The education of ethnic minorities in China is explored, addressing issues that relate to state schooling, ethnicity, and development. Minority religions, which traditionally provided much of the education outside of the family, are tolerated increasingly officially, but not really recognized in state schooling. Language is another major challenge related to ethnic minority culture and schooling. There is a strong national call to use Chinese as the main medium in instruction, but in many cases efforts are being made to educate in minority languages. Although the provision of education for ethnic minorities has been increasing, most minorities are below the national average at all levels. This is especially true for women. The gap between minority achievement and that of the large Han group is also especially apparent in higher education. Since 1980, measures have been taken to increase the participation of minorities in higher education, but much remains to be done. A look at Tibet illustrates many of the problems in minority education in China. So far, the diversity that exists in China does not appear to be fully reflected in the content of schooling, and this is even more apparent in predominantly Han Chinese schools, where there seems to be little sensitivity to minority cultures. Curricula that reflect the cultural diversity of China might increase understanding among ethnic groups and help conserve minority cultures. (Contains 59 endnotes.)
State Schooling and Ethnicity in China: The Rise or Demise of Multiculturalism?

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All multiethnic states, including China, face a similar educational challenge. They must convince their state defined ethnic minority communities, as well as the national and global community, that state-sponsored schooling ensures equal opportunities for all ethnic groups, promotes the economic development of ethnic minority regions, encourages ethnic minorities to practice cultural autonomy and builds an interethnic unity that supports the nation state. State schooling expand in reaction to a market of demands. Individuals demand practical skills, social groups demand status culture, and the state demands social control. Representations of ethnic culture are greatly affected by this market of demands. Within China, the market of demands that shapes the expansion of the education system is dominated by the state. Though the demand of ethnic groups for schools to elevate the status of their culture within the national framework is ubiquitous, the actual content of schooling reflects the state’s view of the nature of ethnic intergroup processes. Hence, a great deal can be learned about the People’s Republic of China by studying how it schools its state defined ethnic minorities, represents their ethnic heritage, socializes them into a national identity, structures their educational opportunities and links their schooling to economic development.

Socio-cultural context is a profound determinant of the form and content of state schooling for ethnic minorities. State schools serve a conservative function by defining and reproducing a national culture that bolsters dominant social structures. China’s state schools conserve a particular brand of national culture (zhonghua minzu wenhua), and are supervised by an authoritarian state wary of outside cultural influences, especially from the West. State schooling is also charged with the responsibility to conserve ethnic minority cultures within a national context that places a premium on Han Chinese cultural capital.

While many aspects of minority education, including education in Tibet, remain highly centralized, the national move to a market economy, administrative decentralization and local elections could begin to have a profound effect on minority schooling. Yet the notion of ethnic pluralism remains carefully proscribed, and multiethnic education is still a sensitive issue. Discussion of multiculturalism is found in academic discourse, but much less so in policy and practice. To what extent do schools in China create an atmosphere that has positive institutional norms toward diverse cultural groups within the nation state? To what degree do schools in China modify their total environment to make it more reflective of the ethnic diversity in the society? State policy accords importance to the special cultural characteristics of ethnic minority regions; however, not
enough is known about actual practice to provide detailed answers to such questions.\textsuperscript{9} In-depth study of the schooling in particular ethnic communities is needed to measure the gap between the policy and practice of ethnic minority regional autonomy in education, and to understand the manner in which ethnic communities innovate in their adjustment to state schooling. This paper aims to review recent research and argue that despite the diversity that exists among ethnic communities in China, state schooling has remains largely monocultural.

**CHINA’ S ETHNIC MINORITIES AND EDUCATION POLICY**

China refers to its minorities as \textit{shaoshu minzu}, which has been translated as national or ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{10} As the government defines ethnic minorities, they account for over 110 million people. Their population has been increasing faster than the majority Han due to a relaxed birth control policy in the sparsely populated minority areas, but also to an increased willingness on the part of minorities to acknowledge their ethnic roots in the national census.\textsuperscript{11} This acknowledgement is due in no small part to the special privileges it bestows in several areas, including family planning, employment and education,\textsuperscript{12} as well as to increased tolerance toward ethnic minorities by the Han since the Cultural Revolution. The government claims 55 ethnic minorities, the largest group having more than 15 million members and the smallest only about 2,000.\textsuperscript{13} The reason these 110 million who account for less than 10 percent of the population occupy so critical a place is that they inhabit over 60 percent of the land area and 90 percent of the interior border region of China, and occupy land that is rich in mineral deposits, forest reserves, and most of the animals that supply milk, meat and wool.

The People’s Republic of China has 156 nationality autonomous areas, including 5 autonomous regions (\textit{qu}), 30 autonomous prefectures (\textit{zhou}), and 121 autonomous counties (\textit{xian} and \textit{qi}).\textsuperscript{14} Though these areas account for the larger part of China’s territory, in only one-third of these autonomous areas is the dominant ethnic minority equal to more than one-half of the population. The Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities was adopted in May 1984 at the second session of the Sixth National People’s Congress.\textsuperscript{15} It includes provisions for autonomous organizations, rights of self-government organizations, help from higher level organizations, training and assignment of cadres, specialists and skilled workers among the minority peoples, and the strengthening and developing of socialist relations among nationalities.

Analyzing China’s national minorities as a single entity is virtually impossible. Great cultural, regional and developmental differences exist between them. Thus, the unified set of ethnic minority policies, including those in education, espoused by the government are intended to be implemented flexibly so as to take account of the unique situation of each minority. Sometimes referred to as little brothers (\textit{xiongdi}) by the Han majority, minorities can be differentiated according to a number of criteria.\textsuperscript{16} These include population size; the nature of the identification of the group; the size, location and terrain of the region they occupy; the proportion of members of the minority group that inhabit an autonomous province, prefecture or county; their proximity to and relations with other ethnic groups, including the Han; whether the neighboring Han were migrants or indigenous residents of the region; whether the ethnic minorities are rural or urban groups, agricultural or pastoral groups, border or inland groups, or concentrated or dispersed groups; whether the group has a strong religious tradition or none; whether the group has a written language or only a spoken one; whether members of their ethnic group also living across the Chinese border in other countries, either as ethnic minorities or as the major nationality; and, finally, whether they have had a separate tradition of foreign relations with peoples of another region of the world.
The educational policies adopted for ethnic minorities since 1979 include the establishment of the Department of Ethnic Minority Education (minzu jiaoyu si) under the State Ministry of Education (which became the State Education Commission in 1985) with corresponding organizations and appointments made at the provincial (minzu jiaoyu chu), prefecture (minzu jiaoyu ke) and county levels (minzu jiaoyu gu). Ethnic autonomous regions became authorized to develop their own educational programs, including levels and kinds of schools, curriculum content, language of instruction. Special funds for minority education were increased, and a portion of the annual budget for ethnic minority areas could be used for education. Funds for teacher training increased and various types of in-service training have been set up. Schools could be established according to the particular characteristics of the ethnic minorities and their regions; in pastoral, frontier and cold mountainous regions, boarding schools were arranged and stipends provided for students. In education special emphasis could be placed on ethnic minority language, culture and historical traditions. Higher education expanded and cooperation increased between frontier universities and those in the interior. Several major universities started special classes for minority students with preparatory programs for first year minority students. University admission standards for minority students have been lowered to make admission easier to attain. Directional admission and work assignments after graduation were arranged so as to build links between ethnic minority areas and the rest of the country.

Of all of the areas of Chinese education, the gaps between policy and practice are probably no more in evidence than in ethnic minority education. The degree of autonomy practiced in educational matters by ethnic minorities is still a matter for research and investigation. At the same time, this gap is particularly difficult to discern because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of many regions. Many areas of concern can be identified, including levels of illiteracy, the accessibility of basic education, dropout rates for minority girl students, history curriculum, cultural representations of ethnic minorities, relevance of vocational education to economic development of ethnic minority regions, teacher training in bilingual education, admission to upper secondary and higher education and special subsidies for ethnic minority education.

RESEARCH ON NATIONAL MINORITY EDUCATION
Development Study and Enrollment rates

Ethnic minority education has not been extensively researched from either inside or outside China. Whether due to their remote locations, ethnic unrest, or extreme poverty, many minority regions were closed to outsiders, including many Han Chinese, for many years. By the 1990s, however, access to minority areas greatly improved for social science research. The newly opened minority areas revealed, with few exceptions, literacy and school attendance rates significantly lower than those in the rest of the country. Economic development could not be significantly improved without investment in education and training. Using schools for socializing a citizenry into a national culture and identity could not in itself ensure legitimacy for China’s educational policy, unless it met the economic needs of the local minority community as well.

National statistics reveal that the percentage of minority children initially enrolled in elementary school parallels their proportion in the national population. In fact, several minorities, including the Koreans, Tatars, Russians, Xibe, and others score above the national average on a variety of educational indicators. While this and the rapid increase in school attendance are a major achievement, statistics also reveal that literacy rates for minorities, including most of those with their own written script, are far lower than that of the Han majority group. Likewise, schools in most minority regions have a lower proportion of qualified teachers. Furthermore, most minorities...
are underrepresented in completion rates for all levels of schooling, with minority females exhibiting particularly high rates of non-attendance and discontinuation. In addition, Han students who study in remote minority regions often fare only slightly better than minority students and less well than Han students nationally, indicating an important link between economic and cultural dimensions of the problem.

By 1990, school enrollment rates across China as a whole had reached 98 percent. Because of this progress, the emphasis began to shift from access to schooling to the improvement of school quality. Yet enrollment rates in many minority regions were much lower, with dropout rates on the rise. The official enrollment rate of minority students in elementary schools across the nation was 9 percent, accurately reflecting the proportion of the ethnic minorities in the total population, but these rates dropped off quickly after lower elementary school. In the case of Guizhou province, for instance, which has a one-third ethnic minority population, the within-year-dropout rate is only a few percentage points, but there is a sharp drop in the number of students at each level of elementary school. The number of students in primary schools in 1996 was 1,117,491 in grade one, 972,299 in grade two, 860,801 in grade three, 736,633 in grade four, 642,362 in grade five, and 563,584 in grade six. While these figures do not represent a decline of one cohort of students over time, they nevertheless indicate a general problem of retention rates. This situation can be accounted for in a number of ways, including limited financial resources for schools, perceived lack of relevance of schooling to rural life, mountainous terrain which makes home-school travel difficult, and work cycles which affect school attendance during rural harvesting times. For example, in the case of Tibetan students, for example, China is confronting an enormous educational challenge. While school enrollment rates continue to climb throughout China, Tibet has significantly lower rates of school enrollment, attendance, retention, promotion and graduation than the rest of the country. In 1995 there were about 340,000 children aged 7-12 in Tibet, with 254,203 students in 3,941 elementary schools (and 32,124 students in 89 secondary schools), where the enrollment rate was said to approach 70 percent. The 1994-5 enrolment rate for elementary schools in the capital city of Lhasa, where most of Tibet’s Han Chinese children attend school, was 85 percent (49,245 students). However, the 1994 enrollment rate for the Shigatze area elementary schools was 71 percent (65,324 students). These two cities account for almost half of all enrolment in state elementary schools in Tibet. Lhasa’s enrolment rate rose 15 percent in 3, from only 70 percent in 1992. At that time, the school enrolment figures for the other major cities were Shannan (Lho ka), 69.8 percent; Linzhi, 66 percent; Shigatze, 43 percent (a rise of 28 percent in three years); and Changdu (Cham mdo), 34 percent. Outside the cities, however, the figures are extremely low. For example, the official figure for enrollment in state schools in Hongda county (outside of Changdu) was 22.4 percent and it was only 10 percent in some countryside and village areas. By the end of the century, the education commission of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) says that it will enroll 80 percent of the relevant age group in schools. The aim by the year 2000 is that 3 years of compulsory elementary education will be achieved in the pastoral areas, 5 to 6 years in the rural areas, and 9 years (including 3 years of middle school) in urban areas. Yet Tibet still remains far below the rest of China on indicators of school provision. This is happening despite the fact that the proportion of the TAR budget allocated to education is said to be approaching 20 percent. The budget increase has coincided with increased Han Chinese immigration to the region. Due to the tight government control over Tibet, less international development agency projects are permitted than in other poor provinces of China, which means that the government contributions have to be even greater. Finally, the TAR government also supports a portion of the cost of the many Tibetan high schools established in cities across China.
Ethnic Minority Education within the Study of Education in China

Given the global interest in multiethnic and multicultural studies in education, it is notable that ethnic minority education in China’s multiethnic state has not received more attention. There have been a number of reasons for this. Aside from the difficulties of gaining access to education, minority educational issues in China are quite complex. Different religions, languages, cultural traditions and geography can make minority educational studies a daunting challenge compared to the study of education in Han Chinese regions. Despite commonality in the organization of schooling found globally, the diversity of cultures and conditions in minority regions limits generalizations.

It is perhaps not surprising that there has been little ethnographic work by either Chinese nationals or foreign scholars on ethnic minority education. However, both groups of researchers are poised to do more. Foreign researchers will do more as access to remote areas increases, and Chinese nationals will do more as they become more familiar with alternative research methodologies and as more funding becomes available for research in minority regions. The situation has improved by virtue of two loosely coupled trends. First, international development agencies began to focus their efforts away from the prospering eastern coastal regions and toward the inland poorer regions, especially in western China where most of China’s minorities reside.

Second, aside from educational researchers, there are also other social scientists, especially anthropologists already studying minorities and aware of the contribution of urban anthropology to the study of education. They have begun to focus on the role of education, particularly schooling, in the life of China’s ethnic minorities, and are able to bring the rigor of ethnographic methods to bear on the study of education in China.

Research on Ethnic Minority Education: Economic Reform versus Multiculturalism?

This paper examines ethnic minority education in China and addresses issues that relate to state schooling, ethnicity and development. This includes the degree to which ethnic groups are drawn from traditional religious institutions to modern schooling, the manner in which state schooling represents ethnic cultures, the effect of state schooling on the conservation of ethnic group languages, the scope of basic education across ethnic minority regions, the results of preferential policies to admit ethnic minorities to higher education and case studies of the results of state schooling’s attempt to ensure equal educational opportunities, reproduce national culture, and foster inter-ethnic unity. In general, the paper works toward addressing the question of what state schooling does to ethnicity and development. It concludes by questioning claims that ethnic minority schools adequately represent ethnic minority culture. Furthermore, it operates on the assumption that a multicultural education can further improve understanding between Han Chinese and other ethnic groups, even to the extent that the latter will increase their participation in state schooling, thereby raising their potential to reap equal rewards in terms of social and economic development from that participation. The paper is divided into three parts: cultural challenges to state schooling, state education provision, and case studies of ethnic minority schooling. The first part focuses on religion and language, both of which usually encapsulate the core of ethnic minority cultural heritage.

Cultural Challenges to State Schooling: Religion and Language

Religion is pervasive for most of China’s minorities. They are generally more committed to it than the Han Chinese majority. It has traditionally been the main form of organized education outside of the family. As a challenge to state schooling, the government is more concerned about
minority religions than about minority languages. Moreover, state schools must often compete with religious education for attendance rates, as well as financial contributions and support from families.

The main religions of China’s minorities are Islam, Buddhism and Lamaism, but others also have a following. Most of China’s minorities have a strong religious tradition. For some, like the Muslim Hui, religion is the main attribute of their identity as a national minority. Members of the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tatar, Uzbek, Tajik, Dongxiang, Salar and Bonan groups are adherents of the Islamic faith. The Tibetans and Mongols, Yugurs, and Tus are adherents of Lamaism. The Dai, Bulang and Benglong are adherents of Hinayana Buddhism. Shamanism is practiced by Oroqens, Daur and Ewenkis. The Drung, Nu, Va, Jingpo and Gaoshan practice polytheism as well as totemism and ancestral worship. A small group of adherents of Christianity can be found among the Koreans, Miao, and Yi.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, freedom of religion was guaranteed in the new constitution. During the early years of communist rule, Mao Zedong argued that religion should not be prohibited, only restricted. Religion was viewed as a historical product that could only be abolished under certain socioeconomic conditions. Thus, the practice of religion has come to be viewed as something that must be permitted to a certain extent. Also, religions share certain social concerns with socialism that permit mutual cooperation in some circumstances. For example, some religious leaders have joined educators and officials in efforts to eradicate illiteracy. Nevertheless, only state sponsored religious organizations are permitted; all others are severely suppressed. The official policy is, however, that government authorities are not to interfere in religious affairs of minorities unless affairs of the state are affected. National minority cadres are not to be dismissed because they have religious beliefs, but rather be persuaded of the advantages of shedding their religious views, as cooperation between religious leaders and communists is still viewed as valuable.

Of all of the ways that the government has attempted to win back support lost during the Cultural Revolution, granting autonomy in the area of culture, especially religion, has been central. Nevertheless, religious autonomy in the context of a socialist authoritarian government has been a matter of degree more than anything else. National minority religion has been increasingly tolerated, and even encouraged when it helps tourism, yet severely limited when it threatens national sovereignty.

Colin Mackerras has outlined the basic situation regarding the many religions of China, with particular emphasis on Islam and Buddhism. Dividing his analysis into pre- and post- 1949 periods, with the latter covering three phases regarding how religion survived after the communist revolution, he emphasizes how monasteries, mosques and churches, which predated state schooling, remain repositories of traditional culture and learning, and continue to flourish in one form or another. In examining state schooling he makes clear that the “state school system adheres strictly to the principle of secularity.” Clerics do little inside of schools, and there are no religious representations. Students are prohibited from reading religious books or praying in schools. The few clergy that teach in schools usually teach language courses rather than teach religious material. Moreover, such clerics would have to dress in secular clothes while in school.

Mackerras also notes that state schooling has expanded at the same time that minorities are experiencing a religious revival. Thus, the question arises as to whether state schooling is partly responsible for this religious resurgence. Mackerras responds that “...this religious revival is in part directly related to the secularization,” as signs of the religious revival, he points to the large number of Tibetan boys entering monasteries and Muslim boys reading the Koran in mosques.
Moreover, while religion is still kept apart from secular education, "state education and religious education are not positional, and ... sometimes graduates of state schools go on to mosques."  

The expansion of state schooling is having a profound affect on religion and ethnicity, even to the extent that schools actually make and remake ethnic nationalities. Dru Gladney critically examines these processes in his study of Chinese Muslims, and notes how religious education and state education often do very different things. In fact, state schooling often runs counter to religious teaching. So, China's Muslims must initiate a process of negation to deal with conflicting sets of norms. Furthermore, Han Chinese often view minority cultures as backward and their religious education as being of little value, as Gladney illustrates with the case of the Hui Hajji he met in China who said he "had no culture," though he had lived for 12 years in the Middle East, and was fluent in Persian, and Arabic, and a master of Islamic Natural Sciences.

What is state schooling doing to ethnic minority culture? From Gladney's perspective, representations of ethnic minority culture are unbalanced. "For most Han Chinese, who have never darkened the door of a mosque and learn little about Islam in public schools, this representation in the 'public sphere' is their only exposure to knowledge about Islam in China or Muslim identities."  

Muslims in China have a very different representation of themselves than that given to them by mainstream culture. Moreover, they are not only members of an ethnic minority but members of a long religious and scholarly tradition that has contributed to Chinese culture and society. Yet, in some cases, state schooling actually marginalizes Muslim minorities. Because many score lower in state schooling, they also become represented as failures.

The Chinese Muslim experience in state education is not monolithic. Even though the Hui do not excel in school measures of achievement, the Tatars and Uzbeks do extremely well. Other Muslims approach the national average as a group. Gladney attributes this either to assimilating to mainstream culture and not rejecting the images represented by the state, or more likely, viewing schooling as merely a tool and resisting the images of their ethnicity represented there. As Chinese Muslims move up the school ladder, they will come to exert an influence on the images and representations that the state assigns to their culture.

Education for Muslims, in sum, seems to result in parallel streams, one in which the state represents Muslim culture and the other in which Muslims represent their own culture. This will not change as long as state education does not incorporate more information about Muslim life. As Gladney states: "The lack of nationality content and Muslim world history may be forcing Muslims interested in their people's history to go to the mosque rather than the public schools and libraries for such 'religious' knowledge."  

A second major challenge relating to ethnic minority culture and schooling is language. With the exception of the Hui and Manchu who use the Han language, all of China's minorities have their own language, with some ethnic group having more than one. Most of the languages belong to the Sino-Tibetan and Altaic families, while some belong to the South Asian, Austronesian, and Indo-European families. Before 1949, only 20 minorities had their own written language. Those in most common use were Mongolian, Tibetan, Uyghur, Kazak, Korean, Xibe, Dai, Ozbek, Kirgiz, Tatar and Russian. Others included Yi, Miao, Naxi, Jingpo, Lisu, Lahu and Va. The Communist Government helped to derive a written script for nine national minorities formerly without one. Still, many minorities are without a written script. While most of the Manchu have long since abandoned their script and now use Han language, others groups such as the Jingpo speak a variety of different languages, some of which are totally unlike each other. Other groups are trilingual, speaking their native tongue, the language of the nationality in closest proximity and Han Chinese.
Since the beginning of the Four Modernizations period, national minority languages have been increasingly emphasized. Nevertheless, there is a strong call for Chinese as the main medium of instruction. This is being justified by pointing out that there are few scientific material published in national minority languages, therefore, the Han Chinese language, which is “international,” should be the main education language and medium of instruction. According to one Chinese scholar, this is further supported by “the Chinese language craze that is sweeping the world.”

The case of Xinjiang with a 62 percent minority population is illustrative. The Uyghurs, Kazaks, Mongols, Kirgiz, Xibe, and Russians have their own written language, while the Hui and the Manchurians use the Han language system. Moreover, certain groups have dual or multiple languages, such as the Uygur, Kazak and Xibe, some of whom use each other’s language as well as their own. And some groups who do not have a written language may take school examinations in the language of another national minority other than the Han. It is often the case in Xinjiang that students from different national minorities attend different schools and thus, ethnic segregation is common. This trend has many educators very concerned, and has led to a call for school desegregation. As one educator, almost echoing the 1954 Brown vs. the Board of Education Supreme Court decision in the United States, stated: “My understanding is that separate schools are detrimental to the development and improvement of national minority populations.”

Among the many advantages of desegregated schools are said to include allowing for a more healthy competition among national minorities, a concentration of educational resources and an increased possibility for teachers to become more specialized. Also, it is argued that integrated schools encourage mutual understandings and friendly relations, and help to cement unity among the nationalities. National minority students would “get a correct understanding of the strong and weak points of their own and of other nationalities...for stimulating proper ideas.”

Language is the medium for the communication of culture. Therefore, the manner in which state schooling permits minority languages is crucial for the form of ethnicity it communicates. Unlike religion, language is essential for achieving the goals of state schooling. The implementation of minority languages as a medium of instruction can increase attendance rates and strengthen socialization into national ideologies. As Regie Stites notes “What the Chinese party/state wants and needs is a bilingual education system capable of producing people who are both ethnic and expert.” Stites maps out the complex linguistic diversity of China and examines language policies and the literature on bi-lingual education in China. A great many permutations are evident in the manner in which minority and Chinese languages and scripts are organized as part of the curriculum within state schools. Four minority languages, Zhuang, Yi, Uyghur and Tibetan, are taken as examples to examine China’s efforts to develop a viable bilingual system of education. Most of those in these four language groups will spend their lives within a linguistic environment different from that of the Han Chinese majority. The Chinese state has recognized this and gone through a long historical process that taught many lessons. As Stites notes, “the history is full of mistakes. Nevertheless, the Chinese state has gone to great lengths to accommodate minority languages.” Minority language textbooks and teaching materials are available, more so than in the United States. Nevertheless, success in bilingual and literacy education for minorities will be shaped to a large extent by the politics of ethnic identity.

State Education Provision: Literacy, Basic Education and Higher Education

Although the provision of education for ethnic minorities at all levels has been increasing, most minorities are below the national average at all levels and this is especially the case with minority women. Nevertheless, national policies have attempted to correct this situation and have met with varying levels of success. In his work that conceptualizes the developmental process with
respect to minority education in different regions, Jacques Lamontagne introduces a model in which phases of the developmental process can be considered separately. His research highlights the educational disparities across regions and ethnic minorities, and then compares the patterns of increase and decrease over time. In this way, he can identify factors which facilitate or hinder the development of education in these regions. As key indicators, he chooses levels of literacy, across regions, as well as across ethnic groups and genders. His model not identifies the most literate provinces, counties, ethnic minorities and genders, but also their trajectories over time. Lamontagne is able to classify selected groups as being in either one of four phases: the low-slow phase (Salar, Tibetan Bonan, Dongxiang), low-fast phase (Achang Jingpo), high-fast phase (Jing and Mulao), and high-slow phase (Tartar, Korean, Xibe). This model of development provides rich avenues for further research.

Chinese scholars like Teng Xing provide an overview of basic education across minority regions and argues that the western regions of China, where most of China’s minority population resides, are falling behind, and that the gap between eastern and western regions is growing. He links the provision of basic education to public finance in minority areas and points to the need for further examination of the connection between economy and basic education. Government financial support to these regions is viewed as increasingly necessary, especially as the twenty-first century approaches. The growing gap between minority and Han regions could have major consequences for the survival of socialist ideology among many of China’s ethnic minorities.

The gap between minority and Han achievement in education has been especially apparent in higher education. In order to ensure national integration, ethnic minority participation at the highest levels of the education system will have to be increased. Since 1980, measures have been taken to accelerate the expansion of higher education for national minorities. Preferential policies in family planning, housing and jobs play a major role. The most important preferential policy dealing with education concerns admission into institutions of higher education. Although these policies have generated some resentment, as they have in other countries, they are viewed as necessary in order to bring minorities into the mainstream. Barry Sautman’s research points out that China is ahead of most countries in the policies and practices of preferential treatment in higher education. "The PRC has one of the oldest and largest programs of state sponsored preferential polices (youhui zhengce) for ethnic minorities." Sautman believes that preferential policies have led to a misplaced sense of identity, and points out that from 1982 to 1990 some 14 million minority people who had previously elected to be classified as Han had themselves reclassified as minority group members.

A variety of measures have been taken to increase enrollment in higher education. Nationality institutes, which mainly serve the function of training minority cadres, contain the largest proportion of ethnic minority students. Teacher training institutions have high rates of minority enrollment since they are considered critical institutions to increase the low minority student participation rates in elementary and secondary schools. In order to increase success rates in higher education, minorities may opt to take the university entrance examinations in their own language (min kao min). Taking the examination in standard Chinese (min kao han) is usually accompanied by the addition of bonus points (jia fen). For those that do gain admission to a university, preparatory classes (minzu ban, yuke ban) are often provided during the first year, especially at prestigious institutions. The system of preferential treatment is complex and detailed. Sautman’s research provides a comprehensive analysis of this massive system of preferential treatment for minorities in China’s universities. A major aim of this policy is also to increase the number of trained personnel in minority regions; however, many minorities do not return to their
home regions after graduation from universities. This pattern is on the rise as universities begin to charge tuition and do away with the job allocation system that was used in the past to ensure that students would return home after graduation.

Case Studies of Ethnic Minority Schooling

Case studies have greatly improved our understanding of important processes at work in the field of ethnic minority education. Compared with previous decades, the 1990s have seen a massive increase in the amount of quantitative data available on minority education in China. While this information has been useful in understanding the general situation, establishing patterns over time and making comparisons between groups, it has limited use in providing explanations of the processes at work in minority education. Quantitative research has not been able to capture detailed processes at work as ethnic minority communities confront state schooling, nor permit us to understand the manner in which minority students and their families come to construct the meaning of schooling within their own communities. Only by using ethnographic methods can answers be found to the question why minority children have higher dropout rates than Han students. While the available literature describes the problems of economic development in minority regions, only by employing ethnographic methods can we see the way in which locality, culture and the perceived value of schooling play a determining role in the willingness of parents to make the financial sacrifice necessary for schools fees, and at what point they would consider supporting the decision to discontinue the schooling of a child. Ethnographic methods can also provide a way of understanding where schooling fits in the constellation of national minority culture; in what respects it is a support or a threat to the preservation of minority heritage and under what conditions support for school attendance would diminish. Finally, ethnographic methods are essential for gaining an understanding of the ways in which members of national minorities deal with the identity conflicts that result from their semi sinicization through national institutions. National integration has little chance of succeeding without high rates of schools attendance. The manner in which the state uses schooling for political socialization, especially within the classroom, can be studied ethnographically.  

Steven Harrell and Ma Erzi have examined the relevance of the cultural discontinuity hypothesis for ethnic minority education in China: "the idea that linguistic and cultural boundaries or differences between the home environment of a minority group and the school environment in which they are expected to learn the values of the dominant majority were the primary cause for the poor performance by minorities." Finding this inadequate to explain the success of some (especially involuntary) minorities, they employ John Ogbu’s notion of folk theories of success: "if members of a minority hold the view that they can use education to achieve success, they devise ways to surmount the obstacles posed by cultural divergence. If they hold, on the other hand, that the education system will merely strip them of their own culture and identity without giving them equal opportunity in the wider society, they will respond with resistance." Harrell and Ma contend that most involuntary minorities hold the oppositional folk theory of success, and most voluntary minorities hold the positive folk theory. These folk theories of success, developed on the basis of perceived chances for success, permit minorities to submit themselves to state schooling for the purposes of achieving social mobility but do not necessarily validate the state’s aim of making them into compliant and subordinate citizens. From their research in Baiwu township of Sichuan province, where 92 percent of the population is Yi or Nuoso, they conclude that status is more important than ideology, and that ethnic subgroups, in this case subgroups of the Yi, have distinct differences that explain differential success in school. In this case, the success of the Mgebbu, an Yi clan, is highly attributed to their folk theories of success. Finally, they argue that
differential school success in Baiwu cannot be explained wholly in terms of cultural and linguistic difference which holds true for gender as well. 47

While folk theories of success are shown to be important determinants of an ethnic minority’s success in school, the Chinese state advances its own folk theory that Han perform better in school due to the “backwardness” (luohou) of the minorities. The prevalence of this notion is shown through the ethnographic research of Mette Halskov Hansen in her examination of the Tai of Sipsong Panna in Yunnan Province. 48 Using Harrell’s notion of “civilizing project,” she traces the history of the Tai, including the central role played by Buddhism and Buddhist temples. 49 Spencer notes that “several monasteries have started to extend education to include mathematics, Thai language (standard Thai of Thailand) and, more rarely, Chinese.” 50 This is significant in that ethnic minority attendance rates in state schools are still low, and parents often support religious institutions more than schools. If formal education is the aim, it may very well be in the interest of the state to permit formal education that combines religion with “modern education.” Moreover, the state could benefit from the having religious groups run schools because of their ability to raise funds for schools. The problem, Spencer points out, is that “Most Han Chinese cadres, teachers, and researchers in and outside Sipsong Panna continue to express negative views on the influence of Buddhist education among the Tai... Some cadres fear that because the Tai are concerned about learning their own script they run the risk of becoming ‘more backward’ than the minorities from the mountains who have always been considered the most backward.” 51 A key issue, then, concerns what the school does to minority culture, through representations, through textbooks, and through notions of backwardness. The need for multicultural education, or at least more content about a group’s cultural heritage, may be essential to foster an attachment to its schools. As Spencer remarks “All the Tai students I have talked to are (sometimes painfully) aware that they belong to what is considered a backward minority group.” 52

Although access to Tibetan regions remains an obstacle to research, the case of Tibetan education is particularly illustrative of the dilemma of ethnic education in China, as shown by Janet Upton’s research. 53 Her fieldwork in the Abba region of Sichuan provides insight into Tibetan schooling, particularly school-based Tibetan language education. The Chinese government is doing much to support mother tongue education for Tibetans, which may seem surprising given the perception of potential problems to national unity. Nevertheless, though China has done well in certain respects in the way it has handled minority language issues, it is perhaps not always as well as most Tibetans seem to want or expect. Very few Tibetans, however, advocate learning no Chinese. An increasing number of Tibetans want to learn Chinese fluently because their day to day survival, as well as access to broader occupational opportunities, depends upon it. Moreover, some would like to study as much English in school as do Han Chinese students.

In Tibetan areas of China, dual track education (Tibetan and Chinese) is generally available in the urban areas, but after the third grade most courses are taught in Chinese with only language and some Tibetan “culture” courses taught in the Tibetan language. However, there are many variations. In the Kangding area of Sichuan, for example, there are opportunities to learn all courses (science, math, history, etc.) in Tibetan up through senior middle school. Some schools offer instruction solely in the Chinese language and some offer all courses in Tibetan. There are also experimental courses that use Tibetan as the language of instruction for all the science and math subjects. These reforms began in Qinghai Province. Tibetans advocating the trial programs want to make Tibetan a language of science and modernity and a language of employment so that Tibetans can use their own language as the main form of communication, as well as increasing their
opportunities to go into higher education since they will learn better and thus perform better on the college entrance examinations. This same argument is used by those who advocate introducing Chinese in the early years, because that, too, will enable children to do better on the standardized tests. Most rural children have no chance to learn Chinese until the third or fourth grade, and their Chinese is often too poor to pass examinations. Thus, the dropout rate is high and the incentive to work hard is diminished. The trial programs have proven that the participating students do much better on tests than those not participating. Nevertheless, problems remain, including a lack of qualified teachers.

To provide a better understanding of the language issue Upton traces the history of Tibetan modern language education since 1949 though periods of development and change, including the Cultural Revolution. Her research is focused on Songpan County of Abba Prefecture, about which she provides a very detailed account of its local Tibetan language school. This account demonstrates how the school had a major influence on the surrounding community in its role as a training ground for the elite of Songpan. Regarding school textbooks, she observes: “Contrary to the rhetoric that often surfaces in Western and Tibetan-exile reports about the Tibetan language curriculum in the PRC, the textbooks in use do contain a fair amount of material drawn from Tibetan sources and relevant to Tibetan cultural life in the broad sense.” Nevertheless, she asserts that the “view of Tibetan history that is presented in the formal curriculum under the current political and cultural regime is far removed from the ‘real history’ that so many Tibetans at home and abroad currently crave.” Her research highlights an important point about multicultural and multethnic content in school lessons: “But what may come as a surprise to some readers, as it did to me, is that some of the most forceful lessons about the value of Tibetan culture can be taught to students through lessons that derive from works that are historically and culturally distant.” The implications for this mode of teaching in ethnic minority schools is an important topic for further research.

The impact of schooling on ethnic identity depends on what is taught, how it is taught, and how it is evaluated. Yet ethnic identity in China is still an official category. Nevertheless, there are some groups in China that are not recognized for what they consider themselves to be. The Minghe Monguor are not one of the official 55 minorities, except insofar as they are part of the Tu ethnic group. Perhaps because of their characterization as Tu, the Monguor do not benefit from the kind of bilingual education that the Tibetans do. Zhu Yongzhang and Kevin Stuart point to “the artificiality of the Monguor educational experience... A school in the area decreed that teachers and students must not speak Monguor. They were to only speak Chinese.” Stuart and Zhu propose that students would greatly benefit from Monguor textbooks. “There is nothing in the curriculum that reinforces this sense of [Monguor] ethnic identity... Monguor students would benefit much from bi-lingual textbooks.” This point is echoed by the Tibetan scholar Baden Nima:

For a long time we have held the misconception that the majority nationality is the main fountainhead for school curriculum. We have also believed that technological knowledge is an outcome of the majority nationality’s social development. Such reasoning creates problems for minority peoples. One is that minority nationality children become very self-abased when they find no reference to their own culture or history in school materials. When they find there is no content which can make them feel proud of being a person of their own nationality, they lose self-esteem and interest in schooling. This is reflected in the high dropout rates of minority children.
When taken together, we can argue that current research on ethnic minority education in China supports a view that despite the authoritarian character of state schooling in China, a great deal of diversity continues to exist. This diversity derives from the vast variety of cultural traditions and practices, especially in religion and language, that continue to flourish. Diversity exhibits itself in many ways. Ethnic minority religious institutions still play an important role in the lives of many minority young people, although they represent minority culture in ways that differ from that of state schooling. Diversity also exists in developmental terms as evident in the wide gap that exists in the educational attainment levels across minority groups and regions throughout China, particularly with respect to the gap between the eastern and western regions. Moreover, preferential policies in higher education bring more diversity to certain types of higher educational institutions, though the top institutions continue to be beyond the reach of most minorities.

Yet, the diversity that exists among China’s ethnic minority population does not appear to be fully reflected in the content of schooling, even though minority languages are emphasized in many regions. School curriculum in predominantly Han Chinese schools has even less of a multicultural emphasis. As the market economy leads to more Han population floating into ethnic minority regions, the chances of cultural misunderstandings will grow unless schools do more to foster a sensitivity to minority cultures. School curriculum that more accurately reflect the cultural diversity that characterizes China’s ethnic minorities might not only increase understanding among ethnic groups and conserve their cultures within the process of economic modernization, but also make state schools much more attractive to ethnic communities, thereby strengthening their identities within the national community.

NOTES


5 Frank Dikotter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992); Frank Dikotter (ed.), The Construction of Racial Identities in China
6 Tao Tao Liu and David Faure (eds.), Unity and Diversity: Local Cultures and Identities in China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996); Melissa J. Brown (ed.), Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996).

7 See Minzu jiaoyu yanjiu (Nationality Education Research), the journal of the Institute of Ethnic Minority Education of the Central University of Nationalities.

8 James Banks, Multiethnic Education, third edition (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1994).


10 Guojia minzu weiyuanhui formerly rendered its title in English as the State Nationalities Affairs Commission but later changes it to the State Ethnic Affairs Commission.

11 Between the census of 1982 and 1990, only one of China’s 55 ethnic minorities had a slower population growth rate than the Han Chinese population. The Russian growth rate of 360 percent and Manchu growth rate of 128 percent, for example, could not be accounted for only on the basis of increased birth rate or migration but rather by willingness to declare one’s ethnicity.

12 See Barry Sautman, China’s Preferential Policies (manuscript forthcoming).


15 See “Autonomy for the National Minorities of China,” in China News Analysis (Hong Kong), August 15, 1989, p.3.


18 Most books written by Western scholars about education in China virtually ignore ethnic minority education. Within China there is only one research institute that specifically focuses on the study of ethnic minority education. See for example Keith Lewin, Angela Little, Xu Hui and Zheng Jiwei, Educational Innovation in China: Tracing the Impact of the 1985 Reforms,


21 Interview with the Provincial Education Commission of Guizhou.


Zhang Guodu, “Fazhan yu jingji shitai yaoqiu xiangshiying de jiaoyu dui wo qu nongqu, bannong banmuqu jiaoyu xianzhuang wenti sikao” (Develop an Education System Suited to the Requirements of the Economic Situation Reflections on the Current State and Problems of Education in Tibet’s Agricultural and Semi-Agricultural Districts) Xizang Yanjiu (Education in Tibet) 1992:2, pp 25-34.

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