This collection of 17 essays focuses on how faculty are employed, rewarded, and managed at universities in developed and developing nations. The essays, which include an introduction, 10 essays discussing European practices, two that focus on Canada and the United States, three which focus on Australia, Japan, and Malaysia, and a concluding chapter are: (1) "Managing Universities and Regulating Academic Labour Markets" (David Farnham); (2) "Belgium: Diverging Professions in Twin Communities" (Jef C. Verhoeven and Ilse Beuselinck); (3) "Finland: Searching for Performance and Flexibility" (Turo Virtanen); (4) "France: A Centrally-Driven Profession" (June Burnham); (5) "Germany: A Dual Academy" (Tassilo Herrschel); (6) "Ireland: A Two-Tier Structure" (Thomas N. Garavan, Patrick Gunnigle, and Michael Morley); (7) "Italy: A Corporation Controlling a System in Collapse" (William Brierley); (8) "The Netherlands: Reshaping the Employment Relationship" (Egbert de Weert); (9) "Spain: Old Elite or New Meritocracy?" (Salavador Parrado-Diez); (10) "Sweden: Professional Diversity in an Egalitarian System" (Berit Askling); (11) "The United Kingdom: End of the Donnish Dominion?" (David Farnham); (12) "Canada: Neo-Conservative Challenges to Faculty and Their Unions" (Donald C. Savage); (13) "The United States: Self-Governed Profession or Managed Occupation?" (Sylvia Horton); (14) "Australia: From Collegiality to Corporatism" (Robert Kelso and Christopher Leggett); (15) "Japan: Collegiality in a Paternalist System" (Kiyoshi Yamamoto); (16) "Malaysia: An Emerging Professional Group" (Mohamed Salleh Hj Din and Bala Shanmugam); and (17) "Towards the Flexi-University?" (David Farnham). Each essay includes references; contains an index.
Managing Academic Staff in Changing University Systems

International Trends and Comparisons

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David Farnham

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Preface

This book provides a descriptive and analytical account, and a contemporary record, of how academics are employed, rewarded and managed, mainly in universities, in conditions of change during the last years of the twentieth century. It is not a definitive analysis but a relative one, because the rate of change in higher education across the world is continuous, relentless and increasing exponentially. What is observable and a conventional wisdom in any higher education system currently may have changed irrevocably tomorrow. Moreover, despite having been given a general brief by the editor, each of the contributors has construed it in his or her own way. All of them have brought to their task their own perceptions, experiences, academic backgrounds, professional skills and personal values in interpreting the reality of what it means to be employed as a member of the academic profession in universities today. In this sense, the book is a contribution to the ongoing debate about the extent to which the process of academic work has become managerialized and proletarianized in recent years, rather than remaining collegial and professional in nature, and the implications of this for institutions and their academic staff. Also unlike some recent studies of contemporary managerial issues in higher education, written by professional managers in executive, non-academic positions in universities, who have adopted largely prescriptive and normative approaches to the problems of university management, a significant feature of these contributions is that they are written mostly by professional academics. As both scholars and objects of management, they have adopted more critical, positivist approaches to how the academic profession is being managed in conditions of change in the late twentieth century. This volume therefore provides valuable insights, from a participant observer and an academic practitioner point of view, into how academics perceive they are being managed in a variety of national settings today.

The book is predicated on the assumption that higher education, broadly defined as higher learning undertaken in a variety of post-school institutions, is undergoing considerable and rapid change in all Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. These changes are in response to a multiplicity of factors such as demographic trends, changes in public policy, the massification of higher education, modifications in its systems of financing, inter-institutional and intra-institutional competition, its growing internationalization and, in many instances, its shift from being largely publicly funded to shifting to the marketplace. Furthermore, universities and other institutions of higher education are increasingly being seen primarily as facilitators of national competitiveness, economic growth and wealth generation, key producers of human capital, major sources of scientific and business knowledge and exemplars of technological innovation. These and similar contextual forces are resulting in changes in the purposes, size, structure, finance, management and governance of higher education, which are providing both opportunities and threats to the academic profession.

The quality of academic staff and how they are trained, recruited, rewarded, utilized and motivated are crucial to the effectiveness of any modern higher education system. This is not to underestimate the importance of non-academic support staff in institutions but integrating the diverse needs of the higher education authorities, students and governments with the professional demands of academic staff is fundamental to the effective delivery and management of contemporary higher education. This integration of what Trow calls the ‘public life’ of higher education (i.e. its organization, governance and finance) and its ‘private life’ (i.e. the life experienced in lecture halls, libraries, seminars and the teaching and learning experiences of academic staff and students) is one of the central tasks facing the higher education community, as the system moves into the next millennium. Effective collaboration and mutual understanding among those funding, governing, managing, teaching, researching and studying in institutions is necessary if dynamic and responsive, high quality centres of learning, scholarship and research are to be maintained. Only in this way can the expectations of all stakeholders in higher education – governments, students, the professions, the business and local communities and the academic profession itself – be met.

One response to the continuous change faced by university and higher education authorities has been the adoption of more flexible human resources and personnel policies, although in some countries, such as in the United States, variations of this approach have been used for many years. These policies include: changes in tenure; non-standard contracts of employment; wider pay differentials; decentralized pay bargaining; performance-related pay; staff appraisal; and work restructuring, all of which, taken collectively, point the way to the emergence of a ‘flexi-university’ model of employment, where these conditions exist. Given this background, the underlying purposes of this book are threefold:

- to describe, analyse and evaluate how university and other higher education authorities are managing the academic profession in selected
OECD countries – and a non-OECD one, Malaysia – in conditions of change
• to provide comparative, international insights of the similarities and differences in managing academic staff in different traditions of higher education
• to identify and examine some of the current issues facing university authorities in managing academic staff in conditions of massification and marketization and the implications of these for the academic profession.

The book is divided into five parts. Part 1 provides an introductory background to the managing of universities and the academic profession in the late twentieth century. Part 2, the core of the book, contains national studies of 10 major states within the European Union, drawn from across the northern, central and southern parts of western Europe. Part 3 contains two national studies from North America: Canada and the United States. Part 4 looks at developments in three selected Asian-Pacific-rim countries, Australia, Japan and Malaysia. Part 5 draws some of the arguments together, discusses the extent to which the academic profession is undergoing structural transition and whether the ‘flexi-university’ is the emerging model of employing academic staff. Throughout these chapters, where expenditure, costs or salaries are specified, they are recorded in United States dollars (US$), using current exchange rates. Despite the problems of accommodating changes in exchange rates and differences in costs of living among countries, this approach has been adopted to facilitate broad comparisons among the different systems discussed in the book.

The completion and editing of this book would not have been possible without the professionalism, commitment and academic expertise of the contributors. Their efforts bear solid testimony to the strength and vitality of the academic profession today, when each of them had so many other calls on their time. Only one overseas academic correspondent failed to deliver what he had promised but I was very lucky to have the last-minute support of Sylvia Horton at the University of Portsmouth, who agreed to write the chapter on the United States at very short notice. My sincere thanks are due to her; without her dedication, this book would have been delayed irrevocably. I would also like to thank all my colleagues for their contributions and positive responses to my requests for editorial changes. My thanks are also due to John Skelton and his staff at the Open University Press for their patience and support during the preparation of this book. Finally, I hope that this volume, in examining some of the contemporary issues facing the academic profession in its organizational and employment relationships with the higher education authorities, will contribute to current debates about the changing nature of academic work and the emerging concept of the ‘flexi-university’ model of employment, in conditions of massification, competition and shifts to the market.

David Farnham
Part 1
Introduction
Managing Universities and Regulating Academic Labour Markets

David Farnham

The academic profession has been described by Perkin (1969: 1f) as 'the key profession of the twentieth century'. He argues that by the latter part of the twentieth century, in a world increasingly dominated by professional experts, 'university teachers have become the educators and selectors of the other professions'. In his view, it is universities, through their academic staff, which provide 'the growth points of new knowledge, the leading shoots of intellectual culture, and the institutionalization of innovation' in arts, sciences and technology. This view of the profession perceives academics as the repository of current knowledge, disseminators of this knowledge and creators of new knowledge, as well as being critics of conventional academic and epistemological wisdoms. However, as professionals themselves, academics have their own disciplinary, occupational and material interests in relation to the institutions of learning in which they teach, research and work. These interests include: freedom to teach and study their academic subjects without political or external interference; the right to share in making decisions in relation to the curriculum and research agenda; the right to participate in determining the conditions of life and work in the institutions where they are employed; security of tenure; and satisfactory terms and conditions of employment.

All these areas interrelate and they incorporate three broad sets of issues in which both the academic profession and those leading higher education institutions have common and sometimes diverging interests. They can be classified in a number of ways. Trow's (1997: 26) distinction between the 'private life' and 'public life' of higher education is a useful starting point. Freedom of academics to teach and research and share in decision-making about these matters correlate with the private life of institutions and are concerned with the 'life of teaching and learning' in institutions. The claim of academics to participate in the running of institutions correlates with the public life of higher education or the life of 'organisation, management,
governance and finance’. There is a third set of issues, however, where academics and those leading them have joint interests, which has not been articulated by Trow. This can be described as the ‘working life’ of higher education, which is concerned with the life of employment and job regulation in institutions, such as tenure, terms and conditions and how work is organized. Here, too, academics seek to influence and share in determining those decisions most affecting their daily, professional lives.

The private life, public life and working life of higher education overlap and interconnect. The first focuses on academic issues and defines the ways in which decisions about curricular and research matters are taken and executed within institutions. The second focuses on organizational and managerial issues and defines institutional systems of governance and internal management. And the third focuses on employment issues and defines the market relations between academics and the institutions where they work. The first two, academic and organizational issues, are closely linked since they are internal to institutions. The third, employment issues, while having internal ramifications for universities, are initiated externally in the academic labour market, when the recruitment and selection of academic staff and determination of their terms and conditions of employment take place. As professionals, university teachers have always sought to use their subject expertise and knowledge of their academic disciplines to impact on the curriculum, its content and how it is delivered. They have used their positional power, in turn, to influence how universities are organized, managed and governed. They have also sought to use their market power to provide job security, good terms and conditions of employment and prospects of career development for themselves.

The academic profession therefore has vital interests not only in curricular and pedagogical issues within institutions but also in the ways in which universities and other institutions of higher education are governed and managed and how academic labour markets and employment issues are regulated. Changes in the contexts of higher education and in its nature, however, are challenging the traditional hegemony of academics in the educational and decision-making processes of institutions, as well as impacting on their pay, conditions of work and career prospects. It is these pivotal issues which provide the framework to the national systems explored in this book.

The changing contexts of higher education

In the last decade of the twentieth century, as the second millennium approaches, higher education is changing rapidly throughout the developed world. While change has been incremental throughout the history of higher education, it is currently on a steadily accelerating trajectory. In essence, higher education is shifting from an elite, introspective, stable system which was traditionally producer-led to a mass, open, unstable one.
which is increasingly being driven by the sometimes contradictory needs of its 'customers' or 'clients' – governments, employers and students. In the developing world too, there are rising expectations about the prospects of higher education for raising living standards, helping these countries compete in the global economy and training their young people to meet the demands of dynamic, deregulated labour markets. The driving forces behind these changes are primarily contextual: economic, political, social and technological but all have implications for higher education, what it delivers and the role of the academic profession within it.

One of the major developments over the past 20 years has been increasing economic integration across the world, facilitated by open financial markets, cheaper international transport, sophisticated information and communications technologies (ICTs) and the lowering of trade barriers between nation states. Held (1995: 151f) neatly sums up the growing interdependence of the world economy and loss of national economic sovereignty:

The internationalization of production, finance and other economic resources is unquestionably eroding the capacity of an individual state to control its own economic future and multinational corporations may have a clear national base, but their interest is above all in global profitability; country of origin is of little importance for corporate strategy.

Yet the phenomenon of globalization is not strictly a new one. International trade and the search for new markets were the prime rationales driving Europe's former colonial and imperial systems, nineteenth-century entrepreneurial capitalism and national growth in the developed economies immediately following the Second World War. Growth of trade both sustained and underpinned the efficacy of these systems (Bairoch 1996). What is new about the 'new' globalization and modern economic integration are its form, scope and penetration. Compared with the past, present-day globalization is more homogenized, wider in influence and deeper in its invasive-ness in the international market economy. It has three major elements: the organization of production on a global scale; the acquisition of inputs and services from around the world which reduces costs; and the formation of cross-border alliances and ventures enabling companies to combine assets, share costs and enter new markets.

International economic integration, the transnational nature of modern businesses and global capital markets have been facilitated by advanced ICT systems. Vast financial resources can be transferred around the world on a 24-hour basis by traders, using a few key strokes on their computer networks. The information allowing benchmarking of commercial performance on an international basis is widely available through international travel and better communications. And more countries have invested in their economic infrastructures and technological capacities so as to be able to compete with established industrial centres in western Europe, north America and Australasia. Further, consumers are generally more sophisticated and better informed about economic affairs than in the past. They
have more personal income at their disposal and rising expectations of how their needs may be satisfied by producers and suppliers in the marketplace.

Because of increasing economic integration and the emergence of developing economies, business enterprises are free to locate in whatever parts of the world they choose, whether for operational, research or administrative purposes. While retaining business headquarters in their countries of origin, multinational companies design, produce and distribute their goods or services globally. These developments have changed relations between businesses and their suppliers, between businesses and governments and between businesses and their workers. They are also impacting on what businesses expect from universities and those working in them. Those directing mobile, profit-focused capitalist enterprises continually seek out new markets for their products, new locations for producing them and new sources of skilled, cost-effective labour to enable them to remain competitive in world markets.

There have been changes in the structures of national, western economies too. The last quarter of the twentieth century has witnessed the decline of old ‘smokestack’ industries, such as coal and steel, heavy engineering, textiles and machine tools in these economies, all of which were based on primary and manufacturing production. These have been replaced, first, by service-sector activities, such as banking and financial services, communications and the mass media, hotels, tourism and leisure, and distribution services and, second, by new manufacturing industries including pharmaceuticals, information technology and biotechnology. In this transformation, national labour markets have changed. In western developed economies, the outcomes have included: a rise in the proportion of employed women; a decline in the proportion of men who are economically active; increases in the proportion of workers on atypical, part-time contracts; decreases in primary and manufacturing employment; an increase in service-sector employment; increases in the proportion of professional and skilled jobs; a decrease in the proportion of unskilled jobs; and a shift to employment in small and medium-sized enterprises and self-employment.

These economic changes have been reinforced by political ones. During the past 20 years, parts of the English-speaking world in particular have seen the rise and decline of the ‘New Right’ in politics, which blamed the bureaucratic, welfare state for many of the problems encountered by their countries at that time (Kaufman 1979). The New Right’s critiques of Keynesian welfarism included: bad policy advice by overpowerful, top officials; poor administration by public officials without managerial skills; and resistance to change by strong public sector unions. Neo-liberal ideology, combined with the so-called ‘fiscal crisis’ of western welfare states, resulted in governments facing new financial problems and seeking to limit public expenditure growth. Economic recession and the apparent end of sustained growth meant limits to increases in public spending and resistance by citizens to increased taxation. Containing public expenditure became a priority for governments of all political persuasions in western Europe and beyond.
Managing Universities and Regulating Academic Labour Markets

Most curbed welfare redistributive spending programmes or reduced levels of service provision (Farnham et al. 1996). Higher education was not exempt from these pressures. This point was made by the Dearing committee in its inquiry into higher education in the UK in the late 1990s. In its view, 'on present trends the pressure on public expenditure in respect of social security, education and health will continue to increase'. Further, while the government had identified education as its first priority, 'it will undoubtedly be competing with other pressing needs, and within education itself there will be competing needs and changing priorities' (National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education – NCIHE 1997a: 59). In addition to higher education being reshaped to respond to national economic needs, there is increased use of market mechanisms to deliver it, a search for greater institutional efficiency in providing it and more state involvement in regulating institutions (Miller 1995).

The social changes driving higher education reform are equally profound. Households throughout the western world are becoming smaller, more people are getting divorced, family size is reducing and populations are ageing. People are marrying at an older age, increasing numbers of women are remaining childless and those having children often do so later in life. Young people, in turn, often seek financial independence at an earlier age and women’s position in society has been radically transformed, largely through education, the technologies of birth control and greater involvement in paid employment. The western world is becoming more secular and more multi-cultural, while people’s attitudes and personal behaviour are becoming both more pluralist and more individualist. Young people are being provided with more educational opportunity and there is greater concern for the environment and natural world. Mass communications, such as television, the Internet and popular press, penetrate households and bring into them a breadth of information, cultural diversity and different life styles which would have been unimaginable a generation ago. Also greater mobility internationally is widening people's perspectives of other countries, their indigenous cultures and ways of living.

Perhaps some of the most profound sets of changes, however, are technological. Cheap, powerful, reliable computers are revolutionizing how information is stored, managed and disseminated. The capacity to transmit large quantities of information quickly and cheaply in electronic form is transforming work, organizational decision-making and education. Use of linked networks of computers – the Internet – is increasing at an astonishing rate and is enabling millions of organizations and people around the world to communicate instantly and cost-effectively with one another. In higher education, the potential impact of ‘information technology-assisted teaching and learning’ (ITATL) is enormous. ITATL facilitates new approaches to teaching and learning by developing appropriate teaching strategies, including flexible and distance learning though it requires staff development at all levels to do so effectively. Knowledge management skills also play a key role in preparing graduates for work and research. Further, ITATL
has a central role ‘in promoting appropriate changes in institutional culture’, as well as underpinning ‘strategic development for a range of educational and commercial activities at local and regional levels’ (Higher Education Funding Council for England 1997: 4ff). Extending the use of information technology applications in higher education is likely to promote new modes of collaboration between higher education institutions and the business and commercial sectors.

The changing faces of higher education

The implications of these sea changes in the external environment are immense for higher education in general and the academic profession in particular. Some are touched on here. A critical one is that higher education is generally becoming more instrumental in its aims and purposes. For policy-makers and employers, relevant higher education is increasingly seen as a key factor in contributing to national economic growth, providing employable and flexible graduates and being a source of scientific and technological innovation to benefit the corporate sector. This prescriptive, utilitarian approach to higher education is epitomized in the UK’s Dearing report which, in the late 1990s, reviewed the ‘purposes, shape, structure, size and funding of higher education’ over ‘the next 20 years’. In its view, higher education in the UK will become an international service, with students and employers choosing on a global basis, the programmes they require, delivered in the ways best suiting them. Higher education institutions, in turn, may need to learn from developments in the business sector and the approach to life-long learning made by some organizations in order to flourish in ‘a fast changing global economy’.

Specifically, Dearing argued (NCIHE 1997a: 55), high quality, relevant higher educational provision will be ‘a key factor in attracting and anchoring the operations of global corporations because of the research capacity of its institutions’. It will also promote the skills and knowledge required of local workforces. More generally, Dearing posited that:

- institutions will be at the forefront in offering opportunities for learning throughout life, to individuals and their corporations;
- institutions will need to meet the aspirations of individuals to re-equip themselves for a succession of jobs over a working lifetime and to manage the corresponding uncertainty with confidence;
- higher education must continue to provide a steady stream of people with high level technical skills and creativity, to meet the premium put on innovation, product and service development by the developing relationship between global corporations and their suppliers;
- above all, this new economic order will place a premium on knowledge. Institutions are well-placed to capitalise on higher education’s long-standing purpose of developing knowledge and understanding. But to do so, they need to recognise more consistently that individuals need to be
equipped in their initial higher education with the knowledge, skills and understanding which they can use as a basis to secure further knowledge and skills;

- in addition to a well-educated, highly skilled workforce, the other prerequisite for a knowledge-based economy is a research base to provide new knowledge, understanding and ideas.

In Dearing’s view, high technology companies will locate in those countries with a good supply of trained researchers and those offering ‘opportunities to companies for communication and collaboration with those involved in basic research’.

Other countries have adopted similar views of the aims and purposes of higher education. The goals of Australian higher education, for example, as defined by the Higher Education Council, are wide ranging. These include the aim of ‘retaining and nourishing its own diversity to meet the needs of a nation that is characterised by its geographical, social and cultural variety’ and of ‘applying the outcomes of research and scholarship in ways that contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of Australia, its States and regions, and its place in the world’ (NCIHE 1997b: 125). In Japan, there is considerable government commitment to basic research in the belief that it provides the bedrock upon which applied technologies are built so ‘its promotion in universities will be essential to the development of science and technology’ (ibid.: 53). In Malaysia, the aims and purposes of higher education are ‘to improve the quality and relevance of courses offered so as to match national manpower requirements’ and to ‘increase the capacity and capability to undertake research and development, particularly that which is relevant to the requirements of the industrial and service sectors’ (ibid.: 110).

Another change, in response to increasing demand for higher education, arising partly out of the social trends outlined above, is that developed countries are moving towards open, mass systems of provision rather than closed, elite ones. The characteristics of mature, mass systems of higher education have been identified, among others, by Trow (1995). While accepting that the move towards massification is uneven in western societies, he defines it where over 25 per cent of the age cohort enters it and cites the United States and Japan as already moving towards 50 per cent participation rates. Massification results in increasing diversity of institutions, growing institutional autonomy and diversification of support, with the state’s contribution to the system falling as higher education shifts closer to the market. Mass systems recruit both more diversified bodies of students and different kinds of staff to the academic profession who, in turn, are more disparate in their professional and social origins. These changes result in stronger institutional leaderships, more entrepreneurial in character and more able to cultivate alternative sources of financial support. There is also growth in numbers of senior administrative staff, supporting the new ‘chief executives’ who, in turn, are more likely to be appointed by ‘corporate’ boards.
rather than being elected by their academic peers. There are increases in the numbers of senior support staff who are professional managers, with their own training, career paths and occupational interests.

There is also evidence, as the purposes of higher education become more instrumental, access widens and the unit of resource provided by the state falls, that control of universities shifts away from what Clark (1983) describes as 'academic oligarchy' towards, somewhat paradoxically, both more market and more state control, though the directions in which these shifts take place differ among countries. The state may well continue to provide the lion's share of resources but it seeks greater accountability for them and more marketization of the higher education process. Shifting to the market results in a more competitive environment in higher education. In commenting on the UK system, Bargh et al. (1996: 14) claim that marketization has two aspects:

first, at the system level, governments, funding councils and other agencies have developed strategic policies to build a 'market' culture and resource allocation systems designed to create quasi-markets; second, at the institutional level, more competitive values have been espoused and competitive behaviour has been stimulated between, and within, universities.

More state control emerges by monitoring 'quality' centrally, reducing subsidies to institutions and their students and encouraging institutions to 'sell their services' in the marketplace. At the same time, by devolving more managerial autonomy to institutions, the state seeks, through 'new' management processes and systems, greater efficiency of provision. Hence 'in times of financial retrenchment perhaps a university is a set of academic departments unified only by a shared assumption that the management is oversized and over-expensive!' (Dopson and McNay 1996: 16). Driven by the 'hard' political right in the UK, these developments have been attacked by the 'soft' political right, as a threat to university autonomy (Jackson 1993: 13):

Historically, Tory governments have always been very concerned to preserve universities' independence, autonomy, self-government and morale. But since the mid-1980s, we have got into the habit of increasingly involving ourselves by legislation and executive action in university matters which should cause us concern.

For intellectual and political liberals like Russell (1993: 107), on the other hand, the threat is to academic freedoms:

the pressure on unit costs, the reduction in the amount of money per student, has been used as a battering ram to take academic judgement out of academic hands. This constitutes a threat to academic freedom. If academics cannot research, cannot decide how to teach, cannot defend the interests of students, cannot decide the standard of their degrees, what academic freedom is left for them.
At micro-level, massification also requires fundamental changes in the higher education curriculum and its pedagogy. According to Trow (1995), the conventional wisdom emerges that students can only be expected to learn what they have been taught. This leads to greater emphasis on the teaching skills of academic staff and puts students at the centre of the learning process, not academic disciplines. There is modularization of courses, the emergence of credit transfer systems and increases in numbers of part-time, mature and working students in higher education. Trow goes on to claim (1995: 16f) that growth and diversification of higher education, along with associated changes in pedagogy, require society and its systems of higher education to surrender any idea of broad common standards of academic performance among institutions and even between subjects within a single university. Higher education leaves 'the gold standard' and degrees are increasingly assessed by the name of the institution where they are earned and the department in which the student took the degree. Further:

The growth in the size of departments makes it impossible for a professor to stand as a guarantor of the quality of work of everyone in his department... So governments tend to develop more rationalised assessments and quality assurance procedures... in part because the system is now very expensive and becoming more so, in part because governments are anxious about how the universities are performing in the face of growing globalisation of economic competition.

Quality assurance systems emerge, in short, because of withdrawal of trust in institutions which are seen 'full of less able students and teachers'. Trow sees the alternative to stronger quality assurance procedures being heavier reliance on markets and institutional competition but does not believe that these are yet in favour in Europe, as they are in north America and some Asian countries.

Another major development in higher education is the need to accept 'a change in the general academic ethos' (Campbell 1996: 28). In this process, academic life, which is traditionally reflective, scholarly and long-term in its goals, is being replaced in western societies, to greater or lesser degrees, by more proactive, planned approaches. This is being driven by the needs of business, the labour market and government, with educational objectives becoming less qualitative and more quantified. Attempts are made to evaluate academic life as an economic commodity with market value, rather than as an intellectual pursuit for its own sake. Another development, following massification, is a tendency for students to become more instrumental and product-centred in relation to their learning. Some argue that this gives more credence to information acquisition by students than to developing their powers of the mind. Also with rising student numbers, there are increases in teaching loads, administrative tasks and student counselling for academic staff. This is almost certainly detrimental to research and scholarship and could lead to the academic function being separated within institutions between those whose main task is to teach and those that
do research. In countries where binary systems have been removed, such as in Australia and the UK, these developments might create a 'new' divide among institutions, with 'top' universities doing most of the research, 'bottom' ones doing most of the teaching and 'intermediate' ones doing mostly teaching and some research, as in the United States.

Higher education is becoming increasingly internationalized. By its very nature, higher education has always had an international dimension. But in elite systems, transnational mobility mainly involved limited exchanges of academic staff, a relatively small group of international conferences and fairly small numbers of students studying abroad. With massification, cheaper international transport, rising incomes per head, more effective communications and wider access to higher education, the internationalizing of student recruitment and the curriculum become the norm. Rising numbers of students from developing countries seek to either study abroad or at least do some of their studies overseas, a policy which is encouraged by their governments, which are often unable to meet indigenous demand for higher education locally. Similarly, students in the developed countries become more mobile at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. They are often supported by their governments, or by intergovernmental schemes such as ERASMUS and SOCRATES in the European Union, in joint programmes of study involving groups of institutions transnationally. Further, since mass higher education involves less state support, universities actively seek overseas markets for their academic programmes. Prime examples of this are the penetration into the 'Tiger Economies' of the Far East by a variety of Australian, United States and British universities in recent years, which work with local providers through franchising and other arrangements. A corollary to these developments is curricular change, drawing in international and comparative issues into courses and units.

These and related changes in higher education challenge the cultural conservatism, traditional professionalism and intellectual autonomy of the academic community. They also make it more costly to employ academic staff, since there are a larger group than in elite systems. Educational instrumentalism, linked with globalization, massification, withdrawal of state support for higher education, marketization, the shift to a student and teaching centred curriculum, declining units of resource and internationalization, all lead to greater demands for more accountability in higher education, away from the academic class to those controlling its resources (government and managers) and those benefiting from its facilities (students and employers). They also result in pressures on employment costs and on quality of working life for academic staff.

Academic professionalism

Academic work is not a profession in the classical sense that medicine, the law and accountancy are deemed to be. Whether measured by 'trait' or
'functionalist' models of professionalism, the classic professions score highly on both counts. Trait models comprise a list of 'attributes' said to represent the common core of professional occupations. Typical of this approach is the work of Millerson (1964) who lists 23 elements which have been included in definitions of professions. Yet in practice, it is impossible to agree categorically the elements said to constitute a profession. Perhaps the most frequently mentioned professional 'traits' are: skill based on theoretical knowledge; provision of training and education; testing the competence of members; organization; adherence to professional codes of conduct; and altruistic service to clients. One weakness of trait approaches is that they tend to incorporate the professionals' own definitions of what it is to be a professional. These are derived from analysing a limited number of professional groups, based largely on Anglo-American culture and practice. Further, while the traits listed above may apply to academics individually, they are imprecise and fail to provide a generic definition of what it is to be a 'professional academic'.

Functionalist models of professions make no attempt to present exhaustive lists of traits. Rather the components of professionalism are limited to those elements said to have functional relevance for society and the professional-client relationship. Thus Barber (1963) claims professional behaviour may be defined in terms of four essential attributes: a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge; primary orientation to the community rather than individual self-interest; a high degree of control of behaviour through internalized codes of ethics, operated by professionals themselves; and a system of rewards, both monetary and honorary, that are mainly symbols of work achievement, not the means of individual self-interest. Yet like the trait model, the functional one excludes from consideration the power dimension of professionalism (i.e. potential conflicts between professionals and their clients) and this suggests variations in the institutionalized ways in which occupational activities are controlled.

Johnson (1972: 45) responds to this omission by positing that professionalism can be redefined as 'a peculiar form of occupational control rather than an expression of the inherent nature of particular occupations'. For him, 'a profession is not... an occupation but a means of controlling an occupation'. He provides a threefold typology of institutionalized forms of professional control. One is where the professionals define the needs of their clients and the manner in which these needs are to be catered for. This is 'collegiate control', based on either occupational authority or a guild system. A second form of control is 'patronage' where clients define their own needs and the manner in which they are to be met. This may be oligarchic patronage, as in traditional societies, or corporate patronage where the major demand for professional services comes from corporations, as in the modern world. The third form of professional control is 'mediation'. This is where a third-party (either capitalist entrepreneurs or the state) mediates the relationship between professionals and their clients and defines the needs and manner in which they are to be met.
In practice, academics have a number of 'clients'. These are primarily students but others might include the business sector and its demands for graduates and higher education services, the institutions employing academic staff and the state. Traditionally, the academic profession exerted professional control between itself and its student-clients largely through collegiate control, based on either occupational authority or, in other cases, as in parts of western Europe, guild control where strong academic 'corps' existed. Increasingly, however, collegiate control is being challenged. This may be by corporate patronage, which is demand-driven, where there is rising demand for graduates and higher education services by the business sector which seeks to define the higher education agenda in its own interests. It may be by state mediation, which is resource and quality-driven, where there is increasing state regulation of institutions and the activities of academic staff. And it may be by entrepreneurial mediation, where entrepreneurs define the needs of users of higher education and how these may be delivered in the marketplace. Where professional self-control is weakened, or does not exist, or where state or entrepreneurial mediation restricts the occupational authority of academic staff, they become de-professionalized 'knowledge workers'. This point is made starkly by Halsey (1992: 13):

The gradual proletarianisation of the academic professions – an erosion of their relative class and status advantages as a system of higher education is propelled towards a wider admission of those who survive beyond compulsory schooling. Managerialism gradually comes to dominate collegiate cooperation in the organisation of both teaching and research. Explicit vocationalism displaces implicit vocational preparation, as degree courses are adapted to the changing division of labour in the graduate market. Research endeavours are increasingly applied to the requirements of government or industrial demands. The don becomes increasingly a salaried or even a piece-work labourer in the service of the expanding number of administrators and technologists.

Whatever form professional control takes, equal status among peers and the continuous occupational career are important mechanisms for maintaining a sense of professional identity, colleague-loyalty and shared values amongst academics. Personal prestige is normally dependent upon peer evaluation and, as a result, individual competence is a significant criterion of professional worth. But the academic profession is not a homogeneous one institutionally, nationally or internationally. By its very nature, much academic work is highly individualistic, such as teaching, marking, researching, writing and administration. But while academics are individuals they are also part of an academic (i.e. institutional) community and have to cooperate and work with others in their departments, faculties and parent institutions to maintain academic standards internally. More significantly, academics are also part of a wider academic community, external to their institutions. This is based on their subject disciplines and their specialisms.
within it and these provide the defining characteristics of professional academic work. In his inquiry into the cultures of academic disciplines, Becher (1989) distinguishes between the epistemological and sociological dimensions of disciplinarity. As cognitive entities, subjects may be hard or soft and pure or applied. Professional networks or disciplinary communities, in turn, may be convergent or divergent in terms of their identity and urban (occupying a narrow area of intellectual territory) or rural (occupying a wide area of intellectual territory) in their patterns of interaction. It follows that there are several career pathways for academics, different reputation-building strategies and diverse forms of external relationships. All academics are part of a community of scholars, however, sharing intellectual interests setting them apart from others. As Becher (1989: 171) writes, academic tribes 'share the same ethnicity; the territories they occupy are part of the same land mass' but:

An enhanced recognition of mutuality could serve as a better defence against the intrusive managerialism which seeks to impose a crude form of accountability, based on false assumptions about the nature of intellectual endeavour, and bolstered by insensitive and often spurious 'indicators of performance'.

The ways in which academics demonstrate their professionalism are wide ranging. These include teaching at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, working with colleagues in committees, undertaking research either alone or in groups, participating in management and networking externally with their disciplinary colleagues and relevant external bodies. The professional academic can only be judged by his/her ability – by students, peers, senior colleagues and outside parties – to undertake these roles in effective and politically sensitive ways. These roles are performed differently by each academic and integrating them at the personal level is a difficult task, which depends on the competences and qualities of individuals. How their time is distributed among these roles and activities depends on the rank, subject area, skills, experience and motivations of each academic. But the ‘building block’ of academic professionalism is the individual academic within a disciplinary and departmental structure. And therein lies the paradox of professional academic life. On the one hand the academic role is rooted in individual ability and personal drive but, on the other, it requires teamwork and good interpersonal skills among colleagues collectively to carry out their institutional roles effectively. Institutions with powerful individual academics, who believe in their academic disciplines above all else, working within strong academic departments, are likely to generate more generic professionalism than those which do not. As Dearlove (1997: 68) comments:

discipline-based departments are the basic units and life-blood of academic work the world over. They transcend the confines of one institution to form invisible colleges that, for many academics, have much more meaning than the university in which they are employed.
Ultimately, however difficult it is to achieve in practice, academic professionalism depends upon effective, individual professionals operating within collective, professional cultures. This professionalism has to be based on mutual trust, tolerance and personal integrity and the freedom within institutions to teach and research those academic issues which are at the cutting edges of subject disciplines.

Governance, management and the challenge of managerialism

Like all large, complex, diverse organizations, universities and other institutions of higher education need to be governed and managed to achieve their purposes. Academic staff, non-academic staff and students have interests in both processes. In essence, university governance is concerned with the accountability of institutions, their strategic direction, policy formulation and, more abstrusely, their ‘good name’. The management function, in turn, deals with the execution, communication and monitoring of organizational strategies and policies and how the university is structured to carry out its academic purposes. The formal structures of a university typically involve three sets of bodies at institutional level: a governing body, executive committee and academic board. Governing bodies, by whatever name they are called, normally consist of externally appointed individuals, staff and student representatives, the chief executive (variously called vice chancellors, rectors or presidents) and other senior staff. They are responsible and accountable for all the affairs of the university, including its financial and legal well-being. University executives, embodied in the person of the chief executive, assisted by senior academic and administrative staff, implement the decisions of governing bodies or ensure that they are implemented through the relevant management structure. Academic boards, which deal with teaching, research and quality issues, are made up of ex-officio academics, pro-vice chancellors (or pro-rectors or vice presidents), administrators, elected staff and some student representatives. Faculty boards and other academic committees, in turn, are subordinate to academic boards and report to them, with departments, the basic unit of academic organization, reporting to faculties. While such structures are hierarchical with formal power and authority at the centre of institutions, there is staff and student representation on governing bodies, academic boards and at faculty and departmental levels. Universities are therefore highly pluralistic and political organizations where consultation with and participation of staff in management and academic issues are the norm rather than the exception. Moreover, since traditional academic work is craft-like in nature, this means that universities are ‘bottom heavy’ institutions, so that it is not too fanciful to see the modern university as a federation of departments which, through their internal political processes, often seek to limit the
power of government by the university as a whole over its constituent parts (Halsey and Trow 1971).

As institutions become more complex and ever larger, there are a number of specialist managerial functions which support the policy-making, executive and academic structures of universities. These include the finance, marketing, audit, estate, student affairs, personnel management (or 'human resources') and administrative functions. These and the management structures outlined above are, in turn, maintained by information technology, communications and other management systems. In summary, university management like any other institutional management is an authority structure, involving the taking of policy decisions and implementing executive actions, with those in managerial roles having responsibility for the 'good order' of their institutions and the effective use of their resources.

For some professional managers within universities, the management function is a non-problematic one. For them, it is a 'common sense', rational set of activities which simply requires 'getting things done' through systems and people. They might define 'management' as where the 'function being carried out is something that “the real world” would readily recognize as running an operation with certain limited resources and within set parameters in the most economical and efficient way compatible with being effective in achieving agreed objectives' (Palfreyman and Warner 1996: 3). In reality, of course, universities are inherently difficult organizations to manage and are full of ambiguities and conflicts, which sometimes involves those in executive roles having to make difficult choices out of the options available. For many academics and non-academics in universities, on the other hand, who are not managers, the above definition of management begs a number of questions including: what is meant by 'efficiency', what is 'effectiveness', how have the 'agreed objectives' been established, what impact will 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' have on implementing academic goals, what impact will they have on the terms, conditions and occupational interests of academic and other staff, to whom are the managers accountable and so on?

Various models of university management have been proposed. Miller (1995) in his review of the literature identifies 13 variants, which indicates a lack of consensus of exactly how university management can be conceptualized. These are: the 'organized anarchy', 'garbage can', 'loose-coupled', 'bureaucracy', 'rational', 'collegiality', 'political systems', 'interactionist', 'the liberal university', 'the research university', 'the multiuniversity', 'the people's university' and 'complete mess-up' models. Bargh and her colleagues (1996: 16) are more eclectic in their approach. In the context of British-based research, they conclude that:

The university has become a complex institution within which different organizational models coexist, often uneasily. It is rather like an archaeological site. In the lowest layer it is the idea of the 'collegium' ruled by academic elders; in the next layer is the notion, popular in the
1960s, of the university as a political system in which issues of representation and participation were dominant; next is the 'corporate' ideal that came into its own post-Jarrett and post-incorporation, and relied on line management bureaucracy; finally, on the surface, is the idea of the university as a creative organization, its separate businesses orchestrated by a strategic centre. These different organizational models are closely related to the increasing scale and complexity of universities.

Given the hierarchical structures of modern, large universities, and the plurality of interests incorporated within them, conflicts between layers and interest groups are not unusual. Some are formal, institutionalized conflicts between executive management, say, and faculties over distribution of resources within their institution. Others may be among faculties, within faculties or within departments. Yet others are more likely to be between the 'formal' structure of the organization, or its constituent parts, and 'informal', unorganized interests embodied in the customs and practices, unwritten rules and conventions defended by ad hoc groups and individuals in the system. Whatever forms of conflict emerge, managing and resolving them take enormous amounts of time and energy for those involved in both the public life and private life of institutions.

More simply, adapting Handy's (1993) and McNay's (1995) classification of organizational cultures, and bearing in mind the dual concerns of academics in protecting their disciplinary interests and participating in the internal management of institutions, we can conceptualize university management systems into four ideal typologies or models, as shown in Figure 1.1. These are, of course, 'ideal' types and in practice institutions are likely to exhibit features of more than one typology, even if a dominant one is apparent, but they are useful for descriptive and heuristic purposes. The model of university management best representing the interests of academic staff is the 'collegial' university, which combines high levels of professional autonomy with high levels of staff participation in management. It is a bottom-up 'person'-based organization in which the focal point of the institution is the 'collegium' of scholars focused around their academic
disciplines. At the other extreme is the 'managerial' model which provides more limited professional autonomy and an executive style of management copied from the private, corporate sector. It is a top-down, 'power' based organization focusing on hierarchy and the actioning of its corporate, financial and academic plans through executive management systems and structures. Intermediate between the collegial and managerial models are two others: the 'bureaucratic' and 'entrepreneurial'. The bureaucratic model incorporates relatively high levels of professional autonomy but fairly low levels of staff participation in management. It is a mechanistic, 'role' based organization, focusing on rules and administrative procedures where the 'administration' acts as the organization's gatekeepers. The entrepreneurial model, which is not common in European higher education, is best exemplified by market-focused business schools, such as the London Business School, INSEAD at Fontainebleu, France, and North American institutions, which sell their 'products' and services in the marketplace. The entrepreneurial model of university management is an organic, 'task' based organization, which focuses on enterprise and searches for new markets and financial security for the institution and its stakeholders.

The classical organizational structure for universities is that of the self-governing, academic community based on collegiality, which complements occupational authority or even benevolent state mediation of the profession. Collegiality is based on the concept of a university as a community of equal scholars, able to govern their own affairs, self-manage their activities and act as a 'clerisy' or a body of scholars looking to the collective rather than the individual in making decisions. Eustace (1987) provides five criteria defining the collegial approach to academic governance: equality, democracy, self-validation, absence of non-scholars and autonomy from society, especially from all forms of state intervention. Although different systems of collegiality have existed in western Europe and North America, the closest example today is that of some Oxbridge colleges, where dons are elected for fixed terms of office and governance remains in the hands of the collegial fellows. In the full collegial model, there is no hierarchy of power, only of individual status. Governing body, executive and academic board are co-equal in authority and influence, whilst their members are individually and collectively accountable to the collegium. Academic, organizational and employment issues are regulated internally. Internal decisions are based on the democratic, elective principle and consensus, or as the last resort majority rule, is the norm. The public life, private life and working life of the institution are in equilibrium and are a unity, albeit in a highly politically charged context (Johnson 1994).

In practice, there probably never was a 'golden age' of unfettered donnish freedom in any higher education system. In the British case, for example, the classic, autonomous model of university governance and management was an ideal which was never absolute in all universities, let alone in other institutions of higher education such as polytechnics and colleges (Moody and Eustace 1974; Collins 1994). However, an essential prerequisite
of self-governance and self-management is independence from financial pressure. It is through the giving of grants by a benevolent state, or by private endowments, that the autonomous institution can set its own educational goals, establish its own teaching and research programmes and build its relationships with the outside world. This was the case in UK universities up until the early 1970s, but it was never the case in polytechnics or colleges of higher education, which were more constrained by their accountabilities to local political authorities. The intellectual driving force behind the collegial model is the objective pursuit of knowledge by individual scholars, even where they work in teams. In this model, teaching and research are craft activities, learned by experience through ‘on the job’ training and academic ‘apprenticeships’ or a ‘guild system’, which involve observing and practising these skills. In such a system, authority is not imposed downwards by managerial hierarchies but upwards by the collective will of the collegium.

Kogan (1988: 68f) defines the collegium as ‘a minimum organisation’ where the ‘independent’ college comes together to admit new members, establish minimum standards and divide up its common resources. For him, the opposite of the ‘independent’ institution is the ‘dependent’ one whose objectives are not set by members of the academic profession but by their sponsors. ‘The academics will still determine how to do it, but ultimately what should be done, and why, will be determined by external forces.’ Most importantly, he argues, the function of higher education under the dependency model is not education for its own sake but to meet national demands for trained people in the labour market and produce useful knowledge for society. While accepting that most institutions have been both independent of the state and dependent upon it, Kogan concludes that in the past academics accepted or rejected such dependency on their own criteria. ‘They did not have to do what they were told in order to keep in employment. Their substance was not determined by a string of ad hoc contracts’ (ibid.: 71).

There are a number of definitions of ‘managerialism’ but Pollitt (1993: 1) provides a summary one. For him, managerialism is ‘a set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which burns the seldom-tested assumption that better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range of economic and social ills’. He identifies five elements in managerialist analyses. These are: social progress requires continuing increases in economic productivity; productivity increases come from applying sophisticated technologies; the application of these technologies can only be achieved through a disciplined workforce; business success depends on the professionalism of skilled managers; and to perform their crucial role in organizations managers must have the right to manage. The ‘new managerialism’ which emerged especially in the UK, United States and other parts of the English-speaking world during the 1980s pervaded both the private and public sectors but, in the UK, it received particular support by government for its introduction into the public services. In 1980, the then Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine, wrote: ‘Efficient management is a
key to the [national] revival... And the management ethos must run right through our national life – private and public companies, civil service, nationalised industries, local government, the National Health Service' (Farnham and Horton 1996: 41).

The introduction of general management practices into the public services in the UK was not only a search for increased economic efficiency but also politically driven by New Right political ideologists and ministers, who were in the ascendant in British politics during the 1980s and 1990s. It was predicated on the assumption that private sector economistic and rationalist approaches to management are the ideal to be aimed at. These were seen as being superior to the public administration model of organization associated with classical bureaucracy. Indeed, if the efficiency and quality of public service provision was to be improved (including higher education), then private sector management practices and ideologies needed to be imported into public organizations. The political agenda underpinning public service managerialism has been identified by Pollitt (1993: 49), since for the New Right:

- better management provides a label under which private-sector disciplines can be introduced to the public services, political control can be strengthened, budgets trimmed, professional autonomy reduced, public service unions weakened and a quasi-competitive framework erected to flush out the natural 'inefficiencies' of bureaucracies.

The new managerialism, in short, was part of the reformist policies of the New Right in British politics during the 1980s and 1990s.

Managerialism in the public sectors of the UK, United States and Australasia did not penetrate as deeply in non-anglophone countries. States with systems of administrative law, established civil service corps, more decentralized political structures and mixed systems of welfare and 'public good' provision were less likely to reform their public services using managerialist approaches. Thus while the UK, Finland and the Netherlands, for example, were the most affected by 'new public management' reforms, Germany and Spain were the least affected, with Belgium, France, Ireland and Italy falling into the intermediate ranges. Although there was a common economic drive to make public services in Europe more efficient and cost-effective in the recent past, the changes have to be placed in their specific constitutional, legal, political, cultural and historical contexts (Depré et al. 1996).

Universities have not been immune to managerialist tendencies and it is in the UK that managerialism has probably penetrated deepest. Indeed Trow (1994: 11) argues that:

- Over the past ten to twelve years British higher education has undergone a more profound orientation than any other system in industrial societies. One aspect of that revolution has been the emergence of 'managerialism' in the governance and direction of British universities.
The chosen managerial mechanisms in the United Kingdom currently are assessments of the 'quality' of the teaching and research done in universities, carried out by committees and individuals appointed by the central funding agency, and linked directly to funding.

Trow sees managerialism as not only a concern by government with the effective management of institutions but also an ideology or set of ideas which are independent of specific situations. He identifies two concepts of managerialism, the 'soft' and 'hard' versions. The soft concept is concerned with managerial effectiveness as an important element in the provision of higher education at the lowest cost, focusing around the idea of improving the efficiency of institutions. Those supporting the soft concept, such as senior administrators and some academics, he argues, are critical of the professional conservatism of academics, their administrative inefficiency and indifference to establishing links with commerce and industry. However, they still see higher education as an autonomous activity, governed by the norms of the academic tradition, regulated by more effective and rationalized systems of management, but serving functions defined by the academic community itself.

Trow's hard concept of managerialism identifies it as one which 'elevates institutional and system management to a dominant position in higher education'. It is a vision of management held by government and business people rather than in universities themselves. Its advocates argue that higher education must be reshaped and reformed by the introduction of management systems, which then become a force ensuring steady improvement in educational provision. This is to be done through continuous improvements in quality and cost, using established mechanisms for assessing the outcomes of educational activities and rewarding and punishing institutions through formulae linking assessments with funding. In Trow's view, hard managerialism was the dominant force reshaping British higher education during the 1980s and 1990s. He argues that it arose because of withdrawal of trust by government in the academic community, and in its capacity to improve its own performance, and by the need to create a 'bottom line' in higher education equivalent to the profit and loss account of the commercial sector:

In brief, then, the withdrawal of trust in universities by the British government has forced it to create ... machinery and formulas to steer and manage the universities from outside the system. In the absence of a competitive market, effectively precluded by government policies, [external] bureaucratic institutions and their mechanisms are the alternative to a relationship of trust between state and universities.

Defenders of managerialism, on the other hand, such as Rear (1994a, 1994b), strongly refute the claim that government is seriously eroding academic autonomy and that managerialism, as a system of corporate control, is threatening academic freedom. He argues (1994b: 15) that institutional
autonomy is conditional upon fulfilling the purposes for which universities are funded. Any erosion of autonomy, he claims, has been largely prompted by the past reluctance of universities to change and serve the economy, as well as reluctance to ‘give a satisfactory account of their stewardship of huge sums of taxpayers’ money’. In his view, ‘good management of the universities is essential as a defence against further erosion of their autonomy’. Provided that there are safeguards to teach and research freely, he argues, it is the task of senior academic managers to be the ‘defenders of academic faith’, by ensuring the economic well-being of their institutions and managing the diverse demands made upon them in conditions of rapid change. Ultimately, Rear concludes, the economic viability of universities ‘and the retention of [their] institutional autonomy depend upon effective management’.

While agreeing that institutions have to be managed effectively, Kogan (1988) places little faith in managerialism. For him, effective management within universities requires securing adequate resources to carry out their academic functions, setting collective rules for academic behaviour and planning in a developmental sense. Such tasks need high technical ability, political skill and time to do things properly. In his view universities are bottom-up institutions, needing strong departments to work effectively and technically able administrators supporting them. He believes that managerialism in higher education is based on the unproven assumption that institutions, and the system to which they are subordinate, can specify institutional objectives within which those of basic units can be subsumed. It also assumes that ability to determine and control the pursuit of university objectives can be distributed hierarchically. He criticizes the Jarrett report (Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals 1985), which was the defining document of soft managerialism, whose aim was to strengthen and rationalize university administrations. Kogan notes ironically (1988: 77) that it obtained the support of five existing or former vice chancellors, as well as the chairman of the University Grants Committee. While accepting the importance of institutional leadership, he states that this can operate within either collegial or hierarchic structures.

Just observe how the Jarrett Report deplores strong leadership and power at working levels of the institution, namely, the departments, but wants it far stronger in the Chief Executive style Vice-Chancellor. So we don’t mind individual power as long as it is well away from the working level. One is bound to ask whether the Master of St John’s College, Cambridge really believed in this kind of model which was written in the report that he signed.

It is clear, then, that there are different models of university governance and management, ranging, at the extremes, from variants of collegiality to variants of managerialism, with the bureaucratic and entrepreneurial models somewhere in between. But the preferred model favoured by academics has traditionally been the collegial one. There are also choices in terms of
which is the dominant one in any system of higher education. If there is a
general inference, it is that elite, decentralized systems of higher education
are more conducive to forms of collegiality than are mass, centralized ones.
What is also apparent is that with increasing managerialism, governing bod-
ies, executive committees and academic boards no longer have co-equal
authority and status. Hierarchies of group and personal power emerge,
with executive committees becoming subordinate to governing bodies and
academic boards subordinate to executive committees. In practice, how-
ever, it is key members of governing bodies and executive committees,
focused around the chief executive, who become the real power brokers
within institutions where managerialism has penetrated deepest, since power
is squeezed to the apex or centre of institutions. Indeed, research in the UK
suggests (Bargh et al. 1996: 176) that ‘effective power is located not in the
formal constitution of...governing bodies but in informal, generally inter-
personal, networks that develop in the interstices of these formal arrange-
ments’. This research partly supports Clark’s (1996, 1995: 9) judgements
that successful, change-oriented universities ‘blend’ managerial with col-
egial authority and that innovating universities depend heavily on ‘leader-
ship at middle and lower levels of management that successfully reconciles
the entrepreneurial drives of central leaders with the drives of disparate
academic professional groups’.

Regulating the employment relationship

The working life of higher education – the life of employment and job
regulation within it – begins in the external market for academic labour,
when institutions search for and recruit staff. Unlike some other fee-paid
professional groups, such as private lawyers or accountants who work under
contracts for services with their corporate or individual clients, academics
are not self-employed professionals. The academic profession works for
either state (public) or non-state (private) organizations and is governed by
legal rules which vary with its members’ employment status. Where the
employer is the state (at either central or local level), academics commonly
have the legal status of civil servant and are public officials; here their
employment is a ‘service’ relationship, not a contractual one, and it is
regulated by public law. Where the employer is a non-governmental, pub-
licity or a private university, academics have the legal status of
employee and their jobs are regulated by contracts of employment under
private law, even if the content of these contracts is determined jointly
through collective bargaining between representatives of the employers
and academic staff unions. The two types of employment status accorded
to full-time academics – civil servant or employee – vary according to the
higher education system in which they work. This is a function of the
system’s history, how higher education is resourced and the balance within
it between public and private provision. Most higher education systems are
public ones, financed largely from taxation. In these systems, such as in most of western Europe, academics are either civil servants (as in Ireland and on the continent) or employees (as in the UK). In other countries, such as the United States and Japan, where there are mixed systems of higher education provision, partly state and partly private, academics may be civil servants, public employees or private employees.

In continental Europe, as civil servants academic staff employed in public universities have a legal status separate from that of academics working in private institutions – even though their terms and conditions of employment may be the same or similar. As public officials, their employment is regulated by public law, not by private law. Public law issues relating to civil servants are adjudicated in separate administrative courts, whereas legal issues affecting private-sector employees are governed by labour law administered in ordinary or labour courts. State officials in the continent of Europe, such as the academic profession, traditionally occupy positions imbued with duties of loyalty to the state in return for job security, often for life, as is the case with German Beamte and French fonctionnaires. But Beamte cannot strike and, unlike in the UK, German civil servants have no rights to collective bargaining. The UK therefore has never had to face the gulf between private law and public law systems, which denied collective bargaining rights to state and other public servants in European countries for many years. As Wedderburn (1991: 198) observes about the UK:

No Beamte (still without a right to strike) no fonctionnaires or agents publics placed under special restrictions, no need of special laws, like those in Sweden, 1965, or Italy, 1983, to bring municipal and state officials imperfectly into collective law, no claim by the State that its `sovereignty' is infringed by collective bargaining . . .

The starting point for continental public officials then has been a public law status quite different from that of an employment contract. In return for the benefits of this status, state officials were originally subject to public law rules prohibiting unionization, collective bargaining and strike action. However, in most countries, collective labour law for the public sector has moved closer to ordinary labour law ‘and there have gradually evolved wide, if qualified, rights to organise, to bargain and to strike in the public sector, even in state employment’ (ibid.: 318).

In those systems of higher education where academic staff work under contracts of employment, rooted in the principles of common law, as in many anglophone countries, it is the contract which is the legal source of the individual ‘pay-work’ bargain between the parties, whether between public corporation and public employee or private corporation and private employee. A ‘normal’, ‘non-casual’ permanent contract defines the rights and duties of the parties to the employment relationship, prescribes what is expected of them and is based on the principle of ‘freedom of contract’ between nominally equal, consenting parties. Normal contracts have three main features: they provide continuity and regularity; they incorporate
mutuality and security; and normal employees, compared with 'atypical' workers on non-standard contracts, receive fringe benefits which are often a valued aspect of the job. 'Taken together these features of the normal employment contract add up to a comprehensive and interdependent relationship' between employer and employee (Leighton 1986: 504). The reality of equality in the contractual relationship may be somewhat different in practice, however, in that 'save in exceptional circumstances, the individual worker brings no equality of bargaining power to the labour market and to this transaction central to his life' (Wedderburn 1986: 5). Indeed, for Kahn-Freund (1977: 6) the employment contract is:

In its inception ... an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the 'contract of employment'.

None the less, both parties entering the contract need the other and each wants to make it work in practice.

In those higher education systems where the employment contract provides the legal foundation of the pay–work bargain, mutuality between the employing authorities and academic staff has been the norm. This is because institutions exist to promote learning, scholarship and research and academics want to promote these activities, advance their professional lives and make a living. The pay–work bargain in this sense is an exchange relationship between the parties and has two main features. First, it is a market relationship between the buyer of labour services (the public or private university employer) and the seller (the academic), with one providing agreed pay, benefits and conditions of employment to the other in exchange for that person's specialist knowledge, skills and experience. Second, it is also an authority relationship, since in entering into the contract, individual academic staff are accepting the ultimate authority of the institution, and its managerial agents, to deploy their skills, organize their work and manage their time according to the needs of the system. Where the demand for academic labour exceeds its supply, where the authority relationship is regarded as just and equitable on both sides or where there are high levels of professional self-management in institutions, neither the market relationship nor the authority relationship is problematic. There are, however, potential tensions in both the market and authority relationship under common law systems (and the market and service relationship under public law ones) since those responsible for running universities want the lowest employment costs commensurate with obtaining and retaining the best academic labour force. Academics, in turn, want the best terms and conditions of employment, commensurate with job control, job security and career prospects. Hence the ability of university employers to satisfy simultaneously their own institutional goals with those of the academic profession are crucial to establishing 'good' working relations between the parties. Further, those charged with managing academic institutions ultimately want
freedom of manoeuvre to take and implement decisions in the interests of organizational efficiency and workplace order. They do not want to be constrained by the individual or collective resistance of academic (or indeed any other) staff within their institution.

There are basically three ways of regulating the employment relationship between higher education authorities and the academic staff working for them. Kahn-Freund (1977: 32) identifies the alternatives perceptibly: 'the substance of the mutual obligations of employer and employee is settled either unilaterally by the employer or bilaterally by collective bargaining or by the law itself'. In the case of bilateral regulation, the pay-work bargain is negotiated collectively and all those covered by the bargaining unit (or bargaining group) are contractually bound by the voluntary 'collective agreement' (as in the UK and Ireland) or by the legally enforceable 'collective contract' (as in parts of Europe and North America). Whether academic labour markets and basic authority or service relations within institutions are principally regulated unilaterally, bilaterally or by law depends on two principal factors: how centralized or decentralized the higher education system is and the relative strength or weakness of academic staff unions. Four 'ideal' typologies and possible associations between these variables are indicated in Table 1.1. State regulation, normally under public law, is associated with centralized public systems of higher education where there is either no union or unions are weak, as in France, Spain and Germany. Bilateral regulation through national collective bargaining, between representatives of employers and academic unions, is associated with centralized public systems of higher education, where there are relatively strong unions, as in the UK. Unilateral employer regulation by private universities (sometimes misleadingly called 'individual' bargaining) is associated with decentralized market systems of higher education and weak academic unions, as in parts of the United States. Local collective bargaining is associated with decentralized market or public systems of higher education where there are strong unions, as in Canada and other parts of the United States. In the United States, for example, Garbarino (1975: 253) has identified those strongholds where faculty unionism emerged: the public multi-institutional system and separate public institutions that had undergone 'major academic transformation or . . . experienced major administrative abuses in the eyes of their faculty' over issues such as governance, tenure and salaries.
If the prime methods of determining the conditions of working life in higher education are found largely within the limits of state regulation under public law, employer regulation under common law and collective bargaining, the outcomes are more wide-ranging. Each national higher education system, or subsystem in decentralized systems, produces its own set of employment rules. These rules typically define a range of issues, on terms and conditions, which are not found universally across different national systems. In some cases, the formal rules are comprehensive and broadly based, such as in public law and some collective bargaining systems. In other cases, the formal rules, incorporated within individual contracts of employment or collective agreements, are narrow and may be complemented by informal, unwritten, customary rules. Whatever the forms and details of the employment rules, their purpose is to regulate the working life of higher education institutions, with the minimum of conflict and dissension. Their details may be embodied in legal decrees, government decisions, employment contracts, institutional rules, employment handbooks or collective agreements, depending upon whether they have been principally determined by law, unilaterally or jointly. Typically, the rules cover issues such as: recruitment and selection, terms and conditions of employment, fringe benefits, career structures, job security and tenure, procedures for promotion, grievance and disciplinary matters, sabbaticals, pension arrangements and so on. With higher education becoming massified and shifting to the market, however, the rules governing the working life of higher education – the life of employment and job regulation – become potentially more contentious and problematic, for both institutions and the academic profession, as pressures on workloads, productivity and accountability rise. Also, the ways in which academic staff are managed become more formal, academic work becomes re-formulated and, for many staff, job security is weakened.

Another feature of academic employment in conditions of massification, marketization and institutional competition is that a rising proportion of staff are employed on casual or non-permanent contracts, in both private law and public law systems. Institutions have always employed non-permanent staff but the proportion of these increases with the shift to massification, because of pressures to reduce unit labour costs and raise institutional efficiency. Reductions in the unit of resource for teaching result in not only work intensification for existing staff but also, what Dearlove (1997: 64) describes as, ‘the employment of a reserve army of temporary piece-workers’ and fixed-term contract research staff. Casual teaching and research staff are the ‘invisible faculty’, excluded from collegial mechanisms within their institutions, whose poor conditions of work sustain the better conditions of permanent members of faculty (Gappa and Leslie 1995). These changes in the employment structures of universities give rise to the emerging ‘flexi-university’. The concept of the flexi-university is centred around a core group of permanently employed, secure, relatively well-paid academic staff (themselves divided into ‘permanent staff’, ‘research stars’ and ‘academic
managers’), supported by peripheral groups of casually employed, insecure, poorly paid staff – many of whom are female – doing routine teaching, instructing and research tasks.

These arrangements provide employment flexibilities for institutions such as: numerical, hours of work, labour cost and pay flexibilities – including localized pay bargaining. Flexibility in staff numbers through casualization, for example, allows institutions to increase or reduce the size (and costs) of their academic workforces in accordance with demand for their services. Flexibility in working hours, using a variety of contractual arrangements including part-time, fixed-term and temporary staff appointments, enables institutions to reduce their staffing overheads and raise productivity through employing less full-time staff. Individual performance related pay, or ‘merit’ pay, is also used to motivate some permanent members of faculty, such as managers and senior academic staff, giving rise to one set of pay flexibilities within institutions. Where pay bargaining for full-time members of faculty is decentralized to institutional level, this provides for another set of pay flexibilities locally. With these developments taking place, the main consequence is a fractionalization of the academic profession. Divisions of interest emerge (Fulton 1996), first, between permanent and casualized staff who ‘are more directed than permanent academics, who in turn are more directed than the research stars who frequently subvert direction and continue to teach within their carefully chosen domain’ (Dearlove 1997: 68) and, second, between highly paid ‘core luminaries’ and other full-time members of faculty. In conditions of continuous expansion and resource constraint in higher education, the employment relationship between institutions and members of the academic profession becomes one of increasing complexity and diversity. There are also pressures on institutions to utilize more flexible modes of employing some academic staff and adopt features of the flexi-university model of employment, which make it easier to introduce change.

References


Part 2

Europe
Belgium: Diverging Professions in Twin Communities

Jef C. Verhoeven and Ilse Beuselinck

From 1425 until 1797, the only institution of higher education in the southern Netherlands was the Catholic University of Leuven (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven – KUL), where instruction had been in Latin. In 1797, during the French occupation, the university was closed down. Under Dutch rule, three state universities were founded in Gent, Leuven and Liège in 1816. After independence in 1830, the language of instruction became French, including in the Dutch-speaking part of the country, and this lasted until the 1930s. In 1834, the state University of Leuven was abolished and the Catholic University of Leuven was reestablished. At the same time, the Free University of Brussels (Université Libre de Bruxelles) was founded by liberals and free-thinkers. This was the first expression of conflict between ideological groups in educational matters in Belgium, which had only become an independent state in 1830. These four universities, together with two small Catholic institutions in Namur and Brussels, provided Belgium with university education until 1965.

Current structure of higher education

In 1965 the first steps towards university expansion were made. New universities were established and old universities were given the right to establish new campuses in other parts of the country. A second university expansion started at the beginning of the 1970s. It was partly the result of the struggle of the Dutch-speaking population which wanted only Dutch-speaking universities in Flanders. In 1963, the country was divided into a Dutch-speaking part (Flanders) in the North, a French-speaking one (Wallonia) in the south, a small German-speaking area in the east and several bilingual towns such as Brussels. The law determined that all acts of administration should be done in the local language, except for the French-speaking part of the Catholic University of Louvain. In 1968, it was decided by the organizing authorities of the university and government that the French-speaking Catholic
University of Louvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) should move to the French-speaking part of the country (Louvain-la-Neuve) and, later on, that French-speaking universities in Brussels (the Free University of Brussels and the Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis) should have Dutch-speaking alternatives. These were the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) and the Universitaire Faculteiten Sint-Aloysis (now KUB) respectively. University expansion in Belgium was the result of not only more demand for university education but also divisions between language and ideological groups in the country (Verhoeven 1982).

Higher education outside the university sector started initially as an extension to secondary education and technical schools, when these institutions were upgraded to independent tertiary bodies, mainly after the Second World War (De Keyser 1974). Primary and secondary school teachers were trained in specialist institutions and, after the Second World War, both types of teacher training developed into training colleges, with a post-secondary training period of three years. This was also the case for technical, agricultural, paramedical (e.g. nursing), social work and arts education. Like university education, development of non-university higher education was influenced by linguistic and ideological divisions. These higher education institutions expanded in numbers and students from the 1960s. Recently, this large number of institutions were required by law to merge: in Flanders from over 160 to 29 and in French-speaking Belgium from 233 to 30 (Verhoeven and Beuselinck 1996).

Since the 1970s, in order to resolve the differences between Belgium’s linguistic communities, the country has moved from a unitary to a federal state. Although this process was largely completed by 1993, it is still continuing. The Belgian Federation is composed of three communities and three Regions. The three communities are the Flemish, French and German-speaking ones, which are responsible for policy in cultural and person-related issues such as language, education and welfare. There are four linguistic areas in Belgium: Dutch, French and German speaking and the bi-lingual area of Brussels. The Ministry of Education of the Flemish community is responsible for Dutch-speaking schools in Flanders and Brussels, whilst the Ministry of Education of the French-speaking community is responsible for French-speaking schools in Wallonia and Brussels. The three Regions, also based on geographical-linguistic divides – Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels – are responsible for economic policy, energy, science, public works, transport and town and country planning.

Communities and regions do not exactly coincide with each other and there is therefore a complex state structure, with different educational policies in each community. Since the budgets of communities and regions are provided by national government, each are affected by the national budget, which had a large national debt amounting to about 139 per cent of GDP in the mid-1990s (Kredietbank 1996). On the other hand, during the last two decades, the Belgian economy has followed average European growth rates, although there has been relatively high unemployment too, at around
9.6 per cent of the labour force since the early 1990s. All Regions are not equally prosperous, with economic growth higher and unemployment lower in Flanders. There are not only linguistic and economic differences among the Communities but also political, religious and demographic ones.

Currently, the Dutch-speaking community and French-speaking community have coalition governments of Christian-Democrats and Socialists but it is clear that Christian-Democrats are stronger in the north of the country, whereas the Socialists are stronger in the south. Besides these parties, each community has a strong Liberal Party and several other parties such as ‘greens’ and some nationalists. Traditionally, government coalitions, at both national and community levels alternate between the major parties. Differences among communities can also be traced in the development of their educational systems, though there are also similarities. Flanders, for example, reorganized higher education by Decrees regulating universities (12 June 1991) and hogescholen (colleges of higher education) (13 July 1994), whereas the French-speaking community still relies more on the former Belgian laws. Some principles were changed by decrees, such as Decree 5 September 1994 concerning the organization of university education and academic degrees, and Decree 15 July 1996 concerning the tasks of higher education colleges and positions within them. Consequently, though both communities use similar descriptions of universities and colleges, they have developed different policies concerning teaching ranks, quality assurance and so on. This makes it a complicated task to give a detailed picture of both systems.

The mission of universities, set out by the Flemish legislature, states that they should be simultaneously active in the field of academic education, scientific research and scientific service provision (Art. 4, Decree 12 June 1991). The mission of hogescholen, in turn, (Art. 3, Decree 13 July 1994) is to be:

simultaneously active in the field of hogeschool education, social service provision and, where appropriate, project-based scientific research in collaboration with a university or other body in this country or abroad. The development and practice of the arts will also be the task of the hogescholen, which will organise courses in the fields of audio-visual and plastic art, music and drama. The provision of hogeschool education will be the primary task of the hogeschool.

Although the missions of the two sets of higher education institutions differ markedly, this is not the case for each component of the education they provide and differences between them are not always clear. But colleges, while offering undergraduate qualifications, cannot confer doctorates. The Flemish community has eight universities, three of them making up the University of Antwerp. The French-speaking community has nine. These universities are shown by community, status, date of foundation and number of students in Table 2.1.

During the last two decades, rising demand for higher education led to an increase in the number of higher education colleges. This was eventually
Table 2.1  Belgian universities: community, status, date of foundation*, and number of students (1994–95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dutch-speaking</th>
<th>French-speaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State or public universities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiteit Gent (RUG) (1816) (N = 18,840)</td>
<td>Université de l’état à Liège (1816) (N = 13,442)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universitair Centrum Antwerpen (RUCA) (1965) (N = 2318)</td>
<td>Université de l’état à Mons (1965) (N = 2590)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universitaire Instelling Antwerpen (UIA) (1972) (N = 2730)</td>
<td>Faculté des Sciences Agronomiques de l’état à Gembloux (1919) (N = 956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universitair Centrum Limburg (LUC) (1971) (N = 2376)</td>
<td>Faculté Polytechnique à Mons (1920) (N = 1068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private (independent) universities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-confessional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) (1834) (N = 7968)</td>
<td>Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) (1834) (N = 17,061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (K.U. Leuven) (1425) (N = 26,060)</td>
<td>Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) (1425) (N = 19,945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universitaire Faculteiten Sint-Ignatius te Antwerpen (UFSIA) (1965) (N = 3502)</td>
<td>Facultés Universitaires Notre Dame de la Paix à Namur (1833) (N = 4545)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Notes:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*‘Universitaire Faculteiten’ (Facultés universitaires) and ‘Universitaire Centra’ comprise only certain faculties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b</strong> UIA, RUCA + UFSIA constitute together the Universiteit Antwerpen. UIA awards most of the Licentiaat degrees of the Universiteit Antwerpen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of the numbers of students: Hendrickx 1995; CREF 1995.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

halted and colleges were forced to merge, in Flanders in September 1995 and in the French-speaking community in September 1996. Currently, Flanders has five autonomous colleges (former state colleges), three provincial colleges, 20 private (mostly Catholic) colleges and one bilingual Flemish community nautical college. The French-speaking community has
six community colleges, 10 provincial colleges, 12 Catholic colleges and two private non-confessional colleges. Traditionally, Belgium has had a large private education system, because of the long tradition of organizing schools by religious denomination. More students attend private schools than state schools, or schools established by towns and provinces. This is also the case in higher education. The largest group of private schools are Catholic, although among universities and colleges there are also a small number of non-confessional institutions. All universities and colleges, whether private or public, have a recognized legal status and receive grants according to their functions and numbers of students. Universities and colleges are autonomous in the ways in which they are managed, although within limits laid down in laws and decrees. Community governments determine fields of study and the degrees an institution may provide, the maximum number and professional requirements of staff and, in Flanders, the quality assurance system. State officials control whether institutions meet these prescriptions and their legal obligations.

The players in higher education

In the mid-1990s, Flemish-speaking universities had 64,527 students and French-speaking ones 62,300. Compared with 1988–89, this was an increase of 17.9 per cent and 18.6 per cent respectively. The proportions of female students in both communities are about the same: 47.4 per cent in Flanders and 47.2 per cent in French-speaking universities. This is a steady increase in comparison with 1988–89, when the proportions were 43 per cent in each case. French-speaking universities have a larger proportion of foreign students (21 per cent) than do the Flemish (8 per cent), as shown in Table 2.2. Participation rates in universities are increasing, compared with 1988–89. Then, only 13 per cent of 18 year olds enrolled in Flemish universities and 15 per cent in French ones. In 1994–95, the figures were 19 per cent and 20 per cent respectively (Van Heddegem 1996). Although participation rates are increasing, children with parents of lower socioeconomic status are less likely to enter universities, preferring to go to higher education colleges (Verhoeven and Beuselinck 1996).

Between 1989 and 1994 the number of students in Flemish colleges increased by 14 per cent to 90,952 students and in the French-speaking ones by 35 per cent to 66,544. Enrolment of female students has traditionally been higher in colleges than in universities and is about 53 per cent in both parts of the country, as shown in Table 2.3. In Flanders, the participation rate of college students was 32 per cent in 1989, increasing to 56 per cent in 1994–95. In French-speaking colleges the rate increased to 62 per cent in 1993–94.

The staff of public universities and colleges are civil servants and can roughly be divided into three categories, as shown in Table 2.4: independent academic personnel, who are permanent staff who can conduct autonomous
Table 2.2  Student enrolments at Flemish and French-speaking universities by gender and nationality, 1988–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Belgians</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French-speaking universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–89</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>52,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989–90</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>54,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–91</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>56,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–92</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>59,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>61,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–94</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>62,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–95</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>62,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Flemish universities |     |     |          |            |        |
| 1988–89 | 56.2| 43.8| 93.9     | 6.1        | 54,712 |
| 1989–90 | 55.4| 44.6| 93.4     | 6.6        | 55,452 |
| 1990–91 | 55.0| 45.0| 93.0     | 6.9        | 56,627 |
| 1991–92 | 54.3| 45.7| 92.1     | 7.9        | 59,175 |
| 1992–93 | 53.9| 46.1| 91.8     | 8.2        | 61,231 |
| 1993–94 | 53.2| 46.8| 91.8     | 8.2        | 62,840 |
| 1994–95 | 52.6| 47.4| 92.0     | 8.0        | 64,527 |


research (ZAP or zelfstandig academisch personeel); auxiliary academic personnel (AAP or assisterend academisch personeel); and support staff (ATP or administratief en technisch personeel). In each group, different ranks are distinguishable, which vary between the two communities. Staff may be permanent or temporary and full-time or part-time. In universities, full-time independent academic personnel have permanent contracts but this is not the case for auxiliary academic personnel, except in the French-speaking community from the rank of premier assistant (research assistant) upwards. Support staff may have tenure or not, depending on their seniority. This is also the case for all support staff in colleges. Although private universities and colleges do not confer the same legal status on their staff as public universities and colleges do (i.e. as civil servants), they are obliged by law to give the same legal rights to staff as those in state institutions.

In 1996, Flemish universities had 2345 (full-time equivalent) independent academic personnel, 1688 auxiliary academic staff and 3533 support staff. There were also 2647 researchers and 2163 support staff working on non-permanent/fixed-term contracts (Bogaert 1996). In 1995, French-speaking universities had 1693 ZAP staff, 2100 AAP staff and 4001 ATP staff (CREF 1995). No data are available about contract researchers in French-speaking universities. The largest group of independent and auxiliary academic personnel is male but the proportion of males in the ranks of
Table 2.3  Student enrolments at Flemish and French-speaking colleges by gender and nationality, 1988–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Belgian</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flemish colleges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–89</td>
<td>47.79</td>
<td>52.21</td>
<td>98.43</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>79,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989–90</td>
<td>48.15</td>
<td>51.85</td>
<td>98.38</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>81,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–91</td>
<td>48.36</td>
<td>51.64</td>
<td>98.31</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>82,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–92</td>
<td>48.24</td>
<td>51.76</td>
<td>98.29</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>80,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td>47.81</td>
<td>52.19</td>
<td>98.26</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>84,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–94</td>
<td>47.34</td>
<td>52.66</td>
<td>97.67</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>90,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–95</td>
<td>46.91</td>
<td>53.09</td>
<td>97.91</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>90,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French-speaking colleges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–89</td>
<td>46.20</td>
<td>53.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989–90</td>
<td>45.44</td>
<td>54.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–91</td>
<td>45.52</td>
<td>54.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–92</td>
<td>45.83</td>
<td>54.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td>46.08</td>
<td>53.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–94</td>
<td>46.07</td>
<td>53.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66,544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.4  University staff by gender in Flemish and French-speaking universities (FTEs), 1995 and 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Flanders</th>
<th>French-speaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAP</td>
<td>2056.07</td>
<td>87.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Independent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>960.22</td>
<td>56.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(auxiliary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP (support)</td>
<td>2004.31</td>
<td>56.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5020.60</td>
<td>66.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


independent academics is the largest. Only in French-speaking universities is the proportion of women among support staff larger than men (see Table 2.4). There are no reliable data for college staff because of recent reorganization of this sector.
Since each university and college is an independent body, the governing body of each institution takes all decisions concerning institutional policy. Rectors of universities, who are elected among ordinary professors for a period of three to five years, and directors of higher education institutions, who are permanent appointees, belong to organizations seeking to defend the interests of these institutions. They are not the same in each community, although there are similarities. The VLIR (the Flemish Inter-University Council), for example, is an umbrella organization for Flemish universities, with only rectors representing universities, and functions as a debating and policy-making forum. It also provides policy advice on university matters to the Flemish parliament and lobbies policy-makers on behalf of universities. VLIR gathers information on all aspects of university operations, enabling it to provide important policy information. Recently the government established Vlaamse Hogeschoolen Raad or VLHORA (the Flemish Colleges of Higher Education Council), having similar functions as the VLIR with only the directors of the colleges representing the colleges.) French-speaking universities rely on a body called CIUF (Conseil interuniversitaire français), which has the same tasks in the French-speaking community as the VLIR has in the Flemish one. There is also the CREF (Le Conseil des recteurs des institutions universitaires de la Communauté Française) which is a forum for rectors of these universities to take joint action.

VLOR (the Flemish Education Council) was set up by the Education Act 1990. Policy-makers must consult VLOR before taking decisions on issues other than budgetary matters. VLOR is also empowered to take initiatives in advising policy-makers. It can sponsor policy research and other surveys to support its advice. Further, it provides a forum in which representatives of organizing authorities, teachers' unions, parents' associations, community associations and the Ministry of the Flemish community can deliberate on educational matters with specialists in the field. This independent body facilitates democratic discussion among all participants in the educational process (Verhoeven and Gheysen 1993).

Academic staff have local professional organizations in many universities and these are represented in the Nationale Federatie van de Belgische Universiteitsprofessoren-Fédération Nationale des Professeurs d'Université de Belgique (NFBU/FNPUB). NFBU/FNPUB is made up of the Flemish Nationaal Comité van het Universitair Onderwijsend Personeel and the French-speaking Comité des Professeurs des Universités Francophones de Belgique. Their members are local organizations of independent academic staff, and the proportion of staff being member differs in each university. These national bodies defend the rights of academic staff with government, parliament, VLIR and CIUF but their action is so low key that most staff are unaware of their influence. They differ from trade unions in that they are not recognized as representatives of university staff in official bodies. This is the right of the unions.

Staff of universities and colleges are also organized into six trade unions, i.e. the Algemene Centrale van de Openbare diensten-Sector Onderwijs (ACOD), the Christelijke Onderwijscentrale (COC) and the Vrij Syndicaat voor het Openbaar
Ambt – Sector Onderwijs (VSOA) in Flanders and their French-speaking counterparts in Wallonia. The proportion of academic staff who are union members is low. Exact figures are known only to the unions but it is probably less than 20 per cent density, with support staff making up the largest membership. Unions are not very interested in academic members because their number is relatively small and most academics are not interested in joining. This is because their career paths are regulated by government decree rather than collective bargaining. In order to protect their members, unions have delegates in all kinds of national advisory bodies, participate in parliamentary hearings when the authorities work on new decrees concerning universities and colleges, have delegates in university and college councils, lobby policy-makers and communicate with their members and the media. Staff in Flemish and French-speaking colleges are represented by the same unions as university staff. For historical reasons, unions in the colleges are probably stronger than in universities.

Structure of the academic profession

Tables 2.5a and 2.5b show the different ranks of academic staff in Belgium. These also provide overviews of the different grades which staff need to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.5a Academic staff grading structure in Flemish colleges and universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colleges</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• praktijklector (practical lector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• hoofdpraktijklector (senior practical lector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• lector (lector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• hoofdlector (senior lector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2: auxiliary staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• assistant (research assistant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• doctor-assistant (doctrinal research assistant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• werkleider (senior research assistant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• docent (lecturer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• hoofddocent (senior lecturer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• hoogleraar (professor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• gewoon hoogleraar (ordinary professor)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Someone with a part-time post at the same level as an ordinary professor.
Table 2.5b  Academic staff grading structure in French-speaking colleges and universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colleges</th>
<th>Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 1 (rank 1):</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group 1:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maître de formation pratique</td>
<td>• Assistant (assistant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(practical lector)</td>
<td>• Assistant chargé d’excercices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maître assistant (doctoral assistant)</td>
<td>• Premier assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chargé de cours (lecturer)</td>
<td>• Chef de travaux (research associate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 2 (rank 2):</strong></td>
<td>• Agrégé de Faculté (senior research associate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maître principal de formation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pratique (senior practical lector)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chef de travaux</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Professeur (professor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chef de bureau d’études</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

proceed through, if they want to become ordinary or full professors, although it is possible – but does not happen often – to omit some stages. Two features of the tables should be stressed: the different ranking structures in the two communities and the different systems in universities and colleges. Group 1 of the Flemish universities has a large group of temporary research assistants (94 per cent) and a small group of temporary doctoral assistants (6 per cent) (Bogaert 1996). In French-speaking universities, the premier assistant, chef de travaux and agrégé de faculté have tenure and make up 37 per cent of the total number of 2038 full-time equivalent staff with AAP-status (CREF 1995). Nevertheless, in Table 2.4 the latter have been placed in the AAP category, thus explaining the larger group of AAP group in French-speaking universities compared with Flemish universities. Group 1 in Flemish colleges is comparable with Group 1 in French-speaking colleges and Group 3 in Flanders with Group 2 in the French-speaking system. In colleges, Group 1 only exists in higher education institutions providing one-cycle basic courses, whilst in Flanders Group 2 only exists at colleges with two-cycle basic courses; Group 3 may be allocated in either.

University and college boards determine the number of staff per teaching grade annually. Both have to maintain control over their staffing levels within budgetary limits. In examining the Flemish community, as an example, since the French-speaking community has a slightly different quota system, we observe that the following decrees or legal rules are taken into
Table 2.6  Staff–student ratios by subject discipline at K.U. Leuven, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Discipline</th>
<th>Basic calculationa</th>
<th>Adjustedb</th>
<th>Own resourcest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exact science</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomedical science</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a number of students per member of the academic staff.

b adjusted for service provision between faculties.

c adjusted for service provision and including externally financed academic staff.

Source: Verhoeven and Beuselinck (1996).

account. Within universities, for example, a maximum 64 per cent of academic personnel may be ZAP members. This 64 per cent is distributed across different ZAP grades according to the following rules. First, the combined number of professors, ordinary professors and extraordinary professors may not exceed 35 per cent of total academic staff and, second, the number of ordinary and extraordinary professors may not exceed 25 per cent of total academic staff. While each university is obliged to work within these guidelines, it can vary its staff gradings within the rules laid down by decree. The basic principle is that, within a university's overall budget, a number of points or units are allocated to each faculty depending on number of students and nature of the faculty (Van Niewenhove 1995). The budget granted by government for students in medicine and engineering, for example, is higher than that for the humanities. Consequently, universities allocate more financial resources to these faculties. Each faculty then appoints staff on the basis of its point allocation, with a specific point weighting for each grade. Staff–student ratios therefore differ from university to university and faculty to faculty. As an example, we show in Table 2.6 staff–student ratios, according to subject group, at KUL during 1995.

In colleges, the principles which apply are, first, within Group 1, the combined number of senior practical lectors and senior lectors may not exceed 20 per cent of that group. Second, the numbers in Group 2 should amount to at least 36 per cent of the combined numbers of Group 2 and 3 staff in the college. Third, the numbers of permanent teaching posts should not exceed 64 per cent of the total number of full time equivalent teaching posts. Turning to Flemish colleges, the numbers of permanent and temporary staff, age structure and gender distribution are shown in Tables 2.7a and 2.7b. An important feature revealed by this data is that roughly two-thirds have permanent contracts and one-third temporary ones. The number of men is larger than women in both categories. Most staff are in the 40–49 age range but there are differences between temporary and permanent staff. Most temporary staff are in the 30–39 age range, followed by 20–29 year-olds. In the youngest age groups, there are more women than men. This is the result of growing numbers of female graduates in universities and colleges seeking jobs in the academic labour market. In French-speaking
Table 2.7a College teaching staff by age, status and gender in the Flemish community (1994) (horizontal per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Permanent M</th>
<th>Permanent F</th>
<th>Permanent T</th>
<th>Temporary M</th>
<th>Temporary F</th>
<th>Temporary T</th>
<th>Total M</th>
<th>Total F</th>
<th>Total T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td>59.00</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40.72</td>
<td>59.28</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>48.31</td>
<td>51.69</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56.87</td>
<td>43.13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>52.70</td>
<td>47.30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>48.91</td>
<td>51.09</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69.48</td>
<td>30.52</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53.60</td>
<td>46.40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>63.96</td>
<td>36.04</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>86.09</td>
<td>13.91</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66.93</td>
<td>33.07</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>80.25</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95.18</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>82.82</td>
<td>17.18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54.61</td>
<td>45.39</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>59.87</td>
<td>40.13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56.42</td>
<td>43.58</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>4285</td>
<td>3562</td>
<td>7847</td>
<td>2472</td>
<td>1657</td>
<td>4129</td>
<td>6757</td>
<td>5219</td>
<td>11,976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AHOWO (1994).
Table 2.7b  College teaching staff by age, status and gender in the Flemish community (1994) (vertical per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th></th>
<th>Temporary</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>14.64</td>
<td>31.44</td>
<td>21.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>19.04</td>
<td>24.51</td>
<td>21.52</td>
<td>40.86</td>
<td>46.23</td>
<td>43.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>40.26</td>
<td>50.59</td>
<td>44.95</td>
<td>29.29</td>
<td>19.19</td>
<td>25.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>33.21</td>
<td>22.52</td>
<td>28.35</td>
<td>12.01</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>4285</td>
<td>3562</td>
<td>7847</td>
<td>2472</td>
<td>1657</td>
<td>4129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AHOWO (1994).
Table 2.7c College teaching staff by gender in the French-speaking community, 1992–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Teaching staff</th>
<th>Auxiliary teaching staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3631</td>
<td>3170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>2195.72</td>
<td>2279.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3721</td>
<td>3305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>2258.79</td>
<td>2377.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.7d College (full-time and part-time) teaching staff (no auxiliary teaching staff) by age in the French-speaking community, 1993–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>11.74</td>
<td>8.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>1841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>22.93</td>
<td>30.38</td>
<td>26.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>1387</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>2605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>37.64</td>
<td>37.16</td>
<td>37.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>1553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>26.35</td>
<td>17.75</td>
<td>22.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3685</td>
<td>3278</td>
<td>6963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


colleges, there are about as many men as women among teaching staff. Only among auxiliary teaching staff is the proportion of women significantly higher than men, as shown in Table 2.7c. Looking at the ages of teaching staff in Table 2.7d, we observe that most are in range 40–49, followed by those who are 30–39 and 50–59. For men, the largest proportions are in the range 40–49, followed by those aged 50–59. The age structure of female staff is younger than that for male staff.
Table 2.8a Percentage distribution of men and women in ZAP ranks in Flemish universities, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>FTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary professor</td>
<td>95.10</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>753.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>92.01</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>433.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior lecturer</td>
<td>87.63</td>
<td>12.37</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>566.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>77.69</td>
<td>22.31</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>498.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88.47</td>
<td>11.53</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>2252.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.8b Percentage distribution of men and women in ZAP ranks in French-speaking universities, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grades</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>FTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary professor</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>678.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary prof.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>273.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated prof.</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>530.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated lect.</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1578.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In universities, the proportion of women is extremely small in ZAP-ranks in both Flemish and French-speaking communities and this difference widens according to level in the professional hierarchy – as shown in Tables 2.8a and 2.8b. Of all women with ZAP-status, the majority are lecturers or senior lecturers in Flanders and, in the French-speaking community, associate professors, lecturers or associate lecturers. In comparison with college teaching staff, the age structure of Flemish ZAP staff is older: about 49 per cent of them are 50 years or older, as shown in Table 2.9. This means that a large number of ZAP staff will need to be recruited in the next 10 years.

Human resources management and the academic profession

The duties of academic staff in universities and colleges in Flanders are listed in Decrees 13 July 1994 and 12 June 1991. Although these duties seem to be similar in both sets of higher education institutions, there are still some differences. Some, for example, concern the nature of scientific
Table 2.9  Age structure of independent (ZAP) academic staff in Flemish universities, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>11.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>13.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>19.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>20.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–60</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>18.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–64</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>9.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and +</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3276</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


research, teaching load and administrative duties. Moreover, while universities have a strong tradition of research, most colleges do not; training and teaching was and is their first obligation. It is possible that this might change in the future as some colleges are developing research activity. Within universities and colleges in Flanders, the following qualifications are required by community law in recruiting academic personnel (Decree 13 July 1994, Art. 116 – Art. 127; Decree 12 June 1991, Art. 83 – Art. 95; Decree 25 July 1996, Art. 3 – Art. 7; and Decree 19 July 1991). In universities, a PhD is required for the posts of doctoral research assistant, lecturer, senior lecturer, professor and ordinary professor. In colleges, a diploma from a one-cycle basic (college) course is required for the posts of practical lector and senior practical lector, while lecturers, senior lecturers, research assistants and senior research assistants require a university diploma or a diploma from a two-cycle course in a college. Most institutions also take other requirements into account in recruiting staff, although these are not compulsory. Appointment as a university research assistant, for example, is only granted to candidates who have achieved excellent marks during their undergraduate training.

Once someone has a position as a ZAP at university or a Group 3 position at a college, other criteria determine promotion. Concerning universities, taking KUL as an example, the criteria are explicitly set out within university regulations. Those seeking to become lecturers must be able to demonstrate that they are able to engage in effective research and have good teaching skills. Individuals wanting to become senior lecturers, in turn, must have proven research records and be effective teachers. Indicators include publications, participating in conferences, being members of editorial boards and attending relevant courses. Those promoted to professor are expected to be creative and productive researchers, such as heading...
research projects and acquiring research funding, be effective teachers and have broad educational experience. To become ordinary or extraordinary professors, candidates must be first-rate researchers, with national or international reputations. They are also expected to have didactic skills, educational experience and leadership qualities. The Flemish legislature has made universities responsible for determining seniority conditions appointing ZAP-rank staff.

In colleges, seniority combined with professional experience is laid down for promotion to posts of senior practical lector, senior lector, senior research assistant, senior lecturer and professor. This is also the case in the French-speaking community. There are differences, however, between internal promotion and external promotion procedures (Decree, 13 July 1994, Art. 130). In the case of internal promotions, candidates must have at least two years' seniority as practical lector to become senior practical lector. In the case of external promotion to senior lecturer, candidates need to have at least four years' relevant professional experience outside education or at least two years' seniority as lecturer at another college or university. Promotion to ordinary professor requires, under Decree, 13 July 1994, Art. 102, first, the higher education institution must be actively involved in research in cooperation with a university within the field of the vacancy. Second, the candidate must have been a lecturer, senior lecturer or professor for six years at a college or university and, during that time, have been responsible for quality research. The competence of candidates within their specific scientific field is judged by a 'jury' or committee of three ordinary university professors from different universities.

An important distinction between universities and colleges is that university staff almost invariably start as lecturers. In colleges, it is possible to enter as senior lecturers or professors, without going through the lower ranks of the profession. Though procedures for promoting academic staff differ from one institution to another, most procedures are similar. Assessment committees at departmental and/or faculty level evaluate applications for appointments and promotions. Dossiers for candidature or curricula vitae are provided and documented by candidates. They include achievements in research, teaching and professional activities. At some universities, it also includes assessments of the candidate's teaching capacities by students. The final decision is taken at central university level. ZAP members also are evaluated by the research funds they obtain at national and international levels.

Contractually, academics are employees in private higher education institutions or quasi-civil servants in public higher education institutions. In Flanders, university staff are paid by universities but college staff by the community government. In French-speaking private universities, salaries are paid by the universities, with staff in public universities, public colleges and private colleges, being paid by the community government. Although the legal status of academics in private and public higher education institutions is not the same, differences in their legal status are very small. In Flanders,
Table 2.10 Annual gross salaries of academic staff in Belgian universities, Group 2 and 3 Flemish colleges, and Group 2 French-speaking colleges (US$), 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Bottom</th>
<th>Top</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>28,694</td>
<td>48,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor assistant</td>
<td>31,683</td>
<td>51,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>34,026</td>
<td>53,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior lecturer</td>
<td>36,584</td>
<td>57,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>42,400</td>
<td>62,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary professor</td>
<td>54,917</td>
<td>83,898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


employers are higher education institutions and their legal status differs according to the nature of the institution, whether it is in the state or private sector. In French-speaking private institutions, employers are institutions, whereas in public institutions the employer is the French-speaking community.

In universities, auxiliary academic staff (AAP) are appointed for two years. This can be renewed twice, except for doctoral research assistants whose employment may be extended by a maximum of a year. In French-speaking universities, premier assistants or higher have tenure. ZAP staff are permanent appointments. If ZAP staff do not meet the conditions for promotion, they stay in their existing rank while retaining a permanent appointment. Again there is an exception: extraordinary professors are not permanent staff but part-time appointments. In colleges, college boards make appointments on either a temporary or permanent basis. Only research assistants and doctoral research assistants are always temporary. Appointment takes place through recruitment, promotion or changing jobs. Again there are exceptions: the positions of senior practical lector, senior lector and senior research assistant are only obtained by promotion or changing jobs.

The Flemish and French-speaking legislatures have given universities and colleges authority to determine teaching hours and other tasks of staff, except in French-speaking colleges where the annual number of hours are stipulated by decree. There is no general rule in universities but ZAP grades teach about five to six hours a week, whereas college hours are much higher. In the latter case, research has traditionally not been carried out, whereas in universities it is considered at least as important as teaching and very often has a decisive influence on the appointment and promotion of staff. ZAP grade staff are expected to take responsibility for developing themselves in line with departmental and faculty research policies, as well as bidding for financial resources, other than those provided by the university, to conduct research.

As shown in Tables 2.10 and 2.11, there are different pay scales and pay rates for different ranks of academic staff in universities and colleges. There
Table 2.11 Annual gross salaries of academic staff in Group 1 at Flemish and French-speaking colleges (US$), 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grades</th>
<th>Bottom</th>
<th>Top</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practical lector</td>
<td>26,701</td>
<td>41,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior practical lector</td>
<td>27,778</td>
<td>45,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lector</td>
<td>28,694</td>
<td>48,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior lector</td>
<td>31,683</td>
<td>51,368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


are also some small differences between the pay scales of the Flemish community and French-speaking community, probably due to differences in collective agreements in the two communities. In Group 2 and 3 of Flemish-speaking and group 2 of French-speaking colleges, teachers have the same pay scales as university teachers. Only Group 1 college teachers have different scales. These are determined by decree or decision of the community government and are regularly changed in line with rises in the cost of living and what all public servants get. In each academic rank, salaries rise every two years until the highest salary is attained after 18 to 25 years in a rank. In principle, universities can, in addition, reward staff for special achievements but up till now no university has applied this principle. Tables 2.10 and 2.11 indicate annual gross salaries for different ranks at the beginning and end of their careers.

Retirement normally takes place at 65 but, depending on circumstances, it may be granted at 60. Permanent staff contribute 7.5 per cent of their gross monthly salary to a pension fund (Heyvaert and Janssens 1996). Full pensions are between 68 and 75 per cent of average salary over the last five years, after 22.5 years of full-time service (VVPL 1995). This might, however, change in the near future because of the impending reorganization of the social security system.

Evaluation of academic staff takes place on several occasions. As an element of staff policy, there are four formal evaluation cycles: on temporary appointment; on extension of contract; on permanent appointment; and on promotion. In Flemish colleges, staff are evaluated every three years. On each occasion, staff are evaluated in line with the criteria for promotion, mentioned earlier. Staff are also evaluated within guidelines provided by quality assurance systems. Decrees on universities and colleges in Flanders, for example, impose a dual quality assurance structure. On the one hand, they require universities and colleges to engage in their own internal quality assurance schemes while, on the other hand, the community government assumes responsibility for monitoring quality within higher education institutions. For internal quality assurance, institutions are required to monitor their education and research activities continuously. For external quality assurance, institutions have to carry out a comparative quality survey, in
collaboration with Belgian or foreign higher education institutions, roughly every five years. Quality assurance by government encompasses examining the internal and external quality assurance processes carried out by institutions (Verhoeven and Beuselinck 1996).

While the aims of these quality assurance programmes are much broader than that of only evaluating academic personnel, it is an important process. For example, at KUL, it is policy to have an internal evaluation for each course every four or five years. This evaluation, lasting two years, is conducted by an evaluation committee comprising representatives from ZAP staff, AAP staff and students of relevant courses. Using questionnaires and interviews, this committee gathers information which can be used when candidates apply for permanent appointments or promotion. Quality assurance at colleges, providing one-cycle basic courses, incorporates a survey ascertaining student views of the quality of educational activities and the ways in which these are delivered. Finally, universities are currently preparing a formal assessment of staff research. Up until now, research has mainly been assessed at the time of appointment or promotion. Academic staff have also had to report to the academic boards about their publications and services to society, on a regular basis.

Conclusion

Since Belgium became a federal state, educational policy in the different communities has developed in different ways. Former language and ideological divisions are not as important as they used to be but each community still develops its own policies. The Flemish legislature immediately changed the laws affecting universities and colleges, whereas the French-speaking community changed some of the old Belgian laws incrementally. Both communities have retained the binary system and both have reorganized colleges into smaller groups to improve educational delivery. Attempts to bring universities and colleges closer have been made, although each still has different missions and structures. Nevertheless, in both communities scope for individual policy-making by universities and colleges has increased, although it is legislatures which determine guidelines for staff policy. In the Flemish community, the legislature has imposed a system of quality assurance for teaching and research for each university and college.

Although colleges are supposed to undertake research as well as teach, this is not yet common practice. Colleges traditionally have been more interested in teaching students and staff still have to teach more than at universities. This makes it unlikely that research will play an important role in most colleges in the future, although interest is growing. At the moment, colleges are busy adapting to new management systems and new freedoms which they have recently been given. Because of cutbacks in public spending and increases in student numbers, the unit of resource in universities and colleges is being squeezed. They have to provide more teaching and research
with less resources. Universities are trying to expand their research capacities relying on external research money, with academic staff competing for research money both nationally and internationally, using private and public sources. This new money is providing universities with the opportunity to increase their junior staff but not senior staff levels.

Since senior academic staff at universities have permanent contracts, there is little flexibility in managing human resources. On the other hand, with an ageing population, there will be many retirements in the next few years which will offer new job opportunities to younger academics. Proposals for premature early retirements have been discussed recently and, though not acted upon generally, some universities have encouraged those over 60, and in Flemish colleges those over 55, to retire early with full pensions. New quality assurance systems have been introduced in public and private Flemish colleges. French-speaking universities are not legally obliged to have quality assurance systems but many do. Quality assessment in French-speaking colleges is the responsibility of the community inspectorate. While quality management existed previously in Flanders, national policy has changed the system. Each institution now has to report annually about actions taken and measures used to improve quality. National comparative quality assurance forces institutions to pay attention to what is happening in other institutions. Reports are published and, where necessary, institutions are expected to plan improvements.

Up until now, no national reports have been available about the effects of quality assurance. Published reports only focus on assessing teaching in departments and faculties at a particular time. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that this policy has led to improved teaching performance, even though there are some signs of evaluation fatigue. On the other hand, others argue that quality management interferes with academic freedom and distracts academics from their real work, namely teaching and research. Nevertheless, academics in general have accepted that they must show that the public monies they use are properly accounted for. They have therefore been willing to accept reductions in their professional independence and autonomy, as a result of recent educational and managerial reforms.

Although the academic profession has lost some of its professional autonomy and independence, it is still one where more candidates present themselves than there are vacancies. Many young researchers still consider the academic profession as offering more opportunities to conduct independent research than others do. Nevertheless, in some disciplines, such as medicine, engineering and economics, academic life has to compete with more rewarding career opportunities. The academic profession still enjoys high social standing, as providers of knowledge for policy making, the economy, the arts and industry. One indicator may be found in the growing amount of contract research commissioned by foundations and industry. On the other hand, the current organization of universities and colleges puts much more pressure on the academic profession than before. Higher education institutions are organizations having to compete with other similar
organizations, such as non-university research units, both nationally and internationally. Teaching and research effectiveness have become more important than ever and higher education institutions need to know where they stand in the competition. While academics were previously semi-independent, scholarly entrepreneurs, they now have to perform within the structures of departments, faculties and universities. This means that they are subject to more managerial control and more accountability, and this requires them to be members of teams and/or leaders of teams rather than independent researchers. Finally, the academic profession as a predominantly male profession is gradually changing. Growing numbers of female undergraduates and junior staff are clear indicators that higher education institutions and the academic profession are becoming more feminized.

References

Laws

Finland: Searching for Performance and Flexibility

Turo Virtanen

Finland’s first university, with 11 professors and four faculties, was established in Turku during Swedish rule in 1640 to civilize ‘the simple minded Finns’. Almost 200 years later, when Finland had become an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire, the Academy was transferred to Helsinki, after a great fire that burned most of Turku. In Helsinki, the university was opened in 1828 as the Imperial Alexander University of Finland. Its main task was to educate clergymen and civil servants. The University of Helsinki, the name given to it when Finland gained political independence in 1917, remained Finland’s only institution of higher education until 1908, when the Helsinki Institute of Technology, founded half a century earlier, was given university status. Soon after, two universities were established in Turku: Åbo Akademi University (Turku’s Swedish-language university) in 1917 and the Finnish-language University of Turku in 1920.

In response to the demands of business and industry, several specialized business and technical institutions were founded in the 1950s and 1960s but, at that time, the higher education system was narrowly based and mainly concentrated in the south of the country. The 1960s and 1970s were a time of rapid expansion and regional development in university education. Twelve of the 20 universities operating at present were established during that period. Further impetus was given by the growing provision of general upper secondary education, new economic prosperity and demands for educational equality. The aim was to offer university education to one-fifth of the post-school age group and extend the institutional framework of higher education to the eastern and northern parts of Finland. Some significant decisions were made at that time: teacher training was incorporated into universities and education in art academies was upgraded to university study.

Currently 10 universities are multi-faculty institutions, the University of Helsinki being the oldest and largest and the University of Lapland, close to
Finland: Searching for Performance and Flexibility

the Arctic Circle, the youngest and smallest. There are four art academies, three schools of economics and business administration and three technological universities. The annual intake is about 18,000 undergraduates, representing about one-quarter of the age group available for university studies. University-level education is also provided by the military academy under the Ministry of Defence. The contemporary higher education system is developing on two fronts as, alongside universities, a network of ammattikorkeakoulu (AMKs) is being established. Starting in 1991, these provide vocational higher education and are resulting in a more clearly defined non-university higher education sector (Lampinen 1995). By 1996, there were 28 AMKs, funded mainly by municipalities, covering over half of all vocational higher education in Finland. The goal is to provide professional education for about 60–65 per cent of the age group by 2000. As AMKs do not conduct research and confer doctorates, their role is not discussed in this chapter.

Current structure of higher education

Nearly all publicly funded education, from primary to higher education, is steered and supervised by the Ministry of Education. All universities are state institutions and funded directly from the state budget. There is no private sector and no tuition fees are collected. In 20 state-owned research institutes, research is mostly applied. Very few private companies have the need or resources for conducting academic research. About 10 of Finland’s present universities were originally private but they were nationalized during the 1970s, with their consent and on their initiative. The role of the Ministry of Education is central in higher education policy-making. Universities are formally independent organizations and have extensive autonomy in terms of teaching and research but, since the Ministry’s role in resource allocation is essential, doubts about the true nature of this autonomy are frequently expressed within the academic community. For each university, there used to be a separate law and a more detailed statute determining its purpose, faculties and basic administrative structure. In the Finnish legal system, laws or acts are passed by Parliament, whilst statutes, specifying the laws, are made by the President of the country. In 1998, a common law and statute for all universities was passed to simplify and relax the regulation of their internal administration. National regulations define the objectives, extent and overall structure of degrees. Universities do not have authority to establish new degrees nor set targets for students. These are determined by the Ministry, on the basis of estimated workforce needs and negotiations with each university.

Up to the 1950s, universities grew without any national policy or unified guidelines. The first national higher education policy was introduced in the mid-1960s, when Parliament passed the Higher Education Development Act. Its purpose was, among other things, to give a larger proportion of
each age group a chance to study at university and balance the regional distribution of higher education. By the 1980s, these goals had been largely achieved but, at least in the eyes of the Ministry, many problems had arisen. These included: graduation took longer than before; drop-out rates were high; postgraduate education was poorly organized; university management was inadequate; planning and budgeting systems were overly rigid and centralized; coordination and contacts amongst universities were haphazard; and universities' international relations were underdeveloped.

In the 1980s, higher education policy changed towards one of deregulation. This provides less control from the centre and more autonomy locally, through managing-by-objectives at institutional level. It culminated with the new Higher Education Development Act 1986 and the government's principles for expanding higher education. Under the Act, total budgets allocated to university education were to rise annually by no less than the rise in the general cost level of university maintenance. This resulted in a 66 per cent increase in higher education expenditure between 1985 and 1991. Government set the following developmental objectives for universities:

- promotion of management-by-objectives
- increased independence in resource allocation and more flexible definition of teacher's duties
- introduction of an assessment system producing adequate and compatible information about the results and costs of research and teaching
- preparation by universities of regular performance reports, including summaries to be drawn up for the higher education development plan approved by government at four-yearly intervals
- consideration of performance in allocating new funds to research and teaching and reallocation of existing resources on the basis of changing needs
- more efficient teaching, enabling most students to obtain a master's degree within four-to-five years' study
- more efficient postgraduate (doctoral) education by universities, enabling students to complete a doctorate after four years of full-time study.

The developmental programme was implemented at a favourable time in higher education. However, due to severe recession in the Finnish economy in the early 1990s, the Higher Education Development Act was cancelled for 1993 and 1994 and budgets for the operating costs of universities were reduced by about 14 per cent between 1992 and 1995.

In the mid-1990s, 69 per cent of the university education budget was financed from the state, channelled through the Ministry of Education, 15 per cent from chargeable services and 16 per cent from external funding. The Academy of Finland, under the direction of the Ministry, finances basic research and training of researchers. The Ministry's aim is to increase private financing, at present only 3 per cent of the total. In the current system of management-by-objectives, university operating costs are covered by allocations consisting of basic funding (about 90 per cent), performance-based
funds (5 per cent) and project funding (5 per cent). Project funds are earmarked for new research and education projects of national importance. From 1997, basic funding is being gradually based on graduation and degree targets, weighted by cost coefficients for each discipline. Targets are decided by the Ministry but there is a preceding dialogue with each university resulting in so-called 'results-contracts'. The weighting of research output is still an open issue but 35 per cent is one proposition being proposed (Tutkimuksen perusrahoitustyöryhmän muistio 1996). Performance criteria for the period 1998–2000 will include: centres of excellence in research, education and artistic activity (a total of 20–40 centres); funds obtained from the Academy of Finland; international funds; internationalization, as measured in terms of student and teacher/researcher exchanges; employability of graduates; and assessment of each university in terms of its development (Yliopistojen tulosohjauksen kehittaminen 1996). In 1996, a national Evaluation Council for Higher Education was established to provide evaluative information about higher education to the Ministry and universities.

Finland’s 20 universities, including four art academies, are located in 11 university towns covering virtually all areas of the country. The number of university students rose by 61 per cent over the period 1981–95, being 135,000 in 1995 compared with about 24,000 in 1960s and 70,000 in the 1970s. The annual intake in 1995 was 19,000, which accounted for about 19 per cent of 19–24 year-olds. The median age for completing a master's degree, which takes six-and-a-half years, is 27, and for doctorates 36. Age of graduation has remained about the same during the last 10 years (Tilastokeskus 1996), irrespective of the policy to lower it. Since 1994, the bachelor's degree has gradually been adopted as the standard basic degree in most academic disciplines. This is to harmonize Finnish higher education with that of other western countries. At the same time, the traditional licentiate's degree, completed before the doctoral dissertation, is being devalued. The doctorate is the only postgraduate degree, the numbers of which are measured for Ministry resource allocation, as part of the total performance of each university.

The gender of university students is balanced, with 55 per cent of entrants being women in 1995. Since 1955 their share has matched the population structure (Opetusministeriö 1972). Only 37 per cent of doctorates are awarded to women, with their proportion rising rapidly. There are no statistics about the social background of students but some studies show a clear correlation between levels of educational achievement of parents and their children: having well-qualified parents increases the likelihood of their children entering higher education (Isoaho et al. 1990; Kivinen and Rinne 1995). The proportion of foreign students has been relatively small, only 2 per cent or 2600 in 1994, but this more than doubled between 1981 and 1994 (Tilastokeskus 1996).

The number of Swedish-speaking students in higher education was 7 per cent in 1991, the proportion of the Swedish-speaking minority being below 6 per cent of the total population. However, in business-related fields, the
percentage of this group was 19 per cent in 1993 (Tilastokeskus 1993). Swedish is the second official language of Finland. In addition to two Swedish-language universities, there are separate positions for Swedish-speaking teachers in some Finnish-language universities.

The parties and players in higher education

In 1995, there were 7552 academic staff employed in Finnish universities, a growth of 17 per cent since 1981. These were made up of 1178 professors (16 per cent), 845 associate professors (11 per cent), 623 senior assistants (8 per cent), 1772 assistants (24 per cent) and 1908 lecturers (25 per cent). They also had 341 full-time ‘untenured’ teachers (4 per cent) – on fixed-term contracts – and 885 ‘fee-paid’ teachers (12 per cent). Lecturers include assistant teachers and senior teachers. Since August 1998 associate professors have been called professors, because their formal qualifications have been the same as those of full professors from 1993 onwards. Between 1988 and 1991, the number of teaching staff was some 3 per cent higher than it is today. Since then, the number of professors and associate professors has increased slightly and the number of untenured, fee-paid staff decreased. The proportion of women among teaching staff has not risen as fast as among students: 12 per cent of professors are women, 21 per cent of associate professors, 30 per cent of senior assistants, 38 per cent of assistants and 44 per cent of lecturers. In addition to teaching staff, universities employed 8300 support staff in 1995 (6700 in 1985) and 7500 from external sources (4700 in 1985). The total of this staff group was 14,600 in 1994, which was about 98 per cent higher than in 1981. It includes researchers (about 900 in 1995) who are on fixed-term contracts, funded by the Academy of Finland, and do not teach. The number of researchers doing commissioned research in 1995 was about 850, with the number of staff funded from external sources growing significantly during the past few years.

There are four trade union organizations representing most categories of university staff. Professors (tenured and un-tenured) are organized by the Union of Finnish University Professors (UFUP) established in 1969, with a membership of about 1400. UFUP has a ‘cooperation agreement’ with the union representing junior teachers and researchers, the Union of University Assistants and Researchers (UUAR), founded in 1967, with a current membership of about 5300. University lecturers are organized by the Finnish Association of University Lecturers (FAUL), founded in 1969, with a membership of about 1600. It is a constituent of the non-university Education Trade Union (ETJ), founded in 1893, which represents school teachers and has a total membership of over 100,000. The union for support staff, KHL, established in 1971, represents staff in other education-related organizations, with a total membership of about 7500. All the unions have membership densities of about 70–80 per cent. In strong professional fields, like jurisprudence and medicine, some staff are organized in non-university unions.
A new pay system is being developed for the state sector. Every state organization, including universities, will design its own system. The new system rejects position-based salaries, which are independent of the person holding the position and where salary is tied to a rank structure throughout the state sector. The new system also opposes standard seniority increments and includes elements of individual pay, group pay and performance pay. In the future, state salaries are to be based on assessments of an individual's work and the demands of the job. The new system has not yet been implemented in universities. Since 1995, however, all civil servants, including academic staff in universities, have the right to negotiate individually for a higher salary than that designated by collective agreement. So far, this provision has been rarely used in universities.

Unions in higher education take part in policy formulation as members of relevant task forces and respond to policy proposals. At university level, a shop steward is elected by members of each local association and stewards take part in preparing personnel policies, such as the new pay system. A distinctive feature of the Finnish system, introduced gradually from the 1970s, is that all organs of internal administration include representatives from all three categories of university stakeholders: professors, junior teachers and support staff, and students. Although numbers vary, about half the members of administrative bodies are from the first category and a quarter from each of the second and the third categories. Members are elected, if the number of candidates exceeds the quota in each category. Elections take place mostly in the student category. This approach is common in the structures of task forces set up by university administrative bodies or the rector, as president of the university. At national level, the national association of student unions plays a role comparable with that of the unions. Recently, apart from traditional salary issues, the main policy problem facing the unions has been trying to influence university budgets by opposing cuts, the new pay system and changes to the working time of academic staff, where a move away from lecture hours to total working time (1600 hours a year) took place in 1998. There has also been the issue of creating new intermediate posts for postdoctoral researchers in order to achieve a better career structure for junior academic staff.

Structure of the academic profession

The annual number of conferred doctorates in Finland has nearly tripled during the last 20 years (Neittaanmäki 1995). In the 1990s, the number of new doctorates has increased every year and, in 1996, the record was broken with 850 doctorates. In October 1996, however, there were 514 unemployed doctorates or licentiates, 8245 with master's degrees and 5111 with bachelor's degrees. The number of jobs available for these graduates were only 26, 91 and 59 respectively. Only a minority of all vacancies are communicated to the employment service, although it is required by law to
do so. Government's aim is to produce around 900 doctoral degrees per year by 2000, which would put Finland in the forefront for doctoral output in relation to its population size. In the period 1973–92, more than 70 per cent of all doctorates (6438 in total) were in natural sciences, including technology and medicine. Most doctoral graduates were working in the fields of education and research (54 per cent) and health care and social services (24 per cent). Only 17 per cent worked for private employers and their degrees were mostly in the fields of technology and natural sciences (79 per cent). This is considered to be a problem, as well as the relative absence of doctorally qualified people in top positions within public and private organizations. As a result, 64 per cent of all doctoral graduates were employed by the state in 1992 and 19 per cent by municipalities. Of all doctorates employed by the state, 72 per cent are in universities. Mixing careers, between academic research and non-academic practice, is rare.

According to the law governing universities, each institution has freedom to teach and research. However, teachers have to obey norms and decrees relating to the curriculum. In practice, this means that while the detailed content of their lectures is their own choice, they have to follow the curriculum and other general decisions about instruction (Perälä 1996). The true nature of ‘freedom of teaching’ is difficult to assess but when many junior academics work as ‘acting’ teachers, without tenure, they are reluctant to challenge the expectations of senior colleagues. Freedom to research is also related to funding, which is more and more from external, non-academic sources. The main qualifications and duties of academic staff in universities and art academies are laid down in statute 309/1993. Teachers have to advance learning in their field, supervise students, examine students and undertake relevant associated duties. These are general duties for all teachers. According to statute 309/1993, professors and associate professors are required to carry out and supervise scientific research (or artistic work in art academies), lead academic developments in their field and examine theses.

The formal duties of professors and associate professors used to differ only in terms of lecture hours: 140 hours per year for professors and 186 hours for associate professors. These were part of the collective agreement between the state and the unions and remained the same for many years. In 1998 lecture hours were abolished by the total working time (1600 hours a year) to be flexibly allocated by the decision of each department. In practice, there are more expectations for professors in terms of postgraduate teaching, managing departments and involvement in external activities. This is changing, however; since 1998 there are no associate professors any more, only professors with different pay.

The Finnish academic tradition includes the appointment of ‘docents’ who sometimes work as ancillary teachers. They are required to have a doctorate, be experts in their academic speciality, show ability in independent scientific research and have good teaching skills. A docent is an academic title given to individuals experienced in scientific research and licensed
to give lectures. The title can be held until retirement age. There are more
than 4500 docents in Finnish universities and the number is increasing.
They are appointed by university chancellors or rectors, after an academic
evaluation. There is no competition for appointment, because there is no
statutory limit to the numbers of docents. Normally, docents earn their
living outside of the university where they hold their docenture, sometimes
in research projects not funded by regular university budgets. Qualified
academic staff of one university may also be docents in another.

Traditionally, docents have been seen as agents of academic freedom and
defenders of the public nature of science. Even today, docents have the
legal right to give lectures but universities are not obliged to pay them. In
practice, departments employ docents whose expertise is considered useful
for their teaching programmes, paying standard fees for their work. Fre-
quently docents represent the ‘voice of practitioners’ in their departments.
Some departments emphasize the role of docents as links with the outside
world and potential sources of funding.

The duties of assistants are regulated by the rules following a model
rule negotiated between the Ministry of Education and UUAR in 1978.
According to the model, assistants do independent scientific research or
take part in postgraduate programmes as students. In addition, they act as
‘instructors’ and student counsellors. They also take part in the internal
administration of their university and develop the curriculum. These addi-
tional duties are not expected to take more than 12–24 hours a week.
Assistants have the right to concentrate on their research for three months
a year. Their average working time is the same as for civil servants (36.25
hours per week).

The duties of senior assistants are also regulated by the rules for assist-
ants. The only difference is that senior assistants also give lectures but not
for more than four hours per week. For lecturers and senior teachers,
which is virtually the same position, lecturing hours were agreed through
collective bargaining. Before the adoption of total working time in 1998,
the number of teaching hours for lecturers was 392–448 a year, depending
on their pay scale, and 336 hours for senior teachers. Traditionally, these
are solely teaching positions but many also do research and have a doctorate.
Full-time untenured teachers provide 420 hours of lectures per year.

The Academy of Finland is the only public organization whose major
purpose is to fund scientific research. In addition to funds for launching
research projects and hiring researchers, there were 358 research posts to
be filled in 1995 for a period of three to five years: 25 academy professors
for ‘top scientists’, 99 senior researchers, 137 junior researchers and 97
research assistants. Since these appointments concentrate on full-time re-
search, competition for them is intense. In addition to research posts, there
were 113 tax-free grants for senior scientists with research experience in
1995. These grants have been used widely by professors and associate pro-
fessors to concentrate on research and working abroad. Grants are awarded
for one year.
The numbers of Academy research assistants were gradually cut back before being finally abolished in 1997, after the new graduate school system had been established in 1995. The purpose of the reform was to raise the quality and efficiency of postgraduate education and reduce completion time for doctorates. Departments can establish graduate schools, normally with other departments, and apply for funds for a fixed period from the Academy. There are now 93 graduate schools with about 1000 graduate students who receive a salary somewhat below that of university assistants. Graduate schools also accept students whose education is funded from external sources. Graduate schools are meant to be the main channels for educating and developing professional researchers. The positions of assistants in university departments are likely to be changed to postdoctoral researchers. The graduate school system will greatly increase the number of doctorates, although whether they eventually get employment is uncertain.

Human resources management and the academic profession

The formal competences required of academic staff is set out in statute 309/1993. Professors and associate professors are expected to have competences in scientific research (or artistic work in art academies), teaching skills and, when important for the job, familiarity with practice in the field in which they teach. The scientific competence of applicants is assessed by their research, ability to lead research, published work, teaching materials with scientific or research value, and academic qualifications and degrees. For art academies, the criteria for artistic competence and teaching skills are also specified. There is no minimum requirement regarding academic qualifications. Formerly, a doctorate was required, although nowadays not even a master’s degree is specified. In practice, however, the doctorate has maintained its traditional position. Assistants are required to have a master’s degree, while lecturers, senior assistants, assistant teachers and senior teachers are required to have licentiates or doctorates. The criteria of teaching skills and familiarity with best practice are applied to all academic posts other than for assistants. Language proficiency in Finnish and Swedish is also specified by statute 309/1993.

Formal procedures for selecting and appointing professors and associate professors are regulated by law 856/1991 and statute 1581/1991. Prior to recruitment, formal job descriptions specifying the legal procedures are drafted by faculty, approved by the chancellor or rector. This includes, among other things, a specification of the research field, qualifications required, documents to be enclosed, legal norms governing selection and requirements regarding referees for reviewing candidates’ applications. The most important enclosures are candidates’ publications. Previously, there was no limit to the number submitted and they could amount to several packages per applicant. Nowadays, the number is normally limited.
Finland: Searching for Performance and Flexibility

to between 10 and 20. After the post has been advertised and the date for receiving applications is closed, at least two but more often three referees or assessors are selected. There are no formal requirements about the standing of referees but normally they are professors from other Finnish universities or increasingly from abroad. Referees are expected to be as impartial as possible in their examination of candidates' cases. Overseas referees are not required to have knowledge of Finnish or Swedish, even if the majority of publications of the applicants are written in Finnish or Swedish. This reflects pressure to publish in English and do 'internationally relevant research'. Sometimes there are dubious motives in selecting referees, because a consensual ranking of applicants virtually ensures that individual's appointment. The selection decision is to a great extent in the hands of the referees, external to the faculty and department.

According to statute 1581/1991, referees are expected to represent different fields covered by the applicants and the specific research field in question. Applicants have to have an opportunity to appeal against any referees before their selection is confirmed. Once confirmed, referees are asked to write a statement, for a small fee, on all applicants. Nowadays, referees negotiate among themselves and co-author the statement, within a three-month time limit. Previously, each referee wrote an individual statement that was often quite long. Where there were many applicants with numerous publications, the task was a very demanding one and this was one reason why recruitment was slow. Applicants are often obliged to demonstrate their teaching skills to faculty but this is not obligatory; they are not interviewed. Traditionally, the scientific competence of applicants has been considered the overwhelming criterion for appointment. Although teaching skills are stressed more nowadays, they are less important than research competence. Many universities have now set rules about weighing and documenting these skills.

The three best candidates are selected from the pool of applicants and are proposed to the relevant faculty board. The principle of proposing the three best candidates is stated in the Finnish constitution. Student and non-academic members of faculty have equal rights with academic members to take part in the decision-making process. Professors were previously nominated to their office by the President of the country, associate professors by the chancellor or rector, but since 1998 this is done by the university itself. After the decision is taken, applicants have 30 days to appeal if they wish. This happens fairly frequently but appeals are rarely upheld. Referees' statements are not legitimate grounds for appeal, only legal flaws in the procedure.

A professor can also be appointed 'by invitation'. In this procedure, referees are chosen to review only one candidate whose willingness of acceptance has already been assured. Appointment by invitation was meant to be a supplementary procedure to recruit speedily the most competent researchers but it seems to have become nearly as common as the traditional procedure. One reason for this is that the procedure is often used for
Table 3.1  Academic staff salaries in Finland (US$), 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Pay scale</th>
<th>Annual salaries^a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>A28</td>
<td>45,728–58,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate professor</td>
<td>A26</td>
<td>37,932–48,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior assistant</td>
<td>A21–A22</td>
<td>25,969–36,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>A20–A21</td>
<td>24,287–33,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>A19</td>
<td>23,029–29,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time untenured teacher</td>
<td>A18–A19</td>
<td>21,832–29,410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ^a with 0–6 seniority increments, including extra vacation pay estimated as half of one month's salary US$.

five-year appointments. In the 1990s, many permanent positions have been converted into five-year fixed-term contracts to meet the changing needs of different research fields. In this way, universities are trying to react more flexibly to new areas of research. Another reason is that the procedure enables departments to recruit the professors they actually want. In some cases, the normal recruitment process has resulted in bad decisions. On the other hand, some of the most talented researchers may not be recruited, if the research profile of departments is all that matters. Since there are no legal or social norms requiring young researchers to work in departments other than the one where they completed their doctorates, warnings about 'academic inbreeding' have been made.

Other categories of the academic profession are recruited by faculty boards. Lecturers are recruited for permanent positions, senior assistants and assistants for periods of three or five years. Individuals who have completed their doctorate, while holding an assistantship, as well as senior assistants, may be hired for consecutive periods without limit. Applicants for these positions are not normally interviewed. In some disciplines, holders of assistantships are relatively experienced researchers, many of them in their forties or fifties with the qualifications of docents. Rapid expansion of higher education during the 1970s brought with it the recruitment of relatively young researchers, which has resulted in promotion blockages to the professoriate for younger researchers (Halinen and Räty 1988; Räty 1988). Only after 2000 will there be more vacant professorial positions.

Current pay scales and salaries of the academic profession are set out in Table 3.1. In the Academy of Finland, annual salaries in 1996, with 0–6 seniority increments, including extra vacation pay estimated as half a month's salary, were as follows: academy professor (grade A30–A31) US$54,912–77,173; experienced scholar (A26–A29) US$37,932–63,998; senior researcher (A24–A25) US$32,353–44,421; and junior researcher (A22) US$28,797–36,776. Most professors and associate professors have all six seniority
increments. According to statistics of the Ministry of Finance, the average salary of university professors, in 1995, was about US$62,000 per year, while that of associate professors was about US$50,000. Professors often get additional payments for part-time work to leading commissioned research and as academic referees. In the same year, the average salary of lecturers was US$38,000, while that of senior assistants and assistants was US$36,000 and US$27,000 respectively.

Collective bargaining of academic pay is based on the law. The Finnish tradition of national-level collective bargaining is followed in higher education. Universities are part of the central labour contract made between the state and main national trade unions. In Finland, these legally enforceable agreements are binding, as minimum conditions of service, on all employers and employees in the industry or sector concerned. The Ministry of Education represents the employer in negotiating employment contracts in higher education. All the academic staff unions – UFUP, UUAR and FAUL represented by ETJ – take part in collective bargaining with the authorities but general contracts on terms of service are signed on behalf of their memberships by the peak-organization of unions, AKAVA-JS. There is local bargaining at university level covering non-teaching staff. There are currently pressures to decentralize collective bargaining, related to reforming the pay system within the state sector as a whole, not just universities.

All academic staff, except professors and associate professors, have had, for many years, the right to receive higher salaries (one or two increments up the pay scales), if they have a licentiate’s degree or doctorate. A continuing complaint has been that professors holding permanent positions have few incentives to improve their teaching or research productivity. Since the late 1980s, permanent professors and associate professors have been paid one or two additional increments based on their contributions in advancing teaching, research and postgraduate studies. There is no overall information about the principles of distributing increments in each university. In the University of Helsinki, for example, increments are awarded on the basis of professors ‘known to be active’ in advancing teaching and research. The information on who is rewarded is not made public. The aim is to make increments periodic and based on performance appraisal. With two increments, the maximum salary increase is about 20 per cent over basic salary. This is the only major change in salaries of professors during the past 10 years.

For lecturers, full-time untenured teachers and senior teachers, there is also an additional increment based on above average performance, initiated in 1995. In the University of Helsinki, this increment has been distributed mostly on the basis of ‘scientific merit’ and publications, with merit in teaching playing only a minor role. No formal measurement of teaching performance or work load has yet been established. Final decisions on distributing increments for both professors and other academic staff are taken by rectors. Though local unions are strong in having influence on the principles underlying distribution of increments, deans are central in advising
rectors about potential recipients of them. The role of department heads is weak or non-existent.

Retirement and pensions rules changed in 1995, to bring the public sector in line with the private sector and balance the demands posed by a rising elderly population and the fiscal capacity of the state. General retirement age is now 65. Previously 63 was optional in the state sector. Pensions are 60 per cent of average annual salary during the previous 10 years. Formerly it was 66 per cent of two average years in the last four, with the best and worst years excluded. Full pension rights require 40 years’ service, whereas formerly 30 years was sufficient. Pensions are indexed and increases are decided annually.

There are no separate procedures for promoting academic staff, since formal recruitment processes do not distinguish between internal and external appointments. However, there is an expectation of internal career progression. Promotion is the main reward mechanism in Finnish universities for academic staff. This seems to have been strengthened by the introduction of management-by-objectives within universities. When universities compete for scarce resources, loyalty and good performance of academic staff are noted.

A managerialist culture is slowly being introduced into universities by the gradual empowering of university rector, deans of faculties and heads of departments at the expense of collegiality. The change has been most apparent in the case of rectors. When managerialistic styles of human resources management (HRM) are introduced, academic staff are expected to be more accountable to their rectors, deans and heads of department than to the scientific community of their discipline or the public. And, with additional pay increments for better than average performance, academic staff become more accountable to academic managers. Nevertheless, the Finnish tradition of emphasising external referees in appointing and promoting professors, and the underpinning legalism of academic appointments, undermines the powers of academic managers. This, together with increasing selectivity in research funding, tends to increase accountability to external assessors rather than to one’s own university.

Traditionally, external assessment has been the safeguard of academic freedom and quality in Finland. But rewards related to academic career development are increasingly being put in the hands of academic managers. This distinguishes the old culture from the new HRM one in the academic world. The more that managerialist accountability grows at the expense of accountability to the scientific community, the more it will affect the nature of the profession. One consequence seems to be increasingly formal measurements of academic performance, which might be seen as being a compromise between these two forms of accountability. In Finland, however, the problem of managerialistic accountability is still unresolved. While decentralization of internal administration has resulted in many kinds of decision-making, no definitive pattern of adjustment in universities has yet emerged (Summa and Virtanen 1995).
Conclusion

Since the mid-1980s, the higher education system has been under continual reform along the lines of the Finnish version of the New Public Management (Hood 1995). Traditional line-item budgets have been replaced by lump-sum appropriations, tied to objectives. Universities can set up new positions and abolish old ones and fixed-term appointments for academic staff are becoming more common. In future, distribution of academic working time is likely to become more flexible, as well as the pay system, and both are becoming oriented to measured inputs and outputs. The base-budget of each university is increasingly tied to performance targets in teaching and research and even to periodic evaluation of research quality by the Academy of Finland. Universities are now in competition, with ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ being determined by external evaluations and assessments.

All these developments seem to share the common goal of making higher education and research more focused and measurable. Resources are allocated for achieving clearly defined goals within priorities related to national strategies of improving international competitiveness and related instrumental ends. Outputs related to achievement, as well as input-output ratios, are being used to make the selection of university goals and their evaluation more transparent. A good graduate or research programme is considered to be the one that accomplishes what it has promised, preferably quickly. Only successful programmes can expect to be funded. Principles of accountability and output measurement are being applied to both higher education institutions and individual members of staff. This creates an atmosphere of ‘playing safe’ within institutions, which is contrary to traditional academic norms of risk taking aimed at creating something totally new. It is also increasingly necessary to do research that is not professionally challenging, or theoretically fruitful, but for which funding is available.

Traditionally, the academic profession was a product of scientific progress and higher education expansion. Both were made possible by economic growth, which ensured more resources for universities and provided conditions where it was not necessary to define departmental strategies in terms of planned objectives and targets. Professional norms of academic freedom evolved to tolerate uncertainty and failure, thus favouring innovation and risk in making new discoveries. In Finland, academic staff are still learning the new rules of the new game. Many have found managerialistic trends confusing and even humiliating, although the winners have probably welcomed the shift in emphasis. Many feel that the principles of performance measurement and budgeting which have been imposed by the state and university authorities are inappropriate to academic work, while others are satisfied because they get increasing support for their programmes.

Under these circumstances, conditions for developing an academic career have changed and have become more uncertain. Suitability of job applicants to fit the research profile and strengths of departments is now so strong that even the most talented people can be turned down for a post. Staff
profiles are specified to increase institutional productivity and the ability to compete with other departments and universities for instrumental, applied research funding, rather than funding for pure research. If the salaries of the academic profession remain low compared with experienced practitioners in many fields, and if the traditional intellectual motivation of academics is challenged by performance measurement indicators and managerialism, incentives for entering the profession may eventually weaken. Although the public standing of academics has probably not changed much over the last 20 years, Finnish academics are now being expected to do different things from what they did in the past.

Note

1 Data in the early part of this chapter are based mainly on Ministry of Education (1996), Klinge (1970) and Numminen (1987) if no other sources are directly referenced. Part of the statistics are taken from the KOTA database, which is a statistical database maintained by the Department for Higher Education and Research of the Ministry of Education (the URL address is: http://www.csc.fi/kota/nuts.html).

References


France: A Centrally-Driven Profession

June Burnham

The present diversity and fissured nature of French higher education is grounded in its history. The Revolution in 1789 abolished the old universities. Seen as elitist and resistant to new ideas, such as Renaissance humanism and the Enlightenment, only the Sorbonne, at that time the theological faculty of the University of Paris, carried much intellectual weight. Napoleon established the Imperial University in 1806 as a public body responsible for an homogeneous, unifying, secular system of education in a ‘one and indivisible State’. In the nineteenth century it had ‘faculties’ preparing students for law and medicine and, after 1870, for teaching. But its function was to control the standards of the baccalauréat – the school-leaving certificate that still gives access to almost any university. The Imperial University’s monopoly of higher education was soon undermined by the creation of grandes écoles, as specialized institutions training public servants, such as the École Polytechnique in 1795 for artillery engineers or the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) in 1808 for teachers. The first divide in French higher education was thus between the grandes écoles on the one hand and the university, with its faculties created in 1896, on the other (Durand-Prinborgne 1992).

A second divide was established by the Freedom of Higher Education Act 1875 allowing private higher education to coexist with public provision. Liberal intellectuals thought state higher education would be reinvigorated by competition with private education and forced to emulate German universities. Furthermore, in the 1860s, after Pope Pius IX had condemned state secular education, the Catholic church was particularly antagonistic towards modernity and the new liberalism of western Europe. The parliament elected in the aftermath of France’s defeat in 1870 by Prussia was unusually pro-clerical and temporarily overcame opposition arguments for a single, secular system. Back in control in 1880, however, the Republicans restored the state monopoly of degree provision and the title ‘university’. Central control over degrees handicapped Catholic ‘universities’, though not those grandes écoles whose ex-students found lifetime status as ‘anciens élèves’ (former pupils or ‘old boys’) more valuable than a university degree.
But students at some écoles needed to gain university degrees too, for example ENS students in order to enter the state agrégation competition for advanced secondary teaching. Catholic higher education survived by offering vocational training for the Catholic community and local employment, such as in social work, business studies and agriculture. The influence of political liberals could be seen in the formation of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, a company founded in 1872 to renew the governing elite by widening its recruitment pool. Its students won places in state administrative bodies. Too closely associated with Vichy, it was replaced in 1945 by the state-run Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) and the Institut d'Etudes Politiques. Business schools sponsored by local chambers of commerce from the 1880s, and the Institut Pasteur for molecular biology, are other examples of areas of study that developed outside the conservative university system.

Current structure of higher education

According to Prost (1987: 234), 'the Republic was basically universal suffrage plus free, obligatory and secular schooling'. This definition of Republicanism shows the political significance of state-driven higher education in France. The student revolution of 1968, caused in part by proposals for selective entry to university, stimulated the Faure reforms that split up old university faculties (Hayward 1983). In 1986, student opposition forced the withdrawal of a bill allowing universities to 'determine conditions of access'. A major issue in French higher education is thus how to supply a growing demand for higher education provision when selection in the system is politically impossible.

The economic case for more higher education, if France is to retain its place alongside other leading economies, is frequently put by the state's authorities (Frémont et al. 1992). But government's economic goals circumscribe its higher education policy. In law, central government controls the form and number of institutions and their financial arrangements. But expansion of higher education has forced central government to seek voluntary financial contributions from local and regional governments which, in return, expect a greater share of power (Durand-Prinborgne 1992). The demographic peak of 18 year-olds in France was in 1988 and a continued surge in enrolments is a consequence of other factors. These are, first, a growing number of students now pass the baccalauréat – 51 per cent passed in 1993 (compared with 20 per cent in 1970), and about 93 per cent of them enrolled in higher education. Second, new public regulations require primary schoolteachers to have a degree. And third, high unemployment encourages students to take higher degrees after graduation. However, in comparison with the explosion in student numbers 1983–92, forecast growth in higher education enrolments to 2003 looks less daunting, as shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1  Numbers of students entering French higher education, 1983, 1992 and 2003 (estimated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Entrants to all higher education</th>
<th>Entrants to university</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>443,000</td>
<td>249,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003a</td>
<td>485,000</td>
<td>277,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *middle-range forecast.  

The objectives of French higher education are set out in the ‘Savary’ Act 1984, confirmed in the Guidance Law 1989. These objectives are: to promote research and raise the level of knowledge, culture and training of the nation, as well as of individual citizens; to promote the economic development and employment opportunities of the nation and its regions; and to take a positive stance against social and cultural inequality between the genders and, as far as possible, to provide access to culture, knowledge and research. There is no distinction in France, as there is traditionally in Britain, between higher education and further education, or between ‘education’ and ‘training’. The result is that institutions providing school and post-school education are pluralistic and overlap in their provision, as well as being fragmented. The 4230 institutions classified as higher education institutions by the education ministry can be placed into a range of categories:

- 50 universities and 40 university annexes
- about 150 grandes écoles run by a variety of ministries and the private sector, whose students are rigorously selected
- a few grands établissements offering courses at doctoral level
- postgraduate teacher-training in four ENS and 26 Instituts Universitaires de Formation des Maitres (IUFM) created in 1990
- Instituts Universitaires Professionalisés (IUP) created in 1991 to provide four-year engineering courses because the grandes écoles were not satisfying total demand
- five Catholic ‘universities’
- 19 private universities including five Catholic universities established under the liberal regime of the 1880s
- three sets of establishments offering two-year post-baccalauréat courses to highly selected students mostly intending to go on to study for higher degrees at universities or grandes écoles, consisting of:
  - about 90 Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUTs)
  - about 480 classes préparatoires (CPGE) preparing students for competitions to grandes écoles, attached to about 330 public and 150 private lycées
France: A Centrally-Driven Profession

- about 1900 sections de techniciens supérieurs (STS) also attached to public or private-sector lycées of which some 1100 are public and 800 private
- about 90 state engineering schools and several Instituts d'Études Politiques which are selective
- about 250 private business schools owned by chambers of commerce or companies
- about 800 schools offering social work and paramedical training
- public research bodies, such as the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) with 26,000 civil servants in 1996, which use research resources and employ staff that might otherwise be employed in universities.

The distribution of students among these various institutions is indicated in Table 4.2. This shows the proportion of the French population of different ages participating in higher education. The greatest growth is in STS, especially private-sector STS offering courses related to the service sector. About half of IUT students and about a quarter of STS students go on to take masters courses in universities. They prefer if possible to start their higher education in selective institutions, because of their reputation for smaller classes and more intensive teaching methods. In the early 1990s, two out of five students were in the selective institutions (9 per cent in medicine-related studies, 10 per cent in CPGE and 28 per cent in technology; Durand-Prinborgne 1992: 221). Table 4.3 shows the proportion of the French population of different ages participating in higher education in 1993–94. In summary, the splits and divisions within French higher education are between: universities, on the one hand, and CPGEs and grandes écoles, on the other; selective and non-selective institutions; public and private ones; and researchers and ‘teacher researchers’. The French higher education system, in short, is fragmented, fractionalized and balkanized, despite the proclaimed intent of the state having a ‘national education’ system.

With the explosion of students, diplomas, disciplines and campuses during the 1980s, annual discussions for higher education funding between universities and ministry finance officials became impractical. From 1989, four-year contracts were negotiated between the central ministry, university and regional and local authorities. Table 4.4 shows the variety of sources of funding in French higher education and growth in spending in the 1990s, especially by local government. Table 4.5 shows the distribution of expenditure and relatively small increase in spending on university teaching in the 1990s. Public spending on higher education increased dramatically between 1988 and 1993 from 0.40 to 0.53 per cent of GDP or from 2.1 to 2.8 per cent of total public spending, a real increase in spending of more than a third in five years (CNE 1993). The post-1993 right-wing governments continued to prioritize higher education whose budget was increased in the 1997 finance bill by 6.6 per cent to US$8.8 billion, at a time when other spending was reduced.

In the student population, there are more women (57 per cent) at French universities than men, mainly because women are more likely to pass the
### Table 4.2 Numbers of students in French higher education institutions, 1995–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ministry of education public</th>
<th>Other ministries public</th>
<th>Private bodies</th>
<th>Public or private</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Growth 1985–95 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>1,360,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,360,500</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUTs</td>
<td>102,900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>102,900</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUFSMs</td>
<td>84,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84,200</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>145,100</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>67,400</td>
<td></td>
<td>225,200</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPGE</td>
<td>61,400</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>12,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering schools</td>
<td>19,700</td>
<td>13,100</td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td></td>
<td>51,500</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic universities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business colleges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,400</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,400</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools of art and architecture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52,600</td>
<td>52,600</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools of administration (ENA)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social work colleges</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>85,800</td>
<td></td>
<td>85,800</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other schools</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,138,900</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Some categories were not broken down by public and private in source.*

*Source: Ministère de l'Éducation nationale (1996: 155).*
France: A Centrally-Driven Profession

Table 4.3 Participation rates in French public and private higher education, 1993–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Population in age cohort (000s)</th>
<th>CPGE-STS</th>
<th>Universities incl. IUT</th>
<th>Other HEIs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>735.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>763.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>815.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>867.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>887.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>889.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>868.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>856.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>842.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>839.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>861.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>869.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>883.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4.4 Spending on French public and private higher education, by final spender in US$, 1990–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>7,897</td>
<td>10,034</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ministries</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local and regional authorities</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other public bodies</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>3,052</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,862</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Government grants to students are allocated to households as ‘final spenders’.

baccalauréat and less likely to go to the écoles. But the higher the level of study, the fewer the number of women students. About a quarter of university students come from working-class households (see Table 4.6) and they are more likely to fail their courses. Institutions in the Paris region are now becoming less dominant numerically. In 1993, they educated 26 per cent of France’s higher education students, compared with 35 per cent in 1970 (Bédarida 1994).
Table 4.5 Spending on public and private higher education (US$), by category, 1990-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1995 prices</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>Growth 1990-95 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teaching</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS-CGPE</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,707</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University teaching</td>
<td>8,345</td>
<td>10,190</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other HE teaching</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total teaching</td>
<td>10,931</td>
<td>13,810</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other activities</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and materials</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants (or pay to teachers in training)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,138</td>
<td>16,483</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4.6 The socioeconomic background of French public university students, 1994-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Men (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal professions, senior managers</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals, middle managers</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar workers</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar workers</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers, skilled trades</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>738,434</td>
<td>561,574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The players in higher education

Public-sector higher education institutions in France are closely overseen by central government, which is the employer of academic and support staff and specifies the number of posts nationally. The education ministry has regional divisions, the académies, responsible for the administration of public education, though school building maintenance was decentralized to local authorities in the mid-1980s, and there have been calls for a similar transfer of university sites to regional governments. The head of each regional
division, the recteur d'académie, is also the university chancellor – an honorific position in British universities – but in France the post is more that of a top ministry official exercising state oversight of higher education in the region. The recteur, who must have the academic status of professor, is appointed by the prime minister in Cabinet. The watchful eye of the recteur is reinforced by the Inspection générale de l'Education nationale. In 1985, the government set up a standing commission to evaluate public-sector higher education, the Comité national d'évaluation (CNE). The CNE appears to be genuinely independent and its reports are regarded as authoritative by government and the academic profession (CNE 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995). It has had the courage – influential government members often being anciens élèves – to review one of the grandes écoles (Ponts et Chaussées) at the invitation of its sponsoring minister.

Universities are établissements publiques. They have legal and administrative autonomy, granted in 1968 and reaffirmed in 1984, but the management issues over which they have control are limited, since so much is in the hands of central bodies. Each university is administered by three elected councils: an administrative council, chaired by the university president (a senior professor, also elected), a research council and a council for teaching and university affairs (a tripartite body of lecturers, students and support staff). Grandes écoles and engineering schools are controlled directly by the relevant minister, who appoints their directors. They have advisory councils chosen by an electoral college whose members represent lecturers, students and support staff.

Some private higher education employers are fully independent institutions, determining their own admission criteria, recruiting teachers and designing their own courses. The business and vocational écoles owned by chambers of commerce are awarded state recognition and have some public funding. The Catholic ‘universities’ – in Angers, Lille, Lyon, Paris and Toulouse – and some écoles have private legal status but operate within state regulations, awarding state degrees and diplomas. But they choose their own teachers, students and teaching methods and set their own fees. Catholic higher education has its own complex management structure difficult to correlate with public-sector arrangements. The senior strategic and decision-making body for all Catholic education is the Commission épiscopale du monde scolaire et universitaire, chaired by a bishop.

Published figures for staff in public higher education institutions, as shown in Table 4.7, do not include CPGEs, STS nor grandes écoles, many of whose staff are either simultaneously working in secondary education or universities, or are anciens élèves offering seminars. The discussion below therefore refers primarily to universities and university institutes, grands établissements and engineering schools managed by the education ministry. Academic staff and other groups working in public-sector higher education are civil servants (fonctionnaires) paid by the ministry of education. In 1992 there were 57,429 academic staff in all types of public sector higher education institutions. In the three years 1989–92, more public-sector teaching posts
Table 4.7 Staff in public higher education institutions, 1993–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Part-time (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenured staff</td>
<td>50,081</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-tenured staff</td>
<td>6,258</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total teaching staff</td>
<td>56,339</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-teaching staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenured staff</td>
<td>37,447</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-tenured staff</td>
<td>5,258</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-teaching staff</td>
<td>42,705</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99,044</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


were created (7362) than in the previous 13 years (5700) (Frémont et al. 1992). The 1997 budget provided for an additional 1448 academic posts, even though posts in other ministries were cut. Educational support staff, in turn, are organized into librarians and five categories known as IATOS (ingénieurs, administratifs, techniciens, ouvriers et personnels de service – engineers, administrators, technicians, manual workers and maintenance staff). There were about 40,500 librarians and IATOS in higher education in 1989. Fifty per cent of these supported research and training courses, 43 per cent were in administration and maintenance work and 7 per cent were library staff. There were significant increases in IATOS posts from 1990 (2200 in the 1997 budget), after several years of cutbacks.

Academic heads of universities (présidents) meet in a Conférence des présidents d’université. Its official chair is the education minister – an indication of the limits provided to university autonomy – though he or she does not usually attend its meetings. IUTs have a similar organization, the Association des directeurs. Both put their grievances to the minister in ‘round-table’ discussions, especially in the autumn, when new students arrive and the following year’s budget is being discussed by parliament. There are numerous other associations bringing together similar institutions or departments, for instance, the Conférence des grandes écoles, the Association of Deans of Law Faculties, and the AGREEPPDI (general assembly of heads of public establishments and écoles offering the engineering diploma). Each major discipline has a national council to exercise oversight and quality control and is represented on the Conseil national des universités (CNU). This council is the highest academic body, with a reputation for conservatism, whose main function is to maintain standards of academic appointments.

Trade unions in higher education are weakened by ideological schisms. There are five main academic staff unions: the communist-leaning Syndicat National de l’Enseignement Supérieur (SNE-Sup), which is the higher education
France: A Centrally-Driven Profession

component of a federation of education unions, the FSU; the higher education section, SGEM-Sup, of another teachers' union, Syndicat Générale de l'Education Nationale, which is affiliated to the socialist trade union federation, CFDT; and the right-wing Autonome. At either side of these labour organizations are Force Ouvrière (FO) and the Union Nationale Inter-universitaire (UNI). Neither of these wins many votes in elections to staff-employer consultative bodies, the comité technique paritaire, that discusses the running of institutions, and the commission administrative paritaire, that discusses personnel management issues. In the 1993 elections, the distribution of voting to the national higher education comité technique paritaire was: SNE-Sup-FSU 33.3 per cent; SGEM-Sup-CFDT 20.6 per cent; Autonome 22.9 per cent; and Force Ouvrière 0.9 per cent (Bédarida 1994). All public-sector higher education personnel are represented by the federations on the official consultative body for the civil service as a whole, the Conseil supérieur de la fonction publique d'Etat. This discusses national changes to the civil service statute and conditions of service applying to civil servants in general.

The unions work in ways related to the size of their constituencies and memberships. Because UNI and Autonome are in the minority in higher education, they act through the Gaullist party. Militant members of UNI were special advisers to Jacques Chirac, when he was prime minister 1986-88, and to the minister for higher education, François Fillon, in 1993. Fillon's successor until 1997, François Bayrou, a centre-right politician, consulted more widely but his reforms made only slow progress. The SNE-Sup, because of its greater impact on policy implementation, has a symbiotic relationship with the central administration: 'between the top levels of the union and the minister there is virtually no contact, but a network of committees links the administration of both' (Wright 1989: 291). A more subtle pressure is exerted by the anciens élèves in top ministerial and administrative positions. IUP postgraduates had to be called ingénieurs-maitres because the anciens élèves wanted to guard their privileged title of ingénieur (Bédarida 1994).

Universities prospered in the early 1990s because the then education minister, Lionel Jospin, and his chief advisor, Claude Allègre, were university professors, with close relationships with the prime minister, Michel Rocard, whose own top adviser was a professor of education history, Antoine Prost. They developed the 'Université 2000' programme through a series of conferences bringing together the national, regional and social partners in higher education. These were: the universities, regional prefects, recteurs, local authorities, research establishments, regional industrial and business associations, academic and support staff, and students (Ministère de L'Education nationale 1991). The need for such complex consultative arrangements stems from the state's detailed intervention in educational affairs that might be left to the institutions themselves in other higher education systems. When Jospin became Prime Minister in 1997 he appointed Allègre education minister, and Allègre soon made plans to trim the old 'mammoth' of an Education Ministry (see Monde, 18 December 1997).
Table 4.8 Age structure of academic staff in French public-sector higher education, 1989–90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Law and Economics</th>
<th>Arts and Humanities</th>
<th>Sciences</th>
<th>Medicine</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 55</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 55</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data refer to professors and maitres de conférence.
Source: Frémont et al. (1992: 121).

Table 4.9 Changes in staff and student numbers in French higher education, 1989–92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Law and Economics</th>
<th>Arts and Humanities</th>
<th>Sciences</th>
<th>Medicine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–89</td>
<td>5300</td>
<td>11,100</td>
<td>19,700</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>47,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–92</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>16,600</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>11,600</td>
<td>57,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in teachers</td>
<td>+9%</td>
<td>+50%</td>
<td>+19%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in students</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+22%</td>
<td>+34%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>+18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Teaching staff includes secondary-level teachers in universities.
Student numbers refer to all public higher education.

Structure of the academic profession

The most significant features of the academic labour market in France are the ageing academic profession, the distorted age profile of academic post-holders and the search for new recruits to the profession, in competition with public research bodies and the private sector. The age imbalance is the consequence of increased recruitment in the 1960s, followed by much slower growth in the mid-1970s. In arts and humanities a quarter of maitres de conférences, equivalent to career-grade lecturers in English speaking countries, are over 55. The average for scientists is younger but a considerable proportion of these will leave the profession between 2002 and 2011, as indicated in Table 4.8. Table 4.9 shows that during the period of rapid recruitment, 1988–92, staff-student ratios (SSRs) in French higher education
Table 4.10 The French academic profession, by numbers and academic discipline, 1994–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Law and Economics</th>
<th>Arts and Humanities</th>
<th>Sciences</th>
<th>Medicine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>3,653</td>
<td>6,855</td>
<td>4,547</td>
<td>17,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maitres de conférence</td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>7,145</td>
<td>13,139</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>26,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants (tenured)</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>2,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chefs de clinique</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3,761</td>
<td>3,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATERs, moniteurs</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>3,796</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (schoolteachers)</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>6,305</td>
<td>4,118</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,370</td>
<td>18,687</td>
<td>28,604</td>
<td>11,779</td>
<td>67,440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data refer to all staff in public 'university' institutions, including IUT, ENS and IUFM. Source: Ministère de l'Education nationale (1996: 229).

improved, except in science. Since 1992 ratios have worsened. The French planning ministry estimated that keeping ratios at 1991 levels would require 2800 additional academic posts each year up to 1994 and 2000 a year from then until the year 2000 (Bédarida 1994) but these figures have not been achieved. Although the official 'norm' for SSRs is (somewhat unbelievably) 1:15, it declined from 1:22 in 1981 to 1:26 in 1992 (Ministère de l'Education nationale, 1991). Policy in the 1990s has been to renovate the academic profession, make it more attractive to potential recruits and create a stockpool of future lecturers.

French academic staff belong to one of three national corps or professional groupings, defined by occupational grade, though there are other staff teaching in universities who were originally recruited to teach in lycées and therefore belong to 'school teacher' corps. The three higher education corps or grades are: assistants, maitres de conférences and professeurs. Numbers of staff of each grade in the four major academic disciplines are given in Table 4.10. In 1984, it was decided to cease recruitment of untenured assistants and promote as many of these as possible to maitre de conférences and facilitate promotion from maitre de conférences to professor. Members of these three corps, who had long been called enseignants du supérieur (higher education teachers), were in 1984 officially renamed enseignants-chercheurs (teacher-researchers) to indicate the double 'obligation' both to teach and conduct research. But the old name continues to be used.

Since 1988 four new categories of junior teaching post have been established. The first was attachés temporaires d'enseignement et de recherche (ATERs or temporary teaching and research attachés). These were created to allow assistants to finish their theses, while teaching. Universities use vacant posts, awaiting central decisions on appointments, to offer students posts as ATERs to ease staff shortages. In 1992, for example, 800 vacant posts were used in this way. Second, moniteurs are doctoral students given research funding...
and an additional sum to take seminars. The system was introduced in 1989 with 1500 new grants being offered each year. The CNE questions whether monitorats provide a well-targeted stockpool, since these posts are awarded on grounds of research abilities, not on whether the thesis area matches teaching gaps (CNE 1993). In September 1996, the ministry of research announced the scheme's abolition, though the circular was withdrawn some hours later (Monde, 25 September 1996).

Third, an increasingly large number of secondary-school teachers with the highest teaching qualifications (agregation and CAPES) were offered special posts in universities from the late 1980s, teaching mainly first and second-year students in arts and humanities (see Table 4.10). The corps feared standards would drop because agregation and CAPES examinations reward conventional analyses – in contrast to the ‘new knowledge’ universities are supposed to train students to discover. Yet many academics are reluctant to teach undergraduates and lectures predominate over seminars and dissertations (Bedarida 1994). These ‘school teachers’ are appointed full-time to the university by the central department of the education ministry (which manages the careers of agregés), when the university reports a vacant post, and might in principle move to a lycée on their subsequent posting should the ministry so choose.

Fourth, the non-tenured grade of associate professor (PAST) was established, offering part-time appointments to people with a simultaneous business career, especially to improve vocational courses. Full-time posts have also been opened to ‘outsiders’, but these are not new types of posts, rather a broadening of selection criteria for traditional corps recruitment. Though deplored by those who had sought to simplify and enhance the career structure, the creation of more varied posts, and opening-up of recruitment to people with different life experiences, indicate a practical need for flexibility in a profession unbalanced in many ways: demographically in relation to changing student numbers and pedagogically in the range of teaching it can or wants to provide to students.

Human resources management and the academic profession

A key distinction throughout the French civil service is between someone qualifying for appointment to a corps and someone being appointed to a post. In consequence, being promoted is being recruited to a higher corps and, in principle, though not always in practice, to a different institution. Would-be maîtres de conférences must have a ‘third-cycle’ doctorate (PhD) before applying to the CNU. CNU specialist sections examine applications according to published criteria, primarily research, and put the best-qualified applicants on an ‘approved’ list (liste de qualification). Until 1992, the CNU made the final decision on appointments to vacant posts, taking some account of each university’s preferences. New policies to increase the rate of appointments
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and promotion have provided the occasion for devolving some responsibility for selection to universities, to relieve the burden on the CNU. Universities now select their own maîtres de conférences from the CNU's list. A panel from the relevant discipline in the university decides itself whether to prefer local candidates, candidates of national standing or candidates with certain specialisms. Appointments to law posts have slightly different procedures based on a national competitive examination.

A similar system applies for recruitment to the professoriate. The doctorat d'état as a fundamental requirement was set aside in 1989, as being too dependent on approval by the academic hierarchy. Instead, candidates apply to the CNU for 'approval to direct research' (habilitation). Habilitation is based on qualifications and publications, with approved candidates competing for vacant professorial posts, where the final decision is made by the individual university. As with appointments to more junior posts, the university bases its choice on candidates' 'portfolios' of research output. Interviews, if any, are 'vivas' on the applicant's research portfolio. On average there are four approved candidates for each post. Recruitment to the professoriate in law, management and economics is, for the majority of posts, still through a competitive national examination (agrégation du supérieur). In 1992, in the first recruitment round for professors open to 'outsiders', the CNU approved 58 per cent of the 2000 private-sector applicants, though it found qualifications difficult to judge and was worried that some candidates might be more interested in tenure than in teaching (CNE 1993).

Promotion to maître de conférences of remaining assistants is made within institutions by peer review. For promotion from second class to first class within each corps, a quota for each discipline is set nationally. But since 1992 universities have chosen at least half their quota. The administrative council of each institution draws up two lists, one based on traditional research criteria, the other on new criteria of teaching or administrative responsibilities. Half the promotions in each list are decided by the university; the other half by the CNU. Each university decides which of their staff on both lists it will promote as its half of the quota (numbers from each discipline being left to its discretion). After all universities have made their decisions, the ministry tells the CNU the number of promotions still 'vacant' in each discipline (which depends on the total number of promotions already chosen by the universities).

The CNU chooses its half of the national quota from staff on university lists who were not actually promoted by the university. The CNU respects each university's order of preference by selecting from candidates at the top of its list (the number selected from each list varying among universities). There are some signs that universities are 'playing the system' by preferring in their own promotions to choose staff they expect not to be preferred by the CNU - perhaps because their research output is low. Ever since faculties were created in the 1880s, there has been a power struggle between the universities, which want to promote the people they prefer, and the centre, which tries to control national standards. Recruitment and
promotion procedures change over decades as the higher education policy community shifts its priority between the two approaches.

Professors, maitres de conferences, assistants and agregés are civil servants employed on terms set out in the civil service statute and in education ministry regulations. In addition, regulations covering the duties, recruitment and promotion procedures within each corps are set out in a decree of the Conseil d'Etat. Associate part-time teachers have three-year fixed-term, renewable contracts that become void if they leave their main job. Academic staff in the private sector are 'employés', working under normal contracts of employment, paid by the institutions for which they work. In private institutions that make contracts with the state on the awarding of state-recognized degrees, for example Catholic universities, the employer is still the organization managing the institution; their personnel still work within private-sector employment law. However, salary scales for academic staff match very closely the equivalent public-sector pay scales. But other conditions of employment, such as pension contributions and welfare benefits, are generally on worse terms than those for public-sector academics. Administrative and financial support staff in private-sector higher education are covered by a collective agreement which applies to all the institutions, whether contracted to the state or not.

Academics, even in public-sector institutions, may be active in party politics as a citizenship right, including as local councillors, but must not show party preference in their work. They may become MPs or ministers, taking unpaid leave and keeping their grade and pension rights. They may be seconded to an administrative post within any ministry or to a minister's cabinet. They may take additional jobs, providing total income from other public-sector work does not exceed the basic salary of their higher education post.

All tenured academics are required to lecture four hours a week (there are 32 teaching weeks per academic year) or take six hours of seminars or nine hours of laboratory work or some permutation of these. Employing secondary-level staff is economical, because they are required to teach 12 hours. ATERs undertake three hours of seminars or 4.5 hours practical work. Monitors take two hours of seminars a week and must attend a short training course organized by the Centres d'initiation à l'enseignement supérieur (CIEP), set up by the education ministry's research division in 1989. 'The underlying idea is that the academic profession requires an apprenticeship' (CNE 1993: 106). Only academics with the biggest administrative responsibilities, such as university presidents or vice-presidents, are given time-off teaching. Research time is not regulated: a limited survey in the late 1980s found 37 per cent of lecturers in mathematics, 18 per cent in physics and 15 per cent of chemists had published nothing in four years (CNE 1989).

In 1989 university salaries were increased very significantly. The remuneration of public-sector academics is determined by government through regulations, in practice after negotiations between ministry and unions that lead to a quasi-judicial settlement. Basic salaries for public sector academics
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Table 4.11 Salary scales for French public sector academics (US$), 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross annual salary</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maitre de conférence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>starting point, 2nd class</td>
<td>25,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>final point, 1st class</td>
<td>45,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>final point, extra-class</td>
<td>53,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professeur</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>starting point, 2nd class</td>
<td>36,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>final point, 1st class</td>
<td>64,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>final point, exceptional class</td>
<td>73,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research bonus (approximate)</td>
<td>1,207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Figures supplied by University of Limoges.*

are shown in Table 4.11. Proposals for salary rises are submitted for consultation to the *commission administrative paritaire* of each *corps*, both at university and national levels. Changes do not take place annually, only when financial, economic and political circumstances combine to enable university staff to make their case. The pay scales provide an annual increment for many staff. In addition to the basic salary scales shown in Table 4.11, all *maîtres de conférences* and professors receive an annual research bonus of about US$1207, plus an accommodation allowance of 3 per cent of gross salary. Half of academic staff receive pay for teaching additional hours in understaffed departments. These are paid at US$43 for lectures, US$28 for seminars and US$20 for laboratory activities. Most female academic staff earn less than men, because they are less likely to apply for promotion and, when they do, they are less likely to get it (Bédarida 1994). One third of *maîtres de conférences*, but only 2.4 per cent of top-level professors, are women.

Administrative, teaching and research bonuses, introduced after 1989, help make academic careers more attractive and are a management tool for increasing staff motivation and organizational commitment. Administrative bonuses are of two types: the first is awarded by the ministry of education to heads of establishment; the second is distributed by universities as they like, within specified financial limits. In 1994, the teaching bonus was valued at a uniform US$1488 a year for four years for *maîtres de conférences* and 10,000 US$1860 for professors. It is offered for extra pedagogical tasks, such as organizing the first cycle (two-year diploma courses). Award-winners are chosen by the university president, advised by the university research council. The research bonus is for additional research responsibilities, such as taking doctoral students into a research team or pursuing individual research of national standing, and is allocated by the ministry of education. It is worth from US$3658 a year for *maîtres de conférences* to US$6907 for top professors. These bonuses are available only to academic staff living near
their university, not taking outside or other remunerated work. In a further reform, designed to compensate for a decision in 1989 that government and CNU would concentrate funding for research degrees on research-active departments, each university was authorized to top slice 15 per cent of this funding element in its four-year contract and redistribute it among staff, to encourage 'lone' researchers in disciplines where research is pursued individually.

Applications for sabbatical leave can be made either to the university or the CNU; replacement teaching is funded by the education ministry. It offers sabbaticals more generously than previously and a higher proportion of them through the universities. In 1993–94 the universities were able to award them to 720 staff and the CNU to 160. In 1992–93 the figures were 72 and 80 respectively. But sabbaticals still benefit only about 2 per cent of academic staff each year. A more high-profile incentive, designed to promote high-level research in state universities and give it more prestige, was the creation in 1991 of the Institut universitaire de France. The government offers permanent membership (somewhat like 'fellowship' of British academic societies) together with research funding of US$18,603 per year and some replacement teaching costs to each of 40 academics—15 'senior' and 25 'junior' under 40 years of age. At least two-thirds of those chosen must be from universities outside Paris. Members are selected by an international panel of judges, nominated by government for five years, renewable once.

The Conferences des presidents d'universite and CNU have welcomed the CNE's 'external evaluation independent of institutions' (CNE 1993: 13) but there is little evidence that they have the courage to introduce self-evaluation. Successive reports of the CNE recommend, without effect, implementation of a 1984 decree obliging academics to report 'periodically' on their activities to the central administration, though the report, the CNE argues, should be used by the universities themselves (CNE 1991: 206; CNE 1993: 128). Only a few, rare institutions have introduced student questionnaires, either imposed by the university president to 'raise the value of the teaching function' or by teachers surveying the utility of the material taught—not the quality of teaching (Bédarida 1994: 181–92). The high undergraduate failure rate in France would seem to make an appraisal of teaching methods imperative. Almost half of students enrolling fail before the third, degree year (CNE 1995), in part because they can register for an undergraduate course in any subject. In 1997 the government was exploring the idea of compulsory student evaluation of teaching but reassessing the pedagogical process has unthinkable consequences for staff workloads, recruitment and resources.

French higher education institutions have statutory representative committees placing staff and students at the top of their management systems but, until the late 1980s, they had very little to manage. Then new measures increased the autonomy of institutions by offering them four-year contracts which gave some certainty on state funding and numbers of teaching posts, and some ways of steering the career paths of academic staff. But the new
powers are limited. Universities have no flexibility in redeploying their salary budget in different ways: such decisions can be taken only at the centre, by government. The feeling of security given to university management by state-institution contracts lasted only till 1994 when, because of national budgetary policy, universities were told that agreed figures for academic posts would not be honoured and new contracts from 1995 would not contain figures on posts.

Nor were the reforms always seen as giving more say to staff. The contracting process established a 'connivance' between academic heads of institutions (presidents and directors) and central ministries that simultaneously deepened the gulf between heads and the university community (Dizambourg, President of Paris XII, quoted by Bédarida 1994: 133–4).

Though some in the 'Université 2000' debate wanted decentralization of ministerial powers to regional governments or wanted market freedoms to give universities real autonomy, others thought local politicians would intervene managerially and even politically, and that only national control would ensure that disparities among universities did not widen. (Ministère de L'Education nationale 1991). Behind this defence of a national public service also lies the defence of professional interests in the preservation of intellectual standards by the CNU and of stable careers within national corps. The new career management arrangements allow a 'coexistence and balance between the national strategy of the corps and the strategies of the institutions' (CNE 1993: 118). Transfer of power to universities is seen by many academics not as a boost for collegiality but as a loss of individual autonomy. The CNE concluded that academics needed to see that 'their careers could be energized without having their civil service statute modified nor their intellectual liberty restricted' (CNE 1993: 128).

Conclusion

Higher education in France currently reflects both strong continuities of tradition and recent attempts at institutional reform, with implications for both the academic and student communities. Current flexibilities in French higher education lie chiefly in the range of intersecting paths through education and training it offers to students. Flexibility in local human resources management, in turn, is severely limited by central controls over recruitment, rules and rewards, justified by reference to the uniform provision of a public service and intellectual independence against local prejudice. However, 'students, local politicians, powerful economic groups, parents, and large swathes of public opinion no longer see universities as ivory towers but institutions they think should be at their service' (Bédarida 1994: 193). Social and economic changes and pressures of mass higher education have shown the need for diversity in recruitment and conditions of service. New bonus and promotion schemes acknowledge careers will vary; research is no longer the only criterion for professional advancement.
While all intellectuals are held in high regard in France, the fissaporous divisions within French higher education ensure that universities come second to the grandes écoles as educators of elites and second to public research bodies as the prime sites of research commitment. Reformers of the late 1980s recognized the special interests that leaders of local authorities had in universities because, unlike the central elite, they went to university and appreciated it and its place in the local economy. But many academics proved reluctant to exploit the opportunities decentralization offered for greater diversity, if it meant losing the certainties of a tenured, centrally managed career. This practical conundrum reflects an enduring intellectual and political conflict, going back to the Revolution, between the Girondins who wanted a decentralized Republic and the centralizing Jacobins whose goal was to unify and equalize, above all through a national education system. Although French higher education institutions continually call for more autonomy, it is a moot point whether they and the academic profession want it, either in theory or in practice.

Note

The author would like to thank her friends and colleagues Michel Coulon, Dr Martine Morris, Professor Hélène Pauliat and Michel Sénimon for their help.

References


Germany: A Dual Academy

Tassilo Herrschel

Germany's system of higher education, often associated with an academic 'ivory tower', is shaped by the inherent contradictions between academic autonomy and institutional self-determination, on one side, and dependency on the state for resources and students, on the other. A second characteristic is the internal division among academic staff into a privileged top 'class', the professoriate, with life-long tenure and academic independence, and a larger group of less privileged, untenured lecturers and researchers. The latter are usually on fixed-term contracts, academically dependent on the professoriate and have little involvement in institutional management. It is a flexible workforce serving as an adjustable resource in response to the changing demands and requirements of higher education institutions. Recent expansionist higher education policies of the state have exposed and highlighted these dichotomies.

The current organization of German higher education, including inequalities among academic staff, has a tradition of almost 200 years. Although the first German universities were established some 500 years earlier (Heidelberg 1386; Leipzig 1409 and Rostock 1419), the blueprint for the modern system was the creation of the University of Berlin by the Prussian philosopher and education minister, Alexander von Humboldt, in 1809–10. The key concepts of his vision of higher education were academic freedom and universality, or disciplinary breadth, on the one hand, and state control of finance, administration and staffing, on the other. It was his ideas which resulted in the statutory establishment of this inherently contradictory academic structure.

Academic autonomy is understood to include institutional academic self-management by the professoriate, academic freedom in doing research and integration of research and teaching activities. The essentially humanist ideal of 'pure science', pursued for its own sake without external pressures, has increasingly been challenged by political attempts to make academia more utilitarian and more applicable to business needs. A consequent danger of this new policy is a deepening division between teaching and research, with the growing importance of research institutions outside universities. The
other main determinant of German higher education, the supervisory role of the state, is largely shaped by the decentralized nature of the country's system of government.

**Current structure of higher education**

Following re-unification in 1990, there are 16 federal states (Länder) with considerable political and policy-making autonomy. The main responsibilities for providing education are devolved to Länder as part of their cultural sovereignty. The most populous Land, North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), with 17 million people, possesses Europe's highest density of higher education institutions (BMBF 1995a) as shown in Figure 5.1. The uneven distribution of higher education institutions among German Länder reflects historical federal traditions, as well as spatial inequalities in population densities and urbanization. Universities and higher education institutions are clustered in the main conurbations of Rhine-Ruhr, Rhine-Main, Stuttgart and Munich. Federal traditions are reflected in the fact that all state capitals also accommodate a university, if only since the 1960s, as in the case of Düsseldorf. A third of all university students were registered in just 10 institutions.

**Figure 5.1** Distribution of higher education institutions by Land and type, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Polytechnics</th>
<th>Other Colleges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meckl-Western Pomm.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Rhine Westph.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Hol.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: BMBF (1995a).*
in 1995 (BMBF 1996), almost all of which are old-established institutions such as Bonn, Munich, Münster and Berlin, as well as the Open University (Fernuniversität), Hagen, opened in 1974. There are 17 ‘mass universities’ with in excess of 35,000 students each. No Fachhochschulen are that size, as shown in Figure 5.2, reflecting their stronger regional roots and intended contribution to regional economic development. The largest share of higher education institutions, some 60 per cent, is at the smaller end of the spectrum, with under 5000 students each (BMBF 1996).

To avoid fragmentation and academic inconsistency in higher education, a national framework has been agreed between Länder and the federal government, based on recommendations by the joint Standing Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs. The framework is statutorily established under the Hochschulrahmengesetz (Act on General Provisions for Higher Education – HRG) and establishes the following key aims and objectives of higher education (HRG, para. 2):

- furthering the sciences and arts through research, teaching and study
- working towards equal opportunities in academia for women
- providing for staff development
- facilitating international cooperation
- furthering mutual cooperation especially between west and east German institutions.

The two main principles underpinning German higher education are those of Chancengleichheit (equal access and opportunity) and Leistungsfähigkeit (academic ability) as formally certified by the Abitur (A-Levels). Equal access has been facilitated through student grants under the Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz (BAföG, Federal Education and Training Act 1971) (BMBF 1995a) and abolition of tuition fees since the 1970s. Consequently, student numbers have multiplied since then, as indicated in Figure 5.3, with numbers rising from just over 290,000 in 1960 to almost 1.3 million in 1994 (BMBF ...
Figure 5.3 Numbers of students in German higher education, 1976–95


1996). As a result, some 13 per cent of the workforce are graduates, of whom some 40 per cent are women (Peisert and Framhein 1994; BMBF 1996). This is in line with the under-representation of women as both school leavers with Abitur and higher education students (BMBF 1995b).

Challenged by the requirements of economic restructuring and growing international competition, humanist idealism in German higher education has been confronted with questions about academia’s contribution to the defence and advancement of the Standort Deutschland (business location Germany). This includes the employability of students and utility of higher education research for business. Research and technology parks, for instance, viewed as instruments to facilitate economic regeneration, have developed in close association with universities (Massey et al. 1992). The new emphasis is also reflected in the renaming of the federal government department for education into the Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology. Consequently, higher education has expanded and diversified, while the original Humboldtian idea of academic freedom and ‘self-purpose’ has inevitably become compromised. Not surprisingly, ‘preparation for employment’ is a key objective stated by the NRW Higher Education Act (Universitätsgesetz (UG), para. 2, see below). Implementation of this was attempted, first, by the creation of comprehensive universities in the 1960s, aiming at removing the divide between theory and praxis by combining application-oriented courses with those focusing on traditional academic values. Second, Fachhochschulen (polytechnics) were established to concentrate on applied higher education. Many Fachhochschulen, established
in the early 1970s, evolved from specialist, vocationally oriented teacher-training, business, retail and civil service colleges (Verwaltungshochschulen) and their employment-orientation has continued.

Following the trend towards differentiation and specificity in a post-Fordist flexible economy (Amin 1994), diversity and differential objectives among types of higher education institutions are now being accepted, following previous attempts to integrate and blur differences between universities and Fachhochschulen by combining the two in comprehensive universities (Gesamthochschulen), thus avoiding the development of a binary system. Nevertheless, only now are degrees from Fachhochschulen acknowledged by universities as sufficient to begin postgraduate, doctoral studies, without first attending university undergraduate classes. The change in emphasis, and its implementation, reflect the strong role of the state as funder and supervisor of the higher education system, including curriculum development and student access. This directly affects academic freedom and institutional management, especially through the resources made available, both financial and personnel, and demands on higher education capacity because of rising student numbers. The latter have substantially increased since the 1960s, in response to state policies of massifying higher education, including wider access.

These trends have highlighted some inherent dilemmas in German higher education. First, demand (i.e. student numbers) cannot be artificially controlled without constitutional challenge, because education, including access to higher education (Giese and Schunck 1976), is a principal civil right established and protected by the Constitution (Grundgesetz [Basic Law] sect 1). Second, ability to meet that demand depends on the state, thus ultimately circumscribing de facto scope for academic freedom in the traditional sense, albeit that teaching has to comply with the spirit of the Basic Law. For instance, national government appears to be reducing its involvement with funding higher education, as indicated in Figure 5.4. Thus while the state is committed to contributing 50 per cent to all capital costs resulting
from expansion or modernization of higher education institutions (GG, para. 91), this type of expenditure has decreased, while higher subsequent maintenance and running costs have to be met by the Länder alone. Consequently, over the last 20 years, NRW has increased its higher education expenditure by some 400 per cent, contrasting with the federal government’s increase in contributions of only 50 per cent (MWF NRW 1994a).

The state not only exercises control through finance but also regulates access to higher education institutions, whether private or public, which must obtain formal recognition through state charter (Braun 1996). This gatekeeper role by the state (GG, Art. 7, para. 1) potentially contradicts the notion of self-government of higher education institutions and institutional scholarly freedom (Art. 5, para. 3). Nevertheless, central control is seen as important for maintaining uniform standards and access to allow inter-institutional transfer of students through mutual recognition of academic credits. Given the inherent dominance of the state in higher education (see also Figure 5.1), it is not surprising that non-state institutions are in the minority, comprising eight universities, two art colleges, 18 theological colleges and 43 Fachhochschulen (BMBF 1996). State hegemony is evident, despite a diversified higher education institutional landscape (see Figure 5.2), when looking at student numbers. Despite a share of 22 per cent of all 326 higher education institutions in Germany, those not under state control enrol under 5 per cent (ca. 37,000) of all students (BMBF 1996), thus reflecting their small, specialist nature. Apart from controlling access, finance and staffing are the main avenues of state influence in the operation of higher education institutions. As shown above, just under 80 per cent of higher education institutions are de jure part of the public sector, controlled by the Land (Universitätsgesetz, UG NRW, para. 1). Accordingly, higher education is an integral part of Land budgets (see NRW) for both capital investment and current costs, including staff salaries. The private sector is hardly of relevance in this respect, although it is important as a provider of research grants and partner in joint ventures (MWF NRW 1994a), especially since the federal government’s funding of research within higher education has been frozen at 1989 levels (Peisert and Framhein 1994).

Comparing sources of higher education income and their purposes, as shown in Figure 5.5, we observe the all-apparent absolute dependence of higher education institutions on state funding. Basic income to cover running costs was some 62 per cent in 1991 (Bund (federal) and Länder), with capital investment merely some 3 per cent (Land and federal government). Income from research funding bodies, such as the German Research Society (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft – DFG), which provided US$990 million in 1993 (Braun 1996), is of lesser relative importance (11 per cent), although not all such income may go through university accounts (Peisert and Framhein 1994). These sources are mainly available to universities rather than Fachhochschulen, with their lesser engagement in research. Funding procedures involve bids by institutions to the Land finance ministry, based on projected expenditure. Land higher education and general financial
policies determine the extent to which projected expenditure will be covered. This highlights the potential influence of the state on the operability of higher education institutions, potentially challenging academic-led institutional self-government and old-established practices in universities.

Such challenge comes from a widening gap between imposed tasks, especially expansion of student numbers, and provided resources and includes the well-established, strict division of status and responsibilities between academic staff. Although higher education expenditure nominally increased nine-fold between 1960 and 1990, this increase is put into perspective by the 11-fold increase in total public-sector expenditure over the same period, as indicated in Figure 5.6. At the same time, student numbers quintupled.
As a consequence, one would inevitably suspect higher pressures on existing resources, both equipment and staff. Indeed, in the early 1970s, problems were identified as part of the massification of higher education, seemingly ‘turning out as many teachers, engineers and doctors as can be processed in the shortest possible time’ (Kloss 1976: 128). This problem has continued until today, as admitted by the NRW Land government, which has recognized that ‘institutions of higher education are financially under-resourced’ (MWF NRW 1994a: 40).

The players in higher education

The key players in higher education are the institutions themselves and the Land and federal government as prime funders of the system, higher education policy-makers and employers of staff. Other groups are primarily bargaining and lobbying groups, including the main representative organizations of academic staff and institutional management. For the latter it is the Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (Association of Rectors of Institutions of Higher Education), which coordinates and voices the concerns and interests of all higher education institutions. The typical representative organizations of academic staff are not trade unions but ‘staff associations’ with more emphasis on lobbying and ‘gentlemen’s agreements’: the Deutscher Beamtenbund (DBB – Association of German Civil Servants) and the Deutscher Hochschulverband (German Association of Teachers in Higher Education). Few academics, especially the professoriate, would consider industrial action as an acceptable way of bargaining with employers, not at least because of their elitist social standing and reputation. This is reflected in membership densities. In Germany, white-collar workers at around 22 per cent density generally show a low degree of organization (Smith 1994). This proportion is even smaller for professional staff such as the academic profession.

In education, including higher education, all staff employed through a state-owned institution are de facto part of the Land civil service and, as such, are paid by each Land civil service finance department, not by individual institutions. This arrangement highlights the predominant role of the Land administrative apparatus in the provision for and management of employees in higher education, leaving the various higher education institutions entirely dependent on government funding arrangements, as shown in Figure 5.5 above. Other available sources are limited and are required for non-routine expenditure, such as research projects and special equipment. As stressed earlier, universities benefit most from these non-state sources. At the beginning of the 1990s, some 60 per cent of university professors received external funding for their research activities, compared with 33 per cent of professors at polytechnics (Enders and Teichler 1995). Private-sector funding is of particular relevance to technology-oriented institutions, such as technical universities (Technische Hochschulen) or those with strong individual departments in this sector (Peisert and Framhein
In some cases, university professors may act as managers of newly established research companies in science parks, a task not part of their normal academic duties. There have been some attempts, supported by public policy, to encourage closer cooperation between the private sector and higher education institutions, possibly leading to 'research to order'. However, these have not developed into a more widespread feature, although the creation of science parks attempts to forge such links. Private sector research is largely carried out either in-house by larger concerns or by independent research institutes, whose link with universities is mainly through the hiring of research staff and academic staff.

Currently, discussions revolve around productivity of higher education, as illustrated by the summary of consultative discussions in North-Rhine Westphalia (MWF NRW 1995). These include issues centring around: 'increased efficiency of higher education institutions', 'extended institutional autonomy', 'streamlined administration', 'optimized decision-making processes' and 'evaluated performance'. Of particular concern is a limitation in study time, with students usually completing their courses at around 28 years of age, so that industry's demands for younger graduates can be met and the economic costs of study reduced, including corresponding staffing costs. A maximum of 4.5 years of study for most academic disciplines is being considered (Braun 1996), thus challenging the established view that studying is not merely a means to an end (i.e. obtaining a degree) but also a process of personal self-development and maturation (Oehler 1989). In addition, following re-unification and the subsequent need to integrate and expand higher education in eastern Germany, the aim is to expand the role of Fachhochschulen so they can take a 40 per cent share of all higher education student intakes, in an attempt to emphasise a stronger applied rather than purely academic approach in higher education, thus facilitating student employability (Braun 1996). Accelerated learning processes are to be achieved through improved in-class teaching performance, teaching reports, course progress reports and monitoring student assessment and staff performance. Currently, only a small proportion of permanent academic staff (largely professors) are evaluated (some 13–15 per cent), compared with over 90 per cent in the UK (Enders and Teichler 1995).

Structure of the academic profession

Staffing in German higher education can be divided into three main categories or levels of worker: the professoriate at top level (Oberbau), those in the middle or intermediate level (Mittelbau) (who are comparable to lecturer and senior lecturer in UK higher education), and non-academic support staff in the lower level (Unterbau). The hierarchical career structure of those in full-time academic employment is outlined in Section 42 of the Hochschulrahmengesetz. Professors teach, research and have varying managerial duties. The Mittelbau is subdivided into two categories: lecturers and assistants.
to professors, and academic employees and teachers for special assignments, such as senior further education teachers or practitioners (e.g. judges, lawyers, civil servants) contracted into higher education. Lecturers are entirely a feature of universities, almost completely absent from Fachhochschulen, where lower-rank professors provide all teaching duties. This reflects a lesser emphasis on research in comparison with their colleagues in universities (Enders and Teichler 1995). Lecturers provide much of the teaching, while carrying out research to gain the necessary entry qualification (Habilitation) for a professorial post. In universities, lecturers have grown in numbers to counteract expanding student numbers and maintain staff–student ratios (SSRs) at a level of 1:14 in 1993, whereas for Fachhochschulen, in the absence of the lecturer grade, SSRs worsened to 1:33 (BMBF 1995a). Their importance is emphasized further by the fact that, in universities, the professor–student ratio was 1:52 in 1991 (Peisert and Framhein 1994).

Increases in staff numbers have primarily been achieved through recruiting more Mittelbau staff, many of whom are fixed-term research appointments. As a result, the number of academics on fixed-term contracts exceeded the number on permanent posts by 30,000 in 1992, twice the number of 1986 (Peisert and Framhein 1994). The actual number of full-time research assistants doubled, from 41,000 in 1972 to 83,000 in 1993. Other full-time staff in the lecturer grades include Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter (academic employees) whose main responsibility is undergraduate teaching (up to 16 hours per week), for which a doctorate is not required. Some three-quarters of this group are on fixed-term contracts lasting normally for three years, with possibilities of renewal (Peisert and Framhein 1994). In addition, there are part-time staff, usually on fixed-term contracts of typically between one and three years’ duration, who supplement teaching and research requirements. They include visiting or ‘pay-as-you-teach professors’ (Honorarprofessoren), to provide special teaching and/or research. There are almost 60,000 of these part-time academics, contributing considerably to research and teaching activities. It is here, where the notion of a flexible academic workforce comes to mind.

Figure 5.7 highlights two key determinants of job insecurity, and thus the duality between professorial and other academic staff of the Mittelbau: fixed-term contracts of normally between one and six years maximum and part-time work. Thus, whereas among the professoriate fixed-term contracts and part-time work are the exception, if slightly more common in Fachhochschulen than in traditional universities, the situation is quite different among Mittelbau staff, which itself makes up 65 per cent of all university academics. Here, less than 20 per cent enjoy tenure and some 22 per cent are on part-time contracts. Positions of Wissenschaftliche Assistenten (academic assistants), for instance, attached to a professorial mentor during their Habilitation, are normally restricted to six years’ duration. Since such posts require a doctorate, normally not attained before the age of 32 (Peisert and Framhein 1994), academic assistants are considered too old at the end of their contracts to enter the non-academic job market.
Degree of job security is thus a major distinction between the two main groups of academic staff: those on fixed-term contracts and luckier individuals who join tenured professors. The latter enjoy the additional benefit of civil service status for life (*Beamte auf Lebenszeit*). This means guaranteed salary levels, protection from redundancy and more generous professional pension arrangements (Smith 1994). In return, they are not entitled to take industrial action, although they may lobby for their interests through the less confrontational *Deutsche Beamtenbund* as a non-trade union association. *Beamte* are thus different from public-sector employees, because they are seen 'as an embodiment of the state and its sovereignty. His is a service relationship, not a contractual one' (McPherson 1971: 23). Other academics may hold the status of public-sector employee (*Angestellter des öffentlichen Dienstes*), both permanent or fixed-term. But they do not enjoy the same degree of employment protection as *Beamte* and may join trade unions and take industrial action. Most non-Beamte academics join their professional association, the *Hochschulverband* (Association of Teachers in Higher Education).

Given the near normality of being on fixed-term contracts of six years maximum duration among Mittelbau staff (78 per cent of them are), it is not surprising that they expect to leave their universities within five years, with 62 per cent expecting to leave higher education altogether (Enders and Teichler 1995). There is a strong indication, therefore, that German higher education provides for a two-class, dualistic system among the academic profession – the powerful, secure and privileged professoriate and comparatively powerless, insecure lecturers. They come quite close to the characteristics of a flexible, post-Fordist, dual labour market, with its emphasis on fixed-term contracts, few prospects of structured career advancement and inherent job insecurity. The broad divide between the two groups also includes scope (or lack of it) for developing personal academic interests. While the professorial group views itself fairly autonomous in deciding research activity and teaching duties, Mittelbau staff see little such scope,
having to fulfil requirements as defined by their professorial mentors and fitting into existing teaching and research structures of institutions. This is not surprising, given the temporary nature of most lectureships, whereas institutional (departmental) teaching and research priorities possess more continuity (Enders and Teichler 1995). Low job satisfaction among lecturers is therefore not surprising and is clearly linked to job uncertainties and lack of career prospects (Enders and Teichler 1995).

Professors and lecturers are combined, however, in their criticism of the bureaucratic university administration and the difficulties they face when seeking to implement new ideas. Thus despite their de jure strong position within universities, German professors consider their influence on institutional-wide matters as rather limited, although they see some scope for influence at departmental level. Nevertheless, compared with the de jure provisions for professorially led institutions, this suggests a relative loss of academic control to a more professional administrative and managerially-driven system. Overall, a dichotomous structure appears to be emerging, with some matters decided largely centrally (e.g. financial priorities and teaching loads) and other mainly local decisions made at departmental level under professorial leadership. The latter include the selection of heads of department and new (non-professorial) appointments, which are traditional rights of academic self-government by the university professoriate. In polytechnics, appointments tend to be more centralized, operating largely through the political authorities and legislation (Enders and Teichler 1995).

Table 5.1 summarizes the main structural features of the German academic profession, such as responsibilities, qualifications and contractual arrangements. Generally, all academic staff need to have at least a university degree, although for a full career a completed doctorate and Habilitation are a sine qua non. The Habilitation (i.e. a 'higher doctorate') is a purely academic degree granted by a university, without state involvement, and consists usually of a published thesis (Habilitationsschrift) or, alternatively, a range of publications, an oral examination by the respective (disciplinary) professoriate and a 'test lecture'. There is no formal training for teaching in higher education, academic qualifications are deemed sufficient, although this is currently under review (MWF-NRW 1995).

Differential responsibilities are reflected in different positions in the career hierarchy and grading structure. So-called 'C4-professors' are the most senior academic rank, with academic employees (research assistants) at the bottom. This translates into annual pay rates of about US$72,730 and US$27,270 respectively. Subdivisions in the professoriate, as shown in Table 5.1, result in variations in administrative and managerial responsibilities and security of tenure. Responsibilities, including research, examining and teaching are circumscribed by the codebook of the respective Land. Professorial appointments are made and reviewed by the relevant Land minister (MWF NRW 1994b), on recommendation by universities. Key pre-requisites for appointment are completed degree study, teaching ability, strong engagement in research and good experience as a researcher, demonstrated during the
Table 5.1 Responsibilities, qualifications and contractual arrangements for full-time academic staff in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Professor</th>
<th>Academic assistant</th>
<th>Senior academic assistant</th>
<th>Senior/lecturer</th>
<th>Academic employee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>defining and directing research and teaching, academic management of HE</td>
<td>academic service provision, including research and teaching students</td>
<td>lecturing and teaching classes according to instructions by respective professor, academic administrative responsibility</td>
<td>similar to those of professor, no administration or managerial responsibility, relative independence in defining contents of research and teaching</td>
<td>academic tasks, relevant administration, instructing students on research methods, supervised by professor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institution, especially universities</td>
<td>research methods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required Qualifications</td>
<td>PhD and Habilitation</td>
<td>Habilitation, implies PhD.</td>
<td>as for professors (Habilitation) but state not involved in appointment</td>
<td>completed degree course</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractual Arrangements</td>
<td>usually non-terminable appointment/’call to a chair’ as civil servant (Beamte)</td>
<td>fixed-term civil servant status for three years, renewable for further three years</td>
<td>fixed-term civil servant (Beamte) for 4–6 years, renewable by time ‘left over’ from previous appointment</td>
<td>fixed-term civil servant status for six years, permanent appointment possible in special cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>academic tasks, relevant administration, instructing students on research methods, supervised by professor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The age structure of the professoriate is an important indicator of future career prospects for younger academics and the rate of academic rejuvenation. Figure 5.8 shows the differences among subject groups (Braun 1996). It is evident that in all areas, apart from law, economics and social sciences, at least 40 per cent of professors are over 56 years of age and, in veterinary medicine, some 60 per cent, with academics in their early professorial careers in a minority, somewhere between 8 and 16 per cent. The implications are, following these career blockages, that a considerable deficit of academics will emerge on the mass retirement of the present academic profession. Inevitably, this will put great strain on the academic labour market, requiring many new entrants within a very short period, which may not be available in sufficient numbers and quality after years of dead-end career prospects. This problem was addressed by a study in 1986, commissioned by the Deutschen Hochschulverband, which lamented the unfavourable age structure among academic staff, with an above average proportion of the professoriate not due for retirement, at that time, for another 15 to 20 years. Consequently, there would be few opportunities for younger academics of the Mittelbau to be appointed till the mid-1990s at the earliest (Karpen 1986). This, it was argued, could seriously affect innovation and creativity in research, with many young academics having to look for alternative employment opportunities, rather than continuing to seek professorships and study for their Habilitation. Prospects of being permanently appointed were judged by the respective deans as uncertain and problematic in more than 75 per cent of cases (Karpen 1986). Many of these would be too old to join non-academic professions: more than half were over 40 and one in 10 were over 45. In general, the study found that just one in five academics with the
Habilitation was likely to secure a tenured professorship. The situation differs among disciplines, with languages and arts the worst, a result of Land financial policy, closely followed by natural sciences, with conditions varying for law, economics and social sciences. It was suggested, as a solution, to increase temporarily the number of lectureships/professorships (with tenure) or turn temporary appointments into permanent ones. This, however, depends to some considerable extent on available finance by the respective Land.

Limited long-term career prospects, budgetary restrictions, the need to cover ad hoc gaps in teaching provision and available research funding resulted in the appointment of a growing number of part-time staff—a clear indication of a post-Fordist restructuring towards flexible forms of employment (Rustin 1994; Pinch 1994). Figure 5.7 above illustrates the growing importance of part-timers for the overall expansion of academic staffing, especially among male staff, who form by far the largest group in higher education institutions. Some of this is due to adjustment processes in eastern German universities, although these affect the status of full-time employees more. Here, differences between permanent and fixed-term contracts are more revealing, as they reflect career insecurity better than part-time work. Thus, while the proportion of part-time work has increased, the main challenge comes from diminished prospects of tenure and thus ultimately lack of suitable career entrants.

Human resources management and the academic profession

Selection and recruitment of academic staff varies between the professoriate, whose appointment to a chair is the responsibility of the Land, and other academic staff who are recruited by individual institutions. Establishing such professorial chairs is entirely at the discretion of the Land and such posts can be transferred between faculties or universities within a Land (Landes-Hochschulgesetz, e.g. in NRW para. 33). The professoriate is responsible for appointing all Mittelbau staff. Decisions about renewing fixed-term contracts, for instance, rests with the professoriate or at least depends on their recommendations. Within the professoriate, promotion and financial reward are strongly based on research performance, with teaching of lesser importance. No formal qualifications are required for this, in stark contrast to the several academic hurdles focused on research. Teaching skills are deemed to be acquired during teaching practice as assistant to a professor, while preparing their Habilitation. In-class teaching abilities are assessed less formally in a 'test lecture' as part of the appointment process.

The 12 years usually spent between first degree and Habilitation are characterized by fixed-term and inherently insecure forms of employment. Many of those qualified for professorial posts are not able to secure a position, because there are many more applicants than jobs. For those not able to stay in higher education, prospects for alternative employment have
Table 5.2 Annual salaries of academic staff in German higher education (US$), 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position/scale</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4-Professor (Ordinarius, universities only)</td>
<td>45,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3-Professor (universities and Fachhochschulen)</td>
<td>38,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2-Professor (mainly Fachhochschulen)</td>
<td>35,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl-senior lecturer</td>
<td>35,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cl-academic assistant (to a professor)</td>
<td>32,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAT2/3-academic employees</td>
<td>31,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Amounts are based on 'married with one child' basic salary plus allowances
BAT = Bundes-Angestellten-Tarif (national pay scale for public sector employees).

become less favourable. Over the next 15 years or so, about 60 per cent of
the professoriate will reach retirement age, generating a high demand for
new recruits. The expected annual replacement rate for retiring professors
has increased from 1.4 per cent for western Germany in 1986 to 3.9 per
cent for a reunited Germany in 1995 and is expected to rise to 5 per cent in
2000 (Karpen 1986). This may create a crisis in higher education, since
insufficient suitable successors may be available.

Divisions among academic staff are reflected in pay scales, as indicated in
Table 5.2, and their degrees of satisfaction with pay. Among the Mittelbau,
less than half (44 per cent) consider their annual salaries of some US$19,393
as adequate. This compares with a 65 per cent satisfaction among university
professors, earning on average US$66,690 per year (Enders and Teichler
1995). Pay rates are integrated into the pay award system of the civil service,
i.e. Beamte and public-sector employees (Angestellte des Öffentlichen Dienstes)
and correlate with scales of civil servants in other state functions (e.g. police,
judiciary and public administration). The appropriateness of the different
scale awards is supervised by the respective Land, as paymaster. Past work
experience, qualifications, length of service and age are important criteria
when establishing the respective pay scales. Often part-time and/or fixed-
term posts come with a particular pay-scale attached, which the respective
applicant has to accept as non-negotiable. The width of the different pay
scales allows considerable variations in response to the above criteria. Unlike
the situation in the UK, where pay differentials are greater, the lowest and/
or highest pay of the senior professoriate is merely some 50 per cent above
that of their assistants.

Given the public sector nature of employment in German higher educa-
tion, terms and conditions reflect those of the respective Land's civil service
(öffentlicher Dienst). They are statutorily established in the respective Land
legislation, incorporating federal guidelines and law (e.g. Bundesbeamten-
- Federal Civil Service Act – and Bundesbesoldungsgesetz – Federal Civil Service Payments Act). Consequently, working hours and conditions, holiday entitlement, pay scales, promotion and pension entitlement are standard provisions, as established for the public sector in general. They are not negotiable locally. Differences in the quality of social provisions (such as health care and pensions) exist mainly between the more privileged Beamten and ‘normal’ public sector employees. For instance, Beamte enjoy on average a higher pension level at about 80 per cent of their last net salary, ‘premium’ health care, special insurance provisions and other perks also after retirement. Rigidity and ‘performance-hostility’ of the civil service-style structure, with its absence of performance related pay and prospects of promotion, are increasingly seen as inadequate vis-à-vis changing requirements placed on higher education institutions (MWF NRW 1995).

New challenges are seen to be coming from greater institutional financial self-management, including income generation, a growing range of responsibilities and managerial skills required from staff. There is also increasing competition within the well-paying private sector for high calibre academics. Apart from income differentials, public sector academics may be disaffected by the strictly hierarchical civil service type of employment in higher education, which does not provide for jumping stages in promotion, switching career paths or holding outside posts in business. Formal staff appraisals, or indeed research assessment exercises, are not common practice in German higher education institutions, although such a system could be established, if performance-related criteria were introduced.

Traditionally, the professoriate has viewed free academic activity, unconstrained by productivity and evaluation criteria, as their professional prerogative. This includes monitoring and assessing the activities of their assistants and junior staff (Mittelbau), who do not enjoy such freedom. Responding to these pressures, in North-Rhine Westphalia for instance, the introduction of locally negotiated contracts, especially for professorial appointments, is one possibility under discussion (MWF NRW 1995, appendix 2). Such arrangements could involve the defining of managerial responsibilities and working hours. Currently, the professoriate enjoys an essentially self-managed working-hours regime. The only quantitative requirement is eight hours teaching during term-time, plus examining duties. Nevertheless, German university professors claim to be working 53 hours per week during term-time and 49 hours at other times (Enders and Teichler 1995). This is considerably more than that invested by their Fachhochschule colleagues: 46 and 36 hours respectively (ibid.), reflecting the different emphasis on self-managed research.

Among the Mittelbau, most of whom are public sector employees, a more formal regime applies, based on the relevant, contractually binding weekly working hours in the public sector of 35 hours. Nevertheless, Mittelbau staff claim to work on average 45 hours per week during term and 44 hours at other times (Enders and Teichler 1995). Considering the relatively large number of part-time staff within this group, the amount of overtime work
can be estimated. This reflects the efforts required to improve their prospects for professorial appointments, including required work for the Habilitation, on top of normal teaching loads.

Traditionally, German universities operated a dual administrative structure, reflecting their nature as autonomous academic institutions, financed and supervised by the state. Academic issues were controlled by the rector, recruited from the professoriate, and administration and finance were managed by the chancellor, acting as a state representative ensuring the appropriate use of public funds, thus highlighting the close linkages between state and higher education. Ordinarius professors, i.e. those occupying chairs, controlled academic and staffing issues, appointed lecturers and researchers, defined the contents of research and teaching, suggested new professorial appointments at faculty level, sent members to the university senate and took on the role as rector through an annual rota basis (Peisert and Framhein 1994). Non-professorial staff were all but excluded from having any influence on decisions in academic and managerial issues within universities.

These key elements of traditional university self-government have seen major changes since the 1960s, in response to the move towards mass universities and the subsequent need for more administrative institutionalization and professionalism. At the same time, the student revolt of the 1960s pressed for the introduction of more democratic structures, allowing students to have some influence on institutional and academic developments. Greater democratization was also wanted by the Mittelbau staff, while Mitbestimmungsrecht (the right to co-decide) was introduced for workers and employees in management issues, on the basis of parity voting (paritätische Mitbestimmung). The higher education sector could not ignore these demands by continuing to maintain its paternalistic, autocratic structures. These changes have been accommodated by the higher education laws of the Länder. Nevertheless, as established by the Supreme Court in 1973, the professoriate has retained the last say in all academic issues and matters of professorial appointments.

Today, institutional self-government involves four groups representing the main players in institutions: professors, students, other academic staff and non-academic staff, who sit on disciplinary-based boards or faculty councils. The Higher Education General Act 1985 (Hochschulrahmengesetz) provides the professoriate with a majority vote in all institutional issues, thus re-establishing traditional professorial hegemony in higher education institutions. Nevertheless, administrative functions have been professionalized, with the rector now a full-time position, appointed for a two-to-four year period, and recruited from internal and external candidates. Non-professorial academic staff have only limited direct influence outside their representations in work conditions related matters, through their trade unions, civil servants' associations or other professional associations. Current pressures on public finance have heightened the debate on 'value for money', financial transparency and accountability of universities. More stringent and professional financial controls, staff appraisals and efficiency drives are buzzwords in this respect. 'Autonomy as appropriate' summarizes the dilemma existing between
a well-established and strong tradition of institutional, professorially-driven administration and the growing requirements of professional corporate management, challenging established practices.

Conclusion

Over recent years, the traditional system of higher education in Germany has come under increasing pressure from politicians and other parts of society, because of its perceived outdated, inefficient and rigid civil service structure. A changing economic and competitive environment, they claim, should open up the proverbial ‘ivory tower’ and introduce performance-related benefits (such as pay and promotion) and formal appraisals of staff efficiency and productivity, including a more rapid turnover of students. Critics see this as a direct attack, especially by the state, on the delicately balanced, albeit inherently contradictory co-existence of academic independence and self-government, on the one side, and state control and dependence, especially finance, on the other. These pressures are bound to further expose and deepen the engrained divisions amongst academic staff, between those ‘in control’ positions (i.e. the professoriate) and those ‘being controlled’ (i.e. other academic staff). All will eventually be affected by changes in culture and ethics in higher education, including a less hostile approach to collaborating with the private sector and contract research. But the implications are most likely to be harshest for the already less privileged Mittelbau staff. Pressures for productivity gains and flexibility will be felt especially at sub-professorial level although, eventually, this could also have an impact on the professoriate.

Envisaged individual bargaining on pay and conditions locally could lead to higher workloads, or evaluation pressures, but also reward particular skills and achievements. The outcome may be a professoriate differentiated into an elite and the rest, especially those in Fachhochschulen. This would ultimately reverse previous attempts to reduce the division between them and universities and extend job insecurity and flexibility, common throughout the Mittelbau, to the professoriate. Already, there are talks about introducing more part-time and fixed-term contract professorial appointments to respond more flexibly and cost effectively to staffing requirements (MWF NRW 1995). These developments would thus reflect ‘the idealised model through which the changes demanded of higher education have been interpreted’ (Rustin 1994: 178).

Given societal and economic changes over the last decade or so, it is probably right to acknowledge that new systems of management in German higher education are timely because flexibility is ‘consistent with the interests of managers, wanting above all efficient use of resources’ (Rustin 1994: 194). New flexibilities could ultimately include those who traditionally were not affected by old forms of flexibility, thus weakening the power of the German professoriate and its conventionally high status as a professional
group, while leading to growing elitism within it. The result may be a growing differentiation into a less privileged larger group, especially in Fachhochschulen, sharing many disadvantages with the Mittelbau, and an elite, using new contractual arrangements and career flexibilities to further enhance their pre-eminence. The at times tentatively mentioned emergence of an ‘ivy league’ may then well become reality.

References


Ireland: A Two-Tier Structure

Thomas N. Garavan, Patrick Gunnigle
and Michael Morley

In recent years, Irish higher education or 'third-level' education has experienced unprecedented change in terms of its development, role in society and relationships with national, social and economic planning. Concomitantly, Irish universities and other higher education institutions have evolved in line with these changes and challenges. Ireland, a small open economy, is a post-colonial, late industrializing member of the European Union. Part of the UK up until 1922, the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921 created the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) comprising 26 of Ireland's 32 counties. The remaining six counties stayed in the UK, known as Northern Ireland. The Irish Free State became the Republic of Ireland in 1949, joining the European Economic Community in 1973. In 1996, almost a half of the population was under 25 years of age and almost a third was in full-time education. About 95 per cent of the population is Catholic.

The development of higher education

Ireland had a reputation as a centre of learning as far back as the sixth century but it did not establish a university until the creation of the University of Dublin in 1592. This remained Ireland's only institution of higher learning until the middle of the nineteenth century. The next significant development took place in 1835 with the establishment of a Select Committee on Foundation Schools and Education in Ireland. This proposed the establishment of four provincial colleges to help provide third-level education facilities for middle-class Ireland. It envisaged that these colleges would be inter-denominational, non-residential, governed by management committees and offering a curriculum similar to that pioneered by the University of London. In May 1845, a Colleges Bill provided for the establishment of three Queen's Colleges situated in Cork, Galway and Belfast.
The new Queen's colleges, which were non-denominational, opened in October 1849. In 1850 the Queen's University Belfast was established to act as an examining and degree awarding body for the other colleges in Cork (UCC) and Galway (UCG). By 1864, the three colleges had a combined student body of 750. The general consensus is that they never realized their full potential. Opposition to the Queen's colleges came primarily from Irish Catholics, with Rome urging the Catholic hierarchy to set up a purely Catholic university in Ireland. This was formally established in 1854 at St Stephen's Green, Dublin, with an initial enrolment of 20 students and a staff of 17. It came under the control of the Jesuit Order in 1883 and, by then, was known as University College, Dublin (UCD). UCD suffered from a particular problem, that of insufficient endowment, while the Queen's Colleges had not grown in student numbers. The tradition, ethos and structure of the University of Dublin (Trinity College – TCD) was unacceptable to the Catholic Church for educating Catholics. Attempts to establish an overall university structure met with failure and it was not until the Irish Universities Act 1908 that a solution was found.

In general, university education was not highly regarded among the Irish middle class until the twentieth century. Demand for university places was extremely low and, in 1900, there were only 3200 university students. The perception existed that university education was only for the upper class. Yet it was the only group with the financial resources to place its children in the professions. Ireland, like other European countries, also suffered from the prejudice existing in the nineteenth century against the participation of women in university education. Further, they formed only a small minority in senior academic and administrative positions within Irish universities and continue to do so today.

The 1908 Act left the University of Dublin intact and a federal non-denominational National University of Ireland (NUI) was established to enhance the Queen's Colleges at Cork and Galway and an expanded University College in Dublin. The new National University gave recognized status to Maynooth College in 1910. Under the 1908 Act, the state gave an initial capital grant and annual current expenditure grants to the new institutions. In reality, however, state support for universities was limited for the next 40 years, which significantly hindered the development of university education.

By 1960 there was a general recognition that Irish universities and other higher education institutions needed reform. Government set up a commission, which reported in 1967, deploring the lack of a coordinating, planning agency for higher education. It was also critical of the university sector and proposed a range of reforms. In particular, it recommended the dissolution of the NUI and advocated that UCD, UCC and UCG should become independent universities but TCD should continue to operate independently. It also recommended the establishment of a permanent statutory Commission on Higher Education, emphasizing the need to modernize all third-level colleges and make them more democratic. In response, a Higher
Education Authority (HEA) was established on an ad hoc basis in 1968, receiving statutory footing in 1971. In 1971, it presented a major report to government recommending the establishment of two separate universities in Dublin, linked by a conjoint board, and further recommending that Cork and Galway should become independent universities. In December 1974, the Minister for Education announced that he favoured a comprehensive rather than a binary system, which had operated previously, where non-university third-level institutions would be linked for degree-awarding purposes with universities. In 1977 there was a change of government and a reassertion of the binary system.

There were similar developments in the non-university sector. The most significant was the establishment of regional technical colleges (RTCs). Five were opened in 1969 (Carlow, Waterford, Athlone, Dundalk and Sligo), followed by others in Cork, Galway, Letterkenny and Tralee. Two more were established in the 1990s, in Dublin and Limerick. Another form of third-level institution came into existence in Limerick in 1970; the National Institute for Higher Education (NIHE), which shared a site with the National College of Physical Education established in the same year. A bill giving a statutory basis to the Institute was passed in 1980. A similar institute was established in Dublin in 1980. Both institutes became universities in 1987. In Dublin, six higher level colleges under vocational education committees (VECs) were organized in 1978 as the Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT). As a result of the Regional Technical Colleges Act, RTCs became independent entities, separated from VECs in 1992.

Higher education has expanded and developed since the early 1960s and witnessed a significant transformation in its national profile. The participation rate has increased almost ten-fold between 1960 and 1996. In 1960 less than 4 per cent of second-level students participated in higher education. This figure had risen to 43 per cent by 1995. In 1960, 80 per cent of higher education students were in universities, whereas in 1995 they accounted for only 52 per cent of all higher education students. The 1980s and 1990s, in particular, have witnessed a number of significant developments in Irish higher education, including new funding mechanisms based on a unit-cost analysis, modularization, closer links with industry, performance indicators and legislation modifying the nature of a number of higher education institutions, as well as the need to clarify the relationship of higher education with contemporary Irish society.

Current structure of higher education

The Irish government's role in higher education arises as part of its overall goal to achieve economic prosperity, social well-being and quality life for Irish citizens. The links between higher education and the economy have been recognized by successive governments, the social partners (government, employers and unions) and various expert bodies in Ireland. Further, the
Irish economy has changed significantly over the last 30 years. Until the 1960s, it was predominantly agricultural, operating within protected market structures with significant reliance on exports to Britain. Since then, industry, manufacturing and the services sector have ousted agriculture as a major source of employment, with the tertiary sector being particularly strong. Much foreign investment was attracted to Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s, which helped fuel economic expansion. By the early 1980s, however, public and foreign debt had reached dangerously high levels and presented significant government expenditure problems. Cutbacks in public expenditure became a feature of life in subsequent years. Since 1988, the economy has made a significant recovery with annual growth rates of between 2 to 4 per cent, reduced interest rates, low inflation and increased export earnings. But unemployment has remained high and, in 1997, it stood at approximately 16 per cent of the workforce, which is one of the highest in OECD countries.

The last 30 years have also witnessed significant changes in the class and occupational structures. Traditionally, power and status in Ireland were based primarily on property but are now rooted in educational competence and waged employment. O’Connell and Rottman (1992) argue that family resources, linked in with the old proprietorial class structure, facilitated acquisition of the credentials and qualifications governing access to the new class positions in services and industry. Those who, for whatever reasons, fail to obtain their share of the educational spoils are now considered Ireland’s major losers.

There is an almost total reliance on the state for the majority of educational expenditure. Total public expenditure on higher education amounted to US$683 million or 8 per cent of gross national product in 1995. The changing nature of public funding is reflected in proportionate expenditures among sectors. In 1966, primary education accounted for 52 per cent, second-level 30 per cent and third-level 8 per cent. In 1995, the respective proportions were 35 per cent, 44 per cent and 21 per cent. There have been periods of tension between the state and higher education leaders, particularly during periods of spending cutbacks. However, as Coolahan (1993) points out, the modus vivendi has been sustained. Due to high unemployment and a high dependency ratio, significant political pressure is placed on budgetary provision for higher education.

The White Paper on education (Department of Education 1995: 5) articulates a wide range of aims for higher education, demanding considerable diversity of institutions with distinctive functions. These include: promotion of social well-being through pursuing, widening and advancing the intellectual, cultural and artistic accomplishments of society; rigorous, sustained and critical evaluations of the past, the present and the possible futures of society; commitment to the highest standards of research in the various branches of learning; and equipping society with the particular skills and qualities necessary for economic growth and prosperity. The paper emphasizes that the teaching function must seek to impart a body of
advanced knowledge and develop the creative, critical and problem-solving and communicative skills of students. Other objectives cited for higher education include:

- promotion of equality in and through higher education
- recognition of the legitimate authority of third-level institutions
- promotion of the highest standards of educational quality
- achievement and recognition of diversity and balance in third-level educational provision
- development of flexible learning strategies
- continuous development of a framework of accountability for individual institutions and the higher education sector as a whole.

The Minister for Education is responsible for introducing legislation for implementation by the Department of Education. Yet very little legislation exists for higher education since the system largely operates under ministerial regulations reflecting the provisions of the Constitution. The Department also exercises a detailed control function, particularly in budgetary matters, and has an overview function in relation to funded institutions under the Higher Education Authority (HEA). The HEA has statutory responsibility for furthering the development of higher education and assisting in coordinating state investment in it. It also prepares proposals for such investment. In addition, the HEA advises the Minister on the need, or otherwise, for establishing new higher education institutions, on the nature and form of those institutions and on the legislative measures in relation to their establishment or in relation to any existing higher education institution. It is also required to maintain a continuous review of the demand and need for higher education.

Figure 6.1 summarizes the present structure of education in Ireland. Higher education is provided mainly by universities, RTCs and colleges of education. From the mid-1960s, Ireland adopted a binary policy, with the non-university sector focusing on certificates and diplomas and adopting a strong applied emphasis. Universities primarily focused on first and higher degrees. The Green Paper (1992) and White Paper (1995) endorsed the binary system, arguing that it was important that the distinctive missions of the university and the non-university sectors should be maintained. However, a number of other institutions provide specialist education in art, music, medicine and law. There are seven Irish universities: UCD, TCD, Dublin City University (DCU), University of Limerick (UL), UCC, UCG and St Patrick’s College, Maynooth. There are also two Colleges of Technology (COTs) and nine RTCs. All public sector higher education is regulated by the Department of Education, unlike the small, private sector (10 per cent of the total) which has no legislative basis. Traditional universities provide a range of undergraduate and post-graduate programmes in arts, science and technology. Increasingly, undergraduate courses are being modularized or unitized to allow greater flexibility in course structure and student choice.
Since the 1970s, there has been a rapid expansion of applied courses in business and technology to meet growing demands for managerial and technical graduates. This trend is particularly reflected in the establishment of new universities at DCU and UL, whose curricula focus primarily on technical and commercial disciplines. This trend has also resulted in the growth of RTCs with a focus on practical business and technical skills. Currently, almost 60 per cent of higher education students pursue business, engineering or science courses. RTCs offer courses for trade and industry over a broad spectrum of occupations and levels, including business studies, engineering and technology, science and paramedical studies. They provide two-year certificate courses, three-year diploma courses and, in a limited number of areas, four-year degrees awarded by the National Council for Educational Awards (NCEA). In addition to the RTCs, there are a number of other specialist colleges offering courses at third-level.

The Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) is now a single institution comprising the former COTs in Dublin: the Dublin College of Catering and the Colleges of Marketing and Design, Commerce and Music. DIT offers a broad range of courses covering certificated and professional awards.
NCEA validates their courses at certificate and diploma levels. Graduates of some professional or degree-level courses are eligible for the award of the degrees of the University of Dublin. The training of teachers for primary schools (first level) is provided in specialized teacher training colleges which are denominational and privately managed but largely financed by the state. There are four colleges in Dublin (St Patrick’s, Church of Ireland, St Mary’s and Froebel). A fifth, Mary Immaculate College of Education, is located in Limerick.

The number of students participating in third-level education has grown five-fold since 1965, from 18,500 in 1965 to almost 91,000 in 1995. Universities and teacher training colleges account for almost 50,000 students, with RTCs and COTs making up the remainder. This rapid growth reflects increased retention rates at secondary level, changing demographic trends and an increased transfer rate to third-level education. Clancy (1995) calculates that, in 1980, 20 per cent of the age cohort advanced to third-level. By 1995 this had increased to approximately 40 per cent, about half of whom were taking degrees. Figure 6.2 demonstrates the age profile of Irish third-level students. Ireland, like a number of other European countries, such as Denmark, Greece, Spain, France and Portugal, has more women than men in higher education. Women tend to enter higher education younger than men and some subjects are more clearly dominated by women than others. Females tend to choose humanities, religion, fine arts, law, medicine, health and hygiene and teacher training. But women have the lowest rate of representation in engineering, architecture, sciences, transport and mathematics (Clancy 1994; Clancy and Brannick 1990). There is a strong imbalance in terms of representation of students from different socioeconomic groups. Clancy (1995) reports that counties with a higher proportion of the population working in farming had a significantly higher rate of admission to university education. He found this relationship to hold for both males and females but it was stronger in the case of males. He also found that counties with lower incomes per capita had higher rates of admission to

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technological education. This relationship held for both males and females. There is also a tendency for counties with a higher income per capita to have higher rates of admission to university. Likewise counties with a higher proportion of the population whose full-time education ceased at age 20 or over tend to have higher rates of admission to universities. Figure 6.3 presents a breakdown of the socioeconomic status of higher education participants in Ireland.
Ireland: A Two-Tier Structure

Figure 6.4 Institutional and state challenges for third-level education in Ireland

- projected growth in numbers participating in higher education
- increasing diversity in the composition of the student body
- the need to maintain the highest standards of teaching and research
- the need for effectiveness and efficiency at all levels
- the growing social and economic expectations made for higher education
- the competing needs of other educational and social sectors for resources
- the growing public demand for more accountability in publicly funded institutions


The players in higher education

Higher education policy reflects the large growth in student numbers entering the system in the last five years. This policy is expressed in the White Paper (Department of Education 1995: 35): 'to balance institutional autonomy with the needs of public policy and accountability, having due regard to the respective rights and responsibilities of the Institution and the state'. It is based on the philosophy that higher education in Ireland seeks to promote social well-being through the presentation, widening and advancement of the intellectual cultural and artistic accomplishments of society. However, Clancy (1989) argues that a growing utilitarianism has been achieved by a progressive process of state intervention. He also notes a trend towards vocationalism in policy initiatives, suggesting that the provision of higher education has been supply-led rather than demand-led. Figure 6.4 presents some important influences on higher education policy in Ireland in recent years.

Table 6.1 presents the staffing breakdown of academic and non-academic staff in Irish universities for 1996, where it can be seen that non-academic staff make up the larger proportion in most universities. Part-time positions are prevalent among junior academic grades and some administrative grades. Similar trends are evident within RTCs, though statistics for the RTC sector are not published. Academics represent a significant professional group in Ireland. Yet in spite of such significance and their role, both as major educational actors and as agents in implementing educational change, there is little systematic analysis of Irish academics as an occupational group. There is, for example, remarkably little information on the social background of Irish academics. Also a view prevails that the academic profession recruits mainly from the middle classes, whereas non-academic staff come more from farming and urban working-class backgrounds, though not exclusively. In Britain, by contrast, a significantly greater proportion of the
Table 6.1 Full-time and part-time academic and non-academic staff in Irish higher education, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff category</th>
<th>UCD</th>
<th>UCC</th>
<th>UCG</th>
<th>SPM</th>
<th>TCD</th>
<th>UL</th>
<th>DCU</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F/T</td>
<td>P/T</td>
<td>%PT</td>
<td>F/T</td>
<td>P/T</td>
<td>%PT</td>
<td>F/T</td>
<td>P/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President/Provost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President/Vice Provost</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor/Associate Professor</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer grades</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative staff</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other support staff</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total staff</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Higher Education Authority, Ireland.
academic profession is drawn from skilled, semi-skilled and working-class manual backgrounds than in Ireland.

Lynch (1989) posits that academics and teachers in general may have an interest in maintaining the status quo, particularly vis-à-vis traditional status distinctions between mental and manual labour. She points out that if intellectual labour were no longer defined as 'superior' to manual labour, then the basis for academic pay relativities would no longer be legitimated. Nevertheless, academics in Ireland enjoy reasonable high social standing, particularly with the advent of applied fields of study. Further Coolahan (1993) argues that Ireland has not experienced a proletarianization of the academic profession to the degree which has occurred in the UK. While traditionally there was an 'ivory tower' mentality, and questions surrounding the relevance of academia, it is now recognized and appreciated that 'the knowledge and skills of people, coupled with the quality of research and development, have a critical contribution to make to economic competitiveness, prosperity and social cohesion' (Department of Education 1995: 95).

Irish academics are represented by a number of powerful unions, as indicated in Table 6.2. Though published figures for membership and union density are not available, it is estimated that some 95 per cent of academics in public-sector institutions are members of unions, whereas union density in the private sector is less than 25 per cent. The Irish Federation of University Teachers (IFUT) is the body to which most university and training college staff belong. Local staff associations elect representatives to the council and executive of IFUT, which is recognized as a key representative body of university staff opinion by government and the HEA. The union's
agenda in the last five years has consisted primarily of pressing for improved salaries and conditions for its members. It is also active in terms of research, seminars and publications on Irish education policy, particularly higher education policy. Minorities of higher education staff belong to the Teachers Union of Ireland (TUI), which represents lecturing staff in RTCs, and the Worker's Union of Ireland (WUI). Non-academic staff are represented by unions such as the Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU), Irish Municipal Public and Civil Trade Union (IMPACT) and Manufacturing Science and Finance Union (MSFU). Academic unions are powerful in Irish higher education primarily because of their numerical strength and willingness to work collectively to influence educational policy and advance their members' interests. There is a significant consultative dimension to their roles. The TUI has a standing arrangement with the Department of Education to hold monthly meetings on issues of mutual concern. Unions are well represented on committees and review bodies set up to develop policies in higher education. Further, while collective action by trade unions has focused primarily on issues of pay bargaining, they have also bargained over a wide range of other issues and participated in the programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) agreed in 1991.

A number of representative bodies of employers operate within the sector. Some are specific such as the Irish University Registrars and Admission Officers Association, Irish University Administrators Association and Committee of the Heads of Irish Universities. The latter comprises the Presidents/Provosts of various institutions and is a university representative body, advising government and the HEA on educational policy. The Irish Business and Employers' Confederation (IBEC) represents business and employers in all matters relating to industrial relations, labour and social affairs. As the country's major representative of business and employers, IBEC seeks to shape national policies and influence decisions to protect and promote their interests. IBEC represents university interests at national level on issues such as pay and general conditions of employment. It also provides a mediation, conciliation and arbitration service to members on a regional basis.

Structure of the academic profession

The characteristics of the academic labour market in Ireland are not well documented. However, it has specific hiring requirements, where recruitment to particular posts is restricted in terms of qualifications and experience, and academic jobs are high skill specific, in that they demand particular technical or knowledge elements. Relatively fixed criteria for promotion exist and trade unions/professional associations have a significant influence on the organization of work and professional practices. Pay differentials remain relatively constant over time and rigid job demarcations exist, although these have become partly eroded due to academics taking on a
wider range of administrative tasks and duties. Further, academic employment is:

- dominated by a small number of large employers who recruit employees with similar types of job requirements
- a sector which experiences few fluctuations in demand for its services and labour demand over time
- constrained by its service sector characteristics which include intangibility and perishability of output
- traditional in terms of its ceremony, style of operating and customs
- labour intensive and, despite the impact of technology, is unlikely to alter substantially in the near future
- dominated by highly skilled employees who are not readily accessible in the external labour market, where a very high initial qualification standard is demanded and job holders have, at a minimum, a masters qualification and most likely a doctorate in a relevant academic discipline
- a market where more senior academic post-holders need to have an excellent research and publication record in refereed publications
- dominated by pluralist industrial relations traditions and relatively good pay and conditions of employment for staff.

The legal status of academics in Ireland depends on whether they work in the public or private sector. Generally, academics employed in public institutions (90 per cent of the total) are civil servants, while those in the private sector (10 per cent) are not. There is, however, some debate regarding the legal status of private-sector academics in Ireland, with some commentators arguing that they have a special status similar to that of civil servants. Irish higher education employers generally impose a probationary period on academics prior to their definitive appointment, at which point they generally have tenure if they are employed on permanent contracts. The duration of the probationary period, where it is imposed, varies from one institution to another but is generally one year for permanent appointments. In the case of fixed-term appointments, it is not usual to impose a probationary period or, where it is imposed, it is of relatively short duration.

The grading structure of Irish academics depends on whether they work within the university or non-university sectors. Table 6.3 presents the grading structure for both sectors. University and non-university institutions
Table 6.4 Full-time academic staff in Irish universities by gender, 1993–1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>% Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCU</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UL</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynooth</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCD</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCG</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCD</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2332</td>
<td>1845</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


have the same number of job categories. The most significant difference is that RTC staff do not have professorial or associate professorial grades. This is explained in terms of their history and how institutions are managed. The academic profession in Ireland is an ageing one. The number of academics who are over 50 has grown steadily since 1980. Similar trends are evident for the 30 to 39 and 40 to 49 age categories. The proportion of young academics under the age of 30 has fallen considerably. There is also an increasing trend of employing part-time academic and non-academic staff, with part-time and fixed-term contract staff accounting for almost 30 per cent of academic appointments within the university sector. Though the Department of Education does not publish figures for RTCs, research indicates that part-time and fixed-term contract staff account for approximately 25 per cent of academics within that sector too.

The greater proportion of academics are employed in business and engineering, with arts and humanities the next largest category. The trend in RTCs is somewhat different, with arts and humanities accounting for a very small proportion of academic employment. Science and engineering is the largest, followed by business and tourism. In terms of gender, there are some significant trends and Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 present the distribution of academic staff by gender. Though representation of women academics in the university sector has improved in the past decade (from 14 per cent to 20 per cent), they still constitute a very small proportion of full-time staff and are generally found in the lower levels of the academic hierarchy. Indeed, a number of universities do not have any women professors. Furthermore, only 15 per cent of college non-academic staff are women. Smyth (1984, 1995) suggests that women do not participate to any significant degree in the senior decision-making structures of the university system.

In terms of distributions across subject areas, women are concentrated in humanities and social sciences and poorly represented in engineering, architecture, veterinary studies, agriculture and business studies. Within
Ireland: A Two-Tier Structure

Table 6.5 Female full-time academic staff in Irish universities, 1983/84–1993/94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>(295)</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Professor</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Lecturera</td>
<td>(441)</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturerb</td>
<td>(809)</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>(171)</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Lecturer</td>
<td>(141)</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(1779)</td>
<td>2779</td>
<td>(245)</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a Includes statutory Lecturer.  
       b Includes College Lecturer.  

Table 6.6 Gender Distribution of Staff in Regional Technical Colleges 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Lecturer 2</th>
<th>Lecturer 1 permanent</th>
<th>Lecturer 2 &amp; 1 permanent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures represent staff in six RTCs. Figures for the remaining five RTCs were not available.  

RTCs, Burke (1995) reports that women constitute 25 per cent of all academic posts but, again, are poorly represented at senior levels. Research also indicates that there are important differences between male and female academics within universities in terms of qualifications, age, experience and publication records. Mahon (1988) and Smyth (1995) demonstrate that:

- males are more highly qualified than females on the same grades
- women are as likely as male academics to hold a doctorate but have fewer published articles as sole authors
- across all grades, women tend to be older than men
- a greater proportion of male academics are married compared with their female counterparts
- males are more likely to have children than female academics.
Human resources management and the academic profession

Recruitment and selection patterns in Irish higher education institutions demonstrate considerable diversity in terms of criteria, methods and composition of selection panels. Differences also exist between the university and non-university sectors. An academic career is still a relatively attractive one to potential applicants in Ireland, with perhaps business and computer studies being the exception. In the case of the latter disciplines, it is possible to obtain attractive salaries within the private sector. Coolahan (1993) suggests that recruitment has been based predominantly on criteria relating to academic achievement, research expertise and publication record, although the latter is less important in the RTC sector. Expansion in student numbers has brought about a gradual increase in the recruitment of new staff by universities and other higher education institutions over the last decade.

Universities and RTCs have experimented with limited term appointments, special scholarship appointments and Jean Monnet professorships. Furthermore, many postgraduate students are employed in tutorial and demonstration activities and, in some cases, they do a small amount of teaching. There is a relatively strong pool of local talent in certain areas. However, it is common in universities and RTCs to recruit outside Ireland for some specialist and professorial posts. In terms of selection methods, there is great reliance on the panel interview, combined with academic references. RTCs generally require applicants to demonstrate their lecturing ability by giving short presentations or mini-lectures as part of the selection process. A number of universities require applicants for lecturer and professorial positions to make a presentation to members of faculty and are subject to peer review. In some instances, faculty may be asked to vote on the recommendation of a selection panel. It is generally policy in most universities, and RTCs, that the interview panel should consist of at least one female interviewer. Typically, the composition of the panel is the dean, a departmental head, a professor, one or two external assessors in the cognate discipline, a representative from the governing body/senate and a representative from the personnel department. Selection panels are generally set up by heads of department, in consultation with the dean and personnel manager. Selection panels for fixed-term contracts or temporary staff are less elaborate. Approval of appointments for full-time positions are made by the governing body or senate of the respective institution.

Tenure is generally the expectation and eventual realization of a great number of appointees. There is, however, a general trend towards casualizing university teaching. In particular three manifestations of casualization are evident: occasional staff paid an hourly lecture/tutorial fee, with many in this category being female; part-time staff paid a specified proportion of a full-time permanent salary; and full-time temporary staff paid a monthly salary. Unions are concerned that these contracts are being used by employers
as a form of cheap academic labour, especially for the purposes of filling temporary vacancies of permanent staff arising from sabbatical leave, leave of absence, sick leave or deferred filling of permanent posts. Such categories of appointment suffer from lack of tenure and other benefits such as pensions. And there is evidence that they are paid at much lower rates than permanent staff, even though they may have qualifications and experience comparable to those of permanent post-holders and may perform a similar range of duties. It is common practice within the universities that professors, subject to good conduct and proper performance of their duties, hold office until they are 65 years of age. There is a provision in some universities for this period to be extended for a further five years. In the case of lecturers there is a provision in a number of universities that they will hold office for a period of seven years, after which they are eligible for reappointment. This is normally a technicality because it is generally accepted in law that such positions have tenure. However, there are considerable variations in types of employment conditions held by academics, primarily due to the status of the contractual relationship and type of institution. Research undertaken by the IFUT (1996) demonstrates that, on average, academics work 50 hours per week on academic matters, including lecturing, research and other activities. There are, however, variations across institutions, with the average number of contact hours being 192 per year. But 50 per cent of academics work in excess of this and evening teaching is not uncommon.

In terms of work activities, academics indicated that they spent 39 per cent of their time directly on undergraduate teaching, in delivering, preparing and following-up classes. There were variations, however, at different grades, with professors and associate professors spending approximately 30 per cent of their time dealing with undergraduates, increasing to 35 per cent for senior lecturers, 41 per cent for lecturers and college lecturers and as high as 55 per cent for assistant lecturers. Irish academics spend no more than 15 per cent of their time on research; a figure which varies little among grades. Yet many Irish academics believe that their workload is too heavily geared towards lecturing, which is felt particularly keenly among junior grades. Contractually, the time specified for various activities is rarely stated formally. The number of hours is neither fixed nor imposed and depends very much on the subject specialist and nature of the institution. Academics in RTCs have more teaching contact hours than university staff, depending upon whether tutorial support is available or not.

Irish academics are relatively well paid, compared with those in the UK. These pay levels can be explained by the high skill and knowledge specificity demanded of job holders, their qualifications and the influence of trade unions within the sector. Table 6.7 presents salary scales for both university and regional technical college staff. On the employers' side, pay is settled by the HEA in conjunction with the Department of Education, with the Department of Finance having a very significant impact on 'what can be afforded'. Salaries are then negotiated through national pay agreements in which the unions have a major involvement. Salary levels are linked to
principal officer grades in the Irish Civil Service. In the RTC sector, salary levels are set by the Department of Education in conjunction with the Department of Finance, with the unions having an impact on other pay elements such as those outlined in Table 6.8. In general, pay scales for lower level academic posts have at least 12 incremental points. College lecturers and assistant lecturers are more likely to start at point 1 or 2 but there is flexibility to be appointed on higher points, depending on educational qualifications and previous experience. Increments are generally granted annually and are not linked to formal appraisal systems. Academics also receive payments for marking examination scripts, projects and theses. These payments are not always made to senior academics in universities and do not apply to staff in the RTC sector.
In terms of promotion, Coolahan (1993) suggests that national policy within Irish universities is to maintain a 40:60 ratio of senior to junior staff. This is clearly not the case when employment figures for different job categories within universities are analysed. A number of universities have in place promotion mechanisms whereby academic staff at junior level, who have achieved a specified length of service, can apply for promotion to lecturer grade but such mechanisms do not exist for higher grades. In recent years, universities have revised their procedures and criteria for promotion. Research output and publications are particularly significant but there is a tendency in RTCs to put more emphasis on teaching performance, relevant industrial experience and contributions to administration, life of the institution and the community. Women present a particular problem in promotion as, in general, they hold less than 10 per cent of senior appointments within universities and RTCs. A small number of universities have implemented policies to remedy this situation but there is not yet full realization at senior levels that the human resources of universities are impoverished, when the potential of a large section of the academic workforce is under-utilized.

Formal schemes for systematically appraising academic performance do not operate in many universities and not at all in RTCs and COTs. This situation exists even though there is some recognition in Irish universities that the importance placed on research, and the link between teaching and research, are not in themselves sufficient to ensure high teaching quality. There is, however, some scepticism among academics whether performance appraisal systems will enhance the status of the academic profession at all. There is also concern among academic staff unions about the extent to which formal performance appraisal limits the scope and professionalism of academics and might lead to an emphasis on narrow assessment criteria. There is a distinct lack of interest in formal appraisal in the White Paper (Department of Education 1995), which does not give a single mention to the issue. Nevertheless, staff appraisal has been on the agenda of some Irish higher education institutions for a number of years and there are examples of informal, ad hoc procedures and practices throughout the system. Their use is not widespread, however, and this deficiency may well have an adverse impact on commitment to human resources development within the sector. While Irish academics are expected to be highly skilled and be on top of developments in their specialisms, universities do not invest in staff development to the extent demanded by the knowledge explosion taking place in many fields. Few universities and RTCs allocate a budget for staff development activities.

A number of categories of staff development are, however, delivered within Irish universities and other third-level education institutions on ad hoc bases. For example, a number of institutions offer well-targeted training on teaching and associated skills for new appointees. A second category relates to in-career professional development or continuous professional development (CPD). A number of trends are evident here:
• centrally designed CPD initiatives, linked to institutional objectives and priorities such as IT training, equal opportunities and quality initiatives
• some elements of institution-wide schemes for professional development
• greater emphasis on professional development for teaching and learning
• recognition of the need to plan more effectively for CPD by making specific budget allocations for it
• greater scope for sabbaticals, attendance at conferences, peer exchange and opportunities to act as editors of professional journals.

A third category of staff development relates to research expertise. The university sector, in particular, realizes that research must come within the remit of staff development. This manifests itself in a number of ways:

• provision of training in relevant skills of supervision and management, as well as development of appropriate attitudes to research
• development of agreed codes of practice for supervision and provision of training in its implementation
• experienced supervisors acting in mentoring roles to junior staff members before they act on their own
• encouragement of research meetings to exchange experiences and discuss practices with colleagues in other disciplines.

As a result, Irish universities and the HEA have begun to realize that staff development issues are important and steps are being taken to appoint staff with special responsibilities in this area. There have also been initiatives to set up inter-university staff development programmes, providing a range of opportunities in areas such as the management of change in educational establishments, the role of departmental heads and issues relating to strategic management and planning. Some of these are funded by EU grants. Staff development has not, however, taken root in the culture of Irish higher education institutions. Institutions are beginning to take it more seriously, but there are significant gaps vis à vis Ireland’s European neighbours.

The Green and White Papers (Department of Education 1992, 1995) put significant emphasis on strong chief executive, ‘top-down’ styles of management in Irish universities. There is, however, little discussion of structures such as academic councils and faculty boards, which have a long tradition within Irish institutions. The Committee of the Heads of Irish Universities (CHIU) appears to be impatient with bottom-up approaches because of their slowness of action. They advocate more direct, linear management approaches. They are concerned that traditional collegiate mechanisms have been inherited from an era when the scale of university activity was significantly more limited than it is today. Coolahan (1993) argues in favour of the value of rotating leaderships, sabbaticals and the need to give discretionary powers to reward particularly effective staff. He is of the view that these issues have not received sufficient attention in Irish higher education institutions. There is evidence, however, of emerging managerialism in Irish universities. Manifestations include the elevation of financial issues as the guiding
principle of taking operational decisions and the tendency for professional managers to play a more significant role in decision-making. Irish academic unions view the ascendancy of managerialism as fundamentally vitiating the collegial approach which has prevailed in older universities at least. Wall (1996), for example, argues that Irish universities are increasingly obliged to adopt practices which may not enhance educational effectiveness and are required to pursue policies which do not foster educational quality.

Conclusion

Higher education in Ireland is at an interesting stage of its development. It confronts many challenges which are complex, interrelated and, which, in some cases, present competing considerations for policy decisions. There is a recognition of the importance of higher education both from a personal development and socioeconomic perspective. This recognition, however, is set against the realization that constant expansion of higher education has major budgetary implications. Such budgeting constraints have given rise to the need on the part of many institutions to maximize the utilization of existing facilities and capture public and private funding for capital projects. A number of specific issues remain to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Quality management is one issue. The report on the National Education Convention concluded that 'the development of good quality assurance procedures is a central task of management in higher education institutions' (National Education Convention Report 1994: 37). The report, while emphasizing general agreement on the need for quality assurance in higher education, recognizes its problematic nature. Three specific issues are highlighted in the Irish context:

- acceptance among higher education staff of the need for accountability in the use of public funds
- perceived conflict between demands for professional autonomy and institutional accountability
- anxiety that accountability and efficiency should not extend to issues of relinquishing control of academic issues.

The 1995 White Paper envisages that quality auditing systems will focus on the cyclical evaluation of departments and faculties by national and international peers preceded by internal evaluations, coupled with the development of appropriate performance indicators using national and international comparisons. There has, however, been little attempt, as yet, to formalize these procedures.

Traditionally, Irish universities have concentrated on undergraduate and postgraduate teaching. In recent years, research has become more important, with expenditure on research increasing in real terms by 200 per cent between 1985 and 1995. There is no explicit national policy on research funding in third-level education, although the government has requested
that each institution should develop and publish an explicit policy on its approach to research, including an emphasis on achieving a balance between research and teaching within subject disciplines.

A major issue in Irish higher education at the present time is that universities are about to enter a period of major reform. The Government published the University Bill in 1997, followed by an Act. This legislation seeks to clarify the constitution of Irish universities, as well as setting out provisions relating to control and public reporting and appropriate sanctions for non-conformance. There is also a stronger role envisaged for the HEA in monitoring compliance with the law and specific provisions dealing with the dissolution of governing bodies and dismissal of presidents and provosts. The Act redesignates UCC, UCG, UCD and the NUI recognized college at St Patrick's College Maynooth as universities in their own right. The Government argues that it is trying to balance the substantial autonomy which universities presently have in the management of their affairs, with transparency in those affairs and accountability to the communities which they serve. The Act has, however, engendered a hostile response from higher education stakeholders. While there is a welcome for some of its provisions and recognition of the importance of autonomy for the success of universities, there is concern about an inappropriate dichotomy being created between the needs for autonomy and the needs of public policy. The concern is that, in effect, autonomy is part of the public interest and, as such, universities only exercise their proper role if they have that autonomy. There is major concern that the legislation will place unacceptable restrictions on university independence in taking academic decisions. Also the legislation appears to have major implications for the terms and conditions of employment of existing academic staff.

The debate on the legislation brings into view the issue of the role of the university in Irish society. It highlights that Irish universities are now expected to act as centres for applied research and development and assist industry in overcoming its technical problems. Universities and colleges are expected to respond to shortages or surpluses in the supply of particular skills and are urged to assist in redressing societal ills in making provision for educating groups who are physically or otherwise disabled. Modern university structures must be able to make appropriate responses to these demands, while preserving their essential mission to act as centres for celebrating intellectual life in the community and the production of graduates, educated to the highest level and imbued with an open-minded respect for learning, and willingness to make contributions as members of society.

As to the academic profession, there is clear evidence of a two-tier professional structure in Ireland. Despite recent changes in the infrastructure of higher education in Ireland, the perception exists, at both the psychological and social levels, that university academics have higher status than academic staff in RTCs, COTs and the private sector. University teachers generally have better pay and conditions and more flexibility in terms of working, as well as the possibility of tenure. Academics outside universities,
in contrast, generally have lower pay, teach more hours per week and do not have tenure, even though they are protected by unfair dismissals legislation. This two-tier structure, which has existed for a considerable time, persists, despite recent narrowing of the gap in terms of academic pay and conditions.

References


After unification of the country in 1861, Italy found itself in the curious position of having both an illiteracy rate and a university attendance rate among the highest in Europe. The excessive production of graduates created a marked imbalance between the supply of and demand for qualified personnel (Barbagli 1982; Cammelli 1995). From this period dates a regular criticism that universities were inefficient, excessive in numbers and too costly to run. In 1861, Italy had 19 universities and six institutes of higher education, with a total student population of 9436. In comparative terms, this meant that there was one university student for every 170 contemporaries in the same age bracket, or 613 students per 100,000 of 20–24 year-olds, or 43.3 students per 100,000 inhabitants. University opportunities were better in the North (with attendance at 48.4 per 100,000 inhabitants) than in the South (40.6) and much better than in the Centre (37.7). By 1871, the rate of university attendance had fallen to 531 students per 100,000 of 20–24 year-olds but by 1910–11 the total university population had grown to 26,682. During the same period illiteracy rates for the country were high, at 60 per cent in the North, 78 per cent in the Centre and 87 per cent in the South.

The problem confronting Italian society in the late nineteenth century was how to remedy a situation where levels of university education were below European levels, yet high when compared against the country’s still rudimentary system of primary education (Cammelli 1995). The response of the ruling class was gradually to restrict access to university education, first, by increasing fees, then, by introducing strict entry requirements and, finally, by controlling progression through ever more demanding academic standards. This attitude resulted in marked social inequalities in effective access to university education which were to persist for several decades (Cammelli 1995).
Current structure of higher education

Major change in the Italian education system was not to occur until the 1960s. In 1962, the middle school system (11–14, the scuola media inferiore) was unified and the school-leaving age raised to 14, where it has remained ever since. This resulted in a doubling of the number of pupils between 1959 and 1969 and the creation of a mass education system with far more pupils aspiring to secondary (scuola media superiore) and university education. In 1961 access to university science faculties was opened up to graduates from technical institutes and in 1965 university entrance examinations were abolished. Between 1960 and 1968, the number of university students almost doubled, from 268,000 to over 450,000 (Ginsborg 1990). However, the system was quite inadequate to deal with this expansion. There were too few university teachers and they were rarely at work. The formal requirement was for a university professor to give only 52 hours of lectures per year. Many professors exercised separate and independent professional lives as lawyers, architects, doctors and politicians. There were no seminars or tutorials and little staff–student contact. Virtually the only form of assessment was through an oral interrogation which was often arbitrary and subject to no objective control. The system became overcrowded and this led to widespread demoralization and frustration. The result was the explosion of student and worker protest in 1967–69.

The student revolt began in autumn 1967 at the University of Trento, founded in 1962 by Catholic intellectuals on the left of the Christian Democratic Party, in the faculty of social sciences – at the time the only such faculty in Italy – and quickly spread, first, to the private Catholic University in Milan and then to Turin. The main focus of the protest was Education Minister Luigi Gui’s proposals for university reform, by reintroducing restricted entry and introducing a hierarchy of awards, ranging from a one-year diploma through to a full degree. It is significant that the teaching body for the most part refused to join with the students in their protest, unlike what was later to happen in France. The rebellion became briefly violent in February 1968 after the battle for the architecture faculty in Rome (the so-called battle of Valle Giulia) but it proved impossible to maintain the level of commitment and intensity beyond the spring. In fact, the focus of unrest shifted quickly from the universities to the factories, where great victories were won – what Ginsborg (1990) proclaims a minor cultural revolution – but very few changes occurred in universities.

In 1969 (law 910/69), all university faculties were opened up to access from all secondary schools, not just the classical grammar schools (licei classici), on the misguided principle that any student could sign up for any faculty regardless of what subjects they had studied at school. This was and continues to be a major cause of one of the major structural defects of the Italian university system: the high drop-out rate among first year students. Reform also failed to achieve its major social objective of transforming the class structure of the university population. Throughout the 1970s, Italy
had about one million university students, with about 30 per cent of school leavers going on to university. Of these, only 15 per cent were from peasant or working-class families and over 50 per cent were children from professional, business or white-collar families (Acquaviva and Santuccio 1976; King 1987).

In 1996, Italy had 46 public universities, which had a further 35 subsidiary colleges or sedi distaccate in other towns. There are three polytechnics (Bari, Milan and Turin), seven university institutes and a further eight physical education colleges. There are a small number of private universities including the Bocconi (business school in Milan), Catholic universities (the Sacro Cuore in Milan and the Maria SS. Assunta in Rome) and the LUISS (Libera Università Internazionale Scienze Sociali – social sciences) in Rome. There are also two universities for foreigners at Perugia and Siena (De Mauro 1996). Some of these universities are very large: Rome's La Sapienza University, for example, has over 200,000 registered students. Eighty per cent of Italy's university students are registered at just eight universities.

By 1992-93, the university student population had grown to over 1.5 million but still some 65-70 per cent of those enrolling fail to graduate (Barbagli 1994). The most likely to drop out are those whose parents have a low level of education, and who went to technical or professional high schools. Registration fees (tasse di iscrizione) in the past were much lower in Italy than elsewhere; the average cost of annual instruction being approximately US$400 which covers just 9 per cent of actual cost (Barbagli 1994: the figures relate to the period 1992-93). Since the majority of students continue to come from the middle and upper middle classes, this means that the state is providing a service at considerably below cost price and subsidizing the education of those social classes who are best able to pay for it themselves. Fees have gone up recently, with the suggested maximum fixed at US$888, although some universities such as the state University and Polytechnic in Milan charge up to twice this amount. This has undoubtedly had an impact on first year registrations which saw a dramatic decline between 1993-94 and 1994-95 (see Table 7.3).

Table 7.1 shows the steady and substantial growth of higher education in Italy in the 1990s. However, what is offered by Italian higher education is basically a university degree or nothing. Although it has been possible since 1992, under law 341/90 and the subsequent ministerial decree of 31 January 1992, to study for a university diploma (diploma universitario, sometimes referred to as a laurea breve or short degree), early experience of these diplomas has been mixed. The diploma was supposed to provide shorter, more vocationally-oriented programmes of study and, with student numbers capped, access on a competitive basis. In 1992, 9869 places were available on 208 courses in 44 universities, in 31 different subject areas. There were 16,112 applications but only 8187 registrations and 17 per cent of places were left unfilled (CENSIS 1994). Two explanations seem possible: first, that entry standards were set too high; second, that some students who
Table 7.1 Supply and demand for university education in Italy, 1989–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic year</th>
<th>University faculties</th>
<th>Total students</th>
<th>First year students</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
<th>Diplomates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Academic staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989–90</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>1,291,991</td>
<td>299,841</td>
<td>84,036</td>
<td>3,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–91</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>1,381,361</td>
<td>322,854</td>
<td>85,811</td>
<td>3,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–92</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>1,474,719</td>
<td>341,722</td>
<td>87,212</td>
<td>3,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>1,564,569</td>
<td>361,927</td>
<td>90,113</td>
<td>6,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–94</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1,574,358</td>
<td>353,739</td>
<td>92,539</td>
<td>6,422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n.d. = no data.

were offered places turned them down because of fears of the acceptability of the qualification with potential employers. It is too early to judge the success of the university diploma in achieving the objectives of mitigating the effects of the massification of higher education and providing more vocationally-oriented pathways through it (De Mucci and Sorcioni 1996). The main criticism of the university diploma is that, despite its more vocational orientation, it is still running in series with the traditional degree, whereas the system really needs new qualifications – and curricula – to run in parallel. Many commentators (Barbagli 1994; De Mucci and Sorcioni 1996; Simone 1994) see obvious links with the long-overdue reform of the secondary school system.

University students in Italy are formally registered as in corso for the nominal (minimum) duration of their course – four years in most disciplines, six in medicine. In fact, it is very rare for a student to complete a course within the nominal registration period. Few attempt to do so, most opting typically to take three or four (out of six) courses per year. Students who fail examinations simply represent themselves at the next sitting until they pass. There is no restriction on the number of occasions on which a student may be examined in the same subject. At the end of the nominal registration period, students may continue to study but are registered as fuori corso. The proportion of students graduating fuori corso (i.e. outside the nominal registration period) in 1992 ranged from 75 per cent in medicine to 95 per cent in agriculture, with the sector average standing at 86 per cent.

Table 7.2 shows the decline in staff–student ratios (SSRs) accompanying the expansion of the sector. Although participation and matriculation rates have gone up, completion rates have declined alongside SSRs. Table 7.3 shows the total number of students registered according to broad subject categories. A spectacular feature of this table is the 16 per cent overall decline in first-year registrations between 1993–94 and 1994–95. Prior to this fairly uniform collapse, the traditionally popular subject areas of
humanities, law and engineering had appeared strong and were expanding faster than the sector average, whereas science (which includes mathematical, physical and natural sciences), and especially medicine, were in rapid decline. Table 7.4 shows that the impact of expansion and redistribution of student numbers among subject groupings has not been reflected in SSRs. Medicine, despite its rapid decline in popularity, continues to enjoy the best SSRs but all science disciplines are better than the sector average. This has had little beneficial impact, however, on the student body who remain impervious to the attractions of scientific education and research.

Tables 7.4 and 7.5 together show a broadly positive correlation between SSRs and completion rates. Medicine has a relatively high completion rate to match its very favourable staff-student ratio and the sciences generally perform above the sector average. Engineering performs rather worse than could be expected but the real anomaly is law, where completion rates are about average despite a staggering SSR of 1:92. Table 7.4 on SSRs hides enormous variations across the system. For example, the Law Faculty of Rome La Sapienza University has 31,000 students and 80 members of staff (SSR of 1:387.5). Completion rates and SSRs tell only part of the story. Matilde Callari Galli (cited in Simone 1994) observes that in 1988–89 two million examinations were taken. Assuming that a ‘real’ student would do a minimum of four exams per year (out of a maximum of six) that means that there were 500,000 real students, whereas the registered student population for that year was 1.2 million. De Mucci and Sorcioni (1996) make the telling point that the university system as a whole produces only 1.7 graduates per year per member of academic staff employed (see also Table 7.2). Finally, Table 7.6 shows the decline in the resources available to the higher education sector since 1990. At the typical exchange rate of 1700 lire to the US$, the annual per capita expenditure declined in real terms over the five years 1990–94 from US$4950 to US$3525, or by some 30 per cent.
Table 7.3  Total student numbers (*in corso* and *fuori corso*) by course groupings in Italy, 1989–94

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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>253,042</td>
<td>272,152</td>
<td>289,253</td>
<td>308,988</td>
<td>320,396</td>
<td>278,456</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>209,797</td>
<td>228,807</td>
<td>244,446</td>
<td>262,142</td>
<td>287,219</td>
<td>240,627</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>-16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>210,654</td>
<td>231,874</td>
<td>256,669</td>
<td>267,657</td>
<td>280,461</td>
<td>228,396</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>215,811</td>
<td>237,457</td>
<td>256,705</td>
<td>263,902</td>
<td>269,314</td>
<td>231,706</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>152,205</td>
<td>160,434</td>
<td>169,966</td>
<td>174,702</td>
<td>179,324</td>
<td>144,152</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
<td>-19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc science</td>
<td>102,877</td>
<td>112,554</td>
<td>125,432</td>
<td>129,188</td>
<td>131,910</td>
<td>108,182</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>92,301</td>
<td>84,598</td>
<td>78,875</td>
<td>80,707</td>
<td>74,217</td>
<td>60,088</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-29.0</td>
<td>-19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>31,688</td>
<td>31,075</td>
<td>31,323</td>
<td>31,588</td>
<td>32,517</td>
<td>31,140</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,291,991</td>
<td>1,381,361</td>
<td>1,474,719</td>
<td>1,564,569</td>
<td>1,627,150</td>
<td>1,322,203</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n.d. = no data.
Table 7.4 Staff–student ratios by faculty in Italy, 1989–94

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary</td>
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<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
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<td>15.8</td>
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<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<td>22.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>24.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.7</td>
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<td>50.6</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social science</td>
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<td>47.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
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<td>54.2</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>20.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>101.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * categories re-adjusted 1994–95.

Table 7.5 Completion rates for groups of courses in Italy, by numbers of graduates per 100 matriculates five years previously

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course groupings</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicine*</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social science</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * numbers for medicine refer to matriculates from 7 years previously.

The players in higher education

Throughout the postwar period the university sector, along with public administration, the postal and telephone systems, health care and most public services, have been characterized as 'marvels of inefficiency' (Spotts and Weiser 1986). The Italian university system is highly centralized, in the
Table 7.6 The financing of Italian higher education, 1990–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>4418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4.42</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5.38</td>
<td>3662</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<td>3372</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>3140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CENSIS (1994).

sense that it is built on top of a state system which has a tradition and ideology of administrative centralization. De Mucci and Sorcioni (1996) identify some structural differences distinguishing Italian higher education from that of other OECD countries:

- Low levels of public and private investment in education – Italy's total investment in education at 5.1 per cent of GNP in 1992 is below the OECD average of 6.5 per cent, with only 0.8 per cent of GNP being spent on higher education, compared with the OECD average of 1.7 per cent. In practical terms, this puts Italy third from bottom of the OECD table for expenditure per university student, at US$5850, compared with the UK's top of the table US$16,058.

- Lack of private investment in higher education. Only 12 per cent of higher education funding in Italy comes from non-government sources, compared with 22 per cent for the UK.

- Strong bias towards primary education in the overall allocation of public funds to education as a whole. Whereas France spends 2.5 times as much on tertiary as on primary education, and the UK spends three times as much, Italy spends only 1.45 times as much.

- Absence of a well-developed non-university higher education sector. Tertiary education in Europe is generally of three types: academic (university), vocational and general. In Italy, the last two are very underdeveloped. This means that the university system as it has expanded has been swamped by students many of whom do not want what is offered. They are there because there is nowhere else to go. This in large measure explains the very high non-completion rates in Italy, which have risen from 50 per cent in the 1970s to 65 per cent in the 1990s, over a period when enrolments have trebled.

- Very low numbers of science students and graduates. In 1992, only 17 per cent of Italian graduates came from science disciplines, compared with 29 per cent in the UK and 33 per cent in Germany. More significant is the number of science graduates in the population as a whole. In the same year, Italy had 187 science graduates per 100,000 25–34 year-olds,
compared with Germany’s 650 and the UK’s 989. The implications of this for Italy’s research and development potential in science and technology are obvious.

The Italian university system operates within a specific legal framework and this has been subject to considerable change since 1989 (CENSIS 1994; De Mauro 1996), especially under Education Minister Ruberti (1989–92). Law 168/89 established the right to statutory autonomy for universities, promised in the 1948 Constitution but never enacted. Since 1989, new universities have been established, new faculties constituted (psychology, sociology and statistics) and new degree courses set up (information science, communication science, education, and oriental languages and civilizations). However, very few universities have actually written their own constitutions as the law allows. In this, as in many other instances, opportunities for radical reform provided by the Ruberti laws have been largely ignored by the academic community (De Mauro in Simone 1995).

Law 341/90 allowed universities to make new awards, most importantly the three-year university diploma and research doctorate. It also required universities to set up tutorial systems, on the English model, to provide students with advice on study skills, remedial support and counselling on study pathways, on both academic and non-academic aspects of university life, as well as support facilities such as libraries and study abroad opportunities. It was left to individual universities to implement the tutorial system in the way they saw fit and this has led to very patchy implementation. 341/90 also established the Consiglio Universitario Nazionale (CUN – National University Council) to advise the Ministry on university matters. The CUN consists of elected members of the academic community. Finally, 341/90 provides for institutional accountability by requiring universities to report on their activities, such as context, resources, processes and products, using a range of standard performance indicators. This part of the law, however, has remained largely a dead letter (De Mucci and Sorcioni 1996).

Law 390/91, among other things, aimed at reforming financial and administrative support for students exercising their right to study. It gave greater responsibilities to the boards (variously called enti, istituti or agenzie) set up in 1983 under regional authority control to administer student grants and loans. The transfer of administration of grants and loans to regional authority control led to considerable confusion and inefficiency and, by 1996, not all regions had introduced appropriate structures. A presidential decree of 1994 established the maximum value of the student grant (in money and services) at US$2400 for students studying from home or US$4160 for students at university more than 25 kilometres from their home. The grant is means-tested. Law 245/91 regulates the establishment of new universities or faculties and the expansion of existing ones. Law 537/93 made a number of provisions relating to the financial autonomy of universities, their organizational structures and registration fees. It also provided for a system of institutional accountability which still remains to be enacted.
From this outline description of recent legal activity, it is clear that there is no lack of political interest in the university system, or of will to reform it. For the most part, however, these laws have failed to have any significant impact on the system. First, no new resources have been made available. It may be that reforms such as the tutorial system and university diploma could be introduced by refocusing existing resources but not without some major restructuring and re-training of staff, for whom there is little or no incentive to change or take on new responsibilities. Second, and more importantly, the system seems to lack the will or ability to manage innovation in a strategic way. Laws are passed with no reference to overall objectives, with no provision for resourcing and with no time frames or systems for verification. The laws introduced between 1989 and 1991 have had little impact on the quality of either teaching or research, because the inadequacies of the system are too deep-rooted. The main problems are the inadequacies of the organizational structure of Italian universities and the socio-psychological make-up of the teaching body (CENSIS 1994; Simone 1994).

Structure of the academic profession and human resources management

The current structure of the academic profession was established in 1980 by law 382/80. There are three grades: professori di prima fascia who are often referred to as professori ordinari (full professors), professori di seconda fascia or professori associati (associate professors) and ricercatori (researchers). Both ordinari and associati are tenured positions with similar teaching and research responsibilities, though ordinari have higher status and salary and may have additional administrative responsibilities. Associati may not be elected principal (Rettore) or head of department. The numbers of academic staff employed within these grades are illustrated in Table 7.7. The minimum qualification for appointment to a university teaching or research post is the laurea (first degree) since, until recently, Italy had no equivalent to a PhD. It now has a dottorato, or doctorate, which may be awarded on successful completion of two years full-time postgraduate research. A fixed number of doctoral posts is available each year but rather than being a source of additional income for institutions, they are a financial drain since each post attracts a grant and is subject to the usual process of tortuous public competition. Winners are formally forbidden from undertaking teaching but in practice doctoral students often become personal assistants to professors, ending up teaching for nothing. The dottorato has little social or educational value and students doing a doctorate usually do so as a way of waiting in line until a research post becomes available.

The proportion of total resources absorbed by staff costs is close to the OECD average of 60 per cent (OECD 1995) but this is not reflected in an even (or rational) distribution among faculties within universities (see Tables 7.4 and 7.7). These tables show wide discrepancies among faculties
Table 7.7: Academic staff in Italy by faculty, 1994–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>Prof ordinari</th>
<th>Prof associati</th>
<th>Researchers</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ordinari per 100 researchers</th>
<th>Ordinari per 100 associati</th>
<th>Associati per 100 researchers</th>
<th>Researchers (%)</th>
<th>Others (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>2,294</td>
<td>3,254</td>
<td>2,358</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>8,584</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>138.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>121.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
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<td>4,044</td>
<td>4,216</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>13,058</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>1,922</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>6,763</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>114.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>664</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>274</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>124.0</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>394</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social science</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>877</td>
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<td>595</td>
<td>2,951</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>205.9</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
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<td>1,844</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>6,805</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>78.5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>555</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
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<td>Others</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>6,257</td>
<td>139.6</td>
<td>145.6</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,988</td>
<td>16,669</td>
<td>17,061</td>
<td>9,334</td>
<td>57,052</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

both in SSRs and in relationships among the three basic professional grades. The combination of the current centralized system of appointment, lack of central planning of supply and limited autonomy of institutions in the management of financial resources bode ill for the resolution of imbalances in the system.

The appointments process and procedures for ordinari and associati are highly centralized. Individual faculties notify the Ministry of Education of vacancies. The Ministry then organizes a national selection procedure (concorso pubblico) for each disciplinary area. Candidates submit a curriculum vitae and may be required to sit a written examination or give a public lecture at short notice. A national selection committee is elected from university professors in the discipline and the final selection panel is chosen by lot. A list of successful candidates is arrived at on the basis of those who will best preserve, promote and develop the discipline. The panel then proceeds to distribute posts among those faculties who have published vacancies. A faculty may not reject a candidate, nor may a candidate reject a faculty. Promotion from associato to ordinario is through the same procedure. Researchers are appointed directly by the faculty concerned on the basis of a competitive examination and on the advice of a panel of three professors: two ordinari (one of whom is internal to the faculty) and one associato. Temporary staff are appointed directly by the faculty concerned. In 1994, there were some 7000 contract lecturers to whom a significant part of the teaching load is entrusted. This large low-cost reserve army of labour is set to grow if and when universities increase their autonomy and as financial resources decline.

In Italy, as in most university systems, university teachers are considered public employees. Their responsibilities formally include teaching, examining, tutoring, research and administration. According to the educational reform of 1980, professors are required to be on university premises for 350 hours per year (6-7 hours per week). The minimum obligation is to deliver one course per year (three teaching contact hours per week). Many do only the minimum. Academic staff are formally required to submit an account of their activities to the rector every three years but there are no sanctions which can be applied to staff who are under-performing, nor any system of rewards for outstanding contributions and the requirement is largely ignored (Simone 1994). University academic staff from any of the three grades cannot be dismissed. This prerogative was preserved even after the law was changed in 1993 to make it possible for all other types of public servant to be dismissed. In fact, the first draft of the decree provided protection only for ordinari but it was extended to all academic grades after extensive lobbying. The academics were assisted in this by their long-standing association with two other powerful lobby groups: top civil servants and senior military personnel who were also exempted from the reform. The employment conditions and salaries of these groups are closely linked.

Pay scales of academic staff are linked by formula to the pay scales of top civil servants and senior military personnel which are determined by a
Table 7.8  Pay scales for academic staff in Italy, 1996 – gross annual pay (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point on scale</th>
<th>Researchers/Assistants</th>
<th>Associati</th>
<th>Ordinari</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td>25,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>14,050</td>
<td>19,700</td>
<td>27,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>15,100</td>
<td>21,170</td>
<td>29,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>22,600</td>
<td>31,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>17,100</td>
<td>24,050</td>
<td>33,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td>25,550</td>
<td>36,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>19,300</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>28,600</td>
<td>40,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>42,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>22,800</td>
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<td>44,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>23,900</td>
<td>33,400</td>
<td>47,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
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<td>35,050</td>
<td>49,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>26,200</td>
<td>36,700</td>
<td>51,650</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>27,350</td>
<td>38,300</td>
<td>53,950</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>39,950</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/1</td>
<td>29,250</td>
<td>40,950</td>
<td>57,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/2</td>
<td>29,950</td>
<td>41,900</td>
<td>58,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tabelle delle Retribuzioni dei Docenti Universitari, 29.2.96.

national pay review body. The average salary of a full professor in 1995 was US$48,000 to US$56,000. Pay is related to seniority, both age and rank, as well as to qualifications, and is the same for all academic disciplines. Academic staff receive biennial pay increments irrespective of their performance (see Table 7.8). All new appointees are required to complete a three-year probationary period before their permanent appointment is confirmed. Once confirmed, appointments are tenured until the normal retirement age which is 65 years of age or after 35 years of service. Ordinari may extend their appointments for a further five years beyond 65 but without further teaching duties. Researchers, a term which is somewhat of a misnomer since this is the entry level for an academic career, receive salaries of US$1600-US$2560 net per month, for which they have a maximum attendance requirement of three hours per week. Researchers are not responsible to an individual senior academic but to the faculty as a whole. Technically, researchers should not teach courses on their own but in practice there is little difference between the lowest grade on the academic scale and the other two.

Every 10 years both professors and researchers are entitled to two years' sabbatical leave (Simone 1994). Yet despite this, research output from Italian universities is among the lowest in the world. In 1990, shortly after its constitution, the Ministry for the University and Scientific and Technological Research (MURST 1991) reported that Italy occupied thirteenth place in the OECD research publications league, producing less than one research
publication per member of staff per year. The age profile of academic staff is a cause of some concern. Large-scale recruitment took place between 1967 and 1975 but this was reduced to a trickle in the 1980s. In 1995, the average age of ordinari was 61–62, of associati 55 and of researchers 46–50. Thus in the next 15–20 years, 80 per cent of professors and 50 per cent of researchers will be retiring, posing enormous problems for recruitment and integration into the system (De Mucci and Sorcioni 1996).

One source of great contention in the university system over the past few years has been the treatment of foreign language assistants (lettori). The lettori have alleged discrimination since they have been refused tenured status and the right to apply for supply teaching posts, despite the fact that they carry out duties including examining which are similar to those of Italian permanent staff but at a much reduced salary. The disputes have led to wholesale sackings of lettori at a number of universities including Bologna and Verona. The cases have been referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which has ruled against the Italian universities. In February 1997, the Italian government was invited by the European Parliament to explain why it had failed to comply with ECJ decisions. Its response was to claim that the selection procedures for lettori were governed by private law and were less rigorous than the public competitions for the permanent positions of researcher and professor and that, therefore, tenure for these positions was inappropriate. Giving lettori tenured status, without putting them through public examination, would, in the view of the government, constitute discrimination against all those who has spent years trying to achieve tenured status through the normal channels. The case continues.

Trade unions are currently weak and exercise little influence over wages or working conditions in universities. The three major national trade union confederations (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro – CGIL, Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori – CISL and Unione Italiana del Lavoro – UIL) all have university sectors but these are supposed to represent all categories of workers and end up representing none effectively. There are also a number of small, independent unions for academics such as the Coordinamento Intersedi Professori Universitari di Ruolo – CIPUR and the Unione Sindacale dei Professori di Ruolo, which are also largely ineffectual and have no bargaining rights.

In fact, academics have no need for trade unions to protect their salaries and working conditions, since these are already extremely well-protected by their linkage with those of senior civil servants and military personnel. Academics have also traditionally enjoyed close links with government, often being appointed to key positions in the public sector, and can therefore exert considerable lobbying pressure directly on their paymasters. University professors often play key roles in government. In the Amato cabinet (1992–93), the Prime Minister himself and the ministers of defence, industry, social affairs and the treasury were all academics. In the Ciampi cabinet which followed, 14 out of 24 ministers were university professors and numerous others were appointed to head various state or quasi-state organizations.
The prime minister in 1997, Romano Prodi, is himself a professor of economics at Bologna University and, between 1982 and 1989, headed IRI – *Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale* – Italy’s massive state holding company and one of the largest industrial concerns in Europe. The direct lobbying power of academics and their ability to exert corporatist influence in the defence of their position cannot be underestimated. Their only defeat in this area came with the reform of the civil service in 1993, when professors elected to parliament were obliged to renounce their academic salary (previously they had continued to receive two salaries).

**Managing universities**

The management structure of Italian universities, as established by law 382/80, is highly democratic. The head of the institution (*Rettore*) is elected by the body of academic staff every three years. The rector chairs the administrative board (*Consiglio di Amministrazione*) and senate (*Senato Accademico*). Senate is composed of Deans (*Presidi*) of faculties, themselves elected on a triennial basis, plus the head of administration (*direttore amministrativo*). The head of administration is appointed directly by the Minister of Education, thereby limiting the effective autonomy of the university. The administrative board consists of elected representatives of academic, research and non-teaching staff, student representatives and the head of administration. It also has nominated members such as those from local and regional authorities, chambers of commerce and a *Pro-Rettore* nominated by the *Rettore* and appointed by the Ministry. The administrative board manages all aspects of university life, particularly the budget.

Each faculty has a faculty board (*Consiglio di Facoltà*) consisting of all teaching staff (*ordinari* and *associati*) plus representatives of researchers and students. Faculty boards make requests for new staff, approve course proposals or modifications of courses and allocate the budget between teaching and research activities. In larger universities, faculty board may consist of 100 members or more. Members are generally ill-informed and have insufficient time to consider the issues before them and many decisions are made almost arbitrarily (Simone 1994). Each faculty has a secretariat (*Segreteria*) outside whose office long queues form at regular intervals such as annual registration for each course, for examinations, for payment of fees and for requests for certificates. De Mauro (1996) comments laconically that every faculty also has an ancient janitor (*bidello*) who knows far more about the functioning of faculty than any secretariat. The traditional working day for administrative personnel in the public sector in Italy used to be 08.00–14.00 on week days and 08.00–12.00 on Saturdays. Thus it was not unusual to find universities, as well as other public offices, with no administrative, technical or secretarial staff in the afternoons. A government decree of 1993 provided for a change in working hours for all public services to 09.00–17.00 on week days, with no requirement to attend on
Saturdays. There are large numbers of dedicated and professional support staff but there are also many who continue to abuse a system where there are no systems to check work done, reprimand poor workers or reward good ones (Simone 1994).

Each degree course has a board of studies (Consiglio di Corso di Laurea) consisting of all staff teaching on the course, plus representatives of researchers and students. The chair of the board (Presidente) is elected every three years. Departments also exist, their main focus being research. While in theory they may cut across faculties, in fact they rarely do so. The university reform of 1980, which constituted departments, seemed to have had in mind that faculties would eventually disappear but the latter have refused to give up their major prerogative of applying for and distributing teaching posts. Thus faculties are now responsible for teaching and departments for research but there is little communication, and often tension, between them (Simone 1994).

The educational reform law (382/80) placed extreme emphasis on elective mechanisms and democratic control of institutions. This was supposed to reduce and eliminate one of the historical maladies of the Italian system – the abuse of power and position by professorial barons. However, what it actually achieved was to remove any possibility for effective decision-making. For example, a Rettore cannot exercise general delegated executive authority but only specific authority for individual decisions taken by the Consiglio di Amministrazione. Senate and the Consiglio partly duplicate each other’s activities but there is no formal or necessary communication between them, except that each is chaired by the Rettore and they are often at loggerheads. Senate in particular lacks decision-making power and representativeness since departments, and thereby the research function, are not represented on it. Decisions take a long time to make and are almost impossible to convert into action. The main weakness of the electoral system is that it is impossible for elected officials to take difficult or unpopular decisions, for fear of being voted out of office. With democracy come elections and, with elections, the panoply of electoral pacts and exchanges of favours which have been so common in Italian public life in general. Electoral activities also take up an inordinate amount of time and effort. However, elected posts are not without their attractions. To be elected means to have status and some power, at least of patronage. To become elected, a candidate must show sensitivity to political balance, an interest in the needs of the electorate and a willingness to work on their behalf. And not too much desire for change (Simone 1994).

In the 1970s, the number of universities grew from about 30 to over 50. This created an enormous demand for university teachers. Since appointment procedures were so cumbersome and slow, many universities resorted to the expedient of appointing new staff on one-year contracts, known as professori incaricati. Initially, such staff appointed on short-term contracts were required to have a libera docenza – a sort of teaching qualification based on their curriculum vitae, a list of publications and a public lecture delivered.
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at 24 hours' notice. The system was abused during the late 1960s when the title was bought and sold and the qualification was suppressed by law in 1970. Between then and the educational reform 382/80, Italy had no system of postgraduate education. Contract staff were appointed directly by faculty, often on the basis of acquaintance or patronage. In 1973 under law 766, all staff who had held temporary contracts for three years or more were converted automatically to full-time permanent posts. This sort of legal drift, whereby a class of staff is recruited to subvert the cumbersome recruitment process, and is then transferred *en masse* to the formal career structure, is typical of the Italian system. The same happened with various ranks of teaching assistants created between 1967 and 1973, who were converted into ricercatori by law 382/80. These conversions come about as the result of the sort of corporatist pressures outlined above (Simone 1994).

Conclusion

The literature on the academic profession in Italy is rather limited compared with that in other countries. However, all major authors (Sensini 1964; Froio 1973, 1996; Giglioli 1978; Barbagli 1982; Santoni Rugiu 1991; Simone 1994, 1995; De Mucci and Sorcioni 1996) concur in the view that the organizational structure of the Italian university system is the result of historical accumulation and a variety of legal accidents and is founded on a network of privileges and unaccountability. Through its association with top civil servants and senior military personnel, and through the regular location of senior academic staff at the heart of government, the profession exercises considerable power and influence. However, it has shown little responsibility and no desire to embrace the opportunities for reform offered by the Ruberti laws. The Italian academic profession's resistance in the face of considerable efforts at reform is formidable but the result is a system which betrays the needs of society, the commitment to teaching and research and the needs and interests of students.

The electoral principle underlying the university management structure is subject to patronage and corruption and would appear to need modification, at least through a modest expansion of professional managerial appointments. While central government maintains control of finance and the curriculum, university autonomy is largely fictitious and would seem to indicate the need for greater devolution in both areas to allow differentiation and competition among institutions, although the institutions themselves have shown little desire for either autonomy or competition. There is little public accountability in the system and recent calls for the public and continuous quality assessment of teaching and research, and the linking of funding to performance, are likely to be strongly resisted. What is perhaps more surprising is the remarkable lack of public discussion of these issues. Education Minister Luigi Berlinguer (himself a professor and former rector of Siena University) has made a number of proposals for reform of the
secondary school system (June 1996) which have been widely publicized and debated but his proposals to reform university appointments procedures and enforce admissions quotas are of little interest except to those closely involved. In March 1997, Berlinguer made some proposals for reform including the introduction of a formal distinction between full-time, part-time and distance learning modes of study to enable better planning of teaching and services and also to clarify the courses which could legally limit the number of entrants (medicine, dentistry and architecture only). Debate about the university system is conducted entirely among academics and with little or no direction or input from public agencies, professional bodies or government. Despite the numerous examples of conscientious teachers and dedicated researchers, the academic profession in Italy remains largely a closed and privileged corporation which is highly successful at protecting its status and conditions of employment but is very poor at serving the higher education needs of an advanced industrial nation.

References

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8

The Netherlands: Reshaping the Employment Relationship

Egbert de Weert

A main feature of Dutch higher education is its binary structure, which separates universities from higher vocational institutions, Hoger Beroepsonderwijs or HBOs. Universities and HBOs developed under very different historical circumstances and are based on different rationales and philosophies of higher education. Universities date back to the sixteenth century when the University of Leiden was founded, followed by Amsterdam, Groningen and Utrecht. Because of their age, prestige and range of subjects they teach, they are the largest universities in the country. Since the end of the nineteenth century, other universities have been established. One category was private universities, which were created in reaction to state control of higher education and were based on denominational identities, such as the Free University of Amsterdam and the Catholic universities of Nijmegen and Brabant. Despite their private status, however, they are now funded by the state under similar conditions as other Dutch universities. Another category was 'new universities'. These were established as the result of an explicit government policy to further economic activity in disadvantaged regions such as Twente and Limburg. Specialized institutes of technology, economics and agriculture were also transformed into universities at Delft, Eindhoven, Rotterdam and Wageningen. In the 1980s, major restructuring took place in higher education to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the university sector as a whole. Reductions in duration of courses, revised personnel classifications and financial retrenchments resulted in reorganizations of institutions, departments and courses.

The HBO sector dates from the late 1960s, when colleges for higher vocational training were upgraded. HBOs were part of secondary education until, in 1986, they were legally established as a subsector of higher education. Because of the sector's fragmented structure, government initiated further reforms in the 1980s. These resulted in amalgamations among more than 400 small institutions, in specific professional fields, into larger institutions, providing a wide range of vocational courses, with a standard period of study lasting four years. In addition to the two main sectors, the Open
University, founded in 1984, provides both university and HBO degrees through distance learning. There are also some teaching hospitals, research organizations and other university-level institutions, mainly in theology and business studies. These institutions are not included in this analysis of the academic profession which concentrates on the staff and staffing issues in universities and HBOs.

Current structure of higher education

There are currently 13 Dutch universities, nine of which provide teaching and conduct research in a wide range of traditional academic disciplines. Three universities offer courses mainly in science and engineering and one in agricultural sciences. The main objectives of university education are: training for the independent pursuit of scholarship; preparation for performing professional functions; and understanding the ultimate unity of knowledge, underpinned by the study of philosophy, the humanities, social sciences, technology and sciences. Universities achieve these objectives through teaching and research. In the Higher Education and Research Act 1992, an explicit aim of universities is to ensure that knowledge is transmitted for the benefit of society. The close relationship between teaching and research, however, does not necessarily mean that everyone is engaged in both sets of activities. Current legislation, for example, allows a distinction to be made between staff with primarily a teaching function and those with a research one. Additionally, there are around 70 HBO institutions. Their main task is to provide theoretical and practical training with a clear vocational orientation. They also have the important task of transferring and developing knowledge for the benefit of the professions in the industrial and service sectors. HBOs concentrate on providing learning in subjects germane to the economies or regions in which they are situated, although, increasingly, they tend to operate nationally and internationally too.

The relationship between the twin sectors has been subject of continuous debate. Although there are overlaps between them and, in principle, courses are of the same duration, government maintains a basic distinction between the two as a guarantee of institutional differentiation. The main difference is in the status of research. For universities, this is a main task but for HBOs it is only permitted where it is applied research, contract research or research into teaching and pedagogy. Despite the strict binary policy, both sectors are incorporated in a single Higher Education Research Act 1992, which became operational in 1993. This encompasses a range of regulations applying identically to both sectors. There is, however, a tendency to seek some homogeneity in organizational and administrative matters on both sides of the binary line. Also tuition fees are the same for full-time students in both sectors. In terms of funding, however, some differences remain, although they are not as great as in the past. The funding mechanism for universities makes a clear distinction between teaching and research, using
differential weightings for types of courses. In the present system, there are
two weightings for both university and HBO sectors: institutions receive less
money for students in the humanities, social sciences and economics than
for those in laboratory-based technical and medical fields. Also, from 1993,
university funding for teaching has been based on the number of students
within the standard length course (generally four years), supplemented
with an amount for students who graduate (Jongbloed and Koelman 1996).

The university research budget is put together as follows: 15 per cent
is based on student numbers, 10 per cent on number of PhDs produced,
and 75 per cent is allocated mainly on an historical basis, in which quality
assessments of research play a part. In addition to this budget, universities
receive money for integrating their teaching and research functions. This
supplement amounts to 14 per cent of the teaching and research budgets
collectively and consequently it depends partly upon numbers of students
and graduates. HBO institutions are funded on the basis of estimates of
enrolments and a so-called ‘dynamic demand’ factor. This is based on a
ratio in which the numerator is the funding period for graduates (4.5
years) and dropouts (1.35 years), with the denominator being the actual
registration period for graduates and dropouts. In other words, if graduates
and dropouts take longer to finish their studies, the denominator increases.
Operation of the dynamic demand factor means that institutions receive
less funding where they are ‘less successful’, thus impacting on the number
of staff employed. This combination of input and output funding means
that the funding of universities and HBOs is dependent upon student
enrolments and student success rates. Consequently, quality of academic
staff and institutional personnel policies are becoming increasingly import-
ant for institutional effectiveness in higher education.

Figure 8.1 shows student numbers in both sectors for men and women,
since 1985. Whereas HBOs have increased their numbers, universities show
a steadily declining plateau, especially since 1992. This downward trend in
universities is expected to continue. Although demographic changes are
affecting enrolments, there are also other factors. For example, govern-
ment aims to reduce opportunities for HBO graduates wishing to take
university courses, moreover research suggests that decreases in university
enrolments are also due to reductions in student financial support. Stu-
dents seem to be less inclined to accept high loans schemes for an uncertain
future after leaving university. They tend therefore to prefer HBOs,
because of their vocational relevance (SCP 1996). It is generally expected
that student enrolments in universities will continue to decrease, by about 7
per cent over the next five years. Figure 8.1 also shows the increased num-
bers of women entering higher education, with the proportion of women in
1995 being close to 50 per cent in both sectors. The participation rate of
20–24 year olds in Dutch higher education is 43 per cent, of which 17 per
cent is in universities. Socioeconomic and ethnic factors affect participation
rates. A study of the 1982-cohort showed that those from lower socioeco-
omic backgrounds participated in university education to a significantly
lower level than those from higher status groups. For the 1989-cohort, the influence of social background on educational participation showed that only 5 per cent of children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds attended upper-secondary school, against 30 per cent of those from higher social classes (Ministry of Education 1995a). Although no adequate figures for those from ethnic backgrounds are available, it is estimated that their enrolments have increased in the last few years, particularly in HBOs. This group is still under-represented in higher education generally, however, compared with their absolute numbers in society at large.

The players in higher education

Since the 1980s the overall policy objective of Dutch higher education has been to devolve some responsibility for managerial decisions from government to higher education institutions, the main purpose of which is to facilitate flexibility so that higher education can respond to the rapidly changing demands of society. This trend is apparent with regard to both funding and staffing. In the 1970s, funds were allocated separately for staffing, buildings, equipment and various other expenditures. Funding for one area of spending could not be vired to others; clear barriers to this existed. After the introduction of block grants in the 1980s, government continued to maintain identical rules for all institutions in terms of staffing, ratios of different categories of academic staff and student–staff ratios (SSRs). Although SSRs were used to determine the block grant for universities, institutions were
free to apply their own SSRs. In the early 1990s, budgets were integrated to include staff costs and other costs which institutions may spend as they wish, while SSRs are no longer used.

In the early 1990s, two important changes were made in determining terms and conditions of employment in the public sector. First, there was a process of 'sectoralization'. This means responsibility for those employed in the public sector has been shifted away from the Minister of Internal Affairs to ministers of respective sectors, such as municipalities, provinces, police, trade and education. Thus the pay and employment conditions of staff at publicly funded educational institutions, formerly under the same terms and conditions as all other public employees, are now determined by the Minister of Education. Only pensions still come within the remit of the Minister of Internal Affairs. Second, there has been decentralization of power within education. This aims at transferring decision-making authority on personnel issues to institutional level. This shift, particularly advanced in higher education, means that institutions have increased freedom to develop their own personnel policies and structures. The earlier adage that employment conditions of staff were determined by the minister, 'unless stated otherwise', has, since the Higher Education Act, been amended so that now the opposite is true. The point of departure is that institutions are legally able to determine some employment conditions of academic and non-academic staff locally, with the exception of certain defined matters still coming under the Minister. These are the so-called primary or 'protocol' issues which include: the system of job evaluation and salary scales; redundancy entitlements; other social security issues; and standard working hours.

The HBO sector is more advanced in the process of decentralization than universities, because of its predominantly private status and regulation by private law. Apart from denominational universities, which are also privately owned, all other universities are in the public sector and their staff are legally public servants. Yet the Akkermans Committee, chaired by the rector of Erasmus University Rotterdam, has advocated the privatization of universities in which academic staff are employed by universities as the legal employers, rather than the state (Akkermans 1995). Although privatization is a controversial issue, differences between public and private institutions are already blurring, while the same legal regulations governing personnel matters basically apply to both sets of institutions.

Because of decentralization, there are currently three main parties involved in determining pay and conditions: the Minister of Education, universities and HBOs and trade unions. Universities and HBOs act as the legal employers of staff and both sectors have their own voluntary associations to pursue the collective interests of their member institutions. For universities this is the Association of Cooperating Dutch Universities (VSNU) and for HBOs the HBO-Council. All institutions recognize their respective organization as the official employers' association representing them in negotiations with the unions. There are four trade union federations: Algemene Centrale van Overheidspersoneel (ACOP – General Federation of Public Employees),
Table 8.1 Academic and support staff Dutch higher education, 1990, 1993 and 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>University</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Higher vocational</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>42,700</td>
<td>22,200</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>45,400</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>22,400</td>
<td>20,600</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ambtenarencentrum (AC – Civil Service Union), Christelijke Centrale van Overheids-en Onderwijspersoneel (CCOOP – Christian Federation of Public Employees) and Centrale van Middelbare en Hogere Functionarissen bij Overheid, Onderwijs, Bedrijven en Instellingen (CMHF – Federation of Middle and Higher-level Employees in Government, Education, Enterprises and Institutions). These federations, some of which are likely to merge, act as the collective bargaining agencies and legal bodies which negotiate for a variety of professional associations. Thus the Vereniging van Academici bij het Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs (VAWO – Association of University Academics), for example, joins CMHF and the Dutch Association of Teachers in Tertiary Education (NFTO) joins ACOP. There are several other professional associations representing special groups of higher education employees such as medical specialists and psychologists. These professional associations are more or less separated between university and HBO employees but the distinction is not as clear cut as in England, say, between the Association of University Teachers, on the one hand, and the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education on the other. There are no definitive figures about staff membership density, which varies according to categories of staff and sector. It is estimated, however, that only about a fifth of university staff are organized, compared with a third of those in HBOs. It is difficult to explain this difference in densities but it presumably reflects the general notion that those in higher positions are less inclined to be organized than those working in what are perceived to be lower status jobs.

Table 8.1 shows the number of academic and support staff in both sectors. Academic staff are those with teaching and/or research functions, while support or non-academic staff are auxiliary, technical and administrative personnel as well as managers. It appears that in universities numbers of staff have declined, after an increase in 1993, whereas in HBOs, the number of staff has remained fairly stable. It is expected that numbers of university staff will continue to decline, as a result of falls in student enrolments. Although there is not yet a lot of experience in the negotiating process, dialogue between the parties takes place predominantly at national level. Primary terms of employment, such as salaries, are determined by the Minister of Education after negotiations with the unions nationally, with all

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the above federations making up the union bargaining side. Though the Minister can legally reach an agreement with some unions, without agreement of the others, this is not the norm because the Minister can unilaterally impose any decision on primary conditions if he decides to do so. All remaining terms and conditions are subject to negotiations both nationally and locally between higher education institutions and the unions. National negotiations on pay and related primary matters take place in separate bargaining units for universities and HBOs. In universities, negotiations between VSNU (representing the universities) and unions began in 1996, with the aim of achieving a collective agreement for the sector as a whole. This agreement became effective for the first time in 1997. Negotiations between HBO employers and the unions in 1993 resulted in a national agreement which is legally binding on both parties. It consists of two parts, one covering collective rights, such as employment issues, temporary and flexible labour contracts, redundancy schemes, rights of appeal and so on. The other covers individual rights such as the obligations of employers and employees, working hours, holiday arrangements, maternity leave, performance appraisal, incapacity for work and so on.

Although there is a clear demarcation between bargaining about primary matters (between Minister and unions) and secondary matters (between higher education institutions and unions), these two sets of agreements are not unrelated. Decisions about working hours or holidays, for example, may have a direct impact on staffing and institutional budgets; higher education institutions, therefore, have expressed the desire to take responsibility for determining salaries with the unions. The Minister has obtained expert advice on this. The thrust is that institutions should first develop personnel policies in which financial reward systems constitute an integral part of managerial strategy (Kemenade 1995). It is proposed that individual payment systems, based on personal performance, should be developed further, attaching greater worth to performance criteria than to job function or post. In other words, wage differentials should be established among staff within the same job categories. If greater differentials are achieved, a further decentralizing of responsibility for primary or protocol-issues from Minister to institution might be possible. The Minister basically agrees with this but has stressed his present responsibility for determining the general wage base.

Structure of the academic profession

The academic profession in Dutch universities has a set of discrete titles and statuses, which was thoroughly reorganized in 1986. Since then the following three main titles are used: full professor and two groups of lecturers (Universitair Hoofddocent – UHD, and Universitair Docent – UD). These titles broadly correspond to the titles professor, senior (or principal) lecturer and lecturer respectively. The remaining categories are other academic
Table 8.2 Academic staff in Dutch universities, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Prof (%)</th>
<th>UHD (%)</th>
<th>UD (%)</th>
<th>Others (%)</th>
<th>Trainees (%)</th>
<th>Assistant (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>22,198</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>23,596</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>22,387</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: UHD: Universitair Hoofddocent (senior/principal lecturer); UD: Universitair Docent (lecturer); Others: other academic staff.
Source: Calculated on the basis of data from VSNU (1996).

Staff, research trainees and student assistants. Research trainees are an apprentice-type position for young academics, in which they assist in teaching and research, whilst at the same time conducting their own doctoral studies. Their position is temporary for a four-year period and normally leads to a doctoral degree. Table 8.2 provides an overview of the numbers and structure of the academic profession in universities in the Netherlands. Although the total number of university academic staff has remained fairly stable over the last five years, there have been shifts in relative proportions of posts. For example, numbers of UHDs and research trainees have increased considerably. In the past, the distribution of staff across categories (professors, UHDs and UDs) was legally defined but the Higher Education Act 1992 no longer prescribes this, so that ratios differ widely across academic disciplines. In engineering and economics, for example, staff numbers have generally increased and in law and the humanities there is a relatively high proportion of professors, whereas medicine and agriculture have larger proportions of UHDs. Similarly, research trainees are by far the largest group in sciences and engineering.

The three main categories of academic staff in universities (professor, UHD and UD) are tenured positions, usually with a probationary period of up to two years. In line with the Higher Education Act, all three categories have teaching and research responsibilities, as well as managerial and administrative ones. But it is universities which determine what staff actually do. This normally consists of 40 per cent teaching, 40 per cent research and 20 per cent management but proportions differ considerably across disciplines, from 80 per cent research and 20 per cent teaching, or vice versa, according to departmental requirements and staff competences. Tenured posts, however, apply only to specific positions, not to individuals. This means that if a particular position is no longer needed, individual members of academic staff cannot claim another post and they become redundant. Similarly, due to shortfalls in student enrolments in some departments, budget cuts or departmental restructuring, tenured personnel can be dismissed where their jobs disappear. This is increasingly happening and even the professoriate is no longer secure, despite the fact that dismissal for this group entails a lengthy, time-consuming procedure. Recently, some universities
Table 8.3 Academic staff in the Dutch higher vocational education, 1993–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>docA (%)</th>
<th>docB (%)</th>
<th>hsdoc (%)</th>
<th>hsdocB (%)</th>
<th>hsdocC (%)</th>
<th>other (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>13,686</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>13,623</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: doc A/B: docent A/B (lecturer); hsdoc B/C: hogeschooldocent B and C; hshdoc: hogeschoolhoofddocent.

have developed a policy of subjecting the professoriate to regular quality assessments. Professors not meeting expected standards can be demoted to a lower rank or even dismissed from their posts.

The academic grading structure precludes automatic promotion from one grade to another, a practice which occurred in the past. This resulted in a top-heavy structure, dominated by the professoriate. The present contraction in numbers of higher academic ranks leaves little room for career development. Current policies seek to change the ratio between professors and UHDs in favour of the latter. Also, other types of appointments have been introduced at the bottom of the job hierarchy, such as post-doctoral positions for young, promising academics with the potential of pursuing an academic career. However, these are temporary posts only, without any long-term prospects. It is generally felt that the academic labour market is too rigid and that more flexibility is needed in the system.

In the HBO sector there are no professorial posts. Up till 1993, there were only two main grades, docent A and docent B (lecturers A and B). Since 1993, the collective labour agreement enables institutions to introduce a further differentiation of teaching posts. In addition to docent A and docent B, whose tasks involve a basic level of teaching, three new positions have been created: hogeschooldocent (hsdoc) and hogeschooldocent (hsdoc) B and C. These three staff categories require higher levels of knowledge from job holders, in which links between theory and professional practice are emphasized. In addition, the categories of hogeschoolhoofddocent (hshdoc) and lector are new positions requiring higher academic qualifications. At present, the latter two job grades are fairly exceptional. It is difficult to give precise British equivalents to the job classifications in HBOs. Although there may be some correspondence with lecturer (docent) and senior (principal) lecturer (hsdoc), any exact translation of these job titles may lead to misunderstandings. HBO titles can be better conceived in order of qualifications, from docent A (lecturer) as the lowest rank to hogeschoolhoofddocent (hshdoc) and lector as the highest. Table 8.3 illustrates the distribution of grades in HBOs in 1993–94. It appears from this that in 1994 over three-quarters of HBO staff (78 per cent) were docent As, with 7 per cent docent Bs and the rest (15 per cent) in positions as hsdoc, hshdoc and ‘others’. There is to date no obvious increase in the newly created posts of hshdoc and lector.
Table 8.4 Main socioeconomic characteristics of academic staff in Dutch HE, 1993 and 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Universities 1993</th>
<th>Universities 1995</th>
<th>HBOs 1993-94</th>
<th>HBOs 1994-95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,600</td>
<td>22,400</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>13,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18,400</td>
<td>17,300</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>9,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 40 years of age</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>12,200</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 years and older</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly working hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20 hours</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-36 hours</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 hours and over</td>
<td>n. k.</td>
<td>13,900</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-term contracts</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>15,400^b</td>
<td>16,100^b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary contracts</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>4,800^b</td>
<td>3,800^b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ^a figures not known.
^b actual number of persons, not converted into full-time equivalents.

Source: For HBOs Blom and Hakkaart (1995); For universities VSNU (1996).

Table 8.4 summarizes the main socioeconomic characteristics of academic staff in the university and HBO sectors during the mid-1990s. It appears, for example, that at universities the numbers of both men and women employed decreased at that time. The decline of men, however, was greater, with the result that the proportion of women was about 32 per cent in 1995. It has also been noted that women still constitute a minority among higher ranked academic staff in universities. In the mid-1990s, for example, there were only 102 female professors out of 2418 professors and 184 female UHDs out of 2611 persons having that rank. However, the number of females in these positions has increased in recent years and it is expected that a rising proportion of women who are in research traineeships (33 per cent) will provide them with opportunities to achieve higher grade posts in the future. The age structure shows an ageing staff. Those aged 50 and over have increased, whereas those under 40 years have declined substantially. In universities, those aged 46–50 have been increasing and of all professors 32 per cent were between 40 and 49 years of age and 62 per cent were over 50. This is a major problem and university managements are eager to find creative ways of tackling this. Moreover, the overall length of service of academic staff amounts to 25 years or over and it is difficult to induce them to change (Vucht Tijsen 1995).

The distribution of full-time and part-time academic staff has remained more or less constant in recent years. There has been an increase in numbers...
of part-time professors, who also have jobs in industry, but this is not yet shown in the data. In HBOs, the proportion of staff on fixed-term contracts and temporary contracts, however, has changed. Those on fixed-term contracts have remained stable, while those on temporary contracts have decreased by 1000 from 4800 in 1994 to 3800 in 1995. The proportion of those on temporary posts decreased between those years from 24 per cent to 19 per cent. The reasons for this shift derive from the policy agreed by the HBO-Council and the unions at national level to reduce temporary appointments as much as possible. The current labour agreement, applying to the whole HBO sector, states that the number of temporary contracts should be limited to a maximum of 10 per cent of all those employed. Another reason for this shift is that temporary positions are especially hit by financial cutbacks (Bakker 1990).

Human resources management and the academic profession

Since 1986, universities have appointed their own academic staff, including professors and senior teaching staff, a task previously done by central government. Academic staff are thus recruited and selected by individual institutions, following advertisements and a public application procedure involving a special selection committee. For lower-level posts, recruitment can be restricted to internal candidates only. Professors are recruited as follows. First, faculty boards establish a selection committee which writes a job description, personnel specification and job advertisement and sets up a selection procedure. Second, faculties at other universities throughout the country, covering the same academic discipline, are asked to draw the attention of possible applicants to the post and are consulted about possible candidates. Third, following advice from the selection committee, faculty boards recommend one or two candidates to the board of governors and the rector, who ultimately take the final decision and appoint a candidate. For universities, it is common practice to recruit academic staff mainly on the basis of their research, publications and scholarship, since it is generally believed that those who have demonstrated knowledge and understanding in a particular field of study are best qualified for an academic post where teaching is a major task. The formal qualifications required of candidates are their scientific or scholarly credentials and, increasingly, a doctoral degree. Teaching qualifications are not required. For many – not least students – this is an unsatisfactory situation and some universities have started to require qualifications in teaching skills and teaching experience. Most universities offer voluntary training facilities for academic staff and this is increasingly becoming a part of staff development. If staff are not prepared to participate in such training programmes, this may harm their future promotion possibilities. Other criteria, especially for senior university staff, include managerial abilities and capacity to attract external research
Table 8.5  Pay structure and salary scales of academic staff in Dutch higher education (US$), 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>r.t.</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>prof A</th>
<th>prof B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,422</td>
<td>24,406</td>
<td>32,863</td>
<td>39,950</td>
<td>45,829</td>
<td>48,159</td>
<td>50,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,968</td>
<td>38,692</td>
<td>45,238</td>
<td>51,556</td>
<td>55,987</td>
<td>61,587</td>
<td>74,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>UD 86%</td>
<td>UD 14%</td>
<td>prof</td>
<td>prof</td>
<td>other academic 90%</td>
<td>UHD 99%</td>
<td>(51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>other academic</td>
<td>other academic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBOs</td>
<td></td>
<td>doc</td>
<td>hsdoc</td>
<td>hsdoc</td>
<td>A+B</td>
<td>B+C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The amounts in the table do not include the vacation allowance of 8 per cent of annual income.

* Research trainee: salaries are calculated as cumulative percentages of scale 10.

For titles in universities and HBOs, see Tables 8.2 and 8.3.

Source: Tables of salary scales, VSNU 1996 and Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.

Table of salary scales as in April 1996.

funding. Generally, contacts with the world of professional practice are considered increasingly important. Practical experience, however, is not normally a major selection criterion, even in applied subjects. In HBOs, on the other hand, professional experience, preferably for a minimum of five years, is considered an important criterion for appointment. Further, staff are expected to have relevant professional networks.

Academic pay structures in the Netherlands are shown in Table 8.5. These are based on a job evaluation exercise which assigns every post to one of 18 grades in the public sector's pay grades. It shows that academic staff in universities and HBOs are mainly in scales 10 to 14. Each grade has associated fixed salary scales, with between 9 to 12 annual increments. Salary increments are provided to all staff automatically, with virtually no provision for withholding them for poor performers. In Table 8.5 only pay at the bottom and the top of the scales are provided. It is clear that university staff have a wider range of scales than do staff in HBOs. Universitair docenten (UDs) are spread among grades 10, 11 and 12 and Universitair hoofddocenten (UHDs) between grades 13 and 14. University professors are rewarded according to separate grades: 'prof A' and 'prof B'. In HBOs, Docent A and B are in grade 11,hogeschooldocent (hsdoc B and C) in 12 and the new hoofdhogeschooldocent (hshdoc) in 13. Almost all teaching staff in HBOs (98 per cent, see Table 8.3) have salaries equal to UDs in universities, which is about a quarter of total academic staff in universities. Staff reaching a certain salary level within their current grade may move into the next grade with equivalent earnings, with the possibility of attaining a higher salary. This happens when individuals appointed to a particular scale move to a higher one or where promotion is obtained on the basis of performance.
and work experience. It is becoming increasingly difficult, however, for individual staff to move from one scale to another.

Decentralization in universities and HBOs means that institutions are now legally able to determine some of conditions of employment of academic staff locally. In universities, a collective agreement covering issues to be determined locally is being negotiated between VNSU and the unions at national level. A basic strategy in the VSNU proposals in 1995 was that determination of actual terms and conditions should take place within individual universities. Going local assumes more freedom of action and responsiveness to labour market and related circumstances by university authorities. A centrally directed personnel framework or policy, with a uniform set of conditions applying to all universities, is not now perceived to be an effective means for getting staff commitment. According to VSNU, national collective bargaining is only justified if economies of scale are involved. The unions are against this, because it can lead to different conditions among universities. They take the line that all bargaining issues should be determined centrally and applied across the board to all universities. The key elements in VSNU's proposals are 'mobility' and 'flexibility'. Mobility refers to increasing the chances of academic staff moving on to other jobs. Considered from the perspective of university management, mobility aims to enhance the employability of academic personnel over a range of functions and locations within institutions. Flexibility reflects the aim of introducing different rewards and fringe benefits to individual staff, based on staff appraisals and performance assessments. University employers are also seeking flexibility of contracts, such as fixed-term and temporary ones. The unions have opposed these on the grounds that they may result in uncertainties for staff and that some staff could be disadvantaged by the creation of unfair pay differentials between different academic disciplines. Moreover, the unions argue, the present system already allows for flexible rewards.

In the HBO sector, similar issues are being discussed. As indicated earlier, since 1993, a national collective agreement exists binding on all institutions. It obliges institutions to introduce staff development schemes, appraisal systems and more flexibility in job tasks and job functions. Until recently personnel management tasks locally consisted of little more than interpreting and applying rules and procedures determined by government. With little experience to draw on, institutions are probably not well-equipped to handle appraisal and development procedures. However, automatic progression through pay scales on the basis of seniority has been abolished and new forms of staff appraisal and career development are being explored.

The question arises whether higher education institutions are capable of developing their own human resources management (HRM) policies. However, a bill for modernizing university governance is intended to change institutional structures to integrate management and administration processes in a single system (Ministry of Education 1995b). This so-called 'integrated management approach' is conceived as a necessary condition for more
decisive and efficient governance of universities. Issues regarding financial, personnel and quality matters are no longer to be handled separately but brought together in an integrated managerial model. The basic thrust of the bill is that collegial management, traditionally embedded in democratically chosen representative bodies in universities and faculties, will be replaced by more managerialist structures. The role of central administrations will become more important and a 'board trustee system' will be introduced. Within faculties, the role of deans, as professional, full-time managers, will be strengthened, with executive powers on research, teaching and personnel management issues. The introduction of this new system of management and employment relations within universities implies a shift away from traditional collegiality and has been characterized as the demise of democratic decision-making structures within higher education. The essential character of university management in which the academic community accepts a cooperative and collective responsibility for managing and administering is changing. The highly decentralized collegiate structure of university decision-making contrasts sharply with the proposed governing model borrowed from industry, with its more top-down management approach where increasingly educational policy and resource allocation are taken out of the hands of academic staff and given to managers. The bill also proposes that academic staff should be able to exercise some influence on management decisions through either an employee council or representative advisory council. Each university would set up such a body, although to what extent it would be influential and effective is debatable.

The HBO sector has some experience of this 'new' employment relationship and most institutions have established representative advisory councils. Tensions between national and local employment relations structures are also emerging. The decision, at the beginning of 1997, by all HBO organizations to withdraw from the collective labour agreement in order to negotiate their own terms and conditions individually, illustrates a strategic shift towards local decision-making. With unions wanting their members' employment interests protected by adequate bargaining procedures nationally, they fear the risk of fragmentation if local agreements deviate from national policies.

Conclusion

The ways in which terms and conditions of employment of academic staff are determined in Dutch higher education have been changing substantially over the last few years. Whereas primary matters such as salaries remain, for the time being at least, within the competence of the Minister of Education to determine, after bargaining with the unions, all secondary issues are the result of negotiations between higher education employers and the unions. In the HBO sector, most agreements are the result of national bargaining, which is binding on all institutions. These agreements allow for some HRM
Egbert de Weert

flexibilities at local level but always within a general policy framework. To
date, variations in terms and conditions are relatively limited, since radical
changes in personnel policies and practices take some years to achieve. For
example, if more than 75 per cent of academic staff are at the top of pay
scale 12, there is little room for wages flexibility and wider pay differentials.
Moreover, job evaluation exercises carried out by some higher education
institutions are felt to outweigh the benefits provided. Nevertheless, the
new system of staffing flexibilities increases the freedoms which institutions
are able to pursue locally, in terms of personnel policies and HRM prac-
tices. At the same time, flexibility in terms of staff working under temporary
contracts is relatively limited, because centralized bargaining restricts the
numbers of temporary staff to be employed within HBO institutions to a
maximum of 10 per cent of the total. Universities, on the other hand, are
less inclined to act collectively and, as employers, feel that national agree-
ments constrain their local autonomy in recruiting and managing academic
staff. Some universities have already developed specific HRM policies suited
to local circumstances. For example, à la carte reward systems are being
developed, whereby personal and variable contracts of employment are
drawn up. Individual staff can choose from a variety of conditions such as
leave, pay bonuses, computers and other fringe benefits. Also the possibility
of appointing professors on temporary contracts – the ‘flexi-prof’ – is being
explored. Generally, financial cuts, new funding mechanisms and fluctuations
in student enrolments are driving universities to offset financial risks by
exploring the issue of flexible contracts of employment for academic staff.
There is also the need to enhance career opportunities for younger, well-
qualified staff, especially in the light of an ageing academic workforce.
Consequently, there are more university staff employed on short-term con-
tracts than previously, among both researchers and, increasingly, teaching
staff. Some universities have retired tenured staff to create more temporary
posts, while some staff have been made supernumeraries and re-appointed
on temporary contracts.

It is too early to assess the extent and nature of these initiatives and
whether they are resulting in a segmentation of the academic profession
and academic labour market into tenured and peripheral staff. It is also
generally accepted that academic careers require lengthy periods of train-
ing and that experienced and motivated staff continue to be crucial in
maintaining academic quality. Academic staff need to be rewarded ade-
quately, and managed sensitively, to prevent them from switching to better
paid jobs in industry or from becoming alienated. But some staff no longer
enjoy security of tenure. It is crucial, therefore, that personnel management
decisions are not left to chance and the whims of idiosyncratic managers.
In conditions of change, universities and HBOs require fair and agreed
appraisal, staff development and staff assessment systems and the ability to
recruit high quality academic personnel. Dutch higher education institutions
are clearly at the beginning of a new phase in reshaping the employment
relationship and in managing the academic profession.
References


Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) *Onderwijsstatistieken*. Voorburg, CBS.


9

Spain: Old Elite or New Meritocracy?

Salvador Parrado-Díez

The long tradition of Spanish higher education dates from the thirteenth century, with the establishment of universities in Palencia, Salamanca, Valladolid and Lérida. Since then, five major phases in the development of higher education can be identified. According to Jiménez (1971), the origins of university education, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, fell within the domain of the monarchy and stemmed largely from the need of scholars to meet the challenges posed by the powers of the civil and ecclesiastical estates. Legal studies took on an importance in helping Christian kings achieve the territorial union of the Spanish kingdoms and reconquer the lands dominated by Islam. A second phase, between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, coincided with the absolutist state when Church influence grew in universities and theological studies took centre stage. The period between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries constitutes the third phase, corresponding with the age of the Enlightenment. Deterioration of the social and higher education systems provoked intervention by the monarchy (Jiménez 1971), thus advancing the centralization process that took place during the nineteenth century. As Sánchez-Ferrer (1996) points out, centralization of higher education was institutionalized in 1857, during the fourth phase of development, with Parliament granting central control of universities, which remained unchanged until 1983. The continuous social and political convolutions of this period strongly influenced universities, with government bringing public employment into the realm of a spoils system (cesantía). This touched on not only political appointments but also employment in universities, as professors suffered purges with changes of government every few years. The professoriate sought, and achieved, permanent public employment, in reaction to the devastating effects of the spoil system since the mid-nineteenth century. This privilege, as a group of functionaries (corps), and the fact that they controlled political appointments in the Ministry of Education, explains their ability to constitute an autonomous power within the university system. Today, the power of the professoriate has not diminished, even with the recent autonomy of
Spain: Old Elite or New Meritocracy?

universities, and this is noticeable in the way in which academic staff are recruited. The end of the civil war in 1940 also inflicted great damage on Spanish universities, because the Franco regime expelled and exiled a great number of professors who had identified with Republican interests. Those who remained had to comply with the principles of Francoism, thus undermining the meritocratic principle in recruitment. Finally, the fifth phase in the development of Spanish higher education began in 1983, which has been characterized by decentralization, with universities acquiring greater autonomy to manage themselves.

Current structure of higher education

The Spanish university system has undergone several major changes since the early 1980s. The transformation of an elite system into a mass one is its most obvious feature. Socialist governments sought to abolish social inequalities and enacted legislation aimed at democratizing higher education and improving its quality (PSOE 1984). Modernizing higher education, and making it more autonomous, were the driving forces behind the Socialist party during the 1980s, with the aim of achieving a more egalitarian society. Socialist governments made considerable efforts to reduce staff–student ratios by building more higher education institutions, with almost a third of the current number of institutions being created during the period 1983–96. The higher education network of 46 public institutions is complemented by 10 private ones, six of which were established in the early 1990s. In spite of growth in private institutions, the largest share of students (96 per cent) went to public institutions in 1996. Yet the geographic distribution of public and private universities is skewed, as Barcelona and Madrid have almost one third of all higher education institutions in their localities, in spite of political decentralization to regions. Further, one of the most striking features of the Spanish higher education system has been the rapid increase of student enrolments during the 1980s and 1990s. Though enrolments in other countries also rose dramatically, Spain has shown the most rapid and radical growth. Applications for entry to university in some other European countries appear to have levelled off and are now declining but enrolments in Spain are still rising.

Table 9.1 shows recent increases in student enrolments in Spanish universities in the early 1990s. Several factors help to explain Spanish patterns of growth in student numbers in comparison with other European countries. First, the Spanish ‘baby boom’ in the late 1960s and early 1970s is probably one of the most important factors explaining the transformation of universities into a mass system. The Spanish birth rate lagged some 10 years behind similar booms in most other European countries. Although birth rates declined after 1976, the full impact of this demographic change will not be felt until the late 1990s. Second, there have also been sharp
increases in female university enrolments in the past few years, from 37 per cent of the total in 1975 to more than 53 per cent since 1995. Third, the changing structure of the job market has strongly influenced student enrolments (International Council of Educational Development (ICED) 1990). On the one hand, high unemployment has forced public authorities to keep young people in the educational system as long as possible. On the other hand, according to a report of the ICED, there is a growing propensity for employers insisting on higher level academic qualifications in the initial screening of applicants for middle and higher level positions in organizations. Fourth, increases in enrolments may also be related to the introduction of new fields of study in universities, linked with new technologies and leading-edge sectors of Spain’s economy (ICED 1990). Fifth, though tuition fees increased in real terms during the 1980s, student grants have risen sharply during the same period, thus reducing the direct costs of financing higher education to families. Further, the network of universities in all 50 provinces, some of them recently created, has helped lessen the indirect private costs of higher education (Camino and San-Segundo 1996).

Table 9.1 Students in Spanish universities, 1992–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>1982/83</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1992/93</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1995/96</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Cycle</td>
<td>181,769</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>416,673</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>501,269</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Cycle</td>
<td>510,383</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>873,848</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>996,598</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7,744</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fields</th>
<th>1982/83</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1992/93</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1995/96</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>418,574</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>137,921</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>143,930</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and juridical sciences</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>681,673</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>790,470</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental sciences</td>
<td>67,279</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>97,972</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>126,088</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health sciences</td>
<td>106,345</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>107,803</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>108,361</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical degrees</td>
<td>99,954</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>265,152</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>329,019</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>7,744</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Basic index</th>
<th>82/83</th>
<th>= 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Universities</td>
<td>670,377</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,250,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Universities</td>
<td>21,775</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for each variable</td>
<td>692,152</td>
<td>1,291,996</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Camino and San-Segundo have also studied demand for higher education in 1987 and 1993, according to father’s status for people aged 18 to 23. They conclude that student financial support has helped eliminate differences in enrolments associated with the socioeconomic backgrounds of students (San-Segundo 1993).

Growth of student enrolments and recent economies of scale in university education represent a rising cost for universities and their academic and support staff (Beltrán 1996). Although socialist governments have given high priority to education, and there has been a noticeable increase in expenditure, from 0.23 per cent of GNP in 1970 to 0.9 per cent in 1991, it has not reached the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) mean of 1.5 per cent (OECD 1993). The distribution of this continuous rise in student numbers is, however, unbalanced in several ways. For example, first-cycle courses, like those provided in the former polytechnics in England and Wales and Fachhochschulen in Germany, share a smaller portion of students than second-cycle courses, as shown in Table 9.1. In the 1970s, the political authorities had hoped that a majority of the expanding student body would opt for short-cycle courses, thus expanding the supply of middle-level professionals and technicians to the labour market. An expansion of students in short-cycle courses is only slowly meeting this provision. Along with this unequal distribution of students between long and short-cycle courses, it is in social studies and the law where more than half of new enrolments have occurred since 1980. These subject imbalances jeopardize the teaching and management capacities of some faculties, according to the ICED study (1990).

Another threat to creating an appropriate distribution of university provision is the current geographical concentration of student enrolments. Three large universities, Madrid Complutense, with 127,750 students in 1995, Barcelona, with 74,630, and Seville, with 69,505, collectively account for some fifth (19 per cent) of public university students, with another 11 institutions having more than 30,000 students each. As the ICED team pointed out, there is no ideal size for a university, although they suggest an optimum size in the range of 10,000 to 20,000 students, beyond which institutions become unmanageable, impersonal and bureaucratic (ICED 1990). If this recommendation were accepted, 27 out of 44 public universities would need to reduce their student numbers. On the other hand, from a financial point of view, the data demonstrate that the larger the institution, the lower the cost per student due to economies of scale (San-Segundo 1993). Growth of enrolments and enlargement of Spanish universities reflect the widening scope of the Spanish welfare state but it is felt by some that its infrastructure is not sufficiently developed to cope with the rising demand. Further, the unequal distribution of students among institutions threatens flexible responses to student demand in the university sector. Traditional universities need to be more creative to overcome their rigid bureaucracies, while recently created institutions are relatively advantaged when applying flexible solutions to managing their organizations.
Current structure of higher education

Spanish universities have moved away from a highly centralized, uniform, tradition-bound system, modelled on the Napoleonic structures of the nineteenth century (Ley de Moyano 1857), towards a modern, more decentralized, diversified system. This is based on the principle of university autonomy, embodied in the Constitution of 1978, and elaborated in the University Reform Law 1983 (Ley de Reforma Universitaria – LRU). The potential flexibilities that universities have also depend upon their autonomy from external pressures and their arrangements for internal management. To ascertain the degrees of autonomy that institutions have, it is necessary to examine the extent to which their decision-making powers can be exerted and how this interacts with the central authorities. In the case of universities, institutional control over staffing matters and budgetary resources, and the ability to compete for good students, professors and research funds, are crucial to understanding their autonomy from central control.

Following Ley Moyano 1857, the Spanish state wielded tight control over universities. Legislation was applied uniformly to all institutions, with all centres of learning adopting the same academic and administrative structures. The Minister of Education also regulated student access, supervised syllabus content and approved textbooks, largely to centralize the curriculum and control it. Moreover, the conferring of professorships was disposed of by ministerial authorities, with most professors being political appointments (Alvárez 1975). Demands for autonomy were expressed by rectors and teaching staff, when the draft of a new university law was being proposed during the transition period from dictatorship to democracy (Sánchez-Ferrer 1996). This demand for autonomy was reinforced by the Spanish Constitution ratified in 1978. Universities only finally achieved autonomy in 1983, however, following enactment of the LRU. This shift towards university autonomy should be seen against the background of the devolution of political power from Madrid to the Autonomous Region after 1983. A particular pattern of decentralization has been that not all centralized state functions have been transferred to all regional authorities at the same time. Only seven Autonomous Communities (AACCs – Comunidades Autónomas) were given authority to carry out educational functions between 1985 and 1987. Since 1996, the remaining 10 AACCs have started to manage their education budgets and currently 44 universities are financed directly by Autonomous Communities, with only two universities, Universidad Nacional a Distancia (Open University) and Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo (International University of Menéndez Pelayo), remaining centrally controlled. The powers of Autonomous Communities to have their own higher education policies have helped facilitate recent growth in university institutions. There are now 56 universities, 10 of them private ones. Of these, 17 new universities (11 public and six private) were created in the early 1990s. The recent creation of new universities has been in response to three main factors. These are: increased demand; legislation favouring the creation of private
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Yet the interactions of the several actors to higher education—central government, AACCs and universities—raise the question of how much autonomy universities really have in practice to manage their own resources. First, a number of legislative provisions exist. Central government fixes conditions of entry to universities and those granting and validating national degrees. Also ministerial authorities approve the basic rules for achieving civil service status for academic staff. Tenured academic staff have civil servant status and belong to a national corps. Central government provides some homogeneity and stability to the system but the existence of a national body of civil servants, that substantially influences recruitment to the academic profession clearly constrains the freedom of universities to develop their own independent staffing policies. AACCs provide some funds for each university budget and, with the approval of central government, can create new higher education institutions. Their capacity for manoeuvre depends largely on the financial framework provided by central government. In practice, an incrementalist pattern of financing public universities minimizes the discretionary powers of AACCs. Universities can formulate their own internal statutes, including mechanisms for taking initiatives and making decisions. They can use their funds to meet specific institutional needs and select their own academic staff, though with some restrictions in both cases. Universities may also create their own academic programmes, within general curriculum guidelines. Furthermore, universities are able to arrange courses for other organizations and negotiate contracts with private or public bodies for specific purposes. This provides the capacity for self-government and freedom to cooperate with external bodies.

Second, the linking body for these three levels of decision-making is the Consejo de Universidades (COU), a body which formalizes the institutional arrangements for dialogue among the actors. The COU is part of the Ministry for Education and Culture (MEC) and is responsible for planning, monitoring and coordinating the overall university system, developing the national curriculum and advising and providing universities, AACCs and MEC with technical assistance. The main functions of COU are carried out by its administrative planning committee, dominated by regional educational authorities, and the educational planning committee led by university rectors. The main aim of COU is to replace the former confrontational and adversarial strategy—whereby the Council of Rectors only had only advisory status—by one of consensus-building involving politicians and academics in jointly making educational policy (ICED 1990).

There are, however, three major restrictions on the capacity of universities to avoid externally imposed rigidities. The first obstacle to flexibility is that recruitment of tenured academic staff, who comprise around 50 per cent of all teachers and researchers, does not rest entirely with universities. The success rate of the candidates applying for tenure depends to a large extent on ‘clientellist’ negotiations among selectors who normally favour universities; and the drive from AACCs to formulate their own higher education policies.
local applicants. Universities are free to hire temporary or non-tenured teaching staff, the remaining 50 per cent of the academic workforce, but the dominant culture within higher education is normally led by permanent staff with civil service status. The second major barrier to institutional autonomy is the limited financial independence of universities. In 1995, universities received some 78 per cent of their funds from central or regional government, about 17 per cent from student fees and 5 per cent from other sources (Camino and San-Segundo 1996). Funds are allocated annually as a result of negotiations between government and university representatives. The starting point for discussions is the funds available in the previous year, numbers of enrolments and the needs for capital investment in forthcoming years. The provision of public funds allocated to Spanish universities has followed an incrementalist budgeting pattern over the years (COU 1995; Mora and Villarreal 1995). A financial model allocating funds competitively might make the university sector more dynamic. So far this approach has been planned for only a handful of Autonomous Communities. The Valencian regional government is perhaps the most advanced in this field. The model, as explained by Mora and Villarreal, contains a basic financial baseline covering the teaching function and tasks of support staff, with another more competitive allocation tied to specific objectives relating to syllabuses, research and innovatory educational programmes. The use of programme contracts between institutions and regional authorities is another means of financing the introduction of new academic or professional studies and adapting existing programmes to the changing labour market (COU 1995). Nevertheless, these financial initiatives are small islands in a large sea of incrementalist budgetary policy for allocating funds.

The third obstacle is that public universities are not allowed to compete for students nationally. Only 5 per cent of vacancies per institution are offered to students coming from other university districts. Students normally study in the geographic area where they live. If a particular course does not exist where the student has studied at secondary school, a change of district is allowed. However, students may not be able to study what they want because another barrier impeding students is that they are not interviewed for admission to particular courses. They apply for the course of their choice and the marks they obtain in their exams determine whether or not they can enrol. Only the highest marks succeed. There is no a priori limit and the lowest mark providing admission depends upon the balance between the student demand for courses and the offer of places by universities. Legislation, in short, has introduced elements of self-government for universities and released them from strict, centralized policy guidelines. These measures alone, however, do not guarantee institutional flexibility, freedom to cope with large numbers of students and a quality service. If universities are unable to compete for students and full-time academic staff, then the autonomy of institutions is more apparent than real.
Structure of the academic profession

The transition from an elite to a mass university system, and from a centralized system to autonomous bodies, has been accompanied by efforts to convert temporary staff into permanent ones to cope with expansion. To understand this transition, some general features of the system need to be considered. Spanish university teachers fall into three broad categories: civil servants with tenure (*funcionarios*), *interinos* who are staff in acting positions, and those on temporary contracts. *Interinos* are individuals working in universities, who may be civil servants in acting positions, as *Catedráticos de Universidad* (professors) but on temporary contracts or as *Titulares de Universidad* (senior lecturers). This can be for up to a year in both cases. All three categories can be employed as either full-timers or part-timers but only staff who are civil servants have tenure. In private universities, the academic profession, whatever their teaching rank, work under normal contracts of employment. Candidates are normally recruited through an interview and are appointed to permanent full-time or part-time contracts. If a tenured professor from a public university transfers to a private one, that individual terminates his or her civil service employment.

The presence of tenured professors in universities has varied considerably over time. In 1982, 22 per cent of all 27,071 academic postholders were civil servants, 15 per cent *interinos* and the largest group, 63 per cent, had temporary contracts (Sánchez-Ferrer 1996). This relatively low proportion of civil servants has increased to about a half of all teaching staff currently. As a consequence of the LRU 1983, about 5000 'contracted' lecturers were given tenure after special state examinations (Sánchez-Ferrer 1996). During Franco's dictatorship, it was not uncommon to have a teaching post, as a secondary job, even among those with tenure, who were technically full-time university teachers. Nowadays, it is also possible to do external work but the university is the focus of the contract and a combination of teaching and research is the primary function of full-time university professors. There has been an important evolution from a system where the academic profession had high social status but little responsibility for their students to one where academics are fully committed to their professional role and duties. In 1990, for instance, more than 85 per cent of tenured staff had full-time contracts.

As indicated in Table 9.2, the first group of academic staff — civil servants — is made up of four categories of university teachers: *Catedrático de Universidad* (full professor), *Titular de Universidad* (senior lecturer), *Catedrático de Escuela Universitaria* (professor in first cycle institution) and *Titular de Escuela Universitaria* (senior lecturer in first cycle institution). Members of the corps of *Catedrático de Universidad* (CU) occupy the highest echelons of the academic hierarchy, the professorship. Applicants for CU positions must belong to the corps of *Titular de Universidad* (TU) and entry to the corps of CU, which is a predominantly male group (92.6 per cent – MAP 1990), takes place at a relatively early age. In 1990, CUs were on average 47.8 years-old and...
Table 9.2 Tenured professors and academic staff on temporary contracts in Spain, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Average age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catedrático Universidad</td>
<td>CU</td>
<td>4,742</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular Universidad</td>
<td>TU</td>
<td>14,611</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catedrático Escuela Universitaria</td>
<td>CEU</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular Escuela Universitaria</td>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>6,515</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interinos (CU, TU, CEU, TEU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,022</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary contracts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asociado (Associate professor)</td>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>16,132</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayudante (Assistant)</td>
<td>AY</td>
<td>4,058</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitante</td>
<td>VIS</td>
<td>150²</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emérito</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>579</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


applicants averaged 40.7 years (COU 1991). TUs also have tenure and applicants for these posts must have a doctorate and take part in a competitive public examination. TUs are also a male dominated corps (71.8 per cent) (MAP 1990a), although the portion of women is rising compared with the proportions of females who are CUs. The Catedrático de Escuela Universitaria (CEU) and Titular de Escuela Universitaria (TEU) are two corps whose functions are theoretically restricted to Spanish Escuelas Universitarias (first-cycle courses). Nevertheless, CEUs and TEUs may be also be located in second-cycle courses in faculties. Applicants for CEU positions must have a doctorate, though a degree is sufficient for TEU appointments.

Interinos make up the second group and are close to getting entry to one of the above corps (i.e. CU, TU, CEU and TEU). Their contract does not last more than two years and they occupy posts reserved for civil servants. There is the equivalent interino for each corps: CU interino, TU interino, CEU interino and TEU interino. Interinos may also compete with external candidates for the post which they are currently occupying, when it becomes tenured. Their salary structure is very similar to that for civil servants but they are not allowed to have funding linked with research and teaching related pay. Finally, those on temporary contracts fall basically into four categories, two should be particularly mentioned. The Assistant (Ayudante – AU) is normally finishing a doctorate or will have already defended it, where the post is temporary between three and five years. Assistants are not supposed to take charge of theoretical classes but may help with seminars and laboratory work. Asociados (ASPs) are high status professionals working
in public administration or in private enterprise and willing to lecture on a part-time basis at university.

An official document of the MEC (1986), on public universities, sets out staffing establishments to be allocated in universities and the funds available for employing staff. The document gave the ideal distribution of different categories of staff to be employed by universities. The recommendations included the number of each broad category of university staff to be appointed: 60 per cent for tenured posts, 20 per cent for assistants and 20 per cent for associates but scientific and technological disciplines could have more assistants and associates. These objectives have not yet been fully accomplished, largely for financial reasons, but the academic profession generally favours this approach to university staffing.

Human resources management and the academic profession

There are different procedures for making temporary and tenured appointments. In both cases, jobs are advertised: in the first case in national newspapers and in the second in the Government’s official diary (BOE – Boletín Oficial del Estado). A temporary contract is the first step of an academic career and begins with an application to undertake a doctorate at 23 or 24 years of age. Doctorands may apply for a national government, regional government or university grant to cover their living needs for four years. Alternatively, they may be employed as an assistant by a university, on a temporary contract. Once the doctorate has been successfully defended, normally at about the age of 29–30, junior academic staff may get another contract as an assistant but this cannot last more than three years. If after three years, assistants do not obtain a tenured post or become an interino, they must leave their university. Tenure, according to the legal requirements, can never be obtained in the same university that assistants have worked in during their three-year contract. Assistants are also expected to have spent at least one year at another university, either in Spain or abroad. These measures are aimed at preventing local candidates from being too parochial.

The next step is normally the TU interino and, after two years, the incumbent should be ready for taking part in a public competition examination to become a TU. This should happen at around the ages of 34 or 35. After a further three or four years, the incumbent could compete for professorial (CU) appointment, which is normally obtained around the ages of 40–45. This short career path to tenure is not always feasible. There are also career pathways. If, after three years as an assistant, there is no money for a tenured position, a post as associate professor or TEU is offered. Technically this is in contravention to the LRU, because associate professors are expected to have their main occupation outside a university. There are even full-time contracts for associate professors, which is also a contradiction in terms,
Table 9.3 Annual average salary of Spanish university teachers (US$), 1996a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Additions for</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed pay</td>
<td>Teaching performance</td>
<td>Research performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servantsb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>38,412</td>
<td>3,639</td>
<td>1,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU</td>
<td>31,114</td>
<td>2,947</td>
<td>1,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEU</td>
<td>31,114</td>
<td>2,947</td>
<td>1,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>26,336</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>1,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary contractsc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>23,896</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIS</td>
<td>23,896</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY</td>
<td>21,071</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>37,113</td>
<td>3,639</td>
<td>1,819</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a In external contracts, the maximum permitted is US$123,810.
b $518 is added for every three years of service (triénio).
c They do not receive research or teaching assessment awards.

These figures are indicative of annual salaries, based upon the assumptions that tenured post-holders have incorporated within their pay two lump sums for 'good' teaching performance and one for 'good' research. In practice, how these additions are awarded varies among staff.


because ‘association’ to a job reflects a part-time appointment. In a survey carried out by the Consejo de Universidades, 40.6 per cent of associates had full-time contracts and they were younger than part-time associates. Also a large number of them had doctorates (COU 1991). Associate professors are also recruited because they are relatively easy to employ and dismiss. As can be seen in Table 9.3, the fixed salary of an associate professor was over US$7000 per year below that of a TU in 1996. Besides, associate professors cannot enjoy the same salary complements as TUs. However, full-time associate professors have the same teaching hours as TUs and the pay of a part-time Associate professor is less in comparison with an assistant having a doctorate and the same teaching load. In times of financial pressures and high demand by students, a cheap workforce is necessary.

Tenure is given by a Comisión (an evaluation commission) of five members made up of peers of those belonging to the same grade or one grade higher appointed on an ad hoc basis among members of the same academic discipline as the post being filled. In Spanish universities, there are approximately 1700 different academic disciplines. The number of civil servants (CUs and TUs) in each varies from just a few to several dozen. The university where tenure is being offered proposes two members of the evaluatory commission, with the other three coming from other universities and being
appointed by lot. This mandatory requirement seeks to avoid mandatory recruitment by the universities. While the composition of such a body should ensure a meritocratic competition, in practice there are always intense negotiations among peers in the academic discipline, who probably network together and are well-known professionally to one another - a sort of academic 'tribe'. Negotiations may be very fierce in the case of a tenured CU appointment. Different academic networks may have pacts on how to vote in the recruitment of future candidates. There are always CUs and TUs who do not identify themselves with a particular group and they could theoretically vote against an agreed candidate, normally a local one when the occasion arises. As Sánchez-Ferrer (1996) points out, in the case of a TU post, the external assessors will not want to impose an outside candidate on the university. They will normally vote for the local candidate but this will probably not be the case for a CU post. A study carried out by the Consejo de Universidades (COU 1991) showed that almost 91 per cent of tenured posts were awarded to local candidates, who normally had positions as interinos. This percentage is probably higher, if recently created universities, without local candidates, are omitted (COU 1991).

There is a situation of Herrschaftspatronage as a way of ensuring the power of academic networks in institutions with new members. They normally obey guidelines of their group in the case of making new tenured appointments (Eschenburg 1961). Internal appointments are not necessarily considered to be adverse for universities, unless there is a non-meritocratic competition. In fact, in most public examinations for tenure, there are several applicants but usually only one, the local candidate, goes through the whole procedure. If a candidate counts on the support of the majority of members of the evaluatory commission, external candidates are unlikely to come to the oral examination, which is open to the public. The examination comprises three elements. First, candidates must provide and defend their curriculum vitae. Second, they have to put forward a syllabus for the subject which they are going to teach and defend this. Third, in the case of CU tenure, they must outline a research project and defend it, while for a tenured TU post, they must give a class which is observed by members of the commission. This method of selection is reminiscent of a 'guild system'. After being selected, tenured staff have to compete for external research funding. Further, their research competence can be assessed, after a period of time, by external referees for the purposes of supplementing their salaries. These reward factors, and the increasing number of young assistants seeking permanent salaried positions, may force government to introduce new selection methods to ensure that the principle of meritocracy survives in Spanish universities.

A national system of salaries and salary structures predominates in the public sector. These are determined annually by government, normally on the basis of inflation, and are incorporated into planned public spending and the government's budget. In the private sector, in contrast, the costs of recruiting a lecturer depends on that individual's market value and it is
more difficult, for example, to recruit a prestigious physician than a sociologist. The tendency is, however, to offer the same salary as in public institutions for jobs of the same rank. Unlike in Anglo-Saxon systems, involvement by trade unions in determining the pay and conditions of academic staff is slight. Trade unionism in the public sector has only been permitted since 1987, with some restrictions. The bargaining power of unions is therefore weak, even though some general agreements are signed with government every two or three years. While unions are theoretically involved in determining salaries, pensions and leave, their influence is far from strong. The normal salary of tenured staff has four elements: a fixed amount, a teaching-related element, a research-related element and money from external contracts. Apart from the fixed part of the salary, there is a competitive amount related to an individual's teaching, as evaluated by the university. Every five years at university, all tenured postholders may apply for an evaluation of their work. If this evaluation is favourable, a monthly supplement to their salary is guaranteed for life. After a further five years, another application to be evaluated can be requested and, in the case of another positive evaluation, the monetary supplement is doubled. There can be up to five evaluations for teaching and research. In the case of research, the period of examination is six years. Nevertheless, in practice, evaluation of teaching is almost invariably positively assessed, because the same university where the lecturer works is responsible for performing the evaluation. The evaluation of research, on the other hand, is carried out by an external agency, accountable to the MEC. For this reason, a positive evaluation is not necessarily automatic.

Two consequences follow from these practices. On the one hand, the importance of research is emphasized, not only as a part of a ritual of entrance to the profession through the doctorate, which closes the academic profession to outsiders (Fulton 1993), but also its preeminence over teaching. As Moses (1993: 178) puts it:

The general conceptualisation of academic work has contributed to a hierarchy of esteem for different academic activities, with research highly valued and rewarded, and teaching and service seen as [un]necessary distractions from research, even in institution types which have explicit vocational orientation.

On the other hand, the positive assessment of research in Spain may contribute to the adoption of more meritocratic methods of managing, rewarding and promoting academic staff. As an official of the Ministry has asserted, evaluation of research has helped to improve the productivity of professors and has aided to identify which of them are really involved in research activity and those who are not. The research and teaching activities of academic staff are complemented by administrative tasks and seeking external funding. These two activities make academics aware of the complexities surrounding their institutions. Academics no longer work in ivory towers, with their duties limited to teaching in classrooms and researching in laboratories.
They have to look for external funding from such bodies as the National Research Commission and other sponsoring organizations. They also contribute to the management of their university. A survey carried out by the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE 1991) showed that teaching (46 per cent) and research (41 per cent) accounted for most of staff time, with administrative tasks accounting for the rest. It appears, however, that time spent on administration and management has increased in institutions recently.

Participation by academics in managing universities, along with administrative staff, is part of the democratic principles enacted by the LRU. The balance between the Gerente (general manager) and the executive (the democratically elected rector and appointed vice-rector from amongst professors and senior lecturers) normally depends on the bargaining abilities of the parties. There is always conflict between administrative efficiency and democratic accountability, against a background of financial pressures. Although the Gerente exert considerable power upon budgetary allocations, most provisions are the results of negotiations among teaching and administrative staff. Teaching staff also contribute to the government and management of their institutions by participating in the different committees, sub-committees, institutes and departments servicing the institution, where most posts are elected ones. Academics also have to seek external contracts, not only to supplement their salaries but also to provide funds for their departments. This is because general university funds may not be sufficient to pay for travelling expenses, information technology or research. Universities receive 15 per cent of each external contract and a proportion is directed to departments. Many research and other activities are financed by these funds. The increasing role that administrative tasks and fund raising play in institutions shows that the academic profession is becoming more flexible in carrying out its multi-functions.

Conclusion

Student enrolments have increased during the 1990s and staff student ratios are worsening, while students are concentrated in Madrid, Barcelona and the old universities. Though efforts have been made by governments to invest in higher education and meet expanding demand for it, this has not reduced the problems associated with the massification of university education. Besides growth in spending on universities, other measures have aimed at granting greater autonomy to universities to enable them to manage their resources more efficiently. The historical evolution of higher education in Spain is undoubtedly linked with the dependence of universities on the state, or church, for its resourcing and the setting of policy. Nevertheless, some factors are still undermining the ability of higher education institutions to avoid political control over them. Eighty per cent of their budgets stems from regional authorities on a non-competitive basis, while universities are not entirely free to hire permanent staff, nor allowed to
compete for the best students nationally as enrolments are restricted by territorial limits.

Though legislation has been tried to limit clientalism within universities, the traditional power of the professorial corps has resisted legal enactments, largely because of their autonomy within the system. Patronage can still counter meritocracy in determining tenure. This might be increasingly challenged in the future since, as resources are diminishing, and tenure seekers are increasing, the support of particular candidates will have to be determined purely on merit, if the decisions of evaluation commissions are to be justified. Public examination competitions for professorships and lectureships with only one candidate, with other candidates being actively discouraged, are also things of the past. Previous acceptance of clientalist arrangements by non-tenured staff are weakening, as the academic labour market fails to absorb the surplus of qualified personnel seeking academic appointments and universities become the main source of employing those holding doctoral qualifications. In the natural sciences, clientalist patterns have already weakened, with recruitment being based on objective criteria such as publishing in referred journals but this is still not the case in the social sciences and humanities. Continued financial pressures, however, are likely to enforce further changes on the nature and tasks of the academic profession, in the short and medium terms. But the present tensions between an old tenured elite and a new emerging meritocracy are as yet unresolved.

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MAP (Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas) (1990) *Catedráticos de Universidad*. Madrid, MAP.

MAP (Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas) (1990a) *Profesores Titulares de Universidad*. Madrid, MAP.


Despite changes in its structure and functions in recent years, Swedish higher education retains deep-rooted notions of uniformity and nationwide equality, reflecting its traditionally close relationship with the state. In fact, the first Swedish university, in Uppsala, was founded 1477 but it was not until the beginning of the seventeenth century that two other universities were founded, one in Dorpat in present Estonia and the other in Turku in present Finland, at that time outer parts of the then far-reaching kingdom of Sweden. These state universities were mainly responsible for training higher civil servants, a necessity for the expanding national state during Sweden’s hegemony in northern Europe. Another major university was founded in Lund at the end of the seventeenth century. These universities were governed by a strict examination system, reflecting the demands of grammar schools, church and the judicial system. Over the years, they received only modest endowments, fees and other non-state income (Svensson 1987; Liedman 1992). After 1815 only Uppsala and Lund remained Swedish. At the end of the last century, two new higher education institutions were founded by private initiatives, in Stockholm and Göteborg, as alternatives to the two traditional universities, with the aims of meeting the new demands of a modernizing society. These institutions gradually extended their activities to professional training programmes and received state subsidies and status as universities. An Institute of Economics was also established in Stockholm by private initiative. Specialized institutions in medicine and technology (the Karolinska Institute, Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm and Chalmers Institute of Technology in Göteborg) consolidated their positions as professional training institutes, by obtaining resources for research and the right to award doctoral degrees. In addition to these institutions, a large number of state, county and municipal post-secondary institutions, such as teacher training colleges and schools of nursing, were established in the latter part of the nineteenth century. A common feature of these was the expectation that they should serve the needs of society by providing vocationally oriented education.
Recent reforms of Swedish higher education

During this century, higher education has moved away from an elite system to a mass system, marked by broader access, greater diversity of disciplines and students and a wider range of purposes. An initial period of expansion took place in the 1960s, mainly in the faculties of humanities and social sciences, to meet the new demands of the labour market, culminating in extensive reforms in 1977. The Government funded new universities and colleges but without providing them with resources for research. A new system of financial support for students was implemented, a measure also contributing to expansion. In 1977, the Government reformed higher education, integrating all post-secondary education into a single uniform system (högskola). The total number of study places in every programme and at every institution was decided by government (the numerus clausus principle). And, until 1989, the state also planned each area of study. Expansion was also met by bringing about a separation of undergraduate teaching from research. Funding for undergraduate studies was earmarked to courses based on fixed numbers of student places, while funding for research and research training was devolved to faculties. A new academic post of university lecturer with full-time teaching duties, mainly in undergraduate programmes, was created.

The need for deregulating and decentralizing higher education was later identified by the Social Democrats, who gradually retreated from their earlier policy of centralization, espousing the cases for increased student participation, decentralization and democratization of higher education (Askling and Almén 1997). However, there was no change in the number of student places and capacity was stabilized in the 1980s, with a total of about 180,000–188,000 enrolled students, despite increased applications for places in higher education. At the beginning of the 1990s, the incoming Conservative Minister of Education and Science took further steps towards decentralization and deregulation and implemented a new higher education policy, based on a critique of the Social Democrat’s policies of centralization and keeping student numbers constant (Swedish Ministry of Higher Education and Science 1993). The Higher Education Act 1993 was passed and a new system for allocating resources set up. Institutions were now free to decide on matters which were previously determined by government, such as organizing courses, using resources and determining their internal organization. On the other hand, they also faced new demands for accountability. Financial separation of undergraduate education from research was retained. At the same time, the system adjusted to a second period of substantial expansion. Since the early 1990s, the total numbers applying for higher education have steadily increased and now the pressure has been met by a large expansion of student places. However, the numerus clausus principle was not abandoned, which means that the number of student places in each programme of every institution is still decided by government. Although there has been about a 50 per cent
increase in places since 1990, as many as one-third of applicants are refused admission.

State resources for research expanded substantially in the 1970s and 1980s. National research councils, funded by the state and governed by representatives of the research community, were established and researchers were invited to apply for grants. Grants were distributed directly to researchers and their departments. This also contributed to the separation of research from teaching. Over the centuries, higher education institutions had been run collegially by tenured staff. Professors had substantial administrative and political powers and rectors were elected by academic colleagues. The hierarchical transmission of academic authority and legitimation of professorial power were evident in institutional governance. Swedish institutions, however, never had the legal autonomy of Anglo-Saxon universities. Coordination and planning at national level were mediated by central planning bodies (Lane 1992; Liedman 1992).

One aim of the 1977 reforms was to increase the influence of public and vocational interests in decision-making, thus breaking the traditional dominance of academics in higher education. It also aimed at preventing higher education institutions from expanding undergraduate education into directions not corresponding with labour market needs. Representatives of public interests had places on university boards, nominated by political bodies, industry, trade and the arts. Societal interests also impacted on the content of undergraduate education through local programme committees. In the 1993 reforms, the autonomy and power of academic staff were strengthened and numbers of external representatives were reduced in decision-making on undergraduate issues. On the other hand, the majority of members on university boards now consist of external interests. Demands by government for additional, external funding have gradually made higher education institutions aware of the importance of strategically managing their resources and penetrating new markets of higher education. In some cases, institutional measures towards 'localized centralism' have been tried. This is contrary to what is expected by the academic profession, who normally want more local academic freedoms rather than less. So, whilst the 1977 reforms aimed at rational planning, within a uniform structure and central governance of higher education, the 1993 reforms aimed at facilitating change and creating flexibility by extensive deregulation and decentralization of the higher education system.

Current structure of higher education

For many centuries, Sweden was religiously, ethnically and linguistically homogeneous. Yet today approximately one million of its 8.7 million population are immigrants, including citizens from other Nordic countries or those having at least one migrant parent (Swedish Ministry of Education and Science 1996). The national language is Swedish, except in the very
north where there is a Finnish-speaking population and the Sami (Lapps). About 40 per cent of the workforce is employed in the public sector. Parliament is the country's highest decision-making authority. With the exception of six years of non-socialist rule (1976–82), the Social Democrats were in power from 1932 to 1991, either alone or in coalition with other parties. In 1991, the non-socialist parties collectively won a majority and ruled for three years but at the 1994 election, the Social Democrats returned to power, forming a minority government. A characteristic feature of the Swedish administrative system is a division of tasks between ministries and administrative agencies. Ministries are mainly concerned with preparing governmental bills, issuing laws and setting out general rules for administrative agencies which are then responsible for implementing policy. Given these contexts, the overall purpose of higher education in Sweden is to provide students with specific knowledge and skills, give them the ability to make independent and critical judgements, enable them to solve problems and help them understand the development of knowledge within their academic disciplines. Higher education is also aimed at improving students' ability to communicate and exchange information at an analytical, scientific level (Swedish Code of Statutes 1992: Högskolelagen – The Higher Education Act). Over the years, in addition to the personal benefits provided by higher education, it has been accepted that higher education should also serve the needs of society and the labour market. These expectations, however, have been expressed in different ways by Conservative and Social Democratic governments, in terms of distributing resources and impact on the curriculum. But irrespective of political majority, higher education institutions are increasingly being exhorted to be sensitive to external needs and fulfil the so-called ‘third mission’ of higher education, i.e. satisfying community needs (Regeringens proposition (Government proposal) 1996–97: 1).

Since 1977, practically all post-secondary education has been incorporated into a single system, the högskola. It now includes 75 institutions, with substantial variations regarding governance, size, research, programmes, staffing and student numbers (Högskoleverket 1996c). Most higher education institutions are state ones, broadly of four types: universities, specialized institutions with research resources, university colleges and university colleges of art. As indicated in Table 10.1, in 1994–95, seven universities and three specialized institutions formed the major elements of the state sector. In Stockholm there are, in addition, an institute of teacher education, a university college of physical and sports education and seven university colleges of fine arts. Collectively, these institutions enrol about two-thirds of all students and represent 83 per cent of total state (and local authority) expenditure on higher education. There are also 16 small and medium-sized university colleges in the state sector, without either research income or rights to award degrees. These enrol about 25 per cent of all students and represent 11 per cent of higher education expenditure. It is these colleges which provided a large part of higher education expansion in the 1990s. They are not organized by academic discipline in the same way as
Table 10.1 Swedish higher education institutions, 1994–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Number of institutions</th>
<th>Number of full-time equivalent students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universities and specialized institutions with permanent resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State sector</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>130,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University colleges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State sector</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University colleges of art</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State sector</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges for health sciences</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other institutions</td>
<td>(Gotland)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>213,071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


'old' universities. Neither do they provide the same breadth of programmes and courses. In 1994–95, there were also 26 county council colleges for health sciences, some of which have subsequently become state university colleges. About 10 per cent of students are enrolled in these colleges, representing some 5 per cent of state higher education spending.

Despite substantial variations in terms of size, research facilities, composition of staff, student numbers and capacity for getting external funding, all institutions providing undergraduate education are required to teach on a 'scientific basis'. Hence there are demands from university colleges for research funding and even university status. In response, the Social Democratic government has said, in principle, that it is in favour of a more even distribution of research resources. Turning to funding, we observe from Table 10.2 that direct government sources accounted for 67 per cent of revenues reported by higher education institutions in 1994–95 (Högskoleverket 1996c). County council allocations, mainly to colleges of health sciences, accounted for 3 per cent of the total. The remaining 3 per cent consisted of research grants from externally commissioned activities, although most of this so-called external funding is also, in fact, state funding.

In 1994–95, over four-fifths of full-time equivalent staff in Swedish higher education were accounted for by universities or specialized institutions, about 11 per cent in small and medium-sized colleges and the rest in colleges of
Table 10.2 Total costs of Swedish higher education, 1994–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>US$ millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State universities and university colleges</td>
<td>3160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University colleges of health sciences</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private universities and university colleges</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student financial support</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4346</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Högskoleverket (1996b).

health care and colleges of art. In terms of student numbers, in 1994–95, there were almost 270,000 students at Swedish universities and colleges. The number of new recruits was approximately 63,000 (Högskoleverket 1996b). The proportion of students under 21 has almost doubled in the past five years. One reason is the high rate of unemployment. Another is new rules for admission which make it easier for younger students to gain entry to higher education. Compared with other western countries, the average age of Swedish students is still relatively high. About 30 per cent go on to higher education institutions after completing their secondary schooling, a figure lower than in many other western countries. One reason for this is the relatively low economic benefits in estimated life income arising out of higher education (SACO 1994). Social stratification strongly influences student recruitment, despite the explicit aim of the 1977 reforms to promote access and mobility by integrating higher education into a single system. In the last few years, the numbers of young people entering higher education have increased among all social groups but especially among students whose parents are salaried, intermediate non-manual workers. There are also differences regarding the kind of institution and programmes for which students apply. University colleges recruit more students from working-class homes than do older universities (Statistics Sweden 1994). Many entrants from working-class homes go on to shorter (i.e. two- or three-year) programmes which, prior to 1977, were not considered to be ‘higher education’, such as nursing, pre-school teaching and teacher education. The proportion of women in Swedish higher education in 1994–95 was 57 per cent. Men’s and women’s subject choices, however, are still bound by tradition: men tend to dominate technology and sciences and women teaching and health-related sciences.

The players in higher education

Prime responsibility for Swedish higher education rests with Parliament, with government controlling educational activities and national objectives.
National and local educational authorities, in turn, implement these activities, in line with national policy. Universities and colleges now report directly to government on enrolments, pass rates and financial matters and institutions negotiate three-year contracts with government, stipulating numbers of student places and expected pass rates. They are allocated a lump sum, based on these contracts, for undergraduate education, but how this is allocated within institutions is locally determined, as is the curricula. Student grants and loans remain centrally administered, separate from the university system. Funding for research and postgraduate education is still earmarked to individual faculties. In contrast with the 1960s and 1970s, there has been no increase in real funding for higher education in the 1990s. Institutions now have to use their resources more efficiently and take difficult decisions on internal priorities and utilization of resources, thus injecting an element of managerialism into institutions. The National Agency for Higher Education (Högskoleverket) is responsible for exerting control over institutions by national audits, accrediting the awarding of degrees and establishing professorships in those higher education institutions without research funds. The Agency has adopted a different strategy from other models of assessment and quality assurance. The Swedish model strongly emphasizes institutional responsibility for monitoring quality, thus supporting the shift towards a self-regulating model of institutional governance (Högskoleverket 1996a).

Although the state is the paymaster, institutions now have more direct responsibility and independence as employers than previously. The right to establish lectureships was given in the 1960s and, since 1993–94, each university and college is entitled to establish permanent professorships. There are now as many employers in Sweden as there are higher education institutions. In central wage negotiations, the state is represented by the National Swedish Agency for Government Employers. In local wage negotiations, employers are represented by university rectors. Over the years, institutional autonomy for local negotiations has increased in establishing posts, appointing staff and determining salaries. In 1994–95, the total number of full-time equivalent staff at Swedish universities and colleges was about 40,000. Some 46 per cent were teachers and researchers, with professors making up about 10 per cent of this group. Almost 37 per cent were technical and administrative staff, 14 per cent postdoctoral students and 3 per cent library staff.

Higher education staff are organized in unions mainly by occupation and/or educational background. The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO) is a non-political association of 24 independent staff associations. Members belong to one of its 24 constituent bodies and collectively there were more than 399,000 members in 1995. SACO members are professional workers such as architects, lawyers, dentists, university teachers, higher secondary school teachers, teachers in comprehensive schools, librarians, engineers, physicians, researchers and so on. Members are employed by state, county, municipal or private employers. The associations with the
largest representation in higher education are the Swedish Association of University Lecturers with 13,500 members, Swedish Medical Association with 1600 in higher education and the Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers with 4300 in higher education institutions. In all, about 80–85 per cent of academic staff are members of one (or in some cases more than one) SACO association. Most remaining academic staff are represented by the Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO). Teachers’ organizations and other employees’ organizations are entitled, under the Co-determination Act 1976, to receive information and influence managerial decisions within higher education institutions. Representatives are also entitled to attend and speak at university and faculty boards.

Structure of the academic profession

Academic staff are grouped as professors, researchers, senior lecturers, junior lecturers, research assistants and doctoral students. To be appointed as professors, researchers and senior lecturers, a doctoral degree is required. Since 1986, a variety of duties are expected of academic staff. These include teaching, research, personal study, counselling and administration. Within the overall working year of 1757 hours, a maximum teaching load (there is no minimum) is specified for each staff grade. The requirements are 473 hours of teaching per year for junior lecturers, 300 for senior lecturers and 86 for professors. There are, however, wide variations in the tasks and working conditions of staff, depending on their competences, formal position and faculty affiliation. Hence the maximum 1757 hours can be used in a variety of ways. Senior lecturers must have a doctorate, and are expected to be active in both teaching and research, but junior lecturers are not required to have a doctorate. About 51 per cent of academic staff have doctoral degrees, with differences between universities and specialized institutions. Sixty-six per cent of university staff have doctoral degrees, while in small and medium-sized university colleges only 2 per cent have. In small and medium-sized university colleges, there are, in general, no professors. Within universities and specialized university institutions, there are substantial variations across faculties regarding the qualifications of staff. Professors are most frequently appointed in faculties of medicine, while almost half the staff in faculties of social sciences are junior lecturers. In law faculties, the large proportion of professors reflects the traditional high standing of this academic discipline. In faculties of technology, the proportion of junior lecturers is also fairly high, at around 30 per cent of the total, as shown in Table 10.3.

In the 1970s and 1980s, universities expanded their research activities while regional university colleges concentrated on undergraduate teaching, thus creating a de facto binary division between institutions. Over the last three years, staffing resources in small and medium-sized university colleges
Table 10.3  Distribution of the academic profession in Swedish higher education by faculty, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Professors</th>
<th>Senior Lecturer</th>
<th>Junior Lecturers</th>
<th>Research assistants</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities and divinity</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sciences</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine, pharmacy, medical, dental</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural sciences</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>4287</td>
<td>2645</td>
<td>1084</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

have increased by 33 per cent and in universities between 10 per cent and 20 per cent, while staffing at specialized university institutions has remained static. This indicates that current expansion has been met mainly within small and medium-sized university colleges. Staff student ratios (SSRs) can be expressed in two ways: number of students per employee (i.e. total staff) or number of students per faculty staff (i.e. teachers and researchers). Using these concepts, we observe that universities and specialized university institutions have about 11 students per teaching and research personnel (academic staff) and seven students per employee (all staff). Small and medium-sized university colleges have 24 students per teaching and research personnel (academic staff) and 15 students per employee (all staff) (Statistics Sweden 1995).

Since 1985, as the total number of undergraduates has increased, so too has the number of academic staff – but more slowly. There has been about a 45 per cent increase in student numbers and a 21 per cent increase in total staff, as shown in Table 10.4. In 1984, professors, senior and junior and hourly-paid teachers represented 34 per cent of all staff, whereas in 1995 the figure was 36 per cent (Statistics Sweden 1995). During this period, the proportion of professors was fairly constant at about 11 per cent of all academic staff and about 5 per cent of total staff. Researchers, in turn, have decreased by 27 per cent. This apparent reduction in numbers of researchers is, however, misleading, as the figures reflect volume of appointments rather than volume of work in teaching or research. A few years ago, many researchers applied for permanent positions as lecturers. Having been appointed, they were relieved from teaching to do research.

In 1994, 71 per cent of higher education teachers were men and 29 per cent women (Högskoleverket 1996b) and the proportion of women in jobs requiring a PhD was low. Amongst senior lecturers 22 per cent were women and among postdoctoral fellows 26 per cent. The pattern is similar in all faculties and higher education sectors, with the proportion of women in junior posts being higher than those in senior ones. Only 7 per cent of professorships were held by women in 1994 (Högskoleverket 1996c). The proportion of men and women in higher positions is similar. Ninety-three per cent of professors, 88 per cent of heads of departments, 90 per cent of deans, 80 per cent of pro-deans, 80 per cent of rectors and most registrars are men. Few women are in managerial and leadership positions. One-third of academic staff is 35 years or younger, about 50 per cent between 35 and 54; 15 per cent is 55 or older. A particular feature of the Swedish academic profession is its low geographical mobility. The academic profession today is characterized by the separation of teaching and research, as established during the 1960s and 1970s. The bulk of undergraduate teaching is done by lecturers, whilst professors concentrate on research and research management, resulting in a schism in academic work, even though the ideal of an integrated profession lives on.
Table 10.4  Numbers of academic staff in Swedish higher education, 1985–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic year</th>
<th>Professors</th>
<th>Researchers &amp; research assistants</th>
<th>Senior &amp; junior lecturers</th>
<th>Temporary teachers</th>
<th>Doctoral students</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>1,484</td>
<td>4,054</td>
<td>7,026</td>
<td>2,489</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>16,621</td>
<td>32,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>4,068</td>
<td>6,873</td>
<td>2,284</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>16,631</td>
<td>32,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>3,994</td>
<td>7,142</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>16,301</td>
<td>32,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988/89</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>3,841</td>
<td>7,581</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td>16,294</td>
<td>33,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989/90</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>3,827</td>
<td>7,803</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>2,358</td>
<td>16,134</td>
<td>33,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>3,805</td>
<td>7,826</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>2,698</td>
<td>15,519</td>
<td>33,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991/92</td>
<td>1,858</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td>8,457</td>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>3,312</td>
<td>15,981</td>
<td>35,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/93</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>2,695</td>
<td>8,984</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>4,019</td>
<td>16,342</td>
<td>35,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>2,766</td>
<td>9,471</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>5,121</td>
<td>16,556</td>
<td>37,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>2,002</td>
<td>2,997</td>
<td>9,864</td>
<td>1,663</td>
<td>5,691</td>
<td>16,505</td>
<td>38,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>2,953</td>
<td>10,073</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>5,823</td>
<td>16,399</td>
<td>39,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%changes 1985–95</td>
<td>+34.1%</td>
<td>-27.2%</td>
<td>+43.4%</td>
<td>-10.5%</td>
<td>+571.4%</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>+20.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Human resources management and the academic profession

The close relationship between the state and universities in Sweden appears to imply that universities are subordinate to the state in recruiting and appointing academic staff and that the academic corps views itself as public servants or servants of the state. Indeed, members of the Swedish academic profession are state employees (Svensson 1987; Lane 1990, 1992). In practice, however, although Swedish universities have never had the same legally autonomous status common to Anglo-Saxon universities, the impartiality of the state and autonomy of academics have been protected in making appointments through a highly formalized, independent and rigorous refereeing system. This tradition is still reflected in the rules governing staffing in universities and university colleges.

Nowadays, though it is institutions which establish new posts, the selection of professors, lecturers and research assistants is still governed by central regulations, despite flexibility and variety of local arrangements. The appointment of faculty staff is handled by special appointments boards, subordinate to faculty boards but not to institutional boards or departments. The procedure aims at achieving a high level of quality control and, in addition, allowing for fair and objective treatment of all candidates. All documents are public. In making appointments to tenured professorships, there is a high cost in achieving fairness because of the time invested in the refereeing system. From advertisement to appointment, the time-span might be as long as two years. The procedure gives priority to traditional academic criteria, as defined by appointment boards and candidates' referees. In addition, people who do not want, for a variety of reasons, to make it public that they are interested in a certain position can refrain from getting involved in such a prolonged, public process. In particular, the system might inhibit some people in the private sector from applying for academic posts. While the procedure has its critics, it has not been abandoned, as it is considered to prohibit nepotism and opportunism. Many departments now try to take a more active part in recruiting professors, by encouraging candidates to apply, thus engaging in a head-hunting exercise before a formal appointment is made.

Some institutions have worked out their own recruitment policies, in which appointment boards are required to take account of specific criteria in assessing candidates. These include teaching experience, examining experience, supervisory and administrative experience, the planning and leading of research and personnel management. To date, although appointment boards have revised their procedures, it is still academic qualifications and research records which play the dominant part in making appointments at all levels. In a recently published report, commissioned by government, a new system for assessing the qualifications of applicants to the academic profession, including professorships, is proposed. More credit is to be given to pedagogical skills and the teaching experience of applicants. If accepted,
Table 10.5 Salaries for academic staff at Linköping University (US$), 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>56,304</td>
<td>41,400–71,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior lecturer</td>
<td>41,892</td>
<td>36,432–59,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research assistant</td>
<td>37,260</td>
<td>35,604–42,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior lecturer</td>
<td>32,208</td>
<td>24,012–42,593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Linköping University, Division of Personnel Management (1996).

it will be necessary to work out appropriate methods for assessing teaching skills of academic staff, thus strengthening the roles of departmental heads.

Regarding pay, each higher education institution now has to formulate its own salary policy and conditions of employment, within the overall framework laid down in general collective agreements between the state, staff associations and unions. General levels of salaries for academic staff, however, are lower than those in many other countries (SACO 1994) and this has been a source of constant dissatisfaction among academics for some time (SACO 1994; Bauer and Henkel 1996). Yet this is true for almost all qualified personnel in Sweden. Variations in salaries within a national framework is a new feature of the Swedish public sector. Table 10.5 gives some figures of salaries at one university in 1996. To these amounts, individual payments might be added for special duties, such as deanships, headships and other posts of responsibility.

Another contemporary feature of higher education in Sweden is the increasing use of personal contracts covering salaries and conditions of employment for academic staff. This individual variation in terms and conditions is found not only between faculties and departments but also within departments. Under these arrangements, factors such as individual skills and personal performance play a significant role in determining salaries. Assessments forming the basis for such decisions have to be made by heads of departments, thus adding a new, tricky and powerful dimension to their jobs. In order to standardize this assessment, and be more open, a new scheme is being prepared and tried out in some institutions. It gives guidance on grading the value and worth of particular tasks of staff. In this scheme, factors such as professional knowledge and job outcomes are taken into account when individual performance is assessed.

In the last few years, some university colleges have been successful in attracting researchers and teachers as associate professors and senior lecturers, by offering them higher salaries and more attractive working conditions than universities. This is an important strategy for these institutions, which are trying to initiate research and raise the status of undergraduate teaching. Yet geographical mobility is low in Swedish higher education and there is little career mobility as in the Anglo-Saxon system, where the reputation of institutions encourages individuals to move from one university
to another during their professional lives. This means that in Sweden relatively few academics apply for positions outside their own institutions, once they have achieved internal promotion.

Within the bureaucratic rules provided by the state’s appointment procedures, promotions from junior to senior lecturer can only be made where formal requirements are fulfilled and the procedure followed. Thus the Swedish system does not allow for promotion on grounds other than stated, academic ones. However, it is now allowing more flexibility and many junior lecturers without doctoral degrees are being encouraged to apply for financial support to do graduate programmes and take doctoral qualifications. Rewards for academic staff are also provided through reductions in teaching loads for doing research. Unfortunately, this gives signals that teaching is less attractive and less rewarding than research, while promotion can take academic staff away from teaching to administration, as directors of studies, vice rectors and so on. As such tasks are often time-consuming and hard to combine with research, promotion is not always valued by staff and is sometimes perceived as a form of ‘temporary compulsory service’ to the academic community. Finally, a few years ago, the new title ‘assistant professor’ was introduced for appointing staff with solid all-round academic reputations.

In its concern for quality in undergraduate teaching and its wish to upgrade teaching, government allocated extra funding to institutions in 1993. This was done in proportion to the size of their undergraduate populations, pedagogical developments and willingness to train teachers. Additionally, institutions are expected to have a quality assessment system, audited by the National Agency of Higher Education. They have to indicate what measures are being taken to support their quality programme. This has been an incentive for establishing teaching support units. The prospective use of pedagogical assessments as formal criteria in promoting staff will also provide incentives to prioritize pedagogic issues. However, budgets are generally tight, as is the time for in-service training, and academic staff have heavier work-loads than in the past, as well as trying to get extra funding for research.

Following a long tradition, academic participation in managing institutions was mainly formal and ceremonial and was carried out within the long-standing model of state regulation. Now academic staff make up majorities on faculty boards. Indeed, in the reforms of 1993, their position was strengthened. In departmental boards, faculty members also make up a majority. So academic representation is strong within institutions. On the other hand, since institutions are now legally independent, the formal powers of their boards have increased and external members, now in the majority, can coordinate their activities and exert substantial influence on internal decision-making. Since 1993, deans are appointed by rectors, after an election among members of faculty. Heads of departments are also appointed by rectors, after less formalized elections. The rector is appointed in a similar manner: elected by an electoral board comprising representatives
of academic staff, administrative staff and students, nominated by the institutional board and appointed by government. The normal term of office for a rector is six years and for deans and heads three years.

Collegiality has a long tradition in Sweden and collegiality is still a predominant issue in appointments to deanships and headships. However, once elected and appointed, the dual accountability of office holders, to their constituencies and the corporate body, is ambiguous. Deans, for example, speak for faculties but, in many universities, have become members of the steering or executive committee of their institution, headed by the rector, and are thus faced with twin pressures on their loyalties: the colleagues electing them and the rector who has appointed them. As a result, it is becoming more difficult for deans and heads to return to their original positions after their periods of office. With increased demands on institutional management, due to decentralization and decreases in funding, leadership positions are becoming increasingly onerous for those holding them.

Conclusion

The massification of Swedish higher education started in the 1970s but it was not until recently that Swedish notions of structural uniformity and homogeneity were questioned (Utbildningsdepartementet 1993a). The Higher Education Reform Act 1993 was a break with traditional forms of central governance of undergraduate education. The major, radical change was the shift from state governance, through regulation and control of inputs, to governance through control of outcomes, using external forces to act upon institutions. The influence of current UK higher education policy is evident, as is experience from the United States. But the new governance has been implemented in an air of trust and not distrust, as seems to have been the case in the UK (Trow 1993). Further, it has been implemented within the tradition of a strong centralized state. What the reforms have facilitated is a more independent, varied mandate for institutions and their staff. The earlier system gave each institution a fixed sum per programme/course, stable student numbers and predictable income. Now resources are allocated by faculties and departments, while they face, at the same time, increased student numbers and less real income. Devolving authority means that institutions have to make their own strategic decisions, taking account of the external environment. All this provides a dynamism within which higher education institutions and their staff have to manage funding, research and new types of students.

These changes have affected the inner life of higher education institutions, requiring modifications in their governance and management, thus redefining the roles of rectors and heads of departments. Rectors are spokespersons vis-à-vis government and external parties and need a vision of where their institutions are going, as well as acting as mediators amongst faculty interests. Heads of departments are executive leaders of operational
units, in which diversity of tasks, income and staffing have to be effectively managed. Deans have even more delicate positions as academic leaders and managers. Decentralization and more dependency on external funding have shifted some of the former powers of faculties to the top of institutions (i.e. the rectorate and institutional boards) and the bottom (i.e. heads of departments), thus weakening the intermediate level.

Decentralization of responsibility and the autonomy of institutions, faculty boards and departments has also meant delegating staffing and financial matters. For some, these tasks are looked upon as deprofessionalizing the academic profession (Bauer and Henkel 1996), as well as resulting in divisions between those who are involved in decision-making and those who are not. In the rhetoric of these reforms, buzz words of the 1970s such as ‘participation’ and ‘grassroots democracy’ have been replaced by ‘autonomy’, ‘academic freedom’, ‘academic leadership’ and ‘quality’, giving academics an impression that decentralization means increases in personal and collegial autonomy (Askling 1994; Askling and Almén 1997). From this perspective, the higher education reforms of 1993 might be seen less in terms of redistributing authority to the top of higher education institutions, under strong executive leadership, than in liberating the academic profession from a centralized, bureaucratic state. After the new Ordinance and resource allocation system was established, however, it was slowly realized that the new governance implied less desirable features: more local planning, restrictions on individual academics and more responsibilities for those in leadership positions (the decentralization paradox) and, in addition, due to financial restrictions, heavier teaching loads.

These changes have put new demands on the academic profession to improve its teaching skills and take an active part in institutional planning, not just giving lectures. Further, academics are also faced by increased demands to become involved in departmental, faculty or institutional decision-making, as well as taking on new administrative and financial tasks. They are also expected to raise funds for their departments and be research active. Further, some limited forms of human resources flexibilities are emerging; one being awarding deserving staff the title of assistant professor. In addition, a probable outcome could be to encourage institutions to specify, before recruiting staff, the relative weights to be given to qualifications, research, teaching skills and academic leadership. With the prospects of heavier teaching loads, and more diverse students, not to mention staff appraisals, quality assessments, competition for research funding and added administrative responsibilities, academic staff might respond by looking for functional specialization of one kind or another, thus leading to a redefinition of the roles of the academic profession, as seems to be the case in other countries (Kogan et al. 1994; El-Khawas 1995). Indeed, the Swedish academic profession might be moving towards internal diversification or a ‘multi-profession’. There is, however, also strong support for maintaining diversity of academic tasks and expecting all staff to take on a range of professional tasks and activities.
In summary, the 1990s have seen extensive changes in Swedish higher education. These include its governance, structure, internal organization, funding, numbers of undergraduates and funding per student. All these have introduced elements of diversity and change in higher education institutions and are reinforcing managerialist tendencies rather than collegial models of governance. In a nation dominated by egalitarian principles, especially in education, it is paradoxical that the academic profession, as in some other countries, now appears to be becoming less equal and more diverse. This inequality shows itself between those who teach and research, those involved with undergraduates and those bidding for research funds and those who manage and teach.

References

The United Kingdom: End of the Donnish Dominion?

David Farnham

Higher learning in the British isles emerged with the creation of 'schools' at Oxford and Cambridge during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. According to Southern (1986), the main reason for this was the need of the 'great men' in medieval Britain, kings, bishops and landowners, to have the services of literate and scholastically trained men to conduct their affairs. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the universities of Oxford (1214) and Cambridge (1290) slowly became established and widened their curriculum to include, besides legal training, theology, medicine and liberal arts. Endowed halls with a defined community life gradually replaced the original halls of residence, run solely on a commercial basis, thus establishing the college or collegiate system which was to dominate British universities for six centuries. Though these institutions were created to satisfy vocational needs, the curriculum became broader than just aiming to meet the needs of the early professions. Thus was created the dichotomy in the Anglo-Saxon model of university education: between promoting knowledge to satisfy the needs of society, by training some of its citizens in advanced learning for work, and promoting knowledge for its own sake, so that the university could act as the guardian and repository of objective truth. Before the Reformation, only three other small colleges were established at St Andrews (1411), Glasgow (1451) and Aberdeen (1495), with the first post-Reformation university being founded at Edinburgh in 1583.

For the next three centuries, change in these six 'ancient foundations' was slow and, in England, vocational training was pursued vigorously through professional bodies, especially in London. These included the Royal Society, Inns of Court and Royal Colleges of Medicine and Surgery. These trained practitioners, promoted learning and regulated professional competence. It was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that universities expanded and new ones emerged, in four broad 'waves of development', largely in response to the demands of industrialists, and later the state, for
trained experts in science and technology and other vocational fields. Following the creation of the first civic Universities of London (1836) and Durham (1837), the six ancient universities were incrementally joined, during the first wave (1832–1909), by a number of ‘old’ civic universities, based within the urban areas of Victorian Britain. These aimed at meeting the civic needs of the time and were structured on non-collegiate lines. They had originated as local colleges, supported by community business leaders and public subscriptions, and they sought to train people in relevant science and technologies to ensure that Britain kept up with its continental industrial competitors.

By the early twentieth century, Durham had merged with other institutions at Newcastle to form a federal university on Tyneside (1908), only to break up again later in the century. London, which by this time had become a large federal institution made up of a number of constituent colleges, had been joined by Queen’s College Belfast (1845), the federal University of Wales and six other old civic universities: Manchester (1880), Birmingham (1900), Liverpool (1903), Leeds (1904), Sheffield (1905) and Bristol (1909).

In a second wave of development (1881–1962), a tranche of six university colleges was created, first teaching external degrees of the University of London, which, apart from Reading (1926), became ‘new’ civic universities in their own right after the Second World War. These were: Nottingham (1948), Southampton (1952), Hull (1954), Exeter (1955) and Leicester (1957). The only new university formed during this period was at Keele (1962), though the University of Manchester incorporated the Manchester College of Science and Technology (now UMIST) as its faculty of technology in 1956.

The third wave of development corresponded with the creation of nine plate glass and 10 technological universities between 1961 and 1969, mainly following publication of the Robbins Report in 1963. Drawing largely on staff from established universities, plate glass institutions were built on greenfield sites, where there had been no existing university provision, such as at Sussex (1961), York and East Anglia (1963), Essex, Kent, Lancaster and Warwick (1964–65), Stirling (1967) and Ulster (1968). Around the same time, 10 former regional technical colleges, with extensive experience of teaching to degree level, were upgraded to universities, having been designated as Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATs) in 1956. These were: Strathclyde (1964), Aston, Bath, Bradford, Brunel, City, Loughborough, Surrey and Heriot-Watt (1966) and Salford (1967). Quite separately, the unique Open University was created in 1969 to provide higher education for part-time students, using innovative distance learning teaching methods.

Following the Further and Higher Education Act (FHEA) 1992, in a final, fourth wave of development, a large, diverse group of 33 polytechnics in England and Wales and 15 central institutions in Scotland were given university status, with powers to award their own degrees. These ‘new’, post-1992 universities had originally been under local authority (i.e. local
The United Kingdom: End of the Donnish Dominion?

government) control in England and Wales and the Scottish Education Department, as part of a binary higher education policy introduced in the 1960s (Robinson 1968). Their genesis lay in the teaching of external London degrees in ‘technical institutions’ from the 1890s onwards (Farnham 1974). In 1966, following an earlier speech by the Secretary of State, Anthony Crosland, a government white paper (Cmd 3006, 1966) defined their ‘distinctive’ function as providing predominantly professional and vocational diplomas and degrees, and some postgraduate work, often on a part-time basis, validated by the Council of National Academic Awards. They continued to do so for the next 25 years but, by 1992, what Pratt (1997: 306) describes as 'the polytechnic experiment' came to an end, 'almost casually', with none of the elaborate analysis of the alternatives advocated in the policy making literature.

Current structure of higher education

By the late 1990s, higher education in the UK had become an essentially unitary system, largely based on universities, but institutionally diverse. Although some 60 small, degree-awarding non-university colleges and institutes of higher education (CIHEs) in mainland Britain had survived, it was the ‘university’ model which dominated. The core elements in this model were the ‘gold standard’ of the three-year, ‘honours’ degree for undergraduate students and the research capacity of academic staff. Except for the independent (private) University of Buckingham (founded in 1973), it was a mainly state-funded, centrally-driven system, governed by common rules and regulations set down by central government agencies but managed locally. These central rules related to issues such as finance, assessing teaching quality, assessing research and other quality assurance matters.

Following the FHEA 1992, an interim Higher Education Funding Council (HEFC) replaced the former University Funding Council (UFC) and the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC). The HEFC, in turn, was subsequently supplanted by three national higher education funding councils, for England, Scotland and Wales. The two admission organizations, the Universities Central Council on Admissions and Polytechnics Central Admissions System, merged into a single body – the University Central Admissions Service. And the two lead bodies representing heads of universities and polytechnics – the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) and the Committee of Directors of Polytechnics – merged into a single organization, the CVCP.

The emergence of this unitary system was only possible because historically the idea of ‘the university’ had dominated the concept of higher education in the UK. It was a policy of ‘academic drift’; whatever diversity it inherited from the past, or created over the decades, was ‘transformed into universities’ (Trow 1995: 18). Yet what was formerly a status hierarchy of types of institutions – universities, polytechnics and colleges – was replaced
by a single hierarchy of 'universities'. Its member institutions, with different histories and resources, are now assessed by the same criteria, thus giving rise to 'winners' and 'losers' in the system. As Trow (1995: 18) indicates, the diversity likely to arise from these new arrangements is the creation of status groupings within the single hierarchy; research universities; research and teaching universities; and teaching universities. The varied origins and different historical roots of the university system, therefore, make it more of a pluralistic one than the common title 'university' suggests. Hence it would be legitimate to describe it as a single system, with institutional and organizational diversity.

There are differences, for example, between the 'old', pre-1992 universities and the 'new', post-1992 ones in their origins, purposes, styles of management, educational portfolios, research capacities and the ways in which they manage their staff. This arises out of the parallel development, since the nineteenth century, of both university and non-university institutions of higher education, epitomized by the binary policy from 1966 until 1992. Apart from Oxford and Cambridge, the pathway through which most universities emerged was from self-funded local institutions to state-funded national ones, such as the civics and ex-CATs. Once they were perceived to have reached the 'gold standard' of the honours degree and were doing research, government gave selected institutions university charters, while other higher education institutions, without charters, remained outside the system. A second, less common pathway was through setting up greenfield site universities (plate glass institutions) in response to perceived national demands for skilled personnel in the 1960s. This again kept out regional colleges and Scottish central institutions from the university 'club'. Excluded so long, these institutions -- many of which had originated as local colleges of technology early this century -- finally entered the system in 1992, but carried with them the legacies and baggage of their long histories, which in many respects were quite different from those of the old universities.

There is also diversity within the post-1992 university hierarchy. Each new university has its unique geographical location, academic strengths and weaknesses and perceived mission, while their size, history and links with their local communities vary widely. Other diversities within the system are sub-national, such as between Scottish universities and the rest of the UK. The most distinctive features of the Scottish system are its breadth and that students can enter university a year earlier than in other parts of the UK. With its three-year 'ordinary' or general degrees (confusingly called 'masters' degrees) and its four-year specialist degrees, Scotland's system is different from the three-year, first degrees common to English, Welsh and Northern Ireland universities. Welsh higher education, in turn, has a major role in sustaining Welsh language and literature, through research and scholarship.

Diversity also exists in the internal government of universities. This reflects, in part, the historic hegemony and standing of Oxford and Cambridge as institutions of higher learning. While Oxford and Cambridge are exceptional, they represent the traditional ideal of what the English university
is supposed to be about: self-governing autonomous institutions, seeking objective knowledge, led by a collegium of scholars – the so-called ‘donnish dominium’ (Halsey 1992). It was an ideal aspired to by most pre-1992 universities, as well as by the academic staff within them, though the reality may well have been different from the rhetoric (Moody and Eustace 1974). Post-1992 universities, on the other hand, have always been more managerial in their structures and less collegial in their systems of governance and administration. This was partly because of their former accountability to their local authority political masters and, in some cases, because of the strong personalities and professional backgrounds of those leading them.

Given the diversity of higher education in the UK, what then are its aims and objectives? Newman’s (1852) nineteenth-century liberal ‘idea of a university’, one which fused and preserved classical and Christian knowledge and denied the place of scientific research within it, had long been replaced, by the mid-twentieth century, by one with more secular, multidisciplinary and instrumental purposes. However, when the Committee on Higher Education (CHE 1963: 6f), chaired by Lord Robbins, asked this question it was unable to provide a simple answer. The committee concluded that ‘no simple formula, no answer in terms of any single aim, will suffice’. To do justice to the complexity of the issue, Robbins accepted that there was ‘a plurality of aims’. One was to instruct in skills suitable for individuals to play a part in the general division of labour. A second was to promote the general powers of the mind. A third was the advancement of learning and a fourth was ‘the transmission of a common culture and common standards of citizenship’. Robbins concluded that higher education institutions vary in both their functions and the ways in which they discharge them. In its view, though the extent to which each principle was realized in different institutions varied, there was ‘room for at least a speck of each in all’, while the system as a whole ‘must be judged deficient unless it provides adequately for all of them’.

Some 25 years later, another government-appointed committee, the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (NCIHE 1997a: 71f), chaired by Sir Ron Dearing, took the Robbins’ aims and objectives as its starting point. Following a consultation exercise by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, on what changes to the Robbins’ aims were needed to reflect changes in the contexts of higher education in the late 1990s, the committee recognized that a shift in the balance of these aims and some amplification of them were necessary. Accordingly, Dearing saw the overall aim of higher education as being to ‘enable society to make progress through an understanding of itself and its world: in short, to sustain a learning society’. Four broad purposes of higher education were identified as deriving from this central aim:

- to inspire individuals to develop their capacities to the highest potential levels throughout life, so that they grow intellectually, are well-equipped for work, can contribute effectively to society and achieve personal fulfilment;
• to increase knowledge and understanding for their own sake and to foster their application to the benefit of the economy and society;
• to serve the needs of an adaptable, sustainable, knowledge-based economy at local, regional and national levels;
• to play a major role in shaping a democratic, civilised, inclusive society.

The first purpose related to the needs of individuals, the other three to the needs of society.

When Robbins (CHE 1963) reported, there were 25 universities in Britain, six in the process of being formed, 153 colleges for educating and training teachers, 10 English CATs, six central institutions in Scotland and 25 regional colleges (which later formed the nucleus of the polytechnic sector). In 1961–62, they collectively had 161,250 full-time undergraduate or ‘advanced full-time students’. Universities had a further 19,350 postgraduates, regional colleges another 23,000 advanced part-time students and higher education institutions employed some 15,750 full-time teachers.

In 1996–97, there were, according to Dearing (NCIHE 1997a: 41), ‘176 higher education institutions in the UK of which 115 [were] titled universities’, including the constituent parts of the federal universities of London and Wales. Dearing reported that there were more than 1.6 million students studying in higher education institutions, of which 1.1 million were full-timers or on sandwich programmes and over half a million part-timers. It was also estimated that there were about 200,000 higher education students in further education colleges. By this time, higher education institutions employed some 100,000 full-time teaching or research staff and another 24,600 part-time teachers or researchers.

Excluding the constituent colleges of the federal universities of Oxford, Cambridge, London and Wales, the UK had 94 universities in 1997. Seventy-five of these were in England, two in Wales, 15 in Scotland and two in Northern Ireland. There were six ancient institutions, 19 civics, eight plate glass, 10 ex-CATs, 42 new universities and nine residual institutions, such as Cranfield University and the University of Buckingham, which did not fit neatly into the above classification. Looked at another way, over two-fifths (44.7 per cent) of them were post-1992 institutions and another fifth (20.2 per cent) were civics. Ancient, plate glass and ex-CATs collectively made up only about a quarter of university institutions. There were, in addition, 52 relatively small CIHEs in England and Wales, 11 colleges teaching at undergraduate and postgraduate levels in Scotland and two colleges of education in Northern Ireland.

Participation in higher education has increased substantially since Robbins. There was rapid growth in the 1960s, followed by a steadily rising plateau throughout the 1970s until the late 1980s and, after 1988, another period of rapid growth. In 1962–63, there were 321,000 students in higher education. Of these about a third (32 per cent) were studying for first degrees, some two-thirds (62 per cent) other undergraduate courses and 6 per cent were postgraduates. By 1979–80, out of 671,000 students over half (56 per
Table 11.1 Undergraduate and postgraduate students in UK higher education by gender, mode of study and age, 1962–63, 1979–80 and 1995–96 (%)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open University</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young(^a)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mature(^a)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \(^a\) undergraduates only.

cent) were reading for first degrees, a third (32 per cent) other undergraduate courses and 12 per cent were postgraduates. Sixteen years later in 1995–96, the number of students in higher education had risen to 1.5 million and, of these, just under three-fifths (60 per cent) were reading for first degrees, a quarter (26 per cent) for other undergraduate courses and 14 per cent were postgraduates. Between 1962–63 and 1995–96, in short, the numbers of students reading for first degrees increased by almost 800 per cent, excluding the Open University. This represented a participation rate of about a third of school leavers in the UK, with around 45 per cent in Scotland and Northern Ireland (NCIHE 1997b).

Table 11.1 shows, first, that between 1962–63 and 1995–96, the proportion of female students in higher education rose steadily, reaching almost half the total in 1995–96 although, in 1996–97, only '39 per cent of first year students studying full-time for research degrees were women' (NCIHE 1997b: 21). Second, the proportion of young students (under 25) steadily declined and the proportion of mature ones steadily rose, with the proportion of these being significantly higher in post-1992 universities than in pre-1992 institutions and most of whom were studying part-time. Third, despite the rapid increase in total student numbers, the proportions of full-time and part-time undergraduates and postgraduates remained relatively static over the same period. In 1995–96, students from ethnic minorities made up 13 per cent of student intakes on full-time first degree courses, proportionally more than were represented in the population at large. A greater proportion of these were mature students, who were concentrated in a few post-1992 universities. Robbins (CHE 1963) reported the under-representation of children of unskilled manual workers in higher education which still remained the case in 1995–95. Although the participation rate of this group had doubled to 10 per cent of total enrolments, it was still a fraction of that of children from professional families who made up 80 per cent of the total.
The players in higher education

The three major players in higher education are government, universities and staff. In essence the traditional roles of these three parties has been for government to determine policy and fund higher education, institutions to implement policy and organize it and staff to deliver it. During the first period of the binary system (1966–84), policy was relatively stable, based largely on the Robbins consensus and the 1966 White Paper. Central to this was the Robbins ‘axiom’ that ‘courses of higher education should be available for all those who are qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and wish to do so’ (CHE 1963: 8). This was supplemented by Crosland’s vision of separate but distinctive sectors of higher education – traditional universities and ‘new’ polytechnics. There was a state system of mandatory maintenance grants and tuition fees for undergraduates on approved courses, with local authorities responsible for paying these. Following the Robbins’ principles, the old universities steadily expanded their numbers, largely in response to student demand rather than to national needs, and the ‘new’ polytechnics were formally established, expanding their total student intakes from about 170,000 in 1965–66 to some 393,000 by 1991–92 (Pratt 1997).

Relations between the university authorities and successive governments were consensual for many years, with the Universities Grants Committee (UGC) playing a key role. Created in 1917, the UGC had a predominantly academic membership, nominated by the Secretary of State acting on advice of past members or university vice chancellors. Standing between government and universities, the UGC monitored university activities and advised government on university needs, national needs for higher education and policies to be adopted. It also had executive responsibility for allocating funds to institutions. In the early 1980s, however, the new Conservative administration, led by Margaret Thatcher, scaled down university funding and over the next few years the UGC responded to government policy by becoming increasingly intrusive in university affairs. From about 1984 onwards, corresponding with the latter phase of the binary system (1984–91), a policy based essentially on partnership was replaced by one of increasing control by government, exercised through the funding body – the UFC – which was set up as a successor to the UGC in 1989.

A parallel policy took place in the then polytechnic sector, though following reorganization of the colleges of education (i.e. teacher training colleges) after a White Paper in 1972 (Cmd 5174 1972), this technically became the 'polytechnics and colleges' sector (Locke et al. 1985). This meant that higher education in the non-university sector was no longer concentrated in 30 large polytechnics alone but was complemented by some 60 smaller CIHEs. When polytechnics were first established in the late-1960s, government had paid little attention to the funding mechanism. With the establishment of the first national funding body, the National Advisory Board in 1982, and the PCFC in 1988, government could direct institutions towards...
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**Figure 11.1** Main sources of funding for English higher education institutions, 1994–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Funding (US$m)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEA Fees</td>
<td>US$1584</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEFC Grant</td>
<td>US$855</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEFCE Funding</td>
<td>US$5542</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Councils</td>
<td>US$669</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Govt Expenditure</td>
<td>US$827</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Universities and Colleges
Total Income US$13,114m

- Overseas Fees: US$619m (4.5%)
- Residences & Catering: US$875m (6.5%)
- UK Charities: US$430m (3.5%)
- Other Research: US$47m (2.5%)
- Other Income: US$2196m (16.5%)

particular types of provision and increase their ‘efficiency’ (Turner and Pratt 1990: 19–33). Scott (1995) describes this relationship between higher education and the state as one which had shifted from a fiduciary basis to a contractual one, with the state being more concerned with auditing outputs than providing inputs. Institutions now had to compete with one another for funds, students and other sources of income. This shift in higher education policy, the removal of polytechnics and colleges from local authority control, their new legal status as corporate bodies (‘higher education corporations’) and the creation of the PCFC following the Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988 brought the convergence of the ‘old’ universities and the polytechnics closer. In the FHEA 1992, higher education was finally unified under an interim HEFC, which replaced the UFC and the PCFC, and the polytechnics were given university status.

Universities and colleges providing higher education receive funding from a variety of public and private sources. Figure 11.1 shows that, in 1994–95, the largest proportion of funding (over two-fifths) for English higher education institutions came from the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), with another major source of public funding being tuition fees. There is also a Higher Education Funding Council for Wales, a Scottish Higher Education Funding Council and in Northern Ireland funds are provided through the Department of Education. The mission of the HEFCE is ‘to promote high quality, cost-effective teaching and research within a financially healthy education sector, having regard to national needs’. Its role is to (HEFCE 1996: preface):
encourage institutions to meet demand from students cost-effectively, while promoting and assessing quality in education and research
• encourage diversity in the provision of higher education, a widening of access and greater opportunities
• to develop active partnerships with institutions, which fully recognise their autonomy
• encourage institutions to build on their strengths and expand their local, national and international roles
• encourage institutions to support these aims and ensure the effective and efficient use of their funds and assets, and delivery of value for money, through strengthening their managerial capabilities and the compilation of well-developed strategic plans.

Each year the HEFCE advises the Secretary of State for Education and Employment on the funding needs of higher education. Actual funds are decided by the government, voted by Parliament and announced by the Secretary of State during the budget statement at the end of November for the following financial year. The HEFCE is responsible for distributing these funds to over 140 higher education institutions, mainly universities, and about 70 further education colleges providing higher education.

Institutions are accountable to the HEFCE, and ultimately to Parliament, for using these funds but as ‘independent’, corporate or chartered bodies they are free to raise money from other sources, as indicated in Figure 11.1. The distributive methodology used by the HEFCE is to allocate funds to each university or college to support teaching, research and related activities as a ‘block’ grant. Higher education institutions are free to distribute this grant internally at their discretion, providing funds are used for the purposes for which they are designated. In 1996–97, total funding for teaching and research in England and Wales was US$5033 million, including US$464 million capital expenditure. Of this US$3558 million (70.7 per cent) was allocated for teaching, US$1021 million (20.3 per cent) for research and US$454 million (9 per cent) for ‘other related funding’. The latter includes liabilities inherited from higher education institutions previously under local authority control, copyright libraries and minority subjects (HEFCE 1996). In England and Wales, with similar arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland, tuition fees for full-time undergraduates were traditionally provided by the Department for Education and Employment and the Welsh Office to local education authorities (LEAs), together with maintenance grants, payable directly to individual students. These were known collectively as ‘mandatory awards’ provided out of general taxation. LEAs, the Student Awards Agency in Scotland and Department for Education in Northern Ireland paid tuition fees directly to institutions for qualifying students (i.e. award holders from the UK and other EU countries). Controversially, the current Labour government has proposed that undergraduates should pay their own tuition fees of some US$1600 per year, by borrowing the money on a means-tested basis. It also plans to abolish
what are now means-tested maintenance awards for students’ living expenses – supplemented by student loans administered by the Student Loans Company – which had replaced universal maintenance grants under the Conservatives.

Table 11.2 indicates the subjects and levels of courses, excluding doctoral work, provided by higher education institutions for the academic year 1994–95 and the distribution of students by subject area. Research conducted by the NCIHE (1997b) showed that the three-quarters of full-time students (76 per cent) were under 21 when they started their courses, while almost four-fifths of part-timers were over 25. Full-time students were more likely than part-timers to be attending pre-1992 universities, and pursuing degree courses, while slightly higher proportions of full-time than part-time students were studying sciences, social sciences and the creative arts. The converse was true for all other subjects. The strongest reasons why students went into higher education were instrumental, to help get a job or a better job (28 per cent) or pursue a particular career (18 per cent). Three-quarters (76 per cent) of full-time students were attracted to a particular institution

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### Table 11.2

Students in higher education institutions by subject areas in the UK, 1994–95 (000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Postgraduate</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ft</td>
<td>p-t</td>
<td>ft</td>
<td>p-t</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine and dentistry</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects allied to medicine</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological sciences</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary science</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical sciences</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematical sciences</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer science</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering &amp; technology</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture, building &amp; planning</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, economic and political studies</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business studies</td>
<td>113.1</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Librarianship &amp; information science</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative arts &amp; design</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>112.0</td>
<td>110.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>939.2</td>
<td>273.6</td>
<td>128.2</td>
<td>161.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: ft = full-time; p-t = part-time.*

*Source: Higher Education Statistics (CVCP 1995).*
Table 11.3 Total estimated staff employed in UK higher education, 1996–97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Full-time</th>
<th>Part-time</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior management</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other management</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>17,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching staff</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>20,900</td>
<td>91,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research staff</td>
<td>29,600</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>33,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretarial</td>
<td>44,500</td>
<td>18,600</td>
<td>63,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>26,700</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>29,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>18,600</td>
<td>24,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>7,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence staff</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>12,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers, etc.</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>23,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>225,400</td>
<td>92,400</td>
<td>317,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


because of its academic and teaching reputation. But the reasons why full-time students chose a particular course were different from those of part-timers. Some three-quarters (76 per cent) of full-timers chose a course for intellectual reasons, whereas part-timers were more pragmatic, with about a third (36 per cent) choosing course structure and proximity of the course to home.

Higher education is a major employer and it is universities and colleges which act as the legal employers of academic and non-academic staff. Since higher education institutions have been created by Act of Parliament, charter, statute or order-in-council, it is in these 'corporate' capacities that they act as 'employers' in the contractual relationship with individual members of staff working in them. Although definitive statistics of all those employed are not available, some indication of the total number of staff employed in higher education in 1996–97, and the wide range of jobs they do, is provided in Table 11.3. This shows that in 1996–97 over 300,000 people were employed by university and college institutions. The largest group was academic and research staff who made up almost two-fifths (39.4 per cent) of the total, followed by secretarial and clerical staff who made up about a fifth (19.9 per cent). Almost three-quarters (71 per cent) were full-timers, with the remaining quarter (29 per cent) part-timers. However, whereas virtually all (96.4 per cent) of senior management and over four-fifths of other management (88.7 per cent) and research staff (88.9 per cent) worked full-time (although many of the latter were on fixed-term contracts), almost three-quarters (72.8 per cent) of cleaning, catering and residence staff and two-fifths (41.8 per cent) of secretarial staff worked part-time. Even a quarter of teaching staff worked part-time (23 per cent). This suggests that staff
who were higher in the job hierarchy were more likely to be employed on full-time contracts, whereas those at lower levels were more likely to be employed on a part-time basis.

Historical data on academic staff numbers are difficult to access but it is generally recognized that recent increases in academic staff numbers have been less proportionate than increases in student numbers. With the massification of higher education, the sorts of professional issues facing the academic profession have included: larger teaching groups; increased teaching loads; new kinds of students; a higher volume of research; rising administrative loads; and more accountability to the authorities. 'Taken together, these developments represent a significant increase in the volume of work for individual academics and a change in its nature' (NCIHE 1997a: 30). Robbins found in the early 1960s that university teachers spent over a third (38 per cent) of their term time on teaching, guidance and examining, over a quarter (28 per cent) on research and 14 per cent on administration and meetings, with the rest spent on various professional activities. A survey by the NCIHE (1997c), covering the whole year, found that academics now typically spend over a third (35 per cent) of their time on teaching, guidance and assessment, a fifth (20 per cent) on research and 15 per cent on administration and management (30 per cent for professorial staff), with the rest spent on professional development.

Both university and college employers and their staff belong to representative organizations. The main university body is the CVCP. The CVCP was founded in 1917 and is a non-profit-making company, 'limited by guarantee'. It consists of the executive heads, normally university vice chancellors or principals, of over 100 UK universities with legal powers to award their own first and higher degrees. It exists to promote, encourage and develop universities and has three main aims. The first is to improve the funding, regulatory and marketing environment within which universities pursue their diverse missions. Second, it aims to promote public understanding of the roles, achievements, needs and objectives of universities. Third, the CVCP seeks to assist in developing 'good practice' in all spheres of university activity by sharing ideas and experience. It works by formulating views on matters affecting universities collectively and representing institutions in their dealings with government, Parliament, funding councils, national organizations and organizations internationally. It also provides information and central services to its members (CVCP 1997).

The CVCP has assigned a number of functions to seven specialist agencies. The governing bodies of these agencies include representatives of one or more of the following bodies: CVCP, the Standing Conference of Principals of non-university colleges (SCOP), the Committee of Principals of Scottish Centrally Funded Colleges and the Committee of University Chairmen (CUC) (i.e. the chairs of university councils and governing bodies). The agencies are: the Universities and Colleges Staff Development Agency; the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service; the Higher Education Statistics Agency; the Higher Education Quality Council; the Higher Education
Careers Services Unit; Higher Education Business Enterprises Ltd; and the Universities and Colleges Employers’ Association (UCEA). UCEA was set up in 1994 to represent higher education institution employers across the whole of the UK, with the exception of new universities in Scotland. UCEA has a managing board comprising nominees from each of its founding organizations – CVCP, SCOP and CUC – with its main role being to service the nine collective bargaining units operating in pre-1992 and post-1992 universities (see below). Like staff unions, UCEA is a voluntary body, with an institutional membership of over 90 per cent.

The main representative bodies in which staff are organized are trade unions. Membership is voluntary but, unlike the employer side, levels of membership vary widely by type of institution where staff are employed, type of employment, size of employing organization and geographical location. Probably, something between one half to two-thirds of staff belong to trade unions but multi-unionism is the norm and membership patterns are complex and overlapping. There are two main professional unions representing academic and research staff: the Association of University Teachers (AUT) and National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE). AUT claims about 36,000 members, about 33,000 of whom are employed in old universities, while NATFHE claims about 18,000 members in new universities and CIHEs in England and Wales. Unlike AUT it does not recruit in Scotland. Other smaller organizations of academic staff are the University Lecturers Association of the Educational Institute of Scotland, the British Medical Association and British Dental Association, the last two of which represent clinical staffs in old universities. The largest union among secretarial, clerical and administrative staff is UNISON, with something approaching 50,000 members. UNISON also has members among computer operators and manual workers in old universities and technicians and manual staff in new universities. The remaining small unions are the Manufacturing Science and Finance Union, representing technicians in old universities, and Transport and General Workers Union and GMB with members among manual staff in old and new universities.

Structure of the academic profession

The structure of the academic profession is slightly different between the ‘old’, pre-1992 and ‘new’, post-1992 sectors. The career structure for teachers in old universities is lecturer, senior lecturer (or reader) and professor, with a parallel career structure for research staff who are graded Ia, Ib, II and III, according to experience, qualifications and seniority. In old universities, a young, new starter in the academic profession is normally appointed as a lecturer A and, subject to satisfactory performance, progresses to lecturer B after seven years’ service. This is the career grade for teaching staff in old universities. Those appointed as lecturers are increasingly required to have a ‘good’ first degree (i.e. either ‘first’ or ‘upper’ second class honours) and
a doctorate in their academic discipline. To progress to senior lecturer, staff are normally promoted on the basis of their research records, general contribution to their university and seniority. In exceptional cases, staff are recruited as senior lecturers, particularly in subjects where it is difficult to recruit qualified personnel. Promotion to or appointment as reader is based predominantly on the research record of candidates and their national reputations as researchers. The title of professor is awarded either to internal candidates applying for a 'personal' chair, on the basis of their research records, professional reputations nationally and their standing internationally, or on a competitive basis. The latter is where a post is advertised nationally (or internationally) to attract external candidates for an established or new chair, although this does not preclude qualified internal candidates from applying and being appointed.

In new universities, the career structure of teachers is lecturer, senior lecturer, principal lecturer (or reader for researchers) and professor. Researchers are graded either ‘A’ or ‘B’. As in old universities, teachers are normally recruited as lecturers, though in some subject areas, such as business and computing studies where there are shortages of qualified staff, some new starters begin their careers as senior lecturers. Again it is increasingly expected that new staff will be well qualified academically in terms of their first degrees and postgraduate qualifications, although completed doctorates are less likely to be demanded compared with old universities. Unlike in old universities, senior lecturer is not a promoted post, since staff reaching the top of the lecturer scale are normally upgraded, beyond the 'bar', to senior lecturer. Thus the career grade of teaching staff in new universities is the lecturer-senior lecturer continuum. Principal lecturer is normally a promoted post, similar to that of senior lecturer in old universities, though, exceptionally, some academics are appointed as principal lecturers where there are staff shortages. The criteria for promotion to principal lecturer are less research-oriented than in old universities. While research is taken into account for those seeking promotion, candidates are more likely to be expected to demonstrate good teaching skills, effective teaching performance, high levels of administrative responsibility and seniority.

In old universities, heads of department are drawn from professors in larger departments for a fixed-term, though non-professorial staff can be appointed in smaller departments. In new universities, in contrast, the post of head of department is more often a substantive, permanent appointment. Here it is commonly a promoted post for those performing satisfactorily as principal lecturers, where the post is advertised internally on a competitive basis. Where the post of head of department is advertised externally, it is sometimes linked with a professorial appointment, providing candidates meet the professorial criteria of the university. Compared with old universities, however, there are pro rata far fewer professorial appointments in post-1992 institutions. This is because traditionally new universities have had, with some notable exceptions, much weaker research cultures than old universities. Recent appointments to the professoriate in new universities
Table 11.4 Academic staff in UK higher education institutions, by rank, gender and contractual status 1995-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full-time</th>
<th></th>
<th>Part-time</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>7,909</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Lecturers and Senior Researchers</td>
<td>16,050</td>
<td>3,540</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturers</td>
<td>30,447</td>
<td>15,030</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>3,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>19,524</td>
<td>10,421</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>2,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4,973</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>2,152</td>
<td>1,919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


have included external candidates, sometimes from old universities. This is to increase the research ratings of departments under the research quality assessment exercise. New universities have professorial appointment procedures, based on those in old universities, enabling qualified internal applicants, normally principal lecturers or readers, to apply for personal chairs. These too stress the central importance of research output, generation of research income and the national and international standing of candidates in their fields.

Table 11.4 shows that some two-thirds (67.7 per cent) of full-time staff in all higher education institutions in 1995-96 were lecturers or junior researchers but there were differences between the genders. While two-thirds (63.3 per cent) of male staff were lecturers or junior researchers, almost four-fifths (78.2 per cent) of females were. Conversely, 10 per cent of males were professors and one-fifth (20.3 per cent) senior lecturers or senior researchers, compared with 2.3 per cent and 10.8 per cent of females respectively. Among part-time staff, a similar picture emerges with just under a fifth (18.9 per cent) of males being professors, senior lecturers or senior researchers and only 5 per cent of females. The academic profession in the UK is also a predominantly white one. According to HESA (1997), out of 83,724 teachers and researchers of 'known ethnicity' in 1995-96, 95.6 per cent were white. Over a thousand of these were from the Indian subcontinent, 712 were Chinese and Asian and 530 black, which is broadly representative of the population as a whole.

This outline description of the rank structure and social composition of the academic profession implies that the academic labour market in the UK is a relatively open, meritocratic one. However, it incorporates an historical bias favouring white, middle-class males, although this is weakening with the recruitment of more women and non-whites into academia. First appointments are made in the external labour market but most promotions are made within institutional internal labour markets. There is some recruitment of middle-ranking and senior posts – such as professors, heads of
department and vice chancellors – from the external labour market but many appointments to higher posts are still made from among internal applicants. There would appear to be greater mobility from old to new universities for promotion. Indeed, individuals have a greater chance of being appointed to a professorial chair relatively early in their careers if they are prepared to change institutions. In a survey conducted by the Dearing committee, it was found that a half of all academics had been employed in a single institution, with mobility being related to age ‘and since moving is related to promotion, it was most frequently found amongst staff in professorial grades’ (NCIHE 1997b: 118).

The legal status of university teachers and researchers is that of ‘employee’. Academics do not generally have any special legal status relating to their employment, now that ‘academic tenure’ has been abolished in pre-1992 universities, following the ERA 1988. They work under normal contracts of employment with their universities. Since the ERA 1988, new full-time members of academic staff and those promoted in old universities have permanent contracts which terminate when they resign, retire or are made redundant. Only staff appointed prior to 1988 retain the right to tenure and, with the agreement of their university, to have their contracts extended to the age of 67. Formal tenure never existed in the former polytechnics and new universities, where retirement age is 65, which is now the same as that in old universities. Pensions in old universities are funded under the Universities Superannuation Scheme and those in post-1992 universities are paid out of general taxation but benefits are equivalent. Staff within both groups get a lump sum on retirement and an index-linked pension based on final salary. To qualify for maximum pension (i.e. half pay) academics need to have paid in 40 years’ contributions, although many have retired early in recent years, with enhanced pension provisions.

There is some evidence that the academic profession is becoming more contractually flexible, especially through the use of part-time and fixed-term contracts of employment. Robbins (CHE 1963) reported that in British universities, outside medicine, part-time teachers formed only 3 per cent of the teaching body. Dearing, in contrast, identified 23 per cent of teaching staff and 11 per cent of research staff as having part-time contracts. Also while only 7.5 per cent of male academic staff had part-time contracts, almost a fifth (18 per cent) of females did. In a survey conducted by Dearing, it was reported that well over a quarter of all academic staff, and nearly all research staff, had fixed-term contracts. This varied by institution, age and rank, as shown in Table 11.5. This survey also showed that more than a half of all academic staff had some experience of working on fixed-term contracts. What was noticeable was the way in which the proportion decreased with age. Academics who had been on fixed-term contracts had spent on average two-thirds of their careers on them, while among researchers the average was much higher. ‘Differences between “pre-1992” and “1992” university staff, and younger and older staff, remain clear’ (NCIHE 1997b: 117).
Table 11.5 Percentages of academic staff on fixed-term contracts, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>Pre-1992 1992</td>
<td>&lt;35 35-49 &gt;49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>28 41 10</td>
<td>63 23 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Human resources management and the academic profession

Academic staff are recruited by open competition, whatever level the post. The processes used are common to those adopted as ‘good practice’ by large, responsible, employers in the public and private sectors. Once a job vacancy has been identified and the budget for the appointment approved, then a job description and personnel specification are drawn up, normally by the department in consultation with the personnel office, and an advertisement placed in the national academic press. Details of the job, department, faculty and university are provided in written form to all applicants. Included within this information pack are the terms and conditions of the appointment, duties of the appointee and the institution’s commitment to equal opportunities. Applications are normally made on standard job application forms, which require references from previous employers or individuals with knowledge of the applicant’s academic and professional background. In some cases, applications may be requested through a covering letter and the *curriculum vitae* of each candidate.

After the closing date, all applications are returned to the originating department which draws up a short list – up to five or six candidates, depending on number of responses and subject area – and possibly a reserve list. This is often done through a consultative process within the department, led by its head, or through a selection sub-committee of departmental representatives. The major qualities looked for include the academic qualifications, research record (or research potential), professional experience and suitability of candidates. Short-listed candidates are invited for assessment and evaluation at the university. This increasingly involves, first, informal discussions or small group interviews with each applicant and teams of two or more academic staff within the department, on a rotating basis of, say, up to half an hour each. For teaching posts, candidates may sometimes be asked to make a short lecture presentation to the department or, for a research post, to make a research presentation. Prior to final, formal job interviews involving senior university staff, such as deans, other heads and professors, each candidate’s performance is discussed within the department by those involved in the informal assessments. Pointers to the formal interview are indicated and sometimes a ranking list is produced for consideration by the interview panel.
The second stage of the selection process is the final, formal interview. Candidates selected for this - some may be eliminated at the initial stage - are questioned by a formal interview panel about their professional backgrounds, suitability for the post and how their competences fit the job description. Depending on the level of post, the chair of the panel will be a senior member of the university, supported by the head of department, other academic staff and someone from the personnel department. Panels can sometimes be quite large. In the case of senior appointments, such as professorships, external assessors are included to provide independent, expert advice. Ideally, interview panels encourage a two-way exchange of views, enabling interviewers to solicit relevant information from candidates and candidates to put themselves across, so that they feel 'fairly treated'. In taking their decision, panels take account of interview performance, references, the views of external assessors and departmental opinion. On this basis, selection 'on merit' is the objective. The job is then offered to the successful applicant who is required to accept the offer in writing, having agreed their terms of appointment with the university. Other applicants are then informed that they have been unsuccessful. On commencing employment, new starters commonly attend an induction training course.

Academic staff below the rank of professor and non-academic staff not in senior management grades are paid on salary scales negotiated collectively between employers and unions nationally. There are currently 10 national collective bargaining units, including one in Scotland for academic staff, which are summarized in Table 11.6. Within the current bargaining structure, employers are represented by UCEA and staff by the recognized unions. There are four bargaining units for lecturers, four for administrative and technical staff and two for manual staff. Only four bargaining units have single union representation, the rest are multi-union. Three have an annual settlement date on 1 April, four on 1 July and three on 1 September. Following the creation of post-1992 universities, and because of the complexity and duplication of existing bargaining arrangements, discussions have taken place amongst the employers to rationalize the bargaining structure (excluding new universities and colleges in Scotland), with the aim of reducing them to either single table bargaining or only two bargaining units. But to date it has proved impossible to obtain a consensus among the employers for collective bargaining reform (Farnham 1997). Following Dearing, the NCIHE (1997a) recommended that the employers, in consultation with staff representatives, appoint an independent review body to report on a framework for determining pay and conditions of service in the future.

The outcomes of existing collective bargaining arrangements are national collective agreements setting out the pay structures and pay rates for each group of staff. Unlike in most other countries, collective agreements in the UK are not legally enforceable contracts between the bargaining parties but are 'binding in honour' only. The legal rule is that collective agreements are only indirectly legally enforceable through the individual contracts of staff, whether or not they are union members. In new universities and
Table 11.6  Collective bargaining units in higher education in the UK, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bargaining unit</th>
<th>Recognized unions</th>
<th>Pay settlement date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old universities (UK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic and academic related</td>
<td>Association of University Teachers (AUT)</td>
<td>1 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff</td>
<td>British Medical Association, British Dental Association</td>
<td>1 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinical academic staff</td>
<td>UNISON</td>
<td>1 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and related staff</td>
<td>Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union (MSF)</td>
<td>1 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>UNISON, MSF</td>
<td>1 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer operators</td>
<td>UNISON, GMB, Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU)</td>
<td>1 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New universities and colleges (England and Wales)</td>
<td>National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education, AUT</td>
<td>1 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturers</td>
<td>UNISON</td>
<td>1 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative, professional and</td>
<td>UNISON</td>
<td>1 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clerical staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>UNISON, GMB, TGWU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New universities and colleges (Scotland)</td>
<td>University Lecturers Association/Educational Institute: of Scotland, Scottish Further and Higher Education Association</td>
<td>1 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Farnham (1997).

Colleges in England and Wales, however, even national agreements are not automatically incorporated into individual contracts. They are 'national recommendations' only, subject to ratification by the governing bodies of institutions. This goes back to the creation of the polytechnics and colleges sector in 1989, when, within the terms of the new union recognition agreement, the employers wanted to guarantee the supremacy of governing bodies in determining the pay and conditions of their staff (Farnham 1991).

The pay scales of teachers and researchers, as shown in Table 11.7, are not identical between old and new universities. In 1996–97, the minimum salary for a lecturer in new universities was some 16 per cent lower than that for a lecturer A in old universities, while the maximum was almost 10 per cent lower. Similarly, the minimum salary of researchers in new universities was over 50 per cent lower than that in old universities but the maximum was over 60 per cent higher.
The pay of university professors, which is surrounded by lack of openness and a 'cloak of secrecy', is determined at institutional level in both old and new universities, not by national collective bargaining. It was estimated that in 1996 the median annual salary for all non-clinical professors was around US$60,800. In pre-1992 universities, there is a professorial minimum salary (US$54,211 in 1997) but pay varies widely among individuals and institutions and is determined unilaterally within each university through a variety of methods. For example, one Northern Ireland university stated in 1997 that it had no official professorial salary scale but 'unofficially, a series of 20 points exist at roughly £1000 (US$1600) intervals, running from £34,000 (US$54,400) to £56,000 (US$89,600)', with all professorial staff being paid on one of these points. Another large, old civic university in the north of England stated that it did not have a professorial scale. It operated a professorial minimum salary, above the top of the discretionary senior lecturer scale (US$57,428) and every professor submitted a report to the university giving reasons why s/he deserved an increment above this figure (private data given to the author). Such individualistic approaches to pay determination gives considerable power and discretion to individual vice chancellors, deans of faculty and professorial remuneration committees in setting professorial pay, where each professor is on a personal salary.
Table 11.8 Salaries of university vice chancellors by pay bands (US$), 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay band</th>
<th>N = 104</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>96,000–127,999</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128,000–159,999</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160,000–191,999</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192,000 or more</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Research conducted in a telephone survey of 29 new universities in the mid-1990s showed different patterns of salary distribution and different methods of pay determination for professors (Farnham 1995). Salaries varied widely at that time from US$40,000 (the lowest) to over US$80,000 (the highest). In 1997, it was estimated that professorial remuneration fell within the limits of US$46,400 to US$104,000, although the upper figure related to professors with senior managerial duties in these institutions. Sixteen out of 29 institutions in the telephone survey (55 per cent) placed individual professors on ‘spot’ salaries within ‘pay bands’, according to factors such as job size and ‘market forces’. Six put professors on ‘spot’ salaries (21 per cent) and six others had incremental salary bands (21 per cent). In 1997, for example, one post-1992 university in central London had a seven-point incremental salary scale for professors ranging from US$49,392 to US$76,558. But these salaries were ‘not subject to automatic annual increases’ and depended upon good performance by individual professors.

One distinguishing feature of pay determination for professors in post-1992 universities from that in pre-1992 ones was that 13 institutions in the survey (45 per cent) negotiated annual pay rises collectively with staff representatives and another three consulted staff representatives (10 per cent). In the other 13 institutions, 10 determined pay rises in individual discussions between professors and their ‘line managers’ (35 per cent) and three imposed them unilaterally on professorial staff (10 per cent).

Data relating to the pay of university vice chancellors and principals (UVCPs) reveals, compared with teachers and researchers, that they are well remunerated. The distribution of salaries for 104 UVCPs in 1996, for which information was available, is shown by pay bands in Table 11.8. This illustrates that almost half their salaries (47 per cent) fell in the range of US$128,000 to US$159,999, with almost another third (31 per cent) in the range of US$160,000 to US$191,999. In examining UVCPs’ pay by type of university, Table 11.9 reveals that vice chancellors earning salaries in excess of US$160,000 tended to be employed in ‘other’ (80 per cent), ex-CAT (60 per cent) and ancient (60 per cent) universities. Also while no plate glass universities or ex-CATs were reported to have paid their vice chancellors less than US$128,000, about a fifth of ancient (20 per cent) and a fifth
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Table 11.9 Salary bands of university vice chancellors by type of university (US$), 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary Band</th>
<th>Ancient</th>
<th>Civic</th>
<th>Plateglass</th>
<th>Ex-CAT</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>96,000-127,999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128,000-159,999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160,000-191,999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192,000 or more</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 13
N = 52
N = 33
N = 12


(24 per cent) of civic universities did. The minority of UVCPs earning in excess of US$192,000 was employed in all types of university institution, except ancient and plate glass ones.

Local patterns of industrial relations vary widely. In new universities, for example, there is some local bargaining over how national conditions of service agreements affecting teaching and research staff are interpreted. These cover hours of work, holiday arrangements, distribution of working time, sick pay and other work-related issues. Negotiations on discipline, grievances and redundancies also take place at institutional level (Arthurs 1995). In old universities, in contrast, decisions are much more likely to operate through staff committees, custom and practice, unilateral employer initiatives and managerial paternalism than through collective bargaining.

Internal procedures for promoting teaching and research staff exist but vary and are not based on a universal model. Like local industrial relations, promotion procedures depend entirely on institutional circumstances and arrangements. Those seeking promotion to senior/principal lecturer or to the professoriate are typically required to apply within the rules laid down institutionally. This involves making a written application stating the applicant's case and demonstrating their suitability for promotion, which may or may not be supported by the individual's immediate 'line manager', and providing, where necessary, external sponsors. In the case of professorial promotions, several external referees of professorial status are required to provide written support for applicants. Promotion decisions, normally on an annual basis, are taken by senior staff and peers in promotion or professorial appointment committees, which sometimes interview candidates or, in other cases, take decisions in camera.

Staff appraisal procedures are relatively new in higher education and also vary institutionally, so it is difficult to identify a generic trend. Where staff appraisal systems exist for academic staff, they purport to link with the training and development needs of staff. Staff are encouraged to set
developmental objectives for themselves in agreement with their departmental heads in an annual 'appraisal interview' and to review and revise these the following year. Appraisal systems for senior academic staff and those managing them, on the other hand, are more likely to be linked with reviews of their job performance rather than their developmental needs. In their annual appraisal interviews, senior staff are expected to agree a set of performance targets with their 'line manager' and be assessed in their achieving these targets the following year. Any salary increase of these staff may well be dependent on their success in achieving and meeting these targets, at least in part (Farnham 1995).

**Conclusion**

Higher education in the UK has undergone continuous revolution for some 10 years. The major outcomes have been massification, marketization, modularity of courses and the continued 'decline of the donnish dominium', as charted by Halsey. His argument is that traditionally 'dons' (the academic profession) were a gentlemanly, autonomous, high status elite, originally based at Oxford and Cambridge, which emerged and developed through a 'guild' system offering an alternative route to academic professionalism to those followed in Germany and the United States (US). In Germany, this professionalism was based on a system of scholars (the professoriate) organized in federations of hierarchic departments in universities. In the US, professionalism was rooted in an academic marketplace, where a wide range of higher education enterprises competed for the employment of teachers and researchers by a system of largely, individual bargaining. In the UK, the legacy of the guild tradition, based on academic apprenticeship, and the slow pre-Robbins expansion 'favoured the rise of the donnish dominium' (Halsey 1992: 127). Both government and industry actively sought the professional services of academics who, in turn, were reconciled to the public and private interests providing them with their privileges. Even in the 1980s, Scott (1983) was able to identify what he perceived to be the distinctive features of the British academic community. These included: solidarity of outlook; autonomy in teaching and research; relative equality of influence among junior and senior staff; strong collegial traditions; unity of teaching and research; and general homogeneity of intellectual and cultural values among all ranks, faculties and institutions, including the polytechnics.

What eventually challenged the academic hegemony were rapid expansion of higher education and an increasingly parsimonious state, which became the sole controller of academic jobs, graduates and research. As a result, the salaries, prestige, autonomy and resources of dons were 'much humbled' (Halsey 1992: 136f, 146). With rather less than 2000 university teachers in the early 1900s, 25,000 in 1966 and 46,000 in the late 1980s, the
market position of university teachers became less protected by economic scarcity than it was historically. Yet in Halsey's view, it was less the market position of the academic profession that fuelled discontent among its members than its loss of status and deteriorating working conditions, particularly during the 1980s. Indicators of this included: increases in non-permanent employment; loss of tenure in 1988; promotion blockages; managerial discretion in rewarding academic productivity; receding levels of financial support; rising staff-student ratios; and public squalor in the common rooms and amenities of some universities and polytechnics. In this process, the academic profession became proletarianized and managerialism dominated the organizing of teaching and research. Consequently, the university teacher increasingly became 'a salaried or even a piece-work labourer in the service of an expanding middle class of administrators and technologists'.

So what then is the state of the academic profession in the UK in the late 1990s? First, there is no evidence that its overall market position has improved since the late 1980s. Some academics have benefited and others have lost out in the massification of higher education and a shift to the market. With the bulk of the profession earning something between US$25,000 to US$45,000, and the differential between highest-paid vice chancellors and lowest-paid researchers being in the region of 8:1, there are few signs of salary equity or 'equality of privilege' between senior and junior staff. So its market winners are senior and middle managers and the better-paid professoriate, employed on personal contracts of employment, details of which are often unbeknown to their colleagues. The market losers are the majority of those on low pay, career grade salaries or insecure employment. Indeed, in the survey conducted for Dearing, the 'stark conclusion' of academic staff was that payment systems should reward excellence in teaching, which they did not, and that they should reward excellence in research which they did not. While new university staff put more emphasis on rewarding teaching, and pre-1992 university staff emphasised rewarding research, 'all academics felt that current payment systems put too much emphasis on management and income generation, and much too much emphasis on length of service' (NCIHE 1997b: 120).

Second, the traditional autonomy of the academic profession continues to be penetrated by ever higher staff-student ratios, continued financial stringencies and endemic managerialism. The era of massification, which policy-makers believe needs to be 'managed' better and more efficiently, has resulted in what Trow (1995: 19) calls the adoption and adaption of American elements in the system: 'more autonomy for institutions, stronger rectors and presidents, more diversified sources of support, a more rationalised academic career, the beginnings of modularisation and the accumulation of academic credits'. In Trow's view, no other modern higher education system has undergone such profound and fundamental changes over the past decade as that in the UK. Indeed, Dearing reinforces the view that larger class sizes, less contact time with teachers and the squeeze on resources requires better management to replace the missing resources. In
his assessment of Dearing, Trow (1997: 26) argues that the main report is not written out of direct experience of teaching or research in universities or colleges. And 'it does not reflect the structure of values or common responses of ordinary teachers – perhaps because the committee did not include one ordinary university teacher who could bring that experience into its discussions'.

Third, Dearing’s investigations into the experiences and expectations of academic staff provide some useful insights into what it means to be a member of the academic profession in the late 1990s. Inadequate staff–student ratios were commented upon by teachers of undergraduates, especially those in post-1992 universities. Only one in eight staff did no research but the proportion was one in 20 among pre-1992 university staff and nearly one in four among post-1992 university staff. Over a half of all staff almost always did research in their own time, with shortage of time being the most important constraint, followed by lack of funding, especially in pre-1992 universities. Further, ‘a substantial minority of research grade staff in “pre-1992” universities implied that they were demoralised or demotivated’ (NCIHE 1997c: 90). Other findings included: academic staff would like to spend less time on administration and marking and more time on research; over a quarter of academics expected to retire before normal retirement age; stress was a particular reason for leaving amongst those in post-1992 universities; staff wanted more resources for higher education; and a commonly mentioned concern was the ‘deprofessionalization’ of staff, particularly by older staff and those in post-1992 universities.

It would seem by the late 1990s that many in the academic profession were discontented about the resourcing of higher education, their pay and conditions of service and their career prospects. There were signs too that the academic profession was becoming increasingly balkanized, fragmented and dissociated. The fault lines included: those employed in elite institutions and those in non-elite ones; those in prestigious departments and those in less prestigious ones; those doing research and those not researching; those on permanent contracts and those in insecure employment; and those in management roles and those in academic ones. Some might argue that even in the heyday of the ‘donnish dominium’ these professional fissures existed, albeit less starkly than today. But it is easy to identify with a unified profession during a period of resource expansion and institutional homogeneity, as after Robbins, and less easy during a period of resource constraint and institutional competition pre- and post-Dearing. Halsey (1992: 268f) concluded, on the basis of his research conducted in the 1980s, that: ‘the dignity of academic people and their universities and polytechnics has been assailed from without by government and from within by the corrosion of bureaucracy’. Ten years further on the decline of the donnish dominium continues unabated. Some would go further and argue that its decline is terminal, with the profession being reconstituted and diversified under pressures of massification, managerialism, competition for resources and technological change.
References


Part 3
North America
Canada's universities are firmly part of the North American tradition in the sense that there is no national system of higher education. Most universities are either de facto or de jure individual corporations with their own boards of governors. The only exception is the Université du Québec system and even in this multi-campus network there are strong tendencies towards decentralization. Indeed, higher education in Canada is even more decentralized than in the United States (US), with government involvement a twentieth century phenomenon and only reaching significant financial proportions after the second world war. Decentralization was and is dictated by the vast size of Canada, its small population relative to its size and by its linguistic and confessional divisions. When Canada was created in 1867, the then Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, hoped for a relatively centralized country with a national education office but soon realized that these goals were politically impossible. Instead Canada became a significantly decentralized confederation with responsibility for providing higher education assigned to the provinces, not the federal government. The federal government, however, retained a general spending power and responsibility for economic development, which it would use particularly during the latter part of the twentieth century to carve out a role for itself in financing higher education. Quebec would not agree to the confederation pact unless education was reserved for provincial authority. This arrangement allowed the francophones of Quebec to create French language schools and universities of their own, despite the anti-French and anti-Catholic prejudices common at the time among the anglophone majority in other provinces. Decentralization was also reinforced by the strong confessional divisions within Canada. The majority of nineteenth-century universities were either de jure or de facto creations of religious denominations. Most were private corporations which received their legal status through charters granted by provincial legislatures. This is why, for example, there are nine universities
with degree-granting powers in a small province like Nova Scotia. Even where secular institutions were created in the nineteenth century, as at McGill, Dalhousie, New Brunswick and Toronto, they sometimes began as confessional institutions and, even when secular, local religious influence remained very strong well into the twentieth century.

**The development and current structure of higher education**

Most politicians and community leaders in the nineteenth century thought higher education to be a private matter with institutions which would mainly finance themselves and be open to a limited number of students who could afford to pay their own fees. There might be occasional small grants from the provincial government but mainly in areas such as medicine, agriculture and engineering. The system by which universities as independent corporations received state aid would remain throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even when state aid would predominate after the second world war. Thus Canada blurred the distinction between public and private institutions which is characteristic of higher education in the US. In Ontario, for example, the provincial government, tired of denominational bickering, facilitated the creation of the University of Toronto as a secular university but with federated religious colleges. The Toronto structure, ultimately reformed in 1905, would prove very influential in English Canada. Legislation completed the process whereby power to appoint academics was withdrawn from the provincial government and given to the university community. Boards of governors became the legal hiring authorities but could only hire or fire at the formal recommendation of the president or equivalent, of each university. This legislation formalized a system of university governance which focused on powerful university presidents assisted by influential deans, especially from professional faculties. This era of institutional paternalism, sometimes benevolent, sometimes not, would last until the 1950s. The province was left with the role of providing the legal framework and some financing but little or no control of operations.

In Quebec, university education was divided both linguistically and confessionally. Université Laval was both French and Catholic, whilst McGill was English and, though legally secular, was *de facto* Protestant. The feeder system for Laval was a structure of *collèges classiques* operated by religious orders or Catholic dioceses and offering a baccalaureate in traditional Catholic disciplines. Laval was situated in Quebec City and eventually opened a branch in Montreal which in time would become the Université de Montréal. Other French universities would not emerge in Quebec until the twentieth century. Thus French higher education shared a common Catholic culture with an emphasis on professions favoured by the middle class – the priesthood, law and medicine.
In the twentieth century, when Canada expanded to the west, new influences came to bear. Those who created the three Prairie provinces were impressed by the Morrill Act in the US, which had created land grant universities. These specialized in mechanical and agricultural sciences but also provided a full university education. This combination appealed to the new settlers in the west as being practical and not too expensive. It was also a structure which avoided the denominational quarrels of eastern Canada. The Universities of Manitoba (1877), Alberta (1906) and Saskatchewan (1907) all followed this pattern, although denominational colleges gained a significant foothold in Manitoba. In all three provinces, local agricultural faculties rapidly became a vital part of the local economy. Across the Rockies in British Columbia, the University of British Columbia was founded (1908) as an offshoot of McGill University but became an independent, multi-faculty university serving a variety of communities in that province. Nevertheless, there was a common culture among the English universities in Canada. This reflected the background of the immigrants from Scotland, England and the US. Scottish models, particularly that of the University of Edinburgh, were especially strong in eastern Canada. There were similar but not identical ideas about curriculum, standards and the like, despite denominational differences. University education was overwhelmingly an undergraduate arts and science experience except for professional degrees in law, medicine, engineering and agriculture. The universities gradually absorbed teacher training colleges and created faculties of education for the training of teachers. The anglophone universities thus became comprehensive institutions offering a traditional British arts and science education, as well as preparation for a variety of middle-class professions. There was little involvement in research.

It was on this basis that Canada’s universities moved into the twentieth century. Between 1914 and 1939, there was a slow but steady increase in the size of the system but no fundamental change in the structure of either English or French institutions. The depression of the 1930s ensured that most institutions remained relatively poor and limited in their enrolments. Major change came during and after the Second World War. This and the period of the Cold War enormously enhanced the study of science and engineering. There was also a dramatic increase in the demand for higher education in virtually all areas of the curriculum. Both federal and provincial governments provided more general financing without, however, disturbing the structure of universities as independent corporations. The federal government also financed Canada’s first affirmative action programmes for returning war veterans. Rapid secularization of English Canadian society and the cost of scientific education led to the withdrawal of confessional control over most anglophone institutions. In some provinces, secularization was a condition of public financial support. A parallel movement developed in Quebec after 1960 with the ‘Quiet Revolution’ under Premier Jean Lesage. The major difference in Quebec was the creation of the multi-campus secular Université du Québec in a variety of cities in the province. This was modelled
after the state universities of New York and California. Older French universities in the province remained outside this new structure, although by this time all were secularized.

In the 1960s, there was dramatic expansion in commitment to research. Universities came to insist on the PhD as a prerequisite for hiring academic staff and graduate faculties were organized. In time, approximately 20 universities came to dominate research and received the lion’s share of research funding but without any regulation to that effect. All but the smallest universities developed some graduate facilities, at least to masters level. The outcome of this new demand for higher education was major expansion, with the creation of new institutions and a large number of new universities. As a result, there are now 71 universities in Canada. In addition, there are also a number of colleges affiliated with universities which have degree-granting powers but usually only use them in the area of theology and philosophy. Some community colleges offer recognized university transfer courses. This has long been the case in British Columbia where five colleges now offer a full four-year programme. There are also some bible colleges, not affiliated with universities, some of which grant degrees in religion, although a few are expanding into secular subjects. In English Canada, the binary divide was established with the creation of community colleges which were conceived of as technical training institutes and, in some provinces, feeder schools for universities but without degree-granting powers. Only in the 1990s would some community colleges in British Columbia receive degree-granting powers. In Quebec a different structure was developed, with the creation of CEGEPs. These are Quebec community colleges with entrance after 11 years of primary and secondary education. They are compulsory for two years for those wishing to go on to university education but they also provide terminal programmes in technology.

Since the 1960s, there has been not only an expansion of universities but also of programmes. New areas of study came into existence or were dramatically enlarged. In some areas this meant the creation of a distinctively Canadian presence in research. It could be most obviously seen, for example, in ‘area studies’ where Canada had a different perspective from the US and the former colonial powers, such as the UK and France. In addition, extension work flourished. Experiments were undertaken with film and then later video studies. Athabasca University was created in Alberta and became an extension university. Student services grew and new clienteles developed such as disabled students, First Nation students and women. The financial motor for this expansion was the federal government. It provided grants, first to universities, but subsequently as transfers to provincial governments, to help pay the costs of expansion. These transfer payments increased dramatically under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The federal government also greatly strengthened its role in financing university research by the creation of three councils – the Medical Research Council, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council, and Humanities and Social Sciences Research Council. In 1964, it
created the Canada Student Loans Program which was a joint federal/provincial arrangement for providing financial aid to university students. Quebec opted out and received a block grant instead. In the 1990s there was a significant reversal of this federal role under the Liberal government which, however, now appears to be reverting to a more activist stance in higher education.

These developments are reflected in the growth of student numbers. In 1920, there were 22,800 full-time undergraduates and 400 graduate students in Canadian universities. By 1930, this had increased to 31,600 and 1400. There was little change during the depression years, with the numbers in 1940 being 34,800 and 1600. Student numbers increased dramatically after the Second World War. Undergraduate enrolments at universities rose from 38,376 in 1945 to 69,111 in 1950 and to 75,046 in 1956–57 and 314,650 in 1976–77, while graduate numbers in the same period rose from 3458 to 38,170 (Ministry of Industry 1954; OCDE 1976). This was also the era of the creation of community colleges in anglophone Canada. As a consequence, total numbers of post-secondary students increased enormously. Numbers then levelled off until the late 1970s. Between 1977–78 and 1993–94, university enrolments increased substantially, despite predictions by some demographers and statisticians that enrolments had peaked permanently. In 1977, there were 383,000 full-time and 220,900 part-time students in university programmes across the country. By 1993–94, these numbers had increased to 587,100 full-time and 338,800 part-time students, with an average annual rate of increase of more than 3.3 per cent. It is particularly striking that while the number of full-time students was rising during this period, the number of 18 to 24 year-olds in the general population was declining. This phenomenon is partly explained by a general increase in the participation rate from 11 per cent around 1980 to 20 per cent in 1993–94. This, in turn, arose in part from a substantial increase in the number of female students.

In 1977, the participation rate for men among 18 to 24 year olds was 12 per cent, while that for women was 9.5 per cent. By 1993, these figures were reversed, with a male rate of 18 per cent and a female rate of 21 per cent. By 1993, the proportion of undergraduate degrees granted to women was higher than the proportion granted to men in all areas except engineering, mathematics and natural sciences. In the same period, the percentage of graduate degrees earned by women rose from 30 per cent to 47 per cent (Canadian Education Statistics Council 1996). There was also a substantial increase in the number of First Nations students enrolled in universities. This arose partly because these communities realized the need for higher skilled persons but also because of the affirmative action programme of the federal government, which financed both fees and living costs for such students. The number of full-time First Nations undergraduates rose from 2071 in 1975–76 to 21,609 in 1990–91 (Indian Affairs and Northern Development 1991). Between 1994 and 1997, full-time enrolments flattened out, while part-time numbers declined. There is speculation that this has
been caused by the enduring Canadian depression of the 1990s, substantial increases in fees and by media stories, mostly false, that it is impossible for graduates to get jobs. In fact, Statistics Canada regularly reports that graduates have a substantially better employment record than non-graduates.

The players in higher education

The key governmental players are provincial governments. Each province in Canada has a ministry of education. Some have a separate ministry responsible for higher education. Provincial governments, which are responsible for funding universities within their jurisdiction, have experimented with a variety of structures for distributing these funds. Most common has been a *de facto* or *de jure* funding formula, usually based on student numbers but with various refinements over time. The provinces have also experimented with variations on the role of the former University Grants Committee in the UK, with the idea of providing a buffer between governments and universities. Grants commissions have had a somewhat rocky history having been abolished in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Alberta and Ontario and substantially changed in Manitoba. The Maritime provinces have created a regional grants commission called the Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission. The major criticism of these bodies by the university community is that they are not sufficiently independent. They can become simply unaccountable devices to shield government from critical discussion of higher education policies. The economic recession of the early 1990s, with the consequent fiscal crisis for the universities along with the rise of neo-conservative governments, have called into question some of these arrangements. Provincial ministries created the Council of Ministers of Education (CMEC). For many years the CMEC was mainly concerned with primary and secondary education. However, when the Mulroney government was in power, provincial premiers thought it might try to carve out an increased federal role in post-secondary education. As a consequence, they urged a higher profile on the CMEC in this area. In 1993, it adopted the Victoria charter which set out the ways by which the Council would become more active. One mechanism has been the calling of a national forum on education every two years, with a substantial higher education component. Another has been an effort to work with universities to facilitate credit transfers between them. It has, however, proved to be difficult to operate in the policy area, since Quebec is essentially opposed to any pan-Canadian policy as indicated, for example, by its recent decision to break a long-standing Canadian tradition and charge differential fees for students from other provinces.

There is no single federal department responsible for higher education. Transfer funds to the provinces are the responsibility of the Finance Department. These amounted to US$1,671,823,920 in 1995–96 but have been substantially reduced and mixed with other transfer funds since then.
In 1976–77, the federal government also transferred certain tax points or tax room to the provinces to help pay for social programmes. Ottawa always adds the value of these tax points each year to the cash transfer. The provinces dispute this, saying that they now have the political responsibility for the tax and it is thus provincial revenue and in any event, Ottawa has increased taxes thereby undermining the tax room (Department of Finance Federal-Provincial Relations Division 1996). University research funding is primarily the responsibility of the three federal granting councils. The total budgets of the three councils was US$588,983,000 in 1995–96. Specific government departments also have research programmes involving university personnel such as Fisheries, Agriculture, the Environment, Natural Resources and the National Research Council. Student aid is administered by Human Resources Canada. This is a federal/provincial programme and the cost to the federal government is US$687,575,000. The federal government also operates the Royal Military College as a degree-granting university, at a cost of US$117,220,000 and funds higher education for First Nation students at a cost of US$179,123,000 per year.

At local level, each university is independent and employs its own staff including academic staff or faculty and sets its own programmes, although substantial changes at the graduate level or in professional education usually require provincial approval. University employers in each province have more or less formal organizations to try to harmonize policies. The largest of these provincial organizations are the Council of Ontario Universities (COU) and the Conférence des recteurs et des principaux des universités du Québec (CREPUQ), reflecting the fact that they are in the largest provinces. There are also regional organizations: in the east the Atlantic Association of Universities (AAU) and in the west the Committee of Western University Presidents (COWCUP). These organizations operate best at the technical level. COU, for instance, has had an impressive research capacity for a number of years. It is, however, more difficult for presidents to agree at the provincial level on funding matters, since they are competitors for provincial funds. Presidents are represented at the federal level by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC), which was created in 1911. Its main purpose is to provide a national presence for university presidents, discuss common problems, lobby for federal funds and operate various national programmes such as international scholarships and fellowships. Virtually all universities, both English and French, belong to AUCC, since membership has been regarded as de facto accreditation in Canada. AUCC reached the peak of its power immediately after the Second World War, when it was instrumental in securing federal support on a large scale for the universities (Savage 1992). At national, regional and provincial levels there are also organizations of chairs, deans and vice-presidents, which are mainly autonomous but sometimes associated with presidential organizations. Some, such as deans of business administration, can be very influential in terms of programme development. The Canadian Association of University Business Officers (CAUBO) has played a useful role in coordinating and modernizing
the business side of university operations. Heads of community colleges have their own national federation – the Association of Community Colleges of Canada.

Within faculty, there are two separate streams of organizations – academic and professional. On the academic side, faculty have created a wide range of national organizations to represent their disciplinary interests. This began in the nineteenth century with the formation of the Royal Society of Canada. Gradually, separate disciplines created their own organizations. In some cases, this involved developing organizations separately and competitively with societies in the US. Many academic societies meet together annually at a different university each year. They are influential in defining the nature of disciplines, promoting new areas of scholarship, providing fora whereby practitioners and graduate students can meet and lobby for research funds. Many of them have coalesced in Ottawa in larger federations, such as the Canadian Federation of Biological Societies and Canadian Federation of the Humanities and Social Sciences. They also form inter-disciplinary lobby groups such as the Canadian Consortium for Research. On the professional and economic side, academic staff in virtually all universities have created local faculty associations to represent their professional and economic interests. The majority of Canadian faculty associations are legal collective bargaining agencies, under labour legislation. In virtually all cases, this results in a requirement that everyone in the collective bargaining unit pays the association subscription whether they are members or not, except for a religious exemption which is little used in academia. This system is known as the 'Rand formula' in Canada and originated in 1944, following a settlement in the automotive industry. The Rand formula is legislated in some provinces but negotiated in others. The consequence is, where faculty associations are certified as bargaining agents under labour law, virtually all academic staff belong. Similar arrangements exist in Alberta and British Columbia but through special statute or through the common law. In a handful of universities, where there are no such arrangements, membership ranges from 50 per cent to 75 per cent membership density. In 1997, Conservative backbenchers in the provincial legislature in Ontario set down a series of private bills to gut or ban the Rand formula but none passed or were supported by the government, although it did rescind the law passed by the previous NDP government which made the formula automatic.

In 1951, the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) was formed as a federation of local faculty associations. It represents academic staff in almost all the universities outside Quebec, plus the anglophone ones in that province, and has a form of sovereignty association with the Fédération québécoise des professeures et professeurs d'université (FQPPU) which represents most faculty associations in Quebec. Recently, CAUT has also formed an affiliation agreement with the College Institute Educators Association of British Columbia (CIEABC) which represents a substantial number of community college teachers in British Columbia. The majority of community
college teachers outside Quebec are represented by the National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE). Some teaching assistants and part-time faculty are represented by the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE). Within Quebec CEGEP teachers are represented by two Quebec-based federations – the CEQ and the CSN – or remain independent of any affiliation. In the 1970s, provincial organizations of faculty under the umbrella of CAUT came into existence in larger provinces outside Quebec. Their main purpose was to lobby provincial governments and create a forum for provincial issues. The Canadian academic community has thus developed, over the years, a complex web of societies and organizations to represent its interests and overcome some of the perils of decentralization.

It has proved very difficult, however, for the major players to have effective discourse among themselves. At the pan-Canadian level, the fora organized by CMEC are too infrequent and too large to allow this to happen. Traditionally, the various elements of the university community have lobbied both CMEC and the federal government separately and have frequently opposed each other, especially on the issue of student aid. In 1996 AUCC, CAUT, and the Canadian Consortium for Research drew together to articulate an ambitious plan for federal support of university research. Similar informal lobbying arrangements, including the two national student federations, have developed over the issue of student aid. The parties believe that the fiscal crisis of the 1990s has made such unity imperative if the system is to survive. Informal structures of communication exist between presidents, faculty and students in some but not all provinces. It seems likely that such arrangements will grow as fiscal pressures increase, although competition among universities within a province puts practical limits on this. The academic community relates to government, whether provincial or federal, essentially through formal and informal lobbying. Formal lobbying takes the form of annual presentations to grants commissions where they exist or to the infinity of commissions, inquiries and the like which Canadian governments are prone to sponsor in higher education and research. Informal lobbying takes place all the time whether by federal or provincial organizations or by individual universities.

Human resources management and the academic profession

Faculty numbers have increased dramatically since the Second World War, more or less in parallel with increases in student numbers at least until the 1980s, as shown in Table 12.1. Between 1977 and 1993, full-time faculty numbers rose 21 per cent, while full-time student numbers rose by 55 per cent. The consequence was an increase in the use of part-time faculty, larger class sizes and a reduction in course choice. In the early 1990s, it was estimated that part-time faculty constituted about 32 per cent of total faculty (Statistics Canada 1995). Numbers are not exact, however, while use of
Table 12.1  Numbers of academic staff in Canada (selected years), 1945–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>5,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5,633</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>6,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>19,794</td>
<td>2,906</td>
<td>22,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>27,957</td>
<td>2,827</td>
<td>30,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>28,285</td>
<td>4,605</td>
<td>32,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>28,926</td>
<td>5,740</td>
<td>34,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>29,817</td>
<td>7,241</td>
<td>37,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>28,868</td>
<td>8,089</td>
<td>36,957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


part-timers varies enormously from one institution to another, and among academic disciplines, and numbers have increased since then. The rank structure is normally in four groupings – lecturer, assistant professor, associate professor and professor in English Canada and chargé de cours, adjoint, agregé and titulaire in French Canada. Between 1977 and 1993 there was a significant change in the distribution of faculty in these ranks. For example in 1977, 27 per cent of faculty were full professors, while in 1993 the proportion had risen to 40 per cent. However, heavy use of early retirement schemes by Canadian universities between 1993 and 1997 may well alter those figures downwards. Current data are not available. The number of female full-time faculty rose from 16 per cent of the total in 1977 to 22 per cent in 1993. In the same period the proportion of women in senior ranks (associate and full professor) increased from 8 per cent to 16 per cent. Early retirement schemes may well affect a disproportionate number of males and thus the percentage changes may be at variance between 1993 and 1997. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that affirmative action remains a significant political issue on Canadian university campuses, since many conservative faculty members believe that affirmative action is a negation of the merit principle (Andrews and Savage 1994; Emberley 1996).

There was a significant change in the 1960s in the qualifications demanded for entry to the academic profession. Increasingly, the PhD became a job requirement. This reflected increased emphasis on research in the same period. There was much less emphasis on preparing academics for their role as teachers. This has produced considerable criticism and, in consequence, increased effort has been made by the major graduate schools to provide a teaching component to their graduate requirements. The market for academic staff is significantly affected by the large number of faculty recruited in the 1960s. This has created an atypical hiring pattern. Most of these faculty will retire between 1997 and 2015. This, combined with the recession of the early 1990s, has meant a tight job market for most academics in recent years but one that should open up in the new century. Shortages
of staff nevertheless still exist in certain areas such as computer science, business administration and electrical engineering. The federal government regulates the immigration of academics but provides exceptions in areas of shortage. Legally, academic staff are employees of the individual universities across the country. They are not civil servants, as are some European academics, with the sole exception of the Royal Military College. As indicated above, almost all universities across Canada have local faculty associations for academic staff. These first came into existence in some larger universities before the Second World War. They attempted to lobby their local boards of governors on economic issues and were also a means of ensuring a measure of solidarity among staff in difficult times. After the war, these associations were greatly influenced by returning veterans, many of whom were not prepared to accept either the paternalism or parsimony of pre-war university regimes. In many ways CAUT became the vehicle for this generation of staff. It initially focused on the economic status of the profession but, by the end of the 1950s had become involved in defence of academic freedom, university governance, lobbying at federal level and support for member associations in their local negotiations over salaries and benefits.

There was an important legal and structural change in the late 1960s when Canadian faculty began to opt for collective bargaining under provincial private-sector labour law provisions. Labour law is a provincial jurisdiction, except for federally regulated industries and the federal civil service. Faculty at the Royal Military College are the only ones covered by federal legislation. Provincial labour legislation does not vary greatly, especially in areas that concern academic staff. Its roots lie in the Wagner Act 1935 in the US which set up the US model of labour relations and labour law, whereby collective agreements would preclude strikes and lockouts during the life of the contract but would provide grievance procedures within the contract. Canadian labour law differs from that of the US in one aspect important to university faculty, namely that the scope of bargaining is virtually unlimited except where there are specific statutes – one cannot make marijuana legal by collective bargaining! CAUT decided to sponsor the development of collective bargaining under labour legislation, eliminated its one rival, the Canadian Union of Public Employees and turned itself into an agency for the practical support of local bargaining. CAUT and its members decided to encourage the reorganization of faculty associations as trade unions, bargain at local level and sign local collective agreements. They would also try to incorporate all academic staff including professional librarians into one bargaining unit at local level. CAUT backed up this change with technical advice and the creation of a strike fund which currently totals more than US$6.5 million. Nor have faculty been reluctant to strike. There have been 17 strikes since 1976, most for a period of two to three weeks but one lasting three months.

This approach meant that local faculty associations became the legal bargaining agents on campuses. Their collective agreements were in the
private sector since their employers were by and large technically private corporations, despite their public funding. This, in turn, meant that bargaining scope was virtually unlimited, unlike the public sector in Canada which has traditionally been constrained by legislation or regulation. There was an initial burst of unionization in the 1970s and then a slow but steady growth across the nation through to 1997. In 52 of 71 universities, faculty are covered by collective agreements under labour law. Another five in Alberta have a special university bargaining act. Those faculty associations that did not seek trade union status gradually negotiated employment arrangements that looked more and more like collective agreements. This approach to collective bargaining greatly strengthened the independent status of universities since they were not subject to provincial or national bargaining regimes. To the surprise of employers, CAUT urged its local associations to negotiate comprehensive collective agreements which, besides salaries, also include a wide range of terms and conditions of employment including the defence of academic freedom, no discrimination articles, rights and responsibilities, procedures for appointment, tenure, promotion and dismissal, patents and copyrights, as well as providing a legally binding grievance and arbitration procedure for individual grievances. CAUT was quite successful through the 1970s and 1980s in setting bargaining standards across the country, since there was no effective organization through which university presidents could resist this at that time. One writer (Cameron 1991), while agreeing with the analysis, deplores the results. Tenure is entrenched in collective agreements or university by-laws. Typically, these agreements provide for a probationary period of five or six years followed by a tenure hearing which is collegial in nature. Disputes are normally resolved by arbitration or by a faculty tribunal on the local campus. Promotion structures, in turn, are set out in collective agreements. They, too, are collegial in nature. Individuals request promotion and departmental peers recommend. A few attempts have been made to downgrade promotions and rank, by some academic staff on the left, but most faculty are resolutely interested in promotions, whether or not significant amounts of money are attached. Academic staff development has been achieved mostly through sabbaticals, which are negotiated as part of the collective agreement. Typically, Canadian academic staff receive a sabbatical at 75–90 per cent of salary every six years. There are also study leaves, particularly for those who need to complete an advanced degree.

This decentralized collective bargaining structure means that salaries and benefits vary across the country, although CAUT strives to keep relativities narrow. In the case of salaries, one can see the variations by looking at four universities – two of the largest (Toronto and British Columbia) and two mid-size ones (Saskatchewan and New Brunswick), as shown in Table 12.2. On average, universities also contribute some 16 per cent of salary to employee benefits, including pensions. Employees also contribute to pensions and other benefits. Pensions are negotiated locally, either as a defined benefit or a money purchase plan or both. In a few places, the pension plan
Table 12.2 Salaries of full-time teaching staff in four Canadian universities (US$), 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Bottom 10%</th>
<th>Top 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full professor</td>
<td>72,417</td>
<td>71,691</td>
<td>62,201</td>
<td>83,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associates</td>
<td>57,821</td>
<td>58,174</td>
<td>45,162</td>
<td>67,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants</td>
<td>39,531</td>
<td>39,342</td>
<td>30,660</td>
<td>49,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full professor</td>
<td>66,810</td>
<td>47,923</td>
<td>42,677</td>
<td>55,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associates</td>
<td>53,638</td>
<td>52,866</td>
<td>46,667</td>
<td>61,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants</td>
<td>43,739</td>
<td>42,984</td>
<td>37,670</td>
<td>50,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full professor</td>
<td>61,211</td>
<td>60,929</td>
<td>50,326</td>
<td>70,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associates</td>
<td>45,632</td>
<td>47,318</td>
<td>38,754</td>
<td>50,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants</td>
<td>36,404</td>
<td>35,868</td>
<td>32,341</td>
<td>40,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full professors</td>
<td>59,960</td>
<td>61,448</td>
<td>49,510</td>
<td>67,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associates</td>
<td>51,053</td>
<td>46,258</td>
<td>39,493</td>
<td>55,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants</td>
<td>36,846</td>
<td>36,469</td>
<td>30,470</td>
<td>43,853</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *Excludes medical, dental and those with senior administrative duties.  

is one provided or guaranteed by the provincial government. Most academic pensions are with private carriers. Defined benefit pensions are normally based in the individual's best three year's earnings. Money purchase arrangements are where pension money is invested in the financial market and beneficiaries receive what the market dictates. Some universities combine these two approaches. All Canadians also receive benefits from the Canada Pension Plan or the Quebec equivalent. In general, Canadian academic pension plans aim to provide 70 per cent of best salary, though plans vary locally and diverge greatly.

The rise of collective bargaining was associated with a certain atrophy in local university governance. In the 1950s and 1960s, Canadian university governance had been transformed by the creation of senates with substantial elected components of faculty and students. This reached its apogee in 1966 with the publication a joint report on university governance by AUCC and CAUT (Duff and Berdahl 1966). However, it appeared to faculty that the new governance bodies were too easily manipulated by university administrators and frequently failed to be responsible to their electorates. As a consequence, faculty channelled a lot of their energies into collective bargaining which they saw as true collegiality, namely the meeting of equals to set policy. In recent years CAUT has revived its interest in university governance, partly because collective bargaining cannot deal with the academic issues which become particularly controversial in an era of fiscal cutbacks.
Neo-conservativism and the challenge of managerialism

The neo-conservative challenge to the Keynesian economic consensus and universities in Canada derives much of its rhetoric and commitment from abroad, especially the Republican Party in the US, under Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich, and the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher and John Major in the UK. Some of the technical ideas, such as the use of performance indicators, come from bureaucrats in the OECD. But the response in Canada has been largely pragmatic and heavily focused on balancing federal and provincial budgets. The main targets have been the poor, especially welfare recipients. Political change in Canada tends to start in a particular province or region and then spread across the country. Sometimes this is sponsored by the federal government, which is how Medicare came into existence in Canada. Much the same process can be seen in the rise of neo-conservatism. A populist conservative government was elected in Alberta in 1993 and, for some years, became the model for neo-conservatives. Its focus was almost entirely fiscal – to balance the budget and eliminate the debt. It generally kept the issues of the religious right at bay including censorship, though it weakened the province’s commitment to human rights. There then followed the election in 1996 of a similar government in Ontario and a dramatic turn to the right by the sitting governments in Nova Scotia and Manitoba. The Conservative government in Ontario is determined to destroy the welfare state. While all provincial governments have moved or are moving to balanced budgets, three are trying to combine this with a fiscally prudent commitment to the welfare state. These are Saskatchewan and British Columbia, with New Democratic Party governments, and Quebec under the Parti Quebecois of Lucien Bouchard. However, even with these governments in office, universities have not fared well financially (LeBlanc 1997).

Neo-conservatism in Alberta, however, also meant a determined effort by the provincial bureaucracy and politicians to increase control of universities and constrain, as much as possible, their independence. This was done in the name of accountability through the use of performance indicators, generally clichés for cheapness and control. Performance indicators would become the device by which civil servants could try to determine the line activities of universities. Both AUCC and CAUT responded by arguing that performance is best measured at local, not provincial or pan-Canadian levels. CAUT urged its member associations to negotiate performance indicators as part of their collective agreements. It has also responded by launching a discussion about a national system of accreditation, which could not be controlled by any single government and would genuinely focus on issues of quality.

There is no parallel in Canada to the state-funded quality rating scheme as found in the UK. The only one that exists is conducted by a popular national magazine, *Maclean's*, which models its survey on that of *US News and World Report*. Universities reluctantly cooperate, even though they object
to the methodology. The major objection is that 20 per cent of the scoring is devoted to reputation derived from surveys. Information about reputation is interesting but bears little or no relation to actual quality, since very few of those interviewed have the necessary first-hand knowledge of all Canadian universities to make objective judgements. The other major criticism is that ranking universities is generally meaningless since, from a student point of view, the key question is the quality of the department or faculty where they study. However, *Maclean's* did come to the realization in its survey that there were at least three distinct groups of Canadian universities: those with medical/doctoral programmes; comprehensive universities with graduate programmes; and small universities.

There was also talk in conservative political circles in Alberta and Ontario of abolishing tenure. Eventually in Alberta, government settled for requiring universities to negotiate financial exigency and redundancy articles in their collective agreements. Such articles are common elsewhere in Canada and were accepted by CAUT in 1970. In Ontario, the Minister hoped to use the tenure issue as a device for political attacks on universities. He appointed an advisory panel on higher education which, however, opposed abolition of tenure (Smith 1996). Conservatives tried to argue that tenure was unnecessary because of the Canadian Charter of Rights. However, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the Charter of Rights applies only to actions of government, and that universities, although publicly financed, are not part of government. Thus the Charter does not apply to them as employers but in any event, the Court argued, faculty are sufficiently protected by the tenure system against any abuse of their rights of free speech. The Court then gave a ringing defence of tenure.

Neo-conservatism came to Ottawa in a major way with the arrival of the Liberal government in 1993, although the previous Conservative government had paved the way with its focus on free trade, consumption taxes and reducing the costs of federal government. The Liberals did not suggest that this would be their approach during the election but took up Thatcherite ideas with a vengeance as soon as they were in power. They too focused on fiscal matters. They cut federal expenditures dramatically in virtually all areas including higher education and research. This fiscal conservatism coalesced with a decision to save confederation by appeasing the provinces. The first step in achieving this was to announce that Ottawa would no longer use its spending power to try to influence decisions in provincial social and higher education policy. This would be achieved by merging federal transfer payments for health, welfare and higher education into one undifferentiated payment for each province and then by cutting funds by US$5.6 billion in cash or 40.7 per cent - although Ottawa agreed that there would be a floor of US$8.8 billion in the future. There were smaller but nevertheless significant cuts made in research funding; manpower training was transferred to the provinces. These dramatic changes and cuts in federal support were, of course, passed on by the provinces to universities. Universities have coped with these financial changes in both negative and positive
ways. The quality of Canadian higher education is declining, as universities try to economize with large increases in part-time faculty, more obsolete equipment and diminished library resources. More and more universities and provinces try to pass on costs to students, so much so that Canadian students are the most indebted in the OECD. By 1998 the federal government had come to recognize both the financial dilemma of the universities and their importance to the national economy. As a consequence it restored the funds of the federal research councils and created, despite the vociferous opposition of Quebec, a new federal scholarship plan. Neither of these developments, however, restored the full value of the previous cuts.

One general approach has been an enthusiasm for planning models drawn up by central university administrations, frequently with little or no consultation with senates. Only by centralized planning within universities, it is argued, can scarce resources be wisely used. In some universities, the planning structure has effectively replaced the senate. The managerial university, however, has all the vices of other bureaucracies. Its homogenized procedures are likely to drive out the creative people necessary to ensure that universities change to meet new realities. This type of over-regulation either breeds a feeling of alienation or, more often, a cynical willingness to devote energies to beat the system. Critics of managerialism in Canada argue that universities should adapt by learning through collegial structures rather than by top-down planning (Hardy 1996). A less sophisticated version of this is the attempt to reintroduce old-fashioned top-down management structures prevalent in Canada before the second world war. This has been particularly true at the Memorial University of Newfoundland. Such administrators argue that the moment has arrived to undermine collective bargaining and return to a system of individual contracts for faculty. This was what lay behind the three-week strike at the University of Manitoba in 1995 and the near strike at Memorial in 1996. The ultimate logic of this model could result in a university composed mainly of full-time administrators and a part-time contractual faculty.

A related approach is to try to eliminate automatic inflation steps in union contracts and replace them with merit pay. Faculty associations usually resist merit pay, because they sense that these payments are not made for merit but for conformity to management expectations or to the old guard in departments. There have been one or two attempts to try to structure merit pay so that it is not a form of bureaucratic patronage, but this has not been popular with university managements. A more pragmatic solution to local problems has been generous buyouts of senior faculty. This has been financially possible in some universities because pension surpluses could be used to fund these arrangements. It can also be done by amortizing the costs over a number of years. In any event, it has been quite common across the country in recent years. No exact national figures on take-up rates exist but the effect can be dramatic in some institutions. Large-scale buyouts at universities, such as Concordia and Waterloo, have typically seen 50 per cent of eligible staff take up the offers. Eligible staff
are usually those 55 to 58 and over. Income tax rules significantly affect these plans. The rule of thumb appears to be to replace one-third of those retiring and to use the rest of the money to balance the university budget. These programmes are voluntary but they can have an unpredictable effect on key parts of the university curriculum.

Many universities, on the other hand, have decided to pursue more pro-active adjustments. One way is to pool scarce resources – something universities will not normally do without outside pressure. In Nova Scotia for example, the libraries of the various universities have created a provincial university library system. In Halifax, universities, pushed by provincial government, have created an administrative fusion of many of the functions of the five universities in that city. In the city of Ottawa, the two universities pool their libraries and graduate schools. In central Ontario, the universities of Waterloo, Wilfrid Laurier and Guelph have pooled purchasing, library warehousing, some smaller programmes and some graduate work. These are recent arrangements but they build on long-standing pooling in such areas as veterinary science, medicine and minority language services. The federal government has also encouraged the creation of inter-university and inter-provincial centres of excellence in research which have been quite successful. These arrangements are designed, in part, to head off provincial governments with an enthusiasm for rationalization dictated by civil servants and politicians. In fact, rationalization may well be the buzzword to replace provincial performance indicators which are turning out to be enormously bureaucratic and expensive and not very effective in encouraging change. This model takes two forms. One is by analogy to the amalgamation of cities which, at least in the Canadian context, almost always turn out to be more expensive than the various entities they have replaced. There have been a few university amalgamations since 1945, such as Concordia University in Montreal and the University of Prince Edward Island. In both cases, Catholic and non-Catholic institutions created one secular university. In 1997, two universities in Halifax merged – the Technical University of Nova Scotia and Dalhousie University. The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, an entirely graduate and research institution, merged with the Faculty of Education at the University of Toronto. Universities can, however, plausibly argue that ad hoc arrangements are generally more likely to meet real needs and be less expensive than creating vast educational behemoths. Ironically, faculty frequently oppose mergers, although many of them would be better off economically since amalgamations usually raise salaries and benefits to the highest common denominator.

Conclusion

Given the many challenges facing Canadian higher education, another pathway through which to navigate change is differentiation. Some politicians as well as the presidents of McGill, Toronto and the University of British
Donald C. Savage

Columbia (UBC) argue for this type of arrangement, whereby the latter would become research intensive universities and professional schools, while other universities would become essentially teaching institutions with no research permitted and much lower costs. Differentiation already exists in the sense that 20 of Canada’s 71 universities do most funded research. But the divisions are not tidy nor do they arise from regulation. These failures are anathema to the bureaucratic mind. One difficulty is that provincial politicians outside Quebec are little interested in research and normally fund universities on the basis of student numbers. If McGill, Toronto and UBC were to cut substantially their undergraduate population, would the provincial governments maintain their grants? Differentiation has gone farthest in British Columbia which used to have the lowest student participation rate in Canada. There were three universities in the province, two in Vancouver and one in Victoria. Most community colleges provided the first two years of university education as, of course, did the three universities. In order to increase participation and keep costs down, the provincial government encouraged five of its community colleges to become undergraduate degree-granting university colleges, with a focus on teaching. This has meant the creation of degree-granting university institutions in many parts of the province that were previously without them. However, political pressure resulted in the development of a full-scale university in Prince George. It seems likely, therefore, that over time faculty pressure and local pride will lead to the transformation of the university colleges into full universities. It also seems likely that attempts to prevent faculty from doing research will not be very effective, particularly since the federal granting councils’ criteria for the right to apply for research grants is university status. In Ontario, by contrast, the recent report on higher education advised against giving degree powers to the province’s community colleges (Smith 1996).

In June 1997, differentiation in British Colombia took a surprising turn, with the decision of the provincial government to create a new university called the Technical University of British Columbia. As originally tabled by the government, this institution would virtually eliminate any significant role in internal educational policy for academic staff and transfer the normal powers of the academic senate to the board of governors and advisory bodies, both of which would be overwhelmingly dominated by business and labour representatives appointed by the government from the local community. The minister argued that this would make the new university more responsive than traditional ones to the demands of the local market. CAUT threatened to blacklist the institution before it even opened its doors, because of the assault on academic independence and academic freedom. Since the new university would need substantial funds at a time when budgets and salaries at universities and colleges in the province were frozen in real terms, there was widespread opposition to the new university within the higher education community. The CAUT launched an international boycott of Tech-BC which ultimately led the board of governors to make a written commitment to academic freedom in every contract offered, and to modify
its governance arrangements to bring them into line with other Canadian universities. These changes persuaded CAUT to lift the boycott.

A more common form of the differential debate is internal. It is argued that universities cannot do everything and should concentrate on what they do best. Most Canadian universities have practised some form of this for many years. There are, however, problems both conceptually and in implementation. Differentiation is usually sold to faculty on the grounds that fringe areas should be let go and the jobs of everyone else protected. However, universities have gradually realized that, while abolition of classics or departments of religion might sell well elsewhere, it does nothing to solve budgetary problems. Only abolishing expensive programmes in science, engineering or medicine will do that trick. But these are precisely the programmes that boards of governors and provincial governments wish to maintain. Furthermore, expensive professional faculties can usually organize a potent political lobby in the community to defend their interests. This type of tactic defeated proposals to close dentistry at McGill and Alberta, architecture at Toronto and journalism in Western Ontario. But it did not save the undergraduate forestry department at Toronto.

There have also been some attempts at privatization. In Canada, this means charging the full cost of programmes to students, so that it is no longer subsidized by the state. This has been the case for some years for executive MBAs whose students are usually funded by their employers. This is now being extended to some other professional programmes whose graduates command significant salaries and who can, it is hoped, borrow the money for studying. There is usually rhetoric about compensating for high fees with increased student aid but only time will tell whether this form of social assistance will withstand right-wing attacks on all such social subsidies. However, the recent Advisory Panel in Ontario argued that such high fee developments are likely be limited. The same Panel gingerly opened the door for truly private universities in Ontario but with so many restrictions that it seems unlikely that there will be many takers.

There are also enthusiasts for the ‘virtual university’. They argue that the development of computer systems means that universities as institutions can be abolished with students sitting at home receiving their higher education on computer screens. It seems more likely that computer-assisted education (CAE), like video, film and radio before it, will greatly enhance certain aspects of the delivery of higher education but CAE is unlikely to replace universities or faculty staff – though it might change some aspects of the academic profession and what it does. While the rich will ensure that there are traditional universities for their children, what the great bulk of the population would get in terms of higher education in such scenarios is obvious. It also seems possible that computerized delivery systems will be more costly than expected, particularly if the private sector pushes up the cost of the Internet.

To conclude, in 1976 the OECD said that Canada had created a revolution in higher education by at the same time enormously increasing its
participation rate and improving its quality of provision. There is no evidence that Canadians wish to sacrifice either accessibility to higher education or excellence within it. In fact, polls suggest that Canadians would pay more taxes to maintain or develop it. Virtually all Canadian governments, except the New Democratic Party in British Columbia, however, take the opposite view, wishing to reduce accessibility and quality without actually saying so. What will happen, remains to be seen. Managing Canadian universities and the academic profession in the inevitable storms produced by this political and social ambiguity will not be an easy task. They are likely to provide serious challenges both for university administrations and for faculty and their professional unions.

Note

1 The US dollar equivalents to the Canadian dollar were made at the time of writing in 1997, and do not reflect current currency values.

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The United States: Self-Governed Profession or Managed Occupation?

Sylvia Horton

Developments in the United States (USA) are watched closely throughout the western, industrialized world because what happens there is usually an indicator of what is likely to follow elsewhere, albeit a decade or more later. This is particularly the case in education. Education has always been a crucial part of the social and cultural fabric of the USA, as it has been the major integrating institution of the ‘first new nation’ created out of successive waves of immigrants searching for freedom from religious intolerance, political persecution and economic insecurity. Schooling and education were the means of creating a people with a single language, a common set of values and beliefs and the basic skills needed to grasp the opportunities that their new country provided. From being the first new nation, the USA became the most powerful country in the world. Both economically and militarily it dominated the western world in the second half of the twentieth century and, since the collapse of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe in 1990, its hegemony is increasingly global. To obtain and retain that super-power position great demands have been placed on its education system, in particular higher education. The great importance attached to higher education, and its inexorable growth, particularly since 1945, led to a large academic profession with high social status. Developments in the last two decades, however, appear to threaten the status of the traditional professoriate and it is these challenges and responses that are explored and evaluated in this chapter.

The first institution of higher education in the US colonies was Harvard College founded in 1636 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. By 1776, 10 more private colleges had been created, all with a religious orientation. Princeton, founded in 1746, was the first college to be created by a colonial government but, after the American War of Independence, the new federal government encouraged higher education by enabling all states to establish public colleges. To acquire statehood, territories were required by national legislation
to demonstrate their commitment to education (Cremin 1980). To assist them, the federal government passed the Land Act of 1862 (known as the Morrill Act after its author). States received 30,000 acres of land for every federal senator and state representative and were expected to use the money, from the sale or leasing of the land, to establish agricultural colleges or fund the expansion of existing liberal arts colleges to develop agricultural, engineering and technology programmes (Levine 1978). This, and subsequent acts, set a precedent for grants-in-aid. Federal and state support resulted in at least one college system in each state by the beginning of the twentieth century. After both world wars, the federal government transferred surplus military equipment and facilities, worth millions of dollars, to colleges and universities. Even before 1945, enrolment was relatively widespread and since many state colleges did not charge fees to state residents, this resulted in more open access to higher education than in other countries. Alongside the spread of public institutions, private colleges expanded throughout the nineteenth century and were particularly important in making access to higher education possible for educationally disadvantaged groups. The first woman’s college was founded in Troy, New York State, in 1821, and the first black university in Pennsylvania in 1861. Segregation of higher education for black Americans continued in many states up to the 1960s, although gender segregation had largely ceased by the end of the nineteenth century. By the middle of the twentieth century, the USA had the most democratic, diverse and open system of higher education in the world.

After the Second World War, higher education expanded dramatically. In 1944 the federal government passed the ‘GI Bill’ which committed it to paying for all ex-service personnel to undertake higher education, including postgraduate study. The legislation was later broadened to include anybody who had served in the Armed Forces. During the 1960s, higher education expanded under the impetus of the Civil Rights legislation, which made it accessible to all those who had previously been excluded on racial grounds. In 1961 blacks accounted for only 6.3 per cent of all students; by 1976 this had risen to 15.7 per cent and it has continued to rise as assistance programmes were introduced to increase access and affirmative action operated to compensate for previous exclusion or segregation policies. During the 1960s many new community colleges were created to accommodate this expansion of higher education and assist the rise of high school graduates entering higher education from 48 per cent in 1961 to over 70 per cent by the 1990s. They also facilitated government policies of adult education and continuing education which amounted to ‘education for all’ throughout their lives. By the 1990s the USA had moved from a mass to a universal system of higher education provision.

Current structure of higher education

History, politics and culture have resulted in a highly decentralized, complex and pluralistic system of higher education in the USA. Responsibility
for all education, including higher education, rests primarily with each of the 50 states. Each state has the constitutional right to determine, organize and operate its own system of education resulting in a very diverse structure across the whole country. The role of the federal government is to provide financial support and leadership on higher education issues of national concern. The Department of Education (created in 1980 to give greater national recognition to education) monitors educational development, administers federal financial assistance to institutions and students and collects and disseminates information on education and encourages programmes that might improve education throughout the country. In addition to directly funding some 100 colleges and universities, the federal government provides indirect support for almost every other college in the United States through the funding of individual students. It also offers programmes to assist institutions which have a large number of disadvantaged and minority groups. The Office of Higher Education Programs and the Office of Post Secondary Education administer these. Students and institutions can apply for federal grants, loans and work study under these programmes, although all are competitive and there is no mandatory entitlement.

Decisions about the structure of higher education, the licensing of public colleges and universities and funding rests primarily with each state. States, however, rely heavily on federal funds to supplement state subsidies financed from state taxes. In addition to determining their own policies through their legislatures, the equal representation of states in the US Senate and their proportional representation in the House of Representatives also ensures some influence over national policy which is the focus of the Committee on Education of the House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities of the Labor and Human Resources Committee in the Senate.

Compared with most national systems of higher education, the US system is very flexible and open. Students of any age can enter, exit and re-enter over an extended period of time and they can move between institutions and across states. There are no standard admission requirements; institutions determine their own. The informal policy is to encourage as many Americans as possible to pursue education to the highest level of their ability and the diversity of courses and levels of instruction make that policy feasible. In practice, there is a dual system which operates with some institutions having ‘open’ access and others being ‘selective’. Most public two-year colleges, many state colleges and some private colleges have ‘open’ access, while the research institutions and the more prestigious colleges, in both the public and private sectors, are selective. There are a range of qualifications awarded by institutions. These include associate, graduate and postgraduate degrees. Associate degrees can be obtained in a minimum of two years, graduate degrees in four years and postgraduate degrees in one year for the masters and four for the doctorate. Students studying for professional qualifications, such as medicine and law, differ widely in qualifications for entry and length of study. Medical students, for example, are
required to do a four-year programme of pre-medical studies, followed by
four years of professional medical training.

Only a minority of students complete their degrees in the minimum
period of time, because most students finance their own way through col-
lege by taking part-time employment. They often interrupt their studies
and return at a later date. This is possible because higher education in the
USA is characterized by semesterization, unitization and modularity. There
are two semesters of 17 weeks each academic year with the opportunity for
students also to attend a summer school. Students take units which are
worth credits and are required to achieve a number of credits to graduate.
A semester unit generally equals three credits; 120 credits are usually needed
to receive a graduate degree, earned over four years: 30 credits per year, or
five units per semester. Degree programmes consist of compulsory core
plus major and minor specialist modules. The first two years, or 60 credits,
provide a general education with some specialization and a student can
receive an associate degree on that basis. During the next two years stu-
dents take a ‘major’, defined in terms of a minimum number of semester
units or credits in a given subject area, to receive a degree in that area of
specialization. Students’ credits are portable, although most institutions re-
quire students to complete a minimum number of units in the institution
from which they earn their degree. Grades are given per unit and it is the
grade point average (GPA) which determines the award. If students fail
they can repeat the unit to receive a pass grade. They can also ‘stop the
clock’, receive an ‘incomplete’ and finish the course at a later date. Finally,
students can drop out of a unit to avoid failing. Students may drop out at
any time, and return at any time, retaining their accumulated credits and
GPA. This promotes flexibility in higher education provision.

Sixty-two per cent of high school graduates in 1994 proceeded to college
(22 per cent in two-year and 40 per cent in four-year colleges). Only about
25 per cent of students entering a two-year college continue into the sec-
ond year and about 50 per cent of those in four-year colleges. The US
system of higher education is not directly comparable with systems in Eu-
rope. The associate degree has been equated with ‘A level’, ‘baccalaureate’ or
‘Abitur’ by European standards; four-year degrees with ordinary bachelor
degrees; and masters degrees with a good British honours degree (National
Committee of Inquiry in Higher Education-(NCIHE 1997). In reality, stand-
ards vary considerably, with ‘Ivy League’ institutions being comparable to
the best European universities and some state universities and private col-
leges with weak ‘post-school’ institutions. Of those completing two years
college education, about one third continue their studies (22 per cent at
four-year colleges, 6 per cent at their two-year college and 2 per cent else-
where). The drop out rate is very high. Only about 50 per cent of students
complete a bachelors degree in the minimum four years with 70 per cent
completing in six years. Roughly one half of students registering for associate
degrees never complete them, along with a quarter of those registering
for bachelor degrees.
To assist appropriate comparisons and analysis of institutional developments, in 1987 the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching formulated the following classification of higher education institutions in the USA:

- **Research universities.** These offer a full range of bachelor degree programmes, are committed to graduate education through the PhD degree and give high priority to research.
- **Doctorate-granting universities.** These offer a full range of bachelor degrees including graduate degrees.
- **Comprehensive universities and colleges.** These offer bachelor degrees and, with a few exceptions, masters degrees. More than half of their degrees are offered in two or more occupation or professional disciplines, such as business administration or health.
- **Liberal arts colleges.** These are primarily undergraduate colleges which award more than half their degrees in arts and science fields. Many of them have highly selective admission policies.
- **Two-year community, junior and technical colleges.** These offer certificate or degree programmes through the Associate of Arts and, with a few exceptions, offer no four year degrees.
- **Professional schools and other specialized institutions.** These offer degrees ranging from first to doctoral levels but most awards are in single specialized fields, e.g. theological seminaries, medical schools and schools of management.

In 1994–95, there were 3698 higher education institutions which were classified by the Department of Education according to ownership and types of degree qualification offered, as shown in Table 13.1.

Higher education institutions vary greatly in size, as shown in Table 13.2. In 1995, over 350 institutions had under 200 students, while 28 had over 30,000. Private institutions tend to be small, with well over half (58 per cent) having under 1000 students. In contrast, nearly a quarter of public institutions have over 10,000 students. As Table 13.2 shows, in 1995 most students were enrolled in public institutions, with only 4 per cent of two-year and 33 per cent of four-year students attending private institutions. Of the 3698 institutions, only 220 are doctorate-awarding institutions, of which...
Table 13.2 Number of higher education institutions by sector and size of enrolments, 1994–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th></th>
<th>Private</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Enrolments</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Enrolments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 200</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>40,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200–499</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11,187</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>128,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500–599</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>87,064</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>284,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000–2,499</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>602,845</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>835,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500–4,999</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>1,289,233</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>562,488</td>
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<tr>
<td>5,000–9,999</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>2,660,188</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>587,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000–19,999</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>3,404,896</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>484,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000–29,999</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2,076,177</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 30,000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,001,094</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66,936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


about a third are private and two-thirds public. In 1995, a total of 1440 institutions awarded bachelor and/or higher degrees. It is these institutions which equate most closely to the UK's higher education system.

There were 14.4 million students enrolled in public and private colleges and universities in 1995. Public institutions accounted for almost 80 per cent (11.3 million) and private colleges for around 20 per cent (3.1 million). In 1945, private colleges had over half (50.7 per cent) of the 2.3 million undergraduates at that time. This share fell to 20 per cent by the late 1970s and has remained steady over the last 20 years, although the number of students has increased by nearly 30 per cent. An additional feature of private colleges is that over 900 of them are religious institutions, which account for nearly 50 per cent of all private sector students. Recruitment of students began to rise in the 1960s, largely because of the increase in the number of high school graduates, due to the postwar baby boom, the Civil Rights Act and new equal opportunities policies. There was also greater emphasis placed on the need for a better educated workforce and more scientists to keep up with the space race. The percentage of high school graduates entering higher education in 1961 was 48 per cent (847,000), rising to 63 per cent by 1995 (1.6 million). In 1961 the percentage of students who were from minority groups was 6.5 per cent. By 1976 their share was 15.7 per cent and by 1994 it had risen to 25 per cent. This expansion was made possible by the creation of large numbers of two-year colleges in the public sector. Minority enrolments are highest in two-year public sector colleges (30 per cent) and lowest in private four-year colleges (21 per cent).

Expansion continued throughout the 1970s, as shown in Table 13.3. In the first half of the 1980s, enrolments remained fairly stable but rose again after 1985 until 1992, when they levelled off. Between 1984 and 1994,
numbers increased by 16.5 per cent and are projected to begin a slow increase after 1997, rising by over another three million to 16.1 million by 2007 (Department of Education 1997). Table 13.3 also shows that the expansion of student numbers has been accompanied by increases in the number of part-time students. In 1961, they accounted for nearly a third of the total but by 1995 over 40 per cent of all students were part-timers. Increases in part-time enrolments are found in all types of institutions but in 1995 one-third of students in four-year colleges were part-time in contrast to nearly two-thirds in two-year colleges (see Table 13.4). The social profile of US students is also distinctive. Thirty-nine per cent in 1995 were 21 or under, while 31 per cent were 30 or over. Fifty-five per cent were women and 45 per cent men, a reversal of the gender enrolment pattern in
The United States: Self-Governed Profession or Managed Occupation?

Table 13.5 Sources of income for higher education institutions by percentage, 1980–81 and 1994–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition fees</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowments</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants and contracts</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales (includes hospitals)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1970. Twenty-five per cent are from minority groups including 1.5 million blacks and a million Hispanics. Among both white and black communities, larger numbers of women than men enrol but not among Asian, native American and Hispanic groups (Department of Education 1997).

The United States spent US$201 billion on higher education in 1994–95 or 3 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product. While all higher education in the US is market-driven, some colleges operate for profit, while others do not and there is wide disparity in their income and wealth. Colleges and universities are financed from a variety of public and private sources as shown in Table 13.5. Private institutions are financially autonomous and depend upon tuition fees, endowments, voluntary gifts and contract services for their revenues. Public institutions are also financed by fees, endowments, gifts and contracts but they rely primarily on government grants and appropriations. The amount from each source varies but both sectors receive income based on student attendance whether it is in the form of direct tuition fees, ‘incidental fees’ or public funding based on ‘average daily attendance’.

About 40 per cent of higher education funding comes from government sources and 60 per cent from private sources, with the largest individual source from fees. This traditional wide funding base has made it easier for colleges and universities to make good any reduction in government revenue by raising fees and increasing donations. As Table 13.5 shows, revenue from fees has increased by 50 and 15 per cent in the public and private sectors respectively, as government funding has fallen by 16 per cent in both sectors over the last 15 years. The fees charged by different types of institutions vary widely. In 1996 the average cost of tuition in a public sector four-year college was US$3151; in a private four-year college it was US$15,581;
in a public two-year college, US$1245; and in a private two-year college US$7039. Adding room and board costs to four-year college fees, the cost per student amounted to US$7451 and US$22,469 in public and private colleges respectively. The overall cost of a four-year bachelor degree, taken at a public four-year college, was about US$75,000. A similar programme split between a two-year and a four-year college cost about US$50,000. This is one reason for recent increases in attendance at two-year colleges. To alleviate the financial burden on poorer students, the federal and state governments provide an array of financial help to students. There are eight major federal programmes, each state has several schemes and the most prestigious private universities offer scholarships. About 60 per cent of full-time and 30 per cent of part-time students receive some aid. In 1997, more than US$36 billion in grants, loans and work study funds assisted over seven million students. One problem continually faced by government is the high level of defaulters. In 1990, some 22 per cent of debtors were defaulters. Since then a stricter follow-up system, combined with a new scheme for direct loan consolidation, has reduced the proportion to 10.7 per cent.

Overall spending per full-time equivalent student rose persistently in all types of higher education institutions between 1983 and 1993, with the biggest increases occurring in private universities. Since 1993, instructional expenditure has fallen in all institutions, with the greatest savings in public and private four-year colleges and lowest in private universities and two-year colleges. Research expenditure, in contrast, has increased and now represents 18 per cent of total expenditure in private universities and 22 per cent in public ones (Department of Education 1996). The response to continuing, burgeoning costs of public spending has been efforts to increase college efficiency and innovative forms of funding, such as use of a state lottery to fund 25 per cent of recurring higher education costs in Florida (NCIHE 1997). Pressure has been on institutions to reduce their costs, raise or retain enrolments and bring in outside money from alumni and non-alumni donors. Some have failed. Between 1960 and 1993, 364 institutions closed down, including 37 public institutions.

Each institution and course must be accredited by an accreditation organization. There is no national organization but six regional conferences, recognized by government. Accreditation organizations help maintain comparable standards among institutions, although, in practice, standards vary widely. The Ivy League universities and prestigious state universities and colleges such as Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Amhurst, Berkeley and Columbia are at the top of the hierarchy, while many smaller state colleges have low reputations. Although institutions seldom lose accreditation, this happens sometimes. More often individual courses, within institutions, lose accreditation. Accreditation agencies look at course content, teaching and assessment techniques and student grades in relation to performance. Concern was expressed in the 1970s at the lowering of standards, as a consequence of responding to student demands during the 1960s student revolts. The demands for greater egalitarianism and 'equality of results' for ethnic
minorities and women led to a rise in the average marks given to students (Lipset 1975). This claim continues to be levelled at higher education and is returned to later. Accreditation boards also undertake institutional validation every five to 10 years, which includes auditing quality assurance arrangements. All institutions use a wide array of quantitative performance indicators to monitor their activities including benchmarking against other institutions, unit costs, graduation statistics, cohort progression, withdrawals, student social profiles and so on, but there is little in the way of evaluation of teaching or the learning process. It is assumed that the student choice of units is an indicator of popularity and student satisfaction.

The players in higher education

The key players in higher education are the colleges and universities, federal, state and local governments, faculty and students and their respective organizations and associations. Each university or college, for example, is governed by a Board of Trustees which has nominal control of the institution and is the legal employer of all staff. Authority for the development of private colleges and universities rests with their boards which are self-perpetuating and are responsible for overall institutional policy, financial viability, personnel management and physical facilities. Private colleges are independent of government control, although their programmes must be validated and may be taken into account by state education planners.

Responsibility for the development of public colleges and universities rests with the states which exercise it through public education departments. Higher education policy, including personnel policy, is set down by the state executive and funding authorized by the legislature but most institutions have a large degree of autonomy and are run by Boards of Regents or Trustees. In most states, membership of these boards is long term, thus insulating them from political pressure. Public two-year colleges, which are created by local governments within states, and are subject to county or district policies, are also run by boards but their membership is sometimes elected. Boards delegate much of their executive power to a chief executive, generally called a ‘president’. Most presidents are academics and many have reached professorial rank. Presidential policy, including employment policy, must be approved by a university or college senate or other assembly made up of faculty members. In small institutions, all teaching staff can vote in this assembly, and students are also represented. In larger institutions, staff members elect representatives to the assembly. The powers of the assembly vary between institutions. In some cases it only has an advisory role, while in others it can veto executive decisions and substitute its own policies where it decides to do so.

Departments are normally the basic organizational unit within a college, with heads of departments serving a mainly administrative role. The post is usually elected by other members of faculty for a set term of office. Further
democratic practices are evident within departments, with departmental meetings taking place regularly, often on a weekly basis, offering an opportunity to discuss strategy, course problems, students and funding issues. All teaching staff may participate in meetings but non-tenured members are often reticent to express their opinions for fear of being denied tenure. In most colleges and universities, departments are grouped into ‘faculties’ of arts, science, postgraduate studies or professional programmes. Faculties or colleges within federal or multi-site universities often have considerable autonomy, including their own libraries, student hostels and endowments and they determine their own fees. Market forces affect behaviour at both departmental and faculty levels. With staff costs dominating budgets and funding generally following students, teaching staff numbers are usually based on student enrolments. Consequently, departments compete for students and, as large classes make more economical use of staff, there has been an inexorable trend towards common courses within faculties and extensive use of computerized assessment.

Academic staff are collectively referred to as ‘faculty’. This is a corps of professional persons employed within institutions of higher education who are engaged directly in teaching, research, related public services, institutional services or combinations of these. There is great variety within the ranks of faculty but they tend to have a number of features in common. Most have a similar education culminating in advanced and extended study at one of 100 to 150 universities. They are committed to the same culture which places great value on academic freedom, scholarship, research, teaching and collegiality. Their common values and attitudes arise from the fact that smaller colleges and universities emulate the more prestigious ‘Ivy League. Faculty members are part of a ‘nationwide communication network consisting of voluntary accreditation, professional associations, public licensing bodies, statewide coordination, multi-campus systems, consortia of institutions and governmental granting agencies and these impose or encourage considerable uniformity’ (Bowen and Schuster 1986: 12).

In 1969–70 there were 474,000 faculty members. This rose to 628,000 in 1975, 686,000 in 1980, 715,000 in 1985, 840,000 in 1990 and 910,000 (including teaching assistants) in 1997. Around two-thirds of faculty are men and one-third are women. From 1960 to the mid-1980s, there was a major increase in the number and proportion of women in faculty. Their share of full-time posts rose from 17 to 27 per cent and of part-time posts from 23 to 36 per cent. Much of the increase was directly attributable to affirmative action and civil rights legislation (Astin and Snyder 1982). Women, however, are generally under-represented at higher levels of the academic hierarchy and are concentrated in certain academic fields. Women represented 50.1 per cent of education faculty, 49.4 per cent in health and 40.9 per cent in humanities in 1994. In contrast, they accounted for just 5.9 per cent in engineering. Women are also less likely to hold tenure than men in all types of educational institution, although their position is worse in private institutions, as shown in Table 13.6. The number of women faculty is likely
The number of faculty drawn from minorities has also been increasing since the 1960s, rising from 6.2 per cent in 1973 to 12 per cent in 1993. Minorities continue to be greatly under-represented, however, especially in four-year colleges and universities. Despite an increase in faculty coming from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, the profession is still dominated by higher socioeconomic strata, especially in more prestigious colleges. Nearly 70 per cent of faculty are protestants with 18 per cent catholic and nine per cent Jews. The average age of faculty in the mid-1990s was 49. Most new entrants into the profession are in their early thirties. This is because of the length of time that it takes to get a PhD. In 1996, the median age of PhD recipients was 34 (Menand 1996). Doctoral students receive little or no formal teacher training but a substantial number work as teaching or research assistants at some point in their degree programme. The evidence is that the academic profession is still dominated by white Anglo-Saxon, middle-aged males, although their dominance is slowly being eroded.

Staff are employed on three types of contract: ‘tenure’, ‘tenure-track’ and ‘non-tenure-track’. Staff in the last two categories are generally given three- to five-year contracts, renewable once. All staff under all three contracts have the same legal rights and academic freedoms but it is difficult to dismiss tenured staff. There is a perception that the proportion of tenure holders has been falling in recent years but the proportion has actually stayed the same over the last 15 years. In 1980, 64.8 per cent of staff were tenured (70 per cent men and 49.7 per cent women). In 1994 the figure was 64.2 per cent (71 per cent and 49.9 per cent respectively). However, what has changed is the ratio between full-time and part-time staff, particularly in the public sector. This sub-group of part-time faculty has been growing since the 1960s. Table 13.7 shows that part-time staff rose from 22 per cent to 35 per cent of staff between 1971 and 1991. The numbers of part-timers vary between sectors and institutions, with most being concentrated in the public sector in four-year and two-year colleges. The largest increase has been in community colleges, where sometimes part-time appointments
Table 13.7  Faculty: full-time and part-time, 1971 and 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full-time</th>
<th>Part-time</th>
<th>Public sector</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
<th>Four-year college</th>
<th>Two-year college</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>369,000</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>333,000</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>382,000</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>474,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>536,000</td>
<td>291,000</td>
<td>581,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>591,000</td>
<td>235,000</td>
<td>826,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


exceed full-time ones. Part-time faculty is a very heterogeneous group consisting of professional people, such as doctors, lawyers and accountants, semi-retired academics, those unable to obtain permanent full-time positions and those supplementing their major income.

The work of college and university faculty consists of teaching and instruction, research, public service and institutional governance and administration. Teaching and instruction is the main function of faculty, though this varies among institutions and according to rank. Research consists of a diverse range of activities from humanistic scholarship to large-scale empirical surveys which contribute to the extension of knowledge and development of new ideas. Research is seen as of equal importance and complementary to teaching. Public service activities are mostly by-products of teaching and research and involve consultancy, advice, free service to the community and participation in governmental bodies. Faculty, individually and collectively, play an important role in the governance and management of their organizations through senate and faculty boards, headships, deanships and principal posts.

Teaching staff account for under half of all staff in higher education. Since the mid-1970s, the number of non-faculty professionals and administrators has increased significantly. To some extent this is due to increased reliance on non-governmental support which requires new kinds of outreach programmes, including the development of alumni resources, fund raising, and community service programmes. Expansion of student numbers has also led to a growth of central services and support posts, including counsellors, career advisors, librarians, sports directors and so on. In autumn 1991, non-teaching professionals ranged from 7.7 per cent of staff in public two-year institutions to 19.4 per cent in public four-year institutions. As top management expands to include academic, business, development, student affairs, information technology, estate, public relations, press and financial aid departments, so there has been a growth of clerical, administrative and technical staff. The increase in multiple faculties and colleges has also generated more managerial and administrative layers. Support staff inevitably expand with size of institutions. Wilson (1979) estimates that in 1942 the ratio of administrative staff to teaching staff was 1:6. By the mid-1970s this was 1:5 and by the 1990s 1:3, although figures varied between types of institution.
Paradoxically, US education is under-organized in some respects and over-organized in others. Unlike most other countries the United States has no central ministry exercising overall control and no nationally formalized system. There are a number of organizations representing employers including the Association of American Colleges (AAC), Association of American Universities (AAU), American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), Association of Community Colleges (ACC), Council of Graduate Schools and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employers (AFSCME). The most inclusive in its membership is the American Council of Education (ACE), founded in 1918, which acts as the national umbrella association dedicated to furthering the interests of those working and studying in higher education. With approximately 1800 members, including accredited degree granting colleges and universities from all sectors of higher education, and over 200 educational and professional associations, ACE acts as a forum for discussing major issues relating to higher education. It is an important pressure group seeking to influence federal and state governments, as well as providing a range of services to its members. It also works closely with the American Association of University Professors in developing policies designed to ensure good practice in the governance of higher education. The only employers’ body to negotiate on pay and conditions, however, is AFSCME.

There is a complex range of professional associations drawn from a wide range of scholarly, scientific and professional fields consisting of individual members who meet locally, regionally and nationally at conferences and whose officials lobby on behalf of their members. Faculty are also collectively represented by three main national unions: the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), founded in 1916, which is a member of the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and has traditionally been furthest to the left of the three organizations. It also tends to represent lower status academics working in two-year colleges. The National Education Association (NEA), founded in 1857, which attracts membership mainly from public sector two- and four-year colleges, is the most conservative of the three. In 1973 the NEA joined forces with the AFSCME to form a new organization – the Coalition of American Public Employees – for the purpose of coordinating activities such as collective bargaining and political action (Ladd and Lipset 1973). By 1977, it had 54,000 members from institutions of higher education and more local units with campus bargaining rights than either of the other two national associations, although it still only accounted for 12 per cent of total union membership.

The American Association of University Professors (AAUP), founded in 1915, represents mostly university, research institute and prestigious four-year college professors. Professors and other academics have historically been resistant to the idea of unionization and, until the early 1970s, teaching organizations were mainly viewed as professional associations. Although the AAUP, the largest faculty organization, had a membership of around 100,000 in 1971, it resisted the notion that it resembled a trade union. Ladd
and Lipset (1973: 21) said of the 1960s: 'unionization of colleges and university professors was not even a ripple on the pond of academic life'. Slowing down in the expansion of higher education, curbing of research money and government appropriations (Garbarino 1973), increasing bureaucratization within public colleges, growing pessimism about career prospects among academics (Lee and Bowen 1971) and the passing of permissive legislation to permit union membership (Le Francois 1970) - all contributed to a major increase in union membership in the 1970s. Lipset (1975: 86) argues that the rapid growth of collective bargaining in higher education 'should be seen as the extension, to the level of university governance and faculty life, of the powerful trend towards equalization and away from elitism'.

The increase should not be exaggerated, however, as research by Ladd and Lipset (1973) shows, barely half of faculty supported unions and collective bargaining and many attempts, in colleges throughout the states, to get union recognition resulted in defeats. By 1977, only 544 campuses had collective bargaining and 74 requests had been rejected. At that time there were still 26 states that did not allow collective bargaining for public employees and only 17.5 per cent of the nation's 3000 institutions were unionized. The number of faculty and other professional personnel in higher education covered by union contracts was around 80,000 or only 10 per cent in 1973. Since then collective bargaining has increased, but even today, union membership and collective bargaining are limited mainly to public institutions and bargaining is normally on an institutional basis. Unions have achieved only limited penetration into the higher education sector. In 1989, 1207 campuses, with 226,975 faculty members (about 60 per cent of the total at that time) were represented by bargaining agents for academic staff, although not all faculty were union members. Of these, only 58 were private institutions (Chronicle of Higher Education, 12 July 1989: A16). Unions have continued to seek recognition, throughout the 1990s, but there remains strong resistance to it, both from the profession itself as well as employers. Unions still see their role primarily as protecting academic freedom, promotion and tenure and ensuring due process in the workplace, rather than fighting for more pay and better conditions.

Structure of the academic profession

The academic labour market in the USA is an open one, with a large number of purchasers or buyers (over 3000 institutions) and a large supply of educated individuals offering themselves for employment. The market is characterized by permeability, as entry and exit to the profession can take place at any level, although most faculty enter at the lowest levels. There is also a high degree of mobility, as academics move within and among institutions. During the 1960s and 1970s, academe was a buyer's market as large numbers of highly qualified young masters and doctoral graduates sought jobs. During the 1980s and 1990s, the market has become much tighter and
lateral entry of other professionals, on both permanent and part-time contracts has increased. The attractiveness of the academic profession depends on the relative status, rewards and terms and conditions of employment and all of these have taken a downward trend since the peak of the 1970s. Referring to a poll taken in 1977, Wilson (1979: 208 and 196) wrote: 'The public at large... ascribes a considerable amount of influence and power to educational institutions.' He added:

In their roles as transmitters, advancers and appliers of knowledge, academics have in the main gained rather than lost status in recent decades. They influence vastly more students than they once did... and, in addition, the interpenetration of their thought modes into the extramural world has been greatly extended.

During the period 1955 to the 1970s, a faculty career was attractive, as a seller's market guaranteed mobility and career progression. Faculty also gained power in university and college decision-making, as well as control over curriculum development and faculty recruitment. This degree of autonomy, combined with unlimited resources, enhanced their professional status (Shulman 1979). Although 20 years later academics are still generally held in high regard, because they serve important social goals, their status, relative to other professions, has fallen and the academic profession no longer appears as attractive to young PhD graduates. The reasons for this are the change from a sellers' to a buyers' market, constraints on financial resources and competition from other professions and career opportunities.

The contractual relationship between individual faculty members and their employer (college or university) has been described as unique (Bowen and Schuster 1986). Like civil servants, faculty have a high degree of security which is designed to protect them from assaults upon freedom of thought, speech and publication, i.e. academic freedoms. It also provides an attractive, reasonably well-rewarded career to attract the most intelligent young people. Further reasons for the special contractual relationship with employers are the important role of faculty in the governance of colleges and universities and the importance of collegiality in academic institutions. A formal written contract, especially in private colleges, often amounts to a letter of appointment with perhaps salary information. In institutions where faculty are represented by trade unions and terms and conditions of employment are jointly regulated through collective bargaining contracts may be very lengthy specifying hours, pay, performance procedures, promotion criteria, merit pay and appeals systems. The usual contract involves several stages as individuals progress through their career (i.e. regarding appointment, probation, tenure, promotion to full professor and retirement). Appointment can be terminated if tenure is denied at the end of probation, for gross misconduct, medical disability, discontinuance of a programme or department or retrenchment due to financial exigencies but in each case due process has to be observed. These contracts are the
norm for tenured staff in most institutions, although not all. Non-tenure track staff, however, work under different contracts. Around 40 per cent of community colleges have no tenured staff and operate with short-term or one-year contracts, sometimes renewable and sometimes not. The non-tenure track arrangement has obvious advantages for the employing colleges and universities, as it gives numerical flexibility to adjust to changing levels of student demand and avoids the higher costs of established staff.

Pay scales are part of the faculty contract and include the relative compensations paid to different ranks and distribution of rewards between cash and other fringe benefits, including health insurance and pensions. The general form of the pay scale tends to be similar between institutions, although actual scales of compensation vary. The pay range, however, tends to be quite narrow, with the relativity between the highest scale and the lowest being in a ratio of 2:1. Middle scales, however, have to be sufficient to attract people in mid-career from government, business and other industries. The academic profession has never looked kindly on performance related pay and has resisted wide relativities between people on the same grade. Recognition of merit and excellence has tended to be rewarded by promotion. Where merit pay exists, it has been described as 'a little whipped cream on the pie' (Bowen and Schuster 1986: 250). Another important element of the faculty contract is the 'sabbatical'. Many institutions provide leave with pay, after seven years' service, for half a year or a whole year on half pay. The intention is that sabbatical leave provides an opportunity for refreshment and professional development. Unpaid leave, for the same reasons, is also often available.

An increasingly important feature of the faculty contract, since the 1970s, has been collective bargaining. As indicated above, the attitude towards collective bargaining in the United States is that it is a symptom of the declining status of the academic profession and not a desirable feature of a democratic society. As Bowen and Schuster (1986: 261) state:

it is our view that collective bargaining is not the optimal arrangement for people in a profession in which collegiality and community are essential. Faculty unions are symptoms of responses to the declining circumstances in which many faculties find themselves. Indeed collective bargaining is seldom sought after and adopted in institutions where faculty are treated with respect, occupy a significant role in decisions affecting them, receive reasonable compensation within the financial ability of the employing institution and are part of a genuine academic community.

Most collective bargaining occurs in the public sector and pay scales are linked to comparable public professional groups, although in recent years differentials have been widening to the disadvantage of faculty.

Traditionally, it has been common for colleges and universities to fix retirement between 65 and 70 and permit additional part-time or full-time
service beyond retirement age on an annual basis. The Age Discrimination and Employment Act 1978 raised the mandatory age of retirement from 65 to 70. Most institutions provide for retirement annuities, accumulated throughout a working life, paid either as a lump sum or in instalments throughout the remaining life of retirees. Annuity plans have generally been compulsory with the individual and employer paying regular monthly contributions. For most private institutions and many public ones, the scheme has been administered by the Teachers Assurance and Annuity Association and its companion organization the College Retirements Equities Fund known jointly as TIAA-CREF. For other public institutions, annuity funds have usually been incorporated in state employee retirement systems. A guide often used in higher education to fix annuities is that set down by the AAC-AAUP Statement of Principles on Academic Retirement and Insurance Plans (1980) that an after-tax income in purchasing power equivalent to approximately two-thirds of yearly disposable income during the last few years of full-time employment should be the norm. Pensions are portable and in general the system operates fairly well, although some schemes provide only very modest incomes in retirement.

There are four ranks of teaching staff in institutions of higher education. The highest is professor, followed by associate professor, assistant professor, instructor or lecturer. In addition, postgraduate students work as teaching and research assistants and, although they are not counted in faculty numbers, they account for around 20 per cent of teaching staff (National Center for Education Statistics 1997). Before the 1970s, the four ranks were fairly evenly distributed. Since then they have become top heavy, because of rapid expansion of new recruits in the late 1960s and 1970s and the ageing of faculty. The full professorship is ordinarily the top academic rank but ‘distinguished professors’ can be awarded personal chairs and these have multiplied in recent years to attract and retain exceptional persons.

Professional academics normally choose their discipline at graduate school and proceed to obtain a PhD in that field. The early part of their career is as research assistants, while studying and researching their doctoral thesis. The doctorate is the certification for employment as a college teacher, although it is also a training in research which is an important element of academic culture. New staff are normally appointed as lecturer or assistant professor, the latter being considered a tenure-track post. Tenure refers literally only to job security and is a commitment by employers that tenured staff may hold their positions until retirement, subject to the conditions outlined above. Tenure follows a probationary period which may range from three to seven years or more. Probation is not normally transportable between institutions but may be taken into consideration. If someone has relinquished tenure to move to another institution, the probationary period is usually shorter. In terms of academic rank, 96 per cent of professors, 81.8 per cent of associate professors, 17 per cent of assistant professors, 7 per cent of instructors and 2.2 per cent of lecturers had tenure in 1995. Somewhere around two-thirds of faculty have tenure at any one time. Until
Table 13.8 Percentage of female academic staff by
teaching rank, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate professors</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant professors</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructors</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturers</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: National Center for Education Statistics (1995).*

recently, the convention was that after seven years in an institution, tenure
was granted or the staff member was released and replaced. In the late
1980s, the average time between initial hiring and tenure was 5.5 years at
four-year colleges and six years at universities. However, eight years is not
uncommon (Miller 1987) and several institutions have extended the period
to 11 years. This is partly due to growing financial constraints restricting
the number of permanent posts on offer but is also due to recognition that
untenured staff often have a heavier than average teaching load, while at
the same time being expected to undertake major research projects. Some-
times qualified staff are kept in post with an understanding that as a tenure
slot becomes available, it will go to them. The granting of tenure usually
entails a promotion from assistant to associate professor. The number of
women faculty has been rising since the late 1960s as indicated above but a
relatively low proportion of female staff hold tenure. This is reflected in
their lack of seniority, as shown in Table 13.8.

Human resources management and the
academic profession

Each institution recruits its own faculty and there are no standardized,
formal qualifications required, although institutions are bound by the dis-

crimination laws which bar discrimination on the grounds of race, colour,
religion, national origin or sex. During the 1970s higher education insti-
tutions were forced to review their recruitment policies and address the
under-representation of women and minority groups because of the federal
government's policy of contract compliance (Wilson 1979). Many adopted
positive discrimination policies but this led to legal actions on the grounds
of reverse discrimination. Although faculty profiles have changed since the
1970s, discrimination remains a live issue today. Faculty members vary widely
in their qualifications, although the PhD is usually required for recruits to four-year colleges and the masters degree for two-year colleges. About a quarter of faculty are recruited with other qualifications. Levine (1972) identified a range of minimal standards including superior general intelligence (in the upper five to 10 per cent of the population), good communication skills, intellectual curiosity, open-mindedness and tolerance, keen interest in and mastery of a special field, self-motivation and good rapport with students and colleagues. Finally, 'a personage and not a nonentity'. These criteria are still implicit in the selection process.

Recruitment of a faculty member is expensive, as it represents a potential investment of up to a million dollars. Recruitment is usually characterized by open competition with advertisements placed in the leading venue, the Chronicle of Higher Education, which is published weekly, and is available on the Internet. Generally, only a few candidates are interviewed, due to limited budgets, but informal interviews of prospective staff are often held at conferences and meetings and networking still plays an important part in recruitment. When funding and enrolments were growing, vacancies were automatically replaced but, in the 1990s, vacancies are often left unfilled to save salary costs or transferred to another department. Increasingly, when vacancies are filled, replacements are at a lower rank and salary than the person being replaced.

The probationary period imposed at time of appointment varies between institutions. One year before the end of the probationary period, candidates are assessed for promotion in a somewhat complicated process. The first level of decision-making lies with departmental teaching staff. Administrators also participate in the process and can review and even overturn departmental assessments. External reviewers may also be brought into the evaluation process. Being awarded tenure depends on several factors, including teaching, research, and public service record. Teaching is frequently cited as the main criterion but evaluation of teaching is difficult. Studies have found that teaching accounts for only 20 per cent of total evaluation for tenure and promotion (Shulman 1979), although teaching dominates the working time of most academics. Today student evaluation of teaching often plays a role, as does assessment of teaching materials. A second broad criterion is research and publications. This is measured by money brought in from grants and consultancies, publications and professional presentations and participation in conferences. As a rule, the more one has published, the greater chance of receiving tenure or being promoted. The service component refers to membership and the holding of office in professional organizations, consulting within a field, and institutional committee work. As Miller (1987) notes, weighting given to the three criteria varies widely from institution to institution but promotion from one grade to the next is determined on similar grounds. Tenure, awarded after successful probation, does not guarantee promotion but offers job security. In theory, tenure is permanent but this is not always the case. Incompetence or failure to perform are reasons for loss of tenure but in recent years financial
considerations, including programme elimination, are reasons for dismissal. Many academics view tenure as more important in protecting their academic freedom than offering job security. When tenure is violated or refused, or when promotion applications are turned down, teaching staff often turn to their unions or professional organizations, if they are members.

In the USA, there is no national pay scale or national bargaining for uniform conditions of employment. Salaries vary by locality, sector, discipline, category of college and rank of staff. There is no regular pattern, although salaries in two-year colleges are on average lower than those in four-year ones, which, in turn, are below those of universities. As Table 13.9 shows, most staff earned between US$25,000 and US$70,000 per year in 1992. Average salaries fell 17 per cent between 1972–73 and 1980–81 but have since risen and recouped most of those losses as shown in Table 13.10 (National Center for Education Statistics 1995). Average salaries for men and women in 1995–96 were US$52,814 and US$42,671 respectively. This average academic salary was almost twice the national average. Salaries are generally set on a faculty or departmental rather than institutional basis. They vary widely by discipline, with those in the health professions earning the most, averaging US$56,079, and those in humanities earning the least, averaging US$41,058 in 1993 (National Center for Education Statistics 1995). Some institutions have numerous pay increments on individual salary scales, while others offer a flat rate of pay for each academic rank. In some cases, staff can increase their income by working over the summer or taking on extra teaching and other duties. There are wide variations between public and private sector and between two-year, four-year and university institutions, as shown in Table 13.11. Even among public universities which are members of the AAC salaries ranged from US$60,000 to US$90,000 for professors and from US$40,000 to US$50,000 for assistant professors in 1995. Women not only are under-represented in higher academic ranks but also, regardless of rank, are generally paid less than men in all institutions,
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Table 13.10 Average salaries of college faculty members (US$), 1994–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ranks</td>
<td>47,300</td>
<td>49,100</td>
<td>50,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>59,800</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>63,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>45,300</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>48,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Professor</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>39,200</td>
<td>40,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>28,800</td>
<td>29,600</td>
<td>30,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ranks</td>
<td>53,800</td>
<td>55,400</td>
<td>57,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>73,200</td>
<td>75,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>48,500</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>51,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Professor</td>
<td>40,100</td>
<td>41,200</td>
<td>42,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>31,700</td>
<td>32,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a excludes church related colleges and universities; b figures are for nine months' teaching for full-time faculty in four-year institutions.

Table 13.11 Average salaries of full-time academic staff, by rank and type of institution (US$), 1995–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Public 4-year</th>
<th>Private 4-year</th>
<th>Public 2-year</th>
<th>Private 2-year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>69,924</td>
<td>84,970</td>
<td>61,076</td>
<td>57,089</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>50,186</td>
<td>56,517</td>
<td>47,850</td>
<td>44,186</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Professor</td>
<td>42,335</td>
<td>47,387</td>
<td>39,554</td>
<td>36,325</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>55,068</td>
<td>65,405</td>
<td>48,566</td>
<td>44,504</td>
<td>43,295</td>
<td>31,915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: a Figures cover full-time members of the instructional staff on 9 and 10 month contracts only. They account for about 85 per cent of all full-time college professors but do not include medical school faculty. The average for all faculty includes the categories of instructor and lecturer and faculty members without rank.

as shown in Tables 13.12 and 13.13. The concentration of women in low-paying fields explains some of the differences in income but other reasons are the relative lack of seniority of women in institutions and their over-representation among part-time staff.

Although academic salaries have kept up with inflation there has been a relative decline of academic salaries, compared with other professions. Hansen argues (1986: 81):
Table 13.12 Average salaries by teaching rank and sex (US$), 1993–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professor</th>
<th>Associate prof.</th>
<th>Assistant prof.</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Lecturer</th>
<th>No rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>60,649</td>
<td>45,278</td>
<td>37,630</td>
<td>28,828</td>
<td>32,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>61,857</td>
<td>46,229</td>
<td>38,794</td>
<td>29,815</td>
<td>34,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>54,746</td>
<td>43,178</td>
<td>36,169</td>
<td>8,136</td>
<td>31,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 13.13 Average salaries, by type of institution and sex (US$), 1993–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Public 2-year</th>
<th>Public 4-year</th>
<th>Private 2-year</th>
<th>Private 4-year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>46,364</td>
<td>41,040</td>
<td>48,019</td>
<td>28,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>49,579</td>
<td>42,938</td>
<td>50,989</td>
<td>30,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>40,058</td>
<td>38,707</td>
<td>41,031</td>
<td>26,142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


it is the action of elected officials – state legislators for public universities and four-year institutions and local education board officials for the two year colleges... [which has] systematically appropriated smaller percentage salary increases for instructional staff in public institutions of higher education than for other public employees... an exception is non-instructional personnel... who have fared about the same as other state and local personnel.

The dominance of public institutions within higher education has the effect of casting them as wage trendsetters, with private institutions linking their salaries to the 'going rate'. Competition for staff with specialized skills in short supply within the general labour market explains some of the variation between academic salaries. This also accounts for the bidding up of salaries in high demand fields, where staff are vulnerable to outside offers, at the expense of salary increases for faculty members where there is no external competition, such as in the humanities. A combination of market, institutional and political, and societal forces can explain both the configuration of salaries and their change over time. In periods of major expansion of higher education and a relative shortage of qualified personnel, such as in the 1960s, real salaries rose. In the 1980s and 1990s, with a slowing down of expansion in higher education and a surfeit of PhD candidates, salaries have been suppressed and fallen below growth rates in other professions. Resource constraints have also forced institutions to economize on faculty costs, while in the public sector the slow and cumbersome procedures for determining funds ensures that faculty salary increases are always behind increases in inflation.
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The low level of unionization and collective bargaining in higher education has clearly hampered faculty in seeking salary increases. In the late 1950s, AAUP initiated a major effort to raise faculty salaries by proposing a system of grading salary scales in colleges and universities from 'A' to 'F'. The idea was to stimulate competition among colleges to raise salaries, thereby improving salary standings. In this way, it was hoped, average salaries would be pushed up. Each year the AAUP published projected salary scales for each grade and it is thought that salaries rose in the 1960s, because of AAUP's efforts. A decade later, AAUP was basing its projections on the expected rate of inflation (cost of living rises) and increases in productivity. During the 1980s, however, it abandoned its projections, largely because of the relative decline of real salaries over the period. Salaries in public institutions are tied to salaries of other public officials who are generally more heavily unionized than academics. Comparability has been an important principle influencing salary rises across the public sector and academics have usually been awarded normal rises in line with other public officials. However, academics are generally paid not a rate for the job but a rate for the person, with individual rewards based on performance, length of service and status. This, plus the fact that retirement usually leads to the appointment of a low paid junior member of staff rather than promotion to the vacant post, gives further scope for differential pay rewards. A decline in real and relative salaries, combined with a widening dispersion of salaries across disciplines, has depressed and lowered morale amongst faculty. It has also rendered academe a less attractive profession. One of the effects has been for academics to supplement their salaries by about 20 per cent from other sources. Although it is widely acknowledged that rewards for academics are largely intrinsic, salary and income are important indicators of social status. Of equal importance is the work environment.

Academics are expected to engage in teaching and research, public service and institutional governance. Hours worked and the distribution among the three activities vary by type of institution, to a lesser extent by sector, and in particular by personal motivation. In 1993, the average number of paid hours worked was 42.7, although the average duration of the work week according to a faculty survey undertaken by the NCES (1995) was 52.5 hours. The average work-time distribution for full-time staff is 54 per cent teaching, 18 per cent research, 13 per cent administration and 10 per cent external consulting. However, this conceals wide variations among institutions, with the lowest shares devoted to teaching and highest to research in private research universities and the highest share to teaching in two-year institutions. Nationwide, in 1992, almost half of full-time teaching staff taught 10 or more hours weekly. However, in private research institutions, over 54 per cent of staff taught less than six hours per week, while over 58 per cent in two-year institutions taught 15 hours or more. In addition, the numbers of students taught varies widely by type of institution. In 1992, nationally, 13 per cent of all staff taught less than 25 students; 11 per cent taught 25 to 49; 19.5 per cent taught 50 to 74; 16 per cent taught 75 to 99;
19 per cent taught 100 to 149; and 13 per cent taught 150 or more. However, in public research institutions two-thirds of staff taught 74 or less and in private research institutions the figure was 69 per cent. Even in private, four-year liberal arts institutions over 50 per cent of all full-time staff taught between 25 and 74 students and an additional 12 per cent taught under 25. By contrast, in two-year institutions, some 64 per cent teach 75 students or more.

Many university administrations have found traditional methods of allocating resources to departments inadequate and have experimented with new methods. For example, in 1993 the University of Connecticut announced a new system in which each academic department was to receive a set of scores scaled from 0 to 5, in 10 categories, including research productivity, public service to the state, national reputation, undergraduate teaching and graduate teaching. Progress in different categories was to be measured over several years against goals set by department staff. The outcomes were to be taken into account in budget decisions. This can be seen as part of a larger movement to make professors at public universities account for the hours they work. Staff appraisal is an inevitable part of the probationary system in all institutions and promotion. It tends to be more formalized in some institutions with student, peer and management assessment. Staff development is assumed to be an inherent characteristic of professional academics and an offshoot of research. Funds are available for faculty to attend conferences and they compete for research funds both externally and internally, mainly in the research universities and four-year colleges. Central services provide a range of support facilities to assist staff to keep up with computer assisted learning and new teaching techniques.

Conclusion

Higher education in the United States has features distinguishing it from systems elsewhere. These include: great diversity between and among its colleges and universities; a highly decentralized system with authority residing with 50 state governments and boards of trustees at institutional level; concurrent existence of strong public and private systems, although the public system now accounts for 80 per cent of provision; and open access to all those who can benefit from it and pay to do so. Although there is a growing element of planning within states, higher education is essentially market-driven, with over 3000 institutions competing for students, funds and research contracts. And although there is financial support available from both federal and state governments, most students finance themselves, either wholly or in part. Federal grants are means tested but nearly four million students get on average US$1500 per year. In addition, the federal government provides loans which are more universally available and a range of campus-based programmes which provide further support if colleges provide matching funds.
Higher education has gone through waves of massive growth and profound changes since the 1960s. Once an elite system, dominated by full-time students attending small, private four-year institutions, it now has a burgeoning population of part-time students attending large two- and four-year public colleges. The sexual, ethnic and age profiles of the student body have also changed, with more than 50 per cent now female, over 25 per cent drawn from ethnic minorities and with an average age of 29. As enrolment has expanded, the academic environment has become more competitive and the curriculum diverse. These changes have affected the work environments of faculties, their motivations, satisfaction and compensation. To accommodate the massification of higher education a structure of community colleges has been created and new university colleges founded. Faculty numbers have increased more than tenfold from 82,386 in 1945 to 910,000 in 1997. Salaries have declined in real terms since 1970, workloads have increased and faculty are more vulnerable to job loss. Staff in public institutions are more unionized and, when tenured, usually have better pension and fringe benefits than colleagues in the private sector. But they are also subject to greater public accountability.

Accompanying the increased size of colleges and universities has been more bureaucracy, managerialism and regulation. This has been at the expense of collegiality and professional autonomy. Although the professoriate still claim control over the content of what is taught and standards in determining academic success, it now has less control over how resources are allocated or over how academic institutions are run. A new profession of educational managers has emerged which at best competes with but in many cases controls the academics. Whereas in the past administrators served and supported academics, today they support managers who increasingly direct and control academics. There is some evidence, therefore, of a deprofessionalization of the profession which no longer has the same status, as reflected in relative rewards and attractiveness to the country’s most talented graduates, that it once had. Academics are also increasingly being directed in both what they teach and how they teach it and important decisions about policy, standards and teaching methods are being taken externally. Deprofessionalization may also be reflected in the greater willingness of many academics to join trade unions and in the need for collective bargaining to protect their interests and maintain parity with other professional groups.

During the past 20 years, both public and private institutions have seen a reduction in government funding. They have needed to economize, while retaining their ability to attract students. Many courses cater for non-traditional student populations and cover new non-academic fields. This has led to the need for a more flexible workforce, growth of part-time rather than full-time employment and an increase in non-tenured staff. Tenure has become a highly political issue, with moves to modify or abandon it and, in some cases, to offer it as an alternative to higher pay. Uncertainty is greatest in the lower ranks, where turnover is highest, remuneration lowest,
duties manifold and the future full of doubt. Some institutions hire through annual renewable contracts. The high geographic mobility of young academicians, accompanying this strategy, precludes feelings of permanence and makes the profession less attractive to the ‘brightest and the best’. During periods of financial constraints, administrations have looked for ways of cutting costs, increasing flexibility and off-loading liabilities. In the USA, as in other countries, the last decade or so has been characterized by rationalization, searches for increased productivity, shedding ‘dead-wood’, revolving-door policies and a shift towards a core and peripheral workforce. For some critics, this has been damaging to the profession and they have urged ‘higher education communities to hold fast to tenure and to the related personnel policies’ (Bowen and Schuster 1986: 267). Changes to tenure policies, however, have become commonplace with longer probation, shorter initial contracts and no automatic right to promotion.

There is still some evidence that the traditional concept of the ‘academic community’ has prevailed into the 1990s, reinforced by the rigid and bureaucratic pay scales common to many of the larger public campuses and also imposed by the central offices of multi-campus systems or by state-wide coordinating bodies. However, pay scales have been compromised because of changes in the labour market, particularly for teachers in engineering, accountancy, management and computer science and, as a result of economic pressures, pay differentials have been widening among faculty. On the whole, however, the customary flat pay scale still survives – but with increasing pressure to abandon it. Persistence of the traditional pattern of faculty compensation indicates that non-monetary factors are still important and that a sense of vocation and collegiality, and the satisfaction derived from academic life, continue to be powerful influences in job decisions. This probably explains why there has been neither a flight from nor a general shortage of applicants to academia in spite of declining remuneration and depressed conditions.

No faculty likes to be managed with all the connotations of control and close supervision which are in conflict with the claims of professional autonomy and academic freedom. However, demands for more accountability and continuously rising costs have led to institutions installing management information systems enabling them to monitor performance and compare their own performance against others. Since the 1980s, questions of efficiency and effectiveness have come to dominate academe. The ACE has promoted professional programmes for educational administrators to overcome what was described by the Carnegie Institute as ‘organized anarchies’ with ill-defined goals, confused procedures and too many ambiguities in decision-making and implementation (Wilson 1979: 96). Academe is now controlled by not only internal managers but also a vast array of external bodies, including federal, state and local government officials, accreditation committees and research contractors.

The pressures that higher education are now under stems from the multiple and often conflicting functions that it is performing. A disseminator
and creator of knowledge, preparing the elite of the next generation and training the professions forming that elite are in conflict with its functions of social integration, social mobility and the egalitarian goal of educating all who can benefit from it. In the past, universities tended to be small, exclusive clubs offering faculty freedoms and privileges denied to the majority. They resembled medieval guilds with apprentices, journeymen and masters. They also approximated to direct democracies more than any other form of government, with their collegiality and open decision-making. But since the 1970s, massification has been a challenge to collegiality and has resulted in a shift towards managerial autarchy. Although there are still forms of democratic participation, exclusion of non-academic staff and non-tenured staff and increased control by bureaucrats and managers of academics have diluted any real self-government. Even appointments are now circumscribed by the law and public policy, while, among research universities, partnerships between industry and academia have seen a scramble for industry to sponsor new faculty posts and professorships, often with strings attached.

The autonomy of nearly all colleges and universities has gradually been eroded. Every state now has a statewide board, council or commission giving policy direction to public higher education. Even private colleges come under their ambit, as the states seek to plan for further growth of higher education. Mandates of the federal government and its agencies have been extended to cover admission policies, faculty and staff employment practices and teaching and research objectives. Also many strong and weak institutions yield autonomy, as they enter into consortia and other arrangements to further collective improvement. Although autonomy is still considered important, control is being lost because of the effects of massification. Egalitarianism has made education a 'right' of the many rather than a 'privilege' of the few. As higher education has become more costly and increasingly politicized, independence has been replaced by interdependence and there has been a movement to greater centralization from local to state or national level and from the private to the public sector. Statewide boards or commissions engage in analysis of institutional budgets while, in some states, coordinating boards now rationalize the provision of education. Financial aid from public agencies has also had strings attached. All these trends are designed to offset the worst aspects of unregulated competition but have the effect of limiting the freedom of individual institutions.

At the end of the 1990s, higher education is high on the political agenda and likely to expand further. It has been given top priority by the Clinton administration, with the aim of keeping US higher education ahead in the knowledge explosion to maintain its position in economic league tables and its hegemony throughout the world. In his State of the Union address in February 1997, President Clinton challenged America to make two years of college universal. The government plans to provide tax breaks and incentives of up to US$10,000 per year to families and individual students to encourage them to undertake higher education, as well as providing
increased loans at low interest rates. Major expansion is likely to take place in community colleges which will need to recruit more faculty. Life-long learning credits, however, will impact more on four-year colleges and universities, including postgraduate institutions.

It appears likely, therefore, that the pressures identified since the 1970s will persist and that the deprofessionalization of faculty will continue. The major trends towards managerialism, educational consumerism and the adoption of computerized learning and assessment systems will enable the 'flexiuniversity or communiversity' of the future to meet the needs of an increasingly diverse student population. Although a small professorial elite is likely to survive in the most prestigious research universities, which will retain elements of academic autonomy and collegiality, faculty is increasingly likely to become a managed occupation. Most institutions will be factories of mass learning, staffed by managers of learning situations, judged by criteria of economic efficiency and consumer responsiveness – a far cry from traditional universities which were citadels of knowledge and repositories of elite culture. The USA departed from the traditional model long before Europe, as it embarked on a mass system post-1945. It is, therefore, perhaps both a sounding board and a warning for other countries moving towards universal, instrumental higher education.

Acknowledgement

My thanks are due to Dr Andrew Ryder whose initial research assisted in the writing of this chapter.

References


Part 4

Asia-Pacific
With the foundation of the Universities of Sydney in 1851, Melbourne in 1853, Adelaide in 1874 and Tasmania in 1890, Australian higher education preceded the formation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. Soon afterwards the Universities of Queensland and Western Australia were founded – in 1909 and 1911 respectively. Drawing their faculty from English and Scottish institutions, these so-called 'sandstone universities' (originally a reference to their architecture) dominated the contemporary system but, despite generous government funding, they 'remained small institutions remote from the concerns and interest of the vast majority of the population until well after the Second World War' (Commonwealth of Australia 1993: 1). Technical institutes, schools of mines and teacher training colleges grew up alongside them and had a combined enrolment greater than that of the university sector. In spite of their tendency to emulate English and Scottish institutions, there was scope for the early Australian universities to experiment and innovate. For example, for many years the University of Western Australia did not levy tuition fees and, together with the University of Queensland, was a leader establishing external studies courses appropriate to the needs of a geographically dispersed population. The curricula were largely vocational, a feature of Australian higher education which has remained to this day (Finn 1991; Charmichael 1992; Mayer 1992).

The Australian National University (ANU) joined the sandstones in 1946 and there followed a rapid expansion of higher education as the Commonwealth government acquired taxation powers from the states and nurtured the national development strategies born of the wartime emergency. Beginning with the University of New South Wales (UNSW) in 1949, 12 universities were founded during the following three decades to compete with the sandstone institutions for research and enrolments. A complementary level of colleges of advanced education (CAEs) was also established and funded to provide vocationally-oriented tertiary courses at undergraduate and masters degree levels, thereby in theory freeing the universities to monopolize
research (McCollow and Knight 1993). By 1974, the Commonwealth had assumed full financial control of universities and other higher education institutions (Commonwealth of Australia 1993). In 1988, these institutions began to be rationalized into the current Unified National System by the 'Dawkins Reforms', named after the minister responsible, so that, between 1987 and 1994, 20 more universities were formed out of CAEs and technology institutes not yet incorporated into the existing university system. Australian higher education was thus changed, largely by Commonwealth government policy directives, from being an elite to a mass provider system, structured into the current 37 publicly funded universities and two private institutions, the religious university of Notre Dame and Bond University (see Appendix 14.1).

Current structure of higher education

In January 1997, the prospects for Australian higher education over the next 20 years were made subject to a government review chaired by Roderick West, a retired headmaster of a prestigious boys' high school in Sydney, which appears to be extending 'the micro-economic reform agenda [of the government] into universities' (The Australian Higher Education, 15 January 1997). The announcement of the Review follows substantial cuts in government funding to universities for 1997, increases in student contributions to the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and a fall in demand for university places, mostly from school-leavers. Under the policies implemented by previous Labour governments, universities became virtual extensions of government and, initially, Senator Vanstone, the Coalition government minister responsible at the time, broadly followed the previous government's policies. Recently, however, there have been calls for a shift in values, both from the Higher Education Review panel and from within the minister's office. For example, the parliamentary secretary to the minister has argued that 'turning universities into an arm of economic policy won't solve our economic problems – but it will seriously damage universities ... rather than allowing themselves to be press-ganged into the service of social change or economic reform' (Campus Review, 17 September 1996).

However, despite its broad brief, the West Review looks set to consider the 'core system-level issues' of the role of higher education in society and the economy, changing demand for higher education over the next 10 to 20 years, its regulatory and administrative framework, research funding and financing teaching and research training' (The Australian Higher Education, 19 February 1997).

Constitutionally, authority for education in Australia rests with the seven states, and universities, with the exception of the ANU and the University of Canberra in the Australian Capital Territory, are autonomous state institutions. The Commonwealth government's powers vis-à-vis universities derives largely from funding them, although Commonwealth social justice legislation has been another source, as higher education policy has reflected the belief
that promotion of social justice contributes to national economic growth. In 1974, the Whitlam Labour government abolished student fees on these grounds but, in the following decade, ‘the expectation that the expansion of higher education would directly contribute to economic growth was not fulfilled’ (Meek and Goedegebuure 1989: 31). In the 1990s, Australian universities have become more market-oriented, particularly regarding the recruitment of overseas students and the provision of distance learning programmes, to the extent that some observers argue higher education has become dominated by economic rationalism and corporate managerialism (Marginson 1994).

A contemporary belief in the right of access to higher education in Australia is almost universal (Aitkin 1993) and has been manifest in the demand for university places and, subsequently, government funding. The introduction of HECS in 1987 broadened the funding sources for universities but the 1996 Commonwealth budget increased tuition fees and created three differentiated bands: Band 1 includes arts, humanities, social sciences/behavioural sciences, visual and performing arts, education and nursing, for which the annual fee is US$2540; Band 2 includes mathematics, sciences, engineering, business and economics, for which the annual fee is US$3620; Band 3 includes law and legal studies, medical sciences and veterinary science, for which the annual fee is US$4240. Among publicly-funded Australian universities in 1996, enrolments of undergraduates varied from just over 3000 at Northern Territory to nearly 30,000 at Monash, postgraduates from 40 at Ballarat to more than 3000 at Sydney and the percentage of part-time students from 20 at Western Australia to 66 at Charles Sturt (see Appendix 13.1).

Prima facie, Australian universities may be grouped into three broad categories: those with liberal purposes (predominantly the sandstones), upholding the values of their English and Scottish forbears, although at the same time making use of their prestige to support their entrepreneurial activities; those with the commercial orientations of some contemporary North American universities (the large ex-technical institutes); and those fulfilling the state institutional role, typical of German universities (ex CAEs and new 'multiversities'). Without distinguishing the aims of individual institutions, the Higher Education Council of the National Board of Education, Employment and Training lists the principal purposes of Australian Universities as being:

- the education of appropriately qualified Australians to enable them to take a leadership role in the intellectual, cultural, economic and social development of the nation and all its regions
- the creation and advancement of knowledge
- the application of knowledge and discoveries to the betterment of communities in Australia and overseas.

Australia's first universities were located in state capitals. The second wave of universities established between 1954 and 1975 included the ANU
in Canberra and, in provincial cities, at Armidale (New England), Newcastle, Townsville (James Cook) and Wollongong. The Dawkins reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, led to an increase in the number both of non-metropolitan and multi-campus universities. A classification of the universities of the Unified National System based on pedigree and current standing leads to the identification of four clusters: the ‘Group of Eight’, currently perceived in the public domain as the leaders; the ‘Second Wave’ founded in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s; ‘Universities of Technology’, upgraded from technical institutes under the Dawkins reforms; and ‘Former Colleges’, i.e. CAEs, teachers’ colleges and amalgamations not absorbed by or merged with universities in clusters 1, 2 and 3 (see Figure 14.1). Some pre-1987 universities are marginal in that they appear to be falling back to cluster 4. Figure 14.1 shows that the Second Wave universities of Monash and New South Wales are included with the sandstones in the Group of 8. These have the highest standing, but the other three clusters do not constitute a ranking, Deakin for example being outclassed by four of the universities of technology and ranked with Canberra, Central Queensland, Notre Dame, South Australia and Western Sydney according to the 1996 prestige ranking (Ashenden and Milligan 1996).

When, in 1987, the then Commonwealth Minister of Education, John Dawkins, announced the end of the binary system of higher education in Australia, there were 19 universities and 47 CAEs, these having been reduced by merger from over 70 institutions but the sector was not delivering the outcomes intended (Meek and Goedegebuure 1989) and was requesting increased funding. In any case, ‘distinctions between the former universities and colleges had become irrevocably blurred’ (Baldwin 1991: 39). Not surprisingly, new funding arrangements for a national unified system included the distribution of operating resources according to weighted
student loads after the establishment of negotiated institutional profiles and research resources on a competitive basis, according to institutional performance. Notwithstanding the unification of higher education from 1987, there is some evidence of a reformation of a binary system, as the technical and further education (TAFE) colleges have developed profiles similar to those of the former large institutes of technology in their early days, this indicating a new form of 'academic drift'. However, none of these changes bridge the comparative advantage gap in staff profiles and technical infrastructure, which the larger and older universities retain in winning research funds.

While Bond and Notre Dame are the only private universities in Australia, publicly funded universities have become increasingly entrepreneurial. This has been driven partly by the decline in public funding and partly, perhaps, by the prospect of a national competition policy (Hilmer 1993). It has become increasingly obvious that a range of educational services currently offered by universities can be provided at lower cost elsewhere. Thus universities are competing with private providers and TAFE for an estimated more than half a billion US dollars of 'edu-business' and industry training each year (Campus Review, 21–27 September 1995). Students have been redefined as 'customers' and 'markets' are 'targeted', particularly overseas ones. Economic growth in Asia has provided opportunities for Australian universities to provide full-fee English language programmes, undergraduate degrees and postgraduate courses. Indeed, some of the more enterprising universities have set up campuses, of various levels of sophistication, in the countries targeted, while others deliver distance learning programmes by electronic media.

Increasing competition and deregulation of Australian higher education have resulted in corporate 'head-hunting' for senior management positions (The Australian Higher Education, 8 May 1996), with a substantial number of vice chancellors and pro-vice-chancellors 'swapping' positions in the early 1990s and again in the late 1990s. The increased value of commercial and applied research activities as revenue earners has resulted in the formation of the Australian Tertiary Institutions' Commercial Companies Association (ATICCA), which represents commercial entities attached to universities and currently has 58 members covering Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia and Singapore.

Student enrolments in Australian higher education increased from around 14,000 in 1939 to around 600,000 in 1995 and now includes 30 per cent of 17–22 year olds. Since 1992, there has been a decline in the number of school-leavers and an increase in mature students (40 per cent of whom are now aged over 25) seeking entry into universities (Campus Review, 1–7 February 1996). There has also been an increase in the proportion of contracted postgraduate students from 28 per cent in 1980 to 62 per cent in 1995. Indigenous enrolment has increased by 43 per cent since 1991 and non-English speaking background (NESB) students are now over-represented in comparison to their incidence in the general population, as are women
Robert Kelso and Christopher Leggett

Table 14.1 Participation by socioeconomic status (SES) and other equity characteristics in Australian higher education, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equity characteristic</th>
<th>SES for equity group</th>
<th>SES for all other students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSI</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NESB</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolated</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


at 55 per cent of total enrolments. Lower socioeconomic groups, rural and isolated students and working-class males, however, have not benefited (Campus Review, 23 July 1996).

Alongside this growth there has been a recognition of inequities in participation and a failure of programmes to address them. The most significant programme was the previous policy and action framework, A Fair Chance for All (Commonwealth of Australia 1990). A recent review of equity outcomes since A Fair Chance for All shows 'that the higher education system has a tendency to replicate itself in terms of certain social characteristics of its student profile' (Commonwealth of Australia 1996: 62). The equity groups for which data are available are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) people, women, NESB students, rural and isolated students and students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds (SES). The statistics in Table 14.1 demonstrate the under-representation of indigenous, rural and isolated groups and suggest that socioeconomic status is an important predictor of participation in Australian higher education. For women and NESB students, participation resembles the biased distribution of all students. Table 14.2 shows, however, that the gender disadvantage is different across the groups.

The players in higher education

In addition to government, through the Department of Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA), the institutionalized parties directly concerned with the employment of academics in Australia are the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee (AVCC) and the National Tertiary Education Union. The AVCC has its origins in 1920 but did not emerge as a major player until 1990, when it merged with the Australian Committee of
Table 14.2 Participation by sex and other equity characteristics in Australian higher education, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equity characteristic</th>
<th>Sex for equity group</th>
<th>Sex for all other students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSI</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low SES</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NESB</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolated</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Directors and Principals to become a peak body and thereby serve paradoxically both as a collective for its members and, through its being consulted, as a legitimating agency for the implementation of government higher education policy, even though it does not necessarily endorse that policy. Its industrial wing, the Australian Higher Education Industrial Association (AHEIA), was formed in the late 1980s in line with the changing institutional structure of higher education at the time to represent the AVCC as an employer in Australia’s then centralized industrial relations system (Marshall 1995). According to Frank Hambly, its administrative head for 30 years, the AVCC has been ‘so obsessed with relations with government, financial problems, management issues, government policy, that they have [sic] not always had time to address some of the academic issues’ (The Australian Higher Education, 18 December 1996). Thus, while the political role of the vice chancellors as economic managers has been strengthened, their relevance to the minutiae of academic leadership has been steadily eroded. Recent competition for government research funding has threatened to fragment ‘the AVCC into several distinct though by no means water-tight factions’ (Campus Review, 12-18 June 1996: 1-2). The new minister in 1997, Senator Vanstone, complained about the ‘unwieldy 36-member AVCC’ and began individual negotiations which threatened to divide the AVCC into three factions: the ‘Group of Eight’, the ‘Useful Five’ (technologically based) and the regional, large multi-campus rural universities.

Academic staff are organized in the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU). In 1997, it had some 25,000 members, a density of 62 per cent among non-casual employees. Consistent with government and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) policy at the time, the NTEU was formed in 1993 from the amalgamation of academic and general staff associations and, against the trend in Australia, its membership grew by 6.5 per
cent in 1996. Officials attribute the growth in academic staff unionism to not only amalgamation but also the effect on employment relations of the restructuring of the tertiary sector, such that academics are increasingly conscious of themselves as employees rather than as professionals. Unlike its predecessor, the Federation of Australian University Staff Unions, NTEU has a wide-ranging membership, a solidaristic structure and is more unionate (McCollow and Knight 1994). Similarly, the push to enterprise bargaining adopted by the previous government, and continued by its successor, makes union membership increasingly desirable to otherwise indifferent academics.

The stated aims of the NTEU incorporate conventional industrial relations as well as professional aims and objectives, such as to 'improve and protect the conditions of employment of members' and 'promote the work of universities and colleges and preserve their independence and integrity' (NTEU undated). Consequently, the union is caught in a dilemma. In spite of the changed political and economic environments of the tertiary sector, and cuts in government funding to universities, NTEU's Council decided in 1997 on a limited agenda of pursuing a 15 per cent pay rise for academics, the maintenance of the positive aspects of existing agreements and a 'managing change clause' to minimize the effects of job losses arising from government policy (Advocate, November 1996).

If casuals are included, the total full-time equivalent of university employees is nearly 83,000 (Commonwealth of Australia 1997). However, only 42 per cent of Australian full-time and fractional full-time university employees, which number just under 79,000, comprises academics; most employees are administrators, support staff and service workers (Moodie 1997). Within universities, these figures reflect a decline in the collegiate authority academic staff traditionally exercised over decision-making. Their resultant sense of alienation may have been reinforced by the creation of non-academic positions in university senior management which are often remunerated according to packages negotiated by the incumbents with the university council and proportionate to vice-chancellors' and pro vice-chancellors' packages. On the other hand, according to the Evatt Foundation (1994: 116), 'new areas of [university] work are being created and new arrangements of [university] work are emerging which blur the traditional distinction between non-academic and academic work'. Symbolically, Central Queensland University encourages its academic and general staff to wear a common uniform but, more generally, less intended developments elsewhere include information systems academics and information technologists both assisting and supervising students, library staff conducting research seminars, human resources administrators determining the criteria for academic performance assessment, directors of international offices instructing faculty academics how to recruit full fee-paying overseas students, desk-top publishers setting the format of academics' distance learning materials and faculty executive officers fulfilling functions devolved by senior management to deans. On the decline of the 'traditional divide' the Evatt Foundation (1994: 117) concludes:
While the extent of the blurring of the distinction between academic and non-academic staff is unclear, the implications of such blurring are significant for the system of classification of employment within higher education, and as a result, on the system of entitlements and career pathways within the university system. The area requires further research.

Assessing the social standing of academics in Australia remains conjectural. Perceptions of the profession have changed with the transition of the higher education system from an elite to a mass provider, from one educating professionals to one cajoled into producing a ‘globally competitive workforce’ (Armitage 1997: 24). The effect on Australian academics of retrenchments resulting from reduction in government-funding, substitution of fixed-term contracts for tenure, the requirements to regard scholarship as a commodity and students as customers, and the uncertainty surrounding public policy on the future of higher education has no doubt had a demoralizing effect on the academic profession. In spite of this, an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) review in 1997 praised Australian higher education for having been ‘remarkably successful in achieving their [sic] main objectives, with a minimum of damaging upheaval or destructive dissent’ (The Australian Higher Education, 26 February 1997).

Structure and management of the academic profession

Although Australia’s higher education academic labour market has been defined to include teaching-only staff, teaching and research staff and research only staff in the universities, it is complicated by being composed of disciplinary markets – interconnected, generic and internationalized – entry to which requires, with some variations amongst subject disciplines, the possession or near completion of a higher degree, increasingly a PhD (Baker et al. 1994). More than one third of academics in pre-1987 universities and about one quarter in the former CAEs gained their highest qualifications overseas (National Board for Education, Employment and Training 1992). This pattern lends something to the character of Australian academe. But, as elsewhere, university restructuring ‘has led to more politicized workplaces and, increasingly, to the politicization of job security’ with almost half of the teaching being done by casual staff ‘employed for an average of two to six weeks over a 14 week period’ (Campus Review, 15–21 May 1995).

A feature of academic staff recruitment to the sandstone eight is that its members tend to recruit their own graduates (National Board for Education, Employment and Training 1992). In the other universities, entry is normally at lecturer A or B levels, academic staff being hierarchically structured from below and through levels A (lecturer), to E (professor), above which senior management is stratified through dean and pro-deputy to full
Table 14.3 Academic teaching staff in Australia, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Untenured</td>
<td>4,263</td>
<td>5,592</td>
<td>9,855</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>4,003</td>
<td>4,564</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>4,849</td>
<td>6,325</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>6,557</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Lecturer</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Tenured</td>
<td>5,102</td>
<td>13,080</td>
<td>18,182</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,365</td>
<td>18,672</td>
<td>28,037</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dobson (1996: 36).

Table 14.4 Full-time equivalent for full-time, fractional full-time and casual staff by work contract, 1988–96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Full-time</th>
<th>Fractional full-time</th>
<th>Casual</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% change on prior year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>54,988</td>
<td>4,758</td>
<td>5,996</td>
<td>65,742</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>55,449</td>
<td>5,164</td>
<td>5,968</td>
<td>66,581</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>57,659</td>
<td>5,826</td>
<td>6,545</td>
<td>70,030</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>60,748</td>
<td>6,181</td>
<td>7,630</td>
<td>74,559</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>62,902</td>
<td>6,741</td>
<td>7,730</td>
<td>77,373</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>64,201</td>
<td>6,893</td>
<td>8,495</td>
<td>79,589</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>64,484</td>
<td>7,035</td>
<td>9,179</td>
<td>80,698</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>65,420</td>
<td>7,359</td>
<td>9,249</td>
<td>80,028</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>65,254</td>
<td>7,449</td>
<td>10,185</td>
<td>82,888</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


vice chancellor, but increasingly complicated by variations on managerial and executive titles and positions in different universities. The distribution of these posts is illustrated in Table 14.3. After 1994, although total staff numbers increased, the number of full-time staff began to decline, while fractional full-time and casual staff numbers continued to rise, the latter by 10 per cent between 1995 and 1996 as shown in Table 14.4. In 1996, women made up 48 per cent of all university employees and about a third of all academic appointments (Campus Review, 26 June and 2 August 1996). Among the latter group, there is a gender imbalance, with women holding only about 18 per cent of positions at senior lecturer and above, although this imbalance could be corrected if tenured male retirement rates are maintained (Dobson 1996: 36).
Faculties, schools and departments recruiting academic staff are required to persuade of a need – not easy to do in the current straitened finances of universities – and comply with equal opportunity policies. Australian academic positions are advertised in the national press, sometimes locally and, as appropriate, in professional journals. Senior positions – and junior positions difficult to fill – are usually advertised in British, North American and south-east Asian newspapers, journals, supplements and on electronic networks. Informal methods supplement printed advertisements, quite often with the purpose of widening the field of applicants. Candidates are required to address a range of criteria in their application and, if shortlisted for interview, can expect to at least be called upon to make a presentation based on their current research and, for positions involving managerial authority, to participate in a series of assessment exercises over two or more days. Prima facie, it is fair to say that the convention of intellectual modesty by Australian academics has been replaced by an expectation that they must market their achievements when attempting to secure a position. Thus candidates are inclined to take care with the content and format of their curricula vitae and the selection and cultivation of their referees.

Regarding the retention and development of higher education staff, a study undertaken in 1994 found that resignations, which at the time were relatively low, were ‘not related to problems occurring as a result of mergers or restructuring but the result of personality clashes and the like or the general situation of increasing teaching loads, too little time or money for research, run down infrastructure and the like’ (Baker et al. 1994: 80). The researchers argued that the Australian higher education sector has been a ‘giant internal labour market’ in which the cost to a department of post-entry training and development was not necessarily perceived as a loss, as there was a spin-off from, among other things, the prestige won from having produced high quality employable staff members. On the other hand, absence of a mandatory retirement age may encourage older academics to stay on who lack the performance capacity of younger staff and thereby block the latter’s career paths. Australian universities have a greying, static workforce and the abolition of compulsory retirement at age 65, particularly for tenured staff, means that institutions face a range of increased costs and reduced flexibility in staff appointments and faculty restructuring. However, tenured employment fell from a high of more than 80 per cent in 1982 to just 58.6 per cent in 1993, giving universities greater staffing flexibility (The Australian Higher Education, 28 August 1995).

While the Australian labour market is the main focus for staffing policies, higher education in general, and management education in particular, are subject to international competition from a number of Asian institutions in collaboration with European and north American universities which offer salaries almost twice those available for teaching and research positions in Australia (The Australian Higher Education Supplement, 3 May 1995). Once among the highest paid in the world, Australian academics have seen their relative pay and conditions decline by about 30 per cent in real terms over
the last 25 years (Bramble 1996). In the future, these are likely to vary among universities, as enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAs) replace the awards of the centralized system of pay determination. The salary ranges of academics under centralized wage awards for 1995 are shown in Table 14.5.

Before 1996, when the Workplace Relations Act (WRA 1996) was passed, higher education constituted an 'industry' in the industrial relations system, with salaries and conditions of Australian academics being set down in the awards of industrial tribunals (Aitkin 1993), although conditions were already beginning to be set by institutional agreements in 1995. However, the WRA 1996 has the potential to deregulate employment in higher education. This would be in accord with the 1995 Higher Education Management Review's recommendation that individual institutions be able to develop employment policies which reflect their individual needs rather than be locked into a national approach (Commonwealth of Australia 1995). In fact, institutions were never locked into a national approach, in spite of the Review's perception, and the early response by NTEU was to employ pattern bargaining in order to prevent anomalies from emerging, particularly between larger metropolitan and smaller regional universities. However, NTEU has recognized that not all universities have the same capacity to pay and that 'forced pay rises will mean loss of jobs' and remaining staff may have higher pay 'but their workloads will increase. There will be more contract and casual staff ... extended use of technology and outsourcing to minimize labour costs' (Campus Review, 3 December 1996). As it is, starting salaries and working conditions in comparable professions, such as school teaching, are equal to if not better than those for university academics. Since 1996, the imperatives for branch NTEU negotiators has been to achieve EBA packages which include salary increases while maintaining the protection of award conditions. Bargained pay increases have ranged from 11 to 18 per cent deliverable in installments over periods ranging from 20 months to three years and have been linked to productivity targets incorporating

### Table 14.5 Salary ranges for higher education academic positions under centralized pay awards (US$), 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>No. of increment stages</th>
<th>Salary range (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48,626–53,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior lecturer</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40,384–46,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32,967–39,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23,077–31,318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Queensland University, Personnel Services, 23 January 1995 (mimeograph).
redundancy provisions, workload rationalization, the management of change, performance management and tenure to non-tenure ratios. However, while NTEU reports 'steady progress on enterprise bargaining' (Ryan 1997: 8), there is criticism from rank-and-file members that individual EBAs – that concluded at the University of Melbourne in 1997, for example – undermine the sector's resistance to the government's economic rationalist agenda for higher education (Advocate, May 1997: 6–8).

For some time, the managing of some Australian academic staff – those applying for tenure, promotion, contract renewal or salary adjustment – has included formal performance appraisal. Its application by academic heads of departments and faculties has generally been guided by personnel departments, the functions of which have widened and deepened with their reconceptualization as human resource management (HRM). Consistent with this development, 'performance appraisal' has given way to 'performance management' in the nomenclature of university senior managements, implying 'planning, counselling, negotiation, continual monitoring and revision of progress plans and integration with organizational needs' and thereby a change in the nature of academic work to one which will produce more definable and measurable outcomes than does scholarship alone (Hort 1996: 4–5). For the time being, however, promotion – through Senior Lecturer and Associate Professor to Professor – is based mainly on research performance measured by publications but opportunities based on other criteria were created by the Dawkins Reforms for former CAE staff, with little or no expectations of becoming researchers within and between institutions.

Control of Australian academics once exercised by collegiality is being rapidly weakened and displaced by managerialism. This has been demonstrated by a shift in the locus of strategic decision-making, as the traditional 'quasi-autonomous academic discipline-based departments, run by "god professors", have typically deferred to faculty groupings and an enhanced university-wide presence represented by Vice-Chancellors and Deputy or Pro-Vice-Chancellors responsible for major themes across the university, such as research, internationalization and information services' (Coaldrake 1996: 33). Vice chancellors, deans, directors and retitled bursars and registrars are often formally classified as 'senior management', irrespective of functional authority, thereby undermining the traditional authority of the professoriat and academic boards. In driving university education closer to the 'customer', public policy-makers and chancelleries have devolved authority to deans, empowering them as budget managers well beyond their traditional academic authority. Although the rhetoric of decentralization is applied to this development, it is academics in schools and departments, i.e. those closest to the 'customer', who have been losing their influence, based as it has been on the institution of collegiality. At the other end, university councils have had to accept a greater responsibility for the efficient management of their universities, particularly as a result of some of their charges accumulating financial deficits.
Conclusion

Substantive changes in Australian higher education over the past decade have resulted in a redefinition of roles and redrawing of previously rigid boundaries amongst institutions. There is also a trend towards privatization, market differentiation and commercial as well as educational entrepreneurial activity as demonstrated, among other things, by the following:

- the establishment of Open Learning Australia and development of 'multiversity' institutions with interstate and international campuses
- changes to traditional methods of teaching and course delivery to include 'flexible' study options, joint offerings and enrolment across institutions
- adoption of three- and four-term academic calendars
- introducing enterprise bargaining and increasing challenges to tenure
- increases in applied research and corporatization of entrepreneurial activities.

In addition, advanced communications technologies are expected to improve productivity in relation to research, teaching, learning and administration by allowing greater access to data and library holdings, facilitating networks of researchers across institutions (and national boundaries) and simultaneously decentralising the workplace, as well as replacing face-to-face teaching.

Elsewhere, the dominant influences upon the Australian higher education sector are identified as basically economic rationalism and management theories drawn largely from behavioural psychology, systems theory and economic individualism, reinforced by government processes such as quality assurance reviews (Marginson 1995). For government, the beauty of these processes is that compliance with them is voluntary. The introduction of the National Quality Assurance Project into the Unified National System required the use of performance indicators, derived largely from statistical data, in the development of strategic management plans. From the point of view of the Federal minister, these are to be 'allied with effective performance management, improved work practices and budgeting and financial management geared to the needs of increasingly commercial operations' (Campus Review, 2 July 1996: 10). Given this climate of change, the current standing of the academic profession is difficult to assess. Many academics who established their careers in the elite universities prior to the Dawkins revolution would have sympathy with the complaint that 'academic life has become less mysterious, less romantic, more prosaic and more open to inspection' (Aitkin 1993: 91). Starting salaries and working conditions in many professions are now equal to or better than that gained in university employment.

The chair of the Federal government's inquiry into higher education, Roderick West, identifies core values of teaching and inquiry and has argued that academics are currently 'too absorbed in administration and in budgets and all those sorts of things... We have to try to develop within
our universities the scholar-cum-teacher' (The Australian Higher Education, 22 January 1997). West and others see this as a return to the original mission of the university in society. For this to occur the focus on research and publications, which was once the preserve of the traditional universities and remains the pre-eminent measure of academic success in the Unified National System, will have to be radically altered in favour of teaching and supervision. It remains to be seen whether the elite research institutions, and that generation of academics who have fought their way to the top of their profession, will accept that shift in focus. Likewise, if the West review continues as predicted, then the power of faculty deans may be checked by collegial resolve. It is difficult to imagine, however, the current tide of managerialism being turned back without significant resistance from those de facto academic administrators who will be forced into the ruck to compete for academic rewards in a game which many of them are now ill-equipped to play. Even three years ago, a study found that 'there was still strong support for the notion of collegiality'. However, there was also general agreement that as older academics took their redundancy packages or retired, the corporate ethos would be more likely to take over the collegial one completely.

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Vice Chancellor Professor Lauchlan Chipman, Appointments Officer Cliff Schnick, Planning Officer Brice Zimmer and NTEU Branch Secretary Dr Lynn Zelmer at Central Queensland University, NTEU South Australia Divisional Officer Cheryl Baldwin and NTEU National Industrial Officer Ken McAlpine for offering them their insights into Australian higher education.

Appendices

Appendix 14.1 Student enrolments in Australian universities and other accredited bodies, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Undergraduate students</th>
<th>Graduate students</th>
<th>Part-time students %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monash University</td>
<td>29,930</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Sydney</td>
<td>21,930</td>
<td>3,158</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Melbourne</td>
<td>21,794</td>
<td>2,722</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland University of Technology</td>
<td>21,604</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology</td>
<td>20,122</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Queensland</td>
<td>19,953</td>
<td>2,741</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of New South Wales*</td>
<td>19,405</td>
<td>2,382</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deakin University</td>
<td>18,909</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Western Sydney</td>
<td>18,760</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of South Australia</td>
<td>17,979</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 14.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Undergraduate students</th>
<th>Graduate students</th>
<th>Part-time students %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Trobe University</td>
<td>16,337</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtin University of Technology</td>
<td>15,990</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffith University</td>
<td>15,468</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Technology, Sydney</td>
<td>15,091</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edith Cowan University</td>
<td>14,870</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Sturt University</td>
<td>14,405</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Newcastle</td>
<td>13,794</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macquarie University</td>
<td>12,114</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria University of Technology</td>
<td>11,687</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Southern Queensland</td>
<td>11,203</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Adelaide</td>
<td>10,320</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Western Australia</td>
<td>10,147</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Tasmania</td>
<td>10,123</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of New England</td>
<td>9,497</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flinders University of South Australia</td>
<td>9,032</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Wollongong</td>
<td>8,408</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian National University</td>
<td>7,746</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swinburne University of Technology</td>
<td>7,067</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Catholic University</td>
<td>6,727</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Canberra</td>
<td>6,684</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Queensland University</td>
<td>6,672</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murdoch University</td>
<td>6,614</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Cook University</td>
<td>6,430</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Cross University</td>
<td>5,867</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Ballarat</td>
<td>3,545</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory University</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond University</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Notre Dame Australia</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other accredited degree institutions b</td>
<td>11,611</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- a includes Australian Defence Force Academy and the National Institute of Dramatic Art.
- b includes Australian International Hotel School, Australian College of Physical Education, Australian Film, TV and Radio School, Australian Institute of Music, Avondale College, Kvä College of Visual Communication, Macleay College, Christian Heritage College, Sunshine Coast University College, Australian Institute for University Studies, International College of Hotel Management, Australian Maritime College, Engineering Education Australia, Open Learning Australia but not Batchelor College.

**Source:** Compiled from *The Weekend Australian*, 27–28 July 1996.

### References

*Advocate*, Newsletter of the National Tertiary Education Union, Melbourne.

Campus Review, Weekly higher education newspaper, Sydney.


NTEU (undated) NTEU Tertiary Education-Your Industry NTEU-Your Union, National Tertiary Education Union recruiting pamphlet.


The Weekend Australian, Weekly newspaper, Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Perth and Hobart.
Japan: Collegiality in a Paternalist System

Kiyoshi Yamamoto

The first modern, public university (Daigaku) in Japan, the University of Tokyo, was established in 1877 by the Meiji government. It was mainly composed of the Tokyo Medical School and Tokyo Kaisei School, which both originated in 'fief' schools of the Edo Shogunate and operated under the principles of Confucianism. The Imperial University Act of 1886 changed the name of 'University' to that of the 'Imperial University' and defined its objective as a response to the 'needs of the Nation'. By 1915, three more Imperial Universities had been established. These national universities consisted of departments of law, engineering, agriculture, medicine, natural sciences and humanities, since government attached great importance to subjects most likely to contribute to the modernization process. Unlike earlier universities in the 1880s and 1890s, these national universities had departments of engineering and similar vocational subjects, reflecting the influence of vocationalism in Japanese society. To enter these universities, students had to complete three years of preparatory education in high schools (Koto Gakko). Government also set up a number of single-subject colleges which mainly trained government officers and professionals to implement modernization policies. As in the case of high schools under the former system of education, students had to pass competitive entrance examinations to gain access to higher education.

Since the public sector alone could not satisfy the rapid increase in demand for higher education, private sector higher education institutions were set up at the same time as government began to establish state universities. The parallel development of private universities with public ones gave rise to two groups of private institutions: the first aimed at enabling people to meet the needs of modernization and the second providing preparatory or initial education and training for the new professional workers required by society. Government, however, did not give financial support to private institutions. Restricted financial resources made these private establishments develop a strategy of 'popularist higher education', focusing on courses in the humanities and social sciences, which were cheaper than natural
sciences, engineering and technology. By 1925 graduates from private institutions accounted for more than half of all graduates produced nationally (Amano 1989).

**Current structure of higher education**

After the Second World War, a new Education Order was implemented under the Fundamental Law of Education and the School Education Law 1947. The multi-track system was abolished and a single-track established. The New Order changed the primary role of higher education institutions from the traditional elite type to a more popularist one, whether public or private, whose roots lay in the state university model of the United States. This policy successfully allowed many more Japanese students to enter higher education than hitherto, thus matching participation rates in the mature US system.

Currently, higher education in Japan is in its third wave of development; the first was after the Meiji Restoration and the second after the Second World War. Though expenditure on higher education was only about 2 per cent of GNP in the 1990s, higher education provision is a major policy concern in Japan. First, since Japan has few natural resources of its own, its future depends largely on the qualities and human resources of its younger generation. Well-trained, knowledgeable and talented graduates are expected to make a significant contribution to the country’s competitive economic position and its place in the world economy. Second, another concern is how government and society should respond to the significant decrease in the numbers of those aged 18 and over now entering higher education.

Under the New Education Order, higher education now consists of three types of institutions: universities, junior colleges and colleges of technology. Universities conduct advanced teaching and research in specialized academic disciplines and provide students with knowledge and theoretical underpinning of their academic disciplines. They may set up graduate schools offering advanced studies to masters and doctoral levels. Junior colleges conduct teaching and research in specialized subjects and train those entering vocational or practical life and were first established in 1950. Although both universities and junior colleges require the completion of upper secondary schooling (high school), or its equivalent, they offer courses of at least four years and of two or three years respectively. Colleges of Technology, which were first established in 1961, accept those who have completed lower secondary schooling and offer five-year programmes. They conduct teaching in specialized subjects in depth and develop in students knowledge and skills required for vocational life.

The present structure of higher education is indicated in Tables 15.1 and 15.2. About half of higher education institutions are concentrated in the Metropolitan and Kansai areas, where the geographic distribution of Japan’s population is most dense, although national universities are located within every prefecture or local government area. This distribution of higher
Japan: Collegiality in a Paternalist System

Table 15.1 Japanese higher education institutions, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Percentage of private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>73.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior colleges</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>83.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges of technology</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1223</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>75.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 15.2 Number of students in Japanese higher education, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Non-Japanese</th>
<th>From abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>2,546,649</td>
<td>821,893(32.3)</td>
<td>51,279 (2.0)</td>
<td>42,105 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undergraduate</td>
<td>2,330,831</td>
<td>767,886(32.9)</td>
<td>32,567 (1.4)</td>
<td>23,460 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graduate</td>
<td>155,423</td>
<td>32,990(21.5)</td>
<td>18,712(12.2)</td>
<td>18,645(12.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior colleges</td>
<td>498,516</td>
<td>455,439(91.3)</td>
<td>3,044 (0.6)</td>
<td>1,506 (0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges of technology</td>
<td>56,234</td>
<td>9,966(17.7)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,039,004</td>
<td>1,266,281(41.6)</td>
<td>54,323 (1.8)</td>
<td>43,611 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the percentages of female, non-Japanese and from abroad.

education institutions is partly explained by the different funding systems in the public and private sectors. Funding in public institutions is mainly out of taxes, with tuition fees providing only some of 11 per cent of total revenues in 1994. In private institutions, on the other hand, about 70 per cent of operating costs derive from tuition fees and, in 1994, only about 12 per cent of their income was supported by government. This was based on the Law of Promoting Private Schools 1975, whose ultimate goal is to finance half the operating costs of private sector institutions. High demand for higher education among young people, and management policy within private institutions to recruit as many students as possible to bolster their finances as in the prewar period, increased the higher education student participation rate from 10.3 per cent in 1960 to 45.2 per cent in 1995. The number of students in higher education has increased five times in the past four decades: from about 600,000 in 1955 to approximately three million in 1995, excluding students in colleges of technology.

The parties and players in higher education

The Ministry of Education is in charge of higher education policy. The Ministry makes higher education policy and implements it after consulting
Table 15.3 Numbers of higher education employers in Japan, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Junior colleges</th>
<th>Colleges of technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The differences between the numbers in Table 15.1 and those in Table 15.3 are caused by the fact that some employers in the private sector established plural institutions.


three national Councils. These are the University Council, Science Council and Council for Private Universities and their legally appointed authorities, known in Japanese law as ‘School Juridical Persons’. The first advises on higher education policy, especially the managing of universities. The second assesses applications for Science Research Grants funded by government and the third consults establishments and initiates changes in higher education institutions. In the private sector, only legally responsible parties (i.e. school juridical persons) can establish educational institutions, including those in higher education, by the School Education Law. Present higher education policy has three main aims based on the advice of the University Council: advancing higher education and academic research; making higher education more flexible; and making institutional operations more efficient and financially viable. The Ministry of Education controls both the public and private sectors through financial measures. These incorporate direct resource provision for public institutions and indirect financial support for private institutions.

Each higher education institution has a president, but the private and public sectors differ in their legal statuses and managerial arrangements. In the public sector, the Minister of Education or heads of local government (either prefecture or municipality) allocate resources for each institution and appoint their presidents. Their terms of office are determined by each higher education institution’s rules and constitution and they hold office for two to four years. The power of presidents is limited, though they are only appointed by the Minister or the head of local government after an election by academic staff in the institution. Thus the real employer in the public sector is the Minister of Education or the head of local government in its area. In the private sector, on the other hand, the chief director of a ‘school juridical person’ is the employer of all staff, including the president, based on the Private School Law. Table 15.3 shows the number of institutions by type of higher education institution employer.

The numbers of academic staff teaching and researching in Japanese higher education institutions are indicated in Table 15.4. According to a survey by Naoi and Moriyama (1990), the social prestige of university professors is very high, being scored at 83 (max = 100) which is about the same
Table 15.4 Numbers of full-time academic staff in Japanese higher education, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Junior colleges</th>
<th>Colleges of technology</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>65,744(10.38)</td>
<td>3,341(11.33)</td>
<td>4,134(12.92)</td>
<td>73,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>71,720(25.99)</td>
<td>17,361(26.53)</td>
<td>172(16.22)</td>
<td>89,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137,464(36.37)</td>
<td>20,702(37.86)</td>
<td>4,206(25.14)</td>
<td>162,472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in parentheses show the number of students per staff.

as that for lawyers (87), doctors (83) and members of Parliament (81), but higher than that of company presidents (73). Their fathers’ educational level is also higher than that of the mean level. In this survey, the job satisfaction rate of university professors was 53 per cent, although wage levels were a little lower than those of researchers in non-university research institutions (Arimoto 1995). Regarding their legal status, academic staff in the public sector are public employees whose status is guaranteed by the National Public Service Law or the Local Public Service Law. In private universities, academic staff are employees of their ‘juridical person’ and are protected under the Labor Standards Law, as are those in other private organizations. Other employees working as support staff have a different legal status according to the institutions in which they are employed. They are divided into five groups: administrative, technical, medical/nursing, instructional and others. There were 187,321 of these employees in 1995, compared with 162,472 academic staff (Ministry of Education 1996).

Representative associations of employers are organized by sector. In public universities there are two organizations: the Association of National Universities, whose members come from national universities, and the Association of Prefectural and Municipal Universities representing local government universities. Private universities have three organizations whose members consist of the ‘school juridical persons’: the Japanese Association of Private Universities, the Private Universities’ League of Japan and the Association for Promoting Private Universities. These three organizations make up the Union for Organizations of Japanese Private Universities, which is the umbrella organization to which more than 95 per cent of private universities belong. Both sets of representative organizations have similar aims, those of promoting higher education to government, communicating among their members and organizing research into higher education.

Academic staff also have a major trade union in each higher education institution sector: the National Union for Employees of Universities, Junior Colleges and Colleges of Technology in the public sector and, in the private sector, the Japanese Trade Union for Employees of Private Universities. In contrast with other public employees, where union density was about 60 per cent in 1993, union density in public and private higher education institutions is about 20 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.
These low unionization rates may be explained by three factors. First, there have been few problems of employment security in higher education because of its steady growth after the Second World War. Second, pay levels of the academic profession have been higher than those with equivalent educational qualifications in private companies. Third, academics are generally strong individualists, who dislike collectivist behaviour and identify with academic elitism. The power of trade unions in Japanese higher education is therefore very weak. However, their aims are to improve the conditions of academic staff and make higher education institutions more democratic. To accomplish these aims, academic unions demand annual pay increases from government and private university employers, as well as promoting professional exchanges among their members.

In contrast to their low levels of unionization, Japanese academics are much more likely to join relevant professional associations. On average, academic staff are members of three or four academic associations, which are normally organized by subject area or academic discipline. Their aim is to promote research and interchange of information and ideas among their members, who usually obtain membership on the recommendations and support of two existing members, confirmed by their governing bodies. They also have research meetings and publish journals. There were more than 1500 associations in 1995, with about 3.2 million members, though not all members are university staff. Among these associations, there are approximately 2 million persons holding doctoral degrees. Also, in science, engineering and agriculture, many researchers in institutes or companies other than in universities, join professional associations. For example, in the Japanese Society of Civil Engineers, which is one of the most traditional associations in engineering, higher education members account for just 12 per cent per of all members. For those holding positions of ‘juridical persons’ there were only 164 professional associations in the mid-1990s.

Structure of the academic profession

The structure of the academic labour market can be analysed in terms of new entrants, promotions and exits. The number of those entering the profession from other jobs in 1992, for example, was 6638 (Ministry of Education 1992). Sixty per cent of those were under 35 years of age. Those from graduate schools or qualified undergraduates make up about 20 per cent of the total of new entrants, which is fewer proportionally than those coming from business and the public services. In Japan, the completion of a doctorate does not ensure an appointment; about 60 per cent of doctoral graduates got employment in 1995 but only a quarter of them held teaching jobs. The significant difference between academic staff employed in higher education and other graduates is explained by the less-developed professional labour market for researchers, analysts, consultants (except in health and engineering), in contrast to the well-developed markets of the
United States and UK. The majority of applicants for new teaching appointments, about 50 per cent of them, are doctoral students or post-doctoral candidates.

Staff transferring within the academic profession in 1992 amounted to 2626 persons. The internal transfer rate, which is calculated as the number of internal movers to other higher education institutions in a year divided by the total number in the academic labour market, is about 2.2 per cent per year, somewhat lower than the rate for other professions. Those transferring into junior colleges or colleges of technology are mostly staff retiring from universities. Retirement in the public sector is between 60 and 67, based on the Special Law, with actual retirement being determined by each institution. The employment contract in private sector higher education institutions also lays down retirement age as being between 65 and 70. Most of those leaving the academic labour market are over 60 years of age. Reasons for leaving institutions are varied: those leaving universities mostly cite ‘transferring to another job’, while those leaving junior colleges or colleges of technology cite the ‘age limit’.

As to the qualifications of academic staff, about 60 per cent hold doctoral degrees, a quarter hold masters’ degrees and 15 per cent first degrees. The rate of those holding doctoral degrees varies widely according to subject discipline: more than 80 per cent in science and engineering, compared with only 30 per cent in humanities and social sciences. This is a unique feature of the Japanese academic labour market. The very low rate in the humanities, which many overseas academics find difficult to understand, is caused by three factors. First, doctoral degrees are not considered primarily as professional qualifications for entering the academic labour market but as honorary titles, showing high attainment in research. Second, doctoral courses in the humanities and social sciences do not provide very effective training in research, since professors have few research assistants and do not have enough time to give to doctoral students. Third, there is little international work done in some departments, with many areas focusing on Japanese topics. Even in economics departments, where there was relatively little international work until recently, few staff have doctoral degrees.

Since the academic profession does not require any teaching qualification, unlike in elementary and secondary school teaching, academic staff are not systematically trained to teach, while research training is implemented on the job by senior academic staff. The legal status of academics is, as mentioned above, different between the public and private sectors. In the public sector, the legal status of the profession is guaranteed by the Public Service Law, while in the private sector it is guaranteed by the Labor Standards Law. This distinction in legal regulation produces differences in tenure in both sectors. Tenure is given to all staff in the public sector by public law, whereas for those in the private sector it is given through the employment contract between academic staff and their juridical person. Most academic staff have tenure, however, except for teaching assistants in private sector institutions.
The occupational grading structure for university, junior college and colleges of technology academic staff consists of presidents, vice-presidents, professors, associate professors, lecturers and assistants. Distributions of grading by institution and gender are shown in Table 15.5 (Ministry of Education 1996). Female staff make up only about 11 per cent of staff in universities and 3 per cent in colleges of technology, compared with about 40 per cent in junior colleges and about 60 per cent in the labour market as a whole. The percentage of non-Japanese academic staff (ethnics) in full-time employment is less than 3 per cent. It was only in 1982 that foreigners were finally allowed to become part of academic permanent staff in the public sector by the Special Treatment Law of Appointment of Non-Japanese Academic Staff. Part-time teachers account for a surprisingly high proportion of academic staff, some 50 per cent of the total. The mean age and length of service are 47 years and 15 years in universities, 49 and 16 years in junior colleges and 46 and 17 years in colleges of technology (Ministry of Education 1992). Mean ages and length of service of all permanent academic staff are higher and longer than those of other professionals. The distribution of academic staff by subject area, as shown in Table 15.6, corresponds to the distribution of students except in social sciences, science and health. These exceptions are explained by mass education in social sciences and high-density education in science and health.

Human resources management and the academic profession

Recruitment of academic staff is based on an evaluation conducted by faculty meetings, in which not only professors but also associate professors
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Humanities</th>
<th>Social sciences</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Engineering</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Home economics</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Arts</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff</strong></td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students</strong></td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ministry of Education (1992).*
and lecturers are involved. This system in higher education institutions, however, is a special one in Japanese public services, since candidates for permanent public service employment are in principle selected legally by competitive examinations. The Special Law for Employees Serving in Education provides exceptions in appointing and promoting academic staff. Appointments are made through the following procedures: first, an evaluation committee is set up; second, the committee selects a candidate through the examinations of persons recommended by the committee’s members or by their evaluations of applicants in cases of advertising the post, though this is rare; third, all faculty teaching members vote for the selection of the candidate; and last, the president appoints him or her as a new member of academic staff, if more than two-thirds of faculty agree to the appointment. Academic staff who are newly appointed have the status of public servant to whom life-time employment is guaranteed in the public sector. In the private sector, the person becomes an employee for the institution through a normal contract of employment with the employer, though implicitly it is a contract for life-time employment.

Turning to remuneration, we observe that rewards are also different between the public and private sectors. In public institutions, the National Personnel Authority (NPA) and the Personnel Committees of local governments (PCs) are legally in charge of the remuneration of national public servants and local public servants respectively. The NPA and PCs annually review pay levels and recommend fair pay revisions for central and local government. Such recommendations are generally implemented by each governmental body. This remuneration system compensates for the prohibition of strikes by public servants, or the concluding of collective agreements, due to their special legal status, while other, non-public employees do have these constitutional rights. Public employees, including the academic profession, only have very limited rights to join unions and bargain collectively. Also the Ministry of Education and presidents of public institutions, like the unions, have very little discretion in determining terms and conditions. In the private sector, on the other hand, terms and conditions are determined in the employment contract with the ‘school juridical person’ under the general law and academic staff have a limited right to collective bargaining with their employers. The role of collective bargaining is very limited, however, since union power in higher education is very weak.

Pay scales and pay structures for academics are set up by the NPA or PCs in accordance with the public-sector grading structure: class 1 for instructional supporting staff; class 2 for assistants; class 3 for lecturers; class 4 for associate professors; and class 5 for professors. Table 15.7 shows the pay scales for academic staff in national public universities and junior colleges in 1996. Academic staff are normally eligible to move to a higher step on their scale as an annual pay rise, though this is limited to the scale maximum, unless they are promoted to a higher grade. Private institutions have similar scales and structures and, in practice, pay levels for each position in the grading structure are similar to those for public institutions.
Both the public and private sectors have a pension scheme consisting of a ‘short-term’ welfare service and a ‘long-term’ welfare service element, with academic staff being obliged to join the corresponding mutual benefit association. The former is mainly for medical insurance and allows 90 per cent of medicare cost for a member of academic staff (or in the case of his or her family 70 per cent). The latter element is the pension service which gives benefits to retired staff over 60 years of age. Benefit levels in both sectors are similar and their mean value is about US$19,765 per year in 1995. Employee contributions are half of those calculated according to the following formula, with the other half of their pension fund being made up by the government or ‘juridical employer’. The contribution per month is equivalent to an individual’s monthly base salary times the following weightings: $74/1000 + 174.8/1000$. The first multiplied coefficient is for short-term medical service and the second for long-term pension service. In the private sector, the weightings are: $85.5/1000 + 130.5/1000$. When a member of academic staff retires, a lump sum is paid as a retirement grant in addition to a pension. This grant is given to staff in the public sector by public law and in the private sector by contract. The amount is generally calculated as the monthly base salary at the time of retirement multiplied by an index (the maximum is 60) for numbers of years employed.

Procedures for promotion are fundamentally the same as in recruitment. Faculties have a mandate for determining whom to promote. When there is a vacancy, from retirement or when someone resigns, candidates who have demonstrated good performance are considered by a promotion committee which evaluates his or her case. If the committee considers the candidate worthy of promotion, its recommendation has to be approved by more than two-thirds of faculty members as in the case of recruitment. In the case of staff appraisal, which faculties, not presidents, legally implement for those in public service, research performance is very much focused on. However, promotion is substantially determined by the seniority system, as outlined...
in Table 15.7. It can be explained by the following reasons. First, the Special Law allows each faculty meeting of the institution to appraise its members’ performance based on its own evaluation standards. Second, seniority is the easiest measure to reach a mutual consent among faculty members and the least subjective in evaluation. In other words, this structure is one in which the academic profession has wide autonomy in personnel matters.

Academic staff are therefore quite involved in managing personnel, research and educational activities through a largely collegial system. Academics in the public sector are also involved in other operational matters based on their autonomy in managing their institutions. Those in the private sector are also involved in operational matters, because the board of directors and ‘juridical person’ are expected to respect the will of faculty members. This requires academics spending a lot of time on administrative work, which amounts to about a quarter of their working hours (Ozen 1994).

Conclusion

Ever since the Meiji Era, academic staff in Japan have traditionally attached much importance to research, whether working in public or private institutions, even though only about a half of all institutions provide doctoral programmes. Domestic and international factors, however, are making Japanese higher education change its focus, such as by making greater emphasis on student-oriented services and internationalization in academic research. Owing to the decreasing proportion of young people going on to higher education, quality is a key element for acquiring students. Also in order to maintain Japan’s economic power in international markets, research which advances the frontiers of science and produces new goods or services is vital for promoting growth and retaining Japan’s position in the world economy. The Ministry of Education only recently deregulated the curriculum, so that now each higher education institution has some discretion in subject content and giving credits. It also introduced a self-evaluation system for teaching and research activities and has encouraged higher education institutions to be evaluated by external reviewers. Further, in 1995, the University Council made a recommendation introducing short-term employment for some academic staff and increasing mobility between institutions.

At the same time, the Ministry of Education has been gradually introducing increasing competition into higher education resource allocation. The Science Research Grant, which supports research funding applied for by academic staff, is growing while the budget allocated in line with numbers of students and staff has been decreasing in real terms. These new policies arouse controversy within the academic profession. Academic trade unions in both sectors are opposed to them, while some younger staff support them. These trends are likely to promote the separation of institutions into universities aiming at international competitiveness in research and those
focusing on satisfying the national labour market for qualified professional workers. Also, some institutions may be forced to leave the higher education market, if they are unable to apply either strategy successfully. It is not clear, however, whether the Ministry of Education will be able to achieve its objectives. This is because academic staff in Japan have a long tradition of making more effort at research than at teaching, even if they belong to the non-research universities and institutions.

References


Malaysia was formed in 1963 as the result of a merger between the Federation of Malaya and the British colonies of Sarawak, North Borneo (presently called Sabah) and Singapore. Before the merger, the Federation of Malaya had gained its independence in 1957 from the British. However, in 1965, Singapore left Malaysia and became an independent state called the Republic of Singapore. The population of Malaysia is currently about 18 million and is expected to reach about 24 million by the year 2000. This population consists of 62 per cent Malays and other indigenous groups (commonly known as Bumiputra), 29 per cent Chinese, 8 per cent Indians and 1 per cent others. The fact that there are three major races and that there is a discrepancy in income distribution among them has a major impact on the educational policy of the nation, as discussed in this chapter.

Malaysia’s rich endowment of economic resources has made it one of the most prosperous countries in south-east Asia. In 1995, the mean annual household income in the country was about US$9600, one of the highest in the region. Although the mean household income is relatively higher than it once was, the uneven distribution of incomes and the problem of poverty remain central issues in Malaysia’s development planning.

Prior to the Second World War, certain key factors such as race, religious and economic backgrounds, and private enterprise shaped education in the Malay Peninsula, Sarawak and Sabah. The Government established and maintained vernacular schools, while the ex-patriate and immigrant communities attended the English schools or their own private vernacular schools, established and maintained by their own communities. Private enterprise also contributed to the shaping of the educational pattern in that it was mainly responsible for the early beginnings of higher education. The dual system of English and vernacular schools, their curricula and the regulations of grants-in-aid are prime indicators of these influences. As Malaya approached independence and self-government in the late 1950s, however, the whole education system was examined from the perspective of ‘nurturing national consciousness’ and ‘moulding national identity’ (EPRD 1989: 2).
When Malaysia gained its independence on 31 August 1957, the post-colonial period saw the introduction of a new and different era for the education system.

Current structure of higher education

The current structure of higher education in Malaysia, as in other systems, derives from its history. On gaining independence, one of the first tasks of government was to establish a national education system for all. A committee, headed by the first Minister of Education, Dato' Abdul Razak Hussein, was set up and published a report, commonly known as the Razak Report. Its underlying principles were accepted by government and these were duly enacted as the Education Ordinance, 1957. This ordinance formed the basis of the National Education Policy, with its 'orientation to a Malaysian outlook' and with Malay as the national language and main medium of instruction in all schools. English and Malay became compulsory subjects for all primary and English schools. The emphasis of educational programmes up to 1970 was oriented towards academic development. In the 1980s, however, it was felt that education should move towards the more holistic development of the individual as expressed in the national education policy. The underlying principles and goals of the national education policy and national education philosophy were translated into educational programmes and activities in order to achieve the following objectives (EPRD 1989: 5):

- to provide pupils with the essential intellectual, affective and psychomotor skills in a holistic and integrated manner so as to produce individuals who are intellectually, physically, emotionally and spiritually balanced and functionally literate
- to inculcate and nurture national consciousness through fostering common ideals, values, aspirations and loyalties in order to mould national unity and national identity in a multi-ethnic society
- to produce manpower with requisite skills for economic and national development
- to inculcate in pupils desired moral values and to promote personality and aesthetic development as well as the sense of being responsible, disciplined and progressive, enabling them to contribute effectively towards nation building.

Interest in tertiary education had commenced as early as 1947 when the Carr-Saunders Commission recommended the immediate creation of a University of Malaya through the amalgamation of the King Edward VII College of Medicine (established in 1905) and Raffles College (founded in 1929). This by-passed the university college stage and the new university was formed with three faculties: arts, science and medicine. In 1949 legislation...
creating a University of Malaya (in Singapore) was passed by both legislatures of the Government of the Federation of Malaya and Colony of Singapore. After 1957, political considerations as well as educational policy made it imperative for Malaya to have a university in the Federation itself. Legislation for establishing these two separate universities was passed in October 1961 in the Parliament of the Federation and in December 1961 in the legislative assembly of Singapore, with the Universities of Malaya and Singapore coming into effect on 1 January 1962. In the following years, Malaysia established eight national and one international university to cater for its growing population and rising demand for higher education.

Overall the direction and rate of growth of higher education in Malaysia has been dictated by the political, economic and demographic needs and realities of the nation. The development of Malaysian higher education falls into two main phases: pre and post the National Economic Policy (NEP) period. Before the NEP was implemented, there was a grave imbalance in the distribution of opportunities for higher education among the different races in Malaysia. Enrolments of students at the University of Malaya, the first and largest university in Malaysia during this period, gives an indication of students by ethnic group: 60.5 per cent Chinese, 20.6 per cent Malays, 16.5 per cent Indians and 2.4 per cent others (University of Malaya 1963). Although Malay students were about a fifth of total enrolments, the majority of them were studying for awards in the arts. During the period 1964–70, for example, out of the total number of graduates of 2337 from the University of Malaya, there were only 119 Malays representing only 5.1 per cent (Chai 1977). This imbalance in racial representation in higher education was due to the imbalance in racial representation at secondary school level. The output of Malay speaking students with a full Higher Secondary School Certificate in Science ranged from 1 in 1967 to 59 in 1972, compared with 921 in 1967 and 1606 in 1972 for English speaking students. Since most of Malays lived in rural areas their access to English medium schools, which were mostly situated in urban areas, was strictly limited. Furthermore, not all English schools were residential to cater for out-of-town students. Also, the medium of instruction in higher education was English. Thus the frustration of the Malays in the 1960s was due to the lack of opportunities for higher education in the Bahasa Malay language.

There was, therefore, strong pressure to develop Malay secondary schools. In the late 1950s, when the question of the status of the national language was a crucial issue in national politics, the powerful Federation of Malay School Teachers Association accused the government of not showing any desire to promote Malay secondary education (Roff 1967). The government gave many reasons for not starting Malay secondary schools. One of the most important was the shortage of qualified teachers. However, due to internal political pressure within United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the main ruling party, as well as from outside UMNO, the Ministry of Education was indirectly forced to start Malay secondary schools, although initially secondary classes were started in existing primary schools.
Only with a satisfactory level of secondary education could any expansion of higher education be undertaken. It has been suggested that the racial riots of 1969 were partly due to ethnic inequalities in educational opportunity (Koyakoti 1981). The Malays and other indigenous groups were found to be under-represented in higher earning jobs, particularly in the professions. Further, Malay entrepreneurs and business people still played only a minimal role in the country's productive sectors. Thus Shah (1987) argues that using higher education as an intervention strategy in the economic development of a plural society was a logical step towards achieving the NEP. Prior to the implementation of the NEP, however, the higher education system continued to consist of only two universities and three colleges. These were the University of Malaya, University of Science, the Technical College, College of Agriculture and MARA Institute of Technology. At these institutions the medium of instruction was English. With the introduction of the NEP, there was a rapid expansion of higher education institutions and the need to provide greater opportunities to Malay-speaking students became an urgent matter. In 1970, the National University of Malaysia was established, with Malay as the medium of instruction. The initial student enrolment at the University was 191 (Yin 1980). In July 1973, the University of Agriculture was formed by the merger of the Faculty of Agriculture of the University of Malaya and the Agriculture College at Serdang, with an initial enrolment of 1559 students. Although it is a university, the University of Agriculture offers both degree and diploma programmes. Like the University of Agriculture, the Technical College was raised to University status in March 1972, starting with an enrolment of 973 students. It too offers diploma as well as degree programmes. The College was formally known as Institut Teknologi Kebangsaan but was later renamed as Universiti Teknologi Malaysia in April 1975. The university provides opportunities for studying science and technology which comprises engineering, architecture, surveying, planning, valuation and scientific and technological management.

In 1993 an international university was established in Malaysia. Unlike all other universities, which were bound strictly by the Universities and Colleges Act 1971, this one was formed through a Memorandum and Articles of Association and was officially registered on 10 May 1993 under the name of the International Islamic University – Malaysia. The University is managed by a Board of Governors consisting of representatives of government and international organizations who have signed co-sponsorship treaties with the Malaysian government. In contrast to the other Universities, which are totally funded by the Malaysian government, the Islamic University receives funding from a number of Muslim states. Hence the University is unique in its objectives, management, sources of finance and student body. Although the University is Islamic in character, its student body is made up of foreign and local students from all races and religions. In addition to Islamic studies, the University offers courses in accountancy, business studies and law. The seventh university in Malaysia, or the sixth
Table 16.1 Malaysian universities, 1962–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of establishment</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Malaya (UM)</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Sains Malaysia (USM)</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Penang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Kebangsaan (UKM)</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Agriculture (UPM)</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Serdang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Technology Malaysia (UTM)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Skudai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Islamic University (UIA)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM)</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Sintok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Sarawak Malaysia (UNIMAS)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Kuching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Malaysia Sabah (UMS)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Kota Kinabalu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Education.

Table 16.2 Enrolment at Malaysian universities, 1993–94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of studies</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-degree program</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>5,003</td>
<td>2,248</td>
<td>7,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First degree</td>
<td>32,268</td>
<td>33,168</td>
<td>65,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduates diploma</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>2,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>2,583</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>3,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41,147</td>
<td>38,457</td>
<td>79,604</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Education.

National university, is the Northern University of Malaysia which was established in 1984 with an enrolment of 295 students. From its inception the university has placed special emphasis on management education. University Malaysia Sarawak (Unimas), established in 1993, was Malaysia's eighth university with one of its main aims being to contribute to national economic growth and sustainable national development. Lastly, University Malaysia Sabah (UMS) was established in 1994 in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. It seeks to produce qualified experts in the areas of science, technology and management in order to achieve the goal of Malaysia becoming a fully industrialized nation by 2020. Even though UMS is based on science and technology, it is also offers business studies and economics. Table 16.1 lists details of all Malaysia's universities and Table 16.2 shows total enrolments in Malaysian universities in 1993–94 but a breakdown of student numbers in non-university institutions is not available.
In addition to the eight national universities and an international university that now offers full-time degree programmes in Malaysia, there are two colleges offering degree or degree equivalent programmes, 31 teacher training colleges and seven polytechnics providing largely vocational education. The two degree-providing colleges are the MARA Institute of Technology and the Tunku Abdul Rahman College. The MARA Institute of Technology has the primary objective of producing professional and sub-professional personnel to meet the national needs for qualified Bumiputras. Although it started as an experimental centre providing short courses in commerce and cottage industry to 25 English educated rural youths in 1956, and was named the Dewan Latihan Rural Industrial Development Authority, it has now expanded to be the largest higher education institution in Malaysia with an enrolment of 32,480 students in 1995 (Malaysian Government 1996). On the other hand, Tunku Abdul Rahman College was established in 1969 with an initial enrolment of 510 students. Like the MARA Institute of Technology, Tunku Abdul Rahman College also expanded its student enrolments, up to 8312 students in 1993. Both these colleges offer professional as well as joint degree programmes with foreign universities. Tunku Abdul Rahman College collaborates with the University of Campbell, while MARA Institute of Technology has links with Ohio University in the United States to offer degree programmes. In terms of government recognition of programmes, the professional courses offered at these two colleges are equivalent to degrees.

Besides these universities and colleges, there are numerous private, profit motivated organizations which collaborate with universities from abroad and conduct programmes through distance learning, franchising or joint study programmes. With joint programmes, students are required to spend about two years in Malaysia and the rest of their programme at the foreign university which is collaborating with the local organization. Some leading organizations, such as Sunway College, Taylors College and TAFE College (non-profit), run joint programmes with universities in the UK, United States and Australia. Private sector higher education institutions have experienced rapid expansion in terms of both physical development and student enrolments in recent years, paralleling expansion in the public sector. Total student enrolments for degree programmes in local public institutions of higher education has increased nearly fourfold from 21,944 in 1980 to 79,330 in 1995.

Currently, one of the most talked about educational issues in Malaysia is the corporatization of the universities. The general feeling prevailing everywhere, from the Ministry to the campuses, is that universities will ultimately be corporatized, possibly in the next one or two years. What exactly does corporatization mean? In essence, corporatized universities will be governed by their own legal statutes or by the Company’s Act and will be administered by executive boards. Technically, they will still be owned by government but managed locally. Corporatization therefore is not privatization, since universities will be administered and managed in the interests of their stakeholders. From the point of view of universities, the move towards corporatization is
essentially aimed at providing administrative autonomy for universities in financial matters, human resources issue, servicing requirements and in selection of programmes to be offered. Since the issue of corporatization issue has yet to be fully resolved, it cannot currently be discussed in any detail but corporatization has become the catalyst for re-thinking and reflecting on the roles and functions of modern universities in Malaysia as institutions of advanced study and higher learning. The sorts of questions being currently asked by educationalists, policy makers and leaders in the community include: are universities being administered efficiently; are costs per student too high and what might be done to reduce unit costs; are university academic programmes viable; what determines first choice university among applicants; is sufficient external revenue being generated to be able to sustain universities in the future; and what needs to be done to generate additional revenue? Responses to these questions demand a possible transformation not only of a university's management style but its approach to higher education as well. Some commentators would argue that the need for transformation would appear to be vital considering that while, among ASEAN countries, Malaysia spends the most per capita on tertiary education it had the lowest enrolment (4.3 per cent) for the age cohort 19–24 in the early 1990s (Suleiman 1995).

From what has been said so far, it is clear that education is a major contributor to the Malaysian economy. Every year the Federal Government spends large amounts of money on educational development. In 1992, for example, a total of US$570 million was spent on educational development, making it the highest expenditure by the Federal Government within the social services budget. Subsequently, in the 1993 budget, out of a total development allocation of US$4.5 million, the social service sector received about US$1.12 million or some 25 per cent and, of that, education received the largest share. This shows the importance given to education by the Malaysian government. Education in Malaysia comes under the direction of the Ministry of Education. Among its many tasks, the Ministry is responsible for drawing up National Education Policy, while the principles underpinning the policy are based on the National Ideology or the Rukunegara. As such, the National Educational Policy adheres to the country's aspiration of national unity and economic development as identified in the Rukunegara. The underlying principles of the Rukunegara are: belief in God; loyalty to king and country; upholding the constitution; the rule of law; and good behaviour and morality. The objectives of the Rukunegara, are to develop a united nation within a pluralistic society; a democratic society through a constitutionally elected Parliament; a just society with equal opportunities for all; a liberal society of diverse cultural tradition; and a progressive society oriented towards science and modern technology. Currently, the Prime Minister heads a cabinet committee which constantly reviews and monitors the implementation of the National Education Policy. The committee was set up in 1974 and five years later it established a philosophy of education for the 1980s and 1990s. The philosophy, as illustrated in Figure 16.1, seeks
Figure 16.1 The national educational philosophy

Principles of national educational philosophy

Belief in and obedience to God

Spiritual

Intellectual

Physical

Emotional

Integrated and holistic development

Knowledge and skills

Desired moral values

Language

Curriculum and syllabus

Teaching learning process

Product

Aspirations of national educational philosophy

Operationalization of national educational philosophy

Good human being

Belief in and obedience to God

Knowledgeable excellence

Responsible

With desired moral values

Loyal and able to contribute towards harmony and prosperity of society and nation

Balanced and harmonious person

Source: Ministry of Education, Malaysia.
Table 16.3 Number of academic staff at Malaysian universities (1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>UM</th>
<th>UKM</th>
<th>USM</th>
<th>UPM</th>
<th>UTM</th>
<th>UUM</th>
<th>UIA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>4195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Lecturer</td>
<td>394</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutor</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language/science teacher</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>1229</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>6447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n.a. = not available.
Source: Higher Education Division, Ministry of Education.

Table 16.4 Number of academic staff in all polytechnics in Malaysia (1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polytechnics</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politeknik Ungku Omar</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politeknik Sultan Ahmad Shah</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politeknik Kota Bharu</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politeknik Sultan Abdul Halim Mu’adzam Shah</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politeknik Batu Pahat</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politeknik Kuching</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politeknik Port Dickson</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>1068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n.a. = not available.
Source: Technical and Vocational Education Division, Ministry of Education.

to achieve a holistic national development based on a sound and effective education system.

The players in higher education

All public Malaysian universities, teacher training colleges and polytechnics are fully financed by government. The Federal Government therefore is the employer of university staff and academic staff are generally civil servants, except those who are not Malaysian citizens. By the mid-1990s, the numbers of academic staff employed within universities and polytechnics are summarized in Tables 16.3 and 16.4. In total, higher education institutions employed
some 10,200 academic staff: 6447 in universities; 1068 in polytechnics; and another 2688 in training colleges. In training colleges, some two-thirds (1779) of academic staff were male and one-third (909) female, while in polytechnics some 69 per cent (742) were male, compared with 31 per cent (326) who were female. A gender breakdown is not available for university staff. There are in addition more than 200 private higher education institutions in Malaysia. Some institutions are owned by individuals, while most have corporate ownership. Two of the largest institutions (Stamford College and Systematic College) are actually listed on the Malaysian stock exchange. Data pertaining to these staff, such as salaries and conditions of service are not readily available. These private higher education institutions are largely unregulated by legal requirements. However, some data on level of expenditure by government on Malaysian universities are available and are summarized in Table 16.5.

There is no formal representative organization of employers or universities in Malaysia, although it is not uncommon for vice chancellors and deputy vice chancellors of the various universities to meet with officials of the Ministry of Education before taking or implementing major decisions. Being such a loose network of individuals, membership numbers and any specific aims for the group of university authorities are not available. Representative organizations for academic staff, however, tend to be somewhat more formal. Being civil servants, members of academic staff do not call their staff associations or staff organizations trade unions. Nevertheless, formal academic staff associations exist within each university, although each association is officially independent of the rest at other universities but, even so, a tenous link among them is inevitable. Membership of these associations is limited to academic staff of the respective universities but so far their activities have largely been of a social rather than of a political nature. These associations have nevertheless acted together when variations in pay scales for academic staff have been proposed by government. The variation was largely due to staff opting for alternative pay rewards, with or without pensionable benefits. Being fairly loose and non-controversial associations, their aims tend to be couched in general terms, that is, to enhance and improve the well being of members of academic staff and their professional interests. In the private sector, academic staff do not have any trade unions or staff associations. This may be due to the fact that this is a fairly new sector of employment and most employers would be hostile to such organizations any way. The proliferation of private higher education institutions has been a recent phenomenon and it is a sector still at its infancy and one which is difficult to organize, given the small size of many employing organizations. However, there is an association for providers of private higher education – the employers. This association – the National Association of Private and Independent Educational Institutes – is not really concerned with the employment relationship but rather with the providers’ relationship with the Ministry of Education, which oversees this sector of the economy. Data on membership is not readily available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>RE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiti Malaya (UM)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM)</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM)</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiti Pertanian Malaysia (UPM)</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Islamic University (UIA)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>172.6</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>178.4</td>
<td>107.5</td>
<td>176.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Recurring expenditure not inclusive of internally generated funds by the universities, ranging from US$2–6 million in 1988 and 1989 for UM, USM, UKM, UPM.

**Source:** Federal Budget Book.
Malaysia: An Emerging Professional Group 335

Structure of the academic profession and human resources management

Within state-funded universities, there are five ranks in the academic hierarchy. The lowest rank is tutor, followed by assistant lecturer, lecturer, associate professor and professor, as indicated in Table 16.3. In the sciences, there are also demonstrators who are ranked lower than tutors. In the private sector all academic staff are known as lecturers and the ‘unwritten hierarchy’ comes with seniority. The labour market for academics is currently bullish. With Malaysia working towards becoming the centre of education for the ASEAN region, the federal government has encouraged an expansion of the public sector, which it is committed to funding, as well as encouraging and supporting further growth of numerous private institutions of higher learning. Further, by the late 1990s, it is expected that there will be 17 universities in Malaysia instead of the present nine. Some of these are likely to be branch campuses of reputable foreign universities. With such an expansion in the supply of higher education, there is enormous demand for lecturing staff. The shortage of adequately qualified staff has resulted in an inflow of expatriates, many of them from the Indian subcontinent.

Academics, other than being specialists in their academic discipline, do not receive any special training, unlike school teachers who are trained in pedagogy and educational theory. While tutors generally tend to hold a first or bachelors degree, lecturers must at least have a masters qualification if not a doctorate. In fact, of late, universities are insisting on their staff having PhDs before they are promoted from lecturer to associate professor level. In the private sector, there are no hard and fast rules on qualifications. Nevertheless, for degree level studies, lecturers are normally expected to hold at least a masters degree. Academic staff have three main types of employment contract: full-time permanent contracts; fixed-term contracts; and part-time contracts. To obtain a permanent appointment in the public sector, staff have to undergo a probationary period normally of three years. They are then considered permanent employees. During the probationary period, their lecture presentations are evaluated and, in some cases, their aptitude for research is also assessed. Contract staff, with fixed-term appointments, are often expatriates within the university system, while part-timers are those ‘casual staff’ employed for a limited number of hours each week. The private sector, in contrast, does not have such contractual diversity. Employment and employability in both sectors is a function of demand and supply in the academic labour market, in addition to the professional performance of staff. However, while staff performance in the private sector is solely based on lecturing skills, in public universities research is also an important criterion in assessing how academic staff are performing.

Procedures for recruiting academic staff are not really different from those used to recruit other types of labour. The process starts with an advertisement in the media (mainly the daily press) followed by short-listing
Table 16.6 Pay scales of university academic staff (US$), 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Salary range per year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lecturers</td>
<td>8,520-20,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Prof.</td>
<td>16,440-24,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>23,904-34,128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Education.

and interviewing. For junior appointment (tutor or lecturer), the interviewing panel is made up of administrators and faculty members. But for senior academic positions (e.g. professor), personnel from outside the university system, who are experts in the area of study relevant to the position being advertised are invited to join the interviewing panel. This procedure, however, applies only to the university system where very specialized posts are offered. In the private sector, interviews are carried out by the managers of institutions. Further, it is not uncommon for lecturers in the private sector to teach at a number of different colleges. While this may pose a dilemma for the colleges and provide a possible conflict of interests for individuals, the acute shortage of lecturers has resulted in such practices. Indeed, the contractual arrangements between lecturers in the private sector and their employers allow for such freelancing. Where colleges insist that lecturers do not teach elsewhere, staff have additions made to their agreed salary. Within the public sector, lecturers are allowed to do some external consultancy work outside the university system. However, as neither ‘consulting’ nor the term ‘some amount’ is strictly defined in the contractual agreement between staff and their institution, lecturers are often free to pursue almost any other academic, as well as non-academic, activity outside their employing university. Since university staff are civil servants, they cannot participate in politics. This is one rule which is adhered to very strictly.

The salary scales of university staff are decided by government unilaterally and there is no separate scale for university teachers. There is a lengthy range of civil servants’ remuneration and academic staff are slotted within this range. The current pay structure for university staff in public institutions is summarized in Table 16.6 and other allowances and contractual conditions in Table 16.7. As pay increments are not automatic, academics who are not research or publication active tend to lag behind their colleagues in the remuneration ladder. As illustrated in Table 16.7, the contractual arrangements between universities and academic staff are specific and comprehensive. Unlike their counterparts in the private sector, public sector academics have very little room for individual negotiations and neither group has access to collective bargaining. As mentioned above, unlike in most other higher education systems, there is no trade union representing either public or private sector academic staff. While some leeway may be possible, for example, in terms of timetable changes or changes in syllabuses or curricula,
there really is no possibility for negotiation on employment or professionally-related issues. Tables 16.6 and 16.7 cover academics in the public sector only. There are no formal pay scales or employee benefits in the private sector. A graduate lecturer's starting salary in the private sector could range from US$720 to US$1200 per month (or annual salaries ranging from about US$8000 to US$14,000) depending on experience, qualifications and, most importantly, area of expertise. Quantitative and computing skills, together with specialized technical skills, seem to warrant the highest incomes. Medical benefits and 30 days of leave per annum also seem to be fairly common among lecturers at private institutions.

Turning to promotions, we note that there is very little difference between the public and private sectors, the end result in both cases is an increase in renumeration. However in the public sector, there can also be a change of designation and status, that is from lecturer to associate professor or associate professor to professor. As mentioned earlier, appraisal for
promotion in the private sector is based solely on teaching excellence and may even be solely related to market value, that is, recruiting large numbers of fee-paying students. In the public sector, in addition to teaching skills, lecturers are in expected to maintain a healthy research output. Staff development, on the other hand, is very much in its infancy, especially in the private sector. In public universities, junior staff are sent on induction courses, as well as to other seminars and external programmes which are deemed as being likely to further and enhance the quality of their teaching and research. In terms of managing universities, academics have very limited say. There is no tradition of collegiality in Malaysia. The university system is basically administered by the senate which includes the vice-chancellor and his deputies. Deans who may be considered to be part academics and part administrators are also members of senates. There is, therefore, some academic staff representation in the decision-making process. Even so, with major policy decisions being taken at ministerial level, only a limited amount of procedural decision-making is undertaken within senates. Overall one can conclude that academics have very little involvement in the managing of universities and colleges. Not surprisingly, academic staff in the private sector have even less input in the managing of the educational institutions in which they are employed. These institutions are managed by owners or professional managers who tend to be very market-centred and entrepreneurial in their approach to their 'businesses'.

Conclusion

Higher education in Malaysia is in a state of continuous flux and transition. There is an overriding political and economic objective to make Malaysia a centre for education in the ASEAN region. Already students from Thailand, Indonesia and India go to Malaysia to undertake their tertiary studies. Since public universities are unable to cope with this expanding demand, there has been a proliferation of private higher education institutions. It was estimated that in the mid-1990s government universities could only provide 12,000 student places, while student applications would exceed 90,000. Though attempts are being made to cope with this expansion, it is unlikely that the supply provided can match demands being made on the system. In addition, with corporatization on the agenda, institutional providers of higher education, in both the public and private sectors, are seriously contemplating how they can respond to these signals from the marketplace. With production of graduates being linked to the needs of the economy and the region, the sorts of new initiatives being considered by policy-makers include: links with overseas universities; internationalization of the curriculum through cross-cultural learning and exchanges of staff and students; awarding joint degrees; developing an off-shore campus in Malaysia; expanding twinning programmes with foreign universities; and developing distance learning arrangements. The changes being envisaged for higher
education in the near future must inevitably be followed by developments in managing the system. More specifically, changes could emerge in the allocation of financial resources, managing and developing human resources, creating new yardsticks for evaluating staff, developing new curricula to meet industrial and commercial demands and ensuring greater accountability of those managing higher education. The central question facing the academic community in these circumstances is whether it will be involved in creating and implementing such changes or merely be an object of changes driven by those pulling the levers of educational policy and power, nationally and institutionally.

References


Part 5
Conclusion
Towards the Flexi-University?

David Farnham

The chapters in this book describe and analyse how recent changes in higher education policy in 15 selected countries throughout western Europe, north America and the far east, have impacted on the ways in which universities, other post-school institutions and the academic staff working in them are currently organized and managed. These policy and managerial changes are the result of the interaction of complex economic, social and political forces. While the exact direction and depth of the changes differ among each of these countries, all the higher education systems appear to be experiencing similar trends such as massification, reductions in public funding, movement to the market, curricular instrumentalism and searching for appropriate methods of managing academic staff in conditions of change. With changes present to varying degrees in each system, they have had important repercussions on the private life, public life and working life of higher education institutions. This final chapter draws the arguments together, compares the scope and impacts of change on the academic profession internationally and examines the extent to which higher education is moving towards the ‘flexi-university’ model of employment.

Recent changes in higher education

As indicated in Figure 17.1, the rate of change in higher education since the 1980s has not been uniform in all 15 countries. Although this taxonomy is a simple one, and might be considered by some as being oversimplistic, its purpose is merely to provide a qualitative judgement of rates of change in higher education within and amongst these countries post-1980. The classification into groups of countries also indicates that, whilst change has been universal, it has been uneven in its impact on each individual country but that groupings of countries, with similar rates and symptoms of change, can be identified. On this basis, Group 1 countries are those where change in higher education has generally been most extensive and penetrating.
Figure 17.1 Indicative rates of change in national systems of higher education post-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP 1</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>EXTENSIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP 2</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium (Flemish-speaking)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP 3</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>MODERATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium (French-speaking)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP 4</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>RESTRICTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

since the 1980s. Here there have been substantial shifts in policy, funding, management systems and organizational structures, and the ways in which academic work is organized and the academic profession managed. The general conclusion is that the reforms which have taken place in this first group of countries are far-reaching, radical and probably irreversible. Group 2 countries are those where change in terms of policy, the management of institutions and the organizing and managing of the academic profession has not been as extensive and penetrating as in Group 1 countries but is nevertheless in the upper ranges of the stability-change continuum and where significant differences from the past are discernible. Group 3 countries, the largest group, in contrast, exhibit relatively moderate rates of change and greater continuities with the past than the first two groups, while in Group 4 countries, change has been the most restricted and limited in its impact on institutions but is nevertheless present.

Change in higher education has been most extensive and pervasive in the English-speaking, Anglo-Saxon countries of Australia and the United Kingdom. In this group, higher education reforms have been initiated in response to a number of factors. These have included the perceived economic and labour market needs of these countries, limitations on public spending growth and the desire to make institutions of higher education and the academic profession working within them more accountable to their 'customers' (however they are defined), managers and political authorities. Change has been orchestrated by politicians and national or local ('state') governments of the New Right and radical persuasions. The
policy instruments adopted by the governmental and university authorities have been both hard and soft versions of managerialism, including quality management systems and attempts to increase the productivity of academic staff, reduce staffing costs, remove or weaken academic tenure and create more flexible academic workforces. Major resistance to the implementation of these policies has come from the professional unions representing academic staff in these countries, where union membership density is relatively high – over 60 per cent of academic staff in Australia and over 50 per cent in the United Kingdom. The strategies used by the unions have included pressure-group lobbying, high-profile political campaigns and strike action but with varying degrees of success.

Higher education change has been significant but not as extensive in the second group of more egalitarian, social democratic states of Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Flemish-speaking community in Belgium, together with Canada which is a special case. Reforms in these four European countries have been driven partly by the fiscal crises of the European welfare state and partly by the political desires of the governments there to open access to higher education to a broader social range of students and to activate more instrumental educational programmes than hitherto. In Finland, the Netherlands and the Flemish-speaking community in Belgium, this has been done by creating binary systems of higher education and in Sweden a diverse, unitary system. The responses of the political authorities in these European countries to the rising costs of providing both 'more' and 'better' higher education have been to introduce some elements of hard managerialism into their national systems and versions of soft managerialism at institutional level. The sort of changes taking place have included: greater administrative autonomy for institutions; independent legal status for universities; and increased scope for institutional policy-making. Attempts have also been made to devolve some responsibility for managing human resources and personnel management issues away from central governments and academic staff unions nationally to institutional managements and unions locally. These human resources flexibilities have included liberalizing the rules governing the recruitment and selection of academic staff, local pay bargaining, institutional salary scales, personal contracts of service and more casualization of academic employment. Compared with some countries in this study, however, non-permanent, part-time or fixed-term employment of academic staff is relatively low in the Netherlands (11 per cent) and Sweden (10 per cent) but is a growing phenomenon.

Canada is a special case in this second group of countries, largely because of its institutional diversity, federal system of government and sheer geographical size. Here higher education reform and its impact on the academic profession have been driven by budget cuts at provincial level rather than by federal government initiatives. It is probably the 'softest' country in terms of the changes introduced in this group of states, largely because of the federal nature of its government. Federalism in Canada makes it impossible to impose a uniform higher education policy across the country as a
whole. Provincial governments imbued with the philosophy of New Right ideologues have not been notably successful in imposing their policy predispositions on universities other than through budgetary cuts. Moreover, there are some signs of change, with the federal government now moving unilaterally to restore some university funding in an area traditionally controlled by provincial governments. Nevertheless, local budget cuts have persuaded some university managements to use the latest managerial fads and fashions of trendy consultants and business school gurus to increase their power in institutions at the expense of faculty, faculty unions and students. Radical change has been resisted, however, because a well-entrenched federal system has made it very difficult to impose a uniform higher educational policy across the country as a whole.

In the third group of somewhat diverse countries, comprising Ireland, Spain, the French-speaking community in Belgium, Malaysia and the United States, change appears to have been more moderate but largely for different reasons in each case. In Ireland with its high participation rate of over 40 per cent in universities and regional technical colleges, new funding mechanisms have been introduced, some performance indicators initiated and educational provision expanded. On the other hand, there has been little attempt to introduce hard managerialist systems in Ireland and, though over a quarter of academic staff are on non-permanent contracts, there are few signs of radical changes in how academic staff are managed. Indeed, the Irish academic profession seems to have retained a high degree of professional autonomy, some of the highest salaries in Europe and high status in the wider community. In post-Franco democratic Spain, the Spanish university system is also in transition, from an elite to a mass system. When socialist governments came to power in the 1980s, they aimed at removing social inequalities in the country, democratizing access to higher education and improving its quality. This involved moving away from highly centralized control of universities and, to some extent, making institutions more autonomous, thus producing a more diverse, decentralized system including new private universities. A distinctive feature of the academic profession in Spain is that almost 50 per cent are non-tenured, non-permanent staff. In French-speaking Belgium, the student participation rate in higher education is lower than that in other European states. Yet while some reforms and some scope for institutional decision-making for universities and colleges using soft managerialist methods have been introduced, there is less flexibility in managing academic staff compared with the Flemish-speaking community.

In Malaysia, the trinary system of universities, polytechnics and teacher training colleges is a product of the nation’s post-colonial legacy and the function of higher education as a means of promoting economic growth, labour market skills and national identity among its multi-cultural population. The driving force of change here is rising demand for higher education. However, expansion of public funding of higher education in Malaysia is being accompanied by searches for more effective systems of institutional
management, including proposals for corporatizing universities so as to improve the management of their financial, personnel and other resources locally. Further expansion is being provided by a growing private sector.

The final state in Group 3 countries, the United States, is a well-established player in higher education. To a large extent it is an exceptional case, comprising an extensive, pluralistic and diverse system of public and private provision, with open access and a highly decentralized structure. Accompanying the increased scale of higher education in the United States in the last two decades, however, has been creeping managerialism and greater bureaucracy within most institutions. A new profession of educational managers has emerged which, in many cases, is looking for fresh ways of controlling the US professoriate. There are signs, too, that the academic profession is being made more accountable to an array of federal, state and local government bodies, accreditation committees and research contractors. There is also evidence of a more flexible academic labour force emerging, of whom about a third are on non-permanent contracts, as well as increasing challenges by institutional managements to academic tenure.

The fourth residual group of countries is made up of three European states, France, Germany and Italy, and an Asian one, Japan, where higher education change has been less extensive than in the other three groups and the most restricted. France and Italy retain fairly centralized systems of higher education, with France's consisting of a diverse range of institutions with little local autonomy and Italy's an essentially unitary, university system where the Ruberti laws of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which provided opportunities for greater autonomy from central government, were largely ignored by the academic community. Germany, in contrast, has a binary system consisting of universities and Fachhochschulen, directed by each of its 16 federal states which have considerable autonomy. Discussions about increasing institutional efficiency and extending the autonomy of institutions have taken place but only limited changes have been implemented. This is despite rising student numbers, increasing expectations that higher education should meet national economic and labour market needs and demands for educational reforms by business leaders and some politicians. It appears within these central European states that elements of the collegial tradition remain more strongly embedded in the culture of higher education, with the professoriate retaining much of its traditional academic hegemony and organizational power – sometimes at the expense of their junior academic colleagues – than in some other systems. There is little evidence of the sorts of decentralized human resources policies found in some Group 1 and Group 2 countries. However, while only some 11 percent of French academics are non-permanent staff, about a fifth of Italian academics are and two-fifths of German Mittelbau are, with the latter group making up two-thirds of Germany's academic labour force. These human resources flexibilities provide contractual cushions which protect the professional and employment interests of the tenured professoriate. Japan also demonstrates relatively limited change in its trinary system of higher education.
education, which is dominated by universities, although there have been attempts to introduce more competition into resource allocation among institutions. The Japanese academic profession, like its French, German and Italian counterparts, retains considerable collegial authority in institutional decision-making and has high status in the wider community. It operates within a paternalist structure and remains relatively well paid.

Differences in rates of change, managerialist penetration and residual collegiality in higher education can be explained by the interaction of a number of complex constitutional, legal, political and cultural forces in these countries. First, it is clear that the constitutional and legal arrangements of particular countries affect their propensities to initiate or not to initiate changes in higher education policy and subsequent innovations in managerial practices. Policy changes in the anglophone countries, for example, are relatively easy to bring about, because they normally take the form of government legislation or executive action. Continental systems of public service with their traditions of administrative law, in particular established civil service structures such as the corps, on the other hand, face particular hurdles in initiating and implementing policy changes. In France, Italy and Spain, for instance, the corps system, entrenched in public law, is a major impediment to change. Second, higher education policy changes and challenges to traditional academic autonomy and professionalism were much more likely to occur in countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada, following the election of neo-liberal, New Right and radical governments – at either central or provincial levels – to political power in the 1980s and early 1990s. Belgium’s political programmes, in contrast, were concentrated on federalizing and regionalizing its political structures in the 1980s and controlling its soaring public-sector deficit, rather than with pursuing wholesale higher education reforms. This shift towards federalism in Belgium goes some way to explaining the differences in the incidence of change between the Flemish-speaking and French-speaking communities during this period. Germany’s political priorities, in turn, lay in re-unification with its eastern Ländler and establishing new political relations with post-communist states in eastern Europe, thus restricting the financial resources and political will to effect change in its higher education system. Further, while new managerialist tools have been introduced into German higher education, there has been no structural change in universities or Fachhochschulen and traditional systems of public administration remain embodied within them.

Third, countries such as Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, with their historic cultural links with the Anglo-Saxon states and use of English as their second language, have been heavily influenced by the ideas of managerialism embodied in the Anglo-American literature and the managerialist practices of United Kingdom and United States public services and multinational companies in the 1980s and 1990s. Public policy and managerial changes in higher education in these countries, and to a lesser degree in Malaysia with its links with the English-speaking world, have also been
facilitated by professional networks, higher education conferences and international seminars, where English has been the medium of discourse and communication. In latinate France, Italy and Spain, on the other hand, as well as in the French-speaking community in Belgium, where English is not normally the second language, change is less likely to be influenced by Anglo-American ideology and the latest managerialist fads and fashions of corporate America.

Fourth, the size of a country’s population and its higher education system may or may not be conducive to changes in higher education policy and its management systems. Thus the Federal government in the United States has never been able to impose comprehensive, uniform change in universities and colleges, partly because of the autonomy of its states but partly because of the sheer size of the country and the large-scale diversity of its higher education system. Change here has been in response to market forces, competition for students and some regulation of provision by individual states. It has therefore been incremental and piecemeal in its impact. Policy changes in Ireland and both communities in Belgium, in contrast, with their relatively small populations and small-scale higher education systems, are more likely to have been influenced, or not, by personal networks between higher educational policy-makers and institutional leaders than in larger, more formal, anonymous systems as in other parts of Europe, north America and Japan.

The impact of recent changes in higher education policy on the private life of teaching and learning in institutions is difficult to assess with precision. However, it would appear, prima facie, that the freedom of academic staff to teach and study in institutions, without undue political or external interference, remains strongly rooted in all 15 higher education systems. It appears too that the right to share in the making and taking of decisions relating to the curriculum and research agenda is still embedded in the culture and practices of most academic institutions in all four groups of countries. Nevertheless, there are challenges to these conventions in the managerial and entrepreneurial models of university management, as exemplified in parts of the Anglo-Saxon systems. In these cases, traditional academic freedoms and the right of academics to take curricular decisions are being challenged in some instances by those leading and managing institutions. This is normally where academics are perceived to be failing to meet either the market needs of their institutions, in terms of revenue earning, attracting students and undertaking ‘relevant’, contract research, or expected quality assurance standards within them. These attempts to ‘re-structure’ academic work are reinforced by the provision of differential rewards and promotion opportunities to those who are seen to be supporting ‘the system’, often for short-term gains, where the gate-keepers to these processes of preferment and corporate patronage are university managements. Further, as the curriculum becomes more vocationally instrumental, and more demand and market driven, traditional academic disciplines (i.e. those unassociated with contemporary professional employment and the
marketplace) are in danger of being squeezed out of the higher education curriculum, despite the protests and opposition of the academic specialists providing them.

Academic involvement in the public life of higher education (i.e. in its management and governance) appears to be inversely related to the rate of change in the higher education system in which the academics work. In general, participation by academics in determining the conditions of life and work in the institutions where they are employed seems to be least likely in those higher education systems where change has been most extensive (i.e. Group 1 countries) and more likely in those systems where change has been more restricted (i.e. Group 4 countries). By this analysis, collegiality and its variants have been most challenged in Anglo-Saxon countries, the Nordic states and the Netherlands and least challenged in the latinate countries of central and southern Europe, Germany and Japan. Put another way, academic collegiality is less likely to be practised in mass, managerial or entrepreneurial systems associated with extensive change. Conversely, it is more likely to be practised in stable, bureaucratic systems associated with restricted change. In Canada, in contrast, where there are few restrictions on collective bargaining, unlike in the United States, many academics believe that collective bargaining provides the best vehicle for protecting institutional collegiality. This is because the negotiation of collective agreements between universities and the Canadian Association of University Teachers allows for real pressure being put by faculty and their unions on institutional managements through strikes (and there have been many of these in Canada) and results in legally binding contracts between the parties around the bargaining table.

**Employment relationships**

The conditions of working life in higher education, and the academic profession’s concerns with job security, satisfactory terms and conditions of work and career development, demonstrate wide variations in practice, as do the methods by which academic labour markets are regulated across the 15 countries. First, a major distinction exists between those permanent academic staff employed as civil servants or public officials working in public institutions and those who are employees working under contracts of employment in either public or private institutions. As a general observation, permanent academic staff in western European countries normally have civil service status (including Ireland but excluding the United Kingdom), as do permanent academic staff in Japanese and Malaysian public universities. This means, for all practical purposes, that they have job tenure until retirement age, once they have satisfactorily completed any probationary period of service to which they are subject. Permanent academic staff in the anglophone countries of the United Kingdom, north America and Australia, in contrast, have the legal status of employees. This means
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that they only have academic tenure where this is incorporated into their contracts of employment. Thus while tenure exists for almost two-thirds of academic staff in the United States, some two-thirds of academic staff in Australia and is entrenched in collective contracts or university by-laws for most academics in Canada, it was abolished in United Kingdom universities for new and promoted staff, following the Education Reform Act 1988. For all intents and purposes, however, full-time faculty in the United Kingdom, who make up some 80 per cent of all academic posts, have de facto permanent employment until retirement or resignation from their posts.

Not all academics in western European universities are civil servants, however. Where there are private universities, such as in the Flemish and French-speaking communities in Belgium, France, and Spain, academic staff are employed under normal private contracts of employment even if, as in some cases, their terms and conditions of work are virtually identical with those of public officials in public universities. The same applies to academic staff employed by private universities in Japan; they have employee status, not civil service status. Privately employed academic staff are much less likely to be members of faculty unions and their terms and conditions of employment are normally determined unilaterally by their corporate employers, as in the United States and Japan.

A second observation is that all 15 countries have institutions employing casual, non-permanent academic staff. The proportion of full-time to part-time faculty varies widely but this means that tenure, where it exists, does not apply to all academic staff working in that higher education system. This employment flexibility enables institutions to employ an insecure, often ill-paid secondary academic workforce to support the secure, well-paid primary workforce of permanent, tenured staff. When demand for particular higher education services rises, additional non-permanent staff can be employed; when demand falls or academic priorities change, staff can be laid off. In the twin communities in Belgium and in Canada, Japan, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States, for example, between a third to a half of academic staff are employed on a non-permanent basis. In Australia, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom, between a fifth to a third of academics work as non-permanent staff. Only in Sweden and France do non-permanent academic staff make up less than a fifth of the academic workforce at 10 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. In at least 10 of the 15 countries, in short, relatively high proportions of non-permanent, 'flexible' academic labour are employed, giving some support to the notion of the flexi-university.

Third, considerable variations exist between the salaries of those at the beginning of their academic careers and those reaching full professorial rank in different countries. The widest pay differential is in Italy, where the starting salary of the lowest academic rank is about a fifth (22 per cent) of the top of the professorial scale. Other countries where the pay differential between these ranks is wide are: Malaysia (25 per cent) and Ireland (27 per cent). The narrowest pay differential between these ranks is in Spain, where
Table 17.1 Estimated percentages of full professors by country, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>Canada, Belgium (French-speaking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>United States, Belgium (Flemish-speaking), Germany, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>Australia, France, Ireland, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;10</td>
<td>United Kingdom, Spain, Malaysia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: "includes associate professors.
Source: Data provided by authors to this volume.

it is about a half (48 per cent). Other countries where the differential is relatively narrow are: the United States (44 per cent), the Netherlands (43 per cent), Germany (40 per cent), Finland (39 per cent) and Canada and Australia (37 per cent). Of these six last-named countries, the United States is again a special case and using 'average salaries' could be claimed to be misleading, since academic pay in research-based universities varies widely from that pertaining in other institutions. Further, in the United States, staff contracts in many universities are for nine months rather than a year and professors get paid through research overheads. Nevertheless, the summary trends provided here indicate the broad directions of academic salaries in the United States, though it must be stressed that salaries in research-based universities are not low compared with other countries. In all other countries, the differential between the top and bottom of the academic profession is about a third: the United Kingdom (36 per cent), France (35 per cent), Sweden and both communities in Belgium (34 per cent) and Japan (33 per cent). The widest pay differentials, however, do not necessarily correlate with the highest and lowest absolute salaries. Without taking account of relative costs of living and exchange rates, and though these figures should be interpreted with caution, it can be estimated very crudely that, in the late 1990s, the highest 'top' professorial salaries were paid in Japan (US$92,000), the Netherlands (US$90,000), Ireland (US$85,000), United States research-based universities (US$85,000), Belgium (US$84,000) and Canada (US$83,000). The lowest 'top' professorial salaries were in Malaysia (US$34,000), Spain (US$44,000) and Finland (US$58,000). By contrast, the lowest starting salaries for junior academic staff were in Malaysia (US$8000), Italy (US$13,000) and Spain (US$21,000). And the highest starting salaries for junior academic staff were in the United States (US$33,000), Germany (US$31,000), Japan (US$30,000) and Canada (US$30,000).

A fourth observation is that the opportunities of reaching the top teaching rank in the academic profession (i.e. full university professor - though the precise status varies by country) differs widely among countries, as shown in Table 17.1. Table 17.1 indicates that full professorial rank is attained by approximately two-fifths of the academic profession in French-speaking universities in Belgium (43 per cent) and Canada (40 per cent) and between a
Towards the Flexi-University?

Table 17.2 Approximate percentages of female university staff and female university professors in selected countries, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Per cent of academic staff</th>
<th>Per cent of professors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (Flemish-speaking)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (French-speaking)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data provided by authors to this volume.

third and two-fifths in Japan (38 per cent), Germany (35 per cent), Flemish-speaking universities in Belgium (33 per cent) and the United States (32 per cent). On the other hand, under 10 per cent of the academic profession achieve full professorial status in the United Kingdom (8 per cent), Spain (9 per cent) and Malaysia (4 per cent). These differences are partly explained by variations in definitions of the ‘professoriate’ in different countries, the ways in which professors are recruited and promoted and the structure of the academic profession. But other factors include whether fixed ratios of senior-to-junior staff exist within career structures, how these ratios are determined, the current age structure of the profession and how such posts are funded.

A fifth observation is that the academic profession is a predominantly male one. Almost a half of academic staff in the United States are females, a third in Finland and the United Kingdom, a quarter in Australia and Spain and a fifth in Ireland, as indicated in Table 17.2. A ‘glass ceiling’ exists in the academic world, where women are usually concentrated in lower academic ranks and the proportions of female academics reaching professorial status in these countries are very low. The highest proportion of female professors is in the United States, followed by Australia, Finland, Japan, the United Kingdom and French-speaking universities in Belgium. In countries with binary systems of higher education, such as in the Flemish-speaking and French-speaking communities in Belgium and the Netherlands, the proportions of female academic staff in the two sectors and females reaching professorial rank differ. It appears generally that higher proportions of females are employed in non-university institutions but they also have lower proportions of female full professors than do universities.

A sixth observation is that trade union membership of academics varies widely among countries. As indicated in Table 17.3, membership is largely
Table 17.3 Estimated academic membership of trade unions by country, 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (more than 60%)</td>
<td>Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Australia, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate (25-59%)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (less than 25%)</td>
<td>France, Belgium (Flemish and French speaking), the Netherlands, United States, Spain, Italy, Germany, Japan, Malaysia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data provided by authors to this volume.

dichotomized between those few countries, Ireland, Anglo-Saxon and nordic ones, where it is estimated that membership is high (i.e. over 60 per cent) and those countries where it is estimated to be very low (i.e. under 25 per cent). Membership is highest in Ireland (95 per cent), Sweden (85 per cent) and Finland (75 per cent), followed by Australia (62 per cent) and Canada (60 per cent). In all other countries, apart from the United Kingdom where membership density is in the intermediate range at about 50 per cent, union membership is under 25 per cent, while in Malaysia there is no union representing the interests of academic staff. If there are any correlations, it appears, first, that union membership is more likely to be high in those countries where pay and conditions of employment of academic staff are determined by collective bargaining and it is more likely to be low where collective bargaining is either non-existent or less important in the pay determination process, as in Belgium where pay is regulated by royal decree after negotiations with the unions. Second, union membership also tends to be higher where there are single, occupational, non-ideological unions for academic staff, as in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but it tends to be lower where there are a multiplicity of general, politicized unions competing for academic and non-academic members, as in latinate countries like France and the south of Europe. Third, given the intensively individual nature of much academic work and the primary professional identification of academics with their subject disciplines and employing institutions, there is sometimes a reluctance by academic staff of ‘getting involved’ in employment issues collectively, through either joining a union or taking part in its activities.

This brings us to how the terms and conditions of employment of academic staff are determined and how academic labour markets are regulated in the 15 countries. The structure of academic pay determination is shown in Table 17.4, which builds on and refines the basic conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 1. Some loose patterns of relationships are discernible. Table 17.4 shows that the most common method of determining academic pay and conditions in public institutions is state regulation as in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan and Malaysia. Here there are weak unions and rates of change in higher education have been either restricted
Towards the Flexi-University?

Table 17.4 The structure of academic pay determination by country, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak unions</th>
<th>Centralized (public) higher education systems</th>
<th>Decentralized (public or private) higher education systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>state regulation</td>
<td>employer regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan</td>
<td>United States (mainly private), Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>(private)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak unions</td>
<td>national collective bargaining</td>
<td>local collective bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Netherlands&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (public), United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>(mainly public)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong unions</td>
<td>national collective bargaining</td>
<td>local collective bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden,&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Canada, Australia, Sweden&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (all public)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* <sup>a</sup> in the cases of the Netherlands and Sweden, collective bargaining takes place both nationally and at institutional level, covering different issues.

<sup>b</sup> in the United Kingdom, professional pay is not determined through national collective bargaining. It is determined at institutional level by the employer unilaterally or, in some cases, by local collective bargaining or 'consultation' with staff.

or moderate. The second most common forms of pay determination are national collective bargaining, with strong unions, as in the United Kingdom, Finland and Ireland and local collective bargaining, with strong unions, as in Canada and Australia. In the United Kingdom, however, professional pay is not covered by collective bargaining, though some universities have local bargaining arrangements with this group of staff. In each of these countries, apart from Ireland, rates of change in higher education have generally been either extensive or significant. Sweden, where higher education change has been significant, is a special case, since it has strong unions and a two-tier bargaining structure. Here national framework collective agreements are determined between the state authorities and unions centrally and detailed salaries and conditions of employment are determined between institutions and unions locally. The Netherlands is also a special case. Like Sweden, it too has a two-tier collective bargaining structure and higher education change has been significant. It is also fair to conclude, certainly compared with Sweden, that unions in the Netherlands are weaker. In the Netherlands, primary issues, such as salaries, are determined centrally and secondary issues, such as other conditions of employment, are determined locally. Where there are weak unions, as in the private sectors in the United States and Japan, and change has been moderate or restricted, employer regulation is the norm. However, there is also local collective bargaining in
some public institutions in the United States, where unions are recognized by individual employers. In Belgium, national collective bargaining is used in the Flemish-speaking community, where the unions are weak and change has been significant, and in the French-speaking community where the unions are weak and change has been moderate.

The most obvious but cautious inference to be drawn from this analysis is that those systems of higher education where change has been significant to most extensive are more likely to have modified their systems of pay and conditions determination than those which have had moderate or restricted changes. Thus Australia, a Group 1 country, is shifting away from a system of central arbitration awards to enterprise agreements, while Sweden and the Netherlands, Group 2 countries, are shifting towards two-tier collective bargaining. The purposes in each case appear to provide institutions with opportunities for negotiated change, leading to pay, conditions and employment flexibilities locally. This enables institutions to respond quickly to changes in funding, competition for students and other resources and innovations in the marketplace. Further, local collective bargaining not only is more likely to legitimize organizational changes affecting academic staff but also enables institutions to compete in the academic labour market for key staff with scarce knowledge and skills, by offering them attractive employment packages so as to 'poach' them from their competitors or buy them in the international labour market. These developments are indicative of more flexible approaches to managing employment issues by university employers.

Reengineering the academic profession?

Traditionally, academic work attracted, recruited and retained well-qualified individuals, for a number of intrinsic and extrinsic reasons. These included: intense interest in one's subject discipline; opportunity for doing stimulating research; the chance to develop clever young people's powers of thinking, analysis and self-expression; the self-sufficiency and independency inherent in academic work; working with and learning from fellow academics in one's own discipline; fair but not excessive terms and conditions of employment; promotion and career prospects for hard-working, motivated staff; social standing in the wider community; and time to think! These types of professionals needed a minimum of managing and were generally self-motivated, self-starting individuals, although there were inevitably a minority who took advantage of their professional autonomy and did little work. Those leading institutions would generally ignore such people at that time, largely because resources were plentiful, students were few in number and institutional productivity was not an issue.

A range of factors make contemporary higher education a more complex, more expensive and more demanding process than in old elite systems. These include to repeat: massification, marketization, wider sources
of student recruitment, growing instrumentalism (i.e. training for employment), new technologies of learning, the continual search for improved quality and the fragmentation of cognitive knowledge. Those paying for higher education - taxpayers and increasingly students - expect it to be of a high quality and delivered cost-effectively (‘value for money’) and flexibly. The intermediary in this process, where it is not the market, is government and its agencies of financial control. Those leading and managing mass higher education institutions, in turn, are made more accountable for the use of the resources and systems which they manage, while institutions become ever more complex and rule-bound. Higher education becomes diversified and institutions more autonomous in terms of what they deliver and how they allocate their limited resources, in response to the market needs of students and their other ‘customers’.

The nature of academic work changes too. Diversity in institutions leads to diversity in the academic profession. Those recruited to the profession come from wider social and professional backgrounds and the motivations for becoming and remaining an academic vary. With knowledge expanding exponentially, new academic disciplines emerge, others decline. The range of duties undertaken by academic staff both broaden and deepen. These include traditional activities such as teaching and researching but new ones such as student welfare, student support, managing staff and developing innovative ways of teaching large numbers of diverse students. Larger amounts of student work have to be assessed and information systems maintained to store, process and categorize this data. The craft nature of teaching small groups of well-motivated, academic students is transformed into a mass production process of transferring information to large groups of instrumentally-oriented, ‘vocational’ students, certainly at undergraduate level, using information technology and other ‘Fordist’ methods of presenting data and disseminating it. With massification, academic work needs more coordination by managers and more teamwork among academics. Functional specialization emerges which gives rise to organizational structures and management systems which place constraints on the traditional autonomy of individual academics and the freedom which they once had to manage their own time.

Academics also become expensive to employ, not because of real pay rises for everyone, but because there are more staff to pay and more employment costs for employers to bear. Institutions and their managements seek greater productivity from staff, more flexibility from them and more accountability and control over academic work. They also seek to motivate the academic profession to raise revenues for their institutions, such as through marketing and selling their skills to firms and customers externally. These organizational motives are often short term in nature. In this way, institutions seek to ‘reengineer’ the academic profession by getting it to accept new methods of working, new systems of managerial control and new human resources policies. Where academic staff are represented by trade unions, the unions may seek, in response, to resist these and related
changes, modify them through negotiation or agree them, in return for tangible benefits for their members. Where there are no staff unions, any resistance is informal, fragmented and diffused and change may be accepted grudgingly. It is realistic to assume, however, that academic reengineering can only be legitimate and effective, where those who are its objects consent to and accept it.

Based on the evidence presented here, the academic profession appears to be evolving from what was formerly a small, relatively homogenous intellectual elite into a large, more diversified set of 'sub-professions' – though the rate of change differs within institutions and amongst higher education systems. The fault lines separating the 'new' academic professionals include not only traditional disciplinary ones but also new functional and status ones. The latter include: those who primarily teach and those who primarily research; those whose main duties are pedagogic and those whose main duties are managerial; those who are permanent staff and those who are non-permanent staff; and those working in elite institutions or departments and those working in non-elite ones. With massification and diversity in higher education, a major challenge for those responsible for managing institutions is to motivate, gain the commitment and win the consent of the diverse academic professionals working in them. The challenges facing academic professionals are wider and have implications both for individual academics and the profession collectively. The main ones are: to retain their academic freedoms to teach and research without undue managerial interference; to be able to participate in the running of their institutions; to maintain the quality of their working lives; to have job security; and to be rewarded fairly for what they do. In an age of transition in higher education, whether these twin challenges are managed with the consent of the profession or whether change is imposed within institutions unilaterally by government and/or management is a central issue for those deciding policy and those leading academic institutions.

It is reasonable to conclude, then, that the academic profession is in transition and that there are signs too, especially in those countries where higher education change has been most extensive, of an emerging flexible-university model of employment. This, in its 'pure' form, comprises a core group of secure, relatively well-rewarded permanent academic staff, star researchers and academic managers and peripheral groups of insecure, relatively poorly rewarded casual teachers, instructors and contract-researchers. Some indicators of increasing employment flexibility within institutions can be found in most of the countries studied in this volume but there are varying degrees of penetration among them. These indicators include: rising proportions of casual academic staff; retrenchment of full-time faculty and replacement by part-timers; a variety of non-permanent employment contracts; weakened provisions for tenure; personal contracts of employment; performance-related pay schemes; wider pay differentials among faculty; decentralized pay bargaining arrangements; attempts at work restructuring by university managers; staff appraisal schemes; and more functional...
specialization within institutions. These developments must not be exaggerated, since they are incremental in nature, uneven in their incidence and there has always been some employment flexibility in higher education. To date they do not represent a flood of change but they provide possible pointers to how some university employers might choose to strategically manage a more diverse academic profession in the future. Were such an overt employment strategy to be widely adopted by university employers, it would present serious challenges to the structure and status of the academic profession and to the unions representing academic staff within the higher education community.
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NEW HIGHER EDUCATION FRAMEWORKS AND ACADEMIC CULTURES

Paul R. Trowler

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This is a comprehensive reference work and a key resource for university managers and for all those interested in higher education policy and practice.

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David Farnham is Professor of Employment Relations at the University of Portsmouth. One of his specialist research areas is the employment relationship and personnel management in higher education, where he has published widely over twenty years. The topics he has researched include pay bargaining in higher education, academic staff trade unionism, union job territories and the pay and conditions of academic staff in higher education. His most recent books include Employee Relations in Context, Managing People in the Public Services (with S. Horton), Managing the New Public Services (with S. Horton) and New Public Managers in Europe (with S. Horton, J. Barlow and A. Hondegem).

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