The relationship between indigenous peoples and nation-states has long been of academic interest, and is also an emerging topic in the international debate about human rights and development. Universities and museums play an important part in this debate as producers, managers, and communicators of knowledge about indigenous peoples. In these processes, the voices of indigenous peoples themselves must also find their proper place. A workshop at the University of Tromso (Norway) in October 1997 addressed aspects of this debate. The point of departure was a collaborative research program between the Universities of Botswana and Tromso to promote research of relevance for the indigenous people of Botswana, called Bushmen, San, Basarwa, or Kwe. The University of Tromso also has a special responsibility to the Saami—indigenous people of Norway. The 17 papers in this proceedings address ethnographic research methods and issues; history, cultural heritage, and cultural maintenance; indigenous relationships with the state and bureaucrats; and remote area development, acculturation, and participatory research on community and educational issues. The papers are: "Objectives and Perspectives on the Collaborative Programme for San/Basarwa Research" (Sidsel Saugestad); "Regional Comparison in Khoisan Ethnography: Theory, Method and Practice" (Alan Barnard); "Another Time, Another History" (Charlotte Damm); "Ethnicity: A Question of Relations" (Per Mathiesen); "Sami Cultural Heritage and Cultural Mobilisation" (Torvald Falch); "Indigenous or Autochthonous? Establishing a Role for Archaeology in the Negotiation of Basarwa Identity" (Paul J. Lane); "A Preliminary Report on an On-Going Research into the Recent History of the Babugakhwe at Khwai, Eastern Ngamiland, Botswana" (Maitseo Bolaane, Kofi Darkwah); "The Politics of Being Basarwa: Identity, Entitlement and Development among Bugakhwe, Tsega and //Anekhwe in Eastern Ngamiland..." (Michael Taylor); "Hunter-Gatherers and Bureaucrats: Reconciling Opposing Worldviews" (Alan Barnard); "Saami Customary Rights and the Problems of Definition" (Trond Thuen); "The Rise and Fall of Norwegian Support to Remote Area Development in Botswana" (Sidsel Saugestad); "Once upon a Nickel Mine: Mining Development, Archaeology and Aboriginal Cultural Heritage in Northern Labrador, Canada" (Bryan C. Hood); "The Remote Area Development Programme and the Integration of Basarwa into
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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN MODERN NATION-STATES

Proceedings from an International Workshop
University of Tromsø, October 13-16, 1997

Sidsel Saugestad (editor)
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The relationship between indigenous peoples and nation-states has for a long time been a topic of a great deal of academic interest. It is also an emerging topic in the international debate about human rights and development. Universities and museums play an important part in this debate, as producers, managers and communicators of knowledge about indigenous peoples, and about their position within democratic nation-states. In these processes, the voices of the indigenous peoples themselves must also find their proper place.

To address some aspects of this important and many-sided debate, a workshop was convened at the University of Tromsø in October 1997. The point of departure was a collaborative research programme that has been established between the Universities of Botswana and Tromsø to promote research of relevance for the indigenous people of Botswana, called Bushmen, San, Basarwa, or more recently N/ôa/kwe or simply Kwe. A special responsibility of the University of Tromsø towards the Saami section of the population, has been a concern since the inception of the University in 1972.

The workshop, then, was set up as a meeting place for researchers from Botswana and from Norway, with the following purposes:

- First, to invite to an assessment of the state-of-the-art of research on the changing relationship between indigenous peoples and modern nation-states. What are the international trends and what are the contributions of the academic community in Tromsø?
- Second, to discuss the relevance and possible use of such approaches for the Basarwa Research Programme in Botswana.
- A third concern, complementing the first two objectives, was to offer the workshop as a research training seminar (forskerkus) to PhD candidates working with relevant projects.

The workshop addressed, but naturally was not able to fully answer, questions relating to the following issues:

- The defining features of being 'indigenous'.
- The presentation of indigenous peoples as part of the national culture; in museums, literature, and in tourism.
- The use of history/prehistory as legitimation of the present situation and position of indigenous groups.
- The use of anthropology, history and archaeology in legal debates.
- The role of research in dialogue, debate and conflict between indigenous people and the state.
- The role of advocacy.

The workshop addressed these issues through lectures and seminar presentations, with time for all the visitors to present their material. Participants were University of Tromsø staff, invited lecturers, University
of Botswana staff connected with the Basarwa Research Programme, and Norwegian PhD candidates. An optional programme before the workshop introduced the visitors to the University of Tromsø and its background, the two centres for Sami Studies (SESAM) and for Environment and Development Studies (SEMUT), and to the Tromsø Museum, its exhibitions and ethnohistorical documentation.

A full programme and list of participants are enclosed. In addition to the papers presented in this volume, Brantenberg, Malila, Pule, and Solli also presented papers. Solli's paper, "Protection of the Environment and the Role of Archaeology", will appear in a volume edited by F. MacManamon, in the Routledge World Archaeology series.

As will be evident from the papers presented, they represent research perspectives and sum up experiences from very different stages in a research process. It has not been considered appropriate to impose a standardised format for such varied approaches. Rather the volume testifies to the main achievement of the workshop: to provide a meeting place for people with different backgrounds but with some interests and analytical intentions in common. Clearly, the debates that took place between the presentations were in many ways the most valuable parts of the workshop, and hopefully these debates will be reflected in other publications that will follow.

The editor has not tried to impose a standardised orthography of Khoesan terminology on the different papers. Although such standardisation is one of the long-term objectives of the San/Basarwa research programme, part of the concern of the present stage of research is to explore, through field-studies, the applicability of different terms. Also, the two standard spellings of Saami and Sámi have both been accepted.

The organisers, Charlotte Damm and Sidsel Saugestad, would like to express heartfelt thanks to all the participants, to the Norwegian Universities' Committee for Development Research and Education (NUFU) for the funding of the Collaborative Basarwa Research Programme, and to the Faculty of Social Science of the University of Tromsø that provided valuable additional funding.

Tromsø April 1998
Sidsel Saugestad
OBJECTIVES AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE COLLABORATIVE PROGRAMME FOR SAN/BASARWA RESEARCH

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Ladies and Gentlemen.
First of all, I wish you all a hearty welcome.

As some of you may not be familiar with the Basarwa Research Programme, I would like to start by saying a few words about the programme, and what we hope to achieve. I will then comment on some of the challenges, as I see them, for research addressing the position of indigenous peoples. I believe the programme for San/Basarwa Research at the University of Botswana to be rather unique on the African continent, being based in a local institution and addressing the predicaments and problems of the indigenous population of that country, explicitly and directly. This merits analysis, as well as support.

The undertaking at the University of Botswana (UB), is supported by a grant of 4 mill. NOK from NUFU, the Norwegian Universities' Committee for Development Research. The present period of collaboration runs up to the year 2000. It is a multi-disciplinary programme, addressing topics within all relevant disciplines. It is hoped that this programme will contribute to an understanding of the situation of Botswana's indigenous population, known there as Basarwa, but otherwise as Bushmen, San or Khoesan, and more recently by a term of self designation: N/aakwe or just Kwe. The researchers have backgrounds in sociology and anthropology, history and archaeology, language and law.

The objectives of our collaborative programme are as follows:

1. To increase research capacity and competence at the University of Botswana, in areas relevant to the Basarwa.
2. To integrate this research in teaching and curricula wherever relevant.
3. To contribute to a dialogue on Basarwa issues in the wider Botswana society, and to a development policy that will benefit the Basarwa.

How are we going to achieve these objectives?

The programme has a number of components:

- A series of projects that are researcher initiated. That means they are linked up with ongoing research by UB staff, and include periods of fieldwork.
- The identification and support of research fellows on MA and PhD levels.
Saugestad: Objectives and perspectives

- Competence building through seminars, workshops, research visits like the present one, and publications.
- A scientific network, with an emphasis on South-South cooperation, so far involving the University of Namibia and the University of Western Cape.
- The establishment of a database comprising all contemporary written materials that touch on the San/Basarwa people, to be published as annotated bibliographies.
- And finally, contact with San/Basarwa representative organizations.

The core of the programme is the research projects. When we started our planning in 1995, no one at the University of Botswana was active in research on the Basarwa. Instead of designing a plan, identifying topics and looking for people to do the job, we chose the opposite strategy: we invited UB researchers to use their professional interests as points of departure, and to apply these skills on what we loosely called 'Basarwa issues'. As the papers presented at this workshop will show, a wide range of issues have been addressed, through projects firmly based on the professional concerns of UB departments. This strategy is modelled on the idea of a 'mini research council'. A research council is a well-proven model: if one wants to direct attention to a specific research topic or area, this is most efficiently done by making research funding available, invite applications, and distribute support according to professional criteria. This is what we have tried to do.

The need to involve the target group

Enhanced academic proficiency is an objective of all research programmes. Another task is a challenge more specific for a programme addressing indigenous populations: the need to involve the target group.

We are probably all familiar with two assertions commonly held about indigenous peoples: 1) that they are over-researched; and 2) that research never benefits the target groups. I have heard Vine Deloria's original Navajo joke in America, in Finnmark in the 1970s and in Botswana more recently. It goes like this:

Question: What is the typical Navajo/Sámi/Bushman family?
Answer: Father, mother, four children and an anthropologist

Such implicit criticism must be taken seriously, but we should also recognise that it invites a stereotype that does not quite reflect the realities of the 1990s, and therefore may divert attention from the more pressing problem of how to involve the target group.

At the large conference on Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage, in Cape Town this year, representatives from San organisations, very reasonably, called for research to better reflect the problems as perceived by the San people. I quote:

There is a growing awareness amongst the San people that it is time that the world should start to think about a more action-oriented type of research whereby there shall be respect for the different San groups in terms of their culture and dignity whilst we are also making the inevitable transition to a modern society (Ngakaeaja et al. 1997)
I have myself often quoted from a report by Alice Mogwe (1992) an observation from a disillusioned Bushman: “Many people have come and gone with our words...they never return, and nothing ever happens.”

What may be the «Tromsø» contribution to the Southern Africa scenario?

I sometimes find it useful to describe the relationship between the Norwegian research community and the Sámi community as a process that over the last couple of decades has gone from research ON, over research WITH, to research BY the Sámi. This development has not been without controversies, but it is a development that has been desired by all involved parties. At the University of Tromsø, this concern is most clearly manifested in the establishment of a Centre for Sámi Studies with a special responsibility to improve recruitment of Sámi students and scholars, and to coordinate and promote new areas of research. Research is here seen as embedded in a larger social context, that requires contact with, and respect for, all parties involved.

I do not want to present the Tromsø experience as an easy success story. There have been many trials and errors. But I do believe that even our shortcomings represent experiences that few other research environments possess.

One of the questions for debate is the relationship between the emerging Sámi research community, and the large and numerically dominant Norwegian research community. Should the training of Sámi social scientists, historians, and linguists imply that Norwegians should step aside and leave the territory to the ‘natives’? This is a debate that of course reflects a more general issue about ‘outsider’ versus ‘insider’ perspectives, and the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dimension so prevalent in anthropological research.

My own position, (as in Thuen 1995), is that any type of monopoly is detrimental to the ideals of the scientific community of intellectual freedom. This argument works both ways: the minority must have adequate opportunities to do research also on their own society, according to their own priorities. At the same time there must be room for members of the majority, and foreigners for that matter. The objective of reducing the dominant position of members of the majority culture, justifies the use of affirmative actions to recruit members of a minority culture into the research community. It should not, however, be a question of replacing one kind of domination by another.

What does a focus on indigenous peoples in modern nation states mean?

As we know, the term ‘indigenous’ is being used with two different meanings. The most common definition is ‘local’ and ‘native’ in contrast to ‘foreign’, ‘imported’, or ‘European’. The other is a more analytical use of the concept, focusing on a special kind of relationship. While both Sámi and Norwegians are Norwegian citizens, which is a clearly defined status, the distinct cultural and ethnic identities of Sámi and Norwegian persons emerges from the multifarious ways people are moulded by their language, history, and culture.

What it means to be a Sámi is experienced and expressed in a discourse among themselves, on a wide variety of cultural and social themes. The parallel discourse goes on among the Norwegians.

However, the Sámi are indigenous in an analytical sense: in terms of their relationship to the Norwegian nation-state. That is to say, in terms of the shifting fortunes of neglect and recognition that they have experienced in the process of building the Norwegian nation-state. This experience makes them...
indigenous, while the Norwegians are not. The hegemonic nation state has imposed a Norwegian cultural standard on all its citizens, and its is the consequences of this for the Sámi minority, that is the analytical focus inherent in the concept 'indigenous'. Only a couple of days ago this past history of discrimination was recognised and apologised for most profoundly by the Norwegian King, upon the opening of the third session of the Sámi Parliament.

Descriptive definitions, such as the one found in the ILO Convention 169 and in the Draft Declaration from the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in Geneva also emphasise this relational aspect. Indigenous peoples are:

- *first come*, in relation to others who came later;
- *non-dominant*, in relation to others who are the numerical majority; and
- they are *culturally different* from the dominant section of the population.

Similarly, in a Botswana context, the defining feature of the San/Basarwa people as indigenous lies in their position within the nation states of which they are citizens. So far the majority has not accommodated Khoesan culture as part of the cultural foundation of the state. It confers a responsibility on both the majority and of the minority, to improve this relationship.

How does one promote indigenous autonomy, achieve an equal relationship, and ensure intellectual freedom at the same time?

There is no blueprint for our work. We want to test out if and how the Tromsø experience can be useful in Botswana. From the very beginning of the programme we have sought to establish channels of communication and to form links with organisations. From my first meeting with John Hardbattle, prominent in the establishment of an interest organisation in Botswana, until his untimely death last November, I found discussions with him about our plans and prospective immensely stimulating. Organisations have been invited to the two workshops held in Gaborone, and, as some project reports will show, contacts have been established in various forms on the local level.

Has this been easy? No.
Do San/Basarwa communities feel that they are adequately involved in our research programme? Probably not.
Do they feel that they have a good grip on San/Basarwa research? Most definitely not.
Is there any San/Basarwa person among the delegation from Botswana? No.

Why then, am I so smugly suggesting that contact with the target group for our research is a main component and concern in our research programme?

First, this contact is recognised as a challenge that must be addressed continuously as the programme develops.

Second, we can build on a professional understanding of the complexities of this kind of relationship, which is similar in Norway, Botswana, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, to mention some countries that will be used as examples in the days ahead of us.

And third, it follows from this experience that we do not naively believe that the recruitment and incorporation of San researchers will proceed automatically and unproblematically.
By way of conclusion, let me emphasise this last point: the importance of having a strategy for recruitment to institutions of higher learning. The reason why there is no San/Basarwa person in the delegation from Botswana is simple enough: there is - to our knowledge - no San person at staff level. The NUFU programme provides good support at post-graduate level, but the need to complement the existing programme with adequate strategies and funding for San students at the lowest level of the university structure - what is commonly called affirmative action - has not yet been properly addressed.

But let me also add: we have begun. We try to involve San students in research projects, and a few weeks ago three San students from Botswana attended an Indigenous week and cultural festival in Oslo, co-funded by our programme. It was a joy to note their interest and commitment.

***

The programme for the next four days will include a mixture of lectures and workshops. We will start each day with a couple of lectures intended to introduce a debate on the topics raised. After lunch we will continue with research reports and presentations of plans for further activities within the programme. We hope this mix will allow for fruitful discussions.

I wish all participants a fruitful workshop, and a very special welcome to our colleagues from Botswana.

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REGIONAL COMPARISON IN KHOISAN ETHNOGRAPHY:
THEORY, METHOD AND PRACTICE

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Abstract

Regional comparison is a method for the analysis of culture and social structure. The central argument of this approach is that elements of one society are best understood within a comparative framework which takes into account the situation of related peoples. By this method one can better understand environmental influences and other outside pressures, as well as the variation which occurs within culture areas.

This paper explores regional comparison through the ethnography of the Khoisan peoples of southern Africa, including foragers and former foragers such as various Basarwa populations of Botswana, and pastoralists such as the Nama and Damara of Namibia. Following an ethnographic overview of the Khoisan peoples, special attention is given to Khoisan settlement patterns and kinship. These are aspects of culture which are especially amenable to this kind of analysis.

This paper is based on a recent article of mine, which appeared about a year ago in the journal Zeitschrift für Ethnologie (vol. 121, no. 2, pp 203-220 [1996]). But for purposes of this presentation, I would like to include a more specific overview of Khoisan ethnography to begin with, then focus especially on methodological issues which have emerged from my own work in regional-comparative studies.

The Khoisan Peoples

The Khoisan peoples include a great variety of groups, with reference to language, economy, and political organization. Many people who claim Khoisan descent today are indistinguishable in language or lifestyle from those formerly classified as 'Cape Coloured' in South Africa, or even from Afrikaners. Others still maintain a subsistence herding lifestyle, a foraging lifestyle, or a (in the Okavango delta) foraging and fishing lifestyle. Less than a hundred years ago, some lived in localized but migratory tribal units numbering in the thousands, with warrior chiefs and a hierarchical clan organization. Others lived, and still live, in acephalous temporary camps, in groups of just five or ten, or seasonally in larger units.

In order to simplify matters, it is useful to think in terms of traditional lifestyles, though the boundary between these is certainly not always clearly definable. Let's call them the 'hunters' and the 'herders'. All the herders once spoke language of the Khoe language group, and a number of the 'hunting' peoples do too. In my overview here, I'll take the non-Khoe-speaking hunters first, then the Khoe-speaking hunters, and finally the Khoe-speaking herders. Language is important here, because some aspects of culture (notably
certain aspects of kinship) are more aligned with language than they are with traditional mode of subsistence.

Non-Khoe-speaking 'hunters'

!Kung

The !Kung consist of three main ethno-linguistic groups — the Ju/'hoansi or Central !Kung of northern Botswana and Namibia, the !Xû or Northern !Kung of Angola, the =Au/ /eisi or Southern !Kung — and possibly one or two distinct, smaller groups. Traditionally, these three labels identify indigenously-defined dialect areas, but they also correspond roughly to cultural units and environmental zones. It is difficult to estimate the !Kung population. In total, they may number as many as 25,000 or even 30,000. The largest group is the Ju/'hoansi, though the !Xû are scattered across a larger land area. In some areas the term Ju/'hoansi is taking on the larger meaning of 'Bushman' or 'Basarwa' in general.

The Ju/'hoansi are the best-known of all Khoisan peoples, thanks to Lorna Marshall, Richard Lee, Megan Biesele, Ed Wilmsen, and many others. The Ju/'hoansi, narrowly-defined, are probably the most-studied, and best-studied, of any ethnic group in the world. Due to the theoretical interests of many who have worked with the Ju/'hoansi, readers of their ethnographies are too often left with the mistaken impression that these people lived until recently in splendid isolation both from other Basarwa groups and from non-Basarwa. It is as if culture contact there were unknown or likely to lead only to contamination of the 'purity' of the foraging lifestyle. In reality, Ju/'hoansi have long lived in contact with other groups, including Herero and Batawana. They have shared their land, served as clients in patron/client relations, and traded with such people for centuries.

Notice the !Xû. In 1990 some 4000 !Xû and Kxoe soldiers and their families, who had sided with South Africa in the Namibian civil war, were resettled at Schmidtsdrift, near Kimberley. There they now compete with Tswana and Griqua for South African government and NGO support, and they are due to be resettled again in about a year's time, on the very edge of Kimberley.

!Xô and Eastern =Hôâ

The !Xô, defined broadly, are a widely-scattered people. They are few in number and call themselves by an extraordinary variety of names. !Xô (!X6ô) is the most widely-used term, though =Hôâ is common in the east and Tshasi in the south. Early ethnographers knew the westernmost !Xô as the N/u //en. The Eastern =Hôâ are only very distantly-related, if at all, to the !Xô or Western =Hôâ. They speak an entirely different language, and to my knowledge no ethnographer has ever done a study of them as a group.

The !Xô are known to the outside world mainly through the linguistic work of Anthony Traill and the anthropological publications of H.J. Heinz. The !Xô are the people who introduced Liz Wily to the problems of social development. Wily was Botswana's first Basarwa Development Officer, and the debate between Wily and Heinz is a fascinating example of the way interpretation plays a part in social science research. To Wily, !Xô practices of sharing, reciprocity, and communal land ownership exemplified the benefits of collectivization and even communism. Heinz, on the other hand, saw in !Xô economic individualism the incipient capitalist principles of private ownership and free enterprise. Each had interpreted their experiences at the Bere settlement scheme as evidence for the equation of Basarwa ideology with their own.
/'Auni-=Khomani

The /'Auni and =Khomani are very, very few in number, having been linguistically absorbed into other population groups. However, they were the subject of intensive investigations by a number of scholars in the early part of the twentieth century, especially in the 1930s. In 1982 and 1983, a South African anthropologist visited the area and found a remnant population still hunting and gathering. Some still identified themselves as =Khomani, though all members of the community then spoke Nama. They were living extensively on tsama melons and hunting mainly gemsbok and smaller, non-migratory game. The existence of this group, at that time, in such a poor environment, is a testimony to the great resilience and adaptability of foraging populations, though that population is, of course, very poor and in need of outside assistance. Earlier this year, a small amount of funding was set aside by the British Department for International Development for aid to this group.

Khoe-speaking 'hunters'

G/wi and G//ana

The G/wi and G//ana, of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve have been more isolated than other groups, but some migrate between the Reserve and areas to the west, east, and south. Some who live in the Reserve also call themselves Kua, which is an ethnic label more commonly associated with Basarwa groups to the south.

The G/wi came to prominence in the 1960s through the work of George Silberbauer, who was then Ghanzi District Commissioner and Bushman Survey Officer. He served for six years in those posts, spending some three years, beginning in 1958, among the G/wi of =Xade pan. This pan became the site of Silberbauer's borehole, in the south-central part of the Reserve. At least until the late 1970s, the =Xade area was known colloquially among Ghanzi Basarwa as 'Silberbauer's farm'. As Bushman Survey Officer, Silberbauer was commissioned to conduct research on the Basarwa in general, but for reasons of practicality he chose to concentrate on the G/wi. His important Bushman Survey Report was published by the Bechuanaland Protectorate government in 1965.

Jiro Tanaka began fieldwork with G//ana in 1966. He has concentrated on observational studies and has provided a great deal of detail on the use of the environment and on social life. Among his more interesting papers is one called 'Egalitarianism and the cash economy among the Central Kalahari San' (1991), which highlights the relation between social values and economic pursuits in the changing central Kalahari context -- including the impact of illegal hunting on horseback.

Eastern and Northern Khoe groups

The culturally-defined Eastern Khoe Basarwa comprise a number of groups scattered from the Kweneng District in the south to Ngamiland in the north. They may number as many as 50,000. Most live in the Central District, often as clients of Bamangwato, Bakgalagari, Kalanga, and Herero. The cultural (as opposed to linguistic) distinction between Central and Eastern Khoe Bushmen is a nebulous one, and I would include among 'Eastern' groups some G//ana who have migrated from the C.K.G.R. to take up a more settled life among the cattle-herders to the south and east. The salient characteristics of 'Eastern' groups, in this sense, are their association with herding people and their high degree of cultural and spatial hybridization.
The classic ethnography of the Eastern Khoe is that of the early twentieth-century missionary, Samuel Shaw Dornan (in 1925). After Dornan, concern was expressed about the practical question of relations between the Bantu-speaking majority and the Basarwa minority. Four enquiries, by government, church, the League of Nations, and a committee of academics and administrators, were established and reported in the 1930s. There was a long gap in research interest until the 1970s, when many scholars, perhaps most notably Robert Hitchcock, did extensive survey work in Central District.

The Northern Khoe groups are those of the Okavango and surrounding areas. They live by fishing, as well as by hunting and gathering. Linguistically, they resemble quite closely the Central Khoe groups. They are now the subject of intensive research by scholars from Botswana, including several who are present here in Tromsø today.

**Nharo and related groups**

The Nharo live in the western part of Ghanzi district, mainly in the Ghanzi farms. There are some also in Namibia. They number perhaps 9000. In most Nharo areas there is a relatively good water supply, due partly to their locations along Ghanzi ridge. Bakgalagari entered the territory the early nineteenth century, and Afrikaners arrived permanently in the 1890s. To the north-east of the Nharo, live the Ts'aokhoe and some smaller groups, who are all very similar to the Nharo.

It used to be thought that the Nharo were highly acculturated, hardly Basarwa at all. However, studies done in the 1970s by Mathias Guenther and by me, revealed a fascinating and resilient culture which retained a considerable degree of its hunting-and-gathering ethos even where its economy had been transformed. This may be less true today, though Nharo identity remains strong.

**Hai//om**

The Hai//om are one of the great ethnographic anomalies of the Khoisan culture area. Their enigmatic name means 'tree-' or 'bush-sleepers'. They have long been thought of as !Kung who acquired the Nama-Damara language at some time in the not-too-distant past. Towards the end of the South African colonial period, the Hai//om were said to be maintaining vociferously their identity as non-!Kung, while officials insisted on classifying !Kung (actually !Xú) and Hai//om together as members of the same 'population group'. Recent studies, especially by Thomas Widlok, have focused on relations between Hai//om and neighbouring agricultural peoples.

**Khoe-speaking 'herders'**

**Nama**

The Nama today number some 100,000 people and today live mainly in southern Namibia. They traditionally herded cattle and sheep. In the past, Nama lived in nomadic, patrilineally-organized groups of varying sizes, and through the nineteenth century often engaged in warfare with their neighbours and with other Nama. The Nama are divided into two main groups, the Great Nama and the Little Nama, each of which consists of a number of smaller tribes which today, as in the past, are headed by respected and sometimes powerful hereditary chiefs.

There have been relatively few ethnographic studies of Nama groups, and even the classic ethnographic work of Winifred Hoernlé was carried out after the Nama, and Nama tribal structure, were
decimated by war at the turn of the century. Nama were converted to Christianity early in the nineteenth century, but their folklore and even ritual aspects of their culture are still strong in some places. Some groups maintain a very strong identity. And, although permanently settled, some, for example, the people of Hoachanas (200 km southeast of Windhoek), retain a traditional hierarchically-arranged circle of houses with the chief in the east and outsiders in the west.

Korana, Griqua, and people of Khoisan descent

The Nama, together with the Korana, Griqua, Einiqua, and Cape Khoekhoe, have long been called the Khoekhoe, or 'People of People'. That term, especially in the language of Namibian political correctness, Khoekhoe-speakers, is also applied today to Hai/om foragers and Damara, formerly servants of the Nama.

Today there are very few Korana or Einiqua, though some claim descent from these groups who once roamed across the northern Cape. There today live most of the Griqua. They speak Afrikaans, and no longer know any Khoe language, but they retain political structures and allegiances to their respective, rival paramount chiefs, Le Fleur and Adam Kok V. All the Griqua were caught up in rival land claims in the nineteenth century, and some are still caught up between rival claims of Batswana, Bushmen, and whites in the area around Kimberley. Adam Kok III led his people southeast to the Drakensberg in 1861, but by the end of the nineteenth century most of these 'Eastern' Griqua were forced to migrate again, to the west coast of South Africa. The Griqua remain divided, both politically and geographically.

The Griqua are partly of Khoekhoe and partly of European descent. Others, less cultural Khoisan, are also today asserting a Khoisan identity. These new Khoekhoe are in fact descendants of those the Dutch met at the Cape in 1652, though for centuries, until the late 1980s and 1990s, they had been classified and had seen themselves as 'Cape Coloured'.

Damara

Finally, there are the Damara. Many have regarded them as non-Khoisan, including Isaac Schapera, who excluded them from consideration in his 1930 overview The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa. However, the Damara speak the same language as the Nama and the Hai/om: they call it Damara/Nama, Nama/Damara, or Khoekhoe-Kowab. Along with the Hai/om, Damara exhibit some aspects of what we might call 'northern Namibian' culture. For example, the prestigious location in a settlement is the east, not as in the Nama case, the west. This is the same for such non-Khoisan groups as Ovambo, Herero, and Himba.

The Damara, who are more numerous than the Nama, mainly inhabit a desert-like hilly area of northeastern Namibia. German colonial officials granted them this after the Damara sided with the Germans in the War of 1904-05, against Nama and Herero. Most Damara are poor, and many have little or no land, but many have an increasingly proud Damara identity. Their then-Acting Paramount Chief, Justice //Garoeb, was just a few years ago crowned King of the Damaras. There are a few recent ethnographic and ethno-historical studies of the Damara, for example, by Ben Fuller and Rick Rohde. But there is certainly scope for further research with this people, and with all the traditional herders, who have been far less studied than a number of much smaller foraging peoples in Khoisan southern Africa.
Comparison as a theoretical concept

Let me turn now to the question of comparison, and to the regional approach to cross-cultural comparison which I advocate.

It is useful to distinguish some three distinct types of comparison in anthropology. These may be called illustrative comparison, global comparison, and controlled comparison.

Illustrative comparison entails choosing examples to make some point about cultural difference or similarity, to draw the reader's attention to a feature of a particular society by comparing or contrasting it to that of another society. This form of comparison is the basis of much undergraduate teaching in anthropology. We might choose the Batswana (in the ethnic sense) as an example of a patrilineal society, and compare Batswana to Ovambo as an example of an essentially matrilineal society. We might choose an element of one society which is unfamiliar to those whom we are addressing, say gift-giving in Nharo society, and compare it to a similar practice in a more familiar case, say gift-giving in Norwegian or Batswana society. Such comparisons may show similarities (e.g., the practice of gift-giving itself), but often the illustrations are designed to show differences which reveal aspects of the nature of the less-familiar society. Nharo give gifts in relation to need and in response to requests; Norwegians give gifts in relation to specific events (e.g., birthdays, weddings, Christmas). Nharo give only non-consumables in formalized gift-giving (/\\ai\/); Germans, at their gift-giving events, may give either non-consumables or consumables. Nharo gifts are never reciprocated immediately; German gifts may be (e.g., at Christmas). Nharo gift-giving overlies a system of rights to use resources which are not given in exchange, such as rights to water; Norwegian gift-giving does not. With these kinds of comparison, we may thus make statements about, in this case, Nharo society, which are meaningful to Norwegian students or indeed anyone else who is familiar with Norwegian culture.

Global comparison, in its literal sense, involves comparing every society on earth, or in many cases every society of a certain type, e.g., all hunter-gatherers. True global comparison in this sense is almost impossible. More usually therefore, 'global comparison' is actually global-sample comparison which is itself a form of statistical cross-cultural comparison. A sample of the world's societies is chosen, either at random or according to some other statistically-appropriate means, and the entire sample forms the basis of a complex set of comparisons. Specialists in global comparison note the statistical correlations which can be drawn between incidences of cultural features, or (in ecological anthropology) between environmental and cultural features, and they deduce causes and effects from among these various features. They believe that the relative instances of cultural features are indicative of necessary culture complexes, or possibly of evolutionary trajectories which occur independently of local historical circumstances. Global comparison is certainly useful at a high level of abstraction, but its obvious emphasis on the simplification of cultural features for heuristic purposes renders it relatively impotent for the understanding of cultural particularity.

Controlled comparison involves an attempt to limit the range of variables, as in the physical and natural sciences, by narrowing comparisons to similar cases, i.e., cases where the significance of those variables can be empirically tested. For example, we could compare a number of different desert-dwelling hunter-gatherers to see the effects of rainfall on settlement. Or we could do the same, but within a particular region of the world, say Australia only, or the Kalahari desert of southern Africa only. Usually controlled comparison is in fact regional, and usually it is based on a search for controls which are structural. They may also be environmental, and this approach is in fact especially useful where
environmental factors come into play. How many possibilities of settlement might there be, given the seasons of the Kalahari? Which of these types are found where? And why? Beyond environmental factors, studies in controlled comparison may be based on any number of social facts which distinguish linguistically or culturally-related societies, perhaps even on some evolutionist scale, e.g., egalitarian to hierarchical, or simple to complex in economic structure. Adam Kuper's work on the politics of marriage among Southern Bantu-speakers is a good example of this controlled, regional-structural, comparison. By concentrating on a small range of societies in this specific linguistic and geographical area, Kuper is able to relate structural features in one society to those in another, and very often to account for the differences in ways which indigenous people would readily understand, though they may not previously have been challenged to do so. My own work on Khoisan hunter-gatherers and herders has broadly followed this model.

My view is that controlled, and especially regional, approaches generally provide greater understandings than other approaches; but any approach which takes into account its own advantages and limitations according to level of analysis has the potential to be fruitful.

Khoisan settlement patterns and territoriality

My first paper on regional comparison (published in 1979) was an analysis of settlement patterns among four Bushman groups. In that paper, I argued that the presence of surface water enabled groups to maintain a non-nucleated form of settlement without territorial defence, while a lack of surface water was a determinant of more nucleated, territorial settlement. Of the four groups, the !Xô (also known as Western *Hôôô, etc.) generally had the least water and were most territorial. Their band clusters were delimited from each other by strips of 'no-man's-land', and visiting across such boundaries was limited. In order of nucleation, then came G/wi (G/wikhoe) and Ju/haoni (central !Kung), and finally Nharo (Naro). The Nharo have always lived mainly on a limestone ridge which traps water underground, and in recent decades they have had access to numerous waterholes put down by the white farmers who occupy their traditional territory. This has created an arrangement whereby their own foraging areas do not need to be so carefully delimited.

In a subsequent paper (in 1992), I came to question this precise correlation -- when new data emerged on the /Auni-*Khomani, a group with even less water than the !Xô but who seemed not as territorial as the !Xô. This led me to postulate a threshold of abundance, before which territoriality was unimportant but after which territoriality emerged as a determining factor. The /Auni-*Khomani were thus too lacking in water and other resources for territoriality to emerge. They had, it seemed, too little in their territories to require band members to defend them. In the meantime, Elizabeth Cashdan (in 1983) had published on the same original four groups. She came to the same conclusion as I had, but interestingly, she pointed out that the relationship between resources and territoriality among Kalahari Bushmen was precisely the opposite as that which had been observed for herbivorous animals in the Kalahari. The animals defend territories which are abundant, rather than those with scarce resources. A formal explanation is that these animals do not reach a sufficient state of abundance to defend territories which are lacking in resources. In other words, we can envisage a scale of increasing resources and increasing territoriality, which is transformed at the threshold of abundance into a scale of increasing resources and decreasing territoriality. The former scale is occupied by the herbivorous animals and by the /Auni-*Khomani, while the latter is occupied by the other Bushman groups. This still leaves the question of whether such animals are different from...
humans in nature, or whether some other factor needs to be taken into account — such as the differing social mechanisms for protection of resources which humans and animals have access to. Without examples of any herbivorous animals on the latter scale, it is difficult to say that the idea of a threshold of abundance does hold true in the same way for humans and animals, but the real point here is that insights can be gained comparing comparisons (between human culture areas or, in this case, even between species), but only after regional comparison has been applied for an initial understanding of the theoretical problem under consideration. It is, of course, useless to compare the territoriality of one group of springbok to that of one group of human hunter-gatherers, but it may be meaningful to compare the range of territorial responses to resources by springbok to those of humans in the same environment.

In yet another analysis using data from the four original groups (in 1986), I pointed out that settlement can be seen as related to seasonality in interesting and perhaps unpredictable ways. I had suggested this in my first paper, but I had not fully realized the implications at that time. Relatively speaking, !Xô are permanently dispersed; they come together in groups larger than the band only for the annual boys' initiation ceremony, not for environmental reasons. Likewise, in this loose sense, the Nharo can be said to be permanently aggregated. They only aggregate in band or smaller units, but they can aggregate in this way all year round. In contrast, the G/wi and Ju'hoansi are seasonal in their patterns of aggregation and dispersal. The Ju'hoansi aggregate during the dry season, when more than one band may share the same waterhole. The G/wi, however, traditionally aggregate as bands in the wet season, and disperse as families in the dry season. They used to do this precisely because they had no permanent sources of water at all in parts of their territory, and so in the dry season they were better off in small units exploiting the very marginal resources of their lands. Thus given two seasons (wet and dry) and two basic patterns of settlement (aggregation and dispersal), all four logical possibilities are realized. Nharo can be aggregated in both wet and dry seasons, !Xô do not aggregate for long at all, G/wi formerly aggregated only in the wet season, and Ju'hoansi aggregated only in the dry season. We may also note that units of aggregation differ in size and level. G/wi traditionally aggregated only at the band level (several families together), while the Ju'hoansi aggregated in larger units (two or more bands together).

In the eastern part of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (C.K.G.R), the G//ana (or G//anakhoe, close relatives of the G/wi) frequently spend the dry season outside their own territories and indeed outside the Reserve. They use water resources occupied by neighbouring herding populations. This means that they do not have to disperse as family units like the G/wi. Their wet-season pattern is like that of the G/wi, while their dry-season pattern is like that of the Ju'hoansi.

To take another example, the Hai/om of northern Namibia can, in some areas, have an even more bizarrely-diverse opposition. To put it bluntly, they can live like Bushmen in the dry season, and like neighbouring Ovambo in the wet season. More specifically, they group as small bands living in mangetti groves, away from water supplies, in the dry season. Their lands have sufficient permanent water resources such that they do not need to travel more than a kilometre or so to fetch water, but they spend this season effectively aggregated with each other but dispersed from their Ovambo neighbours, who remain by the wells and boreholes. In the wet season, these Hai/om move to the permanent water sources and engage in farming, either working for Ovambo or growing subsistence crops in their own right.

Of course, herders are as dependent on resources, especially water in dry regions, as their foraging cousins. The Nama and Damara, unlike the Ovambo, are closely related to the Hai/om, both culturally and linguistically, and they share this relationship to some extent with other Bushman groups of Botswana.
Most Nama live in the dry southern areas of Namibia, while the Damara inhabit even drier parts of northern Namibia. Nama settlement was traditionally based on the circular encampment, not unlike a Bushman camp in form but hierarchically arranged with the hut of the chief in the west and occasionally a defensive wall around the outside. At times an entire Nama tribe would camp in one great circle, and each clan of the tribe had its own kraal within the tribal territory. More usually, the camp was made up of some five to thirty huts. Livestock would, in theory, spend the night in front of their owners' huts or in the centre of the encampment. We know a good deal about such camp layouts, but little about territoriality or seasonal movement prior to the Herero-German War of 1904-1905, which decimated the Nama tribes.

Damara settlement resembled that of the Nama, but also had elements in common with neighbouring non-Khoisan peoples such as the Herero and the Ovambo. The Damara, like the Hai/om who have also borrowed such ideas from their agro-pastoralist neighbours, regard the east as the prestigious place. According to early ethnographic accounts they lacked a clear concept of territorial ownership but occupied poor regions to which they were driven, or which they were given by German authorities after the 1904 War. Thus they seem, in relation to Nama, to have poor resources and lack territorial defence, like the /Auni-Khomani. After the war they were divided into some eleven large, locality-incorporative units. Unlike the Nama, they lacked patrilineal descent. Their group structure was like that of Bushman groups, if not looser. Little is known beyond that of traditional social organization, and indeed some historians and anthropologists have recently come to question the usefulness of the idea of a distinct Damara lifestyle at all.

However, vestiges of traditional Nama and Damara settlement clearly remain, and in spite of vast differences in size of settlement the form of such camps, now often towns in the case of Nama, offers as touchstone to traditional hierarchical arrangements and spatial relations which have kept traditional leadership alive in spite of tribal decimation and decades of apartheid. Yet notions of land use have long since been altered, and in might be said that, while for Bushmen settlement is seasonal and defined in terms of territorial use, for Nama, Damara, and to some extent also Hai/om, it is best defined at the micro-level, i.e., in terms of the spatial arrangements of the settlement itself.

The very transition from foraging to pastoralism involves a number of changes in individual and social attitudes, and it necessitates changes in social structure. Among changes in attitude are recognition of the propensity for selling (as opposed to sharing) meat, the acceptance of longer working hours in exchange for a guaranteed supply of meat, and the development of an ethos of planning for the future of the herd. Among changes in social structure are an increase in social hierarchy as a result of new disparities in wealth, the development of larger social units, often based on a more formal recognition of ties of descent, and consequent changes in political organization away from consensus towards ascribed leadership. There are also changes in people's relation to the land, as the transhumance of foragers gives way to either permanent migration or permanent settlement at major sources of water. All these changes can be understood through comparison within a region, such as Khoisan southern Africa, more readily than in an abstract way. The environmental pressures which are placed on hunter-gatherers operate on herders too, and the methods applied to the study of hunter-gatherer settlement can apply equally to the study of the settlement patterns of Khoisan herding groups. Ultimately, the intensive comparative study of herding and hunting-and-gathering Khoisan settlement should be enlightening for attempts to
Two modes of subsistence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hunting and gathering</th>
<th>Herding, hunting and gathering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>knowledge of the environment</td>
<td>knowledge of herding skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moving around in search of food</td>
<td>moving around in search of grazing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chance of finding meat</td>
<td>guaranteed supply of meat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sharing meat</td>
<td>sharing and selling meat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lots of free time</td>
<td>longer working hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>few possessions</td>
<td>chance to acquire more possessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fewer worries about water supplies</td>
<td>more worries about water supplies</td>
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<tr>
<td>taking each day as it comes</td>
<td>planning for the future of the herd</td>
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understand both the transition, still underway, from hunting to herding, and the ways in which people cope with external pressures such as war and drought.

Khoisan kinship terminology and group structure

My earliest work on Khoe kinship terminology resulted from encounters with members of diverse Bushman groups in western Botswana in the mid-1970s. My informants were aware of both lexical and structural differences between their own, respective terminologies and those of their neighbours. They explained these differences to me as a way in which to clarify my understandings of their own systems. Unlike my settlement pattern comparisons, most of the fieldwork on kinship terminology was done by me. This is feasible for kinship terminology, but plainly not for settlement patterns or for many aspects of kinship besides terminology. I was able to put together what others had written on descent ideology, group composition, and kinship behaviour with what I learned of the terminologies. Doing the collection of kinship terms myself meant both that I gained an intuitive sense of the terminology structures and that I could ensure accuracy and comparability beyond that possible when a great number of ethnographers (including perhaps some ethnographers who are disinterested in kinship) are left to record the data.

The kinship systems of Bushman groups have two important features in common, but there are also a great number of differences. The two important features in common are the presence of a clear, categorical distinction between 'joking partners' and 'avoidance partners', and the extension of these categories universally throughout society. Joking partners are those with whom an individual can joke, tease, sit close to, and in certain cases, engage in sexual play or in intercourse with. Avoidance partners are those with whom these activities would be disapproved of or strictly forbidden. In several Bushman languages the word to 'avoidance partner' is the same as that for 'feared' or 'to be afraid of', while that for 'joking partner' is the same as that for 'not feared'. Those to 'joke' with include, typically, grandparents and grandchildren, same-sex siblings, certain classes of cousins, and sometimes certain classes of uncles, aunts, nephews and nieces. Those to the 'feared' include especially parents-in-law, but also, reciprocally, children-in-law, and also parents, children, opposite-sex siblings, and certain classes of cousins, uncles,
aunts, nephews and nieces. Only joking partners are marriageable, and generally, one's spouse's joking partners are treated as 'joking' and one's spouse's avoidance partners are treated as 'avoidance'.

The differences between Bushman kinship systems can largely be accounted for by language. I mean this not just in the sense that the words for different genealogical relationships are different in the different languages, but also in the sense that the structure of the terminologies differs too. Take the four groups whose settlement patterns I considered earlier: Ju'hoansi, !Xö, G/wi and Nharo, and the Nama. Here it is important to note that membership in a language group does not necessarily coincide with mode of livelihood. The G/wi and Nharo, along with the Nama, are Kho-speaking peoples. The Khoe-speakers form a large subgroup of Khoisan and include all the traditional herders (Nama and Damara in Namibia, and formerly the Cape Khoekhoe and Korana in South Africa), as well as most Bushman groups of the central and eastern Kalahari and the Okavango swamps of Botswana. What is interesting here is that all these groups, whether traditional herders or traditional hunter-gatherers, have similar terminology structures — but with differences reflecting both aspects of group structure and culture contact.

The Ju'hoansi distinguish siblings from cousins and make no distinction between parallel and cross-cousins, except when the 'name relationship' interferes with this classification. Normally, all cousins are considered joking relatives, and uncles and aunts are considered avoidance relatives. Categories are defined by alternating generations: the words for grandparents are the same as those for cousins and for grandchildren. The words for uncle and aunt are, respectively, the same as those for nephew and niece. Ju'hoansi children are each named after a grandparent, or after those names are exhausted, after an uncle or aunt. If a child has his or her grandparent's name, there is no problem; but if the child is named after an uncle or aunt, then both the terms and the joking/avoidance categorization of grandparents, and uncles and aunts, is reversed on that given side of the family. One's true grandparents become 'uncles and aunts', one's namesake-uncle or aunt becomes one's 'grandparent', and that person's brothers and sisters (one's true uncles and aunts) become one's own 'brothers' and 'sisters'. Likewise, one's cousins (who are normally equated with grandparents) become 'uncles/nephews and aunts/nieces'. Thus, for example, a third-born son named after one of his father's brothers will be equated with that father's brother and will classify his relatives differently from the way his own brothers and sisters (named after grandparents) do.

The !Xö have and entirely different system. Like the Ju'hoansi, they do alternate generations, but unlike the Ju'hoansi (and like most other Khoisan groups) they distinguish parallel from cross-cousins and classify parallel cousins as 'siblings'. What is unique about the !Xö is that they classify cross-cousins by a term which means 'step-, extended or classificatory child'. Thus, usually, cross-cousins are avoidance partners and are not marriageable. In fact, this oddity makes perfect sense in light of a more general principle of Khoisan kinship, namely that a joking partner's avoidance partner (in this case cross-uncle or cross-aunt's child) is an avoidance partner. The peculiarity is that the !Xö are the only group whose terminology structure applies this underlying principle to such close relatives.

The G/wi, and also the G//ana and numerous eastern Kalahari and Okavango Khoe-speaking peoples, all distinguish parallel from cross-cousins and marry those of the latter category. They also distinguish terminologically between junior and senior members of the joking category I call 'grandrelative', and they equate same-generation 'grandrelatives' (cross-cousins) with juniors (grandchildren, and also cross-nephews and cross-nieces) rather than with seniors (grandparents, cross-uncles and cross-aunts). Their terminology structure is simple in form and emphasizes the importance of the joking and avoidance distinction. Grandparents, cross-uncles and cross-aunts, cross-cousins, and all their reciprocals are
'grandrelatives' and joking partners. Parents, parents' same-sex siblings (parallel uncles and aunts), their reciprocals and their spouses, are avoidance partners. Same-sex siblings and parallel cousins are joking, while opposite-sex siblings and parallel cousins are avoidance (parallel cousins are classified as 'siblings'). One's spouse's joking partners are joking, and one's spouse's avoidance partners are avoidance.

The Nharo lack the distinction between senior and junior 'grandrelatives', and broadly favour fully-reciprocal terms, like those of the Ju/hoansi. Indeed the Nharo have two nearly synonymous terms for 'grandrelative', tsox5 and mama (the differences are syntactical rather than semantic), and these seem to be derived ultimately from the Ju/hoan language. The Nharo also have the system of personal naming used by the Ju/hoansi, but it exists within a definitively Khoe kinship structure. Thus parents' opposite-sex siblings, like grandparents, are classified as 'grandrelatives', and there can be no confusion of categories because of naming, as there can be among the Ju/hoansi. The Nharo system is the Khoe system taken to simplicity, precisely because the naming system reduces the necessity to classify according to seniority (e.g. to distinguish parents from children, or grandparents from grandchildren). For example, a grandparent's namesake is classified as one's 'grandparent' even if younger. Since the grandparent/grandchild relationship is reciprocal and can be represented in any Khoe language by a reciprocal term, in Nharo tsox5-ku (meaning 'grandrelatives to each other'), the Nharo simply take this one step further and refer to each side of the relationship, egocentrically, as tsox5, or more accurately, ti-tsox5-ba ('my male grandrelative') or ti-tsox5-sa ('my female grandrelative') -- though sometimes also with a diminutive suffix to indicate relative age.

Nama is very similar to G/wi. Indeed, a close comparison of the terminologies of the Khoe-speaking peoples reveals further that a number of terms cross-cut the ethnic and hunter/herder boundaries, as one would expect of closely-related peoples. For example, junior or equal 'grandrelative' is //nuri in Nama and n//odi in G/wi (with appropriate number-gender suffixes). However, structurally there is one significant twist: the Nama terminology distinguishes between male and female first ascending-generation cross-relatives. Thus mother's brother is an extreme joking relative, while father's sister is an extreme avoidance relative; and their reciprocals are classified likewise. The reason for the difference is clearly to do with the traditional patrilineal clan organization of the Nama. Unlike the G/wi, who like all Bushman groups are essentially bilateral or cognatic in group structure, the Nama would in the past treat a father's sister with great respect because father's sisters held authority over their brothers, and by extension their brothers' children. As perhaps in Setswana, father's sister was like a 'female father' in her descent group, although with the destruction of clan organization after the 1904 War, this role has changed to that of a 'grandmother', or one might say, a 'female mother's brother'. The mother's brother relationship was the opposite of that of the father's sister. He was, and to some extent still is, a 'grandrelative' par excellence. A boy may steal his mother's brother's cattle, or most anything else belonging to the mother's brother, and the latter can only replace these with poorer cattle or other goods belonging to the sister's son. In this way, the mother's brother looks after the interests of his young charge and indulgences him, or her, in a way that parents cannot. The parent/child relationship is among all Khoisan peoples a formal one, and in a sense contraposed to that of the mother's brother/ sister's child.

One way to better understand the relation between the various systems is through notions of underlying categories, a method which I have already hinted at above. I explored this possibility in my book Hunters and Herders of Southern Africa, where I defined just four reciprocal joking categories and four reciprocal avoidance categories for all Khoisan systems. No system needs them all; but three or four
of these lower-level categories per higher-level category will suffice. Specific, egocentric kinship terms
(say the term for 'granddaughter') are subsumed within the lower-level categories (such as 'grandrelative',
mentioned above). This method is especially interesting in interpreting seemingly aberrant terminology
structures, such as that of the Eastern *Hoai. The problems with that terminology are too complex to go
into in detail here, but the main difficulty is that the same genealogical position may be referred to by more
than one term, and further, that those terms may out the given relative in radically-different categories. Put
simply, my analysis of Eastern *Hoai rests on the idea that the joking/avoidance distinction is submerged
in favour of other features, and that alternative terms for the same genealogical position could reflect
choices between 'extended-descriptive' and 'categorical' usages rather than between the classification of the
position as belonging to one category or another.

Another way to understand the relation between systems is historically. Through a combination of
regional comparison and conjecture based on known linguistic relationships between the groups, it is
possible to reconstruct the history (or prehistory) of Khoisan kinship with, I believe, a fair degree of
accuracy. Again I have hinted at this above. I published a detailed paper on this idea in the journal *Africa*
in 1988, in which the Nharo system, along with those of two closely-related groups, can be seen as
representing an historical simplification of the Khoe structure caused by contact with Ju/hoan-speaking
people to the north. The historical changes affecting Nama terminology are accounted for as a result of
structural transformation resulting from the loss of clan organization. By comparing a large number of
different but related groups in light of known historical-linguistic relationships, we can work out historical
transformations of terminology and of the group structures which play on them. Thus, theoretically, it is
possible to reconstruct a social history within a region such as Khoisan southern Africa. Such a history is
based neither on evolutionist or diffusionist assumptions, but makes use of logical relations between
structures. Obviously kinship terminologies, as one of the most structured forms of culture anywhere,
afford a useful opportunity for such methods.

**Regional comparison and other aspects of Khoisan society**

Causal factors of regional variation are numerous, and variation in cultural sphere can be the cause of
variation in another. Such causes can include environment, settlement, technology, means of subsistence,
the presence of a cash economy, other aspects of modernization, the character of relations with outside
groups, changes in the scale of social relations, aspects of kinship, and even aspects of language.
Sometimes the exact causal factors are obscure, but careful comparison can reveal new spheres in which
to look for causes, or at the very least, suggest correlations on the basis of linguistic or cultural relatedness.
For example, marriage and childbirth gifts are especially prevalent among Khoe-speaking peoples,
irrespective of whether they are traditional foragers or traditional herders, whereas non-Khoe-speaking
Bushmen tend to have bride-service as a more significant element of the marital process. The exact cause
of this is obscure, but the fact of it lends strength to the view that cultural features of gender relations, as
well as some of those of kinship, are deep-rooted in the culture of linguistically-related Khoisan peoples
and not prone to easy change as a result of change in the means of subsistence. This, then, is evidence
against a simple, mode-of-production basis for the analysis of gender relations, and suggests that cross-
cutting cultural factors may be equally important.

Among Ju/hoansi in Botswana, there has been a gradual shift from bride service to bridewealth as
the means of formalizing the relationship of marriage. The process began when young men returned from
the gold mines with cash which they could use to purchase livestock. They would offer the stock rather than their labour, thereby enabling them greater flexibility in residence. Restrictions on hunting, food distribution through the drought relief programme, and increasing sedentization have all made the acquisition of wealth in livestock more attractive than it was in the past. Accompanying all this has been a greater matrifocality in child-rearing, while at the same time a development towards a more patriarchal band structure, perhaps reflecting the greater incorporation of Botswana's Ju/hoansi into the national culture of that country. Ju/hoan children raised in a sedentary environment do more work, travel further from their homes, and interact more in same-sex, same-age groups than those of nomadic times. Adults spend less time with their children, and children's care-taking groups have been replaced by peer groups. With sedentization, gender differentiation increases. Women stay at home more, and men are more likely to stay away, often to look after their newly-acquired herds.

Regional comparison can help to enlighten views of relations between groups even beyond the given culturally-defined 'region'. It can also serve as an adjunct to illustrative comparison, to add explanatory power in a case where illustration is confined to the region. Take the example of mafisa and 'inverse mafisa', which does both. In Botswana, there is a custom known as the mafisa, whereby people with many cattle loan some to others to look after. The cattle owners are usually Tswana or Herero. The people who receive the mafisa cattle are generally less well off, often having no cattle of their own. Members of a number of different Bushman groups fall into this category. They may milk the cattle under their care and eat the meat of any beast which dies naturally. Sometimes the owner of the herd may give them a calf in exchange for their labour. Thus, if they are fortunate, the poor can acquire stock from the rich, while the rich free themselves of having to look after all their animals themselves. However, Hai//om forager-herders of northern Namibia regularly leave their livestock with the neighbouring Ovambo. This 'inverse mafisa system' enables the Hai//om to move around more freely. Also, since their livestock is, in a sense, 'deposited' with the Ovambo, these Hai//om can avoid requests to slaughter their animals and distribute the meat to others in their community. With both mafisa and 'inverse mafisa', the burdens of wealth are alleviated, and increased livestock ownership is made possible for both rich and poor. However, in the case of 'inverse mafisa', rich Ovambo get richer at the expense of Hai//om, because the Ovambo can make use of the animals in their care, and because they regularly receive payment in the form of calves and kids born to these animals.

There are many other forms of sharing and reciprocity found among Khoisan peoples. These include vegetable sharing within the family; meat sharing according to strict rules, in terms of kinship and work effort in procuring the meat; cattle-snatching between those in specific kin relationships (among herders); alcohol and tobacco sharing on an ad hoc basis; formalized, delayed, balanced reciprocity of non-consumable items (the system which is called hxaro among the Ju//haonsi, but is also found much more widely, including among herders); generalized reciprocity of rights to resources (often defined as including hxaro partners); and long-term borrowing non-consumable items (found in areas of the southern Kalahari where hxaro does not occur).

The situation is similar in other social spheres. In religion, the same rituals occur throughout at least Bushman areas, and beliefs about God and the spirit world -- and even the terms for such entities -- cross-cut both the hunter/herder divide and the Khoe/non-Khoe language boundary. In politics, the differences between hunters and herders are, in fact, more obvious than in economics -- hunters tending to
operate exclusively in consensus terms with self-seeking among 'leaders' not tolerated, and herders tending towards traditional leadership with non-authoritarian chiefs and councils of elders.

Conclusion

When I first thought about the problem of Kalahari Bushman settlement patterns, during my fieldwork in the 1970s, I was sceptical of environmental determinist logic — precisely because of the variation. However, on closer inspection, I realized that the patterns are all part of a larger pattern of patterns, in which season migrations can be seen as related to the diverse availability of resources in each territory and in which an element of determinism became apparent. No amount of close scrutiny of just one group could ever verify an environmental determinist position, or test even less radical ecological hypotheses; only an approach in which the variables can be controlled for, such as in regional comparison, can do this. The same is true of archaeological data on environment and settlement, where a regional comparative approach might also prove useful. Likewise, in kinship, the comparative study of systematic relations has helped to unravel the complexities of all the systems and place them in a larger, even historical perspective. Changes in kinship relations happening now, as the range of social interaction expands in may parts of Khoisan southern Africa, can be best understood in light of the range of possibilities occurring among Khoisan peoples taken as an entirety.

Today in Khoisan studies, regional-comparative models compete against both traditional, isolated, non-comparative models, and the newer revisionist, integrationsist ones. In my view, regional analysis provides not only the best means for the understanding of both specific cultures and the cultural milieu which they are a part of, but also the best prospect for comprehending the complex social problems which occur today across the region. Not only is a knowledge of specific traditional cultures important; it is equally important to see the range of possible variation among like cultures in order to make the right decisions in the provision of development aid. Settlement, kinship, gender relations, and dealings with outsiders are all arenas in which the actions of outside agencies can have either beneficial or detrimental effects. Thus the regional comparative study of such structures has both theoretical and practical significance.
In this paper I will discuss the importance and consequences of different time concepts for studies of history and archaeology. But, as I hope to show, time is important not only to historical disciplines and studies, but is relevant even for most other social studies and disciplines.

You might think that a discipline like archaeology would have been one of the first to be deeply concerned with questions of time - what is it and how it may affect different aspects of societies. But for some reason explicit discussions of time have arrived late in archaeology, although elements of time are always present in discussions, of for instance, chronology.

Western industrialized time

Time to most people in the west is measurable, linear, universal and even somehow timeless. It is almost impossible to imagine a world without time, or a world before or after time. We agree without hesitation that time exists and we have learned to measure it more and more accurately, progressing from sun dials, water clocks and hourglasses to mechanical clocks and now quartz and digital watches. Today, even though two 100 metre sprinters are not actually on the track at the same time, we are able to say that one was 1/100 of a second faster than the other.

Time is very important in our society. Time determines when to get up in the morning, when to start work, when to have lunch, when to pick up the children from school. Even your spare time spent on sports, television, cinema, etc., is increasingly structured by time, and expected to happen at set hours. Thus, modern time is to a large extent a disciplinary time that forces us into identical patterns (Giddens 1984, 110pp). Your life is simply more difficult if you don't live according to the set schedule. We have to adjust to opening hours for shops, banks and playschools, most people have lunch and dinner at approximately the same time of day, etc.

In addition, efficiency is a key word in our society - you have to use time efficiently, and be careful not to waste it. Those who get the most done in less time are respected and even occasionally rewarded, and we tend to admire people who work long hours. Workers sell their time to their employers. We even speak of meaningful leisure time, meaning that rather than waste your time watching TV you should learn another language, engage in sports, be creative. Time has become valuable, time is a commodity, time equals money.

It takes a long time, however, before children become aware of time, at least in the sense of when things will happen and how long it will last. This alone is an indication that time is not as universal and
objective as we tend to believe. So just as archaeologists are becoming aware that gender is a social construct, so we are beginning to realise that also certain aspects of time are socially constructed.

This insight is of course not new to anthropologists who have encountered these different time perspectives during fieldwork in various parts of the world. A few anthropological anecdotes will illustrate my point.

Other time perspectives

An anthropologist went to the post office in Bogota, Colombia, inquiring about a parcel he was expecting. He was asked to return the following day at 11 o clock. The next day the scene repeats itself. There is no parcel, but he is asked to return the day after at a given time. This is repeated for several days. Finally he loses his temper and it becomes clear that rather than say they don’t know, or that the person in charge is out for lunch, the clerks have been told to give gringos a set hour simply to pacify them, i.e., us (Johansen 1989, 69-70). This perhaps tells us mostly about our obsession with clock-time, and how we tend to let the hour of the day determine our activities and to a certain degree our lives.

Another anthropologist was doing fieldwork in Papua New Guinea and was travelling with one of the villagers to another village. At mid-afternoon he suggests to his companion that they walk a bit faster as it is still quite far to the next village, which they want to reach before dark. But the friend responds Don’t worry. If we walk any faster, the sun will also move faster, but if we walk slowly so will the sun! Another person from the same area expressed the idea slightly differently. If you are weeding the garden and you are busy then the evening comes soon. Or: I don’t know why the sun moves quickly - sometimes it moves fast, sometimes slowly (Johansen 1985, 122-23).

To these people time is a very relative thing, that slows down when you do. If, indeed, time stops when nothing is happening, then consequently there is no waste of time if you stop work for a while. With this kind of time perspective, you can understand why it may be difficult to adjust to a production line in a factory.

In these villages in Papua New Guinea, as in many other societies, action directs time, not the other way round. Amongst the Maasai, the rainy season ends with loo-n-gokwa (the moon when a certain star sevenstar sets in the evening), in other words, there is a clear astronomical definition for this moon. But, if it still rains at the beginning of the next moon, they say: Well, we were wrong, this must be loo-n-gokwa! (Johansen 1989, 81). So time is adjusted according to concrete activities, not the other way round.

Our history or their history?

Not surprisingly, we also experienced some misunderstandings caused in part by different concepts of time while doing fieldwork at Khwai. I arrived with my European sense of time; researchers from the University of Botswana were used to a slightly different routine, which again differed from Khwai village time.

All right, you may say, this may complicate field work a little bit, with people not turning up when you expect them, with the result that you are hanging around waiting for a meeting or a ceremony to start (wasting time from one point of view). But what does this have to do with the results of the actual research?? Unfortunately, quite a lot!
First of all, a linear time perspective like the modern European one often produces an evolutionary history, where everything develops from simple to complex whether we are talking about social organisation (from band to tribe to chiefdom), or artefacts and typology. The more complex, the higher ranked. There is also an implicit assumption of gradual, but steady progression involved in such a perspective. Many of these so-called simpler (less complex) societies are also less time-efficient (i.e., their simple technologies are viewed as less productive and they may be thought to spend too much time lazing around), and they invest less time in artefacts, monuments, etc.

Through using the implicit time is money - equation it is possible to estimate the investment in Stone Age monuments, and to show that early Stone Age monuments were simpler and less costly than later ones. With regard to English monuments, for example, earthen long barrows are cheaper than the later Stonehenge monument (Renfrew 1983). Time is used as a measurement. But the time perspective used is the modern, western time-is-money perception, not a time that stops when you take a break! So yet again, our values, our world perspective is used to describe and evaluate other societies - past and present. As there are many indications that this time perspective is not an integral part of Basarwa cultures, we should be careful not to employ it when attempting to write their history.

And there are further consequences of the confrontation between different time perspectives. The American archaeologist Larry Zimmermann has been closely involved in the reburial issues in the US-on the Native American side. (The indigenous groups want all skeletal material and a good deal of important ritual artefacts to be returned for reburial, rather than lying around in cardboard boxes in museums.) On a number of occasions he noticed one of the Dakota elders saying things like:

"This has bothered me for 500 years"

Or: "This has been building up in me for 500 years.

To this Native American elder there was no clear distinction between the past and the present. The Indian knows the past because it is spiritually and ritually a part of his or her daily existence (or at least used to be). And because the past is known, it does not have to be discovered, and archaeological knowledge holds little meaning. As another Native American put it: The past is obvious to the Indian people, as it does not appear to be obvious to the white man (Zimmermann 1987). So because of a very different time perspective, at least certain indigenous groups feel that they have no need for our kind of history or archaeology, as they already know their own past, thank you very much!

**Writing history**

Not surprisingly your time perspective also influences the way you tell stories about the past, and indeed how you perceive causal relationships in the present.

Proper stories in the European tradition have a beginning, a middle and an end - they tend to have a linear, causal structure. To be a good, coherent and complete story the individual parts of the story do not just follow each other, but follow from, or are a consequence of each other. Because A happened, B follows, which logically leads to C. The story has a recognisable, well-known structure. Without this it is not a good story, or perhaps hardly a story at all. A story must present a problem, a conflict or a dilemma, deal with it and then end happily or tragically. This is the classical structure for all fairy tales, for instance. Let s take a look at the ugly duckling by Hans Christian Andersen: we are immediately introduced to the poor ugly duckling and his difficulties. The main part of the story then describes how he tries to deal with
this in a number of substories, but then finally at the end, the problem is solved as he grows into the most beautiful swan!

This structure is valid for novels and for scientific writing as well. An article in a journal must start by presenting a problem, go on discussing it and end with a conclusion. Otherwise something is missing and it will most likely be refused by the editor (Knudsen 1985). We have difficulties understanding it, it doesn't seem logical.

Malinowski, for instance, had great difficulties with the myths of the Trobiand Islanders (Johansen 1988). They lacked, in his opinion, the logical and aesthetically correct structure so he had so ask additional questions about the preconditions and consequences of the events. The Trobiand stories were discontinuous, fragmentary, repetitive with no proper ending, to us apparently without logic. The individual events were important, but their chronological sequence was arbitrary. These stories, of course, make perfect sense to people in the Trobiands. They possess the same structure or logic as the rest of their world - which just happens to be different from ours.

The result is that our stories, our history are often presented as a linear sequence of events, where one event leads to another according to a strict logic, to a certain extent like evolutionary history. Groups with other time perspectives will present their past very differently, possibly with events being more like points spread in time and space with no definite links as one extreme model. Our way of writing history or a story is one possibility amongst others, but it is perhaps not very likely to correspond, for instance, to the Basarwa way of thinking about history or telling a story.

Stories are important in all societies. This is, of course, one thing that Megan Biesele also touches upon in her book on Basarwa folklore (Biesele 1993). Through stories we learn about the rights and the wrongs of the world, about right behaviour, and we learn about reality, although we may do so in a roundabout way - through ugly ducklings or through all the wrong things that the persons in the story do.

**History and the negotiation of rights**

So stories are important, but the past is also important. In some societies there is, as I have already discussed, to some extent no clear distinction between the past and the present - they tend to merge.

However, if there is such a thing as a global time perspective emerging, it is one with a strictly linear time perspective, where the past, the present and the future are almost distinct entities, each of them important to our way of understanding the world. Within this time perspective the past not only serves as something we should learn from - so that a holocaust never happens again for instance. The past is also vital when it comes to the legitimation and negotiation of rights.

Archaeology and history have played a central role in the creation of nations in many parts of the world from the 19th century onwards. In Norway, for instance, the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1904 was accompanied by major investments in archaeological excavation. Some of Norway's most spectacular monuments were excavated, and some of the finds from these are still the pride of the nation. I need only mention the Oseberg Viking ship. Similar use of prehistoric finds was in focus when Denmark in 1920 regained part of our territory from Germany, lost in 1864. The Golden Horns, the first of which were discovered by a farm girl in 1639, the second in 1734, were originally displayed in the King's art and treasure chamber, but were stolen and melted down in 1802. Shortly afterwards this treasure was
celebrated by the great national poet Oehlenschläger. In 1920, copies of these Golden Horns adorned the platform from where the King spoke to his people on the day of reunion (Sørensen 1996).

Archaeological finds are still today used in many contexts to symbolize past glory or to point the way forward. Viking centres pop up everywhere in Norway these days, while a Danish series of history-books was called The European House, a perhaps not so subtle indication of support to the European Union. In short, archaeology and history are used actively to support and legitimize the social and political structures of today.

Backtracking to the concern of the whole seminar, indigenous people and the nation state, archaeology and history are very much part of the debate concerning rights to land and water in Northern Norway. When did the Sami people settle here, who does the land belong to?

It is not that very many archaeologists or historians use their discipline in the political debate, but almost everybody else does - in particular those who know little about history and archaeology. Time and again local newspapers publish letters from readers who use archaeology to argue their case - either that the Sami have been here since the end of the Ice Age, or, more commonly, that the Sami have immigrated recently, and consequently have no land rights. Let me read you parts of a letter published this summer:

The history of the region begins with the first people here...... Have the Sami or anybody else put forward documentation that the Sami and not the Norwegians are the indigenous population in the areas they demand rights to? It has been proven that the Sami immigrated to areas in Norway that were already inhabited by a Nordic people, and had been so for at least 9300 years, when the Sami about 2000 years ago immigrated to the region (a carbon-14 date at Magerøy 11.300 BP). The oldest absolutely certain Sami remains are the graves and skeletons from Varanger dated year 400-800 AD (Nordlys).

Some of the facts employed here are correct, although used in a way that no archaeologists would ever do. Other facts are simply wrong, but they still lend the article credibility in the eyes of those who are not historians or archaeologists.

This way of using the past for nationalistic purposes and to promote nations or ethnic groups is of increasing concern to archaeologists. A large number of recent books discuss the problems of this use of past, and I think a growing number of archaeologists react to both past and present use of archaeology in the service of nations or ethnic groups.

**Time, history and the Basarwa**

The issues I have discussed briefly throughout this paper are in my opinion all related, and they present us with a number of problems regarding the history of indigenous groups.
1. Indigenous sense and understanding of time and of the past may be assumed to be or have been different from the modern European or western one. Is it possible for us to come to understand or even discover these other concepts of time?

2. A different time perspective is likely also to implicate a different sense and understanding of the past. Whose past should be presented, whose past is important? And how do we write or represent it?

3. It is at present predominantly the linear, scientific history which is considered legitimizing with regard to indigenous rights. However, this is a use of the past to which archaeology in general is now reacting negatively. If we reject it in Europe, can we accept it elsewhere?

4. If we for theoretical and political reasons reject the use of archaeology in nationalistic and ethnic conflicts, aren't we then refusing indigenous groups struggling for equal rights the use of a strategy or tactic that worked so very well for us less than a century ago?

References


"If we want to be able to talk about the living world (and ourselves), we need to master the disciplines of description and reference in this curious language that has no things in it but only differences and relationships." Mary Catherine Bateson in Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred. (G. and M. C. Bateson 1987:191)

The notion of 'ethnicity' has been selected as the focus for this presentation at a workshop entitled 'Indigenous Peoples in Modern Nation-States' because I find the term most useful for any analysis of 'race relations' in a multicultural and modern nation-state like Botswana. That is so because the term 'ethnicity' relates closely to the social phenomenon in social anthropology called a 'relation.' (COD, 1976:945: "relation. 2. What one person or thing has to do with another,...") Ethnicity then is seen as a particular social relation, namely the one which emerges when the different cultural backgrounds of the actors are made relevant in the interaction between them. In other words, the hairy notion of 'difference' also comes into focus and I will try to treat it with some care as the term in the present context could give the wrong associations.

In the following, I will discuss some epistemological aspects of the notion of 'ethnicity' which in anthropological usage deals with the dynamics that can be said to work between actors or statuses when their culturally distinct backgrounds are activated. In this perspective, 'ethnicity' cannot be employed to classify a people or a cultural item, only the relationship between peoples.

A relational concept of ethnicity

I will start off by first presenting some of the reasons anthropologists have had for developing what we could call 'relational' terms. I will lean on the two epistemologists Gregory Bateson and Charles Taylor in order to show the usefulness of such terms in their attempts at refining the idea of 'causality' in society. Alongside Bateson, we can state - quite unambiguously I think - that what generates form or frequencies in social life cannot be likened to the type of relations which we believe explain what goes on between moving billiard-balls in a pool game.

The notion of man as a relational creature, the idea that we can see man as socially constituted through the interactions in which he involves himself with different statuses or persons in his surroundings, dominates much of the thinking in anthropology today. The epistemology behind this sort of reasoning is to a large extent inspired by the writings of Gregory Bateson, for instance as illustrated by the following quotation:
"Anglo-Saxons who are uncomfortable with the idea that feelings and emotions are the outward signs of precise and complex algorithms usually have to be told that these matters, the relationship between self and others, and the relationship between self and environment, are, in fact, the subject matter of what are called "feelings" - love, hate, fear, confidence, anxiety, hostility, etc..." (1972:140)

What Bateson argues is that such phenomena as love and hate and fear, etc., should be seen as relations, not simply as 'feelings.' Their subject matter has to do with relations between people. As subjects, we may love and hate and fear some object. That 'feelings' thus are seen as explicitly extrovert, implies that such experiences belong in the realm of anthropology just as much as to psychology.

The Bateson/anthropological emphasis on ethnicity as a relational phenomenon contrasts significantly with the usage given in COD (1976:356), which defines 'ethnic', as something "Pertaining to race, ethnological, whence ethnicity." This understanding of 'ethnicity' has deep roots in public usage, and we must be careful not to mix the two up.

I think it is only fair to say that the modern anthropological understanding of 'ethnicity' as a relational, rather than a race-focused term, represented a change of paradigm in the discipline. Many anthropologists working in the sixties and seventies had gradually become more and more frustrated by feeling obliged to treat their object of study, be it a community, a tribe or an ethnic group, as if that unit could profitably be looked upon as a separate, delineable entity, as a chip in the mosaic. The new school, so to speak, argued, that every such 'chip' should precisely not be seen as a chip, something 'bounded' as the saying went. Rather, it was argued, tribes, communities, etc., were to be understood as more or less integrated parts of a much larger whole, the 'world system', a market or nation. A more systemic perspective was asked for.

That the many people of the world, in spite of their interconnectedness with others, never the less saw themselves as members of separate and distinct groups, similar in many ways to (most of) their close neighbours and different from (most of) those who lived on their margins, made anthropologists rearrange their fields of study. The more traditional studies of 'cultures', of the characteristics of each and every 'people', were now seen as subordinated to the question of how such entities as the groupings which peoples themselves called 'us' or 'we' maintained their distinctions and qualities despite intense interactions and trading with the 'different' others/neighbours, and frequent movements over the boundaries between 'us' and 'them'.

Concomitant with this change of paradigm, much of modern anthropology switched from the study of social form, i.e., from the study of 'culture', to the study of 'social processes', i.e., to processual organisation and maintenance of societal life.

**Ethnic groups and the genesis of ethnicity**

The most conspicuous step in this paradigm change in anthropology was, I suppose, the publication of the book *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* in 1969, with the significant subtitle *The Social Organization of Cultural Differences*, edited and with an introduction by the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth. In his Introduction Barth writes:

"By concentrating on what is socially effective, ethnic groups are seen as a form of social organization. The critical feature then becomes...the characteristic of self-ascription and ascription by others...To the extent that actors use ethnic identities to categorize themselves and others for purposes of interaction, they form ethnic groups in this organizational sense." (1969:13-14)
In emphasizing that aspect of an interaction which is 'socially effective', i.e., that which matters to people and their positioning in the interaction, the idea of a 'relationship' comes out more clearly. The link between 'culture' and 'ethnicity' can be identified, as suggested by the subtitle of the book; 'Ethnicity' has to do with the 'Social Organization of Cultural Differences.' Ethnicity as a type of relationship, is what is generated when in interaction the actor's perception of his opponent includes an awareness of a 'difference' between them, for instance, in outlook on life, and this difference becomes relevant for the process of interaction. In other words and as stated by Barth, the important analytical dimension here has to do with 'the characteristic of self-ascription and ascription by others.' And only to the extent that such ascription is being activated can we talk about 'ethnic groups' and in this organizational manner.

Barth's volume on 'Ethnic Groups' represented a watershed in the understanding of cultural variation, not the least because the papers included were written on the basis of detailed and longlasting fieldwork addressing processes of border maintenance. Contrary to what had earlier been assumed, these papers demonstrated beyond doubt that interaction across ethnic boundaries, movements over them, and mutual recognition of likeness and difference, rather than isolation and lack of contact, were the processes which generated separateness and distinctness. And as the method suggested, the units of analysis were no longer peoples or cultures, but individual actors in contexts. It was assumed that with such a perspective the most appalling tendencies among anthropologists to reify or essentialize the objects under study could be quenched. Field studies of concrete actors disclosed the conjectural nature of the many gross generalizations so often constructed concerning the assumed qualities of entities on a macro level.

Let me remind you that however useful the relational concept of 'ethnicity' might seem it is still only an analytical device, constructed for the purpose of isolating specific aspects of interaction which are not directly identifiable and which are not of a descriptive nature.

**Ethnic identity**

Since the notion of 'ethnicity' is so closely connected with the model of 'relationship' as generated by the juxtaposing of 'self description' and 'identification by others', it is also akin to the idea of 'identity', or more precisely 'ethnic identity.' So, before we return to the term 'difference', let me present a few ideas on the social character of 'identity.'

In a retrospective view on 'Ethnic Groups and Boundaries', Barth wrote:

"Our point of departure was the recognition that ethnic identity essentially is a feature of social organization, rather than an aspect of culture. Ethnicity is basically a question of membership in a social unit, a group, and we therefore assumed that ethnicity is about the social organisation of groups on the basis of cultural differences - as indicated in the subtitle of the book." (1994:174-75; my translation)

A similar perspective has been suggested by Charles Taylor (1994). We find an abbreviated version of Taylor's perspective in Appiah's statement "...identities are dialogically shaped..." (in Taylor:1994:161). In his own words, Taylor writes:

"People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us - what George Herbert Mead
called "significant others". The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical." (ibid.:32)

Clearly, Taylor appreciates a relational perspective in his insistence on the dialogical nature of the 'human mind'. Now, we should note that the paper from which the above quotation is taken is a study of The Politics of Recognition (1994:25-73), an issue not foreign to the members of our workshop. He introduces his paper by stating that "A number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition. The need, it can be argued, is one of the driving forces behind nationalist movements in politics" (ibid.: 25). The demand for recognition, Taylor states, comes from 'minorities and 'subaltern' groups and again we are made aware of the close links between recognition in the sense of 'recognition of rights' allocated to specific not-recognised groups and their separate/different identities. For 'recognition' as a social process, is tied to identity in specific ways:

"The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves." (ibid.:25)

It should not be necessary before an audience like the present to question or discuss more thoroughly the empirical basis for the quotation above. "Demeaning or contemptible pictures" still - we all know - flourish in many parts of the Third and the Fourth Worlds and do represent restrictions on human development and growth.

I have given much attention to Taylor's notion of the social character of identities. I have done so because as a recognizable feature the many types of 'ascription by others' can be identified as independent variables in the process of increasing or retarding expressions of ethnic variation. As such, it can help us to understand more of the genesis of ethnic relations and the many varying forms of inter-ethnic organization. And in this sense, Taylor can assist us in our pursuit for an understanding of 'causality' in society.

Ethnicity and the recognition of difference

Finally then, and only briefly, I turn to the notion of 'difference', so seminal and so frequently employed by Gregory Bateson in his understanding of 'cause and effect.' I will take as my starting point his last book Angels Fear, written in cooperation with his daughter Mary Catherine (Bateson & Bateson 1987). I have picked a quotation from his treatment of 'biological communication' and I do that with the hope that the everyday-life term 'difference' in its apparent simplicity can be made more easily accessible.

Bateson believes the phenomenon of 'information' to be a basic agent in the constitution of human behaviour in society. Information, or rather communication does not emanate from any item or event occurring in our context; there is a "difference that makes a difference", (1972:453) and others that do not. Consequently, the notion of communication (of something different), is closely linked to what is 'new' and 'significant' and which can trigger action. In other words, it can identify a 'cause' and explain an 'effect.' He writes:

"The concept of difference enters twice into understanding the process of perception: first, there must be a difference latent or implicit in the territory, and secondly, that difference must be converted into
an event within the perceiving system - i.e., the difference must overcome a threshold, must be
different from a threshold value." (1987:122)

In the hope of making the idea of 'difference' more accessible, let me include Bateson's comparison of
man with the perceiving facilities of the frog:

"We can do a little better than the frog. She sees only the moving fly, but we can see the fly which
is not moving. We do this by converting the external static difference between fly and background
into an event on our retina..." (In Donaldson 1991:232)

The mythic origins of norwegian ethnic groups

As a Norwegian and having gone to Norwegian schools, I was taught one of the Norwegian creation
myths. It stated that because our country had high mountains and settled villages in between and because
people on the coast grew up on isolated islands and along deep and inaccessible fiords, the population was
split up in numerous local groups, with different cultures. They all had acquired their own dialect, ways of
dressing, singing and playing the fiddle distinct from their neighbours' because - as the story went - they
had developed in 'splendid isolation' from one another, unrestricted by a centralised, homogenizing state (or
at least that was how I understood the message).

Now we know better. We believe that the genesis of ethnic/subcultural diversity had to do with an
opposite type of process. In order to maintain their local and common identity, based on a mutual
understanding that 'we are the best' or at least better than our neighbours, the people of each community
did stick to their own, age-old aesthetic standards, developed their own habits and enhanced the distinct
tones of their music instruments. Interaction with neighbours always emphasised an element of difference.

In this mythical game of pluralization and complementarity - let us assume - the processes of
differentiation had not yet reached a stage where subalterns and high ranking personnel had been
established, so that the latter could assert dominance over the former.

In the current situation in this country - which by now is a centralised nation-state rather different
from this mythical past, 'recognition' lives side-by-side with 'non-recognition. Traditional 'folk'-dresses are
more in use than ever, both by the locals who have an inherent right to wear the costumes, but also by the
urban population with only scant or possibly no local links to the outfit, other than an appreciation of the
(common Norwegian) aesthetics of it. Together the wearers of local costumes express a national set of
values, suggesting that on public holidays, if possible, we should all wear a local dress. The relations
between the wearer and the non-wearer, and between the wearers of different folk costumes have only
vague connotations of 'localism', in an ocean of Norwegian nationalism.

There is an exception to this pattern in the nation-state of Norway. In spite of eager attempts at
assimilating the Sami people into the common ground, the wearing of the different traditional Sami
costumes is a very different matter. Done either on a daily basis or sometimes only on festive occasions,
the donning of different local costume varieties serve as expressions of Sami coherence, as well as the dis-
play of Sami cultural diversity, i.e., as conspicuous ethnic markers which are appreciated by most of their
counterparts.

Colonisation, assimilation policies and nationalism have for generations imposed upon us an
understanding of what is a 'normal' development on the interface of cultural contact; the more 'developed'
has an almost logical right to absorb the other. Obviously, there is *nothing* normal in such processes, only that they are frequent.

**References**


Introduction

Politics has been called the authoritative distribution of values (Easton, 1953:127-132). Culture - the way of living, understanding, communicating, interpreting and acting - is such values. These values are distributed by the authorities each and every day. How they are distributed is an outcome of the political system, and the political power of such a system.

The political system and the power relations within the system, can be seen as an answer to group mobilisation for political participation and inclusion. A mobilised interest group can create a process whereby the distribution of values is changed, to become more in accordance with the wishes and goals of the group in question (Hagtvedt and Lafferty, 1984: 417-422). In Norway, for example, this has happened to the bourgeoisie, the agriculture population, the working class and women.

In so called resource mobilisation theory, factors like political opportunities, economic and social improvements, leadership, organisation, strategy and ideology are important for understanding mobilisation in movements (Oberschall, 1973: 102, 117, 146, 159, 178-179; Falch, 1993: 30-41). The theory combines opportunity and frustration in its explanation (Ellingsen, 1997: 146-147). The unequal distribution of cultural values and rights, together with better living conditions, higher education and changed social ties, paves the way for mobilisation among indigenous peoples. I am not very familiar with research on such movements among indigenous peoples but it is likely that this is what has happened among the Sami population in Norway when they mobilised in the 1970s and 80s.

Ideology and mobilisation

This conference deals with cultural heritage and its management, a field where ideology plays an important part. I myself am working with the management of Sami cultural heritage. I will therefore take a closer look at the factor which is called "ideology" in resource mobilisation theory. All mobilising groups have, to a larger or lesser degree, grounded their claims by identifying what is wrong with the existing society, and by creating an idea of a better future (Falch, 1993: 80). This can, in the broad sense of the term, be seen as ideology-making. History and cultural heritage have been and are important factors for making an "ideology". One could mention words like nation-building, historical materialism or "the forgotten woman". In spite of these conscious uses of history and archaeology in making an "ideology", the mobilised groups mentioned above, like the bourgeoisie and the working class, have claims which can be seen as mainly legitimated by their large number and/or economic strength (Rokkan, 1987: 96-97).
For indigenous peoples, claiming of rights is seldom legitimated by the number of people belonging to the group, or the group's economic strength. In a numeric electing democratic system there is nearly no political risk by ignoring indigenous peoples' claims. Actually, politicians take a high risk by not ignoring their claims. During an election campaign the political parties have more votes to win from the cultural majority than from the cultural minority, and very often the chances of winning increase by opposing the cultural minority’s claims. Suppression of cultural minorities in the name of an integration policy, where everyone is seen as an equal and everyone should formally be treated as such, is an easy winner in a system where votes count and resources decide (Rokkan, 1987: 96, 206). For the indigenous peoples it is therefore even more important than for other mobilised groups to legitimate claims by a strong and well articulated "ideology", where terms like culture, heritage, sites, history, environment, land and belonging to territories are ascribed great importance.

Such terms actually say something about indigenous peoples as peoples. Indigenous peoples very often have a history that is largely unwritten. Their life and culture are still based on their vicinity to nature and their stories of nature; the nature is very much the foundation of their culture. In the Sami rights commissions latest report, released this year, it is stated:

"Nature is the frame of life, experience of the past, knowledge and conduct of life, simultaneously as it is the foundation for reindeerherding, agriculture and fisheries. Nature is therefore the basic condition for both immaterial and material parts of the culture" (NOU, 1997: 7: 60)

The former president in the Norwegian Sami Parliament Ole Henrik Magga has said it more straightforward: "Without earth and water - no culture" (Magga, 1997).

A culture's most important references are vital for its maintenance. To indigenous peoples these are the traditional use and habitation areas, nature and natural resources. Cultural sites play very important role in this context, because they document attachment to territories. For many indigenous peoples, geography is a map without fixed borders, but with many locations of sites and names (Schanche, 1993: 59). Cultural self-knowledge is often more connected to territorial belonging than to private and formal legal ownership of the land. The sense of history among indigenous peoples often have a non-linear relation to time and space. Stories and time do not necessarily level a succession in time or a causal connection and development (Schanche, 1989: 85-87). Stories and myths are rooted in the landscape, and manifested in sites and places. The myths and stories animate the landscape, and can be told only through the landscape. I saw an example of this in the traditional territories of the /Xam when I visited the Northern Cape province in South Africa. The story about the Lizzard Mountain (Strandberg) could only bee told with help of the landscape where the incident happened. An old Sami described a similar experience:

"When I was travelling along the old tracks, I often came to the old places. Sometimes when I came to my ancestors turf huts places, made a little fire, made coffee and ate dried reindeer meet, I felt like living in their turf hut. I felt deeply rooted in their world, and I could experience their happiness, grieves and hardships". (Fjellheim, 1991: 41)

If the landscape is destroyed or the people are shut out from it, the stories lose their meanings, and the cultural territorial references dissolve.

The importance of cultural heritage, as sites and landscapes, is both a result of "real" cultural aspects and of political struggles for goal achievements. This coherence of cultural self-knowledge and political
articulation will, of course, increase the likelihood of cultural mobilisation. A direct threat from external development plans imposed on indigenous peoples land, nature, sites and landscapes will easily result in a noisy and unstable situation for the authorities. We must, as protectors of cultural heritage, also be aware that the same feeling of being ignored and disparaged can occur when authorities are planning to establish protected areas like national parks, and they are doing so by excluding living culture and cultural history. In both situations the indigenous peoples feel their cultural foundation and living conditions directly threatened. The "ideology" articulates that fear. Especially in relation to development plans, it is easy to make alliances with, for example environmental organisations. This can create situations of strong political pressure, with which authorities have to deal. The indigenous peoples movements can thereby be heard and taken seriously in the public policy process for value distribution. This is partly what happened in Norway during the conflict of the Alta river dam construction.

Ideology and culture

It may seen obvious that the articulated "ideology" is synonymous with "real" culture. But it is necessary to bear in mind that culture and ideology are not an organism, which emerge, develop or die by historical determination independent of human will (Jackson, 1989: 128). In many situations culture takes form as "ideological" expressions. These expressions will in many external situations take forms that contrasts with the majority culture. These "ideological" possessions are therefore at least indirectly an outcome of the dichotomy already defined by the majority culture (Schanche, 1993: 58-59). From time to time indigenous peoples hear that their "ideology" is inventing, simplifying and constructing culture. The culture or ethnicity is seen as manipulation or performance (Jackson, 1989: 129).

First, that sort of criticism, or even attack, according to Ole Henrik Magga mostly comes from "Majority societies, who themselves have used huge political, scientific and material resources to strengthen their own identity and their own power - exactly built on ethnicity" (Magga, 1997).

Cultural consciousness and "ideological" articulation of your own culture or identity does not mean that you construct something totally new, something that's has never been there. It means that you are struggling to be part of the public policy that already is distributing culture as a collective good.

Second, "ideologies" never reveal the whole cultural picture. "Ideology" will often show a strategic picture. This does not mean that the articulated "ideology" is not "right", it just means that the arguments are used for a political purpose and made understandable in a majority cultural context (Schanche, 1993: 59). Internally, for example in Sami society, ways of thought and expression in relation to heritage, history and traditions, are highly much nuanced and very dynamic. This alone can defend that the indigenous peoples themselves must manage and develop their own culture, cultural sites, livelihoods and societies.

Indigenous peoples' existence as culturally distinct groups is steadily questioned by the majorities. If we reach a stage where it is not necessary for indigenous people to repeatedly explain to the authorities and the majority culture what it means to be an aboriginal, a stage where their culture and their rights are an obvious part of the nation state, and their existence as cultural units does not have to be continually defended, there may be room for a more open and self-critical discussion about what it means to be indigenous and how indigenous culture should be developed.

In Norway, political development has gone relatively far toward accepting the Sami people and creating a platform for a Sami policy where the Samis themselves set the main premises. But it has not yet
reached this stage. This became quite explicit during the negative electioneering against Samis and Sami rights in the recently finished election campaign.

In my opinion, the Sami cultural political "ideology" still plays an important role for the mobilisation of the Samis, as it did for the establishment of the Sami Parliament and its subsidiary councils, like the Council of Sami Cultural Heritage. The "ideology" has also pointed out the direction for the Sami Parliaments strategies and pertinent to our discussion here, for the management of Sami cultural heritage.

**Ideology and challenge**

The general goal of the Council of Sami Cultural Heritage is to:

"Protect Sami cultural monuments, sites and landscapes for future generations in a way that contributes to a strengthening and a maintenance of Sami culture and identity". (Council of Sami Cultural Heritages' Strategic plan 1995-1997: 10)

This goal has two tasks built in to it. One is to manage and protect Sami cultural sites according to legislation. The second is to work for cultural protection and cultural continuity. Either of these tasks exclude the other, but cultural protection by working with cultural sites can not only be based on the management tasks directed by legislation and acts.

We have a challenging responsibility. We must co-operate with other existing cultural heritage management (Norwegian cultural heritage management), we must articulate a distinction to their management and we must take part in a dialogue and communication about the knowledge, understanding and meaning of sites and landscapes inside the Sami society. So the management of the Sami cultural heritage has many roles to play.

In an external context, we must argue why some sites are Sami (who defines prehistory?) and why Sami sites need special forms of protection, forms that include the concealment of oral traditions given in confidence. In an internal context, we must protect Sami sites and landscapes from the negative effects of traditional subsistence activities with modern tools, resulting in increased traffic with motor vehicles and bigger cabins and reindeer fences. On the one hand we have to defend a culture that is different from the majority culture, partly by using the afore mentioned "ideology". On the other hand we have to be critical of activities defended by and argued for with the same "ideology", within Sami society.

It is therefore many points that we have to balance in our everyday work in the Council of Sami Cultural Heritage.

Dealing with all these dimensions we see one main principle. It is communication, and a recognition that communication and experience of cultural sites depend on cultural, social and historical possession (where you stand depends on where you sit).

We try to emphasise the flow between local knowledge and scientific knowledge as listeners and actors in the ongoing discourse around cultural self-knowledge and its relations to cultural sites. At the same time as we can bring in some theoretical and comprehensive views on sites and landscapes, the local societies can bring us local experiences and knowledge. We are trying to integrate local knowledge in our management, and to some extent I think we are succeeding. When we survey areas for cultural sites, when we accept that cultural sites are arranged for tourism, when we prepare protective plans and when we give
advice for the release of legitimately protected sites, we stress the necessity of interviews, involvement and participation. We are fully aware that we, as a Sami managing institution, are in a certain power position inside Sami society. Therefore we also have to be aware that our knowledge alone does not necessarily bring the best solutions. Our opinion is that communication can contribute to cultural engagement, cultural consciousness and a self-determined cultural development, or, may I say, the self-determined distribution of a peoples own cultural values as collective goods.

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INDIGENOUS OR AUTOCHTHONOUS? ESTABLISHING A ROLE FOR ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE NEGOTIATION OF BASARWA IDENTITY

Paul J. Lane

Introduction

When the United Nations declared 1993 as the Year of Indigenous People, and various bodies began asking the Botswana Government what this might imply for its Basarwa population, the response by the then Minister for Local Government, Lands and Housing, Mr Chapson Butale, was telling. He declared, simply, that 'All Batswana are indigenous', and thus no special measures targeted at Basarwa were being planned for 1993 by the Botswana Government as a way of marking the United Nations declaration (Meyer 1993; see also Daily News 5/3/1993, cited in Saugestad 1997). An obvious implication of Mr Butale's remarks is that, in the opinion of the Government of Botswana, Basarwa have no more or less right to an identity as Botswana's indigenous peoples, than do members of the majority Tswana population or any of the other smaller ethno-linguistic groups in the country.

Rather similar sentiments were expressed in 1996 by a locally-based historian, Dr Jeff Ramsay. Ramsay has done much to popularise Botswana's history and to broaden public understanding of various events in Botswana's past through a number of school text-books (e.g. Ramsay et al. 1996; Morton and Ramsay 1987; Morton and Ramsay 1994) and a regular column in the weekly newspaper Mmegi. In March 1996, Ramsay began a series of articles in Mmegi on the history of the area around Ghanzi, with particular reference to the last few hundred years (e.g. Ramsay 1996a-c, and subsequent articles). In keeping with his style, Ramsay used these newspaper articles to examine the sequence of settlement in the area as recorded in oral and documentary sources, along with a discussion of the consequences of European expansion and the imposition of colonial rule. Although Ramsay noted that different Basarwa populations had a long tradition of settlement in the Ghanzi region, he was also at pains to point out that Bakalakgadi and other Bantu-language speaking populations had also lived in the area for many hundreds of years, and there had been a long history of interaction between the two sets of linguistic communities. Therefore, in Ramsay's opinion, none of these groups could really claim to be the indigenous population of the area 1.

Of course, there is a world of difference between remarks made by an academic historian and those made by a representative of the Government of the day. Yet, both seem to capture the essence of the problems associated with using the term 'indigenous' when referring to populations in Africa. More specifically, what both Mr Butale and Jeff Ramsay appear to have had in mind when discounting the use of the term 'indigenous' to describe Botswana's Basarwa populations, is that throughout most of sub-

1 See, especially, Ramsay 1996a.
Saharan Africa (with the notable exceptions of South Africa, Zimbabwe and perhaps Kenya) there are no African nations which still have sizeable European populations descended from an original White settler community. This is obviously in marked contrast to the situation in North America and Australasia, where a great majority of those populations referred to by groups such as the UN and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as 'indigenous peoples', live.

As importantly, all African countries, including since 1994 South Africa, are self-governing, independent nation states whose politicians, or at least the bulk of them, are drawn from the local African population. Since most of these African populations can point to a long history of occupation of the land, and certainly one which preceeded European settlement and colonisation2, they can all lay claim to the status of being 'indigenous'. Certainly, the ILO's definition of Indigneous people as:

"people in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions" (International Labour Organisation 1989, Article 1.b)

could be said to apply to virtually any African population.

The issue of indigeneity is even more sensitive in a country such as Botswana, given its particular geo-political context. In the first place, Botswana's constitution, adopted at Independence in 1966, underscored the importance of guaranteeing "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual" irrespective of "race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex". In the thirty years since Independence, Botswana has been singled out, justifiably, by the international community as having one of the best reputations for protecting human rights on the entire continent. The long-term political stability and economic success of the country, have also come in for considerable praise from observers in the West, especially in the light of the turmoil that has afflicted virtually all of the neighbouring states over the same period (Good 1992; Saugestad 1996, 1997).

That several of these had institutionalised systems of racial discrimination against their majority, African population until quite recently, also served to underscore the regional importance of Botswana's political climate. By emphasising the equality under law of all its peoples, the Botswana Government gained considerable moral authority within the region, and rapidly came to be regarded as a shining examplar of the benefits of Black majority rule.

Seen in this light, Mr Butale's remarks could be interpreted as a valiant attempt to defend the non-discriminatory principles of Botswana's constitution, and Jeff Ramsay's as populist history intent on avoiding the creation of modern myths that could be used to fuel ethnic factionalism3. Following these lines of argument to their logical conclusion, it might seem more helpful to abandon the use of the term 'indigenous' altogether, and to replace it, when the need arises to emphasise historical primacy, with the term 'autochthonous'. This is an altogether more muted and neutral concept, which the OED defines as implying: 'the earliest known dwellers in any country; original inhabitants; aborigines' (Oxford English Dictionary 1971, 573).

2 The exceptions to this being groups recently displaced as a result of famine and/or civil war.
3 The desire to avoid ethnic factionalism is frequently articulated by representatives of the Botswana Government in a variety of fora, including meetings involving Basarwa - see, for example, the remarks attributed to President Masire at a meeting with residents from Sepako about the Remote Area Dwevelopment Programme in April 1996 (Motswakae 1996).
The difficulty with such an argument is that international bodies and human rights organisations such as the UN, Amnesty International and the ILO, use the term 'indigenous' to imply far more than merely the historical primacy of a particular people's occupation of an area, although this is an important component of the term's usage. More specifically, the discursive definition of indigeneity in these contexts carries with it connotations of a loss of rights as a consequence of primacy of historical settlement in an area. Also, this loss of rights has frequently precipitated a range of social and economic problems, such as alcohol abuse, acute unemployment, restricted educational opportunities, and institutionalised prejudice amongst more dominant neighbouring groups.

For many indigenous communities, the process of disenfranchisement emanated from policies of deliberate persecution and repression. In other contexts, while the causes behind the loss of rights by indigenous peoples may have been more indirect and possibly more drawn out, the results have nevertheless been as damaging. Thus, what the majority of indigenous peoples hold in common is not just that they were the original inhabitants of the land at some point in the past, but that in the present they find themselves disadvantaged economically, socially, politically and/or culturally relative to other sections of the nation state in which they reside, precisely because of their ancestry.

By these criteria, as various commentators have observed, Botswana's Basarwa communities certainly qualify for recognition as severely disadvantaged, minority, indigenous populations (e.g. Wilmsen 1989; Good 1993; Hitchcock and Holm 1993; Saugestad 1993; 1996; 1997). As part of this marginalisation, and in keeping with indigenous peoples in other parts of the world, most Basarwa have recent experience of loss of territory, exploitation and the effects of cultural imperialism (Peters 1996, passim).

Archaeology and Identity

As an archaeologist, one of the issues of interest to me in this kind of debate over whether Basarwa qualify to be known as Indigenous Peoples, is that, notwithstanding Jeff Ramsay's comments, the primacy of Basarwa occupation of the land has not been challenged by those government representatives who oppose this type of appelation. Indeed, as a recent analysis by Motzafi-Haller has shown, a range of 'official' literature that include Government publicity material and school text-books, acknowledge the presence of Basarwa in what is now Botswana, prior to the settlement of Setswana speakers in the same geographical area. (Motzafi-Haller 1995).

The conventional view, widely held and articulated within academic circles, that modern Basarwa populations are to a greater or lesser degree the direct descendants of the so-termed Late Stone Age populations that occupied most of southern Africa between c. 30,000 and 2,000 BP, is thus not contested. Another matter which is not disputed, is the equally entrenched academic orthodoxy that from c. 2,000 BP onwards, these Khoisan/proto-Basarwa LSA populations were steadily encapsulated as groups of proto-Bantu-language speakers moved gradually south. The latter are generally considered to have been

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4 As Saugestad (1997) notes, there is now broad agreement amongst the various organisations involved with Indigenous Peoples, that the concept of 'being indigenous' entails four inter-related notions - first arrival, non-dominance, cultural distinctiveness, and self-identification.

5 There also seems to be a general level of acceptance of this view among members of the public (e.g. Leepile 1996).
responsible for the introduction of domestic crops and a knowledge of metallurgy (although not domestic livestock) into the sub-continent and, by the 6th century AD to have settled all areas of southern Africa except the Western Cape and parts of the Kalahari and Namib deserts. It is from these early agro-pastoralist communities that the bulk of southern Africa's so-called 'Black' or 'Bantu-speaking' populations are believed to be descended. There is also a general presumption that there were, and some would argue still are, a number of biological differences between these two linguistic communities.

What is contested in official and semi-official texts is the subsequent role of these two contrasting groups of linguistic and biological communities. This is rarely done explicitly. Rather, as Motzafi-Haller's paper highlights, it is the very fact that Basarwa are labelled as Botswana's primordial inhabitants that results in their exclusion from discussions of the relative contributions of Botswana's different populations to the creation of the modern nation state. In other words, whatever else constitutes the 'imagined community' (pace Anderson 1983), that is modern day Botswana, this does not at present involve Basarwa except as 'icons of the past' (Taylor 1997a; see also Damm et al. 1997).

There is nothing particularly new about this observation, and it has formed a recurring theme of the so-called Kalahari Debate almost since its inception. As long ago as 1980, for instance, Carmel Schrire argued that:

"Were the San no longer portrayed as a unique example of an evolutionary stage in human development, they would emerge as an African people whose roots, history, and destiny are bound up with those of other Africans" (1980:28).

In much the same vein, the argument that terms such as San, Bushmen or Basarwa are 'class' rather than 'ethnic' categorizations, has been conceived by Ed Wilmsen as an attempt to break free from:

"a fascination with a fixed forager image ... that sets the present of peoples so labelled out of focus and circumscribes any vision of their future" (1988a:47).

As both authors have observed, conventional archaeology, through its preoccupation with origins, has done much to reinforce these cultural stereotypes. So too does the continued use of the labels 'Stone Age' and 'Iron Age', which carry with them a series of overly-simplistic associations of the kind:

- Stone Age = Hunter-Gatherers = Khoisan = Basarwa
- Iron Age = Agro-Pastoralists = Bantu = Tswana

At best, the terms 'Stone Age' and 'Iron Age' are merely chrono-stratigraphic designations which should carry with them no overtones of cultural or ethnic affiliation, and most archaeologists working in the region are well aware of this (e.g. Walker 1995; 1996; Reid et al. 1996). Nevertheless, the very use of these terms does seem to have contributed to an almost complete neglect of so-called LSA sites of the last two thousand, and particularly the last one thousand, years. Yet, it is precisely sites occupied during this period, including ones established during the 19th and early 20th centuries, which have the potential to address the kinds of questions about the extent and intensity of contact, trade and political domination between different socio-economic groups that have formed the focus of the Kalahari Debate (see also Sadr 1997).
Even more importantly, the lack of any systematic studies of sites\(^6\), which potentially could have been occupied by the direct ancestors of today’s Basarwa, makes it virtually impossible to write Basarwa into a history of the formation of the nation state except as marginalised and peripheral communities. As recent research among Bugakwe at Khwai has shown, the very absence of a documented archive of the tangible remains of Basarwa communities for the last one hundred, let alone two thousand, years has denied these communities any kind of officially endorsed ‘presence’ except as modern-day dependents on the State and the tourist industry\(^7\) (Damm \textit{et al.} 1997; see also Taylor 1997b). Moreover, even those items of tangible Basarwa culture from the last one hundred years or so which have been documented, reside, mostly, not in Botswana, but, as Tickey Pule’s research is beginning to show, in various ethnographic museum collections scattered throughout South Africa (pers. comm. T. Pule, October 1997), and most probably, parts of Western Europe.

This is marked contrast to Botswana’s other ethno-linguistic populations, whose collective histories have not only been well documented, but are also amply supplemented by the numerous so-called Late Iron Age (LIA) sites entered in the National Sites and Monuments Register. Although the majority of these sites are concentrated along the eastern hardveld, there are now few parts of the country where LIA sites attributed to ancestors of either Tswana, Kalanga, Bakgalakgadi, Bayei or Hambukushu have not been recorded.

**Land and Belonging**

There is a further problem which needs to be overcome, if Basarwa are to attain some equal status in the collective, national historical imagination. Specifically, one of the most frequently articulated concerns of Botswana’s Basarwa populations in recent years, has been with their diminishing rights over land to which they feel they belong. This concern has been expressed in a variety of local, regional and international fora involving representatives\(^8\) from the Basarwa communities (see, for example, the reported comments of various Basarwa representatives in Maine 1992; Mmegi 1992; Motsokano 1992; Boitumelo 1996; van der Post 1996; Davies 1997). Also, of all the reasons behind meetings and negotiations with government officials and members of parliament it is, perhaps, the one most commonly given coverage by the local and international media (e.g. Dube 1992; Leepile 1992; Mahehe 1992, 1996; Linton 1996; Gaborone 1997; Johnson 1997; Odirile 1997; Oliver 1997). To varying extents, these reports have made it clear that the loss of rights of Basarwa communities over what they perceive as their ancestral lands, has been due to a variety of factors. These include actual physical displacement, exclusion and resettlement, but also less tangible feelings of alienation arising from the presence of non-Basarwa communities and increased proximity to other Basarwa groups (see, for example, the recent Ditshwanelo report on Government of Botswana’s efforts to resettle the community at Xade (1997), and Hughes’s commentary on this (1997)).

Equally, through their frequent identification with the lands they inhabit and the natural resources these provide, different Basarwa communities are now beginning to represent themselves more vocally as

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\(^{6}\) Except, perhaps, for a handful around /Xai /Xai in the north-west (Yellen and Brooks 1988; Wilmsen 1988b).

\(^{7}\) As will probably happen in due course at Xade.

\(^{8}\) These have included Roy Sesana, Aron Johannes, Ducou Caoga, John Hardbattle and Komsa Komsa, among others.
the indigenous inhabitants whose way-of-life in the past was, essentially, one of hunting, gathering and/or fishing. Such self-ascriptions of identity are of critical importance, not least because the notion of self-identification is inherent to most international definitions of the concept of indigeneity, such as that used by the ILO cited above. They also provide points of resistance to the type of external constructs of Basarwa as 'the Other', which have been consistently imposed by the dominant Tswana population, the State and the academic community, albeit in rather different forms.

Interestingly, however, this self-representation as indigenous hunter-gatherers increasingly under threat from outsiders and interference by the State, has arisen at a time when more complex models of Basarwa identities and economic strategies have become the norm within history and anthropology (e.g. Wilmsen 1989; Barnard 1992; Gordon 1992). There is something of a bitter irony here. For, just as the myth of the 'Noble Savage' appeared to have been dispensed with amongst academics, the same image of the past is now being used increasingly as a rhetorical device by Basarwa themselves. Clearly, if this issue is not addressed, and I would suggest this should be done through much more intensive investigation of Basarwa perceptions of their past than has been carried out hitherto, professional archaeologists and historians may soon find their interpretations of the past in conflict with those which have meaning for today's Basarwa populations.

Conclusions

Similar situations have arisen in other parts of the world, leading, often, to quite hostile relationships between archaeologists and indigenous communities (see, for example, Layton 1989a, 1989b). As consequences, archaeologists have often been denied access to certain areas for the purposes of research, and have become embroiled in protracted debates over the treatment of human remains and the restitution of cultural property. To some extent, these experiences have had a beneficial effect on the discipline by encouraging greater consideration be given to the development of archaeological ethics, and more critical awareness of the nature and complexity of historical interpretation.

Recently, there have been signs of increasing rapprochement between archaeologists and indigenous peoples, particularly as more and more of the latter play a more active role in the research and assume greater responsibility for setting research agendas. There are signs that this is also happening in southern Africa, and some of the more successful methods developed elsewhere in the world could be adapted to suit the regional context. Equally, much more basic archaeological fieldwork needs to be done in Botswana before it will be possible to participate in any meaningful debate as to, for example, how long specific Basarwa groups have lived in a particular area, or, whether there was comparable variation between different groups in terms of their settlement patterns, seasonal mobility and degrees of territoriality in the past as has been observed in the twentieth century. At best, mainly through the work of Nick Walker, we can identify three gross regional differences in material culture and rock art traditions,

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9. In this regard, I would caution against extrapolating from the present too far back into the past, for the simple reason that there is now ample environmental evidence that indicates that the Kalahari was, at times much wetter and other times much drier than it is today (for an overview, see Thomas and Shaw 1991). Since certain aspects of the settlement strategies of at least some Basarwa groups appear to have been contingent on the seasonal distribution of water sources, it is therefore conceivable that under different climatic regimes their settlement strategies may have been quite different from the practices observed in the recent past (see Barnard 1992 for a synopsis of these).
which overlap, but do not exactly correspond with, the known spatial variation amongst twentieth century Basarwa populations (Walker 1994, 1995, 1996a, 1996b).

However, despite well intentioned efforts and continuing field investigations, I consider that, thus far, archaeology has failed to provide the various Basarwa groups living in Botswana, and also Botswana's citizenship as a whole, with an adequate indigenous archaeology of and for Basarwa. This is not because archaeology is unable at present to resolve the kinds of arguments that gave rise to the Kalahari Debate, although in an abstract sense this might be desirable. Rather, it is because the discipline has yet to establish the points of correspondence and differences that exist between Basarwa's own perspectives of their past and those which academic archaeologists and historians routinely produce. To put this another way, when Basarwa spokespeople talk of the way of their ancestors and emphasise their loss of rights in terms of their diminished opportunities to pursue and hunting and gathering lifestyle, are they denying centuries of experience as client herders, traders, specialist hunters, and unemployed itinerant wage-labourers, or are they talking about 'a space of time which we cannot measure' \(^{10}\)?

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\(^{10}\) When Professor Rasmus Nyerup used this phrase in his book *Oversyn over foedrelandets mindesmaerker fra old tilden* (1806), he had in mind the difficulty that antiquarians were facing at that time, in placing archaeological remains from different periods into a reliable chronological framework. Archaeological dating techniques have advanced enormously over the ensuing 180 years, but there remains much to be learned about the sociology of time, and in particular how different perceptions of time can affect the way in which a society relates to and utilises its archaeological resources (see Lane 1994, 1996; Damm 1997).


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A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON AN ON-GOING RESEARCH INTO THE RECENT HISTORY OF THE BABUGAKHWE AT KHWAI, EASTERN NGAMILAND, BOTSWANA

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Two reconnaissance visits were made to the research area in 1996: one in July by Dr. Paul Lane and Ms. Maitseo Bolaane and a second in December by the same two researchers plus Drs. A.K. Segobyne and C. Damm. Through these visits the researchers made contact with members of the Khwai community, identified potential informants and resource persons and familiarised themselves with the research area. Preliminary discussions and interviews conducted during these visits enabled the research team to establish the potential of the project and to plan activities for the 1997 fieldwork season. The June/July 1997 field research was therefore geared to explore in some detail the lines of investigation opened up by the reconnaissance visits of 1996. These were:

1. Settlement history of the various communities found in the research area; the nature of historical connections between them and how these may relate to or explain various self-identity perceptions observed among these communities.
2. The origins, establishment and impact of the Moremi Game Reserve and tourist Game Lodges on the communities of the area.
3. The structure of society and the nature of politics in the Khwai community and how these relate to or are reflected in the settlement pattern of the village as well as the different perceptions, within the community, of their history.
4. And, more generally, people's perceptions of the Basarwa and their (place in the) history of Ngamiland in particular and of Botswana in general.

The 1997 fieldwork lasted approximately three weeks, from June 17 to July 6. There were two teams of researchers which worked in close collaboration, one for historical and the other for archaeological investigation.

The historical research team consisted of two staff members - Dr. Kofi Darkwah and Ms. Maitseo Bolaane - and four third year history students. This report covers only the activities and the findings of the history team, the supposition being that the archaeology team will produce a separate report covering its activities and findings.

The focus of the historical investigation was the Basarwa communities of Khwai and Mababe villages, and the Bayei community of Sankoyo village. These three communities are located within a
radius of some 35-40 km from one another. It must be noted that Bukakhwe and Matshega, spoken in Khwai and Mababe, are two of the many Khoisan language groups in Botswana.

To understand what the people say, one has to constantly bear in mind that the area they talk about and claim as their territory is much larger than where they have been confined to over the last thirty odd years; it embraces, in addition to the present settlements, large parts of conservation areas known today as the Moremi Game Reserve and Chobe National Park. Within this large territory there was no restriction to their mobility beyond what was imposed by the terrain and the seasons; therefore constant movement and seasonal migration characterised the life of these communities which are the focus of our research. It is within this context that the concept of ‘Old Khwai’, which keeps coming up, should be understood. Old Khwai refers to all the various early settlement sites within a radius of roughly 60-100 km from the present village of Khwai. Some of these early settlements mentioned are Four Rivers, Karabara, Xaraxasa, Xuku, Kanjii, Khwega, Segagame (the last two named settlements were in an area generally referred to as Sam or Seflesh), Sxegu, Njakamakata and Xwaara.

Similarly the concept of (old) Mababe covers an area larger than the present village of that name. It stretches from where the village is today as far as Xweega and Xanxo (present day Savuti) in the Chobe area, a distance of roughly 100 km. Informants talk about seasonal movement within this general area and remember the names of several old sites such as Sedongo, Sexhiri, Xhodho, Sethungu, etc. In the dry season they would move northward towards Xanxo to areas rich in game and good for hunting and in the rainy season they would move back southward to settle in ecological zones rich in veld products and good for cultivation of crops. For them all this large area was Mababe, their territory. Thus the concepts of old Khwai and old Mababe and what they meant to the people and other role players in the area, such as the managers of the tourist Game Lodges, politicians and bureaucrats in Ngamiland, constitute part of the underlying problem of differing perceptions of the history of the area.

Preliminary Findings

It is evident from the oral data collected that the people of Mababe, who identify themselves as Matshega (Sand Basarwa), are the earliest inhabitants of this large territory under consideration. Both the Babugakhwe (a term of self-designation for this Basarwa group) of Khwai and the Bayei of Sankoyo admit that they found the Matshega of Mababe when they arrived in the area. It is however not clear whether the Matshega are autochthonous to the area or, like the others, moved in from outside the area. This point requires further investigation. There is also mention of another Basarwa group, called Madenisani, who are no longer traceable in the area; it is believed that some of them or their descendants are now found in the Gweta and Diphuduhudu (in Kweneng) areas. This also needs to be investigated further.

Although the people of Mababe village and those of Khwai village are both Basarwa and therefore are in some way related, it is clear that the Matshega of Mababe see their identity as different from that of

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1 See p. 5-7 of Alan Barnard’s paper “Hunter-Gatherer and Bureaucrats: Reconciling Opposing Worldview”, Tromso, 1997; for a discussion of the differing frameworks within which foragers and bureaucrats see specific issues.
the people of Khwai. The latter are Babugakhwe or 'River Basarwa' and their origins and migration into this general area are clearly remembered.

The Babugakhwe

The Babugakhwe of Khwai village are said to have originated from an area west of Seronga which is referred to by some informants as Gudikwa and by others as Kabamkuni. It is not clear whether the names refer to the same place or these are two separate areas.

The reasons given for moving away from Gudikwa/Kabamkuni are two: (a) maltreatment and oppression by their neighbours, the Bakgalagadi, who, as they put it, wanted to enslave the Babugakhwe, and (b) the prevalence in the area of the "tsetse disease" (tripanosomiasis) which caused a heavy death toll among the Babugakhwe.

The dates and sequence of migration as well as the order in which the various sites in old Khwai were settled cannot yet be established with any degree of certainty, but it is clear that the migration involved different families moving in waves over an extended period of time. The attraction of old Khwai was mainly its ecological similarity to the Gudikwa/Kabamkuni area - its riverine terrain and its richness in game as well as in veld products: settlement here would therefore entail very minimal adaptation in their traditional survival strategies.

Prominent among the waves of migrants was the Seriri family, one of whose members, Kwere, was well exposed both within and beyond the area; Kwere Seriri exhibited strong leadership qualities from an early age and was recognised as a leader by the community long before he was officially and formally installed as a Kgosi (chief) of Khwai village when the concept of chiefship developed among the Basarwa of this area. Some later migrating families from Gudikwa went to Khwai because they had heard about the Seriri family already settled there and the attractions of the area. This fact helps to explain the way in which various members of the Khwai community perceive their history. It also explains, in part at least, the power politics and the differential access to power in Khwai village; this situation has the potential to polarise the village.

The Bayei

Unlike the Matshega of Mababe and the Babugakhwe of Khwai, the people of Sankoyo village are not Basarwa but Bayei. From the oral data it appears that the Sankoyo people lived on the southern periphery of the general Khwai/Mababe area. They were cultivators while their Basarwa neighbours were mainly hunters. Oral information from all three communities affirm that there was close interaction between the Bayei of Sankoyo and their Basarwa neighbours. One piece of evidence for this is that some of the settlements in old Khwai, for example, Njakamakata and Kanjii, bear Siyei names. The basis of this interaction was trade; the Bayei traded grains, which they cultivated, for meat and other animal products from the Matshega and the Babugakhwe. There is also mention of Basarwa families taking refuge in Sankoyo in the past in an attempt to flee the ravages of tripanosomiasis which continued to wreak havoc on the people even in Old Khwai. Not surprising, these interactions gave rise to cultural borrowing as well as to miscegenation which has continued into the present.

Another aspect of the history of the area which was researched in the 1997 fieldwork was the establishment of the Moremi Game Reserve and its impact on the Khwai/Mababe peoples.
The archival material on the development of modern conservation and anti-poaching policies in colonial Botswana is yet to be consulted but from the oral interviews conducted in the field it would appear that this is traceable to at least the 1950s. From these interviews the sequence and details of steps taken towards the establishment of the Moremi Game Reserve are far from clear. Further interviews with a number of individuals who are fortunately still alive and resident in Maun need to be conducted urgently to establish these details and clarify the role of individuals whose names came up in the June/July interviews. These include Robert Kay, Jack Ramsden, Peter Smith and Isaac Tudor.

**Impact of Conservation Measures**

The impact of the conservation measures on the local people is fairly clear from the oral data. It is also clear that the impact has not been uniform on all the three communities; it has been most severe and negative on the Khwai people, less so on the Matshega of Mababe and rather minimal and, in some sense, even somewhat positive on the Bayei of Sankoyo. To the Basarwa of both Khwai and Mababe, the development of conservation policies brought severe restrictions on their traditional mode of life. In the first place, the area which they considered their territory was declared a wildlife management area. The effect of this was that not only were they relocated (forcefully and more than once in the case of the Babugakhwe) but also they could no longer move freely or settle freely wherever they wanted as their circumstances and the seasons dictated; they could not hunt whatever animal they chose as they had been used to and now had to have a special licence to hunt only specified animals over a given period of the year (May to end of July); and they were prohibited by law from even collecting the veld products on which they had subsisted in the past. In view of the fact that wildlife is destructive of crops what little agriculture they had practised was now brought effectively to an end. Clearly their very existence as a people and a community was under threat; the choice was between relocating away from the general area altogether (which they adamantly refuse to do on the grounds that the area is their territory) and developing new survival strategies in order to be able to stay on in the area which they regard as their territory. They have chosen to stay on but the new strategies open to them are few and extremely limited in scope. The result is that the Basarwa communities in this area are in dire straights, a fact which has created bitterness and resentment towards the government.

In contrast to the plight of the Basarwa, the Bayei of Sankoyo have had new opportunities opened to them with the implementation of the conservation measures. They are the ones who get employed in various capacities not only in the Wildlife Department but also in the tourist Game Lodges which have been established within the area. The official explanation for this is that the Basarwa cannot speak English and have no skills to make them employable in these sectors.

**Settlement and Historical Perception**

Mention has been made of the pattern of migration from Gudikwa/Kabamkuni region to old Khwai. This pattern is more or less reflected in that of settlement in Khwai village; the earliest families to arrive see themselves as 'owners' of the territory and live in the central parts of what is loosely referred to as Khwai

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2This ties up with Fig. 2 in Barnard, (1997:5). It should also be mentioned that a few of the Khwai people have relocated to Maun and its environs, where there is now a Babukakhwe ward.
I, i.e., west of the main road passing through the village of Khwai. The Seriri family is probably the most prominent of this group. With them in this part of the village are some of the later arrivals. They perceive the history of Khwai as more or less a continuation of the history of their original homeland and emphasise the migratory/settlement story and their 'leadership' role in it.

To the east of the main road which divides the village into Khwai I and II live many of the later arrivals among whom are a number of individuals (at the time of our fieldwork) who consider themselves as 'enlightened' by virtue of having travelled and worked for varying lengths of time outside the old Khwai territory. As a group they are shrewd and vociferous, and articulate a different perception of the history of the village which concentrates only on the post-migration events and developments. In a way their perception of the local history may be said to have a political function in the sense that it enables them to portray old Khwai as the only homeland the community ever had and the only territory the Babugakhwe have ever 'owned'.

Such a portrayal of the history appears to have been crafted to counteract the view articulated by some of the role players in the conservationist and tourist industry that the Babugakhwe came to the area only recently, attracted by the opportunities that the industry offered. The history therefore becomes a weapon for opposing the 'unjust and inhuman' treatment inflicted on the community by the conservationists.

In fairness to all concerned, it must be pointed out that the oral interviews show clearly that members of the Khwai community, irrespective of their perception of the local history, are all fully aware of the negative implications of the conservation measures for their community. It may be that various individuals or groups of individuals articulate this awareness with varying degrees of intensity and emotion, but that is not to say that anyone is ignorant of the measures and their impact on the community.

Social Structure and Kin-relations

Interviewing various individuals within Khwai village, however, one gets a feeling of a subtle desire, even struggle, for recognition, power and dominance on the part of the self-styled enlightened group in the community, and this struggle would appear to an outsider as a potential source of conflict and division in the village.

Yet at another level there is a manifest sense and feeling of togetherness, even unity, within and among members of the community. This is evident from the social structure and kin relationships that exist in the village. The instrument for this unity is marriage; there is a complex web of intermarriage between and among families, the net effect of which is that many, if not most, families are related to each another through marriage. It is entirely possible that this web of relationships has a mitigating effect on the rifts, strains and stresses in the community engendered, among other things, by the different perceptions of the history of Khwai. In this connection mention may be made of an observation made by our research team. On a number of issues of common interest to the community discussed at public fora, it was observed that some wives sided openly with the 'other side' against their husbands while sisters sided with the 'other side' against their brothers if the issues and decisions arrived at were seen by these 'defectors' to be in the best interest of the community as a whole.
Common Perceptions of the Basarwa

At a more general level, the research provides interesting data which will contribute to, and reinforce, the revisions by recent researchers of the misconceptions and misrepresentations of the Basarwa society and culture in the minds of the general public. In Botswana, the common perception and attitude of the general public, especially the dominant groups, to the Basarwa is condescending and patronising. Beyond conceding that the Basarwa are the earliest inhabitants of the country, everything else about them is perceived in terms of stereotypes: a hunting and gathering people with no knowledge of agriculture or herding or craft manufacture; uncivilised, lazy, unproductive and naive, lacking social structure and political organisation. Also the perception is almost universal that all groups of Basarwa subsisted entirely on hunting and gathering,\(^3\) and their history has been seen as static and unchanging.\(^4\)

The oral data from Khwai provides information on Basarwa social structure, traditional medical and educational 'systems', internal politics, craft manufacture, etc., and suggest clearly that the popular conception of the Basarwa in Botswana requires another look. In terms of social structure, for example, a distinct picture emerges of a fairly well structured family life in which the elders took pains to instruct and socialise the young in the values and identity of the community, the advantages and problems of their environment and the strategies needed to survive in it. How far back in time all this goes is yet to be established\(^5\) but even if it should turn out to be adaptation in response to interaction with other cultural groups in Botswana, it would portray the Basarwa as a people whose culture and history are far from static.

Second, it does not appear to be generally known that not all Basarwa subsisted entirely on hunting game and collecting veld products for food. The people of Khwai are part of a larger group known as 'River Basarwa' who lived along the Okavango delta and who depended as much on products from the river as they did on veld products. Thus the culture and the economy of this group of Basarwa were, in large measure, shaped by their riverine environment.\(^6\) This fact deserves to be better and more widely known. These are only a few examples of a range of issues about the Basarwa which require further research in the interest of truth and accuracy of representation.

Plans for Future Research

In the immediate future, more precisely, before the end of December 1997, there is an urgent need to visit Maun to interview those individuals known to have been connected with or involved, in one way or another, in the development and implementation of conservationist policies. In the longer term, a trip to the

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\(^3\) Archaeological evidence from the Okavango area suggests that the San communities owned and controlled small stock in times before the arrival of the Bantu communities. See E.M. Wilmsen (1989).

\(^4\) These views derive not just from local ethnic prejudices and domination but they are also found in anthropological and other studies on the Basarwa done before the 1980s. Although recent scholarship has attempted to revise some of these views, the knowledge that Botswana students and the general public have of the Basarwa is steeped in these misrepresentations.

\(^5\) Since the 1980s a number of researchers, including R.K. Hitchcock and E.M. Wilmsen, have pointed to elements and processes of change in the history and culture of the Basarwa, but these are traced back only as far as the 2nd half of the 19th century.

\(^6\) For example, lediba (pool) is the most common word for identifying places in the research area by the local people.
Seronga/Beetsha area to collect data from Gudikwa to cross-check the information obtained from Khwai will be a priority. Equally important will be further but more focused interviews in the Khwai/Mababe and Maun areas to fill in the gaps in the data collected during the 1997 fieldwork season.

A few reflections on the field interviews may be in order here. Interviews were conducted in two Basarwa settlements, Khwai and Mababe, and a Bayei settlement, Sankoyo. There was an extensive range of individual responses from the Babugakhwe of Khwai. Interviews were conducted across gender lines and focused mainly on the elders of the settlements. It was widely recognised that different communities hold different views about the past, which stem in part from differences in their concepts of space, time and humanity, as Gell (1992) has observed.

Although the Basarwa community is generally suspicious of academic researchers, we believe we were able to strike a rapport and cordial relationship with people, to the extent that by the time we were leaving the camping site to return to Gaborone, they were wondering whether we were coming back. Although the interviews and transcription were done by the researchers, cultural assistants were identified amongst the local communities. They assisted the researchers by accompanying them as they moved around the area of research and serving as interpreters where necessary. Examples of such useful cultural assistants are Brown, K.B. Kwere and Dice. Many people in Khwai have shown interest in our work and are looking forward to a finished product - a document of their history. They are even hoping that one day there will be a radio programme where they would hear their voices relating their own history.

The field research was a learning experience for our four student research assistants. All of them showed a positive attitude towards conducting interviews and the subsequent transcription. What was even more important was that it was a learning experience not only in terms of being out in the Okavango Delta area but in being among a Basarwa community which is more like a moving library. We are hoping that when these students complete their first degree at UB, they will consider taking up some of the questions that are still puzzling their minds about the Basarwa communities.

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THE POLITICS OF BEING BASARWA: IDENTITY, ENTITLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT AMONG BUGAKHWE, TSEGA AND //ANEKHWEE IN EASTERN NGAMILAND. THOUGHTS AFTER PRELIMINARY FIELDWORK

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Introduction

As we set out to cut grass a few weeks ago from our temporary camp on an island 35 km west of Khwai, Joe was reminiscing about a particularly long taped interview he had done with me over the previous two evenings. "I wish that tape could be played on Radio Botswana," he expressed, "so that people can understand why we Basarwa are different." These are questions I have kept asking myself as I have tried to learn about the lives of Basarwa I have been staying with on the northern and eastern fringes of the Okavango Delta: How are Basarwa in this region "different" today? How do they see themselves as part of the wider society in which they live? How do their neighbours see them? How is their experience in this society conditioned by carrying the label "Mosarwa", especially in access to land and entitlement to "development"? In designing their own development initiatives, how are their strategies and aims unique in the light of these factors?

These are, of course, questions that to get an adequate grasp on require much more than the short time that I have so far spent in the field. What follows is a collection of preliminary thoughts and open-ended questions that have arisen so far. The thread that binds these thoughts is the changing configurations of power, control and entitlement in the specific historical and contemporary experience of eastern Ngamiland.

Context

The Basarwa who live along the northern and eastern fringes of the Delta belong predominantly to three categories: Bugakhwe, Tsega, and //Anekhwe. They speak mutually intelligible dialects, all belonging linguistically to the 'northern' subdivision of Khoi, or Central Khoesan languages. Bugakhwe are centred around Khwai and Godikwa, although they extend beyond Mohembo and into the Caprivi Strip. Tsega are centred at Mababe, and the largest concentration of //Anekhwe are at Xaxaba, although most villages in the region seem to have some //Anekwe residents. A significant number of people with each of these labels also live in Maun, the regional capital. All of these groups, particularly //Anekhwe, have intermarried extensively with Bayei, and so often do not physiologically look stereotypically Basarwa.
The northern and eastern parts of Ngamiland are noted for their abundant wildlife. Most Basarwa who live in these areas have found themselves in areas now proclaimed Community Controlled Hunting Areas (CCHAs). This has been part of a strategy by the government to divide up the region into such areas, and then give villages who fall within these areas the opportunity to manage the resources within their particular area, particularly wildlife. Of the approximately ten CCHAs in northern Botswana, the only two that have so far been hesitant to follow the government's programme for 'community control' have been the two that belong to Basarwa villages; Khwai (NG18) and Mababe (NG40). I believe this is significant, pointing to the meanings associated with control of land and wildlife by Basarwa. An understanding of this in the present must be rooted in an understanding of political power and control in the region historically, and the continuum between such processes in the past and today. I will examine these first, as related by informants in the region, without recourse to library or archival material. I then move on to an exploration of identity and relations with Basarwa and non-Basarwa 'others', and finally to conflict. Most of the paper will be with reference to Khwai, where I have done the largest proportion of my fieldwork.

**Political power and control in eastern Ngamiland**

No one I have spoken to, whatever their ethnic affiliation, has denied that Basarwa were the first in the land, or - as it is commonly expressed - were created by God first. Basarwa lived in bands composed of extended families, that moved around following the abundance of animals, veld foods, etc. Those whose lives were associated with the sandveld (mostly Tsega) congregated in a large village in summer, and disaggregated by family to waterholes in the winter, when there was not enough water to sustain a large village. The 'Basarwa ba noka' who lived around the rivers and islands of the swamps (//=Anekhwe and many Bugakhwe) did not follow such a defined annual cycle, as they were unregulated by water shortages. While each band had a clearly defined area, land was abundant enough that there does not seem to have been a strict sense of territoriality. A band 'owned' an area and the resources in it for as long as they used it regularly, but once they moved elsewhere for an extended period of time, it was free for anyone who wanted to move in to it.

There is general agreement that Bayei "came out with their hand on our shoulders", as one old Bugakhwe woman explained to me. Later came Batawana, Hambukushu, Bakgalagadi, whites, and the various other people that live there today. Basarwa and Bayei enjoyed a close and mutually profitable relationship; "Basarwa and Bayei stayed together, knowing if they didn't have each other they wouldn't live well." Crops were traded from Bayei in return for animal products. While there are some Bayei who have told me of Basarwa being as fierce animals in the past that would kill any intruder on their land, most speak of their relationship in terms of an egalitarian friendship. If there was any hierarchy in the relationship, it was probably in favour of Basarwa, who are referred in the historical sense as 'uncles' by Bayei. Many Bayei spent the winter months of the year living in close proximity with Basarwa, hunting and gathering veld foods together.

Bayei and Hambukushu who migrated into the area are said to have recognised the prior ownership of the land by Basarwa, from whom they received permission to settle and use resources such as animals. As Basarwa began intermarrying with the incomers, some of them took up agriculture to some extent, which restricted their mobility in the rainy season.
The prior rights of Basarwa were not recognised, however, by the more politically centralised and powerful Bakgalagadi and Batawana, who formed the next wave of immigration into the area. Bakgalagadi are remembered for the brutal manner in which they coerced Basarwa labour and kidnapped women and children. This was not met without resistance. Those Basarwa bands that were more sedentary and larger were sometimes able to fight off Bakgalagadi (which probably also explains why Bayei were not enslaved or made clients to the same degree). Another option was to move, which is the reason most of those that live around Khwai today left the Kabamukuni region several generations ago and migrated eastwards, beyond the reach of the Bakgalagadi.

The Batawana were to prove a political power more pervasive than the Bakgalagadi, although their presence was not always so immediately felt by Bugakhwe as it was by Basarwa elsewhere in Ngamiland. "They did oppress us, but it was from afar, so we didn't feel it," was the opinion of one Bugakhwe woman. Before the 1920s, Batawana presence in the area west of Khwai was largely through hunting parties in search of ivory. It was Basarwa that acted as guides for these expeditions, as they knew the land best. Specific individuals, such as Seriri, father of the late chief of Khwai, also acted as guides for tours of the region by the Batawana chieftaincy. These tours are remembered by Basarwa as having been done "to know their land, and make us know who our chiefs were." The Batawana chieftaincy asserted their presence more strongly in the 1920s by building a kraal at Khwai, about 10 km west of the present village of Khwai.

The ascendancy of Batawana control in northern Ngamiland coincided with the increased presence of the colonial government. From both of these entities came what is referred to as molau or law. Molau, as explained by Basarwa, means 'control'. But it was an ambiguous control. On the one hand it prevented the kidnapping, enslavement and clientship that characterised some early relationships with Bakgalagadi and to an extent Batawana. On the other hand, the implementation of molau began to usurp Basarwa ownership of what had always been under their control, most noticeably wildlife.

Molau also defined proper human conduct, and thus in a sense made Basarwa nonhuman. Explicitly and implicitly it permeated people's minds. It defined what was 'civilised' and what was 'savage'. Basarwa culture fell on the wrong side of this line, and they knew it. "It was molau that made us stop living separately in the bush and come together in villages, so as to be seen as proper people." "We were sleeping when Batawana came into this land," explained an elderly Khwai resident, "So they took it to put it to use", betraying the sense that Basarwa land-use was inferior to that of the newcomers.

The triumph of molau over the people of Khwai was the creation of Moremi Game Reserve in 1963, resulting in the residents of Khwai being moved several times until they eventually reached their present position, and losing access to all resources inside the reserve. As his father had done for the Batawana chieftaincy, Kwere was instrumental in showing the creators of the Reserve the area, and in assisting them to set it up. He also acted as a guide for white safari hunters, whose numbers in the Khwai region started increasing from the 1950s. The independent government of Botswana has continued this process by placing more severe limits on hunting, and most recently by cutting up the land into CCHAs, many of which have been leased to white operators, generating a large amount of money for the government. For Khwai, this culminated in government plans in the early 1990s to once again remove it from a 'wildlife area'.

Power and control therefore became something in the hands of the Batawana chieftaincy, the colonial and post-independent governments, or white tour operators. When referred to in the precolonial era,
control often has positive connotations. It operated internally among Basarwa, for instance between elder men and younger men in the restriction of alcohol consumption. Today, however, it is something external, in the hands of government and exerted against Basarwa. Ironically, Basarwa have been intimately involved in the process of losing control. As Baka 'pygmies' in Cameroon have helped destroy their own environment by assisting logging companies to find the best trees, so Bugakhwe have 'shown the land' to those that ultimately wrested its control from them.

In light of this, the present initiative by the government to return a degree of custodianship of the land and the natural resources to the people who live amongst them is a significant one for Basarwa. Why is it, then, that the only villages in the region to have not yet taken up this option are Khwai and Mababe? I think this is not indicative of a lack of desire to regain a measure of control of these resources, but rather a profound distrust of the government, which in various guises has for so long eaten away at Basarwa control of what they have seen as their own.

Consultants introducing the new dispensation in kgotla meetings in 1993 were told comments in Khwai, Godikwa and Mababe such as:

The government is involved in an intentional programme of genocide against Basarwa. All over the country Basarwa have never been treated as people. Our government discriminates. Basarwa are not taken as Batswana just as the rich are not taken the same way as the poor. For too long we have received promises by the government, but nothing concrete has been done.

The primary fear is that the government still wants to take their land, and because they are Basarwa, will do it with impunity. Unlike Khwai, Mababe has never been moved, but it has lost most of the land it used in the past to Chobe National Park. In preparing to form a Community Trust that will allow management of their area to be passed over to Khwai, the Khwai Interim Management Committee (KIMC) has been formed. Its members were voted in by the village, and it operates in parallel with the pre-existent Village Development Committee. While it has several functions, its purpose is usually distilled to that of securing their land, especially NG19, on which the village is situated, but which the government initially wanted to tender to the three lodges currently operating in it. In a similar vein, Mababe refused to discuss the new dispensation with consultants on visits in 1994, until they had received from the Batawana paramount chief a reply to a letter they had sent him that began, "We the people of Mababe are waiting to be given back our land..."

Identity

In speaking of what defines themselves as Basarwa, people I have spoken to often draw on primordialist images, even though speaking of the present. While ethnicity is visibly dynamic, it is spoken of in terms that are static and unchanging. As such, these images seem to speak more of values and ideology than actual lived experience. They are usually centred around Basarwa as being people of the bush rather than of villages and towns.

Wild animals are spoken of in metaphors drawn from the stockholders against whom the Basarwa contrast themselves. "We are one with the lions" is a comment heard not only in Khwai, but from Basarwa in other areas of Botswana as well. "Lions are our dogs, buffalo our cows, and impala our goats," I was told several times. In a discussion I listened in on, concerning the food value of some of the more unusual small mammals, MmaMuatudi jokingly referred to herself as a "marginal Mosarwa" when she did not
know about many of them. A dichotomy is also made between a Basarwa life of hunting and an economy driven by money that sekgoa (the way of living of white people) has brought in. This is evident in the way Joe related aspects of his life:

I took my wife and had my first child while I was working at Khwai River Lodge. At this time I was living a life of sekgoa - of money - and had left the sesarwa life. I was different. I was working and had left behind our life of hunting... I had eight children, all of whom I brought up in sekgoa only. I brought them up on money, not fruit... Today everything is done with money.

Comments like this one speak of separateness of the discrete worlds of Sesarwa hunting and living off the veld, versus that which has come in with the pastoral economy of the Batawana and cash economy of sekgoa. The reality of lived experience is not so starkly discrete. Most Basarwa in Khwai partake successfully and concurrently in both a cash economy and a measure of hunting and gathering, and doing so does not make them feel any less Basarwa. Yet it is hunting and gathering that provides the difference with neighbours, and thus the identity as Basarwa. This was expressed by Joe as he spoke of his desires for the use of their land:

Hunting [in NG18] should be for Basarwa. It is our culture, and we don't want our children discarded by progress. We want to teach them as we ourselves were taught by our parents. And they too will teach their children about the same things. If we take all these things and give them to white people, we will be left as Batswana, and Bosarwa ['Bushmanness'] will be finished. I don't want to call myself a Motswana when I am a Mosarwa. That is my origins. [My father] Sango, was born a Mosarwa, and remained one until he died. My mother was a Mosarwa. That is it. (emphasis added).

Participation in a cash economy has not been difficult for many Basarwa in the region. They have been able to earn money and goods in the past by assisting hunting parties, selling ivory themselves, working in the mines, and more recently by working in the many lodges in the region. However, it is the defining aspect of their lives that they have had to struggle against those with political power to be able to continue. As we camped out on an island where we were cutting grass, Joe commented that the Botswana Defence Force had "tried to stop us living in the bush, but the bush is our town. It is where we find everything."

The annual grass cutting is an activity that seems to me to meet successfully the needs of both spheres of life - that of money, and that of 'sesarwa' - which would explain its popularity. I heard it spoken of with much anticipation in the months leading up to the opening of the season. Much of the village relocates lock, stock and barrel westwards to scattered camps on the periphery of the swamps for several weeks in the late winter, cutting thatching grass to sell in Khwai and Maun. It is thus an important income-earner, but it also provides an opportunity to live in the bush and enjoy its fruits for a while. Not every day is spent cutting; some are spent relaxing, or in search of food such as fish, tswii, honey, birds, or predators' kills.

For the residents of Khwai and Mababe, continued access to these resources has been of utmost importance in deciding how to manage their areas. While all of the other eight CCHAs in northern Botswana have followed the government's recommendation to lease it out to a commercial tour operator, Khwai and Mababe have refused to do so in their respective areas. The main reason expressed for this is the fear of losing control of these resources.
Even though living off the fruits of the land seems to form such an important ideological element of identity, as argued above, the lived experiences of Basarwa are not so clear cut. Moreover, those whose lifestyles are actually similar to the ideal type used as a marker of identity are frowned upon. MmaKanjiye and her family were described to me several times in Khwai as "the last Basarwa" because of their alleged inability to spend long periods in the village, and preference for living out in the bush. Yet because of this, they are subjects of suspicion, even fear. One woman in Khwai, who started to become friendly with MmaKanjiye was warned by a friend not to "follow her too closely, as she may turn into a lion, or ride you [as a witch]." Another man criticised her for "putting bosarwa forwards, as a goal. It is not right, because it is a hard life". Perhaps these are attitudes picked up from dominant suspicions of bosarwa, which can be something wild and sinister, because of its close association with nature.

Non-Basarwa stereotypes of Basarwa

The close association of Basarwa with nature also carries implications for the way bosarwa is viewed by non-Basarwa. Apart from the lack of 'proper' humanity it implies, the closeness to nature also implies a power perhaps beyond that of 'normal' people. The fear that this instilled probably gave a measure of respect to Basarwa by non-Basarwa in the distant past. The romantic and dehumanising notion of Basarwa being part of nature is reflected in the attitudes of many whites who have dealings with Khwai. A recent television documentary on three indigenous 'communities' in southern Africa chose as one of its exemplars the Bugakhwe of Khwai. Despite being sensitive to many of the issues involved, their proposal described "the river Bushmen as natural [emphasis added] hunters and fishermen..." Displaying a similar stereotype, a South African tour operator submitted a proposal in May this year to KIMC to market tourism in the area:

The idea is to market a package where foreign guests can spend time with local people and learn their culture and traditions. The idea is to let the foreign guests become "family friends" of a real River Bushmen family. Live like they live, in complete harmony with nature during their stay.

With a wider world that carries romantic images of wild 'Bushmen' - or the even greater mystique of the elusive 'River Bushmen' - ethnic stereotypes of Basarwa can be financially rewarding, rather than disabling, as they have been in a local context. "Khwai has been marketed for 30 years for its wildlife," KB, secretary of KIMC, explained to me, "We now want to let tourists know there are people here." More than making the point that development in the region up to now has been wildlife, rather than people-centred, KB also talks about marketing their ethnicity. One of the first visible results of the KIMC has been the formation of a 'cultural group'. With the intent of raising money for the village, it produced an advertisement for circulation at the nearby lodges. It is headed, "Khwai cultural group provide a unique dancing/singing of the River Bushmen," and invited guests to "come and enjoy the different African style". While the potential exists, it seems as yet to have been hardly exploited.

Conversely, the argument that the people of Khwai are not "real" Basarwa has been used by lodges in the region as a means of arguing they do not have real entitlement to the area. In fact much of the advertising literature for lodges in the region makes no mention of the Bugakhwe who live there. Most of the tour operators, as the government, have regarded people in the area as inimical to the wildlife.
Power and control among Basarwa

An analysis of how Basarwa in eastern Ngamiland have lost - and are attempting to regain - control of resources they consider essential is incomplete without an examination of the development of hierarchy, power and conflict among Basarwa themselves, and the effect that this has on development initiatives.

It is commonly agreed that chieftainship was an institution that arrived in eastern Ngamiland with the Batawana. While it appears that Basarwa had no leaders that united them beyond the level of the band, there were individual men that, through showing the qualities of leadership, commanded respect and earned a following. Such men were not regarded strictly as chiefs, but were referred to as 'fathers' (translated as nate). One such man was Sango, Joe's father and Kwere's uncle. He was the first of the ancestors of Khwai to own a gun, which he bought in about the 1920s from selling elephant tusks to Bayei intermediaries. He was the nate of a relatively large group of Bugakhwe who were attracted partly by his ability to resist servitude - at times violently. His position entitled him to receive a share of the animals that young men in his settlement hunted, so a measure of hierarchy in this form did exist.

The first Bugakhwe to be called 'chief' by those presently at Khwai was Kwere, who was born in about 1926, and died in 1996. He built a following from the dispersed - though related - bands and small villages in the region, attracted by his leadership abilities and "care for people." Nonetheless, this popularity was not enough to make him a 'chief'. This authority had to come from interaction with those that themselves carried political and economic power. As his father Seriri had done, Kwere hunted and acted as a guide for members of the Batawana royal family. They were not forced to do this, and were paid in kind with items such as clothes and blankets. When white hunters began exploiting the rich wildlife in the Khwai region in the 1950s, Kwere often acted as a guide. In the preparations for Moremi Game Reserve, which was declared in 1963, Kwere was involved in helping to survey the land, mark boundaries and build roads. Negotiations for the removal of the village were done through him. Through these interactions, the authority that Kwere had earned from people that chose to follow him was legitimated in the wider power structures under which Basarwa lived. Kwere thus came to be regarded as a chief, and Khwai became more established as a village.

When Kwere died in November 1997, the vacuum that he left was de facto filled by two of his nieces, MmaLebonang and MmaKelereng, who are also sisters. The reason they assumed this position was explained as due to "their ability to speak out in public." While they are undeniably the main power brokers in Khwai, neither are officially recognised as holding a position of chieftaincy. They also derive a measure of power from their membership of KIMC, to which they were voted. Their status, unlike that of Kwere, is not so much due to public support as their own machinations. Many residents of Khwai are unhappy with the unofficial role of chieftainship they play in the village.

The VDC, which has existed for a number of years, is an elected body largely made up of elder members of the village, including MmaLebonag who used to be its chairlady. On the other hand, the more recently-elected KIMC is made up of younger and literate members of the village. Its chairperson and secretary, and most influential members, are two nephews of the sisters, KB and Brown, both in their early twenties. Both are relatively educated and have had extensive contact with white tour operators, and are thus both eloquent and confident in English. Because of their literacy and understanding of the world of sekgoa that KIMC was formed to engage against, KB and Brown have been given this prominent role, and - together with the sisters - form a 'quartet' of power in village politics.
Despite these formal and not-so-formal leadership structures in Khwai, external leadership has proved essential in the struggle to secure control of the land that they live on. This has arrived primarily in the form of Dr Gaborone, an activist from the University of Botswana. Members of the VDC first met him in the early 1990s at a workshop he organised in Maun involving Basarwa from throughout Ngamiland - the first time they had been brought together in such an event. This was soon after a government representative had held a kgotla meeting in Khwai to explain they should choose a new location for the village because Khwai was a 'wildlife' area. The VDC decided to invite Gaborone to assist them in sending a delegation to petition the Minister of Local Government and Lands in Gaborone, which he did. The end result of this was that the threat of removal subsided. The key role that Gaborone played in helping the residents of Khwai retain an element of control over their land is described by Joe:

If Gaborone had not come to Khwai, our village would have been destroyed a long time ago, because the government came with a plan that we would not have been able to counter. All we could do was to go to Maun, but we had no means of going beyond to Gaborone and meeting with ministers like Mokgothu. We recognised this, that if Gaborone was with us he could open the door to where all these things are done. I have never heard of other Basarwa that took their grievances to the Minister. They don't know how to go about it - how do you get in, how do you speak, how do you start, what do you come with, that we are able to speak with such a person. There are a lot of Basarwa who are oppressed, but they do not know whom they can speak to.

Joe also drew parallels between Gaborone and John Hardbattle, in being outspoken about land rights for Basarwa. From the viewpoint of many of the residents of Khwai, therefore, external leadership by those with access to the offices of power is essential for the struggle to maintain access to land. However, leadership and the changes that have come with attempts to form and implement a strategy for development have also accentuated conflict in the village.

Conflict

With respect to leadership, some of the elder residents are unhappy with the responsibility in village affairs given to young members of the village, primarily KB and Brown. There seems to be some resentment that this is given to 'boys' only because they have education. Perhaps this is a frustration with the wider system, that demands education in order to participate in formal political processes. In a recent abortive attempt to find a chief for the village, Amos - one of the oldest and most respected men of the village - turned down requests for him to become chief. "I don't know how to read and write," he explained, "What will I do if I am sent to attend a meeting, and they expect me to take notes?" There is a unanimous desire in Khwai for a chief to be put into place. As noted by one resident, "How can we stop the government without a chief?"

Yet with a relatively strong egalitarian ethic, there is at the same time unhappiness that one person from the village would be given such a formal position of authority over his fellows (and it would be a man). Rumours abound that Kwere was killed by witchcraft, as was John - a young resident of Khwai who was going to stand as councillor for Khwai-Mababe-Sankuyu - but who died several weeks before the election was held. For this reason as well, it may be easier to trust in an external leader, such as Gaborone.

Conflict has also arisen with recent infusions of money into the village. With Gaborone's assistance, P 82,000 was secured from GEF, and about P 18,000 from Kelloggs Foundation, both given to KIMC on behalf of the village as a whole. Decisions concerning how to spend this money has lain with the committee members to whom it has been entrusted, as well as with Gaborone. The reality is that very few people in
the village know how the money is being spent, and so suspicions and accusations of mismanagement are commonly expressed. While communal projects suffer in this manner, individual ones hardly fare better. Joe, one of the most enterprising people in the village, received a grant of about P 10,000 from the Remote Area Development Office to start a poultry project in Khwai, which he did. Once this project started failing from a lack of recurrent capital (and again, accusations of witchcraft having made the chickens sick and die), he received two donations from an American tourist that visits the Khwai region annually, each of over P 1,000, for the revitalisation of his project. He was accused by other residents of Khwai of using money given to the village as a whole for personal profit, and ousted from KIMC. "Such large amounts of money cannot be given to one person alone," was a comment I heard several times. None of the four small vending shops in Khwai are owned by residents of Khwai, and the single Khwai person who owns one chose to do so in Mababe. There are thus strong sanctions against individual enterprise by members of the village, although it is tolerated by outsiders.

The inflow of resources into Khwai seems to have tightened the boundaries of 'us' and 'them' for those in positions of power, thus restricting entitlement to these resources. Those that have fallen into the main 'them' category are most of the residents of the half of the village nicknamed 'Khwai II' (as opposed to 'Khwai III' which is the seat of the four power brokers). While II and III are related to each other and have a common history, those that live in II are mostly the descendants of those who aligned themselves with Sango in the past, while III were closer to Seriri. They thus had a slightly different (though overlapping) pattern of settlement in the decades prior to settling at Khwai in the early 1960s. MmaLebonang refers to them as 'visitors', partly because some of them were originally from the region of Godikwa before they came to Khwai. She has tried to remove several members voted into KIMC, saying they are from Godikwa, so they cannot represent Khwai.

While the divisions may have become more pronounced with the inflow of money, conflict and division are said to have been omnipresent in Bugakhwe society. Amos explained to me that Bugakhwe settlements were rarely large, because they would have trouble getting on. When I enquired how conflict was resolved in the past, Joe filled me in on the solution: "We would all have a big fight, a few people would die, and the next morning the problem would be finished." While there may have been some measure of violence, it is most likely that the fluidity of bands/settlements allowed conflict to be dissipated before it reached such proportions.

**Conclusion**

At this stage, there is no conclusion. I have dipped into processes of power, control, ethnicity, entitlement, conflict, and development as they are displayed in eastern Ngamiland, especially Khwai. The next stage of my research is to try to dig deeper into these issues, both in Khwai, and in neighbouring villages to get a comparative perspective.
Abstract

This paper is an attempt to explain reasons why hunter-gatherers and former hunter-gatherers may misunderstand the intentions of bureaucrats with whom they have dealings. It is equally an attempt to understand why bureaucrats may misunderstand hunter-gatherers. The paper draws on a methodology devised by anthropologists to understand cultural differences in the 1940s, but couples this with a recognition of cultural complexity and power relations indicative of much of anthropological theory in the 1980s and 1990s. The resulting hybrid analytical framework should be widely applicable, especially to situations such as those emerging in Botswana where increased interaction between bureaucrats and Basarwa threaten to multiply misunderstandings to the detriment of Basarwa populations.

The paper deals with five broad areas: land, society (including aspects of kinship), economy, politics, and identity. The focus is on the Basarwa populations of Botswana and those who deal with them, but the paper also touches on comparative material drawn from studies in other parts of the world.

Let me say from the outset that I have done fieldwork among recent and part-time hunter-gatherers, mainly in Botswana but in recent years in Namibia too. I have not explicitly set out to do fieldwork among bureaucrats, though I have encountered them at various times in my relations with former and part-time foraging groups. Most of my intensive field experience was long ago, in the 1970s and early 1980s, with only short-term and less intensive encounters in recent years. But my purpose here is not to provide fresh data. Rather, what I want to do is present an overview of potential problems and possible solutions. In my view, this is best done through a wide comparative framework and a theoretical understanding based on multiple emic perspectives. In this case, I shall set aside my more specific interests in regional comparison (e.g., Barnard 1992; 1996) to assess the problem of large-scale differences in worldview.

In order to understand why bureaucrats and foragers do not see eye to eye, we need to know about the framework within which each sees the other, and then we need to compare these frameworks. This paper touches, in turn, on five very broad areas: (1) land, (2) society (including kinship), (3) economy, (4) politics, and (5) identity, as these are interpreted by bureaucrats and by foraging, part-time foraging, and former foraging populations. The focus is on Botswana, but the issues raised, and some of my examples, go well beyond Botswana's borders.

Before setting out on these topics, let me introduce the problem with a theoretical interlude on 'national character'. My thesis is that the same broad, structural understanding employed by proponents of such studies, especially in the 1940s, may be applicable to our problem today.
National character and cultural difference

Take the case of American soldiers stationed in Britain during the Second World War, and the young British women they sought to entice. The problem was that each nationality played the game according to their own culture-specific rules of gender relations. American boys were used to girls saying 'no' to sex. British girls, the story goes, did not know they were supposed to say 'no', because British boys did not ask! Therefore, when in wartime British girls and American boys were put together, misunderstanding could easily arise. American boys may have found that they got further, quicker, with British girls that with American girls, but often they found themselves engaged to be married without realizing that that is the implication of what they were asking for.

Take a second, and related case (Fig. 1). It is said that if you put a middle-class adult American male in a room with an Englishman of the same class, age and gender, the American will do all the talking. What is more, the American will talk mainly about himself. The Englishman will assume the American is being boastful — which is a very bad thing to an Englishman! However, the American will resent the fact that the Englishman appears to have nothing to contribute to the conversation. He will be suspicious of the motives of this strange Englishman, who does not want to say much about himself. If the Englishman does, he will tend to understate things, as Englishmen do. The Englishman will try to be modest, but the American will only see in the Englishman a false modesty or arrogance, which in America comes to the same thing. So, both the American and the Englishman are behaving in the way they think is appropriate, but the Englishman sees the American as boastful, and the American sees the Englishman as arrogant. Why is this?

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<td>submission (= childlike behaviour)</td>
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*Fig. 1. Bateson's model*

A possible answer lies in the fact that each is trying to be polite. To be polite is to exhibit submissive (or childlike), as opposed to dominant (or parental), behaviour. But Americans and Englishmen bring their children up in different ways. Let us say the typical middle-class American male comes home from work, sits down at the dinner table and listens to his children, who tell him what they did in school. The typical
Englishman in the same situation tells his children what he did at work. So, in England, exhibitionism is equated with dominance (or parental behaviour), and spectatorship is equated with submission (or childlike behaviour). In America, it is the reverse: exhibitionism is equated with submission (or childlike behaviour), and spectatorship is equated with dominance (or parental behaviour). Therefore, in adulthood, the Englishman perceives the babbling American as trying to be dominant, when in fact the American’s babbling is a subconsciously submissive activity. Likewise, the American mistakes the Englishman’s reticence as inappropriately dominant behaviour. Each mistakenly thinks the other is trying to dominate, whether through inappropriate conversation or inappropriate silence.

The point of these two examples, which come respectively from Margaret Mead (1944) and Gregory Bateson (1942), is that cultural differences are not merely random or arbitrary. Rather, elements of culture exist within a framework of cultural elements. Although these frameworks as wholes may be enormously complex, when we take a simple case of relations between elements, and transpose them, something quite spectacular happens. In these examples, Americans and Britons misunderstand each other’s motives completely. Bateson called the contrasting elements bipolarities. Lévi-Strauss would call them structural oppositions. Whatever we call them, these simple contrasts, and not the complex minutiae of cultural wholes, are what create misunderstandings between peoples. Let me end this interlude with some words of warning, and some words of consolation, on two points. First, the method I have just described does tend to generate rather simplistic models, but when used with the realization that the models will inevitably be simple ones it can at least highlight issues of basic cultural difference which can then be studied in more depth. Secondly, what passed as sound, semi-popular anthropological theory in the 1940s does look feeble if read too literally today. Therefore my renditions of these 1940s examples should not be taken as exact plans to be copied in every detail: take them instead as parables or allegories. With that in the back of our minds, we are now in a position to consider the case of foragers and bureaucrats.

**Perceptions of land**

Foragers and bureaucrats will have different conceptions of land (Fig. 2). Land, and landscape, acquire meanings according to upbringing, of course, but more specifically they acquire meaning according to how land is used in different cultures, and how land is understood in relation to boundaries between neighbours, centres of social activity (such as waterholes), and centres of ritual activity. In broad terms, bureaucrats probably tend to see land more in terms of sovereignty: e.g., with regard to the nation-state’s authority to decide what does and what does not constitute legal ‘ownership’. To bureaucrats, semi-sacred rights of freedom, etc., are vested in the people, independent of the land they occupy. For the sake of argument, suppose hunter-gatherers reverse these associations (Fig. 2).
Of all foraging peoples, Australian Aborigines have especially close ritual associations with their land. For them, the land was crossed by spiritual beings in the Dreamtime, at the beginning of the world, and this creative activity continues in significance today as spiritual associations are renewed by the present generation. For African hunter-gatherers, the association between land and the spirit world is not quite as obvious, but it is certainly there (cf. Barnard 1989; Silberbauer 1994). Nharo, for example, say that in the beginning 'Nadiba, 'God the Sky', gave the Nharo lands to the Kajem G/odzi, the 'Oldest Progenitors', and that therefore Nharo rights to land are sacrosanct. Such land is heritable but not, as Scots lawyers might say, disposable. Its heritability continues through Nharo descent from the beginning to the end of time. The Nharo are perfectly aware that in the law of Botswana the land is owned by the Lewis family, the Kemp family and the Masire family, not the families of !Ai, /Oha or Dabe. And they recognize the jurisdiction of Botswana law, but only in certain aspects of land, not in others. Such a concept is characteristic of foragers' attitudes to land across the globe, though it is not entirely confined to foragers. Indeed, in Highland Scotland, differing attitudes to rights of occupation and land use have been a cause of dispute for over a century, as land 'owners' have sought to evict traditional inhabitants according to whim. In terms of conception of land right, Basarwa lie somewhere in between Australian Aborigines and Scottish crofters, but in none of these cases is the attitude the same as that of the state legal system within which, or under which, they live.

Bureaucrats almost invariably see land in terms of its economic potential, but economic potential can be measured in various ways. Foragers and bureaucrats will often see economic potential differently. Here it is useful to distinguish, as Marxists do (or did), the use value from the exchange value of land. But beyond that, it is essential to divide use value according to purpose. The maximal use value of land depends on the means used to exploit it. Therefore perceptions of use value are contingent on the potential means of exploitation. Some uses, or means of exploitation, will be acceptable to bureaucrats (perhaps those requiring investment and yielding the most profit). Different means of exploitation will be acceptable to foragers (perhaps only those which do not disrupt traditional boundaries between bands, band clusters, and ethnic groups).
Beyond economic potential, as I have implied, land may hold ritual or sacred use value to foraging populations. While this is less true in Africa than in, say, Aboriginal Australia, it is nevertheless the case that African foragers have ties to the land which cannot be measured in economic terms alone. For any given generation, land is a matter of knowledge as well as state-recognized ownership, exchange value, and use. Knowledge is collective, not just individual, and rights to resources are traditionally vested in descendants of the original ancestors. Traditional ownership concepts, among Nharo and other former foragers, are collective when it comes to land, because the knowledge of the land and its natural produce is held collectively and because the produce, before it is obtained, is owned collectively. Therefore they differ profoundly from other concepts of ownership, of movable items and even of food, which are owned individually in much the same way as in capitalist societies. To put it simply, foragers maintain a sharp distinction between movable (or individual) and immovable (or collective) property; bureaucrats do not — except insofar as they might see tribal property as vested in the authority of the chief or the tribe as a whole. And Basarwa do not traditionally make a distinction between tribal and freehold, except in their dealings with outsiders, where it is outsiders' views which command the force of law.

Finally here, it is worth considering the relation between human and civil rights, as these are contingent on notions of the relation between a people and their land. For bureaucrats, the human may be equated with the civil, as they usually see the state as the protector of the rights of all the citizens. Hunter-gatherers and recent hunter-gatherers do not generally see the state in this way. The history of relations between state entities and small-scale, sub-state societies around the world is a history of subjugation and intervention beyond what in sub-state society is regarded as morally justified (cf. Clastres 1977 [1974]; 1994 [1980]). This has nothing necessarily to do with colonialism, for in the eyes of hunter-gatherers and other very small-scale societies, colonial authority and nation-state authority come to the same thing. They are both perceived as external to the people. Indeed, Michael Asch (1989 passim) once argued, with reference to indigenous Canadian minorities, that the relation between indigenous peoples and nation-states is analogous to that between colonial subjects and colonial powers.

**Society and kinship**

What is 'society'? Western bureaucrats often seem to equate society with the state. Batswana bureaucrats probably do as well, and may also equate society with the tribe as a political entity, but not to ethnic minorities. Both state and tribe are culturally-constructed political entities. Such an equation in Western discourse has a long history. It dates back to seventeenth and eighteenth-century ideas on the 'social contract', which grew not from an understanding of stateless societies, but from speculation on the nature of society as Europeans understood it. Their speculation was based on an abstract, pre-modern European society in its formative stage. Late twentieth-century bureaucrats, and indeed many European and African intellectuals, inherit this lack of understanding.

In fact, foraging societies and some other small-scale societies differ from all others in one crucial respect: the range of kinship classification. Foragers have what I have called 'universal' systems of kin classification (Barnard 1978; 1981). This means that they do not distinguish between kin and non-kin; everyone with whom an individual associates, at least on a regular basis, is classified as some kind of 'kinsman'. Among !Kung-speaking groups, including Ju//hoansi and ≠Au//eisi, and among Western Khoespeaking Basarwa, including Nharo, Ts'aokhoe and ≠Haba, a name-relationship system ensures that even strangers can be classified easily. Personal names cycle through the generations from grandparent to grandchild, and anyone with the same name is believed to be descended from the same namesake-ancestor.
One with the same name is, by definition, a 'grandrelative'. Non-Basarwa who stay for some length of time are given names too, which fit them into the system. Arguably, this is not even a matter of 'fictive' kinship, as the categories define real social relationships, including the incest taboo, how close one may sit next to another, whether to show formality or informality, etc.; and the rules of behaviour are the same in kind, if not always in degree, between distant and close, name-related and biological kin. The mechanism of classification will be different in societies which lack namesake-equivalence rules (e.g., !Xô, G/wi, G//ana, Kua, and Bugakhoe), but the principle is the same. One traces kinship universally throughout society by genealogical links, and when these fail, then by links of friendship which are regarded as equivalent to sibling or grandrelative relationships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>bureaucrats</th>
<th>hunter-gatherers</th>
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<tr>
<td>kin classification</td>
<td>universal (no distinction between kin and non-kin:</td>
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<td>society</td>
<td>within social network everyone classified as 'kin')</td>
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<td></td>
<td>equated with kinship (defined by kin classification)</td>
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(beyond the range of kin classification)

Thus, in Basarwa and other hunting-and-gathering communities, it is not that easy to distinguish kinship from society itself (Fig. 3). Those who live in acephalous clan-based societies, tribal chiefdoms, and agrarian or industrial states, all see things differently. Bureaucrats, the world over, almost always come from the latter kind of society: one which distinguishes kin from non-kin. They are unlikely to understand the necessity for foragers to define relationship to every other person, and therefore their association with foragers can be difficult, to say the least. From the foragers' point of view, bureaucrats may be perceived as not really having true sociality at all, since the bureaucrats' society fails to provide the necessary mechanisms to keep track of relations between people, as parents and children, brothers and sisters, cousins, and grandrelatives. Thus the society of the bureaucrats may all too easily be equated with the dreaded 'government', almost always seen as an alien institution (see, e.g., Saugestad 1997: 11-13).

It should go without saying that notions of kin-based communities appropriate for thinking about peoples with non-universal systems are inappropriate for thinking about universal systems. Basarwa and other hunter-gatherers live in communities known in anthropology as 'bands', as indeed do traditional Sámi reindeer herders. Yet, while the band is perhaps the most visible unit of social organization, it is not the only one. There is always a territorial unit larger than the band: certainly the ethnic or language group, and often a cluster of related bands. In such cases, among !Xô and Nharo, for example, the band cluster marks the normal range of social interaction. The constant visiting between members of different bands and the frequent changes of band membership mean that Basarwa maintain extensive social networks irrespective of residence. They also retain rights of residence through parentage, often in several bands. I believe that
Barnard: Hunter-gatherers and bureaucrats

sedentization has only a minimal effect on this, though more research needs to be done on different Basarwa groups. While bureaucrats, and indeed anthropologists, may perceive Basarwa variously as nomadic or sedentarized, these are not necessarily categories Basarwa themselves see as that important. Susan Kent's work (e.g., 1993; 1995), in particular, highlights the degree to which 'sedentarized' Basarwa retain other aspects of traditional economic and social relations. Universal kinship very often remains important even after permanent settlement, and it ties in clearly with the idea that one has 'kinship' with people across vast areas, and not merely within one's own locality.

Economy and economic change

In two recent papers (Barnard 1993; 1994), I have suggested that we need an approach which takes account of the continuity of foraging culture, and I came up with the idea of a 'foraging mode of thought'. This, in my view, should direct our attention away from production, in the narrow, Marxist sense, and towards a wider understanding of social and environmental relations. Even economic relations can be resilient, especially where they encode social as well as material functions. Basarwa have an 'immediate-return' economy in that produce is acquired from the wild and utilized directly, without the necessity of storage or the need to plan for the future. Of course, storage and accumulation do occur, but the point is that Basarwa value sharing over accumulation, even to the point that those who do not share are ridiculed for not doing so (see, e.g., Lee 1993: 183-88). Contrary to James Woodburn's (e.g., 1982) narrower definition of 'immediate-return', I maintain that the ideology of sharing persists among part-time and former foragers. Sociality depends on sharing, and is offended by accumulation. Such an attitude to labour and to saving is entirely contradictory to that of members of other societies, including, of course, those of bureaucrats (see Fig. 4). It is worth emphasizing that although Africans in general share more widely than Europeans, sharing among Basarwa and other hunter-gatherers is of a different magnitude. This is because hunter-gatherers see accumulating as inherently bad, and see sharing as its negation. And when hunter-gatherers share, they usually share with everyone, not just with their children, nephews and nieces.

| bureaucrats                                                                 |                         |
| (coming from a community in which goods are not widely shared)               |                         |
| accumulation                                                               | social (= saving for self and dependents) |
| immediate consumption                                                      | anti-social (= not saving) |

| hunter-gatherers                                                           |                         |
| (coming from a community in which goods are widely shared)                 |                         |
| accumulation                                                               | anti-social (= not sharing) |
| immediate consumption                                                      | social (= sharing with family and community) |

Fig. 4. Accumulation and consumption
Capitalist societies have essentially one sphere of exchange, defined by the existence of money, whereas Basarwa societies operate in terms of several separate but mutually interdependent spheres. Among the Ju/'hoansi and the Nharo, there is a system known as hxaro or I lai. This is a sphere in which non-consumable, movable property is exchanged for similar property, but always with a delay of a day, a month, or a year. The duration of the delay does not matter, but the fact of it does. This sphere of delayed but balanced reciprocity actually overlies another, related sphere — that of generalized rights of access to resources, including water, firewood, and rights to hunt in one's exchange partner's territory. These combined spheres of exchange thus equalize access both to movable property and to natural resources. They also entail social responsibilities as well as economic obligations (Wiessner 1982). Thus gift-giving and forms of sharing, although not identical and even operating in different spheres of exchange, can be closely linked.

Other Basarwa groups have quite different mechanisms to accomplish much the same thing as hxaro. For example, among the sedentary Kua of Kutse, there is a practice of long-term 'borrowing' between kin (see Kent 1993). Sharing practices can also remain important even after sedentization. At Kutse, meat is still the most important shared item, and it can be shared in diverse ways. Social aspects of meat sharing operate well beyond economic necessity, and it is culturally expected that meat will be shared, even if other goods are bought and sold.

The extent to which the meaning of economic activities is open to wide interpretation is implied in the interesting debate which occurred in the 1970s between Elizabeth Wily and H.J. Heinz. Wily argued that Bushman social organization exemplified principles of collective ownership and communal will, while Heinz argued that it exhibited the incipient capitalist principles of private ownership and free enterprise. Each had interpreted their respective experiences at the !Xô settlement at Bere, where Wily had served as teacher and Heinz as benefactor and planner, as evidence for the equation of Bushman ideology with their own (see, e.g., Barnard 1992: 73-74, 243-44).

Politics: traditional and modern

Politics is about relations among people, and not just relations between people and organized political entities. Traditionally and internally (as opposed to in dealings with outsiders), hunter-gatherers the world over tend to have loose political organization, with leaders emerging for specific tasks. Their position is neither hereditary nor, in many cases, long-lasting. Nor is it necessarily a position of leadership in general: it can as easily be as a leader for some particular purpose, such as leading a hunt. Leaders command respect and aid in decision-making, but they do not hold, nor do they wish to exercise, power. If they were to seek it, power would almost certainly be denied them.

Bureaucrats generally will have a very different attitude. Their work depends on a line of command, and a formalized decision-making structure. Thus, misunderstandings may easily be made (Fig. 5).
bureaucrats

leadership positive (associated with public service)
followership negative (possibly associated with lack of initiative)

hunter-gatherers

leadership negative (associated with self-interest)
followership positive (associated with deference to the will of the community)

Fig. 5. Perceptions of leadership

With regard to macro-politics, that is, the politics of the outside world which impinge upon hunter-gatherers, the situation is compounded by the fact that political power is almost always in the hands of the outsiders. The relations between governments and indigenous peoples is a subject worthy of detailed comparative analysis, and indeed for historical research. The United States and Canadian governments employed 'Indian agents', and then 'government ethnologists' for a very long time. Henry Schoolcraft, Lewis Henry Morgan and John Wesley Powell in the United States (in the nineteenth century) and Edward Sapir and Diamond Jenness in Canada (in the early twentieth century) combined government work and ethnography. All were advocates of indigenous rights, particularly land rights, and probably none considered themselves bureaucrats. The situation was not that different in the British Empire, though hunter-gatherers were of little concern there. George Silberbauer's decision to undertake his study of the G/wi and to compile the Bushman Survey Report of 1965 was largely his own, and the inhabitants of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve are still waiting for his excellent recommendations (Silberbauer 1965: 132-35) to be carried out.

Botswana had no Basarwa Development Officer before 1974, when Liz Wily was given the job, at her own request. When I applied for a permit to conduct research in 1973, the procedure was quick and simple. I sent in a brief research proposal and two letters of reference. One letter was from my supervisor, who had done fieldwork in Ghanzi District and wrote that I had a good project. The other was from a former, post-independence Ghanzi District Commissioner, who wrote that he knew my supervisor well, and that he (the DC) had met me and found me to be a sound chap. When I got to Botswana, I picked up my permit from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands (as it then was). He seemed genuinely interested in my plans, though I doubt if he expected much to come of my work, in the sense of anything useful to government. Government and district council officials in general apparently had just two basic concerns: first, that I would not get lost in the desert, and secondly, that I would not cause trouble. This seemed to be the case both for elected officials and for civil servants, and those few non-Basarwa traditional leaders I met in the course of my fieldwork did not seem to see my work as having any relevance to their activities.
There are several reasons why Basarwa were not a major issue to government at the time. (1) With the exception of the Ghanzi district, their population was relatively low in comparison to other groups. (2) Ghanzi and Basarwa were not politically important: Ghanzi was not an area where the BDP was either strong or marginal, and few Basarwa voted anyway. (3) Those times - the mid-1970s - were times of exceptionally good rainfall, and Basarwa were well fed, with much more game than there is today, abundant moramas, plenty of berries and roots, and grass for their goats. (4) Importantly, Basarwa were perceived by many, including probably many in government, as being relatively self-sufficient, and their social organization self-regulatory.

Let me take up the implications of the last point. Basarwa society is self-regulatory. Decision-making is largely by consensus (see, e.g., Silberbauer 1982). Because leadership is ascribed to those who deserve it and not sought by those who do not, the system works. Yet it only works in areas where Basarwa have political control themselves. The regulation of affairs between, say, central government and G/wi and G//ana populations in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve is done on the government's terms, not the terms of the G/wi and G//ana. Even the mechanisms for decision-making are defined by government, either when it consults indigenous leaders or when it conducts surveys. Neither method is traditional in Basarwa society.

For many decades, there has been an interest in Basarwa rights as human rights, as opposed to civil rights. Since Botswana's independence (in 1966) and Namibia's (in 1990), the governments of those countries have been reluctant to allow traditional foragers any special privileges. The results of differential treatment for population groups in South Africa and in pre-independence Namibia have been too harmful, and the memory too strong, to bend in this direction - even for the benefit of a small, disadvantaged minority. Yet there are good grounds for such privileges. The use of land and the concepts of land ownership which Basarwa have, do not fit neatly into either traditional Batswana concepts of land ownership (for example), or the land allocation systems of existing government structures.

In Namibia, the Nyae Nyae Farmers Co-operative has over a thousand members. It was established, with mainly private funding from the United States, four years before Namibia's independence, and it continues to be the largest development effort for Bushman people. It has had difficulties, including well-publicised disputes among its expatriate staff. Also, cultural timidity about appearing to dominate others has made it difficult for indigenous leaders to put themselves into positions of power, either in their own community or with reference to outside agencies. There are, of course, leaders, and there always have been. Yet leadership among Bushmen is a different thing from leadership among many other peoples, because the active achievement of leadership is discouraged; and the skills which are learned, and the knowledge which increases with age, confer respect from others, not authority over them.

**The importance of identity**

Writing on European nationalism in the nineteenth century, the political scientist Derek Heater (1990: 59) has commented that there were six ways in which, as he puts it, 'the anomaly of minorities in a nationalist age' could be handled: toleration, conversion, discrimination, persecution, expulsion, or annihilation. Sadly, all of these have occurred with reference to foraging populations in southern Africa, though certainly annihilation has never been seen as a 'solution' in Botswana. Since independence, toleration and conversion have alternately been practised in various branches of government, while discrimination has been common.
in the country at large, if not among bureaucrats. Today, persecution and (internal) expulsion are at least what the world sees when mention is made of Botswana's dealings with Basarwa. I am here thinking specifically of the G/wi, G//ana and others from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve. It is a peculiar irony that this reserve, established in the last few years of colonial rule for the protection of Basarwa, should over the last decade have been the subject of so much effort to exclude them. In terms of land, toleration has increasingly given way to attempts at cultural conversion in what, to Basarwa, is the most blatant possible way – removal and re-establishment in land which is not their own. There is, of course, nothing unique about Botswana here; this is a common way of treating minorities, especially poor minorities perceived as otherwise non-threatening to the majority and the state. It is never, of course, practised against a powerful branch of the majority. The discovery of diamonds in Central District did not lead to the removal of the Bamangwato!

Of course, in the minds of bureaucrats, there is no ethnic discrimination. That is, there is no *de jure* discrimination, but there is *de facto* discrimination – because the inhabitants of the CKGR happen to be overwhelmingly poor Basarwa, along with some poor Bakgalagari. By classifying populations as Remote Area Dwellers, for over twenty years the government has both denied those classified that way their several and distinct identities (G/wi, Nharo, etc.) and prevented them from forming effective political opposition. I actually do not believe, though, that this was the government's original intention. The intentions of government and of the bureaucrats who implemented government policy were good: to emphasize poverty and alleviate it, and more particularly to find common purpose among 'remote' groups and provide aid in the most efficient way for all concerned.

The idea of 'Remote Area Dwellers' is neither academically nor politically neutral (cf. Hitchcock 1997). In academic terms, it accords with the revisionist theory in African historiography and anthropology generally and in Khoisan studies especially (see, e.g., Wilmsen 1989). But as I see it, this perspective, in granting the Basarwa a more prominent part in history, denies them cultural uniqueness and makes more difficult their quest for identity. Statements that 'RADS' or Basarwa represent an underclass more than they represent an ethnic group are, in my view, both historically unfounded and ethnographically misinformed. The details of that are perhaps best left to another paper. Of more relevance here is that such views are politically counter-productive.

In the widest sense of the word 'politics', Basarwa want and require a political voice based on the fact that they are Basarwa or that they are members of specific Basarwa communities. I would totally agree that the revisionist approach is the correct one in cases like Rwanda and Burundi, where historical class rather than culture is the divisive force, but it is not the same in Botswana. The situation in Botswana is more comparable, in many ways, to that of European countries, with for example Gypsy populations, and even more so to countries with indigenous minorities like Norway, Canada, the United States, New Zealand, or Australia.

Botswana is one of the few African countries which is comparable to the archetypal European nation, with a numerical and culturally dominant majority and both economically advantaged and economically disadvantaged small minorities. In such cases, the crucial factor is whether one perceives one's primary identity as ethnic or national (Fig. 6). The net result of these differing perspectives of identity is a diametrically-opposite understanding of the state, either as a protector of shared values of the larger society) or as a usurper of such values (of the indigenous minorities).
Conclusion: 'development' and reconciling opposing worldviews

The notion of 'development' was conceived in the 1940s. Its early use was expressed in negative terms: countries in the South were not yet called 'developing', but 'underdeveloped' countries. At that time, the concept was essentially global, rather than regional or local. Worst of all, in those early days, development was generally equated with economic growth alone, in a crude, essentialist way. 'Traditional' aspects of society were regarded as inferior to the 'modern' sector. Even whole societies were proclaimed to be 'backward'.

As development theory matured, notions of 'modernization' gave way to notions of 'dependency'. In the 1960s, development theorists became concerned with Third World 'underdevelopment' as an historical function of First World colonialism and domination in world trade. In this perspective, economic 'metropoles' each had their 'satellites'. In the 1970s, even anthropologists joined the bandwagon, with their similar notions of 'centre' and 'periphery'. Dependency theory became important in Third World academic and policy centres, while in Europe and North America 'modes of production' became a dominant theme.

In my view, all these perspectives are inappropriate for us here today. Whatever merit any of them may have for assessing global economic or political relations, they all miss the point about development for the people who ought to be our main concern. In the 1970s and 80s, anthropologists and rural sociologists began to become more active in development work, and new, more people-centred approaches...
became prominent. These academics, and some planners too, came to realize that local conditions, local needs, and cultural perceptions ought to be central to the practice of development.

In Botswana, those on the so-called 'periphery', the Basarwa, are still known officially as 'Remote Area Dwellers', or Batengyanateng, or Batho ba Tengyanateng (literally, 'those who are deep inside deep'). Yet, as one of them told Alice Mogwe (quoted in Mogwe 1992: facing first page):

Ha e le gore ka tengnyanateng gatwe re kgakala le Gaborone, Gaborone le ene o kgakala le rona. Gaborone le ene ke tengnyanateng.

If by 'tengnyanateng' it is meant that we are far away from Gaborone, Gaborone is also far away from us. Gaborone is also 'tengnyanateng'.

The task for us as social scientists should be to enlighten those, on each side, who see the 'other' as tengnyanateng. But the relationship between the two sides is not equal. One side has the power, and the other side does not. One side is doing the 'developing', and the other side is being 'developed'. Of course, one might say, participatory approaches to development will help; but this is only part of the picture. Those with the power need to be educated beyond the microcosmic aspects of particular projects and programmes. Only a sharing of cultural understandings can achieve the level of communication which is required (cf. Beauclerk and Narby 1988). We, as researchers, are in a unique position to facilitate this communication, as at least in some cases we probably have better access to either side than they have to each other. The irony is that we lack the power of the bureaucrats, and we can experience the richness of the cultural values of foraging peoples only as temporary sojourners from the cultural world which we share with those bureaucrats of whom we so often despair.

References


SAAMI CUSTOMARY RIGHTS AND THE PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

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Although hardly recognized by governments and the legal profession, it is possible to argue that customary rights for aboriginal peoples are basically legal substitutes for the territorial rights of which colonial powers once deprived them. This was accomplished through a process of annexation which was legalized according to a type of jurisprudence which did not acknowledge collective ownership of lands inhabited by nomads or hunters and gatherers. Culminating in Norway in the 18th century, the process unfolded without any treaties or negotiations between the government and the Saami groups1 which once utilized vast areas for subsistence, but at that time had settled on the coast and in the fjords as farmers and fishermen. Today, their rights to own and utilize land-based and marine resources are based on exactly the same laws which pertain to the rest of the population in North Norway.2 Some parts of this aboriginal population specialized in nomadic reindeer herding during the 16th and 17th centuries, however. Their extensive resource utilization has until recently been considered "tolerated usage". Such usage could be banned if the owner decided to utilize the land for purposes which would exclude reindeer pastoralism. Since the 1960s, however, customary usage has been accepted by the Supreme Court as a right according to which reindeer pastoralists are entitled to monetary compensation should they be excluded from their pastures.

The question concerning the extension to settled Saami (mostly farmers and fishermen) of legal recognition of customary rights deriving from usage "since time immemorial", according to local rules of access and utilization which are not based on officially registered ownership, is today part of a larger unresolved issue which the Saami themselves label "the right to land and water".

1 The Saami are a people living in the northern parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland, and on the Kola Peninsula in Russia. In Norway, an estimate of their number suggests 40-50,000. They are aboriginal to the area, which means that they inhabited it before it was invaded by Germanic speaking peoples from the south, and long before state borders were established. Originally hunters and gatherers, some of them converted to reindeer pastoralism during the 16th and 17th centuries, while others settled and started farming. A long process of assimilation gradually extinguished the language in parts of the region, but it is still retained in the interior of Finnmark and some other areas. This process generated a widespread feeling of membership in a despised category and an urge among some to be accepted as members of the majority. Due to miscegenation and the consequent obliteration of physical distinctions, this aim could also be achieved by some when moving out of their communities of origin. (Eidheim 1971, Thuen 1995).

2 The Saami settlement area is mainly in the northern parts of the country, but some scattered Saami communities are also found in the interior of the middle parts.
This unresolved question particularly pertains to the government's interpretation of the International Labour Organization Convention no. 169 - "Indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries" - which was signed by the Norwegian government in 1990. This Convention's article 14 states that "The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized." Legal experts argue (NOU 1997:5) that, in principle, this article recognizes the Saami people's exclusive right of territorial possession of the areas habitually used by them. However, until now the government considers a strong protection of the right to utilize the areas as consistent with the Convention's intentions. The areas in question comprise the state-owned part of Finnmark county, approximately 96% of the area of this northernmost county of Norway. Further, the government states that nomadic adaptations do not entail rights as expressed in the Convention's wording "ownership and possession" (KAD 1992). The correct interpretation of this Convention is thus a matter of dispute among Norwegian politicians.

In very broad terms, this is the present legal position of the Saami in the matter of territorial rights. In this presentation I intend to present a context for understanding the significance of issues pertaining to customary rights. I will start with a presentation of the main features of Saami ethnicity and their present political situation, before I proceed to some comments concerning dilemmas facing aboriginal peoples, notably the Saami, in their search for a more inclusive control of what they consider not only their territories, but also of their own affairs in a more general sense. The issue is not limited to territorial rights, although such rights are obviously the most urgent and important. In making this general outline my point of departure, I will then take a closer look at the problems pertaining to the delineation of "customs" and "customary rights".

Features of Saami ethnicity

In North Norway, many communities are inhabited by Saami and Norwegians who reside together without clear distinctions of work, resource utilization, language or appearance. Descending from past generations of intermingling inhabitants, many people count both Saami and Norwegians among their ancestors. When ethnic identity ascription is based on descent, if not as a sufficient then at least as a necessary precondition, mixed descent creates blurred boundaries. As a consequence, individual self-ascription of ethnic identity varies within the same community and even within the same family. In other parts of the Saami settlement area, especially in the interior of Finnmark county, boundaries are unambiguous. Saami outnumber Norwegians and the Saami language predominates. This is also the area where the reindeer herders belong. Saami identity is readily apparent among the reindeer herders of this region, and also among its settled population. Because significant cultural traits have largely been effaced among other parts of the population, Saami identity is commonly associated with reindeer breeding even among people whose ancestors a generation or two ago also reckoned themselves to be Saami.

Like so many other Fourth World peoples, the Saami were subjected to a policy of assimilation for at least a hundred years, i.e., from the middle of the last century to the 1950s (Thuen 1995). This policy was a component of a political effort of the central government to integrate the populations of Saami and Kvens into the nation. At the same time, it was a process of modernization characterized by such features as the transformation of household economies from a level where subsistence economy formed a major part, towards a more complete market integration. The school system played a major role in obliterating the Saami language, which was considered a liability for children who had to cope with the novel
opportunities of a modernizing environment. This combined economic, political and educational pressure to become Norwegian was made effective by the character of ethnic distinction itself. It may be seen as a general law of ethnic identity change that when the means to perform the activities and obtain the values generally associated with minority identity are systematically suppressed, and the qualifications required to achieve a way of life associated with the majority culture are at the same time made available, a condition has been created which encourages the substitution of ethnic minority identity, i.e., for crossing the ethnic boundary (Barth 1969). (It should be added here that due to a long period of ethnic mixing in many communities, few if any biological characteristics distinguishing the Saami survive.)

The changing relationship between Norwegians and Saami in the north may be summarized in three parallel processes. First, Saami identity was suppressed and enclosed within a private sphere of activity. In the public, inter-ethnic sphere, Saami were supposed to behave like Norwegians and to use the Norwegian language. For Saami, internalization of a suppressed identity engendered a sense of being stigmatized and of social shortcomings. Second, in many parts of the region Saami were absorbed within Norwegian society. This process generally took two or more generations, resulting in an assimilation proper which implied that individuals succeeded in being accepted as Norwegians on the basis of their command of Norwegian cultural performances. And third, Saami culture and identity management were essentialized. To qualify for Saami identity ascription, Saami were supposed to behave according to a set of expectations corresponding to the rather narrow cluster of cultural characteristics that their local social environment, and the nation as a whole, had selected for them. In other words, Saami were left with the options of hiding their identity from the public scene, forgetting their identity and being absorbed, or elaborating their identity around the expectations of Saaminess conceived by their Norwegian environment. To some extent, the ethnopolitical emancipation since the 1960s slowly changed this situation, although many Saami are unwilling to embrace Saami public identity. This is particularly so if it is expected to engender a return to the state of stigmatization and inter-ethnic antagonisms characterizing the past.

**Saami ethnopolitical developments**

During the years following the Second World War, and notably since the 1960s, a Saami ethnopolitical movement gradually succeeded in obtaining official recognition of the Saami as a people in their own right, and not just a deviant and marginalized population in Northern Norway, often officially referred to as "Saami-speaking Norwegians" (Eidheim 1971, Thuen 1995). These organizational efforts were propelled by a major territorial and resource conflict in the late 1970s and early 1980s over the damming of a large river in Finnmark (Bjørklund and Brantenberg 1981, Paine 1985, Thuen 1995). The subsequent damming caused severe damage to reindeer pastures. The conflict opened the eyes of the government to the question of constitutional rights for the Saami. After prolonged investigations and negotiations by the Saami Rights Committee, a number of proposals concerning their political status were adopted by the Norwegian Parliament in 1987-88. The most important of these decisions were a constitutional amendment stating that the government had to enable the Saami people to preserve and develop their culture and community life, and a legal act prescribing the establishment of a Saami Assembly elected by and among the Saami themselves. This assembly (commonly called "the Saami Parliament" although it is not a parliament in the strict sense) with mainly advisory powers vis-à-vis the government, was inaugurated in 1989. It consists of 39 representatives from 13 electoral districts.
The committee negotiations did not end there, however. In 1997 it presented its last reports on the issue of territorial rights and management. Without resolving the question of ownership, it presented a model for the joint management of the state-owned territories of Finnmark. The model is now hotly debated and will presumably continue to be so in the years to come. The model prescribes that a management board should be established consisting of members elected by the council of Finnmark county and the Saami Assembly on a fifty-fifty basis. On a municipal level in the predominantly Saami areas, local boards should also be established which, reflecting the composition of the population, may have a Saami majority. Much to the disappointment of the Saami Assembly, the issue of customary rights has not yet been properly investigated. The Saami Rights Committee avoided it on the pretext that they had neither the time nor the expertise to go into it. Later, the Ministry of Law agreed to finance research into Saami customs concerning access to and usage of land-based resources.

The significance of aboriginal rights issues

The issue of aboriginal rights comprises two interrelated but distinct domains. One concerns *self-government* in internal affairs. The other concerns *land rights and control of resource management* within their traditional territories. When comparing the political and legal situations of aboriginal peoples of the so-called Fourth World, one immediately becomes aware of the differences in their approaches to these two realms of political authority. These differences reflect aspects of their colonial histories as well as the current level of government recognition of their claims. To summarize very briefly, and perhaps too superficially, what characterizes the differences I have in mind, I will emphasize how strongly aboriginal peoples in countries such as Canada, Greenland, New Zealand and Australia insist upon the intimate relationship that exists between their inherent rights to their territories and their parallel right to govern themselves. This relationship has been recognized, and a regime of comprehensive rights has been established, in only one part of the Fourth World until now. This is Greenland, a former Danish colony which was only some thirty years ago actually defined as a part of Denmark. Greenland gained a state of relative sovereignty in 1979 when so-called Home Rule was introduced. In the other parts of the Fourth World which I mentioned, aboriginal peoples (in Canada called First Nations) file suit against the government to regain the ownership of their territories at the same time as they struggle to reestablish political institutions with decisive authority in what they consider their own affairs.

Indigenous peoples such as the Saami find themselves in the middle of a debate on the legal basis of ownership or usufruct rights to the territories they occupy, and the extension of such rights to modern types of exploitation. This is an internal debate among the Saami as well as being a debate between Saami and Norwegians. It is a *political* debate over legislation much more than it is a *juridical* debate over the interpretation of existing laws and previous court judgements. My point is that the issue of self-government seems to be overshadowed by this seemingly more urgent question of who should control the utilization of land-based and marine resources. Other public concerns - such as social and welfare issues, family policies, crime prevention and punishment, conflict resolution, rules of inheritance, regulations of the management of economic activities and of economic support such as subsidies of local fisheries, agriculture, reindeer herding, etc. - are all subject to general rules of public administration which pertain to these fields nationwide. Furthermore, Saami are not normally entitled to participate on a regular basis in
the execution of these regulations by government bodies. Some modifications of the regulations may exist on a regional basis, but hardly on an ethnic basis.3

Encapsulation
The problem which concerns us here is that the authorities do not recognize that the realm of culture is linked to areas of public concern such as those mentioned. Any culture (considered as a comprehensive unit of conventions, rules and customs regulating conduct) has provisions for the management of such issues. Such conventions, rules and customs are normally understood as cultural institutions. They are emptied of meaning and purpose and made obsolete when a majority population takes over control and introduces its own institutions as a part of its political and legal system, legitimized according to its culturally codified value system. This process of institutional integration within the larger system has been labelled encapsulation. The effect of encapsulation processes is that "culture" tends to be objectified and transformed into a residual category encompassing a limited number of activities typically pertaining to arts and handicrafts, literature and music, language preservation, folklore, etc., in short, those activities which are symbolic of traits and customs designating a population as "culturally" distinct from the majority population.

This process of encapsulation is in my opinion one of the major challenges confronting Fourth World peoples today. In a democratic state like Norway, a certain degree of cultural pluralism is accepted, and the management of activities which demonstrate it are delegated from majority to minority control (within limits set by governmental funding and management regulations). But the overarching political and economic conditions framing the everyday lives of the minority do not distinguish between these members and those of majority. These conditions are basically uniform and universal, deriving from citizenship in the nation state.4

Cultural protection
One of the major problems related to the process of encapsulation is that it poses dilemmas to Fourth World peoples such as the Saami, concerning how to formulate strategies to confront it. Encapsulation engenders political controversies within their own ranks which challenge their political leadership and makes it necessary to find a balance between considerations which may be hard to harmonize. I want to address one significant challenge which the Saami confront in their present ethnopolitical situation, namely the tension between cultural protection and self-government (Thuen 1995). The policy of cultural protection undertakes to preserve what remains of cultural distinctions after a long period of government policies of assimilation and integration. It is often perceived as an urgent operation, aiming at preventing

3 Reindeer breeding is legally codified as a Saami exclusive right (although a few herd units under Norwegian management are allowed to continue).

4 This is a major challenge to democratic states worldwide. One might argue that "our lack of identification with institutions that serve public purposes, the impersonality of public institutions, is the price that citizens should be willing to pay for living in a society that treat us all as equals, regardless of our particular ethnic, religious, racial, or sexual identities" (Gutmann 1994:4). Two sets of objections to this view may be raised. One emphasizes the "equal opportunity" argument stating that disadvantaged categories of the population deserve special treatment to achieve the same public goods as the majority. The other focuses particularly on the injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples who have been deprived of their land as well as their cultural institutions.
Thuen: Saami Customary Rights

customs and traditions, and not least the language, to disappear into oblivion. As such, these policies are promoted by minorities and in recent years have gradually been accepted by governments, although hesitantly and with considerable setbacks.

However, when ethnic distinction is contingent upon cultural preservation it very easily invites efforts to traditionalize ways of life that social changes would otherwise make obsolete. People may find it hard to practise customs and preserve technologies that are felt to be outmoded in a world of rapid changes and new opportunities. When measures and regulations to protect cultural distinctiveness demand preservation of traditions, generational and other types of conflict are hard to prevent. Consequently, a policy of protection and preservation may generate a differentiation between the minority and the majority, who see the minority as backward, underdeveloped, exotic, primitive, impoverished, etc. The way someone is perceived by another, be it an individual or a people, may easily shape his perception of himself. A form of essentialization is generated, signifying gradients of typicality, of distinctiveness, of authenticity, etc.

This argument needs some modification. It is certainly not the intention of the government, and neither of the law-makers, to impose a rigid definition of tradition-based activities on the Saami in order for them to qualify for certain political, legal or administrative measures. The constitutional amendment of 1988 (Act 110 a) states that it is the responsibility of the state "to take the necessary steps to enable the Saami population to safeguard and develop their language, their culture and their community life" (NOU 1984:18, p. 599). This dynamic approach is also stated in the Saami Act of 1987. The government states its responsibilities deriving from these principles in this way: "It is the basic principle of Norway's Saami policy that government authorities have the responsibility to enable the Saami themselves to strengthen and guide the development of Saami society. For this purpose the Saami Assembly - the most important voice of the Saami - has a central impact on the government's Saami policy." (KAD 1992). The problem is, however, that when there is a conflict between Saami interests (e.g., as argued by the Saami Assembly) and other public interests, the burden to prove that "Saami interests" are consistent with "Saami cultural values" resides with the Saami. This demands some sort of objectification and delineation of "culture".

There is another aspect of the dilemma of cultural protection. It concerns the protection of tangible resources, notably the land-based distribution of pastures, berries, freshwater fish, grouse, etc., and the marine resources of coastal fish stocks. In many areas, competition for these resources has been aggravated by the introduction of more effective harvesting technologies, better communications, and increased leisure time. Taken together, these innovations expand the opportunities of people living outside the resource areas to harvest these resources. As a consequence, people living in communities where these resources have been considered common only to community members, or divided among specific groups (e.g., families) within the community according to customary rule, witness "their" resources being emptied by outsiders whose legal right to do so accords with the rule of free access and public ownership of these resources (Gaski 1993). It is argued that if these encroachments are to be avoided on the basis of some concept of aboriginal (i.e., customary) title, then aboriginal title should be tied to local residence rather than ethnic origin. The conceptualization of individual customary rights may often be more firmly associated with a locally defined group of residents than with a group of a specific ethnic origin. Depending on what parts of the northern region are being considered, the ethnic profile varies from communities with a predominantly Saami population, through mixed populations (Saami and
Norwegians\textsuperscript{5}), to those with a Norwegian predominance. Norwegian-dominated communities are generally found on the coast of Finnmark, the Saami ones are mostly located in the interior. Since the issue of resource access has been phrased in terms of territorial rights based on aboriginality, this conflict over resources has been interpreted as an ethnic conflict between a Norwegian coastal population and a Saami interior population. This conceptualization within public opinion oversimplifies the actual situation, exacerbating ethnic tensions in the region.

Two interrelated dilemmas dominate the ethnopolitical debate on Saami customary rights, then. One is the problem of essentialization, prescribing certain "traditional" types of economic adaptations on the basis of their alleged cultural distinctiveness. Another is the problem of ethnification, identifying territorial rights and access to resources with a specific culture and a specific part of the population - a reasonable argument for some communities in the region, but certainly not for all.

This underlining of the problems and perils of what I have called a policy of cultural protection may seem exaggerated. There are certainly reasons for protecting cultural elements in order to preserve them, not least minority languages but also customs, knowledge and methods of resource utilization which are characteristic of aboriginal culture. I am not arguing that indigenous peoples should abandon their efforts to protect their own cultures and become mainstream or "modern" if this entails a process of assimilation to the encompassing majority's culture and identity. The problem resides in the conception that only those cultural elements which are recognized by the majority's government institutions, and occasionally defined by law as belonging to a sphere of resource management, are singled out for protective measures. Customary rights are embedded in a larger sociocultural context. Resource utilization practices are intimately related to knowledge and beliefs about nature, and the kinship system regulates the composition of social units and their mutual responsibilities. When parts of this context are singled out for special legislation while other parts are distorted due to social changes, the meaning and purpose of customary usage may be hard to establish. Furthermore, this situation preserves, in effect, the role of the state as patron and custodian of the minority. This position has been compared to that of the nanny who decides the rules according to which the child has succeeded or failed in its efforts so that he may or may not deserve a reward (Paine, ed. 1977). It is often naively assumed that when some measures of cultural protection are taken and some sort of representative participation by aboriginal peoples is achieved, the patronage position of the majority's institutions has broken down. In fact, such minority representation still occurs within a system of rules designed by the majority.

This is why I contrast the policy of cultural protection with that of self-government, which should include more than just what the encompassing society deems distinctive of an aboriginal people and its culture. In principle, self-government should comprise the right to define the rules of resource management and exploitation as well as the rules of public administration of other realms of life. Self-government is generally conceptualized as a stepwise development, as specific areas of public administration are delegated to the minority's institutions while legal instruments delineating the borderlines between majority and minority control are developed. Two sets of obstacles obstruct this development, however. First, governments are generally reluctant to relinquish their ultimate powers of decision-making. Delegation of authority seems to go against the very raison d'\^etre of political office conceptualized by top-level

\textsuperscript{5} In some communities there is also a third category, the Kvens, who are descendants of immigrants from what is today Finland. Over the years, Kvens have also mixed with Saami and Norwegians. Some of them now claim certain cultural rights on a par with the Saami.
politicians and bureaucrats. Second, there is the problem of territorial circumscription. Exactly what part of the national territory, which settlement areas and segments of the population, should be included within the minority's area of political control? A major reason why Greenland is the best example of internal aboriginal rule is, of course, that its borders are well defined by nature. In most other countries, territorial delimitation is a problem because the settlement is mixed: members of the majority population cohabit with aboriginal people. Political bodies forming local governments should be elected by and among those living in the specific area. More often than not, however, this democratic principle will include members of the national majority. As a result of previous immigration they may even constitute a local majority in the area. Differentiation of the right to vote on the basis of ethnicity is seen as undemocratic and causes strong antagonism. Forms of joint local government will have to be implemented which encompass all residents in an area. Resettlement is no alternative solution.

It is not my intention to go further into the complicated matter of government models for aboriginal rule. I have outlined some perspectives on what I consider to be important dilemmas of aboriginal policy-making within limits set by majority governments. Conflict may develop result from the principle of cultural protection as an objectifying, delimiting practice of prescribing certain forms of activity, certain categories of knowledge, or certain types of public institutions, as distinctive and characteristic of aboriginal culture. This way of thinking engenders personal dilemmas as well as political problems on a collective level. Ideally, self-government provides a solution since it bestows upon the minority the right to formulate and practise certain rules of public management without prior authorization by government. On the other hand, development of self-government also raises problems because it strains the relationship between local residents of majority and aboriginal origin.

Delineating customary rights

It is within this complicated context that the problems of delineating aboriginal customary rights should be considered. As I argued in the introduction, customary usufruct rights may be seen as a legal remedy to the abolition of aboriginal title to land. The principle of customary rights is a legal institution stating that, under certain conditions, specified users of a territory and its resources are recognized as having a legal right to continue their use although they do not have ownership rights to the territory in question. Furthermore - and this is a legal innovation only recently accepted by the government - the government's obligation to protect aboriginal culture and social life may include the obligation to secure the so-called "material base" of that culture. Finally, aboriginal customs pertaining to land use may be considered to some extent equivalent to the regulations inscribed in the legislature and the court practice of the nation state under Common Law. In Norway, this principle has not been legally tried until now, but it is clearly a part of the Saami Assembly argumentation and it is also to some extent accepted in the ILO Convention no. 169.

But what is a custom and a customary right, and what is it that makes it Saami, empirically speaking? According to established law, a customary right it is a legal source which (i) relies on practice over a long period but is not based on ownership, and (ii), is accepted by the owner as an obligation on his part. Saami customs may thus be legally defined as those customs pertaining to access to and utilization of resources, and the regulation of conflicts that may occur concerning such practices, which have traditionally been followed in a particular area where Saami live and to which the land-owner has (implicitly) consented. Furthermore, these practices may be said to be part of larger complex of
institutionalized beliefs and routines characteristic of Saami culture and referred to by specific terms in
their language.

But customs are context-dependent. Part of the knowledge transferred from one generation to the
next, their maintenance is also contingent on suitability. Their specific outline changes with circumstances.
In other words, they are pursued as long as their practitioners see some advantage in keeping to them.
Customs are rarely sustained for their own sake. The analysis of historical material demonstrates that
flexibility and adaptiveness, rather than institutionalized specificity, constitute continuities in Saami
culture. This is an important argument, in my opinion, for the introduction of some sort of local or regional
self-management, and against the legal codification of definite institutions which would reduce flexibility in
the long run, when circumstances alter and new adaptations are in demand.

This is not to say that distinctive institutionalized customs should not be legally protected at all. In
some cases conflicts occur, when residents from outside a community invade local territories because their
mobility and their harvesting technology have increased their range of operation and there is no official law
protecting local resource exploitation from outsiders. This has become a major source of conflict in
Northern Norway, which clearly demands legal regulation. This conflict is not always an ethnic conflict,
however. In many instances it is rather a conflict between local interests and the principle of free access to
outlying fields and marine resources. When some of these communities are Saami communities, the
conflict may be formulated in ethnic terms, which makes the whole issue less reconcilable. This conflict is
further exacerbated when the issue of customary rights is related to the overarching question of territorial
rights on an ethnic basis.

Another potential conflict area in which customary usage may be challenged is that among local
residents. Changing circumstances will typically engender antagonisms regarding the right to utilize
resources. Some local residents may see their interests better suited by national law, while others appeal to
local rules and traditional usage in order to legitimize their interests. Again, when local communities have a
mixed population, we may expect that the ethnification of resource conflicts will make them even more
antagonistic. There is a potential conflict here, between an ethnopolitical leadership whose strategy it is to
present the case of customary rights in ethnic terms, and local groups who may wish to avoid such terms. I
do not want to express a firm and one-dimensional view on this issue. It is undoubtedly legitimate to argue
for the recognition of customary rights on an ethnic basis, and it is perhaps the only legal and political
strategy possible to achieve such recognition. On the other hand, ethnification alienates parts of the
population, not only Norwegians but also many Saami. In the North Norwegian context it is important to
bear in mind that, as I have argued above, in most ethnically mixed communities people are not
systematically differentiated along economic or cultural lines. In other countries with aboriginal
inhabitants, local residents of majority identity are clearly distinct, culturally, economically and socially. In
many North Norwegian communities, particularly outside the reindeer breeding districts, people of
different ethnic origin have cohabited for centuries without any such clear class distinctions of economic
specialization and resource utilization. Their awareness of ethnic difference is related to other distinctions,
notably language and mutual knowledge of descent and origin. The apparent exception to this rule is the
case of reindeer breeding. This is clearly and exclusively Saami, who have developed a system of customs
and adaptations to their natural environment to suit the demands of a complex interrelationship of animals,
humans and nature. The ethnic identification of the customary practices of reindeer herding Saami is thus
obvious and undisputed. But the ethnic identification of other adaptations, such as farming and fishing, and
other communities, particularly on the coast, may be expected to engender protests from non-Saami living
in similar communities and referring to similar practices on their part.

In this presentation I have tried to demonstrate the complex relationship between tradition and change
which is easily overlooked when interests of an ethnic nature are to be codified within a new institutional
framework of jurisdiction. Some of these problems may be similar to those experienced in other countries,
in casu those of the so-called Third World, but others are clearly different. This complexity makes the
modelling of solutions difficult. Any proposal may be met with hostility and refusals. Perhaps it is fair to
say that attitudes and actions on both sides - that of the ethnic minority as well as that of the government -
may be interpreted as inconsistent by the other party. Admittedly, inconsistency on the part of the
government is more detrimental to the minority than the other way around. However, the development of a
more legitimate democratic system will rely on finding new solutions to these challenges, politically as well
as legally. It is my contention that these solutions should be modelled on a principle of equity between two
peoples. At the same time, mutually beneficial customary adaptations on local and regional levels should
be given priority over bureaucratized and universalistic management regulations, as well as over
regulations based on the concept that customs are everywhere ethnically distinct and should be made the
object of legally binding ethnification.

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In Botswana’s policy towards the Basarwa indigenous minority, the official perception of the role of the international community, and international donors specifically, has always been ambiguous. On the one hand involvement and opinions voiced by foreigners have frequently been condemned as improper involvement in internal matters. On the other hand, the government of Botswana has consistently invited foreign funding to cover development programmes targeting the Basarwa. For a period of five years Norway was the main international donor to the Remote Area Development (RAD) Programme, the rural development programme most directly addressing the Basarwa minority. An analysis of how Norway came to be involved, and the scope of involvement, may be a useful contribution to a wider understanding of the conditions that determine opportunities for Basarwa development.

The bilateral relation between Botswana and Norway concerning the RAD Programme may be divided into four phases.

- The first phase, from 1989 up to 1991, emphasised the programme's character as a welfare programme. Towards the end of this period, the "Let them talk" evaluation brought attention to significant achievements, but also highlighted some serious shortcomings of the programme.

- In the second phase, around 1992, some of the inherent ambiguities in the bilateral cooperation came into the open in a series of confrontations that brought Norwegian-Botswana relationships to an all-time low. The controversy was brought out by a new group of actors who started to voice an opinion: Basarwa representatives.

- A third phase brought diplomatic relationships ‘back to normal’, leading up to the time of the Second Regional Conference on Africa’s San Population at the end of 1993. This event probably represents the peak so far of official (Norwegian as well as Botswana) commitment.

- In the latest stage, the relationship changed again. NORAD involvement was scaled down, following a general phasing out of Norwegian bilateral assistance to Botswana from 1994 to 1996. From 1997 Norway has pulled out altogether. Botswana’s involvement has reverted to a low intensity continuation of the infrastructure components of the RAD programme. Controversy over the Central Kalahari Game Reserve has taken over in terms of attracting national and international attention.

1 This paper is an extract from a manuscript under preparation: The Inconvenient Indigenous. Remote Area Development, Donor Assistance and the First People of the Kalahari, (Saugestad, forthcoming).
The programme agreement

An agreement for programme cooperation was signed between the governments of Botswana and Norway in 1988. The general objectives of the programme are briefly presented in the main text, and are expanded upon in an annex:

...to contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of the Remote Area Dwellers (RADs) of Botswana. This should be done by ensuring that public services are extended to RADs, that their economic opportunities are promoted and that they are ensured political and legal rights.

RADs are under this Agreement understood to be people living permanently outside established villages. They will mainly be descendants of ethnic minority groups living under poor conditions in remote rural areas. (GOB/GON 1988)

The annex commits both parties to a recognition of the "basic prerequisites for improving the living conditions of the RADs under the Programme" to be:

- securement of land areas to cater for productive employment development in and around settlements
- provision of adequate water supply and water facilities in old and new settlements
- provision of basic infrastructure and staff to enable public services like health care, education, transport, employment promotion, vocational training and extension services to take place in settlements
- promotion and formal recognition of local institutions and leadership to represent target groups
- retainment of RADs cultural integrity. (GOB/GON 1988).

The same annex to the Agreement specifies that the programme activities will take place in seven districts: Kgalagadi, Central, Kgatleng, Southern, North West and Kweneng, with the important proviso: "The Parties recognize that activities related to the proposed resettlement of the population presently living in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve shall not be a part of the Programme covered by this Agreement." A similar point is emphasised in a separate final paragraph: "All activities under the Programme shall be based on the principle of voluntary participation by the target population."

In making the decision to support the Remote Area Development Programme, Norway formally accepted the definition of the target group as laid down by Botswana. From the very beginning, however, there has been ambiguity regarding what might be considered the overarching development objectives for the programme. The official Norwegian designation of the programme, BOT 022: Minority groups in remote areas is not a direct translation of the title in English -- a fact which in itself is rather unusual. It does, however, express the dual justifications for Norwegian involvement: (a) that the RAD programme addressed a general development objective of poverty alleviation, consistent with a basic needs strategy; but in addition (b) that it was seen as a means to reach an especially disadvantaged minority group. The Basarwa were viewed as an indigenous minority in need of special assistance, and experience from Norwegian-Saami relations was seen as a relevant background, as well as an added justification for involvement. The 'poverty alleviation' consideration was obviously more congruent with Botswana's policy than the 'minority' concern.
The Norwegian perspective: poverty alleviation

As in most countries, Norwegian development policy is a mixture of development ideologies, i.e., normative expressions of values and desired objectives; and development strategies, i.e., instrumental, often pragmatic ideas about how to achieve desired development objectives (Hettne 1990:135). The focus has consistently been on assisting the poorest countries, and the poorest sections within these countries. The strategies have shifted over the years in step with international trends in how causes for under-development have been perceived, and what solutions have been offered. In line with prevailing modernisation theories, the 1960's saw a concern to promote growth by spurring domestic output, productivity and industrialisation. As the basic-needs approach was gaining prominence in the mid-1970's, NORAD's ideology turned to traditional sectors of the economies of developing countries, advocating increased contributions to the basic-needs sectors — food supplies and employment, water supplies, health and education.

The basic-needs approach which dominated Norwegian thinking at the time when the RAD agreement was signed, thus aimed at transferring assistance in a service oriented fashion, rather than attempting radically to reform economic structures. The thinking reflects a central welfare state doctrine: it is the responsibility of the government to act on behalf of vulnerable individuals and groups, as market mechanisms fail to benefit all individuals equally. Development assistance aims at strengthening the recipient country's own ability to promote development and to solve poverty problems. The principle of recipient responsibility makes the recipient country responsible for the planning and implementation of all development activities.

We find all these ideas reflected in the bilateral cooperation between Norway and Botswana. When the first aid agreement was signed in June 1972, the main reasons for selecting Botswana as a new partner were: (a) that it was one of the 25 nations listed by the UN as the least developed countries; and (b) that it was in a difficult geo-political situation as a land-locked country surrounded by hostile South Africa, Rhodesia and South West Africa (Granberg and Parkinson 1988:vi). It was further assumed that the government had been able to create the conditions necessary for Norwegian assistance to contribute effectively to programmes designed to combat widespread poverty. Sectoral programmes emphasised primary health care, rural welfare, labour intensive programmes, and district development. All programmes included measures for institution-building, in particular technical assistance support and training.

On all counts, support to the Remote Area Development Programme fitted the Norwegian paradigm of basic-needs orientation, poverty alleviation and recipient responsibility. This was also the conclusion arrived at by the assessment undertaken prior to the initiation of Norwegian involvement (Guldbrandsen et al. 1986). This report subscribes to the 'welfare' dimension of the programme, and describes the target group according to the official Botswana view, as a large and heterogenous socio-economic category, with poverty as a common denominator. In fact any consideration of cultural characteristics of the target group is notably absent in the report. However, to uncover the full range of concerns that came together to determine Norwegian involvement, we have to look beyond the Gulbrandsen report, to the wider context of Norwegian international commitment at that time. Among the arguments and analyses leading to the decision to support the RAD programme, one important consideration was Norway's commitment to human rights issues.
Norwegian perspectives: the indigenous dimension

Giving priority to democracy and human rights issues in international development assistance reflects a long term commitment to a humanitarian tradition in international affairs, where indigenous issues are seen as part of larger human rights issues. Norway played an active role in the preparation of the *ILO Convention No. 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries*, and was the first country to ratify it. Likewise, in the process towards the formulation of the *Draft Declaration on Indigenous Peoples*, Norway has participated in the United Nations' Working Group in Geneva with an active delegation and a strongly worded commitment.

The Saami background

If we assume that Norway got involved in the RAD programme in order to influence its development in the 'right' direction, the Norwegian view of what would be the 'right' direction towards emancipation of indigenous peoples had been stated clearly, and repeatedly, in international fora. For some time these issues had been debated intensely in Norway, and during the 1980's a national policy began to emerge, formulated with active participation from the people concerned (Brantenberg et al. 1995, Minde 1996).

The Saami have been a marginalised group both geographically and socially, and were subjected to an active assimilation policy up to the 1950's. Subsequent to the conflict over the damming of the Alta-Kautokeino river in 1981 (Paine 1982), a period of dialogue followed, when for the first time Saami claims were taken seriously and dealt with through the established system. Two government commissions were appointed, one on Saami Rights, and one on Languages and Culture. A report on the Legal Position of the Saami (NOU 1984 No.18) recommended that the Constitution be changed, to recognise that the Kingdom of Norway is inhabited by two peoples, Norwegians and Saami. It also recommended the establishment of a Saami Parliament. The Report on Saami Culture and Education (NOU 1985 No.14) proposed a number of steps to promote language development and mother tongue education. The strides that were made for the Saami people were strongly influenced by the international movements for indigenous peoples' rights, as noted above. In this way, Norway has been directly involved in an extensive international discourse, as well as in a debate on its national implications.

The relevance for the Botswana context

To what extent, then, may the Norwegian commitment to the RAD programme be seen to reflect this general Norwegian concern for human rights, minority rights and indigenous peoples' rights? While Norwegian development assistance is not strongly tied to political, military and commercial interests, there has always been a strong moral, often missionary, emphasis on human rights issues. Such emphasis has been reflected, for instance, in steadfast support to liberation movements, and to the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. In relation to indigenous peoples, such guiding values are officially and unambiguously declared in statements emphasising "co-operation and mutual respect," and the importance of "self-identification and cultural freedom." It is reasonable to assume that this attitude, expressed at the very

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2 The term 'indigenous' has two different meanings: it is used as synonymous with 'local', or 'native', but also to describe specific structural features of a minority situation, in relation to the national government/authority. In this paper the term is used in the second, more restricted, sense.

3 Norwegian representative at the meeting in Geneva 1989, when the ILO convention 169 was adopted (GON, proposition to parliament No.102 (1989-90).
same time as Norwegian involvement in the RAD programme started up, also influenced the priorities for
development assistance to Botswana.

To unravel the precise linkages between a general concern with indigenous people, and the specific
priorities with regards to the Remote Area Development Programme, however, is to some extent a case of
reconstruction. We have seen the 'Sámi' background for a belief that Norway might have a special
competence in assisting the Botswana government to address similar challenges, aiming at improving
the situation for the Bushmen. NORAD, however, has never suggested that the policy pursued in Norway
should be replicated in Botswana. The parallels in the problems encountered have been hinted at regularly.
But respect for Botswana's non-racial policy has prevented explicit declarations from the Norwegian side
on what a recognition of the Basarwa as a distinct cultural minority might mean, and what the policy
implications of such a recognition might be. One may assume that the expectation has been that, over
time, this dimension would be easier to take up more explicitly. It is a rather sad paradox, that at the same
time as this minority dimension was first recognised as a topic in Botswana's national discourse (I would
put this point to be the Regional San Conference, October 1993), the first steps towards Norwegian
withdrawal were being taken.

In retrospect it may also be relevant to ask to what extent the arguments put forward for Norwegian
participation, and the measures Norway supported, truly added up to a policy that effectively addressed
the predicament of an indigenous people? On what level, or to what extent, did NORAD involvement
actually reflect the concerns that had been voiced so clearly in international fora? While the ideology was
clear, we find many problems on the level of implementation. Much of this had to do with the way the
target group was defined.

The problem of defining the target group

A 'client' model

While most components of the RAD programme are similar to other rural development efforts, two
aspects stand out as particular to this programme. The first is the considerable complexity of the
programme's components. The second is the ambiguity in the definition of the target group. The definition
provides a detailed description that fit the Basarwa more than any other group. At the same time it is
emphatically denied that this is a programme targeting the Basarwa. Inevitably, the programme has come
to mean different things to different people.

After a re-definition of the programme in 1978, the Bushmen or Basarwa were rechristened and given
the new designation "Remote Area Dweller" (RAD), presumed to be a neutral, non-ethnic bureaucratic
term. It is deeply resented by those who are so called. Over the years, the definition of the target group has
changed in detail, but has been consistent in being descriptive. RADs are basically defined as all citizens
who live in small communities outside the traditional village structure, and who

| tend to be poor |
| tend to rely heavily on hunting and gathering |
| tend to lack livestock |
| tend to have no, or inadequate access to land |
| tend to have no or inadequate access to water |
| tend to be marginalized ecologically |
| tend to be culturally and linguistically distinct, with another language |
than Setswana as their mother tongue
tend to have low level of literacy and little access to formal education
tend to have egalitarian political structures
tend to be a 'silent' sector politically (MLGL 1989:6-7).

This reads like a catalogue of social problems, which amply justifies a social welfare programme, and make it well suited for NORAD assistance, with its emphasis on poverty alleviation. In line with the government's non-racial policy, the target group is not defined in cultural terms, but according to socio-economic characteristics. The few cultural characteristics that are included are perceived as part of the problem description: it is a problem not to speak Setswana, and a problem to have an egalitarian political structure. The emphasis is on what the target group is lacking, in terms of important resources and (efficient) organisation and leadership. Thus, the programme does not only define a situation of scarcity, it also present a target group in terms of their perceived shortcomings and defects.

For anyone familiar with the general discourse in Botswana, the 'Basarwa-ness' of the programme is meta-communicated by the use of communicative conventions which, by their very nature, need not be stated openly. Communication about the target group refers to attributes conventionally associated with the Basarwa, who regularly are defined by negations in Botswana discourse: they belong to a primitive past, in contrast to the prosperous economy and culture of the majority, and to the margins of society, in contrast to the rapidly growing centres. At the same time it is emphatically denied that the RAD programme addresses the Basarwa specifically.

To give an example: during the Remote Area Development Conference in Ghanzi 1992, one would often see an impoverished man from one settlement who would stand up and speak about "the problems for us Basarwa." Invariably he was reprimanded by one of the organisers who emphasised that this was "a conference for poor RADs, not for Basarwa." (Saugestad 1992). This situation is confusing for everyone, but is frustrating and humiliating for Basarwa, whose very real concern about discrimination is consistently denied legitimacy.

It should be added that the ambiguity and uncertainty created by combining (implicit) cultural and (explicit) socio-economic criteria in one bureaucratic category is not always perceived and recognised as a problem, because of the considerable empirical overlap of the two sets of criteria. Not all the poor people in marginal areas are Basarwa, but most of them are. Conversely, not all Basarwa qualify for assistance according to the RAD concept, but most of them do. Empirically, the programme deals mostly with clients who are both 'Bushmen' and 'RADs', and for many practical purposes it is not always necessary to make a distinction, as a 'poor Bushman' or a 'RAD' who is Basarwa are equally entitled to the welfare provisions that the RAD programme is designed to provide. This empirical overlap makes it easy to overlook the special problems that the Basarwa encounter, and thus difficult to find solutions.

Implications of terminology

Absolute or relative deprivation is a good justification for setting up a welfare programme. However, the development objectives mentioned in the 1988 agreement noted that a basic prerequisite for Basarwa development is the "promotion and formal recognition of local institutions and leadership." To achieve this, a 'client' concept is not the best approach. Any standard manual in community development, and a whole school of 'grass root' community developers (see e.g. Chambers 1983, 1997) argue convincingly that in order to achieve development one has to take as point of departure the resources people possess. This
does not primarily mean material resources, as poverty will always be a defining feature of a development programme. But development depends on local mobilisation and local skills. It is only by recognising what people have got in terms of resources, aspirations and organisations that a programme may adequately mobilise those resources in a development effort.

To borrow a set of concepts from gender studies, it seems that the RAD programme, in its effort to be *culture neutral* has become *culture blind*. In the Botswana context, the carefully worded neutrality of the RAD programme, trying to be all things to all people, has in effect deprived the target group of a cultural identity which could have been a mobilising factor in local development. It has also deprived the target group of dignity as they are reduced to passive welfare recipients. Moreover, by disregarding cultural characteristics which single out the San/Basarwa (and other minority groups) as distinct ethnic groups, the accumulated professional knowledge about the characteristics of such groups is, by definition, irrelevant. In its place strategies of implementation are formulated according to prevailing superficial stereotypes about the Basarwa: as people of the past who, because of their nomadic disposition, have yet to learn to value village life.

The emphasis on welfare was spelled out very clearly by the Minister of Local Government, in his opening speech to the Regional San Conference in 1993:

> The beneficiaries of the Remote Area Development Programme are defined geographically and not ethnically. It is unfortunate that some people associate the term Remote Area Dwellers with Basarwa. The programme, thus, forms part of the government’s overall strategy for the integration of the marginalised and disadvantaged sections of the population, irrespective of their ethnic background, into the social and economic mainstream of society in pursuit of the national objective of social justice. (Butale 1993)

In any monitoring or evaluation of the RAD programme, it is of fundamental importance to recognise the analytical distinction between a 'welfare' concept of the target group and one that recognises their minority status as the main problem. A development programme should not only address the symptoms (i.e., poverty), but also go beyond these to look for the generative processes which create these symptoms. There is a qualitative difference between the solution that follows from whether one defines poverty or a stigmatised minority status, as the central difficulty. Even if the description of problems is similar on the level of symptoms, the choice of terminology reflects different perceptions of what is perceived to constitute the underlying causes of the problems.

If the target group is described as *Remote Area Dwellers* (RADs), the problem is seen as a matter of relative deprivation. RADs are lacking certain services; the solution is to provide what they are lacking.

On the other hand, if the target group is described as *Basarwa*, or *Bushmen*, *San*, or *N/oxwe*, this is a categorical description which calls for a recognition of the special attributes shared by this group. It means that in order to achieve some degree of equality in life chances and living standards, compared with the majority, the measures provided by the development programme need to be differentiated. This does not mean that the Basarwa should be given special privileges, but that development programmes should *compensate* for their special, and amply documented, problems.

Furthermore, while a minority-approach encourage the development and recognition of indigenous representative structures, an emphasis on the welfare dimension leads to the neglect of the need to develop such structures.
Diplomatic constraints

There are constraints of a diplomatic nature inherent in bilateral cooperation that contrast sharply with the freedom to voice progressive views in international fora. The lack of explicit statements from the Norwegian Government about the Basarwa, coupled with a visible and persistent concern for their plight, may have contributed to some prevailing perceptions among the public, based more on old stereotypes about foreign interference than on factual knowledge. Even among some academics one may hear that NORAD's position is tantamount to separate development.

A linkage to indigenous issues is indeed indicated in Norwegian documents, but at the same time it is not categorised as an 'indigenous peoples programme'. On the whole, there is much double communication and euphemism in the way this is expressed. While internal discussion in NORAD noted that support to the RAD programme would in fact be support to the poor Bushmen of the remote areas, great care was taken to avoid this terminology in official project documents. Instead the more rounded references to groups who "tend to rely on hunting and gathering" and "tend to be culturally and linguistically distinct" were used.

It is important to remember that communication about the RAD policy and programme takes place in a public space, among different stakeholders, and with different audiences in mind. Communication is not only between the two governments, but also between the governments and their constituencies. It is a proven strategy for politicians, in Botswana as in Norway, to phrase political decisions and documents in a sufficiently vague terminology to command the broadest possible support and to forestall possible criticism.

Thus, it can be claimed with considerable justification that the change in terminology to Remote Area Development, and the expressions used in RAD policy documents, have been essential in order to get the programme underway. But with equal justification, it can be claimed that the ambiguous terminology used in the programme agreement has invited much of the misunderstandings which came up at later stages of the programme, and has certainly made it difficult to reach any realistic assessment of its achievements. There are complex layers of communication and meta-communication about Basarwa in Botswana society. There was thus little reason to expect the terminology referring to the RAD programme to be straightforward, but perhaps good reasons to be better prepared for the problems in communication that arose later on.

Should NORAD have come out and stated its policy more clearly in these matters? NORAD would probably answer no to such a question, because NORAD's stated policy has been to support Botswana's policy. At the same time, the outline of a more coherent minority policy has evolved in Norway, through dialogue between organisations and in representative bodies involved in setting up committees and commissions. Norway is certainly propagating new measures in international fora. There are discrepancies between these policies and the policy of Botswana that came out clearly in some of the encounters in 1992 and 1993. But ironically, none of these events had any direct bearing on the subsequent Norwegian withdrawal, which was decided upon for entirely different policy reasons. Nor did the Botswana government -- to my knowledge -- express any desire for NORAD to withdraw as a donor to the RAD programme.
Many NORAD officials have seen the Remote Area Development Programme as a way to empower the Basarwa with regard to their status as an ethnic minority and as an indigenous people. However, to accept a perspective on the Basarwa as an ethnic group and indigenous people as a valid basis for policy measures, would lead to a different type of debate in Botswana than the one we have had so far. Norway has wanted to encourage this type of debate. Some such support is still forthcoming — but again, only implicitly — in the support to the Collaborative programme for Basarwa Research, between the Universities of Tromsø and Botswana, and in minor support to the Kuru Development Trust.

It has been tacitly assumed that it would be possible to steer the RAD programme's implementation in the 'right' direction, i.e., to contribute to a process whereby internationally recognised standards would gradually be taken into consideration, and that this would be possible whichever terminology was used. Was this a good strategy? It probably was — up to a point. But Norwegian authorities did not seem to have any clear cognizance of when that point was reached, nor were they prepared to change strategies after that point.

Norwegian involvement and withdrawal

NORAD involvement has been both persistent and persuasive, but persistence has been overtaken by events. The success of Botswana's fiscal policy and the rapid democratic transformation of South Africa have resulted in Norwegian withdrawal from bilateral cooperation, on the most cordial terms. Where does that leave the impact, relevance and sustainability of Norwegian support to the RAD programme?

The principle of recipient orientation justified the acceptance of a definition of the target group that left little room for a policy that could bring about more fundamental changes. A recognition of a special minority/indigenous position for the Basarwa, however, would require political concessions that might be seen to conflict with Botswana's other priorities for economic development procedures for political representation. By being loyal in its support to the Botswana government, NORAD has in practice aided the Botswana government's rural policy, which basically seems to have maintained the status quo in the distribution of power and property.

Obviously, interests and attitudes to these matters are not uniform in Botswana either, and a dialogue resonates differently with different people. While all bureaucratic systems strive to present an outwardly unified front of stated policies and well codified rules, there are always internal differences in terms of connections and commitments. Within the context of the RAD bilateral cooperation, NORAD's natural allies have been the more 'liberal' sections of Botswana's society, including the civil society and the university community. In view of the values underlying the initial Norwegian involvement, there should be a basis here for continued collaboration.

Beyond state-to-state cooperation

Norwegian diplomatic withdrawal was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs decision, on a state-to-state level, and was not connected to any assessment of achievements or problems connected to the RAD programme. The phasing-out, however, could have been done in different ways. For instance, there could have been an intensified involvement towards the implementation of the resolutions passed by the Regional San Conference in Gaborone. Norway could also have more actively been seeking out new alternative strategies for collaboration, following a new emphasis on human resource development, NGO support, and
institution-to-institution contact. The procedure actually followed, was to start a lengthy process of evaluation in 1993, which effectively blocked any new initiatives during the entire phasing-out period.

In international fora Norway has warmly advocated support to indigenous organisations, and the building up of representative structures that can voice their claims clearly through dialogues with governments. Norway has given, and may continue to give, direct assistance to indigenous organisations, and to support structures that may assist such organisations in gaining political concessions. Although such support, and indeed all contact with the emerging organisations have always been open and above board, the balance has sometime been hard to strike, as the events of 1992 proved. Support given, and the expression of a supportive attitude, have also opened the way for charges that indigenous mobilisation is influenced or even dominated by foreign interests.

However, such problems are structural problems, predictable within the parameters for the way indigenous organisations have developed over the last decades. All acts of international solidarity render participating nations vulnerable to charges of improper interference. In view of the considerable experience and competence in the area of indigenous relations, accumulated over years of sometimes turbulent relationship between the Norwegian and the Saami, and internationally (NOU No 5. 1997), it has been somewhat surprising that this has not justified continued support to efforts to find new solutions to the still unresolved situation of the San of southern Africa. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been unable or unwilling to adjust its own policies according to the lessons learned about ethnic relations that we have been so eager to teach the Batswana. While the experiences from Norwegian-Saami relations, and Norwegian international advocacy for indigenous peoples' rights, are persistent themes in Norwegian official rhetoric, there is little or no overlap between this field of discourse and the offices and the personnel that deal with indigenous issues as part of bilateral development assistance.

Most likely, the significance of NORAD's involvement in the RAD programme, measured in financial terms, was decreasing when withdrawal started. Several analyses have also concluded that the contribution from the RAD programme towards the mobilisation and empowerment of San/Basarwa people has not been according to expectations (Kann et al. 1990, CMI 1996, Saugestad 1997, forthcoming). The events over the last four to five years show that the momentum has changed, from originating from within a state-to-state relationship, to a situation where organisations, or the 'civil society' has become a more important driving force. This is as it should be. The basic needs of the N/oakwe can only be met through a mobilisation that involves the N/oakwe as a political constituency. And this work has only just begun.

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ONCE UPON A NICKEL MINE: MINING DEVELOPMENT, ARCHAEOLOGY AND ABORIGINAL CULTURAL HERITAGE IN NORTHERN LABRADOR, CANADA.

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Introduction

Throughout the world, indigenous people repeatedly have been faced with large scale natural resource development projects which threaten their land rights and cultural integrity. Often these projects go ahead without any form of compensation to indigenous peoples or resolution of their land rights. In those few cases where land claims settlements previously have been reached, the developments can be managed within a regulatory framework which the indigenous groups have negotiated with their encapsulating nation-states. In many cases, however, it is the juggernaut of resource development which provides both incentives and pressures for indigenous groups and states to resolve land claims, although such agreements are not always the best of possible worlds for the indigenous groups (cf. the controversies over the 1975 James Bay hydroelectric agreement in northern Québec, Feit 1985).

For the past two years the Inuit and Innu peoples of Labrador, northeastern Canada, have found themselves in the latter situation, pressured towards rapid resolution of land claims by the fast paced development of a nickel mine at Voisey's Bay. Long prior to any such land claims agreements, however, the aboriginal groups had to deal with the immediate problem of environmental impacts from the poorly regulated preliminary stages of mineral exploration and mine infrastructure development. Among the wide array of environmental impact assessments, the archaeological study was unique in that it was subject to significant control by the aboriginal groups. But this situation, and its implications for aboriginal influence on the project, did not come about without a struggle.

I will discuss the role of archaeology in this mineral development project and how the discipline made a modest contribution to empowering aboriginal people. I begin with a general discussion of the socio-economic context in Labrador, including a brief historical retrospective on archaeological practice. I then move on to a discussion of the archaeological impact assessment work at Voisey's Bay, describing the joint Inuit-Innu project set in place in 1996. I end with a few comments on the future role of archaeology in a Labrador transformed by land claims settlements and mineral development.

Labrador: socio-economic context

Labrador, the geographically largest part of the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, lies at the transition between the arctic and subarctic zones of northeastern Canada. A cold southward flowing
marine current affects the climate such that a strip of arctic-like tundra vegetation (lichens, moss, grass, dwarf shrubs) is present along most of the outer coast and the winter environment is marked by frozen sea ice, a platform which may extend up to 30 km offshore. The coast is home to a diverse array of sea mammals: seals, whales, occasionally walrus and polar bears. In contrast, the inner bays and interior areas are covered with boreal forest and the primary animal resource is caribou (reindeer). This ecological division is paralleled by a cultural division, with Inuit ("Eskimo") people concentrating their activities on the coast (supplemented by caribou hunting inland), and the Innu ("Indian") people harvesting the resources of the inner bays and interior region, especially caribou.

The Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) is comprised of about 5000 members, who are spread out in five coastal communities and the regional central place of Goose Bay in the interior (Figure 1). Within the Association is an important ethnic division between those considered to be Inuit and those categorized as "settlers." Settlers are the descendants of Europeans who homesteaded in Labrador in the 1800s and often married into Inuit families. Today, some settlers may speak or understand Inuktitut, but most are unilingual English (Brantenberg 1977, Kennedy 1982). This split has important implications for social and political organization. Generally speaking, the Settlers have more education, knowledge of the outside world, control over small businesses and wealth accumulation than the Inuit, such that the ethnic distinction also constitutes a status differentiation. These advantages have helped some Settlers attain a prominent role in LIA (too prominent, according to some Inuit). Perhaps one result of this organizational schism is that LIA has tended to take a rather low profile and more compromise-willing approach to land claims and aboriginal politics than their Innu neighbours. Another consequence is that the division constitutes a weak point which state and corporate interests may take advantage of through effective use of divide and rule tactics.

The Labrador Innu number about 1200 and are concentrated in two communities: Sheshatshit, inland near Goose Bay, and Utshimassit (Davis Inlet) on the central coast. They do not have the same problem with ethnic division as do the Inuit. In contrast to the low political profile of the Inuit, in recent years the Innu have pursued rather aggressive politics, including the use of what Robert Paine (1985) has called "ethnodramas"-- deliberately staged events. For example, the Innu protested low-level fighter-jet training at the Goose Bay NATO base by occupying the runways and being arrested (Wadden 1991), they ejected a visiting judge and police officers from the community of Utshimassit, and they built protest camps in 1995 and 1997 to challenge the recent mineral developments. The Innu have been much better at manipulating the media for their own benefit than have been the Inuit, including setting up their own home page on the Internet.

The vast majority of the province's Euro-Canadians live on the island of Newfoundland (population ca. 500,000 vs 30,000 in Labrador). Newfoundlanders have a regionally distinct culture with roots in Ireland and the English west-country, and they are very conscious of their folk traditions. Most aboriginal people live far away in Labrador, so there is little direct contact with them. Consequently, Newfoundlanders are largely ignorant of the aboriginal cultures and what little information they receive on them from the media is often negative, dwelling on social problems. The recent collapse of the cod fishery-- in what was already Canada's poorest province-- has turned Newfoundlanders even further inward, to the extent that the "usual suspects" who would be expected to support aboriginal rights (academics, environmentalists and left-leaning politicians) are preoccupied with the socio-economic problems of rural Newfoundland and are largely silent on aboriginal concerns. The mineral finds in Labrador are widely seen
as the salvation of the provincial economy (plagued by up to 20% unemployment), and aboriginal people are often seen as primitives who hinder progress. Consequently, aboriginal groups have a hard time finding Euro-Canadian allies within the province.

I think it is fair to say that Newfoundland and Labrador has lagged well behind other provinces in dealing with aboriginal issues. This situation is partly a consequence of history. When Newfoundland and Labrador became part of Canada in 1949, part of the Terms of Union were that the province retained responsibility for administering aboriginal affairs, while funding for social welfare was provided by the federal government (unlike the rest of Canada, where the federal government both funds and administers aboriginal affairs). Because of this peculiarity, and because of Newfoundland's status as the poorest province in Canada, it has been argued that aboriginal people in the province have not received the same level of services as those elsewhere in Canada (Haysom 1992). The comparative grounds for this point might be debated, but the perception is not without foundation. I distinctly remember the words of a Labrador Inuit woman who visited Greenland (a former Danish colony now under Inuit home rule) in the 1980s; in comparison, she said, Labrador seemed like the Harlem of the Inuit world.

But the province's laggard position on aboriginal issues may also be related to other factors, some of which are ideological. Although the provincial government set up in 1951 a bureaucracy to deliver social welfare in Labrador, the motivation for the program can be questioned. Kennedy (1977:281-284) has argued that the underlying rationale was "welfare colonialism" (cf. Paine 1977):

I do not believe that the province's commitment to welfare in that area was based on real needs, but rather, in part at least, on the conviction (of policy makers) that native Labradorians were, in comparison to Island Newfoundlanders, culturally inferior and thus naturally dependent on their 'big brothers'...This view that Labradorians are inferior has a long history; although softened by the altruistic rhetoric of liberalism, it basically assumes that native Labradorians are naturally incapable of managing their own affairs; that only by external guidance can their better interests, as drafted in St. John's [provincial capital], be realized (Kennedy 1977:283).

Kennedy (1977:284) also points to socio-economic components of the government's welfare ideology. Aboriginal people were to be integrated (i.e. assimilated) into mainstream society through settlement relocation and education, and in order to promote modernization, the subsistence economy had to be replaced by wage labour. Furthermore:

A physical presence in northern Labrador ostensibly administering welfare and basic services was, I believe, related to the more general (if, except for the fishery, unrealized) conviction that Labrador's natural resources might someday benefit the province-- and Newfoundland, in particular (Kennedy 1977:284).

The exploitation of Labrador as an internal colony of Newfoundland has its roots in the 18th-19th century fur trade and the large-scale 19th century cod fishery. The conviction that Labrador's resources could be a boon to Newfoundland began to be realized during the 1960s. Iron mines were established in western Labrador and the Churchill Falls hydroelectric project flooded vast areas of interior Labrador (see Zimmerly 1975 for a more detailed socio-economic history). The latter was accomplished without compensation to the Innu and resulted in the destruction of unknown numbers of archaeological sites. Only the most cursory archaeological investigations were undertaken.
The most recent resource exploitation project, which dwarfs all the others in terms of potential profits, is the mineral development at Voisey's Bay on the north coast (Figure 1). Here, literally in the backyard of the Inuit community of Nain and the Innu community of Utshimassit, is what is claimed to be the world's richest deposit of nickel (as well as copper and cobalt). The announcement of the discovery in 1994 precipitated a gold rush-like stampede to stake additional mineral claims, as well as all kinds of entrepreneurial fantasies to cash in on the discovery. As of 1996, over 250,000 separate mineral claims had been staked in Labrador. This was an easy process for Euro-Canadian prospectors compared to the difficulties Innu and Inuit peoples have had in getting the government to pay attention to their land claims.

Although the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) began the land claims process in 1975, the issue dragged on for years without resolution (Haysom 1992:182-186). At times the process was marked by the provincial government's outright hostility towards the concept of aboriginal rights itself. The previous provincial government leader (a constitutional lawyer) asserted the primacy of individual over collective rights at the same time as he emphasized the collective rights of the “people” (read Euro-Canadians of Newfoundland) to the land and resources of central and northern Labrador. Only the sudden spurt of mineral resource development since 1994 has forced the government to make land claims resolution a priority, in the face of an aboriginal threat to challenge the project in court unless significant progress was made on land claims.

The result of these pressures was a fast-tracking of land claims negotiations with the Inuit in 1996. On November 6, 1997, the provincial government unveiled an agreement in principle with LIA, although at the time of writing this has yet to be ratified by the LIA membership. Under the framework agreement, Inuit will be given ownership over 5% of the land under negotiation ("Inuit-owned Land"), along with a managerial role and hunting-fishing rights in a broader "Labrador Inuit Settlement Area." Inuit will receive 3% royalties from the province's tax on the Voisey's Bay mining project and 25% of provincial royalties from future developments on Inuit-owned land. For developments within the Settlement Area, the Inuit will receive half of the first $2 million in provincial royalties, plus 5% of additional royalties. The royalties will be terminated, however, once the average income of Inuit reaches the Canadian average. Self-government provisions are also included in the package. In addition, separate employment and revenue sharing agreements will be reached with mining companies through impact benefits agreements (Cleary 1997).

The resolution of Innu land claims lags behind the Inuit. Meanwhile, they have attempted to cope with serious social problems at Utshimassit-- problems partly related to inadequate resources and infrastructure at the settlement to which they were relocated in 1967 (Innu Nation and Mushuau Innu Band Council 1995). In recent years the Innu developed a plan to move the village to a more favourable location, but the previous provincial government was extremely hostile, refusing to provide financial support while reluctantly-- and apparently without awareness of the irony-- offering the Innu "Crown" land (already regarded by the Innu as theirs) for the new settlement. The financing for the move, which is now in its initial stages, had to be picked up by the federal government.

Archaeology and aboriginal people prior to 1996

The history of aboriginal peoples' relationship with the users and administrators of archaeological resources also reflects aspects of the "welfare colonialism" discussed above, including exploitative
elements and a lack of aboriginal control over their own heritage. I provide a brief overview to support this assertion (adapted from Baikie and Hood 1996).

Systematic archaeological research in central and northern Labrador is rather recent, having begun only in the late 1960s. This research was rather neo-colonial in the broadest sense, in that it was almost totally dominated by Americans from the Smithsonian Institution. Additionally, until ca. 1990 the archaeological work was socially detached; by that I mean it was directed towards narrow archaeological objectives and neglected the interests of local aboriginal communities, although a few Inuit were hired as field assistants in the early 1980s. Artifactual material was transported south at the end of each field season, never to be seen again by local people (or by Canadian archaeologists). It is hardly surprising that today one frequently encounters Labradorians who feel that their cultural heritage has been stolen from them by archaeologists, that archaeologists take from their land but never give anything back. On the positive side, the American archaeologists did contribute to the basic research underlying LIA's land claims (in Brice-Bennett 1977).

In 1991-92, the Innu Nation and LIA formulated a set of research guidelines for archaeologists working within their land claim areas. These guidelines included stipulations such as: acquiring community consent, filing copies of research proposals, hiring local people, not disturbing burials, providing understandable reports, etc. In 1992 the Innu Nation decided that it would issue its own permits for archaeological research. Not surprisingly, this initiative was not well received by the provincial government, whose Historic Resources Division had the responsibility for permitting archaeological research. Archaeologists were threatened with the potential denial of a government research permit if they acceded to Innu demands. The issue created a brief "tempest in a teapot", then faded.

The provincial government's Historic Resources Division maintained tight control over aboriginal cultural heritage until quite recently. The present Historic Resources legislation was formulated without consultation with aboriginal groups and until as recently as 1994, when aboriginal review finally became a condition of archaeological research permits issued for Labrador, Inuit and Innu people were offered no role in managing their own cultural heritage. A few examples will provide a good illustration of this situation.

In 1990-91 LIA became concerned about mineral exploration activities in the Kiglapait Mountains north of Nain. To assess possible archaeological impacts, they requested site information from Historic Resources, but they were denied access, presumably on the grounds that archaeological site data should be restricted to "qualified professionals." Roughly the same time, the Torneasok Cultural Centre (cultural arm of the LIA) filed a request with Historic Resources to have assembled a small artifact collection for teaching purposes in the new school in Nain. This request was also denied.

In 1994, Historic Resources took the initiative to call a meeting with archaeologists to discuss possible changes to the Historic Resources legislation. Unfortunately, although aboriginal issues were placed on the agenda at the request of some archaeologists, the Division did not invite aboriginal participants. Indeed, during the course of the meeting it became clear that government policy at the time forbade them from inviting representatives of aboriginal groups.

The first time the provincial government was forced to relinquish significant control over Labrador aboriginal culture was in response to the 1994 request by LIA for the reburial of Inuit skeletal remains from Sagleek Bay in northern Labrador. The government was placed in a virtual no-win situation, since a denial of reburial would have had very negative public relations consequences. For the first time Inuit were
able to assert control over an element of their cultural heritage, and the reburial set an important precedent for relationships between aboriginal people, archaeologists and the state.

In the winter of 1994-95, this already contentious environment was complicated by another event: the announcement of the Voisey's Bay mineral find and an acceleration of exploration activity. Given the government track record, the Innu and Inuit had understandable grounds to be apprehensive about how the mineral exploration would affect their land claims and how archaeological impacts would be managed. These apprehensions were reinforced by the 1995 developments.

The first environmental assessments of the Voisey's Bay area began in 1995, months after the mining company (Diamond Fields) had established a base camp and begun exploratory drilling. The company contracted with a large private environmental consulting firm to undertake a range of impact studies, including archaeology. The archaeological work was scheduled for the summer and fall of 1995, but the aboriginal groups were locked out of the planning process. Given their strong distrust of the research design, both LIA and the Innu Nation requested that I participate in the fieldwork as a monitor. Unfortunately, a number of serious difficulties and deficiencies were encountered during the course of the field program, and these problems were communicated to the aboriginal groups. After a protracted struggle between the aboriginal groups and the companies over the following winter, the company archaeologist was withdrawn from the project.

Meanwhile, the pressure on government to clear areas for drilling was so immense that in April 1996 Historic Resources approved a "winter archaeology" program to be conducted by two private consulting archaeologists. This program consisted of shovelling the snow cover (up to 2.5 m deep) from drill sites, thawing the ground and digging test pits. Not surprisingly, virtually nobody other than the mining company considered this to be meaningful archaeological assessment.

In sum, the first phase of the Voisey's Bay archaeological program was chaotic, inadequate, and conducted under corporate pressure. The central archaeological problem was the lack of any coherent advance or long term planning and the reluctance of the company to mandate much other than site-specific surveys (drill areas, infrastructure locations). This approach led to a highly fragmented assessment process in which bits and pieces were suspended in geographical space without being contextualized within the broader region.

There was also the political problem of the peripheral involvement of aboriginal groups. Both Inuit and Innu people had a vested interest in ensuring that the mineral developments did not have negative impacts on their cultural heritage, yet their involvement was limited to a few jobs as untrained field researchers. They had no say in the planning and implementation of the project.

Voisey's bay 1996: co-managed archaeology

Even before the beginning of the problematic 1995 archaeological field season, it seemed clear to me that the scale of the Voisey's Bay development and other mineral exploration work in Labrador would require a new model for managing archaeological assessment, a model which would help empower aboriginal people. This approach would have to be based on the premise that aboriginal people have an inherent right to manage their own cultural heritage and that archaeologists must be willing assist aboriginal groups in implementing that right (cf. Park et al. 1993, on participatory research). My proposal was that the two aboriginal groups should sidestep the private consulting companies and undertake the archaeological work
themselves. To my pleasant surprise, this proposal was incorporated into the plan for the 1996 field season.

The form of the 1996 Voisey's Bay archaeological project was negotiated by LIA, the Innu Nation and the Voisey's Bay Nickel Company (VBNC, a subsidiary of INCO, the International Nickel Company) in the late winter and spring of 1996. LIA and the Innu Nation entered into a direct contract with VBNC to undertake the archaeological assessment semi-independently, with the company retaining the same private environmental consulting firm to manage the contract and coordinate the fieldwork. The financial accounting was the responsibility of the Mushuau Innu (Utshimassit) Band Council. Each aboriginal group retained an archaeologist, myself with LIA, as did the consulting firm. The fieldwork was preceded by a training program for the Innu and Inuit researchers, which was conducted in close collaboration with the aboriginal groups. In essence, this was a co-management relationship, akin to arrangements negotiated elsewhere in Canada (cf., Roberts 1996). The other notable feature of the project was that it was the first time the two aboriginal groups had engaged in cooperative action with each other.

The fieldwork was conducted by three archaeological teams. The first team concentrated on surveys related to the exploratory drilling program, focusing mainly on the upland areas. The second team took responsibility for surveying proposed mining project infrastructure locations (e.g. roads, pipelines, tailing ponds), as well as some coastal surveys within and outside the VBNC claim area. This involved traversing a wide variety of environmental zones. The third team conducted a regional survey, mostly within the VBNC claim area, but also a few places outside the claim. Much of this regional program was oriented towards intensive test-pit surveys of relict marine and river terraces.

Each survey team consisted of a Euro-Canadian field leader and two aboriginal researchers, one from LIA and another from the Innu Nation. A total of 16 aboriginal researchers worked on the project, coming and going in two week shifts. This organization not only ensured appropriate representation, but led to interesting dialogues and some mutual education among the field personnel. For example, it was the experience and observation powers of my Innu and Inuit colleagues which resulted in the identification of easily overlooked archaeological features—stone anchors for metal fox traps (the latter having been removed)—that had never before been recorded in Labrador. Consequently, we can now use material culture to document the distribution of recent trapping activities, which were previously of low archaeological visibility.

Overall, the project worked out more successfully than I had anticipated. The negotiation of a contract defined the rights and responsibilities of the concerned parties, thus providing a normative framework within which the work could be conducted. In some cases, particularly towards the end of the field season, the company pushed the work to the utmost limits of the contract. In other cases, however, the archaeologists could use the contract as a tool to refuse or resist unplanned initiatives from the company. For example, after the private environmental consulting firm failed to forge an agreement with the aboriginal groups for a program to collect traditional ecological knowledge, the company attempted to foist their own program on all the impact assessment teams. In response, the archaeologists refused to cooperate with the initiative on the grounds that it was not in the contract, had not been approved by the aboriginal groups, and was methodologically flawed. The program was dropped hastily after pressure from the aboriginal groups.

The most important sociopolitical achievement of the project was that it probably had the greatest amount of aboriginal planning input and participation of any archaeological fieldwork heretofore.
undertaken in Labrador. Furthermore, of the various studies conducted for the environmental assessment process, the archaeological work was the one which was most subject to aboriginal control and featured the largest aboriginal representation among field researchers. It was in the context of the archaeological project that aboriginal people had the greatest opportunity to say (in the words of one of my Innu colleagues): "WE ARE HERE!" On the other hand, it was certainly the case that most of the field decisions were made by the three Euro-Canadian archaeologists rather than the aboriginal participants. In any event, I hope that the participation of a significant number of aboriginal people in the project, as well as our efforts to communicate the results to the communities, has helped raise the profile of archaeology in central and northern Labrador and demonstrated its significance in the contemporary world. Hopefully, some of the project alumni will take their experiences back to their communities and engage themselves in local cultural heritage developments.

Archaeologically, the project was the first concerted survey of an inner-bay and near-interior region in Labrador and was probably the most intensive survey which has ever been undertaken in Labrador. It resulted in the discovery of 131 archaeological sites, mostly historic or recent, but also a number of prehistoric sites, including important localities outside the claim area (Labrèche, Schwarz and Hood 1997). Although the number of prehistoric sites registered was rather modest, we demonstrated that with a sufficient investment of time and energy it is possible to detect traces of archaeological sites with very low visibility. The main archaeological failure was our inability to push the company into supporting a more extensive regional survey program to be conducted outside their claim area, although that might have been expecting too much.

The key question, though, is whether the learning experience of the 1996 Voisey's Bay project will set a precedent for the future conduct of archaeology in Labrador. I believe it will, although the terms of reference under which archaeology will be conducted may be rather different from those which have heretofore governed research.

Conclusion: archaeology in the service of indigenous peoples

The bottom line of the 1996 Voisey's Bay archaeological work was to produce the best possible archaeological impact assessment, one which would advance the goals of cultural resource management shared by both archaeologists and aboriginal people. Permeating many of our practices, however, was the concern of how the work could serve the interests of aboriginal people, providing them with greater control over their cultural heritage. I have discussed some specific contributions of the project towards this goal, but they have to be regarded as short term accomplishments. What about the long term?

In the past, archaeological research in Labrador has been strongly biased towards surveys of the outer coast, where sites are easily identified because of the sparse vegetation. In the future, if the Innu are to be assisted in documenting their land claims, we must build on the Voisey's Bay work and redirect our efforts to the inner bays and interior regions, since this is where much of Innu cultural heritage lies hidden within the spruce forests and along the rivers and lakes. Future archaeological research will benefit greatly from the active participation of Innu whose familiarity with the land may provide valuable insight for identifying the locations of archaeological sites. Ongoing community-based archaeological programs, such as those pioneered by Loring (1996), will continue to play an important role in connecting archaeology with community concerns and increasing community involvement.
Since an Inuit land claims settlement seems near, one might anticipate that the implementation of self-government and increasing Inuit administration of archaeology within Inuit-owned lands will have a profound effect on the way archaeologists conduct their research. Future archaeological activity in Inuit areas of Labrador will no longer serve the political function of providing primary documentation for land claims. Instead, a culturally relevant archaeology will be sensitive to questions of interest to the Inuit themselves and will increasingly emphasize community involvement and heritage studies in addition to the traditional research interests of academic archaeologists. In the absence of fully trained Inuit archaeologists, Euro-Canadian researchers will probably have an important role to play in the developmental stages of local archaeological heritage programs.

Labrador is on the threshold of major socio-economic changes, propelled by both mining development and land claims settlements. The role and practice of archaeology will be transformed in relation to these changes, requiring the negotiation of a new research landscape. At present we have only a vague idea as to the contours of this new topography, but it is clear that neo-colonial archaeology is dead and that collaborative research will be the norm in the future.

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THE REMOTE AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AND THE INTEGRATION OF BASARWA INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF BOTSWANA SOCIETY: THE CASE OF MANXOTAE AND MABESEKWA, TUTUME SUB-DISTRICT

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Introduction: What the Research is About
The research discussed in this paper investigates the model through which the government of Botswana seeks to integrate Basarwa into the mainstream of Botswana society. This model is inherent in the Remote Area Development Programme which aims at uplifting citizens who reside in those parts of the country that are defined by the state as “remote”. Residents of these areas are referred to as Remote Area Dwellers (RADs). RADs are characterised, among other factors, by socio-economic and political marginalisation. Despite a non-ethnic definition of the RADP’s intended beneficiaries, research has shown that a majority of RADs are Basarwa. It is the non-ethnic definition of the RADP’s intended beneficiaries that prompted this study. The study argues that it is essential for the realisation of the objectives of the programme, that the RADP’s beneficiaries are disaggregated to a level where ethnicity is used not only as an explanatory variable in understanding the marginalisation of the Basarwa, but also, as a variable in the planning of their integration. The main assumption that underlies the study is that, given the historical relations between Basarwa and other Tswana ethnicities the non-ethnic definition of the RADP’s beneficiaries impedes the effective integration of Basarwa into the mainstream of Botswana society. The invitation is to see genuine integration of the Basarwa as achievable through the adoption of policies founded on the principles of affirmative action.

The study addresses the objectives and achievements of the RADP, focusing on the extent to which the integration of the Basarwa has been achieved under the programme. Through a case study of two settlements, Manxotae and Mabesekwa, the study examines the economic, social and political marginalisation of Basarwa as a result of the non-ethnic definition of the programme’s target group.

Integration Defined
Integration is one of those terms that are widely used but whose definition is never made explicit, probably because their meanings are treated as unproblematic. Despite the fact that the primary objective of the RADP is the integration of Basarwa into the mainstream of Botswana society, at no point does the policy document define integration. Without an explicit definition, the implicit definition of integration can be deduced from what the RADP offers. When used in reference to the position of the Botswana government
in relation to the Basarwa, the term integration seems to have acquired assimilationist connotations. The term is used in reference to protracted attempts aimed at suppressing the socio-cultural and economic practices that distinguish Basarwa from the dominant ethnic groups in Botswana. The RADP package includes the resettlement of Basarwa communities into permanent settlements, the provision of basic infrastructural services and the introduction of administrative structures commonly found among Tswana ethnic groups.

These efforts have been accompanied by systematic land dispossession in which Basarwa lose their land to dominant Tswana groups. In addition, the natural resources which Basarwa exploit to supplement their income are increasingly becoming inaccessible, thus the weakening the economic base from which Basarwa draw their sustenance. As espoused by the RADP the integration exercise is undertaken to pave the way for economic ventures for other Tswana groups. This was the case with Tribal Grazing Land Policy and more recently, wildlife and mining in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve. Paradoxically, then, integration of the Basarwa into the mainstream of Botswana has tended to intensify their marginalisation.

In this study integration is placed within a democratic pluralist framework in which diversity is endorsed. Within this set up, integration mobilises the marginalised and voiceless toward active participation in their own development as well as the determination of how they interact with other interest groups, including the nation state. In this way integration becomes a democratising project in which the disenfranchised become part of mainstream society on their own terms. The integration project therefore, targets those structures that sustain the ‘exclusionist’ practices that engender economic, social and the political marginalisation of the Basarwa.

The marginalisation of the Basarwa emanates from the nature of the relationship the Basarwa have had with other ethnic groups in Botswana. This relationship has been characterised by systematic dispossession and subjugation of the Basarwa. In contemporary Botswana, Basarwa remain amongst the country’s poorest of the poor. Given this situation, meaningful integration would entail, among other things, attempts to create those conditions within which Basarwa- like any other ethnic group in Botswana- can take their rightful place in the development of their country. This would entail the right to participate in the decision-making processes that define not only their own destiny but even the development of the country as a whole. As shown later in this study, the RADP as currently constituted, offers only limited opportunities towards any meaningful integration of the Basarwa.

**Preliminary Findings**

**Background and Location of the Settlements**

Manxotae and Mabesekwa are two Remote Area Settlements that are situated in the Tutume sub-district of the Central District. According to the 1991 Population and Housing Census, the population of Manxotae was 289 while Mabesekwa had about 189 people. These settlements have some similarities in terms of location, physical accessibility and the events leading to their establishment.

Manxotae lies some 25 km upstream the Nata River and can be reached from Nata through two main routes. These are the Nata-Sepako Road and the Manxotae-Nata Lodge Road. When using the Nata-Sepako Road Manxotae is about 32 km from Nata. This route involves re-crossing the Nata River to reach Manxotae. The Manxotae-Nata Lodge Road is much shorter - 15 km- but because of the sandy terrain, it requires a four-wheel drive vehicle. Since none of the two routes is tarred, access to Manxotae is
highly seasonal with the settlement more accessible in the dry season and becoming virtually inaccessible in the rainy season.

Mabesekwa lies some 70km south-west of Francistown and, like Manxotae, there are two main routes that can be used to reach the settlement. These are, the Francistown-Orapa Road and the Francistown-Tonota-Mabesekwa road. The Francistown-Orapa Road is the most preferred by motorists since it involves a 50km stretch of tarred road leaving only about 20 km of dirt road to reach Mabesekwa. The Francistown-Tonota-Mabesekwa Road has about 30km (Francistown-Tonota) of tarred road leaving the remaining 70km as gravel road. This makes this road impassable in the rainy season.

Physical accessibility has profound effects on the general development of the two settlements. In the case of Manxotae, for example, inaccessibility (particularly during the rainy season) is often cited as one of the factors behind mass emigration from Manxotae to Nata especially by the youth. In Mabesekwa, the poor status of the roads in the rainy season hampers delivery of essential supplies to the various facilities in the settlement and its catchment area.

The two settlements emerged mainly from initiatives by local Basarwa communities. In both cases the initiatives were supported by non-Basarwa individuals who acted as facilitators. In the case of Manxotae, Basarwa initiative to establish a settlement received the support of the anthropologist Robert Hitchcock and his interpreter Mr. Mosi among others. In Mabesekwa, such efforts were supported and in fact spearheaded by a Mongwato, Mr. Selei, who lived in the cattle post area in the vicinity of present-day Mabesekwa. The point to note is that the two settlements are not RADP-initiated settlements but were incorporated into the programme. In the process, both Basarwa communities participated in selecting the preferred sites where these settlements are currently located. There is evidence to suggest that in both cases local knowledge was indeed used in locating the settlements. In the case of Manxotae, it was the availability of a relatively long-term water-holding pan and a flat terrain on high ground that made the present site ideal. In Mabesekwa, the availability of water enhanced the suitability of the site.

Ethnic Composition

Over 80% of the residents of the two settlements are Basarwa. Other ethnic groups that constitute the population in the two settlements include Bakalanga in Manxotae; Bakalanga, Bakgalagadi, Bangwato and Bakhurutshe in the case of Mabesekwa. The non-Basarwa sections of the communities include mainly civil servants, amongst them primary school teachers, tribal police personnel, court clerks and agricultural extension workers. Inter-ethnic relations appear to be cordial and intermarriages between Basarwa and Bakalanga seem to be quite common in Manxotae. In response to the question of whether such settlements should be inhabited exclusively by Basarwa, the majority of the respondents pointed out the importance of the intermingling of ethnic groups.

Despite the cordial relationships, there is evidence that points towards areas of inequality and potential conflicts between Basarwa and non-Basarwa ethnic groups. The retail outlets in the two settlements – a general dealer in Manxotae and liquor-restaurant in Mabesekwa- are owned by non-Basarwa. Another area of possible conflict concerns crop-damage by cattle. Cattle are mainly owned by non-Basarwa living within the settlements or in their vicinity. Claims for compensation for crop-damage by cattle is usually contested and it is during such disputes that ethnicity is used to demean each other. In one incident in Mabesekwa, when a Mosarwa whose crops had been destroyed by cattle complained to the
owner, she was told “ka je tjetjeni.” meaning “go and live on “tjetjeni berries” Such is viewed by the Basarwa as depicting the “inhuman nature of the Kalanga. In one incident quite unaware of her own discriminatory remarks, a Mosarwa woman in Manxotae stated “mokalaka gase motho, ha dikgomo tsa gagwe di go jetse mabele o bua le ene, o go ra ya a re “nkhwa a ana nda” meaning, “Bakalanga are inhuman; if you complain when his cattle ravage your crops, you are told that a Mosarwa has no business to own a field. Such cases are, however, uncommon. According to the headman of Manxotae, “ga go nke go thoka dikgogagano” meaning, “disputes and misunderstanding are part and parcel of every community”.

In neither settlements was there evidence that Basarwa were leaving the settlements as a result of the influx of non-Basarwa ethnic groups. Instead, the one thing that seems to be driving Basarwa from these settlements is lack of viable sources of income. Emigration to other settlements is particularly serious in Manxotae. This is due to a combination of factors that includes a weak economic base and the settlement’s physical inaccessibility. Instead of applying for a plot in Manxotae, Manxotae youth usually apply for one in Nata. As a result, an entire ward in Nata is made up of people from Manxotae. Over 70% of the respondents in Manxotae had a family member in Nata. For most households, there is a second home in Nata. Emigration to Nata is viewed as undesirable by many residents of Manxotae and, in fact, there are fears of it developing into a ghost settlement. As one disappointed resident of Manxotae put it in reference to the youth emigration, “re ne re direla bone jaanong ba re tlogela ba ya go aga ko Nata. Re sala mo matoteng one a” which means “we established this village for our children but they are now leaving for Nata and leaving us behind in a deserted and desolate settlement.” These fears are shared by teachers at the local primary school who indicated that the number of parents transferring their children from Manxotae to Nata is increasing.

Social Services and Infrastructure

Infrastructural provision in the settlements includes primary schools, a health post in Manxotae and a clinic in Mabesekwa. The two settlements share health and educational facilities with other communities within what is in both cases an extensive catchment area. In the case of Manxotae, the catchment area extends over a 50 km radius, while for Mabesekwa it extends over 32 km. What should be emphasised is the fact that the population of the catchment areas consists mainly of Basarwa living at cattle posts where they are employed as badisa- herders.

In terms of water supply, Manxotae depends on water drawn from Nata. A council water tanker (bowser) makes about two trips daily from Nata to deliver water to the settlement. Work to install a water pipeline from Nata started around August 1997. This will ensure a much more reliable and less expensive way of supplying Manxotae with water. Mabesekwa, on the other hand, enjoys a good water distribution system from a relatively reliable council borehole.

In both settlements there have been complaints concerning the lack maternity at the clinic and health post. This should be understood within the context of the health service hierarchy in Botswana. Within this hierarchy, maternity facilities are only provided for health units at the top end of the hierarchy. In the case of Manxotae, the situation was even made worse by the lack of a vehicle and the health post has to rely on vehicles from either Nata or Sepako- some 30 km away. As a result of the lack of maternity facilities, over 80% of the baby deliveries in Manxotae take place at home. This causes disquiet among the health staff and the community at large. The picture is not any different in Mabesekwa, where labour-
related deaths have been reported. Expectant mothers are requested to go and await the delivery date in Francistown or Tonota, where such facilities are available.

Health and educational workers are dissatisfied with community attitude towards their facilities which have been interpreted by the staff as casual. With regard to health services, the main complaint is the high default rate among patients, especially TB patients. With regard to education, the main complaint from teachers was the irregularity with which some pupils turned up for school. Cases in which children miss school for months were reported as common. In one case in Manxotae, one child missed school for almost six months only to reappear the following year. In Mabesekwa where there is an abundance of thewa (grewia flava and grewia bicolor), there are reports of pupils disappearing at playtime to go on berries gathering trips.

Of interest are the innovative and creative strategies employed by some health and education staff in dealing with these problems. The health team in Manxotae vigorously embarks on follow-ups and home visits. With regard to infrequency in school attendance, instead of striking the pupils off the register as required by the Ministry of Education, teachers in both settlements re-admit such pupils. In fact, in the case of Manxotae, successive head teachers of the primary school are known for tracking down and bringing back pupils who decide to drop out from school. In one widely cited case, the former headmaster of Manxotae Primary School had a running battle with one of the pupils who, despite having passed well at standard seven, did not want to proceed to secondary school. The head teacher followed the pupil and caught up with him at a cattle post some 60 km east of Manxotae. After a successful completion of form three the young man returned to the cattle post but again the headmaster followed him up. The young man did complete form five and then flatly refused to go to the university!

In the case of Mabesekwa attempts to sensitise parents on the need for children to attend school regularly have included the establishment of Counselling and Guidance Committee. Such efforts among extension staff bring relief and hope to those concerned with the plight of the Basarwa and should be enhanced.

With regard to environmental quality, the two settlements are to varying degrees characterised by sub-standard housing structures. Environmental quality in this case refers to the constructed features of the environment and to the general cleanliness of the settlements. Environmental quality is important in that it has a bearing on the health standards of the local population. In Manxotae, two-thirds of the houses consist of incomplete structures. Plot boundaries are quite often not demarcated and despite large family sizes, the average number of houses per plot is two. This usually results in high densities per house which can be dangerous in the event of communicable diseases.

The architectural style common in the two settlements is similar to what is found in major settlements in Botswana. The building materials range from wood, grass and mud to the so-called modern building materials- cement and corrugated iron roofs. The structures are generally of poor quality and could, in fact, be a major hazard in the event of heavy rainfall. The poor housing structures, especially incomplete houses, were the subject of a kgotla meeting in Manxotae. In defence of the poor structures, residents blamed the flood that engulfed the settlement early this year.

General sanitation in the two settlements is still rudimentary. However a pit latrine construction scheme has recently been introduced in both settlements. The programme requires a Pula 30 down-payment, upon which the council provides the pit latrine substructure, leaving the individual to finish off
the superstructure. About 15 and 10 households enlisted for the programme in Manxotae and Mabesekwa respectively. The problem is that for most households even the Pula 30 down-payment is too high.

**Political and Administrative Institutions**

Manxotae and Mabesekwa both have a kgotla classified in the tribal administration hierarchy as a customary court of records. The headman handles criminal cases, and oversees the activities of tribal policeman and court clerks. In terms of ethnic origins, whereas the Manxotae headman is a Mosarwa, the Mabesekwa headman is a Mongwato who grew up among the Basarwa. Both headmen were popularly elected by the people within their respective settlements. The election of a Mongwato headman for Mabesekwa was not without controversy. While the headman appeared popular among the Basarwa for the leading role he played in the establishment of Mabesekwa, his popularity was not shared by some influential individuals in Tonota. This group consisted mainly of non-Basarwa people who lived in Tonota and had close association with Mabesekwa. This group sponsored a Mosarwa candidate who lived in Tonota and was not familiar with the problems of Mabesekwa. In the interest of the welfare of the people of Mabesekwa, as opposed to ethnicity, a Mongwato was therefore headman in Mabesekwa.

Both settlements have the following committees: the Village Development Committee (VDC), Parents Teachers Association (PTA) and Village Health Committee (VHC). These committees are dominated by Basarwa and, in fact, in both cases the chairpersons of the VDCs are Basarwa. Research indicated that the committees are largely ineffective. In Manxotae, the inactivity of the VDC is ascribed to the youthfulness of the committee members, while in Mabesekwa the chairman is singled out as responsible for the demise of the VDC. It is argued that he fails to turn up for meetings and if he does his meetings end abruptly, without any conclusions. The story of the Village Health Committee in Mabesekwa is not different from that of the VDC. The committee has never met since it was established in 1996. According to the Family Welfare Educator, the VHC members want to be paid just like the VDC. As a result of the failure of the members to meet, the FWE has been working with the village choir to address the public health issues which the VHC ought to be addressing.

The inactivity and dormancy of development committees in the two settlements is a serious blow in that it deprives the communities of forums where the plight of the communities could be discussed. This further entrenches the political marginalisation of the Basarwa. The committees are dominated by Basarwa and quite often the advisors or the extension officers servicing these committees are non-Basarwa. The extent to which the extension staff officers who find themselves working in these communities are prepared to work with Basarwa is in some cases questionable. While officers such as teachers, nurses and assistant project officers (RADP) find themselves working in what they correctly viewed as positions requiring special skills, none of these officers indicated ever receiving such training. As pointed out earlier, some have adapted to the situation quite well and have come up with innovative ways of dealing with the local communities. The inactivity of the committees is a clear indication that having the committees dominated by Basarwa should not be an end in itself. Instead, it should be accompanied by strong support from the extension staff with the sole aim of making the communities realise the value of these committees in providing the basis for a dialogue between the local communities and the state.
Economic Base

The economic marginalisation of the Basarwa is apparent in the weak economic base for the two settlements. As a result, the settlements are characterised by high levels of unemployment and general poverty. The only reliable source of income is agriculture, particularly in Manxotae where over 60% of the respondents indicated that they had fields. Despite a large percentage of those involved in agriculture, the actual cultivated area is in the majority of cases less than 2 ha, a phenomenon attributable to lack of draft power. Agriculture is less common in Mabesekwa since it was not until recently that land was set aside for ploughing purposes and the fields are still to be developed.

For both settlements, regular employment has only been through the drought relief projects (namolo leuba). Occasionally, local residents are employed temporarily as labourers in small scale development projects that might be taking place in the settlements. In Manxotae, for example, in July/August 1997, the Department of Water Affairs employed about 80 people from Manxotae to help with the digging of a trench for a water pipe-line running from Nata to Sepako via Manxotae. In Mabesekwa, some construction work at the primary school created temporary employment for about 10 local residents. Though not confirmed by the research, “placing” might be one of the livelihood strategies employed by Basarwa families in the two settlements. Over 80% of the respondents indicated that members of their families were either working or looking for jobs in the nearby major settlements of Nata and Francistown. In such cases remittances were reported received from these members of the family.

Poverty among the residents of the two settlements can be traced back to the economic exploitation Basarwa suffered under other Tswana groups, particularly the Ngwato royals. Manxotae is largely made up of people whose parents looked after cattle belonging to the Ngwato royal family. These cattle were stationed at a place called Saxa which lies some 15 km east of Manxotae along the Nata River. The respondents claim that following the demise of Tshekedi, they were dismissed without any form of compensation and were left to fend for themselves. The story from Mabesekwa is similar: the majority of the respondents emerged from their association with Bangwato royals with virtually nothing.

For most respondents, this situation is aggravated by lack of access to information. This is mainly information concerning government-sponsored programmes and schemes such as the Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP), the Arable Rainfed Agricultural Programme (ARAP), the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) etc. Most of these schemes remain unknown or incomprehensible to the Basarwa. In those cases where the schemes are known, the procedures to be followed and requirements to be met before accessing the funds are not well understood and quite often beyond the means of the residents. It does appear that the projects apply standard requirements irrespective of the communities within which they are dealing. In most cases, it is naive to expect local communities posses the skills and means to take advantage of these programmes. With regard to the down-payment for FAP projects for example, Basarwa can utilise the Economic Promotion Fund (EPF) but it is other requirements that discourage, and in fact, disqualify Basarwa from utilising such schemes. Of the major obstacles cited, those posed by the Land Board are the most ridiculous. In the case of Mabesekwa, it was the overzealous Tonota Sub-Land Board that deprived a significant number of Basarwa from utilising the fencing component of ALDEP. It does appear that, unless a conscious attempt is made to make such schemes accessible, they are likely to have a minimum impact on the lives of the local communities. The contention here is that conditions governing access to the schemes should be relaxed to take into account the economic marginality of Basarwa.
The EPF-sponsored projects have made very little impact on the economic advancement of the two settlements. In fact, in Mabesekwa, the fate of three such projects - a tannery, cattle and goats schemes - testifies to the gross mismanagement of EPF by some officers. The tannery has since closed down while both the goats and cattle schemes never went beyond the first recipients.

Planned exploitation of natural resources within the vicinity of the two settlements could possibly offer an economic lifeline to the two settlements. Although gathering and hunting do not play a major part as income generating activities in the two settlements, both settlements are endowed with an array of veld products. In Manxotae, these include mokolwane and mosene, the main raw materials for basketry. Mabesekwa is surrounded by a predominantly mophane (colophospernum mopane) vegetation which makes the area a good habitat for phane worms (gonimbrasea belina). The viability of veld products as a source of income in the two settlements has been reduced by, among other factors, an exploitative marketing system and, in the case of phane in Mabesekwa, lack of control of resources by the local community. Lack of control over local resources has meant that the community in Mabesekwa has to face fierce competition from other communities over resources found in the vicinity of Mabesekwa.

**Issues Emerging from the Research**

The evidence from the two settlements points to major defects within the RADP as a strategy through which the integration of the Basarwa could be realised. As shown in the preceding discussion, physical infrastructure - schools, health facilities and potable water provision - and the so-called modern institutions - kgotla, VDC, VHC PTAs, Farmers' Committees - are all in place. Given the nature of the communities in these settlements, it does appear that it is not enough just to establish these structures without making sure that they are actually of benefit to the communities. Perhaps what is required is something similar to community mobilisation and the enthusiasm that characterised the atmosphere in which these settlements were established. In fact, Manxotae used to have a viable craft industry which has since died. The settlement actually used to host workshops on several issues pertaining to remote area settlements. It appears that this was a period when both settlements enjoyed the services of "facilitators" or, in their own terms a "volunteers". Hitchcock is reported to have been active in selling items from the Manxotae craft industry. His departure left the craft open to exploitative marketing which led to the demise of the industry. In the case of the tannery in Mabesekwa four people were actually sent to the Rural Industrial Innovation Centre (RIIC) in Kanye where they received training in leather works. Mismanagement led to the closure of the tannery and ways of reopening it have not been explored with vigour.

Attempts at community mobilisation in the two settlements are hindered by the absence of any active Community Based Organisations (CBOs) or even NGOs. In Manxotae, Mr Mosi's attempts to set up the Bosele Rural Aim could provide a forum through which communities in the Nata River settlements could work towards self-improvement. In Mabesekwa, an association known as Maja Phohu (literal translated - those who eat the eland) was recently established. It does appear however that it is not well known in the settlement and has never been active.

Government officers in these settlements - especially the RADP's Assistant Project Officer - complain about the lack of support from and proper consultation by officials at the sub-district headquarters. It is possible that the lack of support is indicative of failure on the part of the district officials to appreciate the special needs of the communities within these settlements.
Future Research

Although data analysis for the present research project is not yet complete, a number of areas which call for future research and intervention strategies are beginning to emerge. At least three such areas have been identified:

i) Revival and or introduction of income generating activities in the two settlements. The starting point would be the revival of the craft industry in Manxotae and the re-opening of the tannery in Mabesekwa.

ii) Enhancement of the activities of the two CBOs - Bosele Rural Aim and Maja Phohu. This would help not only in articulating the needs and plight of the Basarwa, but also in mobilising and general awareness raising among the Basarwa people in the area.

iii) Mapping of natural resources in the two settlements and their catchment areas. The aim will be to enhance the control and management of natural resources by the communities in the study area.
This paper presents the findings of a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) carried out in Tshokwe, Botswana, in August 1997. The PRA was carried out by two colleagues within the project. These are Dr B Acquah from the National Institute of Research and Documentation (NIR) within the University of Botswana, and Ms D Keboneilwe, from the Ministry of Agriculture. Both of them are agricultural economists with extensive knowledge of the PRA technique. This PRA is an initial step in a larger research project which will compare Basarwa in Tshokwe and Diphuduhudu in terms of:

a) social organisation;
b) livelihood strategies;
c) contact and interdependence with non-Basarwa outside Basarwa settlements.

Initially, work will focus on establishing reasons for differential response to change among households in the same ecological setting. Attention will be given to variation in the adaptive strategies followed by different households. In this connection, a case study of Tshokwe will be made. This is because this settlement has a longer history than Diphuduhudu. At least nine months will be devoted to studying Tshokwe. Following that, similar work will be done in Diphuduhudu, lasting about the same time. Eventually, broad comparisons will be made between the two settlements. Although at this point the comparisons will be at the community level, they will be centred on household strategies in different ecological contexts.

Tshokwe

Tshokwe is in the hardveld. Its residents use the Setswana language for communicating among themselves, although a number of them know and speak Sesarwa dialect. Basarwa in Tshokwe (and in Diphuduhudu) subsist heavily on subsidies from the government. While they previously depended on cattle owners for subsistence, they now depend on the state. They do very little hunting because they are confined to their settlements and the wildlife population has been very much depleted. Their self-determination has now been significantly reduced compared to their situation prior to congregating in Tshokwe.

Tshokwe is situated between the Motloutse and Shashe rivers in Bobirwa, about 18 km north of Tobane. It was first settled in 1984, mainly by squatters from cattleposts in the neighbourhood. Seven boreholes have been drilled to secure a potable water supply. Residents still depend upon water deliveries by bowser for their domestic needs (although a low-yielding cattlepost borehole should soon supplement
this source. Many Council-funded developments and extension services have been withheld for the past 10 years pending provision of a safe permanent water supply. The primary school, however, has been physically expanded. There are at least 8 cattleposts within 12 km of Tshokwe, the closest being 5 km away. Competition for grazing land and other resources is intense and there is little scope for expansion as the population grows in the future.

1. Demographic Data

1.1 Population Size and Composition

1990: 326 (de facto). Average household (av hh) membership: 6.6. 36 reported absent.


1993: 408 in 62 hhs. Av. hh membership: 6.6. 160 reported absent

Some 200 people from the surrounding cattleposts make use of facilities in Tshokwe.

Women are heads of 20 (32%) hh.

216 (53%) people were below 16 years of age.

Ethnic differentiation:

54 hh Basarwa
5 Bangwato
3 Bakalaka

60 hhs listed Setswana as their common language. Only 2 claimed they speak a Sesarwa dialect at home.

1.2 Population movements

In 1990, many people had been registered as residents because of the influx of drought relief recipients who came from surrounding cattleposts. Subsequent reductions in population can be partly attributed to the cessation of drought relief projects.

Of 160 people absent in 1993,

48 were working
15 were seeking work
39 were at school
10 were visiting
48 were absent for other reasons.

44 hhs. had been established at Tshokwe for more than 8 years while 6 had settled in the past 3 years.

2. Infrastructure

2.1 Domestic Water Supply

Lack of potable water at the settlement site has been the single greatest factor limiting development for Tshokwe residents. Since 1987 a Council bowser has delivered water to Tshokwe (and Lepokole) from the Shashi river. Water is stored in a 9m ground tank which is normally filled in a weekly basis.

Surface water is seasonally abundant in ephemeral streams and rivers. For part of most wet seasons, livestock are not limited to grazing around water points, and residents have an alternative supply. Sand
river aquifers are another reliable source of water in the area, but are located some 15 km away from the settlement.

### 2.2 Livestock Water Supply

Most livestock are watered at the Shashe river some 18 km north of Tshokwe. A few stock are watered at neighbouring cattlepost boreholes, though most owners are reluctant to allow this without payment. Livestock are occasionally also watered from domestic supplies, though this is fairly strictly controlled by the community.

Seven attempts to provide the settlement with a potable ground water supply have failed. Plans to pump water from Morele on the Shashi by pipeline have been shelved following debates over sustainability and escalating construction costs. The Council has repossessed a low yielding cattlepost borehole 2 km away. Water from this source should soon be supplementing existing sources. Longer term plans are to reticulate water to Tshokwe and Polometsi via a transfer pipeline from Letsibogo dam.

The lack of potable reticulated water supply is seen by the community as a major obstacle to development. Water shortage has affected the provision and development of physical infrastructure as well as economic opportunities such as livestock rearing, horticulture, trade and business.

### 2.3 Housing

Well-built houses at Tshokwe belie the poverty of some residents who built them when it was relatively easy under the terms of their employment under the drought relief programme. House design and construction at Tshokwe is far superior to that found in most eastern Botswana villages.

### 2.4 Government Staff Housing

There are 6 VDC staff quarters, each with a pit latrine, Tribal administration offices, a covered kgotla shelter and a VDC storeroom.

Council/RADP-funded standard infrastructure will be provided only when a permanent potable water supply has been secured, according to CDC policy. VDC plans include construction of two more staff houses through drought relief. Requests submitted to CDC include improvement of the road to the Shashe river water collection point.

Tshokwe residents are determined to develop their settlement with or without assistance from the Council, despite questionings concerning the long term viability of the site, given the surrounding land use patterns.

### 3. Access to land

As of December 1993, 61 residential plots and 46 arable fields had been allocated by the Ngwato Land Board. Residential plots are in a grid pattern along tracks, and are much more closely situated than plots in most other RAD settlements. Arable lands average 2 ha, a figure that is higher than the average for other RAD settlements.

There is no provision for a communal grazing lands allocation for Tshokwe, and no available space between existing cattleposts for extensive grazing lands or expansion. Tshokwe has always been a densely
populated and intensively used cattlepost and land use area. However, lack of water for cattle means that most of them will continue to be kept in Shashe river.

4. Health
There is one Enrolled nurse in Tshokwe. The Female Welfare Educationist (FWE) post is vacant. There is no health education activity in the absence of FWE. There is health post with a pit latrine, but no radio or dedicated vehicle. Fortnightly mobile health services are conducted from Sefophe clinic. Health facilities here may be used by almost 1,000 people. But no children were considered to be at risk of malnutrition in December, 1993. The Village Health Committee (VHC) is no longer functioning.

5. Education
There is no preschool. There is a mud and thatch private primary school. The headteacher notes that enrolment has been constant since 1990, despite a rise from 70 to 112 between those dates.

There is a literacy group leader who is teaching two groups of approximately 15 members each. There is a high illiteracy rate of 74% among residents in general. Educational standards are very poor. Standard 5 leavers from Tshokwe continuing their education in Tobane have to re-start in Std 3. This is in part due to the qualification of the teachers. Many of these pupils drop out. Pregnancy and accommodation problems plague them. Pupils staying with non-relatives outside Tshokwe complain of mistreatment, despite the fact that they are given P40 food ration monthly and uniforms through the RADP.

6. Staffing Situation of Settlement (Nov 1993)
- Principal Remote Area Development Officer: stationed at Serowe, visits only occasionally.
- Senior Remote Area Development Officer: post vacant.
- Remote Area Development Officer: stationed at Bobonong, visits regularly.
- Remote Area Development Assistant: post vacant.
- Assistant Production Officer (APO): posted to Tshokwe 1991.

Since the APO was posted to Tshokwe, she has worked hard to initiate these projects:
- LG 127 projects: four school buildings.
- Economic Development projects: since 1991, training has been provided for selected Tshokwe residents in five different skills areas. During the 1994 survey, 4 production groups were operating. In addition, assistance has been given to basket making.

7. Other Social and Community Development
- Assistant Community Development Officer visits monthly from Bobonong to distribute destitute allowances.
- Drought relief coordinator based in Bobonong visits weekly.
- Agricultural extension: the Agricultural demonstrator based in Tobane visits 2/3 times per month.
• Veterinary services: the veterinary assistant based in Tobane visits fortnightly.
• Tirelo Sechaba participants: 1 at the health post and 1 at the school.

8. NGOs
Co-operation for Research and Development (CORDE) has assisted both the sewing and carpentry groups with group formation, production and management skills, and agricultural activities.

9. Drought Relief and Destitute Programmes
Drought relief is the major source of employment in the settlement. Community leaders said many members of the community also rely on drought relief for food rations. At the time of the survey, there were 7 drought relief projects:
  • kgotla shelter construction
  • VDC storeroom construction
  • kgotla office construction
  • expanding and de-stumping cemetery
  • fencing cemetery
  • toilet construction at cemetery
  • brick moulding.

10. Economic Data
10.1 Employment Levels
Each of the 7 projects had 11 employees and 60% of those employed were women. The participants are rotated every two months. When the projects are fewer, there is a systematic attempt to select one participant from each dependent household.

96 people (50% of the de facto population over 16 years) claimed some form of paid employment (59 under Namolo Leuba). 291 people (145m/146f) were unemployed at Tshokwe in November 1993. Of these, 63 residents (27m/36f) were engaged in some type of unpaid work.

Of the 62 households interviewed, the following skill areas were listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill Area</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>building</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fencing</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>herding</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hunting</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tanning</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gathering</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic servants</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sewing</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knitting</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
crafts (11)
carpentry (0)
blacksmithing (7)

10.2 Destitutes

There were 7 group A and 10 group B destitutes registered in Tshokwe at the time of the survey (9% of the de facto population over 16 years of age).

Observation: The APO has been active in planning for Namola Leuba projects and in getting numbers of people employed through the programme. Consequently, there are fewer destitutes registered at Tshokwe per capita than any other settlement surveyed in 1993.

10.3 Economic Promotion Fund

With EPF funds, selected residents have been trained in five production areas. A summary of the number of people trained and the current status of each production group is given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Productivity Activity</th>
<th>Project Status</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activity Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bone Carving</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>n/start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Carving</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>n/start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basket Making</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 hired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 hired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knitting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 hired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 hired</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sewing group: each member of the group was provided with a sewing machine. APO makes regular follow ups weekly. Products sold locally or in Tobane and in other neighbouring settlements.

Knitting group: very active, produces goods and garments regularly, marketing some in S/Pilcwe.

Basket making: 4 women using traditional skills to weave baskets. No training

Bakery: baker is VDC chairman, attended courses at RIIC. P200 from FAP and P208 from RADP.

10.4 Livestock

35 hhs. (56%) reported owning no goats. Of the livestock owning hhs., 17 (27%) report keeping 214 cattle and 44% keep 385 smallstock. Livestock ownership is skewed in favour of Bangwato and Bakalaka households. Numbers of stock owned exceed reported figures in some cases.

Six Basarwa households reported keeping 81 mafisa cattle and four others keep 62 mafisa goats. There are no RADP livestock schemes in place at Tshokwe due to a lack of reliable water supply. Tshokwe residents apparently own only about 7% of the livestock sharing their communal grazing areas.
10.5 Cultivating Crops

46 hhs. were allocated arable lands (av. 2 ha) by the Ngwato Land board at the time of the survey. Thirty households reported owning ploughs. However, only 13 (21%) were cultivating crops during the 1993-94 season, despite assistance from the government in the form of subsidies like seeds, land fencing, ploughs and donkeys. Maize, beans, melons, sweet reed and sorghum were planted.

An arable lands area of about 1900 ha has been demarcated and is now protected by a drift fence built under drought relief. Arable agriculture potential is much greater at Tshokwe than at any of the sandveld settlements, and most households are better equipped to cultivate crops, yet this was obviously not a priority coping strategy during the period of our field-work. Shortage of draught power was mentioned as a constraint by some households while 158 donkeys were counted in Tshokwe in December 1993. Only 20 households claimed ownership of donkeys.

10.6 Gathering Veld Products

A wide variety of veld products are used at Tshokwe. Members of almost every household gather some veld products on a seasonal basis. These include mogwana, mophane worms, thatching grass and mophane building poles.

Veld products can provide a very lucrative income for many households in Tshokwe. Mophane is sold in neighbouring villages at P25 per bucket. Thatching grass is sold to people in larger villages during rainy seasons. Mogwana is eaten as berries and sold as an ingredient in local beer.

10.7 Hunting

No special game licences are issues to Tshokwe residents due to low game numbers in the region. Many residents poach animals and arrests are common. Four respondents admitted owning a rifle and two admitted trapping small game.

11. Local Institutions and Leadership

According to the Councillor, village committees fail to thrive because members are usually unaware of their roles, responsibilities and the skills of conducting meetings. Attendance is poor in kgotla meetings except when drought relief jobs are being allocated.
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (CED) AND BASARWA COMMUNITIES IN BOTSWANA

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Introduction

The multiphase marginalization experienced by Basarwa in Botswana is a function of structural inequalities emanating from decades of slavery and serfdom. Because the post-colonial government did not have the welfare of Basarwa at heart, they did not develop sufficient infrastructure to facilitate improvements to their socio-economic conditions. Instead of changing and transforming oppressive institutions reminiscent of the old order, to create a foundation for empowerment and growth after independence the Botswana government pursued and continues to pursue development policies that are inadequate and inappropriate relative to the problems and needs of Basarwa. This has led to calls for new perspectives on development and the formulation of development strategies that suit the special circumstances of the Basarwa.

In this discussion, I will focus on Community Economic Development (CED) as a strategy that seeks to address in an integrated manner social, economic, political, and personal factors that militate against efforts towards positive social development of Basarwa communities. The paper begins describing the Basarwa situation and outlines the problems they face. Next, it focuses on CED. Finally, the Basarwa situation and CED are linked.

Characteristics of Basarwa communities

Hitchcock et al. (1987) made an interesting observation that the quality of life for most indigenous peoples in Africa and elsewhere has declined as a result of interaction with more complex systems not only because of exploitation, but also because of environmental destruction or dispossession. A combination of factors, including population pressure, technological change, labour withdrawal, provision of handouts, and paternalistic development policies, has served to undermine the traditional socio-economic systems of indigenous groups.

The Basarwa, an ethnic minority in Botswana, are among the few indigenous populations that are left in the world today. Although there is some evidence to the contrary (see Wilmsen, 1989), it is generally believed that they have lived a predominantly nomadic mode of life centering on hunting and gathering. The activities of the post-colonial state, with respect to the control and use of land resources, wildlife and tourism have dispossessed the Basarwa of land, and including hunting areas. This has ultimately forced them into permanent settlements coordinated by the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP).
Today, Basarwa communities comprise mainly small settlements, experience high rates of unemployment and limited capacity to generate income (Mogwe, 1992; Kann et al. 1990). As a result, poverty tends to be more widespread and absolute than in Tswana villages. The level of poverty is often indicated by poor shelter, inadequate food resources, low levels of nutrition, excessive alcohol intake, high levels of poverty-related diseases such as tuberculosis, inadequate clothing, poor sanitation, high dependency ratios and lack of cash and purchasing power (see MLGL, 1987). According to UNICEF (1989), about 90% of the Basarwa especially those in the settlements, depend on food rations to meet their survival needs. Some Basarwa live in camps provided by their farm employers and may be chased out at the whims of their employers. Generally, the Basarwa farm labourers are underpaid and live under the most squalid conditions (Mogalakwe, 1986).

The national government did not do much to ensure that Basarwa own land of their own as an ethnic group. It is quite safe to conclude that Basarwa are the only ethnic group in the country who do not have of their own land. At a political level, Basarwa have inadequate representation both at the local constituency and parliamentary level (there are few Basarwa councillors); they do not have a chief of their own in the House of Chiefs; they do not have representatives in the land allocation institutions (many of them live on ranches where they work or in settlements determined solely by government). It is only recently that a few Basarwa headmen are emerging (Mbere and Matsvai, 1993). The outcome of all this is that Basarwa as an ethnic community suffer infringements upon their dignity because they lack self-awareness, and the self-confidence to articulate their issues (Mogwe, 1992; Hitchcock, 1992)

**Current efforts to ameliorate the basarwa situation**

The government of Botswana developed a Basarwa Development Policy in the early 1970s in recognition of the underdevelopment which confronted Basarwa at the time. The policy was a precursor of development plans currently undertaken by the government of Botswana to address Basarwa problem. Current plans as contained in a technical Project Memorandum prepared for National Development Plan 7 includes among others the following (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996):

- Provision of land, The focus is on land for residential and arable purposes, as well as access to grazing areas (though no policy guidance is given).
- A campaign to combat negative attitudes in land boards and other institutions relevant to the distribution of land rights.
- Hunting rights through distribution and issuance of special game licences to Basarwa living in Wildlife Management Areas.
- Economic activities are promoted through Economic Promotion Fund (EPF).
- Labour intensive works compensate the settlements for the withdrawal of draught relief programmes.
- Continued provision of water, education and health services.

Although these plans have in some instances succeeded in addressing some of the above-mentioned problems, they have had little impact on people's ability to raise their living standards permanently above poverty levels. They also have the disadvantage that they generate a culture of dependence and further undermine the potential self-sufficiency of Basarwa communities.
Community economic development (CED)

There is a lot of literature on CED. However, given the diversity of its origins and current evolution, there is no consensus on its precise definition among practitioners and academics (Jacquier 1994, Perry 1980, Shragge, 1993). The main features of the debate over the definition of CED are described below; Blakely (1989:4) describes what he calls "local economic development" in the following terms:

"local economic development refers to the process in which local governments or community-based organizations engage to stimulate or maintain business activity and/or employment opportunity in sectors that improve the community use of existing human, natural, and institutional resources".

In this view, local development is aimed at increasing community's capacity to adapt to change and at encouraging and supporting entrepreneurship.

Perry (1980), Lemelin and Morin (1993) see CED as a means of transforming low income communities through community-based businesses, job creation and job protection. In contrast to this emphasis on the pursuit of local economic growth, another perspective emphasizes community empowerment (Swack and Mason 1987, see also Fontan 1993, Lewis 1994). They define CED as:

"an effective and unique strategy for dealing with the problems of poor people, powerless people, and underdeveloped communities. As an intervention strategy in an underdeveloped community it does not seek to make the existing conditions in the community more bearable. Instead, CED seeks to change the structure of the community and build permanent (new or changed) institutions within a community. As a result, the community begins to play a more active role vis-a-vis the institutions outside the community, and residents of the community become more active in the control of community resources. The starting premise for CED is that communities that are poor are in that condition because they lack control over their own resources".

CED as a strategy for integrating social and economic interests seeks to promote a real sense of community participation in, and control over, decision-making processes involving the allocation of resources at the local level. Goldenberg (1978) articulates this point: (CED) is a bottom-up approach to social change that relies upon action and skills of a community in its implementation. Thus the basic premise and strategy of CED revolves around local ownership and control of community resources. Brodhead (1994:3) provides a checklist of a CED initiative. CED must:

- Be a response to or emerge from underdevelopment and marginalization at the community level.
- Seek to build local capacity to plan, design, control, manage and evaluate initiatives aimed at revitalizing the community.
- Be inclusive, not exclusive, in its outreach—enabling disadvantaged and disempowered groups in the community to create partnerships with others interested in a sustainable future for the community.
- Favour medium and longer term approaches over short term quick fixes to job creation.
- Ensure that benefits accrue directly to the community at large rather than primarily to individuals within the community. Also, wealth should be generated and circulated within the community.
CED approaches represent a turning away from centrally-based development efforts toward those that are more community-based. It advocates a reduced role for the government in the development of marginalised communities, such as the those of the Basarwa, and an enhanced role for community-based organizations. Proponents of CED envisage decentralised and devolved structures of governance and assume that ordinary people have the potential and capability to manage their own affairs, that is, they can articulate their own priorities and organise around them. The rational for CED includes the following:

- Governments all over the world, particularly in developing countries, are finding it increasingly difficult to plan and direct all development activities from headquarters. This has proved inefficient and very expensive in the face of dwindling national incomes, leading to questions about where additional capacities for development management can be found (Honadle, 1985).

- Bureaucratic approaches to dealing with problems of poverty, unemployment and social exclusion have proved unworkable, hence the need for communities to manage their own development efforts can no longer be ignored (MFDP, 1997).

- The focus of CED is not on the development of communities but rather on the establishment of institutional and human capacities at local levels which can contribute to broader developmental efforts (Uphoff, 1984).

- It emphasizes the promotion of "bottom-up" development approaches but at the same time not neglecting the positive contribution that may come as a result of "top-down" efforts. It is paradoxical that where traditions of central control predominate, "top-down" efforts are necessary to initiate "bottom-up" endeavours.

CED strength lies primarily in its community approach in dealing with problems of poverty, unemployment and social exclusion. Proponents of CED strongly believe that community organizations are generally more responsive to the needs and problems of the local people. Further, they are more likely than governments to have the interest and skills to adapt development projects and programs to local conditions. There may be some continuing assistance from outside, but it should be given in ways and on terms that do not displace people's own efforts to generate income, enhance their quality of life or create infrastructure. Thus CED seeks to enhance the well-being of the community at large by increasing economic activity, as well as empowering community members. For example, many CED organizations focus on education, employment and training needs of community members in an effort to improve the quality of their lives.

Linking ced to the Basarwa situation: what could work?

When I asked myself this question, "What would be the appropriate strategy for the development of Basarwa communities?" I came to a very simple provisional conclusion that the strategy should not be paternalistic nor patronising but should be empowering and sustainable. It is important to note that in Botswana there is controversy surrounding the effectiveness of traditional development efforts employed by government agencies, which focus only on individuals and not the structural forces that impinge upon peoples total environment. It is within this broader framework that an attempt will be made to show how CED could be employed to address the Basarwa situation.
From the foregoing discussion two things are clear 1) the appalling situation and under which Basarwa live; and 2.) the potential of CED. Two questions arise: a) how can CED be employed in Botswana to deal with the problems of the Basarwa?; b) what is the appropriate role of CED in relation to the government with regard to addressing the Basarwa problem?

Hitchcock (1992) notes that over the past two decades Basarwa have formed local action organizations in an effort to ensure the protection of their rights and promotion of development. These grassroots organizations range from Village Development Committees (VDCs) that plan development strategy, to multi-purpose organizations that engage in everything from agriculture to running small businesses and providing day-care services. While the effectiveness of these community-based organizations has been somewhat uneven, there is no doubt that they have served to stimulate self-help and enhance the quality of life in Basarwa communities.

CED is unique amongst growth and development approaches because it insists on advancing social goals while pursuing economic development. Most conventional approaches to economic development do not include a clear position on social goals. As a holistic approach to development, CED insists on the inclusion of both social and economic objectives (Galaway and Hudson, 1994). Thus CED is a strategy that seeks to enhance the material well-being of communities without sacrificing their social wellbeing.

A number of Basarwa communities have embarked on development activities that are sensitive to both economic and social goals and have proved to be sustainable over the long term. The community of Zutshwa in the Kgalagadi District has initiated a desalination project which produces salt. This salt is then sold to people in other communities. The Kuru Development Trust in northern Ghanzi District has initiated a whole series of innovative development activities (Nthomang and Rankopo, 1997). In other parts of the country a number of Basarwa communities have suggested establishing small-scale rural enterprises such as bee-keeping, sewing, woodworking, horticultural and agroforestry projects, as well as poultry production units. These initiatives suggest that many Basarwa communities are working hard to develop their own communities. These efforts are very important in helping to shape their future as the government continues to change and adopt new development strategies. A CED strategy is recommended for Basarwa communities in that it: 1) employs a diversified set of approaches; 2) allows local people to take part in all discussions and decisions about their own development; 3) enables communities to have a final say over the kinds of projects to be undertaken; 4) invests a lot of resources in training, employment creation and retention activities; 5) facilitates a process whereby communities can pursue their own social and economic development in places of their choice; and 6) promotes the establishment of a large number of employment opportunities and capital for loans to individuals and groups in Basarwa communities.

Given the above linkages, it is important for Basarwa communities to have not only a developed vision of CED, but to transmit it over time as a guide to organizational action. Without this vision, the organizations will likely be absorbed by the state as is the case now, through both the process of funding and partnership.

While ideas suggested by CED in addressing the Basarwa problem are not always easy to implement, it is hoped that people are learning valuable lessons from their experiences. Many of them will realize the constraints they face in building institutions and pursuing actions that will help promote development and help bring about sustainable livelihoods. Continued involvement and participation of Basarwa communities in CED related activities have resulted in large numbers of them now taking part in the
political process, as was evident in the 1994 general elections, in which Basarwa were able to elect several district councillors and sub-landboard members. Basarwa organizations such as the First People of the Kgalagadi are making a great contribution to mobilise Basarwa to stand united and fight the government’s oppressive policies, such as the re-settlement policy. A combination of greater political participation and involvement in community-based development activities will help ensure a more balanced approach to the development of Basarwa communities.

Conclusion

To conclude, there is a need to look at the appropriateness between CED strategy and the situation of Basarwa communities. Linking CED to the situation of Basarwa communities, brings into focus the role of people as participants or partners.

CED views people as interacting within their social, economic and political environment. The degree to which they interact successfully is dependent upon both their participatory competence skills and the opportunities for participation within that environment. The nature and character of Basarwa communities calls for appropriate intervention strategies that encourage the participation of people in their own development. CED strategy offers hope since it is based upon the strengths of the people and views the development of empowering relationships as a means of increasing the possibilities for positive change.

Bibliography


Introduction

In 1996 the Basarwa Alcohol Abuse Action Research Project was set up to help and support Basarwa communities in Ghanzi District, Western Botswana, in their struggle to cope with the ever-increasing problem of alcohol abuse. In order to do this effectively there was a need for the baseline information necessary for a community needs assessment. This was primarily an assessment of individual and community alcohol patterns including type and strength of alcohol and any other psychoactive substances used; quantity, duration and frequency of use; type of use e.g. experimental, social, chronic, chaotic; motivations for use; level of knowledge about alcohol and its effects; gender differences in the use and abuse of alcohol. In particular, an assessment was needed of both the costs and the benefits of alcohol use to the individual and the community so that realistic and achievable intervention and prevention strategies could be developed based on a harm reduction model.

The aims of the project were not based on an abstinence model where the only goal is to stop people drinking completely. Rather the project was based on a harm reduction model where the aim is to reduce the level of risk and harm to the individual, the family and the community. Harm in this context refers to health-related harm, both physical and psychological; social harm, for example breakdowns in personal and family relationships; and economic harm, such as poverty and lack of employment. It should be noted, however, that concerned groups within the communities themselves perceive an abstinence model as the only ‘workable’ model for Basarwa. As non-drinkers, or ex-drinkers who are now abstinent, they have little faith in a model where controlled, responsible alcohol consumption is one of the primary goals. However, this is not the only goal of harm reduction and one example from recent fieldwork experience illustrates only too well the scope and potential of viewing alcohol-related problems from a harm reduction perspective.

On a dark moonless night around 8:00 p.m. in D’Kar, a settlement 40 kms North-East of Ghanzi, I visited a shebeen with my ‘cultural interpreter’ Nico. It was the end of the month and people had money available to binge drink, a common pastime if the money is available.

From what I could make out from the available light source, two candles burning in the doorway of the shebeen, there were between 20 and 30 people milling around in various states of intoxication. A ‘ghetto-blaster’ was blaring and some people were dancing. When people recognised me they asked me to
buy them a drink, which I did. After about 30 minutes I left as it wasn’t easy to talk to people above the noise-level of the music, and almost impossible to do any observation because of the darkness.

The next morning, I learned that ten minutes after I left a young man had been stabbed in the neck, arm and chest, allegedly by a young woman over an argument concerning a borrowed cigarette. The young woman, who had no history of violence or heavy drinking, denied that she was the assailant.

From a harm-reduction perspective, the addition of one hurricane-lamp in that situation would have provided enough light so that a person attacked would at least have had an opportunity to see their assailant coming. There would also be no doubt about the identity of the assailant.

Although in no sense condoning irresponsible or problematic drinking, a harm-reduction approach acknowledges that people have the right to drink if they so wish and that only they can realistically decide when it is time to stop drinking. Harm-reduction strategies ensure that risk, harm and injury are kept to a minimum until such time as a person reaches that point in their drinking career when they decide to give up drinking completely.

The Context

Indigenous groups in developing societies live in very different socio-economic, cultural and political contexts than do similar groups in Australia, Canada, Norway and the USA. While indigenous people in ‘modern’ contexts, based primarily on a capitalist culture of consumption, often experience difficulty in accessing services due to poverty, lack of private or public transport, and remote location, those living in ‘developing’ contexts may have few services available at all, or, if there are services they may be under-funded, under-resourced or culturally inappropriate. In a similar manner, government policy and legislation in the ‘developing’ context may not even recognise indigenous groups as requiring any special provision because of their extreme marginalised, impoverished and powerless nature, which may not be that much greater than the rest of the population. Botswana, for example, does not recognise the Basarwa as any more ‘indigenous’ than any of the other ethnic groups in the society. Indeed, in a ‘developing’ context such as that of Botswana, where 48% of rural households live in poverty anyway (Government of Botswana, 1997), this has profound consequences for understanding alcohol use and abuse in settlements.

In 1986 The Presidential Commission on Economic Opportunities recommended that the Government of Botswana remove any existing restrictive regulations «in order to allow all Batswana to engage in various forms of commercial activities in the informal sector. Shebeens were accepted as a commercial and social reality» (Molamu and Manyaneng, 1988, 86).

In effect this legitimised the production and sale of ‘home brews’ such as khadi, bojalwa and nyola, as well as the commercially-available sorghum-based beer chibuku, as an important source of income for impoverished rural households, particularly those that were female-headed. A licence was only needed to sell proprietary brand beers, wines and spirits.

Undoubtedly this policy resulted in a proliferation of unlicensed ‘shebeens’, or ‘spots’ where alcohol is brewed, sold and consumed. Shebeens in the context of Basarwa settlements, however, are very different from the type of ‘up market’ shebeens often found in the townships of South Africa, for example, where people also go to eat, dance and socialise in a bar or restaurant type of environment and where ‘shebeen culture’ plays a central role in many communities (Macdonald, 1996, 131). Indeed, ‘shebeens’ in settlements are typically only people’s homes, although some may be modified with the addition of chairs,
music and the sale of tobacco. Interestingly from a harm-reduction perspective, some shebeen owners reported that they provided no facilities because otherwise people would stay too long and drink too much which might lead to arguments and even violence. Similarly, some shebeen owners only brewed 20-50 litres of *khadi* for sale each day when it was obvious they could have sold more, such was the demand. When asked why they did not do this, they replied that if people stayed and drank more they would get drunk and cause ‘trouble’. This way the ‘trouble’ was moved to another shebeen and the risk of harm was substantially reduced for the shebeen owner.

It also needs to be said that of the 20 shebeen owners interviewed, 3 were Basarwa, the rest were Bakgalagadi, Baheero and Batswana. This highlights one of the main problems related to the alcohol trade, that even in their own communities the Basarwa are principally consumers of alcohol, not vendors. Although some Basarwa do brew for their own consumption, they very rarely sell to others. Their very strong cultural norms relating to sharing prevent this and, if broken, might lead to ridicule or social exclusion. In essence, what this means is that the Basarwa are further impoverished and move closer towards destitution as a result of purchasing and consuming alcohol with the attendant problems that this typically brings. For members of other ethnic groups the production and sale of alcohol may be their only economic salvation and the difference between living in bearable poverty or unbearable destitution.

Government policy that encourages such entrepreneurship and models of economic development in impoverished and marginalised communities helps to legitimise the schisms, tensions and troubles caused by the inequities and inequalities of the alcohol trade. On a different level, some communities are concerned at the ease with which ‘outsiders’ are granted licences for bottlestores in their settlement. It was alleged by the chief of one settlement that when government officials were confronted about this, they replied «but this is development, you cannot stop development».

A controversial solution to this problem has been raised in one settlement where the community has the possibility of owning its own bottlestore. While abstainers within the community are set against this, others realise that by owning and controlling their own bottlestore, profits from the sale of alcohol could be ploughed back into community development projects, alcohol sales could more easily be controlled, and the bottlestore could be used as an outlet for health information and advice on alcohol-related problems. If a community-owned bottlestore did not offer credit to its customers, however, it would have little chance of success. A key feature of the alcohol trade in settlements is the credit offered by most shebeen owners and on which most drinkers are dependent, especially in the middle of the month when funds are more limited. Similarly, it has been verbally reported that cooperatives are not viable in settlements because, although they offer lower-priced goods than commercial shops, they do not extend credit to their customers.

**The Research**

1) As already stated, the research component of the project was designed to elicit information about patterns and types of alcohol consumption in four Basarwa communities in Ghanzi district. This will provide part of the baseline data necessary before any intervention or prevention strategies can be successfully developed.

West Hanahai and East Hanahai were chosen as ‘typical’ small settlements within the district with populations of around 300. D’Kar was chosen because it was a relatively developed and wealthy settlement which houses Kuru Development Trust, an organisation that provides relatively well paying
jobs for nearly 100 Basarwa, mostly from D’Kar itself. It has a large population of around 1400. The fourth community, Maipayfela was, until recently, the main squatter settlement in Ghanzi, although it is now a development area where the council allocates plots for building. As is the way of things, a new and smaller squatter settlement now exists outside the demarcated roads and fencing of Maipayfela.

It has a ‘floating’ population and is visited by people from other areas in Ghanzi Town, from other settlements throughout the district, and by Basarwa living and working on outlying farms. It was chosen on the basis that it represents the likely future for ‘urban’ Basarwa in Botswana.

2) A small scale social mapping exercise was conducted in all four communities in May-July 1997 by the project’s three research assistants. Basically, this was to find out how many retail alcohol outlets existed in each area, as well as to provide information about numbers and types of customers in selected outlets.

In D’Kar, with an adult population of around 750 (approximately 50% of the population of any Basarwa settlement is likely to be children), there was one licensed bottlestore, one licensed shop and 24 shebeens selling khadi, nyola or chibuku, or a combination of these.

In West Hanahai, with an adult population of around 200, there were six khadi shebeens (although not all were regular) and three unlicensed shebeens selling chibuku, nyola and, illegally, cans of beer. In East Hanahai, with a similar population, there were 8 retail outlets. One of these was run from a teacher’s house where chibuku was sold to raise funds for the school!

While the population of Maipayfela fluctuates, with outsiders coming in to drink and socialise, there were 23 alcohol outlets. One of these was a more ‘modern’ type of shebeen with lighting, seating with tables, a roof and a huge sound system. The sound system was so loud that residents were known to come and cut the speaker wires after dark to stop the noise level. One of the other shebeens, although unlicensed, blatantly displayed a ‘menu’ outside its door advertising beer and ‘hot stuff’ (spirits) as well as khadi, nyola and chibuku.

3) Over a ten day period in August 1997, 41 drinkers and 20 shebeen owners were interviewed in the four communities. Unfortunately two of the principal researchers were not able to be present for the fieldwork, so this was a lower number of interviews than anticipated and the ‘focus groups’ we had intended to ‘convene’ in some selected shebeens never took place.

The main purpose of this part of the research was to gain first-person phenomenological accounts from drinkers of the stages of their own drinking careers. In any sociological research process it is important to start with the ‘first-order concepts’ of the social actors themselves before interpreting the data through the ‘second order concepts’ of the researcher. This is particularly important if any ‘action’ based on the data is to have any meaning and practical applications for the drinkers themselves.

What follows is based on semi-structured interviews conducted with 23 drinkers in D’Kar, 18 males and 5 females. It should be noted that the interview process necessitated an interpreter, who also acted as ‘cultural interpreter’ of the drinkers behaviour and drinking spots visited. Without this help, interpreting the answers, as well as the researcher’s observations, would have been more difficult. Some of these interviews were conducted in Setswana by one of the research assistants, a Mosarwa Social Science student from the University of Botswana.

For the methodology purist, ‘sampling’ in the context of interviewing drinkers, especially in a Basarwa community, is fraught with problems. Interviewing drinkers, in any situation, is never easy. There are
problems related to immediate sobriety levels, memory and recall of inebriated episodes, and the tendency to under-exaggerate consumption levels and amounts of money spent on alcohol. The first drinker I encountered on my first day in D'Kar was drunk, aggressive, riding a horse bareback, and did not want to be interviewed. I later encountered his brother, who was equally drunk, even more aggressive, and certainly did not want to be interviewed, although he did agree to do so when sober. Subsequently I met him three times over the next few days and he was drunk each time. When I eventually met him sober, he was very shy and almost apologetic, but made some other excuse to be interviewed. The second interview I conducted almost disintegrated as the woman agitatedly said «when are you people going to do something for us, all you ever do is talk, talk, talk ....».

Alcohol Consumption Patterns: «It's a Medical Thing ...»

Twelve of the drinkers started drinking alcohol early in the morning, usually before 9:00 a.m. Various reasons were cited for this, for example, «lack of food at home», «to stabilise me from the night before», or simply, «because the drink would be finished by that time». Five people, however, did not start drinking until the afternoon or early evening. One because he would then go home and sleep, whereas if he drank in the morning «I will get drunk, abuse people and fight». For some people it depended on contingency factors such as money or how they felt at the time, while others said they could not start to drink until they had eaten something, «after breakfast, because you cannot drink without food or you will weaken». Two people drank before going to work at 8:00 a.m., then drank again at 5:00 p.m. on completion of work. They were mindful that they had to be «fit for duty» the next day, and controlled their consumption accordingly.

When asked «How often do you drink now?» people tended either to say «everyday» (7) or «at weekends only» (5).

Others qualified their answers by saying that it depended on the availability of alcohol, available funds, whether they felt stressed or not, or «when I am happy» or «when somebody gives me some». One man said he would not accept drink from friends because «they only give me the leftovers with spit in it».

Ten people said that if they had more available money then they would drink more often. As most people only have money towards the end of the month this is when most drinking takes place, usually in the form of ‘binge drinking’. It should be noted, however, that there is no professional or clinical agreement as to what constitutes ‘binge drinking’ (ICAP, 1997). It is a culturally relative concept and is often used in a morally pejorative sense.

How much alcohol people drank in a «typical day» varied considerably from «two cans of beer are enough» to «20 litres of khadi if I have the money». Certainly the majority of people interviewed could be considered as serious problem drinkers based on their reported daily consumption rates, for example: «up to 10 litres of khadi»; «up to 20 litres of khadi»; «a case of beer or 15 litres of khadi»; «a half bottle of pushkin vodka and 4 cans of beer»; «three bottles of red wine»; «10 litres of nyola»; «a half bottle of brandy and two cans of beer»; two half bottles of pushkin vodka, 12 cans of beer then a half bottle of clubman mint punch».

A «typical day», however, can be interpreted as those days when a person has the money available to drink as much as they want, particularly at the end of the month. Some people, perhaps more realistically,
qualified their answers by saying that they didn’t really know as they shared their drink with others, or it depended on who they were drinking with.

All the drinkers had a relatively sophisticated and detailed personal knowledge of the perceived effects of different types of alcohol which informed their choice of drink, although this was sometimes contradictory in nature. While one person said «I take vodka because it burns the chest and stops me coughing. Its a medical thing», another said, «I would never take ‘hot stuff’, it hurts my chest and makes me cough blood». Another said, «I prefer pushkin (vodka). It easily makes you drunk but without a hangover», while one said «I only drink khadi, nyola and beer, but never ‘hot stuff’. It is too strong, I will die». One man said, «if I can afford ‘hot stuff’, because it heals the body».

Indeed, what was most interesting about expressed preferences for certain types of alcohol was that they were largely based on notions of self-medication, either to promote health or to avoid sickness. Two people drank only khadi because it contained ‘protein’ and ‘pure ingredients’. One man, albeit mistakenly, said, «I prefer red wine. It is like a medicine. When you are ill it makes your liver better and gives you an appetite for food». Another person considered beer as giving him an appetite, whereas drinking nyola or khadi «makes you lose your appetite». This may well be the case, because the main reason for drinking khadi and nyola seems to be to suppress hunger. Two people said «Castle beer, because then I can belch. It gets rid of biliousness»; while others claimed: «nyola. Unlike khadi it does not give me hiccups and running stomach» and «only cans of beer. I was told when I was young that if you drink nyola or khadi, you would urinate in your blankets».

In terms of preferences for certain types of alcohol, then, this clearly illustrates that, although sometimes misinformed, this group make rational choices based on personal harm-reduction strategies.

Motivational Accounts for Drinking: «It’s a Social Thing....»

It is acknowledged that the reasons people give for starting to drink are not usually the same as those given for continuing to drink at a later stage in their drinking career. In the case of this group, however, the reasons for onset of drinking are very similar to the reasons why they continue to drink now.

The range of social reasons given for starting to drink were wide in their personal meaning and included: «my friends were drinking with girls, so I had to drink to get a girl»; «my friends influenced/persuaded me» (7); «other people seemed happy when they were drinking, so I joined them»; «I felt left out when people drank. When they drink they walk with an air of superiority». The main impression is that people, particularly younger people, were socialised into drinking through friends and work colleagues with some pressure and persuasion being used to encourage them to drink. One person even said that he felt he had been «tricked into drinking by my colleagues».

The other main reason given for starting to drink was hunger. Eight people stated that they took alcohol to stave off hunger and «just to keep going». One person said he assumed it was food because his parents gave it to him, and, similarly, one 60 year old man said, «when I saw my granny take it I thought it was food. She used to brew khadi for herself and I used to steal it from her! I liked the sugar». One person said he didn’t really know why he started while another said, «because I was away from home and lonely (at school), it helped me to forget».

The reasons given why people continued to drink, in some cases 20 to 30 years later, were very similar. Eleven people cited mainly social reasons, particularly the use of alcohol as a social lubricant, for
example, «it creates more friendships», «to socialise with others, it makes me forget about unemployment», and «I’m too quiet if I don’t drink. It helps me to speak to others». Five people reported that hunger was still the main reason while, noticeably, four people said it was a way of coping with stress, forgetting about problems, «thinking less» and «feeling happy». Four others said they didn’t really know why they continued to drink as it had «no real benefits».

Apart from hunger, the reasons for drinking given above are normative throughout most modern societies where alcohol consumption is part of the culture. In terms of a process of change model, most, although not all, of the drinkers acknowledged that they had problems with their drinking. This means that they are at a contemplative, rather than a pre-contemplative stage, with regard to changing their drinking habits (Macdonald and Patterson, 1991, 139).

**Alcohol-Related Problems**

Asked if they had problems relating to their drinking the majority of people said ‘yes’. People were prompted as to whether the problems were health-related, financial or to do with social relationships. While seven people claimed that they had no health-related problems, some qualified their answers by saying «apart from hangovers». Eight other people just admitted that hangovers, or babalase, were problematic, causing vomiting, headaches, increased heart-beat and «pains in the body» from falling down when drunk. Two people said they had problems with their liver, one said he couldn’t breathe at night because of problems with his chest and one vomited blood when he was drunk. In these latter two cases over-consumption exacerbated what was most likely TB. One other man claimed «drinking caused TB in my body».

Eleven people reported that buying alcohol caused financial problems. They spent too much money on drink, even to the point of having «no money for shoes». One person claimed «I’d buy alcohol before trousers» while another succinctly suggested that «alcohol is a disaster in money». Two people claimed that they would only buy alcohol after food, one saying «I look at my shoes, look at my kids, look at the food, then go drinking».

In terms of relationships, five men said that alcohol caused misunderstandings and quarrels with their ‘woman’ while six other people claimed that alcohol generally led to arguments, the use of abusive language and «speaking roughly» to others. Three people said they got into fights, or were beaten when they were drunk, and another said «I slap my spouse».

**Stopping Drinking**

From the perspective of future intervention strategies, the most interesting finding from the interviews is that eighteen of the twenty three drinkers had completely stopped drinking at some stage in their drinking career, although all had resumed drinking again. This shows that, given certain conditions, people can stop drinking. The main problem, common to all alcohol intervention strategies, is the prevention of relapse.

Six people stopped drinking for periods between 3 months and one year for health reasons. Sometimes this was on medical advice, for example, due to hepatitis, and sometimes because a person fell ill due to alcohol abuse. One man said «a long time ago, I stopped for 3 months. I was drinking too much
and nearly died, so I became frightened. A ghost came to me in a dream and told me that if I stopped drinking, I would die, so I started again». Another man also stopped for 3 months, «I had twisted my neck and was sick. I think I was bewitched to start drinking again, somebody wanted me to be a slave of alcohol».

Another common reason for stopping drinking was a lack of money. Four people reported this, including one who stopped for a year and another, more typically, who said «I stopped for one month or so, then when I had the money I started again». Significantly, two people stopped because they were working on farms where they were ‘paid’ with food, so were not hungry at that time. Other people talked about ‘unspecified’ problems or «losing my appetite for drink» which resulted in stopping drinking, although six people said they resumed again because of social reasons, for example, «I missed socialising. You need to be drunk to respond to drunks». One man said that he had stopped drinking «3 or 4 times» for 3 months each time, «I get ashamed when I go home and insult people. However, I started again. If I’m drinking women will know I have money so they will talk to me. They don’t like talking to me when I’m sober».

Generally, people expressed their reasons for resuming drinking in extreme terms, such as longing, craving and temptation. One man who had never been able to stop drinking said, «No, it is not easy for me, I am used to drinking. Even if I am asleep I dream alcohol».

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This brief presentation of some of the interviews conducted in Basarwa settlements indicates, as would be expected, an extensive range of individual responses as well as common patterns and trends of drinking careers. The information will be reported to Basarwa groups themselves in the next stage of the action research process. This will enable informed choices to be made about future intervention and prevention strategies for dealing with the undoubted problems of alcohol abuse in these communities.

References


PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH: A DEVELOPING WORLD RESEARCH PARADIGM FOR CHANGE?

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Introduction

This paper gives an outline of some of the problems encountered by people living in the remote areas of Botswana, and reports on some results from a Participatory Rural Appraisal undertaken by myself and two other colleagues, namely: Dr Samora Gaborone and Dr Francis Reimer. The main intention of the study was to have the parents themselves, of Remote Area Dweller (RAD) children, to identify ways of improving their children's access to formal schooling. At present RAD children are the most disadvantaged in formal schooling as they never complete schooling and continue to remain outside school as the 'missing children' from the school system.

Socio-political background to Botswana

Modern day Botswana is hailed as Africa's success story both economically and politically. At independence, Botswana was counted amongst the world's poorest countries with scant resources and almost no infrastructure. However, the fortunes of the country have since changed, and this has been as a result of the discovery of diamonds and other minerals and a persistent democratic tradition of elections every five years coupled with good governance. Botswana has remained a good example of a multiracial society during the height of apartheid in neighboring South Africa. The country has also been viewed as an island of stability during the turbulent period of the liberation wars that plagued Southern Africa.

Politically, Botswana has continued to follow a conservative democracy model. The Botswana democratic party has been at the helm of government since 1966. However, since the 1989 general elections, the main opposition party, the Botswana National Front, has been steadily gaining the support of the electorate. This challenges the government to review, in particular, some of its development strategies and bring about appropriate reforms. At an economic level, the country's wealth has been steadily increasing over the years. Botswana has the third strongest economy in Africa, after Libya and Mauritius. At present, the country's foreign reserves are valued at $5 billion (approximately P20 billion). This almost miraculous economic advance is attributed mostly to the prudent fiscal policies Botswana has followed over the years.

The greatest challenge to Botswana has been to bring about an equitable distribution of the nation's wealth through the provision of infrastructure, such as roads and schools, to all parts of the country. The rural areas remain the most disadvantaged in the country in terms of such facilities. They also remain the areas with the highest population, standing at 55% of the total population according to the 1991 census.
As a result, government, through its successive national development plans since 1968, has had rural development as its priority. Since its inception in 1982, Botswana's Rural Development Policy has mainly succeeded in the provision of infrastructure and social services to the rural areas. However, access to land, income generating opportunities and marketing facilities are still elusive for individuals residing in the rural areas. The most affected, referred to by some as "the poorest of Botswana's poor," are the Remote Area Dwellers (RADs) who remain dependent upon government's subsidies in the form of drought relief (namola leuba) aid from the RAD program and destitute rations (Gulbradsen and Nleya 1986 and Kann et al. 1990). The term "Remote Area Dwellers" was coined largely to dissociate the Remote Area Development Program from any particular ethnic group. Nonetheless, it continues to be perceived as a denotational reference to the country's Basarwa population.

Some strategies for the development of Remote Area Dweller communities

Recent history concerning both Botswana's remote ethnic minorities and the Basarwa living within the country's borders revolves around official policies toward the country's remote area dwellers, dating back to the country's 1974 Bushman Development Program, which was designed to assist men and women who had been displaced by the development of freehold ranches in the Ghanzi district, through to today's Remote Area Dweller Program (RADP). The Program has undergone several transformations, mapping political issues and changing opinions about ethnicity and nomenclature, but the overall aim and objectives have remained constant. RAD programs have all aimed to improve the standard of living of the country's most remote residents through the establishment of organized settlements, the allocation of land for settlement dwellers, and the provision of basic education, health, water and sanitation services and income generation support to settlements theoretically on an equal level with non-RADs. In addition, the definition of RADs as living in scattered settlements circumvents the country's rural development guidelines which set official village populations at more than 500 people, and thus allows infrastructure development in smaller RAD settlements.

However, despite 20 years of government efforts, the RADs have remained poor, marginalised and dependent on government support. A 1990 review of the Accelerated Remote Area Development reveals that "according to estimates made by the RAD Program, up to 90% of all RADs were dependent upon food relief in the period between 1982 and 1990" (Kann et al 1990:11). It is further argued by Hitchcock and Holms (1993) that this dependence is related to the program's major flaws. They assert that:

- land allocated to the settlements has no relationship to the number of residents in the settlement;
- the settlement, residents do not control access to land resources and receive little assistance from the government to stop trespassing;
- settlements have no income-generating capacity and men and women will stay in them for only as long as they function as distribution centers for famine relief.

A justification for a community participation strategy

Although Botswana's Rural Development Policy as initially set out in 1982 is holistic and community oriented, in practice the programme has been most successful in its provision of rural infrastructure and services. The government's policy and development strategies for the remote rural areas have also been
characterized by a centralized, top-down approach. As a result, most of the remote rural communities still show lack of sense of ownership and support to development services provided in places such as schools and clinics (Tshireletso 1995). A community participation approach to rural development is suggested by the National Development Plan 8 (1998-2003) as a means of enhancing community involvement in development and minimizing dependency on government support. Community participation as an approach to rural development is perceived as encouraging local community support to local community development projects through utilization of community-based resources and skills. This process builds the community's capacity to organize itself, empowers people to understand and influence decisions that affect their own lives and leads to a greater sense of responsibility for the projects that are undertaken. The process also guarantees that development initiatives are grounded on felt needs, measured in terms of readiness to organize and to contribute.

Although the government of Botswana continues to encourage community participation in locally-based development projects, many communities, particularly the most remote, continue to lack the capacity to initiate and implement their own initiatives. However there have been notable efforts by some non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Kuru Development Trust and the Botswana Orientation Center to use Participatory Research Appraisal (PRA) to enhance development at the rural community level.

PRA has been developed from the Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) techniques which were mostly used in the agriculture, health and nutrition sector. PRA is a shift towards participatory analysis. It turns the "expert" paradigm that is still often utilized in development work on its head. This expert model, top-down in nature, is represented by a researcher, often a consultant summoned from outside the country at considerable expense, who embodies knowledge about what is and what should be within the target community. Armed with survey tools and informed by census data and other demographic particulars, the expert flies in for a few days, and spends most of his time in the capital city interviewing a long list of ministry officials and private sector representatives. His actual visit to the target community is generally short. He surveys the scene by holding discussions with the local elite and, at best, gathers information from key respondents with the use of pre-written "closed" interview forms. In this model, the consultant is the expert. It is his knowledge which is official, and it is his interpretation of the local situation which provides foundation for future development efforts.

A paradigm shift

Improving access and quality to education for the children of Remote Area Dweller settlements provided the background to a participatory research exercise carried out at Motokwe, which included participants from Tshwaane and Khekhenye RAD settlements, in Kweneng district carried out in October 1996. The key areas of concern were to identify those factors that could be contributing to poor attendance of those children in school and how conditions for their education can improved. Previous studies (Kann et al, 1989; Tshireletso 1995; Ministry of Education 1993) already confirmed that most of the missing school-children are children of the RADs.

A shift in approach to ascertaining the problem issues surrounding the schooling of RAD children involved parents and other community members, non-governmental organizations, village extension teams, central and local government personnel, the school and school personnel and international agencies in the
The participatory method

In order to make the research process more community-based, participants from the local community were asked to discuss typical ways of identifying problems and the kinds of actions they might make to solve problems in their households or the community at large. They talked about identifying problems and their manifestations, describing possible causes and suggesting solutions, adding that while this local process is at times conscientiously followed, other times it can be a spur of the moment set of decisions. Workshop facilitators differentiated this local approach to problem identification and resolution from conventional research which is formal, deliberate, and systematic. The participants asserted that they gather information informally through gossip, questions, observations, reading, listening and discussing, matching the strategy used with the type of information gathered. In relating informal data gathering methods with the more systematic research tools, the facilitation team introduced and described village profiles and house-to-house surveys, which result in base line data on the local community, observations which generate information on what happens locally, and interview and focus groups, which yield particulars about both what people do and what their actions mean to their surveys.

Dividing themselves into four methods-based groups (i.e., house-to-house survey, village profile, observation and interviews), workshop participants identified areas within the local context on which to focus and designed questions to guide their data collection.

The Data

While community-based research seek to enhance the community members' role in the development process and to strengthen the community as a whole, the data that are produced may not be as detailed or as accurate as those obtained by econometricians or trained ethnographers. Consultants can expose community members to a variety of research methods, and can provide opportunities for individuals to gain experience gathering information about their own communities. However, community members are not trained professionals. Many are illiterate, and others may not be accustomed to the level of specificity and particularity required by donor-funded data collection. Information itself is culturally specific, and what western-based donors require may differ from what remote communities value or prioritize.

Giving control back to communities implies giving up complete control not only of the development projects initiated in a community, but also of the information required to make development-related decisions. It requires a trade-off that can feel uncomfortable to donors and implementing agencies. Augmenting community-gathered information with data collected in preliminary and follow-up visits conducted by a team of researchers and trained assistants can relieve some of these data-related issues. However, in order to avoid community members' feelings of being over-probed and over-researched,
decisions also need to be made up-front concerning which data are essential and which are tangential to the project.

**Economic Poverty**

According to teachers in Motokwe, attendance at school is seasonal. While schools remain open in the winter, the mere provision of formal instruction does not in and of itself ensure access. Winters in the sandy desert of Motokwe are cold and all the children, both those who reside in Motokwe and those staying in the hostels, cannot keep warm. "In winter they desert school. After winter they return," asserted several teachers. Children lack warm clothes and few have shoes. In addition, the hostels in which RAD children reside are in a constant state of disrepair: windows and doors are broken, and blankets and mattresses are in short supply. In theory, children have access to the school throughout the year. However, in practice, that access is limited by poverty, combined with plummeting temperatures. Poverty, compounded by the cold, acts as a barrier to accessing public education.

**Parental interest**

Anecdotal evidence suggests that most school-age children in all the three communities of Motokwe, Tshwaane and Khekhenye attend primary school. As the Kgosi in Khekhenye asserted, "Everyone sends their children to school. Just the small ones are here. Probably eight years old is time to go." All respondents to the survey and the in-depth interviews stated that their school-eligible children attend or have attended primary school. The government's messages concerning the importance of education for both personal and national development seems to have made an impact upon parents. Parents asserted:

- I see a difference between people who go to school and those who don't. The ones who went have a better life. I want my children to be teachers as they were taught (father, Tshwaane.)
- I like their education, they can provide income for us (mother, Khekhenye.)
- Education can be a wealth no one can take from you (mother, Tshwaane.)

The few children who did not attend school were known throughout each community. One Basarwa boy in Tshwaane for instance, had attended standard 1, but would not return to school for the next school year. *We tried to talk to him,"explained his father, but he won't go. He doesn't say anything, just cries .... His tears run out. We think he has been bewitched.* In this situation, like many of the other cases encountered, parents attempted to send their children to school, and felt helpless when the child refused to attend. The quality of parental support, however, is negatively affected not by their beliefs, but by their own lack of education.

We don't know how to support the learning efforts of our children. Nobody has ever taught us how to support them. Because of illiteracy among parents, our children think they know better than us parents. Therefore we don't know how to support them. (parent, Khekhenye.)
References
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PROGRAMME - TROMØ WORKSHOP

Monday 13 October

09.30 Welcome, by Rector Tove Bull
   Sidsel Saugestad: Objectives and perspectives on the NUFU collaboration
10.00 Alan Barnard: Regional comparison in Khoisan ethnography: Theory, method and practice
11.30 Charlotte Damm: Another time, another history
14.00 Per Mathiesen: Ethnicity in changing contexts
15.15 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
   Molebatsi: RAD settlements and the integration of Basarwa
   Mazonde: Livelihood strategies of the Basarwa in varying levels of integration.
   Nthomang: Towards an appropriate development model for Basarwa communities.

Tuesday 14 October

09.15 Brit Solli: The past is a different place.
10.15 Torvald Falch: Sámi cultural heritage: principles and perspectives
13.15 HISTORY/CULTURAL HERITAGE
   Paul Lane: Indigenous or autochthonous? An archaeological perspective on the place of Basarwa in the history of Botswana
   Tickey Pule: The past in the present: Educational aspects
   Maitseo Bolaane: The establishment of game reserves in East Africa and in Botswana

Wednesday 15 October

09.15 Alan Barnard: Hunter-gatherers and bureaucrats: Reconciling opposing world views
   Trond Thuen: Saami customary rights and the problems of definition
13.15 STATE, BUREAUCRACY AND THE LAW
   Sidsel Saugestad: The rise and fall of Norwegian support to Remote Area Development
   Malila: Law and social dynamics in formerly acephalous communities: The case of the Nharo of Ghanzi.
Thursday 16 October

09.15  Bryan Hood: Mineral resource development, archaeology and aboriginal rights
       Terje Brantenberg: Paradoxes of indigenousness in the modern world: The Mabo case and beyond.

13.15  COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT/PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH
       David Macdonald: Development or destitution? Towards an understanding of alcohol use in the Kalahari.
       Lucky Tshireletso: Participatory research: A developing world research paradigm for change?
The map indicates the extent of Saami settlement historically (light) and the so-called core area with the grater part of the Saami population (dark).
MAP OF LABRADOR
Indicating communities and places mentioned in the text
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Corporate Source: Faculty of Social Science, University of Trondheim

Publication Date: April 1998

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