These proceedings are composed of the papers presented at the 1997 and 1998 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society. The 1997 papers include: "The Role of Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Education" (Jerome A. Popp); "On Accountability and Accreditation in Teacher Education: A Plea for Alternatives" (Gary D. Fenstermacher); "Searching for Teacher Education Programs that are Consistent with Democratic Ideals--A Response to Professor Fenstermacher" (Ronald Swartz); "On Anti-Intellectualism in Popular Culture: Bud Abbott, Lou Costello, and Lon Chaney, Jr. Go To College" (Michael A. Oliker); "Character Education in John Dewey" (Holly Salls); "H. G. Wells and the Origins of Progressive Education" (Don G. Smith); "John Dewey's 'Experience and Education' and Museum Education" (Ted Ansbacher); "Breaking the Silence" (Louis Silverstein); "Multiculturalism and the Teaching of Literature" (Allan Johnston); "Waiting: Killing Time? Playtime?" (Walter P. Krolikowski); "Rousseau and the Religious Basis of Political Order" (John M. Fennell); "The Discourse of Natural Instruction in Rousseau's 'Emile'" (Guillemette Johnston); "Hermeneutic Disclosure as Freedom: John Dewey and Paulo Freire on the Non-Representational Nature of Education" (Anthony Petruzzi); and "Models of Educational Democracy" (Walter Feinberg, Belden Fields, and Nicole Roberts). The 1998 papers presented included: "Historical Precedents Concerning the Mission of the University" (John C. Scott); "How We Go On: Values Education and Reinhabitation in Gary Snyder's 'The Practice of the Wild'" (Allan Johnston); "Toward a Progressivist Philosophy of Environmental Education" (Ron Meyers); "Savages, Barbarians, Civilized: A Case of Survival?" (Walter P. Krolikowski); "W. E. B. Du Bois and the Hampton Idea" (Percy L. Moore); "Dewey, Correctional Education, and Offender Habilitation" (Clyde A. Winters); "Nietzsche as Educator" (Kirk Wolf); "Toward A Nietzschean Pedagogy" (Maughn Gregory); "The Theatre of Education: Rousseau's 'Lettre a d'Alembert' and 'Emile'" (Guillemette Johnston); "Educational Implications of H. G. Wells' 'The Time Machine' and 'The Wonderful Visit'" (Don G. Smith); "The Marriage of Self and World: John Dewey and Stanley Cavell on the Romantics" (David Granger); "Understanding Wisdom: Its Nature and Development" (David B. Annis); "Socrates and Aristotle's Contribution to the Character Education Movement: Can Character and Virtue Be Taught?" (Madonna Murphy); "On Some Positions in Ray Boisvert's Recent Book" (Howard...
G. Callaway); "John Dewey's Educational Theory and the Challenge of American Racism" (Steve Fishman and Lucille McCarthy); "John Dewey, Democracy and Education, and What We May Expect from Schools" (Joop W. A. Berding and Siebren Miedema); "Boisvert and the Levels of Deweyan Engagement" (Alan G. Phillips, Jr.); "Dewey Now: Lived Experience versus Scientific Method" (Raymond D. Boisvert); "Bloom and His Critics: Nihilism and 'True Education'" (Jon M. Fennell); and "Cognition, Dewey, and the Organization of Teacher Education in Small Schools" (Clyde A. Winters and Cynthia K. Valenciano). The volume concludes with memorials to Arthur Brown, Harry S. Broudy, C. J. B. MacMillian, and Frederick L. Will, six appendices, and an index. (BT)
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RICHARD M. DALEY
MAYOR

CITY OF CHICAGO

November 6, 1998

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

GREETINGS

As Mayor and on behalf of the City of Chicago, I extend my warmest greetings to the members, honored guests and all participants in the annual meeting of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society (MPES).

Chicago is always proud to be the host City for your conference. One of the cornerstones of my administration is to assure that every person in our city has an opportunity to receive a quality education. Few endeavors are more important to our future than this. Members of the MPES are at the forefront of educational theory in our region. Your efforts help to ensure that this goal is met.

I join with you to honor the lives and accomplishments of the distinguished members of your profession who died during the past year. Arthur Brown, Harry S. Broudy, Frederick L. Will and C.J.B. Macmillan were scholars of great significance. Throughout their careers, they inspired thought and discussion and will be greatly missed.

While you are here, I hope that you will take time to discover some of what makes Chicago a favorite destination for visitors from around the world. I know that you will like what you find—from our great architecture to our beautiful Lake Michigan shoreline with its refurbished Navy Pier, from our exciting nightlife with its excellent restaurants, clubs and theaters to our many world-renowned cultural institutions, fine shopping and ethnically diverse neighborhoods.

Best wishes for an exciting and productive conference.

Sincerely,

Mayor
Preface and Acknowledgments

Michael A. Oliker
Executive Director MPES,
Adjunct Lecturer Loyola University Chicago

This edition of the MPES Proceedings covers the two year term of President Jerome A. Popp. I am grateful to President Popp for appointing me Executive Director of the MPES and for assigning the jobs of Chair of the Program Committee and Editor of the Proceedings to the Executive Director. Because of a serious illness, President Popp was unable to attend the 1998 meeting so I was given the task of doing the reading of the Presidential Address.

The responsibilities of the Executive Director also include expanding the membership of the MPES. Several past and present officers of the society prefer that the MPES attract members from anywhere in the United States and members from other nations who might be interested in our topics. My effort has been to expand our USA membership by inviting some nationally known individuals to make presentations and to notify scholars around the world by e-mail that we welcome the interest of researchers interested in John Dewey and/or educational theory from anywhere.

At the 1997 meeting the opening address was given by Prof. Gary D. Fenstermacher of the University of Michigan. Prof. Fenstermacher teaches philosophy of education and is the former Dean of Education at the University of Arizona. He is also well know for his collaboration with John I. Goodlad as co-editors of the 1984 yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. The other nationally known scholar who spoke at the 1997 meeting is Professor Walter Feinberg of the University of Illinois at Urbana. Prof. Feinberg is a past President of both the national
Philosophy of Education Society and the American Educational Studies Association. Both Feinberg and Fenstermacher are co-authors of books in Jonas Soltis’s highly regarded “Thinking About Education” series from Teachers College Press.

At the 1998 meeting, I chose (with President Popp’s approval, of course) to organize an opening memorial session to honor the memory of three highly regarded philosophers of education — Harry S. Broudy, Arthur Brown, and C. J. B. Macmillan — who had died within the year prior to the meeting. I also chose to invite a memorial address on behalf of the late Prof. Frederick L. Will, a deceased Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois whose graduate seminars had been strongly influential on graduate students in philosophy of education in the 1950s and 1960s. The late Prof. Arthur Brown of Wayne State University was a past President of the MPES. The memorial presentations on behalf of Prof. Brown were done by two other past Presidents of MPES: Profs. Ronald Swartz and Robert Craig. The late Prof. C. J. B. (“Jim”) Macmillan of Florida State University was a past President of the national PES who had been collaborating with Dr. Jon M. Fennell — a member of MPES — on some philosophical research, so I chose to include Prof. Macmillan. The late Prof. Harry S. Broudy of the University of Illinois at Urbana can be described as a “superstar” in philosophy of education. He was also past President of the national PES and had hundreds of publications including articles, books, and even one film that I have seen. Ronald D. Szoke, a computer specialist at the Urbana campus of the U of I, had done graduate study with Broudy in the 1960s and had collaborated with him on an awesome bibliography of work in the philosophy of education entitled: Philosophy of Education: An Organization of Topics and Selected Sources which was published by the University of Illinois Press in 1967. The other memorial presentation in honor of Broudy was by Dean Emeritus John M. Wozniak of the College of Education at Loyola University Chicago who stressed Broudy’s impact on the field. And the late Prof. Frederick L. Will was honored by the former Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Illinois: Prof. James D. Wallace.

One of the two concurrent closing sessions at the 1998 meeting was a session of Commentary on Raymond Boisvert’s new book John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time. Boisvert’s book was published as part of the State University of New York Press’s Philosophy of Education Series which is edited by a past President of the MPES: Prof. Philip L. Smith of Ohio State University. I am proud to have been able to recruit a number of speakers from Europe by sending out calls for papers by e-mail on the international
"John Dewey List." Prof. Howard Callaway an American alumnus of Temple University who now is at the University of Mainz in Germany is becoming well-known among Dewey scholars for his scholarly commentary on the "Dewey List" and his book on pragmatic theory of language that was published in Europe. Prof. Siebren Miedema of the Free University Amsterdam is becoming a well-known Dewey scholar in Europe. Prof. Miedema's graduate student Joop Berding co-authored the paper with Miedema and also managed to attend our meeting with him. Prof. Steve Fishman of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and Prof. Lucille McCarthy of the University of Maryland at Baltimore recently completed an important book that shows the relevance of Dewey's philosophy of education to teaching methods at the college level. Prof. Boisvert attended the session and responded to the reviewers.

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS BY INVITED GUESTS (Alphabetical by title.)


Microcomputers on the Farm: Getting Started, by Duane E. Erickson, Royce A. Hinton, Ronald D. Szoke, ASIN: 0813811570.


The Role of Cognitive Science In Philosophy of Education

Jerome A. Popp
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of education is the normative study of the relationships among (a) the cognitive and affective development of individuals, (b) teaching practices, and (c) social institutions, especially schools. Until recently, the literature in philosophy of education subordinated the normative studies of teaching and schooling to conceptions of individual human-development. In other words, theories of worthwhile teaching and conceptions of good institutions were seen as based upon accounts of human nature and theories of worthwhile human development.

Much of the contemporary discourse in philosophy of education suggests that theories of worthwhile human development supervene on characterizations of (often utopian) conceptions of society, which explains the exiguous accounts of learning found in this literature. Such conceptions of the structure of discourse in philosophy of education assume a kind of universal plasticity for human development. When the desirable society can be characterized prior to, and independently of, conclusions about the nature of human development, one must be assuming that human development is so plastic that it can take the form required by any social theory.

Explanatory studies of learning, cognition, and intelligent problem-solving are developing rapidly, and forming new relationships among previously disparate academic disciplines. That any group of philosophers or sociologists could establish a viable conception of the good society, including adequate accounts of how children therein should be treated prior to consideration of
this research, is preposterous. If philosophy of education is to address adequately the normative questions of education, it must be informed by the research into the nature of cognition. Since cognitive science is now the prime study of the nature of learning—including how learning is related to thinking, problem-solving, and intelligence—it must be seen as an essential element in the normative studies of education. It is now impossible to engage in significant analyses and evaluations of educational theories, policies, and practices without an understanding of the results of research in cognitive science.

In defense of this claim I want to briefly reconsider Dewey’s educational and philosophic ideas in light of the philosophic literature in cognitive science. I hope to show that cognitive science provides additional support for Dewey’s criticisms of empiricism and rationalism. But more importantly, I hope to show that cognitive science can lead to the further explication of Dewey’s arguments. When one reads the literature in philosophy of education, one often gets the impression that Dewey’s thought and/or pragmatism in general, right or wrong, are for the most part finished products. But as I will show, this view is seriously deficient and dramatically mistaken.

THE SEARCH FOR A UNIVERSAL ACID

In his analysis of Darwin’s theory and “the meaning of life,” Dennett (1995: 63) appeals to one of those discussions that many of you will recall from your days on the elementary-school playground. If there were a universal acid that could dissolve any substance, what type of container would we keep it in? Dennett refers to this bit of school yard speculation as a way of characterizing what he takes to be the philosophic significance of evolutionary theory. Though many have tried to contain the consequences of Darwin’s theory of evolution, Dennett argues that it is, epistemically speaking, the universal acid.

Dennett presents his own inimitable account of the philosophical significance of evolution, but it is not a distortion to claim that Dewey was the first American philosopher to explicate fully what the Darwinian discovery meant for philosophic inquiry. Dennett seems correct to argue that any theory of consciousness must show us how consciousness evolved from nonconscious antecedents. But Dewey’s achievement was much wider in scope. If Darwin’s account is correct, then all philosophic concepts must have evolutionary explanations.

A number of contemporary writers in philosophy of education hold an ideological thesis contrary to the Dewey-Dennett universal philosophic acid: All scientific and philosophic theories, while proffering themselves as sources
of objective (empiricism) or warranted (pragmatism) conclusions, are actually manifestations of the underlying ideologies of their authors. This ideology-is-at-the-root-of-everything thesis takes the office of philosophy of education to be that of (a) exposing the politically oppressive ideological underlayments of claims about worthwhile educational practices, and (b) replacing them with claims drawn from some utopian ideology. (I think the old "contradiction finding" methodology of the ideologues has been abandoned, perhaps because they finally discovered that a contradiction implies every thesis, not any one particular thesis.)

The ideologues will claim that Darwinism is itself just another ideology, and a very capitalistic one at that. Obviously, we cannot have two universal acids. So, which is it? Does ideology dissolve Darwinism, or does Darwinism dissolve ideology? Expressed in the terms of contemporary epistemology, are all claims in cognitive science, including those about the educational practices they subvene, reducible to ideology; or, are there claims about cognition, learning, intelligence, and problem solving that are extra-ideological? If the former is true, then all meanings are created by political processes, which include: negotiation, persuasion, propaganda, indoctrination, intimidation, and so forth. But if the later view is correct, then things are not at all well within contemporary philosophy of education.

To avoid allowing this discussion to take the "It is so!—No it isn't!" form, we should ask ourselves why we are engaging in the discourse. As Steven Horst (1996: 1) has recently observed, "There are few things that hold greater fascination for us human beings than the project of explaining ourselves to ourselves." Is anyone going to argue that how we explain ourselves to ourselves is irrelevant to how we evaluate approaches to parenting and schooling? Part of what we want to know is, as Patrician Churchland (1986: 152) puts it (in Neurophilosophy), "how humans and other animals learn, what makes them smart, how they plan and problem solve, how they recollect and forget, how their brains differ when their personalities differ, how they can be self-aware, what consciousness is." It is obvious to me that her philosophic arguments are directly related to the theory and practice of education. If we think about how we can develop explanatory theories of effective teacher-practices, it seems clear that pursuing answers to the questions she raises are unavoidable aspects of the realization of such theories. To put it more strongly, adequate theories of teaching are impossible without answers to these questions.

Asserting cultural relativism as epistemology makes explaining ourselves to ourselves a local problem—local in that other cultures will in all likelihood
have other explanations. Some have claimed that our science is just our magic. They want to defend the thesis that "a society's image of the natural world is completely on a par with its image of the social world. Both are culturally relative, and in neither case is it possible to prove one image superior to the other." (This is Giere's (1988: 131-2) characterization of the view he rejects.) The relativists' claim that research in educational psychology and teaching practices is purely a matter of giving expression to cultural biases. I have given the naturalists' answer to this view (1998), and will not pursue that argument further here except to point out that the term 'nihilism' is now appearing in the literature of philosophy of education.

But Horst's question is normative: how should we explain ourselves to ourselves? Which myth continues to explain as neuroscience floods us with new information about the brain, cognition, memory, and consciousness? Science is, in a sense, the search for myths that have longevity in an age where new information is being generated at an ever expanding rate.

**Up From Chemistry**

"An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe." (Dennett 1995: 203) That little scrap of chemistry, DNA, was formed by the rules of chemical action—physical algorithms. Darwin's theory is that by means of these algorithms and chance, biology as we know it emerged. Biology has design, but this design is not explained by appeal to a designer. (Kitcher's (1993: 380) way of describing Darwin.) A designer has a design in mind, but when chemistry and chance were producing DNA, the mind had not yet been produced.

When neural tissue developed to a certain level, consciousness began to emerge. We could think of the emergence of consciousness as an idealized event, such as Hobbes social compact account of society, but as Dretske (1995: 168) puts it, humans became conscious as a person becomes wealthy if he or she is given enough pennies long enough. And as Dewey liked to point out, when humans became conscious of their thinking, they turned thinking on itself, and everything changed. *Evolution became our responsibility.* At the very time when we can literally remake ourselves, and articulate the principles of planetary change, some among us hold that thinking can never get beyond itself and will forever be the slave of political ideology.

Dennett holds that Darwin provides us with the wherewithal to jettison what he calls philosophic skyhooks—concepts that philosophers drop on us
out of the blue to solve their problems. (1995: 73-80) Consider one of philosophy's most famous skyhooks. Kant views the mind as possessing synthetic \textit{a priori} categories such as time and causation (among well-known others used by Piaget). How does the mind come by these categories? This is not Kant's question, which is, of course, how is our knowledge possible? Kant's answer to this question, which he considered to be as significant for epistemology as Copernicus' view was to planetary science, was the creation of synthetic \textit{a priori} skyhooks.

In the age of cognitive science, we still ask how the mind develops the concept of time, causation, and so forth. But we place a restriction on our answers—no skyhooks! The Darwinian account of the evolution of thought from mindless little scraps of chemistry is a \textit{crane} account, i.e., building up our epistemic structures from the bottom. What contemporary philosophy seeks to achieve is the construction of a theory of knowledge from the ground (scraps of chemistry) up. Dewey and Dennett are epistemic-crane engineers.

So what is the crane for our concept of time? Consider a simple case. Humans have four types of taste cells on the tongue—sour, sweet, salty, and bitter. What we taste (excluding olfaction, which participates in what we call 'taste') is a function of these four types of sensors. When a person tastes a peach, a given activation pattern of the four kinds of taste sensors is created. Certain neurons of the second layer, called target cells, detect the peach activation pattern in the sensory layer, and become activated themselves. (Churchland 1995: 37) Some cells of the next layer detect this target-cell activation and become activated. In this way sensory information is passed along the ascending pathways.

The action of the sensory layer on the target cells constitutes the first step in the ascending pathway, with each successive layer's activation pattern producing an activation pattern in the next layer. As information moves up the pathways, it is possible to distinguish earlier data from later data; that is, it is possible for brains to order data, and thus events, by time, which must be the simplest way that we experience time. Paul Churchland (1995: 104-106) suggests further that such temporal orderings allow for the explanation of cause-effect thinking. While Kant may have shown that certain concepts are required to explain how it is that we know about the world, he did not explain the origin of these concepts. Note that we have replaced Kant's mysterious skyhook-account of our concept of time with a crane account. In other words, the theory of mind based upon the synthetic \textit{a priori} account of knowledge has been dissolved in Darwin's universal acid.
Dissolved along with the Kantian a priori, are all forms of nativism or preformationism, such as that contained in the theories of Rousseau, Maslow, Chomsky, Piaget, and Kohlberg. The nature versus nurture debate that has historically occupied much of the discourse in philosophy of education is being further clarified by neuroscience. But the crane approach to explaining ourselves to ourselves is not without problems, the most significant of which one could argue, is the Frame problem.

WHAT IS THE FRAME PROBLEM?

Each person has a set of beliefs gained from experience and inference. When new information is learned, either (a) the set of existing beliefs is unaffected by the new beliefs, which means that the new information has entered the belief system additively, or (b) some of the existing beliefs will have to be modified in light of the new evidence—think of the historical development of any area of science. The Frame Problem asks how we should select (frame or identify) from the set of existing beliefs those beliefs that should be reevaluated, given the acquisition of certain new beliefs.

For Dennett (1998: 274), the Frame Problem is “a deep, new, unsolved epistemological problem ignored by generations of philosophers.” And “Plato almost saw it. In the Theaetetus, he briefly explored the implications of a wonderful analogy:”

SOCRATES: Now consider whether knowledge is a thing you can possess in that way without having it about you, like a man who has caught some wild birds—pigeons or what not—and keeps them in an aviary he has made for them at home. In a sense, of course, we might say he “has” them all the time inasmuch as he possesses them, mightn’t we?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But in another sense he “has” none of them, though he has got control of them, now that he has made them captive in an enclosure of his own; he can take and have hold of them whenever he likes by catching any bird he chooses, and let them go again; and it is open to him to do that as often as he pleases.

“Plato saw that merely possessing knowledge (like birds in an aviary) is not enough; one must be able to command what one possesses. To perform well, one must be able to get the right bit of knowledge to fly to the edge at the right time.... But he underestimated the difficulty of this trick, and hence underestimated the sort of theory one would have to have to give of the
organization of knowledge in order to explain our bird-charming talents." (Dennett (1998: 275))

Those who seek to write programs to make machines engage in intelligent problem-solving must deal with the Frame Problem in that they must determine what knowledge is relevant within a given problem situation. Anyone who is at all familiar with philosophic problems will sense that this is no simple matter. But let us set aside the creation of robots and focus on human learners.

Classical computationalists, such as Ned Block, Dan Dennett, and Jerry Fodor, grant that the human brain is not a serial digital computer but a massive parallel processor. They argue that just as a desktop serial, digital computer can run both Microsoft Word and Wordperfect, the brain's parallel-processing can simulate a serial, digital computer. The argument is that the actual architecture of the processor (serial or parallel) does not matter, because the mind (intelligence) is composed of algorithms. That is, our reflective, analytical, and synthetic powers are algorithmic, digital computer programs that run on our parallel-processing brains. The classical computationalist view has entered educational discussions in the form of Bruer's popular book, Schools for Thought (1993).

Connectionists, such as Patricia Churchland, Paul Churchland, and Horgan and Tienson, claim that it is seriously misleading to use the digital computer as a model for mind. They argue that the fact that the brain is a massive parallel-processor indicates that human learning and cognition are not explained by programs (algorithms) written for digital computers. They point to the work in artificial intelligence and neuroscience that interprets learning as the process of changing the activation patterns within neural networks.

Connectionists see the Frame Problem as the downfall of classical computationalism. Horgan and Tienson (1996: 37) hold that, "it is utterly inefficient, if not impossible, to search through all the items of stored information to see whether and how each item should be changed." Moreover, "Nobody has the slightest clue how a tractable computational process could update memory appropriately or find relevant information efficiently for beliefs systems of the size possessed by humans. Indeed, it all seems entirely likely that it can't be done via (classical) computation at all." (Horgan and Tienson, 1996: 38) For the connectionists, the only way to solve the Frame Problem is in terms of the changing activation states of neural networks. (A more complete analysis of classical computational psychology versus the neural network view is presented in Popp, 1999).
John Dewey and the Frame Problem

To rehearse the familiar, Dewey argued that problem-solving is always a matter of the analysis of means, ends, and contexts. The end of education is more education, which is another way of saying that education has no end beyond itself. And just what is education, so construed? Dewey presented his locus classicus: "Education is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience that adds to the meaning of experience and increases the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience." (MW 9: 82) How can we reconstruct our experience so that we achieve greater meaning and autonomy? The answer is, of course, the methods of reflective thinking, which are best exemplified in scientific inquiry. What sociopolitical context maximizes the reconstruction of experience? Such a context will (a) be characterized by each individual consciously sharing "numerous and varied" interests with all other individuals, and (b) permit and actively support the "full and free interplay" of each individual with "other forms of association." (MW 9: 89) To the degree that a given sociopolitical context satisfies these conditions, it is a democratic context. Thus, it is within a democratic context that each individual maximizes the meaning of experience and achieves the greatest autonomy.

For a good part of the twentieth century, this account of the relationship between human development and the good society has occupied those interested in educational theory. But it is now possible to further explicate this view. Dewey's locus classicus makes his whole theory of education, his whole philosophy, indeed pragmatism itself, dependent on the notion of reconstructing experience. We advance educational theory as well as pragmatism if we can further explicate our answer to the question of how we go about reconstructing our experience.

Dewey's account of education places the Frame Problem at the epistemic center of the teaching profession. Some sort of answer to the Frame Problem is required if we are to expect teachers to (a) implement the processes that lead students toward the reconstruction of their experience, and (b) avoid actions that inhibit it. The claim that teaching is a profession as opposed to a mere occupation entails the claim that teachers possess certain specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by other well-educated people and that the professional practice involved is regulated by a code of professional ethics. An understanding of the Frame Problem and what it means for classroom activities must surely be central to the professional knowledge and ethics of teaching.

I hope that it is now clear that the Frame Problem is neither an empirical question of teacher effectiveness, nor a technical question in educational
psychology. The Frame Problem asks about how we adequately process information, which leads us into the most prominent issue in contemporary philosophy of mind.

Democracy as the Context of Cognitive Growth

On the neural network view of thinking, the brain brings previously acquired information to bear on perception by means of descending pathways. For example, imagine that you find part of a photograph that someone has torn into many small pieces. Even though the sensory input is seriously degraded, we can often recognize the persons in the photo. Or, consider all of those cases when you thought you heard someone call your name, and then discovered that no one had. How do these things happen?

Information comes through the descending pathways and allows us to fill in the missing elements in degraded perception. While the sensory layer's activation patterns are activating certain target cells, other (previously acquired) information is being brought to bear on this same perceptual event. But as Paul Churchland (1995: 113) points out, the specific information from the descending pathways is not always predictable. It is not algorithmic as to what information a specific bit of sensory information may summon from the descending pathways. We may be able to catch our epistemic birds, as Socrates suggested, but which birds will be together at the time of any given cage opening is not fully predictable.

It may turn out that the overall state of the neural network at the time the new information is acquired assigns higher probabilities to some recollections that others. The same perceptual information may evoke different recollections under different network states. This does not lead us to the conclusion that theories of teaching are impossible because we can never know the network states of our students. This would be the conclusion one would be forced to if one assumes the classical computational view of thinking as algorithmic.

The hypothesis that (a) previously acquired information is brought to bear on a given learning or problem situation by means of the descending pathways, and (b) it is not fully predictable just what information will make the descent, has great import for theory of teaching. Those who advocate direct teaching, such as Madeline Hunter (1986), always characterize teaching as algorithmic. The first stages of the algorithm typically involve review, stating learning objectives, and set induction, i.e., developing an anticipatory set. This initial period of teaching is supposed to lead students to engage
in activities that will allow them to make connections between what was previously achieved and what is to be studied in the current lesson.

The theory of direct teaching sees teachers as the determiners and solicitors of student’s previously acquired information that shall be brought to bear on the present lesson. This approach works to some degree. Since each student relates to the direct teacher, there is no reason to have students interact—such interactions are thought to lead to disruptive classroom behavior. But the neural network approach suggests that the unpredictable nature of the information from the descending pathways is not being properly utilized by direct teaching.

Dewey viewed the development of the mind as a social process and he held that we should think of society as a means to our cognitive development. Cognitive science has obviously given great effort at addressing questions about minds, thinking, intelligence and so forth. But Dewey’s view brings us to the social dimension. Dennett correctly sees evolutionary theory as the source for our understanding of the origins of consciousness and intelligence, but he does not inquire into the possible social origins of consciousness or intelligence. Did consciousness develop to the level that we know of it because of social interactions? Many philosophers seem to stop their analyses with biology. Dewey is saying that the concrete operations of making food, clothing, and shelter will not explain the highly developed intelligence humans now exhibit, nor does it provide the means for more than minimal individual growth.

Let’s assume that Dennett (1991: 190) is correct when he says that the human brain is the same in our heads as it was in the heads of our ancestors 10,000 years ago. (I can find no writers disputing his claim.) Dennett says that the difference between us and our ancestors is that we have better software to make our brains function as more intelligent machines. I think that this analogy is useful to a point, but it is now serving to screen off certain dimensions of the topic we are studying. For example, if the connectionists are correct, then the software we are using has to be loaded into our brains, but not the way that one copies a disk to a hard drive or loads a program in memory. This is a truly algorithmic (and mindless) process. But how does our parallel-processing brain load a program?

According to the connectionists, a so-called program is in our brains when we have achieved certain activation patterns. How do we create these activation patterns? Someday it may be possible to wave a device over our heads that induces some previously set activation pattern, but at present we have to achieve these patterns. How do we do this? We read, write, and social-
ly interact. We have to program ourselves by our own cognitive efforts. Note how this reflects Dewey's point that education is not preparation for life, but is life itself. We can do what we can do because of our experience. We create those activation patterns that allow for intelligent problem-solving.

The Frame Problem has not been addressed in educational theory, at least directly. How do we inventory our beliefs that might require modification, given a new experience? We can think about the problem while alone, but when we are in the presence of others who both have the same experience and are willing to talk about it, our ability to deal with the Frame Problem is maximized. We cannot always predict what our response will be—what will come down the pathways. Neither can anyone else. When we hear what others are thinking we gain ideas about our own beliefs. We profit from other peoples' mental associations with common problems. Dewey's insight was that a social context that maximized our ability to reconstruct experience (deal with the Frame Problem) would have to be one that was as open as possible with regard to other forms of association.

Numerous and varied consciously-shared interests among participants in an inquiry create a social common-ground in which participants can understand each other. Dewey would say that we become conscious of shared interests through social interaction. When a situation develops where the parties are not interacting, social remediation is required. But deficient situations do not have to occur. If the development of children were optimized, development would be a process of engaging in wider and wider forms of social interaction. Through such interactions, consciously shared interests would become evident. One can hope that the Internet and other technologies to come will further these democratic principles. (For a defense of Dewey's principles mentioned above against the criticisms of Hook and Rorty, see Fott (1998: 83-84).)

A Classroom Example

Kindergarten students studying spiders will have many questions to ask about a spider brought to school: How many legs does it have? How does it eat? Where does it live? How does it spin a web? Children already have experiences of varying kinds with spiders and will make a host of different connections with them, in terms of previous experience. When students observe the spider, they are acquiring sensory data, which moves through the ascending pathways. They are also bringing previously acquired information and associations to bear on this sensory input by means of descending pathways. Students are
experiencing, for the most part, the same data in their ascending pathways, but the information that their individual descending pathways are bringing to bear on this situation will vary widely. As the students of the group share their experiences with spiders, a pool of previously acquired, but not always predictable, information is made available to all participants. To say that this allows students participating in the discussion to learn vicariously about the topic grossly underdescribes the situation. The pooled experience creates a context in which each student may find that their beliefs are not congruent with those of other students, thus, creating a context of mutual inquiry. As ideas are shared, the previously acquired information of one student adds to her or his own understanding as he or she increases the understanding of others. One student's spontaneous association will evoke different associations in others. Such exchanges may range beyond spiders into all sorts of subcultural differences. (This approach is developed in M. Popp, 1997).

What social conditions optimize students' ability to deal with the Frame Problem? To optimize our ability to profit from new experiences requires that we interact with those engaged in other forms of association. This goes beyond the potential or permission to interact with other forms. To deal adequately with the Frame Problem requires that students feel free to pool much of the information from their descending pathways, which will occur only under the conditions of mutual respect and feelings of personal safety.

Students who interact in the fashion described will have increased opportunities to solve the Frame Problem. When students are presented with a method, technique, theory, rule-of-thumb, and so forth, some will think, "This subject matter is irrelevant to me." In many cases, this conclusion results from the student's failure to deal with the Frame Problem. Through the interaction with other students, especially how these students see the relevance of the subject matter at issue to their own goals and desires, the original skeptical student may come to see that this method, etc., is in fact quite useful. It may turn out that the only effective methodology for dealing with the Frame Problem is by means of social interaction with competent peers. Through such social interactions we modify our conceptual prototypes, which suggests further that one of the most valuable educational resources that classrooms offer students are other students.

REFERENCES

**ADDENDUM**

**Introduction to Cognitive Science and Philosophy**
The following seven titles offer a good general introduction to the philosophic aspects of cognitive science.


**Substantial Studies in Cognitive Science**
To the above list add the following titles:

1997 Annual Meeting
On Accountability and Accreditation in Teacher Education: A Plea for Alternatives

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In this paper, I propose that a choice in approaches to specialized accreditation may benefit teacher education. This choice is currently represented by two different organizations for the accreditation of teacher education programs, NCATE and TEAC. These two organizations represent substantial differences in approaches to accreditation, and thus serve as good examples of the kind of choice I advocate here. Others may argue that alternative approaches to accountability and accreditation will do harm to teacher education. The voices for this position are usually heard in defense of NCATE, the older and more senior of the two accreditation approaches. In contrast to these voices, I will argue that given the present course of educational reform in the United States, an alternative conception of accreditation holds considerable appeal to those whose vision of a democratic, civil society is at odds with the vision implied by the current reform movement.

In her seminal work, The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt says that her task in that work is “nothing more than to think what we are doing.” What I would ask us all to do as we engage in supporting or defending one scheme of accountability over another is to think what we are doing. As I think about what we are doing in the currently dominant schemes for the professionalization of teaching and the accountability of educational institutions, I am concerned. Indeed, more than concerned. I am deeply troubled.

What troubles me is the extent to which the authority for setting the criteria and standards of our work as educators, for envisioning the good and proper outcomes of our labors, is moving so relentlessly upward. When I say
upward, I am referring to levels of government as well as spheres of influence in state and national associations. The shift that is occurring today is away from sites where the actual work takes place, away from schools and neighborhoods, campuses and communities, to state or federal governments and to national organizations and associations.

The reform movements that impel this transfer of power and authority are those that press for common subject matter standards, statewide or national assessments, statewide or national tests, national goals, national curricula, standardized performance outcomes, and the various provisions associated with the current teacher professionalization movement. Much of what presently characterizes our conceptions of accountability and accreditation in teacher education is closely linked to these reform initiatives. I want to pose the possibility that these initiatives are leading us in a direction that is ultimately alien to our most noble and prized conceptions of education and democracy.

When I think of what we are doing in these current reform endeavors, two different, though related, consequences come to mind. The first is that we are diminishing the demands on all participants in the educational process to act with the highest levels of intelligence in the execution of their work. Instead we are forming intellectual elites that act on behalf of others, rather than enabling others to act on their own behalf. The second thing we are doing is weakening the “networks of civic engagement” that produce the social capital essential to a healthy democracy. I hope that I can make myself clear on each of these points.

On the matter of intelligence and whether our current approach to accountability in teacher education distributes its exercise more broadly or concentrates it among the few, one could have no better guide than John Dewey. Listen to his wonderful summary to chapter 8 of Democracy and Education, where he is engaged in describing the nature of an aim and how important it is for each of us to formulate the aims for our actions. An aim, says Dewey, “signifies that an activity has become intelligent.”

A true aim is thus opposed at every point to an aim which is imposed upon a process of action from without. The latter is fixed and rigid; it is not a stimulus to intelligence in the given situation, but is an externally dictated order to do such and such things. Instead of connecting directly with present activities, it is remote, divorced from the means by which it is to be reached. Instead of suggesting a freer and better balanced activity, it is a limit set to activity. In education, the currency of these externally imposed aims is responsible for the
emphasis put upon the notion of preparation for a remote future and for rendering the work of both teacher and pupil mechanical and slavish."

With these words, Dewey leaves no doubt where he stands on initiatives that "decenter" teachers and their learners while "centering" small elites that formulate aims, as well as standards, processes, and procedures, then pass these "down" the hierarchies of government or related organizations to site-level actors. It is fascinating to note a similar line of reasoning in no less an authority than John Stuart Mill, who in his essay, "On Liberty," wrote:

"Though individuals may not do the particular things so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal."

I believe that good systems of educational accountability should be conceived in ways that make maximum demands on the intelligence of teachers, teacher educators, school administrators, and district governing authorities. Educational policies that foster such systems of accountability are what Richard Elmore called "capacity enhancing," rather than "compliance-effecting." Compliance-effecting policies are regulatory in character. Although such policies are occasionally necessary, they carry a tremendous cost inasmuch as they typically divert resources to surveillance and compliance assessment, and away from problem-solving and inventive application. In contrast, capacity-enhancing policy downshifts complexity and control to the site level, where it serves to promote and sustain dialogue and deliberation, and thereby, as Mill says, "strengthen the active faculties" of those who are most closely engaged in the work of educating teachers and children.

The force of these ideas, as I understand them, is that a central, moral obligation of those who are entrusted with accountability for the education of children and their teachers is to ensure a policy environment that promotes the exercise of intelligence at the "bottom" of our tables of organization, where teacher candidates and teacher educators, and teachers and this nation's children, are engaged in the work of education. It is, in my view, questionable whether this central, moral obligation is met by the imposition of performance measures, standards and outcomes, accompanied by "high stakes" assessment, all of these impelled forward by national agencies and associations earnestly seeking to join forces with the juridical powers of national government.
the state, so that together they might lead us all to education’s mythical Elysian Fields.

There is another way to think about what we are doing, another way to create accountability to good means and good ends. It is a system of accountability that says something like this to the site-level actors: You will be held accountable for what you believe it is right and proper for you to do; we who serve as your external reviewers will audit your performance to ascertain whether you have set forth clearly stated and carefully grounded aims, whether you have acted on them in good faith, and whether you have independent evidence of the success or failure of your efforts. We are not responsible, however, for supplying you with aims, or demanding that you comply with aims obtained elsewhere. As rational, intelligent agents, you must take these steps. Our task is to assure ourselves that you have indeed taken these steps, that you have done so in fiduciary relationship to those you serve, and that you have established ways to keep from deceiving yourselves and those you serve about the consequences of your work.¹³

Were I to give a name to this form of accountability, I would call it apple accountability. No typo here; it is indeed “apple.” The allusion here is to the apple that Eve plucked from the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden. You may recall that eating this apple introduced evil to humankind, but it was also what gave the species free will and independent intelligence.¹⁴ Apple accountability calls on all participants to the educational endeavor to bite into the apple of knowledge, thereby becoming responsible for the exercise of intelligence as part and parcel with the formation of aims, as Dewey would put it, and the exercise of judgment, as Mill would put it. Having gone this far, I would take the corresponding step of referring to the contrasting form of accountability as crown accountability. The name comes from the fact that those held accountable are subject to the aims and judgments of the crown, or an authority similar to a crown, wherein it is presumed that we are sufficiently sure of what is right and good that a few are entitled to hold all others accountable to it.

There are times and circumstances when crown accountability is justified, even in free societies. However, as already noted, it carries large penalties for the cultivation of knowledge and judgment by those subject to it. This loss of opportunity to expand understanding and enhance discernment is not the only cost. There is another, one that takes us directly to the democratic context for public education.

We all know that democracy, of the kind evident in the United States, requires education. All of us are familiar with the eloquent arguments on
this subject by Thomas Jefferson, Horace Mann, and John Dewey, as well as more recently by such scholars as Benjamin Barber, 15 John Goodlad, 16 and Kenneth Strike. 17 What may be less evident to many of us is that our democracy also requires associative communities, also sometimes referred to as networks of civic engagement. These associative communities or networks arise to deliberate and act on matters of common interest. They are formed around such things as neighborhoods, religious convictions, public service, artistic endeavors, mutual aid societies, philanthropy, educational specialties, occupational categories, and a myriad of other factors in our society. These associations are almost always voluntary, and are not a part of the governing apparatus of a community, state, or nation. 18 One of the major values of these associations is that they serve as sources of what Thomas Green has called "strong normation," 19 which is basis for the formation of virtuous character and high conscience.

Among the most profound and critical occasions for the formation of associative communities in U. S. society is the dialogue and deliberation around education. To the extent that this dialogue and deliberation remains centered at the sites where education take place, sites where children and teachers are taught, to that extent dialogue and deliberation contribute to and sustain networks of civic engagement. If this dialogue and deliberation is "upshifted" to higher levels of government, to state and national arenas, to organizations whose centers of power are far from the sites of teaching and learning, dialogue and deliberation at local sites become correspondingly unnecessary. As dialogue and deliberation decline, so does associative community. As associative community declines, so does strong normation. In that decline is the decline of what we have come to know as social capital. Without rich enclaves for the production of social capital, democracy itself is endangered. If you have any doubt of this result, you need only consult Robert Putnam's brilliant study of civic traditions in modern Italy to see what happens to democracy when networks of civic engagement atrophy. 20

Systems of accountability and accreditation can be designed to foster the growth of networks of civic engagement by ensuring that sites where the work of education takes place are encouraged to meet, deliberate, decide, act and judge. These systems must be at pains to "downshift" to local sites the burdens of discourse, the resolution of differences, the formation of aims, and the determination of the consequences for the choices made. In so doing, these systems will enable associative communities to arise and to flourish. Moreover, this approach is the one most likely to cultivate the intelligence and the judgment of the site-level actors. What could more devout-
ly be wished for than this conception of educational accountability that is itself educative?

The current wave of reform, as well as the current manifestations of accountability and accreditation in teacher education that follow this wave of reform, are, in my view, tilted too far towards the crown. Taking Arendt's advice, and thinking what we are doing, I would rather eat the apple than wear the crown. That may not be your preference. The issue here, however, is not what you or I prefer, but whether there are sufficient merits in either approach to justify making a choice available. In that regard, I hope I have offered a worthy argument on behalf of the apple.

ENDNOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1997 Meeting of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society. The paper was subsequently revised for presentation at a major symposium of the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education annual meeting, held on February 27, 1998, in New Orleans, Louisiana. Additional, but modest, revisions have been made for this latest version, to be published in the Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society. The author welcomes comments by email addressed to gfenster@umich.edu.

2. NCATE is the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education, currently the sole specialized accrediting agency for teacher education in the United States.

3. TEAC is the Teacher-Education Accreditation Council, an emerging organization that seeks recognition as an accrediting agency providing an alternative approach to that currently employed by NCATE.


5. It is important to separate standards from assessment, but that is not often done in the current reform climate. If standards stood alone, as if they were models that others might voluntarily emulate after due deliberation, they would not present the kinds of difficulties that lead to the criticisms offered here. However, when standards are linked with assessments, especially assessments that imperil the prestige or remuneration of site-level actors and agencies, then they are open to the criticisms lodged here.

6. In using the expression, "the current teacher professionalization movement," I want to be careful to distinguish the desiderata that all teachers be professionals and be treated as such, a goal I strongly support, from the notion that the occupation of teaching should be professionalized in the manner of medicine or law, a goal that is, in my view, far less attractive than the first. To gain a sense of what is involved in professionalizing the occupation of teaching, one need only consult the public documents released over the last few years by the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (particularly a brochure entitled, "The New Professional Teacher Project," and an article by NCATE President, Arthur Wise, entitled "The Coming Revolution in Teacher Licensure: Redefining Teacher Preparation," in *Action for Teacher Education*, XVI(2), Summer, 1994, 1-13), the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, and the September, 1996 report of the National Commission on Teaching & America's Future, *What Matters Most: Teaching for America's Future* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, National Commission on Teaching and America's Future).
Arguments that caution against this professionalization movement can be found in Gary D. Fenstermacher, Some Moral Considerations on Teaching as a Profession, and Roger Soder, The Rhetoric of Teacher Professionalization, both appearing in J. I. Goodlad, R. Soder, & K. Sirotnik, Eds., The Moral Dimensions of Teaching (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990), pp. 130-151 and 35-86, respectively.


11. This point parallels a similar point made by Thomas F. Green in The Activities of Teaching (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971, pp. 32-33), wherein he poses the view that "teaching is an activity primarily concerned with enlarging the manifestation of intelligence."


13. This conception of accreditation is based on a view of collegiate accountability developed by Patricia Albjerg Graham, Richard W. Lyman, & Martin Trow, in Accountability of Colleges and Universities: An Essay (New York: The Trustees of Columbia University, 1995).

14. It is fascinating to listen to the concerns of those who resist placing more control in the hands of site-level actors. They are frequently heard to argue that if site-level actors are given discretionary authority, these actors may do terrible things with such freedom. Free will and free action have always carried this downside, as the Book of Genesis makes clear when noting that one does not obtain knowledge without also obtaining evil in the bargain. Perhaps the root question here is how site-level actors are to be held accountable to high standards that are well-regarded by most in the profession, if these actors are allowed the freedom to choose what they will do. This question is merely a microform of the question that vexes all liberal democracies: How does the state permit each person to construct his or her own version of the good life while holding all citizens accountable to justice and equal consideration before the law? The question is not easily answered, but it can never be set aside in a democracy merely because it is vexing. It is of more than passing interest that in American democracy we have sought resolution to this problem through mass, popular, common education, and we have, for the most part, been amazingly successful at this resolution.


18. Alexis de Tocqueville made much of the distinction between political and civic associations, as noted in volume II, Part 2, Chapters 5, 6, & 7 of Democracy in America.


Searching for Teacher Education Programs that are Consistent with Democratic Ideals—A Response to Professor Fenstermacher *

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I. INCLUDING QUESTIONS ABOUT DEMOCRACY IN DIALOGUES ON TEACHER EDUCATION

After reading various versions of Gary's paper I have come to the conclusion that in a number of ways he wishes to challenge educators to reflect on a problem such as the following: How can we make questions about democracy a significant part of our contemporary dialogues related to policies and programs for teacher education in the United States? And in the little time given to me this afternoon I will only be able to offer a few hints about some scattered issues associated with having people take seriously Gary's recommendation about "eating the apple" instead of "wearing the crown." Moreover, in order to give a few preliminary examples about the kinds of questions I consider important for those who wish to bring liberal democratic ideals to teacher education and education in general I think it is worthwhile to note here that in his summary of issues discussed in his book Education and the Social Order Bertrand Russell noted the following:

In our first chapter we proposed a question: Can the fullest individual development be combined with the necessary minimum of social coherence? This has led us to consider the various ways in which education is affected by politics and economics, most of which, we have found, are harmful to the boys and girls concerned. Is it necessary that the effects of politics and economics on the individual should always be harmful? Or is this a temporary misfortune of our time? And, in the later case, what hope is there of a greater harmony between individuality and citizenship in the not too distant future?
II. ON STANDARDIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

Standardization in both teacher education and education in general is clearly argued for by the leadership of the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) and individuals such as Diane Ravitch, Chester Finn, William Bennett, E.D. Hirsch, Mortimer Adler, Allan Bloom, Bill Clinton, and a host of other lesser known people. However, unlike Gary I do not view the contemporary movements for greater standardization to be a great threat to education; as I see matters, the various movements for greater standardization in American education are not likely to have much influence on the groups they wish to influence. In other words, a few more gigantic educational bureaucracies in Washington D.C. or state capitols will probably not transform teacher education programs or the way young people are educated in our schools.

Modern movements for the creation of standards of excellence in teacher education and education in general have yet to truly grapple with the idea that in liberal democratic societies education is not likely to be transformed by an elite group of people who attempt to impose their ideas on educational institutions. Educators and schools can perhaps make a contribution to transforming the way the young are educated in liberal democratic societies such as the United States, Canada, and England. But in contemporary liberal democratic societies institutions such as the home, the workplace, the media, and religious organizations play a significant role in the education of all of us. And the notion that education is taking place throughout our lives in diverse social settings is an idea emphasized in the historical work of the late Lawrence Cremin. Furthermore, Henry Perkinson’s The Imperfect Panacea: American Faith in Education 1865-1990 offers an explanation about why schools are likely to play a limited role in the education of children growing up in a society founded on the liberal democratic ideals of people such as Thomas Jefferson.

Briefly stated, liberal democratic societies need to learn how to create educational policies that integrate the historical insights of scholars such as Cremin and Perkinson. And once we begin to realize how complex the educational process truly is we should not be surprised to find much diversity of thinking about educational matters. In relationship to the notion that educators are likely to have disagreements about the problems they study it is worthwhile to note that John Dewey once wrote the following:
at the present time different sciences of education are not only possible but much needed. Of course such a statement goes contrary to the idea that science by its very nature is a single and universal system of truths. But this idea need not frighten us. Even in the advanced sciences, like those of mathematics and physics, advance is made by entertaining different points of view and hypotheses, and working upon different theories. The sciences present no fixed and closed orthodoxy.

III. On Human Personality in the Quest for Satisfactory Educational Programs

John Dewey and Bertrand Russell are two giant twentieth century philosophical thinkers who have now been haunting me for well over thirty years. And in my daydreams, nightmares, and writing sessions Dewey and Russell usually pop up. Moreover, as I read the various versions of Gary's paper, Russell's essay "Freedom Versus Authority in Education" was constantly on my mind. This paper is important for our contemporary discussions about standards in education because it helps to remind educational authorities in democratic societies that their "grandiose social schemes" often forget that those who we educate have thoughts and minds of their own which should be respected. That is, for Russell,

No man is fit to educate unless he feels each pupil as an end in himself, with his own rights and his own personality, not merely a piece in a jigsaw puzzle, or a soldier in a regiment, or a citizen in a State. Reverence for human personality is the beginning of wisdom, in every social question, but above all in education.

IV. Concluding Remarks

In a number of ways I think it is correct to say that Gary's plea for alternatives in the way we accredit teacher education programs is a step in the direction toward "reverence for human personality." And I for one applaud Gary's efforts to bring issues about democracy to our contemporary discussions devoted to teacher education. Gary is involved in a worthwhile task and I wish him the best of luck in his endeavors to upgrade the dialogues we have related to educating teachers.
NOTES

On Anti-Intellectualism in Popular Culture: Bud Abbott, Lou Costello, and Lon Chaney, Jr. Go to College

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INTRODUCTION.

My first course in Aesthetic Education was at Temple University in 1969 with Dr. Alan Soffin. Dr. Soffin had gotten his Ph.D. at the University of Illinois under the supervision of the late B. Othanel Smith and the late Harry S. Broudy. I was later admitted to the Ph.D. program at Illinois and during my first year I asked Prof. Broudy if I should take his course in Aesthetic Education. After he asked me what topics had been covered in Dr. Soffin's course, Prof. Broudy told me not to enroll in his course because I would find his course "simple-minded!" Dr. Soffin had emphasized critical thinking about art, literature, music, and film in his class and had devoted several classes to intellectual discussions of both high culture and popular culture. Subsequently, I had many valuable discussions of issues in philosophy of education with Prof. Broudy and still have positive memories of him. But after I read some of Prof. Broudy's publications on Aesthetic Education I realized that Dr. Soffin and I agreed on the value of critical thinking about popular culture but Prof. Broudy took a different position.

In his book Enlightened Cherishing, Broudy made a distinction between "popular art" and "serious art." For Broudy, "popular art" is "widely accepted" and "requires no connoisseurship or special training for its appreciation." While he acknowledges that there can be such an activity as the serious study of popular art, Broudy is concerned to insist that the serious study of popular art does not convert popular art into serious art. My purpose in writing this paper is NOT to argue that Bud Abbott and Lou Costello's 1945 low-
brow comedy *Here Come the Co-Eds* should be regarded as a film at the level of *Citizen Kane.*¹ What I wish to do is to show what is in the film that might be worthy of serious attention or repeated viewings despite its being neither Abbott and Costello's nor Lon Chaney, Jr's best performance (cf. *Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein*). I have argued elsewhere that films made during the 1940s with schools or classrooms as their settings reveal a change in popular educational ideology from a basic optimism about the value of education to a deep-rooted cynicism that what goes on on the campuses of educational institutions can be anything other than meaningless rituals.² I believe that the close scrutiny of popular arts in any era can reveal much that is worth knowing about social trends.

*Here Come the Co-Eds* is usually identified as a musical comedy starring Abbott and Costello. It was released in 1945 near the end of World War II. The setting for this film is Bixby College for Young Ladies, a small private women's college in financial difficulty. Lon Chaney, Jr. plays the part of Johnson the custodian: a rather ill-tempered individual whose loyalties are to Jonathan Kirkland (Charles Dingle) the Chair of the Board of Regents. Kirkland appears to be embroiled in a power struggle with Bixby's Dean Larry Benson (Donald Cook). As the sociologist David Reisman might have pointed out, Kirkland is a Tradition-Directed individual while Benson is more Other-Directed.³ The essential conflict is that Kirkland wants to keep the school the same as it was during his grandmother's day, while Benson wants the school to remodel itself according to whatever might be good public relations. One of Benson's more controversial reforms is the establishment of an intercollegiate women's basketball team. The crisis comes when the Bixby team must go up against Carlton College's championship team which has in reserve a contingent of large athletic women who play for a professional women's team called The Amazons. Contrary to what you might expect, Bixby does NOT win the game!

But Bixby does survive. Although much of the comic action in this film is structured around confrontations between Abbott & Costello's characters and the character played by Lon Chaney, Jr., the reader should remember that this is an Abbott & Costello film, not a Lon Chaney, Jr. film. Despite outstanding performances in *Of Mice and Men* (1939) ⁵ and *The Wolf Man* ⁶ (1941) Chaney still accepted low prestige roles. In this film, Chaney is billed sixth. His character—Johnson—is the ally of the villain Kirkland while the stars' characters—Slats McCarthy (Abbott) and Oliver Quackenbush (Costello)—are the allies of Dean Benson. Chaney's performance is not comparable to his major roles in *Of Mice and Men* or the Wolf Man series. His role
is a supporting role that is not fleshed out. The audience learns little about the character of Johnson the custodian although the scene in which his first name is mentioned does have dramatic impact. Nor is Chaney's performance comparable to his brief appearances in supporting roles in *High Noon* (1952) and *Not as a Stranger* (1955) that have a tremendous impact on the viewer. In this film, Chaney plays a type of character that is often termed a “flat” character by literary critics such as M. H. Abrams. The character has a function in the story that requires the writers not to flesh out the character. So it is inappropriate to criticize Chaney's performance as shallow: that is how the character is written.

From the very beginning of this film it is suggested that there may be a dark side to the fortunes and misfortunes of Bixby College. When Slats and Oliver are hired to work at Bixby, they are hired by Benson but are assigned to work for Johnson. Johnson is the college custodian so Slats and Oliver are the assistant custodians. But there is an immediate joke about “the custodian needing a custodian.” When Slats and Oliver are assigned to clean up the custodian's quarters—which will be the residence of all three of them—they discover that the quarters are not fit for habitation and much humor results from the difficulties that Oliver gets into by simply trying to wash dishes and clean up the floor. Throughout the film, Johnson is rarely shown doing any of the usual work of a custodian while Slats and Oliver find that their job description does not cover the full scope of their responsibilities. Clearly they are at Bixby to serve as Benson's right hand men while Johnson is serving Kirkland more as a strong arm man. The film is more than half over when the audience finally learns Johnson's first name: “Strangler.”

**CONTEXTS AND ISSUES.**

*Film Noir*

*Here Come the Co-Eds* was made during the 1940s near the end of World War II. Although the United States won WWII, the American public did not emerge from the war years in a confident, optimistic spirit. Rather, the dominant mood of the public seems to be reflected in the style of filmmaking that has come to be known as *film noir*. *Film noir* typically places its characters in settings dominated by dark shadows wherein the characters are oppressed by forces they cannot control. So, in a *film noir*, everyday events take place in a visual and narrative context that is commonly associated with horror movies. When *Here Come the Co-Eds* was released, Lon Chaney, Jr. had already appeared as the wolf man in several films and was beginning his
Inner Sanctum series. In the Inner Sanctum series Chaney frequently portrayed characters who are inadvertently drawn into crime. These characters may escape their difficulties by the end of their films, but in the horror films and the Inner Sanctum films much of the action takes place in dark and sinister environments. In Here Come the Co-Eds, both the opening sequence at the Miramar Ballroom and the closing scene at the torchlight parade take place at night. So the presence in a musical comedy of night scenes as both prologue and epilogue, a supporting actor who is known for his appearances in horror films, and a director who has directed horror films introduce the elements of the film noir into a musical comedy. The mere appearance of Chaney in a scene in this film is a symbol of the presence of evil.

The Politics of the 1940s

In 1945 the USA was approaching victory in World War II but suddenly President Franklin D. Roosevelt was dead and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of England—the articulate leader of America's number one ally—was out of office. And the atomic bomb—which had ensured America's victory over the Japanese—was suspected of unleashing forces that might have the potential to destroy all mankind, not just our enemies. So, even the historical events of 1945 seem to take on the characteristics of a film noir. The Republican victory in the 1946 election that resulted in the appearance as members of Congress of Richard M. Nixon and Joseph McCarthy seems to have been the result of a campaign that suggested a sinister future. Their slogan was: "Had enough? Vote Republican!"

Careers of the Director and the Actors

Here Come the Co-Eds was Abbott & Costello's first of many appearances with horror film stars and characters between 1945 and 1955. In later films, they would encounter the undead vampire Count Dracula, The Frankenstein Monster, The Invisible Man, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, extraterrestrials, killers, and The Mummy. (Chaney did not appear in Abbott and Costello Meet the Mummy [1955].) The director of Here Come the Co-Eds—Jean Yarbrough—had already worked with Bela Lugosi in the horror film Devil Bat (1940) and had directed other horror films. Yarbrough would later work with the deformed actor Rondo Hatton in the horror films House of Horrors (1946) and The Brute Man (1947). After making the horror film The Creeper (1948) Yarbrough switched from horror work to extensive work with Abbott and Costello. Here Come the Co-Eds was not Yarbrough's first work with A & C. He had already directed A & C in In Society in 1944 and immediately directed another A & C film—The Naughty Nineties—in 1945. He
followed up with two more A & C films in 1952: *Jack and the Beanstalk* and *Lost in Alaska*. He also became the main director of A & C's television program in the 1950s. However, Yarbrough did not devote himself to comedy exclusively. At the end of his directing career in 1967, Yarbrough worked with Chaney again and two other elderly horror film stars—John Carradine and Basil Rathbone in the low budget production *Hillbillies In A Haunted House*. Again: the presence of Lon Chaney, Jr. as Strangler Johnson in *Here Come the Co-Eds* signals the presence of the forces of darkness on the campus of Bixby College. Johnson is not just another custodian. He is a custodian who has connections to the underworld and may have had past involvements in fixed sports events. The events at the end of *Here Come the Co-Eds* consist of attempts to prevent Bixby from closing by students betting on a supposedly fixed wrestling match. Quackenbush upsets the applecart of the gamblers by unexpectedly winning the match. So Kirkland, Johnson, and the gamblers set up a fixed basketball game between the women of Bixby and the women of top-rated Carlton College. Kirkland brings in a group of professional women basketball players to substitute for Carlton's starting lineup in the second half of the game. And despite the appearance of Quackenbush in drag as a member of the Bixby team and the presence of the legendary sportscaster Bill Stern (playing himself) as game broadcaster, Carlton still wins the game. For a moment, Kirkland, Johnson, and the gamblers have the prize money and it appears that the forces of the underworld have triumphed and Bixby College will be closed. But the movie is not over. Yet.

**Women's Issues**

Bixby College is a women's college. From a feminist point of view, the main character of *Here Come the Co-Eds* is Slats's sister Molly McCarthy (Martha O'Driscoll) trying to survive in a male-dominated world. Indeed, a comparison of *Here Come the Co-Eds* with the 1952 film *She's Working Her Way Through College* reveals that the two films have virtually the same plot. But in the latter film Virginia Mayo receives top billing as a former burlesque queen who is sincerely seeking an education with the assistance of a sympathetic professor (Ronald Reagan!). In *Here Come the Co-Eds* there are occasional hints that Kirkland may be a sexist. For example, in a scene in a music class—one of only two scenes in the film where we encounter an actual professor—Kirkland seems to be quite uneasy when he notices that Molly may actually be learning something. The students answer the music professor's question in Italian musical terminology which makes their answers laughable gibberish to most of the audience. In addition, Kirkland is also uneasy when he
sees young women playing basketball at the beginning of the film. His involvement in the fixed basketball game at the end of the film seems to be motivated by more than a desire to win the gambling money. The viewer will notice that one of the co-eds is Kirkland's daughter who also seems to be attracted to Benson the "progressive" dean. And Kirkland's fears are not entirely without basis. Slats and Oliver take their jobs with great enthusiasm for an opportunity to be "caretakers" for several hundred girls. The moment The Boys set foot on the Bixby campus, Oliver is immediately the object of thinly veiled sexual advances from several students! So the sexual aggression of the co-eds toward both Oliver and Dean Benson hardly suggests that Bixby is a place for serious young women who want an education. It merely reinforces the stereotype of the young college girl who is only in college to find a husband.

A feminist reading of Here Come the Co-Eds might also note the peculiar use of the word "co-eds" in the title of this film. The term "coeducational" typically referred to a college that was formerly all male that had begun to admit women. So, in that context a "co-ed" would be a female student at a college that had previously not admitted them. But to refer to women students at a women's college as "co-eds" seems to imply a kind of cynical view that even women at a women's college should somehow be regarded as outsiders.' Note that only once in this film do we encounter a female teacher and that she immediately allows Slats and Oliver to displace her as the instructor in her class. Even in the musical numbers performed by Phil Spitalny And His Hour of Charm All-Girl Orchestra Featuring Evelyn And Her Magic Violin, the only authority figure—Phil Spitalny—is a male.

Educational Policy?

Bixby College appears to be a place where no one—with the possible exception of the music professor who appears in only one scene and is not even given billing in the cast list—is interested in education. Consider for a moment a comparison with two other films with similar plots: the Marx Brothers's comedy Horse Feathers (1932) and the more serious (?) John Wayne film, Trouble Along the Way (1953). In both the Marx Bros. film and the Wayne film a college in financial trouble must be rescued by the protagonist by winning a crucial sports event. In the earlier film the Marxes direct considerable ridicule at stuffy, conservative professors but direct equal humor at college boys who are only in college to improve their sex lives (as personified by Zeppo Marx). In addition, Groucho (as Huxley College President Quincy Adams Wagstaff) jokes about whether to tear down the college in
order to give more attention to football. I am inclined to regard the Marxes's humor as ironic and aimed at college administrators who have the wrong priorities. The view that educational policy should take a back seat to sports has even darker consequences in *Trouble Along the Way*. In this 1953 film, a priest (Charles Coburn) who has mismanaged a Catholic college to the verge of bankruptcy hires a former professional football coach (John Wayne) who is willing to break every rule in the book to field a team composed of professionals and high school dropouts—one of whom is played by the legendary James Dean—that is good enough (according to Wayne's character) to "beat the Chicago Bears even if they use real bears!!" The humor ends when the discovery of Wayne's recruiting violations nearly results in the closing of the college and his losing custody of his daughter. But this film contains ambiguities. Coburn's character is shown to be a good teacher whose tutoring of Wayne's daughter (Sherry Jackson) results in her actually developing an interest in books and reading!!!! The priest confesses his mistakes and it is the mighty Roman Catholic Church (and not John Wayne!) that comes to the rescue in the end. So, *Here Come the Co-Eds* can certainly be characterized as being an anti-intellectual film about education. But is also a film about a school that may be covertly controlled by criminals. Kirkland is concerned to maintain Bixby College's traditions simply so he can retain financial control of the school, but an additional motive for his actions may be to continue his involvement in illegal gambling. Benson seems to espouse a questionable form of "progressivism" that would simply require the school to adopt intercollegiate women's sports because this was the current trend in 1945. In other words, public relations would become identical to educational policy at Bixby College, should Benson triumph and rid the campus of Kirkland.

**NOTES**


2. See Robert L. Carringer, "Citizen Kane," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 9 (April 1975): 32-49. There is little controversy about *Citizen Kane* being a great film, so for a film teacher to use this study guide in a class would be what the British philosopher John Wilson would call a "model case" of Aesthetic Education. Should a teacher write a similar study guide for *Here Come the Co-Eds* and use it in a class, would that be a "contrary case" of Aesthetic Education—a mere time waster? I would hold that an attempt to seek a critical understanding of a lowbrow film such as this by using many of the same skills of inquiry that a student might use in critically evaluating an acknowledged masterpiece like *Citizen Kane* would be at worst what Wilson would term a "borderline case" of Aesthetic Education. See John Wilson, *Thinking with Concepts* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

71 (Winter 1993): 72-75.


7. Don G. Smith, pp. 113-115; 125-126.


19. This paper is a shorter and revised version of my paper "Toward an Intellectual Understanding of Anti-Intellectual Popular Culture" that appeared in the Journal of Thought 33 (Summer 1998): 83-94.
John Dewey and Character Education: Is He the Answer?

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As we strive to evaluate the effectiveness of our character education practice at the end of this century, an examination of contemporary character education in light of John Dewey's ideas could be most helpful to the educational community. In this session, therefore, I will discuss Dewey's rationale for moral education, his notion of character, and the framework he envisioned for effective moral education. I will then address the contexts in which Dewey felt that character formation takes place, discussing setting in some detail moral education within the context of schools. Finally, I will make some comments regarding current trends in light of Dewey's methodology.

Dewey argued that moral education was necessary for several reasons. The most pressing was his understanding of the nature of American democracy, in which it is crucial to have citizens able to assume leadership roles and spearhead needed social reforms. Students must learn, he wrote, to "take their own active part in aggressive participation in bringing about a new social order". To carry out this mandate, individuals must learn to think as democratic citizens. Dewey rightly points out that they can hardly be expected to assume the role of democratic citizen as adults if they have never experienced democratic participation as children. In Democracy and Educational Administration he wrote, "Whether or not the educative process is carried on in a predominantly democratic or non-democratic way therefore becomes a question of transcendent importance not only for education itself but for its final effect upon all the interests and activities of a society that is committed to the democratic way of life". Thus, the job of moral education is to foster
the identification of immature individuals with democratic citizenship by fostering character and values appropriate for a democratic life-style. He writes, "The primary business of school is to train children in cooperative and mutually helpful living, to foster in them the consciousness of mutual interdependence... reproducing on the child's plane the typical doings and occupations of the larger maturer society into which he is finally to go forth".

It is interesting to note that, although Dewey understood character education to be an integral part of democratic education, he did not descend to the same type of detailed suggestions when writing about it that he offered when addressing the importance of science, the arts, and geography in a democratic curriculum.

The reason, I think, is Dewey's conception of character itself, and how he thinks it ought to be educated. In his essay "Character Training for Youth", he provides a description of the nature of character, saying it is composed of "all the desires, purposes, and habits that influence conduct... The mind of an individual, his ideas and beliefs, are part of character, for thought enters into the formation of desire and aims. Mind includes the imagination... If we could look into a person's mind and see which mental pictures are habitually entertained we should have an unsurpassed key to his character". A little later in the same article, Dewey emphasizes the fact that character is formed and cannot be taught. He says, "Character, in short, is something that is formed, rather than something that can be taught, as geography and arithmetic are taught". It is important to remember that, for Dewey, character and conduct are closely related. In Democracy and Education he writes that "the moral and the social quality of conduct are, in the last analysis, identical with each other". All conduct is social, and so, one of Dewey's basic tenets is that society is the most influential educator of character, forming both character and conduct. Since personality is forged upon social interaction, good character also follows upon social involvement and is the result of membership in a social group. Dewey writes just this in "Character Training for Youth", when he says, "every influence that modifies the disposition and habits, the desires and thoughts of a child is a part of the development of his character".

Since it is society that molds character, most moral education is carried out independent of formal schooling, being the result of other influences. Dewey writes that character "is such an inclusive thing, the influences that shape it are equally extensive... the moral education of our children is in fact going on all the time, every waking hour of the day and three hundred and sixty-five days a year... In short, formation of character is going on all the time, it cannot be confined to special occasions."
Dewey's list of the major influences in character formation is very enlightening. Of the four most important factors he mentions, Dewey ranks schools in last place. This is not because he thinks school is an inappropriate environment for character formation, but because he feels schools have the least impact on young people. For Dewey, there are other more essential arenas of character formation. The three most influential factors are: concrete social relations, the natural tendency of young people to engage in common activities, and the family. Dewey writes that "the concrete state of social relations and activities is the most powerful factor in shaping character ...". As evidence of this he describes the economic situation prevalent until the 1930s in which "youth has grown up in a social atmosphere in which emphasis upon material success was enormous ... They came to feel that possession of money was the key to the things they most desired". Dewey then goes on to describe the character this fostered: "So many persons have come to think that the great thing is to "get by", and that if a person attains material success no great attention will be paid by society to the means by which he "got away" with it ...".

The second major influence in character formation is the innate tendency young people have "toward activity and some kind of collective association". Dewey holds that society guides its youth in natural and unobtrusive ways and is more effective than formal or direct instruction. Indirect influences, says Dewey, have a lasting impact because they do not preach or arouse resistance. "The friends and associates of the growing boy and girl", he writes in Character Training for Youth, "what goes on upon the playground . . . the books they read, the parties they attend . . . their effect is all the greater because they work unconsciously when the young are not thinking of morals at all".

Dewey ranks family as the third most important factor in character formation, giving special importance to the relationship between children and parents. For him, social sanctions, parental guidance among them, are a primary influence in children's character formation because of the normative power they possess in determining what is considered good. As proof of the family's importance, Dewey cites psychological findings "with respect to how relations between persons—between parents with respect to each other and with respect to their offspring—affect character", and he strongly urges family to take an active role in character formation.

Dewey proposes social changes that promote better character formation which reflect his preference for indirect character education. First of all, he advocates an economic order that will foster cooperation rather than competition.
ition. "It is difficult", he says, "to produce a cooperative type of character in an economic system that lays chief stress upon competition, and wherein the most successful competitor is the one who is the most richly rewarded and who becomes almost the social hero and model". He advocates guaranteeing useful work for all citizens, security for old age, decent housing, and educational opportunity for all children based on means other than money. Thus, says Dewey, society will reduce competition and foster cooperation.

Dewey's second suggestion to improve character formation is better parent education. "There are still multitudes of parents", he writes in Character Training for Youth, "who... are totally unaware of the influences that are the most powerfully affecting the moral fiber of their children". He argues that those parents who are aware of the impact their actions have on their children will make sure that it fosters good character. When parents receive a more democratic education themselves, they will come to realize that their attitudes and reactions toward their children have a vital impact on the self-image the young acquire. Finally, Dewey advocates a more comprehensive program of free time activities, both in rural areas and in cities where youth do not have places to congregate or things to do.

In writing about character education in schools, Dewey asserts that their effectiveness is determined by how well schools reflect the social context of the child's life outside of school. For this reason, he insists that schools work in conjunction with society. "If I put the school fourth and last", he writes in "Character Training for Youth", "it is not because I regard it as the least important of factors in moral training, but because its success is so much bound up with the operation of the three others".

First among the principles Dewey sets forth in Moral Principles of Education is the consideration of the child is a member of society "in the broadest sense". To this end he writes that "[t]he business of the educator, whether parent or teacher, is to see to it that the greatest possible number of ideas acquired by children and youth are acquired in such a way that they become moving ideas, motive-forces in the guidance of conduct. This demand and this opportunity make the moral purpose universal and dominant in all instruction- whatsoever the topic. Were it not for this possibility, the familiar statement that the ultimate purpose of all education is character-forming would be hypocritical pretense".

Dewey also holds that schools should educate for leadership, for shaping and directing change. He comments, the child "must be educated for leadership... He must have power of self-direction and power of directing others, power of administration, ability to assume positions of responsibility..."
that he . . . may not only adapt himself to the changes that are going on, but have the power to shape and direct them". Schools must be "vital social institutions . . . an embryonic typical community life. . . ." Dewey points out in addition that schools need to foster an "interest in community welfare. . . . That is to say, in perceiving whatever makes for social order and progress, and in carrying these principles into execution. . . ."

Having highlighted some salient aspects of Dewey's moral education and character formation, I would now like to comment on selected aspects of contemporary moral education in light of the framework John Dewey envisioned for effective character formation.

Since the 1960s moral education practice has utilized a number of differing methodologies, including Values Clarification, the cognitive developmental approach, and the self-esteem programs found in most elementary and middle schools today. An article published in US News and World Report advised parents to ask each teacher what he or she meant by the term character education, since it seems to have no commonly accepted definition or implementation. The authors state that "there are many divergent strategies for moral and civic virtue . . . Precisely because of the diversity of philosophies that fall under the rubric of 'character education' . . . parents need to be aware of what the term means in their own child's classroom." As discussed above, Dewey argued that schools are effective when they mirror the child's larger social context. Schools that did not embrace their social role were obstacles to social advancement, and in need of reconstructive reform.

Schools today seem to conceive their relationship with society much differently than did Dewey. Looking aghast at high rates of teen pregnancy, violence, drugs etc., schools do not try to reflect society, but rather strive to provide a safe haven for its immature members. All too often schools see their mission as protecting children and youth from corrupting social influences, before it is too late. The entire October 1997 issue of Educational Leadership, one of the most widely read journals for primary and secondary educators, is dedicated to the discussion of schools as safe havens. The editorial contains assertions such as "Despite some protest that they shouldn't have to be involved in such matters, schools today are making extraordinary efforts to be safe havens in our society—places where human life is held dear and where children can thrive... All children deserve a safe haven." Because experience in the classroom seems to reflect the inability of today's parents to provide adequate values and life-views for their children, schools also feel an obligation to step in and compensate for dysfunctional . . . Youngsters appear to be drifting in a world in which they are unable
to make commitments and towards which they seem to feel no obligation, a situation disturbingly similar to that which prompted Values Clarification in the 60s. Schools now try to teach basic attitudes toward society and social issues which, historically, were passed on from parents to children as a natural part of family life, not by the school. This current attitude of protecting children from society and dysfunctional families could not be further removed from Dewey's framework for effective and lasting moral education.

There is another important difference between much of today's moral education and Dewey's vision. Whereas Dewey gave prime importance to fostering character through a democratic school atmosphere, today's character education is frequently an appendage to existing curricula, designed to inform about specific issues and teach concrete traits or virtues. Some programs focus on preventing behaviors that undermine young people's capacity to behave as democratic citizens. They try to convince students of the dangers of drugs, teach them how to avoid unwanted pregnancies, and instruct them in non-violent methods of negotiation within schools. Others have pinpointed concrete values to stress in school, hoping to raise the moral climate to a level at which they can operate safely. Our efforts today seem to be directed towards salvaging those children who are being lost, in hopes of arresting behavior that is not considered acceptable for democratic participation in society. This is, of course, sorely needed, but it is a far cry from Dewey's scheme of educating for leadership and reconstructive participation in society.

In short, contemporary character education in American schools seems to be viewed as the most hopeful way of leading young people away from the negative influences of family and society. Dewey's framework for effective character education seems to be inverted. Society, friends, social activities, and family are no longer seen as positive character educators. On the contrary, they are viewed as an obstacle to learning moral conduct. Current literature suggests that many schools feel they have replaced society as the most stable source of character formation. Not only that, they also feel they are being asked to remediate deficiencies of the very institutions Dewey considered most crucial to effective character formation.

One ought to ask how this came to be. Why has Dewey's framework for character education been turned on its head when it seemed to be a formula for success? I would venture to say that Dewey's social framework for character formation—family, society and the school, is a good one. His understanding of the impact that social relations and situations have on young people is, I feel, a real reflection of how young personalities are formed.
Schools that feel the need to be safe havens are really confirming Dewey's insights in this area. To come to a tentative answer, therefore, one must look at another aspect of Dewey's educational thought.

It has generally been acknowledged that values clarification did not work. Students who could clarify their personal values did not necessarily change their behavior, even though its goal was to help children develop a sense of direction and a relationship to society that was "positive, purposeful, enthusiastic and proud". Reflecting the pattern of moral inquiry espoused by Dewey, educators sought another way to teach morality that would foster positive social interaction; Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. Towards the end of his career, however, Lawrence Kohlberg himself realized that his initial theory of moral development was an insufficient basis for character education in the school setting. In 1978, after using it in schools known to have severe social problems he wrote,

"I realize now that the psychologist's abstraction of moral cognition from moral action, and the abstraction of structure in moral cognition and judgment from content are necessary abstractions for certain psychological research purposes. It is not a sufficient guide to the moral educator who deals with the moral concrete in a school world in which value content as well as reasoning must be dealt with. In this context the educator must be a socializer teaching value content and behavior not only a Socratic or Rogerian process-facilitator of development".

By that time, however, schools had long since adopted his original theory. Students educated in the stage theory of moral reasoning could now reason their way to solutions of moral dilemmas. However, as Kohlberg affirmed, "One can reason in terms of principles and not live up to those principles".

Thus, one can argue that experience points to the fact that schools have done a less than effective job in promoting the type of social conduct John Dewey would consider appropriate in young citizens. From Dewey's point of view contemporary moral education has failed to perform its function.

However, although moral education may have failed to produce individuals who function well as democratic citizens, it ought to be noted that values clarification and moral reasoning did have a pronounced impact on those students who have been educated over the past thirty years. On the whole we seem to be a society able to state our values and arrive at theoretical conclusions regarding moral behavior, but we have not always linked values and moral solutions with a serious commitment to society, a step that is key in
Dewey's thought. Many adults today, parents included, are not the aggressive participants in the democratic process that Dewey envisioned. But they most certainly are the result of the moral education they received. It should come as no surprise to us, then, that many parents cannot help their children acquire a sense of social commitment, or that they do not model a character that exemplifies morality in terms of positive social conduct.

In light of this, one could ask, “What are we to do now?” It seems that theoreticians of moral education have followed the steps of moral inquiry. After careful and responsible deliberation they devised and implemented what they honestly considered the best solutions to a generalized flagging of social commitment. Those solutions did not remedy social problems, however, and we are once again faced with the difficult task of making moral education and character formation more effective. There is no doubt in my mind that character formation has a social origin. It is not learned in isolation from life, as Dewey understood so well. Thus, this task is not an academic one alone. Moral education and character formation theories have a profound impact on those taught within their ideologies. They not only affect the well being of the American democracy, but also, and perhaps more importantly, character and moral education constitute the foundation upon which each individual is able to make a commitment to being a democratic citizen and building a sense of purpose in life. As a society we cannot afford to make more mistakes in moral education and character formation if we want to remain strong. As educators we do not have the right to do so.

Should we reconsider the role of moral inquiry in formulating moral and character education theories to be implemented in schools? How can we be sure that the next theory will not create a need for remedial efforts similar to those being made now? How can the elements of Dewey's character formation, family, society and school, be put back in order? It seems to me that the inversion of Dewey's scheme is a central part of the problem facing moral education today. But if Dewey is right, and character education in schools will be fruitless if it is not based on the moral education provided by family and society, how does one do this when today's family and society seem to be unable to provide this support? Those of us involved in the practice of moral education look to the academy not for practical tips, but rather for philosophical guidance in defining our relationship to the family and society and in our task of educating young people for the twenty first century.
NOTES


5. Ibid., pp. 187-188.


8. Ibid., pp. 186-187.

9. Ibid., pp. 190-192.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 192.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.


22. Ibid., pp. 13,15,16.

23. Ibid., p. 17.


28. Ibid.
H. G. Wells and the Origin of Progressive Education

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H. G. Wells is primarily known today as the author of such science fiction classics as *The Time Machine*, *The Island of Doctor Moreau*, *The Invisible Man*, *The War of the Worlds*, and *The First Men in the Moon*. As anyone familiar with Wells knows, however, he was much more as well. Not surprisingly, his early writings dealt primarily with science. Much less known, however, is the fact that he also wrote prolifically about science education. As such, these are seminal writings in what we know today as progressive education. Though this paper is a work in progress, I will show how Wells’ early writings qualify him as the father of progressive education in England as John Dewey’s writings qualify him as the father of progressive education in the United States. One of the hallmarks of Pragmatism (from which progressive education derives) is its insistence on tying theory to practice. Therefore, science and scientific thinking play a foundational role in the development of progressivist educational theory.

One of the first topics Wells tackled in his early writings was the problem of causation and human freedom. From the scientific standpoint, he believed that for every effect there was a cause. Therefore, as he argues in a rejected article titled “The Universe Rigid,” the laws of nature predestine humanity. Nevertheless, in an 1891 article titled “The Rediscovery of the Unique,” he suggests that “[A]ll being is unique, or, nothing is strictly like anything else. . . . we only arrive at the idea of similar beings by an unconscious or deliberate disregard of an infinity of small differences. No two animals, for instance, are alike, as any bird or dog-fancier or shepherd can tell.
Any two bricks, or coins, or marbles, will be found on examination to differ in size, shape, surface, hue—in endless details as you make your investigation more searching and minute.” The universe is therefore rigid from the absolute standpoint but indeterminate from the human perspective. Of course, much in nature is predictable, but never with one hundred percent certainty. Wells did not consider the universe rigid and the rediscovery of the unique as contradictory. Today, we would say that the views exhibit “complementarity” rather than contradiction. This more inclusive and generalized application of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle was explained by Niels Bohr in “The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory” (1927) and in “The Quantum of Action and the Description of Nature” (1929) as different approaches in discovering all aspects of phenomena.

As Wells makes clear in his autobiography, however, he never thought that humanity’s theories could encompass, exhaustively explain, or truly reflect the wonders of nature as it really is. He writes:

We are compelled to simplify because of the finite amount of grey matter that we possess. The direct adequate dynamic causation of every event, however minute, remains the only possible working hypothesis for the scientific worker. There is no more need to abandon it than to abandon counting and weighing because no two things are exactly alike. And we may so far agree with Max Planck as to believe that we shall continually approximate to it with increased precision of observation and analysis. But also we may add a conviction that we shall never get to it. We shall never get to it for the excellent reason that there is not the slightest justification, outside the presumptions of our own brain, to believe that is really there.

Though surrounded by wonder and mystery, Wells works within the world as best he can understand it.

“Complementarity” allows Wells to maintain both faith in science and hope for humanity through education. From the cosmic standpoint, human beings are predestined, but from the human standpoint, we can and should consciously work toward a better future with faith that we can make a difference. With that faith in mind, Wells then examines morality from the human perspective:

Here we are on ground where we modestly fear almost to tread. There is the dire possibility of awakening the wrath and encountering the rushing denunciations of certain literary men who have taken public morality under their protection. We may, however, point out
that beings are unique, circumstances are unique, and that therefore we cannot think of regulating our conduct by wholesale dicta. A strict regard for truth compels us to add that principles are wholesale dicta: they are substitutes of more than doubtful value for an individual study of cases. A philanthropist in a hurry might clap a thousand poor souls into ready-made suits all of a size, but if he really wanted the people properly clothed he would send them one by one to a tailor.'

This argument is the prototype of John Dewey's position in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), in which Dewey argues that human beings must turn to intelligence rather than to universal principles when deciding conduct. Like Wells, Dewey sees human beings as continuous parts of nature and as products of varied experiences. We should, therefore, rely on habits of experience when engaging in relatively familiar situations and turn to our habits of intelligence when faced with relatively unique situations. It follows that the training of practical intelligence should be a primary goal of education.

While Wells had faith in humanity's potential for intelligent progress, he also feared a danger suggested by evolution. In an 1896 article titled "Human Evolution, An Artificial Process," he acknowledges that, when faced with an altered environment, species that breed rapidly (such as insects) have a better chance for survival than those that breed slowly (such as humans). Since many "lower" species progress through many generations to humanity's one, they are subjected more often to natural selection, and their chances for adaptation are enhanced. Human beings must therefore rely on the "artificial" factor of intelligence to accomplish what blind natural selection will accomplish for "lower" species. He writes:

If this new view is acceptable it provides a novel definition of Education, which obviously should be the careful and systematic manufacture of the artificial factor in man.

The artificial factor in man is made and modified by two chief influences. The greatest of these is suggestion, and particularly the suggestion of example. With this tradition is inseparably interwoven. The second is his reasoned conclusions from additions to his individual knowledge, either through instruction or experience.'

In Article Three of his "My Pedagogic Creed," John Dewey writes of a similar process, calling it "a continuing reconstruction of experience."5 Wells goes on to say that in the future, human beings of trained reason and sound science may conduct our journey through the "currents and winds of the universe"6 in such a way as to "work towards, and at last attain and preserve, a
social organization so cunningly balanced against exterior necessities on the one hand, and the artificial factor of the individual on the other, that the life of every human being, and indeed, through man, of every sentient creature on earth, may be generally happy.”

Wells’s utilization of education for the perfection of society is a prototype for Dewey’s views on the school and social progress as expressed in Article Five of “My Pedagogic Creed.” Dewey writes, for example, that “[T]he community’s duty to education is, therefore, its paramount moral duty. By law and punishment, by social agitation and discussion, society can regulate and form itself in a more or less haphazard and chance way. But through education society can formulate its own purposes, can organize its own means and resources, and thus shape itself with definiteness and economy in the direction in which it wishes to move.”

Wells realized, as Dewey would, that if society is to produce intelligent problem solvers, progressive teaching methods would have to replace traditional methods stressing rote memory and the cramming of facts. Calling for such changes, Wells wrote a number of articles on the subject of science teaching in which he called for specific reforms. The most meaty of these articles is “The Sins of the Secondary Schoolmaster,” published in three parts. In the first installment, “His Technical Incapacity,” Wells charges that the average schoolmaster does not know his trade:

One might therefore imagine that any one aspiring to be a schoolmaster or schoolmistress would devote a certain amount of attention to the study of right and wrong ways of teaching, over and above the study of subjects of instruction, and would be eager to exhibit proofs of this attention. As a matter of fact, this is not the case. In the public elementary schools, a certain portion of the teachers have gone through such a course of special instruction in 'method,' but the vast majority of middle-class, public, and high-school masters and mistresses are altogether without any evidence, documentary or practical, of such knowledge.

Next, Wells charges that the deficiency does not lie only in the instructors’ lack of training in the art of teaching but also in the meager educational backgrounds of teachers and headmasters. He goes on to describe the inevitable results of such ill-prepared teachers’ labors:

The victims of the incompetent or dishonest schoolmaster enter life knowing no language but their own, and that imperfectly, dead to the beauties of literature or art, often incapable of using their hands skillfully, and indeed — unless the thirst for knowledge save them, that
intellectual dipsomania that springs up at times so unaccountably in
the minds of ill-educated youths — predestined to failure. They are
condemned to live narrowly, work feebly, think darkly, and die with
the best things in life still unknown.10

Dewey and the Pragmatists also insist that teachers study pedagogy and
instructional methodology, a concern that moved Dewey to create his lab
school at the University of Chicago.

In the second installment of Wells' attack on secondary teachers, "His
Remarkable Examination Results," Wells cites statistics indicating that more
than half the pupils of the five thousand schools which submit candidates to
the College of Preceptors' examination never attain minimum requirements
to enter the college. In other words, half of the pupils cannot compose a rela-
tively easy paper in English grammar and elementary arithmetic, correctly
answer enough questions on European geography or English history, or pass
in subjects chosen from elementary algebra, the beginnings of a foreign lan-
guage, freehand drawing, etc. Wells finds these statistics appalling, and he
blames teachers for the "amazingly low" results.

Some apologists at the time apparently defended the teachers by claim-
ing that they simply taught too much Latin and pure mathematics. Wells
counters:

The truth is, they do nothing of the kind. They do not teach too
much anything, for the simple reason that they do not know the way.
They fumble with Latin, fumble with mathematics, fumble with
drawing, fumble with science, and with difficulty lift perhaps half
their pupils above the level of the sixth standard of the Board schools.11

Wells laments that somewhere between thirty and forty thousand under-
educated adolescents graduate every year to become citizens and holders of
important positions in the British society and economy. Some of them unfor-
tunately go on to become teachers themselves! After rejecting several reform
proposals as either unworkable or immoral, Wells concludes that only pres-
sure from the general public can bring about the needed reform.

In the final installment, "His Absurd Technical Teaching," Wells briefly
recounts the British public's discovery that schools were not preparing stu-
dents for real life. Therefore, in order to offer a more "practical" education,
schoolmasters relabelled their institutions as "Modern Schools," Commercial
Academies," or "Technical Institutes." The chief difference, writes Wells, is
that the new schools offered book-keeping and shorthand as school subjects,
created something called "commercial geography, taught chemistry and
physics out of textbooks without any experimental work, and introduced a number of technical courses such as electrical engineering and metallurgy. Though Wells welcomes the new emphasis on science, he deplores the way schoolmasters teach it:

There is a certain natural order of studies which must be observed in genuine educational work, a point obvious enough, one might think, were it not disregarded so extensively. You cannot, for instance, teach algebra before arithmetic, or the second book of Euclid before the first, or statics before any geometry. You must begin teaching with simple and familiar things, and build up to the more complex and more abstract conceptions slowly and very carefully, if they are to last and give a basis for further advances in or after the school time. Of course, you can make a pupil commit anything to memory, whether it be understood or not—all the more readily if it is not understood—but we are speaking now of real education, the building of a firm fabric of mental habits and co-ordinated ideas. Wells goes on to criticize as preposterous the order of studies in science education, such as the teaching of physiology before chemistry and physics. Unfortunately, Wells says, on rare occasions when secondary teachers get the order of subjects right, they ruin the enterprise with wretched teaching:

The whole benefit of science teaching consists in the gradual and systematic development of the general laws underlying phenomena. The law is of far less moment than the habit of mind induced by the investigation that led up to it. Not knowledge, but a critical and inquiring mental habit, is the aim of science teaching. Carefully graduated experiments and carefully elucidated reasoning is its essence. But your schoolmaster will set about teaching chemistry by telling boys that all matter is made up of molecules. He will give them scientific theories as if they were facts, explain the dogma first, and follow it with some specious examiner's proof that is no proof at all. In evidence of this assertion let any one look into a selection of school text books in chemistry or physics. In these crystallized lessons one stark assertion follows another, and each chapter is rounded off with a selection of questions, demanding as little thought, and as much faith and memory, as the most dogmatic catechism that ever theologian invented.

Wells notes that though money has been lavished on schools in response to public criticism, the money would be better spent elsewhere—on the navy, for instance. The remedy is for instructors to give the same amount of attention to their teaching technique and theory as physicians do to theirs.
Along these same lines, Wells returned to the sequence of studies when unfavorably reviewing three science texts in Nature, arguing that each book exhibited “The evil of a neglect of the rational sequence of studies. . . .”

Wells’ concern that school subjects train critical thinking rather than the passive memorization of previously established facts is similar to Dewey’s insistence that school be life itself, not a preparation for life. When education is a preparation for life, students learn attitudes and approaches to learning that make them docile and apathetic toward the subject matter at hand. Like Dewey, Wells wants to maximize the schools’ ability to produce active, critically thinking citizen-scientists.

Usually in the Educational Times, Wells would continue to criticize the formal “education” of his time as the following titles indicate: “The Miscellaneous as an Educational Curriculum; “Science teaching—The Ideal and Some Realities;” “The Root of the Matter—Some Reflections on the British Schoolmaster;” “About the Principia—Dead Languages That Ought to Be Buried;” “The Fine Art of Not Teaching Mathematics;” and “The Cheerful Game of Teaching Science Without a Balance.” Wells would continue to write directly or indirectly about education for the rest of his life. His early writings, however, suggest that he worked independently of John Dewey and American Pragmatists in laying foundations for progressive education. As such, Wells was not just a science fiction pioneer; he was an educational pioneer as well.

NOTES

6. Wells. Early Writings. p. 218
7. Ibid. p. 218.
10. Ibid. 2.
13. Ibid. 2-3.
John Dewey's *Experience and Education* and Museum Education

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The strength of museums is providing experiences—real things to see and do, so by its title alone, John Dewey's *Experience and Education* signals that it should be of interest to museum practitioners. And indeed it does not disappoint. To a remarkable extent this book, written some 60 years ago, speaks to major topics at issue for museums today: can we develop a *theory* for informal education; what kinds of experience do we want visitors to have at exhibits; how and what do visitors learn from their experience; what are the characteristics of an exhibit that make it effective; how can the effectiveness of an exhibit be evaluated; what is the difference between education and entertainment, and how much of the latter should museums include; and how does the museum experience relate to school curricula and standards.

Even though Dewey is cited as one of the important forebears for museum education and his name is generally familiar, he is regarded as a part of history and his actual work is not widely read or applied by today's museum professionals. This paper was originally written to bring *Experience and Education* to the attention of those involved with museum education. Here the paper has been rewritten for people primarily interested in Dewey's philosophy of education to show its application to museum education, a field they may not be so familiar with.

That a book written some 60 years ago still has great relevance is both encouraging and discouraging. On one hand it shows that the roots go deep and the ideas put forward have stood the test of time; on the other hand it forces us to ask why, after all this time, we are still struggling with the same
issues. In Dewey's own words, "the point of studying the past is to illuminate the future," and this book still shines great light in that direction.

Written in 1938, towards the end of Dewey's career, *Experience and Education* both reviews his philosophy of experience-based education and responds to criticisms those ideas and the "progressive" schools they inspired had received. Most of those criticisms will sound familiar to those involved with museums today—particularly those striving for more interactive exhibits—and indeed everything Dewey says can be applied to present-day museums as well as to the schools he was originally addressing.

What follows is a summary of *Experience and Education* with a discussion of how its ideas apply to museum education. The headings are taken from the chapter titles and the page references are to that book.

**Traditional vs. Progressive Education**

Dewey starts his comparison of "traditional" and "progressive" education with this key observation: "The history of educational theory is marked by opposition between the idea that education is development from within and that it is formation from without. . . ." (p. 17) Indeed, this distinction between educational approaches seems to be more fundamental than the one museums commonly use between "informal" and "formal" education. Learning from within can be found in the formal setting of the schools, just as didactic teaching from "without" can be found in museums. Neither sector has a monopoly on a particular approach. "Constructivism: is a currently popular position among museum educators that embraces "development from within," and much of the debate over what that term means, and when, where, and how to apply it in museums, seems to be really a debate over this split in underlying philosophy identified by Dewey.

An implication of the "without" position, Dewey reminds us, is that the subject matter "must be imposed, even though good teachers will use devices of art to cover up the imposition so as to relieve it of obviously brutal features." (p. 19) One can see the equivalent of these "devices of art" at some science museums, and certainly in "edutainment" software, where the focus is on making learning "fun," while the underlying pedagogical approach is till "teaching is telling." Dewey, coming from the "within" side, postulates as fundamental to his educational philosophy "the idea that there is an intimate and necessary relation between the processes of actual experience and education." (p. 20) The remainder of *Experience and Education* examines the nature of this experience and the criteria that dis-
tistinguish educative experiences. All of this, it should be no surprise, turns out to be directly applicable to the development and evaluation of museum exhibits and programs.

THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF EXPERIENCE

Starting with the premise "that all genuine education comes about through experience," Dewey quickly add that this "does not mean that all experiences are genuinely or equally educative... . . . Everything depends upon the quality of the experience which is had. The quality of any experience has two aspects. There is an immediate aspect of agreeableness or disagreeableness, and there is its influence up later experiences." (pp. 25, 27) This recognition of two aspects of experience not only serves to define educational experiences but also clarifies three important issues for museums: what kinds of goals to set for exhibits; how to evaluate learning from exhibits; and the relationship of entertainment to education.

The job of an exhibit developer is to create an environment in which a visitor can have certain experiences, and recognizing two parts to the quality of those experiences means that goals need to be set for both. The intended immediate interactions with the exhibit and the learning outcomes that may follow both must be specified. Either one without the other will not do. Specifying only what visitors will see and do may lead to exhibits with little positive effect, or worse, with mis-educative results. One the other hand, setting learning outcomes without specifying what experiences will lead to them will likely lead to a weak exhibit experience with mush of the "learning outcomes" simply written into the labels.

Likewise, evaluation of the educational effectiveness of an exhibit will have to look at two parts. First, what visitors are actually seeing and doing at the exhibit can be determined. This can be done by direct observation, and is most effective if done as an integral part of the exhibit development process. Only if visitors are having the intended immediate experience does it make sense to go on to the second part, evaluating the resulting learning. This is a more difficult evaluation for many reasons, not the least of which is that one is trying to find the "influence up later experiences," where the "influence" may be quite subtle and "later" is not well defined.

Distinguishing the immediate experience from its future effects also gives clarification to the "education/entertainment" question. If one's goal is entertainment, then only the agreeableness of the immediate experience needs to be considered. If, on the other hand, education is the goal, then success lies
in the future effects. Dewey does not rule out the possibility that disagreeable experiences may have positive future effects, but it is reasonable to assume that people will not voluntarily come to museums for this. The museum's goal becomes, in Dewey's words, to "arrange for the kind of experiences which, while they do not repel the student, but rather engage his activities are, nevertheless, more than immediately enjoyable since they promote having desirable future experiences." (p. 27) So Dewey does not see any conflict between an enjoyable and the educative experience, but he does caution that "an experience may be immediately enjoyable and yet promote the formation of a slack and careless attitude," and also that "experiences may be so disconnected from one another that, while each is agreeable or even exciting in itself, they are not linked cumulatively to one another." (p. 26) These, among others, are the kinds of undesirable outcome, sometimes subtle and not immediately evident, that concern those who are wary of the move towards "edutainment" in museums.

Why then, after close to a century, is the experience-based approach to education still struggling to take hold, not only in schools but in museums as well? Dewey himself provides at least a partial answer: "It is a much more difficult talk to work out the kinds of materials, of methods, and of social relationships that are appropriate to the new education than is the case with traditional education. Many of the difficulties . . . and criticisms leveled against them arise from this source. . . . [It is a mistake to think] that the new education is somehow easier than the old." (p. 29)

CRITERIA OF EXPERIENCE

This chapter, of perhaps greatest relevance to museum practitioners, looks at how to discriminate between those experiences that are educationally worthwhile and those that are not. For this purpose Dewey proposes two guiding principles—continuity and interaction—which "in their active union with each other provide the measure of the educative significance and value of an experience." (p. 44) The principle of continuity says that "every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after." (p. 35) In other words, every experience is embedded in a personal continuum of experiences. This is an internal condition. The principle of interaction says that "an experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment. . . ." (p. 43) This is an external condition, and includes both physi-
cal and social factors. For museums this means that, beyond the immediate exhibit, and experience also is affected by persons with whom one is talking, the temperature and noise level of the room, the lack of a place to sit down, etc.

How would these two principles help with the exhibit developer's talk of creating an educative experience for the visitor? The principle of interaction tells us that the only way to create an experience is by skillfully arranging and utilizing the physical and social surroundings—those things over which we exercise some control. The way visitors interact with these surroundings can be checked by direct observation. In addition, the principle of continuity says that even though they are beyond our control, internal factors also are critical in determining what kind of experience the visitor has. To take the internal factors into account requires assessing what is actually going on in student's minds, and that has been neglected in traditional schools, Dewey points out, because it requires both more skill and individual attention on the part of the teachers. Likewise for an exhibit developer, the principle of continuity poses the more difficult challenge because of the wide range of museum audiences and the absence of one-on-one interaction with visitors. The closest approach to assessing individual attitudes at present lies with "front-end evaluation"—interviews and focus groups that take place with visitors in the early stages of exhibit development. But even when good information is obtained, making one exhibit that can accommodate a range of visitors is difficult. Partly because of this, some museums now are placing more staff members in exhibit areas to personally interact with visitors.

Dewey goes on to point out two pitfalls to avoid in applying his principles. One is to think that all education is preparation for the future and therefore to always sacrifice the present for the future. One the contrary, Dewey states, "Only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future. This is the only preparation which in the long run amounts to anything." (p. 49). Museums should be encouraged by this to focus on providing rich experiences at exhibits as their primary function.

The other pitfall—"perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies"—is to think that only the particular subject matter under study at the time is what is learned. Collateral learning—the formation of attitudes, likes, and dislikes—is also taking place and may ultimately be much more important. And for Dewey, "The most important attitude that can be formed is that of go on learning." (p. 48) That the formation of attitudes also may be
the greatest benefit of museum experiences has long been recognized in the profession, yet when talking about the “educational value” of exhibits, it is almost always the specific cognitive outcomes that are mentioned.

Having established some grounds for assessing what experience is and what marks it as educative, Dewey goes on in the remaining chapters to examine topics related to the actual processes of experience-based learning.

**Social Control and the Nature of Freedom**

One of the troublesome issues for experience-based classrooms that carries over to museums (as anyone can attest who has been to a museum on a busy school-group day) is the nature of freedom for the student/visitor and how social control can be maintained without violating that freedom. Dewey clarifies the situation by distinguishing freedom of intelligence, which he says is the only freedom of enduring importance, from freedom of movement, which he sees as a *means*, not an end. While spontaneous impulses and desires constitute the starting point, and igniting these is certainly one thing museums want to do, Dewey reminds us that there is no intellectual growth without some reconstruction, some remaking of these impulses and desires. Freedom of movement may be conducive to the former, but some restrictions on movement may actually help the latter. The criticism that children are “just playing” in science centers reflects the fact that this reconstruction does not appear to be happening, and that is often attributed to there being too little social control.

Dewey suggests that to have social control that does not violate personal freedom the control must come from the “community” itself, not by command from the outside. If students feel they are responsible for and contributing to their own experience, social control will take care of itself. Adapting this approach for class visits to museums, with their short duration, is a considerable challenge. On the other hand, museums might legitimately question whether “reconstruction” really needs to take place immediately on the exhibit floor, or whether sparking “impulses and desires” there is enough, with “reconstruction” taking place in other locations or following the museum visit altogether.

**The Meaning of Purpose**

In Dewey’s words, “There is no point in the philosophy of progressive education which is sounder than its emphasis on the importance of the participation of the learner in the formation of the purposes which direct his
activities in the learning process." (p. 67) Surely this is also the defining characteristic of what museums broadly call informal education.

A genuine purpose, according to Dewey, starts with an impulse which converts to a desire from which a purpose may develop. The purpose is characterized by having a plan and method of action based on looking ahead to the outcomes of the actions. In these terms, a crucial problem for the educator/exhibit developer is how to facilitate the translation of impulse into purpose; that is, helping visitors postpone immediate action on impulse until some plan and method of action has been developed. Traditional education tends to ignore the importance of personal impulse and desire as a source of motivation, and tries to impose its own purposes. The newer education, and museums, can just as easily err in the other direction by “overemphasis upon activity as an end, instead of upon intelligent activity.” (p. 69) In the classroom purpose can develop out of suggestions contributed and organized by the group itself, including the teacher. But again, it is a challenge to adapt this approach to museums.

**PROGRESSIVE ORGANIZATION OF SUBJECT-MATTER**

"One consideration stands out clearly when education is conceived in terms of experience," Dewey observes, "Anything which can be called a study, whether arithmetic, history, geography, or one of the natural sciences, must be derived from materials which at the outset fall within the scope of ordinary life-experience." (p. 72) But he goes on to caution that “Finding the material for leaning within experience is only the first step. The next step is the progressive development of what is already experienced into a fuller and richer and also more organized form, a form that gradually approximates that in which subject matter is presented to the skilled, mature person.” (p. 73)

This chapter, "Progressive Organization of Subject-Matter," looks at how that further development takes place and addresses issues that relate to museums' efforts to work more closely with schools and current educational reform and standards movements.

In his own time, Dewey observed that a weakness of the “newer schools” was that while focusing on experience as the beginning of instruction, they did not give as much attention to “the orderly development toward expansion and organization of subject matter through growth of experience.” (p. 74) For museums that are beginning to recognize and deal with this same problem, the issue becomes how far and by what means to go beyond the initial exhibit experience. This is territory largely unfamiliar to museums, and
those engages in this effort would agree with Dewey that "undoubtedly this phase of the problem is more difficult than the other." (p. 74)

In prescribing how to accomplish the desired "growth of experience," Dewey gives a concise description of what is now usually called inquiry learning. He notes that it is not sufficient to simply give pupils new experiences, they must be experiences that present new problems, and those problems must meet two conditions. The first is that "the problem grows out of the conditions of the experience being had in the present, and that it is within the range of the capacity of students." The second is that "the problem is such that it arouses in the learner an active quest for information and for production of new ideas." The result is that "the new facts and new ideas thus obtained become the ground for further experiences in which new problems are presented. The process is a continuous spiral." (p. 75) The idea of an exhibit giving experiences that present problems that lead to inquiry is very different from the more common notion of an exhibit as a form of communication, just as the inquiry-learning classroom is very different from the "teaching is telling" one.

As an example of inquiry learning Dewey looks specifically at the study of science. Since here "the immature cannot study scientific facts and principles in the way in which mature experts study them," (p. 80) it becomes the teacher's role to lead from the student's present experience to that understanding. "The educator cannot start with knowledge already organized and proceed to ladle it out in doses." (p. 82) The method needed "to extend to present experience to extended organization and understanding of that experience," he points out, is closely related to the method of science itself. Initial ideas are recognized as hypotheses to be tested by the consequences they produce, and it is a continuous process in which learning from what has been done enables more intelligent dealing with further experiences. Teaching and learning, in this same way, are viewed as a continuous process of reconstruction of experience. For science museums, the important point is that interacting with an exhibit is actually doing, and therefore leaning, science. For visitors of different backgrounds, even though the ideas they engage will be at different levels, the process they use will be the same—the "expanding development of experience."

Experience—The Means and Goal of Education

In this final chapter Dewey restates his basic tenet, that "education must be based upon experience—which is always the actual life-experience of some
individual," (p. 89) and warns of the major challenge or danger that it faces. Education based on this principle, he recognized, is "more difficult and strenuous to follow" than traditional education based on transfer of knowledge. The danger is that "it will be thought of as easy to follow and may be improvised in impromptu fashion, ... that it will not be adequately conceived, and that educators who professedly adopt [these principles] will not be faithful to them in practice." (p. 90) This warning seems equally apt for the many museums adopting the "interactive exhibit" model.

Sixty years after its writing, *Experience and Education* can be read and appreciated anew for its relevance to museum education. Creating visitor experiences through interaction with real objects and phenomena is the strength of museums, and providing education is a key part of their stated mission. This book, which lays out the philosophy and the practice of experience-based learning, is worthwhile reading for anyone seeking to understand learning in museums and to develop a theoretical underpinning for informal education.

**NOTES**


2. References to John Dewey's seminal role in experience-based education are found, for example, in:
   Howard Gardner, *The Unschooled Mind: How Children Think and How Schools Should Teach* (Basic Books, 1991). "It is in ... progressive education that I find clues toward the construction of an educational environment in which genuine understandings can become a reality. The model is there in the writings of John Dewey. . . ."

   Jeremy Roschelle, "Learning in Interactive Environments: Prior Knowledge and New Experience," in John H. Falk and Lynn D. Dierking, eds., *Public Institutions for Personal Learning: Establishing a Research Agenda* (American Association of Museums, Washington, D.C. 1995). "Dewey's lifework was concerned with understanding the conditions that enable inquiry to proceed, and herein lies the most salient inspiration for designers of interactive experiences."

When I was a student at the City College of New York in the 1950's, the war at home against communism, the Red Scare, was in its heyday. I learned that if I wanted to enjoy a successful professional life after my studies were completed, I should “Just Say NO” to communism, which meant not associating with communists, but also not engaging in any semblance of serious discussion or study of the subject in terms of its pros and cons as a political and economic system except to damn it as a horrible evil, and that was to be the end of any inquiry. The conviction that an institution of higher education should have at its essence the principle of a free marketplace of ideas where all subjects would be freely discussed and measured against thoughtful and reasoned discourse, resulting in truth unfolding was deemed to be unacceptable according to the dictums laid down by Senator Joe McCarthy, the House Un-American Service Committee, and the Senate Internal Security Committee.

In sum, a war against communism became a war against speech, against civil liberties, against serious study of a controversial subject, against thought itself. America and its peoples paid a huge price for such a witch hunt—lives and careers were ruined by this “anything is justified war” by blacklisting and other nefarious means, and life in academia was corrupted by fear, threat and silence. The Inquisition would brook neither heresy nor heretics even if the very reason for having a constitutional right protecting free speech was to ensure the right to speak and write words that challenged the orthodoxies of the day.
The war on drugs has been pushed to the main stage front of American consciousness by government bureaucracies, private corporations who profit from the prison business and the mass media. The main theme of the play being staged before our eyes, the militarization of a socioeconomic, psychological and spiritual problem would seem to validate the insight offered to us by political scientist Richard Barnett that the "chief threat facing any national security bureaucracy is the absence of enemies. To wit, the war on drugs serves to replace the cold war to an ever growing sense as a justification for "fortress America."

We are now in the midst of a war against drugs. Much has been written and said about how this war is dysfunctional—that our prison systems are overflowing with drug users and low level drug sellers while felons who have committed serious crimes are released early to make room for the casualties of this war; that we have created the modern day equivalent of a plantation system for our prisons are being primarily filled with poor, young men and women of color as the drug wars are pursued with 3,000+ black men incarcerated for every 100,000 in the population as contrasted to 700+ black men incarcerated for every 100,000 during the height of the apartheid system in South Africa; that monies are being diverted from education and the arts, proven means of prevention against becoming involved in criminal activity, because we choose jails over school as the preferred way to deal with errant youth; that drug abuse is on the rise among young people notwithstanding all the monies and human power has been spent on the war; that drugs has replaced communism as the scourge of the earth while poverty, homelessness and the destruction of our ecosystems play second or third fiddle as issues of our time next to the crusade against drugs. It is not my intent to rehash this point of view, which I do believe has great merit on its side.

For is not the axiom that the way to hell is often paved with good intentions about to come true as a direct consequence of the war on drugs? Shall our current policy to combat drugs, so dependent on law enforcement as its linchpin, lead to ever more serious violations of our civil liberties? In Hollywood, Gore Vidal has President Wilson instructing us: "I pray I'm wrong. But I'm deathly afraid that once you lead this people (Americans)—and I know them well—into war, they'll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. Because to fight to win, you must be brutal and ruthless, and that spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fiber of our national life. You—Congress—will be infected by it, too, and the police, and the average citizen. The whole lot. Then we shall win. But what shall we win?
When a large police machine is established to fight "evil," and the war on drugs is seemingly at war with evil, the edifice so constructed in order to justify its existence and expansion soon outgrows its original objectives, and it demands to be fed. "More enemy! More raids! More monitoring of entire communities! More tests to prove one's innocence! More enemy! More raids!"

A rather sad and tragic commentary on the current state of affairs as we are about to enter the 21st century, but why expect otherwise in an age of information—because information is not wisdom. For the "Just Say NO" to drugs campaign has unleashed the furies of another witch hunt upon this land of ours, similar in nature and scope to the Red Scare of earlier times. For both teachers and students are being instructed to say no to exploration, to examination, to reflection, to discourse, in sum, to that which comprises studying and learning, that is what "Just Say NO" means in essence. To say yes to a serious, non-prejudicial and disciplined inquiry into the subject of drugs becomes the basis for being charged with being soft on drugs, to encouraging drug use, to condoning an illegal activity, to undermining the moral fabric of America, to playing into the hands of the drug cartels, accusations that carry serious personal, social and professional penalties.

The drama that we were witness to when Cardinal, I mean Senator, Jesse Helms refused to allow the Senate to conduct hearings into the worthiness of former Massachusetts Governor William Weld's nomination to be U.S. Ambassador to Mexico because he favored the medical use of marijuana, a controversial idea worthy of being submitted to the polity for public debate and due consideration, only attests to the fact that unless one subscribes to the official line of there being only position to take on the subject of drugs, speech as much as use—be against, be tough, or shut up—one risks one's credibility.

My own experience with an uncle dying” from stomach cancer, who was told by his doctor that he should try marijuana as a relief from his nausea when all conventional and legal medications that he had been prescribed did not relieve his symptoms, advice that he reluctantly followed given his conservative bent, only to find that it did work, and that he could now die in greater peace, prompted me to look beyond the official word on the subject. What I found in the literature was a vast array of knowledge, opinion and fact that I hadn't never know existed, and, which I gather from the say no to drugs establishment, I shouldn't want to know what was out there unless I wish to be charged with being in cahoots with the cabal out to destroy America.

Why can't students engage their teachers in a subject that is they are most interested in, and, which given the role that drug use/abuse and public poli-
cy on the subject of drugs plays in the youth culture, is most necessary if we seek to impart to our youth a sense of responsibility, purpose, empowerment and visions as they become engaged with the realities and potentialities of drugs in relation to self, others, society and culture? Could it be that some of the drugs that fall under the category of the illegal threaten the very core of the consumer culture that we are drowning in if we were take the time to realize that to consume, consume and consume is not a practice that the earth can continue to sustain for any appreciable future time without great cost to human existence as we know it?

To paraphrase the words of David Lenson (*On Drugs*), we rise above the rhetoric of “Just Say No,” to a realization that conditioning and prevailing norms of consciousness are challenged by that which one experiences while under their influence, and that one is afforded the realization that there are choices available to be made as to one’s self-identity, values, ways of being, purpose in life and construction of societal structures and policies, explorations that might cause one to rise above the commandments of our time—Buy until you die! Why go to a library when you can go to a mall! Watch the screen and dream the mass dream! You are what you own and possess!

In essence, words and thoughts about drugs to be read and reflected upon that the wardens and guards of the cultural prisons of our times—all those temples to money and accumulating things—do not want youth to come in contact with for fear of raising consciousness above the walls of a consumer culture, above spending, acquiring and consuming.

As Krishnamurti, the noted Indian philosopher and spiritual teacher once wrote:

> Without inner richness worldly things become extravagantly important, leading to various forms of destruction and misery. . . .when we are inwardly poor, we indulge in every form of outward show, in wealth, power and possessions.

To be sure, there are more passage ways than one into the room of the inner search for meaning and purpose in life, to opening, in the words of visionary artist William Blake’s, the doors of perception. I use meditation, tai chi and prayer as my passageways and doors, means that I bring to the attention of my students as alternatives to drug use. However, there is a sufficient body of worthy and significant knowledge in the field of drugs to merit serious study of what are these things called drugs that goes beyond threat: “Just Say NO” to speaking out on the wrong side of the issue or you won’t get hired, won’t feel secure in your job, won’t be taken seriously, won’t
get funded, the modern equivalents of being burned at the stake for those who wish to work in academia.

Mention drugs and you have a subject that affects and concerns students in most profound ways and that they most earnestly desire want to know about in an intellectually honest manner—the truth in its entirety. For our institutions of higher education to ignore and/or deny the reality and necessity of such inquiry is shameful and destructive of both the scholarly tradition and free speech as well as being harmful to the best interests of our youth and our culture. A “Just Say No” rhetoric has evolved into a “Just Say Nothing” intellectual and public policy.

It is time for the silence to be broken.

Yes, the abuse of drugs needs to be dealt with in our schools, communities and homes. At the same time, America’s “war on drugs” seems to be based on a mentality of “we destroyed the village in order to save it.” For we are abusing and destroying the rights of America’s youth, as, for example, by paying students a monetary award to turn in one’s classmates suspected of using or dealing drugs ($20, by a Fayette County, Georgia sheriffs office), and by strip searches of students suspected to be possessing drugs; creating a modern day version of a plantation system in our prisons; and allocating funds and manpower to a failed policy while educational programs that work to educate the whole person for a productive life go begging for the necessary funding to carry out their missions as major consequences of this war.

Let us now turn to the practical aspects of what a holistic approach to educating youth about drugs would entail.

We must first realize that drugs are here to stay, that the war on drugs isn’t working, that we’ll never build prisons fast enough to find room for all the drug offenders, and that the philosophical underpinning of the drug war—the carrot and stick approach of drug education and incarceration—cannot work because the human urge to gain the effects of drug use ultimately is so strong that we cannot be either educated or frightened out of it. (See Intoxication: Life in Pursuit of Artificial Paradise by Ronald K. Siegel, in which Dr. Siegel makes a strong case that the biological impulse to get high rivals the biological impulse for food, water and sex.)

History teaches us that it is fruitless to hope that drugs will ever disappear, and that any effort to eliminate them from society is doomed to failure.

During most of this century, Western society has attempted to deal with its drug problems through negative actions: by various wars on drug abuse implemented by repressive laws, outrageous propaganda, and attacks on users, suppliers and sources of disapproved substances. These wars have been
consistently lost. Drug use is to be extensively found among all socioeconomic classes and racial ethnic groups, and the drug laws have created vicious and ever-enlarging criminal networks that corrupt society and cause far worse damage than the substances they distribute.

We must learn to distinguish drug use from drug abuse. As long as society continues to call all those who take disapproved substances "drug abusers," it will have an insoluble problem of enormous proportions. Real drug abusers are those in bad relationships with drugs, whether the drugs are approved or disapproved by society.

Preventing drug abuse is a realistic goal. Two approaches are possible. One is to teach people, especially young people, how to satisfy their needs and desires without recourse to drugs. The second is to teach people how to form good relationships with drugs so that if they choose to use drugs, they will continue to be users and not abusers.

Why do people take drugs? To rebel. To go along with peer pressure. To establish an identity. To improve physical performance. To alter moods. To promote and enhance social interaction. To treat disease. To aid religious practices. To explore the self. To enhance sensory experience and pleasure. To stimulate artistic creativity and performance. A mixed bag, to be certain. So, let us explore with our students this question: What are the benefits and costs, to self, family and society, of taking drugs to attain the above mentioned goals for drug use?

Providing models of intelligent drug use is the best way to assure that people will use drugs rather than abuse them if anyone chooses to use them. It is well known that alcoholics tend to come from families where one or both parents are teetotalers. What is less well known is that alcoholics also tend to come from families where both parents are teetotalers. Apparently the absence of a parental role model for successful drinking is the determining factor. So the question arises: in the absence of a parental role model, what is to be the role of educators in providing such role models?

Philosophy—literally, the "love of wisdom"—owes its existence to the practice of self-reflection. It relies on the ability to mentally distance oneself, to step back, to question. We employ reason to lay bare the most basic assumptions of our world views. Through our philosophy, we weave a story, an ongoing reconstruction of knowledge, that either, in Deweyian terms, reaffirms our commitment to both discovery through learning and democratic values, or "puts new clothes" on a dogmatic transmission of facts, beliefs, and practices that serves to foster an authoritarian mind, society and culture.
If life in academia is to be reflective of the pursuit of truth and not of propagandizing couched in the guise of a specious objectivity, we, in the learned professions, must be willing to tread beyond the boundaries of what are culturally acceptable parameters of dialogue and socio/political constructs that serve to deny the process of unbridled truth-seeking its primary place in the marketplace of ideas to be found within educational institutions.

The general mission of education is to equip students with a perceptual framework, knowledge, skills and values to become fully participating members in society. As educators, we are committed to creating a classroom environment that serves to foster amongst our students the reclaiming of the imagination, critical and creative-thought, and questioning, dialogue, problem-solving and decision-making skills. Hopefully, we also seek to inspire students with a sense of responsibility, purpose, empowerment and vision as they become engaged with the realities and potentialities of drugs in relation to self, others, society and culture. Drugs in and of themselves are neither good nor bad; rather, they are powerful substances that can be put to good or bad uses, whether legal or illegal, approved or unapproved. We educators need to believe that by presenting the truth, reasoned discourse, and open and enlightened dialogue, and not distortions, falsehoods and propaganda, about these substances, we can help people, especially young people, come to terms with drugs. As educators, our purpose needs to be to help people to live intelligently in a world where drugs shall always exist.
Multiculturalism and the Teaching of Literature

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In American education, the word "literature" often calls up specific ideas about genre, authorship, interpretation, and meaning. These ideas concern art's ability to be categorized or interpreted "correctly" or "authoritatively" solely on the basis of its content, its internal coherence, and its "authority" as part of a long-standing chain of "masterpieces." Such ideas facilitate discussions of technical strategies, character, and setting to get to a work's meaning. "Literature" is thought of as "imaginative" works of prose, poetry, and drama. Theatre is meant to be acted rather than narrated. In poetry the lines don't meet the far side of the page. Fiction involves character, plots, settings—narrative elements. The creators of literary works seem mostly to be dead white males, though in fiction and especially in poetry, works from the last two centuries may be by women or persons of color. Yet most creative writing by minorities, as well as by women, dates from after 1920. This rule also applies to works from non-western cultures, at least in English or translation.

Such preconceptions about literature underlie assumptions about viability and discussibility that often decide which works get into the curriculum. They appear at all educational levels, affecting literature's dissemination from anthology and course design to pedagogical practice. These facts become important when one considers the impact multicultural literature, which I define as literature from all times, places, societies, races, religions, and ethnic groups, may have on the curriculum. Regarding genre, authorship, interpretation, and meaning, multicultural literature raises concerns similar to
those raised in modern theory, and its introduction into education may profoundly affect how literature is taught.

In each literary genre, specific works exemplify technical features such as first person point of view or the sonnet form. Along with this approach, works represent specific themes linked to "key points" in people's lives. Of course, thematic arrangement relates to meaning. But interpretations must fuse in an overall sense of meaning, and the work's integrity will (in part) be measured by the extent to which this happens. The build-up of interpretive questions and their answers into overall interpretations and considerations of moral and aesthetic taste result in evaluations of the work's ability to give pleasure based on *mimesis*.

From a multicultural perspective, however, it is clear that "literature" as described here is actually the invention of a specific time and place. In fact the genre-fying of literature represents a positivist attempt to scientize it, reflecting the same aim of control as the emphasis on national literatures that developed in the nineteenth century. Positivist ideas of control and conformation such as the distinction of genres "guided the greater part of European and American scholarship in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." Taine's literary positivism viewed the literary work as "the expression of the psychology of an individual" reflecting his period and *milieu* and "the race to which he belonged." Taine justified this approach by its dealing with "perceptible facts rather than ideas." Importantly, one such fact, an Enlightenment if not Renaissance prejudice, was the 'fact' of "irresistible racial differences," which solidified the fiction of "ultimate, irreducible difference between cultures, linguistic groups, or adherents of specific belief systems which ... also have fundamentally opposed economic interests" (Gates, 4-5).

First to go in a multiculturalist perspective on literature might be *genre*, for though we can speak of theatrical or non-theatrical performing, the merging of theatre into ritual in one direction, puppet play in another (Kabuki), and both in yet another (Balinese shadow play) obliterates distinctions between theatre and, say, religion. Arguably, poetry exists in all cultures, but does its difference from prose? Cultures often generate epics with heroes who fight enemies or monsters, but these fictions are often mythologies which in context define cultural truths. Thus the Bible is literature, as are tales about George Washington. Fact and fiction, a dichotomy assumed in literature's categorization into types as well as its ability to represent "truths" without "facts," might not be as distinct as assumed. Native American Coyote stories seem like tales, yet they describe such realities as the world's creation or the color of coyote tails. On the other hand, Malcolm
Margolin makes clear the problems of fact one faces when dealing with nineteenth-century California Indian autobiographies, which "[give] no details about birth, marriage, or occupation, but [consist] of ... recountings of dreams and contacts with the spirit world"—features that "made perfect sense" in tribal life (7).

These last comments suggest a second problem with multicultural literature, especially tribal literature—the problem of authorship. Simply put, the author is an invention of literate cultures. In pre-literate societies "authors" do not exist—only tellers or re-tellers. When one deals with re-telling, one deals with changes in the story via forgetting, embroidering, or refashioning for an audience, so that a hero’s adventures may be reinterpreted to bring out different messages. Tales such as the "Swan-Maiden myths" attest to the spread and diversification of stories.

The "death of the author" or "decentering of the subject" has been central to literary criticism since the 1960s. Hirsch and others have claimed that "authorial intention ... is the only practical norm for a cognitive discipline of interpretation." In New Criticism, "coherence" replaces a "meaning which [could] no longer be attributed to the author." In structuralism, however, nothing replaces the author, so "ambiguity becomes fully polysemic, in the sense of consisting of an unreconcilable multiplicity of meanings." Structuralism’s assault on authority pointed the way for Foucault’s contention that "the notion of ‘author’ constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas" (141).

Controversy over the importance of authority often centers on claims of authority for specific texts. For instance, critics judge versions of Shakespeare’s plays depending on whether they think the work was published from manuscript or pirated by scribes during performance. On another tack, much is made of Shakespeare’s foraging in histories, tales, and other plays for his plots, and of his reworking of these materials into his plays. But what happens when no authoritative text exists, when each telling/retelling is in many ways totally separate from other tellings? Tribal texts directly call into question ideas of the “authority” of authors and all the hierarchical assumptions associated with “correct” versions of works. In fact seeing stories as retellings points out that the “aura” Walter Benjamin associates with paintings also exists for “canonized” works. Canonical rankings, including those of originary “texts” recording the “authoritative” word of God, become less important when texts emerge as retellings, possibly of archetypal myths. As Mary Helen Washington puts it, “the creation of the fiction of tradition is a matter of power” (32).
Insistence on the collapse of the category of author may seem odd in the post-literate classroom. After all, texts are written, even if they have been transcribed. Besides, most texts now being written seem to fit into the "western" mode of authored works in specific genres—perhaps as much a legacy of colonialism as concern over "the race to which [an author] belonged" is a legacy of positivism. But behind the question of authority lies the question of interpretation. A common positivist assumption is that the version of a work "approved" by an author—its "authoritative" version—provides its "correct" meaning, the one intended by the author. Against this position, "reader-response" critics have argued that "the knower's own present situation is already constitutively involved in any process of understanding" (Linge xiv) or for contextual approaches, in which "to be in a situation is to see . . . words . . . as already meaningful" (Fish 631).

Multiculturalism might further problematize these possibilities. First, when a work draws on the creativity of an entire culture, is it possible to consider "what the author meant to say"? Can one approach the "original significance" of a story that comes from a culture far removed from one's own? Consider Aboriginal songs that serve as "maps" to waterholes while preserving the essence of Aboriginal culture. "Audience-centered" response seems possible until one recalls that the original "audience" of the story may think completely differently from its contemporary readers (who undergo a "falsified" experience of the text as a result of their reading it or hearing it in a classroom). Difficulties of "authoritative" interpretation intensify once one reads or teaches from a multicultural position.

But the problems do not stop there. The use of "literature" as an area of classroom discussion involves assumptions that become shaky when one approaches literature from a multicultural perspective. Difficulties with "realism," comprehensibility, and the degree of "depth" in stories suddenly appear. Before considering these issues, I would like to look at some assumptions underlying "New Critical" or "reader-response" approaches to "cohesion" and "comprehensibility" in relation to certain Positivist concepts and the idea of "discussibility" itself.

Literature teaching aims to encourage "'personal growth','" "the preservation of a cultural heritage," and "the development of language competencies." Forgoing "language competencies," what do the other categories represent? "Cultural heritage" obviously defines assumptions about a cultural dominant, a tradition such as Eliot refers to when he writes that "existing monuments [of art] form an ideal order" (5). In practice this means certain texts are retained because of their perceived significance in light of economic conditions dictat-
ing the exclusion of other works. Beyond the ideal order, though, how are “personal growth” and its corollary “constructivist perspective” related to hegemony? How do the “content and form” of works of literature recreate “structures of the social environment of individualistically oriented advanced industrial economies”? Answers to these questions rest in the assumption of the “shared” experience of the text. According to Applebee, in secondary school “[t]he typical literature classroom is organized around whole-group discussion of a text everyone has read, with the teacher in front of the class guiding the students toward a common or agreed-upon interpretation.” While total agreement need not be reached, it is important that reasons for interpretation be introduced and dissected. This is in part due to what constitutes a “discussible” text. In New Critical terms, it must have all the components it needs within it for the “coherence” that unifies “meaning.” Though there may be “more than one reasonable answer” to a question about the text, what happens or what the story means must ultimately be discussible, generally in terms of “character motivation,” striking language or details, or “words, phrases, or sentences that can be understood in more than one way.”

The paradox here lies in the crossing of discussion leading toward consensus and the growth of the person. It instances the “objective, symbolic violence” that appears “insofar as [pedagogic action] is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power.” On this view, the “habitus” or “incorporated possibilities” of the dominant group become “the natural and only proper sort of habitus,” “reproducing social and cultural inequalities from one generation to the next.” One can compare this scenario for individuation to a Native American model, in which “identity” or “growth” occurs through leaving the community for communion with the spirit world. One receives a song or a name from the spirits which becomes part of the self, an identifying reality not shared with others.

The contradiction can be approached from the other side, but to do so, I must use personal experience. I used to edit story collections for an educational publisher to widen cultural diversity in the anthologies we published. I skimmed and read hundreds of stories, always bearing in mind age suitability, “discussibility,” and several features “dictated” by letters of complaint that editors felt would make stories “less suitable” for certain grade levels. These concerns included sad or violent endings, unsympathetic or weak female characters, witches and ghosts, death, sex, Satanism, racism, and political overtones. When selecting texts for discussion, editors would avoid certain categories of experience. The aim was to find texts describing experiences all could share. However, this tended to pull texts considered for inclusion
away from "political" or sociological issues toward "individual" or personal experience. Family interactions, interactions with friends, and feelings of rejection became dominant "themes," on the assumption that everyone shared these experiences. This meant Langston Hughes's "Thank You, Ma'am" (about a boy caught stealing) and Toni Cade Bambara's "Raymond's Run" (about a runner and her retarded brother) could be continued from earlier series, and the excerpt "Simangele and Vusi" from Njabulo Ndebele's The Test, dealing with competition between boys, could be considered.

Paradoxically, the very issues that define multiculturalism as an issue tend to be done away with in the incorporation of "multicultural" texts into classroom discussion. This "blocking" results from the cross-referencing of "personal growth" with "consensus" and "discussibility," and the need for internal "coherence." Such coherence defines itself in terms of the dominant model for social construction in art works, or in other words in terms of the "dominant culture" and its "ideal forms." Consider a story like Doris Lessing's "Through the Tunnel," in which a vacationing English boy feels left out when he is ignored by French boys at the beach. The French boys disappear at one place under the water, then surface at another. The English boy discovers they are swimming through a tunnel. Moving from uncertainty to determination, he swims through the tunnel, a tremendous ordeal. This story addresses feelings of rejection and compensation for these feelings, an experience all children share. Yet consider a slight change to the story. Now the boy is an Arab; the group of boys is European. From the dominant cultural standpoint in American schools, the story is no longer as discussible as it was before. In fact it may no longer be discussible at all, having crossed the borders of taste. It no longer touches on the experience of "everyone." This results from the crossing of race, the political ground of difference, with the psychological ground of similarity. Internal "coherence" (psychology) as a discussible issue ("character motivation") fades once "exterior" factors (racism and history) intervene.

Just as for Foucault "the coming into being of the notion of 'author' constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas," so the coming into being of "internal coherence" in the work, which the individual, through the group, converts into "personal growth," marks the "individualization" created by the "structures of the social environment of individualistically oriented advanced industrial economies." "[W]ith every appearance of neutrality [education] establishes hierarchies ... so that social value comes to be identified with 'personal' value." The overall "marker" of this "individualitic" society is, surprisingly, its conformity, as indicated by its insis-
tence on comprehensibility, depth, and realism. As an editor, I aimed at finding stories suitable for different age levels from any number of cultures. One line of separation we used, which ran roughly between fourth and fifth grades, had to do with the degree to which the stories reflected "reality." Fifth-graders and their teachers wanted stories involving "real" characters in "real-life" situations. They felt folktales and fairy tales, with their fantastic elements, were for "children." Our own criteria of using stories that were discussible often inclined editors to select stories that dealt with "real," "discussible" issues, while again, audience considerations eliminated certain "realities."

When "realism" becomes an issue in teaching, the creative offerings of many cultures become unacceptable. Children who call fairy tales "kid's stories" will not accept folkloric literature involving magic, witches, ghosts, or dragons. These are not children's stories in other cultures, as they were not in western culture until recently. In one way, then, "literature" is an invention of a specific type of culture associated with specific modes of production. This is why the "literary" representation of multiculturalism in most anthologies comes from the twentieth century. The writings conform to the parameters of the reality that the "cultural arbitrary" of industrial society brings to consciousness, reconfirming that school "transforms social classifications into academic classifications."

If realism is an issue, so is comprehensibility, which again links to a mode of production. Comprehensibility defines what is available to readers. One way of considering the issue is through the lens of "raw" versus "processed" narrations. In "raw" narration elements occur outside of probability, progress, or "cause-effect" relationships. As in nintendo, opposition to a character's achievements pop up, seemingly as much to block achievement as to give "significance" to accomplishment. Not all narratives suggest that heroes overcome anything more than physical obstacles, and not all cultures find this lack of "growth" a loss. Perhaps the favoring of "significant" over "raw" events inverts the repetitiveness without "significance" or "end" often described in modern life.

Of course it is equally possible that "growth" in a culture occurs in ways not obvious to us. An Eskimo story tells of two brothers lost on the ice. One dies, and the other cuts the frozen body open to make a human kayak and paddle back to land. Arriving at a village, he meets and marries a woman. When the woman asks him about his hunting ability, he shows her that he can turn into a bird and catch fish which turn into seals. Since he has revealed his secret to her, though, he must leave her. He goes to his native village to use his hunting magic there. In a story like this it might be hard for us to say
what the main character has undergone. On the other hand, stories from the People's Republic of China often revolve around details of social interaction filtered through layers of Communist bureaucracy. Characters act in light of their relation to each other in the party. Such tales do not lend themselves to an American classroom not steeped in study of Chinese bureaucratic structures. If you can imagine a Tibetan trying to understand a story that equates success in life with the rules of tennis, you can see how hard multicultural literature can be.

A last issue along the same lines is interpretability, or "depth," as a category of experience. Western cultures assume a difference between surface phenomena ("fact") and deep structure ("truth"). For instance, psychoanalysis has observed differences between expressed, believed motivations and unconscious, indirectly expressed yet identifiable motivations that provide "deep" structure. But such stances might actually represent cultural strategies for interpreting experience as much as they represent a human universal. For example, "raw" narration might represent unconscious expression without the need of the "logic" filter consciousness tries to impose on "meaningful" material. On the other hand, certain literatures do not always seem to offer depth of character motivation. Japanese children's stories can seem without "depth" in the sense of showing how disobedient children suffer or "learn to cope" through experience. In fact "subconscious" expression of experience, such as one finds in western folk tales as interpreted by psychologists, do not always seem prevalent. "Troubled" behavior need not occur. Adult stories such as "Rashomon," in which the same event is described differently by different characters, call into question the viability of "solutions" drawn from "interpretive strategies." Or consider haiku. In western poetry nature often represents the feelings of the poet. In haiku, however, "nature" presents itself immediately, without interference from the feelings of its viewer. From a Buddhist perspective, "the thing perceives itself in us" rather than perception occurring through an action by a filtering "subject." By presenting the here/now surface of phenomena as the totality of perception, haiku elides westernized "discussions" of "meaning."

Depth, comprehensibility, and interpretability become meaningful in light of meanings, intended, discovered, or "missed," in multicultural texts. The problems involve being able to find and identify meanings. Many tellings of stories are targeted toward a specific, present audience, and stories vary between tellings. Where, then, is meaning? It may be esoteric, essentialist, or even "tabu" in that its "real" meaning is revealed only to the initiated. Rationality may be local rather than universal, and "pragmatic liberalism"
may only work if one assumes that even though cultures are incompatible, similar intentions or mutually recognizable levels of discourse permit "overlapping consensus" and interaction. Can "pragmatic" interaction occur in literary studies? What force drives it? What does the teacher do if literature is not "pragmatic"?

This issue can be phrased in another way: how can one teach beyond the thought processes embedded in the culture, if one thinks it desirable to do so? Some answers come to mind—answers that would not only "free" multicultural literature to express itself, but that might also "free" much of contemporary western writing. These include putting less emphasis on consensus for determining "meaning," comparing literatures, and introducing history, politics, and anthropology into the classroom. The possibilities are there, and some have already started to be realized. But I hope I have suggested how multiculturalism might affect the study of literature in American schools. Bringing multicultural literature into the American classroom might affect education in ways similar to the way contemporary literary theory is now affecting higher education.

NOTES

1. I derive my definition in part from Alpana Sharma Knippling's comments on what constitutes multicultural literature. According to Knippling, "traditionally, literature has not been termed 'multicultural'; hence, one is at liberty to presume that 'multicultural literature' is ... any literature that is marginal, non-Western, postcolonial, 'Third World,' noncanonical, and/or nontraditional" (215n.). Knippling's wish is to highlight the "oddity" of the concept of multicultural literature, yet one might also argue that such an approach (if coupled with literature that is constructed as non-multicultural, i.e., "the canon"), would give students expansive insight into different cultural practices, and so increase awareness of "the other," which is possibly one of the purposes of literary study. It should be remembered that in its actual manifestation in US schools, multicultural literature tends to highlight American ethnic groups rather than literature as a whole. It "does not concern 'world literature'" because it is meant to bring American minorities into the educational process rather than bring about overt awareness of and appreciation for difference. In this way, as Alan C. Purves points out, "for the United States, multiculturalism remains ethnocentric" (109).

2. For some idea of how cultural differences in literacy construction affect perceptions of literary works by non-native speaking students, see Anne O. Soter's comments on factors affecting second language literacy learning and knowledge of discourse conventions in written language in her study of English teachers and the non-native student. Soter points out that "the process [of literacy acquisition] involves a shift from the physical world of experience to a symbolic representation of that world," and that "representing information in print necessitates acquiring ... symbolic systems" that differ from oral systems. This of course results in "differences between oral and literate cognitive styles in orally-based and literacy-based cultures." Because of these differences, not to mention the differences between systems of symbolic representation that literacy-based cultures evolve, "What makes a story ... a 'good' story versus a 'poor' story is cultural-
ly determined. Assumptions about sharing similar understandings of 'plot,' 'point of view,' 'figurative language,' 'character development,' and so on in literature study and writing are ill-founded.... [Cultures] do not share similar assumptions about texts, and both teachers and students labor under unnecessary misapprehensions unless this factor is acknowledged" (233-235).

REFERENCES


Waiting: Killing Time?¹ Playtime?

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What do children do when they are left on their own at school? Teachers must leave the room; they must work with a few students and leave the others to their own resources; or the student must wait to talk to the principal. What do children do? They wait. Such moments are not unusual; they happen everywhere in the school day and in life. Very similar are times spent in the waiting rooms of doctors and dentists, waiting for a bus, waiting for a friend to appear, waiting for meat to be cooked through. As Dr. Seuss tells us:

Waiting for a train to go
or a bus to come, or a plane to go
or the mail to come, or the rain to go
or waiting around for a Yes or No
Everyone is just waiting.²

But this is not the occasion to worry about waiting in general, except in passing. Rather what should students do while they wait? Read, meditate, talk to a friend, write in a journal, turn on a walkman, twiddle their thumbs? What should students do while they wait or in the interstices between events of some moment? How should children wait for Thanksgiving or a wedding day? Are these just lost times?

Strangely enough, Rousseau builds some such moments into his educational scheme in the Emile. He speaks of negative education. Thus, let us say, when a child first wants to swim, she should be put off and urged to take a walk. A child wants to know about sex; let’s hurry to the market. A young man wants to meet young ladies; he is encouraged to go horseback riding.
When Emile falls in love with Sophie, he is taken on a field trip to other countries to find out how they are run. In all these instances, the student is cajoled into waiting. The image at the beginning of the fourth book graphically tells the Rousseauvian story. The bags of wind on Ulysses' ship are opened, and the ship is blown off course for many a year. Such crises must be avoided at all costs. Persons' capacities must catch up to their desires before they are allowed to act. Developmental theory requires waiting. As a result, the student is compared to a sleep-walker, who wanders around waiting for something, he knows not what. "As a somnabulist, wandering during his slumber, sleepwalks on the brink of a precipice into which he would fall if he were suddenly awakened, so my Emile, in the slumber of ignorance, escapes perils that he does not perceive. If I awaken him with a start, he is lost. Let us first try to get him away from the precipice and then we shall awaken him in order to show it to him from farther off." Waiting is an indispensable tool of the teacher.

On the other hand, John Dewey, in Democracy and Education, is against any educational enterprise which considers students as mere candidates waiting for life, as people on a waiting list. His running polemic, then, is against education as a preparation for adult living or, even worse, against adult living as a preparation for another life. Under these conditions, children lose all impetus, procrastinate, are in situations where a conventional average standard of expectation must be substituted for a standard based on what the individual can do, and must be motivated by rewards and punishments to keep them working. School turns out to be a long, long waiting period that encourages both routine and capricious activity, minimizes increments of meaning, and in the end does not help the student learn to control consequences.

II.

In a difficult, even controversial, area such as this, it is always a good thing to make a preliminary survey of the field. Waiting has many faces, more even than Rousseau or Dewey face up to; let us look at some of them as they appear in recent journals.

We wait for a certain time, for the right moment, for the right person. We wait for someone else or ourselves to do something. Waiting can make things better or worse. Waiting can be rejected or profitable. Waiting can be waiting for or waiting with. It can be purely imaginative or actually change the present. Waiting can be paradoxical.

To spell out this listing: We wait for a certain time. We wait for the
dawn, the morning star, the morning train, the harvest, for a time we know not when.\(^6\)

We wait for, watch for the right moment. In the 1930s, conservative and nationalist revisionists among German historians waited in the wings anxious to struggle openly against neofascist views. During Gladstone's long tenure, the Marquis of Hartington had his long tenure as "Prime Minister in waiting." A recent headline read: For GOP, religious right plays waiting game in Iowa. The Middle East waits for autonomy. Hong Kong women in prostitution wait for love. Hannah is an example of waiting in hope for a child, who turns out to be Samuel.

We wait for the right person. John Knox waited for the appearance of a new Deborah, the judge, in Mary Tudor, Mary of Lorraine, Mary Stuart, and even in Elizabeth. Alasdair MacIntyre waits for a new St. Benedict. Graduate students wait for a professor to come back from a sabbatical.

We wait for someone else to act before we move. So in World War II the Japanese battle fleet sat waiting to attack the advancing American fleet. The widow of Pál Maléter spent many years waiting for confirmation of his death. Pizarro's army spent several months at Coaque waiting for reinforcements. Citizens wait for the reform of the law concerning health care access and finance. Citizens wait for the coming of the barbarians. China is waiting for human rights. Elderly people wait for their allocations. Army wives wait to be reunited with their husbands.\(^7\) Women wait for the implementation of ordination canons in the Episcopal Church. Prostitutes wait for the next customer.

We wait to do something. In the 19th century, the port city of Le Havre played an important role for German emigrants waiting to emigrate to the United States. Death row inmates play the waiting game, wanting to do what is right and not knowing what that would be.

Sometimes waiting makes things better. In the 19th century stories of people being buried alive in France led to the introduction of a 24-hour waiting period before burial to allay fears. In Blois, in 18th century France, many foundlings were inscribed on waiting lists, which insured that some were actually reclaimed by their relatives after some years. A brochure on waiting has been prepared for sick patients who wish to grow spiritually. Patients place themselves on several waiting lists at the same time to insure treatment. Scientists continue to wait for conceptual schemes that will help them organize material.

At other times, waiting makes things more difficult. Waiting times are instituted to make access to social security benefits harder to obtain. Immigrants to the New World frequently faced unsanitary and crowded wait-
ing areas. Waiting lists of the elderly hungry grow as demographics shift and attention wanes. The British National Health Service engages in unpublicized and unconsented forms of implicit rationing through the use of waiting lists.

Waiting can be bad if it goes on too long. A man can wait longer to have children than can a woman, biologically. But there is a limit for both, especially when having children entails bringing the child to maturity.

Waiting is rejected. In the Russia of the 1910s and in China under Mao, instead of waiting for the ideal objective conditions for socialism to materialize, namely an industrialized proletariat, the revolutionaries moved ahead. While daydreaming at his desk in the Swiss Patent Office, Einstein had a vision of himself falling freely from the roof of the building. By immediately bringing this vision under suitable physical concepts and without waiting for linked data, he found the Equivalence Principle, which eventually led him to General Relativity. In 1982, without waiting for the findings of the national hospice study, Congress passed legislation to enable certified hospices to receive medicare reimbursement.

Waiting is used possibly profitably. In British Malaya between 1919 and 1941, because of the high investment needed for rubber plantations and the long period necessary to wait for a return (six years), the Chinese used sharecroppers. In order to provide needed capital, the share-croppers grew pineapples while waiting for the rubber trees to mature. In the second half of the 18th century medical popularization spread so that many small-sized health dictionaries were published which allowed patients and their relatives to behave judiciously, either while waiting for the physician's arrival or even while doing without one. In 15th and 16th centuries in Durham County, England, most teachers, waiting for clerical positions, were satisfied to churn out a steady stream of recruits for service in the church. Waiting on desegregation, southern states considered freezing programs until cases were decided.

Thus far we have considered waiting for but there is also waiting with. Is Western culture waiting for Godot or waiting with Godot? Beckett's characters are always “waiting for” the arrival of some purpose personified in Godot. But the two characters wait with each other. Oakeshott's civil philosophy provides the basis for criticizing “waiting for” as inauthentic, preferring the authentic activity of “waiting with” or “in” one's world of present experience. There are places these days where pregnant women and dying women wait—for different things but together.

Waiting is used imaginatively. During the Renaissance, a ritual devout Christians employed was to imagine that they were condemned criminals, waiting to be executed.
Waiting changes the present. Imad Shouery examines phenomenologically states of consciousness under the impact of waiting. In waiting, the present becomes distorted and changes our concrete orientation to the world, because what we are waiting for cannot be ignored and yet is not yet. The immediacy found in direct experience is annihilated; action is postponed; choice become impossible or very difficult.

Waiting can be paradoxical. Recycling is an answer waiting for a question. What is needed is already there waiting if only we could see what it could solve. Einstein’s use of tensor calculus for his general relativity enhanced the myth that physicists find the mathematics they need waiting for them.

III.

It may also be helpful if we compare human waiting with animal waiting. Do animals wait?

In the wild, birds build nests. Do they do it because they need a place to lay their eggs? And do they hold off laying eggs until the nest is built? Do they wait? Sitting on their eggs, are they waiting for the eggs to hatch? Or, in the case of mammals, do animals who perform the sex act do it in order to have young? And does pregnancy then become a time of waiting?

Clearly, the domesticated dog and cat wait for the master or mistress to come home and feed them. Through habituation, they learn to wait. Is that true in the wild? Do animals having their second brood or third begin to wait for its birth? Does pregnancy ever become a time of waiting for the male? Do mammals ever get to the point where the wait for the sex act is a prelude to having a brood? Does waiting become a pleasant time? Sometimes it seems that waiting for the mistress to throw the frisbee becomes a part of the dog’s enjoyment of catching it. But how long can that wait be?

Again clearly, animals can show great patience in stalking prey. They wait for the right moment to pounce. Waiting is in this instance a necessary component in a successful hunt. For animals, waiting is worth while, but not necessarily pleasant. Does it ever become play?

It might be good to first eliminate from our discussion certain ideas of animals’ waiting by using a human example, a queer case in the Wilsonian sense. Oliver Sacks gives an example of the pathological case of Gregory F whose frontal lobes were irremediably damaged and whose behavior had many of the characteristics of animal behavior. He lacked “a sense of ongoing, of next,” of relation to past or future. Persons or things became familiar through habituation but without context. He was amnesiac. He never waited because he was bound to present stimuli; he knew only presence, not
absence. His play was immediate and unpremeditated. Yet though "normal control and selectivity of thinking" were often lost, "there was a half freedom, half compulsion, of fantasy and wit." 

IV.

Under normal conditions, like it or not, we may have to wait because the next step depends on more than ourselves. We'd rather not extract our own teeth; the science class waits for the arrival of the science teacher. Power lies in someone else's hand, and we must wait on that person: waiting for someone to pick us up or for a taxi, waiting for an event such as receiving an inheritance or the harvest.

Sometimes we wait for the appropriate moment. This is Rousseau's concern, and, as often happens, there are such moments. The victory assembly waits on victory and the return of the team to the school. There is a minimum age for voting. Frequently a hiatus, a waiting, between stimulus and response is to our advantage. A pause allows time for evaluation. The stimulus is under-determined; we need something more to move us to this or that action. Waiting can be evidence of power, of having things in our own hands; it allows time for reflection.

So sometimes power is in someone else's hands and we wait. But sometimes power is in our hands, and we wish to wait; waiting because we have the power but for some reason or other we are unwilling to exercise it. Power of itself is neither good nor bad; neither is waiting. Power can be bad if it stops us from acting or propels us into acting before we have thought things through. It can be good when it stops us from acting before we are ready, when it would be premature to act; it makes us wait; and obviously power allows us to act when we are ready. Not all waiting is bad.

Sometimes waiting is inappropriate. We can wait too long to have sex instruction. On the college level, once registering for classes became feasible by telephone, long lines in armories no longer made sense. Rousseau writes, "To wait until they (women) no longer care for men is equivalent to waiting until they are no longer good for anything." 

Sometimes waiting comes easily; other times it becomes distasteful. Here is Tony Hillerman describing one of his heroes:

Normally Joe Leaphorn was good at waiting, having learned this Navajo cultural trait from childhood as many Navajos of his generation learned it. He'd watched his mother's flocks on the slopes above Two Grey Hills, and waited for roads to dry so he could get to the trading post, and waited for the spring to refill the dipping pool with
the water he would carry to their hogan, and waited for the nuts to ripen on the pinon where his parents had buried his umbilical cord thereby tying him forever to the family home of Beautiful Mountain. But this morning he was tired of being patient and especially tired of being patient with Officer Jim Chee.”

But what is undoubtedly true is that waiting is with us, many times a day in every school day.

V.

One way to handle at least some of these moments is, in a sense, to ignore them, to subvert them. Madeline Hunter has given us an excellent set of suggestions for filling short gaps that occur in every school day: reviews and extensions of lessons already had and exercises to build readiness for the next lesson—as the students gather or are about to disperse. She encourages the teacher to fill these times between teaching periods with activities that are not pure rote or time-wasters but rather truly educational objectives within the capacities of the students. Relying on research done at UCLA, Hunter presents “sponge activities” that soak up waiting periods profitably. In effect, these activities attempt to eliminate waiting.

There is another alternative on what to do while waiting. Is it not true that ordinarily we think of these times as tempus liberum, free time, times when nothing is being asked of us, except to wait? Hunter would agree; it is the reason she tries to eliminate them. They are not the same as leisure, because we really are waiting for something more important to begin. Nor are they necessarily times of hope. We are waiting for the next event to begin, but usually we are certain that it will: a 2 o’clock appointment, the return of the teacher. We aren’t necessarily buoyed up by the thought of the next events. We are just waiting. As Denis the Menace says, “The trouble with waiting is you can’t rush it.”

How else can we spend these moments? If we value autonomy and creativity, if we take seriously another side of John Dewey, the Dewey who says that work made play is art, there is an alternative to teacher-induced activities that is neither doing nothing nor what Dewey calls shilly-shallying. Dewey and the phenomenologists are surely on to something when they worry about a devaluation of the present. But once children realize waiting is inevitable and can’t be rushed, they may find themselves free in a quite unexpected way. Waiting is precisely a time when children can fill the interval on their own. They can play; they can mimic life without risking it. In a non-
serious way they can practice skills in a modified form. As George Allan writes: "I practice my engineering skills by doing crossword puzzles. I learn to adjust my goals in the light of others' purposes by playing chess or basketball. Poker teaches me how to distinguish others' real from their apparent intentions. Pilots practice takeoffs and landings in a flight simulator before ever starting down an actual runway, and soldiers engage in war games. Politicians rehearse their options by running through alternative scenarios, and simulation games have become a classroom staple in social science courses. It's no empty claim that 19th-century Britain manufactured its imperial leadership on the playing fields of Eton." Waiting can be "playing with other worlds," "dramatic rehearsals," fun in themselves but also preparations from what is to come. But, in some sense, such play is, in the long run, instrumental, not necessarily engaged in for the sake of the future but still bringing about something valuable in the future, something worth waiting for. In the language of Plato, these are good in themselves and in their consequences. Can we also see these periods as occasions for experiencing things simply good in themselves? Which, incidentally, is what we are doing in any aesthetic experience of literature or art.

Such waiting need not be instances of waiting for; they can also be instances of waiting with others. Play does not have to be solitary. Ideas, in the Deweyan sense, are individual property; play can be social.

And, as Dewey also reminds us, formal education grows out of informal education. This is not the end of the line. Dewey being the good Hegelian that he is, thesis aufgehoben into its antithesis is then transformed into a synthesis; informal education aufgehoben into formal is meant to be transformed into an informal education enriched by formal education. In the best of all possible worlds, play becomes work only to be transformed into a deeper play. Waiting need not be mindless. It's worth waiting for and delighting in.

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**NOTES**

1. "In camp the soldier is usually cheerful and brisk, singing and playing all sorts of pranks, simply in order to kill time and forget his troubles." Ulrich Im Hof, The Enlightenment (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 70. But Paul Feyerabend puts a slightly different spin on "killing time." "I was truly 'killing time.' In a way I was waiting for my life to begin—tomorrow, I thought, or next week, or next year everything would fall into place. Yet, in the midst of this emptiness I wrote papers and sketches that didn't merely make technical points but showed a simple and unreflected concern for others." Paul Feyerabend, Killing Time. The Autobiography of Paul Feyerabend (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 138.


4. See John Dewey, *The Middle Works*, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985) 9, 59-61. Heidegger and other phenomenologists speak of waiting, one mode of the human's being as a being in the world, as causing a kind of freezing. The past no longer is; the future is sheer coming to be; and waiting seems to remove all significance from the presence. The present is dominated by absence. See Imad Shouery, "Phenomenological Analysis of Waiting," *Southwest Journal of Philosophy* 3 (1972): 93-101.

5. There is a great literature on waiting as a religious activity, for waiting is not wholly passive.

6. All these examples I owe to the various CD-Roms available now to students in university libraries.

7. Cognate are the stories of six couples during the gold rush when the man went off to search for gold and the woman waited at home. The women were thrown on their own resources. Normal living ceased, and they were put into a social limbo. Independence was thrust upon them. As John Faragher (p. xi) notes in the foreword, "Not only did women keep the home fires burning (and since men often came home broke and sometimes humiliated, they were sorely in need of those comforts) women also ran the farms and the businesses, paid the mortgages, and frequently sent off the money that men needed to pay their passage home." Waiting does not necessarily mean inaction. See Linda Peavy and Ursula Smith, *Women in Waiting in the Westward Movement. Life on the Home Frontier*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994).


11. Rousseau, *Emile*, bk. V, 359. This is a difficult passage in a longer difficult passage. Men and women in so far as they belong to the same species are equal. In so far as men and women are different, they are incommensurable, *totaliter aliter*. When they unite, they each contribute in their own way, physically obviously but also morally. One is active and strong; the other is passive and weak. And the weak is for the strong. And ought to make herself pleasing to the inevitable. But her charms are a form of violence; her weakness takes the form of resistance. Her victory is to have the man work to win. Her modesty and shame become the man's natural weapons to enslave the strong. But she must not use her "strength" nor impose her will, because then the natural order will be ignored and ruin will follow. And it would be easy for her to do exactly that.

Furthermore, we have much in common with the animals. Among them, when a need is satisfied, desire ceases. If women were to lose this negative instinct of modesty, their desires would be without limit, only to die down as age comes on. If one had to wait till that moment, then women's very function of pleasing men would be negated, and they would be "no longer good for anything (qu'ils ne soient plus bons à rien)."
Waiting for nature to correct itself may mean having to wait too long. Instincts are good, but instincts modified by desire need restraints beyond what instinct gives us.


14. Harry F. Harlow's discussion of satisfied animals offer us an occasion for turning the question around. They seem to do things to give themselves time for waiting; drive-reduction of internal states doesn't explain what they do. Rats, for instance, scurry through the maze, feed themselves, and then have leisure to explore—before they need more food and drink. Rhesus monkeys squirrel food in pouch-like parts of their mouth. So they always have food with them. Food cannot be the explanation for their curiosity. See Harlow's “Mice, Monkeys, Men, and Motives,” in From Learning to Love. The Selected Papers of H.F. Harlow, ed. by Clara Mears Harlow (New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 87-99. See also R.W. White, “Motivation Re-Considered: The Concept of Competence,” Psychological Review 66 (1959): 297-333.


17. John Dewey's thoughts are this subject are well known. Perhaps less well known are Piaget's. On the one hand, his theory of developmental stages surely shows the need of "waiting for"; on the other hand, his theory of social construction by the individual leaves little room for "waiting with." Only inter-subjective confirmation as an epistemological requirement leaves the door ajar, but monologue, even serial monologue, is not the same as dialogue. Very perceptive on this point is David W. Jardine in “Piaget's Clay and Descartes' Wax,” Educational Theory 38 (1988): 287-298.
Rousseau and the Religious Basis of Political Order

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Rousseau's account of the dependence of politics on a religiously-based education, especially as rendered in the Social Contract, constitutes a fascinating chapter in the history of political philosophy. The full purport of Rousseau's account is, however, not fully appreciated until it is viewed in light of the profound decadence that characterizes American political education in the closing decades of this century.

The Legislator

In his 1843 essay, "On the Jewish Question," Karl Marx credits Rousseau with a clear understanding of what is required to secure "political man." As evidence, he cites Chapter vii, Book II of the Social Contract:

Whoever dares to undertake the founding of a nation must feel himself capable of changing, so to speak, human nature and transforming each individual who is in himself a complete and isolated whole, into a part of something greater than himself from which he somehow derives his life and existence, substituting limited and moral existence for physical and independent existence. Man must be deprived of his own powers and given alien powers which he cannot use without the aid of others.¹

Chapter vii, entitled "The Legislator," occurs between chapters entitled "The Law" and "The People." At the close of the chapter on the law, Rousseau declares that two facts give rise to the need for the Legislator: 1) "[I]ndividuals see the good they reject", and 2) "[T]he public wills the good
it does not see.' From this he concludes, "All stand equally in need of guidance." And finally, "This makes a legislator necessary."

The Legislator, then, is a response to a problem of education. The answer to this problem is a kind of understanding. Whether it is knowledge remains to be seen.

What is clear is that the Legislator possesses knowledge. Of what does he have knowledge? To begin with, he knows human nature. And, because he knows human nature, he also knows politics. The Legislator knows the art and science of politics in a way that most people do not, and cannot.

Of course, the Legislator of the Social Contract is the creation of Rousseau, so the attributes of the former also belong to the author. The book is ranked among the greatest texts on political things. It is not commonly acknowledged, however, that it presents two different types of theoretical teaching. First, it offers what we might call "philosophical" political theory. The book's subtitle is "Principles of Political Right." The treatise, especially in its description of the General Will, is an outline of the conditions that must obtain for political authority to be legitimate. Second, Rousseau in the Social Contract gives us what might be called "practical" theory, i.e., advice on how to establish and preserve a regime. Here we learn what is necessary for any state, legitimate or not, to survive.

The most prominent feature of the passage cited by Marx is Rousseau's recognition that establishment of a new order requires a transformation of human nature. But Marx's selection from Rousseau stops short of the brutally frank upshot of the Legislator's function: Man's "natural resources," says Rousseau, must be "annihilated." What does this mean? How can it be squared with the paean to nature found in the Discourse on Inequality? To answer these questions we must leave Chapter vii to take a look at Rousseau's position on a larger scale.

THE GENERAL WILL AND THE NEW NATURE

In the Social Contract Rousseau says very little about the state of nature. In Book I, however, he refers to three kinds of liberty, one of which—natural liberty—is possessed by the inhabitants of the primitive natural condition. On Rousseau's account, nothing more is implied by this form of liberty than that man exists for himself. He is dependent solely upon the impersonal rule of nature: Man is entirely, but simply, subject to natural necessity.

The second type of liberty discussed by Rousseau is civil liberty. Civil liberty becomes possible following passage out of the state of nature into society. Rousseau says, "What man loses by the social contract is his natural lib-
erty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses." Natural liberty is limited only by the strength of the individual; civil liberty is limited (and guaranteed) by the law. Moreover, man, in passing out of the state of nature, becomes a moral being. "The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in this conduct, and giving his actions the morality they formerly lacked." The innocent primitive of the natural setting has now become knowledgeable, capable of right and wrong, and, most important, conscious of himself.

The stage is now set to examine the third category: moral liberty. After describing the transition from the natural state to civil society, Rousseau declares:

We might, over and above all this, add, to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty.

Moral liberty, then, is acquiescence to self-imposed rules. And where civil liberty allows us to do all but what is proscribed, moral liberty prescribes what we must do.

In Chapter vii, Book I of the Social Contract Rousseau makes one of the most provocative statements in all of political philosophy:

In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than he will be forced to be free. . . .

This is a shocking phrase. But a deeper consideration of moral liberty reveals that Rousseau's suggestion is not as outlandish as it at first glance appears.

The idea that man be forced to be free is a response to a critical problem in democratic theory that is at the center of Rousseau's political writings. He says,

The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself, and remain as free as before.
This, he goes on to say, is the problem to which the *Social Contract* (and, we might add, the notion of moral liberty) provides the solution.

Despite the amorality and non-rationality of the inhabitants living in the primitive natural condition, Rousseau ardently strove to reestablish certain of its features. More specifically, he lamented the loss of three primary constituents of natural existence: oneness of man with external nature, equilibrium between our wants and the power to satisfy them, and, above all, the psychological condition (unity, simplicity, and harmony) resulting from the first two. But Rousseau openly announced the impossibility (and undesirability) of a return to the state of nature. So, if the liberty and other virtues of the natural state are to be enjoyed today, they must be had in the post-primitive condition, i.e., in civil society.

But while existence in civil society is necessary and is a prerequisite for moral liberty, it is unfortunately true that the inhabitants of most societies have not been free or happy. Throughout history men have been reduced to slavery and, with rare exceptions, have been worse off than if they had remained in the state of nature.

The properly constituted political order is to solve the problem posed by Rousseau. Under its jurisdiction man will gain the optimum blend of the natural virtues and the benefits available only in society; he will be protected and defended by the whole body, but will obey only himself and remain as free as he was in nature.

Moral liberty was defined by Rousseau as obedience to self-imposed rationally determined laws. This alone makes one master of himself. How is this liberty integrated into the social fabric such that the problem which occasioned the *Social Contract* is solved? At this point Rousseau’s notion of the General Will is key. In brief, the laws to which we must submit if we are to be free are embodied in the General Will. When we obey the General Will we are free. But, given the definition of moral liberty, it follows that there must be some correlation between the “self” of “self-imposed,” and the General Will.

The necessary connection between law and the individual is made by positing the “real will” of man, or what Rousseau calls the “constant will” of the members of the State. Reference to a real or constant will allows us to make sense of Rousseau’s recommendation that man be forced to be free. The real or constant will of man is his wish (perhaps unbeknownst to him) to be law-abiding even when he is not. When one fails to obey, he is not free, and the coercion which ensures one’s compliance secures his freedom.

Our discomfort with this formulation may be attenuated by the recog-
nition that there is an “extended self” implicit in the notion of moral liberty. When one is truly free, says Rousseau, one is obeying only oneself, but we must understand that when many persons are free each is obeying the same self. That is, the more extensive entity is present (at least potentially) in all of us, but it has an identity that transcends any of our particularities.

Up to now we have been discussing the conceptions of liberty present in the Social Contract and suggested by Rousseau’s first two discourses. Turning to Emile we again find liberty discussed, but in different terms.

In what is perhaps the most important passage in Emile, Rousseau summarizes the view of freedom that dominates that book: “The truly free man wants only what he can do and does what he pleases.” Freedom, then, consists of a balance between desire (or will) and power. A person who cannot do what he desires is not free; but so, too, is one who desires what is impossible.

The idea of self-sufficiency is at the center of this view of freedom. For example, young people whose desires exceed their powers are not free. But this condition of dependence is not restricted to children. Indeed, as Rousseau passionately argues in the first and second Discourses, society has undermined human freedom by creating a host of desires and needs which are insidious and enervating as well as inherently insatiable.

Prior to social existence man was free—from the kinds of dependence fostered by society. But there are two kinds of dependence: dependence on things and dependence on people. Dependence on people comes with society and indeed has characterized all prior and existing social settings. Dependence on things, however, exists prior to society and marks the condition of man in nature. So, if man is truly free in nature, freedom must be compatible with this form of dependence. And this is Rousseau’s view: “Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices.”

But while social existence has always in the past necessitated a dependence on people and has been marked by oppression and unhappiness, this need not be the case in the future. It is significant that in Emile, as part of the discussion of freedom and dependence, there is mention of the General Will and the system described in the Social Contract. Emile calls for freedom in the form of a harmony between power and desire. Lack of such harmony results in dependence. Dependence on things is not harmful, however, and the individual will adjust his desires once this imbalance is recognized. Dependence on people, on the other hand, is dangerous and degrading, and since it is fostered by social existence, in order to abolish it and to attain true
freedom, a form of society where all dependence on people is replaced by a
dependence on things is necessary. We cannot return to the state of nature.
What we can do, however, is establish a society wherein a dependence on
things, not people, is the rule, and this is precisely the outstanding quality of
the system described in the Social Contract.

Our very existence in society is an indication that we cannot satisfy our
needs without the assistance of others. Rousseau's task is to ensure that the
dependence implicit here is on a thing, not on other people. The General
Will is posited in order to allow this to happen. The result is that in the properly
constituted society one obeys the impersonal and trans-individual
General Will and not the dicta of one or several persons. In this fashion we
enjoy the benefits of both nature and society: "The freedom which keeps
man exempt from vices [is] joined to morality which raises him to virtue." That is, we are freed from the evil-producing dependence (on people) found
in all other societies without relinquishing the morality and freedom possible
only in a social setting.

Critics of Rousseau are apt at this point to cry "foul!" They remind us
that Rousseau is primarily concerned with preserving the order of nature and
legitimately point to Emile and other works for substantiation. Next, they
assert that nothing is more natural than man's lawless condition in the state
of nature. But in the Social Contract (and in the notion of moral liberty as
well) Rousseau exalts the status of law and various restraints which are absent
in nature. Therefore, Rousseau is inconsistent.

The error in this argument is that it fails to understand Rousseau's use of
the term "natural." Responding in Emile to a hypothetical critique of his edu-
cational strategies, he states,

I will be told that I abandon nature. I do not believe that at all. It
chooses its instruments and regulates them according to need, not to
opinion. Now, needs change according to the situation of men. There
is a great difference between the natural man living in the state of nature and
the natural man living in the state of society."

The first thing we should note here is that entrance into society is not
necessarily a departure from nature. Indeed, it is possible for natural man to
exist in a variety of settings but, of course, what constitutes "natural" varies
with the setting.

Rousseau pointedly disagrees with Aristotle's view that man is by nature
a political animal—that man was originally political. Nevertheless, Rousseau
is able to claim that a natural bond connects members of a community to
each other and to the community as a whole. Here we note a second meaning of “natural,” one we may refer to as the dynamic sense of the term. Man is a political being provided that his nature be equated with his potential. Thus, when Rousseau speaks of the natural order and calls for its establishment, he need not (and is not) counseling a resurrection of our brute forebears and the conditions under which they lived. Instead he is asking us to exercise our faculties in order to become the kind of beings we are capable of becoming. The establishment of moral liberty, although it does follow upon a departure from the state of nature, is not a renunciation of the natural order. Quite the contrary. Life under the General Will, in addition to serving as a response to the central problem of democratic theory, constitutes the apotheosis of political life: An elevated moral condition congruent with, and sharing in the authority of, Nature.

EDUCATION: THE CORNERSTONE

We see, then, that Rousseau’s use of the concept “natural” is complex, and that the annihilation of the natural endowment of man mentioned in Book II of the Social Contract may in fact lead to the advent of a new order of nature or, more properly, to the advent of a neo-natural order. In what does the de-naturing of man consist? Essentially, it is an eradication of the independence of natural freedom, and ultimately gives rise to a different sense of identity—a new (extended) selfhood. Earlier we discussed the new “self” in the context of moral freedom and the General Will. What commands our attention as we return to Book II, Chapter vii is the means through which the Legislator secures this new sense of selfhood—and why he has recourse to the methods he employs. Let us begin with the latter issue.

Rousseau reminds us that under the “fundamental compact” within which individuals come together to form political life, we are obligated to follow only the General Will. But the Legislator, at the beginning, is only a particular will. Moreover, we can know whether a particular will is consistent with the General Will only through “the free vote of the people.” Therefore, in securing the changes in man required to establish the just regime, the Legislator could legitimately act only after receiving the sanction of the General Will via the consent of the people. But, “[t]here are a thousand kinds of ideas which it is impossible to translate into popular language.” And, in a typical rhetorical flourish, Rousseau adds:

For a young people to be able to relish sound principles of political theory and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect could have to become the cause; the social spirit which should be

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created by these institutions, would have to preside over their foundations; and men would have to be before law what they should become by means of law.²³

From this Rousseau concludes that the Legislator, barred from the use of both force and reason, must have recourse to a third sort of authority, religion, which is “capable of constraining without violence and persuading without convincing.”²⁴

What does the use of religion accomplish for the Legislator? Recall, from Plato’s Republic, the discussion of the myth known as “the noble lie.”²⁵ Socrates argues that while falsehoods are generally harmful, they may at times be “useful” as a means of avoiding even worse things.²⁶ The noble lie, simple in content, is grand in consequence, for it teaches that all citizens are siblings, and that mother Earth has sanctioned the roles and hierarchy outlined for the ideal polity. The noble lie leaves no doubt that the justice of the regime is grounded in something more than mere human convention.

Rousseau’s Legislator understands such matters. He would “have recourse to divine intervention and credit the gods with [his own] wisdom.”²⁷ The result is that the people would attribute to politically necessary conventions the authority of (God’s) nature. As a result they would “obey freely, and bear with docility the yoke of the public happiness.”²⁸ It is important to recall that self-sufficiency (the hallmark of moral existence) is not undermined by dependence on (impersonal) things. Equally important, people rarely protest against the nature of things.

Rousseau raises additional problems: “But it is not anybody who can make the gods speak, or get himself believed when he proclaims himself their interpreter.”²⁹ One of the most striking phrases to be found in all of political philosophy then follows: “Any man may grave tablets of stone, or buy an oracle, or feign secret intercourse with some divinity, or train a bird to whisper in his ear…”³⁰ Such stratagems are not in themselves enough to “found an empire”; it is necessary to have “wisdom,” a “great soul,” or “genius.” Whether this requirement is instead of, or in addition to, such stratagems is not clear. But I would remind you that graven stones were in fact brought to us by one such genius.

Among the most noteworthy implications of Rousseau’s analysis is how rare true founding must be. Chance plays a great role, for not only must genius be present at the proper time, it must also enjoy the conditions required for its nurture.

In the event that rare genius should arise at the opportune moment, Rousseau is clear regarding what will be its primary concern. Chapter xii of
Book II is entitled “The Division of the Laws.” Here, after explicating the meaning of “political laws,” “civil laws,” and “criminal laws,” Rousseau turns to a fourth kind of law, one that is the “most important of all.” This is the sort of law that is graven “on the hearts of the citizens” and “forms the real constitution of the State.” This law “keeps a people in the ways in which it was meant to go, and insensibly replaces authority by the force of habit.” Rousseau admits that he is talking here “of morality, of custom, above all of public opinion....on which....success in everything depends.” Rousseau concludes,

With this the great legislator concerns himself in secret, though he seems to confine himself to particular regulations; for these are only the arch of the arch, while manners and morals, slower to rise, form in the end its immovable keystone.

Let us pause to recapitulate. We have discovered that while the Social Contract is explicitly concerned with outlining the principles of political right, it is at the same time concerned with what can be called “practical” theory (as constrained by those principles of right). The foremost practical problem is that of founding the regime. Given human nature, the founding cannot—at least initially—be based on reason; it instead requires the sanction of the divine, i.e., a grounding in the order of things. To achieve this connection between the conventional and natural a rare genius, the “Legislator,” is required. Preservation of the influence of divine sanction for the regime is also a concern of the Legislator. If founding is an act of genius per se, preservation is by contrast a kind of nurturing. More specifically, it is a matter of replicating in successive generations the manners and morals (“les moeurs”) that are each individual’s interior guide to judgment and action.

Les moeurs take the form of customs, habits, and what Rousseau calls “opinion.” Rousseau represents a long tradition, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, which maintains that a viable politics depends on education. The concrete link between education and the “opinion” (manners and morals) that supports politics is treated in Rousseau’s third discourse, “A Discourse on Political Economy.” Here, after reminding us that the most important rule for legitimate government is to follow the General Will, he notes that we will need to be taught to know what the General Will is, and also be trained to “love” it, i.e., to want to be just. This process is a matter of penetrating “into a man’s inmost being,” of shaping the heart. To achieve the changes we require, however, “is not the work of a day; and in order to have men it is necessary to educate them when they are children.” For this reason,
Rousseau calls for universal public education with a primary emphasis on the formative years of infancy and childhood. The result of this process is the expanded sense of self found at the heart of moral liberty: Men will “at length come to identify themselves in some degree with [the] greater whole, to feel themselves members of their country, and to love it with that exquisite feeling which no isolated person has save for himself.”

ROUSSEAU AND THE AMERICAN REGIME

Let us consider the meaning of Rousseau’s analysis for us who, of course, exist within a regime that has been founded. Adopting Rousseau’s perspective, the existence of our regime is a marvel. It is worthy of our reverence. What, then, are we prepared to do to preserve the regime, and to defend it against its adversaries? We face at least two challenges. The first of these is a combination of stupidity, complacency, and sloth. Not appreciating what was required to found the regime, we fail to take the steps needed to preserve it. Some of us may even believe that, because the regime is in the nature of things, there is nothing to worry about.

The second challenge, in light of the religious foundations of the regime, is nothing less than the work of Satan. Here Rousseau would draw our attention to efforts to strip the regime of its divine sanction and make it appear as something less than natural. Much of what we regard as nihilism and relativism falls into this category.

In the case of both challenges, on Rousseau’s analysis a priceless heritage is being squandered. And time is running out.

Is there still hope? Rousseau teaches us that if the founding of the regime is a problem for education, so too is its preservation. Perhaps if control of the public schools were taken back by those who love the regime, and if all of the young were properly reared, then the marvel might endure. But there is little reason for optimism. There are many institutions which “educate,” and public schools at their best may not be sufficient to counter the influence of those that have a detrimental impact. Rousseau, moreover, warns that healthy opinion (les moeurs), once lost, is difficult—if not impossible—to reestablish. It is much easier to destroy a regime than it is to found or preserve one.

If public schools are beyond redemption or by themselves cannot negate the impact of corrupting institutions, might private and home schooling constitute a remedy? Despite widespread excitement about these movements, we need to be cautious about the prospects. To begin with, private and home schooling touch only a minority of the populace, and they typically affect those who least need their salutary influence. Second, private and home schooling
schooling are intrinsically independent. Their outcome is unpredictable; there is no guarantee that any particular set of beliefs or convictions will be established through them. Third, private and home schooling are in fact capable of making things worse. For they may replicate the corrupting influences that already surround us. Libertarian measures give vent to human nature; they do not correct it. In sum, the flight to private and home schooling is just as likely to undermine the regime as it is to preserve it. But of course, if the regime has already fallen, it matters little what we do, and a healthy “private” education (in the sense outlined in *Emile*) is the best we can hope for.

NOTES


3 *Social Contract*, p. 37 (II, vi).


7 *Social Contract*, p. 18 (II, viii).


9 *Social Contract*, p. 18 (II, vii).


11 This is the term used by Frederic Copleston, S.J see *A History of Philosophy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Image, 1964), Volume 6, Part 1, p. 108.

12 *Social Contract*, p. 106 (IV, ii).

13 See Plamenatz, “Ce Qui Ne Signifie,” p. 332.

14 See Plamenatz, “Ce Qui Ne Signifie,” passim.


16 Earlier (p. 80) Rousseau states that unhappiness also results from a disproportion between power and desire. “A being endowed with senses whose faculties equaled his desires would be an absolutely happy being.” Thus, an equivalence between freedom and happiness is suggested.

17 *Emile*, p. 85.

18 *Emile*, p. 85.

19 *Emile*, p. 85.

20 *Emile*, p. 205. Emphasis added.


25 See 414c.
26 See 382d.
33 Social Contract, p. 53 (II, xii).
41 In a long footnote, deep within Emile, Rousseau argues that atheism is more dangerous to society than is fanaticism. "[l]religion" for Rousseau is a species of "the reasoning and philosophic spirit." It "concentrates all the passions in the baseness of private interest, in the abjectness of the human I, and thus quietly saps the true foundations of every society. For what private interests have in common is so slight that it will never outweigh what sets them in opposition" (p. 312, note). So much for founding the regime on self-interest or, more accurately, on a self-interest that has not been properly extended, via expansion of the self, to include others. Rousseau goes on to point out that "From the point of view of principles, there is nothing that philosophy can do well that religion does not do still better, and religion does many things that philosophy could not do" (ibid.). Among these things is prevention of harm and production of "virtues and laudable actions" (p. 313, note). However benign man may be in the primitive state of nature, it is clear that for Rousseau (now showing his membership within the conservative tradition) that raw human nature is not only unsuitable for political order, it is a threat to it.
42 Given the events of the past few years, charter schools should perhaps also be mentioned. Since, however, charter schools—for all their innovation—remain part of the public school system, they would seem to have less opportunity than private and home schooling to introduce fundamental change.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Emile* describes a mythical process of education in which the master reveals wisdom that is at once social and natural to his pupil. I call this process mythic because myth "[represents] beings who embody under symbolic shape the forces of nature [or] aspects of the human condition" (Robert 1251), bringing nature into human form while justifying human subordination to nature, and recalling Rousseau's insistence that nature govern human behavior. In the myth the master serves as nature's emissary, since Rousseau wishes to restitute natural directivité in Emile via the master's natural, non-anthropological yet distinctly social discourse. Rousseau develops his pedagogic mythology via fable-like, pragmatic "texts," which I call myth/fables, that give Emile both active and passive directives through a generic yet metaphoric discourse that exposes nature's code while avoiding negative or "historical" components. I will examine this discourse to determine its structure, operations, and effects. First I will locate each discursive element, describing its relations to other elements via concepts from Saussure, Jakobson and Rousseau. Next I will examine how Rousseau can restitute an unvarying "ur" text of nature at different times in Emile's growth. Finally, I will typify what I call the myth/fable, looking at its representational yet metaphoric structure to see how Emile can assimilate significance in spite of the overdetermination of poeticity or interpretibility. I will use Bettelheim and Propp to examine qualities of the myth/fable which let it enhance nature's communication of order.

Ferdinand de Saussure's *Cours de linguistique générale* distinguishes langue or speech from langage, the general ability to send and interpret signs.
One must not confuse social consensus with regard to signs (langue) with the heterogeneous, indistinct capacity for semiologic communication (langage) that occurs across "several physiological, physical and psychic domains" (Saussure 25). The distinction explains why "articulating words exercises itself only with the instrument created and supplied by [a] collectivity" (27), and helps us isolate an important characteristic of langue—its temporality. Words cannot be exchanged in synchrony; speech involves modes of transmission that presuppose the exteriorization of psycho-physical combinations. Saussure points to each individual's ability to express personal thoughts and to the consciousness and individuality of each participant in describing this non-instinctive acoustic phenomenon.

If Saussure identifies sender, message, and receiver as the physiological components of speech, Roman Jakobson describes functions in the message that serve as independent elements in this circuit. To work efficiently, the message must have a context that the receiver comprehends, use a code the participants share, and employ a physical and psychological mode of contact between participants. Primary functions are the emotive focus on the sender's sentiments, the connative focus on the receiver's sentiments or actions, and the referential focus on context. Of the other functions, the phatic emphasizes means of contact, the metalinguistic the code, and the poetic the form of the message itself.

Through Saussure's and Jakobson's models we can evaluate the elements that make up Rousseau's communication circuit. First, though, we should recall Rousseau's assertion that "Good social institutions ... denature man, [taking] him away from his absolute existence so as to give him a relative one, and [carrying] the self into the common unity" (Emile 249). Creating an individual who merges with the community requires a continuous effort. One must avoid errors and ensure that Emile's education bypass traditional pedagogic prejudices. One must identify not only all means of knowledge transfer, but also all transferred knowledge. "Negative education," which lays the grounds for a well-ruled freedom and determines the rapports one has with nature, man, and things, lets Rousseau bring a degree of staticity to his communication circuit. Exchange between the master and Emile must initially allow only ready-made answers; education need not at first involve the consecutive exchange between consciousesses that occurs in langue. After all, Rousseau suggests in the Essai sur l'origine des langues that direct communication involves the transfer of feelings via energetic, expressive sensible signs. The most efficacious language, he claims, "has said it all before speaking"; "one speaks much better to the eyes than to the ears" (Essai 61-62).
Saussure's distinction of langue from langage differentiates the socially conventional from the naturally social. His speech circuit describes langue as an acquired, conventional system of signs that identify concepts. Yet for Rousseau, langage, as a capacity, is prior to langue insofar as expressive communication first appears not as words, but as visual signs. The gestural language he describes in L'Essai sur l'origine des langues displays qualities of both langue and langage. It depends less on conventions than langue; regarding the message's diffusion, factors of time and distance are considerably reduced; the message itself does not require complex deciphering. It therefore belongs to the instinctive, natural present, the time of non-complex knowledge in which direct expression touches sentiments felt by all.

In the educational discourse in Emile, one finds the three elements Saussure delineates in the speech circuit: the sender (the master), the message (nature), and the receiver (Emile). Looked at more closely, however, each element begins to manifest features of the others. The master, the representative of nature, is not the only sender; nature itself, via the master, becomes a sender. The message is nature in both particular and general senses, since it aims at bringing out the natural in things and in humans as well as in culture. Nature assists Emile in developing faculties via a gradual practicum of physical and intellectual exercises. Yet Emile, as a product of nature, has a naturally receptive composition. Rousseau's advocacy of the study of relations to nature, man, and things (Emile 247) thus applies techniques that subordinate human effort to a recognition of nature's presence within us—to respect our own nature.

In regard to any communication which aims to make Emile recognize his own nature, then, one can talk of the transposition of a monologue rather than of a dialogue. Call the sender A, the message B, the receiver C. Since the discourse involves rediscovering nature's design, it can only have one meaning, one direction, until it is complete. We see in the projection of this message a triple movement which makes combinations of interfering relationships lead to identity. If the relations A+B (Master+Nature) and B+C (Nature+Emile) exist, one will recognize at the message's terminus the relation A+C (Master+Emile). Nature, which expresses itself through the master, is, through a series of exchanges, absorbed and found again by Emile, who, from the non-realized state man/nature, becomes the realized state Man/Nature, or the double of the master, who is also nature. Thus the message repeats the essential relationships A+B=B+C=A+C. Each combination is identical to the other; the result is Emile's appearance as a reflection of the master—a synthesis of master and nature. Three moments thus define them-
selves in the projection of the message: one of sending, one of absorption in
which Emile comes to reflect the master’s teachings, and one of static realiza-
tion expressible as the equation C=B, since A=B and A=C.

The interchangeability of elements in the circuit creates movements of
expansion and contraction in which components merge. In other words, for
Rousseau, once the circuit is closed, all elements creating the discourse fuse
with the discourse itself. This “meltdown” occurs because Rousseau sees ges-
tural and sensory langue not as conventional, but as expressing an instinctive,
transparent, yet social semiology created by nature itself. Since it is natural
rather than conventional, the discourse need not display the functions
Jakobson identifies in the circuit, though some do appear. As both message
and context, nature can manifest the referential function. Rousseau’s insis-
tence on an impartial setting for objective education suggests the importance
he assigns to pedagogic rapports to nature, man, and things. “[T]he [rapport]
of nature does not depend on us,” he tells us. “[T]he one of things depends
on us only to some extent,” while “the one of men is the only one of which
we are the masters” (Emile 247). Education thus must focus on unchanging
natural rapports:

What is [the] aim of [education]? It is [the aim] of nature itself....
Since the participation of the three educations is necessary ... one
must direct the other two toward [nature] about which we can do
nothing. (Emile 247)

Education is an art which aims to respect nature, and nature is both its
means and end. Hence the connative function appears when the discourse
aims at awakening Emile’s natural and social conscience, the phatic when the
master solicits the child’s attention (one finds it in the stagings, in negative
education that stresses one part of the message over another, in emphases on
necessity, utility, etc., as existential conditions that parallel stages in Emile’s
growth), and the poetic when, via fabulous, mythical, or other elements,
attention fixes on the message’s form. The metalingual function never
appears, though, since Emile reads directly from nature that he is the self who
is the other.

The form of the discourse lets us see that the learning Rousseau empha-
sizes involves the perception of a state rather than the reception of ideas. This
emphasis lets Rousseau avoid the pitfalls extant in language’s historical pro-
duction, which through blind automatism weakens the acuity of conscious-
ness. To reach consciousness, one must discover the object through partici-
pation. We thus see that Rousseau’s circuit is not really a circuit, but more a
reflexive structure in which the message reveals itself in organic transpositions and transformations. A and C exist and recognize themselves in their fusion with B. Communication need not use acoustic images if it can achieve its effect in silence and agreement. The discourse occurs in a structure which through a system of exchanges confers on each of its parts a common, global property symbolised by Nature. Since nature cannot be a mere "source of knowledge," one cannot refer to varied messages, but only to regulated broadcasts of the message which, as source of all consciousness, is both end and means. Thus the discourse can be described in terms of expansion and retraction.

But if the discourse defines itself in nature, its message can only be extracted by identifying the texts it uses. I suggested above that all texts in the discourse return to nature via the transposition of shared proprieties. Direct, adequate communication occurs for Rousseau only when langue follows a natural code that relegates it to Saussure's domain of langage, making it potentially understandable to all. The distinction is important when one recalls that for Rousseau, no clear boundary exists between langue and langage. The master must stimulate whatever is of and in nature in Emile each time he presents the discourse of nature to him. But Rousseau also wants to establish a code that paradoxically will depend on what could be called the general conventions of nature. Texts derived from nature can only disclose nature itself, but to restitute nature through education, nature's message must be established in advance.

To raise Emile well, then, one must use what I will call pre-texts: texts that present moments precursory to the realization of the Primary text "I am the self of nature which is the other." These pre-texts align natural qualities of the child with nature. They indicate when, where, how, and why the diverse, necessary processes of rectification must take place. Thus Rousseau conceives of an ideal yet real structure aimed at realizing knowledge as nature/culture in the individual conscience which, during its progression, has, if not to be in opposition to itself, at least to be temporarily removed from its context to reintegrate elements of universality, individuality, and society.

We can gain a clearer view of the theory behind this formularizing of the absolute text if we look at its global configurations. Rousseau suggests that to transform Emile, the master must always bear in mind three factors: nature as a universal structure; the child as an individual, natural structure; and consciousness as a natural, cultural structure that binds the individual to the universal. In the universal structure of nature, Rousseau identifies a general, non-centric code manifested in all life. This code reflects the laws of
necessity, need, utility, desire, and to a certain extent passion. While cultivating those capacities of the child that represent the natural, individual structure, Rousseau isolates an individual and general code related to perceptive and generative modes, i.e. sensations, sensibility, sympathy, sentiment, judgment, and imagination. Regarding consciousness as a natural, cultural structure which joins the individual to the universal, Rousseau discovers faculties of sensitive reason, common sense, reasoning, love of the self, and love of the other. Full development, such as occurs when Emile emerges as a social being not subject to prejudice and opinion, only happens when these levels combine in harmony. This goal is approached by two means: the pre-texts that Rousseau develops in his mythology of education, and negative education, which prevents the corruption of consciousness as it is affirming itself.

Combinations of the code of nature with the individual code form nature's language and follow a progression. In the stages of need, necessity, and utility, the master plays upon sensations, senses, sentiments, sensitivity, judgment, and imagination in the child. This encourages the development of sensitive reason, common sense, reasoning, love of the self, and love of the other. These types of rapports establish themselves because Rousseau launches a series of life-situations in which the child participates in rites of passage without having recourse to books—a major theme in Emile being the abolition of books in favor of the objective discourse of nature. The objective "texts of nature"—the myth/fables staged by the master—allow the realization of a kind of figural organic discourse. This lets the master give Emile knowledge while assuring that the knowledge is actively lived.

The problem lies in putting together a discourse that appears to be organic and autonomous while explaining how to behave and generating a series of rapports between Emile, the world, and nature. This "social discourse of nature" should establish a code of behavior that permits variety according to circumstances while remaining essentially unchanged, since it reflects nature's universal features. Emile presents a series of anecdotal situations or scenarios, or myth/fables, that direct the child toward a specific line of conduct and aim at transposing Emile from one plane of consciousness to another. But the situations elaborated by Rousseau only serve as pretexts for the insinuation of direct, practical natural knowledge into Emile. I call these situations myth/fables because they help Rousseau avoid recourse to reported knowledge while cultivating the physiological, psychological, and emotional faculties of the child.

In The Uses of Enchantment, Bruno Bettelheim explains how myth, thanks to its symbolic nature, can broach boundaries of understanding that
initiate self transformation. Interestingly, he cites Plato and Aristotle as advocates of this didactic use of myth:

Plato—who may have understood better what forms the mind of man than do some of our contemporaries who want their children exposed only to "real" people and everyday events—knew what intellectual experiences make for true humanity. He suggested that the future citizens of his ideal republic begin their literary education with the telling of myths, rather than with mere facts or so-called rational teachings. Even Aristotle, master of pure reason, said: "The friend of wisdom is also a friend of myth." (Bettelheim 35)

Recalling Plato’s and Aristotle’s impact on Rousseau as well as the conditions in which he hopes to raise Emile, one should not be surprised to find Rousseau wanting to affect the child via strategies close to those used in myths and fables. But if for Bettelheim and others myths and fairy tales help children resolve emotional, psychological, or psychosexual conflicts, Rousseau’s pre-texts serve another end: to prevent conflict by creating situations that pacify or control encounters with the other, thus putting into play in symbolic fashion natural structures that reflect the human condition. The pre-texts assist in moving the consciousness of the child through the stage of precarious unity that non-identity provides and the stage of difference and division that the recognition of identity demands to the stage of unity that occurs in encountering a being whom one recognizes as one’s double. Their intent thus is to reconstitute, according to the developmental stage, the metaphysical and moral qualities of one being recognizing itself in the other. Hence, they need not employ an elaborate structure. However, the repetitive nature of the lesson explains why, while they do not offer supernatural elements that titilate the child’s imagination, the myth/fables display a morphology similar to the one Propp identifies in folk tales. Propp traces formulaic patterns in fables that permit the character to solve conflicts through his or her own actions. Rousseau’s stagings similarly lay out a basic organic structure beneath his educational project.

Before studying the fairy tale as a category separate from folktales, Propp compares tales in general to organic, natural forms. He suggests a “theory of origin through metamorphosis or transformations going back to a specific cause” for these tales (Propp, “Transformations” 234). When he tries to establish the inherent structure of certain types of tales (fantastic tales or folktales), he isolates a series of phases necessary for the progression of the action so the required transformations can occur. Each tale presents situations determined by the actions a certain type of character must undergo. One can identify the
type through constant though variable structures within the genre. Both
caracter functions and elements in the action coincide with a base model
that can be traced in several variations, reductions, amplifications, substitu-
tions and modifications through which the story progresses. The part that
function, or an "act of a character, defined from the point of view of its signifi-
cance for the course of the action" (Propp, Morphology 21), plays in relation to
the action gives meaning to the genetic dynamic of the tale.

In Rousseau's productions a common dynamic allows for constants and
variations like those of folktales. The goal of directing Emile's conscience
serves as the major constant and contributes to the promotion of both the
text and the message. First, confrontation or encounter with the object of
knowledge occurs, followed by a study of relations between the object of
knowledge and the child. Finally, a moment of realization, or a "going
beyond," occurs, leading to the child's transformation. These stages appear
under the aegis of both modified representations and negative education,
which enables the master to control Emile's progress.

Let us see how a morphology similar to Propp's might apply in the
myth/fables presented by Rousseau. Whatever contributes to the desired pro-
gression of events bears directly on the function of the characters in the
action. Initiation, illustrated by the actions of the characters and by similari-
ties of situation, is a constant theme in all stagings. Each character thus falls
into one of two categories: initiator and initiatee. Initiators appear in the
 guise of the master, the spectators who influence the infant, the crowd at the
fair, the gardener, the tumbler, the vicar, the text of nature, history. There is
only one initiatee, however, Emile; and in the end he transforms into an ini-
tiator. All initiators play different parts according to the level Emile has
reached, but all share the function of contributing to the blossoming of
Emile's consciousness.

Knowledge assimilation always occurs in a definite dynamic recalling the
amplifications, modifications, etc. that Propp describes. Processes of dou-
bling via mechanisms of repetition and substitution precede the child's trans-
formation, reproducing themselves constantly in one form or another in each
example. For instance, in incidents aimed at reassuring the child, at trans-
forming anxiety that results from confrontations with the unknown, at devel-
oping habits, and at presenting a model to follow, repetition appears. Thus
Emile repeats the actions of the master, the gardener, and the tumbler during
the scenes in the forest, in the garden, and at the fair respectively, gaining
knowledge with each repetition. Hence throughout Emile's development
contact is maintained between the roles characters play in relation to the
child's maturation and the roles they play in the actions that contribute to the child's metamorphosis.

By presenting different obstacles and variable situations, the myth/fables give the illusion of varied content even while the stagings fulfill the same formal function. If one acknowledges the organic aspect of these examples through which action always occurs at two levels (the level of the moment of realization and the level of organization of all elements participating in it), one sees that Rousseau succeeds in restituting a message whose meaning ties directly into the integrity of the dynamic of its structure and the order projected in the events. This structure, the myth/fable, employs a narration that is simultaneously spontaneous and representational, explaining why Rousseau favors this type of text. The myth/fable, with its staging, permits the control and depth available in reading while having the impact of lived experience.

The mythical or fabulous tries to repeat patterns perceived in nature in an instinctive manner by representing them in the form of narrative or rite. Rousseau imitates this specific textual form to accomplish the social and initiatory functions of his educational project. Rousseau's choice of examples in Emile can only be pertinent insofar as it corresponds to ritual or drama. His pedagogical examples manifest a morphology upon which rests the very constitution of the myth/fable. The aesthetic aspects of myths or fables rely, more than other genres, on genetic form, letting the message be lived simultaneously in the production and the reception of the work. In fabulous or mythical tales, the text produces itself through repetitive, signifying structures in relation to the progress of the characters through the action. The mimetic qualities of these characters facilitate the process of identification. Making sure that Emile relives the narration of the fable and the ritualization of the myth is thus only a logical step in a form of instruction that tries as much as possible to reduce the gap between knowledge and its restitution—to make communication follow the form of authentic reading, reading of one's own natural, universal constitution.

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**Note**

1. Here and throughout this paper, I have translated citations from works listed in French into English. For many of the original citations see Guillemette Johnston, Lectures poétiques: La Représentation poétique du discours théorique chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Birmingham, AL: Summa, 1996).

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Hermeneutic Disclosure as Freedom: John Dewey and Paulo Freire on the Non-Representational Nature of Education

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Freedom is a participation in the revealment of what-is-as-such...Existence, grounded in the truth of freedom, is nothing less than exposition into the revealed nature of what-is-as-such...Only where what-is is expressly raised to the power of its own revelation and preserved there, only where this preservation is conceived as the quest for what-is-as-such, only there does history begin.

—Martin Heidegger; "On the Essence of Truth" 307-08

Although the alignment of Paulo Freire and John Dewey may at first seem like an uneasy pairing, I would like to argue that there are important similarities that link these two philosophers of education. The similarities might be summed up in their axiological arguments that transform the representationalist concept of education, as the acquisition of discrete bits of information, to a non-representational concept of education, as an event that discloses a fundamental human value: freedom. Both thinkers argue that authentic educative situations create a context in which the process of inquiry becomes the practice of freedom. The educative context is what Heidegger might call "the original living realm of truth" (305). Assuming that the incarnate realm is defined by particular ways of existing or behaviors, how do educators attune students toward forms of participatory engagement in an inquiry into "what is"? Furthermore, how do we characterize the process of disclosing modes of existence as freedom? How does the value of freedom work to attune students so that they participate in the kinds of hermeneutic acts that disclose of the "original living realm of truth"?
The value of freedom is not an inherent, eternal or universal value; rather, it is an activity that is enacted in social practices and particular ways of being-towards the future; furthermore, freedom is a particular attunement towards understanding, and a particular way of thinking about acts of knowing. All three of these comportments towards the world define freedom as one’s involvement in hermeneutic acts that projectively disclose new and unthought ways of existing in the limit-situations within which one inhabits. Both Dewey and Freire, I will argue, share this hermeneutic approach to education as the practice of freedom. I will try to sketch out the broad outlines of how both Freire and Dewey’s approach to education embodies an hermeneutic event structure from which freedom emerges as the disclosure of truth.

Richard Rorty, in “Hermeneutics, General Studies, and Teaching,” has pointed out the ways that Deweyan pragmatism and a strand of hermeneutics, which Gadamer calls “philosophical hermeneutics,” share a “common doctrine” that emphasizes “the linguistic character of experience” (526). Rorty argues that “the Dewey-Gadamer view is that we can invent something which will improve on our tradition, on what we have been told” (527). Rorty notes that the common thread between Dewey and Gadamer is their insistence upon the projective quality of existence, the resolute process of inquiry that is structured by critical and dialogic relationship with tradition. However, Rorty does not develop the way that Gadamer’s analysis emerges from a tradition that is concerned with the ontological values that are inherent in the process of hermeneutic inquiry. There are ontological values that Gadamer and Freire certainly attribute to the dia-logic of question and answer. I will argue that Dewey also shares the concept that when one has a dialogical experience that discloses new potentialities-for-being in “our tradition” one creates an act of knowing, or enacts an event of living incarnate within truth. Living within the realm of truth is to live freely. None of these values, tradition, truth, freedom or knowledge have fixed moral ends, objectifiable ulterior ends, or finalizable foundations; rather, they are values that emerge out of a dialogical and critical inquiry into existing problematic or limiting situations. Dewey, like the thinkers in the hermeneutic tradition Gadamer, Heidegger and Freire, argues that the concept of truth can not be “confined to designating a logical property of propositions” (Nature 161); rather, we need to “extend its significance to designate character of existential reference, this is the meaning of truth: processes of change so directed that the achieve an intended consummation” (Nature 161).

There is an agreement between the hermeneutic positions of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Freire on the definition of freedom as a social practice. Helen
Khoobyar states Heidegger's position this way: "Heidegger emphasizes that freedom is not a property. Man does not possess freedom as a property. It is the contrary that is true, namely, man belongs to freedom, to openness. In this sense freedom uses (possesses) man as the source for the unfolding of truth" (48). Freedom is not an object that can be bestowed upon either citizens or students; rather, it is a disposition or an attitude that attunes students towards two productive kinds of experience, which Dewey calls "continuity" and "interaction." The mode of experience that Dewey calls "continuity" is a description of the hermeneutic circle of understanding. The expanding and growing circle of understanding grounds itself in tradition only to destroy and construct a new projection of its self-understanding: "the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both take up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after" (Ex & Ed 35). Experience must concomitantly look back at the historical "has-been" in order to be able to modify it and construct a futurity in the projection new understandings. Dewey's concept of "interaction" is the "second chief principle for interpreting an experience in its educational function and force. It assigns equal rights to both factors in experience—objective and internal conditions....Taken together, or in their interaction, they form what we call a situation" (his emphasis; 42). For Dewey, a situation is not like a container, in which one is either inside or outside; but rather, it is a transaction "taking place" between one who experiences the continuity of looking backward and projecting forward—what I would call the "anticipatory retrospection" of hermeneutic circle of understanding—and one who experiences that "environing conditions" in terms of the projections of its anticipatory retrospection. For Dewey, freedom emerges as the activity of questioning the apparently "inflexible dictates" of social regulations that structure the limits or conditions of existential situations; meaning occurs from within union of continuity and interactions where in one is freed from one's own particular limit-situations through the inventing and reinventing of self-understanding of the situations.

For Freire, the logic of question and answer is the only logic that generates authentic inquiry; and it is that process which generates the movement toward humanization: "knowledge emerges only through the invention and re-invention... in the world, with the world and with each other" (Pedagogy 53). Consciousness and the world are given at the same moment; both are shaped by existential limit situations into which particular individuals are thrown (Pedagogy 63). Freire describes the humanizing process of inquiry, "invention and re-invention" of our self-understanding of being-with the
world, in terms of the recursive action of the hermeneutic circle of understanding:

The circle of knowledge has but two moments, in permanent relationship with each other: the moment of the cognition of existing, already-produced, knowledge, and the moment of our own production of new knowledge. ...Both are moments of the same circle. ...There is no genuine instruction in whose process no research is performed by way of question, investigation, curiosity, creativity. (Hope 192-93)

Knowledge is not an object which has a form and a content; it is a recursive questioning of tradition, a critical inquiry into the already said, and a concomitant dialogic response that follows the logic of question and answer, not the logic of correct propositions or scientific methodology. To invent and re-invent the tradition is to critically interrogate existing knowledge as it is embodied in tradition, and to reanimate the static traditions with the interpellant force of new dialogic disclosures is to incarnate the truth, to live truly within circle of question and answer of one’s previously understandings; the processual reconstruction of tradition creates the conditions to exist truthfully in acts of knowing that are the “as processes of inquiry” (Pedagogy 53).

By being attuned to these two forms of lived experience—the hermeneutic retrieval of tradition, which is a concomitant creative reconstruction, and the situational nature of understanding and acts of knowing—students can focus their attention on the way education is a processual critical investigation into social and historical constructions of values. Dewey argues that a shift in our understanding and interpretation of experience “radically” transforms a traditionalist classroom: “the teacher loses the position of external boss or dictator but takes on that of leader of group activities” (Ex & Ed 59). For Freire and Dewey, the classroom must be a context in which to learn the value of freedom from their lived experience of being-a-student. Such a concept of educative experience, argues that educational contexts are not excluded from the production and reproduction of values. As both Freire and Dewey suggest, there is a type of social acculturation that occurs in tradition education, which is both fundamental and a formative of the lived-experience of students, and which limits the existential ability of a students to projectively disclose their potentiality-for-being. And yet, it is not enough for either pedagogue to simply acknowledge this formation of axiological points of view (Pedagogy 25). Both Dewey and Freire insist that in order to develop a liberatory and emancipatory educative context, we must define learning as a critical inquiry into what Freire calls the “limit-situations” or what Dewey...
calls “interactions” of experience that are, paradoxically, created and made to appear by social values as if they are rigid and static.

Again, both Dewey and Freire agree that education is fundamentally a philosophical criticism of values; Freire starts his discussion of pedagogy with the axiological (Pedagogy 25), the value of “humanization,” and he quickly extends it to the ontological, an analysis of practices or particular ways of existing and their impact upon interaction between the environing social conditions and individual efforts to become more fully human. Further, both insist that any philosophy of education must theorize a set of practices in order to develop a critical consciousness in order to problematize the values that are unreflectively reproduced. Critical reflection upon the commonplace values must occur in order to disclose the ontological and historical meaning of those values. Both argue that educational theory must include a way of critically evaluating values that are disclosed, either through the development of what Freire calls a “Critical Consciousness” or what Dewey calls “Critical thinking.” Criticism, as Dewey says, leads to an emancipatory understanding of “genuine freedom [which] is intellectual” (How 66). As Dewey argues, a critical approach to knowledge must discover “the conditions and consequences, the existential relations” (Nature 432) of social values that are part of all human experience.

For Freire and Dewey, a critical approach to education involve a struggle to critique cultural values. Dewey explains it this way: “There is no intellectual growth without some reconstruction, some remaking, of impulses and desires in the form in which they first show themselves” (Ex & Ed 64). In Freedom and Culture, Dewey argues that only when “habits of thought and feeling,” which are “the products of long centuries of acculturation,” are understood as “entrenched dispositions” (133) that can and must be problematized in order for authentic inquiry to occur, can freedom occur. Freedom is the ability to make and remake the ways that we understand and interpret our lived-experience; therefore, freedom involves a critique of values that begins with a set of theoretical assumptions that are ontological. That is, freedom always only occurs with an analysis of the existential position of values that disclose the ways human being exists-in-the-world: freedom means the “development of agencies of revising and transforming previously accepted beliefs” (Democracy 305). Dewey argues that the practice of freedom is an essential aspect of democracy: “As believers in democracy we have not only the right but the duty to question existing mechanisms” (Freedom 121). His analysis reveals that “culture as a complex body of customs is to maintain itself. It can reproduce itself only through effecting
certain differential changes in the original or native constitutions of its members” (Freedom 22). The way social conditions “maintain itself” is by denying participatory interactions, authentic interactive relations are covered over with what Heidegger calls “authentic untruth”; that is, with the withdrawal of truth into concealedness. Truth and untruth are in a mutually appropriative relationship; that is, truth is bound to traditions of the “has-been said” and for truth to enact a disclosive reconstruction it must release itself from the “has-been said” and articulate new unthought understanding; therefore, it order for the “entrenched dispositions,” which represent culture as static, discrete, and unchanging, new dispositions, which privilege process, interdependency, and change, must become a part of educational acculturation. Such new dispositions are sustained only through continual hermeneutic disclosure of the “knowledge” that has become embodied and entrenched in social habits of mind. When education is construed as the acquisition of embodied pre-thought concepts, there can be no development of critical consciousness to modify and transform the already known into its unthought possibilities.

Consequently, Dewey and Freire share a theoretical position that attacks representational, mentalistic or dualistic metaphysical systems that various pedagogues have employed to support a style of education that Dewey calls “Traditional” and Freire calls “Banking.” Traditional or Banking style educators have not understood that their pedagogy cannot be separated from ontological assumptions that focus only on intellectual traditions, stable knowledge, external authority, or what Dewey calls “the acquisition of organized bodies of information” as either a standardized subject-matter or a standardized conduct for the acquisition of that predigested educational product. Dewey agrees fundamentally with Freire’s argument that a Banking style of education, which Traditional pedagogues employ, produces and reproduces sets of “proper attitudes” through which students acquire the intellectual habits of “docility, receptivity, and obedience” (Ex & Ed 18). All forms of pedagogy that are outside of the idea of education as “bodies of information and skills that have been worked out in the past” (Ex & Ed 17) which are simply “transmitted” to new generations become a threat to the moral order implicit in a Traditional or Banking philosophy of education. External control, authority and the proper rules of conduct are all threatened by the contingencies of experience, social interaction, critical examination which are privileged in emancipatory education.

Dewey and Freire argue for a non-representational view of education were there are no antecedent existences, no absolute values which are outside
of existential contingencies, no essential qualities, properties, totalities, rationalities, permanencies, truths, valorized concepts of the good or static substances, no “ulterior functions” or “original properties” which can then be reified into a concept of “ultimate real Being” (Nature 26-9). Rather, both Freire and Dewey what a pedagogy that reveals the event structure of experience as it occurs within an holistic context; individuals who accomplish acts of knowing in particular limiting-situations. One of the fundamental problems with trying to frame educative contexts in a holistic point of view, is the overwhelming transparency of representationalist assumptions that construct educative contexts in dualistic terms; the mind/body, form/content, and literate/illiterate sets of bipolar oppositions are just a few of the dualisms that transparently form the assumptive base or educational theory and practice.

As Rorty suggests, Dewey wanted to dissolve the philosophical problem of the mind/body split which he felt were derived from outdated distinctions “between Truth, Goodness, and Beauty which engender such problems” (Consequences 86). Rorty goes on to say that Dewey’s “chief enemy was the notion of Truth as accuracy of representation” (Consequences 86); in fact, he argues “that without spectator model of knowledge” there would not be a dualistic separation between the mind and body as there is in the representationalist model. Dewey argues that the epistemology of representationalism has direct implications for pedagogy and educational theory. In fact, Dewey states that “it would be impossible to state adequately the evil results which have flowed from this dualism of mind and body, much less exaggerate them” (Democracy 141). The mentalistic view which posits a mind that is severed from the world of things becomes primarily a pedagogy of cognition, this devaluation of experience and the reification of the cognitive faculties has this function: “something which is called mind or consciousness is severed from the physical organs of activity. The former is thought to be purely intellectual and cognitive the latter to be” (Democracy 140) irrelevant. Dewey argues that this epistemological theory is a destructive because it denies the interdependence that occurs between knowers in knowledge communities; in fact, representationalist epistemology is seems to argue explicitly against acts of knowledge as a productive and important aspect of social acculturation that occurs in education because its logic argues that the mind is a “something independent and self-sufficient” (Democracy 293).

Besides falsely denigrating the social aspects of the educative event, representationalist epistemology also needs to construct an explanation for how one gets assess to knowledge: “Given a subject—the knower—and an object—the thing to be known—wholly separate from one another, it is nec-
ecessary to frame a theory to explain how they get into connection with each other so that valid knowledge may result" (Democracy 293). The severing of an individuals' holistic relationship with their environing world is direct result of this theory that argues "that we cannot know the world as it really is but only the impressions made upon the mind" (Democracy 293). Dewey's critique of theories of knowledge that sever the individual's interactive experience with the environing conditions directly invokes the Kantian and neo-Kantian notion of "a priori" structures that shape subjective forms of "thinking." As Dewey interprets this view of the mind, it devalues lived experience and subordinates it to "fixed and ready made universals, 'principles' and laws: Kant taught that the understanding employs fixed, a priori, concepts, in order to introduce connection to experience and thereby make known objects possible (stable, regular relationships of qualities), he developed in German thought a curious contempt for the living variety of experience and a curious overestimate of the value of system, order, regularity of their own sakes. (Reconstruction 98).

The forms, which are anterior and exist within the mind, allow one to "see"; the activity of "seeing" is a primal function that transforms empty forms into meaning filled representations. Lived experience that occurs from existential situations and it cultural contexts is devalued in favor of a search for the ultimate foundations of knowledge. The radical decoupling of understanding and interpretation from foundational principles leads both Freire and Dewey to a non-representational theory of knowledge which is founded on idea that freedom exists only in the processual activity of hermeneutic disclosure.

Authentic being is a non-representational comportment toward futurity. As Dewey says, comportment toward the future is an "inquiring, hunting, searching attitude instead of one of mastery and possession" (Democracy 295). The "self achieves mind" as acts of critical thinking; Dewey defines "knowledge" as the eventfulness of experience, "knowledge of things is incarnate in the life" world, one who questions and problematizes that world is holistically participating in an event of knowledge. On the one hand, incarnate acts of knowing indicate an increase in being more fully human; that is, the process of hermeneutic disclosure increases one's self-understanding of limit-situations; on the other hand, there is a decreased in being more fully human (i.e. the "dehumanization" that occurs in Banking styles of education) that occurs as one is submerged in entrenched dispositions. To "escape the
limits of routine and custom" and become emancipated is also an act of cultural criticism.

Freire suggests that those who do not develop a critical consciousness of the environing conditions that produce culture must therefore simply adapt to it. He uses the term "adaption" to describe the internalization entrenched social dispositions or habits of mind. Such an internalization, which enacts "docility, receptivity, and obedience," destroys what Dewey calls "the reciprocal connections" (Freedom 25) between culture and human being. Freire, like Dewey, sees "adaptive" behavior as a cultural enforcement of particular ways of existing, and a way of thinking that always remains submerged within the "everyday" understanding of anterior social formations of discourse. To adapt to the anterior web social understandings, the always already existent public interpretations, is to submerge one's authentic understanding, in docile, receptive and obedient ways of being and thinking. In opposition to this passive and adaptive behavior Freire argues for an authentic form of understanding that is based upon the development of a critical disposition and that exists within dialogic communicative exchanges.

Freire's essay "Extension or Communication," is perhaps his most extended and important critique of traditional epistemology; he argues that we need to replace epistemology with hermeneutics, and knowledge with understanding, the acquisition of knowledge with acts of knowing. Freire's thesis is that knowledge is non-representational—knowledge is not a noun; but rather, that knowledge is a processual, dialogic, and non-representational event of understanding—knowing is a verb. Understanding is an unending verbal structure, a continual discursive and affective problematizing of one's own existential situation. Freire draws a distinction between the authentic act of communicative disclosure of truth and the unauthentic adaption to a realm of public interpretation that I will call "everyday understanding."

Freire's view of knowledge is argues for a holistic relationship between a subject's affective attunement to its environing world and the problematization of the everyday understanding from which subjects always already interpret their world. The articulation of one's self-understanding existential situation always provides the possibility that a dialogic communicative engagement with the limiting aspects of the environing conditions will transform everyday understanding into a disclosure of new potential ways of being-in-the-world. For Freire, a problem-posing education occurs only in the articulation of the intelligibility a individual's being-there; that is, from the specifics of one's existential situation. The everyday understanding of being-there always occurs from a position of being "submerged" in a passive and
adaptive way. An authentic act of knowing has occurred only when an articulative self-finding occurs from within one's submersion causing an ec-stasis, or emersion.

Everyday understanding is a realm of 'publicness' that Freire sees as a general structure of the human situation. Each individual has the capacity to articulate the intelligibility of their concrete situation, or 'there,' but that articulation only occurs as an event which allows understanding to “stand out” from its “absorption in” the involvements of “everydayness.” The everyday manner of understanding one's involvements with its environment constitutes a passive form of interpretation. Everyday understanding is based upon involvements with the world, and it constitutes the ways in which one's comportment occurs in the social environment. Understanding is an ontological state of being; an authentic ontological state of being occurs as an event of problem-posing. Acts of knowing, which emerges from critical inquiry, are the locus of truth and knowledge. Neither truth or knowledge are determinate, they are processes that occur and delineate how one comports oneself within the social environment within which one has been “thrown” into or submerged in.

Freire redefines understanding as an epistemic process in which the making-known or disclosing of truth always and only concerns the ways that human beings exist in their concrete involvements with the everyday world. The problem-posing attunement to the world enacts an active inquiry of self-understanding, which manifests a ‘self-presentation.’ Everyday understanding is the “original knowledge” of self-evident understanding. Everyday understanding belongs to a realm of public interpretations from which it draws a pre-ontological way of understanding but, for Freire, “knowledge” has a “dialogical structure” (Extension 139). “True education incarnates the permanent search of people together with others for their becoming more fully human in the world in which they exist” (Extension 96). Dialogue occurs between “those who seek to know along with others the meaning of their involvement in this ‘dialogue’”; in other words, they seek to disclose and critically problematize the “conditions for knowing” (Extension 101). For Freire, knowledge is not an epistemological object to be validated or articulated in a “correct” proposition; rather, knowledge is a verb, an action; that is, knowledge occurs in communicative action and “never occurs in the extension of what is thought from one subject to another” (Extension 139). Dialogical acts of knowing between thinking agents are the only authentic "educational processes." Freire sees the educational process as "a state of being" (Extension 144), it is an ontological event; the educational process
does not represent objects of knowledge which can be possessed in an objective form or in a static embodiment of everyday understanding, or anonymous public interpretations.

For Freire, the "self" is not a personal or a private unity; rather: "authentic-self" is always defined in terms of his current inquiry into its world. In other words, an authentic self is defined as a way of existing, and the affective relation between that way of existing and the self-understanding that investigates that way of existing. When "a way of existing" is determined by public interpretation, the process of articulating one's potentiality of being as an authentic-Self is "submerged." The authentic-Self is in a constant struggle with its submersion in the public interpretations which are deposited in a plurality of discursive formations, but particularly in educational institutions that privilege a banking style of knowledge "acquisition" rather than disclosive acts of knowing. Education as the practice freedom creates the habits of mind that are "emancipated from the leading strings of others" (Dewey, How 64).

Education as the practice freedom is transformative and attempts to replace a static representationalist view of knowledge as a reflection of correctness. Critical thinking is an act of knowing that extends, clarifies and emancipates from the narrow understanding of existing conditions by thinking theoretically, that is beyond the known, into the truly practical realm of the unknown. Dewey describes the way that the environing web of socially "accepted meanings and values" embodies the everyday understanding that "is called knowledge. Thinking, on the contrary, starts, as we have seen, from doubt or uncertainty. It marks an inquiring, hunting, searching attitude, instead of mastery and possession. Through its critical process true knowledge is revised and extended, and our convictions as to the state of things is reorganized" (Democracy 295).

Both Freire and Dewey argue that traditional or embodied knowledge, which is assumed to be correct, without question, it is simply and incorrectly called knowledge. They both counterpoint the idea of embodied knowledge with a concept of acts of knowing that occurs as Heidegger suggests within the "living realm of truth." Freedom occurs as acts of knowing in which "true knowledge is revised and extended"; knowledge as the activity of freedom is then "incarnate in the life about" (Democracy 295) the self. A critical disposition is the active process of inquiry, knowledge achieves an incarnate mode of existing to the extent that it is recreating its own self-understanding of its social context. Freedom is the act of participation in the recreation and recreation of one's environing social conditions through critical thinking.
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NOTES

1. Leroy F. Troutner has attempted to compare and contrast Dewey and Heidegger in some interesting ways. My intent here is not so much to enact such a project; rather, to outline so of the broad features that are held in common by the hermeneutic Disclosive theory of Truth. The thesis of the paper is that both Dewey and Freire contribute to a non-representational pedagogy that is structured by a common view the disclosure of truth occurs as a cultural event and that as a cultural event truth is the concomitant revealing and concealing of ways of existing in concrete and limiting existential situations.

2. For Dewey, critical thinking is a disposition that has the "power to start and direct significant inquiry and reflection" (How 39). This means that critical thinking is pre-reflective attunement that suspends the logical propositional and Representationalist nature of "problem-solving"; as Dewey puts it: "The essence of critical thinking is suspended judgment; and the essence of this suspense is inquiry to determine the nature of the problem before proceeding to attempts at its solution" (How 74). The inquiry into the ontological meaning or nature of a particular situation starts at the level of theory, not at the practical: "Men (sic) must have at least enough interest in thinking for the sake of thinking to escape the limits of routine and custom. Interest in knowledge for the sake of knowledge, in thinking for the sake of the free play of thought, is necessary then to the emancipation of practical life—to make it rich and progressive" (How 139).
Models of Educational Democracy

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PART I. TWO MODELS OF EDUCATIONAL DEMOCRACY

In this paper we explore the relation between education and democratic society in terms of the possible participation in school governance of marginalized parents and members of their communities, the support staff, students, and the administration of each school. We examine what we label the core value model of democracy in terms of some problems that are posed by an alternative which we call the preference model. We also examine the efforts of a local group in a midwest town to address the issues raised by these conflicting models.

The core value model of democracy holds to a thick model of democratic education—that there are some understandings, skills and values that democracy requires in order to maintain and recreate itself and that these are not necessarily those that parents would choose to teach to their children. The model that we are exploring emphasized participation in decision making and holds that part of the work of schools in democracy is to provide a forum in which conflicting desires and preferences can be discussed and reshaped in the light of other desires and different preferences.

The preference approach has a considerably thinner understanding of the role of education in a democratic society. Democratic education serves to satisfy parent and student choice. The more choices that are satisfied, the more democratic the educational system. Under this model there is no special need to provide a forum in which preferences are reshaped. There is only the need to meet them, or at least as many of them as are possible.
What marks the core value model off from the preference approach to democracy is the belief that the skills, attitudes, and perspectives needed to establish and maintain a democratic society, while related to the desires of individual, have an integrity that can not be reduced to these desires. Critical thinking, cooperative inquiry and decision making, valuing the world view of others, a willingness to submit one's deeply held beliefs to evidence and to allow the deeply held beliefs of others to be held with insufficient evidence, seeking out dialogue and discourse are valuable for democracy even if no parent wants their child to acquire them. Thus according to this model, the sum of parental choices is not adequate to sustain democratic social values. Or, to put it differently, the needs of the larger democratic society are not a necessary outcome of a system in which parents choose what they view to be best for their individual child. As Dewey writes in *Democracy and Education*:

> The intermingling in the school of youth of different races, different religions, and unlike customs creates for all a new and broader environment. Common subject matter accustoms all to a unity of outlook upon a broader horizon than is visible to members of any group while it is isolated. The assimilative force of the American public school is eloquent testimony to the efficacy of the common balance and appeal.

The school has the function of coordinating within the disposition of each individual the diverse influence of the various social environments into which he enters.

For Dewey these functions are critical for the creation and reconstitution of a democratic society:

> A democracy is more than a form of government; it is a mode of associative living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in interests so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity.

Although Dewey, like Hirsch, saw value in common subject matter, he, unlike Hirsch, was concerned to provide a cooperative climate for inquiry and decision making, and he was especially concerned about any school that did not involve teachers in the decision making process. Dewey was somewhat divided in his opinion about the success of public schools in establishing this cooperative climate. In an essay entitled "The school As a Means of
Developing a Social Consciousness and Social Ideals in Children" he wrote: “that no other influence has counted for anything like as much in bringing a certain integrity, cohesion, feeling of sympathy and unity among the elements of our population as has the public school system of this country.” Yet he felt that this was accomplished haphazardly and without a great deal of planning and foresight, with new tensions arising from the First World War, there was a need for schools to develop more systematic approaches to cooperation. According to him this need would not be met until the problem of non democratic, top-down administration and governance was resolved. Dewey’s solution was to provide teachers with more control in the governance of their schools and to develop structures of teacher and administrative cooperation. In an essay entitled “Democracy in Education”, Dewey argued that one of the problems was that teachers themselves were not involved in the development of educational decisions and hence children were not exposed to a democratic alternative to the authoritarian model that pervaded the schools. He wrote that “until the public school system is organized in such a way that every teacher has some regular and representative way in which he or she an register judgment upon matters of educational importance with the assurance that this judgment will somehow affect the school system, the assertion that the present system is not, from the internal standpoint, democratic seems to be justified.” Without exposure to such a model, instruction in citizenship involves mechanical transmission of information, but does not produce the cooperative skills and spirit required by democracy. Largely missing from Dewey’s model of cooperative governance was the voice of the parent that is the very voice that the advocates of the preference model believe is primary for the development of democratic education. Also missing was the voice of the community, and the support staff. This is somewhat odd given Dewey’s larger concern to relate education to the on-going needs and interest of the community, and to educate students to be active participants in the process and decisions of a democratic community. We will return to this issue shortly, but first we want to explore the rather dramatic change that has taken place in the discourse about these two models. We can see the dramatic difference in the evaluation of these two models by examining the subtle but important rhetorical change that has taken place since the ruling in Pierce v. the Society of Sisters (1925), a ruling that affirmed parents’ rights to send their children to a non public, parochial or private school. In granting parents such a right, Pierce did not require the state to provide any financial aid in realizing it. In this case the burden was on the parents to find the means to exercise the right Pierce provided them.
The ruling required no more of the state than that it allow parents to choose a non public school for their children. The reason for placing the burden on parental choice was largely because it was assumed that the public schools were responsible for developing a core of civic virtues that would enable children to transcend the values of their local group and to identify with the nation at large.

Today the debate around parental choice is focused on issues such as school vouchers, home schooling and charter schools, but the burden of proof is shifting to the state and its authority to determine how and where children should be educated. Whereas in Pierce the important question was how will national coherence be maintained if each parent has the right to choose to educate their child privately, today the core question is why should not all parents be enabled to educate their children as wealthy parents now do, according to their own choosing and with the aid of the state.

In allowing, but not encouraging, parents to choose their child's education in light of cheaper and often more convenient options, Pierce was holding to the importance of core values to a democratic nation. However, it was also recognizing that one of these core values was the right of parents to pass on their own values to their children. A similar line of reasoning can be seen in the Yoder case, 1972 where Amish parents were allowed to remove their children from school prior to the official school leaving age for religious reasons. The court was allowing the Amish to hold values that were different from the core, but they were still affirming the importance of these values for the rest of the citizenry.

The argument for vouchers, which has become so prominent in recent years, is considerably different. Here the question is not whether the state should allow parents to send their children to schools of their own choosing, but whether the state should encourage such developments by providing enabling means. Whereas, Pierce, even in allowing parents to choose to send their children to non public schools, still assumed that there was a core set of values that constituted the civic virtues and that these were largely the responsibility of the public schools to transmit, most arguments for vouchers seem to assume that democracy can be equated with maximizing individual parental choice. The system that satisfies the most choice is the most democratic. Instead of an approach which envisages democracy in terms of a set of core values, this one views it in additive terms, and seeks a system where the most parents are satisfied in terms of their educational desires. If there are to be any core values they are largely those needed to stabilize the system.
There are probably at least four reasons why Dewey emphasized the voice of the teacher but was largely silent about that of the parent: first Dewey believed that teaching was essentially a professional calling, and that teachers had expert knowledge that was needed in order to make sound educational decisions; second Dewey was uncertain about the quality of parental judgment, and felt the education of the young needed to be controlled by more scientific tendencies; third he believed that one of the purposes of education was to expose children to values and life styles that were different from their parents; fourth he felt that democratic decision making needed to be modeled if children were to develop the intellectual and spiritual values that it required, and he was more secure in teachers doing this than parents. This is the point of his comment quoted earlier from “Democracy in Education”: “Without exposure to such a model, instruction in citizenship involved mechanical transmission of information, but does not produce the cooperative skills and spirit required by democracy.” He felt secure that teachers had or could develop a special understanding of children and therefore should cooperate with the administration in determining the educational programs of the school.

Given this understanding of democracy, the preference model by itself is never sufficient for Dewey. Indeed, one of the functions of Dewey’s model is the development of structures for the cooperative reconstruction of desires. Thus when, under Dewey’s model, desires are satisfied, it is not the first blush of desire, but that wiser desire, reshaped as a result of cooperative discussion. The problem with all of this from the point of view of the preference model is both that it excludes parents and that it does not describe the real, on the ground work of many schools. Many public schools do not advance the values and perspectives that Dewey seeks, and there is little in our resegregating society to see how they might. Thus, from this point of view, it is argued that it is better to enable parents to choose the schools they want for their children.

It is hard to argue with either of these two models. The core value model seems correct. There are certain values that are critical for developing and maintaining democratic society and these values need not necessarily be of high priority among parents. Moreover, the quality of democracy is likely to be improved when people are willing and able to discuss their differences in an open and reasonable way. However, it also seems quite undemocratic to exclude the immediate choices of parents on the grounds that they have not been subject to sufficient deliberation or that they are not quite scientific, refined or democratic enough to count, especially when the parents are more
likely than any one else involved to care about the object of these decisions—their own children.

Each of these models has its problems however. The preference model can be excessively individualistic, willing to accept all parental desires as equal regardless of how they were formed. Desires formed through indoctrination, through a hard sales pitch, through misinformation, or prejudice are equal in value to those that are formed through study, reasoned discourse, and discussion. Some parents may choose their schools wisely, but there is little to aid them in doing so, and it is very likely that preference models will reproduce educational inequities.

If the preference model has the problem of excessive individualism, the core value model has the problem of excessive professionalism. Where matters of pedagogy, curriculum, and discipline are at stake some parents feel left out and alienated from the very institution that is supposed to develop allegiance to the larger political and social order.

PART II: PROJECT FOR EDUCATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE TWO MODELS

We have been studying a movement, Project for Educational Democracy (PED). PED was initiated by teachers and members of the teachers union, but now includes parents, non-certified staff community organizers and other members of the community. Its aim is to strengthen the legitimacy of the public schools by including members of the community in its governance. This movement, has been focused on the African American segment of the community, with additional concern voiced for including poorer whites as well. Many members of these groups express alienation from the schools and their administration and feel left out of the decision making process. PED is a work in process and so at this time we will describe the concerns that motivate it, the vision of some of its more active members, and where we think it may be moving. PED is a way to reformulate the goals of both the preference and the core value models. For the former it seeks ways to increase the voice of poorer parents and community members in shaping the local schools. For the latter, it holds that the public schools are the best opportunity we have for addressing problems in a democracy. Moreover, it seeks to create environments in which teachers, administrators, support staff, parents, students and community members are involved in a common discourse in which initial interests and desires are reshaped in ways that seem to us consistent with many of Dewey’s formulations.

The community, which we call Edge City, has a population of about 138 Feinberg, Fields, & Roberts • 127
35,000 people with an African American population of between ten and fifteen percent. The sense of alienation that we mentioned above is somewhat invisible to the administrators and School Board representatives who are proud of what they see as the openness of the system. Indeed they believe that the system is so open to the desires of individual parents that they have coined a phrase, “The Edge City’s way”, to indicate the informality of the chain of command and the fact that parents can jump over one layer in the chain and gain access to the next. Whether or not the “Edge City Way” works for a significant number of parents is uncertain, but a sizable number of the African American community believe that the system is closed to them, that the schools board members do not care about their ideas, that teachers and administrators do not listen to their concerns, and that they simply do not have an effective voice in the process.

Although Edge City has been integrated for more than two decades, there are a number of reasons to believe that the present system of representation has not served the African American community well. There are but three African American Administrators, one in the central office, a principal and an assistant principal, and only a handful of African American teachers. These numbers have left the impression among many in the African American community that the School Board has been unwilling to do what is necessary to hire and retain African American administrators and teachers. In addition, African American representation on the School Board has been considerably lower than their percentage in the community. Only two African Americans have served on the Board since the schools busing began in the late 1960’s and at the present time there are no African Americans on it. Moreover, those who have served expressed considerable frustration and alienation in our interviews with them. One told us that he felt that little that he said was taken seriously and another that at least one decision was made behind his back.

The Board itself has adopted a procedure that contributes to the community’s sense of alienation. While they will solicit comments from the community at their open meetings, board members will not respond to those comments except as they discuss among themselves the reasons for voting this way or that. This policy leaves the impression among many African Americans that the Board is just not listening to them.

The teachers, support staff, parents and community members who comprise PED are racially mixed and all are committed to one degree or another to public education. Early in the formation of PED meetings were held in an African American church to provide a more comfortable space for African
Americans. It was moved to the public library about the same time that the minister of the church began developing plans for a private school, and our speculation, which was denied by one PED member but affirmed by another, was that the private school project played a significant role in the move.

Initially PED was formed with a rather vague idea of increasing the voice of parents and underrepresented communities, especially the African American community, in the public schools. The founders were concerned about the alienation of the African American Community and a potential flight from public to private schools. Their movement was a way to marry parental choice and core values by bringing decisions closer to the schools and by involving parents in them. The movement was motivated by a good deal of idealism. It was initially comprised of some former civil rights workers, teachers who wanted an outlet for their activism, a union representative who, as a student had been impressed by the involvement of workers in participatory management in Tito's Yugoslavia, two African American community organizers, one of whom was brought in by the union, along with some committed teachers. Some had visions of participatory modes of decision making actually replacing a representative School Board that many felt had been unresponsive to the needs of the African American community.

This grand vision is mentioned less frequently now that the nuts and bolts deliberation has begun. In contract negotiations with the teachers union, which is controlled by those either directly involved in PED or favorable to it, the Board agreed to establish a district-wide committee to look into the present practices and future possibilities of site based decision making in the district. Board members, administrators, PED members, parents community members, and students now all engage in dialogue. Indeed one newer PED member has been elected to the Board and also sits on the District Committee. As interaction with the Board member has increased, some of the initial rhetoric which some Board members found confrontational and offensive has been toned down. On the other hand, PED is more sensitive to the larger responsibilities of the Board, including its accountability to those who pay taxes for all of the schools but do not have a special interest in any one of them. The people who want a good education but at reasonable cost and with accountability for student progress. The wider responsibility of the Board is being taken seriously by PED as it seeks to advance the cause of a more inclusive form of decision making within the individual schools and at least one Board member who had been hostile to PED in an earlier interviews now publicly praises its ability to bring parents into the process.

Even though many of the concerns that motivated the formation of PED
still exist—the African American Community is still not represented on the School Board and many African American parents still feel alienated from the schools—PED's role is changing. It is working within a representative framework even as it works to mobilize the community and these changes are providing us with new ways to think about the goals advanced by the two models and perhaps especially by Dewey. First, by attempting to develop a shared structure of decision making that is located in the individual schools it is seeking to create a participatory model that serves as a balance to the centralized board. Second, the model provides a possibility for addressing one important criticism of Dewey, that his theory work to enhance the authority of the professional. Dewey wanted a democracy that created opportunities for different interests to be discussed and reshaped, and he wanted education to enrich both individual and community life. Yet he also advanced a view of teachers as professionals that brought them into cooperation with administrators, but not necessarily with the community as a collective unit. While teachers were to relate to administrators as members of a collective that had certain rights, parents and community members by default were to continue to relate to teachers as individuals, just as the Edge City way suggests. Given this model, and the implicitly power relations it suggests, teachers are there to aid parents and community members reshape their interests, but influence and power are uneven. The parents and community are not there to reshape the teacher's interest. We believe that one of the reasons the preference model seems to be gaining in favor is that it breaks up the collectivity of teachers and requires both parents and teachers to relate to each other as individuals. Indeed, under this model parents have considerable power because they can choose not to participate in schools that do not satisfy them. Yet their power is exercised only as individual consumers, without a structure to reshape their interest in light of contact with others in the community. We see PED raising a new vision. One which increases the roles of the parents but does so as active agents for the community and in ways that enable interests and desires to be reshaped.

PED is now questioning this power equation that brings individual parents into contact with a teacher who is also a member of a collective body. Although it is maintaining a position as a change agent and gadfly, it is taking on a new position as a broker between the formal institutions of the schools and organizations that serve the interests of underrepresented communities such as the Urban League, The NAACP and a number of locally based groups. For example, one of its concerns has been the lack of student representation of the District Site Based Committee. At the last School Board
meeting, at the instigation of one or two of the teachers involved with PED, sixteen students from diverse ethnic and racial background, volunteered to serve. At this moment PED is concerned about the practice of schools and the central administration to appoint the same parents to committees, and of not holding meetings at a time when working parents are able to attend. It will begin to notify the schools of this problem and request that they be informed of the formation of school committees. They will then inform community activist, and agencies that represent the interests of the poor and people of color so that they may find new volunteers for these committees.

PED itself has become a forum for discussions between teachers and community members about the policies and directions are best to the schools, and in the coming year these may be the issues that test PED the hardest. They will also be the ones that test Dewey's concern that interests be reshaped within a context where power is more evenly distributed between teacher, parent and community. To take one recent instance, some parents on the committee object to a number of policies that the union fought hard to obtain, and some of the more conservative African American community members have voiced objection to educational policies that many of the more progressive teachers cherish. Some of these concerns have provided the union members on the committee with an opportunity to explain the reasons for the policies in terms of the educational needs of the children in the school system. We suspect that this kind of dialogue will continue and that there is a reasonable possibility that new interests will be identified, discussed and sometimes reshaped in ways that will provide a more collective spin to Dewey's often voiced ideas that teachers are workers and that schools are instruments of both children and communities.

NOTE

1998 Annual Meeting
Historical Precedents Concerning the Mission of the University

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Institutional mission is an issue that is frequently discussed today in both public and academic circles. This essay is an analysis of change in the mission of the university since the Middle Ages. "Mission" is broadly defined herein as the major roles or functions performed by the organizations.

Medieval University: Teaching and Scholasticism in Europe

The first true universities arose in Europe during the later Middle Ages (c. 1200-1500). As civilization became increasingly complex, the church, secular governments, municipalities, and businesses required highly educated priests, administrators, lawyers, and physicians. Fulfilling this demand were the medieval universities, which were clearly teaching and vocationally-oriented.¹ The universities developed the Scholastic system of philosophy based upon Aristotelian logic and dialectic. Scholasticism was a teaching method, as well as a method of inquiry into the whole range of knowledge.²

The basic teaching mission and organizational structure of the medieval model still remains intact today. It has been copied worldwide—in the Americas, Asia, and Africa.³

Early Modern University: Nationalization and Humanism in Europe and Latin America

Early modern Europe (c. 1500-1800) saw the rise of nationalism, modern nation-states, and royal absolutism. Toward the close of the Middle Ages, secular governments had consolidated their power and essentially national-
ized their universities. After 1500, the traditional teaching mission of the university endured; yet, as institutions now controlled by states, the training of the expanding governing elite increased greatly. Throughout Latin America, starting during the sixteenth century, the Spanish Empire planted its state-controlled colonial universities in urban areas. To this day, most of the world's universities are national institutions and still retain this early modern mission: service to the state, whether it be free or totalitarian.

Philosophically, medieval Scholasticism was gradually replaced by Renaissance philosophy and disciplines in the universities on the Continent and in England—called humanism. Originating as part of the Italian Renaissance, the humanistic movement emphasized literary and educational activities. It first appeared outside of the universities. Humanists studied the works of the ancient, pagan Greeks and Romans with a new vigor. Overall, there was a much greater emphasis on man, free will, and human values, hence the term humanism.

In the Western university of today, the humanist tradition still dominates the curriculum and intellectual thought. This is particularly true regarding the modern liberal arts curriculum, because it is directly descended from Renaissance humanist philosophy. Furthermore, the humanistic American and European universities are foremost in their quality and quantity, and thus serve as models to the rest of the world.

FORMATIVE AMERICAN COLLEGE: DEMOCRATIC ADVANCEMENTS

The United States of America (f. 1776) was the first democratic government in world history. Colonial thinkers had been influenced by the European Enlightenment and its French philosophes. Consequently, they believed strongly in an educated citizenry. Without a doubt, the underlying mission of American higher education during the nineteenth century was "democratization," later to be embodied in the public service mission of the twentieth century institutions. The most powerful forces for democratization were the state university, land grant college, and municipal college movements. Over the past 25 years, in particular, European and other nations have followed the American lead in providing mass and universal higher education.

GERMAN GRADUATE INSTITUTION: RESEARCH AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Eminently important in shaping the research mission of the modern university, worldwide, was the nineteenth and early twentieth century German model, especially Prussia's new University of Berlin (f. 1809).
Directly related to research, there were many teaching and curricular developments of consequence within the German universities:

1) **Lernfreiheit**, the concept of "freedom to learn" by students;
2) **Lehrfreiheit**, the concept of "freedom of teaching" by professors regarding lines of inquiry in research;
3) seminar method;
4) specialist's lecture;
5) laboratory instruction;
6) monographic study; and,
7) immensely expanded curriculum and fields of study.¹²

Organized research was, indeed, a dramatic and useful addition to the traditional teaching mission of the university. Most academics still believe that doing research enhances one's classroom teaching. Understandably, the German model has been copied around the world.

**MODERN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: SERVICE TO INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY**

The public service ideal, as a part of the modern American university, is a natural extension of the democratization of higher learning begun during the nineteenth century. Above all, Congress had passed the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 to expand teaching and to promote service activities in agricultural science and the mechanical arts through land grant (state) colleges and universities. This idea of service is fundamentally American. Laurence Veysey documents the growth of a new and modern type of graduate institution, in the US, around the turn of the century. Unique to the world, it combines the ideals of teaching, research, and service.¹³

Most representative of the public service ideal during the early industrial period were William Rainey Harper's University of Chicago (f. 1892) and the "Wisconsin Idea" (1904). President Harper's Chicago plan featured summer sessions, extension services, correspondence courses, and the university press. The "Wisconsin Idea" was a partnership between the state government and the University of Wisconsin, emphasizing faculty advisory support in Madison and statewide extension services.¹⁴ Subsequently, many other state universities followed the University of Wisconsin by elevating service as a core mission, equal to teaching and research.¹⁵

Today's colossal, multifunction university or "multiversity," a term coined by Kerr,¹⁶ generally pursues the three-fold mission of teaching, research, and service. Since World War II, governments around the world have increasingly moved toward industrialization and democracy, following the Western pattern accordingly, many nations have established their own multiversities.¹⁷
Now that the Western world, Japan, and other rich societies stand on the brink of the postmodern or postindustrial age, what are the future prospects for the mission of the university? Postmodernity is characterized by the production of new knowledge and increasing globalization/interdependency. Hence, the university is ideally positioned to become the leading institution in postmodern civilization, because it has, throughout its history, created the bulk of society’s new information and existed as a key international organization. Conceivably, the next mission of the university to emerge will be internationalization—especially in the areas of curriculum, research, and public service as the earth becomes “smaller.” For the nations of the world to succeed in the global marketplace of the future and to solve perplexing international problems may depend on their universities and graduates possessing far improved international skills and perspectives.

NOTES


14. The Universities of Chicago, Wisconsin, and many others were influenced by Chautauquan ideas. See John C. Scott's forthcoming article "The Chautauqua Movement: Revolution in Popular Higher Education," *Journal of Higher Education*.


"How We Go On": Education and Gary Snyder’s The Practice of the Wild

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As a poet, Gary Snyder has long identified himself as holding “the most archaic values on earth.” But only since the inclusion of the section “For The Children” in his 1975 volume Turtle Island has Snyder’s concern turned explicitly toward the passing on of these values. This shift in direction is well exemplified in the title poem of his 1983 volume Axe Handles, where Snyder explores a moment of sharing between father and son that illuminates the methods and purposes of education. Snyder and his son Kai are practicing throwing a hatchet so it sticks in a tree. Kai “recalls the hatchet-head / Without a handle in the shop / … and wants it for his own” (5). Working on the handle with the hatchet, Snyder recalls the saying of Ezra Pound “When making an axe handle / The pattern is not far off.” He traces the saying in his mind to a fourth century “Essay on Literature” by Lu Ji that his own teacher, Shih-hsiang Chen, translated for him:

And I see: Pound was an axe,
Chen was an axe, I am an axe,
And my son a handle, soon
To be shaping again, model
And tool, craft of culture,
How we go on. (5)

The cross-referencing of understandings between cultures and disciplines (Chinese to American; literature to wood-carving and tool-making), and the idea of shaping “tools” (children) from “models” (teachers), illuminates the purposes and practices of education, as well as describing a means of cultur-
at transmission as old as humanity that forms the basis of "how we go on." By moving from literary studies to tool making, Snyder reverses the seeming flow of the "craft of culture" from its material base while suggesting how basic those foundations are. Significantly, in the next poem of the volume, "For/From Lew," a fellow poet who disappeared near Snyder's home in the Sierra Nevada comes back from the dead to say "Teach the children about the cycles. / The life cycles. All the other cycles. / That's what it's all about, and it's all forgot." (7)

Snyder's essay collection The Practice of the Wild more clearly elucidates, albeit indirectly, Snyder's concern with education. Though the book deals with topics as diverse as Indian dance, chokesetting, old-growth forest protection, and Buddhist philosophy, I would argue that it concentrates on the need to develop a particular cultural perspective and on the means, objectives, and content required to "resolve the dichotomy of the civilized and the wild" (23). Snyder's purpose, then, is to open the gates to a "deep ecological" consciousness that, as he puts it, will permit a civilization that will survive wilderness. Achieving this long-term goal requires the deployment of two strategies: first, a reinterpretation of certain concepts embedded in prevalent western understandings of nature; and second, a reintroduction of "primitive" perspectives derived from societies retaining a close relation to nature, while adapting these perspectives for modern sensibilities and aligning them with contemporary scientific understandings of nature. The accomplishment of these goals, in turn, requires reflection upon the means by which one can re-establish the passing on of this "grandmother" knowledge. I will discuss the two goals first, then examine Snyder's considerations regarding their fulfillment through education.

The first goal, or reinterpretation of concepts embedded in western understandings of nature, requires an analysis of the terms that underlie civilized perspectives on the natural world. In "The Etiquette of Freedom," the chapter which introduces the book, Snyder examines the etymology and connotative associations of words such as freedom, nature, wilderness, and "wildness" (i.e. the meanings assigned to "wild") as a way of rethinking these terms. For instance, "nature" as a word is commonly set in binary opposition to "culture." Snyder describes this usage as delineating "the world that is apart from the features or products of civilization and human will" (8). But by tracing the word's etymological connection to nation, native, pregnant (i.e., "prebirth"), and generate, genus, kind, and kin—these latter traced from the reconstructed Indo-European root *gen, Snyder posits the broader scientific definition "the material world or its collective objects and phenomena" (8),
including all human endeavor (i.e., culture) and the supernatural as “phenomena which are reported by so few people as to leave their reality in doubt” (8). According to Snyder, then, “science and some sorts of mysticism rightly propose that everything is natural. By these lights there is nothing unnatural about New York City, or toxic wastes, or atomic energy, [or anything] we do or experience in life” (8).

If everything is natural, though, not everything is wild. In English-speaking and other contemporary cultures, according to Snyder, “wild” is consistently defined in terms of negation, by explaining what it is not, and always from a human-centered and culture-centered perspective. Thus, to define the wild, we find the following terms, which Snyder credits to the Oxford English Dictionary:

Of animals—not tame, undomesticated, unruly.
Of plants—not cultivated.
Of land—uninhabited, uncultivated.
Of foodcrops—produced or yielded without cultivation.
Of societies—uncivilized, rude, resisting constituted government (9).

Snyder points out that the reversal of these interpretations, their viewing from a positive rather than a negative perspective, completely alters the interpretation encouraged in these traditional approaches:

Of animals—free agents, each with its own endowments, living within natural systems.

Of plants—self-propagating, self-maintaining, flourishing in accord with innate qualities.... (9-10)

These perspectives, Snyder suggests, have most familiarly been advanced in civilized culture in China, since they “come very close to how the Chinese define the term Dao, the way of Great Nature: eluding analysis, beyond categories, self-organizing, self-informing, playful, surprising, impermanent, insubstantial, independent...” (10). From this perspective, “wild” becomes the source of values of freedom, and “wilderness” consists of “the very real condition of energy and richness that we so often find in wild systems” (11). Controlled environments such as New York City are “‘natural’ but not ‘wild’” (11) since they are not self-organizing as such. But wilderness exists not only in the tracts of unpopulated land we so often associate with the term, but also in the micro-organismic world of spores and fungi that surrounds us constantly, in our own self-organizing bodies, and in such seemingly human constructs as language, a self-generating, self-sustaining, natural and biological feature of
human development. Given this extension of the wild into all areas of our lives, Snyder claims, "to speak of wilderness is to speak of wholeness" (12).

This rethinking of the wild allows Snyder to pose a system of values centered in "grandmother wisdom" that is designed for peaceful co-existence with wilderness and with nature. According to Snyder, since the sixteenth century most advanced cultures have become "nature-illiterate" (12), concentrating instead on problems of internal management coupled with a rationalistic disposition that has denied significance (except as resource), sentience, and even "soul" to the natural world. Given this perspective on wilderness and its representation in contemporary society, Snyder can now trace positive (as opposed to negative) value systems that are supportive of a harmonious relation with nature. These values stem largely from pre-market economies, pre-industrialized societies, and emphasize communal sharing, conservation, and *ahimsa* (the Buddhist precept that one "cause no unnecessary harm"). Snyder characterizes one manifestation of these values, a list of "Inupiaq values" he sees upon the wall of a Kobuk tribal school he visits in Alaska, as "grandmother wisdom" (see appendix).

The "grandmother wisdom" embedded in these values are, according to Snyder, "the fundamental all-time values of our species" (56). They contrast with the values that have become dominant in our individualistic, market-oriented society. In this way they begin to form the basis for Snyder's implicit critique of western education, particularly in the area of what we could call "values education":

People today are caught between the remnants of the ongoing "grandmother wisdom" of the peoples of the world (within which I include several of the Ten Commandments and the first five of the Ten Great Buddhist Precepts) and the codes that serve centralization and hierarchy. Children grow up hearing contradictory teachings: one for getting what's yours, another for being decent. The classroom teacher, who must keep state and church separate, can only present the middle ground, the liberal humanistic philosophy that comes out of "the university." It's a kind of thinking that starts (for the Occident) with the Greek effort to probe the literal truth of myth by testing stories and theories against experience. The early philosophers were making people aware of the faculty of reason and the possibility of objectivity. The philosopher is required to conduct the discussion with both hands on the table, and cannot require that you ingest a drug, eat a special diet, or follow any out-of-the-way regimen (other than intelligent reflection) to follow the argument. I'd say this was a needed corrective in some cases. A kind of
intellectual clarity could thus be accomplished without necessarily discarding myth. Keeping myth alive requires a lively appreciation of the depth of metaphor, of ceremony and the need for stories. Allegorizing and rationalizing myth kills it. (57)

Teaching, that is, currently balances between values systems — those of the “wisdom of the tribe,” a value system derived from a society embedded in and at one with nature, and those that generate a human-centered market economy for which nature is merely material for use. The teacher is stuck in the negotiation between producing students as viable economic integers and as humans. This balance has been developing since Greek times, when rationality, science, and philosophy started to question the veracity of the “grandmother wisdom” of myth. This balance between sides (ethical education versus education to the “realities” of modern life) leads to the viewpoint that “the humanistic stance lacks moral decisiveness” (58). The contrast between these viewpoints becomes clear when Snyder contemplates what he would do if he were a teacher at the tribal school he visits:

Suppose I was a teacher a Kobuk or Shungnak, I thought, and had to teach the culture and history of this [contemporary American] civilization that is moving in on them. Maybe we would read Shakespeare, some Homer, one of Plato’s dialogues. (They are already well versed in Protestant Christianity.) “This is what they valued century after century,” I’d have to say. And then they would live to see a mining operation open up nearby. The day-by-day procedures and attitudes of businessmen and engineers reflect little of anybody’s supposed Western Culture. The experience of contradictions, like taking little doses of poison, would prepare them to survive in a tricky pluralistic society.... And should not the teachers uncover the greed and corruption of successive empires, veiled behind art and philosophy?... It seems as though everything except mathematics and linguistics—and myth—will become obsolete.

American society (like any other) has its own set of unquestioned assumptions. It still maintains a largely uncritical faith in the notion of continually unfolding progress. It cleaves to the idea that there can be unblemished scientific objectivity. And most fundamentally it operates under the delusion that we are each a kind of “solitary knower”—that we exist as rootless intelligences without layers of localized contexts. Just a “self” and the “world.” In this there is no real recognition that grandparents, place, grammar, pets, friends, lovers, children, tools, the poems and songs we remember, are what we think with. Such a solitary mind—if it could exist—would be a boring prisoner of abstractions. With no surroundings there can be no
path, and with no path one cannot become free. No wonder the parents of the Eskimo children of the whole Kotzebue Basin posted the “Inupiaq Values” in their schools. (59-60)

The values of western society: “the ideology of individualism, of human uniqueness, special human dignity, the boundless potential of Man, and the glory of success” (63)—finally only serve the “Oil Pipeline philosophy” (63) that is destroying Inupiaq culture, the Alaskan countryside, and (by extension) the environment. These values contradictorily emphasize both individualism and the universality of the human spirit. In this way for Snyder they fundamentally oppose Inupiaq “grandmother wisdom” values that center in a place and emphasize interconnection with the tribe and the environment, values that recognize and conjoin the interests of people with the wide interests of ongoing inhabitation, that prize ecological relations. It is here that Snyder’s third intention—the reintroduction of primal values that will help us regain “the etiquette of freedom” (24)—comes to the fore. First, we need to re-center in place, to establish the primacy of full ecological knowledge of and value for the place one occupies. This connects to Snyder’s ongoing concern with “reinhabitation,” the need for continuously uprooted, mobilized Americans (on the go since before the westward expansion) to connect to the land they occupy. “Place” is here recognized as a biological place, part of a bioregion with distinct biological and ecological features, and is connected with the concept of the commons as an area shared, respected, and cared for locally by all people, established through mutual agreement as open land as opposed to private property, and available to all species. In this way it is fundamentally opposed to the cherished western institution of private property, since it recognizes the possibility of and need for land that is not owned, either by individuals or by the state, but communally designated as open to all beings, left open and wild by agreement rather than by decree.

Snyder most fully explores these relationships to place in his essays “The Place, the Region, and the Commons” (25-47) and “Good, Wild, Sacred” (78-96), which explores the institution of the commons in place-based societies and demonstrates the connection between “wild” land (which includes the commons) and the sacred as manifested in specific places (as in the sacred groves of ancient Greece). From these perspectives communal sharing of specific places and their resources can in fact reinforce the spiritual significance of place, rather than reducing “wild” (i.e. “useless”) places to “resource pools,” as tends to occur in modern societies. The commons requires a philosophy of social compact centered in local, in-place management and is opposed to the view that all resources are or should be “owned”
by private entities (such as corporations) that are permitted by their ownership to exploit these places fully. "The commons is a level of organization of human society that includes the nonhuman. . . . Understanding the commons and its role within the larger regional culture is one more step toward integrating ecology with economy" (36-37).

Reinhabitation involves the establishment of a relationship with the nonhuman inhabitants of place. "In the old ways, the flora and fauna and landforms are part of the culture. The world of culture and nature, which is actual, is almost a shadow world now, and the insubstantial world of political jurisdictions and rarefied economies is what passes for reality" (37). Reinhabitory values are in fact the basis for "cultural pluralism and multilingualism," which "are the planetary norm" (42). Establishing this relationship with place requires the rethinking of the idea of the text, "one of the formal criteria of humanistic scholarship" (66). As Snyder explains it, "A text is information stored through time. The stratigraphy of rocks, layers of pollen in a swamp, the outward expanding circles in the trunk of a tree, can be seen as texts" (66). "Texts" here includes the natural world, and what can be learned both about that world and from that world (what happened, what will happen, where resources are, what resources are left, etc.) is part of the knowledge inherent in reinhabitation. Nature in fact can be seen as a gigantic, self-generating, self-referring text, though adopting this point of view can be misleading, since it assumes that nature is "a system of symbols, a referential world of mirrors" rather than "a complete presentation, an enactment [that] stands for nothing" beyond itself (113).

Though Snyder does present general guidelines (place-based and "post" human foci) for the reoriented society he envisions, his concentration is largely in generating an overall cultural perspective on ethical guidelines (values education) that will permit the development of a civilization in tune with nature and that might thus help preserve wildness in all its senses. In other words, he does not concern himself with the specific contents and organization of education beyond his speculations about what he would do were he teaching the Inupiaq. But in the chapter "On the Path, Off the Trail" (144-54), Snyder does introduce alternative educational models—the traditional arts and craft apprenticeship and the Zen monastic training he himself underwent in Japan in the 1960s—to explore the benefits alternative educational models offer. In the traditional arts and crafts, Snyder tells us, **Boys and girls of fourteen or so were apprenticed to a potter, or a company of carpenters, or weavers, dyers, vernacular pharmacologists, metallurgists, cooks, and so forth. the youngsters left home to**
go and sleep in the back of the potting shed and would be given the single task of mixing clay for three years, say, or sharpening chisels for three years for the carpenters. It was often unpleasant. The apprentice had to submit to the idiosyncrasies and downright meanness of the teacher and not complain. It was understood that the teacher would test one’s patience and fortitude endlessly. One could not think of turning back, but just take it, go deep, and have no other interests. For an apprentice there was just this one study. Then the apprentice was gradually inducted into some not so obvious moves, standards of craft, and in-house working secrets. They also began to experience—right then, at the beginning—what it was to be “one with your work.” The student hopes not only to learn the mechanics of the trade but to absorb some of the teacher’s power, the *mana*—a power that goes beyond any ordinary understanding or skill. (146)

Snyder does not propose a return to this type of education, of course—such a step would equate to a return to Feudalism. But he does point out specific effects achieved in this approach that often seem lost in modern education. First, and most obviously, such an approach aims to produce persons who are masters of at least one task or trade. Second and more important, though, this approach tends to decenter the subjectivity or ego of the student, opening him or her to being at “one with … work” and so potentially being one with the other, with the world as something that exists outside of and sometimes comes *through* rather than *from* the person. In other words, rather than catering to the needs or comfort of the student, as may perhaps often seem to be the case in contemporary schooling, Snyder’s vision points to the need to adapt the student to the world in all its conditions. Just as the emphasis on “grandmother wisdom” in the Inupiaq school downplays the individual in emphasizing the values of the community, so the traditional arts apprenticeship downplays the significance of the individual in relation to the needs of the task at hand.

This emphasis can be more clearly seen by looking at Snyder’s comments on the role of creativity in contemporary arts training in the west. Snyder points out that this training tends to “downplay the aspect of accomplishment and push everyone to be continually doing something new…. The emphasis on mastering the tools, on repetitive practice and training, has become very slight. In a society that follows tradition, creativity is understood as something that comes almost by accident, is unpredictable, and is a gift to certain individuals only. It cannot be programmed into the curriculum…. when it does appear it’s the real thing” (147). Viewed from another perspec-
tive, what happens in the contemporary emphasis on creativity is a stressing of the importance of the individual as against the craft, which is part of the culture and the community. We are confronted again with the “solitary knower,” the “rootless intelligences without layers of localized contexts” that exist in a solitary relation of “self” to “world.”

In many ways the system of apprenticeship works in spite of itself, since it requires that we “learn from the useless.” Its central feature is that it achieves decenteredness, leads one to the point of recognizing that “effort itself can lead one astray” (150). Learning to do so well that doing is beyond thought brings one (Snyder suggests) to the edge of a spiritual practice beyond work (and learning) that marks entry into the wild within the contexts of culture. As Snyder reminds us, the opening line of the Dao De Jing tells us that “The way that can be followed (‘wayed’) is not the constant way.” He glosses this line as meaning, “A path that can be followed is not a spiritual path.”... The intention of training can only be accomplished when the ‘follower’ has been forgotten” (150). As Snyder’s Roshi put it in a lecture, “The perfect way is without difficulty. Strive hard!” (149) “Repetition and ritual and their good results come in many forms.... [A] round of chores is not a set of difficulties we hope to escape from so that we may do our ‘practice’ which will put us on a ‘path’ —— it is our path.... The truly experienced person, the refined person, delights in the ordinary” (153).

If contemporary education concentrates on filling the student rather than allowing the student to be filled, Snyder tells us, in the end it has the potential of leaving the student empty of any sense of fullness (or emptiness) such as one achieves when one operates without intention. “We still only know what we know,” Snyder reminds us. “The flavors of the peach and the apricot are not lost from generation to generation. Neither are they transmitted by book learning’ (Ezra Pound). The rest is hearsay. There is strength, freedom, sustainability, and pride in being a practiced dweller in your own surroundings, knowing what you know” (178).

Snyder concludes Practice of the Wild with a meditation on the nature of knowing. Only “two kinds of knowing” actually exist, Snyder maintains; everything else—including the book-learning that is the content of so much focus in contemporary education, is “hearsay,” information that is perhaps useful in passing cultural “tests” or achieving “cultural literacy,” but is not essential to existence. Of the two types of learning, the first involves knowledge that “grounds and places you in your actual condition,” a sort of knowing that “can enhance public life and save endangered species. We learn it by revivifying culture, which is like reinhabitation: moving back into a terrain
that has been abused and half-forgotten—and then replanting trees, dechannelizing streambeds, breaking up asphalt.” The other knowledge “comes from straying outside” (178-79), is “off the track,” “decentered,” and is what Snyder refers to as the experience of the wild within the self. “Nature is the subject, they say, of science. Nature can be deeply probed, as in microbiology. The wild is not to be made subject or object in this manner, to be approached it must be admitted from within, as a quality intrinsic to who we are. Nature is ultimately in no way endangered; wilderness is. The wild is indestructible, but we might not see the wild” (181).

This focus on a spiritual intent to education, combined with reinterpretation of contemporary perspectives on nature and wilderness and the reintroduction of perspectives from societies that have retained a close relation to nature, opens the door to a truly “deep” ecological consciousness that will permit a civilization which can survive wilderness. In this regard Snyder hopes to offer us a means of spiritualizing everyday life in a way that aims to “resolve the dichotomy of the civilized and the wild” (23).

Works Cited


APPENDIX

“Inupiaq Values”
HUMOR
SHARING
HUMILITY
HARD WORK
SPIRITUALITY
COOPERATION
FAMILY ROLES
AVOID CONFLICT
HUNTER SUCCESS
DOMESTIC SKILLS
LOVE FOR CHILDREN
RESPECT FOR NATURE
RESPECT FOR OTHERS
RESPECT FOR ELDERS
RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRIBE
KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE
KNOWLEDGE OF FAMILY TREE
INTRODUCTION

Environmental education (EE) is a field which draws upon many disciplines. From the biological and physical sciences, it is heavily informed by ecology, biology, geography, geology, biology, and agronomy. From the social sciences, elements from sociology, psychology, education, and communication are sometimes drawn. In addition, environmental educators draw upon, in differing degrees, different philosophies of education, mind, language, ethics and epistemology and political philosophy. The interdisciplinary nature of EE, and its emphasis on sharing knowledge of good practices with educators, means that basic philosophical debates present in many disciplines are sometimes given little or no treatment in EE. This paper explores selected issues in environmental education and education in general from a somewhat simple philosophical approach in order to begin to identify the import of varying philosophical debates upon EE, and to suggest that the pragmatic/progressivist philosophy of education appears to hold great promise for successfully navigating current issues facing EE. This exploration begins by touching upon the implicit philosophy of education several of the many founders of EE appear to have held, before suggesting how a pragmatic/progressivist view of EE might begin to address selected issues in EE. These issues include the purpose of EE and whether or not EE ought to teach learn to adopt specific behaviors to protect the environment.

Several founders of EE, including John Disinger (1983), Harold Hungerford (1980, 1990), and Robert Roth (1976), appear to have drawn
heavily, either directly or indirectly, on the work of John Dewey and other pragmatic philosophers to develop a progressivist informed approach to EE (Dennis & Knapp, 1995). Their works appear to incorporate a progressivist approach, but, for reasons of brevity and faithfulness to the direct purpose of their works, they sparingly reference Dewey and do not explicitly show the relationship between their ideas and Dewey's and other pragmatists.

One issue in EE today concerns its primary purpose. As a relatively young (about 30 years for EE, with conservation education about sixty years), growing, dynamic, interdisciplinary field, this issue is still strong even as the field has many declarations which define EE's purpose and goals. It can be argued that the founders might be sympathetic to the idea that EE's primary purpose is to first and foremost develop responsible citizens, who, when guided to have formative experience with the environment and educated about their interdependency upon the environment, would become environmentally responsible citizens. They would explicitly reject the idea that EE would tell learners what specific behaviors learners ought to take concerning the environment (Hungerford & Volk, 1980; Disinger, 1993; Roth, 1976). Using the pragmatic/progressive philosophy of education, they developed a(n) (implicit) philosophy of EE which educates learners to be self-determining yet socially integrated citizens.

Describing the purpose and methods of an educational philosophy is for the progressivists, as it is for most philosophies of education, complex. However, a Deweyan progressivist philosophy of education can be too briefly described as the process of facilitating citizen: understanding of their interdependence upon their physio-socio-economic environment; the scientific method as a tool for understanding the world and finding empirical evidence about the world to share with others; develop their communication and social skills so they have the capacity to choose whether and how to use the skills; and develop their ability to achieve self-determined yet group considerable aims. These are the skills which are identified as important factors to develop in Hungerford and Volk's Model of Responsible Environmental Behavior, and in other works in EE. The purpose of education may be simplified as follows: to develop a citizenry which has the capacity and dispositions to responsibly participate in the civic life according to their conscience. James' theory of psychology (1890), and much subsequent empirical work in psychology provides a foundation for the belief that teaching citizens about their connection to and need for the environment will, when conjoined with other educative experiences, develop their dispositions and skills necessary and sufficient for the citizens to consider the environment and become (envi-
ronmentally) responsible citizens. Experiential education is important under James' and Dewey's understanding that direct experience, subsequently mediated through reflection which seeks to identify the meaning of the experience to the student, is a powerful force in increasing students valuation of the environment and disposition to consider it. This appears to be the philosophical foundation for experiential education and environmental education. In sum, the progressivist philosophy of EE holds that experiential, reflective education increases citizen appreciation and appreciation of the environment and, when integrated with citizenship education, increases citizen environmentally responsible behavior as they choose ways to protect what they appreciate.

It appears that the purpose of environmental education as historically defined is close to a progressivist definition of EE. For both adult and child education, it can be expressed in Dewey's terms from "Democracy and Education," (1916) with two minor additions, noted in italics, "It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience concerning the environment and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience with the environment" (p. 76). For K-12 education, it is to create in the child, the habits and dispositions necessary to successfully operate in society and the natural world, so the child learns to learn and learns to develop the dispositions that will help them achieve their desires given the natural, social, and technological world within which we live.

This re-expression of Dewey's philosophy of education speaks to several questions environmental educators ask today, and is challenged by those who appear to reject a progressivist philosophy of education (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Gigliotti, 1991; Robertson, 1994). To the extent that the Deweyan progressivist philosophy of education is rejected by environmental educators because it is misunderstood or confused with other versions of progressivist philosophies of education, it is hoped that this paper will reduce such rejection, or provide a clearer account of a Deweyan-progressivist view of EE to allow for a more informed rejection.

This is a fine moment to review John Dewey's educational philosophy for environmental educators, given the recent increase in attention to Dewey. Raymond Boisvert's (1998) and Alan Ryan's (1995) recent works on John Dewey help bring attention to Dewey's philosophy of education. It is this author's hope that the approach taken here to a progressivist philosophy of environmental education reflects a portion of the strength of Boisvert and Ryan, who kept in the fore of their works the social purpose of education, its
political context and import, and its implications for increasing our capacity to create a world which more closely reflects a world in which we wish to live.

A Brief Philosophy of Environmental Education

Why do we educate the young? Different educational and political philosophies give different answers. Some emphasize the development of the individual, others, society, while some emphasize both. Dewey's account of education as necessity provides as strong a story as can be told of the social nature of human life, of how we depend upon and interact with others in order to gain the vast benefits of society. It would seem that many fail to appreciate that the social wealth conferred upon the young in society is almost unimaginable. Language, mathematics, logic, and myriads of physical tools are all inventions we use to help us gain the capacity to communicate, to comprehend much more of the world than our ancestors did, and to enjoy the world in innumerable ways. We inherit more knowledge than we can possibly use in the forms of social knowledge and written texts. Thus, the necessity of educating the young can arise from a sense of moral obligation to pass on to children their inheritance of the benefits of society. The emphasis placed here upon benefits of society to the individual is neither meant to deny the significant and varied degrees of oppression and poverty which many face, nor to ignore the significant adverse consequences of humans having these tools, but to begin to argue that social atomistic views of humans somehow formed as wholly independent beings who can choose to join society is fundamentally flawed. As Hegel (1891) and Boas (1890) argue, who we are as humans is so intimately bound to the culture within which the individual resides that we must investigate the society in order to understand individuals. The more interesting questions arise in attempting to understand the social/individual relationship and what we ought to do once we as scholars begin to understand the relationship. William James (1890) and John Dewey (1916) tell a rich story of this relationship, which will not be reviewed here, except to note that it emphasizes individual self-determination within the context of a social system which supports that self-determination. If one accepts that society has wealth in the form of language, knowledge, customs, etc., then we can understand that it is a moral necessity to pass on the best of our social wealth to children, in the forms of institutions of formal and nonformal education. If we agree that, at least in part, the purpose of education is to pass on the accumulated wealth (but, to the maximum feasible extent, not the liabilities) of the social system, the questions arise of what ought to be passed on, what ought not, and the justifications for these judgements.
One issue today, though, is whether or not it is morally proper to pass on certain elements of social wealth through education. Some point out that society is oppressive and that the educational system is used to maintain that situation. Friere, Perry and Gilligan and others argue that educational systems are oppressive. Certainly, education as it is sometimes practiced and the educational philosophies used to support such practices have been oppressive, especially when used to maintain authoritarian systems of government, or the status quo of socio-political systems which discriminate against persons based upon gender, ethnicity, et al. Without digressing into a detailed analysis of the status of the U.S. or other educational systems, several important points can be made concerning these arguments. To better understand such arguments, it is usually helpful to distinguish what is being practiced in education from the intentions and philosophical theory of the system, and to carefully situate critiques of educational systems and philosophies. For educators in the U.S., the educational system as practiced arguably contains many arguably oppressive practices in that it tends to impose others aims upon learners, encourage excessive conformity, teaches learners to accept authority on the basis of power, etc. It also is part of a system which includes many discriminatory practices. However, it can also be argued that the present system has and is significantly challenging the previous status quo of discriminatory practices, and is a flawed but honest attempt to promote the development of a citizenry which can responsibly engage in a system of democratic governance. In this light, the educational system promotes individuality and democracy, and is viewed as the opposite of systems of education designed to continue fascist, totalitarian regimes. This author judges that challenges to the system are significant because we have a democratic ideal (which varies in our population in both is degree of inclusiveness and the number of people who hold such an ideal) which is certainly askew in practice, but which nonetheless is an ideal which supports, however fitfully, such challenges. While there are many philosophical currents operating in educational today, it can be argued that most would speak favorably of increasing the inclusiveness and "democraticness" of society. Friere and others who argue that educational systems as practiced are oppressive generally do not appear to argue to abolish the whole notion of having educational systems because the systems include problems. They generally argue to reform, revolutionize or replace educational systems as practiced with better educational systems. In this paper we do not address the positive proposals of these and other educators, but sketch out a positive proposal for this Deweyan version of the progressivist philosophy of environmental education, based upon the pragma-
tists James and Dewey, and important environmental educators such as Hungerford, Volk, Hines, Disinger, Roth, and others.

Under a Deweyan progressivist view of education, part of the social wealth we have is our knowledge that it is necessary to help children develop certain dispositions, in order to enable them to achieve their aims. The notion of a disposition is central to this philosophy and means what Aristotle meant by habits: to have the tendency to act in a certain way. Training young children to have carefully selected dispositions is regarded as necessary to ensure that the individual has the capacities necessary to increase their likelihood of experiencing a good life, however the individual defines the good life. As children grow to have greater self-directedness, and certainly when they are adults, it is no longer considered the role of the educator to train students to have dispositions. But which dispositions are appropriate for educators to teach children? In secular schools, remarkable few, but these few have immense power. This philosophy of education holds that it is necessary to develop in the young the disposition: to consider the impacts one's actions have upon others and in turn upon oneself (including how one affects and is affected by the socio-economic system one is within); to consider the interdependence of oneself and others with the natural environment (including the economic interdependence, the aesthetic value, the consideration of future generations concerning the environment); to investigate for themselves the claims of others and to use the scientific method to aid in understanding what is actually occurring in the world; and, finally, to have the disposition to join with others in efforts to find mutually satisfactory solutions to problems (in both social and political environments, as part of developing an engaged citizenry).

An educational system which develops these dispositions in children leads to adults who have the capacity to make informed choices about whether or not and how to consider others and participate, thus increasing the self-determination of individuals. And, when a society is comprised of individuals with certain capacities, the capacity of the social system to address collective aims is increased, thus increasing the likelihood that many in the social system will benefit. Passing these dispositions on to children requires a social system which includes many components, including education. In addition, part of the wealth we pass on to our children is the social system itself. Insofar as the social system is flawed, the system should be improved as much as is possible. Because the most effective system to improve flawed systems seems to be self-correcting systems, it follows that we should seek to develop a system which has the best chance to be self-correcting and respect-
ful of individuals lives. This progressivist view includes the idea that the development of a social system which is founded on democratic ideals and which seeks to continue our experiment in creating a democracy is a portion of our wealth which we seek to pass on to our children through the educational system. It must be emphasized that the progressivist view of education's role in society is to support the continued growth of the individual, which necessarily includes developing the dispositions of citizens to engage in the continual reformation of society, in the continuing effort to build democratic institutions and increase the possibilities for individual growth. This progressivist philosophy has no illusions that we have achieved a satisfactorily democratic society in the workplace or body politic.

Regarding environmental issues, this view of a progressivist environmental educator would maintain that environmental education's role is to help build the dispositions of the young, and pass on the social wealth we have in order to seek a citizenry which understands environmental issues, has self-developed aims regarding environmental issues, and has the dispositions and capacities to effectively promote and participate in more democratic solutions to environmental issues. To the extent that present social institutions are barriers to achieving our environmental aims, learners should be able to understand the connections between their aims and how those institutions affect the achievement of their aims, and have the skills to identify, evaluate, promote, and find common solutions to the problematic nature of these institutions. The idea that the acceptable role of education is to maintain the status quo of existing social structures is firmly rejected by this view.

Another major view of education, is that education ought to facilitate the self-actualization of children, but can do so only by not teaching them any values but by unconditionally supporting their self-directed natural growth processes. Carl Rogers and Jean Paul Sartre are examples of this general approach to education and social change. They can be considered to be advocates for indirect social change, like the progressivists, but they maintain that strong educator guidance to develop any particular dispositions, including the disposition to consider others, interferes with the development of the individual's full potential, including morality. Under such views, the individual must find for themselves what dispositions to develop, and decide for themselves the value of considering and respecting others. It is part of their philosophy that the young will, if treated justly, continue to develop their innate goodness by continuing to choose to act in ways which we consider "good." Educator efforts to directly show the young what is valuable and morally right are counterproductive, as are efforts to develop dispositions in

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the young. A Rogerian approach to education has educator expose the young to many views, so the young can make an informed choice which works for them. It appears to trust the young to develop all dispositions, or habits, of their own choice, and to choose what knowledge they will seek. The Rogerian approach with the young seems somewhat contradictory, in that it recommends that the young be treated in certain ways, (i.e., with respect and to consider others) in order to allow them to freely choose how to treat others. But in doing so, the educator is modeling for children the behavior they hope (and expect) the child to emulate. They are, in effect, training the child to have the dispositions of treating each other fairly, with respect, and to consider others. The Deweyan-progressivist approach makes this training more explicit, and recognizes that children must be socialized to have certain dispositions, because children who are not socialized to have these dispositions become anti-social.

In contrast to the Rogerians, the Deweyan-progressivist educational philosophy recognizes the necessity of education to explicitly pass on certain disposition to the young so they have the advantage of what has been painstakingly developed over millennia, and to gently, but nonetheless with the intention, develop certain dispositions pass on to the young the best dispositions and knowledge we have learned. When children can be self-driven to learn through well-constructed environments, then little direct guidance appears necessary. But direct guidance and teaching them of the need to have certain dispositions is regarded as appropriate if the young learner does not learn through other methods. As environmental educators, we have certainly learned valuable lessons concerning the impacts of environmental issues, lessons which the young would be wronged if not guided to learn them for themselves. We have learned just how important the natural environment is to our ability to achieve our aims. We have learned that mercury, when dumped into estuaries, can bio-accumulate into fish, which when eaten in sufficient quantities by pregnant women, can result in horrific birth defects in their children. We have learned that CFC's in aerosol cans and air conditioners destroy ozone, increasing the rate of skin cancer. We have learned that dredging and channeling rivers has benefits (increases navigation, reduces flooding where channeled or dredged (actually increasing this downstream)) but that it also has many adverse impacts. It destroys the fishing holes that our grandparents enjoyed, and we would too, if our rivers did not also contain human sewage and other pollutants. In short, we have learned just how interdependent we are with other humans and our environment, and that failing to recognize this interferes with our capacity to
attain aims such as enjoying a cool swim on a hot summer day, or fishing in the river, or enjoying the aesthetic beauty of the river, or keeping our bills lower because we're not paying to remove someone else's pollution from our water supply, even while being unfairly burdened by the increased risk from the residual pollutants in our water supply. The guidance to the young to learn this can be done in many ways, with experiential education at the base of these methods. Through experiential education, the young learn of the aesthetic and recreational potential of undisturbed areas, and, when contrasted to highly disturbed areas, quickly learn of the difference. Guiding the young to reflection upon the experience will often develop the understanding in the young of the relationship between activities done by humans (i.e., dredging, channelizing, clear cutting, discharging pollutants, et al) and their ability to achieve their aims (swimming and playing in a cool clean creek on a hot day). Further experience and reflection can build in the young a sophisticated understanding that we have many legitimate aims (building factories, houses, farming) which affect other aims (having great play places, clean environment, etc) and that we need to work together to find out how to maximize obtaining all of our aims. Developing this understanding in the young, along with the social and political skills to understand each other and find mutually satisfactory solutions to achieve our aims, is citizenship education at its finest and quite the opposite of indoctrinating the young to advocate for the educators views of necessary environmental protection goals regardless of others views and interests.

The necessity of constructing an educative environment which develops the dispositions of the young to consider their environment and the impacts of their action upon others entails another necessity: that of teaching students to develop their own aims. For the progressivist environmental educator in the public schools (including public universities), the prior statement of environmental problems is not meant to support educators teaching students that they have to take any particular action, except to consider others and the impacts of the actions on others and the environment, and to develop the capacity to engage in informed democratic decision making. Dewey speaks of the democratic faith, which is faith not only that democracy has the best chance of improving our lives, but that individuals will, if educated to have certain dispositions, maintain the disposition of considering others and their interrelatedness to their environment. It is not necessary, and is anti-educative, to teach students to take particular actions. Such an educational approach interferes with the development of the student's capacity to develop their own aims. (Except in the case of the very young who are in the devel-
opmental stages which require guidance to learn appropriate dispositions and socially acceptable behaviors.) In this view, educators who impose their aims on students, even with the good intention of protecting the environment, are reducing learner capacities to be effective considerers of environmental issues, and participants in democratic action to address environmental issues. Imposing educators aims, even when judged to be necessary to take action on some important environmental issue, actually reduces the likelihood that environmental issues in general will be successfully addressed. Due to constraints of this paper, the argument to support this view cannot be made here, except to note that it relies upon the importance of developing citizens with self-developed environmental aims in order for those citizens and society to be able to address the complex, ever-changing nature of environmental issues. Imposing educators aims reduces the likelihood that students will come to understand the importance of the issue for themselves, and can reduce their desire to address the issue, and results in students who may take some actions to please the educator, but will not continue to investigate or take actions on environmental issues because it is important to them. Facilitating student's experience so that they learn that they cannot obtain their aims unless they consider the environment is the most powerful approach we have to teaching them to consider the environment. For the progressivist educator, it is not just a nice thing to teach the young to consider the impacts of their actions on the environment, it is a necessity if they are to be able to develop aims for themselves and work to achieve such aims as having a healthy environment, an environment with some aesthetic value, or an economic system which fairly internalizes the external costs of production. Again, the educator does not impose these aims on the learner, but relies on the knowledge that all rational citizens who consider how their and others actions affect their aims, will be led to consider the environment in order to make intelligent decisions regarding the safeguarding of their health, to whatever degree they choose to do so, and to maintain some aesthetic quality in their environment, to whatever degree they choose to do so, and to consider how environmental considerations affect their economic interests, to whatever degree they choose to do so. The approach of focusing upon learner development of their aims relies upon Dewey's theory of cognition to provide an explanation of the nature and importance of aims. In a gross sense, individual desire to satisfy their wants is the basis of this approach. As we are educated, we learn that satisfaction of wants requires understanding and consideration of many things, such as our social interdependence and the interests of others, is necessary in order to satisfy our wants. A considered want, to be achieved in the near term, is an aim.
As we grow, we also develop increasing capacities to appreciate the world and others, and the creations of culture, and so develop new desires for appreciative experiences.

ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION AS A SOCIAL FUNCTION

Under most conceptions of EE, its purpose is to change learner behavior toward the environment, either directly or indirectly. It is often left unstated that we do this to improve our lives, perhaps because this view is challenged by those who hold that we are morally obligated to protect nature because of its intrinsic value. This progressivist approach supports continuing the inquiry into environmental ethics, but opposes efforts to indoctrinate students into a particular environmental ethic. Rather, this view strongly supports an educational approach which works towards learners understanding of their connection to and dependence upon the environment, and their need to consider the environment in order to achieve their aims. This paper is not able to provide a detailed explanation to support this view, but can only suggest that a progressivist approach to EE would result in learners who have a deep appreciation of the environment and will seek to take actions to protect their environmental interests.

The North American Association for Environmental Education Guidelines for Excellence in Curriculum (1996) can be interpreted to generally agree with the progressivist view presented in this essay (Meyers, 1997). However, scholars in the field differ on how to educate for behavioral change. Progressivists, such as Roth, Hungerford, Disinger, and others hold that we educate students to appreciate the environment through experiential education, to understand the impacts of their actions on the environment, to learn how to learn about environmental issues, to learn citizenship skills, and to develop their own aims as an indirect path to changing learner and citizen behavior. We have only briefly addressed the importance of developing student capacity to develop their own environmental aims. How does a progressivist EE see students developing aims which result in “improved” environmental behavior? With experiential environmental education, the approach holds that if educators facilitate student experience in the environment, we increase their capacity to experience the environment. Students who have experiences with the environment increase their ability to gain more experience out of successive experiences with the environment. The student can actually have more sensate experience, more understanding of the interconnectedness of nature as the meaning of their experience is enlarged, and thus gain more out of their experience, especially if reflective education-
al practices in the environment are utilized to increase student capacity to gain more out of their experience, and students learn to use these practices to enrich their experience. We know that increasing the significance of the environment to the learner in turn increases their affect toward the environment (Palmer, 1993). This view of progressive education holds that properly constructed educational activities increase learner ability to perceive and learn about the environment around them. When given the opportunity and guided, they learn to investigate their environment, experiment with it, and discover how they are dependent upon it to achieve their aims. As they increasingly discover their interdependence upon the environment for material, social, and aesthetic interests, appreciation of the environment grows, and it is increasingly considered an aim to consider and protect their interests in the environment, be they aesthetic, recreational, health, economic, or recognition that others have significant interests such as these. As students learn that they must consider the impacts their actions have upon the environment if they are to be able to achieve their aims, they, if taught the socioeconomic context of their society, learn that they are interdependent with others and need to join with them if they are to succeed in protecting their interests in the environment, just as others are interdependent with them for achievement of their environmental aims. Imposing the educator's aims for a clean environment, or educator's ideas of appropriate behavior toward the environment is rejected under this approach for many reasons. In this example, it is rejected because it interferes with student development of their own environmental aims.

This progressivist view of environmental education appreciates that the social dispositions which Dewey wrote that educators ought to help develop in learners, such as consideration of others when developing our aims, and learning how to work with and communicate with others, are dispositions which Dewey called the dispositions necessary for a democratic society. These are the same dispositions which Disinger (1993), and Hungerford and Volk (1980), refer to as citizenship skills. If learners have others aims imposed upon them, or do not learn how to effectively consider each other and work together, then their capacity to address environmental issues will be diminished. This approach to EE seeks to use a model of EE which aims to increase these dispositions, emphasizes increasing the capacity of learners to understand how the environment affects their aims, and to participate in making society more democratic by encouraging democratic change processes concerning environmental issues.

This progressivist view of environmental education necessitates the
“democratic faith” that Dewey spoke of that learners and citizens have the capacity to utilize democratic methods to address environmental issues. In practice, this means we not only find ways to help learners understand how environmental issues directly affect their aims so they naturally come to include environmental concerns in their aims, but we also develop their capacity to understand how it is in their self interest to engage in individual actions and democratic processes which bring about policies which achieve their aims. Rejecting this faith in the citizens to have the capacity to use democratic methods to bring about their aims would appear to require the educator to reject the democratic ideal, either because of a lack of faith in the capacity of citizens to use the present system or to create through democratic processes such a system. Either one appears to be a rejection of the democratic faith. Rejection of the democratic faith would appear to leave environmental educators who are committed to changing environmental behavior of learners/citizens in order to change environmental problems with few palatable alternatives.

While the progressivist view of EE strongly supports democratic approaches to EE, it holds that educators ought to facilitate the development of certain dispositions in the learner. How can it do so without be undemocratic?

Using Dewey’s approach, it is to develop the individual so they have the capacity to make an informed choice on if or how they will participate in the democratic system. This involves developing habits in the young of careful observation of how their actions actually impact others and the environment, so they improve their understanding of the world around them and learn how to learn about the world around them. It also involves developing habits in the young of learning that they can test their ideas about what is happening in the world by experimenting with the world, both to understand natural processes and to test what the actual impacts are of proposed solutions to social problems. It also involves developing the dispositions or habits of the young to considering what goals they want and what it may take to achieve them. The children will learn what actions and behaviors are necessary to achieve their aims, and will choose the behaviors and actions which best help them achieve their goals, given their particular tastes. Educator imposition of goals, or aims, interferes with the child’s (and adults) ability to develop aims. And, educator imposition of the behaviors to achieve the educators aims is viewed as significantly interfering with the students development of their capacity to choose behaviors and aims. Furthermore, it reduces the student’s dispositions to observe their environment, identify problems for themselves,
identify and explore alternative solutions to those problems (considering the various impacts of alternative solutions upon themselves and others), dialogue with others about their perceptions of the problem and their alternative solution to the problem, select the test solutions to the problems in concert with others, test the solutions to the problems, observe the results of the tests of the solutions, and take further action, if necessary to further investigate and address the same and related problems. Thus, the Deweyan progressivist environmental educator strongly opposes teaching students to adopt specific behaviors, because it reduces the capacity of the student to learn how to learn to address environmental problems and participate as responsible citizens in a democratic society.

NOTES

1. For the purposes of this paper, the progressivist view is one which applies the experimentalist or pragmatic philosophy as described by John Dewey to approaches to education.

2. The progressivist view can be criticized for being anthropocentric, in that it has the learner understand how they are dependent upon the environment and must consider it in order to achieve their aims. But this progressivist approach to EE also emphasizes the development in the learner of their aesthetic capacity, and realization of the incommensurable value of environmental entities. The things which are of intrinsic value is a matter of dispute, but that it is prudent to preserve nature because we depend upon it, and because it has incalculable value for enhancing and pleasing our aesthetic and cultural sensibilities is hardly disputed. The progressivist view would seek, through these indirect methods, to develop learner felt appreciation of the environment. That development of a deep appreciation of the environment is a reliable result of EE which uses this approach supports the progressivist view that it has the best chance of actually obtaining significant protection of the environment, including actions to protect ecological integrity and endangered species. It does this because it develops the understanding of the importance of these actions to improve their lives, facilitating learner development of these actions as aims in their lives.

3. Most environmental issues, in order to be effectively addressed in a timely manner, appear to require coordinated social action, generally in the form of programs or policies which require some level of legislative approval. While the relationship between public will and policy is complex, the primary point here is that, for most environmental issues, the only democratic way to effectively address them is to obtain some degree of consent of the public, through the political process, to change environmental policy. It is suggested that public and private educators alike who desire the public to agree to some environmental change have the best chance of achieving increased public acceptance by showing the public how it is in their interest to do so. The method of exhorting the public to support or take the action because it is morally obligatory to do so, would, under this view, have less efficacy than educating the public to the value of the policy on some more tangible sense. For environmental educators in public K-12 schools, exhortation of the value of some thing and the learner's moral or social obligation to take action to protect the thing is anti-educative and is anti-democratic in the imposition of the educators will upon the learner.

Environmentalists who advocate policies of outlawing environmentally adverse behaviors such as using automobiles must obtain the consent of the public to achieve such policies,
consent which is unobtainable without having the public accept that it is in their interest to accept the policy. Accepting this appears to imply that the advocate accepts that the public has the capacity to make informed decisions, and accepts that the public will adopt policies which reflect an understanding of the environmental consequences of the policy. However, if the advocate believes that the public does not have the capacity to make a rational decision to protect their environmental interests (especially if the advocate holds that individuals allow material or selfish interests to interfere with the interests the advocate believes the individual ought to have) then the advocate appears to believe that they know better that the public, even an informed public, what the public ought to do. Unless the environmental educator/policy advocate makes it clear that they do believe in using democratic processes to determine environmental policy, this position seems to lead to the conclusion that the public ought not decide for themselves what environmental policies ought to be. If the advocate holds this position, and they hold the position that they ought to decide for the public what the policy to be, implying that they believe that they ought to have the power to decide for the public what they ought to do, and that they are in the position of deciding for others what they will be allowed to do, under policy and force of law. Such as position, if held, can only be charitably described as undemocratic. Depending upon the form of government desired by such advocates, alternatives to democracies range from dictatorships (one wise person decides the policies which dictate what the rest will be allowed to do), or some variant form of elitism, where those who are presumed to know better than the public decide the policies for others, without any democratic input. If it is believed that the public's choices make no difference to policy, then it could be argued that we live in a dictatorship, or a non-democratic society of some fashion. However, if the advocate rejects efforts to instill in learners or the public the dispositions to identify their aims for themselves or to participate in democratic processes of determining the policies which govern them, then they are not promoting building of democratic capacity.

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Savages, Barbarians, Civilized: A Case of Survival?

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In the very first chapter of *Democracy and Education*, as if it were a most usual distinction, John Dewey speaks of savages, barbarians, and civilized peoples. From the context we learn some things that characterize the distinction. It involves hierarchy, because, unless genuine transmission of culture takes place, “the most civilized group will relapse into barbarism and then into savagery.” (MW 9, 5) It is a social distinction because it involves the group: a savage tribe as against the Athenian people or the American nation. (MW 9, 5) Savages depend completely on informal education for their young: “to savages it would seem preposterous to seek out a place where nothing but learning was going on in order that one might learn.” (MW 9, 10) Not so with civilized groups because “the gap between the capacities of the young and the concerns of adults widens.” (MW 9, 11) There is a progression from a simple to a complex society. (MW 9, 11) With progress come new problems and dangers: in an advanced culture most of what is “learned is stored in symbols.” But, since the ordinary standard of reality is connected with practical concerns, in such an advanced culture, symbols could give relatively technical, superficial, artificial knowledge removed from one’s permanent social interests. (MW 9, 11) But there is no turning back, except in a pedagogical sense: in the school curriculum the primitive life of savages helps us see our complex present situation in an immensely simplified form and frees us from thinking the present is “hard and fast.” (MW 9, 222-223)

Here the distinction is mainly between savages and civilized people. Later Dewey gives an example of what he means by barbarians. The dark ages
and the early medieval ages form the barbarian period. The barbarian lives off another culture: as the Romans received culture from the civilized Greeks, the later Europeans acquired theirs by borrowing from the Greeks and the Romans. There was no true individualism: one lived off of the beliefs of others and, in so far as intellectual labor occurred, one worked over what had been received. This scholastic method relied “upon the principle of authority and acquisition rather than upon that of discovery and inquiry.” (MW 9, 289; see 301 as well) We ought not be surprised that this view of the age of the barbarians also influenced the curriculum of schools in America because of the shape it imposed on the study of history.

These distinctions do not suddenly appear in Democracy and Education and then disappear. They are arrows in Dewey’s quiver and are frequently used throughout his long career as a writer. In 1895 in “The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge” he remarks on the parasitic nature of the barbarian (EW 5, 11-13). In one of his major early works, “Interpretation of the Culture-Epoch Theory” [1896], he accepts the distinction as a fact (EW 5, 247-253). In “Ethical Principles Underlying Education” (1897) he compares the simpler forms of hunting, nomadic and agricultural life at the beginnings of civilization with the relatively complex civilizations of Greece and Rome (EW 5, 70; See also The School and Society, MW 1, 32). In “Interpretation of Savage Mind” [1902] he uses Herbert Spencer’s description of the savage and the savage’s difference from a civilized person but superimposes on it an Hegelian evolutionary twist. (EW 5, 40-52). Closer in time to Democracy and Education, the distinction appears in a series of 1914 addresses, “Crises and Behavior” (MW 7, 399-401), “Rationalistic Control of Crises” (MW 7, 401-403), and “Development of Private Judgment and Initiative” (MW 7, 405).

Even after Democracy and Education, the distinction remains useful. In 1920 in Reconstruction in Philosophy Dewey contrasts the savage and the civilized man: If we suppose that both were living in a wilderness, the savage would accommodate himself to conditions, “Micawber-like,” waiting for something to turn up; the civilized person would be a doer, everywhere, building, digging, searching, improving “in a word, transform[ing] his environment” (MW 12, 128-129) In 1921 in a “Syllabus”, Dewey relies heavily on Franz Boas’s Mind of Primitive Man. (MW 13, 356-358). In two of Dewey’s other great works of the 20s, Human Nature and Conduct (MW 14: 19, 55, 67-68, 72-75, 108), Experience and Nature (LW 1: 87, 165, 224, 269) he continues to make use of the distinction.

But we ought to ask ourselves: what meaning does the distinction have? Where does it come from?
All three words are a part of the ordinary person's vocabulary: a savage being seen as a wild, ferocious creature; a barbarian, someone without manners, without culture; a civilized person, someone enlightened and refined. Etymologically, a savage is related to the forest; a barbarian is one who speaks like a foreigner—"them versus us"; a civilized person is a citizen. "Savage" carries with it a connotation of existing at the lowest level of culture; "barbarian" is connected to cruelty; "civilized" is connected with refinement.

The tri-partite division has its remote ancestor in Montesquieu: he speaks of three kinds of societies: the republic, which includes aristocracy and democracy; monarchy; and despotism to which, as Emile Durkheim notices, ought to be added a fourth type of society which consists of savages and barbarians. The former are hunters, the latter generally cattle raisers. In his Essay on the History of Civil Society (1764), Adam Ferguson, a Scottish philosopher, commented on Montesquieu and used three categories, savage, barbarous, and polished, which are distinguished in terms of characteristic economic activities, patterns of social subordination, and constellations of opinions. Thus savages are not acquainted with the idea of property but barbarians are; both are contrasted with the "polished" or civil society. For this contrast, Ferguson uses a different and political criterion, which goes beyond the idea of possessing wealth. This is the first time to my knowledge that these three distinct and separate categories are so designated.

The distinction is picked up by British and American anthropologists in the 19th century. E.B. Tylor uses it in The Origins of Culture. In his chapter on social evolutionism, Maurice Mandelbaum traces the vestiges of this distinction in Tylor but also in McLennan, Lubbock and Lewis H. Morgan. Academics like G. Stanley Hall and sociologists like Herbert Spencer also use the distinction which, as time went on, was gradually simplified into a distinction between savage or primitive people and modern or civilized people, barbarians dropping out of sight.

Barbarians do represent a special case. The word "barbarian" goes back to the Greeks. In ordinary usage it stands in contrast to civilized. Rather than in contrast to the savage, the barbaric and rude stand in contrast to the cultured and refined. This latter use was confined to those who wished to distinguish the nomadic hunters from the settled farmers and herders. It was used historically to describe what happened to the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome: how they were overrun by hordes from the uncivilized North and then, as time went on, how those tribes acquired culture, but a culture borrowed and not their own. The term could then be used to describe a state which followed on civilization, a regression that constantly
threatened civilization which often, as disasters piled up in the twentieth century, seemed only skin-deep. With regard to evolutionary theory, though regressions were allowed for, those who believed in progress were never entirely comfortable.

As always, Dewey continued to hunt for meaning in our changing world, looked for new angles, and continued to comb the literature, past and present, for suggestions. The present was not hard and fast; neither could theory be.11

The distinctions between the primitive and the present, he realized, are not as clear as the words might indicate. A complicating factor is continuity. In an article of 1891, “The Scholastic and the Speculator,” he writes: “The evolutionist tells us that nothing disappears; that apparent passing away is only transition into something else.” (EW 3, 148)12 Though there is development, “transformation” as he would say,13 there is a fundamental continuity. So in “Anthropology and Law” (1893), he writes, “Some of the most highly developed legal ideas and practices of to-day can be traced to a beginning in the crude psychological structure of primitive man . . . Continuity is never broken; the old is never annihilated at a stroke, the new never a creation ab initio.” In Human Nature and Conduct (1922), he takes as his own the saying that “civilization is only skin deep, that a savage persists beneath the clothes of a civilized man. . . . Within civilization, the savage still exists. He is known in his degree by oscillation between loose indulgence and stiff habit.” (LW 1, 72, 75) More than continuity, Dewey sometimes finds a degree of sameness. The experiences Dewey will have, much later, with the art world, as exemplified by his friendship with Albert C. Barnes, make him revise earlier opinions of primitive art as “merely technical devices for securing rain, sons, crops, success in battle” and see such art in radical continuity with modern art. (LW 10, 36) But he also goes in an opposite direction: it is not enough to resolve a present phenomenon into something in the past, so that there is nothing new, “no genuine genesis;” “Every culture has its own individuality and has a pattern that binds its parts together.” (LW 10, 338)

We find change as well as continuity in Dewey’s thought.

We also find the concept of “survival” not only as an integral part of Dewey’s explanation of the primitive in history but in the very movement of Dewey’s thought.

As early as the Preface to Democracy and Education, Dewey alludes to the phenomenon of survival (We persist in speaking of the power of an automobile in terms of horses). A part of his plan is to criticize regnant theories of knowledge and morals “which were formulated in earlier social conditions
but which still operate, in societies nominally democratic, to hamper the adequate realization of the democratic ideal." (MW 9, 3) Here, Dewey is using a theory formulated much earlier by E.B. Tylor, a prominent British anthropologist. Tylor's formulation is: "It seems scarcely too much to assert, once for all, that meaningless customs must be survivals, that they had a practical, or at least ceremonial, intention when and where they first arose, but are now fallen into absurdity from having been carried on into a new state of society, where their original sense has been discarded."14 Dewey was citing Tylor in the 1890s and continued to cite him in Experience and Nature in the 1920s,15 and into the 1930s.16 Even in an article on the atom bomb he is still appealing to the theory of survivals, survivals we cannot resurrect, though now he uses a more contemporary term, "cultural lag" in place of the century-old term, survivals.17

Though Dewey ties the theory of survivals to his own theory of habits, it just may be that he hung on to the theory longer than was necessary. Hayden White has some perceptive things to say about theory-building in history. "Societies feel the need to fill areas of consciousness not yet colonized by scientific knowledge with conceptual designators of their own existentially contrived values and norms. . . . Concepts which in an earlier time functioned as components of sustaining cultural myths and as parts of the game of civilizational identification by negative definition, have one by one passed into the category of the fictitious."18 White then writes of the "gradual demythologization of concepts like "wildness," "savagery," and "barbarism." Before considering this charge, may we not wonder whether the doctrine of survivals, as a tool of analysis or even of description, has perhaps outlived its usefulness?

Clearly by the 1920s, Dewey was beginning to use other concepts to describe stages of cultural development. As early as 1902 he tries out a four-step progress in scientific inquiry which moves from the "bull of no inquiry" through the empirical, a hunting stage, to the speculative, a classification stage, to that idea of scientific inquiry which involves an interaction of ideas and facts.19 In 1911 he expands the tri-partite distinction: after a stage of hunting and fishing, followed by the nomadic and shepherd life and then by an agricultural stage come those of metals and the beginnings of manufacture and universal commerce and intercourse.20 In 1915, he briefly considers a Kantian distinction where civilization is "an intermediary between the natural state and the truly or rational moral condition" man is capable of.21

In 1920 Dewey offers a developmental theory. First there are memory and tradition in which imagination rather than facts plays a major role;
then there are two co-existent stages of consolidation and systematization accompanied by attention to facts which are tied to arts and crafts; lastly, there is a philosophical stage in which the Greeks restore in a transformed way what custom had formerly tried to handle imaginatively.22 In that same year in a lecture on Bertrand Russell, Dewey looks not disprovingly at a correlation Russell makes: “Instinct infuses us with energy; knowledge provides us with method; and spirit directs us toward purpose.” When these three are coordinated, the human person performs most admirably. “When we sacrifice mind and spirit for excessive development of the life of instinct, we live the life of savages. When our effort to satisfy desire is not sufficiently informed by knowledge we are barbarians, not civilized people. And when the life of the mind becomes too critical of the life of instinct, we becomes skeptics.”23

Again in the 1920s Dewey frequently calls attention to human history as divided by the watershed which began with Columbus, Machiavelli, Erasmus, Luther, and Copernicus24 and included the rise of science25 and the new era of human relationships brought on by “mass production for remote markets, by cable and telephone, by cheap printing, by railway and steam navigation.” He goes on to say: “Only geographically did Columbus discover a new world. The actual new world has been generated in the last hundred years.”26

For me, Dewey shows himself most ready for a new theory as the result, among other things, of reading Paul Radin’s Primitive Man as Philosopher in 1927. In this work Radin questions and destroys the easy distinction of mankind into savage, barbarian, and civilized. He attacks the regnant anthropological theories which assume: a general intellectual and ethical progress in human affairs; an evolutionary theory of God; the application of the Darwinian theory of evolution to the facts of social experience; primitive people as playthings of their passions and pre-logical. Other seemingly solidly founded parts of the regnant theory are also questioned: Tylor and Hobhouse’s theory that the primitive was not an individual, Tylor’s assumption that contemporary primitive people represent an early stage in the history of the evolution of culture, Levy-Bruhl’s theory of the primitive as pre-logical. Radin proposes a theory which posits an invariant distribution of abilities and temperament: idealist and materialist, dreamer and realist, introspective and non-introspective people, people devoted to and indifferent to religion. As Radin writes: “it must be explicitly recognized that in temperament and in capacity for logical and symbolical thought, there is no difference between civilized and primitive man.”27
In his introduction to Radin’s book, Dewey is especially caught by the idea of primitive cultures having intellectuals among them as a class and not just simply as individuals: he comments on “the existence of a definite intellectual class, proportionate in numbers and influence to the ‘intellectuals’ in any civilized group, and one which is possessed of ideas upon most of the themes which have formed the staples of philosophical discussion.”

Primitive man was more “tough minded” and more realistic in facing facts than is currently believed. Primitive man could be individualistic, not enslaved to group standards but individually responsible for his own actions. (LW 4, 335-337)

What we find in the next decade is evidence that Dewey has taken thoughts like Radin’s to heart though we have already seen evidence that the old theories survive along side of them. As I have already mentioned, Dewey’s contact with the art world made him more sensitive to primitive art as something as vital as the art of today. He remarks in *Art as Experience* that “colors of a landscape become more vivid when seen with the head upside down. (LW 10, 254). It seems to me that art in a similar way forced Dewey to stand on his head and see so-called primitive peoples afresh. Similarly, his late attempt to express a faith worthy of our age forced a new look at people through time. In a passage which may well be one of his great summations, he writes: “We who now live are parts of a humanity that extends into the remote past, a humanity that has interacted with nature. The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements of a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant.” (LW 9, 57-58) What might such a hope entail for schools designing a curriculum for the diverse population of children they serve?

By way of coda, let me add that we still struggle with the “savage within” each of us (and here Rousseau is perhaps a superb model) and with the barbarian, who in these days of multiculturalism is everywhere, and is perhaps our common lot. Civilized though he undoubtedly was, Dewey, reveling in the uncertainty of the hunt, may well be a model for us who sometimes see being civilized as something to strive for.
NOTES

1. It may be sheer coincidence, but Immanuel Kant has remarks to make about savages and barbarians in the first pages of his *Education (Über Pädagogik)*, 1803 trans. Annette Churton (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960 [1899]), 3-4. Similarly, J.S. Mill speaks the same language in his 1836 essay, “Civilization.” See *Essays on Politics and Society by John Stuart Mill* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1977) XVIII, 119-147, but especially 119-126. More importantly, Dewey’s contemporaries were using the same anthropological language, though not always in the same sense. A good example is Thorstein Veblen, who proposed in 1906 a theory in which savages were seen as peaceloving people filled with idle curiosity (but also with streaks of exploitation of nature) who were, at a late date in human history, succeeded by pragmatic barbarians who suppressed their inclinations of idle curiosity and exploited their world of nature and humans and were, in turn, succeeded by the civilized who raised idle curiosity to new heights through scientific investigations but also exploited the results of science through modern industry. See *The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation and Other Essays* (London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1994) 1-31.

Worthy of note is the fact that recent writers use more or less the same series of stages but now see each of them as a stage of civilization. An example would be Enrique Dussell, “Globalization and the Victims of Exclusion: From a Liberation Ethics Perspective,” *Modern Schoolman* 75 (1998): 119-155.

2. Dewey’s works are referred to as EW (Early Works, 1882-1898 [Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press]), MW (Middle Works, 1899-1924 [Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press]) and LW (Later Works, 1925-1953 [Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press]).


7. “From an ideal point of view, civilization may be looked upon as the general improvement of mankind by higher organization of the individual and of society, to the end of promoting at once man’s goodness, power, and happiness. This theoretical civilization does in no small measure correspond with actual civilization, as traced by comparing savagery with barbarism, and barbarism with modern educated life. So far as we take into account only physical laws of the world, this is especially true. Acquaintance with the physical laws of the world, and the accompanying power of adapting nature to man’s own ends, are, on the whole, lowest among savages, mean among barbarians, and highest among modern educated nations. Thus a transition from the savage state to our own would be, practically, that every progress of art and knowledge which is one main element in the development of culture.” Edward Burnett Tylor. *The Origins of Culture. Part 1 of Primitive Culture* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958 [1871]), 27.

9. See, for example, a paper on "Civilization and Savagery," which Hall gave before the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1903. *The Proceedings*, 4-13.


11. It seems to me that one of Dewey's great insights is that we must be freed from the "dead hand" of the past, in spite of the variety of riches it has furnished us which have freed our imagination, but also that we must be freed from the oppressive presence of a present which tries so hard to have the appearance of something "hard and fast," of something frozen in place. An interesting non-Deweyan perspective on all this is John W. O'Malley, "Tradition and Traditions: Historical Perspectives," *The Way* 27, 3 (1987):163-173.

12. An example Dewey uses is that of hunting. The primitive relies on set meanings. With advance in complexity, discrimination enters in. Among a variety of ideas which is the one to be used? We have to hunt. See "Some Stages of Logical Thought, 1900," in MW1, 154-158. Equally interesting is Thorstein Veblen's use of the same activity of hunting. He finds that we can understand better the activities of workers under salary and of those on non-hourly contracts by relating them to hunters. See Alan Day Haight, "'Padded Prowess: A Veblenian Interpretation of the Long Hours of Salaried Workers," *Journal of Economic Issues* 31, 1 (1997): 29-38.

13. "The Socratic period recurs, but recurs with the deepened meaning of the intervening weary years of struggle, confusion, and conflict, in the growth of the recognition of the need of patient and specific methods of interrogation. So, too, the authoritative and institutional truth of scholasticism recurs, but recurs borne up upon the vigorous and conscious shoulders of the freed individual who is aware of his own intrinsic relations to the truth, and who glories in his ability to carry civilization—not merely to carry it, but to carry it on. Thus, another swing in the rhythm of theory and practice begins. "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge, 1895," in EW 5, 22.

14. E.B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Arts and Customs* (New York, 1889), 1,71. See Margaret T. Hodgen, "The Doctrine of Survivals: The History of an Idea," *American Anthropologist* 33 (1931): 307-324. But the idea of survivals shows up everywhere. In John Stuart Mill's 1867 "Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews" we read: "The path opened by Mr. [Henry] Maine has been followed up by others, with additional illustrations of the influence of obsolete ideas on modern institutions, and of obsolete institutions on modern ideas; an action and reaction which perpetuate, in many of the greatest concerns, a mitigated barbarism: things being continually accepted as dictates of nature and necessities of life, which, if we knew all, we should see to have originated in artificial arrangements of society, long since abandoned and condemned." In *Essays on Equality, Law, and Education by John Stuart Mill* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984) 246. See also Hugh J. Dawson, "E.W.Tylor's Theory of Survivals and Veblen's Social Criticism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 54,3 (1993): 489-504. A recent citation of Tylor on survivals gives a different interpretation. Matt K Matsuda in his *The Memory of the Modern* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 10, writes: "The narrative time of my 'histoire générale' is thus the imbrication of many selected ages and epochs, many pasts and many presents of the sort described in the late nineteenth century by the anthropologist E.B. Tylor: 'When a complete change is produced in a people as a result of the progress of time, one frequently observes a great number of phenomena which con-
form not to the new conditions, but which come from the former conditions.' Through memory, historical time is an aggregate of shifting images, epochs, civilization, endlessly recomposed.” For Matsuda, survival is not only inevitable, but it allows for a new history.

15. Citing Tylor is only part of the story. Later Dewey continues to use the idea of survivals: "Old ideas do not die when the beliefs which have been explicitly associated with them disappear; they usually only change their clothes. Present notions about the organism are largely a survival with changed vocabulary, of old ideas about soul and body.” “Experience and Nature,” in LW 1, 224. See also “Anthropology and Ethics, 1927” in LW 3, 11.


22. “Reconstruction in Philosophy” in MW 12, 80-94.


26. “The Public and Its Problems, 1927” LW 2, 323. Worthy of note is a very late article of Dewey, “The Future of Philosophy”: “There wasn’t any ‘physical world’ for a very long time, or anything called ‘physics’ as a subject matter as at present. It was only when human culture had developed to a certain point that physics became a distinctive subject matter. A lot of things had to be stripped off—animistic things. The world was previously seen through human eyes in terms of human customs, desires, and fears. It wasn’t til the beginning of modern science (the sixteenth century) that a world distinctively physical came into recognized acknowledged existence. This is merely an illustration of the transforming power of culture, in this broad sense of raw material.” LW 17, 467.

27. Paul Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher (New York: D. Appleton, 1927) 373. But see the second half of the book. Besides Dewey’s introduction, there were several reviews: Mary Austin, in Saturday Review of Literature 4 (October 1927): 453; Kenneth Burke, in Dial 83 (November 1927): 439-440; Alexander Weinstein in Bookmen 66 (December 1927): 477-479. I have often wondered if Dewey ever read Julius E. Lips, The Savage Hits Back (New York: University Books, 1966). Published first in 1937 by a German anthropologist appalled by what was already going on in Germany, it is rich in pictures of non-white primitive artists who depict white people as savages as they are seen by ”savages.” What did or would Dewey have thought of it? Once we admit that the distinction of savage and civilized cannot be made, we get ready to ask what happens when civilizations clash. The immigration of peoples to the United States makes this more than a pressing problem. A possible way to address the problem is being traveled by revisionist Canadian authors in relation to the French and the Native Americans. See Denys Delage, “Les principaux paradigmes de l’histoire amérindienne et l’étude de l’alliance franco-amérindienne aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles,” International Journal of Canadian Studies 12 (Fall 1995): 51-67.

28. Dewey continued to be concerned about the position of intellectuals—philosophers, critics, writers, and professional persons in general—in present-day society. In 1930, he wrote, “intellectually dispersed and divided.” Their weak social efficacy has led to a
chaos “due, more than to anything else, to mental withdrawal, to the failure to face the realities of industrialized society.” What is needed is a return to and emphasis on “more thinking and more significant inquiry.” The honored position intellectuals held in the past must be restored. [An interesting view on intellectuals by an archaeologist is to be found in Paul Zanker, *The Mask of Socrates. The Image of the Intellectual in Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995)]. Though intellectuals seem to be freer than ever, “whether their actual efficacy has been correspondingly increased may be doubted. In some degree, they have attained their liberty in direct ratio to their distance from the scenes of action.”

“Individualism, Old and New” LW 7, 107-108.


29. I have always been sorry that Dewey did not have the same kind of interest in music as a human activity that he had in art. If one looks at music in early Europe, where new developments and innovations moved forward very fast, there is little musical reason to attach “barbarian” in Dewey’s sense to the culture. Interesting insights are available in Michael Richter, *The Formation of the Medieval West. Studies in the Oral Culture of the Barbarians* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). But there is a more general question to be asked: were barbarians barbarians? Revisionist historians ask the question and reply in the negative. On one of the greatest “barbaric” rulers, see William M. Daly, “Clovis: How Barbaric, How Pagan?” *Speculum* 69 (1994): 619-664. With regard to the Greeks and the barbarian West, an exhibit in Venice in 1996 shows how, when the Greek came to the “barbarian” west, what they found in Italy “influenced their own artistic traditions.” See “Greece Goes West,” *History Today* 46 (June 1996): 2-3. One can ask the same question of Greece at a still earlier time in its relation to the East. For instance, Herodotus portrays “barbarian kings as inquirers and investigators,” indeed very much like himself in this regard. See Matthew R. Christ, “Herodotean Kings and Historical Inquiry,” *Classical Antiquity* 63 (1994): 167-202.

30. One of the contemporary manifestations of the primitive is the vagabond, who deserves to be studied as well as that “savage within” of whom psychoanalysis and contemporary events have more than made us aware. Cf. Matt K Matsuda, *The Memory of the Modern* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) Introduction, 3-18 and 130-134.

ourselves that though Europeans thought of Africans as savages, Africans in turn saw Europeans as savages. Are we not, all of us, savages among other savages? See Fritz W. Kramer, *The Red Fez: Art and Spirit Possession in Africa* (London: Verso, 1993) x, but see entire book. Let us give the final word to the "lonely African" quoted by the anthropologist Colin Turnbull: "I believed in your world at one time, even if I did not understand it, and I tried to follow your ways. But in doing this I lost my spirit. It left me somewhere; perhaps in Matadi . . . But somewhere it left me, and I am empty. In your world you people made me change to your ways, and tried to make me think like you. But no matter how hard I tried you never took me as one of yourselves. To you I was still a savage, and you used me for your own ends. I was content, because I knew that I could never be completely like you, but I thought that my children could learn, and their children would surely be just like you. I tried to bring help to my people by telling them of your ways, and by being their capita. But look at them, they do not even pay me the respect due to an old man; to my own people, as to you. I am just a savage. I am alone in this world. You made it impossible for me to be true to the ways of my ancestors, yet I cannot understand the way of your Bwana Yesy. I cannot believe his beliefs. When I die, very soon, shall I still be alone? Will you talk to me them? Will my people talk to me? Will anyone speed my spirit on its way to some resting place, or shall I be as I am now, alone?" Quoted in William Pfaff, *Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989): 167-168.

32. I would like to thank Ruth McGugan for providing valuable criticisms of an earlier draft.
W. E. B. Du Bois and the Hampton Idea*
(The Legitimate Marriage of Hampton to Dead Poets)

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The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line,” said Du Bois, as early as 1903. These words, familiar and often-quoted, formed the outer parameters for Du Bois’s future work – which was considerable; and it appears, in retrospect, that Du Bois’s words were also prophetic. Ninety-five years later, color continues to be a major factor in political and social arrangements around the world.

Du Bois is known as a writer, social scientist, civil rights activist, educator, and philosopher – among other things, but he is not ordinarily thought of as an educational philosopher. His views on education, however, have found compatible lodging in recent discourse in education, particularly, where disfranchised groups are the subject. I think Du Bois’s views on education deserve more attention from teachers and educational philosophers; so today, I wish to share with you my reading of and response to an address delivered by Du Bois, and to lift up certain implications of this address in the context of philosophy of education.

I take the liberal versus industrial education controversy between Booker T. Washington and Du Bois as a larger reference point. The controversy began with certain of Washington’s remarks in an address he made before a group of white women and men at the Atlanta Exposition of 1895. From that historic address, it was clear that Washington espoused a political platform of gradualism and accommodation for his fellow African Americans.
Washington's remarks divided the African American community then and they continue to inspire debate even today. It was, especially, with Washington's strong emphasis on a program of industrial education for Blacks that Du Bois differed. Du Bois felt an industrial education model, exclusively, was shortsighted. He felt that such a program kept Negroes in subordinate economic and social positions and sustained their dependence on the white ruling class. Du Bois favored a liberal education model, especially, as essential to the full and complete liberation of the nation's African American citizens. For Du Bois, the issue was that of voice, franchise, and the exercise of independent citizenship. Washington and Du Bois never fully agreed on ways to coalesce their divergent views on education into one practical and effective program to serve the various needs of the Negro race at that time. Importantly, each man, by his defense of his particular views on education, was in fact, supporting a certain philosophy of education. In each case, that philosophy was informed and undergirded by a number of complex and interrelated political and social factors. The pursuit of these complex and interrelated political and social factors is important but it is a project best left for another time. Let us focus, now on the specific topic at hand.

"The Hampton Idea" is the title Du Bois gave to the published address he delivered to the assembly of Negro teachers attending the 1906 summer conference at Hampton Institute in Hampton, Virginia. The "Hampton Idea" actually refers to the particular kind of training offered by the institution at that time. Today, we know Hampton as an important university among historically black schools, diverse and comprehensive in its disciplines and subject offerings. At the time of Du Bois's address, however, the school primarily offered industrial and technical training and limited academic work. Even so, the school's industrial and technical programs were modest when measured by the sophisticated and advanced standards of a post-industrial age.

At the early part of the twentieth century, Hampton was a prime example, in education, of what Reconstruction efforts had to offer black people recently freed from working the soil as bonded slaves. Even so, out of literally millions of people of color, only a few managed to get to Hampton to take advantage of this opportunity. Although Hampton's mission focused primarily on industrial and technical programs, there arose a tradition at the school which brought Negro teachers there each summer for further training or "continuing education" - as it were. They came together to discuss certain issues and for the sharing of views and mutual concerns. These summer conferences routinely featured addresses by national leaders, and included action.
which occasionally culminated in the passing of resolutions relating to certain aspects of education affecting Negroes.

It was in 1906 that Du Bois was asked to address the conference. This is how he opened his talk:

I have chosen a theme tonight which seems to me most weighty and important – that contains in a way the kernel of that message which I have been called to give to men. I am to speak of Self-Assertion and the Higher Education: I am going to point out the Great Lack which faces our race in the modern world, Lack of Energy; and the Great Fear that consciously and unconsciously grips the world lest that Lack be supplied.²

Du Bois's address centered around two essential points he held in juxtaposition: one, is what he termed the Great Lack and the other, what he called the Great Fear. By Great Lack, Du Bois meant Lack of Energy in reference to the Negro race and the socio-political posture the race held at the close of Reconstruction and at the start of the Industrial Age. This lack of energy had nothing to do with anything physical in nature. It was described by Du Bois as the Negro race's failure to be self-assertive; the race's inability to use its innate power to the best of its ability, and in ways commensurate to the challenges of the times. This lack of energy of which Du Bois speaks seems to be more psychological in nature, a condition which had an overall effect on the Negro race as a whole – as a group, and not some phenomenon peculiarly manifested, necessarily, in certain individuals within the group. Du Bois went to great lengths to say that this lack of energy on the part of the Negro race was not to be mistaken for laziness. In his words, "nor is this racial indolence or ease of life a fault or badge of inferior gift or development.³ He goes on to say:

We are not lazy, we work continuously ... rather this racial trait of ours today shows itself in a certain lack of initiative—a timidity in doing: a want of self-confidence, self-assertiveness, and self-knowledge — a kind of spiritual hesitation in a world where spirit rules.⁴

In his talk, Du Bois tells his audience that it is precisely the antidote to this Great Lack – this Lack of Energy, which gives rise to the Great Fear. He says:

Now the world knows this and the American world above all frequently points to it, and yet when the manifest antidote appears, when the remedy is pointed out, when the course of procedure,
which will turn indolence into energy, hesitation into confidence, and diffidence into self-assertion — when the well-known and world-tried methods of human awakening are mentioned in regard to us and ours, there falls a strange and ominous hush on the voices of the world; and spoken or unspoken, there arises the Great Fear.

Du Bois says, it is when an oppressed people strive to rise above their station, their subordinate position, that the oppressor senses some cause for alarm. Such rising, so it seems, becomes a threat to the oppressor's superior position. Pointing to sixteenth century serfdom in Germany, as an example of what he means by this, Du Bois notes that the peasantry of that time — and out of their degradation, suddenly became conscious of their power, challenging the nobility. The challenge came, Du Bois says, roughly as the peasants "fought and pillaged, burned and murdered, in mad fury." The uprising of the peasantry was squelched by the powerful, well-armed ruling class. Du Bois points out that the Germany nobility of that day defended its actions with the justification that

oppression is better than anarchy — beware how you raise in the hearts of the lower classes ambitions that can never be fulfilled — self-assertion that courts annihilation.

Du Bois's response is that

the world fears or rejoices according to the way in which it has been trained to contemplate a change in the conditions of the class or race in question.

Du Bois warns his audience at Hampton that the same fear described of sixteenth century Germany was being articulated in 1906 against Negroes in America. He said, there exists a ruling class which de-emphasizes ambition and aspiration among Negroes but emphasizes their duty as workers in society's substratum. Cynically, Du Bois said:

Take the eyes of these millions off the stars and fasten them in the soil; and if their young men will dream dreams, let them be dreams of corn bread and molasses.

More seriously, Du Bois warned against this sort of philosophy by supporting his point with a recent example his audience could relate to and would find difficult to deny. He cited that only days before, President Theodore Roosevelt had delivered an extemporaneous address to the faculty and students of Hampton Institute. Du Bois reminded his audience that the President of the United States told the Hampton graduates "not to hitch their
wagons to a star, but to a mule.” It was this kind of doctrine that Du Bois opposed so vigorously.

Du Bois chose the occasion of the summer conference at Hampton to voice his views for two reasons: first, because Hampton was a center for the nation’s work of this kind. The Institute, founded only five years after emancipation, was devoted to providing agricultural and technical training for former slaves – ostensibly, equipping them with skills for independent living. What better place to lodge his objections to the limits of the industrial program model than at its locus? Secondly, Du Bois felt that the effect of his talk had the possibility of impacting positively on the lives of future students taught by the teachers assembled at Hampton. He believed in his views so deeply that he was not concerned about how his position would be received. It was only imperative that his position be voiced and heard.

So, what was the immediate consequence of Du Bois’s address? Du Bois said that the Hampton folk were outraged by his talk, some saying that he had taken advantage of their hospitality. Years later, reflecting on what he had said in 1906, he felt that there was not much he would have changed, in substance, because he believed he had spoken the truth. Thirty years later, in 1936, he received and accepted another invitation back to Hampton to speak. He said:

When I went back to Hampton in 1936, behold, Hampton had become a college and was wondering what to do with her industrial equipment! Indeed so complete was the transformation, that in after years I again took Hampton to task for surrendering the Hampton idea so entirely.

Now, the question is, what is there of consequence for us in this little read address, hidden away and lost from the view of many? And what is its value for philosophy of education? Let me approach this by attempting to interpret what seemed to be at issue, as Du Bois saw it. I believe, for Du Bois, the issue was that of freedom and liberation – full, complete, and unequivocal. The issue called for an end to political domination and economic disfranchisement based on race and class differences, and the reversal of the conditions which supported the social degradation of a whole race of people. Du Bois believed that the Hampton idea of education supplied institutional support for the perpetuation of these conditions. He objected to an ideology which deliberately curtailed the civil rights of Negroes. The issue, for Du Bois, was one which cut at the moral and political fiber of the entire nation, a nation which included nearly nine million citizens of color at the turn of the century.
Du Bois's discussion of the Great Lack, the lack of energy, the "spiritual hesitation," as he called it, can be seen or understood as Du Bois's way of not only kindling the consciousness of the assembled Negro teachers but of also indicting the institution at Hampton, as well. No doubt, in his mind the Institute did little to inspire a sense of social equality among citizens of color, and little to encourage dreams of complete and effective suffrage for the Negro race. In Du Bois's eyes, these were most needed at that time; and Hampton, an educational institution founded to assist in social reconstruction, did little to provide what Du Bois felt was required the most. His interest and objective was that of bold and daring uplift; a program which would give remedy to the Negro's problem of "spiritual hesitation." The surest way to achieve freedom and to end social dependence, according to Du Bois, was for the Negro race to prepare its own leaders for free, capable, independent thought. This would be best achieved by encouraging the race's brightest to pursue a liberal education.

The Hampton idea of education, as a model for group advancement, was found to be deficient by Du Bois because it further contributed to this "spiritual hesitation." Hampton, as it was then configured, says Du Bois, only moved an already powerless people along an obsequious path; one which fostered further servility and prepared the Negro for nothing more than obedient duty and service to the dominant culture. The Hampton model did little to promote initiative of thought, free thinking, or intellectual assertiveness. The educational plan in place at the Institute was safe, "party-line" in nature, and contained few risks for the ruling hegemony. It was not radical in its effect and its essence was in the interest of preserving the status quo. Putting it in the terms of contemporary academic discourse, it was education for unquestioned, non-critical cultural reproduction. Donaldo Macedo refers to it as a kind of "literacy which makes use of institutional mechanisms to undermine independent thought." Macedo says that such education functions in the interest of the dominant ruling elites, rather than in the interest of the oppressed groups ... and is designed to produce power asymmetries along the lines of race, gender, class, culture, and ethnicity.

Du Bois pushed for an education of more relevance, an education which had definite political ramifications for a whole race, and an education which was far-reaching in its effect and consequences. Clearly, Du Bois's model for education was linked, decidedly, to society, with strong and obvious social consequences. I am reminded of the book, The Relevance of Education, writ-
ten by the American psychologist, Jerome S. Bruner—and the place in it where Bruner talks about the linkages between and among culture, politics, and pedagogy. Bruner advances the argument that the educator should rightly formulate her pedagogical theory with conscious and deliberate regard for the political, economic, and social realities at hand. Not to do so, he says, is mere triviality; and the educator deserves not to be taken seriously. Bruner makes the case for relevance in education and ties curriculum theory to politics and culture. In his book, published in 1973, Bruner echoes a concern Du Bois voiced nearly 70 years earlier, a concern for relevance in education. As a psychologist, his formal interests lay with such matters as cognition, knowledge acquisition, and theories of instruction but, otherwise, Bruner is philosophically in league with Du Bois and shares Du Bois's belief in and approach to effective and socially-relevant instruction. I suspect Du Bois intended that his Hampton message serve as one step in the journey toward group liberation; and I believe he understood that what he had to say was a much needed beginning to what he saw as necessary in changing how his people, and others, thought about the purpose(s) of education for the Negro. Although his thoughts about education included the notion of drawing out the fullest potential of the student—a notion representative of today's commonly-accepted currency in enlightened pedagogy and educational practice, Du Bois's larger agenda extended beyond the individual learner to include the maximum effect for the group.

Du Bois's views on freedom and group liberation, as these ideas are linked to purposes in education, are not unlike those held by more recent educational theorists, such as Henry Giroux and Paulo Freire, although predating them by more than a half century. For example, Giroux's views on education also include an emphasis on pedagogical and political dimensions. In his book, Border Crossing: Cultural Workers and the Politics of Education, Giroux says the political dimension should be viewed as means "to mobilize knowledge and desires that may lead to minimizing the degree of oppression in people's lives," and should be understood as that which "extends the possibilities for creating new public spheres in which the principles of equality, liberty, and justice become the primary organizing principles for structuring relationships between self and others." Giroux's theory would suit Du Bois just fine because it acknowledges the significance and dignity of the person; and it advocates for structures which are sympathetic to liberation rather than containment, to voice and empowerment rather than restrictive silence, and to authentic community rather than the kind of isolation so often described by Du Bois's use of the veil metaphor.
Du Bois's position also finds support in Freire's views on education, which constitute what Freire terms education for critical consciousness, "gestures associated with the awakening of critical awareness;" Freire sees this as an education of relevance, rooted in the real needs of an oppressed people. In his essay, "Education as the Practice of Freedom," Freire calls for an education which includes recognition of human struggle and which is designed to equip people to better find and give legitimate expression to their own voices. Here again, Du Bois would be at home with the purposes of education as express by Freire.

Far removed from the agrarian society of Chile or Brazil, clothed and staged in the upper stratum of America's world of private education, the theme of voice also runs through the Peter Weir film, Dead Poets Society. It is depicted in the 1950's. In the film, the progressive advocate of modest non-conformity, English teacher, John Keating (ably played by actor Robin Williams), encourages his young preppy charges at Welton Academy to "seize the day"—Carpe Diem!!! Strive to find your own voice, he urges. Beyond an agenda which focuses on basic literacy for agricultural workers and technicians, Keating goes about his work, in an extraordinary manner, through the teaching of English and American literature—a liberal and classically-inspired curriculum, no less. The theme and franchise of voice in Dead Poets is explored for quite different purposes than it is in Freire's several essays. If, however, it is regarded as an important issue for society's more economically and socially-abled, how much more important it is to consider it as the much-need franchise of the less economically and socially-abled. I suspect Du Bois would think so.

As contemporary theorists, both Giroux and Freire point to freedom and access as relevant issues in education. The theme of voice, an essential element in the liberation of the human spirit, sums it up. In "The Hampton Idea," Du Bois speaks of all these as contributing to the "sudden consciousness of the peasantry," the awakening of the inner power in a people. From Du Bois's point of view, they contribute to the antidote to the so-called Great Lack found among people of color. For Du Bois, they constitute the conditions, without which, no meaningful life can be lived and no socially-relevant education program can boast to have integrity. In terms political and pedagogical, an education program which includes these elements challenges the established system while empowering the disfranchised group. Such a program, necessarily, calls for a redistribution of opportunities and rewards, and
it demands a recognition based on equal rights and the dignity of all persons. Du Bois, finally, views education as that activity which serves the purposes of freedom and liberation. It is, for him, a liberal education which does this best and not an education program which limits free thinking or which discourages intellectual and social independence. Education is the means for individual empowerment, for Du Bois, as well as the all-important tool which works toward race uplift.

The problem of the color line, described by Du Bois so dramatically in 1903 as the problem of the twentieth century, need not be the problem of the next millennium.

DEDICATION

*Delivered in memory of Dr. Arthur Brown, educational philosopher and professor at Wayne State University for more than 30 years; a past president of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society.

NOTES

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Dewey, Correctional Education, and Offender Habilitation

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In most prisons there is not enough money to educate all the inmates who need it. This is a shame because the number of illiterate inmates is increasing. In 1989, there were over one million inmates in prisons and jails in the United States. In a 1988, study of male arrestees in 20 cities by the National Institute of Justice, it was determined that a large number of inmates were dropouts. For example, the percentage of male arrestees that were dropouts ranged from 32 percent in Fort Lauderdale to 67 percent in San Antonio. This along with estimates as high as 15 percent, for the number of mentally handicapped inmates in our prisons highlight the need for more funds to educate offenders.

In any education system there must be an established curriculum model, which can guide learning, teaching and research. This is true of any educational program may it be regular, special or even correctional education. An important innovator educational theory and learning in the United States.

JOHN DEWEY AND EDUCATION

John Dewey (1990,1997) was truly ahead of his time. He wanted to see more interactions between the teacher and his students in curriculum development and learning. He made it clear that teachers must be life-long learners, a reflective teachers, who are guides that facilitate learning among their students while they construct their own knowledge (Archumbault,1974).
Dewey (1990) also made it clear that the learner should learn within the context of a humanistic curriculum. In general the philosophy of the humanistic curriculum is based on the work of John Dewey (1990; 1997) and stresses a student-centered curriculum. The Humanistic curriculum seeks, coherence through integration of emotion, thought and actions of the students.

The key idea concerning achievement in the humanistic curriculum is based on motivation and attributive theory. It seeks to base work within the educational program founded on the student’s interest.

Dewey saw education as a social process. He called on teachers and students to develop a community of learners where all members of the community use critical thinking to construct their own knowledge. To Dewey teaching is a “cooperative enterprise” of all persons involved in the learning process recognizing that “development occurs through reciprocal give-in-take, the teacher taking, but not being afraid to give” (Archumbault, 1974, p.72).

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENDER STUDENTS

In 1988, over 60% of the inmates in America’s jails and prisons were under 30 years of age, even though this group represents only 24% of the American population (1998). Most of these inmates are dropouts. In Illinois for example, 72% of the inmates are dropouts (Karwath, 1991). Dropouts cost the nation $240 billion in crime welfare, and health cost (Winters, 1998).

We need more education programs in the jails. In jails and prisons around the United States thousands of inmates are housed. Most of these inmates are illiterate, and lack even a 6th grade education (UNESCO, 1995; Winters 1995, 1997).

CORRECTIONAL EDUCATION

Education and training play an important role in our socialization and our future vocational and economic well being. A good education is like money in the bank since it can provide you with the skills to enhance your vocational and economic future. Moreover, basic literacy is required for inmates who hope to become self-sufficient taxpayers and avoid further involvement in the criminal justice system. It is the consensual method for attaining wealth (Winters, 1998).

Today inmates become involved in educational programs for many reasons. Surveys of inmates in educational programs indicate that inmates participate in these programs for educational and non-educational reasons. Some inmates participate in these programs just to get out of their cells or to
be with their friends (UNESCO, 1995). They may also participate in educational programs to obtain the necessary skills to pursue varied career and training opportunities so they can obtain their social and economic goals (Boshier, 1983; Parsons & Langenbach, 1993; Winters, 1993).

The history of correctional education in the United States has always had a humanistic element to the development of its curriculum and teaching. The main objectives of contemporary prisons are twofold, custody (punishment and incapacitation) and treatment (the rehabilitation) of the inmate. Many methods have been proposed to “treat” the social pathology of the inmate. A constant treatment measure for much of the history of prisons in the United States was the education of the inmate.

Education in correctional centers has always been seen as a treatment program that can help inmates to better their lives in free society. We can define correctional education as a generic term describing a wide range of educational activities that take place in institutional and community correctional settings. Educational activities have always taken place in prison.

For example, inmates often are educated by other inmates in how to commit the “perfect crime”. The objective of the institutional educational programs is more noble, in correctional education we hope to prepare the inmate to contribute fully to free society in a law-abiding fashion. This has made the mission of the correctional educator both socially and morally important.

The idea of correctional education grew out of the prison reform movement. The first school for inmates was opened in Philadelphia.

The first penitentiary in the United States was the Walnut Street Jail. In 1790, the Philadelphia legislature declared a wing of this jail a “penitentiary house” for offenders. This system encouraged the education of inmates through religious instruction, as one of the basic “treatment” programs for inmates.

Robert Vaux and Richard Vaux of Philadelphia played a prominent role in penology and inmate education. For example, Robert Vaux, advocated day and night solitary confinement of inmates with their books as a method for reforming prisoners.

But it was the religious community, which most greatly affected the rise and development of education in United States prison. The American religious community has greatly influenced correctional education. It was groups like the Prison Discipline Society (PDS), led by Louis Dwight, that helped send reading materials and established Sabbath schools in prisons during the 1820’s.

Today’s academic educational programs in American prisons were an outgrowth of “Bible” or “Sabbath schools. In this type of school many
inmates learned to read and write, while they learned the Bible. Prison chaplains usually provided reading instruction. For most of the past hundred and fifty years in correctional education, prison chaplains have served as the primary teachers in the prison schools around the United States.

The PDS provided prisons with thousands of bibles and related religious literature that formed the foundation for many prison libraries. Prison Discipline Society members also sent missionaries to prisons or served as chaplains. These chaplains were also instructors in the Sabbath schools.

The objective of the Sabbath schools was to spread literacy among the inmates, while they learned the Bible, and became better citizens. The PDS was very successful in organizing Sabbath schools. Between 1826-1854, the PDS helped make the Sabbath school a major feature of many prisons in the United States.

Around the same time Sabbath schools were being introduced in many correctional institutions, the handicraft and/or factory system of industrial education was introduced to American prisons. This program was aimed at providing some inmates with training in the trades as a method of deterring crime.

The factory system was founded at Auburn Prison in 1823. The prison factory system of production was well received by many state legislatures because of the profits they produce, especially in prisons like the Auburn and Sing Sing prisons in New York.

Under this system prisoners worked for private employers. Private companies then sold the products made by these prisoners. Many states like Kentucky and New York made considerable profits from this system.

By the 1840's correctional institutions began to recognize the benefits to free society in educating inmates so they might find productive employment in free society. In 1841, the Boston House of Correction began classes for inmates. And in 1847, the legislature in the state of New York, provided funds to support two educators in each prison in the state. By 1865 “professional” teachers were educating inmates in New York and Pennsylvania; and chaplains were teaching inmates in Connecticut, Ohio and New Hampshire. By this time the state of New York was spending $7,500 a year on chaplains, teachers and books for its prisons.

The major influence on correctional education in the late 1800's was Enoch Wines. Dr. Wines views on educational institutions for prisoners were greatly influenced by the PDS. Dr. Wines began his crusade to reform prisons after he visited penitentiaries across the United States in 1865.

Much of what we know about correctional education in the 1860's collected by Wines. Prisons in the Midwestern part of the United States were
the first to establish regular “academic” programs in its prisons after New York. In Indiana and Ohio, state prisons had night schools; and regular weekday classes were made available for inmates in Wisconsin and the Detroit House of Corrections. The night schools in Ohio, were staffed by chaplains and met three nights a week. Although professional educators were increasingly entering the field of correctional education most prison educators were chaplains.

Many Sabbath schools were also expanded during this period. The Sabbath school at Charlestown, for example offered lectures for inmates each month, and appropriated funds to provide textbooks for inmates in its educational program.

It was early recognized that inmates must be educated differently from illiterate children. The education of inmates was considered different from education in free society because inmates “they are men in the practical experiences of life, they must be approached intellectually as men and not by nursery tales, by kindergarten methods or juvenile textbooks”.

Up until, and beyond the 1860’s correctional educators taught inmates on an individual basis. Correctional educators usually moved from cell to cell, as the chaplains had done prior to the introduction of teachers into correctional institutions.

Wines founded the National Prison Congress. The National Prison Congress had a tremendous influence on correctional education along with the reformatory system.

In 1870 130 delegates from 24 states, Canada and South America met at the National Prison Congress in Cincinnati. The participates at the Congress consist of prison reformers and several prison administrators. In the Declaration of Principles, adopted by the National Prison Congress of 1870, it was noted in Principle No. 8, that the aim of the NPC was to promote “Religion and education as the most important agencies of reformation”.

Between 1870 and 1900 the reformatory system was introduced to the United States. Under this system an academic education and trade training was emphasized.

The idea of providing a trade for ex-offenders was began at the Elmira Reformatory. This was the origin of the vocational education programs of correctional institutions.

Between 1870 and 1900, the reformatory system was introduced to the United States. Under this system education and trade training was emphasized. This system was aimed at bringing inmates closer to free society, than the regimen of silence systems prisons prior to this period employed.
Zebulon Brockway, at the Elmira Reformatory in New York introduced the first academic educational program in American corrections. This correctional education program emphasized education in trades and an opportunity for academic instruction with immersion in the study of the Bible. By the 1930's most prisons had basic education programs and a prison library.

The Reformatory system made it possible for prisoners to receive fixed terms and might earn a parole if it was authorized. In addition all reformatory inmates were placed into one various classes including: tailoring shop, drafting class, machine shop, blacksmith course or sign painting.

Brockway believed that the Elmira Reformatory school was an important aspect of the prison. Although the prison school during this period was organized along the model of the public schools, many correctional educators recognized that the education for inmates was a "distinct branch of educational work" according to A.E. Upham, director of the Elmira school in 1897.

The success of the Elmira reformatory made many states model their own correctional centers on this institution. This led to increased interest in providing inmates with literacy.

Very little changed in correctional education between 1900 and 1950. In many respects this organization of correctional education prevailed in American prisons until the 1970's.

The principal goal of correctional education in the 1990's, remains security or "good order" in the jail or prison, since it keeps the inmate meaningfully busy (Collins, 1988; UNESCO, 1995). Correctional education also seeks to further the resocialization of the inmate, while providing him with the social and intellectual skills to lead a non-criminal lifestyle and attitude change (Mathews and Winters, 1993; Porporino & Robinson 1992; UNESCO, 1995; Winters, 1993).

Mathews and Winters (1993) believe that correctional education programs should have two additional purposes 1) the development of marketable skills and/or the basic education that can allow the offender to be trainable for a job; and 2) the education program should provide the offender with positive social values, so s/he can live in society without committing more crimes.

Correctional education should and can play a role in changing the character of the offender. Duguid (1991) believes that a correctional education without attitude change only produces highly skilled prisoners. Tom Gehring (1993) has observed that

Our aim is to help students who are ready to "turn their lives around". Correctional education is an intervention strategy. We
seek transformation. We use social learning activities to interrupt
and help stop asocial, non-social, or antisocial behaviors (p.68).

Research indicates that many inmates fail to empathize with others, suf-
fer emotional disturbance and lack social cognitive skills (Smaenow, 1991;
UNESCO, 1995: Mathew & Winters, 1993). They exhibit developmental
delays in social adaptation. In general the social perspective of offenders is
egocentrically focused. (Samenow 1991). Fabiano (1991) noted that offend-
ers have “progressed beyond an egocentric stage of cognitive development
they are unable (or fail) to distinguish between their own emotional states
and thoughts and views and those of other people” (p.102).

The absence of an internal locus of control and failure to empathize with
others necessitates a Humanistic curriculum in correctional education. This
curriculum aims to sharpen the offender’s cognitive and moral reasoning
skills. The objective of moral/social education is to provide offenders with
positive alternatives to their present antisocial behaviors.

**Humanistic Correctional Education Curriculum**

Dewey’s (1990,1997) educational theories form the foundation of the phi-
losophy of Humanistic Correctional Education Curriculum requires that the
inmate-students be self-motivated and practice metacognition during
engaged learning activities. This philosophy calls on the student: 1) to
become knowledgeable about self, and 2) to seek personal growth, integrity,
autonomy and self-actualization.

In the Humanistic Correctional Education Curriculum the teachers and
students play specific roles. The teacher in correctional education provides
the learner with intrinsically rewarding experiences that reflect their culture
and ability. They also should use selected techniques to help students learn
feelings using: Maslow’s (hierarchy of needs) for growth; Vygostky- social
learning concept (which demand that teachers and students participate jointly
in the construction of knowledge and development of the curriculum); and
Gestalt- (get in touch with your feelings) learning theories (Mathews &
Winters, 1995).

It is clear that the ideas of Mathews and Winters (1993) and Gehring
(1993) demand that the teacher in correctional education make an effort to
facilitate social cognitive learning among their students. This results from the
goals of correctional social education which seek to promote stable social rela-
tions, the ability to challenge authority without violence and respect for the
property rights of others.
Dewey's educational ideas on education mesh well with the objectives of correctional social education. They make it clear that the students in the Humanistic Correctional Education Curriculum (HCEC) are to use metacognition to monitor their learning. Students are also, to become more self-directed when learning, using cognition to make choices and set goals. This is important for inmate learners who usually lack empathy for others.

In HCEC are to become affective learners who can set goals and accomplish them. And social, through work in cooperative groups. In general the activities of the HCECC should encourage morality, ego development, self-respect and self-confidence among students.

In general the role of the Teacher in the Humanistic Correctional Education Curriculum is: Serve as a resource; Provide nurturing atmosphere in classroom; Motivate students through mutual trust. This means that teachers practicing the HCEC must: listen to students; respect students; be natural and authentic with students; and avoid the use of coercion.

One way to do this is to use essay writing and role playing as forms of bibliotherapy to have students get in touch with their feelings, while they enhance their basic literacy skills (Winters, 1993).

In conclusion inmates are alienated due to their involvement in criminal activities. Although they lack social skills and suffer many emotional problems, we should use correctional education to habilitate them to life outside prison.

In correctional education we can not talk about rehabilitation. We do not seek the rehabilitation of the inmate because, if he returns to the lifestyle he participated in before being incarcerated he will be continuing to be a participant in criminal activity. As a result we seek the habilitation of the inmate into an individual who is self-confident and ready to participate positively in all areas of free society.

Dewey advocated the humanistic curriculum as the best way to ensure maximum learning and interaction between teachers and students. We believe that many correctional educators (Gehring, 1993; Mathews & Winters, 1993) have made modifications of this curriculum through the HCEC which can implement the necessary social skills inmates need to be full participates in free society. This makes the work of Dewey (1990, 1997) as timely today as it was almost a hundred years ago.

REFERENCES


The young Nietzsche was fundamentally concerned with education; he was both ein Erzieher (as a Professor of Classical Philology at Basel), and also ein Bildungophilosoph (as a philosopher of education). In 1882, Nietzsche gave a series of five public lectures at Basel “On the Future of our Educational Institutions,” and in a fragment from late 1874/early 1875, “We Classicists,” he made the following command and confession: “Educators educate! But first educators must educate themselves. It’s for them I write” (Nietzsche, 1990, p. 351). Between the Basel lectures and “We Classicists,” however, Nietzsche wrote the second and third Untimely Meditations, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” and “Schopenhauer as Educator.” The former meditation is a harsh critique of what later came to be called historicism, while the latter meditation pays homage to and celebrates Nietzsche’s most influential educator, Arthur Schopenhauer. The relative independence of these two meditations, though, is only ostensible; they are, I want to argue, united by an attempt to teach the educators to educate themselves. The second meditation articulates a diagnosis of modern educational pathologies and the cultural pathologies they represent, and the third meditation recommends certain cures illustrated through Schopenhauer. Moreover, Nietzsche’s early attitude towards and treatment of education are shaped by Goethe’s Faust, and to the extent that higher education remains Faustian, Nietzsche’s meditations on the problem of education and culture remain timely. Many of his problems with education and culture continue to be our problems.
In "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," Nietzsche attempts to "depict a feeling by which [he is] constantly tormented" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 59). The source of his torment is the failure of his age to strike a healthy balance between living historically and living unhistorically. Animals, Nietzsche tells us, have no memory and no sense of history, and so live completely unhistorically; that is, animals live only in the contentment of the present moment. Humans, however, have both memory and a sense of history, and so are capable of living historically. Humans live between the horizons of past and future, and organize themselves and their projects in light of both. Our ability to live historically elevates us above a mere animal existence, yet involves the risk that an individual or even an entire culture may become paralyzed by memories or awareness of previous failures and suffering. In other words, to live unhistorically, without memory is to be too base, too animalistic, while to live historically, with memory is to be debilitated by an acute awareness of our finitude and imperfectibility. Either life is an illness for Nietzsche because "the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 63).

Given that the unhistorical is anthropologically prior to the historical—the unhistorical is our native state—our task as Nietzsche sees it is to employ history in the service of life. To this end he identifies three different species of history, the alternate and occasional use of which is most conducive to human flourishing. Monumental history attends to great individuals and great deeds, and teaches us that "the greatness that once existed was in any event once possible and may thus be possible again" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 69). Antiquarian history inspires veneration of tradition which elevates individuals or an entire nation above wretched conditions, and lastly, critical history examines and condemns obsolete aspects of the past in the interest of the present.

What does all this talk of history have to do with the ills of education, though? Nietzsche thinks his age, modern Germany (and all of modern Europe for that matter), is gravely ill. The illness is not simply that history is not employed in the service of life as Nietzsche recommends, but rather that history is increasingly employed in the disservice of life. For the first time in history, history itself is seen as an object of scientific study. The demand that history should be a science is motivated by a desire to know, not a desire to enhance life, and the scientific study of history is pursued by a select few scholars. In other words, the scientific conception of history removes history
(and so its services) from the domain of every individual, and relegates history to scholars who pervert history into a static, lifeless corpus of knowledge. Scientific historians seek objective historical facts and truths simply for the sake of accumulating and storing them. The result is that scholars of history (and of all "scientific" disciplines) become solipsistic and develop, as Nietzsche puts it, "an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 78). The exaggerated inner world of the scholar becomes a warehouse of information and abstractions which fail to transform the outside world, or even to translate into action. The motto of this weakened scholarly personality, Nietzsche reveals, is "fiat veritas, pereat vita" (let truth prevail though life perish) (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 78). In short, the organic relationship between history and life has been fractured, and at the tremendous expense of genuine education.

Nietzsche argues that all scholars suffer from some form of the historicism that plagues scholars of history. The scholar, he says, is "a solitary man of knowledge" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 82), a "walking encyclopedia" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 79), a "pure thinker who only look[s] on at life" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 77), who has "lost and destroyed his instincts" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 84) and "feels in abstractions" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 81). After the founding of the University of Berlin in 1811, the modern research university developed in Germany during Nietzsche's lifetime, and universal education transmitted the scholars' sickness to the wider population. Nietzsche claims that this age "suffers from this universal education" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 85) precisely because universal education makes its students sick. "There are no personalities to be seen, let alone free personalities," Nietzsche laments, "nothing but anxiously muffled up identical people" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 84). In his ossified age, Nietzsche seriously asks whether "there [are] still human beings... or perhaps only thinking-, writing- and speaking-machines" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 85). In Nietzsche's eyes, the objective detachment of the scholar plagues us all.

Nietzsche holds that individuals and culture stand in dialectical relation to one another. Consequently, this sickness of individuals infects their culture, understood as the "unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 79). Nietzsche's nineteenth-century German culture of knowledge is, he says, a "noisy sham-culture" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 95), "not a real culture at all but only a kind of knowledge of culture; it has an idea of and feeling for culture but no true cultural achievement emerges from them" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 78). Such a culture then militates against the
production of great human beings, which Nietzsche sees as the goal of real culture. Ultimately, a certain excess of history and the popularization of science undermine the health of individuals, culture, and humanity by preventing humans from feeling and acting unhistorically.

German education is the bridge between the second and third meditations. At the end of the second meditation Nietzsche is most concerned with German students. The innocence and malleability of youth make students most vulnerable to being poisoned by scholars. The typical university education of Nietzsche’s Germany produces scholars, scientists, civil servants, money-makers and “historical-aesthetic cultural philistine[s]” (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 117), but not human beings. Students learn neither to employ history in the service of life, nor even to live. Heads are crammed with facts and ideas derived from “highly indirect knowledge of past ages and peoples, not from direct observation of life” (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 118). In short, knowledge and science have come to dominate life. Youth, however, in virtue of its vitality, courage and honesty, also offers the most hope for the eventual ennoblement of humanity. To attain that goal genuine educators such as Schopenhauer are needed.

“Schopenhauer as Educator” begins with a question; “how can we find ourselves again” (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 129), Nietzsche asks, how can we escape the dialectical bind between culture and individuals discussed above, given the pernicious vacuousness of higher learning? The solution lies not in the doctrines of Schopenhauer, not in what he explicitly taught, but rather in the education provided by his person; Schopenhauer educates as an exemplar.

Schopenhauer is a worthy educator of humanity for three reasons. First, his character possesses three fundamental virtues: simplicity and honesty in thought and life, cheerfulness in the face of misery, and steadfastness. Schopenhauer wrote and lived genuinely and for himself; he remained cheerful and passionate despite the criticism and malice of his contemporaries (especially Hegel), and he endured life while committed to a deeply pessimistic philosophy. Secondly, Schopenhauer triumphed over constitutional dangers. His solitary life did not lead to despair, he endured a philosophy that holds that the world is fundamentally irrational and meaningless, and he lived with an agonizing tension between the intense genius he felt himself responsible to cultivate (for the improvement of humanity), and a burning longing for the peace offered by the denial of the will his philosophy recommends. Lastly, he triumphed over the perilous dangers of his age. As a youth he knew there was something higher and purer in life than what he saw in the life of his time, and he knew that to live and be truthful is to suffer and
so avoided the petty diversions of his day—security, ease, honor, romance—lest they diminish his suffering. Nietzsche “profit[s] from a philosopher only insofar as he can be an example” (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 136), and Schopenhauer serves as an example of a human being in a less-than-human age.

How, though, does the example of Schopenhauer as an educator translate into practical activity? Nietzsche suggests that the historicism and scientism he despises are motivated by a chronic psychological illness. The scholar is unable to live, to endure life as a flesh and blood human being, and consequently escapes into impotent historical facts and scientific knowledge. Self-knowledge, which is essential to Nietzsche’s central pedagogical imperative, “Be yourself” (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 127), is avoided by and replaced with knowledge of the world. Schopenhauer the exemplar teaches us not to be Schopenhauer, but to be like Schopenhauerian humans: honest (above all with oneself), simple, cheerful, resolute, independent, courageous and opposed to one’s age in a struggle against that which prevents us from being Schopenhauerian humans and for human ennoblement in a genuine culture. “Your educators,” Nietzsche reminds us, “can be only your liberators” (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 129). Schopenhauer as educator liberates us from education and thus restores our health.

“On the Uses and Disadvantages of History” for Life” and “Schopenhauer as Educator” contain no less than twenty-six explicit references to Goethe, many of which concern his Faust. Moreover, the former meditation begins with a quotation by Goethe: “In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity” (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 59). This raises the question of Goethe’s influence on these two early meditations.

As a classical philologist, Nietzsche would have been familiar with the ancient origins of the Faust idea. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is the Greek form of Zoroaster, the founder of the ancient Persian religion Zoroastrianism. In the second century C.E. Mani, a Persian fanatic, established Manichaeism. Although Mani was eventually crucified by his Zoroastrian enemies, Manichaeism spread throughout the Ancient Mediterranean, and in the fourth century C.E. Augustine speaks at length of Faustus, the leading Manichee of his age. Bishop Faustus, Augustine observes in his Confessions, “was a great decoy of the devil and many people were trapped by his charming manner of speech.” “He was very well versed in all the higher forms of learning and particularly in the liberal sciences” (Augustine, p. 92). As a good European, Nietzsche also would have been familiar with the more recent his-
tory of Faust. Matriculation records of Heidelberg University in 1509 indicate that Johann Faust was affiliated with the university, and it is with him that the modern Faust tale begins (Westburg, p. 28). Faust then develops at the hands of numerous authors, Marlowe, Lessing, Klinger and Schink just to name a few, until it culminates in Goethe's masterpiece.

Goethe clearly exercised great influence on Nietzsche, especially on the early Nietzsche; Nietzsche's understanding of human freedom as individuality, his insistence that humans are their deeds, and his view that individuals must be understood developmentally all stem from Goethe. But, aside from Nietzsche's frequent references to Goethe and his Faust, aside from his familiarity with the long Faust tradition, and aside from Goethe's general influence on Nietzsche, why read the second and third Untimely Meditations in the light of Goethe's Faust?

The central reason is that in these meditations Nietzsche attempts to diagnose the sickness of his age as reflected in chronically ill scholars. Goethe's Faust is both a scholar and also in many ways the incarnation of (Nietzsche's description of) modern German character. Faust, Part I, which Goethe published in 1808, begins with an expression of the title character's demoralization: "I have, alas, studied philosophy,/ Jurisprudence and medicine, too,/ And, worst of all, theology/ With keen endeavor, through and through/ And here I am, for all my lore,/ The wretched fool I was before" (Goethe, p. 93). Faust the scholar seeks enlightenment and understanding, yet his deep dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of conventional learning leads him to the brink of suicide and later to what one commentator has aptly called "forbidden and dangerous avenues of inquiry" (Hoezel, p. 74), magic and a wager with Mephistopheles. Ultimately, Faust is saved by divine grace and enters heaven, but not before seduction, murder, and disastrous suffering make this philosophical drama a tragedy.

Goethe and Nietzsche both recognize that Faust experiences the existential dilemma between being and knowing that plagues us moderns. The real tragedy for Nietzsche, though, is that Faust desires an understanding of, and insight into the human condition at the expense of simply living as a human being. Faust's laudable hunger for life and his eventual renunciation of the knowledge he once sought elevate him above the listless Nietzschean scholar; but, they are plagued by both the lack of wisdom to set bounds to knowledge and desire, and also the inability to endure themselves and the ambiguities and paradoxes of life. Faust famously claims that "In the beginning was the Act" (Goethe, p. 153), but for him and the Nietzschean scholar the pure, unhistorical act is no more. "He who would live according to Schopenhauer,"
Nietzsche concludes with a sense of irony, "would probably seem more like a Mephistopheles than a Faust" (Nietzsche, 1995, p. 153).

To conclude, the purpose of higher education according to Nietzsche is self-realization through the fullest cultivation of one's native intellectual and human endowment—higher education is most definitely not vocational training. True educators are healthy, authentic, intellectually honest individuals who liberate, inspire, and transform students. The task of educators, moreover, is of paramount importance because the quality of education is proportional to the level of culture. Educators can warp students, say by merely conveying information or by training students exclusively for economic success, or educators can lead students to become, and overcome, themselves by embodying the most noble lessons; in either case, the quality of culture is dialectically conditioned. Nietzsche, who was said by his own students to be a masterful educator (Pletsch, p. 107), continues to teach us the importance of these lessons in our so-called information age.

REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION

Nietzsche provided the outline and many details of a bipartite epistemology describing rationality and intuition as related but distinguishable processes for producing knowledge. Two aspects of Nietzsche's epistemology make it distinctive and relevant to education. First, Nietzsche's is the first anti-representational—and in that sense, postmodern—epistemology in Western philosophy. No philosopher of mind before Nietzsche separated himself so deliberately or thoroughly from the Enlightenment mind-set and the modernist project of representing more and more aspects of the world, more accurately—a project that commands the participation of schools today. Second, Nietzsche's epistemology gives a bifurcated account of human knowledge according to which rational, conceptual knowledge is an overlay on a more immediate, intuitive and existential knowledge. The latter, Nietzsche hoped could be cultivated and constantly pitted against conceptual knowledge, so that it could be continually de-constructed and re-constructed. This paper presents some pedagogical implications of this epistemology. I suggest that Nietzsche's insights call for a pedagogy that fosters imagination, intuition, idiosyncratic interpretation, and fearless innovation, in addition to the kind of conceptual knowledge and collective reasoning fostered in traditional approaches to education.

Nietzsche's Epistemology of Rationality

For Nietzsche, the most important shortcomings of human knowledge had to do with how we create knowledge out of experience. Nietzsche's most rad-
ical criticism of this enterprise was a direct denial of the Cartesian claim that
the mind is capable of grasping certain truths directly and immediately, from
which the mind may then rationally infer other truths:

[1] It seems to me that “the correct perception”—which would mean
the adequate expression of an object in the subject—is a contradic-
tory impossibility. For between two absolutely different spheres, as
between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and
no expression. There is at most an aesthetic relation . . .

Cartesian epistemology was an answer to the radical skepticism generat-
ed by Descartes’ own insuperable dichotomy of the mental and the material.
His epistemology guaranteed that humans knew some things certainly, and
that there was a method for extending knowledge beyond those certainties,
while maintaining certainty. The human mind that Descartes postulated was
not only impressionable to certain truths, but incapable of being mistaken
about them. Against Descartes, Nietzsche asserted that accurate perception in
a subject cannot be caused by an object. The subject’s experience of the object
is neither an expression nor a representation of the object. The experience
may give the subject certain images and expectations of the object, but there
is no guarantee of correctness or accuracy, because the subject and object
belong to “absolutely different spheres.”

Nietzsche’s epistemological narrative begins with the human subject
inhabiting the empirical world and receiving sensory data from it via the
nervous system. But what the nerves “say” and what the mind “hears” are dif-
derent things. For when the mind begins to cognize the nerve stimulus—to
make use of it—it has only one intellectual means at its disposal: a trick
Nietzsche called “imaginative transference”:

To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first
metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second
metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one
sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one.

The most important aspect of this transference is its aesthetic or
metaphorical nature; Nietzsche is not merely saying that we only know
objects through the effects they produce in us, but also that our notions of
objects are imaginative, artistic interpretations of those effects:

Between subject and object ... there is at most an aesthetic relation: I
mean a suggestive transference, a stammering translation into a com-
pletely foreign tongue—for which there is required, in any case, a
freely inventive intermediate sphere and mediating force.
Nietzsche described sensual images as having “originally streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid . . .” Imagination, then, is a physiological function that mediates between what effects the object causes and what perceptions result to the subject.

The fault of perception that most troubled Nietzsche was the abstraction involved in it. Nietzsche asserted that to begin with, “each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals and is therefore able to elude all classification . . .” But the function of metaphor is to relate two different things, or to make reference to one thing by means of another. And since the perceptual metaphor is not strictly caused by the object in the world, the imagination is free to produce the same perceptual metaphor in conjunction with divergent phenomena. The result is that we understand and respond to a plethora of phenomena by means of a limited number of perceptions. Perception itself is an abstraction that does not register subtle differences of phenomena.

The next episode in Nietzsche’s epistemological narrative is conception, which Nietzsche described as a further process of imaginative transference: from perceptual image to intellectual (linguistic) concept. Conception is inextricably tied to language, and again, abstraction is its principle danger:

Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin. We obtain the concept, as we do the [perceptual] form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us.

Conception imposes a greater degree of order or rationality upon empirical phenomena than does perception. Although metaphorical, the process of conception is rational in that it is teleological and practical—directed by the pragmatic human will. Nietzsche formulated his epistemology under the influence of Schopenhauer, and he accepted Schopenhauer’s pragmatic idea that human knowledge is informed by the human will. We conceive the world in such a way that we can have power over it: manipulate it, control it, re-create it according to our desire. Knowledge, therefore, is necessarily instrumental rather than representational, and the world we know is “thoroughly anthropomorphic”, “the metamorphosis of the world into man.” But unlike Schopenhauer, Nietzsche’s mistrust of conventional knowledge did not stem from any loathing of the human will-to-pleasure, but rather from a belief that linguistic concepts tend to become ossified and unre-
sponsive to new experience. Biased knowledge systems tend to survive without regard for their lack of merit. Concepts and conceptual schemes are perpetuated out of habit, generation after generation, in spite of their tendency to lose their efficacy in communicating or conjuring authentic experience. One factor in this process of ossification is the simple social necessity that people living together need to believe and act on much the same ideas:

[This is] the duty which society imposes in order to exist: to be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors. Thus, to express it morally, this is the duty to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a manner binding upon everyone.  

And the tyranny of society is weak compared with the tyranny of each individual's own intellect in constricting what may be known, for linguistic conception turns back on perception: directing it, limiting it to pre-conceived, pre-established forms. It pre-disposes the individual to rely on a small and fixed number of conventional forms to organize and interpret all her experience. It teaches her not to see for herself, and not to create for herself new perceptual metaphors, but rather to let the rationality of millennia stipulate the limits of her own experience. Language, then, is the fabric of the illusion humans create and socially enforce in the place of reality. It is the graveyard of intuitive perception, as Nietzsche saw it, and the prison of the intuitive subject.

Knowledge is more than a vocabulary. It is a system of "fact" that functions in the form of propositions and arguments. For propositions, grammar is required, and for arguments, logical form. Nietzsche suggested that to doubt reason was more radical than to doubt this or that body of knowledge, since the latter doubt retains a faith in reason, and the hope that reason will correct knowledge. It is this fundamental mistrust of reason as a self-corrective process for producing more and more accurate knowledge that marks Nietzsche's break with modernism and Enlightenment thought. Nietzsche was a proto-pragmatist, asserting (in Arthur Danto's words) that, "our ideas are arbitrary structurings of chaos, and the question is not whether they are true but whether we should believe them, and why." What matters is what kind of life our ideas make possible:

[I]t was precisely during their period of dissolution and weakness that the Greeks became ever more optimistic, more superficial, more actory, but also filled with a greater lust for logic and for making the world logical, which is to say both more 'cheerful' and more 'scientific' ....
For all his condemnation of rationality, Nietzsche recognized and even commended it as humanity’s principal tool of survival—a tool we dare not do without, in order to obtain consistency, security and repose. Nietzsche warned that the person who pays more attention to intuition than to conception is fated to keep falling over into the same ditch. Rationality also creates “a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations and clearly marked boundaries” which enables humans to accomplish the simple tasks of living. And if simple projects and physical survival require rationality, then so of course do “higher” pursuits: “There can be neither society nor culture without untruth. The tragic conflict. Everything which is good and beautiful depends upon illusion ....”

**Nietzsche’s Epistemology of Intuition**

Human beings are continually engaged in two kinds of knowledge, as Nietzsche saw it: the system-building of rationality, and an intuitive, imaginative experience of the world. Without the former, experience would not be sensible enough to allow us to formulate intention. But without the latter we find ourselves trapped in archaic habits of thought and action. Every rational system contains the seeds of its own demise and reconstruction. We have the power to escape the prison of our conceptual world and revitalize our experience—to de-construct and creatively re-construct our rational knowledge systems—all by virtue of that same drive and faculty which prompted us to create knowledge in the first place:

The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought .... This drive continually confuses the conceptual categories and cells by bringing forward new transferences, metaphors, and metonymies. It continually manifests an ardent desire to refashion the world which presents itself to waking man, so that it will be as colorful, irregular, lacking in results and coherence, charming, and eternally new as the world of dreams.”

Nietzsche’s account of intuition constitutes a separate epistemology: a theory of knowing, and of justifying a certain set of claims to knowledge. By “intuition” Nietzsche may, at times, have been referring to a pre-perceptual connection with reality. In most cases, however, he seems to have been referring to metaphorical perceptions themselves, which, though they are already interpretations, constitute our most immediate and provocative experience of the world:
As a "rational" being, Imanj now places his behavior under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. For he universalizes all these impressions into less colorful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to them. For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations and clearly marked boundaries—a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world.10

Perceptive intuition is not intellectual but sensational. It is more feeling than thought,11 since it is only once-removed from raw somatic nerve stimuli. Thus it is more vivid, emotional, and holistic than conception.32 Also, the regularity that perception imposes on empirical phenomena is not sufficient to make the phenomena rational to us—to facilitate human purpose and action. Perception is more varied and complex than is conception. Perceptual metaphors are not formed instrumentally, toward any rational purpose, and so they are essentially creative, imaginative, aesthetic, erotic and playful.

Nietzsche exalted both imagination and will as liberating forces pitted against conventional thought and action and capable of disrupting, overthrowing, and/or re-directing the work of reason. In this way he avoided Schopenhauer's pessimism. And unlike Schopenhauer, Nietzsche did not postulate intuition as a privileged means of knowledge. For Nietzsche, the authenticity of intuition is personal and existential rather than universal. Nietzsche's intuitive man is not privy to Truth but to authentic experience. He does not know the world as it really is, only the world as his imagination would have it. Indeed, this may be more of the world than is dreamed of in conventional knowledge.33 He cultivates original, non-conforming experience, and then uses his intellect to sport with convention. This is in contrast to the rational man, for whom conventional wisdom limits the experience of which he is capable.34

That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, it is
demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. There is no regular path which leads from these intuitions to the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions. There exists no word for these intuitions. When man sees them he grows dumb or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present intuition.

In order to survive and grow in significance, an intuition must find the vehicle of a metaphor that makes it communicable: that generalizes its meaning without diluting its sensational power. It must move others to a similar intuition (a task which the idiosyncracy of intuition makes difficult), and must be found useful enough to warrant a challenge of the convention. But the very fact of nonconformity makes intuition vulnerable. Every social convention is a mode of organizing experience that has had some practical value to some community. The most tyrannical conceptual systems are only rational elaborations of erotico-poetic experiences had by someone at some time. They serve, or once served, adaptive functions, and so to turn one's back on convention can be dangerous. And of course, social conventions are sites of social power, so that even to be susceptible to nonconforming intuition already makes one an outlaw. Nietzsche warned that,

the run-of-the-mill sorts of men were and always are at an advantage.
The extraordinary, the sensitive, the strange and difficult to understand sort of men easily remain alone, or, through their apartness, meet with mishap, and seldom propagate themselves.

What's more, the most aberrant and primal intuition that mocks and threatens to shatter convention, if it is to be communicated and acted on, is bound to be conceptualized and rationalized, to lose its metaphorical efficacy, and eventually be challenged by fresh intuition. But the demise of a metaphor or a conceptual system may be protracted, even indefinitely, for these do not die of themselves, but must be supplanted by nonconforming intuition. It hardly seems possible for a nonconforming intuition to acquire enough significance and power to overthrow a rational convention. But Nietzsche saw himself in the line of artists, saints and prophets who swing their hammers of intuition at the tablets of convention. For Nietzsche, philosophy is the practice of cultivating authentic, non-rational experience in order to overthrow conventional knowledge and morality.
CONCLUSION

I'm not very interested in the import of Nietzsche's epistemology for philosophy of language, and I want especially to avoid its metaphysical implications. My most impassioned response to these ideas happens as I consider them politically, and especially in the context of the compulsory education of children. I find it encouraging that so many of Nietzsche's ideas about knowledge, desire and power have been reiterated and extended by philosophers of education like Dewey, Whitehead, Foucault and others. I'm encouraged that notions like fallibilism, dead metaphors, cultural horizons, and extra-rational criteria are so commonplace among educational theorists. But I'm discouraged that few of them have matched Nietzsche's radical ambivalence toward rational knowledge.

The educational philosophy I find most amenable to this ambivalence is pragmatism. Actually, I see pragmatism as a logical extension of Nietzsche's theory of rationality. Pragmatists manage to champion rationality as a useful tool for coping with our surroundings, while remembering to worry about fallibility; and all the time they manage to postpone indefinitely the question of whether this instrumental knowledge we keep re-making is getting any closer to representing the world as it exists outside of our representations. Pragmatist educators stress the acquisition by students of creative and rational inquiry skills that empower them—even as children—to take part in this evolutionary project of reconstructing knowledge.

But Nietzsche's theory of rationality was only half of his epistemology. So I'd like to conclude by raising two ideas from his theory of intuition, that I believe merit some pedagogical experimentation. Unfortunately, I will have to leave the development of these ideas for another paper. The first idea is that we should all be invited to cultivate intuitive/imaginative experience, of the caliber that can disrupt some of our rational habits of mind and body. Nietzsche's description of an intuitive rapport with the world reminds me of how Chuang-Tze described Taoist sages, and of how William James described religious geniuses, who salivate and fall over in the thrall of their visions. And James says that the infirmity of their hold on rationality—be it congenital or cultivated—is a prerequisite for their spiritual or aesthetic receptivity. But then to practice this kind of reverie requires more than exercising our imaginations. For most of us it will take some kind of ritual or ceremony to sufficiently remove ourselves from our rationalist habits of thought, feeling and movement, that we become open to fresh impressions and new perspectives. I would venture to say that after a thorough public education, it might
take a ritual as dramatic as an extended fast, isolating oneself in the desert, the use of mind-altering substances, or the like, to really open the door to what Nietzsche and others have described—which precludes the possibility for some of us. How far are we willing to go, personally? As educators, how far are we willing to lead our students toward this experience?

The second idea is that we must learn—and help our students to learn—how to articulate our intuitive insights:

What is originality? To see something that has no name as yet and hence cannot be mentioned although it scares us all in the face. The way men usually are, it takes a name to make something visible for them.—Those with originality have for the most part also assigned names.4

We must learn to craft visual and verbal metaphors that for a while might startle others into the same intuitions. We must learn how to communicate our new impressions—to ourselves and others—and use them to challenge current conventions of knowing and doing. Yes, this means we must rationalize them and, if they are worth it, institutionalize them—make them into personal and collective habits—until they outlive their usefulness.

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Notes

1 Nietzsche addressed epistemology early in his philosophical career and left that work largely undeveloped but secure, in that his later work is consistent with it.

2 In this regard, Raymond Geuss observes that “Modern culture”, in the sense of that term Nietzsche insists on using, starts in mid-fifth-century Athens with Socrates. It is essentially theoretical or scientific in that it assumes that knowledge (not custom or the most aesthetically pleasing words of the best poets) should be our guide in life…. Nietzsche clearly holds that it is appropriate to call ‘modern’ nineteenth-century culture ‘Socratic’ in the wider sense of being essentially devoted to the pursuit and application of propositionally articulated ‘theoretical knowledge’ and incapable of conceiving that anything else could be an appropriate guide for how to live.” Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy And Other Writings, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Perss, 1999). pp. xvi-xvii.


4 It is uncertain what Nietzsche meant with this phrase. Clearly, he was not affirming the Cartesian dualism of mind and body as ontologically different spheres; Nietzsche favored a naturalistic—a physiological—account of perception and cognition. Perhaps he meant simply that every subject is physically and physiologically separate, or distant, from every object. In any case, the result, for Nietzsche, was epistemological separateness: the character of objects providing no basis for the adequacy of a subject’s images and expectations of them. In case this is what he meant, the claim that subject and object belong to different spheres must not be read as a premise to the conclusion that the two are epistemologically separate, which
would be a question-begging inference; it should be read merely as another way of describing that epistemological separateness.

5 Breazeale, p. 82.
6 Ibid., p. 86
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., pp. 84-5.
9 “The initial power [of imaginative transference] produces an equation of things that are unequal .... The existence of concepts, forms, etc. is based on this.” Ibid., p. 94.
11 “The ‘thing in itself’ ... is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relation of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors.” Breazeale, p. 82.
12 Ibid., 83.
13 Breazeale notes that, “according to the theory of language and concept formation developed ... in (On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense), the distinction between “literal” and “metaphorical” usage is entirely relative—a difference in degree rather than kind.” Ibid., p. 89, n. 10.
14 One of the most interesting aspects of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is the uncanny detail with which his conception of the will presages Freud’s conception of the id, as a drive toward bodily gratification, which operates as the unconscious motivation for human behavior. The epistemological import of will, for Nietzsche, was that unlike perception, which was playful and artistic, conception had an agenda: the will to power.
15 Breazeale, pp. 85-6.
16 Ibid., p. 84. Nietzsche also wrote: “From boredom and necessity, man wishes to exist socially and with the herd; therefore he needs to make peace and strives accordingly to banish from his world at least the most flagrant bellum omnium contra. This peace treaty brings in its wake something which appears to be the first step toward acquiring that puzzling truth drive: to wit, that which shall count as ‘truth’ from now on is established. That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth.” Ibid., p. 81.
17 Compare Alfred North Whitehead: “Now, when we examine how a society bends its individual members to function in conformity with its needs, we discover that one important operative agency is our vast system of inherited symbolism.... The response of action to symbol may be so direct as to cut out any effective reference to the ultimate thing symbolized. This elimination of meaning is termed reflex action.” Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect: Barbour-Page Lectures, University of Virginia, 1927 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1927), p. 75.
18 As Danto reiterates Nietzsche’s idea, “The languages we have commit us spontaneously to a metaphysics of the world it is meant to describe.” Arthur Danto: Nietzsche As Philosopher (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965, 1980), p. 87.
19 Breazeale, p. 88.
20 Ibid., p. 89.
21 “Even skepticism contains a belief: the belief in logic.” Ibid., p. 94.
22 Danto, p. 72.
24 “As a means for the preserving of the individual, the intellect unfolds its principle pow-
ers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves—since they have been denied the chance to wage the battle for existence with horns or with the sharp teeth of beasts of prey. This art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man.” Breazeale, p. 80.

25 “As soon as we see a new image, we immediately construct it with the aid of all our previous experiences, depending on the degree of our honesty and justice.... We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live—by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life. But that does not prove them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might include error.” Nietzsche: *The Gay Science (With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs)*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 173, 177. “It is only by means of the rigid and regular web of concepts that the waking man clearly sees that he is awake .... Conception helps us distinguish reality, however poorly grasped, from dreams and fantasies; it prevents us from being ‘carried away by sudden impressions.’” Breazeale, p. 89.

26 Ibid., 91.

27 Breazeale notes that among the blessings of conception is “selective forgetfulness”—that ability to focus attention on certain regulative details of experience that make it meaningful to us, that allow us to understand it and formulate intention toward it. See Ibid., p. 33, note 68. The lack of this ability was dramatized to horrifying effect by Jorge Louis Borges in his story, “Funes the Memoria” *Ficciones* (New York: Grove Press 1962), p. 107.

28 Breazeale, p. 92.

29 Ibid., pp. 88-9.

30 Ibid., p. 84.

31 “Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings—always darker, emptier, and simpler.” *The Gay Science*, p. 203.

32 “[P]hilosophizing was always a kind of vampirism.... Don’t you sense a long concealed vampire in the background who begins with the senses and in the end is left with, and leaves, mere bones. mere clatter? I mean categories, formulas, words ....” Ibid., p. 333.

33 Arthur Danto explains: “[I]t is an open possibility that one may escape, not, to be sure, from ideas to reality itself, for that is permanently closed to us, but from one set of ideas to another. It is always at least possible to build a world upon the basis of one’s intuitions, however difficult this may prove in execution.” Danto, p. 41.

34 Compare Alfred North Whitehead’s distinction between primary and secondary thoughts. Primary thoughts arise directly from sense-presentation, are not verbal, but are direct apprehensions of qualities and relations within the content of consciousness. So the field of actual experience is disorderly, fragmentary, a *continuum*, with elements not clearly differentiated, radically untidy, ill-adjusted. Secondary thought organizes—divides and quantifies—the stream of experience known in primary thought. Secondary thought is the way we come to think of things, not from abstract necessity, but because we have inherited that method of organizing experience, which can only be laid aside by an immense effort, and then only for isolated short periods of time. *The Aims of Education and Other Essays* (New York: The Free Press, 1929), pp. 106, 123-6.

35 Breazeale, p. 90.

36 Nietzsche once wrote, for example, “I caught this insight on the way and quickly seized the rather poor words that were closest to hand to pin it down lest it fly away again. And now it has died of these arid words and shakes and flaps in them—and I hardly know any more when I look at it how I could ever have felt so happy when I caught this bird.” *The Gay Science*, p. 239.

37 Rorty explains it perhaps better than Nietzsche: “We call something ‘fantasy’ rather than ‘poetry’ or ‘philosophy’ when it revolves around metaphors which do not catch on with
other people — that is, around ways of speaking or acting which the rest of us cannot find a use for. But Freud shows us how something which seems pointless or ridiculous or vile to society can become the crucial element in the individual's sense of who she is. Conversely, when some private obsession produces a metaphor which we can find a use for, we speak of genius rather than of eccentricity or perversity. The difference between genius and fantasy is not the difference between impressions which lock on to something universal, some antecedent reality out there in the world or deep within the self, and those which do not. Rather, it is the difference between idiosyncrasies which just happen to catch on with other people — happen because of the contingencies of some historical situation, some particular need which a given community happens to have at a given time. Nietzsche, poetic, artistic, philosophical, scientific, or political progress results from the accidental coincidence of a private obsession with a public need. Contingency, irony and solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 37.

38 Beyond Good and Evil, p. 268, cited in Danto, p. 123. This of course, gives rise to Nietzsche's admonition: "The secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is—to live dangerously!" The Gay Science, p. 228.

39 Danto has it: "[T]he conceptual systems which men fabricate out of a primordially poetic rapport with experience, rise, are modified through art, and fall." Danto, p. 44.

40 Nietzsche pre-figures Foucault in charging that the legitimation of certain kinds and sources of knowledge is a partly a function of social power: "[M]an's greatest labor so far has been to reach agreement about very many things and to submit to a law of agreement—regardless of whether these things are true or false. This is the discipline of the mind that mankind has received; but the contrary impulses are still so powerful that at bottom we cannot speak of the future of mankind with much confidence." The Gay Science, pp. 130-31.

41 "What makes a person noble?... It involves the use of a rare and singular standard and almost a madness: the feeling of heat in things that feel cold to everybody else; the discovery of values for which no scales have been invented yet ...." Ibid., p. 117.

42 "The nature of genius has been illuminated by the attempts to class it with psychopathological phenomena. Borderland insanity, crankiness, insane temperament, loss of mental balance, psychopathic degeneration, has certain peculiarities which, when combined with a superior intellect make it more probable that the individual will make his mark and affect his age than if his temperament were less neurotic.... If there were such a thing as inspiration from a higher realm, it might well be that the neurotic temperament would furnish the chief condition of the requisite receptivity." William James: The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Triumph Books 1991), pp. 36, 37.

43 Nietzsche described our predicament: "There is a stupid humility that is not at all rare, and those afflicted with it are altogether unfit to become devotees of knowledge. As soon as a person of this type perceives something striking, he turns on his heel, as it were, and says to himself: You have made a mistake. What is the matter with your senses? This cannot, may not, be the truth." And then, instead of looking and listening again, more carefully, he runs away from the striking thing, as if he had been intimidated, and tries to remove it from his mind as far as he can. For his inner cannon says: "I do not want to see anything that contradicts the prevalent opinion. Am I called to discover new truths? There are too many older ones, as it is." Ibid., p. 100.

44 Ibid., p. 218.

45 "We who think and feel at the same time are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations." Ibid., p. 242.
In the Lettre à M. d'Alembert, Rousseau writes that "to ask if spectacles are good or bad in themselves is to ask too vague a question ... it is to examine a rapport before having fixed its terms." He adds that "spectacles are made for people, and it is only by their effects on [people] that one can determine their absolute qualities" (66-67). Thus Rousseau's opposition to the establishment of a théâtre de comédie in Geneva is certainly not an absolute rejection of theatre, but rather a questioning of theatre's function within a definite context. For Rousseau, "man is one ... but man modified by religions, by governments, by laws, by customs, by prejudices, and by climates becomes so diverse that it is no longer possible to look for what is good for men in general, but only for what is good for them at a certain time or place" (67).

Rousseau's claims concerning the damaging effects of theatre must therefore be seen as nuanced; it is the frame of mind one presents and the way one puts theatre into practice, not its very existence, that need to be reconsidered. As an imitation of nature and a source of knowledge, theatre is a way of rediscovering the self, for Rousseau recalls elsewhere that "the stage in general is a tableau of human passions, of which the original is in all hearts" (68-69). What makes theatre dangerous is the possibility that it might become a tool of distortion that turns away from nature. Thus Rousseau fears "that one might incessantly need to bind one's heart to the stage, as if it were ill at ease within oneself," and that it may be "the loss of simple and natural tastes which makes extraneous amusement so necessary." In fact man has enough with just "pleasures which derive from nature" (65). These pleasures satisfy
the natural man because they offer all the means of expression favoring absolute communication and self-unity.

With his knowledge of the classics, Rousseau is obviously conscious of the nebulosity surrounding the topics of representation and expression, and it is not by chance that all of his works are saturated with a series of preoccupations that concentrate on the study of being and appearance, on form and its foundations. If this major opposition of being with appearance is evident to every reader of Rousseau, the paradoxical and contradictory positions he seems to take according to the discourse he is engaged in can lead to confusion regarding his lucidity and intentions. In fact the unprepared reader might hastily conclude that for Rousseau theatre is a corrupting force only of importance in situations in which innocence has already been forever lost.

But if the very presence of a theatre in a community is for Rousseau a sign of moral dissolution and of a need to reestablish human integrity, one can ask why he chose to adopt a series of mises en scène as the main tool in Emile's education, as a way to lead an innocent being to the threshold of consciousness and make him the incarnation of the balanced and conscious adult. Rousseau's concern about the establishment of theatre in Geneva actually goes beyond worry about an immediate, practical matter. The problematic needs to be understood not as pertaining to theatrical representation itself, but to theatre as offering a false representation of the object it tends to represent. As an external incarnation of internal vision, theatre ought to be true in its reproduction of the world. With the aid of the points of view of Plato and of Aristotle, we will define Rousseau's position regarding the traditional debate over representation, clarifying his stance in relation to these authors and to more modern perspectives. Our study will center on two works, the Lettre à M. d'Alembert and Emile.¹

Traditionally representation has been simultaneously perceived as having both positive and negative effects. In book 10 of the Republic, Plato defines representation in terms of an opposition between the ideal (the form) and reality (the thing). For Plato, reality is nothing but a copy of the ideal deforming the ideal's authenticity. A primary problem here is that Plato establishes a hierarchy for the concepts he uses. In the domain of perception and reception of the idea, a definite order appears by which one can determine the true. Representation of the ideal can only offer vulgar imitation, a copy, a doubling that leads to duplicity.

A further difficulty unfolds with regard to art — the problem of the means or medium by which the ideal is communicated to the public with the intention of public instruction. For Plato, to the extent that it is mediated,
representation via imitation can only lead to contamination of judgment and distancing of the subject from the "real nature of things." Thus for Plato the poet can only play a nefarious role in society, for he must have recourse to art in restituting the true. All means which permit the poet to communicate are so many signs (simulacrum) that distance the receiver of the message from the "real nature of things." Moreover the poet, who has no direct knowledge or experience of that which he relates, must use his imagination. The artist and by extension art are forms of seduction, means of insisting on the common and obliterating the ideal.

Already one can see emerging the traditional problem of representation linked to the ideas of the origin and of authenticity. The poet and artist have no place in the ideal society because they contribute to the stupefaction of consciousness and offer only a factitious knowledge of "the real nature of things." The poet has no role in the moral enterprise of education because his art derives from representation, from the simulacrum.

Knowing that Rousseau has an aversion for anything that masks or deforms truth, one can reconcile his perspective with Plato's insofar as Rousseau desires that every mode of communication have no other end than presenting the truth—or more exactly the truth of humanity's true nature—and to the extent that he thinks that the theatre can bring nothing to human knowledge that is not already present in humanity.

I would appreciate it if someone could clearly and without verbiage show me by what means (theatre) can produce sentiments in us that we have not already had, and make us judge moral beings who differ from those we judge in ourselves. How peurile and devoid of sense are all these vain, profound pretentions! Ah, if the beauty of virtue were a work of art, it would have been disfigured long ago. As for me, though one might accuse me of nastiness for daring to maintain that man is born good, I think it and believe I have proved it: the source of interest that attaches us to that which is honest, and inspires aversion in us for evil, is in us and not in our plays. Art has nothing to do with producing that interest, but only with taking advantage of it. The love of beauty is a sentiment as natural to the human heart as the love of oneself; it is not born in the arrangement of stages, the author does not bring it there, he finds it.... (Lettre, 76. My emphasis.)

Starting from the idea that the Genevan is a natural being and basing his argument on the effect theatre has in a great city like Paris, Rousseau emphasizes theatre's secondary influence as an institution whose attributes amount only to diverse forms of seduction. Though Rousseau does not automatical-
ly condemn imitation as a reprehensible form of instruction and of restitu-
ing reality in an artificial context, he does see in spectacles that are organized
to suit public taste a way of encouraging people to become interested in a
type of diversion which pleases instead of instructs. The paradox once again
resides not precisely in a criticism of pleasure but in a criticism of the arti-
ficial and circuitous character of a pleasure whose source is not the natural and
sober sentiments of satisfaction but rather a desire to escape the self. By
ardently following theatre one forgets to look into oneself and so to know
how to be self-contented. Rousseau's criticism thus only aims at frivolous
pleasures whose practice is useless, for in forgetting the self and the other,
man comes to live a fiction derived from lies. Rousseau in fact tells us that at
the theatre "each person isolates himself; it is there one goes to forget friends,
neighbors, and acquaintances, to interest oneself in fables, to cry for the sor-
rows of death or smile at the cost of the living" (66).

Rousseau considers theatre reprehensible when it presents a message that
leads man to superficiality and hardened sentiments rather than to self-
knowledge. It is obvious that for Rousseau, metropolitan theatre has become
a mode of expression created by a degenerate, barely introspective public ded-
icated to vice and corruption. Theatre is thus bound to the perverted tastes
of diverse people who only want to stir up passion. Underlining how the
playwright depends on spectator approval for survival, Rousseau specifies
that "Far from choosing ... the passion he would like to win us over to, [the
author] must choose those we love," so that "theatre purges passions one does
not have, and foments those one does have" (73-74). The stage has become
a place where the arts of author and actor only offer compromised truths and
integrity. Far from describing human passions as they are, the author and
hence the actors modify them to capture the interest of the public and follow
the values of the nation. Since as a medium theatre serves national caprices,
Rousseau maintains that it occupies a secondary rank in the hierarchy of
modes of communication that aim to educate and ameliorate man, for
"instead of giving the law to the public [it] receives it from it" (75). Rousseau
cynically notices a fact that one could apply to current debates about televi-
sion: theatre does not have "the power to change either sentiments or habits
that it can only follow and embellish" (69).

The insistent criticism Rousseau develops in the letter is in fact a study
of the consequences of an inflation and an alteration of sense adapted to the
tastes of a public destitute of reason and common sense. This general con-
spiracy of spectators, authors and actors which aims ultimately to produce or
follow whatever is popular creates chaos. The popular becomes a mode of
representation that distracts us from our essence, transporting us into appearances and removing us from the real nature of things. However, what pleases the masses is not, for Rousseau, the sole factor contributing to the subversion of the true; the poet's very art helps create a supplementary, artificial standard. Rousseau specifies that theatre by nature demands stylization and adaptation of genres in light of imagined criteria (comedy as well as tragedy), so that the playwright's art involves modifying reality to the detriment of any usefulness in fiction. To support his claim, Rousseau paraphrases Muralt and even cites Aristotle:

It's an error ... to expect that someone ... will accurately show [in a play] the true relations of things: for in general, the poet can only alter relations to accommodate them to the people's taste. In the comic, he diminishes them and puts them below man; in the tragic, he stretches them to render them heroic, and put them above humanity. Thus, these relations never are to his measure, and we always see in theatre beings who are not like us. I will add that this difference is so true and so obvious that Aristotle made it a rule in his Poetics. (81-82; my emphasis.)

This "art for art," Rousseau maintains, contributes to a spoilage of the truth of illusion; "what does the truth of imitation matter if illusion is there" (8; my emphasis)? From this comes another troublesome consequence born of the imposture of imitations that do not uniquely deform truth. The spectator who does not recognize himself does not identify, for he sees in the spectacle a play that lets him both dissociate himself and distance himself.

Thus [we see] all these grand sentiments and all these brilliant maxims that one speaks highly of with so much emphasis, regulate them forever to the stage, and show ourselves virtue as theatrical play, good for amusing the public, but ... folly to want to seriously transpose to society. (80)

One can see in Rousseau's judgments a philosophy similar to that of Plato since it sees in the artistic character of the theatre a means of distancing oneself from the true in the manufacturing of the false. Plays, stages, actors and the public contribute together in the unnecessary creation of the superficial and the artificial. Nevertheless, Rousseau's objections concentrate on theatre as a degenerate institution. When he deals with the spontaneous source of original Greek theatre, his opinions become more nuanced.

Indeed, though Rousseau repudiates theatre as merely additional, as destabilizing and existing without legitimate foundation, he reminds us that
Greek theatre did not have an aura of supplementarity, for it developed from the core of the nation and its practices. In such conditions, one can only have a perfect integration of being and appearance, and through that continuity of comportment and the situation of the people, moral integrity comes to rule. As a means of expressing the sacred in the individual, theatre, in that it recalls its noble and divine constitution, cannot be considered nefarious. It appeals to the exaltation of the universal, and even more to the laws of nature. In this manifestation it does not move man away from his center, but calls him back to it (see Lettre, pp. 160-161).

Through this positive comparison to Greek theatre, one can see how the Rosseauist debate over truth situates itself in a sphere leading again to authenticity itself. It leads us to a criticism of the rapport of a corrupt theatre and the morality that Rousseau sought to achieve. Greek theatre does not give rise to supplementary myths but marks the importance of continuity and tradition. One can note here the difference between supplementarity and continuation. If theatre ends up merely presenting false and frivolous ideas, it can only be negative since it brings with it a suite of infernal interpretations completely removed from noble values. But if theatre offers continuity to the wholesome qualities of a people and even exalts them, its force rests in its detachment from public opinion and in its ability to ameliorate and perpetuate good morals. Rousseau here validates the didactic aspect of theatre that Aristotle stresses; even though theatre does not report facts faithfully, it elevates man.

Turning briefly to the role of representation as Aristotle describes it in his Poetics, we can say that unlike Plato, Aristotle saw representation as linked with the diffusion of knowledge, more particularly with the comprehension and recognition of the human condition. What counts, for Aristotle, is not the facts of history, but what could happen. Thus in the process of restituting reality, representation plays a redemptive and even superior role since it warns humanity against possible pitfalls, or even informs common mortals of universal types of comportment. Representation thus participates in the formation of thought and of self-knowledge in its quest for perfection.

For Aristotle, consequently, a displacement of priorities occurs in any concentration on the problem of the hierarchy of origins instead of on the action of representation as an art, a positive technique for reproducing universal knowledge. In the fictive unrolling of events that it restitutes, art can inform and instruct on condition that it offer facts or actions that reenact universal conditions.

This technique of reproducing universal knowledge through art is the approach that Rousseau chose to adopt in Emile. To reduce his tract on edu-
cation to a basic, utilizable moral discourse on a child's development, Rousseau adopted staging to recreate direct experience and establish a social though non-anthropocentric discourse. In order to communicate the message of nature to the child, Rousseau presents a series of *mises en scène* that can be associated in function to myth or fable. These stagings present Emile with a natural and symbolic expression of the human condition, much like what one finds in mythic tales. Rousseau's technique in fact offers nothing astonishing if one recalls that the works lie calls fables in a pejorative context present lies and not nature in itself. If in the *Lettre à M. d'Alembert* he criticizes French plays as "nothing but pure fable" (83), what he deplores is the falsity of their "lessons." But in *Emile* the fables of LaFontaine are not condemned as lies, but as forms too complex for the child's psychology. Always Rousseau's stagings repeat a set of symbolic messages aimed at enhancing the child's maturation and at protecting the growth of conscience.

Indeed, the mode of instruction adopted by the pedagogue in *Emile* suggests that through the process of instruction, Emile learns to identify himself to the other by recognizing the other in himself. To this end the master selects a series of *mises en scène* in which identification plays a key role. Through mimesis Emile learns to know and comprehend the world and develops a moral sense. Thus one could say that the master's instruction is a veiled manifestation of pity, which Rousseau describes in diverse works as a natural means of knowing and understanding the laws of nature and of being. The master's stagings serve to sensitize Emile to the human condition.

Looking at only four examples (the mask scene, the scene in the garden, the scene at the fair, and the scene in the forest) we can see the importance of repetition and identification as a means of learning. The diverse phases of trying to adapt the infant to ugliness by means of masks and the reactions of his entourage develops the child's responses via imitation. The incidents of the garden and the fair have a different dimension in that each presents a variation on the significance of identification and the function of pity. In Emile's apprenticeship as a gardener, for instance, the infant starts to garden after seeing the master demonstrate a taste for working the earth. Rousseau assures us that "the child will not have seen work in the garden two time ... before he will want to garden himself" (330)." By identifying with the master the child gains a taste for gardening. As the master says, "I work with him, not for his pleasure but for mine, or at least so he thinks" (330). By facing a situation similar to that of Robert, the gardener whose garden has been destroyed, the child learns (via deception) to sense compassion. The garden incident permits an exploration of self-love through mediated experience.
At another level of consciousness, one can see the experience of the fair as using mimesis to present *amour-propre* to Emile and secure him against it. After unconsciously trying to humiliate the juggler, the child himself experiences humiliation and learns to remain content within himself, not to seek satisfaction in popularity.

In the scene in the forest, the child learns, once again by imitating the master's reactions, to act in a fashion appropriate to circumstances. This incident shows Emile the usefulness of knowledge. Here the master involves himself more directly in the staging, playing in some ways the same role as Emile, though of course with variations. Just like Emile, he is lost (or pretends to be), and just like Emile, he seems worried. However, unlike Emile, who grows alarmed and starts to cry, the master seeks to find a solution by using knowledge intelligently to both their profit. Now posing *not as Emile's double, but rather as his model*, the master can incite Emile to behave appropriately. The dialogue shows the parallel structuring used in this example. To the alarmed question of the master “How are we going to get out of here?” Emile responds, “I don’t know. I’m tired; I’m hungry; I’m thirsty; I can’t go farther.” To this the master exclaims:

*Do you think I’m in better shape than you, and do you think I’d hesitate to cry if I could eat my tears? It won’t help to cry, we need to get our bearings. Look at your watch; what time is it?*

**Emile:** *It’s midday, and I haven’t had breakfast.*

**Jean-Jacques:** *That’s true; it’s midday, and I haven’t had breakfast.*

**Emile:** *Oh, you should be hungry, etc.... (449)*

All the situations elaborated by the master aim at making the child relive the steps in the development of consciousness. In fact, one can associate the recurrent structure of these symbolic messages to mythic and fabulous structures described in the formalist tradition to bring to light the practical impact of a definite form on a type of universal narration such as the folktale. The identification of constitutive parts of the discourse permits the isolation of a mechanism of repetition aiming at developing a conscience that is both individual and collective. Rousseau’s choice of a series of stagings in his system of education through which inherent structures recreate the morphology of the myth in the functions they represent brings us back to the question of similarities between the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and Rousseau. Plato and Aristotle recognized myth’s role in the maturation of consciousness, and the telling of myth is considered an efficacious means of developing the ego in psychology. Bruno Bettelheim, for instance, stresses myth’s functions...
in his chapter "Fairy Tale versus Myth" \textit{(The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales)} \cite{Bettelheim1976} Thanks to its symbolic function, myth broaches the boundaries of consciousness in a way that helps to initiate major transformations in the ego. Interestingly, Bettelheim cites Plato and Aristotle as advocates of this didactic function of myth:

> Plato—who may have understood better what forms the mind of man than do some of our contemporaries who want their children exposed only to "real" people and everyday events—knew what intellectual experiences make for true humanity. He suggested that the future citizens of his ideal republic begin their literary education with the telling of myths, rather than with mere facts or so-called rational teachings. Even Aristotle, master of pure reason, said: "The friend of wisdom is also a friend of myth." (35)

Recalling Plato’s and Aristotle’s influence on Rousseau, and also the conditions in which Rousseau intended to raise the child, one should not be surprised that the means Rousseau uses to influence the child hearken back to the mythic and fabulous. Whatever intention Rousseau may have had in using staging to put the child in contact with reality and with the world of things, one of his main concerns is that the child not be exposed prematurely to others. It is in fact essential, according to Rousseau, to isolate the child from others, at least while he is young, thus avoiding contamination by vice.

The esthetic character of myth and of fable rests more than in other poetic genres on a genetic form that serves to facilitate the production and the reception of the message through the action. In fabulous or mythic works, the text produces itself through repetitive signifying structures that aid vis-à-vis the action in the evolution of a character whose mimetic qualities facilitate the process of identification.\cite{Ricoeur1981} Thus it is only a logical step to ensure that Emile relive the narration of the fable and the ritualization of myth via theatre, a form of instruction that tries as much as possible to reduce the distance between knowledge and its restitution, to reduce communication to a form of authentic reading of one’s true and universal condition.

It seems appropriate here to recall the role mimesis plays as it is described by Paul Ricoeur in his interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of poetic metaphor.\cite{Ricoeur1981} Myths and fables and the functions they play in Emile’s education link easily with the first fable that Aristotle associates with tragedy. For Aristotle, Ricoeur tells us, a complex and vital relation exists between mythos (the first fable) and the function of mimesis in poetic language. It is in fact only by mimesis that the first fable could live and incarnate itself. More than a simple representation of nature, mimesis, as an integrating part of the poet-
ic function in the fable, adds an active and tangible dimension to the human tragedy. By linking imitation to identification, mimesis becomes a form of language existing at the second degree, propulsing the narration forward to let it become human in its significance.

The combination of myth and fable thus becomes a way of associating two poetic visions of the world, one figurative, or emblematic or symbolic, the other figured, or decorative and directly mimetic. Their combination also simultaneously incorporates many levels of human time. To the extent that myth describes existence symbolically, this mode of discourse reconstructs and situates a universal present. The fable, which relates what could occur in a complete, accomplished form, presents the future or eventual while its production relates it to the past. These forms of discourse work as officially determined modes of narration that contextualize time and space and personify passions that illustrate natural human history and propensities.

Thus the diverse zones of human time in myths and fables render the master's task easier since they allow him to incorporate pre-arranged structures in a specific order chosen according to the opportune moments of physiological, psychological, and emotive growth Emile goes through. However, Rousseau does take into account the possibility of unexpected situations susceptible of deforming the primordial order of his educative art. In such cases, one must restore a mode of poetic language by improvising scenes, juxtaposing dramatic interpretations on the “action” and “decor” of lived moments, to suppress inopportune signs so that the situation can be read according to the principles of the book of nature.

Because of the master's efforts to make Emile an accomplished reader of his true nature, Emile's education comes about largely through organized or improvised mises en scène. The pedagogue's stagings attempt to reenforce the message of nature while placing it at the second level, thereby eliminating the need for direct discourse and establishing a set of dialogues that leads above all to reasoning. The script, which makes the master disappear as an interlocuter, then represents the discourse of justice as diffused in action. The use of a theatrical method thus has as its aim to combine the reality of the world with the symbolism of a moral discourse reflected within boundaries and in immediate actions, without interference, without interruption.

To recall Rousseau's ideas regarding theatre, then, one can see that Emile's instruction by means of a type of theatre that recreates the first fable is permissible because this theatrical form is characterized by qualities exactly opposed to those Rousseau condemns in his Lettre à M. d'Alembert. Thanks to this structure the inherent functioning of which repeats by imitation
and identification the diverse natural and universal moments of development of consciousness in its becoming, Emile’s education encourages a constant return to the self, sensibility, compassion, recognition of the similarity between the other and the self, and an integration of sentiments of equilibrium rather than a dissimulation of being. One can thus metaphorically call that theatre which has lost its guiding function, of which Rousseau speaks in the *Lettre à M. d’Alembert*, a theatre of vanity or of *amour-propre* (or in other words the theatre of disintegration of the self). On the other hand, one can characterize the instructive theatre of *Emile*, whose form repeats and encourages in constant though varying fashion the modification of consciousness in its maturation, the “natural theatre of illusion and of imitations,” or the theatre of pity, its expression restituing in diverse ways the multiple variations of the dynamic of sympathy and of universal pity identified by Rousseau as the eternal order expressed in the universal law.

NOTES

1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Lettre à M. d’Alembert sur son article Genève* (Paris: GF/Flammarion, 1967). Hereafter cited as *Lettre*. Passages from this work and from all cited French works have been translated by the author.


4 It is evident that it is not the form that Rousseau condemns, but the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of that form. Imitation does not automatically have a reprehensible impact. It is only when imitation and illusion do not reveal the natural that Rousseau’s criticism becomes biting, as one can see in the criticism of Parisian theatre made in *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, letter XVII, part II. According to Rousseau, the loss of *unaisemblance* in French theatre “comes from the fact that the Frenchman does not look to the stage for the natural and the illusory and does not want spirit and thought from it; he pays attention to pleasure and not imitation and does not care to be seduced as long as he is amused.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse,” *Œuvres complètes*, II, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: NRF/Gallimard, 1964), p. 254.

5 It is interesting to note that conversely to Rousseau Aristotle does not make a moral judgment when he makes this description.


7 One can recognize here the influence of Condillac, who sees in conscious imitation the development of personal individuality. Condillac, *Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines*.


Before studying fairy tales as a category apart from popular tales, Propp compares the
study of tales in general to that of organic forms in nature. The association is seductive, especially since one can retrace in tales as in the forms of nature a morphological resemblance derived from a genetic linkage. Propp calls this theory "the theory of origins by metamorphoses or transformations, stemming from a certain cause." V. Propp, "Les transformations des contes merveilleux," Théorie de la littérature, ed. et tr. par Tzvetan Todorov (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965), p. 234. Thus when he tries to lay out the inherent structures in many forms of tales (marvelous or popular tales), Propp isolates, at the very heart of the composition of these tales, a series of phases necessary to the progression of the action in order that the required transformations can operate within the progression of the story. Each story evolves according to a series of situations determined by the actions of certain types of persons whom one can identify by constant or variable structures contributing to the morphology of the story as a genre. In fact, elements expressed through the action and the functions of the characters correspond to a formula that appears according to variations, reductions, amplifications, substitutions, and modifications that all aim to make the story advance.

Unlike fairy tales, the fable, more pragmatic and above all moral, often presents popular or mythical heroes or types of heroes rendered directly responsible for their actions. The identification of these fables as mythic structures permits us to isolate the essential and organic structure of the educative project of Rousseau, since the very constitution of the myth puts into play in symbolic fashion natural structures that reflect the human condition. One thus recognizes in diverse mises en scène provided by Rousseau for the pedagogue a fundamental structure with constants and variables similar to those of popular tales. The evolution of Emile's conscience surely corresponds to the major function that simultaneously contributes to the promotion of the text and of the message.


10 One should bear in mind Propp's definition of the function: "Function is understood as an act of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action." V. Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, tr. Laurence Scott (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1968), p. 21.


12 The poetic function concentrates on the way a message presents itself. We use the word "poetic" in the sense specified by Roman Jakobson: "The set (Einstellung) toward the message as such, focus on the message for its own sake, is the POETIC function of language." Roman Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," Language and Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 69.

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Educational Implications in H. G. Wells' *The Time Machine* and *The Wonderful Visit*

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Both Plato's *Republic* and H.G. Wells' *The Time Machine* are political allegories which treat matters of significance to education. *The Wonderful Visit*, Wells' next publication, is a Swiftian parable that satirizes British schooling in Victorian England. Both of Wells' works have been largely ignored by philosophers of education, but Wells, as a father of progressive education in Great Britain, must be considered seriously—even when spinning allegory and parable.

In the first chapter of *The Time Machine*, Wells introduces us to the Time Traveller and his dinner guests. One guest is the Provincial Mayor. All but the Mayor are educated middle class Englishmen—professionals in psychology, journalism, medicine, etc.. Their economic and social stations are the result of their knowledge. The Mayor, on the other hand, wields power as a property owner. He is proud to be uneducated and disdains those who are. Since he alone does not return the following Thursday evening to hear the Time Traveller's promised report of his journey, Wells portrays him as an ignorant roadblock to progress.

Wells harkens back to his early essays, "The Case Against Classical Languages" and "A Modern Education," when the Medical Man pokes fun at the attempt of German philologists to reconstruct the pronunciation of ancient Greek from its literary texts. This type of Greek was also taught in the universities to those of the landed aristocracy in pointless preparation for their lives as civil servants. Wells, of course, believed that all such nonsense should cease and that the universities should concentrate on providing scientific education.
In Chapter Two, Wells further alludes to the superiority of science education over aesthetics when he has the Medical Man comment on the beauty of the time machine, and Hillyer, the humanistic framing narrator, call it a “squat, ugly thing.” In showing disinterest in the Time-traveller’s scientific verifications, Hillyer demonstrates his disinterest in science, mechanics, and their potentialities for improving humankind in the future. Hillyer is not ignorant. His schooling has unfortunately given him an aesthetic rather than a scientific mind. He is a misguided romantic. Whether Hillyer is ignorant or misguided, however, Wells views both the Mayor and him as impediments to a better future.

In Chapter Three, Hillyer questions the Time Traveller’s concern for the future of our fragile civilization. As Wells had expressed in his early writings, humankind must plan its future, not leave it in the hands of those who trust blindly in necessary progress.

In Chapter Four, the Time Traveller narrates his adventure of travelling into the future. Upon arrival in the year 802,701 A.D., he encounters a marble sphinx which he dubs “The White Sphinx.” The statue is a reference to Carlyle’s essay, “The Sphinx” in his book *Past and Present* (1843). Therein, Carlyle warns that managing organized labor and the working class will be “the Problem of the whole Future, for all men who will in future pretend to govern.” Factory owners are to blame for allowing labor to organize in pursuit of interests inimical to the social good. Carlyle compares workers with apes and calls for an order imposed by the “Captains of Industry.” These “Fighters Against Chaos” must wrest power from trade unionists and re-establish law and order. Of course, in mythology, death comes to whoever cannot solve the sphinx’s riddle, and the death of culture and civilization awaits those who cannot or will not solve the labor problem facing English society.

After discovering the sphinx, the Time Traveller spots an Eloi: “He was a slight creature—perhaps four feet high—clad in purple tunic, girdled at the waist with a leathér belt. Sandals or buskins . . . were on his feet; his legs were bare to the knees, and his head was bare. . . . He struck me as being a very beautiful graceful creature, but indescribably frail.”

Here we see first evidence of Plato’s influence. In the Republic, Plato says that justice would prevail if men were simple, in which case an anarchist communism would suffice. He then describes such people as vegetarians who live according to the seasons, who return to nature and to primitive simplicity. Note that Wells describes the Eloi in much the same way and even dresses them as ancient Greeks.
In Chapter Five, the Time-traveller is shocked to find that the Eloi exhibit "a certain lack of interest" and possess the intellectual level of five-year-old children. The Time-traveller reluctantly concludes that the future represents a decayed present, a time of blissful ignorance and indolence. In Chapter Six, the Time-traveller concludes that he has happened upon "the sunset of mankind." Humanity has triumphed over nature and then rested. Content to move no further, humanity vegetates. With the conquest of nature will come the death of artistic spirit. Only inactivity, illiteracy, and intellectual ruin will remain.

The Eloi are the result of what Carlyle rails against when criticizing the older aristocracy and land owners of his day for ignoring the new industrialism and its problems. "What do these highly benefited individuals do to society for their wages?" Carlyle asks. "Kill partridges," he concludes. "Can this last? No, by the soul that is in man it cannot, and will not, and shall not... Eleven thousand souls in Paisley alone living on three half pence a day, and the governors of the land all busy shooting partridges!"

The Time Traveller suggests that people require adversity in order to grow in physique and intellect, and the Eloi apparently live in a world without adversity. The Time Traveller, however, is wrong. Adversity exists in the form of the Morlocks, squat, ape-like humanoids who live under ground and harvest the childlike Eloi for food. For Wells, the Morlocks are the degenerated working classes.

Wells based the Morlocks and their underground environment on his knowledge of the working classes of his time and their conditions: laborers who struggle long hours in dark, underground mills, and subterranean miners who broil in sweat, dirt, and darkness. The centuries of exploitation have transformed such human beings into sub-human animals bent only on survival. In the future, the formerly exploited laborers will evolve into creatures that exploit the progeny of a decayed aristocracy. In a sense, the elite will become bovine and the workers will become simian.

In Chapter Ten, the Time Traveller investigates an "educational museum and learns that "all the traditions, the complex organizations, the nations, languages, literatures, aspirations, even the mere memory of Man as I knew him, had been swept out of existence. Instead were these frail creatures [the Eloi] who had forgotten their high ancestry, and the white Things [the Morlocks] of which I went in terror."

Clearly, the human race has failed to solve the riddle of Carlyle's sphinx. In Chapter Thirteen, the Time Traveller sums up what has happened and his 

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I grieved to think how brief the dream of the human intellect had been. It had committed suicide. It had set itself steadfastly towards comfort and ease, a balanced society with security and permanence as its watchword, it had attained its hopes—to come to this at last. Once, life and property must have reached almost absolute safety. The rich had been assured of his wealth and comfort, the toiler assured of his life and work. No doubt in that perfect world there had been no unemployed problem, no social question left unsolved. And a great quiet had followed.

The human race no longer faced adversity. Free of threat and free of trouble, human intelligence and intellect decayed. "The upper-world man had drifted toward his feeble prettiness, and the under-world to mere mechanical industry."

So what can humanity do, if anything, to alter affairs? In an 1899 interview, Wells stressed the need for a new breed of capitalist leaders—Carlyle's "Captains of Industry," Saint-Simon's "industrial chiefs." Returning to Plato's Republic for inspiration, Wells sees the ideal society as governed jointly by a class of intellectuals and philosophers and an auxiliary class of soldiers or administrators—scientists and industrial managers.

For these leaders, a scientific education is necessary, not the useless schooling of the mayor, and not the literary schooling of Hillyer. In the library section of the museum, the Time Traveller encounters "the decaying vestiges of books." It is not the loss of poetry that he mourns, although he earlier expresses regret that literature and all else indicative of civilization had passed. It is really for the loss of science that he mourns, for science (presumably both natural and social) holds the answer to the sphinx's riddle. Just as the Time Traveller is fortunately unable to blow up the sphinx and his hidden time machine in order to exterminate the Morlocks, the elite of our future must not subdue labor with violent force but rather control them through scientific and cultural superiority—through intelligence and cunning. Otherwise, we will invite widespread destruction and conflict.

In Plato's "Allegory of the Cave," the escaped prisoner returns to enlighten those still fettered in the darkness, only to be ridiculed, ignored, and possibly threatened with death. In Wells' The Time Machine a man from Victorian England travels to the distant future with the capability of helping a decayed human race. Unfortunately, they ignore him and ridicule his anger at their having squandered human culture. Thus, just as Plato's allegory contains educational implications, so does Wells' The Time Machine.
Wells followed *The Time Machine* with a Swiftian satire titled *The Wonderful Visit* (1895). In this slight novel, Wells continues his criticism of British schooling. In the novel, an angel falls to earth and has difficulty adapting to and understanding the contemporary social order. In short order, the evils of capitalism and the hypocrisy of religion become apparent to the Angel, as do several other problems and contradictions of English morals, manners, and institutions. The novel is rich with well-drawn minor characters, the most endearing being the Respectable Tramp, “a pallid creature, dressed in rusty black, with a broken-spirited crush hat cocked over one eye.”

The Respectable Tramp enlightens the Angel as to the nature of government sponsored schools. When the Angel answers the Tramp that he has never heard of a pithed frog, the tramp explains that “It’s a thing vivisectionists do. They take a frog and they cuts out his brains and they shoves a bit of pith in the place of ‘em. That’s a pithed frog. Well—that there village is full of pithed human beings.”

Pointing out a little red building called the National School, the Tramp explains that “that’s where they piths ‘em....It stands to reason. If they ‘ad brains they’d ‘ave ideas, and if they ‘ad ideas they’d think for themselves. And you can never meet anybody doing as much. Pithed human beings they are. I know that village. I was born there, and I might be there now, a-toilin’ for my betters, if I ‘adn’t struck against the pithin’.

When the Angel asks if pithing is a painful operation, the Tramp says that it is “in parts:"

Though it ain't the heads gets hurt. And it lasts a long time. They take ‘em young into that school, and they says to them, 'come in 'ere and we'll improve your minds,' they says, and in the little kiddies go as good as gold. And they begin shovin’ it into them. Bit by bit and ‘ard and dry, shovin’ out the nice juicy brains. Dates and lists and things. Out they comes, no brains in their 'eads, and wound up nice and tight, ready to touch their 'ats to any one who looks at them. Why! One touched 'is 'at to me yesterday. And they runs about spry and does all the dirty work, and feels thankful they're allowed to live. They take positive pride in 'ard work for its own sake.

Wells’ point is clear. The National School fills childrens’ heads with facts, makes them memorize those facts without understanding, and conditions them to obey orders. The pupils graduate ready to take their place as cogs in the British industrial economy. Well schooled but largely uneducated, they are the docile workers required in the work force. *The Time Machine* warns us of what can happen when the well-trained but uneducated fall under the
influence of unruly labor leaders. The Tramp is indeed respectable because he has sacrificed social and economic “success” as defined by the society in order to remain a free thinker.

John Dewey, of course, railed against “education for the factory,” suggesting that the ideal factory worker, or company man, is incompatible with the ideal citizen. According to management, the ideal factory worker is a docile follower of orders, and according to Dewey, the ideal citizen is a critical thinker, trained to solve social problems. Schools cannot produce both as defined above, and Wells would agree.

Though the section featuring The Respectable Tramp elicits a chuckle, anger and sadness exist just below the surface. The Angel and the Time Traveller are both intruders from the outside who possess the capability of helping those they encounter. Unfortunately, those they encounter respond with indifference, suspicion, and violence. The outlook for humankind is pessimistic, and, according to H. G. Wells, only Platonic educational reform can save us.
The Marriage of Self and World: John Dewey and Stanley Cavell on the Romantics

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The world in which we immediately live, that in which we strive, succeed, and are defeated is preeminently a qualitative world.

—John Dewey, “Qualitative Thought”

INTRODUCTION

Being interested in philosophy as well as an avid reader of poetry, both English romantic and nineteenth-century American, I was naturally drawn towards questions and issues dealing with the potential for dialogue between philosophy and literature from the earliest stages of my graduate work. After beginning my studies of John Dewey’s writings several years ago, and subsequently coming to believe Dewey’s philosophical vision very amenable to my interdisciplinary inclinations, I found myself immersed in the writings of William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Ralph Waldo Emerson for a seminar at the University of Chicago. The continuities between these writings and Dewey’s Art as Experience struck me almost instantly, particularly in their prescriptions for developing what Dewey scholar Thomas Alexander has recently called “the human eros”: the native impulse to pursue a life of ever-expanding meaning and value.

In the course of my reading, I began to notice a number of distinct parallels between the way Dewey and the romantics talk about “experience.” Most importantly, for present purposes, both view experience as some type of
immediate, primary reality of the world encountered as something suffered and enjoyed. It is the crucible of meaning and value, but not primordially a knowledge affair.

"The essential idea of romanticism," writes noted literary critic Robert Langbaum, "is...the doctrine of experience....Like the scientist's hypothesis, the romanticist's formulation is evolved out of experience and is continually tested against experience." This passage from Langbaum's *The Poetry of Experience* identifies in a concise manner an elementary bond between romanticism and empiricism. The sort of empiricism favored by the romantics was however not very companionable with the atomistic sense data of the conventional, Lockean empiricist, which the former typically found, as Emerson brusquely put it, "paltry." Thus Langbaum continues, "the doctrine of experience [holds that] the imaginative apprehension gained through immediate experience is primary [in import], whereas the analytic reflection that follows is secondary...[Romantic poetry] makes its statement not as an idea but as an experience." It is this devotion to immediacy and related ambition to reconcile creed and life, I believe, that above all else led Dewey to consider the romantics so engaging.

Dewey was introduced to the romantics relatively early in his academic career, having read Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* as an undergraduate at the University of Vermont. Asked repeatedly if he was "right with Jesus" by an ever-vigilant mother, Dewey found Coleridge a breath of fresh air in that he viewed faith as "a state of the will and affections, not a merely intellectual assent to doctrinal and historical propositions." In addition, Dewey approvingly noted, Coleridge "was an unusual type of conservative, a thinker who demanded that the meaning of the old be comprehended and acted upon" (*LW* 5: 181). This earnest appeal to the court of lived experience, and to the reconstructive potential of experience through the art of reflection, held an instant attraction to the budding philosopher, later prompting him to follow Emerson and Wordsworth in dubbing poets, not scientists, "the true metaphysicians of nature." While Dewey's unflagging intellectual growth would continually alter his orientation towards their writings, especially as he began to break with idealist and absolutist philosophies, the romantics remained with Dewey throughout his life. For the more transcendental ideals that young Dewey discovered in the works of figures like Coleridge would become in *Art as Experience* "possibilities for poetically inspired human construction." Indeed, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Emerson, William Blake, John Keats, and Percy Bysshe Shelly receive between them no less than sixty citations in the Index to the *Collected Works* edition of Dewey's aesthetics.
Just a brief glance at this impressive list of names and several themes shared by Dewey and various of the romantics spring readily to mind. Perhaps most prominent and compelling are the following: (1) a pronounced dissatisfaction with the “paltriness” of conventional empiricism; (2) an appeal to the “feeling intellect” (“we receive but what we give”); (3) a commitment to the transfiguring capacity of the human mind (imagination, as distinct from fancy); (4) some notion of a marriage of self and world; (5) a natural supernaturalism and general reverence towards nature; (6) a belief in the expressive potential of everyday or commonplace objects and events; (7) and an interpretation of poetry, art, or aesthetic experience as aspiring to an organic unity. While all of these themes receive considerable attention in my dissertation, I will today focus primarily on the idea of a marriage of self and world as it relates to Dewey’s aesthetics.

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

In the opening pages of *Art as Experience*, Dewey contends that human flourishing would be impossible if our surroundings were not marked by periods of both flux and stability:

There are two sorts of possible worlds in which [growth and experienced satisfaction] would not occur. In a world of mere flux, change would not be cumulative; it would not move toward a close. Stability and rest would have no being. Equally is it true, however, that a world that is finished, ended, would have no traits of suspense and crisis, and would offer no opportunity for resolution. Where everything is already complete, there is no fulfillment....The moment of passage from disturbance into harmony is that of intensest life."

Unfortunately, Western philosophy has tended to pursue the stable and fixed at the expense of the changing or dynamic—to exalt mind over body, reason over affect, the objective over the subjective, the universal over the particular, product over process, and theory over practice. The search for ultimate foundations for knowledge, for some type of definitive system or theory of reality, has surely been the dominant theme in philosophy since Plato. According to Dewey, however, this search is at once bound to fail and fundamentally misguided. Yet he would urge us not to be discouraged that the “quest for certainty” remains a mirage, but to take advantage of the opportunities for growth, expansion of meaning, and experienced satisfaction our aleatory world affords. For Dewey, these goods are paradigmatic of aesthetic experience.
Aesthetic experience, *qua* aesthetic, is from a Deweyan perspective an immediate enrichment of experience to which knowledge plays a chiefly instrumental role. A purposive reconstruction of the "brute and unconditioned 'isness'" of events (LW 1: 75), aesthetic experience is the ultimate fruit of intelligently guided behavior. (Thus Dewey contends that "science' is properly a handmaiden" to art (LW 1: 269).) Though not primarily cognitive, aesthetic experience is consequently more than just aesthetic. "Art is a quality that permeates an experience," Dewey offers; "it is not, save by a figure of speech, the experience itself" (LW 10: 329). Knowledge is actually transformed in aesthetic experience in that "it is merged with non-intellectual elements to form an experience worth while as an experience" (LW 10: 294).

With aesthetic experience, Dewey writes, we are "introduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live in our ordinary experiences. We are carried out beyond ourselves to find ourselves" (LW 10: 199). What Dewey means here, I think, is that the aesthetic sensitizes us to the expressive dimension of experience, to those potentially countless meanings embedded in ordinary objects and events, but that apart from art objects often remain nebulous or inchoate. He continues:

> Tangled scenes of life are made more intelligible in esthetic experience: not, however, as reflection and science render things more intelligible by reduction to conceptual form, but by presenting their meanings as the matter of a clarified, coherent, and intensified or 'impassioned' experience.

—(LW 10: 295)

In other words, while science states meanings; art expresses them. Nonetheless, and regrettably for Dewey, the desire to treat art as if it were a mode of knowing or an embodiment of the "truth of things" has been a prominent theme in Western aesthetics.

Thus like the romantics, and unlike "rationalistic' philosophies of art,'" Dewey finds no fundamental dualism between "quality as sensuous and meaning as ideational" (LW 10: 263). Rather, he argues, this distinction should be treated as "an instrumentality of reflection....Its office is to lead in the end to a perceptual experience in which the distinction is overcome—in which what were one conceptions become the inherent meanings of material mediated through sense" (Ibid). The qualities of objects and events are then not meaningful a priori; they only become "pregnant" of funded with meaning by entering into commerce with the human organism. The expressive meanings apprehended during aesthetic experience have been developed and condi-
tioned over time through past experience, both at the individual and the socio-cultural level. Constituted by the myriad values or goods frequently lost to the biddings of workaday life, they "[enable] us to share vividly and deeply in meanings to which we had become dumb" (LW 10: 248). Art is the incomparable "language" of qualitative meaning. It is uniquely capable of expressing that which can only be "pointed to" by words (LW 10: 111).

Because he views aesthetic experience as a participatory event, Dewey also maintains that the process of interpreting diverse kinds of art objects can occasion the expansion of our habits of perception and, consequently, our ability to experience and respond to the world in its innumerable facets. Recalling the "dilated eye" of Emerson's poet, Dewey speaks of this process as calling us to attend to the world in new ways, "releasing...powers [of perception] previously cramped or inert" (LW 10: 307). This is not so much a bare arithmetic change in our total fund of experience as a qualitative change in the way we experience. It is a critical factor, for instance, in determining whether Piet Mondrian's "Broadway Boogie-Woogie" appears as nothing other than a more-or-less pleasing arrangement of shapes and colors, or is perceived as expressing something novel about the fast-paced, almost musical rhythms of modern city life. Hence there is with aesthetic experience a heightened sense of integration of self and world and concomitant wide-awakeness to the world. It is by reconstructing and expanding its means of interpreting its environment through such experiences that the self finds itself in a richer world of the everyday; an activity Emerson terms "renovating nature." 10

Aesthetic experiences for Dewey have two other, more formal characteristics as well. First, they convey a dramatic sense of growth and development such that each phase of the experience carries with it the meaning of previous phases. Aesthetic experiences can often be described in narrative terms, with a discernible beginning, middle, and end. Second, aesthetic experiences are unified experiences. They do not just terminate, but conclude at a point of consummation or fulfillment. It is to the aesthetic, then, that one must go to see experience in its full flower and integrity (LW 10: 278).

Art objects are perhaps the most ready source of such experiences, being purposively created to refine and intensify in certain ways the experience of the perceiver. But they are surely not the sole or even principal medium of the aesthetic. Because aesthetic experience is actually an enhancement of the normal processes of living, quotidian activities can likewise be reconstructed in an aesthetic manner. Solving an engaging mathematics problem, gaining a perspective on a difficult science concept, or a stimulating classroom
discussion all have the potential to provide experiences with a pronounced aesthetic dimension. Therefore the “task” of *Art as Experience*, explains Dewey, is to “restore continuity between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings that are universally recognized to constitute experience” (*LW* 10: 9).

**THE “ROMANTIC” IN DEWEY’S AESTHETICS**

Much as Dewey advocates an aesthetics of the everyday, Wordsworth yearned for a poetry of the everyday, a poetry dedicated to putting in a fresh light (as with a child) “incidents and situations from common life.” To press the point even further, Wordsworth wanted us to envisage the commonplace itself as potentially poetic, and as the supreme environment for rebuffing what he saw as the emotional and spiritual fragmentation of post-Enlightenment culture. Its life giving and rejuvenating “soil,” he wrote in the autobiographically flavored “Home at Grasmere,” has the power to bring home to us:

How exquisitely the individual Mind
To the external World
Is fitted—and how exquisitely, too...
The external World is fitted to the Mind;
And the creation (by no lower name
Can it be called) which they with blended might
Accomplish.12

The basic idea of Wordsworth’s “Home at Grasmere,” like other of the *Lyrical Ballads*, was to capture human experience as it appears at the pitch of awareness; or as Dewey puts it in his description of aesthetic experience, at the moment of “intensest life.” This is the moment when the very drama of the human encounter with the world becomes art; when, according to Wordsworth, the commonplace unseats the art object as the primary vehicle of poetic transfiguration:

Paradise, and groves
Elysian, Fortunate Fields—like those of old
Sought in the Atlantic Main—why should they be
A history only of departed things,
Or a mere fiction of what never was?
For the discerning intellect of Man,
When wedded to this goodly universe
In love and holy passion, shall find these
A simple produce of the common day.13
One can see from this passage that Wordsworth’s poetry is not about making the commonplace appear uncommon through, for example, some highly-specialized “poetic diction,” but about the ongoing work of perception. Like Dewey, Wordsworth is encouraging the reader to explore the novelty and untapped meaning embedded in everyday objects and events. To lose interest in the commonplace, he seems to be saying, is to lose touch with its inherent mystery, wonder and strangeness as well; indeed, with the human condition itself. Stanley Cavell captures this idea admirably when he writes that for Wordsworth, “the common world, the world common to us, is as it stands of no interest to us, that it is no longer ours, that we are as if bored quite to death, and that poetry has nominated itself to bring us back from this ‘torpor’.” 14

Though Cavell has been reluctant to acknowledge it, this is basically the same realization of loss expressed by Dewey in *Art as Experience*. There he writes, “Ordinary experience is often infected with apathy, lassitude and stereotype....The world is too much with us as a burden or distraction. We are not sufficiently alive to feel the tang of sense nor yet to be moved by thought” (*LW* 10: 264). In making such an overt allusion to Wordsworth’s doleful sonnet, “The World is Too Much with Us,” Dewey is in effect announcing his commitment to doing what he can as a philosopher (and I believe educator) to aid in the poet’s cause, to “rescuing” the “sense of the familiar...from the oblivion” of the mind’s savage torpor (*LW* 10: 145). The way the common world stands to us is largely up to how we stand to it, Dewey, Cavell, and the romantics all want us to understand. It is a function of the responsiveness of our own feeling and discerning intellects, of our willingness to support and nurture the marriage of self and world. But, again, the emphasis here is on “rescuing” the meaning of the commonplace that is, at least potentially, already there as a natural function of our everyday interactions with our surroundings, not deliberately dressing it up or altering its fundamental structure (*LW* 10: 272). This is the point that Dewey is trying to make when he takes the time to quote verbatim an entire weather report:

Low pressure prevails west of the Rocky Mountains, in Idaho and south of the Columbia River as far as Nevada. Hurricane conditions continue along the Mississippi Valley and into the Gulf of Mexico. Blizzards are reported in North Dakota and Wyoming, snow and hail in Oregon and zero temperature in Missouri. High winds are blowing southeastward from the West Indies and shipping along the coast of Brazil has received a warning. (*LW* 10: 228)
Without modifying it in any way, Dewey presents this bit of ordinary prose as "something poetic" found in an "unexpected place" (Ibid). He sees beauty in "the euphony of the geographical terms," and in the "accumulation of allusions that create a sense for the wide spaciousness of the earth, the romance of distant and strange countries, and above all the mystery of the varied turmoil of the forces of nature in hurricane, blizzard, hail, snow, cold, and tempest" (Ibid). To my mind, no celebration of the familiar could be more Wordsworthian in tone or sentiment.

Thus because "experience" is the product of a self in its struggles and achievements in an aleatory world, it contains, even in its rudimentary forms, the promise of the aesthetic (LW 10: 25). Yet this promise is at best inconclusive. For the kind of engagement with the world that affords us the ability to arrange for, maintain, and enhance the prospects for aesthetic experience is never to be taken for granted, as I will show in a moment.

THE MARRIAGE OF SELF AND WORLD AND THE SKEPTICAL IMPULSE

In the eighth stanza of his famous ode, "Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood," Wordsworth dubs the child the "best philosopher":

Thou, whose exterior semblance doth belie
Thy Soul's immensity;
Thou best philosopher, who yet dost keep
Thy heritage, thou Eye among the blind,
That, deaf and silent, read'st the eternal deep.

As its cardinal theme, the ode speaks of the mingling of gain and loss at a couple of levels. Adulthood confers an ability to interpret and make sense of the world in ways that are beyond the child. But for the child everything is basically new, and much less likely to be viewed automatically through some preexisting lens—the product, perhaps, of habit or custom, concerns over the exigencies of everyday life, professional or scholarly allegiances, human suffering, or mortality. If the latter should be allowed to extinguish one's ability to see anew, the poetic power and value of the child's experiences, as remembrances, are forever lost. Even in this poem, which celebrates the child's splendor in the objects of sense, Wordsworth's personal recollections are colored and tempered by an adult awareness of mortality, part of the "earthly freight" of maturity. And at still another level, the poem reminds us that each possible perspective necessarily precludes others, that for everything we see we miss something else. (Emerson and Coleridge label this the
Principle of Compensation.) What, then, does it mean to refer to the child as the “best philosopher”?

What Wordsworth has in mind here, I believe, is that the child, not yet predisposed to think of the external world as an “other,” is to some extent in a better position than the adult to assume a genuinely reciprocal relationship with the everyday; that is, recalling Dewey’s language, one that does not inhibit the “undergoings,” the pauses or “defining rests” in experience that help give it a dramatic, rhythmic flavor, and that open a space for the emergence of those aesthetic meanings all too frequently diffused by the exigencies of workaday life (LW 10: 178). Of course it is impossible to retain the youthful “Eye among the blind” indefinitely. Nor is it possible to secure a perspective that allows one to perceive all aspects of things at once. There are an infinite number of ways of seeing, Wordsworth clearly understands, but no final way. In fact, it is in the drive for complete presence (or certainty) that we are most likely to “lose” the everyday as the primary medium of personal and cultural renewal.

Cavell’s rather ingenious interpretation of external-world and other-minds skepticism shows just how easily this can happen. From a Cavellian orientation, such skepticism is most productively construed as “a perpetual dissatisfaction with the human condition, a demand for a God’s Eye View or Nothing, that degrades the only perspective that is actually available to us.” To some degree a natural and inexpungible element of human experience in an aleatory world, the skeptical impulse manifests itself in all manner of endeavors to turn away from or deny the uncertainty and disappointment of the quotidian. It becomes seriously problematic, however, when it results in as vigorous a withdrawal from the everyday as is apparent in the supra-empirical or transcendental voice of traditional metaphysics, or of late, the more restrictive voice of much analytic philosophy and positivism—the latter of which Emerson would doubtless consider “paltry empiricism.” Both of these voices are expressions of the skeptical impulse in that they refuse the primacy of the everyday by either striving to escape to an otherworldly realm of certainty and purity or clinging to some distilled and often highly abstract version of the full lived situation. “It is this downgrading of the human position,” Hilary Putnam explains, “this aspiration to be outside our own skins (nothing else would be good enough), that Cavell calls ‘skepticism’”.

Emerson frequently speaks of skepticism in terms of the impulse to clutch at the various constituents of the experienced world: “I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our fingers when we clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our
condition." 16 Cavell reads this passage as suggesting that the quest for certainty is ultimately a violent, even immoral act, one that disfigures objects and people by attempting to possess and control them. They disappear or become something less with the skeptic’s longing to make them fully present. Whole movements in Western thought have fallen prey to this impulse: Dewey mentions it often.

For instance, one can imagine Dewey confronting the positivist with the question, Why is the reality most acceptable to science one that no small child can be expected to understand? Should we accept Newton's mathematically conceived rainbow as more real than the poet’s? to cite a question posed by Keats's haunting Lamia. To “unweave a rainbow” and treat the resultant physical components as ontologically superior is for Dewey to commit “the philosophical fallacy.” 19 A related kind of skeptical behavior occurs whenever values are discarded by the “immune system” of positivism, and the real equated with the known or knowable. Even deconstruction can be interpreted as skeptically minded in as much as it supposes the full presence of “texts” as an ultimate but unreachable goal, and consequently recoils from the ethical dilemmas and responsibilities of the everyday. 20

Examples of a skeptical urge for transcendence are likewise plentiful. Plato’s fixed and finished realm of Forms or essences clearly manifests a longing to escape our embodiedness and the precariousness and uncertainty of ordinary empirical affairs. This kind of withdrawal is in fact a native constituent of the spectator attitudes and theories of knowledge that Dewey critiques so heavily. The Coleridgian belief that art furnishes a path to the true sources of being also reflects the skeptical impulse, as, in a complimentary way, does Immanuel Kant’s supra-empirical domain of the thing-in-itself. While he recognizes the inherent limitations of human knowledge, Kant, like all skeptics, assumes that our primordial relation to the world is one of knowing (or not knowing) and then tempts us with an ultimate reality beyond our reach. Moreover, as Coleridge knew all-too-well, this “settlement” with Humean skepticism leaves the subject in a state of alienation from the created world, leading Cavell to exclaim, “Thanks for nothing.” 21

Such does however mean that all notions of transcendence can or should be eliminated. There is doubtless a powerful form of transcendence operant in Emerson’s essays, and both Dewey and Emerson use the words ‘religious’ and ‘mystical’ now and again to describe the sense of wholeness and unity characteristic of aesthetic experience. But transcendence here does not denote an escape from the everyday as much as an enhancement of it. To find the extra-ordinary or “transcendent” in the ordinary we must, instructs

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Emerson, "know [our] worth, and keep things under [our] feet." Albeit not speaking directly of the skeptical impulse, Martha Nussbaum expresses this general idea eloquently when she writes in Love's Knowledge:

> Philosophy has often seen itself as a way of transcending the merely human, of giving the human being a new and more godlike set of activities and attachments. [An] alternative...sees it as a way of being human and speaking humanly. That suggestion will appeal only to those who actually want to be human, who see in human life as it is, with its surprises and connections, its pains and sudden joys, a story worth embracing. This in no way means not wishing to make life better than it is. But...there are ways of transcending that are human and "internal" and other ways that involve flight and repudiation.

As they strive to keep the skeptical impulse in check, figures like Emerson and Ludwig Wittgenstein are nonetheless respectful of it, treating the impulse as a kind of worthy other. It is not, according to Cavell's unorthodox interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Investigations*, a philosophical neurosis from which one can be "cured" once-and-for-all, but an ineluctable part of the human condition. If a sense of alienation from the world and others (the "pathos of distance") is at times a feature of lived experience, no purely intellectual argument—not even Dewey's theory of emergent evolution—can overcome skepticism entirely. In the later Wittgenstein's endeavors to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use," for instance, one finds phrases like, "we are tempted," "we are inclined," and "we desire." There is here and elsewhere in Wittgenstein and Emerson a genuine attempt to be sympathetic to our tendency to clutch at or try to get beyond our aleatory world.

As should be evident by now, Cavell's approach to the tragedy of skepticism is not one of simple denial, for this denial is itself a species of skepticism. Instead, he adjures us to attend to what one might refer to as the human voice; that is, the voice of the world as it is experienced in the everyday, as it makes claims on us, and, hopefully, as it is acknowledged, received, and cared for without guarantees of certainty. To Cavell, the failure to attend to this voice, something we all do at times out of a sense of insecurity and liability, is ultimately a failure to attend to ourselves, to the ways in which we are (already) implicated in the welfare of the larger environment. If clutching is the most unhandsome part of our condition, as Emerson alleges, its opposite, receiving and responding to the rightful claims the world and others make upon us, is the most handsome. Cavell believes that this non-skeptical attitude calls for a substantial rethinking of several basic aspects of our
customary orientation towards knowledge. One does not have to strain to see Dewey carrying out some of this same rethinking, and with similar concerns in mind.

From his earliest published writings, Cavell has maintained that a non-skeptical attitude necessitates that we relinquish the idea that our primary relation to the world is one of knowing. The world's presentness to us (i.e. the way it discloses itself to us), he argues in the manner of Wittgenstein, is not primordially a knowledge relation. It is, more likely, a function of those immediate meanings emanating from our shared forms of life. In this much at least Cavell’s Wittgenstein would appear a distant cousin to American thinkers like Emerson and Dewey, who, in Cornel West’s words, evade their inheritance in epistemology-centered philosophy. But as critic Richard Poirier is quick to point out, ‘evade’ is probably the wrong term here, assuming too circumscribed a view of what it means to write philosophy. From a broader Cavellian perspective one might say that these thinkers all perceive the emptiness or even danger of continuing to wrestle with the conventional problems of epistemology, and so work to challenge the constraining picture of human experience that helped give birth to, and in some quarters continues to nourish, the habit of asking questions about ultimate foundations and certainty. In other words, they do not so much evade what Dewey tags “the industry of epistemology” as attempt to undercut “the claims of [its] questions.”

Yet another salient feature of Cavell’s non-skeptical attitude involves the close etymological tie between the words knowledge and acknowledge. Indeed, knowing and acknowledging are two sides of the same coin for Cavell: “I do not propose the idea of acknowledging as an alternative to knowing but rather as an interpretation of it, as I take the word ‘acknowledge,’ containing ‘knowledge,’ itself to suggest” The skeptic regards knowledge claims as threatening and dangerous; she tends to withhold any positive response, desiring that some impossible degree of certainty could somehow be secured. Knowledge as a sort of acknowledgment however takes an active, prophetic form. While it does not ignore the more “intellectual” criteria of knowledge claims, it ultimately sets its sights beyond them, to the need to respond to the best possibilities of an object or person. Dewey, I would argue, offers much the same thing when he contends that “knowledge is a case of belief,” a passionate disposition to act (LW 1: 316). “To say in a significant way, ‘I think, believe’...is to accept and affirm a responsibility” (LW 1: 179-180). Like acknowledgment, knowledge as belief registers both a positive interest and investment in the world (doing), and a willingness to live with
the vulnerability that comes with this disposition (undergoing). If this sounds more than a little reminiscent of Wordsworth's portrayal of the marriage of self and world in "Home at Grasmere," there is good reason. This marriage metaphor and the idea of a romance with the world have recently become central to Cavell's work with skepticism. They represent in the eyes of both Cavell and Dewey a potential corrective to "our refusal to take an interest in our experience," a refusal "fatal to the thinker as well as to the objects of thought." 30

The main appeal of the marriage metaphor for Cavell lies in its suggestion that a non-skeptical relationship with the world is something that one must constantly work at. Marriage is not an automatic or certain attachment, as the skeptic wishes it to be. And is the case with human partners, Wordsworth's marriage never completely or permanently dissolves the difference between self and world. There are clearly times when the self is "broken off, discrete, because it is at odds with its surroundings," Dewey explains (LW 1: 188). A healthy marriage can nonetheless provide a powerful and ever-expanding feeling of continuity between oneself and an-other. Yet without the ability to acknowledge and respond to the claims of this other in the face of everyday uncertainties, marriages can also go bad, be lost. According to Wordsworth's metaphor there must however always be a possibility of remarriage, of a recovery from skepticism and a renewed intimacy with the world. Cavell puts it thusly:

The validity of marriage takes a willingness for repetition, the willingness for remarriage. The task...is to get the pair back into a particular moment of their past lives together. No new vow is required, merely the picking up of an action which has been, as it were, interrupted; not starting over, but starting again, finding and picking up a thread. Put a bit more metaphysically: only those can genuinely marry who are already married." 1

Marriage, in the Wordsworthian sense, is a way of being in the world, a continuous (re)affirmation and (re)acknowledgment of our humanity, not simply a legalistic or precept-bound relationship. Aesthetic experience, I would argue, is a prominent and recurring feature of exactly this kind of marriage. It represents the possibility of an endlessly renewable intimacy with an endlessly meaningful environment. But it also calls attention to the fact that this marriage requires emotional as well as intellectual responsiveness, and therein reminds us of the skeptical withdrawal or savage torpor that can very easily make us feel as though we are not at home in the commonplace world.
CONCLUSION

An education that looks to enhance our emotional and intellectual responsiveness to the everyday is one that nourishes the human eros, the drive to live with a funded sense of meaning and value. It recognizes that the human need to learn, create, and grow has many dimensions, that we are much more than "rational individuals or 'epistemic subjects' whose primary function is to generate propositional claims about the world." Indeed, if Cavell is correct, the latter actually signals a kind of skeptical withdrawal from the "quotidian world of common sense objects and fellow passengers to the grave." However the skeptical impulse is also our constant companion in life. It, too, is an integral part of being human. The important thing is that we learn to live with this impulse gracefully and, when its energies take the domesticated form of a transcendence from within, gratefully. This is why Dewey’s mature writings encourage us to own up to and affirm our limitations by taking an active interest in all of the constituents of our experience. Dewey asks us to “accept life and experience in all its uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half-knowledge and turn that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities—to imagination and art” (LW 10: 41).

Aesthetic experience can I think help us learn to live gracefully with the skeptical impulse. It shows us that “the world is not to be learned and thrown aside, but [continually] reverted to and relearned” (LW 10: 326). Neither an isolated phenomenon nor medium of disinterested pleasure, aesthetic experience for Dewey is inherently social. The expressive meanings that art and the aesthetic provide can thus serve to reaffirm and renew our alignments with one another, enhancing our sense of the “other” within each of us. For in creating environments that support and nurture this marriage of self and world we simultaneously acknowledge our common interests in the objects and events of a commonplace world.

NOTES


5. John Dewey, “James Marsh and American Philosophy,” LW 5: 181. After their initial citation, each of Dewey’s writings (taken from the Southern Illinois Press Collected Works edition) will be referenced in the text in the above standard form, consisting of initials representing the set (EW, MW, and LW for Early Works, Middle Works, and Later Works respectively), the volume number, and the page number.

9. It should be mentioned that most of the time Dewey employs ‘aesthetic’ to relate the consumer’s experience as “appreciative, perceiving, and enjoying,” while ‘art’ and ‘artistic’ refer to the “process of doing or making” (LW 10: 53). However, both the creation of an artistic product and cultivation of aesthetic experience necessarily involve a balanced process of “doing” (reconstructing) and “undergoing” (taking in) (LW 10: 54).
10. Emerson, “The Poet,” Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p.311. I need here to explain my use of the term ‘everyday’ (or at times ‘ordinary,’ quotidian,’ and ‘commonplace’). Dewey regularly employs this word to refer to qualitative immediacy as opposed to cognitive activity. This is not quite what I have in mind, however. (After all, thought is an everyday occurrence as well.) Instead, more in accord with Stanley Cavell’s use, I mean to denote the “everyday” in three related ways: First, I will generally contrast the everyday with the more antiseptic representations of the experienced world characteristic of much analytic philosophy and positivism, on the one hand, and the transcendental or otherworldly aspirations of traditional metaphysics on the other. Second, I will at times distinguish everyday from aesthetic experience in an essentially qualitative fashion. And third, I will also speak of everyday objects as among those things we typically encounter in our workaday lives, yet often ignore. Some of Cavell’s most interesting commentary on the everyday can be found in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) and This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein, (Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989).
13. In his “Prospectus,” Wordsworth went so far as to pray for the “blissful hour” of the “end of art,” the time when the “discerning intellect” can transfigure the world on its own.
15. As Dewey would be quick to add, however, adult practices of analysis and interpretation can be valuable tools for cultivating and enhancing aesthetic meanings.
17. Ibid.
18. Emerson, “Experience,” Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p.330. It is interesting to note here that ‘penetrate,’ ‘pierce,’ ‘digest,’ ‘grasp,’ ‘master,’ ‘catch,’ and ‘take’ are among the synonyms for ‘understand’ and ‘knowledge’ in The Oxford Thesaurus.
19. Dewey’s philosophical fallacy refers to the error of converting the eventual functions of inquiry into antecedent existences (LW 1: 34). According to M.H. Abrams, even Keats “accedes to the fallacy (in which he has been joined by numerous professional philosophers) in a perceptual phenomenon is explained by correlating it with something more ele-
mentary than itself, the explanation discredits and replaces the perception—that only
the explanation is real, and the perception illusory." See Abrams's The Mirror and the Lamp:
20. Michael Fischer makes such a claim in Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism, (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1989). "Because we are ineluctably hidden," he explains,
"we are not answerable for hiding" (p.77).
21. Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism, (Chicago:
23. Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature, (New York:
25. Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, p.86.
p.135.
28. This is how Dewey puts it in his classic essay "The Need for a Recovery of
30. Fischer, Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism, p.118.
31. Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1981), pp.126-127. While they fit in rather nicely with the the
present discussion, the lines quoted actually come from Cavell's depiction of marriage and
remarriage in certain Hollywood films, affirming, once again, his contention that skepticism
is a fact of lived experience.
Stuhr, ed., p.203.
Wisdom is a precious possession. As Plutarch says, "Make wisdom your provision for the journey from youth to old age, for it is a more certain support than all other possessions." While Plutarch may be right that a well lived life in general requires wisdom, several complex issues immediately arise: What is the nature of wisdom, how does it develop, and what does this imply about educational theory and practice? This paper is an initial exploration of the first question "What is the nature of wisdom, that is, how should we understand it?" My argument is that there is considerable confusion in the professional literature about how we should understand or conceive of wisdom. In the paper I try to clarify its nature, and consider what this implies about the empirical research on the development of wisdom.

Our story on wisdom begins with the recent renewed interest in virtue ethics. Many contemporary ethical theorists, be they in education, psychology, religion, or philosophy, have tended to approach ethics by focusing on relatively abstract principles of right conduct such as the Golden Rule or the utilitarian principle of maximizing overall welfare. For example, Lawrence Kohlberg's psychological theory of moral development is based on the idea that as we reach higher levels of moral development, we base our moral decisions on abstract moral principles chosen because of their universality and comprehensiveness.

This focus on abstract principles of right conduct is not the way that the ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle approached ethics. Their approach,
Virtue ethics, focused on the study of character and the kinds of traits, emotions, desires, and motivations that virtuous or vicious people display.\textsuperscript{3}

Recently, there has been a renewed interest by moral theorists in the virtue approach to understanding morality. This interest has become quite broad, and has found its way extensively into the popular press, and spawned character development programs in the public schools and TV shows on character for children.\textsuperscript{4}

What virtue theorists have done so far is to try to (a) explain what a virtue is (what is a trait, what is character), (b) provide an analysis of many virtues and vices (what is courage, integrity, envy, etc.), and (c) explain what makes a particular virtue valuable or a vice bad. What contemporary theorists have not tended to do is to explore what might be called the “operational” relations between the virtues. How is it that the virtues “work together” to produce an integrated, reasonable result? How, in a particular situation, do we balance honesty, compassion and fairness? According to Aristotle, the virtuous person because of his or her character does the right thing with the right motivation in the right situation. But how does the virtuous person manage to do this?

The ancient Greeks proposed an answer. Practical or moral wisdom is another virtue which the virtuous person possesses. For the Greeks, this trait was the most important virtue; it was the “master” virtue that enabled us to integrate all the virtues. It was what enabled us to evaluate a situation and judge correctly what was the appropriate thought, feeling, and action in the situation. While practical or moral wisdom continued to play an important role in the study of ethics during the medieval period, references to it all but vanished in modern times in the professional literature. With the renewed interest in virtue ethics, it is time again to explore moral wisdom.

Theoretical wisdom or sophia for Aristotle was synoptic knowledge of the basic principles of nature. Newton and Einstein were wise in this way. Aristotle distinguished this from practical or moral wisdom (phronesis) which focused on living well or human flourishing. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines this sense of wisdom as the capacity for judging rightly in matters relating to life and conduct. Moral wisdom is practical in that it is what we need to understand in order to cope with the central problems humans face in their everyday lives. It is practical also in that it must infuse or guide one's life. As St. Thomas put it, one can't be wise in words alone, but must be wise in deeds.\textsuperscript{1} To have moral wisdom one must manifest it in the way one lives one's life. This has significant implications for understanding wisdom.
What a wise person needs to understand in order to cope with life's problems is, of course, diverse. Robert Nozick's partial list is as follows:

- The most important goals and values of life.
- What means will reach these goals without too great a cost.
- What kinds of changes threaten achieving these goals.
- How to recognize and avoid or minimize these dangers.
- What different types of human beings are like in their actions and motives.
- What is not possible or feasible to achieve or avoid.
- Knowing what is appropriate in what circumstances.
- Knowing when certain goals are sufficiently achieved.
- What limitations are unavoidable and how to accept them.
- How to improve oneself and one's relationships with others.
- Knowing when to take the long-term view.
- Understanding oneself.

One can clearly manifest wisdom or folly in such matters as choosing a career, developing and maintaining a long-term intimate relationship, raising children, coping with job stresses, living with chronic pain, adjusting to retirement, facing your own death or the death of loved ones, etc. These are all important life concerns, and much of the knowledge in Nozick's list would be necessary for dealing effectively with these concerns.

Moral wisdom involves a rich set of cognitive factors. John Kekes argues that moral wisdom is composed of a conception or understanding of a good life, and the knowledge, evaluation and judgment required for living according to it. Psychologists studying moral wisdom also have tended to focus on the cognitive aspects of such wisdom. For example, Bates & Smith define wisdom as a highly developed body of factual and procedural knowledge and judgment dealing with the fundamental pragmatics of life. More specifically, they define it as an expert knowledge system. Focusing on just the cognitive aspects of wisdom, however, ignores other vital parts.

A significant aspect of moral wisdom requires being able to see the world from the perspective of other people. But to be effective this requires a degree of "other-regarding" emotions such as empathy, compassion, sympathy, pity, etc. Consider compassion. If Jones has compassion for Smith's plight, then Jones believes that Smith is suffering some serious harm, imagines what Smith is undergoing, is concerned about Smith's welfare, where this involves being bothered or upset by Smith's distress, and Jones is disposed to help or at least want the suffering alleviated. In short,
compassion involves sorrow excited by the distress of others. It is an affective response. We feel sorrow, sadness, anger, grief and so on because of the plight of others.

Moral theorists for the most part in the modern era have downplayed the role of the emotions in our moral lives, in part because the emotions were viewed as being irrational or at least opposed to reason. But the ancient Greek philosophers realized how important our emotions are in our moral lives. They are an affective response to the world we experience. As William Bennett notes, “Compassion is a virtue that takes seriously the reality of other persons, their inner lives, their emotions, as well as their external circumstances . . . Compassion thus comes close to the very heart of moral awareness, to seeing in one's neighbor another self.” One simply couldn't have moral wisdom without a fair degree of compassion, and so our affective side can't be neglected in the study of such wisdom.

Since moral wisdom is practical, in that it requires the morally wise person to manifest that wisdom in his or her own life, it follows also that moral wisdom requires self-control (and the supporting virtues such as temperance, perseverance, will power, a degree of courage, etc.). Self-control applies to a wide domain—our actions, thoughts, feeling, desires. And yet researchers again have neglected the study of self-control when examining moral wisdom.

Suppose we focus our attention for a moment on the cognitive aspect of moral wisdom. What are some of its central features? First, it requires knowledge of a very diverse sort, and it can't be reduced to just one dimension. Some moral theorists have stressed knowledge of “the moral point of view.” For example, Kant and utilitarianism might characterize the moral point of view in terms of impartiality. We are, according to this approach, each rational agents whose interests must be weighed equally and impartially in making any moral decision. Supposedly understanding this impartial perspective constitutes much of moral wisdom. The problem is “the moral perspective” can't be reduced to just one dimension in this way; it is inherently pluralistic. While being impartial may be essential in some moral situations, it isn't always, and so it doesn't capture the moral point of view. The moral perspective is just too complex to be neatly summarized in this way. The result is that the knowledge involved in moral wisdom has to be quite diverse.

Part of the diverse knowledge involved in wisdom consists of principles or general truths about human life and experience. The wisdom literature of the world contains many such examples.
• "Pride goeth before a fall."
• "A lazy person sleeps soundly, but goes hungry."
• "A short-tempered person is without friends."
• "Ambition is never satisfied."
• "We are too soon old and too late wise."
• "Bitterness eats at the soul."
• "You can't chew with someone else's teeth."
• "Don't let yesterday use up too much of today."
• "What one cultivates is what one harvests."
• "One who throws mud gets himself soiled as well."

Some have argued that such truths are so trivial that they are empty of content, and so can't constitute wisdom or be an important part of it. I would argue, however, that the world's wisdom literature captures deep truths about human life, and that a significant part of moral wisdom is understanding these truths. The reason the ancient Greek tragedies and dramas speak so vividly to us today is that they do contain deep truths about human life. As an east African proverb puts it, "Proverbs are the daughters of experience." The stories, proverbs, principles, and truths we learn from wisdom literature represent the distillation of the experience of many people and societies across a broad expanse of history. One ignores them at one's peril! Of course wisdom isn't simply being able to recite these truths, but understanding their broader meaning and how they apply to life which comes basically from undergoing a rich variety of experiences.

Several theorists have characterized practical or moral wisdom as a hierarchically structured second-order cognitive trait. One critically evaluates one's conception of living a good life in relation to one's skills, traits, and prospects, and then makes adjustments by either changing one's conception of living a good life, or by trying to develop the competencies to live that life, or by trying to alter one's social or economic prospects. According to this view, moral wisdom involves considerable self-monitoring, self-evaluation, and self-reflection. It is primarily composed of metacognitive processes, abilities, and knowledge. This view is attracting a fair number of adherents in the professional literature.

My response is that this is to excessively "intellectualize" moral wisdom. While some morally or practically wise people may be highly self-reflective, and may engage in second-order monitoring of their desires, skills, and life prospects, it isn't clear to me that this is a necessary feature of such wisdom. Some of the simple peasants described in Tolstoy's short stories live morally.
wise lives, and yet they aren't particularly self-reflective people. Cicero notes that there is often wisdom under a shabby cloak, and Chaucer adds that the greatest clerks are not the wisest men! People can be kind, honest, fair, compassionate, live morally wise lives and be able to give good advice to others on coping with life's problems without doing a lot of abstract thinking about how one should live one's life.

It might be said in response that part of being wise is being aware of our fallibility. Many recent researchers have suggested that knowledge about knowledge—its certainty, its limitations—is an important part of wisdom. While this may be true, it doesn't follow that wisdom is a second-order cognitive trait. One can manifest an awareness of the limits of knowledge by exhibiting a degree of humility and not being excessively assertive or cocksure. This is a first-order manifestation of being aware that one's knowledge may be fallible. But this first-order awareness doesn't require a second-order knowledge that knowledge is fallible. It doesn't require that an individual have a theory of knowledge. Perhaps it would help to express the point this way: One can be reasonable without having thought a lot about what it is to be reasonable or even having thought about whether one is reasonable. One can successfully engage in lots of first-order activities without engaging in second-order activities.

It may very well be that possessing good metacognitive skills, and engaging in a fair degree of second-order thinking (thinking about what are my goals, can I really achieve them, etc.), enhance moral wisdom. My point is that it is not required, and further it may even lessen one's moral wisdom. Engaging in too much self-reflexivity may impede one's ability to engage the world and others in morally effective ways. One can become too absorbed in thinking about the good life, the traits necessary for living such a life, the problems of life etc., so that it actually interferes with living a good life.

The reason I dwell on this point is that there is a danger in turning wisdom into a second-order trait. It makes wisdom and wisdom research focus on higher-order cognitive processes and skills. This in turn probably would exclude many from being said to be wise, and it deforms our understanding of moral wisdom. The focus of moral wisdom is on living a good human life. This requires good interpersonal skills, understanding others, coping with life's everyday problems, and these can't be reduced to simply higher-order cognitive processes.

Our emerging picture is that moral wisdom is complex and multidimensional. It involves a number of domains—cognitive, affective, conative (i.e., desires), volition, character and personality features, and more. Moral
wisdom requires general competence, good common-sense, broad knowledge about matters of life, good understanding of people and oneself, sound judgment, an appreciation of a wide variety of values, recognition of the unavoidable and difficult problems humans face, an awareness of our fallibility and the ability to learn from experience and our mistakes, open-mindedness, the ability to see situations from the perspective of others, to see things in the larger context, good interpersonal skills and a concern for others so one can respond in a sensitive manner to them. In addition personality theorists have noted that morally wise persons have an integrated, effective personality structure. They have moved beyond a concern solely for themselves and show empathy, care and understanding of others. Several empirical studies conducted asking respondents to list key descriptors of wise people have identified the above traits.

The above conception of moral wisdom has significant implications for research on the development of moral wisdom. While there is not a lot of empirical research which focuses directly on moral wisdom, there is much research on various aspects of it. For example, there is a lot of research on how children develop empathy and what this implies about altruistic behavior. Since empathy is a significant aspect of moral wisdom, it follows that we do have some understanding on the development of moral wisdom. Similar remarks apply to the research on moral reasoning, moral development, problem-solving skills, coping mechanisms, and other relevant research. All of these studies are helping us to understand pieces of the complex puzzle of moral wisdom—what it is and how it develops. At present we don't know how all the pieces fit together. In part that is due to our not realizing that they were pieces of the same puzzle. Having a clearer philosophical or conceptual understanding of moral wisdom should help us to integrate the diverse research on different aspects of moral wisdom, at least that is my hope. Given the above conception of moral wisdom, we need to know, for example, the correlation between the development of empathy (one's degree of empathy) and Kohlberg's measure of moral development, what factors are relevant to increasing the correlation, how empathy measures and Kohlberg's measure correlate with critical thinking scores, measures of self-knowledge, and so on. Once we have a clearer picture based on the empirical research of how wisdom develops, we then can consider how we may best enhance its development in the schools through the use of literature, the study of other cultures and history, role playing, peer mentoring, service learning, character development programs, and a host of other activities and techniques.
NOTES

Socrates and Aristotle's Contribution to the Character Education Movement—Can Character and Virtue Be Taught?

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Can virtue be taught?” Meno asked Socrates over two thousand years ago in the dialogue written by Plato with the same name. He goes on to ask, “if it is not teachable, is it the result of practice or are we born with it, or does it come to us some other way?”

Meno’s questions are still of great interest today. Currently, there is a national movement in which politicians from both parties, concerned citizens, business leaders, educational researchers and parents are urging the schools to return to a deeper and more conscientious involvement in the moral life as well as the intellectual life of their students. We need to ask—Can we teach virtues, values and character to students in today’s schools or are we to expect them to come to school already possessing these qualities? However, it is not clear that those in the character education movement clearly understand what character is, nor for that fact what virtue is. They maintain that character education can be taught in our schools, but Socrates would rightly ask them, “How can teach character unless you know what character is. Furthermore can you teach character if there are no teachers of character? With a few exceptions, today’s schools of education do not teach future teachers how to teach character or virtue.

In this paper I will try to answer Meno’s question regarding the teachability of virtue using the current character education movement for the analysis. Some of the current definitions of character education will be examined and critiqued. Aristotle’s definition of virtue will be used to answer Meno’s question regarding the nature and origin of virtue. A paradigm will be pre-
sented which summarizes Aristotle’s concept of character education and should be of value to current character educators.

SOCRATES’ ARGUMENT IN THE MENO

Socrates tells Meno that before you can say whether virtue can be taught, you must know what virtue is. Meno give Socrates many examples of virtues, but is not able to give him one definition that encompasses all virtue. He suggests several definitions, one of them being “Virtue is the desire of things honorable and the power of attaining them.” Socrates then proposes his optimistic maxim that no one desires evil. When evil things are done, it is only thinking that they are in some way a good. If people are taught the good, they will do the good. Since Socrates and Meno cannot come to an agreement on a definition for virtue, they pursue a different track in answering the question. They hypothesize that if virtue is a kind of knowledge, then it must be acquired by teaching. It virtue can be taught, there must of necessity be teachers of virtue. However, since Socrates could find not teachers of virtue, he ends the dialogue by saying that virtue must come to the virtuous by divine dispensation. However we can never really know the certain truth until we inquire into the actual nature of virtue. Thus having “benumbed” Meno, Socrates leaves him.

THE CASE FOR CHARACTER EDUCATION

There has been a substantial long-term decline in the conduct of young Americans e.g. rising youth homicides, suicides, teenage pregnancies and school vandalism, along with declining academic performance in school. Along with these measures are statistics which showed the effect that the break down of the traditional family and the lack of traditional socialization for the youth had had on school performance.2 These societal problems have fueled the re-evaluation of moral education in America. This has led to an examination of the important role character development in schools plays in promoting academic excellence. In response to the moral crisis of our culture, character education has become what is perhaps the fastest growing educational movement in the country today. There is a currently a national movement to return to the original mission of the public schools to teach students to develop their character as well as their mind. This movement has been endorsed by the President of the United States and bi-partisan congressmen and senators, business executives, parents and concerned citizens. The 1990s have seen a spate of books on the subject, the emergence of two national organization – the Character Educational

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Partnership and the Character Counts Coalition – dedicated to promoting character education, federal funding for character education projects, and grassroots initiatives by schools that are reportedly having a positive impact on school climate and student behavior.¹

As character education has mushroomed into a movement, skeptics and critics have emerged to raise challenges—some of them echoing Socrates’ questions in the Meno. What is character and can it be taught? Does character education develop better people? Or does it merely train students to do what they are told? Does it develop students’ intrinsic motivation to be good? Are there more effective character education practices than some? Can character education be evaluated? Everyone is talking about it, but does anyone really know what it is?

Valid criticisms of character education stem from the fact that there does not seem to be a general understanding of what character it. Is character merely good behavior? Is it good citizenship? Is it good-decision making skills? Is it a person with a positive self-esteem? Do you have good character if you can give definitions for a list of virtues or character qualities adopted by your school? Can you only know good character by one’s actions? Do those who do deeds of service for others show they have good character? Then is the corollary that those who do not get involved in community events have poor character? This confusion is seen in the schools today by the many different activities that they include under character education—the Quest program—a life skills curriculum, drug education programs, sex education and health education, self-esteem programs, guidance programs, citizenship programs, boys scouts, discipline programs, service programs. Alfie Kohn is perhaps the most vocal critic of the character education movement. He agrees with the main tenet of this paper and says that the term “character education” is blurred. It can have two different meanings i.e. one very broad—which includes anything the school might provide outside of academics to help children grow into good people, and one very narrow—a particular style of moral training. “What goes by the name of character education nowadays is, for the most part, a collection of exhortations and extrinsic inducements designed to make children work harder and do what they’re told.”

Another criticism of the character education movement echoes Plato’s second argument—how can character be taught if there are no teachers of character? Several studies have shown that although there is overwhelming support for the concept of character education, it is not a high priority in the curriculum of teacher education, rarely even found as a unit in the foundations courses—fact a recent study sponsored by the Center for the Advancement of
Character and the Character Education Partnership supports the main tenet of this paper as they found that—“There is little philosophic consensus about what character education is and how it should be taught.”

WHAT IS GOOD CHARACTER?

Philosophers of education can help those involved in the character education movement by using the ideas of Plato and Aristotle to help answer these questions. Aristotle was a strong proponent of character education; he understood all that was involved in developing virtues. Aristotle says, “Each man speaks and acts and lives in accordance with his character” *(1127a27)*; the virtue of a man will be “the state of character which makes him good and makes him do his own work well” *(1106a23)*. The Greek work “charakter” which means enduring mark as the “charakter” on a coin gave its worth. The “charakter” of a person is considered to be the distinguishing qualities or principles that a person subscribes to as a guide for his or her behavior. Character influences how someone makes decisions, chooses to act or not to act, and summarizes the general way in which one deals with others. Aristotle tells us that there are three steps necessary in order to form one’s character:

In the first place, he must have knowledge; secondly, he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sake; and thirdly, his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. *(1105a31)*

Aristotle answered the problems Socrates’ encountered in *Meno* in his work *Nichomachean Ethics* by telling us that virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue can be taught, while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit. Students learn the intellectual principles of science and art, and there by develop understanding, and wisdom which enable them to develop good decision making skills. Intellectual virtues owe their birth and growth to teaching and thus take time and experience to develop.

Moral virtues come as a result of habit, they do not arise in us by nature, although we have the potentiality to acquire them for they are the perfection of our nature. Aristotle argued that the goal of human beings is happiness, and that happiness is achieved by fulfilling our function—a life governed by reason. Aristotle’s ideal person practices behaving reasonably and properly until he or she can do so naturally and without effort. Aristotle stresses the importance of developing moral habits from the earliest years and is a strong proponent of character education. “It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference” *(1103b10-25)*. It is no easy
task to be good, according to Aristotle. This is because in everything we need to find the middle road of virtue. According to Aristotle, "Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean between two vices, one involving excess, the other deficiency... with regard to what is best and right. 1107a1-7. The development of character or moral virtue is thus a matter of learning to avoid extremes in behavior, finding instead the mean that lies between the extremes. Moral virtues helps us to develop this facility to doing the good—"to do this (the good) to the right person, the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive and in the right way is no easy task".

We are the sum of our actions, Aristotle tells us, and therefore our habits make all the difference. We must practice hitting the mean by determining which vice we tend toward and then consciously moving toward the other extreme, until we reach the middle.

The novelty of Aristotle's contribution to virtue theory lies in the deep appreciation of the tripartite components of the moral development of the individual: the body, appetite and reason. Each must be developed. We can use this concept to develop a model that shows character as the intersection of moral knowing, moral attitude and moral action.

Children need to be taught in order to know what virtue is and then they need to be guided in order to reason well and choose the correct action to do in a given situation. Aristotle tells us that we must also develop the desire and love for the good in able to be virtuous. Finally, we must have the opportunity for action in order to live virtuously. "The moral virtues we get by first exercising them...e.g. we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts" 11036.

Figure 1. A model of good character.
Aristotle's tripartite understanding of the moral person is also seen in the definitions of character given by the academic leaders of the character education movement. According to Kevin Ryan, Professor at Boston University and Director of the Center for the Advancement of Ethics and Character, “To have good character means to be a person who has the capacity to know the good, love the good and do the good.” Dwight Boyd defines moral character as including “those enduring aspects of the expression of personhood to which we are inclined to give moral evaluation across different attitudinal and behavioral contexts.” From this we can see that character is a holistic term, concerning the whole person. It means to have a good head, good heart and good hands.

“Good character”, following Aristotle’s model, needs to be taught, imparted; i.e. children are directly instructed in virtuous behavior. Virtues such as honesty, tolerance, respect, hard work and kindness are taught, modeled and reinforced by the significant adults in children’s lives. The premise of character education is that there are virtues, objectively good human qualities that should be taught to all. These virtues are held to transcend religious and cultural differences. “Character education” usually involves explicit teaching of what each of these different virtues are, how to distinguish “right” from “wrong”, and the provision of examples of virtuous and morally correct behavior through the use of either literature or real life models. Students also need the opportunity to practice virtuous actions, for as Aristotle points out, one becomes virtuous by practicing virtuous actions. In order to promote this aspect of character education, schools need to provide students with opportunities in which they can perform virtuous acts and acts of service to others by promoting clubs and offering opportunities to volunteer.

Aristotle’s construct is also useful for organizing the many different ways in which schools can promote character development. First, schools must make an effort to directly teach specific values and virtues so that students have “moral knowing” of what they should do. This can be done through a mission statement that identifies the virtues and values which a school professes to promote. It can also be accomplished through the use of curricular programs which teach what specific virtues and moral values mean. Teachers need to take advantage of specific “character moments”, i.e., incidents or situations in school or society which are used as content for a class on moral decision-making, helping students decide what should be done in the given situation. Second, through assemblies, school mottoes, awards and other special programs, schools can instill moral desire in students by encouraging
students to want to live a life of good character values. This "moral feeling" aspect of character development is shown by the ways in which a school motivates students and guides them in the development of a sense of positive self-esteem based on human dignity. Finally, schools wishing to foster character must develop students' moral actions; this can be done by upholding high academic standards, good discipline, citizenship and community service.

THE ROLE OF THE TEACHER

Although Socrates was not able to find any "teachers of virtue" in Athens before the end of the dialogue, Aristotle found those teachers of virtue. He said that teachers help students to become good, when they teach in such a way that they help students to cultivate good habits, or virtues. For "with regard to virtue, it is not enough to know, but me must also try to have and use it, and in this way become good" 1179a. Aristotle considered education to be an especially difficult art or skill, belonging by nature to the sphere of ethics and practical wisdom. The aim or object to be achieved in the art of education is to guide man in the actions through which he shapes himself as a human begin, that is, in his knowledge and moral virtues, and at the same time conveying to him the spiritual heritage of the nation and civilization to which he is involved.12

The recognition that schools inevitably teach values has become widespread through a realization that the very act of educating another is a moral act.13 Possibilities for moral education lie in every part of the curriculum. There is a general consensus that we need a comprehensive approach for teaching character education and moral values to prospective teachers. All teachers are required to take some kind of foundations course, usually a History and Philosophy of Education course for certification. Teachers and schools, like parents and families, cannot avoid teaching values.

We can answer Socrates' question, "Can virtue be taught?" affirmatively. The teaching of human virtues and the subsequent shaping of "good character" can be taught. It needs to be restored to its historical place as the central desirable outcome of the school's moral enterprise. However if the current character education movement is to have any effect in our schools, it will need to take into consideration all three aspects of character formation proposed by Aristotle in his Ethics. Socrates and Aristotle challenge today's philosophers of education to offer their expertise and guidance to the current character education movement.
NOTES

On Some Positions in Ray Boisvert’s Recent Book

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A review of

The author’s prior book, a very Aristotelian look at Dewey’s Metaphysics (1988), starts from criticism of the idea of freedom as autonomy. That theme persists, along with an Aristotelian flavoring in the present account of Dewey. “Autonomy as a model of freedom,” Boisvert says, “leads in practice to separation from others, not toward democratic community” (p. 64). While it is true that emphasis on autonomy may put community under strain, we must ask if this is not sometimes needed to ensure its democratic character.

Boisvert’s new volume “seeks to play a special role” in the current revival of Dewey and American philosophy. He says in the Introduction, “I would describe the text as a ‘primer’,” and “its aim is to serve as a brief and generally accessible introduction to Dewey’s philosophy” (p. 4). The text is “expository rather than critical,” though it is not lacking for critical suggestions; and the topics were selected as “central to an inclusive overview” of Dewey’s positions (p. 4). Boisvert’s Introduction puts his book in the immediate context of the eclipse and revival of classical American philosophy, one of its most well argued and appealing elements. A chief question is how the autonomy of the pragmatist tradition can be served lacking emphasis on its independence.
Boisvert attempts a “sympathetic” interpretation of Dewey but basically accepts critical perspectives from Reinhold Niebuhr, Ernest Gellner, and John Patrick Diggins. (Cf. p. 168 n4.) There are appreciative quotations from Heidegger, casting doubt on visual metaphors in philosophy, but no mention of Habermas (a friend of a Kant-derived conception of autonomy). Related points put the present work in some tension with other recent efforts such as James Campbell’s Understanding John Dewey (1995) and Larry Hickman’s John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology (1990). The contrast in the account of Dewey and early Niebuhr is especially interesting.

The post-WWII era was a period of “recolonization,” according to Boisvert, and “the classical American philosophers were quickly marginalized as universities sought to embrace the latest European ideas” (p. 3). “Positivism and existentialism were imported from the continent, and language analysis from the British Isles,” and “the academics who embraced” the imports “too often took on the role of imperialists seeking a thorough recolonization of the American territory” (p. 3).

The situation changed, with the availability of Dewey’s writings in the 37 volumes of Jo Ann Boydston’s edition, the founding of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (1973), and Richard Rorty’s work in drawing attention to Dewey. The revival of interest in Dewey is not to be doubted, and the book rightly distances these efforts from the postmodernist “hermeneutics of suspicion,” in favor of the “hermeneutics of recovery” (p. 157), of the pragmatist tradition. Central questions posed concern the degree to which current American conditions are a continuation of those which eclipsed Dewey and classical American philosophy. Rorty’s writings and the influence of early Niebuhr and existentialism included. If we were “recolonized,” this was not by invasions of foreign intellectual “imperialists.” To follow out Boisvert’s analogy, should we not take a look at our domestic intellectual “neo-colonialists,” those who benefitted by uncritical facilitation of imports?

Beyond the Introduction, there are 8 numbered chapters, a listing of chief events in Dewey’s life, an Appendix on “Dewey in Cyberspace,” three photographs of Dewey, a bibliography, notes, and an index. A natural progression in the topics of the numbered chapters starts from “The Life World” and the primacy of interaction in Chapter 1, through “Thinking,” and inquiry in Chapter 2, “Democracy,” in Chapter 3, “The Public” and its problems in Chapter 4, “Education,” in Chapter 5, “Making” and art, in Chapter 6, and “Devotion,” concerning Dewey’s philosophy of religion, in Chapter 7. Chapter 8, in conclusion, discusses Dewey’s contemporary relevancy, and it is the philosophical key to Boisvert’s reading and perspective.
Here we find summary mention of "the weaknesses in Dewey's philosophy," based on his critics: "he is too dependent on science, too optimistic, too anthropocentric," and in addition "the 'personal' dimension" as in existentialist writers, "is lacking from his thought" (p. 160). In spite of this, Boisvert attempts "to highlight those Deweyan plant stocks that can continue to be helpful in the hybridization necessary for our own time" (p. 161). Generally, the emphasis is on Deweyan primary or immediate experience, and the Logic and methodological works are deemphasized. Dewey "specifically rejected the attitude that epistemological concerns are the main issues dealt with by philosophers" (p. 161). Bothersome, for Boisvert no doubt, is that Dewey says that "logic" and inquiry "are autonomous" (LW12, p. 28). We are not to import questionable or problematic conclusions from an imagined outside. Moreover, Dewey's "theory of inquiry" is his replacement for traditional epistemology.

Boisvert makes use of Dewey, selectively in "rethinking our time," and does so in a "polytemporal" way, employing a "filter of organic metaphors" which can also be found in "Aristotle, Leibniz, and Whitehead" (p. 161). The book is generally well written, though we must wonder if Boisvert's particular filters chiefly focus the reader's overall view of Dewey. Boisvert's Dewey, partly to avoid the purported Deweyan "anthropomorphic," is cast in language and assumptions which work in the service of critical perspectives established in their essentials well before the current revival. Thus, in view of Boisvert's convictions in crafting the book, it may be argued that it cannot easily function to bring the full range of Dewey's writings into an evaluation of the social and intellectual forces responsible for the 50 year eclipse of the pragmatist tradition. In degree, the author risks a continuation of the eclipse.

Often disdaining use of Dewey's own vocabulary, in view of "futile controversies" (p. 11), Boisvert casts Dewey's work in a triad of negations. The Introduction portrays Dewey as not captured by the "Plotinian Temptation" of monism, not engaged in a scientistic "Galilean Purification" of experience, and not engaged by "The Asomatic Attitude" of disembodied minds and mind-body dualism. But sometimes what is required to get Dewey right is simply to settle some of the old "futile controversies," though the opposition can certainly be stiff. This would require critical attention to Dewey's domestic detractors, and perhaps a less smoothly readable book. Boisvert's concessions to Dewey's critics, on the other hand, make for a compact and smoothly reading volume.

Reiterating these negative characterizations through the book, the author reverts many of the controversies of interpretation involved in explaining
Dewey's positive doctrines. No doubt we can agree that Dewey rejected any "Plotinian" monism in favor of pluralism, rejected absolute unification in favor of harmonization of values. But harmonization of diversity sometimes requires Deweyan reconstruction, to diminish conflicting commitments grown too broad. Do we not sometimes need a collective bonfire of the vanities? Does Boisvert over-emphasize a plurality of uncritical commitments, in contrast with Dewey's critical role for philosophy? What in particular does it mean, in understanding Deweyan pluralism, to say that philosophy "needs to embrace its own point of departure" (p. 9).

Surprisingly, avoiding the reductionism of a "Galilean Purification" we learn not only that philosophy must begin in medias res; but, what seems much stronger, that "the here and now is not something to be overcome" (p. 9). To be sure, the Deweyan can agree that philosophy might be "at home in the concrete, complex, indeed messy, condition of human life" (p. 9), but only if it retains vision and ideals for reconstructive purposes and motivations. Our ideals are part of the "mix."

Approaching Boisvert's continuing and important contributions to Dewey scholarship requires exploring what seems a central tension of the volume. First we need to take a look at his account of Dewey on equality, afterward moving back from there to his critical treatment of autonomy.

According to Boisvert, Dewey's "interpretation of democratic equality emphasizes 'individuality'" (p. 65), rejecting a simple "quantitative reading" of equality, and a similar distribution of, say, talent, wealth, or powers among all members of society. Quoting Dewey, Boisvert maintains that we understand moral equality best by linking it to individuality, and not the notion of a "universal atemporal context of judgment" of others: "Moral equality means incommensurability," hold Boisvert and Dewey (not a bad word, so long as we avoid absolutizing the notion), "the inapplicability of common and quantitative standards" (MW13, p. 299; quoted p. 68). This is a way of recognizing the uniqueness of human beings, but beyond that Dewey regards equality "not as a natural possession," but instead as "a fruit of the community when its action is directed by its character as a community" (MW12, p. 330). In consequence Boisvert emphasizes a rejection of individualism, as connected with Locke and the empiricist tradition. There are some kind words for the old New England Puritan monoculture.

Democratic equality requires that we "seek out, identify, and appreciate" the unique and distinctive contributions of each person rather than measuring everyone against a single standard, and Boisvert's Deweyan conception of equality involves a plurality of evaluative standards; equality means that "no
single end, activity or approach can be judged as superior in a universal way;”
equality as an ideal “celebrates plurality and diversity” (p. 70). This focus on
individuality and plurality in the account of equality, might be expected to
lead up to a treatment of equal rights or equality before the law, but Boisvert
draws no connection to human rights or the rule of law. He is chiefly con-
cerned to warn, correctly, against a single, universal standard of evaluation,
leading to rigid class divisions. Though the lack of a discussion of Dewey on
human rights is to be regretted, and we are left to wonder how problematic
conflicts of values might be non-arbitrarily mediated on occasion (Cf.
Dewey’s *Theory of Valuation*), still, the idea of equality as incommensurate
individuality and value is well worth pursuing.

In fact, we might fairly use it in the evaluation of Boisvert’s negative view
of autonomy. Moral equality as individuality, is essentially a plea for the indi-
vidualization of our conception of growth, and insofar as we can plausibly
think of individualized growth and development as a Deweyan conception of
human freedom, then this invites a critical look at Boisvert on autonomy.
Our growth in individuality is fairly viewed as a product of interaction in
communities, but the character of communities suited to facilitate growth, as
I will argue, requires significant freedom and autonomy within the larger
society.

It is not that the word “autonomy” plays an especially large role in
Dewey’s writings. But neither do we find a complete rejection. Dewey and
Tufts in the 1908 *Ethics* contrast “autonomy” with traditional forms of social
dependency:

> Individual initiative and responsibility have steadily increased, and
> the economic development has undoubtedly strengthened the devel-
> opment of religious, political, and moral freedom. It is the combi-
> nation of these which gives the person of to-day the worth and dig-
> nity belonging to autonomy, self-government, and democracy
> (MW5, p. 472).

There is room to question Boisvert’s rejection of autonomy on grounds
of concern for human worth and dignity, though this certainly contrasts with
Boisvert on Deweyan equality. “If we were all the antecedently completed
selves suggested by Locke, the ideal of freedom as autonomy might be feasi-
ble and comprehen-

sive,” Boisvert writes (p. 58). He argues that the Lockean
conception of “completed selves” is a “fable,” and “There is no completed self
requiring only elimination of extraneous conditions to reveal itself” (p. 58).
But while we can all agree that human beings are in fact, “open ended,”
shaped and influenced by their cultures, languages, and by their human relations, what is to prevent us from thinking of autonomy in these processes as requiring individualized growth and unique contributions based in our “incommensurate” differences? It is not, of course, that particular individuals can be thought of as completely determining all developments in interaction with others, but there is room to doubt that this is a reasonable meaning to attribute to any conception of autonomy. Even Locke can more plausibly be thought of as positing or suggesting not “completed selves,” but instead a distinctively human potentiality for self-development; not a pre-social or anti-social self, but instead moral conditions of human beings in community, taken as appropriately shaping political forms. The distinction between the social and the political is crucial to the Lockean notion of the “state of nature,” as it is to the classic republican distinction between “natural” (or moral) rights and “civil rights” arising out of political arrangements. Related discussions are pretty much lacking in Boisvert’s contrast of individualism with individuality. Needed criticism of Locke on natural rights might still see it as a precursor of contemporary positions.

None of this is intended to question Dewey on the need to provide positive social conditions of growth, in contrast with the classical liberal idea of merely removing restrictions, in order that human beings should develop and flourish. The idea is that human rights and the rule of law, political guarantees of minimal autonomy independent of the vagaries of our relations to communities, should count among the needed social conditions of human growth and expression. We rightly emphasize more “positive” elements of freedom where legally guaranteed rights prove insufficient, but this is far from slighting basic human rights when they are genuinely placed in question by oppressive forces in particular political societies. There is a balance to be hit here, and Boisvert on equality as individuality could help us see more clearly that our conception of human rights is a needed minimal guarantee of autonomy and of opportunity for growth. No doubt, we sometimes do better to emphasize how freedom and equality are to be achieved through interaction in community, but this cannot plausibly substitute for basic legal guarantees of human rights and equality before the law.

Boisvert correctly sees a need for greater contemporary emphasis on the value of community, and this stance is the root of his doubts about autonomy. We will likely sympathize with the idea that nominalistic conceptions of individual freedom have contributed significantly to the eclipse of the pragmatist tradition and prevalent contemporary loss of intellectual and moral orientation. Yet we must avoid any suggestion of tradi-
exclusionary or predatory forms of community—that would be communitarianism with a vengeance.

Boisvert perhaps best approaches needed points of balance in his discussion of devotion and Dewey on the religious. What Dewey had in mind, retaining the category of the religious, is a devotion to “the sense of connection of man, in the way of both dependence and support, with the enveloping world that the imagination feels is a universe” (LW9, p.36; Boisvert, p. 141). The refusal to reduce the religious to the moral or aesthetic signifies the crucial role which this sense of connection plays in the conviction that our own acts can and do make a difference. Because of such conviction, we can continue to seek to realize ideals out of the actual, even in the face of defeats, and recognizing our own limitations. According to the author’s account, Dewey follows Emerson in being “neither an adherent of a religion nor a secularist” (p. 144); and part of the idea is to avoid dogmas of theology while emphasizing that though we start with social practices, “when certain of them are infused with a conviction” and “their meaning is linked to wider natural and social forces,” then “we come as close as is possible to what traditional religions had as best about them” (p. 144).

We need to avoid exclusive focus on the human world and overly Promethean conceptions of humanity, since even humanistic religion, where it excludes our relation and dependence on nature is “pale and thin” (p. 151), threatening to end with worship of the all-too-human, and neglecting the ways in which our real and imaginative, or possible, relations to nature facilitate improvements to the human world. Dewey’s “natural piety,” and our dependence and support by forces beyond our control, is central in Boisvert’s account of Dewey on the religious, and in consequence resources are provided to resist any egoism, individual or collective, which would aim to destroy what it cannot control. Though the topic of religion, the religious, and secularism will doubtlessly continue to be hotly debated in contemporary pragmatist circles, even those most inclined to secularism stand to benefit from Boisvert’s thoughtful discussion.

Given this perspective, and Boisvert’s obviously pluralistic and communitarian sympathies, readers may wonder if an argument could not be made from the Deweyan conception of the religious toward substantial philosophical conceptions of “religion” and “religions.” Equality as individuality of faith or confession suggests, beyond the freedom of religion, the need of positive support from distinct religious communities.

Certainly the diversity of American religious communities provides some support to our felt need for community and re-emphasis on plu-
eralism, while also engaging deeply felt traditions. Part of the argument turns on the idea that a purely secular approach to the religious tends to homogenize, that special institutions devoted to ethnic-religious traditions, social orientation, and community inspired piety deserve our tolerance and cooperation, that arguments for religious freedom become somewhat doubtful given only anti-religious or non-religious grounds, and that religious groups have traditionally played crucial roles in social reforms, starting with abolitionism, through the movement for women's suffrage, and continuing in the civil rights movement. There is room to suppose that the prominence of secularism in American society has interfered with the growth and development of religious liberalism, reinforced fundamentalist tendencies, and has thus tended to undercut social and political liberalism in general.

While the present volume is not designed to deal with these issues fully, Boisvert's detailed account of the Deweyan conception of the religious will prove a useful addition to the growing focus on related questions in contemporary pragmatist discussions. In this way, and in many others, the book will doubtlessly assist the current revival of the pragmatist tradition, both as a primer for students, especially those maintaining connections to religious traditions, and as one among other contemporary approaches to Dewey's work.

EDITOR'S NOTE

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John Dewey’s Educational Theory and the Challenge of American Racism

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STEVE FISHMAN:
The focus of Lucille McCarthy’s and my presentation today is John Dewey’s educational theory and the challenge of American racism. In particular, we ask, is Dewey’s idea of the democratic classroom practicable in light of increasing sensitivity to the racial divide in America, our growing awareness that social justice demands that teachers be color-sensitive rather than color-blind?

As a teacher I am committed to three Deweyan classroom objectives: (1) development of a common language to describe shared experience, (2) development of dialogic virtues such as openmindedness, wholeheartedness, responsibility, and cooperation, and (3) development of common goals, that is, shared commitment to expanding every class member’s interests. However, as we shall see in the videotape, Lucille McCarthy will show in a moment, racial differences in my Intro to Philosophy class in fall, 1998—as well as the bitter legacy of the history of those racial differences—present a significant challenge to achieving my Deweyan objectives.

We believe the questions we pose about Dewey and racism are important because of demographic projections. Estimates are that by the year 2020, more than half of our public school students will be pupils of color, whereas 95 percent of our teachers are expected to be white.

Before turning things over to McCarthy, I confess that I have been unable to find many discussions by Dewey about U.S. racial differences. The one exception is his May, 1932, address to the NAACP in Washington. In this talk, Dewey appears to take a Marxist approach to racial prejudice, sug-
gesting that poor people in America—no matter their race—face similar problems. I wonder out loud today if this is not to gloss over the bequest of our country’s history of racial divide, a bequest which we will now see presenting serious challenges to my Deweyan classroom goals.

LUCILLE McCARTHY:

As Steve has just said, several things may impede the achievement of a Deweyan classroom. In a 15-minute segment of videotape, I will show some of these impediments at work in his Intro to Philosophy classroom, namely, differences in language and race. These differences are, we are finding extremely hard to talk about as we study Fishman’s class because they are so complicated and mixed that to draw attention to any one factor is, perhaps, misleading. But in light of urging from educators of color that we not ignore race, that we not be colorblind, Steve and I have attempted to analyze this segment with racial differences in mind. As a result, at the start of the tape, we interpret the comments of one African American student, 36-year-old Audrey Williams, as a distancing from other members of the class, an alienation fueled by anger at the privileges of her white classmates. In the middle of the tape, a second African American, 28-year-old Alexis Fuller, also appears to separate herself from the group by preaching rather than conversing, a behavior we believe may be tied to race, specifically her distrust of white teachers and the white educational system. Finally, at the end of the tape, we interpret the rhetorical style of a third African American student, 30-year-old Tonya McInnis, as a reflection of typical patterns of debate within the black community.

The scene is Fishman’s Intro to Philosophy class at UNC Charlotte, September 24, 1998. A diverse group of students, all of whom have enrolled to satisfy graduation requirements, sits in a circle discussing an essay by Clarence Darrow (1932). Students are evenly divided between males and females, and of the 25 students there are five people of color, all women, four African Americans and a woman from India. We enter the scene about half way into the 75-minute period, the session having begun with students pairing up and commenting on each other’s homework responses to the Darrow piece. Fishman is now calling on pairs to report what they learned from one another.

Fishman calls first on 36 year old Audrey Williams, a junior criminal justice major, who describes her partner’s efforts to explain evolution to her. It is a concept Audrey is unfamiliar with, she says, and, although she finds it interesting, she stands by her faith in God. When Fishman questions her,
Audrey explains that her faith is rooted in personal experience. God helped her walk away unharmed from a serious car accident, and He saved her brother when he was shot. Audrey then asks Fishman, “But why should I question my beliefs anyway, when I am happy with them? If they’re not ‘broken, why fix them? In any case,” she adds, addressing her classmates, “I don’t have time. I have kids; I work full time. If I were 21 years old, just hanging around with nothing to do, I too would suck this stuff up. But I’ve got other things to worry about.”

In Audrey’s comments, Fishman and I hear anger, the implication that “You all are rich, whereas I have to work. You’re young and free, whereas I’m under all sorts of adult pressures.” In the previous unit, Audrey was confrontational as well, challenging white students about race, saying that no matter how well they got to know her, they would always see her primarily as a black woman. On another occasion she snapped at a white student who had just described Black History Month in her high school, “So you want me to thank you?!” Audrey’s anger may also be fueled by the low grades she is receiving in Fishman’s class, and her comments about lack of time may be her effort to explain these. Thus, when Fishman and I watch Audrey on this tape, we see anger and defensiveness, attitudes we believe may be connected to race.

As a white male, Fishman is, as he has said, concerned about how best to teach other people’s children. Is he doing it right? He is not following Lisa Delpit’s (1995) advice to white teachers to teach minority students directly, to tell them explicitly what they need to know to succeed in his class. Rather, as you will see, Fishman follows Dewey’s quite opposite advice to teach indirectly. Quietly modeling philosophic questioning, Fishman presses students for clarification and reflection, showing rather than telling them how philosophers think and speak. According to Lisa Delpit, such an indirect approach may be fine for students familiar with academic discourse and able to read between the lines, but teachers’ failure to spell things out may put minority students at a disadvantage. And Audrey Williams indeed appears to be resisting Steve and his Deweyan approach, implying she is neither interested in critiquing her own views nor open to new ones.

As you will see, Fishman takes Audrey’s query, Why question?, very seriously, not only because he wants to respect Audrey’s concerns but also because her question is, after all, at the heart of the philosophic enterprise. And Audrey’s challenge interests her classmates as well, some of whom told me later they winced at her comment. Although younger than Audrey, they too work many hours, they said, and, like her, “have other things to worry about.” Nevertheless, in the discussion that follows, you will see not only
Fishman modeling the dialogic virtues but several students as well. And even Audrey, despite her rejection of the philosophic method, seems to respect the conversation itself. She listens to classmates’ responses to her question and entertains Steve’s further probing of her position.

The second African American student, 28-year-old Alexis Fuller, also separates herself from the group, but, unlike Audrey, Alexis detaches herself not only by what she says but also by how she says it. Interrupting class conversation with what appears to be a non-sequitur, Alexis witnesses: “I just want to say that God is everywhere.” Once she has declared her belief, she then tries briefly to connect it to the ongoing dialogue by claiming, in effect, that she is better than Audrey because her religious views rest on just the sort of critical inquiry Audrey has rejected. However, this sort of critical thinking is, after all, not worth the effort because, despite much study, her beliefs remain unchanged. Midway into Alexis’s contribution you will see Heather, a white woman, sitting next to Alexis, question her, apparently wanting to bring Alexis closer to the class’s line of inquiry, to render her comments more relevant to the conversation. This stops Alexis’s witnessing only briefly, however, and she eventually concludes, “I do think you need to hear others’ points of view, but it won’t matter so long as you’re strong in what you believe.”

As classroom researchers, Steve and I wonder what we are seeing. How do we interpret the vehemence with which Alexis teaches the class, her certainty that, as she told me later, she is giving these students important points to learn, whereas they are teaching her nothing. One way to interpret this is that Alexis is simply a closeminded fundamentalist. However, if we want to be non-colorblind, we might interpret Alexis’s stance as tied to race. It may indicate that she feels she is in a hostile world, that she is distrustful of the public educational system and what she has been taught by whites. And, in fact, her comments do reinforce what Fordham (1996), Ogbu (1988), and Weis (1988) say: That although many minority students profess the importance of education, they actually have a long history of skepticism about schooling and its promised benefits because these benefits have for so long failed to materialize. When Alexis describes her college professors, she tells me most of them have been “secretive and phony,” destructive of her self-esteem, and unwilling to give her good grades—even “offended”—when she tells them that she is learning what is right for her, although it may not be right for them.

Although Audrey and Alexis both distance themselves from the group, questioning in their different ways the value of philosophic method and con-
conversation, in the final minutes of the tape a third African American student, 30-year-old Tonya McInnis, defends the class and the dialogic virtues, in particular, the virtue of openmindedness. However, Tonya does this in a very non-academic way. Borrowing Audrey's word, "suck," to oppose Audrey's position, Tonya tries to get the better of her via performance and linguistic flourish rather than by careful Deweyan analysis. This appeared to Steve and me at first to be a personal attack on Audrey, but when put in the context of race and cultural difference, we believe it may simply be Tonya's preferred way of arguing (see Kochman).

I will now roll this 15 minute tape so you can see for yourselves.

+++ 

As you can see, Audrey Williams, Alexis Fuller, and Tonya McInnis present Fishman and me with significant interpretive challenges. In Audrey's and Alexis's cases, what appears to us to be race-related resistance may actually be explained by other factors. And, similarly, our seeing Tonya's performance as reflective of a debate style typical within the black community may be to essentialize and miss more complex factors at work. In any case, this tape gives you a sense of the challenges we face as color-sensitive classroom researchers trying to assess Fishman's Deweyan pedagogy and its effects on other people's children.)

NOTE

Unfortunately this videotape has not been duplicated and is, therefore, unavailable for circulation.

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John Dewey, Democracy and Education, and What May Be Expected from Schools

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INTRODUCTION

In his book John Dewey. Rethinking Our Time (Boisvert, 1998) Raymond Boisvert deals in a very lucid way with a broad scope of Deweyan themes. Boisvert's book offers a thoughtful introduction into a multitude of Deweyan landscapes. In broad strokes it presents the main characteristics of Dewey's philosophical position and defends that position, but not without including a critical and adequate remark about the limitations of the application of Dewey's views in our own time. We have read his book several times with great pleasure and felt that this is again a contribution to a still growing field of new Deweyan scholarship (cf. Garrison, 1995). This doesn't mean that we don't have any comments on some issues or that we completely agree with Boisvert's conclusions. But we do agree with one of his main conclusions that it would be very un-Deweyan to suppose that we could transplant his ideas to our time and situation. This goes especially for the educational aspects of Dewey's philosophy, on which we will focus in our presentation. In our view, Dewey's thoughts and insights of how education 'works' or should work, can both be a source of inspiration and a critical force against certain less favourable ways in which educational thought and practice seem to develop.

The core concepts of Dewey's educational theory: growth, participation, co-ordination and individuality (cf. Berding, 1997) are part of a specific and by no means 'mainstream' view of education, of the child and of society. These concepts can be helpful, because they challenge a certain 'common' understanding of education, for instance the view of children as the 'objects'
of education, views on curriculum and on the function of schooling in a multi-cultural society. Dewey's view on education and democracy provides the main entry into these issues.

THREE POINTS FOR REFLECTION

In this paper we will do three things. First (1) we'll say a few words about our own background and our interest in Dewey. We think it's useful to give an impression of our reading of Dewey, which is influenced by the fact that we live in The Netherlands, a country that knows strong and very specific traditions in education. Then (2) we'll identify three important contemporary educational debates that so far have benefited too little from Deweyan thought. These debates centre around notions of transfer of knowledge and culture, and the function of curriculum in that process; about the development of children; and about the broader societal function of education. After that (3) we will locate Dewey's key concepts of experience, participation and growth as concepts that can be inserted in these debates as alternative educational scenario's; these concepts are described within the transactional relationship of democracy and education in Dewey.

In our conclusion we will focus on what may - and can - be expected from schools. We concentrate on what we call the 'pedagogical responsibility' of the school, responsibility being another core concept of Boisvert's reconstruction of Dewey.

(1) Our own background and Dewey

The Netherlands know strong and specific traditions in education. One of the main features of all the sub-systems of twentieth century Dutch education in schools is the division between public-authority education, that is organized under the auspices of local or national governments, and denominational (for the most part roman-catholic or christian) education, that is organized by private boards, but paid for by national government if it complies to the education laws. This segregation or 'pillarization' (Miedema & De Ruyter, 1995) within one national system of schooling, together with the other phenomenon of the strong christian tendencies in the Dutch science of education, especially in the first half of this century, are probably the two important factors that have kept educators and academic pedagogues in our country from embracing educational philosophers-theorists such as Dewey. It is even worse. We hesitate to quote one of the leading philosophers of education in postwar Dutch academic pedagogy, M.J. Langeveld, who wrote in his obituary for Dewey among other things the following:
His [Dewey's] theory of values was very simplistic and only the certainty of Dewey's personal decency and the background of a well-disposed liberal world as background [L. refers to the USA], made his ideas in this matter harmless. We Europeans have missed in Dewey the carrying and fixed foundation of a philosophy of life, of a kind that is accessible only for people with religious faith (Langeveld, 1952, 202).

In our country only a few people have tried to grasp beyond Dewey's pragmatism; in most cases the term and the ideas of pragmatism (if seriously explored), were perceived - at its best - as a value-neutral philosophy; and at its worst as a philosophy that questions or even desecrates everything that is held dearly in Western civilization and philosophy and is founded in Christian faith. Most of this goes for the reception of Dewey's educational theory as well. At its best, the didactical side of it was accepted (often but erroneously referred to as 'the project method', or as a defense for a mindless 'learning by doing'; both slogans not stemming from Dewey but from Kilpatrick and Francis Parker respectively); the philosophical foundations again were dismissed.

In the past twelve years the present authors together with our colleague Gert Biesta have made an effort to turn this negativism. Biesta wrote the first book-length study in Dutch fully devoted to Dewey's philosophy (Biesta, 1992); Miedema reconstructed the reception of Dewey's philosophy and educational philosophy in both Europe and the Netherlands (Biesta and Miedema, 1996), and stressed the relevancy of Dewey's philosophy of religion for contemporary educational thought (Miedema, 1995); Berding reconstructed Dewey's position in the debates with the Herbartians and Froebelians on educational philosophy and educational practice around 1900. A period which is highlighted by Dewey's involvement with what Europeans would call 'pedagogical anthropology' (Berding, 1992; 1993; 1997). It's no overstatement to say that in spite of these efforts, Dewey was and still is a marginal figure in our country. To some extend that is a good thing. By not being a part of the establishment, Dewey's insights can (and are) used as a critical force, i.e. they play a role in the evaluation and appraisal of some of the debates going on in the Netherlands at the moment. But not only in our country.

(2) Contemporary debates and entries into Dewey's work: thinking our own time

We think there are three major educational debates going on. The first is about the way children are dealt with by adults and society in general and what 'images' adults have about (their) children. The second is about cur-
riculum: what a curriculum is or should be; how it is or should be developed and used; who develops it or should develop it. And the third debate is about the moral and societal significance of general public education.

These issues are all touched upon in detail by Boisvert, and with no great effort retraceable in Dewey's work. For each of these debates there are significant entries into Dewey's work. A first one is the way in which he criticizes a number of views about the development of the child (see chapters 3 through 6 in Democracy and Education; 1916; MW9). To put it succinct, where pedagogues such as Rousseau or Froebel speak about 'development', Dewey uses 'growth' as a summary of his naturalistic outlook on the human species (Boisvert, 1998, 58, 59). By using this concept, Dewey stresses the dynamics of life, both the natural life and the cultural-economic-political life. It has a significant impact on ideas about the end or goal of education and on questions like 'Should education prepare for life?'. Dewey characteristically equates education with life.

A second entry is provided by Dewey's critique of the settled idea of education (or schooling, or curriculum) as a form of industrialized transport of ideas from a knowing head to another not-yet knowing one:

The bare fact that a child goes to school in order to learn tends to make learning a synonym for taking in and reproducing what other persons have already found out (1929; LW5:131).

The ever expanding arsenal of knowledge is bundled up in 'sizes appropriate to age and arranging for their serial distribution, each in its proper year, month, and day' (1929; LW5:132). Education tends to be a form of pre-fabrication of ready made articles and their efficient and mechanical transfer. Dewey's alternative paradigm for this view of education as transfer is participation, the co-creation or co-construction of situated knowledge, or more generally the idea of partnership, and shared interests in the process of education (cf. Fishman and McCarthy, 1998; Berding, 1999).

Thirdly, in the Netherlands the moral and societal dimensions are widely discussed, among other things as part of a debate about the pedagogical responsibility of schools. This focuses on the way in which schools should or could transfer not only knowledge, but also moral standards and attitudes.

To tackle these issues we would like to enter into Dewey's theory of democratic schooling (or schooling in a democracy), because we feel that this is a view in which many threads are woven together.

(3) Dewey's theory of democratic schooling or schooling in a democracy
acknowledges the fact that schooling is a very crucial and influential societal function, but that it is not the only one that is educative. It also sees that education alone cannot be held responsible for the task of securing a democratic society. Although his famous Pedagogic Creed perhaps suggests otherwise, where he says: 'I believe that education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform' (1897; EW5:93), we have never felt that Dewey seriously entertains the possibility that schools alone could alter societies' course in any fundamental manner, and certainly not in the short run. Dewey was not naive. But he was a Utopian of sorts. In his short essay 'Dewey Outlines Utopian schools' of 1933, Dewey shows what a broad system of educational practice would look like, if we were able to start from scratch:

The most Utopian thing about Utopia is that there are no schools at all. Education is carried on without anything of the nature of schools, or (Dewey hastens to add), if this idea is so extreme that we cannot conceive of it as educational at all, then we may say nothing of the sort at present we know as schools. Children, however, are gathered together in association with older and more mature people who direct their activity (1933; LW9:136).

The education Dewey has in mind proceeds within large grounds, orchards, gardens, greenhouses; while the buildings have workshops, museums, and scientific laboratories and a central library. The parallels with Dewey's own ideas about how to design a school of almost forty years earlier as related in The School and Society (1899; MW1:44-46), are, of course, more than accidental. The Utopians who show Dewey around are bewildered by his account of how schools are usually run, and by his questions about the 'objectives' of the activities: 'The notion that there was some special end which the young should try to attain was completely foreign to their thoughts' (1933; LW9:138). The Utopians felt liberated from the yuk of formal, institutionalized education when

... the concept of external attainments was thrown away and when they started to find out what each individual person had in him from the very beginning, and then devoted themselves to finding out the conditions of the environment and the kinds of activity in which the positive capacities of each young person could operate most effectually (1933; LW9:139).

Though this account of Utopian schools perhaps seems a little too anecdotal (we think it illustrative for Dewey's dry sense of humour), it nevertheless contains all the crucial features of a serious educational program. It also
makes clear that utopian thought may fulfill a helpful proleptic function (cf. Boisvert, 1998, 42) within an empirical-naturalistic framework. For Dewey there is an intricate relationship between the psychological and the social factors in education, and he situates the co-ordination between these factors both as a problem and as a task that has its ramifications in the entire society (cf. Berding, 1999). If we were free to design education anew, we probably would not build the factories that dominate the educational landscape today. For Dewey, ordinary everyday common social practice has primacy over the formal, institutionalized and in some ways 'artificial' practices, such as go on in schools. This is probably one of the reasons why the 'family-model' is so important to Dewey, as Boisvert (1998) carefully notes (and by the way Garrison, 1997 criticizes as being a bit old-fashioned). Nevertheless, most of what Dewey (and Boisvert) subsequently tells us about education is in fact a tale about schooling. That is, the deliberate, carefully designed (i.e. planned; cf Tanner, 1997) attempt to have a new generation go through processes of gaining knowledge and insights, in a way that is developmentally appropriate and which appeals to all the instincts and experiences with which children enter school. They are, in a manner of speaking, already 'experienced'. We have to keep in mind that children learn, and live (create their lives) before school and after school time.

Dewey's theory of democracy differs in significant ways from dominant Enlightenment-rooted, mainstream theory of democracy: that of democracy as a formal system of representation, in which a few (the elected) take over part of the powers of decision-making from the many (those allowed to vote). Dewey's 'model of democracy' (Held, 1992) is more reminiscent of the way in which Athens carried out democracy (the 'original' model of participative democracy), than the way in which democratic practices are carried out in most western representative democracies. With one big difference: where in Athenian democracy all-embracing participation was the prerogative of the few, and the polis was inhabited by only a minority of the people, in a Deweyan democracy all participate in everything. In a modern mainstream democracy everybody is entitled to representation, which is in fact a reduced form of participation. Democracy is regarded as 'a cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broadest participation of the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make political decisions (that is, decisions affecting the whole community)' (Held, 1992, 17), which neatly illustrates both the extensions and limitations of representative democracy. In most views of democracy the non-identity of state and society is not an issue.
democracy. In Dewey's view of democracy, however, not elections, representation, and democratic institutions are the key concepts, but growth, social intelligence, communication, community, and a very intense trafficking of ideas, and ideals, insights, beliefs, and hopes (cf. what Boisvert, 1998, 57 calls 'a context of criss-crossing and zig-zagging interests'). The shortest description Dewey ever gave of democracy was 'conjoint communicated experience' (1916; MW9:93). Experience of course, although a troublesome also a core concept that appears very early in Dewey's work. Already in 1892 he spoke of experience as 'simply what we do' (1892; LW17:154). In later statements Dewey describes experience as 'an active and a passive element peculiarly combined' (1916; MW9:139); where the active stands for 'trying out' and the passive for the 'undergoing' of the consequences of that act:

When we experience something we act upon it, we do something with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We do something to the thing and then it does something to us in return (1916; MW9:139).

Like Dewey, Boisvert connects experience with everyday life, the way ordinary people lead their ordinary everyday lives. We think this is well seen. It makes clear that Dewey was by no means a philosopher in an ivory tower. Dewey's conception of the continuity of culture and nature is in the heart of his philosophy. He regards human experience as a special case of general, universal or 'natural' experience; for which he late in his career used the term transaction. In a certain sense life 'is' transaction or experience. There is no other, external authority we can turn to for legitimizing our decisions. This constitutes Dewey's outlook on democracy, as is illustrated by the following quotes: '... democracy is belief in the ability of human experience to generate the aims and methods by which further experience will grow in ordered richness' (1939; LW14:229), while 'Every other form of moral and social faith rests upon the idea that experience must be subjected at some point or other to some form of external control; to some “authority” alleged to exist outside the process of experience' (1939; LW14:229).

For Dewey, such an authority does not exist. From what was just said about communication and experience follows that Dewey's is a formal kind of theory which has very little to say about what actual practices are to be judged as democratic and which have to be judged as undemocratic. The case is even stronger: there are no absolute standards to use in these judgments. That is the essence of equality: that no-one could invent an absolute standard that would make all other standards subordinate (cf. Boisvert, 1998,
68). The only thing Dewey gives are two general criteria that can be used to determine to what extent forms of social life can be characterized as being democratic. The first criterion deals with the question how numerous and varied the shared interests are in a society. The second criterion points to the question how full and free the intercourse and communication is between the diverse groups (cf. 1916; MW 9:105).

CONCLUSION

We come back to the question we formulated earlier in this paper: 'What should the pedagogical responsibility of the schools be in our society?' Answering this question is a form of thinking our time, and in that sense a task of philosophers of education. One way of conceptualizing the responsibility of schools is to stress the importance of these institutions in respect to the transmission of knowledge, values and norms. In such a view schools, then, play a significant role in the preparation of pupils for external and future societal ends. With Dewey we can criticize the objectivistic and dualistic ontological and epistemological underpinning of this position. By applying Boisvert’s thorough analysis of the three strands (the Plotinian Temptation, the Galilean Purification, and the Asomatic Attitude) to educational thought, elements of the transmission view on the pedagogical responsibility of the school can easily be detected.

Our view on the pedagogical responsibility of the school is a different one. In our opinion the pedagogical aim of the school should be to support pupils to become more effective in their participation in a growing number of cultural structured activities. Education then is a matter of ‘instrumentation’. These participation processes are at the same time in themselves learning processes. Subject-matter, in terms of a formal curriculum, is important in this view too, but the criterion is not whether the subject-matter is transmitted to the students, but whether the students have transformed the subject-matter in such a way that it got subjective, i.e. personal meaning for the students (cf. Wardekker, Biesta & Miedema, 1998). From schools that want to go along the participative instead of the transmission road, we may expect that in their evaluation and appraisal of organized arrangements and spontaneous arising learning situations in the school they will at least use the criterion of the growing participation of students in cultural structured activities and the criterion of the growing meaningful personal relation of the students with subject-matter at hand.

That it is possible to think our time and do philosophy of education by introducing such a participative view on the pedagogical responsibility of schools.
schools, is partly due to the proleptic power of Deweyan thought. Not by replicating Dewey’s views, but by adapting his insights to our situation-at-hand. Wasn’t this, what Dewey had in mind as the task for the philosophy of education?

**Note**


**References**

*Works by Dewey* [from the collected works; J.A. Boydston, Ed.]

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- My Pedagogic Creed (1897; EW5:84-95).
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Boisvert and the Levels of Deweyan Engagement*

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Raymond Boisvert provides a succinct, readable and generally thorough introduction to the philosophy of John Dewey in his book John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time. However, having said this, I believe a close examination of Boisvert's treatment of Dewey's theory of knowledge reveals an occasional overemphasis on the Deweyan commitment to social engagement at the expense of attention to Dewey's subtle distinctions between different levels of engagement prior to any sort of problem solving. Even though Boisvert might disagree with Israel Scheffler's negative assessment of Deweyan engagement, his own treatment of philosophical engagement is analogous to that of Scheffler's since it is also preoccupied with a read of Dewey in terms of application rather than contemplation.

Although active verbs like "experiencing," "making," "experimenting" and "thinking" are used by Boisvert to characterize Dewey's reaction against older philosophical approaches, adjectives such as "deliberative," "consummatory," "hypothetical" and "imaginative" receive less attention even though they are also an integral part of the Deweyan corpus. Such words are often related to what could be termed contemplative moments, those involving periodic removal from the scope of everyday problems and concerns deemed "practical." I will argue that Dewey's approach to significant problems can be best characterized by a continuous oscillation between various types and levels of engagement. This is why his philosophy cannot be captured in terms of a preoccupation with impending application to broad social concerns.

Although Boisvert is obviously aware of Dewey's many remarks about
the importance of periodic withdrawal from contexts christened "everyday," he does not adequately convey this understanding at critical junctures in John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time. For example, when examining Dewey's view of the role philosophy should play in social life, Boisvert remarks:

*Philosophy's place is within this matrix of weal and woe. Too often...philosophy has served as an avenue of escape, a route of solace and detachment from the pressing complicated difficulties of life. This is the false path of ivory tower philosophers. Dewey's Copernican revolution involves so marked a shift in orientation that the tendency to escapism is minimized. Thinking, doing, and responsibility...are continuous and intertwined.*

Later, at another point, Boisvert says, "Rejecting the picture of the philosopher who withdraws for the purpose of analyzing ideas, Dewey prefers the example of an artist engaged in fabrication as more accurately symbolizing the process of deliberation." Then later he adds, "How much easier is it for academics to bury themselves in arcana and speak a dialect incomprehensible to all but the initiated."

This emphasis on engagement as a major theme of Dewey's is reiterated in another earlier piece written by Boisvert. In his article "Rorty, Dewey, and Post-Modern Metaphysics," the author reminds readers of Dewey's attack against what Rene Girard calls "the myth of detachment," arguing that this is what Deweyan metaphysics works against. He explains that "Dewey's ground-plan, which stresses interaction and life-histories, recognizes interconnectedness as a basic and ineluctable trait of existence."

I do not intend to take issue with Boisvert's emphasis on Dewey's repeated attempts to challenge philosophical approaches from Descartes onward that perpetuated the dream of a perfect starting point or "Galilean Purification" as he calls it. However, I would like to challenge his subtle, perhaps unintended, implication that the Deweyan vision of philosophy's role entails a perpetual obsession with specific kinds of attachment, engagement and application.

Boisvert seems to celebrate Dewey for this Copernican Revolution while others criticize him for it. I think both camps are mistaken if they fail to point out that Dewey's major contention is with those spectator theorists who set up detachment from ordinary social contexts as a permanent condition for the thinking subject, not with those who regard it as a necessary element in select processes of inquiry.

Israel Scheffler is another author, like Boisvert, who emphasizes Dewey's ward practical application and engagement. Unlike Boisvert, Scheffler
raises many criticisms of this approach. In an article entitled “Reflections on Educational Relevance,” Scheffler maintains the following:

Epistemological relevance, in short, requires us to reject both myth and mystic union. It requires not contact but criticism, not immersion in the phenomenal given, but the flexibility of mind capable of transcending, reordering and expanding the given. An education that fosters criticism and conceptual flexibility will transcend its environment not by erecting a mythical substitute for this world but rather by striving for a systematic and penetrating comprehension of it.

Here, Scheffler portrays a pragmatic emphasis on application in terms of a relentless intimacy that makes movement between contexts of differing scope nearly impossible. Relating this to Dewey in another work, Scheffler accuses him of suggesting “...that the import of theory can be wholly encompassed within the sphere of action and observation,” and concludes, “The latter suggestion cannot...be sustained.” Scheffler then explains that “Distance...is functional for the theorist, who strives for ever deeper insights and broader perspectives on nature. The value of theoretical distance must be acknowledged in education, and distinguished from mere remoteness and pedantry.”

Although Scheffler is critical of Dewey, and Boisvert welcomes his Copernican Revolution, both authors can be criticized for being too preoccupied with an understanding of Deweyan interaction in terms of close engagement or intimate attachment to immediate surroundings. Like William James before him who emphasized an individual's oscillating relationship to what is focal and marginal in a changing perceptual field, Dewey is sensitive to a thinker's continual movement between and across contexts of narrow and wide scope.

He pays explicit attention to levels of action and engagement, without falling prey to the dualistic fallacy of choosing between what Boisvert calls the “Galilean Perfection” or “the Plotinian Temptation.” Dewey avoids positing a completely “detached” subject over and against one kind of continuity by paying attention to the differential ebb and flow of attachment, interaction and relevance. This emphasis emerges from a consideration of those Deweyan activities that cannot be characterized in terms of “mystic union” or complete immersion.

For example, I think it is fair to say that Dewey's understanding of deliberation is not all that far removed from what Scheffler has in mind when he examines theorizing, nor is it foreign to activities Boisvert disparages as too “utopian” or imaginative. In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey comments
on the practice of deliberation, saying it is "...a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action...an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like." Then he explains that "...the [deliberative] trial is in imagination, not in overt fact." Dewey concludes by maintaining, "Activity does not cease in order to give way to reflection; activity is turned from execution into intra-organic channels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal." Thus, for Dewey, deliberation is not separate from activity or imaginative processes as Boisvert and Scheffler imply; it is another type of engagement involving imagination, occasional distancing and creative foresight; according to Dewey, it entails a "...period of delay, of suspended and postponed overt action."

Another case which challenges the models of engagement offered by Boisvert and Scheffler involves artistic activities. As noted already, in his chapter on Deweyan aesthetics, Boisvert replaces the image of the philosopher/analyst with that of the artist/fabricator in order to capture Dewey's philosophical approach. His chapter on "making" reiterates this view of the artist, even though Dewey often focuses on those instances where artists disengage from a wide context only to concentrate on a narrower one or pause in the wake of a consummatory experience. Although Boisvert claims that Dewey, like Plato, understands that "social ideals are not to be invented by the free play of imagination," there are passages in Dewey that offer another vantage point. For instance, commenting on artistic activity, Dewey says:

Relief from continuous moral activity—in the conventional sense of moral—is itself a moral necessity. The service of art and play is to engage and release impulses in ways quite different from those in which they are occupied and employed in ordinary activities.

According to Dewey, oftentimes there is an interim between the contemplative activities of artists and engagement with the pressing problems of wider social contexts. This leads him to observe that "...most of the significance now found in serious occupations originated in activities not immediately useful, and gradually found its way from them into objectively serviceable employments." Characterizing artistic contemplation in Art as Experience, Dewey says, "It is not practical, if by 'practical' is meant an action undertaken for a particular and specialized end outside the perception, or for some external consequence."

Dewey does raise the possibility that a time interval between artistic and scientific activities can delay engagement to the peril of social life. No doubt, this is why he says:
Even the pursuit of science may become an asylum of refuge from the hard conditions of life—not a temporary retreat for the sake of recuperation and clarification in future dealings with the world. The very word art may become associated not with a specific transformation of things, making them more significant for mind, but with stimulations of eccentric fancy and with emotional indulgences. The separation and mutual contempt of the “practical” man and the man of theory or culture, the divorce of fine and industrial arts, are indications of this situation.

Dewey is aware of the dangers of sustained detachment, but he is also cognizant of the need for varying levels of engagement depending on the problem to be resolved or the enjoyments to be valued. A close reading of his work reveals suspicion of theories of knowledge which permanently disengage or separate thinkers from their contexts (i.e. British empiricism), yet it also displays a wariness of subservience to demands for immediate applicability or knee-jerk activism. What emerges from the Deweyan approach to knowledge is an oscillation between moments of engagement with concerns broad in scope and those times when thinkers are removed from such concerns, not for the purpose of evading them, but for the purpose of intelligently linking up with them when the time is right.

There are moments when artists engage with their audiences only after contemplative periods following the consummation of earlier engagements with paint, canvas or landscape. Likewise, there are times when deliberative scientists disengage from family and friends only to emerge from laboratories with cures or remedies that find application in the domain of public health and medicine. An active, Deweyan approach to knowledge cannot be characterized by one type of engagement nor with the ideal of perpetual divorce. Instead, it envisions situations where periods of apparent inactivity alternate with moments of overt response. I believe that this continuous oscillation between levels of engagement is a process that any newcomer to the life and thought of John Dewey should reconsider after a reading of authors like Boisvert or Scheffler.

Even beyond the realm of Dewey scholarship, it is a process represented in literature on the nature of human development or various rites of passage. For example, Carol Gilligan seems to be grappling with this process in her ground-breaking study on the moral development of men and women entitled *In a Different Voice*. She says, “Attachment and separation anchor the cycle of human life, describing the biology of human reproduction and the psychology of human development.” Likewise, cultural anthropologists
from Arnold Van Gennep to Victor Turner characterize passage from childhood roles to adult responsibilities in terms of ongoing transitions between socially defined moments of separation and reintegration.¹⁵

Boisvert points out, “Socrates is the great model philosopher for Dewey, someone fully immersed in the concerns of living a good life.”²⁶ I will not argue with him on this account, but will add that Socrates’ student, Plato, also portrays processes of knowing in terms of a back-and-forth movement between immersion in a rarefied realm of perfect forms and ordinary life in a cave of shadows.²⁷ Although Dewey departs from the ontological details of such a depiction, nevertheless, he retains many of its valuable insights.

NOTES

*At the outset, I should mention that Ralph Page and Walter Feinberg offered many helpful suggestions and valuable insights regarding the first draft of this paper. Any gaps or oversights should not be attributed to either man since both made exceptional efforts to help me express my central points and concerns. Special thanks are also in order for the input of Nick Burbules, Pradeep Dhillon, Jeanne Connell and fellow graduate students who offered critical input during an earlier presentation of this paper to the Philosophy of Education Discussion Group at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on October 23, 1998.

1. In his earlier book Dewey’s Metaphysics (New York, Fordham, 1988), Boisvert observes, “Dewey does not deny the value of purely theoretical understanding, but in his view the undue emphasis on that kind of knowledge too readily leads to the mistaken analysis that posits a passive knower who merely contemplates the spectacle of beings set before him” (p. 104). One could add, as I am attempting to do, that de-emphasizing Dewey’s attention to theoretical contexts and other arenas that are not overtly engaged with the “problems of men” also threatens to distort a clear overview of the Deweyan project.


8. Israel Scheffler, Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead and Dewey, (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), p. 204. Critics like Richard J. Bernstein would take issue with Scheffler’s characterization of the pragmatic understanding of action. In Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1971), Bernstein explains, “Dewey placed so much stress on the active projective dimension of experience that there is a danger of misinterpreting him. There is a shallow criticism of Dewey that he conceives of man as a restless agent who is always concerned with a future that alludes him. This common criticism ignores that Dewey was just as concerned with the moments of completeness and fulfillment that take place within the rhythm of experience” (p. 208).


17. Boisvert, *John Dewey*, p. 88. This passage is consistent with what the author says elsewhere. In "Rorty, Dewey, and Post-Modern Metaphysics," Boisvert explains that for Dewey the "...task of social philosophers is akin to that of artists" (p. 188).


19. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 162. In this passage, Dewey continues his examination of differential engagement by noting that artistic activities are often characterized by a "spontaneity and liberation from external necessities" which "permits to them an enhancement and vitality of meaning not possible in preoccupation with immediate needs." (pp. 162-163)


23. No doubt, this may be one reason why, in his discussion of what he means by aesthetic contemplation, he concludes, "Detachment" is a negative name for something extremely positive. There is no severance of self, no holding of it aloof, but fullness of participation." See *Art as Experience*, p. 258.


My remarks here today will be brief. They begin with a note of gratitude, follow with a quotation from Kant which I hope will not apply to me, and then meander through some stream of consciousness reflections occasioned by today's presenters. I want to thank Mike Oliker, first of all, for conceiving of this session and organizing it. My gratitude extends also to the people whose papers have made this a fruitful afternoon: Howard, Steve, Lucille, Joop, Siebren, and Alan. Philosophy panels are too often like jousting tournaments where each speaker tries to knock all the others down. Discussion confused with jousting is, gratefully, inimical to the spirit of Dewey's philosophy. It is not surprising, therefore, that today's participants all reveal themselves as individuals engaged in thinking cooperatively about important issues facing the human condition.

Thinking about my own book in light of today's session sent me back to a comment made by Immanuel Kant as he reflected on public reception of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here is what Kant had to say:

It will be misjudged because it is misunderstood, and misunderstood because men chose to skim through the book, and not to think through it—a disagreeable task, because the work is dry, obscure, opposed to all ordinary notions, and moreover long-winded.

Quite happily for me, the participants in this symposium have neither misunderstood nor skimmed through my recent book. I can also say that, being about Dewey, the book is not "opposed to all ordinary notions." Whether I have written it in a way that avoids the description as "dry,"
"obscure," and "long-winded" is something about which readers in general will have to judge.

The participants in this symposium have addressed some important questions. Steve, discussing pedagogy, asserts, in a fully Deweyan fashion, that teaching today involves the surprising challenge of creating the very need for what we do. Joop and Siebren emphasize how the continuity between nature and culture is central to Dewey's thought. Howard worries about the overly Aristotelian and communitarian dimension to my rendering of Dewey, especially in contrast with the interpretation articulated in Jim Campbell's *Understanding Dewey*. Alan writes appreciatively of Dewey, but worries that an overly hasty reading might lead some interpreters, and my book is thought to fall into this pattern, to so emphasize the engaged dimension of Deweyan philosophy, that its reflective, contemplative side is unfairly marginalized.

There is a sharp contrast between those we have heard from today and a panel of prominent philosophers who gathered for the World Congress of Philosophy in Boston last Summer. Those panelists, whose members included Willard van Orman Quine, Donald Davidson and Peter Strawson were asked "What have we learned from philosophy in the 20th century?" Embarrassingly, the three most famous philosophers on the panel could not come up with any adequate answer. My guess is that the people here today, like most members of the APA who are not at high powered institutions, could have offered a great variety of answers to the reporter's question. From within the tradition of American Philosophy alone several responses come immediately to mind: William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience* emphasized an especially rich concept which has allowed tolerance and mutual understanding to flourish, pluralism. Decades before the fascist threat, James was sensitive to the dangers of emphasizing purity and unity as human ideals. John Dewey's *Democracy and Education* symbolized two important lessons learned from philosophy: first, the importance of an educational system that recognizes how the student is an embodied, encultured creature interested in learning, not just an empty vessel to be filled; and second, the attempt to articulate an understanding of democracy that keeps the traditional ideals of democratic life alive under conditions that have changed dramatically since the ideals first came to prominence in the 18th century.

Since the speakers have already covered lots of different ground quite effectively, what I would like to do is simply provide a commentary that summarizes what I take to be some of the most important components of Dewey's thought, touching, at the end, on some of its limitations. These reflections are occasioned by the papers which the participants have already read.
Richard Rorty, not always the most accurate representative of Dewey's thought, did get one thing right. To understand Dewey, we need to grasp the anti-foundational context within which Dewey works. Charles Peirce apparently suggested that philosophers should begin by taking to heart the following injunction: “avoid make-believes.” For Dewey, this means accepting the human condition as it is. Philosophers should not pretend to be what or where they are not. They begin as historically situated, encultured beings. They find themselves always and inevitably in medias res. This means that, if we seek a point of origin for philosophy, or a single indubitable piece of evidence on which to build a philosophy, we will find it only if we pretend, that is to say, artificially assume ourselves to be in a situation that is not really ours.

We can move from the local to the global, we can attempt, as Dewey did, to provide generic traits that characterize accurately the conditions within which we find ourselves, but we do not get at these by pretending that we have intuited or perceived some bit of indubitable data as providing a rock solid foundation for a philosophical edifice erected on that basis. Dewey was both a contextualist and a fallibilist. What we have to go on are sedimented human experiences combined with the fruits of contemporary research. As Peirce had taught, we do not pretend to doubt what for all practical purposes is not doubtful.

Most of what we believe at any time is true, although any single component in our cluster of beliefs may prove to be false. This is sort of the slogan suitable for Deweyans. When we make praxis central we no longer need to long for absolute certainty in cognition. We can, instead, realize the importance of making choices based on information and experience that are sufficient to making determinations about the situation at hand. When, in place of concrete human beings, we substitute the make-believe view which considers humans as essentially minds seeking only dispassionate and absolutely certain knowledge about a world from which mind is alien, much ink will be wasted worrying about objectivism and skepticism. Farmers, much more Deweyan in their orientation than professional philosophers, plant their fields based on the best available information regarding soil conditions and the weather. They fully believe that, if things go well, the seeds will produce plants that are true to type. Subjectivists and philosophical skeptics are rara aves in the realm of praxis.

In place of a foundation, either as an apodictic first principle of the mind, or some indubitable truth discernible only by the intellect, or some absolutely secure first data given to sensation, the Deweyan works out of a
resonating center that takes seriously human experience. Once we eliminate
the great “make-believe” of modern philosophy, the notion of humans as
minds seeking to bridge the epistemological gap between themselves and the
“external” world, we can move in a Deweyan direction. The great make-
believe of modern philosophy not only led to inflated claims for philosophy
but it also provided the context for relativism and skepticism. If truth
depends on a related “make-believe,” the mind in touch with something
indubitable, and if this “make-believe” is exposed for what it is, then truth
and knowledge become generally suspect. When Dewey embraces human
experience as it is, along with the impulse for philosophizing within the con-
text of ordinary existence, he is moving entirely out of the orbit which kept
philosophers polarized between absolutist and skeptics.

The embrace of human experience is just the beginning, though.
Dewey believes that this experience can provide the guidance which we need
to chart our individual lives and to optimize the chances for producing har-
monious communities. For this, one needs more than just a criticism of
foundationalism. There must be some substantive set of beliefs about what
the world is like. For Dewey, this substantive center is what might be called
an “ecological ontology.” Here, it seems, is the permanent deposit left by
Hegel that Dewey mentions in his autobiography. The safest generalization
that can be made about entities is that they are interconnected. Isolated, self-
sufficient atoms are the exception. Things in varied relations with each other
are the rule.

This ecological ontology had important ramifications in Deweyan polit-
ica5 philosophy. Democratic ideals came to prominence at a time when both
British empiricism and continental thinkers like Rousseau tended to think in
terms of isolated entities as primary. Relations were considered to be second-
ary, and perhaps as artificial rather than natural. What Dewey wished to do
in his political philosophy was to preserve the ideals for democratic life
espoused by a Locke or a Rousseau, but to make them vibrant for the pres-
ent by reconceptualizing them within the thicker, concrete, more accurate
context which accepts humans as naturally involved in multiple sorts of inter-
actions with others. In more formal philosophical terms, to understand
Dewey properly, one must recognize that relations are as ontologically impor-
tant as are physical entities.

A proper understanding of Dewey also involves grasping the attitude
that guided him. Here it seems that his upbringing within the reformation
tradition of Christianity left an imprint that was not to be erased. Dewey was
an inveterate reformer. At no time did he think that humans could sit back
and say, “wow, this is perfect, no tinkering or improvements need be made.” He left formal religion behind in his thirties, but the spirit of the Reformation lived on in him. He was concerned to keep authentic ideals in mind while examining the conditions of contemporary life that distorted those ideals. Dewey could never have been the type of philosopher who constructed an airtight, conceptually complete system. He was, instead, a philosopher who always had a pebble in his shoe, who always sensed the limitations of any formulation. He felt deeply the need for vigilance in improving and reforming, not just philosophy, for philosophy is here a means, but for improving and reforming the life experiences of concrete human beings.

This “pebble in the shoe” attitude prevented Dewey, in other words, from being any sort of fundamentalist. Regrettably, some followers of Dewey tend to be inclined to fundamentalism when it comes to his thought. There is often strong reluctance, among Deweyans in general, and philosophers of education, in particular, to recognize that, just as Dewey tried to articulate a philosophy for a time when conditions had changed from previous generations, so we, too, live in a time which has altered significantly from that in which Dewey grew up and in which he had his lengthy teaching career. In particular, the latter part of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century were dominated by the impressive achievements of science. This led to a conviction, among many intellectual leaders, that generalizing the “scientific method,” extending it beyond the limited spheres in which it had had so much success, was exactly what was needed in order to provide the reforms in cultural, social and political institutions that would enhance the life-experiences of ordinary human beings.

In the last half of the twentieth-century, however, philosophical movements like hermeneutics and the sociology of science have taught us how much temporality and interpretation pervade all that we do, including the work of scientists themselves. We are now in a position to take even more seriously than Dewey the need to think of subject-matters and their methods as inextricably correlative. This means that the ideal of transferring a single method to all subject-matters, to all areas of concern seems less and less defensible.

Without disparaging science, contemporary Deweyans can none the less worry openly about the more dramatic of Dewey’s pronouncements about the wonders to be wrought by the extension of the scientific method to areas it had not yet reached. Steve mentioned the need sometimes to exaggerate to make a point. I would employ that strategy here, and suggest that the one book often used to introduce Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, is an
absolutely disastrous text from the point of view of emphasizing exactly what needs to be overcome in Dewey's philosophy. It is in *Reconstruction* that Dewey openly embraces Francis Bacon's optimism about the unlimited wonders to be derived from the extension of a single methodology. Dewey reveals himself in that book as overly smitten by the notion of progress, and seems not sensitive enough to the important fact that methods and subject-matters are correlative.

Some subject-matters such as political questions, moral issues, even we now know, scientific topics like the weather, simply cannot be dealt with accurately with the presuppositions associated with a late 19th century emphasis on a single, omnicompetent methodology. If contemporary Deweyans want to continue the Reformation tradition, they will have to move beyond some of Dewey's formulations, just as Dewey moved beyond those of his predecessors. If today's symposium represents various tendencies of that movement, then we are truly continuing the work of Dewey, not just repeating his formulations.
Bloom and His Critics: Nihilism and “True Education”

Jon Fennell
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It is just over ten years since Allan Bloom shocked us all with the spectacular success of The Closing of the American Mind. Bloom’s bitter assessment of American higher education sparked numerous responses, very few of which showed any understanding of Bloom’s central concerns. Among the small number that engaged Bloom in a responsible manner were critiques by Richard Schacht and Harry Neumann. Interestingly, both of these writers were critical of Bloom’s assessment of nihilism (which, Bloom had alleged, largely accounted for the decay of higher education in this country). But where Schacht asserted that Bloom erred in not recognizing the value of nihilism as a necessary condition for something higher and redemptive, Neumann (a self-professed nihilist) declared that Bloom in his attack on nihilism flees from the truth. Bloom, Schacht, and Neumann, then, represent three contrasting positions on nihilism, as well as on the question of human purposes and possibilities that a stance on nihilism necessarily entails. By examining their conceptions of true education, we will more clearly grasp these alternatives, thereby becoming more thoughtful and serious educators.

True education is a process as well as an outcome. As a process it is the pattern of growth that leads an individual, or his children, toward the ideal—it is the means by which the ideal is made actual. Movement along this path constitutes human fulfillment and is the mark of achievement. As an outcome, true education is a synonym for realization of our life’s purpose. It is the ultimate achievement. There is nothing more important to know about a person than his conception of true education.
Let us begin our journey with the pedagogy recommended by Bloom in *The Closing of the American Mind*. Bloom esteems both “a serious life” and “liberal education.” Indeed, liberal education exists in order to promote the serious life, which means

being fully aware of the alternatives, thinking about them with all the intensity one brings to bear on life-and-death questions, in full recognition that every choice is a great risk with necessary consequences that are hard to bear.¹

A serious life is the result of having faced “great questions.”⁴ This encounter with weighty questions is accomplished through exposure to the Great Books,

in which a liberal education means reading certain generally recognized classic texts, just reading them, letting them dictate what the questions are and the method of approaching them—not forcing them into categories we make up, not treating them as historical products, but trying to read them as their authors wished them to be read.⁵

Study of the Great Books not only excites the student; it also creates a foundation for community and friendship by revealing the big questions and illustrating models for addressing them.⁶

Bloom’s frequent use of the term “risk” in conjunction with true liberal education indicates that his vision has students conducting their lives in accordance with decisions they have made on the big questions. “True liberal education requires that the student’s whole life be radically changed by it, that what he learns may affect his action, his tastes, his choices, that no previous attachment be immune to examination and hence re-evaluation.”⁷ To be “serious,” then, entails being deep and thoughtful; it requires courage. To be serious is intrinsically radical. Bloom’s ideally educated student will recognize the reigning prejudices of his age and will in his own life replace them with thoughtful choices informed by study of the great minds of the past. Bloom’s rejection of nihilism, then, is of one cloth with an educational program that possesses positive content (viz., knowledge of various perspectives on the big questions) and results in what is properly labeled “character.”

Interestingly, however, although Bloom’s educational program purportedly stands in opposition to nihilism, it does not recommend any particular beliefs. Great Books will expose the student to the central problems of human existence. Student and teacher seek the truth,⁸ but one of the possibilities that must be taken seriously is relativism. Because relativism may be true, to start
with the conviction that it is false is to violate the very heart of Bloom's program. So, it seems that for Bloom it is the "facing" of the issues that is key—not adherence to any particular view.

The reason for the tentativeness of this judgment emerges when we ask for the point of Bloom's educational program. The rationale most often offered by Bloom is liberation through insight: Acquaintance with the great thinking of the past permits us to escape the clutches of the dogmatic relativism and indolent lack of seriousness that characterize our age. The young will recognize their implicit nihilism and "examine it seriously." At first glance it seems as though there is no affirmation in this process; it is simply a clearing away of misunderstanding. But can this be true?

According to Harry Neumann, "Bloom's education is...a form of play, entertainment; its serious element is hatred of seriousness, that is, politics." He continues,

it is not relativism's immorality which appalls [Bloom], but its dogmatism. He does not deny relativism's possible truth; he opposes any student piously determined not to entertain this possibility. Indeed the heart of Bloom's pedagogy is elimination of piety (politics) by always compelling students to "entertain" alternatives. This compulsion is the real meaning of his pseudo-liberal subordination of politics to his university and its philosopher-kings. It is the very "political" program of his "truth party."

Commenting on Neumann's critique, Harry Jaffa observes:

The question that Neumann raises, is whether good classroom discussions about whether morality is good are really possible, when the highest object in view is the discussion, and not morality itself. Bloom's educational philosophy elevates the Great Books above the moral concerns central, not only to human life itself, but to many of those very books. Neumann questions whether a primary and genuine concern with the moral phenomena is not as indispensable a precondition to the teacher as to the students, in those classrooms in which these books are taught.

We have, then, two significant indictments of Bloom's program. The first alleges that Bloom, while professing to be open, is in fact promoting an agenda that is closed—closed (and hostile), that is, to actual instances of piety. On this view, the objective of Bloom's program is, granted, to teach the young to face issues and to promote establishment of a community defined by the examination of the big questions. But, in the name of these objectives, the university is to practice a strange orthodoxy whose only rule is "no orthodoxy."

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The second indictment, presaged by Neumann's reference to "play" and "entertainment," is even more disturbing: By assigning first priority to the process of examination, as opposed to the possession of truth per se, Bloom's pedagogy is in the final analysis sterile. Not only is belief by at least one participant that he knows the truth a prerequisite for serious moral debate, the possibility that discussion may issue in truth is what gives the process its purpose. Skepticism suffices neither as starting point nor as objective.

Are these indictments of Bloom's pedagogy just? And how, exactly, is Bloom's true education opposed to nihilism? (Can seriousness alone be enough?) Elaboration of a fundamental ambiguity in Bloom's views will help us to decide.

On the one hand, Bloom wishes students to think about things. They are to recognize alternatives and become acquainted with profound possibilities. This leads to awareness of a full range of perspectives. On the other hand, Bloom wants students to take risks and enjoy the consequences of a serious life. Having "faced" the alternatives and thought things through, students will make a choice and live in accordance with that choice (i.e., deliberately and consistently). They will show character.

Now, if the first of these thrusts were all there was to Bloom's pedagogy, it would go nowhere and would be of little use in the struggle against nihilism. Given the nature of the big issues and their rich treatment by the Great Books, examination and reevaluation would never end. We would remain perpetually tentative. Although we might grow increasingly aware of perspectives, we would never arrive at the truth.14 As Neumann suggests, the only thing radical about this pedagogy would be its tendency to destroy conviction and complacency.

But the second side of Bloom's true education is anything but tentative. It is constituted by resolve in the face of evidently never-ending complexity. This is Bloom's "seriousness" which is distinctly neither play nor entertainment. Granted, Bloom does not say that in such seriousness the student has arrived at the truth. Surely, however, the student has discovered something. How else can we explain his strength, commitment, and sacrifice?

We noted earlier that true education is both a process and an outcome. Bloom's pedagogy contains a strong emphasis on process. Its relative paucity of outcome accounts for the criticism by Neumann and Jaffa. Jaffa finds the truth in the theology of the Declaration of Independence. Neumann, while rejecting that theology, accepts the Declaration and the pedagogy that promotes it as the model for any education that would stand against nihilism. Because Bloom's true education is preponderantly a process of examination
whose ideal result is a serious life with no particular “theological” commitment, it appears deficient (for very different reasons) to Neumann and Jaffa. On their view, for a moral commitment to constitute a real alternative to nihilism, it must be a commitment to a specific doctrine (and include a straightforward rejection of relativism). A serious life is not enough. 

Relevant to this controversy is an element of Bloom's pedagogy that he does not acknowledge. In his battle against nihilism Bloom can afford to focus on liberation through insight, as opposed to particular doctrinal outcomes, because he is confident that there is a truth to be found, and that it will be found through the pedagogy he outlines. But why does Bloom believe that there is a truth to be found? One possible response is that I (Bloom) found the truth in this way and therefore others will find it too. But even granting that Bloom can be imagined saying such a thing, “truth” is going to be awareness of the permanent questions and a grasp of “a diversity of profound opinions” on them. In short, the point of the true education described in The Closing of the American Mind resides in the search for truth itself, not in arrival at some destination. But (and this is what Bloom does not acknowledge) there would be no reason to conduct the search if one did not from the outset possess faith that the truth exists. Faith inspires Bloom's pedagogy. What distinguishes his true education from the straightforwardly “theological” pedagogy that Neumann associates with Jaffa is the belief that the prospect of truth, including the rewards of the quest itself, is sufficient. Knowledge of the truth is not a prerequisite for genuine education. Nor is such knowledge necessary in order for life to be worthwhile.

Bloom's true education, then, contradicts nihilism. But it does so indirectly. The direct approach would be to assert and defend objective truth(s) regarding the good, the just, or the beautiful. Bloom, in contrast, argues that the process leading to the truth is incompatible with nihilism (as well as relativism), and that the truth is inaccessible to those improperly reared and lacking the appropriate education. It is not so much that nihilism is false; rather, the point is that one can never approach the truth while under its influence. And, if the challenge of relativism must be understood in order for it to be overcome, stubborn adherence to a theology impedes the search for truth. Indeed, relativism is a problem precisely because it constitutes just such a prejudice.

The centrality of the search for truth in Bloom's true education establishes the validity of Neumann's critique of Bloom. Relativism, as a prejudice, must be overcome by the educator. But so too must any other prejudice that impedes serious consideration by the student of profound alternatives. Piety,
the self-conscious possession of the truth, is at odds with the search for the truth. Therefore, piety also must be overcome by the educator. The search for truth, which is also the destruction of pieties, constitutes the program of Bloom's "truth party" which, insofar as it is animated by faith that truth can be found, is a form of piety itself.\(^{18}\)

Neumann, of course, has his own vision of true education. This pedagogy is captured in his frequent reference to "serious education," "authentic enlightenment," and "genuinely liberal education." What lies behind these headings? We begin with this typically forthright passage:

My liberalism is not political. It offers no moral-political hope for mankind or for me; it knows that nothing amounts to anything. My notion of liberal education is confronting students and teachers with this truth in a world in which the distinction between truth and falsity, like all distinctions, is groundless. Liberal education begins and ends with this confrontation; it cannot—and I believe should not—show students and teachers how, or whether, to live or die.\(^{19}\)

Neumann's true education is an active process of exposing students, and the teacher himself, to the truth that

there are no "fixed entities," no facts only interpretations, points of view, opinions—or, to put it more harshly, only conflicting prejudices, bigotries and biases or, if you will "values." There is no fixed impartial "objective" standard permitting one to honestly say anything is true or false, right or wrong, progress or regress.\(^{20}\)

Neumann understands that this account, while essentially horrifying, has become trendy. It is on the lips of the most comfortable undergraduates, and constitutes a shallow orthodoxy at the center of innumerable academic careers. So, he adds,

an honest humanities program reminds students and teachers of the emptiness of their lives and of reality as a whole...education forces—and it is always a matter of forcing!—men to confront reality's void. Nothing goes more against the grain of the grovelers. Genuine academic freedom is freedom from moral-political opiates obfuscating nihilism's horror.\(^{21}\)

True education for Neumann, then, is to promote an understanding of the truth, where the truth is nihilism.

If honest confrontation with the truth\(^{22}\) is a central objective of
Neumann's education, so too must be development of the capacity and willingness to bear that truth. Neumann often observes that cowardice impedes enlightenment. Cowardice is for Neumann an echo of the struggle for survival of our desire that the world be other than it is, i.e., of the passionate yearning that there is in fact some purpose to our existence. “[L]iberal education...triggers...the violent, fanatic reaction of desire—any desire—against its devaluation by nihilist reason.” This is due to “liberal education's always unwelcome lesson.” Only “intellectual toughness” allows us to defeat desire and stand fast in the harsh light of the truth.

Due to the struggle of the desires, “serious reflection” will not come easily. It is presumably because of this fact that a teacher is needed to “force” students to “confront” the truth. Neumann unfortunately does not say how this is to be done. Is the required “toughness” a product of his pedagogy, or is it presupposed by it? We will have to observe his classes and talk to his students to know more. But this much is clear: the point of Neumann’s pedagogy is to bring student and teacher to a genuine humanity constituted by abandonment of all faith in the eternal or non-arbitrary, eradication of any need for such, and (one must surmise) the capacity and inclination to remain sane and civil in the absence of any reason to be so.

The third perspective on nihilism is central to Richard Schacht’s critique of The Closing of the American Mind. Derived from Nietzsche, this view elaborates the promising possibilities manifest in an alleged post-nihilistic condition.

The pedagogy suitable for realization of the promise of nihilism is outlined by Schacht in his short essay on Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer as Educator. Schacht’s summary is clear and concise:

Nietzsche’s true education may be conceived as involving [an] ascent and development through one’s attraction to a succession of ideas and exemplary others...Through such encounters and responses, we may in fact become what we have it in ourselves to be. And by reflecting upon them, we may achieve a better understanding of our true natures, since our attraction to these objects of interest reveals us to ourselves. Our real educators, our liberators and “educers,” are all those special influences that have this significance for us, even if certain individuals stand out, as did Schopenhauer for Nietzsche.

As an ascent, true education is movement from a starting point to a destination that is higher. The starting point is a form of immersion characterized
chiefly by thoughtlessness. Movement away from this condition is an achievement. It is an overcoming. Each step forward is marked by an increase in freedom. There are two aspects to this growth: freedom from distracting entanglements allows freedom to create, viz., to create oneself. In short, true education issues in autonomy. And since man is essentially consciousness of the opportunity and responsibility for creation, true education is the process of becoming fully human.

What must be overcome in order for true education to occur? Nietzsche opens Schopenhauer as Educator with a reminder that the "tendency to laziness" is the most common impediment. Granted, men shun honesty and consistency out of fear of social sanctions. But it is the capacity of these sanctions to disturb comfortable indolence that makes them so threatening. Inertia and aversion to disruption of anesthetizing routine account for the rarity of genuine understanding and true humanity.

Later in the essay Nietzsche becomes more specific about the forces that impede freedom and understanding. These are the State (identification with and commitment to Leviathan), moneymaking, sociability, and what Nietzsche calls "science." Because each of these forces possesses a strong attraction, only a few rare individuals have resisted seduction by one or more of them. Sociability, for example, is for Nietzsche preoccupation with how one appears to others. This is at heart a flight from the realization of one's actual ugly or boring content by way of incessant activity meant to make one interesting. If one is sufficiently creative in this regard, as well as successful in locating others with similar gifts, it is possible to enjoy a life that is busy and largely entertaining, though intrinsically shallow. Science, which for Nietzsche means a life of scholarship, is simply an institutional and more intellectual form of the same process. Through his studies, his teaching, his collegial activities and his reading (especially his reading), the scientist-scholar effectively escapes leisure and the ominous boredom that it is likely to bring.

Another way to characterize the path to freedom for Nietzsche is to consider it an overcoming of the present age. In particular, the pursuit of truth leaves little time for politics, and one is especially well advised to "refrain from reading the newspapers every day." The present age becomes a problem insofar as it infects the self. Like Rousseau 100 years earlier, Nietzsche is acutely sensitive to the constituents of selfhood, and understands that freedom is preponderantly a matter of recognizing and eliminating the residue within us of lifelong exposure to surrounding pollutants. The damage is largely done long before the individual is aware that there is a problem. Thus,
“all great human beings have to squander an incredible amount of energy in the course of their development merely to fight their way through the perversity in themselves.” The greatest barrier to true education lies within us. Nietzsche believes that success in this war against one's time, which reduces to a war within oneself, depends on access to a teacher: “only he who has attached his heart to some great man is by that act consecrated to culture.” The teacher does not so much impart a doctrine as he represents an example of how to stand in opposition to the powerful forces around us, and he shows how to discover the truth in spite of them. For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer was the exemplar that showed him how to educate himself against his age. Nietzsche recommends Schopenhauer to us; and to the degree that he believes that he has successfully followed Schopenhauer's lead, he recommends himself as well.

In light of Nietzsche's condemnation of “modern life” and his celebration of true education, it is clear that he is not a nihilist. Schopenhauer awakened Nietzsche to the meaning of “culture,” which “sets for each of us but one task: to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist, and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature.” What permits Nietzsche to speak of perfection is his conviction that something magnificent exists for man to realize. Granted, the prize is achieved through and in man (via self-creation), but the result is nonetheless real.

Still, if Nietzsche is not a nihilist, he is heavily indebted to the collapse of meaning. Schopenhauer's description of modern life is stunning:

The waters of religion are ebbing away and leaving behind swamps or stagnant pools...The sciences, pursued without any restraint in a spirit of the blindest laissez faire, are shattering and dissolving all firmly held belief...Everything, contemporary art and science included, serves the coming barbarism...A winter's day lies upon us, and we dwell in high mountains, dangerously and in poverty...[A]lready the mists of early evening are creeping in...the wanderer's step grates on the ground; for as far as he can still see, he sees nothing but the cruel and desolate face of nature.

A terminal illness of the spirit (as spirit has previously been understood) is upon us. Yet, this condition provides an invaluable opportunity. It provides work for “the physicians.” The kind of medical practice envisioned by Nietzsche will not cure the sick patient. Instead, it will carefully diagnose the illness as a prelude to describing a new, heretofore unimagined, picture of health. The need for, indeed, the very possibility of, the new medicine, arose out of the collapse of the former vitality. True educa-
tion is the prescription of this new medicine. It is a powerful and dangerous potion, but nothing less will suffice to effect the transformation needed to return the human race to health.

Schacht clearly summarizes this post-nihilistic character of Nietzsche's true education:

The endowment of human life with meaning and value through its creative transformation is a central theme of Nietzsche's thought...[H]e first detected this idea at the heart of the ancient Greek response to the problems of rendering life in a harsh and inhuman world endurable and worth living. Subsequently he came to view it as the key to overcoming that nihilistic crisis in which, he believed, this problem had in his own age returned with a vengeance. In *Schopenhauer as Educator* this problem and this conception of its only viable resolution both loom very large. They define the context in which Nietzsche...honors Schopenhauer as a different kind of philosopher and educator—a kind for whom there is now the greatest need. Without such philosophers and educators, he holds, there is little hope that mankind will be able to meet this grave nihilistic challenge and to redeem itself—and nature with it—from meaninglessness."

One final aspect of Nietzsche's (and Schacht's) true education requires comment. In brief, who is it for? Or, to pose the question somewhat differently, given that the vessel of civilization is rotten beyond redemption and is destined to sink into oblivion, who is to be saved, and through such salvation perhaps serve as the physicians for the rest? Schacht, in continuation of the passage cited above, notes that for Nietzsche

the vindication of life depends upon its qualitative enhancement; and that in turn depends upon the emergence of exceptional human beings through whom the potential as well as the reality of our existence and the world are revealed and more fully realized, and by whose examples others are induced to exert themselves in like manner and to still greater effect. In this way humankind may succeed in educating and transforming itself, drawn toward the higher spirituality of which it is capable by a vanguard through whose genius its possibility is envisioned and its realization is furthered. Its attainment may never be widespread; but enough exceptions to the general human rule may occur to justify all."

When we recall the courage and intellectual ability required for true education (not to mention the good luck needed to encounter a teacher and to learn that one needs one), it is unsurprising that true education will not be
universal. At the heart of true education for Nietzsche is not only the ability to separate oneself from the world, but also the passionate desire to do so. This is necessarily rare. But that fact scarcely disturbs Nietzsche who instructs us that

the question is this: how can your life, the individual life, receive its highest value, the deepest significance? How can it be least squandered? Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest, and most valuable exemplars, and not for the good of the majority, that is to say those who, taken individually, are the least valuable exemplars.

"Living for the good of the rarest" means opening ourselves, as much as our ability allows, to true education. This is part, the strictly personal part, of preparing "for the birth of the genius and the ripening of his work." At the close of his essay, in an effort to underline its essential theme, Nietzsche declares, "what matters above all is the existence of philosophy on earth!...[i.e.] that a philosopher should appear on earth...." Our individual significance is measured in terms of our contribution to the emergence of what is higher. This emergence can to a limited degree occur in each of us (who care to make the requisite effort). But even this modest advance depends on our acquaintance with a higher understanding, the appearance of which, in the form of a "philosopher," is the highest thing possible. As Schacht observes, whether enlightenment is widespread is insignificant. What matters is that human transformation occur, and to the degree that this is carried forth through the rare genius and those few who can hear his voice, it is their cultivation that is paramount.

This version of true education is scarcely democratic. Indeed, Nietzsche’s pedagogy makes the allegedly elitist Bloom appear egalitarian. Bloom believes that some pursuits are higher than others, and that the university at heart exists to promote study of the higher things by the minority of individuals interested in them. But this is far more generous to contemporary notions of human possibilities than is Nietzsche’s doctrine. For Bloom does not in principle exclude anybody from awareness of what is higher, whereas Nietzsche asserts that only the rare genius can actually break through, and that the most that is possible for the rest of us is to assist these few individuals to attain their goal. In short, underlying this conception of true education is a stark hierarchy of human talent and worth in which there is no question what (and whom) is most valuable.
NOTES

2. “Nihilism” is a term more often used than understood. For the purposes of this paper, “nihilism” is equivalent to Schacht’s “axiological nihilism,” which is “the doctrine that there are no objectively valid axiological principles.” This definition occurs in Schacht’s “Nietzsche and Nihilism: Nietzsche and Danto’s Nietzsche,” in Making Sense of Nietzsche: Reflections Timely and Untimely (Urbana and Chicago: The University of Illinois Press, 1995), p. 35. See also p. 49. This article will hereafter be referred to as NAN.
3. Bloom, Closing, p. 227. See, too, p. 343: “Without recognition of important questions of common concern, there cannot be serious liberal education, and attempts to establish it will be but failed gestures.”
4. Ibid. See also Allan Bloom, Giants and Dwarfs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 359: “the questions are the same today as they were for Socrates. It is these questions which are permanent and the consideration of which forms a serious man. It is the role of the university to keep these questions before its students.”
5. Closing, p. 344. Bloom’s endorsement of the Great Books approach to higher education is anything but naïve. He goes on to list no fewer than eight objections to the “Great Books cult.” He even agrees with them!
6. What are these questions? Bloom provides a representative list: “reason-revelation, freedom-necessity, democracy-aristocracy, good-evil, body-soul, self-other, city-man, eternity-time, being-nothing” (ibid., p. 227).
7. Ibid., p. 370.
8. In order for modern youth to “recover the primary natural experience,” i.e., to see the world as it is, they must have available “alternate visions, a diversity of profound opinions” (ibid., p. 238).
9. Several of the essays contained in Bloom’s Giants and Dwarfs are a fruitful source of elaboration on the themes of The Closing of the American Mind. As objectives for his recommended pedagogy we find, for example, “self-understanding” (p. 11), awareness of “the permanent questions” (p. 236), “inner freedom” (p. 237), “consciousness of the fundamental alternatives” (p. 345), and “the total formation of a human being and a standpoint beyond the specialties” (p. 355).
10. Closing, p. 239.
12. Ibid., p. 89. Neumann is not critical of Bloom for promoting a “truth party,” but for his lack of self-knowledge. (See Liberalism, p. 97.) The term “truth party,” incidentally, is Bloom’s. See Closing, p. 276.
14. Compare Bloom’s conception of political philosophy in Giants and Dwarfs: “political philosophy is the quest for...knowledge, not necessarily, nor even probably, its actualization. In fact, since philosophy, by its very name, implies the pursuit of wisdom—an unending search in which every certitude is counterpoised by a more powerful doubt—the best political philosophy can provide is clarity about the fundamental alternatives to the solution of the human problem” (p. 296). Two pages later he says, “If we do not have completed, final wisdom, then our most important task is the articulation of the fundamental alternatives” (p. 298). See also p. 366.
15. The implications for teaching are fundamental. Is promotion of openness (even with the goal of developing a serious life) a sufficient objective for education? If not, is the best teaching a form of preaching? If advancement of some notion of truth is a necessary part of principled
pedagogy, how is this to be distinguished from indoctrination? In the end, the question is: What beliefs (if any) must our students come to possess in order for us to consider our efforts successful?

16. Bloom (Closing, pp. 373-374) notes that it is the widespread belief (especially in the university) that there is no truth to be found, except via the natural sciences, that has corroded the confidence of humanities teachers and largely explains the lack of interest in Great Books (true education). "The contents of the classic books have become particularly difficult to defend in modern times, and the professors who now teach them do not care to defend them, are not interested in their truth" (p. 374).

17. Neumann sees that faith is at the heart of Bloom's "true community": "The philosophic (illiberal) primacy of the moral-political question [i.e., what is the true character of the good?] is not revealed by rational inquiry since it sets the goal of all rational inquiry. Faith in its primacy is forced upon both philosophic and unphilosophic herd members by what Nietzsche... calls the strongest instinct of any herd" ("The Closing of the Philosophic Mind: A Review of Bloom's Closing of the American Mind," p. 99).


22. Neumann (ibid., p. 278) refers to "self-knowledge."

23. This discussion is strongly reminiscent of the central scene of the film "A Few Good Men," in which the dark and seasoned Marine colonel (Jack Nicholson) responds to the white-clad and much younger Navy attorney (Tom Cruise), "You want the truth? You can't handle the truth!"

24. See "The Case Against Life..." in Liberalism, pp. 206-207: Education "is precluded by...cowardice, their horror of intellectual honesty."


26. Ibid., p. 176.


28. See "Feminist Propaganda at Scripps College: An Interview with Miss Shelly Rondeau," in Liberalism, p. 272: "School is not, nor should it be, a pleasant of enjoyable thing. Intellectual honesty, self knowledge or knowledge of one's world, is harsh and repellant."

29. See "Nihilism at Scripps College," p. 277: "really being human means to abandon faith in such non-arbitrary gods or authorities, however they are understood."

30. There is another side to Neumann which contradicts what, ironically, could be called the "optimism" of this pedagogy. In his more recent work, Neumann states, "Enlightenment, genuine education, is and always was a lost cause" ("Atheism," p. 124). And later: "It seems to me impossible to conceive of men lacking awareness of sacred alternatives" (p. 137). While
Neumann might therefore be viewed as inconsistent, it might be more accurate to conclude that these statements in fact confirm Neumann's essential consistency: Only a residue of piety (belief in the existence and sanctity of truth) could give rise to a sense of offense at inconsistency, and only a pious sensibility expects (simple) consistency in the first place. Neumann invites us to understand what atheism (nihilism) truly means. Consider also Strauss in "How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed," in Liberalism Ancient and Modern (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 143: "Maimonides deliberately contradicts himself, and if a man declares both that a is b and that a is not b, he cannot be said to declare anything."


32. NFM, p. 165.
34. Ibid., p. 158. Nietzsche discusses these forces in detail on pp. 164-174. See also pp. 148 and 163.
35. Ibid., p.166.
36. Nietzsche's disdain for the accent on appearances, and for the use of sophistication to avoid an encounter with truth, is strongly reminiscent of Rousseau's passionate critique of society in his first and second Discourses. This common concern with the loss of authenticity (that necessarily results from preoccupation with appearances) casts some light on Leo Strauss's comment, "Rousseau with whom Nietzsche is in a strange way akin throughout his work." (This remark occurs on p. 15 of the transcription of a course offered on Nietzsche by Strauss, evidently at the University of Chicago, during the Spring term of 1959.) Rousseau, along with Goethe and Schopenhauer, are offered by Nietzsche as "three images of man which our modern age has set up one after another and which will no doubt long inspire mortals to a transfiguration of their own lives" ("Schopenhauer as Educator," p. 150). Schacht suggests that Nietzsche's reference to Schopenhauer, in this context, is actually a reference to himself. See NFM, pp. 159-160.
38. Ibid., p. 181. This is preceded by, "he who has the furor philosphicus within him will already no longer have time for the furor politicus." Nietzsche's attitude toward today's television and the media elite is easy to imagine.
39. Ibid., p. 179. See p. 145: The great man "is contending against those aspects of his age that prevent him from being great...his hostility is at bottom directed against that which, though he finds it in himself, is not truly himself."
40. Ibid., p. 163.
41. See pp. 146, 163, and 180.
42. Ibid., p. 160.
43. Nietzsche notes (p. 161), "there are moments and as it were bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we cease to understand the world 'I', there lies something beyond our being which at these moments moves across into it, and we are thus possessed of a heartfelt longing for bridges between here and there." It is hard to imagine a less nihilistic statement than this.
44. Ibid., pp. 148-149.
45. Ibid., p. 149; cf. p. 174.
46. Schacht, NFM, p. 164.
47. Ibid.
48. Nietzsche is surely correct in noting that only a few are willing to invite "unprofitable truths." ("Schopenhauer as Educator," p. 172.)
52. Schacht usefully points out (NAN, pp. 59-60) that Nietzsche endorses different moralities (and thus different sorts of education) for different types of people. The great majority, given their limitations, can do no better than to subscribe to "herd morality," which corresponds quite closely to prevailing and traditional conventional morality" (p. 60). Doing so will keep their impulses in check (which is directly important to everyone's wellbeing) while at the same time creating the conditions required for the higher type of man to emerge via his pursuit of the more demanding "individualistic, self-assertive morality" (p. 60). In this way both sorts of people make their distinctive contribution to enhancement of the species. Schacht adds that the actions of both types of man thereby fall under the authority of "the general 'morality of development' to which [Nietzsche] is committed, and to the basic standard of value that underlies it. In this way, it is possible for Nietzsche to take a position of moral relativism at one level, while maintaining his commitment to a nonrelative morality at another, more fundamental level" (p. 60). Only a moment's reflection on the character of "conventional morality" (especially as understood by the higher man) will suggest the parallel between Nietzsche's moral ecology and that surrounding the use of the "noble lie" in Plato's Republic and "civil religion" in Rousseau's Social Contract.
Cognition, Dewey, and the Organization of Teacher Education in Small Schools

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Dewey (1933) has been an important influence in the development of innovative educational changes in the United States. He advocated many educational innovations including smaller classes; more time for teacher reflection; more cooperative education and the social genesis of education and learning behaviors (Dewey, 1933, 1990, 1997; Archumbault, 1974). Although it has been almost a hundred years since Dewey introduced and advocated these changes in the organization of schools and teaching, many of his ideas remain vibrant and applicable to school change during this period of educational reform.

Today many schools in large urban districts are beginning to subscribe to the school-within-a-school movement, in which teachers in large urban schools are organizing themselves into small schools, which specialize in creating unique yet varied, educational experiences. These Small Schools are presently offering hundreds of teachers the opportunity to form schools where they play key roles in curriculum design and financial management.

In 1996, the Bennett and Shedd Chicago Public Schools (CPS) were invited to join a fledgling network of CPS school and Chicago State University (CSU) in the making of a Small Schools Network, which was approaching the Annenberg Foundation for a grant to facilitate the creation of Small Schools. The goal of the Annenberg Small Schools grant is to end isolation of teachers, parents and students within the Public Schools due to the problems of size, isolation, and time.
The Bennett and Shedd schools joined the CPS-CSU Network, because staff members recognized an opportunity to make education and learning more effective and efficient at these schools. We also recognized that an Annenberg grant might allow us to make whole school changes at Bennett and Shedd from a bottom up direction, driven by the needs of our students and teachers.

The ability to make bottom up changes at Bennett and Shedd schools within the context of the creation of Small Schools, has forced us to make new accommodations for the organization of the education of our teachers, so they could play new roles within the Small Schools. Teachers began to take on new roles, such as financial officer, grant writer and curriculum developer, which many of these teachers had never played before in the larger school.

The need to play new roles in the Small Schools led some of the teachers at Bennett and Shedd to seek educational models which could accommodate changes that would insure more time for teacher reflection and collaboration with their peers. After an extensive review of the educational literature, we found that many of Dewey's ideas regarding teachers and teaching could help us solidify real change in our proposed Small Schools.

**The Need for Small Schools**

The major objective of the CPS-CSU Network was the creation of Small Schools to eliminate the problems caused by time, size and isolation. These problems were to be eliminated not just at the individual Small School level, but at the Network and Annenberg levels as well. There are four host schools in the CPS-CSU Network: Pullman, White, Bennett, and Shedd Schools. Chicago State University is the external partner and as such offers the teachers and principals assistance as they come to know the small schools philosophy, plan unique learning experiences, and implement these plans into action. Each school in the Network has its own culture, mission and vision for its students based on the teachers' visions of essential best practices.

There are many educational benefits to be gained from the creation of Small Schools for both the teacher and the students. Through the creation of Small Schools teachers have more participation in the decision making process of their schools and more time for collaboration (Klonsky, 1996). Teachers who create Small Schools want to improve student learning and encourage better academic achievement for their students. They create safe, nurturing environment where students construct their own knowledge while teachers guide them in the completion of more engaged learning.
Students also obtain many varied benefits from the creation of Small Schools (Howley, 1994; Lortie, 1975; Meier, 1996). These benefits include: 1) greater interaction between students and teachers, 2) greater intra-grade and intra-age level interaction among students in the Small Schools, 3) greater respect between students and teachers because they know each other well, 4) greater safety resulting from more intimacy between those being taught, and the professionals engaged in teaching, 5) greater parent involvement in the school, and 6) greater attendance levels (Howley, 1994; Klonsky, 1996 & Meier, 1996).

**Teacher Collaboration**

Dewey (1933, 1990, 1997) has made it clear that time for reflection is necessary so teachers can be more effective educators. Although Dewey made this special reference to this fact almost a hundred years ago, teachers continue to lack enough time for collaboration and reflection during the school day (Lasley & Matcznski, 1995). There is a need for reflection time among teachers due to its influence on professional efficacy. Lasley and Matcznski (1995) observed that:

> Good teachers think before they act (reflection-for-action), think while they act (reflection-in-action), and think after they act (reflection-on-action) (p.306).

Even though time for teacher reflection and collaboration are important in keeping teachers current in their subject matter and promoting teacher innovation, teachers have little time for collaboration. There are a number of barriers to teacher collaboration in American schools. These barriers include: 1) limited networking with colleagues inside and outside of the school; 2) teachers are isolated in their own classrooms; 3) the structure of the school day limits time for collaboration; and 4) the absence of continuous time for contact with colleagues to reflect on instructional practice and research (Fullan, 1991; House & Lapan, 1978; Huberman & Miles, 1984 & Lasley & Matcznski, 1995).

Teacher isolation and limited non-teaching time are major reasons for teachers to have more time to collaborate. Stevenson and Stiger (1992) found that teachers average only one hour each day, when they are not instructing classes. This makes it almost impossible to find time for reflection when many teachers use this "free" time to grade papers or make lesson plans for future classes, rather than time to seriously reflect on improving the curriculum and the mastering the latest strategies promoted in research (Lortie, 1975).
The lack of time for teacher reflection has negative consequences for teacher creativity and morale. Lasley and Matcznski (1995) wrote that the lack of time for teacher collaboration has a detrimental effect on teachers' abilities to grow professionally.

It isolates them from engaging with other adults, especially colleagues; it exhausts their enthusiasm and energy; it limits their planning focus to short term day-to-day activities; and it limits the opportunity for sustained reflection (p.313).

Given these negative consequences associated with teacher isolation and the lack of time to collaborate, teachers at Bennett and Shedd made the elimination of the challenges associated with teacher isolation a major objective of Small School change.

**Education is Social**

Teachers at Bennett and Shedd created four Small Schools: BEST, HOTS, PAF and STRIVE, to decrease student-teacher and parent-student-teacher isolation and the corollary problems of time and size. To accomplish this change, we believe that learning is a social entity and should be based on the concepts promoted by Vygotsky (1978), Bandura and Dewey (1990, 1997), which stress the ability of children to learn best when they have positive and consistent interaction with other children and adults. We also allowed the educational ideas of these researchers to guide our efforts to educate the Small School staffs to the new roles they would play in the development of their own schools-within-a-school.

Dewey acknowledged that education is a social process which is best "realized in the degree in which individuals form a community group" (Archumbault, 1974, p.58). He wanted to see the creation of learning communities within the school because he felt that there was a wide gap between teachers and their students (Dewey, 1890, 1897). And as a result, he called for more positive interaction between children and adults as a way to encourage greater learning among students.

The Russian educational psychologist L. S. Vygotsky, (1978) also promoted teacher-student interaction as a means to facilitate more efficient and effective learning. Vygotsky (1978) conducted many experiments with small children, which indicated that learning among children was not solely dependent on stages of development and maturation. He found, as a result of his experiments, that when children are confronted with a problem, they solve the problem through communication with themselves and/or their
peers. This evidence makes it clear that collaboration among teachers can be an effective method to enrich the curriculum and learning opportunities of our students within the BEST, HOTS, PAF and STRIVE Small Schools.

Vygotsky (1978) believes that knowledge is mediated by the individual learner based on his social experiences and interaction with other members of society within a communicative process. He makes it clear that learning takes place in a "zone of proximal development" where the learner finds solutions to problems under expert guidance or "collaboration with more capable peers" (Vygotsky, 1978, p.86). In other words, the collaborative process allows humans to change their environment by broadening their own experiences through an exchange of knowledge between an expert and a novice.

Vygotsky's (1978) learning theory guides much of the collaboration process in the Bennett and Shedd Small Schools. This learning theory makes it clear that learners must collaborate to create new knowledge. In this collaboration process, experienced learners share knowledge and expertise with less advanced learners to change their environment or solve problems. Recognition of this reality allowed us to envision how an Annenberg grant could provide us with the financial support to find more time to facilitate more teacher-teacher and teacher-student collaboration through the creation of Small Schools.

Dewey (1937, 1990, and 1997) provides the rationale for development of an educational program within the school to sustain teacher time for reflection. Dewey wanted more interactions between teachers and students in curriculum development, and learning. It was his view that education is dynamic and that the teacher must be a life-long learner.

In our Small Schools, we want to see more student co-construction of knowledge while they master the necessary skills to improve academically. Dewey (1990) also recognized that teachers should act as guides, while their students construct their own knowledge through intra-peer interaction within the school. Even before Ann Brown demanded that we use cooperative learning to develop a community of learners, where students jointly constructed their own knowledge, Dewey (1990) advocated the development of a community of learners where all members of the community "are engaged in communicual projects" (Archumbault, 1974, p.58). As a result, Dewey saw teaching as a "cooperative enterprise" of all persons involved in the learning process, "the development occurs through reciprocal give-and-take, the teacher, taking but not being afraid also to give" (Archumbault, 1974, p.72).
When Dewey proposed that the University of Chicago implement the "Laboratory School," he did so with the argument that the study of psychology as it relates to education was a worthwhile endeavor. He said that his school would demonstrate the "principles of feasibility." Dewey believed that learning about the learner could tie psychological and pedagogical theories to practice. When he instituted the "laboratory school" his purpose was to demonstrate the feasibility of the method and not the reproduction of schooling environments. He believed there were many ways to nurture the innate learning spirit of the child. He advocated that the curriculum emanate from the psychological and move to the logical components of content, thereby promoting a "child centered" learning environment.

Many of these same principles were used as the CPS/CSU Network challenged itself to create innovative ways to bring about new perceptions of teacher work and teacher learning. If we advocate child-center life-long learning for the students, perhaps we may benefit from creating to make teacher-centered, career-long learning, professional development opportunities for the teacher. To illustrate the Networks' efforts to accommodate and sustain change at the Network, Whole School, and Small School levels and to combat the problems associated with isolation, time, and size; we employed strategies similar to those used in cartography. We began to map the collaborative relationships that were forming because we had instituted teacher collaboration as a vehicle for school reform. The Hub and Spoke Model (Smylie, 1998) afforded our group a visual mapping of Network change. As we enter into the "information age," it becomes advantageous to map the flow of information. Therefore, we mapped out our journey from isolation to collaboration. We wanted to know in what ways we were utilizing collaborative partnerships. We wondered if we were attacking the isolation that is found in the traditional teaching culture (Lortie, 1975; Hargraves & Fullan, 1992; Lieberman, 1995).

The Hub and Spoke Model helps to map out the maturation and growth of a network. In this model the "hub" represents the well of topical knowledge and/or goals the network sets out to achieve. Our hub contains six topical goals: To bring about greater student achievement, greater impact from professional development, greater understanding of the whole school mission, greater participation in whole school change, restructuring to sustain reform, and greater knowledge and participation in financial reporting. Each of the partners forms a perimeter around the hub. Typically, newly formed
networks have difficulty valuing and finding connections to each of the topical goals found in the hub. Each partner draws from the hub in varying degrees according to what seems to benefit their needs, which form the spokes of the model.

More advanced networks draw from all topical goals found in the hub and furthermore, they share their understanding with other network partners. When partners join in the collaborative "give and take" of information, we see a rim forming on the wheel of the Hub and Spoke Model. This rim began to form when the partners were asked to discuss their accomplishments in meeting the goals at network gatherings. The storied accountings of resourcing learning opportunities, special events, methods of instruction and assessment, parental involvement, and restructuring of the whole school, etc., provided an opportunity for growth among partner. They began to take and give tips and encouragement to each of the partners. We began to make sure that there was time on the agenda to hear the challenges and successes of each partner. The partners provide a supportive and encouraging environment where reform efforts are examined, reworked and celebrated. This forum helped to alleviate the perception that the external partners were calling network meetings to transmit perfected understandings. The external partner tried to promote joint fostering of the give and take relationship and to act as an invested member who works with others to draw from the hub of an innovation and therefore equally able to learn.

Collaboration is an organizational change that creates a forum or an empowering environment. However, the organizational redesign of teacher work and learning is not sufficient to sustain reform efforts over time. A sense of collegiality is necessary for a network to avoid "contrived collaboration" (Little, 1990). Collegiality taps into the emotional ties of respect the individual expertise that a group cultivates as they work to accomplish common learning and working goals. Networks that value the cultivation of collaborative empowering environments, as per the organizational design, and the collegial emotional ownership as per the cultivation of newer perception of the teaching culture, may form schools that can actualize change.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, a story that Dewey tells about the preparation for the Laboratory School comes to mind. He was in search of materials, equipment and furnishing for the school. As he searched the school supplies shops; he shared his vision with the shop owners so that they could help him acquire
the things on his list. One shop owner, who was having difficulty fulfilling Dewey’s requests said, “You want something in which students can work; all these are for listening.”

Perhaps the same can be said for the innovations that are on the horizon for teacher learning and teacher work. New models that help us break away from teacher isolation, lack of time for reflection, collaboration and collegiality may not be immediately available in the traditional school supply shops.

The teacher education process in the development of Small Schools is ongoing. It is an educational endeavor, which demands change within and among teachers as they acquire the skills and cultivate new cultures. These are necessary components for sustaining change within the whole school as illustrated in the Hub and Spoke model of networking. It is an educational process that reflects the Dewian (1900) and Vogotskian learning theory (1978). It recognizes the roles teachers, students and other invested partners play in the construction of knowledge.

The Small Schools Network demonstrates the feasibility of the principles for developing learning communities. In these communities, teachers guide children to construct their own knowledge through meaningful, engaged learning projects as advocated by Dewey (1990, 1997). They do so with the experiential knowledge that comes from similar professional learning and working experiences.

The Hub and Spoke Model of networking allowed us to document the change process in the CPS-CSU Network. We have already the principle of feasibility. Perhaps all of us can benefit from revisiting Dewey’s work as we go about the school reform efforts that will enable us to meet the demands of the 21st century.

REFERENCES


I first met Art Brown in the summer of 1970. I had just finished an M. Div. Program in a Catholic Seminary and knew I was not being called to ordination. In examining alternatives, I wanted to pursue a doctorate in Philosophy of Education. When I shared that my GRE scores were not acceptable, he said: "So. What does that have to do with your intellectual ability anyway? Take a couple of courses with me and we will know if you have what it takes."

Notice a couple of themes in Art's comments, which reflect aspects of his life's intellectual agenda. First of all, his attitude toward the GRE scores. In "Grading Testing and Grading," he wrote:

An examination of the system of testing and grading requires first a look at the representational quality of test results and grades. Representations are, by definition, at least once removed from truth. Hence, test results and grades cannot be fully descriptive.¹

And, again, quoting a finding by the American Psychological Association:

... students admitted to graduate school on the basis of grades or test scores alone are often narrow, self-conscious scholars ... the emphasis (must be) placed on interviews and personal evaluations.²

One theme found in Art's work is a criticism of any view or process which neglects the 'human' component in favor of the artificial and mechanical. This will be noted in more depth when discussing his view on competency-based education and other such movements.
Secondly, the decision whether I am capable of pursuing a doctorate in Philosophy of Education would be made by both of us. Art never set himself up as judge and arbitrator. The process of decision making was to be collegial. This becomes more obvious when we examine Art’s ideas regarding institutional democracy.

Not only was I admitted into the doctoral program, but I also had the honor and privilege of sharing an office at Wayne State with him (and Zip Boyter) for almost five years—the famous, and infamous, room 399. I have not experienced the depth and excitement of ideas to the same degree since. Art had a way of making Educational Theory come alive. (He once told me: “I’m an Educational Theorist, not an Educational Philosopher,” meaning that theory was a broader concept for him.)

One thing that came through clearly during these discussions was Art’s relentless pursuit of the truth, a term he did not especially like, but ‘truth’ with the recognition and openness to it impermanence and possibility (and perhaps need) for reinterpretation. Likewise, Art never separated categories into neat bundles to be reified. Responding to Israel Scheffler, Art wrote:

> We would all do well to heed George Counts’s challenge, and John Dewey’s and Israel Scheffler’s and provide an opportunity to students to acquire those philosophic understanding and moral sensibilities so that, at the very least, they would be armed to resist the kind of mean spirited politics and the nonsensical education which currently prevail.

For Art, understanding alone was never enough. It needed to issue in moral, social and/or political responsibility.

When I was writing an article of Dewey’s concepts of experience, discipline, and art education, and asked Arthur to help me clarify Dewey’s concepts, he remarked: “There is nothing to clarify. Dewey uses all the concepts synonymously.” Art’s world was a relationary one. There was no place for arbitrary separations and oppressive control:

> I would recommend . . . that all of us not bemoan the loss of the term vocation but recognize that the spirit of vocation can be retained and the ideals of society can be protected if and only if teachers mobilize as professional and become actively engaged in the requisite political activities. One can hardly expect teachers to maintain a sense of vocation when they are made to accommodate to a never-ending string of mandates about how they should go about their business . . . .

Regarding control and the academy, Art said: “How desirable tight con-
trol may be for certain functions in the university, e.g. the financial accounting system, it is not desirable for the academic function . . .”

II.

This leads me to some of Art’s insights regarding Institutional Democracy and the attempt by educationalists to measure, predict, quantify, and all the positivistic talk. I was at Wayne State University during the heyday of the Competency-Based Teacher Education movement. It was a time of excitement for many people; a time of optimism, after all we were going to be able to ‘measure’ the competencies involved in ‘teaching with excellence’. There was even government support; and money.

The department of History and Philosophy of Education was asked to participate in ‘delivering’ measurable skills, especially in philosophy, to all sorts of pre-service teachers and interns. Art was asked to be involved in the “Integration of Philosophical Skills Into the Vocational Arts Educational Intern Seminar.” These were students who were doing student teaching and taking the seminar at the same time.

Art recognized the political uncomfortableness of such a situation. The term for the one involved from our department was “Philosopher in Residence.” Since I had delusions, or is it illusions, of grandeur and always wanted to be a “Poet in Residence,” the idea appealed to me. When Art requested that I ‘take his place,” after the customary, “No body can ever take your place,” stuff, I was secretly overjoyed with the title “Philosopher in Residence.” This is when I began growing a beard and playing Socratic games with the few friends I had left.

When I asked Art why he was opposed to complying with the request himself, he responded, “Because I don’t want to get my hands dirty.” At first this seemed so unlike him, so elitists. But after a few minutes of involvement with CBTE, I realized his wisdom. As has become common-place by now, such movements are able to quantify what is trivial (making three different types of bulletin boards, for instance), but can’t measure what is most important to humans, such as care and rapport.

I wanted to distinguish between measurement, for the former skills, and evaluation, for the latter. Art didn’t want even to go that far. He disliked the idea of legitimizing something so inhumane as CBTE, so reductionist and mechanistic. In a talk he gave entitled “What Could Be Bad?” Art talked about his mother’s chicken soup, which she gave him when he had a cold. He noted it had all the right ingredients, potatoes, carrots, etc., and they were all healthy. “What could be bad?” For one, Art noted that like his mother’s soup,
he didn’t like it (CBTE). But he went on to develop arguments why CBTE was problematic.

Here we have vintage Art Brown, if I may talk this way. He noted that such mechanistic approaches to education took away its ‘soul’, the first and only time I ever heard him use a metaphysical term. By ‘soul’ he meant the spirit of Progressive Education, with open-ended goals and a human, humane and broad social/democratic perspective. He argued that movement like CBTE was inherently elitist and undemocratic. Art’s was always a social vision. One aspect of the educational process that was essential for Art was student engagement. As he wrote: “Teachers can stimulate students, they can entertain them, they can inspire, they can demonstrate, but it is the student who must, in the final analysis, make sense out of whatever is studied—and this is made possible only by active engagement.”

III.

I used to approach Art with metaphysical and spiritual questions. In an odd way he was my guru, all respect intended. And like an authentic guru he never answered anything. He either left me with other questions and/or told me a story. Me: “What is so horrible about CBTE?” Art: “You can struggle with a cow, but the cow gives the milk.” Zen sounding, no?

When the PES Annual Meeting was last in Houston, Art and I had lunch. I asked him questions about the nature of the self and he responded: “Who is the ‘I’ that is asking the question?” When I asked him about his Jewish beliefs, he told me a story about his father.

Of course, it would be easy for me to say that deep-down everyone has a metaphysics, even Logical Positivism. But that would be a true, perhaps, but trivial statement. There is metaphysics, based on all kinds of unsupp- ported and insupportable beliefs, some, at the very least, which would benefit from Occum’s Razor. Then there is metaphysics in the Dewyian sense of religion—that which embraces a sense of wonder and mystery. Certainly, Art had the latter.

Incidentally, the wonder and mystery not only cannot be put into words, it ought not. The very act of doing reduced the wonder to ‘babbling’. But I don’t have strong opinions about this either way! Responding to my Presidential Address, Art said:

Having over the years become more interested in political and social philosophy as they relate to education ... I find myself not paying much attention these days to mental states or to mental states or to matters metaphysical. I am not suggesting these matters are unim-
important. But I find they do not help me either understand or arrive at positions on the practical problems of the world.

After talking about reading Thomas Merton and Art's temptation to be a Trappist monk, Art said:

Instead of the monastery, I went into agriculture and was involved in farming for a number of years. The attraction of the farm was, I believe, to that of religion. It was a place for elevation of the spirit, for communion, for peace, for self-knowledge, and for meaning.

It seems that Art was influenced by his reading of the Existentialists, as well as John Dewey, although Art read widely in an unbelievable number of areas. I don't remember his quoting any Existentialists in anything he wrote, but he understood 'suffering' and its necessity in psychological, relational, and social growth. When I asked Art to write a response to something his response was: "I'd like to write more, but it's so much suffering." It was like there was something inside him that was birthed when he wrote. All of this is vague, I realize, and the analogies break down. But after all, aren't we talking about 'wonder' and 'mystery'? As Art says: "We are never the same self; over time we are always different selves. In this never-ending process we can arrive at higher levels of integration and understanding—a loving."

IV.

If I were wise, which I'm not, I would end here. But there is something else to be said, which is even difficult to say. If at a certain level, metaphysics can't be said, at what level is this. I'm familiar with the Eastern wisdom: "Those who know do not say. Those who say do not know." But I won't follow it.

Art certainly suffered terrible by his son's, Freddy's disappearance. Whenever I was in a different city with Art, like when he came to Houston, I would often go with him to the Missing Person's Department of the Police Department, or other such institutions. Art's sense of family was so powerful, and eventually it included the universe.

The only experience I have of Art's feeling a need to defend anything was when the Department was being threatened by certain, quite powerful, professors who were saying the 'Philosophers in Residence' was the limit of our usefulness. Art went back over ten years to the student class evaluations and dug out of them any comments students made, all of which were quite positive. He published the results. In my opinion, this was not as much territorial as it was "when students value what they are doing, when they identify with the task at hand, problems of inattention, discipline, and achievement fade away."

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Often Art worked behind the scenes, usually without any need for ‘official’ recognition or praise. When Fred Neff was considered for nomination to the PES presidency, someone was worried that Fred might not quite be up to the task. Art said: “Don’t worry. I do most of the work>” He did at Wayne State when Fred was Department Chair. Art scheduled classes, did paperwork, etc. What else could have been behind this except the ‘love’ Art talked about as a developer of human encounter?

Most of us were aware of Art’s political involvement, behind the scenes, in such things as the development and publishing of the Standards for Foundations of Education. Maybe we were not as aware of how much this kind of involvement affected Art at the practical level where most of us (or at least me) feel great pain: Loss of money. Art’s political involvement at Wayne State, for instance, led to his not being recognized for Merit Pay from the President’s Office for a large number of years. There is no other way to say this than in the form I did. I re-wrote this sentence many times, trying to soften the tone, lest it imply that the President’s office was getting even. Let it say whatever you want to hear. Although Art was right when he always insisted that any concept lacks meaning unless it is ‘contextualized,’ I’m not sure what he means here. For what it’s worth, a huge difference between Art and myself is my political naiveness.

Finally, I would like to mention what I feel to be one of Art’s highest values, his humanism. In his Weinstein Lecture he argued:

Anything which diminishes the human person needs to be corrected.  
Any institution, be it the family or a college of education, which reduces humans merely to mechanisms of efficiency and productivity, needs to be reformed.”

When Art’s wife, Clare, called to inform me of his death, she said: “This is a great loss for humanity, and of course for me personally. I know Art’s death is a profound loss for you since Art was in a father-son relationship with you.”

I would not have spoken this way had my wife died. I feel the priority of ‘humanity,’ herself, and my ‘relationship’ with Art suggests the values they have in common. And it is true: By our very existence we are in relationship. We can’t help but be. Art’s issue, which should have a normative priority for all of ‘school-people,’ is Kantian. That is, never treat a person as a means but always as an end.

What makes Art’s insight so significant is that he brought it to institutions. In a sense Art saw institutions as persons; that is, institutions have per-
sonal responsibility, since humans create them in the first place. So anything that dehumanizes, which is reductive and mechanistic regarding humans, "All that shop talk regarding people," Art said somewhere, "is oppressive."

To use a term Art did not, his view of humanity and social development is ecological. Even our "thoughts and feeling," he noted, "are context bound." His love of Dewey and Frankena's Model bear witness to a portion of his theoretical framework. He did not look upon himself as a philosopher, but as a 'theorist,' and whatever the theoretical claim Art seemed to think that it is warranted if and only if it leads to human/social growth.

Like Dewey, Art saw means and ends as interrelated. In fact, for Art, they cannot be separated. Although I don't remember Art ever using the words 'holism' or 'holistic,' they are good descriptions of his world-view. A higher one, I cannot imagine; a more loving and integrated one is beyond my capability, at least. If after life most people remember one's care and humanness, isn't the life as integrated and enlightened as any human would desire?

All those whom Art has affected, especially his students, like myself (so proud of being his first doctoral student in Philosophy of Education) can only try to repay our debt in kind, as deeply as we can. The person who made Philosophy and social theory come alive for so many is dead. But that energy, the movement toward 'Uncommon Goals,' toward the elevation of the human spirit through the personal relationships inherent in education, toward a world where everyone is a participant at some level, is alive and is Art's gift to us. This kind of, is it okay if I say, 'spiritual energy,' even though Art didn't use this phrase, pervades us and is to my mind, synonymous with the unfolding of all that is, with evolution itself. This can never die because not even we humans can kill it.

So, so many things are let unsaid, which is okay. What really needs to be said, the spirit of Art Brown, cannot be said. It is beyond words and concepts. In death, as in life, Art leaves me in the light and glory of the silence. There, this place of no place, is where we all swell anyway. There we are always together.

NOTES
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 145.
8. Ibid., p. 146.
10. Ibid., p. 149
12. Ibid.
Homer Lane and Paul Goodman: Two Often Forgotten Socratic Educational Reformers

*Dedicated to the memory of Professor Arthur Brown, 1922–1997*.

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I first met Homer Lane in 1917, when I visited his Little Commonwealth in Dorset, England, where in 1913 he had been appointed superintendent of a colony of delinquent boys and girls who governed themselves in a small democracy, each person— including Lane himself—having one vote .... More than four decades after his death in 1925, it is apparent that Homer Lane has had little effect ... I myself owe much to Lane ... It was from Lane that I obtained the idea of self-government at Summerhill ... Forget the idea that education means learning school subjects, conditioning children, molding character. The only true education is in letting a child grow in his own way, in his own time, without outside fears and anxieties. Homer Lane showed the way. To him humans are born good, but like everyone else, he could not understand why man comes to kill what he loves.

Growing Up Absurd began as a book on juvenile delinquency, commissioned by a publisher who realized, on seeing the completed manuscript, that it was not the quick cash-in on a voguish subject that he had bargained for. Goodman kept the advance and once again began to hunt for a publisher. If his count can be trusted, sixteen others also failed to recognize a best-seller ... in the Sixties Goodman found himself rubbing elbows with people who ran things—planners, educators, jurists, senators. He did not get many ideas for educational reform by sitting on the local school board, but his new tone of voice, patiently spelling out the details, was the result of that face-to-face familiarity with his audience. He began to speak as if his program might actually be put into practice ... Goodman died August 2, 1972, just
short of his sixty-first birthday ... In 1970 someone asked him what the overall effect of his work had been; he answered, "Nothing. My feeling is nothing."

I. REMEMBERING ART BROWN

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Professor Arthur Brown (1922-1997). And throughout a long academic career that was filled with many professional activities Art was a member of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society for over thirty years. Moreover, in the Spring of 1974 Art recommended to me that I join MPES; during the quarter of a century in which I knew Art our relationship developed into a wonderful friendship. I miss talking with Art in places such as restaurants, airports, taxis, and hotel elevators. And in the few moments when I was fortunate to see and speak with Art I learned important lessons about life and the philosophy of education. Art taught me much and in some small way I hope this paper honors his memory.

II. BORGES ON WRITING

Before I begin to once again write about the educational reform work of Homer Lane and Paul Goodman I would first like to say a few words about the fact that for well over three decades I have spent some of my time writing about educational problems which came to my attention in the 1960s when I was a high school and undergraduate student; over the years I have often asked myself the question, "Why should I continue to write about educational problems?" This question is not usually far from my mind when I have a pen in my hand. And when I feel a strong need to understand what keeps the pen moving I try to return to a brief paragraph that was written by Jorge Luis Borges; in one of his numerous attempts to explain why he spent so much of his time writing Borges once noted the following:

I do not write for a select minority, which means nothing to me, nor for that adulated platonic entity know as "The Masses." Both abstractions, so dear to the demagogue, I disbelieve in. I write for myself and a few friends, and I write to ease the passing of time.3

Using writing "to ease the passing of time" is a beautiful idea that has greatly helped me understand why it is worthwhile to make writing a part of my life. However, when I was younger, I did not write for wonderful reasons such as communicating with friends or easing the passing of time; in the early 1970s when I started to write papers about educational problems I lived with the delightful illusion that my writing efforts would somehow help others see
how schools might be transformed, and perhaps improved, in ways suggested by odd educational reformers such as Lane and Goodman. And in wild moments of extreme enthusiasm, I would at times write a paper under the delusion that I was a young John Dewey laying the groundwork for an educational reform movement that would recognize Lane, Goodman, and A.S. Neill as founding fathers. But, alas, my lack of talent and desire did me in; as the years have passed it has become readily apparent to me and all who are aware of my few scattered published essays that not only am I not a new John Dewey, but at best I am a mediocre philosopher of education whose written work is destined for oblivion.

The desire to use writing as a means to change, transform, reform, and improve the way people are educated is not a dream I no longer dream. But in my more sober waking hours I try ever so hard to follow Borges' views on why it is worthwhile to write; at this moment I have great regrets about the fact that my good friend Art Brown will never read what I write here. What this paper needs is the kind of Deweyan critique which Art often provided for my educational ideas; the poverty of the views developed here is partly the result of not having Art around to point out the errors in my thinking.

III. INCLUDING QUESTIONS ABOUT SUMMERHILL IN CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES ON EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS

While discussing educational issues in his book *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* Alan Ryan notes the following:

The "Dewey School," otherwise the Laboratory School, was suppose to be what its name suggested: a laboratory. It was not a teacher training institution or primarily intended to provide a dazzling different elementary education for its students. In practice it became a test bed where Dewey's ideas about how to teach children were put into practice. A hundred years later Dewey's school seems less astonishing than it did to his contemporaries. With adequate financing there was no reason why it could not have gone on forever. Its educational results were entirely satisfactory, as everyone from the most to the least committed agreed. It was in this quite unlike more radical and free wheeling undertakings, such as the school at Beacon Hill that Dora and Bertrand Russell ran in the 1920's and A.S. Neill's Summerhill. Their results were less impressive.

After reading Ryan's unbelievably clear appraisal of the pragmatic progressive educational programs created by John Dewey and his numerous disciples I could not help recalling the first time I came in contact with a writer
who compared Dewey's educational reform efforts with those of A.S. Neill. Specifically, in the fall of 1964 when I was a highly disillusioned second year undergraduate student at the Urbana campus of the University of Illinois I accidently came in contact with Paul Goodman's essay, "Compulsory Mis-education;" in this somewhat long winded and rambling monograph about the inadequacies of American education Goodman claims the following:

Authentic progressive education ... has moved into new territory ...
The new progressive theory is "Summerhill." ... Like Dewey, Neill stressed free animal expression, learning by doing, and very democratic community processes (one person one vote, enfranchising small children!). But he also asserted a principal that to Dewey did not seem important, the freedom to choose to go to class or stay away altogether. A child at Summerhill can just hang around; he'll go to class when he damned well feels like it - and some children, coming from compulsory schools, don't damned well feel like it for eight or nine months ... it is precisely the society of free choice, lively engagement, and social action of Summerhill and American Summerhill that are relevant and practical ... just as with Dewey, the new advance of progressive education is a good index of what the real situation is. And no doubt society will again seek to abuse this program which it needs but is afraid of.

Are Summerhill variant schools an improvement upon the progressive educational programs that follow in the pragmatic tradition of John Dewey and his numerous disciples? Are the results of Summerhill less impressive than the Dewey Laboratory School? Goodman and Ryan clearly disagree about how to answer these two questions. For the remainder of this paper my claim is that it is worthwhile to understand the disagreements about issues related to comparing the kinds of schools that follow in the traditions of Dewey and Neill. Moreover, as the ideas in this essay unfold my hope is to demonstrate that Summerhill variant schools have incorporated views on learning that were argued for by Socrates as he is portrayed in Plato's Apology. And, finally, one of the outrageously grandiose aims of this essay is to suggest that questions about Summerhill are worthwhile to consider in an age dominated by an educational dialogue whose range includes ideas from the bell curve to bell hooks and the distinguished authors of the collections of essays called "American Education: Still Separate, Still Unequal" and "Education Yesterday, Education Tomorrow."

IV. REMARKS ON DREAM DIALOGUES WITH DEAD SCHOLARS

A major obstacle in the way of comparing the results of Summerhill and the Laboratory School is that significant educational scholars have often found it
difficult to take seriously the work that Neill did at Summerhill. And in the early drafts of this essay I tried to explain in detail why Lawrence Cremin had made a mistake when he excluded the work of Homer Lane and Paul Goodman from his monumental three-volume “comprehensive history of American education.” Furthermore, in the grandiose fantasy life which I share with only a few of my most intimate friends, I have at times imagined that one day I would have the good fortune to meet Cremin in order to discuss the selection criteria he used in works such as his *American Education: The Metropolitan Experience, 1876-1980.* But when Cremin died on September 4, 1990 my hopes for having a meeting with him became a part of my vastly expanding dream dialogues with significant deceased educational scholars who have now captured my attention for well over three decades. And in order to understand why a person might desire to have imaginary dialogues with dead people, it is worthwhile to recall that in a letter written to Lucy Martin Donnelly on April 22, 1906 Bertrand Russell claims that there is a kind of communion with past and future discoverers. I often have imaginary conversations with Leibniz, in which I tell him how fruitful his ideas have proved ... and in moments of self-confidence, I imagine students hereafter having similar thoughts about me. There is a “communion of philosophers” as well as a “communion of saints,” and it is largely that keeps me from feeling lonely.

When I first came in contact with the young Russell’s metaphorical notion of a “communion of philosophers” I was quite enchanted with this idea partly because it helped me deal with the intense feeling of loneliness that was present when I tried to explain to others the need to begin a broad-based Socratic liberal democratic self-governing educational reform movement that is consistent with many of the views developed in the writings of Goodman and Neill. As it turns out, most of the people I came in contact with in the early 1970s usually thought that my ideas about Socratic educational programs were either dead wrong or so muddled and confused that they did not really merit serious attention. Thus, rather than argue with friends, colleagues, university students, teachers, and public school administrators who regularly suggested that my educational theories verged on being absurd, I retreated to libraries or my home study; in the ivory tower that I built for myself I engaged in some kind of philosophical communion with individuals who challenged me to study and write about educational problems I found to be so very important and incredibly fascinating.

Over the last few decades I have become increasingly critical of Russell’s views on the communion of philosophers. Specifically, I now think that the...
extremely crucial task of learning to deal with human loneliness needs to be confronted in a far more direct fashion than talking to the dead. Nevertheless, I can still find some value in the lovely romantic idea of engaging in dialogues with individuals who are no longer alive. And at this moment I would like to share with Homer Lane, Paul Goodman, Bertrand Russell and Art Brown some thoughts that Thomas Jefferson wrote to John Adams in 1823; in an attempt to explain how democratic revolutions will ultimately end in victory Jefferson noted the following:

The generation which commences a revolution rarely completes it. Habituated from their infancy to passive submission of body and mind to their kings and priests, they are not qualified when called on to think and provide for themselves; and their inexperience, their ignorance and bigotry make them instruments often, in the hands of the Bonapartes... A first attempt to recover the right of self-government may fail, so may a second, a third, etc. But as a younger and more instructed race comes on, the sentiment becomes more and more intuitive, and a fourth, a fifth or some subsequent one of the ever renewed attempts will ultimately succeed.

V. JEFFERSON AND LANE ON TWO QUESTIONS RELATED TO DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

Scholarship related to the life and work of Thomas Jefferson is indeed a "highly complex, never uniform and never stationary" phenomenon which has at times overwhelmed me to the point of paralysis. When I feel lost in an ocean of written material dedicated to the achievements of the Sage of Monticello I try ever so hard to remember to return to the preface of Bertrand Russell's monumental work, A History of Western Philosophy; at the outset of a book which would be nearly nine hundred pages long Russell reminds his readers that although he has been a student of philosophy for well over half a century,

It is obviously impossible to know as much about every philosopher as can be known about him by a man whose field is less wide; I have no doubt that every single philosopher whom I have mentioned, with the exception of Leibniz, is better known to many men than me ... I ask the indulgence of those readers who find my knowledge of this or that portion of my subject less adequate than it would have been if there had not been no need to remember "time's winged chariot."

The vast intellectual achievements created by Russell help us see that even brilliant scholars cannot hope to ever know all there is to learn about many of
the subjects one chooses to write on and understand. Whereas it may be reasonable to endorse the ideal that scholars should always attempt to learn more about the issues they study, it is nevertheless the case that, as Karl Popper has noted, it is extremely profitable at times to give a progress report about how one's present "state of learned ignorance" can be used to deal with challenging problem situations. Russell and Popper have helped me learn that people should not be afraid to write about subjects they have not yet completely mastered; over the years I have made an effort to remember that my incomplete knowledge and overwhelming ignorance should not prevent me from making some kind of attempt to record my present understanding of complex issues such as Jefferson's views on educational programs in liberal democratic self-governing societies such as the United States, Canada, and England.

It seems correct to say that Jefferson wished to provide an answer to a question such as, "How should children be educated for the responsibilities and freedoms associated with being adult citizens in liberal democratic self-governing societies?" This question, which I will call Jefferson's educational problem, is far different from the question, "Is it reasonable for young people to attend schools that are organized as liberal democratic self-governing communities similar to Homer Lane's Little Commonwealth and A.S. Neill's Summerhill?" This question can be referred to as Lane's educational problem.

Since the late eighteenth century when countries such as the United States began to experiment with liberal democratic political institutions Jefferson's educational problem has often been at the center of educational discussions in liberal democratic societies. And as a rule Lane's educational problem has received little attention in serious dialogues about how to develop adequate educational programs for people who will eventually become full-fledged citizens in a liberal democratic society. Nevertheless, Neill and Lane belong to that small group of educational theorists who wished to make liberal democratic self-governing ideals a crucial part of life in educational programs for people from the ages of five to eighteen.

VI. REMEMBERING GOODMAN’S UTOPIAN VISION FOR MODERN AMERICA

In many ways it is correct to say that Paul Goodman was the person who did much to popularize the Summerhill philosophy of education in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. At this moment I have only vague memories of attending a lecture given by Goodman at the University of Illinois in 1964. And as Goodman paced back and forth across the dais in the room we were in he finally sat down on the edge of the stage as he argued for many of the educational ideas advocated by Neill and Lane; as I heard

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Goodman explains how the Summerhill “society of free choice, lively engagement, and social action” are both “relevant and practical” for life in a modern twentieth century urban industrial world. I acquired an unaccustomed desire to learn more information related to the issues that Goodman was talking about. Of course, at the time I was mesmerized by the image of a flamboyant hyperactive lecturer, I had no way of knowing that I was experiencing one of the early significant events in a career as a philosopher of education that has now lasted for many decades.

As I look back on the three decades that have passed since my only encounter with Goodman I am quite surprised by the fact that his numerous books and essays continue to attract my attention so many years after they once helped me deal with an adolescent identity crisis; on rereading parts of Goodman’s book *Growing Up Absurd; Problems of Youth in the Organized Society* I was reminded that this book once helped me understand that my desire to ask questions such as “How am I justified? What is the meaning of my life?” are questions that have “no rational answer.” For Goodman, the kinds of questions which preoccupied me during my late teens were viewed as “final” questions that indicated something was wrong with the world in which I was living.

Throughout *Growing Up Absurd* Goodman suggests that the asking of final or ultimate questions about human existence is a dead end endeavor which signifies that a person has been unable to find worthwhile work to do. For Goodman, people can easily avoid the despair associated with asking unproductive questions if they are lucky to live in a society that provides individuals with an abundance of opportunities to engage in meaningful activities. That is, Goodman has argued that

if a man’s developing needs and purposes do indeed keep meeting with real opportunities and duties, no “final” questions are asked. As Rabbi Tarfon said, “You do not need to finish the task, and neither are you free to leave it off.” The opportunities need not be such as to satisfy a man and make him happy - that would be paradise; the duties must not be such that he must succeed in performing them - that would be hell; it is sufficient if there are simply possible ways for his activity and achievement, so that he knows the world is for him, if he is earnest. This condition of meeting the world is called being in a state of grace. In such a case the questions that are really asked are practical and specific to the task in hand. The questions, “How am I justified? What is the meaning of my life?” is answered by naming the enterprise that one is engaged in, and by the fact that it is going on. As Kafka said, “The fact of our living is in itself inexhaustible in its proof of faith.”
It took me many years to appreciate the ancient wisdom contained in Goodman's creative connection between the work of Rabbi Tarfon and Franz Kafka. But as an undergraduate student what I found to be so incredible about Goodman's writings is that he had a clear sense of the idea that much of what I was being asked to do as a student was not worthy of my time. Needless to say, in the middle of the 1960s when a student questioned whether or not his education was meaningful he or she could easily find a few other lost souls to talk with about this issue. And, as I read and discussed Goodman's ideas with some friends and a few professors who would spend time talking with me, I eventually saw that Goodman's educational writings provided arguments for a negative answer to a question such as, "Is what we are doing in our schools and classrooms worthy of our time?" In answering this question, which I now refer to as Goodman's educational problem, Goodman argued that the absurdity of schooling and much of life in our modern society was rooted in the idea that so many people were engaged in unworthy activities which they had been socialized to accept as worthy. For example, Goodman used to point out that people in the United States spend much time discussing the wonders of new cars which "make our cities unlivable;" in an essay written in 1961 Goodman and his brother Percival suggested that the time had come for "banning private cars from Manhattan Island."!

The very practical and concrete proposal about the desirability of forbidding cars in places such as New York City was on my mind the other day as I traveled during the early morning rush hour to a public elementary school a few miles from downtown Detroit. And as I was making calls from my car phone I could not help but wonder how our modern world might have evolved if some of Goodman's plans for social reform had been adopted years ago; it is now quite apparent to me that Goodman's utopian efforts to criticize "not merely the cars but the factories where they are made, the highways on which they run, and the plan of livelihood that makes those highways necessary" have been a total failure. Moreover, throughout the forty or so books that he wrote in his short life of nearly sixty-one years, Goodman explained in detail his utopian vision of a humane existence where people lived in harmony with the world around them.

VII. ONE HOW SOCRATIC EDUCATIONAL IDEAS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH LEARNING AT SUMMERHILL

A comprehensive account of the details of Goodman's utopian vision of life in a modern liberal democratic self-governing community far exceeds the limits
of this essay. My goal here is merely to explain that the educational aspects of Goodman’s utopian vision need to at least be acknowledged as a possible educational alternative for teachers and students who wish to participate in an experimental learning situation whose intellectual roots include the work of Socrates and the efforts of the people who have attended Summerhill. Goodman’s efforts to include Socrates as one of the inspirations behind his educational proposals helps us see that in a modern school environment it may be possible to integrate aspects of the ancient teachings of the Athenian citizen who was sentenced to death partly because he was convicted of the crime of corrupting the minds of young people. Specifically, one of Goodman’s efforts to incorporate Socratic views into his educational proposals can be found in a December 12, 1959 letter to the state of New York Commissioner of Education; in his efforts to explain to a state school administrator the value that Socratic thinking has for learning Goodman noted the following:

it has been my universal experience that formal preparation of a lesson plan beyond the next hour or two is not only unrealistic but can be positively harmful and rigidifying, for it interferes with the main thing, the contact between the teacher and his class ... (Our model must always be the Socratic dialogue, for the aim is not to convey some information but to get the information across as part of the student’s nature and second nature, so he can make an individual and creative use of it.)23

As a nineteen year old undergraduate student Goodman’s writings provided me with a preliminary understanding of the idea that there was a learning method called the Socratic dialogue; for Goodman the educational views advocated by Socrates somehow allowed students and teachers to overcome the harm that might result from having educational programs which coerce students to study and learn a standardized or core curriculum that contains an overwhelming amount of information of questionable or dubious worth. And I now see that when I began to study the Socratic method decades ago I was far too optimistic about how easily this ancient learning strategy might be readily incorporated into modern educational programs. Specifically, over the years I have slowly come to realize that a large number of teachers, students, parents, school administrators, and other educational experts such as curriculum developers and university professors are extremely reluctant to give up the idea that some wise individuals can identify a great deal of knowledge or information which teachers should somehow motivate students to learn.

Unlike Goodman who saw the “contact between the teacher and his class to be the main thing,”24 most students and teachers who I have known
seem to think that the main goal of formal education is the transmission of much important information from the wise teacher to the uninformed student; this ancient Sophistic model of education which Socrates argued against in the Apology seems to remain a major obstacle on the way to having students and teachers engage in dialogues where all individuals admit that “The wisest of men is he who has realized, like Socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless.”

Goodman's brief comments about the Socratic dialogue being the model for interactions between students and teachers does not emphasize the view of wisdom that Socrates so forcefully states in the Apology. And when I first came in contact with Goodman’s praise of the Socratic learning style I had no way of knowing that eventually I would spend decades trying to decipher complex and extremely difficult to understand ideas such as the Socratic dictum that “wise people are wise because they recognize that their wisdom is worth little or nothing at all.” Moreover, in my early attempts to understand a Socratic philosophy of education that is consistent with the ideas outlined in Plato's Apology, I eventually saw the need to ask a question such as, “Are there some social or educational authorities that can be consistently relied upon to tell students and teachers what should be learned in school?” This question, which I now refer to as the Socratic educational problem, was clearly answered in the negative by the Socrates of the Apology. On the other hand, since the time of Socrates most influential Western educational theorists and practitioners have assumed an affirmative answer to the Socratic educational problem.

The dialogue between Socrates and his intellectual opponents has received little attention partly because the Socratic educational problem is a question that appears to have an obvious solution. In other words, as with the Sophists, most educators since the time of Socrates have assumed that an affirmative answer to the Socratic educational problem is the only reasonable or correct solution to this problem; all too often the Socratic educational problem is either ignored or viewed as unworthy of serious consideration by reasonable people. But when the Socratic view of wisdom is given a great deal of credibility, the Socratic educational problem can be a place to begin the extremely difficult task of understanding an unconventional way of conceptualizing the teaching and learning process. And if a negative solution to the Socratic educational problem is endorsed, then teachers and other educational authorities will not be expected to create a standardized or core curriculum that contains much information which all students are expected to learn.

It is to Goodman’s credit that he realized that Socratic educational pro-
grams have modest aims compared with the grandiose goals associated with conventional schools that attempt to transmit to the young a huge body of information that has been certified by "knowledge experts." In order to understand how Goodman wished to alter the aims of education in a Socratic direction, it is worthwhile to note that in a book published two years before he died Goodman claimed the following:

To provide a protective and life-nourishing environment for children up through twelve, Summerhill is an adequate model and can easily be adapted to urban conditions, especially if we include houses of refuge for children to resort to when necessary, to escape parental and neighborhood tyranny or terror. Probably an even better model would be the Athenian pedagogue touring the city with his charges... but for this the streets and working places of the city must be made safer and more available. (The idea of city planning is for the children to be able to use the city, for no city is governable if it does not grow citizens who feel it is theirs.) The goal of elementary education should be a very modest one: it is for a small child, under his own steam, not on a leash, to be able to poke interestedly into whatever goes on and to be able, by observation, questions, and practical imitation, to get something out of it on his own terms. In our society this happens pretty well at home up to age four, but after that it becomes forbiddingly difficult. 28

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In a number of ways this very brief essay provides a summary for many of the educational issues which were a part of the dialogues I had with Art Brown for nearly a quarter of a century; in our dialogues Art and I often found that we had deep disagreements associated with how best to ask, solve, and write about educational problems. Specifically, Art disagreed with me about my appraisal of the educational work done by Homer Lane in the first two decades of this century; as with most professional educational philosophers Art saw little value in the innovative schools created by a rather odd American vocational education teacher. Thus, in order to help Art and others understand my reasons for finding much merit in Lane's work I wrote a number of essays explaining my views on Lane's contribution to the development of a liberal democratic self-governing educational philosophy. 29

During the last five years of his life Art and I would meet for breakfast about once a month at our favorite local pancake house; and in between discussions about food and the headlines on the front page of the New York
Times we would occasionally talk about our written work. Art did his best to explain to me what he viewed as my mistaken interpretations of the work of people such as Dewey and Lane; when we would leave each other I would often go home and write another essay which either tried to incorporate Art’s criticisms or explain why his criticisms had missed the mark. As time passed we eventually saw that we would have to agree to disagree with one another about many issues related to understanding educational problems. Nevertheless, our relationship continued partly because both of us made an effort to comprehend what the other was saying. And through the struggle to understand another human being Art and I developed a friendship that has greatly enriched my life.

NOTES


16. See the reference in footnotes five and ten.

17. See footnote five.


19. Ibid., p. 139.

20. Ibid., p. 134.


24. Ibid.


26. See footnote twenty-three.

27. Refer to the reference in footnote twenty-five.


29. See Ronald Swartz, “Homer Lane’s Lost Influence on Western Educational Thought,” Focus on Learning, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1983), pp. 56-62. References for other articles about Lane’s work can be found in footnotes ten and fifteen. Also, at this time I would like to thank Susan Swartz for the helpful criticisms she offered for early drafts of this essay.
I. REMARKS ON BROUDY’S STANDPOINT AND TEACHINGS

I shall assume the purpose of this memorial session is not merely to eulogize Harry Broudy, and that some brief remarks in critical appreciation of Harry’s contributions to educational theorizing will not be out of place. Those contributions are, in my judgment, indeed impressive.

We did not have a warm personal relationship, Harry and I, and I did not greatly admire him personally, but I did and do respect his academic accomplishments. If you wanted only uncritical encomium, praise and celebration, I was the wrong person to ask. Keep in mind that my presence here signifies that I honor him and highly value his teachings, whatever reservations I may now have about some particulars.

A) The Question of “Realism.”

Broudy was perhaps best known as a rather lonely “classical realist” in philosophy of education. What is “realism,” now so much debated in philosophy of science? It seems to be a thesis about the existence and knowability of an external world—and of a human nature—which is what it is, independently of what anyone—or everyone—may think about it. I think that realism of whatever variety retains a valuable insight, despite recent “postmodernist” orthodoxy to the effect that “everybody is biased,” that “there is no objectivity” (and thus no reality, knowledge, or truth), and that everything we take to be true or factual is merely a reflection of the power relations in society. Indeed, the notion that any truths or facts exist at all seems unbearably
"oppressive" to some people, conferring privilege or hegemony on some ideas—and people—over others. This is said to be a Bad Thing.

This line—so reminiscent of the ancient sophists and skeptics—has, I think, fostered the now-common sinister sense of “educating the public” when referring to political or commercial propaganda. If there is no objectivity—as we are now assured from all sides—then everything is at bottom a matter of “spin control” and of my rhetorical cleverness in suckering people with my story before you sucker them with yours. (Cf. Rorty 1991.)

My own views are closer to the “pragmatic realism” of Hilary Putnam when he writes that “the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world,” and he endorses the James—Dewey emphasis on the primacy of the agent’s point of view over that of the spectator in knowing. (Putnam 1987:1,70).

Be that as it may, the primacy of agency seems a step Broudy was unwilling to take when he mentions (1974) not following John Wild in Wild’s movement from classical realism to his later interest in phenomenology and existentialism. Earlier, when Broudy cited someone for philosophical support, it was most often Aristotle, then Wild’s _Introduction to Realistic Philosophy_ (1948). But Broudy later came to concede that philosophical positions underdetermine pedagogical prescriptions, there being no direct “implications” of the kind often suggested.

B) Some Personal Notes

Harry’s father was a would-be rabbi, and I think of Harry as more of a wise man, sage and secular rabbi than as a hard-edged professional philosopher. But he was completely silent on religious matters, as I recall, seeming to become a little impatient and dismissive when any such topic surfaced. (An interesting thesis topic might be: how many of his generation of educational theorists were the agnostic but idealistic sons of clergymen—mostly Protestant ministers. I think in this connection of my other professors such as B. Othanel Smith and William O. Stanley.)

Harry was notably reticent about his personal and family life, saying almost nothing that I can recall hearing about his parents, brothers, wife and son. But better that, I think, than erring in the opposite direction.

I thought he in sometimes betrayed more status anxiety than was seemly in a philosopher. But it did sensitize him, I think, to a “realistic” emphasis of the desirability of school people knowing about and teaching something relevant to the “success routes” of the culture—without necessarily treating the System as gospel, any more than Kierkegaard did.

Two thinkers whose positions might have seemed congenial to Harry
were never referred to by him, as far as I know: Mortimer Adler, with his "Paideia Project," and Leo Strauss on classical political philosophy. Harry always seemed to me, in political terms, quite conservative by basic instinct; yet sometimes surprisingly liberal in his actual political judgments.

I have always disagreed strongly with his rejection of unionization and collective bargaining by teachers.

He seems to have been a pioneer in arguing for the centrality of esthetic education and the fine arts in schooling. Puzzlingly, his practical criticism of specific works is devoted only to conventional and safe examples. I can't recall anything about natural beauty (as in the environment) nor discussion of anything very recent,"difficult," esoteric or avant-garde: he appears always to have remained within the safe ambit of officially certified Masterpieces of Great Art, called "exemplars."

C) Some Final Queries

1. Harry was rumored to be one of the "three young philosophers" to whom W. E. Hocking dedicated his textbook *Types of Philosophy*, revised edition (1939, back when the taxonomic approach to different positions was still fashionable). Can anyone confirm this?

2. I have heard that Donald Vandenberg wrote a substantial biographical work on Broudy a few years ago which remains unpublished. Does anyone have more information on this?

REFERENCES


II. BROUDY CHRONOLOGY

1905 July 27, Born in Filipowa, Russian Poland, to Michael & Mollie (Wyzanski) Broudy.

1912 Brought to USA by his family; attended public schools in Milford, Mass.

1924–25 Attended M.I.T., studied chemical engineering.

1929 A.B. (valedictorian), Germanic literature and philosophy, Boston University.

1933 M.A., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.


1936 Naturalized as US citizen.


1937–49 Professor of philosophy and psychology at North Adams State Teachers College, Mass.

1940 Massachusetts Youth Study, with W.C. Seyfert.


1947 Married Dorothy L. Hogarth. One son, Richard M.

1949–57 Professor of philosophy and psychology at Framingham State Teachers College, Mass.


1953 President, Philosophy of Education Society.

1954 Building a Philosophy of Education. (Book)


1955 President, Association for Realistic Philosophy.

1956 Psychology for General Education, with Eugene L. Freel. (Book)

1957  Appointed professor of education, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.


1960  Case Studies for Social Foundations of American Education. (Book.)


1961  Paradox and Promise: Essays on American Life and Education. (Book)


1963  Syllabus and Notes for Social Foundations of American Education. (Book)

1964  The Scholars and the Public Schools: The Boyd H. Bode Memorial Lectures, Ohio State University, 1963.


1965  Exemplars of Teaching Method, with John R. Palmer. (Book)


1966–69  Member of advisory board, American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education.

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1967 Philosophy of Education: An Organization of Topics and Selected Sources, with Michael J. Parsons, Ivan A. Snook, and Ronald D. Szoke.


1967-68 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calif.

1968-71 Member of advisory board, Educational Testing Service.


1970 Consultant to the Agency for International Development in South Korea.

1971 "Democratic Values and Educational Goals," In Robert M. McClure, ed., The Curriculum: Retrospect and Prospect, 70th Yearbook of the NSSE.

1972 The Real World of the Public Schools. (Book)


1972 A Critique of Performance-based Teacher Education.

1973 Editor, Philosophy of Educational Research, with Robert H. Ennis and Leonard I. Krimmerman


1974 On Taking Accountability Seriously.

1974 Retired from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; professor emeritus.


1977 The Whys and Hows of Aesthetic Education.


1980 In Who's Who in America, 41st ed., 1980—1981: “My professional life has been dominated not so much by certain principles or great ideas as by a few persistent problems, to the solution of which formal education should make some small contribution. These problems are rather old chestnuts: Can an achievement-oriented society avoid injustice? Can a democratic society avoid mediocrity? Is an achievement society that is also democratic a contradiction in terms? One can pretty well tell a man's outlook on life by the seriousness with which he takes these problems” (vol. 1, p. 436c).


1981 Toward a Theory of Vocational Education. National Center for Research in Vocational Education, Columbus, OH.


1987 The Role of Imagery in Learning. Getty Center for Education in the Arts, Los Angeles. (Book)

1988 The Uses of Schooling. (Book)


REFERENCES


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to: Michael A. Oliker, for the invitation, information and suggestions; John Schmitz & Judith Algozin for suggestions.

NOTE

Obviously far from complete: many minor and fugitive items are not included. For a more inclusive bibliography, see Vandenberg 1992b.
A Note on Dr. Harry Broudy’s Broader Influence

John M. Wozniak
Dean Emeritus, School of Education, Loyola University Chicago

I did not have the good fortune to have had Harry Broudy as a teacher or mentor. Many of you have experienced him in those roles.

My vantage point from being the Chairman of the Department of Education and then Dean of the School of Education at Loyola, however, gave me the frequent chances to hear and see him in various other capacities. For example, he was a Visiting Lecturer and Consultant at Loyola University Chicago when we were becoming a School of Education. His advice was invaluable. As his curriculum vitae amply shows us he was in constant demand to lecture at a whole host of institutions. Many of these contributions found their way into print. His influence was even more far flung in his many scholarly publications, in his articles, books and in the various year books of the N.S.S.E. His tempered classical realism resonated with people everywhere, especially through his classic Building a Philosophy of Education which was translated into Spanish and Korean. I got to know him better through the meetings and committees of the A.A.C.T.E. where he exerted a large influence in teacher accreditation and in democracy and excellence in American education. This seemed to be his besetting problem—how to reconcile the one and the many or how to achieve excellence and democracy throughout American education.

When he spoke at A.A.C.T.E. meetings as well as elsewhere people listened. He elicited respect and was looked up to. I can still hear his rich and articulate voice cutting to the heart of many a dialogue. I can still read his writings as a philosopher par excellence.
Jim Macmillan, Philosopher of Education

Jon M. Fennell
Naperville, Illinois

I barely knew Jim Macmillan, but what I knew I liked very much: Jim Macmillan was a gentleman; Jim Macmillan believed in philosophy of education. Allow me to share with you how I learned these things, and thereby make a small contribution to our Society’s tribute to the man.

It is now 25 years since I joined the Philosophy of Education Society. Because during this time I have seldom been an academic, I have only irregularly been an active member of the guild. Still, in the Proceedings, in Educational Theory, and elsewhere, it was impossible even from the sidelines to overlook work by, and references to, “C. J. B. Macmillan.” Who was this figure? Surely he must be one of the chiefs!

In March 1994 I attended the PES meeting in Charlotte where Jim presented a paper entitled “Choosing to Believe in Modern Schools.” The paper intrigued me, so I authored a response. It may prove useful to outline for you both Jim’s paper and that response. (I will here be citing passages from my subsequent MPES address.)

In his paper Jim expressed concerns regarding the widely held view that schools should help students become proficient in choosing what to believe. He was particularly concerned with the usual corollary of this view, viz., that schools remain neutral as they assist students in becoming proficient in choosing between beliefs. What can it mean, Jim wondered, for schools to be neutral while promoting such a capability?

In my response I argued that there was in fact a difficulty with the demand that schools remain neutral as they teach students to be proficient in
choosing what to believe, but that the difficulty was not the one imagined by Jim. My analysis of Jim's argument was followed by the suggestion it is the establishment of confidence, rather than concern over neutrality, which should be a primary focus of those concerned with the state of the schools. A neutral school would be a moral and professional disgrace. Among the primary responsibilities of the philosopher of education is elucidation of the grounds upon which a teacher may legitimately, and confidently, go about shaping the lives of his or her students.

By late June the first draft of the response was complete. I showed it to Mike Oliker. Dr. Oliker, always on the lookout for material to include in the Midwest society meeting, suggested that I submit it for presentation here. Before agreeing to do so, I wrote to Jim requesting permission to cite the Charlotte draft of his paper. I deemed it presumptuous to send him my own paper, and thus refrained from doing so. A week later I received a call from Jim. He said he had not changed his paper since Charlotte, that he had submitted it for publication in the Proceedings, and that I was free to cite it. And then he asked me to send him my response—by e-mail no less! (Jim was far more advanced in such matters than was I.)

By mid July, Jim responded. I will quote the message because it captures something important about the man:

Dear Jon,

Your paper arrived nicely; I've even managed to download it and print it out. Haven't had a chance to read it all the way through, but will be back in touch when I do. It looks interesting and to the point!

Cheers,

Jim

I trust you discern the enthusiasm of this short message. Note, too, how supportive it is. Before long I came to realize that these qualities were a manifestation of Jim's central characteristic vis à vis PES: Here was a colleague who believed in philosophy of education!

Not ten days passed before I received a concise and eminently polite critique of my paper. It closed with the question, "Can we talk?" Well, Jim soon thereafter left for Belgium, so we did not have that conversation, though we did exchange e-mails while he was in Europe. By January, 1995 Jim had returned to his post in Florida. His intended response to my paper had stalled due to his being "caught up in Wittgensteinian stuff." He wondered, however, if I would grant permission for him to use my piece in his graduate seminar:
I want to give an example of the sort of thing that philosophers of education do when they take their work seriously, and the interplay (dialogue? dialectic) on choice makes a good case.

Later, Jim added, “It makes such a good example of philosophical dialogue!” Naturally, I sent the paper (by e-mail, of course), but that was the last I heard from C. J. B. Macmillan.

So, what remains to be said as we commemorate the life of Jim Macmillan? To begin with, surely I am not alone in saying that I will miss Jim. This is not only because he and I will never have that “talk,” but also because his passing, I fear, represents the loss of something vital to philosophy of education.

Jim Macmillan was the embodiment of collegiality. Jim’s conception of philosophy of education as a team activity was founded on a sense of common purpose leading to a sense of mutual respect. These were the consequence of a reverence for reason and adherence to the canons of logic, i.e., in a steadfast rejection of the claim to centrality by race, ethnicity, gender, or class. Jim was uncomfortable with my reference to an implicit authority in the very meaning of education. But I believe that he would agree that truth may be discovered, and it is accessible to everyone (with proper training). And since truth is possible, so is error. Jim agreed that educators need confidence to do the right thing and, more fundamentally, to imagine that there is a right thing to do. Now Jim realized that evil and error can be confident too. So I expect that he would agree that we need courage as well as confidence. Above all, we will need indefatigably as educators to press for clarity and the skillful use of reason. I would say that central to Jim Macmillan’s legacy is the recognition that our choice is between this laborious prospect and tribal warfare (or at best an uneasy and suspicious peace).

In short, a viable PES (and Midwest PES)—not to mention a functional and durable democratic polity—are made possible by the characteristics of a Jim Macmillan. We are only fooling ourselves in believing that our Society, or civility in general, can endure without belief in and practice of the traits that mark this lost colleague.
Cook book medicine, legalistic ethics, imitative scientific research, and obedience, no matter what, to the letter of the law are at best dull matters. At worst, they are disastrously stupid. Such rigidity is the very opposite of reasonable, intelligent practice. We believe that the intelligent person is critical, flexible, and creative, and as teachers, we strive to encourage these qualities in our students. Yet we belong to an intellectual culture that takes the mechanical observance of rules and other norms to be the paradigm of rational practice. The discipline of logic, the study of the norms of reasoning, is widely taken to consist in the mastery of the rules of the syllogism and the algorithms of truth-functional logic. Thomas Kuhn in his influential study of actual scientific revolutions (1962) concluded that momentous changes in scientific theory that alter scientists' understanding of how good science is done must be guided by extra-rational considerations. Legal realists and those influenced by them teach that because judges cannot follow the letter of the law in deciding hard cases, they must be making up law in their decisions, more or less by fiat. Moral philosophers distrust “ordinary” morality because, for example, the understanding that a borrower should return an owner's property at the owner's request appears to them to require that we return deadly weapons to insane owners on demand. The tension is acute between the idea that every certifiably rational act must instance an existing norm of reason and the idea that the highest order of intellectual merit lies in the innovative.

Frederick L. Will, who began his career studying induction, came to realize that the vexing problem of induction as formulated by David Hume is
only one important symptom of our acutely conflicted thinking about norms of thought and action. We tend, Will noted, to think that these norms function solely as templates to be replicated exactly in the behavior of those who are governed by them. He labored to find a conception of norms and their functions that would illuminate their crucial roles in cultural and intellectual growth, adaptation, and innovation.

Norms, Will taught, are psycho-social phenomena. Like the “habits” of Peirce and Dewey, they are aspects of learned activity that are taken to be proper ways of proceeding in the activity. People gradually over time develop ways of doing things such as treating wounds, measuring distances, keeping records, building shelters, raising children, and conducting inquiries in laboratories. These same developments can be described as coming to know the difference between better and worse ways of doing these things. People adopt as their practice what they take to be the better ways, and such practice serves as their norm. This is their guide for further activity. They share their experiences, cultivate the best ways, and teach the practice to others. Learning a practice is norm acquisition (Green 1998).

Will developed and defended the view that the norms that govern intellectual and other practices are constituents of the practices they govern. This results in a naturalistic understanding of the nature, origin and development of norms. The view also invites the objection that it makes impossible the sort of thoroughgoing objective critical scrutiny of our practices that has been the aspiration of philosophy since Plato. The standards by which practices are judged better or worse, correct or incorrect, adequate or inadequate, must be entirely independent of those practices, the objection continues, if “real” criticism of practice is to be possible.

What, though, could such norms independent of the practices they govern be like? What might be their origin, the source of their authority? The history of philosophy offers a number of responses to these questions in Plato’s theory of forms, for example, or in the Cartesian idea of the natural light of reason, or in the empiricists’ conception of the laws of the mind. The difficulties with these philosophical views and their modern descendants are well known. The idea persists, though, that critical appraisal of existing practices is possible only by appeal to norms independent of those practices.

If we adopt Will’s view of norms of thought and action as elements of our intellectual and other practices, how are we to understand the process of proper improvement and extension of our practices? By what standard can we judge innovations in our practice as better or worse? Here, a view such as
Kuhn's (1962) seems inevitable. Existing practices are norms in that they function as paradigms of right practice. When an existing practice confronts an unprecedented problem for which it is not adequate, no standard of proper practice is available to guide practitioners. Innovation, exemplified by scientific revolutions, the development of new paradigms, the objection continues, must proceed without the guidance of cognitive norms. Real innovation seems inevitably extra-rational.

This, however, is not Will's view. He rejects the idea that routine practice, exemplified by Kuhn's "normal science," is radically different from scientific practice in response to unprecedented problems. Every situation that confronts any sort of practitioner is in some way new, unprecedented. In learning a practice, according to Will, students from the very beginning must act in the face of novelty. The difference between a routine application and the more challenging improvisational adaptation of the practice to a novel and difficult problem is real and important, but the germ of the ability to deal with the more difficult application that significantly changes the practice and its norms is present in the routine exercises of the beginner.

To explain how practices can be constructively criticized by appeal to norms that are internal to them, and how such norms can provide guidance for effecting intelligent changes in their activities, Will draws our attention to the fact that we generally encounter norms in groups rather than singly. Physicians, for example, are guided by a large body of norms. They must strive in particular clinical situations to observe a great many norms at once, and sometimes the norms will indicate contrary courses of action. The practitioner who understands the point of the various norms, their relationships to one another, and the complex purposes of medicine is often, for that reason, in a position to make intelligent proposals for the alteration, the adjustment of the conflicting norms so that they can be observed simultaneously in the situation. The practitioner can devise a course of action that is somehow faithful to all the norms and to the purposes of the practice.

Complex learned activities such as medicine, agriculture, or scientific research are not practiced in a social vacuum. Each is pursued in a community together with many other practices, and each is more or less adjusted to the others so that they can be pursued simultaneously in a single economy, polity, culture. The norms of a particular practice thus in a way reflect their adjustment to every other practice in a community. This adjustment in a changing world must continually move.

The entire body of norms that governs the larger life of a community is thus a resource for the reform and adjustment of a particular practice that
encounters an unprecedented problem. An individual or group who is in this manner guided by a body of norms in adapting a practice to solve an unprecedented problem is not at all like the individual who simply strives to replicate a fixed pattern of behavior exemplified by a single norm. When the owner asks one for the return of a borrowed pistol, and it is clear that the owner is beside himself with rage, more than one norm is relevant to one's response. On reflection, we see that practices concerning property must be harmonized with our concerns for people's safety, and property is generally more easily replaced than limbs and lives.

This brief account of one aspect of Will's philosophy is very general and abstract. To appreciate fully the power of his ideas, it is necessary to work through in some detail actual historical examples of important and successful intellectual and social changes. Consider, for example, William Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood (Butterfield 1965: Chap. 3), the adoption of Copernicus's heliocentric model of the solar system (Will 1988: 242-244), the amendment of the moral prohibition against lending money at interest (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: Chap. 9), and John Locke's argument for religious toleration in the late 18th century (Locke 1983). In each case it is apparent that those who effected these intellectual successes were guided by reflecting on the relationship of their problem to large social and intellectual practices of their time. We do not find in these reflections methods for the easy solution of our own challenging problems, but we have as a result a clearer notion of what we must do to resolve them intelligently.

The most fitting memorial to Frederick L. Will would be for philosophers to study his book Beyond Deduction and his later essays edited by Kenneth Westphal under the title, Pragmatism and Realism. If the influence of these works could break the hold of the idea that norms are merely templates for action, then the result would be a significant improvement of the practice of philosophers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


On Dying and Death
Louis Silverstein
Columbia College Chicago

The strong leaves of the box-elder tree
Plunging in the wind call us to disappear
Into the wilds of the universe,
Where we shall sit at the foot of a plant,
And live forever, like the dust.
—Robert Bly

My thoughts on dying and death are based on an intimacy with the subject that merge observation, participation and reflection. I say this because in the brief space of seven years my father (not unexpectedly, he was in late 80’s) and two younger brothers (unexpectedly, both were in their 40’s) have passed on, and I was with them as they lay dying.

It was September when my father, more forlorn than raging against the dying of the light, departed along with the leaves as his aged, weathered and frail body surrendered to the inevitable. On Friday, he had suffered a stroke, leaving him in a coma. On Saturday, he died. On Monday, he was cremated. Jacob, once a vibrant child with a river of life coursing throughout his body, was now ashes, the workings of the grist mills of time and disease.

My father, an immigrant from Lithuania at the turn of the century, high school dropout, pushcart peddler, candy store owner, manager of a ten-cent dance-dance hall, husband of Yetta, co-creator of “four sons . . . , this entire person, once 5’6” and 160 pounds, was now contained in an urn which I could hold in one hand. A quite humbling experience for all we humans who see ourselves as the center of the universe.

My father, dad, papa was gone. My wife, daughter, my son and I each took some of Jacob’s ashes and scattered them upon the waters. My father could no longer hold me in his arms, so it was the arms of my Paula, my Ana Rebeca, my Ben Rafael that now embraced me, and I wept.
As we walked back to our car, my son took my hand and spoke these words: "You are my papa. Are you going to die?" Kneeling so that our eyes were on the same plane of existence, I pressed him close to me and told him: "All papas die someday. But when I die, I will still be with you. All you need do is close your eyes, see your heart opening up, and there you shall find my love for you."

Joe, in the Silverstein tradition, had long eyelashes, the kind that many a woman would die for. I had never noticed their exquisite beauty until I looked at him most intently as he lay dying on his hospital bed. His eyelashes caught my attention because save for them, eyebrows, a wisp of very fine hair on his scalp, and a couple of days stubble on his face, his entire body had sacrificed all his body hair on the altar of chemotherapy.

"Joe, do you want to go to sleep?" his doctor asked of him. All he uttered in response was one word, and yet that sufficed to say all that needed to be said. The word was "Please." He went gently into the night, no raging against the dying of the light, his wife holding one of his hands in hers as she stroked his forehead gently and soothingly with her other hand as if he were a baby going off to sleep, and I doing the same with my hands. He died and we cried. Tears of sorrow for him and for us. His death, that of a young man, serving as a reminder that we, too, would die someday.

His ashes were placed in the earth next to those of Mikie, his sweet young boy. Whenever he visited the cometary where his son lay buried, he comforted father and child alike by telling the two of them that one day they would be together again. And now they were.

When I returned home from my brother's funeral, my son Ben asked me once again if I were going to die. I took him into my arms and, gazing intently into his eyes, I told him, "Yes, I would." But before I could finish the sentence, he, looking intently into my eyes, said to me, "Dad, when you die, all I need do is close my eyes, open my heart, and your love will be there for me."

I remember thee in this solemn hour, my beloved brother. I remember the days when lived together in happy companionship and they living friendship were my delight and support. Though thou hast gone from me, thine image abides with me. I think of thee with gratitude and bless thy memory for all the devotion thou didst show me. May God bless thee with everlasting joy, may He have thee in His keeping and grant thee eternal bliss. Amen

—Union PrayerBook for Jewish Worship

The summer had been a most wonderful one for my family and I, overflowing with the joys of living, until the time of Edward's, my kids brother, dying and death came.
It was a bright, sunny and warm day on Maui. We are descending from Haleakala, the house of the sun, eleven thousand feet above sea level, after having scattered his remains in the crater and watched as became one with eternity—ashes joining dust that has been in existence since time immemorial. Each of us said goodbye to him in our own way. I watched as my son Ben grasped some of my brother's ashes in his hand, and then flung them into the wind as he told his uncle of his love for him and wished him some good traveling in heaven.

It is six o'clock in the evening. Edward's bon voyage party is in full swing. It is time for the planting of the tree, the roots of which shall feed on his essence, bear starfruit which his family shall feed on, and which will serve as a living memorial to him. Edward shall be joining Jacob, Jackfruit tree, and Joe, hibiscus tree, in the garden. The guys will be back together. Once again family.

All present who wish to participate are invited to place some ashes on the roots. Most choose to do so with a prayer, a mantra, or a flower, including the many children who also give thanks that it is not their father who is being put into the earth.

Sitting on a stone bench from which we have a clear view Edward, the lotus pond which he built, and the papaya, coconut and papaya trees which he planted, the Teresa, his widow, and I take in the scenery. I mention that Edward's leaves are drooping, that he needs some wetness.

It begins to rain.

Be a gardener
Dig a ditch,
Toil and sweat
And turn the earth upside down
And seek the deepness
And water the plants in time.
Continue this labor
And make the sweet floods to run
to spring.
Take this food and drink
And carry it to God

—Julian of Norwich

So there you have it, my philosophy on dying and death. Make of it what you wish. All I really know is that I shall never write or read words of wisdom as lovely as a tree. It is all a mystery to me.
NOTE: These are not complete bibliographies they are simply selected from a few databases that I have access to. Harry Broudy has close to 100 items in the ERIC database. There are more items by Broudy, C. J. B. Macmillan, and Frederick L. Will in THE PHILOSOPHER'S INDEX. And there are many more items by Arthur Brown and one by Broudy in the back issues of the MPES Proceedings!

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Appendix A

1997 Annual Conference

Loyola University Chicago—Water Tower Campus
Host: School of Education
Peggy Fong, Dean

Friday, November 14, 1997

1:00 P.M. FIRST GENERAL SESSION
Chair: Michael A. Oliker, Northeastern Illinois University
Gary D. Fenstermacher, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
*The Teacher Educator as Professional and NCATE as Interloper: The Grounds for Rejecting Both*

2:00 P.M. POPULAR CULTURE AND EDUCATION
Chair: Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University
Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University
*Nothing Better than Super-True: Education, Popular Culture, and the Supermarket Tabloid*
Michael A. Oliker, Northeastern Illinois University
*Toward an Intellectual Understanding of Anti-Intellectual Popular Culture: Abbott & Costello's Here Come to Co-Eds (1945)*

2:00 P.M. JOHN DEWEY AND MORAL EDUCATION
Chair: Craig A. Cunningham, Northeastern Illinois University
Justin Dennis, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
*Postmodernism, Continuity, and a Pragmatic Morality*
Holly Salls, The Willows Academy
*Character Education in John Dewey*

3:30 P.M. EDUCATION AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Chair: Steven Tozer, University of Illinois at Chicago
Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University
*H. G. Wells and the Origins of Progressive Educational Theory*
William Russell, Merrimack College (Massachusetts)
*The Constitutional Ideal of the Educated Person*

3:30 P.M. AESTHETIC EDUCATION
Chair: Douglas R. DiBianco, Eastern Illinois University
Ted Ansbacher, Science Services (White Plains, NY)
*John Dewey's Experience and Education and Museum Education*
Bill Engel, Harvard University
*The Aesthetic Core of Classroom Mnemonic*

Saturday, November 15, 1997

8:00 A.M. THEORIES OF PEDAGOGY AND AMERICAN CULTURE
Chair: Ronald R. Morgan, Loyola University Chicago
Ian Harris, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
*Nonviolence in Education*
Louis Silverstein, Columbia College
*rugs, Culture, Curriculum, and Pedagogy*
8:00 A.M. MULTICULTURALISM OR CULTURAL PLURALISM IN EDUCATION?
Chair: Ann Whitaker, Northeastern Illinois University
Allan Johnston, DePaul University & Oakton C.C.
Multiculturalism and the Teaching of Literature
Clyde A. Winters, Loyola University Chicago & Uthman dan Fodio
The Philosophical Basis of Africalogical Studies

9:15 A.M. THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF W. E. B. DUBoIS
Chair: Meyer Weinberg, University of Massachusetts (Emeritus) &
Northeastern Illinois University
Bartley L. McSwine, Chicago State University
W. E. B. DuBois and Educational Philosophy
Percy L. Moore, Wayne State University
W. E. B. DuBois’s Relevance for Issues in Education Today

9:15 A.M. PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
Chair: John M. Wozniak, Loyola University Chicago (Emeritus)
Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola University Chicago
Waiting: Killing time? Playtime?
Robert P. Craig, University of Houston
The Tale of the Exhausted Ego: The Journey Toward Being a Teacher

10:30 A.M. ROUSSEAU
Chair: Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola University Chicago
Jon M. Fennell, Independent Scholar, Naperville, Illinois
Rousseau and the Religious Basis of Political Order
Guillemette Johnston, DePaul University
The Discourse of Natural Instruction in Rousseau’s Emile

10:30 A.M. RECONSTRUCTION IN EDUCATION
Chair: David J. Blacker, Illinois State University
Anthony Petruzzi, University of Nebraska at Kearney
Hermeneutic Disclosure as Freedom: John Dewey and Paulo Freire on the non-
Representational Nature of Education
Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University
Social Reconstructionism and the Ideology of Nannie Helen Burroughs

11:45 A.M. SECOND GENERAL SESSION
Chair: Gerald L. Gutek, Loyola University Chicago
Walter Feinberg, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Dewey and the Issue of School Governance

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Appendix B

1998 Annual Conference

Loyola University Chicago—Water Tower Campus
Host: School of Education
Peggy Fong, Dean

Friday, November 6, 1998

11:30 A.M. Opening Memorial Session
Opening Prayer, Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J.
On Arthur Brown, Robert P. Craig, Ronald M. Swartz
On Harry S. Broudy, Ronald D. Szoke, John M. Wozniak
On C. J. B. MacMillan, Jon M. Fennell
On Frederick L. Will, James D. Wallace
On Dying and Death, Louis Silverstein

2:00 P.M. Philosophy of History of Education
Chair: Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University
Peter J. Goldstone, Temple University
Historians and Philosophers: The Public School Movement and the System
John C. Scott, Independent Scholar, Archbold, Ohio
Historical Precedents Concerning the Mission of the University

2:00 P.M. Nature, Environment, and Education
Chair: Ronald Swartz, Oakland University
Allan Johnston, DePaul University & Oakton C.C.
How We Go On: Values Education and Reinhabitation in Gary Snyder’s The Practice of the Wild
Ron Meyers, Ohio State University
Toward a Progressivist Philosophy of Environmental Education

3:30 P.M. John Dewey and Progress
Chair: Craig A. Cunningham, Northeastern Illinois University
Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola University Chicago
Savages, Barbarians, Civilized: A Case of Survival?
Jennifer Hogan, Teachers College, Columbia University
Ideal Philosophy and Real Technology

3:30 P.M. Race and Socialization
Chair: Ann Whitaker, Northeastern Illinois University
Percy L. Moore, Wayne State University
W. E. B. Du Bois and the Hampton Idea
Clyde A Winters, Uthman dan Folio Institute & Loyola U. Chicago
Dewey, Correctional Education, and Offender Habilitation

6:30 P.M. Presidential Banquet and Address
Jerome A. Popp, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville
The Role of Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Education

Saturday, November 7, 1998

9:00 A.M. Nietzsche on Education
Chair: Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University
Kirk Wolf, University of Kansas

Nietzsche as Educator

Maughn Gregory, Montclair State University

A Nietzschean Pedagogy

9:00 A.M. THE ARTS AND MORAL EDUCATION
Chair: Ronald R. Morgan, Loyola University Chicago

Guillemette Johnston, DePaul University

Theatre or Pedagogy? Aspects of the Function of Representation in the Lettre a d’Alembert and the Emile of Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Justin M. Dennis, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

What William Bennett Doesn’t Tell Us, or How Does Literature Teach Values?

10:30 A.M. EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND NINETEENTH CENTURY LITERATURE
Chair: Thomas I. Stark, Harold Washington College (Emeritus)

Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University

Educational Implications of H. G. Wells’ The Time Machine

David Granger, University of Chicago

The Marriage of Self and World: John Dewey and Stanley Cavell on the Romantics

10:30 A.M. TEACHING VIRTUE
Chair: Robert P. Craig, University of Houston

David B. Annis, Ball State University

Understanding Wisdom: Its Nature and Development

Madonna Murphy, University of St. Francis

Socrates and Aristotle’s Contribution to the Character Education Movement: Can Virtue Be Taught?

1:15 P.M. RAYMOND BOISVERT ON JOHN DEWEY
Chair: Philip L. Smith, Ohio State University

Howard G. Callaway, University of Mainz, Germany

On Some Positions in Ray Boisvert’s Recent Book

Steve Fishman, U. of North Carolina, Charlotte, & Lucille McCarthy, U. of Maryland, Baltimore County

Dewey’s Idea of Community and Democratic Classrooms

Joop W. A. Berding & Siebren Miedema, Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands

John Dewey, Democracy and Education, and What We May Expect from Schools

Alan G. Phillips, Jr., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Boisvert and the Levels of Deweyan Engagement

1:15 P.M. THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT IN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY
Chair: Richard C. Pipan, Oakland University

Jon M. Fennell, Independent Scholar, Naperville, Illinois

Bloom and His Critics: Nihilism and “True Education”

Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University

Stolen Legacy, Black Athena, and Pink Elephants: The Social Psychology of Truth Claims

Clyde A Winters, Uthman dan Folio Institute & Loyola U. Chicago

Cognition, Dewey, and the Organization of Teacher Education in Small Schools

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Craig a. Cunningham, Northeastern Illinois University
Thomas I. Stark, Harold Washington College (Emeritus)

PROGRAM COMMITTEE
Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola University Chicago

APPENDIX B
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Appendix C

MPES BUSINESS MEETING MINUTES 1998

by Don G. Smith
Eastern Illinois University

Since President Jerry Popp could not attend the conference, Secretary-Treasurer Don G. Smith presided over the business meeting. He explained that he neglected to bring the minutes of the previous meeting, and those present agreed to go to the next order of business.

Don G. Smith gave the treasurer's report, and it was accepted by the membership.

Election of new officers produced the following results:

President: Don G. Smith
Vice-president: Charsetta Ellis
Secretary/Treasurer: Richard Pipan

Michael Oliker answered questions to everyone's satisfaction regarding his arrangements of the banquet at the Raphael Hotel.

Alex Makedon explained and provided visuals of the new web site devoted to MPES activity. The membership voted to postpone making the web site officially that of the MPES to allow for further monitoring.

Discussion on final approval of the web site was postponed until next year's meeting.

Motion was made and accepted that a letter of appreciation be sent to the officers whose term of service just ended. Don G. Smith agreed to do so.
Appendix D—Web site

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WEB PAGE STUDY COMMITTEE
by Jerry Popp, November 1998

The Study Committee, which was appointed by the President, consisted of Craig Cunningham, Don Smith, Phil Smith, and Ron Szoke. The Society is in their debt. The committee attempted to identify and explore the basic questions involved. This report is a synthesis of these efforts.

1ST QUESTION: ON WHOSE SERVER WILL THE PAGE EXIST?
Any university served with the appropriate technology, e.g. regular backups, will work for us now. But we have to think about the future. When people retire, they may lose the availability of such resources. The home of the page should be decided as soon as possible.

2ND QUESTION: WILL IT BE A TEXT ONLY PAGE OR WILL WE INCLUDE GRAPHICS?
We should begin with a simple page, i.e., with text material and limited graphics. We can use some simple public-domain graphics for dividers, buttons, etc.

3RD QUESTION: CAN THE SOCIETY AVOID INCURRING COSTS FOR THE PAGE?
The Committee members think that we can use our members’ university resources for the foreseeable future. At some point we may have to revisit this question.

4TH QUESTION: HOW WILL THE SOCIETY SELECT A WEB MASTER—OR AT LEAST A CODE WRITER?
Somebody should be designated as Web Master for the site, with responsibility and authority to make final technical decisions about the form of the site. The Web Master should be appointed by the executive Committee, and serve a two-year term. The Executive Committee retains ultimate control over the web site.

5TH QUESTION: WHAT WILL BE THE CONTENT OF THE SITE?
A. What should be included?
We should begin by presenting the basic information about MPES: (a) how to obtain more information about the organization, (b) calls for papers, (c) program announcements, (d) current officers of the Society, and (e) how to contact the Web Master.

B. What should not be included?
We should not include the following: (a) academic papers, (b) no links to
other sites, and (c) nothing that would suggest approval or disapproval of any scholarly or political organization, educational institution, or publication.

C. Should membership information be posted?
There is some divergence of thinking on this matter. Some think that it is a reasonable policy to list names, institutional affiliations, postal and e-mail addresses and a link to the web pages of all current members who have them. Others think that such information should not be posted on such a page.

PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MPES WEB PAGE, by Jerry Popp, President, November 1998

ARTICLE ONE: WEB MASTER
A Web Master for the MPES web site will be appointed by the Executive Committee of the Society. The Web Master will serve for a two-year term. The Web Master will have the responsibility and authority to make final technical decisions about the form of the site. The MPES Executive Committee retains ultimate control over the web site. It will be the task of the Web Master to identify a server on which the web site will exist.

ARTICLE TWO: FORMAT OF THE WEB PAGE
The MPES web page will consist of text material. Simple public-domain graphics for dividers, buttons, etc., may be included at the discretion of the Web Master.

ARTICLE THREE: CONTENT OF THE WEB PAGE
The MPES Web Page will include the following information:
3.1: How to obtain more information about the organization
3.2: Calls for papers
3.3: Programs
3.4: Current officers of the Society
3.5: Information concerning how to contact the Web Master

ARTICLE FOUR: EXCLUDED CONTENT
The following material will not be included on the MPES Web Page.
4.1: Academic papers
4.2: Links to other sites
4.3: Nothing that would suggest approval or disapproval of any scholarly or political organization, educational institution, or publication.
4.4: Membership information, including e-mail addresses, U.S. addresses, or personal web page addresses.
Appendix E

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<th>PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS</th>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J.</td>
<td>Robert Craig &amp; Frederick C. Neff</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>David Angus</td>
<td>Michael C. Smith &amp; Adrian Dupuis</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>Philip L. Smith</td>
<td>Philip L. Smith</td>
<td>Adrian Dupuis</td>
<td>ED 345 984</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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<td>George Kizer</td>
<td>ED 241 407</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>Alexander Makedon</td>
<td>Michael C. Smith &amp; J. Williams</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>ED 345 985</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>Alexander Makedon</td>
<td>Michael C. Smith</td>
<td>Philip L. Smith*</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Lawrence J. Dennis</td>
<td>ED 356 993</td>
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<td>1985-86</td>
<td>David B. Annis</td>
<td>Philip L. Smith</td>
<td>David B. Annis</td>
<td>ED 319 670</td>
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<td>1987-88</td>
<td>Peter Collins</td>
<td>Lawrence J. Dennis</td>
<td>Ronald M. Swartz</td>
<td>ED 345 987</td>
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<td>1989-90</td>
<td>Michael A. Oliker</td>
<td>David B. Annis &amp; Michael A. Oliker</td>
<td>not in supplement</td>
<td>ED 371 973</td>
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<td>1989-90</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
<td>Michael A. Oliker</td>
<td>George W. Stickel</td>
<td>ED 364 493</td>
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<td>1991-92</td>
<td>David B. Owen</td>
<td>David B. Owen &amp; Ronald M. Swartz</td>
<td>David B. Owen</td>
<td>ED 413 277</td>
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<td>1993-94</td>
<td>George W. Stickel &amp; Janis Fine</td>
<td>George W. Stickel &amp; David B. Owen</td>
<td>Robert Craig</td>
<td>ED 413 282</td>
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<td>1995-96</td>
<td>Charleserta M. Ellis</td>
<td>Michael A. Oliker et al.</td>
<td>Jerome A. Popp</td>
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