Few places in the west are as evocative of the tragic story of the Indian Wars as Big Hole (Montana) National Battlefield. The site memorializes the bravery of the Nez Perce and U.S. soldiers and volunteers who fought there during the epic flight of the Nez Perce in 1877. Big Hole preserves the scene of one of the most famous battles of the Indian Wars. This administrative history is divided into chronological chapters, with each chapter divided into topical sections and subsections. A chronological organization highlights two salient themes in Big Hole National Battlefield's administrative development: (1) its long evolution as a small unit assigned to a succession of federal agencies (the War Department, the Forest Service, and the National Park Service); and (2) the close connection that exists between its land base, interpretive (education) program, and resource management. Chapters are: (1) "The Battle and Its Aftermath (1877-1883)"; (2) "Administration under the U.S. Department of War (1883-1910)"; (3) "Administration under the U.S. Forest Service (1910-1936)"; (4) "Administration under Yellowstone National Park, Early Years (1936-1956)"; (5) "Administration under Yellowstone National Park, Later Years (1956-1977)"; (6) "Administration under the Rocky Mountain Regional Office (1977-1987)"; and (7) "Administration under Other Small Units (1987-1997)." An appendix contains laws and executive orders. (Contains 82 references and 458 chapter notes.)
Commemoration and Preservation:

An Administrative History of
Big Hole National Battlefield
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Prepared for

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Columbia Cascades Support Office

by

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Cover Photograph. Chief Joseph and Colonel John Gibbon, erstwhile adversaries in the Battle of the Big Hole, sat for this portrait many years later. Photograph courtesy of Big Hole National Battlefield.
Few places in the West are as evocative of the tragic story of the Indian Wars as Big Hole National Battlefield. This site memorializes the bravery of the Nez Perce and U.S. soldiers and volunteers who fought here during the epic flight of the Nez Perce in 1877 and preserves the scene of one of the most famous battles of the Indian Wars. Located in the lush Big Hole Valley in southwestern Montana, the beauty and tranquility of the setting add immeasurably to the solemnity of the battlefield. “One of the great ironies associated with American battlefields is that they are often quite beautiful,” cultural historian Edward Linenthal observed in his book Sacred Ground. Here the picturesque natural setting has changed relatively little since the day of the predawn attack on the Nez Perce village, August 9, 1877.

Today, this national park system unit of 655 acres encompasses most of the principal features of the battlefield. Roughly rectangular in shape, it is bounded by the two-lane State Highway 43 on the south, Beaverhead National Forest on the west and north, and private ranch land on the east. Bisecting the area, the North Fork of the Big Hole River meanders in a northeasterly course through swampy bottomland. Battle Mountain rises on the northwest side of this river valley, Ruby Bench on the southeast side. Battle Mountain is backed by the forest-covered Anaconda Range, Ruby Bench by the high, open expanse of the Big Hole Valley.

The natural boundary between forest and steppe at this location, although pronounced, does not quite follow the foot of the mountains. The lower slope of Battle Mountain is marked by a treeless, grassy, open area now known as the Horse Pasture. Here, the Nez Perce grazed their horses while they were encamped along the other side of the river, and from this point came the predawn attack by the U.S. soldiers and volunteers. To the west of the Horse Pasture, in a draw known as Battle Gulch, the lodgepole forest extends down to the valley floor over a low promontory known as the Point of Timber. This site was the defensive position picked by Lt. Colonel John Gibbon when he called retreat. Forced back across the river and taking the high ground within these trees, Gibbon’s command dug rifle pits and threw up breastworks in a roughly circular position now known as the Siege Area.
As originally established in 1910, Big Hole Battlefield National Monument consisted of just five acres where the siege had taken place. Enlarged to 200 acres in 1939, the national monument then included all of the Siege Area plus the route of Colonel Gibbon's approach and the area along the foot of Battle Mountain from which he had launched his initial attack. Still outside the boundary of the national monument, however, was the Nez Perce Encampment Area where some of the fiercest fighting had occurred on the morning of August 9. Further additions, authorized by an act of Congress in 1963 and accomplished over the next decade, brought the Encampment Area and the development site into the unit. Bloody Gulch, where most of the Nez Perce withdrew while the warriors held their attackers at bay, remains outside on private land.

This administrative history is divided into chronological chapters, with each chapter divided into topical sections and subsections. We chose a chronological organization to highlight what we thought to be two salient themes in Big Hole National Battlefield's administrative development: first, its long evolution as a small unit assigned to a succession of federal agencies (the War Department, the Forest Service, the National Park Service) and then to a succession of other units within the national park system (Yellowstone National Park, Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site, Nez Perce National Historical Park); and second, the close connection that exists between its land base, interpretive program, and resource management.

Since its establishment as a national monument in 1910, Big Hole has been an administrative orphan, passed from one agency or unit to another about every ten to twenty years. Prior to 1910, the War Department had a limited involvement in the administration of the battlefield. From 1910 to 1933, the administration of Big Hole battlefield was shared between the War Department and the U.S. Forest Service. Since coming into the national park system in 1933, Big Hole has been assigned to regional offices in Omaha, Denver, Seattle, and San Francisco, while its unit managers have reported directly to superintendents of Yellowstone National Park, Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site, and Nez Perce National Historical Park. At different times the NPS has regarded Big Hole as coming within the political and recreational orbit of Yellowstone (as the nearest large national park in Montana), or within the interpretive orbit of Nez Perce Country, centered in Idaho. Frequent changes both in regional administrative boundaries and in thematic groupings of national park system units have impeded the smooth development of Big Hole's physical plant and management plans.

Throughout its history, Big Hole National Battlefield's land base has exerted a powerful effect on how the site was interpreted and protected. The soldiers' monument, erected in 1883, was explicitly dedicated to the U.S. military's role in the battle and tacitly overlooked the Nez Perce experience and perspective. This imbalance was perpetuated in the proclamation of 1910, which set aside five acres around the soldiers' monument but left the Nez Perce Encampment Area in private hands. Given the small land base, early interpretive efforts naturally focused on the drama of the siege and the valor of the U.S. soldiers and volunteers. The unit's managers came to believe that the emphasis on the siege was skewed; visitors needed to see the Nez Perce Encampment Area as well as the Siege Area and to recognize the tragedy of the event for the Nez Perce people. This search for balance drove managers' efforts to acquire more land, bring additional battlefield features under the government's protection, and broaden the interpretive focus at Big Hole. Again, it seemed that chronological chapters were the way to present this story. The unit consisted of 5 acres from 1910
to 1939, 200 acres from 1939 to 1963, and 655 acres after 1972. The size and scope of the protected area bore directly on how this battlefield was staffed, managed, and interpreted to the public.

For most of Big Hole National Battlefield's history the search for a balanced presentation has involved two kinds of historical memory: the American military tradition and the Nez Perce military tradition. The American military tradition consists primarily of written documentation and monumentation, the Nez Perce of oral storytelling and ceremony. At Big Hole, interpretation of the events of August 9-10, 1877 shows these two kinds of historical memory in juxtaposition, but it reveals an unusual synthesis, too. Nez Perce have remembered events with their own stone monument, and they have assisted efforts to document combatants' positions and movements on the battlefield with a kind of precision that is more characteristic of the American military tradition than their own. Non-Indians, both inside and outside the National Park Service, have recorded Nez Perce oral traditions and encouraged Nez Perce ceremonial observances at the site. In recent years, non-Indian "re-enactors" have developed their own form of ceremony for remembering the Battle of the Big Hole. The National Park Service (NPS) has actively supported this blending of the two traditions.

The search for a balanced presentation at Big Hole National Battlefield has also entailed a more subtle conflict between memorialization and preservation. For the most part, memorialization and preservation are complementary strategies to achieve similar goals. Both aim to protect the area from land uses that would detract from the site's intrinsic power to evoke historical remembrance. The pairing of memorialization and preservation is common to many units in the national park system. It is particularly pronounced in many Civil War and Revolutionary War battlefields in the East, where site administration by the NPS followed decades of guardianship by the War Department and various national cemetery superintendents. At Big Hole, memorialization began as early as 1883 with placement of the soldiers' monument. Here, as in the East, the Park Service has integrated memorialization and preservation through an interpretive program that informs visitors not only about the battle itself, but about the history of memorialization at this site. The monuments are historic resources in their own right.

We would like to thank Big Hole National Battlefield's Superintendent Jon G. James for his enthusiastic support of this project. His passion for history was evident throughout. We are grateful to Historian Gretchen Luxenberg of the Columbia-Cascades System Support Office for facilitating this history and seeing it through with her usual aplomb. We want to thank all those present and former Park Service employees who granted us their time for interviews. Finally, we are indebted to Fred York, David Louter, Edwin C. Bearss, Barry Mackintosh, and Otis Halfmoon, as well as Jon and Gretchen, for their meticulous review of the draft report.

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Chapter One
The Battle and Its Aftermath (1877-1883)

Big Hole National Battlefield is both a memorial and a historic site. At this place in southwestern Montana on August 9, 1877, U.S. soldiers and citizen volunteers clashed with Nez Perce “hostiles” in one of the last and most dramatic of Indian Wars in the American West. Since that day, the battlefield has possessed an evocative power for Indians and non-Indians, battle participants and their descendants, locals and out-of-state visitors, U.S. citizens and foreigners. As a memorial, the quiet scene on the North Fork of the Big Hole River has engendered veneration of various kinds: grave marking, monument-building, commemorative ceremonies, and physical preservation. The battlefield is “sacred ground.” It is imbued with meaning not only by the events that took place on August 9, 1877, but also by the symbolic actions of the thousands of people who have visited the site in the 120 years since that day.

Big Hole National Battlefield is also an historic site. Beginning with the after-battle reports of Lt. Colonel John Gibbon and Brig. General O. O. Howard, people have been concerned with documenting and reconstructing what happened there. Battlefield visitors have come to learn, and battlefield caretakers have sought to interpret. First the U.S. Forest Service, then the National Park Service, managed the site to preserve historic features and cultural artifacts.

Like other American battlefields that have been preserved, Big Hole National Battlefield combines the qualities of a memorial and a historic site. Bridging the two, battlefield preservation has come to involve certain conventions that bear a complex relationship to historical time. Visitors expect the battlefield to evoke the feeling on the eve of the battle (a peaceful landscape, a lost world), and to present cues for visualizing the battle itself (named features, interpretive signs), and to memorialize the battle’s legacy (graves, monuments, a place of solemn remembrance). In protecting, developing, and interpreting the battlefield, site managers have had to balance the demands of memorialization and historic preservation.

The Battlefield on the Eve of the Battle

On the eve of the battle the scene along the North Fork of the Big Hole River appeared much the same as it does today. The valley was spacious and open. Willows and occasional cottonwoods and lodgepole pine marked the meandering course of the river, while sagebrush and a sparse growth of prairie grasses covered the benchlands and the valley above the floodplain. Wildflowers were probably still in bloom in August. If wildlife was observable, it probably included much the same variety of animals that were recorded in the area in recent times: Columbia brown squirrel, jackrabbit, porcupine, badger, skunk, weasel, and other small mammals typical of this type of intermountain locale, together with a large number of bird species including swallows, warblers, sparrows, marsh hawks, and ducks. Mule deer and elk were probably reduced in numbers in the Big Hole in 1877 as they were throughout much of
their range. Bison, which had once occurred in the Big Hole, were gone from the valley by this time.

From the top of the bench where the National Park Service visitor center now stands, a person’s gaze is drawn from the battlefield to the mountains that frame this beautiful valley. Immediately to the north, across the river bottom, one sees the heavily forested foothills of the Sapphire Mountains, which run along the northwestern edge of the Big Hole and define the northern perimeter of the battlefield itself. Looking in the opposite direction, the Beaverhead Mountains jag down the west side of the valley and the Pioneer Mountains run down the east side, both fading into the distance to the south. The Pintlar Mountains form yet another rampart to the northeast. The Beaverhead, Pioneer, and Pintlar ranges are all topped by numerous peaks that rise above timberline. The highest of these shelter snowfields even in late summer. The scene affords an overall feeling of spaciousness, scenic beauty, and — to the modern observer — breathtakingly pristine conditions befitting this historic site.

The Twin Trees, where Nez Perce sharpshooters are said to have positioned themselves during the battle. Photo by K.D. Swan, October, 1921. Courtesy, U.S. Forest Service.

At nearly 7,000 feet elevation, the valley is prone to long, hard winters of bitter cold and deep snows. The harsh climate discouraged white settlement of the valley prior to 1877, and it has limited the amount of settlement since that time. Although the Big Hole is now a patchwork of private ranch lands dotted with haystacks, these features are relatively inconspicuous around the battlefield. The land remains so sparsely settled that one can easily imagine the way it
appeared at the time of the battle. It adds immeasurably to the power of the scene to contemplate how little it has changed since 1877.

The Big Hole Valley showed few traces of human use or occupancy in 1877. Among Indian peoples it had long been used as a summer hunting ground, a traditionally neutral zone frequented by plains tribes to the east and plateau tribes to the south and west. The Nez Perce people regarded the Big Hole as a middle ground between their homeland on the Clearwater River and the buffalo country east of the Rocky Mountains. They called the place “Izhkumzizlakikpah” after the small rodent that was abundant there. Indian use and occupancy were visible mainly in the few wide Indian trails that traversed the valley.

White settlers had not yet moved into the Big Hole in 1877. The Lewis and Clark expedition traversed the valley from north to south in 1805, and mountain men set their trap lines through the Big Hole in the 1820s and 1830s. Non-Indians had little more use for the area until 1862, when a party of prospectors discovered gold on Ruby Creek, a tributary to the Big Hole River. Located near the Continental Divide, the gold strike was approximately ten miles from the future site of the Battle of the Big Hole. The discovery produced a small flurry of activity that included the construction of a sawmill and some sluice boxes. The placer deposits, named the Pioneer Diggings, were abandoned that summer. Cattlemen began grazing their livestock in the valley in 1874.

Most of western Montana’s non-Indian residents lived in the mining towns of Butte, Helena, and Virginia City and the trading towns of Deer Lodge and Missoula in 1877. Agriculture in Montana was confined to the vicinity of these towns, a few valleys such as the Bitterroot, and a handful of Indian agencies. Although we do not have a census of Montana Territory for 1877, an estimate of Missoula County’s white population by the commanding officer at Fort Missoula in 1879 gives a fair impression. The officer gave the total white population as 1,875, distributed as follows: Missoula, 500; Frenchtown, 180; Stevensville, 150; Corvallis, 100; Skalkaho, 75; rural Bitterroot Valley, 400; Hell Gate and Grass Valley, 300; mining camps, 160; Flathead Lake country, 20; Horse Plains, 10. The Indian population, meanwhile, was mostly removed to the Jocko (Flathead) Reservation — except in summer when many groups returned to their traditional grounds for hunting, fishing, and gathering edible plants. The same officer gave the number of Indians as 1,000 Pend d’Oreilles, 500 Kootenais, and 120 Flatheads on the reservation, plus 350 Flatheads of Chief Charlot’s band who had refused to leave their home in the Bitterroot Valley. In addition, 11 lodges of Nez Perce under Eagle-from-the-Light — numbering no more than 50 people — lived with the Flatheads in the Bitterroot Valley.

Montana’s main transportation routes also contributed to the Big Hole’s isolation. Montana’s primary transportation route in 1877 was the Corinne-Virginia City Road, which ran north and south from the nearest railhead at Corinne, Utah, to the goldfields around Bannack and Virginia City. The road forked along the Red Rock-Beaverhead River, with one branch leading to Virginia City and Helena, and the other skirting the southern edge of the Big Hole at Horse Prairie on the way to Bannack and Deer Lodge. In the Deer Lodge Valley the road connected with Montana’s second important wagon road, the Mullan Road, which followed the Clark Fork
River to Missoula and went on into Idaho. Rough trails led from the upper Bitterroot Valley to the Big Hole via Skalkaho or Big Hole Pass, but these were nearly impassable for wagons.

The Nez Perce Encampment

In the second week of August, 1877, about 750 Nez Perce made camp in a lush meadow on the south side of the North Fork of the Big Hole River. Known to their white adversaries as the "non-treaty Nez Perce," most of the group had been on the move since early June, forced by the U.S. Army to leave their homelands in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho and to resettle on the Nez Perce Reservation in Idaho. En route to the reservation, several young men in the group attacked and killed 14 or 15 white settlers in Idaho, and U.S. troops under the command of General Oliver O. Howard had begun their pursuit. Joined by other disaffected bands of Nez Perce, the non-treaty Nez Perce had fought a series of battles and skirmishes in Idaho during the latter half of June and the first part of July, before crossing the Bitterroot Mountains.

The Nez Perce intended to remain in their camp on the North Fork of the Big Hole River for several days. They believed that the war was behind them. Having eluded General Oliver O. Howard in Idaho and crossed Lolo Pass into Montana, they thought the U.S. soldiers would cease their pursuit. Proof of this, it seemed, lay in the Nez Perce's successful maneuver around Fort Fizzle on the Montana side of Lolo Pass, where the soldiers who had been called up from Fort Missoula let them pass without a fight. "Thinking in tribal terms, rather than national," historian Aubrey Haines explains, "their war had been with the Idaho people; there was no need to fight the Montanans, who had always been their friends." Adding to their newfound sense of security, they had traveled through the Bitterroot Valley without serious incident, buying fresh supplies of ammunition from white traders along the way.

They arranged their 89 lodges in the form of a V with the apex pointing upstream. On the other side of the river, in the intervening area between the village and the foot of the mountain, stretched a stand of willows about one-quarter mile wide laced by an irregular pattern of shallow sloughs and grassy patches. Pine forest covered most of the mountainside, making the camp vulnerable to a surprise attack from across the willow-covered bottomland. The site of the encampment was not chosen as a defensive position, but rather because it was a familiar site to the Nez Perce who had passed this way before on their way to the buffalo country. There was a part of the mountainside across the river that was bare of trees, making excellent pasturage for the horses. There were also plenty of trees nearby which could be cut and dried to make travois and lodge poles.

Making their camp on the North Fork of the Big Hole, Chief Looking Glass counseled rest and calm. While the women gathered firewood, cut and peeled lodge poles, and laid them out to dry for several days, the men formed hunting and fishing parties. A few Nez Perce remained uneasy about the threat of attack, but the leaders insisted that the bands were no longer at war. On the night before the dawn attack, the Nez Perce did not post any sentries.
The Battle of the Big Hole

Contrary to the Nez Perce leaders' hopes, the American officers had no intention of letting the renegade bands of Nez Perce alone. While General Howard marched his command over the Bitterroot Range, Colonel Gibbon took up the pursuit with a force of 17 officers and 146 enlisted men from various posts across Montana. Trailing the Nez Perce up the Bitterroot Valley, Gibbon's force was augmented by volunteers from the Bitterroot settlements. The volunteers were added to a small detachment of cavalry under Lt. James H. Bradley. It was this cavalry detachment that Gibbon sent ahead to scout for the Nez Perce, and which discovered the camp on the North Fork of the Big Hole River.

Gibbon's plan was to surprise the Nez Perce, flush them onto the open ground east of the river bottom, and separate them from their horses. During the night of August 8, he moved his force into position at the foot of the mountain, above and to the west of the camp. Shortly before the first light of morning, about 3:30 a.m., the men began to deploy along the foot of the mountain at the edge of the willow flats flanking the encampment. Before they were fully deployed, however, a Nez Perce herder unwittingly approached the enemy line. There was a volley of shots, the man went down, and the soldiers rushed the village.

Nez Perce men, women, and children scrambled out of the lodges. Many of them, realizing that the high ground to the east of the village would afford no cover, ran for the willows or jumped into the river even though these were in the direction of their attackers. Others hid in the sloughs and concavities between the camp and the bench located immediately to the east of the tepees. In the dark amidst this pandemonium the warriors had to find their weapons — or to strip them from the enemy. Yellow Wolf recalled how he saw a "soldier crawling like a drunken man" and struck him with his war club, seizing his rifle and cartridge belt.

The southern end of the village was quickly overrun, but the soldiers' advance on the northern end of the village stalled with the death of Lt. Bradley. Apparently unaware that the victory was incomplete, Gibbon ordered the men on his right flank to burn the tepees, while the men on his left flank had not yet dislodged their opponents. The tepee covers were damp and did not ignite easily, and this curious distraction in the heat of the battle gave the Indians just the chance they needed to rally.

Two Nez Perce chiefs, Looking Glass and White Bird, exhorted the warriors to stand and fight. As the tide of battle turned, the soldiers found themselves caught in a deadly crossfire. Some of the Nez Perce were hidden amongst the willows; others had taken cover southwest of the village along the sweep of the riverbank or in the trees on the slope overlooking the village. Gradually Gibbon and his force fell back. After about an hour and a half or two hours of fighting, the colonel ordered his men to move back to the timber from which they had originally deployed.

The soldiers retreated to a low promontory at the edge of the timber. Gibbon had noted the defensive advantages of this Point of Timber (the Siege Area) while moving his men into position. It was hardly an ideal defensive position, but it afforded some cover and modest high
ground on three sides. The men used the limited supply of rocks and downfall to form breastworks and they dug rifle pits with their trowel bayonets. The Nez Perce warriors slowly encircled them, one warrior getting behind a log within fifty yards of their position. Meanwhile, some distance away, Gibbon’s single 12-pounder mountain howitzer and gun crew were attacked on their way to support the assault on the village and the gun was captured. With no help in sight, Gibbon ordered his men to conserve their ammunition and prepare for a siege.

With Gibbon’s force pinned down across the river, the Nez Perce gathered their dead from the village and the surrounding area. “As the people mourned,” writes Merrill D. Beal, “they wept with such feeling that the battle-toughened men in the trenches listened and trembled.” Some thirty Nez Perce — men, women, and children — were slain in the village and many more, perhaps as many as sixty, died while trying to escape or counterattack. Nearly every family lost someone. Joseph and Ollokot both lost wives. The Nez Perce buried the dead as well as they could, wrapping them in buffalo robes and placing them under cutbanks.20

At the end of the long day, Gibbon sent three runners out under cover of darkness in the hope of obtaining help from General Howard and medical supplies from the town of Deer Lodge. Some 20 or 30 Nez Perce warriors maintained the siege of Gibbon’s position through the night and into the next day, while the rest of the bands made haste to get away before the arrival of General Howard’s troops. Finally, about 11 a.m. on the second day, the warriors lifted their siege and melted away.21

The End of the Nez Perce War

The Battle of the Big Hole was a turning point in the Nez Perce War. Although the Nez Perce avoided defeat and capture, they sustained grievous losses. Moreover, they now knew that the U.S. Army would not give up its pursuit. After the battle, the Nez Perce fled south and east in the vain hope of finding sanctuary on the Crow Reservation in eastern Montana, then north in a desperate bid to reach Canada. Howard summoned other forces to head them off, and at the Battle of the Bear’s Paw in north central Montana the Nez Perce were once more attacked and brought to surrender after a six-day siege.

Despite their captors’ promise that they would be allowed to return to their homeland, most of the non-treaty Nez Perce were exiled in Oklahoma. There, many of them died of malnutrition. When the survivors were allowed to return to the Pacific Northwest many years later, some settled on the Colville Reservation in Washington, others on the Nez Perce Reservation in Idaho. Later, some went to the Umatilla Reservation in Oregon. The Nez Perce War exacerbated differences between the treaty and non-treaty bands of Nez Perce. The bitter legacy of war and exile left the Nez Perce a divided people. Tragic in its own right, the persistence of intratribal differences would profoundly affect administration of the battlefield site throughout the twentieth century.

The Battlefield after the Battle

When dawn came on August 11, Gibbon’s force was in possession of the field. But he could hardly claim victory. His losses in the Battle of the Big Hole were heavy: 29 dead and 40 wounded. The volunteers had sustained a 30 percent casualty rate, the officers 50 percent. Although two volunteers reported the whereabouts of the fleeing Nez Perce cavalcade — distinguished by the dust cloud rising on the west edge of the valley about 30 miles to the south — Gibbon’s force was in no shape to pursue.22

Most of the non-Indian dead lay among the willows where the initial attack had occurred or at the Point of Timber, to be known henceforth as the “Siege Area.” Most of the wounded lay in the rifle pits. When General Howard arrived with his advance party of cavalry about 10:00 a.m. on the 11th, he found the place resembling a hospital guard:

So many wounded; nearly half lying cheerful, though not able to move; many white bandages about the head and face; some arms in slings; there were roughly constructed shelters from the heat of an unrelenting August sun.23
Two doctors with Howard’s command provided medical care until more help arrived. On August 13, a force of thirty-five volunteers, two doctors, and four wagons arrived from Butte. Another party of 60 volunteers, three doctors, and twenty wagons arrived from Helena. These relief parties also brought ambulances and tents. Eventually the wounded men were transported to St. Joseph’s Hospital in Deer Lodge.24

While doctors attended the wounded, the able-bodied soldiers and volunteers buried their fallen comrades. In general, the volunteers and the soldiers each buried their own. Aubrey Haines, an historian with the National Park Service who served on the Big Hole staff in the 1960s, made a close study of both the physical and documentary evidence concerning the location of these burials. Haines concludes that the bodies were probably buried near where they lay rather than gathered together in a common grave. He quotes a statement by Cpl. Charles W. Loynes that the dead “were buried as best we could at that time.” Haines notes the lack of digging tools and the difficulty of transporting bodies across the sloughs.25

G. O. Shields, author of The Battle of the Big Hole (1889), described the initial burials as somewhat more dignified:

Captain [Richard] Comba was sent out on the morning of the 11th with a party of men to bury the dead soldiers and citizens, all of whom were found, recognized, and decently interred. Rude head boards, obtained by breaking up cracker boxes, were placed at the heads of the graves, on which were written, or carved, the name, company, and regiment of the citizen whose grave each marked.26

Even if Shields’ account was colored by sentimentality, it still lends support to the theory that the soldiers were buried about where they lay.

No one could report with certainty how many Nez Perce were killed in the Battle of the Big Hole. Colonel Gibbon reported that his burial detail counted 83 dead Nez Perce at the battlefield plus 6 more who died from their wounds and were found in a ravine some distance from the battlefield.27 Like the soldiers, the Nez Perce appear to have buried most of their dead near where they lay. A number of bodies were placed along the river banks where the earth could be caved in over them. Others were buried in camas ovens — pits that the Nez Perce had dug for roasting camas. Gibbon’s burial detail made some effort to deepen these graves but without much success. In the days following the battle General Howard’s Bannock scouts returned to the site, broke into these shallow graves, and desecrated the remains of their erstwhile enemies. White souvenir hunters defiled the Nez Perce burials as well.28

The many corpses were not the only sign of battle. A number of the Nez Perce’s horses lay dead and bloating in the summer sun. The battlefield was littered with equipment, clothing, blankets, and spent cartridges. There were several tepees still standing in the Encampment Area, stripped of their skin covers, and dozens of tepee poles lay scattered about where the Nez Perce women had peeled them the day before the battle.29 Around the Siege Area, the lodgepole pines showed numerous abrasions where flying bullets had grazed the bark or embedded themselves in the trunks of these trees. The rifle pits, which the men had gouged out of the soil in desperate haste on August 9, probably still smelled of newly turned earth in the days after the battle. These
impressions in the trees and earth would soon dull with exposure to rain and sun, but in muted form they would last for decades.

General Howard waited for the arrival of the rest of his command on August 12, and with the addition of 50 men from Gibbon’s command he resumed his pursuit of the Nez Perce on August 13. Gibbon, meanwhile, dismissed the volunteers and led the remainder of his force, including the wounded, to Deer Lodge. Three days after the battle the place was already deserted.

In the following weeks, many people from the Bitterroot Valley and elsewhere visited the battlefield to satisfy their curiosity or collect souvenirs. A circuit-riding Methodist minister, Rev. W. W. Van Orsdale, passed by the battlefield in mid-September en route from Bannack to the Bitterroot Valley. He reported the grim news that bears and other wild animals had dug up a number of the human remains and dragged them from their graves. As a result, a party of Bitterroot settlers was organized to retrieve the bodies of the volunteers for reburial in cemeteries in the Bitterroot Valley, and a detail of soldiers from Fort Missoula was dispatched to rebury the soldiers’ remains at the battlefield. The officer in charge of the latter, Lt. J. T. Van Orsdale, 7th Infantry, had been in the fight.

Van Orsdale’s report was unusually vague regarding locations of the soldiers’ graves. Since it is the only first-hand account of where the bodies were laid to rest it is quoted here in full:

I have the honor to report that in compliance with Post Order No. 54, dated Hdqrs. Post Near Missoula, M.T., Sept. 19, 1877, I left said Post with party of 8 enlisted on the morning of the 20th and proceeded via Deer Lodge to the Battlefield of the Big Hole for the purpose of re-burying the dead, etc. I found that some fourteen (14) including Capt. [William] Logan and Lieut. Bradley had been disinterred; the officers had been scalped showing that Indians as well as wolves and other animals had been at work at the dead. I reburied the same with the exception of Capt. Logan whose remains I brought to this place and deposited in the Cemetery for the time being. I examined the Field thoroughly with a view of finding out if possible the numbers of Indians killed and determined the presence of more than eighty (80) scattered from a point one mile below where the lower end of their Camp rested at time of battle to a point opposite the rifle pits constructed by troops, a total distance of nearly 1-1/2 miles. Said number included those visible or partially so.

Haines suggests that Van Orsdale placed all of the soldiers’ remains in a common grave on the edge of the bluff below the point where the granite soldiers’ monument would be situated six years later. He cites as evidence Colonel Gibbon’s poem of the battle, in which he writes,

There is the very spot where [William] English fell,
Close by the spot where our dead soldiers sleep.

Moreover, this would have been standard military practice. (Soldiers’ remains were placed in common graves after the Battle of the Little Big Horn in 1876 and after the Battle of the Bears’ Paw in 1877.)

There is some evidence to the contrary, however. Thomas C. “Bunch” Sherrill, a Bitterroot volunteer, later served as caretaker of the battlefield and placed a number of interpretive signs
around the site. A number of Sherrill’s interpretive signs described not only where soldiers and Nez Perce were killed or wounded, but also where the dead were buried. “Three soldiers buried [sic] here one shot thru the head, names unknown,” stated one sign. “Another soldier buried [sic] here with [Sergeant Edward] Page,” read another.

Sherrill may have been ignorant of the soldier reburials; however, his description is corroborated by mountain man Andrew Garcia’s description in the posthumously published Montana classic, *Tough Trip Through Paradise* (1967). Garcia visited the battlefield in 1878 at the behest of his young Nez Perce bride, In-who-lise, who had lost her father and sister and was herself wounded in the battle. Although Garcia wrote his account more than fifty years later — after visiting the battlefield a second time in 1930 when Sherrill’s interpretive signs might have “refreshed” his memory — his description nonetheless casts doubt on the supposition that the soldiers were buried in a common grave:

We tried to find the grave of In-who-lise’s sister, Lucy, but our search was in vain. The sight was awful to see. Human bones were scattered around as though they had never been buried. *Still, it looked as if the soldiers had been buried where they fell and their graves were in fair condition.*

Captain William Logan’s grave, Custer Battlefield National Cemetery (now Little Big Horn Battlefield). Logan was the only casualty of the Battle of the Big Hole to be reburied in this cemetery. *Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.*
Another document written in 1910 further clouds the issue of where the soldiers' bodies lie. U.S. Army Quartermaster General J. B. Alshire was asked how much area should be reserved for the War Department to protect the national monument. He replied as follows:

The only interments ever made on this site were of those who were killed in the battle of 1877. There are no marked grave sites now, and according to the best information obtainable it seems that all these bodies have since been removed. All that there is there is a monument erected in 1883 by authority of the Secretary of War, around which a protective steel fence was erected in 1909. It is thought that all that is necessary is to have sufficient ground set apart for the protection of this monument.36

A search of the Army Quartermaster's records at the National Archives failed to disclose what information, if any, formed the basis of Alshire's remarks. In any case, Alshire's statement appears to have resolved any doubts about how the battlefield ought to be memorialized. The transformation of this site from burial ground to national monument is the subject of the next chapter.37
Chapter Two
Administration under the U.S. War Department (1883-1910)

Federal recognition and administration of Big Hole battlefield developed slowly in the decades after the battle. A monument to the U.S. soldiers was erected at the site in 1883. A bill to establish a national park was considered in 1906. After the Antiquities Act of that year, officials in the War Department, the U.S. Forest Service, and the General Land Office moved cautiously to set aside a small area under executive order.

Early Interpretation of the Battle

The Battle of the Big Hole generated immediate and widespread interest. Even more than the Nez Perces’ long retreat over the Bitterroot Mountains into Montana, the hard-fought battle turned the Nez Perces’ struggle into an epic, sensational event. That these Indians had been ambushed in their tepees and had still managed to escape seemed to confirm the military genius of the Nez Perce chiefs. Even as the war continued, newspaper writers spawned the legend of Chief Joseph’s superb military leadership. The timing of the battle was important, too. “Coming within fourteen months of the Custer Massacre,” historian Merrill D. Beal has written, it “aroused the whole nation and attracted the attention of the world.” Some observers predicted that the Nez Perces’ resistance could lead to a general Indian uprising.¹

Survivors of the Battle of the Big Hole began to interpret what had happened as soon as the campaign was over. Colonel Gibbon wrote an “after action” report of the battle on September 20 from his hospital bed in Deer Lodge, detailing his actions and those of his adversary. General Howard also filed a report that fall. Gibbon and Howard each described the encounter in retrospect — Gibbon in an article published in Harper’s Weekly in 1895, Howard in Nez Perce Joseph (1881) and again in My Life and Experiences among Hostile Indians (1907). Several soldiers and volunteers published accounts of the battle in various national magazines during the 1880s and 1890s. Even if these many accounts by survivors of the conflict varied in detail and reliability, they all contributed to making the Battle of the Big Hole perhaps the most well-documented battle of the Indian Wars.

No sooner was the war over than contemporaries sought to draw moral lessons from the episode. A New York Times editorial charged that “the Nez Perce War was, on the part of our government, an unpardonable and frightful blunder.” The Nez Perce had been “goaded by injustice and wrong to take the war path.”² Chief Joseph corroborated this view. Following his exile to Oklahoma, he recounted his people’s story to a writer who published it in The North American Review in 1879.³ Significantly, the piece was titled “An Indian’s View of Indian Affairs” — it used the story of the Nez Perce War to draw larger lessons about federal Indian policy. Similarly, when members of Congress held hearings on the conduct of the Nez Perce War in 1878, they asked Colonel Gibbon not only to provide analysis of the Army’s poor
showing in the battle and the campaign, but to expand on the problems of federal-Indian relations.4

The lively interest in the Battle of the Big Hole extended to the battlefield itself. Montana pioneer Granville Stuart visited the battlefield on May 11, 1878, and made two sketches of what he saw. The first was a panorama looking toward the mountainside, with numbered annotations describing the soldiers’ approach, the Nez Perce Encampment, the Twin Trees, and the Point of Timber to which the soldiers fell back. Stuart must have been accompanied by a veteran of the battle when he made this drawing. His second drawing was an artistic rendering in birdseye perspective. The litter of human skulls, horse skeletons, and tepee poles in the foreground of the picture suggested a moral censure of the attack on the Nez Perce village — a noteworthy perspective for a white resident of the territory.5 It contrasted sharply with contemporary views of the Battle of the Little Bighorn that venerated Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer and his men as martyrs in the cause of westward expansion.6

At least two schematic maps of the battlefield were made by or with the help of participants in the battle. Pvt. Holmes L. Coon located the main features of the battle in a crude sketch. And one L. T. Henry made a map of the site based on notes and measurements provided by Capt. J. M. T. Sanno, a battle veteran. The latter was presented to the Historical Society of Montana by the *Helena Herald* on September 2, 1888.

**The Soldiers’ Monument**

In 1883 a granite monument was erected at the battlefield to honor the soldier dead. Who initiated the project and precisely what the monument meant were details soon forgotten. Official correspondence in the early 1900s — when the soldiers’ monument was already nearly twenty years old — disclosed that authorities in the War Department were uncertain whether the monument doubled as a grave marker or not. In the absence of documentation, it was assumed that it did not.

The idea for the soldiers’ monument may have originated with Colonel Gibbon. The colonel recommended a number of his men for Medals of Honor, and years after the battle he wrote letters in support of the Bitterroot volunteers’ claims for compensation for their service. Together with General Howard and Col. Nelson Miles, he also took an interest in the cause of returning the exiled Nez Perce to their homeland. In addition to these activities, it appears that Gibbon first suggested the idea of a monument to commemorate the slain members of his command at the Battle of the Big Hole.7

On February 28, 1882, Secretary of War Robert T. Lincoln authorized the expenditure of $800 for the placement of a granite monument on the Big Hole Battlefield. The expenditure came from incidentals of the quartermaster’s department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1882, and did not require an act of Congress.8 The six-ton monument was cut in Concord, New Hampshire, shipped by railroad to Dillon, and hauled by ox teams from there to the battlefield. It was erected in September 1883 by a detachment of soldiers from Fort Missoula, under the command of Capt. J. T. Thompson, Third Infantry.9

Cut in the shape of a stout obelisk and bearing an inscription that honored the U.S. soldiers who fell in the battle while making no mention of Nez Perce casualties, the “soldiers’ monument” conveyed a nationalistic sentiment of honorable sacrifice. The dimensions and placement of the soldiers’ monument near the Siege Area were suggestive of a large, common gravestone. Indeed, like the granite obelisk placed at the Little Bighorn Battlefield in 1886, it bore the names of all the officers and enlisted men killed in the conflict. Yet the soldiers’ monument made no specific reference to soldiers’ graves.

In the years following the placement of the soldiers’ monument, the Big Hole Valley grew less isolated. Homesteaders moved into the valley beginning in May 1882, taking up claims along the river and creeks where they could grow hay and raise cattle. Small ranches soon dotted the length of the Big Hole and the towns of Wisdom and Jackson Hot Springs sprang to life.10 Transportation in the valley remained primitive; one of the early wagon roads originated from...
settlers using the wheel ruts made by the wagon that had carried the granite monument into the valley in 1883. As the Big Hole became settled, tourists frequented the battlefield in growing numbers. The soldiers' monument served to mark the site years before there was any official interpretation or protection of the battlefield.

One person who visited the soldiers' monument, Lt. P. Murray, 3rd Infantry, was disturbed by what he found. "Relic hunters," Murray complained, were defacing the monument. In a letter dated February 6, 1895, Murray stated that "nearly all the corners are broken off, the edges being similarly attacked." He also found that the pine trees around the Siege Area were being "cut to pieces by people hunting for bullets." Murray's letter was forwarded to Capt. George S. Hoyt, assistant quartermaster in Helena. In June 1895, Hoyt submitted an estimate for the erection of an iron fence to enclose the soldiers' monument and protect it from further vandalism. No appropriation was made at this time.

Soldier's monument in Siege Area. The metal cage was added later to protect the monument from souvenir collectors. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.
On February 8, 1900, the Senate passed a resolution requesting the Secretary of War to ascertain what action “has been taken or should be taken to properly mark the graves of those killed and buried on or near the battlefield, and to preserve such marks from obliteration.” In reply, Quartermaster General M. I. Ludington stated that “the records of this office give no information on the subject of the Big Hole battlefield, or the marking of the graves of those buried there.” Ludington was only able to produce correspondence from 1882-1883 regarding the erection of the soldiers’ monument and from 1895 regarding the need for a protective fence. Less than a quarter century after the battle, the administrative record of this soldiers’ monument was already obscure to the officials responsible for maintaining it.

A National Park Proposal and a Temporary Land Withdrawal

Between 1900 and 1910, a number of proposals were put forward to make some kind of federal reservation around the battlefield. These various proposals included a Senate resolution, a House bill, administrative actions by both the War Department and the fledgling U.S. Forest Service, and finally a presidential proclamation. The proposals languished, and the government’s hesitation probably attested to continuing uncertainty about whether the site held any soldiers’ remains.

The Senate resolution of February 8, 1900 requested information on whether the area was surveyed. Implicit in the Senate resolution was the idea that the government might withdraw an area of the public domain from private land entry. Correspondence between the Adjutant General’s Office and the General Land Office (GLO) in March 1900 established that the sections around the monument were not yet surveyed. The latter office made a projection, based on existing surveys, that placed the battlefield in sections 31 and 32, T1S, R16W; and sections 5 and 6, T25S, R16W, Montana meridian. No further action was taken.

Two years later, in October 1902, the War Department requested an update of this information. The GLO replied that the land was still unsurveyed; however, it now placed the battlefield approximately six miles southwest of the earlier location in the N½ of section 24, T25S, R17W. The GLO stated at this time that it saw no reason why the land “should not be withdrawn from settlement and declared a military reservation,” that is, a commemorative site under War Department jurisdiction. Still, no further action was taken.

On February 13, 1906, Congressman Joseph M. Dixon of Montana introduced House Resolution 12699, a bill to create a “Big Hole Battle Ground National Park.” This bill is significant as an expression of national park purposes early in the development of the national park system. In February 1906 there were less than a dozen national parks in the nation. All were nominally under the administration of the secretary of the interior, although the U.S. Army had functional responsibility for a number of them. The Antiquities Act, so vital to the expansion of the national park system in its authorization of presidents to create national monuments by proclamation, still lay four months in the future.
The bill provided for a reservation of 1,280 acres: the E1/2 of sections 13 and 24, T25S, R17W, and the W1/2 of sections 18 and 19, T25S, R16W. The bill placed the national park under the administration of the secretary of the interior, and declared that any act of vandalism toward “any monument, grave, or building, fence, or improvement” would be punishable by fine or imprisonment. The bill was submitted to the Committee on Public Lands.\(^\text{17}\)

Secretary of the Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock suggested amending the bill so that the secretary of war rather than the secretary of the interior would administer the area. The latter official, Hitchcock explained, had “supervision of national military parks, which reserve famous battlefields, and national cemeteries, where deceased soldiers are interred.”\(^\text{18}\) These were sacred places where the nation memorialized its wars and the people expected to find a solemn kind of inspiration. National parks, by contrast, were “set aside as pleasure grounds for the use and benefit of all the people, and with a view to preserving forests, wonders of nature, etc.”\(^\text{19}\) Managing a historic place particularly if it related to war, it seemed to Hitchcock, was beyond his department’s ken.

Hitchcock raised another consideration. According to the GLO, 840 acres of the area proposed for a national park were covered by three private claims. These included one patented desert land entry, one pending claim under the Desert Land Act, and one pending claim under the Homestead Act.\(^\text{20}\) Hitchcock, therefore, proposed another amendment that would allow land exchanges between private owners and the government to restore these lands to public ownership. Meanwhile, Hitchcock took the precaution, in case the bill were passed, of directing the commissioner of the GLO to suspend all applications and entries for lands in the four sections mentioned in the bill until further notice.\(^\text{21}\)
Forest Service Initiatives

Four months after Congressman Dixon introduced his national park bill, Congress passed the Antiquities Act of June 8, 1906. Sponsored by Congressman John Lacey of Iowa, the law was intended to protect areas of unusual historic or scientific interest. It authorized the president to proclaim such areas as national monuments. President Theodore Roosevelt immediately invoked the law to create Devils Tower National Monument in Wyoming, thereby establishing the important precedent that national monuments could encompass monumental landforms (much like national parks) as well as archeological or historic resources. Despite this action, however, there was no immediate expectation that national monuments would be administered together with national parks by one agency. That development would come many years after the creation of the National Park Service, when Executive Order 6288 consolidated national monuments, military parks, and historic sites within the national park system.22

Lodgepole pine scarred by souvenir hunters, who cut bullets out of the trunk. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.

The Forest Service, newly established in 1905 as a land management agency in charge of national forests, responded quickly and aggressively to the legislation. Forester Gifford Pinchot promptly revised The Use Book, the agency’s versatile little handbook of regulations and instructions for use of the national forests, to reflect the Forest Service’s ability to manage such areas. The 1906 edition, issued less than a month after passage of the Antiquities Act, included the following two paragraphs on historic and scientific monuments:
All persons are prohibited from appropriating, excavating, injuring, or destroying any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity situated on lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States, without the permission of the Secretary who has jurisdiction over the land involved.

Forest officers should report to the Forester the location and description of all objects of great scientific or historic interest which they find upon forest reserves, and should prevent all persons from injuring these objects without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture.

Pinchot’s purpose was to demonstrate that national monuments need not be transferred out of the Forest Service’s jurisdiction for they would receive due consideration under national forest management. In Pinchot’s haste to embrace the new legislation, these paragraphs were tacked onto the Forest Service’s Regulation 43 concerning wild hay!

The Big Hole National Forest was established in November 1906. It was enlarged and renamed the Beaverhead National Forest two years later. The original national forest boundary ran through sections 13 and 24, T25S, R17W, intersecting the area withdrawn by the GLO in connection with the battleground national park bill. Consequently, the GLO brought the park proposal to the attention of the Forest Service. One C. R. Pierce, a clerk in the GLO’s Law Division, reported that local citizens wanted the Forest Service to protect the battlefield and the soldiers’ monument from vandalism. “It seems that it can best be done,” Pierce concluded, “by withdrawing the land as a National monument.”

The Forest Service surveyed the site, which it called the “proposed Gibbons Battle Field National Monument,” during the winter of 1907-08. Forest Supervisor C. K. Wyman forwarded a map and cost estimate for improvements to Forester Gifford Pinchot on April 18, 1908. Wyman wanted to put a barbwire fence around the whole area. His estimate also carried an item for “cleaning up grounds and burning down timber.”

It is unclear what happened to this national monument proposal. Perhaps it was converted into an appropriation request. On January 22, 1908, Joseph M. Dixon, now a U.S. senator from Montana, submitted an amendment to the Army appropriations bill providing for $1,200 for restoration of the soldiers’ monument and construction of a suitable iron or steel fence to go around it and protect it from vandalism. Presumably the fence pictured in later photographs (and since removed) was built at this time.

In the meantime, the Forest Service decided to protect the battlefield by withdrawing the area as an administrative site. Forest Ranger W. H. Utley prepared a report and plat on the “Gibbons Battlefield Administrative Site” in the summer of 1909. Forest Supervisor C. K. Wyman approved the withdrawal on September 17, 1909. It encompassed 115 acres in three adjoining rectangular blocks along the foot of the mountain. It included the soldiers’ monument together with a suitable area for a ranger station about 400 feet up the draw. Assistant Forest Ranger Arthur M. Keas, who would occupy the site beginning in 1912, described it as “the best location obtainable in this district for the Ranger’s headquarters and for fire protection.”
Establishment of Big Hole Battlefield National Monument

The final action leading to the proclamation of Big Hole Battlefield National Monument by executive order on June 23, 1910 was mundane. One can search in vain for any profound statements about the purposes of the national monument. Instead, it appears to have begun with a telephone call from a clerk in the GLO to Secretary of the Interior Richard A. Ballinger, relaying citizens’ concern in Beaverhead County that the four sections of land mentioned in the unsuccessful national park bill of 1906 were still withdrawn from entry. Should these four sections be reopened to settlement? Secretary Ballinger drafted a memorandum on Big Hole battlefield for the War Department, providing a brief history of administrative developments since 1882 and inquiring whether the lands temporarily withdrawn should be set aside by executive order as a “military reservation.” This memorandum was circulated to the Adjutant General’s Office, the Quartermaster General’s Office, and Army Headquarters Department of Dakota, collecting nine endorsements before returning to Secretary of War Jacob M. Dickinson. Two endorsements were significant. Quartermaster General J. B. Alshire stated — with deliberate vagueness it would appear — that the battlefield had “no marked grave sites now, and according to the best information obtainable it seems that all these bodies have since been removed.” Noting the placement of the soldiers’ monument, he advised that all that was necessary was to have “sufficient ground set apart for the protection of this monument.”31 Brig. General C. L. Hodges recommended “that a square of five acres be set aside by Executive Order as a military reservation for the better protection of this battle monument,” with the soldiers’ monument at the center of the square.32

Secretary Dickinson approved the proposal for a small reservation to protect the soldiers’ monument. Commissioner of the General Land Office Fred H. Dennett confirmed the location of the site and provided information that it did not overlap the single patented desert land claim in the area belonging to one W. H. Reinken. Both Dickinson and Dennett quoted Alshire’s statement that there were no known soldiers’ remains at the site. Dennett then drafted an executive order, which President William H. Taft signed on June 23, 1910 (Appendix A). The executive order established a five-acre reservation of unsurveyed land “embracing the Big Hole Battlefield Monument in Beaverhead County.”

Changes in the Landscape

At the same time that Big Hole National Monument was being established, the Big Hole Valley was undergoing significant change. Montana’s homestead boom reached a climax in the first two decades of the twentieth century. While the high plains of central and eastern Montana absorbed the greatest number of hopeful new settlers, the Big Hole and other mountain valleys in western Montana continued to attract more people too. A number of families established ranches along the North Fork of the Big Hole around the turn of the century. These included George Thompson, Johnny Cottrell, Herman Mussigbrod, Don Alby, Weldon Else, and the Lawrence and Bacon families. According to local tradition, the George Mudd Ranch, located in the
northwest section of the Big Hole, hosted Theodore Roosevelt during a hunting trip sometime in the early 1890s.33

The Big Hole settlers made a living raising cattle and hay. Most of the land entries in the vicinity of the battlefield were made under the Desert Land Act of 1877, which authorized individuals to claim up to 640 acres at $.25 per acre provided that the land was irrigated within three years. Settlers often formed irrigation companies for mutual assistance in developing ditch systems and establishing their land claims. One such company, the Trail Creek Water Company, was incorporated on March 3, 1910. Initial directors of the company were Robert H. Jones, Edward A. Sweet, William J. Tope, John B. Tope, and Hans Johnson, all of Wisdom, Montana.34 Major developments by this company near the battlefield — and the water rights associated with it — are described in detail in Chapter Seven.

Early settlers had already built a number of small irrigation ditches near the battlefield by 1910. A ditch diverting water from Trail Creek (now the North Fork of the Big Hole) just east of the present Big Hole National Battlefield boundary was depicted on a GLO plat of 1900. It ran northwest to the open meadow, suggesting early hay production in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield. By 1915, when T2N, R17W was finally surveyed, the land along Ruby Creek, Trail Creek, and the Big Hole River was riddled with ditches.35

Today, the Ruby Ditch remains the most discernable ditch construction within the national monument boundaries. Although documentary evidence is scarce, this ditch and an associated wood flume and trestle are thought to have been constructed prior to 1900 by the Salt Lake Placer Company. These works carried water from Trail Creek to the benchlands above the valley, where the water was used in a hydraulic mining operation. The resulting gash in the hillside, still visible today, is commonly referred to as the “Mormon diggings.”36 Two other ditches parallel the Ruby Ditch on the slope between the present-day visitor center and the battlefield area.

From 1877 to 1910, the War Department was more instrumental than any other government agency in preserving and memorializing the battlefield. Although the Forest Service acquired a presence in the area after 1906, War Department administration shaped the national monument to 1910. The small area set aside by executive order in 1910 was befitting a war memorial but it was not conducive to historical interpretation. This early site protection laid the foundations for Big Hole National Battlefield's subsequent administrative history. From 1910 to the present, an overriding concern for managers of the area would be to acquire a larger land base that would include more of the battlefield and enable a more comprehensive and balanced view of the battle.
From 1910 to 1936 the national monument was primarily under the care of the U.S. Forest Service. Although the War Department retained jurisdiction over the five-acre site around the soldiers’ monument, War Department officials supported virtually every recommendation of the Forest Service concerning the proper protection and development of the grounds. For all practical purposes, the Forest Service managed the national monument and the adjoining 115-acre Gibbon’s Battlefield Administrative Site (see Chapter Two) as one unit. Although the five-acre national monument was transferred from the War Department to the National Park Service (NPS) in 1933, the Forest Service continued to have a presence until the national monument was enlarged by presidential proclamation in 1939.

Just as the War Department had largely determined the size, shape, and character of this commemorative site from the day after the battle until its establishment as a national monument 33 years later, the Forest Service put its unique stamp on Big Hole National Battlefield over the next 30 years. In contrast to the War Department’s rather narrow focus on honoring the soldier dead, the Forest Service took a more expansive approach by encouraging public use of the area for historical interest and recreation. This led to the development of a year-round ranger station and public campground facilities near the battlefield.

Ranger Station Development

As with so much else the Forest Service did, the withdrawal of the Gibbon’s Battlefield Administrative Site was made with multiple uses in mind. As noted in Chapter Two, the withdrawal seemed like a prudent thing to do in light of the national park proposal introduced in Congress in 1906. More to the point, Forest Service officials were motivated to make administrative site withdrawals by the Forest Homestead Act of June 11, 1906, which gave citizens the opportunity to enter upon national forest land and claim up to 160 acres provided that the land was suitable for agriculture. From the young agency’s standpoint, the Forest Homestead Act produced something of a land rush on the national forests. Quite apart from the threat to the Big Hole Battlefield, the many homestead claims competed with the Forest Service’s ability to secure good agricultural and pasture land for its own ranger stations; officials recognized the need to make administrative site withdrawals in order to preserve the agency’s ability to develop these sites in the future. Thus, in the Beaverhead National Forest and throughout the West, rangers were busy recommending and surveying hundreds of administrative sites — many of which would never be developed.¹

The Gibbons Battlefield Administrative Site contained all the essentials for a ranger station: enough agricultural land to raise a little hay for stock and to grow a vegetable garden for the ranger and his family, and suitable pasture for a few head of horses. Forest service regulations in
the *Use Book* defined these requirements in detail and noted that care had to be taken to select sites that did not conflict with existing mineral or homestead claims.²

Administrative sites functioned as staging areas for the re-supply of backcountry rangers, seasonal forest guards, and fire lookouts. Forest rangers selected administrative sites along common routes of travel — generally no more than one day’s horse ride from one another. Prior to the 1920s there were few roads in the national forests and travel by horse was the ranger’s primary mode of travel. Consequently, the need for stock pasture was a crucial consideration. Other considerations for a site’s selection included proximity to areas with exceptional fire hazard, commercial timber, or other resources (such as the historic battlefield). Finally, administrative sites were selected to be visible and convenient to the public.

It was important to the Forest Service that the Gibbons Battlefield Administrative Site was convenient to the Big Hole ranching community. In the Forest Service’s early years, the rangers’ most important contacts with the public were not with lumberman as one might expect; rather, they were with stockgrowers, homesteaders, and miners, all of whom required reassurance that the Forest Service was not “locking up” resources. Many forest rangers in Montana assisted with the formation of livestock associations for purposes of regulating livestock grazing on the national forests.³
The Forest Service had all these purposes in view when it developed the Gibbon’s Battlefield Administrative Site. Built in 1912, the ranger station consisted of a four-room frame house, horse stable, and tool house. The buildings were located about 400 feet up a draw from the soldiers’ monument, less than 150 feet west of the five-acre national monument boundary. In contrast to the modern-day visitor center, the development site was practically on top of ground traversed by the combatants in 1877. Other improvements were added over the years. Assorted maps and inventories from the 1920s and 1930s are unclear as to when various structures were built; however, they show a growing number of buildings associated with the ranger station complex. These included a garage, woodshed, two machine storage sheds, latrine, corrals, pasture fences, water pipe line, and yard fence.

The first occupants were Ranger Arthur M. Keas and his wife Frances. The Keas lived at the station until July 1917. Ranger Marshall G. Ramsey moved into the station in August 1917 and remained there until the fall of 1929 when Gibbon’s Battlefield and Steel Creek Ranger District were combined to form Wisdom Ranger District and Ramsey moved his headquarters to the town of Wisdom. Ramsey remained district ranger until 1940.

The Forest Service administrative presence provided protection for the national monument. To NPS inspectors in the 1930s, the unoccupied ranger station detracted from the historical integrity of the battlefield. But to visitors in the previous two decades the government buildings may have contributed something to the place’s charm. When it was occupied, the ranger station was landscaped with flower beds and a public drinking fountain and the lawn in front of the house was fenced and well tended. Local writer Ella C. Hathaway, describing the Big Hole section of the designated scenic route known as the Park-to-Park Highway in 1919, commented that “one of the beauty spots along the route is the ranger station at the Gibbon’s Battlefield.” The government, she noted, had “extensive plans for making this popular resort even more popular.”

Ranger Marshall Ramsey, who occupied the Gibbon’s Battlefield Administrative Site and Ranger Station in the late 1920s. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.
Some time between 1912 and 1919 the Forest Service built a summer cottage in Battle Gulch for Tom C. Sherrill, a former Bitterroot volunteer and caretaker of the battlefield. Sherrill developed a rapport with visitors to the national monument, regaling them with his own colorful stories of the battle. He and his family spent many summers at the battlefield, housed in what Ella Hathaway described as “one of the coziest bungalows in the hills.” Sherrill “retired” about 1923. Assistant Forester Will C. Barnes described Sherrill’s position to the War Department in 1925:

For several years we maintained a civil employee who acted as guide to the field but for want of funds we were forced to drop him about two years ago. He was one of the survivors of the battle and told a very good story to the visitors.10

There were proposals to reinstate this position but nothing came of it. With improvements in communications and transportation, the trend in the Forest Service was toward consolidation of ranger districts and reductions in the number of summer employees or “forest guards.” One official suggested that the battlefield caretaker position “would be a very nice assignment for some ranger who is approaching retirement age, and might be provided for in that way.” But the caretaker’s cottage remained empty.11

Visitor Access and Use

Access to this remote location improved in the years after the national monument’s establishment. About 1915, a graded road was completed from the Bitterroot Valley over the Sapphire Mountains by way of Gibbons Pass to the Big Hole, and south through the Big Hole to Dillon. It was designated the “Park-to-Park Highway” connecting Glacier and Yellowstone national parks. The original location of the road brought it down the left bank of Trail Creek to a point just west of the battlefield and ranger station where it crossed the creek, climbed the bench, and continued east to Wisdom. The road brought the battlefield within easy weekend distance of Missoula, the Bitterroot Valley, Helena, Butte, Deer Lodge, and Dillon and made the site a popular destination for picnics and overnight camping trips. By 1919, the Forest Service had installed outdoor fireplaces for the use of recreationists.

Accurate statistics on the visitation in this era do not exist. The Forest Service placed a guest register at the national monument some time before 1925, but no visitor tally or compilation of registered names has been found. In a 1925 memorandum, one Forest Service official noted that “about 3500 people registered there this year, which probably is somewhere between 50 and 70 per cent of the actual number of visitors.” In 1932, Forest Supervisor Alva A. Simpson provided the following remarks on visitor use:

The Battlefield National Monument attracts a considerable number of visitors each year. Many of them camp for from one night to a week, since there is good fishing and other recreational attractions. Annually, one and one-half standard registration books are filled by visitors. These books have room for 2000 signatures and this indicates that not less than 3000 people register. Assuming the registration is 75 per cent, about 4000 people visit the Battlefield each year. Probably 15%, or 600, camp overnight or longer. It is evident that use is heavy and that our facilities are woefully inadequate for proper sanitation, fire protection, or comfort of the visitors.

Estimates of visitor use remained about the same through the 1930s. In 1935, Forest Supervisor E. D. Sandvig stated the number as 3,000 to 4,000 people annually. In 1939, the first year in which monthly travel statistics were kept, the NPS recorded a total of 4,005 visitors — more than 1,000 per month in July, August, and September, 450 in October, and 200 in November. These numbers corroborate the earlier Forest Service estimates.

Recreational Development

Recreational development at Big Hole National Battlefield was made in response to local demand, but it also reflected broader patterns in national forest administration. Throughout the West, recreational use of the national forests increased dramatically with the spread of the automobile and the growth of a highway system. The Forest Service began to weigh aesthetic forest values against the dollar figures attached to timber sales, mineral leases, and grazing permits. Such a reorientation, Chief Forester William B. Greeley explained in 1924, was consistent with the Forest Service’s goal of managing the forests for “the greatest good of the greatest number over the long run.” Greeley emphasized that the Forest Service was responding to popular demand. “The American people,” he wrote, “have taken possession of the National Forests as one of their great playgrounds.”
The Forest Service had good reasons for welcoming recreational use of the forests. One reason was to obtain broad-based political support for the development of the forests. Public demand for access to the forests translated into federal dollars for road construction, which in turn increased the value of all other natural resources with which the forests were endowed. Another reason was the establishment of the National Park Service in 1916. The creation of this agency gave a considerable boost to the national park movement. Since most national parks were created from lands in the national forest system, the Forest Service found itself in an interagency struggle over land. The Forest Service promoted recreational use of the national forests partly to squelch the argument that the NPS was uniquely suited to manage lands for public recreation.

The Forest Service now set aside a certain portion of funds for recreational development. In the 1920s these funds were supplemented — often surpassed — by contributions from local communities and organizations. Still, they represented a beginning for recreation funding. An important part of recreational development was recognizing the need for planned campgrounds at all. The purpose of campgrounds was to concentrate campers in prepared areas and minimize their impact on the forest.

Picnickers on Battle Mountain, overlooking the Encampment Area and the troop withdrawal area. *Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.*
Campers at Big Hole Battlefield National Monument used two sites in 1925: one directly uphill from the national monument fence, the other farther uphill above the road. The Forest Service had installed fireplaces, garbage cans, and two toilets, the latter inside the battlefield enclosure. Forest service officials found two shortcomings with the existing facilities. First, they needed more fireplaces, garbage cans, and water spigots to accommodate the large number of people. Second, they wanted to move things around so that each campsite would be more self-contained and so that the whole camping area would be less conspicuous in relation to the battlefield.

Improvements were slow to happen in part because the Forest Service tried unsuccessfully to persuade the War Department to bear some of the cost. In 1930, Assistant Regional Forester M. H. Wolff directed Forest Supervisor J. C. Whitham to prepare a comprehensive recreational plan for the battlefield. Given the campground’s popularity and close proximity to a “historical attraction,” Wolff thought the campground development should receive “high priority” for funding. “Is there not opportunity to expand the camp space in a northerly or northeasterly direction from the ranger station,” Wolff prodded, “perhaps even going down upon the flat below the site of the monument, if that is not too moist during the usual season of camping and picnicking.” Two more years passed before the Forest Service completed the recreational plan.

The projected improvements were extensive. In a 1931 draft plan, Ranger Ramsey and Forest Supervisor Whitham proposed to develop seventeen campsites, each with stove and table, at two locations that they called the upper and lower campgrounds. In addition they wanted seven garbage pits and two new toilets. In their final “Unit Recreational Plan,” Whitham and Ramsey reduced the number to ten: five in the timber above the national monument and five in the willows below the national monument. These campsites would be “adequately screened from each other.” Existing toilets were to be improved “to make fly-proof and sanitary.” Water supply for the upper campground would come from the existing pipe line, and for the lower campground from wells or pitcher pumps. The area in front of the entrance to the national monument would be devoted to parking and tent space for overflow crowds.

The Forest Service never implemented the recreational plan, probably due to the fact that the five-acre national monument was transferred to the National Park Service the following year. Forest service officials insisted there was still a great need for campground improvements, and recreational development became the major issue between Forest Service and NPS officials in the transition years from 1933 to 1939.

Resource Protection

Its enthusiasm for recreational development notwithstanding, the Forest Service had little experience protecting historic sites or interpreting historic resources for the public. The Forest Service’s accomplishments in this field at Big Hole Battlefield National Monument were principally due to the personal initiative of three individuals who took a keen interest in the site. These individuals were battle veteran and caretaker Tom C. Sherrill, District Ranger Marshall G. Ramsey, and Assistant Forester Will C. Barnes.
Sherrill was an old man by the time he assumed the role of caretaker at the battlefield. He had a keen memory and could recite many details of the battle. If some people questioned the accuracy of what he said, others were willing to accept him as a reliable eyewitness or even an authority. Sherrill gave many visitors guided tours of the battlefield. He sometimes shared his personal collection of artifacts from the battle, which included his own hat with a bullet hole, a bloodstained deerskin sleeve torn from the jacket of a dead Nez Perce, and a scalp-lock taken from another Nez Perce killed on the battlefield.25

Sherrill staked the ground where he recalled certain people to have been killed, wounded, or buried. Eventually he prepared a series of texts, which were printed on white signboards and placed at appropriate locations around the site. These texts had a rustic character and were written utterly from the soldiers’ point of view. For example, one sign noted “Where the Indian was killed that crawled the closest to our breast works,” and another “Where the Indian was killed that sang his death chant for thirty minutes before he died.” Some displayed a gritty sense of humor: “Jack Bear held this rifle pit for thirty-six hours, thru the fight, he was well entertained by Indians under the hill.” Significantly, some of the signs marked the spot where soldiers were buried. There were some 37 signs altogether. Although they were removed in the 1930s, the locations and texts of each sign were preserved in a memorandum prepared by Sherrill and Ranger Ramsey titled “Points of Interest,” dated October 7, 1921.26

Sherrill and Ramsey also sought to protect the battlefield from relic hunters. In 1928, several years after Sherrill’s position was eliminated, Ramsey built a rough picket fence of lodgepole pine around portions of the battlefield, and a pole fence around the rifle pits. Photographs of these improvements show that they were highly intrusive on the scene. With no caretaker at the site, however, Ramsey believed the fences were necessary to protect the resources.27
The third official to take an interest in the battlefield was Assistant Forester Will C. Barnes, a former cattleman and veteran of the campaign against the Apaches in Arizona in the 1880s. Having risen to one of the senior positions in the Forest Service, Barnes developed an interest in the national monument after taking the opportunity to inspect the battlefield on a trip to Montana in 1925. Upon returning to Washington, D.C., Barnes served as the Forest Service’s liaison with the War Department. His chief interest was to recover and rehabilitate the 12-pounder mountain howitzer used by Colonel Gibbon’s command.

According to the best information available in the 1920s, Nez Perce warriors had overrun the howitzer and had disabled the weapon by hacking spokes from the wheels and rolling the carriage into the river. Some weeks after the battle in the fall of 1877 a party from Deer Lodge hauled the cannon out of the river and took it back to Deer Lodge. The wheels were repaired and for many years the cannon sat in front of the State Penitentiary in Deer Lodge. In 1923, Governor Joseph M. Dixon ordered the cannon returned to the battlefield.28

During 1926, Assistant Forester Barnes corresponded with Maj. L. D. Redington of the Quartermaster Corps, U.S. Army, as to the proper repair and maintenance of the cannon. Redington provided specifications and material for painting the metal and wood parts of the cannon based on the War Department’s experience with preserving cannons in the national cemeteries and national military parks in the East. Redington also facilitated a transfer of $500 from the War Department to the Forest Service for construction of a wood shelter for the cannon and a museum building. The transfer of funds was accomplished in 1928.29
The museum building was built in 1928 or 1929. Its walls were made of lodgepole pine peeled logs and the gable roof was covered by hand-split cedar shakes. Measuring 14 by 18 feet, the building housed the cannon as well as other relics of the battle. In 1929, an inspector reported that the building conformed “very well to the surroundings,” and that local citizens had agreed “to return articles in their possession which will add great interest to the collection.”

No sooner was the museum built than the Forest Service had another resource at risk. The lodgepole trees around the Siege Area were attacked by insects. By 1932, some 80 “historic trees” were dead. The trees were significant because they dated back to 1877 and related to the combatants’ positions; many also bore battle scars. Three years later, Ranger Ramsey and Forest Supervisor E. D. Sandvig estimated the number of insect-killed trees in the area at 2,000. The dead trees occasionally toppled over, presenting a hazard to visitors. Moreover, they were aesthetically displeasing. To Sandvig, the dead trees presented “a picture of untidiness and forlorness [sic],” and needed to be cut down and removed.

Removal of the dead trees was no ordinary salvage logging operation, however, because the trees in the Siege Area constituted historic resources. Many bore scars from the hail of bullets during the battle. Souvenir hunters also saw them as historic objects; they had been chopping away at the trees for years, taking splintered sections out of the trunks and carrying them home for use as desk fixtures or mantle ornaments.
The "Unit Recreational Plan" of 1932 stipulated that "historic trees that are killed will be taken down and sections preserved in the Museum." Since the plan was never formally adopted, however, Ramsey readily deviated from the policy in 1936 when historian Lucullus V. McWhorter asked to be sent a splintered section of the tree that had sheltered Nez Perce warrior Peo Peo Tholekt. Ramsey packaged and shipped the chunk of tree to Forest Service employee K. D. Swan of Missoula for McWhorter's son to pick up and take to McWhorter's home in Yakima. Although McWhorter purportedly wanted the section for safe keeping, his motivation hardly differed from that of other collectors who took an avid interest in the battle.

Unit managers would later describe the entire timbered area as a historic resource because it had provided a strong defensive position to which Gibbon's command had retreated in the course of the battle. It is worth noting that managers in the 1930s regarded the trees as objects or historic artifacts rather than part of a historical landscape.

Interpretation: The McWhorter Era

Lucullus V. McWhorter brought to light the Nez Perce side of the battle just when it was in danger of dying with the last of the Nez Perce war veterans. On five separate occasions between 1927 and 1937, McWhorter visited the Big Hole Battlefield with his Nez Perce friends and elicited their recollections of what happened on August 9, 1877. Accompanied by a surveyor, McWhorter and the Nez Perce veterans staked the battlefield in 1928 and again nine years later. The staking superseded the earlier staking done by Tom Sherrill and greatly amplified the Nez Perce perspective of the battle. McWhorter also presented a Nez Perce "voice" in two books that were based on his extensive interviews with tribal members: Yellow Wolf: His Own Story (1940) and Hear Me, My Chiefs! Nez Perce History and Legend (1952).

McWhorter was a cattle rancher and historian who had an abiding interest in Indians. According to his biographer, McWhorter's reading of frontier history "convinced him that the American Indians had been 'cold-decked'... and their heroic defense of their homes and families constituted a true American epic." Moving his family from Ohio to central Washington in 1903, McWhorter sought to befriend Indians and to write their story. His early endeavors focused on the Yakama tribe who lived near his ranch outside of North Yakima, Washington. In 1907 he met a Nez Perce named Hemene Mox Mox, or Yellow Wolf, who had just finished his seasonal job in the nearby hop fields and was returning to his home on the Colville Reservation. McWhorter's friendship with Yellow Wolf became his point of entry to the Nez Perce people.

Over the years McWhorter struck up friendships with a number of Nez Perce veterans of the War of 1877. On the fifty-year anniversary of the war, he made his first automobile trip to the Montana battlefields accompanied by Yellow Wolf, Peo Peo, and Sam Lott (Many Wounds). They camped at the Big Hole Battlefield. McWhorter's biographer has described this first visit:

Since 1908, McWhorter had been listening to veterans describing the Battle of the Big Hole; now everything was exposed with clarity. There was the open hillside, surrounded by timber, where the bands had kept the horse herd. Below, along the base of the hillside, ran the meandering stream — the North Fork of the Big Hole — which separated the horse pasture.
from the tipi village. Across the north side of the river and upstream from the encampment, rose the low timbered hill where the warriors surrounded Colonel John Gibbon’s troops and held them under siege. A little farther up the drainage, Peo Peo showed McWhorter where he had helped capture Gibbon’s mountain howitzer. He found the spot where he had buried the howitzer barrel, but it no longer was there. As McWhorter looked to the south, he could see the open country across which the retreating bands escaped with their wounded. With this on-site investigation of the Battle of the Big Hole, McWhorter could document individual acts by warriors, and recreate a clear and comprehensive historical picture of the battle from the Nez Perce point of view.37

McWhorter returned to the Big Hole battlefield for a third time in July 1930 accompanied by Yellow Wolf, Sam Lott, Peo Peo, Lewis, and his son Virgil. As his biographer explains, McWhorter was interested in recovering more details about the battle, believing that “Indian narrations are entirely different from that of the average white person.” It was McWhorter’s
experience that an Indian informant “seldom branched from the line that he may have in mind, but later some trend of mind might bring it to him.” Consequently, each new visit to the battlefield elicited new facts from each individual, and “then comes another enstallment [sic].” Moreover, McWhorter made repeated visits with the aim of acquiring an understanding of the battle from many individual points of view.

McWhorter made yet another trip in August 1935, this time with Sam Lott and Chief White Hawk. The main purpose of the trip was to restake the Bear’s Paw battlefield. The original stakes from 1927 were in poor condition. The local chapter of the Lion’s Club in nearby Chinook, Montana raised funds to defray the travel expenses of the two Nez Perce veterans, and a Blaine County engineer named Noye helped with the surveying. While visiting the Big Hole battlefield on this trip, McWhorter was saddened to find that the tree which sheltered Peo Peo in 1877 had died since their previous visit. It was after this trip that he asked Ranger Ramsey to preserve a section of the tree for him.

Yellow Wolf, Peo Peo, and Sam Lott all died in the following months. Perhaps it was this news, which McWhorter relayed to Ramsey the following August, that prompted the ranger to urge McWhorter and his Nez Perce friends to make yet another trip to the battlefield and stake some additional ground. “There are many things we talked about,” Ramsey wrote, referring to the original staking in 1928, “that I figured at the time I would never forget, but as I try to recall some of the instances that occurred in different places I find that by not writing them down they are not as clear to me now as they could be.”

Chief Joseph monument placed at Big Hole Battlefield in 1928. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB.
To this letter McWhorter replied:

I can get two of the warriors, and a first class interpreter, one who is deeply interested in the work that I have on hands [sic], who will go with me and point out the places of particular historic interest, both in the lower meadow where the village was attacked, as well as where the howitzer was captured, and also confirm the mistakes pointed out to me by both Peo and Yellow Wolf, in the staking of the park field, relative to the Indians killed there. I am satisfied that Mr. Sherrill had those stakes incorrectly placed.42

Significantly, McWhorter saw the role of his Nez Perce informants as not merely to augment, but to correct or reinterpret information that had come from white participants in the battle. McWhorter’s efforts at Big Hole supported his larger goal to retell the story of the Nez Perce War from an Indian point of view.
Ramsey was supportive. On the occasion of McWhorter’s earlier visits in 1927 and 1928, Ramsey had given the party a hearty welcome. Although he did not see McWhorter and his Nez Perce companions in 1930 or 1935, he put some effort into arranging the last trip in 1937. Ramsey tried to obtain financial support from both the local Lions Club and the National Park Service before securing private donations through the Big Hole Road Association. With the help of the “wide awake women” of this organization, Ramsey sent McWhorter a check for $75 in July to pay expenses to the battlefield. McWhorter returned in September 1937, accompanied by two elderly Nez Perce, Camille Williams and Phillip Williams, to restake the battlefield and to map various points of interest.

By 1937, McWhorter had been collecting material on the Nez Perce for thirty years. Although he had no official capacity, he had become a major asset to the national monument. Forest Supervisor W. B. Willey, anticipating Park Service administration of the site, informed Yellowstone Superintendent Edmund B. Rogers of McWhorter’s efforts in December 1936:

Mr. McWhorter is in the last stages of preparation on a book delineating the details of the Nez Perce War. He has made his home among or near the Nez Perce Indians for many years and is in possession of facts that probably can never be gathered again. . . . Ranger Ramsey tells me that Mr. McWhorter speaks the Nez Perce language fluently besides having acquired a great deal of background and confidence while preparing his manuscript among the Indians. It is my opinion that you will be taking advantage of a rare opportunity if you include in your program the surveying and marking of the Big Hole Battlefield with the help of this historical researcher.

McWhorter published *Yellow Wolf: His Own Story* in 1940. He died in 1944. Another book, *Hear Me, My Chiefs! Nez Perce History and Legend* was published posthumously in 1952.

McWhorter’s contribution was enormous. Without his organizing efforts it is doubtful whether any Nez Perce war veterans would have returned to the battlefield, much less imparted their knowledge to non-tribal members in a way that could be preserved for posterity. McWhorter recovered the voice of the Nez Perce in the 1920s and 1930s just as the last of the warriors were dying. As a result, recollections of Yellow Wolf, Peo Peo, and other Nez Perce came to inform interpretive efforts at the battlefield just as much as recollections of Tom Sherrill and written accounts by Colonel Gibbon, Amos Buck, Will Cave, and other white battle veterans.

The Nez Perce “voice,” literally engraved in many of the signs around the battlefield, drew the attention of the battlefield visitor to the village Encampment Area where so many Nez Perce women and children had lost their lives in the initial attack. This was, of course, a section of the battlefield that greatly impressed “tourists” soon after the battle — it featured prominently in Granville Stuart’s sketch of May 1878, and in Andrew Garcia’s haunting memories of his visit to the battlefield later that same year. Yet for more than fifty years after the Nez Perce surrender, the Big Hole battlefield was commemorated primarily through the placement of a war memorial to the U.S. soldiers. The soldiers’ monument as well as the many signs and splintered trees throughout the Siege Area put the interpretive focus squarely on the plight of the white soldiers and volunteers. Although the soldiers’ monument would continue to be a focal point for picnics,
reunions, and commemorative events (often involving relatives of the Bitterroot volunteers), these activities gradually became more muted. As early as 1935, one Forest Service official urged that “purely recreation activities, particularly those of a more frivolous nature such as organized group picnics and camping,” should be discouraged. Rather, it was “fitting and essential that an air of quiet dignity be preserved about it.”

It is not too much to say that McWhorter and the Nez Perce veterans preserved what was most vital to the national monument not just for the Nez Perce people but for the nation. Even while the Nez Perce War was in progress the renegade bands had aroused the sympathy of many Americans, and their long fighting retreat through Idaho and Montana had long since entered the annals of American history as one of the epic tragedies of Indian defeat. As one travel magazine writer described the visitor experience at the Big Hole battlefield some years later, “There slumbers a valley in southwestern Montana so impregnated with silence that the spirit of the visitor seems to hear sorrow…as if the sound waves of a once great misery enacted here moved on but left sad ghosts behind.”

Transfer to the National Park Service

On July 28, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 6228, transferring jurisdiction of the five-acre national monument from the War Department to the National Park Service. The executive order placed a total of 48 national monuments, battlefields, and military parks in the national park system. Most of these sites related to the Revolutionary and Civil wars and were located in the East. Only one site — Big Hole Battlefield National Monument — commemorated a battle fought in the West. It would be joined by a second, the National Cemetery of Custer’s Battlefield Reservation, seven years later. Both of these battlefields of the Indian Wars were relatively inaccessible in the 1930s, and of the two Big Hole was the less renown.

Following the usual procedure when a national monument was proclaimed in a remote location, the NPS assigned the area to a “coordinating superintendent” in the nearest national park. This was Yellowstone Superintendent Roger W. Toll, whose headquarters at Mammoth Hot Springs was a day’s drive from the battlefield. It seems that Toll had but one opportunity to visit Big Hole Battlefield National Monument before his tragic death in an automobile accident in New Mexico in February 1936. Toll sent Ranger Maynerd Barrows to inspect the national monument in August 1935 — two years after the transfer. His report on Barrows’ inspection to Forest Supervisor E. D. Sandvig, dated August 8, 1935, is the earliest known document by an NPS official concerning the Big Hole battlefield.

Superintendent Toll’s memorandum offered the first clues as to changes of management that the Forest Service could expect following the transfer of the five-acre national monument. Toll provided an itemized list of recommendations:

1. The dead trees in and around the national monument should be cut at ground level, sawed in 15-inch lengths, and split in four blocks. Sections containing bullet marks should be preserved for museum pieces.
2. Any historic trees still standing should be left if they had a good chance of remaining upright for a number of years.

3. The two old latrines just outside the national monument should be removed, since adequate toilet facilities were provided in the Forest Service campground.

4. The bridge near the entrance to the national monument should be repaired.

5. The NPS would try to employ a summer caretaker, who would be quartered in the Forest Service caretaker’s house.50

Toll’s memorandum indicated that the NPS was interested in the land surrounding the five-acre site. It shared the Forest Service’s interest in providing visitor facilities. Clearly, on the basis of Toll’s memorandum, the Forest Service had to redefine its role in managing the area around the national monument.

Forest Guard Tom Sherrill demonstrating soldier’s position in the Siege Area. One of the last surviving veterans of the battle, Sherrill served as battlefield custodian, circa 1915-1923. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.

Local Forest Service officials, meanwhile, were impatient for the NPS to do more — or at least they wanted the two agencies to negotiate what kind of presence the Forest Service would maintain there. The general appearance of the place had declined since the abandonment of the ranger station in 1929. The recreational plan completed in 1932 had never been implemented. By 1935, the ranger residence and outbuildings were partially dismantled and the structures that remained were supposed to be burned down. Forest Supervisor Sandvig described the “deplorable condition” of the station to the regional forester: “It now has the appearance of an
abandoned dryland farmers' abode and presents a despicable picture to all who view it. From the standpoint of local Forest Service officials, it was an awkward time to find the battlefield in limbo between two agencies.

After receiving Superintendent Toll's memorandum, Forest Supervisor Sandvig consulted with the regional forester on the prospect of an NPS employee occupying the caretaker residence. He had no objection other than the fact that he had wanted to replace the cabin with a log building farther away from the national monument. Now it seemed necessary to coordinate with the NPS before proceeding further with his improvement plan.

Superintendent Toll also expressed the need for coordinated planning. In a second letter to Sandvig on August 17, 1935, Toll noted the Forest Service's longstanding effort to work for the preservation of the area even though it was not under the direct jurisdiction of the Forest Service. "We appreciate deeply the fact that you are continuing this same service now that the jurisdiction of the area has been transferred to the National Park Service," he wrote, "although our Service has as yet been unable to take any active part in administering the area."

At the same time that Toll and Sandvig were establishing a connection between their two agencies, the Forest Service was moving a crew of Civilian Conservation Corps enrollees into the battlefield area to "do a general cleanup job." Toll urged Sandvig to make sure that any artifacts discovered during the cleanup were turned over to the government. "It is suggested that relics be adequately labelled together with the name of the man by whom it was found and turned in," Toll wrote.

In the following months, Forest Service officials sensed that it was a propitious time to suggest boundary changes for the national monument. Ranger Ramsey advised his superior that he would be in favor of extending the boundaries of the national monument to the north, south, and west—all within the national forest. He pointed out the importance of the Nez Perce Encampment Area but noted that the land currently belonged to the Huntley Cattle Company and would have to be purchased. The landowner had cut hay in this area for a number of years and had used it for pasture since 1932.

Assistant Forester V. T. Linthacum offered his views on the boundaries after inspecting the site with Ramsey in September 1935. Like Ramsey, he was in favor of transferring national forest land to the national monument so that the NPS would be responsible for all recreational development associated with the battlefield. "It all forms a single natural unit," he explained. "National Forest recreation should be found elsewhere." As for including the Nez Perce Encampment Area, Linthacum advised that that should be left up to the NPS.

Linthacum offered more pointed remarks in a second memorandum. He believed the Forest Service should completely withdraw from the old Gibbon's Battlefield Administrative Site so that the two agencies would not be in each other's way. "The present monument area is entirely too restricted, both for the purpose intended and as an inducement to the Park Service to make something out of it and give it proper administration," he wrote. "If the Park Service will propose to make this a National Monument that we can all be proud of let's help things along in every possible way which does not involve or seriously inconvenience our Forest
administration." Forest Service actions after 1935 followed in this spirit — the following spring, Forest Supervisor Sandvig directed Ranger Ramsey to remove remaining improvements and Forest Service signs as rapidly as possible.  

As Forest Service involvement in the site waned, National Park Service development did not take place the way Forest Service officials had hoped and anticipated it would. Despite an enlargement of the site in 1939, Big Hole Battlefield National Monument would acquire the dubious honor of becoming a backwater unit in the national park system, a "sleepy hollow" in the words of a later superintendent. That disappointment notwithstanding, the transfer of Big Hole National Monument to the Park Service was a model of interagency cooperation. In contrast to the larger scheme of Park Service-Forest Service competition in this era, Beaverhead National Forest officials hastened to facilitate a turnover of land, improvements, and visitor services to the other agency. NPS intentions for the site, and the factors that would make Big Hole of low priority in the national park system, are detailed in Chapter Four.

Human skull found in Battle Gulch. *Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.*
“History as Well as Scenery”

In June and July of 1933, under authority vested by the Federal Reorganization Act of 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt consolidated all national parks, monuments, memorials, military parks, and eleven military cemeteries under Park Service jurisdiction. This consolidation almost doubled the number of areas in the national park system and marked a critical transition in Park Service history: the agency acquired a significant presence in the East, as well as the West, and assumed primary federal responsibility for the preservation and interpretation of America’s cultural heritage. Concurrently, New Deal emergency funding substantially in excess of regular appropriations allowed the Park Service to expand dramatically upon the infrastructure, staffing, and educational programs at many of the new sites. Through this concentrated and aggressive program of development, national monuments and other historic sites gained a degree of parity with the natural parks. As mandated and in a role that it embraced, the service turned to “history as well as scenery.”

The development of Big Hole Battlefield National Monument contradicts these general trends. The monument was western, isolated, and rarely visited. Increased funding and a heightened NPS presence offered little political advantage to an agency seeking to expand its appeal to a broad audience and its sources of funding to the eastern states. The monument was also thematically isolated from the Revolutionary War and Civil War sites that made up the vast majority of the 1933 acquisitions. Interpretation of eastern sites allowed the Park Service to take full advantage of public knowledge and interest, a rich body of literature, and the academic training and interests of those in the Historical Division of the Branch of Research and Education. In contrast, the Indian Wars remained poorly documented and poorly understood, not only by the general public but also by Park Service historians.

At Big Hole, lack of knowledge of the details of the battle, the participants, and the larger war melded with discomfort with those facts that were known. Historian Hal Rothman argues that “the average American” easily understood the importance and recognized the value of Colonial Williamsburg, Gettysburg, the Statue of Liberty, and other popular eastern sites. In a process sped and underscored by Park Service focus on American achievement, these sites became “cultural validators,” part of the “iconography of democracy.” In contrast, Big Hole Battlefield represented what Yellowstone Superintendent Roger Toll described as a discreditable chapter in American history, where even the bold drama and popular appeal of Manifest Destiny were unable to mask the tragedy of a pre-dawn assault on a sleeping village.

Other factors also conspired to check Park Service enthusiasm for Big Hole Battlefield. In order to protect the integrity of the park system from an onslaught of marginal properties, the
Branch of Education defined three types of historic sites that properly belonged in the federal system: places that offered an outline of the major themes of American history; places with strong connections to the lives of famous Americans; and the locations of dramatic episodes in American history. This question of significance and appropriate jurisdiction would greatly affect monument funding, interpretative efforts, and land acquisition during the early years of NPS tenure. In the absence of resolution, Big Hole would languish through the 1930s without a finalized master plan for comprehensive development and therefore without an effective claim to Depression-era emergency funding or to the labor force provided through the Emergency Conservation Work (ECW) plan.

As the Forest Service worked with Yellowstone personnel to facilitate the transfer of authority and to devise an immediate course of action for better site development and interpretation, Superintendent Toll reported to Director Arno Cammerer that “the first question to be determined is whether or not this battlefield is properly classified as a national monument.” While Toll maintained that the site represented an important chapter in the United States’ treatment of western tribes, he lacked “sufficient data to determine whether or not the Big Hole Battlefield is one of the two or three most important sites of the Indian wars” and deferred to the National Park Service Historical Division, Branch of Education, to evaluate its national significance. If NPS historians found the site representative of one of the outstanding events of American history, Toll averred, then the NPS had an obligation to appropriate “sufficient funds... to maintain the area in a creditable manner.” Two immediate needs were an expanded land base that would include the Nez Perce camp site as well as sufficient land for camping and parking beyond the battlefield proper and a seasonal custodian/ranger to maintain it. If the Historical Division declined to assign national significance to the site, then Toll recommended that arrangements be made with the State of Montana for establishment of a state park.

Toll died in an automobile accident soon after his visit to Big Hole Battlefield National Monument. Upon his death, the historical evaluation of the battlefield and the initiation of active Park Service administration stalled. In June 1937 (nearly four years after the transfer of authority to the Park Service), Yellowstone Superintendent Edmund B. Rogers and Assistant Regional Landscape Architect Howard W. Baker inspected the battlefield with Ranger Marshall Ramsey. Baker filed a report to the Chief Architect.

Baker was not surprised to find the area in considerable need of cleanup work. More dead trees had fallen and some of these deadfalls had destroyed sections of the wire and lodgepole picket fences that surrounded portions of the area. In contrast, the log museum and caretaker's cabin were in good condition. Ramsey reiterated the Forest Service's offer of the cabin to the NPS and Baker recommended that “these accommodations will serve very nicely for the present time.” As for boundaries, Baker suggested that an NPS historian “familiar with Indian history” visit the area and make a recommendation.

The following summer, Acting Regional Historian Edward A. Hummel visited the battlefield in company with Hugh Peyton, assistant chief ranger of Yellowstone National Park. (In 1938, Peyton served as Big Hole Battlefield National Monument's first seasonal ranger since the area's transfer to the national park system.) Hummel and Peyton recommended boundaries for a minimum area of
200 acres and a maximum area that would include “practically all of the battlefield and all points of interest associated with the battle.” Hummel and Peyton only hinted at the potential difficulty of acquiring private lands within the maximum area, stating that the minimum area was entirely within the national forest.11

During the winter of 1938-1939, NPS Director Arno Cammerer and his advisors determined that the battlefield lacked national significance and therefore recommended the more modest boundary expansion to the Secretary of the Interior.12 As a result, on June 29, 1939, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Presidential Proclamation No. 2339, expanding the monument boundaries from 5 acres to 200 acres, including “public lands within the Beaverhead National Forest... contiguous to the said national monument and... necessary for the proper care, management, and protection of the historic landmarks” (see Appendix A).13 As defined by Cammerer and Hummel, the additional 195 acres provided the minimum acreage necessary for effective administration and incorporated “the major portion of the battlefield and a sufficient buffer strip to allow adequate protection and provide a site for utility buildings.” The expanded acreage also included a spring within the east 495 feet of the northeast quarter of Section 23, providing an adequate water supply.14 Counter to the Historical Division’s recommendations for maximum land purchase, these 195 acres did not include the Nez Perce Encampment Area or a development site of sufficient size to support a new residential complex and headquarters building. Acting Secretary of Agriculture M. L. Wilson, on behalf of the Beaverhead National Forest, concurred in the transfer of land, noting that the proclamation would add “certain [if not all] essential historical features to the present Monument area.”15

Despite Cammerer’s decision, in a November 1939 report, Yellowstone National Park Resident Landscape Architect Sanford “Red” Hill (assisted by Yellowstone Chief Ranger Hugh Peyton and Yellowstone Assistant Naturalist W. E. Kearns) recommended that the newly defined 200-acre monument again be expanded to include an additional 200 acres of private land; these recommendations accorded generally with the original maximum boundary recommendations submitted to the Director by Regional Historian Hummel.16 This acquisition would permit infrastructure development on a hillside south of the battlefield, allowing visitors a panoramic view of the battle scene and freeing the battleground “of all evidence of development.” The land acquisition would also incorporate “the most important part of the battle,” the Nez Perce Encampment Area, within the monument boundaries. Only through this inclusion, Hill argued, “could the real story be presented to the people.” Failure to acquire the encampment and development sites and initiation of a development plan on the basis of the smaller 200-acre tract, Hill warned, would result in a very poorly planned national monument” beneath the Service’s standards of interpretation and development.17

Specifically, Hill had four recommendations. First, the government should purchase the Nez Perce Encampment Area and make it a focal point of interpretation. Second, the NPS should remove Forest Service structures from the area of retreat and retrenchment of the U.S. Army (the Siege Area); the past emphasis on this area, dating to the establishment of the soldiers’ monument and continuing through the Forest Service’s tenure, contributed to the false impression that the battle took place “on about an acre of land.” Moreover, the Forest Service development
Boundary expansion proposal, 1939. This was the chosen alternative.
Boundary expansion proposal, 1939. This was the more expensive of two alternatives.
threatened to "dominate the area" and afforded a poor view of the battlefield, hampering interpretive efforts. Third, the government should purchase the bluff overlooking the battle scene, south of the existing boundary, as a construction site for a headquarters building and residential complex. Finally, the NPS should reconstruct the Nez Perce village or encampment, based on careful research and first-hand information from Nez Perce veterans. Together these changes would "provide the complete story of the Big Hole battle in an interesting and logical manner [and] the necessary Government buildings and facilities needed to handle this area [would] become very insignificant to the whole picture." Former Yellowstone Park Historian Aubrey Haines reports that the owner of the Encampment Area facilitated implementation of the plan when it offered to donate the acreage to the National Park Service.18

Hill's recommendation that the Nez Perce village be re-created anticipated the NPS Interpretive Division's focus on reenactments and "living history dramatizations," both significant components of the system-wide interpretive program by the 1960s. It also represented the Park Service's early interest in memorializing Nez Perce participants in the battle, by encouraging and facilitating the predominantly non-Indian monument visitors' "imaginative entry" into the peaceful pre-attack Nez Perce camp site.19

By February 1940, the Branch of Plans and Design and the Historical Division developed a preliminary master plan based on Hill's recommendations. While Regional Director Allen agreed that the resulting plan was "the best . . . so far submitted" he reminded Thomas Vint, Chief Architect, Branch of Plans and Design, and Ronald F. Lee, Supervisor of Historic Sites, that their proposed Big Hole development plan ignored the plan of action approved by the Director, whereby the minimum acreage would be acquired in recognition of the site's limited significance. It also suggested a degree of development that would preclude eventual state management thereby compelling the NPS to assume "indefinite" responsibility for the battlefield. Despite an inclination simply to "remind the Region of the Director's instructions and plan of action and [request] that they comply with them without further elaboration," Allen instead deferred to Vint and Lee: "if either Mr. Vint or Mr. Lee consider the area of enough importance to follow the ideal plan of the technical representatives, the initiative must be taken by their Branches."20

If the Branch of Historic Sites or the Branch of Plans and Design assumed the initiative, they did so quietly and slowly. In his preliminary approval of the 1942 Master Plan for Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, Yellowstone National Park Superintendent Rogers confirmed that all development plans for the monument were to be "predicated on the decision to restrict all development within the existing boundaries of the area." Recommendations, however, "to extend the boundaries, as proposed by the Branch of Plans and Design and the Branch of Historic Sites to include the entire battlefield area" would remain a matter of record.21

Despite this apparent stalemate, debate over Big Hole Battlefield National Monument's boundaries continued to define all substantive discussions of monument development and interpretive efforts. In 1945, Region II Director Lawrence C. Merriam classified Big Hole Battlefield National Monument as a Class 2 area: "areas which need boundary revisions, and for which the information relating thereto is complete enough so that only minor field work, if any,
is needed before recommendations can be prepared.” Hummel and Hill’s recommendations of six years earlier, Merriam argued, provided the information needed for expedient adjustment. Only a survey was “necessary in order to accurately establish the proposed boundary lines and ownership of the tracts involved.” Director Newton B. Drury, who had succeeded Cammerer in 1940, disagreed, citing the need for “studies necessary to thoroughly evaluate the historical significance of the area ... before boundary studies could be resumed.” Again the process stalled.

The effects of this continued disagreement and continued study on Big Hole development were dramatic. The New Deal era was one of unprecedented growth of the national park system. Under the auspices of the Emergency Conservation Work (ECW) plan, five federal programs provided an abundance of low-cost, skilled and unskilled laborers to federal land-management agencies. By 1940, emergency appropriations to the Park Service totaled $218 million, almost twice the $132 million in regular appropriations. NPS staffing increased accordingly, with a dramatically expanded cadre of historians, museum specialists, and landscape architects charged with developing a comprehensive vision for each unit and integrating that vision with specific plans and specifications for development. In the absence of a comprehensive development plan, Big Hole Battlefield National Monument was unable to capitalize on these opportunities. Seasonal ranger Warren L. Anderson alluded to this failure in 1952, when he complained that the primary directional sign to the monument appeared “homemade, crude ... National Monuments generally have such signs finished in rustic and emplaced in cement and stone.” The pattern of neglect continued through Service-wide World War II restrictions on construction materials, manpower, and visitation. In 1950 Yellowstone Superintendent Edmund Rogers reported that “since taking over the area in 1933 the Park Service has not been able to make any important developments and has relied on the Forest Service for many favors.”

A master plan for Big Hole Battlefield was not approved until 1962 and would not be implemented until 1963. In the interim and in the absence of clear directive, Yellowstone National Park provided a “seasonal ranger historian on a short-term basis” and miscellaneous technical support as needed. To frequent requests from visitors for better signage, an expanded museum facility, improved site interpretation and curation, and increased protection of the Encampment and Twin Trees areas, the Park Service consistently replied: “at present there are not sufficient funds available to do anything in this area other than to keep it clear and in as good physical condition as possible. The National Park Service will continue to do all it can to prevent vandalism and protect the historical features of the area.” The impact of disagreement of the merits of the site and the inevitable impacts upon funding and physical development went unstated. This stop-gap response defined the first 20 years of NPS administration.
Administration and Physical Development

From 1939 until 1963, the responsibility for keeping the national monument clear and in good condition fell to the seasonal ranger, generally assigned to duty in early June and relieved of duty in mid-September. The ranger reported monthly to the Yellowstone chief ranger’s office, detailing weather conditions and fire danger; maintenance efforts; assistance from “cooperating agencies”; naturalist services (interpretive efforts); travel patterns; and miscellaneous special projects, including museum acquisitions. While the chief ranger’s office officially solicited applicants “qualified to advance the historical research and interpretive program for the monument,” it also recognized the ranger’s more immediate responsibility to complete routine maintenance tasks “in an excellent manner.” In a representative letter, Yellowstone Acting Superintendent Fred T. Johnson informed new hire Warren L. Anderson of the conditions of his employment. Anderson would find an old “but comfortable” house, equipped with a shower but without electricity or phone service. The nearest phone was at the Wisdom Ranger Station and could be used during Anderson’s weekly trips to town for supplies, or as needed for administrative tasks. Anderson would be responsible for all public contact work with the monument visitors and also for the care of the museum collection, and the general maintenance of the area. (Much of his time, Anderson would soon learn, was spent painting signs, digging latrine pits, and pulling weeds from the trails.) All questions were to be directed to the Yellowstone chief ranger’s office. Anderson could also expect “occasional inspection trips” during the summer months. Despite the routine nature of many of the tasks and the ultimate authority of the chief ranger’s office, the Park Service considered the assignment “an important one since the ranger is largely on his own and an experienced man is selected who has had field experience and is thoroughly dependable.”

With the exceptions of Samuel M. Beal, Fred W. Warders, Jr., and Michael Sedar who each served for two seasons (1944-1945; 1949-1950; 1947 and 1954, respectively), the seasonal ranger position provided a rapidly revolving door to promotion and other assignments within the National Park Service. The lack of continuity was most obvious each spring, when the new rangers devoted time to “a study of all historical events pertaining to the Battlefield.” Suggested reading lists were drawn from Yellowstone history files, a compilation of “references to the Nez Perce Indians, Chief Joseph, and the
Big Hole National Monument,” collected in the years following the 1933 transfer to the Park Service.29

Beaverhead National Forest personnel assisted the rangers by providing access to Wisdom District historical and administrative files. Additional “favors” from the Forest Service included use of the telephone line at Wisdom, storage space during the winter months for the national monument’s limited artifact collection, and seasonal access-road maintenance and improvements. The Park Service also frequently benefited from loan of a truck, office supplies, and short-term laborers as needed. It responded with both frequent and effusive thanks for the Forest Service’s “manifestations of interest and good will” and also with a long-term commitment to data collection at the USFS weather station constructed on the monument grounds.30 In hopes of a monument of which they “could be proud” and in continuation of a policy first articulated at the time of transfer to the Park Service, Beaverhead National Forest Officials “help[ed] things along in every way” that did not conflict with administration of adjacent Forest Service lands.31

Log museum built by the U.S. Forest Service and inherited by the National Park Service. 

_Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d._
Big Hole Road, Bitterroot National Forest. The narrow, twisting road over Gibbon Pass limited visitor use of Big Hole Battlefield National Monument in the 1940s and 1950s. Courtesy U.S. Forest Service, n.d.

Visitation

Throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, seasonal rangers estimated annual visitation at between 2,500 and 4,000, or “ten cars on Sunday and an average of three on week days.” Rangers described the majority of visitors as local residents, living within a radius of 50 miles and generally interested “in the history of the West and the struggle between the Indians and the white settlers for supremacy.” Their visits lasted approximately one hour, during which time they visited with the ranger, quickly toured the small museum, and walked the trails through the Siege Area. Substantial numbers were also fishermen and hunters, drawn to the Beaverhead National Forest and to the North Fork of the Big Hole River and its tributaries Ruby and Trail creeks. “As there was no admission fee charged and no regularly operated checking station for the area” these estimates of visitor numbers and demographics were based upon voluntary visitor registration and approximate counts. And they did not include early and late season visitation, when the NPS maintained no presence at the battlefield. In June 1955, for example, seasonal ranger Charles E. Martin reported that “appearances indicated that there were many visitors even before the Monument opened [on June 14].” Visitation increased through the early 1950s, a trend that the seasonal rangers attributed to increased “organized tour” patronage by school and fraternal groups and to improved all-season roads to the monument that not only facilitated access by an increased number of out-of-state tourists, but also extended the visitor season through the spring and fall months.32
Through the 1950s, local organizations also assumed responsibility for monument publicity, publishing hours of operation, travel conditions, and synthesizing details of the battle in local newspapers. They also appear to have assumed at least partial responsibility for directional signs to the isolated site. In 1952, W. M. Stone, Secretary of the Beaverhead Chamber of Commerce, informed Seasonal Ranger Anderson of placement of a road marker on the Bitterroot-Big Hole road, 27 miles from the battlefield. The sign “was ordered and paid for by the chamber,” which hoped to place additional markers in time for the 1953 season.33 Yellowstone Chief Naturalist David Condon encouraged this assistance, arguing that the signing of the approach roads was properly the responsibility of regional civic organizations who realized the most economic benefit from increased visitor use.34

Those who successfully located the monument complained “consistently” of the lack of camping and picnicking facilities and the limits to the interpretive signage and museum collection. These visitors were also cited in monthly reports as having voiced interest “in the full details of the action that took place” and having “express[ed] regret” that the Nez Perce Encampment Area was not included within the monument boundaries so that a complete picture of the battle could be reconstructed. These paraphrased criticisms suspiciously mimicked the chief ranger’s office’s position on the value of boundary expansion. It is not clear, however, whether the monthly reports were written in deliberate attempt to support and substantiate existing management goals or whether public understanding of the battle and concern over its proper presentation drove official NPS interpretation and land-acquisition efforts.35

**Interpretation**

Within the confines of this limited land base, the Park Service attempted to expand upon the interpretive presentation and museum collection. Both efforts focused on the need to avoid a myopic presentation of the battle, either as geographically imposed by the emphasis on the Siege Area or as imposed by a thematically and temporally limited artifact collection. Although there is little documentary evidence of a formal plan for interpretive development, Yellowstone personnel, including the Chief Ranger, the Assistant Chief Ranger, the Chief Naturalist and the

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**Visitation, 1938-1956.**

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Resident Landscape Architect, directed all curatorial and interpretive efforts (with technical support and direction from the Branch of Historic Sites and the Branch of Interpretation).

In 1941, Resident Landscape Architect Frank Mattson urged that the site be interpreted not as Custer Battlefield was interpreted, with focus on the immediate military details, but rather as “one event in a chain of events; a bead on a chain of beads.” This analogy effectively described not only historically related events, but also a geographic linkage of historic sites, most notably Big Hole Battlefield; Bannack, Montana; Virginia City, Montana; and Yellowstone National Park. Together, the chief ranger’s office maintained, these four sites in southwestern Montana, roughly linked by State Highway 91, allowed the NPS to interpret “the story of the ejection of the Indian and the colonization of the West.”

At Big Hole, effective implementation of Mattson’s recommendations demanded significant modification from the “physical planning standpoint.” Most obviously, this entailed wholesale removal of facilities from the Siege Area “where the [visual and interpretive] picture is materially restricted.” It also required modification to signage, interpretive text, monumentation, and ranger presentation.

In 1941, the NPS distributed a brief four-page leaflet documenting the history of the Nez Perce flight and of the Battle of the Big Hole. Through inclusion of maps and panoramic view photographs, the brochure was also designed to expand upon visitors’ visual understanding of the progression of the battle and therefore to mitigate the closed view provided at the siege site. With minor revisions to historic text but without revision of interpretive focus, this leaflet was reproduced until 1955.

The 1955 brochure folder led with “BIG HOLE BATTLEFIELD NATIONAL MONUMENT, Scene of tragic battle of the Indian Wars of the 1870’s that were part of the winning of the American West” and followed with description of “one of the more dramatic and tragic episodes during the long struggle in the United States to confine the Indians to the ever-diminishing reservations and to force them off the land wanted by the whites.” Although the national monument was first established, the leaflet noted, “as a memorial to the soldiers who risked and gave their lives here,” it also served as a “memorial to the fortitude of the Indians.” This tacit attempt at Big Hole Battlefield to present the story through both education and commemoration is representative of the challenge facing the Park Service — to develop a site “where people came to be informed, not as shrines where people came to worship.” It is also representative of the demands and expectations of those who visit sites of violent conflict. “Commemoration,” NPS historian Robert Utley notes, “has always been a powerful motive, perhaps the most powerful, for preserving historic places. People approach these places not only as vestiges of the past, as vehicles for enlightenment, but also as shrines, as temples for veneration.” At Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, rangers reported, local residents “return[ed] year after year as they would to the graves of their ancestors.” Within the constraints of the confined geographic boundaries and the less tangible emotional boundaries imposed by visitors’ efforts to secure the battlefield as sacred ground, the Park Service attempted to present the historical intricacies and the military details of the battle and of the era in a balanced manner.
The brochure formed only one component of this educational program. Rangers “contact[ed] personally as many of the visitors as possible,” conducting them through the site, “answering questions” and “telling stories of general historical interest.” Interpretive trails, developed during the USFS administration yet reconstructed and maintained by NPS personnel, included trails leading from the museum to the Siege Area and the “old soldier trail” leading to the howitzer pit above and outside the boundaries of the monument. In contrast to the view provided at the museum site and forested Siege Area, the cannon pit offered “an excellent view of the battlefield and the valley.”

The walking tour was augmented with a series of signs, marking known points of conflict. Through the early 1940s, the Park Service manufactured and placed 75 “rustic” interpretive signs, which differed from the USFS black and white signs in style but do not appear to have differed in text: in 1944 Ranger Beal requested additional “rustic-style” signs, while quoting from USFS interpretive efforts. As late as 1946, Yellowstone Chief Ranger Maynard Barrows recommended development of a sign program because “many of the old markers are misleading in text.”

The most substantive revision to the USFS signage program was not realized until the 1950s. In 1953, after 14 years of documented and confirmed visitor confusion “that the Nez Perce were encamped on and all fighting occurred in the area known as the battle siege area,” seasonal ranger Anderson lobbied for installation of an overlook marker on the brow of the hill overlooking the Nez Perce Encampment Area. As modified by the Yellowstone chief park naturalist and as approved in 1955, the sign read:

Just beyond the willows is the meadow where the Nez Perce Indians were camped at the time of Col. Gibbon’s surprise attack at dawn, August 9, 1877. No distinction between women, children, and warriors was made by the troops. Within 20 minutes the Indian camp appeared to be in possession of the soldiers. The Indians quickly recovered from their shock and soon made the soldier’s position untenable. Gibbons ordered a retreat to this wooded point where the troops remained under siege.

Memorialization of the Indian dead proved as difficult as presentation of the “whole picture” within an inadequate land base. Soon after the 50th anniversary of the battle, Ranger in Charge Ted Hackett noted a small stone monument erected without the knowledge or the permission of the National Park Service. The wording on the monument, Hackett argued, suggested that the monument was “erected or cause [sic] to be erected by indians [sic] or an association sympathetic with the indians [sic].” Regional Historian Merrill J. Mattes was certain that Mr. Thain White of Dayton, Montana, had sponsored the monument. White had assisted McWhorter in the staking of both the Bear’s Paw and Big Hole battlefields in the 1930s and had written on the Nez Perce flight. In December 1950, White informed Mattes that he wished to put my little bit of work toward the future keep of that ground; which is to mount a bronze tablet about 8 by 10 inches in size saying this: ‘In memory of the Indian infants, women, old men and children who were killed and wounded near this battlefield, August 9, 1877.’
Mattes, although “expressing sympathy for the desire to memorialize the Indian victims” informed White that any plans for monumentation would have to be reviewed by Regional Director Howard Baker. In placing the monument surreptitiously, White had disregarded this procedure. Despite the fact that White had violated federal regulations, Acting Regional Director John S. McLaughlin advised that the monument be left intact, pending formal justification for the memorial, its design, and its text, and subsequent approval by the Director. The Park Service was aware of the public-relations hazards inherent in public dispute over the monument placement and text and also of the need for increased recognition of the Nez Perce. Officially unsanctioned, the monument remained in place until the 1980s when it was removed to the museum and presented as a relic of historic attempts to commemorate the Indian dead.

Lack of a coherent and defined management plan and interpretive program is suggestive not only in the paucity of management documents and in the reuse of USFS signage, but also in the lack of fanfare for the 75th anniversary of the battle. In late July 1952, Seasonal Ranger Warren L. Anderson reminded his immediate supervisor, Assistant Chief Ranger Stanley McComas, that August 9 was the 75th anniversary of the Battle of the Big Hole. “I wonder,” he wrote, “if there are any plans for the publicity of the anniversary?” Anderson recommended submittal of a “broadside” to papers within a hundred mile radius, “especially to those in the Bitterroot Valley.” No response from the chief ranger’s office appears in the record.

Curation

The Park Service did not formally establish guidelines for collection acquisition, care, and use until the 1967 publication of the Museum Handbook. As established in the handbook, a “well-managed collection” met five basic criteria: “its specimens are selected purposefully, they are readily available for study, they are well preserved, they are accompanied by adequately organized data, and they are used to their potential in the park program.” Prior to the 1960s, however, NPS curators generally had the advantage of a clear and formal statement of a unit’s natural and cultural significance as defined in the enabling legislation. Beginning in 1925, when Director Mather restricted the subject matter of park museum collections to the park story, and as formalized in a 1939 policy memorandum establishing the scope of museum exhibits, the Service defined unit significance (whether natural/geographic or historical/thematic) as the foundation criterion for all acquisition efforts. At Big Hole Battlefield, acquisition efforts therefore closely followed discussion over the significance of the site. Funds and formal guidelines for the more prosaic tasks of purchase, care, and presentation, proved more difficult to secure.

In 1944 and 1945, Seasonal Ranger Samuel Beal made the first concerted effort to collect artifacts for the monument museum. Beal “barraged” newspapers in Dillon, Butte, Anaconda, Deer Lodge, Hamilton, Darby, and Salmon with requests for information and donations of artifacts related to the battle specifically, to Nez Perce culture in the second half of the 19th century, and to western military regiments. Yellowstone park personnel, including Chief Ranger Maynard Barrows and Chief Naturalist Max Bauer, supported this effort, providing a truck “for the purpose of making these collections,” display cases designed by Yellowstone staff, “some funds for expenses,” and (belatedly) a lock for the museum door, which until 1947 was nailed.
shut during the unmanned winter months. Bauer directed Beal to accept anything “that will help tell the story of the conflict,” including military and Nez Perce artifacts from the general period of the battle. Upon completion of the collection effort, Beal had acquired a number of guns either used in the battle or representative of those that would have been used, empty shells and miscellaneous Nez Perce artifacts collected at the battlefield site and also from the larger Big Hole and Bitterroot regions. During the winter when the monument was closed, District Forest Ranger, Earl M. Walton displayed part of the collection at the Wisdom Ranger Station. Additional pieces were displayed at the Basin Mercantile Company and the Wisdom Public Library.

Management of Cultural and Natural Resources

From the early years of Park Service administration at Big Hole Battlefield National Monument rangers integrated cultural- and natural-resource management. In 1947, the Park Service prohibited grazing within the monument boundaries. “In an area of 200 acres,” Chief Ranger Barrows argued, “it seems that all grazing should be prohibited if we are going to preserve original conditions” — as they defined the cultural rather than the historic scene. Efforts for further restriction continued through the 1950s, with continued (and unsuccessful) attempts to fence the monument “as a protection against cattle grazing in the surrounding forest. Much damage has been noted, not only to the area in general, but to the battlefield in particular.”

Siege Area. Photo by George A. Grant, July 30, 1951. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB.
Park Service officials continued to debate the merits and advisability of visitor and administrative facilities that encroached upon the Siege Area, threatening physical integrity and disturbing the historic scene. Similarly, they resisted the frequent requests for expansion of campground and picnicking facilities, arguing that the battlefield was of historical rather than recreational importance, and that the Park Service should encourage visitors to seek camping and picnicking facilities on the Forest Service land that adjoined the monument to the east and west. Facilities remained limited to a small six-unit campground dating to the Forest Service tenure. This campground was later determined to be inconsistent with the master plan for development and was removed.53

Beyond the land base, cultural resources recognized and protected by the Park Service were limited to the lodgepole pine, riddled with bullets during the prolonged siege of the entrenched soldiers and savaged by the pine beetle blight of the 1910s and 1920s. In 1935, Forest Service officials “topped” the dead and dying bullet-scarred trees, creating a false and unhealthy natural environment while attempting to preserve cultural relics. By the 1950s, these trunks, most as tall as 10', were also collapsing. “The most urgent of all recommended projects,” wrote Seasonal Ranger Ted Hackett, “is the preservation of the numerous standing tree trunks that are the remains of the trees which stood during the battle. These bullet-scarred tree trunks are one of the few evidences of the historic battle, and their presence creates an atmosphere that takes the visitor back to the time of the battle.” In an effort to preserve the trunks, the Park Service cemented the root bases. While these efforts preserved the trees as artifacts, they also created unhealthy and unnatural forest conditions and a visual scene markedly different from that at the time of the battle. By the 1980s, the Park Service and Forest Service would cooperate on “reconstruction” of the Siege and Horse-Pasture areas to more natural and historically accurate growth patterns.54

**Transition to Mission 66**

In September 1949, while en route between Yellowstone National Park and Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, Assistant Chief Ranger B. R. Finch “was interested to find” that 18 miles of the road between Divide and Wisdom had been oiled and surfaced. An additional 18 miles, he learned, were to be surfaced by the spring of 1950. Soon, a new, paved, all-season highway would pass directly west of the national monument, connecting Wisdom with the Bitterroot and Missoula valleys and placing the monument on a primary thoroughfare between Glacier and Yellowstone national parks. “If and when such a highway is constructed,” Finch noted, “the present improvements at the monument will be entirely inadequate to withstand the impact of increased visitor use... [The battlefield] will not remain an isolated area visited only by a few people during the summer months.”

Specifically, Finch noted that the present parking area would accommodate only 20 cars. Enlargement of the parking area was not feasible without expansion of the monument boundaries. Second, if the monument became accessible year round, a permanent ranger position would have to be established; increased personnel would require increasing housing facilities on an expanded administrative site. Finally, expansion of the land base for purely
administrative reasons provided an opportunity to acquire additional land of historical significance.

For years, the adequacy of 200 acres to effective and accurate interpretation had been debated. The adequacy, however, of existing space and infrastructure to the logistical demands of a high volume of visitors had never before been at issue. Despite this changing impetus for a "reorientation of . . . thinking as to boundaries, development, and future disposition,"55 Finch’s final recommendation echoed Superintendent Toll’s advice of fourteen years earlier. "Unless the Park Service is willing to make the necessary improvements, it would seem logical to turn the area over to the State of Montana."56

In response to Finch’s memorandum, Yellowstone Superintendent Rogers assigned Regional Historian Mattes, a representative of the Landscape Division, and Finch to yet another comprehensive evaluation of the national monument’s historical significance, current conditions at the site, and likely impacts of the new highway development. Armed with this data, Merriam hoped to achieve "general agreement" on a "definite program of action."57

Mattes, Yellowstone Resident Landscape Architect Mattson, Finch, and Yellowstone Chief Naturalist David Condon visited the battlefield on September 14, 1950. In response to the visit and subsequent study, and with the concurrence of the Yellowstone Superintendent and Region II officials, this team reiterated that the battlefield was representative of a phase of western history that had gained significance with the passage of time and that it was suitably located and sufficiently endowed with elements of high drama to interpret that story. Paraphrasing Mattes, Superintendent Rogers wrote:

> It is true that the Big Hole Battlefield National Monument up to the present time has been a marginal area in respect to its use by the public but it actually is the historic site where the interpretation of the story which encompassed much of the West can be told. For this reason we think to round out the National Park Service preservation of significant western historical areas and to best tell the western Indian story.58

Still others remained skeptical that the battlefield had that much merit. In 1954, despite Mattes “comprehensive evaluation,” Big Hole battlefield was included in a report of the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monument’s Survey Team charged with identification of Park Service units of state rather than national significance. Big Hole Battlefield was one of 7 “substandard” properties proposed for Congressional disestablishment.59 In the wake of the Survey Team’s report, five national monuments and a recreation area were transferred by act of Congress from the National Park Service to their respective states or to another federal agency. Two of the units had been inherited from the Department of Agriculture or the War Department in 1933 and had therefore not been subjected to prior NPS evaluation of their appropriate place in the Park Service system. In every case, both the National Park Service and the receiving party supported the transfer of authority and public and political opposition was minimal.60
In company with these divested sites, Big Hole Battlefield National Monument was an inheritance from the U.S. Forest Service and the War Department. Historically, the isolated site had received few visitors (restricting the impact of interpretive efforts). In contrast, however, to the divested units, local and Park Service response to the proposed action was immediate and a strong argument had been made for national significance. Montana’s congressional delegation, Governor Hugo Aronson, and the Beaverhead Chamber of Commerce protested, noting in part that “the battlefield is one of the most important tourist attractions in the area.” Mattes, Rogers, and Baker also formally recommended to the Director that the monument be retained in the national park system, on the basis of its important association with western expansion.61

By November 1955, the immediate threat of disestablishment had dissipated. Yellowstone Superintendent Rogers reported that “now that the status of the monument has been established, it is imperative that plans for development and protection be made.” These boundary recommendations were presented in Big Hole’s first Mission 66 prospectus. Roughly defined, they included purchase or administrative transfer of the Nez Perce Encampment Area, the Howitzer Capture Area, and the Horse Pasture/Twin Trees Area (excluded from Hill and Mattson’s 1939 maximum boundary recommendations), and adequate land for “public use and orientation from which visitors may obtain a panoramic view of the entire battlefield.”62

Finally, in October 1959, four years after Rogers reported the status of the monument secure, the Advisory Board on National Parks officially recognized the national historical significance of the monument, under the subtheme “Military and Indian Affairs” of Theme XV, Westward Expansion and Extension of the National Boundaries to the Pacific, 1830-1898. Approval of a final development prospectus and congressional revision of the boundaries, based upon this formal determination of national significance, dominated the years between 1959 and 1963.
Chapter Five
Administration Under Yellowstone National Park,
Later Years (1956-1977)

Mission 66

NPS Director Conrad L. Wirth conceived of Mission 66 as a means of summoning administration and congressional support for massive federal investment in the national parks. Instead of going to the Bureau of Budget and Congress for development funds in two- and three-year increments, Wirth proposed to submit a comprehensive plan for the renovation of the national park system over a ten-year span. The completion of the program in 1966 would coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the National Park Service.¹

Wirth was helped in his endeavor by individuals and organizations in the conservation movement whose writings in the mid-1950s brought about a heightened public awareness of the state of the parks. For example, Bernard DeVoto’s scathing article in Harper’s Monthly, “Let’s Close Our National Parks,” described the decaying infrastructure and demoralizing working conditions in the national parks, and an article in Reader’s Digest by Charles Stevenson, titled “The Shocking Truth About Our National Parks,” warned prospective visitors of the unsanitary, even slumlike conditions that were typical of the hotels and campgrounds.

First and foremost, Wirth persuaded President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the key committees in Congress to support Mission 66 because it would rectify nearly fifteen years of neglect resulting from budget cutbacks during World War II and the Korean Conflict. It would also restore the parks to a condition that would satisfy the growing millions of Americans who visited the national park system each year.

Of greatest importance to Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, Wirth also conceived of Mission 66 as an opportunity to rethink concepts of national park design. As Wirth remembered his instructions to his staff years later in his book Parks, Politics, and the People, the Mission 66 staff and steering committee were to question any elements of park design that they thought had outlived their usefulness: “nothing was to be sacred, except the ultimate purpose to be served. Men, method, and time-honored practices were to be accorded no vested deference.”²

Big Hole Battlefield faced the Mission 66 era as an under funded and underutilized stepchild of Yellowstone National Park.³ Here, “time-honored practices” were limited to making do with too little funding, too little land, and too little foresight. Those who guided the monument through the Mission 66 planning process accorded this practice little deference.⁴
Big Hole Battlefield National Monument: Mission 66 Prospectus for Development

On July 7, 1956, Historian Roy E. Appleman — a hard nosed, dedicated professional — inaugurated the Washington office’s involvement in the Big Hole Mission 66 planning process when he toured the battlefield with seasonal ranger Michael Sedar and Assistant Yellowstone Superintendent Warren Hamilton. Neither Appleman nor Hamilton had been to the site before. The day was bright and warm, displaying the “gorgeous scenery” of the Big Hole Valley to full advantage. A steady trickle of visitors, drawn to the area (Sedar guessed) by the good fishing on the Big Hole River, walked the trails that criss-crossed the Siege Area. They seemed, to Appleman, to be interested in what they saw.

Despite Appleman’s enthusiasm for the monument’s setting and potential, he described the current condition as intolerable and could remember no other service area that showed “more neglect over a long period of years than Big Hole Battlefield.” Visitor facilities were limited to pit toilets, a drinking fountain of good water, an incoherent collection of poorly displayed artifacts, and the old log museum that transgressed upon the Siege Area. A registration book rested on a shelf outside the museum. A “large number” of signs related to the soldiers of Gibbon’s Command and to the Bitterroot Volunteers were incised with outdated text developed during the Forest Service’s tenure. Markers related to the Nez Perce dated to McWhorter’s investigations of the 1920s and 1930s. The signs and pedestrian trails were in good condition only if one considered the serious lack of help and funds availed the seasonal ranger. These developments neither adequately served visitors’ needs nor adequately reflected the importance of the site.

The draft Mission 66 prospectus or “master plan” submitted to Washington in late 1956 addressed these needs in gross abstractions. The Park Service promised to preserve battle remains for posterity and to interpret the battle and its relation to the broad sweep of western American history. To this end it promised construction of trails and walkways; water, sewer, power, and communication systems; a visitor center and administration building with exhibits; a
residential and utility compound; new directional and informational signs and markers in the battlefield area and on the approach roads; and a boundary fence. These improvements would not include overnight accommodations or additional camping facilities: Big Hole Battlefield would remain primarily a day-use area, with recreational use encouraged on adjacent forest service land; the air of quiet dignity appropriate to a memorial would therefore be preserved. Details of design, resource placement, and interpretive focus would be resolved over the course of the next pivotal decade in Big Hole history.6

Park Service officials agreed that the success of this development scheme hinged on immediate road improvements to the monument site. In 1956 (and despite the improvements anticipated by Assistant Chief Ranger B. R. Finch in 1949), the 12 miles of State Highway 43 northwest of Wisdom to the battlefield remained unpaved, as did the 24 miles between the monument and the Bitterroot Valley. The road could not be fairly classified as all-weather. In encouraging Montana State Highway Commission support for highway reconstruction, the Park Service reminded the state of the economic advantages of increased tourism and promised a well-funded commitment to the development and improvement of the battlefield as part of Mission 66. The Park Service also negotiated with the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) for an alignment that would place the new road “as near the [historic] monument entrance as possible” and that “exploited the views” toward the monument. In deference to topography, curve slope, and the water rights associated with private ditches, however, BPR routed the highway approximately two-miles west of the historic alignment. In 1962, the state of Montana and the U.S. Forest Service completed improvements to Highway 43, linking U.S. Highways 91 and 93. Visitation increased dramatically, from 9,600 in 1961 to more than 20,000 in 1966.7


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>1977</td>
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Park Service officials also insisted that proper development of Big Hole Battlefield National Monument depended on an extension of the boundaries. Overcoming two decades of ambivalence on this issue, the proposed master plan established that acquisition of the Twin Trees, the howitzer capture site, and the Nez Perce Encampment Area was essential if the monument was to be interpreted to Park Service standards and if significant resources were to be protected. Continued discussion of these acquisitions focused not on need or merit but on determination of the eastern and southern limits to the Encampment Area. This discussion was informed in part by a cursory metal detector survey of the area completed by Custer Battlefield
Historian Don Rickey in July 1959 and by the battle-related details provided in a historical research report completed by Dr. Merrill D. Beal (see Research and Interpretation, below). In large part, however, the Park Service based its boundary expansion objectives on the staking completed by McWhorter and Yellow Wolf in 1937; "we seriously question whether any evidence could be more precise or authoritative." Ultimately, the service acquired the W1/2 NE1/4 of Section 24, Township 2S, Range 17W. Historians from Region II and Yellowstone National Park voiced confidence that those 80 acres encompassed the camp and initial-attack area.

Robert Burns, seasonal ranger and management assistant at Big Hole in the late 1950s, and first superintendent of Nez Perce National Historical Park, established in 1965. Courtesy National Park Service, Yellowstone NP, n.d.

Finally, there was little discussion as to the need for additional administrative staff at the park. In 1959, Robert L. Burns was appointed "Management Assistant, Big Hole Battlefield National Monument," assigned to the Yellowstone Superintendent yet responsible for the day-to-day administration of the battlefield. Following Burns' transfer to Perry's Victory and International Peace Memorial National Monument in October 1960, the post was filled briefly by Yellowstone Park Ranger Lloyd R. Hoener and then by Yellowstone Law Enforcement Officer Howard Chapman. There is no evidence that either Hoener or Chapman were actively involved in monument administration during their brief tenures. In April 1961, Yellowstone Ranger Jack R. Williams assumed the management assistant position. Williams was followed by Clyde Maxey, Aubrey Haines, Elroy Bohlin, David Stimson, and Al Schulmeyer. In June 1961, staff was further expanded with appointment of a seasonal maintenance man, a first in the history of the site. The seasonal ranger position was redesignated "Seasonal Interpreter/Historian" and two interpreters were assigned to the site each summer season. Together this team was responsible for site administration, interpretation, research, and protection. ("Complete separation of functions," Williams wrote, "[was] difficult in a small area.") These tasks were designed to meet two overriding goals: first, to tell the story of "those dreadful days in August of 1877" without bias and second, to "channel and control" visitor use in a manner that minimized physical impact.
Big Hole National Battlefield

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Howard Chapman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Elroy Bohlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-72</td>
<td>Dave Stimson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-87</td>
<td>Al Schulmeyer **</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*(position redefined as Superintendent ca. 1973)*

The relative equanimity of the Mission 66 planning process ended when officials debated the location and extent of visitor services. In 1957, landscape architects Sanford “Red” Hill and Frank Mattson of the Branch of Plans and Design proposed to locate park headquarters and a visitor center one-half mile south of the estimated southern end of the Encampment Area, on a flat bench that provided a panoramic view of all phases of the conflict without intruding on the battlefield. This “Ruby Bench” site was also, Appleman criticized, “more than ½ mile from any point of interest” (demanding that visitors make two stops or hike a substantial distance) and was on private land (necessitating costly purchase of an estimated 143 acres). Appleman proposed a sagebrush slope 200 yards northwest of the Siege Area as an alternative. It provided immediate visitor access to the battlefield and could be acquired from the Forest Service at no cost. Like Ruby Bench, the north slope offered a view of the army’s initial approach route, the Nez Perce Encampment Area, and the Siege Area. Unlike the bench, Appleman and others argued, this view was more “intimately” associated with the battlefield proper and its construction would not disrupt the middle-distance view from the river bottom toward the crest of the hill. Staff residences could be located in the forested swale west of the proposed visitor center, where they would be sheltered from public view. Park Service officials debated these two sites for the next five years, weighing the “economy and efficiency” of the north-slope site against the panoramic view of the bench.

Ultimately, Park Service officials determined that neither the howitzer site nor the Twin Trees could be easily seen from the north-slope site. The Siege Area “showed as tree tops.” Inadequate level land was available for parking and building construction and, finally, the access road would require construction of a visually intrusive hillside cut. The final Mission 66 master plan and associated boundary status report recommended purchase of the Ruby Bench building location. The plan identified the bench as the site that best conformed to Park Service goals not to infringe upon the battlefield, as the site most “handy” to the revised alignment of State Highway 43, as the site that best facilitated interpretation, and as the site most vulnerable to “adverse use” if left in private ownership.

Administrative tasks outlined in the master plan included construction of housing for all uniformed permanent and seasonal personnel; maintenance of the fire-fighting agreement with the Beaverhead National Forest, “cooperation” with the state of Montana in the management of fishing; and inclusion in the NPS omnibus bill of the $664,895 required to complete the monument development plan in one package unit.
For the immediate future, the battlefield was to be managed within the framework of this master plan and under the supervision of the Yellowstone National Park superintendent. As early as 1962, however, the Park Service foresaw a time when the monument would be sufficiently developed and would attract sufficient visitation to be established as an autonomous unit, without the constraints imposed by a “coordinating” superintendency.¹⁷

Initiation of the plan required only congressional approval of the boundary modifications and land purchase.

“*At Long Last*: Public Law 88-24

Park Service officials who sought to acquire the additional land and funding assumed the challenge of presenting the Nez Perce people and their story as worthy of the proposed memorialization. Their careful effort to clarify the tragic cost of westward expansion (beyond a “regrettable footnote to an otherwise happy story”) contradicted the patriotic fervor that defined Park Service interpretive efforts and public response to Custer Battlefield.¹⁸ Their cause was aided by the sympathy that Anglo-Americans had long accorded the Nez Perce and by the ease with which the Nez Perce could be categorized as “good” Indians, “civilized,” and historically respectful of America’s move West. As described by Park Service officials in written testimony to Congress, the Big Hole Battlefield Siege Area and historic War Department monument “rightly served” as testimony to the “high military qualities” of the Frontier Army. Park Service control of the Nez Perce Encampment Area, Howitzer Capture Site, and Twin Trees simply “expanded” the tribute to include the military skill of the Nez Perce and expanded the interpretive potential to include “white encroachment on the Nez Perce lands and a continuing series of mistreatments of the Indians.” One official enthusiastically compared the epic Nez Perce flight with Xenophon’s March of the Ten Thousand in the Persian wars of antiquity. Chief Joseph was lauded as a humane man “without the ferocity and savagery expected of Indian leaders of his time,” a remarkable military strategist, and the “highest type of Indian that General Nelson A. Miles had ever known.”¹⁹

On May 17, 1963, the 88th Congress approved Public Law 88-24, authorizing the addition of 160 acres of national forest land and 295.6 acres of private land to the monument boundaries.²⁰ The private land included the visitor center building site on Ruby Bench, right-of-way for an access road to the new alignment of State Highway 43, and the Encampment Area as defined by the McWhorter survey and subsequent investigations. Shown through “recent” studies to be significantly associated with the battle, the acreage also included the Horse Pasture/Twin Trees Area and the Howitzer Capture Site, both on national forest land. The Forest Service had agreed to this transfer and the land would be acquired at no cost. (This degree of cooperation between two agencies that often competed for control of federal lands runs through the history of Big Hole National Battlefield. In September 1963, Garrison thanked Region I Regional Forester Boyd L. Rasmussen and commended his staff: “a hearty thanks to you for your helpfulness in the matter of the land for Big Hole National Battlefield. . . . Over the years, the Forest Service has been mighty helpful and constructive with Big Hole matters and we are indeed grateful for this. We find continuing cooperative assistance from all of your men.”)²¹ The bill also redesignated
the monument a national battlefield, a title more descriptive of the historic events and in keeping with NPS policy to designate uniform and appropriate administrative titles to units in the national park system (P.L. 88-24). Finally, it laid the groundwork for concurrent jurisdiction with the state of Montana over petty offenders in the national monument area (see Appendix A).²²

Upon passage of the Big Hole expansion bill, a jubilant Jack Williams (recently transferred to Aztec National Monument) wrote local historian Thain White:

[I] imagine you are aware of the good news regarding Big Hole? It became Big Hole National Battlefield on May 17. One of five such areas in the country. Now, at long last, there is within the boundaries the site of the Nez Perce camp (McWhorter can now rest in peace); the Twin Trees; and the howitzer capture site. A couple of years should see it really nice I do believe with a good museum and so forth.²³

Williams’ jubilation was premature. The National Park Service did not secure legal title to the development site until 1966 and did not secure title to the Encampment Area until 1972.

**Land Acquisition**

In 1958, with Park Service encouragement, Mark and Tom Clemow had denied the Forest Service right-of-way access across the Encampment Area; the proposed Forest Service timber-haul road, the NPS argued and the Clemows agreed, would threaten the integrity of the historic scene. Although the Clemows’ most immediate objection to the road was potential disruption of their irrigation system, they also voiced support for NPS plans to develop the monument. Yellowstone Superintendent Lemuel Garrison reported

the Clemow brothers expressed great interest in our plans, and gave the impression they were far more interested in seeing the Monument developed, along with improvements of access through rebuilding of State Route 43, than they were in seeing the development of forest products processing plants in the Wisdom and Big Hole Valley areas. . . . They assured me they would not sell the land to anyone other than the National Park Service until we had more time to develop a method of acquisition, and if we would stake out the minimum area we required, were willing to explore the possibility of an exchange for public domain lands of the Bureau of Land Management.

Immediately upon this vote of support from the Clemows, Garrison had the Encampment Area staked — it covered an estimated at 80 acres within the W1/2 NE1/4 Section 24 — and NPS officials approached the Bureau of Land Management about the possibility of a land exchange. This exchange was approved in principle by the BLM and the Clemows in June 1959. Subsequent land appraisals, however, failed to find suitable BLM land of equal value to the choice bottomland of the Encampment Area. In June 1960 the land-exchange scheme was abandoned and the Park Service established a “fair-market value” of $4,400 for the 80 acres. Negotiation over the dispensation or continuance of water rights appurtenant to the land and over the land’s fair market value continually delayed purchase. A $20,000 congressionally imposed ceiling to the land-purchase budget at Big Hole further complicated the negotiations. This entire amount, once deemed adequate for the full extent of private land, had been expended on
purchase of the development site in 1966 (see below). In March 1969, the Park Service successfully established an 18-month purchase option on the 80-acre Encampment Area plus 40 acres earlier excluded from the development site acquisition. Passage of the law (86 Stat. 120), which increased the acquisition ceiling at Big Hole National Battlefield, secured these funds and the Park Service acquired the Encampment Area in 1970, 33 years after Hill’s initial report recommending its purchase (see Appendix A). The Clemows retained rights of use and maintenance for the single ditch that passed through the property.24

Old water flume trestle shortly before it was removed in 1967. Photo by Elroy Bohlin. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB.

Acquisition of the Ruby Bench development site (redefined as 175.718 acres) also proved more difficult than anticipated. Assured as early as 1958 of the Clemows’ willingness to sell, the Park Service proceeded to make “numerous studies” of the “possibilities of interpretation” from the bench site. This process of “studies, moves, and counter-moves” continued for four years, to Mark and Tom Clemows’ father’s apparent frustration. In July 1962, Yellowstone Superintendent Garrison wrote a conciliatory letter to Martin Clemow, apologizing for the delays in land acquisition and for the continued uncertainty as to Park Service plans. “It must seem to you,” Garrison wrote, “that the National Park Service is intolerably slow and confused in their approach.”25

In August 1964, the assistant director of specialized services reported that Mark and Bessie Clemow had declined Park Service offers made “at or near” the appraised value of $14,500. In addition, the Park Service had been unable to reach agreement with the owner of mineral rights.
underlying the land, Bruce Risley. Of greatest concern, however, was Clemow’s anticipated sale of much of the development site to a private party who proposed construction of a gas station, restaurant, motel and trailer park.

On October 6, 1964, the Secretary of the Interior filed condemnation proceedings for 175.718 acres of land owned by Mark Clemow of Mark Clemow Ranches, Inc., and for mineral rights. At the time of filing, the Park Service deposited $14,500 in the Registry of the Court for the taking of the land and $1 for the taking of the mineral rights. The jury defined just compensation at $18,300 for the land, counter to the Park Service's offer and despite Clemow's testimony that its value approached $40,000. Risley, meanwhile, failed to answer the court summons and the jury found the Park Service offer of $1 to be full, fair, and just compensation for the mineral rights. The final deed reserved the private use of four irrigation ditches and the right of access to maintain and repair them.26

Upon conclusion of the proceedings, the Park Service was able to advance development plans on the bench site. “Good will” among the service’s Big Hole Valley neighbors, however, was significantly compromised. In a request for assistance from Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, Risley wrote: “you probably do not realize how little respect the various government agencies have for the property or rights of the taxpayer. . . . The attitude seems to be — to hell with you as an individual. . . . If the Park Service takes over this land, how could I do any mining? I could not touch land that is under the Park Service so where are my rights?” Current Big Hole Superintendent Jon James reports that many in the Big Hole Valley shared Risley’s sentiment and that the Park Service continues to repair the damage caused by the condemnation proceedings.27

Visitor Center Construction

On August 26, 1967, the Park Service broke ground for Williams’ “good museum.” Hill had initiated the visitor center design process in February 1964, with submittal of the “Advance Preliminary Drawing, Visitor Center and Utility Building,” NM-BHB-3002. In conformity with a service-wide Mission-66 trend, the building was titled a “visitor center” rather than a museum and served multiple functions, providing administrative, museum, and utility space. In this initial and in all subsequent design proposals, the panorama of the battlefield served as the major display. Artifact collections and informative panels were intended to be “minor in extent,” with exhibits related to Nez Perce culture and the political and military underpinnings of the campaign to the left of the panoramic windows and those related to the Nez Perce flight from Big Hole to Bear’s Paw to the right.28

A diorama of the Nez Perce camp would show women and children fleeing as soldiers attacked and “a few” warriors returned fire. From the observation deck overlooking the battlefield, visitors would listen to a taped narrative. A ranger, stationed at a central information desk, would have an unimpeded view of all public spaces and would establish personal contact with the visitors as they entered. The west-display structural component mimicked tepee design. Truck storage and administrative offices were incorporated in the east wing of the structure.
Additional infrastructure was limited to a four-unit employee apartment building, set back from the overlook site, outside the viewshed of the battlefield. The planned superintendent’s residence was excluded from the final construction package, as a cost-saving measure.29

Access from the visitor center to the battlefield interpretive trails was provided by a new “return road,” completed in 1967, that led across the wash and down the slope to a point on the historic museum access road. This road diverted from within the monument boundaries rather than branching directly from the new Highway 43 realignment. Although longer and more expensive to build and maintain, this route allowed the limited monument staff to better monitor visitors.

The visitor center was completed in 1968. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB.

The Park Service announced completion of the visitor center in July 1968 and in August Garrison authorized destruction of the old USFS museum and residence at the Siege Area. The Park Service celebrated this momentous transition with pomp and circumstance. Tepees erected in the Encampment Area represented the expanded scope of the memorial effort and visually “placed” the encampment site — coveted but not yet owned by the NPS — within the monument. An estimated 400 people attended the dedication ceremony, where Congressman Arnold Olsen of Montana was the principal speaker. Joseph and Ida Blackeagle and their daughter Norma (descendents of Chief Joseph) were in attendance. Josiah Red Wolf, the last survivor of the battle, cut the ceremonial ribbon. Midwest Regional Director Fred C. Fagerson commended Nez Perce National Historical Park Superintendent Bob Burns for his efforts to bring Red Wolf to the site: “I understand it took a lot of coaxing on your part before he would
condescend to do this. . . . His being there was one of the most significant parts of the entire program.” For Red Wolf, five years old in 1877, it was a first and final return to the site where his mother had been shot and killed while fleeing the attack with Red Wolf and his infant sister. When asked at the last moment to speak extemporaneously, Red Wolf declined — a moment that Burns remembers as a profound but awkward testimony to the lasting personal scars of the Nez Perce War and to the continued challenge of effective communication between two cultures.30

Josiah Red Wolf, last survivor of the War of 1877. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB.
Research and Interpretation

Research and interpretive efforts increased commensurate with increased staffing; for the first time, Williams remembers, Big Hole staff had the “funds and the wherewithal” to accurately and objectively interpret the details of the battle.\(^\text{31}\) During the summer of 1962, park staff constructed a new circular trail from the historic parking area, around the Siege Area, to the Nez Perce Encampment/Horse Pasture overlook.\(^\text{32}\) By the end of the 1962 season, Williams and Haines had installed new trail markers, in one of four designs: a routed outline of Chief Ollokot on brown, designating Nez Perce actions; a routed outline in white of a trooper hat designating army or volunteer actions; a white black-tipped eagle feather showing where a Nez Perce was killed or wounded; and a white cross designating the same for the troops and volunteers. Additional markers were added over the years, as new sites were revealed. They corresponded to a guide leaflet, “mimeo-graphed and hand assembled” during the first seasons and professionally printed (with minor modifications) by the Government Printing Office from 1963 until 1975. These leaflets were distributed from a new ten by fifteen-foot visitor center constructed by Williams at the Siege Area trailhead.\(^\text{33}\)
Marker placement was based in large part on Williams' 1961-1962 effort to indicate the location of all known artifact finds on a master base map. Although Williams and his staff relied primarily on McWhorter's work (1937) they also included the results of Sherill's 1917-1918 survey; Don Rickey's 1959 metal-detector survey of the Siege Area and initial attack area, reported in "Field Research, Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, July 16-22, 1959"; and O.W. Judge's 1961 survey of the Encampment Area, reported by Williams in "Metal Locator Search — Nez Perce Indian Camp Area . . . August 21, 22, and 25, 1961." This data base was expanded in 1964 with Seasonal Ranger Kermit Edmonds' discovery of several important sites near the Howitzer Capture Area. This discovery "located and authenticated beyond any doubt the site of the howitzer episode" and was reported in "Field Research Project Report, Big Hole National Battlefield, June, July, August 1964" and associated grid maps NB-BIHO 8813 and NB-BIHO 8814. In 1964, Haines surreptitiously conducted a survey of the privately owned Nez Perce Encampment Area, tying in all artifact finds to McWhorter's stake locations on base map NB-BIHO 8812. Late in the fall of 1964, when the tourists had left and his family had returned to Yellowstone and he found himself with "nothing to do," Haines also surveyed two previously uninvestigated portions of the Encampment Area, locating evidence of Gibbon's left-wing charge, led by Lieutenant Bradley; the right-wing charge, led by Captains Logan and Rawn; and a probable battlefield burial. He reported his significant finds in "Report on Historical Research Accomplished at Big Hole National Battlefield During 1965."34

Interpretive Ranger Kermit Edmonds defined protection of these archeological artifacts as one of the most important tasks confronting park personnel in the early 1960s. The Park Service undertook these surveys not only as a means of increasing understanding of the details of the battle, but also as a means of protecting buried artifacts — and their information potential — from relic hunters. In off hours and late evenings, Edmonds also assumed responsibility for cataloguing all artifacts collected in the field, creating the Big Hole National Battlefield study collection.35

Haines attributes these early efforts to make Big Hole National Battlefield "a reasonably well interpreted site" to Jack Williams. These were "no-cost," "take-the-initiative," "grab-your-instruments-and-head-on-over" projects that inspired little controversy and generated an only modest paper trail. "The higher-ups in Yellowstone," Haines notes, "saw Big Hole as a nuisance site. There was no controversy because Yellowstone didn't really care."36

Formal development of an Interpretive Prospectus waited passage of Public Law 88-24 and expansion of the monument boundaries. Written by Clyde A. (Al) Maxey, this prospectus concentrated on the design of the visitor center, the logistics and location of the trail networks, and the tone and content of the interpretive signage. Typical visitor characteristics, as altered by the increased out-of-state traffic that followed reconstruction of Highway 43, informed these three primary development themes.37

Maxey reported that increasingly few visitors selected the battlefield as their primary destination; Big Hole provided a side trip and a rest stop — often made on impulse — for those traveling through the Big Hole Valley. These visitors were generally unfamiliar with the battle or the Nez Perce campaign and were wholly dependent upon Park Service interpreters for
gripping explication. Increased numbers of out-of-state visitors diluted the impact of
descendants of the Bitterroot Volunteers, who, prior to road completion, were an important
constituency at the site. Edmonds remembers that, to the discomfort of park personnel and at
variance with the interpretive focus, “these people wanted to celebrate the bravery and victory of the
citizen volunteers . . . where most people came to contemplate the tragedy of the battle.”

Nez Perce occasionally visited the battleground, placing flowers, ribbons, and pendants at the
Nez Perce death-site markers. The Park Service made no effort to remove the memorials,
heightening the battlefield’s dual role as historic site and sacred ground. American Indians of other
tribal affiliations also came to Big Hole to draw inspiration or to pay their respects, moved
perhaps by pan-Indian sentiments growing out of the civil rights movement and American
Indian activism.  

The interpretive prospectus assumed that most visitors would proceed from the visitor center
along a modified road system down to the battlefield area. The road would provide reasonably
direct access to the battlefield, without unnecessarily disrupting the historic scene. Formal trails
for the more “ambitious, energetic, and inspired visitor” were designed to provide a self-guided
introduction to the battle, in chronological sequence, from the Army’s approach, to the Horse
Pasture, then to an overlook from the point where Gibbon’s command made its initial assault on
the Encampment Area, and finally to the Siege Area and the post-battle memorials. The
memorials were to be treated as cultural resources, representative of evolving public response to
the battle and the Indian Wars. Through this chronological telling — initiated in the visitor center with the pre-battle interpretive displays — Park Service planners hoped to avoid the errors made at Custer Battlefield. There, the story was “literally told in reverse,” beginning at the point of Custer’s defeat and the soldiers’ burials and forcing inordinate and inappropriate attention on the battle and the Seventh Cavalry rather than on the “long and bitter struggle between the white man and the Indian.” (Historian Edward Linenthal argues that in books and movies, through the 1950s and 1960s, “the Indians’ plight did not register as a human tragedy but served instead as the backdrop for the celebration of the westward march of Anglo-American civilization. Injustices done to the Indians were regrettable footnotes to an otherwise happy story.”) Since the 1870s, the Nez Perce saga had struck a different chord in the American public and the interpretive program and visitor response at Big Hole National Battlefield differed from those at other Indian War sites, most notably at Custer Battlefield.)

According to the interpretive prospectus, interpretive text and battlefield signage would heighten the visual experience with a sense of the “excitement, the valor, the confusion, the cruelty of war and ultimately the futility of many of these conflicts.” During normal working hours, monument staff would also present information. Monument gates were to stay open, however, during early morning and evening hours when full staffing was not practicable. Self-guided trails were to fully convey the broad details of the years prior to the battle, as well as the years that followed.

The “main exhibit” — a panoramic view of the battlefield. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.
This focus on audio-visual and written materials not only accorded with the limited staff at the monument but also with changes in the service-wide interpretive program. In 1964, a Museum Study Team under the authority of the newly created Division of Interpretation and Visitor Services completed a management survey of the NPS Museum Branch. The team proposed a number of guidelines on exhibit design and preparation. Ralph Lewis reports that one guideline — that "the narrative story should, generally, be presented through publications and audiovisual means" — marked a turning point in the role of park museums. No longer would personal contact with a seasonal ranger define most visitors' national park experience.42

The NPS had intended to base their interpretive program and development plans at Big Hole on Historian Merrill D. Beal's monograph "The Nez Perce Campaign, 1877" (prepared under contract to the NPS and published in 1963 by the University of Washington Press as 'I Will Fight No More Forever'; Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce War). Reviewers in the academic press criticized the work as rife with minor errors, inconclusive in its analysis of controversial details of the military conduct of the campaign, and "failing to rise above its forerunners." Theodore Stern of the University of Oregon noted "[Beal's narrative] marks a regression from Fee's provision of battle maps, Haines' treatment of the events leading up to the war, and the special insights offered by McWhorter from Indian participants."43 Park Service opinion was mixed. Regional Historian Mattes roundly criticized methodology and content. Haines, though more circumspect, also voiced concern that the study provided little new knowledge of the battle or the campaign." Yellowstone Superintendent Garrison, however, maintained that NPS reviewers had failed to acquaint themselves with the limits to the contract and had missed the opportunity for timely review. Garrison ruled that Beal had adequately fulfilled the terms of his contract and ordered that he be paid in full. Negative assessments of the work, however, prevailed and the monograph was not widely used by park staff. In 1967, Haines' "Historical Research Management Plan for Big Hole National Battlefield & Bibliography of the Nez Perce War, 1877" superseded Beal's document as the park's basic planning and interpretive document.44

Although Haines' work provided an effective management document, the Park Service continued to work without a definitive history of the Battle of the Big Hole. In his enthusiastic review of the "Historical Research Management Plan," Robert M. Utley requested that a "documented history of the battle of Big Hole" be added to the Summary of Research Proposals. "There is no one authoritative study on the subject, and . . . [one] should [be] available as soon as possible." This goal was not realized until the 1991 publication of Haines, An Elusive Victory — The Battle of the Big Hole (West Glacier, Montana: Glacier Natural History Association, 1991).

Since the 1930s, park interpreters had struggled to balance accurate presentation of the tragedy inherent in the battle with tribute to the Army Regulars and Bitterroot Volunteers. They had also struggled between a close focus on the details of the battle and a broad view of the Indian Wars and the cost of western expansion. In his "Statement of Historical Significance," Haines struck that balance and defined the dual focus as mutually inclusive. The details of the battle as revealed through careful research and testing — the location of a tepee, or a line of attack, or a death chant, or a burial — brought into immediate relief the lessons of the larger war. These details were reduced to minutia only when the larger story was excluded from the telling:
As a focal point in one of the least justifiable of all our Indian wars, the Big Hole National Battlefield is both a memorial to the courage and tenacity of the men of two disparate cultures, and a reminder of a dark phase in the Indian-White relationship. In the first sense — as a memorial — this battlefield provides an insight into the purposes and feelings of the individual participants . . . because it is so well documented from the particular viewpoint of each side, and because there is such a wealth of supporting physical evidence. The strong sense of duty and steadiness of the white soldier is as apparent as the Indian warrior’s resolve to protect his own . . . The travail of both, and the Indian non-combatants as well, stands out in bold relief.

In the second sense — as a reminder — the battle of the Big Hole illustrates the bitter end product of misguided policy . . . In few other incidents does the injustice and futility of settling a dispute by force of arms appear more plainly than in this battle.45

Thirty years later, as he contemplates the length of his career and his contribution to Big Hole National Battlefield, Haines remembers “It is the best recorded battlefield of all the western Indian wars. Soldiers, volunteers, and the Nez Perce have contributed information. That makes it a more powerful story . . . [Visitors] would go quietly around the area, like they were in a cathedral. I have never been in a Park Service area where people were so interested and so respectful.”46

The Branch of Interpretation maintained that “not the least of the fruits of adequate interpretation is . . . that it leads directly toward the very preservation of the treasure itself, whether it be a national park, a prehistoric ruin, a historic battlefield or a precious monument of our wise and heroic ancestors.”48 Of Big Hole National Battlefield’s treasures, the sweeping historic scene was of greatest concern. The
Mission 66 master plan established that “an awareness of the values in the natural setting will govern the preservation, development, and grounds maintenance policies.”

Immediately upon passage of P.L. 88-24, newly appointed Management Assistant Al Maxey initiated a flora restoration policy designed to return battlefield vegetation to its condition in 1877. Secondary historic and biological studies suggested that the Big Hole beaver would have been all but destroyed during the fur trade of the early to mid 19th century and that the population had not sufficiently recovered by 1877 to impact the landscape through flooding and the creation of willow habitat. Large numbers of grazing ungulates would have further controlled willow growth. Adverse landscape impacts associated with the introduction of cattle included over-grazing and the raising of the water table through extensive flood irrigation.

This analysis was substantiated by verbal, photographic, and unpublished accounts, including Herbert Lord’s 1882 description of an open grassy hillside near the twin trees, mature lodgepole pine in the Siege Area, and isolated clumps of willow at the river bottom. By 1962 the Park Service managed a significantly different landscape: Sagebrush had increased on the overgrazed hillside. A solid mass of willows covered the bottom land. A 1920s beetle epidemic had killed the historic bullet-scarred trees and opened the Siege Area to second-growth timber. And fire-prevention efforts had altered the transition between forest and steppe.

Maxey advocated careful photographic documentation by a range-plant expert to provide base-year data against which the Park Service could measure its efforts. He also encouraged completion of a dendrochronological study to determine the age of the Siege Area stand in 1877; removal of encroaching sagebrush, lodgepole, and the beaver population; and continued maintenance of the bullet-scarred trunks with a petroleum-based preservative. By 1964, excavation of the battle trenches to their original depth had been added to the resource maintenance plan.

Aubrey Haines and Yellowstone’s Chief Park Naturalist John M. Good objected to Maxey’s plan on only one significant account. Continuation of the on-going and marginally successful effort to preserve the trunks was not worth the limited interpretive benefits. “Better to save a few stumps for the museum and let the others go the way of all flesh,” Good wrote. Haines agreed, suggesting construction of concrete cast replicas that could be erected within the Siege Area to “provide a few examples both of the manner in which lead was flying about at that time and the enthusiastic carving done by tourists attempting to salvage souvenirs at a later date.” Haines also suggested that the bottom-land vegetation-restoration program include controlled grazing along Trail Creek (at times of minimal tourist use), to control the willows and other vegetation.

Despite early realization of the importance of the landscape to the interpretive and preservation effort, implementation of Maxey’s plan was delayed until the 1970s when Superintendent Al Schulmeyer lobbied for action.
Post Mission 66

In October 1972, Pat H. Miller of the NPS Operations Evaluation Team submitted his "Evaluation Report of Big Hole National Battlefield." The report was timely: the visitor center had been in operation for four years and the land-acquisition program had been completed, culminating the two primary components of the Mission 66 planning effort.

Although audio equipment was of poor quality and the audio-visual narrative contained some factual error, Miller voiced general approval of the visitor center layout and of the audio-visual presentation. The Siege Area Trail, however, he described as antiquated, rambling, and marked with "too much detail" that distracted from the more important circumstances of the battle. The trail leaflets could be "qualitatively improved" with assistance from the NPS Harpers Ferry Center.53

Deficiencies in monument administration demanded a more dramatic response. Incumbent Management Assistant Dave Stimson complained to Miller of too little autonomy from Yellowstone. Within this most basic constraint, Big Hole Battlefield personnel were not provided with sufficient training in Yellowstone procedures or the administrative requirements relating to the battlefield. Nor were they provided with basic planning, programming, or budgetary documents and forms. There was no imprest cash fund, no copy machine, and no procedure to file or retain records. Staffing was insufficient during the off-season: when the full-time Management Assistant was compelled to travel, the monument was left unattended.

Infrastructure concerns included the decayed bridge across the North Fork of the Big Hole River, an overworked sewage leach field, and a noisy and inefficient ventilation system in the top of the visitor center "tepee." Security and fire-protection systems were meager. The battlefield staff depended on a cooperative agreement with the state of Montana for snow removal and, when snow clogged the valley and taxed the state's limited resources, the staff often had to wait a frustratingly long time for access road clearance.54
Alfred W. Schulmeyer, assigned to the battlefield in 1973 (as “Superintendent” rather than Management Assistant, a title that he insisted upon as a condition of employment), inherited these deficiencies in the physical plant and in the interpretative and administrative programs.

In Anticipation of the Centennial Year: 1974-1977

As Schulmeyer began his long tenure at Big Hole — he would serve as Management Assistant/Superintendent from 1973 until 1987 — he was aware that the centennial of the battle lay just four years away and would coincide with the national Bicentennial. This timing presented new opportunities for Big Hole National Battlefield, as record numbers of Americans were expected to visit historic sites. As in the past, NPS interest in increased visitation to the battlefield coincided with local interest in increased tourist dollars, providing an opportunity for a public/private partnership and for an effective “Public Relations” campaign. Most specifically, Schulmeyer served as co-chairman of the Heritage Subcommittee of the Beaverhead Bicentennial Commission and as Vice President of the Magicland Council (the “travel-vacation-tourist arm” of the Chambers of Commerce for Beaverhead and adjoining counties), responsible for realizing the Bicentennial’s potential to increase tourist awareness of Montana’s historic sites and to increase tourist revenue.55

The timing of the centennial also presented new challenges. In a time of growing Indian militancy and awareness by non-Indians of the historic injustices perpetrated against Indian peoples, any commemoration of the battle was likely to be controversial. Park Service planners were vividly aware of recent events at Wounded Knee, Pine Ridge Reservation, South Dakota, where members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) seized and occupied the town near the site of the infamous massacre of 1890 and demanded radical changes in Indian affairs. Criticism of the centennial observances at Custer National Battlefield in 1976 heightened Park Service officials’ mood of caution in approaching the centennial at Big Hole. (In response to the invitation to attend the centennial memorial program, Aubrey Haines wrote: “Dear Kermit: Wilma and I will be there at noon on the 9th . . . . I heard a rumor from the Southwest that Indians are contemplating some sort of demonstration. You may have heard of this already, and it may be purely talk — let’s hope so.”56) The Park Service carefully defined the Big Hole centennial program. Site improvements were to meet NPS development goals without committing the Park Service to a substantial role in defining the tone or the tenure of any commemoration: “It is our feeling that the National Park Service involvement in the centennial should be low key and should center around having the park in good physical condition.”57

Interpretive Folders

The centennial reconstruction program resulted in a modified “mini-folder,” initially written by Schulmeyer and edited and designed by Nancy McCaslin of Harpers Ferry Center (HFC). In conformity with the 1964 interpretive plan, the folder was to address events prior and subsequent to the battle, setting the Nez Perce campaign within the larger context of westward expansion. The discussion of the battle itself was to focus on those elements that made the battle significant and unique from others of the Nez Perce War. The primary objectives were also unmodified: to
heighten public awareness of frontier history and Indian/White relations in general and the Battle of the Big Hole in particular, while instilling an appreciation of both Nez Perce and non-Indian combatants “caught in the much broader context of two mutually misunderstood ways of life.” To these, HFC added another goal: to foster an appreciation for the role of the National Park Service in protection of the natural and cultural resources of the battlefield.58

Editing of the new brochure revealed the sensitive nature of the battlefield story. Schulmeyer’s sympathy for the Nez Perce was obvious to those who reviewed the text, underscored by statements such as “the orders were to take no prisoners”; “…fleeing from the relentless U.S. Army which was under orders to herd them onto a reservation”… “sneaking up on… the unwary Nez Perce.”59

In his review, Chief Historian Harry W. Pfanz complained primarily of the lack of objectivity. “Most of those reading it who know something of this phase of our history will be sympathetic to the Nez Perce,” Pfanz noted. “However, this natural sympathy should not be intentionally encouraged (or discouraged) by the personal attitude of the writer.” Pfanz also suggested increased focus on the fate of the Nez Perce after their surrender, based upon Robert Utley’s recently published The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1890.60

Schulmeyer, for his part, protested Pfanz’s general comments and line edits, complaining that the modified text was “too passive” and read “like a historical journal.”61 Ultimately, Schulmeyer and Paul Sweringen, Interpretive Specialist at the newly established Rocky Mountain Regional Office (RMR), “sat down together” and revised the mini-folder text, line by line, removing the text that Pfanz had found most objectionable while retaining “sensitivity to the Indian point of view.”62 The final folder, described by Schulmeyer as of high-quality and worth the wait, arrived at the park in November 1975.63

A revised Siege Area trail folder, also written by Schulmeyer, arrived in the park in time for the 1976 season. This folder was paired with a new Siege Area Interpretive Trail (minus the “rocks, gravel, and stumps”). The absence of discussion regarding the text and presentation of the new folder suggests that it was not substantially different from the folder developed by Haines and Williams in the 1960s. The 1960 edition had relied heavily upon McWhorter’s investigation and had rejected the soldier/volunteer focus of the Sherill markers and text. This incorporation of the Nez Perce story accorded with the formal interpretive plan pursued during the 1970s.64

To a degree not seen since McWhorter’s work of the 1930s, Schulmeyer and Chief of the Rocky Mountain Region’s Division of Interpretation, Wes Wolfe, also attempted to incorporate the Nez Perce “voice” in the Encampment Area Interpretive Trail folder. On June 20, 1977, Wolfe, with Schulmeyer’s concurrence, petitioned for publication of a pamphlet “that revealed the Nez Perce experience of the Big Hole battle.” The detail in the presentation, Wolfe maintained, would be less important than the insight on a subject that “goes deeper than the facts of battle.” Wolfe and Schulmeyer recommended that Phil George, a poet and scriptwriter, or Alan Slickpoo, Nez Perce tribal historian, be asked to write the pamphlet. Both men wrote well, were knowledgeable of the subject, and through their close affiliation with the contemporary Nez
Perce would bring credibility to the narrative. Wolfe further recommended that the Park Service refrain from debating style or content and not “saddle” the author with any restrictions other than a 2000-word limit: “it is the Nez Perce view we want to share with visitors.” Efforts to contract with George were unsuccessful. Slickpoo, as tribal historian, contributed to the final text, written by Schulmeyer.65

**Interpretive Displays and Archival Collection**

For the museum, the Rocky Mountain Region secured $10,000 for artifact acquisition and repair and for redesign of the museum cases. With some of these funds, technicians at Harpers Ferry Center’s Museum Lab repaired the shrinking, loose fitting, and checking wood of the mountain howitzer spokes and repainted the howitzer and limber. A “magnificent” eagle-feathered chieftains headdress66 donated by Dr. Ralph Hubbard of Pine Ridge, South Dakota, formed the centerpiece of the redesigned Indian Life exhibit. In January 1976, the battlefield received a collection of artifacts from the General Gibbon estate. Edmonds described this collection as a “rare and spectacular [find] for the western military historian” and also of significant value to the battlefield by virtue of its association with Gibbon.67

Schulmeyer’s final assessment of the nine new display cases was less than enthusiastic (although clearly representative of his frustration with the “collaborative relationship” with HFC): “the cases have a scant relationship to the preliminary plan presented to the park and region for review. If there are interpretive themes in the cases, they are too far-fetched for anyone to perceive.” “Luckily,” visitors devoted “scant time” to the display cases.68

In contrast, Schulmeyer was pleased with the historic portrait photographs and quotations that formed a “frieze” in the exhibit room. This successful presentation he attributed to his own and historian Paul Hedren’s weekend and evening review of manuscript sources for quotes and photographs of “soldiers and warriors not just officers and chiefs.” Schulmeyer and staff compiled information not used in the photograph display into biographical files housed in the visitor center. The photograph display, Schulmeyer reported, delighted visitors while the biographical files of the “common men” significantly added to the historical record of the battle.69

Schulmeyer was equally pleased with the tepee frames established in the Encampment Area prior to the centennial year. The frames had been approved in the 1964 interpretive prospectus as a means of conveying the extent and the size of the Indian camp. Completion of the visitor center had heightened the need for the display: Schulmeyer reported that those viewing the battlefield from the overview site often asked “where was the Indian camp?” Erection of 10 to 20 frames of 4 to 8 poles each, he argued, would visually place the camp while still “challenging” the visitor to “fill in the details” of a much larger populated camp of 87 hide-covered tepees of 20 to 40 poles each. Accurate, quality re-creation of the camp site was “out of the question financially” as each tanned tepee hide would cost more than $2,000. Although the Nez Perce had used canvas covers, the transition did not occur until the 1880s and their use would be not only inaccurate but a sign of a “lack of imagination” on the part of the Park Service and a lack of faith in visitors’ ability to recognize symbols and to respond appropriately.70
Tepee frames, Encampment Area. Superintendent Al Schulmeyer had the tepees installed before the centennial. *Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, September 1998.*

Chief Joseph’s coat with ermine tails, loaned to the NPS from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point soon after the visitor center opened. *Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.*
Encampment Area Interpretive Trail and Nez Perce National Historical Trail (Nee-Me-Poo)

Also in anticipation of the centennial, Denver Service Center and HFC officials concurred on Schumleyer’s request for an interpretive walking trail to the newly acquired Encampment Area. As built in the spring of 1977, the encampment trail was 4’ wide and extended 3,000 feet from the existing trail parking area to the camp site. Any visual intrusion to the historic scene, the Park Service argued, paled in contrast to the current “indiscriminate tracking” created by the estimated 10,000 visitors who wandered the meadow. Construction of the trail marked completion of the NPS interpretive trail program. All five principal battle areas as described by Landscape Architect “Red” Hill in 1939 — the howitzer capture site, the Siege Area, the initial assault, the Horse Pasture/Twin Trees, and the Indian Camp — could be easily accessed by visitors.71

This interpretive trail system was slightly modified in 1977 with designation of the Big Hole Battlefield National Recreation Trail, a component of the proposed Nez Perce National Historical Trail, also known as Nee-Me-Poo. Designated by Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus in time for the Centennial Program, the 22½ mile recreation trail extends from the Sula Basin in the Bitterroot Range, across the Continental Divide, and along Trail Creek for 16 miles to the western boundary of the national battlefield. The trail enters the battlefield along the abandoned USFS access road and ends one-half mile later at the confluence with the Siege Area Interpretive Trail. In 1977, the Park Service anticipated that impacts of trail designation would be limited to possible increased use of the interpretive trails by hikers. Trail designation did not alter NPS plans to restore the abandoned 6 to 8-foot graveled roadway through contour reconstruction and revegetation.72
Despite Miller's general approval of the audiovisual (AV) program, the Denver Service Center and HFC officials concurred on Schulmeyer's request for correction of the more jarring factual errors. While Schulmeyer described the commissioned chalk and crayon drawings as "well done, imaginative, and aesthetically pleasing," he regretted that "technical aspects . . . [had not been] researched more thoroughly." Technical errors related to both the U.S. Army and the Nez Perce and included confusion of General Howard and Captain Perry ("if the officer being portrayed is meant to be Howard he has one arm too many"). A slide portrayed the Big Hole Valley as strewn with aspen or poplar, rather than willow. Another showed a Nez Perce warrior on foot. It was considered a shame in Nez Perce culture, Schulmeyer argued, to be caught dismounted. In addition, trenches were shown as too wide and too deep, tepees were inaccurately fastened, and all U.S. troops were shown in the decorative (and easily recognizable) uniforms of the cavalry. In fact, few cavalry had participated in the battle. Schulmeyer regretted these errors on two grounds: one, they contradicted the NPS focus on education and, two, battlefield staff were likely to be "caught up short" by an increasingly educated public.73

Schulmeyer reported that the first revised AV program received from HFC eliminated some errors while adding new ones. He also deemed the "contemporary female narrator" inappropriate. Wes Wolfe, Chief, Division of Interpretation in the Rocky Mountain Region, agreed and suggested that HFC "modif[y] the female voice to reflect a strong characterization
which might include the use of an Indian accent.” An approved program was submitted in time for the centennial season.74

The Historic Scene

Schulmeyer also called for a more concerted effort to return the North Fork and the battlefield to its historic appearance. The preeminence of the historic 1877 landscape in Schulmeyer’s tabulation of Big Hole cultural resources was consistent with the 1962 Master Plan. Efforts to restore this landscape had included removal of the historic Ruby Ditch trestle (1964),75 of the Soldiers’ Monument fencing (1967), of the Forest Service complex (1968), and of the large edging rocks along the Siege Area Interpretive Trail (1971). Through the 1960s, the NPS also participated in a beaver transplant program with the state of Montana; four to thirty beaver were removed per year, depending on the time spent trapping. In December 1973, Schulmeyer directed removal of a driftwood and beaver dam that had caused the North Fork of the Big Hole River to abrade into the Indian Encampment Area. In 1974, a Yellowstone maintenance crew spent a week on a partial restoration of the old road cut to the Siege Area. Their effort included application of excelsior matting and the distribution of sagebrush seed.76

These stop-gap efforts, however, fell far short of the more expensive and technically difficult projects demanded if the Park Service were to effectively address the “natural resource problem.” Echoing Maxey’s 1964 report, Schulmeyer’s 1977 “Statement for Management” identified the meandering river bed, the oversized willow, the uncontrolled beaver population, and the visual impact of abandoned roads and ditches as primary concerns.77

Schulmeyer also attempted to extend restoration of the historic scene to protection of the viewshed. When determining the boundaries of the Encampment Area and the limits to NPS land acquisition, Park Service historians had focused on the physical limits of the camp. In 1973, one year after purchase of the 80-acre Encampment Area, Schulmeyer reported that “the Clemow land adjacent to the Indian Camp site is still grazed while the Battlefield side is lush grass. The contrast after one summer already is an aesthetic eyesore.” Schulmeyer proposed a revised boundary along the Ruby Bench contour until it joined with the willows of the river. He also recommended adjustment of the national battlefield/national forest boundary, to follow topographic/hydrographic boundaries at the limits of the battlefield viewshed, thereby protecting the battlefield from the visual intrusion of clearcutting on Battle Mountain: “at present we have nothing but verbal promises from the USFS that they will not cut timber up to the Battlefield boundary.” Schulmeyer directed his boundary revision suggestions only to the Assistant Superintendent of Operations, Yellowstone, noting that the matter was one of “policy” rather than of immediate need (and that he had no real desire for a formal negative response from Region!).78
Administrative Restructure

Administrative changes initiated in the 1970s addressed some of the problems identified in Pat Miller’s 1972 Operations Evaluation Team report. On July 1, 1975, the battlefield received an Imprest Fund. No longer were staff required to expend their own funds on minor purchases and then wait for reimbursement. In February 1975, Rocky Mountain Regional Director Dave Thompson designated the Yellowstone Library and Museum Association as an official cooperating association for Big Hole National Battlefield. The association assisted in artifact, photograph, and document acquisition, including the battlefield’s large collection of pension records. Finally, by 1976 the battlefield had been provided with a ¾-ton, 4 x 4 pickup truck and blade plow for winter snow clearing.

A service-wide “belt-tightening” directive issued in 1974 (“a year of fuel shortages, high prices and a troubled economy,”) stymied efforts to increase staff. The staff remained at a permanent superintendent, a subject-to-furlough maintenance man, two seasonal interpreters, and a seasonal laborer. Schulmeyer augmented this small staff with use of the Volunteer in the Parks program and he had the seasonal laborer double on occasion as an interpretive ranger. Without these adjustments, Schulmeyer maintained, “visitor services would [have] . . . suffered.” This crew was not only inadequate in number but also in experience. “Seasoned” interpreters Kermit Edmonds and Dale H. Annis did not return for the 1975 season. While the new seasonals adapted quickly, Schulmeyer missed the “exceptionally high quality” that Edmonds and Annis brought to the interpretive program. For the 1976 season, Schulmeyer successfully “prevailed” upon Edmonds to return.

In 1977, the maintenance position was reclassified as full-time permanent and the battlefield was authorized its first full-time historian, Paul Hedren, on a career-seasonal appointment. This position was reclassified as permanent upon release of the hiring ceiling. Ironically, immediately upon receiving authorization for a permanent maintenance position, maintenance man Steve Winters was transferred to Grand Canyon National Park. Schulmeyer was unsuccessful in recruiting a qualified replacement and the position was vacant for the last quarter of 1976. Qualified seasonal interpreters also remained scarce. In 1976, Schulmeyer reported that applicants from the newly instituted Rocky Mountain Region Seasonal Hiring and Rating System had “no background in history.” Those secured through the regional Equal Employment Office were only “minimally qualified” and were most-often still in school and therefore unavailable for the spring and fall months.

Centennial Memorial Program

In the years leading to August 9-10, 1977, the Park Service had focused on “cleaning house” at Big Hole, assuring that the facilities were adequate and interpretive material accurate and appropriate. As late as 1974, the Interpretive Planner, Division of Planning, Denver Service Center, had advised against active involvement in defining the tone of the centennial memorial. In fact, the Park Service carefully orchestrated the ceremony, weighing the needs of a diverse constituency and factoring the increased demands of an increasingly militant American Indian
community as revealed at the Custer Battlefield centennial ceremony and at the Return to Wounded Knee. Despite initial proposals to center the story upon the Nez Perce, Acting Rocky Mountain Regional Director Glen Bean deemed it appropriate to invite a representative from the military: “since this war is portrayed as a clash between lifestyles and as a consequence of westward expansion, we can hardly present an all-Indian program in good conscience.” In the interest of “enhancing relations” with the state, Bean also requested that a Montana speaker, rather than a “Federal employee from Denver,” represent the military; if no local representative could be found, former Big Hole ranger and NPS military historian Don Rickey was “not a bad” choice. Although Bean did not consider it “inappropriate” for the treaty Nez Perce to assume high-profile positions in the program, he also expressed “strong concern” that “Joseph’s people” be represented. The Park Service stood between the demands of disparate constituents. They planned accordingly and then held their breath as the memorial service proceeded.83

An estimated 2,500 people attended the event, drawn by word of mouth, telephone calls, formal invitations, and press release. The Dillon chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution assisted with local arrangements and the Wisdom Women’s Club sold coffee, soft drinks, and sandwiches. Yellowstone provided six rangers to guard against demonstrations. Master of Ceremonies Bean welcomed this crowd to the Big Hole National Battlefield, a place, he said, where “amity flowered where blood had flowed.”84 Nez Perce ceremonial dancers began
the program. They were followed by the Rev. Frank Andrews, who provided an opening invocation, and by Nez Perce Tribal Historian Allen Slickpoo. Rickey spoke only briefly on the "life and attitudes of the soldier." Upon conclusion of the formal program, members of the Looking Glass band set up a tepee and other Nez Perce women displayed traditional crafts. NPS Historians Doug McChristian and Bill Henry dressed as soldiers of the 1870s and mingled with the crowd. Rumored protests proved false and Schulmeyer described the event as a "colorful, honest, dignified event which brought credit and compliments to the Service, the park, and the participants."86

One man's assessment of the memorial was less optimistic. Edward Parks, writing for the *Smithsonian*, reported that the white visitors seemed "festive, talkative, reminiscent" but that there was "no forgiveness in the older Indian faces." The speech by Slickpoo "fell like icewater on the balmy mood of the crowd":

This battle represents in the hearts and minds of the Looking Glass [band] one of the saddest days in the tribe's history. . . . Many of the stories told of this place are sorrowful ones. . . . One hundred years later that memory may have dimmed a little but today that memory is sharp, and tears are felt in the hearts of the Looking Glass [band] today.87
Chapter Six
Administration under the Rocky Mountain Regional Office (1977-1987)

The centennial commemoration culminated a twenty-year effort by Park Service personnel to rescue the battlefield from oblivion and to create a site that the park service “could be proud of.” These years witnessed land acquisition, construction of a modern visitor center, intensive archeological survey, and development of a powerful, if controversial, interpretive program. In recognition of these years of successful effort, a Rocky Mountain Region Operations Evaluation and Consultation Team prefaced its 1978 evaluation with praise for the “unique and rewarding park experience” created despite limited personnel and fiscal resources: “the overall image of the park to the visitor . . . is excellent . . . [and] the quality of the park staff is outstanding. Their performance and attitude reflect favorably upon the National Park Service and immeasurably add to the enjoyment of the area by the park visitor.”

The years that followed Mission 66 and the centennial anniversary were defined less often by new archeological discovery and new interpretive prose and increasingly by the more mundane tasks of infrastructure maintenance, resource protection, visitor control, and site administration. A Statement for Management (SFM), approved in 1979, guided these decisions. The SFM identified a historic zone, where physical development would remain at the minimum necessary to preserve, protect, and interpret cultural values. It defined a development zone where non-historic park development and intensive use might substantially alter the natural environment. Further, it identified a special use zone encompassed four irrigation ditches and a service road; although the park service owned the underlying land, the water claimants had reserved the private use of the ditches and the right of access for ditch maintenance and repair. According to the SFM, “the private water right owners’ vehicles wander[ed] this special use zone at will,” creating a special zone of land use and management options.

Legislative and administrative constraints identified in the SFM included the battlefield’s listing in the National Register of Historic Places. This listing mandated that management and use of the park be completed within the guidelines of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Legislated environmental constraints included the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Executive Order 11988, which guided/restricted development within 100-year floodplains (the extent of the battlefield), and Executive Order 11990, which regulated development in known wetland habitats. The rights of local ditch associations to maintain and access active and abandoned ditches through the battlefield were also identified as a point of administrative concern. By 1981, Schulmeyer had identified “completion of a water rights study and action plan” as the top priority planning requirement. Although conflict over water rights and irrigation ditches “posed no immediate problems,” they had long-range implications. This study, action plan, and associated legal action are detailed in Chapter 7.
Official management objectives remained consistent with the master and interpretive plans of previous years. Within legislative and fiscal constraints, the Park Service promised to restore and maintain the historic and natural resources and to make these resources available and accessible to the public. “Accessibility” was interpreted as an issue of physical access and of intellectual access to the two primary interpretive themes: 1) the Battle of the Big Hole within the context of the Nez Perce War and of westward expansion and 2) the personal experience and motivations of those on both sides of the battle.

Visitation

From 1968, when the visitor center was completed and the battlefield first staffed year round, until 1972, visitation increased at a steady rate of 10-12 percent per year, peaking at 45,850. These numbers dropped precipitously in 1973 in response to the international oil crisis and associated high fuel prices and travel restrictions. Visitor numbers did not return to historic levels until 1982, and then fluctuated for the remainder of the decade, from a high of 46,748 in 1983 to a low of 32,694 in 1987. July consistently registered the highest numbers of visitors, with most arriving on Sunday rather than Saturday. Numbers dropped significantly mid-week, suggesting that despite a relative increase in out-of-state and international tourists, Montana and Idaho residents remained the dominant battlefield constituency. Those visitors who did not progress beyond the visitor center generally stayed thirty minutes to an hour, enough time to use the restroom, scan the artifact displays, and listen to the ten-minute audio-visual program. Those who ventured to the interpretive trail network spent an hour and a half to two hours at the site, more if they stayed to fish or to picnic at the tables established near the Siege Area parking lot. In accordance with Big Hole’s official designation as a day-use area, Battlefield rangers directed visitors in search of camping facilities to the newly expanded USFS campground seven miles west on May Creek. Those interested in other sites of historic interest were directed to Clearwater and White Bird Canyon battlefields in Idaho, Fort Fizzle near Missoula, Virginia City, Bannack, Chief Joseph Battleground State Monument, and Nez Perce historic sites within Yellowstone National Park.4

As described in the Statement for Management, battlefield visitation remained “supplemental to other regional recreational activities.” Battlefield officials cooperated with the Beaverhead National Forest on publication of forest recreational activities. While cross-country skiing, hiking, camping, and other recreational opportunities were developed outside the boundaries, the park service maintained a bulletin board at the visitor center, and actively advertised and directed visitors to forest service resources. This cooperation was mutually beneficial, meeting USFS goals to increase the recreational component of their “multiple use” mission and NPS goals to increase battlefield visitation.5
Personnel

Al Schumeyer’s 14-year tenure at Big Hole National Battlefield, from 1973 to 1987, is remarkable in the history of a site (and an agency) where one- to three-year turns proved to be the norm. This continuity in battlefield administration eased but did not solve the battlefield’s staffing difficulties. Through 1987, when Big Hole was placed under the administration of Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site, in northwest Montana, “authorized and funded” staffing remained at a full-time historian/interpreter, two seasonal interpretive rangers, a full-time Superintendent, and a full-time maintenance man. Staffing to these levels, however, was often “impossible,” with positions left vacant or filled by untrained career-conditional employees without prior NPS experience. As during previous years, the 1978 operations evaluation team recommended funding of a seasonal clerical position during the summer months to allow Schumeyer and the maintenance man to devote more time to their official tasks. This position was never funded. Of particular note, the Rocky Mountain Regional Office also recommended “obtaining an Indian on the staff,” but attributed the recommendation only to the demands of federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) laws and regulations. Employment of women, although also encouraged by EEO regulations, was more problematic. Through the 1980s interpretive rangers shared a communal “bunkhouse” within the apartment complex. This housing arrangement “posed some problems in the event female employees should successfully compete for a job.” Presumably, the female ranger hired in 1981 — the first in the history of the site — was assigned to separate housing or commuted to the site.6
Significant administrative changes included the 1982 transfer of authority over Big Hole National Battlefield from Yellowstone National Park to the Rocky Mountain Regional Office. Theoretically, the “upward organizational and reporting relationship” with Yellowstone had been to the battlefield’s advantage, incorporating the battlefield within Yellowstone’s substantial annual budget, and making available equipment, expertise, and facilities. “These advantages,” the operations evaluation team noted, “have been negligible in actuality. . . . Little routine assistance of an onsite nature has been offered Big Hole Battlefield from Yellowstone National Park in recent years.” Former Yellowstone National Park Historian and former Big Hole National Battlefield Management Assistant Aubrey Haines disagrees only with the assessment that the problem was of recent origin, stating that historically the Yellowstone Chief Rangers Office saw the battlefield as an unvisited backwater, an unwelcome challenge, and an unfortunate drain on a strained budget and rarely accorded the degree of support, resources, or technical assistance requested by battlefield staff. In 1978, the operations evaluation team recommended that the site be recognized as an independent park, with access to the various specialists and program managers of the Rocky Mountain Region. The region could offer “a level of management assistance and guidance and resources” that the battlefield “needs and deserves.”

Schumeyer recognized “INDEPENDENCE DAY” as June 13, 1982, when “formally and officially Big Hole National Battlefield was separated from the administration and organizational ties to Yellowstone National Park.” The transfer did provide the battlefield superintendent with
a welcome degree of independence. It removed a level of management in the chain of command and report review, sped the exchange of information between offices, and obviated the requirement that the battlefield superintendent travel to Yellowstone every two weeks. In an era of increased data evaluation and policy review, however, the transfer did little to ease the work load of battlefield staff.8

Beginning in the 1970s, throughout the Park Service, and at every level of organization management decisions became rooted in data collection and evaluation. Organizationally, resource management in the Park Service was divided between natural and cultural disciplines. Natural resource management required scientifically trained botanists and wildlife biologists. Cultural resource management drew upon the disciplines of archeology, curation, history, and historical architecture, with contribution by cultural anthropologists beginning in the 1980s. Data collection and evaluation differed according to the resource and called for increasing specialization by discipline. Resource management grew more deliberate, thorough, precise, and time consuming. At the regional level, this fundamental change occurred by a gradual accretion of new technical staff positions and management plans. At Big Hole National Battlefield, responsibility for development of the various management plans and for their revision fell to Schumeyer and his staff. Schumeyer introduced his 1984 Annual Report with the complaint “when you are surrounded by snapping alligators you don’t see enough of the swamp to get a general perspective.” He explained:

the big beasts are the preparation of plans which may take weeks to think out even before doing much writing. This park can handle one or two significant plans but more than that are a disaster. This year [1984] we completed the Interpretive Operations Plan and the write and rewrite of the [Cultural] Resources Management Plan to which was added the Land Use Plan and its rewrites. . . . We are pleased to note that as the year ended we had survived but there was much undone.9

Virtue in the beasts was found only in that, on occasion, “resource management [came] to the front with more than just writing another plan, and that is good.” Moreover, at Big Hole National Battlefield the line between cultural and natural resources was indistinct and often artificial, creating a unique opportunity for integration of two resource management disciplines often seen as contradictory. In retrospect, this integration foreshadowed the Park Service’s recognition of the significance and value of what is now formally termed a “cultural landscape” but which at Big Hole was interchangeably referenced as the “historic scene” and the “natural scene.”10

Efforts to restore this scene dominated the final years of Schumeyer’s tenure. Additional projects included continued research on the lives and motivations of those on either side of the Battle of the Big Hole and continued archeological survey and ground-truthing of the historical record and oral tradition.
Concurrent Jurisdiction

In 1933 the Park Service assumed exclusive jurisdiction over Big Hole Battlefield National Monument. Public Law 88-24, May 17, 1963, not only extended the boundaries of the Big Hole Battlefield but also recommended concurrent jurisdiction over petty offenders with the state of Montana, pursuant to state approval. Under the terms of exclusive jurisdiction, the federal government possesses all of the police authority of the state and the state concerned has not reserved the right to exercise authority concurrently with the United States. In 1956, an Interdepartmental Committee for The Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States recommended that exclusive federal jurisdiction be obtained, or retained, “only where it is absolutely necessary to the Federal Government, and in such instances the United States should provide a statutory or regulatory code to govern the areas.” The committee further established that proprietary jurisdiction — “wherein the Federal Government not receive, or retain, any measure whatever of legislative jurisdiction, but that it hold the installations and areas in a proprietoril interest status only” — was the desirable status for a large majority of federally owned land. Exceptions included only areas of immense size, large populations, remote locations, or peculiar use. In these instances concurrent jurisdiction — wherein the States reserved the right to exercise authority concurrently with the United States — was preferred. Remote Big Hole Battlefield fell within this category.11

As late as 1976, the state legislature had not passed legislation accepting the 1963 retrocession. Correspondence suggests that the delay resulted from inaction rather than from disagreement over the conditions or the fact of the transfer. In fact, Al Schumeyer presented concurrent jurisdiction as a means of increasing support for the Park Service within the “strong[ly] conservative Republican [Big Hole] area.” The Beaverhead National Forest and the Bureau of Land Management, Schumeyer noted, had been recently (and roundly) criticized for “‘tyrannical actions by federal agencies without considering local feelings.’ . . . I do not want the NPS and the Battlefield to fall into the same group without an effort to avoid it.”12

Concurrent jurisdiction would cost the county no additional money, as park service rangers would continue to assume all responsibilities for police patrol. It would also place state and county laws on a par with federal laws, thereby “increas[ing] local control and participation [at] no increased cost.” State representative Terry Murphy agreed to introduce legislation in approval of concurrent jurisdiction. Schumeyer also urged that Yellowstone and Rocky Mountain Region officials actively involve State Senator Frank Hazelbaker, “MR. REPUBLICAN,” in the legislative process, thereby sharing ownership for the proposal and for the anticipated positive local response. To do otherwise risked further alienating both Hazelbaker and the local community. While Schumeyer was confident that concurrent jurisdiction would pass despite local opposition from the surrounding area he had no desire to create another source of animosity or to waste an opportunity to cultivate good will. The Montana legislature approved concurrent jurisdiction in 1980. By April 1982 all necessary documents had been filed with the county clerk, county sheriff, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Attorney’s office.13
Infrastructure Maintenance

The sewage leach field established downslope from the visitor center in 1964 provided the first infrastructure crisis. By 1975, the septic tank system had proven inadequate and was leaking sewage from the leach fields into the local water courses, including area ditches and the North Fork of the Big Hole River. (Former Management Assistant Aubrey Haines remembers that in 1964, the Western Regional Office design team chose to ignore his concern that the bentonitic clay of the leach-field site would not allow sufficient evaporation and percolation, and proceeded with the inferior design.) The new system addressed the non-porous characteristics of local soil, the high water table, the variable rate of visitation/water demands, and Montana Water Quality standards that demanded tertiary treatment of all waste. As built, the system (“best described as a modified facultative wastewater oxidation pond with effluent disposal by evaporation and irrigation”) incorporated a one-acre lined aerated lagoon connected to the existing septic tank by 700 feet of sewer pipe. A pump station conveyed treated sewage from the lagoon to a six-acre irrigation site. Indirect impacts associated with construction of the new sewage lagoon outside the historic district boundaries included “visual intrusion.” The Park Service attempted to mitigate this impact with regrading and replanting and by using terrain and vegetation as natural screens.\footnote{14}

The 1979 Big Hole operations evaluation also included directives to immediately install a security system in the visitor center, to protect the building from fire and the museum articles from theft. This recommendation had been made before, but had previously been assigned a low priority and was not scheduled until 1984/1985. Given the distance between staff housing and the visitor center, and the ease with which the doors could be forced, the evaluation team considered this delay inadvisable.\footnote{15} (Previous to 1979, there had been two incidents of theft. In 1972, Chief Joseph’s pipe and pipe bag was stolen. They were not recovered until many years later. In 1977, bows and arrows and rifles, including Yellow Wolf’s rifle, were stolen from a display case. Investigators fingerprinted the smashed display case and traced the incident to two men employed by local rancher Dick Hirschey. The stolen items were found in a hayloft. The incident demonstrated the need for greater security precautions.\footnote{16}

Infrastructure needs were not limited to maintenance and reconstruction of Mission 66 improvements. The superintendent’s residence included in the initial master plan for development had been deleted to save costs. Since the 1968 removal of the historic forest service residence, the superintendent and his family had lived in a two-bedroom unit of the four-unit apartment building. As staffing increased in the mid-1970s, one of the three remaining units was converted to a bunkhouse for interpretive rangers. As described in the 1978 operations evaluation, the auxiliary house trailer brought to the site in the late 1950s provided needed additional space but was an obtrusive eyesore. At a minimum, the house trailer needed to be replaced by a model that blended with the apartment complex. At some point in the future, construction of additional housing was imperative.\footnote{17}
Cultural Resources Management

Maintenance and reconstruction demanded compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as described in 36 CFR 800. This act and associated federal register regulations dictated that federal agencies assess the impact of proposed actions on significant cultural resources (those prehistoric and historic districts, sites, buildings, objects and structures determined eligible for the National Register of Historic Places) and mitigate that action determined to be “adverse.” By the late 1970s, the 106 compliance paper trail of cultural resource inventories, evaluations, and determinations of effect increasingly dominated Big Hole Battlefield’s administrative files.

In 1966, the national monument — as a historic site of the National Park Service — was “administratively listed” in the National Register of Historic Places for its significant association with the Indian Wars and Westward Expansion. A formal nomination form excluding the Developed Zone/Ruby Bench area from the historic district boundaries was approved by the National Register in 1978. The historic Chief Joseph monument, moved to the museum sometime between 1976 and 1978, was excluded from the resource “count” of the National Register Nomination (Section 5). The Park Service based this decision on National Register directives that “objects relocated to a museum are inappropriate for listing in the National Register of Historic Places.” Moreover, the Park Service argued, if returned to the original site within the Siege Area or to a more appropriate commemorative site within the Encampment Area, the marker would still be evaluated as a noncontributing resource: “although the Battle of the Big Hole was fought in 1877, the monument to the Indians was not erected until 1928, some 51 years later. It cannot be said that the monument has either great age or longtime association with the battlefield.” This evaluation conflicted starkly with long-time NPS inclusion of the soldiers’ monument, the Chief Joseph monument, and Thain White’s unauthorized plaque to the Nez Perce dead within its interpretive program, as examples of historic and evolving commemoration of the battle.18

An addendum to this form in 1984 identified individual resources and values that “contribute” to the significance of the battlefield. These included the five primary battle sites, the soldiers’ trenches, and the soldiers’ monument. (Upon designation as “significant and contributing,” battlefield resources were also incorporated within the Park Service’s internal cultural resources data base: the List of Classified Structures.) Noncontributing historic resources, including historic mining, ranching, and Forest Service administration, were defined as all resources not associated with either the principal ethnographic theme focusing on the Nez Perce or the principal battle theme.19

As approved in 1984, the National Register nomination did not include any prehistoric sites. In 1986, Montana State Historic Preservation Officer Marcella Sherfy requested revision of the Cultural Resource Component of the Resources Management Plan, to read:

the archeological resources of Big Hole National Battlefield and the historical remains of the Battle of 1877 . . . and any prehistoric remains yet to be identified. . . . No prehistoric sites have yet been identified on the Battlefield, with the exception of a isolated project[ile] point.
However, that likely reflects the absence of prior professional inventory for prehistory and poor ground visibility more than the absence of sites.\textsuperscript{20}

The Park Service responded by indicating that the Cultural Resources Study would be "more complicated than the usual one" and would include a metes and bounds definition of the "four major archaeological sites" (the Siege Area, the Nez Perce Encampment Area, the Battle Zone, and the Howitzer Capture Site).\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chief_joseph_monument.jpg}
\caption{The historic Chief Joseph monument was moved to the visitor center. \textit{Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, September, 1998.}}
\end{figure}

### Cultural Resources Management Plan

The National Historic Preservation Act required not only that the impact of federal action on cultural resources be evaluated and mitigated as necessary (Section 106), but that federal agencies take a proactive role in identification and protection of all cultural resources within their land base or regulatory purview (Section 110). This requirement was clarified with the issue of Executive Order 11593, mandating that all federal land managing agencies prepare a cultural resource survey for lands under their control and that they develop and institute a cultural resources management plan. For "historic," rather than "natural" parks, these were critical management documents that guided site interpretation and research as well as site preservation.

In 1984, Al Schulmeyer identified completion of a comprehensive \textit{Cultural Resources Survey of Big Hole National Battlefield} as a priority project. Recognizing that "funding and contract" for the entire 655-acre survey was untenable, Schulmeyer recommended a series of smaller-scale
surveys on the 20-30 acres of documented historic activity and likely prehistoric use. These included continued archeological investigations of the Siege Area, to recover, document, and map the rifle pits and the estimated 20% of expended cartridge shells that remained. Without this effort, the significant archeological record of the Siege Area remained vulnerable to relic hunters. Schulmeyer hoped also to identify the “missing” fifth line of fire referenced in the historic record yet never located or ground truthed. Upon more complete documentation of the rifle pits, the Park Service would also be in better position to proceed with minor excavation and selective tree thinning, to return the rifle pits to their historic condition.

The archeological record within the Encampment Area was organic and not likely to be recovered through the use of metal detectors or ground survey. Schulmeyer recommended that this survey be more specific, targeted at identification of a large communal camas bulb earth oven pit referenced by survivors of the battle. Preparation of camas bulbs was a 3 to 4 day process. Location of the oven would confirm the hypothesis that the Nez Perce held a false sense of safety after their crossing from Idaho to Montana, were no longer in flight, and did not contemplate immediate departure. Although a small oven was later discovered during the course of a 1991 investigation, it was not the large communal oven that Schulmeyer described.22

Prescribed burn on Battle Mountain. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.
The "Natural Scene": Natural and Cultural Resource Protection

The Cultural Resources Management Plan also reflected the battlefield's long-standing definition of the "natural scene" as a significant cultural resource. In response to federal environmental legislation, particularly the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), and of service-wide environmental initiatives, Park Service personnel increasingly included identification and protection of natural resources (in contrast to the "natural [historic] scene") in the battlefield preservation plan. In broad terms, NEPA defined "a national policy . . . to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man." As carefully defined, the environment included "historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage." To that end, NEPA stipulated a "systematic, interdisciplinary" review of natural and social science data to assist in planning and decisionmaking, or — as interpreted in practice and regulation — Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact Studies.23

As with passage of the National Historic Preservation Act, compliance with NEPA dramatically redefined management, use, and development of all federally owned land. Within the context of this management transition, Big Hole Battlefield was unique only in the degree to which preservation of cultural resources was synonymous with preservation of natural resources. Park Service staff continued to evaluate the "historic scene" as the overriding cultural resource of concern. Montana State Historic Preservation Officer Sherfy commended Schulmeyer on his "clear description of the park's cultural resource as its natural resource and praised the park's proposed long-term treatment of the natural scene as "clearly and concretely planned."24

In 1981, the Park Service contracted with John Pierce, University of Montana School of Forestry, to complete a vegetation study of the battlefield (similar to that first proposed by Clyde Maxey in 1963). As described by the park service, the study was designed to provide baseline data of species composition, relative abundance, and distribution on the battlefield. This baseline information was then used to assess the possible impact of management actions to native flora and fauna. Schulmeyer noted that "it is only with the development of the baseline data that it becomes possible to determine the degree, the location, and biological process of succession." Armed with this information, Schulmeyer pursued an aggressive course of action.25

Park service personnel had long lamented the changes in vegetative cover, particularly the willow growth of the bottomland, the second-growth lodgepole pine of the Siege Area, and the second-growth encroaching upon the Horse Pasture/sagebrush steppe. Pierce's analysis, based upon field study and historical research, established that prior to the battle and until substantial settlement of the Big Hole Valley in the 1890s fire had burned through the willow bottoms every eight to ten years. These fires were part of the natural cycle; the altered and deteriorated willow community was both historically inappropriate and unnatural, representing "over 100 years of human interference in the natural process of fire."26

In an era when federal land management agencies increasingly used fire as part of an integrated approach to resource management, Al Schulmeyer proposed the use of controlled burns to return the battlefield to an approximation of 1877 conditions. In preparation of his
“Environmental Assessment, Willow Control, Big Hole National Battlefield,” Schulmeyer consulted with Pierce, an ecologist, a biologist, a prehistoric archeologist, a historic archeologist, an historian, a wildlife specialist, a NEPE/NHPA compliance officer from the Rocky Mountain Region, and the Montana State Historic Preservation Officer. Resource management at Big Hole National Battlefield was an increasingly multi-disciplinary affair.27

The final environmental assessment established that controlled burns would recreate the historic scene and recreate wildlife habitat. Ideally, the heat of the fire would remove the dead materials, return nutrients to the soil, and stimulate willow regrowth. The only threatened plant within the river bottom, penstemon lemhiensis, had been shown to respond well to fire. Assessed alternatives to fire included “No Action,” whereby the continued “denseness and age [of the willow community] would drive away the wildlife . . . and hinder effective understanding of the [battle]; chemical treatment, effective in killing the overgrowth yet also fatal to the root crown (and demanding removal of all dead material; and mechanical removal, dismissed as too labor intensive and visually intrusive (as “the cut ends would be apparent, and regrowth would not be rapidly stimulated”). In 1985, the Park Service received clearance to proceed with the controlled fire alternative.28

Burning sagebrush in the Horse Pasture.Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.
Reconstruction of the eroded riverbank adjacent to the Encampment Area also required an assessment of associated environmental impacts. In 1973 Schulmeyer directed removal of a driftwood and beaver dam that had caused the North Fork of the Big Hole River to abrade into the Nez Perce Encampment Area. This effort proved insufficient and a 100-yard reach of the North Fork River continued to erode, threatening archeological resources and altering the historic battle scene. The NPS considered four alternative proposals to control the erosion and evaluated the associated impact to natural- and cultural-resource values. The no-action alternative, Alternative 1, would require acceptance “of the loss of the historic scene.” Alternative 2, substantial and expensive rip-rap of the eroded bank with concrete or stone, would control the immediate threat to archeological resources yet would also intrude upon the natural and historic scene. It was dismissed as quickly as Alternative 1. Planting additional willow along the river’s edge, Alternative 3, would stall the erosion without environmental impact yet would also exacerbate the existing problem of willow overgrowth and would introduce additional management costs associated with annual vista clearings. The Park Service, with SHPO concurrence, determined that Alternative 4, construction of seven synthetic beaver dams at points subject to the force of high water river flow, most effectively “protected the natural scene which is the historic scene.” Officials with the Rocky Mountain Regional Office and the Montana State Historic Preservation Office, found that Alternative 4 would have no significant impact on the natural or historic environment.29

Additional land-base proposals initiated by Schulmeyer yet not completed during his tenure included selective thinning of the Siege Area, based on baseline (1877) data provided by Pierce; a controlled burn on Battle Mountain to eliminate the lodgepole pine encroaching on the Horse Pasture Area; and removal of two beaver dams that diverted water from the historically swampy land between the Encampment and Siege areas. Restoration of the abandoned road cuts and irrigation ditches also remained a park goal. These projects were included in the draft 1984 Cultural Resources Management Plan and were approved between 1986 and 1987, following findings of no significant impact (FONSI). They were not funded and initiated until the 1990s.30

Research and Interpretation

Although the Museum Branch advocated redesign of interpretive displays every five years (“to keep pace with developing knowledge and tastes”) funds were rarely available for any but minor variations. The battlefield interpretive prospectus remained static in its identification of the primary interpretive theme — “the Nez Perce War of 1877 and the clash and confrontation of individuals and cultures” — and the most appropriate means of communicating that theme — the audio-visual auditorium, museum exhibit room, information desk, sales desk, self-guided trails, and wayside exhibit of the howitzer capture site. Within this general outline established in 1964, however, Schulmeyer’s impact on the interpretive focus and research effort is evident. In the 1984 interpretive prospectus Schulmeyer wrote: “without followers there can be no leaders” and urged an interpretive focus that respected the individuals involved. The Cultural Resources Management Plan includes a recommendation for continued effort to identify “the names of the battle participants on both sides and learn something about them before and after” and to
organize and analyze the McWhorter research collection in an effort to learn more about the individual Nez Perce who participated in the battle. The management plan also urged continued study of the soldier uniforms and accoutrements worn in the field at the time of battle, in an effort to retain a "balanced" rather than Nez-Perce focused interpretive presentation. Schulmeyer also recommended continued analysis of the leadership of the Seventh Infantry to explain "why Gibbon chose certain companies and officers to fight and why certain companies performed better than others under stress." Each of these projects was to be continued "on a low key, as a supplemental duty but without rigid goals or required annual production." As such, these were personality-driven rather than contract-driven projects, absolutely dependent upon the time, energy, and commitment of those assigned to the battlefield.  

In 1984, NPS historian Jerome Green and Chief Historian Edwin C. Bearss protested that the hat and feather markers along the Siege Area trail were more appropriate to Disneyland than to a battlefield site. In a dramatic example of the impact of changing taste and methodology on static goals, Acting Associate Director for Cultural Resources Rowland T. Bowers chided Harpers Ferry Center and Big Hole officials to find a more "dignified treatment of a battlefield, where men, women, and children of both races made the supreme sacrifice." The markers, however, remained.

Controversy that would define the next phase of the interpretive program was introduced in 1985, when a Rocky Mountain Region Operations Evaluation Team (with the support of Big Hole Park Ranger Phillip Gomez) criticized the interpretive program as slanted to the Nez Perce point of view. The focus of the Centennial-era interpretive program (particularly the audio-visual program), Gomez complained, was a "relic of the 1960's and the Civil Rights Movement," and did not reflect 1980s public sensibilities. Schulmeyer objected strongly to the operation team's criticism of the content and focus of the AV program, noting previous positive evaluations and visitors' approval. He agreed, however, that the presentation and text were outdated, and urged funding of a new program, developed by Harpers Ferry Center in collaboration with Big Hole personnel.
The hat and feather markers identify positions held during the siege. *Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, September, 1998.*
Chapter Seven
Administration under other Small Units (1987-1997)

Consolidation with Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site

In 1987, Superintendent Al Schulmeyer’s superiors in the Rocky Mountain Regional Office still regarded Big Hole National Battlefield as a “sleepy hollow.” Remote from Montana’s major cities, airports, interstate highways, and National Parks, the battlefield still received relatively light visitation. It was a place, regional officials assumed, where mid-level administrators marked time. Thus, when Schulmeyer’s two permanent staff members both resigned in the first half of 1987, the dual vacancies presented an opportunity to reevaluate how much staff was required at Big Hole. Perhaps the battlefield could be administered through another office. The Rocky Mountain Region’s deputy director noticed the two vacancies and reached for his administrative pruning shears. He requested Associate Regional Director Harold P. Danz and Colorado National Monument Superintendent Robert W. Reynolds to conduct a study of Big Hole’s staffing needs looking to a consolidation of management offices some place else.2

For Schulmeyer, now in his fifteenth year as superintendent at the battlefield, the reorganization was painfully abrupt. Danz and Reynolds received their assignment on June 4, 1987, and conducted the study four days later. Reynolds visited the battlefield on June 8 and interviewed Schulmeyer about the management issues that were unusually complex or unique to Big Hole. Danz, who had been to Big Hole before, joined the discussion by telephone. They considered the feasibility of combining Big Hole’s administration with that of Grant Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site. The following day, Reynolds continued these conversations with the superintendent and division chiefs at Grant Kohrs.3

The study team characterized Big Hole National Battlefield as a “rather small area” — 655.6 acres in size, lightly visited, and served by a “modest” physical plant. In 1987, the physical plant consisted of the visitor center, a four-unit apartment building, a double-wide house trailer, some temporary storage sheds, and a 50,000-gallon water tank and sewage lagoon. Danz and Reynolds learned from Schulmeyer that the battlefield was formerly administered by Yellowstone National Park, was separated from Yellowstone on June 13, 1982, and since that date the superintendent reported directly to the Regional Director, Rocky Mountain Region.4

Maintenance was the primary year-round staff function at Big Hole, Danz and Reynolds reported. In the winter, maintenance work consisted of removing snow from the entrance road, maintaining utilities, providing security, and performing custodial tasks. Closing the battlefield during the winter was not an option, primarily because of the need to maintain utility systems and provide security for the museum exhibits and collections stored in the visitor center. However, if the state or county were persuaded to take over plowing of the entrance road, then staff duties during the winter months would be significantly reduced.5
The study team recommended that the most appropriate reorganization "under the present circumstances" was to place Big Hole National Battlefield under the administration of Grant Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site. Technical staff at Grant Kohrs Ranch would be available to Big Hole. The new arrangement would "ensure a more effective, efficient, and economical use" of resources. Regional Director Lorraine Mintzmeyer approved the study team's recommendation. Superintendent Jimmy Taylor of Grant Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site assumed responsibility for Big Hole National Battlefield on October 1, 1987. (Taylor left in 1988 and was replaced by Eddie Lopez.) Maintenance duties, curation, and administrative functions at Big Hole were all transferred to the Grant Kohrs Ranch staff. A press release asserted that the main effect of this "realignment" would be "to provide increased focus on interpretive programs and the park's cultural and natural resource management concerns." Schulmeyer bitterly disagreed, proud of his own accomplishments in these areas. Rather than accept a directed reassignment, he retired.

In January 1988, Jock Whitworth was hired as chief of interpretation and resources management. The single permanent ranger and all seasonal interpretive staff reported to Whitworth, while the chief of maintenance reported directly to the chief of maintenance at Grant Kohrs Ranch. The following November Whitworth's title was changed to unit manager, at which point he supervised maintenance too. The change of title was tacit acknowledgement that the effort to consolidate administrative functions between Big Hole and Grant-Kohrs Ranch had gone too far. In March 1992, his title was changed again to park manager/superintendent. This included a position upgrade from GS-9 to GS-11. Throughout the years 1987-1992 the Grant Kohrs Ranch staff provided administrative and clerical support and oversaw curation at Big Hole National Battlefield. These activities are detailed later in the chapter.

Consolidation with Nez Perce National Historical Park

Hole with the other park was based on much more than mere administrative expedience; it was intended to enhance the interpretive design of Nez Perce National Historical Park. The park additions included three other battlefields along the Nez Perce Trail — Camas Meadows in Idaho, and Canyon Creek and Bear’s Paw in Montana — as well as sites associated with the Joseph band’s homeland in Oregon and its eventual place of exile in Washington. The additions were consistent with the original conception of Nez Perce National Historical Park as a series of sites, or “string of pearls,” whose significance derived from their historical association with Nez Perce country.9

The Nez Perce National Historical Park Additions Act placed Big Hole National Battlefield in a somewhat anomalous position. Section 2 of the act expressly added Big Hole National Battlefield to the park, but it did not change the national battlefield designation nor annul the unit’s own authorizing legislation. Indeed, the act directly acknowledged the site’s dual status in its provision that “Lands added to the Big Hole National Battlefield, Montana, pursuant to paragraph (10) shall become part of and be placed under the administrative jurisdiction of the Big Hole National Battlefield, but may be interpreted in accordance with the purposes of this Act.” Further, the battlefield retained its own base funding as a distinct unit within the National Park system.10

ON THIS FIELD

17 OFFICERS AND 138 ENLISTED MEN OF
THE 7TH. U.S.Infantry
Under its Colonel

EVT. MAJOR GENERAL JOHN GIBBON WITH 8 OTHER

SOLDIERS AND 36 CITIZENS

SURPRISED AND FOUGT ALL DAY A SUPERIOR
FORCE OF NEZ-PERCE INDIANS
MORE THAN ONE - THIRD OF THE COMAND BEING
KILLED AND WOUNDED

The legislation presented new challenges and opportunities for administering Big Hole. The greatest challenge was distance: Nez Perce National Historical Park now sprawled over four states (or five, if one included the section of Nez Perce Trail through Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming). The headquarters for this unique park was in Spalding, Idaho — an eight-hour drive from Big Hole over twisting two-lane highways. In winter, the two mountain passes between Big Hole and Spalding could make the trip considerably longer. Another challenge was the existing boundaries between National Park Service regions: Nez Perce National Historical Park reported to the Pacific Northwest Region Office in Seattle; Big Hole and Grant Kohrs Ranch were under the Rocky Mountain Regional Office in Denver. On the other hand, the greatest opportunity presented by the joining of Big Hole and Nez Perce National Historical Park was the sharing of staff expertise, since both units revolved around the preservation and interpretation of Nez Perce culture and history.

It appears that Congress's intent in the Nez Perce National Historical Park Additions Act was to allow the Park Service some latitude in formulating how Big Hole and the three new battlefield sites in Idaho and Montana would be administered. Indeed, NPS officials at the field level began conceptualizing how the expanded park could most effectively be administered several months before Congress finally enacted the legislation. Jock Whitworth and Grant Kohrs Ranch National Historical Site Superintendent Eddie Lopez began working on the legislation with Nez Perce National Historical Park Superintendent Frank Walker in 1990. Walker believed that the most effective way to manage the Montana sites would be from Big Hole and the Rocky Mountain Regional Office. To avoid duplication of efforts between the two regions, certain parkwide administrative matters such as general management planning, interpretive planning, and relations with the Nez Perce Tribe could be handled out of one region.11

Pacific Northwest Regional Director Charles H. Odegaard supported this concept and broached the prospect of a cooperative agreement with the Rocky Mountain Region on October 19, 1992, three weeks after the Senate passed the bill. Odegaard suggested that the two regional directors decide between them which region would take the lead. The first task of the lead office would be to prepare a memorandum for activation of the new sites.12

Even this arrangement proved unwieldy, however. In May 1993, Rocky Mountain Regional Director Bob Baker was helping conduct a Purpose and Significance Workshop for Big Hole National Battlefield when he realized that it was difficult to interpret Big Hole separately from the other sites in Nez Perce National Historical Park. In March 1994, Baker and Odegaard agreed to an exchange: the three Montana battle sites for the Oregon National Historic Trail. The exchange took place on June 10, 1994. Thus, the Montana sites were brought under the administration of the superintendent at Spalding.13

At the same time that the regional directors were negotiating this agreement, the staff at the battlefield was in flux. Jock Whitworth left in June 1993, transferring to Rocky Mountain National Park. Art Hutchinson, an archeologist and interpretive park ranger from Mesa Verde National Park, accepted a temporary assignment as acting superintendent at Big Hole from July to November 1993. The park ranger also transferred out and a temporary replacement arrived that summer. Hutchinson successfully guided the permanent and seasonal staff through a
transitional year. Returning seasonal interpreters provided a measure of continuity, and Hutchinson reported at the end of the year that the staff had functioned in "a definite atmosphere of cooperation."

On January 13-14, 1994, the superintendents of Nez Perce National Historical Park, Big Hole National Battlefield, and Grant Kohrs Ranch National Historical Site convened with staff from the Personnel Division of the Pacific Northwest Regional Office to revamp the park’s organizational structure. In essence, the plan replaced traditional functional divisions with five management units based on logical clusters of sites. Each of these units would handle daily operations, cultivate local community support, and develop working relations with the park’s partner’s in that area. Technical activities, planning, and overall coordination would be consolidated in a parkwide support unit based at Spalding.

The administrative reorganization of Big Hole National Battlefield and Nez Perce National Historical Park paralleled the larger reorganization then underway throughout the National Park system. Superintendent Walker decentralized the administrative organization of the park at the same time that National Park Service Director Roger G. Kennedy activated a general reorganizational plan aimed at reducing the size of regional office staffs and moving personnel from regional offices to the field. Both efforts were aimed at empowering employees, putting employees closer to the resources and the Park Service’s constituents, and reducing administrative costs. Both plans drew inspiration from the objectives outlined in the report of Vice President Al Gore’s National Performance Review, *From Red Tape to Results — Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less.*

Superintendent Walker put his staff reorganization into effect in stages. The Oregon-Washington Unit was activated even before the unit organization concept was fully developed. Paul Henderson began work in August 1993 at Joseph, Oregon, as the park’s first unit manager. The following year, Walker established two staff units in Idaho. Art Hutchinson served as manager of the Spalding Unit, with primary responsibility for the visitor center operation, and Mark O’Neill became manager of the White Bird and Upper Clearwater Units, with offices and staff at Grangeville. Meanwhile, in February 1994, Tony Schetzle became the first unit manager of the Montana Unit under the reorganization, then moved four months later to Grant Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site as superintendent.

Sue Buchel, curator at Nez Perce National Historical Park headquarters in Spalding, Idaho, took Schetzle’s place as unit manager of the Montana Unit in June 1994. As former curator with responsibility for exhibits and museum, library, and photo collections at Spalding, Buchel brought a detailed knowledge of Nez Perce history and culture to her job. In addition to managing a permanent staff of five at Big Hole, Buchel exercised line authority over a single park ranger at Bear’s Paw Battlefield and was responsible for the undeveloped Canyon Creek site outside of Laurel, Montana. Buchel served a year and seven months at Big Hole and then resigned for personal reasons. During this time, Buchel and other Nez Perce National Historical Park staff concluded that Big Hole National Battlefield needed to be somewhat more autonomous than the other management units. In September 1995, the Montana unit manager
position was redesignated as both superintendent of Big Hole National Battlefield and unit manager of the Montana Unit of Nez Perce National Historical Park.

Jon G. James arrived at Big Hole in March 1996. An historian by training, James had served as a seasonal interpreter at Big Hole nearly twenty years earlier in 1977. He was excited to return because he believed the Park Service had a "really important story to tell" at Big Hole and the interpretive design still needed work.

Certainly with the battlefield's integration into Nez Perce National Historical Park the need was now greater than ever to interpret the battle and the War of 1877 in the wider context of Nez Perce history. In yet another refinement of the administrative reorganization, James negotiated a verbal understanding with Superintendent Walker according to which James reported to Nez Perce National Historical Park on management issues relating to Nez Perce culture and history, and looked to the Columbia-Cascades System Support Office (formerly the Pacific Northwest Regional Office) for help on all other management issues. In some ways, Nez Perce National Historical Park now served as a system support office or lead cluster park for Big Hole, providing technical assistance in the areas of natural resources, cultural resources, and computer and library support as well as coordination of historical themes and interpretation. Big Hole, meanwhile, provided management activities in support of the three "Montana" sites (Bear's Paw, Canyon Creek, and Camas Meadows) by performing maintenance, management support, administrative support, community relations, and supervision of personnel. Additionally, the Big Hole superintendent took advantage of the unit's proximity to the USFS Region 1 office in Missoula by serving as NPS coordinator for the USFS-managed Nez Perce National Historical Trail.

### Superintendent/Unit Managers, 1988 to current.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>1988-1993</td>
<td>Jock Whitworth</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Art Hutchinson</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>Tony Schetzle</td>
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<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>Sue Buchel</td>
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<td>1996 to present</td>
<td>Jon G. James</td>
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New Staff Housing

The administrative reorganization of Big Hole National Battlefield had repercussions for the unit's physical plant. It became evident as early as 1992 that Big Hole's staff would increase and that staff housing needed to be expanded. Superintendent Jock Whitworth initiated a housing study, and the Rocky Mountain Regional Office produced a new Housing Management Plan. The plans were in place when Whitworth transferred to a new position in June 1993, and the new housing units were built shortly thereafter. The new housing complex marked the most visible addition to the battlefield's physical plant since the construction of the visitor center some thirty years earlier. Whitworth acknowledged that the possibility of overbuilding gave him "nightmares," but given the Park Service's lack of authority to construct housing units outside the boundaries of the national battlefield the necessity for more on-site staff housing was inescapable.23

Existing quarters in 1992 were too small to accommodate the park staff. Not only was the staff itself growing, but the NPS workforce in general was becoming more diversified. Personnel who were married or had children needed larger accommodations. The housing complex in 1992 consisted of a two-bedroom mobile home, a pair of two-bedroom apartments, and two studio apartments for seasonal interpreters. That summer the trailer was occupied by a family of three, and each of the two-bedroom apartments by families of five. Four seasonal employees were crowded into the studio apartments, while two others lived in Wisdom. Temporary housing in Wisdom was of poor quality and hard to find.24

The Park Service contracted for the new housing construction and the project was completed in 1994. Subsequently, administrators contended that the contractor cut corners and that Park Service oversight of the contract was not well-executed. The project occurred at the same time that Big Hole National Battlefield was transferred from the Park Service's Rocky Mountain Region to the Pacific Northwest Region, perhaps explaining the lack of vigilance in overseeing the contract. In any case, the complex was not properly landscaped or contoured, and the ground did not drain well. Superintendent Jon James had to address these problems after he arrived, two years after the contract had been completed.25

Rehabilitation of the visitor center and housing complex topped the list of items included in the "action plan" for Big Hole National Battlefield in the new General Management Plan for Nez Perce National Historical Park and Big Hole National Battlefield, adopted in September 1997. By the fall of 1998, plans were underway to expand and remodel the visitor center, construct a new maintenance facility, and landscape the housing complex. The total cost of these contemplated improvements was estimated at $3.2 million.26
Visitor Use

Visitor use of Big Hole National Battlefield increased in the 1990s. Having see-sawed either side of 40,000 people per year in the 1980s, visitation averaged around 50,000 in the early 1990s and climbed to 65,000 by 1997. The seasonality of visitor use remained about the same between the two decades with roughly half of annual visitation falling in the months of July and August and fully 95 percent of annual visitation appearing in the six months from May through October.27

Big Hole staff attributed much of the increase to population growth in western Montana, particularly in the Bitterroot and Missoula valleys to the west and north of Big Hole, as evidenced by the county numbers on Montana license plates commonly seen in the parking lot. “In the late 1980s, western Montana was discovered,” Jock Whitworth recalled. The influx of population to these counties seemed to spring not from economic opportunity but from the area’s attractiveness as a place “to enjoy the good life.”28 Many of the new day visitors to the battlefield appeared to the staff as greenhorns. At worst, they did not give the battlefield proper respect. Kermit Edmunds, a Missoula high school teacher who had served as a seasonal interpreter at Big Hole sporadically since 1964, remembered an incident in 1991 that seemed to epitomize the change. Once during that summer he had to apprehend some visitors who had brought a pair of llamas in a horse trailer to the battlefield and were allowing the animals to graze in the Siege Area. For Edmunds, this signaled that “the era of the cappuccino cowboy had arrived.”29

Crowds attend an anniversary event. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.
Whitworth obtained an analysis of visitor use in 1991. He found that Montana residents comprised 30 percent of visitors in that year. Washington, Idaho, and California supplied the largest percentage of out-of-state visitors, while Oregon, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, Minnesota, and Wisconsin accounted for 2 to 4 percent of visitors each. Texas, Wyoming, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Nevada accounted for another 1 percent each. Approximately 15 percent of visitors were over 61 years of age, approximately 55 percent were between 61 and 18, and the remaining 30 percent were under 18. Whitworth estimated that 50 percent of visitors came in nuclear family groups (including couples traveling without children), 10 percent in organized tours, 10 percent by themselves, and the remaining 30 percent in some other grouping of extended family, multiple family, partial family, or peers. “Special populations,” such as visitors with handicaps, non-English speakers, and ethnic minorities, had a relatively small presence at this unit of the National Park system, accounting for about 1 percent each.

Whitworth’s analysis included breakdowns of visitor use by duration of stay and activity. An overwhelming 99 percent of visitors were day users. Of these, approximately 10 percent were “home-based visitors” on a one-day excursion and approximately 89 percent were “through visitors” on an extended trip. Four out of five visitors centered their visit around the unit’s “primary resource” — the battlefield, while one in five entered the area for purposes incidental to the primary resource.
In 1994, another analysis of visitor use was made under contract by the Cooperative Park Studies Unit, University of Idaho. This study, based on results from several hundred visitor surveys, corroborated the demographic profile described by Whitworth in 1991. It disclosed additional information about the visitor experience: for example, some 18 percent of visitors were repeat visitors, 99 percent of visitors made use of the visitor center, and 90 percent of visitors came "to learn history." Completed in 1995, the visitor study provided detailed statistics on visitors' length of stay, activities, reasons for the visit, primary area of interest, sources of information, use of visitor services and facilities, and preferences for educational subjects and tribal contact in the future.33

The staff was aware of another significant if intangible feature of visitor use: increasingly, visitors expressed more sympathy for the Nez Perce point of view. Staff members attributed some of this change to broad currents in American culture: for example, the pro-American Indian sentiment elicited by the popular Hollywood movie, "Dances with Wolves." Staff members also believed that the Nez Perce story was becoming more widely known among the general public. Many people, already knowledgeable about the story, came to the battlefield to pay homage to the site and to contemplate the tragedy. Although these visitor perspectives could not be documented statistically, they nevertheless had a potent effect on the interpretive program.34

Interpretation

The most significant change in the battlefield's interpretative program from 1987 to 1997 was an increased emphasis given to the Nez Perce point of view. Not since the McWhorter period in the 1920s and 1930s had there been such a concerted effort to include the Nez Perce "voice" in site interpretation. Indeed, Congress specifically mandated that the Nez Perce people would be consulted on interpretation of all park sites — including Big Hole National Battlefield — in the Nez Perce National Historical Park Additions Act of 1991. Even before that legislation was passed, the Park Service moved to involve the Nez Perce tribal leadership (through its governing body, the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee) and Nez Perce individuals in various issues of interpretation and cultural resources management at Big Hole National Battlefield.

Jock Whitworth contributed enormously to the increased Nez Perce presence at Big Hole. Beginning in 1988, he recruited Nez Perce to serve as seasonal interpreters. Whitworth believed that the best way to achieve "balance," or at least a presentation of both the soldiers' and Nez Perce's point of view in the battle, was to include both military historians and Nez Perce tribal members on the interpretive staff. In his previous position at Theodore Roosevelt National Park, Whitworth had recruited American Indians from three local tribes who provided cultural demonstrations.35 In his first year at Big Hole, Whitworth hired Lem Mitchell as the first seasonal interpreter from the Nez Perce Tribe.36 In 1989, he hired Ernestine Slickpoo as a Nez Perce Cultural Demonstrator. In 1990, Whitworth appointed permanent ranger Kevin Peters under an Indian Hiring Preference Authority. Peters was descended from Nez Perce who had participated in the battle. In 1991, Whitworth added Wilfred "Otis" Halfmoon to his staff under a cooperative education grant. Halfmoon was a descendant of an honored Nez Perce warrior.
killed in the battle. Halfmoon's position was renewed the next year. In 1992, Peters transferred to Nez Perce National Historical Park and Halfmoon was hired to fill the vacancy at Big Hole. Halfmoon transferred to Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area in 1993, and then to Bear's Paw Battlefield in 1994, where he served as the first on-site ranger. Halfmoon and Peters made important contributions to the visitor experience. Whitworth described Halfmoon's presentations as "very emotional and memorable," and reported receiving many positive comments from visitors.37

Five years after Halfmoon and Peters left the Big Hole staff, the future of Nez Perce employment at Big Hole remained uncertain. For reasons unrelated to Big Hole, the Park Service lost its earlier ability to hire seasonal interpreters under the Indian Hiring Preference Authority. That reversal, coupled with the fact that few Nez Perce tribal members were readily interested in a Park Service career, made it difficult to recruit more Nez Perce onto the staff. Although other tribal members had served on the staff of Nez Perce National Historical Park, those staff positions were located closer to tribal members' homes on the Nez Perce Reservation. First Montana Unit Manager Buchel, then Big Hole Superintendent James, wanted to continue Whitworth's efforts in bringing Nez Perce interpreters to Big Hole, but the opportunities had narrowed. Moreover, after the unit reorganization in 1994, the superintendent of Nez Perce National Historical Park rather than the superintendent of Big Hole was primarily responsible for fostering relations with the Nez Perce Tribe. The superintendent of Nez Perce National Historical Park had a big advantage being located nearby the Nez Perce Reservation.38

Whitworth sought to involve the Nez Perce Tribe in other areas of interpretation besides staff presentations. Traveling to Lapwai, Idaho, he established official contact with the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee (NPTEC). He soon developed personal friendships with Al Slickpoo, a recognized expert on Nez Perce culture, and Horace Axtell, Nez Perce historian. He worked with Axtell on interpretation of the Nez Perce Trail. Traveling to Nespelem, Washington, he invited input from the Joseph Band of Nez Perce who resided on the Colville Indian Reservation. Among the latter group, he developed important lines of communication with two distinguished members of the band, Joseph and Soy Redthunder.39 Subsequently, he consulted Joseph and Soy Redthunder on such interpretive matters as a draft script for a new audio-visual presentation. The Redthunders also spoke at the annual memorial ceremony held at Big Hole National Battlefield each August.40

The growing involvement by the Nez Perce Tribe enriched the interpretive program in many ways. With Whitworth's encouragement, Nez Perce assumed a conspicuous role at the memorial ceremony held each August on the anniversary of the battle. As Otis Halfmoon recalls, Nez Perce participation in this event revived in 1989 thanks in large part to the promotional efforts of NPTEC Chairman Wilfred Scott. Scott succeeded in getting the Nez Perce Tribe's local post of Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) to take a lead role in the annual preparations. By the early 1990s, Nez Perce participation was so strong as to practically dominate the event. As the annual event continued to evolve, Wilfred Scott recognized the need to involve local VFW posts in the Bitterroot and Big Hole valleys as well as the Nez Perce-dominated VFW post on the reservation so that non-Indians would take part in the ceremonies.41
Wilfred "Otis" Halfmoon, a descendent of an honored Nez Perce warrior killed at the Big Hole, joined the staff in 1989. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.

similar groups were another fixture at the annual memorial ceremonies, with members dressed in period uniform explaining to visitors what the daily life of an enlisted man was like in Idaho and Montana territories in 1877. This complemented the cultural demonstrations provided by Nez Perce men and women.42

By the mid-1990s, consistent Nez Perce participation in the annual commemorative ceremony at Big Hole seemed assured. Unit Manager Sue Buchel reported in 1994 that the event featured Nez Perce cultural demonstrators, drummers, dancers, and a poet. In addition, Nez Perce members of the VFW held a special pipe ceremony at the Encampment Area, beside the North Fork of the Big Hole River.43 Another notable addition was made to the event in 1995 with the performance of the “empty saddle ceremony.” In this ceremony, five appaloosa horses with empty saddles were paraded on the battlefield, each horse representing a chief and band who were present in the Nez Perce flight of 1877. The event marked the revival of a ceremony that had not been seen on the Nez Perce Reservation for many years.44

While Nez Perce participation was the most significant development in Big Hole National Battlefield’s interpretive program in the late 1980s and 1990s, Jock Whitworth introduced a number of other changes too. Whitworth’s approach to interpretation was markedly different from that of his predecessor, Al Schulmeyer. Whereas Schulmeyer believed that the visitor should have a choice to experience the battlefield either with or without an interpreter, Whitworth believed it was the Park Service’s responsibility to initiate visitor contact. He eschewed a program of formal guided walks in favor of “roving interpretation.” According to
the new approach, interpreters circulated among the visitors — both on the trail system and on
the visitor center floor — eliciting visitor questions and providing interpretation in a face-to-face
context. Consistent with this more assertive approach to visitor contact, Whitworth also placed new
emphasis on educational outreach. He invited guest speakers to the battlefield, gave slide talks
about the battle and the history of the War of 1877 in western Montana communities, encouraged
school groups to visit the site, and shared educational materials with area schools. In April and
May 1989, the staff conducted a series of outreach programs at Wisdom School, 10 miles east of
the battlefield. Montana Unit Manager Sue Buchel and Superintendent Jon James continued
the programs begun by Whitworth. In 1995, some 1200 students visited the site on school field
trips in May and September. Invited speakers included Douglas McChristian, historian at Little
Bighorn National Battlefield, in 1995, and Professor Edward T. Linenthal, author of Sacred
Ground: Americans and their Battlefields, in 1997. In another instance of off-site interpretation, the staff at Big Hole cooperated with Beaverhead National Forest in providing campfire programs at the May Creek Campground located on the national forest about 7 miles west of the battlefield.

For years the annual commemoration of the battle in August marked the climax of the busy
summer season for the battlefield’s interpretive staff. Jock Whitworth took the event to a new
level in 1989 when the event was held in conjunction with various Montana statehood centennial
events, drawing 4300 tourists over a two-day period. Whitworth arranged to have a day devoted
to interpretation of the soldier’s life on the frontier, featuring performances by “living history”
experts from throughout the West, followed by another day dedicated to Nez Perce cultural
demonstrations and commemoration of the Nez Perce participants in the battle.

The Big Hole staff developed other commemorative events as well. Unit Manager Sue
Buchel organized an event on May 21, 1995 to commemorate the 85th anniversary of the
proclamation of Big Hole National Monument. Activities centered around interpretation of what
the Big Hole Valley was like in 1910. Community volunteers portrayed early 20th century ranch
life with demonstrations of the beaver-slide hay stacker and the use of draft horses. Staff from
Bannack State Park offered visitors a chance to pan for gold. Park Service staff from Grant-
Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site demonstrated blacksmithing on the open range. Forest
Service staff talked about the life of an early days ranger. The Big Hole Cattlewomen’s
Association provided a lunch. Volunteers from the Beaverhead County Museum lectured on
early travel in the Big Hole Valley.

A decade after Whitworth revamped the interpretive program at Big Hole, there were certain
projects long discussed or called for in park planning documents still remaining to be done.
Starting with Whitworth, unit managers all agreed that the interpretive markers on the battlefield
— the cartoonish-looking soldier’s hats and warrior’s feathers — were outdated and
inappropriate and needed to be replaced with something else. Superintendent James oversaw
development of a plan to update these markers. The plan was to pull them all out, replacing a
limited selection with unobtrusive metal cylinders to show in a more suggestive manner the
positions of the combatants.
Unit managers also shared frustration over the failure to get a new audio-visual program completed. The effort to produce a new AV program was initiated in 1989. The battlefield received $25,000 out of the Rocky Mountain Region’s exhibit repair/rehabilitation funds for a new program and equipment. The Park Service contracted with Far West Communications, Inc., of Missoula, Montana, to produce it. Although the Park Service received a satisfactory first draft of the script by April 1990, the project stalled. The Park Service’s Harper’s Ferry Center (HFC) insisted on a larger role in the project after it was started, creating a funding shortfall. As Whitworth explained the situation in July 1990, “Originally we were informed that we could have it produced through HFC or through area production companies. We requested bids from three companies, awarded the bid and selected the equipment, and received the first draft of the script when I was notified that we would have to go through HFC and change the format and equipment.” Whitworth reported in November 1991 that “efforts to restart the stalled video project were successful,” and he noted “donations of national quality footage of the Nez Perce sites by Channel 9 TV in Denver.” But some time thereafter the project again stalled.

Unit managers Buchel and James continued to remind their superiors of the need for this program. Finally in January 1998, James met with Anne Tubiolo of HFC, Marie Marek of Nez Perce National Historical Park, and documentary filmmaker Chris Wheeler, whose company, Great Divide Pictures, had taken over the project. By now the Park Service had invested $45,000 and it seemed that another $52,000 would be needed to finish the video by May 1999. Wheeler had completed a script, but there was unanimous agreement that the video needed interviews and a professional interviewer.

The struggle to get a new AV program done highlighted another element in the battlefield’s interpretive program: the Park Service wanted to tie interpretation at Big Hole National Battlefield more closely to the broad interpretive themes of Nez Perce National Historical Park. Increasingly, the Park Service sought to introduce visitors to a wider story and encourage them to seek more information at other related sites. The unique configuration of Nez Perce National Historical Park demanded such an approach. With the establishment of a “Montana Unit” including the Bear’s Paw and Canyon Creek battle sites, the need for an effective interpretive web was more pressing than ever. By the mid-1990s, plans were underway to redevelop the visitor center exhibits and park brochure in order to reflect the relationship of Big Hole National Battlefield to all of the sites in Nez Perce National Historical Park.
Natural and Cultural Resources Management

The Statement for Management for Big Hole National Battlefield, updated in 1989, confirmed Superintendent Schultmeyer's efforts to integrate natural and cultural resources management into a seamless whole. The document listed three management objectives for natural and cultural resources management:

- To maintain the historic lands and the natural resources in such a way that they approximate the scene in 1877 when the battle occurred.
- To make the historical (cultural) resources available and accessible to visitors and also protect the cultural resources from adverse impact and possible loss of data.
- To promote archeological, historical, and biological research to provide accurate data for management and interpretation of the resources of Big Hole National Battlefield and related areas.

Since the principal features of the battlefield — the meandering river, the willows, the twin trees, the point of timber — were all natural objects, it followed that the distinction between natural and cultural resources would have less bearing than usual. Unit managers recognized that it was Big Hole's impressive story coupled with the somber beauty of the battlefield and its environs that drew visitors.

Collection Management

The emphasis on story and landscape was reflected in Big Hole's museum collection, which remained relatively small. In 1987 it consisted of some 1900 items. The collection included Nez Perce and U.S. Army weapons and accoutrements, clothing and personal gear, archives, photographs, and about 400 herbarium specimens.

Record keeping practices prior to 1987 had been "somewhat casual." In the reorganization of 1987, Big Hole's curatorial function was consolidated with Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site. The collection remained in the visitor center at Big Hole but curatorial responsibilities were transferred to the Chief, Curatorial Division, at Grant-Kohrs. As the authors of the reorganization plan commented, "this position is the only one which has the professional training and skill to manage the Big Hole collection." Placing the collection under the care of a curator was a start toward bringing the museum collection up to current NPS standards. During the following year Curator Randi Bry prepared a Collection Management Report on the Big Hole collection. Of approximately 1900 items, 1430 were catalogued. All items were stored or exhibited in the visitor center. Bry's report served as a point of departure for the development of a Collection Management Plan between 1989 and 1991.

In 1989, the Park Service assembled a collection management planning team consisting of Allen S. Bohnert, regional curator in Denver; Rachel Maines and Laura Joss Griffin of the collection management firm Maines & Associates; and Lisa Mibach, a conservator. The team visited Big Hole National Battlefield on October 26, 1989, to evaluate the current museum collection management program. It reviewed previous planning documents, including a
Yellowstone National Park memorandum of June 18, 1945, “Collecting Artifacts for Big Hole Battlefield Museum” — the earliest known management direction given to the collection, and a Scope of Collection Statement of 1986. Scant reference to the museum collection was found in other planning documents, including the Resources Management Plan of 1987, Statements for Management in 1987 and 1989, and Jock Whitworth’s Interpretive Plan of 1989.62

The Collection Management Plan for Big Hole National Battlefield, approved in 1991, provided a detailed guide for management, care, and growth of the collection. In some respects, collection management at Big Hole was relatively straightforward. Not only was the collection small, it was well-tailored to the preservation and interpretive mission of the battlefield. Few items were extraneous to the story of the battle. Moreover, the possibilities for adding to the collection were relatively focused. As the plan’s authors noted, there were only three potential sources of growth for the collection: archeological exploration of the site, natural history collecting, and acquisition of relevant artifacts from other locations — such as items associated with battle participants. The plan’s authors made two salient recommendations: to develop more storage space, and to improve record keeping.63

Kermit Edmunds, veteran seasonal interpreter.Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB, n.d.
Coincidentally, the collection management planning team completed its work about the same time that the Park Service received a tip leading to the recovery of a precious item that had been stolen out of the visitor center nearly twenty years earlier. As noted in Chapter 6, a burglary in 1972 had resulted in the loss of Chief Joseph's pipe and pipe bag. In September 1990, Superintendent Whitworth learned from an informant that the stolen pipe was in the possession of a man residing in St. George, Utah. Whitworth contacted law enforcement rangers at nearby Zion National Park, and that park's investigator, Pat Buccello, recovered the pipe with the assistance of an agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on December 26, 1990. Five suspects were indicted for conspiracy to conceal stolen property; one of the five was tried while the other four were granted immunity in return for testimony. The testimony implicated one of the remaining four alleged conspirators in the burglary of the visitor center, a separate crime. After the suspect returned from a year in Antarctica, Whitworth and Buccello relocated the man and questioned him about the missing pipe bag. Two weeks after the interview, on November 18, 1992, the pipe bag arrived in the mail at Big Hole National Battlefield's post office box in Wisdom. Over the two-year period Whitworth and Buccello had traveled to six states and interviewed numerous witnesses and suspects. As Whitworth remarked in his annual report, “we finally interviewed the right suspect enough times that he apparently decided to pressure someone into returning the bag to us.” Whitworth, Buccello, and the regional chief ranger's office were praised for their dogged pursuit of the stolen property.64

Archeological Investigation

The tip leading to the recovery of Chief Joseph's pipe was not the only lucky break that Big Hole staff experienced in 1990. Country western singer Hank Williams, Jr., approached Park Service officials at the end of that year about the possibility of a grant to fund an archeological investigation at the battlefield. Williams owned a ranch in the Big Hole. A frontier military history buff, he had taken a keen interest in the recent archeological investigation of the Little Bighorn Battlefield. The Park Service had long desired to undertake an archeological investigation of Big Hole Battlefield but had lacked funds. Superintendent Whitworth encouraged Williams' proposal and suggested that the investigation might be extended over a wider area in order to learn more about the Nez Perce participants in the battle. He introduced Williams to the two Nez Perce on the staff, Kevin Peters and Otis Halfmoon, and directed the country western singer to various sources on Nez Perce military culture at the time of the War of 1877. As a result, Williams acquired a strong interest in Nez Perce history and culture and became personally acquainted with the Halfmoon family at Lapwai. His offer of financial support grew into a careful research design, principally authored by Dr. Douglas Scott of the Park Service's Midwest Archeological Center (Omaha), in 1991.65

Proceeding with this unusual source of funding, the Park Service conducted the archeological investigation that summer. Headed by Doug Scott, the field work involved battlefield staff, archeologists from the Midwest Archeological Center, and more than 50 volunteers from around the nation. More than 1000 artifacts were recovered. The effort included a thorough re-examination of the existing collection as well as a metal-detecting survey of the battlefield. The survey drew some significant conclusions for management, including the location of tepees and
events during the battle that indicated a need to acquire additional acreage at the site. It also provided valuable information for interpretation, confirming the disposition and movements of troops and warriors during the battle and the fact that Bannocks had mutilated the bodies of fallen Nez Perce.66

Prior to the project, battlefield staff consulted the Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee on how to proceed in case the investigation uncovered any human remains. Sadly, the investigation did uncover the remains of a young Nez Perce woman killed in the battle, and the consultation was renewed after this burial was disturbed. The tribal consultation was notable, since it predated any law respecting Native American burial remains. At the request of the Tribe (and on the recommendation of Otis Halfmoon), the remains were reburied in a safer location farther from the river channel. The reburial took place during a ceremony conducted by Tribal Historian Alan Slickpoo, Sr., and his son. The men sang traditional Nez Perce songs and gave prayers and offerings. Traditional food was shared with the woman’s spirit by placing it with the remains. Two golden eagles and two hawks soared overhead, a sacred sign for the Nez Perce. Accentuating the sadness of the occasion, the remains revealed the fact that the young woman’s body had been extensively mutilated after the battle.67

Following the archeological investigation, the Park Service had further discussion with Hank Williams, Jr., about funding an expansion of the visitor center exhibits to display some of the newly discovered artifacts. These discussions broke off in 1993, due in part to the administrative reorganization and turnover of superintendents at that time, and additional funding was not forthcoming. In August 1995, Montana Unit Manager Sue Buchel informed Williams that
"rehabilitation" of the exhibit area was then under consideration as part of the overall interpretive planning associated with Nez Perce National Historical Park. As for the artifacts, they had been moved off-site during the winter of 1994-1995. With the completion of the new housing complex that summer, additional storage became available. In August 1995, Buchel worked with Doug Scott of the Midwest Archeological Center to have the collection returned to the national battlefield.68

Superintendent Jon James revived efforts to expand the visitor center’s exhibit area. Indeed, the project topped the list of items included in the “action plan” for Big Hole National Battlefield in the new General Management Plan, adopted in September 1997. In the meantime, James arranged for a temporary exhibit of artifacts from the archeological study that would travel from city to city in Montana. Hank Williams, Jr., indicated that he would be willing to work with the Park Service further.69

Vegetation Management

Management direction did not change on the issue of vegetation management at Big Hole. Succeeding Statements for Management reiterated that the object was “to maintain the historic lands and the natural resources in such a way that they approximate the scene in 1877 when the battle occurred.”70 Superintendent Schumleyer was the architect of the battlefield’s vegetation management program. His successors after 1987 implemented his policies. In the decade after Schumleyer’s retirement, major elements of vegetation management included willow burns, sagebrush burns, weed control, and logging of young trees encroaching on the Horse Pasture Area. Although unit managers requested a comprehensive vegetation management plan for Big Hole National Battlefield, it was yet to be funded.

Superintendent Whitworth acknowledged Schumleyer’s contribution while preparing a fire management plan and environmental assessment for Big Hole National Battlefield. “Thanks for your interest in the fire management plan at the battlefield,” Whitworth wrote. “I appreciate your efforts in developing the prescribed fire program during your tenure.” It was one of the few occasions when Schumleyer, retired and residing in Wisdom, involved himself with the national battlefield’s management. The Fire Management Plan, approved in May 1991, integrated the Park Service’s prescribed burning efforts with new, more aggressive procedures for suppression of wildfire that sprang from the infamous Yellowstone fire season of 1988.72

Removal of sagebrush and new trees in the Horse Pasture Area was relatively easy compared to the willow problem. Unit managers wanted to burn the willows back so that they would be approximately the size of the willows growing in the bottomland in 1877. Vegetation studies indicated that before the era of fire suppression, the willows were swept by natural fire approximately once every eight years. In an effort to get back to something resembling that fire cycle, the Park Service conducted willow burns in 1986 and 1988.73 These jobs required close coordination with the Forest Service, careful consideration of human safety, property, and environmental hazards, and favorable weather conditions.74 The large size of the willows made the task more difficult. The first two prescribed willow burns did not go well, as the fire killed but did not consume the largest willows. Forest Service wildlife biologist Jeff Jones of the
Wisdom Ranger District estimated that it would take three years for the dead “snags” to lay down or for new growth to conceal them. Given the many river channels through the area, it was hard to ignite ground fires by the usual drip torch method and achieve a hot enough burn to take out the big willows. The alternative, aerial ignition by helicopter, carried risks of spilling gas into the river or creating a fire so hot that it would kill the root clumps. After extended consultation with burn experts in the Forest Service and the Park Service, Whitworth obtained authority in 1991 for a third major willow burn using a helicopter and helitorch module.

In preparation for the major burn, smaller burns were carried out in 1991 and 1992 to reduce fuel loads. Finally another major willow burn was undertaken in May 1993 — the first of that magnitude since 1988. Although weather conditions were within the prescription, they were marginal. The burn did not accomplish the desired results and the ignition was terminated early. A fourth willow burn was conducted in the spring of 1998.

Noxious weeds were another challenge to the Park Service’s goal of managing vegetation so that the landscape looked much the way it did in 1877. Exotic species included spotted knapweed, yellow star thistle, and leafy spurge. These plants were not even known to the region at the time the battle was fought. Although noxious weeds were not as much of a disturbance to the untrained eye, they threatened to drive out other species that were native to the area.

Early in 1995, Unit Manager Buchel renewed Big Hole’s interagency agreement with Beaverhead National Forest. The agreement included a cooperative plan for noxious weed control. Under the agreement, the Forest Service provided the Park Service with a certified herbicide applicator supervisor to direct a crew of Park Service and Forest Service sprayers. To complete the weed control program, Nez Perce National Historical Park’s new resource management specialist, Renee Beymer, obtained authorization to use two herbicides, “Tordon” and “Roundup,” on the battlefield for the control of spotted knapweed, yellow star thistle, and leafy spurge. In the summer of 1995, 2.4 gallons of Tordon was applied to 88 acres of the battlefield using three backpack sprayers and a Forest Service tank truck. In addition, battlefield staff spent eight man-days hand-pulling weeds in areas that were too close to the river to permit chemical applications. A similar program was undertaken the following year.

While the goal of willow burning was to get the vegetation back to a condition where smaller prescription fires at appropriate intervals would maintain the desired effect, the outlook for weed control was less encouraging. Buchel described the “incredible infestation” of exotic weeds visible along the roads leading from the Big Hole Valley over the mountains to the west. “How will we ever combat the ‘drift’ from badly infested areas such as this?” she asked. The Park Service could take steps to control the weeds on the 655 acres under its care, but it would constantly face the threat of reintroduction from weed-infested areas outside.
**Water Rights**

No other resource issue at Big Hole National Battlefield is so closely tied to the area’s ranching community as that of water rights. Several old irrigation ditches cross the national battlefield, and a number of area ranchers assert water rights that could potentially effect national battlefield resources.

Historically the NPS, like other federal agencies, recognized state water law to pertain wherever waters traversed federal lands under its jurisdiction. Montana state water law is based on the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, which recognizes the *priority* of water rights, or the order in time in which they were originally acquired. Adapted to the region’s semi-arid climate, the doctrine provides that in times of water shortage, appropriators who have prior or senior rights can use water from a given stream before appropriators with later or junior rights on that same stream. Under the doctrine, appropriators can claim a water right by putting water to *beneficial use*, such as for mining or irrigation purposes. In addition, Montana state water law provides for ditch rights that are distinct from water rights. In most cases, ditch rights are easements with the same legal status as any other easement, such as an easement for an access road.

Within the boundaries of the national battlefield, Ruby Creek and Trail Creek converge to form the swampy headwaters of the North Fork of the Big Hole River. Subsequent to 1877, and mostly prior to the establishment of the national monument in 1910, upstream waters that flow through the national battlefield were appropriated for use in mining and ranching operations. In addition, appropriators built a number of ditches through the area now contained within the boundaries of Big Hole National Battlefield, thereby establishing ditch rights. Not all of these appropriative water rights and ditch rights are in use and some may no longer be valid. As a whole, however, these water rights and ditch rights have presented three distinct but related issues for park administration. First, the National Park Service has sought to ensure the unit’s own water supply. Second, it has taken steps to protect the battlefield setting from intrusive physical developments associated with ditch rights — particularly the reconstruction of a trestle across the bottomland that would flume the water diversion from one side of the river to the other. Third, it has striven to establish a federal reserved water right that will protect instream flow and the biotic resources that are dependent upon it.

The National Park Service first addressed the issue of water rights for administrative use in 1944. On the initiative of Acting Director Hillory A. Tolson, NPS officials inquired with the Forest Service as to whether it had filed a water claim by the United States for Big Hole National Battlefield Monument. Although the Forest Service had appropriated water for domestic use by the ranger station and campers, it appeared that the appropriative right had never been perfected. The Forest Service had no water claim in its records and probably none had ever been filed. In further reply to this inquiry, the Forest Service disclaimed any interest in the existing water supply system associated with the ranger residence and campground, these facilities having been transferred to the NPS by the 1939 boundary extension.

Four years later — the reason for the delay is unclear — the NPS filed a Notice of Appropriation of Water Right with the state of Montana and Beaverhead County. The water
right notice was prepared by the service’s Water Resources Branch based on information provided by Yellowstone’s assistant park engineer. The NPS filed a claim for domestic, recreational, irrigation, and other purposes for Big Hole Battlefield National Monument based on a prior appropriation date of December 31, 1909. The water claim amounted to a modest 0.025 cubic feet per second, or the total flow of a “nameless spring” located within the monument.85

In 1962, following the introduction in Congress of House Resolution 11781 to enlarge the national monument, the NPS reviewed its water claim and considered the need for an additional water source to supply a prospective visitor center on the top of the bench on the opposite side of the river. As a result, the Midwest Regional Office programmed $700 for a field study of potential well development and an additional $600 for test-drilling and test-pumping of the water supply. It requested the U.S. Geological Survey to conduct the two-phased project.86 The well was completed in 1966. A second water right filing for the national battlefield was made soon afterwards.87

In 1973, the Montana legislature passed the Water Use Act, establishing new administrative procedures for adjudicating water rights. The state law affirmed the Prior Appropriation Doctrine by recognizing and confirming all “existing rights,” or water rights with priority dates before July 1, 1973.88 Passage of the Water Use Act, together with a drought in 1973, sparked new interest in water rights on the North Fork of the Big Hole River. That fall, Superintendent Al Schulmeyer reviewed the general situation and filed a lengthy memorandum to the assistant superintendent at Yellowstone.89

Schulmeyer noted that water rights on the main rivers in the Big Hole Valley had been contested and determined. In general, these water rights were the most senior in the valley. Water rights on the tributaries were another matter, however, as “priorities along the rivers apparently never covered waters of the tributaries which never reached the main river.” Schulmeyer believed that later homesteads along the tributaries had traditionally taken what they needed regardless of downstream water rights. In recent times, as larger ranches in the valley acquired some of these homesteads, it formed the potential for litigation between “tributary waters vs. river priority rights.”90

Trail Creek and Ruby Creek, converging within the boundaries of the national battlefield to form the North Fork of the Big Hole River, were two such tributaries. The headwaters of both creeks, Schulmeyer explained, were in the national forest. Trail Creek flowed eastward through Willow Ranch before entering the national battlefield. Ruby Creek began southwest of the battlefield and flowed northeastward through Ruby Ranch, then under the highway and through a corner of Willow Ranch before entering the national battlefield. There were privately held water rights on both creeks. There were also claims to three or four irrigation ditches running through the national battlefield.91

Encumbrances on Trail Creek, Schulmeyer continued, began with the formation of an irrigation company “about 1912.” (Subsequent research would disclose an earlier claim by a Ruby Water Company, whose notice of appropriation of a claim to 250 cubic feet per second was filed in February 1901. Further, the company filed an application for ditch right-of-way in
The so-called Ruby Ditch began at a point of diversion upstream from the battlefield site, ran along the bench on the north side of Trail Creek to the point where it joins with Ruby Creek. From that point, the company had built a flume and trestle across the bottomland to the Ruby Bench on the south side. The Ruby Water Company had failed early in the twentieth century, its ditch had fallen into disuse, and the trestle had eventually collapsed. Although the Ruby Ditch had not been used for decades, the owners did occasional maintenance work to maintain the right. In 1973, Schulmeyer thought the ditch was owned by Mark Clemow whose ranch bordered the national battlefield on the east.\textsuperscript{93}

Water diversions along Ruby Creek also dated to the early twentieth century. Ruby Ranch itself was “laced with irrigation ditches,” Schulmeyer wrote. Near the point that Ruby Creek enters the national battlefield, Schulmeyer reported the existence of “an unused dam which can divert the entire water of Ruby Creek into Ditch #1,” or Ruby Ditch. According to Schulmeyer’s information:

One of the ditches on Ruby Ranch takes off Ruby Creek water and crosses the highway and enters the Battlefield where yet another dam is capable of dividing the waters between Irrigation Ditches #2 and #3. The Rights to Ditch #3 are 100\% owned by Mark Clemow and has not been used for decades. On the other hand, Ditch #2 is very active and is owned on shares. Mark Clemow owns 1/3 which he does not use. The other 2/3’s are owned by the Fred Else Ranch. As ditch #2 passes from the Battlefield it enters Clemow’s Ritschel Ranch and then finally on to the Fred Else Ranch.\textsuperscript{94}

Schulmeyer recommended that the NPS negotiate with the ditch owners. If it could not obtain the ditch rights, the NPS should prove its claim to any waters not reserved and forestall any other claims to additional waters within the national battlefield.\textsuperscript{95}

Spurred, perhaps, by the new Montana water law, one local rancher after another began to assert interests in the Ruby Ditch. “If everyone who had told me that they had a share of the claim were valid, there would be an army,” Schulmeyer remarked.\textsuperscript{96} By 1978, these ranchers were proposing to rebuild the flume and trestle and reactivate the ditch — actions that would have a profound visual effect on the battlefield scene and an impact on the amount of water flowing in the creek bed respectively. Organized first as the Ruby Ditch Company, later as the Big Hole Irrigation District, and still later as the Trail Creek Water Association, the ranchers asserted claims to the water right and ditch right based on a U.S. Forest Service special use permit issued in 1911 to the Trail Creek Water Company. The ranchers claimed to be heirs of the Trail Creek Water Company.\textsuperscript{97} The proposal remained inchoate until September 1982, when the Trail Creek Water Association submitted a written plan to the NPS.\textsuperscript{98}

The NPS had two options for deflecting this threat to the national battlefield. It could block the development altogether by invalidating the ranchers’ claim on the grounds that the right-of-way was abandoned. Or it could mitigate the effects of the development by having the flume and trestle relocated upstream, west of the national battlefield. Litigate or negotiate. Schulmeyer tried both tacks at once.

Schulmeyer was unsuccessful in his effort to obtain a legal opinion that the ditch right-of-way was abandoned. First the NPS sought an opinion from the field solicitor in the Department of the Interior's office in Billings, but the interior solicitor insisted it was a question for the Department of Agriculture since the ditch right-of-way originated under a Forest Service permit. Next the NPS requested a determination by the Forest Service's Office of General Counsel. The result was disappointing. Attorney Lawrence M. Jakub found that the right-of-way should be treated "as a valid existing easement." Moreover, he did not think a rerouting of the easement could be required as a condition for reconstructing the flume and trestle. Short of condemning the easement, he wrote, the government had "no legal means to prevent appropriate use of the easement for irrigation purposes."99

This legal finding left the NPS with little choice but to negotiate with the ranchers on the location of the easement. (There is no indication in the written record that NPS officials were interested in pursuing condemnation of the easement. Schulmeyer recalls that the possibility of condemnation was never broached, but he also insists that that had nothing to do with the ill-feelings brought about by the earlier condemnation of Clemow property.100) In Clemow's deed to the National Park Foundation of April 18, 1972, the conveyance was made subject to "the use and maintenance of an irrigation ditch."101) In May 1983, the NPS received notice from David C. Moon, attorney for the ranchers now organized under the name Trail Creek Water Association, that his clients intended to reactivate the ditch. The Rocky Mountain regional director replied to Moon:

The National Park Service is greatly concerned about the proposed development associated with your reactivation project and we request that Trail Creek Water Company personnel coordinate very closely with the Park Service Superintendent, Mr. Alfred Schulmeyer, to mitigate the adverse impacts on the Big Hole National Battlefield.102

He requested that the ranchers furnish Superintendent Schulmeyer with plans and maps of the proposed development for his review "pending final approval" of the project.

Based on the Trail Creek Water Association's plans, NPS officials in the Lands Division, Rocky Mountain Regional Office, proposed an alternative route for the Trail Creek crossing approximately 1/4 mile west of the national battlefield boundary. The new easement would cross wetlands on both the Beaverhead National Forest and the Big Hole National Battlefield; consequently, the Forest Service and the National Park Service cooperated in the preparation of a joint environmental assessment, completed in June 1984.103

Three alternatives were considered. Alternative A, "No Action," assumed that the proposed action did not take place. Alternative B, "Use of the Existing Right-of-Way," involved burial of a siphon within the right-of-way as routed in the original easement. The existing right-of-way paralleled Trail Creek Ditch downstream for about 1/4 mile from the point of diversion on Trail Creek, then turned southeastward to cross Trail Creek within Big Hole National Battlefield. It also crossed a corner of land owned by the Dick Hirschey Cattle Company. Most of the easement lay within the national battlefield. Finally, Alternative C, "Use of a New Right-of-Way," involved burial of a siphon within a new right-of-way located west of the national
battlefield boundary, and an extension of the Ruby Ditch 728 feet westward to an intersection with the siphon. Most of the new easement would span the Dick Hirschey Cattle Company property.104

Before the environmental assessment was released, Schulmeyer alerted the Nez Perce Tribe to this threat to the national battlefield. The Nez Perce Tribe registered its opposition to the development in a strongly-worded resolution in January 1984. The Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee urged the NPS to disapprove the plan. Noting that the inverted siphon would “deface” the site, the Tribe defined the proposed action as “an act of disgrace and dishonor to the significance of the memorial site.”105

Local landowner Wayne D. Petrik also objected to the proposal. Petrik owned 40 acres in the southwest corner of Section 23, about one mile west of the national battlefield. The Trail Creek Ditch ran through his property. According to Petrik’s own research, the members of the Trail Creek Water Association were not heirs to the Trail Creek Water Company’s ditch. Petrik provided his documentation to the NPS. Petrik’s argument focused on the transfer of lands to Beaverhead County for tax delinquency in the 1920s and their repurchase by the Bankers Loan and Mortgage Company of Billings a few years later. Petrik believed that name confusion between the Trail Creek Water Association and the Trail Creek Water Company had led officials to dismiss the issue of abandonment too quickly.106

In 1985 and 1986, the ranchers advanced two more proposals. The Soil Conservation Service office in Dillon assisted with the plans and cost estimates. The plans involved new rights-of-way and in the first instance a new water filing claim for 70 cubic feet per second, reduced from 176 cubic feet per second. The Forest Service raised concerns about potential impacts to the Nez Perce Trail and Lewis and Clark Trail west of the national battlefield.107 The Nez Perce Tribe renewed its objections to the development. Gwendolyn B. Carter, Water Resources Coordinator for the Tribe, noted that the plan did not include costs for monitoring by an archeologist. In burying the siphon, “the potential for uncovering graves is great since Nez Perce who lost their lives during the Battle were buried where they had fallen.”108

As the ranchers’ legal costs and projected construction costs mounted, their interest in the project waned. Schulmeyer believed that the ranchers eventually turned away in frustration. “Let’s say I tied them up with bureaucracy and they gave up,” the former superintendent recalls.109

In 1988, two members of the Land Resources Division, Rocky Mountain Regional Office, Lloyd Garrison and Richard Young, reviewed the history and current status of the proposal to reactivate the Trail Creek Ditch. At that time the Trail Creek Ditch Association was exploring an alternative that would route the ditch around the national battlefield, but little had been heard about the plan since 1986 “very likely due to the depressed state of agriculture in general.” The NPS expected the issue to resurface. When it did, the NPS would have three options: to allow the ditch to be reactivated and a siphon installed on the original right-of-way through the National battlefield; to resist all attempts to reactivate the ditch; or to work with the ranchers in an effort to have the siphon relocated outside the national battlefield boundaries. It was Garrison
and Young’s assessment that the first option would provoke “a highly critical reaction” and a lawsuit by the Nez Perce Tribe, while the second option would require condemnation and perhaps a sizable outlay of funds. Consequently the NPS stood ready to negotiate further should the ranchers desire to proceed.110

No sooner did the reactivation proposal for the Trail Creek Ditch recede than another threat arose, this time involving a ditch on the north side of the river where the national battlefield abuts the Clemow property. On October 12, 1986, Superintendent Schumleyer filed the following incident report:

In the morning of October 7, the park neighbor, Mark Clemow, had a very large earth moving backhoe (bucket about 3’ wide) come to his ranch, traveling along the fence to the northeast part of the park along the valley floor. It did cross the North Fork of the Big Hole River. The contractor makes a living maintaining irrigation ditches. The machine dug an irrigation ditch along the toe of Battle Mountain for a distance of 1,940 feet, to connect with sloughs and pools of a meandering river and thus make a new water diversion from the main river, the North Fork of the Big Hole, which passes through the park.111

After conferring in person with Clemow and by telephone with his superiors in the Rocky Mountain Regional Office, Schumleyer averred that the NPS regarded Clemow’s action as a trespass and would seek restitution for damages.

One week later there was a second alleged trespass, again by contractors working for Clemow. The workers extended their excavations in an easterly direction to Clemow’s property.112 Two days later Field Solicitor Richard K. Aldrich advised Schumleyer that he was referring the matter to the U.S. attorney to institute legal proceedings against Clemow and seek a restraining order.113 A few days after that, Monte Clemow and his son, Mark Clemow, visited headquarters and produced some documents that purported to show an existing ditch where his men were excavating. Mark Clemow announced that he had filed for water rights on the project.114 Afterwards Schumleyer reluctantly admitted that there may indeed have been a ditch in that place unbeknownst to the NPS. If so, Clemow had the right to clean the ditch. When it came to ditch maintenance, however, “cleaning it up,” Schumleyer had had occasion to observe, really meant making the ditch “a little wider and a little deeper.”115

After review of property records, aerial photos, and the physical ground, the Montana Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) stated that “there has been a ditch there for quite some time.” Based on photographic evidence and the size of the brush growing in the ditch, the MDNR estimated that the ditch was more than 35 years old.116

Again the NPS sought a compromise solution. The NPS would pay to have the ditch lined. In return, it would have better control over maintenance activity. Not only would the arrangement prevent Clemow from getting in there with a backhoe again, the ditch lining would tend to protect the national battlefield from losing additional water out of the North Fork to water migration through the intervening swampy ground.117 Clemow and the superintendent signed a letter of understanding on October 6, 1988, stipulating that Clemow would notify the NPS one year in advance of any ditch maintenance within the national battlefield.118

136
By the 1990s, issues involving ditch rights and water rights were receding from view. The Trail Creek Ditch was inactive; the Clemow ditch was lined. As long as these private interests remained intact within the national battlefield the potential for adverse development remained, but nothing appeared imminent.

On a separate track, meanwhile, NPS officials worked with the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission to define the federal reserved water right at Big Hole National Battlefield. These negotiations were part of a larger process to define the federal reserved water rights for all national park lands in Montana. The intent was to establish what each NPS unit required so that the unit’s natural resources would be protected and so that state and private interests would be able to claim or develop anything left over. An initial effort to reach a compact in the 1980s broke down — primarily over issues at Glacier National Park and Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area where water courses extended onto Indian reservations — but in 1991 the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission invited the NPS to renew negotiations. In January 1993, the NPS signed the first of two compacts, which defined the federal reserved water rights for Glacier and Yellowstone national parks, and Big Hole. In May 1994, the NPS signed the second compact involving Little Big Horn National Battlefield and Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area.119

Once approved, the compact would establish a federal reserved right for Big Hole National Battlefield involving minimum flow of 10 cubic feet per second in winter and a limitation on the amount of water that could be taken upstream in other seasons. After the Montana State Legislature ratified the two compacts they were submitted to the state water court as preliminary decrees awaiting objections.

Neighbors And Partners

Beginning in the 1980s, the National Park Service placed increasing emphasis on relations with park neighbors and partners. “Neighbors” were those nearby landowners whose land uses could potentially impact park resources. “Partners” were those public and private entities who worked with park managers to achieve mutual objectives. The increasing emphasis on neighbors and partners stemmed in part from the pressures of population growth and the universal need for more regional planning and growth management. Frequent use of the disarming terms “neighbors” and “partners” also signaled the Park Service’s response to broad-based public concerns — most pronounced in the rural West — that government agencies had become bloated and domineering. Faced with a resurgence of private property interests, states rights, and fiscal conservatism, the Park Service sought to improve its effectiveness and increase its base of support by looking outward.120 Other federal land management agencies adopted a similar strategy. For Big Hole National Battlefield’s managers, this required innovative approaches toward four principal groups or entities: neighboring landowners, the Forest Service, state and county government, and the Nez Perce Tribe.
The Clemow Ranch

The most important neighbor to Big Hole National Battlefield was the Clemow family. The Clemow ranch bordered the battlefield on the east. Of the national battlefield’s 655.6 acres, some 295 acres or 44 percent of the land surface had been taken from the Clemow property by condemnation proceedings between 1964 and 1972. Mark Clemow remained bitter about the loss of his valuable pastureland along the North Fork of the Big Hole. Superintendent Schulmeyer’s efforts to improve relations with Clemow foundered on the alleged trespass incident in 1986. By then the elderly Mark Clemow was passing the ranch operation to his son Monte Clemow, who demonstrated a more accommodating attitude toward the Park Service. The desire to improve this important relationship was probably one factor in the decision to replace Schulmeyer with a new unit manager in 1987.

While the administrative reorganization at Big Hole was under discussion, Schulmeyer provided his assessment of three possible additions to the national battlefield’s land base. Foremost in importance was the addition of a strip of land approximately 100-200 yards in width along the eastern boundary with the Clemow ranch property. The ground would provide a buffer zone beyond the Nez Perce Encampment Area and would include most of Bloody Gulch, the draw through which the Nez Perce fled the battle. If the area were acquired in fee simple, the NPS could eliminate the property fence line. Alternatively, a scenic easement would afford protection against building construction but it would not eliminate the fence line or the grazing of cattle on the edge of the battlefield. Schulmeyer noted two other additions of lesser importance: a 40-acre tract on the west side of the national battlefield belonging to rancher Dick Hirschey, and an area of national forest land extending from the north boundary to the crest of Battle Mountain. The Hirschey property was undeveloped and attractive because it was cut off from the rest of the Hirschey ranch by the highway and Hirschey was probably a “willing seller.” The national forest parcel was significant because it comprised the upper watershed of Battle Creek and was presently part of a grazing allotment under lease to the Big Hole Grazing Association.

When Jock Whitworth took over management duties at Big Hole in 1988, the property line between the national battlefield and the Clemow ranch remained a sensitive issue. The findings of the archeological survey in 1991 heightened interest in the strip of land east of the Nez Perce encampment site. In November 1991, Monte Clemow raised the question of trading the land to the government for tax credits. Although this specific proposal did not get very far, it opened the door to further negotiations. The timing was propitious since the Park Service was then looking at other land issues associated with the Nez Perce National Historical Park bill. As a result, the Nez Perce National Historical Park Additions Act authorized the Park Service to acquire lands on the east of Big Hole National Battlefield.

Perhaps with a view toward pressuring the Park Service to act on this authorization, the Clemow family next made gestures toward subdividing the land and developing it for condominiums. In June 1993, Mark Clemow, vice president of Mark Clemow Ranches, Inc., had the western portion of his land surveyed into 38 lots of 20 acres each and placed under "restrictive covenants" of his own making. Each parcel was to be "used only for a residential
dwelling which must be custom built and must have a minimum of twelve hundred (1200) feet floor area,” the covenants began. All buildings were to be “set back a minimum of sixty (60) feet from the exterior boundaries of the property.” While Clemow’s declared purpose was “to preserve the natural beauty and serenity within the Big Hole,” his plan raised the spectre for the Park Service of condominiums sprouting up within a stone’s throw of the eastern park boundary.123

The Park Service contracted with Hoeger-Jackson & Associates, a Bozeman real estate firm, for an appraisal of the land at issue in the summer of 1994. Dennis C. Hoeger appraised the land to have a fair market value of $160,000, and a Park Service official from the Division of Land Resources of the Pacific Northwest Regional Office reviewed and approved it. In November 1994, Rick Wagner, Chief of the Division of Land Resources in Seattle, informed Mark Clemow of the appraisal and invited Clemow to make a sale offer for that amount. Clemow’s sale offer, Wagner explained, would become a binding contract when accepted on behalf of the United States.124

Here the matter stood when Jay Lynde, a wealthy businessman residing in Billings, Montana, purchased the Clemow ranch. In November 1996, Lynde’s representative, Ron Johnson, of Dillon, Montana, contacted Big Hole Superintendent James about the possibility of Lynde donating 355 acres of his property as a conservation easement. On December 13, 1996, Superintendents James and Walker and Rick Wagner from the SSO met with Lynde in Billings.125 From this discussion a general plan emerged over the next year and a half involving a three-way land exchange between Lynde, the Park Service, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). In exchange for the 355-acre parcel adjoining Big Hole National Battlefield, Lynde would acquire BLM land adjoining his Bridger Creek Ranch near Billings. By the fall of 1998, the land exchange appeared to be imminent; a first phase involved four parcels south of Big Timber, Montana, and a second phase tentatively included two parcels in the Big Hole Valley. In return for the BLM land, the Park Service undertook all of the NEPA and Section 106 compliance work.126 After more than a year of negotiations, Jon James anticipated the first extension of Big Hole National Battlefield’s boundaries in more than 25 years.

USDA Forest Service

Big Hole National Battlefield’s longstanding relationship with the Forest Service continued into the 1990s. Memoranda of Understanding covering interpretation, vegetation management, fire suppression, and a joint Youth Conservation Corps program were updated. As before, the Park Service offered interpretive programs at the nearby national forest campground in Beaverhead National Forest and the Forest Service provided expert assistance with prescribed burns and other measures to manage the battlefield’s vegetation so that it appeared the way it looked in 1877.127 Cooperative efforts, meanwhile, were extended in two areas: administration of the Nez Perce National Historical Trail and federal wildland fire management policy.

Formally designated on July 19, 1991, the Nez Perce or Nee-Me-Poo National Historical Trail had long been recognized as a cultural and recreational resource. In 1976, Congress amended the National Trails System Act to authorize a joint study of the 1,200-mile route of the
Nez Perce flight of 1877 by the Park Service and the Forest Service. The agencies submitted the joint report to the public review process after 1982, and Congress designated the trail in 1986 (P.L. 99-445). The law placed the trail under the administration of the Forest Service — one of the few units in the National Trail System administered by that agency. The Forest Service administered the trail with the help of the private Nez Perce National Historic Trail Foundation, which included a representative of the Nez Perce Tribe in Idaho as well as a member of the Joseph Band on the Colville Reservation in Washington.128

Throughout the planning and implementation process, the Forest Service sought advice from the Big Hole staff on issues relating to the trail, particularly in the vicinity of the battlefield. The trail’s approach to the battlefield was over present-day Gibbon Pass and down Trail Creek mostly within Beaverhead National Forest although it traversed some private land holdings west of the national battlefield. Five miles west of the national battlefield was the site where Colonel Gibbon’s command had camped the night before the battle. Known as the Wagon Train Camp, the site marked where Gibbon had left his supply wagons, stock animals, and mountain howitzer when he advanced under cover of darkness to the edge of the Nez Perce encampment (with orders for the howitzer crew to follow at dawn with the gun and a reserve supply of rifle ammunition). Although little remained of the Wagon Train Camp site as it had been heavily disturbed by dredge mining around the turn of the century, it still held interpretive interest. The trail’s continuation east and south of the battlefield, meanwhile, extended mostly through private land. The site of the Nez Perce camp on the night following the dawn attack was thought to be on the Peterson Ranch, approximately 16 miles south of the battlefield. Big Hole National Battlefield staff treated both the wagon train camp and the post-battle Nez Perce camp as related resources outside of the park boundaries.129 Forest Service officials relied extensively on Park Service expertise for technical assistance with this section of the Nez Perce Trail.130

The second area of increased cooperation involved wildland fire management. In the 1990s, Big Hole National Battlefield joined Beaverhead National Forest and other organizations in an expanded effort to pool resources and develop a more comprehensive approach to fire management activities. These included use of prescribed fire and fuels management, suppression of wildfire, interagency coordination of fire policy and program management, and wildland/urban interface protection.131 In 1994, Big Hole National Battlefield became a party to a new interagency operating plan, or memorandum of agreement, developed by the Dillon Interagency Dispatch Center (DDC). The DDC was established to handle fire and other emergency dispatching for the Beaverhead and Deerlodge national forests and the Dillon Unit of the Department of State Lands.132

**State and County Agencies**

Big Hole National Battlefield had long looked to state and county agencies for various support services such as snow removal and law enforcement. In the 1990s, the NPS sought opportunities for forming partnerships with state and county agencies under which it could give as well as receive assistance. In 1990, for example, the NPS prepared a cooperative agreement with the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks that aimed primarily at research, a
mutual concern and a shift away from the traditional focus on wildlife law enforcement. Drafted principally by members of Glacier National Park’s staff, it covered all National Park system units in Montana including Big Hole National Battlefield. The agreement established procedures for mutual sharing of staff expertise, research, equipment, and supplies, and it provided for either agency to elicit funded assistance from the other agency through formal work orders.133

The NPS also became more involved in the state’s efforts to promote and manage growth of the tourism industry. In 1993, the NPS joined ten other federal and state agencies in forming the Montana Tourism and Recreation Initiative (MTRI). A Memorandum of Understanding was developed in November and was signed at the Governor’s Conference on Tourism and Recreation in April 1994. The purpose of the MTRI was “to facilitate and enhance communications, management, protection, administration, planning and information concerning natural and cultural resource related tourism in Montana.” Under the Memorandum of Understanding, a representative of each agency was appointed to the MTRI and the group was to convene twice a year. Eddie Lopez, superintendent of Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site, represented the NPS at the initial meeting and his successor, Tony Schetzle, represented the NPS at the next.134 In the area of planning, the MTRI sought to encourage coordination of statewide interagency tourism marketing efforts with the state’s six tourism “countries.” Big Hole National Battlefield fell within the area called “Gold West Country.” The region covered all of southwest Montana. State tourism brochures and the official state highway map described various historic attractions in the region including Big Hole and Grant-Kohrs Ranch, mining ghost towns, and the historic mining cities of Helena and Butte.

Members of the Frontier Soldiers Association, 1992. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB.

The NPS also supported non-government organizations involved in tourism promotion. Jock Whitworth joined the Big Hole Association for Tourism. As a member of that association, he requested Gold West Country of Montana, Inc., an organization based in Deer Lodge, to advertise all special scheduled events in the Big Hole Valley in its upcoming publications and promotions. These were not limited to battlefield events, but included “Wisdom Days,” a one-day street dance and barbecue in Wisdom, “Old Timers Day,” a day of foot races, games, and a barbecue in Jackson, and the “VFW Turkey Shoot,” held on the Dale Strodman Ranch near Jackson.135 Thus, the NPS tried to stimulate tourism outside the national battlefield itself.
Significantly, the tourism promotion effort by-passed the Beaverhead County government. A Beaverhead County Comprehensive Plan, produced by the county commission and revised in 1990, did not even mention tourism as a sector in the local economy nor did it contain a single reference to historic resources or Big Hole National Battlefield. The county remained predominantly rural and agricultural. There was relatively little county support for the growing interest shown by the state in “heritage tourism,” the marketing of historic resources to attract vacationers.\textsuperscript{136}

Partnerships were nowhere as important to overall site management as they were at the other battlefield sites in the Montana Unit. Camas Meadows Battle Sites, located in southeastern Idaho, Canyon Creek, located in Yellowstone County, Montana, and Bear Paw Battlefield, located in Blaine County, Montana, were all cooperative sites established on the Nez Perce National Historical Park model, and consisted solely of private and state lands. In the case of Camas Meadows, local landowners were wary of drawing too many visitors to the site. Sensitive to these local concerns, the Park Service proposed to develop an off-site interpretive display at the Interstate 15 rest area east of the site. At Canyon Creek, meanwhile, the Park Service found an eager partner in the Friends of Canyon Creek, an organization of local business owners and history enthusiasts who wanted to improve interpretation of the site. There, the Park Service planned to redevelop a wayside exhibit and to create a new exhibit in the nearby town of Laurel with assistance from Friends of Canyon Creek, Laurel Chamber of Commerce, the Crow Tribe, and other partners. Finally, at Bear Paw Battlefield, where the state had already established limited visitor facilities, the Park Service worked with Blaine County Museum, Chinook Chamber of Commerce, and the Fort Belknap Tribe to redevelop the site.\textsuperscript{137}

**Nez Perce Tribe**

As discussed in the section on interpretation above, Big Hole National Battlefield made significant strides in developing closer ties to the Nez Perce Tribe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nez Perce participation in the “Cultural Contrasts” event of August 5 and 6, 1989, was covered in a formal Memorandum of Agreement between Big Hole National Battlefield and Nez Perce tribal members. Dancers, drummers, and other performers received honoraria and funds to help cover expenses.\textsuperscript{138} In subsequent years, Nez Perce participation continued on a less formal basis.

In 1990, Congress passed the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), a law with long-term ramifications for NPS administration, cultural resources management, and relations with Indian tribes. The act required that all federal agencies and museums having possession or control of Native American human remains and associated funerary objects compile an inventory of such items within five years. To the extent possible, these inventories needed to identify the geographical and cultural affiliation of such items and notify the affected Native American tribes within six months of the completion of the inventory. If the cultural affiliation of such items was established, the agency was required by law to return such items upon the request of a known lineal descendant of the Native American Tribe.\textsuperscript{139} In 1994, the NPS contracted with the Nez Perce Tribe to consult with park officials on the
inventory of items held in Nez Perce National Historical Park, including the Montana Unit, as required by NAGPRA.¹⁴⁰

After Chief Joseph’s pipe bag was recovered in 1992, the NPS received a request by the Nez Perce Tribe for the repatriation of this item as a sacred object of the tribe. This was the first such request in the Park Service’s Rocky Mountain Region, and it led to an official interpretation of what was “sacred” under NAGPRA. After some debate, it was decided that anything a Native American tribe declared as sacred had to be considered sacred by the Park Service under the act.¹⁴¹

Nez Perce members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in the Encampment Area, August 1993. Courtesy National Park Service, Big Hole NB.

Perhaps the Park Service’s most ambitious effort to develop stronger relations with the Nez Perce Tribe began to unfold in October 1993, with the convening of an Interagency Coordinated Strategy workshop. The workshop brought together representatives of seven federal agencies and the Nez Perce Tribe. Its goal was to develop a coordinated strategy for federal land managers in the Nez Perce country of Idaho that would allow agencies to pool their resources and minimize conflict. At first the Coordinated Strategy was modeled on the so-called “Four Corners Strategy” of resource management being developed in the four corners region of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona. But as the program developed, the focus shifted to interpretation, documentation, and consultation relating to Nez Perce history and culture. The Park Service, Forest Service, and Nez Perce Tribe were the major partners in the Coordinated Strategy; the Bureau of Reclamation, Army Corps of Engineers, Fish and Wildlife Service, Soil Conservation Service, and Idaho State Historic Preservation Office were involved too.
Following the workshop, designated participants took six months to prepare an action plan. Among the promised actions was a Nez Perce Trail symposium. The first symposium took place in Lewiston in October 1995.\textsuperscript{142}

As the Nez Perce National Historical Park staff took over primary responsibility for fostering good relations between Big Hole and the Nez Perce Tribe in the 1990s, opportunities still remained for the Big Hole staff to improve this relationship, too. Chief among these was the annual commemorative event at Big Hole in August. Superintendent James expanded the number of contacts with Nez Perce tribal organizations each year to include such groups as the Nez Perce Young Horsemen's Project, the Chief Looking Glass Descendants Pow-Wow Committee, and the Nez Perce Nation Drum.\textsuperscript{143} The avid participation of such groups in Big Hole National Battlefield's interpretive program was indeed an encouraging sign, recognized in the opening lines of the General Management Plan for Nez Perce National Historical Park and Big Hole National Battlefield published in September 1997:

The drumbeat, the heartbeat, of the Nez Perce people has echoed across the forests, rivers and canyons of the homeland for a very, very long time. It continues to be heard today – loud and clear and stronger than ever....Once heard it is hard to forget. It carries messages for those who would listen – messages of hope and despair, of deception and triumph, of pain and guilt, laughter and joy. It speaks to us as human beings – where we have been and where we are going. And it helps define us as a nation.\textsuperscript{144}
Conclusion

In the 120 years since the Battle of the Big Hole, visitation has grown from a trickle of curious Montana residents and souvenir hunters to some 65,000 people annually who come from all over the United States and the world. Most of the increase in visitor numbers has occurred on the Park Service's watch, much of it as a direct result of the national battlefield staff's efforts to promote the site and to make the visitor's experience inspirational and informative. During this same period, the administrative presence at Big Hole battlefield has grown from one seasonal caretaker or ranger to a small staff of three or four year-round and four or five seasonal employees. The original physical plant, consisting of a forest-service built ranger station and museum located near the Siege Area, was removed and replaced in the Mission 66 era by a modern visitor center and employee apartment complex on the bench overlooking the battlefield.

Big Hole National Battlefield has accommodated this growth in visitation fairly successfully. The classic tension in national park management between preservation and use exists at a relatively low level of intensity at Big Hole. Controversies over the appropriateness of public camping at the battlefield in the 1930s, the location of the visitor center in the 1950s, and the character and size of the new employee housing complex in the 1990s were essentially internal. Typical management problems of heavy use — visitor crowding, human impacts on the natural environment, visual intrusions of parking lots and roads — remain secondary to other management issues at Big Hole.

All of the leading management challenges revolve around interpretation. Big Hole National Battlefield possesses an extraordinarily compelling human story, but physical traces of it are spare and a sensitive telling of it can be demanding. As early as 1935, Yellowstone Superintendent Roger W. Toll recognized that the story was hardly one to inspire patriotism. L.V. McWhorter worried about the dearth of Nez Perce sources in the written record, and dedicated himself to preserving the Nez Perce perspective on the battle. By the 1960s, the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement brought new interpretive challenges to Big Hole; as veteran seasonal ranger Kermit Edmonds recalled, this battle was the Indians' My Lai. When the battlefield centennial approached, NPS officials fretted over each word and phrase of Big Hole's interpretive literature.

The difficulty of interpreting the Battle of the Big Hole objectively — or with equal sensitivity to the soldiers' and Nez Perce's point of view — was compounded by problems with the land base. Too much of the battle ground lay outside the unit boundaries. Extension of the national monument boundaries helped to broaden the interpretive focus from the siege — reminiscent of Custer's Last Stand — to the whole see-saw course of the battle. Beyond that, it opened the door to a more finely textured presentation of the epic tragedy of the Nez Perce flight. Indeed, Big Hole National Battlefield became a counterpoint to Custer National Battlefield 500 miles away in eastern Montana. At Custer, most visitors came in search of the immortal moment when Custer and his men laid down their lives in the cause of Manifest Destiny. By contrast, most visitors to Big Hole came in solemn remembrance of the horrors committed against the North American Indian. For Kermit Edmonds, a longtime seasonal interpreter and specialist in the frontier military, it was
always a place of sorrow, the very bushes "redolent with pathos." For Otis Halfmoon, a Nez Perce park ranger, the battlefield literally cried out to him with the spirits of the dead.

In interpreting Big Hole National Battlefield to the public, the Park Service has faced other significant challenges. Giving equal weight to the soldier and Nez Perce points of view in the battle, for example, has required a delicate combining of documentary evidence and oral tradition, supplemented in recent times by archeological investigation. Alternatively, the Park Service has not so much tried to meld the two traditions as present them side by side and let the visitor draw his or her own conclusions. Interpreters at Big Hole have sought to provoke without offending, but the distinction has not always been clear.

Big Hole's unit managers have faced the problem that the battleground's physical features are changing. The vegetative cover that existed in 1877 became modified over the decades through a combination of natural plant succession, fire suppression, livestock grazing, and invasion by exotic weed species. The Horse Pasture turned to sagebrush, the willows grew too high, bullet-scarred trees died and toppled over, and rifle pits gradually filled with duff. Since successful site interpretation must tie the story to the existing scene, this, too, was a central management issue.

Unit managers long ago recognized that the most important artifacts of the battle were the trees and willows and grasses that formed the "natural" environment in 1877. Yet this environment was itself a historical artifact — shaped by the near-extirmination of the beaver a generation before the battle, the elimination of buffalo from the valley by the 1870s, and the grazing of horses each time Indians camped in the area. To restore the vegetation to the way it looked in 1877 was perhaps the Park Service's most difficult goal of all. And yet the modern visitor to Big Hole National Battlefield could find much to be pleased about. At the end of the twentieth century the battlefield appeared remarkably unspoiled and pristine. The surrounding ranch country remained largely open and sparsely settled. The Park Service was poised to acquire another 635 acres to the unit's land base, including the Nez Perce's path of retreat known as Bloody Gulch.

Superintendent Al Schumley described Big Hole National Battlefield as a "sleepy hollow," a description that Superintendent Jon G. James still considered apt in 1998. The unit began in a remote section of Montana and has remained far off the beaten path. Yet there are currents of change that could transform the unit's administrative context in the coming decade. The Nez Perce Tribe's involvement in cultural preservation and interpretation is growing, partly as a consequence of the Nez Perce National Historical Park Additions Act of 1994. Heritage tourism initiatives are underway in Montana, stimulated by growing public interest in the Lewis and Clark and Nee-Me-Poo trails and rising expectations about the Lewis and Clark bicentennial event. Despite its relative isolation, Big Hole National Battlefield is central to these resources, both geographically and thematically. Already serving as a parent unit to the Montana battlefield sites of Nez Perce National Historical Park, Big Hole is likely to acquire increasing administrative importance in the future.
Annotated Bibliography

I. Unpublished Documents

Big Hole National Battlefield Administrative Files.
The collection contains approximately 15 linear feet of records consisting of correspondence and reports from the 1890s through the present. It was compiled and organized by Maines and Associates. It includes War Department records, Beaverhead County land and water rights records, and Forest Service records. Also includes Big Hole records generated at Yellowstone National Park.

National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
Record Group 79, Records of the National Park Service. Administrative records concerning Big Hole National Monument, 1933-1957, will be found in the main series arranged by operating units of the NPS either under Big Hole or Yellowstone. In addition, Records of the War Department relating to military parks, cemeteries, monuments, and other areas transferred to the Office of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations in 1933 may contain material on Big Hole.

National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Record Group 393, Records of the United States Army, Continental Commands, 1821-1920. Department of the Missouri, Special Files. There is a file on the Nez Perce War of 1877. In addition, records of the Quartermaster may contain information on the post-1877 administration of the U.S. soldiers' remains.

National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Record Group 94, Records of the Adjutant General’s office, 1780-1917. General Correspondence, 1890-1917. These records contain correspondence on a bill, H.R. 12699, “Creating to the Big Hole Battle Ground National Park.”

National Archives, Denver, Colorado.
Record Group 79, Records of the National Park Service. These include records of the Rocky Mountain Region Office and the Denver Service Center pertaining to Big Hole.

National Archives, Kansas City, Missouri.
Record Group 79, Records of the National Park Service. These include records of the Midwest Region Office pertaining to Big Hole.

Ravalli County Museum, Hamilton, Montana.
Vertical Files contain several newspaper articles relating to the Battle of the Big Hole in Western News, Bitterroot Times, Stevensville Register, and Bitterroot Journal. Most of these articles recount anniversary events held over the years between 1897 and 1968.

Yellowstone National Park Archives.
Accessioned records are well-indexed and contain limited material on Big Hole National Monument. Unaccessioned records include 300 boxes of Yellowstone National Park administrative records transferred from the National Archives in Denver. These records presumably contain limited material on Big Hole National Monument too, probably largely duplicative of material gathered by Maines and Associates for Big Hole National Battlefield Administrative Files.
II. Congressional Documents

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III. Books and Articles

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______. *Yellow Wolf: His Own Story.* Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1940. An account by a veteran of the War of 1877.


IV. Selected Technical Reports


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Maxey, Clyde A. “Interpretive Prospectus for Big Hole National Battlefield.” 1964. (Revised periodically.)


________. “Statement for Management: Big Hole National Battlefield.” 1986. (Revised semi-annually.)

V. Interviews

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Aubrey Haines, June 24, 1998.

Al Maxey
Al Schumeyer, November 12, 1997.
Endnotes

Chapter One Endnotes


2 Vegetation and wildlife are described in “Environmental Assessment, Proposed Sewage System, Big Hole National Battlefield, Montana,” prepared by Denver Service Center, National Park Service, 1974, NPS History Division files (hereafter cited as NPS HD).

3 For a firsthand account (1831) of bison in the Big Hole, see Bertha Agnes Francis, The Land of the Big Snows, (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1952) p. 64.


5 L. V. McWhorter, Hear Me My Chiefs! Nez Perce Legend and History (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1952), p. 368. Some Nez Perce claim that the valley was called another Nez Perce word meaning “Place of the Buffalo Calf.”

6 In addition to the Indian trail that the Nez Perce followed in 1877, Francis documents the existence of “a very large Indian trail” that crossed the continental divide between Fort Lemhi and Horse Prairie, in The Land of the Big Snows, p. 76.

7 Francis, The Land of the Big Snows, pp. 76-79.


11 Haines, An Elusive Victory, p. 35.

12 Beal, “I Will Fight No More Forever,” p. 113. The willows may have been less dense in 1877 than today due to occasional fires.

13 L. V. McWhorter, Yellow Wolf: His Own Story (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1940), pp. 112-113.

14 Berthold, Big Hole Journal, p. 53.


17 McWhorter, Yellow Wolf, p. 117.


20 Apparently some of the dead were taken away for later burial.

21 Brown, The Flight of the Nez Perce, p. 259. There is some question as to how many warriors stayed to conduct this siege and for how long.

22 Haines, An Elusive Victory, p. 106.


Another account, by Will Cave of the Bitterroot Volunteers, may be found in *Nez Perce Indian War of 1877 and Battle of the Big Hole*, printed by *The Missoulian* (date unknown, copy in vertical file at Ravalli County Museum). Cave states (p. 22): "On the 11th, when the soldiers and volunteers were burying their dead on the field, they found the Indian dead wrapped in robes, all in a row, under the edge of the river bank, with but a slight covering of earth, and were counted as being 89."

Beal, "I Will Fight No More Forever," pp. 123, 127. The soldiers' bodies may have received similar treatment. One of the volunteers, Thomas C. "Bunch" Sherrill, reported many years later that "the Indians treated our dead good, as none of them were mutilated." Sherrill was referring, of course, to the Nez Perce Indians rather than the Bannock scouts. Others supported the claim that the Nez Perce did not scalp their enemies. However, Lt. J. L. Van Orsdale stated that some of the soldier and citizen corpses were scalped in the weeks after the battle (see below). Years later he was very insistent on this point. G. O. Shields in his book, *The Battle of the Big Hole* (pp. 88-89) quoted a January 4, 1889 letter by Van Orsdale: "About six weeks after the fight, I returned to the battle-ground to rebury our dead, many of them having been dug up by Indians, bears, and wolves; and, to destroy one more fiction which has obtained credence, to the effect that these Indians did not scalp their victims, I must say that both Captain Logan and Lieutenant Bradley, as well as several private soldiers, had been dug up and scalped, presumably by those Indians who had been left behind to care for the wounded hidden in the hills near there."

See Granville Stuart’s sketches, dated May 11, 1878, which are included in the Big Hole files in the records of the National Park Service, History Division, Washington Office (hereafter WASO). Andrew Garcia saw the same scene in 1879 and described it from memory years later: "Some of the tepee poles of this once large Injun camp still lay scattered around. The peeled ones were as good as they were two years ago on the day when some unfortunate squaw hauled and set them up here, her lips breathing with song and laughter, not knowing that tomorrow would bring their death song." *Tough Trip Through Paradise*, edited by Bennett H. Stein (Sausalito, California: Comstock Edition, 1979), p. 275.


Copy of letter on file at Big Hole National Battlefield Library, J. L. Van Orsdale personnel file.


"Notes, Battlefield Monument, Points of Interest, Wisdom, MT.," October 7, 1921, untitled microfilm roll, Yellowstone National Park Archives (hereafter YNPA).


J. B. Alshire, 2nd Endorsement, April 23, 1910, Box 2050, Central Classified Files (CCF) 1933-49, Record Group 79 (hereafter RG 79), National Archives II (hereafter NAIH).

Brown, *The Flight of the Nez Perce*, p. 259. There is some question as to how many warriors stayed to conduct this siege and for how long.
Chapter Two Endnotes


3 The account by Joseph is suspect. Historian Steven Ross Evans has written that "it probably was based upon remarks made by Joseph through an interpreter, Arthur Chapman, before an informal meeting of congressmen and Indian Bureau officials. Joseph's testimony apparently then was adapted and modified by a sympathetic white editor for publication." (Voice of the Old Wolf: Lucullus Virgil McWhorter and the Nez Perce Indians, Pullman: WSU Press, 1996), p. 20.


5 Sketches on file in National Park Service, History Division, WASO.


8 W. W. Acker, Memorandum for First Assistant Secretary, April 9, 1910, Big Hole, Box 2050, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II. A search of the records of the quartermaster's department in the National Archives failed to disclose any correspondence on where the idea for a monument originated.


10 Francis, The Land of the Big Snows, pp. 151-172.


15 W. W. Acker, Memorandum for First Assistant Secretary, April 9, 1910, Big Hole, Box 2050, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II.


20 E. A. Hitchcock to John F. Lacey, February 13, 1906, Folder 173, L1429, BHNBA.

21 Acting Commissioner F. F. Pollock to Register and Receiver, Missoula, Montana, October 26, 1906, Big Hole, Box 2050, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II.


26 C. K. Wyman, Forest Supervisor, to the Forester, April 18, 1908, Folder 173, L1429, BHNBA.

27 Congressional Record, 60th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 42, pt. 1, p. 968. Unfortunately there is nothing in the Joseph M. Dixon papers (University of Montana, Mansfield Library Special Collections and Archives) on Dixon’s involvement with the Big Hole battlefield.

28 Two years later the War Department advised officials in the Interior Department that the fence was built and the Soldier’s Monument restored. (See R. A. Ballinger, Memorandum for First Assistant Secretary, April 9, 1910, Big Hole, Box 2050, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II.)

29 C. K. Wyman, Forest Supervisor to W. H. Utley, September 2, 1909, Folder 98 H14, BHNBA.

30 Arthur M. Keas, Assistant Forest Ranger, no date, Folder 100 H1415, BHNBA.

31 2d Endorsement, War Department, Office of the Quartermaster General, April 23, 1910, Big Hole, Box 2050, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II.

32 6th Endorsement, Headquarters Department of Dakota, April 27, 1910, Big Hole, Box 2050, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II.

33 Francis, The Land of the Big Snows, pp. 170-171.

34 Jim Waltermire, certification, August 4, 1982, Folder 150, L1415, BHNBA. Evidence on this date is conflicting; see also Commissioner of the General Land Office to Register and Receiver, Missoula, Montana, February 20, 1915, Folder 157, L1425, BHNBA.

35 General Land Office Plats, Township 2 South, Range 17 West (surveyed 1915, signed 1917) and Township 2 South, Range 16 West (surveyed 1899, signed 1900), on file with Bureau of Land Management, Billings, Montana.

36 In 1993, archaeologist Doug Scott identified the “Mormon diggings” as a “depression, approximately 600' in diameter and varying from 10' to 20' in length...along the 6200 contour line near the southwest corner of the park boundary.” (Recorded as MT Site 24BE1643.) Scott also identified a probable sawmill site approximately 600 feet south of the Nez Perce village site and a probable blacksmith shop site near the southern end of the Nez Perce village site, which were likely associated with flume construction. Douglas Scott, “Rocky Mountain Region Archaeological Project Report: Non-battle archaeological sites at Big Hole National Battlefield, Montana,” (report prepared for USDI NPS Midwest Archaeological Center, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1993), p. 7.
Chapter Three Endnotes


3 For example, see Clyde P. Fickes, Recollections (USDA Forest Service, Northern Region, Missoula, Montana, 1972).


5 Alva A. Simpson, "Unit Recreational Plan, Big Hole Battlefield, Beaverhead National Forest, Wisdom District," Folder 98, H14, BHNBA. Also see "Improvement Plan Gibbon's Battlefield" no date, File "Big Hole Battlefield, War Department files," Box 8, Entry 5, RG 79, NA II.


7 Information provided by Wisdom Ranger District. Prior to the construction of the Gibbon's Battlefield Ranger Station, district rangers were Burt Gillis in the spring of 1907 and William H. Utley from the summer of 1907 to January 1912.


9 Hathaway, "Battle of the Big Hole in August, 1877."

10 Will C. Barnes, Assistant Forester, to Quartermaster General's Office, War Department, December 8, 1925, File "Big Hole Battlefield," Box 8, Entry 5 Records of the War Department relating to the National Parks, RG 79, NA II.

11 Theo Shoemaker, Memorandum, October 22, 1925, Folder 142, K3827, BHNBA.

12 General Land Office Plats, Township Nos. T2S R17W (surveyed 1915, signed 1917), on file with the Bureau of Land Management, Billings, Montana.


14 Theo Shoemaker, Memorandum, October 22, 1925, Folder 142, K3827, BHNBA.

15 Alva A. Simpson, "Unit Recreation Plan, Big Hole Battlefield, Beaverhead National Forest, Wisdom District," May 23, 1932, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.


19 Theo Shoemaker, "Memorandum," October 22, 1925, Folder 142 K3827, BHNBA.
20 Will C. Barnes, Assistant Forester, to Quartermaster General, April 29, 1926, File "Big Hole Battlefield, Box 8, Entry 5, Records of the War Department relating to the National Parks, 1892-1937, RG 79, NA II.

21 Will C. Barnes, Assistant Forester, to Quartermaster General, April 29, 1926, File "Big Hole Battlefield, Box 8, Entry 5, Records of the War Department relating to the National Parks, 1892-1937, RG 79, NA II.

22 M. H. Wolff, Assistant Regional Forester, to J. C. Whitham, Forest Supervisor, June 6, 1930, File 1680 History, Management of the Battlefield, Wisdom Ranger District, Beaverhead National Forest, USDA Forest Service.


24 Alva A. Simpson, "Unit Recreation Plan, Big Hole Battlefield, Beaverhead National Forest, Wisdom District," May 23, 1932, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.

25 Hathaway, "Battle of the Big Hole in August 1877."

26 This document appears on an untitled roll of microfilm in possession of Yellowstone National Park Archives. HRA provided a duplicate copy of the microfilm roll to Big Hole National Battlefield. Ramsey's authorship of the document is noted in Theodore Shoemaker, "Memorandum," October 22, 1925, Folder 142 K3827, BHNBA. Installation of the 37 signs is noted in "Big Hole Battlefield National Monument," File "Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, Montana," Box 2050, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II.

27 "Big Hole Battlefield National Monument," File "Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, Montana," Box 2050, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II.

28 John B. Somers, Forest Supervisor, to L. V. McWhorter, December 5, 1927, Folder 142, K3829, BHNBA.

29 Will C. Barnes to Quartermaster General, April 29, 1926, W. R. Gibson, Colonel Q. M. Corps, to Barnes, June 14, 1928, Barnes to Quartermaster General, June 16, 1928, File "Big Hole Battlefield (War Department files), Box 8, Entry 5, Records of the War Department relating to the National Parks 1892-1937, RG 79, NA II.


31 Alva A. Simpson, "Unit Recreation Plan, Big Hole Battlefield, Beaverhead National Forest, Wisdom District," May 23, 1932, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.


33 L. V. McWhorter to Marshall G. Ramsey, September 23, 1936, Folder 143, K3827, BHNBA.

34 Alva A. Simpson, "Unit Recreation Plan, Big Hole Battlefield, Beaverhead National Forest, Wisdom District," May 23, 1932, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.

35 Marshall G. Ramsey to L. V. McWhorter, October 6, 1936, Folder 143, K3827, BHNBA.


37 Evans, Voice of the Old Wolf, pp. 103-104.

38 Evans, Voice of the Old Wolf, pp. 107, 165.

39 Evans, Voice of the Old Wolf, p. 121.


41 Marshall G. Ramsey to L. V. McWhorter, October 6, 1936, Folder 143, K3827, BHNBA.
42 L. V. McWhorter to Marshall G. Ramsey, Senior Forest Ranger, November 18, 1936, Folder 143, K3827, BHNBA.

43 Marshall G. Ramsey to L. V. McWhorter, July 1, 1937, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.


45 W. B. Willey, Forest Supervisor, to Edmund B. Rogers, Superintendent, December 15, 1936, NPS WASO.


52 E. D. Sandvig, Forest Supervisor, to Regional Forester, August 14, 1935, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.

53 Roger W. Toll, Superintendent, to E. D. Sandvig, Forest Supervisor, August 17, 1935, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.

54 Roger W. Toll to E. D. Sandvig, August 17, 1935, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA. The CCC apparently revisited the area sometime after 1937. When McWhorter learned in 1944 that the interpretive signs now bore the initials “C.C.C.,” he wanted an explanation. He was told that the CCC boys had repaired or fixed up the markers and left their signature. See Evans, *Voice of the Old Wolf*, p. 166.


57 V. T. Linthacum, Recreation Assistant, “Memorandum for Lands and Supervisor,” November 21, 1935, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.

58 E. D. Sandvig, Forest Supervisor, to District Ranger, May 26, 1936, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.

Chapter Four Endnotes


2 Everhart, *The National Park Service*, pp. 28-33; Barry Mackintosh, *Shaping the System* (Washington D.C.: US Department of the Interior, 1985), p. 24; Rothman, *America’s National Monuments*, p. 162. National Park Service responsibility for conservation of historic resources was further defined with passage of the Historic Sites Act of 1935, establishing “a national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings and objects of national significance.” Assigned primary responsibility for implementation, the Park Service established a Branch of Historic Sites and a museum division within the existing Branch of Research and Education (later renamed the Branch of Interpretation). Personnel within the varied arms of these two branches worked closely with the evolving “Master Plan” concept (assigned to the Branch of Plans and Design) whereby interpretation and museum functions and facilities were integrated into a park’s total plan. Representatives from each of the branches were assigned to the Regional Offices, established in 1937 as the first line of contact and technical support for park field offices. At the park level, responsibility for museum administration, selection of interpretive personnel, and development of a park-specific “plan of administration of educational activities” was delegated to the park’s chief naturalist. The naturalist reported to the appropriate regional office and collaborated with technicians from the Branch of Interpretation and the Branch of Historic Sites. Russ Olsen, “Administrative History: Organizational Structures of the National Park Service, 1917 to 1985,” 1985, on file at the University of Montana Library, Documents Division, pp. 47, 55.


6 Federal emergency programs organized under ECW included the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Public Works Administration, the Works Progress Administration, and the Civil Works Administration.

7 Roger W. Toll, Superintendent [Yellowstone National Park] to The Director, National Park Service, August 20, 1935, Folder 149, L14, BHNBA.

8 Roger W. Toll, Superintendent [Yellowstone National Park] to The Director [Cammerer], National Park Service, August 20, 1935, Folder 149, L14, BHNBA.

9 Howard W. Baker, “Report to the Chief Architect on Big Hole Battlefield Nat’l Mon.,” June 17, 1937, Folder 2, Yellowstone BIHO Files, BIHO 3533, BHNBA.

10 The report by Peyton and Hummel (see below) refers to present arrangements for on-site administration that strongly suggests that Peyton occupied the cabin in 1938. Aubrey Haines notes that Peyton had oversight of the battlefield in 1939 (*An Elusive Victory*, p. 42).


12 The decision to acquire the minimum acreage was predicated on NPS reluctance to commit to long-term administration of the site. Region II Director Thomas Allen remembered that: “somewhat more than a year ago recommendations were submitted to the Director as to the establishment of boundaries at the Big Hole Battlefield National Monument in Montana. These recommendations stated a maximum proposed boundary and a minimum proposed boundary. The Director decided to establish the minimum proposed boundary on the basis that the area was of state significance only and not of national significance. An Executive Order creating the boundary to this...continued on next page
limitation was secured.” Memorandum, Regional Director to Mr. Vint and Mr. Ronald Lee, February 13, 1940, WASO. Emphasis added.

13 Presidential Proclamation No. 2339, June 29, 1939, Folder 173, L1429, BHNBA.

14 Arno B. Cammerer, Director [NPS], to the Secretary [of the Interior], January 10, 1939, “Special File,” General Correspondence, December 1933-April 1956, BHNBA.

15 M. L. Wilson, Secretary, to the Secretary of the Interior, June 10, 1939, Folder 98, H14, BHNBA.

16 This included 160 acres, south of the monument, owned by the Federal Land Bank and 40 acres belonging to Frank Ritschel, incorporating the Indian Village. USFS officials estimated that the Federal Land Bank property could be purchased at $10 per acre. Although regional Historian Hummel “believed” that the Ritschel land would be “quite expensive to purchase” no dollar estimates are provided in the correspondence reviewed to date (Regional Landscape Architect to Resident Landscape Architect Hill, September 18, 1939, File 602-01, Box 2051, Entry 7, CCF 1933-1949, RG79, NA II). In March 1940, Senior Beaverhead National Forest Ranger M. Ramsey — “knowing of” the Park Service’s interest in the Encampment Area — approached Frank Ritschel in March 1940. Ramsey proposed a land transfer, whereby Ritschel would receive a tract of USFS land on the open hillside north of the battlefield (the Nez Perce Horse Pasture/Twin Trees area), in exchange for his 40 acres east of the monument at the Indian Village site. Forest Supervisor W. B. Willey “saw no reason why some form of exchange cannot be worked out for National Forest lands near the battlefield area in order to increase the area now controlled by the Department of the Interior” and the proposal was presented to Yellowstone National Park Assistant Chief Ranger Hugh Peyton. Despite this initial concurrence on the part of USFS officials and Ritschel’s professed interest in the exchange, no NPS response has been found and the land exchange was never initiated (M. G. Ramsey, Sr. Forest Ranger, to Mr. Hugh Peyton, Yellowstone National Park, March 8, 1940; W. B. Willey, Forest Supervisor, to Ranger Ramsey, March 12, 1940, Folder 100, H1415, BHNBA).

17 Sanford Hill, Resident Landscape Architect [YELL], Hugh Peyton, Assistant Chief Ranger [YELL], W. E. Kearns, Assistant Naturalist [YELL], “Special Report on Big Hole National Monument, Wisdom, Montana, to the Regional Landscape Architect, National Park Service, Region II,” n.d. (based on July 12, 1939 field visit), File 602-01, Box 2051, Entry 7, CCF 1933-1949, RG79, NA II.


19 See, for example, Marcella Sherfy, “Honesty in Interpreting the Cultural Past,” Parks, Vol. 3, No. 4, Jan-Feb-March 1979, pp. 13-14 and Linenthal, Sacred Ground, p. 5.

20 Memorandum, Regional Director [Allen] to Mr. Vint and Mr. Ronald Lee, February 13, 1940, WASO.

21 Rogers to Regional Director, May 3, 1941, Folder 37, D18, BHNBA. Although the draft 1942 Master Plan guided trail and sign location at the battlefield through the 1940s, there is no evidence that it was ever finalized. An approved document was not found at BHNBA, Yellowstone National Park Library and Archives, or the National Archives. It is also not on file at the Technical Information Center, Denver Service Center, Denver, Colorado or at Harpers Ferry Center, West Virginia.

22 Newton B. Drury, Director, to the Regional Directors, March 9, 1945, File: Oct. 1952-Dec. 1962, BIHO, L1417, Box L-26, National Archives and Records Administration, Kansas City (hereafter NAKC); Unsigned, Boundary Status Report, March 9, 1945, Folder 155, L1419 and L1425, BHNBA.

Merriam, Regional Director, to Superintendent [YELL], March 28, 1950, Special File, Big Hole National Monument, General Correspondence, December 1933-April 1956, NAKC.

24 Warren L. Anderson, Ranger in Charge [BIHO], to Chief Ranger's Office [YELL], September 20, 1952, Folder 17, BIHO 3533, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA; Edmund B. Rogers, Superintendent [YELL] to [Lawrence C. Merriam] Regional Director, Region II, March 10, 1950, Folder 17, BIHO 3533, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA. In a representative monthly report, Ranger Samuel Beal reported: “my custodian activities have consisted of meeting the public, removing the stumps of the trees killed by the . . . beetle infestation of the 1920s, and painting. . . . The toilets have been painted and I am now doing several signs that were made in 1922” (Samuel M. Beal, Ranger [BIHO], “Monthly Narrative Report,” July 1944, File 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA).


26 Acting Supervisor of Historic Sites to Regional Director Region II and Regional Historian Region II, September 27, 1940; Flora Hirschey, Sec't Big Hole Road Association to Hon. Harold F. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, October 28, 1939; Senator Burton K. Wheeler to Ickes, October 31, 1939; Mrs. J. Atwood Maulding, Director of Personnel, to Wheeler, December 22, 1939; Assistant Secretary [of the Interior] to Wheeler, November 8, 1939; Ronald F. Lee, Supervisor of Historic Sites, to Honorable J. Thorkelson, House of Representatives, November 21, 1939. All from WASO. Effective off-site administration was further hampered both by distance — Yellowstone headquarters at Mammoth Hot Springs were a difficult 240 miles south of the monument and the Yellowstone chief ranger or his assistant often managed only an annual visit — and also by poor communication facilities. Until ca. 1950, the battlefield ranger communicated with Yellowstone officials by post or over the Forest Service line in Wisdom. This system “is unreliable since there are many times when no one is in the office to make the connection.” Breynton R. Finch, Assistant Chief Ranger [YELL] to Chief Ranger [YELL], October 11, 1949, Folder 17, BIHO 3533, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA.

27 Warren F. Hamilton, Acting Superintendent [YELL], to Regional Director, Region II [James V. Lloyd], February 3, 1953, Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA.

28 Fred T. Johnson, Acting Superintendent [YELL] to Mr. Warren L. Anderson, February 21, 1952, Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA. Anderson was offered $3,175 per annum, minus “standard” (undefined) deductions for meals, lodging, and medical expenses. In 1953, this position was upgraded from a GS4 to a GS5 (Warren F. Hamilton, Acting Superintendent [YELL], to Michael Sedar, February 9, 1953; James V. Lloyd, Acting Regional Director, to Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, February 20, 1953. Both in Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA).

29 R.W.T. [Roger W. Toll] to Dr. Bauer, October 22, 1935, WASO; Supervisor of Historic Sites to Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, April 7, 1939, WASO; Chief, Research and Survey Section, Branch of Historic Sites, to the Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, November 13, 1939, File: Big Hole, Box 2050, Entry 7, CCF 37-49, RG79, NAII; Samuel M. Beal, Ranger [BIHO], “Monthly Narrative Report,” July 1944, File 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA; Michael Sedar, Ranger in Charge [BIHO], “Monthly Narrative Report,” June 30, 1947, Folder 13, Box: Monthly Reports, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA.


14, Monthly Reports, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA; Monthly Narrative Reports, ca. 1939-ca. 1955, Monthly Reports, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA, passim.; Stanley McComas, Assistant Chief Ranger, “Revised General Information and Park Prospectus Sections for Big Hole Battlefield National Monument Master Plan,” n. d. (ca. April 1952), Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA. The United States Forest Service assumed responsibility for the graded summer-use road over Gibbon’s Pass. Through the late 1940s, Beaverhead and Deer Lodge counties’ jointly funded improvements to the county road between Anaconda and the Big Hole Valley while the State was responsible for reconstruction of State Highway 91 to modern width and stability standards (Samuel M. Beal, Ranger [BIHO], “Monthly Narrative Report,” August, 1944, File: Samuel Beal, Correspondence 1944-1945, Box: Curatorial, BHNBA; Edmund B. Rogers, Superintendent [YELL], to the Director, August 27, 1941, Folder 207, Annual Rpt. Supt.,” Box 2050, Entry 7, CCF 1932-1949, RG79, NAIL, pp. 3-4).

33 W. M. Stone, Secretary Beaverhead Chamber of Commerce, to Warren L. Anderson, Ranger in Charge, Sept. 17, 1952, Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA.

34 David de L. Condon, Chief Park Naturalist [YELL] to Assistant Chief Ranger McComas, November 12, 1952, Folder 45, D18, BHNBA.


36 Stanley McComas, Assistant Chief Ranger, “Revised General Information and Park Prospectus Sections for Big Hole Battlefield National Monument Master Plan,” n. d. (ca. April 1952), Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA.

37 Frank Mattson to Mr. Hamilton, n.d. [ca. 1941], File 37, D18, BHNBA.


40 Robert M. Utley, forward, in Linenthal, Sacred Ground, p. x.


42 Maynard Barrows, Chief Ranger [YELL] to Files, December 10, 1946, Folder 1, Box 1, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA. In 1951, seasonal ranger Ted Hackett alerted the Chief Ranger’s office to two errors in monument signage, one dating to USFS interpretive efforts and the second a typographic mistakes made in the routing of the new NPS “rustic” signs from the USFS painted signs. The twin trees sign, Hackett noted, stated that a Nez Perce sniper was shooting from behind the tree, from whence he would not have been able to see the battlefield. The sign was amended to indicate that the sniper shot from the south tree. The marker northeast of the museum, along the edge of the soldier trenches was corrected to indicated that Oscar Clark [rather than Claire], Sam Chaffin, Rite, Sam Durches, Howard, and other soldiers occupied the trenches (W. Ted Hackett, Ranger in Charge [BIHO], to Chief Ranger’s Office, Yellowstone National Park, September 23, 1951, Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA). In 1952, seasonal ranger Warren L. Anderson removed the sign marking the site where Lt. W. L. English received his fatal wounds, from which, the marker contended, he died 24 hours later. The New Northwest (Deer Lodge), Anderson noted, reported in November of 1877 that English, Company I, had received fatal wounds to the bowels, . . .continued on next page
ear, scalp, and wrist from which he died on August 20, 1877, in a Deer Lodge hospital. In that “the source of all the information on the marker is considered to be unreliable, since part of the information has been shown to be untrue” the marker was removed pending notification from the Chief Ranger’s Office (Warren L. Anderson, Ranger in Charge [BIHO], to Chief Ranger’s Office [YELL], September 12, 1952, Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA.

43 Charles E. Martin, Ranger in Charge [BIHO], “Monthly Narrative Report,” July 31, 1955, Folder 14, Monthly Reports, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA.

44 Warren L. Anderson, Ranger in Charge [BIHO], to Chief Ranger’s Office [YELL], September 12, 1952, Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA; David de L. Condon, Chief Park Naturalist [YELL] to Assistant Chief Ranger McComas [YELL], November 12, 1952, Folder 45, D18, BHNBA. Condon’s modifications to the text suggested by Anderson included changing “attackers” to soldiers.

45 In April 1995, the Park Service honored Thain for his efforts to preserve important historical sites in north-central Idaho and western Montana (Susan Buchel, Unit Manager NEPE-BIHO) to Dr. H. Duane Hampton, February 28, 1995, K38, BHNBA).

46 W. Ted Hackett, Ranger in Charge [BIHO] to Chief Ranger Skinner and Assistant Chief Ranger McComas, [YELL], August 12, 1951, Folder 93, D66, BHNBA; Mattes to White, January 4, 1951, quoted in John S. McLaughlin to Superintendent Yellowstone National Park, September 4, 1951, Folder 93, D66, BHNBA.

47 Susan Buchel, Unit Manager NEPE-BIHO) to Dr. H. Duane Hampton, February 28, 1995, K38, BHNBA.

48 Warren, L. Anderson, Ranger in Charge [BIHO] to Stanley McComas, Assistant Chief Ranger [YELL], July 28, 1952, Folder 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA.


51 Maynard Barrows, Chief Ranger [YELL] to Samuel M. Beal, Seasonal Ranger, September 2, 1944; Beal, “Monthly Narrative Report,” September 15, 1944; Beal to Edmund B. Rogers, Superintendent [YELL], August 28, 1944; Beal, “Monthly Narrative Report,” September 15, 1944; C. Max Bauer, Chief Naturalist [YELL] to Beal, August 25, 1944; Earl M. Welton, District Forest Ranger, to Forest Supervisor, Beaverhead National Forest, September 4, 1944. All in File: Samuel Beal, Correspondence 1944-1945, Box: Curatorial, BHNBA.

52 Maynard Barrows, Chief Ranger [YELL] to Files, December 10, 1946, File 1, Box 1, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA, emphasis added.


55 Lawrence C. Merriam, Regional Director, to Superintendent [YELL], March 28, 1950, Special File, Big Hole National Monument, General Correspondence, December 1933-April 1956, NAKC.

56 Breynton R. Finch, Assistant Chief Ranger [YELL], to Chief Ranger [YELL], October 11, 1949, Folder 17, BIHO 3533, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA.
Lawrence C. Merriam, Regional Director, to Superintendent [YELL], March 28, 1950, Special File, Big Hole National Monument, General Correspondence, December 1933-April 1956, NAKC.

Fred W. Warders, Ranger in Charge [BIHO], "Monthly Narrative Report," September 18, 1950, Folder 13, Monthly Reports, YELL BIHO Files, BHNBA. Edmund B. Rogers, Superintendent [YELL], to Regional Director, Region II [Howard Baker], March 19, 1954, Folder 22, A6423, BHNBA, emphasis added; Howard W. Baker, Regional Director, to Superintendent Yellowstone National Park [Rogers], March 15, 1954, Folder 22, A6423, BHNBA. Although Mattes' preliminary evaluation of the national significance of the site is cited and paraphrased in numerous correspondence, including the Rogers/Baker series cited here, no formal report based on his September 1950 field visit was prepared. In 1955, Acting Region II Director George F. Baggley wrote that "Mr. Mattes has been quite fully occupied in handling technical supervision of all Missouri River Basin historical and archeological survey and salvage programs. At this date we believe it would be pointless to work up a special report based on the 1950 field review. We believe the same objective will be achieved for present purposes by your MISSION 66 prospectus" (George F. Baggley to Superintendent, December 9, 1955, Folder Oct. 1952-Dec. 1962 BIHO, Box L-26, NAKC).

These units included Millerton Lake Recreation Area, Platt National Park, Mound City Group National Monument, Moore's Creek National Military Park, Natchez Trace Parkway, and Lehman Caves National Monument (Ise, Our National Park Policy, p. 522). In 1953, the Secretary of the Interior appointed a team to survey the different bureaus within the Department and to make recommendations "for more efficiency and economy in government operations." Transfer of substandard properties from the National Park Service was included in their recommendations (Stanley McComas, Assistant Chief Ranger [YELL], to Mrs. Marion Place, Butte, Montana, September 10, 1954, Folder 151, L1417, BHNBA).


Edmund B. Rogers to the Director, November 29, 1955, Folder Oct. 1952-Dec. 1962 BIHO, Box L-26, NAKC.
Chapter Five Endnotes


4 Aubrey L. Haines, Park Historian (Yellowstone), to the Superintendent, April 13, 1962, Folder: “Master Plan,” D18, BHNBA.

5 Roy E. Appleman, Staff Historian, “Report on Visit to Big Hole Battlefield, Montana, 7 July 1956,” September 17, 1956, WASO.


9 Rickey was accompanied in the field by Robert Condie, who had assisted McWhorter, and was able to generally identify the limits to the staked area. Not until 1961, however, did park historians locate a copy of McWhorter’s base map.

10 Roy E. Appleman, Staff Historian, to Chief, Branch of National Park Service Planning, January 30, 1961, History File, WASO; Don Rickey, “Field Research, Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, July 16-22, 1959,” n.d. (ca. 1959), WASO; George F. Bagley, Acting Regional Director, to The Director, April 17, 1961, Folder: 158, L1425, BHNBA; Charles W. Porter, III, Acting Chief Historian, to Superintendent, Big Hole Battlefield, January 1962, File 1.1 H14, Box 6, 079-76.D 1229, RG 79, NAII.


13 Roy E. Appleman, Staff Historian, “Report on Visit to Big Hole Battlefield, Montana, 7 July 1956,” September 17, 1956, WASO; Chief, Division of Interpretation, to Regional Director, September 26, 1956, WASO; National Park Service Director to Regional Director, Region II, April 5, 1961, History File, WASO; D18, BHNBA, passim. See, for example, the draft 1957 development prospectus (which excluded the Ruby Bench from purchase), the . . . continued on next page

In August, 1963, a modified cooperative forest fire control agreement supplemented the agreement executed in March 1950. Beaverhead National Forest and Big Hole Battlefield personnel agreed to "watch for and report all fires discovered on the other agency's territory. In addition, the agreement stipulated that the cost of fires entirely on or of threat to the lands of one agency would be paid for by that agency. Fires on the lands of both agencies would be adjusted between the agencies on the basis of the proportional acreage burned. "Cooperative Forest Fire Control Agreement Between the United States Department of the Interior . . . and the United States Department of Agriculture . . ." signed Lemuel A. Garrison, Superintendent Yellowstone National Park, August 16, 1963, and Victor N. Stokes, Supervisor, Beaverhead National Forest, August 12, 1963.

Jack R. Williams, "Master Plan for the Preservation and Use of Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, Mission 66 Edition," March 1962, Folder: "Master Plan," D18, BHNA, p. 5. The monument development schedule included Roads and Trails (major and minor roads; construction, reconstruction, and expansion of interpretive trails and reconstruction of signs; construction of 2 footbridges); Buildings and Utilities (water, power, and sewer systems; visitor center and maintenance building; 3 three-room residences and a four-unit apartment; comfort station); and Miscellaneous improvements (entrance development and signs; boundary fence; site landscape improvements.)

Ibid.


Ben H. Thompson, Assistant Director, to the Honorable Wayne N. Aspinall, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States House of Representatives, n.d. (ca. April 4, 1963); John A. Carver, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to the Honorable Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, March 22, 1963; Conrad Wirth, Director, National Park Service, to Legislative Counsel, Office of the Solicitor, June 22, 1962, all in "Big Hole National Battlefield," Branch of History Legislative File, WASO; Congressional Record — Senate, 88th Congress 1st Session, Vol. 109 Part 5.

Specifically, the Park Service acquired 100 acres of the horse pasture, including the twin trees (SW¼SE¼, SE¼SW¼, and ExSW¼SW¼ Section 13) and 60 acres at the howitzer emplacement and hillside below (E¼NE¼SE¼ Section 23 and NW¼SW¼, W¼SE¼ Section 24) from the Forest Service. Private land authorized for purchase included 80 acres incorporating the Nez Perce Camp (W¼NE¼ Section 24) and 226 acres incorporating a development site, access thereto from State Highway 43, and the foreground of the battlefield (E¼SW¼, W¼SE¼, Section 24 and those portions of the NE¼NW¼ and the NW¼NE¼ Section 25 north of the right of way of State Highway 43). All private land was owned by the Clemow brothers. Action Regional Chief of Recreation Resource Planning to Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, February 20, 1962, Folder: 151, L1417, BHNA.

Garrison to Rasmussen, September 9, 1963, Folder: 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BIHO 3533, BHNA.

The state did not accept concurrent jurisdiction until the late 1970s. See chapter 6. For a comprehensive discussion of "proprietary," "exclusive," and "concurrent" jurisdiction see Jackson E. Price, Special Assistant to the Director, "Federal Legislative Jurisdiction of Lands in Areas Administered by the National Park Service," May . . .continued on next page
23 Jack R. Williams, Aztec Ruins National Monument, to Thain White, July 3, 1963, Folder: 6, YELL BIHO Files, BIHO 3533, BHNBA.


26 Frank J. Barry, Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, "Declaration of Taking," United States District Court, District of Montana, Butte Division, September 9, 1964; Jackson E. Price, Assistant Director, Specialized Services, to Acting Associate Solicitor, Parks and Recreation, June 27, 1966; Chief, Division of Land and Water Rights, to Regional Director, Midwest Region, June 19, 1964; W. D. Murray, District Judge, Final Judgement and Order Disbursing Fund, Civil No. 1184, United States District Court, Butte, Montana. All in Folder: 163, L1425, BHNBA.


28 Expansion of the monument's artifact collection proceeded apace with plans for the new visitor center. In 1958, the Division of Interpretation attempted the purchase of "authentic Nez Perce items for the period... appropriate for Big Hole Battlefield" from Mrs. Joe Evans, Sacajawea Museum, Spalding, Idaho. Both Regional Historian John Hussey and Museum Curator Abel had assessed the items as of "major importance for an understanding of the culture of that tribe" and their purchase as therefore consistent with Park Service plans to use Big Hole Battlefield as a stage on which to tell the Nez Perce "saga." Ronald E. Lee encouraged immediate acquisition despite the absence of a museum prospectus and suggested creative funding opportunities through the Eastern National Park and Monument Association. Ultimately, the Nez Perce Tribal Committee agreed to purchase the entire collection, which was purchased by Nez Perce National Historical Park, Spalding, Idaho, in 1967. Big Hole National Battlefield did, however, benefit from the long-term loan of a cradleboard from the Evans collection. Chief, Division of Interpretation, to Superintendent, Whitman National Monument, December 3, 1958; Bennett T. Gale, Regional Chief of Interpretation, to The Director, December 8, 1958; Regional Historian Mattes to Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, December 12, 1958; Ronald E. Lee, Chief, Division of Interpretation, to Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, January 7, 1959. All at WASO. Jack R. Williams, Superintendent Nez Perce National Historical Park, to Acting Superintendent Big Hole National Battlefield, October 14, 1969; Regional Curator, Pacific Northwest Region, to Superintendent, Nez Perce National Historical Park, August 15, 1986. Both in Folder: 1, D62, BIHO collection, Intermountain System Support Office, Denver.

29 Lewis, p. 146; Jerry A. Riddell, Chief Architect, WODC, to Regional Director, Midwest Region, February 28, 1964, Folder: 66, D3415, BHNBA; Anonymous, "Interpretive Prospectus for Big Hole National Battlefield," 1964, continued on next page


32 Williams reported with pride on the native-rock that delineated the trail. In an effective illustration of changing management goals, in 1974 these rocks were identified as an inappropriate visual impact and were removed.


35 Kermit Edmonds, interview by Ted Catton, February 26, 1998; Haines, An Elusive Victory, pp. ix-x.

36 Kermit Edmonds, interview by Ted Catton, February 26, 1998. The American Indian Movement, led by Russell Means, Leonard Peltier, and Dennis Banks was intended as a “pan-Indian” effort that would transcend tribal allegiances while restoring traditional tribal culture and reclaiming tribal rights guaranteed by treaty. There is little evidence in the secondary literature that the Nez Perce tribe or tribal members assumed a prominent role in the movement. However, the Nez Perce war (in company with the massacre at Sand Creek [Colorado], and the Battle of Greasy Grass Creek [Custer’s Last Stand, Montana]) did assume symbolic importance. See Russell Means, with Marvin J. Wolf, Where White Men Fear to Tread; The Autobiography of Russell Means (New York: St. Martins Press, 1975).

37 In 1973, 35,149 people visited Big Hole National Battlefield. These visitors represented 49 states (all but Rhode Island) and 24 foreign countries. Montana residents composed the largest percentage (37%), followed by California (12%) and Idaho (11%). Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1974, “Visitor Statistics by State, 1974 compared to 1973,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA, n.p.


39 Clyde A. Maxey, “Interpretive Prospectus for Big Hole National Battlefield,” October 16, 1964; Kermit Edmonds, interview by Ted Catton, February 26, 1998. The American Indian Movement, led by Russell Means, Leonard Peltier, and Dennis Banks was intended as a “pan-Indian” effort that would transcend tribal allegiances while restoring traditional tribal culture and reclaiming tribal rights guaranteed by treaty. There is little evidence in the secondary literature that the Nez Perce tribe or tribal members assumed a prominent role in the movement. However, the Nez Perce war (in company with the massacre at Sand Creek [Colorado], and the Battle of Greasy Grass Creek [Custer’s Last Stand, Montana]) did assume symbolic importance. See Russell Means, with Marvin J. Wolf, Where White Men Fear to Tread; The Autobiography of Russell Means (New York: St. Martins Press, 1975).

40 In his on-site review of the interpretive program, Regional Chief of Interpretation and Visitor Services David J. Thompson, Jr. recommended removal of the steel grating surrounding the Soldier’s Monument: “It takes away any dignity that might be surrounding the memorial.” Interpretive Naturalist Charles M. McCurdy concurred, describing the grating as “bluntly ugly looking.” On September 11, 1967 BIHO Management Assistant Elroy W. Bohlin supervised removal of the “cage.” Thompson to Associate Regional Director, August 1, 1966 and McCurdy to Assistant Regional Director of Operations, September 6, 1967, both in Folder: 1, Box 2, YELL BIHO Files, BIHO 3533, BHNBA. Bohlin to Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park, October 1, 1967, Reports Monthly, A2615, BHNBA.


55 “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1976,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA.

56 Haines to Edmonds, Folder: 121, K18, BHNBA.

57 Interpretive Planner, Division of Planning, Denver Service Center, to Chief, Interpretation, Rocky Mountain Regional Office, April 15, 1974, Folder: “BIHO Interpretive Prospectus,” Box 5, 79-97-0015, RG 79, NAD.


59 “A Long Journey to Surrender,” draft copy-edited typescript attached to Barry Mackintosh, Acting Chief Historian, to Nancy McCaslin, HFC, May 14, 1974, WASO. This naked sympathy stood in sharp contrast and counterbalance to the patriotic rhetoric that defined visitor response at Custer Battlefield. See, for example, continued on next page
Linenthal, *Sacred Ground*, pp. 129-171. Linenthal writes: “the Last Stand was portrayed as the pivotal battle between barbarism and civilization, and patriotic rhetoric celebrated the opening of the Anglo-American West as the most tangible outcome of the battle.”

60 Barry Mackintosh, Acting Chief Historian, to Nancy McCaslin, HFC, May 14, 1974 and Bruce Hopkins, Acting Chief, Division of Publications, to Mackintosh, May 22, 1974; Harry W. Pflanz, Acting Assistant Director, Park Historic Preservation, to Chief, Division of Publications, June 5, 1974. All at WASO.

61 Bruce Hopkins, Acting Chief, Division of Publications, to Mackintosh, May 22, 1974, WASO.

62 Wes Wolfe, Chief, Division of Interpretation, Rocky Mountain Region, to Schulmeyer, November 14, 1975, Folder: 130, K26, BHNBA.

63 Schulmeyer to Sweringen, October 28, 1974, Folder: 130, D26, BHNBA; “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1976,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA.


65 Wolfe, Chief Division of Interpretation, Rocky Mountain Region, to Superintendents Big Hole National Monument [sic] and Yellowstone National Park, June 20, 1977, Folder K1817, 079-84-0021, RG 79, NAD; Schulmeyer, “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1976,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA.

66 Acquisition of the Plains tribe headdress conflicted with the museum’s intent to interpret Nez Perce culture, as distinct from an inaccurate and inappropriate focus on generic “Indian culture.” In his 1984 interpretive prospectus, Schulmeyer complained that “the headress [sic] serves as a wedge into discussions of Nez Perce Indian Culture.”

67 “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1975”; “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1976,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA.

68 “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1975,” “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1976,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA.


70 Schulmeyer, to Executive Secretary, Museum Association, n.d. (ca. May 1973), Folder 84, D62, BHNBA.

71 Interpretive Planner, Division of Planning, Denver Service Center, to Chief, Interpretation, Rocky Mountain Regional Office, April 15, 1974, Folder: “BIHO Interpretive Prospectus,” Box 5, 79-97-0015, RG 79, NAD; Lynn H. Thompson, Regional Director, to Ron G. Holliday, State Historic Preservation Officer, August 19, 1976. The Montana State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation concurred with the Park Service’s evaluation of “no adverse effect,” pursuant to Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. John D. McDermott, Director Office of Review and Compliance, to Thompson, September 13, 1976; Ron Holliday, State Historic Preservation Officer, to Thompson, August 27, 1976. Both in File H34, Box 7, 793076, RG 79, NAD.

72 “National Recreation Trail Designation,” n.d., Folder: 179, L34, BHNBA.

73 Schulmeyer to John Reed, Interpretive Specialist, Rocky Mountain Region, January 6, 1975; Reed to Bryan Jones, AA Arts, HFC, February 25, 1975. Both in Folder: 062, Box 8, 793075, RG79, NAD.
74 “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1976,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA; Wolfe to Production Manager, Division of Audiovisual Arts, Harpers Ferry Center, February 10, 1976, File K1817, Box 10, 793077, NAD.

75 Haines remembers that he blew up the trestle during his summer as management assistance, in large part because it posed a threat to public safety. Part of the trestle was on private land. Haines had not received authorization and was not licensed to work with explosives. He had, however, served with the Army Corps of Engineers in WWII and knew “a thing or two” about dynamite. The trestle “went down nicely.” Aubrey Haines, interview by Ann Hubber, June 24, 1998.

76 Interpretive Planner, Division of Planning, Denver Service Center, to Chief, Interpretation, Rocky Mountain Regional Office, April 15, 1974, Folder: “BIHO Interpretive Prospectus,” Box 5, 79-97-0015, RG 79, Denver NARA; Schulmeyer to Assistant Superintendent, Operations, April 22, 1975, File N-2215, Box N153, YNPA; “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1973”; “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1974,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA.


79 “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1975” and “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1976,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA; Lynn H. Thompson, Regional Director, Rocky Mountain Region, Feb. 11, 1975, Folder: 10, A42, BHNBA.

80 “Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole Battlefield, 1974,” Superintendents Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA.


83 Glen T. Bean, Acting Regional Director, to Schulmeyer, March 17, 1977, File A8215, Box 3, 729802, RG 79, Denver NARA; Los Angeles Times, quoted in Linenthal, Sacred Ground, p. 145.


85 The National Park Service entered into agreement with Nez Perce Tribal Members “for the purpose of securing Tribal Members to present a program and cultural demonstrations at the Centennial celebration at Big Hole National Battlefield.” Al Schulmeyer remembers that the Nez Perce desired only that their expenses for the two-day journey be paid. Although tribal members did not actively seek a role in the ceremony, or a voice as to its content, they proved eager participants once Schulmeyer made the initial contact (Schulmeyer, telephone interview by Ann Hubber, October 21, 1998.


Chapter Six Endnotes

1 "Operations Evaluations and Consultation, Big Hole National Battlefield, July 13-14, 1978," L6017, BHNBA.

2 Alfred W. Schulmeyer, Statement of Management [sic], Big Hole National Battlefield, Montana, written November 14, 1975, approved May 8, 1979, Folder: D18, Box 3, 079-84-0021, RG 79, NAD.


9 “Operations Evaluations and Consultation, Big Hole National Battlefield, July 13-14, 1978,” L6017, BHNBA; Schulmeyer, “Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1982,” Folder: Superintendents’ Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA; Schulmeyer, “Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1984,” Folder: Superintendents’ Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA. There is additional evidence that the new arrangement was an only modest improvement. In 1985, the Associate Regional Director, Planning and Resource Preservation, RMR, offered assistance in typing the next draft of Schulmeyer’s “Resource Management Plan, Cultural Component,” but regretted that his staff would be unable to undertake revision. Richard A. Strait to Schulmeyer, June 25, 1985, WASO.


11 Special Assistant to the Director, “Federal Legislative Jurisdiction of Lands in Areas Administered by the National Park Service,” May 10, 1973, Folder: W30, Box W-128, YNPA.
This local hostility stemmed from opposition to the proposed West Big Hole Wilderness Area proposed by USFS and BLM officials. Schulmeyer reports that through the late 1970s the Big Hole Valley witnessed its own "Sagebrush Rebellion." Schulmeyer, "Superintendent's Annual Report, 1984," Folder: Superintendents' Annual Reports, A2621, BHNBA.


"Operations Evaluations and Consultation, Big Hole National Battlefield, July 13-14, 1978," L6017, BHNBA.

Jon G. James, comments on draft, September 1, 1998.

"Operations Evaluations and Consultation, Big Hole National Battlefield, July 13-14, 1978," L6017, BHNBA.

Susan A. Tenney, "Reasons for Excluding Nez Perce Monument from National Register Nomination for Big Hole National Battlefield," n.d. (ca. 1983), H30, BHNBA.

Schulmeyer, "Big Hole National Battlefield National Register of Historic Places Inventory – Nomination Form," May 19, 1977 (approved 1978); Edwin C. Bearss, Chief Historian, to Chief of Registration [Carol] Shull, Interagency Resources Division, June 22, 1984; Acting Regional Director, Rocky Mountain Region, to Associate Director, Cultural Resources WASO, January 13, 1984. Both at WASO.

Marcella Sherfy to Richard A. Strait, May 14, 1986, Folder: 114, H3015, BHNBA.

Superintendent to Associate Regional Director, May 30, 1986, Folder 114, H3015, BHNBA.

Otis Halfmoon, comments on draft.


Marcella Sherfy, Montana State Historic Preservation Officer, to Richard A. Strait, May 14, 1986, Folder 114, H3015, BHNBA.

Schulmeyer, "Cultural Resources Management Plan, Big Hole National Battlefield," July 25, 1984 (unapproved), Folder 114, H3015, BHNBA.


Schulmeyer, “Cultural Resources Management Plan, Big Hole National Battlefield,” July 25, 1984 (unapproved), Folder 114, H3015, BHNBA.

Schulmeyer, Cultural Resources Management Plan, Big Hole National Battlefield, July 25, 1984 (unapproved), Folder 114, H3015, BHNBA

Bowers to Manager, Harpers Ferry Center, November 14, 1984, Folder: H30, Box 20, 079-91-0006, RG79, NAD.

Schulmeyer to Regional Director, RMR, February 4, 1986, Folder: A5427, Box 1, 079-92-0001, RG79, NAD.

Chapter Seven Endnotes

1 Al Schulmeyer, interview by Ted Catton, November 12, 1997.
8 Jock Whitworth, interview with Ted Catton, April 30, 1998.
10 Catton, Nez Perce National Historical Park Administrative History, p.130.
11 Catton, Nez Perce National Historical Park Administrative History, p.130.
12 Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region to Regional Director, Rocky Mountain Region, October 19, 1992, L58 Proposed Areas — New Additions Wallowa, Nez Perce National Historical Park (NPNHP) administrative files.
13 Catton, Nez Perce National Historical Park Administrative History, p.130.
14 Acting Superintendent to Regional Director, Rocky Mountain Regional Office, no date, File K2621, BHNBA. Adding to the flux, Grant Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site Superintendent Eddie Lopez left in 1993 and was replaced by Tony Schetzle who had brief oversight of Big Hole before it was placed under the administration of Nez Perce National Historical Park in 1994. Hutchinson, Ranger Crystal Coffey-Avey, and Chief of Maintenance Lonnie Hergenrider all received special achievement awards for their efforts while in acting status. Superintendent’s 1993 Annual Report, Big Hole National Battlefield, BIHO D14, DSC reports on microfiche, CCSO library, Seattle.
15 Nez Perce National Historical Park, Unit Organization Concept, no date, NPNHP library.
16 Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1993, NEPE D14, DSC reports on microfiche, CCSO library, Seattle.
17 Unit Manager to Regional Director, October 31, 1994, K2621, BHNBA.
Team Captain, Nez Perce GMP to Manager, Western Team, DSC, no date, D18 Planning Program, BHNBA.

Staff organization charts, February 1995, Nez Perce National Historical Park library.

Memorandum, “Clarification of Relationship, Big Hole National Battlefield & Nez Perce National Historical Park, January 1996 (updated May 1996), Jon G. James administrative files copied on disk and provided to authors.

Jon G. James, interview by Ann Hubber, November 12, 1997.

Memorandum, “Clarification of Relationship, Big Hole National Battlefield & Nez Perce National Historical Park, January 1996 (updated May 1996), Jon G. James administrative files copied on disk and provided to authors.


Jon G. James, interview by authors, September 1, 1998.

Total visits (data sheet excerpt), Folder 103, H22, BHNBA.

Jock Whitworth interview.


Jock Whitworth, Annual Statement for Interpretation, Big Hole National Battlefield FY 1991, K1815, BHNB administrative files.

Jock Whitworth, Annual Statement for Interpretation, Big Hole National Battlefield FY 1991, K1815, BHNB administrative files.

Jock Whitworth, Annual Statement for Interpretation, Big Hole National Battlefield FY 1991, K1815, BHNB administrative files.


Jock Whitworth interview; Kermit Edmunds interview.

Jock Whitworth interview.


Otis Halfmoon interview.

Jock Whitworth interview.

Jock Whitworth to Joseph and Soy Redthunder, April 21, 1990, Folder 134, K3015, BHNBA.

Otis Halfmoon interview.


Unit Manager Sue Buchel to Regional Director, Rocky Mountain Regional Office, October 31, 1994, K2621, BHNB administrative files.

“Nez Perce Memorial,” Ravalli Republic, August 4, 1995, clipping in K3415, BHNB administrative files; Otis Halfmoon interview.
45 Kermit Edmunds interview.
46 Chief, I & RM, Big Hole, to Division of Interpretation, November 8, 1989, K2621, BHN administrative files.
47 Several examples of educational outreach are documented in K1815, BHN administrative files.
49 "Big Hole Interpretive Program Schedule August 7 — August 24," pamphlet, K3415, BHN administrative files.
50 Jock Whitworth, Chief, I & RM, Big Hole, to Division of Interpretation, November 8, 1989, K2621, BHN administrative files.
51 “Visit the Big Hole Valley in 1910,” USDI NPS news release, K3415, BHN administrative files; “Big Hole Valley — 1910,” program, K18, BHN administrative files.
52 Acting Superintendent to Regional Director, no date, K2621, BHN administrative files.
53 Jon G. James, interview with authors, September 1, 1998.
54 Jock Whitworth to Randy/Anita, July 4, 1990, BHN chronological files.
55 Jon G. James interview.
56 Jon G. James to Chris Wheeler, Anne Tubiolo, and Marie Marek, January 21, 1998, Jon G. James administrative files provided to authors on disk.
57 Sue Buchel to Hank Williams, Jr., August 24, 1995, BHN chronological files.
60 Harold P. Danz and Robert W. Reynolds, “Organizational Structural Analysis Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site and Big Hole National Battlefield,” Folder 23, A6427, BHN.
61 Big Hole National Battlefield, Collection Management Plan.
62 Big Hole National Battlefield, Collection Management Plan.
63 Big Hole National Battlefield, Collection Management Plan.
64 Ranger Activities Division Morning Report, November 24, 1992, folder labeled BIHO Theft and Break-ins, box labeled Curatorial, BHN storage; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole National Battlefield 1991 and 1992, DSC reports on microfiche, 341/D-14, CCSO library.
67 Superintendent’s Annual Report, Big Hole National Battlefield 1991 and 1992, DSC reports on microfiche, 341/D-14, CCSO library; Otis Halfmoon interview. The remains were the subject of a separate report, "What Price Victory: Human Remains Uncovered at Big Hole National Battlefield, 1991," prepared by National Park Service, Midwest Archeological Center, DSC reports on microfiche, D-15, CCSO library. Whitworth described the reburial and placed the discovery in historical perspective in a news release. See “It Was Not Good to See Women and Children Lying Dead,” no date, K3415, BHN administrative files.
68 Sue Buchel to Hank Williams, Jr., August 24, 1995, BHNB chronological files.

69 Jon G. James, interview by authors, September 1, 1998.


71 Jock Whitworth to Al Schumley, no date, Folder 226, Y14, BHNBA.

72 Fire Management Plan, Big Hole National Battlefield.

73 Susan Buchel to Jim Magee, Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, March 13, 1995, Y1415, BHNB administrative files.

74 Jock Whitworth to Files, March 31, 1989, Y14, BHNB administrative files.

75 Chief, I & RM to Files, March 31, 1989 and April 7, 1989, Y14, BHNB administrative files.

76 Jock Whitworth to Tom Zimmerman, Office of Fire Management, September 26, 1991, and Joe Carvelho, Prescribed Burning Plan, May 1, 1991, Y14, BHNB administrative files.

77 Superintendent's 1993 Annual Report, Big Hole National Battlefield, DSC reports on microfiche, D-14, CCSO library.

78 Susan Buchel to Rick Hartz, October 2, 1995, enclosing 1995 Weed Control Program, Big Hole National Battlefield, A44, BHNB administrative files.

79 Susan Buchel to Rick Hartz, October 2, 1995, enclosing 1995 Weed Control Program, Big Hole National Battlefield, A44, BHNB administrative files.

80 Susan Buchel to Rick Hartz, October 2, 1995, enclosing 1995 Weed Control Program, Big Hole National Battlefield, A44, BHNB administrative files.


82 Hillory A. Tolson to Regional Director, November 20, 1944, and Howard W. Baker to Superintendent of Yellowstone, November 25, 1944, File 660-05.7 Water Rights Big Hole, Box 2051, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II.

83 W. W. Wetzel, Forest Supervisor, to Yellowstone National Park, December 21, 1944, Folder 184, L54, BHNBA. Wetzel quoted the September 17, 1909 recommendation for an administrative site withdrawal by Assistant Ranger Arthur M. Keas, "Water is not needed for irrigation and none has been appropriated."

84 Chief, Branch of Water Resources to Regional Director, July 10, 1962, Folder 184, L54, BHNBA. This letter references a January 3, 1945 memorandum.

85 Notice of Appropriation of Water Right, no date, File 660-05.7, Box 2051, RG 79, NA II. Assistant Park Engineer A. L. Haines described the water supply as follows. "Reservoir. – A concrete structure 6' x 8' and 10' in depth (capacity approximately 3,590 gallons). This reservoir is in a very poor state of repair and cannot be filled above the half level due to leakage through cracks in the concrete bottom and walls. Also, mud filters into the reservoir to an extent that renders the water unusable at times, making it necessary that the structure be drained and cleaned. The reservoir is entirely inadequate as the daily lawn watering will drain it despite the inflow from the spring. Spring. – The diversion works consist of a concrete box 3' x 3' set in the head of a draw. The spring is steady, but not adequate to supply the present 3/4" pipe line without further development. Seepage around the spring box and along the course of the pipe line in the draw indicates that the water supply could be further developed. Some erosion of the sides of the draw interfere with the operation of the spring box during storms. A field examination of the site would be necessary to determine the area suitable for spring development. Name of Stream. – The intermittent stream adjacent to the pipe line has no local name...continued on next page
and is dry during most of the summer season. It is not a drainage of particular prominence [sic].” Haines, memorandum, May 10, 1948, File 660-05.7, Box 2051, CCF 1933-49, RG 79, NA II.

86 Russell L. McKown, Acting Assistant Regional Director to Charles W. Lane, District Geologist, U.S. Geological Survey, October 19, 1962, Folder 184, L54, BHNBA.

87 Bruce J. Miller, Assistant Chief, Office of Land and Water Rights, SSC, to Superintendent of Yellowstone, October 14, 1966, Folder 185, L54, BHNBA.

88 Doney, *Montana Water Law Handbook*, p. 9. The law followed the new Montana Constitution of 1972, which provides that “[a]ll existing rights to the use of any waters for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed.”

89 Al Schulmeyer, Superintendent, Big Hole, to Assistant Superintendent, Yellowstone, November 28, 1973, Folder 191, L54, BHNBA.

90 Al Schulmeyer, Superintendent, Big Hole, to Assistant Superintendent, Yellowstone, November 28, 1973, Folder 191, L54, BHNBA.

91 Al Schulmeyer to Assistant Superintendent, Yellowstone, November 28, 1973, Folder 191, L54, BHNBA.

92 Notice of Appropriation of Water Right, undated, and Register to Commissioner, General Land Office, March 12, 1904, attached to Leigh W. Freeman to Paula Stinger, September 16, 1976, Folder 156, L1425, BHNBA.

93 Al Schulmeyer, Superintendent, Big Hole, to Assistant Superintendent, Yellowstone, Folder 191, L54, BHNBA.

94 Al Schulmeyer, Superintendent, Big Hole, to Assistant Superintendent, Yellowstone, November 28, 1973, Folder 191, L54, BHNBA.

95 Al Schulmeyer, Superintendent, Big Hole, to Assistant Superintendent, Yellowstone, November 28, 1973, Folder 191, L54, BHNBA.

96 Superintendent to Associate Regional Director, June 21, 1978, Folder 191, L54, BHNBA.

97 Al Schulmeyer to Lee Garrison, April 2, 1981, Folder 191, L54, BHNBA.

98 Stanley W. Hulett to Senator Max Baucus, December 23, 1982, Folder 213, L7621, BHNBA.

99 Lawrence M. Jakub to Lands, March 17, 1983, Folder 171, L1425, BHNBA.

100 Al Schulmeyer, interview by Theodore Catton, April 16, 1998.

101 Warranty Deed, Book 204, Page 193, Folder 11, L54, Yell BIHO files, BHNBA.

102 Regional Director to David C. Moon (draft), June 20, 1983, L54 (1), BHNBA.

103 Message Record, October 19, 1983, L54 (1), BHNBA.


105 Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee, Resolution, January 1984, L54 (1), BHNB administrative files.

106 Wayne D. Petrik to Al Schulmeyer, Superintendent, December 16, 1984, Folder 150, L1415, BHNBA.

107 Superintendent, Big Hole, to Chief, Division of Lands, Rocky Mountain Region, December 31, 1985, L54 (1), BHNB administrative files.


Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Rocky Mountain Region, "Briefing Statement, Big Hole National Battlefield, Reactivation of the Trail Creek Irrigation Ditch," February 1988, Folder 212, L7617, BHNB.

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Chuck Burton to Monte Clemow, July 16, 1989, Burton to Mike McWright, July 20, 1989, Memorandum of Agreement, no date, Folder D08, L54, BHNB administrative files.


For a general announcement of increased emphasis on cooperation with park neighbors, see Director to Directorate, Field Directorate, WASO Division Chiefs, and Park Superintendents, February 5, 1990, D18, Golden Spike National Historic Site, Promontory, Utah, administrative files.

Alfred W. Schulmeyer, Superintendent to Chief Historian, June 14, 1987, Folder 9, A38 Public Relations, BHNB.

Jock Whitworth, Unit Manager, to Superintendent, Grant-Kohrs Ranch National Historic Site, November 22, 1991, L14 Acquisition of Land, BHNB administrative files.


Rick L. Wagner to Mark Clemow, Jr., November 30, 1994, L14 Acquisition of Land, BHNB administrative files.

Rick Wagner, Chief, Land Resources Program Center, to Area Manager, Bureau of Land Management, Jon G. James administrative files copied on disk and provided to authors.

Jon G. James, interview with authors, September 1, 1998.

Interagency Agreement between Beaverhead National Forest, National Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, and Big Hole National Battlefield, National Park Service, Department of the Interior (various drafts), Cooperative Agreements, Federal, State, and Local, Folder 11, BHNB; Acting Superintendent, Big Hole to Associate Regional Director, January 23, 1990, Memorandum of Agreement, Interagency — Beaverhead National Forest, Folder 12, A44, BHNB.

Superintendent, Nez Perce National Historical Park, to Regional Director, February 5, 1987, NPNHP chronological files. Superintendent Roy Weaver suggested that Joseph and Soy Reilthyridgr could provide the
desired input from the Joseph Band, failing to remind the Forest Service to maintain relations with the Colville Business Council. Subsequently, the Colville Business Council criticized the Redthunders and the Forest Service for this informal arrangement. The Chief Joseph Band of Nez Perce complained that it lacked proper representation in the management of the trail. (Catton, *Nez Perce National Historical Park Administrative History*, 67n.)


Interagency cooperation also encompassed the Lewis and Clark Historic Trail and the proposed Continental Divide Trail. An undated draft interagency agreement stated: "Each of the parties have obligations and direct responsibilities for the work and reports related to the trails in the local areas, the parties also have responsibilities to report and monitor developments on a regional and national level as well." See Cooperative Agreements, Federal, State, and local, Folder 11, A44, BHNBA.

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130 Interagency cooperation also encompassed the Lewis and Clark Historic Trail and the proposed Continental Divide Trail. An undated draft interagency agreement stated: "Each of the parties have obligations and direct responsibilities for the work and reports related to the trails in the local areas, the parties also have responsibilities to report and monitor developments on a regional and national level as well." See Cooperative Agreements, Federal, State, and local, Folder 11, A44, BHNBA.

131 Associate Director to Field Directorates, June 2, 1995, Wildland Fire Management, Y14, BHNBA administrative files. Several years prior to NPS involvement in the interagency fire management agreement, the Forest Service had developed an interagency fire management agreement with the Bureau of Land Management and the Bureau of Reclamation for southwestern Montana.

132 1994 Dillon Interagency Dispatch Center Operating Plan, Memorandum of Agreement, A44, BHNBA administrative files.

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134 Anthony J. Schetzsle, Superintendent, Grant-Kohrs Ranch to Superintendents, BICA, GLAC, LIBI, & YELL; Unit Manager, BIHO, September 18, 1994, A44, Memoranda of Agreement, Montana Department of State Lands, BHNBA administrative files.

135 Jock Whitworth to Gail Jones, no date (1989), Folder 33, A82, BHNBA.


138 Memorandum of Agreement between Big Hole National Battlefield and Nez Perce Tribal Members, Folder 33, A82, BHNBA.

139 Regional Director to Superintendents, Rocky Mountain Region, January 2, 1991, H22, Golden Spike National Historic Site, Promontory, Utah, administrative files.

140 Statement of Work for a purchase order by the Nez Perce National Historical Park to the Nez Perce Tribe, 1994, File: NAGPRA, BHNBA administrative files.

141 Jock Whitworth interview.

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143 Jon G. James to Rudy Shaballa, July 28, 1997, James to Angela Broncheau, July 28, 1997, and James to Mike Penney, August 11, 1997, Jon G. James administrative files provided to authors on disk.
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Laws
and
Executive Orders
8. Big Hole Battlefield National Monument

Reservation of area for military purposes, for use in protecting monument, pursuant to Antiquities Act: Executive Order (No. 1216) of June 23, 1910................ 124
Enlarging the area: Proclamation (No. 2339) of June 29, 1939.................. 124

EXECUTIVE ORDER
[No. 1216—June 23, 1910]

It is hereby ordered that the E½ of the NE¼ of the SE¼ of the NW¼, sec. 24, T. 2 S., R. 17 W., Montana, containing 5 acres of unsurveyed land, as represented upon the accompanying diagram, embracing the Big Hole Battlefield Monument in Beaverhead County, be, and the same is hereby, reserved for military purposes for use in protecting said monument, in accordance with the act of Congress approved June 8, 1906 (34 Stats., 225).

Wm. H. Taft.
The White House,
June 23, 1910.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION
[No. 2339—June 29, 1939—53 Stat. 2544]

WHEREAS the unsurveyed E½ NE¼ SE¼ NW¼ sec. 24, T. 2 S., R. 17 W., P. M., Montana, was reserved by Executive Order No. 1216 of June 23, 1910, as the Big Hole Battlefield Monument;
WHEREAS upon survey it has been found that the area intended to be reserved by that Executive order is the five-acre tract designated as the "Big Hole Battlefield Monument" on General Land Office supplemental plat of the survey of sec. 24, approved July 19, 1917, and described by metes and bounds as follows:
Beginning at a point S. 0°1' W., 5.00 chs. and N. 89°42' E., 3.00 chs. from the northwest sixteenth-section corner of Sec. 24, T. 2 S., R. 17 W., M. P. M.; thence S. 0°2' W., 10.00 chs.; S. 89°42' W., 5.00 chs.; N. 10 chs.; N, 89°42' E., 5.0 chs.; to point of beginning;
WHEREAS it appears that certain public lands within the Beaverhead National Forest, adjacent to the Big Hole Battlefield Monument, are historic landmarks, forming a part of the battle grounds where Chief Joseph and a band of Nez Perce Indians were defeated by a detachment of United States Soldiers;
WHEREAS certain other public lands within the aforesaid national forest are contiguous to the said national monument and are necessary for the proper care, management, and protection of the historic landmarks included within the monument; and
WHEREAS it appears that it would be in the public interest to reserve all of the aforesaid public lands as a part of the said national monument:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 11, 36 (U. S. C., title 16, sec. 473), and the
proclaim that the above-mentioned Executive Order of June 23, 1910, is
hereby construed in conformity with the supplemental plat of survey
approved July 19, 1917, to embrace the tract described above by metes and
bounds, as well as the area erroneously reserved thereby; and that the here-
inafter-described lands are hereby excluded from the Beaverhead National
Forest and, subject to valid existing rights, added to and made a part of the
said monument, which is hereby designated as the Big Hole Battlefield
National Monument:

MONTANA PRINCIPAL MERIDIAN

T. 2 S., R. 17 W., sec. 24, lots 1 and 2, N 1/4 NW 1/4;
sec. 23, E 1/4 NE 1/4 NE 1/4, E 1/4 SE 1/4 NE 1/4;
comprising 195 acres.

Warning is hereby expressly given to all unauthorized persons not to
appropriate, injure, destroy, or remove any feature of this monument and
not to locate or settle upon any of the lands thereof.

The Director of the National Park Service under the direction of the
Secretary of the Interior, shall have the supervision, management, and
control of the monument as provided in the act of Congress entitled “An
act to establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes,” approved
supplementary thereto or amendatory thereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 29th day of June in the year of
our Lord nineteen hundred and thirty-nine, and of the Inde-
[sal] pendence of the United States of America the one hundred and
sixty-third.

By the President:
CORDELL HULL,
The Secretary of State.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
APPENDIX


Executive Order

ORGANIZATION OF EXECUTIVE AGENCIES

WHEREAS section 16 of the act of March 3, 1933 (Public No. 428, 47 Stat. 1517), provides for reorganizations within the executive branch of the Government; requires the President to investigate and determine what reorganizations are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the statute; and authorizes the President to make such reorganizations by Executive order; and

WHEREAS I have investigated the organization of all executive and administrative agencies of the Government and have determined that certain regroupings, consolidations, transfers, and abolitions of executive agencies and functions thereof are necessary to accomplish the purposes of section 16;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the aforesaid authority, I do hereby order that:

SECTION 2.—National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations

All functions of administration of public buildings, reservations, national parks, national monuments, and national cemeteries are consolidated in an Office of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations1 in the Department of the Interior, at the head of which shall be a Director of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations; except that where deemed desirable there may be excluded from this provision any public building or reservation which is chiefly employed as a facility in the work of a particular agency. This transfer and consolidation of functions shall include, among others, those of the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior and the National Cemeteries and Parks of the War Department which are located within the continental limits of the United States. National cemeteries located in foreign countries shall be transferred to the Department of State, and those located in insular possessions under the jurisdiction of the War Department shall be administered by the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department.

The functions of the following agencies are transferred to the Office of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations of the Department of the Interior, and the agencies are abolished:

- Arlington Memorial Bridge Commission
- Public Buildings Commission
- Public Buildings and Public Parks of the National Capital
- National Memorial Commission
- Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway Commission

1 "National Park Service" was substituted for "Office of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations" by Act of March 2, 1934 (48 Stat. 389), see excerpt, page 13.
Expenditures by the Federal Government for the purposes of the Commission of Fine Arts, the George Rogers Clark Sesquicentennial Commission, and the Rushmore National Commission shall be administered by the Department of the Interior.

* * *

**SECTION 19. General Provisions**

Each agency, all the functions of which are transferred to or consolidated with another agency, is abolished.

The records pertaining to an abolished agency or a function disposed of, disposition of which is not elsewhere herein provided for, shall be transferred to the successor. If there be no successor agency, and such abolished agency be within a department, said records shall be disposed of as the head of such department may direct.

The property, facilities, equipment, and supplies employed in the work of an abolished agency or the exercise of a function disposed of, disposition of which is not elsewhere herein provided for, shall, to the extent required, be transferred to the successor agency. Other such property, facilities, equipment, and supplies shall be transferred to the Procurement Division.

All personnel employed in connection with the work of an abolished agency or function disposed of shall be separated from the service of the United States, except that the head of any successor agency, subject to my approval, may, within a period of four months after transfer or consolidation, reappoint any of such personnel required for the work of the successor agency without reexamination or loss of civil-service status.

**SECTION 20. Appropriations**

Such portions of the unexpended balances of appropriations for any abolished agency or function disposed of shall be transferred to the successor agency as the Director of the Budget shall deem necessary.

Unexpended balances of appropriations for an abolished agency or function disposed of, not so transferred by the Director of the Budget, shall, in accordance with law, be impounded and returned to the Treasury.

**SECTION 21. Definitions**

As used in this order—

"Agency" means any commission, independent establishment, board, bureau, division, service, or office in the executive branch of the Government.

"Abolished agency" means any agency which is abolished, transferred, or consolidated.

"Successor agency" means any agency to which is transferred some other agency or function, or which results from the consolidation of other agencies or functions.

"Function disposed of" means any function eliminated or transferred.

**SECTION 22. Effective Date**

In accordance with law, this order shall become effective 61 days from its date; Provided, That in case it shall appear to the President that the interests of economy require that any transfer, consolidation, or elimination be delayed beyond the date this order becomes effective, he may, in
his discretion, fix a later date therefor, and he may for like cause further
defer such date from time to time.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE;
June 10, 1933.

[No. 6166]


Executive Order

Organization of Executive Agencies

WHEREAS executive order No. 6166 dated June 10, 1933, issued pursuant to the authority of Section 16 of the Act of March 3, 1933 (Public No. 428—47 Stat. 1517) provides in Section 2 as follows:

"All functions of administration of public buildings, reservations, national parks, national monuments, and national cemeteries are consolidated in an office of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations in the Department of the Interior, at the head of which shall be a Director of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations; except that where deemed desirable there may be excluded from this provision any public building or reservation which is chiefly employed as a facility in the work of a particular agency. This transfer and consolidation of functions shall include, among others, those of the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior and the National Cemeteries and Parks of the War Department which are located within the continental limits of the United States. National Cemeteries located in foreign countries shall be transferred to the Department of State, and those located in insular possessions under the jurisdiction of the War Department shall be administered by the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department."

and;

WHEREAS to facilitate and expedite the transfer and consolidation of certain units and agencies contemplated thereby, it is desirable to make more explicit said Section 2 of the aforesaid executive order of June 10, 1933, insofar as the same relates to the transfer of agencies now administered by the War Department:

NOW, THEREFORE, said executive order No. 6166, dated June 10, 1933, is hereby interpreted as follows:

1. The cemeteries and parks of the War Department transferred to the Interior Department are as follows:
APPENDIX

NATIONAL MILITARY PARKS

Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, Georgia and Tennessee.
Fort Donelson National Military Park, Tennessee.
Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battle Fields Memorial, Virginia.
Kings Mountain National Military Park, South Carolina.
Moore's Creek National Military Park, North Carolina.
Petersburg National Military Park, Virginia.
Shiloh National Military Park, Tennessee.
Stones River National Military Park, Tennessee.
Vicksburg National Military Park, Mississippi.

NATIONAL PARKS

Abraham Lincoln National Park, Kentucky.
Fort McHenry National Park, Maryland.

BATTLEFIELD SITES

Antietam Battlefield, Maryland.
Appomattox, Virginia.
Brices Cross Roads, Mississippi.
Chalmette Monument and Grounds, Louisiana.
Cowpens, South Carolina.
Fort Necessity, Wharton County, Pennsylvania.
Kenesaw Mountain, Georgia.
Monocacy, Maryland.
Tupelo, Mississippi.
White Plains, New York.

NATIONAL MONUMENTS

Big Hole Battlefield, Beaverhead County, Montana.
Cabrillo Monument, Ft. Rosecrans, California.
Castle Pinckney, Charleston, South Carolina.
Father Millet Cross, Fort Niagara, New York.
Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Florida.
Fort Matanzas, Florida.
Fort Pulaski, Georgia.
Meriwether Lewis, Hardin County, Tennessee.
Mound City Group, Chillicothe, Ohio.

MISCELLANEOUS MEMORIALS

Camp Blount Tablets, Lincoln County, Tennessee.
Kill Devil Hill Monument, Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.
New Echota Marker, Georgia.
Lee Mansion, Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia.

1 Wharton Township, Fayette County.
APPENDIX

NATIONAL CEMETERIES

Battleground, District of Columbia.
Antietam, (Sharpsburg) Maryland.
Vicksburg, Mississippi.
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Fort Donelson, (Dover) Tennessee.
Shiloh, (Pittsburg Landing) Tennessee.
Stones River, (Murfreesboro) Tennessee.
Fredericksburg, Virginia.
Poplar Grove, (Petersburg) Virginia.
Yorktown, Virginia.

2. Pursuant to Section 22 of said executive order it is hereby ordered that the transfer from the War Department of national cemeteries other than those named above be, and the same is hereby postponed until further order.

3. Also pursuant to Section 22 of said executive order it is hereby ordered that the transfer of national cemeteries located in foreign countries from the War Department to the Department of State and the transfer of those located in insular possessions under the jurisdiction of the War Department to the Bureau of Insular Affairs of said Department be, and the same are hereby postponed until further order.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE.
July 28, 1933.
[No. 6228]

200
Public Law 88-24

AN ACT

To redesignate the Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, to revise the boundaries thereof, and for other purposes.

Public Law 88-24—MAY 17, 1963

May 17, 1963
[S. 138]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Big Hole Battlefield National Monument, established by Executive Order Numbered 1216 of June 23, 1910, and enlarged by Proclamation Numbered 2339 of June 29, 1939, is hereby redesignated as the Big Hole National Battlefield.

Sec. 2. In order to preserve historic features and sites associated with the Battle of the Big Hole and to facilitate their administration

77 STAT.] PUBLIC LAW 88-24—MAY 17, 1963

and interpretation, the boundaries of the Big Hole National Battlefield are hereby revised to include the following described lands:

MONTANA PRINCIPAL MERIDIAN

Township 2 south, range 17, west: Section 13, southwest quarter southeast quarter, southeast quarter southwest quarter, east half southwest quarter southwest quarter; section 23, east half northeast quarter southeast quarter; section 24, west half east half, north half southwest quarter, southeast quarter southwest quarter, east half southwest quarter southwest quarter; section 25, those portions of the northeast quarter northwest quarter and the northwest quarter northeast quarter lying north of the north right-of-way line of relocated Montana State Route 49; consisting of approximately 466 acres.

Sec. 3. (a) The Secretary of the Interior may acquire by donation, purchase, exchange, or otherwise, lands and interests in lands within the area described in section 2 of this Act.

(b) Any lands described in section 2 of this Act that are a part of the Beaverhead National Forest when this Act takes effect are hereby excluded from the forest and added to the Big Hole National Battlefield.

(c) Lands included in the Big Hole National Battlefield pursuant to this Act shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of the Act entitled "An Act to establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes", approved August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1-3), as amended and supplemented.

Sec. 4. There is hereby retroceded to the State of Montana, effective when accepted by said State in accordance with its laws, such jurisdiction as has been ceded by such State to the United States over any lands within the boundaries of the Big Hole National Battlefield reserving in the United States, however, concurrent legislative jurisdiction over such lands.

Sec. 5. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums not exceeding $20,000 as are necessary for the acquisition of lands and interests in land pursuant to this Act.

Approved May 17, 1963.
V. NATIONAL BATTLEFIELDS

1. Big Hole

An Act to provide for increases in appropriation ceilings and boundary changes in certain units of the national park system, and for other purposes. (86 Stat. 120)

Re it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—ACQUISITION CEILING INCREASES

Sec. 101. The limitation on appropriations for the acquisition of lands and interests therein within units of the national park system contained in the following Acts are amended as follows:

(2) Big Hole National Battlefield, Montana: section 5 of the Act of May 17, 1963 (77 Stat. 18), is amended by changing "$20,000" to "$42,500";

Approved April 11, 1972.
NOTICE

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