This paper considers the British thinker C.S. Lewis as a "forensic figure," defining "forensic" in the sense of public discussion and debate. The paper relates that, long before Lewis emerged as a public persuader, he learned to hold his own in private exchanges with William T. Kirkpatrick, his tutor from 1914-1917, and in letters with his Belfast neighbor, Arthur Greeves. It states that with Greeves, Lewis maintained a debate on the subject of religion—the young Lewis equated religion with mythology. The paper explains that Lewis later changed his mind about Christianity and contends that his May 11, 1959 lecture at Westcott House in Cambridge has particular merit because its claims are crucial to every defense he made of historic Christianity. After a brief overview of the talk, the paper examines in detail its content and evaluates Lewis's arguments on the basis of their clarity and soundness. According to the paper, the audience for the talk was composed mainly of seminarians, and to get across his proposition, Lewis employed a strategy that forensic educators teach early to their debaters: cast doubt on the trustworthiness and methodology of the opposition. The paper concludes that, in the Cambridge talk, Lewis demonstrated the importance of identifying basic assumptions, evaluating the evidence and reasoning behind claims, questioning terminology and definitions, understanding literary forms and various senses of meaning, and mastering biblical texts. Includes 13 notes; cites 20 works. (NKA)
C. S. LEWIS AS A FORENSIC FIGURE IN THE RELIGIOUS AGORA

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To describe Lewis as a forensic figure in the religious agora is to draw an analogy from ancient Athenian life:

At the foot of the Acropolis, the three hundred foot limestone hill which dominates the central city of Athens, stands the agora or marketplace. Here traders came to buy and sell. Here were located the minor courts, side by side with merchant stalls, and here was the stoa or porch where the philosophers liked to stroll. The agora was an international marketplace for goods and ideas—colorful, noisy, varied, unique in the world of the ancient Greeks (Golden, Berquist, and Coleman 20).

Within this bustling polis, where “public discussion was continuous and intense” (Grant 70), one of the three types of speaking was forensic or that done in the courts. The English adjective forensic derives from the Latin forensis, which means a market or forum. Currently the word pertains to legal matters, public discussion and debate, as well as educational argumentation and debate programs (Webster’s). It is in the sense of public discussion and debate that C. S. Lewis, by means of his numerous speeches and publications, qualifies for the title “forensic figure.”
Long before Lewis emerged as a public persuader he had learned to stand his ground in private exchanges. He credits William T. Kirkpatrick, his tutor from 1914-17, with teaching him the art of disputation. For the tall, whiskered Kirk or The Great Knock, the thrust and parry of argumentation were not limited to occasional bouts but were his habitual approach to oral communication. He insisted that terms be clear, every proposition—even observations—be supported by evidence, and talk be directed at discovering truth. Verbiage was outlawed as a time waster and ungrounded opinions as worthless. Never one to sidestep a chance to expose sloppy thinking, he pounced on the almost sixteen-year-old as soon as he arrived in Surrey to take up residence in his home. The brilliant, well-read Lewis, shocked at first by the explosive demand to define an adjective, soon flourished under Kirk’s tutelage. It suited both his temperament and mental capabilities. Later in his autobiography, he would honor Mr. Kirkpatrick as one of his two greatest teachers.²

During the Surrey years, Lewis was in the early phase of a correspondence that extended until shortly before his death on November 22, 1963.³ The recipient of his letters was a Belfast suburban neighbor and friend Arthur Greeves with whom he shared a love for mythology, literature, music, and nature. Many of Lewis’s letters reveal sportive disputes between the two friends and how Jack, as he was known to his friends, conducted his side of the arguments. Because of time and purpose limitations, only three letters will come into this discussion.

The first excerpt concerns a request for information about gramophone records. Jack is critical of Arthur’s reply:

I despair of making head or tail of any of your gramophonic talk, where your extraordinary loose and obscure use of words like ‘latter’ etc makes havoc of the
sense. Do you mean that you had another record of the Venusburg music, before you heard it with Lohengrin, à l’autre côté? Or do you know what you mean? Or, lastly, do you mean anything at all? . . . Why didn’t you give me the number of the Polonaise: and what cheek to say ‘I think it is in A Flat’, when a journey downstairs would make sure (Stand 71).4

Lewis penned these words about eight months after he had arrived in Surrey. If we accept Lewis’s later word that before he encountered Kirk he had not realized that his thoughts (and by inference anyone else’s) needed to be based on anything, then we can see how rapidly he had absorbed and applied Kirk’s instruction. Lewis’s accusations of unclear writing, absence of thought, and failure to check facts—a tirade tinged with ad hominem—echo his tutor’s direct challenges.5

In two instances in October of 1916 Lewis vented himself on the subject of religion. Greeves, himself a Christian,6 had broached the matter with his atheistic pen pal. Jack did not relish discussion of religion, calling it “dry bones” and suggesting they write about noncombative topics (Stand 138). Be that as it may, his claims about religion and how he defended them have relevance for this study because they show an incipient forensic figure at work, one who would later gain worldwide fame on the switch-side of the question.

The two October letters lay out what Lewis claims is “the recognized scientific account of the growth of religions” (Stand 135). If his contentions and support material had been cast into an outline for a debate speech, they would have taken a form similar to this one:7

Resolved: that all religions, which are merely man’s own invention, can be equated with mythology.

I. The earliest religion developed from man’s ignorance and fear.

A. Man found terrible things and events in nature.
1. Thunder
2. Pestilence
3. Snakes, etc.

B. Man supposed they were animated by evil spirits trying to torment him.

C. Man placated these evil spirits.
   1. By cringing
   2. By crying
   3. By making sacrifices

II. As man grew up, he elevated nature-spirits to the old gods.

III. When man became more refined, he pretended that the spirits were good and powerful.
    A. Mythology formed around famous persons who actually lived.
       1. Christ
          a. His execution mentioned by Tacitus in the *Annals*
       2. The Buddha
       3. Loki
       4. Odin
       5. Hercules
       6. King Arthur
    B. Mythology spawned marvelous tales around famous persons.
       1. The tomfoolery about Jesus’ virgin birth, magic healings, apparitions, etc.
       2. Malory’s stories of King Arthur
3. The nonsense coming from the Middle Ages about the adventures of Alexander the Great

C. Mythology then deified famous people posthumously.
   1. Hercules
   2. Odin
   3. The Hebrew philosopher Yeshua (Jesus)

Jack uses this line of reasoning to show that Christianity is nothing more than mythology. With this mythology he wants no part, especially not Arthur’s belief in life after death. The youth who 25 years later would preach an unforgettable beautiful sermon on longing for the direct perception of God’s glory (Weight) could, at this point, only conjure up the image of God as “a bogey who is prepared to torture me forever and ever if I should fail in coming up to an almost impossible ideal. . .” (Stand 137-38).

What Lewis brought to the stand was the prevailing secular evolutionary position on the development of religion. He parroted its main contentions, and, where he could, he supplied instances as evidence. By the time Lewis had come under Kirkpatrick’s tutelage he already was an atheist. In Surprised by Joy Lewis recalls that Kirk never attacked religion in his presence so apparently the case he spouts in his letters to Greeves did not emanate from Kirk’s mouth. The books in Kirk’s library, however, gave him grist for his skeptical mill (140). The very fact that even before his university days he could condense and articulate a viewpoint of secular scholars outside his major academic interest shows his mental acuity and bent toward disputation.

In spite of his protestation that mythological superstition (the sort adopted by Arthur) could hold only common people, not those of education and rationality (so what, he wonders, is
wrong with Arthur), Jack assures his friend that he would not completely close the door on further enlightenment:

Of course, mind you, I am not laying down as a certainty that there is nothing outside the material world: considering the discoveries that are always being made, this would be foolish. Anything MAY exist: but until we know that it does, we can't make any assumptions. The universe is an absolute mystery: man has made many guesses at it, but the answer is yet to seek. Whenever any new light can be got as to such matters, I will be glad to welcome it. In the meantime I am not going to go back to the bondage of believing in any old (& already decaying) superstition (Stand 135-36).

By 1931 this tiny crack that Lewis allowed in his 1916 thinking had gradually widened into an exit. He now espoused traditional Christian beliefs.

In Public Discussion and Debate

Although his religious outlook had changed over his early adult years, his love of disputation held fast and went into action on behalf of various issues. Among Lewis's massive corpus are apologetic works that originally had been delivered as papers, lectures, sermons, and radio talks. Some refute the very objections to religion—and to Christianity in particular—that he had slung at Greeves. His most widely heard defense of Christianity went over the BBC in four series of talks during the war years of 1941, 1942, and 1944. These talks, published first in three small hardbacks and then revised and expanded into Mere Christianity (1952), have given Lewis a worldwide forum. In them he speaks, with remarkable concision, instructiveness, and appeal, on the beliefs that have united Christians across two millennia. Basically the subject matter comes from the major creeds—The Nicene and The Apostles'—but Lewis's treatment, free from churchly rote, scintillates with his ever-new life in Christ. Most notable for this paper
is Lewis's affirmation of crucial doctrines that he had glibly bypassed or denied in the cited letters to Greeves, namely, divine revelation, God's immanence in history, the deity of Christ, and eternal life. Undergirding every one of his points is his commitment, as he states in his essay "On Ethics," "to supernaturalism in its full rigour" (44).

Even though each of Lewis's presentations can be studied as a forensic artifact, his May 11, 1959 lecture at Westcott House in Cambridge, England, has particular merit because its claims are crucial to every defense he made of historic Christianity. After a brief overview of the talk, we shall examine its content and then evaluate his arguments on the basis of their clarity and soundness.

At the invitation of The Right Reverend Kenneth Carey, the Principal of Westcott House and later the Bishop of Edinburgh, Lewis delivered a paper entitled, "Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism." Mainly the audience was composed of seminarians who in that day were exclusively male. To get across his proposition, Lewis employed a strategy that forensic educators teach early to their debaters: cast doubt on the trustworthiness and methodology of the opposition. The target of his attack was the work of the divines who were engaged in the New Testament criticism that had undermined the old orthodoxy.

In this presentation, as in others dealing with theological or biblical matters, Lewis places himself on the laity level. He admits that he is an educated layman, but he is just a sheep while they are the shepherds. As such they have the task of communicating their beliefs to their flocks. If they preach the views of scholars such as Loisy, Schweitzer, Bultmann, Tillich, or Vidler—"a theology which denies the historicity of nearly everything in the Gospels to which Christian life and affections and thought have been fastened for nearly two millennia" ("Modern Theology" 153)—they will drive their uneducated parishioners into the Roman Catholic Church or atheism.
Clergy who hide their unorthodox beliefs by preaching “picture-truth” to their people and then turning around and using “esoteric-truth” among their fellow ministers cannot expect to enjoy their duplicity. As for himself, Lewis thinks that preaching what he does not believe would make his forehead red and damp and his collar tight. “But that is your headache, not mine,” he adds with apparent relief and the humor that infects all his work.11 “You have, after all, a different sort of collar” (153).

Following these introductory remarks, Lewis launches into his case. Now the predominant voice is that of the famous literary critic who less than five years earlier had left Oxford University to fill Cambridge’s newly created chair in Medieval and Renaissance English. He offers four reasons—he calls them “bleats”—that show why he is skeptical of the methodology and the conclusions of modern, liberal theologians.

First, Lewis states that he distrusts biblical scholars as critics: “They seem to me to lack literary judgement, to be imperceptive about the very quality of the texts they are reading” (154). He suspects that their literary experience has had a narrow focus on biblical texts and peer writings, rather than on the wide and deep reading that would have given them critical standards. He offers three examples of biblical criticism gone wrong: One critic (Lock quoting a 1903 source) mislabeled the literary type of and applicable canon for the Gospel of John; Bultmann failed to see the episodic unity in the Gospel of Mark; and Bultmann also missed the striking personality of Jesus radiating from the New Testament. Lewis wraps up his first point in this way: “These men ask me to believe they can read between the lines of the old texts; the evidence is their obvious inability to read (in any sense worth discussing) the lines themselves” (157).
The second reason Lewis is wary of biblical critics concerns their claim that they have exhumed the real Jesus, not the one they say was misunderstood and misrepresented by his followers. The speaker points to similar attempts at unearthing Plato and Shakespeare. From living mentally in Shakespeare's world, Lewis knows that most of the numerous interpretations he has read of the Bard of Avon are "merely impossible" because they reflect an outlook unknown in Jacobean times. This professional experience leads him to suspect the same is true of New Testament studies and those on Plato. In the idea that a person would be opaque to his contemporaries and transparent to later generations, "there is an a priori improbability... which almost no argument and no evidence could counterbalance" (158).

The third bleat identifies the basic assumption of the biblical scholars: nothing supernatural can occur. By starting their investigation at this point, the scholars automatically exclude predictive prophecy and miraculous events. Not wanting on this occasion to discuss whether miracles are possible, Lewis only points out the philosophical nature of the question and that the basic assumption does not arise from textual study.

Lewis tells the divinity students that his fourth bleat is the longest and loudest. Instead of stating his objection right off, he explains how critics attempt to reconstruct the genesis of a text. Carried out with "immense erudition and great ingenuity" (158), it is a task that Lewis might have found convincing had not his own writings been subject to reconstruction by reviewers who at short range adopted the method used by scholars at long range. Every one of the reviewers' speculations that Lewis can remember about his motivation, external influences, sources, intended audience, etc., has been wrong. Furthermore, he knows first hand that two theories about separate works of his friends J. R. R. Tolkien and Roger Lancelyn Green are totally inaccurate. If the inferences made by contemporary reviewers about contemporary works are so
fanciful and mistaken, how then can he put stock in the reconstructions of even brilliant scholars who are widely separated in time, place, and culture from the sources under study?

"Remember," Lewis warns, "the Biblical critics, whatever reconstructions they devise, can never be crudely proved wrong. St Mark is dead. When they meet St Peter there will be more pressing matters to discuss" (161)

At the outset of the lecture Lewis had told the seminarians that their principal had wanted them to know how an outsider regards a certain type of theology. Having presented his four objections to it, he now shares the hopes he cherishes and sometimes finds uplifting. Lewis hopes that the assured-results-of-modern-scholarship approach to theology will end. To support that possibility he gives several examples of an about-face in critical literary studies and points to the fall of idealism just within his lifetime. With his bent toward disputation never far from the surface, he encourages the students to express any misgivings they may have regarding biblical criticism. He recounts how his youthful lack of confidence in his case against the idealist philosophy kept him silent. Later he witnessed its fall due to the same objections. Likewise, a seminarian’s arguments directed at modern theology may have an unimagined function.

Considering the fact that Lewis did not take well to numbers, it is surprising that he now adopts a mathematical approach to the linked hypotheses of biblical critics. He explains that each hypothesis in a proof can be computed for its probability relationship to the successive one (A to B, B to C, C to D, etc.). Lewis demonstrates that a critic such as Bultmann can generate a chain of reasoning that contains separate hypotheses of high probability, but when taken as a whole the chain has virtually none.

Toward the end of his paper, Lewis makes two qualifying statements. He does not distrust all biblical criticism, only the kind that veers away from mere textual criticism into
subtle and ambitious reconstructions. For example, to throw into question the historicity of some aspect of a Gospel because it does not conform to a scholar’s time line of early Church development—a sequence based on fragmentary evidence—arouses Lewis’s deepest skepticism.

Lewis also tells the students that he does not want to reduce their skepticism, but he does suggest that they try doubting something other than the New Testament and the Creeds. As a starter he leads them in examining a major idea of demythology as propounded by George Tyrrell (1861-1909). He and other exponents assert that the old doctrines of the Church, such as the Resurrection, the Ascension, and the Second Coming, are no longer consonant with modern experience and thought; therefore, they should be regarded in all their details as symbolical and analogical, not literal. If a dog were trying to form a conception of human life, for example, it could only conjure up analogues. Lewis explains the flaw he sees in this reasoning of the demythologizers: “If the dog visualized our scientific researches in terms of ratting, this would be analogical; but if it thought that eating could be predicated of humans only in an analogical sense, the dog would be wrong” (165). But the dog could only make these distinctions if and when he entered a new, human form of reality. Likewise, the only way anyone can know whether all the details of a thing are symbolical (in this case the story behind the Ascension) is to have access to both the thing and the representation so a comparison can be made. If, however, the doctrine is an expression of God’s thought and, as such, is a transcendent, objective reality, then an earthling cannot know whether all the details of the story are symbolical. Not until a person knows as he is known will he understand the true nature of the story. Lewis ends this section with a simple question: “Had we not better wait?” (166).

All that remains of his lecture are a few, brief comments made from his layman’s stance. It has been right, he avers, for them to hear from a layman what their own parishioners will not
often disclose. Now, unlike in past days, the layman believes more than the priest who himself often needs a missionary to survive, as does the Church of England.

Although the foregoing summary of "Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism" is a poor substitute for reading the text in toto, it provides an overview of this noteworthy speech and the basis for evaluating two aspects of Lewis’s argumentation. To carry out the latter purpose, we shall raise and answer two questions. First, are Lewis’s arguments clear? Upon reading Lewis, even individuals with a smattering of philosophy and theology usually can grasp what Lewis is saying. Those schooled in these fields marvel that Lewis takes the concepts many other writers manage to tangle, removes the knots, and stretches out lines of reasoning. Contributing to this clarity is his use of organizational sign posting, which is amply demonstrated in this lecture. In the introduction he sets forth his purpose in addressing the seminarians, and then near the end he gives a final swipe: "Such are the reactions of one bleating layman to Modern Theology" (166). He uses enumeration for his main objections to the work of the critics whom he regards as despoilers of orthodoxy. Frequently he highlights his sub-points such as "There are two sorts of outsiders" (152) and "Now I must first record my impression; then, distinct from it, what I can say with certainty" (159). The logical and linguistic links between each successive idea also give clarity to his utterances. This ability to integrate organization in such an organic way is a hallmark of Lewis and other skillful speakers.

There is one section in this talk, however, that might have been confusing to some hearers. In it Lewis explains the basic idea of the demythology approach to the New Testament, a system to which every seminary student would have been or would be exposed. Until Lewis claims, "But surely there is a flaw here," his exposition is clear. But his next words, "The argument runs like this" (165), do not indicate whether he will further explicate his opponent’s
position (Tyrrell's) or immediately provide his own. "Here" needs a clearer referent and "argument" an identifying adjective. Even in print Lewis's refutation, which includes the various modes of a canine's mind, is confusing. The reader can reread, but the seminarians, unless they had tape-recorded his talk, had no second chance. Nevertheless, if any students had been submerged somewhere between Tyrrell and the Ascension, then Lewis's perspicuous conclusion to the theological controversy would have brought them back to the surface.

The next question is: Are Lewis's arguments sound? Except for two cases that will be discussed below, the answer is affirmative. The Wescott House address reveals a brilliant, logical mind at work. Usually Lewis moves deductively from the general to the specific: he states a claim and supports it by well-evidenced logic. In developing his fourth objection to a certain type of biblical critic, he proceeds inductively from specific cases to a generalization. After pointing to the mistakes of contemporary reviewers, he asks his hearers to conclude that if the critics who live today cannot make correct inferences about the work of a living man, then surely they cannot accurately second guess a dead one. All along he leads the audience in making assumptions, forming premises, noting logical connections, rejecting faulty logic, raising questions, and coming to conclusions. His support material—and there is a plethora of it—comes from a lifetime or reading and extensive research. Most of the evidence takes the form of instances and examples from secular and religious literature and theology, subjects one would expect from an English professor whose reputation as a popularizer of Christian thought had put him on *Time* magazine's cover of 8 September 1947. Additionally, from his own experience he offers primary evidence, which has the highest probative force, to show how dead wrong reviewer speculation can be. Like all cases, his can be refuted, but the strength of his reasoning and evidence mount a challenge for even the most nimble modern theologian.
Perhaps Lewis’s least convincing claim is that he is just a layman, albeit an educated one. Given his erudition and his widely-read, respected, and influential books on religion, this self-categorization arouses more than admiration for his humility: it appears humorous. Lewis had worked hard at creating this debatable, lay persona: “I am a very ordinary layman of the Church of England...” (Mere 6); “I am your pupil, not your teacher” (Dock 89); and “I write for the unlearned about things in which I am unlearned myself” (Reflections on the Psalms 1). Of course, Lewis for whom definitions were important had a basis for these statements. He believed that to be called a biblical scholar one needed a formal education in theology, the original biblical languages, and related areas. Not possessing this background, Lewis carefully distinguished between his lay and scholarly fields. His hearers and readers who have a different view on his qualifications but also guard definitions can find justification in Webster’s and in Black’s Law Dictionary for regarding Lewis as at least an expert in religious matters.

On another matter, one that is germane to his case against liberal theologians, Lewis uses an argument that is superfluous and risky. This concerns his attempt to show mathematically that Bultmann’s hypotheses become less and less probable as they develop into a chain. The fact that Lewis can show this downward progression is not the telling point: he has already made it by exposing certain critics’ naturalistic basic assumptions, lack of literary judgment, and proclivity to speculate. The cognitive process of linking hypotheses is not at fault—without it the scientific method would disappear—but the weaknesses in proof for the hypotheses. The risk factor in the argument is that an opponent could easily turn the tables on Lewis by calculating the descending probability of his speculations, say, about purgatory or the afterlife. No doubt his rejoinder would be that Bultmann and his type of critic fail to acknowledge their speculations.
Why the claims of this speech are crucial to Lewis's apologias should now be apparent. By casting doubt on the methodology, literary judgment, and reasoning of his opponents, Lewis not only reduces their credibility but the reliability of their conclusions. This means that the Church has no reason to desert her ancient fortress. The invaders are attacking with sticks, not battering rams.

Conclusion

Throughout the May 11, 1959 speech we see Lewis the skilled expositor and disputant carrying out his host's request to present his views on the dominant, current approach to theology. His talk serves more than an informative function. As he works through his main points, he has the secondary purpose of engendering a critical attitude toward theological ideas that crop up, sound convincing, flourish for a time, then wane. In a sense, his address is a call to the seminarians not to throw over historic Christianity for the dubious reconstructions of Tyrrell, Loisy, Schweitzer, Bultmann, Tillich, or Vidler. His words can even be seen as an admonition against the fakery of clerics who embrace modern theology but preach orthodox truth.

The Westcott House address is also an exemplar. Rather than merely advising the men to mount an offensive on the Bultmannian-type critics, Lewis shows them how to advance it. He demonstrates the importance of identifying basic assumptions, evaluating the evidence and reasoning behind claims, questioning terminology and definitions, understanding literary forms and various senses of meaning, and mastering biblical texts.

Armed with this intellectual battery, Lewis strode, as it were, on the stoa where his voice could be heard in the religious agora, his opponents debated, and his ideas disseminated.
Notes

1 The other two types of public speaking were deliberative (political) and epideictic (ceremonial, i.e., praise of virtue or censure of vice). See Aristotle Bk. 1, 3.


3 Two hundred and ninety-six letters are published in Lewis, Stand. Those from Greeves, except for the four in Stand, are not in print and apparently were not preserved. See “Editor’s Note” 42.

4 In editing the letters, Hooper retained the punctuation and spelling used by Lewis.

5 In Rancer, et al. results show that a training program involving 296 adolescent students significantly increased their general tendency to argue and their ability to generate arguments. Given the outcomes of this seven-day program, we should not be surprised by the 30-month influence of the disputatious Kirkpatrick on young Lewis.

6 It is ironic that Arthur Greeves later drifted into a succession of religious persuasions, most bearing no resemblance to Christianity. See Hooper, Companion 665-66.

7 The outline was developed by the present author from the arguments Lewis used in letters 44 and 45 of Stand.

8 Brightman (31-67) describes various ideas about the genesis of religion, some similar to those of the young Lewis.

9 For a bibliography of oral material, see Keefe 143-44.

10 For a run-down of metaphors Lewis uses in Mere Christianity for Christian regeneration, see Ward 151.

11 The full range of Lewis’s humor is delineated by Lindvall in Surprised by Laughter.
12 In *Surprised by Joy* 186, Lewis relates how after he had passed the Oxford entrance examination, he still had to prepare for "Responsions," a test involving basic math. The subject was his nemesis. Back to Kirk he went for further tutoring. He reports that he was "plowed" by the exam, but after the war an exemption from the test for ex-servicemen gained him a reprieve.

13 Although Charlesworth (222) credits Bultmann for his brilliance and influence as a New Testament scholar, he points out that the theologian did not delve into historical sources that might differently have informed his theology. He also claims that the Bultmannian School is dead (224), an eventuality Lewis had forecast in his Westcott House address (162-63).
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