbol with imaginative and aesthetic dimensions.

Such topics require sensitive treatment. As an example of what can go wrong, I refer to a drama class I observed in which the teacher insisted that the teenagers talk about their feelings about recent deaths in their families due to AIDS. The entire class was soon crying hysterically, and some students remained emotionally fragile throughout the course of this program. The teacher of this group was following the principles of method acting--tapping the feelings of the actors, which is not necessarily appropriate with all students. Perhaps Courtney would suggest that the teacher switch perspectives on the drama through frequent interventions and discussions to distance and mitigate its emotional nature. Questions like: "What is this character saying? What point of view do they represent?" can introduce new perspectives. This is a way of deliberately using verbal constructs to distance the material. On the other hand, a powerful dramatic scene says much more than words. Courtney also held the opinion that words are not always necessary for analyzing dramas (personal communication, December 1996). Trying to discuss such a scene in some cases can be awkward, even insulting. Another way of switching perspectives is to use more distanced material, such as practices from other cultures which the students could study themselves.

In Courtney’s construction the mind acts through metaphors, which are the source of the drama process, and can provide interesting teaching tools. The above hypothetical lesson utilizing La Calavera would evoke many kinds of metaphors about death. Has death “robbed” families? Is death a solemn reaper, a grim justice, an ultimate judge? Is death a sweet peace? Students can find metaphors not only from their own feelings, but also by studying about different cultures and their belief systems. To explore the metaphors they find, students might work with different scenes in which death--La Calavera--is understood by different metaphors, for example, as a diva, a witch, a mother, or a young girl. Thus, metaphors can be used analytically, to talk about “what is happening” in a
scene. Metaphors can also engage divergent thinking. For example, if La Calavera is a wise teacher, what would the scene be like? Improvising on the metaphor of wise teacher facilitates learning in an exploratory mode.

The perspectival dimension of drama facilitates work with coexisting rather than opposing alternatives. According to Courtney, learning through drama is based on perspectival thinking and action. For example Augusto Boal’s (1974) technique of Forum Theatre is a way of improvising in which members of the audience intervene and take different roles, redirecting the perspectives of the drama. As an example, La Calavera comes to visit a young mother to take her child. The mother argues that this is not fair, this is her first child. A member of the audience has a different argument to present. She enters the scene, replacing the mother. She argues that La Calavera would do better to wait. The baby’s life is worth nothing at this point. When the baby becomes a full woman, then La Calavera would really have a prize. Another mother argues that La Calavera, as a woman, should empathize with the mother’s pain. Drama is essentially perspectival, and any dramatic work provides opportunities for making this aspect conscious.

La Calavera becomes a medium for all the players. Issues are generated in response to her, and she provides feedback. For example if La Calavera approaches a young boy and tells him his time has come, this boy creates his own character through interactions with the medium she presents—imminent death. The boy decides to create an unexpected concept—to welcome her, and tell her that he has always longed to see her splendid kingdom. The boy has created a meaning for death through the medium of La Calavera. La Calavera in turn can use this new meaning as a medium for her next move. The medium of Godmother Death provides each individual student with an opportunity to create his/her own meaning in interaction with her. Since drama is always dialogical, all participants constantly work with one another as media for their own self-expression, and as media they are changed by others. Awareness of the framework of mediate knowledge can enable teachers to exploit this potential.
Drama is a narrative form, to adopt Bruner’s phrase (1986, 1990, 1996). It is a way of telling stories about events, beliefs and imaginings. But drama is a form that involves many storytellers at once, all interacting and contributing. Dialogue is essential for this learning to take place. If Courtney’s work emphasizes dialogue, this places responsibility on teachers to monitor the balance of power in social groups in order to facilitate a dialogue for all students. Dialogue also replaces emphasis on isolated individuals or their achievements against normative standards. Dialogue implies that people create new realities between them. This emphasis is particularly appropriate for multicultural situations, according to Courtney’s colleague Nellie McCaslin [Interview] whose textbook on classroom drama (1990) has been in print for some thirty years. For McCaslin, drama expands individual realities. McCaslin deplored the use of drama “to feel good about myself--how small can you get!” [Interview]

Understanding the dramatic nature of events, the work of the imagination and feelings, the metaphoric movements of the mind, the perspectival qualities of learning and knowing, and the involvement of media in learning processes provide ways of understanding and facilitating existential learning. An existential implication of Courtney’s work is the degree of personal responsibility people have in all of their perceptions and actions. “A player is continuously responsible for his or her choices” (Courtney, 1990, p. 28), creating his/her own worlds, using numerous perspectives.

Facet 7: Implications for Research

This section treats the implications of Courtney’s work through several approaches to research. The above scheme is already supported to a certain extent by experimental research. If learning through drama is distinguished by the participation of feelings along with cognition in an existential form of learning, then there is a body of contemporary research relevant to Courtney’s ideas.
(Goleman, 1995, LeDoux, 1996). Goleman (1995) wrote of the importance of “emotional intelligence” by pointing to clinical studies. “Evidence... leads Dr. Antonio Damasio (University of Iowa College of Medicine) to the counter-intuitive position that feelings are typically indispensable for rational decisions: feelings point us in the proper direction, where dry logic can then be of best use” (p. 27) (italics in original). Studies of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1996, 1997) have shown that high achieving students enjoy an absorbing and positive emotional state during 40% of their study hours (Goleman, 1995, p. 94). Gardner’s (1991) work also points to the importance of emotional states in engagement, commitment and performance among students (Goleman, 1995, p. 94).

More specifically, scientists who study the brain have arrived at some notions that are similar to Courtney’s ideas. While scientists have not been able to define emotions once and for all, some current thinking calls emotions “thoughts about situations in which people find themselves” (LeDoux, 1996, p. 23)—emotions are used to process experience. LeDoux (1996) advocated scientists study emotions as carefully as they study cognition. Recent research has revitalized an old notion, one that was implicit in the philosophical writings of Aristotle, Descartes, and Spinoza—that emotions might be cognitive interpretations of situations... The success of (the Schachter-Singer theory) is exemplified by the fact that the psychology of emotion, to this day, is mostly about the role of cognition in emotion. (p. 49)

Thus “subjective emotional states, like all other states of consciousness, are best viewed as the end result of information processing” (p. 37) like Sartre’s ideas which Courtney used, that emotions process perceptions. If learning occurs through emotions, and “given that emotional and cognitive processing both largely occur unconsciously, it is possible that emotional and cognitive processing are the same, or, as it is usually said, that emotion is just a kind of cognition” (p. 68). Therefore, LeDoux wrote,
in the final analysis, the processes that underlie emotion and cognition can be studied using the same concepts and experimental tools. Both involve unconscious information processing and the generation of conscious content on the basis of this processing. (p. 38)

Just as Courtney surmised, the unconscious processes people tap in active situations, their tacit knowledge and intuitive insights, provide them with most of the knowledge they receive from life. Courtney (1990) attributed divergent, creative and associative thinking to “the gifted, talented, highly creative, and intelligent” (p. 52). Divergent and associative thinking are qualities scientists have ascribed to emotional thought styles. Emotions draw on awareness of the body, unconscious memories and evolutionary wisdom “which probably has more intelligence than all human minds together” (LeDoux, 1996, p. 36). Emotions may not display transparent reasoning processes, but often they are indispensable sources of information.

LeDoux (1996) wrote of studies that confirm other aspects of the kinds of felt-meaning discussed in this dissertation. For example, experiments have shown that emotions are influenced more powerfully when this effect is not grasped in the conscious mind (p. 59), just as symbols operate more powerfully when they are not deconstructed or acknowledged. Philip Johnson-Laird found that people accumulate knowledge not on the basis of logic, but on the basis of their own hypothesis-testing, concluding that

if the human mind is a formal logic machine, it is a pretty poor one.

People are rational, according to Johnson-Laird, they just don’t achieve their rationality by following formal laws of logic. We use what Johnson-Laird calls mental models, hypothetical examples drawn from our past experiences in real life or from imagined situations. (LeDoux, 1996, p. 35)
Similarly Courtney wrote that drama serves as the means of testing hypotheses, which is the way he believed people learn in life. Some scientists have said “emotions are social constructions, things that happen between rather than within individuals” (LeDoux, 1996, p. 23)--like Courtney’s betweenness of dialogue and experience.

The model about which Courtney wrote could provide directions for further research into the role of consciousness. Scientists have studied the brain’s capacity to process and interpret information necessary for survival. Studying people’s abilities to negotiate, mediate and find new solutions in situations of conflict could address the functions afforded by understanding multiple perspectives. Studying people who have successfully overcome mental disturbances and trauma could address how people use emotional resources to find new life strategies. These approaches entail interpreting the human being as a creator of his or her own meaning and worlds.

Research into learning through feelings is also of interest to arts educators who would like to justify putting arts back into school curricula. Some researchers have found that incorporating arts learning in the curriculum contributes to improved academic performance (Fowler & McMullan, 1991, Beardon, 1998). Other educators point to the motivational factor of using enjoyable and expressive activities to stimulate students. But if, as Courtney said, learning through drama is the learning of various perspectives and their felt-meanings, then drama should specifically provide a means of re-structuring and proliferating mental structures. This study has treated drama as a means of spatializing imaginary worlds and inner ideas, making them concrete and using them to organize space. Winnicott (1982) wrote that this kind of event first occurs in the space between the mother and child, where feelings acquire forms in the rituals between them. For Winnicott culture, including drama, is a process of finding meanings by organizing space and forms, which later become internalized as abstract thought.

Perhaps a parallel can be found with recent studies that have found that listening to music has an effect on spatial reasoning, temporarily changing the IQ
Neuroscientist Gordon Shaw at the University of Irvine discovered the “Mozart effect”, that listening to Mozart’s Sonata in D Major improved students’ spatial reasoning skills by as much as 40%. These skills are used to solve complex math problems. Frank Lloyd Wright (Burns & Novick, 1997) also saw music’s potential for spatial reasoning when he compared the structures of music to those of architecture. Wright claimed that Beethoven’s symphonies are so structured that listening to them enabled Wright to structure buildings in creative and sound ways. These writers claim that music functions in a palpable manner to organize imaginary or abstract ideas, which resembles Courtney’s (1988) claim that people improve their intelligence through drama. “It includes the ability to turn the problem round, to see one facet and weigh it against another, and to relate all aspects one to another” treating ideas as structures. “It develops the individual capacity to see oppositions and contrasts, similarities and complexities” (p. 104).

This suggests that further research should explore the ways a drama experience affects subsequent reasoning, divergent thinking and problem-solving. One such study (Vrazel and Hoffman, 1991) found that students who had just engaged in improvisational drama were more fluent with metaphors. Courtney is suggesting drama results in an improvement in manipulating ideas, seeing many possibilities at once, holding in the mind complex ambiguities and finding ways to synthesize and conceptualize them. Experimentally testing these possibilities would require a complex instrument for analyzing students’ responses and outputs.

A version of this idea was implemented by Howard Gardner (1996) in Project Zero’s study of the Lincoln Center Institute’s program in aesthetic education. The objective of the program Gardner was studying was to “teach the arts not just as a set of skills and performances, but also as a habit of thinking and inquiry that promotes a comprehensive world view” (Moore, 1996), the kinds of goals Courtney also discussed. Gardner’s objective was to see if participating in the program affected students’ thinking. Gardner used short interviews to
compare the responses of students who had experienced the aesthetic education
program with those who had not. These interviews were subjected to quantitative
measures and statistical analysis. Some discussants of Gardner’s presentation
(personal communications, March 1996) criticized his findings, stating that these
findings depended largely on the verbal skills of the students rather than on
aesthetic learning, and reduced students’ responses to preformulated quanta.
Gardner’s study did show a positive effect of aesthetic education as implemented
by the Lincoln Center Institute, but his study also highlighted the difficulties
involved in trying to measure aesthetic learning. This suggests that further
research into student responses should use qualitative design and analysis, to
discover new meanings that students intend to convey. Students’ attempts to
explain new insights would probably not conform to preordained frameworks.
Ross’ (1993) study of aesthetic education found discrepancies between the way
students and their teachers viewed the aesthetic learning they had experienced in
the same classroom.

The above studies, real and hypothetical, all deal with research about the
usefulness of learning through drama—or through the arts. They are intended to
assess whether or not a framework like Courtney’s provides effective learning.
But a different avenue of research would be to utilize Courtney’s ideas as an
instrument for looking at people’s dramas. Courtney’s scheme bears a close
relationship to the ideas of symbolic interaction (Geertz, 1973, 1983, 1995;
Turner, 1974; Cohen, 1974, Woods, 1992). This close relationship between drama
and the social sciences implies a two-way street. Drama can be used to analyze
living social situations. Conversely, dramatic work like spontaneous drama
exercises in the classroom can be analyzed in more depth by using methods from
the social sciences. Before exploring the implications of drama linked with
symbolic interaction, I take a detour to the apparent roots of Courtney’s symbolic
interactionism.

After I had written a draft of this chapter, detailing constructions for
Courtney’s scheme of learning through drama, I interviewed Courtney’s one time
student and colleague, Robert Landy. Landy compared the prolific and randomly presented nature of Courtney’s work with that of George Herbert Mead,

American sociologist, philosopher, I guess he called himself a social scientist at the time. He basically was a brilliant lecturer as Richard was a brilliant speaker. The words never stop, the words are always there. But unlike Richard, Mead was not a writer. So one of his students took very full lecture notes and basically crafted the book Mind, Self and Society. Compare Play, Drama and Thought (Courtney, 1968). It’s beginning that whole symbolic interaction thing. [Interview]

With this cue from Landy, I took closer look at Mead. I found that all of the key concepts I had gleaned from Courtney’s work could also be found in Mead (1932, 1938, 1964). Mead relied on neo-Kantian notions about privileging people’s construction of meaning over external reality, and the relationship between consciousness and the environment. More crucially, Mead’s “philosophy of the act” depended on what Courtney called a dramatic awareness--using one’s self as a symbol and an object, or what I call understanding from within and from outside the frame of the drama. For Mead (1964) “individual selfhood depends upon reflexiveness--the ability of the subject to be an object to himself... he is both subject and object” (p. xxix). Mead called the self “basically cognitive” since it was through experiencing these different perspectives, as subject and object, that people acquired and created social meanings. Mead used the dramatic word “role” frequently: “Selfhood depends upon the capacity of the individual to assume the attitudes and the roles of others... play and games develop selfhood” (p. xxx).

Mead also used the example of a child using a toy or his/her self to find new perspectives and meanings. This process evolved into role play later in life, and the use of the self as symbol in one’s own cognitive worlds. For Mead, as for Courtney, through identification with others people can take on the different roles that allowed them to develop their social beings and their thought processes.
“Sociality,” says Mead (1938), “is the capacity of being several things at once” (xxxix). It is through social acts--Mead’s scheme was called “the philosophy of the act”--that people acquire their individual selves. “We must be others if we are to be ourselves” (p. 292). Mead applied this principle both to personal learning processes and to social ethics. “The limitation of social organization is found in the inability of individuals to place themselves in the perspectives of others, to take their points of view” (p. 310). Like Courtney’s, Mead’s construction was highly personal and at the same time intrinsically social.

In this way we play the roles of all our group; indeed, it is only insofar as we do this that they become part of our social environment--to be aware of another self as a self implies that we have played his role or that of another with whose type we identify him for purposes of intercourse. The inner response to our reaction to others is therefore as varied as is our social environment.... Until this process has been developed into the abstract process of thought, self-consciousness remains dramatic. (p. 147)

Through identification with others people acquire a capacity for understanding many perspectives. Like Courtney’s, Mead’s scheme (1938) was based on learning through the proliferation of perspectives. Thus, “knowledge consists of the process of co-ordinating perspectives. Hence knowledge, meanings, judgments and hypotheses are expressed in terms of dynamics--in terms of co-operative, directed action” (p. xlii).

Mead’s (1938) interest, like Courtney’s, was in learning to be rather than learning as accumulating knowledge. “What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? For to gain the whole world epistemologically is to lose the import and character of the experiences that constitute the self” (p. 37). Being depends on doing. The unit of existence is the act. Mead’s work was closely linked with the ideas of his colleague John Dewey. Both defined themselves as behaviorists, but in their definition behaviorism
included the study of personal will and awareness. "Behaviorism in this wider sense is simply an approach to the study of the experience of the individual from the point of view of his conduct, particularly, but not exclusively, the conduct as it is observable by others" (Mead, 1970, p. 2). Both Dewey and Mead strongly advocated personal and cultural freedom. Mead cherished a lifelong interest in the problem of consciousness, in the tradition of William James' inquiries into psychology. Colleague Dewey noted that the

"nature of consciousness as personal and private" was for Mead the "original haunting question" that dominated all his inquiries and problems. While Mead conceived mind as a social process, he also recognized the individual self, although itself the product of the social process, as a source of privacy, uniqueness, and creativity. (Introduction by Andrew Reck in Mead, 1964, p. xxix)

Mead (1938), like Courtney, wrote about knowing through hypothesis testing. People in real situations test their hypotheses through acts. "Knowledge is not contemplation of meaning or existence but discovery of the unknown through hypotheses put to test by action" (p. xv).

In brief, reflective thinking consists in communication, in role-taking, wherein the individual form assumes the attitude of the group, a generalized other, and it is this common perspective, common attitude, which is the universal in the philosophy of the act. The forms of knowledge consist, then, not of static subsisting relations or of Platonic eternal objects but rather of tested hypotheses. The testing of a hypothesis consists of an act which unifies the various perspectives of which statement is given in the hypothesis itself. Perspectives are united through action, and action is essential to the scientific verification of hypotheses. (Mead, 1938, p. xlix).
This deep root of pragmatism and symbolic interaction seems crucial to Courtney’s ideas about learning by doing, by hypothesis, by taking roles and by switching perspectives. Interestingly, whenever I ventured, in speaking with Courtney, to compare his work with that of Dewey and other pragmatists, Courtney dismissed the comparison. “Let’s not talk about these social scientists,” he would say, “They make me think of lab people walking around in white coats. Anyway they were associated with behaviorism” (personal communication, December 1996). Despite these apparent deflections I found a strong link between Courtney’s ideas and the essential thought of George Herbert Mead. Courtney seems to have found a basis in Mead’s ideas for his own dramatic universe. This connection between social science and arts seems useful with implications for further research. As Geertz (1983) has written, this connection bears examining.

A dramatistic perspective in the social sciences needs to involve more than pointing out that we all have our entrances and exits, we all play parts, miss cues, and love pretense. It may or may not be a Barnum and Bailey world and we may or may not be walking shadows, but to take the drama analogy seriously is to probe behind such familiar ironies to the expressive devices… at a time when social scientists are chattering about actors, scenes, plot, performances, and personae. (p. 26)

How can this connection inform further research? In the following paragraphs I explore this. I use the word “actor” here to refer to participants in living situations, actors in their own dramas.

Symbols are used by symbolic interactionists, and in Courtney’s scheme they are also the currency of drama. Symbols are basic units of thought and meaning (Cassirer, 1953; Fernandez, 1977, 1986) which are manipulated in dramatic action. Dramatic action works at the high pitch of felt-meaning that
symbols engage. Analysis can make use of symbols by exploring the implications and meanings behind each symbol of the drama, as Turner (1974) analyzed the death of Thomas à Becket. In Turner's analysis, Becket transforms himself into the symbol of a martyr and plays out its implications and inner realities. By making himself that symbol, Becket resolves his position and clarifies his purpose. In Turner's analysis, Becket uses the symbol of Christ both consciously and unconsciously.

Through examining symbols, a dramatic analysis explores the imaginary world of the actors as well as their outer world of actions. Courtney's scheme implies that in human action there are several levels of meaning, so that a behavioristic account of outer activities does not suffice to express the reality of the living situation. Understanding the dramas between people entails understanding the personal realities or worlds which people inhabit. It is not useful to look at actions without taking into account personal worlds. Those worlds comprise highly individual mixtures of the actual and the fictional, the personal and the social. This places a greater burden on the researcher to elucidate the worlds of the actors involved, which, being personal, cannot be predetermined by general categories. For example, in the classroom one child's world will vary considerably from another child's world, with its mixture of parental influence, peer influence, socioeconomic realities, imaginative and intellectual activity and schooling experience. Each child's world features a different mixture. According to this paradigm, it is not useful to weigh nature against nurture in general terms, or to judge a child's behavior in terms of parental care or socioeconomic status, but to look at each case individually. The child is experiencing her own world, and not the world of the teacher or the world of statisticians. An important aspect of understanding human situations is, according to Courtney's scheme, understanding the imaginary worlds and dramas unfolding alongside the "real" ones.

Actors in their respective dramas also utilize a variety of perspectives which dynamically resolve into new perspectives. This implies that researchers
should challenge themselves to continually rediscover the perspectives of the actors involved. As with Courtney’s analysis of dialogue, in which the figure continually switches places with its ground and each intervention creates a new whole, an activity seen dramatically continually acquires different dimensions. The implication of this idea is that the emphasis on psychological reality, on the needs and problems of the participants, is inadequate to a developing, living situation. In this view, people are not limited by their psychological profiles or the opinions of others. People are able to reconceive themselves continually.

Metaphors are useful as tools for understanding the unfolding drama. Courtney’s scheme implies that reality is constantly fluid, a medium through which people switch roles and perspectives and re-create themselves. Researchers should be aware of the actors’ metaphors, avoiding confining categories. The imaginary dimension as understood by an individual’s metaphors provides a double of the “real world”, and has the potential to continually transform it.

According to Courtney, these multiple dimensions are further transformed by dialogical processes, which Courtney has discussed according to different models (Chapter IX). These can provide analytic tools for understanding interactions. At the basis of all these models is the idea that constructs and world views are constantly being transformed through encounters with others. For, in Courtney’s scheme, meaning is being created between the actors, in the space of their dialogues and actions.

Drama work can benefit from the kind of analysis that anthropologists apply to their studies. Just as social scientists should not limit their understanding of people to psychological norms, but take into consideration the imaginary worlds of the actors, so drama work by students can be seen through analyzing imaginary worlds, symbols and dramas. The dramatic metaphor implies layers of personal realities which shift through interactions and through time. Courtney’s paradigm sees reality as comprised of complex, fluid processes which involve constantly shifting metaphors and world views. This view requires an analysis that takes into account the transformations which occur through time. People
create their own worlds and their own dramas and rely mainly on their own personal agency. In terms of research, this removes events from deterministic paradigms, valuing instead personal narratives and the existential notion that one creates one’s self.

Conclusion

When we plan and implement programs, or when we assess students or evaluate courses of study--we ignore the human drama at our peril. (Courtney, 1980, p. 2)

Courtney’s ideas about drama are ideas about human events--he called himself an “existential phenomenologist of human action” (personal communication, October 1996)--on the world’s stage, for “the world we know is not actual but dramatic” (Courtney, 1990, p. 71). They are ideas about learning as it occurs continually in life, for “drama pervades life” (1990, p. 4). Courtney’s ideas about drama explore the ways people learn to change their Being--become different people. This kind of learning is different from the acquisition of skills or accumulation of facts. Courtney’s paradigm begins with the individual’s creation of her own world: “Essentially, we start with the learner--not with the idea of where the activity will lead us” (Courtney, 1989, p. 15). It deals with a depth of learning in which “knowing is to grasp ideas that they become part of our inner self” (Courtney, 1990, p. 138). “Learning occurs when there is a qualitative change in a person’s understanding of experience” (1982, p. 9). That is because in Courtney’s paradigm learning involves a constant adjustment of world view, of personal metaphors and of perspectives. “Dramatic learning like all textual learning is the learning of a philosophy, whether human beings realize it or not--that is, a set of expectations about the nature of possible contexts” (Courtney, 1990, p. 152). This depth is possible through the acknowledgment of feelings and
imagination in all learning processes, just as they occur in all drama processes. This point of view has special application to the current multicultural environment of schools and other places where people engage in dialogues. Its emphasis on felt-meaning and transformative metaphors can create new social meanings. It suggests a movement away from a normative viewpoint, the viewpoint that there is a single standard for all peoples for forming judgments according to age and stage of development. Rather, people from many different cultures bring the splendor of their special traditions onto a common stage where meaning is created through interactions and self-reflexive dialogue.

Courtney’s drama paradigm explores the importance of interaction, from the intrapsychic level of feelings and imagination to the mutual creation of the social dramas which we call the world. The world seems more interconnected than it ever has. Banks collapsing in Asia and Russia bring down the Dow Industrial Average on Wall Street. The 24-hour news cycle connects cable viewers with remote provinces of China and with the marital infidelities of leaders. Imports and exports travel hourly around the globe. Courtney wrote about a learning paradigm which shifts the emphasis from the individual learner to interactions among people. Social constructivism (Salomon & Perkins, 1998) and Bruner’s (1996) culturalism have done some work in that direction. Courtney’s ideas about drama suggest different aspects of an interactive constructivist kind of learning.

In fact Courtney saw his work as in step with other fields, fields which have been discussing learning in terms of interaction, constructivism, intuition, symbolism and metaphors. Even geology and natural exploration have been using these terms, according to a recent book about the Grand Canyon called How the Canyon Became Grand by Stephen J. Pyne (Viking Press, 1998). Pyne wrote about the evolving conceptual frameworks which have guided discoveries in the Grand Canyon, from imperialism and missionary zeal, to the 19th century passion for classification in “an eternal grid of Newtonian time and space” (McNeill,
1998, p. 52), to the present. The present century explores the earth, according to
the reviewer,

with due respect for relativity--i.e., the interaction between observer and
observed that allows us to create meaning by symbolic manipulation
(mathematical and verbal, as well as visual), and relies on intuition,
metaphors, and similes to call attention to the significant elements in an
otherwise chaotic flow of sensory input. (ib.)

This approach to acquiring knowledge about the Grand Canyon seems to be
indistinguishable from Courtney's approach to learning through drama.

I have written this dissertation with the principle intention of finding the
story Courtney was telling about drama. However, textual analysis also deals with
the story an author tells about himself. In order to find the story Courtney told
about himself I studied a book which was not directly relevant to my research
questions, but rather provided a unique opportunity to study Courtney. This book,
among all of Courtney's oeuvre, made it possible to study how Courtney used
sources in telling his own story--the spin he put on others' work--as well as his
relationships with his material and his audience. The Birth of God (1997) was
based on specific sources which I could obtain, and dealt with material about
which there is a great deal of extant literature--the story of Moses. In the case of
this particular book, I found that Courtney's approach to his sources, his material
and his audience belied his other writings on mutually constructed social reality
and dialogical learning. In The Birth of God (1997) I found that Courtney did not
seem to hear the voices of his sources, and did not seem to treat his audience with
candor. The story Courtney was telling was one of distant authority, as he
casually appropriated others' material and remained isolated from his audience.
These findings seemed to contradict the story Courtney was telling about drama
throughout the rest of my study and throughout which I sustained an effort to
follow Courtney's texts closely. The aim of my dissertation has been to elucidate
Courtney's ideas about learning through drama. The analysis of *The Birth of God* stands alone in its content, approach and findings. This is the content of the next chapter.

The View from the Lower Forty-Eight

I first wrote about Courtney's work in a 20-page essay that proposed that Courtney's ideas are particularly useful for education in the U.S. Observers of the arts in the U.S. have long noted a split between the vigor of this country in certain areas, and the dearth of a corresponding cultural environment. de Tocqueville (1998) wrote of the U.S. in the 1830's: “It must be acknowledged that in few of the civilised nations of our time have ... great artists, distinguished poets, or celebrated writers been more rare” (p. 188). Walt Whitman (Dukore, 1974) observed in the 1870 that “America has yet morally and artistically originated nothing... America needs bards” (p. 864, 866). Rockefeller's (1977) study called *Coming to Our Senses* found that

the American people do appear to believe that arts are important, but simultaneously they are hard put to reconcile that view with their conviction that the schools should concentrate on reading, writing and arithmetic. ... Johnny still can’t read, and more recently we have discovered that he can’t write either. College entrance test scores have been dropping for a decade. ... With its tradition of pragmatism, the American public is more committed to getting direct results (in terms of the three R’s) than to developing the means which produce results; probably it is assumed the arts can only get in the way. (p. 54)

Fowler and McMullan (1991) agreed that “the purpose of education in this nation has always been pulled between a vocational and utilitarian pole on the one hand and a broader, civilizing, more holistic view on the other” (Foreword). George
Herbert Mead (1964) noted much earlier “the break between the culture and the directive forces in the community” (p. 376).

I believe that there is no more striking character of American consciousness than this division between the two great currents of activity, those of politics and business on the one side, and the history, literature, and speculation which should interpret them on the other. (p. 378)

Courtney wrote about how significant learning occurs in the aesthetic mode, unlike learning utilitarian skills. My first essay about Courtney was entitled “Discussing the Developmental Drama of Richard Courtney: An American Perspective” (1996). It seemed to me that Courtney addressed an approach toward unifying these two divergent strains. Courtney concentrated on the immediate, empirical and pragmatic experience of the learner, the learner’s own aesthetic perceptions and the ways learning happens in everyday life’s dramas. Courtney wrote about an approach which seemed a particularly appropriate unifying notion for the American split between aesthetics and “real life”, consistent with individualism and democratic traditions.

Interestingly, I have since learned that someone else saw the potential of a uniquely American contribution in the same way: George Herbert Mead. In a late essay Mead (1964, p. 371) discussed the contributions of certain Americans, including William James and John Dewey, to a uniquely American brand of thought. These Americans dealt with a scheme very much like Courtney’s. Rather than “setting up a metaphysical problem”, William James found meaning in immediate cognition and experience (p. 383). Dewey likewise “passed out of his idealistic position” by occupying himself with “the function of knowledge in doing” (p. 388). Dewey (1934) saw art in terms of a process that “restores consciously and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, and impulse and action.” Daily life is the source of theater and the arts, not an idealistic domain. This rather “American” point of view seemed to Mead (1964)
"an implicit intelligence in the midst of the American community... In the profoundest sense John Dewey is the philosopher of America" (p. 391).

It is interesting that Courtney's work struck me similarly. Now it seems logical because Mead was discussing something very similar to what I was discussing, the same kind of pragmatic, active approach to culture and learning. I had also considered this approach very "American", a natural approach to aesthetics, through process and immediate experience. Mead's (1932) "philosophy of the present" seemed to commentators the philosophy of our contemporaries. "Process," "development" and "emergence" are catchwords of recent thought, and while the current is perhaps less strong today than it was ten or even five years ago it still represents a dominant theme among us. (p. xi)

This was written in 1932, but it might have been written today. Thinkers in the U.S. seem to have been struggling for a long time to unify the dynamic daily life in the U.S. with corresponding cultural traditions. Courtney's work, defining drama as a developmental tool that naturally occurs in living action, seems to me a very useful idea for education in the U.S. Whereas drama in the U.S. has been criticized as being "too oriented toward a theatrical product", spontaneous dramas are taking place everywhere on our streets, playgrounds and in classrooms. Yet, according to observers, the richness of this life is not interpreted through or reflected in what has traditionally been considered culture. Often art is considered alienating among U.S. peoples: "The rare, cosmical, artist-mind," Whitman wrote, "the enemy... Culture, or what it has come to represent" (p. 864).

Mead's colleague Dewey regarded experience as a "knowledge affair" (McDermott, 1973, p. 61). And art is the living and concrete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need,
and impulse and action ... its intervention also leads in time to the idea of art as a conscious idea—the greatest intellectual achievement in the history of humanity. (Dewey, 1934)

Where else do people get ideas, impulses and knowledge, but in the interactions and transactions they themselves experience? Where else have people gathered the material that becomes “art”? “It is not, simply, that life is like a stage; life itself is a drama” (Courtney, 1980, p. 20). Creating, enacting and comprehending this drama is learning. “Being is an aesthetic meaning-giving activity in the creation of mental worlds” (Courtney, 1990, p. 136). We live to learn. We live to give meaning to the dramas of life.
CHAPTER XI
THE VOICES OF PROPHETS

This chapter is a critical analysis of a single book, *The Birth of God* (1997), for the portrait it provides of Courtney's relationship with his sources and his audience, and an angle on the story Courtney told through his narrative. In *The Birth of God* he explored his hypothesis that drama is the main source of culture. He did so by proposing a radical theory: "It will be startling to some readers to find that the evidence we have of the Exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt... comes from the performance of an ancient play--a ritual drama" (p. 1). *The Birth of God* (1997), Courtney's last published work, seems to have been a climactic effort in Courtney's work on drama. The following analysis shows that this book seemed to be written for purposes more personal than scholarly. Was it a dream realized? Was it a push to publish one more book? Perhaps this book is not fully representative of the way Courtney worked, but it does present a unique opportunity to compare Courtney's writings directly with his sources, which are also available. Of Courtney's books, none refers so directly to its sources, and none has so precise a subject matter. An analysis of this book locates Courtney's own voice and the spin he put on others' ideas.

*The Birth of God* (1997) hypothesized that the Pentateuch was based, not on history, but on a ritual drama which was practiced over the centuries among the Jews. The word "hypothesize" is not exactly accurate, since Courtney presented this material as if it were an indisputable fact. Courtney stated: "I am neither a biblical scholar, nor an historian of ancient religions. My viewpoint is that of a theatrical critic who examines ancient ritual drama, and my primary emphasis is practical--on what was done" (p. vi). From there he proceeded to assume that Moses and Aaron, and the other figures in the Pentateuch, were not
historical or literary figures, but characters in a ritual drama. Courtney’s emphasis here resembled the work he was doing on Shakespeare at the time (1994a, b, 1995b), in which he analyzed the plays “as scripts intended for performance” (1994a, p. 9). The difference is that Shakespeare did write for the stage, whereas it is Courtney’s own hypothesis that the Bible was also written “for the stage.” In *The Birth of God* Courtney cited “the works of Harold Bloom, James W. Flanagan, Theodor H. Gaster, David Rosenberg, Victor W. Turner, J.M.N. Wijngaards... I have followed them closely” (1997, p. vi). Fortunately, almost all of the mentioned publications are available, facilitating a close comparison between them and Courtney’s text. Such books were Courtney’s only sources. Courtney did not attend digs in Israel nor did he pore over the original Hebrew. He took all of his information from these secondary sources. Thus, when he used the word “evidence” he was referring to the same books which I also read. This scenario provided a unique opportunity among Courtney’s books, which usually relied on a wide range of literature that is often not cited, and which cover a vague interdisciplinary area not easily circumscribed. For *The Birth of God* Courtney’s main source was *The Book of J* (1990), attributed to “J” who is believed to have been one of the original biblical authors. Courtney (1997) wrote: “What J tells us is that the Israelites dramatized existence through the Moses performance” (p. 189).

If these fragments of *The Book of J* demonstrate anything it is that ritual dramas of all kinds were performed in Israelite everyday life. Human existence was understood as dramatic and the Moses Festival Play was the climax of the year. (p. 60)

Thus, Courtney plainly stated that the evidence for the Moses Play came directly from *The Book of J* and other sources. Strangely, neither *The Book of J* nor any of the other sources mentions a Moses Play or any other play.
Courtney’s Sources

Courtney’s main sources were three in number. First, The Book of J is a literary interpretation of the work of J, an early biblical author, in an original translation from the Hebrew. This version of The Book of J was extracted from the Hebrew Bible and translated by David Rosenberg, then interpreted by Harold Bloom. Rosenberg commented on the scholarship involved.

The scholarly sources I followed for extracting the J text are the standard authorities in the field, as refined most recently by Martin Noth and superseded by the insights of Harold Bloom. Overall, I followed a conservative approach to the last hundred years of J scholarship… Yet I stand by Bloom’s intuition, usually grounded in several scholarly authorities, and supported by the total nuances in the Hebrew. (Rosenberg in Bloom, 1990, p. 328)

A second main source is Gaster’s Thespis (1961). This book represents what Courtney called “the myth and ritual school”, scholars who study the ritual ceremonies of the ancient Near East--including Babylonia, Assyria, Egypt and Canaan. Gaster is considered an eminent scholar in his field, according to Gilbert Murray who wrote “Dr. Gaster has turned his vast learning… in fields far beyond my reach” (Gaster, 1961, p. 11). But Gaster’s hypothesis is more modest than Courtney’s. Gaster (1961) cautioned:

It is not argued that the (extant) texts themselves were actually the libretti of liturgical dramas or the spoken accompaniments of ritual acts …but only that they are mythic and literary articulations of the same basic Seasonal Pattern. (p. 12)
The comparison is on the psychological, not the historical level. I am endeavoring only to show that certain rudimentary reactions to the rhythms of nature and the succession of the seasons characterize virtually all men everywhere. (p. 13)

Gaster did not argue for literal evidence of ritual, but for interpretation on a psychological level. He considered the texts of the Bible as poetry and literature, sometimes structured like pagan rituals, perhaps in a previous version once accompanying them (p. 442). But nowhere in Gaster’s work is there evidence of a Moses Play. Courtney (1997) wished to prove that the existing Bible is a script for a play—that it is proof of a literal Moses Play. “Given the ritual traditions all over the ancient Near East, it is likely that these sources were scenarii—ancient kinds of “prompt books”—records of the actions and words that were performed in the ritual drama” (p. 61) because “among contemporary traditional people, “prompt books” of diverse kinds exist.” In proposing that evidence be found by looking at contemporary traditional cultures, Courtney was modeling Biblical history on contemporary culture, passing over the four thousand years between them. By contrast Gaster argued only for a metaphorical or psychological interpretation of a seasonal ritual pattern.

Another source for Courtney is represented by Flanagan’s (1983) work, which analyzed historical events of the Biblical narrative. Flanagan and other scholars (Meyers & O’Connor, 1983) used theatrical metaphors to describe social and historical events. One of these metaphors is the term “social drama.” Social drama does not refer to a performed, scripted ritual or to a stage drama but to an historical event. For example, Biblical accounts of David portray him performing rituals, but many scholars believe that David created spontaneous rituals to ease the social strain of potentially disturbing occasions (Meyers & O’Connor, 1983) corresponding to the sociological term social drama. This interprets David’s actions as singular and historical actions, not as annually repeated traditional ritual dramas. These authors considered David’s ritual transfer of the ark, which
served to ceremonialize a new stage in Hebrew history, a social drama to ceremonialize a turning point in his kingdom. But Flanagan and his colleagues did not discuss play scripts, and nowhere in these works is there any mention of a Moses Play. Flanagan (1983) wrote:

The purpose of this essay is to describe the turbulence and uncertainty that characterized the transitional period connecting Saul’s with David’s reign and to demonstrate that the ritual transfer of the ark of the covenant to Jerusalem constituted a rite of passage which mediated and legitimated the temporal, spatial and social transformations occurring at that time. (p. 361)

The Book of J

Courtney’s main source was The Book of J (italics here indicate the specific version by Bloom & Rosenberg). The generic Book of J is composed of original biblical sources presumed to be by an author who is called J, which stands for Yahweh, the name this author used for God. The Book of J is an invention, or discovery, of the 19th century when biblical scholarship discovered that the Torah came originally from writers of vastly different eras, the first of whom would have been J at about 950 BC. The Book of J has been culled by various scholars from the Torah where this presumed work has since been mingled with other sources and repeatedly edited for various theological and political purposes. The version Courtney used was translated by David Rosenberg and interpreted by Harold Bloom. Bloom (1990) gave a history of “J scholarship” (pp. 17-23) which asserted multiple authorship of the Pentateuch (Five Books of Moses)--and which contains no mention of a ritual drama. Bloom’s interpretation of The Book of J is literary, and entails frequent comparisons between the author J and Shakespeare. Bloom believed Shakespeare relied on the Geneva Bible, which Shakespeare is known to have possessed. Bloom believed, for example, that Shakespeare’s King Lear was based on J’s version of God or Yahweh. But
Bloom never mentioned drama or a Moses Play. Rather he compared J with Shakespeare as an author of literature.

Courtney (1997) commenced his own argument with a reference to Bloom’s comparisons of J and Shakespeare, claiming

We go further than Bloom in two ways:

* **Dialogue**—J’s main style is dialogue (*dramatic speech*). Indeed, we could equally well describe Shakespeare’s style in much the same way.
* **Irony**—J is the master of irony. (p. 42)

This beginning seems surprising. Courtney stated that he has gone beyond Bloom’s interpretation by highlighting J’s irony. But Bloom’s main point is J’s irony. There is scarcely a passage in Bloom’s book which does not contain the word “irony.” At this point one wonders if Courtney actually read Bloom’s book.

Bloom (1990) began his own book by saying:

> J’s uncanny sophistication as a writer is so subtle and nuanced as to suggest Shakespearean dimensions to her irony. There is considerable social irony in portions of 2 Samuel, but nothing like the high, even, exalted irony that is the continuous condition of the Book of J. (p. 25)

Courtney’s statement highlights another gap in his assertion that he follows Bloom closely. Bloom’s central hypothesis is that J, the original author of the Pentateuch, was a woman. Frankly and with humility Bloom (1990) titled his second chapter “Imagining an Author” and proceeded to try and prove his hypothesis, recognizing that even a male J is really a figment of the imagination.

What is it about J’s tone, stance, mode of narrative, that was a difference that made a difference? One large area of answer will concern the representation of women as compared with that of men; another will
concern irony, which seems to me the element of style in the Bible that is still most often and most weakly misread. (p. 10)

Bloom’s case was that J’s literary voice, her irony, and the way J wrote about emotional relationships all indicate that J was a woman. Bloom surmised that “J was not a professional scribe but rather an immensely sophisticated, highly placed member of the Solomonic elite, enlightened and ironic. But my primary surmise is that J was a woman” (p. 9). Courtney has used the carefully constructed arguments that Bloom created to support his hypothesis that J was a woman, without a single reference to this central idea of Bloom’s work. Courtney changed each feminine pronoun to a masculine pronoun, never mentioning Bloom’s main argument, which has been widely discussed by other readers. Though Bloom never alluded to the possibility of drama or a Moses Play, Courtney repeatedly stated that Bloom’s Book of J supports the Moses Play hypothesis.

Rather, Bloom considered The Book of J an original tale that may have been used for theological and nation-building purposes, but was in itself simply the highest quality of literature. Even “Yahweh, in the Book of J, is a literary character, just as Hamlet is” (p. 12). Thus Bloom referred to Biblical characters as well as Shakespeare’s characters as part of literature, without any reference to drama. Bloom summarized his hypothesis:

J tells stories, portrays theomorphic men and women, links myth to history, and implicitly utters the greatest of moral prophecies to post-Solomonic Judah and Israel. Yet J is something other than a storyteller, a creator of personalities (human and divine), a national historian and prophet, or even an ancestor of the moral fictions of Wordsworth, George Eliot, and Tolstoy. There is always the other side of J: uncanny, tricky, sublime, ironic, a visionary of incommensurates… it is this antithetical element that all normative traditions--Judaic, Christian, Islamic, secular--
have been unable to assimilate, and so have ignored, or repressed, or evaded. (p. 13)

Courtney has marshaled Bloom’s data in support of his cause: that Moses was a character in a play.

To look at Courtney’s narrative more closely, I compared Courtney’s and Bloom’s respective approaches, including their narrative voices, relationships with their audience, and characterizations. I also looked at the methods Courtney used in his argument. These analyses serve my study by helping me to interpret Courtney’s own narrative—the story he was telling.

Courtney began *The Birth of God* (1997) with his cultural narrative, a sweeping account of early cultures and the importance of drama. In it he used the word “drama” loosely, to describe both the use of flowers in burial customs (p. 7), and the paintings of Paleolithic caves (ib.). Courtney stated that since he was not a Biblical scholar he would treat the Moses Play as a dramatist—simply assume that *The Book of J* describes a play. Courtney never used the word “assume” again in the book, but simply re-stated the existence of the Moses Play in declarative statements. He never employed the subjunctive mode, or in any way framed this as a hypothesis. The following statements are examples of Courtney’s (1997) syntax:

If these fragments of the Book of J demonstrate anything, it is that ritual dramas of all kinds were performed in Israelite everyday life. Human existence was understood as dramatic and the Moses Festival Play was the climax of the year. (p. 60)

The plot of the Exodus that exists in J’s words in the Bible, or can be assumed from these, is the record of a performance. (p. 62)
The sources of J... are either the rituals themselves or, at least, direct reports of them. (p. 61)

What J tells us is that the Israelites dramatized existence through the Moses performance. (p. 189)

Most of *The Birth of God* interprets conventional Biblical history. Courtney followed Bloom in many of his ideas. But Courtney used these insights to support his own hypothesis about a ritual play. In the following examples, Bloom’s text is in the lefthand column, and Courtney’s use of them are in the righthand column. I have highlighted the identical passages:
Figure 21
Comparison between passages from Bloom and from Courtney

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An elliptical style derives from a shrewd sense that a reader's preconceived</td>
<td>J evades the stock responses of the participant-audience,... J provokes the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responses need to be evaded, or provoked into freshness by dissociative means.</td>
<td>fresh reactions of the participant-audience by dissociative means; and he uses endless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In J, the characteristic ellipsis is related to endless wordplay, to an incessant harmony of puns, false or popular etymologies, homonyms</td>
<td>wordplay, puns, false or popular etymologies and homonyms. (p. 41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homonyms (p. 26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtless J tells this story for the pure joy of it, as befits this greatest of all narrative writers, but there is to the tale another edge, a touch demonstrating that Rachel is fully the equal of her outrageous husband and her toughly sly father. (p. 216)</td>
<td>The tale contains Rachel’s finest moment in J--her theft and concealment of the teraphim, her father’s household gods where she is the equal of her outrageous husband and her sly father (p. 55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As such, David incarnates the dynamics of change, and those dynamics belong to Yahweh, whose essence is surprise, even if the wary J is always too alert to be altogether surprised by him. Those who have contempt for Yahweh lack the capacity for change; they are fixed and obsessive, builders of Babel, inhabitants of Sodom, Egyptian slavemasters, backsliding whiners in the Wilderness. Beyond</td>
<td>David defines the wholeness of Being; he incarnates the dynamics of change, and those dynamics belong to Yahweh whose essence is surprise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-believers cannot change; they are fixed stereotypes, with no desire to be helpful to Yahweh. (p. 59)</td>
</tr>
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surprise, despisers of wholeness, they have no desire to be helpful to Yahweh. That desire is elitist, and one of its fullest embodiments is the gorgeous career of David, and of Joseph before him. Human caprice, however damned or deprecated by normative tradition, remains the essence of elitism and helps account for what it is that attracts Yahweh to David, and less fully to Joseph (p. 227)

The perpetually changing consciousness of J's beings is very different from the Homeric state of mind, and prepares the way for a similar dynamism in the Shakespearean personae. (p. 227)

What is different in Shakespeare, which is that his characters change by brooking upon what they themselves have said, is a grand originality that Shakespeare developed from hints in Chaucer, and yet even the Wife of Bath and the Pardoner seem less Shakespearean characters than are J's Jacob, Joseph, and Yahweh. (p. 228)

In J's version of the Commandments, there is no Sabbath.

That desire is elitist, and the fullest embodiments are David, and Joseph before him. *Human caprice* is the essence of elitism and helps account for what attracts Yahweh to David and Joseph

The perpetually changing consciousness (the *process of mind*) of J's people is very dramatic; it is different from the Homeric state of mind and prepares for a similar dynamism in the Shakespearean personae. What is different in Shakespeare is that his characters change by brooding upon what they themselves have said. Shakespeare developed this technique from his profession as a player, his use of the dramatic metaphor, and hints in Chaucer; and yet, as Bloom says, "Even the Wife of Bath and the Pardoner seem less Shakespearean characters than are J’s Jacob, Joseph and Yahweh.” (p. 59)

In the Moses Play, J’s version of the Commandments has no Sabbath. His
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Her Yahweh is presence, is the will to change, is origination and originality. His leading quality is not holiness, or justice, or love, or righteousness, but the sheer energy and force of becoming, of breaking into fresh being. What we encounter in him, however, is not an abstract becoming or being but an outrageous personality. (p. 294)</th>
<th>Yahweh is presence: he is the will to change--his essence is spontaneity and originality. His main quality is not holiness, justice, love, or righteousness, like the later God of the Jews and the Christians; rather it is the sheer energy and force of Becoming--of bursting into fresh being. What the audience encountered in him was not an abstract Becoming or Being but an outrageous personality. (p. 95)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What drives Yahweh to fury is the nature of the Israelite host, which is portrayed by J as little better or worse than any other mass of refugees enduring privation out in the desolate places. (p. 249)</td>
<td>Yahweh is furious at the behaviour of the Israelites, shown by J as the actions of a mass of refugees enduring privation in desolate places. (p. 71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenberg speaks here: J’s stories are told or retold in scenes: as if the author were there when they were happening, as if she were a witness. This poet was not concerned with a conventional storyteller’s pose, the marshaling of points of view, but with the stance of the poet. (p. 326)</td>
<td>J’s stories are told or retold in scenes. As with any other dramatist’s scenes, they are told as if the author was there when they were happening--in the “here and now” as if J was a witness. (p. 82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The play of word with--and within--word produces a basic poetics of diction and rhyme. It is a diction based on Hebrew phrasing.</td>
<td>As David Rosenberg tells us, the play of word with, and within, word produces a basic poetics of diction and rhyme. It is a diction based on Hebrew phrasing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That can only be translated into English if it is recreated. The King James translation embodies the standard for English diction but substitute much of J’s ironic stance—the way she shades meaning—with a less modulated grandeur. Later translations, especially recent ones, give up both grandeur and irony in one fell swoop of reduction.</td>
<td>That can only be translated into English if it is recreated.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Since my own principal assertion in this book is that the Yahwist herself is not a Yahwist but a tale-teller taking Yahweh as her protagonist and Yahwism as her matter (p. 284)</td>
<td>The Book of J may be the story of Yahweh, but it is not the history of Yahwism. J tells his tale dramatically, with Yahweh as his protagonist and Yahwism as his content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extraordinary vividness of J’s art depends upon its ability to convey restless interactions between persons, persons and groups, individuals and Yahweh, groups and Yahweh. Even covenants must be subsumed under that phrase, “restless interactions,” for there are scarcely any limits to J’s dynamics of irony. (p. 287)</td>
<td>To prefer the spoken word over the visual image is to imitate reality through mimesis--basic inter-action. J conveys restless interactions between persons, persons and groups, and individuals and groups with Yahweh. Even covenants are forms of interaction, or drama. (p. 82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And the great plagues begin. J has wonderful fun with the plagues, putting us closer again to children’s literature than to</td>
<td>Then the great plagues begin. J enjoys the plagues, which Buber calls a “fantastic popular narrative.” (p. 64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is something of an understatement to say that there are similarities, though Courtney has not cited Bloom in the above examples. Courtney has appropriated many interesting ideas from Bloom, without working at his own interpretation. This suggests to me Courtney's deliberate deception about Bloom and about Courtney himself. In other ways the two books, that of Courtney and that of Bloom, are quite different. The main difference is the authorial voice. Courtney never used the first person singular, as is true with his other books as well. There is no "I", no Courtney. How did the author represent himself? Apparently he was an authority with responsibility and power over the readers. This figure seems like a prophet in his sweeping and definitive statements. He did not couch his words in "it seems" or "it appears", but his statements say "it is." He spares the audience any doubt, telling his tale as if to a younger audience.

Nothing in this book should disturb the faith of this reader: the fact that the events of Moses' life (as written in the Bible some centuries later) came from a ritual drama does not affect faith. (p. 1)

In place of "I", Courtney sometimes referred to "modern thinkers" or "Biblical scholars." Bloom, on the other hand, employed the first person singular extensively, cultivating a fairly sensuous and dialogical relationship with the audience and with J as a woman. Bloom "imagines" J, indeed apparently falls in love with J and with all the poignant, outrageous and vulnerable characters of J's book, who appear as fraught with existential dilemmas as any contemporary fictional characters. Bloom is comfortable with the postmodern notion that fantasy and imagination are part of scholarly knowledge.
This J is my fiction, most biblical scholars will insist, but then each of us carries about a Shakespeare or a Tolstoy or a Freud who is our fiction also... That author is perhaps our myth, but the experience of literature partly depends upon that myth. (p. 19)

Bloom openly enacted Courtney’s ideas about imagination and about fictional worlds, while Courtney insisted on the literal and concrete interpretation of a ritual play. Bloom shared his fictions with the reader, whereas Courtney kept his use of illusion--deceiving the audience--to himself. Bloom (1990) displayed sympathy for his audience.

Since my own principal assertion in this book is that the Yahwist herself is not a Yahwist but a tale-teller taking Yahweh as her protagonist and Yahwism as her matter, my reader may begin to feel a certain bewilderment or even fury at not being told exactly what Yahwism was, anyway. (p. 284)

Where Bloom sympathized with the reader and their understandable confusion, Courtney never mentioned this confusion, presumably because he has left so little to doubt. But Courtney’s readers’ confusion must be considerable since Courtney keeps referring to Biblical scholarship showing evidence of a Moses Play, without producing it.

Portraits of Yahweh

A deeper perspective on the two authorial voices comes from looking at the products of their imaginations, their characters. J created Yahweh, according to Bloom, using her own unforgettable, outrageous, powerful personality. But later her “vision had to be scaled down and revised into moralism and belief... the
scandal of an all-too-human God who finally resists either moralizing or a removal to the high heavens” (p. 198). Bloom wrote that the woman J portrayed Yahweh as a child, indulging in his arbitrary, self-contradictory fury.

We need to be like wise children in reading or listening to J, because her mode, and not just in the primeval history of humankind, is like a more sophisticated kind of children’s literature than any we now possess. Her Yahweh is a wise child’s Yahweh, and her Joseph is the ultimately wise child. (p. 32)

The following phrases are examples of how Bloom believed J molded the child-god Yahweh, the monotheistic god who later became the model of patriarchal authority:

J’s attitude toward Yahweh resembles nothing so much as a mother’s somewhat wary but still proudly amused stance toward a favorite son who has grown up to be benignly powerful but also eccentrically irascible. (p. 26)

Bloom’s bold metaphor of J as a mother is carried out by his metaphor of Yahweh as a child.

Yahweh, unlike the rival creator-gods of the ancient Near East, does not stand in front of a potter’s wheel. Instead, he picks up the moistened clay and molds it in his hands, rather like a solitary child making a mud pie or building clay houses near water. (p. 175)

Bloom’s metaphors are complex, human and sophisticated.
J begins in irony, with Yahweh’s childlike molding of clay, and concludes in irony, with Yahweh’s uncanny burial of Moses. Why does a child bury a beloved creature in isolation and then refuse to divulge the location of the grave? Perhaps to preserve the memory for himself or herself alone. But why? A kind of wounding and wounded intimacy seems to be the answer. (p. 34)

Bloom’s theology is complex and anthropomorphic.

The rhetorical pattern... the promise made to Adam, first giving and then taking away. You are free to eat of every tree in the garden, but not the fruit of the two trees, knowledge and life. This is the land I swore to Abram, Isaac, Jacob and their offspring. But you will not cross there. The same patterns manifested in the creation of Adam and the death of Moses. Yahweh makes the first man with his own hands, and then buries his chief prophet, again with his own hands. Our cycle is from clay to clay; everything is given to us, and then what matters most is taken away from us. (p. 268)

Courtney, on the other hand, did not seem to have registered Bloom’s lengthy and complex treatment of Yahweh. Courtney wrote: “Throughout the plagues and the dialogues between Moses and Pharaoh...J is wholly on Yahweh’s side” (p. 64). Courtney interpreted Bloom’s text simplistically, whereas Bloom actually wrote of J’s “remarkable detachment toward Yahweh”, her “negative judgment” (p. 208) and the fact that “J clearly does not intend that either Moses or Yahweh will look the better for it” (p. 264). Courtney (1997) became aware of this complex relationship between J and Yahweh only twice. Once was when Yahweh tried to murder Moses:
Of all the fabulous events in J's story, the most terrifying is Yahweh's attempt to murder his prophet Moses without cause or reason. Something was probably cut from J's text here. (p. 73)

Courtney found this terrifying, and implied that a resolution could be found in the text which was cut. What was cut, according to Bloom who was a scholar of the Bible, was a passage about circumcision. Unlike Courtney, Bloom seemed unimpressed with Yahweh's strangeness, which was fairly consistent with everything Yahweh had done so far. Bloom instead concentrated on the fact that it is Moses' wife who saves him:

Zipporah, the wife of Moses, stands up against Yahweh as Moses himself would not have dared to do, even when the question was one of his own survival. (p. 245)

Bloom mocked Moses, while Courtney seems to have been seriously shaken that God has turned on Moses. This is the first instance of an expression of emotion in The Birth of God. What is the reason for Courtney's unexpected emotional reaction? Does he so thoroughly identify with the prophet?

Yahweh's behavior at Mt. Sinai is the only other time that Courtney saw Yahweh as unreasonable. "For the first time, J's Yahweh is overwhelmingly self-contradictory" (p. 71) and "This is the first time that Yahweh has been a potential horror...J's Yahweh becomes dangerously confused" (p. 72). But for Bloom (1990), this is consistent with Yahweh's "outrageous" behavior. For example

Yahweh......threatens to kill Isaac, and most certainly sends a deathly angel against Jacob, and unmistakably attempts to murder Moses. Nor can J’s Yahweh be trusted as he rages unpredictably on the approaches to his manifestation upon Sinai....
J's outrageously volatile Yahweh (p. 275).
Courtney on the other hand found these two instances anomalous with Yahweh’s otherwise reasonable and supportive behavior. Courtney interpreted Yahweh’s behavior as generally rational, a view that makes little historical sense. For, in the world of the ancient Hebrews, who were the gods? The pagan gods were no models of rationality. They required animal and human sacrifices to be pacified. Neither the Hellenistic notion of rationality, nor the moral God of the Western World had arrived in this hard land of conquest, siege and exile, the barbaric Near East of 1230 BC. Courtney’s rational Yahweh was the product of his own ideas about authority, not J’s and not history’s. Courtney’s notion of Yahweh in *The Birth of God* resembles the work he was simultaneously doing on Shakespeare (1994a & b, 1995b). Courtney described Shakespeare’s notion of

A monarch (throne or crown) to Shakespeare is an archetypal symbol, not a political idea. In the majesty of absolute power and the splendor of a crowned king, he embodies the health of the realm. Shakespeare develops this idea from play to play. (Courtney, 1994, p. 26)

This is not a conventional reading of Shakespeare, who is usually considered to have written unpredictably and creatively, without using fixed symbols. Shakespeare is usually considered an artist whose point of view is impossible to pin down (Saccio, 1995). Shakespeare is also considered a master of living realities, and not of archetypal symbols. It is perhaps Shakespeare’s most famous king speech, in which young King Henry V speaks cynically about the uselessness and vanity of the crown.

And what have kings that privates have not too,
Save ceremony, save general ceremony?
And what art thou, thou idol ceremony?
What kind of god art thou…
I am a king… and I know
'Tis not the balm, the sceptre, and the ball, 
...nor the tide of pomp 
That beats upon the high-shore of this world-- 
Can sleep so soundly as the wretched slave. 

*Henry V*, Act 4, Scene 1, 235

This speech does not portray an archetypal symbol of absolute power but the bitter ironies of human existence on a throne. Like Courtney’s Shakespearean kings, Courtney’s vision of Yahweh in *The Birth of God* seems epic and distanced, an absolute abstract authority. This abstract notion of power is consistent with the monarchs of pagan rituals, ceremonies which renewed the mythic order maintained by kingship. Their power helped to resist the threatening chaos, and gave meaning and order in the performers’ world. ... Re-enacting the myth in the ritual perpetuated the divinely sanctioned order. ...David is ritualized. He stands eternally. 

(1997, p. 155)

Courtney’s David resembles the pagan god dwelling in the absolute epic realm. In reaction to this mythical realm of absolute power, Bakhtin (1981) proposed his notion of dialogical imagination—the mutability and permeability of human life. Courtney’s gods were epic, the antitheses of human life. In contrast to Courtney’s King David, the more widely accepted view sees David as the most controversial of Hebrew kings, filled with human weaknesses and marvelous vitality. That was J’s David. Courtney’s David, on the other hand, was a fixed symbol—eternally fixed by a performance of a “mythic order.” Kingship, order and fixity seem to be an important part of Courtney’s story.

While Courtney’s Yahweh embodies fixity, rationality and majesty, Bloom’s Yahweh embodies the fallibility of real authorities. J’s Yahweh is like Freud’s Superego, both
are grand characters, as Lear is a grand character. Learning to read J ultimately will teach you how much authority has taught you already, and how little authority knows. (p. 306) (emphasis added)

Just as Courtney’s Yahweh is his own fiction, Bloom’s Yahweh is his J’s own:

J is the author of Yahweh, even though she did not invent him, but then Shakespeare did not invent Hamlet. I venture the speculation that J's power as a writer made Judaism, Christianity, and Islam possible, if only because the furious liveliness of her Yahweh presented tradition with an unforgettable and uncanny being. (Bloom, 1990, p. 198)

Portraits of Moses

The two authors also saw Moses very differently. Like Bloom’s metaphor of J and Yahweh as mother and son, Yahweh and Moses are troubled father and son. Bloom portrayed Moses as

a prophet who knows his limitations all too well, and who moves us not by sublime grandeur but by a sense that he never will overcome altogether his reluctance to lead. ...he never quite forgets his conviction of his own incommensurateness, not just with Yahweh, but with Abram, Jacob, and Joseph. (p. 263)

Even the Bible recorded a self-deprecating and reluctant Moses:

But Moses said to the Lord,
“O my Lord, I have never been eloquent, neither in the past nor even now that you have spoken to your servant; but I am slow of speech and slow of tongue.” (Exodus 4:10)
Moses said to the Lord, "...If this is the way you are going to treat me, put me to death at once." (Numbers 11:15)

Now the man Moses was very humble, more so than anyone else on the face of the earth. (Numbers 12:3)

By contrast, Courtney painted Moses as an epic hero, a legend, a charismatic leader and shaman. Courtney (1997) wrote that although Moses had the authority of an antique magician, he was also the model for the later judges... a leader with political authority. He wielded this authority all his life: he made his appearance in the time of troubles... punished idolaters... Moses came from a family of magicians... No longer a simple magician: he was the messenger of Yahweh. (p. 68)

Bloom’s Moses contrasts strongly, a mistreated anti-hero.

J’s Yahweh has a tormented relationship with his own chosen prophet, Moses, whom he even attempts to murder, for no reason, and whom he excludes from Canaan, for no good reason. Possessiveness, rather than affection, or even regard, is the stance of J’s Yahweh toward Moses. A poor thing, but mine own, Yahweh seems to think, and we are left again wondering at the extravagant strangeness of J’s Yahweh. (p. 34)

As for J’s Moses, he is quite underwhelming, as we might say. An object of scorn to Pharaoh, cursed by the overworked Israelites who are now compelled to make bricks without straw, Moses is reduced to a pathetic stammering... Yahweh disdains comforting the wretched prophet. (p. 247)
Moses... stammers out of dread and bewilderment, and has to be rescued from Yahweh by his wife through their baby son, hardly a dignified salvation for the prophet. (p. 247)

But clearly Moses wins no prizes as a desert guide; if you lead a multitude three days into the desert, they surely have some right to assume that you know here you are going. (p. 250)

Bloom’s Moses is an existentialist anti-hero, while Courtney’s Moses is a masculine legend without personhood or depth. This portrait is consistent with Courtney’s hypothesis of a Moses Play. If there were a ritual depicting Moses, it would have sprung from the pagan rituals of the area. Those rituals celebrated god-kings, and were specifically designed to appease powerful forces. The heroes of these rituals were absolute authorities, lacking nuance and vulnerability. The epic hero and pagan ritual are mutually reinforcing notions. They are from a mythical realm, not the realm of history, human beings, or even Judaic culture. The main problem with this picture is that Courtney does not seem to have evidence for his ritual hypothesis and its absolute god. What is Courtney’s argument for a ritual play, and how did he frame it?

Courtney’s Rhetorical Methods

Courtney’s main method was to repeat his assumption without misgivings or use of the subjunctive mode. Courtney did pose some questions, and permitted the doubting subjunctive mode in certain cases. Courtney’s rhetorical technique was to frame certain uncertainties in the context of his certainty. He juxtaposed these uncertainties with “known facts”, the fact of the ritual drama, and the fact that Moses was a shaman. These questions appear in the following examples.
Monotheism first appears in *The Book of J*.

**Supposedly stated by Abram (Abraham) and repeated by Moses, in fact monotheism lies in the acts of Yahweh and is repeated in the acts of Moses Festival Play created by Joshua--which is in *The Book of J.* (Courtney, 1997, p. 43)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: Did monotheism begin with Abram?</th>
<th>Certainty: Monotheism began with Joshua’s Moses Play.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Yahweh is different. He is the one and only God. But do J’s few remnants from the early stories indicate that he began the Festival play with the Creation or with Moses? Of one thing we are certain--many of the rituals pre-Moses that appear in *The Book of J* are outside the structure of the Festival Play. They are rituals extra to the core of the Festival. (p. 43)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: Did the Book of J begin with Creation or with Moses?</th>
<th>Certainty: rituals existed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

This accounts for two contrasting features of Moses as a character: his magical performances as a shaman, and the likelihood that he originated monotheism in the Moses Festival Play. On the face of it, it is surprising that a shaman should create monotheism. But prehistoric shamanic practices, codified within two agricultural styles (Mesopotamian and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: Did Moses create monotheism?</th>
<th>Certainty: Moses was a shaman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Figure 22**
Courtney’s Questions
Egyptian), were inherited by the Hebrews. (p. 65)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It is likely that Moses was historically the first to think of monotheism. Although he had the authority of an antique magician (p. 68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>question: Did Moses begin monotheism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certainty: Moses was a magician.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24: The earliest events in the Bible are records of ritual-myths. * At first the story line (the myth) was performed (the ritual). But which came first, myth or ritual? Some say myth, some ritual, some both, and some say it varies in each case. (p. 24)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>certainty: The Bible came from ritual-myths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>question: which came first, myth or ritual?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>...generations of believers have thought that these ritual events and personages were factual whereas they were fictional. Actual events and actual people may have existed but they have been known through their dramatized form. (p. 69)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>certainty: The Bible came from ritual events, dramatized form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>question: were they fictions or fact?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another rhetorical approach Courtney used is the juxtaposition of his ritual theory with the words of his sources, implying that his sources support the theory. The following examples show such sources in context--in Bloom’s book--in the lefthand column. In the righthand column are Courtney’s phrases--the way he used Bloom’s words. The pattern is: Courtney located a statement which could be construed to refer to drama and used it out of context, distorting Bloom’s words. Courtney inserted his own argument (underlined below) in the middle of Bloom’s actual words.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloom’s (1990) actual context:</th>
<th>Courtney’s (1997) references to Bloom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would contrast him to Shakespeare’s Lear, who is purged by the passage from fury through madness to compassion and reunion with his daughter Cordelia. J’s Yahweh is necessarily an even more formidable and daemonic paternal personality than Lear, who I think is modeled implicitly on the Yahweh of the Geneva Bible, Shakespeare’s Bible. Lear’s fury... evokes the shocking anger of J’s Yahweh in Numbers 14, where he threatens to destroy the entire people in the Wilderness. (p. 304)</td>
<td>J’s major personages, Yahweh included, are remarkably like Shakespearean characters, as Bloom says. This is not only because they are both dramatists and write dialogue, but also because the J portions of the Geneva Bible influenced Shakespeare’s ideas of representation. (p. 59) Falsely implies that Bloom called J a dramatist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The scandal of her work always was and still is a Yahweh at once human-all-too-human and totally incommensurate with the human. I suggest that this was a deliberate scandal, though of a high-spirited, comic kind. Scholars assume rather readily that all the ancients invariably were solemn, particularly where God and the gods were concerned. I may be accused of creating my own J, and through her my own impish Yahweh, but I would argue that theologians have created their own J. (p. 281)</td>
<td>Much later, from the return from the Babylonian Exile, J was considerably revised by those who regarded writing as a form of sacrifice or worship--strictly “religious writing”--and denied drama. This contrasted with J. The “scandal” of J, as Bloom puts it, is that his Yahweh is, simultaneously and paradoxically, both very human and also non-human--a deliberately comic creation. (p. 95) Falsely implied that Bloom wrote about drama.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the standpoint of normative Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, J is the most blasphemous writer that ever lived, far surpassing the beleaguered Salman Rushdie. (p. 297)

We may assume that J’s model for Yahweh was an actor—the priest (or priests) who acted Yahweh’s role in Solomon’s time or a little later. As Bloom puts it, by normative standards, Jewish or Christian, J’s portrayal of Yahweh is blasphemy; rather like a Shakespearean character who runs off the page into our lives. (p. 95)

Falsely implied Bloom called J’s model an actor.

Finally, what is Courtney’s evidence for his hypothesis? I have found six concrete reasons Courtney gave to explain his belief that the Exodus was actually a play. I list them here on the lefthand side, with my responses on the righthand side.

Figure 24
Courtney’s Evidence

| 1) For Courtney, that J leaves out words is sure sign of writing for performance. | But it is also a literary style. |
| 2) Courtney believes word play is evidence of drama. | But word play is used in all literature. |
| 3) “Witnessing” = a sure sign of ritual drama. | But the idea of witnessing is used throughout literature and song (Behold, Lo, etc.). |
| “Witnessing is necessary for the act to be real” | All storytelling and myth existed without |

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being witnessed. This also contradicts the spirit of Yahweh, who wanted the people to believe without seeing, and to have faith without idols.

4) Repetition indicates a ritual drama

Parallel construction is a common literary device.

5) Yahweh’s wrath resembles mythology from other cultures. Courtney states syncretization indicates ritual drama,

Syncretization can indicate any form of art or communication.

6) The use of scenes and the immediacy of the prose are dramatist’s methods.

--as well as those of the poet and author.

These six points seem to provide extremely thin evidence that the Bible came from a ritual drama, especially in the absence of any other evidence.

I hold that the main flaw in Courtney’s argument that the Moses story is a ritual that reinforced ancient pagan beliefs is that it completely ignores the picture the Hebrews have of themselves. The Old Testament has often been portrayed as a turning point in morality and ethics (Eliade, 1971; Kaufmann, 1976; Bruns, 1992), a departure from the ancient Near East cultures. The Hebrew story of the Exodus is said to have departed from the repetitive, cyclical rituals of pagan cultures and their anti-historical approaches to meaning. Eliade (1971) wrote that ancient people used rituals to cleanse away the “unreal” and “chaotic” events of everyday life in favor of a mythical realm of spirits and gods. But the ancient Hebrews broke with that pattern, when they narrated linear time in the events of the Exodus and the destiny of the Israelites. The meaning of life, which had belonged to a mythical other-worldly realm, was now consigned to a single, all-powerful god. Eliade termed this shift of meaning “theophany.” All the injustice and cruelty of fate and history were now faced head on, but God was held
responsible. So if the early Yahweh is arbitrary, self-contradictory, and even cruel, according to J, that would be consistent with Eliade's explanation of how the hitherto intolerable events of history were absorbed into the will of God. As the Old Testament was edited to fit with evolving morality, the vagaries of history were interpreted as just punishment for transgressions against Yahweh. Eliade (1971) wrote that the Jews were the first people to try and make sense of history, to "face their suffering" and forge ahead into new territory, trusting, not in ritual and sacrifice, but in a monotheistic God and his destiny for them (p. 102).

Courtney seems to be imposing the earlier model of ritual sacrifice and cyclical renewal on the Hebrews. He is modeling the Israelites on their predecessors, in a backwards movement.

But more importantly for this study, what does Courtney's study say about Courtney? Why did Courtney write this book with so little evidence? What is the point he was trying to make? One of the most salient points in *The Birth of God* is Courtney's frequent allusion to fact and fiction, reality and appearance—illusion. Bloom (1990) said that he used fantasy and fiction to imagine that J is a woman, but in Bloom's case he shared his fantasy with his readers. "All our accounts of the Bible are scholarly fictions or religious fantasies" (p. 9).

This J is my fiction, most biblical scholars will insist, but then each of us carries about a Shakespeare or a Tolstoy or a Freud who is our fiction also.... That author is perhaps our myth, but the experience of literature partly depends upon that myth. (p. 19)

Bloom acknowledged the place of fantasy in scholarly work, and invited his readers to share this fantasy. Courtney was also imagining a kind of fiction or fantasy—but perhaps he kept the joke to himself. Throughout *The Birth of God* Courtney (1997) made frequent mention of the illusory nature of "reality":

...
When the Israelites arrived in Canaan they were set in a dramatic context. They saw life as dramatic: they existed in a "double" world formed through farming and metallurgy--of reality and fiction whereby a comparison between the two provided "truth." (p. 14)

It is J who introduces the relation of appearance and reality into Western consciousness. He emphasizes process, dynamism and movement more than the external world as we see it. (p. 81)

J clearly understands that fact and fiction are different perspectives, and that the issue of reality and illusion is key to human life. (p. 190)

For Courtney, illusion seems superior to "the external world as we see it." How did Courtney see the external world? As fixed and static? Bakhtin (1981) saw the external world as far more dynamic than the static epic world, as do most observers of human life. But Courtney saw the use of "illusion" as "key to" and more dynamic than human life--and attributed this idea to Bloom. On the contrary, Bloom (1990) valued the vitality and down-to-earth human qualities of J's characters.

I can think of no better description of J's writing and its vision than "actuality is the fact of power and action, which are life"... A monistic vitalism that refuses to distinguish between flesh and spirit is at the center of J's vision. (p. 277)

Bloom's J wrote of active life and open vitality, unlike Courtney's J of illusion. The J of illusion seems to embody a story Courtney wished to tell. Similarly Courtney's versions of Yahweh and Moses seem to fly in the face of tradition and scholarship, favoring Courtney's personal story. Yahweh and Moses seem to be
his own, in complete contradiction to his sources which he stated he was “following closely.”

Courtney’s interest in magic and illusion played a large role in his portrait of Moses. In Courtney’s version, Moses and his family were established magicians—Moses only became a prophet later. In Bloom’s text, it is Yahweh who makes the bewildered Moses a magician only when Yahweh needs a magician. The Hebrews saw Moses not as a magician, but as a man under tremendous duress because he was “held to a higher standard than other men” (personal communication, Amnon Cohen, June 1998). This was a forward movement, a departure from ancient pagan magic to an ethical framework. Moses created a moral, God-centered religion (Kaufmann, 1976). Magic was seen as subversive to the spirit of the emerging Israelite morality. The Pentateuch is filled with proscriptions against magic—doubtless evidence that magic was still practiced. But to identify the Hebrews and their prophet with magic shows a disregard for their own voice, and the way they represented themselves. One might compare the world of pagan magic of Moses’ day with the right-wing militias in the U.S. today: both are reactionary forces, both do violence, both work outside the law and both depend on a kind of mythical ideology that does not correspond to the facts as most people see them. I suggest that Courtney’s emphasis on ritual and magic shows disregard for the spirit of the Israelite adventure. Courtney used their own material to tell the story he wished to tell. He did not seem to hear their voices.

In fact, in The Birth of God Courtney equated drama with magic. In this book drama exerts power—the power of illusion. Whereas elsewhere Courtney wrote that seeing things from another’s perspective is an action of empathy and community, in The Birth of God Courtney (1997) equated that act with power.

As we have already seen, the shamanic belief in magic and possession is founded on a dramatic way of comprehending existence. The acts performed are dramatic per se because the belief in power over spirits, and
other people, is based on the view that by “putting oneself in another person’s place” one gains control over events. (p. 132)

Drama is a magical power. Equating drama with ritual and pagan shamans makes drama a power over others. In an earlier text Courtney (1982) wrote:

With the rise of civilization in the Near East, the shamans who had been in touch with the supernatural spirits slowly grew into priests who were in touch with the gods. In time, the king became the chief priest; he was assisted by minor priests who interceded with the gods on behalf of the community. It was these priests who led the way to the actors of the Athenian theatre of the fifth century BC. (p. 29)

Courtney’s version of the origin of actors is the same as his version of Moses--a shaman, a man who had special powers, and was in touch with the supernatural, a priest and authority over the Jews. According to Courtney, these prophets were ancestors of the actor. This seems to be the history Courtney wanted to tell: secret power, masculine heroes and illusory dramas.

Courtney’s Story

What is Courtney’s story in The Birth of God? The story comes partly from Courtney’s method:

- his treatment of his sources did not permit them to use their own voices
- his treatment of his audience made him a distant authority, averse to any risk of personal representation, either in terms of his self, or his opinions
- his methods of argument permit no dialogue
- the opacity and density of his prose are his own inscrutable performance, whose message is also one of absolute and static power.

I compare this distant, risk-averse stance with Courtney’s statements about drama found elsewhere in his writings:
The fact that human beings interact in such a highly complex way, taking all the personal and social risks that they do, and in activities ranging from simple social communication to the art form of theatre, indicate a high degree of intelligence. (Courtney, 1990, p. 58)

This statement treats drama quite differently than the drama conveyed by The Birth of God.

From this analysis, my hunches are that Courtney’s remoteness as an author, his opacity and one-way relationships with his sources and his readers contradict his ideas about drama found in other books. His casual appropriation of others’ writings, both to use them for himself and to misrepresent their own intent may or may not have been characteristic of his other writing. If this was indeed true for him, such habits show no respect for either the literature or the reader. A similar message of anti-dialogue emerges in Courtney’s creations of Yahweh, of Moses and of the shaman-priest-actor. All three are figures of absolute power and of fixed nature, who practice magic and are also actors in dramas. Courtney has made no mention whatsoever that Bloom’s J was a woman. Why not? Also interesting is the relationship Courtney has with his subject-matter, the Israelites. Courtney has largely ignored their own ethical concerns and their own self-narratives.

The notion of drama put forth in The Birth of God is a power over others. The learning involved in such drama seems to be mystical and participatory, one that involves ritual drama and magic, forms not far removed from ritual sacrifice. In following the models of the ancients, Courtney extolled the grandeur of absolute power in the form of nonhuman god-kings, the epic past that Bakhtin (1981) wanted to penetrate with real dialogue. Courtney’s interest in this realm of the patriarch, mystical and mythical powers, and the coercion involved in illusion made him something of a Prospero late in life. Courtney (1990) came to define his dramatic metaphor in terms from the Tempest. “For Prospero, life is not simply
like a theatre; it is a play we all perform. Human existence is a dramatic illusion that, like a dream, melts and dissolves” (p. 71).

Estrangement from the dynamics of life seems to permeate *The Birth of God*, Courtney’s final book. When I discussed Courtney’s final years with Landy [Interview], he remarked that Richard died

on an island, profoundly isolated. He lost sight of an audience, writing on his island, without thinking about who’s reading the writing, for whom is he writing, and what’s the purpose of his writing. Somewhere along the line he lost an audience, he lost a community, he lost society.

Courtney was a Prospero--making his own magic on his own island. This view is consistent with the emergent message of *The Birth of God*, in which drama provides the power of illusion, and illusion provides an answer to life. Courtney's magic controlled the words of others, using them as he remained behind a curtain, an isolated wizard.

I had come to visit Courtney on his island (Salt Spring Island) in 1996. I found Courtney fascinating and entertaining, and his books well worth studying. I followed them closely in my analysis, to decipher Courtney’s words. I stubbornly pursued my own path--not a path Courtney would have chosen--through these words. I extracted a construction of learning through drama that seemed useful, that seemed above all connected with a great deal of other literature from other disciplines. By contrast, to me *The Birth of God* is about isolation. It speaks from an epic distance, in the voices of prophets. Perhaps it shows the effect of Courtney’s final years, living on his island in isolation. Landy [Interview] noted

Prospero lived on that island with his books. To get to him you had to burn his books. When the bad guys plotted against Prospero Caliban told them you have to burn his books. Everything he knows is in his books. Prospero, at the end of the Tempest, breaks his staff and says it’s time for
me to retire, to die, to go away, and leave the world to the younger generation.
CHAPTER XII
COURTNEY’S UNENDING PERFORMANCE

In the final analysis, the human quest for meaning is an unending performance. Nowhere is this more evident than in dramatic action, where the illusion within the illusion (the play within the play) provides a myriad of meanings, actual, metaphorical and symbolic. (Courtney, 1990, p. 134)

This dissertation has focused on deconstructing Courtney’s message and distilling it into a construction of learning through drama. Textual analysis also entails deconstructing the author’s voice. This final chapter addresses Courtney’s voice, in view of the findings of Chapter XI in which an analysis of The Birth of God (1997) indicated that Courtney’s writing style seemed to ignore his own prescriptions for dramatic intelligence. Sometimes ignoring the voices of other authors, sometimes appropriating their words and ideas for his own ends, Courtney seemed to treat his reading audience condescendingly and deceptively, and was less than authentic when he claimed scholarly authority in cases that he had none. His approach sometimes seemed to be characterized by anti-dialogue, rather than dialogue.

Yet when I asked former friends of Courtney’s if they thought this appraisal was correct, the majority disagreed. John McLeod [Interview] in Chapter IV, for example, described Courtney’s writing style as inviting dialogue and employing a dramatic style. Was Courtney inviting dialogue, when he used ambiguous phrases that seemed deliberately opaque, or was he actually inviting others to project their own desired meanings—indeed their desired image of Courtney—on him? Was Courtney asking others to “make up their mind” with full understanding of Courtney’s writings, or was he asking them to interpret his
loosely structured work because he could not or would not? Some described
Courtney as a memorable friend (David Booth), a great man (Otto Weininger) and
a mentor (Peter McLaren, Robert Landy). These characterizations seemed to
contradict the evidence I unearthed in my study of The Birth of God. I have drawn
the conclusion that Courtney did employ the dramatic intelligence he wrote about,
but he did so to achieve his own ends. He mixed reality and illusion in a
performance that “worked for him.” But that dramatic intelligence did not
necessarily obey the rules of scholarly discourse.

In Chapter IV I described Courtney as an actor on a stage in his own self-
absorbed drama, remote from audience members who each interpreted this act in
their own subjective manner. In fact this metaphor has continued to be applicable.
Courtney’s “performance” in writing The Birth of God is consistent with his
descriptions in that book of dramatic writing. The Birth of God seems to report on
Courtney’s ideas, but it does so by “playing the trickster.” Audience members are
treated to a combination of reality and illusion, to persuade them to Courtney’s
point of view and his chosen identity. Courtney performs the role of a biblical
scholar, and his hypothesis of a ritual play triumphs over reality within the pages
of this book.

In The Birth of God, for example, Courtney wrote that one sign of
dramatic writing is word play—e.g., “go down to Egypt” was decoded to mean
“go down to the underworld.” Much of Courtney’s conceptualizing depended on
word play more than on clear thinking, such as his mutating definitions of words
like drama that leave readers without a clear understanding of what exactly is
being discussed. If, as Courtney maintained in The Birth of God, repetition is also
a sure sign of ritual drama, Courtney has surely repeated his assumptions over and
over without giving evidence for them. Elision is likewise a prominent feature in
Courtney’s style. He often left out connecting logic, so that he did not seem to
make a point of his own, but left that to the reader. Like the absence of the first
person singular, this aspect of Courtney’s writing made it difficult to pin down
exactly who Courtney is and what he intended to say. Courtney’s elliptical and
mysterious way of writing is evident in the following paragraph which I have broken into units:

In the post-Exilic period, the priests could not allow for theogony. The monster was depersonalized and creation was consummated by the mere “word” of God in seven days. Israel and Babylon shared the tradition of the Sabbath: in the Exile, they shared the magical qualities in the number seven: in Mesopotamia the shabuttu was a day of penance, while in Israel it was a happy day of rest from work--which became associated with the market economy of Israel. (Courtney, 1997, p. 45)

Does this paragraph make sense? Courtney seems to have left connecting phrases out so that the sense of the paragraph must be largely filled in by the reader. It seems almost as if Courtney brought together statements from a number of sources, cataloguing them in an impenetrable prose. This is consistent with some remarks Courtney made to me about his process of constructing books. He told me that he used Xeroxed copies of others’ writings in constructing his books. I told him that I usually take notes from other books, but that I do so by typing relevant phrases into computer files so that I can become more familiar with the work and assimilate it better. Courtney told me that he didn’t have time for retyping from others’ books (personal communication, December 1996). In fact, he told me, sometimes he simply read synopses instead of the books themselves to save time. This approach seems to shed light on the difficulty of his writing, in which a connecting logic or authorial synthesis seems to be missing. For example, here is most of a paragraph from an earlier book (1990), which I have similarly broken into units:

The quaternity is a fundamental mental process that relates the self symbolically to the eternal problems of existence.
Similarly, the traditional figure of Christ is synonymous with psychic manifestations of the self, and, universally, the mandala and other quaternity/circle symbols are motifs for ultimate wholeness, or God. Jung proposes that “the one against three” is the quaternity within a mental structure acting as a catalyst in the unification process; or in alchemical terms that sparks the spagyric birth...

For in the One, is the One and yet not the One, it is simple and consists of the number four.

When this is purified by the fire in the sun, the pure water comes forth, and, having returned to simplicity, it will show the adept the fulfillment of the mysteries.

Whereas metaphorically there are close links between four with five (the quincunx), Jung indicates that with symbols there is also a continual vacillation between four and three:

We unconsciously tend to round off the Christian Trinitarian formula of the godhead with a fourth element, which tends to be “feminine, dark, and even evil.”

This fourth element “has always existed in the realm of our religious representations, but it was separated from the image of God and became his counterpart, in the form of matter itself (or the lord of matter--i.e., the devil.).” (p. 114)

I suggest that this doesn’t read like a paragraph as much as a catalogue of pieces of text, which have been inserted without connecting logic, perhaps taken directly from Jung. The above paragraph does not seem to lead toward a cogent point so much as it is “performed” in a dense, intimidating fashion. Readers can infer meanings, but in doing so the readers’ own meanings result, not Courtney’s. Courtney’s meaning is “whatever you make of it.” Courtney left readers to infer meanings, or possibly simply failed to communicate his own ideas. I suggest that this is typical of Courtney’s performance, consistent with his discussion of
symbolic manipulation: ambiguity allows the audience to infer their own meaning. Just as Courtney never used the first person singular "I", he kept his own "true identity" a secret. While the above passage bears an outer resemblance to scholarly discourse, it does not actually seem to follow its internal rules. Another interesting aspect is that Courtney has clearly implied an opinion about "the feminine."

This strange phrase—"feminine, dark and even evil"—raises the issue of Courtney's attitude toward women. Courtney left the phrase in quotations, but he did not leave it out. In Chapter XI I mentioned that Courtney never acknowledged Bloom's central thesis in The Book of J, that J was a woman. None of Courtney's acquaintances accused him of hating women. Yet one of them (Wilkinson, personal communication, October 1997) agreed with me when I said that I felt, as a woman, that I would never be part of Courtney's "circle." In the few instances of Courtney's texts where he mentioned women, I found evidence to support this hunch. The following phrases are from Courtney's books on Shakespeare, and betray a stance which says more about Courtney than about Shakespeare. The emphases are mine.

But the subversive female voice is only heard briefly; Shakespeare's audience will not permit more. (Courtney, 1994b, p. 30)

Male values are protected against the feminine demand for physical facts because the play is a fiction. (ib.)

Rosalind wears the disguise of Ganymede, a male. As a supposed man she wields male powers and becomes the remarkable person that she is. The implications here are vital to an understanding of the play. Shakespeare's greatest female character in comedy becomes significant because she usurps maleness. And, moreover, she only returns to femininity because
Shakespeare's society would not have it otherwise. Clearly he was trying to teach his contemporaries a very modern lesson. (1994c, p. 83)

Whether male power is tyrannical or benevolent, it requires women to be subordinate, and Rosalind finally enacts this role. Festive celebration occurs because a male social order is secured. (ib.)

In case we missed the message, Shakespeare decreases Rosalind's power again in the Epilogue when it is revealed that she is a boy actor. (p. 84)

And her liberation does not last; as the play returns to the normal world, she is reduced to the traditional woman, subservient to men. (p. 88)

In the above phrases, Courtney not only spoke of the need for "protection" against "feminine demand(s)", and for women's "subservience", he called this a "very modern lesson." Courtney's interpretation of Shakespeare as a socially enforced misogynist is unconventional. First of all, it portrays Shakespeare as a moralizer who catered to social norms. On the contrary, Shakespeare is usually considered a creative genius who adhered to no norms or fixed morals. Further, the creator of Cleopatra, Kate the Shrew, the wives of Windsor, Rosalind, Portia and other powerful women can hardly be considered a misogynist. I reintroduce a more widely acclaimed Shakespearean interpreter and winner of a number of literary prizes, Harold Bloom (1998), who wrote of Shakespeare's women:

Shakespeare, who clearly preferred his women characters to his men (always excepting Falstaff and Hamlet), enlarges the human, from the start, by subtly suggesting that women have the truer sense of reality. (p. 35)

Quoting G. B. Shaw:
Rosalind... makes love to the man instead of waiting for the man to make love to her—a piece of natural history which has kept Shakespeare’s heroines alive, whilst generations of properly governessed young ladies, taught to say “No” three times at least, have miserably perished. (p. 202) Rosalind again makes a third with Falstaff and Hamlet ... The voice in all three... is as close as Shakespeare ever will come to letting us hear the voice of William Shakespeare himself. (p. 225)

As in *The Book of J*, Bloom considered the strength and wisdom of women a part of “natural history” and of literary history. Women thrive *because* they make demands. Bloom wrote that Shakespeare spoke through his women. By contrast, Courtney’s approach to Shakespeare’s women seems to reveal a strange distrust, fear or revulsion.

This is one instance of Courtney’s apparently unexamined biases. Another emerges in Courtney’s flirtations with postmodernism. Interestingly, Courtney’s own stance seemed to contradict his prescriptions for the perspectival agility of postmodernism. Courtney saw drama as making meaning, as generating knowledge. “The actor, dancer or musician is creating within the existential moment, like the ritualist, a direct parallel with the ritual actor-dancer” (1988, p. 17). In Courtney’s writings, this existential meaning-making is most characterized in ancient tribal dramas. “In these symbolic performances, the players know existence and the cosmos: the past is brought into the present to affect the future; time is collapsed and everything is a symbolic whole in the ‘here and now.’” (1990, p. 110) It seemed, for Courtney, that this control over existence, knowing the answers to all questions, became an important key to Courtney’s notions of cultural dramas. In this view, existentialism assumed an archaic quality, like the repetitive ritual dramas of Eliade’s (1971) writings in which “truth” is inherited and fixed. Courtney’s Israelites, for example, worshipped fixed ritual dramas. It seemed that Courtney actually feared the loss
of control implied by postmodernism’s “truths” which are constantly being reconstructed.

Unfortunately... mythology... has become very diffuse, even fragmented. Students have a multiplicity of styles of hero—from adventure, war, sports, film and television. Institutions of learning must adjust to this, difficult though this may be. (1982, p. 22)

Ultimately, I found a tension in Courtney’s work on cultural dramas, between the individualist and progressive existentialist moment of contemporary drama, and the timeless moment of archaic drama, whose “truth” is bequeathed by fixed authorities as characterized Eliade’s (1971) notions of the archaic on which Courtney relied heavily. Eliade described how the ritual dramas of archaic cultures were based on reliving “beginnings” through myth and ritual, producing a cyclical, repetitive, anti-historical approach to meaning. For Eliade, the Israelites introduced the idea of linear time to replace these cyclical timeless rituals. The revolutionary notion of linear time created the contemporary sense of history, and the possibility of personal interventions which can chart the course of one’s existence. It renders ideas about cause and effect meaningful, as well as ideas about blame, guilt and responsibility. Linear time made a moral framework possible. For Courtney, the Israelites did not even experience progressive historical events, but rather kept re-experiencing their predecessors’ ritual dramas. Courtney’s Israelites moved backwards in their world view, not forwards. A similar dichotomy to the archaic/existential distinction I am making was drawn by Pavel (1986) about fictional worlds as discussed in Chapter V. The fixed power of religious worlds exert normative force, as opposed to the tenuous quality of utopian worlds (p. 61). Courtney seemed to prefer the certainty conferred by the rituals and religious worlds of traditional societies, with their fixed and enforceable metaphysics.
Courtney also revealed contradictions in his personal remarks. During three weeks spent at his home, I felt embarrassment at times for what seemed to be slips—or was Courtney merely naïve? Was he simply unaware of the minefield of politically incorrect possibilities which we in the US tread so carefully every day? I would suggest that there are several reasons why Courtney seemed to have left many of his own biases unexamined. First, Courtney never earned more than a bachelor’s degree. His reputation came from one book, *Play, Drama and Thought* (1968) which was written more as a stream-of-consciousness related literature section than a polished work of analysis. He was rewarded for a display of diversity which implied many things and said none of them very specifically. Courtney was seldom, if ever, subjected to peer review, since he did not go through the doctoral dissertation process nor did his peers analyze his work. He was able to “magically” pass through many glass ceilings, finally becoming the head of a graduate program, without paying the usual dues. He seemed rarely, if ever, to have been subjected to serious critiques from others, partly because he himself was so intimidating in his mastery of verbal and symbolic skills. Perhaps Courtney was a “lord” in his world, a world he had constructed to replace the “commoner” origins and outsider status of his boyhood. As a symbol to many people, frequently a symbol of authority, wisdom and generosity, Courtney’s stature became invested with the felt-meanings of others. Courtney played a classical professorial role. McLeod (Interview) agreed with me that Courtney would probably not be able to get a post in academia today. But he nonetheless embodied his own notions about symbols and the power of their felt-meaning.

While Courtney had interesting ideas, and/or was able to find them in others, it seemed he was under no requirement to work out the logic behind these ideas. Courtney was instead rewarded for his performance as a “prophet” and “magician.” This of course is to gloss over the aspects of Courtney’s life which I did not study. Courtney did tell me, however, that many of his books remained largely unread, and few if any of his colleagues publicly discussed his ideas. Perhaps this explains the metaphors for drama which Courtney finally used in *The
Birth of God, the means of magic and power over others. Courtney seemed to have benefited “magically” from his own “dramatic intelligence.” But Courtney’s ability to capitalize on his gifts did not seem to help his rigor or logic. For example, one subject I did not include in this dissertation is Courtney’s notion of belief. Belief, according to Courtney (1990, 1995), was the same as knowledge. To be convinced was to learn. This paradigm equates persuasion through symbols and rhetorical manipulation to teaching, while knowledge is highly relative to the interests of those who acquire it. I found this notion so problematic that in attempting to streamline my analysis I did not attempt to include this notion of belief in my own construction. I am convinced that some of Courtney’s ideas, as well as his biases, would have benefited from more critical thinking, dialogue and general discourse with his peers. This seems not to have happened, either because of Courtney’s relationships with others, or because by the time these later books emerged Courtney may not have had relationships with others. Courtney (personal communication, December 1996) told me that when he moved to Salt Spring Island he lost contact with many people.

Having said this, I am convinced that I have found useful ideas in my analysis of Courtney’s work. Learning through drama as an interactive, mutually constructed reality which depends on imagination and feelings that are involved in all cognition are useful elements for further discourse. The analysis which has emerged in this dissertation came from my own research process which might also be useful for further study of study of drama as a mode of learning. Courtney’s ideas treat drama as a metaphor for life, outside of classrooms and off stages, extending a discourse from the social sciences. Courtney had the opportunity and the imagination to write about a kind of learning which has often been lost sight of in the politics of arts and education in the US which tends to focus on concrete outputs rather than processes. As pointed out in the related literature and conclusion of this dissertation, the notion of drama as a pre-scripted, rote process seems to prevail in the US. Courtney’s work contributes to attacking that notion at its conceptual base. As I discussed in Chapter X, the arts have often
been considered alienating in the US, making it more difficult to negotiate the funding of arts in education. Courtney's work, relying heavily on Dewey, Mead, and others from the US, unifies life and art in a pragmatic learning, a natural mode that de-alienates drama and has the potential to reintroduce it into mainstream education.

Just as I maintain that readers of Courtney's work project onto it their own meanings, I am finally faced with the question: how much of this dissertation is about Courtney, and how much of this is about me? My method has compelled me to sift through, compile, organize and interpret Courtney's ideas by working very closely with his texts. In this I have stayed close to these texts which are my data. This process also required me to constantly simplify, whereas simplicity is not in the spirit of Courtney's work. But it was a necessary analytic process for a doctoral dissertation. The method enabled me to deconstruct Courtney's definitions, create solid examples from his mesmerizing words, and bracket off those ideas which could have practical implications. As I have mentioned, in doing so I employed a context that was not Courtney's own, but seemed to be necessary for demystifying Courtney's work. My emphasis reflected my own interests, including a focus on learning outside of formal pedagogical structures, on learning through feelings and imagination, and on the dramas that take place everyday in political and social life which can be analyzed through symbols and their felt-meanings. I have contributed an emphasis, and I have also contributed connecting logic and means of grounding these ideas. In truth, I have pursued my "quest for meaning" in Courtney's unending performance. But on the whole, the "myriad of meanings, actual, metaphorical and symbolic" came from Courtney—if Courtney can be pinned down at all.
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APPENDIX A

SAMPLE PAGES FROM COURTNEY’S BIBLIOGRAPHY
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1997


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1997


1998


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WORKS ABOUT RICHARD COURTNEY

COMMENTARY


FORTHCOMING

Alistair Martin-Smith, biography.

Mallika Henry, Ph.D. (NYU).
APPENDIX B
SAMPLE LETTERS FROM COURTNEY
24 February 1996

Mallika Henry
83-20 141st Street, Apt. 5K
Kew Gardens, NY 11435
USA

Dear Mallika:

Your letter of the 13th arrived here on the 23rd. And that's quick. Normally allow 14 days each way.

I'm happy to enter into a correspondence with you about your concerns. As no doubt Robert Landy told you, we first met in a similar way when he was doing his Ph.D. As I am now Professor Emeritus, my main postgraduate teaching is through such correspondence to various places in the world.

First, some parameters. I had a vein in the pupil of my left eye break about four years ago, and laser surgery failed. As a result my left vision is fragmented - it gives me 6+ simultaneous representations - and so your letter required me to use a magnifying glass. A little bigger, and a little more space, please. I'll try to reply by return, but will not always be able to. I am in the middle of a number of book contracts which sometimes require my attention for several continuous weeks.

While I am fit and well in myself, the medics sometimes cart me off into hospital as I have two post-phlebitic legs. I never know when this will be, so expect the odd gaps. My longest and oldest correspondent, Bishop James Burton in the UK is now 88 and quite blind. As he puts it: "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is bloody, bloody weak!" An ex-student of mine has just put our interchanges into a book MS: Between Ourselves - The Dialogues of Bishop James Burton and Professor Richard Courtney which I daresay will never be published.

All this, I suddenly realize, makes me sound like an invalid, which I'm not.
Now to your immediate concerns. You are a very brave person. Work in a homeless shelter in the Bronx (where I've been) would break most people. My immediate thoughts are political: it is a disgrace that our politicians have allowed this to happen and we should all stand up and be counted! Sartre was right on target when he said, "I am responsible for the War in Vietnam!" Advanced capitalism has bred the disaster of our inner cities - worse in the US than in Canada, but still a disgrace - and we should make our politicians should get off their butts.

That doesn't help in the immediacy of the situation, however. In my view, the first thing a drama worker can do is to break down the usual categories and treat the context as holistic. That is, while TIE, DIE, improvisation, theatre games, drama therapy, theatre proper, dance drama, and the like are useful academic differences, they become secondary in situations that are in extremis - such as in an urban homeless shelter.

What becomes primary under such circumstances are the immediate needs of the players. This is to return to Brian Way's famous adage: Start from where they are. If their immediate needs are for love and comfort, that is what we should provide. If their immediate needs are for building self-confidence and personality strength (e.g., through role-playing), that is what we should provide. And so on. Two things arise:

- The difference between psychodrama and drama therapy. In psychodrama, Moreno uses a specific technique for a problem. In drama therapy, Schattner uses the most effective technique for the individual - a drama technique, a music technique, or whatever [see Schattner & Courtney, *Drama in Therapy*, 2 vols., NY, Drama Book Specialists].
- How can we know what to provide? Simply put, by the teacher/therapist's expertise. Not by some external measure or rule. Brian Way rightly says he's concerned more with the development of people than the development of drama/theatre.

In such a context, administrative parameters, available buildings, the use of useless labels, etc., become tertiary. "Schizophrenic," "depressive," "therapy," "education," are categories that are labels which may or may not be useful - as the work of R.D. Laing shows. [And remember McLuhan's famous joke: "As Narcissus
said, Watch yourself!"

In the 1960s I worked with students for several years in buildings that had been condemned for use in 1914 – but the work was fine! As to working with limiting administrative parameters, they are *socially determined* and, while they may affect work, they are not at the core of it. Good work can be done despite them.

The need to provide a structure for this kind of work: a caution. It could be very useful. But, at the same time, we should recognize that the prime need is to provide the work. Any structure to do so will probably not be universal. We should expect that an effective structure for New York will differ from an effective structure for Dar es Salaam (which has equally terrifying, but different, urban chaos). Provided that we recognize that a suggested structure is a *particular* not a *universal*, it can be valuable. What might be the different structures, say, for New York, Miami, Albuquerque, and Los Angeles? Would there be common principles for each which could result in effective differences? That may be the basis of a thesis question . . .

Although there are now more ways to research these issues than there used to be, Objectivity insists on raising its ugly head, which provides two problems:

- **Therapy will, at times, use the medical model which is fatally flawed**: based on cause-and-effect it is based (like law) on previous case studies ("rule of thumb").
- **Objectivity is itself fallacious** [see my *The Quest: Research & Inquiry in Arts Education*, University Press of America, 1984].

Theoretically, I have postulated another form of knowledge beyond objective and subjective knowledge – *mediate knowledge*, where in drama the person is the medium, in dance the moving person is the medium, etc., etc.

You are right to say that attention is beginning to be paid to the affective and personal life in school systems. But too little, and too late. There is a huge backlog of neglect. And now that mechanism and objectivity are deeply embedded in school systems, “attention is beginning to be paid . . .” In my view, we should not let society off so easily.

For example: teacher-pupil ratio. We have known since the 1920s that a good ratio is 1:16, e.g., that ratio is still maintained by the British independent schools (i.e., “public” schools) because parents pay and see the increase in failure when that ratio
is increased. What is the ratio in your local schools? If it is over 1:16, it is personal
development qualities (self-confidence, self-concept, feeling, emotion, awareness,
perception, motivation, transfer, etc.) that universally get forgotten.

Second example: size of schools. A.H.Bullen did a Ph.D. at U of Toronto
somewhere about 1984(?) on school size. He used "effective" to mean in learning,
in teaching, in personal and social development, in relation to the community, in
finance, etc., and asked, What is the most effective size of secondary schools? He
finally stated that the maximum size is 200 pupils. Bullen was an Assistant Deputy
Minister in the B.C. government, and the moment he returned to B.C. he took New
Westminster Secondary School (then the largest secondary school on the continent,
I believe) and broke it up into many different schools. [My granddaughter went to the
only one where all the pupils took 95% of the work home and taught themselves — a
very effective strategy with the creative-rebellious.]

That must be enough this time. I haven't written much about the issues of the
population with which you deal. Sorry. Perhaps some specific questions will tease
that out of me.

Yours sincerely,
26 June 1996

Mallika Henry
83-20 141st Street, Apt. 5K
Kew Gardens, NY 11435
USA

Dear Mallika:

Your letter of the 19th arrived here on the 25th. And that’s quickish. NY usually takes 10-14 days each way. Alistair phoned yesterday and is in Vancouver where his wife is making a film. He should be here any day. He told me he’s coming to NY and then your letter confirmed it. Now you tell me he may be your chair. Expect changes in thesis format — usual when changing chairs.

No, I’m not coming to NY this summer. At the moment I’m not travelling. Post-phlebitic legs don’t like it. I feel fit and well but my legs don’t. I can walk a few yards comfortably, that’s all. But we’ve a spare bed here in the library area (as well as a charming verandah for outside sleeping) so anyone who wants me can stay. You’re welcome anytime provided we’re not booked. June-September are best visiting months for weather on SSI — called "Paradise" by locals.

The Proposal

In general, loud applause. I always look first for the thesis question which was in your letter. Two things:

- The better the thesis question, the better the Proposal, and the better (and easier) the thesis.
- Yours needs refining to make it more accurate — to keep your eye on the ball as you’re writing. I’ve spelt this out in The Quest (Univ Press of America 1982) which doctoral students have found useful. I recommend the final thesis question when refined is written out and stuck over the computer screen.
p.1 para 2 penultimate line the family a middle-class assumption? Recent statistics on the normal American family show great changes.

Quote fascinating

p.2 para 3 1st line Piaget Not good in this context. Piaget is a cognitive psychologist and has little important to say on the affective. Susan Isaacs is much better for our purposes – remember she threw him out bodily from her school!

last para Goleman I don’t know.

p.3 2nd para 9th line. aesthetic context OK in normal usage but I’ve been contending for some time that ‘aesthetic’ in this usage is from philosophic Idealism (the search for supposed ‘beauty’) and is less suitable for Drama purposes than Kant’s usage (followed by German philosophers and European existentialists [cf. Sartre]) that ‘aesthetic’ is a quality of mind – our thought has cognitive/affective/aesthetic qualities – why do I chose this cup rather than that cup? – I may fear (“tremble or faint” – Sartre) when a tiger walks into the room, but I may appreciate a sunset. Both are, in English, called ‘feelings’ but they are different – one is an emotional quality, the other is an aesthetic quality. As this is not normal usage, you might just like to scrub it. (Watch use of ‘aesthetic’ elsewhere.)

Next line. motivating. There is a difference between ‘an active involvement’ per se, and ‘a dramatic active involvement.’ It is one of intention. (This is also the difference between Dewey’s ‘learning by doing’ and Caldwell Cook’s ‘learning by dramatic doing.’) Also you need a reference on motivation. The only one I know is the chapter in my Re-Play.

End of page. Don’t leave ‘widow’ lines.

p.4 Definitions. You’ll also need ‘empowerment.’ Add as you go.

DIE – a comparatively new term (for ‘drama across the curriculum’) describing an old practice. Will it continue? Between which and does add ‘usually’.

TIE – begun in England by an ex-student of mine, Gordon Vallins, in Coventry, but now decreasing there because of the Marxist bent of many of the early TIE teams. Will it continue as is?

End of page. Don’t leave ‘widow’ lines.
p.6 2 para mid way Kieran Egan of Simon Fraser (note spelling). KE is good but he's a specialist in literature and story. His friend, David Booth (also mine -- he co-edited Re-Cognizing Richard Courtney with Alistair, Pembroke Pubs.) of Toronto would probably be a better example because he specializes in Drama & Language Arts, and has a recent book, *Story Drama* (Markham, Ont.: Pembroke Pubs.) He is prolific in this area. Smashin' feller, too, as Alistair will tell you.

penultimate para Dewey See above. Following reads like Peter McLaren.

There are 2 criticisms of Dewey: (1) as above; (2) he created with G.H. Mead the 'social science method' -- goddam him! Newer views on education (suitable for us) are Otto Weininger and Brian Sutton-Smith.

Last line Development through drama is of 2 kinds -- personal and social (cultural). Miss one and the critics will nab you!

p.7 quote ... the self-reflective. See John Macmurray and Hans-Georg Gadamer.

p.9 1st para 1st sentence. No it isn't! It's been almost entirely English-speaking since 1900. Some European developments have begun in the past 20 years, but even the most effective French form (*l'expression dramatique*) is only 25 years old, its leader is Gisèle Barret, a Quebecker, and it is her influence that has moved the universities (e.g. the Sorbonne) and the Iberian peninsula. Most of what we hear about Europe are isolated examples.

p.10 top quote Yes. Right on your topic.

p.11 central para Yes. Useful link. Unique to you. I think.

central quote. This, in action, becomes 'care' = 'reflectiveness'.

p.12 *A Need for Testing*. Contentious issue. OK if qualitative, not if number-crunching. This needs a more thorough writing. What do tests test? What of the varieties of modern forms of assessment?
Why do you need this section at all? If you do, you must read Dr. Joyce A. Wilkinson's *Developmental Drama Rating Scale* - outlined in *YTJ* about 6 years ago. She may have a copy of the whole thing - write to her c/o Curriculum Dept. [OISE].

p.12 *Related Literature.* It should be made clear that there are 3 main segments: enactment, drama therapy, and personal stories. I suggest you deal with each separately.

You have to mention Moreno and his development in Jonathon Fox's *Playback Theatre*.

As you describe Felman and Hermann they would be in the personal story category. In that category, too, would be the large number of theses-supervised by Dr. Michael Connelly (Curric, OISE) discussing personal stories as the basis of Curriculum (Alistair will tell you all about Mick Connelly, who is President of the Dewey Society).

p.13 last para. DD does not = process drama. DD is *the study* of dramatic action in all its processes and forms.

p.15 Winnicott - yes! His transitional object = proto-media. The dramatic act is liminal.

*Methodology.* Already discussed, but you might like to look at Glaser and Strauss' *Grounded Theory*, if not for their whole methodology for the analysis of data. Many OISE dissertations used it.


Slade's books include *Child Drama, Introduction to Child Drama, Experience of Spontaneity, Natural Dance*, and in 1996 *Child Play*. You also need the books of E.J. Burton (*Teaching English Through Self*

In your letter, p.2, final para ...“I would like to measure ...” No you wouldn't! You might like to 'discover,' but that’s different. Esme Crampton, the famous British-Canadian speech expert spent her life trying to measure such things, and died in the attempt!

p.3 1st para. The 'liberation' of story. Yes, but the liberation is with the mutual existence of 'actual' and 'fictional' – the actual and the ritual-myth (where ritual = dramatic action and myth = story) of the ancients.

final para – you ask about myth. Delighted to see Parabola in your Biblio. Alistair has lots of ideas about myth. I would simply caution you to take myth back as far as you can to the 'origin myths' (cf. Mircea Eliade works, Un of Chicago). Thus Persephone myth is a male Ayran version of the original Sumerian myth of Inanna where she went to the netherworld (not to live with the King) but to conquer her sister, Ereshgi.

Incidentally in her Ph.D. dissertation at OISE, Helen E. Smith discovered the only known living female myths in Daughters of Copper Woman by Ann Cameron (just north of here on Vancouver Island). All other female myths have been made chthonic by Aryans and other male-dominated societies.
With this letter, I will ask David (my secretary) to attach an out-of-date Bibliography of mine. You'll need it to get your Bibliography accurate.

A word of advice. Keep your Bibliography fully written up from now. Otherwise it becomes a terrible chore later on.

This should catch the post in the morning (27th).

Since I started to write this, I've heard that (so far) our visitors this Summer are Alistair (as above), an ex-colleague of mine from Trent Park College, London, for a day, our first grandson (2-3 days), our granddaughter with our great-grandson (2-3 days), and Mrs Betty Crocker (that was, before she sold out and made her millions) for one day. I expect them all in July. I have yet to hear from David Booth – I expect him and his son later. Our son, John, from England with his wife will not essay the trip this year as Rosie's just had a second boy, but I expect them for 2-3 weeks next Summer. That gives you the picture as I know it.

Yours ever,
25 July 1996

Mallika Henry
83-20 141st Street, Apt. 5K
Kew Gardens, NY 11435
USA

Dear Mallika:

Letter 2
to yours of 14 July 1996

Your chairperson. I can make no comment on this. Everything depends on the institution and most institutions handle this matters internally and personally. "Rumor has it . . ." you say. Rumor is the very worst informant at Grad School.

Please do not worry about the qualitative. The only time you should is when your chairperson worries about the qualitative — then you could have problems! The important thing is to address the right sort of question. Quantitative questions address numbers — how many? how much? Of X and Y, which is better (as measured)? Etc. My The Quest has material on this.

Being on your own (without faculty advisor), etc. Difficult. But worse would be to have an adviser/chairperson who is wrong for you. Most good doctoral candidates can sort out most things for themselves, and merely want their hands holding (by someone who knows saying they were quite right in the first place). That is, they need confirmation. Or they need help sorting out sheep from goats:

• Academic issues — quantitative vs. qualitative. Both "correct."
• Institutional issues — one Grad School in the mid-West, with a strong science and math basis, prides itself on only doing quantitative theses, but Joyce Wilkinson got her Ph.D. there with a qualitative thesis that "looked as if" it was not!

Remember that faculty members have different experience of theses. What kind of thesis did Dr. X do? In general, go for one whose thesis relates to your question, and
who has already experienced putting Ph.D.'s through, and is sympathetic to (a) your topic and (b) your way of addressing it.

Your thesis question. "It evolves with the work I have been doing." Only in a limited sense. That should be so in the first place, as you begin. But shortly thereafter you should have it settled. Only when the question is clear to you, does the research experience begin to make sense - that is, can you see which parts of the data relate to the question, and which parts do not and can be jettisoned.

I learned my lesson on this issue with Peter McLaren. He never would get his question clear, which meant his Proposal was not clear, and his thesis writing was a huge amorphous bag of stuff - all very interesting and I learned a lot - but over ½ was superfluous to the thesis question. The first draft was over 900 pages long! I knew I would get no one to sit on his committee if they examined a thing that long. So I had to put my foot down and insisted he divide it into two parts: the thesis (less than ½) and the appendices (more than ½), there being no limits on appendices at Toronto. Then he had to finalize his question for Part 1, and rewrite it accordingly. He was cross with me, of course, but after all the first purpose in writing a Ph.D. thesis is to PASS.

Aesthetics. I wrote on 26 June to you as follows:

Be careful with "aesthetic." You mention Cassirer, who is excellent, but he is a philosophic Idealist. So, too, by the way is Langer who is linked to him. Remember:
My early writing was mostly from the B perspective. Since I opposed the traditional dichotomy (objective vs. subjective) and proposed a third form of knowledge and logic (the "mediate"), my writing has been from that (new type C).

When you say, "They are introduced to aesthetic approaches [what does 'aesthetic' mean there?] as well as the aesthetic space [and there?]" this mediate area of knowledge, transitional objects, Winnicott's concept of culture, drama's liminal space, as opposed to the concrete and socially ordained world which is entrapping them. When they become artists . . . [depending on what you mean by 'artists' – formal or informal?] I can only applaud!

Dewey. Bertrand Russell was once asked what he thought of the philosophy of John Dewey. He replied: "He puzzles me, I must admit. When he speaks of Z he defines it in terms of A. And when he speaks of A he defines it in terms of Z!"

Testing. "Can I leave this out?" (Yes.) "What is the dissertation – does it not require the research aspect?" (Yes.) There's a muddle here between logical classes (e.g., between terriers and dogs). Normal usage: "testing" = testing of pupils against some norm. "Objective testing" = testing of pupils against some numeric norm (statistics). Research = a kind of inquiry, finding out, according to specific criteria.
In qualitative research you do not have to measure anything. You have to make judgments (Canadian spelling) based on criteria, but measurement, no!

Yes, you do have to discuss Research in the thesis. You should discuss the Research Method (A) that you have chosen, saying why A is better for answering your question than B, C, D, etc.

Myth. I don’t think there’s 1 volume that addresses this in the way you want. It comes from various sources: Merlin Stone (The Paradise Papers) does it from the feminist perspective, which is fine but I could wish (a) she’d been a little more conservative in her claims, and (b) have made it a little more scholarly – its deliberately “popular” and has been dismissed by academe, which is unfortunate. More academic is T.H. Gaster’s Thespis (Anchor, NY) which is a tremendous sourcebook, Henri Frankfort on Kingship, and general references in PDT (Play, Drama & Thought).

Yes, do write to David Booth for his bibliography. Many of his books come out of Pembroke Books, Markham, Ont. (That address will find them). I have quite a few of his books but not all. Moreover, the only part of my library here that is not properly sorted after the move is Theatre Ed/Drama Ed/Art Ed/Ed General. There’s some interesting stuff in 1 and 2 but I dumped some of 3 and 4 before we moved. The whole section is of 5 x 12’ shelves. I’d think there’s about 12 x Booth. Of course I have all my stuff in my study.

Yours ever -
NOTES from
RICHARD COURTNEY

Letter to the Editor 1 September 1996
Already commented. Nicely argued.

Research Story 14 September 1996
Fascinating. P.2, opening of final para ["The details..." etc] does not make sense.

Significance: etc. 4 October 1996
P.2 end of 1.2 – 'self' should surely read 'self-in-society,' yes?
1st para, 1.11 – 'psyche' should read 'psyche-in-society,' yes?
Last line – or post-Marxist, post Freudian?
Last para, 3 lines up from bottom – 'participants' + and of the participants' effect on society.
P.3 line 4 – 'communicate' + and authorizing others to communicate
1st para, end – + and vice versa.
2nd para centre – 'a personal process' should read 'an interactive process (personal and social)

What is Literature? 10 October 1996
P.1, para 2 – Brian Way out of place in this list. He is specifically anti-intellectual and relies on the senses.
End of page, Courtney, not quite. Should be:

a term indicating:
1. The study of all kinds of enactment in life and theatre.
2. The use of all kinds of enactment – pedagogical, etc. etc.
P.2, top – UK don't use term 'model' which is from Dewey. Better expressed as US from top down, UK from bottom up.
P.2, top – other pedagogical purposes in UK & Commonwealth:
1. Drama per se.
2. Drama across the curriculum.
2nd para, centre – Thus, some of the literature and research relate to the ‘doing’ of aesthetics and some to objectified aesthetics [see my article on Suzanne K. Langer] – the idealistic concepts of aesthetics, which have...

Last sentence – delete. It is not so.

3rd para, penultimate sentence. Insert ‘about death’ instead of ‘to die.’

P.4, 1st para, last sentence. In some way indicate that Freire is subsequent to RC.

3/4 paras. Names want fleshing out.

P.5, final sentence. Cut.

What is Theory? 16 October 1996


1.5 as a means to personal and social development.

1.6 not merely for the purposes

penultimate para, here you are talking about “start from where they are” (Way) which is vital to my practise.

P.6, 1st para. Yes, your approach is different from psychodrama which is a medical practise for the psychic and/or physiological sick. But it is very similar to the all-inclusive dramatherapy (as in Slade and Jennings in the UK, and Landy, Emereth, Schattner, and Johnson in the US, Barret in Quebec and Francophone countries) in its second definition:

1. As psychotherapy (Moreno).
2. Personal/social help for the well.

Your approach is similar to that of Gestalt therapists (eg Perls) who use Gestalt approaches rather than Freudian psychotherapy.

Engaging with . . . (Proposal) No date (2 pp. only)

You haven’t described the activity in detail. What will you do?

Scope and Organization 27 October 1996

Page 1, para 1. Approx 8 weeks – you need to state this latter in the paper when you can also state the criteria for length. In general, drama has better long-term effects than short-term. Objective research demands short-term study. Responsive research is better for long-term.
2nd para, last sentence. Many qualitative researchers refuse to generalize the results beyond the particular.

Page 2. Money and time. Remember that qualitative research is lengthy.

Page 3. Diagrams need explanation.

Laing article.
Many thanx for this. Don't agree with her opening. He was alive and well in reputation the last I heard. It was his opposition that found him mad. But she has some revealing passages about his life.

What is Method? 31 October 1996
Glaser and Strauss suggest GT analysis of 'experts' statements provide the bedrock of the Method.
P.2, para 2. You say, "The method or the guiding principle." You have concentrated on the second, not the first (as the paper is titled.) See Marlene Anderson for method.

Penultimate sentence. For therapy, see What is Theory? Above. In 'Method' you discuss what the researcher will do, more than what participants will do. I find the observers' tasks best done through a task analysis.

What is evidence? 8 November 1996
P.1. start. Evidence = words? Not quite; evidence = what is said and what is done by the participants that reveals human meaning, and as recorded by trained observers. 'Words' and particularly 'language' are at a level of abstraction from reality. Strictly, that is. In GT.

Meaning = of 2 kinds: (1) explicit and (2) tacit. (Polanyi). But 'what is evidence?' is not the same as 'what is meaning?'

This whole page is not sufficiently grounded in what an observer hears and sees, 'given off' by the participants. What do Glaser and Strauss say?
P.2, lower half. Respondents' talk is less reliable that 'a drama,' you say. I say, direct talk is more accurate of meaning, but less meaningful than 'a drama' which carries more metaphorical meaning.

Performance section reads well.
ATHE Proposal

Panel. Who? When will they discuss? How much time will each have (5 minutes)?

Oh, they need it but will they accept it?

26 November 1996
Dear Mallika:

Many thanx for yours of the 24th with your 2 papers – I’ll comment on these when I’ve read them. I was pleased to receive the program for MASKS. You may be interested to know that, as far as I can ascertain, my father, Jack Courtney, held the very first exhibition of children’s own art somewhere in the 1930s in Newmarket, Suffolk, and that it included the first extant paintings by the young Alan Reynolds, later a major East Anglian painter. We were friends as children and he kept in touch with Jack until my father died. The four huge Seasons paintings by Alan are in N.Y. (I’m not sure where), the Victorian Art Gallery in Melbourne, the Tate in London (hanging near the Turner, I believe), and somewhere in Paris. I have small prints of them hanging in the corridor off the front door (after these, he turned to cubism) together with a small colour sketch he did for my father.

Rosemary, who got the cough a week before I did, is now better, so I suppose I’ve got about a week to go. Our little cat died last week 17½ years after my wife caught her in a Toronto back-alley. She just slowly went to sleep.

I realized from your letter that I don’t call it “my duality model.” The reason is that “duality” is usually used for systems of thought (Plato, Aristotle, Jews, Christians, etc.) who try to separate mind and body whereas what I try to do is to unify them – they are merely two perspectives on one unified
gestalt whole – the human being or humans being. “Dual perspectives on a unified whole” I might accept. Your women, as you say, “are thinking in two worlds” – but they believe they think in one. The self-conscious realization of 2-in-1, or 1-in-2, is a specific developmental step (which Kohlberg might say occurs in post-adolescence in “normal” post-industrial cultures). You say, “the more mature, intelligent ones seem to be always aware of several levels at once.” Yes. But not always accurately.

Christmas plans are firming up. Grandson Josef-Kee (now a headshaven and tall busy professional stage management consultant), and yourself, David my secretary and his Thai wife Jantra (a chef) will be cooking Christmas dinner and then eating it with us. So far the menu is: oxtail soup; Turkey, stuffing, white sauce with cloves, roast potatoes, Yorkshire pudding, and veggies; Christmas pudding and cream; coffee. Two wrinkles in the plans:

- Your vegetarianism. Please tell us what alterations to the menu you require because Jantra is an expert veggie chef, and now is the time to say so honestly. (E.g., veggie soup instead of oxtail?)
- The dinner must take place on the 24th (Christmas Eve) in the later afternoon because David and Jantra will be celebrating Christmas at his mother’s (she lives on our road).

The downstairs bedroom awaits you. Work when you want and stay entirely at your convenience. Expect no Christmas streamers, etc., as I stopped all that when the children left home. Josef-Kee sleeps upstairs. Julia + family will be going to the interior of BC for Xmas to meet up with half the father’s family. A phone call from John in Britain says he and his family (Rosaleen + 2 baby boys) are not coming for Xmas but will be here at the end of June-early July when the boys can run in the open-air and not destroy the house. Obviously we could not sleep you in the house at that time but if you wanted to come there are good cheap motels. We can always use help for the necessary babysitting as Rosaleen must be pretty fed-up by now.

Yours ever –
APPENDIX C

PICTURE OF RICHARD COURTNEY
I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION:

Title: The Player and the Playing: An Interpretive Study of Richard Courval's Texts on Learning Drama

Author(s): Mallika Henry, Ph.D.

Corporate Source: New York University

Publication Date: 1999

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