The distinguishing characteristics, content and processes, and the variations of essential elements that are exemplified by projects in the United States and abroad in education for democratic citizenship are presented in this book. The volume addresses how international partnerships involving the United States and several post-communist countries advanced the cause of education for democracy. Chapter titles include: (1) "Concepts at the Core of Education for Democratic Citizenship" (John J. Patrick); (2) "Education for Constructive Engagement of Citizens in Democratic Civil Society and Government" (John J. Patrick); (3) "A Cooperative International Project to Develop and Disseminate a Framework on Education for Democratic Citizenship: Introduction and Rationale" (Charles F. Bahmuelle); (4) "A Framework on Education for Democratic Citizenship: Summary and Commentary" (Charles F. Bahmuelle); (5) "Civil Society and Democracy Reconsidered" (Charles F. Bahmuelle); (6) "Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program" (Charles N. Quigley; Jack N. Hoar); (7) "Reconsidering Issue-Centered Civic Education Among Early Adolescents: Project Citizen in the United States and Abroad" (Thomas S. Vontz; William A. Nixon); (8) "Guiding Principles for Cross-Cultural Curriculum Projects in Citizenship Education Reform" (Gregory E. Hamot); (9) "Building Democracy for the Twenty-First Century: Rediscovering Civics and Citizenship Education in Australia" (Murray Print); (10) "The Uses of Literature in Education for Democratic Citizenship: Lessons and Suggestions from the American Experience" (Sandra Stotsky); and (11) "Resources in ERIC on Education for Democratic Citizenship: International Perspectives." (Elizabeth R. Osborn). (IIB)
Principles and Practices of Education for Democratic Citizenship
International Perspectives and Projects

Edited by
Charles F. Bahmueller
and
John J. Patrick

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PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND PROJECTS

Edited by Charles F. Bahmueller

and John J. Patrick

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Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program is a consortium of leading organizations in civic education in the United States and other nations. The Center for Civic Education, directed by Charles N. Quigley, coordinates and administers the Civitas program. The United States Department of Education supports the program, which has been conducted in cooperation with the United States Information Agency (USIA) and its affiliated offices throughout the world. Civitas enables civic educators from the United States of America and cooperating countries to learn from and help each other in improving civic education for democracy.

ERIC, Educational Resources Information Center, is an information system within the U.S. Department of Education.
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INTRODUCTION

What is education for democratic citizenship? What are its distinguishing characteristics? What content and processes are necessarily part of it no matter where in the world it occurs? And what are some variations on its essential elements that are exemplified by projects in the United States and abroad? Finally, how have international partnerships involving the United States and several post-communist countries advanced the cause of education for democracy? These questions are addressed by the eleven chapters of this volume.

Chapter 1 discusses concepts that enable one to know what democracy is and what it is not. It also distinguishes constitutional liberal democracy from non-liberal or illiberal types of democracy. Finally, Chapter 1 discusses the essential components of education for democratic citizenship, which include knowledge of democratic principles and practices, skills of thinking about and participating in democratic political and civic life, and virtues or dispositions of democratic citizenship.

Chapter 2 treats instructional practices that are likely to develop civic competence needed for responsible and effective citizenship in a democracy. Purposes and practices of engagement in civic and political life are examined and evaluated.

Chapter 3 introduces an ongoing project to develop “Education for Democratic Citizenship: A Framework.” This international project, conducted by the Center for Civic Education in Calabasas, California, recommends essential content of education for democratic citizenship. This chapter also presents the rationale for a universally applicable knowledge base for education for democratic citizenship.

Chapter 4 offers a summary of the content in “Education for Democratic Citizenship: A Framework” and commentary on the different sections of the Framework. This Framework is still in development and will not be published and disseminated until next year.

Chapter 5 discusses the idea of civil society and its relationship to key principles and practices of democracy. This chapter explains why a vibrant civil society is an essential component of a constitutional liberal democracy.

Chapter 6 describes “Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program.” This program involves partnerships between American civic educators and counterparts in other countries for the purpose of promoting effective education for democratic citizenship. This “Civitas Exchange Program” is coordinated by the Center for Civic Education in Calabasas, California.

Chapter 7 discusses the substance and application of an innovative instructional treatment, “Project Citizen.” It was developed by the Center for Civic Education and has been used successfully in the United States and other countries in various parts of the world. “Project Citizen” is designed to develop intellectual skills, participatory skills, and dispositions of democratic citizenship.
Chapter 8 sets forth guidelines for conducting cross-cultural projects in education for democratic citizenship. These guiding principles are anchored in practical experience. They will help directors of international partnership projects to avoid pitfalls and achieve their goals in producing effective educational materials for development of democratic citizenship competencies.

Chapter 9 discusses trends and issues of education for democratic citizenship in Australia. The development and dissemination of a national curriculum reform project is described and appraised.

Chapter 10 examines the uses of literature in teaching and learning about democratic citizenship. Pedagogical practices that are consistent with constitutional liberal democracy are emphasized.

Chapter 11 presents a select annotated bibliography of publications on education for democratic citizenship in the database of ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center) of the United States Department of Education. These selections offer international perspectives on principles and practices of education for democratic citizenship.

This collection of chapters was developed to assist civic educators and promoters of democratic citizenship. The chapters were written to help users understand what education for democratic citizenship is, how to do it, and why it should be done.
CONCEPTS AT THE CORE OF EDUCATION FOR démOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

By John J. Patrick

Most peoples of our world favor democracy over other types of government. And as some peoples strive to consolidate or improve democracy in their governments and societies, others aspire to achieve it. A global revival of education for democratic citizenship accompanies the worldwide resurgence of democracy. Diverse peoples in various parts of our world commonly understand that if there would be "government of the people, by the people, for the people," then there must be education of the people in the principles, practices, and commitments of democracy.

Both established democracies and new ones depend upon good education for democratic citizenship for their maintenance and improvement. Both peoples in pursuit of democracy and those in debt to ancestral founders of it recognize that schools must teach young citizens the principles and practices of democracy, if they would develop and sustain its institutions. No matter how well constructed, a democracy cannot be a "machine that would go of itself." The efficacy and utility of its institutions rest ultimately on widespread comprehension of and commitment to the ideas at their foundations.

Conceptualization of Democracy for Civic Education

Political and civic ideas matter. Good ideas tend to yield good consequences. But they only do so if they are widely known, believed, and practiced, which points to an indispensable place for concepts at the core of education for democratic citizenship: what are the basic concepts that citizens must acquire and use if they would know what democracy is, how to do it, and why it is desirable?

Treatment of this question, and the concepts embedded in it, certainly does not exhaust the topic of what to teach about democracy and how to do
it through civic education. It does, however, highlight fundamental elements of any workable and conceptually sound curriculum, which may be elaborated and practiced variously to suit social and cultural differences. The assumption is that the concepts presented here about curricular content are necessary, if not sufficient, to education for democratic citizenship anywhere in the world.

The first objective of education for democratic citizenship is to teach thoroughly what a democracy is, and what it is not. If students are to be prepared to act as citizens of a democracy, they must know how to distinguish this type of government from other types. The label democracy has often been used by regimes with showcase constitutions proclaiming popular governments and individual rights, which have meant little or nothing to the victims of tyranny. The so-called “people’s democracies” of former communist countries are tragic twentieth-century examples of the bogus use of a political label.

Through their civic education, students should develop defensible criteria by which to think critically and evaluate the extent to which their government and other governments of the world do or do not function authentically as democracies. A set of key concepts necessary to a deep understanding of democracy and democratic citizenship must be taught and learned. These essential ideas are listed in Figure 1: Concepts on the Substance of Democracy at the Core of Education for Democratic Citizenship. (See Figure 1 on the following page.)

How should the core concepts in Figure 1 be introduced, defined, and elaborated upon in education for democratic citizenship? This is the recommended response: introduce a definition of minimal democracy and then elaborate upon it through explication of a set of core concepts (with which it is inextricably associated in the operations of any authentic democratic polity) such as constitutionalism, rights, citizenship, civil society, and market economy.

Teachers and students should use the concepts in Figure 1 as criteria by which to compare and evaluate political systems and thereby to determine whether they are more or less democratic. These cognitive exercises will reveal that core concepts or principles of democracy are practiced variously. There is no single set of institutions that exactly and exclusively embodies democracy. Rather, there are constitutional and institutional variations on the central themes or concepts in the various democracies of our world.

The concepts in Figure 1 are cognitive tools for interpreting and judging the extent to which political systems (including one’s own) are, or are not, exemplifications of democracy. They are foundations for civic educa-
FIGURE 1
CONCEPTS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF DEMOCRACY
AT THE CORE OF EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

1. MINIMAL DEMOCRACY
   a. Popular sovereignty (government by consent of the governed)
   b. Representation and accountability in government
   c. Free, fair, and competitive elections of representatives in government
   d. Comprehensive eligibility to participate freely as voters in elections
   e. Inclusive access to participate freely to promote personal or common interests
   f. Majority rule of the people for the common good

2. CONSTITUTIONALISM
   a. Rule of law in the government, society, and economy
   b. Limited and empowered government to secure rights of the people
   c. Separation, sharing, and distribution of powers in government
   d. Independent judiciary with power of judicial or constitutional review

3. RIGHTS
   a. Human rights/constitutional rights
   b. Political rights and personal or private rights
   c. Economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights
   d. Negative rights and positive rights

4. CITIZENSHIP
   a. Membership in a people based on legal qualifications of citizenship
   b. Rights, responsibilities, and roles of citizenship
   c. Civic identity and other types of identity (e.g., ethnic, racial, religious)
   d. Rights of individual citizens and rights of groups of citizens

5. CIVIL SOCIETY (FREE AND OPEN SOCIAL SYSTEM)
   a. Voluntary membership in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
   b. Freedom of association, assembly, and social choice
   c. Pluralism/multiple and overlapping group memberships and identities
   d. Social regulation (rule of law, customs, traditions, virtues)

6. MARKET ECONOMY (FREE AND OPEN ECONOMIC SYSTEM)
   a. Freedom of exchange and economic choice
   b. Economic regulation (rule of law, customs, traditions, virtues)

7. ONGOING TENSIONS IN A CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
   a. Majority rule and minority rights (limits on majorities and minorities/individuals)
   b. Liberty and equality (combining negative and positive rights to achieve justice)
   c. Liberty and order (limits on power and liberty to achieve security for rights)
   d. Individual interests and the common good (latitude and limits of personal choice)
tion in a democracy. If people would establish or improve a democratic political system, they must first know the concepts or criteria by which to distinguish a democratic government from a nondemocratic government.

**Minimal Democracy and Liberal Democracy**

The first concept in the Figure 1 list is minimal democracy, the root idea of this conceptual set. What does it mean? And why is it the necessary foundation of any conceptualization of democracy?

Construction of a minimal definition of democracy for today’s world begins with a look back to the ancient world. The roots of democracy, more than 2,500 years old, are in the ancient city-republics of Greece, where the people (demos) began to rule (kratia). Democracy (demokratia) in ancient times, rule by the many, was commonly compared to aristocracy, rule by the few, and monarchy, rule by one. The ancients practiced direct democracy on a small scale. That is, the citizens (all people included in the polity) had the right to participate equally and immediately in making and executing public decisions for a very small realm, the polis (community of the city).

Political thinkers of modern times, from the philosophers of the European Enlightenment to the founders of the United States of America and thereafter, have pointed to critical deficiencies of ancient democracy, such as its proclivity for disruptive factional conflict, majoritarian tyranny, excessive claims on the individual on behalf of the community, disregard of personal or private rights, and inept administration of government. Thus, James Madison wrote in his celebrated 10th Federalist Paper, “that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths” (Rossiter 1961, 81).

As in ancient times, democracy in our modern world still is, in Abraham Lincoln’s memorable words, “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” Democracy today, however, is representative, not direct; and the nation-state, not the small city-republic is the typical large-scale realm of the modern polity. Furthermore, unlike the very limited citizenry of the ancient polis, today’s democracies are inclusive: most inhabitants of the realm may possess or acquire the rights and privileges of citizenship.

Differences aside, however, the linkages of ancient to modern democracy are visible in a widely held definition of minimal democracy today, which provides a first criterion for distinguishing democratic from non-democratic regimes. This is the criterion for minimal democracy: a political system is “democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in
which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (Huntington 1991, 7). Thus, for example, a political system is undemocratic if there is no authentic opposition party to contest elections, or if the right to vote or otherwise participate is systematically denied to particular categories of persons for reasons of race, ethnicity, religion, ideology, and so forth. This minimal definition emphasizes that the free, open, regular, fair, and contested election, decided by popular vote, is an essential condition of representative democracy. (See item 1 in Figure 1.)

The minimal standard or threshold for distinguishing democratic government from nondemocratic government, with its emphasis on free, fair, and competitive elections, points to popular sovereignty or government by consent of the governed. By using their right to vote in public elections for representatives in government, citizens express popular sovereignty, which has become the only legitimate source of authority in most countries of our world today. The French philosopher Pierre Manent (1997, 92) stresses that, “the democratic principle of legitimacy is the principle of consent: a law or obligation is not legitimate, nor am I bound to obey it or fulfill it, unless I have previously consented to this law or obligation through myself or my representatives.”

The principle of popular sovereignty implies that institutions of government are either directly or indirectly accountable to the people, the citizens. And the people's representatives in government may exercise power only if it is granted to them legally by the citizens. Thus, the rulers are public servants of the ruled, who have the right and responsibility to affirm or reject their rulers through periodic public elections. During the interval between elections, citizens have the right to influence their representatives in government in order to promote individual or common interests.

In a democracy there is majority rule expressed directly by citizens or indirectly through their representatives. Any governmental body that makes decisions by combining the votes of more than half of those eligible and present is acting democratically. In order to sustain the democracy, however, majority rule must be tempered by minority rights. Thus, all citizens, including those outside the majority of the moment, are able to participate fairly, freely, and openly to influence their government by voting in public elections or by participating during the periods between regularly scheduled elections for the purpose of promoting personal and group interests and influencing policy decisions by their representatives in government.

More than 115 countries in various parts of the world today meet the minimal standard for democracy, which requires, at least, that representatives of the people in government are selected through free, fair, contested,
and periodic elections in which virtually all the adult population has the right to vote. Before the 1970s, less than 40 countries met this minimal standard of democracy, and before 1945, the number was less than twenty. So it seems that we are living now in an unprecedented, worldwide era of electoral democracy, defined by the democratic process of electing public officials (Dahl 1998; Karatnycky 1999; Plattner 1997).

The global trend toward electoral or minimal democracy has not immediately brought about an exactly equivalent surge toward personal or private rights to freedom or civil liberties. According to the most recent "Freedom House Survey," less than half of the world's 191 countries (46 percent) were rated "free," which means "that they maintain a high degree of political and economic freedom and respect for basic civil liberties." Another 53 countries received a rating of "partly free." This is 28 percent of the world's countries. And 50 countries (26 percent of the world's countries) had a rating of "not free" because they deny to their people basic rights for freedom and civil liberties (Karatnycky 1999, 112).

It seems that many democracies of our world only meet the minimal standard. They are electoral democracies but not liberal democracies (Diamond 1996; Zakaria 1997). An electoral or non-liberal democracy protects the political rights of those in the minority, who are recognized as an integral part of the people of the polity. All individuals, including those in the minority, may exercise their rights to vote, to free speech and press, to freedom of assembly, and to seek and hold offices in government. There can be no electoral democracy unless these political rights are guaranteed equally to all members of the people. In a liberal democracy, however, protection for individual rights extends beyond political rights to fundamental personal rights, such as freedom of conscience, free exercise of religion, the ownership and use of private property, and security against unwarranted intrusions by government into one's private life. The idea of personal liberty is the root of the liberal strain in democracy.

A liberal democracy is government of, by, and for the people, which government is both empowered and limited by the supreme law of the people's constitution for the ultimate purpose of protecting equally the autonomy and rights of everyone in the polity. In a liberal democracy, there paradoxically is majority rule with extensive protection of minority rights. Thus, there are constitutional limits on both the power of democratic majority rule and the liberal exercise of rights by individuals or groups. Both kinds of constitutional limits—those that restrain democracy and those that restrain liberty—are intended to achieve one overriding purpose of a liberal and democratic political order, which is to secure on equal terms the autonomy and rights of all persons in the polity.
An unrestrained or illiberal democracy is likely to become a tyranny of the majority in which the rights of unpopular individuals or minorities are insecure. And unrestrained liberty will lead to licentious disorder in which the rights of individuals and groups are always at risk from uncontrolled predators. So security for rights depends upon political order anchored in a constitution of the people, which simultaneously empowers and limits a government by consent of the governed (Zakaria 1997).

The world’s fully free countries in the annual “Freedom House Survey” merited this rating by securing for their citizens not only the political rights of an electoral democracy, such as the right to vote, but also the economic rights and personal or private rights to freedom of a liberal democracy. Electoral democracy may be a stage in development toward liberal democracy (Plattner 1997, 180). A necessary component in the transition from minimal democracy to liberal democracy, security for a broad range of individual rights in concert with government by consent of the governed, is constitutionalism. (See item 2 of Figure 1.)

Constitutionalism and Democracy

The concept of constitutionalism is rooted in the use of a constitution, usually a written document that legitimates, limits, and empowers the government, which, if democratic, is based on periodic and competitive election of representatives by virtually all the adult population. A constitution articulates the structure of government, procedures for selection and replacement of government officials, and distribution and limitations of the powers of government.

Not every government with a written constitution exemplifies constitutionalism. Many constitutions have presented merely the appearance of limited government with little or no correspondence to reality. Soviet-style constitutions of the recent past, for example, grandly proclaimed all kinds of rights while guaranteeing none of them. Only governments that usually, if not perfectly, function in terms of a constitution to which the people have consented may be considered examples of constitutional government.

Constitutionalism means limited government and the rule of law to prevent the arbitrary, abusive use of power, to protect human rights, to support democratic procedures in elections and public policy making, and to achieve a community’s shared purposes. Constitutionalism in a democracy, therefore, both limits and empowers government of, by, and for the people. Through the constitution, the people grant power to the government to act effectively for the common good. The people also set constitutional limits on the power of their democratic government in order to prevent tyranny and to protect their rights (Holmes 1995).
The rights of individuals to life, liberty, and property are at risk if the government is either too strong or too weak. Both tyranny and anarchy pose critical dangers to security for individual rights. An effective government in a constitutional liberal democracy is sufficiently empowered by the people to secure their rights against foreign invaders or domestic predators. Its power is also sufficiently limited by the people to secure their rights against the possibility of oppressive government officials. A continuing challenge of constitutionalism in a liberal democracy is seeking simultaneously to empower and limit the government in order to maintain liberty and order and thereby to achieve the liberal purpose of protecting equally and justly the rights of all persons in the polity.

Separation of powers is one way to design and use a constitution to distribute power to protect individual rights and to support democratic procedures. James Madison stated the importance of separation of powers to prevent tyranny in the 47th Federalist Paper: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny" (Rossiter 1961, 301). Without some type of effective distribution and sharing of power, there cannot be an authentic constitutional liberal democracy.

The American model of constitutional liberal democracy distributes power among three coordinate branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial departments. Each branch has constitutional means to check the actions of the other branches to prevent any of the three coordinate branches from continually dominating or controlling the others. These constitutional checks involve practical overlapping and sharing of powers among three distinct branches of the government, each with a particular function.

There are many examples in the United States Constitution of ways that one branch of the government can check the actions of another branch to maintain a balance of powers among the three branches of government. For example, the President (executive branch) can check the Congress (legislative branch) by vetoing bills it has passed. The Congress, however, can overturn the President's veto by a two-thirds vote of approval for the vetoed bill. The Supreme Court (judicial branch) can use its power of judicial review, if warranted, to invalidate or nullify actions of the executive or legislative branches that violate the Constitution. The people at large, acting in terms of Article V of the Constitution, can counter the Supreme Court's use of judicial review by amending the Constitution to trump or overturn a particular decision by which the Court declared an act of Congress unconstitutional. Additional examples of the checks and balances system can be
found in Articles I, II, and III of the United States Constitution. In the 48th Federalist Paper, James Madison highlighted the relationship of checks and balances to separation of powers as a means to effective constitutionalism. Madison wrote that unless the separate branches of government "be so far connected and blended [or balanced] as to give to each a constitutional control [check] over the others, the degree of separation . . . essential to a free government can never in practice be duly maintained" (Rossiter 1961, 308).

Of course, the American model is merely one way to separate, distribute, and share power in constitutional government. There are other workable structures, such as those associated with various forms of the parliamentary type of constitutional democracy. The parliamentary democracies usually exemplify legislative primacy vis-a-vis the executive functions of government. However, they also tend to have a separate and truly independent judiciary, usually including a constitutional court with the power of constitutional review, which is roughly similar to the judicial review of the American system.

A notable worldwide trend in constitutionalism has been the distribution to an independent judiciary of the power to declare legislative and executive acts unconstitutional (Tate & Vallinder, 1995). This is a critical constitutional means to stop the legislative and executive powers from being used to violate individual rights or subvert democracy. A bill of rights in a constitution may eloquently declare lofty words about rights to life, liberty, property, and various forms of social security. But these rights will be practically useless unless there is governmental machinery to enforce them against acts of despotism. In the 78th Federalist Paper, Alexander Hamilton argued, "The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. . . . Limitations of this kind [to protect the rights of individuals] can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing" (Rossiter 1961, 464).

The constitutional courts of parliamentary democracies tend to concentrate their work on constitutional questions. Issues that pertain only to statutory interpretation, apart from the constitutionality of a law, are usually resolved by other courts, without action by the constitutional court. Unlike the American judiciary, these constitutional courts may provide opinions about the constitutionality of an act apart from the adversary process whereby a real case involving the act at issue is brought before the court by a prosecutor or someone filing suit against another party. Thus, these con-
stitutional courts may render advisory opinions, which is not done by the American judiciary (Favoreu 1990).

The essence of constitutional review by the constitutional courts, however, is the same as the judicial review of the American judiciary. This power of an independent judicial branch of government is used to protect immutable individual rights to life, liberty, and property and to sustain the fundamental procedures of democracy that depend upon freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom to participate in public elections and other public actions aimed at influencing and holding accountable the people's representatives in government.

The importance of an independent judiciary and judicial review to constitutionalism in democratic government is underscored by Herman Schwartz, who has served as an adviser on constitutionalism in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe. He believes that “whatever chance these countries have to continue developing into constitutional democracies depends on strong, independent courts that can repel legislative and executive encroachments on their constitutions” (1993, 194).

An independent judiciary with the power of judicial or constitutional review exemplifies the principle of constitutional limitations on democracy in order to prevent abusive or corrupt use of the people’s power in government. Is constitutionalism antidemocratic? No! Constitutionalism, properly understood, is not antidemocratic in its limitations on majority rule and the popular will. Rather, it protects a democratic government against certain maladies or deficiencies, well known to students of the ancient polis, which could lead to the demise of a democracy. Cass Sunstein, a notable American political scientist, says it well: “[A] central goal of constitutional democracy is to secure a realm for public discussion and collective selection of preferences [through public elections, for example] while guarding against the dangers of factional [majoritarian] tyranny and self-interested representation” (1988, 352). Constitutionalism in a democracy denotes an unshakable commitment to limited government and the rule of law for the two purposes of securing individual rights (liberalism) and enabling democratic government to operate for the common good (republicanism).

To fully understand, analyze, and appraise democracy in modern times, and to distinguish it from nondemocratic government, students of civics must include constitutionalism in their definition of democracy. The following criterion is offered as an example that can be explicated through education for democratic citizenship. In a constitutional liberal democracy, there is popular, representative government, based on free, fair, and competitive elections of representatives by an inclusive pool of voters; this government is both empowered and limited by the supreme law of a constitution.
to act for the public good and to secure the rights of everyone in the polity. This criterion incorporates and builds upon the definition of minimal or electoral democracy presented in the preceding section of this chapter.\textsuperscript{6}

The separation, distribution, and sharing of power in democratic governance is subsumed by the higher-order idea of constitutionalism. It is a necessary, if not sufficient, part of any constitutional design to secure individual rights and support democracy. If civic educators would teach their students to understand, analyze, and appraise democratic governments, then they must teach them the idea of separated and distributed powers, with attention to an independent judiciary with power to declare unconstitutional, when warranted, the acts of government officials. Students should be taught to use the idea of separated, distributed, and limited power as a criterion by which to comparatively analyze and appraise the authenticity of claims about democratic governance. They should understand that there are different ways to achieve the distribution and limitation of power in a constitutional democracy. However, they must know that a government with little or no actual separation, distribution, and sharing of power cannot realistically be called a constitutional democracy.

A primary objective of education for democratic citizenship is teaching students to use the concept of constitutionalism as a criterion, a standard, by which to analyze and appraise the authenticity of claims about democratic governance. Students should be taught to compare different political systems to determine the extent to which they are or are not constitutional democracies. Through this use of comparison they will better understand the concept of democratic constitutionalism (Hall 1996). Students should also be challenged to apply the concept of constitutionalism to evaluate procedures and policies of their government. Thus, they might evaluate the extent to which it exemplifies the concept of constitutionalism.

Rights and Democracy

Through education for democratic citizenship, students should learn the close connection between constitutionalism and \textbf{rights} in a liberal democracy. (See item 3 in Figure 1.) Constitutional limitations on the democratic government’s power are necessary to guarantee free, fair, open, and periodic competitive elections by the people of their representatives in government. The traditional constitutional rights of free speech, free press, free assembly, and free association must be guaranteed if elections are to fit the minimal definition of democratic government. Further, the rights of free expression and protection from abuses by the government in legal proceedings against the criminally accused are necessary to maintain loyal but authentically critical opposition to the party in power. There must be little
or no possibility for rulers to punish, incarcerate, or destroy their political opponents. Further, constitutionalism involves limitation on the power of the majority in a democracy to prevent use of this power to deprive individuals in the minority of their personal rights to life, liberty, property, privacy, freedom of conscience, freedom from arbitrary or unjust treatment by government, and so forth.

Students should be taught the origins and development of the concept of rights, which is commonly understood to be “justifiable claims to have or obtain something, to act in a certain way, or to be treated in a certain way.” For example, all persons have the right to ownership of property, to freedom of speech, and to protection against arbitrary arrest and incarceration by police. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when these ideas became prominent in Western Europe and North America, they carried the label “natural rights” to denote derivation of these rights from the nature of every human being. Each person, according to the natural rights concept, possesses equally certain immutable rights by virtue of her or his membership in the human species. It is the duty of a good government to protect each person’s natural rights. The American Declaration of Independence, for example, proclaims, “That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men…” (Center for Civic Education 1997, 6).

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the concept of natural rights was transformed into the idea of human rights. This change reflected an expansion of the scope or range of rights to include two types of claims. The first and older type is negative; it would limit the power of a government to protect peoples’ rights against coercive uses of its power. The second and newer type of claim is positive; it would enhance the power of the government to do something for the person to enable or empower her or him in some way (Berlin 1991, 118-172). Thus, the late twentieth century idea of human rights, which incorporates both the positive and negative types, means that “certain things ought not to be done to any human being and certain other things ought to be done for every human being” (Perry 1998, 13).

The older negative claims on rights are exemplified by Articles 1-21 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These Articles imply that no government or society should act against individuals in certain ways that would deprive them of inherent political or personal rights, such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and due process of law in dealings with government. The newer positive claims on rights are exemplified by Articles 22-28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They imply that every government and society should act for individual members to enable them to enjoy certain social and economic rights or ben-
benefits pertaining to social security, employment, housing, education, health care, and general standard of living.

The negative rights of individuals are protected by constitutional provisions that stop government from acting against anyone to deprive her or him of certain rights to liberty. The individual's positive rights, by contrast, are achieved, through constitutional or statutory provisions that require the government to do something affirmatively, such as establish public schools or provide public health care facilities, which enables a person to fruitfully exercise her or his rights to liberty. So positive rights empower individuals to possess resources of education, health, and wealth that are needed to effectively use such negative rights as freedom of speech, press, assembly, and due process of law. Advocates of positive rights have argued "that the worth of negative rights was limited where individuals had not the material circumstances to exercise them" (Fierbeck 1998, 37).

There is a general or global agreement among advocates of human rights that both types of rights, the negative and positive, must be included in a worthy constitutional liberal democracy. However, there is worldwide conflict or disagreement about which type of rights is primary and more important in a constitutional democracy. There also are continuing debates about particular benefits or privileges that should or should not be included in a basic list of rights. For example, should a democratic government act affirmatively to guarantee certain environmental or cultural rights? Should there be a positive right to clean air and water? Should there be a positive right, or constitutional guarantee, that the cultural identities and languages of all groups in the polity will be protected and preserved? Education for democratic citizenship should include analysis and debates about current questions and controversies on the meaning and use of human rights in constitutional liberal democracies.

United Nations documents proclaim the universality of human rights, as did Enlightenment-era philosophers and founders of the United States of America. So, too, have major world religions recognized the equal worth and dignity of all persons, a universalist idea that undergirds human rights. For example, Pope John Paul II has often expressed the global or universal relationship between human rights and belief in the equal worth and dignity of each person (Schall 1998).

These claims to the universality of human rights have been disputed by particularists and historicists, those who see them only as expressions of Western civilization rather than as global aspirations and standards. They view the current international surge of constitutional democracy and human rights as cultural imperialism by the West against the non-West. By contrast, universalists see a global destiny for human rights, a viewpoint sup-
ported by the worldwide decline of totalitarian regimes during the latter part of the twentieth century (e.g., the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union).

The universalists claim that people everywhere, if given a choice, will choose constitutional government and human rights. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, contends that "the concept of human rights, the idea of human freedom, and respect for the individual are universals." He recognizes that "they may not be achieved universally at the same time, but they remain universally pertinent, and we must promote them to the extent that we can" (Brzezinski 1997, 5-6).

At the end of the twentieth century, support for human rights has become prominent throughout the world, and the flagrant abuse of certain negative rights anywhere is likely to become a global concern. Most governments in the nation-states of today's world recognize the legitimacy of international interest in the inherent negative rights of every person, even if some do it grudgingly or superficially. Given the global primacy of the idea of rights, there should be pervasive and systematic human rights education in schools throughout the world.

There is a strong international movement for human rights education. According to leading educators, teaching and learning about human rights in age-appropriate ways is feasible and desirable from kindergarten through grade twelve and beyond. Schools in most parts of the world have incorporated human rights education into the curriculum.

One important gauge of curricular frameworks, content standards, instructional materials, and pedagogical practices is their treatment of constitutionalism and human rights. Are these core concepts addressed amply and effectively in the curriculum and the classroom? Are students challenged to use them comparatively to analyze and critically appraise governments of the world, especially their own government? Are students challenged to examine and respond to political problems or public issues about human rights violations or about the unending tensions between majority rule and minority rights? If not, then education for democratic citizenship is flawed. If there would be constitutional liberal democracy—government of, by, and for the people that secures equally the rights of individuals—then there must be effective education of the people about constitutionalism and human rights, because they bear the responsibility of knowing their rights, believing in them, and defending them.

Citizenship and Democracy

The people of a democracy have the ultimate responsibility for securing their rights, because this collective entity is sovereign. In a democracy,
the source of all authority, the legitimate basis of all power, is the collective body of the people, the citizens of the polity. There is popular sovereignty of the citizens. (See item 4 of Figure 1.)

In a constitutional liberal democracy, the sovereign people agree, through their consent to the supreme law of a constitution, to limitations on their exercise of power in order to secure or safeguard particular rights of citizens and other individuals of the polity. Certain negative rights are constitutionally recognized to be beyond the reach of the democratic government’s power.

A primary and continual question in the origin and evolution of democracy is: who, exactly, are the people? The constitutional answer to this question determines who will or will not be a citizen, “a full and equal member of a democratic political community,” such as a country or nation-state (Mouffe 1995, 217). The French political sociologist Alain Touraine points out that, “Membership in a community is one of the necessary preconditions for democracy” (1997, 65).

In some states or countries, citizenship, the condition of being a citizen, derives from the place of a person’s birth, which is known as jus soli citizenship. In other places, the status of citizen comes from the citizenship of one’s parents, which is known as jus sanguinis citizenship. Some states use both bases for ascribing citizenship. Further, most democratic states have established legal procedures by which people without a birthright to citizenship can become naturalized citizens (Dauenhauer 1996, 95-96; Maddex 1996, 45). The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States says, for example, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside” (Center for Civic Education 1997, 30). Citizenship, the legal link of an individual to the democratic political community, can be both granted and taken away by a political system.

In addition to the primary questions about how citizenship is acquired or lost, there is a very significant secondary question: what are the rights and responsibilities of citizenship? Equality before the law is one fundamental right of the citizen. For example the Constitution of Italy says, “All citizens have the same social dignity and are equal before the law, without discrimination of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal or social conditions” (Maddex 1996, 45).

Rights of citizenship are set forth in the constitutions of liberal democracies and in statutes and judicial decision anchored in the supreme law of the constitution. Constitutions may make a distinction between the rights of citizens and of inhabitants of the political community. For example, in the United States of America, only citizens have the right to vote, serve on
juries, and be elected to certain offices of the government, such as Congress. All other rights in the United States Constitution are guaranteed to everyone residing in the country, citizens and noncitizens alike. Likewise, the Constitution of Canada says, "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms [list of basic human rights]. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein" (Madex 1996, 45).

The status of citizenship involves very important obligations or responsibilities, such as paying taxes, serving in the country's armed forces when called upon, obeying laws enacted by one's representatives in government, demonstrating commitment and loyalty to the democratic political community and state, constructively criticizing the conditions of political and civic life, and participating to improve the quality of political and civic life (Dauenhauer 1996, 99-100; Galston 1991, 221). The responsibilities of citizenship include action to narrow the gap between ideals and realities. For instance, the highest standards for good government in a constitutional liberal democracy are equal security for the rights of all persons in the polity and government by consent of the governed. Citizens have the responsibility to recognize and overcome contradictions of ideals concerning equality of rights for all citizens, such as unjust denial to certain persons or groups of their rights to participate in government or to fair treatment in the courts of law (Galston 1995, 48).

If citizens of a constitutional liberal democracy would have security for their rights, they must take responsibility for them. First, they must respect the rights of others. Second, they must act to defend their own rights and the rights of others against those who would abuse them. And third, they must exercise their rights in order to make democracy work. The rights to vote, speak freely on public issues, and participate in voluntary organizations, for example, have little or no significance in political and civic life unless citizens regularly and effectively use them.

Among the roles of citizenship in a constitutional liberal democracy are (1) the voter in public elections; (2) the participant in political parties, interest groups, and civic organizations; (3) the supporter and maintainer of principles and practices on security for rights, civic equality, and popular sovereignty; and (4) the reformer of political and civic life in order to narrow the gap between principles and practices of the government and society. The maintenance and improvement of a constitutional liberal democracy depends upon the informed, effective, and responsible participation of its citizens.

The rights, responsibilities, and roles of democratic citizens have practical meaning today only within a particular kind of political order, the state
or nation-state. Only within the authority of a democratically governed state are there dependable means to enforce constitutional guarantees of rights. In the absence of governmental institutions with sufficient power to act decisively, the citizen's rights will be in jeopardy, for example through rampant social disorder. And only within the democratic nation-state are there dependable means to exercise citizenship responsibilities for holding government accountable to the people (Manent 1997).

The ideals or principles of constitutional liberal democracy may have universal applicability to the common human problem of governance. At present, however, democratic nation-states are the only dependable agencies for enforcement of their citizens' rights and for the exercise of their citizens' responsibilities. "Citizenship is the fundamental institution that connects the individual bearer of rights to the protective agencies of the state. The civic realm of the state provides the main channels through which individuals can participate politically and share in governance" (Kluever 1996, 77).

The people of a democratic state may have various and overlapping identities based on such factors of society as religion, race, ethnicity, social class, and gender. A constitutional liberal democracy, of course, recognizes that all people, regardless of differences, equally possess certain rights by virtue of their membership in the human species. And the state's constitutional government guarantees and protects these rights equally and non-preferentially among diverse individuals and groups of people.

The single identity possessed equally by all citizens of the polity, regardless of other differences, is civic identity. Held in common by all citizens, civic identity is based on freely given commitment, consent, to certain principles and values of the constitutional liberal democracy. Thus, members of ethnic or religious minority groups within a constitutional liberal democracy are guaranteed the same rights, with the same obligations, of citizenship as other groups of citizens in the polity. Both majorities and minorities have the same civic identity.

In societies with widespread diversity in religious, racial, and ethnic identities (e.g., the U.S.A., Canada, and Australia), common civic identity is the tie that holds citizens together in a single democratic political order. The diverse citizenry becomes a democratic community by shared commitment to common civic principles and values rather than by a common ethnic, racial, or religious identity. There is freedom to choose an overarching civic identity that exists apart from any particular cultural identity.

In pluralistic liberal democracies, individuals, not groups, are the primary bearers of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. However, particular minority groups may be granted special rights pertaining to cultural preservation. For example, certain indigenous peoples in the United States,
Canada, and Australia are afforded governmental protection and support in their efforts to preserve particular cultural group identities and practices. And affirmative action programs have been enacted legislatively to provide certain benefits to persons based on their membership or identity in particular racial or ethnic minority groups (Kymlicka 1995). In democratic states with two or more major ethnic groups, there may be power sharing among groups of people who otherwise see themselves as distinct cultural communities. This type of power-sharing political order is called consociational democracy. Distinct cultural groups of a consociational democracy have certain rights to local autonomy within a federal system of government, and they have the rights of power sharing in the general government of the state (Lijphart 1995).

Within strict limits, group-based rights of minority cultural groups may be compatible with constitutional liberal democracy. Excessive latitude for cultural group rights and privileges, however, is inimical both to liberalism and to democracy, because it elevates a deterministic or primordial cultural group identity above the autonomous individual’s right to a freely chosen and superordinate civic identity. Furthermore, if rigid or impermeable differences between monolithic and exclusive ethnic, racial, or religious groups become more important to people than the inclusive, open, and dynamic civic community, there will be subversion of both individual freedom and the common good. Individuals would be locked into singular and separate group identities which shackle their liberty and could preclude or at least impede their freedom to exercise rights and responsibilities of citizenship in cooperation with a diversity of other citizens on behalf of the common good (Touraine 1997, 64-68). 8

The concept of citizenship, based on the individual’s freely chosen civic identity, is a key to comprehension of what democracy is and how it works. Students involved in education for democratic citizenship need to know what citizenship is, how it is acquired or lost in various political systems, what rights and responsibilities are entailed by it, and how it is connected to the institutions of particular nation-states, especially their own.

Citizenship in a constitutional liberal democracy should be understood as civic identity in distinction from other types of social or cultural identities that may exist more or less extensively and simultaneously within a political system. Further, students should be taught that their civic identity “may coexist with other identities that define different aspects of their personhood. But democratic citizenship should provide those who share it with a common bond of political allegiance and a shared space for civic participation” (Klusmeyer 1996, 97). If not, the well-being of a constitutional liberal democracy is threatened.
Civil Society and Democracy

Civic participation, a right and responsibility of democratic citizenship, is exercised through the organizations of civil society in a constitutional liberal democracy. A vibrant civil society is an indicator of effective constitutionalism in a democratic government. By contrast, a genuine civil society is impossible under a totalitarian government, which attempts to concentrate all power in a centralized state dominated by one party. The emergence and growth of civil society organizations during the 1980s in countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia signaled the fall of their once-dominant communist regimes.

What is civil society? How is it related to constitutionalism, individual rights, citizenship, and democracy? And why is it necessary to the freedom and workability of any democratic polity? (See item 5 of Figure 1.)

Civil society is a debatable concept which political theorists and practitioners have used variously during the past 300 years. However, most would agree that it pertains to “social interaction not encompassed by the state” (Dryzek 1996, 481). Further, most current users of the idea would likely agree, at least, that civil society is the complex network of freely formed voluntary associations, distinct from the formal governmental institutions of the state, acting independently or in partnership with state agencies. Apart from the state, but subject to the rule of law, civil society is a public domain that private individuals create and operate. Examples of nongovernmental organizations that constitute civil society are free labor unions, religious communities, human-rights advocacy groups, environmental protection organizations, support groups providing social welfare services to needy people, independent newspaper and magazine publishing houses, independent and private schools, and professional associations. An individual of a free country may belong to many civil society organizations at once and throughout a lifetime. Americans, for example, have sustained a long tradition of multiple and overlapping memberships in nongovernmental organizations.

Civil society is distinct from civil government and the state, but not necessarily in conflict with them. Pluralist democracies, for example, include many different kinds of civil society organizations that act freely and independently of state control for the public good, which the state may also seek. Civil society organizations may act in harmony with the purposes of the state, if not always in agreement with particular state agencies. But they may also act as an independent social force to check or limit an abusive or undesired exercise of the state’s power. Civil society can be a countervailing force against the state to oppose despotism and protect the civil liberties and rights of individuals and groups (Gellner 1995, 32).
A constitutional, liberal democratic government is empowered to protect individual rights to free expression, assembly, and association, which are necessary to the independent operations of civil society organizations. Thus a top-down structure protects civil society; it extends from the state’s constitutional government to the people’s local activities and guarantees the rights of individuals to join and conduct nongovernmental organizations.

But the constitutional democratic state also receives bottom-up support, which stems from the “grassroots” through community-based, nongovernmental organizations acting democratically for the public good. Local, regional, and national nongovernmental organizations provide channels for citizens to express their needs and interests to candidates for office and representatives in government. Through these channels, citizens’ concerns can be transformed into public policies. Civil society organizations, then, are public guardians that empower citizens to take responsibility for their rights and hold public officials accountable to their constituents. Through participation in organizational activities, members acquire the knowledge, skills, and virtues of democratic citizenship. So community-based, voluntary organizations are public laboratories, in which citizens learn democracy by doing it, contributing mightily to democratic governance of both the state and the civil society that it serves.

Civil society is an opponent of despotism and an ally of any state governed as a constitutional liberal democracy. The government of such a state is simultaneously limited and empowered for the common goal of securing rights to life, liberty, and property, which will be at risk if the government is either too strong or too weak. Its constitutionally imposed limitations disable the state from despotically infringing upon human rights and destroying the domain of freely formed and independently operated nongovernmental organizations. Further, civil society organizations, grounded in social mores and civic culture, are an ever-present countervailing force against statist or despotic tendencies of the civil government. At the same time, its constitutionally provided powers enable the democratic state effectively to enforce laws that protect and advance human rights, maintain the order and safety necessary for productive organizational life, and provide social benefits jointly with nongovernmental organizations (Holmes 1995, 77-81).

However, the state is not the only source of oppression in society. Malevolent and illiberal associations can be as oppressive as a despotic government. Tribalist or chauvinistic organizations, for example, can repress individual rights and civic virtues. The liberal, constitutional, and democratic state protects individual rights against group-based oppression in civil society. And groups in civil society, in turn, may guard individuals against the state’s despotic tendencies. Individual rights to liberty, therefore, depend
upon continuing interaction between the state and civil society organizations.

The French sociologist Emile Durkheim concluded that to safeguard individual liberty, a constructive tension must exist between the state and civil society.

"...If that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual, it has itself need of some counterbalance: it must be restrained by other collective forces, that is by... secondary groups [of civil society]. ...It is out of this conflict that individual liberties are born [and maintained]. (Durkheim 1957, 65)"

The rule of law, grounded in the democratic constitution and civic culture of a people, is an indispensable regulator of tension between governmental and nongovernmental organizations. This rule of law enables civil society and the state to function freely for individual rights and the common good. It is the key to congruence between civil society and the democratic state. And it is missing in flawed conceptions of civil society that wrongly denigrate government and the state as inevitable enemies of liberty.

The vitality of civil society is a gauge of the strength and prospects of democracy in any country of the world. Thus, if students of civic education programs would know, analyze, and appraise democracy in their country or elsewhere, they must be able to comprehend the idea of civil society, to assess the activities of civil society organizations, and to connect their knowledge of this idea to other key concepts, such as constitutionalism, individual rights, and citizenship. (See Figure 1.)

Students should be taught to distinguish democratic from nondemocratic governments by using as a criterion the idea of civil society to guide their comparative analyses and appraisals. A government with power to crush or control voluntary social organizations cannot be an authentic constitutional liberal democracy. A political system without a genuine civil society cannot legitimately claim to be a constitutional liberal democracy.

Students should also be taught the skills and dispositions or virtues they need to act effectively in the development of civil society. The behavioral skills and dispositions pertaining to cooperation, trust, tolerance, civility, and self-reliance can be learned through practice in school and in the community outside the school. (See Figure 2 in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.)

If civic educators would sustain healthy constitutional liberal democracies in the twenty-first century, they must teach their students how to maintain and improve civil society. Citizens must know what it is, how it relates to constitutional democracy and liberty, and how to participate responsibly and effectively within it. (See the discussions of intellectual capital and social capital in Chapter 2.)
Market Economy and Democracy

A free democratic government depends upon both a vibrant civil society and a market economy, which involves freedom of exchange at the marketplace. The market is a place where buyers and sellers freely make transactions, such as the exchange of goods and services. (See item 6 of Figure 1.)

Freedom of exchange at the market, like other social interactions of a constitutional liberal democracy, is regulated by the rule of law, which prevails in all spheres of democratic political and civic life. Thus, constitutionalism is used to limit the government’s power to control economic transactions, thereby protecting private rights to property and free exchanges at the market. Constitutionalism also empowers the government to regulate, within certain limits, the economic affairs of individuals, which yields the order and stability necessary to security for individual rights to life, liberty, property, equality of opportunity, and so forth, which represent the greatest good in the genuine liberal model of democracy. So, freedom of economic activity in a constitutional democracy is freedom under the rule of law.

Every democratic country has a market economy which the government modifies more or less in response to interests expressed by citizens. The result of this kind of government intervention is a mixed market economy; it is based more or less on a free market but restricted significantly by laws enacted presumably to satisfy the majority of citizens. According to an eminent political scientist, Robert Dahl, “[A]ll democratic countries have not only rejected centralized command economy as an alternative to a market economy, but have also rejected a strictly free market economy as an alternative to a mixed economy in which market outcomes are modified substantially by government intervention” (1993, 279). In his latest book, On Democracy, Dahl writes “Polyarchal [constitutional and liberal] democracy has existed only in countries with predominately market-capitalist economies and never (or at most briefly) in countries with predominately nonmarket economies” (1998, 166-167).

The mixed market economies of democratic countries vary significantly in the amount and kind of modification by the constitutional government in response to public demand. The range extends from the highly regulated and modified markets of the social democracy model to the less regulated and freer markets of the liberal democracy model. World-renowned economists of the 1980s and 1990s, including recent Nobel prizewinners, have recommended less regulation and freer markets as a key to productivity, prosperity, and liberty for individuals and societies.

The Nobel laureate in economics Milton Friedman asserts: “Economic freedom is an essential requisite for political freedom. By enabling peo-
ple to cooperate with one another without coercion or central direction, it reduces the area over which political power is exercised.” Further, Friedman claims, “Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between political freedom and a free market. I know of no example in time or place of a society that has been marked by a large measure of political freedom, and that has not also used something comparable to a free market to organize the bulk of economic activity” (1982, 9).

The market, the means to freedom of exchange among parties in need of cooperative relationships to pursue certain economic interests, serves to offset or check concentrations of political power that could be exercised against individual rights. A market economy in tandem with a dynamic civil society enables development and maintenance of plural sources of power to counteract the power of the state and safeguard the people’s freedom. By contrast, “The combination of economic and political power in the same hands is a sure recipe for tyranny” (1990, 3).

A centrally directed command economy, the antithesis of the market economy, substitutes the directives of government officials with virtually unlimited state power for the free choices of the marketplace. Through their total control of the production and distribution of goods and services (wealth and the means to acquire wealth), the government officials in command of the economy have power to control totally the inhabitants in their realm. There are no effective limits on their power to abuse individuals at odds with the state or to deprive unpopular persons of their rights to liberty, to equality of opportunity, and to life.

The totalitarian state precludes the market economy and civil society, because it cannot abide countervailing sources of power. By contrast, the market with its private property rights and relatively free choices and exchanges precludes a regime of total control and forms a material foundation for constitutional liberal democracy. Historian Richard Pipes argues that “there is an intimate connection between public guarantees of ownership and individual liberty: that while property in some form is possible without liberty, the contrary is inconceivable” (1999, xiii).

If civic educators would teach their students to know constitutional democracy and liberty and to distinguish it from alternatives, then they must teach them that free exchange in a market economy is a foundation of free government. Further, these students must acquire knowledge of centrally controlled command economies and state-dependent people with little or no capacity to make free choices. They must learn that a government with sufficient power to comprehensively distribute, according to its commands, the goods of economic and social security also has sufficient power to deprive individuals of their rights to life, liberty, property, equality of opportunity, and the pursuit of happiness. An enduring lesson of modern history is that
markets, which require free choices for their operations, are a necessary condition for a political and social life in liberty. This lesson from history must be at the core of education for democratic citizenship and freedom.

Education for democratic citizenship should emphasize the necessary connection of a market economy to the maintenance of liberty in civil society. Students should learn that there can be no democracy without civil society and no civil society without a market economy (Fukuyama, 1995, 356-357). Further, they should understand that both a free economy and civil society depend upon constitutionalism, including the rule of law. There cannot be authentically free societies and economies without constitutionally based regulation for the common good (Hayek 1960, 205-219).

A perennial public issue of all constitutional democracies pertains to how much and what kind of legal regulation there should be. Fundamental rights of individuals will be at risk if there is too much regulation or too little regulation by the constitutional government. Achieving the appropriate mixture of liberty and order, freedom and regulation, is a challenge faced by citizens of every democracy. Examination of issues about the extent and kind of governmental regulations, therefore, should be emphasized in education for democratic citizenship.

**Ongoing Tensions in a Constitutional Liberal Democracy**

The set of concepts in Figure 1 (items 1-6) denotes the substance of constitutional liberal democracy, the kind of democracy that secures individual rights and promotes the common good. Equal rights to liberty for individuals and government by consent of the governed are the key standards, the criteria, by which to assess and appraise the quality of constitutional liberal democracy. They are the ultimate purposes for which institutions of government should function and the participation of citizens should be directed. To seek achievement of these highest purposes of constitutional liberal democracy is to serve the common good, the general well-being of the community.

To pursue these purposes, however, triggers four types of ongoing tensions in a constitutional liberal democracy: (1) majority rule and minority rights, (2) liberty and equality, (3) liberty and order, and (4) individual interests and the common good. (See item 7 in Figure 1.) Each category of tension is a paradox of an authentic constitutional liberal democracy, which cannot be resolved by choosing one side of the equation to the exclusion of the other side. To opt for such extreme solutions would destroy the nature of the democratic polity, which depends for its existence on the maintenance in some practicable fashion of both sides of the paradox. "Democracy exists only by combining different and partly contradictory principles"
(Touraine 1997, 71). So each category of tensions is an ongoing challenge for citizens, which continuously raises public issues that must be managed within the paradox that generates them.

The categorical or generic issues of these paradoxes are never resolved once and for all. There is no comprehensive, ultimate, or universal solution to them. Rather, citizens respond to them on a case-by-case basis as the issues emerge particularly and variously in different times and places, and they manage them in various ways that fit their particular traditions and cultures with more-or-less kinds of responses while avoiding either-or-types of solutions. Thus, the four types of public issues are both historical and everlastingly current in the different places where people have attempted to establish and maintain constitutional liberal democracy. Through comparative analysis and appraisal of these four kinds of issues and various responses to them in various times and places, students will gain a deeper understanding of democracy, both its strengths and weaknesses, and its potential for success as well as failure. Each of the categorical paradoxes of constitutional liberal democracy is discussed in one of the following four sections of this chapter.

**Majority Rule and Minority Rights.** The first category in the list of ongoing tensions is the paradox of democracy involving the contradictory objectives of majority rule and minority rights. (See item 7a of Figure 1.) The very essence of democracy is rule by the many. And education for democratic citizenship necessarily involves teaching and learning about majority rule—the making of binding decisions by combining the votes of more than one half of those persons eligible to participate. For example, Article 6 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic recognizes this fundamental feature of democracy. It says, “Political decisions shall stem from the will of the majority, expressed by means of a free vote” (International Institute for Democracy 1996, 90). So why should there be limits on majority rule, this essential element of democracy? And why is setting and maintaining such limits a universal problem of democracy?

Well, any source of political power, if unlimited or unchecked, may be used oppressively and unjustly. Power exercised by majority rule of the people is no exception to the general rule that absolute power inevitably threatens liberty and justice. Indeed, if absolute or unlimited power is given to the many, they are likely to oppress the few who differ from them. Likewise, history teaches us that if all power is given to a few or to one, there will be oppression of the many. So, good education for democratic citizenship teaches that unlimited majority rule in a democracy may be as dangerous and despotic as the unlimited or absolute power of an autocrat or dictator.
Article 6 of the 1992 Czech Constitution, for example, recognizes the problem of unlimited majority rule. It says, "The majority's decisions must heed the protection of the minorities." So, the Constitution of the Czech Republic conforms to the general understanding in today's world that constitutional liberal democracy is majority rule with protection of minority rights, and unlimited majority rule may become democratic despotism or tyranny of the majority. Thomas Jefferson, the second President of the United States of America, eloquently expressed this basic principle of modern democracy in his First Inaugural Address (1801): "All . . . will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect and to violate would be oppression" (Center for Civic Education 1997, 47). In a constitutional liberal democracy, the power of majority rule is both sanctioned and limited by the supreme law of the constitution to protect the rights of individuals. Tyranny of the majority is barred. But so is tyranny by a minority.

The possibility for democracy to degenerate into majority tyranny against unpopular minorities is always present. In every modern democracy, there have been and are sad cases of majority tyranny against unpopular individuals or groups in the society. Education for democratic citizenship, therefore, must emphasize the principle of majority rule with protection of minority rights and teach honestly and forthrightly about violations of this principle in the past and present events of one's society. Further, there must be discussions and debates among students about constitutional limits on majority rule to protect minority rights. And there must be discussions and debates about constitutional limits on the exercise of minority rights in order to maintain majority rule. "Democracy is not compatible with the rejection of minorities. Nor is it compatible with the minorities' rejection of the majority" (Touraine 1997, 65).

Students should examine cases of political behavior and constitutional review that raise such questions as the following: when and to what extent should the power of majority rule in a democracy be limited to protect the rights of individuals and groups in the minority? And when and how should the exercise of minority rights be limited to serve the common good? Why should this be done? And how can it be done effectively and justly? Through these classroom experiences, students will learn that a democratic constitution is the country's supreme law that both sanctions and limits majority rule for the purpose of protecting the rights of everyone under the government's authority.

Here is a criterion about majority rule with minority rights for the education of democratic citizens. The most certain test by which we judge whether or not a society is truly democratic and free is whether or not minori-
ties, including those most different or disliked by the majority, are secure in their enjoyment of human rights and democratic opportunities on equal terms with others in the society. This is a challenging criterion—one that no democratic country has met perfectly. It is, however, a worthy standard by which to direct and evaluate the behavior of democratic citizens and their institutions, and it should be part of good education for democratic citizenship wherever in the world it occurs.

**Liberty and Equality.** The second type of ongoing tension in the list of paradoxes of democracy is liberty and equality. (See item 7b of Figure 1.) In one sense, liberty and equality are perfectly compatible; that is, all persons are equal in their possession of certain rights to liberty, because they equally are members of the human species. Thus, all persons should be equal before the law and equal in their rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Everyone should be equal in the common status of citizen. This kind of equality is not merely compatible with liberty, it is essential to it (Hayak 1960; Pipes 1999).

By contrast, equality defined as equivalency of reward, an equality of outcomes regardless of variation of the quality of inputs, is perfectly at odds with liberty. This kind of anti-liberal equality is expressed by the Marxist slogan, “From each one according to his ability and to each one according to his need.”

This kind of illiberal equality is rarely, if ever, achievable by consent; so coercion by an all-powerful governing force is the only way to seek it. Richard Pipes, an expert on Russian history during Tsarist and Soviet times, points out that “the enforcement of equality destroys not only liberty but equality as well, for as the experience of communism has demonstrated, those charged with ensuring social equality claim for themselves privileges that elevate them high above the common herd” (1999, 283).

Teaching and learning about the relationship of liberty to equality in a democracy raises issues about how and when to combine negative and positive rights to promote the common good and maintain individual freedom. Negative rights are exemplified by the American Bill of Rights, which are directed against the power of government to stop it from depriving an individual of her or his civil liberties. Amendment I of the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights, for example, says, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (Center for Civic Education 1997, 27). Similar restrictions on the power of government to protect rights to liberty can be found in the constitution of every state committed to constitutional liberal democracy.
Positive rights are also found in many democratic constitutions, which guarantee that the government will use its power to affirm or provide opportunities and benefits for citizens to promote social and economic equality. For example, the 1992 Constitution of Lithuania says in Article 41, "Citizens who demonstrate suitable progress should be guaranteed education at establishments of higher education free of charge." And in Articles 52 and 53 there are guarantees of positive rights to social, economic, and medical benefits: "The state shall guarantee the right of citizens to old age and disability pension, as well as to social assistance in the event of unemployment, sickness, widowhood, loss of the breadwinner. . . . The state shall take care of people's health, and shall guarantee medical aid to citizens free of charge at state medical facilities. . . ." (International Institute for Democracy 1996, 215-216). These kinds of positive rights are found in most constitutions of the world's democracies. In some constitutions, the guarantees of social, economic, cultural, and environmental rights are very great in number and broad in scope to the point of empowering the government to very amply intrude into the private lives of citizens and the operations of the civil society and economy to redistribute resources or otherwise promote social and economic equality of the citizenry.

In their restrictions on the government's power, constitutional guarantees of negative rights may be in conflict with constitutional promises of positive rights, especially if the guarantees of positive rights empower the government to intrude extensively into the private domains of civil society and market economy.

Advocates for the primacy and predominance of positive rights argue that "bread is more important than freedom of speech." They contend that the duties of government to provide social and economic welfare benefits for all the people require enhancement of public power and authority to enter and direct all areas of economic and social life to promote the common good. Members of Poland's recent struggles for freedom from communist tyranny, however, argue that negative rights to personal and political freedoms "are not the result of, but a necessary precondition for, social and economic rights. History has taught us that there can be no [secure guarantee of] bread without freedom" (Osiatynski 1990, 301). They have understood that negative rights are the foundations for democratic and free deliberation by citizens about the positive rights they think their government should or can practically guarantee without undue loss of individual liberty.

Proponents of the negative rights tradition worry about the enormous increase of centralized government power required to provide positive rights through large-scale public programs. This could lead to a government so powerful, intrusive, and insufficiently limited that it could arbitrarily deprive
particular persons (those out of favor with authorities) of their personal, private, and political rights. Thus, they maintain that human rights generally depend upon the primacy of guaranteed negative rights. They assert this standard or criterion: a constitutional democracy that would only recognize negative rights is incomplete because it fails to accommodate widespread needs for social and economic justice; however one that would only or primarily recognize and address positive rights is impossible, because security for negative rights is an indispensable condition of a genuine constitutional liberal democracy. If an overemphasis on positive rights for equality would so empower government as to put negative rights at risk, then the very existence of constitutional liberal democracy, with its personal rights to liberty, will be in jeopardy.

A major responsibility of citizens in every constitutional liberal democracy is to seek accommodations to avoid severe incompatibilities of negative and positive rights. The generic issue is not a choice between one extreme or the other, negative rights for liberty or the virtual exclusion of positive rights for equality or vice versa. Rather, the challenge of democratic citizenship is to decide, on a case-by-case basis, what should be the limits on positive rights in order to conserve the foundational civil liberties without which constitutional liberal democracy is impossible. Richard Pipes offers this conclusion in the final section of his impressive inquiry into the relationship of private property rights to freedom in political and civic life:

The state must regulate today more than ever (to provide positive rights advocated by the people through democratic procedures). But it should do so reluctantly, to the minimum extent necessary, always bearing in mind that the [negative] economic rights of its citizens (rights to property) are as essential as their civil rights (rights to equal treatment), and that, indeed, the two are inseparable. And as for the "right" to equal reward, it is unattainable and, in any event, destructive of true, private rights. (Pipes 1999, 283)

Education for democratic citizenship should include lessons that require students to examine and evaluate human rights claims on government, both negative and positive, and the relationships, conflicts, and accommodations of these two types of rights. And these lessons should involve analysis, appraisal, and decision making among students about alternative viewpoints concerning the primacy of negative or positive rights and the extent to which positive rights should be guaranteed by a constitutional liberal democracy. Through these lessons students should comprehend that availability of resources may limit a government's capacity to guarantee positive rights. Further, they should realize that empowering a government beyond certain limits, even in the cause of positive rights for equality, justice, and the common good, leads directly to the possibility of despotism or even totalitarianism.
Liberty and Order. Effective limitation of a democratic government to protect negative rights raises a third category of generic issues of a constitutional liberal democracy, which is: how can both personal liberty and the power of government be limited to establish and maintain the kind of social and political order necessary to guarantee the rights of individuals? (See item 7c of Figure 1.) Consideration of this problem involves a generalization about liberty and order. Genuine personal liberty can exist only in a well-ordered community, which involves authoritative limits on freedom of expression to protect the common good and authoritative limits on the power of government to protect each person’s right to liberty.

The right to personal liberty looms large in the principles and practices of modern democracies. According to the Preamble to the 1787 Constitution of the United States of America, a main purpose of government is to “secure the Blessings of Liberty” (Center for Civic Education 1997, 12). And the 1992 Constitution of the Czech Republic concurs with other constitutional liberal democracies, past and present, in its recognition that personal liberty is a primary objective of government. Article 1, says, “The Czech Republic shall be a sovereign, united and democratic law-governed state, based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and of the citizen” (International Institute for Democracy 1996, 89).

The right to personal liberty in a constitutional democracy, however, is not absolute. Unlimited freedom for one or some individuals would most likely result in the extensive restriction of freedom for everyone else. Social control and political order, based on the just exercise of authority, are necessary to secure the maximum freedom for all members of a society. Thus, every constitutional democracy continually confronts the problem of setting limits to the exercise of personal liberty and of balancing the power of government with the liberty of individuals in civic and political life.

A supreme test for any constitutional democracy is its capacity to both empower and limit the government in order to secure liberty for the society and its citizens. James Madison, a great American political thinker, eloquently defined this universal problem of democracy in the 51st Federalist Paper: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself” (Center for Civic Education 1997, 43).

Madison recognized that one’s right to personal liberty is at risk if the government has too much power or too little power. If the government’s power is not limited sufficiently, then it can and probably will use this power
to oppress certain individuals and deprive them unjustly of their right to personal liberty. So there must be constitutional limits upon the power and authority of government, even a democratic government, in order to secure the right to personal liberty for all members of the community. However, if the government is not empowered sufficiently by the people, then it cannot take action to protect individuals against predators who would, if they could, deprive others of their rights to liberty, property, and safety. So a good democratic government must be both limited and empowered by the people to secure the right to liberty for all persons under its authority, which is necessary for the common good of a community.

Categorical issues about limits for both personal liberty and the power of government must be part of education for democratic citizenship, because the life or death of a democratic political system depends upon an effective response to the problem. A government that fails to deal with the problem of setting limits for personal liberty and balancing personal freedom with institutionalized power and authority will not remain a constitutional liberal democracy. Rather, it will either degenerate into some type of despotism or it will break apart into licentiousness and anarchy. Thus, participants in the political system must learn, through lessons in democratic citizenship, to recognize, analyze, and respond effectively to public issues about setting limits to the exercise of personal liberty and to the exercise of power through government.

Students should examine and discuss cases of political behavior and constitutional review that raise controversial questions about when and to what extent the government should or should not exercise power to limit personal liberty. For example, should individuals be permitted to participate in political organizations that seek the violent overthrow of the government? Should individuals have freedom to express hatred toward persons or groups who are different from them in their racial or ethnic origins or their religious beliefs? Should the government have power to compel public expressions of loyalty to the constitution and the state? When, if ever, should the police have power to enter and search a person’s home or property? Questions such as these should be raised continually and discussed freely, openly, and robustly by students involved in education for democratic citizenship.

**Individual Interests and the Common Good.** The fourth and final category of issues in a constitutional liberal democracy involves individual interests and the common good. (See item 7d of Figure 1.) A defining attribute of constitutional liberal democracy is freedom for individuals to pursue their preferences or personal interests. But this fundamental freedom for individuals to pursue their personal vision of happiness or self-fulfillment depends upon a healthy community.
If most individuals of a community independently pursue personal interests with little or no regard for others, the community will suffer; and with its decline will come the demise of social order and stability without which rights to individual liberty are insecure. So individual interests must be pursued in combination with concern for the common good, upon which all members of the community depend for personal fulfillment. “The idea of a common good above our private interests is a necessary condition for enjoying individual liberty” (Mouffe 1992, 228).

Citizens of the community must sometimes be willing to subordinate their private and personal interests in favor of the public and common good. The critical generic issue concerns the latitude and limits of personal choice in a democratic community that balances pursuit of individual interests in concert with the common good. At what point and for what ends should one transcend her or his private objectives in order to achieve common ground with a diversity of others in the community? For example, individuals may in certain situations accept, or even seek, public regulations of their private property in order to protect the environment or to guarantee safety for employees at the workplace. By recognizing and acquiescing to public limits on private choice for the well-being of the community, one exemplifies democratic citizenship for the common good, the highest expression of civic virtue.

A practical and workable balance of individualism and communitarianism occurs when two distinct models of citizenship are combined in democratic civil society and government. One model, liberal citizenship, stresses the broadest possible latitude for personal preferences and choices within a functioning democratic civil society and government. Individuals may choose to participate less in the public sphere of political and civic life in order to pursue more extensively their private interests. By contrast, the civic republican model of citizenship requires continuous engagement with political and civic life. The citizen is expected to cooperate with others to seek common ground and serve public interests for the common good. “For civic republicans, citizenship is not just a status but an activity: citizen participation” in civil society and government (Klusmeyer 1996, 96). The civic republican model also emphasizes the strictest possible limit for personal preference and choices that is consistent with guarantees of fundamental human rights to liberty.

In his celebrated examination of Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote about the necessity to blend political and civic participation with individual interests in order to maintain the common good of civil society and government. He referred to this kind of citizenship as “self-interest rightly understood” because through contributions of time and effort to the well-being of civil society and government, the citizens helped one
another to maintain conditions of public well-being needed for their fruitful pursuit of personal interests and fulfillments: Toqueville wrote, "The principle of self-interest rightly understood is not a lofty one, but it is clear and sure... Each American knows when to sacrifice some of his private interests to save the rest" (Bradley 1987, 122-123).

Generic issues about individual interests and the common good, which involve questions about the latitude and limitations of personal choice in a constitutional liberal democracy, must be part of education for democratic citizenship. These kinds of issues are particularly pertinent to the workings of a market economy. When and why should private and personal preferences be overridden by collective concerns with regard to the production and consumption of goods and services? When and why should an individual's use of private property be trampled by the community's concern for environmental protection? Questions of personal and public morality may also be raised. Is freedom to choose an abortion an unwarranted violation of community concerns about morality and thereby subject to restriction on behalf of the common good? Or is it an inviolable right of privacy that the community should not abridge?

Questions and issues like these about the interplay of personal interests and the common good must be addressed in education for democratic citizenship. If not, students will lack competence for citizenship that requires both individual choices and collective deliberation to secure civil liberties within the common good of civil society and government upon which freedom depends (Axtmann 1996, 36-79).

Components of Education for Democratic Citizenship

Effective education for democratic citizenship satisfactorily treats four basic components: (1) knowledge of citizenship and government in democracy, (2) cognitive skills of democratic citizenship, (3) participatory skills of democratic citizenship, and (4) virtues of dispositions of democratic citizenship. (See Figure 2.)

These four basic categories of civic education may be treated variously by educators of different countries. But there are certain themes within each generic category that are the criteria by which we define civic education for constitutional liberal democracy. If they are missing from the curriculum, then education for democratic citizenship is grossly flawed.

As indicated by the first component in Figure 2, the primary objective of the civics curriculum is to teach systematically and thoroughly a set of concepts by which democracy in today's world is defined and practiced. These concepts, listed in Figure 1, are minimal democracy, constitutionalism, rights, citizenship, civil society, and market economy. Acquisition of
FIGURE 2

COMPONENTS OF EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

1. KNOWLEDGE OF CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNMENT IN DEMOCRACY
   a. Concepts on the substance of democracy
   b. Ongoing tensions that raise public issues
   c. Constitutions and institutions of democratic government
   d. Functions of democratic institutions
   e. Practices of democratic citizenship and the roles of citizens
   f. Contexts of democracy: cultural, social, political, and economic
   g. History of democracy in particular states and throughout the world

2. COGNITIVE SKILLS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
   a. Identifying and describing phenomena or events of political and civic life
   b. Analyzing and explaining phenomena or events of political and civic life
   c. Evaluating, taking, and defending positions on public events and issues
   d. Making decisions on public issues
   e. Thinking critically about conditions of political and civic life
   f. Thinking constructively about how to improve political and civic life

3. PARTICIPATORY SKILLS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
   a. Interacting with other citizens to promote personal and common interests
   b. Monitoring public events and issues
   c. Influencing policy decisions on public issues
   d. Implementing policy decisions on public issues

4. VIRTUES AND DISPOSITIONS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
   a. Promoting the general welfare or common good of the community
   b. Recognizing the equal moral worth and dignity of each person
   c. Respecting and protecting rights possessed equally by each person
   d. Participating responsibly and effectively in political and civic life
   e. Taking responsibility for government by consent of the governed
   f. Becoming a self-governing person by practicing civic virtues
   g. Supporting and maintaining democratic principles and practices

This set of concepts will enable students to know what a constitutional liberal democracy is, and what it is not; to distinguish this type of government from other types; and to evaluate the extent to which their government and other governments of the world do or do not function as authentic constitutional liberal democracies.

Students who master this set of concepts on the theory and practice of democracy will be able to think critically about four types of issues that are generic to the constitutional and liberal form of democracy. These categorical issues pertain to tensions of democracy such as (1) majority rule with minority rights, (2) liberty and equality, (3) liberty and order, and (4) individual interest and the common good. (See item 7 of Figure 1.)
Basic knowledge must be applied effectively to civic life if it would serve the needs of citizens and their civitas. Thus, a central facet of civic education for constitutional liberal democracy is development of cognitive skills, which are included in the second component of Figure 2. Cognitive skills empower citizens to identify, describe, explain, and evaluate information and ideas pertinent to public issues and to make and defend decisions on these issues.

The third component of Figure 2 treats participatory skills, which empower citizens to influence public policy decisions and to hold accountable their representatives in government. In combination with cognitive skills, participatory skills are tools of citizenship whereby individuals, whether acting alone or in groups, can participate effectively to promote personal and common interests, to secure their rights, and to promote the common good.

The development of cognitive and participatory skills requires intellectually active learning by students inside and outside the classroom. Students should continually be challenged to use information and ideas, individually and collectively, to analyze case studies, respond to public issues, and resolve or meliorate political problems.

The fourth and final component of education for democratic citizenship pertains to virtues and dispositions. The items of the fourth component of Figure 2 are traits of character necessary to the preservation and improvement of a constitutional liberal democracy. If citizens would enjoy the privileges and rights of their polity, they must take responsibility for them, which requires a certain measure of civic virtue. Civic virtues such as self-discipline, civility, honesty, trust, courage, compassion, tolerance, and respect for the worth and dignity of all individuals are indispensable to the proper functioning of civil society and constitutional government. These characteristics must be nurtured through various social agencies, including the school, in a healthy constitutional democracy.

A well-designed and well-taught curriculum on democratic citizenship will include the four components of Figure 2. This kind of education for democracy can yield citizens with deep understanding of the essential concepts or principles of democracy, strong commitment to them based on reason, and high capacity for using them to analyze, appraise, and decide about phenomena of their political world.

In using basic concepts to comprehend and evaluate political systems, students should learn that democracy is not Utopia. It involves neither the pursuit nor promise of perfection. Further, students should recognize the inevitable disparities in every democracy between ideals and realities. These disparities do not invalidate the principles of democracy. Rather, they should
challenge students to become citizens committed to reducing the gap between principles and practices in their polity.

Through comparative analysis of political systems of the past and present, students will learn that democracies have tended to be less imperfect than other types of government. Thus, they might conclude that democratic governments are better than nondemocratic types, because they are less imperfect. Despite its flaws, democracy in practice has been better than other types of government in protecting human rights, respecting the individual’s dignity and worth, and promoting international peace. Civic educators can use the relatively positive record of modern democracies as evidence to justify their efforts to develop democratic citizenship in countries throughout our world.

If they experience good education for democratic citizenship, which includes at its core the four components of Figure 2, students will enhance their understanding of what democracy is, how to practice it, why it may succeed or fail, and why it is worthy. They may also enhance their capacities to develop and maintain the kind of political and civic conditions that are indispensable to the survival of democracy. Finally, through this kind of civic education, students may learn that constitutional liberal democracy lives or dies in the minds and hearts of citizens. And they may learn that its success or failure depends ultimately on the knowledge, skills, habits, and actions of committed citizens and the political and civic conditions they create, and not merely on the cleverness or elegance of constitutional design or institutional structures.

Notes
2. The set of concepts in Figure 1 represents an "ideal-type"—a conceptualization of democracy that no state has ever fulfilled perfectly. Nonetheless, these concepts or criteria provide very useful standards by which to assess and judge the achievements or deficiencies of democratic governments. And they certainly enable one to distinguish democratic governments from nondemocratic ones.

6. The critical importance of constitutionalism in any criteria for modern democracy is emphasized by Bruce Ackerman, *The Future of Liberal Revolution* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1992); in particular see pages 46-68; Ackerman urges the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe to legitimate and protect their newly won rights by "constitutionalizing their revolutions."

7. This definition of rights is taken from Chapter 4 of this volume.

8. Alain Touraine offers warnings about the threat of extreme multiculturalism to constitutional liberal democracy. He says, "The recognition of minorities within a democratic society is desirable, provided that those minorities accept majority rule and are not entirely absorbed in asserting their identity. A radical multiculturalism ... eventually destroys membership in a political society. ..." (1997, 65).

9. The term "liberal" is used throughout this chapter to signify the kind of democracy that is directed toward protecting and promoting the rights to liberty of individuals. By contrast, an "illiberal" regime, democratic or not, is either indifferent or hostile to security for the personal and private rights of individuals to liberty. The term "liberal" is NOT used here to designate a person or group on the left of the political spectrum. "Liberals" as used in this chapter has little to do with the left to right political spectrum invoked by journalists, broadcasters, and other popular commentators on political life. Rather, "liberal" in this chapter designates commitment to human liberty, and persons of this persuasion can be found across the broad center of the political spectrum, from center-left to center-right. By contrast, persons and groups of the far left wing, usually are "illiberal" in their practice of coercion and determinism instead of consent and choice to promote their goals. Likewise, persons and groups of the far right wing tend to be "illiberal." Both extremes are ready to use the same kind of "illiberal" means to achieve fundamentally different ends. One thing they have in common is their indifference or hostility to "liberalism" correctly understood and correctly used.

References


EDUCATION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT OF CITIZENS IN DEMOCRATIC CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT

By John J. Patrick

Engagement of citizens with the institutions and operations of their communities and governments is a central characteristic of a healthy democracy. A traditional strength of democracy in the United States of America, for example, has been the vitality of civil society, which consists of freely formed, voluntary associations not encompassed by the state and its institutions of government. Through voluntary participation in freely formed civil society associations (sometimes called nongovernmental organizations or NGOs), citizens pursue personal, private, or public interests that may serve the common good. Through this civic engagement, they develop the knowledge, skills, virtues, and habits that make democracy work (Diamond 1996; Huntington 1997; Putnam 1995). Further, the many freely formed associations of civil society are an ever-present countervailing force against abuses of power in the government.1

A recent report of The National Commission on Civic Renewal (1998, 6) has sounded alarms about the declining quantity and quality of citizen engagement in the United States and warns, “In a time that cries out for civic action, we are in danger of becoming a nation of spectators.” Several reports concur that the comprehensive civic condition of the United States is weaker than it was, and it needs to be improved. There has been a steady decrease in the engagement of citizens in their civil society and government, which is both an indicator and consequence of declining health in political and civic life (American Civic Forum 1994; Eisenhower Leadership Group 1996; Lipset 1995; Putnam 1995; Sandel 1996).

Political scientist Everett Carll Ladd agrees with the “alarmists” that engagement of citizens with the institutions and operations of their communities and governments is a central characteristic of a healthy democra-
cy. "The health of the country's associational life and individual participation in civic affairs are of vital importance" (Ladd 1998, 1). But Ladd disputes claims that American political and civic life are in serious decline. He sees decline only in some traditional sectors of civil society and vitality in other newly emergent sectors. Some older voluntary associations are moribund while some newer groups simultaneously are robust (Ladd 1999).

All sides to the current debate on the quantity and quality of political and civic engagement, however, agree that continuous attention to their maintenance and improvement is essential to the health of democracy. So all parties are deeply concerned about how to educate citizens for constructive engagement in their civil society and government.

This chapter addresses principles and practices for the improvement of political and civic engagement through education in schools and society in the United States of America. First, it examines a persistent problem of democracy—how to educate citizens for engagement in common purposes and commitments of civil society and government. Second, it treats development of intellectual capital in education for democratic citizenship. Third, it discusses development of social capital in education for democratic citizenship. Fourth, it concludes with an emphatic call for vigorous discussion and debate about renewed and improved development of intellectual and social capital in education for democratic citizenship.

A Persistent Problem of Democracy: Education for Constructive Engagement in Common Purposes and Commitments of Civil Society and Government

The current wave of concern about citizen engagement in political and civic life is neither unprecedented nor unfounded. It is an emphatic expression of a persistent problem of democracy in the United States and elsewhere: how to engage citizens more fully, effectively, and constructively in civil society and government and thereby to confirm the validity and legitimacy of popular government in a free and open society.

But engagement of citizens in political and civic life, if necessary to the vitality of a democracy, is not sufficient to its long-term prospects for good health. We need to ask and answer questions about the quality and commitments of this engagement, not merely about its quantity, to determine whether or not it is constructive or conducive to the well-being of democracy. Not all political and civic activity is compatible with our ideals or goals of citizenship and government in liberal and constitutional democracy. So we need to ask: what should be its purposes—the criteria by which we judge the quality of engagement in political and civic life? What lessons should be taught and learned in schools and other venues of education.
about the ends and purposes for which we want citizens to be engaged in their civil society and government?

Of course, responses to questions about the quality and ends of constructive citizen engagement are influenced by one’s political and civic traditions and institutions. So I readily turn to the founding era of the United States, to America’s founding documents and personalities, to find the sources of common purposes and commitments that should guide the education of citizens for engagement with their civil society and government. For example, the major goal of Thomas Jefferson’s proposals for the education of citizens was derived directly from the principal American founding document, The Declaration of Independence, which asserted, “That to secure these Rights [to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness] Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the Consent of the Governed” (Center for Civic Education 1997, 6). In line with these criteria for good government—security for rights and government by consent of the governed—Jefferson recommended education of citizens “to enable every man to judge for himself what will secure or endanger his freedom” (Pangle & Pangle 1993, 108). Thus, according to Jefferson and his compatriots, constructively engaged citizens are ones who have the desire and capacity to protect their natural rights as responsible participants in civil society and government. Through this kind of constructive engagement in behalf of their natural rights, citizens reaffirm the principle and practice of government by consent of the governed.

James Madison, Jefferson’s best friend and political partner, pointed to another widely shared founding-era purpose of political and civic engagement in The Federalist 51, “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions” (Center for Civic Education 1997, 43). According to Madison and like-minded American founders, one constructive purpose of engagement in political and civic life is participation to check and otherwise harness the necessary powers of government so that they will be employed to protect the rights of individuals and not to abuse them.

A major purpose of education for constructive engagement in political and civic life is to teach citizens the timeless truth that their rights are at risk if their government is either too weak or too strong. Further, it should teach them that security for their rights depends upon their interest and capacity to judge the quality and uses of their government’s power and to act effectively to either enhance or limit it, under various circumstances, in order to guard against abuses of their rights.
The founders were, of course, concerned about both individual rights and the common good, about both liberalism and republicanism. They understood that security for individual rights could be achieved only in a healthy community. So an objective of responsible engagement in their political and civic life was to promote the public good, the general welfare of society, in concert with the private rights of individuals. Thus, education for citizen engagement involves teaching and learning of civic virtues and dispositions, traits of character that dispose one to subordinate personal interests for the common good, and development of capacity to make sound judgments about when and how to act for the general welfare of society (Callan 1997; Dagger 1997).

Historians Lorraine Smith Pangle and Thomas Pangle (1993, 11) emphasize the intertwined purposes of education for constructive civic engagement in the founding era, which involved education and action to secure both individual rights and the common good. “The paramount educational challenge of the Founding generation was that of preparing future generations to become democratic citizens who would sustain a regime of individual freedoms [security for rights] as well as responsible self-rule” or government by consent of the governed for the common good. This “paramount educational challenge”—developing citizens capable of maintaining and improving their democratic republic—has persisted from the founding era to our era.

Civic educators of every era must know that if there would be “government of the people, by the people, for the people,” there must be education of the people about the principles, practices, skills, and dispositions of citizenship in a constitutional and liberal democracy. If not, democracy will fail because neither a democratic constitution nor democratic institutions of governance will work in the absence of widespread public knowledge of constitutional liberal democracy, commitment to it, and patterns of behavior that support it.

People are not born with the knowledge, skills, and habits necessary to make constitutional liberal democracy work; rather, they acquire this knowledge and capacity for democratic citizenship only through experience. And civic education in schools is the systematic arrangement of experience for the purpose of developing widespread capacity for democratic citizenship. How can we meet our educational challenge of civic renewal? What should be done through education in schools to sustain and renew responsible, constructive engagement in political and civic life and thereby revitalize civil society and government in our constitutional and liberal democracy?

Good education for democratic citizenship, of course, includes teaching and learning about the principles and practices of democracy, the con-
stitution and government of one's country, and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. It also involves development of certain skills of thinking, communicating, and participating in political and civic life. And it consists of particular civic virtues and dispositions—attitudes and habits that support the principles and practices of democracy, such as self-restraint, civility, compassion, tolerance, loyalty, duty, honor, courage, honesty, fairness, and, above all, respect for the worth and dignity of each person.

Development of Intellectual Capital for the Engaged Citizen: Curricular Foundations for Constructive Engagement in Democratic Political and Civic Life

First of all, schools should enable students to acquire and use intellectual capital for civic and political purposes. Intellectual capital consists of knowledge and skills that enable one to make sense of the world and thereby to act rationally and effectively within it. The kind of intellectual capital needed for responsible citizenship is knowledge of democratic principles and practices and cognitive capacity to apply this knowledge to public affairs (Hirsch, Jr. 1996, 17-47; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry 1996). Among the concepts at the core of education for democratic citizenship are government, popular sovereignty, political participation, constitutionalism, human rights, responsible citizenship, civil society, and market economy. This is an essential, if not exhaustive, inventory of concepts in the intellectual capital of a well-educated democratic citizen. The kind of "verbal cognitive proficiency" that enables one to use key concepts to interpret information and act effectively in political and civic life "is the most relevant cognitive ability in relation to democratic citizenship" (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry 1996, 41).

Citizens in possession of ample intellectual capital have the capacity to pursue time-honored purposes or ends of constitutional government in America, such as security for individual rights and promotion of the common good, to be self-governing citizens capable of "enlightened political engagement" (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry 1996, 11-38). Intellectual capital is related positively to one's propensity to participate in political and civic life, and it enables warranted decisions about when and how to be engaged civically and politically. And intellectual capital is correlated with other attributes of good citizenship, such as political tolerance, political interest, and sense of political efficacy. "In short, informed citizens are better citizens in a number of ways consistent with normative and pragmatic notions of what constitutes good citizenship" (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996, 19).

Those with less of the intellectual capital needed for constructive engagement in political and civic life have less opportunity to seek and gain the benefits of democratic citizenship. For them, democracy in America does
not work as intended because they lack the capacity to participate effectively within it. This situation is grossly unjust say political scientists Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, who contend that, "For citizens who are the most informed, democracy works much as intended, while for those who are the most uninformed, democracy is a tragedy or a farce" (1996, 60). One prominent educator, E. D. Hirsch, Jr., speaks for many when he claims that a fair opportunity to acquire and use intellectual capital is a "civil right" that should be readily available to all (1996, 43-48). And most political scientists agree with Delli Carpini and Keeter, "that democracy functions best when its citizens are politically informed" (1996, 1).

Given the critical significance of the intellectual capital needed for constructive engagement in political and civic life, it is regrettable that so many citizens in the United States do not possess adequate amounts of it. Numerous studies of the political/civic knowledge of American youth and adults, during the past half-century, reveal gross ignorance of principles and practices of democracy and information about political institutions, leaders, and events (Niemi & Junn 1998, 24-51). It seems that a minority of citizens possess the intellectual capital needed for "enlightened engagement" in political and civic life. According to Niemi and Junn (1998, 5), "the lack of knowledge among American citizens is striking to those of use who deal with political life daily. What is most significant, however, is not so much the inability to recall isolated facts and figures but the breadth and depth of the ignorance"—that is, the incapacity to demonstrate possession of intellectual capital needed for "enlightened engagement."

Can civic education in schools be an effective means to a more broad and equitable distribution of intellectual capital needed for constructive engagement in political and civic life? Yes, say many prominent educators and political scientists (Ceasar & McGuinn, 1998; Hirsch, Jr., 1996; Niemi & Junn 1998).

Niemi and Junn document conclusively the potential of civic education in schools to develop intellectual capital among students, which is needed for constructive or enlightened engagement. Effective civic education involves systematic teaching and learning of key ideas about the substance of democracy throughout the elementary and secondary school curriculum. As students mature, they should encounter and use the same interconnected core concepts in cycles of increasing depth and complexity and in relationship to an ever-broader scope of information. Further, effective civic education includes application of core concepts to analysis and appraisal of public issues and problems of democracy. And it involves ample opportunities for learners to discuss ideas and otherwise interact with one another, as they confront issues and problems of democratic government and citizenship. So systematic exposure to key ideas and systematic practice in
applying them to the organization and interpretation of information and issues is "what makes students learn" the requisites of constructive and enlightened civic engagement (Niemi & J urn 1998, 117-146).

Development of intellectual capital through the school curriculum involves the conjoining of core content and cognitive processes—basic subject matter and skills of thinking that all students should be expected to learn. To elevate one over the other—core content over cognitive processes or vice versa—is a pedagogical flaw that impedes achievement of knowledge (Hirsch, Jr. 1996; Shanker 1997).

Some ideas, information, and issues should be viewed by teachers and learners as more important and thereby more worthy of emphasis in the school curriculum than other subject matter. Students should be taught that all knowledge is not equal in its value for constructive engagement in political and civic life. For example, concepts on the substance of democracy at the core of education for democratic citizenship, discussed in Chapter 1, are prerequisites to the development and maintenance of an active and responsible community of self-governing citizens. (See Figure 1 of Chapter 1.) Without this kind of common knowledge, which should be developed through common learning experiences in school, citizens are unable to act together to analyze public policy issues or problems, make cogent decisions about them, or participate intelligently to resolve them.

The National Standards for Civics and Government (Center for Civic Education 1994) is an excellent guidebook to essential knowledge for the school curriculum. This is the key to intellectual capital needed for constructive engagement in political and civic life to build a vibrant community of democratic citizens capable of securing their rights and promoting the common good under government by consent of the governed.

Development of intellectual capital—essential knowledge and cognitive skills—is enhanced by a curriculum anchored in core subjects or academic disciplines. Well-designed and delivered courses in civics/government, economics, geography, and history—based on ideas, information, and issues of democracy—enable students to acquire a fund of knowledge they can use to comprehend the challenges of political and civic life and to cope with them. According to John T. Bruer, a leading cognitive scientist, "Expertise [development of intellectual capital] depends on highly organized, domain-specific knowledge that can arise only after extensive experience and practice in the domain [the academic discipline]. Strategies [and skills] can help us process knowledge, but first we have to have the knowledge to process" (1993, 15).

Development of cognitive processes and skills of learners is very dependent upon particular structures of knowledge such as the frameworks of academic disciplines. It cannot proceed satisfactorily unless the learner knows
certain concepts and facts related to the question, issue, or problem under consideration. Thus, cognitive processes and skills are most effectively introduced and developed within the conceptual structures of subjects, such as history, economics, geography, and political science/civics/government.

Acquisition, retention, and effective use of intellectual capital results from the interrelated teaching and learning of core concepts and cognitive skills of academic subjects or disciplines. According to Alan Cromer in his acclaimed book, Connected Knowledge (1997, 178), "The [effective] curriculum is concept driven. [And] all concepts are linked to experience through appropriate activities." This kind of education "provides a consistent, coherent, and universal framework of basic knowledge on which individuals can build their own understanding of the world" (Cromer 1997, 183). Thus, citizens would be prepared in schools to know and constructively affect political and civic life through mastery of concepts at the core of education for democratic citizenship, such as those discussed in Chapter 1. (See Figure 1.)

Proponents of developing intellectual capital through well-connected, "domain-specific" learning experiences reject recommendations by some prominent social studies educators for an "issue-centered" or "problem-centered" curriculum based on interdisciplinary organization of content and a generalized model of reflective thinking or problem solving, which elevates process over content. According to the advocates of a comprehensive "issue-centered" curriculum, the main purpose of the school is not to teach a common core of knowledge but "to provide the means for the learner to develop the intellectual skills related to critical thinking and problem solving" (Barth 1991; Jarolimek & Foster 1993, 142). Others stress that knowledge is ephemeral and only cognitive processes are everlastinglly valuable components of education for democratic citizenship. Thus, they oppose the very idea of a core curriculum anchored in subjects that should be commonly and systematically learned by students (Evans 1997; Shaver 1992; Shor 1992).

Promoters of issue-centered civic education claim that it highly interests and motivates students, who view it as especially relevant and practical. They also claim that students are likely to learn as much knowledge, if not more, through the issue-centered curriculum than they would through subject-based studies in history and the social sciences; and they believe that what students learn through their analyses of issues is likely to be most useful to them in their roles as citizens in a democracy. Finally, the issue-centered civic educators posit cognitive processes and skills as the constant and essential elements of the curriculum. Content is to be organized flexibly and variously around current public issues or social problems of significance to the students' democratic society and government. These public
issues or problems might vary among students in the same school and from one semester or year to the next. So subject matter would vary according to student interests and the changing public political and civic agenda (Engle 1989; Evans 1997; Shor 1992).

Current calls for an interdisciplinary, problem-based or issue-centered education for democratic citizenship, anchored in a general cognitive process model that dismisses the fundamental importance or preeminent worth of particular academic content, are neither novel nor practical. They have persisted from the 1920s through the 1990s despite meager evidence of their worth in bringing about student achievement of knowledge and skills. Unresolved pedagogical problems that have prevented successful implementation of this kind of civic education have been thoroughly documented in historical studies of failed curricular reforms (Bellack 1978; Cremin 1964; Hertzberg 1981) and in contemporary classroom research (Gardner 1999; Gardner & Boix-Mansilla 1994; Roth 1994).

Contrary to the claims of its advocates, a curriculum pervaded by interdisciplinary courses on public issues, social problems, or trendy topics is not likely to yield substantial gains in students' knowledge of social reality in the past and present. Research on the history of educational reform in the social studies indicates that this means of selecting and organizing curricular content has tended to produce "a formless curriculum from which students learned little and bored them" (Hertzberg 1981, 80-81). And teachers have tended to avoid this method of education because of conceptual confusion about organizing and implementing it (Cremin 1964, 348; Gross 1989).

The issue-centered model of civic education is not well suited to the development of intellectual capital that students need to become responsible, effective citizens of a constitutional liberal democracy. Weaknesses of the issue-centered model, however, should not drive civic educators away from inclusion of public issues or problems in the school curriculum. On the contrary, student inquiry about significant public issues of the past and present should be a prominent part of effective teaching and learning within the conceptual frameworks of school subjects. Cognitive processes and skills should be used to study significant public issues within the context of courses in civics/government, history, or economics.

Subject-specific teaching of cognitive processes and skills through investigation of public issues seems to be the most effective means to build intellectual capital among students in schools that can be applied to the challenges of democratic citizenship in the community outside the schools. By contrast, it seems that a social studies or civics curriculum based primarily or exclusively on current public issues or problems, and which ignores systematic
common learning of concepts anchored in core school subjects does not work. Let us heed the wise advise of Albert Shanker, the late president of the American Federation of Teachers, who said that “throwing away disciplinary learning for youngsters who have not yet mastered the disciplines creates serious problems of teaching and learning” in schools (1995, 5).

Issue-centered or problem-based lessons or modules may be a valuable part of civic education in tandem with domain-specific and discipline-based instruction. For example, Project Citizen, developed by the Center for Civic Education, is a worthy set of methods and materials on teaching and learning about community issues or problems, which can be incorporated into a solid, subject-based school curriculum (Tolo 1998). Project Citizen is an instructional module that requires students to work cooperatively in groups to select, study, and recommend resolutions of a current public issue in their school or community. Project Citizen may involve students in interdisciplinary applications of knowledge to particular public issues or problems. But this can be done within a curriculum anchored in core subjects, including civics/government, history, and economics, designed to prepare students for democratic citizenship.6

Project Citizen develops intellectual capital among students. It also develops social capital, another indispensable component of education for democratic citizenship.7

Development of Social Capital for the Engaged Citizen: Educational Experiences for Constructive Engagement in Democratic Political and Civic Life

What is social capital? Why should it be a core component of education for constructive engagement in the political and civic life of a constitutional liberal democracy? And how can it be developed among students and citizens in the school and society?

Social capital, like other forms of capital, is instrumental in the achievement of desired outcomes. It “encompasses any form of citizens’ civic engagement employed or capable of being employed to address community needs and problems and, in general, to enhance community life” (Ladd 1998, 2).

Social capital consists of participatory skills and civic virtues and dispositions that enable individuals and groups to achieve certain objectives (Newton 1997, 577). Civic virtues and dispositions refer to such traits of character as civility, sociability, honesty, self-restraint, tolerance, trust, compassion, a sense of duty, a sense of political efficacy, capacity for cooperation, loyalty, courage, respect for the worth and dignity of each person, and concern for the common good (Schmitter 1997, 249).
Three types of participatory skills are interacting, monitoring, and influencing. Interacting pertains to skills of communication and cooperation in political and civic life. Monitoring involves skills needed to track the work of political leaders and institutions of government. And influencing refers to skills used to affect outcomes in political and civic life, such as the resolution of public issues (Center for Civic Education 1994; NAEP Civics Consensus Project 1996).

Political scientist Robert Putnam explains how participatory skills and civic virtues or dispositions become social capital. “By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital—tools and training that enhance individual productivity—social capital refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (1995b, 67).

An essential element of social capital is trust among the citizens of a community. People who trust one another can cooperate to achieve common objectives. Conversely, alienated, atomized, or cynical people are likely to stay outside civil society in a marginalized domain of inefficacy (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993; Seligman 1997).

Robert Putnam’s long-term research indicates that participation by citizens in a network of community-based voluntary organizations, the fabric of a democratic civil society, is the means to build social capital in combination with intellectual capital, which “makes democracy work” (Putnam 1993, 181-185). Through voluntary participation in civil society organizations, citizens practice skills and habits of behavior that enable them to be constructively engaged in political and civic life (Stolle & Rochou 1998, 52-54). So community-based, voluntary organizations are public laboratories, in which citizens learn democracy by doing it, contributing mightily to the well-being of their civil society and constitutional government.

Social capital is synergistically related to civil society, which is both instrumental in the development of social capital among members of civil society organizations and dependent upon that social capital for its sustenance and vitality. And a constitutional liberal democracy depends upon a vibrant civil society for its maintenance and improvement (Walzer 1997). In the absence or gross weakness of civil society, it is impossible to consolidate or sustain a constitutional liberal democracy. (See Chapter 5 of this volume for a detailed discussion of civil society in the theory and practice of constitutional liberal democracy.)

Given the fundamental importance of social capital to the vitality of civil society, and given the critical significance of civil society to the well-being of a constitutional liberal democracy, it is necessary for civic educators to place the development of social capital among students and citizens.
high on their agenda. What can be done in schools to build social capital in
corect with intellectual capital in education for democratic citizenship?

Development of social capital can be achieved through the school curric-
ulum in concert with learning experiences outside the classroom. For
example, civic virtues and participatory skills can be acquired through coop-
erative learning and service learning experiences that connect academic les-
sions in the classroom with educational activities in the community outside
the school. Cooperative learning experiences involve students working
together in small groups to achieve common goals. And service learning
involves students participating together in projects that serve the public
good in the school or the community outside the school (Schine & Halsted

Regular participation in school-based service learning activities is posi-
tively related to development of political interest, political participation
skills, and a sense of political efficacy. But service learning activities are
not likely to be effective in development of students’ social capital unless
they are systematic and sustained (Niemi & Chapman 1999). Findings of a
recent national study of high school students in the United States “indicate
that the positive relationships between service and civic development were
generally found among those who had performed 35 or more hours of work.
It is questionable whether smaller amounts of service are of any conse-

Development of social capital for the engaged citizen is likely to be
enhanced when cooperative and service learning experiences are connect-
ed systematically to the development of intellectual capital through lessons
about academic subject matter. For example, principles and practices of
democracy that students learn through formal academic activities in the
classroom should deliberately be applied to service learning experiences in
the community outside the school. And students should be required to reflect
upon the connections of core academic concepts and service learning expe-
riences (Youniss & Yates 1997, 135-151). Evidence from research on school-
based service learning is tentative but positive in suggesting “that community
participation is a powerful learning experience that, if structured properly,
can be enjoyable and worthwhile” (Shaver 1995, 157). Positive effects are
greatest when educators provide for systematic briefing and debriefing of
learning experiences, which connect the formal program of studies in school
and civic action in the community (Battersby 1998).

A new program that develops social capital through participation by
students in the school or local community is Project Citizen, produced by
the Center for Civic Education for use by middle school students. Particip-
ants in Project Citizen cooperate in small groups to identify a significant
public issue or problem, conduct research to become informed about it, examine alternative responses put forward to resolve the issue or problem, select an alternative response to the issue as desirable and defend it against interrogators and opponents, and take action with like-minded participants to influence a practical resolution of the issue or problem. Thus, participants in Project Citizen develop intellectual capital and social capital that enable them to become constructively engaged in the political and civic life of their constitutional liberal democracy. They are on their way to achieving competencies that make democracy work to protect individual rights, to practice government by consent of the governed, and to serve the common good (Tolo 1998).

Student participation in extracurricular activities of the school is also related positively to development of social capital needed by citizens for constructive engagement in political and civic life. Participation in democratically run student organizations, and especially in student government activities, provides opportunities to practice the habits and skills of democracy. This kind of student participation in various school activities is associated with development of political interest, political efficacy, and participatory skills (Niemi & Chapman 1999, 32-33). Further, the ethos or civic climate of the school may be a powerful factor in promoting or inhibiting development of social capital needed for political and civic life. There seems to be a positive relationship between a democratic school spirit or ethos and development among students of civic skills and virtues (Mosher, Kenny, Jr., & Garrod 1994).

Participation in both student government and school clubs or interest groups is most strongly related to adult engagement in political and civic life as voters, members of voluntary associations, and contributors to the common good of the community (Youniss, McClellan, & Yates 1997, 620-623). It seems that formal participation in the student organizations of “American high schools [provides] hands-on training for future [civic] participation” of adults by providing “opportunities to practice democratic governance” (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995, 425). In addition, student participants in high school organizations are likely to develop civic virtues and dispositions, such as tolerance, respect for individual differences, and capacity for cooperation and deliberation, that persist into adulthood (Youniss, McClellan, & Yates 1997, 624).

Both curricular and extracurricular activities of schools can be used effectively to develop social capital for democratic citizenship. And the schools in collaboration with the local civil society and government can be a pivotal factor in renewal of civic consciousness and vitality among students and citizens throughout the United States.
Conclusion: Renewal of Debate on Education for Democratic Citizenship

Development of intellectual and social capital among students and citizens is connected closely to overarching purposes and standards of good civic education and good government in America—security for individual rights and promotion of the common good through government by consent of the governed. The First Amendment constitutional rights of free speech, press, assembly, and association, for example, mean little unless citizens have the capabilities and dispositions to responsibly use them to vitalize their civil society and influence their constitutional government. Further, the citizen’s right to vote in public elections is diminished if she or he lacks the intellectual and social capital to use it intelligently and responsibly.

Through vibrant civic and political organizations, citizens may effectively and responsibly express interests to government officials and hold them accountable to their constituents. Further, they may, when necessary, protect their rights to liberty by using the collective power of individuals in civic and political organizations as countervailing forces against encroachments by overbearing government officials. Thus, social capital in concert with intellectual capital enables citizens to take responsibility for maintaining government by consent of the governed and security for individual rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.

Do sufficient numbers of Americans have the intellectual and social capital needed to sustain and improve upon their constitutional liberal democracy through their roles as citizens? And, if not, how do we use our schools and other venues of education to more adequately prepare the people to assume their responsibilities of citizenship? From the founding of the United States until today, Americans have worried about these questions and argued about the answers.

In this chapter, I have offered responses to these questions. I have discussed recommendations about how to develop through education in schools the intellectual and social capital needed by individuals for constructive engagement in political and civic life. And I recognize that the evidence and arguments in support of my societal analysis and pedagogical proposals, though significant and reasonable, may not compel agreement. Rather, they may provoke arguments.

Some scholars, educators, and prominent public leaders for example, dispute the alarms raised by The National Commission on Civic Renewal. Robert Putnam, and others, whose views are discussed in this chapter, about the severe deficits in the intellectual and social capital of Americans. Consider, for example, the different and more positive view of our civic condition presented persuasively in an interesting new book, The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life. The author, Michael Schudson, boldly
asserts, "Citizenship in the United States has not disappeared. It has not even declined. It has, inevitably, changed." And says Schudson, the changes mostly are for the good (1998, 294). And Everett Carli Ladd in his new book, The Ladd Report on Civic America (1999), claims that civil society and democratic government in the United States are quite healthy.

Both Robert Putnam and Seymour Martin Lipset agree that the United States compares very favorably with most other countries in the quantity and quality of its civic engagement. Lipset concludes that "Americans are more civically engaged than most other people in the world" (1995, 14). Robert Putnam agrees with Lipset, "America still outranks many other countries in the degree of our community involvement and social trust" (1995a, 666). Putnam also documents the serious decline of civil society in America during the past forty years. He concludes, "American social capital in the form of civic associations has been significantly eroded over the last generation" (1995b, 73). Lipset concurs: "Much of the available evidence on trends supports Putnam’s conclusion that Americans’ involvement in voluntary organizations has declined" (1995, 15).

According to Putnam, "High on America’s agenda should be the question of how to reverse adverse trends in social [and civic] connectedness, thus restoring civic engagement and civic trust" (1995b, 77). Although Putnam’s concern is broader than civic education in schools, it certainly includes this central domain of democratic development.

Although scholars like Michael Schudson and Everett Carli Ladd disagree with Robert Putnam’s somewhat negative assessment of the American civic condition, they strongly agree with him about the great importance of renewing and improving education for democratic citizenship. For example, Ladd writes, "Let government do it has never been our thing. We’ve counted on individuals doing it—by accepting responsibility for building and maintaining a good society" (1998, 2). Individuals, however, cannot "do it" politically and civically without sufficient intellectual and social capital and dispositions to use this capital wisely and well. And they will neither possess this capital nor the capacity to use it for the good of their constitutional liberal democracy without exposure to effective civic education.

My recommendations about how to organize and conduct education for democratic citizenship in schools, about how to develop the intellectual and social capital of students in preparation for their roles as citizens of a constitutional liberal democracy, may prompt dispute and disagreement by some civic educators. Others will agree with my curricular and pedagogical recommendations.

Regardless of variations in our responses to this debate, we can agree that civic consciousness in America, and with it civic education, is once
again in vogue across a broad spectrum of political and intellectual life—
from the left to the right side of our ongoing public debates. It seems that
the “anti-civic orthodoxy” born in the protests and alienation of the 1960s
has run its course and is declining into disfavor (Ceaser & McGuinn 1998,
85-90). So the time is ripe, the fruitful moment is at hand, to consider care-
fully alternative ideas about the quality of political and civic life in Amer-
ica and how to preserve and improve it through education for democratic
citizenship in schools, both public and private, and in the society at large.

The challenges of our current civic condition are connected closely to
our civic heritage. Long ago, for example, James Madison raised this ques-
tion in an essay published in the National Gazette (December 20, 1792):
“Who are the best keepers of the people’s liberties?” His answer, of course,
was “the people” in tandem with their “republican” or representative insti-
tutions of constitutional government.” Madison contended that two condi-
tions of political and civic life must be maintained: (1) a well-constructed
constitution that provides for representative institutions of a limited gov-
ernment and (2) popular participation of citizens to hold the governors
accountable to the governed (Dinan 1998).

Without sufficient knowledge and cognitive skills (intellectual capital)
plus civic virtues and participatory skills (social capital), however, the peo-
ple cannot and will not be “keepers of their liberties.” If we Americans
would conserve our principles and practices of constitutional liberal democ-
archy and improve upon their uses in our political and civic life, then we
must know what these principles and practices are, why they deserve our
commitment, and how to use them in our civil society and government. Ef-
fective education for democratic citizenship is the only means to achieve
this end: the capacity of citizens to be “keepers of their liberties” in gov-
ernment by consent of the governed.

Notes
1. Chapter 5 of this volume includes a comprehensive discussion of civil society and
   its relationship to the theory and practice of democracy.
2. See Chapter 1 of this volume for a definition and discussion of constitutional lib-
   eral democracy and the concepts at the core of education for citizenship in a con-
stitutional liberal democracy.
3. Principles of constitutional liberal democracy constitute the content of Chapters 1
   and 4 of this volume.
4. Essential concepts in education for democratic citizenship are discussed in-depth
   in Chapter 1 of this volume.
5. See Chapter 7 of this volume; the authors discuss obstacles in the way of success-
   ful use of issue-centered civic education.
6. Project Citizen is used primarily in sixth through eighth grades, but also with stu-
   dents as young as fifth grade and as old as twelfth grade. For more information
   about Project Citizen, contact the Center for Civic Education, 5146 Douglas Fir
Road, Calabasas, CA 91302-1467; telephone (800) 350-4223; FAX (818) 591-9330; World Wide Web <www.civiced.org>

7. Project Citizen is treated in-depth in Chapter 7 of this volume. The authors discuss uses of Project Citizen in the United States and abroad.

8. Service learning programs have great potential for renewing or enhancing the operation of civil society in a democratic republic. They provide an opportunity for students to learn by performing responsible citizenship in a democratic community. The University of Minnesota recently established a National Service-Learning Cooperative Clearinghouse to monitor and promote teaching and learning that connects students' meaningful community service with academic achievement, personal growth, and civic responsibility. Dr. Robert Shumer is director of the National Service-Learning Cooperative Clearinghouse at the University of Minnesota, 1954 Buford Avenue, Room 290, St. Paul, Minnesota 55108, Telephone: (800) 808-7378; (612) 625-6276.


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A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL PROJECT TO DEVELOP AND DISSEMINATE A FRAMEWORK ON EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

By Charles F. Bahmueller

Is it possible to develop an international cross-cultural consensus on the central meanings and character of the ideas, values, and institutions of democracy? Further, can we identify common elements of these ideas, values, and institutions that should constitute education for democratic citizenship? A new project is attempting to answer these difficult and thorny questions. This project, Education for Democratic Citizenship: A Framework, is administered by the Center for Civic Education. This is an international project with a global reach—with advisors and critics from every inhabited continent.

The Framework project, which began in 1996, is expected to continue well into 2000, when the last in a series of drafts will be published. In the interim, teachers, educators and other interested parties from around the world are invited to participate by commenting on successive versions. Review of the Framework’s first draft began in autumn 1997; a second draft was released during the summer of 1998; a third draft was in development in 1999.

Among those reviewing Framework drafts and advising the project’s developers are individual scholars, NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and national ministries of education from more than three dozen countries, including China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkmenistan in Asia; Benin, Ethiopia, and Ghana in Africa; Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Serbia in Europe; and Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and the United States in the Americas.
Comments on the first draft were overwhelmingly favorable. For example, “I believe this framework is a very good achievement” (Costa Rica). “The document, I thought, was excellent” (Dominican Republic). “I find the project an important one. It will be of much use for democratic education in many parts of the world” (China). “This Framework meets our interest and will be very useful for all institutions dealing with civic education” (Mongolia). “I am very impressed by [your] careful and thorough approach to the subject. This is a well balanced outline” (Serbia). “It is already obvious that the final variant of this document will be very useful and widely used . . . in different countries” (Tajikistan).

One Framework, Two Versions

At this writing, the Framework is presented in two versions. One is known as the Five-Part Outline and the other as the Seven-Part Outline. While most of the reviewers favored the seven-part version, a significant minority favored the five-part version (some strongly), and a number favored both. Consequently, both will probably be published. Giving readers a choice rather than a single version carries its own message, a democratic, or better put, a “liberal” message. The majority has not, as in a liberal democracy itself, decimated the minority; a plurality of voices is heard, not a monotone.

The roots of this liberal message are nearly as old as democracy itself. In this presentation of plural voices some will hear an echo of Aristotle’s famous criticisms of the notorious unity—and consequent decimation of liberty—found in Plato’s Republic. In Aristotle’s view, Plato erred in searching for social harmony by driving out all dissident sounds from his “closed society,” mistaking a single note for a chord. Real harmony consists of more than one note. By the end of the twentieth century, we have come to believe that, like musical integrity, the fabric of liberal democracy is undiminished by dissonance. Be this as it may, the message of the Framework is conveyed in part by its form, not by its contents alone.

The Five-Part Outline. What is the substance of the Framework? The Five-Part Outline is a logically constructed whole that begins with “The World” and ends with “The Citizen”:

I. The World: the transnational context of human rights, the open society, and political order;
II. The People: the foundation of political community and government;
III. The Polity: the ordering of civic life, politics, and political systems;
IV. The Government: the formal institutions and processes for public affairs;
V. The Citizen: the principal actor.

This arrangement of topics forms a unity that pleases some reviewers, but disturbs others, since any alteration of the topics fatally disrupts the flowing logic of its structure.
The Seven-Part Outline. By contrast, the Seven-Part Outline is not a closed whole nor an unalterable process of reason. It is composed of a series of questions and opens with the germane query, “What is democracy?” and closes, in its summer of 1999 version, with a question about the roles of democracies in world affairs:

I. What is democracy?
II. Who belongs and who rules in a democracy?
III. Why choose democracy?
IV. What makes democracy work?
V. How does democracy function?
VI. How do democracies develop, survive, and improve?
VII. How does democracy shape the world and how does the world shape democracy?

Since most topics covered under these headings are dealt with in each version, for brevity’s sake only the material covered by the Seven-Part Outline, preferred by reviewers, will be examined in some detail in this chapter.

The Framework is not intended as a course of study or textbook outline, nor is it intended primarily for students. Rather, it attempts to outline the common elements that any program of civic education should include to prepare youth or adults for democratic citizenship. How and when this material might be taught is beyond the Framework’s scope.

The Structure and Content of the Framework

The Framework seeks to lead the reader from the most elemental, protean aspects of human self-government—from the question of why there should be government at all and why politics is found in any human group—to a knowledge and understanding not simply of any kind of democracy but specifically of liberal democracy, the regime of choice of the world’s most economically and socially developed countries from Japan in Asia to Australia and New Zealand in Australasia to many nations in Europe, North America, and elsewhere.

The Framework first describes what liberal democracy is, carefully distinguishing it from other kinds of democracy, that is, from illiberal versions (see below). It seeks to articulate an international consensus on democracy’s values, principles, and essential characteristics. These include, for example, such “liberal-constitutional” elements as respect for and protection of individual freedoms, the rule of law, the equality of citizens before the law, limited (constitutional) government, an autonomous civil society, and the maintenance of the open society, as well as such elements of “democracy,” narrowly conceived, as the conduct of free, fair, and regular elections; the secret ballot; and universal adult suffrage.
The Framework’s concern with the ideology of liberal democracy, its underlying philosophy and view of human nature, is apparent from the outset. Inherent in this ideology is liberal democracy’s refusal to take a stand on the ultimate human condition, man’s destiny and salvation, considering them as matters outside its purview. Such questions must necessarily be left to religion and speculative philosophy, excluded from the inherently limited vision required by liberal freedoms. In this view, it is not accidental that enlarged visions of the human condition are officially held by theocracies, by twentieth-century communism, and by certain varieties of illiberal democracy. Such regimes sharply circumscribe religious liberty and attempt to direct the inner world of the individual; privacy, essential to liberties protected by liberal regimes, is curtailed or abolished.

This is not to say that liberal democracy has no public philosophy. Openly or implicitly, democracy requires an assumption of the possibility of man’s self-responsibility and maturity. A precondition of successful liberal democracy was described by Immanuel Kant in 1784 as man’s “coming of age,” the autonomous thought of the adult citizen, undirected by the state. Other regimes, by contrast, keep the individual in child-like submission to the authority of an elite, who alone understand sufficiently to govern and direct the thinking of their subjects (Kant 1949, 132-139). Recent political philosophy argues forcefully that the liberal state is not simply neutral among all values and that certain ideas of human virtue are inherent in the public philosophy of liberal democracy (Galston 1991; Macedo 1990).

**Distinguishing Liberal from Illiberal Democracy.** The central focus of the Framework is the moral and formal substance of democracy and the conditions that allow it to be established, to be maintained, and to flourish. First, what is meant by “democracy”?

The term democracy means little in itself other than free, fair, and regular elections. In the recent past certain scholars and democratic activists around the world were content to conflate democracy—a term heavily freighted with moral legitimacy and uplift—and free elections. But experience has delivered this identification mortal wounds. In Sub-Saharan Africa, elections, not necessarily free and fair, but sometimes accounted “free enough” by observers, often meant dictators assumed or maintained power. To the north in Algeria, it was clear that planned elections would mean the death of democracy. Paradoxically, the elections were scuttled in the name of democracy.

It is now clear to those concerned with democracy in Africa, as well as to others, that the equation of democracy and elections is unwarranted insofar as democracy is assumed to bring to power a decent, humane regime that respects what are regarded as the fundamental rights of citizens. At the
same time, prominent political scientists such as Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard University regard elections as the heart, if not the soul, of democracy. "Elections, open, free, and fair," Huntington writes, "are the essence of democracy, the inescapable *sine qua non*." Huntington remarks that although the governments produced by such elections may be corrupt and irresponsible, their bad qualities only make them undesirable; "they do not make them undemocratic" (Zakaria 1997, 24).

Whether one accepts this argument, however, depends on acceptance of its premise that elections are the "essence of democracy." This premise is a matter of philosophical judgment, not a matter of fact. The problem here is that identifying regimes as "democratic" in Huntington's narrow sense *does not tell us enough*; in particular, it does not tell us what *kind* of democracy is in question. In the end, the implicit view of the Framework is that discussing democracy in the narrow sense of multi-party electoralism is not sufficient or even very interesting. Instead, varieties of democracy must be clearly distinguished. And what kinds are there?

The term democracy is often intended, especially by those who are not professional scholars, to mean morally decent governments that not only hold free elections but also protect fundamental rights. "Undesirable democracy" in this usage is a contradiction in terms. Thus, when the California History-Social Science Framework (1997) recommends that students ask themselves "Is our society democratic?" it asks far more than whether free elections are held; indeed, the context makes it clear that it would consider the reduction of democracy to free elections alone to be absurd.

This dispute is reminiscent of the argument between positivists and anti-positivists about what constitutes law. A centuries-old adage has it that *lex injusta non lex est* (unjust law is no law). In this view, what might otherwise be a legitimate law loses its legitimacy if it is morally tainted. Therefore, it need not be obeyed. For some democrats, the same is true for fairly elected governments: if they turn on those they rule, they lose the right to be called democratic.

Opponents argue that the moral substance of a law and the obligation to obey it are issues separate from what can or cannot be called a law. What a law is depends on certain objective criteria: was it passed by both houses of parliament/congress and signed by the monarch/president? If so, however morally tainted, it is a law. Similarly, under the elections as-democratic-essence criterion, political systems with fairly elected illiberal governments are democracies.

The difference in these two positions can be effectively bridged by admitting that in itself democracy means little, that it must always be qualified. Taken literally, there is never simply democracy: rather, democracy
is always, as we have said, a kind of democracy. Those that limit the ends and means of government and respect individual rights and that also hold free elections have for generations been called liberal democracies. Regimes based on free elections that neither practice limited government nor consistently respect fundamental rights are best described as illiberal (Zakharia 1997).

By adopting consistent descriptors for the varieties of regimes that are elected through free elections one preserves both the insistence on elections as a characteristic of any democracy, whether desirable or undesirable, and other democrats' attributions of moral qualities to democracy, to which the qualifying "liberal" must now be added. On the question of elections, it can be said that free elections are common to all forms of democracy. A consequence of this discussion is that "liberal" can be detached from democracy; not only are all forms of democracy not necessarily liberal, but all constitutional-liberal governments are not necessarily democracies. The United States was not a democracy in 1789, but it was in most respects a liberal regime, with the glaring anomaly of chattel slavery. Constitutional monarchy in Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was also a liberal regime although not a democracy. It may be pointed out, however, that in today's world it is difficult at best to sustain liberal freedoms in the absence of democratic controls on power.

The fact that liberal and democracy can be separated both conceptually and actually is not unimportant. Some potential users of the Framework may find full-fledged liberal democracy a utopian dream given their country's circumstances: but they can demand and may be able to implement progressive liberalization as a step toward liberal democracy. And, perhaps more important, citizens of countries where governments fail to meet the standards of liberal democracy, but which hold free and fair elections, can use the electoral process to demand liberal freedoms.

The Morphology and Infrastructure of Democracy. As the Framework proceeds from topic to topic, it is clear that its authors believe citizens should be familiar with the morphology of democracy in its varying forms and procedures; the relationships of government with civil society, including religious institutions; the function of mass media; the functions of a civil service; and other matters (e.g. V. "How does democracy function?"). The Framework is equally concerned with the infrastructure of democracy, its soft underbelly of networked relationships and civic trust and of other emotional ties, such as patriotism (as opposed to extreme nationalism or xenophobia) and loyalty to constitutional values. These latter ties signify adherence to a constitutional morality that places limits on the action of both public officials and ordinary citizens. All of this and more compose section IV. "What makes democracy work?"
Democratic Citizenship. Perhaps the high point of the Framework is its treatment of citizenship (II, "Who belongs and who rules in a democracy?"). There can be no democracy without democrats, without those who are self-conscious members of a self-governing sovereign people. The Framework discusses the meaning and significance of citizenship for liberal democracy; the kinds of opportunities for participation that democracies offer citizens; the roles, rights, and obligations of democratic citizens; and how they differ from those of other forms of government.

To distinguish citizenship from the roles of individuals under other types of regimes, the Framework contrasts citizenship with communal membership and the status of subjects. To sharpen its focus on the unique character of democratic membership, the Framework examines how the idea of democratic citizenship differs from other concepts of the relationship between the individual and the political system, such as subservient or passive versus active, dependent versus independent, or childlike versus adult.

Finally, the Framework asks what civic dispositions and traits of public and private character, such as self-discipline, skepticism, compassion, and civility, strengthen liberal democracy; and it treats at length the importance of citizens' attitudes and dispositions to their civic relationships. In sum, it may be said that if the Framework as a whole attempts to articulate the core meanings of liberal democracy, the section on citizenship forms the heart of education for democratic membership.

The Viability of Liberal Democracy. It should be apparent even to casual readers of the document that the Framework makes no assumption about whether liberal democracy is viable in every part of the world. Thus, section III, "Why choose democracy?". It discusses disadvantages as well as advantages of democracy and the conditions under which other systems might be preferred. The Framework asks if democracy is always desirable and does not assume a positive answer. It would be easy to answer that democracy is undesirable if it empowers certain illiberal governments. It is also true that when social disorder reaches a certain level, threats to survival may suggest the necessity of some form of illiberal regime. The Framework is, therefore, far from an unrealistically optimistic or missionary document seeking to indoctrinate nonbelievers into a new dogmatic political faith that is applicable indiscriminately without regard to place and time.

Moreover, section VI, which discusses transitions to democracy, speaks of stages of democratic development, suggesting that societies do not become liberal democracies overnight, but as a result of a complex and sometimes lengthy process. It also makes the important caveat that democracies are rarely black or white, that political systems may embody a mixture of dem-
ocratic and nondemocratic features. And it discusses at length the social, economic, and political conditions that threaten the democratic order.

In the last section, VII, the Framework examines "the interplay between democracy and the world." How has democracy changed the world, especially in the twentieth century? Are its values universal? How has it influenced the development and propagation of science and technology? And how have they, in turn, influenced our sense of space and time? Democracy has undoubtedly constituted a principal causative factor (though it is hardly the sole factor) in revolutionizing world economics—in creating, for example, a global economic system, an international civil society, and global standards in many areas of human intercourse and endeavor. This influence can be seen in the fruit of international cooperation from the Law of the Sea, GATT, and the World Trade Organization to codified and informal rules of right and wrong that inform both practical affairs and moral conscience around the world.

**Democracy as Western "Imperialism"**

The spread of democratic practices by the West has been attacked in recent years as a new form of "imperialism." The idea of imperialism necessarily includes some form of coercion. The Framework project, however, in no way forces itself on potential users. It has no means of coercion. Its only armies are its adherents, who are free to pick and choose among its wares, selecting only what they approve, adopting and adapting what they please, ignoring the rest. If, in its final form, the Framework has any force, it will be solely because of the compelling force of its persuasive power, to which no one can object.

The only "empire" here is a liberal empire of ideas or, better put, a "republic of freely chosen ideas." This is a "republic" into which interested persons anywhere may enter and leave at will. Moreover, participants in the project know that the Framework's pages, when published, will be permanently incomplete, since the conversation of democracy, like the search for justice, is by its nature forever unfinished.

The suggestion by skeptical voices that "Western" democracy is out of place among other civilizations is an argument to which only history will supply a definitive reply. In the meantime, those from every inhabited continent taking part in the development of this Framework spurn the notion that it constitutes a form of "imperialism"—Western or otherwise. It is an exercise of free men and women and nothing else.

Further, not only scholars and educators but statesmen as well reject the notion that democracy can be legitimately considered culture-bound, that it means whatever governments of the day say it means. That is what
in 1997 Chilean President Eduardo Frei retorted to Fidel Castro, who repeated the claim, made for more than half a century, that communists have their own form of democracy. Clearly, to Frei democracy means liberal democracy, since to him the only democracy worthy of the name is the kind that protects fundamental rights, not the ersatz charades practiced in Cuba and elsewhere.

Thus, democracy does not mean whatever is politically convenient. It has an inner core of ideas and practices, however they may be adapted and reformulated in varying places and times. Democracy may fail—will fail—in some places (but not necessarily permanently), though just as surely it will succeed in others. Although basic democratic ideas have long since spread throughout the world, misunderstandings of their meanings are not uncommon. Before the Framework project, no attempt had ever been made to state these ideas in a systematic form through a process of international consensus.

Skeptical Voices

There are other skeptical voices about the enterprise of a world-wide democratic movement. After all, ideas, especially political ideas, are notorious for their tendency to be culture-bound. Attempts to export political values, such ideas as the freedom of the individual, undeniably an idea invented by the West, have met stern opposition from prominent Asian figures, such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, and Malaysia’s bitterly anti-Western prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. Lee is the most articulate spokesman for “Asian values,” excoriating the West for attempting to apply Western standards to Asia, which, he argues, has its own standards (Zakaria 1994). These standards place authority before liberty and family before the individual. Lee argues, in effect, that the West should mind its own business.

Responses to these arguments did not take long in coming. Chris Patten, former British governor of Hong Kong, and others have pointedly asked why anyone should take the strictures of authoritarians such as Lee or Chinese communists to be the authentic voices of Asian values rather than those of Burma’s Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Philippines’ Cory Aquino, the thousands of Chinese students who raised the standard of a universal “lady liberty,” or famed Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng. These are only a few of the most outstanding exponents of rather different Asian values that those espoused by the “benevolent despots” of Southeast Asia (Jones 1994).

Moreover, India, indisputably an Asian country, has long been considered a democracy (though of the “fragile” or “frozen” variety), and India’s political values are at odds with the authoritarian expressions cited above. Although India’s values must surely count in the Asian values debate, lit-
tle is heard of them from Lee and his ilk. Finally, if Lee and his successors are so confident that they represent the real values of their people, why have they never been willing to test them in free elections, rather than the sham events held in Singapore?

What is occurring in Asia, as well as elsewhere, is a political struggle among those of opposing views, not the inexorable continuation of tradition in the context of impenetrable cultural unity. Asian values differ both within and among countries of the region: from the liberal democrats of Japan, India, Taiwan, and Mongolia to the suppressed democrats of mainland China, the people of Hong Kong, and the opposition in Burma, Indonesia, and elsewhere.

Opposed to this line of thinking is Samuel P. Huntington, who articulates the hotly contested view that the world’s major civilizations must be seen as remaining separate in their central values and institutions, including political values and arrangements. He argues that as these civilizations modernize it cannot be expected that they will adopt Western values and institutions. The image of “an emerging homogeneous, universally Western world” is “misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous” (Huntington 1996).

Among Huntington’s arguments is that only a relative handful of first-generation leaders, especially in Asia, who were educated in the West have adhered to liberal democracy. Newer-generation leaders educated at home with a few often badly translated texts on democracy adhere to traditional, anti-liberal politics. This may be true in various cases today, but it strains credulity to believe that rejection of liberal democracy will continue indefinitely. Non-Western students still flock to Western universities; new generations rise to challenge the values and practices of parents and paternal states.

New generations need not abandon such key Asian values as family, work, thrift, and social harmony to embrace liberal freedoms and liberal democracy itself. South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan stand as living refutations of the notion that liberal democracy is incompatible with Asian values and that given the choice Asians—East Asians, indeed, in each of these instances—choose authoritarianism over liberal freedoms. The truth about the “Asian values” debate, which in any case now appears to be a dead letter, is summed up by a Chinese scholar: “[T]he assertion of ‘Asian values’ gains political prominence only when it is articulated in government rhetoric and official statements. In asserting these values leaders from the region find that they have a convenient tool to silence internal criticism and to fan anti-Western nationalist sentiments” (Li 1996, 1).

Other Asian voices concur. In 1994, Kim Dae-jung, now South Korea’s president, wrote, “Asia should lose no time firmly establishing democracy
and strengthening human rights. The biggest obstacle is not its cultural heritage but the resistance of authoritarian rulers and their apologists. . . . Culture is not necessarily our destiny. Democracy is" (cited in Mendes 1998, 1). And from Malaysia comes the voice of Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister: "It is altogether shameful, if ingenious, to cite Asian values as an excuse for autocratic practices and denial of basic civil liberties. To say that freedom is Western or unAsian is to offend our traditions as well as our forefathers who gave their lives in the struggle against tyranny and injustices (Ibrahim 1994, 3-4). In an address delivered in Washington, D.C., the following year the deputy Malaysian Prime Minister said that "we in Asia are undergoing a resurrection of the debate over democracy and civil society." "This discourse, rooted in Asian traditions and culture, is led by a new generation of confident and assertive Asians—intellectuals, social activists, artists, and politicians—who subscribe to the universality of democratic values" (Ibrahim 1995, 1). In short, the apostles of "Asian values" turn out to be representatives of Asian authoritarianism and their apologists and not of Asia itself, a continent of immense diversity.

Prior to the economic crisis of 1997-1998, the rise to economic prominence of certain Asian "soft" authoritarian nations, especially tiny Singapore and Malaysia (which were united as a single state) but also Indonesia, had been cited as a challenge to the relevance of liberal democracy in developing countries. The degree to which the corporate mentality of Asian neomercantilism, summed up in the terms "Japan, Inc." and "Asia, Inc.," will be retained, abandoned, or transformed as the new millennium dawns in 2001 remains to be seen. That there will be substantial change, hastened by the crisis, in the region’s fundamental economic structure in the direction of liberalization, is already clear. "Transparency" and "accountability," together with the opening of markets and the distancing of government and industry, are watchwords marking a transition from pure corporatism toward competitive free market systems.

Important political consequences have become apparent with the fall of Indonesia’s Suharto, the very icon of crony capitalism, and his replacement by a democratically elected government. The intense economic suffering of that populous country under its corrupt but once successful ancien regime points up the dangers inherent in authoritarianism, not only in Asia, but everywhere. It also points out the need for the cleansing effects of transparency prescribed by liberal notions of the open society. Rulers invariably claim to be wise, but are they? And if once they were wise, do they remain so? Or has society, perhaps, grown sufficiently mature to cast off the paternal hand of "guided democracy" and assume responsibility for its own fate? Are not constitutional controls on authority, at all events, safer than the powers of unchecked officialdom?
The ancient question, "Who guards the guardians?" reverberates not only through centuries, but across cultures and civilizations as well. Those attempting to cope with this question may find the ideas of liberal democracy fully germane to their situation, even if they must be adapted to non-Western settings. It is difficult to deny that the evils of unchecked power are universal.

In this context, the views of Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997, 3) should be considered. Brzezinski argues that contemporary accounts of Asian values express differences in the stage of socio-economic development, not evidence of unbridgeable cultural divides in a world of relative values. Contrary to Huntington, he believes that economic development will lead to a convergence of certain core political values, and that if and when countries in Asia and elsewhere approach the level of development of the West, they, too, will abandon authoritarianism and demand fundamental liberal freedoms. Nor is it clear that authoritarian government is the correct formula for economic success in the developing world. On this question, even before the outbreak of the Asian economic crisis, Nobel laureate Amartya Sen remarked that "the 'Lee hypothesis' is based on very selective and limited information" (Sen 1997, 1). Ironically, for this debate, Lee Kuan Yew himself appears to hold some variation of the convergence view, since he foresees the future adoption of liberal freedoms in East Asia—the only question seems to be when.8 Francis Fukuyama (1992) has similarly argued the convergence thesis at length.

Finally, as already stated, the Framework makes no claim that the non-democratic world is now ready for liberal democracy; it implicitly insists, however, that bastardized illiberal versions of democracy not be confused with liberal and constitutional varieties, a confusion that can only be avoided through a careful examination of the meaning of democracy, which is precisely what the Framework attempts.

The jury is out regarding liberal democracy as the end point (Fukuyama 1992), as it were, of the age-old human quest for dependably decent and effective government. It will remain out for a very long time, perhaps permanently. As a precondition for choice, the world needs a shared understanding of the core meaning of democracy. The Framework is a giant stride in making the meaning of democracy the common intellectual property of everyone. As such, it deserves the support and participation of democrats everywhere.

Notes
1. The Framework is available at the Center for Civic Education site on the World Wide Web (www.civiced.org). Comments should be sent directly to the center by e-mail (center4civ@aol.com), Fax (818) 591-9330, or mail to 5146 Douglas Fir Road, Calabasas, California 91302, U.S.A.
2. It is sometimes suggested that illiberal regimes be called "non-liberal," but this term is unsatisfactory. Regimes that trample fundamental rights are more than merely "not" liberal; they are diametrically opposed to liberal values—they are anti-liberal. "Non-liberal" at best soft-pedal and fails to capture the defining characteristic.

3. It may be asked if under this regime of definitions "peoples democracies" is a legitimate use of democracy. The answer is no, because all forms of democracy require free elections, with all that this key term means, not simply elections such as the sham elections held under communism.

4. Not all features of American democracy today are democratic, since the United States Senate is not elected according to the idea that all votes are to count equally, the Benthamite notion that each is to count for one and no more than one. That is, two senators are elected by the voters of Wyoming whose population is approximately 450,000 but California, whose population exceeds 30,000,000, also elects just two senators. Thus, a senatorial vote is weightier in Wyoming than in California. Nevertheless, Americans find these arrangements completely legitimate, not problematic.

5. It should also be pointed out that liberal freedoms under enlightened despots such as Catherine the Great of Russia and Frederick the Great of Prussia in the eighteenth century or Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore in the twentieth are notoriously uncertain. Educated, "progressive" despots need not be liberal at all, as in the case of the Shah of Iran, whose methods of rule included a notoriously brutal secret police.

6. See Marc F. Plattner and Carl Gershman, "Democracy Gets a Bum Rap," The Wall Street Journal, 26 January 1998. Among the authors' arguments is that although elections are "not enough" for the establishment of liberal democracy, regimes that hold free and fair elections "arouse citizens to insist upon their rights and upon the accountability of elected officials. The process makes government more subject to public scrutiny."

7. The crisis may materially alter perceptions of the relative performance of certain Asian and Western, especially American, economies. As recently as 1995, the anti-Western prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, wrote that "Americans must accept that the prosperity they once enjoyed is a thing of the past. . . ." Angered at negative publicity in the United States about palm oil, a principal Malaysian export, Mahathir, a trained physician, also wrote that palm oil is "wholesome," but that "... in the United States, palm oil was blamed for virtually all the heart disease there." See Mahathir Mohamad and Shintaro Ishihara, The Voice of Asia (Tokyo, New York, and London: Kodansha International, 1995), 40-41. It remains to be seen whether the crisis, and the economic and political fallout from it, will alter perceptions in Asia and elsewhere of the desirability and authoritarian neomercantilist regimes. For an analysis of changes in the relationship between government and markets in Asia and elsewhere, see Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the Modern World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 156-91 and passim.

8. At various times, Lee has said that it might be one hundred years before Asians might be entrusted with liberal freedoms, and that it might be only thirty years.

References


A FRAMEWORK ON EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY

By Charles F. Bahmueller

The preceding chapter on “Education for Democratic Citizenship: A Framework” explained the character and rationale of the project and gave a very brief description of its content. The purpose of this chapter is to present a more ample but compressed version of the content of the Framework as it stood in the spring of 1999. This version of the Framework, however, will be further revised after being commented upon by reviewers around the world.

It must be stressed that it is difficult to present in a brief compass the complexities of the Framework as now constituted. What follows, therefore, attempts to summarize the most salient aspects of the present text (with occasional commentary) without pretending to completeness. The Framework’s seven parts, summarized with commentary in the remainder of this chapter, are:

I. What is democracy?
II. Who belongs and who rules in a democracy?
III. Why choose democracy?
IV. What makes democracy work?
V. How does democracy function?
VI. How do democracies develop, survive, and improve?
VII. How does democracy shape the world and how does the world shape democracy?

I. What is Democracy?

For most democrats the only kind of democracy worthy of the name is liberal democracy, the variety that protects a range of individual rights beyond basic democratic political rights. Among forms of democracy, only liberal democracy champions such individual rights as those of freedom of religion and conscience, privacy, and freedom of expression beyond political speech alone.
It is vital to distinguish among forms of democracy since, as the Framework points out, democracy can, at least theoretically, take more than one form. Besides liberal democracy are illiberal (non-liberal) forms of democracy, forms that (again, in theory) protect political rights, but not private rights, such as those just mentioned. In today’s world, Iran, some might argue, comes closest to this form of democracy because of the degree of integrity of its national elections. Iran, however, falls short of the minimum standards for democracy, since only a certain range of Islamic opinion is permitted in its political debate, so that it is far from protecting freedom of political speech. And Iran fails other democratic tests as well.

Democracy—liberal democracy—can best be understood as composed of the three dimensions of “constitutional liberal democracy.” While this formulation is sometimes divided into “liberal-constitutionalism” on the one hand and “democracy” on the other, its meaning is the same. Simply put, constitutionalism refers to the use of constitutions to empower and, especially, limit the means and ends of government. Liberalism specifies which limits are to be placed on government in order to protect individual rights; and democracy stipulates that universal adult suffrage be exercised in regular, free, and fair elections and that all citizens be eligible to stand for public office. All democratic values and principles, such as rule of law and due process of law, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of speech and expression, a right to privacy, economic liberty, and popular sovereignty, can be arranged under one of this conceptual triad. “Constitutional liberal democracy” therefore summarizes all of the important components of “democracy.”

The Framework stands for the proposition that democracy is more than a form of government. In its most developed state, democracy transcends its purely political form to become an ethos, a way of life, that manifests itself in myriad ways in a people’s habits, manners, and mores. While few societies can be expected to be thoroughly egalitarian, no democracy can be considered fully developed without a degree of egalitarianism.

The consciousness of democratic citizens remains undeveloped if they do not, at least in gross outline, accept the logic of democracy. A major premise of this logic is that the people as a whole forms the foundation of democratic political life. An informed and willing democratic people also accepts the proposition that legitimacy is embodied in the public authority of a democratic state; a democratic people authorizes its political system. In other words, to accept democratic citizenship is to accept the legitimacy of political authority. Legitimacy means that those who exercise authority have a right to do so. This is the meaning of the primary principle of democracy, popular sovereignty—since legitimate authority resides in the
people, their consent alone, and nothing else in its absence, can establish legitimacy.

It follows that in establishing their government, a democratic people in no way alienates or abandons its sovereignty. Rather, the people should be understood to “delegate” its power to its representatives, who in moral terms serve as “trustees,” those to whom property is entrusted to be administered for the benefit its owners. Hence the Anglo-Saxon adage, “a public office is a public trust.” Democratic authority, therefore, flows upward from people to “rulers,” and not vice versa. In this sense, the people own its government.

A second foundational principle of democracy is majority rule. This is not an absolute principle, but is subject to certain provisos and modifications. The first of these is that the fundamental rights of the minority must be respected. The powers of majorities are limited by constitutional provisions. Some democratic constitutions, moreover, place greater limits on majorities than others, requiring supermajorities for passage of certain measures or embodying forms of “consociational” democracy. It is important to see that pure majoritarianism (in which any decision of a majority is legitimate) is inimical to democracy, since the logic of democracy dictates that the minority never cease to be members too. Because they remain equals with the majority in political rights, the minority are entitled to equal rights under law.

With these qualifications in mind, we may restate the principle as “majority rule, minority rights.” But what is a “majority”? People of the European Middle Ages also believed in the right of the “majority,” but the term was understood in a sense different from our own. The “majority” was the “major pars,” Latin for “weightier part,” of the political order, great landowning magnates or other members of an aristocracy. The democratic revolution introduced the notion that in essential ways princes and paupers are equals or, as the often-cited Benthamite formula has it, “each is to count for one and for no more than one.”

In democratic mores, this is not just a formula for each person’s vote to count the same in elections. It also stands for the more profound idea that each person in a democracy is to count for as much as any other. On a mundane level, this would mean that if a policeman sees two individuals in need of assistance, he is to render aid on the basis of need, not evidence of wealth, education, or social status. On a philosophical level, each person in a democracy is to be accorded “equal concern and respect.” Some form of this ideal has often formed the foundation of demands for institutional reform or legal redress.

The Framework emphasizes the concept of “constitutionalism,” distinguishing it from a polity’s simply having a constitution. The Framework
says that a constitution "embodies or sets forth the purposes and organizations of political power and government for a society." It may be a description of a form of government, a document or collection of documents, a written document or series of documents augmented over time by custom, legislation, and legal rulings. In that case, it would be both written and unwritten. It may also be considered a kind of "higher law" that limits the powers of government to protect individual rights and promote the common good. Polities in which a constitution limits government in practice are said to have "constitutional government." In this case they are said to practice "constitutionalism."

A primary aspect of constitutionalism is the "rule of law." The "rule of law" refers to several ideas. Thus, laws are set forth in advance and are widely known, rather than obscure or secret; and they are of general and impartial application, so that no one, such as members of social, political, or economic elites, is not subject to the same laws as the rest of the population. The rule of law therefore means more than merely having laws—the "rule of law" is qualitatively different from a "rule of laws." The rule of law is opposed to a capricious and arbitrary "rule of men," which in essence means lawlessness.

According to the Framework, "there is a reciprocal relationship between constitutionalism and political and economic freedom." Political and economic freedoms limit government; and limited government is essential to the protection of political and economic freedoms. There is also a relationship between political freedom and economic freedom, since each type of freedom promotes the other. There are differing schools of thought, however, over which one is more fundamental.

The Framework makes observations about the relationship of democracy and conflict that may surprise some readers. It points out the democracy not only entails but actively embraces certain kinds of conflict and that, so far from vitiating or undermining democracy, such conflict is required by and actually enhances it. Democracy is "government by discussion," and the animated contention among alternative ideas and policies is among its distinguishing features. Democracies are as garrulous as autocracies are tense or silent. Dictators are notorious for dismissing parliaments as mere "talking shops." But in the democratic experience the open clash of ideas in legislative chambers, meeting halls, town squares, cafes, and private homes helps greatly to maintain social peace.

Conflict in the interpretation of democratic principles and attempts to obviate the inevitable conflicts among them (such as the tension between liberty and equality) are inherent in the continuing conversation of the democratic process. Of course, as the Framework points out, some types of con-
flict do threaten democracy, such as elemental struggles among political and military leaders, and conflicts among rigidly defined, exclusive, or uncompromising factions.

The Framework stresses the intimate relationship between democracy and human rights. Rights are "justifiable claims to have or obtain something, to act in a certain way, or be treated in a certain way (or not to be interfered with)." Some rights are conceived as essential to the nature of a person or activity; this is the idea that certain rights inhere in the nature of things, or, to use the eighteenth-century formulation, constitute "natural rights." Two centuries later, "natural rights" became "human rights," rights that one possesses merely by being a person. For example, the idea that legitimate political obligation arises only by consent is arguably part of "the nature of things." If so, the right to a voice in choosing one's rulers is among human rights.

II. Who Belongs and Who Rules in a Democracy?

The Framework's second section is concerned with the status and character of the democratic citizen. It begins by describing the people who "own and operate," so to speak, a democratic political system as its "political people," that is, the polity's citizens viewed as a whole. This "political people" organizes a state or polity composed of one or more peoples or nationalities. This section describes the character and varieties of nation-state; it compares the status of individuals in politics other than democracies with that of democratic citizens. It describes the role of democratic citizens and their rights and responsibilities and compares them with the roles of those living under other governmental systems. The Framework then surveys opportunities for democratic citizens to take part in political and civic life. The section closes by considering the kinds of loyalties that liberal democracy must tolerate, beginning with the consequential claim that its core principles demand that democracy must at the least tolerate all loyalties which do not seek its abolition and which allow others their own loyalties.

First, then, a "political people" is a body of persons who have agreed among themselves to form a polity. This political organization we commonly call a "nation-state." The world is organized (with qualifications and exceptions) as individual nation-states (also called "states"). Nation-states may be composed of a single national or ethnic group (e.g., Japan); or it may consist of two or more such groups, in which case it is a multinational state, such as the Soviet Union was or Canada is. Or its citizens may be a mixture of many ethnic groups, such as Australia and the United States, which the Framework terms "cosmopolitan" countries, in which the primary identification and political allegiance of ethnically diverse groups is to the nation-state as a whole.
Individuals living in various types of political systems have varying types of status useful to understand the status of democratic citizens more clearly. One such "status" of the individual is "communal member," such as members of familial, clan, ethnic, religious or tribal communities. Others are "subjects," such as those living under monarchies, theocracies, or a variety of autocracies. "Citizens," however, members of republics or democracies, have a distinctive status based on a different understanding of the capacity of individuals and the character of their rights and obligations to the political community. Understood in that status is the right of the citizen to share in setting the rules by which all citizens live. In this sense, as Rousseau long ago pointed out, citizens have a dual role as subjects of the law. Though they are subjects, they are not only subjects, since they share in the sovereign powers associated with self-rule.

To distinguish further the status of the democratic citizen, it is instructive to compare the relationships of the individual in varying political systems. Examples found in the Framework include:

- Subservient or passive vs. active
- Dependent vs. independent
- Childlike vs. adult (paternalist forms vs. non-paternalist forms)
- Disposable object vs. considered having intrinsic value as persons

Thus, unlike those living under other political systems, the democratic citizen is taken to be an active, independent adult having intrinsic worth—someone whose legitimate rights and needs provides the purposes for which government is established. Furthermore—and this is especially significant—in democracy, the relationship of individual to government reflects the difference between the individual conceived as having inherent rights, as opposed to having only those rights that are derived from community membership. In the latter case, rights either can be stripped from individuals if the character of community membership changes or if the individual is removed from membership. But the concept of inherent rights suffers from no such contingencies.

The citizen as an individual is situated at the center of public life of a democracy. The Framework presents a detailed account of citizens' rights and responsibilities as well as their opportunities for participation in civic and political life. As the Framework puts it, "citizenship may be conceived as an office of government, like any other, possessing its own rights and responsibilities." And, under the principle of popular sovereignty, citizens collectively occupy the supreme office of democracy. "To be a citizen is to be a full and equal member of the sovereign people." "An essential idea of democracy," the Framework continues, "is that there are no classes of cit-
izenship, no 'second class' citizens." Furthermore, democratic citizenship is more than legal status. At its highest form of development, it is "an ethos, a character of spirit that guides relationships among persons and animates individual commitment to fundamental principles."

The second section closes with a consideration of a commitment by liberal democracy that lies at the heart of its enterprise: that the right of citizens to multiple, freely-chosen loyalties be respected. This right is at the core of the most profoundly held democratic values and principles because it encompasses individuals' right to liberty. This is individuals' rights to direct their lives as they see fit, to choose the direction and venues of their social and ethical life, to act upon their deepest beliefs by associating with other like-minded individuals, and openly declaring their interests, convictions, and even their eccentricities to the world.

At bottom, the right to multiple loyalties entails an affirmation of human personality as the source of free and legitimate moral choice. The capacity for moral choice is an essential human attribute to be preserved and championed and given the widest latitude consistent with the rights of others and the continued existence of the political community. These provisos mean that not every loyalty is compatible with liberal democracy generally or with a particular democracy. Democracies need not permit dual citizenship, for example; and "groups whose purpose is to commit or conspire to commit crimes"—including conspiracies for the violent overthrow of the polity—"have no right to be tolerated in a democracy." In protecting citizens' capacity for choice, democracy stands for the moral autonomy of the person; in democracies, the individual is not in any sense "owned" by the collectivity.

III. Why Choose Democracy?

The third section of the Framework asks why anyone should choose democracy. It should be noted that although the Framework in many ways advocates liberal democracy, it is limited and circumspect in this advocacy. It makes plain that democracy is not always and everywhere feasible or desirable, in any case not always desired. In presenting the case for democracy, it is careful also to present the case against it. The Framework has a double reason for adopting this way of preceding. No "choice" is worthy of the name unless it is an informed choice; all sides of any question, it implicitly argues, should be heard. Moreover, in writing a Framework for teaching democracy, democrats should model the form of governance they advocate both in its content and in its method of its composition and revision.

Justifications of democracy can be divided into intrinsic and instrumental varieties. To the enhancement of the self-determination of the indi-
ividual just discussed may be added the self-determination of a people: people have a right to govern themselves; or, to put the matter otherwise, claims of general obligations of political obedience that are forced upon them are fraudulent. The "just powers" of governments, Thomas Jefferson wrote famously in 1776, are derived from "the consent of the governed." According to democracy's creed, human beings are born with a form of innate moral equality that excludes intrinsic or inherited rights to command others or obligations to obey. As the Framework puts it, "each person has a right to an equal share in governance."

As for the argument that they are incapable of self-government, democrats since Pericles have argued that people are qualified to govern themselves because those unable to initiate policy may nevertheless be fair judges; and because collectively the people have more wisdom than any elite. Furthermore, people, rather than an elite, are capable of defining their common interests and, the Framework argues, are "the most trustworthy depository of the powers for the protection of their interests." Other "depositories" may be good; but people are better, because their interests, their lives, and their futures are at stake.

Another set of justifications may be termed "instrumental," since they defend democracy as "a means or instrument for the achievement of desirable ends or outcomes." Two such justifications are, first, that democracy protects liberty from encroachments on individuals' freedoms; and, second, that it secures their rights. Because rights are democracy's foundation "to undermine them is to undermine democracy itself." Added to these justifications is democracy's fostering of the individual's intellectual development and self-respect. Its members' faculties are sharpened by fulfillment of civic responsibilities as they deliberate and come to judgment on public policy—watching, listening, reading, thinking, and discussing the range of issues that occupy the public life of a democracy.

More than this, democracy fosters respect for the individual and a sense of personal responsibility by entrusting citizens with powers of decision and helps to ensure orderly change and containment of social conflict within prescribed channels. Democracy legitimizes the political system by creating avenues through which popular sovereignty can be exercised. More than this, it encourages innovation through its openness and enhances freedom by encouraging expansion of choice in every field of human endeavor through open markets and the free market of ideas and perspectives. And democracy maximizes the accountability of authority by ensuring the public scrutiny of public officials. Finally, democracy promotes the overall quality of life, as determined by citizens, who are the final arbiters of public policy.
Having enumerated a range of justifications for democracy, the Framework mentions the purposes of government that democracy has in common with other legitimate forms of government, such as protection of life and promotion of justice and the common good. It continues by discussing attributes unique to democracy. Among attributes unique to all forms of democracy are the following:

- the protection of a range of political rights and liberties;
- the dispersal of decision-making by increasing the number of people involved in deciding public policy;
- the promotion of the free flow of information, the “currency” of democracy essential for informed choice;
- the transparency of government, the open and continuous scrutiny of government through publicity;
- the other institutional means of preventing abuse of power, such as systems of checks and balances.

In addition, democracy’s competitive atmosphere, its attitude of not taking things for granted, and its belief in change and improvement promote its dynamism, in the Framework’s view a uniquely democratic feature.

Liberal democracy has a further set of unique attributes. One is a commitment to the worth and dignity of each individual, in that “liberal democracy holds the well-being of each individual in especial esteem.” Others include the protection of a further extent of individual rights, including freedom of conscience and belief; freedom of expression that goes beyond political speech alone to encompass the whole of human expression; and development of the individual by providing conditions conducive to the full flowering of the individual’s potential. Further, an especially significant feature of liberal democracy includes civil society, the autonomous, self-organized portion of society independent of the state: “Liberal democracy recognizes, protects, and relies upon this nongovernmental sphere (which is) a principal site for the exercise of individual rights and a location for the achievement of the common good.”

Ultimately, the freedoms of liberal democracy are based in large measure upon its provision for a market-based economy. Markets enhance both political and personal liberty, breaking up concentrations of power by decentralizing decision-making, removing it from what in practice operates as a single set of government hands and directing it to myriad sets of uncoordinated private hands. The market system provides freedom for release of entrepreneurial energies and opens up an arena for initiating economic enterprise that sustains society’s freedom. And market-based economies, the Framework argues, tend to promote and support cultural diversity and social
pluralism beyond the economic sphere—pluralism "which liberal democracy needs and extols."

At this point the Framework turns to a different set of arguments—those arguing against democracy. In doing so the Framework attempts to model the same standards of even-handedness and fair play that it seeks to promote in the practice of democracy itself. Since consent is empty unless it is informed consent, so the choice of democracy must be accompanied by arguments that point up its weaknesses and uncertainties, its fallibility and failings.

First among these arguments is that democracy may undermine order by unleashing popular passions and prejudices. It also tends to undermine tradition by taking nothing for granted, fastening its public eye on the future instead of the past, and denying the accumulated wisdom of the past. It is liable to lurch toward sudden social change, rejecting the continuity upon which forces for civilization depend. Again, democracy tends to destabilize authority by distrusting those who hold it and tending to undermine absolute moral norms with its social and economic dynamism, its free flow of ideas that challenges every inherited truth. Democracy avoids final determination of what is right.

It may be argued, further, that democracy endangers justice by decentralizing power through its market basis, possibly leading to an inequitable division of resources. "Democracy," the Framework asserts, "does not (necessarily) provide a disinterested protector of the rights of the less able."

Next, democracy is said to erode competence and efficiency—the former by exalting the "common man" at the expense of excellence; the latter, by delaying decision-making or blocking it entirely. Moreover, democracy (arguably) undervalues merit by promoting a "mass society" of atomized and homogenous individuals which levels standards to the lowest common denominator. An emphasis on equality promotes sameness and "requires an absence of ranking of any kind."

In its extreme form the Framework continues, this situation "leads to a lowering of expectations, mediocrity as a model for emulation, ridicule of excellence, anti-intellectualism, and an avoidance of standing out"—of being an outstanding person—"in order to be accepted as one of the group." By the same token, democracy is said to stifle creativity in that the mass culture associated with it "channels tastes and production into commonly accepted formulas and patterns."

Finally, democracy may jeopardize liberty through what Alexis de Tocqueville called the "tyranny of opinion." Liberty is threatened when the opinion of the majority acting with an irresistible force, overwhelms independent judgment and "so thoroughly dominates individuals that they become
incapable of thinking independently." Moreover, democracy’s emphasis on equality may “deny the significance of individuality” and “restrict the arena for the exercise of individual difference.”

Having gone this far in presenting potentially damaging charges against democracy—charges that have been heard from the Athenians of ancient Greece to the critics of mass culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—the Framework takes a somewhat different tack in examining why non-democratic institutions are typically tolerated in democratic societies. It might, indeed be argued that these institutions save democracy from the arguments just arrayed against it. Some are institutions that secure the safety of the state such as the military; others maintain economic health, such as central banks. Others still, especially the judicial process, must be insulated from public opinion and the political process to ensure impartiality. Liberal democracies may elect some judges, though not entire systems of elected judges. And many institutions of civil society may be undemocratically composed and operated. Paradoxically, this is a manifestation of the very liberty that liberal democracy is established to protect, since liberty means that, although they may be regulated, the governing structures of private organizations are not subject to public control. Religious institutions and business corporations that may be hierarchically organized fall into this category.

Besides protection of liberty, reasons for allowing non-democratic features in social institutions are, the Framework believes, twofold. First, some organizations such as hospitals are based upon expertise that could be undermined by certain forms of democracy. Second, if run as democracies, organizations such as business corporations whose success depends on efficiency and expertise might also be undermined.

The Framework’s third section closes by recounting reasons for suspending or delaying the introduction of democratic systems, without defending or recommending them. In rare and extreme circumstances, such as natural disasters, epidemics, or rebellions, it may be necessary for certain features of democracy to be temporarily suspended. At other times, external threats or lack of an adequate political, social, and economic basis may make democracy appear impractical. So, too, according to the Framework, if “democracy is to have a reasonable chance of success, it may be necessary for society to undergo transitional phases of development that may be less than democratic.”

IV. What Makes Democracy Work?

The Framework’s fourth section opens with an inquiry about the “kinds of factors” that shape political systems in general, and then the factors that
"enable, inhibit, and shape democracy." The Framework is thus interested in exploring factors with both positive and negative consequences for the democratic enterprise. It systematically examines characteristics of whole societies, individuals, groups and organizations, legal and educational systems, economies and standards of living, governmental institutions, political leaders, and public officials. It closes by asking what trends in society and politics erode democracy and where responsibility lies for maintaining democracy's viability.

Social characteristics favorable to democracy are those such as a large developed middle class and an active civil society. The middle class has long been associated with the social basis of democracy because middle class people tend to be peaceable and industrious. Middle classes, too, are likely to be more literate and in command of the skills required for democratic citizenship. They are likely, for example, to have developed social skills and to be active in the organizations of civil society (another key social element), and therefore to have more "social capital," effective relationships formed through taking part in the networks of associations and influence that form the "infrastructure" of democracy.

Among more than a dozen other social characteristics favorable to democracy enumerated by the Framework are widespread social trust, absence of a rigid class structure, shared political or constitutional values, ideological and social pluralism, widespread literacy, and universal public education. By the same token, however, there are, as it were, negative characteristics, those detrimental to democracy. Examples of these include the division of society into rich and poor (absence of a developed middle class), widespread civic alienation, entrenched social stratification, social mistrust, "absolute belief" in one's ethnic and racial superiority, lawlessness and corruption among public officials, and lack of basic education, civic knowledge, and civic skills.

Similar sets of positive and negative characteristics are set forth for the other categories mentioned above and occupy most of the remainder of part IV of the Framework: examples follow. Thus, positive traits of individuals include confidence, self-discipline, tolerance and compassion, civility, civic mindedness, mistrust of power, and skepticism; negative include self-centeredness, malice and bigotry, unwillingness to compromise, apathy, and unrealistic expectations of government. Among positive traits of social groups and organizations are tolerance of opposing groups and self-restraint; negative ones include prohibition of dissent, group orientation to the exclusion of individuality; and insistence upon non-negotiable demands.

Positive traits of a country's legal system include existence of the various criteria that form a rule of law; comprehensible laws that are available
to the public; and processes open to public scrutiny. Among negative attributes are excessive complexity, partiality and caprice in application, and inaccessibility of the law and its operations. Features of a country’s economy and standard of living that promote democracy are the institution of private property and the ability to use it as a means of ensuring personal independence and a market-based economy. Others include maintenance of “an equilibrium of economic justice in the distribution of benefits and burdens” and the achievement of a standard of living adequate for participation in public life. Contrary conditions, by contrast, include concentration of wealth and economic power in a few hands; factors that inhibit innovation and the release of entrepreneurial energies and that foster stagnation and widespread misery and inequality; and treatment of workers as disposable “things.”

At this point the Framework makes a telling point about the relationship of markets and political freedom when it argues that without markets political freedom cannot be created or maintained. This is so, the Framework argues, because “where the state is the only source of income, there will be no real freedom for dissent.” In this circumstance, power which otherwise would have devolved to individuals and the autonomous organizations of civil society passes to state bureaucracies.

The Framework continues with accounts of the features beneficial and detrimental to democracy of a nation’s educational system, leaders and officials, and governmental institutions. Among positive characteristics are provisions for universal access to literacy, openess to public scrutiny and accountability, availability of publicly financed education, and the goal of critical understanding rather than indoctrination. Features identified as negative include education that produces passivity and unquestioned acceptance of the regime and its ideology; insufficient quality of education, including failure to attract, train, and retain competent teachers; and exclusion of some segments of society from access to education.

Examples of the “attitudes, behaviors, and practices” of political leaders that promote democracy are, first, leaders’ respect for the letter and spirit of their nation’s laws and its constitutional values and principles; second, knowledge and competence to do their job. and third, attentiveness to the public will. A further item not merely “conducive” to democracy but essential to its functioning is the willingness of officials to give up office when defeated in elections. Official attributes menacing to the democratic standards run from corruption, nepotism, and a rapacious appetite for power to ignorance, demagoguery, and contempt for citizens and the law.

From the perspective of understanding how good governance promotes stable democracy, the features of governmental institutions conducive to
democracy described by the Framework are especially significant. Among them are limits both to institutional ends and to the means used to pursue them: responsiveness to citizen needs and demands; and public accountability; efficiency and resourcefulness. Other significant traits include integrity—absence of corruption; procedures and structures for protection of individuals and minorities; and vision—concern for the overall well-being of society and for the future.

Contrary attributes include rigid separation of government and society based on claims of superior official knowledge and competence, and intrusion of political power into all aspects of society. Additional examples are domination by a complex, unrestrained, and unresponsive bureaucracy and intrusion of the military into affairs outside their purview—lack of proper civilian control of the military.

This section of the Framework concludes with discussions of trends in social and political life that tend to erode democracy and where responsibility for correcting them lies. Indifference to public affairs, severe social fragmentation and conflict, corruption in officialdom, and political violence are all social and political trends antithetical to the democratic ethos. So, too, are self-satisfaction and complacency with the status quo, the conclusion that society has reached the perpetual high-noon of its apogee. And, perhaps most ominous, is irrationalism in public and private life—the emergence of nihilism, resort to extremism, and recourse to soothsayers and astrologers, and to the occult, all toxins to democracy's soul.

The answer to such trends, insofar as there are answers, lies squarely within the responsibility of the whole body of citizens. As the Framework puts it, "The more widely political power is shared in society, the wider is the responsibility for maintaining the existence and well-being of the political order." More particularly, if democracy is to deal with its pathologies and meet its challenges, citizens must internalize its values and standards—they must "understand the animating spirit of democracy's ideas and institutions. They must also live out essential democratic ideas. . . ." They must make democracy a way of life—*their* way of life.

V. How Does Democracy Function?

The fifth section of the Framework is concerned with questions about how democracy operates. It points out that democracy cannot operate without institutions, since it is they that actually carry out the popular mandate to govern. But the democratic character of how these institutions carry out the people's business is crucial.

Institutions are required for democracy to function, just as any form of government requires institutions. Institutions provide regularity and pre-
dictability in the conduct of public business as well as continuity and endurance of governmental forms over time. In addition, they afford a kind of collective memory and furnish expertise in matters within their purview. They may also offer a counterweight to other centers of power that enhances freedom of action for citizens.

On the other hand, institutions may have negative features, too. They may be dominated by the past and resist change, become stalemated in the processes of making public policy, and aggrandize themselves and overpower individuals and organizations, destroying in the process the balance among centers of powers which at other times they help to maintain.

The Framework describes governmental institutions as "bodies empowered by fundamental law, constitutions, or settled custom and convention to make, interpret, and apply rules and laws." The basic functions and purposes of governmental institutions run from the alpha of providing for the security of citizens, securing their liberty through protection of individual rights, and looking to the general welfare of society to the omega of representing the nation and its people in international venues. To address basic purposes, governmental institutions act on the gamut of issues that occupy public attention at any time—the "public agenda."

While formal institutions of government constitute primary means for fulfilling democracy's purposes, other means are found in "civil society." As used philosophically, this term does not mean "a society that is civil—one that practices civility." Although civility is indeed, as scholars have argued, the virtue of civil society, the term refers to "the autonomous, self-organized sphere of voluntary individual, social, and economic relationships that, though limited by law, is separate from governmental institutions." More simply put, civil society is society as distinguished from the state. In today's parlance, however, civil society often (though not always) means not simple "society," but society organized for some purpose. According to one view, civil society is organized for some public purpose; according to another, it may be organized for any purpose.

As a generalization, it is scarcely too much to say that civil society is the single most important force and causative factor in democracy for maintaining freedom. And, potentially, it has many more key functions. Independence from government removes the multitude of civil society's organizations and associations from political direction. Civil society can thus limit and compete with the power of government by maintaining numerous alternative centers of powers, sometimes by supplementing or providing substitutes or alternatives for government programs.

Civil society provides intermediate organizations operating between government and the individual that may protect individuals psychological-
ly and practically from the direct operation to government power. Further, by providing individuals opportunities for multiple affiliations and networks of social relations, civil society promotes community cohesiveness and liberates individuals by freeing them from domination by a single social organization. Civil society helps to develop the potential of citizens, promoting creativity, serving as laboratory for experimentation, initiating and sustaining innovation and reform in social and public affairs.

A further set of issues considered in part V concerns government's regulatory functions. Although by its nature civil society must be free of government intrusiveness, government must regulate civil society according to established legal standards that arise from basic liberal democratic commitments and constitutional principles. There is a tension, therefore, between the liberal requirement for liberty and the democratic constitutional requirement for limited regulation—for setting appropriate bounds to liberty. "The question of governmental regulation of civil society," the Framework appropriately remarks, "may be problematic and controversial."

A key arena in which conflicting demands for freedom and regulation arise is economic life. Since a basic purpose of government is looking to society's general welfare, "the objective of enhancing and regulating the economy is a priority of government policy-making." The Framework argues that in dealing with economic life, democracy may tend to a certain hubris—overconfidence that may have injurious consequences if not contained. Some democrats may take the view that since society is based on popular rule, government control of economic life is justified, so long as democratic procedures are adhered to. They may believe that government can and should solve all problems.

The effect of such a view, however, if carried into action would be to undermine the liberty of civil society that democracy is committed to protect—liberty that is based in significant measure on the functioning of a market-based economy. Tensions are bound to arise, therefore, in questions concerning the protection of individual rights on the one hand, and considerations of distributive justice and damage to the democratic enterprise stemming from great aggregations of wealth and poverty, together with a weak middle class on the other.

Having surveyed these thorny but vital areas of contention, the Framework moves to a more empirical phase in which various forms of the practical operation of democratic institutions are examined in detail in a section dealing with "alternative institutional arrangements [that] serve the purposes of democracy." The section is prefaced with a discussion of criteria for determining if governmental institutions serve democratic values and principles, such as public access, predictability, and procedural fairness;
and others for determining adequate institutional performance, such as forms of efficiency. At this point, alternative institutional designs and arrangements for fulfilling democracy's purposes are sketched. These include systems varying in the degree to which power is centralized; forms of electoral systems; and arrangements of executive, legislative, and judicial functions.

As a conclusion to this section, the Framework explores how public business is carried out within institutional arrangements. The central feature in this regard is the idea of democratic deliberation. Public and non-public forms of deliberation are outlined, and citizen opportunities for deliberation, choice, and participation—the very stuff of the democratic process—are enumerated. Finally, the Framework asks what standards should be used in judging the ends and advisability of public policy in a democracy; and it surveys forms of recourse available to citizens dissatisfied with government's performance, from voting to remove office holders to temporary or permanent self-exile.

VI. How Do Democracies Develop, Survive, and Improve?

The Framework's penultimate section asks how democracies "develop, survive, and improve." The Framework makes the claim, which might be disputed by some democrats, that the principles of democracy "are progressively being refined through reflection on their meaning and their relationship to experience." "Refinements" and "interpretations" are always open to the charge that they undermine or in some way mangle democratic ideas and are therefore not refinements but retrograde steps.

Be this as it may, it is undeniable that the meaning and proper application of the values and principles of liberal democracy are continuously being discussed and debated. By their nature, according to the Framework, democracies cannot be finished or perfected, drawing sustenance from the very activities of political and philosophical dispute, from the cacophony of democratic discourse itself, in all its forms and contexts. This means that democracies by their nature do not aspire to become utopias, flawless societies, in which, for example, the search for justice has come to a successful conclusion. On the contrary, even if perfection were possible, "it would be antithetical to democracy because it would stop the process of criticism, innovation, and progress." Nevertheless, the Framework argues, abandonment of utopian ambitions or pretensions does not mean the democracies cease attempting to reduce the gap between ideals and reality.

Before asking how democracies develop, the Framework describes what they are like when developed. Among the characteristics of developed democracies is their adherence to animating principles of democracy in day-to-day governance. Also, democratic elements are not disparate attributes
but coalesce so as to cohere as a "consolidated" whole: discrete elements, in other words, have become a system. As such, mature democracies are stable and predictable, eager to maintain the integrity of their polities and take their place as members of the international community.

Regarding how nations become democracies, the Framework points to a multitude of factors that allows a new political direction to be chosen. Conditions antecedent to democracy are the spread of literacy, making information and ideas more widely accessible; dissatisfaction with the status quo and dissemination of democratic ideas; a decline of fatalistic attitudes; a degree of economic development sufficient to allow people to look beyond themselves and their present needs. The Framework also points to the necessity of a degree of "differentiation of persons as individuals rather than as parts of a social organism."

Factors that may prompt fundamental political change run from revolution, economic development, and modernization to opposition movements, international norms, and popular demand for participation, accountability, and improvements in daily life. Circumstances that contribute to democratic development are positive economic performance, the evolution of appropriate legal and educational systems, and the rise of civil society, creating networks of association and communication that energize civic life and disseminate knowledge and ideas.

The Framework enumerates signposts of progress towards democracy. Awareness of these milestones can raise the awareness of democratic citizens and assist them in judging the extent of their polity's democratic transition, consolidation, or maturation. These include, for example, the extent of personal, political, and economic freedom; establishment of a rule of law; respect for democratic arrangements by major power centers in society; the decline of one-party hegemony; and the extent of popular vigilance in exposing official malfeasance.

Newly established democracies often face special obstacles in normalizing and consolidating their gains in the form of the negative legacies they inherit from the old regime. These may take the form of patterns of thought, such as passivity and personal dependence on government, lawlessness, alienation and cynicism, coupled with a dearth of the civic skills that make for political efficacy. These negative legacies may also take the form of social and political obstacles, such as (among others) social disorder, ethnic fragmentation and hatred, the absence of a middle class, political interference by the military, and lack of democratic traditions and understanding.

If newly established democracies often face daunting challenges, democracies of longer duration but which are not fully consolidated have their
own problems that may lead to failure. Their institutions may not provide honest and effective government, and excessive political fragmentation may prevent the adoption of needed policies. Social fragmentation may place political cooperation beyond the reach of democratic institutions, and the economy may fail to meet to minimum expectations, all leading to erosion of the democratic ethos and to constitutional crisis.

Not even the most advanced democracies are immune from what the Framework terms “destructive and seemingly intractable problems.” These vary from instances of severe social fragmentation, communal violence, and substance abuse, to extensive criminality, spread of extremist ideas, and the spread of irrationalism and pseudoscientific ideas.

Democracies in all states of development face the following question: how should they treat anti-democratic forces within their society? Are those who actively oppose democracy to be tolerated or not? No answer is without difficulties, for if anti-democratic forces are tolerated indiscriminately, they may succeed in overthrowing democratic institutions; and if they are not tolerated, basic democratic freedoms may be trampled upon. Given this circumstance, it is little wonder that opinions among democrats differ about what, if anything, democracies may do to protect themselves. Steps that have been taken in some democracies include limitations on expression, such as prohibition of “hate speech” and advocacy of violent overthrow of democratic government; and restricting or outlawing extremist political organizations.

A further question is what action, if any, democracies can legitimately take when anti-democratic forces use entirely democratic means to gain power—with the intention of abolishing democracy once they assume office. Must democracy, to be true to itself, act suicidally? The Framework submits arguments on both sides of this issue to stimulate thought and discussion.

Finally, this section concludes with considerations on the citizen’s role in the renewal and improvement of democracy. Democracies are sometimes conceived as having “life cycles.” In this view, like living organisms, democracies are born, in the right circumstances mature, and then may die. But, the argument proceeds, rather than dying, they may regenerate themselves. The Framework’s admonition in this regard is categorical: “The citizen’s role in the renewal, self-correction, and ultimate survival of democracy is decisive.” For example, citizens can explore and critically question their polity’s basic principles and whether they are adhered to in practice. And they can evaluate the extent to which the first principles of democracy are atrophying and act on their evaluation. In general, conscientious citizens ensure that their civic actions reaffirm and are grounded in fundamental democratic values. In the last analysis, citizens are democracy’s grounding and fundament, its beginning and end—its alpha and omega.
VII. How Does Democracy Shape the World and How Does the World Shape Democracy?

The seventh and final section of the Framework asks what impact democracy has on the world. The short answer is that it has had a profound effect. For one thing, democracy's claim that its values are universal has at least provoked world-wide debate. But is this claim correct?

Universality of Democratic Values. Universality implies that something is applicable across time, place, and culture. For example, something is "universal" if it arises "from the nature of things:" in a political context universal values would be based on an understanding of human nature, assuming that there is such a thing. If democratic values are universal, therefore, one must ask if democratic values are reflective of human nature, to what extent democratic values are applicable to all cultures: and the extent to which the concept of democracy has shaped human aspirations and standards.

The Framework does not answer these questions, though the further questions it poses may strike some readers as tendentious or at least suggestive of a positive answer to the universality question. For example, the Framework asks, "Have the values of democracy become a vehicle for articulating and channeling [human] longings so they can be realized?" The answer seems to be in the affirmative.

The Framework does not ask if values or inclinations some might find contrary to democracy might also be universal, such as the desire for power over others or the need for and value of hierarchy, which might also be accounted "universal." Is there a natural instinct to oppose oppressive rule? Or was Dostoyevsky's "Grand Inquisitor" right in declaring freedom to be an oppressive burden to the mass of humanity, who would lay it willingly at the feet of authority? Or if not to the whole of humanity, might such willingness apply to a significant section of it?

Further questions discussed concern the extent to which elements of any culture can be seen as resonating with certain fundamental democratic values and how democratic values and standards embody and animate international human rights norms. One might comment that the idea of a natural "right to life," perhaps the quintessential "human right," is found historically prior to modern democracy in the roots of liberalism—reminding us that, whether or not the Framework acknowledges it, "democracy" without its liberal content can hardly be conceived as embodying certain deep human aspirations, beginning with the desire for physical safety, including safety from the depredations of government.

Norms for the behavior of states are ancient in origin: modern, especially twentieth century, norms for such behavior have come to include con-
cern for the treatment of individuals by states, which is to say, human rights. Since democracy has come to be seen as the best guarantor of these rights, democratic standards have become a dominant focus for securing them. One can trace historically the enactment of such norms into various international conventions down to the present day. Democratic ideas have in many ways changed the world.

**Justification of the Nation-State.** The concept of a self-governing political community has been used to justify the idea of the nation-state as an autonomous political unit. This idea played a principal role in decolonization. Moreover, the democratic idea has elevated the status of the individual person, tending to undercut deference as a model for human relations where there is hierarchy, inherited status as opposed to individual merit, and the notion that some are inherently more worthy than others.

**Status of the Individual.** Modern democracy is associated with the development of liberalism, since it is liberalism that advanced the idea that certain rights are inherent to individuals, that there are "natural" rights. The idea of "human rights" is precisely the idea that they are "natural"—that their legitimacy is due simply to individuals' humanity and not to membership in a political system that has chosen to accord them official recognition. In this view, it is morally illegitimate for any state not to recognize and protect "human rights." While the present version of the Framework is not always either clear and consistent on the matter, it follows that what the world now recognizes as "democracy" is liberal democracy, the kind that recognizes a range of individual rights, rights summarized by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence as "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness."

**The World Market.** Other effects of democratic thought and practice on world affairs include the growing legitimacy of world markets as mediums of free exchange, enterprise, and innovation. Here again, the historical development of these ideas came with the advancement of liberalism and liberal ideas. As liberal democracies have risen to the ascendency in world affairs, they have brought the ideals of free markets to world attention and to a significant, though incomplete degree, brought about their realization. As a result, liberty promoted by free markets threatens authoritarian systems everywhere.

**Civil Society.** Liberal democracy also encourages creation of autonomous organizations of every variety. The realm of these self-directed associations, not part of the state, is known as "civil society." But thanks to the influence of the world's democracies, the international version of civil society has been growing exponentially in the second half of the twentieth century.

**Science and Technology.** At the close of the twentieth century, science and technology have come to dominate world and national economies and
to exercise vast influence on thought about society as well as on society itself. Both parts of the term “liberal democracy” have been both beneficiaries and catalysts in the spread of science and technology. The liberal aspects of society are enhanced both because scientific thought is inherently attractive and has the effect of opening minds and promoting discussion; and because powerful means of communication have been unleashed by technological applications of science, beginning, for example, with the invention of the telegraph in the nineteenth century down to the extensions of electronic mail at the close of the twentieth.

The democratic aspects of society are enhanced because science is inherently democratic: anyone, including the self-taught, with the ability to science can participate in some capacity in scientific thought and practice. Scientific talent cannot be based on inheritance and is therefore naturally subversive of aristocracies of birth. Just as Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century scoffed at the idea of a “hereditary geomet,” science and technology today form its own “natural” elites, whose knowledge and “how” are based on natural talent, not on the fiat of the powerful.

Moreover, as the Framework argues, “Because democracy is predicated on open discussion, unimpeded inquiry, experimentalism, and a search for truth based on evidence, as distinguished from dogma and predetermined answers, science, and technology, and the progress associated with them will flourish in these circumstances.” And because democratic culture emphasizes both creativity and responsiveness to people’s wants, it increases the pace of scientific inquiry and discovery which itself depends upon the dissemination of knowledge.

It should be noted—as this version of the Framework omits mentioning—that “democratic” culture in this context must mean liberal democracy, for it is the full freedom of expression found in the concept of liberalism and in liberal societies that is relevant, not the freedom of political expression alone, which is the extent of the commitment of “democracy,” narrowly conceived.

**Democracy and the Concept of Time.** Democracy takes a different view of time than certain earlier notions that saw the past as cyclical—as endlessly repeating the same patterns. Historically, modern democracy embraced the idea of progress: some early American democrats embraced the idea of the “perfectibility of man.” Modern democracy, however, did not invent this break with Greek and Roman views of history’s cyclical: this was the accomplishment of the Judeo-Christian view of history as leading to a predetermined end toward which history progressively travels. Democracy, however, is decidedly future oriented. Every election is about the future. At a less mundane level, democracy is committed to making a
future based on decisions of people acting together to improve their lives and provide for future generations.

**International Relations.** Democracy in the twentieth century has had a marked effect on international relations because the principles that democracies hold in common have led them to act in solidarity with each other in the international arena. Only history can judge the contention of the “democratic peace” argument that democracies by their nature do not make war against each other. It is true, however, that modern democracies have never fought a major war against each other. Even minor skirmishes, such as the “Cod War” in the 1970s over fishing rights between Britain and Iceland have been marked by civility.

Democracies have not only acted in concert with each other based on mutual adherence to basic principles; they have also sought to expand these principles abroad. Danger may be said to lurk in these circumstances. Because of their faith in the universality of democratic principles, democracies may adopt crusading foreign policies with potentially explosive consequences, as autocracies resist the democratic tide.

Critics might argue that the recent Balkan war is an example of the potential results of democracies’ crusading spirit, though defenders of the Balkan war might make precisely the same argument. The belief in the universality of democratic principles has, as the Framework puts it, “fueled attempts to impose political uniformity in nation-states, notwithstanding differences in their circumstances.”

**Global Standards for Practices and Institutions.** A final example of the profound impact of democracy on world affairs is that democratic principles have to a considerable degree become global standards for international behavior. The democratic commitment to the principle of the equal worth of every individual may be applied anywhere in the world. At the least, when governments are seen to disregard the value of life, a worldwide outcry condemns this behavior in the name of human rights, a concept forged in the historical crucible of liberalism and later adopted by liberal democracies everywhere. The fundamental principles of democracies have become the “gold standard,” as it were, of the internal as well as the international behavior of states.

**Other Questions Treated.** The final pages of the Framework treat a further series of questions. These ask how the structure of political systems enables democracies to exist in the international context; how world affairs affect democracy; and how the concept and practices of democracy shape interactions among nation-states.

A final question asks why democracies might care about the internal arrangements of other nation-states. Since the conventional notion of sov-
ereignty has it that the internal affairs of states are none of the business of other states, the very mention of this question is provocative. The Framework discusses a number of factors, including the self-defense of democracies against regimes whose internal instability may lead them to aggression. But democracies may also be aggressors, whether for good or ill. "Democratic conscience" might be a source of such aggression, since democracies may find the human rights violations of other regimes intolerably reprehensible. Such judgment could lead the way to open and aggressive confrontation.

In dealing with anti-democratic regimes, democracies may use varying means to further the democratic cause. Whether democracies either as a matter of moral rightness or of prudence oubt to use these means is a matter for debate. These means could include direct imposition of democracy following military defeat or take-over, as occurred in Germany and Japan after World War II. Other forms of coercion short of direct imposition could be used, such as military threat or economic sanctions. On the other hand, democratic influence may be focused on indirect methods aimed at developing economic, cultural, or educational capacities that democracies believe will further democratic development. Direct support of non-governmental organizations may be a tactic geared to develop civic competence and alternative centers of influence that compete with governmental power.

Finally, democracies might also adopt policies of non-interference on the ground that democracy, if it is to arise, must arise from natural evolution, not through external influence. Democracies may believe that democracy will succeed only when freely chosen. They may believe, moreover, that if a people has freely and openly chosen another form of government, that choice should be respected. The idea of popular sovereignty to which all democrats are committed implies precisely such respect.

Notes
1. It is debatable whether actual non-liberal "democracies," sometimes called "electoral democracies," can be called democracies at all. First, virtually none of the elections under such governments is completely "free and fair" without qualification. Observers invariably say they are "fair enough," which means some degree of electoral corruption or other flaw occurs. And real political liberty between elections is generally abridged if it presents a threat to the ruling party. To call such regimes "democracies" of any sort is questionable—as if "democracy" is primarily about elections, a notion the Framework disputes. One might as well call them authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian regimes that use electoral processes as instruments of legitimation.

2. The rule that "all citizens be eligible to stand for political office" is subject to certain qualification in some democracies. In the United States, for example, only "a natural born Citizen" may be elected president.
3. It should not be overlooked that the “people” establishing democracy must have a sense of national identification, or in other words a sense of “nationalism.”


5. Although this famous formulation has long been ascribed to the English reformer Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), it has never been located in his writings, published or unpublished.


7. Development of the Framework has been managed by the Center for Civic Education, 5146 Douglas Fir Road; Calabasas, California 91302-1461. The telephone number is (818)591-9321; Fax: (818)591-9330; E-Mail: <center4civ@aol.com>. For information about the Framework contact Charles N. Quigley, Director of the Center for Civic Education or Charles F. Bahmueller, Director of Special Projects of the Center for Civic Education.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY RECONSIDERED

By Charles F. Bahmueller

Civil society” is on everyone’s lips, but not everyone means the same thing when they say it. Nor can anyone “accurately” define civil society. Ideas have no “essences” to discover in the absence of common agreement; the meaning of any word or idea is the way people use it. Today, after hundreds of publications and untold public discussions, including scholarly conferences devoted exclusively to the topic, no definition of civil society prevails, nor is one likely to do so. Because the term has become so prominent, writers often wish to claim it for their cause; as a result, definitions of civil society often reflect the function one wishes it to perform.

The Meanings of Civil Society

Principal bones of contention over the definition of civil society include whether the term should be primarily a normative or non-normative tool of social science; and whether we should consider economic and religious relations and even the family as part of it. Michael Walzer defines civil society as “the space of [politically] uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology—that fill this space” (1990, 293). It is not clear whether “interest” in this definition includes economic interest not organized to pursue public ends.

In their lengthy treatise on the subject, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato explicitly eliminate the economic sphere in this “working definition” of civil society: a “sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements and forms of public communications” (1922, ix).

By contrast, the late Edward Shils saw civil society as composed of three parts. One is a “complex of autonomous institutions,” including economic ones, distinguishable from family, clan, locality, or state; a second
is a portion of society that possesses "a particular complex of relationships between itself and the state and a distinctive set of institutions which safeguard the separation of state and civil society and maintain effective ties between them"; and the third is a "widespread pattern of refined or civil manners" (1991, 3).

Robert Hefner accepts the mainstream notion of civil society as the arena of voluntary associations, including "business associations" that extend "beyond the household but outside the state" (Hefner 1998, 5-6). This is more or less Hegel's view. Don Eberly, on the other hand, finds the possibility of loyalty a paramount defining feature of civil society. While he admits local economic relationships to the civil society arena, he excludes large scale, especially multinational corporations as incompatible with the emergence of loyalty that face-to-face associations are capable of generating (Eberly 1998, 22-23). Thomas Janoski applies an astute analytic hand in dividing the polity into state, public, private, and market spheres, locating civil society at certain overlapping areas of these spheres. He defines civil society as a sphere of public discourse among these four elements (Janoski 1998, 12-13).

Offering a somewhat different slant on civil society, Salamon and Anheier (1997) restrict the term to formally constituted "non-profit" organizations. They describe these organizations as a significant economic "sector" that contributes large-scale employment opportunities and expenditures to their respective national economies. They omit the family and highlight certain economic features of "civil society:" but it is not clear why they ignore the other historical meanings of the term.

Benjamin Barber views civil society as "civic space" that "occupies the middle ground between government and the private sector:" but, unlike nearly every other writer on the subject, he believes the civil society of his normative understanding had nearly disappeared from American life "by the time of the two Roosevelts" (1995, 281). In a later publication of 1996 Barber presents a view of civil society that amounts to a utopian fantasy, eliminating practically every organization currently included by myriad writers, since only a handful of groups could meet his stringent criteria for inclusion.

Excluding the economic sphere and including the family in many contemporary writers' views of civil society flatly contradicts Hegel's path-breaking concept of "civil society" as a competitive arena encompassing economic and other forms of social life lying between family and the state. In this view, followed by Marx and his adherents, civil society is a quasi disorderly social realm where, among other things, the struggle for economic existence takes place. For Hegel, because civil society limits the
forces inclining people to cooperate, the state must harmonize competing interests. Here civil society and state are not locked in competition, as they became in communist Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Instead, the state makes civil society liveable, perhaps even possible, by controlling its excesses.

Contrasting with primarily normative notions of civil society and those that find state and civil society necessarily in conflict, a prominent student of democracy offers a largely positive (empirical) view geared to the comparative study of democratic transition and consolidation. Here is the definition of Larry Diamond, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy:

[Civil society is] the realm of organized social life that is open, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from “society” in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable.

(1997, 5)

Like many definitions, Diamond’s excludes familial, religious, and economic realms. He also warns that, although civil society organizations led the opposition to communist states in 1980s Eastern Europe, we should not see civil society as necessarily an adversary with the state, locked in a “zerosum struggle.” Thus, civil society so conceived can join the state to some degree in establishing and consolidating new democracies.

While these are but a few of the formulations of the concept of civil society, most of them illustrate the commonalities shared by nearly all definitions of the term. Civil society refers to voluntary social activity not compelled by the state. The accepted central, though incomplete, core characteristic of civil society is its composition of autonomous self-organized associations limited by a framework of law. Civil society is the location of independent thought and, within legal boundaries, voluntary action. This view of civil society recalls Tocqueville, for he found the American habit of self-organization for every conceivable purpose—as opposed to popular dependence on the state—uniquely American. He thought this uniqueness mitigated the social leveling and love of equality inherent in democracy.

One of the most profound, if not always clearly expressed, twentiethcentury concepts of civil society came from Ernest Gellner, a Czech refugee from fascism who settled in Britain. Gellner’s view of civil society reflects his experience with political extremism; he emphasizes the empirical and normative roots of our interest in it, not only for the study of democratic transitions, but also for understanding established democracies, especially our own.
In *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals*, Geilner sniffed out what he considered the single most significant functional goal of civil society: namely, to act as a force maintaining liberal freedoms. The key function of civil society pointed to Geilner’s definition of it as “that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and . . . can . . . prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society” (1994, 5).

However, Geilner realized that this formula does not adequately specify the connection between civil society and liberty, since the definition just cited, as Marc Plattner has pointed out, could also apply to premodern pluralist societies, whose caste or “segmentary” nature oppressed the individual while checking the state. Later in the same work, Geilner described civil society as “a society in which polity and economy are distinct, where polity is instrumental but can and does check extremes of individual interest, but where the state is in turn checked by institutions with an economic base; it relies on economic growth which, by requiring cognitive growth, makes ideological monopoly impossible” (1994, 12).

In a later article, Geilner expressed more directly the uniqueness of modern civil society: it formed the conditions for the individual liberty of liberal democracy. As opposed to the ascriptive character of the human bonds of premodern societies, which contained, indeed trapped individuals, powerless to extricate themselves from the obligations and conditions of their birth, modern civil society places the individual in a different condition. Geilner called the liberal democratic citizen “modular man.” This term means that individuals can detach themselves from one institution or commitment and reattach themselves to others; and this is what the denizens of liberal democratic societies do at will. “Yet,” wrote Geilner, “these highly specific, unsanctified, instrumental, revocable links or bonds are effective! This is civil society: the forging of links which are effective even though they are flexible, specific, instrumental.” These “links or bonds” are found throughout society (1995, 42).

We find more reasons for including economic, religious, and other organizations in broadly defining the idea of civil society when preserving liberal freedoms is the goal of that concept. Some ideas of political sociology can help us identify these freedoms.

In *The Politics of Mass Society* (1959), former University of California sociologist William Kornhauser studied societies in which weak social bonds affected significant numbers of socially and politically alienated individuals. Those with such relatively attenuated associations Kornhauser called “available” for recruitment to illiberal social movements. He associated various forms of social crisis, such as those caused by rapid indus-
trialization and economic depression, with the political extremism of chil-
lastic ("millennial") appeals that threaten individual and social liberties.
The growth of European fascist movements in the 1930s illustrates this idea.

One can imagine the psychic needs of the members of a society as a
vast reservoir potentially available to demagogues and "saviors" who might
threaten liberal freedoms if they gained power. One can also imagine myri-
ad associations, especially religious ones, that make sufficient claims on
this reservoir to preclude the significant influence of millenialists. Surely
the associations that preserve liberal freedoms deserve inclusion in a con-
cept of civil society centered on its freedom-preserving function.

Similarly with economic enterprises and associations, we can imagine
such associations dividing up a reservoir of potential state power, which
could threaten liberal freedoms—just as large-scale state ownership or con-
trol of the means of production and distribution historically have done. Even
if they are not associations with the public purposes and involvements that
gain them entrance to more restrictive concepts of civil society, they func-
tionally divide and decentralize economic power, keeping it out of statist
hands. Here too, a large range of economic organizations seem part of a
social sector whose primary function is to protect the freedoms of estab-
lished democracies, even if their role in establishing democracies is less
clear.

It is worthwhile to notice a second meaning of "civil society." In this
second sense the term refers to society as a whole, including the state, which
is distinguished by civility. It refers comprehensively to a society that con-
tains civil society in its first meaning, an autonomous sphere regulated by
the state but otherwise independent of it. Thus, civil society can have two
meanings: an independent portion of society, and an entire society con-
taining this independent part (Shils 1991, 4). We are concerned in this essay
mainly with civil society as an autonomous sphere of voluntary action. How-
ever, this paper will end by exploring the link between civility and civil
society in the second sense.

Finally, the view of civil society adopted here has both normative and
positivist elements: it looks to "really existing" capitalist liberal democratic
societies, including those that feature social democratic policies, and asks
which autonomous self-organized groups and relations supply a foundation
for a free society. This is its positivist element. Its normative aspect con-
sists of explicitly choosing as society's fundamental project to maintain the
traditional pantheon of liberal freedoms.

This capacious concept of civil society—the whole range of civic action
independent of formal political institutions—includes service associations,
philanthropic groups, cultural groups, religious organizations, labor unions,
athletic organizations, and youth groups, plus many more in every imaginable field of interest or endeavor. The concept also embraces economic relations, organizations, and activities not owned or directly controlled by the state. All these elements play roles (though not always equal ones), however invisible, in sheltering, defending, or nurturing the conditions of liberal freedoms.

**The Historical Roots of Civil Society**

The idea of civil society has a long pedigree. Although it now relates to societies in different civilizations, including those in Asia and Africa, its roots lie exclusively in the West. The term comes from the Romans, who spoke of “societas civilis.” One of ancient Rome’s greatest achievements was its creation of the civil law. First codified in 450 B.C., the civil law underwent further centuries of development, reaching its apogee in the codifications achieved under Justinian in the early sixth century. In a sense, society for the Romans was the creature of the civil law, which came to regulate numerous features of social relations; including family and economy. Cicero extolled the function of law: for the Romans, to be civilized meant being subject to civil law.

Nevertheless, neither Greece nor Rome distinguished between state and society. This distinction became implicit only in early modern Europe. Although medieval Europe was conceived as a single society, its name, Respublica Christiana (Christendom), contained two elements, the secular and the sacerdotal. This division, unique to Western society, came about through the influence of Christianity, which brought divided loyalties between ecclesiastical and political authorities. The struggle between political and religious powers broadened as the Middle Ages waned and cities, increasingly proud of their emerging independence, gained the economic strength to resist the demands of external rulers. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, “society” became sufficiently independent in fact or aspiration for theorists to take the key step of forming separate concepts for society and political order. Early modern Europe developed competing centers of power, distinguishing it from other major civilizations, and allowed the eventual development of what we know as “civil society.”

John Locke took the “key step” of distinguishing the state and society. He used the term civil society, but not in our sense, since for him the state was part of “civil society.” But he distinguished the political order from “the community” and placed the moral basis of the political order on the consent of the “community,” that is, on society. The political order springs from and is authorized by society. Society creates political institutions to protect itself, and it changes them whenever it likes to do so. In this regard,
it is no accident that Locke’s great predecessor Thomas Hobbes pointedly refused to separate state and society, arguing that no society can exist without the state. Left to itself, Hobbes argued, society would disintegrate. The independent social orders implied by separating state and society could lead only to catastrophic conflict based primarily on religious differences. From this view, Hobbes could draw only deeply authoritarian conclusions.

It is a great historical irony that Lockean liberalism rested on Hobbes’ premises of natural human liberty, equality, and consent as the basis for legitimate obligation. However, for Locke the separation of state and society led not to disaster but to salvation: a community with an adequate consciousness of its own rights and the confidence to challenge authority could tame the political powers that traditionally threatened and devoured human beings’ “natural rights.” Accordingly, if these powers trampled members’ rights, such a community could and would justifiably overthrow them. Government might be necessary and inevitable; but the “community” would tolerate this particular government only so long as it respected the rights of its masters—the community that established this governing body for its own protection.

As for Hobbes’ amply justified fears of religious (today we would add “ideological”) conflict, Locke recommended the Dutch remedy he had experienced at first hand during his enforced escape to the Netherlands: toleration, or in other words, religious liberty. One consequence of this remedy was the existence of numerous independent religious groups; liberty implies pluralism. Liberty also implies conflict, as Hobbes knew so well. However, through historical blindness he could not see that under certain conditions this conflict could remain within acceptable bounds. And he could not see that moderate conflict is a positive force, that conflict is a condition of liberty. When acceptable opinion is unitary, there is no space for plural voices; there is no place for dissent; and liberty is lost.

Later, many saw the crux of “civil society” in the capacity of independent groups—including those beyond religion—to maintain their liberty against encroachments from other groups and the state. James Madison had said as much in The Federalist 10, writing that liberty necessarily gives rise to numerous competing factions; but if a polity contained a multiplicity of competing factions, a single dominant group, a “majority faction” damaging to the public good would be far less likely to emerge.1

Also in the eighteenth century, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson linked the development of polished manners—civility—to the growth of modern society, which they called “civil society.” Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society never defined the subject of its title exactly; the work is mainly a history of “civilization.” Ferguson’s civil society appears to
mean a modern society whose manners are “polished,” whose arts and letters flourish and, above all, whose government is not despotic. In this society urban life and commerce flourished; we know it today as pluralist society. Centrally concerned with moral and intellectual progress, Ferguson declined to apply the adulatory title “civil society” to the despotic governments of China and India, however well administered, on account of their despotism. His statement that it is “in conducting the affairs of civil society that mankind find the exercise of their best talents as well as the object of their best affections” suggests participation in public affairs as an important element of “civil society” because of its educative ability to invigorate the higher faculties (1967, 155). He specifies the centrality of attention to public affairs for the well being of civil society in remarking.

[If a growing indifference to objects of a public nature, should prevail, and under any free constitution, put an end to those disputes of party, and silence that noise of dissension, which generally accompany the exercise of freedom, we may venture to prognosticate corruption in the national manners. (1967, 256)]

Thus, although “civil society” for Ferguson was a sort of society as a whole, attention to public matters lay at its core.

By the nineteenth century, the autonomous associations of civil society became the breathing room of a social order no longer ceaselessly pressed by authority in every sphere of life. And, as the example of religious liberty suggests, the new freedom of liberal society that grew in nineteenth century Western Europe and America was not simply political freedom; it was, as the French theorist Benjamin Constant said, a freedom unknown to the ancient world. It was personal liberty pursued openly in public or behind closed doors in a new, hitherto unknown, realm: a private sphere guaranteed by the state to the individual acting alone or in association with others.

With the thought of Tocqueville, civil society’s “liberal substance” comes to full consciousness. His sophisticated political sociology leads us to a clearer understanding of the role of free association in liberal democracies, especially in the American (“new world”) conditions of relative social equality. In these circumstances, individuals seldom attempt to act alone, on their own account; they must associate together to do what government would do otherwise. Leaving the field of private enterprise to government, he believed, would be catastrophic: “The morals and intelligence of a democratic people would be as much endangered as its business and manufacturers if the government ever wholly usurped the place of private companies” (1990, 108). The free associations of the United States played such a critical role in the well-being of society that Tocqueville wrote the following at
the end of his chapter titled "Of the Use Which the Americans Make of Public Associations in Civil Life":

Among the laws that rule human societies, there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased. (1990, 110)

In retrospect we see that the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century separation of state and society was a step of great significance. It allowed theorists to conceive society as a social and psychological space in which the individual, alone or associated with others, could view the acts of public officials from a critical perspective. The separation of state and society in liberal political thought crafted a powerful theoretical justification for limiting the powers of the state regarding its citizens. As viewed from the perspective of liberal writers from Locke to Tocqueville, society occupies a position of moral superiority in its relations with the state. The state is merely the extension and servant of society. We are close to the idea that the purpose of the state is to protect the autonomous life of individuals in society.

Civil Society, Authoritarianism, and Totalitarianism

We understand the idea of civil society more clearly by comparing its position in liberal democracy to that in other systems of government. Liberal democracy legally permits and protects all social activity within a wide latitude. By contrast, authoritarian regimes seek to regulate and control civil society with an intensity that provides the very measure of its authoritarianism.

However, under full-scale totalitarianism civil society disappears altogether, as the state demands total control of every group and all forms of social expression, organized or not; nothing lies outside political control. Thus the state politicizes all organized social activity.

The Soviet Union, for example, made independent political expression illegal, and it treated dissidents harshly. The regime tolerated no social organization independent of the state. But with the end of totalitarianism, social and political groups quickly emerged, and expression of all kinds sprang up spontaneously. Even in such Soviet satellites as Poland, the far less virulent post-Stalinist regime tolerated no independent social organization, with the significant exception of the Catholic Church. Polish loyalties to the Church were so powerful that the regime tolerated it solely out of necessity. But in Russia itself the Russian Orthodox Church was more or less run by the KGB, the secret police.

In the satellite countries, once Stalinism had run its course, small cracks in the edifice of state control appeared. Although scouting organizations
were under state control, individual scout leaders could often be alone with their troops and teach them heterodox, or at least independent views. However, such exceptions do not materially depart from the preceding description of civil society's suppression under Soviet-style communism.

Civil Society in Communist Eastern Europe: Resistance to Illegitimate Government

Ironically, the character of the post-Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe gave rise to the currency that the term "civil society" enjoys today. After Soviet tanks shattered the hopes of the Prague Spring of 1968, and the satellite countries settled into the stagnant political torpor of the Brezhnev era, political action seemed clearly useless: surely political action directed toward changing the state was unavailing. The only politics at hand appeared to be that of the cynical and self-seeking. Most men and women had to squeeze what meaning they could from apolitical careers and the private life of family and friends.

This situation was the context in which Eastern European philosophers resurrected and refurbished the idea of civil society in the late 1970s and early '80s. Since the worst of Stalinism was an unpleasant memory and only a rotting autocracy hung over the present, these thinkers could conceptualize civil society as a new arena of independent, imaginative ethical thought and action uncorrupted by the state.

The idea of civil society took center stage in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia and later in the Baltic Republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as a program of resistance to communism. At first only the courageous few dared to carry on secret or even open independent activity, as the police harassed or broke it up. Men and women like Vaclav Havel, who insisted on creative expression independent of the state, went to jail. In Poland even before the Solidarity movement, a so-called "floating university" traveled from flat to flat in Warsaw in defiance of the regime. Moreover, though repeatedly attacked by the police, the "university" made a point of carrying on its activities openly.

With the advent of Solidarity in 1980, a new hope arose that civil society could save society as a whole from a limitless future of bleak communist rule. Here at last was more than a glimmer of social activity independent of state domination: here was the self organization of society, a new home for moral resistance to an illegitimate government, for an "anti-political politics." Bronislaw Geremek, the Polish historian and Solidarity leader imprisoned for his activities, describes the purpose of independent action in civil society:
Moral resistance, though seemingly hopeless against systems that are based on political and military force, functions like a grain of sand in the cogwheels of a vast but vulnerable machine. The idea of a civil society—even one that avoids overtly political activities in favor of education, the exchange of information and opinion, or the protection of the basic interests of particular groups—has enormous anti-totalitarian potential. (1992, 4)

So long as it did not openly pursue political ends, civil society might act as a "cocoon," gradually enclosing and marginalizing the apparatus of state control. In Czechoslovakia the Charter 77 movement took up the mantle of civil society to oppose an oppressive state. In the Baltic Republics, a variety of nationalist movements, "citizens' committees," and other organizations sprang up spontaneously in the late 1980s, an open struggle for separation from the Soviet Union. Under the conditions of "weak" totalitarianism prevailing in Eastern Europe, civil society appeared as an arena of social action in which morally whole men and women could find their wholeness confirmed. And they could draw large numbers of the previously quiescent into active resistance. In this way, organizing civil society can play a major role in creating democratic societies as well as strengthening both new and developed democracies.

The functions of civil society in transitions to democracy in Eastern and Central Europe have recurred around the world in varying degrees. "In South Korea, Taiwan, Chile... South Africa, Nigeria, and Benin (to give only a partial list), an extensive mobilization of civil society brought critical pressure for democratic change" (Diamond 1994, 5). Even in China, which has not begun a recognizable transition to democracy, Chinese as well as foreign scholars have seen the applicability of civil society (Shu-Yub Ma 1994, 181-185). Thus, if the concept of civil society previously applied only to the West, the cultural diffusion of Western ideas combined with economic and social development have gone a great distance toward universalizing this pregnant idea, despite charges of "Western imperialism" against Western scholars applying the civil society idea to non-Western societies. Thus, even in the face of counterclaims by cultural relativists, the concept of civil society is nearing universality.

The Functions of Civil Society in Liberal Democracy

Larry Diamond has outlined ten "democratic functions" of civil society (1994, 11). Its first and most basic function is limiting state power, accomplished primarily by two linked efforts. Civil society must both monitor the abuse of state power—such as corruption or vote fraud—and also mobilize society to protest such abuses, thereby undermining the legitimacy of undemocratic governments. Second, civil society supplements the role
of political parties in stimulating political participation. *Third*, civil society can develop attributes such as toleration and moderation crucial to democratic development. *Fourth*, it creates channels other than political parties for "the articulation, aggregation and representations of interests," not least at the local level. *Fifth*, voluntary associations can create interests that transcend the fault lines of region, religion, class, or ethnicity and the like. *Sixth*, voluntary associations recruit and train potential political leaders. *Seventh*, such organizations may help to build democracy in a variety of other ways, such as in monitoring election procedures. *Eighth*, civil society can widely disseminate information useful to individuals in playing their roles as democratic citizens. *Ninth*, civil society can help to achieve the economic reforms without which democracy is unlikely to take root. And *tenth*, the well-functioning of civil society may (benignly) strengthen the emerging democratic state by pressuring it into patterns of behavior that enhance its legitimacy.

Actually or potentially, civil society has other indispensable functions, some of which overlap those just mentioned, in the liberal democratic order. We can hardly exaggerate their importance. Unless these functions and those enumerated above operate at least minimally, the situation of liberal democracy is precarious indeed.

**Integrates Individuals and Groups.** One of civil society's key functions is its capacity to integrate lone individuals or exclusive groups into the larger social order by offering avenues of social contact, alliance, and cohesion. This function is significant because modern society tends to separate people from each other. Today economic forces often encourage mobility, sending untold millions from the countryside to cities, where they find themselves relatively alone. In these conditions, primary social connections, such as family, school, and community associations are weak or broken. Sociologists find that these individuals of all ages are prone to serious pathologies, including substance abuse, suicide, crime, and membership in such extremist groups as religious and ideological cults and violent political organizations. Civil society can be a cohesive force against the fragmentation of modern life. Associations draw relatively lone individuals out of themselves into potentially meliorative social contact, providing avenues of involvement to direct interest and purpose and building networks of trust. Civil society can also positively affect isolated groups, peacefully integrating ethnic and other minorities into society without a surrender of their identity. The socializing forums and networks of civil society are not a panacea for alienating conditions. But they can prevent some social pathologies; and they have the capacity to ameliorate and in some cases to restore social health.
Disperses Power and Protects Individuals. A second and essential function of civil society lies in its ability to disperse power. It does so by creating numerous centers of thought, action, and loyalty. The independence of these separate associations and organizations from direction by the state characterizes civil society's dispersal of power. A result of this dispersal is that the associative life of civil society can protect the individual in significant ways. Membership in civil society associations can act as psychological, social, and economic barriers between individuals and political or social forces that demand submission against the individual's will. The variety of associational solidarity available in developed civil society can strengthen individual or group resolve and resources against external pressures to conform or capitulate. There is a further way in which civil society protects individuals, groups, and society as a whole from the abuse of power. According to an argument of James Madison in The Federalist, liberty spontaneously gives rise to organized interests. The variety of independently organized interests and points of view fostered by fully developed civil society makes it less likely that any one group or interest will dominate society, abusing its power to the detriment of other groups' rights or the public good.

Supplements or Substitutes for Government Programs. In addition, the activities of some organizations of civil society supplement or substitute for government programs by providing similar services of their own. For example, community groups share such tasks as caring for the sick, the aged, and the disabled; they also care for the able-bodied poor, homeless, or mentally deficient. National, regional, or local associations may organize programs that parallel other government activities. Churches, labor unions, private foundations, neighborhood, or other organizations may engage in activities related to health, education, social welfare, recreation, or numerous other activities that have the effect of dispersing power by offering alternative sources of government services.

Mediates Between Individuals and the State. The organizations and activities of civil society may also act as mediator between the individual or family and the state. Especially in large, modern political systems individuals may feel dwarfed by the scale of the modern state and unable to make their voices heard. Membership in labor unions, religious organizations, and professional associations, for instance, provides a context and opportunity for discussion of all levels of public issues. Many independent organizations involve themselves in political issues; through membership and participation individuals can hear their voices in the councils of power more clearly than through formal political representation alone. In this way membership in nongovernmental organizations can result in a more stable
society by linking individuals to the community as a whole and to its political institutions.

**Educates Citizens for Democracy.** Another function of the associational life of civil society is to be a school in the arts of democratic citizenship. The associative life of civil society is the seedbed for a variety of skills vital to democratic life. Political participation is a leading virtue of democracy, since it requires at least a minimum of participation to function adequately and ensure itself against internal atrophy and decay. While it is not necessary for democracy's survival that everyone participate in ways that require political skills, a certain degree of participatory ability, spread throughout society, is a necessary staple of democratic life. In its absence, only an elite takes action, and to the degree that it does so democracy rests on more or less shaky foundations. We must remember that democracy *must reproduce itself*. It must train each new generation in the ideas and practices of citizenship. The organizations of civil society can provide training ground for democratic action. Participating in meetings, recruiting members, organizing activities, speaking in public, and practicing quiet persuasion are some of the activities in which civil society can cultivate the arts of civic membership. Further, as organizations are self-governing, participation in them promotes the experience and values of democratic citizenship by allowing the experience of internal autonomy. At the same time, the associational life of civil society preserves key values against the corrosive effects of modern culture. In many cases, it can promote an experience of social pluralism by acquainting individuals with others unlike themselves. This experience may go far toward fostering essential democratic virtues, such as respect and toleration for others. A political culture requires such virtues if it is to perpetuate democracy.

**Promotes Creativity.** Creativity also characterizes developed civil society. Where threats and intimidation inhibit the spontaneous interchange of ideas, creativity wanes, except in a few hardy souls. Even where the creative process continues in private, if often lacks open or full expression. But regimes that protect the independent thought and association of civil society allow creative forces to flourish. Many forms of creativity are crucial to liberal democracy. Economic well-being in today's world economy depends on creative innovation. The inhibition of the interchange of ideas in the former Soviet Union placed economic prosperity in the “Information Age” beyond its reach. State bureaucracies are notoriously adverse to change. But modern societies face deep and compelling difficulties, ranging from inadequate education, environmental disasters, international economic competition, and ethnic strife to drug addiction, crime, and disease. Only the full expression of human creativity can hope to deal with them. In drawing
a curtain around civil society, the closed society simultaneously suffocates its ability to relieve or resolve these dilemmas. Liberal democracy also cannot survive in the long run if modern social problems go unchecked. The creative force of civil society is a potentially abundant well-spring for resolving these problems.

**Extends Exclusive Loyalties.** In the nineteenth century Tocqueville meditated deeply upon the importance of civil society and its congeries of associational opportunities. Two of his conclusions are most relevant here. Tocqueville observed that voluntary associations can temper narrow selfishness by showing individuals the "connections between their own affairs and well-being of others, nourishing a democratic politics of 'self interest rightly understood.'" Membership in voluntary associations does something else: it draws people out of themselves and, through associational life, encourages moral and ethical concern for others, fostering an ethic of responsibility. In some instances, emerging democracies have found that civil society may contain and soften ethnic and national conflict. Instead of exclusive membership in an all-encompassing identity leading to conflict with other exclusive identities, multiple memberships in civil society foster plural loyalties that hold group conflicts in check.

**Liberates the Individual.** Tocqueville also noted that if individuals belong to groups involved in religion, economic interest, politics, service or the like, no one group's perspective can dominate them. The variety of associations protects members from psychological or practical coercion by any one group's monopoly on their knowledge, attention, and loyalty. The multiple memberships available in civil society thus promote individuals' ability to choose among alternative points of view and courses of action. The ability to choose is freedom itself. Thus membership in cults and similar groups consuming the whole person represents the opposite of the freedom promoted by multiple memberships in civil society. Tocqueville sums up his argument in the phrase "multiply your associations and be free." The plural loyalties possible in the liberal democratic state can liberate the individual. But a single, all-encompassing loyalty may well capture the whole person; and practical circumstances, such as a lack of alternative economic support, may preclude the independence of those wishing to withdraw from commitment to a single loyalty. For this reason liberal writers today advocate government policies that ease practical impediments to detachment from single loyalties.

**Civil Society, Civility, and Liberal Democracy**

Associations of civil society have not always supported liberal and morally defensible ends. The influence of civil society associations may
run counter to the positive influences just described, and the protection of civil society by the liberal democratic state will not always appear in a positive light. As Ghanian scholar Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi has shown, some associations, such as many in African civil society, undermine transitions to democracy (1996, 121-129). Organizations may be thinly veiled ethnic enclaves; trade unions are vulnerable to co-optation by the government; religious groups may be docile before authority rather than demanding positive change; the private sector is weak and cannot provide material support for independent non-governmental organizations; traditionalist associations may perpetuate anti-democratic hierarchialism and inequality; and so on.

Moreover, since individuals frequently abuse their freedom, liberty can be perverted. Freedom of association can lead to the creation of groups that range from the dubious to the distasteful to the morally indefensible. Not every aspect of civil societies as we find them, as opposed to how we might imagine them, is good or desirable. But if the state guaranteed the ethical worthiness of civil associations, it would assault the very liberty that liberal democracy aims to protect. For example, if the liberal state had the power to suppress religious or quasi-religious groups it found distasteful, it could curtail the religious liberty of everyone.

Nevertheless, the necessity to preserve democratic liberties does not mean that “anything goes” in the life of civil society if liberal democracy is to remain truly liberal. The actions of hate groups have often crossed the line between the permissible and the forbidden. Irrational, distasteful, or even loathsome speech ought to be protected, but not incitement to violence or violence itself. In principle, liberal toleration extends to every loyalty that allows others their own loyalty.

Finally, what about civil society in relation to the ideal and practice of civility? Civil society in this context refers to its second meaning identified at the beginning of this essay, society as a whole including an independent portion. Edward Shils, one of the most searching analysts of links between civility and civil society, has argued that, despite a loose equating of liberal society with civil society, they are not exactly the same. The key difference between them, he argues, lies in the degree of civility that characterizes a truly civil society. In this view, civility is the virtue of civil society. In this view, it is more than good manners; it is also a form of political action which strongly implies that antagonists are also members of the same society, that they participate in the same common identity. Treating others civilly marks them as members of the same moral universe, just as not doing so excludes them. Thus incivility implies gross alienation.

In this perspective, “a society possessing the institutions of civil society needs a significant component of ordinary citizens and politicians who
exercise the virtue of civility (Shils 1991, 11). In some persons civility preponderates; in others, it is at a low ebb. Society benefits when civil individuals occupy positions of authority, with visible civility. Civility needs to concentrate in key segments of society, but it must also permeate society. Civility, which is fully compatible with robust debate, is contagious, for those with more civility animate the potential civility in those around them. Most importantly, civility protects liberal democracy from the dangers of extreme partisanship. As self-discipline is an imperative for self-government, so an aspect of this discipline is the practice of civility. Ordered liberty cannot exist without it.

Conclusion

Although the idea of civil society is subject to debate, it has a generally accepted core of meaning centering on the roles of the autonomous, self-organizing associations of society; and we have seen that, depending on who uses the term, civil society has both normative and positive (prescriptive and empirical) aspects. An important way of viewing the concept of civil society combines the normative and the positive in seeking to understand the ways in which civil society fosters and defends traditional liberal freedoms—freedom of religion, association, speech, the press, and so on—as well as a private realm that, within legal boundaries, is no one's business.

We have also seen how the concept of civil society arose from the peculiar conditions of Western Civilization, the several divisions of power in medieval Europe, such as independent cities, but especially from the West's division of sacred and secular powers and loyalties found in Christianity. After the seventeenth century's bloody wars of religion, some Western European countries, such as the Netherlands and England, instituted a policy of religious toleration, which in turn created a plurality of legally tolerated autonomous groups. The existence of these groups, combined with Christian doctrine, separated church and society in much of Europe. The American version of this separation, established under the Constitution of the United States of America, became "the separation of church and state." Together with other autonomous social groups such as those found in cities, these social divisions formed the basis of what is now called civil society. The release of individuals from the obligations of medieval society meant that they could change their position in society more and more by their own efforts. In a word, they were free in a new sense. The "ascriptive" (inherited and unchangeable) categories provided by medieval law and its social order no longer contained individuals.

Beginning with John Locke, writers began to recognize in political theory what had been occurring in society. They demanded the wholesale aban-
donsment of such doctrines as the claim to a Divine Right of Kings, the
notion that political authority is a top-down affair in which God grants sov-
ereignty directly to monarchs. This idea meant that inferiors could not ques-
tion monarchs. Their powers were legally unlimited. Instead, Locke and his
followers divided society and government and saw society ("the commu-
nity") as the superior power in relations between society and government.
Society needs government, but only that government which respects the
freedom of individuals (buttressed by what they now called "rights") and
the autonomy of the independent groups these individuals created. In the
nineteenth century, Tocqueville showed how self-organized, autonomous
social groups play a paramount role in maintaining the freedoms of the
world's most advanced democracy. He saw how social structure and libe-
ry are interrelated.

By the twentieth century, this relationship became better known and
studied. These countless varieties of autonomous associations became known
as civil society, which theorists understood as the indispensable social under-
pinning of liberal freedoms. While scholars studied the idea of civil soci-
ety in universities, it lacked any special significance outside academic circles.
But in the 1980s in Eastern and Central Europe, this idea became promi-
ient for theorists living under communist oppression. They saw society's
capacity for self-organization independent of the state as its moral salva-
tion, however much a weak totalitarianism might persecute such efforts at
independence.

As communist rule began to weaken and then crumble, the civil soci-
ey idea gained momentum in the East. It spread to the West as autonomous
organizations across the Baltic States of the Soviet Union and the satellites
of Central Europe, such as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czecho-
slovakia, sprang up, gaining deep admiration from champions of civic and
personal freedom. Also in Poland, the independence of the Catholic Church
had proved impervious to communist domination. By the 1990s scholars
were showing how autonomous associations in societies around the world
could play key roles in transitions to democracy.

We have also seen that the civil society question does not just concern
transitions to democracy. These transitions are important subjects for aca-
demic study that can have an impact on emerging democracies. Academic
studies can demonstrate to emerging leaders, for example, which strategies
in the struggle for democracy have borne fruit. But to understand how
autonomous associations function in securing liberal freedoms for estab-
lished democracies also, we need a more encompassing concept of civil
society.

This essay has focused on the ways in which civil society can promote
the values and practices of liberal democracy. Of course we have seen it
does not always do so. Civil society can act as the social basis of liberty as the West and, increasingly, other places globally, understand liberty. This social basis allows states to decentralize and divide power, to extend loyalties across social fault lines, to promote civic literacy and civility, to foster responsible leadership—and so on through the potential functions outlined above.

However, I conclude with a warning. Civil society is now so much in vogue, and traditional politics so out of fashion or distrusted in some quarters, that we are in danger of catching the "Eastern disease"—the marked tendency of the populations of Central and Eastern Europe, so inured to the evils of the state and its corrosive politics, to take refuge in the anti-political strategies of civil society. The idea of civil society, immensely important as it is, may be in the process of colonizing all we consider bright and shining in public life, relegating the "dubious" field of politics proper to a permanently tarnished, even ignoble status. This would be a grave error: because civil society as it actually exists has its own imperfections and shortcomings, and because, for all its actual and potential virtues, civil society has a limited reach. It does not and cannot rule society as a whole. The body politic rules society as a whole through the medium of the state, the formal agencies of government.

In these circumstances we must recall the overarching and integrative role of citizenship, a concept that unites governance of civil society with the governance of society as a whole—as body politic or nation. The idea of citizenship transcends civil society narrowly understood to include involvement in the deeply serious matters that concern political power, whose interest and duty it is for citizens to monitor and influence.

Civil society may influence law and policy, but in democracies citizens' representatives create and implement them. Elected public officials wield the power that in developed democracies, inter alia, defends citizens against domestic and foreign perils, protects them from destitution, regulates industry, administers justice, promotes prosperity through monetary and fiscal policies—or fails to perform these vital functions to a greater or lesser degree.

Those who see the nation-state in decline too often overlook these facts in their haste to advance their political predilections and agendas. Moreover, a vast international or global order is beyond both the practical comprehension and the psychic reach of ordinary men and women, who withdraw into privacy when confronted with an overwhelming political space, where they feel lost and disempowered. The idea of citizenship of a defined group ("We the people") within a defined area is aggregative and inclusive. It embraces the social dimensions of civil society's governance and the polit-
tical dimensions of society’s formal government. Citizenship remains the indispensable civic idea to which civil society necessarily is subordinated.

Notes

References
CIVITAS: AN INTERNATIONAL CIVIC EDUCATION EXCHANGE PROGRAM

By Charles N. Quigley and Jack N. Hoar

At the very time of its apparent triumph in the war of ideas, it is increasingly clear how vulnerable democracy is, not only in formerly totalitarian states, but also in established nations such as the United States of America. In order to strengthen democracy in the U.S. and abroad, a cooperative group of leading organizations in civic education developed Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program (Civitas Exchange Program) in 1995.

Civitas Exchange Program Background

Administered by the Center for Civic Education, the Civitas Exchange Program is funded by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI) of the U.S. Department of Education, and conducted in cooperation with the United States Information Agency (USIA) and its affiliated United States Information Services (USIS) posts overseas. As originally authorized by the U.S. Congress, the program was designed to provide a series of exchanges among leaders in civic education in the U.S. and in Eastern European nations and the then newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (EEN/NIS). The program has now been reauthorized to support exchanges with civic education leaders in emerging democracies throughout the world.

The Civitas Exchange Program is affiliated with Civitas International, a consortium formed in June 1995 at the Civitas@Prague conference sponsored by the United States Information Agency. At the close of that conference, participants representing more than 50 nations signed a declaration pledging to “create and maintain a worldwide network that will make civic education a higher priority on the international agenda.” Members of Civitas International include leading civic education organizations from throughout the world and are dedicated to strengthening civic education and constitutional democracy.
Civic education is understood to play an important role in the development of the political culture required for the establishment, maintenance, and improvement of democratic institutions. The Civitas Exchange Program provides civic education leaders with opportunities to learn from and assist each other in improving education for democracy in their respective nations.

The National and International Significance and Need for the Civitas Exchange Program

Democracy has triumphed in many parts of the world, only to discover how vulnerable it is. In emerging democracies, new democrats struggle against great odds to build a culture of citizenship from the rubble of totalitarianism. In developed nations, democracy strains under the accumulated weight of ethnic and religious conflict, irresponsibility, crime, and apathy. In worlds so different, the challenges to civic development have much in common.

Much concern understandably has been given to the objective conditions in which constitutional democracy takes root—the economic circumstances, the social and political institutions, and the formal processes through which democracy becomes securely established. Much attention is also now being paid to what diplomats describe as a new architecture of relations among the democratic and democratizing nations.

But what of the spirit of democracy that must animate these institutions and processes: the subjective conditions, the knowledge, the understandings—what Alexis de Tocqueville called the “habits of the heart”? As much as anything, democracy is a culture—a culture sometimes taken for granted. What are we doing together to strengthen the culture of democracy?

In fact, in both the U.S. and emerging democracies, teachers, community workers, and others committed to the future of democracy in many different ways and without great fanfare, are today engaged in reviving and strengthening the skills and values of democratic life—the civic culture. Those involved in this work are now reaching out to one another across national borders to learn, to gain strength, and to win wider recognition of the need for education for effective and responsible citizenship. Educators in emerging countries—many working in new, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—have turned to the United States for curricular models, texts, and training models to translate and adapt for use in their schools.

During the course of the past four years, American organizations have consulted with educational ministries and new civic organizations on curriculum development and teacher training in most of the EEN/NIS coun-
tries. Not only have selected American materials been translated and adapted—in nearly every case with funding from U.S. non-governmental and government agencies—but also American curricular frameworks have been put to use. Civitas: A Framework for Civic Education, a model civic education curriculum framework published by the Center for Civic Education in 1991, has been widely distributed by the USIA and private foundations and has been translated for use by educators in new democracies. The USIA has also distributed throughout the world 5,000 free copies of National Standards for Civics and Government (1994), developed by the Center as a follow-up project to Civitas. USIA has also made unlimited access to the National Standards text available on the Internet. In addition, American organizations have assisted colleagues in emerging democracies develop their own texts specifically addressed to their needs.

In the course of this work, the American organizations have well understood that such interactions are not one-sided, and that what they have learned about the history and government of other nations has great value in the development of civic education programs for the United States of America. Particularly in times of declining attachment to the institutions and values of government within established democracies, the insights offered by work with educators in emerging democracies have been deeply instructive. The collaborative development of Comparative Lessons for Democracy, a series of lessons for U.S. high school teachers on emerging EEN/NIS democracies, is a significant example of the Civitas Exchange Program benefiting Americans.

Certain agencies of the U.S. government, such as the USIA and its USIS (United States Information Service) posts overseas, have been invaluable in facilitating these activities. And for the past four years, through this exchange program, the U.S. Department of Education has been at the center of international civic education reform.

Yet for all the mutual benefits of a civic education exchange, and despite the pressing need to strengthen the culture of democracy in established and new democracies, the lack of systematic support prior to 1995 for civic education exchanges hampered these enterprises. Funding was piecemeal, the flow of information was haphazard, and coordination across organizations and continents was meager. Given the necessity to buttress new democratic institutions in emerging democracies and to support democratic principles and practices in the U.S., the need for coordinated action and sustained support was urgent. Fortunately, the Civitas Exchange Program was instituted in 1995, and a great deal of excellent work in the field of international civic education was initiated.
Civitas Exchange Program Goals

The goals of the Civitas Exchange Program are to:

- acquaint educators with exemplary curricular and teacher training programs in civic education developed in the United States;
- assist educators in adapting and implementing effective civic education programs in their own countries;
- create instructional materials for students in the U.S. that will help them to better understand emerging constitutional democracies;
- facilitate the exchange of ideas and experience in civic education among political, educational, and private sector leaders of participating countries, the U.S., and other established democracies; and
- encourage research to determine the effects of civic education on the development of the knowledge, skills, and traits of public and private character essential for the preservation and improvement of constitutional democracy.

These goals are accomplished through a number of means, which include seminars for civic educators on the basic values and principles of constitutional democracy and its institutions, visits by civic educators to school systems, institutions of higher learning, and nonprofit organizations with exemplary civic education programs, translations of basic documents on constitutional government and significant works on political theory, constitutional law, and government, and adaptations or development of exemplary curricular and teacher education programs. They also include joint research projects in the areas of curricular development, teacher education, and evaluation to determine the effects of civic education programs on students.

At the most fundamental level, this program is devoted to the accomplishment of a multitude of tasks in the participating nations that will incrementally contribute to the establishment and improvement of constitutional democracy and the realization of its ideals. The peoples of the participating nations will not be the only beneficiaries of this program. Potentially, at least, the entire international community can benefit through the contributions made to democratization and world order.

Elements of Systematic Implementation of Civic Education

The goals of the Civitas Exchange Program are set in the context of the identified "Elements of Systematic Implementation of Civic Education" outlined below. The overarching goal is to improve teaching and students' mastery of advanced knowledge and skills in civics and government and a reasoned commitment to the fundamental values and principles of constitutional democracy.
Introduction to the Elements of Systematic Implementation of Civic Education. The tasks to be accomplished to institutionalize effective programs in civics and government in public or private schools are described below. Also presented are steps to be accomplished to fulfill each task. The purpose of this outline is to provide a guide for activities under the Civitas project and a means of evaluating progress.

The full achievement of all of the tasks specified is not expected or possible under this program in any of the nations involved, including the United States. Tasks are undertaken that pertain to assessed needs of international partners and are based on the circumstances in each nation and the time and resources available under this project. Depending upon these circumstances, it might be reasonable, for example, to focus attention solely on a single task such as the development of standards, a curriculum framework, or a teacher education program. In other circumstances, a set of tasks might be addressed such as implementing a pilot program, including development of curricular materials, teacher training, classroom instruction, and evaluation. Since many programs are also being supported by other sources, it should be useful to use this outline to insure that efforts to improve civic education are well coordinated and form a comprehensive and rational approach.

Tasks and Indicators of Achievement. Eight tasks and indicators of their achievement are listed below. These tasks and indicators constitute the "Elements of Systemic Implementation of Civic Education."

Task 1. Standards: Development and establishment of content and performance standards in civics and government. Indicators of achievement are:

- development, distribution, and promulgation of standards,
- participation of gatekeepers and others influential in the development process,
- presentations of standards to educational policymakers, and
- institutional adoption of standards.

Task 2. Curriculum Framework: Development and adoption of a K-12 curriculum framework in civic education. Indicators of achievement are:

- development, distribution, and promulgation of curriculum framework,
- participation of gatekeepers and others influential in developmental process,
- presentations of curriculum framework to educational policymakers, and
- institutional adoption of curriculum framework.
Task 3. Required Courses: Formal requirement for instruction in civics and government in the school curriculum. Indicators of achievement are:

- development, distribution, and promulgation of course outlines and frameworks,
- participation of gatekeepers and other influential in developmental process,
- presentations of course outlines to educational policymakers,
- pilot programs of courses (with supportive teacher training programs and curricular materials) accompanied by evaluations,
- demonstrations of courses, and
- institutional adoption of course outlines.

Task 4. Instructional Materials: Provision of instructional materials aligned with the standards and curriculum framework. Indicators of achievement are:

- development, distribution, and promulgation of instructional materials,
- participation of gatekeepers and other influential in developmental process,
- presentations of instructional materials to educational policymakers,
- pilot programs of using instructional materials (with supportive teacher training programs and materials) accompanied by evaluations (as noted above),
- demonstrations of use of instructional materials (as above), and
- institutional adoption of instructional materials.

Task 5. Teacher Education: Establishment of pre-service and in-service education programs to develop the capacity of teachers to provide high quality instruction in the use of the instructional materials in order to promote attainment of the standards. Indicators of achievement are:

- development, distribution, and promulgation of teacher education programs,
- participation of gatekeepers and others influential in developmental process,
- presentations of information on teacher education programs to educational policymakers,
- pilot teacher education programs accompanied by evaluations (as noted above),
- demonstrations of teacher education programs (as above), and
- institutional adoption of teacher education programs.
Task 6. Leadership and Network Training: Establishment of training programs to enhance the capacities of leaders of civic education programs in program planning, budgeting, networking, administration, implementation, curriculum development, evaluation, and related tasks related to systemic implementation of civic education. Indicators of achievement are:

- development, distribution, and promulgation of leadership and network training programs,
- participation of gatekeepers and other influential in developmental process,
- presentations of information on training programs to educational policymakers,
- pilot leadership and network training programs accompanied by evaluations (as noted above),
- demonstrations of leadership and network training programs (as above), and
- institutional adoption of leadership and network training programs.

Task 7. Assessment: Establishment of assessment programs to determine student attainment of standards. Indicators of achievement are:

- development of assessment programs, procedures, and instruments,
- implementation of assessments of existing state of student knowledge, skills, and attitudes in civics and government, of pilot programs, etc.,
- promulgation of results of assessments, and
- institutionalization of assessment programs.

Task 8. Credentialing: Establishment of licensure to ensure that all teachers develop the subject matter and pedagogical expertise needed to prepare all students to meet the standards. Indicators of achievement are:

- development of credentialing requirements in civics and government,
- promulgation of requirements,
- adoption of requirements, and
- institutionalization of supportive educational programs for teachers.

Civitas Exchange Program Organization

The Civitas Exchange Program has established primary and secondary sites in the U.S. and the EEN/NIS. Lists of these sites follows.

Principal U.S. civic education organizations:

- American Federation of Teachers (AFT),
- American Political Science Association (APSA),
- Center for Civic Education (CCE).
• Mershon Center and College of Education at The Ohio State University, and
• Social Studies Development Center of Indiana University (SSDC).
• Affiliated civic education organizations at state and local levels:
• Council for Citizenship Education at The Sage Colleges (New York).
• Florida Law-Related Education Association, Inc.
• State Bar of Texas Law-Related Education,
• Classroom Law Project at Lewis and Clark Law School (Oregon).
• Center for Civic Education Through Law (Michigan).
• We the People...Program of Washington State,
• We the People...Program of Illinois.
• Boston University School of Education,
• Anchorage School District (Alaska).
• Partners in Education, Inc. (Nevada), and
• Arizona Bar Foundation Law-Related Education.

EEN/NIS Sites:
• Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH): Civitas@Bosnia-Herzegovina.
• Croatia: Croatian Ministry of Education and Sports,
• Hungary: Civitas Association,
• Latvia: Democracy Advancement Center,
• Poland: Center for Citizenship Education,
• Russia (East): Sakhalin Civitas Center, Sakhalin Department of Education, Culture, and Sport, and
• Russia (West): Russian Association for Civic Education; Grazhdanin Training Center; and the American Federation of Teachers-Moscow.

Mini-Grant Recipients and Additional Civitas Sites. In addition to maintaining established exchanges between primary and secondary sites in the U.S. and EEN/NIS, the Civitas Exchange Program partners with emerging democracies worldwide. In many cases, the Civitas Exchange Program provides "mini-grant" funding to support a wide range of activities to promote the development and improvement of civic education. Training and technical assistance is also frequently provided by Center staff. A list of these sites follows:
• Argentina,
• Australia,
• Belarus,
• Brazil,
• Columbia,
• Czech Republic,
• Dominican Republic.
Illustrative Examples of Civitas Exchange Program Activities and Products

All participating U.S. and international sites have taken part in a wide range of civic education experiences and activities. The accomplishments of the Civitas Exchange Program are many and diverse. Civitas has increased the available knowledge about successful educational exchanges between civic educators in the U.S. and in emerging democracies. The array of publications produced to date includes scholarly analysis and curricula developed for teachers and students. Knowledge about civic education curriculum development, teacher education, and research and evaluation processes in the U.S. has been shared with international civic educators. Information on the most innovative and effective civic education methodologies and pedagogical techniques has been exchanged.

Given that the Civitas Exchange Program has a history of four years of achievements, it seems reasonable to review some of these accomplishments and to extrapolate from them the nature of the tangible and intangible products likely to result from the continuation of the Civitas Exchange Program. Examples of these activities and their resulting products are discussed below.

Published Products Resulting from the Civitas Exchange Program.
Civic education curricula and instructional materials have been developed and are being refined. In every participating country—including the U.S.—these materials have the potential to improve civic education significantly.

Numerous resource documents for scholars and teachers have been published and distributed through the ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education and its Adjunct ERIC Clearinghouse for International Civic Education. These affiliated clearinghouses are located at the
Social Studies Development Center of Indiana University, which is a primary site of the Civitas Exchange Program. Their publications include Resources on Civic Education for Democracy: International Perspectives, Yearbooks Numbers 1 and 2. Others include ERIC Digest: Civic Education Constitutional Democracy: An International Perspective; ERIC Digest: Civic Education for Democracy in Latvia: The Program of the Democracy Advancement Center; ERIC Digest: Internet Resources for Civic Educators; ERIC Digest: Global Trends in Civic Education for Democracy; ERIC Digest: Libraries and Democracy; ERIC Digest: Issue-Centered Civic Education in Middle Schools; and ERIC News Bulletin on International Civic Education. Through the ERIC system these documents have been widely disseminated and thereby have the potential to improve social studies and civic education not only across the U.S., but elsewhere in the world.1

Further reinforcing the extraordinary potential impact of the program, articles have been published in professional journals and newsletters reaching large target audiences. For example, the Summer 1998 issue of The International Journal of Social Education included eleven articles about various aspects of Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program. This publication was developed for the Civitas Exchange Program by the ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education at Indiana University.2 Further, civic education leaders and teachers in every state in the U.S. and in participating countries have been informed of the program through both regular and special publications of the participating organizations.

Curriculum development has taken place with all international delegations in cooperation with U.S. participants. One of the most significant examples of collaborative curriculum development is Comparative Lessons for Democracy. This text contains a series of lessons developed by Civitas participants for use in American classrooms. Developed through a unique collaborative process, educators from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Russia drafted a comprehensive set of lessons designed to actively engage students in comparative analyses of the histories and transitions of emerging EEN/NIS democracies.

This new resource offers innovative strategies and primary source materials for teaching about a complex and rapidly changing region of the world. The volume includes 35 lesson plans and resource materials intended to use in high school government, comparative government, world history, and current affairs classes. Comparative Lessons for Democracy is also useful for students at the community college level or for advanced middle school students. The lessons were demonstrated and well-received at last year’s annual conference of the National Council for the Social Studies.
Comparative Lessons for Democracy is being distributed by the Center for Civic Education to teachers throughout the U.S. as a pilot project. Currently, more than 350 teachers in 38 states are piloting this new resource in their classrooms. As a result, an estimated 47,000 students are being introduced to new materials examining emerging EEN/NIS democracies. These lessons have also been included in the database of ERIC by the ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education at Indiana University. The impact of Comparative Lessons for Democracy both as a collaborative development model and as a teaching resource is significant.

Another resource for U.S. students developed by the Civitas Exchange Program is Hungarian-American Lessons for Democracy. This unique text contains lessons on constitutionalism, human rights, and politics and is currently being used by high school teachers in Florida. Selected lessons have also been translated for use by Hungarian teachers.

A ninth-grade civics curriculum has been developed and disseminated to every school in Latvia. And student workbooks and teacher handbooks for civic education in Latvia have been developed and published. A new teaching resource. Civic Education for Democracy in Latvia: Principles, Practices, and Resources for Teachers, has been developed and published jointly by Indiana University's Social Studies Development Center and Latvia's Democracy Advancement Center. This publication has been distributed to teachers throughout Latvia. The Polish Center for Citizenship Education is developing a National Core Curriculum for Civic Education adopted by the Polish Ministry of Education. Their Center has also developed over 100 lesson plans for elementary students, with a distribution of 6,000 teachers, and more than 140 lesson plans for secondary schools, with more than 3,000 copies distributed. Thus, over 55,000 students have received instruction based on their materials.

The Hungarian Civitas Association has adapted the We the People...The Citizen and the Constitution program for use in Hungary. In 1999, more than 1,000 middle school students participated in regional competitions in preparation for the program's third annual national competition in Budapest. The level of student involvement has increased by forty percent since 1998 and reflects the tremendous interest in civic education programs in Hungary.

In Russia, Uchitelskaya Gazeta, the teacher's newspaper published by the Russian Civitas partners with a circulation of over 200,000, has run many articles on civic education, and a civics supplement based on the delegation's Civitas Exchange Program experience. Russian partners have developed a new version of We the People...The Citizen and the Constitution based on the Russian Constitution. In addition, Russian and American
partners have developed a 250-page methods book on teaching civics entitled, *The Active Classroom*, which has been distributed to more than 2,000 teachers in Russia.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a civics-related, ecological curriculum and accompanying computer software have been translated and adapted by the Federal Ministry of Education. The new materials, titled *Exploring BiH in Europe's Environment*, now contain BiH-specific examples and are available in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. The materials will be introduced in an upcoming series of seminars for teachers participating in the *Project Citizen* program.

In Belarus, the European Humanities University in Minsk developed a draft version of a teacher's manual for teaching civics in English as a Second Language secondary school courses. A final version of the manual is to be introduced to teachers at the Institute of Teachers in Minsk in the 1999-2000 school year.

Perhaps the most exceptional curricular document being developed under the Civitas Exchange Program is *Education for Democratic Citizenship: A Framework*. The document, which is being developed through a world-wide cooperative effort among interested educators and scholars, is intended for use in civic education programs in emerging and developed democracies. The Framework is a generic statement of the democratic values and principles and other knowledge and understanding that should be part of any nation's educational programs for democratic citizenship. Both the development process and the final product, which is intended to be detailed and rigorous, should be of great benefit to civic educators around the world.

**Seminars on History and Government and Site Visits to Governmental Institutions and Public/Private Sector Agencies and Organizations Involved in the Political Process.** As part of the Civitas Exchange Program, each delegation participates in seminars on the history, government, and educational systems of their partner nations. The list of seminars conducted is extensive and includes such topics as:

- The History of American Democracy.
- Cooperative Learning and Civic Education.
- Authentic Assessment and Civic Education.
- Teaching Civics and a Constitutional Culture Through Literature.
- Building Non-Governmental Organizations.
- Concepts, Principles, and Resources of Civic Education.
- Russian Government and Politics, with Comparisons with other NIS Countries.
- Constitutional Principles—A Framework.
• Constitutionalism.
• The Role of Civic Education in a Democratic Society.
• Training in Evaluation and Assessment.
• Internet Training for Civic Educators.
• Lesson and Unit Planning.
• Law-Related Education.
• Introduction to Teacher Education Reform.
• Elementary Education: Multicultural Influence.
• Teaching Civic Education: Decision Trees.
• Research on Effective Teaching and Schooling.
• Teaching Controversial Subjects in Civic Education.
• Hypermedia Presentation on Models of Civic Education, and
• Democracy and Economics.

Participating delegations traveling to the U.S. visit both American federal institutions in Washington, D.C., including the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Department of Education, and state and local legislatures, as well as, in most cases, state executive and judicial officials. For instance, the Hungarian delegation met with the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives. And the Latvian delegation participated in a program involving the Justices of the Indiana Supreme Court.

Similarly, American delegations traveling to Europe have met with a variety of international public officials in host countries. In Hungary, for example, Florida delegates met the Hungarian President, the Lord Mayor of Budapest, the Deputy Head of the Constitutional (Supreme) Court, numerous members of parliament, including the Head of the Constitutional Committee, and many other elected officials, who have become patrons of Civitas Exchange Program activities. Similarly, the Polish parliament has issued an official proclamation endorsing the Center for Citizenship Education's work in Poland, and parliamentary representatives met with the Ohio and Michigan delegations. And the Latvian Minister of Education has issued an official proclamation to recognize the contributions of Indiana University's Social Studies Development Center to development of education for democratic citizenship in the public schools of Latvia.

Nearly all the delegations have included more members than the originally planned number of five participants per visit. For instance, one American delegation to Hungary included 16 participants and was partially supported by private sources.

**Visits to School Systems, Institutions of Higher Learning, and Organizations Conducting Exemplary Education Programs in Civics and Government.** In every case, American and international delegations have
visited school systems, institutions of higher learning, and non-governmental organizations conducting exemplary civics and government programs—many of which represent impressive associations of educators. The Russian Association for Civic Education, for instance, is a professional association and an umbrella organization of member NGOs with more than 9,800 members. School visits are always among the highlights of the trips, since they permit interaction with students, teachers, and administrators at various levels and in various circumstances.

**Observation and Participation in Teacher Training Programs and Activities Involving Elementary and Secondary Students.** Nearly all of the U.S. and international delegations' visits have included observation and participation in teacher training programs. Indeed, the American delegations usually are selected with an understanding that workshops and presentations would be a central feature of their visit.

The last two and one-half days of an American delegation's visit to the Czech Republic, for instance, were given over to a "trainer-of-trainers" workshop for educators from throughout the country. The workshop was so successful that more extensive workshops have been scheduled. In the U.S., a Czech delegation conducted a session on *Comparative Lessons for Democracy* for American colleagues participating in a summer institute on "Achieving the Civics Standards" at Lewis and Clark College in Oregon. The five Czech educators shared their experiences and observations during the seminar organized by the Classroom Law Project in Oregon.

Another activity found Civitas Exchange Program participants from 14 countries along with educators from nearly 50 American states attending a four-day *Project Citizen* Professional Development Institute in Los Angeles, California. This diverse group of educators received a detailed presentation on instructional components of *Project Citizen*, an introduction to public policy making, and the opportunity to exchange teaching strategies and ideas for effectively implementing *Project Citizen* in their own states or countries.

The presentations and discussions with elementary and secondary students have permitted programs and curricula to be viewed under "real world" conditions. Even when interpreters are necessary, these first-hand observations are invariably reported to yield a remarkable amount of information and insight. For example, a recent visit to the Center for Civic Education by an Indonesian delegation included classroom observations of fifth-grade students in Burbank, California participating in a *Foundations of Democracy: Justice* lesson. The delegates also observed *We the People...The Citizen and the Constitution* classes in a nearby Arcadia, California high school.

In the field of pre-service education, new university-level courses for civics teachers were developed and included in the curricula of three Lat-
vian Pedagogical Universities. And the Russian partnership is developing similar pre-service courses of studies for Russian universities.

**On-site Demonstrations of Curricula and Pedagogy for Educational Leaders.** On-site demonstrations have been conducted not only in the “laboratories” of pedagogical institutions but have also been the focus of school visits. Increasingly, the American delegations have been involved as presenters and participants in intensive curricular and pedagogical workshops of several days’ duration.

Numerous workshops have been taking place involving thousands of teachers in participating countries and the U.S. In Poland alone, 1,200 teachers have been trained. In Russia, four national workshops have trained 1,000 teachers. In addition, with American assistance, the Russian partners are developing a regional in-service training capacity within Russia for the recertification of teachers, which is required every five years. In Latvia, more than 2,000 teachers have been trained in civic education workshops in regions throughout the country.

**Participation in Presentations and Discussions with Public and Private Sector Community Groups.** American community groups are included in nearly every international delegation’s visit. They vary from Junior Achievement; Arizona, Florida, and Indiana Bar Associations; Florida State University’s Center for Civic Education and Public Service; Youth Services Center of Henry County (Indiana); DePage County (Illinois) Head Start Program; and Lancaster (Pennsylvania) Newspapers, Inc. Similar meetings were held for U.S. delegations in Europe. For example, in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a U.S. delegation met with private cultural organizations representing various ethnic groups. And in Latvia, the U.S. delegation met with members of the Latvian Adult Education Association to discuss programs in education for democratic citizenship.

**Translations and Adaptations of U.S. Civic Education Curricular Programs.** While it is recognized that ultimately each country’s own educators must develop their own curricula, translations and adaptations of American curricular materials can be completed relatively quickly, implemented in classrooms immediately, and can serve as resources for future curriculum development. Thus, in almost every case, international partners have translated and adapted U.S., texts and programs. For example, the Russian newspaper Uchitelskaya Gazeta has produced verbatim translations and serialized—without adaptation to Russian circumstances—both *National Standards for Civics and Government and We the People...The Citizen and the Constitution*. Of these translations, some 12,000 copies of *National Standards for Civics and Government*, 50,000 copies of *We the People...The Citizen and the Constitution*, and 12,000 copies of *Project Citizen* have been distributed.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Project Citizen and selections from *We the People...The Citizen and the Constitution and Foundations of Democracy: Authority, Privacy, Responsibility, and Justice* curricula have been translated and adapted into Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian versions and, thus far, used by some 41,000 students. More than 4,500 students from 171 schools participated in the Project Citizen program in 1997-98 in preparation for the first countrywide Project Citizen showcase held in Sarajevo in May 1998. The historic event provided students the opportunity to present their civic education work to more than 550 educators, students, teachers, government officials and members of the media. Plans are underway for the second annual showcase to be held in Sarajevo in May 1999.

In Latvia, 15,000 Latvian-language copies of Project Citizen have been distributed. They have been used in teacher training workshops and primary school programs in education for democratic citizenship.

As noted above, the Hungarian Civitas Association has translated and adapted the *We the People...The Citizen and the Constitution* text as an academic program for Hungarian students. In addition, in 1999, Hungarian translations of Project Citizen are being used by 336 students in 48 schools throughout the country. These students will prepare for the first nationwide Project Citizen competition to be held in Budapest in July 1999. In Poland, a "Young People Vote" program has been inaugurated with 32,000 participants and mock trial competitions and other law-related education programs are being implemented.

The Center for Civic Education is also participating in a new civic education program in Ireland. "Civic-Link" is a new Irish civic initiative for young people developed by the Center and Co-operation Ireland. A Belfast-based NGO. Based on Project Citizen, the program is designed to encourage young people to learn how government works and how they can constructively participate in issues affecting their communities. Beginning in September 1999, twenty-six schools in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will participate in the new program. Through an accompanying series of residential exchanges, students from participating schools in Northern Ireland and the Republic will share ideas and approaches for addressing public policy issues.

In Macedonia, more than 30 teachers have received training for a pilot program based on the Center for Civic Education materials on *Foundations of Democracy: Authority, Privacy, Responsibility and Justice* elementary curriculum. The lessons, which have been translated and adapted into Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, and Serbian, are being piloted in classrooms with 900 fourth graders in rural and urban Macedonia. Finally, in Mexico, a pilot project based on Project Citizen has recently been launched in three
states. Some 60 teachers and civic education leaders participated in training in Yucatan, Guadalajara, and Mexico City in preparation for in-class implementation of the adapted materials.

**Planning Research and Evaluation Programs to Determine the Effects of Civic Education.** Each of the international delegations has engaged in seminars or extensive discussions regarding civic education research and evaluation. These are areas of significant interest to the international participants, since in the past there have been few resources devoted to them in partner countries, and there is much for Americans to share. In many cases, the U.S. partners have assisted international partners in the development and implementation of their own evaluation programs.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Pedagogical Institute of Sarajevo has been assisted by the Center for Civic Education in the evaluation of the program conducted in the Federation. Also in BiH, a student survey was developed under the supervision of Dr. Richard Brody of Stanford University and Dr. James Gibson of the University of Houston. The survey instrument is designed to test the differences in attitudes, behavior, and opinions of students participating in the *Project Citizen* program and those who have not been exposed to civic education programs.

In evaluations of *National Standards for Civics and Government* and *We the People...The Citizen and the Constitution* conducted by the Russian Association for Civic Education, responding teachers asserted that these publications were valuable even without adaptation to Russian circumstances, despite their having been written for an American audience.

In Hungary, the Civitas Association collaborated with researchers from the University of Central Florida to conduct an evaluation of the Hungarian “Citizen in a Democracy” program. The assessment found that participating students believe the competition improved their knowledge, skills, and attitudes related to Hungarian democracy and increased their political tolerance.

In conclusion, this brief report shows that the Civitas Exchange Program has already produced extraordinary results which have reached a significant number of students, teachers, scholars, and representatives of governmental and non-governmental organizations. Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program is an extremely successful collaborative effort which deserves to be supported and expanded. This ongoing exchange program has the potential to create and maintain a global network that will strengthen education for democratic citizenship in participating countries throughout the world.
Notes
1. ERIC, the Educational Resources Information Center, oversees 16 Clearinghouses funded by the U.S. Department of Education. The ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education (ERIC/ChESS) is located at the Social Studies Development Center (SSDC) of Indiana University, a primary site of the Civitas Exchange Program. Through its participation in the Civitas Exchange Program, the SSDC created the ERIC Adjunct Clearinghouse for International Civic Education, which has acquired and entered documents on civic education into the ERIC database. It has also co-published several ERIC Digests and other publications in partnership with ERIC/ChESS, with which it is affiliated at the SSDC, and in partnership with the Civitas Exchange Program.
2. John J. Patrick, director of the Indiana primary site of the Civitas Exchange Program, served as the guest editor of this special issue of The International Journal of Social Education.
3. See the chapter on the Framework in this volume by Charles F. Bahmueller.
4. For more information and a descriptive brochure on Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program, contact Jack N. Hoar, Director of International Programs. Center for Civic Education, 5146 Douglas Fir Road, Calabasas, California 91302, (818) 591-9321, Fax: (818) 591-0527, Email: (international@civiced.org).

References
RECONSIDERING ISSUE-CENTERED CIVIC EDUCATION AMONG EARLY ADOLESCENTS: PROJECT CITIZEN IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD

By Thomas S. Vontz and William A. Nixon

There is a broad consensus among social studies educators that the core mission of a social studies curriculum is civic education. In a democracy, the need for a body of informed and responsible citizens capable of confronting, debating, and ultimately deciding current issues of public policy cannot be overstated. Civic education is a vital means by which our society transmits to the next generation the core knowledge, skills, and dispositions of democratic citizenship. It is what allows democratic societies to reproduce themselves across generations.

Of course, there is an appropriate place for civic education at every level of learning. It is increasingly recognized, however, that the middle school years (i.e., early adolescence) are an especially crucial time in the development of civic roles and responsibilities. These are the formative years during which students are discovering their identities, their larger roles in their communities and in society, and the values that they will hold throughout their lives. Yet there is a general lack of institutionalized civic education aimed at promoting citizenship during the middle school years (Tolo 1998, 16). Educators, policymakers, parents, and concerned members of the community need to recognize civic education in the middle school as a prime concern.

Even where there is a commitment to providing a foundation in civic education, the pressing issue remains of exactly how democratic citizenship should be taught. On this point there has been considerable debate over the course of the twentieth century. James P. Shaver (1992, 95) has broken down the argument into two perennial questions: (1) is the teaching of content culled from history and the social sciences, appropriately tailored for young minds, adequate citizenship education in and of itself; and (2) should
students first master a core body of information and concepts before being asked to consider the issues that face adult citizens, or will the learning of information and concepts take place more effectively in the context of confronting issues? Educators who answer "no" to the first question, and who support learning in the context of confronting problems have turned to the issue- or problem-centered approach to civic education.

Although several approaches to issue-centered civic education have been advanced, most proponents agree on some common principles. Broadly speaking, issue-centered civic education examines social questions using the ideals of democracy as the criteria to judge competing answers to pressing social problems. The method can be used in either a discipline-based or interdisciplinary curriculum. At the core of issue-centered education are reflective questions that can be answered variously and ones that emphasize thoughtfulness and depth. In the process of examining reflective questions and reaching a decision, there should be an assessment of evidence, competing values, and the weighing of possible outcomes (Evans 1992, 93).

At its best, issue-centered civics education promises a high level of integrated learning and student involvement in the learning process. However, critics have rightly pointed to serious problems in its underlying conceptions and practical difficulties in its application in the classroom. As a result, issue-centered civic education has never been fully accepted or implemented in American schools. Despite these criticisms and realities, educators should not fully dismiss an issue-centered curricula as one component of an appropriately tailored civic education curriculum.

One issue-centered civic education program that appears to be gaining support throughout the world is *We the People... Project Citizen (Project Citizen)*. First implemented in California in 1992, and expanded into a national program in 1995 by the Center for Civic Education and the National Conference of State Legislatures, *Project Citizen* represents a considered effort to take advantage of the benefits of issue-centered civic education while resolving many of the problems that critics have found with that approach. The program's appeal around the world suggests that educators need to reconsider the positive role that the issue-centered approach can have in forming the knowledge, dispositions, and skills of democratic citizenship.

The remainder of this chapter consists of five sections. First, the philosophical and historical roots of the issue-centered approach are traced in order to demonstrate that *Project Citizen* represents a continuous strand of thinking that has been present since the inception of "social studies" in the schools if not earlier. Second, the historical arguments for and against issue-centered education are reviewed as a context for understanding how *Pro-
ject Citizen can be implemented in a way that avoids many of the problems that have been associated with this approach. Third, a closer look is taken at the structure, methods, and aims of Project Citizen as it is designed. Fourth, key findings of a recent evaluation of Project Citizen are briefly summarized. Fifth, the chapter closes with an examination of how Project Citizen has been implemented throughout the world using the countries of Latvia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the state of Indiana in the United States of America as examples of its implementation.

Philosophical and Historical Roots of Issue-Centered Social Studies

Issue-centered education has its ultimate roots in classical philosophy, and particularly the teachings of Socrates, as preserved in the dialogues written by Plato. As portrayed in the dialogues, Socrates, who was famous for claiming that he did not know anything, assumes the role of the critic drawing out ideas and opinions from others and subjecting them to rigorous scrutiny, with the end result being a new, genuine understanding. Contrary to some modern misconceptions about Socratic teaching, the question and answer method of inquiry associated with Socrates does not take the form of an adversarial contest or debate with potentially humiliating consequences for the participants, but rather a cooperative search for truth and understanding through the dialectical process (Taylor 1995). This classical focus on the process of inquiry as a way to gain knowledge parallels an issue-centered approach.

While issue-centered education can lay valid claim to this Socratic heritage, in the twentieth century it is most commonly associated with the Progressive reform movement, and especially the philosopher and educator John Dewey. Dewey's instrumentalist philosophy centers on inquiry as both a means and an end. Whether looking at questions of morals, politics, or the sciences, Dewey called for the application of intelligent inquiry, understood as the self-correcting method of experimentally testing hypotheses created and refined from previous experience. In all cases, he insisted that inquiry take place in a social context that mediates both the terms of the initial problem and its solution, and that the social context is itself transformed through the process of inquiry. Dewey's epistemology was matched by his moral fallibilism and belief that no knowledge-claim, moral principle, or ideal can ever be assumed and treated as immune to possible criticism and revision (Hanson 1995).

Dewey was very interested in the processes of human thought and learning. In the Deweyan perspective, there are many different ways in which people think and learn. The better ways of thinking, labeled "reflective
thinking," lead to learning that is functional and becomes part of a person's thinking and basic approach to reality. In reflective learning, people learn as they think, and think best when confronted with problems that are real and relevant, and that pose meaningful questions (Dewey 1933, 3-16).

Reflective thinking, understood as a form of inquiry by Dewey, consists of five phases, outlined in his classic study *How We Think* (Dewey 1933, 106-118). It is worth reviewing these stages because they are reflectively developed, to a significant extent, in the underlying structure of *Project Citizen*. The first phase is "suggestion," meaning a disturbed and perplexed situation that arrests a direct activity. This cannot be an artificial, ready-made problem, for such problems are merely tasks. In this phase there is no problem yet, but simply a perplexing situation. Such situations cause the mind, still committed to action, to formulate ideas about how to proceed. Where more than one possible course exists, a state of suspense is created which leads to "intellectualization," the second phase of reflective thinking. In this phase, a difficulty or perplexity that has been felt and directly experienced is transformed into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought.

The third phase, the "guiding idea," involves the use of one suggestion after another as the potential solution to the problem leading to the formulation of a working hypothesis to guide further observation and the collection of more data. The fourth phase, "reasoning," is the process of mental elaboration by which our observations are transformed into an idea. This is the phase of great mental development. Through reasoning, solutions that seemed plausible at first sight might be rejected as unfit, and others that seemed implausible can be transformed into fruitful possibilities. The development of an idea through reasoning supplies the necessary intervening terms for linking elements of the problem that seemed in conflict with each other into a consistent whole. The ultimate product of reasoning is an idea about how the problem can be dealt with most expeditiously and effectively.

With such an idea comes the fifth and culminating stage, "testing" the hypothesis by overt or imaginary action. Testing can yield verification of the idea, or it can lead to a failure, or refutation, of the idea. The great advantage of reflective thinking is that neither outcome means an end to thinking. Through testing the idea might become a conclusion, but it always remains subject to the possibility of contrary facts that indicate the advisability of revision. And the failure of an idea itself highly instructive, suggesting what modifications should be introduced in the operating hypothesis, or perhaps bringing to light a new problem altogether. To a large extent Dewey's stages are evident in the *Project Citizen* program which will be more fully discussed later in the chapter.
In Dewey’s view, although reflective thinking broadly follows this five phase course, the way in which these steps are managed and the amount of time each takes will depend upon the intellectual tact and sensitivity of the individual. Moreover, while Dewey argued that reflective thought was the best kind of thinking, he did not hold that prior information was of no use. On the contrary, Dewey was emphatic that there “must be data at command to supply the considerations required in dealing with the specific difficulty that has presented itself” (Dewey 1916, 84). In the case of the classroom, Dewey believed that too much emphasis was placed on the static, “cold-storage” of knowledge approach to teaching, but he was equally clear that knowledge was “the working capital, the indispensable resource” of inquiry (Dewey 1916, 85-86).

Throughout his career Dewey was committed to finding ways to relate his philosophy to contemporary concerns, and no concern seemed more important to him than the problem of how to ensure the continuity and revitalization of democracy over the course of generations. Schools, he believed, must play a vital role in training youth to become reflectively thinking participants in a democracy. Dewey’s ideas about education for democratic citizenship found expression in the National Education Association’s seminal 1916 Report on the Social Studies in Secondary Education (Committee on Social Studies of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education of the National Education Association 1916). While the Report is important for many reasons, not the least of which is its formal adoption of the term “social studies,” what is most noteworthy here is its call for an eighth-grade community civics course that bears a striking similarity to Project Citizen, both in terms of its aims and its methods.

Because the Report stands as a crucial antecedent for Project Citizen, it is worthwhile to look closely at its goals and structure. In the view of the National Education Association (NEA), the aim of community civics education was, broadly speaking, to help a child to know his community. More specifically, this aim was analyzed as follows (Committee on Social Studies of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education of the National Education Association 1916, 21-22):

To accomplish its part in training for citizenship, community civics should aim primarily to lead the pupil (1) to see the importance and significance of the elements of community welfare in their relations to himself and to the communities of which he is a member; (2) to know the social agencies, governmental and voluntary, that exist to secure these elements of community welfare; (3) to recognize his civic obligations, present and future, and to respond to them by appropriate action.

The emphasis on “elements of community welfare” was the linchpin of the program. Rather than focus on the machinery of government, stu-
dents were to look at their own community and consider typical areas of social concern during the Progressive era, including health, protection of life and property, recreation, education, civic beauty, wealth, communication, transportation, migration, charities, and correction. Three steps were recognized in teaching an element of community welfare (Committee on Social Studies of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education of the National Education Association 1916, 23):

1. **Approach to the topic.** In beginning the study of an element of welfare the teacher should lead the pupils to realize its importance to themselves, their neighborhood, and to the community, and to see the dependance of the individual upon social agencies. Much depends upon the method of approach. The planning of an approach appropriate to a given topic and applicable to a given class calls for ingenuity and resourcefulness. In this bulletin approaches to various topics are suggested by way of illustration, but the teacher should try to find another approach whenever he thinks the one suggested is not the best one for the class.

2. **Investigation of Agencies.** The knowledge of the class should now be extended by a concrete and more or less detailed investigation of agencies such as those suggested in the bulletin. These investigations should consist of first-hand observation and study of local conditions. The agencies suggested under each topic are so many that no attempt should be made to have the class as a whole study them all intensively. Such an attempt would result in superficiality, kill interest, and defeat the purpose of the course.

3. **Recognition of responsibility.** A lesson in community civics is not complete unless it leaves the pupil with a sense of his personal responsibility and results in direct action. To attain these ends is perhaps the most difficult and delicate task of the teacher. It is discussed here as the third step in teaching an element of welfare; in practice, however, it is a process coincident with the first two steps and resulting from them. If the work suggested in the foregoing paragraphs on "Approach" and "Investigation of Agencies" has been well done, the pupil's sense of responsibility, his desire to act, and his knowledge of how to act will thereby have been developed. Indeed, the extent to which they have been developed is in a measure a test of the effectiveness of the approach and the study of agencies.

These aims and steps should be kept in mind as we describe *Project Citizen* later. As will be made clear, while the areas of social concern and the terminology—not to mention the gendered language of the 1916 *Report*—have changed, the commitment to transmitting the skills and dispositions of democratic citizenship to early adolescent children through the examination of specific social problems has not.

Since the *Report*, a significant and influential group of social studies educators, including Maurice Hunt, Lawrence E. Metcalf, Donald W. Oliver, James P. Shaver, Fred M. Newman, Shirley H. Engle, Anna S. Ochoa, Byron G. Massialas, and Ronald W. Evans, to name only a few, have consistently pressed for application of the issue-centered approach (Hunt and
Metcalf 1955; Oliver and Shaver 1966; Newman and Oliver 1970; Shaver and Larkin 1972; Engle and Ochoa 1988). Moreover, advocates are now represented by the Issue-Centered Education Special Interest Group of the National Council for the Social Studies. Yet despite the tireless efforts of such leaders, the history of issue-centered civic education since 1916 has largely been the story of its non-implementation. The same kind of frustration expressed over three decades ago by Oliver and Shaver in *Teaching Public Issues in the High Schools*, an influential attempt to refit issue-centered education to meet the considerable demands of the 1960s, can readily be found today in the writings of other contemporary advocates (Oliver & Shaver 1966, 3):

[The rather static condition of the social studies for the last fifty years or so (since the report of the 1916 Commission on the Social Studies) indicates that if educators have been actively involved in this selection process it has not been deemed necessary, at least among those who control the curriculum, to make any significant changes. As with any generalization, there are of course exceptions to such a statement. . . . But in the main, whether because of reliance upon conservative, commercially produced textbooks, reluctance to depart from past practice, or firm convictions about the validity of the traditional social studies patterns, the status quo of content-based education has prevailed.]

This unusual state of affairs, in which repeated and emphatic calls for the implementation of issue-centered civic education have, for the most part, been ignored in the schools, suggests that there are good arguments both for and against the approach. In order to better understand these arguments and how *Project Citizen* balances these competing concerns, we now consider the strengths and limitations of the program.

**The Strengths and Limitations of Issue-Centered Education**

In the words of Hazel Whitman Hertzberg (1981, 171-172), “nothing is clearer in the history of social studies reform than the central role assigned to the social studies in the education of citizens. This has been both a mainstay and a source of many of our problems. . . . The definition of the appropriate education of citizens has been one of the most vexing questions in social studies history.” This is the terrain over which debates about the merits of issue-centered civic education take place.

The standard arguments in favor of the issue-centered approach should not be surprising in view of the foregoing discussion. More than anything else, proponents rest on the arguments, reviewed above, about the benefits of learning through reflective thinking that have been in common currency since the Progressive era. But in a democracy, the value of issue-centered civic education takes on new meaning. Perhaps nothing is more central
to the continuity of a democracy than that its principles and practices be transmitted from one generation to the next, and the issue-centered approach is well-suited to this objective. This method directly ties students to problems present in their communities in a direct and immediate way that is relevant and intriguing to their minds, engaging them as nascent citizens and not merely as passive recipients of received knowledge.

Another prong to the arguments supporting the issue-centered approach relates to the increasingly diverse and pluralistic composition of the American nation. Because this approach to civic education rests on the subjective views of students, when put into practice in the classroom it creates a safe space for divergent perspectives, thereby exposing students to views that differ from their own (Shaver 1968, 97-120; Pang & Park 1992, 108-112). And as America enters the twenty-first century, with so many serious problems directly confronting our increasingly diverse youth, more of an issue-centered approach well may be inevitable (Massialas 1989, 173).

Most importantly, issue-centered civic education teaches the invaluable democratic practice of decision making. As Shirley H. Engle (1968, 343) observed, “the mark of the good citizen is the quality of decisions which he reaches on public and private matters of social concern,” and the best way to train good citizens is by an approach to civic education that is “reflective, speculative, thought provoking, and oriented to the process of reaching conclusions.”

Nevertheless, several criticisms have been made of issue-centered civic education, falling roughly into three areas. The first cluster centers on the essential negativity of focusing on social problems. One aspect of this is the potential danger that by directing students to social problems, too much emphasis is placed upon the negative aspects of society and not enough on the positive traditions and institutions that also characterize society (Oliver 1968, 40). Another element can be found in the concerns of some teachers, parents, and community groups that the emphasis on potentially controversial problems will lead to a thoughtless “controversy-is-good-perse,” and generates an unnecessarily adversarial climate in the classroom (Shaver 1992, 83, 95).

Another type of critique comes from proponents of a content-based civic education. Because an issue-centered approach requires a significant allocation of scarce classroom resources and extra effort on the part of teachers, it effectively reduces the time that can be spent on content coverage. This has made the issue-centered approach unattractive to teachers who are committed to exposing students to a broad, well-structured content curriculum. While most teachers are willing to trade breadth of knowledge for a greater depth of understanding, there is the concern that by adopting an
issue-centered approach, content will be sacrificed to the extent that stu-
dents will lack the knowledge base that is a prerequisite for an informed
examination of policy problems.

Indeed, the view of some proponents (though, as indicated above, Dewey
was not in this camp), is that the issue-centered approach should replace
content-based teaching altogether. A particularly scathing critique of this
extreme approach was recently articulated by E. D. Hirsch (1996), who
believes that eschewing content for the sake of stressing specific problems
will hurt under-privileged students. Hirsch asserts that dropping content
from the curriculum will deprive children from disadvantaged backgrounds
of the basic knowledge and skills that more advantaged children receive in
their homes, even though it is no longer provided in the schools (Hirsch
1996, 6-7, 113-114).

Finally, doubts have been raised about the methodology of issue-cen-
tered education. Many educators believe that the structure provided by the
framework of content-based curriculum is a crucial element in teaching.
Here, the concern is that the issue-centered approach, with its interdisci-
niplinary subject matter and emphasis on process over content, lacks the con-
ceptual structure needed to facilitate attainment of content standards of
achievement. From this weakness, critics see the ultimate source of many
of the difficulties that have been documented in attempts to implement the
issue-centered approach (Patrick 1998, 10).

These criticism are warranted, but they should not cause us to com-
pletely dismiss or ignore issue-centered civic education. Although a strict-
ly issue-centered civic education curriculum denies students the structure
of discipline-based learning and will, in all likelihood, never receive broad-
based support in the schools, the approach, properly conceived and utilized
in the schools, has a great deal to offer. The challenge is how to take advan-
tage of the benefits of issue-centered civic education without sacrificing
student achievement of content standards in the teaching and learning of
civics and government. Project Citizen is the kind of issue-based civic edu-
cation program that meets this challenge for early adolescents.

An Exemplary Issue-Centered Civic Education Program

Project Citizen is an issue-centered civic education program that fos-
ters the democratic dispositions and skills that enable effective and respon-
sible participation in government and civic society. The program asks students
to become actively involved with governmental and civil society organiza-
tions to acquire the social capital necessary for responsible democratic cit-
izenship. The program rests on several theoretical underpinnings. First, that
democracy requires self-government and therefore active and informed cit-
izen participation. Second, that an essential component of citizen participation is the disposition and ability to monitor and influence public policy decisions. Third, that students learn this component best by actually engaging in the public policy process, while "doing citizenship." Fourth, that the middle school years are an especially vital time to engage students in the democratic process and to foster democratic citizenship. And, fifth, that civic education is at its best when young people study problems and issues that are important parts of their lives, in their schools or communities.

The purpose of Project Citizen, then, is to motivate and enable early adolescents to enjoy the rights and accept the responsibilities of democratic citizenship. The instructional materials are designed to foster the civic development of young people in the following ways (Center for Civic Education 1998a). Students are expected to:

1) learn how to monitor and influence public policy in their communities;
2) learn the public policy making processes;
3) develop concrete skills and the foundation needed to become responsible participating citizens;
4) develop effective, creative communication skills;
5) develop more positive self-concepts and confidence in exercising the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

Overall, Project Citizen gives to 10-to-15-year-olds the opportunity to participate in government and civil society while practicing critical thinking, dialogue and debate, negotiation, tolerance, decision-making, and civic action (Tolo 1998, 2-17).

Although designed for use by middle school students in social studies classrooms, the program has also been used at the upper elementary and high school levels in language arts, science, and interdisciplinary courses with students of all ability levels. Given 50 minute class periods, the program is approximately a six to eight week course of study. The teacher's role is primarily that of coach or facilitator, who guides students to new sources of information, helps them to arrange contacts, and provides them with other helpful suggestions during their inquiry. The teacher's guide succinctly explains each step of the inquiry process, provides many additional resources (e.g., suggested teaching strategies, guidelines for conducting a simulated hearing), and equips teachers with evaluation rubrics for both the students' written and oral performance. The program also provides certificates of achievement to be presented to students upon completion of the program. The student edition includes several innovative assignments to assist participants during each step of the program, specific criteria for completion of each assignment, a glossary of terms, and appendices to assist students in locating the resources needed for in-depth study of public policy issues.
For many students, the first step of *Project Citizen*, selecting the problem to study, is the most difficult (Tolo 1998, xvii). Students are often so successful at brainstorming problems in their schools (e.g., trash in the school courtyard, attendance, grading scales, violence) and in their communities (e.g., “brown fields,” lack of sidewalks, water pollution, or the discriminatory practices of local businesses) that they have a hard time selecting one problem to study. The program then asks students to investigate the worth of potential problems by interviewing community members and reviewing media resources for information about the problem (Center for Civic Education 1998b, 11-15). Once the class is confident that it has obtained enough information about the problems under consideration to make an informed decision, the students vote on which problem to study. Although not a formal part of the curriculum, many teachers ask students to develop criteria to judge the worth of potential problems (e.g., importance of the problem, feasibility of study).

After selecting an important issue, the class is divided into research teams to gather information from multiple sources (e.g., libraries, newspapers, community members, community organizations, legislative offices, administrative agencies, and electronic sources). The class is again divided into cooperative teams for an in-depth focus on one of the stages of inquiry and engagement in the public policy making process (Center for Civic Education 1998b, 24-25):

1) *Explaining the problem.* This group is responsible for explaining the problem the class has chosen to study. The group also should explain why the problem is important and why that level of government or government agency should deal with it;

2) *Evaluating alternative policies to deal with the problem.* This group is responsible for explaining present and/or alternative policies designed to solve the problem;

3) *Developing a public policy that the class will support.* This group is responsible for developing and justifying a specific public policy that the majority of class agrees to support;

4) *Developing an action plan to get government to accept the class policy.* This group is responsible for developing an action plan showing how citizens can influence their government to adopt the policy the class supports.

The efforts of each cooperative team are displayed in a four-part (one for each group) portfolio exhibit and documentation binder. The culminating activity for the program is a simulated legislative hearing where students demonstrate their knowledge by role playing expert witnesses testifying before community members who represent members of a state legislature. During the hearing, each of the four portfolio groups prepares and presents a statement on its section of the portfolio. After each opening statement, the
panel of community members asks the students questions and judges the quality of each team’s work according to specific rubrics provided to each judge.

The format of the simulated hearing offers students an opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of how public policy is formulated while providing teachers with an excellent means of assessing student performance. Knowing that they are studying a school or community problem that they selected and are part of a team that will make a public demonstration of their work, many students are more motivated to excel than they would be under other circumstances. In addition, the hearings are an opportunity for students to showcase their thorough understanding of a local public policy issue before parents and interested members of the community. Often, it is the community members involved in the simulated hearings that assist in expanding the program by attracting other teachers, further funding, and political support.

In the United States and in several other countries throughout the world, Project Citizen teachers and students are encouraged to participate in a local, regional, state, or national competition. Although not a requirement for participation in the program, the competitions serve as a way to motivate student learning, reward student achievement, and highlight the program to members of the community and potential funding agencies (Tolo 1998, xvii). Although not all states or countries have the resources to fund state or national competitions, most are working toward that goal or have developed innovative ways to reduce the costs associated with a competition (e.g., conduct a competition among the portfolios without the expense of bringing students). In addition to funding concerns, many teachers choose not to participate because they dislike academic competitions generally, or because they feel pressured to quickly move on to other topics and concerns (Tolo 1998, xviii). For many states and countries, one response to the aversion of competitions is to conduct a regional, state, or national “showcase” of student portfolios through simulated hearings without scoring the results. Without competing, a showcase retains many of the benefits of the competition (e.g., motivating students to excel, exposure for the program) and has been successfully implemented in several locations throughout the world.

Project Citizen is particularly well-suited to effectively complement a well-structured content-based civic education curriculum. Schools that use Project Citizen as one important component of their civic education program, contextualized by well-structured, disciplined based civic education courses, do not give up the positive benefits that go along with well-structured content. Project Citizen becomes a vehicle for students to put ideas
they have learned in the classroom into practice in the real world. Thus, *Project Citizen* is an outstanding example of an issue-centered approach that fits within the larger framework of civic education for democracy.

In addition, *Project Citizen* effectively responds to many of the criticisms that educators and others have directed against issue-centered education. Instead of injecting problems into the classroom merely for the sake of controversy, the program encourages students to examine important questions of policy that are relevant to them and their communities. The format of *Project Citizen* helps to ensure that when difficult questions are raised, as they so often are in civic and political life, the students think through the issues while remaining respectful of differences of opinion and other points of view. Moreover, the issues that are raised during a typical project are multifaceted and require that students carefully analyze the arguments and evidence on all sides of a given question.

**An Assessment of *We the People... Project Citizen***

In September of 1997, a research team led by Professor Kenneth Tolo at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs of the University of Texas at Austin conducted a comprehensive eight-month study of *Project Citizen* as it is practiced in the United States of America. Although the assessment focused on a number of issues relating to the administration of *Project Citizen* (e.g. teacher training, competitions, financial and political support), we will briefly focus and summarize two categories of key findings: 1) classroom use; and, 2) benefits to students. The other findings will be summarized as we discuss *Project Citizen* in the United States during the next section of this chapter.

The researchers at the University of Texas found that teachers using *Project Citizen* in the United States face seven key challenges (Tolo 1998, xvii):

1) how much time to dedicate to *Project Citizen*;
2) how to fit the program into state and local curricula and standards;
3) how to use *Project Citizen* materials;
4) how to implement the program in the classroom;
5) how to determine what financial support and resources are needed to complete *Project Citizen*;
6) how to involve parents in the program; and,
7) how to choose the *Project Citizen* portfolio topic.

Many of the challenges are related to the relative brief period of time the program has been in existence. Since the report was published in 1998, several of the concerns have been addressed by national and state administrators as well as classroom teachers. For example, many states, in cooperation with the Center for Civic Education, have developed correlations with state
standards or local curricula to demonstrate the program's alignment with state or local mandates. Additionally, as teachers gain experience with the program, they are better able to determine how to implement the program in their classroom and schools (e.g., how much time to spend on various aspects of the program, how to choose a portfolio topic, or how to involve parents).

Also of great interest to those concerned with issue-centered civic education generally, and Project Citizen specifically, are those findings that suggest a positive relationship between students involved in Project Citizen and the acquisition or strengthening of beliefs about democratic dispositions and skills. The study reported that (Tolo 1998, xviii):

1) students using Project Citizen believe they can make a difference in their communities;
2) students do make a difference in their communities through Project Citizen;
3) students and teachers believe Project Citizen helps students develop a greater understanding of public policy;
4) students and teachers believe Project Citizen helps students understand how their government works and develops student commitment to active citizenship and governance;
5) students and teachers believe Project Citizen involves students in their communities and helps students learn about specific community problems;
6) students and teachers believe Project Citizen encourages students to work in groups;
7) students and teachers believe Project Citizen teaches students important communication skills;
8) students and teachers believe Project Citizen teaches students important research skills; and
9) students enjoy Project Citizen.

The study and results are an important first step in assessing the value of Project Citizen as a vehicle for civic education and its implementation in the United States. However, merely because students and teachers believe that Project Citizen produces positive results does not make it so. Further study is needed to support or temper the beliefs that both students and teachers share about the positive benefits of the Project Citizen program. Subsequent research could identify, with more precision, the knowledge, skills, and dispositions of democratic citizenship the Project Citizen aims to develop to determine the degree, if any, the program positively impacts these important areas of democratic citizenship in the United States or abroad.

**Project Citizen in the United States and Abroad**

Because of its focus on community problems and student interaction with state and local governments rather than specific content, Project Cit-
izan is the kind of civic education program that can be shared with other democratic nations throughout the world with few adaptations or in many cases nearly direct translations. Through the efforts of Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program, a consortium of organizations, individuals, and governments interested in promoting democratic citizenship. Project Citizen is currently being used in 15 countries around the world including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Hungary, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, Israel, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Slovakia (Center for Civic Education 1999a, 9). Several other countries have expressed interest in the program and are planning its implementation.

The Civitas Exchange Program, funded by the United States Department of Education, administered by the Center for Civic Education, and further supported by the United States Information Agency, is the international network through which participants exchange information, materials, and programs on civic education. Although the Exchange Program promotes a variety of civic education endeavors, Project Citizen's use in both emerging and established democracies as a means of developing competent democratic citizens is surely one of the most important. Tens of thousands of students in emerging and established democracies around the world are participating in the program. Using three discrete examples of Project Citizen in practice, the nations of Latvia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the state of Indiana, we will examine the program in practice in both emerging and established democracies.

During the 1998-99 school year, the first year of the Project Citizen program in Latvia, more than 700 students from 14 schools participated in the program. Working with its Civitas Exchange partner organization in the United States, the Social Studies Development Center of Indiana University, the Democracy Advancement Center administers the program throughout Latvia. Fifteen thousand copies of Project Citizen materials were translated and distributed into Latvian schools in grades 4-10 during the 1998-99 school year. Eager for new methods of instruction to match a revamped civic education curriculum, teachers were intrigued by the challenges of a new project in citizenship education. Additionally, the program benefitted from a built-in "project week" that required all students to engage in a project for an entire week during the spring semester. Many of the participants used this built-in week to complete Project Citizen activities while others chose to make Project Citizen an after-school club.

The Democracy Advancement Center, directed by Valts Sarma, implemented Project Citizen with the assistance of a variety of organizations in Latvia. The Latvian Ministry of Education and Science, the University of
Latvia, Daugavpils Pedagogical University, local school boards, and non-governmental organizations such as the Jurmala Town Museum all helped to facilitate and support the program in Latvia. Although unable to provide direct funding for the program, these organizations helped to promote and organize Project Citizen activities. With the help of this network, the Democracy Advancement Center was able to conduct ten one-day teacher training seminars in various regions of Latvia during the 1998-99 school year.

Like Project Citizen programs in other parts of the world, the future expansion of the program in Latvia depends on the ability of program administrators to gain further financial and political support. To this end, Project Citizen administrators are planning to highlight the positive benefits of the program in Latvia through a showcase demonstration during the 1999-2000 school year. Parents, members of the community, interested teachers, government officials, and representatives from non-governmental organizations will be invited to this event in the hopes of attracting further funding and support. Given the limited resources of this program and its brief existence, the success of the Project Citizen program in Latvia is remarkable.

Another example of Project Citizen's use and acceptance throughout the world can be found in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. First implemented in 1996, Project Citizen has become a major civic education initiative of the Federation. As in Latvia and several other countries throughout the world, the program is funded and supported by the Civitas Exchange Program. CIVITAS®Bosnia and Herzegovina, a non-governmental organization that works toward improving education for democracy directed by Reha Ozidic, administers the program in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Center for Civic Education, the Arizona Bar Foundation, and Partners in Education of Nevada participate with CIVITAS®Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Exchange Program. As in Latvia, the success of the program in a relatively brief period of time is remarkable.

In May of 1999, the Federation held its Third Annual We the People... Project Citizen National Showcase. More than 5,600 students from the Federation and the Republika Srpska presented their portfolios at the showcase that was attended by more than 550 educators, students, government officials, and media representatives (Center for Civic Education 1999 [b]). The Project Citizen Showcase annually brings together students of once-warring factions of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs for a common purpose—to share their issues of public policy, potential solutions, and action plans with the larger community.

As in Latvia, CIVITAS®Bosnia and Herzegovina has established a network of organizations that assist in implementing the program. The United States Information Service of Sarajevo, the Ministries of Education in
the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, and other non-governmental organizations provide administrative and organizational support. In addition, CiVITAS® Bosnia Herzegovina has established a network of 20 regional coordinators to assist in the administration of the program.

Like many other educational initiatives, successful implementation of the Project Citizen program depends upon adequately informing teachers of the program's existence and providing teachers with professional development opportunities to assist in its implementation. Since 1996, Federation Project Citizen Teacher Institutes have involved hundreds of teachers and thousands of students in one to four day seminars. The high number of Federation teachers who implement the program after these seminars suggests that they embrace the Project Citizen program as an excellent means to civic education for democracy.

If the recent past is any indicator of the future, the prospects for expanding the Project Citizen program in Bosnia-Herzegovina are great. Now in place are a cadre of committed teachers, administrators, community members, and perhaps most importantly, citizens, who support the program and will work toward its continuation. Of course, program administrators realize the need to seek and gain additional sources of funding and support for the program. The program is currently dependent on funding from outside the Federation thereby placing it at risk should these funding sources diminish or disappear. In the short term, however, they hope to raise awareness of the program and its benefits by conducting conferences with headmasters (principals) and other educational officials.

A final example of Project Citizen's implementation can be found in the country of its origin, the United States of America. In the United States, Project Citizen is administered nationally by the Center for Civic Education and directed by Michael Fischer. The program is organized similarly to another successful civic education program sponsored by the Center for Civic Education, We the People . . . the Citizen and the Constitution (We the People . . .) program. As with the We the People . . . program, Project Citizen is administered through a network of 50 state coordinators who promote the program in their states. Limited amounts of free textbooks and materials are made available to every state coordinator. Each state is also supplied with a small budget to help pay for professional development, marketing, regional and state competitions, and other expenses directly related to the program. However, all state coordinators are encouraged to seek additional sources of funding within their own states.

Even though the Project Citizen program in the United States shares several of the same concerns as does its counterparts around the globe such
as funding, teacher recruitment, professional development, and building political support, more than 44,000 students participated in Project Citizen simulated congressional hearings. Thousands of additional students used the materials without participating in a formal hearing (i.e., many teachers conduct informal hearings in their own classrooms). The numbers of students and teachers participating in the program has risen every year since the program began.

Implementation of the program, however, varies widely from state to state ranging from virtually no participation to thousands of participating students. Generally, those states that have attracted additional funding for the program have been most successful in its expansion. Many states find themselves in a dilemma: to attract more funding they need a larger program with more exposure, but to have a larger program with more exposure they need more funding. We will use the Project Citizen in the State of Indiana as one example of its implementation in the United States.

The Project Citizen program is jointly administered by the Indiana Program for Law-Related Education of Indiana University's Social Studies Development Center and the James F. Ackerman Center for Democratic Citizenship of Purdue University. During the 1998-99 school year Indiana's Project Citizen program increased dramatically, going from five portfolios at a single state competition in 1997-98 to 21 portfolios at two regional competitions in 1998-99. Indiana's program brings together the state's two largest universities, Indiana University and Purdue University, as well as private organizations such as the Indiana State Bar Association and the Indiana Bar Foundation in a cooperative effort to promote civic education. Using the considerable resources of a network or organizations has aided all phases of program expansion including teacher recruitment, program awareness, professional development, and funding.

During the 1998-99 school year the program was also aided by the formation of an advisory committee of influential community leaders and a grant from the USA Group Foundation. During the fall of 1998, an advisory group met for the first time to discuss the future of the program in Indiana. Several ideas that were generated during the meeting came to fruition the following spring. For example, ideas about funding, professional development institutes, regional competitions, and moving the state competition to the state capital all became realities during the spring semester. In addition, the USA Group Foundation provided administrators in Indiana and Arizona with funding for professional development institutes during the summer of 1999. Administrators in Indiana hope to build on the recent success of the program next year by attracting even more teachers and funding agencies to the program. Like the Project Citizen program in other states and
countries, the future expansion of the program will depend upon gaining additional resources and support from both public and private institutions.

Conclusion

Although proponents of both issue-centered and content-based civic education will continue to disagree about the design and structure of the civic education curriculum, all can agree on the importance of civic education, particularly among early adolescents. In the United States and abroad, Project Citizen appears to be the kind of issue-centered civic education program that could satisfy proponents of both views. If the question of curricular organization is not reduced to an either/or choice, then it is possible to appropriately place important issues or an entire issue-centered program into an existing well-structured civic education curriculum. This approach minimizes many of the critiques of issue-centered education, preserves the benefits of well-organized content-based courses, and helps students to relate the sometimes abstract political, historical, legal and economic concepts to real-world issues that have direct implications for students’ lives.

How teachers, schools, and countries educate students toward democracy is perhaps now more important than it was even a decade ago. As historian Thomas Pangle reminds us in The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Age (1992), it may be more difficult to support principles of democracy as better than some alternative (i.e., communism) when the alternative is in retreat throughout the world. Ironically, democracy may be more fragile in the context of communism’s retreat than it ever was during its height. Fortunately, the peoples of emerging democracies are now able to join the process of more precisely defining democracy and the kind of civic education that would support their vision. While obvious differences exist among democratic nations the world over, a commitment to human freedom and our own humanity make possible the sharing of methods and materials that support civic education for democracy.

Notes

1. For very similar, more recent expressions of these views about the failure of issue-centered civic education to gain widespread acceptance, see Evans, "A Dream Unrealized: A Brief Look at the History of Issue-Centered Approaches," Social Studies 80 (September October 1989): 178-84; and Richard E. Gross, "Reasons for the Limited Acceptance of the Problems Approach," Social Studies 80 (September-October 1989): 185-86.

2. See John J. Patrick’s discussion of weaknesses of issue-based education in Chapter 2 of this volume.

3. North Carolina, for example, has correlated Project Citizen with the North Carolina Standard Course of Study.
4. Many states have been successful at gaining funding for Project Citizen. Arizona and California, for example, both receive funding from their state legislatures.
7. Few states, however, have more than ten classes using the program each year.
8. An additional 21 portfolios were produced in Indiana but not entered in the competition.
9. Telephone interview by Thomas S. Vontz with Dr. Lynn Nelson, Director, James F. Ackerman Center for Democratic Citizenship at Purdue University, June 2, 1999.
10. The USA Group, a non-profit organization based in Indiana, insures lenders against default on federal education loans, supports other student loan guarantors, services student loan accounts for lenders, and operates one of the nation’s largest student loan secondary markets. The USA Group also has large offices in Arizona.

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GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CROSS-CULTURAL CURRICULUM PROJECTS IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION REFORM

By Gregory E. Hamot

The fall of Soviet communism gave birth to a new constellation of developing democracies in Eastern and Central Europe. Their transition from Sovietization to democratization has been problematic, and long-term solutions to these problems are still being formulated and tested. Among the more important components to these solutions is finding a way to socialize future citizens for informed participation in a democratic society.

This socialization must take place largely through the agency of the public schools. Faith in the power of the people presupposes the enlightenment of the people, and a free democratic society cannot thrive without public schools that teach the knowledge, skills, and dispositions necessary for effective democratic participation.

Curriculum reform aimed at reaching such goals will naturally take an evolutionary path in Eastern and Central Europe, but the sudden paradigmatic shift from communism to democracy begs an accelerated process. Given this situation, “educators of Central and Eastern Europe have looked to the West, especially to the United States of America, for inspiration, material aid, and, above all else, ideas for civic education in support of constitutional democracy” (Patrick 1996, 3).

A Need for Guiding Principles

In facing the challenge of formulating and implementing a tradition of democratic citizenship education, Eastern and Central European educators have engaged in many projects based in the United States and directed at educational reform. These cross-cultural projects offer unique opportunities for American institutions to work with post-communist counterparts as...
they reform their citizenship education curricula to reflect a democratic orientation. These opportunities range from one-time consultancies to in-depth, continuing partnerships. An example of a short-term commitment is the United States Information Agency’s Academic Specialist Program that sends U.S. educators to post-communist countries for two-week workshops in areas that include citizenship education. On a more long-term basis, projects such as Civitas link U.S. teachers and teacher educators with partners in Central and Eastern Europe through exchange programs aimed at fostering citizenship education reform and curriculum development.¹

Nonetheless, issues arise in such projects that have no generalizable resolutions. As the partnerships between the United States and post-communist countries test the universality of democratic philosophical preferences and pedagogical traditions, questions embedded in these issues may not yield pat answers that apply across all cases of curriculum reform. For instance, does the American tradition of democratic philosophy and beliefs lend itself to the individual contexts and needs of the newly developing democracies of Eastern and Central Europe? Additionally, to what degree can and should American practices in citizenship education influence the newly reformed curricula of post-communist democracies?

This chapter draws upon experiences gained from three long-term citizenship education projects with countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The purpose is to provide comparable future projects with a set of guiding principles for democratic citizenship curricular reform that address the previous and similar questions.

The projects discussed here were joint efforts between The University of Iowa College of Education and leading citizenship education reform efforts in the Czech Republic, Armenia, and Bulgaria. Drs. Peter Hlebowitz and Gregory Hamot, both from The University of Iowa, acted as U.S. project co-directors for these projects. The Czech project co-director was Dr. Radmila Dostálová, Assistant Director of the Institute for Educational Research and Development at Charles University. The Armenian project co-director was Dr. Manouk Mkrtchian, Division Head at the Ministry of Education’s Center for Education Reform. Dr. Rumen Valchev of the Open Education Centre in Sofia served as Bulgarian project co-director.

The United States Information Agency (USIA) sponsored the Czech project through the Congressionally mandated Support for Eastern European Democracy Fund. Financial subsidy for the Armenian project came from USIA via the Freedom Support Act. Funding for the Bulgarian project came from Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program, which is conducted with funds from the U.S. Department of Education in cooperation with USIA. These projects involved a residency at The Uni-
iversity of Iowa College of Education for a team of curriculum writers from each country. During their residency, their charge was to meet their individual project goals. All of these teams sought the overarching goal of curricular reform in citizenship education. However, each of the projects had slightly different approaches to accomplishing this goal and various objectives subsumed by it.

**The Project Analysis Process**

The guiding principles for conducting cross-cultural citizenship education reform with developing democracies stem from experiences in such projects and an organized approach to analyzing these projects within a useful theoretical framework. The framework used to analyze these projects was adapted from cross-cultural psychology. Project documents, interviews with project participants, personal notes and journals of the U.S. project directors, and the curricula themselves acted as points of reference in formulating the guiding principles.

**Theoretical Framework.** In developing a set of guiding principles, a theoretical framework known as the analysis of cultural ecology was adapted from cross-cultural psychology (Berry 1996). Developed by Berry, Poortinga, Segall, and Dasen (1992), this framework offers four useful categories for analyzing projects in cross-cultural curricular reform.

These categories include the developing democracy's new socio-political context, which is defined as the conception of democracy that exists in the post-communist partner country. This context may differ significantly from one project to another. The program developed for the curriculum writers while they were in the United States constitutes the second category, new experiences with another culture. The third category, cultural adaptation, involves the theoretical and practical alternatives offered by the project for consideration in the reformed curriculum and the decision making process that leads to the inclusion of these alternatives. Cultural adaptation occurs when the post-communist curriculum writers filter their new project experiences through their new socio-political contexts. The fourth category, observable characteristic of each of these projects, was the first draft of the reformed curricula.

**Points of Reference.** These three cross-cultural projects offered myriad possibilities for points of reference. These references included project documents, interviews with project participants, personal notes and journals of the American directors, and the curricula developed by the participants.

Project documents included each project’s proposal for funding, correspondence received from project participants and their institutions, and project schedules. Interviews with post-communist project participants took
place at timely intervals throughout their cross-cultural experiences at The University of Iowa. Notes and journals kept by the American project directors and staff acted as guides to lessons learned from preceding projects and acted as references for handling similar situations encountered in ensuing projects. The curricula themselves acted as points of reference for comparative analysis. This analysis highlighted the effects of the guiding principles across the projects.

A constant comparison of the three projects on the four categories adapted from the analysis of cultural ecology led to the findings of this inquiry. First, however, an in-depth description of each project is necessary to give the findings, and the guiding principles that follow, a contextual basis.

The Three Projects

The projects with the Czech Republic, Armenia, and Bulgaria all shared the overarching goal of curricular reform for democratic citizenship education. A brief description of each project’s goals and format lays the foundation for the findings and overall guiding principles derived from these projects.

Citizenship Education for the Czech Republic. The “Citizenship Education for the Czech Republic” (CECR) project was a collaborative partnership between The University of Iowa College of Education and the Charles University Institute for Educational Research and Development in the Czech Republic. Beginning in 1989, civic education reform in the Czech Republic sought to eliminate Marxist-Leninist perspectives in the historical, philosophical, and social science content of the curriculum; to reintroduce the study of religion into the curriculum; to renew the study of Czech history, culture, heritage, and geography; and to move from expository to active teaching and learning in the classroom (Hamon 1997). This project sought to pursue this ideal for civic education reform through three goals.

First, CECR targeted the redesign of citizenship education practice at the secondary school level. The existing social studies curriculum, put in place after the fall of communism in 1989, set the content for this course. The Institute for Educational Research and Development, in consultation with Ministry of Education officials and Charles University faculty, decided that the third form of secondary schools (17- and 18-year-old students) was the most appropriate level for implementation of a new citizenship education curriculum. To achieve this goal, the United States Czech project directors organized two workshops for a team of five Czech teachers and scholars chosen by the Czech project co-director as the curriculum writing team. The first workshop, held in Prague, centered on curriculum design and pedagogical methods crucial to citizenship education in the Czech
Republic. During the second workshop, the Czech curriculum team took up residence at The University of Iowa College of Education for three months. This workshop resulted in the first draft of the reformed citizenship education curriculum for Czech secondary schools. This draft included 21 instructional units containing 63 lessons, all of which were based on the existing content areas normally taught in the third form. These lessons took the format of stated objectives and suggested procedures for opening, developing, and closing the lessons.

The second goal of the project focused on an evaluation of the desired outcomes (knowledge, skills, and dispositions) commonly associated with life in a democracy and conceived by the Czech curriculum writers in consultation with American experts in citizenship education during their residence in Iowa. After a workshop with American and Dutch research and evaluation experts in Prague, Czech researchers gathered empirical evidence on this curriculum reform effort during a field test of the draft curriculum conducted in a nationally representative sample of Czech schools. These data led to revisions of the entire curriculum for final publication and use in Czech secondary schools.

The project’s third goal involved the advocacy and dissemination of the reformed curriculum through the professional development of Czech secondary teachers. This goal was achieved through a major international workshop conducted in conjunction with the annual Summer School on Education for Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Citizenship at University Palackého, Olomouc, Moravia, the Czech Republic. During this conference, eleven American project participants were involved in both presenting and attending workshops based on the new curriculum.

**Education for Democratic Citizenship in Armenia.** The “Education for Democratic Citizenship in Armenia” (EDCA) project was a collaborative effort between The University of Iowa College of Education and the Armenian Ministry of Education. With the fall of communism, the Armenian Ministry of Education eliminated the Soviet-imposed civic education course titled “Man and Society.” This course, heavily laced with Marxist-Leninist ideology, no longer served a purpose in the Armenian transition to democracy.

Unlike the Czechs, however, Armenians did not take immediate steps to replace this course with one dedicated to education for effective democratic citizenship; nor did they reintroduce curricula more suited to democratic pedagogical and philosophical principles. Seventy years of communism and a long history of subjugation by foreign interests left the Armenians with no previous experience on which to build or to reintroduce curriculum for a free and open society. As a result, consultations with Ministry of Edu-
cation officials, university and pedagogical institute rectors, and Armenian teachers led to the purpose of this project: filling the need for a completely new course in citizenship education. Further discussions led to the project goal of developing a framework and accompanying instructional materials for an original citizenship education course in Armenia. This course targeted the seventh grade—the penultimate level of compulsory schooling in Armenia. The Armenian and American project directors designed a three-phase project aimed at developing the first citizenship education curriculum for the newly independent Armenia.

During Phase I, an American project director visited Armenia to work with the Ministry of Education on three objectives: (a) conducting a workshop on citizenship education curriculum development, (b) choosing a six-member Armenian curriculum writing team, and (c) preparing the specifications for the materials to be developed. This visit resulted in an agreement for the new course to contain a curriculum framework as a content guide for teachers who would teach this new course and to include sample lessons for implementing this framework. Phase I concluded when the Armenian curriculum writing team attended a two-week workshop at The University of Iowa.

Immediately prior to this workshop, the Armenian team conducted interviews with key informants in Armenia in order to settle on the core knowledge needed for this new course. Upon their arrival in Iowa City, the Armenian team focused on the theory and design of a curriculum framework for citizenship education. Between Phases I and II, the Armenian team returned home to collect the necessary materials for Phase II and to conclude work on a draft of the curriculum framework.

Phase II was a three-month curriculum development workshop held at The University of Iowa. During this workshop, the Armenian team consulted with American experts in civic education and curriculum design, finalized their curriculum framework, and developed sample instructional materials that exemplified the knowledge, skills, and dispositions embedded in their framework.

The framework developed by the Armenian team took the form of content essays with accompanying educational goals for each of seven units. Each unit contained between four and six lesson plans illustrating various instructional strategies associated with democratic citizenship development. These lessons, similar to the Czech design, contained behavioral objectives followed by suggested teaching formats that included opening, developing, and closing each lesson. The Armenian team participated in a variety of field experiences carefully designed to assist them in completing their curriculum development task. These experiences took place in Iowa City and
diverse geographic and demographic regions of the United States, such as Minnesota and California, and included schools visits, attendance at professional conferences, and observations of city council meetings and school board meetings.

Phase III consisted of two stages. First, the draft curriculum framework and instructional materials underwent critical review by a team of Armenian and U.S. experts in the social and behavioral sciences, history, special education, philosophy, and pedagogy. Second, upon expert revision of the new curriculum and materials, the American and Armenian partners hosted an in-service workshop in Yerevan, Armenia for a group of Armenian secondary school teachers responsible for field testing the new curriculum. At this time, the Ministry's Center for Educational Reform is gathering and analyzing the field test data for final revision of the new curriculum. Eight schools located throughout Armenia are participating in the field test. Continued funding for publication and dissemination is a future goal of EDCA.

Citizenship Education Curriculum Development for Bulgaria. "Citizenship Education Curriculum Development for Bulgaria" (CECDB) is an ongoing project conducted collaboratively between The University of Iowa College of Education and the Open Education Centre in Sofia, Bulgaria. This project is the result of a gift presented by First Lady Hillary Clinton to the people of Bulgaria in February 1998.

With Bulgaria’s liberation from totalitarian communism in 1989, various, but uncoordinated, citizenship education projects developed throughout the country. Areas of concern for citizenship education reform centered on content related to free market economics and conflict resolution. The Open Education Centre led these reforms by establishing centers throughout the country that offered extracurricular opportunities for Bulgarian students to participate in various forms of citizenship education. These activities ranged from dramatic productions to debate tournaments. Other curricular innovations developed throughout the country, as well as some developed by the Open Education Centre, took the form of suggested activities that could be integrated into existing areas of the Bulgarian curriculum.

However, these innovations did not represent a concentrated effort to develop a new curriculum (Armenian model), or to revise an existing curricular mandate into a citizenship education course (Czech model). A preliminary meeting between the U.S. and Bulgarian project directors resulted in the overarching goal for CECDB to develop citizenship education curricula for all pre-collegiate grade levels in Bulgarian schools (i.e., primary school, secondary school, and high school). These three levels parallel generally the U.S. conception of schooling that includes elementary school, middle school or junior high school, and high school. During its spring ses-
sion. 1999, the Bulgarian Parliament voted to adopt the project's resultant courses as the new core curriculum in citizenship education for Bulgarian schools.

Similar to EDCA, this project involved a three-phase approach to curriculum reform for citizenship education. However, CECDB was unique in two critically important aspects. First, this project had a third collaborator—the Center for Citizenship Education in Warsaw, Poland. This nongovernmental organization, established as an outgrowth of projects conducted originally in the Polish Ministry of Education, has perhaps Eastern and Central Europe's longest and most prolific record in developing citizenship education curricula since the fall of communism. The purpose of engaging this center in the reform of Bulgarian citizenship education was to foster cross-national alliances between emerging democracies in the region. Ten years have passed since the fall of communism in Europe, and many projects on citizenship education reform have been successful. This collaboration between two post-communist curriculum development centers, in conjunction with an American partner, introduced a new era in these endeavors, one that brings to the table the growing expertise of these newly established democracies in their quest to reform citizenship education for their countries.

Second, this project was unique because the bulk of curriculum writing took place in Bulgaria. After a workshop with the Poles concluded in Sofia, the Bulgarian curriculum writers, drawing on their existing experience and that of the Poles, wrote the first draft of the primary and secondary curricula. During the first phase of the project, one of the U.S. project directors visited Sofia to observe the curriculum writing process being implemented by the Bulgarian team. Unlike the lesson format adopted in the Czech and Armenian projects, the Bulgarian team, in consultation with over sixty Bulgarian teachers, wrote lesson scenarios for teachers to use as narrative guides on the basic elements of citizenship education.

CECDB's second phase took place at The University of Iowa College of Education, where the Bulgarian curriculum writers took up residence and completed the first draft of the high school course. During this phase, the Bulgarians participated in workshops with American experts in citizenship education and curriculum design to evaluate and improve the first draft of the new courses. Additionally, the Bulgarian team attended classes conducted by Iowa City teachers and experienced various teaching methods on all three levels for which the curriculum was intended.

The third phase of the project will bring the U.S. project directors and the Polish consultants to Bulgaria to participate in a professional development workshop for Bulgarian teacher educators who will prepare the next generation of teachers to use the new curricula. These teacher edu-
Findings

Findings of this inquiry fall within the categories adapted from an analysis of cultural ecology. These four categories include the new socio-political context, new experiences, cultural adaptation, and the observable characteristics. These findings led to four implications, which contain the guiding principles.

New Socio-Political Context. Each of these projects strove for democratic citizenship education curriculum reform within new socio-political contexts. The countries involved in these projects began to formulate new socio-political contexts after the fall of communism. For the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, these changes began in 1989 and 1990 respectively. In Armenia, these changes began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The approach to understanding and implementing democratic social and political behaviors in these three developing democracies is simultaneously similar and different. A brief overview of each country’s new socio-political context illustrates these similarities and differences.

In the case of the former Czechoslovakia, citizens viewed the approximately 50 years of Communist Party domination as an interruption of their status as a democratic state established by the Treaty of Versailles. Known as the “Velvet Divorce,” the breakup of the former Czechoslovakia took place in 1993. This peaceful disassociation led the Czech Republic into an era of comparative ethnic homogeneity. At present, the ethnic population is Czech (94.4%), Slovak (3%), Polish (0.6%), German (0.5%), Gypsy (0.3%), and Hungarian (0.2%). This situation has led to a form of democratic citizenship that no longer includes the Slovak nation, but must continue to address the existence of minority populations throughout the republic. Additionally, the democratic constitution of the Czech Republic advocates a mixture of negative and positive rights for its citizens. Unlike the immediate past, negative rights such as free market economic pursuit and social liberalism with regard to freedom and responsibility now appear in the constitution. Various levels of positive rights, similar to guarantees embodied in the previous constitution, ensure employment, healthcare, and retirement security.

Armenia is entirely new to the world of democratic nations. Subjugated for centuries by neighboring powers, present-day Armenia became a part of the Soviet Union shortly after World War I. As such, Armenia has virtually no democratic history. Additionally, Armenia is the oldest Chris-
tian nation on earth. The establishment of Armenian Christianity predates that of the Roman Empire. Today, the Armenian Apostolic Church maintains a high place in Armenian society and culture, although 70 years of Soviet anti-religious mandates reduced direct participation in the church. Ethnically, Armenia is homogeneous. Ethnic Armenians comprise nearly 96% of the republic’s 3.6 million people, with the remainder being Kurds, Yezidis, Russians, Jews, Assyrians, and Greeks. Constitutionally, the Armenians enjoy a broad mix of negative and positive rights. Regarding the former, the constitution guarantees rights to free speech, free assembly, and free market economic endeavors. Many of the latter include entitlements to property and work, as well as many of the positive rights found in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.

Political chaos following World War I led Bulgaria from a brief state of democracy to a dictatorship that dominated Bulgarian life until World War II. After World War II, Bulgaria became a communist nation influenced directly by the Soviet Union. In January, 1990, the Bulgarian Parliament voted to revoke the constitutionally guaranteed dominant role of the Communist Party. In so doing, Bulgaria declared itself a democracy with little democratic historical context as a guide. The redesign of the constitution took place immediately after the fall of communism. This rush to constitutional reform reflects problems indicative of Bulgaria’s weak historical foundation in democracy. However, constitutional provisions that protect minority rights eclipse those found in the Czech and Armenian constitutions. Bulgaria, unlike the Czech Republic and Armenia, is a multicultural nation-state made up primarily of Bulgarians (85.3%), Turks (8.5%), Gypsies (2.6%), and Macedonians (2.5%). Although this multi-ethnic makeup is not new to Bulgaria’s social context, it raises issues regarding the new political context that were not evident under totalitarianism. Under the previous regime, ethnic differences submitted to the communist homogenization process. This process treated all inhabitants as “the proletariat” with little regard for cultural differentiation. Now, cultural differentiation is a major concern in citizenship education reform.

Each of these cases shares similarities with the other two. Most obvious is their collective emergence from communism. Historically, experience with democracy in each case differs from the others. The same is true regarding ethnic makeup and, to a lesser degree, regarding constitutionalism. Given these similarities and differences, each approach to curriculum reform for democratic citizenship education is unique in philosophical interpretations of democracy, but somewhat similar in requisite skills and attitudes.

Moreover, the differences between the newly democratic socio-political contexts of these three post-communist countries and the more estab-
lished socio-political context of the United States was problematic to each project. For instance, the notion of liberal democracy so dear to United States citizens is not necessarily central to Eastern and Central European interpretations of democracy. The new socio-political contexts in these countries, as reflected in their constitutions, includes a communitarian interpretation of democracy to a much greater degree than does the political system of the United States. Ignoring this difference could have led the curriculum reform process to a stalemate on the appropriate interpretations of certain subject matter such as free market economics and social entitlements.

Additionally, as noted by the Eastern and Central European partners involved in each of these projects, U.S. students are considered to be “partners” in their learning experience to a greater extent than students in the Czech Republic, Armenia, or Bulgaria. Consequently, existing pedagogical limitations—mainly hierarchical vestiges from the past that still exist in these new socio-political contexts— influenced the sorts of teaching methodologies employed in the reformed curricula.

**New Cultural Experiences.** An equally important category for analysis in the curriculum reform process for democratic citizenship education in Eastern and Central Europe is the new cultural experiences offered by these projects to the curriculum writers while in the United States. These experiences play a critical role in the process because the new socio-political context of each country delimits the extent of curricular change for democratic citizenship education. However, the new socio-political context of a developing democracy does not offer a guiding principle for the types of new pedagogical experiences that can be implemented within the cultural parameters of these unique national settings.

Given the need to explore the limits of possibility within each new socio-political context, the cross-cultural experiences organized for the curriculum writers while in the United States constituted the new experiences that led to curricular reform in citizenship education. Offering a wide variety of experiences to the curriculum writers, while they developed and revised their newly reformed curriculum, allowed them the opportunity to make judgments on the viability of implementing or adapting new content and pedagogical practices offered by the U.S. model of citizenship education.

Remy’s curriculum development workshop model, adapted for each of the three projects, offers a base for developing cross-cultural experiences dedicated to expanding the possibilities for democratic citizenship education in developing democracies.¹ This model centers on the need for a curriculum development workshop at a major United States research university that can offer the necessities, both technical and intellectual, for the completion of the project. This workshop model includes an ongoing curricu-
lum seminar held with the curriculum writers and the U.S. project directors. Additionally, all the experiences organized around this ongoing seminar feed the curriculum reform process by exposing the writers to innovative and traditional approaches to citizenship education in the United States (Remy 1996, 70-72).

Remy developed three key components for the curriculum development workshop: professional development, completion of a written product, and reflective feedback. Regarding professional development, Remy advocated drawing upon the expertise of U.S. consultants in civic education and curriculum theory and design, including evaluation. Through workshops held by these experts, ideas heretofore unknown to the curriculum writers were placed into consideration for their reformed curricula.

The second component—the completion of a written product—was the essential goal of each of the projects in this study. This component focused the process-related experiences of the curriculum writers while in the United States. In organizing this component, work space, library access, computer availability, and technical support were essential. Additionally, the curriculum writers worked with the U.S. project directors to make the most comfortable match between their content knowledge and specific subject matter chosen for the curriculum. This match allowed for expedient task completion by eliminating, as much as possible, the need for each curriculum writer to learn an entirely new body of content.

The third component involves reflective feedback. In essence, the ongoing seminars with the U.S. project directors and the curriculum writers offered a venue for constructive criticism, heady debates, and group decision-making that contributed to completion of the reformed curriculum in a first draft version and in the evaluation of the curriculum developed in-country (e.g., the Bulgarian project).

In addition to the curriculum workshop components adapted from Remy, the three projects in this study included a partnership component with two elements embedded in, but not clearly delineated by, Remy's model. First, curriculum writers from the Czech Republic and Armenia were assigned teacher partners from the Iowa City Consolidated Public School District and professor partners from The University of Iowa College of Education. These partners chose these partners based on a match in content and pedagogical interests. The goal of the partnership component was to allow for less formalized feedback on the curricular products under development or evaluation. The pairs of partners arranged their meeting times and conducted their substantive discussions without the intervention of the U.S. project directors or project staff.

Second, this component allowed for school and university classroom visits by all three teams of curriculum writers. These experiences enhanced
the professional development of the curriculum writers by introducing them to teaching techniques and course planning typical of U.S. educational practice. Some of these experiences led the curriculum writers to borrow content and pedagogical practices heretofore unknown in their schools, but that were adaptable to each country’s new socio-political context and, thus, their reformed curricula. During these visits, the curriculum writers were able to experience the theory presented and discussed in the curriculum seminars through actual classroom practice.

**Cultural Adaptation.** Cultural adaptation represents the point where the new socio-political context and new experiences blend and give life to a new curriculum for citizenship education. New experiences, when perceived through a lens of a new socio-political context, leave the individual with certain alternatives. In the case of cross-cultural curriculum reform for democratic citizenship education, these alternatives encompass the new knowledge, skills, and dispositions that have been learned during new experiences and that become candidates for adaptation to the new socio-political context. Cultural adaptation also includes a decision-making process in which the curriculum writers utilize a discriminating psychological framework that leads to the development of the new curriculum.

Cross-cultural curriculum development as enacted in these three projects included, by necessity, a variety of experiences offered by the developed democracy to the transitional democracy. In these projects, a myriad of alternatives on the knowledge, skills, and dispositions required by democratic citizenship education were placed into consideration for the curriculum writers. In so doing, the U.S. project directors and staff urged the curriculum writers to consider constantly the new socio-political context of their country when observing and considering the many alternatives offered.

The constant consideration of the most culturally adaptive alternatives concerning knowledge, skills, and dispositions came about as the result of two activities: the curriculum seminars and interviews with the post-communist participants. These two communication vehicles allowed the U.S. project directors to gauge the value of any new experiences as viewed by the post-communist curriculum writers. In several instances, the curriculum writers viewed these experiences as inappropriate to their new socio-political contexts. Overtly, these vehicles informed the U.S. project directors as to which experiences matched well the new socio-political contexts, thus requiring further explication and refinement for use in the reformed curricula. Without the knowledge of appropriate alternatives, the U.S. project directors could have led the curriculum writers to experiences not adaptable to their new socio-political contexts; thereby, leading to a curriculum for democratic citizenship reflecting only an American pers-
spective and ignoring the inherent differences between developed and transitional democracies.

An example of understanding the cultural adaptability of certain knowledge, skills, and dispositions came about during project activities devoted to the teaching strategy known as community service learning. The University of Iowa College of Education has a nationally recognized program in community service learning that is an essential component of its elementary social studies preservice teacher education program (Wade 1997). The U.S. directors offered the curriculum writers a chance to experience community service learning as a critically important component of democratic citizenship education. In each case, the curriculum writers became intrigued by the value of this skill and its concomitant development of democratic dispositions. However, only through interviews with the participants and seminar discussions on community service learning did the U.S. project directors realize the past meaning of community service and the negative implications this sort of activity may have if included in these reformed curricula. Under communism, community service was a requirement of citizenship mandated by the state. Although community service learning in the United States grows from student input in all phases of such projects, the U.S. directors learned that the notion itself would not be readily accepted by teachers and parents in these developing democracies. This activity was not yet adaptable to the curriculum writers' new socio-political contexts due to the totalitarian baggage of communism.

Equally important in cross-cultural curriculum reform for democratic citizenship is the monitoring of decisions made by the curriculum writers when adapting new knowledge, skills, and dispositions for their reformed curricula. As the constant awareness of adaptable alternatives is incumbent upon the U.S. participants, so is the constant monitoring of decisions of both exclusion and inclusion in these new curricula. Given the many experiences offered through the curriculum workshop—and the cultural adaptation of the curriculum writers to their new experiences—the possibility of including aspects of democratic citizenship education not appropriate to the new socio-political context of these nations could result. The exclusion of universally requisite knowledge, skills, and dispositions crucial to each of these contexts is also a concern.

Again, communication through the curriculum seminars and the interviews played a major role in determining the appropriateness of new experiences the writers decided to adapt for their reformed curricula. In addition, the curricula themselves were another crucially important source for monitoring the appropriateness of decisions based on the alternatives offered by these new experiences. The goal in each of these projects was to advance
the notion of democratic citizenship beyond the existing, traditional curriculum of each participating country. However, socio-political context may not have allowed for huge leaps forward in curriculum development that were based on the programs experienced by the curriculum writers while in the United States.

An example of this dilemma can be found in the decision-making process on an area of content offered for consideration in two of these projects. An important aspect of democratic citizenship is the understanding of free market economics. Miller noted the relation of economic literacy to the role of the citizen in a democratic society as "rooted in the idea that economics provides a set of conceptual tools to help citizens think about their government's relationship to the economy and the many economic issues citizens in a democratic society face" (Miller 1996, 26). The Czech and Armenian projects included a seminar workshop on free market economics. Invariably, the curriculum writers deemed the concepts difficult for their students, but necessary for inclusion in their curricula. However, when the curriculum writers who prepared the units on free market economics presented these units for review, the U.S. project directors and the other curriculum writers realized the unadaptability of these materials. The decisions made by the Czech and Armenian writers on free market economics became too adaptive of U.S. perspectives on this content and were not appropriate for the new socio-political contexts of these two developing democracies. The wide differences in free market economic maturity between the United States and each of these countries dictated a much different approach to this essential content.

The alternatives offered to curriculum writers from developing democracies and the accompanying decisions required for developing a reformed curriculum make up the category of cultural adaptation in such cross-cultural projects. The point of contact between the new experiences and the existing social-political context constitutes the cultural adaptability of democratic citizenship education from a developed democracy to a transitional democracy.

**Observable Characteristics.** The interplay between the new socio-political context and the cultural adaptability of new experiences leads to the observable characteristics, or the actual product. This category reveals the similarities and differences between each case with regard to the final product. All of the projects in this study sought to reform curricula for democratic citizenship education, and the outcomes of each project achieved this overarching goal. Obversely, each project included different objectives within the larger goal that derived from the uniqueness of each country's new socio-political context. Given the variation in each country's new socio-
political context, a comparison of these curricula reveals differences that, at times, ran counter to the original expectations of the U.S. project directors and staff.

The outcomes, or observable characteristics, of cross-cultural curriculum reform projects are dependent on the new socio-political context. Although all of these countries emerged from totalitarian communism at approximately the same time in history, the type of socio-political context they experienced under communism and their unique histories with and perspectives on democracy dictated different orientations for each curriculum.

However, this observable characteristic “rule-of-thumb” resulted in surprising similarities and differences in curricular orientation. For example, the Czech and Armenian curricula took on many more points of similarity than difference with regard to the varying degrees of emphases placed on requisite knowledge, skills, and dispositions. In both of these curricula, the orientation relied heavily on the knowledge of democratic principles and philosophies, as well as the historical events that led to their development. The Bulgarian curriculum writers chose a path that was vastly different from the other two. Their curriculum emphasized the need for skill and disposition development. As a result, their curriculum placed knowledge in the position of background information that served the primary purpose of cultivating democratic skills and dispositions.

This finding is somewhat counterintuitive because Bulgaria and the Czech Republic were “satellite” countries caught in the gravitational orbit of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Armenia was a Soviet Republic, and, as such, a part of the Union’s gravitational mass. The expectation that the Czech and Bulgarian curricula would hold more points of similarity—especially on the need for developing democratic skills and dispositions—would be a logical conclusion drawn from this reality. The similarities between the curricular orientation of the Czech and Armenian curricula and their differences with the Bulgarian curriculum point yet again to the importance of recognizing the foundation of each country’s new socio-political context. The seemingly illogical results of this comparison stem from the fact that Bulgaria existed in a much more repressive state than did the Czech Republic or Armenia. The hold of the Communist Party on the lives of the populace was more constricive in Bulgaria than in the other two societies. The level of “learned helplessness,” or the inability to make decisions for oneself, was still a major part of Bulgaria’s new socio-political context. Thus, the Bulgarian curriculum writers believed that this socio-political reality begged a greater emphasis on the skills and dispositions needed for democratic citizenship than did either the Czech or Armenian curriculum writers.
The goal of each project was to produce a reformed curriculum for citizenship education based on a democratic orientation. However, the objectives for achieving this goal varied. In the Czech project, the objective was to refashion an existing course in social studies education—one that would reflect, in its new form, the skills and dispositions required for democratic citizenship that were absent in its original form. As such, the reformed Czech curriculum maintained, in large part, the integrity of the knowledge objectives found in the original third form social studies course because this course was developed after the fall of communism. Little variation in the requisite knowledge for Czech students to develop into democratically minded citizens was evident.

The Armenian project pursued entirely original objectives for the seventh grade course in democratic citizenship. This curriculum, unlike the Czech curriculum, required the introduction of new content as well as skills and dispositions to accomplish this goal. Virtually every aspect of this course sought to fulfill curricular objectives heretofore unknown in the Armenian educational system.

The Bulgarian effort resembled the Armenian project in its complete originality, but the Bulgarian curriculum targeted a much wider audience, as it was prepared for students at all levels of pre-collegiate education. Additionally, the Bulgarian curriculum differed from the other projects because its objectives placed a much greater importance on orienting students toward requisite skills and dispositions, rather than knowledge acquisition.

**Implications and Guiding Principles**

The theoretical framework served as a lens for analyzing three cross-cultural citizenship education curriculum reform projects with post-communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Adapted from cross-cultural psychology and known as an analysis of cultural ecology, this framework offered the following four categories through which to analyze these projects: (1) new socio-political context, (2) new experiences, (3) cultural adaptation, and (4) observable characteristics.

The implications of this inquiry, couched in the form of guiding principles for cross-cultural citizenship education curriculum reform, stem from these four categories and correlate with the answers to the following fundamental questions developed by Ralph W. Tyler (1949, 1) as starting points for curriculum development:

1. What educational purposes should the school seek to attain?
2. What educational experiences can be provided that are likely to attain these purposes?
3. How can these educational experiences be effectively organized?
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are being attained?
These four questions have driven curriculum development in democratic societies for over half a century. These questions acted as the "educational link" between the cross-cultural psychological nature of the findings and the guiding principles for curriculum reform that resulted from this inquiry (Hlebowitsh & Hamot 1999).

**Principle 1: Guiding Philosophy and Educational Purpose.** The answer to Tyler's first question, "What educational purpose should the school seek to attain?", can be found in the new socio-political contexts of post-communist democracies that U.S. participants need to understand in order for them to assist in curriculum reform. Among these three cases, differences in socio-political context raised important issues in philosophical approaches to curriculum reform that illustrated slightly uncommon versions of democratic theory and pedagogical practice. Additionally, in this analytical category, each case differed from the United States.

Given this situation, the first guiding principle in cross-cultural projects aimed at citizenship education stems from the need to understand each developing democracy's new socio-political context: *The development of a common understanding on what Dewey termed a "guiding philosophy" (1929, 9-10) and the educational purposes implied by this philosophy form the foundation on which successful cross-cultural citizenship education reform projects will take place.* In so doing, the U.S. and post-communist partners will share a common base from which to develop the content and pedagogical practices needed to support the purpose of the reformed curriculum as an instrument in the process of democratization.

A guiding philosophy—in these cases represented by slightly differing versions of democracy—drives the purpose of curriculum reform. This philosophy takes its educational meaning from three fundamental factors in the educational process: the nature of the learner, the nature of society, and the organized subject matter (Dewey 1902, 4-8). Although each of these projects sought to develop materials suitable to teaching and learning democratic citizenship, the subtle nuances between their new socio-political contexts made each project unique. As a result, the first guiding principle implies the need for U.S. project directors and staff members to uncover the nature of the learner and the nature of society in the partner democracy, as well as the subject matter most appropriate to teaching democratic citizenship that is related to these two fundamental factors in the educational process.

To do otherwise could steer the curriculum toward a model unsuited to the target population. The differences between conceptions of democracy and citizenship in the United States and a transitional democracy may, on certain matters, be so vast that some educational issues may be simply irreconcilable.
On the one hand, when situations of this sort arise, project participants must return to the commonly understood guiding philosophy so as not to mar the overall educational purpose of the reformed curriculum. Thus, the first guiding principle implies the importance of knowing the developing country’s new socio-political context in order for the reformed curriculum to fulfill an educational purpose based on a commonly understood guiding philosophy.

This principle addresses the viability of U.S. democratic philosophy in relation to that of the developing democracy. The uniqueness of each context, although at times very subtle, dictates the guiding philosophy of democracy. This philosophy reveals itself in the culturally bound nature of the learner, nature of the society, and the organized subject matter, thereby giving purpose to democratic citizenship education curriculum reform.

**Principle 2: Organizing Educational Experiences.** The first guiding principle sets attainable objectives founded on a mutually understood guiding philosophy of democracy. The second guiding principle involves the new cultural experiences offered to the curriculum writers and their usefulness in attaining the objectives of the new curriculum. Essentially, these new cultural experiences help to answer Tyler’s second question: “What educational experiences can be provided that are likely to attain these purposes?”

In devising a set of cultural experiences for the curriculum writers while in the United States, the American project directors sought to reach two objectives. First, the curriculum writers had to be exposed to the theoretical purpose of citizenship education in the United States. This objective was important to each of the projects because citizenship education in the United States offered more than 200 years of experience in attaining this educational purpose. The curriculum development workshop model, which included the ongoing seminars and the presentations by experts in the fields of civic education and curriculum design, was the vehicle for achieving this goal.

Second, the U.S. project directors realized that the theoretical purpose of citizenship education needed to be accompanied by observation of and participation in actual classroom practice. This objective was achieved when the curriculum writers visited schools. During school visits, they had the opportunity to experience new pedagogical methods and to discuss these methods with teachers. These visits gave life to the theoretical purpose of citizenship education encountered in the university-based curriculum workshops. Through this activity, the curriculum writers developed an answer to Tyler’s second question by realizing the types of new experiences that their reformed curriculum might provide in attaining the educational purpose of democratic citizenship education.
Taken together, the curriculum development workshop and the school visits moved the curriculum writers from their initial conceptions of citizenship education to the limits of possibility offered by their new socio-political context. The theoretical and practical objectives met by these two experiences formed the core of the second guiding principle: Established theoretical ideas in citizenship education, when combined with their practical application, offer new cultural experiences that are most likely to give birth to educational experiences aimed at fulfilling the purpose of citizenship education curriculum reform.

Although these new experiences may hold promise for the reformed curriculum, they may expand beyond the capabilities of the developing democracy’s students and teachers. Here, the third guiding principle plays an important part in fusing the new socio-political context with new cultural experiences in an effectively organized and attainable pattern.

**Principle 3: Monitoring Cultural Adaptation.** The findings of this study implied that cultural adaptation of democratic theory and educational practice from a developed democracy may lead to a reformed curriculum unsuitable for the developing democracy’s new socio-political context. These three projects indicated the need to offer new experiences from which to choose possible knowledge, skills, and dispositions for adaptation into the curriculum. Nonetheless, the alternative experiences offered and the decisions that need to be made on whether or not to include these alternatives beg Tyler’s third question: “How can these educational experiences be effectively organized?”

Effective organization of educational experiences requires adaptation to the educational context. In cross-cultural democratic citizenship education reform projects, the effective organization of educational experiences builds from the new socio-political context and new cultural experiences. The reality of life in the developing democracy poses a limit on the reformed curriculum. The possibilities held by new cultural experiences in attaining the educational purpose tug at the existing, albeit new, socio-political context. At this point in the curriculum reform process, organizing the newly acquired experiences into a coherent curriculum for democratic citizenship requires a perception on the part of all the participants as to how to fashion educational experiences that expand the horizons of the students and achieve the desired educational purpose within the existing educational system of the developing democracy.

Here, a possible problem arises that requires heightened attention to detail. As the curriculum develops, constant monitoring of the alternatives offered for inclusion in the reformed curriculum must take place. The project participants from both countries must work to develop educational expe-
riences for students in the developing democracy that reach beyond the existing norms, but they must also keep in mind the limits of possibility. The effective organization of the educational experiences for democratic citizenship must take place within established parameters set by the new socio-political context. Additionally, the curriculum must include the most appropriate educational experiences for democratic citizenship. A delicate balance between these two realities must be established.

When organizing the educational experiences that give life to the new curriculum, the participants must avoid the possible clash between the curricular alternatives experienced and the limits of possibility. Avoiding this possible conflict while balancing the new socio-political context with new cultural experiences leads to the third guiding principle: The effective organization of educational experiences for democratic citizenship requires a monitoring of cultural adaptations to insure that these adaptations reach for, but do not exceed, the limits of possibility within the new socio-political context of the developing democracy. Otherwise, the application of the reformed curriculum to the new socio-political context may result in organized educational experiences that confuse rather than assist the students in their development as democratic citizens.

**Principle 4: Formative Evaluation of the Outcome.** The observable characteristic, or outcome, of cross-cultural curriculum reform projects for democratic citizenship education is the product. The product in each of these projects was the first draft of a course on citizenship for use in the schools of the developing democracy. However, the probability that the newly reformed curriculum will achieve its educational purpose is strictly speculative until it is evaluated. As Tyler asked, "How can we determine whether these purposes are being attained?"

One answer to Tyler’s fourth question lies in whether or not the new curriculum has held true to the democratic orientation dictated by the new socio-political context of the developing democracy. These projects included many opportunities for formative evaluation of the first draft of each curriculum. These opportunities include the curriculum development workshops, informal discussions between the U.S. project directors and the curriculum writers, and the partnership programs. By taking advantage of these opportunities for formative evaluation, the American project directors and the curriculum writers were able to fashion the new curriculum to the socio-political realities in which the curriculum would be taught and learned.

Another answer to Tyler’s question is the level of correlation between the first draft of the curriculum and each project’s objectives. In each of these cases, the U.S. project directors traveled to the developing democracy to meet with ministry officials, members of leading nongovernmental
educational organizations, pedagogical experts, and teachers. These meetings served the purpose of setting objectives for each project. These objectives varied from project to project due to the differences in each country's new socio-political context. However, these predetermined objectives offered criteria for formative evaluation of the outcomes, or observable characteristics, of each project. Prior to leaving the United States, each group of curriculum writers completed the first draft of their newly reformed curriculum, and this first draft allowed for a comparison of the reformed curriculum to the predetermined objectives. These predetermined objectives offered benchmarks for determining whether or not each reformed curriculum achieved its educational purpose in relation to its new socio-political context.

Obviously, the real test of curriculum reform for democratic citizenship education takes place in the classrooms of the developing democracy. Two of the projects in this study included a field test component. At the time of this study, however, only one of these field tests was complete. Nonetheless, the formative evaluation of each curriculum as it was being developed in the United States proved useful in at least allowing for some form of feedback before field testing or actual implementation took place. Therefore, the fourth guiding principle derived from this study builds upon the other three: A systematic formative evaluation of the curriculum's observable characteristics will increase the curriculum's possibility for achieving its educational purposes by centering the developing democracy's guiding philosophy and monitoring the cultural adaptability of new educational experiences.

**Conclusion**

This chapter opened with two key questions for United States directors to consider when conducting cross-cultural projects in citizenship education reform with partners from post-communist democracies. First, does the U.S. tradition of democratic philosophy and beliefs lend itself to the individual contexts and needs of the newly developing democracies of Eastern and Central Europe? Second, to what degree can and should American practices in citizenship education influence the newly reformed curricula of post-communist democracies? Left unaddressed, these questions will haunt the curriculum reform process to a point where the outcomes of the project might bear little hope for nurturing future citizens in the post-communist democracy for which the reformed curriculum is intended.

This inquiry revealed that these questions have no universally applicable answers. Each curriculum reform project with a post-communist democracy will reveal differences that require distinctly different answers to these questions. However, the analysis of curriculum reform projects with the Czech Republic, Armenia, and Bulgaria brought forth guiding principl-
gles aimed at assisting U.S. project directors as they seek the unique answers to the two key questions.

Instrumental in determining these principles was a theoretical framework for analyzing these projects that was adapted from cross-cultural psychological research. This framework offered four analytical categories that proved useful in determining the differences and similarities of these three projects as they strove to generate citizenship education curricula with a democratic orientation.

These four categories provided for a systematic analysis of three cross-cultural curriculum projects aimed at democratic citizenship education reform. This analysis offered findings that, when applied to the fundamental questions for curriculum development established by Ralph W. Tyler, revealed four guiding principles for conducting similar projects with post-communist democracies. Even though these countries hold conceptions of democracy and pedagogical practice that differ somewhat from those found in the United States, each of them benefitted from the guiding principles established by this inquiry.

Although generalizable answers to the two fundamental questions raised at the beginning of this chapter cannot be found, the guiding principles for cross-cultural curriculum reform projects in democratic citizenship education formulated through this inquiry do indicate the need to attend to these two questions on a case-by-case basis. They also act as maxims for successfully conducting any cross-cultural citizenship education reform projects that seek to make a positive impact on the socio-political landscape of a developing democracy.

Notes
1. See Center for Civic Education, Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program (Calabasas, California: Center for Civic Education, 1999). This descriptive brochure detailing the Civitas project is available from Jack N. Hoas, Director of International Programs, Center for Civic Education, 5146 Douglas Fir Road, Calabasas, California 91302. In addition, see Chapter 6 of this volume, which describes the Civitas Exchange Program.
2. The entire curriculum was published in three volumes: a teacher’s manual, which included the lesson plans; a student work book; and a book of primary source readings. The length of the entire curriculum was 894 pages.
3. The demographic data cited in this section were taken from The World Factbook 1998, published by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. These data can be found on the World Wide Web at:
4. In 1991, Richard C. Remy of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University developed the prototype for organizing cross-cultural citizenship education curriculum reform experiences when he embarked on a major, ongoing project for democratic citizenship education in Poland.
5. The Bulgarian curriculum writers, due to the fact that they had completed two-thirds of their draft curricula in Bulgaria, were in residence at The University of Iowa for only five weeks. Due to their short stay, the partnership program was not put into effect.

References


BUILDING DEMOCRACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: REDISCOVERING CIVICS AND CITIZENSHIP IN AUSTRALIA

By Murray Print

We aim no less than a change in the political culture of this country both nationally and locally: for people to think of themselves as active citizens, willing, able and equipped to have an influence on public life and with the critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting.

Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998

In a decade characterized by dramatic educational change, the world is currently experiencing a quiet revolution in the teaching of citizenship and democracy in schools. This is not a revolution in pedagogical strategies for teaching civics, or how education for democratic citizenship might be assessed in schools, for, although desperately needed, these changes are yet to come. This quiet, though profound, change is focused on the nature and amount of subject matter taught under the heading of civics, citizenship, and/or democratic education in the school curriculum.

As countries and educational systems prepare for the twenty-first century and reflect on their current educational and political problems, they are rediscovering the need for civics, citizenship, and democratic education as an integral feature of preparing future generations. This reflection, often taking the form of a national review, has found serious inadequacies in both the understanding and practice of civics in schools and the opportunity to learn civics within the school curriculum. Consequently, school curricula in civics, citizenship, and democracy education are experiencing substantial and sustained change, regardless of the country, or the condition of its democracy.

Evidence from around the world clearly demonstrates that most countries are in some way reviewing, adjusting, developing, or evaluating the
way that education for democratic citizenship is conducted through their school systems. Whether it be Britain (as evidenced in the quote above from a national review), the United States, Australia, Canada or other established democracies, the concerns are similar as these democracies reassess their situation with the onset of the new millennium (Patrick 1996). In a report released recently, the British Advisory Group on Citizenship (1998) clearly stated the problem for similar countries. Democracies need to remain vigilant and ensure that future generations are well prepared to perpetuate democratic principles, processes, and values through a civil society. Further, the Advisory Group on Citizenship issued a challenge that should be trumpeted in all democracies around the world: “We should not, must not, dare not, be complacent about the health and future of British democracy. Unless we become a nation of engaged citizens, our democracy is not secure” (1998, 8).

Many of the democracies created since World War II are equally reflective and concerned. Countries such as Germany, Italy, Japan, India, and Israel are seeking ways to reinforce their democracies and protect themselves against forces of opposition. The newly created democracies of Eastern Europe are even more concerned to identify means by which democracy can be consolidated both now and in the future. Many countries ranging from Mongolia, Thailand, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil are struggling to establish or maintain their democracies and are searching for viable means to ensure a democratic future.

In all these democracies the role of formal school education is recognized to be of paramount importance in the process of ensuring a democratic future. Within the field of education in general, civics or citizenship education has taken the specific lead in promoting democracy in schools. Its importance in the school curriculum is beyond dispute. Or is it? This chapter addresses the recent developments in one established democracy, Australia, as it attempts to grapple with the issues involved in securing its democratic future.

Australia is one of the oldest, most stable and successful democracies in the world. Yet many in its current generations know little about the concepts, processes, and values which underpin their democracy. And for some four decades the fundamental knowledge, skills, and values associated with civics and democracy have not been purposively or explicitly taught in Australian schools in any systematic manner. There is, in brief, a prevailing perception that a major “civics deficit” exists among students in Australian schools, which in turn has driven recent attempts to stimulate civics and citizenship education (Civics Expert Group 1994; Keating 1995; Kemp 1997; Phillips 1989; SSCEET 1989).
History of Citizenship Education in Australia

For the first five decades following the foundation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, civics was an integral and important part of Australian schooling. In the early years of the newly federated country, it was one of the vehicles which helped form common bonds and a sense of unity amongst peoples of the formerly "independent" colonies. Through civics and moral training in the school curriculum in the first two decades of federation students learnt civic virtue and "good" citizenship, especially their civic duties and rights. As well, civics looked outwards so students learnt about Australia's role in the British Empire and later the British Commonwealth. They also learnt about the functions of government including the civil service and cabinet, order and justice, the electoral system, and more practical activities such as work, housing, and the care of people (Musgrave 1994; Print 1997; Thomas 1994).

In this period it was difficult to identify civics or citizenship education as a separate subject in school curricula. More commonly, civics was interwoven within history, or increasingly from the 1930s onwards within the new school subject called social studies. Until the 1960s, civics addressed information about political structures and processes, citizen rights and responsibilities, and the values of civic participation as a dutiful citizen (Thomas 1994). An understanding of the Constitution, the roles of the civil service and cabinet, the place of order and justice in society, and the levels of government were all considered important to produce a well-rounded citizen.

Important as these learnings were, some authors suggest that the lack of an independent subject, identity, and presence within the school curriculum contributed to the later demise of civics (Connell 1971; Thomas 1994). From the 1960s onwards, Australia experienced a significant decrease in the formal teaching of civics within the education system (CEG 1994; Macintyre 1995; Print 1996, 1997; Thomas 1994). Opportunities decreased for even incidental learning, such as the singing of the national anthem at school assemblies. Some indirect teaching of civics continued within existing school subjects such as social studies and history, but rarely was there a deliberate attempt by governments, educational systems, or schools to explicitly teach civics and citizenship. This remained the situation until the mid-1990s, when the current transformation commenced.

Attempted Revival. Toward the end of the 1980s several groups demonstrated substantial interest in reviving civics within the Australian school curriculum. Attempts by groups of teachers and academics to invigorate participation in civics-related subjects in secondary schools were numerous, particularly at the upper secondary level, though none could be con-
sidered successful (Phillips 1989; SSCEET 1989, 1991). In 1989 the Commonwealth and State Ministers for Education adopted a set of national educational goals called the Common and Agreed National Goals for Schooling in Australia (1989). Active citizenship through civics was highlighted as an important objective for school curricula in Australia through two key goal statements:

- To develop knowledge, skills, attitudes and values which will enable students to participate as active and informed citizens in our democratic Australian society within an international context.
- To develop in students . . . a capacity to exercise judgement in matters of morality, ethics and social justice. (AEC. 1989)

Despite the visionary nature of these statements they were of little value unless they were translated into policy within the respective states. As the constitutional control of schooling is vested in the six Australian states, with the Commonwealth Government only able to provide support, the future of this initiative was in the domain of the states. Finally, in 1997, after several aborted beginnings, the state and federal governments agreed on a new initiative for civics in Australia called Discovering Democracy: Civics and Citizenship Education (Kemp 1997).

Two attempts to stimulate an interest in civics at the national level took the form of Australian Senate inquiries: Education for Active Citizenship (SSCEET 1989) and Active Citizenship Revisited (SSCEET 1991). Although heightening awareness and concern at the condition of civics within Australian schools, the reports had little significant impact on educational practice. Similarly, the Constitutional Centenary Foundation, formed in 1991 to encourage public discussion and understanding of the Australian Constitution (Boston 1996), had little initial impact. The Centenary of Federation Advisory Committee, formed to organize the 2001 centenary celebrations, also found the need to stimulate understanding of Australia's civic history and its constitution (Pascoe 1996).

Individually these attempts had merit, though collectively they failed to raise the profile of citizenship education to one of national importance. In the Australian states these initiatives in civics did not create a critical mass of interest amongst students, teachers, parents, or educational bureaucrats. In general Australians, particularly young Australians, remained largely ignorant about their political and government systems and their role as citizens within their country (CED 1994; Doig, et. al 1994; Print 1995, 1996, 1997).

A Civics Deficit. The principal factor which helped change public opinion about the need for citizenship education in schools and which transformed tacit support into curriculum practice were the abysmal levels of
civic literacy of Australians. In the early 1990s media reports of the levels of political ignorance amongst Australia’s youth shocked the public and the nation’s politicians alike. The evidence galvanized support for a bipartisan political approach to address this problem.

Low levels of civic and political literacy have been linked directly to poor citizen participation, something seen as highly problematic for the effectiveness and ultimately the survival of democracies (Bean 1988; CEG 1994; SSCEET 1989). In the study of Australian attitudes from the National Social Science Survey (NSSS), it was noted, “Interest in politics is a good indicator of the propensity for political activity” (Bean 1988, 47). This position was strongly supported by the Senate Standing Committee on Employment, Education and Training, which argued:

[Political ignorance is a strong indicator of indifference and apathy towards political dimensions of experience. The citizen who knows little about community affairs, or about local, state and national government is frequently the citizen who has little interest in such matters.... High levels of political ignorance in a community are therefore a danger sign.... They are a warning that the quality of democracy may be under threat. (1989, 9)

It is of great concern to educators and educational policy makers that students might acquire only marginally more civic and political literacy as they progress through the years of secondary school. An Australian study on political understanding, for example, showed that Year 5 students performed at levels not dissimilar to those of Year 9 students (Doig, et al 1994). In part, this finding is supported by other research which suggests a minimal difference between the levels of political literacy of lower and upper secondary students (Print 1995). However, where students had studied civics, their levels of civic and political knowledge were significantly higher (Print 1995). Not surprisingly, opportunity to learn the subject matter does enhance subsequent student understanding.

Concern at the low level of young people’s civic and political literacy is not restricted to Australia. In the United States and Canada, research found student knowledge of their country’s government to be inadequate, lacking in connections, displaying misunderstandings and confusions, overly simplistic, and polarized (McKeown & Beck 1990; Patrick & Hoge 1991; Sears 1994).

In one United Kingdom study it was reported that over 70 percent of young people declared themselves to have little or no interest in politics (Bottery 1990). In both the United States and the United Kingdom, it seems that students translate their lack of knowledge and interest into non-participative political behavior, a concern enunciated emphatically in the recent British review of citizenship education (Advisory Group on Citizenship
The problem for Australia and our education system, however, is the direct transition from secondary school student to a compulsorily voting and participating citizen. Under some circumstances, such as an election in the year when students are eligible to vote, many may participate in their first compulsory voting experience while still at school. If students do not acquire a fundamental, non-partisan understanding of political processes through the school, they may well never have an opportunity again.

**Achieving Critical Mass.** The foundational factors upon which to construct a critical mass of support for citizenship education in Australia were already present within the educational community. What those factors lacked was the catalyst to unify them, to galvanize them into a powerful force, and to inform the wider community. The catalyst was found in the Prime Minister, Paul Keating, and the formation, largely on his initiative, of what he called the Civics Expert Group (CEG).

The Federal Government commissioned a review of civics and citizenship education in 1994 by the CEG and its report *Whereas the People ... Civics and Citizenship Education* (CEG 1994) set the basis for a renewed initiative in civics education. From that time civics has been a significant, though not dominant, feature of Australian education policy at both federal and state levels.

During the 1990s several other broadly based factors have affected interest in civics issues within Australia. Awareness of civics issues increased through publications and media reports in the education field during this time. Australians were challenged by the changing international scene, especially developments in the former Yugoslavia, Germany, and parts of Africa which impacted on concepts of citizenship and how Australians saw themselves and their nation. Simultaneously many Australians manifested increasing concern about politicians and levels of political disenchantment rose. But it was the activity of ethnic groups within Australia, and particularly the role of indigenous peoples as they addressed their identity, which heightened interest in issues of citizenship and civil society. Together with the inexorable refocusing of Australia's identity towards the Asia-Pacific region, these factors have forced Australians to reconsider their understanding of civil society and their national identity as well as the need for citizenship education in schools.

The critical mass created by the CEG report was reinforced by a set of serendipitous factors that have encouraged Australians to reflect upon what directions civics may take in schools. Coming together in Australia in the mid-to-late 1990s, these factors include the approaching centenary of the Australian federation, the Olympic Games in Sydney in 2000, initiatives such as the Centenary of Australia Advisory Committee, and the
Ideas for Australia program, as well as the increasing pressure for an Australian republic.

Together these factors stimulated debate and helped focus Australian interests towards a coherent and comprehensive program of citizenship education in Australian schools. Therefore, as Australians stand at the beginning of a new millennium, they are ready to take on a new set of values that will underpin new directions and new ideals for what it means to be an Australian. In this exercise, the role of the school, particularly what is offered as civics through the school curriculum, will be of vital importance.

By the late 1990s the substantial support for the new civics and citizenship education from governments and educational systems is being translated into educational practice. Yet there is little evidence of widespread support from teachers en masse, or from teacher subject associations, and certainly not from teacher unions (Dickson 1998).

Conversely, in the important case of New South Wales, with the exception of small numbers of history teachers and a negative response from the NSW Teachers Federation, there has been little opposition (Dickson 1998). Most teachers, it appears, are in a condition of resigned acceptance.

**Discovering Civics: The Vehicle for Democratic Citizenship Education**

In May 1997, after a gestation lasting some fourteen months, the then recently elected Federal Government released its policy on what has become known as civics and citizenship education. The new civics initiative, called *Discovering Democracy*, was designed to address the fundamental problems identified within the Australian education system in the area of civics and citizenship education. This policy continued, with some changes and redirection, the former federal government's policy as stated in its support of the CEG report of 1994 (Keating 1995). In the process some $18 million was allocated, almost entirely for civics in schools, to civics and citizenship education over four years.

The principal areas of difference between the new civics policy document and its predecessor were in many ways not significant. Where differences are discernible they have tended to be greater emphasis upon three features: (1) history as the vehicle for civics in schools, (2) addressing a set of predominantly democratic values, and (3) to a lesser extent, the subject matter associated with the rule of law.

The most substantial, most expensive component of the *Discovering Democracy* program is the Discovering Democracy Schools Materials Project (DDSMP). This consists of sets of curriculum resources produced by the Curriculum Corporation and disseminated to all Australian schools (Cur-
Within the federally funded curriculum materials produced by the Curriculum Corporation, clear historical and legal emphases are found.

Goals. The intention of the DDSMP, and *Discovering Democracy* itself, is to assist students in Australian schools to understand the relevance of our political and legal systems, to know how they evolved and function, and to develop capacities to participate as informed, reflective and active citizens in their multiple civic communities. More specifically the goals (Curriculum Corporation 1998) are for students to:

- Gain knowledge and understanding of Australia's democratic processes, government and judicial system, and the nation's place in the international community.
- Understand how participation and decision-making operate in contemporary Australia and how the nation's civic life might change in the future.
- Develop personal character traits such as respecting individual worth and human dignity, empathy, respect for the law, being informed about public issues, critical mindedness and willingness to express points of view, listen, negotiate, and compromise.
- Understand how our system of government works in practice and how it affects citizens.
- Understand the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and the opportunities for exercising them at local, state, and federal levels.

What is clearly present in *Discovering Democracy* is an explicit statement of the importance of a set of values for students to acquire. These values are encouraged within *Discovering Democracy* in order to reflect and enhance the cohesive, pluralistic nature of Australian society. Those values, which are recognized, include:

- democratic processes and freedoms (such as speech, association, religion);
- government accountability;
- civility and respect for the law;
- tolerance and respect for others;
- social justice; and
- acceptance of cultural diversity.

It is the deliberate inclusion of enunciated values, particularly a set of values associated with the concepts and processes of democracy, which significantly differentiate *Discovering Democracy* from other and earlier forms of curriculum in social education. It is also highly likely that this area of
the civics curriculum will cause some concern for teachers who perceive they have not deliberately taught values in the past and are not prepared for teaching these values now.

**Structure.** *Discovering Democracy* is organized into two closely interrelated components of a comprehensive program: first, a multi-year funded program for schools and second, a number of incentives for supporters of citizenship education. The great majority of activities are focused on schools across the range of years from Year 4 to Year 10. The second, far smaller component, involves groups associated with civics and citizenship education and schools—academics, subject associations, parents, and principals—which play a supportive role in facilitating and encouraging the effective implementation of civics and citizenship education in Australian schools.

The subject matter of *Discovering Democracy* is presented in two separate packages of materials: one for middle and upper primary school and the other for lower and middle secondary school. Within those curriculum resource packages are found the three traditional components of content: knowledge, skills, and values, which focus on four themes (Curriculum Corporation 1998; Ferguson 1998):

- **Who Rules?** This theme addresses how power has evolved and is exercised within Australia's democratic system as well as the rights and responsibilities of citizens and the principles underlying Australian democracy.
- **Law and Rights:** This theme examines the rule of law, its origins in Australia and how laws are made including the role of constitutions, parliaments, and courts.
- **The Australian Nation:** The emphasis of this theme is the establishment of Australia's democratic institutions and how civic identity has changed over time in our nation.
- **Citizens and Public Life:** The final theme addresses the ways people participate in Australia's civil society, particularly the way people can effect change within our democracy.

The four themes are addressed in eighteen units of study (see Appendix 1) spread across four levels of schooling: middle primary (Years 3-4), upper primary grades (Years 5 6/7), lower secondary (Years 7/8), middle secondary (Years 9-10). It was recognized and agreed in the project that in the early primary school years it would be difficult for students to comprehend relevant concepts in civics and citizenship education.

More problematic is the apparent tacit acceptance that civics and citizenship education should not be included within school subjects in the final
two years of secondary education (CEG 1994; Kemp 1997). As in many other countries the end of Australian secondary education is dominated by extremely important external, systemic examinations. Results from these examinations (which are set across a range of school subjects and at advanced levels of difficulty) are used for highly competitive entry into universities and specific disciplines or faculties as well as a record of school achievement. Consequently there has been little support for either creating specific school subjects at this level, including such Grade 12 courses as Problems of Democracy or Government as found in the United States, or the inclusion of civics within existing school subjects. Yet some students in Australian schools will turn eighteen in their final year of schooling, or soon after, and under Australian law will be required to vote in both state and federal elections. Many find it ironic that the closer students are to the age of compulsory voting and adulthood the less likely they are to participate in the formal learning of civics.

While themes have minimal content included within the individual unit structure, each is supported by additional access to substantial audio-visual resources (Curriculum Corporation 1998). Each of the themes also provides: (1) indicators of student achievement stated in reasonably general terms; for example, students can describe the role of political parties in Australian democracy; or identify and evaluate strategies citizen groups employ to achieve political change; and (2) explicit links to curriculum statements for each of the six states and two territories; this link is to the appropriate syllabus document or curriculum framework in the respective state or territory. Further, each unit of study is structured around three to five focus questions per theme, which outline content, teaching and learning tasks, and special features associated with that theme. In addition, minimal background information is supplied in each unit of study, but this can be readily supplemented by the resources supplied including a reference book, two CD-ROMs, a video, and other resources appropriate to that theme. Finally, most of each unit of study is devoted to providing multiple activities for students to use which also guides teachers in terms of content and learning activities. The deliberate, explicit intention in the creation of Discovering Democracy is to actively involve students in learning. This is achieved through discussions, focused inquiry sessions collecting data, group exercises, school-based participation, using cartoons and photographs, use of technology especially the Internet, and similar activities.

The content in each theme represents a deliberately selective coverage of the learning domain associated with that theme. Comprehensive content coverage was neither desired nor possible. The content is also explicitly Australian in nature, as that was the deficiency clearly evident among Australian students (see the Appendix).
The curriculum materials in the \textit{Discovering Democracy} program have been designed to be extremely user friendly for teachers. Given that many teachers have not formally studied civics, or addressed it systematically in teacher professional development programs, they need to be encouraged to adopt the resources. This policy and practice appear to be most successful, and initial responses from teachers who have used the materials are highly positive. It appears that the materials achieve their intended purpose. The more substantive problems are twofold: first to make teachers aware that the curriculum materials exist, and second, to encourage teachers to use them.

\textbf{Development and Implementation.} The means by which the \textit{Discovering Democracy} policy was developed and implemented were fourfold. First, the creation of a key advisory body, the Civics Education Group, drawn mostly from the university academic disciplines and educational systems, was an instrumental step in developing and implementing a citizenship education program. The group's task was to advise on and supervise all aspects of citizenship education associated with the Federal Government's program. As such it has been an extremely influential group, and its composition (two historians, a professor of law, and two educational bureaucrats) further suggests the direction of the federal civics initiative. Second, there was development of packages of civics and citizenship education curriculum materials for distribution to all ten thousand Australian schools. These include hard copy and CD-ROM resources for teachers and students which will be delivered over several years. Third, there was the allocation of \$4.6 million, a small but helpful amount, to provide teacher professional development around Australia for the effective use of the curriculum materials. Fourth, small amounts of funds for key players in universities, subject associations, vocational education and community education were allocated to enhance the implementation of civics and citizenship education.

The first set of complementary curriculum resources for all 10,000 Australian schools was disseminated in November 1997. This set consisted of the Ministerial Statement by Dr. Kemp, the Commonwealth Minister for Education, Training and Youth Affairs, a booklet called \textit{Introducing Discovering Democracy}, a CD-ROM called \textit{One Destiny}, and one issue of a teacher magazine on civics. Unfortunately this set of materials arrived at schools toward the end of the academic year when teachers were conducting assessments and preparing student reports. As there was little additional publicity on the materials' arrival, or a strongly perceived need by schools and teachers to address civics and citizenship education, those resources were largely ignored. Indeed many teachers were completely unaware of
the *Discovering Democracy* program or that the resources were available in their schools.

A year later the main set of *Discovering Democracy* curriculum resources were distributed to all schools. The materials were packaged into two separate kits: one for primary schools and one for lower-middle secondary schools. These are teacher and student centered materials consisting of two activity-focused books on the units of work, two CD-ROMs, a video, and a specially written reference book and posters. Additional resources, including assessment materials, will be distributed later in the project. A *Discovering Democracy* website has been established by the Curriculum Corporation to provide additional resources for students and teachers.

There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that the curriculum materials from *Discovering Democracy* have been well received and are perceived by teachers to be useful. But will teachers and students in Australian schools use them in classrooms? Several key issues need to be addressed to determine if teachers will implement *Discovering Democracy* effectively and thereby help rediscover civics and citizenship education.

**Issues in Rediscovering Civics and Citizenship Education**

**Implementation: Federal-State Relations.** Given that the Australian states have a constitutional mandate over education, and the Commonwealth cannot impose policy upon them, if any form of national policy is to be effected the federal government must encourage and persuade the states to agree. The Commonwealth, as the initiator of *Discovering Democracy*, used three methods to actively encourage the states to accept the program and implement it in schools: first, by proactively seeking their support and encouraging involvement in decision-making in the planning of the program; second, through the provision of curriculum resources to all of Australia’s 10,000 schools at the expense of the Federal Government; and third, through providing the states with nearly five million dollars for teacher professional development to help implement the program.

Relations between the states and the federal government are frequently not positive, particularly where different political parties form the governments. In recent times the federal government has been from the liberal/conservative parties and so have the majority of states. New South Wales, the first settled by Europeans and the most populous state, accounts for more than a third of the national school population. This state’s government has been from the labor/democrat parties. Regardless of the government’s political persuasion, the large proportion of people in New South Wales makes it extremely difficult to achieve anything of a national nature without that state’s agreement.
Federal-state relations in civics and citizenship education have proved, thus far, to be remarkably cohesive and resilient. This is not often the case in education and certainly not in other aspects of inter-governmental relations such as transport or health. This harmony, achieved largely through the engagement and goodwill of the states, together with the largesse of federal funds, has led to consensus about the nature of the materials and the means of their implementation. In short the states and territories have agreed to allow the Discovering Democracy curriculum materials to be delivered to their schools and then used in both primary and secondary schools. But what does this mean in practice?

Within their educational domains each state has also addressed civics and citizenship education in its own way. In most states this has meant a positive position has been taken by the state education authorities as the main provider of primary and secondary schooling and by the respective curriculum agencies (called Board of Studies) in the states. In some states, such as New South Wales, the NSW Board of Studies produced a position paper called Citizenship Education K-10 Framework (Board of Studies 1996).

Unfortunately this was not synchronized with the development of the federal government’s policies, either Whereas the People, Civics and Citizenship Education (1994) or Discovering Democracy (1997). Consequently the framework document and the subsequent school curriculum documents have less correlation than could be the case. Furthermore, despite an agreement to cooperate with the Discovering Democracy curriculum materials, the states have not necessarily made significant changes to their existing school curricula to accommodate the federal civics initiative. In part this reflects different timing in the development process of curricula and in part a determination by the states to maintain their independence and control over education regardless of the value of the federal initiative. Nowhere is this more evident than in the determination of what should be included within the curricula devised in the respective states.

Curriculum Compatibility. In each of the eighteen units of study within the Discovering Democracy, program attempts have been made to demonstrate compatibility between the program and the respective state curricula. In many states, the correlation is quite high, while in others the relationship is minimal.

Despite the apparent cooperation between the states and federal governments, however, the states have not seen fit to significantly change their school curricula to accommodate the themes of Discovering Democracy. Consequently, school curricula in many states are not highly compatible with the federal initiative. Even though many states have been revising their
primary and secondary school curricula over the past few years, they have responded more to internal forces and demands than to the directions of the federally based *Discovering Democracy* program. This situation will produce a problematic future for the implementation of the program in schools around the country.

A principal issue of concern in the states has been how much emphasis and space within existing overcrowded curricula should be accorded to civics and citizenship education. In almost all cases the states have chosen to integrate civics within existing school subjects such as studies of society, human society and its environment, history, and geography. But this has produced substantial problems for both the existing subjects and for civics and citizenship education. This situation may be seen in an example from New South Wales, a state arguably in the vanguard of the change to civics and citizenship education.

In Stages 2 and 3, or Years 3-6 of primary school in New South Wales, the new Human Society and Its Environment (HSIE) Syllabus correlates quite highly with the units of work found in *Discovering Democracy* (Department of Education and Training 1999). All four units at each level have some relationship to the New South Wales (HSIE) Syllabus and frequently amplify the syllabus well. The curriculum materials are valuable teaching resources for teachers and students alike. The recently released HSIE Syllabus (Board of Studies 1998a) was designed, in part, to be compatible with *Discovering Democracy* units of work, and civics and citizenship education consequently appears to have a secure future in primary schools.

However, in Stage 4, Years 7 and 8 of secondary school, the correlation between the four *Discovering Democracy* units of work and the history syllabus is minimal (DET 1999: Dickson 1998). Only one section of the History Syllabus (Board of Studies 1998b), a study of Ancient Greece, is compatible with any of the material in the four units in *Discovering Democracy*. In Stage 5, or Years 9 and 10 of secondary school, considerably greater compatibility is found between the two documents, though some major differences occur such as the lack of study on democracy, government, and the law (Dickson 1998: Department of Education and Training 1999).

The second opportunity for civics and citizenship education to be taught in the high school curriculum is found in the geography 7-10 syllabus. However, neither Stage 4 nor Stage 5 geography offers much civics outside of a study of global citizenship. Indeed while much of the syllabus (Board of Studies 1998c) provides an opportunity to include a civics dimension, there is little that requires teachers to address this material. Given the opportunity for teaching what they are familiar with, what they taught previously, and what they perceive as the appropriate subject matter of geography, there
is little likelihood that geography teachers will adopt a high profile in civics and citizenship education. The future for civics and citizenship education in high school classes is highly problematic.

**Teacher Response and Application.** A key factor in determining the effectiveness of the *Discovering Democracy* program may be addressed by answering a single question: will teachers actually use the *Discovering Democracy* materials? Before that question can be answered, however, we need to identify teacher awareness of this curriculum innovation.

Do teachers know about *Discovering Democracy*? It seems unlikely that teachers could not know about this major initiative in civics and citizenship education. Yet the anecdotal evidence from teachers and schools suggests a very sizeable percentage are still not aware that *Discovering Democracy* exists.

A major national study of teachers of civics and citizenship education in late 1998 has found that more than half were not aware of the *Discovering Democracy* project (Print & Craven 1999). By this time the first set of curriculum materials had been distributed to all Australian schools and considerable publicity had been undertaken. Since that time a second, and major, package of curriculum materials has been distributed to all schools. Further publicity has been undertaken and more information is appearing in teacher literature and new syllabuses, such as those from the Board of Studies in New South Wales, have appeared (Board of Studies 1998a, b, c; Dickson 1998; Ferguson 1998). It can be assumed that more teachers are aware of *Discovering Democracy* and the need for civics and citizenship education to be an integral part of the school curriculum. But will they teach it and will they use the *Discovering Democracy* curriculum materials?

The success of *Discovering Democracy* and civics in general may be judged by the response to this question: do teachers perceive *Discovering Democracy* to make a meaningful contribution to their subject area and the education of students? It is rather early to make a definitive judgement in response to this question. While Australian teachers of civics have access to an abundance of teaching resources, the problem may well be linked more to perceived relevance with the subject syllabuses. Certainly the presentation of the curriculum resources is not contentious. They are very appropriate, helpful, interesting, and student oriented. With the assistance of many teachers in trial schools, the curriculum resources were carefully prepared, trialed, revised, trialed, and revised. The materials are comprehensive, balanced in opinions and values, and prepared at appropriate levels for students.

Yet preliminary evidence suggests that teacher reactions in large measure are less than positive and forthcoming. Other than awareness and appli-
cability to school syllabuses, a major constraining factor appears to be a lack of incentives to use the curriculum materials. Are teachers likely to teach the subject matter? For many they will avoid such material where it is perceived to clash with their existing subject material. A new national study will be undertaken in the near future to assess teacher response to the Discovering Democracy curriculum materials.

Student Performance. Will students learn the materials? Will they change and improve their civic participation? How will we know if they have? These are problematic questions for a national curriculum initiative implemented by different states and territories. The first response is that students need the opportunity to learn the material. If the curriculum opportunities are not present, it will be difficult for students to acquire such learning. The three previous sections address this problem from differing perspectives.

The nature and amount of student learning also reflects how we measure that learning. An outcomes-based approach has been used to address the issue of determining student performance. In New South Wales, for example, all new school syllabuses use outcomes statements as guides for student achievement. Similarly each of the Discovering Democracy units provides a limited range of outcomes statements or indicators of student achievement. This will facilitate compatibility between the units of work and the state syllabuses.

Student performance on the Discovering Democracy units can also be determined by means of a national assessment. This is the basis of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) study of civics in the United States (NAEP 1998). The NAEP Civics Consensus Project sought first to specify the civic knowledge and skills that students should possess at grades 4, 8 and 12, and second to present descriptions of achievement by which students' performance should be judged and reported (NAEP 1998). A similar study has been developed nationally and a benchmark-oriented study undertaken in New South Wales (Print & Gray 1997; Print, Gray, Gore, & Hughes 1997).

In 1998 the federal government funded a group of researchers to undertake the National Baseline Study in Civics. This project is now well under way and the first set of data should be published by 2000. The intention is that from this baseline study future regular studies will be conducted to gain an understanding of student performance at a national level. The evaluation of the Discovering Democracy curriculum materials will occur at a later stage.
Conclusions

The need for a comprehensive program to encourage civic understanding and participation by students has been well documented in the Australian literature. In particular, major concerns have been expressed at the "civics deficit" existing among Australian youth. The application of a program such as *Discovering Democracy* in Australian schools is considered essential if Australia is to remain a leading proponent of liberal democracy, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Given two aspects of our citizens' obligatory civic participation, namely compulsory voting in elections and participation in jury duty, a populace informed through civics programs in schools is a critical and logical beginning.

Awareness of a widely-based and profound civics deficit by Australian school students, clearly identified in recent research, has been a driving force in changing the attitudes of government leaders and the public alike. Despite the clear lack of student knowledge and understanding of civics and citizenship, student attitudes toward the need for learning about political processes within the broader school curriculum have been remarkably positive. Schools need to build on this sense of positivism and, armed with recently revised school syllabuses and curriculum resources from *Discovering Democracy*, should forge a learning environment which encourages students to become active and concerned citizens for the new millennium.

The *Discovering Democracy* program attempts to address perceived inadequacies in student civics understanding through provision of multi-level curriculum materials, teacher professional development, and support for those educators encouraging civics and citizenship education in schools. How effective these interventions will be in addressing the civics deficit is yet to be determined. The quality, range, and amount of curriculum resources suggest that citizenship education has a sound base from which to grow. Yet recent anecdotal evidence from schools, together with the learning opportunities provided through state curriculum documents, suggest that the implementation of civics in schools will be considerably more problematic.

Notes
1. "Whereas the people" are the beginning words of the Australian Constitution.
2. For half the Australian states the primary school years are K - 6, while the other half are K - 7. Consequently secondary or high school commences in either Year 7 or Year 8 and continues to Year 12. Compulsory schooling finishes at the end of Year 10.
References
Board of Studies, NSW. History 7-10 Syllabus. Sydney: Board of Studies, 1998b.
Board of Studies, NSW. Geography 7-10 Syllabus. Sydney: Board of Studies, 1998c.


Senate Select Committee on Employment, *Education and Training (SSCEET).* *Education for Active Citizenship Education in Australian Schools and Youth Organizations.* Canberra: AGPS, 1989.


## Appendix: Discovering Democracy Unit Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Middle Primary</th>
<th>Upper Primary</th>
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| **Who Rules?**         | Stories of the People and Rulers  
• Types of governance: absolute monarchy, direct and representative democracies  
• Citizenship and citizens' rights  
Contexts: Ancient Egypt, Ancient Greece, contemporary Australia | Parliament versus Monarch  
• From absolute to constitutional monarchy  
• Parliamentary power and the development of the Westminster system  
Contexts: the Magna Carta, King Charles I, contemporary Australia |
| **Law and Rights**     | Rules and Laws  
• Rules and laws: definition and comparison; purposes and functions  
• The qualities of good rules and laws  
• Types of law: customary and parliamentary  
Contexts: school and game rules, road law, Ancient Roman law, Aboriginal law, parliamentary law | The Law Rules  
• The qualities of good judicial process; elements of a fair trial, judicial independence and equality before the law  
Contexts: Historical and contemporary judicial procedure, operation of the law in early colonial and contemporary Australia, the Myall Creek massacre (case study) |
| **The Australian Nation** | We Remember  
• Symbols of state and nation  
• National celebrations, commemorations of significant lives and events over time  
Contexts: Historical and contemporary Australia | The People Make a Nation  
• Federation in Australia, arguments for and against  
• Structure and functions of federal government today  
Contexts: Pre-federation and contemporary Australia |
| **Citizens and Public Life** | Joining In  
• The nature, purpose, structures and procedures of community groups  
• Project planning and evaluation  
Contexts: School and community groups, Clean Up Australia Campaign, local government services | People Power  
• Citizen action  
• Strategies for achieving change  
Contexts: The Australian Freedom Rules, the Eight-Hour Day movement, the campaigns for equal pay and equal opportunities for women |
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<th>Theme</th>
<th>Lower Secondary</th>
<th>Middle Secondary</th>
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<td></td>
<td>• Types of governance;</td>
<td>• Political parties in Australia: origins, purposes, objectives,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- monarchy, aristocracy,</td>
<td>ideologies, constituencies, operations</td>
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<td>- tyranny, democracy</td>
<td>• Impact of the party system on parliament, pre-Federation to</td>
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<td>- Features of Australia’s</td>
<td>contemporary Australia</td>
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<td>system of representative</td>
<td>• Contexts: The 1949 and 1972</td>
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<td>democracy</td>
<td>Australian federal elections (case studies)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Contexts: Ancient Athens and</td>
<td>• A Democracy Destroyed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sparta, contemporary Australia</td>
<td>• Features of a democracy</td>
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<td>• Contexts: Nazi Germany;</td>
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<td>contemporary Australia</td>
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<td>Law and Rights</td>
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<td>A Democracy Destroyed</td>
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<td>• Origins of our law and its</td>
<td>• Use of the justice system</td>
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<td>development</td>
<td>for undemocratic purposes</td>
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<td>• Types of law: common,</td>
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<td>- statute, customary,</td>
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<td>- criminal and civil</td>
<td>of human rights and responsibilities</td>
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<td>• The Australian</td>
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<td>Constitution and the role</td>
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<td>of the High Court</td>
<td>• Protection of human rights in Australia</td>
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<td>• Elements of a fair trial</td>
<td>• Human rights of Australia</td>
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<td>• Aboriginal customary law (case study), club and national</td>
<td>• Australia's indigenous</td>
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<td>constitution, court operation</td>
<td>people over time</td>
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<td>• Contexts: The Declaration of</td>
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<td>the Declaration of Rights of Men and Citizen (France), the Bill of</td>
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<td>Rights (USA), UN Declaration of</td>
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<td>• Key elements of democracy</td>
<td>• Processes of federation:</td>
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<td>• Objectives and strategies of struggles to establish these elements in</td>
<td>rebellion and peaceful</td>
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<td>Britain and Australia</td>
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<td>• The establishment of franchise for Australian women and Indigenous people</td>
<td>• Constitutions as a basis</td>
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<td><strong>Contexts:</strong> Charism in mid-19th century Britain, the Eureka</td>
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<td>• The evolution of a</td>
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THE USES OF LITERATURE IN EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: LESSONS AND SUGGESTIONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

By Sandra Stotsky

Purpose

Those who seek to develop effective programs for civic education in the schools must confront a myriad of social issues—far more than they have had to contend with in the past. In some countries, there has been no authentic civic education. Their forms of government have not been based on the principles, values, and practices associated with a constitutional liberal democracy—those principles, values, and practices that cultivate the primacy of a people's civic identity or sense of membership in its civic communities. In such countries, there have been few if any public institutions or procedures in place to provide external support and concrete meaning for their efforts in civic education. In other countries, civic educators must deal with a legacy of highly nationalistic beliefs and informal practices that, overtly or implicitly, privilege as citizens only members of particular ethnic, racial, or religious groups and that denigrate or create hostility to other groups of people, whether or not they are in their midst (sometimes as citizens). In yet other countries, civic educators have to confront a deepening hostility to the inculcation of a national, or civic, identity in any form; much of this hostility emanates from those who espouse something called “cultural democracy,” or what Anthony Appiah calls “illiberal multiculturalism” in his essay review in an issue of the New York Review of Books (October 9, 1997). Civic educators must now address not only the usual problems of student motivation but also the anti-civic forces in the school curriculum arising from this illiberal form of multiculturalism—the effort, in Appiah’s words, to “close young people off into identities already ascribed to them.” Its effect is to make students think that they bear no per-
sonal responsibility for their thinking or behavior because—so the illiberal multiculturalist claims—both are determined by their "culture" or "race, ethnicity, or gender" (1997, 33).

In developing programs for civic education, civic educators tend to draw on particular academic disciplines for the content of their programs: political science, political philosophy, sociology, social psychology, economics, history, and jurisprudence, although not necessarily all of them in any one country. The one discipline they tend to overlook for its potential contribution to civic education, both to strengthen it and to address these anti-civic forces, is literary study. Yet, National Standards for Civics and Government, a widely praised document specifying what K-12 students should know and be able to do in civics and government courses in the U.S., notes that achievement of the standards should be fostered in related subjects, including literature (Center for Civic Education 1994, 5).

A decade ago, I began to explore the contribution of literary study to civic education. What had other scholars written on the topic? And what was taking place in literature programs in U.S. schools? To my surprise, I could find only one literary scholar who clearly saw a relationship between the particular works that Americans read and the development of those attitudes, concepts, and values required for the preservation of the American experiment in self-government. In his preface to Jeffersonianism and the American Novel, Howard Mumford Jones observed that in our political culture, the adult American is understood to be "a being capable of both rational and moral choice" (1966, xi). Upon this assumption, he wrote, "the republic rests." And yet, in his survey of American novels of the twentieth century, Jones found that this view of the individual as an autonomous moral being had been, if not obliterated, then seriously weakened. Jones was not looking at what was in the school curriculum, however, only at the contribution twentieth-century American writers were making to the republic of letters from a civic perspective.

In my explorations of what is in the literature curriculum today, I have found the near disappearance of a portrait of the average American as a rational, decent human being. And I have found a strong expression of all the anti-civic tendencies associated with illiberal multiculturalism. I will of necessity use the U.S. experience to describe the anti-civic forces now at work in the literature curriculum and to explain why they exist. The ultimate purpose of this essay is to suggest how literature programs can honor the essence of literary study (that is, the teaching of literature as literature) and at the same time strengthen the underpinnings of a constitutional democracy centered on individual rights and a concept of personal responsibility. I will also use examples chiefly from American and British literature to
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illustrate my suggestions, although the literature of any country, I believe, can be drawn on as support for civic education.

To explain anti-civic forces in our school literature programs and why they exist, we need to look first at the purposes and content of literary study at the time it became a subject in American schools and note how they evolved in the twentieth century. Contrary to a current academic myth, literature was not taught for ideological purposes throughout most of the twentieth century. Nor was there ever a literary canon in the curriculum, if by canon we mean a fixed body of works taught from generation to generation. This myth has been used by those who now seek to use literature for ideological purposes and to exploit or remove from the curriculum altogether all the works now in it that do not lend themselves to ideological uses.

Literary Study at the Secondary Level in the Nineteenth Century

Until about the turn of the twentieth century, secondary students usually studied individual literary works or excerpts as part of lessons in reading, composition, or public speaking. When literature was studied for its own sake, it tended to be accompanied by study of the history of literature, often with much more attention paid to the history than to the literature. Generally, textbooks were organized chronologically, dealing first with the life and works of the author, and then presenting long extracts or whole poems from the author’s writings, together with brief literary “thought gems” to be committed to memory. At the time that literary study became a high school subject in its own right, at the beginning of the twentieth century, cultural content evolved from classical works to chiefly English literature, with American literature taught as a separate subject.

The study of English and American literature became a full-fledged subject in the secondary curriculum after the Committee of Ten, a group of distinguished college presidents and secondary school headmasters, set forth its educational priorities for all subjects in the nation’s secondary schools in the 1890s (National Education Association 1892, 27). The objectives of English study, according to its subcommittee on English, were “to enable the pupil to understand the expressed thoughts of others and to give expression to thoughts of his own” and “to cultivate a taste for reading, to give the pupil some acquaintance with good literature and to furnish him with the means of extending that acquaintance.” It assigned to English teachers the task of not only providing students with good literature, but also motivating them to want to read it, even when their school days were over. It called for the reading of whole works and denounced manuals of literary
history. It warned that the “committing to memory of names and dates should not be mistaken for culture” (National Education Association 1892, 32). The subcommittee recommended that some books be read in class, others “cursory,” that students give written and oral reports on their reading, and that time be given to discussion in the classroom. It suggested the parallel study of some works as well. It vigorously favored one English course for all students; it saw “no excuse” for a two- or three-track system.

Influenced by the Committee of Ten’s recommendations and by changes in the college entrance examinations, high schools began to introduce contemporary works such as those by Charles Dickens and George Eliot. More important, literary study became a regular subject in the high school curriculum, necessitating the use of literature anthologies to help teachers with the task of providing their students with good literature three periods a week, every week for the entire school year, and for four continuous years. The emphasis shifted almost completely from a study of the lives and works of great writers to the actually reading of their works.

In a collection of essays and addresses published in 1898, the purposes for literary study were again articulated by Charles William Eliot, the President of Harvard University and the chairman of the Committee of Ten. What is important here is that he placed literary study in the context of democratic education. As Eliot saw it, the aim of democratic education was “to lift the whole population to a higher plane of intelligence, conduct, and happiness. From education, there should result in the child a taste for interesting and improving reading, which should direct and inspire its subsequent intellectual life. That schooling, which results in this taste for good reading . . . has achieved a main end of elementary education” (Eliot 1898, 403 and 407).

Driving this concern for developing taste in reading was a particular view of “culture,” a term with many meanings then and now. As one scholar of this period notes, culture could refer “in an Emersonian sense to the possession of broad sympathies and varied interests, or to a set of carefully inculcated values, moral as well as aesthetic, or, increasingly after 1850 to something one acquired, much like other conspicuous possessions, as a mark of social status” (Witt 1968). Literary study was recommended to be a required high school subject by the educational reformers because they believed that an interest in reading widely, a familiarity with literary masterpieces, and the capacity to make judgments about what was good or inferior writing were characteristics of a cultured person and thus the appropriate aims of a literary education.

This educational philosophy heavily influenced the stated purposes of literature anthologies used in American high schools from the middle of the
nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, regardless of the literature in them or the pedagogical approach. In 44 English literature textbooks published between mid-nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century, the aim most frequently mentioned was the development of literary taste—helping students learn how to choose the best reading materials (Witt 1968). Other aims mentioned encompassed the development of an appreciation of great literary masterpieces, the enjoyment of reading good literature, the tracing of literary changes, the building of mental discipline, and laying the foundation for future study. In 66 American literature textbooks published from 1870 to 1952, the aims most frequently mentioned included the development of “culture,” the relationship of literature to history, and the enjoyment of good literature (Dunmire 1954).

I point out these aims because a tension between two general groups of aims seems to have existed from the very beginning of literary study in this country. Many educators have always had grand objectives for students—an appreciation of great literary works, a capacity to discern good literature from “trash” once they left school, an improved moral character, a life-long interest in reading literature, and, for some students, the possibility of contributing to the development of American letters (Witt 1968). But other educators have had more limited and immediate objectives. They saw literary study useful for helping students acquire a veneer of “culture,” for developing skills in reading, writing, and speaking, or for providing the discipline and background necessary for advanced or post-secondary study. Despite the intrinsic appeal of the first set of objectives to most teachers of literature, practical concerns have almost always led the schools to put a premium on short-term rewards and limited goals (Witt 1968).

The fundamental concern for those who have viewed the teaching of literature as a humanizing and morally elevating experience has been the abuse that literature has suffered whenever it has been used in an academic setting for an ulterior motive, whether to prepare students for college or to advance a particular ideology. Indeed, they feared that the use of literature as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself, was inherent in an academic setting; teachers must have something to teach to justify their existence (Witt 1968). Little could they have suspected in the first half of the twentieth century the ulterior purposes for which literature would be used in the last decades of the twentieth century.

Changes in Cultural Content of Major Works Taught in the Twentieth Century

Dramatic changes took place in the major titles read by secondary school students from the beginning of the twentieth century to the most recent
decade. The first survey in this century to present tabled information was conducted in 1907 for the English profession by George Tanner. He reported on information gathered from 67 high schools, grades 9 to 12, in the Middle West. The list he compiled was heavily British; of the 40 most frequently assigned works, only nine are by American authors. There were few contemporary works on the list, whether essays, poems, plays, or novels (Tanner 1907, 37-54).

Three recent surveys of major works read in American secondary schools clearly show how much has changed since the beginning of the century. In 1964, Scarvia Anderson reported the results of a nation-wide survey undertaken by the Educational Testing Service. Of the top 42 works assigned by 5% or more of public schools, grades 7-12 (in 222 representative schools and 7,121 classrooms in these schools), 18 authors are American. Many have adolescent protagonists (e.g., Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet*, Mark Twain’s *Tom Sawyer* and *Huckleberry Finn*, Charles Dicken’s *Great Expectations*, Harper Lee’s *To Kill a Mockingbird*, John Steinbeck’s *The Pearl*, Robert Louis Stevenson’s *Treasure Island*, Marjorie Kinnan Rawling’s *The Yearling*, and Esther Forbes’s *Johnny Tremain*), in part a reflection of the literature used in grades 7 and 8. We also find a number of works featuring a woman as a central focus or character (e.g., Besier’s *The Barretts of Wimpole Street*, Longfellow’s *Evangeline*, Bronte’s *Jane Eyre*, Rodgers and Hammerstein’s *The King and I*, Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice*, Goldsmith’s *She Stoops to Conquer*, Shaw’s *Pygmalion*, and Hawthorne’s *The Scarlet Letter*). Some of these works are distinctly contemporary (e.g., *The Pearl*, *The Yearling*, *To Kill a Mockingbird*). Only 12 of these 42 titles are on Tanner’s 1907 list, although there are more works by Shakespeare and Dickens on the 1964 list than on the 1907 list.

In a nation-wide survey of 322 representative schools in 1989, Arthur Applebee found that 26 of the top 43 titles in 5% or more of public schools, grades 7 to 12, are by Americans. About 26 reflect contemporary life, and except for George Orwell’s *1984* and *Animal Farm*, and William Golding’s *Lord of the Flies*, they are all by Americans. As with Anderson’s list, many of these works have adolescents as protagonists. Of interest is that only four of these titles are on Tanner’s 1907 list.

Despite differences in methodology and in the questions each study asked, a survey sponsored by the New England Association of Teachers of English (NEATE) in 1990 turned up results very similar to Applebee’s (Stotsky & Anderson, 1-11). The information in the NEATE survey came from secondary school members of this organization who had responded to a questionnaire asking them what ten well-known and ten less well-known titles they would recommend to their colleagues based on their own expe-
rience in teaching these works. Of special interest here is that only five of the top 45 works recommended by these secondary English teachers are on Tanner’s 1907 list. And 29 are by American authors.

Changes in Cultural Content of Literature Anthologies in the Twentieth Century

Not surprisingly, the cultural changes in literature anthologies paralleled those in the major works studied in the schools. A survey published in 1963 by James Lynch and Bertrand Evans, two professors of English, gives us a base with which to compare changes in content since then. Lynch and Evans examined 72 literature anthologies for grades 9 to 12 published between 1949 and 1961, analyzing almost every textbook that they found in use, including series designed for less able readers. They approached their analysis with the philosophy that literature anthologies “should be the repositories of the very best ever thought and written in the spirit of the humanistic tradition and the Anglo-American heritage” (Lynch & Evans 1963, 5). Table 1, which is adapted from their book, shows the distribution of the contents of these 72 anthologies according to the nationality of the author (Lynch & Evans 1963, 149).

Table 1: Distribution of Contents of 72 Anthologies in Lynch and Evans (1963) According to the Nationality of the Author (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Foreign (in translation)</th>
<th>Classical (Greek/Roman)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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</table>

As Table 1 shows, the vast majority of selections were by American authors by mid-century, with less than 10% from non-British foreign sources. Among their chief concerns, Lynch and Evans noted the excessive reliance upon “a spate of nonliterary, nonfictional, ‘informational’ materials more suitable at their best to the daily newspaper...” And they reported the almost total absence in grades 9 and 10 of “literature written before 1930, to say nothing of before 1900.” Table 2, adapted from their book, shows the distribution of content according to date (in percentages). Noting the stated purpose of many of these anthologies, Lynch and Evans pointed out rather caustically that an acquaintance with “Our cultural heritage... remains little more than a promise when the anthologies for half the high school course in literature almost completely ignore all literature old enough to have become part of anyone’s heritage” (Lynch & Evans 1963, 151).
Table 2: Distribution of Contents in 72 Anthologies in Lynch and Evans (1963) According to Date (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Pre-Twentieth Century</th>
<th>Twentieth Century</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Judging large quantities of the writing in these anthologies to be “mediocre, trivial, or dated,” Lynch and Evans proposed that in conjunction with “faulty criteria for selection” the “restrictive” effect of many of the organizing schemes within the anthologies—in particular, topical organization—was the major reason for the presence of such selections. Topical organization, they observed, could contain little or no literature. It “put literature in a subordinate position”—for use for non-literary purposes. The function of literature, they asserted, is not bibliotherapeutic. Nor is its function to treat sociological topics. A work of literature, they declared flatly, “is not a social tract.” Nor is it intended to inculcate virtue—whether social or personal—by teaching it directly. The basic function of literature as they expressed it is to “humanize,” not to “socialize.” Nevertheless, despite their warning about choosing and using literature to inculcate social virtue and about the unsuitability of using topics drawn from the social sciences as organizing schemes for literature anthologies, the anti-literary tendencies they spotted in the selection criteria and organizational schemes in these post-World War II anthologies did not diminish.

A survey of literature anthologies by Applebee in 1991 analyzed the seven leading series of literature anthologies for grades 7 to 12 copyrighted in 1989. Applebee found unchanged the America-centered curriculum apparent in the anthologies examined by Lynch and Evans. From grade 7 to grade 10, selections by British writers ranged from 12% to 20%, while between 68% and 79% of the selections for grades 7 to 10 were by authors whose “place of origin” was in “North America” (Applebee 1991). Moreover, the dates for the selections in grades 9 and 10 in the Applebee study did not differ by much from those in the Lynch and Evans study, although, as Table 3 shows, the past had disappeared a little more by 1989. Table 3, based on one of Applebee’s tables, also shows that the balance between the twentieth and pre-twentieth centuries in grade 11, where American literature is usually taught chronologically, remains identical to that in the Lynch and Evans study.

However, we face a curious problem in interpreting Applebee’s percentages on authors because his study did not make clear why he chose to
Table 3. Distribution of Contents of 28 Anthologies in Applebee (1989) According to Date (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Pre-Twentieth Century</th>
<th>Twentieth Century</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
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substitute “place of origin” for “nationality of author,” the descriptive term in the Lynch and Evans study, and what he meant by “North America.” The North American continent is generally understood to include Mexico and Canada, the first a Spanish-speaking country, and the second a country with a large French-speaking population. Thus, Applebee’s percentages are not necessarily comparable to Lynch and Evans’s.

In any event, we do see in Applebee’s survey the characteristics of the selections in the anthologies that appear to be of greatest interest to him—and to the academic audience to which he is writing—the color and gender of the author. He notes that “over the past 30 years, literature anthologies have broadened their selections to include a wider representation of works by women and of works from alternative literary traditions” and that it is particularly true in the volumes intended for use in grades 7 to 10 (Applebee 1989, 114). His results indicate that, in the anthologies for grades 7 and 8, about 21% of the authors are non-white (these are the authors who are considered to reflect “alternative literary traditions”), while 30% of the authors are female. Overall, he reports, between 26% and 30% of the selections in the anthologies for grades 7 to 10 were written by women.

The results of all these surveys clearly indicate the shift over the twentieth century from a predominantly British curriculum to a predominantly American one. The surveys document the fact that changes began before mid-century, showing that English teachers, like all responsible professionals, continuously updated their literature programs. By the 1960s, to judge from Anderson’s survey, almost half of the top 40 or so titles were by Americans. The surveys also suggest the extent to which changes continued to be made to these mid-century changes. Only 18 of the 43 titles on Applebee’s 1989 survey are on Anderson’s list (a change of 68%), while only 16 or the 45 books on the NEATE survey are on Anderson’s list (a change of 64%). Finally, we see in the results of the NEATE survey the beginnings of the movement to include works with ethnic content as part of American literature. What is perhaps most remarkable about the cultural shift from a British-oriented curriculum to an America-centered one over the course of the twentieth century is that it seems to be virtually unre-
marked upon in the academic world and in the professional literature for English teachers. University educators have apparently been too busy denouncing an unchanging “Eurocentric” canon in the school curriculum to notice.

We can also see in our literary history a shift in what is considered important in a literature curriculum. What was of great concern in Lynch and Evans study seems to be of least concern in Applebee’s study—the quality of the literary selections themselves. His study has almost nothing to say about what might still appear to many English teachers to be of paramount importance. This is an important part, but only one part, of the trade-off that seems to have taken place in the editorial thinking behind the selections in some current literature anthologies.

**Forces for Change in Recent Decades**

What impelled so many of the changes in content in school literature programs in the past three decades? One major reason for the focus on the color and gender of the author can be clearly seen in the table of contents for a leading anthology published in 1964. I use this anthology only as an example, as the situation can be generalized to the other anthologies in use at the time. In this 700 page anthology (Pooley, et al. 1964), which could have been used in grade 9 or 10, there is only one selection by a black American—six pages from Booker T. Washington’s autobiography describing his struggle for an education. Only fourteen selections are by women, and most are poems. It is against a background of almost complete neglect of female writers and writers from America’s racial and ethnic subgroups in particular that we must understand the changes in the contents of literature anthologies not only in the 30 years between the Lynch and Evans study and Applebee’s survey, but also in the years following 1989.

Both positive and negative forces have fueled these needed changes in the past 30 years. The positive push has come from those appealing to the generous sympathies that most American educators have always had for the underdog and to the genuine interest the best teachers have always had in extending their knowledge of our own and other cultures. During the 1960s and 1970s, many English educators began to urge recognition and inclusion of racial and ethnic literature in the school curriculum on the grounds that a course called American Literature misled students about the nature and content of American writing if it did not do so. As a report of the 1987 English Coalition Conference suggested, students “should be invited to read deeply in our diverse literary traditions, including writing by men and women of many racial, ethnic, and cultural groups” (Lunsford & Lloyd-Jones 1989, 3). If the criterion was good literature, they and others argued, then many
authors from American ethnic and racial groups deserved recognition on that basis alone. More literature from countries around the world was also recommended on the grounds that greater knowledge of the world was needed. As the co-authors of a textbook for English educators stated, we needed "to recognize that no country or part of the world has a monopoly on literature; that quite often English and American literature is indebted, in one way or another, to Continental, Near Eastern, and Far Eastern literature" (Lazarus & Knudson 1967, 7).

Unfortunately, this positive message has been completely drowned out in the past two decades by the withering sarcasm of other "educators" who chose to use divisive strategies based on differences in gender and race to make their case. They have regularly applied political labels and a political cast to any attempt at counter-argument to what they have arbitrarily decided is just. In so doing, they created an intimidating environment in which educators with any reservations or questions about the directions urged by the most radical of these sarcastic and negative voices became reluctant to articulate in public any critique at all when they felt that compensation for past neglect might have gone beyond reasonable civic considerations and was no longer compensatory in spirit.

As an example of the divisive strategies and the sarcasm used by those promoting changes in the literature curriculum in the past few decades, we need look no further than the comments of three English "educators" in four reviews of the leading literature anthologies published in 1989. In all four reviews, published between 1989 and 1991 in the leading journal for secondary school English teachers, the reviewers consistently expressed their animus against works written by "dead writers" or, as they were called in one review, "DOWGs" ("dead old white guys"). Literary selections written by "DOWGs," they declared, will not "inspire students to learn nor teachers to teach and learn." In their view, writers should be able to speak "directly to the experience of many adolescents" and to "concerns that adolescents are likely to have in the 1990s." In fact, students "must be empowered to make and respect their own decisions about what they read" (Appleby, Johnson & Taylor 1989, 77-80).

The reviewers' assumption is clear: once an author dies, his works no longer have anything to say to contemporary adolescents, especially if the dead writer was a white male. Instead of making a positive case for the works of those living writers they believed deserved to be anthologized, they chose mostly to attack the dead. They complained that "nearly half of the poets among the recent literature selections [in the grade 11 anthology in one series] were dead" and saw this "homage to the dead" continuing in its grade 12 anthology. They even scorned the recent dead who in some
cases speak from “alternative literary traditions” themselves, despite being “white.” For example, the reviewers described Bernard Malamud (a Jewish-American writer) and Harry Mark Petrakis (a Greek-American writer) as the “most geriatric” short-story writers in a grade 11 anthology. On the other hand, in the same review, they praised the inclusion of a “deeply moving letter by Bartolomeo Vanzetti on the eve of his execution”—a nice example of hypocrisy. That Vanzetti was also dead and a white male did not seem to matter when the writer’s message had a political cast that suited the reviewers (Appleby, Johnson & Taylor 1990, 86-90).

Not only do authors seem to become irrelevant upon death, they also automatically enter the ranks of “conservatism.” A poetry section in one anthology was scorned for its “conservative list of authors” precisely because it contained few “living” authors. In all four reviews, the epithet “conservative” is regularly applied to any anthology or any section of an anthology with too many dead writers to suit the reviewers’ taste. A twelfth grade text that included George Herbert was called “a study in conservatism.” Anthologies for grade 11 and 12, the only two years of literary study that must include the past, were almost consistently criticized for not including enough of the present, even though the present has always been amply provided for in the other ten years. The existence of a “canon” was also regularly claimed, but in a puzzling way. One anthology was criticized for reflecting “the literary canon as seen in the 1950s,” another for reflecting the “canon as it existed in the 1960s” (Appleby, Johnson & Taylor 1990, 86-90), implicitly raising the question of how a “canon” that changed every decade could still be called a “canon” (Appleby, Johnson & Tayler 1991, 93-96).

Altogether, these reviews make clear that the quality of literary selections in the anthologies was of as little interest to these reviewers as it was to Applebee (1989 & 1991). The color, gender, and vital signs of the authors are for them, apparently, the critical features of the selections. There is nothing to suggest that a love for reading, development of taste, and a broad acquaintance with literary masterpieces from our own and other cultures matter. In this approach to the curriculum, we find the anti-civic forces at work.

The Literary Sources of Anti-Civic Education

What are the sources of anti-civic education in the literature curriculum today? One is the exclusion of this country’s genuine diversity from the curriculum. Clearly, no reasonable person can quarrel with the notion that students should be able to read good literature by or about members of different social groups in their country as part of their school programs. And
few educators in the U.S. did when the case was made in the late 1960s; the early advocates of multicultural literature claimed to seek inclusion, not exclusion. Although its chief focus was, understandably, black literature, other American ethnic groups were included as well, the specific ones depending on author or publisher or classroom teacher. This was certainly the case in anthologies of ethnic literature offered by educational and non-educational publishers. While works by black writers were almost always featured in these compilations, they also tended to include literature about Irish Americans, Jewish Americans, and Italian Americans. At the time, ethnicity was not coextensive with race. The ethnic experience (except for blacks and Native Americans) was understood as an immigrant experience. This experience quite visibly included the experiences of European ethnic groups, and the ethnic or immigrant experience was seen as a transitional experience as newcomers became acculturated as Americans. However, when the shift from the term “ethnic minority” to “multicultural” began in the 1970s, it coincided with the notion that the ethnic or immigration experience should not be seen as a transition into the American mainstream. The illiberal and anti-civic ideology that began to develop at this time emphasized race, ethnicity, and gender as the determinants of individual thought and behavior.

By the mid-1990s, the immigrant experience of European ethnic groups is almost non-existent in both high school literature anthologies as well as the elementary school reading series, and “diversity” consists of a few common categories despite occasional hints at real diversity. For example, Scott Foresman has published an anthology called Multicultural Voices that it recommends as an elective supplement to its literature anthology series for grades 7 to 12. Although the four-page brochure describing it states that the anthology “celebrates the immense diversity of American culture” and includes recent works by “Americans of varied cultural backgrounds—African, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, European, and Middle Eastern,” this description is highly misleading. Almost all the works are by members of the four affirmative action categories, and there is exactly one work about an identifiable European ethnic group—“The Wooing of Ariadne” by Harry Mark Petrakis, an American of Greek ancestry. It stands out like a sore thumb in this collection. On the other hand, the editors of an anthology entitled Multicultural Perspectives, published by McDougal, Littell as part of its Responding to Literature Series, have made a clean sweep of European ethnic groups—a sort of literary ethnic cleansing, if you will—apparently deciding that only members of the “four affirmative action categories” have retained their “cultural identities” and have “unique heritages” that can strengthen and enrich America (Foote, et al 1993, 4).
Multiculturalism has come to conceptualize diversity in very narrow terms not only within this country but outside its boundaries as well. For its Elements of Literature series, Holt, Rinehart and Winston lists five major groups: the "four affirmative action groups" and a fifth group called "Other"—the only category that indicates a few ethnic groups other than those in the four affirmative action categories. This label—"Other"—hints at how all non-members of the four affirmative action categories in this country may soon be portrayed.

The battle over who's in and who's out is not over, despite the seeming monopoly by the four affirmative action categories on the direction of the changes in ethnic content in our readers and literature anthologies. Whether peoples judged to be "of color" should be the chief or only ethnic groups featured in multicultural literary materials seems to be a prominent bone of contention among those who write books promoting multicultural literature. Dissension, as well as a lack of internal inconsistency, is quite visible in recent works for educators and librarians.

The exclusion of the authentic diversity of Americans from the literature curriculum is of serious concern because illiberal multiculturalism, unlike liberal multiculturalism, seeks to use the literature curriculum as the means to enhance the political power of certain "cultural groups" that can in some way be viewed as non-European American. This motivation has led to the selection of texts for the literature curriculum that have little literary quality or are not literary in nature at all (such as family chronicles, ordinary diaries, or outright journalism). Selections appear to be chosen on the basis of whether they enhance the image of social groups considered outside the American mainstream.

A second source of anti-civic education in the literature curriculum is racial or cultural stereotyping directed against white groups of European ancestry. European ethnic groups have generally disappeared from the literature (and history) curriculum and been lumped with white Protestant Americans in order to portray prejudice primarily in racial terms. Selections abound in classrooms today that portray members of racial minority groups primarily as "saints" or victims of white oppression, such as those in Toni Morrison's The Bluest Eye, Leslie Silko's Ceremony (about the problems of native Indians in contemporary America), or Jeanne Wakatsuki and James Houston's Farewell to Manzanar (about the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II).

At a time when the concern is to improve race relations, reverse cultural stereotyping amounting to a blanket condemnation of a whole group or race of people as oppressors is no more morally acceptable than the original stereotypes educators sought to redress. But more important, pervasive
reverse racial or cultural stereotypes may have unhealthy effects on white Americans. They may at first elicit guilt about the racism, sexism, environmental destruction, immorality, and greed that some white Americans and Europeans have been guilty of. But guilt is rarely a stable or healthy psychological mechanism for motivating good deeds. Inevitably pervasive reverse stereotyping may arouse anger and then indifference or an attempt to point out the same flaws in others, especially when it is obvious from real world information and experience that the suggested cultural dichotomy between the virtuous and the vicious, here and abroad, is a false one. Further, the presence and acceptance of reverse cultural stereotypes suggests a double standard—that it is acceptable to stereotype white Americans and Europeans in general, but not others. The writers of such works (and those who promote their use) thus invite charges of hypocrisy and dishonesty. Ultimately the moral stature of those who have been, and may still be, the victims of the earlier stereotypes is degraded, and sympathy lost.

Such works may also leave both white and non-white American readers indifferent to or actively opposed to the needs of our civic communities. Why should they want to be honest, taxpaying, and socially responsible citizens of this country if they believe that white Americans almost without exception have been and remain irreparably racist, environmentally destructive, and morally depraved? Indeed, if all students come to believe from their school curriculum, their literary and artistic culture, and the media that all political, intellectual, and moral values associated with the West and especially the Enlightenment are tainted, that a society based on individual rights and the notion of individual responsibility is incapable of social justice, they may well believe those who claim that social justice would be better advanced by the elevation of group rights over individual rights, and by a cultural democracy that preempts self-definition, genuine individual choice, and, hence, moral and intellectual growth.

Constructing Literature Programs to Strengthen Civic Education

Anthony Appiah points out in his review (1997, 31-33) that the “primary demand of multiculturalism—to teach children mutual tolerance and respect—does not mean, as many contemporary advocates of multiculturalism assume, that the curriculum must be radically changed by the addition of a large number of new subjects.” To open “young people to a variety of social identities in the world” does not mean that one also has to force them “to live within separate spheres defined by the common culture of their race, religion, or ethnicity.” He goes on to note that “naturally, there must be some sort of official culture. Government has to go on in a small
number of languages and is most easily conducted in one. For people to identify with the nation, they need some kind of public history, some national meanings, what Rousseau called a ‘civil religion’.” Quoting from Michael Walzer’s latest work, he agrees that the “American liberal tradition, which constitutes the political core of our official culture... has its origins, at least, in Protestant and English history,” and should require, for a multicultural education, “not the subtraction of the liberal story from the curriculum but the addition of other stories.” But how the other stories get added to the curriculum is the crux of the matter today, and this critical problem Appiah doesn’t address. He is right to say that there is no tension between a “liberal multiculturalism” and the requirements of liberal citizenship if these other stories do not force on each child its “proper” identity. But if these stories inculcate scorn or hatred for those who belong to the Protestant or white majority and convey the notion that individual rights and the concept of individual responsibility for one’s thinking and behavior are simply a facade behind which white dominance hides, then authentic civic education is subverted.

There are several ways in which literature programs can be constructed to maintain the teaching of literature as a humanizing and morally elevating experience and to strengthen the basis for liberal constitutional democracy and for American citizenship in particular. First, literature programs should be designed so that all students, regardless of ethnic or racial background, are exposed to the full range of ethnic and racial diversity in this country, thus undercutting the notion that the concept of diversity singularly signals racial differences. This means including works about the European ethnic experience in America. There are fine literary works about nearly every European ethnic group in America. They address a variety of themes beyond those dealing with exploitation or discrimination, focus on the often complex relationships of one ethnic group to another as well as to the dominant culture, and can be meaningfully grouped with works about groups in the four affirmative action categories to show the frequent parallels in their assimilatory patterns over several generations. However, as Appiah implies, the shaping of children’s cultural or religious identity should not be undertaken by public schools through the literature that is chosen for their classroom programs. That is their parents’ responsibility. It is as important to separate ethnicity and state as it is to separate church and state.

Second, teachers should ensure that the literature by or about a variety of social groups is not chiefly “white guilt” (or white male guilt) literature. No student or group will benefit from a fairy-tale curriculum in which all non-white (or female) characters are virtuous and all white (or male) characters are bigoted, hateful, morally confused, alienated, or nihilistic. Such
a literature program inevitably breeds contempt for the literature and a lack of sympathy for the "virtuous" groups. This also means that teachers are responsible for considering the possible moral, or rhetorical, effects of whatever is deemed a work of literature in judging its suitability for the K-12 classroom. Truly good literature rarely contains stock characters, nor is it didactic in intent.

Third, literature programs need to retain a central place for works in our literary and civic heritage, some of which come from classical sources, others from non-American and non-British sources, that can advance understanding of central civic concept because they reflect clearly the values sustaining a liberal constitutional democracy—its legal principles and its political institutions. For example, the concept of civil disobedience and the acceptance of the legal penalty are found in the writing of Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Or the notion of a legal system that effectively protects the rights of individuals, which is discussed in Terrence Rattigan's The Winslow Boy and Jerome Lawrence and Robert Lee's Inherit the Wind, one a British play, the other American. Or the idea that individuals can maintain their integrity and still win, achieve, or live, as it appears in Twain's Huckleberry Finn, Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead or Romain Roland's Jean Christophe. Or the idea that one's integrity is worth maintaining even in the face of certain death, as it is portrayed in the Trial of Socrates, Antigone, and Robert Bolt's Man for All Seasons. Or such values as the work ethic, initiative, and self-reliance, which are emphasized in Benjamin Franklin's autobiography and Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on self-reliance. Or how cynicism or evil results when laws are corrupted or not observed, which is the theme of Clark's The Oxbow Incident and Di Lampedusa's The Leopard. Or the tensions and political power plays within a democracy that suggest how difficult it is to make it work, which are exemplified in Robert Penn Warren's All the King's Men and Edwin O'Connor's The Last Hurrah. Or the elements of effective leadership in a democracy, as it is powerfully illustrated by Winston Churchill's speeches during World War II or by Franklin Delano Roosevelt's " Fireside Chats."

Finally, to use good works of literature for the cause of civic education in perhaps the most powerful and productive way, I would recommend multidisciplinary approaches at the high school level that link philosophical readings (taught in either a philosophy or a humanities course) and important historical documents with appropriate literary works, each integrated set of readings illustrating the treatment of an important civic concept. For example, to highlight the use and abuse of power, one could link excerpts from Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer with such documents as The Federalist Papers and The Declaration of Independence, and with such
literary works as Animal Farm, Antigone, Oedipus Rex, All the King’s Men, and Ayn Rand’s Anthem. To address the nature of man, one could link selections from Locke, Rousseau, Mill, Jefferson, Plato’s Republic, and Chapter 3 of Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents with The Federalist Papers and with such literary works as The Bacchae, Lord of the Flies, Tennessee Willia’s A Streetcar Named Desire, and Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. Newer literary works, as well as works from countries around the world, can always be brought into these sets of readings, expanding students’ understanding of them in a larger historical and political context.

According to the preface of the National Standards for Civics and Government, the purpose of civic education is to help develop “competent and responsible citizens who possess a reasoned commitment to the fundamental values and principles that are essential to the preservation and improvement of American constitutional democracy” (Center for Civic Education 1994. 1). Its introductory pages go on to note that effective and responsible participation of “competent citizens committed to the fundamental values and principles of American constitutional democracy” requires not only the “acquisition of a body of knowledge and of intellectual and participatory skills” but also the “development of certain dispositions or traits of character that enhance the individual’s capacity to participate in the political process and contribute to the healthy functioning of the political system and improvement of society.” As these statements suggest, civic education in the United States is clearly tailored to a particular form of representative self-government. In addition, the schools are to foster the “dispositions or traits of character” that sustain loyalty to its political values and principles—such as openness, honesty, acceptance of personal responsibility, tolerance of other’s beliefs, and respect for individual rights (Center for Civic Education 1994. 1-11).

Why is it so important for the schools to cultivate understanding of and allegiance to the specific principles embedded in American constitutional democracy, and to foster the values sustaining them as well? Because shared political principles and values are the only source of the bonds of mutual respect and responsibility in a country whose people have no shared ethnicity, race, religion, class, ancestral language, or national origin. Without this commitment and these values, citizens of the United States have no common ground when attempting to resolve peacefully the conflicts among these principles and values that inevitably arise in the ordinary course of social and political life.

In this context, K-12 teachers have a professional and civic obligation to cultivate their students’ sense of membership in their civic communities—those communities that are governed by our laws and that are sup-
posed to reflect our political values. No matter what else they consider themselves, students need to acquire a civic identity as American citizens, an identity superseding all their other identities. And to do so, they must be able to take pride in that identity. The way in which the U.S. must develop a civic identity among American students will undoubtedly differ from the way in which most other countries seek to do so. But, despite some national differences, those countries seeking to develop civic-minded citizens who can participate in the ongoing and never completed work of a liberal constitutional democracy also need to develop their students' civic identity. They must be careful not to succumb to illiberal multicultural sirens claiming that a civic identity is oppressive, and that our thinking and behavior are shaped solely by our gender, race, and ethnicity.

A positive civic identity based on the worth, dignity, freedom, and integrity of the individual is the chief bulwark against the totalizing thought of those on either the right or the left who would give complete precedence to the claims of often artificial communities—or, more precisely, to the demands of often self-appointed spokespersons—over those of the individual and his or her rights to liberty. Literature teachers have a prominent role to play in the development of our individual uniqueness and our common humanity, and they will find resources in their own national literature as well as in the literature of other countries to preserve the best fruits of the Enlightenment, if they consciously and conscientiously seek them.

Notes
2. This quotation from Witt's doctoral dissertation is taken from the Abstract of this work.
References


Sandra Stotsky


RESOURCES IN ERIC ON EDUCATION
FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

By Elizabeth R. Osborn

In recent years, the interrelationship between schooling, democracy, and citizenship has attracted renewed interest from scholars, school administrators, and government officials. Established democracies, reinstated democracies, and new democracies are all working together to determine how schools can best be used to prepare students for their roles as citizens in a democracy. As the world's largest and oldest source of educational information, ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center) is a valuable resource for materials and information about education for democratic citizenship.

The ERIC Information System is a part of the U.S. Department of Education's National Library of Education. The System consists of sixteen clearinghouses, each of which acquires current education-related materials for the ERIC database in specific subject areas (e.g., social studies/social science education). The ERIC database contains records consisting of citations with abstracts for two types of materials: education-related journal articles and education-related documents such as policy papers, state curriculum guides, conferences presentations, research reports, teaching units, and lesson plans.

ERIC records may be accessed in several ways. Public Internet access to the ERIC database is available through the World Wide Web, telnet, and gopher sites. In addition, the ERIC database is available at many large public and university libraries. For more information contact ACCESS ERIC at (800) 538-3742 or visit the system-wide ERIC World Wide Web site at http://www.accesseric.org/index.html. The full text of ERIC Digests, for example, may be accessed in this manner. Digests are not included in this bibliography, but those related to this topic include Gregory Hamot's Civic Education in the Czech Republic and Charles Titus' Civic Education for Global Understanding.

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The full text of many of the international civic education materials referenced in this bibliography may be purchased from the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS) at (800) 443-ERIC or service@edrs.com or http://edrs.com, accessed at ERIC document microfiche collections available at many major libraries, or ordered from commercial publishers. Journal articles listed in this bibliography can be found in journal collections of major libraries, purchased from article reprint services such as CARL Uncover S.O.S. and ISI Document Solution, or obtained through Interlibrary Loan services.

Since 1992 more than 1,300 RIE and CIJE documents have been added to the ERIC database with "citizenship education" as a major descriptor. Recently, the ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education (ERIC/ChESS) of the Social Studies Development Center of Indiana University established an ERIC Adjunct Clearinghouse for International Civic Education (ERIC: ICE). Support for ERIC: ICE was provided by the Center for Civic Education through Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program. The purpose of ERIC: ICE is to acquire, review, index, and abstract the global English-language literature on civic education and democracy. ERIC: ICE contributed many of the articles, books, research reports, conference presentations, curricula, and instructional materials in this bibliography.

The following annotated bibliography is a small sampling of the many materials on civic education listed in the ERIC database. In choosing which items to include in this sample bibliography, the author developed a set of specific criteria. First, material included is chosen from that published or issued no earlier than the 1990s. Second, all resources cited have specific potential for transnational utility. If you are looking for materials focused exclusively on the United States, then consult the ERIC database, which contains numerous additional resources. Finally, the author included material that deals with content and pedagogy at the core of civic education: what is necessary for democratic citizenship and fundamental instructional practices. Since 1992 more than 1,300 journal articles and document records for materials about citizenship education have been added to the ERIC database.


Akinbote maintains that citizenship education is an important aspect of the philosophy of Nigerian education. In this article he describes the role and growth of citizenship education from the pre-colonial period to the pres-
ent. He also provides suggestions on how to make citizenship education in Nigeria more effective.


This seminar report describes debates that centered around three civic educational themes of identity/citizenship, civics, and school life, and the study of the European Convention on Human Rights along with ideas presented at the opening of the seminar and general conclusions at the end. The discussion of civic education led to a range of solutions that included thirteen human rights propositions to form the basis of civic education. This first section detailed identity citizenship as the two key concepts of civic education. The concepts covered three types of meanings. That which is imposed and attributed. That which is built up. And, that which can be changed. The seminar focused on school life and dealt with the development of democratic attitudes, learning the rules of community life, and training strategies for teachers. The European Convention on Human Rights as a resource was emphasized. Recommendations from the seminar included teacher training, inclusion of civics in state curriculums, compulsory study of civics in secondary school by member states of the Council of Europe, and translations of the European Convention into all languages of member states. Two appendices contain a questionnaire on perceptions and opinions of civic education and a list of participants.


This article evaluates the relative importance of educational, economic, and cultural factors in supporting the emergence and stability of democracy. Data from more than 100 countries on long-term changes in democracy, 1965-80 and 1980-88, support an institutional perspective that emphasizes the effect of elite higher education (as opposed to mass education and literacy) on political outcomes such as democratization.

Birzea, Cesar. Education for Democratic Citizenship Consultation Meeting. This report provided the basis for the consultation meeting on “Education for Democratic Citizenship” in Strasbourg. 1996. ED 419 721.

This collection of educational documents, technical reports, legislative documents, and summaries from a variety of areas of education for democratic citizenship was assembled for the consultation meeting in Strasbourg.
France. These documents formed a foundation for the work of the meeting and a future project dealing with civic education in schools and adult education in the European countries represented. The report is structured in three parts. The first part seeks to explain the political context of the new project, emphasizing its place within the overall activities of the Council of Europe. The second part deals with education for democratic citizenship with conceptual clarifications in terms of the most closely related concepts of civics education, civil education, and human rights education. The third part of the report aims to group the proposals concerning the new projects by covering the several aspects of needs, objectives, target groups, expected results, key issues, working methods, and evaluation.


Birzea reports on the final symposium of the “Strategies for Interculturally-Oriented Civics Teaching at Primary and Secondary Level” pilot project. He presents an overview of the various aspects of the project, and outlines the results of the experimental phase in which forty teachers representing sixteen European countries conducted civics education projects. Among the results were significant changes in the organization of civic education and in teacher/pupil skills, changes in curricula, improved arrangements for pupil cooperation and pupil participation, and incorporation of the intercultural dimension into curricula and school life. The report closes with twelve conclusions and recommendations resulting from the symposium.


Although academics in Germany are engaged in extensive theoretical discussions over individualism (“liberalism”) and communitarianism, this paper argues that the modern question of “individual freedom versus the community” is not currently an explicit component of the German civic education curriculum. Because of the difficult and vague nature of German academic theory, potentially valuable and relevant theoretical discussions often do not affect education practitioners. A classroom teacher’s perspective is formed first not by theory but rather by the expressed interests of students and the topical conflicts in society as mirrored in the media: the
teacher's field of interest, educational background, and teacher training; and the availability of applicable teaching materials. The treatment of the "liberal freedom versus the community" concept in various teacher materials including German civic education curricula, textbooks, magazines, "brochures," and teaching units is evaluated. The concept's relevancy to high school civic education is demonstrated and examples of questions to apply in the civics classroom are provided.

Broclawik, Krzysztof, and others. Schools and Democratic Society: A Course Syllabus for Poland's Future Teachers. Columbus, OH: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1992. ED 361 263.

A course entitled "Schools and Democratic Society" was prepared between September 1992 and March 1993 as the result of a cooperative effort between the Polish Ministry of National Education and the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University. This document presents the rationale for the course. As Poland moves through the transition from communism to democracy, it is clear that the role of the school must change. The purpose of the course is to empower prospective teachers to take on the challenges of change toward democracy in the Polish school system. The course is organized around seven features of the educational system: the position and role of the teacher, student rights and responsibilities, parent participation in schools, school and local community distribution of resources for education, school as organization and as a community, and the role of schools in a democratic society.


This document summarizes a civics course for primary schools in Plangd, grades six through eight. The curriculum was developed as part of the Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland Project, a cooperative effort of the Polish ministry of National Education and the Mershon Center. The Ohio State University (United States). The project aims to help schools and teachers educate succeeding generations of Polish youth to be active, competent citizens committed to democratic values. The curriculum includes over eighty detailed lesson plans. The document is divided into two sections: the first consists of unit and lesson titles, and lesson abstracts. The second part is made up of sample lessons. The curriculum has five units. The first focuses on local government, which includes fighting unemployment, different interest groups, water, garbage, influencing decisions, daycare, budget decisions, neighborhood, local campaigns and elections, prob-
lem solving and responsibility of local government. The second looks at the principles of democracy including majority decisions, decision risks versus non-decision, compromise, conflicting values, everyday democratic principles, freedom of speech and artistic expression, democracy versus dictatorship versus anarchy, nation versus state, and patriotism versus nationalism. The next section examines human rights and freedom, including what they are and who is entitled to them, basic documents, children's rights, extra-governmental protection of human rights, rights of ethnic minorities, citizen responsibilities, and Amnesty International. The next two parts of the text cover institutions of the democratic states and citizenship participation and public opinion. The concluding chapters discuss the free market economy and current problems in Poland, Europe, and the world.


Catlaks describes the history of Latvia's political culture in relation to the country's democratization, particularly in its schools over the last decade. Although many Latvian institutions have been slow to change, visible democratic developments have taken place in the classroom between teachers and students. The change has come mainly as an expansion in teachers' and students' freedom to make their own decisions. Prescriptions for Latvian teachers to continue the growth of their students' democratic citizenship include introducing new democracy education subject materials, teaching methods, and hands-on teacher training beginning with the primary level for teachers of all disciplines.


This report examined the effects on political socialization of students in grades five and six, based on teachers' use of local newspapers in classrooms throughout Argentina (except in Buenos Aires) during the 1995 school year. Data were collected by self administered questionnaires filled out by students, to measure educational outcomes, and by teachers, regarding teaching methods, throughout the country. Results indicated that use of the newspaper in the classroom significantly and positively affected students' political knowledge, democratic norms, and communication behaviors. Strong effects were found on tolerance, support for democracy, the formation of political...
opinions, and on communication behaviors such as discussing politics with family members and reading the newspaper at home.

De-Simone, Deborah M. "Educational Challenges Facing Eastern Europe." *Social Education* 60 (February 1996): 104-06. EJ 526 703.

De-Simone identifies three major educational problems facing Eastern Europe: the development of a new philosophy of education, new methodologies of education, and new methods of training teachers. She also examines the first tentative steps in these efforts and discusses educational and financial problems.


Dostalova argues that a tradition exists in the Czech cultural background for humanity and democracy in education, and that those values can be incorporated into the school environment again. The long-term isolation of Czechoslovakia from the developments in the social sciences that have taken place in the West since 1939 has resulted in an aversion to modern social sciences. Czech participants in discussion of the content of civic education agree that the central aim of civic education is to develop in students the skills for individual responsibility and social participation. The goal of social science teaching that developed from participant discussions is to provide pupils with an understanding of the principles of a democratic society and to identify the fundamental values of a democracy. Extracurricular activities based in the civics curriculum help the students to think critically, listen with discernment, and communicate with power and precision.


Although the demise of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 was described as "the ultimate victory of Democracy," this paper asserts that serious internal problems exist within modern democracies throughout Europe and the United States today. However, civic education offers a potential remedy. Part One, "The New Democratic Question," identifies the main problem area as the relationship between the individual and the community, the so-called "communitarian debate." With the decline of many formerly dominant social institutions (religious organizations, the family, and
school) that defined and provided answers to basic moral and ethical questions, the new replacements are often factions and small organizations that offer an almost infinite variety of moral norms, resulting in a new sense of uncertainty, a lack of social and cultural orientation, and a rise in individualism. In Part Two, “The Crisis of Democratic Orientation” is evidenced in the following three societal developments: the decline of central political institutions; the growth in distance between citizen and state; and the rise of special agenda organizations (social movements, interest and lobby groups). These developments represent a change in democratic attitudes resulting in a growing divide between the way democracy works in practice and its normative and legal foundations as set in its constitutions and laws. Part Three, “Implications for Civic Education,” proposes that civic education is the best arena in which to ensure that democratic principles are embedded firmly in the social framework of a society and in the hearts and minds of the people. However, a new civic education framework should include expanded methods that reflect social change and the multiplicity of the factors at work in the public sphere.


This work presents three brief articles recalling US teachers’ experiences conducting civic education workshops in Bosnia. Pat Feichter writes “Would I Return? In a Heartbeat.” Gail Huschle examines “Beauty in the Midst of Devastation.” Mary Bristol considers “Making Connections Between Cultures.”


This set of collaborative lessons and teacher resources offers a unique focus on Central and Eastern Europe and the tremendous changes of the last decades. Thirty-five lessons present material about the history and government of Central and Eastern European nations and ask students to use comparative analysis with their own nation’s history and government. The countries featured are the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Poland, the Russian Federation, and the United States. The emphasis is on active teaching and learning methods. The materials are divided into four major sections with a schematic organization. The organizing questions include: (1) “Historical Connections - What Are the Connections Between the Past and Present?”; (2) “Transi-
tions: Comparative Trends: What Are the Challenges Inherent to Any Form of Change or Transition?; (3) "Constitutionalism and Democracy: Comparative Issues - How Are the Components of Constitutionalism and Democracy Reflected in Government?"; and (4) "Citizens' Rights and Civil Society: How Do Emerging Democracies Protect Citizens' Rights and Promote the Growth of a Civil Society?" A guide to instructional support materials is also provided along with the appendices offerings of the constitutions of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Poland, the Russian Federation, and the United States.


This study examines diversity in citizenship education within a set of boundaries where the ideals of citizenship, democracy, and education were somewhat similar. The five nations expected to be quite similar were the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Even among these western democracies with many shared experiences and values relevant to this study, there are considerable differences in the ways that they prepare their young people to participate as citizens. The study bridges the fields of social studies education, political socialization of learning, comparative education, and draws on feminist studies. Hahn describes alternative forms of education for democracy and points to consequences of various alternatives in diverse settings. Her data comes from interviews and classroom observations, with complementary findings from surveys administered to students fifteen through nineteen in fifty schools in the five countries. Chapters include: (1) Studying Civic Education: Setting the Stage; (2) Becoming Political: Adolescent Political Attitudes and Behaviors; (3) Gender and Political Attitudes; (4) Freedom of Expression and Civic Tolerance; (5) Democratic Inquiry and Discourse: Classroom Climates in Cross-National Perspective; and (6) Teaching Democracy.


Hall proposes that promoting change in civic education means rethinking what are the important aspects to teach about the Constitution, law, and democracy to equip students to be effective and affective citizens. He argues that the scope of instruction needs to broaden to include specific comparisons between the U.S. federal system of law and constitutionalism with counterparts in other nations. The comparative approach offers three func-
tions: (1) creates an awareness of alternatives; (2) allows students to test
the relative impact of various social, economic, demographic, political, or
intellectual factors on the form of different nation's civic cultures; and (3)
permits students to identify common patterns of action and behavior. Hall's
discussion of various constitutions and laws provides examples to learn
about the advantages and limitations of the U.S. Constitution, law, and pol-
icy. The examples show the unique aspects of the U.S. Constitution and
law, gives meaning to concepts of globalization, internationalization, and
multiculturalism, and provides opportunities to appreciate others. Two pro-
posals promote a modest and a radical view on instruction: (1) the modest
proposal combines the multicultural emphasis to a broadened vision of
cross-cultural and international studies of law and law-related subjects; and
(2) the radical proposal adopts a strongly thematic and value-based approach
that would look less at understanding the system and more on appreciating
the values embodied in that system.

Hanson, E. Mark. "Educational Change Under Autocratic and Democratic
Governments: The Case of Argentina." Comparative Education Review

The author compares the strategies, procedures, and outcomes of edu-
cational reform under Argentina's military autocratic government (1976-
83) and the civilian democratic government that followed (1983-93). Hanson
points out that the harsh change strategies employed by the military regime
proved ineffective, even disastrous, but the participative strategies of the
democratic period also encountered numerous barriers.

Janowski, Andrzej. Ethical and Moral Education: A National Case Study
of Poland. Paper presented at the International Conference on Educa-
tion, Geneva, Switzerland. 1994. ED 379 204.

This study explores the Polish experience in values education. Between
the years 1944 and 1989 Polish education was often state controlled with
the sole purpose of subjugating education to Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Over the years the Communist party's dictates varied in intensity. Despite
the party's efforts to prescribe ethics, certain values remained uncontami-
nated by communist oriented decision making. While it is difficult to sub-
stantiate this with objective research findings, evidence comes from the
teachers themselves, especially teachers in the humanities and social sci-
ences, who could observe and monitor values in Polish schools. Three val-
ues survived the government's ideologic pressure: knowledge, patriotism,
and western civilization. All three of these ideas remained deeply rooted in
the minds of both teachers and parents. Three reasons contribute to explain-
ing why patriotism remained an important principle. First, Polish pre-war schooling followed an early nineteenth century approach that viewed education as the path toward liberation for subjugated nations. In the majority of families, parents encouraged this attitude. Second, the Catholic Church, a very influential institution in Poland, supported patriotic education. Third, the communist authorities were unwilling to suppress patriotic education because they were afraid to go against popular attitudes. The study suggests that the new focus for Poland’s schools should be mutual understanding, an education for international understanding. Specific programs and curricula are discussed.


This manual traces the emergence of democracy in Albania from the end of the Communist system in 1990. It deals with the concepts and practices of democratic citizenship education and emphasizes the role of education in developing and sustaining democracy. The manual is to assist educators in putting together the knowledge and skills they already possess with the new information presented in the manual in order to educate the citizens of tomorrow for a new and democratic Albania. The three chapters are entitled, “Albania Moves Toward Democracy,” describing the first six years’ achievements and problems and discussing the need for democratic citizenship education; “The Basics of Democracy” defining and tracing “democracy,” and discussing the basic values and principles of democracy; and “The Basics of Democratic Citizenship Education” including the curriculum of democratic citizenship education, methods of teaching democratic citizenship education, and teacher education.


Defining civic education reform in the Czech Republic since 1989 in terms of its post-communist transition, this paper contends that the breadth, depth, and range of educational reforms proposed or already adopted in Central and Eastern European societies is extensive, involving most areas of education (curricula, educational legislation, management, new types of school and university institutions, and the system’s overall structure, administration, and financing.) The document includes explanations of Czech Republic education reforms from political, historical, and sociological perspectives: “Character of Our Educational Reform”; “Anomie” and
'Crisis'”; “The Heritage of the Communist Regime”; “The Role of Pre-War Models and Traditions”; “The Influences of Political Doctrines”; “The Legislative Framework”; “The Role of Public Opinion and the Media”; “General Principles and Main Problems of Curriculum Reform”; and “Conclusions.” After a seven-year transitional process that has opened up the education system to local and individual initiatives with relatively minor State involvement, the next phase of reform in the Czech Republic (and Central and Eastern Europe) requires collaborative discussions on the goals of education and curriculum content.


This analysis of Japan’s democracy focuses on changes in the postwar period and explores how the most recent changes are rooted in earlier transitions. It considers the potential future effects of those changes. After a brief introduction, four chapters follow Japan’s democracy from the revolutionary changes of the American Occupation (1945-52) to the evolution that began with the Occupation and continued through the 1980s, to the upheavals of 1993-94, and finally, to the present and future of Japan’s democracy. A final section suggests discussion questions for students and discussion groups.


Kuhmerker’s article summarizes the “Free to Learn, Free to Teach” program that draws linkages between considerate and compassionate behavior relevant to young children and democratic values. Various charts and activities illuminating class, school, and safety rules also instruct the students in such democratic concepts as compromise and consensus.


Kuiper and Van-den-Akker report on an evaluative study of secondary level civics curriculum in the Netherlands. The authors find a discrepancy between the curriculum plans of the development and the classroom implementation of the curriculum. They recommend an implementation-oriented development strategy with emphasis on early and intensive formative evaluation.

LaBoon argues that because community education is both collectivist and democratic, it would allow Russians to continue collectivist traditions. He asserts that it would give the Russian people a format for addressing specific social problems and to clear up misconceptions about democracy.


The East Central Europe Information Exchange collects and disseminates information on exchange and training programs undertaken with United States private and governmental funding. This study focused on programs related to democratization and civil society. An introductory section defines the parameters, background, and research methodology; lists the funding agencies involved; and summarizes some of the survey results and conclusions. Section One highlights assistance efforts devoted to legal reform; reviews the history of United States assistance to non-governmental organizations in East Central Europe; illustrates with a case study many aspects of a program of assistance to local governments; and presents a model for assisting the development of non-governmental organizations fostering human rights. Section Two of the report includes a sample project survey; and various types of program data, such as organization by primary field of activity, type of project, funding, and contact person. Appendices contain a list of Soros Foundation and Democracy Network programs.


This paper describes aspects of the transition taking place in Czech educational efforts since the Velvet Revolution of 1989, particularly changes in the teaching of civic education in the schools. Mauch takes the position that governments, no matter their type, find it important to mold new generations in areas of civic responsibility, whatever the nature of those governments, however controlling or free they may be. His study is based on exploratory interviews with students, faculty, and administrators at the University of South Bohemia and at the Ministry of Education in 1992-94, as well as a limited review of the literature. A section on education under Communism describes the forty year effort to remodel Czechoslovak education in the image and likeness of the Soviet Union's education system and fol-
ollowing the principles of international communism. The next several sections describe the transitions to a post-communist educational system in basic education, secondary education, higher education and civic education. A section devoted to the transition period following the revolution goes into greater detail on the content of a new civic education which is seen as having the goal of providing students with the skills for individual responsibility and social participation, with ethical values, and with the ability to think critically. A final section offers recommendations for planning civic education curricula.


This works reacts to the general neglect of cultural behavior education within civic education; illuminates particular problems, in the European context, of civic education in Slovakia; and concentrates on the main ideas of the PHARE project “Education for Citizenship and European Studies.” Key ideas from the Department of Ethics and Civic Education at the Faculty of Education, Comenius University, in Bratislava (Slovakia) and also ideas about new concepts for civic education and teacher training are presented.


Noting that law-related education (LRE) instills in its practitioners a strong desire to share its message with the world, this technical bulletin outlines the international activities of several LRE organizations. The Center for Civic Education, for example, hosts international visiting scholars, sponsors an annual conference that alternates between sites in Germany and the United States, and provides technical support to countries such as Nicaragua and Poland. The Chicago-based, women-managed, nonprofit organization Heartland International has promoted civic education programs in Ethiopia, Namibia, Uganda, and Tanzania. The American Federation of Teachers International Affairs Department created the Education for Democracy Clearinghouse in 1993 to collect and disseminate information about civic education programs worldwide. The Mershon Center at The Ohio State University has been involved in the Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland Project since 1991 and has been invited to develop programs in Lithuania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Russia. The National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law (NICEL) has been involved in projects on four continents, Asia, Europe, Africa, and South America. For the future, NICEL
proposes the Citizens Education Democracy Corps, comprised of recent alumni from U.S. graduate schools in the fields of law, education, and the humanities. A list of contact persons for each agency is provided.


This article compares contemporary issues related to moral and citizenship education in Poland with a similar era in the late eighteenth century. They describe an education reform effort that began in 1773 and was based on nationalistic and romantic literature of the time. The Niemczynski's contend that the moral values that were derived from this literature are essential for the development of democracy in modern Poland.


This collection of essays was presented at a 1993 conference on Education for Democracy at the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University. All essays are concerned with aspects of the ideal of democracy: what it is, how it evolves, and the goals of democracy yet to be achieved. Contributors from the United States, South Africa, Germany, and Russia are experts in civic education, problems of minorities, the U.S. Constitution, the transition to democracy in former communist countries, and education and democracy in South Africa and Japan. Each essay implies that democracy has a concrete definition with a range of features and that, despite the imprimatur of "democracy" applied by a government, not all governments claiming to be democracies are true and genuine democracies.


Patrick discusses civil society as a central idea in the recent global resurgence of democracy. Recent developments represent a turning away from state-centered conceptions of government, and a renewal of voluntary, community-based, non-governmental organizations as a means of renewing democracy. As civil society has surged globally, it has sagged in the United States, its long-time exemplar. The time is ripe to seek a renewal of civil society in the United States through civic education and current educational reforms.

This work argues that inquiry into the relationship of community and individuality should be at the center of civic education and presents five recommendations that should help civic educators meet this challenge: (1) teach the analysis and appraisal of public issues about community and individuality and emphasize those issues that have been landmarks of public debate in United States history; (2) teach comparatively and internationally about public issues pertaining to community and individuality in different constitutional democracies of the world; (3) conduct the classroom and the school in a manner that exemplifies the conjoining of community and individuality in a democratic civic culture; (4) use service learning in the community outside the school to teach civic virtues and skills needed to conjoin community and individuality in civic life; and (5) teach civic knowledge, skills, and virtues that constitute a common core of learning by which to maintain the culture of a community and coterminously teach individuals to think critically for the purposes of freeing themselves from unworthy traditions and to seek improvement of the community.


This resource guide is intended to facilitate cooperation and exchange of knowledge among civic educators around the world. The guide is divided into six parts. Part One consists of three civic education papers: “Education and Democratic Citizenship: Where We Stand” (Albert Shanker); “Civil Society and Democracy Reconsidered” (Charles Bahmüller); and “Civil Society and the Worldwide Surge of Democracy: Implications for Civic Education” (John J. Patrick). Part Two features an annotated bibliography of materials about civic education from July 1996 through July 1997 selected from the ERIC database. Part Three contains nine ERIC Digests on civic education published between 1994 and 1997. Part Four is an annotated bibliography of books that address key topics about the work of civic educators. Topics covered include comparative politics in democratic societies, Western political philosophy on civil society and democracy, U.S. political/constitutional history, contemporary U.S. civil society, and civic education in the United States. Part Five is a selective list of Internet resources about international civic education and features information
useful to civic educators. Part Six is an international directory of civic education leaders, programs organizations, and centers. The entries include names, addresses, telephone numbers, electronic mail addresses, and World Wide Web sites. An appendix concludes the guide and features information about Civitas: An International Civic Education Exchange Program and documents and journal articles in the ERIC database.


This article describes the recent revitalization of civics education in Australian schools. The approach incorporates traditional citizenship education into a new curriculum that addresses environmental and multicultural issues. Print also delineates the guidelines and goals of this new curriculum.


Murray Print charts the rebirth of civics and citizenship education in Australia and discusses the decline of interest in citizenship education during the 1960s and the educational and social influences leading to its renaissance. He also examines the educational model proposed by the Civics Expert Group and extends this treatment to include more egalitarian concepts.


This project is designed to help students develop citizenship skills important for intelligent and effective participation in a self-governing society. Specific educational objectives include helping students learn how to express their opinions; how to decide which level of government and which agency is most appropriate for dealing with the community problems they identify; and how to influence policy decisions at that level of government. The guide provides students with step-by-step instructions for identifying and studying a public policy problem and for developing a class portfolio, a cumulative organized collection of information (statements, charts, graphs, photographs, and original art work) that makes up the class plan for responding to the public policy issue the class has studied.

This book is the result of a project to strengthen democratic reforms in Poland by enhancing student and teacher understanding of citizenship in a democracy. The goal of the initiative is to promote the development of democracy in Poland by instituting a new citizenship curriculum in Polish schools. The immediate goal of this project was to develop curriculum guides for an eighth grade course and a secondary school course on citizenship for democracy. The project has met all of its key objectives including: (1) developing and publishing a three-volume curriculum guide for courses on citizenship in a democracy that will be used in subsequent curriculum development and teacher in-service programs; (2) introducing Polish teachers to new instructional strategies and materials of particular value in education for democratic citizenship; (3) mobilizing and training a core group of Polish teachers who now have experienced a process of democratic reform and who can play leadership roles in disseminating the new approaches and materials throughout Poland; and (4) laying the foundation for ongoing working relationships between the Ministry of National Education and the National Center for Teacher Training in Poland and key citizenship education centers in the United States. The project has contributed to the understanding of how best to serve the special needs of citizenship educators in countries like Poland which are trying to overcome the legacy of Communist rule. The report recognizes a need to teach about democracy in ways that overcome popular skepticism about the efficacy of democratic ideals and formulas, and to incorporate economic education into civic education.


Sayer and others describe the work of a Trans-European Mobility Schemes for University Studies (TEMPUS) project, directed by John Sayer and based in the Department of Educational Studies of the University of Oxford. The project’s activities, concerned principally with the development of democratic processes in the elementary, secondary, and higher education systems of the Czech Republic and Poland, are illustrated through twenty papers. Taken together, these papers provide an extensive case study of a democratic collaboration of four European universities from very different social, economic, political and cultural settings, working with local schools and authorities across disciplines in an attempt to develop schools for democracy in Europe.

Recognizing that civic education is the school subject specifically dedicated to preparing students for democratic citizenship and that the school and classroom often have a less than democratic and value-loaded "political culture," this paper emphasizes the fundamental goals of civic education and then arrives at the ingredients of political culture in the school and classroom that are favorable to preparing students for democratic citizenship. The three fundamental goals of civic education are: (1) helping students become self-confident, well-informed citizens who are able to think rationally and who are committed to the values of human dignity and human rights; (2) fostering a willingness and capacity to participate in political affairs on local, national, and international levels; and (3) developing a strong recognition of the need to balance individualism and self-interest with human interdependence and social as well as environmental responsibility. To effectively prepare students for democratic citizenship, individual classrooms and schools, teachers and administrators must model democratic citizenship for and with their students in the classroom and school climate in terms of how all members of the school community communicate; by avoiding indoctrination at all levels; and through the types of learning and teaching methods used.


Sears reviews recent research on citizenship education in Canada and discovers that, although citizenship education is widely promoted, little is known about actual classroom practices and wide disparities exist about the very definition of citizenship. Some evidence suggests improvement; however, more research is needed.


This paper discusses community and morality in an international context, recommending a transnational ethic grounded in international custom and agreement and noting that the Nuremberg Obligation provides a foundation for such an ethic. Snauwaert maintains that this ethic provides the moral foundation for a civic education cognizant of global interdependence.

Is the transmission of norms and values an appropriate function of liberal education as envisioned in a liberal constitutional state (The Netherlands)? This paper draws a distinction between the inculcation of intellectual virtues and indoctrination and presents a cogent analysis of the concepts and objectives of liberal education for citizenship.


Taylor reviews teaching for and about democracy in Australia, and identifies key concepts embedded in the notion of democracy (representation, leadership, decision making, public criticism). The article draws on ethnographic data from settled and remote Aboriginal Australia to explore whether understandings and practices associated with these concepts are shared by the dominant society, and the ramifications of this fit for citizenship education.


The Political Literacy and Civic Education (PLACE) project in Kroo Bay, Freetown, Sierra Leone, was developed to enable people, through functional literacy and civic education, to participate in the processes of good governance by exercising their rights, duties, and obligations in an informed and responsible manner. The project suggests a curriculum based on knowledge, skills, and attitudes to be acquired, in the context of the need for political development and in the face of previous poor economic development policies. A framework for developing a political literacy and civic education curriculum is suggested, with the concepts to be taught related to instructional and possible lesson topics in an integrated approach. A model for facilitating curriculum development is provided.


Tschoumy examines the changes occurring in French-speaking Switzerland as represented by the nearly thirty Children’s Parliaments that have emerged in the past few months. Specialists agree that European societies
are experiencing a period of decomposition/recomposition, a political and cultural process that will lead to a social Renaissance of unknown proportions. Previously, citizenship was a simple process. The new citizenship will change from the state domains to the infra-state and supra-state levels, and will feature new compound citizenships that are more socially appropriate for mobile young people. Basic questions emerge. Will education for citizenship contribute to the development of compound citizenships in Europe? What education is needed for compound citizenships?


This paper discusses the framework for civic education in Estonia. Objectives of civic education in Estonia come from the traditional beliefs of Estonian society, the new demands of social change, standards established by the Council of Europe, and experiences of neighboring countries. The main objective of civic education is to teach a new generation, regardless of their nationality, to become citizens of the world and to be loyal to the democratic Republic of Estonia. The civic education curriculum of the basic school for the ninth form is divided into thirty-five lessons in five areas. The curriculum for the twelfth form consists of seventy lessons in two areas. The first focuses on society from the aspects of political, social, and cultural life. The second discusses the economy of societies and the contemporary world.


White examines the role teachers and schools can and should play in educating young people to become good citizens in a democratic society. She concentrates on becoming and being civil in the everyday world and how certain virtues and values of ordinary people stand out as important to the maintenance and flourishing of a democratic ethos in an open, pluralistic society.