Accountability in Higher Education: Are There "Fatal Errors" Embedded in Current U.S. Policy Affecting Higher Education?

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Accountability in Higher Education: Are There "Fatal Errors" Embedded in Current U. S. Policy Affecting Higher Education?

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Some observers of political phenomena are already referring to the 1990s as the “age of accountability.” Judging from the considerable number of references in Educational Abstracts and Educational Research Information Center (ERIC) entries on accountability in higher education, their observations seem highly appropriate. When examined chronologically from the late 1980s on, the large volume of archived literature and research studies exhibits a “wave” of commentary on the accountability issue.

Early in the decade of the ‘90s, articles in periodicals, professional journals, and other sources were voicing warnings about increasing public policymaker frustration with higher education and the spreading development and implementation of accountability policies in the U. S. and Europe (Altbach et al (Eds.), 1994; Bascom and Sherritt, 1994; Bogler, 1993; Bok, 1994; Chambers, 1995; Changing states: Higher education and the public good, 1994; Cross, 1995; Ewell, 1991; Lively, 1992; Netherton (Ed.), 1994; Peters, 1994; Phillip, 1995; Quality counts: Setting expectations for higher education ... and making them count, 1994-95; Rebarber, 1991; Voices of America for higher education, 1994; Zemsky (Ed.), 1995; Zemsky and Massy, 1995).

By the middle of the decade, many authors were writing about the actual implementation of accountability policies in various states and the U. S. government (Ashworth, 1994; Callan, 1996; Florida State Postsecondary Education Planning Commission, 1994, 1996; Freeman, 1995; Gaither, 1995; Gordon, 1996; Hayes, 1995; Honeyman et al (Eds.), 1996; Louisiana Board of Regents, 1994; Muffo, 1996; Ruppert, 1996; Ten public policy issues for higher education in 1996; Tucker, 1996; Trow, 1996). Then the “tide” in the literature seemed to turn more toward acceptance of the reality of accountability and various alternatives for responding to accountability demands in higher education (Benjamin, 1996; Bowman and Snowdon, 1997; Burke and Serban, 1997, 1998; Commission on National Investment in Higher Education, 1997; Ewell and Wellman, 1997; Ikenberry, 1997; Joint Commission on Accountability Reporting, 1996; LeMon et al, 1995; Slaughter, 1998; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Weaver and Geske, 1997).

Although accountability is the current reality in federal and most state funding of higher education, a review of the literature on this topic during the 1990s also hints that there may be some “fatal flaws” in the headlong, policy-driven pursuit of the accountability chimera. For example, evidence does not exist to support controlling the costs and outcomes of nonprofit public higher education institutions in the same fashion as if they were for-profit businesses (Block, 1995). The assumption that quality performance and productivity in higher education can be standardized and reliably measured is suspect (Gaither et al, 1994; Gullatt and Weaver, 1995; Simpson, 1996; Yorke, 1997). No accounting has been made of the costs of developing and maintaining accountability data gathering and reporting systems in higher education institutions.
versus any real benefits to the taxpaying public, such as increased institutional effectiveness (Klinger, 1997; McConnell, 1993). And, in general, the notion that compliance in higher education with state and federal accountability policies can be achieved as envisioned as yet has not been shown to be successful and if economic theory is considered, isn’t likely to happen (Ortmann, 1997).

In order to better understand the situation—how the current state and federal demands for accountability developed and evolved—a brief exploration of the historical development of higher education in the U.S. and more recent economic, cultural, and political factors influencing educational policy making is needed. Therefore, a discussion of the context for the current high education accountability situation follows, preceding a more in depth explication of three accountability policy options and a detailed review of one of them. This discussion will conclude with specific policy-related recommendations.

The Context for Accountability in Higher Education

Callan (1993) indicated that the eminent educator, Clark Kerr, characterized the 1980s as a “status quo decade ... nonhistorical in the sense that so little happened that made history.” But Callan (1993, p. 3) also observed that “seeds of important changes may, however, be sown in periods of apparent ‘normalcy,’ ...” He went on to note that “the decade of the 1980s was profoundly different from those that immediately preceded it and was one of significant change in the roles of federal and state governments and in the influences of both levels of government on colleges and universities.”

The “seeds of change” that Callan (1993) cited in regard to American higher education include several significant political and economic factors. The 1980s were the era of “Reaganomics” when spending on domestic federal government-funded programs was slashed across the board. Education was particularly singled out for rhetorical attack by key members of the Reagan administration and federal funding for all levels of education failed to keep pace with the rapidly increasing rate of inflation during this period. At the same time, more responsibility for educational funding was shifted to the states who were also struggling financially due to international economic competition, recession, high unemployment, demographic and technological changes, reductions in federal aid, and revenue shortfalls. This situation also heightened the competition for state funding between public schools and higher education in many states.

The 1980s were also an era when the costs of higher education rose rapidly. Tuition costs climbed at a much steeper rate than inflation and rapid increases in the costs of administrative and ancillary services, rather than the cost of instruction, have been targeted as the major cause (Callan, 1993; Losco and Fife, 1997). Callan (1993) also noted that the rate of increase in costs at public colleges and universities outstripped increases in state appropriations by nearly 30 percent from 1980 to 1987. As a result, many middle-income parents began to fear that they would be unable to afford higher education for their children and grandchildren.
What happened in the 1980s and 1990s is deeply rooted in the history of public education in the U.S. and the historical development of universities in Europe during the middle ages (Duryea, 1981; Trow, 1993). Although Trow (1993) asserted that when institutions of higher education were first established in the U.S. during the colonial era, they developed with characteristics entirely at odds with the way in which higher education functioned in Europe and elsewhere in the world, Duryea (1981) indicated that the tension between academic freedom and institutional autonomy and accountability which exists today can be traced to the beginning of universities in Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Universities in medieval Europe began as informal groups of scholars—masters and students—associated with cathedral schools (Duryea, 1981). Thus their initial affiliation was also with the Roman Catholic Church but they began as autonomous institutions utilizing the corporate form of internal governance. In subsequent centuries, kings assumed power as their divine right and replaced the papacy and the church as the ultimate authority for higher education. As a result, universities became institutions authorized by and obligated to their respective states but retained their relatively autonomous character and internal governance.

The roots of the early universities were also strongly connected to the utilitarian purpose of preparing students for the professions and government service, as well as for the church (Duryea, 1981). The Protestant Reformation and the humanistic ideals associated with the Renaissance further strengthened the universities as institutions whose mission evolved with the social, economic, and cultural developments in society. The growth of science and related philosophies during the Enlightenment period in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries enhanced the importance of secular knowledge and its application to societal issues even more.

During the nineteenth century, the growing secularization of higher education weakened the church-state-education connection, renewing the medieval idea of the university as a place for learning and strengthening the belief in the university community of the importance of intellectual autonomy or academic freedom (Duryea, 1981). The growing dependence on science and technology and the effect on educational opportunity as a means of upward mobility in society in the twentieth century gave higher education a position of broader and greater significance. This change also had the effect of renewing and strengthening autonomy—the idea of universities as having a special role as centers of learning and research apart from society in general. As a result, Duryea (1981) stated that by World War I, “higher education had achieved a reasonable, if at times uncertain, balance between intellectual freedom and institutional autonomy and accountability for an educational service and accompanying public control” (p. 28-29).

Duryea (1981) explained that the colonists who established universities in the New World brought with them from Europe the “traditional theme of the trinity of church, state, and college,” but also adapted it to fit their particular beliefs and societal needs (p. 22). Consequently, the higher education system which evolved in the U.S. has
long been governed by strong presidents and lay boards, has displayed considerable diversity in forms and functions, and has generally been responsive to other social and political institutions, as well as important societal issues (Trow, 1993). Trow (1993) also noted that American institutions of higher education “were regarded by their founders and supporters as forces for survival in a hostile environment ... crucial, indeed indispensable instruments for staving off the threat of reversion to barbarism ... “ (p. 46). As a result, the American system evolved with a mix of public and private support and authority and “Americans have tended to regard all of their higher education institutions as having a public dimension” (page 47).

The U. S. Constitution also had a profound impact on the further development of the American higher education system, according to Trow (1993). Because of the deep suspicion the anti-federalists harbored against a strong central government, the constitutional “separation of powers” (which was further expanded by the Tenth Amendment in the Bill of Rights) placed the primary responsibility for education (including higher education) with the states, rather than the federal government. Trow asserted that as a result, “[f]ederalism in the U. S. can be seen as the major determinant of the governance and finance of the nation’s system of higher education” (1993, p. 39).

Consequently, no central law or authority has ever governed or coordinated American higher education (Trow, 1993). Although public higher education institutions are “accountable” in varying degrees to state and local authorities, they are usually governed by lay boards of trustees and their administrators are relatively autonomous in making financial and other operational decisions.

Trow (1993) also indicated that there is considerable variability in the forms and governance of higher education institutions, both among and within states. He cited as examples the universities of California and Michigan who have state constitutional provisions protecting their autonomy against political intrusion. In both cases, they have used this freedom to diversify their sources of financial support and at present, might more accurately be termed “state-aided” institutions, rather than “state universities” because only 20-30 percent of their total funding comes from state appropriations (Trow, 1993). In contrast, other state institutions lacking constitutional protection are subject to constant state interference in their policies and management via such policy tools are line-item budgeting, limited discretionary funding, and close monitoring of expenditures by their state governments.

Trow (1993) also mentioned that diversity of funding (which results in multiple and often conflicting demands for accountability as well) is at the heart of the wide range in character and function of American higher education. Higher education institutions in the U. S. get support from many private sources, as well as from federal, state, and local governments. And with the decline in funding from public sources in the 1980s and 1990s, many higher education institutions have focused their attention on expansion of private funding and entrepreneurial activities as the best means of acquiring additional financial resources (Slaughter, 1998).
Trow (1993) reported that on average, in 1989 public institutions of higher education received about half of their operating budgets from state governments and only about 11 percent of their costs of operation from the federal government. Most of the direct federal funding is in the form of grants and contracts for research and development, although financial aid to students has also been an important indirect source of funds for tuition and other costs of higher education since the 1960s.

In general, the federal government has not intervened in the determination of state policy or support for higher education, other than to protect the civil rights and liberties of faculty and students. One of the major exceptions to federal policy in relation to higher education was the Morrill Act of 1862 which provided states with tracts of federal land which they could use to fund public institutions of higher education that would provide agricultural and technical education, as well as the traditional liberal arts, and broaden access to higher education (Chambers, 1995; Trow, 1993). However, this legislation also provided an impetus for states to increase their support to higher education (Duryea, 1981). Subsequently, other federal policies, such as federal sponsorship of agricultural and defense-related research, the G. I. Bill which provided veterans with greater access to higher education, and direct federal appropriations, provided more financial support to higher education institutions, as well as the need for accountability for these funds.

In retrospect, the relationship between government and the public and higher education prior to the 1980s seems like a “honeymoon” period in comparison with the attitude ushered in during the Reagan era. House (1994) conjectured on the cause of this turn-around in public image and policymaker approach. He linked the growth in higher education in the U. S. to the growth of professionalism, which in turn is connected to economic growth and upward mobility for graduates. House thought that the economic downturn in the 1980s, brought on at least in part by the implementation of supply-side economic theory, a key feature of Reaganomics, was blamed on professionals and that higher education was used as a scapegoat for the disastrous outcomes that resulted.

House (1994) noted that during the Reagan era, taxes on the wealthy were greatly reduced, defense spending was rapidly increased, leading to the development of a massive federal deficit, and business was largely deregulated. As a result, major scandals occurred and serious structural damage was done to some sectors of the economy. Education, especially higher education, was blamed for many of the problems caused by the economic policies enacted in the 1980s. Prior to this period, increased education had generally been linked with better jobs and economic development—positive gains for individuals and society. Leading conservatives in the Reagan era took the opposing view that education was to blame for lack of discipline and preparedness for work which in turn, resulted in unemployment, welfare, poverty, and crime.

Consequently, the political approach to education during the 1980s shifted from supportive toward increased monitoring, inspection, and enforcement of mandated standards; increased surveillance via national testing; increased individual and institutional competition for funds; and more privatization of public education (Clark and
House (1994) noted that such policies don’t add to government costs, enforce discipline on students and teachers, and protect the interests of the conservative elite.

House also predicted in 1994 that the conservative attacks on public education would shift toward higher education. He asserted that higher education would likely be severely downsized and transformed in coming years. Among the policies that House (1994) thought would ensue are political priority setting, mandating of university policies and curricula, more privatization and out-sourcing of services, and use of productivity indicators to cross-compare institutions and control costs. House also predicted that these measures would likely ultimately include consolidation of campuses, departments, and programs, cutbacks in faculty and staff, increased teaching loads and contact hours, and the elimination of tenure. While some of the reforms predicted and subsequently implemented are aimed at containing costs and increasing productivity in higher education, they also effectively reduce the traditional autonomy of higher educational institutions and they tend to heighten faculty fears of loss of academic freedom.

Money or the lack of it, which in turn stems from public reluctance to continue to fund higher education primarily from taxes, is behind the changes that House (1994) noted have happened or are likely to happen in higher education in the near future. He also indicated that costs in higher education during the 1980s rose much faster than the rate of inflation—141% versus 64%. Among the reasons cited were declining faculty productivity in terms of teaching and advising loads, increases in faculty and staff salaries, expanded student services (many of them mandated by federal policies and regulations), and increasing administrative costs. Ironically, some of the increasing administrative costs are due to the increasing demands for accountability which in turn necessitates hiring more institutional research staff to collect data and prepare the myriad of reports required by state and federal agencies and more legal staff to protect the institution in case of fraud or abuse of funds by faculty and staff (Gordon, 1996). As a result, House (1994) concluded that “current policies aimed at [improving] higher education productivity are badly mistaken in the effects that policymakers hope to achieve, as has happened so often in the past. In short, these policies may lead to less, rather than more productivity in higher education” (p. 31).

In summary, the context for accountability in higher education indicates that trend watchers correctly foresaw that the shift in financial responsibility from the federal government to state governments and the rapid rise in tuition and other costs to shore up the declines in state appropriations to higher education would result in legislatively-mandated accountability measures. Subsequently, higher education institutions have been scrambling to respond to these mandates in order to maintain their federal and state funding. Many institutions are also pursuing or exploring other funding options, such as increasing individual and corporate giving and income from contractual arrangements with business and industry. There are serious implications about the direction in which these actions appear to be taking higher education. Therefore, policymakers may want to consider the longer-term consequences of accountability on public higher education and
re-consider whether current policies are likely to accomplish what they intended and what the public desires—access to quality higher education at a reasonable cost.

Discussion of Three Possible Accountability Policy Options

At this point in time, policymakers basically have three options—they can either (a) maintain present accountability policies and see what happens, (b) abandon the idea that accountability can be legislatively mandated and rely instead on financial audits and legal remedies for any fraud and abuse in the use of appropriated public funds (Gordon, 1996) or (c) they (and higher education) could re-consider their approach to accountability and work together to allow higher education institutions greater flexibility in finding workable means of being accountable and regaining public trust in the quality of their educational efforts and their contributions to the public good. A brief discussion of each option follows.

A. Maintain Current Accountability Policies

This policy option offers policymakers the path of least resistance since policies are already in place in most states and institutions must comply if they wish to continue receiving state and federal funds. Policymakers don’t incur any out-of-pocket costs for policy implementation and no immediate negative consequences appear to be evident. However, the reality within institutions is often quite different. Klinger (1997) summarized the discussion at an annual meeting of the National Association of College and University Business Officers which indicated that accountability requirements were having adverse effects on institutional effectiveness.

Complying with accountability requirements does require the diversion of university resources—faculty and staff time and dollars—to develop plans to respond to accountability requirements, to prepare performance indicators and determine measures, to collect and summarize performance indicator data, and to write and submit reports when they are due. Since no appropriations are generally made for the purpose of funding these activities, responding to accountability diverts dollars which would otherwise be spent on activities desired by policymakers and the public, such as improving the quality of instruction, particularly for undergraduates, advising students, enhancing student services, upgrading libraries and technology capabilities, installing more efficient and effective management systems, etc. The net effect of accountability compliance is a negative impact on accountability, rather than a contribution toward improving it.

The current situation encountered by the University of Minnesota Extension Service is an illustration of the internal institutional costs associated with meeting accountability requirements. Extension receives an annual appropriation, currently $11.4 million, directly from the U. S. Department of Agriculture to conduct noncredit adult and youth education outreach programs in the state of Minnesota. These funds currently represent about 19% of the organization’s overall budget. In order to continue to receive them, Extension must comply with the Agricultural Research, Extension and Education Reform Act of 1998 (AREERA), the latest re-authorization of the Smith-Lever Act of
1914, the federal statute that established Extension services at all of the 1862 (Morrill Act) institutions of higher education in the U.S. This legislation now incorporates the accountability requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).

AREERA requires Extension to prepare and annually report against a five-year plan of work which specifies the kinds audiences to be reached, educational programs to be delivered, and anticipated outputs and outcomes to be accomplished. An annual report of accomplishments and results must be prepared and submitted to USDA in order to continue to receive federal funds. In compliance with federal paperwork reduction requirements, the AREERA guidelines provide estimates of the amount of time necessary to (1) prepare the five-year plan of work, (2) prepare an annual update, if needed, and (3) prepare the annual accomplishments and results report. The estimated amount of time needed annually for compliance is more than the equivalent of a full-time faculty or academic staff member. Using the average salary for a faculty or academic staff member, including fringe benefits and overhead costs, the value of the time needed to comply with AREERA is in excess of $150,000 annually, which is not reimbursed by USDA. And the staff time contributed to this effort cannot be used in other ways, such as for improving the quality of educational programming.

Other, longer-term negative accountability impacts on higher education are likely to accrue. For example, Bogue et al (1993) noted that when faced with growth in enrollments, level or declining state appropriations, and increased expectations for quality and accountability, higher education institutions in a number of states had a limited number of policy options from which to choose. These included (1) increasing tuition and fees, (2) eliminating programs and closing institutions, (3) reorganizing or restructuring governance to achieve efficiencies, or (4) redesigning educational delivery systems to achieve economies of scale.

Unless accompanied by increases in financial aid, raising tuition and fees tends to reduce access to educational opportunity for economically-disadvantaged students. This action also mitigates against broadening the diversity within student bodies, since minority students are more likely to need financial assistance in order to attend college than white, middle-class students. The other three policy options have potentially equally negative impacts that are counter to what policymakers and the public desire from higher education in terms of quality and access to opportunities for personal and economic development. These policies over time will also tend to reduce the availability of new, entry-level professionals and employees in business and industry—at a time when shortages in some, highly technical professional fields are already apparent. This effect in turn, adversely affects economic development and global competitiveness.

Another option for finding new revenue that is being advocated and adopted by many higher education institutions is entrepreneurship (Armajani et al, 1994). The "enterprise model" as advocates call it, encourages faculty and staff to actively seek more outside funding, through grants and contracts and partnerships with business and industry and to develop "products," educational programs and materials with sales value. In some
instances, these efforts are successful, but in other cases, they divert faculty and staff effort away from improving instructional quality and providing public service. Time is required to search for grant and contract opportunities and to write grant proposals or to seek profitable external relationships.

Kintzer (1996) cited some of the negative outcomes of an ill-considered, all-out focus on entrepreneurship. Some examples are faculty members who devote most of their time to writing and promoting “bestselling” textbooks rather than teaching or advising students and those who seek grants and build elaborate in-house organizations that serve as conduits for acquiring and spending additional grant and contract funds. Other potentially negative forms of entrepreneurship in higher education include faculty members who constantly seek paid consultancies and fees for lectures while on university time, those who travel around the country and the world, imposing the American system in less-developed countries, and clinical faculty members who use their university positions to enhance their private practices.

Slaughter (1998) argued that the effects of more than two decades of the impacts of shifts in federal student aid and research and development polices on public research universities are already evident in increased privatization, deregulation, and commercialization of faculty activities and research “products.”

Another longer-term potentially negative outcome of rigid enforcement of compliance with accountability is the damage done to faculty morale. In one of the few documented case examples of the longer-term effects of accountability on faculty, Muffo (1996) reported on the lessons learned from a decade of state-mandated assessment of higher education outcomes in Virginia. His research on the impacts of assessment/accountability on faculty revealed that faculty are going to resist assessment/accountability, especially if it is imposed on them without their advice and consent; faculty (and others) will only accept study results, especially if they are about their departments or units, if they are informed about the purpose and methods of data collection; assessment data often point to individual faculty members, even though most assessments try to deal with programs rather than individuals; internal assessment and accreditation must be mutually supportive; assessment must be linked with long-range institutional planning; and providing some financial support for faculty involvement in assessment helps to change attitudes and gain support.

Another issue related to accountability is whether the outcomes of higher education and faculty performance can be reliably measured. Assessment must be based on explicit or implicit criteria, usually expressed as standards, guidelines, or goals (Simpson, 1996). Assessment also involves observation and measurement, as well as judgment in interpreting the results. Peters (1994) asserted that accountability’s failure to provide convincing information about the outcomes of higher education is because a consensus doesn’t exist, even among faculty members, on general goals for teaching and learning. He also noted that consensus on goals and outcomes does not exist in government either and that, in terms of measurement, objectivity is an elusive achievement.
Gullatt and Weaver (1995) expressed a similar concern that not enough is known about the components of faculty productivity or how to appropriately measure it. Their research discovered that there are no universally accepted standards of faculty performance among the institutions they surveyed. Yorke (1997) evaluated the performance indicators used to measure higher education performance in the United Kingdom. She concluded that in terms of them measuring what they purport to measure, their validity and therefore also their reliability generally is suspect.

All of the preceding criticisms cast considerable doubt on whether accountability in higher education is truly a chimera, an impossibility that will never be achieved. If so, then perhaps the best alternative for policymakers is to abandon this hopeless quest which leads to the discussion of the second policy alternative.

B. Abandon Legislatively-Mandated Accountability Entirely

While this option is certainly one that many higher education administrators and faculty would like to see happen, the current political climate is such that it is highly unlikely. Higher education is both “part of the problem, as well as part of the solution” for accountability, which according to Romzek (1996) is really another term for stewardship of public resources. Romzek’s professional field is public administration and she indicated that the quest for accountability in that arena is far from new. The American political system has a long-standing, fundamental cultural norm of distrust of government (and anything else in the public sector), according to Romzek. As a result, we are preoccupied with accountability and continually impose new mechanisms to attempt to achieve it whenever public administrators generate public and/or political disapproval.

Romzek (1996) also revealed that the accountability issue has been defined since the early 1940s by a “debate between those who believe that modern bureaucracy is capable of self-control … and those who argue that it is necessary to maintain strong external oversight over government … agencies … “ [higher education as well] (p. 97). The latter school of thought has long supported “hierarchical” relationships that are based on a military model of following orders and being obedient to the expectations of others [not an accurate description of the kind of culture typical of most campuses and academic departments!].

Romzek noted that accountability measures attempt to make agencies and public employees [which also includes faculty and staff at public institutions of higher education] answer for their performance. As a result, the accountability challenge for public sector employees [including those in higher education] is increasingly how to answer competing expectations from multiple legitimate “masters” or sources of control. Peters (1994) found it interesting, though, that while legislators micromanage higher education in an attempt to gain efficiency and productivity, business is moving in the opposite direction—toward decentralized control, autonomy for employees closest to the customers, and intuitive, holistic modes of performance assessment.
So, the notion that accountability might just go away does not appear very likely, particularly when higher education did not appear to "stay tuned" to the concerns of its many constituencies, especially the parents and legislators who were watching the rapid escalation in the costs of tuition and other expenses in the 1980s. Many of the criticisms of higher education unfortunately have some validity and the voices of the critics should be heard.

Chester Finn is one of higher education's harsher critics—a former assistant secretary of education during the Reagan administration, now a fellow at the conservative Hudson Institute. Finn and Manno (1996) asserted that "[t]he American public has always had mixed feelings about the 'ivory tower' life while according the professoriate an exaggerated respect. Now, however, a new combination of factors is tilting the balance of opinion against higher education. While among policymakers there is a growing concern about the shoddy quality of much higher education, the broader public feels increasingly oppressed by soaring prices." (p. 44) These authors go on to note that while higher education did practically nothing about escalating charges and expenditures in the 1980s, most U. S. corporations were struggling to survive under conditions of global competitiveness. While business and industry downsized and cut jobs, most faculty in higher education continued to enjoy the security of tenured positions.

Finn and Manno (1996) also criticized higher education for inflexibility and lack of responsiveness to societal needs and public concerns. They indicated that a public opinion poll conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation in 1993 revealed that 54% of Americans believed that higher education in their state needs a "fundamental overhaul." The culture in higher education is oriented only to expansion and institutions continue to spend all that they can take in because they set their own prices, refuse to set goals or measure their effectiveness, insist that faculty productivity can't be measured and that only other scholars can judge their research, use academic freedom as a shield against accountability, and in general, aren't answerable to the public or policymakers. Even if one disagrees with the assessments of these critics, reviewing their criticisms is instructive in understanding why the public trust in higher education has declined in recent years and why policymakers have resorted to accountability legislation as a means of controlling the costs of public higher education and getting the attention of university administrators and faculty.

Wolfe (1996) also has voiced criticism of higher education in recent years, particularly the notion of faculty governance as a means of creating and instituting the necessary changes needed within the academy to rebuild public trust and regain the confidence of policymakers. He indicated that the general response among faculty is to continue to pursue their respective specializations, oblivious to the outside world until threatened externally—then the response is to unite against the perceived threat to academic freedom and autonomy. Wolfe noted that "[a]cademics are deluding themselves if they think that they can have autonomy without accountability. The privileged always live at the sufferance of others." (p. 63)
Spokespersons and those who have recently studied the political context of accountability are clear that politicians see higher education as out of control and intend to see that institutions in their states change to meet the needs of constituents. Jim Guy Tucker (1996), former Governor of Arkansas, stated this view succinctly: “The future of higher education in public institution rests not only in the hands of the Academy but also in the political arena and with the public from whom policy and legislation mandating directions and funding necessarily come. ... It is accountability, not accreditation alone, on which higher educators must focus.” Tucker began his discussion of higher education’s mission and accountability by quoting Frank Newman (1987) in Choosing Quality: Reducing the Conflict Between the State and the University on the need for the university to better understand and respond to the needs of modern society.

While acknowledging the contributions that public higher education has made in the past, Tucker (1996) also noted a tendency for faculty to think only in terms of continuing to grow and enhance the research image of their institutions, even though the original mission of their institutions was work-prepardness (two-year institutions) or undergraduate education (four-year institutions). This “upward drift” as Tucker called it results in higher education continually coming back to state legislatures seeking more funds for expansion of programs, rather than demonstrating a clear focus on mission and exerting internal discipline to clarify and adhere to their strategic direction and spend their appropriations wisely. As a result, legislators perceive that higher education is out of control and research is being pursued at the expense of quality teaching, particularly for undergraduates. For this reason, Tucker also indicated that accreditation is not viewed as a substitute for accountability.

Tucker (1996) aptly illustrated the different “world views” of academia and politicians when he listed the issues of concern that he and his fellow governors are facing: Reducing violence and crime; funding and improving public education; providing adequate health care; achieving economic competitiveness and nuturing job growth; and maintaining the physical infrastructure of the state. Clearly, higher education is not in this list but politicians like Tucker believe that higher education could do more to help address these issues than is currently being done. Tucker cited a strategic planning process undertaken by a university in Arkansas where the public was involved. The message the public gave the university and its faculty, in priority order, was that they wanted them to

- collaborate (or form partnerships) with community groups to solve community problems.
- serve as a forum and conference convener for public policy and economic debate.
- emphasize public and professional service for faculty and students.
- ensure better community access to the university.
- provide excellent teacher education and relationships between the university and the public schools.
- reach non-traditional, at-risk, and minority students.
- directly assist businesses and industry.
- develop faculty and staff expertise on issues that confront
government and disseminate the results of applied research to the public.

- collaborate with other universities.

Tucker’s views are consistent with the research on state legislative views on higher education conducted by Ruppert (1996). Her work documented the conservative political shift that occurred in the 1994 elections and resulted in a considerable change in the political balance and committee leadership in many state legislatures. In addition to greater support for more assertive legislative control of higher education, Ruppert found that budgetary priorities were shifting toward elementary and secondary education, Medicaid, and corrections. Legislators tended to view higher education as a “budget balancer” because they were aware that a share of the fiscal responsibility for this purpose can be shifted elsewhere, primarily to students and their families through increases in tuition and fees, as well as external revenue generation.

Ruppert (1996) also examined the sources of information that legislators use in making policy and budget decisions on higher education. She learned that legislators generally rely on a combination of empirical and subjective information, as well as their personal attitudes and values. Their information sources tended to fall into one of three categories in terms of perceived value in the policy-making process. The information most valued came from legislators’ own staff and committees and from state higher education agencies, if such existed. Next most valued but often conditioned by self-interest, were interactions with representatives of the “public,” such as students, constituents, and taxpayers (Republicans, especially those newly elected, were much more likely to use this source than Democrats), other legislators, the governor’s office, and various “experts” and representatives of special interest groups. The least useful information was viewed as coming from the federal government, unions, and the media. However, legislators were affected by the media’s reporting on higher education, particularly if the content was negative. They viewed current and future funding of higher education as the major issue they had to address.

The legislators in Ruppert’s (1996) study reported their priorities for higher education as follows: (1) Teacher preparation; (2) undergraduate instruction and advising; (3) elementary and secondary education improvement; (4) job training and continuing education; (5) graduate and professional programs; (6) research directed toward solving social problems; (7) remedial education for underprepared students; and (8) basic research. Legislators viewed the latter as being primarily funded by the federal government and generally not relevant to local and regional issues.

Weaver and Geske (1997) looked deeper into the educational policy making process in state legislatures. They were interested in learning who are the internal experts among legislators and the degree of influence they have on their colleagues and educational policy making. Relationships with colleagues and staff via committees, party caucuses, and the legislative bodies in which they serve were found to have the most influence on legislators. Staff were especially influential because they help to set agendas and do much of the policy preparation work behind the scenes.
Committee membership and especially leadership roles as current or former chairs were highly relevant to other colleagues in seeking advice on educational policy issues. Members generally sought service on education committees because they had been educators themselves or school board members and therefore they were viewed by non-member colleagues as having more "expert" knowledge of education. Committee members were more likely than non-members to consult with extra-legislative sources of information, such as state departments of education or higher education agencies, special interest groups, university officials and the like, thereby enhancing their reputations among colleagues as "experts." They were also more likely to initiate policies, than to wait to respond to other legislators' proposals.

The foregoing discussion indicates that the possibility of policy makers abandoning the demand for accountability from higher education can be termed "slim to none." Conflicting demands for a limited amount of public funding and the public and legislative views that higher education is out of touch with the pervasive social and economic changes occurring indicate that higher education must seek to better understand and respond to these messages, rather than merely grudgingly giving minimal attention to developing performance indicators and preparing reports to respond to the demands for accountability. The level of misunderstanding and lack of communication is clearly more complex than many faculty and staff grasp. Therefore, the third option will consider what higher education has done to respond, prior to a discussion of what might be done in the future.

C. Re-Think Higher Education's Response to Accountability

The literature on accountability in higher education is replete with various positions taken by various authors sharing their ideas on various kinds of responses, ways to develop effective performance indicators and other measures, and other alternatives for dealing with the issue. In some instances, higher education institutions, seeing that accountability was becoming a key issue in the land, attempted to preempt it by developing "legislative report cards," "annual performance reports," and other response measures to head off legislative accountability mandates (Baldwin, 1997; Boatright, 1995; Burke, 1994; Harvey, 1995; New Jersey State Commission on Higher Education, 1996).

Other accountability responses were more intensive. For example, the Montana and Arkansas higher education systems instituted long-range planning efforts which resulted in reform of faculty collective bargaining and introduction of funding based on productivity enhancement and a multi-year fiscal plan for their operating and capital budgets (Albright, 1995). The Ohio Board of Regents proposed a new three-part funding system that would provide a foundation of support based on campus enrollments and costs but link the provision of new state support to improved performance by providing incentives for innovation and use of technology (1994).

In Oregon, Portland State University undertook an intensive internal review and strategic planning effort to better align its mission with its environment and the Oregon state higher education system developed a model for assessing their impact on the growth
and change in students (Oregon State System of Higher Education, 1995; Ramaley, 1995). The Louisiana State Board of Regents reported the goals they developed for their system (1994).

Other authors explicated new accountability measurement possibilities, such as benchmarking, a criterion-based review of professional performance for faculty, and the use of critical success factors to measure impact on students and institutional benefits to society (Alstete, 1995; Swaffer, 1996; Winchip, 1995). In addition, a Joint Commission on Accountability Reporting was formed by the American Association of Community Colleges, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, and the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges to develop uniform accountability reporting formats (1996).

In terms of working internally in new ways, state higher education finance officers looked at outcome-based budgeting (Anderes, 1995). Missouri implemented a two-tiered higher education funding program that addresses accountability but also rewards faculty for improvements in teaching and learning (Stein and Fajen, 1995). Florida explored using a two-tiered approach to conducting higher education accountability reviews (annually and cumulatively every five years) and also undertook to develop performance measures for research and public service (Florida State Postsecondary Education Planning Commission, 1994 and 1996; Klinger and Iwanowski, 1997). And in Texas, three state institutions collaborated on the development of a common set of performance indicators (Hayes, 1995).

These responses indicate that higher education institutions and associations have been taking accountability seriously, particularly since the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, a few voices continue to advocate that higher education be “de-regulated,” arguing that other social and economic forces will ultimately transform higher education (MacTaggart, 1998; McDaniel, 1997). McDaniel has taken the position that competition among institutions, public views on quality, consumer power, serving multiple constituencies, and seeking funding through multiple sources can largely replace traditional forms of (state) government regulation in public higher education systems. While he argues that higher education can be minimally held responsible for (1) fiscal accountability, (2) quality of education and research, (3) producing adequate value for the public money invested, (4) avoiding major internal inefficiencies, (5) assuring institutional receptiveness and responsiveness, and (7) being receptive to a “limited” number of specific policy goals, he appears to underestimate the extent to which the American public and policy makers want to see higher education change and the determination of policy makers to see that it does change. Nevertheless, the external social and economic forces that McDaniel cited are and will likely prove to be even more powerful drivers of change in higher education, perhaps ultimately more powerful than mandated accountability.

The preceding discussion indicates that there are many ideas and many voices in higher education and elsewhere addressing the accountability issue. A consensus on the
direction that higher education should take to rebuild public trust does not yet appear to exist, although there are voices and themes emerging from the discussion.

The future for higher education: Is there another answer?

This discussion indicates that accountability can be seen as a symptom—the current lack of public and policy maker trust in higher education. If this is the case, then the challenge, particularly to public higher education, is to regain that trust, i.e., to redress the imbalance between responsibility to society and institutional autonomy that has been a key recurring issue since the middle ages. To some extent, Ewell addressed this issue in 1994 when he wrote an article entitled “A Matter of Integrity: Accountability and the Future of Self-Regulation” in Change. In this article, he said...

...[there is] substantial and growing evidence that the rules of the accountability game have changed, as well as the ground on which it must be played. These changes, in turn, are the product of some structural and fiscal realignments in American higher education that have been in the making for at least a decade. ...credible self-regulation marks the essence of what society recognizes as a profession. ...the perception of integrity is not a variable commodity that can be influenced by politics or persuasion. When we have lost it, it is gone—only to be earned back again by example and right action (p.26).

Ewell then noted several previous turning points in American higher education and observed that it is about time for another one to occur. He used the metaphor of the closing of the our western frontier to illustrate how the era of unchecked expansion in higher education is ending and we must change our thinking, but retain some of the core values that will still be useful to us.

Ewell (1994) also noted that “the roots of higher education’s current accountability problem ...[reach back] to the early 1980s with a strong and visible resurgence of discussions about the public purposes of higher education” (p. 27). He went on to say that we are, in effect, “a product of our own lobbying efforts.” Our leaders have long argued before legislatures that investments in higher education would pay off in an array of public benefits—an argument that policy makers found appealing and acted on in terms of funding. But we neglected to notice that they perceived they had made a “bargain” and now they are holding us to it. The net result is a new kind of accountability for higher education that views public funding for it as a “strategic investment.” Viewed in this way, it becomes obvious why legislators and the public they represent increasingly expect a demonstrable return on that investment.

Ewell (1994) further argued that if his analysis is correct, “we need to re-fashion self-regulation for the long haul, not just to ride out the current storm” (p.27). He said that demands to be “efficient” without sacrificing quality need collective solutions, therefore, “re-envisioning a credible self-regulation function for higher education ... is not just ours to define, but society’s. ...[w]e must make certain that ‘collective responsibility’ includes listening to the voices of our principle clients—students, employers, and society’s representatives. At the same time, we must increasingly think...
not just of public disclosure as an element of future self-regulation, but of a large measure of public consultation and involvement as well.”

Other voices have joined Ewell in advocating a more pervasive re-thinking of the meaning of accountability in higher education. For example, Block (1995) cited the need for new campus structures, governance, and teaching strategies that emphasize community involvement and partnerships. Zemsky (1995) called for developing a new partnership between faculty, presidents, and trustees. Casteen (1997) also noted that institutional integrity is built by cultivating innovation, self-scrutiny, and ongoing public discourse. Cross (1995) stated that higher education needed to make students the central focus, manage limited resources more efficiently and effectively, utilize technology, and restore public trust by demonstrating accountability. The Illinois State Board of Higher Education (1998) appears to have begun putting these recommendations into action by developing a citizen’s agenda for higher education and refocusing their higher education budget development accordingly.

Some observers of higher education have advocated a stronger approach to preparing students for citizenship as a key means of renewing public trust and engaging students and faculty in community work (Brown, 1995; Lyall, 1997). Lyall said that the first step is “lifting the public dialogue” about higher education (p.11). She also said that higher education should be asking how we can do our best for our students, which includes preparing them for citizenship because “the quality of all of our lives and the future of our nation depend on a sense of interdependence, of collective responsibility to each other.”

Brown (1995) decried the fact that most higher education institutions have no coherent public interest agenda. He indicated that faculty and students, by and large, are focused solely on their own personal advancement. Like Lyall, Brown advocated civic education as a way both to provide students (and faculty) with practical experience in community work, addressing social problems, but also as a means of re-opening the public dialogue and re-building public trust in higher education.

More recently, the Kellogg Commission on the Future of State and Land Grant Universities (February 1999) published an “action plan” for proceeding with the idea of civic engagement and public discourse as a means of re-connecting with the public. This report is aptly entitled Returning to Our Roots: The Engaged Institution. The focus of this report, intended as an open letter to the presidents and chancellors of state universities and land grant colleges, is embodied in the opening statement:

In the end, the clear evidence is that, with the resources and superbly qualified professors and staff on our campuses, we can organize our institutions to serve both local and national needs in a more coherent and effective way. We can and must do better. (p. 3)

The Kellogg Commission (1999) defines “engaged institutions” as those colleges and universities “that have redesigned their teaching, research, and extension and service functions to become even more sympathetically and productively involved with their
communities” (p. 9). They also indicated that an engaged institution must accomplish at least three things: (1) It must be organized to respond to the needs of today’s students and tomorrow’s, not yesterday’s; (2) it must enrich students’ experiences by bringing research and engagement into the curriculum and offering practical opportunities for students to prepare for the world they will enter; and (3) it must put its critical resources (knowledge and expertise) to work on the problems the communities it serves face.

Conclusion

A great many voices have been heard (and published) on the issue of accountability in higher education. Some have advocated attempting to go around it, others through it by diligent attempts to develop performance measurements and the like, and a few are seeing that accountability is a symptom of a deeper problem—the need for higher education to truly re-think its role in society and re-invent itself to more fully engage in that role. The risks of taking that course of action are substantial but the risks of not taking it are even greater. Those who are afraid might do well to remember what the late Winston Churchill once said …

“We must take change by the hand, or it will take us by the throat.”
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