This paper suggests that a well-composed scheme of civic education does not merely predispose the citizen to political engagement, but more fundamentally, the considered systematic design of civic education parallels the essentials of both the constitutionalism and the democracy to which it gives access and control. This paper aims to draw out some of the important connections between "education" and the other two aspects of this type of regime, noting that, in this regard, a scheme of civic education prefigures (and then reinforces) a model of the citizen and a map of the domains of that citizen's knowledge and engagement. The paper discusses the American "National Standards for Civics and Government" (Center for Civic Education, 1994) and the current international project to develop a framework outlining "Education for Democratic Citizenship" and how they might be understood as reflecting a whole theory or theories about the constitutional universe in which they would operate. According to the paper, the model of citizenship and the map of the domains of civic engagement that the published "Standards" and the draft Framework describe and/or propose would first be extracted. The paper suggests that the "Standards" culminate in the part which questions the roles of the citizen in American civic life. It then focuses on the 5-part version of the Framework, which sets its goal as generating an understanding of democracy from first principles and is organized as a logical sequence so that its structure itself communicates important dimensions of democracy. (Contains 6 references and a model of the 5-part framework.) (BT)
Domains of Civic Engagement in a Constitutional Democracy.

by Will Harris
A well-composed scheme of civic education does not merely predispose the citizen to political engagement, preparing one for civic life. It is not simply a useful supplement to a properly functioning constitutional democracy. More fundamentally, the considered systematic design of civic education parallels the essentials of both the constitutionalism and the democracy to which it gives access and control.

The overall combination of education, constitutionalism, and democracy, through its intermingling of primal components of knowledge, order, and power in the authoritative engagement of the citizen in civic life, produces a distinctive type of regime that is not fully specified without mentioning all three of these aspects of its complex form. In short, a well-composed scheme of civic education is not only necessitated by the theoretical logic of both constitutionalism and democracy, separately. It must be sustained by an internal logic of its own. And as such its full-blown existence would properly amend the regime type, adding as much to constitutional democracy as democracy and constitutionalism add to each other.

Each of these facets of the complex political form — education, constitutionalism, and democracy, understood systematically on its own terms — anticipates important principles of the others. For example: the fundamental commitment of constitutional order to popular comprehensibility or the invocation of popular sovereignty in constitutional ratification (for elaboration, see my arguments in The Interpretable Constitution, 1993), or the affinity of democracy for the wholeness and generality also associated with constitutionalism (see, e.g., Charles H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern, 1947).

One of the purposes of this paper to draw out some of the important connections
between “education” and the other two aspects of this type of regime. In this regard, a scheme of civic education prefigures (and then reinforces) a model of the citizen and a map of the domains of that citizen’s knowledge and engagement. Such an understanding is an order of magnitude beyond the valuable observation that an effective civic education mediates between the person and larger wholes like community or commonwealth.

"Citizenship" does not arise from the dictionary, with its definition complete. It is not only the peculiarly well-tailored artifact of the provisions of the constitutional system and the structure of democratic polity — in the conventional Aristotelian sense. But far more particularly and practically, it is the derivative of the scheme of civic education, of the transformation of persons into governors of themselves and others through the efficacy of their knowledge of public matters and through their capacity in the domains in which they direct the use of this knowledge. Nor are these domains pre-set in some prior understanding of “civicsness” or politicalness, however much they may be implicated in part by a rigorous theory of constitutionalism or of democracy, as I have suggested and will later elaborate.

Any assessment of the extent to which citizens are, or ought to be, engaged in civic and political life should take into account these fundamental preliminary questions about the appropriate model of citizenship itself and the proper domains of engagement.

There are two important objections to common understandings at stake here. One is that a program of civic education that aspires to a serious sort of systematicalness and normativeness is not simply a tool for more active or effective engagement: It is constitutive of citizenship itself — paralleling, supplementing, or conflicting with other sources of standards for the concept and practice of citizenship (e.g., arising from constitutionalism or democracy). The second is that the domains of civic engagement are not sufficiently characterized by participation simply in the processes of elections or government and in the activities of civil society: They are configured (for full, practical citizenship) into zones of attentive awareness, levels of intellectual intensity, and places for consequential questioning that are mapped out by the habits, knowledge, and skills cultivated by such a well-composed scheme of civic education.

The articulation of standards for education in this field, therefore, would be expected to hold profound implications for the nature of the polity in which this schooling is to take place. Thus the American National Standards for Civics and Government (Center for Civic Education, 1994) and the current international project to develop a framework outlining “Education for Democratic Citizenship” might be understood as reflecting a whole theory or theories about the constitutional universe in which they would operate.

To perceive such a theory or theories is not a matter of determining what overt political commitments (e.g., preferences for democracy or constitutional limitations, expectations for state-federal relations) these standards might be making, however many of these there may in fact properly be. The point is to go deeper than a description of the type of polity or substantive political values contained in the Standards or Framework. What is the nature of the overall constitutional order that is implicated by the specified habits of mind, objects of focus, and aspects of knowledge laid out or presupposed by the Standards or Framework? If a political form were projected solely (and only in one direction) from this strategy and composition of civic knowledge, what would it look like in its essential contours? (I sometimes ask my students in university courses on Constitutional Theory to imagine that
they have found only a single textual artifact of a constitutional polity — often the presumably well-known American system — and then to construct a broader sketch of the whole order using only that artifact. This would be such an enterprise of interpretation and construction.)

I propose that the first stage of such an undertaking would involve extracting the model of citizenship and the map of the domains of civic engagement that the published Standards and the draft Framework describe and/or presuppose.

National Standards for Civics and Government

The voluntary National Standards for the United States, published in 1994 by the Center for Civic Education, have been translated and republished in many other national contexts, but they have not been given much of a broader theoretical interpretation or analysis beyond the already attentively conceptual rigor and self-conscious structure embodied in the text itself.

The Analytical Organization. In the five-part organization of the National Standards for Civics and Government, the structure, character, and processes of the American system of politics and government occupy the central position (Part III). But this focus (the conventional preoccupation of previous views of American civics education) is preceded by two parts which, first, develop the concept of civic life and a political order along with the establishment of forms of government in a general sense (Part I) and, second, set out the constitutional foundations of the distinctive American form of government (Part II). The focus on American politics is then followed by two parts which move beyond it, first, by extending the view to the world arena (Part IV) and, second, by concentrating on the perspective of the individual citizen as the most basic constituent of a political order (Part V).

Just as the very concept of civic life in Part I serves as the most fitting beginning for a broader framework of deliberative intelligence and critical understanding about civics and government, the concept of citizenship in Part V provides the culmination of an educational enterprise which would cultivate reflective and efficacious shareholders in a constitutional democracy. And Parts II and IV place American politics in context in different ways, the one by giving the institutions and processes a more solid grounding in constitutional foundations and the other by giving these institutions and processes the broader horizon of international relations.

Throughout this overall arrangement and within each of the parts, the goal is to establish a set of categories in which political values and actions can be comprehended and argued about in a spirit of inquiry and deliberation, beyond the recitation of conventional wisdom, the appeal to ready-made ideology, and the invocation of casual opinion.

In addition to their self-conscious structure, the five parts of the Standards are connected to each other in content by echoing certain basic questions, in an effort to provide additional angles of view on the material of each Part from the perspective of the other Parts. Thus, different analytical “cuts” can be made through the Standards in a variety of schemes for cross-referencing which would accentuate alternative major themes across the five Parts; e.g,
the nature of constitutionalism, the status of rights, the allocation of power, the channeling of participation, the relationship between principles and processes.

The Fundamental Concepts. The most general concept of the Standards is the idea of civic life. This idea is the larger universe of the Standards as a field of subject matter and as a discipline — the space laid out when separate individuals are assembled, theoretically or historically, in an association to produce the collective dimension of a political order. This is the arena of civic existence where the place for discourse and action concerning the things held in common by a community is separated from the private or purely personal sphere of human life.

Further, this space must be configured into a distinctive political order, or form of government — a form which is created by arranging the elements of politics, such as power, participation, and rights, so that public life takes on the authoritative regularities of established processes and habits of practice. Forms of government give structure to public life so that coherent political discussion and activity can be directed toward identifying and addressing the possibilities or problems of a community's existence.

In this most basic sense, civic life can take many political and governmental forms. And one of the surest means to understand one's own political order is to conceive of it as an alternative among other options. The most basic distinctions among these varieties arise from the questions of how to make the transformation from individual to collective and where to draw the line between public and private. At its simplest, the first distinction produces the alternatives of political orders based on reason and consent versus those imposed by accident and force. And the second distinction provides the range of forms of government that are limited versus those that are unlimited. The term “constitutional government” is used in the Standards to designate limited political orders whose authority is established by consent. Sometimes the word “constitutionalism” is used for this concept, which is set out as differing crucially from forms of government that purport to have a “constitution” but do not produce limited power whose authority is based on consent of the governed.

At the next level of particularity, among the several possible varieties of limited government (e.g., social democracy, constitutional monarchy), the United States has established a constitutional democracy (or, more properly, “liberal democracy”). The liberalism of liberal democracy derives from the word's association with liberty, and democracy arises from the root meaning of rule by the people. And so, liberal democracy, as a form of constitutional government, further extends the concept of limited power by providing for individual rights and freedoms in the normal operations of governing. And it elaborates on the idea of popular consent by incorporating democratic participation and accountability in the everyday processes of determining how to achieve the common good.

The political order called liberal democracy is, therefore, a hybrid one. And combining these two major components creates a tension of commitments to fundamental values (like individual worth versus equal membership, or the right to be treated differently versus the right to be treated similarly) which often complement each other but at times generate conflicts about what the government should do to accommodate its most foundational commitments, while effectively carrying out the purposes for which it is instituted. The need to deliberate simultaneously at the level of honoring constitutional principles and at the level of formulating effective policy marks the fullest character of a citizen of the liberal democracy.
founded on the Constitution of the United States. Thinking constitutionally and acting effectively become the two aspects of a rich conception of American citizenship which is itself a political hybrid of self-protective public-spiritedness.

The most important objective implicit in these Standards is to enhance the multi-dimensionality of how this citizen thinks about civics and government, while increasing the efficacy of what this citizen does as a participant in the nation’s civic life.

The Model of the Citizen. It is evident that the Standards culminate in the fifth part, labeled with the question, “What are the roles of the citizen in American civic life?” One could profitably summarize this section to produce the text’s account of citizenship, a conceptualization that could only have come after the grounding and specification that is provided by the four earlier parts. In many important respects, this section on citizenship is the point of the whole undertaking of the Standards.

Still, the nature of the citizen is to be found not only in the account portrayed in Part V of the Standards — considering that this section is itself part of what is to be learned and deliberated upon in the educational regime of this text. More important is the citizen to be produced by the learning and the deliberation. The character of this political personage is that of a Constitutional Citizen, one whose values are inscribed by the fundamental principles of the American constitutional order but who is also capable of fixing those principles in the mind, then providing a reasoned endorsement and interpretation, and/or a proposed reform or revision of them. And all of these potential phases are to be carried out not merely to suit the thoughtful standards of the specific citizen alone but also to be commended to fellow citizens for their mutual consideration as an essential kind of political engagement in itself — for there is a strong implication that the constitutional order is a self-watching and self-correcting system capable in extraordinary circumstances of internal self-reformation.

Such a constitutional citizen is not defined as the subject of a government; a consumer of values, benefits, or products; a viewer casually observing the public spectacle of governance; a customer of public services; or even a payer of taxes; although citizenship might at times overlap with any of these. What is most distinctive about the “citizenship” of the Standards is the layering of levels of political capacity into the “office” of the citizen, as one who:

(a) can function fully in the political system, choosing those or seeking to become one of those who make and apply the laws;

(b) can use and protect one’s rights, being able to do things he or she could not do alone;

(c) can monitor governmental officials, political processes, and policy options knowingly, as one of the owners in common of the constitutional order, in order to assure fidelity to fundamental principles;

(d) can reflect on the meaning of constitutional principles and advocate the adoption by other citizens of one’s considered interpretations;
(d) can maintain the political system, taking care of institutions (not just promoting preferred policy themes) as one of their trustees, by keeping it true to its fundamental principles through one’s use of powers provided by the system;

(e) can change the system in concert with other citizens so that it is better adapted to the purposes of constitutional democracy and the people’s well-being — if necessary, fashioning new constitutional values if the current set are not worthy of one’s attachment;

(f) and, because of the ability to understand how to change the political system in accordance with standards for better constitutions, can serve as well to reaffirm its principles and structure in times of uncertainty and challenge.

The model of American constitutional citizenship must be as extensive and as well-grounded as the constitutional order itself (see Endnote on the Oath of Citizenship). Choosers, policy advocates, office-holders, users of rights, monitors of government, institutional protectors, constitutional interpreters, constitutional amenders, constitution-makers: In short, in the well-composed educational regime of a durable constitutional democracy, individuals learn not only to serve as both citizens and leaders. They also have the persistent capacity to be founders or constitution-makers. And, however seldom this capacity may be used wholesale at the level of the American polity itself, it remains available as the undergirding of a constitutional order that traces its ultimate authority to its being founded by an act of popular sovereignty. Moreover, this capacity for founding and constitution-making does show up frequently in the aptitude of American constitutional citizens for designing and establishing ordered collectivities and institutional enterprises at all other levels of the society (e.g., commercial, professional, religious, educational).

The Standards seem to have come to terms with the proposition that a narrower or more parsimonious or truncated concept of American citizenship would undermine the theory on which the entire constitutional order stands and through which it revives itself. It is fitting, in this regard, to recall that the constitutional founders at the end of the eighteenth century believed that the order they had constituted could “heal” itself of the diseases of historical political degeneration, described by the classical political writers, if they had produced a system where evolutionary changes in either the constitution or its People or in the people and their Constitution — could be accommodated and reflected in the other.

Education for Democratic Citizenship: A Framework

The ongoing project by the Center for Civic Education to produce a framework for “Education for Democratic Citizenship” is international — or cross-national — in its purpose, aiming for a level of abstraction that would make it instructive for democratic polities anywhere, without giving up the theoretical rigor that makes democracy a distinctive political form that needs to be chosen and designed in contrast with other types of regime.

There will be two versions of the Framework, designated the “Seven-Part” (the more discursive in its organizational sequence) and the “Five-Part” (the more theoretical in its strategy). Both of these versions are currently being developed, but their underlying
structures seem to be pretty well settled upon. I will focus on the Five-Part version here, using the Oct. 1, 1997, draft that was made available on the Internet for international commentary (www.civiced.org).

The Logic of the Five-Part Model. The Five-Part version of the Framework, which sets its goal as generating an understanding of democracy from first principles, is organized as a logical sequence so that its structure itself communicates important dimensions of democracy (see Diagram, “Model of the Five-Part Outline”), so that the question “What is Democracy?” prompts an inquiry at all five of the levels it has laid out:

I. THE WORLD: The Transnational Context of Human Rights, the Open Society, and Political Order
II. THE PEOPLE: The Foundation of Political Community and Government
III. THE POLITY: The Ordering of Civic Life, Politics, and Political Systems
IV. THE GOVERNMENT: The Formal Institutions and Processes for Public Affairs
V. THE CITIZEN: The Principal Actor

Civic education would not just concern each of these levels as part of its instructional subject matter. It would, as well, take place at each of these levels, with a particular style, structure, and substance appropriate to each.

As shown by the Model of the Five-Part Outline (also included as part of my paper for the 1997 International Conference on “Democracy and Rule of Law” in Schwerin, Germany: “Rule of Law and Government by the People: The Evolution of Their Connection”), each of the first four domains is inclusive of the domains within it — e.g., the broader Polity of public deliberation includes the more institutionalized Government — but it is important not to identify Government, in reverse, as entirely subsuming Polity. The Model labels the crucial conceptual distinctions that rest on the theoretical separations and overlaps that take place with each bounding of the more politically focused domains of democracy.

Most significantly for purposes of understanding democratic citizenship (the stated subject of the Framework), the Fifth Part — “The Citizen: The Principle Actor” — is set out in the Model as embracing all of the first four domains. And, though listed (cumulatively) last and therefore reliant on the nature and development of the others, it is the broadest domain, existing somewhat outside the others in the Model. Thus the part (citizen) contains the whole (all five domains of democracy).

I would emphasize both the dependence of citizenship on the other domains of democracy (it hardly exists as a natural phenomenon independent of the political dimension of human existence), as well as its more comprehensive status than any of the other domains. In fact, the Citizen is portrayed explicitly by the Five-Part Outline (and the Model) as a layering of interactions in each of the five domains, comprising “[r]elations with (a) the World; (b) the
People as a whole; (c) the Polity; (d) the Government; (e) other individual Citizens” (cited from the Model, see Diagram).

As the draft text of the Outline puts it, in the form of an inquiry:

What is the importance of the citizen’s relationship to

1. The World? (e.g., awareness of one’s relationship to humanity and to transnational standards of civilization, attention to the status of constitutional democracy in other countries)

2. The sovereign People? (e.g., an individual’s consciousness of membership in the polity, contribution to the society, having a stake in sovereignty, civic pride, the right to leave or renounce citizenship)

3. The overall political system? (e.g., patriotism, loyalty to fundamental constitutional values and principles, civic activism and attentiveness to public affairs, withdrawal of consent to constitutional arrangements and the right to propose new ones)

4. Governmental institutions? (e.g., participating, monitoring and influencing the use of governmental authority, assessing performance of government, evaluating proposals for institutional reform, opposing the exercise of governmental power inconsistent with constitutional restraints)

5. Other citizens? (e.g., civility, tolerance, respect for rights, fulfillment of responsibilities, discussion and mutual deliberation, cooperation, skepticism and wariness, trust, holding each other accountable, competitiveness)

This conceptualization of the Citizen should help move the idea away from the identification of “citizenship” with legal status or an exclusive preoccupation with the relationship between citizens and governmental institutions — and, along with this, the expansion of the understanding of democracy also as fitly comprising all of these domains.

As would be appropriate in the movement from national standards to an international framework, many of the dimensions of constitutional citizenship implicit or dispersed in the American Standards have been consolidated into an overt theoretical proposition about the nature of democratic citizenship, explicitly incorporating domains that would arise from a comprehensive understanding of democracy. The effect is both to provide a broader framework than the American Standards and to aspire to a more abstract view of the Citizen that can be used as a model against which to assess the practical accounts of citizenship set forth for any existing political system, including that of the United States.

The Domains of Civic Engagement. The logic of the Five-Part Model of the Framework, therefore, adds a more comprehensive picture of the domains of democratic citizenship,
incorporating the layering of levels of the functions or "roles" of the citizen provided less systematically in the Standards, but moving beyond the portrayal there to project a more strategically designed theory of the Citizen itself as the focus of education, constitutionalism, and democracy.

In this model, for instance, the citizen's interactions with fellow citizens are not just helpfully supplemental to a more confined understanding of democracy as centering on government-to-individual relations; and one's relations with society more broadly are not just preliminary to a person's engagement in political processes. An account of each of the five domains, on its own terms as well as in respect to their overlaps and interactions, is understood to be essential to a well-ordered concept of the Citizen in a constitutional democracy. Without these essential dimensions, citizenship — as well as civic education, constitutionalism, and democracy — would be theoretically impoverished.

The strategic layering and sequencing of this model of Citizenship, however, also lays out the practical domains of civic engagement, suggesting a much more complex inquiry into this subject than is usually understood or carried out. A well-composed scheme of civic education would dispose a person to think and act in each of these domains of engagement, cultivating a capacity to reason and participate effectively across all five.

And yet this layering and multiplicity suggests more subtle inquiries as well. What are the relationships among the domains of engagement? In what ways do these structurally distinct opportunities for engagement in the several domains reinforce or detract from each other? Surely, in some important cases, the variety of the domains may provide alternatives for individual citizens to choose to emphasize. In other instances, the options of domains may distract from effective engagement. In still others, the relationship among the domains may provide an appropriate sequencing of engagement, moving toward the center (Government) or the periphery (World).

Or to focus in some areas may be to choose not to focus on others. And thoughtful appraisers of civic engagement should perceive that even some kinds of withdrawal or disengagement would make sense — from an apt perspective on democratic citizenship itself — in terms of this broader picture of Citizenship, as long as the withdrawal is not from all of the domains.

Citizenship for the Federalists and the Antifederalists. In the American case, it would not be surprising to realize that adherents of the two great paradigmatic constitutional traditions — succeeding from Federalist and Antifederalist founders of the period of constitutional framing — would focus their understandings of citizenship with more emphasis on different domains.

With their gradually evolving concept of a "constitution" as making a whole People as well as designing the broader Polity (occupying the position of John Locke's Social Compact or Thomas Hobbes's Covenant of every one with every one else; see, e.g., Alexander Hamilton in Fed. No. 84), the picture of the appropriate citizen in the Federalist Papers is one of a person of theoretical moderation who can weigh the welfare of the whole American people and constitute a national future. But there is little enough commitment to an intense or even particularly attentive participation on the part of individual citizens in the day-to-day
conduct of governmental institutions. And so, some critics declare that the authors of the *Federalist* are not sufficiently "democratic," not seeing the extraordinary appeal to popular understanding as the very basis for the constitutional order itself.

With their understanding of a "constitution" as establishing a contract between an already existing people and their government (occupying the position of Locke's "second" governmental contract with the majority of the society; see, e.g., James Winthrop, "The Letters of 'Agrippa,'" in *The Antifederalist*), where politics itself is understood to be the natural condition of human beings, the focus of citizenship is on controlling Governmental institutions and the enhancing activist creation of public policy. Clearly, this may be the basis for a richer practical notion of democratic citizenship in one of its proper domains, but some of the Antifederalists, at least, had a very low opinion of the people's capacity for constitution-making (see, e.g., "The Letters of 'Centinel,'" in *The Antifederalist*), and a predisposition against constitutional interpretation (in the domain of the form of the Polity) as a formal enterprise independent of regular elections for government officials, or as a subject matter distinct from publicly citing separate words in a legalistic Constitutional document (see *The Interpretable Constitution* for a more thorough treatment of this).

Adding to this mix, the difference between the Federalists' commitment that the form of political order can be artificially composed by reflection and choice (the product of theory) and the Antifederalists' belief that political institutions occur naturally and improve through evolution (the consequence of history) yields fundamentally distinct understandings of what citizens can effectively think about and do in the realm of civic life.

The United States has the complicated good fortune to have had both of these theoretical paradigms exist comprehensively and simultaneously, making for a complex and sometimes apparently confused intellectual understanding of the American constitutional order. But the regular (and rarely self-conscious) interplay of these paradigms — from the levels of citizen conversation all the way to formal constitutional interpretation — has supplied intellectual resources for constitutional and political problem-solving when either of the two theoretical regimes by itself might have come up short.

The competing Federalist and Antifederalist paradigms have also enriched the concept of citizenship by playing off each other in a constitutional order where disputatious accommodation of fundamentally different understandings about how to achieve the founding of a political system that served both liberty and the common good was part of what would hold the enterprise together.

Given such an explanation of the American experience, moreover, it should be expected that the establishment or development of practical democratic arrangements in other countries would reflect a variety of emphases among the domains of civic engagement.

It should still remain the case, however, that a full theory of practical citizenship in a constitutional democracy must comprise all five of the domains whether it is as yet realized in actual instances or not.

Until then, citizenship will be incomplete in extant systems of constitutionalism and democracy. But the concept of the Citizen need not remain incomplete, in this way or for so long, in existing systems of civic education.
The text which I have proposed for a new Oath of Citizenship for the naturalization of new citizens of the United States is intended to reflect the close relationship between American constitutionalism and citizenship:

Devoted to liberty and dedicated to the common good, today I join the sovereign self-governing People of the United States of America.

Solemnly, freely, and without any mental reservation, I renounce all previous political obligations.

I pledge full faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. To this end, I promise to support and defend the Constitution — to preserve its fundamental principles and to protect its democratic institutions.

I will abide by the laws of the United States and of the State in which I live.

And I will respect the rights and well-being of my fellow Americans.

Such a new oath would track the conceptual outlines of the Constitution itself, incorporating the fundamental dimensions of the Constitution’s authority and meaning. It would replicate the constitutional founding in the making of each new citizen. And the educational initiatives for what candidates for citizenship should know (and be tested on) could then be correlated with the elements of the oath itself, so that the required knowledge and conceptual skills would parallel the logic of the oath. The effect would be to “constitutionalize” rather than to “Americanize” persons in the course of making them citizens. This would further distinguish the American theory of citizenship from that of other nations which focused on a single ethnicity or a uniform culture — a distinction that has its basis in the 14th Amendment’s radical new design for citizenship in the mid-1800s.

REFERENCES


EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: A Framework

MODEL of The Five-Part Outline

A response to the question "What is Democracy?" requires an inquiry at all five of the levels set out below. These are different levels on which to construct and explain civic life and political community; to reflect and decide about the design of a constitutional order; to argue about fundamental principles; and to participate in public affairs. Each domain of inquiry -- signified by the rectangles below -- is inclusive of the regions within it; e.g., the polity includes the government, but it is more, embracing civil society at large and including the principles by which civil society is distinguished from government. Thus, for instance, it should be clear from the model that, although an effective representative government may approximate a well-founded constitutional polity, it is only an approximation and there is much more to public affairs than the activity of government. Likewise for the other divisions.

I. THE WORLD [Human rights; open society]

II. THE PEOPLE [Civic life; political community]

III. THE POLITY [Constitutionalism; rule by the People]

IV. THE GOVERNMENT [Public policy; participation]

- Contract with Gov't

  (Distinction between governmental and non-governmental public affairs -- civil society)

- Constitution-Making

  (Distinction between public and private)

- The Social Compact

  (Distinction between humanitarian and political)

V. THE CITIZEN [Relations with: (a) the World; (b) the People as a whole; (c) the Polity; (d) the Government; (e) other individual Citizens]
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