This study identifies successful election strategies employed by community colleges in bond issues or tax levy increase elections, and distills these strategies into a list of principles or rules that can be utilized by colleges in preparing for such an event. Results of case studies conducted at Maricopa (Arizona), Santa Monica (California), and Washtenaw (Michigan) community colleges indicate that: (1) dollars raised by campaigns are not enough to guarantee victory; (2) each campaign had significant support from a broad array of community organizations; (3) the length of the formal campaign was relatively brief for all three subject colleges; (4) the impact of other, unrelated issues on the same ballot differs by college; (5) the primary organization of each campaign came from a core of college staff members; (6) efforts to involve students in the campaign efforts were emphasized; (7) staff participation at the colleges were crucial to electoral success; (8) efforts to involve faculty and staff began years before the formal campaign; (9) strengths and weaknesses were assessed by the subject colleges both internally and externally; and (10) the primary role of the formal campaign committees was to raise dollars for the advocacy effort of the campaigns. Each of the colleges studied had an electoral victory; further research on colleges that lost elections might provide a useful comparative analysis. Appended are the questionnaire provided to state community college directors, the fifty-state telephone survey, the follow-up questionnaire to subject colleges, the interview guide and procedures, a summary of contacts in fifty-state telephone survey, summaries of interviews, ballot language, and employee guidelines for bond election. Contains five tables and 114 references. (AS)
SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY COLLEGE ELECTION STRATEGIES

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education

By

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University of Missouri at Columbia, 1985
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May 1998
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From my earliest memories, my parents, Clyde and Esther King, have encouraged and supported me and emphasized the value of education. Even though somewhat puzzled by my need for still more formal education after law school, my mother often has reminded me that time passes whether or not I am working toward a goal, so I might as well make the most of lifelong educational opportunities.

My wife, Cristina, had no idea when she married me in June of last year that so many hours would be lost to research and writing, but she has been supportive and loving throughout this challenging experience. Had she not continually expressed her confidence and belief in me, I might well have been overwhelmed by the vastness of the undertaking. Her mistaken but charming belief that she married a “brilliant” man is only one of her many endearing qualities. If only the whole world could see me the way my wife and parents do!

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Public community colleges face unique challenges in building the community support necessary to pass bond issues or tax levy increases (Honeyman, 1991; Morrison, 1995). When many public school districts are having difficulty passing revenue increases of any kind, the challenges facing community colleges are even more daunting (Minor, 1992). Although a campaign for a public school district might feature cute, smiling kindergartners who deserve the opportunity to learn in a safe, warm, friendly environment, the face of a community college student may be that of a recently unemployed factory worker who was not fully committed to education his or her first time around (Day, 1996; Koontz, 1980).

“No new taxes” is not a new rallying cry. Had it not been for the imposition of a tax deemed unfair by the colonists, New England might still be a part of the British Empire today. But at the close of the twentieth century, polls indicate that distrust of government and anti-tax fervor may be on the rise. California’s Proposition 13 in 1978 signaled the beginning of what some observers have labeled a “taxpayer’s revolt” (Kintzer, 1980; Martorana & Smutz, 1978-79). Many other states have emulated Proposition 13 in the past 20 years in an attempt to reduce taxation and hold government more directly accountable to the voters (Ponce, 1993; Zapler, 1994b, October 26).

According to James L. Wattenbarger, “People just don’t want to pay taxes. This is an attitude created by government itself. It’s unfortunate, and an attitude we will have to overcome” (Mercer, 1992, p. A14).

Proposition 13 and similar referenda indicate that many voters feel powerless to
reduce taxes imposed by their representatives in state and national government. As a result, when voters have an opportunity to cast a direct vote on a local school or community college tax issue, the local issue frequently becomes a lightning rod for pent-up voter frustration. But as William C. Witter, former president of Sante Fe Community College explains, “If we wait for the right time, we’ll never have it. You have to ask for it when you need it and hope voters are responsive” (Mercer, 1992, p. A14).

In many states, public community colleges are the only institutions of higher learning that rely in part on revenues approved directly by local taxpayers, often in the form of property tax. Public four-year colleges and universities usually receive tax dollars as a direct appropriation from the state legislature. Such legislative appropriations do not require any local voter input or support. As a result, community colleges often must also overcome the perception of many citizens that colleges and universities are among the worst culprits when it comes to wasting tax dollars. Local property tax is a particularly unpopular form of taxation in general, but at times especially so when the revenue is for higher education (Burns, 1995). One plan introduced but not adopted in Nebraska proposed the elimination of property tax as a source of revenue for community colleges (Zapler, 1994a).

For the majority of public community colleges, the three primary sources of revenue are state appropriations, local tax revenue, and student tuition and fees, frequently in that order (Mercer, 1992, August 5). Because community colleges must compete not only with other public institutions of higher education but also with a host of other worthy causes for state appropriations (including health care, elementary and
secondary education, roads and bridges and prisons, to name but a few), increasing state appropriations will remain a challenge. Although community colleges enroll roughly 60% of college students in the U.S., Peter Burnham estimates that community colleges receive only about 20% of state higher education appropriations (Mercer, 1994b). Because of a long-standing commitment to low tuition and open access, increasing tuition is an unpalatable source of revenue to many community colleges (Mercer, 1992). Almost by default, many public community colleges are forced to take another look at raising revenue through an increase in the local tax levy or through a bond issue.

Even though the importance of community college revenue elections is growing, little has been written about winning strategies in community college elections. Perhaps this gap in the literature exists in part because of the perceived difficulty of identifying techniques that work in community college bond issue or tax levy elections. The somewhat more extensive literature addressing the strategies for public elementary and secondary schools is at times instructive for community colleges, but not directly tailored to the unique challenges public community colleges face (Bauscher, 1994; Flanigan, 1995; Holt, 1994; Hanbury, 1991; Graham, 1990). Because of the dearth of research examining community college revenue elections, the present study makes a significant contribution to the knowledge base concerning successful community college election strategies.

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this study was to identify successful election strategies employed by community colleges in bond issue or tax levy increase elections and to distill those
strategies into a list of principles or rules that could be utilized by community colleges in preparing for such an event. No single list of strategies or techniques guarantees success in a public community college election for a bond issue or a tax levy increase. However, a community college should be able to increase the probability of victory by utilizing the techniques and strategies employed in past successful campaigns.

**Research Questions**

To achieve this purpose, the study sought to answer to the following questions:

1. How important is fundraising (raising dollars to fund the campaign) in a successful campaign?
2. Which community organizations outside of the college are involved in successful campaigns?
3. Is there a relationship between the length of the formal campaign and the outcome?
4. What is the impact of other, unrelated issues on the same ballot as the community college tax levy or bond issue?
5. What are the roles of community college staff members in successful campaigns?
6. Do students play a significant role in successful campaigns?
7. To what extent do successful campaigns rely on paid, outside consultants?
8. How do successful campaigns involve and integrate faculty and staff in the effort?
9. How do successful campaigns assess the strengths and weaknesses of a
What is the role and/or necessity of a formal campaign committee in successful campaigns?

Definitions of Key Terms

The definition of terms in this section are for specific terms that were relevant to this study. In the course of the study, a number of terms required specific definitions that are provided below.

Bond Issue Election

A ballot issue that allows a public community college to borrow money based upon a guarantee by the voters that the electorate will allow collection of taxes sufficient to pay the debt. The ballot language for a bond issue may or may not include an estimate of the amount of tax increase required to service the debt incurred by the community college (Flanigan, 1995).

Paid Political Consultants

Paid political consultants include campaign strategists as well as advertising and marketing professionals. The use of paid political consultants is particularly important in states which do not allow college officials to participate in advocacy efforts during the campaign.

Property Tax

Property tax is a tax assessed on the basis of the value of real property (land and fixtures on the land) and personal property (usually automobiles and other items of tangible, personal property) owned by an individual or an organization, usually levied as a
certain percentage of the assessed value of the property (Burns, 1995).

Public Community College

Two-year, publicly supported institutions of higher education which award associate’s degrees and one-year certificates and provide additional educational services based on the needs of the community (1997 Directory of Postsecondary Institutions; Lucas, 1994).

Sales Tax

Sales tax is a tax assessed as a percentage of the purchase price of an item (McCurdy, 1994a). Sales tax is usually collected at the time of a purchase, and specific essential items such as food are frequently exempted from sales tax.

Super Majority

In some states, approval of bond issues or tax increases require a majority of those voting to vote favorably in excess of 50%. A majority in excess of 50% is a super majority.

Successful Election Strategies

Successful strategies are those that lead to electoral victory, but also may include strategies which allow a college to increase “yes” votes by a substantial number from a previous election, even if the increase does not result in electoral victory.

Tax Levy Election

A ballot issue that involves voter approval of an increase in a local tax which is dedicated to the purposes of a public community college. The ballot language for a tax levy increase would usually indicate the specific amount of the tax increase (Campion &
Limitations of the Study

The community colleges of the United States are incredibly diverse. Even within a single state, significant differences exist in terms of the size of community colleges, the demographics of the students and the public served and the political climate in which different colleges exist. Although the diversity of community colleges is in many ways their strength, that diversity is a source of difficulty when attempting to determine if strategies and techniques utilized in one successful election would be of assistance to another community college. For example, an effective campaign for a large, metropolitan community college that serves a large number of minority students may not be an exact blueprint for a small, rural college that serves a homogeneous student body. The methodology outlined in Chapter III addresses these limitations, but the difficulty of universally applying the results of case studies remains.

Nature and Order of Presentation

This study examines successful election strategies used by public community colleges in bond issue or tax levy elections. Chapter II summarizes the literature examined in the formulation of the research questions and in determining the research strategy selected. Chapter III describes the methodology of the research, including the research design, study population and sample selection, and data collection instruments and procedures.

Chapter IV presents the findings of the study. First, Chapter IV details the states that allow public community colleges to go directly to local voters to seek revenue
through tax increases. Next, the study examines a subject group of three colleges that have conducted successful revenue elections in recent years to describe and analyze the strategies that resulted in success.

In Chapter V, the study concludes with a discussion of how the current research might influence public community college actions, including a list of strategies and techniques to increase the likelihood of electoral victory.

Conclusions

For many community colleges, revenues from state and federal appropriations and tuition are either flat or declining. A local election for a tax levy increase or bond issue is often the only option for increasing the revenues needed to meet student needs. A community college attempting to develop successful election strategies finds little assistance in the existing literature. Because more colleges will be a part of elections in the coming years, identification of successful election strategies is an integral part of electoral success.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

Little has been written about winning strategies in community college elections since the period of rapid growth of the community college movement in the 1960s and 1970s. When new community colleges were coming into existence on a regular basis and existing colleges were experiencing explosive growth, the political climate for a community college revenue election was probably more supportive and enhanced the likelihood of success. In response to the need to build facilities and meet other needs created by unprecedented growth, literature concerning community college revenue elections seems to have peaked and then tapered off until more recently. The difficulty of identifying techniques that work in community college bond issue or tax levy elections may also explain the limited amount of literature.

A relative wealth of literature exists concerning revenue elections in elementary and secondary public school districts. One possible explanation for the greater volume of materials concerning public schools is that school districts in all 50 states can seek local tax support from voters, whereas only about 15 states allow community colleges to make direct appeals to local voters (Table 1 in Chapter 4.) The somewhat more extensive literature addressing the strategies for public elementary and secondary schools is at times instructive for community colleges, but is not directly tailored to the unique challenges public community colleges face. Most voters intuitively understand the direct impact the quality of elementary and secondary education has on their lives, but community colleges often begin an election with the challenging and fundamental public relations task of
explaining how the college benefits the community and is deserving of increased tax support from voters.

In identifying the relevant literature, two preliminary sources for information on elections published by the Educational Resources Information Center were identified. The first was the Current Index to Journals in Education and Resources in Education. It provided an overview of materials that relate to revenue elections by educational entities, including journal articles and other materials addressing election strategies and summarizing election experiences. A review of dissertations disclosed few studies specifically addressing community college revenue elections (Day, 1996; Jackson, 1977; Minor, 1992; Otis, 1982) and several dissertations addressing public school revenue elections (Foerch, 1989; Garber, 1985; Halverson, 1986; Kelban, 1981; Neiman, 1990; Ough, 1991; Ptacek, 1990; Pulliam, 1983; Smith, 1989). Most of the studies reviewed focused on a single case study of an election, not multiple case studies of elections conducted by different organizations.

The second source of information was Academe Today, the computer on-line database of The Chronicle of Higher Education, which allows descriptor searches of articles that have appeared in The Chronicle for the last eight years. Because much of what has been written about community college elections has covered the time period immediately before or after the elections, The Chronicle was an invaluable resource in researching higher education revenue elections.

Somewhat surprisingly, neither the Association of American Community Colleges nor the Association of Community College Trustees were able to provide any published
materials concerning community college election strategies for bond issues or tax increases.

This chapter summarizes literature examined in the formulation of the research questions and in determining the research strategy selected. The chapter is organized under the following headings: Review of Community College Revenue Elections in the 1960s and 1970s; The Modern Anti-Tax Movement, Beginning With Proposition 13 in California; Fiscal Challenges for Today's Community Colleges; and Election Strategies and Summaries.

Review of Community College Elections in the 1960s and 1970s

Community college revenue elections were more common during the boom in the community college movement in the 1960s and into the 1970s. Many factors contributed to the creation and rapid expansion of community colleges during that period. One important precursor to the period of explosive growth was the publication of the Truman Commission Report in 1947 that called for the establishment of a network of public community colleges that would charge little or no tuition and serve the area in which they were located (Vaughn, 1995). Vaughn also noted the importance of the expansion of student aid legislation in the 1960s, beginning with the Higher Education Act of 1965 and later amendments and reauthorizations, that made it possible for nearly every American to attend college.

In the late 1960s, new community colleges came into existence at a rate of nearly 100 a year and community college enrollment increased by more than 200,000 annually (Overbeck, 1969a). For many community college officials today, the 1960s may seem
like a golden era for public support of community colleges, but Overbeck wrote in 1969 that “the community college movement’s greatest period of growth since the twenties has coincided with the greatest taxpayer’s revolt since the depression” (Overbeck, 1969a, p. 3). Overbeck summarized the literature concerning community college revenue elections in the late 1960s with a statement that remains true almost 30 years later: “Except for bond elections in individual districts, there are virtually no studies of junior college bond elections to be found in the literature—virtually no one has undertaken a broad study of junior college bond elections as such” (Overbeck, 1969b, p.4).

Though revenue elections were more common in the 1960s and 1970s as community colleges responded to enrollment growth and the need for permanent facilities, the volume of literature about successful election strategies did not correspond to the high volume of elections. To the extent that authors did address the challenges of seeking voter approval for higher taxes for community colleges, the themes they sounded are similar to the challenges that face colleges today.

Overbeck examined four California community colleges that had successful bond elections after suffering eight previous defeats between them. His conclusions were that the chance for a successful election were greater if: (a) a “yes” vote would not result in a tax increase; (b) the college seeking a bond issue is a going concern, not a start-up operation; (c) organized opposition can be avoided; (d) editorial and media support exist; (e) college leadership engages the local community personally; (f) the plans for the bond issue are familiar to the community (Overbeck, 1969a). Although the first conclusion (that voters are more likely to support an issue that does not raise their taxes) might be
obvious, the remaining conclusions addressed issues that are raised in the research questions of the present study.

Witt and Pearce (1968) wrote of a dilemma that is familiar to colleges considering an election in the 1990s: “When taxes and education are involved, the results are quite unpredictable since most people favor education and oppose taxes. Thus, the outcome depends on which of their concerns is currently the stronger of the two” (p. 2).

Witt and Pearce examined the amount of public support for a bond issue to be placed before the voters of one college, the San Mateo Junior College District, in 1968. Through the use of two “spot polls” before the 1968 election, Witt and Pearce sought to achieve the following objectives: (a) determine the number of “yes” votes for the proposal; (b) identify issues that voters consider when casting their vote; (c) determine which blocks of voters are inclined to vote for or against the proposal; and (d) ascertain the degree of voter knowledge concerning the proposal. The techniques of evaluating public opinion are much more sophisticated in the 1990s than they were in 1968, but the goals of public opinion research in community college elections remain much the same.

Another challenge examined in the 1960s and 1970s that faces community colleges today is the challenge of involving students in the election process. Donovan (1975) and Fuller and Samuelson (1977) attempted to summarize techniques to involve student voters. Donovan described a permanent voter education organization that would begin at the secondary level, continue through higher education and encourage life-long participation in the electoral process. Fuller and Samuelson asked the pragmatic question whether student voters actually make a difference in election outcomes. Fuller and
Samuelson noted that almost ten million young people became eligible to vote in 1971 when the voting age was lowered to 18, but that only a small percentage of those who became eligible actually voted.

One study attempted to construct a predictive model to anticipate the outcome of a community college financial election. In 1977, Jackson focused on a single community college bond election in Kansas and attempted to identify empirically the factors that led to success or failure in a revenue election, including the degree of faculty and staff involvement and the effectiveness of campaign materials.

Though Overbeck was correct that none of the literature in the 1960s undertook a broad study of junior college elections, the limited research in the 1960s and 1970s does provide some bases for identifying the issues that remain relevant in the 1990s, including public opinion, media coverage, and faculty, staff and student involvement (Overbeck, 1969a).

The Modern Anti-tax Movement, Beginning with Proposition 13 in California.

A nationwide backlash against all types of taxation may have had its genesis on the west coast with California’s passage of Proposition 13 in June of 1978 (California Budget Project, 1997). Frederick C. Kintzer wrote in 1980 that “California’s Proposition 13 was the most dramatic fiscal limitation measure enacted during the last decade” (p. 1). The California Budget Project noted that Proposition 13, which was enacted by a rousing 65% majority of California voters, reduced local property tax revenues in California by almost $6.5 billion overnight by capping property tax rates at 1% and rolling back property values for tax purposes to the 1975-76 level.
The backlash against taxation represented by Proposition 13 and similar measures in other states has posed tremendous challenges for all of government, and community colleges have not been immune. In a 1990 study, Sandeen examined 10 community colleges in southern California and concluded that Proposition 13 had resulted in dramatic changes in the community service programs offered by the subject colleges. Sandeen suggested that community colleges in the wake of Proposition 13 decreased community service offerings and emphasized programs that were economically self-sufficient and that focused on service to business and industry.

As Kintzer explained, “Proposition 13-type legislation is hardly a recent phenomenon” (Kintzer, 1980, p. 1). Although Proposition 13 was a new experience to a large segment of the American public in 1978, Kintzer identified property tax limitations dating as early as the 1800s, again during the Depression years when income declined and the property tax base eroded, and in as many as 20 states during the 1970s before the passage of Proposition 13. Although Proposition 13 was by no means unprecedented, it can be argued that it has become the symbol for voter reluctance to approve measures that involve taxes.

The California Budget Project concluded that “neither proponents’ wildest promises nor opponents’ harshest fears have come to pass,” but that Proposition 13 had “fundamentally changed how public services are financed and administered at all levels of government in California” (p. 1). The California Budget Project summarized the overriding significance of Proposition 13 and similar measures in other states limiting collection of property:
The limitations on local governments' ability to increase revenues raise a number of issues in an era where 'devolution' increasingly shifts programmatic and financial responsibility from the federal government to the states and from the state to local government (California Budget Project, p. 1).

The legacy of Proposition 13 and its progeny is that many government entities, including public community colleges, are more likely to be forced to seek local taxpayer support at the same time that numerous legal restrictions make that support more difficult to obtain.

**Fiscal Challenges for Today's Community College**

Many community colleges struggle to identify and preserve sources of revenue. The average community college in 1996 received 17.9% of its revenues from local sources, 39.4% from state funds, 19.9% from tuition and fees, 12.6% from federal funds, and 10.2% from other sources (American Association of Community Colleges 1996-97 Annual, 1996). Because of the variety of different sources of revenue for community colleges from state to state and even for different colleges within a given state, the national averages may not be particularly meaningful. Of the possible sources of revenue over which some local colleges have some control, most community colleges increase tuition and fees reluctantly and may find increasing property tax unpopular and difficult. In one rare instance in which a state legislature attempted to allow community colleges to access local sales tax revenues, a California court invalidated the local sales tax (McCurdy, 1994b).

The theory in many states is that community colleges should receive roughly one-
third of their revenue from the state, one-third from local governments, and one-third from student tuition, but "in reality, one revenue stream often emerges as the main source of support" (Mercer, 1994b). Mercer also noted that community colleges that rely on property taxes for any part of the college’s revenue face the same inequities that have plagued many school districts and prompted the state of Michigan to abandon property tax as a source of revenue for public school districts: “Counties in community college districts rich in taxable property will flourish with a lower tax rate, while poorer counties will have to levy much higher taxes simply to survive” (Mercer, 1994b, p. A19).

At least one state has considered the elimination of local property tax as a revenue source for community colleges. A 1994 plan proposed by a Nebraska legislator was met with vocal opposition from the state’s community college presidents. Richard Gilliland, president of Metropolitan Community College in Nebraska, successfully argued that the plan “would seriously hamper the cooperative effort between community colleges and four-year colleges by placing them in competition for state funds” (Zapler, 1994a, p. A35).

When local property taxes are a potential source of revenue for community colleges, factors such as recession and other economic conditions can make it very difficult for voters to obtain necessary voter support. When Maricopa Community College asked the electorate to support a $340 million bond issue in 1992, the deep recession was one factor that resulted in 54% of the voters in a district that traditionally has enjoyed strong public support saying no (Mercer, 1992). Mercer noted that community college educators often face a difficult choice in a recession because “the
need for local property taxes is exacerbated, because tuition cannot be much higher without making it impossible for some students to enroll” (Mercer, 1992, p. A14).

In a relatively small number of states, community colleges rely entirely on the state for revenue. In those states, state support is driven mostly by enrollment and tuition (Mercer, 1994b). Peter F. Burnham asserted that “community colleges enroll about 60% of the nation’s college students, yet receive only about 20% of the state appropriations for higher education” (Mercer, 1994b, p. A19). When North Carolina Senator Marvin W. Ward said the North Carolina General Assembly “has historically done a better job of financing the public schools and the university system than community colleges,” his statement was representative of the funding patterns of many states (Cage, 1990, p. A1).

Revenue received by community colleges from statewide ballot initiatives is an alternative to state legislative appropriations, although an unpredictable option (Cvancara, 1994; Jaschik, 1992; McClain, 1994). The erratic experience in the state of California in the 1990s is in many ways typical of the difficulty of relying on statewide, voter-approved revenues. California voters endorsed a $900 million general obligation bond issue for building and maintenance projects at the state’s public colleges in 1992 (McCurdy, 1992), rejected a similar $900 million issue in 1994 (McCurdy, 1994b), and endorsed a proposition in 1996 that dramatically increased costs for community college districts by requiring them to pay a share of assessments levied to finance public works that benefit them (Strosnider, 1996) after approving $1 billion in bonds for public colleges earlier in the year (Geraghty, 1996). After the 1996 election, Kim Strosnider wrote that “voters from the Plains states to the West Coast were in a tight-fisted mood at the polls last week.
In California, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, they approved measures that could eventually hurt public colleges and universities” (Strosnider, 1996, p. A42).

One of many trends in this decade has been the move away from enrollment-driven funding formulas in favor of student outcome-driven models (McClain, 1994). Community colleges have responded in many creative ways to fiscal challenges, although some responses such as an increased reliance on part-time faculty are not without problems (Rouche, Rouche, & Milliron, 1995).

Regardless of the sources of revenue available to community colleges, colleges will continue to struggle to maximize the resources available to them. Although community college educators of every era seem to lament the difficulty of obtaining necessary revenues, one author suggested that the 1990s are actually more favorable to community college finance than the 1980s (Honeyman, 1991).

**Election Strategies and Summaries**

**Elementary and Secondary**

A considerable amount of literature has addressed elementary and secondary revenue elections. Although many of the strategies discussed are unique to elementary and secondary schools, some of the campaign tactics might be transferable to a community college revenue election. The literature addressing elementary and secondary elections was divided into two basic categories, literature that recapped a single successful election and literature that provided overarching strategies with universal applicability.

The articles recapping successful elections included summaries of a $325 million
bond issue in the Jefferson County, Colorado School District (Bane & Pride, 1993), a bond issue passed shortly after a tax increase (Chopra, 1988), two bond referendums approved by the Park City Utah, School District (Fielder, 1995), a $7 million bond referendum in Luenburg County, Virginia (Greig, 1990), a successful bond issue in the Olmsted Falls City School District in Ohio (Kreiner, 1995), a $7 million dollar millage increase in a Colorado school district (Mitchell & Williams, 1992), an 81-cent tax levy increase in a rural Missouri school district, and a series of bond issues for public libraries, including detailed analyses of campaigns in Spokane, Washington, and Denver, Colorado (Hall, 1992).

The articles that provided summaries of a single campaign generally consisted of a list of the strategies that were implemented as a part of the successful campaign and an explanation of why the author believed those strategies were worth duplicating in other elections. Bane and Pride described the use of a budget-tracking tool that helped the Jefferson County, Colorado school district improve management decisions and rebuild credibility among district voters after years of opposition. Chopra explained a strategy to obtain support for a bond issue in a time-frame not far removed from an earlier tax levy increase. Fielder (October, 1995) offered 10 suggestions for a school bond campaign based on the strategies used in two successful Park City, Utah bond elections. Greig (1990), a new superintendent at the time of a successful bond election in Luenburg County, Virginia in 1989, emphasized the importance of grass-roots organization in a successful school bond campaign. Kreiner described the successful campaign for the Olmsted Falls City School District in Ohio as a conversation about educational needs as
opposed to a sales pitch about a new school building. Mitchell and Williams (1992) stressed the importance of 2,000 volunteers in a $7 million millage increase election, and offered 10 lessons learned for future campaigns. Simpson (1993) shared a year-long campaign plan that included planning, advertisements and significant community involvement.

Only Hall, reviewing public library elections, addressed multiple elections and attempted to identify similarities among several successful campaigns (Hall, 1992). Hall examined referenda for public libraries in various states in the period from July of 1990 through June of 1991.

The second category of literature involving elementary and secondary elections did not focus on a single election, but summarized broad strategies for electoral success in what amounted to a “cookbook” format. The title of one such article, “Getting voters to say yes,” is typical of this group of articles that provided a short list of the keys to success in a school election. Hanbury (1991) suggested that a school: (a) Study the economic and political climate; (b) use the media; (c) explain the budget; (d) recruit supporters; (e) remind people of school services and benefits; and (f) get out the vote.

Bauscher (1994) identified a 12-step process to win a school bond election. Flanigan stressed the importance of public opinion surveys to determine community needs and develop a campaign strategy that responded to the perceived needs of a community. Graham (1990) presented a school district campaign approach based on modern marketing techniques, including customer satisfaction and consumer problem-solving. Holt in 1994 listed critical factors that contribute to campaign success, such as
an active support group, media support, grassroots campaigning and an effective bond consultant. Jacobson (1995) focused exclusively on tactics to improve mail-in voter participation and approval. Mulkey (1993) instructed schools considering a levy or bond issue to seek legal guidance concerning limits on advocacy, develop a campaign schedule, educate the local media, and begin a campaign with a focus on internal constituents like parent organizations, teachers and board members.

**Community Colleges**

For a variety of reasons, recent literature has addressed community college revenue elections less than elementary and secondary elections. As noted above, only 15 states allow community colleges to seek local taxpayer support. In addition, community college revenue elections may be less common in the 1980s and 1990s because of relatively less enrollment growth and facilities construction compared the period of explosive growth in the 1960s and early 1970s.

As is true of the literature addressing elementary and secondary revenue elections, much of the limited literature concerning community college elections examines a single successful election. Campion and Huffstutler (1995) summarized the experiences of Henderson County Junior College in Texas, including the strategies of the campaign, the organization of campaign leadership and methods to secure publicity for the campaign effort. Day's 1996 analysis of a rejected bond referendum at Johnson County Community College in Overland Park, Kansas is a rare review of an unsuccessful campaign, including a review of the socioeconomic data of the community and background data of local voters. Although Koontz entitled his 1980 article "Not a Snowball's Chance in Hell," he
described the involvement of faculty, staff and students in an internal publicity campaign at Palm Beach Junior College that set the tone for a successful bond election. Like Day, Minor (1992) examined the possible explanations for the failure of a bond issue, focusing on a California community college.

A few authors have written about the component parts of a community college election or general community college election strategy. Conklin (1992) summarized a public opinion survey conducted before the unsuccessful election at Johnson County Community College in 1992. Otis (1982) examined one community college's use of the community participation model in policy-making in relation to a successful bond issue. Spicer and Karpp summarized the attitudes of a focus group of faculty and staff at Glendale Community College in California concerning a proposed property tax increase to provide additional college support.

Summary

The review of the existing literature demonstrated that, although the need for community college tax levy and bond issue elections is probably on the rise, very little has been written about successful community college election strategies. The limited literature that exists is frequently focused on a recap and analysis of a single election for a single school or college, and has limited applicability to future elections. In addition, many of the elections that have been the subject of recap and analysis are now decades in the past.

The existing literature identified many fiscal challenges facing community colleges and described many opportunities and problems in the anti-tax political climate
epitomized by California's Proposition 13. The development of strategies to succeed in a community college tax levy or bond issue election in order to respond to these fiscal challenges is an area that merits further analysis.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The explanation of the methodology used in this study contains three sections. The first section presents the research design utilized in the study. The second section explains the study population and sample selection for the study. The third section addresses instruments used to collect data and procedures for data collection.

Research Design

The study used a multiple case study research model. The cases were studied to determine if selected public community colleges that had participated in successful elections involving bond issues or tax levy increases employed similar election strategies.

Although the multiple case study is useful to test hypotheses and theories, it is not commonly used because it may prove difficult to generalize the findings to other, unique situations (Gall, Borg, & Gall, 1996). This disadvantage is outweighed in this instance by what Gall et al. described as the emergent quality of case studies, the flexibility to change the emphasis on which case the study focuses and to alter data collection methods and research questions in the process of gathering information and insights.

Because of the differences between the subject colleges, the multiple case study research model provided flexibility in tailoring the instruments used to collect data. Interviews with election participants were responsive to the demographics, political climate and availability of election participants at the subject colleges. In the process of data collection, refinement of interview questions took place to identify issues that had applicability to the broad spectrum of community colleges in the United States.
Strauss and Corbin (1990) explained that case studies can disclose information from which a broad-based, practical theory can emerge: "If the data upon which it is based are comprehensive and the interpretations conceptual and broad, then the theory should be abstract enough and include sufficient variations to make it applicable to a variety of contexts related to that phenomenon" (p. 23). Through a thorough, detailed review of a variety of strategies and campaign materials used by the three subject colleges, the study provided sufficient data to make it applicable to future revenue elections at many different, sometimes dissimilar community colleges.

**Study Population and Sample Selection**

The target population was comprised of public, two-year community colleges that conducted tax levy or bond elections within the last 10 years. The initial challenge of the study was to determine an appropriate sample from the more than 1,100 community colleges nation-wide. The first step in limiting the number of subjects was to identify colleges that had participated in a tax levy or bond issue election in the previous 10 years. At the Association of American Community College annual meeting during the week of April 13-17, 1997, the state directors of community colleges in attendance were provided with a brief questionnaire with a self-addressed, stamped envelope. The questionnaire requested from each state director information concerning any college in his or her state which had conducted a tax levy or bond issue within the last decade. The questionnaire was the initial step in selecting the sample for the study.

To ensure that all 50 states were included in the study, the initial questionnaires were followed up by a 50-state telephone survey to determine if tax levy or bond issue
elections were available in each state and to identify any colleges that had held elections in the last 10 years that might not have been identified in response to the initial questionnaires.

Once colleges that have conducted elections in the last 10 years were identified, follow-up telephone interviews were conducted to identify colleges that had been successful in the election process and to obtain demographic information about these colleges. Of the relatively small group of colleges that were identified to have been successful in the election process, the number of colleges appropriate for case study was reduced further by identifying whether the administration and staff and other key participants most directly involved in the campaign were still with the college and/or were available for interviews and other forms of data collection.

The goal was to reduce the target population to a group of three colleges that would each become the subject of an extensive case study. The case studies included a detailed written questionnaire, interviews and a thorough review of election materials, including printed and broadcast promotional materials, when available. Participants included state-wide community college directors, college trustees, system-wide chancellors, college presidents, chief financial officers, public information officers and other college executives, public relations and campaign consultants and journalists.

**Human Subjects**

The Institutional Review Board of the University of Arkansas reviewed and approved this research prior to data collection.
Data Collection Instruments and Procedures

The research included a questionnaire provided to state community college directors to identify colleges that had held elections in the past decade (a copy of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix A). The questionnaire requested information concerning colleges that had conducted tax levy or bond issue elections in the past 10 years and identified a possible contact person for each college.

A 50-state telephone survey was conducted to determine whether tax levy or bond issue elections were available to local colleges in each state (a copy of the telephone survey is attached as Appendix B). Using the American Association of Community Colleges directory of member institutions, a statewide community college official and/or one or more colleges in each state were contacted as a part of the telephone survey. A statewide officer or the business officer, chief executive or other appropriate person at each college contacted was interviewed as a part of the survey to determine: (a) If the colleges in the state could seek local financial support through an increase in local property tax, sales tax, or through the authorization of general obligation bonds; (b) If the college contacted had conducted an election seeking local financial support in the form of a property tax increase, sales tax increase, or issuance of general obligation bonds, and, if so, what percentage of yes votes was required and what outcome resulted from the election; (c) If the survey participant was aware of any other colleges in his or her state that had conducted an election in the last 10 years.

The three colleges that were selected as subjects of case studies received a detailed, follow-up questionnaire specifically addressing the research questions presented
in Chapter I. (A copy of the follow-up questionnaire is attached as Appendix C.) The follow-up questionnaire requested specific information about the college’s successful election, including the percentage of yes votes, the amount of money raised as a part of the campaign’s fundraising efforts, identification of key individuals involved in the campaign, the formal filings required as a part of the campaign, the community organizations involved in the campaign, the theme of the campaign, whether or not other issues were on the ballot, the degree of involvement of students, and the type and amount of media involvement in the campaign. In addition, printed and broadcast materials used in successful campaigns were reviewed.

Both the initial questionnaire and the follow-up questionnaire were pretested using participants from one of the subject colleges, Maricopa Community College. Questions on the questionnaires were revised slightly until the questions were understood accurately by most participants from the pretest subject college. Respondents were allowed to critique the questionnaires and offer suggestions to improve the questions (Gall et al., 1996).

After receipt of the follow-up questionnaire, key participants in the successful campaigns selected were identified and interviewed to amplify survey responses. The participants selected for interviews were those individuals who were identified as having played an integral role in the formulation and implementation of campaign strategy (Stewart & Cash, 1994). Because the subject colleges were geographically dispersed, many of the interviews were conducted by telephone (Lavarkas, 1993). Each interview was summarized and documented contemporaneously.
The interview guide and procedures were pretested using participants from one subject college, Maricopa Community College. (The Interview Guide and Procedures is attached as Appendix D). The pilot test of the interview guide and procedures ensured that the interviews yielded reasonably unbiased data and provided information concerning questions that need to be rephrased or revised.
CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS

The summary of findings of this study contains two main sections. The first section details the findings of the initial questionnaires provided to state community college directors and the results of the 50-state telephone survey. The second section presents the findings of the three specific case studies, including summaries of responses from questionnaires, interviews and a thorough review of campaign materials.

Responses to Initial Questionnaires and 50-State Telephone Survey

Of the initial questionnaires provided to state directors of community colleges in attendance at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Community Colleges (Appendix A), six surveys were returned via mail. Five other community college directors provided information either through electronic mail or telephone calls. Although the relatively small percentage of responses to the initial surveys was initially somewhat disappointing, the survey responses provided a significant amount of information. Approximately 15 colleges were identified that had conducted elections for bond issue or tax increases in the last 10 years. In addition, the state directors who responded became a resource for subsequent follow-up interviews after the subject colleges were selected.

One subject college, Maricopa Community College in the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan area, was identified and selected in part in response to information provided in a questionnaire response. Maricopa Community College had conducted an unsuccessful election in 1992, losing by an almost two to one margin. In Maricopa
Community College's successful 1994 bond election for $386 million, the successful outcome was almost reversed, with 62.5% of voters supporting the issue. According to Maricopa Community College officials, the $386 million bond issue was in 1994 the largest successful bond issue in community college history.

The 50-state telephone survey provided a wealth of information and filled in the gaps that had existed because of the limited responses to the initial questionnaires (Appendix B). The telephone survey insured that the study would include information from across the country. (A summary of contacts who participated in the telephone survey is attached as Appendix E.) The telephone survey also indicated a possible explanation for the low response rate to the initial questionnaire. As Table 1 indicates, only 14 of the 50 states allow community colleges to seek local voter support through an election either to increase local taxes or to issue bonds. Twelve states allow local colleges to seek an increase in property tax; 13 states allow local colleges to bring bond issues to the voters. Thus, many state community college directors may have concluded that the survey was not applicable to his or her state. Table 1 also includes information concerning the majority required to prevail in an election seeking a property tax increase or authority to issue bonds. Somewhat surprisingly, no states allow community college to seek voter approval for use of sales tax as a revenue source for community colleges.

Participants in the telephone survey also identified approximately 25 additional colleges that had participated in revenue elections in the last 10 years. Two subject colleges, Santa Monica College in Santa Monica, California, and Washtenaw
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Property Tax</th>
<th>Sales Tax</th>
<th>Bond Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALASKA</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARKANSAS</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARIZONA</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
</tr>
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<td>NO</td>
</tr>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLINOIS</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>YES (80%)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>YES (majority)</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
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<td>MASSACHUSETTS</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
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<td>MICHIGAN</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINNESOTA</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td>MISSISSIPPI</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSOURI</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Property Tax</td>
<td>Sales Tax</td>
<td>Bond Issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
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<td>MONTANA</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBRASKA</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
</tr>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW JERSEY</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW MEXICO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH DAKOTA</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHIO</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>OKLAHOMA</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHODE ISLAND</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH DAKOTA</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENNESSEE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXAS</td>
<td>YES (majority)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES (yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTAH</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERMONT</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIRGINIA</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST VIRGINIA</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISCONSIN</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WYOMING</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Community College in Ann Arbor, Michigan, were identified and selected in response to information provided in the telephone survey.

In its successful 1992 campaign for a $23 million bond issue, Santa Monica College was one of a relatively small group of community colleges in California to pass a bond issue after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. Santa Monica College cleared the two-thirds majority mandated by Proposition 13 by a handful of votes.

Washtenaw Community College was a suburban college in Ann Arbor, Michigan that suffered in 1992 the first election defeat in its 26-year history. Four years later, Washtenaw Community College conducted a successful bond election in August of 1996 but failed in the August election in an attempt to increase the operating property tax millage. In an election three months later in November of 1996, Washtenaw Community College succeeded in obtaining approval to increase the local property tax that supported the college.

Case Studies of Subject Colleges

The three colleges identified and selected as a case study college included an urban, multiple-campus college with more than 80,000 college credit students each semester, a single-campus college in an affluent area of southern California serving about 23,000 college credit students each semester, and a suburban, single-campus college with about 10,000 college credit students each semester. Table 2 provides an overview of the colleges that were subjects of the case studies.

Each of the case studies includes relevant demographic background about the college, a summary of the events leading up to the campaign, a detailed analysis of the
Table 2: Overview of Findings From Subject Community Colleges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maricopa</th>
<th>Santa Monica</th>
<th>Washtenaw</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of College Credit Students</td>
<td>89,637</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Campuses</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Election(s)</td>
<td>Nov. 8, 1994</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1992</td>
<td>Aug. 6, 1996, and Nov. 5, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Election</td>
<td>Bond Issue</td>
<td>Bond Issue</td>
<td>Bond Issue/Millage Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount Sought</td>
<td>$385.8 million</td>
<td>$23 million</td>
<td>$38.9 million/.85 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Use of Funds</td>
<td>Purchase technology, improve and expand facilities</td>
<td>Asbestos removal, modernize science labs, modernize library</td>
<td>Build Technical Education Building, enhance technology, computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Favorable Votes</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(yes/total)</td>
<td>342,071/547,304</td>
<td>33,399/50,000</td>
<td>60,537/108,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Required for Victory</td>
<td>simple majority</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>simple majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollars Raised in Campaign Fundraising Effort</td>
<td>$135,000</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
<td>$50,000 $60,000 (in Nov.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollars spent for Each “Yes” Vote</td>
<td>$.40</td>
<td>$2.69</td>
<td>$.99 (in Nov.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Tax Increase to Average Voter</td>
<td>$15 a year</td>
<td>$15 a year</td>
<td>$60 a year (combined)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Formal Campaign</td>
<td>three months</td>
<td>two months</td>
<td>varied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1In November millage election.
written questionnaires provided to key individuals at each subject college, telephone or face-to-face interviews with key contacts, and, when available, a review of campaign materials, including print and broadcast materials.

Maricopa Community College

The Maricopa Community College District was established in 1962. Phoenix College, the forerunner of the Maricopa Community College District, was established in 1920. The district extends throughout the Phoenix/Tempe, Arizona, metropolitan area. Maricopa Community College ("MCC") is one of the nation’s largest multi-college community college systems, second in size only to the Los Angeles system (Maricopa Community Colleges Web Page).

Beginning in the 1980s, metropolitan Phoenix began to experience extraordinary population growth that has continued into the present. As the Phoenix population has grown, enrollment in the Maricopa Community College district has soared. More than 89,000 college credit student enroll at 1 of the 10 colleges in the Maricopa Community College District each semester, including Chandler-Gilbert Community College, Estrella Mountain Community College Center, GateWay Community College, Glendale Community College, Mesa Community College, Paradise Valley Community College, Phoenix College, Rio Salado Community College, Scottsdale Community College and South Mountain Community College. At nearby Arizona State University, more than 60% of students enrolled as upper division undergraduates in 1994 transferred credits from a Maricopa Community College. Approximately 50% of all Arizona State undergraduates in 1994 earned course credits from the Maricopa Community College
Once MCC was identified as a subject college for a case study, the follow-up questionnaire (Appendix C) was provided to the following key election participants: Rick DeGraw, Executive Assistant to the President; Marilyn Anderson, Director of Finance/Controller; Bill Waechter, Vice Chancellor for Quality and Employee Development; and Linda B. Rosenthal, president of the MCC Governing Board during the 1994 election. After receipt of the completed follow-up questionnaires from each of the key individuals, Mr. Rick DeGraw, Ms. Marilyn Anderson, Mr. Bill Waechter, Ms. Linda B. Rosenthal, Ms. Christa Severns, an outside political consultant to the campaign, and Chancellor Paul Elsner were interviewed by telephone to amplify the responses contained in the questionnaires. In addition, written campaign materials for the 1994 election were reviewed and analyzed. Table 3 provides a summary of the findings from these various sources.

At first glance, MCC seemed to have been in an enviable position as it prepared for its November 8, 1994 $385.8 million bond issue. MCC had been featured in the 1992 College Guide in U.S. News & World Report in which the Maricopa Community College District was selected as one of the best districts in the nation. However, in spite of all the favorable local and national media coverage before the 1994 election, MCC had been unsuccessful only two years before with a $340 million bond issue in June of 1992.

Because of poor economic conditions in Arizona at the time of the unsuccessful 1992 election, MCC had considered delaying that election until a more favorable political climate existed. But Barbara Hitchcock, who was president of the MCC governing board
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Campaign Theme</strong></td>
<td>At the Crossroads; emphasis on Workforce Development; focus on “safety and savings”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Campaign Community Approval</strong></td>
<td>90% of poll respondents viewed MCC as the most effective of seven government entities in Maricopa County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Statement</strong></td>
<td>Filed with Maricopa County Board of Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Endorsements</strong></td>
<td>Nearly 100 community organizations supported the issue, including the crucial Sun City Homeowner’s Association, 13 Chambers of Commerce, 7 school districts, 4 newspapers and numerous other organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant Opposition</strong></td>
<td>The Phoenix Chamber of Commerce (the “disturbing no”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaign Advertising</strong></td>
<td>Radio, print and direct mail (no t.v. because of cost and concern of getting lost in blitz of election t.v. ads)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Issues on Ballot</strong></td>
<td>Eight other issues on ballot, including proposition for new freeways and mass transit (rejected) and an increase in legislators salaries (rejected) and hundreds of candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student Involvement</strong></td>
<td>Student organizations on all ten campuses were involved, assisting in awareness building, voter registration and other important tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Consultants</strong></td>
<td>Christa Severns, Grossfield &amp; Severns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Faculty/Staff Involvement</strong></td>
<td>Assisted in development of 1994 Capital Development Plan; participated in informational efforts; delivered direct mail pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media Coverage</strong></td>
<td>Numerous newspaper editorial endorsements and articles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Key Contacts**                    | Marilyn Anderson, Director of Finance/Controller  
**Rick DeGraw**, Executive Assistant to the President  
**Dr. Paul Elsner**, Chancellor  
**Linda Rosenthal**, President of Governing Board  
**Christa Severns**, consultant  
**Bill Waechter**, Vice Chancellor |
in 1992, explained the decision to go forward:

I believe the more difficult the economic situation, the more we need community colleges. If we don’t have funding to maintain and improve our facilities, to take care of a burgeoning population and all the people who need retraining, we’ll be in trouble. (Bergman, 1992, p. 9)

In spite of the poor economic conditions in Arizona at the time of the 1992 election, the college’s history with special bond elections was a source of confidence. In the most recent special bond election preceding the 1992 election, MCC had received the support of 78% of the electorate in the 1984 bond election, with some districts voting “yes” in numbers greater than 80% (Bergman, 1992). Perhaps because of concern about the economy and perhaps out of a false sense of confidence based on previous electoral success, the 1992 campaign was quiet and low-key. According to Rick DeGraw, Executive Assistant to the Chancellor, the 1992 campaign relied on a grass-roots, word-of-mouth campaign that did not include an aggressive direct mail or media effort. (A summary of the telephone interview with Rick DeGraw is attached as Appendix F).

Whether the economy or the type of low-key campaign was the culprit, MCC suffered a crushing defeat on June 23, 1992, going down to defeat with a “no” vote in excess of 65%. The president of the MCC governing board during the 1994 election, Linda B. Rosenthal, explained that the college was somewhat complacent during the 1992 election: “We sat back and said, ‘Oh, we’re wonderful!’” (A summary of the telephone interview with Linda B. Rosenthal is attached as Appendix K). Bill Waechter, Vice Chancellor for Quality and Employee Development, echoed Ms. Rosenthal’s comment:
"We did not spend enough time image-building, but just assumed everyone knew about MCC. Voters were familiar with their local college, but did not understand it was a part of the Maricopa Community College District.” (A summary of the telephone interview with Dr. Bill Waechter is attached as Appendix M.) Another mistake in the 1992 campaign identified by Dr. Waechter was MCC’s assumption that retirees would not be supporters of the bond issue. As a result, Dr. Waechter stated that the college failed to cultivate the senior citizen vote.

Dr. Paul Elsner, Chancellor of MCC, saw the outcome of the unsuccessful 1992 election as less a result of the 1992 campaign effort than it was a result of the economic climate at that time. (A summary of the telephone interview with Dr. Paul Elsner is attached as Appendix O.) In his opinion, “we may have actually done a better job in the 1992 election, but the timing was just wrong.”

In the period between the 1992 defeat and the 1994 election, the economy improved and the needs of the college continued to increase. According to Marilyn Anderson, MCC’s Director of Finance/Controller, the college had identified more than $1 billion in pressing needs before seeking approval of the 1992 bond issue. (A summary of the telephone interview with Ms. Anderson is attached as Appendix G). The defeated special bond election in June of 1992 was for $340 million, yet MCC optimistically returned to the voters in 1994 asking for an additional $46 million (Frequently Asked Questions about the Maricopa Community Colleges’ Capital Improvement Plan and Bond Request).

The Maricopa Community College budget relies much more heavily on property
tax for revenue than the national average for community colleges of 17.9% (AACC 1996-97 Annual). In the early days of the college in the mid-1960s when the budget was only $6.4 million, the state appropriation was the largest source of revenue. However, before the unsuccessful election in 1992, only 17.3% of the MCC budget came from state appropriations (Bergman, 1992). According to Ms. Anderson, 65% of MCC’s revenues come from local property tax in the 1997-1998 fiscal year (including the revenue from the successful bond election in 1994), and only about 16% from state appropriations. Remaining revenues come from tuition and other sources. Thus, property tax revenues are very important to MCC.

MCC was determined to learn lessons from the disastrous 1992 election. According to political consultant Christa Severns, the crushing defeat in 1992 made MCC officials much more responsive to political consultation. (A summary of the telephone interview with Ms. Severns is attached as Appendix L.) Mr. DeGraw had joined MCC in 1991 just before the unsuccessful election, but did not participate in the election process because of the perception he was not sufficiently removed from recent activities as a political consultant. Mr. DeGraw had been involved in MCC’s most recent successful campaign in 1984, and had served as a campaign consultant in more than 270 elections with a winning percentage in excess of 80%. Chancellor Elsner described Mr. DeGraw as one of the most knowledgeable experts of voter behavior and the political process in the United States. Mr. DeGraw, Dr. Waechter and Ms. Severns were among the few key participants in developing a different strategy for the 1994 campaign.

Before setting a date for the 1994 election, the college commissioned an extensive
poll conducted by Fairbank, Maullin & Associates. According to Dr. Waechter, the public opinion survey was “the most important thing we did.” Chancellor Elsner was more reluctant to assign that degree of significance to the survey, emphasizing what he perceived as the “randomness” of the electoral process. Dr. Elsner did acknowledge that “any information has value,” but he did not single out the information from the survey as uniquely important.

One significant finding from the public opinion survey was that a November general election was a much better time to hold a bond election than a special election (e.g., February or April or June, the month the 1992 election was held). According to Mr. DeGraw, the polling data indicated that voters more disposed to supporting an MCC bond issue—including women, minorities, and less affluent voters—take part in general elections in greater numbers. Chancellor Elsner stated that the MCC issue in 1994 became the “one bright spot” on a crowded ballot that included many tax issues that prompted a negative reaction from voters.

Based in large part on the polling data, November 8 of 1994 was identified as the election date most conducive to a successful outcome. Dr. Waechter emphasized the importance of designing the campaign strategy directly around research, including polling data. As Dr. Waechter explained, “the survey told us things we did not want to hear, but that we needed to hear.” One important discovery that resulted from the public opinion survey was that retirees in Sun Valley, a huge, affluent retirement community, were willing to support education and MCC; the college learned that more than 15 retired college presidents lived in Sun Valley and countless retired teachers. After reviewing the
polling data, Dr. Waechter admitted that "we could not believe how stupid we had been [in the 1992 election] to ignore the retirees."

Another important finding from the poll conducted after the 1992 defeat concerned the amount of the bond issue. In essence, the poll asked a broad-based question on the amount of a bond issue the voters would support. In other words, the poll sought to determine "what the market would bear." The poll indicated that the electoral market would support a bond issue of between $300 million and $400 million. An amount of $500 million was too much ("half a billion was frightening to voters" according to Mr. DeGraw), and interestingly, $250 billion was not well-received either ("a quarter of a billion"). Although the college had identified in excess of a billion dollars worth of needs, the polling data was instrumental in selecting a smaller amount for the bond issue. Use of the polling data was an example of designing the campaign around the research, as Vice Chancellor Waechter emphasized. Mr. DeGraw explained that the polling data did not indicate a significant difference in support for a $300 million or $400 million bond issue, so the college chose a number at the upper end of that range.

Once MCC identified the amount of the bond issue, an extensive process ensued involving faculty and staff to determine how to best allocate potential bond dollars in a way that would also increase the likelihood of electoral success. The result of that process was the Maricopa Community College 1994 Capital Development Plan. Significantly, the Plan identified one or more significant projects for each of MCC's ten colleges. Each of the projects was needed, but as Dr. Waechter explained, including a project for each college also enhanced internal support for the bond issue: "Including a
project for each campus insured involvement from each college. Our entire faculty and staff saw how passage of the bond issue would impact them.” In addition, political consultant Severns indicated that the poll was useful in identifying and excluding projects from the bond proposal that lacked public support. It was crucial for MCC to place items on the bond issue ballot that voters would support.

In addition to the projects for each of the ten colleges ranging from $17.5 million for South Mountain Community College to $49.5 million for Mesa Community College, the Plan also identified the need for three new education centers, the Arrowhead Education Center, the Sun Cities and Sun Lakes Education Centers, and the Guadalupe Education Center. Each of the proposed education centers was responsive to an educational need, but each was also responsive to political necessity. The three proposed centers would serve areas of the MCC district that had significant voter blocks, most notably the Sun Cities projects.

Sun City is a senior citizens retirement enclave with an extremely high voter turnout. According to Mr. DeGraw, specific inclusion of projects targeted to Sun City helped to garner support from Sun City while also meeting an educational need. Ms. Severns also noted that the college staff did an incredible amount of outreach to Sun City residents in the process of building a favorable rapport. Dr. Waechter stated that a retiree who lived in Sun City was hired by the college well before the election to act as a “mouthpiece” of the college to communicate with Sun City retirees. Chancellor Elsner concluded that Sun City support does not guarantee electoral success, but that Sun City opposition “can kill you.”
Once the date of the election was set, the amount of the bond issue determined, and the projects to be included in the bond issue identified, one of the next steps was to develop ballot language. (The language of the issue that appeared on the November 8, 1994, ballot is attached as Appendix I.) The names of all ten colleges and the specific project for each are included in the ballot language. Thus, the ballot itself reminded voters of the project geographically closest to them. Mr. DeGraw and others also explained that the ballot language was also crafted in part in response to criticism during the 1992 election, including the assertion that 20-year debt service was too long for technological enhancements. The ballot language explained that bonds used to purchase technology would be retired first, since depreciation for technology occurs much more quickly than for buildings and other capital improvements.

By the spring of 1994, MCC had the pieces in place to set a campaign in motion. Dr. Paul Elsner, Chancellor of Maricopa Community Colleges, announced: “There is a strong possibility that the Maricopa Community Colleges will ask for public support of a bond referendum in the $400 million range in the November, 1994, general election.” (Memo from Maricopa, Spring 1994, p. 1)

Chancellor Elsner explained that the bonds would be used for capital projects like restoration of aging buildings, building new classrooms, and replacing and upgrading outmoded technology. At the beginning of 1994, Maricopa County was already the sixth largest county in the United States with forecasts that the county’s population might increase 64% by the year 2010 (Memo from Maricopa, Spring 1994).

As the 1994 election approached, one significant, positive indication of voter
support of MCC was a response from the public opinion survey indicating that 90% of respondents viewed the Maricopa Colleges as the most effective of seven government entities in terms of fiscal responsibility (Memo from Maricopa, Spring 1994).

On May 24, 1994, the MCC board decided to request that the State Board of Directors for Community College place a bond issue on the November, 1994 ballot. Before the meeting of the state board on May 24, 1994, Chancellor Elsner commented on the changes in the Arizona economy since the unsuccessful 1992 election: “I think the business climate has improved. I think we’ll have better business-community support” (Kelly, 1994, p. A1). As Ms. Anderson explained, authorization from the State Board of Directors of Community Colleges is required before a college can place a bond issue on a local ballot. The State Board ultimately authorized MCC to place a $386 million bond issue on the November, 1994 ballot.

Governing board member Ms. Rosenthal indicated that the initial plan was to ask the State Board for authority to place a $479 million bond issue on the 1994 ballot, but that the $386 million figure was a political compromise necessitated by the State Board’s reluctance to authorize an amount as large as the initial $479 million request. The State Board had one member appointed by the governor from each of Arizona’s counties, so only one representative to the state board was from Maricopa County. Given the huge majority vote in support of the 1994 election for $386 million, Dr. Waechter noted after the fact that in all likelihood a $479 million bond issue might have passed with relative ease, also.

Chancellor Elsner actually perceived the action of the state board as an
unexpected political asset. Noting that the Phoenix area is part of the “cradle of conservatism,” Dr. Elsner thought that the unfavorable decision of the state board may have generated some support from voters who did not approve of local authority eroded by the actions of a centralized state body. Dr. Elsner noted that, if the action of the state board did aid the campaign effort, the action was another example of the “random” events in a campaign over which the participants have virtually no control.

By the summer of 1994, the college was beginning to provide information to faculty and staff and to the community about the November election. Linda B. Rosenthal, president of the Maricopa Community College District Governing Board during the 1994 election, concisely summarized the community need: “In order for us to continue to serve our community, we must be sure that our equipment and facilities are sufficient. The only way this can be achieved is to ask for the public’s support” (Memo from Maricopa, Summer 1994).

Although the commitment and involvement of faculty and staff was important, Arizona is like many states in that college employees cannot work during college hours to advocate passage of a bond issue or tax increase. The MCC district and its employees could only provide factual information during the campaign. (A copy of the Employee Guidelines for the MCCD Bond Election is attached as Appendix J.) Ms. Rosenthal, in a questionnaire response, said: “The most important aspect is to be sure the internal staff is informed of the need and moderated to keep [advocacy activities] on their own time. Without them, it may very well be a disaster!” Ms. Rosenthal took an active role in speaking to as many faculty and staff groups as possible to discuss the bond issue.
Involving students was also crucial in the MCC election. According to Ms. Rosenthal, students “held voter registration drives, rally, forums, and did lots of work to help.” Vice Chancellor Waechter noted that students were helpful in validating the need for the bond issue, and in awareness building, with student organizations at some campuses becoming more involved than others.

MCC prepared a variety of effective informational pieces for faculty and staff, students, and for the voters are Maricopa County. Because of the bilingual makeup of the county’s population, all informational materials were printed in both English and Spanish. One such brochure was *At the Crossroads: The Maricopa Community Colleges*. This publication traced the history of MCC and succinctly identified two of the major focuses of MCC: university transfer education (“at least 62% of Arizona State University’s juniors and seniors have taken much of their lower division work at one of the 10 Maricopa Community Colleges,” p. 1) and job training (MCC is “the largest provider of job training in Arizona,” p. 1). *At the Crossroads* also listed several of the hundreds of businesses served by MCC’s employee training programs and emphasized the college’s outstanding reputation for quality. The focus of *At the Crossroads* was positive background information about MCC. Only half of page 3 of the brochure referred specifically to the November bond election. This portion of the brochure explained that the cost of the $385.799 million bond issue would be $15 per year for 20 years for the average Maricopa County taxpayer. The brochure emphasized the positive benefits of the bond issue in broad terms:

We are running out of classroom space. Many buildings are in need of repair and
some are in need of replacement. Library space needs updating. Equipment used for teaching and learning will soon be obsolete. Another college campus, additional satellite centers, and a skill center are called for (At the Crossroads, p. 3).

Any specific, detailed information about the bond issue possibly lacking in At the Crossroads was included in an informational brochure entitled Voter Information Pamphlet. This comprehensive pamphlet included specifics about the purposes for which the bonds were to be issued, the proposed issuance schedule, the estimated cost to taxpayers, the districts' debt limit and a complex estimation of the debt retirement schedule. In addition, Voter Information Pamphlet included instructions on how to vote, where to vote, the option to vote by mail and the option to vote early (absentee). Each voter's polling place was noted on the mailing label attached to the pamphlet. Because of the relative ease in Maricopa County of voting either by mail or absentee, substantial information was provided to voters on these alternative voting methods. Mr. DeGraw estimated that more than 5,000 voters voted either by mail or through the absentee process.

Another informational piece produced by the college was Memo from Maricopa: Frequently Asked Questions About the MCC Capital Improvement Plan and Bond Request. This brochure provided answers to the following eleven questions:

1) How will the funds be used? 2) How will you pay for the operating costs of new, expanded or improved facilities? 3) Why buy new technology that may become outdated in a few years? 4) What’s so important about a college education
in today's job market? 5) What is the purpose of having the bond question on the general election ballot? 6) Why build new classrooms since there has been a slight decline in enrollment? 7) Why should I pay taxes for colleges across town and not even in my neighborhood? 8) Your 1992 special bond election was for $340 million. It lost. Now the amount is increased by an additional $46 million. Why? 9) What are your immediate plans if the voters approve the bonds? 10) Maricopa County bonds have recently been downgraded. Will this affect the community college bond election or the rate at which its bonds can be sold? 11) Finally, if voters approve the bond package at the November 8th general election, how will this affect my property taxes?

The 11 answers did not respond to every conceivable question, but did provide concise information in response to the most frequently asked questions.

According to Mr. DeGraw, the campaign was divided into two distinct phases. The first phase of the campaign focused on the reinforcing the general positive image of the college. Part of the general image promotion, in addition to written information provided voters such as *At the Crossroads*, was the placement of four television spots coinciding with fall student registration. Paid for by the college as a normal, non-campaign public information expenditure, the television commercials emphasized the positive image of MCC in the mind of the community. Closer to the election, MCC provided specific information about the election in pieces such as the *Voter Information Pamphlet* and *Memo from Maricopa: Frequently Asked Questions About the MCC Capital Improvement Plan and Bond Request*. 

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The second part of the campaign was an intense, two-month emphasis on direct mail and public appearances in support of the bond issue. Since the goal of this portion of the campaign was advocacy, MCC could not participate directly in this effort (See Appendix I). A campaign committee apart from the college, “Citizens for Community Colleges ‘94”, was established. Ms. Severns estimated that Citizens for Community Colleges ‘94 raised in the neighborhood of $135,000, primarily to fund direct mail efforts. The $135,000 figure may sound like a lot of money to many colleges, but in a sprawling metropolitan district like Maricopa County, governing board member Linda Rosenthal responded succinctly to the question “how much money was raised as a part of the campaign fundraising effort?” “Not enough!” was her reply.

One district-wide piece created by Christa Severns for Citizens for Community Colleges ‘94 was a brochure entitled A Common Bond, with the caption “Jobs, Safety, Savings, A Common Bond.” A Common Bond urged voters to vote yes, and provided several reasons for a “Yes” vote: Vote Yes to solve common problems (the need for quality education and job training); Vote Yes for Common Cents (only $15 a year for the average household); Vote Yes for Common Links (more program choices and better job training); Vote Yes for Common Benefits (improved, safer facilities). A Common Bond also included two very personal profiles in each brochure, with the profile featuring students from one of the ten colleges. One example of the profiles was that of a 38-year-old African American, Karl Burns, who had recently received his associate’s degree while pursuing a career in the Air Force. The profile stated that Mr. Burns was now in the process of transferring to a university for a bachelor’s degree. A second example of
the profiles was that of a Hispanic MCC instructor, Dorothy Sisneros, who had recently left the business world to share her expertise in the classroom as a health and business instructor.

In addition to pieces like A Common Bond that were suitable for distribution district-wide, a direct mail piece was also prepared for each of the ten colleges to target voters within the service area of each college. Although the different direct mail pieces had a customized message for the patrons of different colleges, the campaign insured that the different direct mail pieces had a similar consistency and focus. Mr. DeGraw estimated that well in excess of a million direct mail pieces were delivered. According to Ms. Severns, because of the limited cash available to the campaign, thousands of the direct mail pieces were hand-delivered by volunteers.

Unlike the use of television spots in the general image awareness efforts paid for by MCC, the second phase of the campaign did not include the purchase of television spots. Mr. DeGraw explained that the campaign concluded that television commercials for the MCC bond issue would be lost amidst the clutter of general election campaign commercials. In addition, Ms. Severns commented that the campaign simply could not afford television. Thus, the funds raised by the Citizens for Community Colleges '94 were used almost exclusively for printing, mailing and delivering a barrage of direct mail.

Although the Citizens for Community Colleges '94 did not purchase media time, the coverage by the print media was extensive and generally very favorable. MCC officials were somewhat disappointed by the lack of broadcast media coverage, but
agreed that little radio and television coverage was preferable to extensive negative coverage.

An example of the glowing newspaper editorial support was a letter from the editor, James Hill, in The Phoenix Gazette on October 7, 1994, that read like a direct mail piece paid for by Citizens for Community Colleges ‘94:

The Maricopa Community Colleges are one of the Valley’s spectacular success stories. They provide quality, entry-level higher education to thousands of students at a fraction of the cost of attending one of the three state universities. In addition, MCCD is the only source for some of the specialty training courses needed to both seek jobs and advancement. And a few of the colleges even sport some pretty good football teams--without having to sport half-million-dollar salaries for head coaches (Hill, 1994, p. B7).

The Scottsdale Progress Tribune concluded that “it’s worth those few dollars for them [MCCD] to continue making those differences that no other institutions are making” (DeKeyser, 1994, p. A12). The headline to the endorsement from The Phoenix Gazette summed up their position: Why not the best for community colleges? (October 24, 1994, p. B8.) The endorsement from The Arizona Republic concluded: “We urge Maricopa County’s voters to take a stand for continued excellence and vote ‘yes’ on the community college district’s bond proposal” (October 28, 1994, p. B4). In its endorsement, The Scottsdale Progress Tribune urged voters as follows: “Don’t just look at the price tag attached to this bond issue when you enter the polls on Nov. 8. Look at the future. Vote ‘yes’” (Schuster, 1994, p. A10). Finally, on the eve of the election, Mary Lou Bessette of
The Arizona Business Gazette concluded that Maricopa County “tax money, to fund the $386 million bond issues, is an investment in Arizona’s educational future” (November 3, 1994, p. 14).

Dr. Waechter admitted the degree of support from newspaper editorials remains a delightful but difficult to explain phenomenon. Nonetheless, Dr. Waechter said, “I still read the good editorials every day.” The editorials have been enlarged and framed and hang on the wall outside of his office.

In addition to the slew of enthusiastic newspaper endorsements, an impressive variety of community groups endorsed the 1994 bond issue. One very important endorsement came from the Sun City Taxpayers Association board of directors on October 4, 1994. According to one board member of the Sun City Taxpayers Association, Alvin Meyers, “I think I can afford the $15, that’s the way I look at it,” (McCormack, 1994, p. A8). Governing board member Ms. Rosenthal noted that the endorsement of the Sun City Taxpayers Association was very significant because “this senior group usually does not support anything that raises taxes.” All of the campaign participants interviewed identified as a part of the study identified the Sun City Taxpayer’s Association endorsement as the key endorsement of the campaign. Other endorsements included thirteen area Chambers of Commerce, seven school districts and numerous other organizations ranging from “A” (Arizona Hospital Association) to “W” (Western Maricopa County Coalition). The significant, organized opponents to the issue were a tax advocacy group, the Arizona Tax Research Association, and the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce. (Kelly, 1994, p. A15.) The opposition of the Phoenix Chamber
of Commerce is what Mr. DeGraw referred to as “the disturbing no.”

Even with an intensive, grass-roots campaign, a well-conceived Capital Development Program, and enviable support from the editorial pages of local newspapers, the headline of a November 9, 1994, article in The Phoenix Gazette was a welcome relief: “County college bonds win in a walk” (Bland, p. A1). The final tally was 342,071 “yes” votes out of 547,304 votes cast. The smiling faces of Chancellor Paul Elsner and MCC governing board president Linda Rosenthal appeared on page 9 of the November 15, 1994, issue of Community College Times. As Chancellor Elsner explained, “It was a grassroots effort that passed the bond in spite of ‘No’ votes for a number of other tax increases in Arizona” (Cvancara, 1994, p. 9).

Almost immediately after the successful 1994 election, MCC began preparations for the next election, which Dr. Waechter estimates will take place early in 2000: “We have already encumbered almost all of the $386 million in bonds we were authorized to issue after the 1994 election.” Although still very pleased with the outcome of the 1994 election, Dr. Waechter cannot help but to lament the loss of the additional $64 million that would have probably been available if the State Board had approved the college’s initial request to place a $450 million bond issue on the ballot instead of the $386 million issue placed on the 1994 ballot.

Dr. Waechter emphasized that MCC has kept the public thoroughly informed about the project and completion of each project included as part of the 1994 ballot. When MCC seeks voter support early in the next millennium, the college will be prepared to demonstrate that the voters’ enthusiastic support of the college in the 1994 bond
Santa Monica College

Santa Monica College was established in 1929. A public two-year community college accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges, Santa Monica College ("SMC") grew from 153 students in 1929 to its current enrollment of more than 23,000 students each semester. SMC is a single-campus college on a 38-acre campus less than two miles from a Pacific Ocean beach. The district includes Santa Monica and Malibu, California. SMC leads all California community colleges in transferring students to the prestigious campuses of the University of California and the University of Southern California. SMC also has the largest contingent of international students of any community college in the United States, with more than 2,000 visiting students from more than 85 countries (Santa Monica College Web Page).

In 1978, California's community colleges and other taxpayer-supported institutions in the state were rocked by the passage of Proposition 13. One of the direct consequences of Proposition 13 was that community colleges were required to obtain a two-thirds supermajority for approval of a bond issue, instead of the simple majority previously required. The fact that SMC was in 1992 one of a relatively small group of community colleges in California to successfully pass a bond issue since Proposition 13 was one of the primary reasons that the SMC election was selected as a case study.

Once SMC was identified as a subject college for a case study, the follow-up questionnaire (Appendix C) was provided to the following key election participants: Tom Donner, Vice President of Business Administration; Don Girard, Director of Marketing;
and Keith Maullin, a public opinion consultant with Fairbank, Maullin and Associates. After receipt of the completed questionnaires from each of the key individuals, Mr. Girard and Mr. Maullin were interviewed by telephone to amplify the responses contained in the questionnaires. Written comments by Mr. Donner and Dr. Richard Moore, president of SMC in 1992 and currently president of the Community College of Southern Nevada, were reviewed. In addition, written materials for the 1992 election were reviewed and analyzed. Table 4 provides a summary of the findings from these various sources.

Don Girard is now SMC’s Director of Marketing. During the 1992 campaign, he acted as a political consultant to the college. According to Mr. Girard, approximately 13 colleges had unsuccessfully attempted a bond issue since the passage of Proposition 13 when SMC decided to make an attempt in 1992. (A summary of the telephone interview with Mr. Girard is attached as Appendix H.) In an article he wrote after the completion of the campaign, Mr. Girard used an analogy to describe the challenge SMC faced at the outset of its campaign:

In baseball terms, Santa Monica College began its $23 million local bond campaign for the 1992 election with two strikes against it, but knowing that it was also bringing a powerful .970 batting average. The first strike against the bond issue was the question of fairness. Only 18% of SMC students live in the local district. Why should local taxpayers pay the cost for a state institution? The second strike was the issue of growth. Santa Monica voters had just overturned
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Theme</td>
<td>Campaign for Safety and Modernization at Santa Monica College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Campaign Community Approval</td>
<td>97% of poll respondents viewed SMC favorably, the highest figures of 6 institutions tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Statement</td>
<td>Filed with Los Angeles County Board of Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Endorsements</td>
<td>More than 40 organizational and newspaper endorsements, including the Santa Monica Commission on Older Americans, the Santa Monica Bay Area Chamber of Commerce and the Santa Monica Rent Control Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Opposition</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Advertising</td>
<td>Primarily direct mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Issues on Ballot</td>
<td>National races (president, v.p., U.S. Senate and Congress), state and local races, 13 state initiatives and 6 county measures (including SMC issue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Involvement</td>
<td>Student participation in voter registration, information; student contributions for student government association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>Richard Maullin, public opinion consultant for polling, Fairbanks, Maullin &amp; Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty/Staff Involvement</td>
<td>Significant financial contributions to campaign from faculty and staff; involvement in demonstrating need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Coverage</td>
<td>Significant newspaper coverage and editorials in the Santa Monica Outlook</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Key Contacts                  | Tom Donner, Vice President of Business and Administration  
Don Girard, Director of Marketing  
Dr. Richard Moore, president of SMC in 1992 |
two development projects through referendums, and much of the $23 million
bond would be for new and enlarged facilities. (Girard, 1993, p. 1)

The "970 batting average" to which Mr. Girard referred was a number from a
March 1992 public opinion survey conducted by Fairbank, Maullin & Associates for
SMC that indicated 97% of those polled expressing an opinion about SMC rated it
favorably. As Tom Donner, Vice President of Business and Administration, explained in
a questionnaire response: "The polling was to survey public opinion and assess the
chances of passing a bond."

Richard Maullin, the political consultant who conducted the poll, explained that
SMC had never commissioned a professional public opinion survey before the March
1992 survey. (A summary of the telephone interview with Mr. Maullin is attached as
Appendix N.) Mr. Maullin indicated that the SMC president in 1992, Dr. Richard Moore,
and key members of the SMC staff were very involved in development of the survey
questions. Mr. Maullin emphasized the importance of politically involved members of
the faculty and staff, like Mr. Girard, in developing solid grassroots support for the bond
issue. According to Mr. Maullin, 400 randomly selected voters were interviewed for the
survey, with interviews lasting 18 minutes on average.

Mr. Girard explained that the SMC bond issue proposal was also the result of
considerable internal input to identify projects that had substantial support within SMC
before the 1992 survey was conducted. The college created a Facilities Task Force in
1989 to determine the needs of students. Composed of SMC faculty, staff and students,
the Facilities Task Force engaged in a two-year process which culminated in a report, the
Long Range Facilities Plan, with specific recommendations that were adopted by the SMC Board of Trustees in 1991. The Long Range Facilities Plan was incorporated into a 10-year plan submitted to the State of California. The Plan was also a part of an accreditation self-study that had just been completed in 1991. Thus, the input of faculty, staff and students was crucial in identifying projects for possible inclusion in the bond issue.

The projects identified in the Long Range Facilities Plan were presented to the public in the 1992 Fairbank, Maullin and Associates public opinion survey. An important result of the survey was that $29 million worth of projects identified in the Facilities Task Force Report were reduced to a $23 million bond issue proposal. The 1992 public opinion survey indicated that more than 60% of voters would support a bond issue of up to $20 million, but only 32% favored a bond issue in the $21-50 million range. Respondents indicated they preferred a combination of public and private funding sources for SMC projects, but more than 60% of survey participants also acknowledged that private sources would not be sufficient to complete the projects identified in the Facilities Task Force. The answer to the most crucial question of all was encouraging to the SMC staff: two-thirds of the respondents, the majority needed to pass a bond issue in California after the passage of Proposition 13, said they would support a bond issue if it were on the ballot.

Several arguably worthy projects identified in the Facilities Task Force Report, including an English classroom with computer hookups and studio space for performing arts, did not make the cut. Four projects were firmly rejected by survey respondents: a
small business start-up center, modernization of physical education facilities, a 2,000 seat community auditorium, and relocation of the college’s swimming pool and tennis courts.

Of 13 projects survey respondents were asked to evaluate, only 6 projects were rated “important and worthy of public expenditure.” Each of the projects rated in the public opinion survey as “important and worthy of public expenditure” was included in the final bond issue. Synthesizing internal input and survey results, the final bond proposal included a $6 million library expansion project, $13 million for a science addition to a building and $4 million to mitigate asbestos contamination and earthquake hazards. Each of these projects was identified in the Facilities Task Force Report and received favorable public support in the public opinion survey. As Dr. Donner explained, “the science faculty wanted and needed a new building, and the library expansion project was supported by everyone.” Mr. Girard added that “the bond reflected something that really interested people; almost all of the money and volunteers in the campaign came from within the College staff.”

The process that culminated in the November 1992 election had begun years earlier. SMC took steps to insure the involvement of faculty, staff and the community. The college involved various constituencies and ultimately included projects in the bond issue that reflected the desires and opinions of the voters as reflected in the March 1992 public opinion survey.

Once the amount of the bond issue, the projects to be included, and the date of the election had been decided, the process of developing a campaign began in earnest. In a memorandum to the SMC Faculty Association on April 2, 1992, Mr. Girard, acting at that
time as an outside consultant, laid out the plan of action for the campaign. As Mr. Girard explained in the memorandum, SMC had already overcome one technical, uniquely local hurdle in receiving approval from the Santa Monica Rent Control Board to place a bond issue on the ballot. The Rent Control Board is a very important entity in Santa Monica. According to Mr. Girard, approximately 78% of residents in the Santa Monica College district live in apartments. The high percentage of renters is indicative of the demographics of the SMC district.

While the average income in the Santa Monica area is quite high, Mr. Girard emphasized that a substantial number of area voters are solidly middle-class or even lower middle-class and predominantly white. Mr. Girard estimated that the Santa Monica community is about 89% white, while the student population is only about 43% Caucasian. In addition, fewer than 20% of the students who attend Santa Monica College reside in the college district (Girard, 1993). Mr. Girard referred to the demographics as the first “strike” against the campaign effort because of the potential perception that the college is populated by “outsiders” who are different from local residents.

Also in early April, SMC publicized the encouraging results of the Fairbank & Maullin public opinion survey. The leading Santa Monica newspaper, The Outlook, reported that “two-thirds of residents polled by Santa Monica College say they would support a local bond measure to raise money for things like asbestos removal and an expanded library” (Lund-Seeden, 1992a, p. A4.) In the article in The Outlook, Dr. Moore stated that he wouldn’t “rule out” the possibility of a $20 to $30 million bond issue on the November ballot based on the results. Dr. Moore summarized the survey results in The
Outlook article: “We found out that if they [taxpayers] are going to be paying the bill, and they will be, this is what they would support.” As Dr. Moore explained, survey respondents supported “science and job training. They’re not dealing with fine arts and ethnic studies” (p. A4).

At the time of Mr. Girard’s April memorandum and SMC’s public release of the results of the public opinion survey, ballot language had not been finalized and the process of seeking endorsements had barely begun. Mr. Girard’s memorandum emphasized the crucial role faculty and students would play in order to make the election a success. He stressed the importance of the formation of a campaign committee separate from the college, but also concluded that “it’s entirely appropriate that the campaign committee consist of key administrators, among others.” Mr. Girard indicated that one faculty and student role of vital importance would be campaign fundraising. The fundraising was essential, the memorandum explained, so that the campaign would have sufficient dollars for voter education through direct mail, responses to public inquiries to the campaign, gathering endorsements and coordinating volunteers in a speaker’s bureau.

In early May, one member of the SMC Board of Trustees, Ralph R. Villani, wrote a column in The Outlook to solicit input from area voters concerning the possibility of a $20 million to $25 million bond issue:

It appears the only way to get these much-needed funds and to continue the great programs at the college for all of our students is to ask Santa Monica/Malibu residents to provide these funds. The alternative is to have an inferior science and library program. If the board of trustees agrees to place the bond issue on the
ballot, the Santa Monica/Malibu electorate would be asked to approve the measure during the month of November, 1992. (Villani, 1992, p. A10)

On May 30, 1992, the SMC governing board officially and publicly decided to place the bond issue on the November, 1992 ballot. SMC President Richard Moore summarized what would be a few of the major themes of the campaign: “This is insurance for the future. It’s three things: modern science, study resources and jobs” (Lund-Sudeen, 1992, p. 1). The same evening, Carole Currey, who was president of the SMC board in 1992, explained that “we want to stay on the cutting edge in California, and we need to upgrade our facilities in order to achieve that” (Lund-Sudeen, 1992, p. 1). Dr. Moore concisely explained the college’s decision to reduce the amount of the bond issuance by $6 million from the $29 million of needs identified in the Facilities Task Force Recommendations: “In a tough year, go for less.”

The final ballot language reflected the balances struck in developing the bond issue:

For the purpose of improving college facilities to provide handicapped access and mitigate asbestos contamination and earthquake hazards, and to provide educational facilities for the extension and improvement of the Science Building, an extension of the Library, and the remodeling and improvement of the Madison facility of the district, shall the Santa Monica Community College District incur a bond indebtedness in the maximum amount of $23,000,000?

The first three purposes identified by the ballot language, handicapped access, asbestos abatement, and earthquake protection, had been identified by the Facilities Task
Force and were also the items that received the highest favorable ratings from prospective voters in the Fairbank, Maullin & Associates public opinion survey. Thus, the public opinion research continued to guide important decisions throughout the campaign process, including the development of ballot language.

From the very beginning, the theme of the SMC campaign was “Safety and Modernization at Santa Monica College.” The name of the campaign committee established to spread the word to Santa Monica area voters echoed the theme: “Campaign for Safety & Modernization at Santa Monica College.” By election day, Mr. Girard notes that the campaign committee raised and spent about $90,000, the total of contributions from more that 350 different donors (Girard, 1993). One key donor was the college’s associated students group, which was allowed by California law to endorse and spend money on political measures. The campaign also held three fund-raising events, and received substantial contributions from SMC faculty and staff.

Mr. Girard emphasized that “you need the money for a successful campaign. Our bond issue was well-funded relative to other local issues” (Girard, 1993, p. 3). Particularly in a November general election, Mr. Girard discussed the importance of having the funds necessary to get the campaign’s message out to the public when the bond issue campaign is competing with so many other ballot items. The Santa Monica bond issue was one of more than 20 different issues on the November 3, 1992 ballot.

Between the kick-off of the campaign and election day, Mr. Girard estimated that the campaign mailed over 220,000 informational pieces, including six different brochures, to more than 44,000 addresses in the Santa Monica College district. In
addition, the campaign made an estimated 5,000 volunteer phone calls and knocked on doors to distribute literature to more than 5,000 likely voter homes.

Direct mail played a vital role in the campaign strategy. As Mr. Girard explained, in a typical Santa Monica election, “out of 55,000 registered voters, only 29,000 pieces of mail are prepared in order to reach virtually everyone who will vote” (Girard, 1993, p. 5).

The first mailing to voters was in July of 1992. The first mailing and every mailing included the following factual statement from the March, 1992, public opinion survey: “65% of Santa Monica & Malibu families have attended classes at Santa Monica College”.

The first mailing from the Campaign for Safety & Modernization at Santa Monica College was a thorough, comprehensive brochure entitled: Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond Proposal. The piece aggressively tackled what might at first glance appear to be a weakness or, as Mr. Girard labeled it, a “strike.” That is the fact that fewer than 20% of SMC students were residents of the college district in 1992.

The response in Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond Proposal was simple and effective: “Residents pay less than 25% of the cost of operating the college.” Thus, the campaign materials emphasized the large number of Santa Monica College district residents who had attended the college while at the same time stressing that non-residents were paying the majority of the costs associated with college operations.

In addition to responding to the issue of the large number of students who were not residents of the district, Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond
Proposal also identified the major projects that were to be a part of the $23 million bond issue and the costs associated with each project: $4 million for asbestos removal at one college site to expand and modernize the Nursing and Respiratory Therapy program; $13 million to modernize science labs “originally built to handle the science needs and environmental concerns of 40 years ago”; $6 million to upgrade and enlarge the colleges library, which would allow SMC to “teach first-time students, returning to school adults, and working adults how to use the new tools and new technology to get information.”

The second page of Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond Proposal provided detailed information about the history of SMC, the need for the projects, the background of the proposal (including the Long Range Facilities Plan), and one final crucial fact, the cost to the public if the bond issue were to be approved ($15 per $100,000 of assessed value). As with all campaign materials, Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond Proposal included the following note: “Campaign for the Safety & Modernization at the College (Campaign for S.M.C.)/James Bambrick, Treasurer/P.O. Box 2435/Santa Monica, CA 90407-2435/I.D. # 921696/Not Printed at State Expense/Labor Donated.”

The second direct mail piece of the campaign was a voter guide entitled Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety and Modernization Bond Proposal. This voter guide was an eight-page mailing that reiterated the projects to be included in the bond issue and also presented personal profiles of three SMC faculty members. Once again, Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond Proposal emphasized that “65% of Santa Monica and Malibu families have attended or are currently attending classes at the
College.” By the time the second direct mail piece was distributed, the SMC bond issue had been placed on the ballot as county measure “T”, the very last item on the ballot. Thus, Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond Proposal and mailings that followed it also urged voters to “Vote YES on T!”

Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond Proposal addressed each of the major parts of the bond issue, with a faculty profile accompanying each issue. The need to remove asbestos and provide handicapped access to SMC’s Madison site was reinforced by Gloria Lopez, the SMC Director of Nursing, who explained that “Measure T will expand and modernize the Nursing and Respiratory Therapy programs at SMC.” Ruth Logan, Chair of Life Science at SMC, described the need for the safety and modernization of science labs: “The new technology can improve understandings of the many models, processes, and structures necessary for further study.” The emphasis for upgrading and expanding the SMC library was on providing resource to the community. According to Mona Martin, Director of Library Resources at SMC, “Community adults are coping with an information revolution, and many do not have access to this type of guidance anywhere else.”

The final page of Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond Proposal included several endorsements from community leaders. Rose Kaufman, Chair of the Santa Monica Commission on Older Americans, stressed the local benefits of the bond issue: 100% of the money raised by this bond proposal stays in Santa Monica and Malibu--available to Santa Monica and Malibu students--forever. Not one dime leaves our community.” Dolores Press, Chair of the important Santa Monica Rent Control
Board, wrote that “every day I meet people whose lives have been affected positively by Santa Monica College. Measure T is an important protection of quality education for all residents.”  Carol Currey, Chair of the Santa Monica College Board of Trustees, outlined the important process that led to the bond proposal:

The Safety and Modernization proposal is based on the College’s Long Range Facilities Plan developed from 1989 to 1991, and supported in a public opinion survey of registered voters in Santa Monica and Malibu. The proposal includes only those projects that were rated most important and worthy of public support.

The final campaign direct mail piece was a unique brochure entitled This Election, Save the Best for Last. This piece was a four-panel brochure, with a total size of about 4" by 40". When folded, the piece arrived in the mailbox as a 4" by 10" piece until unfolded to its full size. The outside panel read simply “This Election, Save the Best for Last.” The only other text on the outside panel was a concise, two-paragraph summary of the mission of SMC, emphasizing transfer education to the elite colleges in the California University system and job training and placement.

The inside panel of Santa Monica College: 1992 Safety & Modernization Bond Proposal contained the heading, “Save the Best,” and then listed the entire lengthy ballot for the Santa Monica November election, including the race for President and Vice President of the United States, two U.S. senate races, a U.S. Congressional race, two state legislative races, one county race, a school board election, an SMC board election, the Santa Monica city council race, no fewer than 13 statewide ballot measures (including a statewide $900 million bond issue for public educational facilities), and four county
ballot measures in addition to the SMC issue. At the bottom of the extraordinarily long ballot was the caption: “Last on the Ballot. First in the State. Vote Yes on T.”

On election day, voters approved the SMC bond issue by a razor thin margin. Mr. Girard said that “the good news is that on election day, 667 out of every 1,000 voters deciding this issue voted yes, and the measure passed with the necessary two-thirds margin” (Girard, 1993, p. 3). After all of the efforts that were a part of the campaign, the measure passed with only 64 votes more than were required.

Mr. Girard stressed that the communication necessary to win an election must continue at all times, not just when a college is involved with a ballot issue, because “if the public doesn’t hear about your successes, they will become slower and slower in helping you with your troubles” (Girard, 1993, p. 3).

Washtenaw Community College

Washtenaw Community College was established on January 15, 1965, following a vote in which the citizens of Washtenaw County approved financial support of the college. Washtenaw Community College ("WCC"), located in Ann Arbor, Michigan, began its first semester of classes on September 12, 1966, with 1,200 students enrolled in 30 different programs. In its first years of operation, WCC held classes in an old elementary school, a fire station, a bowling alley, a former dairy distribution plant and the basement of a downtown Ann Arbor church. WCC began construction of its permanent, 235-acre campus in 1969, and has grown steadily to its present enrollment of more than 10,000 college credit students each semester (Washtenaw Community College Web Page).
Once WCC was identified as a subject college for the study, the follow-up questionnaire (Appendix C) was provided to the following key election participants:

Cathie Dries, Director of Community Relations and Conference Services; Marty Heator, Director of Publications/News; Dr. Gunder Myran, President; and William Holmes, Executive Director of Community and Business Relations. The questionnaire responses were discussed with the key individuals who received the questionnaires and also with Dr. Jacqueline Andrews, Director of Institutional Research, Dr. Cynthia Straub, Coordinator or Program Development, and Jean Nelson, College Projects, in a round table interview on the campus of WCC on February 26, 1998. In addition, written campaign materials from the WCC election defeat in 1992 and the successful elections in August of 1996 and November of 1996 were reviewed and analyzed. Table 5 provides a summary of the findings from these various sources.

Cathie Dries, Director of Community Relations and Conference Services at WCC, explained that the college had never lost a millage authorization in seven elections going into a November 4, 1992 election to increase the operating millage. (A summary of Ms. Dries' comments as a part of the February 26, 1998 round table discussion is attached as Appendix P.) The convincing loss suffered by WCC in the 1992 election was unexpected and disappointing. As Dr. Gunder Myran, president of WCC, explained, the unsuccessful 1992 campaign had been similar to the previous successful elections in that it was low-key and included very little advocacy targeted at voters via media or direct mail. (A summary of Dr. Myran's comments as a part of the February 26, 1998 round table discussion is attached as Appendix Q.) According to Dr. Myran, the message of
Table 5: Summary of Findings From Washtenaw Community College Elections in August and November of 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Theme</td>
<td><strong>Better Jobs, A Better Future;</strong> WCC as the community problem solver and leader in workforce development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Campaign Community Approval</td>
<td>Surveys after unsuccessful 1992 election indicated substantial community support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Statement</td>
<td>Filed with Washtenaw County Board of Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Endorsements</td>
<td>Ann Arbor newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Opposition</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Advertising</td>
<td>Direct mail, phone bank, postcards, yard signs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Issues on Ballot</td>
<td>August election; special election, few other issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November election; 1996 general election issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Involvement</td>
<td>Student government support, student newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>EPIC/MRA, Lansing, MI based political consulting firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty/Staff Involvement</td>
<td>Development of strategic plan; personal time used for campaign efforts (including election day activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Coverage</td>
<td>Newspaper endorsements, articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Contacts</td>
<td>Dr. Jacqueline Andrews, Director of Institutional Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cathie Dries, Director Of Community Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marty Heator, Director of Publications and News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Holmes, Executive Director of Community &amp; Business Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Gunder Myran, President</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jean Nelson, College Projects</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Cynthia Straub, Coordinator, Program Development</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
the 1992 election was that “the former era of campaigning was over.”

Two brochures prepared for the WCC 1992 election seem representative of what Dr. Myran referred to as the “former era” of campaigning. The first brochure was an 8½" by 11" tri-fold informational brochure prepared by the college entitled The Open Door: Information about Washtenaw Community College’s millage proposals on the November 3, 1992 General Election ballot. The brochure contained an overwhelming amount of information, including everything from detailed prose on the open access philosophy of the college to annotated pie charts on how the one mill for operation and three-tenths of one mill would be used for a bond issue. The outside cover of the brochure was a drawing of a door with a sign on the door reading: “Welcome, please come in.” Once the reader “opened the door,” the brochure focused on open door admissions, affordability and employability. Although the brochure included a wealth of information about WCC, including enrollment history and a WCC student profile and faculty profile, the WCC staff noted that the sheer volume of the information on such a small brochure probably meant that only a very few readers were able to complete the brochure and determine the focus of the facts they had read.

A second brochure for the 1992 campaign was a direct mail piece prepared by the Friends of WCC Campaign Committee entitled Vote Yes November 3. The emphasis in Vote Yes November 3 was on four testimonials, one from a WCC plumbing and piping student, one from the president of a local company, one from a university student who began her college career at WCC and another student testimonial from a WCC graduate in an allied health profession. Although the brochure featured individual success stories
from WCC, the reader had to look closely to find specifics about the need for the 1992
tax increases and the amount of the proposed increase. The only specifics about the
ballot issues in *Vote Yes November 3* were contained in this brief statement:

Voters need to approve both of WCC's ballot proposals— one mill for operations
and approximately three tenths of a mill for facilities which includes a new
business education classroom building and a library/classroom building. The cost
to you is low. For example, if your home has a market value of $100,000, both
proposals together will cost you only about $6 a month. (*Vote Yes November
3*, p. 3)

Ms. Dries explained that the two brochures contained a large volume of
information, but that in hindsight neither brochure contained the specific information
voters were coming to expect in 1992 when considering the merits of a tax increase
proposal. Ms. Dries indicated that in 1992 as in previous successful campaigns, WCC
essentially told voters "we need the money, just count on us to spend it for the right
things." One of the messages from voters in the 1992 election was that WCC needed to
provide more specific information about why the money was needed and how it would be spent.

To the extent that the two 1992 brochures reflected the outdated strategy of
earlier, successful campaigns, the brochures did not address some significant shifts taking
place in the political culture in the city of Ann Arbor and the state of Michigan in 1992.
One factor that Dr. Myran and others identified as a possible reason that the approach of
previous successful campaigns did not work was a change in voter attitudes concerning
taxes. Ms. Dries suggested that the presidential candidacy of Ross Perot in 1992 and a growing sentiment for a move away from property tax as a financing source for Michigan public schools were factors that created a very difficult political climate for a tax increase in the Ann Arbor area in 1992. Both Dr. Myran and Ms. Dries also identified a competing local issue, a tax increase for a “safe house” for battered and abused women, as a reason for the WCC loss in 1992.

William Holmes, Executive Director of Community and Business Relations, noted that the local “safe house” issue addressed a very focused local need, and also asked voters for a substantially smaller tax increase than the WCC millage issue (A summary of Mr. Holme’s comments as a part of the February 26, 1998 round table discussion is attached as Appendix S.) The success of the “safe house” issue and the failure of the WCC issues indicated that Ann Arbor voters were casting “yes” votes for tax issues much more cautiously than in past years.

Mr. Holmes shared an anecdote that he believed was in many ways representative of the unmet challenges of the WCC 1992 election. Immediately after the 1992 election, Mr. Holmes had a discussion with a WCC custodian about the unsuccessful vote. She told Mr. Holmes that she loved the college, but did not vote yes because she did not completely understand how the money would be spent. Mr. Holmes recounted the difficulty of obtaining a favorable vote when even loyal, long-time employees close to the college were not sufficiently informed and persuaded to vote “yes.”

Although WCC was understandably disappointed with its first electoral defeat after the 1992 election, the college began planning for a future election almost
immediately. Marty Heator, Director of Promotional Services, emphasized the important leadership role assumed by Dr. Myran after the unsuccessful 1992 election: "Dr. Myran set the tone for a future election immediately after the 1992 election" (A summary of Mr. Heator's comments as a part of the February 26, 1998 round table discussion is attached as Appendix R.) Mr. Heator noted that Dr. Myran explained two possible futures for WCC, one future without increased local tax support that was quite bleak contrasted with a brighter future resulting from increased local tax support that would allow the college to prepare for the next millennium with enhanced technology and improved facilities.

To assess the successes and failures and to attempt to avoid the mistakes of the 1992 campaign in the future, WCC held a retreat of its Constituency Relations Counsel ("CRC") after the 1992 election. The CRC, composed of key WCC administrators who focused on marketing and image issues, established a number of objectives after the 1992 election. One of the most important objectives was the formation of a strategic plan. The development of a strategic plan over the next two years would have a significant impact on the 1996 election. Mr. Heator wrote that Dr. Myran insisted that the strategic plan focus on two issues: (a) The county’s need for a competitive workforce, and the College’s role in providing such a workforce; and (b) The role technology would play in response to the community need. The CRC established a "positioning strategy" for the next two years: WCC should be positioned as a community problem solver and as a leader in workforce development (Heator, 1997, p. 1).

Almost immediately after the 1992 election defeat, WCC for the first time in its history commissioned a public opinion survey by an outside firm. The firm selected was
EPIC/MRA, based in Lansing, Michigan. As Mr. Heator explained, EPIC/MRA was chosen in part because of a successful track record in providing public opinion support for tax issues and candidates. In addition, WCC was impressed with the ability of EPIC/MRA to develop useful survey questions and sample an appropriate number of college patrons to obtain meaningful results.

Dr. Myran noted that the initial survey conducted after the 1992 election defeat "helped make sense of the loss by determining that the community supported WCC, just not the proposed tax increase." The research indicated that the loss in 1992 was primarily a result of the economic fears of the voters, especially fear of unemployment. The EPIC/MRA 1993 survey did not disclose a lack of confidence in either the mission of WCC or mistrust or lack of confidence in WCC. The survey results also emphasized that jobs and education were issues of great concern to local voters (Heator, 1997).

With the information from the 1993 public opinion survey in hand and with the CRC in place to spearhead development of an updated strategic plan, the framework was in place in 1993 to begin the process of developing a successful campaign. According to Ms. Dries, the two key differences between the 1992 and 1996 elections were the development of and reliance upon the WCC Strategic Plan and the greater inclusion of faculty and staff in the processes that culminated in the successful 1996 ballot issues.

While the Strategic Plan was being developed in 1993 and 1994, Dr. Myran noted that he instituted visible cost cutting measures and what he termed "belt tightening," including the elimination of food that had been provided to faculty and staff at internal
meetings. Instead, Dr. Myran said that WCC “fed our constituents at town hall meetings and focus groups.” Mr. Heator explained that the budget cuts and hiring freezes implemented by Dr. Myran made “the need tangible to the community and also to faculty and staff.”

Mr. Heator wrote that input from community advisory boards and focus groups with opinion leaders “helped shape the strategic plan and the millage and bonding proposals that emerged from that plan” (Heator, 1997, p. 2). The strategic plan—summarized in a brochure entitled WCC 2000 Strategic Plan Summary—did not focus on specific fiscal and facility needs, but instead identified outcomes consistent with the WCC mission like “Enhance the outcomes of student learning” (Outcome A), “Enhance student retention and success in courses and programs” (Outcome B), and “Expand workforce development with an emphasis on technology education” (Outcome C). To the extent that the strategic plan did address financial issues, it was within the context of meeting needs and using resources wisely: “Shape enrollment based on available resources” (Outcome E); “Create a new era of financial viability and accountability” (Outcome J).

Mr. Holmes stressed the importance of the straightforward nature of the needs identified and supported by WCC's internal team and summarized in the strategic plan. According to Mr. Holmes, the focus of all of the needs identified in the strategic plan was technology and jobs. Mr. Heator noted the emphasis of the WCC strategic plan on workforce training. In addition to the importance of the strategic planning process, Mr. Heator cited the importance of the CRC and the team the college later assembled to sell
the campaign plan, a unique group that included the president, the marketing and public relations staff, WCC's top management information executive, the director of institutional research and other key staff members (Heator, 1997).

Dr. Myran explained that the strategic plan helped WCC place the 1996 election within the context of the college's mission and long-term goals. The internal process implemented after the 1992 election defeat resulted in much greater focus as WCC prepared for its 1996 election. In addition, EPIC/MRA conducted another public opinion survey in 1996 to, as Mr. Heator wrote, "help shape the messages that would be used to articulate the strategic plan and the millage/bonding proposals" (Heator, 1997, p. 2).

One decision that was a result of the 1996 EPIC/MRA survey was to place two issues on the August 6, 1996 ballot, a bond issue proposal and a millage increase proposal. The ballot proposal requested a tax increase of about .25 mills for a bond issue and .95 mills for operating funds for a total proposed increase of 1.2 mills. For the entire period between the 1992 election defeat and the decision to place two issues on the August 6, 1996 ballot, WCC had been putting the pieces in place for the next election. The objectives identified by the Constituency Relations Council, the development of a strategic plan and the public opinion research by EPIC/MRA all prepared WCC for another attempt to seek increased taxpayer support.

As Mr. Heator explained, the first phase of the strategy for the August 1996 election was to "build internal understanding of, and enthusiasm for, the strategic plan and its millage/bonding proposal" (Heator, 1997, p. 2). To accomplish the first phase of the campaign and build the internal support crucially needed, WCC utilized a variety of
methods to communicate with faculty and staff. Through an employee newsletter, *Link-up*, the college kept employees abreast of the development of the strategic plan and opportunities to contribute to the planning process. As the August 1996 election approached, *Link-up* stressed the benefits to faculty and staff that would be made possible by the millage/bonding proposals.

A less formal in-house publication entitled *Hotsheet* written by WCC's Director of Institutional Research, Dr. Jacqueline Andrews, provided additional information about the specifics of the ballot proposals and also highlighted opportunities for WCC faculty and staff to become directly involved in the campaign. To keep the election issues visible in the minds of faculty, staff and students as WCC approached the August 6, 1996 date, Mr. Heator said that brightly colored posters were placed throughout the campus to emphasize the benefits of the parts of the strategic plan that the bond issue and millage increase would make possible.

As the date of the election came closer, Dr. Myran and other key participants in the development of campaign strategy made themselves available to faculty, staff and students. Dr. Myran met with students in the classroom to discuss the strategic plan and the specifics of the bond issue and proposed millage increase. Dr. Myran and other key administrators also met with a variety of WCC committees and other staff organizations. According to Mr. Holmes, the college used faculty in-service training in 1995 and 1996 as an opportunity to present major themes to faculty and staff and also to test the tentative themes.

In addition, WCC held public forums on campus that were open to the student
body as well as the faculty and staff. Mr. Heator noted that one such forum was held “in conjunction with a Board of Trustees meeting” (Heator, 1997, p. 3). To provide a social setting to share information about the strategic plan and the August 1996 ballot issues, WCC sponsored ice cream socials and coffees throughout the campus.

The second phase of the campaign was the effort to provide voters with information concerning the August 1996 ballot proposals. The college paid for and mailed several purely informational pieces to voters. An election advocacy group, Friends of WCC, prepared “a series of hard-hitting mailers targeting voters whose demographics, geographic location, and previous voting patterns suggested they were more likely to vote ‘yes’” (Heator, 1997, p. 3). Dr. Myran explained that the election advocacy group was necessary because Michigan law allowed WCC to present general information to voters but prevented the college from advocating that voters vote “yes.”

With respect to the college-funded materials, Mr. Heator identified three important vehicles WCC used to provide information to voters. The college provided three mailings of a newsletter, WCC & You, to voters in the period before the August 1996 election. The information contained in WCC & You closely tracked the findings of the EPIC/MRA surveys, and emphasized the finding that “jobs, education, and access to technology were important issues to voters” (Heator, 1997, p. 3). WCC also mailed informational postcards and flyers to students, staff, faculty and other natural supporters of the college.

Mr. Heator said that in addition to the direct mailing of WCC & You to voters by the college, WCC ran a series of newspaper ads that communicated WCC’s role as a
community resource through testimonials. Dr. Myran explained that ads in the Ann Arbor newspaper were particularly effective because the community had only one daily newspaper and the newspaper reached more than 60% of households daily. During the 1992 election, Dr. Myran noted that the college had incorrectly assumed that the newspaper would be supportive of the WCC proposed millage increase and bond issue. In 1992, the newspaper opposed the WCC ballot proposals.

By purchasing ads in the newspaper, WCC was able to offset any possible negative coverage in the newspaper. At the same time, Dr. Myran and others met with the newspaper editorial board to build support. Dr. Myran emphasized that the educational process with the newspaper editorial board began much earlier in the 1996 campaign than it had in 1992, and resulted in an endorsement from the newspaper of both WCC proposals in 1996. Mr. Heator explained that the editor and publisher met with Dr. Myran and other college representatives three times in the year before the August 1996 election, once at the newspaper office and twice on the WCC campus.

While the focus of the WCC-funded informational materials was to provide specifics about the ballot issues and the needs of the college and the community, the primary focus of the advocacy materials produced by Friends of WCC was to identify frequent voters and to persuade them to vote “yes” on August 6, 1996. Friends of WCC, the campaign advocacy group separate from the college, prepared three straightforward direct mail pieces for the campaign. All three direct mail pieces were based upon the public opinion research conducted by EPIC/MRA.

In the Ann Arbor area as in much of the United States, welfare reform was a hot
The title of one tri-fold direct mail brochure prepared by Friends of WCC asked: How Do We Get Real Welfare Reform? The answer on the inside of the brochure was: “Have More Workers With Good Paying Jobs.” Beneath the first answer in the brochure was a second question: “And How Are We Going to Get These Workers?” The brochure also provided an answer to the second question: “By Voting ‘Yes’ for the Washtenaw Community College Proposal on Aug. 6.”

The format and content of How Do We Get Real Welfare Reform? was in sharp contrast to the campaign materials WCC developed in the unsuccessful 1992 campaign. The 1996 brochure did not include the detailed information about the history and philosophy of WCC, but did concisely summarize information that survey data indicated was important to voters. How Do We Get Real Welfare Reform? summarized the entire August 1996 campaign in one sentence: “A ‘Yes’ Vote on Aug. 6 = The Best in Computers, Technology and High Tech Training at WCC = Better Jobs, A Brighter Future.” For voters who wanted additional information, more specifics were supplied in smaller print under the leading bullet points summarized above, including the estimate that the August 1996 ballot proposals would raise taxes “less than $60 a year on the average home.”

Ms. Dries noted that several area legislators complained that the How Do We Get Real Welfare Reform? direct mail piece was indirectly a criticism of the failure of the legislature to deliver “real” welfare reform. Ms. Dries stressed that the campaign did not seek to criticize the state legislature, but the piece probably did tap into the voters’ sense that welfare reform had been too long in coming.
A second brochure prepared by Friends of WCC touched on two additional themes that the survey data indicated were important to voters in Ann Arbor, a suburb of Detroit. Those two issues were job creation and the future of the auto industry. The title of the brochure summarized the two issues: **100,000 jobs in the auto industry--and we're not going to get them.** The response inside the brochure to the comment on the outside of the brochure immediately linked WCC to job creation and the resurgence of the auto industry: “Unless we vote ‘YES’ on the Washtenaw Community College Proposals Aug. 6.” The straightforward message of **100,000 jobs in the auto industry--and we're not going to get them** was that “the Big 3 auto makers will have 100,000 high tech jobs to fill in the next few years” and that to get those jobs, “our students and workers will need the most up-to-date training on computers and other technology.”

**100,000 jobs in the auto industry--and we're not going to get them** provided voters with a reason to support the WCC proposal-- the creation of new jobs that paid well and required the kind of high-tech education that the college could provide. As did **How Do We Get Real Welfare Reform?, 100,000 jobs in the auto industry--and we're not going to get them** detailed the specifics of the proposals for voters who sought that information and noted that the cost to the average homeowner would be about $60 a year.

The third brochure prepared by Friends of WCC for the August 1996 election asked a question that is relevant in virtually every election involving a tax increase: **When is a Tax Increase Really SAVING You Money?** The answer to the question: “When it's bringing computers and high tech training up to date at Washtenaw Community College.” The brochure included three bullet points that encapsulated the major themes of the
campaign in equation form: Better Education Using Computers = More Employable Workers; More Workers = More Taxpayers and Less Government Spending; A Small Increase = A Big Return. In summation, the brochure concluded that “that’s how a tax increase can really be a decrease--when it saves you money.”

As did the two other direct mail pieces prepared by Friends of WCC, When is a Tax Increase Really SAVING You Money? explained the specific projects to be included in the bond issue and millage increase and noted the cost to the average taxpayer. Each of the three pieces concisely explained that the increased property tax revenue would be used to build a Technology Education Building (including a new library, computer lab and computer equipment), provide technical enhancement at area high schools, offer classes at off-campus locations (including distance learning technologies), and to establish a Job Skills Training Academy.

Mr. Heator summarized the vital role of Friends of WCC in the 1996 election: “The Friends of WCC proved invaluable and reflected the broad support the College had within the community” (p. 4). Ms. Dries said that Friends of WCC raised $50,000 for the August 1996 campaign, an amount that made broad distribution of the three brochures discussed above possible.

Ms. Dries was the WCC staff member who was most directly involved in the campaign from start to finish. One example of the crucial role she played in the campaign was her assistance to both the college and Friends of WCC in determining the distribution schedule of materials concerning the August 1996 election. Ms. Dries’ experience in politics was a tremendous asset throughout the campaign process. She had
previously served on the staff of a Michigan congressman, and remained active in local politics in Ann Arbor. Ms. Dries was able to access data concerning voter patterns and trends from past elections to identify voters who were most likely to vote in the August 1996 election. For example, in one spreadsheet, Ms. Dries identified voting patterns in WCC’s last successful election in 1986 and in the unsuccessful 1992 election by city and township broken down precinct by precinct.

The years of work leading up to the August 6, 1996 election culminated in a mixed result on election day. The bond issue was approved, but the proposed millage increase was defeated. The initial reaction of the WCC staff after the partial defeat was that the WCC issues had been adversely affected by a low turnout in a primary election that lacked few compelling primary races. Once again, WCC turned to an EPIC/MRA public opinion survey to determine the accuracy of their preliminary reactions. The research data confirmed the impression that low voter turnout was a primary reason for the defeat of the millage increase.

Based on the EPIC/MRA public opinion survey conducted after the August 1996 election and also on what Mr. Heator described as “the College millage team’s gut feelings,” the millage increase proposal was placed on the November 1996 general election ballot (Heator, 1997, p. 4). Although the quick turnaround time between the August 1996 primary election and the November 1996 general election posed certain challenges, the WCC staff emphasized that they thought at that time the advantages of having a campaign organization and an active advocacy group, Friends of WCC, already in place outweighed any possible disadvantages.
An important confirmation of the decision to proceed with a November 1996 election was that Friends of WCC raised an additional $60,000 for the general election in less than 90 days. Because of the impressive amount of money the Friends raised, the broad direct mail campaign that ensued allowed the Friends to communicate effectively the message of the November campaign even in middle of the blitz of November general election campaign ads. As Ms. Dries explained, the theme of the November 1996 election became “Finish the Job.” In addition, partly in response to polling data, WCC reduced the amount of the proposed millage increase from the .95 mills sought in August to .85 mills.

As was the case in the August 1996 election, WCC paid for purely information materials and the Friends of WCC provided “vote yes” materials. As Mr. Heator noted, “many of the strategies used for the August election were repeated for the November election” (Heator, 1997, p. 5). The college conducted additional discussions with faculty, staff and students and again provided additional ice cream and coffee as a backdrop for public forums. Voters received two more issues of WCC & You and the college renewed its series of testimonial newspaper ads. The October, 1996 WCC & You stated that “Educational technology, job training are the focus of WCC’s reduced millage proposal.” The November, 1996 WCC & You presented the following request: “On November 5, WCC asks you to turn the ballot upside down.” The November issue of WCC & You stressed the fact that the WCC proposal was the last item on the November ballot. Both issues of WCC & You included a logo with the theme: “On November 5, Vote Local First!”
A college brochure, *What every WCC student should know about the November 5 millage proposal* was mailed to WCC students. A major theme of the brochure, echoing the message of the two issues of *WCC & You*, was “Vote Local First.” Ms. Dries explained that the emphasis on local ballot issues in the November campaign served two purposes: first, it allowed the college to present the materials it prepared within the context of encouraging good citizenship through participation in the local election issues; secondly, it allowed the campaign to solicit support from local candidates who would benefit from the higher voter turnout the WCC campaign was courting. Dr. Myran met with candidates in local and state races to explain the WCC proposal and to solicit their support and endorsement when possible.

*What every WCC student should know about the November 5 millage proposal* stressed six reasons that students would benefit from approval of the November 5 issue: “Focuses on employability; Upgrades computers and other technology; Builds on good teaching; Seeks a modest investment ($42.50 per year for the owner of a $100,000 home); Finishes what was started in August; Is the Last item on the ballot.”

The emphasis in *What every WCC student should know about the November 5 millage proposal* that the WCC issue was last on the November ballot was the exclusive focus of a WCC brochure entitled *Finish Your Ballot!*. The EPIC/MRA survey after the August 1996 election indicated that in a general election as many as 40% of voters do not complete their ballot after voting in national races that appear at the beginning of the ballot. *Finish Your Ballot!* informed voters that “democracy is alive and well at the bottom of the ballot.” The brochure linked the WCC millage increase proposal to a focus
on local democracy, explaining that the end of the ballot is “where you’ll find local candidates and local issues. And that’s where you can really make a difference. Look for WCC’s millage proposal at the very end of the November 5 ballot.” In addition to informing voters about the importance of local issues and voter participation, Finish Your Ballot! concisely summarized the need for the WCC tax increase and explained how the money would be spent.

A brochure prepared by Friends of WCC, Look for WCC’s Proposal at the Very End of the Ballot: On November 5, Vote Local First, once again echoed the themes of the Finish Your Ballot! informational piece and the two issues of WCC & You. In addition to encouraging voters to finish their ballot, Look for WCC’s Proposal at the Very End of the Ballot: On November 5, Vote Local First also asked voters to “please vote YES to support WCC.” The brochure emphasized that WCC had not had a millage increase in 10 years.

In addition to the aggressive, well-financed direct mail campaign for the November election, the college added hundreds of yard signs, ads in the student newspapers of the nearby University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, a speaker’s bureau and “Vote Local First!” stickers worn by supporters of the issue, including faculty and staff (Heator, 1997). According to Mr. Heator, “the highlight of the November campaign was the involvement of literally hundreds of people, including employees, students, alumni and friends” (Heator, 1997, p. 6). Mr. Heator added that more than 100 volunteers on election day wore aprons with the legend “Vote Yes” and distributed information at various targeted polling places.
The result of the well-financed, thoroughly organized campaign between August and November of 1996 was a resounding victory on election day. The WCC millage increase was approved with a solid 55.8% majority. With Dr. Myran retiring in the spring of 1998, his 28-year career at WCC ended on a high note with the successes of the 1996 campaigns.

Ms. Dries stressed that WCC learned that the campaign process never really ends. Voters inquired as to how the additional revenue approved in August and November of 1996 was being spent before the college even had an opportunity to issue the first bonds and begin construction. Although WCC did not have plans for an election in the near future in the spring of 1998, Mr. Dries emphasized that the college will continually provide information to voters explaining the "progress as promised" that resulted from the successful 1996 elections.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter summarizes the findings concerning the 10 research questions upon which the study was based in three sections. The first section provides a summary report of the findings within the context of the 10 research questions. The second section presents the implications of the study for colleges that are considering strategies for an election for a property tax increase or bond issue. The final section discusses recommendations for further research and present practice.

Analysis of Findings by Research Questions

Each of the 10 research questions addressed by the study is discussed in further detail below.

Research Question 1: How important is fundraising (raising dollars to fund the campaign) in a successful campaign?

“Not enough!” Linda B. Rosenthal, president of the Maricopa Community College governing board during the MCC successful 1994 election, echoed a common theme among all three colleges with her answer to the question “How much money was raised as a part of the MCC campaign fundraising effort?” Because all three subject colleges were prohibited by state law from encouraging voters to vote “yes,” the dollars raised by the campaign organizations separate from the colleges were crucial to electoral victory in all three cases.

Although the Maricopa Community College group, Citizens for Community Colleges, raised the most money of the three campaign organizations ($135,000), the
Santa Monica College group, Campaign for Safety and Modernization at Santa Monica College, raised an impressive amount of dollars ($90,000) as did the Washtenaw College group, Friends of WCC ($50,000 in the August 1996 campaign and $60,000 in the November 1996 campaign). In fact, the amount of dollars spent for each “yes” vote was greatest in the 1992 Santa Monica College, in which the campaign spent $2.69 for each “yes” vote; the Maricopa Community College campaign spent only 40 cents for each “yes” vote, while the Washtenaw College campaign spent 99 cents for each “yes” vote (Table 2, Chapter IV).

Neither the total dollars spent in a campaign nor the “dollars spent for each ‘yes’ vote” provided a precise measurement of the importance of fundraising in each campaign. In survey responses and in interviews, participants in the case studies consistently stated that their campaign simply could not have succeeded without active fundraising organizations separate from the college. Since the subject colleges were limited by law to providing information to voters, the campaign organizations were the exclusive vehicle to advocate a “yes” vote.

In addition to the fundraising dollars gathered and spent by the outside campaign organizations, each of the colleges also conducted an extensive, college-funded public awareness campaign just before the election. The colleges were able to allocate significant financial resources to television, radio and print that improved the visibility of the colleges before the campaign organizations began spending money to advocate a positive outcome in the election. As a result, the colleges were able to set the stage for the advocacy of the campaign organizations as the date of the election neared.
Research Question 2: Which community organizations outside of the college are involved in a successful campaign?

Each of the campaigns had significant support from a broad array of community organizations. Different types of organizations were more crucial in the different geographical regions, but senior citizens groups were important to all three colleges because senior adults comprised a disproportionate percentage of the voting public.

Because of the vast area of the Maricopa Community College District, MCC had more than 100 endorsements from community organizations varying from the Sun City Homeowner's Association to 13 chambers of commerce, seven school districts, and numerous local and regional newspapers. Only one significant organization in the Phoenix metropolitan area opposed the MCC bond issue, the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce. The opposition of the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce was what key participants of the MCC campaign referred to as "the disturbing no" (Table 3, Chapter IV).

Santa Monica College secured more than 40 endorsements, including the Santa Monica Commission on older Americans, the Santa Monica Bay Area Chamber of Commerce and the Santa Monica Rent Control Board. The SMC campaign also secured the support of numerous local candidates and "slates" of local candidates in the 1992 general election; this allowed the campaign to share advertising and distribution expenses with other individuals and groups (Table 4, Chapter IV).

The most important endorsement secured by Washtenaw Community College was that of the local Ann Arbor newspaper. In its unsuccessful 1992 election, the newspaper
had opposed WCC’s tax levy increase. Because the newspaper has an unusually high penetration in local households—estimated to be in more than 60% of local homes—the support of the newspaper was critical. In addition to the support of the newspaper, WCC also sought the support of local and statewide candidates in the 1996 general election. As was the case in the SMC campaign, the support of candidates allowed WCC to leverage campaign dollars through cooperative marketing efforts with candidates who appeared on the same ballot (Table 5, Chapter IV).

Although the importance of different types of community organization varied in the three campaigns, each of the subject colleges identified the organizations in their community that were most important and cultivated the support and involvement of individuals who were members of such groups. The community organizations frequently provided endorsements, and also in many cases provided crucial campaign dollars to the campaign organizations.

Research Question 3: Is there a relationship between the length of the formal campaign and the outcome?

The length of the formal campaign was relatively brief for all three subject colleges. Each of the campaigns lasted from 60 to 90 days (Table 2, Chapter IV). Participants in the case studies emphasized that voter attention span was quite short, and any attempts to directly persuade voters more than two or three months before election day was probably a waste of money. As discussed in Research Question 1, each of the campaigns would have liked to have had more dollars to spend during the formal, advocacy portion of the campaign. Had more dollars been available during the formal
campaign, the participants indicated that they would have spent more money in the final
days leading up to the election instead of extending the time-frame of the formal
campaign.

Although the formal period of the campaign was brief in each case, the informal,
college-funded awareness portion of the process was much longer. For Maricopa
Community College, the awareness campaign for the 1994 election began almost
immediately after MCC's electoral defeat in 1992. For Washtenaw Community College,
the awareness efforts for the 1996 campaign began almost immediately after the defeat of
WCC's millage increase proposal in 1992. For Santa Monica College, an understanding
of the challenges of Proposition 13— including the two-thirds majority required to approve
a bond issue after 1978— led to an increased emphasis on image-building and general
awareness of SMC preceding the 1992 campaign.

Certainly, the 90% approval rating achieved by SMC before the 1992 bond issue
election would be the envy of any college considering an election to seek increased local
taxpayer support. In the absence of measurable community support before the campaign
begins, the study participants agreed that the length of the formal campaign was
irrelevant.

Research Question 4: What is the impact of other, unrelated issues on the same ballot as
the community college tax levy or bond issue?

The findings concerning the impact of other, unrelated issues on the same ballot
as the issues of the subject colleges were among the more surprising findings of the study.
One school of thought is that a local school or tax issue has the greatest chance of
succeeding in a special election when the tax issue stands alone, allowing the proponents of the issue to marshal a voter turnout consisting of dedicated supporters of the issue. The experience of the subject colleges flew in the face of this "conventional wisdom."

Santa Monica College in November of 1992, Maricopa Community College in November of 1994, and Washtenaw Community College in 1996 all placed ballot issues on a November general election ballot crowded with numerous candidates and other issues. For SMC in November of 1992 and WCC in November of 1996, the general election was also a presidential election, insuring an exceptionally high voter turnout. In both the SMC and WCC campaigns, the college issue was the last issue on a long ballot, prompting the campaigns to encourage voters to "Save the Best for Last" (SMC) and "Look for WCC's proposal at the very end of the ballot." Maricopa Community College did not create special campaign materials in response to the lengthy 1992 Maricopa County general election ballot, but emphasized that the plethora of other, unpopular tax initiatives on the ballot may have actually made the MCC issue appear more palatable to voters.

Each of the colleges, relying to a great extent on findings from professional public opinion surveys, concluded that a crowded, high-turnout, general election ballot provided the greatest opportunity for success. The data indicated that voters more favorable to community colleges would turn out in higher numbers in a general election, including women and lower to middle class voters who were more likely to have benefited from the services of a community college.

Research Question 5: What are the roles of community college staff members in
successful campaigns?

Although each of the subject colleges had a campaign organization separate from the college to raise funds for the campaign and conduct advocacy activities, the primary organization of each campaign came from a core of college staff members who developed the theme of the campaign and orchestrated the overall campaign. This core group usually consisted of the Chief Operating Officer of the college, the Chief Financial Officer of the college, several additional key administrators, one or more representatives from the faculty, the public information organization of the college and one or more individuals with unique and practical experience in politics.

In each campaign, among the small group of key faculty and staff members was one individual who, in the words of various participants, “really lived the campaign.” For each subject college, the individual who “lived” the campaign had extensive previous political experience and the ability to bring together different constituencies within the college. In each instance, the one individual with the greatest involvement in the campaign was not an individual who would necessarily be easily located on the college’s organizational chart.

For Maricopa Community College, Rick DeGraw, Executive Assistant to Chancellor Dr. Paul Elsner, was the savvy, political veteran who brought a different focus to the MCC 1994 election than had been present in the unsuccessful 1992 election. Mr. DeGraw worked closely with Dr. Bill Waechter, Vice Chancellor for Quality and Employee Development, and an outside consultant, Christa Severns, in developing the strategy for the campaign. In a sprawling, urban area like Maricopa County, Arizona, the
importance of the political experience of Mr. DeGraw and the organizational skills of Dr. Waechter were crucial to success.

For Santa Monica College, Don Girard was the veteran of Santa Monica grassroots political organizing who helped articulate the strategy of the SMC campaign. Mr. Girard worked closely with Dr. Tom Donner, Vice President of Business and Administration, and the consulting firm of Fairbank, Maullin & Associates. Mr. Girard’s efforts were particularly effective in the process of campaign fundraising, with many dollars raised from contributions by members of the SMC faculty and staff and student body.

For Washtenaw Community College, Cathie Dries, Director of Community Relations and Conference Services, meticulously coordinated all aspects of the WCC campaign, including detailed spreadsheets on previous voting patterns and precinct by precinct voter turnout. Dr. Gunder Myran, president of WCC, was probably the CEO most directly involved of the presidents or chancellors of the three subject colleges. At the direction of Dr. Myran, Ms. Dries was able to coordinate an exceptional information campaign directed by WCC’s Director of Publications and News, Marty Heator, and a detailed public opinion survey conducted by the outside consultant, EPIC/MRA.

In short, the participation and coordination provided by key college staff members were crucial to the successes of each of the three subject colleges. Without one individual who truly "lived" the campaign, the colleges would have faced an even greater challenge in developing a coherent campaign strategy.

Research Question 6: Do students play a significant role in successful campaigns?
The participants from each of the three subject colleges emphasized efforts to involve students in the campaign efforts. Some participants expressed skepticism that student involvement was critical to the ultimate outcome of the campaign, at least in terms of voter participation. The healthy skepticism was a result of the reality that the demographics of most community college student bodies indicate that students are unlikely to vote in significant numbers. Although the impact of student participation in influencing voters is difficult to measure, each of the colleges spent substantial time and resources in encouraging student participation.

The efforts of Maricopa Community College to involve students in voter registration efforts and the distribution of informational about the bond issue were typical of the three subject colleges. MCC involved students on all 10 of its campuses, and utilized students to distribute direct mail pieces when funds were exhausted for the cost of postage (Table 3, Chapter IV). During the formal campaign, the MCC campaign committee used testimonials from students as a key part of the “vote yes” strategy.

Santa Monica College involved students in the same ways that MCC did, but also benefited from a significant contribution to the campaign war chest from the SMC student government fund. California law allowed the SMC student government association to contribute to the campaign, decreasing the amount of funds that the campaign had to raise from other sources (Table 4, Chapter IV). Given the razor-thin margin of victory in SMC’s 1992 election, students who voted may well have been the difference between defeat and victory for SMC.

Washtenaw Community College also involved students, and benefited from
favorable coverage in the student newspaper and support of the WCC student government association. WCC not only provided written materials to students as a part of the informational campaign, and the WCC president and other key members of staff spent many hours meeting with students in the classroom to present the merits of the bond issue and proposed millage increase.

Research Question 7: To what extent do successful campaigns rely on paid, outside consultants?

As the response to Research Question 5 indicated, the staffs of the subject colleges were crucial to electoral success. In each of the subject colleges, one of the most important functions of the college staff was to recognize the need for paid, outside consultants to bring professional expertise to the election effort that was not present on the full-time college staff.

Each of the subject colleges relied heavily on the expertise of an outside public opinion consultant. Both Maricopa Community College and Santa Monica College retained Fairbank, Maullin & Associates of Santa Monica, California to conduct a public opinion survey that was instrumental in the development of the respective campaigns, including the identification of the best date for the election, the amount of the issue, and projects to include in the issue. For Washtenaw Community College, EPIC/MRA conducted a crucial series of public opinion surveys between WCC’s unsuccessful election in 1992 and its victory in 1996. For both SMC and WCC, the public opinion surveys conducted in preparation for the elections were the first outside public opinion research in the history of each college.
Many community colleges and other public organizations have a tendency to identify needs internally and then go directly to the voters, confident that the public will accept the priorities selected by the college staff. Each of the subject colleges relied on the public opinion consultants to present possible choices to voters before placing a plan on the ballot. As a result, the issues ultimately placed on the ballot in each election reflected public priorities and public support.

In the formal campaign, the outside campaign committees of each college used marketing and advertising professionals extensively in the development of campaign direct mail materials. For the colleges that were unsuccessful in a previous campaign before achieving victory in a later campaign, the difference in the quality of campaign materials between the successful campaign and the unsuccessful campaign was often stark. The involvement of paid professionals dramatically improved the quality of the material prepared for the campaign.

Research Question 8: How do successful campaigns integrate faculty and staff into the effort?

For each of the three subject colleges, efforts to involve faculty and staff began years before the formal campaign. The development of a strategic or long-range plan was the vehicle each college used to integrate faculty and staff into a planning process that culminated in the electoral victory.

For Maricopa Community College, the result of the planning process was the Maricopa Community College 1994 Capital Development Plan. As Dr. Bill Waechter explained, “Including a project for each college insured involvement from each [of the ten
MCC colleges]. Our entire faculty saw how the passage of the bond would impact them.”

For Santa Monica College, a two-year process resulted in the Long Range Facilities Plan, with specific recommendations from a Facilities Task Force composed of members of the SMC faculty and staff. The Long Range Facilities Plan was also an important part of the re-accreditation self-study process, focusing on the input of faculty, staff and students.

After the defeat it suffered in a 1994 election, Washtenaw Community College immediately convened its Constituency Relations Counsel (“CRC”) to begin the formation of a strategic plan. Marty Heator noted that the development of the WCC Strategic Plan was essential to the greater inclusion of faculty and staff in the processes that resulted in the 1996 electoral victory.

Participants from each of the three subject colleges emphasized that the integration of faculty and staff must begin long before an election date is set. With the faculty and staff having played a key role in identifying the needs that were to be met by increased local tax support, the employees of the subject colleges were far more likely to participate enthusiastically and effectively in the formal campaign.

**Research Question 9: How do successful campaigns assess the strengths and weaknesses of the college and integrate a college’s strengths and weaknesses into the campaign?**

The subject colleges assessed strengths and weaknesses both internally and externally. The planning processes described in the discussion of Research Question 8 allowed the subject colleges to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the colleges as perceived by faculty and staff. The public opinion surveys described in the discussion of
Question 7 allowed the subject colleges to refine strategy based on the strengths and weaknesses of the colleges as perceived by local voters.

As Dr. Bill Waechter of Maricopa Community College explained, the public opinion survey was “the most important thing we did.” Dr. Waechter also acknowledged that the survey results included “things we did not want to hear, but that we needed to hear.” For Santa Monica Community College, the survey confirmed a 90% approval rating that gave SMC confidence the community would support a bond issue, even though a two-thirds majority was required by California law. After a disappointing loss in 1992, the Washtenaw Community College survey informed the WCC staff that the community still supported the college, just not the ballot issue presented to them in the 1992 campaign.

Through a combination of participative long-range planning and detailed public opinion surveying in the community, the subject colleges were able to thoroughly and passionlessly assess strengths and weaknesses. As a result, the colleges were able to minimize weaknesses and incorporate strengths into the campaign.

Research Question 10: What is the role and/or necessity of a formal campaign committee in successful campaigns?

The primary role of the formal campaign committees was to raise dollars for the advocacy effort of the campaigns. Because each of the subject colleges was prohibited by state law from engaging in advocacy efforts, the formal campaign committees were essential in raising money for the development and distribution of “vote yes” campaign materials (see discussion of Research Question 1).
In addition to their primary role of fundraising, members of the campaign committee who are not part of the college staff also lend credibility to presentations and speaking engagements on behalf of the various ballot issues.

Conclusions

Based on the findings of the current study, the following conclusions were drawn regarding successful community college revenue elections:

1. Fundraising (raising dollars to fund the campaign) was essential to success in the subject community college elections involving a bond issue or a tax levy increase. Because the community colleges were prohibited by state law from encouraging voters to vote “yes,” the dollars raised by the campaign committees separate from the colleges allowed the campaigns to advocate the desired outcome.

   Although the amount of money raised may not have translated directly into guaranteed victory, participants from the successful campaigns agreed that it is difficult to have too much money in the campaign coffers, and that most campaigns struggle to get their message out in large part because of limited resources.

2. The involvement of community organizations outside of the college was an important ingredient in the successful campaigns. Different organizations were crucial depending on the community, but the successful campaigns were able to identify the organizations that mattered most and involved them in the planning process that culminated in a victory at the polls.

   Community organizations were important not only because of the endorsements they provided, but also because the members of community-oriented groups were an
important source of campaign fundraising.

3. The length of the formal campaigns of the subject colleges was from 60 to 90 days. The brief, formal advocacy campaigns (funded by campaign committees separate from the colleges) were preceded by informal, college-funded awareness efforts that were most intense in the months leading up to election day, but that in many cases had been underway for months or years before the election.

4. Although the conventional wisdom in some quarters is that school or college bond issues or tax increases fare best on a special election ballot with few if any other issues on the ballot, each of the subject colleges placed its ballot issue on a crowded, general election ballot. The colleges placed their issues on a general election ballot in large part as a response to public opinion survey data that indicated that more voters likely to support a community college vote in general elections than in special elections.

5. Community college staff members were responsible for the primary organization of the successful campaigns. Although each college had a campaign committee separate from the college to raise money and prepare materials advocating a “yes” vote, in each case a core group of college staffers developed the theme of the campaign and orchestrated the strategy of the campaign. Out of this small, core group emerged one individual who “lived” the campaign, in the words of study participants, and was the primary architect of the successful campaign.

6. Each of the colleges focused on students in developing their successful campaigns, but expressed some skepticism about the impact of the roles the students
played as voters. Student governments and student newspapers were supportive of the campaign efforts, but student demographics indicated that a relatively small number of students actually voted in the elections. Nonetheless, the experience of Santa Monica College—in which the bond issue prevailed by a handful of votes—reinforced why the colleges spent so much time cultivating and involving students in the campaign process.

7. The successful campaigns relied heavily on paid, outside consultants, most importantly in conducting public opinion surveys to ascertain community interests and community support for various projects. Each of the campaigns used survey data to develop the ballot issues, to determine the best date for the election, and to identify areas in which the colleges needed to educate voters.

In developing the formal campaigns, the campaign committees separate from the colleges used paid consultants to develop direct mail pieces, broadcast commercials and other advocacy material prepared for voters.

8. The successful campaigns integrated faculty and staff into the campaign effort by involving them in strategic and long-term planning months and years in advance of the election date. Through the development of a long-range or strategic plan that was the result of faculty and staff input and participation, the colleges were able to solicit internal participation that culminated in direct involvement in the campaign.

9. The successful campaigns assessed their strengths and weaknesses internally through the strategic or long-term planning process and externally through professionally-conducted public opinion surveys. Even when the assessments resulted in responses the colleges did not want to hear, the colleges were responsive to the feedback
and developed their campaigns around the strengths identified through the internal and external feedback.

10. Each of the campaigns established a campaign committee separate from the college. The campaign committees were essential not only in raising money for materials encouraging voters to vote “yes,” but also in identifying members of the community who were willing to assist the campaign by speaking to groups about the ballot issues and lending credibility by virtue of the fact that they were not on the colleges payrolls.

Recommendations for Further Study

Although the three subject colleges were a diverse group in terms of geography, enrollment and local political dynamics, a college considering an election that is distinctly different from any of the subject colleges might welcome research involving a larger group of colleges that includes even greater diversity. The strategies of the successful campaigns in this study may have some degree of applicability to all colleges, but a review of additional successful elections would provide greater insight into the universality of the findings.

Each of the elections examined in this study resulted in an electoral victory. Perhaps there are lessons to be learned from losers as well as winners. One possible avenue for additional research would be to review a group of colleges that were unsuccessful in their elections, and determine if the election strategies employed by community colleges in unsuccessful bond issue or tax levy increase elections are similar.
REFERENCES


Campaign for Safety & Modernization at the College (Campaign for SMC). (1992). This election, save the best for last. [Brochure]. Santa Monica, CA.


Friends of WCC Committee. (1996). *When is a tax increase really saving you money?* [Brochure]. Ann Arbor, MI.

Friends of WCC Committee. (1996). *100,000 jobs in the auto industry--and we’re not going to get them.* [Brochure]. Ann Arbor, MI.


Maricopa Community Colleges. (Spring, 1994). Memo from Maricopa: A report to the community. [Brochure]. Phoenix, AZ.

Maricopa Community Colleges. (Summer, 1994). Memo from Maricopa: A report to the community. [Brochure]. Phoenix, AZ.


Maricopa Community Colleges. (Spring, 1995). Memo from Maricopa: A report to the community. [Brochure]. Phoenix, AZ.


Washtenaw Community College. (1996). *What every student should know about the November 5 millage proposal.* [Brochure]. Ann Arbor, MI.


APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE PROVIDED TO STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIRECTORS

March 17, 1997

Dear State Community College Director:

I am currently enrolled in the doctoral program for higher education at the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. I am in the process of conducting research for my dissertation topic which concerns tax levy and bond issue elections at public community colleges. To that end, I would be greatly appreciative if you could take a few moments and: 1) Complete the short questionnaire below and 2) Mail it to me in the enclosed, self-addressed, stamped envelope.

Thanks in advance for your cooperation!

Sincerely,

Brian King
Assistant to the President

Your name: ___________________________ Your title: ___________________________

Your address: ___________________________

Phone number: __________________ Fax number: __________________

Community colleges in your state which have had tax levy or bond elections in the past ten years and a possible contact person for each college named:

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX B

FIFTY-STATE TELEPHONE SURVEY

State: ____________________________________________________________

Contact Person: ___________________________________________________

Contact Person’s Title: _____________________________________________

Contact Person’s Phone: ___________________________ Fax: __________

1. In your state, can community colleges seek local financial support through an election to:

   a. Increase local property tax. What percentage of yes votes is required to increase local property tax?

   b. Increase local sales tax. What percentage yes votes is required to increase local property tax?

   c. Authorize issuance of bonds. What percentage of yes votes is required to authorize a bond issue?

Comments:

2. Has your college had an election seeking local financial support in the form of a property tax increase, local sales tax, authority to issue bonds or any other local revenue source? If yes, what type of election? What was the outcome (percentage yes/no)? What percentage was required to win? Who was the person who had primary responsibility for coordinating your campaign? (Name, phone number if applicable.)

3. Are you aware of any colleges in your state which have had an election seeking local financial support in the form of a property tax increase, local sales tax, authority to issue bonds or any other local revenue source? If yes, what type of election? What was the outcome? Could you identify a contact person at that college?
APPENDIX C

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONNAIRES TO SUBJECT COLLEGES

Please return the completed survey to:

Brian King
Direction of Institutional Development
OTC
Box 5958
Springfield, MO 65801

Name of Survey
Respondent:__________________________
Title or Position:______________________
Address:_____________________________
Phone:_____________Fax:___________E-mail:________________________

1. What was the outcome of your successful election (including a total of yes votes and no votes if at all possible)?

________________________________________________________________________

2. How much money was raised as a part of the campaign effort?

$________________________

3. What group and/or individual coordinated fundraising for the campaign? (Please include phone numbers and addresses, including e-mail if available.)

________________________________________________________________________

4. Was a formal campaign committee established for your campaign, and if so, does the law of your state require an entity separate from the college to conduct elections?

________________________________________________________________________

5. Was the campaign required to file financial statements with a governmental entity?

YES/NO.
6. If a financial statement was filed, is it a public record and how would I go about obtaining a copy of the statement?

7. What community organizations outside of the college were involved in your campaign?

8. Did any organizations endorse your campaign issue? If so, please list any such organizations and offer your opinion as to whether the endorsement(s) were significant.

9. How long did the formal campaign last? (i.e., the public part of the campaign)

10. What was the theme of your campaign?

11. Describe any advertising used by your campaign, including print and broadcast ads. (If possible, please attach examples of advertising used.)

12. Were any other issues on the ballot (especially other tax issues, but also including races involving candidates or other issues)? If so, please list the other issues and their outcome.

13. Who were the staff members involved in the campaign in addition to you? (Please list names and titles and phone/e-mail addresses if possible.)

14. Did students play a significant role in the campaign, and if so, how?

15. Did the campaign utilize paid, outside consultants (including any type of public information campaign to raise awareness before the formal campaign for the bond issue or tax levy election)? If so, please list the consultants, including addresses/phone
16. How were you able to successfully integrate and involve faculty and staff in the campaign?

17. Did you have detailed media coverage of your campaign? If so, please identify any reporters and the name of his or her newspaper, magazine, television or radio station.

18. If there is information significant and relevant to your campaign not requested in this survey, please indicate what that information is.
APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW GUIDE AND PROCEDURES

Name of Interviewee: ___________________  Title: ___________________
Phone number: _______________________  E-mail: _____________________

1. What is your professional background?

2. What was your personal involvement in the campaign, including a description of the tasks you performed?

3. What was the theme of your campaign?

4. Before the campaign, did you have any indication of community support for your issue?

5. What, if any, community organizations endorsed your issue?

6. Was there significant opposition to your issue?

7. What, if any, other issues were on the ballot in addition to your issue?

8. What forms of advertising were used in your campaign, and what was the cost of each?

9. To what extent were faculty and staff involved in your campaign, and what methods did you use in an attempt to involve faculty and staff?
10. What media coverage did your campaign receive, and who were key media participants?

11. Was a campaign committee established separate from the college?

12. If a campaign committee was established, how much money did the committee raise and how?

13. To what extend were students involved in your campaign, and what methods did you use in an attempt to involve faculty and staff?
APPENDIX E

SUMMARY OF CONTACTS IN FIFTY STATE TELEPHONE SURVEY

ALABAMA
Contact Person: Renee Culverhouse
Title: General Council, Alabama Dept. of Postsecondary Education
Phone: 334-242-2982
Fax: 334-242-0214

ALASKA
Contact Person: Doug Desorcie
Title: Dean of Instruction, Prince William Sound Community College
Phone: 907-834-1666
Fax: 907-834-1611

ARIZONA
Contact Person: Tom Saad
Title: Associate Executive Director for Business & Finance, Arizona Community College Board
Phone: 602-255-4037
Fax: 602-279-3464

ARKANSAS
Contact Person: Steve Floyd
Title: Deputy Director, Dept. Of Higher Education
Phone: 501-371-2000
Fax: 501-371-2003

CALIFORNIA
Contact Person: Gary Cook
Title: Fiscal and Business Services Administrator, California Community Colleges
Phone: 916-445-8752
Fax: NA

COLORADO
Contact Person: Mary Ann McEldowney
Title: Vice President of Legal Affairs, Colorado Community College
Phone: 303-595-1549
Fax: 303-825-4295
CONNECTICUT
Contact Person: Mary Ann Cox
Title: Public Relations, Connecticut Board of Trustees of Community-Technical Colleges
Phone: 860-725-6601
Fax: 860-566-6624

DELAWARE
Contact Person: Hope Murray
Title: Public Relations, Delaware Technical and Community College
Phone: 302-739-4053
Fax: 302-739-6225

FLORIDA
Contact Person: Ron Fahs
Title: Director of Facility & Planning Management, Florida State Board of Community Colleges
Phone: 904-488-7926
Fax: 904-488-9763

GEORGIA
Contact Person: Carolyn Crowder
Title: Public Relations, Georgia Dept. of Technical and Adult Education
Phone: 404-679-1600
Fax: 404-679-1610

HAWAII
Contact Person: Allen Subica
Title: Director of Administration, Hawaii Community College
Phone: 808-974-7611
Fax: 808-974-7692

IDAHO
Contact Person: J.M. Mason
Title: College of Southern Idaho
Phone: 208-733-9554
Fax: NA

ILLINOIS
Contact Person: Ken Kolbet
Title: Vice President of Administration Affairs and Treasurer, College of DuPage
Phone: 630-942-2218
Fax: 630-858-3855
INDIANA
Contact Person: Ann Taylor
Title: Administrative Assistant to President, Ivy Technical State College
Phone: 317-921-4860
Fax: 317-921-4864

IOWA
Contact Person: Beverly Bunker
Title: Administrative Consultant, Bureau of Community Colleges
Phone: 515-281-8260
Fax: 515-281-6544

KANSAS
Contact Person: Merlyne Hines-Starr
Title: Chief Executive, Labette Community College
Phone: 316-421-6700
Fax: 316-421-0921

KENTUCKY
Contact Person: Ben W. Carr
Title: Chancellor, University of Kentucky Community College System
Phone: 606-257-8607
Fax: 606-257-5640

LOUISIANA
Contact Person: Joseph Brennan
Title: Public Relations, Delgado Community College
Phone: 504-483-4114
Fax: 504-483-4088

MAINE
Contact Person: Gary Crocker
Title: Director of State and Federal Programs, Maine Technical College System
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Fax: 207-287-1037

MARYLAND
Contact Person: Ronnie Haritieg
Title: Maryland Higher Education Commission
Phone: 410-974-2971
Fax: NA
**MASSACHUSETTS**  
**Contact Person:** Dale Hamel  
**Title:** Director of Fiscal Policy, Massachusetts Higher Education Coordinating Board  
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**MICHIGAN**  
**Contact Person:** Patty Loncharich  
**Title:** Higher Education Consultant, Michigan Community College Services Unit  
**Phone:** 517-373-3360  
**Fax:** 517-373-2759

**MINNESOTA**  
**Contact Person:** Karen Kedrowski  
**Title:** Budget Department Management Analyst, Minnesota State Colleges and Universities  
**Phone:** 612-296-5707  
**Fax:** 612-297-3312

**MISSISSIPPI**  
**Contact Person:** Harvey Trapp  
**Title:** Business Officer, East Central Community College  
**Phone:** NA  
**Fax:** NA

**MISSOURI**  
**Contact Person:** Dr. Norman K. Myers  
**Title:** President, Ozarks Technical Community College  
**Phone:** 417-895-7111  
**Fax:** 417-895-7161

**MONTANA**  
**Contact Person:** Justin Cross  
**Title:** Chief Fiscal Officer, Dawson Community College  
**Phone:** 406-365-3396  
**Fax:** 406-365-8132
NEBRASKA
Contact Person: Carna Pfeil
Title: Associate Director of Finance, Nebraska Coordinating Commission Postsecondary Ed.
Phone: 402-471-2847
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NEVADA
Contact Person: Martin Kyte
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Phone: University of Community College System of Nevada
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NEW HAMPSHIRE
Contact Person: Marie Mills
Title: Administrative Assistant, New Hampshire Dept. of Postsecondary Technical Education
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Fax: 603-271-2725

NEW JERSEY
Contact Person: Robert Goertz
Title: Business Affairs, New Jersey Commission on Higher Education
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Fax: 609-292-7225

NEW MEXICO
Contact Person: Frank Carrasco
Title: Business Affairs, Santa Fe Community College
Phone: 505-827-7383
Fax: 505-827-7392

NEW YORK
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Fax: 212-794-5671
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Contact Person: Clay Hines
Title: Assistant to the President for Legal Affairs, North Carolina Community College System
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Fax: 919-733-0680

NORTH DAKOTA
Contact Person: Cathy McDonald
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Fax: 701-328-2961

OHIO
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OKLAHOMA
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Title: Research Analyst, Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education
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OREGON
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PENNSYLVANIA
Contact Person: Leland W. Myers
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Fax: 717-233-4723

RHODE ISLAND
Contact Person: Nancy Abood
Title: Public Relations, Community College of Rhode Island
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Fax: 401-825-2365
SOUTH CAROLINA
Contact Person: Dr. Horace McLane Holderfield
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Comprehensive Ed.
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Fax: 803-737-7781

SOUTH DAKOTA
Contact Person: Carol Stonefield
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Fax: 605-773-5320

TENNESSEE
Contact Person: Lisa Hall
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Fax: 615-366-4464

TEXAS
Contact Person: Bill Dixon
Title: Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board
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Fax: 512-483-6444

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Fax: 801-321-7199

VERMONT
Contact Person: Bob Nicol
Title: Chief Financial Officer, Vermont State Colleges
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Fax: 802-241-3369

VIRGINIA
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Fax: 804-786-3786
WASHINGTON
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Title: Budget Director, Washington State Board for Community College Education
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WEST VIRGINIA
Contact Person: Jim Skidmore
Title: Vice Chancellor for Community Colleges, West Virginia State College System
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WISCONSIN
Contact Person: Greg Wagner
Title: Director of Budget & Finance, Wisconsin Technical College System
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Fax: 608-266-1285

WYOMING
Contact Person: William Lovejoy
Title: Dean of Information, Planning and Policy, Wyoming Community College Commission
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Fax: 307-777-6567
APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH RICK DeGraw

Interview with Rick DeGraw, Executive Assistant to the Chancellor
Maricopa Community Colleges
602-731-8719/DeGraw@maricopa.edu
February 3, 1998, 2:00 p.m. C.S.T.

Mr. DeGraw has an M.A. from Rutgers and an M.A. from Princeton. He was originally a Presbyterian minister, then a legislator, then Chief of Staff to the Arizona legislature, then a teacher at Arizona State University, among other various occupations.

In the last twelve years, he has run 279 elections as a consultant, with a winning percentage of more than 83%. He was first involved with a successful election at Maricopa Community College (MCC) in 1984.

Mr. DeGraw joined the MCC staff in 1991 in the Office for the Community Agenda with the assignment to identify and create new programs. MCC had a 1992 bond election, but Mr. DeGraw did not participate because of the perception he was not sufficiently removed from his political consultancy. MCC was soundly defeated in its $510 million 1992 bond election by a margin of approximately 68% to 32%. After the 1992 election, Mr. DeGraw wrote a memo the Chancellor suggesting a different strategy.

Before setting a date for a 1994 election, MCC conducted an extensive poll. One finding was that a November general election was a much better time to hold an MCC election than a special election time (e.g., April or February). Many more favorable voters--women, less affluent, minorities, etc.--take part in general elections. The poll also indicated that the electoral market would withstand a bond issue of between $300 million and $400 million. The amount sought in 1992 ($500 million or “half a billion”) did not resonate politically. Based on the polling data, the amount was set at $386 million.

The campaign was divided into two, distinct parts: 1) A general image campaign paid for by MCC using four t.v. spots about two months before the district-wide election and coinciding with fall registration; 2) An intense two-month direct mail and public appearance campaign, focusing on each of the ten colleges in the MCC district with a unique consistency for each. More than a million direct mail pieces were delivered. In this part of the campaign, no broadcast media was used.

Ballot issues and language were important: each city in the district was named if possible to indicate local benefits for each college. The ballot language was crafted to respond to previous criticism, including the Chamber of Commerce’s criticism that 20-year debt
service on technological enhancements was too long.

There was organized opposition in the 1994 campaign, but it was unable to raise significant dollars to combat the $225,000 plus raised by the MCC campaign.

Unique demographics: Maricopa County is growing at a 14% rate annually. The population is also very transient; 70% of voters are new every four years.
APPENDIX G

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH MARILYN ANDERSON

Interview with Marilyn Anderson, Director of Finance/Controller
Maricopa Community Colleges
602-731-8571/anderson.marilyn.a@a1.dist.maricopa.edu
January 13, 1998, 3:00 p.m. C.S.T.

Ms. Anderson is Director of Finance/Controller for the Maricopa Community College District. Her focus in the election process is on financial analysis, including various debt structure scenarios for a bond issue; she had frequent contacts with investment bankers in the process of crunching the numbers. 65% of MCC’s revenues come from local property tax; 16-17% from state aid, and the remaining revenues from tuition and other sources.

Before the college’s unsuccessful 1992 election, a needs analysis identified more than a billion dollars of needs ($1,000,000,000). After the 1992 bond issue of approximately $500 million met a crushing defeat, the state board approved a bond issue of approximately $385 million for the November, 1994 ballot. Authorization from the state board was required before placing a bond issue on the local ballot. A simple majority is required for passage.

Ms. Anderson emphasized that the college cannot advocate passage of the bond issue, but can provide information to voters. Her role in the campaign was to provide accurate financial information for the college’s informational campaign. Ms. Anderson identified several individuals who played a key role in the campaign, including Rick DeGraw, Office of the Community Agenda, Dr. Bill Waechter, Vice Chancellor for Quality and Employment Development, and a member of the MCC Board, Linda Rosenthal. Dr. Paul Ellsner is the MCC chancellor. An outside campaign committee did retain several experts and consultants.

MCC’s governmental relations office coordinated informational efforts; an outside campaign group, Friends of the College, raised money for the advocacy part of the campaign. According to Ms. Anderson, the college emphasized an absentee voter campaign because of revisions in absentee voting policy which make absentee voting in the Phoenix/Tempe area relatively easy.

Because of a high percentage of seniors and retirees in Maricopa County, much of the campaign focused on them.
APPENDIX H

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH DON GIRARD

**Interview with Don Girard**, Director of Marketing
Santa Monica College
310-452-9287/dgirard@smc.edu
January 7, 1998, 4:00 p.m. C.S.T.

Mr. Girard is Director of Marketing at Santa Monica Community College. During SMC’s successful 1992 campaign, Mr. Girard was an outside consultant as President of Gutenberg 2000 Communications.

After Proposition 13 in California in 1978, bond issues have required a 2/3 approval (66.66%) for passage. Between the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 and the SMC election in 1992, about 13 colleges had unsuccessfully attempted a bond issue.

Before the campaign began, SMC conducted a poll which indicated that SMC had a 90% recognition rate; of the 90% which recognized SMC, 98% of those with an opinion rated SMC excellent or very good. 78% of residents in the district live in apartments; income is bifurcated between very wealthy and not-so-wealthy; a large percentage of residents live in rent-controlled apartments. The district assessed valuation is a whopping, eye-popping $5 billion. The district includes Santa Monica and Malibu.

The Santa Monica Community is a majority Caucasian community (80%), and is a liberal community that supports education. While the community is 80% Caucasian, the student population is only 43% white; only 20% of students reside in-district, most come from outlying Los Angeles area communities, predominantly in west Los Angeles. SMC has positioned itself as an "elite" community college with many students transferring to U.C.L.A. Los Angeles City College is twelve miles away, serving L.A. and the mid-cities.

In 1992, the Santa Monica school district had just recently passed a $75 million bond issue in the community of approximately 90,000. SMC had just completed a "mini-war" over parking; parking was symptomatic of a "no-growth" movement in Santa Monica, with many candidates advocating little or no growth.

The SMC bond issue was a $23 million proposal, reduced from an earlier $29 plan. The plan included a $6 million library, $13 million for a science addition to a building and $4 million for asbestos removal. The proposal was a result of internal input and identifying projects which had support (a theater and recreation center didn’t make it). The theme for the college was "Safety and Modernization at SMC".
The focus of the campaign was “it’s the right thing to do”; emphasized that improvements would remain locally and benefit local community. Key endorsements from the Santa Monica and Malibu City Councils.

According to Mr. Girard, the Santa Monica Community was very sophisticated politically. Early in the campaign, the college direct-mailed over 4,000 pieces to community leaders with a specific statement of the exact projects based on the public opinion poll.

The election took place during the 1992 general election campaign in which Clinton defeated Bush, so the campaign benefitted from a high Democratic turnout in a time when the declining economy was perceived as a concern.

The campaign raised approximately $90,000, and the college committed about $30,000 to a public information campaign. Many direct mailings, a good field operation that included more than 5,000 direct contacts and 5,000 phone contacts. The campaign bought space on sample ballots and contributed to local coalitions to receive endorsements; the local election also got a tremendous amount of play because of slates of candidates with a position on controversial rent control issues.

SMC was successful by the thinnest of margins, with just sixty votes more than required out of 60,000 votes cast. Shortly after SMC’s successful election, the City of Santa Monica sought approval for a police station and was defeated.

Mr. Girard offered a few summary bits of advice: Too many campaigns focus on “elite” leadership and ignore the grass roots constituency. Don’t threaten voters—they won’t vote in a way that will harm themselves.
APPENDIX I

MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT

BOND QUESTION

November 8, 1994

Shall the District be authorized to issue and sell general obligation bonds in the principal amount of $385,799,000 to meet the needs of all District students by constructing new or acquiring existing buildings;
- improving security at all campuses and educational centers;
- constructing additions and improvements to and remodeling and modernizing building;
- equipping and furnishing buildings;
- upgrading and increasing the efficiency of the central plant equipment at each campus and education center;
- installing new and upgrading existing utilities;
- completing on-site and off-site improvements;
- constructing additional parking facilities;
- improving computer technologies;
- removing buildings;
- purchasing land adjacent to existing campuses;
- refinancing existing building obligations;
- purchasing or leasing land in the following areas for educational centers:
  (a) a parcel located in Phoenix, between Camelback Road on the north and Madison Street on the south, Eights Avenue on the west and Twenty-fourth Street on the east for an educational center;
  (b) a parcel located in northeast Scottsdale between Shea Boulevard on the south and Carefree Highway/Cave Creek Road on the north, Tatum Boulevard on the west and 136th Street (extended) on the east for an educational center;
  (c) a parcel located in the West Valley between Interstate Freeway 17 on the east and Litchfield Road on the west, and Peoria Avenue on the north and McDowell Road on the south for a skill center;
  (d) a parcel located in the Sun Cities area between Eighty-third Avenue on the east and Sarival Road on the west, between Deer Valley Road on the north and Olive Road on the south for an educational center;
  (e) a parcel located in the Sun Lakes area between Arizona Avenue on the east and Price Road on the west, between Chandler Heights Road on the north and the Hunt Highway on the south for an educational center;
  f) a parcel located in the Town of Guadalupe for an educational center; and said bonds may bear interest at a rate not to exceed 12% per annum and said bonds may run for a period of not to exceed 20 years from their date.
APPENDIX J

EMPLOYEE GUIDELINES FOR THE MCCD BOND ELECTION

By law, the district may only provide the public with certain factual information during elections. Since the district is a tax-supported institution, employees may not, during their normal work hours, work on the promotion of the bond election nor may employees use district materials or resources to help promote the bond election.

In practical terms, this means that district personnel cannot spend or use district resources in an attempt to persuade any of our voters.

Factual, content-neutral information concerning the bond election will be supplied to each voter’s household in an information pamphlet. Other factual, content-neutral information about the bond election may be provided by the district office and excerpts may be placed in newsletters as long as it remains content-neutral and does not become the dominant topic of the newsletter. To satisfy the Federal Voting Rights Act, all information produced by the district after the election is officially ordered and called must be translated into Spanish and oral presentations must be made in certain non-written native dialects.

PLEASE REMEMBER THE FOLLOWING:

1. You may act as an advocate, but only in your capacity as a private citizen, on your own time and using your own (or other private) resources. If you choose to support or oppose an election, you must make it clear when speaking or writing that you are acting only for yourself, as an individual private citizen, and that you are not acting as a representative of or for the district.

2. Do not spend time during your work day writing promotional materials or engaging in other types of promotional activities. Do not use district secretarial/support staff to prepare promotional materials. (To avoid even the appearance of wrongdoing, we ask that you do not use “break” for private advocacy activities during the work hours at district facilities.)

3. Do not spend district money promoting the election.

4. Do not use district equipment (such as copiers, telephone, fax, mail boxes and electronic mail) for advocacy.

5. Do not use students as messengers for any advocacy position. Newsletters that are written, privately paid for and distributed independent of district resources and students...
are permitted.

6. You may not use the authority of your position with the district to influence the vote or political activities of any other employee or to solicit moneys from employees for such activities.

7. The district is not responsible for the decision by an organization leasing or using district facilities to extend invitations to proponents and opponents of the ballot issue(s).

Please follow these guidelines carefully. It is important to remember that even one minor infraction could result in the election being declared invalid.
APPENDIX K

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH LINDA B. ROSENTHAL

Interview with Linda B. Rosenthal, member, MCCD governing board, and president of governing board during 1994 election
Maricopa Community Colleges
602-285-7135
February 10, 1998, 3:45 p.m. C.S.T.

Ms. Rosenthal is a former teacher who has served on the MCCD board for nineteen years. She is a former teacher, and served as president during the 1994 campaign.

Ms. Rosenthal stated that MCC lost the 1992 campaign by a narrow margin mainly because of complacency, the thinking that “Oh, we’re wonderful”. The 1992 campaign was also in the summer, and the media accused MCC of running a “stealth” campaign. In fact, the 1992 election was moved back to the summer because Maricopa County had recently attempted an unsuccessful bond issue.

According to Ms. Rosenthal, developing the internal constituency of faculty and staff was crucial. She lead the charge, meeting with faculty and staff to discuss the bond issue in 1994. She even appeared on a local public television talk show, “Horizon,” where she faced off with an opponent of the bond issue, a member of the Arizona Tax Researchers.

Ms. Rosenthal explained that the initial recommendation to the State Community College Board was to have been $479 million, but was reduced to $386 million because of concerns from the State Board that the amount was too high. The seventeen member State Board has only one member from Maricopa County, and that member was absent at the May meeting at which the request to be placed on the ballot was made. The State Board had also suggested that MCC split up the bond issue as different votes for different projects, but MCC held fast in keeping the bond issue one single vote.

Vice Chancellor Bill Waechter was a key staff member according to Ms. Rosenthal, with Rick DeGraw providing essential political expertise.
APPENDIX L

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTA SEVERNS

Interview with Christa Severns, public relations consultant
Maricopa Community Colleges
602-784-4890
February 10, 1998, 5:15 p.m. C.S.T.

Ms. Severns is a political consultant with the Grossfield & Severns firm. She and her partner act as consultants exclusively for referendums and similar issues, and no longer represents candidates (they “whine too much” according to Ms. Severns).

She became involved in the 1994 MCC campaign because of contacts with the MCC Foundation and Vice Chancellor Bill Waechter. Grossfield & Severns worked for the campaign committee (not the college). She remembers the campaign as a very positive experience, with great discipline and participation from MCC staff.

Ms. Severns said the campaign committee raised about $130,000 for the campaign. Before the campaign got underway, MCC had spent more than $100,000 for t.v. time for “feel good” information spots; although the impact of those spots on the campaign is tough to track, the impact was certainly positive.

Ms. Severns said MCC officials were much more responsive to consultation in light of their crushing defeat in 1992; they wanted to avoid their previous mistakes and understood that professional help was needed and were willing to take guidance from the professionals. She emphasized the importance of the leadership of Chancellor Elsner in particular, and the implementation skills of Vice Chancellor Waechter. She also noted the importance of the political savvy of Rick DeGrew.

She noted the importance of the poll conducted by Fairbank, Maullin & Associates as an important precursor to the campaign (the same polling organization used by Santa Monica College). The polling data was important in identifying the amount of the bond issue and in eliminating projects that lacked public support.

One of the big challenges of the campaign was running an effective campaign in a sprawling metropolitan area with only about $130,000. Television was too expensive (and possibly not effective because of the general election); much of the direct mail was hand-delivered to keep costs down (an amazing grass roots structure).

As did other participants in the MCC election, Ms. Severns emphasized the crucial importance of the endorsement of the Sun City Taxpayer’s Association. She stated that
the endorsements were secured in part because of projects that benefitted the Association's member, but primarily because of outreach by MCC staff. In essence, she said that the polls indicated what people wanted, and the proposal gave it to them. Too many times, she said, educators and other governmental entities start with what they think they need and assume voters will be supportive, no matter what it costs. In her opinion, one reason MCC was successful was because of their understanding that the issue needed to be built on what the community would support. "Any time someone in a campaign thinks they know what the voters need more than the voters, you're in trouble!" She also stated that too many campaigns assume voters are stupid, and they're not! If voters are given a compelling reason to vote yes, they will.
APPENDIX M

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH DR. BILL WAECHTER

Interview with Dr. Bill Waechter, Vice Chancellor for Quality and Employee Development
Maricopa Community Colleges
602-731-8103

Dr. Waechter has been with MCC for fourteen years; he spent 25 years in southern California, first with Long Beach Community College, then the Coastal Community College; his responsibilities include staff development and other "people" issues.

When asked what mistakes were made in 1992 and corrected for the 1994 election, Dr. Waechter identified 1) planning errors, not spending enough time image building, assuming that everyone in the district knew about MCC (they were familiar with their local college, but didn't understand it was part of the system); and 2) MCC assumed that retirees would be against them, so the college didn't cultivate retirees. As Dr. Waechter summarizes in hindsight, "We couldn't believe how stupid we'd been to ignore retirees." The survey data indicated that the Sun Valley retirees understood education; the area includes about fifteen retired college presidents and numerous retired teachers, most with high retirement incomes. MCC hired a "mouthpiece" for the Sun Valley community, a retiree, after the 1992 defeat.

According to Dr. Waechter, the survey by Fairbank, Maullin & Associates was "the most important thing we did." Dr. Waechter said MCC in essence hired the professionals and let them loose. "In a large district, you have to hire qualified people and let them do their job." He emphasized that "they told us things we really didn't want to hear, but that we needed to hear."

Identifying specific projects for each of the ten colleges was very important, because each project insured involvement from each college, especially students, faculty and staff.

The level of frustration with the state governing board, which reduced the request for the amount of the bond to be placed on the ballot from $450 million to $386 million, was quite high, especially after the overwhelming vote.

When asked how difficult and important was campaign fundraising, Dr. Waechter replied "It was one helluva challenge."

Dr. Waechter talked of the "luxury" of going to voters for property tax revenue, which he explained is stable, dependable, and usually grows a consistent amount each year.
One final point Dr. Waechter made is that since the campaign, the college has kept the public thoroughly informed about the progress and completion of each project. The ballot language was very specific, and makes it easy to track exactly how the money should be and is spent. Because Maricopa has almost encumbered all of the $386 million approved in 1994, the college will return to the voters in about 2001; the date of the next election could have been deferred if the 1994 election had been for $450 million instead of the $386 authorized by the state board.

When asked about the success of securing outstanding newspaper editorial support, Dr. Waechter said he reads those editorials every day, as they have been enlarged and hang on the wall outside of his office.
APPENDIX N

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD MAULLIN

Interview with Richard Maullin, Political Consultant
Fairbank, Maullin & Associates
Santa Monica, California
310-828-1183
February 16, 1998, 6:30 p.m. C.S.T.

Mr. Maullin has been involved in opinion research since 1980; he received a Ph.D. in political science from U.C.L.A. He served in Governor Brown's cabinet, and was involved for several years with an energy company. His firm focuses on governmental and public policy issues, with a significant minority of business (35-40% in an election year) from candidate races. The majority of the firm's clients are in California, although they have assisted in campaigns in more than 10 states. Their services include research analysis, developing questionnaires, and conducting phone surveys.

When Fairbank, Maullin & Associates conducted the survey for SMC, the college had never commissioned a public opinion survey before. Mr. Maullin believes targeting voters may have helped in the success of the election, given the small margin for error (60 or so votes). At SMC, the president and his staff were very involved in the development of the questionnaire, but ultimately deferred to the professional expertise of Fairbank, Maullin & Associates. In addition to the initial survey, Fairbank, Maullin & Associates also conducted research for the college concerning the student body, the general image of SMC, and public sentiment about budget allocations. Mr. Maullin emphasized the extensive involvement of politically active individuals like Don Girard, who was an outside consultant at the time of the 1992 election with solid grass roots organizational skills.

Fairbank, Maullin & Associates also conducted the initial survey for MCCD, which Dr. Waechter identified as the most important single thing the college did in the campaign. Mr. Maullin provided me with a copy of the survey.

Mr. Maullin estimates that the approximate cost of a survey like those done for SMC and MCCD in today's [1998] dollars would be between $15,000 and $20,000. Such a survey requires a sample of about 400-500 respondents who take part in a survey that takes 15-20 minutes.
Dr. Elsner has been Chancellor of Maricopa Community College for more than twenty years. During his time at MCC, the college has become one of the largest and most respected districts in the country.

Dr. Elsner provided a very different perspective on the 1994 $386 million bond election at MCC. In his opinion, “we may have done a better job in the [unsuccessful] 1992 election, but the timing was just wrong in 1992.” In his opinion, the 1994 general election was a much better time for the issue, and the MCC issue was “one bright spot” on a ballot that included many issues that voters reacted to negatively.

A common theme of Dr. Elsner’s responses was the “randomness” of elections. He was very reluctant to assess the value or impact of any one factor, such as faculty, student or staff involvement, political consultants, or advertising. He did speak in glowing terms about Rick DeGraw as one of the most knowledgeable experts of voter behavior and the political process in the country.

When asked about the importance of Sun City support, Dr. Elsner said that “Sun City can’t help you [politically], but it can kill you.” When asked about the importance of the public opinion survey, Dr. Elsner said that any information is valuable, but he did not single out the information from the survey as uniquely important.

Dr. Elsner did offer one opinion that was unique among those contacted at MCC. When asked about the decision of the state board to reduce the bond issue to be placed on the ballot from the $479 million MCC requested to the $386 million that appeared on the ballot, Dr. Elsner suggested that the state board’s decision may have helped MCC. Since the Phoenix/Tempe area is what Dr. Elsner called “the cradle of conservatism,” he thought the state board decision may have generated some support from voters who did not local authority eroded by a state body.
APPENDIX P

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH CATHIE DRIES

Interview with Cathie Dries,
Director, Community Relations/Conference Services
734-973-3630
On the campus of Washtenaw Community College
February 26, 1998

Ms. Dries has been with WCC for 12 years. She has a background in elementary education, with an M.A. in early childhood, and began at WCC doing entry assessments for students. She has also worked for the WCC Foundation.

Before joining WCC, Ms. Dries had been involved in politics in several capacities, including time as an aide for a U.S. Congressman, Bob Traxler, and as an active Democrat in local grassroots politics. Ms. Dries was also involved in WCC's unsuccessful 1992 election; she indicated that the Ross Perot candidacy was a negative factor, growing anti-tax sentiment, including a movement away from property taxes for public school financing, and a local issue that competed with WCC for local tax dollars (a local "safe house" for battered women).

In the 1996 election, the theme was: Better Jobs, a Better Future. According to Ms. Dries, one of the key differences between the 1992 and 1996 campaigns was the reliance on the WCC Master Plan, and the inclusion of faculty and staff in the process that led up to the successful 1996 election.

From a WCC staff perspective, Ms. Dries was the person who really "lived" the campaign. She prepared detailed analyses of voter patterns in previous elections, and in many ways coordinated the activities of the campaign advocacy group, the Friends of WCC Committee. She is also the "archivist" for the campaign, and was able to provide most of the printed materials used in the campaign.

In 1996, the WCC bond issue passed in the August election but the millage increase failed. Thus, the theme in the November election became "Finish the Job." In addition, WCC reduced the amount of the millage increase, emphasized the place of the issue on the bottom of the ballot.
Dr. Myran has been President of WCC since 1975, and is retiring this coming April. He has coordinated the growth of WCC from 5,000 to 10,000 college credit students, and from essentially one building to a 200 plus acre campus with outstanding facilities.

As Dr. Myran explained, the successful 1996 campaign really began immediately after the unsuccessful 1992 campaign. Before the defeat in 1992, WCC had never lost a revenue election, and was “8 and 0 lifetime.” Dr. Myran stated that campaigns up to and including the 1992 campaign had been low-key and had required little focused advocacy. He concluded that the message of the 1992 loss was that “that era of campaigning was over.” WCC attempted to learn from the mistakes of the 1992 campaign.

In Dr. Myran’s opinion, the voters’ attitude concerning taxes underwent a dramatic shift in Michigan in 1992. Proposition A, the proposal to eliminate property tax as a revenue source for local public schools, was brewing in 1992. Another important factor identified by Dr. Myran that led to the unsuccessful outcome in 1992 was a local issue to establish a “Safe House” for battered women that require only about 1/4 of the tax money sought by WCC. According to Dr. Myran, many voters used their “one yes” for the Safe House issue.

After the unsuccessful 1992 election, Dr. Myran noted that EPIC/MRA consultants helped make sense of the loss through a community survey that indicated that the community supported the college, just not the tax increase. WCC sponsored many focus groups and breakfast meetings to amplify the results of the 1993 public opinion survey, which was the first survey ever conducted at WCC by an outside public relations/political consulting firm.

After the 1992 loss, Dr. Myran instituted visible cost-cutting measures and “belt tightening,” including the elimination of most food provided to faculty and staff at internal meetings. Instead, WCC “fed our constituents at town hall meetings and focus groups.”

During the 1992 election, WCC has assumed that the Ann Arbor paper would be supporting, an assumption that proved unfounded. Dr. Myran emphasized that the
educational process involving the newspaper editorial board began much earlier in the 1996 campaign. Ann Arbor is somewhat unique in that the one newspaper in town reaches 60-70% of the households in the city. The 1993 survey indicated that respondents remembered the unfavorable 1992 editorial (though they claimed not to be influenced by it).

Dr. Myran stressed the importance of the Master Planning process and its effectiveness in placing the 1996 election within the context of the college’s mission and long-term goals.
APPENDIX R

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH MARTY HEATOR

Interview with Marty Heator, Director of Promotional Services
313-973-3624
On the campus of Washtenaw Community College
February 26, 1998

Mr. Heator is responsible for marketing and promotions for WCC, and oversees a promotional budget in excess of $500,000. Mr. Heator prepared a submission to the National Council for Marketing and Public Relations (NCMPR) in the Government or Community Relations Project based on the 1996 campaign that will receive a national first place award.

Mr. Heator emphasized that the actions of Dr. Gunder Myran, president of WCC, “set the tone” for the 1996 election after WCC’s unsuccessful 1992 election. According to Mr. Heator, Dr. Myran explained the “good future v. bad future” based on whether or not a bond issue passed. In addition, Mr. Heator identified budget cuts and hiring freezes implemented by Dr. Myran as key decisions in making the need tangible to the community and also to faculty and staff.

Of particular importance according to Mr. Heator was the realization that needed improvements in computer wiring and networking throughout the campus would not happen unless a bond issue became a reality.

In developing the campaign strategy, Mr. Heator stressed the importance of the WCC strategic plan and its emphasis on workforce training. In addition to the strategic planning process, Mr. Heator noted the importance of the college’s team assembled to sell the campaign plan, including the president, the marketing & p.r. staff, the top management information system executive, the director of institutional research and other staff members.

Mr. Heator indicated the importance of the EPIC/MRA public opinion survey as an important force in identifying the groups who would be most likely to support the WCC bond issue. He stressed that polling data is important, but that the college staff must know the local area to effectively use the results of the survey.
APPENDIX S

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM HOLMES

Interview with William Holmes, Executive Director, Community and Business Relations
313-973-3439
On the campus of Washtenaw Community College
February 26, 1998

Mr. Holmes stressed the importance of an easy to understand set of needs; the needs were supported by the college’s internal team. With faculty and staff, the tentative themes of the campaign were tested during the November, 1995 college in-service training period and again in 1996. The focus of all of the needs identified that were included in the campaign was technology and jobs.

Mr. Holmes identified share his favorite anecdote from the 1992 campaign; a female custodian told him she loved the college but did not vote yes and was not overly familiar with the emphasis on jobs and technology. Mr. Holmes recounted the difficulty of expecting a favorable vote when those closest to the college are not sufficiently informed and involved to vote yes.

Another point Mr. Holmes made was that the understanding the local political environment is crucial. In Ann Arbor in 1992, WCC was impacted by a local issue involving a “Safe House” for battered women (that involved a lower tax increase than the WCC issue) and a national wave of anti-tax sentiment, including the candidacy of Ross Perot.
SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY COLLEGE ELECTION STRATEGIES

By

D. Brian King

Dissertation Director: James O. Hammons, Ph.D.

College of Education
Department of Educational Leadership,
Counseling and Foundations

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to identify successful election strategies employed by community colleges in bond issue or tax levy increase elections and to distill those strategies into a list of principles or rules that could be utilized by community colleges preparing for such an event.

A questionnaire was provided to state community college directors requesting information concerning colleges that had conducted a tax levy or bond issue within the last decade. The initial questionnaires were followed up with a 50-state telephone survey to determine if revenue elections were available to community colleges and to identify colleges that had conducted elections in recent years.

Only 14 of the 50 states allowed community colleges to seek local voter support through an election to seek an increase in local taxes or to issue bonds. Twelve states allowed colleges to seek an increase in property tax, 13 states allowed colleges to bring bond issues, and no states allowed colleges to seek an increase in local sales tax. From a
sample of more than 1,100 community colleges nation-wide, 3 subject college were identified for case studies, Maricopa Community College, Santa Monica College, and Washtenaw Community College.

The 3 subject colleges employed similar election strategies in their successful campaigns. Each of the colleges relied on professionally conducted public opinion surveys to identify issues that the public supported to determine the amount of the proposed tax increase or bond issue, and to set the date of the election at a time when success was most likely. Two of the subject colleges conducted a professional survey for the first time after a previous unsuccessful campaign.

All 3 subject colleges involved faculty and staff in the election process by incorporating college personnel in a long-term or strategic planning process. The planning processes culminated in the ballot issues placed before voters in the respective campaigns. In advance of the formal campaign, the subject colleges developed and paid for informational commercials and written materials to enhance public perception of the colleges.

Each of the colleges established a campaign committee separate from the college to conduct fundraising and to advocate that voters vote “yes,” activities that state law prohibited the colleges from taking part in. The formal campaign of each college was short, varying in length from 60 to 90 days. The activities of the campaign committees built on the foundation of the informational efforts financed by the colleges.
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