This study traces Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students' perceptions of the Cyprus conflict. The data comes from a 1993 Harvard workshop which included 11 Turkish Cypriot and 38 Greek Cypriot students. The workshop was a collaboration of Harvard's Conflict Management Group, AMIDEAST, and US AID. The objective of the workshop was to teach students effective negotiation skills, such as identification of students' perceptions. The primary purpose of the study was to determine how perceptions of involved parties compared. Written workshop products were coded for certain features and examined. Results indicate that students' perceptions differed greatly but their willingness to communicate and seek solutions that would best suit both parties' interests suggest that the negotiation skills targeted towards these ends were initiated. Investigations based on psychology of ethnic and political violence can provide access to individuals' perceptions and, when coupled with other strategies of conflict resolution, can be vital in attaining peace education. (EH)
Reflections on Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Students' Perceptions of the Cyprus Conflict: Implications for Peace Education

Sibel Erduran
Department of Teaching and Learning
Peabody College, Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN 37203

ABSTRACT

This study traces Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students' perceptions of the Cyprus conflict. The data source is a workshop conducted with 11 Turkish Cypriot and 38 Greek Cypriot students in Spring 1993 by Harvard University's Conflict Management Group in collaboration with AMIDEAST and US AID. The objective of the workshop was to teach students effective negotiation skills. One negotiation strategy involved identification of students' perceptions. The primary purpose of this study was to determine how perceptions of involved parties compared. To this end, written workshop products were coded for the following features: source and definition of conflict; timeframe for conflict; important issues surrounding the present situation; and historical reference. Students' estimation of the other side's perception of them and their recommendations for a peaceful future were noted and used as a measure of success of negotiations. Results indicate that students' perceptions differed greatly but their willingness to communicate and seek solutions that would best suit both parties' interests suggest that the negotiation skills targeted towards these ends were initiated. Investigations based on psychology of ethnic and political violence can provide access to individuals' perceptions and when coupled with other strategies of conflict resolution can be vital in attaining peace education.
INTRODUCTION

Peace education is a vital domain in the fostering of global perspectives and non-violent relations (World Press Review, 1995; Bjerstedt, 1993; Harris, 1988; United Nations, 1983). In recent years, there have been several peace education ventures in countries ranging from Northern Ireland (Duffy, 1992) to Australia (Lawson and Hutchinson, 1992). Cyprus, an island with "the world's last divided capital" (Hedges, 1995) has a long history in ethnic conflict (Szulc, 1993; Feltman, 1982; Peace Corps, 1964). Continued strife in Cyprus not only bears a significant psychological burden on its inhabitants (Woodworth, 1995) but also implies economic as well as political instability for the factions involved. The United Nations peace keeping forces which have been based on Cyprus since 1964 currently spend $ 42 million a year for maintaining its operation on the island (World Press Review, 1995). At a time when the world is witnessing an eruption of ethnic conflicts, Cyprus presents a serious threat to the future of NATO allies and involved parties, Greece and Turkey. Historically, these countries occupy one dimension of the complex ethnic rivalries in the Balkans.

One aspect of peace education in the Cypriot context involves educating Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students for effective negotiation skills. To this end, Harvard University's Conflict Management Group (CMG, 1993) has carried out a series of workshops which implemented conflict management and resolution techniques with students from both communities. Such techniques are instrumental to peace education and they also help elucidate critical perceptions surrounding the conflict at hand. The purpose of this paper is to report results from an investigation of students' perceptions reflected in conversations throughout the workshops.
conducted by CMG. Analysis of perceptions is one aspect of research in psychology of ethnic and political violence and such an analysis has implications for peace education in general.

LITERATURE ON PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHNIC AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

It has been estimated that during the last decade alone 10 million children have been traumatized by the effects of war, 1.5 million children have died in armed conflicts, and 4 million have been disabled (Benjamin, 1994). In a recent special edition of Child Development, the necessity for further research into psychological effects of ethnic and political conflicts on children has been emphasized (Ladd and Cairns, 1996). Although prominent psychologists such as William James (1910) and Jean Piaget (1934) have tried to raise interest in psychology of political and ethnic conflicts, this area of psychology has not resulted in an enduring community of researchers. Ladd and Cairns point to numerous reasons why developmentalists have been slow to undertake research on ethnic and political violence. The authors state:

"One obvious reason is that research on ethnic and political violence poses certain risks for investigators. Given that the world's "trouble spots" (e.g., international conflicts; countries experiencing political unrest, civil wars; cities crippled by terrorism, riots, etc.) serve as the principle "sites" for this type of investigation, research on political and ethnic violence is inherently dangerous. Moreover, in such locations, it is often difficult if not impossible to gather data systematically or implement conventional data-gathering strategies. Another potential deterrent is that such research often poses ethical and political dilemmas for scientists. Although scientists may wish to enter violent contexts with no preconceived ideas or remain neutral on political issues, it may in practice be difficult to do so in highly charged situations or contexts in which children's health and welfare are at stake. Yet, to take sides, or conduct projects that can be perceived as taking sides, may put investigators at risk and raise questions about 'objectivity' of their investigations. Finally, the nature of ethnic and political violence and the cultural context in which it occurs may pose difficulties for researchers, or discourage active programs of investigation. Researchers may have difficulty obtaining access to politically troubled areas, and their investigative aims and interests may not always be welcomed. Governments may, for example, wish to conceal acts of ethnic and political violence to avoid censure or sanctions imposed by other nations. /.../ Another impediment to this emergent field is that research on ethnic and political violence does not have an established identity within contemporary scientific communities (e.g. professional societies), nor does its mission fit well into national and international research priorities and funding "categories"." (p.16)
Despite lack of an adequate empirical research tradition in psychology of ethnic and political violence, theories have been advanced to account for aggressive human behavior in general (Harris, 1988). One theory often associated with Konrad Lorenz (1961) state that human beings have a predisposition to aggressive behavior programmed in their genetic code. This view based on biological determinism, often refers to the *territorial imperative* where humans stake out territory and then employ violent ways to protect it. At the psychological level, Sigmund Freud (1930) emphasized how violence is deeply rooted in human nature, being an expression of the unconscious barbarity of man. Under this theory, violent behavior expresses urges that exist deep within human psyche. The way to deal with these aggressive drives it to channel them constructively and learn nonviolent ways of expressing them.

Although psychological and developmental effects on children of ethnic and political violence have been understudied, various researchers have proposed conflict resolution models that aim to teach conflict management and peacemaking skills to children (Iowa Peace Institute, 1994; Rubin, 1994). While some models focus on the process of mediation of peacemaking (Lane and McWhirter, 1992), others encourage development of communication skills (Schultz and Anderson, 1984). However, all models attempt to foster peacemaking skills by developing respect for differing opinions, teaching empathy and by improving collaborative problem-solving skills (Rubin, 1994). Individuals' perceptions and mediation of social cognition by such perceptions have been identified as being crucial in conflict management (Blumberg, 1993). It has been postulated that images of enemy groups whether they be foreign countries or various subgroups within one's
own country, are important psychological constructs to the willingness to support the use of military force and warfare (Bjerstedt, 1991).

One model of conflict resolution, which is embedded as a means to peace education within the context of this study was proposed by Fisher and Ury (1991). This model which underlies the peacemaking efforts of the Conflict Management Group, has been implemented in various parts of the world (e.g. Guatemala and Quebec) and has been critical for the attainment of peace between Egypt and Israel. As a precursor to building negotiation skills, Fisher and Ury advocate identification of involved parties' perceptions of the conflict in question.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT GROUP

Conflict Management Group (CMG) is an international non-profit organization based at Harvard University. It is involved in conflict analysis, consulting, diagnostic research, process design, training of negotiators as well as facilitation, prevention and ongoing management of conflicts. CMG defines its mission statement as follows:

"Public conflicts and ineffective means of dealing with them lead to wasted resources, social instability, reduced investment, chronic underdevelopment and loss of life. CMG believes that good negotiation, joint problem-solving, facilitation and dispute management skills can help those with differing interests, values and cultures cope more effectively with their differences. A well-managed negotiation or mediation process can help reconcile interests while creating working relationships that catalyze economic growth and stimulate social change." (CMG, 1993)

Here, I will outline some key features of CMG's approach to conflict resolution. First, I will present the elements of the negotiation process identified by CMG. Then, I will elaborate on how these elements are utilized
in the negotiation process. I will briefly discuss the role in conflict resolution of partisan perceptions which CMG considers as being significant in setting the stage for negotiations. Like many conflict resolution models, CMG model emphasizes a problem-solving approach. I will review this approach and finally, I will describe establishment of conditions for effective conflict management.

CMG identifies seven elements of the negotiation process which are summarized in Table 1. Fisher and Ury's (1991) framework for negotiation uses these seven elements to prepare, conduct, review and evaluate a negotiation. The authors caution that there are certain common errors associated with the implementation of these elements. These include: ignoring alternatives, focusing on positions and ignoring interests, limiting options and one-way communication.

These elements of negotiation are elaborated on within the negotiation process in seven steps:

1. Deal simultaneously with the relationship and the substance, each on its own merit.
   - Separate people problems from substance problems
   - Attack the problem, not the people
   - Don't make concessions in the hope of better relations
   - Use people techniques to deal with people problems

2. Test alternatives
   - Develop our own BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement)
   - Raise their perception of our BATNA
   - Lower their perception of their BATNA

3. Draw out and clarify interests
   - Rather than react to positions, probe for interests
   - Ask for criticisms, not concessions
   - Look for mutual, consistent or parallel interests
Table 1. Elements of the negotiation process characterized by CMG (CMG, 1993).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of the negotiation process</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td>These are what parties can do without the agreement of the other side. In general, neither party should agree to something that is worse than its BATNA—its Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement away from the table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>These are basic wants, needs, desires, and fears which underlie positions. Interests are not positions; positions are parties' demands. Underlying the positions are the reasons they are demanding something: their needs, concerns, desires, hopes and fears. The better an agreement satisfies the parties' interests, the better the deal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Options</td>
<td>Options are the full range of possibilities on which the parties might conceivably reach an agreement. Options are, or might not be, put on the table. An agreement is better is the best of many options, especially if it exploits all potential mutual gain in the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>These are criteria for establishing that an agreement is fair, wise or sensible. Each party in a negotiation wants to feel fairly treated. Measuring fairness by some external benchmark, some criterion or principle beyond the simple will of either party, improves the process. Such external standards of fairness include laws and regulations, industry standards, current practice or some general principle such as reciprocity and precedent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>This concern the ability of parties to deal well with each other, as distinct from the substantive terms of an agreement. In general, a strong working relationship empowers the parties to deal well with their differences. Any transaction should improve, rather than damage, the parties' ability to work together again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>This is the ability of the parties to convey information back and forth clearly and accurately. Good communication helps each side understand the perceptions and concerns of the other. Other things being equal, a better outcome will be reached more efficiently if each side communicates effectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments</td>
<td>These are oral or written statements as to what the parties will or won't do. They may be made during the course of a negotiation or may be embodied in an agreement reached at the end of the negotiation. In general, an agreement will be better to the extent that the promises made have been well planned and well-crafted so that they will be practical, durable, easily understood by those who are to carry them out, and verifiable if necessary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Generate options for mutual gain
   • Rather than focus on what concessions to make, work on options that satisfy interests
   • Consider informal processes for brainstorming
   • Give them an answer, not a problem

5. Use criteria to "build a golden bridge"
   • Use external criteria to decide among options
   • Consider how they will explain results to their constituents

6. Make commitments at the end of the process
   • Break-up "decision making"
     -inventing options
     -evaluating options
     -refining options
     -committing to options
   • Consider process as part of the commitment

7. Facilitate good two-way communication: focus on what they hear
   • Listen actively and inquire
   • Frame what we say in light of what they will hear

Analysis of partisan perceptions

CMG identifies partisan perceptions and their causes as being critical in the negotiation process. Partisan perceptions are important considerations since people's perceptions play a role in their willingness to participate in the negotiation process. People often experience and observe different data and hence are interested in different things. They collect evidence to support prior views and ignore or dismiss non-conforming information. That is, incoming data is often selectively filtered and recalled. Furthermore, individuals revise their memories to fit their preferences and remember what they want to remember. Memories themselves form the basis for new, confirming perceptions.

Within CMG framework, there are several ways of dealing with partisan perceptions. First, the causes for these perceptions should be
understood. Individuals need to recognize their biases and enlist neutral help. Understanding how others see things is another important factor in dealing with partisan perceptions. Individuals need to inquire and write out contrasting perceptions. Role reversal is one way of getting them to understand others' perceptions. Furthermore, individuals can listen and show the other side how they understand their perceptions and then explain their own.

Moving toward joint problem-solving

Beyond a consideration of the negotiation process and analysis of partisan perceptions, CMG provides a scheme for how negotiations can take on a problem-solving approach. This scheme embraces five features:

1. Listen for interests behind positions
   • Ask "Why?"
   • Ask "Why not?"

2. Turn arguing into brainstorming
   • "That's one option."
   • "What if we tried it this way?"

3. Find criteria within positions
   • Ask "Why would that be fair?"

4. Emphasize improving BATNAs

5. Almost anything can be framed as a joint problem
Establishing conditions for effective conflict management

Although the outline so far provides a useful model for negotiation, it does not take into consideration potential barriers that can hinder initiation of the negotiation. The barrier to effective conflict management is that parties may be unwilling and/or unable to engage in conflict management. Furthermore, the parties may perceive resolution as less attractive than alternatives, lack comfort and skills for conflict resolution. The willingness and ability to engage in negotiation depends of several perceptions:

1. Perceived value of unilateral solutions/alternatives to negotiation, conciliation and mediation.
   - Without having analyzed critically interests, options or alternatives, parties may conclude that no process will work

2. Perceived value of negotiation or mediation
   Perceptions of:
   - interests/needs (their own, other party's)
   - options to meet interests
   - Parties don't know the rules of the game, distract the environment
   - Third-party processes seen as favoring powerful/less powerful

3. Perceived credibility of a possible process
   - Parties may lack skills
   - Parties unable to listen/learn entrenched positions and perceptions of others

4. Ability to communicate effectively- confidence in skills
   - Parties may lack trust, confidence in each other
   - Parties blame other side for conflict, see nothing they can/should do

5. Sufficient working relationship
   - Parties may be unable to establish a working relationship

6. Ability to commit
   - Parties may lack ability to make commitments, control constituents

This brief survey illustrates that negotiation strategies are at the core of CMG's approach to conflict resolution. These strategies evidently include identification of individuals' perceptions. The central themes of this paper are: what perceptions surround the Cyprus conflict; how such perceptions
relate to psychology of ethnic and political violence; and finally, what implications these perceptions have for peace education in general. It is not the scope of this paper to elaborate on conflict resolution although the preceding discussion on conflict resolution perspective of CMG was necessary to provide a context for the source of data analyzed in this study.

**STUDY**

**DATA SOURCE**

The data source is written products from a workshop sponsored by United States AID (Agency for International Development) in collaboration with AMIDEAST (America Middle-East Educational Training Program) and CMG. The workshop was held for 5 days, 7 hours per day in Spring 1993 in Boston. 11 Turkish Cypriot and 38 Greek Cypriot students who had recently completed undergraduate or graduate degree programs in various US institutions participated in the workshop. Two officials from US AID and 3 from AMIDEAST attended as spectators while 5 CMG officials conducted the workshop sessions. The program of the workshop is included in the Appendix. The workshop presentations which were carried out by CMG officials were as follows:

**Day 1:**
- Introduction and purposes of workshop
- Tools for conflict analysis: Basic elements of the negotiation process

**Day 2:**
- Guidelines for negotiation
- Analyzing partisan perceptions
- Brainstorming options for mutual gain
- Systematic analysis using a joint problem-solving tool
Day 3:  • Managing the interpersonal process I: Building communication and relationships in cross-cultural contexts

Day 4:  • Managing the interpersonal process II: Turning positions into problem-solving
• Dealing with difficult negotiators
• Beginning the mediation process: Getting parties to the table

Day 5:  • A basic process for facilitation and complex negotiations: The "One-text procedure"
• Negotiation power

Overall purposes of the workshop was to increase each side's awareness of the other; provide an analytical framework for dealing with the conflict; offer some rules of thumb; and finally to assess and improve negotiation skills. The means to achieve these purposes followed a four-track approach: presentations, exercises, review and applications.

Students' responses during the exercises were recorded by CMG officials on an overhead projector and commented upon by the students. All activities carried out during the workshop were collected in a document summarizing the workshop (CMG, 1993).

All exercises concentrated on the following: active listening (improving communication and relationships); reversed roles (exercise in which roles were reversed to try to estimate what the other party considered the most important aspects of the case in question and in which each then communicated to the other their own perception of it); turning confrontation into problem-solving; analysis of interests underlying positions; joint problem-solving; brainstorming new approaches to dealing with the conflict (visions for the future, possible diagnoses, ideas for moving forward).

Initially, the exercises dealt with mock negotiation cases such as making an oil deal between companies. Students broke into groups (which consisted of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots), discussed the cases
and prepared for negotiations with their rivals. As the workshop proceeded, the Cyprus problem was brought forth and various exercises followed which integrated with respect to the Cyprus problem similar negotiation strategies as the mock cases. One exercise involved identification of each side's perceptions of the Cyprus problem. Students' responses from this exercise are summarized in Table 2. Another exercise asked each side to estimate the other side's perceptions of them. Table 3 summarizes students' responses from this exercise.

A third activity centered around a dispute that arose between the Hellenic Student Association (HSA) and Turkish Student Association (TSA) regarding the display of the Turkish Cypriot flag on a display window at Purdue University. Representative students who attended this institution expressed their positions underlying the dispute. Table 4 illustrates each side's perspective. A fourth exercise involved active listening in which a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot participant each recounted a personal experience of how the Cyprus conflict affected her life and the other actively listened to understand. Participants commented on what made the exercise effective and they made reference to the following:

- Expressing being touched by the personal story of the teller

- Did not react to the word "invasion"- [Turkish Cypriots identify the arrival of Turkish troops to Cyprus as an "intervention" not an invasion. The latter term denotes distortion of facts for Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, refer to this event as a foreign invasion of the island.]

-"What were they coming to save you from?"- [Asked by the Greek Cypriot participant when the Turkish Cypriot participant identified Turkish troops as saviors.]

- "I've been told that...You're saying something different. Can you tell me why you felt joy? What were the incidents?"/ "How hard it is for me to hear something I've been told is a disaster." [For Turkish Cypriots, arrival of Turkish troops was a favorable occasion and they refer to it as a "peace operation" whereas Greek Cypriots envision it as a "brutal invasion."]

- "I regret that this happened to your family." [Expressed by both participants]
Table 2. Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students' perceptions of the Cyprus conflict (CMG, 1993).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkish Cypriot Perceptions</th>
<th>Greek Cypriot Perceptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arming in Greek Cyprus is not an indication of good will</td>
<td>Relevant events from 1974 are the invasion and occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Akritas plan is an excellent example of what the Greek government had in mind in 1963. The recent elections may be an indication that these are still the intentions</td>
<td>Greek Cypriots are perceived as the weak side in the negotiations, and Turkish Cypriots have taken advantage of the situation. For example, through establishment of a state and changing attitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since Turkish Cypriots are a minority, they were ignored and treated unfairly until 1974</td>
<td>Settlers are an organized effort to change the demographics of the island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1974 was a period of barriers preventing Turkish travel; the intention was to destroy the community</td>
<td>Cemeteries are destroyed and graves dug up on the Turkish side; yet Greek Cypriots are trying to preserve Turkish cultural heritage, for example mosques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 Turkish intervention was legal under the 1960 agreement</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriots are trying to gain time; they are satisfied with the status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention was needed and vital to protect against genocide</td>
<td>Changing the names of streets etc. is evidence of lack of commitment to reunify the island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Cypriots are an &quot;equal community&quot; with equal rights, not a minority trying to get rights</td>
<td>Division of Cyprus had been contemplated by Turkey and UK since 1958- Whitehall Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under British rule, both sides got along well against a common enemy</td>
<td>Icons are being sold off, much of Greek Cypriot heritage and culture is being destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1963, Greek and Turkish Cypriots got along well; cultures are very similar</td>
<td>Northern part of Cyprus is being promoted in tourist offices of Europe as part of Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (continued). Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students' perceptions of the Cyprus conflict (CMG, 1993).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkish Cypriot Perceptions</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enosis is not acceptable</td>
<td>When Greek Cypriots ask about missing persons, Turkish Cypriots ignore us or do not cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The island is Turkish Cypriots' home too; there is 400+ years of Turkish presence on the island</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriots' use of the Turkish pound is evidence of lack of cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 1963, the government of Cyprus did not represent Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>Greek Cypriots cannot go to the North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey had an obligation to intervene</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriots come to Greek Cypriot side to work because they have low wages in the North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since the establishment of Republic, Turkey hasn't had imperialistic intentions</td>
<td>Turkey is building fears of Turkish Cypriots to find excuse to invade the island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Cypriots have missing persons and lack information about them</td>
<td>After 1963, both sides engaged in criminal actions by extremists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Greek Cypriot] women's parade to the Green Line and attempts to cross the border are signs of aggression, mistrust and violation: [it is a] political act to publicize to international community what is going on, diverting international media in an exaggerated way; soldiers are doing their job</td>
<td>Greek Cypriots are trying to show an attitude of good will. e.g. University of Cyprus, Cypriot currency and official papers have two official languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current situation is not a solution but just an alternative for the time being</td>
<td>Denktas admitted he planted the first bomb to provoke the Greek Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek side is the powerful party</td>
<td>Education in the North gives one side of the story; Turkish Cypriots don't get the full picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We are not represented or participating on an equal footing in the UN process</td>
<td>In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, violated 1960 constitution, Treaty of Guarantee and Greek Cypriots' human rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (continued). Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students’ perceptions of the Cyprus conflict (CMG, 1993).

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<th>Turkish Cypriot Perceptions</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The aim of the establishment of the Turkish Resistance Force is to protect Turkish Cypriots from EOKA</td>
<td>The key to a solution lies with Turkey; Turkey will only come to solution with international pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Cypriots have documents that the Greek side was aiming for Enosis in 1960s-70s.</td>
<td>Historically, there has been a lot of hostility between the two sides. Turkish Cypriots have &quot;terrorist&quot; organizations that are/were against Greek Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority has the right to self-determination</td>
<td>Greek Cypriot hesitation is due to Turkish support of Turkish Cyprus, and Turkish history with Armenians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Turkey had imperialistic intentions, it would have taken over [the whole island]; it had the power to do so</td>
<td>Largest percentage of Greek Cypriots don't want Enosis but also don't support two states on Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The reason the Greek Cypriots use Turkish as an official language is to legitimize their control of the government</td>
<td>Comments by the current president of Turkey suggest that there will be further conflict in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In universities, there is anti-Turkish propaganda</td>
<td>Government in the North is illegitimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pseudo-state in the North bases most of its revenue on the exploitation of the Greek population and Turkish money; it is not a viable state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish Cypriots and Turks are different</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot estimation of the other side's perceptions on Cyprus (CMG, 1993).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkish Cypriot Estimation of Greek Cypriot Perception</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek Cypriots will go back to their old homes when Turkish troops leave</td>
<td>Cyprus should remain an independent island not related to Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is pressuring Turkish Cypriots not to collaborate or communicate with Greek Cypriots</td>
<td>Recognition of property ownership: property invested post-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time froze in 1974 in the North; nothing is going on in the North since then</td>
<td>Fear of safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Cypriots don't want enosis [union with Greece] anymore, except for a small percentage of the population; those mobilized by the Church want enosis</td>
<td>In 1963, Turkish Cypriots were illegally forced out of the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus has been Greek since 2000 BC</td>
<td>Discrimination, isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks from Turkey invaded Cyprus</td>
<td>Fear of losing ethnic identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unacceptability of 1960 constitution up to 1963</td>
<td>Intervention in 1974 was justified following the coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social suppression in Turkish Cyprus by Turks</td>
<td>Foreign troops out of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There were, in 1963 and 1974, some Greek Cypriots who didn't believe in enosis</td>
<td>Fear of Greek Cypriot military aggression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 (continued). Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot estimation of the other side's perceptions on Cyprus (CMG, 1993).

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish and Greek Cypriots lived happily together before 1974, and Turks came and disrupted that</td>
<td>[Turkish Cypriots don't want to be] controlled by the Greek Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current allocation of land is not acceptable because it doesn't represent population percentage</td>
<td>Equal political representation required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus] is a puppet government of Turkey</td>
<td>1963-1974 [was a period when] Turkish Cypriots were terrorized by Greek Cypriots and under constant threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of probable Turkish attack on Greek Cypriots</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriots were displaced from villages and forced into isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear that mainland Turkey settlers will never leave</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriots feel threatened by Greek Cypriots due to EOKA and British propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Ozker] Ozgur is a good politician who can bring a solution</td>
<td>Time is on our side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey had the right to come to Cyprus to save Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish immigrants/settlers have no more rights than Turkish Cypriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Better to stay in current situation than go back to previous situation or give up some of the things gained in 1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Interests underlying Turkish Student Association (TSA) and Hellenic Student Association (HSA) positions regarding display of Turkish Cypriot flag in display window at Purdue University (CMG, 1993).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkish Cypriot interests (TSA)</th>
<th>Greek Cypriot interests (HSA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inform people of existence</td>
<td>Not accept permanence of current division of island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertise Northern Cyprus</td>
<td>Not admit northern part to be legal; not accept legality of current situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show how beautiful Cyprus is</td>
<td>Protect cultural identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote tourism</td>
<td>Not let others exploit cultural heritage and identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make sure that complete picture is given</td>
<td>Prevent one-sided story; make sure that complete picture is given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrate identity, especially abroad</td>
<td>Hearing that there are other options possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be able to answer/articulate responses to questions about identity</td>
<td>Give incentives to Turkish Cypriots to work toward options to unify island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have one country</td>
<td>Have one country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be treated equally</td>
<td>Have a Cypriot identity for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify differences</td>
<td>Not have &quot;reality&quot; imposed on me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a way of communicating cultural identity</td>
<td>Have understanding of our perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not have conditions put [forward] for whether or not to talk</td>
<td>Personal emotions and experience validated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANALYSIS OF DATA

In this study, only the data that pertain to the Cyprus problem are analyzed. That is, students' responses during the mock negotiation cases which preceded the discussion on Cyprus are not considered. Overall purpose of this analysis was to determine how Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students' perceptions of the Cyprus conflict compared. To this end, students' responses were coded for the following features: source and definition of conflict; timeframe for conflict; important issues surrounding the present situation; and historical reference. Criteria of clarity and coherence of statements were considered in coding.

Students' estimation of the other side's perception of them and their recommendations for a peaceful future were noted. This information was used as a measure success of the negotiations. In the latter case, the following criteria (identified by CMG) were implemented in coding: the agreement or result achieved (1) is better than "our" best alternative to a negotiated agreement; (2) satisfies interests of all parties involved; (3) leaves no joint gains on the table and is among the base of many options; (4) is legitimate such that parties view the outcome as fair and sensible as measured by objective criteria; (5) contains commitments that are well-planned, realistic and operational; (6) is reached efficiently, meaning that there is effective communication; and (7) helps building a good working relationship among the parties.
RESULTS

Source and definition of conflict

Turkish Cypriots identified the Greek Cypriot ideal of Enosis (union with Greece) and mistreatment of their community especially as exemplified by the actions of the Greek Cypriot terrorist organization EOKA as the source of the Cyprus conflict. Greek Cypriots perceived the arrival of Turkish troops on the island in 1974 as the major source of conflict. For Greek Cypriots, presence of Turkish settlers from the mainland was perceived to be contributing to the conflict whereas Turkish Cypriots did not view this as an issue relevant to the problem.

Timeframe for conflict

Turkish Cypriots emphasized 1963-74 as the relevant timeframe for the Cyprus problem whereas Greek Cypriots viewed 1974 up to present as the critical period pertaining to the problem. Greek Cypriots perceived Turkish Cypriots as "buying time" as the Cyprus problem remains unsolved whereas Turkish Cypriots did not make any reference to the "influence of time" on the unresolved conflict either with respect to their or Greek Cypriots' status in the situation.

Important issues surrounding the present situation in Cyprus

Arming in the Greek Cypriot side as well as women's marches to the Buffer Zone were an indication of animosity for Turkish Cypriots; Greek Cypriots regarded these actions as being essential for defense and voicing of rights. Lack of travel across the two regions was only mentioned by Greek Cypriots as being a problem. Turkish Cypriots emphasized unfair treatment
of their community as a minority. They argued that since 1963 Republic of Cyprus has not represented Turkish Cypriots and that the reason for use of Turkish as an official language in the Greek sector is to legitimize Greek Cypriot control of the government. Whereas Turkish Cypriots regarded Turkey's role in 1974 on the island as a "peace operation," Greek Cypriots labeled it as a "brutal invasion." Greek Cypriots regarded the key to a solution to the Cyprus problem as lying with Turkey and that Turkey will only approach such a solution under international pressure. Turkish Cypriots did not specify any key element for being critical towards a solution but implied that Greek Cypriot side is not cooperating since they still maintain the ideal of unification with Greece (Enosis).

Both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot students regarded the contemporary negotiation process through the United Nations as being unfair to their community's interests. Turkish Cypriots stated that they are not participating in the negotiations "on equal footing" whereas Greek Cypriots expressed that their community is perceived as the "weak side" in the negotiations. Both groups emphasized the importance of missing persons and Greek Cypriot students perceived lack of cooperation by the Turkish Cypriot side when this issue was brought to their attention. Greek Cypriots emphasized the arrival of Turkish immigrants and viewed these immigrants' settlement as an "organized effort" to change the demographics of the island. Turkish Cypriots did not make any reference to the Turkish immigrants.
Historical reference

Both groups provided references to treaties and documents which played significant roles in the political history of the island. Treaty of Guarantee was mentioned by both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots though in different contexts. The former referred to it in order to legitimize the Turkish intervention in 1974 whereas the latter viewed arrival of Turkish troops as a violation of this Treaty. Both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots mentioned the 1960 agreement. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots identified the 1960 Akritas plan and Greek Cypriots mentioned the 1958 Whitehall Document.

Estimation of other side's perceptions

Comparison of Table 1 (perceptions of either group) and Table 2 (estimation of other side's perceptions) illustrates that both groups of students were quite successful in identifying the other group's perceptions about the Cyprus problem in general and about them in particular. There are, however, a few issues which were surprising to both groups. For instance, Greek Cypriots did not expect that Turkish Cypriots regarded the current situation as "not a solution but just an alternative for the time being." Turkish Cypriots considered the Greek Cypriot side as the powerful party although the latter's self perception was quite the opposite.

Recommendations for future

Although their perceptions differed greatly and occasional burst of anger resulted from both sides at the beginning of the workshop, students were willing to follow the negotiation sessions. Towards the end of the
workshop, they grew patient and made rather fruitful suggestions for bringing peace to Cyprus. For example, both sides agreed that education, and objective history education in particular, is critical for a peaceful and lasting solution. Both sides criticized media for being biased and for promoting nationalistic feelings. Furthermore, they offered various initiatives that would encourage bi-communal participation. For example, establishment of universities open to students from both sides as well as social activities such as joint art festivals were recommended. Legal, constitutional, economic as well as military issues were regarded by both sides as being of primary importance for beginning to address the Cyprus problem. Overall, the recommendations satisfied the seven criteria which were used to measure success of the negotiations. Both sides expressed that the proposed recommendations fit well with their interests.

DISCUSSION

The complexity involved in the Cyprus conflict is reflected through the comments made by both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The situation embraces a multitude of issues and these issues tend to be selectively addressed by either group. For instance, Greek Cypriots avoided discussion of EOKA and Enosis (the predominant issues of importance for Turkish Cypriots) while Turkish Cypriots did not respond to issues of legality of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the changing demographics of the island by way of arrival of Turkish immigrants. The confrontation between the Turkish and Hellenic Student Association further demonstrates a sort of selective emphasis on what counts as important issues in the Cyprus
problem. As Table 4 displays, the main interest underlying the Turkish Cypriot position was a demonstration of ethnic and cultural identity via display of a flag. The same display denoted a political message for Greek Cypriots and brought forth issues of legality of the Turkish Cypriot state.

Underlying the students' perceptions are many psychological tensions. Fear, anger and mistrust seem to play a central role in the perceptions of both sides. Furthermore, feelings of helplessness and weakness (for Greek Cypriots, solution lies with Turkey, the strong party and hence it is beyond them); oppression and inequality (for Turkish Cypriots, there is exploitation of ethnic and cultural identity) are quite strong. I would argue that in fact, similar sentiments characterize both sides only with respect to different issues. Both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots feel mistreated: the former blames Turkey for violation of their human rights and purposefully altering the identity of the island while the latter accuses Greek Cypriots for maintaining nationalist and idealist feelings towards Greece at the expense of Turkish Cypriots' existence.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The workshop on which this study was based was a part of a series of efforts initiated by the United States government agencies to bring together students and professionals of both communities of Cyprus. Customarily, workshops have been conducted in Nicosia, Cyprus at the Ledra Palace Hotel which is located in the Buffer Zone (under the control of United Nations). In the case of an arranged meeting at this hotel, groups of individuals from both
communities are granted permission to be escorted by UN soldiers to the designated area of the meeting. There is a time-constraint to such visits and individuals operate under strict guidelines such as when and where to meet to be escorted back. The workshop which formed the basis of this study was held in the United States which provided a "neutral" and unthreatening context for attendance and participation. Overall, the negotiations were successful and the location of the workshop might have played a role. However, students' willingness to communicate and seek solutions that would best suit both parties' interests suggest that the negotiation skills targeted towards these ends were initiated.

One implication of the study is that identification of perceptions of conflicting communities plays an important role in bringing them together. These perceptions are often based on and influenced by political, social, historical and personal circumstances in rather complex ways. Recognition of such a diversity of sources in individuals' perceptions can be critical for peace education. Investigations based on psychology of ethnic and political violence can provide access to individuals' perceptions and when coupled with other strategies of conflict resolution can be vital in attaining peace education.

Note: The author is not affiliated with the Conflict Management Group, Harvard University. She was a Turkish Cypriot student participant in the mentioned workshop. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the Conflict Management Group and no official endorsement should be inferred.
REFERENCES


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Printed Name: SIBEL ERDURAN
Position: RESEARCH ASSISTANT
Organization: VANDERBILT UNIV.
Address: DEPT. TEACHING & LEARNING
GPC 330, VANDERBILT UNIV.
NASHVILLE, TN 37203
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