This 1997 issue of "The Carolinas Speech Communication Annual" contains the following articles: "Bridges of Understanding: UNESCO's Creation of a Fantasy for the American Public" (Michael H. Eaves and Charles F. Beadle, Jr.); "Developing a Communication Cooperative: A Student, Faculty, and Organizational Learning Experience" (Peter M. Kellett and Mary Leigh Wallace); "Strom Thurmond and the Metonymic Campaign of 1996" (Roy J. Schwartzman); "Definition and Metaphor in Ronald Reagan's Drug Control Discourse" (Ronald O. Wastyn); "The Gender Factor in Negotiations" (Jason M. Lewis); and "Analysis of Campus Conflict Using the Analysis Schema" (Rex M. Fuller and William D. Kimsey). An index to "The Carolinas Speech Communication Annual Volumes I-XIII" concludes the issue. (NKA)
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The editor would like to thank the hard work of the associate editors over the past two years for their service to the CSCA. Those wishing to make contributions for Volume XIV should check NCA’s Spectre for the name and address of the new editor who will be elected at the 1997 conference of the Carolinas Speech Communication Association Convention in Charleston, South Carolina. Individuals may also E-mail the former editor after the CSCA convention for the name and address of the new editor at MCKINNEYB@UNCWIL.EDU.
"BRIDGES OF UNDERSTANDING"
UNESCO'S CREATION OF A FANTASY FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

Michael H. Eaves and Charles F. Beadle, Jr.

As evidenced by World War II, the League of Nations had not maintained global peace. The United Nations (UN), thus, was formed in 1945 with the express purpose of peacekeeping between nations. The founders hoped that the newly formed body and its subsidiary agencies would not make its predecessor’s mistakes. Several of the subsidiary agencies of the UN, however, were characterized by many in the U.S. as greedy and lustful for power. The major recipient of such criticism was the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

UNESCO was formed in response to a need for educational and scientific research among various cultures. The Reagan administration charged that the Paris-based agency had undergone major changes in philosophy and commitment that brought it into conflict with American ideology. After giving UNESCO a one year warning, the U.S. withdrew its membership from this organization in 1983.

This essay will attempt to provide a review of Bormann's fantasy theme analysis as a critical tool; describe the historical development of the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, including the media treatment of the event; describe Bridges of Understanding, a media attack made by UNESCO in response to the U.S. media; apply fantasy theme analysis in a critique of the UNESCO film; and shed new light on the media's role in the treatment, criticism, and response to the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.

THE CRITICAL METHOD: FANTASY THEME ANALYSIS

Ernest Bormann, in his work "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," lays the groundwork for the rhetorical tool. Bormann draws on small group communication research, especially from the work of Robert Bales.
My argument is that these moments happen not only in individual reactions to works of art, or in a small group's chaining out a fantasy theme, but also in larger groups hearing a public speech. The dramatizations which catch on and chain out in small groups are worked into public speeches and into the mass media and, in turn, spread out across larger publics, serve to sustain the member's sense of community, to impel them strongly to action (which raises the question of motivation), and to provide them with a social reality filled with heroes, villains, emotions, and attitudes.¹

Fantasy theme analysis offers a contemporary, fresh perspective of looking at rhetorical events and artifacts, especially in television and film. Foss and Littlejohn used it in their analysis of The Day After in 1986,⁵ and Foss suggested its use for this purpose as recently as 1996.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UNESCO

At the center of the decision leading to the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO was Amadou-Hahtar M'Bow, Senegalese Secretary General of UNESCO from 1974 to 1984. Having been ousted by the Senegalese government in the early 1970's, M'Bow fit the need for an African to assume the post at UNESCO. The U.S. now faced in UNESCO a situation similar to their position in other areas of the UN—a loss of power. M'Bow consistently favored African and Eastern Bloc nations in policy decisions.⁷

PROBLEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL

The problems cited as reasons for U.S. withdrawal fell into three categories—the perceived politicization of the organization, the financial burden placed on the U.S., and the lack of reform in UNESCO.
Politicization of UNESCO

One report suggested that UNESCO attacked Western ideals, alienated the U.S. from other members, and supported press censorship, third world rhetoric, and statist policies. David Bell wrote:

Stated simply, UNESCO doesn't work anymore. Its politicization, its advocacy of "statist" policies such as N.W.I.C.O. (New World International Communication Order), and its sheer inefficiency leave its operations hopelessly confused and ineffectual."

Another writer noted that UNESCO was "vengeful" and run by a so-called "Yugoslav mafia" of bureaucrats. The Nation put the problem into perspective:

Lurid stories of its dreadful bureaucracy, rampant patronage and wasteful spending do not much help the image of an organization dedicated to upholding the core values of civilization. More important, still, have been such emotional issues as UNESCO's votes to condemn Israel ....

The UNESCO organization seemed to be unable to tone down the negative voices from third world country leaders. Sanctions prevented Israel from participating in the organization, a decision that was not reversed until years after the U.S. withdrawal.

While the evidence on supporting Soviet regimes is sketchy, UNESCO had developed a client list of unknown persons. Some money allocated for educational and scientific needs was channeled to terrorist groups.

Political or military groups ranging from the PLO to the Organization for African Unity, are being financed; too many vague conferences are being planned (400 over the next two years); the Director General uses his position as an instrument of power.
Financial Burden on the U.S.

The U.S. contributed approximately one-fourth of UNESCO’s budget in 1983, an amount out of proportion to its representation and influence. Some felt the U.S. should withdraw and allocate funds directly to educational, scientific, and cultural areas. Some, however, did not agree with all the negative attacks. Former UNESCO Ambassador McHenry said on the Macneil/Lehrer News Hour that it was hypocritical for the U.S. to be screaming about the UNESCO budget when it could not balance its own national budget. While the turmoil perhaps originated with the Reagan administration, Mr. Diene, then of UNESCO, commented that the threat of the United States to withdraw from UNESCO dated back to January 1981, when David Stockman, in his first budget proposals, suggested severing the U.S. contribution to UNESCO (emphasis added).

UNESCO’S Reluctance to Change

The U.S. government believed that too much of the budget went to the organization’s Paris headquarters and included questionable employee promotions, routine vacation trips, and interior design modifications. When UNESCO decided to nearly double its 1984 budget to $374 million, the U.S. took a hard-line stand on the issue. Despite that opposition, UNESCO voted to approve the increase. A series of articles in the New York Times and the Washington Post as well as several U.S. government press conferences denounced UNESCO’s activities and poor management. Such harsh rhetoric put additional pressure on the government to act against wasteful spending. On December 29, 1983, the U.S. formally announced that it intended to leave UNESCO.

Biased Media Coverage of the U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO

Media bias issues fall under two categories. First, there was a bias in the selection of sources. Nearly twice as many articles quoted sources favoring U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO. From a sample of 215 articles written between June 1, 1983, and January 31, 1985, almost two-thirds were pro-withdrawal. Only a few articles...
took no position. The case of two Australian reporters, each an expert on the topic, is illustrative of the selection bias. E. Gough Whitlam, who resisted U.S. withdrawal was disregarded by the American media, while his counterpart, Owen Harries, who favored withdrawal, gained most of the media attention.

On August 8, 1984, the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO's press conference was minimized and downplayed by the U.S. media and by Washington officials as trivial and insignificant. Although the event presented a crisp, original perspective on the issue, the public received a distorted, incomplete, and slanted view of UNESCO's contribution. In effect, much of the pro-UNESCO information was successfully censored by the U.S. government.

The second category of media bias involved the coverage of the issues, primarily focusing on the politicization issue. The media quickly embraced a letter from George Schultz to M'Bow characterizing the agency as a "political nightmare." The issues bias was affected by the source bias since the media relied heavily on information leaks by U.S. government officials or documents. George Will suggested "we are studying the inoculation of the world with degraded language manipulated by America's enemies." The coverage's tone reflected an unrestrained hostility toward UNESCO.

"BRIDGES OF UNDERSTANDING": THE FILM

In response to its criticism, UNESCO made a short but powerful documentary, Bridges of Understanding, in 1983. The film was written and directed by Joseph Mehan and was narrated by Leonard Nimoy, who spoke about the need for the American public to know about UNESCO. The film covered several points of information.

First, it pointed out that indeed the U.S. does contribute about one-quarter of the UNESCO budget. It illustrated the necessity of continued U.S. support, stressing that it was essential to the sustained existence of UNESCO.

Second, it discussed the important contribution UNESCO made to the discovery and restoration of cultural artifacts. The film stressed cultural landmarks including many cities and parks throughout the U.S. so that viewers could identify with the "American" goal of the film.
Third, it outlined UNESCO's educational pursuits. Nimoy depicted U.S. high school-UNESCO projects working with third world countries, teaching leadership skills to enable participants to instruct in their own language. The project has met with success by promoting cultural values and preserving national interests.

Fourth, it discussed scientific strategies and endeavors. Snapshots of marine projects, farm experiments, and chemical lab studies were shown. Dr. Laycock, the director of a Midwestern grazing experiment, thanked UNESCO for the development and support of the grassland program.

Fifth, it stressed UNESCO’s ties to the steel industry. A personal walk was conducted through the Denver Steel Center. Foreign visitors were shown giving speeches at the center.

Sixth, it invited viewers into the publishing house where UNESCO produced thousands of documents. The UNESCO press and workers were shown busily working on documents.

Finally, it pleaded for continued U.S. support. The 300 million dollar budget was compared to the annual budget for Columbia University ($400 million) and the nearly five hundred billion dollars spent yearly on armaments throughout the world. The conclusion was reached that UNESCO's budget was an insignificant amount. A final plea came from James Holderman, President of the University of South Carolina. Nimoy summarizes the film and refers to the failure of UNESCO without U.S. support.

APPLYING FANTASYTheme ANALYSIS TO THE FILM

Fantasy theme analysis seems appropriate to critique Bridges of Understanding. Such fantasies may be created from past or future events as in the film. Bormann explains:

Fantasy theme analysis studies the way communicators discuss fictitious and nonfictitious events in the past or in the future or at some other place than the here-and-now of the immediate communication episode.... The narrative form implies or attributes motivations to the personae and may provide an explanation based on
lawfulness or the will of a supreme being rather than on chance or accident.31

The overall rhetorical vision of Bridges of Understanding is to reach Americans, to teach the value of UNESCO. It reflects several fantasies, based on past and future events. The first fantasy is the necessity of the continued U.S. role in UNESCO politics. Historically, the U.S. has been involved in supporting international groups who work toward the development of education and growth, opposing communist or socialist ideology. While there was an established need for this contribution to the organization before 1984, the subsequent years without U.S. support have illustrated that U.S. aid to UNESCO's budget was not needed for the organization's institutional survival. In essence, the film creates a fantasy for the audience to believe in—an illusion that UNESCO cannot survive without U.S. aid. UNESCO, after the U.S. withdrawal in 1984, has regrouped and moved forward with many of its original objectives.

UNESCO may have created falsehoods or, at a minimum, stretched the truth at the prospect of losing critical and desperate U.S. financial assistance. Still, the film represents a unique approach to tapping into American minds, by “chaining out” various fantasy types and creating a shared rhetorical vision for its viewers. Bridges of Understanding represents an overt, carefully planned response to the harsh, one-sided criticism that was being reflected in the U.S. media coverage. The fantasy of the U.S. role in UNESCO was both true and false. On one hand, the fantasy is true since the U.S. played a key role in the financial contribution to the agency's existence. On the other hand, the fantasy is false when compared to the rhetoric by third world and communist countries in the UNESCO general assemblies.

The second fantasy in the film is the existence and preservation of key national and international artifacts. Not surprisingly, the film is quick to draw the audience's attention to the projects in the U.S., while the actual percentages of UNESCO's role in those cultural artifact preservations remains a mystery. For instance, the film shows outdoor and indoor shots of Independence Hall in Philadelphia. Nimoy argues that UNESCO was responsible for the restoration and continued preservation of one of America's great historical buildings. This remark may have offended some since America has always taken
pride in its independence from the rest of the world. America has worked hard on preserving its young cultural history.

The questionable nature of UNESCO's argument not withstanding, the fantasy still works well in the film. Coupled with other sites such as Yellowstone and Everglades National Park, Independence Hall is seen as a site for cultural preservation. The film allows the viewer to live out a fantasy of preserving and protecting a shared value. The fantasy is real, using fine, precise manipulation of media and technology. Bormann underscores the power of the media:

Messages that contain rhetorical fantasies cast there-and-then events in narrative frames and provide a structured, understandable, and meaningful interpretation of what happened. The speaker [or film director here] will attribute motives, purposes, and causes to the people in the story and will fit events into a meaningful sequence of events. Fantasies always provide an organized artistic explanation of happenings and thus create a social reality which makes sense out of the blooming buzzing confusion of the experience.\(^\text{32}\)

Third, the film depicts yet another rhetorical fantasy--an educational pursuit. The decade of the 1980s was a period of "intercultural awareness", and the film hopes that American citizens will adopt an ideology consistent with cultural awareness. Without doubt, Americans are drawn into multiple fantasies, stories within stories, narratives within narratives. In essence, the audience comes to share the stories and narratives.\(^\text{33}\) The viewers' attitudes and values are "tested" and "legitimized" by the sharing process. The commonality is established through this sharing or what Bormann refers to as "fantasy chains."\(^\text{34}\) UNESCO was hoping to reach a select, intelligent, if somewhat small audience that perhaps would be eager to see efforts directed at world peace, cultural enrichment, and educational success.

It was assumed that educators or students would most likely comprise the audience for the film. Such an audience, whether critical or not, would be more likely to support further educational
endeavors. In this sense, the fantasy works in two ways. One, multiple audiences are exposed to a single message. If the message does not work for a teacher, it might work for a student or an activist. Two, word-of-mouth should help spread the information about UNESCO's cause. If viewers found the message to be challenging, they could tell their friends about the problem. Indeed, this two-step flow of information from opinion leaders was counted on to maximize the effect of the film's minimal exposure on PBS. The two-step flow model of mass media suggests that the media's effects are not limited to directly affecting the original consumers. It holds that there is a second level of exposure to the message as opinion leaders among those who saw the film share the film's images, stories, and narratives with others who value their opinions. The audience for the fantasies within the film is not limited to those who actually saw it.

Perhaps it is understandable why UNESCO chose to air the documentary on PBS instead of a commercial network. Was it by choice or economic necessity? Probably neither. Instead, UNESCO's access to network television was heavily restricted. In addition, the public would have lashed out against Bridges of Understanding if aired on CBS, NBC, or ABC. One network did air another program during prime time, but it was geared to what the public wanted to hear--leave UNESCO now.

Fourth, UNESCO suggests that the organization is helpful in scientific projects. Interviews show fishermen, farmers, and lab scientists as members of the UNESCO team aimed at scientific development for the world. In this segment, the film's cast seems most influential in creating and chaining out the group's fantasy. UNESCO tries to adapt the film to the forgotten middle-class worker, a profession that the educators would be partial to immediately.

The scientific and educational community probably welcomed the claims, charges, and arguments expressed in the film. Viewers probably adopted a new, fresh perspective for the fate of international education and science. For example, one vision became a political ploy opposing Reagan administration rhetoric. The Heritage Foundation, especially Owen Harries who was serving on its board, was blamed for much of the negative rhetoric used in the media.

Fifth, another fantasy is created for the steel industry. Certain viewers of the film may be sympathetic to discussions about
promoting steel worker relations, enhancement, and rights. The message is to reach former or current steel employees around the U.S. to be enthusiastic about the "cause." Interviews were conducted at the Denver Steel Center. Persons from steel towns such as Birmingham or Pittsburgh could adopt this fantasy.

As is seen in an earlier fantasy depicted in the film, one goal is to encourage cultural awareness in the audience. This fantasy provides an escape for the viewers who want a new world, a better world. Robert Bales contributes a unique line of thought:

The world of a group culture is big enough to hold a complete individual life, and yet it is completely existent within the perspective of the mind's eye. It can be traversed from the portal of heaven to the mouth of hell by mental means alone. Men fly in it more naturally than they walk. No wonder groups create and maintain fantasies, and individuals can hardly live without incorporation in one or more such groups.39

The sixth fantasy theme deals with UNESCO's contribution to employment and jobs. The film explains that U.S. workers comprise most of its 3500 person staff at its headquarters in Paris. The fantasy works because viewers see that the patronage benefits U.S. citizens. They would be reluctant to see "home folks" lose their jobs. Upon buying into the fantasy, the viewer would want to support the continued livelihood of U.S. service workers in a foreign nation. The film taps into the emotions of the audience, leaving the logical, structured, and organized patterns in the first several fantasies. This fantasy, like other fantasies in the film, is driven by the goal to reject the status quo and politically support change.

The last fantasy in the film is a direct response to allegations and criticism appearing in the popular media about the UNESCO budget difficulties. This fantasy works well because there are simple analogies for the viewer to compare its budget with the budget of Columbia University and to contrast it to the vast amount spent on world armament. In this sense, the budget is minimized when compared to these expenditures. The audience's attention is
redirected from focusing on UNESCO's budget to other budgets. The fantasy helps to draw attention away from financial problems and focus on positive contributions made to world peace, growth, and education.

Perhaps the film's title implies more than mere intercultural awareness and support. Instead it postulates a "bridge" between two rhetorical visions with respect to sharing one fantasy construction--UNESCO. The U.S. still does not belong to the Paris-based agency, but this does not mean that the film was a complete failure. Indeed, the film succeeded in developing numerous fantasy chains. The Bush administration contemplated returning to UNESCO. The Clinton administration has changed many of our policies toward UNESCO, including aid packages and donations. The British Government, which withdrew from UNESCO in 1985 (two years after the U.S. withdrawal), announced its intention to return to the organization on July 1, 1997. Its representative, Tony Bazeley said to the UNESCO Executive Board:

"Britain has been indelibly linked with UNESCO since its inception. Although we have been formally absent from the organisation for many years we have nevertheless continued to take an interest in its activities and have participated in a number of its collaborative ventures and programmes."

**SUMMARY**

*Bridges of Understanding* represents a useful media artifact for fantasy theme analysis. The film provides an alternative argument for UNESCO. Offering an alternative to viewers allows such participants to share a coherent, symbolic framework or fantasy vision to place within which to place it and to give it meaning.
NOTES

1See Flora Lewis's article, "Uncultured Politics," in the late edition issue of the December 27, 1983, New York Times. Lewis says that while they did not expect the UN to be a utopian organization the expectations were high for the body and its agencies.


3For a discussion of Robert Bales's work on fantasy theme chains in small groups, see his book, Personality and Interpersonal Behavior, 1970. Bales and his colleagues developed the fantasy theme analysis in the classroom. Bormann used this work in developing his ideas on fantasy chains in larger, public communication contexts.

4Bormann, p. 398.
5Foss and Littlejohn, 1986.

7For a brief historical sketch of M'Bow's history, see David Bell's article, "Withdrawal Symptoms," in the December 31, 1984, issue of New Republic, p. 12.

8See the New York Times for December 21, 1983, p. A27. The article, "U.S. Quits UNESCO," was written by Owen Harries, formerly the Australian Ambassador to UNESCO (1982-1983). Prior to that he was senatorial advisor to then Prime Minister Malcolm Frasier. At the time of the article, he was serving as a fellow with the Heritage Foundation.

9Bell, p. 13.
11See the January 14, 1985 issue of The Nation, p. 4.
12For a review article addressing some of the actions (or inactions) contributing to the U.S. withdrawal, see Bernard Gwertzman's "U.S. Called Ready to Leave UNESCO" in the December 28, 1983 issue of the New York Times, p. A8.

18 See the transcript #2154 of the Macneil/Lehrer News Hour for December 29, 1983. McHenry's statement appears on p. 6 of the transcript. Additional comments are made regarding the double standard used in the U.S. in press censorship issues.
19 See the transcript #2154 of the Macneil/Lehrer News Hour for December 29, 1983, p. 5.
20 For a synopsis of events leading to the decision for the U.S. to withdraw from UNESCO, see David Shirbman's article, "Time is Running Out for the U.S. to Decide Whether it Should Leave UNESCO," in the December 21, 1983, issue of the New York Times, p. A16.
21 See the transcript #2154 of the Macneil/Lehrer News Hour for December 29, 1983, p. 3. The Reagan administration was outraged by the budget increase and called for a freeze on all UN spending. UNESCO's failure to control its budget was probably a key reason for the U.S. response.
22 Gwertzman, p. A1. Also see Oberdorfer, p. A1. Apparently Secretary of State George Schultz's recommendation to withdraw was based on a State Department consensus that UNESCO had not progressed sufficiently toward the objectives spelled out in its charter.
24 For a detailed account and analysis of the U.S. media treatment of UNESCO, see Preston, Herman, and Schiller's Hope & Folly: The United States and UNESCO, pp. 213-226.
25 For a discussion of Harries and Whitlam, see Hope & Folly, pp. 222-223.

For a discussion of the U.S. government involvement, see Hope & Folly, pp. 239-242. Preston, Herman, and Schiller mention that "another significant contributor to the supply of charges was the Heritage Foundation, which was in a close alliance with the Reagan administration in propagandizing the case for withdrawal."


The tone of the media coverage is dealt with in Hope & Folly, pp. 244-252. Tables illustrate the tonality of language used in the articles analyzed. A clear dichotomy may be drawn between the two perspectives.

See Hope & Folly, pp. 253-256 for a discussion of the U.S. treatment of disarmament. It closely paralleled the position taken by UNESCO. See also Mary Beth Reissen in the January 13, 1984 issue of the National Catholic Reporter.

See Bormann, Communication Theory, p. 190.

Bormann explains the impact of the median on the audience and the shared fantasy that results. For two specific media treatments and their fantasies, see Bormann's "A Fantasy Theme Analysis of the Television Coverage of the Hostage Release and the Reagan Inaugural" in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, 1982, p. 134.

See Bormann, 1982, p. 135.

See Bormann, 1972, p. 398.


See Hope & Folly, pp. 138-140 and 182.
See Bales, p. 152.


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The Nation, January 14, 1984, p. 4.


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DEVELOPING A COMMUNICATION COOPERATIVE: A STUDENT, FACULTY, AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE

Peter M. Kellett and Mary Leigh Wallace

Communication departments, like all organizations that are committed to excellence in serving their constituents (including students) and their communities in an ever more demanding environment, have to effectively navigate and learn from a number of key complexities. There are five needs associated with these complexities. First is the need to keep organizational practices, particularly curriculum, aligned with department and university mission, vision, values, and goals. Second is the need to provide students with practical and professional experience that connects to their likely area of life work, while maintaining the integrity of a theoretically grounded liberal arts education that can be completed in four years. Third is the need to provide educational opportunities in current communication practices and technologies, at a time when it is increasingly difficult for educational programs to remain technologically "state of the art." Fourth is the need to build strategic relationships with the private sector at a time when administrators are holding academic programs more accountable for reaching out to their communities in meaningful ways, and in times of shrinking job bases and shrinking state funding (where fostering community relationships might have future funding potential). Fifth is the need to place students in community roles where they will not only make a valuable contribution, but also will build bridges to those companies as potential employees, and as important stakeholders in shaping the educational experiences of the student that they might one day hire. This essay presents an account of the challenges, opportunities, benefits, experiences, and main lessons learned, in creating a cooperative program, as one way of balancing these various complex needs and demands of a future minded communication program.
Traditionally, academic programs have responded to these tensions and needs partly through internship programs. Almost all of the four year programs in communication studies in the Carolinas have established internship programs that are valuable in the following ways: First, internships can offer valuable, and often necessary pre-professional training within a liberal arts educational frame (Blanchard & Christ, 1993, Eastman, 1993, Wood, 1993). Second, internships offer a context where concepts, skills, and principles learned in the classroom can come to life in valuable ways (Limburg, 1993). Third, internships can help build cooperative alliances with local corporations and organizations as prospective employers.

Other academic programs, such as engineering, have made better use of their strategic relationships with their community constituents through developing cooperative (co-op) programs. Co-ops embody all of the benefits of internships but also differ from internships in the following key corrective ways: First, internships can often feel like a student is in and out, grabbing some experience and a vita line, while being treated as free labor along the way. While some students do gain valuable academic and professional experience, a cooperative takes the student into a longer term, and deeper, professional learning relationship. They are typically full time, on site, paid, project-based, learning experiences. Co-ops may involve continuous learning through semesters on site sandwiched between academic semesters. This means that knowledge is applied continuously back and forth between academic and professional settings. Second, students are formally treated as pre-professionals. Salaries are usually scaled as a percentage of what they would make as fully qualified candidates in that position. They are supervised while doing the work of a professional in their field. Consequently, the credibility of their academic training and degree are maintained as there is not a mindset of getting communication majors for free labor. What students know is treated as a valuable learning resource for the organization. Third, the relationship fostered between the educational department and the corporation involved are beyond the alliance typical of an intern. Rather, for example, the co-op we developed proved to be a valuable mutual learning organizational experience that
is central to our continued development (Kofman and Senge, 1995, Weintraub, 1995, Wood, 1995).

The reason that we have not developed a co-op program before is part disciplinary, and part specifically a historical issue of our department (Communication Studies, University of North Carolina at Greensboro). On a disciplinary level, it is often difficult to place communication students in positions that parallel professional roles when formal titles such as Communication Specialist, or Organizational Communication Consultant are rare in organizations. Programs such as electrical or mechanical engineering do not suffer from the same naming challenges. Many corporations hire engineering co-ops who will eventually be hired in well established job lines specifically as engineers. Organizations know more about how to treat those disciplines, and typically know what they can do for their company. There are few ready made tracks for, "Organizational Communication Specialists," nor are co-ops common in the communication field.

On a departmental level, we have had a successful and well run internship program at the undergraduate level for many years. Many internships have resulted in full time positions with those companies. In recent years, however, there has been a sort of "experience inflation" creeping in. Employers used to ask whether a student might have had an internship, now they ask about how many internships they have had, and with whom. We have not, until recently, felt the need to expand or evolve into developing a cooperative program. The relatively successful internship program, when coupled with the fact that being innovative--making an effort to change through developing a co-op--is work, has lessened the incentive to get a co-op program started. Developing a co-op takes effort in planning, implementing, and evaluating the experience. They are labor intensive for students, and organizations, as well as service work that is often time consuming, but minimally valued in terms of annual review and tenure/promotion credit, for the faculty involved. It is often the case, also, that reaching out to the community to develop projects such as a co-op is seen as the job of "applied" people in departments, rather than as a shared goal. These are the main challenges and opportunities for collaborative learning that we worked through in building the co-op program.
Developing this co-op program proved to be a valuable learning experience for faculty, students, and the host organization. Each party involved has valuable insight to contribute toward understanding both what was beneficial, and what was challenging about the process and experience. What follows is a summary of each party's perspective and feedback on the co-op experience.

**Faculty Perspective (Kellett)**

There are three main phases in which, as a faculty member, I played an important supportive role in the co-op project. First, in planning and developing the co-op, faculty will be involved in the following tasks: Setting up the initial contact and liaison with the corporation; meeting with the corporation to define what a communication person can do for them, and to determining their needs; connecting the project to the communication curriculum, and to the language and issues that are familiar to, and of interest to, the organization; generating the interest of students in being the "guinea pig" for this program, and gaining a commitment from one that he or she will take on the project; helping the organization to screen and interview candidates; setting any prerequisites in related coursework; mediating between student and corporation in determining responsibilities and defining the project; clarifying expectations of all parties involved; liaising with the university department in terms of credit and grading criteria for the co-op performance. The issue of academic credit is significant in the broader sense of graduating students in four years or less. We were able to use indepeddant study hours (3) to make sure the time spent on the co-op was roughly equivalent to a summer session load. As we move into regular semester based co-ops, it will be necessary to review the options for crediting the work. It may be necessary to create a scale of co-op credit hours that equals the hours a student would normally take during the semester.

Second, during the actual co-op project, faculty will be involved in the following: Providing consulting advice throughout the co-op; providing support and an external theoretical and practical
perspective where needed (students regularly need an outsider with whom to share ideas and experiences); determining and negotiating responsibilities and demands once on the job (organizations may demand more than they initially stated, as they see the benefits of the project); on site visitations if the site is close by; periodic talks with student and corporation to make sure expectations are being met; agreeing on the method and form of presentation of the results of the internship. This might involve setting up a presentation to the organization to complete the project.

Third, when the co-op is complete, faculty will be involved in the following: Assessing student performance; meeting with the corporation and the student for the final presentation of the project results, if appropriate; arranging a seminar presentation to the student’s peers, so that they gain informal credit among their peers. This also ensures that the program is publicized so that future potential co-op candidates can be located.

I found the co-op experience to be both an interesting and academically valuable series of exchanges and relationships. It is exciting to see a student develop hands on applied consulting skills in a real world setting. It is also interesting and affirming to see course principles, theories, and insights, being translated into terms that an organization outside the communication discipline finds valuable.

Student Perspective (Wallace)

As a student, I was involved in three phases of the co-op. First, I interviewed with the corporation on site and negotiated the length and logistics of the co-op. Second, I spent eleven weeks on the job in the corporation, and held weekly phone conferences with my sponsoring professor. In the eleven weeks I worked on site, I performed a number of services for the corporation while learning some basics of communication consulting, and successfully meeting the considerable challenges of becoming a communication consultant. In the third phase, after completion of the co-op, I served as a guest speaker in the communication department, presenting an overview of my experiences, and answering questions from faculty and students.
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to place a communication graduate in a co-op as a "communication consultant." These positions are not commonplace as in house positions in organizations. It is difficult to find a company that houses a department of communication experts, unlike engineering or accounting where co-ops abound. In my position, I worked independently, under the supervision of my professor (off-site) and a special projects manager (on-site). On site, I was offered no advice and little encouragement in taking a particular plan of attack. Simply, they did not really know what I could do for them. All my plans, ideas, and projects, came from my professor and my readings in organizational communication and consulting. Being in this position was strange, frightening, and wonderful, all at the same time. As a self-starter and independent worker, I was content to develop my own projects to evaluate and improve communication, yet I had never done this type of project before. The magnitude of the company (Fortune 100) and the task (evaluating the communication of 1,800 employees) was, initially, quite daunting.

Before beginning a communication audit, I met with the manager of the corporation and my on-site mentor, to develop goals for my co-op. They decided on four goals, but were flexible on how many I should complete in the time available. I was to (1), evaluate overall communication in the corporation and suggest improvements; (2), review the current communication technology and make recommendations for new equipment; (3), assess the effectiveness of employee meetings; and (4), look at the efficiency of written forms of communication in the company. Each one of these goals could have taken eleven weeks.

To assess the effectiveness of overall company communication, I developed a communication audit, similar to that of DeWine and James (1988). A separate interview was developed for management and employees, though the main themes of both questions were: Knowledge of mission and vision, job information, training, evaluation and feedback, relationships, and other methods of communication. In total, I conducted seventy three in depth interviews and conducted a series of focus groups.

To accomplish the second goal of recommending new technology, which was definitely not in my realm of knowledge, I
studied the system from those that operated it. I also talked with several communications experts, and looked at previous bids that had been offered to improve the system. The corporation had been looking at updating the system for several years, but wanted a second opinion. At the end of my co-op, I presented upper management with several options for upgrades and ideas for new programming. These included: Develop automated programming, video graphics, audio behind PC images, split screens, and use video tape equal in quality to local news broadcasts.

In reviewing the employee meetings and written forms of communication, notes and organizational communication articles provided insight. In addition to these resources, the communication audit included questions concerning the importance and effectiveness of company written communication methods. The main recommendation was to create a plan for conducting pre-shift meetings that ensures they are uniform in important information while being relevant to individual work stations. It was also suggested that time in the pre-shift meetings should be used to educate, inform, and motivate the workforce.

Throughout the co-op, I communicated weekly with my sponsoring professor by phone and fax. It was an advantage to have someone from the outside, who was an experienced consultant but not involved in the pressures and decisions of the current situation, as a sounding board and guide. As mentioned previously, there was no one on-site to give me direction or even to understand how communication works, so my professor acted as my main outlet for professional information.

I gave him weekly updates on my projects and narratives that emerged from the organization. He encouraged me to keep a daily journal of narratives, thoughts, and impressions. These interpretive field notes were an invaluable tool in recognizing my evolving perceptions of organizational life. In addition to the journal, I kept daily records of calls, meetings, and people I met. I took notes at every meeting, and used these accounts to construct an ethnographic chronicle of the corporate cultural system (Goodall, 1989).

At the end of the co-op, I presented management with the findings of my communication audit, as well as suggestions for improving communication within the organization. During the
presentation, which was attended by my sponsoring professor, I explained what communication is, and how it works systemically within the organization. I offered some new technical programming ideas and upgrades for their audio/video system. Finally, I offered suggestions for follow up projects so that the groundwork for further co-ops could begin. The co-op was an eye opening experience, as I stepped into the world of high pressure corporate consulting. I was working for an organization that is very influential in the business world. They are a leading multinational manufacturing corporation. This magnanimity put pressure on me to make professional decisions and create profitable, workable solutions. The work was enjoyable, but long and endless. I learned that communication is not a one time fix all process. Rather, it is part of an ongoing learning cycle (Levey, & Levey, 1995). I also learned how difficult it is to convince others of this. I was the first communication consultant to enter their organizational site, and this fact put more pressure on me to perform. The company did not know what to expect from my work, except, of course, excellent, bottom-line oriented solutions.

I learned many lessons from this experience. Number one: Listen more and talk less (Senge, 1994, p. 377). The answers are all around you. I found that if you listen long and well, people will give you most of the information you need, and more. Number two: Read, read, read. The demands of the job and the new position forced me to learn on the job from a number of key academic sources (DeWine, 1994, Eisenberg & Goodall, 1993, Senge, et al., 1994), as well as magazines like The Harvard Business Review. The texts gave me a theoretical background necessary for my work, while the magazines and current articles kept me on the cutting edge of business practices, and in touch with the sort of talk that a corporate audience understands and values.

Support and guidance in this type of academic/corporate venture are necessary for success. A knowledgeable, experienced professor can be the best resource. Throughout the co-op, I formed trusting relationships with my sponsor, which further enhanced my role as a bridge between the university and the corporation.
Organizational Perspective

The organization reported that they found the co-op, and the results of the audit, valuable and challenging. Initially, we felt that management--trained engineers--expected someone to come in, tell them what was wrong with the "people on the floor" and make a nice tidy suggestion for how they could improve. Cause and effect, and problem-solution, were prevailing cultural values in the organization. Explaining their problems according to the principles of systems thinking was a challenge. Getting management to realize that if one part is not functioning at capacity then all parts suffer, for example, was difficult (Senge, et. al., 1994, pp. 91-92). Admitting that their communication difficulties reached deeper than a few middle management techniques was also difficult. It is challenging to talk about systems thinking to people trained to view the world as a series of problems that have clear and immediate solutions. The organization was reluctant at higher levels to disclose information, to allow the co-op to be present at meetings (she was asked to leave at least once), and to admit that they, too, need to change.

In the end, the organization was pleased with the audit results, although the report challenged their ways of thinking about and valuing communication in terms of what it is and how it works. They knew that they needed to change how they handle the flow of information, but they did not anticipate that it would be so involved, and be such a commitment. In their discussion after the final presentation, they told us that they learned a lot of valuable lessons, some of which they had been thinking about for a while. They also stated that if all parties might benefit again from a similar arrangement, then they would be willing to keep the working relationship going in future.

GUIDELINES FOR MANAGING COOPERATIVES

From reflection on all three of these perspectives, we would give the following guidelines as necessary to effectively managing co-ops and avoiding difficulties: First, establish clear guidelines for completion of the academic credit, and for accomplishing the organizational goals. It is appropriate for the student to ask for a list
of goals and guidelines from both parties and make sure that they are consistent. Second, have the sponsoring professor set up weekly conferences to discuss progress and suggestions for future work. Consider, also, setting up a support team with expertise in a variety of communication areas such as groups, interpersonal, and organizational communication. Third, maintain open communication with the organizational members who are key to the success of the co-op. Fourth, provide the student with a mandatory and suggested reading list, including academic and non-academic sources. They should be prepared before beginning their work. Fifth, make sure that the final report to them is useful, and is presented in the language and terms that they understand. This may take some industry specific research.

CONCLUSION

A co-op helps a student build a marketable skill set, develop valuable professional contacts, and develop a tangible product (in the case of a consultancy report) that can add to their portfolio. The greatest benefits of this type of experience, however, is that they bring textbook theories and principles to life. Resistance to change, organizations as systems, and other classroom examples are just examples until they are confronted in person. A co-op provides an opportunity to work through the organizational dilemmas and discover how frustrating and time consuming they are to solve. Real life examples of communication problems are much more complicated, and much more interesting to solve than a twenty minute class exercise.

Besides these educational benefits, co-op programs also have potential for building learning relationships among programs and departments in the Carolinas. At the Carolinas annual convention, heads and directors of graduate studies have talked in recent years about developing a spirit of system wide cooperation and about the need to develop more specialized niches at the various campuses. Rather than duplicate areas of expertise and compete unnecessarily for the same students and co-ops, sharing co-op opportunities among programs as they fit those niches might be a good way to encourage these productive relationships. We may find that different co-ops reflect the differing goals of each program.
NOTE

I am using mission, vision, values, and goals here based on Senge et al (1994), pp. 302-303. The university and newly created departmental vision are consistent around concepts of creating learning relationships with our surrounding community. It was easy, therefore, to align the co-op as a "goal" within both institutional and departmental guiding statements.

REFERENCES


The 1996 U.S. Senate race in South Carolina didn’t exactly set the state ablaze with interest. The situation is more aptly summarized as “Strom Thurmond renews defense against usurpers” than as a genuine race for a contested seat. Yes, Thurmond had two challengers in the Republican primary, but he handily defeated them. Most national television programs covering close Senate contests either omit South Carolina or make a passing reference to Thurmond as a 93 year-old novelty. For example, CNN’s Inside Politics Weekend that aired on 12 October discussed television advertisements in “hot” U.S. Senate races. South Carolina escaped notice. Few South Carolinians, moreover, have investigated Thurmond’s web site. As of 1 October, the site registered only 362 visitors (including myself) since its establishment on 31 July (“Senator Strom Thurmond”). Such a paltry visitation rate may indicate that Thurmond, having served as U.S. Senator since 1954, has little need to disseminate more information about himself. Whoever is unfamiliar with Strom Thurmond probably isn’t eligible to vote in South Carolina anyway.

The familiarity of Thurmond to the average South Carolina voter insulates the candidate from attack by allowing a metonymic campaign. A metonymic campaign, instead of highlighting the candidate per se, subsumes the candidate within a less contestable “container.” Employing the Burkeian logic of container and thing contained, the candidate emerges as a subset of the people, the state, or another aggregate that is uncontroversial (or at least less controversial than the candidate).

METONYMY AS A RHETORICAL STRATEGY

Kenneth Burke includes metonymy as one of the four “master tropes” tucked into the final appendix of A Grammar of Motives (503-517). As part of a persuasive strategy, metonymy takes on characteristics somewhat different from those Burke enumerates.
Metonymy operates as a trope by replacing one term or concept with another that bears some logical connection to it. Figure 1 illustrates several of the possible logical connections.

**Figure 1. Metonymic Tropes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explicans</th>
<th>Explicandum</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>A smoking gun representing an armed robbery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Scenes of destruction representing a tornado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Upright people in Russell, Kansas epitomizing Bob Dole’s values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign</td>
<td>Motive</td>
<td>Discovery of a bloody glove implying O.J. Simpson concealed a murder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since Burke is often concerned with literary uses of tropes, he understands metonymy as a form of reduction (503) and thereby as a way to clarify and concretize the abstract. In attempts to capture the essence of a concept or phenomenon linguistically, metonymy goes beyond correlations that at best would imply probable relationships (Burke 505). Metonymy simplifies the explicandum by equating it with something more “corporeal or tangible” (Burke 506). Returning to the examples in Figure 1, each item being explained is rendered more understandable by framing in terms of a concrete object or phenomenon. The facts of an armed robbery may be mysterious, but
the smoking gun provides an object as the locus for reconstructing events. The meteorological dynamics of a tornado may be incomprehensible, but the damage it leaves makes the mysterious tangible, often combining statements of physical destruction with monetary estimates of its cost. Character may not be observable, but its manifestations are. The deaths of Nicole Brown and Ronald Goldman may be unexplained, but the bloody glove implies an attempt at concealment. In each case, complexity is reduced by concretization that is epitomized in the dramatic enactment of intangible human motives and emotions (Burke 506-507).

The application of metonymy to political campaigns requires a broadened view of this linguistic device. According to Burke, metonymic transferences are unidirectional. The abstract is always rendered as something more concrete, since the objective of using metonymy is to clarify (Burke 505-507). In political contexts, however, ambiguity can assume strategic importance. The strategic use of ambiguity involves symbolically engineered deflections and diffusions. Instead of metonymy acting as reduction, metonymy moves in the opposite direction, toward expansion. Metonymic expansion makes the concrete and specific larger than life, a phenomenon that might explain Richard Weaver’s references to some American public address as “spacious” (164-185). The strategic advantages of metonymic expansion make this rhetorical device attractive, since attempts at rebuttal must contend not with the specific object or candidate, but with the framing of that item within a more abstract and thus more elusive whole. A metonymic campaign, therefore, places the candidate within a framework larger than the individual. The candidate fits within a larger whole, so countering the candidate requires opponents to take on the grand narratives in which the candidate participates.

Figure 2 summarizes some of the metonymic characteristics of Strom Thurmond’s campaign. In each case, the specific characteristic or action culminates in an example that frames the candidate in a more abstract and expansive context.
Figure 2. Some Metonymic Aspects of Thurmond's Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Characteristic</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficient Cause:</strong> Thurmond, powerful legislator, can cut through red tape</td>
<td><strong>Effect:</strong> Solves individual constituent's problems</td>
<td>Restores widow's social security benefits after they were mistakenly stopped (Thurmond TV ad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Necessary Condition:</strong> Thurmond has 100% Senate attendance</td>
<td><strong>Implication:</strong> Thurmond can accomplish more than lawmakers who are absent</td>
<td>Thurmond's darkened profile, ever vigilant against Washington skyline (Thurmond TV ad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attribute:</strong> Thurmond has experience and seniority</td>
<td><strong>Equation:</strong> Thurmond is South Carolina tradition</td>
<td>Voters owe allegiance to Thurmond (Thurmond campaign slogan: “He’s earned our respect! He deserves our support!”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remainder of this paper investigates the senses in which Thurmond's campaign effaces the individual candidate and thereby preempts rebuttals that do not engage the concepts and institutions in which he participates. The strategies of two of Thurmond's political opponents, Republican Harold Worley and Democrat Elliott Close,
also will be examined in light of how they encountered, countered, and in some ways contributed to a metonymic campaign.

WHY WASN’T WORLEY WORTHY?

To understand the difficulties facing Thurmond’s opponents, it is helpful to backtrack a bit to the Republican primary. Thurmond’s main Republican opponent in the 11 June primary was Harold Worley, a state legislator representing Horry County, the Myrtle Beach area. Worley has since endorsed Thurmond. My analysis of Worley’s campaign strategy consists mainly of a close reading of his most extensive mass mailing, a 16-page, 8.5 x 11 inch color newsprint magazine. Worley, like Thurmond, characterizes Elliott Close with depersonalized labels. Claiming he would be better able than Thurmond to compete with the Democratic opponent, Worley identifies the Democrat as “liberal Democrat and multi-millionaire Elliott Close” (“Harold Worley for U.S. Senate” 13).

Worley’s unsuccessful campaign, however, typifies the difficulties faced by candidates who attempt to qualify as conservatives while attacking Thurmond’s age. Every candidate, especially a Republican, eagerly embraces the tag “conservative.” The first of six “good reasons to elect Harold Worley” is “Harold Worley is a proven conservative, and a fighter for the taxpayers” (“Harold Worley for U.S. Senate” 9). Similarly, Worley’s brochure includes the question, answered affirmatively for Worley and listing Thurmond’s position as a question mark: “Can this candidate effectively battle the liberals in Congress? Can he fight for our conservative Republican principles ... and win? (13; boldface and ellipses in original). A casual perusal of campaign signs and billboards reveals that local candidates are scrambling to qualify as conservatives. Candidates label themselves as “the true conservative” and “a caring conservative.”

Self-portrayal as a conservative can be effective, especially for candidates seeking election in South Carolina. But that tactic stands little chance of success in the U.S. Senate race. Putting aside the probably unanswerable question of who is “really” conservative, Thurmond’s opponents face a dilemma. If they emphasize their conservatism, it is difficult to reconcile reluctance to change with
opposition to the incumbent. Voters might have a difficult time determining how respect for tradition can be touted while simultaneously clamoring for change. The theme of change worked for Bill Clinton in 1992 largely because he was running against the incumbent. The problem of respecting the past while calling for futuristic thinking plagues aspirants for Thurmond’s seat. Worley’s campaign brochure again serves as an illustration. The first page consists of a letter from the candidate, explaining “why I decided to enter the Republican primary for U.S. Senate against Strom Thurmond.” Worley does not even acknowledge the third candidate in the primary. After a paragraph-long paean to Thurmond, calling him “the most important South Carolinian of the last century,” Worley justifies his campaign in a single line: “But this election isn’t about the last century. It’s about the next one.”

Worley presents a conflicting message, emphasizing plans for the future while invoking traditional values from the past. On one hand, Worley makes statements such as: “Please let me fight for South Carolina’s future” (1), “Harold Worley will work tirelessly for South Carolina’s future” (2), “We cannot afford to cast our vote for the last century. We must look forward to the next” (12). Worley’s brochure even includes a quotation from Harry Truman regarding how term limits would “help cure senility and seniority, both terrible legislative diseases” (3). A two-page spread devoted to issues affecting children concludes: “South Carolina’s 922,781 children under the age of 18 cannot vote in June. But if they could, they would vote for the future. They would vote for Harold Worley” (11-12). On the other hand, Worley represents himself as someone reluctant to change. He “still believes in the same basic values he has always held” to the point that “he still lives on the family farm where he once worked sharecropping the fields” (2). How progressive and forward-looking can a candidate be while lauding the values and virtues of the past?

**THE METONYMIC CAMPAIGN**

As the campaign progresses, it becomes more apparent that Thurmond supporters would endorse and encourage an equation of their candidate with South Carolina, the South, and perhaps with the nation’s history. A recent biographer of Thurmond reveals in the
preface to his book: "... I realized that the 'story' is the public evolution of Strom Thurmond—and the South" (Ellers ix).

In his most widely aired television commercial during the Republican primary, Thurmond made only a cameo appearance. The young, vibrant governor of South Carolina, David Beasley, offered his endorsement of Thurmond. The voice of the present (Beasley was elected in 1994) then was replaced by the voice of the future, former Republican governor Carroll Campbell. Campbell represented the future on two fronts at the time. Since this advertisement aired before Dole had selected Jack Kemp as his running mate, Campbell was considered a Vice Presidential hopeful on the Republican ticket. On a more localized front, Campbell is considered the heir apparent to Thurmond's U.S. Senate seat ("Strom Thurmond: Home on the Hill" 37). Following these personifications of South Carolina's—and the nation's—present and future, Thurmond himself appears briefly, uttering the totally decontextualized sound bite: "We've got to balance this budget." Since the clip comes from a speech that apparently occurred on the Senate floor, viewers can place Thurmond less in the context of the campaign itself than in the environment where he apparently belongs: the Senate. Furthermore, the excerpt of remarks instead of a live address to the voters helps fuel the perception that "The Iron Man" of South Carolina is so busy working to serve them that he cannot and will not engage in the self-serving act of campaigning (Dent 1).

Indeed, Thurmond is often portrayed less as the agent of action in the state than as a true public servant. Dent, a former Thurmond staffer, mentions Thurmond not as a leader (he never uses the word), but as a subset of the state and people themselves. The voters therefore can feel empowered by a Senator who is continually "working to win and serve," "a real honest politician who truly serves them..." (Dent 1). The people appear empowered by a Senator whose own power devolves from seniority regardless of whether his votes represent the interests of his constituents.

A second television spot featuring Campbell and Beasley continues these metonymic expansions from Thurmond the man to Thurmond the force. The only appearance Thurmond makes is during the last moment, and then only in a distant still shot with a narrator's voice-over. The past and present governor alternate lines, with
Campbell claiming that Thurmond is “more than just our senator. Beasley adds, “He’s our lifeline to Washington,” thus completing the metonymic expansion from officeholder to vital force. Governor Beasley, who proclaims, “I’m sticking with experience and seniority,” also assists in framing the campaign as the opposition of someone who has “earned our respect” against an opponent who allegedly has not even earned a salary.

Another Thurmond television commercial highlights his old-fashioned personal concern for constituents. The ad narrates the story of an aged widow whose social security benefits were denied after her husband’s death. The denial of benefits was due to a mistake, but her efforts to restore the benefits were fruitless. As a last resort, she contacted Strom Thurmond, who fixed the problem and restored her benefits. The widow urges voter to “stay with” Senator Thurmond because he has a “kind” and “caring heart.” Interestingly, the very personal testimony of the constituent is not accompanied by the “caring” candidate himself. The advertisement lacks even a voice-over by Thurmond. Despite the extraordinary effort to help one person, the agent who corrected the error is more a powerful force than a concerned individual. Thurmond can take decisive action from afar as an invisible hand that fixes whatever is broken. The social security commercial represents a metonymic campaign in full swing, with the added paradox that the invisible candidate offers personal attention.

The Debate Over Debates

Elliott Close has repeatedly issued calls for Strom Thurmond to engage in a debate or any other type of joint forum where issues can be discussed. Close’s weekly campaign updates report that he has participated in several forums and urges Thurmond to join Close in town meetings (“A Close Look” 23 July, 30 August, 13 September). Thurmond, not surprisingly, has refused. The town meeting format places a premium on eloquent spontaneity, which may not be one of Thurmond’s strengths. Newsweek has remarked that the Senator becomes confused and “disoriented” whenever he must depart from a written text (Kosova & Rosenstiel 38), a point belied by his astounding memory when making personal appearances.
Thurmond’s refusal to debate, however, goes beyond fears that he might appear enfeebled. The forum would offer a quick, inexpensive way for Close to get statewide exposure. The mere appearance of Close with Thurmond would establish that the candidates were acknowledging each other as equals, a move that clearly would work to Thurmond’s disadvantage. When Close personally confronted Thurmond in Greenwood, Thurmond ignored Close’s direct request for debates (Bandy A1). Thurmond wisely has recognized that debates would give his opponent a forum he would not otherwise have (Bandy A5). Specifically, a televised debate would highlight the candidates as individuals. Close-ups, for example, visually block out any context that might appropriately frame a candidate, thus depriving viewers of a visual metonymic connection.

Thurmond’s silence is not confined just to exchanges with Elliott Close. Thurmond “failed the 1996 National Political Awareness Test by refusing to answer issue-oriented questions” distributed by Project Vote Smart, a program sponsored by the nonpartisan Center for National Independence in Politics (Project Vote Smart). Close completed the questionnaire. Since Thurmond’s record is so extensive and easily obtainable, his positions are in large measure a chronicle of the Senate’s history. Close, however, must construct a history and so he is deprived of readily employing a metonymic strategy. In Burkeian terms, Close needs to identify a metonymic container within which he can fit. The party label, which historically has served that purpose for candidates who wanted to flaunt their political pedigrees, cannot suffice because of voter dissatisfaction with both major parties and their personal doubts about Bill Clinton’s character. Close often uses phrases “a conservative Democrat” or “a new independent voice” in his advertisements so he will not be harmed by negative associations with party or President. The only attempt Close has made to connect with tradition is to grasp at the frayed coattails of the founding fathers: “Washington, Jefferson, and Madison never envisioned, nor would they have supported, the current system where career politicians run Washington for decades and never think twice about going home” (“Elliott Close on Changing”).

Opportunities for clash with Thurmond certainly exist. Representatives William Clay and Louis Stokes, members of the Congressional Black Caucus, refused to accept awards from the
National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education when they discovered that Thurmond was to receive the same award ("Reps. Clay and Stokes" 30). Thurmond’s segregationist past might be gone but not forgotten. *Jet* magazine questions his sincere support of education and other rights for Blacks. Introducing Thurmond as “The 93 year-old senator, a formidable Republican who has served 40 years in the Senate and switched parties like he has changed some civil rights positions” (Reps. Clay and Stokes” 30), *Jet* insinuates that Thurmond’s allegiances might have changed more rapidly than his heartfelt sentiments.

It is understandable why the Thurmond campaign would balk at debates that might rekindle racial issues and other controversies. Aside from the reasons already discussed, Thurmond hails from an era that placed a premium on sustained oratory, and personal appearances, not on pithy sound bites. Although he still holds the record for the longest filibuster in Congressional history, Thurmond might have difficulty stating his message succinctly in a debate format. Since 1948, while Thurmond was governor, opening statements in Presidential debates have dwindled from twenty minutes to two minutes this year. The response time has been trimmed from eight and one-half minutes in 1948 to only one and one-half minutes in 1996 ("Incredible Shrinking Sound Bite” A25). When Thurmond makes personal appearances, he is usually “mobbed by well wishers” (Bandy A5) who place no demands on him to make statements that differentiate him from opponents.

**Close, But Not Quite?**

Ironically, Thurmond’s campaign has been able to portray him as an underdog despite his overwhelming support. In an October 4th letter soliciting campaign contributions from 5,000 supporters, Thurmond employed terminology vaguely reminiscent of that used by Oral Roberts: “I am running out of both time and money . . . .” (“Thurmond Bucking” 1A). Elliott Close is cast by Thurmond as the rich liberal who is attempting to buy the election. Naturally, Thurmond can generate a few dollars of campaign contributions himself, but that fact sidesteps what Thurmond’s control of the roles accomplishes. Elliott Close is referred to as “a young millionaire”
(Dent 1), not only by Thurmond sympathizers but by Newsweek, which identifies the challenger only as “textiles millionaire Elliott Close” who “is pumping his own money into the race” (38). Close is introduced to newspaper readers more often in economic than political terms: “Close, an heir to the Springs Industries fortune, has spent more than $600,000 on the campaign and has said he is willing to spend more than $1 million of his own money” (“Thurmond Bucking” 21A). An article in Roll Call regarding Close’s declaration of candidacy bears the title “Thurmond Draws Wealthy Challenger” (Curran).

A new Thurmond television commercial continues the associations of Close with money. The economic angle now has a new twist: Close’s money is unearned. A voice-over makes the following claims: No real job No real salary, while flashed in red letters across the screen: “Records show Close hasn’t held down a real job or earned a real salary. He gets his money from his family’s trust funds.” Not only is Close associated with money, but with money that supposedly he never made any effort to obtain. Close thereby becomes the “rich boy” of the election. Thurmond is cast as the underdog because he has to earn the money to finance his campaign. This move, however, smacks more of hearkening to the past than anticipating the future. Like the investment firm Smith-Barney, Thurmond gets his money the old-fashioned way: he earns it. The homepage of Thurmond’s campaign includes the comment “He’s earned our respect! He deserves our support!” (“Senator Strom Thurmond”) This slogan appears on many of Thurmond’s campaign signs, and it is repeated by Carroll Campbell and David Beasley in their most recent television commercial endorsing Thurmond.

The election, therefore, pits Close’s money against Thurmond’s people-focused service. While Close’s money can function independently of the constituents and of the candidate himself (since anyone can conduct a financial transaction), Thurmond’s entire campaign is subservient to and a product of South Carolina’s electorate. The Thurmond narrative fits perfectly into the American ideal of altruistic service, and it supports the Protestant work ethic of service earning rewards. Thurmond, asserting that blood is thicker than paper, told Newsweek: “I’ll put my record against his money any day” (“Strom Thurmond: Over the Hill” 38). Thurmond scrupulously
avoids naming his opponent, as if the election pitted the people of South Carolina against an abstract, depersonalized stack of currency. Close, whose sole identification is “the millionaire,” has managed to construct no campaign narrative that has a role reserved specifically for himself.

Thurmond takes the side of the individual voter against “[f]aceless strategists in places such as the Democratic National Committee . . . “ (Thurmond, 4 May 1996: 1). Thurmond assumes the role of “South Carolina’s champion” (“Senator Strom Thurmond: A Tradition of Service” 3) against the faceless Washington bureaucrats. His time-tested method of sending personal notes to high school graduates and new brides accentuates his contrast with the Washington insiders who at best reply to inquiries with form letters—if they reply at all (Eichel). Thurmond’s age, however, has raised a question that has not been voiced explicitly: If the senator is feeble, then would a vote for him in effect be a vote for his unelected and largely anonymous staff who handles his affairs? In essence, is the candidate Thurmond himself or those who work behind the scenes to perpetuate the Thurmond legacy?

The Age/Old Issue

The main “issue” Strom Thurmond’s campaign must confront is the candidate’s age. While adjectives of wealth regularly modify Close’s name, Thurmond is treated as a novelty because of his age. In the absence of many divisive issues and with every candidate rushing to the protective cloak of conservatism (in some of Close’s television ads, he is touted as a “new conservative”), Thurmond’s ability to govern has emerged as the central point of controversy (“Thurmond Bucking” 21A; Associated Press; Sack 1A).

Thurmond and his staff cannot take questions about the senator’s age lightly. With decades of public service, Thurmond need not worry about clarifying his stand on most issues. But his campaign, by failing to produce much discourse specific to this election,

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1When I visited Strom Thurmond’s campaign headquarters requesting any written position statements or other discourse specific to this Senate election, I came back empty-handed. His campaign manager said that nothing aside from
unintentionally contributes to doubts about the political hero of days past to look toward the future. The biography of Thurmond available through his web page is titled “Senator Strom Thurmond: A Tradition of Service.” Tradition, at least in the form of Washington “insiders,” is exactly what the Close campaign targets. The Thurmond biography is weighted heavily toward the past, fueling suspicion that the candidate may be more aptly linked with “preservative” than “conservative.” The biography calls itself a “keepsake publication,” as if it were a precious artifact passed down from previous generations. Although it promises to narrate Thurmond’s “unprecedented record of service and his vision for the future,” only the final two paragraphs employ the present tense (“Senator Strom Thurmond: A Tradition of Service”). Not a single sentence is written in the future tense, and the five sentences written in the present tense simply list his Senate committee memberships and state how he is unique and “commands the respect of national and world leaders.” Thurmond, despite his impersonal characterization of Close as a millionaire, emerges more as an icon than as an ordinary person sharing the concerns and challenges of his constituents. Although “Strom Thurmond continues to build on his tradition of service” (“Senator Strom Thurmond: A Tradition of Service”), there is little anticipation that the electorate might want to rebuild by tearing down the old senatorial edifice and constructing a new foundation.

In a move reminiscent of Perot’s tactics in the 1992 Presidential election, Close treats Thurmond’s experience as a liability. As the new kid on the block, Close claims the role of the outsider who will return politics to the people. “Not a politician,” according to one of his television commercials, Close seeks to “change the way Washington does business. Politicians inside the ‘Beltway’ are addicted to wasteful pork projects pushed by PACs and lobbyists” (“Elliott Close on Federal Budget Priorities”). The “outsider” theme has become a mainstay of Close’s campaign. He pledges to “cut the perks and privileges that politicians have become used to” (“Elliott Close for U.S. Senate: A Conservative Democrat”). With Close “ready to take on the politicians in Washington” (“Elliott Close for television ads had been produced because everyone knew or could easily access Thurmond’s record in the Senate.
U.S. Senate: A New Independent Voice”), the “Washington outsider” strategy tests the limits of a metonymic campaign. If a candidate is subsumed within a larger entity, the rhetorical struggle devolves on how that entity will be cast discursively. If a candidate succeeds in becoming identified with an ideograph that defies opposition (much as anti-abortion activists initially co-opted “pro-life”), then political opponents face the difficult task of undermining the revered concept in order to counter the candidate (cf. McGee). On the other hand, if a candidate is associated with a more contestable collectivity—such as scheming Washington bureaucrats—the opponent can gain momentum by creating an “us” (the voters) versus “them” (out of touch, possibly corrupt politicians) mentality.

Just as wealth has framed Close’s campaign, age has framed Thurmond’s re-election bid. The Close campaign has launched a television advertisement that places Thurmond in the environs a rest home. Several senior citizens are sitting on a spacious front porch discussing whether Strom Thurmond should “retire” at 93. The elderly conversationalists sip iced tea and play checkers on the verandah, as if biding their time in a nursing home. To emphasize Thurmond’s advanced age, one elderly gentleman comments that Strom Thurmond began public service before the speaker (no young whippersnapper himself) was born. Another man comments, “Strom’s great, but I don’t think he can fight any more.” This choice of words is particularly apt, since Thurmond’s campaign literature invites supporters to volunteer for the campaign by asking them to “Join the Thurmond Army” (“Senator Strom Thurmond”) on behalf of “South Carolina’s champion” (“Senator Strom Thurmond: A Tradition of Service”). In an awkward attempt at word play using a recent movie title, Thurmond pledges: “I won’t give up the fight. No matter how tough the going I don’t give in, and I don’t give up. After all, they don’t call me the ‘Thurmandator’ [sic] for nothing” (Thurmond, 4 May speech). Thurmond has dubbed his canvassing of the state his “Thurmondator tour” (Bandy A1).

The Close commercial, titled “Folks” by the producers—implying an elided “Old” before the “Folks”—concludes with a not-so-subtle hint that Thurmond belongs in a nursing home, extending Newsweek’s claim: “The blunt fact is that the Senate is, in effect, Thurmond’s nursing home” (Kosova & Rosenstiel 36). Close’s
ad portrays Thurmond as a lovable character in his dotage: “I love Strom, but it’s time for him to come on home.” This invitation to return home beckons Thurmond to retire, presumably to the rest home environment of iced tea and checkers. The female voice-over accompanies a decidedly unflattering, still close-up of Thurmond with his mouth agape. The still shot makes Thurmond look far worse than the retirees who are talking about him.

Another mixed semiotic message regarding age appears on Thurmond’s own campaign homepage. Visitors are greeted with a color photo of Thurmond, sporting a cowboy hat, waving to a crowd of onlookers as he rides horseback in what appears to be a parade. The campaign apparently banks on the photo reminding voters that the candidate is a vigorous outdoorsman, thus visually preempting questions about his fitness for office. On a deeper level, the cowboy imagery also connotes that Thurmond, much like former President Ronald Reagan in his “Star Wars” address, is ready to saddle up and restore order to the wild frontier (Rushing). John Fiske suggests that resistant meanings should be sought and encouraged in artifacts designed for mass display or consumption (Reading the Popular 176-177). The sight of Thurmond on horseback reminds observers that Thurmond, like his mode of transportation, may be an anachronism.

CONCLUSION

Although his opponents might see Thurmond as an anachronism, his metonymic campaign places him beyond many of the standard attack ads that target the individual. Since the particular candidate is contained within the framework of abstract ideas such as the power to help those in need, counterarguments must somehow either assail the encompassing frameworks (such as altruism and vigilance) or sever the metonymic connection between the candidate and the context. Perhaps the most effective way to counter a metonymic campaign would be to employ metonymy in the way Burke envisions, restoring specificity and individuality to a candidate. Arguments then would be interpreted as directed against the candidate’s failure to qualify for or live up to the positive connotations of the abstract institution or concept.

A metonymic campaign, therefore, can be countered by a
strategy of dissociating the terms and concepts that are metonymically linked. The dissociation becomes particularly difficult in a case such as the Thurmond campaign. Strom Thurmond has spent so many years in public life that he has effectively merged with many voters’ conceptions of South Carolina and the South. A metonymic connection forged over decades cannot be severed overnight and perhaps not in one political campaign. The strategic use of ambiguity makes metonymic campaigns elusive targets.

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DEFINITION AND METAPHOR IN RONALD REAGAN'S DRUG CONTROL DISCOURSE

Ronald O. Wastyn

Presidents utilize the process of definition to control their policy agenda and to focus policy discussions. How one defines a problem influences subsequent attitudes, policies, and debate about that problem. (see Bosso, 1987, Cox, 1981, Hall, 1973, Peters, 1986, Reich, 1988, Schattschneider, 1960, Windt, 1990, and Zarefsky, 1986). Defining problems in the first "two stages of policymaking—agenda setting and policy formulation—are important because they set the parameters for any additional consideration of the policy areas" (Peters, 1986, p. 39). Defining policy becomes rhetorical because the definition creates a reality through which audiences must consider that policy. This article provides a case study of the rhetorical power of definitions in public policy discourse using Reagan's "war on drugs" rhetoric and evaluates the failure of his resultant policy in terms of the definitions Reagan employs.

When examining Reagan's drug control rhetoric, the war metaphor to define U.S. drug control efforts is unmistakable; Reagan continually refers to his "war on drugs." Beginning in October 1982, Reagan declared and fought a war on drugs. This war resulted in policies that vastly expanded efforts to interdict incoming supplies of drugs. Reagan also significantly increased law enforcement to stop domestic drug distribution. Although these supply reduction policies were not new ideologically, their increase marked an important step in U.S. drug control efforts. However, analysis of drug use after Reagan enacted these policies reveals a failure to significantly curb drug use -- a failure I attribute to a poor understanding of the problem as evidenced by his public rhetoric.

PROBLEM DEFINITION, METAPHOR AND PUBLIC POLICY

The focus on definition as a presidential rhetorical tool is not new. Many scholars recognize the importance of definition in the policy process. Responding to Neustadt's (1980) claim that "presidential power is the power to persuade" (p. 10), Zarefsky (1986) adds "that the power to persuade is, in large measure, the power to define" (p. 1). Zarefsky (1986) provides a compelling rationale for studying public policy as
rhetorical and definitional:

To view a question of public policy as a problem of rhetoric, then, is to focus on the creation and exchange of symbols through which issues are perceived, defined, addressed, and resolved. In a government based on consent, any policy proposal can be examined from a rhetorical perspective. Ways must be found to persuade relevant audiences to support the proposal. (p. 5)

Clearly, the power to define, which coincides with the agenda-setting stage of public policy, must not be understated. Reich (1988) reveals the implications of approaching public policy from a definitional or rhetorical perspective:

The responsibility of policy analysts is not only to choose the best means of achieving a given objective. It is also to offer alternative ways of understanding public problems and possible solutions, and thus to expose underlying norms to critical examination. (p. 6)

Those who examine the merits of policy must consider the definition of the problem before rendering an opinion about the policy's success or failure. The responsibility of government is not only to make and implement decisions responsive to public wants, but to engage the public in an ongoing dialogue over which problems should be addressed, what is at stake in such decisions, and how to strengthen the public's capacities to deal with such problems (Reich, 1988, p. 6).

To ignore the definitions in the agenda-setting stage of policy making risks ignoring one of the most crucial determinants of public policy. If a policymaker controls the definition of the problem, he or she influences others:

Power, the control of others, is accomplished by getting others to accept your view and perspective. This is achieved by controlling, influencing, and sustaining your definition of the situation, since, if you can get others to share your reality, you can get them to act in the manner you prescribe. (Hall, 1973, p. 51) [emphasis added]
Light (1991) explicitly states that "control of the agenda becomes a primary tool for securing and extending power" (p. 2). If the definition is accepted by the public and policy elites, the President subsequently controls the specifics of the policy in the ensuing debate, including if the problem should be included on the agenda and what solutions the government should enact:

> [H]ow an issue is presented structures the number and range of participants and policy alternatives. Define an issue broadly... and you open the floor to all views. ... Define an issue narrowly... and you likewise narrow the range and number of interested or legitimate parties to the debate. (Bosso, 1987, p. 27).

The goal in defining an issue is to ensure that the public and political elites support your definition. If successful, the politician can exert influence in designing the resultant policy. Thus, Windt's (1990) claim that "the starting point for any study of presidential rhetoric is the political definitions that Presidents assign to events, policies, and people" (p. 4) is reinforced when placed into the context of agenda-setting and policy initiation.

As one examines the nature of problem definition, its relationship to metaphor emerges. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that "the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (p. 5). Schöns (1979) suggests that "metaphor' refers both to a certain kind of product — a perspective or frame, a way of looking at things — and to a certain kind of process — a process by which new perspectives on the world come into existence" (p. 254). Burke (1969) maintains that, "[m]etaphor is a device for seeing something in terms of something else" (p. 503). These observations suggest that a metaphor establishes a relationship between two previously unrelated perspectives; we use the "other" to gain perspective on our subject. When studying metaphor rhetorically, one focuses on how a metaphor defines or characterizes the phenomena. Particular attention is paid to the intersecting perspectives which are given priority because of the metaphor. In the metaphor "Richard, the lion-hearted" perceptions of a lion and Richard are compared. The vehicle of the metaphor gives priority to aspects of Richard that he shares with the audience's conception of a lion. A metaphor is effective when the audience connects the vehicle and the tenor. (The term "vehicle" and its corresponding term "tenor" are created by I.A. Richards,
Other terms have been substituted for "vehicle" and "tenor" such as "frame" and "focus." For a discussion of these terms, see Black, 1962, pp. 39-44).

Research also recognizes the role of metaphor in social policy. Advocates of this position believe that social policy should be understood not as problem solving, but rather as problem setting (Schön, 1979). Emphasis is placed on the power of metaphor to "generate" new ideas and perspectives. How a problem is represented symbolically, either by metaphor or some other rhetorical means, becomes the primary concern because that representation influences the subsequent policy design.

Schön maintains that metaphor is an important part of the problem-setting perspective. Understanding metaphor as "generative" leads Schön (1979) to define metaphor as "a perspective or frame, a way of looking at things -- and to a certain kind of process -- a process by which new perspectives on the world come into existence" (p. 254). An example of generative metaphor is Schön's description of researchers trying to improve the performance of paintbrush bristles. After experimenting with various types of bristles, someone suggested that a paintbrush is a kind of pump; that is, paint is forced out through the bristles onto the surface. By thinking of the paintbrush as a pump, the researchers could draw upon their experiences with a pump to improve the paintbrush.

For Lakoff and Johnson (1980) "the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (p. 5). Furthermore, "the very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another (e.g., comprehending an aspect of arguing in terms of a battle) will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 10). There are characteristics of the two concepts which are dissimilar and shouldnot be compared. Lakoff and Johnson conclude that "when we say that a concept is structured by a metaphor, we mean that it is partially structured and that it can be extended in some ways but not others" (p. 13). For public policy discourse, the nexus between similarity and difference is where rhetorical analysis of metaphor may be the most influential.

Reagan utilizes the drug metaphor to define the drug problem during the 1980s. This definition has certain policy implications, both directly related to drug interdiction and treatment and indirectly related to suspending civil liberties.
REAGAN’S DEFINITION OF THE DRUG PROBLEM

In June 1982, Reagan (1982) revealed his administration's first complete definition of the drug problem, and introduced the war metaphor into his policy rhetoric:

We are rejecting the helpless attitude that drug use is rampant, that we're defenseless to do anything about it. We're taking down the surrender flag that has flown over so many drug efforts; we're running up the battle flag. We can fight the drug problem and we can win. And that is exactly what we intend to do. (p. 811)

By defining drug control as a war, Reagan made three assumptions about the nature of the drug problem. Reagan "worked" the drug metaphor by expounding upon each of these assumptions thereby allowing the public to buy into the subsequent policy proposals.

The first assumption Reagan made about the nature of the drug problem is that drugs threatened to destroy the country’s social and moral fabric. Reagan conceptualized that drugs must be seen as a threat to our way of life, only then would a "war" on drugs be justified. Reagan (1982) revealed this assumption in an address in July of 1982:

Drugs already reach deeply into our social structure, so we must mobilize all our forces to stop the flow of drugs into our country, to let kids know the truth, to erase the false glamour that surrounds drugs, and to brand drugs as marijuana exactly what they are -- dangerous, and particularly to school-age youths. (p. 813)

To engage in a rhetoric of war, Reagan created a political reality in which drugs were a serious concern, serious enough to warrant a "war" in response. Drugs must be empowered with the capability of destroying what we deem valuable. Reagan continued to blame drugs for society’s problems:

We're making no excuses for drugs -- hard, soft, or otherwise. Drugs are bad and we're going after them. (1982, p.1253)

Coming to grips with threats posed by such evils as
drugs will require all free people working together. (1986, p. 512)

Drugs are menacing our society. They're threatening our values and undercutting our institutions. They're killing our children. (1986, p. 1178).

According to Reagan's rhetoric, drugs, not drug users, threaten our society. Reagan attributes motives to drugs that we would normally attribute to drug users. Wars, by definition, have an enemy and in Reagan's war on drugs, drugs are the enemy.

The second assumption Reagan made about the drug problem is that it was solvable: a well fought war would eliminate drugs. This is evident in Reagan's pledges of victory:

As I've said before, we've taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag. And we're going to win the war on drugs. (1982, p. 1253)

Ultimately victory can only come from the dedication and commitment . . . (1984, p. 1346)

. . . I'm here to announce six major goals of which we hope will be our final stage in our national drug strategy to eradicate drug abuse. (1986, p. 1046)

. . . my very reason for being here this afternoon [is] . . . to call . . . for a national crusade against drugs, a sustained, relentless effort to rid America of this scourge. . . . (1986, p. 1046)

If we're to defeat this enemy, we've got to do it as one people, together and united in purpose and commitment to victory. (1986, p. 1046)

"Eradication," "rid," "defeat," and "victory" are all terms which are associated with the total defeat of the enemy. Reagan defined his objective as the eradication of drugs in the same way we predict victory in a war.

The final assumption Reagan made was the need for united support for drug control and against drug use. Conceiving of the drug problem as a war encouraged the public and politicians to rally around the President and pledge their support for the war.
Ultimately victory can only come from the dedication and commitment of private industry, public organizations, local government, and citizen volunteers. (1984, p. 1346)

If this battle is to be won -- and it must -- each and every one of us has to take a stand and get involved . . . . If we're to defeat this enemy, we've got to do it as one people, together and united in purpose and committed to victory. (1986, p. 1084)

Everyone will have to participate . . . [by] joining arms with the rest of America in this battle against the most insidious of all evils. (1986, p. 1084)

In each of these instances, Reagan utilized the notion of a war and commitment to the war effort to persuade people to support his policies. If we failed to commit and mobilize as a nation, Reagan reasoned, we would not solve the drug problem.

Establishing drugs as an enemy presented the drug problem as far reaching. According to Gallop public opinion polls, the percentage of people who believed that drugs were the most important problem facing the country rose from 1 percent in 1984 to 11 percent in 1987. (This is based on comparative polls conducted by Gallop, 1985, p. 139 and Gallop, 1987, p. 89 and confirmed by Jensen, et al., 1991, p. 656.) By the time Reagan left office in 1989, Americans believed that drugs were the country’s number one problem, ahead of the economy, unemployment, and foreign threats (Gallup, 1989). Reagan convinced Americans that the drug problem was urgent and that we needed a "war".

That Reagan defined U.S. drug control policy as a war is evident from the preceding discussion. The policy that resulted from Reagan defining the drug problem was a war to restrict the drug supply. In the latter half of the 1980s, Reagan also tried to convince the American people to be intolerant of drug users, similar to how we might be intolerant of the atrocities committed during a military war. Reagan's definition of the drug problem as a war had definite implications for the policies he sought to enact.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS**

One policy that emerged from Reagan's war rhetoric was an unprecedented increase in the military to intercept drugs. The military is
the most logical actor to eliminate the enemy in a war. Reagan's war on drugs was no exception. The Reagan administration supported changes to the Posse Comitatus Act (post civil-war legislation which forbid the U.S. military from operating domestically except in cases of national emergency). These changes allowed the military to take a more active role enforcing the nation's drug laws. Inciardi (1991) explains the implications:

Although military personnel were still prohibited from physically intercepting suspected drug vessels and aircraft, conducting searches and seizures, and making arrests, the entire war chest of the U.S. military power did become available to law enforcement -- for training, intelligence gathering, and detection. Moreover, members of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps could operate military equipment for civilian agencies charged with enforcement of drug laws. (p. 10-11).

For the first time, what had been a symbolic war became more of an actual war against the drug supply. Wisotsky (1990) outlined U.S. military involvement in the drug war:

Reagan also succeeded in literally militarizing what had previously been a rhetorical war by deploying military forces of the United States in drug enforcement operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) provided pursuit planes, helicopters, and other equipment to civilian enforcement agencies, while Navy "hawkeye" radar planes patrolled the coastal skies in search of smuggling aircraft and ships. (p. 5-6)

The use of the term "war" created a political context in which using the military to control the drug supply was appropriate and necessary. From a rhetorical standpoint, the question is whether Reagan's focus on drugs as a threat and enemy to our society created a climate in which the war on drugs moved from a symbolic war to an actual war. Based on Reagan's rhetoric, expanding the military to halt the flow of drugs into the country was the logical policy alternative.

Reagan's "war" did not stop with using the military. His rhetoric
also created a climate in which people supported drug-enforcement policies (e.g., drug testing, random search and seizure, censorship) that suspended the civil rights of drug users and suspected drug users. Intolerance toward drug users was evident in harsher penalties and a public willing to sacrifice some privacy rights. Blachman and Sharpe (1989-90) document that "the erosion of civil liberties — the invasion of privacy, censorship, the loss of safeguards against arbitrary search — are...a lamentable but inevitable price to pay in order to win the war on drugs" (p. 136). The bottom line was a belief that drug users (or suspected drug users) did not deserve the same Constitutional protection of non-drug users. Sacrifices were necessary to support the war on drugs. Blachman and Sharpe (1989-90) cautioned against blurring the metaphorical nature of the drug war:

Basic liberties are further imperiled because of the tendency to view drug-law enforcement in terms of a war. For during a war, the legal, constitutional, and moral restraints on government misuse of power tend to be weakened. American history is rife with instances of domestic spying and surveillance of U.S. citizens in times of war... (p. 139)

Within the context of the drug war, citizens were willing to surrender some basic liberties to support of the war. Blachman and Sharpe (1989-90) reported:

Nearly two-thirds of those questioned by the Washington Post-ABC News poll said they "were willing to give up a few of the freedoms we have" to attack the problem. They would sanction the search of one's home, solely on the basis of suspicion and without a court order (52 percent), the search of cars at random (67 percent); and film censorship, making it "against the law to show the use of illegal drugs in entertainment movies" (71 percent). (p. 136)

Reagan's rhetoric unified public opposition and reinforced society's attitude against drug use.

Direct comparisons between a war and drug policy reveal a misguided but influential policy. The metaphor's inappropriate
comparisons suggest that we need to be cautious when defining the nature of the drug problem. Wisotsky (1990) explained that the rhetoric of a drug war clouds our understanding of the problem:

The War on Drugs is clearly stuck, mired in paramilitary rhetoric that obscured understanding while worsening the problem. Enforcement does not work to control supply. Therefore, we must intensify enforcement. That creates terrible black market pathologies, at home and abroad. Therefore, we must intensify enforcement even more, further worsening the consequences. This vicious cycle represents a complete failure of courage and intelligence, perversely working against our interests. (p. 174)

Wisotsky and other drug policy analysts argue that we need a definition and a drug policy which better addresses some of the underlying reasons for drug consumption. Defining the drug problem in militaristic terms creates a reality in which alternative policies, such as treatment and prevention, are not accorded the attention they deserve.

CONCLUSION

This article questions the suitability of the war metaphor to define the U.S. drug problem. Significant differences exist between a military war and a symbolic war against drugs, differences significant enough that policies resulting from the use of the metaphor fail to adequately address the problem. The fact that drug use still remains a problem today is evidence enough that the policies of the 1980s failed.

First, by defining drugs as a threat to our way of life, the war metaphor fails to account for the reasons why people take drugs. As Reagan implies, drugs by themselves are not dangerous, but his definition does not allow for this alternative conception which might provide a better solution.

Second, the war metaphor casts the drug problem as winnable. Within the logic of the military, in fighting a war the ends are fairly clear -- defeat the enemy and the war is won. The underlying causes of the drug problem are more complex and the winnability of this war is questionable at best. While the war rhetoric served to unify the public, it created unrealistic expectations.

Finally, the war metaphor suggests that people need to unite to
defeat the enemy. In a war, an “us-against-them” mentality prevails. In Reagan’s drug war, this “us-against-them” mentality legitimized suspending civil rights to defeat the “enemy.”

Alternative conceptions of the drug problem indicate that those who take drugs are not an “enemy,” but rather individuals with a disease, an addiction, a shortcoming, or a problem. Reagan’s conception of the drug problem as a war fails to allow for these alternative conceptions to be considered and contributed to a failure of drug policy as a whole.

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THE GENDER FACTOR IN NEGOTIATIONS

Jason M. Lewis

Although research on gender differences in communication has become widespread in recent years, less attention has been paid to the differences between gender variances regarding negotiation. Of research most recently conducted, contradictory results have surfaced. Some have found that the differences between male and female negotiators are minimal (Dreher, Dougherty, & Whitely, 1989), while others suggest significant contrasts between both style and outcomes (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Neu, Graham, & Gilly, 1988). In addition, a great majority of gender research in negotiations has focused upon salary-related negotiations, and studies consistently conclude that men generally receive higher starting salaries than women who are just as qualified (e.g., Dreher, Dougherty, & Whitely, 1989; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993).

Suggesting that men and women inherently use different styles of speaking, Tannen (1986; 1990) emphasizes that neither gender style is either good or bad. Many researchers stress the importance of realizing these contrasts so that communication barriers can be overcome between males and females (Neu, Graham, & Gilly, 1988; Griffin, 1994). Tannen (1986; 1990) further explains that women generally have a tendency to use rapport talking, a communication style which attempts to make and maintain a connection with the receiving party. Conversely, men tend to communicate with report talking, placing more importance on facts and information. She asserts that men often use report talking as a one-up means of controlling the conversation.

If males and females do in fact have different communication styles, gender contrasts must also be apparent in negotiation encounters. Additionally, the possibility for misunderstanding is likely to be greater between opposite gender negotiators than with same sex negotiators (Neu, Graham, & Gilly, 1988). Many researchers suggest that men implore more influence tactics and styles in negotiations than women due to socialization experiences (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Betz & Fitzgerald, 1987;
Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993). These findings seem to support Tannen’s genderlect theory in that men have more of a tendency to use more logic and reason than females. Other possible explanations of higher negotiated salaries for males are that women may not put forth as much effort in negotiating higher salaries, due to lower goals, and that men have more confidence in negotiating for larger salaries (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, Carnevale, 1980). Studies by Stevens, Bavetta, and Gist (1993) concluded that women can sharply improve starting salaries through the training of higher goal-setting and self-management courses to increase negotiating confidence.

Understanding contrasts in gender styles can greatly improve negotiation outcomes for both sides. These investigations can offer insight to the reasons of different outcomes for men and women in negotiations, especially in salaries. Additionally, negotiators may refine their styles by realizing potential weaknesses, while further developing their strengths.

**GENDER AND NEGOTIATION: RESEARCH FINDINGS**

The investigation of gender differences in negotiations is a difficult topic of discussion because the simplistic reduction of contrasts between men and women is not a simple black and white issue. Individuality exists as an important variable in this area and must be considered; however, a growing segment of researchers believe that certain characteristics are apparent within gender-specific negotiation styles, although various exceptions do exist (Betz & Fitzgerald, 1987; Neu, Graham, & Gilly, 1988). The intention of this article is to highlight some of these differences in male and female negotiation styles. In addition, ways of improving upon negotiation abilities will be briefly discussed. Although some of the material may appear controversial, the author supports the claim that the dangers of ignoring differences in communication styles are far greater than the potential risks of naming them (Tannen, 1990).
Differences in Negotiated Salaries

As mentioned, a significant amount of research has been conducted concerning salary differences between genders, and studies consistently indicate that men attain higher starting salaries than women in managerial and professional positions (Betz & Fitzgerald, 1987; Dreher, Dougherty, & Whitely, 1989; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993). Some suggest that one of the key factors in negotiating higher salaries results from effectively using influence tactics and styles. Kipnis, Schmidt, and Braxton-Brown (1987) found that negotiators who used “tactician” styles yielded the highest salaries for top CEOs. The tactician style employs a high degree of logic and reason; furthermore, this style seems to rely heavily on facts and information exchange.

Studies conducted by Betz & Fitzgerald (1987) indicate that women may not have proper knowledge of tactical influence strategies or proper knowledge of when to use them. One main reason for this finding may be that women are generally less interested in formal bargaining roles and may feel less comfortable than men in task-oriented encounters, such as the attainment of higher salaries through negotiations (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, Carnevale, 1980). However, research conducted by Dreher, Dougherty, and Whitely (1987) seems to support Betz and Fitzgerald, emphasizing the importance of rationality for female negotiators. In their article “Influence tactics and salary attainment,” the authors write:

The dominant predictor in the female equation was the rationality dimension. The use of logic, the presentation of detailed plans and information in support of a request, and a general use of reason represent tactics that were associated with higher salaries among women. (p. 547)

Another theory attempting to explain why women generally negotiate lower salaries is that females may have lower confidence in negotiating larger salaries and, therefore, set lower goals for themselves (Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993). Although this area is relatively new to examination, studies conducted by Stevens, Bavetta,
and Gist (1993) produce some interesting results. The researchers first provided tactical training for newly graduated women seeking professional jobs. Surprisingly, tactical training had little impact on starting salaries, as women continued to negotiate an income averaging $1350 less than their male equivalents. However, supplemental training designed to improve women’s confidence did produce positive results. After completing self-management courses, women attained salary levels much closer to their male equivalents, and they tended to set slightly higher goals for themselves.

Studies by Neu, Graham, and Gilly (1988) suggest that the reason for lower starting salaries is because women may enter negotiations inadequately prepared in comparison to males, but this data is inconclusive (Neu, Graham, & Gilly, 1988). If the aforementioned study has any plausibility, than this obstacle can easily be overcome if women negotiators only make use of proactive planning, which entails gathering information and preparing before the negotiation proceedings. According to Lewicki, et. al. (1994), negotiators (both male and female) who are informed and prepared with a negotiation plan receive far better outcomes than those who only use reactive planning.

Exemplifying this point, the author of this article recalls a transaction between his mother and the manager of a car dealership. After deciding which model she wanted, my mother extensively researched invoice prices, options, and dealer objections prior to visiting the car lot. She recalled the manager’s reaction when she accurately recited the invoice price of the car. Surprised, the dealer responded, ”You have done your homework.” Quite frankly, it is rare that women come alone to buy a car this well informed.” As a result, the two negotiated what each considered to be a fair price for the buyer and a fair profit for the dealership. This interaction is a classic example of a win-win, integrative approach to negotiation.

Negotiation and Conflict Resolution

Understanding the needs of the other party, as in the above example, is an important feature of conflict resolution in negotiation, and the dual concern model effectively illustrates different positions that negotiators take (Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994).
In relation with Tannen’s genderlect theory, one may deduce that women would have a tendency to favor the avoiding (inaction) approach if Tannen is correct in saying that women often avoid conflict to maintain connection in the relationship. The accommodating (yielding) approach may also be a likely approach if concern for the other’s needs are greater than one’s own needs. However, women may be far better suited than men for effective integrative negotiations, due to a generally greater concern for the receiving party; thus, the ideal collaborator (problem-solving) approach may be more easily implored by females.

Conversely, men may have more of a tendency adopt a contending (controlling) stance, implying that men are more concerned with their own needs. This claim may be supported by Tannen’s genderlect theory, stating that men are apt to use report talk more than women. Report talk employs many of the same characteristics as tactical negotiation, using facts, reason, logic, and information exchange to relay a message or position. In addition, Tannen (1986; 1990) suggests that men use this style of communication to competitively gain a one-up position in conversation. Griffin effectively summarizes this predominantly male style of speaking, stating that “men use talk as a weapon. The function of long explanations they use is to command attention, convey information, and insist on agreement” (p.434).

Many of these same communication styles are implored in distributive negotiations. One-up communication is an attempt to competitively control and dominate the conversation, often a communication style of male speaking (Griffin, 1994). Studies by Kimmel, et. al. (1980) seem to validate these findings, asserting that when negotiations become competitive, men often revert to distributive, win-lose bargaining. In an attempt to further control the conversation, Tannen (1990) found that males are far more likely to interrupt others than are females when conversing. Clearly, such tactics could escalate conflict and delay resolution.

CONCLUSION

Both genders could clearly benefit from the understanding and acknowledgment of strengths and weaknesses in their negotiation
styles. Women could try to improve tactical styles, especially before entering distributive negotiations. Additionally, they could take self-management courses, improve preparation, and become further informed so that better outcomes may be obtained. Men could learn to listen better and interrupt conversations less frequently. In order to improve upon integrative negotiation tactics, men must also realize that they should be more interested with the other's concerns, especially in ongoing negotiation relationships. All negotiators, no matter how successful, should always realize that there is room for growth and improvement.

The study of gender differences helps to overcome barriers to conflict resolution in negotiations. Additionally, researchers may provide insight to negotiators so that better outcomes may be attained; however, more research is necessary, especially the area of gender differences beyond salary negotiations (e.g., home purchases, car dealings, retail sales, intrabusiness negotiations). Furthermore, additional studies pertaining to integrative negotiation and its relation to gender may provide very different findings than the already studied, distributive approach.

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ANALYSIS OF CAMPUS CONFLICT USING THE ANALYSIS SCHEMA

Rex M. Fuller and William D. Kimsey

It is, we believe, axiomatic that we live in a violent world. Certainly, there is no need to provide the reader with evidence of our nation and culture’s demonstration, perhaps, preoccupation, with conflict and violence. Virtually every new publication and broadcast contains a seemingly endless litany of conflict and violent incidents. While we wish for a “kinder gentler” world called for by former President Bush, and many agree with Hillary Rhodman Clinton’s assertion that It Takes a Village to Raise a Child, we are daily reminded that we live in a society in which elementary school children are murdered in their classrooms, where government civil servants are bombed at their desks, and innocent travelers lose their lives to railroad train saboteurs, and the examples multiply.

In a recent article in the Canadian Journal of Peace Studies, the authors, in an attempt to understand our Society’s propensity toward violence, presented an analysis schema for describing, explaining, and predicting an individual’s choice for violent behavior (Fuller & Kimsey, 1996). The model assumes that an individual has a choice to behave with either tolerant-nonviolent behavior or intolerant-violent behavior. Expression of violence may include innocent disagreements involving rhetorical rejection to diabolic outcomes where the sanctity of human life is denigrated and destroyed. Ultimately, projection of one’s world view may result in self-defense strategies that legitimize the use of violence.

Concepts contained in the analysis schema include the following:

* **World View**--This concept represents what an individual considers true. The structure and substance of values, attitude, beliefs, and behavior provide a framework for assigning meaning to one’s world.

* **Tolerant/Intolerant Scale**--The horizontal axis describes an individual’s predisposition to permit belief systems different from or hostile to one’s world view.

* **Level of Acceptance**--The vertical axis describes an
individuals' ability to provide approval for held World View. The strength of approval defines the extent to which an individual has confidence in their expressed world view.

*Ethnocentrism*—Is the phenomenon of viewing one's world as paramount, and all other world views as inferior and potentially hostile by comparison. Hypo-ethnocentric behavior characteristically accepts other world views as legitimate explanations for what is true. Hyper-ethnocentric, on the other hand, describes individual behavior that defines other world views as illegitimate, unacceptable, and threatening (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1**  
Analysis Schema of Potential for Violence

![Diagram of Ethnocentric Scales](image)
Inadequate information, faulty reasoning, or lack of approval from majority opinion may undermine an individual's tolerance and self-acceptance. If a person cannot validate their world view and doubts exist, then the individual hides their uncertainties and are most likely to not tolerate other world views. The individual uses violence to mask their insecurities and doubts. Their response is hyper-ethnocentric and that person intersects at point "A" on the potential for violence.

When an individual is confident about their world view, for whatever reason, they do not need another's approval for held beliefs. High self acceptance, generally speaking, predisposes a person to be more accepting of others regardless of how different they may be. The likelihood for choosing violence is minimal. Intersection at point "B" is a hypo-ethnocentric response where conflicting or alternative world views are non-threatening.

Position "C" on the Scale for Potential for Violence suggests that individuals may exhibit some insecurity and intolerance and may or may not make a choice for violence. The probability of making a choice for violence is less than point A but greater than point B. The individual is tentative about their held world view and their tolerance of other potentially threatening world views.

Options for an individual to express themselves may be summarized as follows:

I want to be confident of my world views --
When I am not, I hide my doubts.
   When will I stop hiding?
   When I become confident.

When I doubt the validity of my own world view,
   I need another's validation.
If they don't validate my world view,
   I won't tolerate them.

However, when I am confident,
   I don't need another's validation.
Therefore, I can tolerate their world view--
   No matter what their doubts may be.
THE ANALYSIS SCHEMA

Step One of the analysis must begin with a careful definition of the groups or population included in the communication environment. Not only should these groups be precisely defined, but also their definition should include some preliminary history or background which will fully inform the analysis of each group's perspective or point of view.

Step Two must identify and define the minority group's world view as expressed in the communication environment. The minority argument must be detailed and fully described. As a part of Step Two the analysis should include a description of the minority argument's development over time.

Step Three focuses on a careful and complete discussion of the majority group's acquiescence to the minority group's argument. In Step Three the analysis should detail specific instances of argumentative clash between the majority and the minority and show that the minority world view is permitted to replace the majority world view. The analysis should attempt to identify specific instances of rhetorical behavior which gives evidence of the majority's failure to argue the majority world view.

Step Four must document the progression of rhetorical events leading from argument to violence. In Step Four the analysis presents a carefully detailed explication of the evolution of rhetorical argument to demonstrations of violence or overt conflict. Step Four presents a chronology of escalating conflict, beginning with competing rhetorical argument evolving to physical violence. Central to Step Four is the development of an answer to the question, "What conditions or elements are in evidence to explain the violence choice?"

Step Five provides an explanation and description of the resulting social or cultural communication environment. Step Five contains the concluding summary reported by the preceding analysis. In Step Five, the analysis seeks to address a variety of questions including the following. Given the current status quo, what is the prospect that the minority world view will evolve into the majority world view? What appears to be the potential for continued or increased instances of physical conflict or violence? Is a status of harmony and cooperation possible to attain between or among the
TWO ANALYSIS SCHEMA APPLICATIONS

Two "Stories About PC" were chosen by the authors from the 1993 film Campus Culture Wars, by Michael Pack. Each of the stories contained in Pack's film examine university incidents involving conflict. The two cases selected for analysis are a gay rights and religious expression conflict at Harvard University, and a conflict involving the pursuit of multicultural ideas at Stanford University. The authors have used data presented in the film for analysis using the analysis schema.

Gay Rights and Religious Expression at Harvard University

In 1991 a conflict erupted on the Harvard University campus between two clearly identifiable groups. The majority group defined itself as the gay, lesbian, bit-sexual community and it has established a campus representative body called the Bi-sexual Gay Lesbian Student Association (BGLSA). It is clearly evident that the majority of the university population identifies with the BGLSA world-view. BGLSA gatherings draw large audiences. During the active conflict period several university administrators gave rhetorical support to the BGLSA. The Senior Pastor of the university church professed his own homosexuality and denied the sin categorization of homosexuality. Assertions are articulated by members of BGLSA that Harvard and homosexuality are intertwined. Public homosexual behavior and poster advertisements in support of homosexual practices are acceptable in the community. Gay, lesbian, and bi-sexual issues are emphasized in the university and role-play homosexual sensitivity training is required of all freshmen.

The minority group defines itself as Christian and conservative. This group admits a small number and typically maintains a low public profile. Group activities tend to be clandestine including private prayer meetings in a single faculty member's office. The minority group believes, based on personal experience, that any public expression of Christian or conservative value will produce hostile responses. They claim that their world view is defined by the majority
group as anti-intellectual and oppressive. One member of the minority group observes that the Roman Catholic faith is the least PC of all and he claims to "receive heat for being Christian and conservative."

In the period prior to the conflict event, the minority group appears to have succumbed to the "Spiral of Silence." They, fearing isolation or the denial of their self-concepts, have refrained from public and visible demonstrations of their Christian and conservative world-view. They have continued to coexist with the majority group by, for all appearances, remaining silent. In response, the majority group as acquiesced. It has allowed the minority group to exist and permitted their low-profile activity.

However, the status-quo was ended immediately following the publication of a 1991 issue of Pennisula, a campus newspaper published by the minority group, which focused on various aspects and questions of homosexual behavior, morality, and acceptability. The minority group's publication of the offending issue may be traced to an earlier incident in which a freshman student and member of the minority group was required to participate in a dormitory sensitivity training session during which he was required to repeat the phrase "My name is ________, and I am gay." Although the student claims to have been offended by the requirement, he did participate and it appears that it is his post-decisional anxiety that contributed to the minority group's decision to respond with their October/November 1991 issue of Pennisula.

On reflection, members of the minority group explain their action by claiming that they felt that they, and their world-view, were "under siege." They also attribute their behavior to the fact that in the group they identified a mutual support group, a feeling of family, and it was a good feeling to generate a defensive and active response to their perceived oppression.

The October/November 1991 issue of Pennisula was distributed, door-to-door, throughout the university community late at night to avoid direct confrontation. The minority group anticipated a hostile response and turned the distribution activity into a ritual event. The event began with a group sing of the "Star Spangled Banner" followed by a commando type raid of the campus depositing a copy in front of every residence's door. It is also alleged that anti-gay graffiti appeared on some dormitory walls.
The anticipated hostile response was immediate. The following day the BGLSA held a mass meeting and presented an attack response. For this analysis, the focus question is "What motivated BGLSA's attack response and to what can their defensive reaction be attributed?" The actual environment had not been altered with the publication of the offending issue of Peninsula. The majority group, BGLSA and supporters, still represented the majority and still defined the status quo. The minority group's identity and membership had not changed. However, BGLSA responded in a hostile, defensive way.

In the day following the midnight distribution of Peninsula a mass meeting was held on the Harvard campus. During the meeting a large audience of BGLSA supporters attended and voiced their opposition to the minority group's statement. Three university deans spoke in support of BGLSA and in general support of the homosexual world-view. One dean, Dean of Students Archibald Epps characterized the minority group's rhetoric as Hate Speech, which is a felony offence. However, when pressed to show instance of Hate Speech in the minority group's publication, he declined. When asked to prosecute for criminal violation, he also declined. In addition, to the three deans, the minister of Memorial Church, the university church, Rev. Gomes, declared his own homosexuality and spoke in favor of homosexuality as an acceptable world-view in the Christian world.

Why this attack on a seemingly powerless minority group? Our evaluation drawn from the Analysis Schema suggests that the majority group lacks the internal confidence in their stated world-view to withstand the level of rhetorical statement represented by the minority group's statement in the October/November 1991 issue of Peninsula. The fact of the majority group's immediate rhetorically violent reaction, which included a publication of minority group member names and telephone numbers with encouragement to call and harass, as well as direct threats to minority members' physical harm, is evidence of their insecurity. The Peninsula issue increased the minority group's public profile to end the majority group's willingness to acquiesce.

The resulting social and cultural communication environment is the re-establishment of the previous status quo. All university
administrators supporting BGLSA continue in their offices. The Rev. Gomes continues as senior past at Memorial Church. The BGLSA and the homosexual world-view have again been established as the only acceptable world-view. Spokespersons for the majority group and the minority group, agree that the "debate is done." For the moment, the BGLSA has won and the minority group has lowered its public profile to a level acceptable to BGLSA.

Given the current status quo, it appears that the minority world-view has not prospect for replacing the majority world view. If such a condition were to occur, it would be stimulated by another similar event. It also appears that the violence demonstrated in this episode will not be continued. Because the minority rhetorical voice has been cowed and no longer violates a level of presence tolerable to the majority, the conflict is ended. While cooperation and harmony have been achieved, the minority group has retreated to their former rhetorical position which provides the majority group with enough security to reestablish their acquiescence.

Multicultural Ideas at Stanford University

During the fall 1988 semester a conflict emerged between two groups of Hispanic students on the Stanford University campus. While neither of these groups appears to be significantly large in number, they are clearly distinguishable from each other. Both groups are contained in the student organization MECha, the Hispanic student group. The majority group is defined as the founding leadership of MECha. The majority group, lead by student leader Rudi Fuentes, appears to have been the representative, status quo, boy for Hispanic students in the Stanford University community. The minority group defined itself during the fall 1988 semester and is characterized as a small group of militant students. While this group existed previous to the fall 1988 conflict, they had not evidenced themselves in any significant way.

The issue of this conflict focuses on the way in which the goal of multi-culturalism is to be achieved. The majority group has consistently demonstrated a win-win philosophy in regard to multicultural issues. They appear to embrace notions of reasoned discourse and authority by persuasion. Group meetings are described as long.
indicating the majority group's willingness to pursue extended argument in search of consensus decision. The minority group, however, "wanted to be more aggressive in their pursuit of multicultural ideals." It appears that the small number of militant students, the minority group, chose to use aggressive means to encourage MECha's alliance with similar militant student groups.

While evidence of the majority group's acquiescence to the minority group's argument is sparse, it seems reasonable to assume that the majority permitted minority group member's expression of opinion and argument in group meetings. To the extent that the majority group's world-view embraces the concept of openness, it seems that as long as the minority argument did not violate the majority group's win-win norm, they would be tolerated. However, following one long meeting during which significant disagreement was voiced, the minority group attempted to use direct aggression, physical intimidation, and threats of violence to achieve their goal. It was at this moment that the majority group abandoned its posture of acquiescence and tolerance for the minority group.

A program of harassment and intimidation, most characterized by a practice referred to as encirclement in which a central member of the majority group is encircled by members of the minority group and subjected to oral harassment, physical finder poking, and threats of harm and violence. The practice is clearly and definitely intended to provoke submission and retreat.

The majority group's leadership appealed to the university administration for support and confirmation. However, a university spokesman claims that after an exhaustive investigation of the complaint, no violations of university policy or procedure were found. The minority group was, for all practical purposes, endorsed by the university administration.

The Stanford Review took an independent investigation and reported that the militant group had used tactics that had been used to harm fellow students. Of the majority group member, only one student spoke on the record about the intimidating and threatening practices of the minority group. All other student members of the majority group remained publicly silent.

The rhetorical events leading from argument to violence appear to be contained in the meetings of the student group MECha.
When minority group members found that their arguments were lacking the ability to persuade or convince the majority group, they chose to use more aggressive and rhetorically violent means. The analysis schema theory suggests that members of the minority group lack the confidence necessary to permit continued expression of the majority group rhetorical position. They elect to use intimidation and threat of physical violence and harm to silence the majority.

With the majority group's failure to win support from the university administration, the minority group gains rhetorical advantage and their win-lose paradigm prevails. Following the fall 1988 conflict, group roles appear to have been changed. The minority group has successfully gained control of MECha and represents the status quo voice of Hispanic students in the Stanford University community. The former leadership, characterized by a more conservative win-win philosophy, has retreated into silence. To some extent the former majority voice, now minority, is tolerated because it does not represent a threat to the more radical, militant majority voice.

Finally, further documenting the radical militant group's new reality as majority group, former student members have been hired into the current Stanford University administration. It appears, in this instance, that violence and intimidation were effectively used by a group, unable to successfully articulate its arguments persuasively, to win in a win-lose confrontation with a competing group who embraced a more cooperative win-win philosophy. Using the analysis schema helps explain how violence comes to be a reasonable and an acceptable choice. While the analysis schema cannot reduce or stop violence, our better understanding of its causes and outcomes can help.

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