This study traces the evolution of Quincy Junior College, the third largest community college in Massachusetts, from its founding in 1956 to the present. As one of two municipal two-year colleges in the nation, Quincy presents an interesting case study of how a community college fared under city school board governance. This dissertation explores Quincy's history, the movement from individual control, clashes of organizational culture between the college and school system, and factors that ultimately forced the college's separation. Chapters include the following: (1) Introduction; (2) Related Literature; (3) Individual Leadership and Control: 1948-1986; (4) The Institution Comes of Age: 1985-1991; (5) Struggle Towards Resolution: 1991-1996; (6) Divergent Paths: An Analysis of Change at Quincy College; and (7) Implications: The Road Not Taken. An epilogue reviews events occurring from 1996 and 1997, such as the college's re-accreditation and the layoff of many of the college's senior leaders. Appended are enrollment statistics, and three charts illustrating Quincy's history. (Contains 74 references). (EMH)
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THE ROAD NOT TAKEN:
THE EVOLUTION OF A MUNICIPAL JUNIOR COLLEGE

A dissertation
by
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The Road Not Taken:
The Evolution of a Municipal Junior College

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Abstract

When Quincy Junior College was formed in 1956, most two-year colleges were sponsored by local school boards. But times have changed dramatically. Until recently, Quincy College has been the only public junior college in the country to remain under the control of a city school board. It is now one of two municipal two-year colleges in the nation. In this regard, Quincy represents the road not taken for municipal junior colleges.

The study that follows traces the evolution of this college from a small 13th and 14th grade program to become the third largest community college in the state. In so doing, it focuses on governance decisions made by and for the college, and analyzes the individual, organizational and political factors which kept it under school board control for so long, but which finally forced its separation from the school system.

During its early years, the college was dominated by a series of strong, sometimes charismatic individuals. As it grew, and as it fought the restrictions of individual control and the constraints of the public school system, severe organizational strains developed. As time passed, conflicts over leadership, culture, and control of the college’s growing resources came to dominate college activity. Ultimately, the college’s increasing wealth and the president’s attempts to resolve the organizational conflicts through the involvement of outside agencies led to a resolution in the political arena -- with decidedly political results.

The study analyzes this movement from individual control, through emerging bureaucracy and organizational stress, to the final political solution. It considers issues of organizational stress related to growth and the accumulation of resources, clashes of organizational culture between the college and school system, and other factors that ultimately forced the college’s separation.

The study also cites Quincy College as an example of how other two-year colleges might have fared under school board control, postulating that cultural and political factors would have led, over time, to increasing conflict between the colleges and their parent school systems.
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THE ROAD NOT TAKEN

Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth;

Then took the other, as just as fair,
And having perhaps the better claim
Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
Though as for that the passing there
Had worn them really about the same,

And both that morning equally lay
In leaves no step had trodden black.
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
I doubted if I should ever come back.

I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I --
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.

Robert Frost

Doctoral dissertations are not for the fainthearted, at least for mid-career working professionals. They require time, energy, commitment bordering on obsession, and the firm belief that the end result will be worth it. I will leave for others to debate the question of whether the process of the doctoral dissertation, or the doctorate, should be constructed as it is. But for the adult student -- with a job to maintain, bills to pay, a family to support, a spouse to help and communicate with (occasionally), children to parent, and the complications of modern life to sort through, and without the luxury of being able to devote anything like full time to the process -- the doctoral dissertation is a daunting challenge. I better understand now than I did when this began why so many who complete their coursework, with all the work and expense that implies, still fail to complete this final requirement. I suspect that, like myself, a disproportionate number of these dropouts have many other responsibilities to attend to, and that the end, ultimately, fails to justify
the means. The late night and weekend work can strain both relationships and realities of time, energy and commitment. This being the case, it is not hard to see how much support is needed by an individual embarked on such a task, and how much that task might draw in others. Certainly I have had this support, and my activities have had this kind of impact on those around me. These include the following:

First, I am indebted to the members of my Dissertation Committee. If this body had consisted of the evil egos I have heard stories about, I would probably have retired to a secluded mountainside by now, there to shun human contact for the rest of eternity. Fortunately, my committee -- Philip Altbach, Howard London, Gary Yee, and Ted Youn -- have been thoughtful and supportive throughout, understanding their roles not as creating additional hurdles or showcasing their own extensive knowledge, but rather as providers of counsel and guidance. Sometimes support includes the wisdom of maintaining distance. For the consideration shown by my committee in displaying both wisdom and knowledge, I am most appreciative.

This has been particularly true of Ted Youn, chair of the committee and my adviser from the time I arrived, who has been extremely helpful both in his commentary and support, and in (gasp!) functioning as a true committee chair -- spearheading the committee's efforts, arranging logistics, making decisions, communicating with all concerned, and providing leadership to the entire process. According to the word on the street, this kind of leadership displayed on a dissertation committee (which, after all, serves no function within the university hierarchy or structure) is almost unheard of. I am extremely grateful to have been its beneficiary.

I also owe debts outside the university. Many friends and associates from Quincy College, as well as many strangers, were extremely helpful in providing formal and background information concerning the college's activities -- both recent and long past. These friends and acquaintances are too numerous to mention, and might not choose to be mentioned, but you know who you are. Other friends have been uniformly supportive and sympathetic, both of which were required at different points. I appreciate everyone's help and support.

The Community Training and Assistance Center, where I have worked full time during most of the
past seven years, has also been flexible and supportive. Had I not been able to take days off at certain
points, leave early at others, and generally adjust my work schedule to meet deadlines, I might have been a
victim of logistics that were too complicated to work through. As it was, from the Center director to board
members to individual colleagues (some of whom had recently been through a similar process) my place of
work has been supportive, flexible and understanding. Work deadlines and requirements themselves have
not always cooperated, but within the constraints of having to get a job done, I have been most fortunate to
have this flexibility.

Lastly, and most importantly, my family has adjusted its life to accommodate mine. Not completely,
certainly, but substantially over the past years. When I have said “But I have to work” they have (usually)
allowed me to do so. Had they not, I would never have finished. Furthermore, they have put up with the
results of my frustrations -- reflected in extra levels of crankiness -- more than, I am sure, they would have
liked. Not all of this was related to working on the dissertation, of course, but more than enough was.
Therefore to my wife, Fran, and to my kids Jenny and Julie, I say a very heartfelt thank you. Yes, there is
life after a doctoral program. Yes, I can play a game this evening.
1. Background

In 1989, community colleges enrolled 35.8% of all college students, including 44.3% of all college Freshmen and women. As of 1993, 45% of the undergraduate students in America were students in two year institutions -- 39% of all students in the country, graduate and undergraduate.\(^1\) Over time, these students have become increasingly and disproportionately students of color, older, and with lower family income; they are primarily non-residential and are more likely than students at other institutions to be the first in their families to attend any college.\(^2\)

These figures not only illustrate the extent to which two-year institutions are a force in higher education, but begin to suggest the differences between public two-year colleges and other institutions of higher education. While all colleges share common traits, the conditions and organizational cultures at two year colleges differ substantially from other institutions. Among these conditions are the lack of residential students, in most cases, the preponderance of "non-traditional" students, the differing faculty requirements and attitudes, the relatively short histories of most two-year colleges, the circumstances of their creation and the uncertainty over purposes, and the distinct lack of the kind of history and traditions that so strongly influence many four-year colleges and universities.

While a considerable body of literature exists on the nature of organizations and the nature of decision-making in organizations, very little focuses on two-year colleges. Much of the organizational literature is based on economics and the marketplace, and focuses on business decisions. Some studies have been done on the structure of institutions of higher education, and on the decision-making processes at these institutions. Of these, most have focused either on universities or on traditional four-year colleges; few have been conducted on public two year institutions, or indeed, any two year college. Given the large numbers of students enrolled, and the funds expended on two-year colleges, there is a need for greater understanding of how these colleges have grown, how they make decisions, and how they function.
2. The Research Problem

The focus of this study is a major institutional decision at a two-year public college. The decision, which was more than 30 years in the making and which is still being implemented, is one of governance: the decision of the last school system-sponsored two year college in the state, and in the nation, to remove itself from the auspices of the city school committee and create a new governing board. The questions the study focuses on concern how this decision was shaped and determined, who the principal actors were, and why they acted as they did.

The purpose of the study is not to illustrate statistically the overall effects of community and two-year colleges, but rather to illustrate the roots of this major decision and the forces that shaped it, and to extrapolate to other institutions with similar roots. How did Quincy College choose, and how might the same forces have affected, and continue to affect, similarly formed institutions? Given the particular purposes, constraints, culture and conditions that shaped municipally-sponsored community colleges, why have they done what they have done?

Research Questions

While the institution in question was and is uniquely situated, the study addresses questions that also relate more broadly to other two-year institutions.

When did institutional governance become defined as a problem? Why and by whom?

Which factors most influenced the making and implementing of this institutionally critical decision -- why did the institution make the decision(s) that it did?

To what extent was the ultimate decision shaped by individuals or individual conflict, organizational structure issues, or the political environment in which it was made?

To what extent did the unique characteristics of two year colleges impact the decision in ways different from what might be expected at four year colleges and universities?

What may be learned regarding the unique characteristics of community colleges and the applicability of current theories of organizational decision-making? How well do these theories explain this decision?
Herbert Simon, one of the early influences on the growth of organizational theory, proposes five areas for further study that look "especially promising" in his 1986 essay, Decision Making and Problem Solving. One of these is "[d]ecision making in organizational settings, which is much less well understood than individual decision making and problem solving." This can be studied "with great profit using already established methods of inquiry, especially through intensive long range studies within individual organizations." In addition, Simon describes setting agendas and framing problems as "poorly understood processes," and notes that it is "conflicts in values...and inconsistencies in belief" that make decision making in the organizational setting such a complex matter. Along these lines, this study addresses this need for understanding, not just knowing the results of, the decision-making process.

Theoretical Bases:

The study considers the actions and events surrounding this institutional decision in light of two bodies of theoretical literature.

Higher Education and the Community College: The first theoretical basis for the case is literature related to institutions of higher education in general and the community college in particular. The study considers the industry of higher education -- the cultural norms and structural conditions that differentiate this industry from others and make it unique -- and the particular nature of the two year community college, an institution that has been, and remains, both within the spectrum of academic institutions and substantially different and separate, with its own norms, aspirations and culture.

The nature of the higher education institution is often described as being "loosely coupled," (Weick) such that individual units of a particular institution are more adaptable to the outside environment than others, causing organizational stress but allowing departmental adaptation to different aspects of the environment. Organizational adaptability is an issue in the subset of academe -- the two year public college -- that has experienced such dramatic growth during the past several decades, and particularly for an organization that has grown as much as Quincy College. Similarly, the nature of the industry of higher education, characterized as prestige driven rather than product driven (Clark), and the related tendencies towards organizational aspiration or isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, Youn and Loscocco) are also
important in considering Quincy College. Finally, it is important to consider the cultural history of American higher education, which stretches back well beyond the founding of the country itself. The collegial structure and foundation of the university -- far different from the structure of the public school -- has been an important factor in Quincy College’s history.

Similarly, the literature on community colleges also supports the analysis of this particular institution. Community colleges are often discussed as though they exist in multiple clouds of confusion: the first cloud is confusion over the purpose for the formation of community colleges. Though the community college is recent and its history is short, this founding purpose is nevertheless much debated. The second cloud has to do with function: do community colleges have a primarily academic function, offering broad access and transferring students on to four-year institutions, or should they be primarily vocational, training people to qualify for better jobs and serving to support the growth of industry and the economy? Should they be community-, business-, or academically-oriented? A third cloud of confusion surrounds the effects of the institution. After arguing the intent of the college -- to provide access or to winnow the field of those who progress by providing the appearance of access -- there is still the question of what community colleges accomplish. Whatever their founding intent, do they serve to create avenues of advancement for under-served populations, or to close them off? These questions and others are explored in the following chapter, and provide a theoretical basis for this study.

Organizational Decision-Making: The history of Quincy College is intimately linked with its governance structure -- a structure which was common in the 1950's but which Quincy is the only college in the nation to have retained into the 1990's, and which has obsessed the college for most of the intervening years. Because of the importance of the governance decision, the second theoretical basis is provided by literature on institutional decision-making. This literature is divided, for the purposes of this study, into several subsets. Following a consideration of rational choice in decision-making, which serves as both the starting place for decision-making theory and the (unstated) frame of reference for the public and the press, the study considers three differing bodies of theory on who actually makes or controls decisions in institutions, divided into three units or levels of analysis:
- Individual choice and conflict (the individual as unit of analysis): Several strong figures engaged in highly public fights for power and control throughout the history of the college. This viewpoint posits the individual as the decision-maker and considers both the forces motivating key individual actors and the impact these actors had on the ultimate nature of the choice that was made.

- Organizational or Institutional theory (the organization as unit of analysis). This viewpoint considers the organization as the decision-maker, and examines organizational factors such as structure, culture, goals and technologies to explain decisions.

- Power and Politics (the political environment as unit of analysis): This viewpoint focuses on the relationships between institutions and actors, and the ways in which these relationships shape, constrain, or force actions by individuals and institutions. Through this lens, the study considers the closely interlocking relationships between political entities in the city of Quincy and the state legislature, the effect of the growth and subsequent troubles of the state’s community colleges, and the influence of the accrediting agency.

3. Quincy College

Quincy Junior College was founded in the 1950's as one of several municipally-sponsored two-year institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Like its sister institutions -- Holyoke Junior College and Newton Junior College -- it started small, sponsored and run by the School Committee governing the public schools. Unlike these two institutions, however, and unlike most of the municipally sponsored junior colleges in the country, Quincy Junior College remained under the aegis of the city’s school committee until 1994, and continues as a city-sponsored institution to this day. Whereas Holyoke Jr. College became one of the state’s community colleges, and Newton Jr. College eventually closed its doors, and whereas most school-system-sponsored community colleges throughout the country have become parts of larger systems or independent community college districts, Quincy Junior College (now Quincy College) remained a unit of the school system until very recently. This is, truly, the road not taken in the history of junior and community colleges.
The road the college has taken has been rocky, however. Throughout the institution's 40+ year history there have been few periods where governance has not been a major item of discussion and contention, and fewer still where calm or certainty have prevailed. By following and analyzing this institution, an institution which shares its roots with community colleges across the country but which has taken a different path, this study attempts to shed light on issues of conflict and culture that bind, and that distinguish, community colleges.

Quincy College is unique in several ways, yet typifies community colleges in several others -- a combination that makes it an ideal institution for in depth research. First, the story of Quincy College is a fascinating one; it is rich in data and action. It is peopled by bold and colorful (if not always admirable) characters, major conflicts, small and large incidents, and highly public battles. At many institutions, change is gradual; there are few definable moments of decision or memorable figures -- either leaders or villains. Such institutions may be exemplary in many ways, but because the lines with which they are drawn are faint and blurry, they may illustrate little. Not so Quincy College. It's lines are drawn boldly and in bright colors. The major figures defining its history and helping to shape its decisions have been larger than life. Its struggles have been both monumental and public. Not only is this the material from which novels are created, the fierce and public nature of the battles over potential changes in governance make the influences on the decision easier to discern.

Second, QC is unique in that, while its origins are similar to many other community colleges nationally, it has come closer to retaining its structural roots than most. Only two municipal two-year colleges remain. The only other city-sponsored two-year college in the country is the Technological College of the Municipality of San Juan in Puerto Rico. But municipal sponsorship was once a common model. In Massachusetts, three two-year colleges sponsored by city school committees preceded the community college system and were the first colleges in the state to address the new populations for which community colleges were formed. In this structure, they were similar to San Jose Jr. College, Clark's subject for The Open Door College (1960). In his original introduction to The Open Door College, Clark observes that, "In the country as a whole, more than three-fourths of the public two-year colleges are
administered by forms of local school government. It is safe to predict that the junior college will assume a larger place in American education during the next half century. As it does so, forms of local control promise to be nationally decisive. At least, control by the local public schools will be the major alternative to control by the university or the state" (emphasis in the original). Clark’s prediction was not fulfilled, but Quincy College, while distinctly different from the current structure of most community colleges, remains closer to these roots and embodies what might have been.

Third, the college’s broader history and decision-making processes powerfully represent all three of the decision-making frameworks for analysis proposed in this study: individual, organizational, and political/environmental. Strong individuals have interacted; the structural foundation Quincy College kept until recently brought about sharp conflict as the college grew and reacted to internal and external pressures; and a full range of environmental and political influences combined and clashed to influence and shape the college’s history. This makes the college a fertile subject for study. Moreover, most of the influential political forces in the college’s history are close to the institution and have been highly public in their actions -- unlike state boards or legislatures, where both actions and motives are likely to be harder to identify and examine. While this distance from the control of state boards makes Quincy College different from other community colleges, it means that the political forces are more accessible and open for study.

Some of the factors that make Quincy College unique, particularly the connection with a school committee rather than state system, might be supposed to make any results from its study less generally applicable. The purpose of this case study, however, is to look at the interplay of forces and factors, using different levels of analysis and theory, to try to understand how the factors interrelate and why the college developed as it did. This interplay of forces will be different at every individual community college within a system, since each has its own key actors, students, communities, and events. Accordingly, for the purpose of this study, the advantages of Quincy College outlined above far outweigh the disadvantages of its unusual circumstance. Despite its unique characteristics, Quincy College is fairly typical of community colleges as they are described throughout the literature. Its student body parallels other community colleges in its socio-economic background, racial diversity, range of ages, percentage of part-time versus
full-time, percentage working while studying, and other general descriptors. Its older faculty comes from backgrounds similar to faculties in other community colleges (a mixture of vocational, public school and collegiate), and displays similar attitudes and allegiances. The percentages of and tensions between older faculty, newer faculty (more academically oriented), and adjunct faculty (exploited by this institution and others) mirror those of other such institutions.

The decision itself -- how to structure institutional governance -- is central to the institution. No study of Quincy College could fail to address this issue. At Quincy College, no decision has been more defining than this one. Had it not been identified in advance, it would have emerged as an overriding theme and defining institutional characteristic. More broadly speaking, institutional governance is a critical issue in any community college -- whether it is balancing the dictates of state and local leaders or simply attempting to function within its own complex community. Still, the nature of governance is not the question in this study so much as the forces that influenced the major change that was ultimately made. These are also the forces that shaped the college.

Finally, what may be learned from this work? First, too little is known about why community colleges function as they do. There is substantial data aggregated from across institutions, but the understanding of the culture of these institutions -- for example, the relatively weaker faculty and stronger administration -- is frequently reported without being fully explored. This study attempts to provide a better understanding of how all the various factors link together in the making of decisions. How do the culture and climate of the two year college -- with the dominant president, the demanding community, the weak and often self-deprecating faculty, the transient and diverse students, and the strong and conflicting political forces with differing agendas and motives -- interact within a single entity? Second, while there has been significant research into the historical goals and origins of two year colleges, Quincy College provides the unique opportunity to explore how the original institutional structure of municipal control through a school committee played itself out, providing clues to current college issues and structures, and how they may have come about. In an era where community colleges are playing a larger and larger role in higher education, a deeper understanding of the community college needs to be developed.
4. Research Design

Many years in the making, this decision was affected by all the major political and organizational forces that tug a college, or any institution, in different directions. It is the kind of monumental decision that is deeply “embedded in the phenomenon.” The best way to really understand it is through the “thick description” of a case study, as described by Stake, Merriam and Yin.

Case Study Methodology: The domain of qualitative research, particularly of the case study, is understanding why. Quantitative analysis indicates particular trends, attitudes and results, but often does not explain the phenomenon it describes. Nor is it intended to. In this instance, however, the intent is to understand the factors that led to a particular decision, and to consider these factors more broadly in other settings. Case study methods are the most appropriate means for accomplishing this purpose.

Case studies are undertaken, according to Yin, “when description and explanation (rather than prediction based on cause and effect) are sought, when it is not possible or feasible to manipulate the potential causes of behavior, and when variables are not easily identified or are too embedded in the phenomenon to be extracted for study.” Whereas survey research tends to be deductive, “[d]escriptive case studies, on the other hand, are usually inductive in nature. It is impossible to identify all the important variables ahead of time. Results are presented qualitatively, using words and pictures rather than numbers.” The specific form of the research depends on the conditions imposed by the investigator and the case itself: the type of questions being researched, the extent of investigator control, and the degree of focus on contemporary rather than historical events.

Merriam identifies the defining characteristic of a case study as whether the unit of analysis is a “bounded system,” -- “a specific phenomenon such as a program, an event, a person, a process, an institution, or a social group.” Stake makes a similar distinction: “A case need not be a person or enterprise. It can be whatever bounded system ... is of interest. An institution, a program, a responsibility, a collection, or a population can be the case. This is not to trivialize the notion of case but to note the generality of the case study method in preparation for noting its distinctiveness” (emphasis in the original).
While case studies may be quantitative, they are more often qualitative, where "researchers are interested in insight, discovery, and interpretation rather than hypothesis testing..., 'interpretation in context.'" The case study is particularistic, descriptive, phenomenological, inductive. It is concrete and contextual, including both the researcher and reader (with all their biases) in the interpretation and generalization of results. Not to be confused with case history, case method, or casework, the case study is a common anthropological and historical technique that yields "thick description" of language, culture, and human interaction in all of its complexity and context. It is "intense, holistic description and analysis of a single entity, phenomenon, or social unit." 

In the final analysis, understanding is the primary purpose of this case, leading to the selection of case study methodology. The two primary sources are documentary evidence and accounts by those either involved in or able to directly observe major activities or actors in the decision-making process. These are described further below:

**Document Analysis**: The following documentary sources have been explored:

- **Newspaper accounts**: As a political issue, the governance of the college has been a constant source of public scrutiny. One major source of information, therefore, has been the local media. The city's daily paper, the *Patriot Ledger*, has dominated the local information landscape for years and has been the major news source. In addition, a smaller weekly plus occasional articles in the *Boston Globe* have also contributed substantially. Together, these sources have provided, on an almost daily basis, a huge body of information as to events and comments relevant to the case.

- **Official records of School Committee and City Council Meetings**: The minutes of these meetings have provided documentary evidence of official actions taken by the respective bodies with regard to the decision under consideration and related events.

- **Legal Documents**: Part of the controversy around the decision involved legalities. Statutes relating to city-sponsored colleges, of which Quincy was the only one remaining in the state, as well as particular legislation specific to Quincy College, are important. In some instances, it has not been clear whether the laws governing school committees and public schools or the laws governing colleges take precedence. In
these situations, the laws have been given careful and sometimes conflicting readings by key actors. These legal documents have increased understanding of the particular circumstances of the college.

- **Official College Documents:** Planning documents, official reports, the college’s accreditation self-studies, reports from the accrediting agency, and the minutes of the college’s two related non-profit organizations, have provided a substantial base of information regarding the genesis of the decision in question and the particular events that occurred along the way. While there are gaps and inconsistencies in these documents -- for example, in the way student enrollment figures were kept and reported -- trends and official actions are documented.

- **Memos and Letters:** Finally, correspondence of various types has been obtained from present and past faculty and staff, providing an additional rich source of documentary information. These help to provide a contemporary view as to plans, actions, and influences.

- **Interviews with Key Informants:** While the documents have provided a chronology of events in the college’s development, as well as demonstrating the parameters of the decision, they often do not contain explanations as to motives or underlying factors that influenced events. Therefore a range of formal interviews have been conducted with “key informants” of two types: those who themselves have been intimately involved in the process of making the decision, which Merriam might call “elite” informants, and those who were well placed to know what was happening even if they were not themselves directly involved. Those in the first group may be presumed to be less than reliable, in some instances, about their own motives (and even perhaps about their actions), but shed light on what they believed to be the motives and actions of others. The second group, by offering a different view of the same actions and events, provides balance. These have been supplemented by less formal conversations with a range of participants at the college, primarily present and former college faculty and staff, who have offered opinions and information that shed light on current and past attitudes -- sometimes based on accurate information, sometimes not, but highly relevant either way.

**Confidentiality:** Given the uniqueness of this institution, an attempt to disguise its identity seems futile. No such attempt has been made. Similarly, the president, board members, mayors and others took
actions which are clearly identifiable, and which in any event are a matter of public record. No attempt to
disguise or alter this record has been made. Much of the basic narrative -- the chronology of what
happened when and to whom -- has been constructed from stories appearing in the press and in public
statements recorded at that time. These are not confidential statements and have been quoted liberally.
Confidentiality has been assured, however, regarding matters of opinion which are not part of the record
but which are relevant to describing the motive for a particular action. Each interviewee was offered, and
most accepted, the opportunity to review any quotations to be used in the text that were drawn from the
interviews they consented to. In many instances, while they have (or probably would have) agreed to the
use of their names with respect to a particular opinion, it has seemed just as effective to refer to a source or
sources. In no case are people identified who provided information in the halls or in informal sessions; in
some instances, their identities have been obscured. Every attempt has been made to keep the flavor of the
description of college activity while limiting the use of direct quotes, except for those taken from the
newspapers, both because the culture of the institution is not always one of free exchange and the
broadcasting of confidences might cause embarrassment or worse, and because the identification of
particular respondents has not seemed either helpful or necessary. For the sake of clarity, however, and in
order to provide an investigatory and analytical path, many quotes taken from individual interviews are
identified by a code. This allows their specific comments to be traced back to interview notes or tapes,
should that be necessary, but keeps their identities confidential. While this step may seem overly dramatic,
the institutional action of the college has in the past, and continues, to justify such care.

Bias and Indications of Rigor: Both Stake and Merriam suggest that the biases of the researcher and
the reader are a part of the fabric of a case study. Still, investigator bias must be considered in this project.
The investigator spent four years in a senior position at the institution, and knows and is known to many of
the principals. Following prescribed methods of addressing potential bias of this type, the following steps
have been taken:
The investigator identified both his purposes and his former role to all participants, since not all knew him, both in his letter to them and in their subsequent conversations. Biases were identified to participants, and are identified within the text of the study where relevant.

Multiple data sources have been used. Indeed, this has not been difficult given the extensive written record and the number of people available to speak with. Where information was obtained from only one source or is speculation, it is so identified.

Finally, the sources of factual statements and of opinions are identified in the text to the extent possible. However, fear of retribution permeated the college during discussions, quite possibly with good cause, such that the decision was made to hide the specific identity of interviewees in many of the quoted remarks. As described above, however, even where identities are concealed, remarks are identified such that they could be traced to their source if necessary. Unattributed statements ("The faculty generally believed ...") may be assumed to reflect, to some extent, the bias of the researcher and those people he has spoken to informally. An attempt has been made to keep these statements to a minimum. Finally, the inferences drawn regarding institutional action, right or wrong, are the opinions of the researcher. They are also, I hope, well grounded in the case.

These steps -- identification of biases, multiple sources, and the creation of a clear path to conclusions -- satisfy the conditions for investigator bias set forth by Merriam, Yin, Stake and others. In the final analysis, however, overall validity lies in the case study's "making sense," and in the "thick description" that enables the reader to follow the investigatory and analytical path that the researcher followed. If these are available and sufficiently convincing, the study has not only demonstrated its validity, but it may be, to use Stake's conception, more generalizable to the real world than the more "scientific" studies -- in that it is more believable in reflecting the complexity of life than quantifiable statistics can ever be.

5. Plan of the Study

The overview provided in Chapter One briefly describes the institution under study, the research problem, the methodology used in addressing the problem, and the theoretical bases that have been
employed to inform the analysis. Chapter Two reviews the theoretical literature on higher education and organizational decision-making upon which much of the analysis is founded.

Chapters Three through Five provide a narrative history of the college -- what events shaped the institution, who was involved, and how it was perceived in the college community and in the press. Chapter Three covers the period from the founding of the organization through the point where, in the mid-1980's, it had successfully survived a near-death experience brought about by a tax-limitation ballot initiative, and was beginning to rebuild. It chronicles how the college grew from a small adult education program to the third largest community college in the state under the guidance of strong, charismatic leaders, and the strain that resulted from this growth. Chapter Four covers the college's organizational period, where organizational stress related to growth, the accumulation of resources, and the resulting clashes between a strong president and the hierarchy of the school system dominated governance concerns. Chapter Five covers the period from 1991 through 1995, during which a range of governance structures were proposed and debated by city leaders, and a plan was finally adopted and implemented.

Chapter Six presents an analysis of the progression of the college from a small, individually dominated institution through organizational stress and trauma, to the ultimate governance solution made in the political arena. Chapter Seven draws broader conclusions about institutional governance, alignment and culture, and proposes speculations as to why most community colleges have moved away from the municipal form of governance over the years, and how some may still be affected by their birth in public school systems. Finally, an epilogue describes more recent activities at Quincy College and in the community -- activities that occurred after the investigative stage of this study but which nevertheless helped shape the analysis -- and raises questions for the institution's future.
Notes to Chapter One


10. Merriam, 10.

CHAPTER TWO
Related Literature

The chapter that follows considers literature related to this case. Because the institutional context of higher education differs significantly from other institutions, the review begins with the structure, culture, organization, and decision-making processes of higher education. The subject of this study is a public two-year college, however, a member of a unique subset of higher education which differs substantively from four-year institutions and universities. Accordingly, the chapter provides a separate review of relevant work on two year colleges which, though growing, remains somewhat paltry. Finally, because the study considers the impact of environmental, institutional and individual factors in decision-making, a sampling of literature on organizational decision-making provides a broader theoretical context.

1. Organization and Structure of Higher Education

The Industry of Academe: It does not take long observation to discover that institutions of higher education differ substantially from other organizations. These differences run the gamut from purposes, goals and values through operational constructs to the consideration of product and outcome. Colleges and universities are generally considered prime examples of loosely coupled organizations (Weick, Clark, Kerr, Cohen and March), where change in one unit may have little effect on other units, as described below. Colleges also exist in a highly political world. Lindblom’s premise of “muddling through” using “successive limited comparisons” -- in which the incremental and timid steps of the bureaucrat that seem so inadequate to the outsider may actually be an intelligent and successful adaptation to an uncertain and treacherous political environment -- also applies to higher education. Organizational decision making must be understood in the context of both the attributes of the organization in question and the environment of which it is a part. What is the essential nature of the college or university? How does it differ from the typical corporation? What is the nature of the industry of higher education? And how does the community college fit within this industry?

As a starting point, Bolman and Deal provide a contrasting description of McDonald’s and Harvard, illustrating how differences in organizational goals lead to differences in organizational structure.
McDonald’s has clear goals, objectives, and standards. Harvard does not. It is easy to tell whether a hamburger is prepared according to the prescribed criteria, whether the restaurant is clean, and whether sales goals have been met. The organization is structured towards two ends: to maintain prescribed standards, which leads to careful control of raw materials plus extensive training and careful monitoring, and to increase sales, which leads to extensive marketing. McDonald’s is organized hierarchically; relatively little discretion is left to the individual franchise manager, let alone the point-of-contact person who serves the customer. By contrast, what Harvard actually does, what it intends to do, and whether it does it well, are extremely hard to determine. The arguments in academe concerning whether research or teaching is the primary purpose, what a well-educated student looks like, and how to tell whether any of it is well done, are legendary. Indeed, the most prevalent determinants of institutional prestige are, at best, tangential to the quality of the education provided.

One of the most common public determinants of an institution’s rank within the industry of higher education is the quality of its raw materials (students), as determined by standardized tests. Another is the publication record of faculty. These may suggest the quality of the education provided, and are certainly indicative of the prestige value of a particular degree, but they are, at best, indirect measures of institutional quality. Finally, unlike McDonald’s, Harvard and other higher education institutions are structured as semi-autonomous fiefdoms; the people at the point of contact -- primarily the faculty -- have much latitude indeed. Faculty members hardly see themselves as parallel to food servers at McDonald’s, and in fact they are not. Faculty members, to a large degree, determine the substance and quality of the product delivered, whether teaching or research. Food servers serve food.

Both McDonald’s and Harvard are exemplary institutions of their types, but they are, it is clear, very different institutions. This dramatic contrast in purposes and characteristics has led to, and grows out of, an equally dramatic difference in organizational structures: one is vertical with defined authority and prescribed rules; the other is horizontal with much organizational fuzziness. Some of the particular traits of higher education organizations, and their implications, are explored below.
**Loose Coupling:** Weick (1976) uses the term “loosely coupled,” since embraced by many others, to describe institutions with high levels of ambiguity, of which colleges and universities are a prime example. According to Weick, loosely coupled components or events are responsive to each other, but each also “preserves its own identity and some evidence of its physical or logical separateness.” Among the loosely coupled elements, he cites the distinction between the technical core of the organization and the authority of office, and the lack of direct connection between intent and action, as the most notable. In a tightly coupled business, a change at one level has sharp ramifications for other components of the business. In higher education, however, individual departments and units adapt freely to external change in their disciplines or fields with relatively little impact on the larger institution. Indeed, Cohen and March go beyond “loosely coupled” to describe institutions of higher education as “organized anarchies” with the following three principal characteristics: problematic goals, unclear technology, and fluid participation.

These organizational characteristics have significant implications for decision-making at institutions of higher education. Weick notes, for example, the pattern of certification versus inspection: the tendency for loosely coupled organizations to emphasize certification in the (apparent) inability to inspect that which they cannot define. McDonald’s, on the other hand, rigorously inspects at all stages. Another characteristic is how members of the organization gather information and construct meaning. At McDonald’s, the purposes are clear and meaning relative to those purposes can be easily constructed. At Harvard and other universities, the absence of clearly defined goals plays itself out in part through an emphasis on ritual and symbolism. The “organizational saga” described by Clark (see below) is probably stronger in the institution of higher education than the international fast-food emporium because its meaning-making ability is needed. Though McDonald’s, too, doubtless has its organizational sagas, their impact on the average employee might be expected to be less than specific rules and procedures.

**Prestige and Institutional Loyalty:** Further, in the industry of higher education, loyalties to discipline and profession compete with, and often surpass, loyalties to the particular institution. This “stunning fact” presents a countervailing force in determining direction and making decisions in individual institutions. The relative strength of the profession and the institution, and the relative loyalty accorded to each by
faculty members, present a complicated framework for considering which decisions are made towards which ends. “What became most striking in our exploration of the identifications of professors in leading universities,” Clark concludes in describing the pull between these two forces, “is how much the disciplinary strength of their institutions is basic to the value they place upon them.”

This, in turn, leads to the prestige ranking of colleges and universities, codified by the Carnegie Commission (and engaged in by publications such as U.S. News). Perceived institutional prestige is also an important consideration in how decisions are made. Colleges and universities sell prestige. It attracts students and faculty. Students provide money, of course, but the more prestigious the student attracted (according to national test scores), the more prestigious the college or university. Students, in their own turn, are attracted by the aura of prestige that a college is able to promote via such measures as selectivity rates, faculty renown, and, yes, average test scores of admitted students. Faculty renown is gained primarily through publishing, which is influenced by the ability of the institution to attract (and pay for) professors who have already published, and the ability of the institution to pay professors to conduct research rather than teach. Successful publishing is more closely related to prestige and renown in the discipline than to institutional affiliation (which matters hardly at all). Thus, the prestige colleges seek comes in direct proportion to the extent to which they employ professors whose allegiance is to the profession rather the institution (and who therefore tend to publish more and, quite possibly, to change institutions more frequently).

**Isomorphism and Institutional Aspiration:** Given the extent to which institutional prestige drives the industry, it is not surprising that institutional *prestige envy*, leading to isomorphism, is a dominant factor in institutions of higher education. (Youn & Loscocco, DiMaggio & Powell). “This push to isomorphism is powerful,” according to Youn and Loscocco (1991); “organizations make choices that lead them to resemble one another even if this push is neither rational nor efficient. Dominant organizations compel weaker and vulnerable organizations in the field to imitate their seemingly successful and legitimate institutional form. The more vulnerable organization selects the most appropriate routine from the apparently successful organization.” And the less prestigious institution selects routines, structures and
rituals, and attempts to imitate, those institutions it perceives to be somewhat above it but within grasp. Thus, Quincy College would not attempt to imitate Harvard, despite geographic proximity, but might copy some of the attractive traits of colleges that it saw in its organizational field, the particular class of other institutions as defined by status, proximity, competition for students, or in other ways, that are within its view. This may or may not be an effective strategy, and may or may not be overtly rational. Quincy’s transformation from Quincy Junior College to Quincy College followed a number of other two-year institutions that made the same move, and was undertaken to increase the college’s stature. It seems likely that it had that effect. On the other hand, while it is questionable whether the increased interest among community colleges in hiring faculty members with doctorates will have much beneficial effect on institutional prestige, it is not unlikely that it will lead to increasing divisions among faculty.

**Collegiate Governance:** Another extremely important example of industry norms is the well-known and generally respected belief in shared governance between the administration and faculty. The Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities published jointly by the American Association of University Professors, the American Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards in the 1960's, notes that “[t]he faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the educational process. On these matters the power of review or final decision lodged in the governing board or delegated by it to the president should be exercised adversely only in exceptional circumstances, and for reasons communicated to the faculty.” This tradition extends back to medieval European institutions and is strongly embodied throughout much of academe in the form of tenure and various models of faculty governance such as the Faculty Senate. Though greatly respected at some institutions and honored largely in the breach at others, collegiality and faculty governance are nevertheless fundamental components of the governance and culture of universities and colleges throughout the country.

The Joint Statement and the concepts it sets forth, however, are not without their weaknesses. As Birnbaum (1988) observes, the statement has the widely criticized weakness of vagueness, and “is thus
seen by some as an academic Camelot -- devoutly to be wished for but not achievable by mere mortals.”

He goes on to identify a second weakness, less noticed but no less real: that the statement “does not fully appreciate the [institutional] differences in such critical matters as purpose, size, sponsorship, tradition, and values.” Community colleges exemplify this distinction, and are furthest from the ideal of faculty governance. In the Land of Academe, in which Camelot is the unattainable center, community colleges exist in by far the remotest regions. It would hardly be surprising if, having heard of Camelot and finding it much more appealing than their own reality, the citizens (faculty) in these farthest reaches of Academe might feel both a cultural clash of some significance, and a tendency to want to move more towards this ideal vision, along the way aspiring to be more like their neighbor institutions that function closer to the center.

**Leadership:** In an organization where governance is so diffuse, the nature of leadership is also ambiguous. Since the invasion of the Japanese management style into American consciousness in the 1980’s, it has been noted repeatedly that of all American enterprise, colleges and universities most closely parallel the successful Japanese businesses described in Ouchi’s Theory Z. “Not only do academic organizations possess several key traits of Japanese organizations, e.g., lifetime employment,” writes Dill (1982), “but they are organizations in which organizational culture plays a dominant role. Furthermore, critical segments of the academic culture -- the culture of the profession and the culture of the enterprise -- have fallen into decline, while the culture of the discipline has strengthened. The primary meaning for academics has thus become not profession, not institution, but their professional career, and external conditions decrease the meaningfulness of that orientation as well. Academic managers therefore face the real potential of alienation at the level of the profession, the enterprise and the discipline.” This, he argues, requires leaders to learn to manage the culture through the use of symbols, rituals, and forms of social integration. “The nurturance of the symbolic life of academic organizations and the distinctive skills of social organization necessary for their coordination and control are unique skills of academic management which must be rediscovered and accentuated or they will be lost.”
These are not the skills or the inclination of the American corporate leader, by and large, although they may be on the rise. They do describe the particular dilemma of the leader of a college or university, in which the ends and means are unclear, the structures diffuse, and the organizational culture is strong. Leadership is difficult to define in any major institution, and may be more so in the highly complex college or university. “There is still no agreement,” writes Birnbaum, “on how leadership can be defined, measured, assessed, or linked to outcomes.”11 Perhaps, as Pfeffer (1981) somewhat cynically suggests, “Successful leaders... are those who can separate themselves from organizational failures and associate themselves with organizational successes.”12

Organizational Culture and the Institutional Saga: Organizational culture is a powerful and complex force in higher education. “Institutions certainly are influenced by powerful, external factors such as demographic, economic, and political conditions, yet they are also shaped by strong forces that emanate from within,” Tierney observes. “This internal dynamic has its roots in the history of the organization and derives its force from the values, processes, and goals held by those most intimately involved in the organization’s working.”13 To attempt to understand the decisions of an organization without considering the organizational culture, particularly in an institution so immersed in history and contradiction, is to miss much of a college’s distinctiveness, and possibly the most important determining factors. Indeed, the institution’s history, structure, organizational culture, professional culture, and particular characteristics all are factors that shape organizational decisions.

The lack of specificity in either the industry or the process of education leads to the transference of meaning to other forms. Because academic goals, measurements of educational success, and outputs are unclear, meaning is transferred to faculty credentials, indicators of educational input such as the “quality” of incoming students as measured by standardized tests, and more definable outputs such as publication. It might perhaps be argued that the whole elaborate prestige system upon which higher education functions exists to fill the vacuum left by the inability to clearly articulate goals, describe processes, evaluate outcomes, or link cause and effect. However that may be, it is hardly surprising that institutional cultures,
which embody institutional memory and meaning in rituals and symbols, tend to be strong on college and university campuses.

Clark (1980) has identified four aspects of the culture of higher education: the cultures of specific disciplines, of the academic profession, differing institutional cultures, and of national systems of higher education. The strength of disciplinary cultures, and of the academic profession, have been discussed above, and the strength and particularities of the culture of the community college are addressed below. The strength and shape of institutional culture, Clark says, is based on several factors: these include the scale of the organization (smaller organizations tend to have stronger cultures), the tightness or interdependence (more interdependent organizations tend to have stronger cultures than independent ones), the age of the organization, and the circumstances of its birth. American colleges and universities trace their histories and structures back to medieval Europe; thus, their cultures reflect traditions, beliefs, values and rituals that are medieval as well as those that are distinctly American. The amalgam of traditions and beliefs that constitutes the American college and university system, therefore, is a peculiar mix of medieval guild society and American values. While the embodiment of this culture at individual institutions varies considerably, the strength of the old world -- its rituals, values, traditions, and beliefs -- is felt more keenly in academe than in most of the rest of American life.

Among the effects of organizational culture is to provide meaning to daily activity. Traditional culture "denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols," according to sociologist Clifford Geertz. "Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law, but an interpretive one in search of meaning." To uncover that meaning, Tierney proposes examining six aspects of an institution: its environment, mission, socialization processes, information, strategies, and leadership. Each of these cultural aspects occurs in every institution, but, as with Tolstoy's unhappy families, they occur in each institution in a different way. From institution to institution, "the way they occur, the forms they take, and the importance they have, differs dramatically."
Definitions of institutional culture vary, but culture is generally differentiated from institutional climate or atmosphere in that culture represents deeply shared values, beliefs and assumptions which are not explicitly stated and very slow to change, whereas climate represents feelings or attitudes about everyday institutional life that may change dramatically with a switch in administrators, say, or the departure or arrival of a particular faculty member. Among the most noted embodiments of institutional culture is the unique institutional saga that Clark has identified as growing around the distinctive colleges he studied. Each of these institutions embodied its differentness, and endowed its activities with meaning, through the saga of its foundation and growth. Just as in American tall tales, through which early Americans took a measure of pride in the exploits, real or imagined, of Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett, and found some meaningful themes in American society, so faculty, staff and students come to take a similar pride in the myths and tales of their own institution, developing a shared understanding and sense of purpose. At its strongest, according to Clark, an organizational saga is “a powerful means of unity.” “With deep emotional commitment, believers define themselves by their organizational affiliation, and in their bond to other believers they share an intense sense of the unique... Such an emotional bond turns the membership into a community, even a cult.”

Certainly not every institution of higher education has culture strong enough to lead to the kind of emotional attachment Clark describes. Nor are all cultures, or their accompanying sagas, entirely positive. Little seems to have been written of negative cultures, but they may be supposed to exert a similarly strong influence over members of their respective institutional communities. All institutions have a culture, however -- strong or weak, negative or positive -- made up of elements cited above: the ingredients of the particular institution, the profession, the parent organization, the community. Organizations born of one culture into another, such as municipal colleges, face the strain of trying to reconcile the two.

2. Community Colleges: The Ambivalent Academy

Arguments of Origin and Purpose: Analyses of community colleges seem to break down by political position regarding the institution -- believing in the essential goodness of community colleges or not -- rather than any particular analytical framework. To describe differing general points of view, Dougherty
(1994) divides most analysts into three camps: the functionalist advocates, the Marxist instrumentalists, and institutionalists. To these he adds a fourth view, which he calls State Relative Autonomy.

Functionalist advocates range from the mildly critical but supportive (Cohen & Brawer, Roueche, Vaughan, O’Banion), to those who might be called cheerleaders or apologists (Parnell). Marxist instrumentalists, who believe that Community Colleges are instruments of the capitalists, include Zwerling, Karabel (in his early days), Bowles and Gintis, and Pincus. Brint and Karabel (a later incarnation) coined the term institutionalists for themselves in 1989, following the premise that the institution (or those within it) act first in favor of self-preservation. Dougherty’s fourth view, State Relative Autonomy, is built on the institutionalist view but adds a range of other governmental players not considered by Brint and Karabel -- mayors, governors, superintendents of schools and chief state school officers, etc. -- as well as an expanded view of power relationships.

**Functionalists:** Functionalists see community colleges as providing broad avenues of opportunity, while instrumentalists see them more as creating cul-de-sacs that protect class privilege, to use Dougherty’s metaphor. The problems functionalists identify are operational, such as equalizing opportunity at the front end (providing better counseling and developmental help early on) and keeping vocational training up to date. Functionalists believe that community colleges provide access and the opportunity for people who would not otherwise attend college to do so, offering the choice of transferring to a four year institution or getting vocational education, and also provide training for mid-level workers, particularly technical workers, as a service to both the workers and to industry. In so doing, community colleges play a useful role for the students, who are able to get better jobs; for business, which gets the trained workers it needs; and for society, which has a stronger economy and a better tax-base made up of more productive workers. Most community college faculty and staff are practicing functionalists.

**Instrumentalists:** Instrumentalists see the reverse. They see community colleges as *instruments* of the ruling elite, believing that these colleges uphold the ideal of equal opportunity in word, but vitiate it in deed. Specifically, they believe that community colleges train workers to serve capitalist needs at public expense (a kind of oppression reminiscent of Freire), and that they maintain social hierarchy and inequality
in the name of equal opportunity by taking students from the lower classes and systematically lowering
their aspirations, transferring large numbers from academic to vocational tracks (Clark's "cooling out"
effect). Further, the vocational tracks that most students are switched to after they are unable to "make it"
in the academic sphere are often low-wage, low-prestige, dead-end jobs that simply exploit the workers to
build wealth for the elite. Further still, community colleges protect universities from having to deal with
the masses which, among other things, might radicalize them to the extent that they threatened the present
hierarchy. (This is clearly an argument from the 1960's; today's community college students are anything
but radical.) For the instrumentalists, this is both the intent and function of the community college. There
is no question of unintended consequences. Community colleges were designed as a cynical social safety
valve and succeed in that function.

Institutionalists: Brint & Karabel's institutional view is a modified version of the instrumentalist. They still see community colleges as engaging in the "managing of ambition," through which they reconcile the aspirations of the many for access to higher wage and status with society's limited supply of college level positions. While this view sees fewer outright villains and does not claim a capitalist conspiracy, it still characterizes the impact on students as fairly negative --an "occupational status penalty" associated with two-year colleges. The institutional view sees the rapid vocationalizing of the community college historically as a function primarily of institutional self-interest, whereby presidents and other officials, like puppies with their tails between their legs, adopted a position of "anticipatory subordination" to both the business and university worlds, creating a need which no one else knew existed. By the 1960's, during the explosion of interest in community colleges, the argument for open access gained mythic status; community colleges are now generally believed to provide access and appropriate job training while, in fact, they routinely reduce the aspirations of their lower-class clients and train them to be drones. Brint and Karabel do, at least, grant the distinction between the expansion of opportunities provided to individuals and an aggregate democratizing effect. Community colleges claim, or are believed, to provide both. Brint and Karabel believe that while they provide opportunity for individuals, they tend to preserve the current position of groups within society.
The term institutionalist was claimed by Brint and by Karabel in 1989. "Perhaps the model's most fundamental feature is that it takes as its starting point organizations themselves, which are seen as pursuing their own distinct interests." This view rejects the traditional lines of debate on both the origins and the functions of the community college -- the consumer-choice and business-domination models -- because these models pay too little attention to "the beliefs and activities of the administrators and professionals who typically have the power to define what is in the 'interest' of the organizations over which they preside." Instead, they focus on "explaining why these administrators chose to vocationalize" despite what they describe as the opposition of the consumers (students) and the indifference of the business community. This view has the advantage over the previous market-force models they describe, which tend towards simplistic views of the community college as the tool of either the good guys or the bad guys. But, ultimately, it substitutes the motives of administrators for those of consumers and/or capitalists, which still downplays the complexity of organizational decision-making. Certainly the administrators (and faculty) of community colleges had a role to play in the shaping of the organization's future, but it seems likely that institutional view one or another ascendent individuals is still too simplistic. (A more complex institutional view is presented below.) Cohen and March argue that the president of a college, while exercising influence, does not preside in the sense implied by Brint and Karabel. "Presidents occupy a minor part in the lives of a small number of people. They have some power, but little magic. They can act with a fair degree of confidence that if they make a mistake, it will not matter much." This hardly seems sufficient power to act against the wishes of both business and potential students.

State Relative Autonomy: Dougherty's view builds on the institutional, to which he adds the role of other relatively autonomous governmental actors -- mayors, school superintendents, state legislators, etc. -- who supported the creation of community colleges for a variety of reasons that were both self-serving and public spirited (like most politicians). Thus, a variety of actors have and continue to be involved in and supportive of community colleges, for a variety of good and bad reasons. His discussion of power
relationships emphasizes the constraining power of business as much as its pro-active power, and builds more on the complexity of both the institutions and the relationships.

**Mission Creep, Mission Drift:** It is difficult to comprehend how an institution that is unable to define its mission to begin with could be suffering from a serious case of mission creep. But mission creep, "mission drift" (Clowes and Levin, 1989) or "mission blur" (Armes, 1989) is generally identified as a significant institutional problem for community colleges. As the mission of individual institutions creeps or drifts between the differing missions outlined above, the result is certainly a blur. There are costs to this institutional schizophrenia. One cost may be found in the failure of the community college to significantly accomplish any of its missions. To the extent that this is true, it is likely that a blurred mission has something to do with blurry results. Clowes and Levin note a second cost: "We conclude that community colleges generally are losing significant components of their mission (specifically, collegiate/transfer and career education) to other nonselective institutions in higher education. Because we find little or no evidence for competition for students between community colleges and proprietary schools, we place competition between community colleges and nonselective four-year institutions." Their solution, which many do not agree with, is for community colleges to focus on career education as "the only viable core function for most community colleges." Whether this route represents the best one for community colleges may be debatable, but the conclusion of confusion is not.

**Institutional Effect:** Dougherty's research on the effects of the community college is perhaps the most comprehensive and the most thoughtful available today. Using the results of a range of studies, he finds that some of the charges, and some of the negative claims, are true -- but that many are not. The truth, he believes, lies in the murky middle. In discussing the lower rates of baccalaureate attainment of two-year college students who attempt to transfer compared to four year students (corrected for aspiration and background), he concludes: "The wide range and malignant effectiveness of the hurdles community college entrants face in pursuing a baccalaureate can easily lead one to assume that these obstacles are deliberate. It seems plausible that because the community college's effect is to hinder baccalaureate attainment that this has been its intent. However, this assumption of a symmetry between effects and
intents is mistaken...these hindrances emerge from the community college's attempt to reconcile many different and often antithetical goals. It has contradictory effects because it has contradictory goals” (emphasis in the original).

Dougherty makes his points using broad statistical information from a variety of other studies. It is possible, however, to question some of his assumptions -- the comparability of aspirations between similar students who enter 2- and 4-year institutions, for example, or the assumption that all community college students could have entered four-year colleges, or that if they had entered they could have equaled the achievements of those who actually did enter. Given the finite space available within 4-year institutions, the limits on financial aid, etc., is it fair to compare two year students with four year if they could not have been accommodated in four-year institutions? Or, in the case of earning potential, could the economy have provided the same wage scale for all four year graduates if all two year graduates suddenly became four year graduates? Would it be more appropriate to compare 2-year college students not to four year college students from similar backgrounds, but to their peers who did not attend college? This might well reverse the “occupational status penalty” identified by Brint and Karabel as being associated with community college graduation. Another look at these assumptions might suggest again what was already stated above: that two year institutions provide greater opportunity for individuals, but have not changed the relative position of groups in the economic or educational hierarchy. The debate concerning the impact and function of community colleges will likely continue.

At the same time, Dougherty’s larger point is well made and well taken: that community colleges are beset by competing and conflicting goals and purposes, and that this ambiguity may adversely affect their ability to achieve their disparate goals. A more comprehensive understanding of these institutions, in all of their depth and complexity, is needed to balance the statistical data from which Dougherty, and Brint and Karabel, work. How are decisions really made in two year institutions? Which factors are most critical? Certainly these institutions appear to exemplify the loosely-coupled organized anarchies described by Cohen and March and others: Problematic goals? Fluid participation? Unclear technology? Certainly -- as much as or more than other educational institutions. The scant literature on decision making,
organizational culture, and structural issues in community colleges may reflect the low prestige accorded to these institutions within the prestige hierarchy. Much of the literature is either practice-related (that is, creating tech-prep programs or considering the impact of remediation), or part of the debate on whether these institutions are serving society or undermining it. While this narrow debate dominates discussion, these institutions enroll nearly half of the nation's students.

Scholarship and Academic Quality: One part of the fall-out over mission confusion is the issue of academic quality, which is endlessly debated when community colleges are discussed. Is it possible for an institution with open enrollment to maintain standards of academic integrity and still promote the social goal of being a second chance institution through which non-traditional students can succeed? If so, what does it require? If one believes that the intent and/or effect of the community college is "cooling out" those students not suited for a higher station in life -- the business of "managing ambitions" -- academic quality may not be an issue. But it is doubtful that most community college practitioners believe they are engaged in such a cynical enterprise (even if that is what they accomplish), so academic quality and the maintenance of standards are, indeed, issues. Based on statistics such as Dougherty's, there is a widespread belief that community colleges often fail their students in a variety of ways, the most significant of which is in the failure to serve as a route to a four-year institution. The reasons for this failing, if it is true, are elusive. "The continuing problems with the reality of mass education, its apparent inability to cash in the promise of social mobility, is usually traced variously to failures of politics, or finances, or will," according to McGrath and Spear (1991). "Without denying the importance and the power of such factors, we offer a new way to understand the trajectory of open access colleges... The battle for access may have been won, especially if victory is understood in terms of numbers of students registering for classes. But the question that now has to be confronted is what access is access to. The battle for the rigor, substance, and distinctiveness, of community college education is the one that now must be fought."25

A further but related problem identified by Vaughan (1988), is a lack of scholarship, by which he means not research or teaching specifically, which are subsets of scholarship, but "the systematic pursuit of
a topic, an objective, rational inquiry that involves critical analysis.” Whether conducting research or
teaching, all colleges and universities should be scholarly institutions. Many community colleges,
according to Vaughan, fail to link scholarship to teaching, fail to reward scholarship, reject scholarship as
related only to research, and fail to leave time or provide avenues -- from the president through the faculty
-- to engage in or promote scholarly activities. Of particular importance is a tendency among some leaders
to take what Vaughan calls “perverse pleasure in proclaiming that community colleges are not research
institutions and, therefore (one assumes), are not concerned with scholarship.” This circle-the-wagons
mentality parallels that of lower prestige individuals, cities, and sports teams that respond with, in the
parlance of the day, attitude. For community colleges with attitude, however, the team-building qualities
associated with being the underdog are reminiscent of a strong American strain of anti-intellectualism
found throughout the working classes of the country, in the media, and in much of popular culture. For
this strain to be embodied in the culture of a college is indeed troubling. “As institutions dedicated to
outstanding teaching,” Vaughan notes, “community colleges can never achieve their full potential without
a commitment to scholarship, nor can they assume a legitimate place as members of the higher education
community.”26 It is possible that, at least in some instances, this anti-intellectual attitude may have its roots
in the municipal origin of many community colleges.

As to the question of whether it is indeed possible to maintain high academic standards in an open
enrollment institution, the answer remains unclear. While Roueche and Baker (1987) conclude in their
study of Miami Dade Community College (MDCC) that access and excellence can both be achieved, and
that MDCC has achieved both, their description leaves room for doubt.27 It may be that access and
excellence are another academic Camelot, to which many aspire but which “mere mortals” will not reach.
Certainly Miami Dade must be considered the Sir Lancelot of community colleges, and even its success is
not overwhelming. The lessons of Miami Dade seem to suggest, if nothing else, that actually achieving
both access and excellence, which would overcome many of the complaints of weak academics and poor
results cited above, can be accomplished only with massive student supports. MDCC’s array of student
supports -- including a sophisticated system of early faculty identification of problems, calls and letters to
students, and substantial academic and social counseling -- will not be possible at many institutions, and
may not be sustainable even at the country's premier community college.

**Governance and the Faculty:** "As opposed to universities," observes Bryant (1992), "there is no
history of shared governance in American community colleges." Generated "as teenagers if not adults in
the chronological growth process...there was no evolution of a governance concept. It was and is an
instant governance concept, and does not involve the faculty." Indeed, while the literature of higher
education in general is full of references to and discussions of faculty governance and its long history, it is
hard to find even a mention of the concept in literature specific to the community college. "With their
roots in the secondary schools," Cohen and Brawer (1989) observe, "the community colleges usually were
managed by former instructors who had become first part-time and then full-time administrators." When
they note that in the 1970's, "the all-powerful president had disappeared from all but the smallest colleges," they are speaking of the intrusion of governing boards, which had frequently been little more than rubber
stamps in the past, not increasing roles for faculty in the governance process. Indeed, Cohen and
Brawer's chapter on Governance and Administration makes no mention of faculty except in the section
headed *Collective Bargaining*, in itself a strong statement about the extent to which the traditions of
college faculty have been unable to overcome the norms of public schooling -- the roots of many
community colleges. The issues for faculty, whom Cohen and Brawer describe as being generally happy
"doing what they are doing," include "the untoward separation of the occupational and the academic; the
private world of instruction; the separation of the remedial instructors; and the uncomfortably slow
development of a unique professional consciousness." The issues for administration related to faculty
include "the adversarial relations between faculty and boards and administrators," "teacher burnout,"
"moonlighting and psychic early retirement," the appropriate use of adjunct instructors, and efficiency.
Some suggest, according to Cohen and Brawer, that "a professionalized community college faculty would
necessarily take a form similar to that taken by the university faculty... It need not. It more likely would
develop in a different direction entirely, tending neither toward the esoterica of the disciplines nor toward
research and scholarship on disciplinary concerns. The disciplinary affiliation among community college
faculty is too weak, the institutions' demands for scholarship are practically nonexistent, and the teaching loads are too heavy for that form of professionalism to occur. A professionalized community college faculty organized around the discipline of instruction might well suit the community college.

The essence of the governing structure of the community college, according to Birnbaum (1988) is bureaucratic. By this he means an organization “designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals.” There is a systematic division of labor, lines of authority, and the typical rules of the bureaucracy. “Superiors give directives to subordinates as problems are encountered for the first time, but some problems are encountered so frequently that they become part of standard operating procedures.” In community colleges generally, “administrative authority is supreme. It is reflected not only in the way decisions are made but also in the culture of the institution.” While faculties at community colleges exercise some level of determination about which directives will be obeyed (such as deciding not to attend a faculty meeting scheduled for a Friday afternoon), this structure is hardly close to the traditions of faculty governance that prevail, to a greater or lesser extent, at universities.

Community Relations: “A distinguishing characteristic of the community college,” note Richardson, Blocker and Bender (1972), “is its intimate relationship with the community it serves.” In various studies of power and decision-making in communities, they identify several principles germane to the governance of a community college, including the relative amounts of power and influence held by various leaders in various positions, the resulting formation of ad hoc coalitions around particular issues, the existence in every community of a unique power structure (as well as “invisible” leaders who do not hold public office) and the need for involvement of the community in decision-making. Public image related to attracting students plus business support, a good relationship with the media, and the need to have a broadly representative board are all identified as critical concerns for the community-based institution. That concern may have lessened as the past two decades have seen the centralization of community college governance at the state level. For Quincy, however, lack of clarity concerning the role of the college in the community has been a major source of stress.
Richardson, et. al., provide a discussion of the theory of management, in which they use Likert’s definition of four basic management systems: exploitive authoritarian, benevolent authoritarian, consultative, and participative group. Based on this model, they develop a thesis that argues for a participative governance structure: “decision making is a shared responsibility with all of those affected by a decision represented in the decisional processes. Involvement in decision making, in turn, provides the mechanism through which values and attitudes are changed to keep them consistent with organizational purposes.” They note, however, that such a structure is not the norm. “The assumption that students and faculty are a part of the administrative organization does not seem consistent with the realities of emerging institutional relationships,” they acknowledge. Their thesis, however, is that, “[w]hile it is probable that most institutions will move in the direction of adversary relationships between various constituencies, this is by no means an inevitable or irreversible process.”

**Leadership:** People who worry about community college leadership worry about two things: the huge numbers of leaders and administrators who will soon be retiring, and the autocratic nature of community college leaders. Bryant (1992) quotes studies in which 66% of community college faculty described their top administrator as autocratic, and considers the “self-fulfilling prophecy” quality of autocratic behavior, in which an administrative attitude which expects little from subordinates tends to get it. He also sees a trend towards leadership development at the community college level, aimed both at filling the large number of anticipated vacancies and improving the nature of administrative leadership (a trend which, if it is real, has been significantly absent from Quincy College).

The challenges of leadership at the community college level include coping with the substantial ambiguity of the institution, as well as managing change and growth. In part, the community college will have to choose, intentionally or non-intentionally, which world it wants to reside in. If community colleges are to become more like other colleges and universities, and if faculty and administrators, as well as students, begin to travel more freely between the two, community colleges will probably have to become more like other institutions of higher education. If it happens, this will represent a significant
change for many community college administrators and the clash of cultures, already significant in some institutions, will likely become both more acute and more difficult to manage.

**Institutional Culture:** So, are community colleges similar to other colleges and universities in structure and content, if not in the particulars of their origins or traditions, or are they extended public schools masquerading as colleges but functioning according to very different values, beliefs, and traditions? Or both? Along with the other clouds of confusion that engulf community colleges, add yet another to the mix: the cultural nature of the community college. Even so, the issue of culture does not engender much consideration at the community college level. "In literally thousands of conversations with community college leaders," observes Vaughan (1988), "I have rarely heard anyone discuss institutional culture." Such a discussion would raise questions of values, ethics and integrity, as well as a consideration of what past values should be appropriately maintained. Believing that institutional ethics should also have broader discussion, Vaughan adds: "Open access, an important aspect of the culture of a community college, is itself a value statement. Admitting students who have academic deficiencies and not dealing with those deficiencies, however, is ethically wrong."

To the extent that institutional culture embodies shared values, open access is one of the most accepted and respected of the values of the community college. This value is at the heart of the debate over academic quality, as well as questions of purpose and effect. Open access for what purpose, to what end? If, as Vaughan states, "the effective leader understands and is sensitive to the culture of an institution," community colleges need more effective leaders. Based on the literature, few appear to understand how their historical organizational roots and current institutional aspirations combine to create their unique institutional cultures, or to consider such knowledge important.

3. **Organization & Decision-Making Theory**

Among the central questions of organizational decision-making are the assumption of rationality, and the context within which to consider organizational action -- the unit of analysis for decision-making. Rationality is a consideration because public perception is shaped by a belief in rationally acting individuals and, frequently, rationally acting organizations. This perception is sharply apparent in the
press accounts and public perceptions of Quincy College activity. But if decisions are not made by
individual leaders acting in their own self-interest, as becomes apparent in a close study of institutions,
who does make the decisions and how are they shaped? Some of the factors and influences, divided into
frames of reference that consider individual, organizational and political influences, are presented below.

**Rational Choice Theory:** The belief that humans are essentially rational is the basis of economics, the
forerunner of organizational theory and a predominant strain of Western thought. *Homo economicus*, the
rational actor who makes logical and willful choices on the basis of his or her preferences, is assumed to be
the typical human being in “normal” circumstances. Americans are awash in assumptions of rationality
even as most of us recognize how often we are not rational. Individuals are *expected* to act rationally most
of the time, and the policies of government and business are *expected* to serve the interests either of these
entities, or their leaders, as they perceive them. Whereas rational action, depending on how it is defined,
may not often be achieved, it remains the goal -- the ideal -- for both individuals and organizations. Both
anti- and pro- arguments about either government or business presume rationality; they argue the point of
whose interests are being served but do not question that someone is benefitting. Thus, as described
above, instrumentalists claim that community colleges are tools of a controlling elite. Institutionalists and
state relative autonomists see various college and governmental officials as acting in their own interests in
creating community colleges. Both arguments are tied to an assumption of rational, or self-serving,
individual action.

True rational action means choosing the *best* alternative, which requires, according to Allison, “(1) the
generation of all possible alternatives, (2) assessment of the probabilities of all consequences of each, and
(3) evaluation of each set of consequences for all relevant goals. These requirements demand, in Simon’s
words, ‘powers of prescience and capacities for computation resembling those we usually attribute to
God.’” Thus, Simon introduced the concept of “*bounded rationality,*” which recognizes limitations on
an individual’s capacity to gather all the relevant information, or to process it if it were gathered. Within
these limits, the individual tries to act rationally. “*Intendedly rational*” action is therefore “behavior within
constraints.”
But it is clear to most observers that many actions taken by individuals and organizations are not only not intendedly rational, but defy any definition of rationality. They cannot be understood except through understanding the complex forces that affect both individuals and organizations in constructing decisions. Increasingly, researchers and analysts have found that, as March & Simon (1958) described the supposed rationality of organizations, "There is in the literature a great disparity between hypotheses and evidence" (emphasis in the original). March has also observed that "the fact that such patterns of behavior are fairly common among individuals and institutions suggests that they might be sensible under some general kinds of conditions -- that goal ambiguity, like limited rationality, is not necessarily a fault in human choice to be corrected but often a form of intelligence to be refined by technology of choice rather than ignored by it." This theory parallels Lindblom’s classic concept of “muddling through,” which sees the incremental decision-making of the bureaucrat more as an intelligent and necessary reaction to a political environment than as a bureaucratic failing.

Organizationally speaking, ambiguity is a persistent issue in decision making. March (1988) identifies four basic ambiguities. Preferences are often ambiguous, as are relevance, history, and interpretation. “In classical discussion of decision-making in organizations, a logic of causality connects policies to activities, means to ends, solutions to problems, and actions in one part of an organization to actions in another part... Actual events in organizations appear to be much less tightly coupled. Often there appear to be deep ambiguities in the causal linkages among the various activities of an organization, between problems and their 'solutions', and between how managers act and how they talk” (emphasis added). The problem of which goals the organization should pursue -- the ambiguity over values -- has been of particular importance in the history of Quincy College.

Similar problems exist with the conception of complex organizations as unitary actors, in supporting the assumption that they exist in a stable environment, or in demonstrating that the processes they go through to reach their decisions are irrelevant -- all tenets of rationality. In particular, it is hard to escape the conclusion that in real life the process of arriving at and implementing a decision is often of much greater import than the content of that decision. Nonetheless, according to rational choice theory, there is
not only a best choice for any organization in any circumstance (if only we had the knowledge), but also, following the logic of best choice, there is a direct correlation between choice and outcome. For there always to be a single best choice related to obtaining maximum utility for an organization, there must be a direct connection between choices and outcomes, and the process for arriving at or implementing choices cannot matter. The very presumption of a single best choice makes process irrelevant -- if process mattered, there could be no single best choice. Thus, considering the choices of organizations as the results of a rational decision-making process fails to sufficiently explain many of these choices. Below are brief descriptions of factors identified in the literature beyond simple rationality that affect individual decision-makers, organizational decisions (as distinct from individual decisions in organizations), and decisions in the political realm.

**Individual Decision-Making:** There are many frames of reference in decision-making that use the individual decision-maker as the unit of analysis. In addition to intended rationality, individuals are driven by stress avoidance (Janis and Mann), emotions (Flam), normative affective factors (Etzioni), and habit (Camic), to name just a few.

Janis and Mann (1977), for example, offer a theory based on differing levels of stress on individual decision-makers with an organization. Their analysis assumes that “within the repertoire” of every person is a range of strategies and tendencies, including evading or avoiding making choices, procrastinating or practicing other means of “defensive avoidance,” choosing based on the opinions of others or on seemingly irrational internalized standards or constraints, and choosing based on the perceived consequences of both good and poor choices. The stress levels start at unconflicted adherence to the current course of action in low stress situations, and end at “hyper-vigilance,” a state of near panic that prevents reasoned choice-making. At varying levels of stress, individuals may engage in a range of more or less effective decision-making tactics, from “bolstering” (magnifying the attractiveness of the chosen alternative or minimizing other options), to “suboptimizing” (maximizing some utilities at the expense of others), to “satisficing” (opting for meeting minimal requirements or “good enough” instead of taking the time and incurring the risk of the potentially higher reward decision).
Many other theories describe the different motivations and constraints that affect the choices of individuals acting within organizations. Normative-affective, emotion-driven, power-maximizing, and altruistic forces, along with habit, laziness and fear all have been shown to affect individual choices. Etzioni (1988), for example, argues that "normative-affective factors shape to a significant extent decision making, to the extent it takes place, the information gathered, the ways it is processed, the inferences that are drawn, the options that are being considered, and those that are finally chosen" (emphasis in the original). These factors, according to Etzioni, dramatically limit the range of acceptable choices before any rational process takes place -- legitimizing some choices but not others. By contrast, Flam sees emotions as the driving force behind much human action. Because humans are dramatically affected by their emotions, organizations must be "emotion managers," and corporate managers are "emotion motivated emotion managers." Rules and regulations manage emotions such as acquisitiveness and ego-aggrandizement. Paralleling the socialization function of society, organizations also use emotional tools to control the emotions of workers and direct them along a prescribed path: "corporate actors, just like social and occupational groups or elites, may rely on 'controlling' emotions, such as fear of embarrassment, or shame, or guilt, to buttress whatever other (normative or instrumental) means of control they have at their disposal in the organization of their work."

Similar cases can be and are made for the many other factors that affect individuals making decisions within organizational settings. Despite their differences, these theories support the common perception that organizational action reflects individual choice. If the choices are not always rational, they are still individual, and the key to understanding them lies in understanding individual motivation.

Institutional Perspectives: As complex organizations have grown larger and more complex, and as they have proliferated, so have theories of organization. Many of the conclusions regarding the actions of Quincy Junior College find their roots in the understanding of institutional functioning, as distinct from the actions of individuals.

According to March and Shapira, organizational theory is much more than the study of individuals in organizations. "Organizational decisions are no more made by individuals than the choices of individuals
are made by the hands that sign the papers," they say. If individual choice is not the determinant of organizational action, however, what is? The primary questions explored from this theoretical perspective are how organizations are structured, how they gather information, how they learn, the nature of organizational change, how order is created and maintained, how preferences are determined, and how the symbolic aspects of the organization -- the organizational culture, the symbols and rituals, the myths, the organizational "sagas" -- shape the decision-making process. How each of these areas of organizational activity is constructed bears on the nature of organizational decisions. Information is powerful but may be tainted; it is subject to "strategic misrepresentation," and it is filtered by individual and cultural perceptions. Change may come about through planning, or may appear to be arbitrary and adaptive. Order may be created through a hierarchical structure, but most organizations are much more complex than a simple hierarchy. Consequently, order may be derived through meanings embedded in ritual or routine.

Organized Anarchy: With regard to college and university decision-making Cohen & March (1986) propose a view of the institution of higher education that is far from the model of the rationally acting organization. "The American college or university is the prototypic organized anarchy. It does not know what it is doing. Its goals are either vague or in dispute. Its technology is familiar but not understood. Its major participants wander in and out of the organization." This description closely mirrors the debates on the purposes and effects of community colleges presented above.

In both colleges and other institutions, committees and departments interact and interrelate in a variety of ways that may not be predictable. The study of these structural relationships led to Cohen, March and Olsen's "garbage can model," in which actors, problems, and solutions are placed in the metaphorical garbage can together, usually at a meeting, where they interact in unpredictable ways. The result is connections and "solutions" which might not have existed otherwise, and which are highly dependent on who happens to bring which concerns and issues to the table at what time. "From this point of view, an organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions look for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision-makers looking for work."
Timing: Timing is also a significant factor. The institutional view “focuses attention on the way the meaning of a choice changes over time,” according to Cohen, March, and Olsen. “It calls attention to the strategic effects of timing, through the introduction of choices and problems, the time pattern of available energy, and the impact of organizational structure.”49 “The logic of order is temporal,” say March and Shapira. “Problems, solutions, and decision makers fit together because they are available at the same time. Thus, decisions depend on an ecology of attention, and important elements of the distribution of attention are exogenous to any specific decision process.”50

Process and Symbolism: Similarly, the symbolic value of a decision, or of the decision making process, may be more significant than the decision itself. The details of a curriculum choice at a given college or university are probably less important to the success of that curriculum -- in either educating students or satisfying faculty -- than the process through which the choice was made. If the curriculum is perceived as having been developed through a legitimate process (a high degree of faculty involvement and control), it will be embraced by faculty and presented to students with much greater enthusiasm than the same curriculum determined by administrative fiat. The same “choice” of the same curriculum may thus lead to very different outcomes. Process, through this lens, is far from irrelevant. The process of decision-making, involving all of the organizational characteristics detailed above, is at least as important as the content of that decision, possibly more so. Even when process is largely symbolic, its importance should not be underestimated. Further, the symbols should not necessarily be taken at face value, but should be questioned and explored. As Perrow (1986), somewhat darkly, observes: “The role of symbols is crucial, but we should search for powerful interests behind the distortions that the symbols hide...the results we get may not be due to organizational failures but organizational successes.”51

Institutional Mythology: Organizational sagas, as identified by Clark (1972) through his work on three distinctive colleges, also play a role in collegiate decision-making. To the extent that senior faculty members and others at a college or university derive satisfaction, meaning and fulfillment in part through belief in the organizational saga, a decision that countered that belief -- either in the content of the decision or the way in which it was made -- would stand a poor chance of success. All of these factors -- the
structure of organizations, their processes, relationships and symbols -- can be critical factors influencing decision making in organizations.

**Power and Politics:** This final organizational framework encompasses theories of political or negotiating relationships, resources and the allocation of power, and broader environmental issues. Its emphasis is the interrelationships between institutions and individuals, particularly the relationships of power and perceived power. Far from being isolated from or independent of environmental factors, organizations are quite the reverse: the unit of analysis from this viewpoint is the political environment. “All organizations are dependent on their environment, but the degree of dependence varies,” according to Bolman and Deal. “Generally speaking, organizations in more uncertain, turbulent, and rapidly changing environments will develop more sophisticated architectural forms... The effectiveness of an organization is therefore contingent on how well its structure matches or can deal with the demands of the environment.”

Allison argues that just as an individual’s actions are shaped and constrained by his or her organizational environment, so the organization’s actions -- or the actions of the organization’s leaders -- are shaped by “a central, competitive game. The name of the game is politics.” “Government behavior can thus be understood...not as organizational outputs but as results of these bargaining games.” These results come about through the interaction -- the bargaining games -- of the leaders of government organizations and of governments. Similarly, the results of organizational action cannot be considered in isolation, but must be considered the results of organizational interaction, both within the organization and with environmental forces.

The political viewpoint, according to Bolman and Deal, “views organizations as ‘alive and screaming’ political arenas that house a complex variety of individual and group interests.” Their five “propositions” regarding the political perspective include viewing organizations as coalitions of individuals and interest groups, recognizing the “enduring differences” among and between both individuals and groups, understanding that resource allocation is at the center of most critical decisions, recognizing that power is the most important resource, and recognizing decisions as emerging from “bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying for position among members of different coalitions.” Expanded a level, not only do
organizations consist internally of these factors, but they exist in environments driven by the same kinds of relationships and interactions. Through this conceptual lens, organizations are viewed as members of coalitions which, by their very nature, shift and re-form regularly. The range of forms of power must also be understood -- from positional power, to expertise, to the ability to control either agendas or symbols. Relationships, particularly power relationships, are the essence of this framework.

There are many adherents to this conception of reality. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984), in discussing the failed implementation of the Oakland Project, describe implementation as "a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them." Implementation requires joint action, or at least careful coordination among many actors. These are, at best, difficult to achieve. "When we say that programs have failed," they observe, "this suggests that we are surprised. If we thought from the beginning that they were unlikely to be successful, their failure to achieve stated goals or to work at all would not cry out for any special explanation. If we believed that intense conflicts of interests were involved, if people who had to cooperate were expected to be at loggerheads, if necessary resources were far beyond those available, we might wonder rather more why the programs were attempted instead of expressing amazement at their shortcomings."

Pressman and Wildavsky’s major point is that a decision, like a policy, is not complete without implementation. And implementation of a major decision presumes both the passage of time and, generally, the involvement of numbers of actors. These actors, both corporate and individual, exist within their own contexts and are governed by their own peculiar mix of goals, beliefs, and preferences -- as well as their formal responsibilities and alliances.

In describing the relationship between a publishing firm and its environment, Powell (1985) notes that the "dialectical process, between editors as agents of the publishing house and editors as friends and supporters of authors, reflects the manner in which organizations incorporate certain aspects of their environment -- certain techniques, knowledge, and skills... Ongoing affiliations of this kind reflect more than a web of resource dependencies. They are institutionally embedded, often dating back to the earliest days of a company’s history.” Thus, “the actual line of demarcation between a firm and its environment
may be problematic...." As with ambiguity and uncertainty in the determination of preferences, Perrow observes, "[T]he most significant examples of uncertainty absorption occur at the boundaries of organizations, where information about the environment is obtained. The selective perception, distortions, omissions, and so on that can occur in a marketing unit are numerous, and little can be done to check this tendency, for it is impossible to obtain complete and accurate information. Even the information obtained still leaves much uncertainty because consumer preferences, competitors' actions, disposable income, or the weather may change rapidly."

For Holman and Deal, "The political perspective suggests that the goals, structure and policies of an organization emerge from an ongoing process of bargaining and negotiating among the major interest groups...the political view suggests that the exercise of power is a natural part of an ongoing contest. Those who get and use power best will be winners. There is no guarantee that those who gain power will use it wisely or justly. But it is not inevitable that power and politics are always demeaning and destructive." However applied, it is the power, resources, preferences, skill and knowledge that go into the bargaining equation that determine the result and that form the focus of this framework.

For a highly politicized institution, such as a public school system or public college, theories of political decision-making help explain why things are as they are. Banfield (1961), offers this thesis with regard to Chicago, specifically, but more generally for decentralized systems in which no one person holds full control: "The paradigm is as follows: the actions of many persons, each of whom has independent authority, must be concerted for a proposal to be adopted; the proponents of the proposal try to concert these actions by exercising influence -- by persuading, deceiving, inveigling, rewarding, punishing, and otherwise inducing; meanwhile the opponents exercise influence either to prevent the actions from being concerted or to concert them in behalf of some alternative proposal which they prefer."

Each person, in this schema, has some measure of influence, some institutional power and resources at his or her control. The more such influence under one's control, and the more skillfully it is used, the more authority can be asserted. Organizational resources are highly desirable in such a formulation, while individual alliances are likely to be fleeting.
"Organizations generate power," Perrow observes; "it is the inescapable accompaniment of the production of goods and services; it comes in many forms from many sources; it is contested; and it is certainly used." The power of an individual is determined by the position held and the resources controlled. According to Pfeffer (1981), the "power of organizational actors is fundamentally determined by two things, the importance of what they do in the organization and their skill in doing it." Similarly, organizations exist in power relationships with each other, based on their structural and legal relationships and the resources they control. Resource dependency (Pfeffer) is at the very root of power relationships. As control of resources changes, or as the resource balance shifts, dependency relationships also shift and the balance of power is altered. Similarly, ability -- being able to control knowledge concerning alternatives, to determine the description of alternatives (decision premises) or the selection of alternatives, or to influence broad public opinion through individual stature, persuasion or perception -- is a major source of power and influence, and a major determinant of organizational decisions.

Conclusion

Thirty years ago, Clark (1960) examined a single institution in great detail -- "an organization and its context" -- and raised some of the questions, such as cooling out, that have shaped the debate ever since. In his classic ethnographic look at City Community College, London (1978) illustrates the early ambivalence of community college students and faculty, illuminating the conflicts that clouded the organization in its early stages through extended conversations with students and faculty. These studies are valuable in their insights on community colleges in general, and in illustrating how the forces that have shaped such colleges may continue to exert influence over the nature of such institutions in the coming years. Both sounded themes that have reverberated for many years. However, both are significantly dated; the colleges are more mature now, and their student bodies and faculties have both changed dramatically. A more complete literature based on the institution as it is today, in all its complexity, is needed.

It is in this context that the study that follows examines a single institution and focuses primarily on a single decision, using case study methodology to illustrate larger themes and influences. Through the use of theoretical perspectives on higher education, community colleges, and the nature of the decision-making
process, the intent of this paper is to illuminate some areas of the growth, culture, and decision-making influences of a municipally sponsored two-year college -- the kinds of factors that have received little attention in the past. Chapters Three through Five describe three successive historical periods in the history of Quincy College, during which its growth and development strongly influenced the factors that were most important to decision-makers. Chapters Six and Seven provide an analysis of the college's growth, and its decision related to governance, based on the foregoing theoretical perspectives.
Notes to Chapter Two


15. Tierney, Organizational Culture, 127.

16. Tierney, Organizational Culture, 130.


34. Richardson, et al., *Governance for the Two-Year College*, 112, 133, 211.


CHAPTER THREE
Individual Leadership and Control: 1948-1986

The college's story is presented in Chapters Three, Four and Five. Each chapter represents a period in the college's history where a particular set of forces, either individual, organizational or political, dominated the college's growth and development. As discussed more completely in Chapter Six, the college progressed through a long period of individual control to periods where organizational and political factors dominated college life and activity. This progression paralleled the college's growth, its accumulation of resources, and its emerging identity.

The story of this growth is presented chronologically, as experienced by those involved and reported in the press. Since the history and development of Quincy Junior College has always been closely associated with the development of the state community colleges, each chapter also contains a summary of the parallel development of Massachusetts' state college system.

Introduction

Like many junior colleges, Quincy Junior College was launched in the early 1950's as a 13th and 14th grade for area youth who, it was believed, had limited opportunities to attend other colleges. Although there was some hesitation to cover even the minimal start-up costs, the launching of Sputnik kicked off a national wave of patriotic support for education that helped the college through its initial years. Chapter Three covers the growth of the college from this very small adult education program held in the afternoon and evening into the third largest public two-year college in the state. The chapter is divided into three sections, each of which covers a major component of the college's early history: its formation, the long struggle to win designation as a state community college, and, when that struggle ultimately failed, the reformation of the college after the tax-limiting Proposition 2½ with a new president and fiscal structure.

During most of this period, the college was controlled and led by a series of strong, sometimes domineering, often charismatic individuals. Initially, the most important players in the college's formation included members of the committees who studied needs and championed the creation of the college. Thereafter, this series of strong individuals ruled over the college and largely determined the nature of its
development, aided considerably by external events that helped the college grow through the late 1970's. The most significant and visible actors in this portion of the college’s history are identified below:

- **Charles Sweeny**: A long time supporter of Quincy Junior College, Sweeny and others helped launch the college. A School Committee member in the 1950's, Sweeny was also a founder of College Courses, Inc. in the 1950's, remaining active into the 1990's.

- **Kenneth White**: White was the college’s first full-time director, later named its first president.

- **James J. McIntyre**: Both Mayor of Quincy and a State Senator (at the same time), McIntyre was a key figure in Quincy politics and was generally supportive of the college. Mayor McIntyre led the effort to win the designation of South Shore Community College (SSCC).

- **Edward F. Pierce**: Formerly a dean at a New Hampshire college, Pierce was the college’s second president; the first with true academic credentials.

- **Lawrence Creedon**: A favorite of McIntyre’s, School Supt. Creedon exercised enormous clout, demanding loyalty, wielding power in a strict authoritarian fashion, and reportedly planting many friends in district jobs, including at the college. Until he was felled by a sex scandal which threatened to expand, Creedon was the undisputed king of both college and school system.

- **O. Clayton Johnson**: The city's first black administrator and the college’s third president, Johnson had been a college administrator in several settings, most recently at Worcester State College. Appointed just after Proposition 2 1/2 passed, Johnson was seen by some as the person to pull the college through such a tough period. The equal of Creedon in strength of personality, Johnson became the primary college spokesman and authority when Creedon resigned.

1. **The College is Founded: 1949 - 1962**

   **Formation**: The seeds of Quincy Junior College were planted in the 1940's. Junior colleges were becoming more popular, but the community college boom of the 1960's had not yet begun. During the 1940's, two Massachusetts communities -- Holyoke and Newton -- were the first to create junior colleges as parts of their school systems. In 1949, Headmaster Gordon Thayer of the well-respected Thayer Academy in Braintree, having just completed a study of educational needs in the area, proposed using the
soon-to-be-decommissioned Naval Air Station in nearby Weymouth for a regional junior college. "We graduate some 3000 students per year in 16 towns of the South Shore area," Mr. Thayer commented. "Of these, approximately 27 percent are in the college preparatory program; 25 percent are in commercial programs. Both programs presume further education. Actually, less that 14 percent of the graduates continue their education. The barrier for the other 34 percent is primarily an economic barrier." While Thayer's recommendation for the air station was never realized, it did bring attention to the topic of post-secondary education. Later that same year, the South Shore Chamber of Commerce approached Boston University about opening a South Shore campus. In response, BU President Daniel Marsh commissioned a study of need, which included interviewing 400 local business people; in late December, Dean Judson Butler proposed "tailor-made" courses specifically designed for the needs of the South Shore. Six months later, however, BU abandoned the idea as "too costly." This rejection was seen as a "serious setback" by educational and business leaders in the community, but the Chamber of Commerce vowed to find a way to make a local community college viable.

Little progress was made for several years, but in 1954, several prominent Quincy-based educators were tapped for a College Advisory Committee to explore the potential of a junior college further. At its second meeting, the committee chair predicted that there would be no tax burden for the citizens of Quincy, based on a review of Newton and Holyoke Junior Colleges, which were "practically self-supporting." A second committee was established to consider the issues further, and a counselor at the high school was hired to conduct another study. Estimates of need were presented to the Quincy School Committee in May, 1955. By this time, community interest had been stimulated. Based on the committee's plan, which had been prepared from yet another study by a Harvard doctoral student, a Patriot Ledger staff reporter developed a series of three articles on the possibility of a junior college entitled "Bargain in Education." Summarizing the beliefs of the advisory committee, she noted in the series that the head of the taxpayer's association favored a college, that Newton and Holyoke Jr. Colleges were "largely self-supporting," that the total cost to the city was likely to be a "negligible" $10-15,000 per year, and that the return would be "immeasurable." Quoting the committee, she found a "great need," and
described the junior college as an "asset to Quincy." Finally, she noted the sizeable pool of students to
draw from on the South Shore, the potential lessening of the region's dependency on Boston, and the dual
purpose of preparing students for either further education or jobs. The School Committee of Quincy was
to have the "final" say on the launching of this much-to-be-desired institution.5

Editors of the Patriot Ledger, the South Shore's newspaper of record and the same paper that had
published the laudatory series, doubted this assessment and editorialized against it. While affirming their
support of "any realistic proposal to improve education in Quincy," the editors questioned the assumptions
of the Joint Study Committee. Among these, they expressed doubts as to whether there would be enough
students and questioned the relevance of Newton Junior College, which enrolled 75 students: could
Quincy hope to enroll three times as many, the minimum number needed for viability? Further, the
editorial questioned the cost estimates being presented, and noted Newton's policy of using high school
teachers to teach the college courses. Where would the faculty come from? Who would foot the bill?
"The idea of a junior college ought to be publicly debated on a sound basis," the editors concluded, "but
until up to date facts and figures are available we think the city would do better to start eliminating
weaknesses that presently exist at the elementary and high school levels."6

When the school committee actually met in mid-December 1954, a college in Quincy was discussed at
some length, and $12,000 was ultimately allocated as start-up funding. At the same time, however,
another proposal was brought in by the superintendent of schools. Dubbed "Northeastern in Quincy," it
involved the prospect of a branch of that university locating in the city. Despite the allocation, school
committee members decided to meet with officials from the two existing Junior Colleges -- Newton and
Holyoke -- before making a final determination.7

Debate continued through the first half of 1955. While Joint Committee Chairman Fritz Streiferd was
sure that "Quincy has everything to gain,"8 Harvard educator Harold Hunt (the adviser of the doctoral
student who had conducted the study), was convinced that "it is inevitable state aid will be needed" to
cover costs. He advised the school committee to "go slow."9 In February, the school committee was
"strongly advised to appoint a director and get on with the job,"10 by the directors of the Newton and
Holyoke community junior colleges. In March, however, the committee cut college funds to bring the budget into line, calling the appropriation an “educational extra.”

Nonetheless, by September, 1956, college level evening courses were being offered. The cost was $14/credit hour; $42 for a three-credit course. Two professors from other institutions were hired to teach English and history, and a director with junior college experience was appointed. As distinct from the other junior colleges, both faculty members had doctorates. One had retired from Boston University, while the other was chair of the History Department at Eastern Nazarene College; both had earned graduate degrees from Harvard. These credentials were publicly and proudly announced, both by school department officials and by the Ledger, with the repeated assertion that these were to be truly college level courses, not just another version of adult education. In addition, an advisory committee was appointed consisting of Quincy residents who taught at various colleges including not only the local Eastern Nazarene, but also at Tufts (English), MIT (engineering), Northeastern (chemistry), and the chairman of the department of education at Boston College. To this day, the acting Vice Chairman of the school committee at that time, Charles Sweeny, believes that the use of “real” college professors set Quincy Junior College apart from the other Junior Colleges, and contributed to its survival. “Newton used their high school teachers to teach in the junior college. The kids went there, they had the same teachers they had in high school, and just on image and impression, they didn’t get the respect a college professor should get...With one exception, a French teacher from Quincy High School, all the teachers or professors [at Quincy Junior College] were college level.”

In February of 1957, the college reported its first deficit ($828), due to lack of enrollment. While enrollment fluctuated in the early years, deficits were common. Reports of deficits tended to be interspersed with statements by college and school officials that the college always ran in the black. This may have been due, in part, to the method of financing. College funds were approved as part of the Quincy Public Schools operating budget, but income went into the city’s general fund. “When we needed it we could get it from there,” according to Sweeny. Still, while college expenses always showed as large
expenditures to school committee members and the press, it appears that college officials saw tuition earnings as a bonus -- a contribution to the city’s coffers not equaled by any of the city’s other schools.

In the enthusiasm to bolster enrollment, some ideas were poorly conceived, such as giving Quincy teachers cut rates and potential raises if they enrolled in QJC classes. As the Ledger noted, most teachers had bachelor’s degrees or more. “To provide pay raises for college graduates who go back to college to take freshman courses is preposterous no matter what institution is to give the courses -- Harvard or the Quincy School Department” opined the Ledger; “it appears to be an idea born of desperation.” This idea was quickly dropped.

Much of 1957 was spent in a public debate as to whether the courses, and Quincy Junior College as it then stood, were “successful” or not, with opinions ranging from “disastrous failure” to having “distinct positive value” and being a valuable and successful trial run. To help defray the cost overrun and support the college, a non-profit organization that came to be called College Courses, Inc. was formed in May. As the year progressed, several events provided momentum to the young effort. In August, the state legislature passed a bill providing a state subsidy of $100 per year per pupil to municipalities that provided college level education. This support, later rescinded, eased the city’s anticipated financial burden. In September, 57 students enrolled on registration night, with several more in process, thus making up the numbers that had been lost in the Spring semester.

Sputnik: 1957 was also the year of Sputnik, the Russian satellite that galvanized a national wave of hand-wringing about the poor quality of American education and the Russians “beating us” into space. In Quincy, as elsewhere, Sputnik changed the nature of the debate. Only two months after the school committee was debating whether the additional state subsidies and increased enrollment were enough to sustain college level courses, public concern turned to focus on how much more could be done, and how fast. “Quincy Warned To Expand Community College System,” screamed a November Ledger headline, followed by the lead sentence, “Tragedy looms for many of Quincy’s younger people in being denied higher education beyond high school unless the city’s present Community College facilities are extended...” In his remarks, Harvard educator Harold Hunt, who had previously advised the school
committee to move slowly, urged the committee to move forward, noting that “no stigma would attach to Community College students who became accredited in transfer to a senior college,” and that “Quincy is large enough to support a good Community College and its young people are entitled to receive its benefits right at home.”

In an editorial, the Patriot Ledger warily endorsed the school committee’s move as beneficial to students, but warned that “the city of Quincy is in no position to subsidize education beyond high school to any great extent.” The paper’s editors posed questions that resonated for many years to follow: How long will the “modest” subsidy remain modest? How high will the standards be? And, since the University of Massachusetts had previously maintained that community colleges should come under its jurisdiction, what would the attitude of the state colleges be? Still, enthusiasm remained high. Charles Sweeny, still a member of the school committee as well as chairman of College Courses, Inc., highlighted several of the reasons for this enthusiasm in a letter to the editor: the lack of direct competition in the area, the ease of finding prominent professors from private institutions such as Harvard, Tufts, MIT, and BU, the cost-effectiveness of using public school buildings for instruction, and the recent claim by the UMass president that his institution had no interest in jurisdiction over community colleges. As for lowering standards to attract students, he wrote, “experience to date, here and elsewhere, has proven that no such action is necessary to ‘get students.’ As time goes on the problem will be rather to limit the number of students commensurately with available facilities.”

**State Community Colleges – Massachusetts Climbs on the Bandwagon:** Late in 1957, with the release of its Audit of State Needs, the state praised Quincy, Holyoke and Newton for their foresight in launching junior colleges, even as it took notice of it’s own ranking as 48th in the nation in support of public higher education. The audit had been initiated in 1956, based on the “economic prosperity” of the 1950’s, and the desire of the newly elected Governor Foster Furcolo, with his allies in the state legislature, to expand the educational system statewide. When the commission’s report was presented, not only were the existing junior colleges praised, but several statewide efforts were announced. These included the
expansion of the University of Massachusetts, the diversification of the teachers' colleges, and the creation of a system of community colleges.  

The three communities with existing junior colleges were naturally interested in this development. State involvement could mean money, competition, and/or state control, depending on how the system was set up. Initially, the governor's proposal called for community college students to pay $400 per year in tuition, compared to $100 for the University of Massachusetts (and about $200 at Quincy, with a $100 state subsidy), on the theory that because UMass students lived on campus, they had to cover additional living expenses. This provision was debated, along with others, and did not last.

In the meantime, QJC grew slowly. In May, 1958, it introduced the concept of technical and job-related courses, following a national trend toward occupational education documented by Brint & Karabel, Dougherty, and others. This trend was resisted by the Patriot Ledger editorially, but a survey of needs was conducted and business-related courses were introduced into the college curriculum in fall of 1958. By December, 1958, the college enrolled 10 students full-time and 73 part-time. Since state junior colleges were still "a long way off," the chairman of the QJC Development Council was predicting "triple-growth" -- to 250 students -- by 1961. Fears that this growth would be expensive had already proved "groundless," supporters said, as half of the cost was borne by tuition with the state and city splitting the rest. In fact, even with its continued growth, the college's budget request for 1960 was 60% lower than the amount spent in 1959, as the college was becoming "more efficient" in its growth, and more funding was expected from the state. Despite these achievements, or perhaps because of them, the superintendent of schools announced in December, 1959, that Quincy would apply to be one of the first three state-funded community colleges in the state. An unused school building was identified to house the college if the application was approved. That same month, the school committee also voted to ask neighboring towns, who were already benefitting from the existence of the college, to help support it. An important factor in the selection of the initial state community colleges was supposed to be community support (some communities were adamantly opposed to housing a community college).
Quincy Junior, coupled with the anticipated fiscal support of the closest neighboring communities, was seen as enhancing Quincy's application.27

2. South Shore Community College -- The Dream: 1960-1979

Getting Ready to Join the State: The first state community college to open was in Pittsfield, in September of 1960. Three others were scheduled to be opened in the following year. Partly to be ready for a state designation, should it come, and partly to accommodate growth, Quincy Junior College officials began discussing a permanent site for QJC. A full-time director was hired, and he began making plans to expand from afternoon and evening classes to a full day schedule. The first “graduating class” -- three students -- received diplomas in June. Despite this growth, the Patriot Ledger cited problems at Newton Jr. College -- the resignation of its director over the unwillingness of the NEASC to accredit that institution, and the inadequate community backing that apparently contributed to that unwillingness -- to issue a stern warning about the “futility” of attempting to run a college so close to Boston. “We do not believe the taxpayers of Quincy want to go into the junior college business. Perhaps the same feeling is in the minds of School Committee members and accounts for the ridiculously inadequate, but also unobtrusive, budgets the committee has been allowing the junior college... Now that Quincy Junior College has had a test run, it would seem time to take stock. Assuming that the taxpayers of this city do not want to invest large sums of money to bring the school up to the standards of institutions of higher education in Boston, there would appear to be little use in pushing the experiment further.”28

Rampant Growth: For all the discussions of state takeover, and despite the lack of permanent housing and the disapproval of the press, the college continued to grow. In October 1961, it announced its Fall enrollment as 127 night students, 103 day students, and 99 teachers and nurses; 329 students overall -- surpassing even the optimistic predictions of previous years. In December, the college’s budget had nearly doubled to $99,000, with the expectation that all but $14,000 would be returned to the city’s coffers. The trend continued in 1962, as Fall enrollment increased by nearly 50%, to 410, with a parallel budget increase. In 1962, as 10 students graduated, the state’s Board of Collegiate Authority granted the college
authority to award associate degrees in arts and sciences. The proposed 1963 budget rose to $126,000, of which all but $17,000 was to be returned to the city.

State Affiliation: As the Board of Regents had not acted on its 1959 request, the school committee once again took up the question of offering the college to the state in 1962. At the earliest, this possibility was seen as a few years distant; in the meantime, site issues were raised as a major concern. The college’s use of classrooms in the Coddington School, a building also used by high school and trade school students until 2:30, was seen by many as an obstacle. A state takeover would have cut the college’s $400 tuition in half, but the executive director of the Board of Regional Colleges warned that “we aren’t interested in going into a shared building.” Some school committee members urged quick movement on the building of a new Trade School, freeing up the Coddington School for college use. Others, including Vice Chair Charles Sweeny, were not in a rush to hand the college to the state, favoring a go-slow approach. Urgency was clearly felt by the college director and school superintendent, however. The director noted that lack of adequate housing would also hold up accreditation, and the superintendent warned, “If we don’t apply [to be a regional community college]...someplace else will.”

In March, 1963, John Costello, the Acting Director of the Massachusetts Board of Regional Colleges, met with a committee formed from Quincy and the surrounding communities to discuss the potential of a community college for the South Shore. Costello urged those present to quickly complete the required surveys and applications, and indicated that there was “a strong chance” for the South Shore to have a state college by 1965, joining the state’s five other operating community colleges. Among the criteria of importance: a survey of educational opportunities, business, and transportation; the identification of at least three sites, preferably with operable buildings, and strong “evidence of continuing interest” on the part of the community. Costello indicated that several communities had made inquiries, and that strong interest was being shown by Brockton, as well as Quincy. This statement may have raised the temperature in the room considerably, given the competitive relationship between the two cities. The committee, comprised of 18 educational and political leaders from a dozen communities, voted unanimously to proceed with an application, and Quincy Junior College officials offered to sponsor, and pay for, the survey.
Two months later, the field of potential sites had been narrowed to three, including the Coddington School in Quincy Center (current site of the college), and sites in Weymouth and Hingham. Costello remained enthusiastic about the prospects, noting that a college had been planned for the South Shore from the start. The site, which might be a “first stage” site used temporarily until a “second stage” site could be identified, would ultimately be selected by the State Board of Regional Colleges, and would probably be whichever location “costs the state the least.” College director Kenneth White told the committee at its May meeting that the only weakness in the developing proposal was indication of community interest, due largely to the lack of diligence of committee members. Interest among potential students was high. For the rest of the year, the communities prepared and submitted their reports. And the college grew. In September, combined enrollment reached 600, including 208 full-time freshmen, 75 sophomores, 60 nursing students, and 257 in the evening division.

In February, 1964, the school committee voted to ask the state to consider taking over the Coddington School, site of Quincy Jr. College (plus spill-over high school classes), as the temporary site of South Shore regional community college. The general feeling reported was that the city stood a better chance of being the permanent site of the college if it offered to be the temporary site. At the same meeting, Director Kenneth White was named the college’s first president, signifying not a change in duties but a reflection of stature equal to the leaders of similar colleges across the state.

More Growth: The college continued to grow. In May, 1965, it announced that it expected a Fall enrollment of 750 students as it prepared to graduate 45. By August, however, it was reporting 875 students. At this point, the college was divided into four divisions, with a total of 38 faculty members, one-third of whom were part time and most of whom held at least Master’s degrees. In addition, as President Kenneth White reported to the school committee in October, 1965, the “quality” of students was improving: the board scores of Quincy students were “approaching within a few points of the norm of the average four-year college.” Further, President White noted, 90% of the graduating students went on to further education.
All of these trends continued without interruption. Enrollment grew to 1,200 by Spring, 1966, and to 1,350 by the Fall. Educational offerings also expanded, especially through continuing education, while space remained extremely cramped. In Fall of 1967, the college was finally forced to turn away qualified students and create a waiting list. Throughout this period, daytime enrollment had been limited to "qualified students;" those not deemed qualified or sufficiently serious were allowed to try evening classes. If they were successful in the evening, they were generally allowed to enroll as degree students. Simultaneously, the search for appropriate land to offer to the state continued, led by Mayor and State Senator James J. McIntyre. From the end of 1967 into 1968, the city, at the urging of Mayor McIntyre, got serious about site identification. Sites were identified, chosen, and presented to the State Board of Regional Colleges which, by September of 1968, selected the site it favored. Along the way, state officials regularly indicated strong interest in siting a community college in Quincy.

**Massasoit Community College:** At the same time, plans for another community college in nearby Brockton had moved past the Quincy effort. By 1966, Massasoit Community College was open and running in an unused suburban high school outside of Brockton. While site considerations also slowed the building of a new Massasoit campus, the commitment of a state-supported community college for Brockton had been realized. As Brockton is not considered part of the South Shore, it is not clear that the opening of a college there precluded opening another in Quincy. Indeed, even after the opening of Massasoit, state officials gave every indication that they were planning another in Quincy. Still, there would be, if nothing else, a significant overlap in service areas if both colleges were funded.

**Other Forms of State Support:** By 1967, the Board of Regional Colleges oversaw 12 functioning "centers," which included community colleges and vocational centers. As each new set of "centers" was determined, officials indicated an interest in Quincy. But the designation was never made. At the end of 1967, the board announced its intention to open four more centers. Quincy once again prepared to bid. In an October meeting between city officials and the president and chairman of the Regional College Board, it was agreed that the communities that had formed colleges on their own initiative should not be punished for having done so. The president promised to develop an "interim" plan of subsidy for the regional
vocational schools in the state, and for Quincy and Newton Jr. Colleges, until all could be incorporated into a state program. Mayor McIntyre appointed another site committee. The following year, apparently frustrated by his lack of success and the increasing burden on taxpayers, Mayor McIntyre announced that the city should "abandon" Quincy Junior College, in that it was hurting efforts to have South Shore Community College established. At about the same time, the superintendent proposed doubling the college's tuition from $380 (residents) and $440 (non-residents). A smaller but still significant increase (about 50%) was eventually voted.

For several years, the governance and finance questions seemed to follow parallel tracks. The quest to have Quincy named as the site of South Shore Community College continued, while a parallel effort to have the state provide significant state support to the remaining junior colleges -- Newton and Quincy -- was also pursued. Superintendent Pruitt and Mayor McIntyre recommended filing a bill with the state for reimbursement of "excess costs," which might be, as Pruitt said, "less expensive and thereby more acceptable to state officials than state takeover." Since site negotiations were proceeding with the state (slowly), efforts in 1969 and 1970 to temporarily house the growing student population, and to cover costs, were seen as interim measures during the 2-3 years of construction. In February, 1969, the college was given temporary use of the old Norfolk County Courthouse, next door to the Coddington School (now Coddington Hall) as the court moved to a new site. In March, Newton and Quincy requested "temporary" aid from the state to fund the difference between revenue from tuition and costs. In 1970, students rallied at the statehouse in favor of this additional funding, which nonetheless received an adverse report from the legislative committee and which was not forthcoming.

**The Dream Lives On:** Site discussions continued for several years. In 1968, after touring a potential site in Quincy Point, the state Board of Regional Community Colleges voted in favor of establishing a community college in the Quincy area, choosing from two available sites. The Quincy Point site was tentatively selected in September, and site planning was funded. Mayor McIntyre, who called "realization of the community college his top priority item for 1968," was pleased. By the end of 1969, problems were found with the chosen site, and funding was delayed pending another year of study. But in 1970, the
Chairman of the Senate Ways and Means Committee and State Senator from Brockton, James Burke, announced that he opposed funding for purchasing a site in Quincy, saying that since other communities had provided land, Quincy should too. Quincy urged the state to buy the site, to no avail. In March, a new site -- Broadmeadows -- was identified by the city. It became clear that the state would not purchase land for a community college in Quincy, despite the lobbying and precedents for such a purchase found by Quincy legislators. Nonetheless, the legislature did appropriate $250,000 for site selection studies and related work. The Patriot Ledger, which described South Shore Community College as having “a long history that centers on the theme of frustration” also noted an irony in the vote to approve the funds: the bill, which was passed with the blessing of Brockton’s Senator Burke and was unopposed, also contained $350,000 for Phase II plan preparation of Massasoit Community College, being built in Brockton, and a $500,000 multi-service youth center, also to be located in Brockton.

Since the state would not pay for the site, Mayor McIntyre favored the cheaper alternative site at Broadmeadows, despite the potential for more expensive construction costs due to wetlands covering a portion of the area. This site was approved by the state board in February, 1971. The city began negotiating for the land in April, and bought it in July. In October of that same year, it transferred most of the land to the state -- about 90 acres -- for the purpose of constructing a new community college. Still, nothing much seemed to happen. In April of 1972, Quincy officials met with Governor Sargent to try to “give the thing a push along and see how things are going.” In 1973, an architectural review panel was set up to review plans for the new college, and in March, 1974, the Board of Community Colleges announced that SSCC was a “top priority” in its 1974 capital outlay budget recommendations. Up until this time, the Ledger reported, the proposal had been “hopelessly lost in a bureaucratic tangle of red tape involving the Board of Community Colleges and Bureau of Building Construction.” SSCC, it appeared, had been 11th on the priority list, despite what the city had been told, and had been vetoed by Gov. Sargent. Even after the appropriation of $750,000 for site work, only test borings were completed. With the placement of the South Shore as the second on the revised priority list and the resolving of the difficulties between the two state agencies, Quincy officials were optimistic that the new college, finally, would be built.
The Rock of Sisyphus: Despite the official invitation to apply to be a state community college (1963), several official designations of sites for South Shore Community College (1968, 1970), the taking of land by the city for use as a college, and the subsequent deeding of the land for that purpose to the state (1971), the rendering of drawings for buildings on the deeded land, (early 1970's), and the designation of a college for the South Shore as a “top priority” (1974), South Shore Community College still did not materialize. College faculty members and administrators do not report the possibility of being part of the state system as something they thought about much, and it is not hard to see why. Nonetheless, through the efforts of Mayor McIntyre and later Mayor Tobin, who were both state senators and held various other local offices at different times, official Quincy maintained an optimism that the new community college would eventually come to pass.

As to why Quincy continually got bumped from the priority list, there are no clear answers. According to one source, Mayor McIntyre did not push hard for state takeover while Quincy Junior College ran its small surplus, but began to push the state when the college started to run a deficit. “The word was he felt we could become part of the state system at any time.” Another source believes that each time Quincy came up on the list, a greater need was felt elsewhere in the state because, after all, Quincy already had a functioning college. At the same time, faculty members from that era did not consider SSCC to be a serious possibility, though it sounded good. Students were not generally aware of the potential change.

Growing Pains: In the meantime, the ever increasing number of students caused not only space problems but also, sometimes, budget shortages. Budget reports during these years speak of small deficits and small surpluses. The more critical issue, however, was that tuition at Quincy Junior College ran approximately twice that of the community colleges. When there were no nearby community colleges, this was only an issue of the students’ ability to pay. With more community colleges opening up, however (particularly Massasoit), the potential for damaging competition loomed.

Nonetheless, the limited facilities of the college were constantly filled. Classes were reported at capacity in Fall, 1969, with a waiting list of 200. Enrollment leveled off at approximately 1,700 - 1,800
students for a couple of years, and despite high costs the college was generally described as more or less breaking even. Growth occurred where it could, such as a 30% increase in summer enrollment announced in 1973, but lack of space, the need to raise funds through tuition, and the related inability to pay for teacher salary increases or purchase new equipment, were frequently cited as problems.

During this period, long-time President Kenneth White was killed in an auto accident, and was replaced by a Dean from a New Hampshire College, Edward Pierce -- arguably the first truly collegiate level president. In addition, Supt. Pruitt was replace by Lawrence Creedon, a product of Quincy and the school system, who had previously been a star principal. Early 1970's, the college applied for accreditation and, in 1976, won approval from the state for several new Associate's of Science degrees in technological areas. The college increased enrollment to 2,500 by the end of 1973, using 14 rooms "on campus," plus another 19 "off-campus," including the abandoned courthouse next door.48 Enrollment grew to a reported 4,000 by 1975; budget shortfalls announced for the school department were attributed to increased college enrollment, and were made up by increased revenue, which reverted to the city's coffers.

A New Era: 1976 saw the election of a new governor in Massachusetts -- Michael Dukakis -- and the introduction of a new era -- fiscal austerity. While little activity is reported regarding the new community college in 1975, architectural plans were developed during this period. By 1976, financial troubles that had been brewing were beginning to be felt within the state college system -- even as the SSCC site experienced still more problems. Early in 1976, Governor Dukakis proposed a reorganization of the state's colleges to save money and be more efficient. Sen. Kevin Harrington, President of the Senate, counter-proposed a revised reorganization in May.49 These proposals were eventually routed to a study committee and buried. The financial outlook for state colleges did not improve, however, and by 1977, the state colleges were reported in the Globe as being "in trouble." The school committee voted again, in April, 1977, to "encourage the state to assume full responsibility for Quincy Jr. College, thus making it a community college for the South Shore." The Patriot Ledger described the state, perhaps not surprisingly, as having "cooled" on the idea of taking over QJC, noting that the costs of a state college were four times the cost of Quincy Junior.50
The mid 1970's were the beginning of a long and difficult period for Massachusetts' state colleges, and several trends began to take shape. One of these was that community colleges, in particular, began to look to continuing education as a source of revenue with which to supplement other college operations. Unlike other states, continuing education fees and tuition were set on campus, and CE revenues remained within the confines of the college. It is hardly surprising that community college presidents, facing diminishing state funding, would turn to continuing education. By September of 1976, continuing education programs were described as “booming” in the Boston Globe. (This was seen as a benefit at that time; only later did it become a “boondoggle.”) By the end of 1977, Gov. Dukakis had revived the notion of “reorganizing” the state’s colleges. Having learned some political lessons, this time he appointed a Special Commission to study the question. Intent on cutting expenses even as he broke his “lead pipe” guarantee not to raise taxes, the Governor was not about to let the colleges escape the new austerity of state government.

The dream of Quincy’s housing a new South Shore Community College had probably died by 1978, killed by the governor and the state’s precarious fiscal situation. If it had not, it is likely that one final event finished off the idea: in 1978, twelve years after its first classes were held in an abandoned high school outside of town, Massasoit Community College opened at its new campus in Brockton under the leadership of its first president, Gerald Burke, former Plymouth County Commissioner.

Many interviewees report the speculation that a deal was cut among the various lawmakers, perhaps including Gov. Dukakis, in which Brockton got the community college while Quincy got several stops on the extended Red Line of the Boston subway system (and got the train placed below ground, a significant accomplishment). “The fact that it eventually did go to Brockton was definitely a political compromise made in the State House by politicians at that time,” commented one source. “You give me this, and I’ll see that you get that. Quincy was interested in some things. It was willing to say goodbye to the notion of the college being in Quincy, the community college... There were some definite advantages that looked very clear to the economic future of Quincy... And there was a strong delegation from Brockton that was
also very interested in having a college being in the Brockton area." And so, killed by a poor economy, a tight fisted governor, and, possibly, some political bargaining, the dream finally died.


The fiscal troubles that led to the demise of the South Shore Community College dream were the beginning of a long period of economic and political turmoil in the city, the state, and across the country. Tax cutting fervor was beginning to develop nationally, and Massachusetts, often derisively called Taxachusetts, was hitting financial difficulties even in the midst of relatively high taxes. Financial problems for both the state college system and the city school system began to be felt several years before the passing of the state’s tax-limiting Proposition 2½. After its passage, financial conditions were even worse.

At the same time, Quincy Jr. College's growth had begun to lead to the emergence of organizational issues, particularly those related to the divergence between the tight control exercised by the superintendent and the growing trend of the college toward more collegiate functioning. This is demonstrated most clearly in the disengagement of President Pierce from presidential functioning, and in the identification of governance as an issue to be resolved in the initial accreditation report. It is likely, as discussed more completely in Chapter Six, that this organizational stress would have become more pronounced had not Proposition 2½ caused a major change in the college’s structure -- a change that threatened its very survival.

The Good Old Days: President Pierce had come to Quincy Junior College in 1972; Supt. Creedon was appointed in 1969, so patterns of operation were well established by the time of Proposition 2½. These patterns were not altogether happy ones for all parties, but the rules of the game were clear to everyone within the system. Larry Creedon was often described as a brilliant educator and administrator. He was named Superintendent of the Year, honored by various societies, and had written a book on education. He is credited by some for bringing better educational practices to the city. He was also known to be highly autocratic -- a “little dictator” with “a very, very domineering personality.” This personality, combined with close ties to the McIntyre political machine, gave him “much more power than an ordinary
superintendent." He was known to wander the halls of schools, dropping in on teachers unexpectedly or demanding an immediate response from the internal phone system he used to call individuals within the system and, according to some reports, to eavesdrop on them. While promoting some innovations at the schools, he “owned” the school committee. He would deliberately tell parents “things that the school committee knew were wrong and they just didn’t correct it.”

Pierce was “laissez-faire.” He was “not going to challenge Creedon, except meekly.” While Pierce ran the institution day to day, Creedon was the “godfather.” Pierce had to attend the superintendent’s weekly staff meetings as a kind of department head, and generally functioned in subordination. Among his successes, Pierce was responsible for the college’s first accreditation and, according to some, “it was no accident” that the first accreditation report contained language on governance and the separation of the president from the superintendent. When this issue was raised, Creedon was “apoplectic,” according to one faculty member. Later, according to the same source, when the new law was written creating the college as an entity fiscally separate from the school department, the superintendent “made sure it was written into the law that the college president would continue to work for the superintendent of schools.”

While Pierce remained at the college for approximately 10 years, was a “decent guy” and “did his job,” faculty members and administrators report that he became more “laissez faire” as time went on. Pierce was an avid skier, and several faculty and staff members report more than once having seen him arrive by one door, park his car so that it could be seen by the superintendent, enter the building and attend to the mail or other necessary business, and leave by a different door to catch the bus home so that he could go skiing. Students sometimes reported seeing him on the slopes. How this arrangement suited Creedon, who had reportedly placed a number of friends and girlfriends on the college staff, and who (it seems) must have known about it, is not clear. But with the advent of Prop. 2½, it is generally agreed that Pierce was “eased out,” and “none too gently -- he was embarrassed.”

**Proposition 2 ½ and Quincy Junior College**

The College is “Cut Loose.” Massachusetts was one of the first states in the country to follow the lead of California’s Proposition 13. The state’s Proposition 2½, named after the percent increase in local
property taxes that would be allowed each year, was approved by referendum in 1980. Cities and towns took the brunt of Proposition 2½, which limited local rather than state revenue raising. Quincy was no exception. Even before its passage, the Quincy school system was predicting layoffs of at least 25 teachers due to declining enrollment. In May, 1980, Superintendent Creedon, fighting proposed cuts, was already rolling out all of his rhetorical thunder: “We will be second rate. We will be third rate... These are not games we’re playing. The school system will be destroyed, lock, stock and barrel.”

The 1979-80 situation at Quincy Junior College was better, but only because it had been “rescued” by $200,000 in state vocational funds. Before this support, according to Supt. Creedon, “the picture was very bleak... We wondered if the college could continue to run because of the financial constraints.” With the new funds, the college’s finances were described as “stable,” at least for a year. But 1980 was not a normal year. Finances continued to worsen, even before passage of the tax-limiting proposition.

Most participants remember the creation of the college’s enterprise account, which gave the college the legal right to raise and spend funds, as a reaction to Proposition 2½. In fact, it was discussed and initiated early in 1980, before Proposition 2½ actually passed, as much to help the financially strapped school system as to help the college. Supt. Creedon noted that as the college returned most of its budget to the city anyway, separating the college would not actually help the system much. “I just don’t see that at this particular point in time that it is going to bring us any immediate relief,” he noted. Still, he supported the move for the long term, and the plan went forward.

At the end of that year, 22 years after its formation, Quincy Junior College finally received its accreditation. Noting that the lack of accreditation had not hurt students, President Pierce also hoped that it would aid the college in future fundraising efforts. In early 1981, the city voted to make Quincy Junior College and Quincy Hospital self-supporting entities, and took the necessary steps to introduce a home rule petition into the legislature. As a part of the overall plan, the other income generating programs of the school system not associated with the college -- primarily vocational and technical programs, including nursing -- were also placed under the college’s aegis. According to council president Leo Kelly, who had
been and remained a friend of the college, the vote was taken with regret. Most councillors thought that the separation, while necessary to help the ailing school system, would lead to the death of the college.68

As part of this change, the city would no longer subsidize the difference between revenues and expenses, which the previous year had been $300,000 (out of a $1.7M budget). To fill this gap, the college planned to raise tuition by an average of $400, an increase of roughly 40%. During the same meeting at which this budget was approved, the school committee announced the layoff of 500 school department employees, including 226 teachers.59 Within a few months, after being combined with similar requests from other communities across the state, the college’s enterprise account was approved by the state legislature in July. At the end of the year, a new group to be known as the college’s “Board of Trustees” was established to raise funds for the college.

A New Leader, A New Order: 1982 was the first year of operating under the newly constrained budgets of Proposition 2½ (for the schools) and fiscal autonomy (for the college). Initially, according to one source, Superintendent Creedon, who lost his autonomous control over budgets and appointments through Prop. 2½, sought to make a deal with the city: he would take on the bulk of the losses incurred by the city through Prop. 2½, if he could decide how they got distributed. When he attempted to do this, however, parents did not accept his arguments for cuts, and the plan was abandoned. Even so, the school department laid off hundreds of teachers, while the superintendent attempted to protect as many of his friends in the central administration as he could. The school department had been substantially “padded,” according to this knowledgeable source; “that’s why he could handle it.”70

For the college, “it was really scary,” remembers a long time college employee, “because everybody was worried the college was going to collapse. Everyone knew 2½ was going to pass. There was no doubt it was going to pass... The college, I don’t remember the exact figures, but roughly our budget was somewhere around $2 million and the school system was kicking in about $500,000.” With the advent of 2½, therefore, and the separation of the school department budget, the college stood to lose 25% of its funding. The situation was just as bad, if not worse, for the schools. “They laid off back then almost a
third of the teachers in Quincy and 45% of the high school went. I mean, it was a slaughter... It was just devastating.‘

Making the devastation worse, the college was seen as “a way to save positions, administrators,” from the school system. The system was “in the position of closing ten, twelve elementary schools and riffing literally hundreds of teachers and administrators. So the college became a way of saving programs and saving educational positions of some administrators.” As one college employee remembers, “They laid off teachers, but they had all these coordinators and directors. They had a director of elementary curriculum, and secondary curriculum, and a coordinator of this and a coordinator of that... And of course [Creedon] didn’t want to let anybody go. Those were all his friends, his buddies. So he shifted a lot of jobs around...” Including several to the college.’

In 1982, a new mayor and school committee were elected and President Pierce was eased out. Among the local candidates for president were: Carl Deyeso, an “inside” candidate favored by the superintendent, who had officially run the college during the year-long interim; and James Sheets, a history and government instructor at the college who was also a city councillor and who had been a state representative. In early 1983, Sheets dropped out, saying it would be “awkward” sharing authority with the superintendent. “It is critical that the leadership of the college be unified,” he said in a prepared statement. “Given the unique governance structure, where power is shared by president and superintendent, there is a potential for that leadership to be dysfunctional.”

Many thought this left the field open for Deyeso, a “nice guy” with little college experience. Instead, the nod went to an outsider, a vice president at Worcester State College, O. Clayton Johnson. Johnson would be the city’s first black administrator, and one of few minorities of any description in this working class, predominantly Irish and Italian city. Johnson’s coming coincided with the college’s 25th anniversary, which was celebrated in 1983, following the first year of implementing Proposition 2½. At that anniversary, Supt. Creedon claimed that “Proposition 2½ was one of the best things that ever happened to QJC,” saying that the college was “on the way out” until the reforms that had been brought about. While the period had seen significant tuition increases, students continued to enroll. Still, it was
generally believed that rising costs would cause tuition, which was already higher than state community colleges, to rise higher still -- quite likely beyond the ability and willingness of students to pay. Both Johnson and Creedon strongly stated the need for state funding.

During his first year, Johnson reorganized the faculty and administration “to bring them in line with standard college structures... ‘There are so many systems not yet in place it’s unbelievable,’” he told the Patriot Ledger in an interview. He found full-time faculty members who taught only two courses a week (one for some department chairs) with no research requirements. He found a registration system where enrollment counts were made by hand counting enrollment forms and folders. And while he found some hardworking faculty and staff members, there were others who appeared to do no work at all. He set about aggressively to address these issues. By the end of that first year, he was winning praise, at least from the superintendent and some of the school committee members. “‘He has had some confrontations with faculty members, telling them what is needed to be done to earn a paycheck and what is needed to be done to keep the college on track,’” the superintendent noted.77

In the meantime, “Johnson drove everybody absolutely nuts the first year. He would have huge meetings that went on for hours and hours; days, in fact. Into the evenings, on the weekends. He examined everything and he examined it over and over and over again.” He reorganized from departments into divisions, dramatically cutting back the number of faculty with reduced loads. He cut some programs and reduced others, laying off some faculty. The faculty “didn’t like that,” according to some, “but...everyone recognized that the school was fighting for its life. What really pissed people off I think was his attitude...that attitude that he was always right and everything was going to be done his way and so forth.”78 Within the year, there was a one-day strike organized by the faculty, the first ever at the college. Johnson attempted, and ultimately succeeded in, a reorganization of faculty work requirements. After some tricky negotiating, which left a large rift between the faculty and Johnson that never fully healed, the faculty ended up with many new part-time permanent faculty at .5 of full time and .7 of full time. But a “.5” faculty member taught 3 courses plus office hours (more than half of a 5-course teaching load), and a
"J" taught four courses plus office hours. The way this and other changes were achieved, and Johnson’s negative attitude toward the faculty, led to constant battles throughout his tenure.

During the next two years, these changes continued, but enrollment dropped slightly and a shortfall was predicted for the 1984-85 school year. When the school committee voted to cover the budget deficit with school department funds, Johnson helped develop three bills to be introduced into the state legislature to garner aid for the college and ease the financial burden. Shortly thereafter, however, facing a projected enrollment drop of 200 students, he proposed a cut in faculty and holding the line on tuition as the only way to continue to attract students. "There are others in the marketplace offering what we’re offering for $850," he said. "I think we have to hold the line because the state schools are making moves to increase their tuition and they should take the heat for it." The QJC tuition at that time ranged from $1400 - $3800, depending on the course of study.79 There was widespread hope among officials that state aid, proposed in several ways, would help ease the burden.

The early 1980’s were tumultuous in other ways as well. In March of 1984, political powerhouse James McIntyre died unexpectedly at the age of 53. A long time supporter of the college, and the chair of its “Board of Trustees," McIntyre was also a principal backer of Supt. Creedon. Three months later, in June, Creedon was accused by a high school girl of “touching” her. While the charge was at first dismissed by the school committee, the outcry over that dismissal and the surfacing of a number of other similar complaints caused the case to be reopened and eventually led to Creedon’s resignation.

These two changes significantly altered the landscape of politics in Quincy. Most people involved with the college say that Johnson was relatively restrained while Creedon was superintendent. “He really didn’t push while Larry Creedon was in power,” said one faculty member. “Larry told him cut it out, and that was the end of it, or goodbye."80 “He was fine while Larry was there but he was starting to flex his muscles a little towards the end. And then right after Larry left, forget it. Because nobody wanted to deal with him,” notes another close observer.81 The first year that Johnson was at the college, another faculty member says, “he was kept under the thumb of Creedon. Creedon was an incumbent with immense power and legitimacy throughout the system, and Dr. Johnson was day to day operational head."82 Still, Johnson
and Creedon did fight over such issues as one of Creedon's female appointments to the college, a person who was to be seen as often at the superintendent's office as at the college, and who was defiant toward Johnson. When Creedon was replaced by Jack Osterman, a man who "had enough problems trying to handle the school system," Johnson "walked all over" him.83

State Support -- Options and Interests: The collapse of talks about South Shore Community College at the end of the 1970's did not end the desire on the part of Quincy officials to obtain state help in supporting the college. As part of the 2½ backlash, Quincy participated in an effort in 1981 to have the state reimburse cities for non-taxable land within their communities, a remake of a bill that failed in earlier attempts. In 1983, while noting that Proposition 2½ had "rescued" the college, Supt. Creedon also stated publicly, again, that "some kind of affiliation with the state" would be best for the institution in the long run, perhaps vital to its survival.84 In the meantime, he petitioned the legislature for a subsidy of operating costs.85 The argument was one of fairness: "The state spends $76 million to support 15 community colleges," Creedon told the Ledger, "and the South Shore should have a share."86

After experiencing operations under Prop. 2½ for a few years, however, and with the help of QJC's President Johnson, this effort became more serious. At the beginning of 1985, the three bills Johnson had announced previously were submitted through the Quincy delegation to the state legislature. One of these was to provide financial aid for needy students. The second was for assistance in serving non-Quincy residents. The third was for the state to reimburse Quincy for the difference between what was collected through tuition and the actual cost of running the college. "I think we are closer to state support of this institution than at any time before,"" Johnson told the school committee.87
Summary

The college remained firmly under the control of the superintendent and the city's political structure for many years, despite some growing organizational stress. But the economic upheaval that led to Proposition 2½ and the college's struggle to survive, a cataclysmic event in the history of the college, submerged these growing organizational issues in the struggle for survival, and returned the college to another period of reliance on, and dominance by, a single individual. That individual, Clay Johnson, led the effort to save the college. As soon as the organization began to move out of this struggle, however, and shifted from a focus on survival to consideration of its future, and as it began to grow again, the organizational stress and tension became more pronounced. Clay Johnson was just coming into his full glory as President of Quincy Junior College in 1986, but already the organizational strains that had begun to emerge under President Ed Pierce and Superintendent Lawrence Creedon -- and which were forgotten for a time as the college struggled to survive under fiscal independence -- were emerging again.

This stress and the organizational issues that arose from it -- caused by such factors as growth, organizational and cultural clashes with the school system, and the president's attempts to maintain tight control -- increasingly became the predominant factors shaping college direction. While Johnson remained in office for several more years, and continued to exercise considerable clout, the era of individual dominance was ending with the growth over which he presided. Chapter Four describes the period of the college's growth during which these organizational issues emerged as the primary force shaping college activity and direction.
Notes to Chapter Three

2. BU may study South Shore's need for community college, 10 Oct. 1949, *Patriot Ledger*, 1.


27. Quincy to seek state funds for junior college, 16 Dec. 1959, Patriot Ledger, 1
Quincy wants towns to share Junior College costs, 23 Dec. 1959, Patriot Ledger, 1,6.


29. Regional college study asked by committee, 26 July 1962, Patriot Ledger, 8

30. Steps take to obtain college for South Shore, 16 March 1963, Patriot Ledger, 18.

31. Sites for proposed South Shore community college narrowed to three, 18 May 1963, Patriot Ledger, 19.


33. City bids for community college, 28 Feb. 1964, Patriot Ledger, 8.


35. Quality of students at junior college shows improvement, 28 Oct. 1965, Patriot Ledger, 12.


37. Community college site to be sought in Quincy, 26 Oct. 1967, Patriot Ledger, 16.


41. Board favors area college in Quincy, 13 April 1968, Patriot Ledger, 10.
Quincy site for community college apparently meets state requirements, 10 April 1968, Patriot Ledger, 39.


44. South shore college given priority, 8 March 1974, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 9.

45. Interview with D, conducted by the author, Jan. 1997, p. 55. (Page references for interviews in this and subsequent notes refer to the relevant pages of the compiled transcriptions.)

46. Interview with C, conducted by the author, Nov. 1996, p. 196.


50. QJC takeover urged, but state cool to idea, 28 April 1977, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 12.


53. Interview with B., conducted by the author, November, 1996, p. 177-178.

54. Interview with G., conducted by the author, November, 1996, p. 86.

55. Interview with E., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 147.

56. Interview with H., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 115.

57. Interview with L., conducted by the author, November 1996, p. 88.

58. Interview with D., conducted by the author, January, 1997, p. 56.


60. Interview with D., conducted by the author, January, 1997, p. 58.

61. Interview with E., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 147.

62. Interviews with G., p. 72, L, p. 89, and F., (interview notes), conducted by the author.


68. Interview with H., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 112.

No waver on school budget cuts, 12 March 1981, Patriot Ledger, 1, 8.

70. Interview with H., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 108.

71. Interview with F., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 100.

72. In school systems, a layoff is often labeled a “reduction in force (RIF).” Thus, people get “riffed” or “riffing” occurs.

73. Interview with B., conducted by the author, November, 1996, p. 179.

74. Interview with F., conducted by the author, October 1996, p. 100.

75. Sheets out of race for QIC presidency, 23 March 1983, Patriot Ledger, 1.


77. Jason Seiken and Maggie Adams, Johnson installed as QIC president, 27 April 1984, Patriot Ledger, 1, 14.


79. QIC must trim teachers, president says, 8 April 1985, Patriot Ledger, 8.


82. Interview with L., conducted by the author, November, 1996, p. 90

83. Interviews with F., p. 102 plus interview notes, D., p. 60, and G., p. 74, conducted by the author.


86. Nina McCain, Quincy College head says race isn’t issue, 22 Oct. 1983, Patriot Ledger, 17, 22.

87. Funds voted to help QIC cover deficit, 3 Jan. 1985, Patriot Ledger, 8.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Institution Comes of Age: 1985 - 1991

Introduction

The organizational stresses which began to appear at the college in the late 1970's, and which were temporarily overshadowed by the shift in the college's fortunes and structure brought about by Proposition 2 1/2, did not take long to re-emerge. President Johnson had a few years as undisputed leader of the institution after Creedon's departure, during which time the college focused on survival and the president dominated all aspects of college life. But partly because of the college's emergence from the threat of closure into a period of dramatic growth, and partly because of the president's attempts to tightly control every aspect of college activity, it was not long before organizational issues became major institutional struggles. The resulting organizational stress -- between the faculty and president, and between the college and school system -- came to dominate the news reports, the day to day life of the faculty and staff, the discourse between the college and its sponsoring organization, and the college's development and decision-making.

Chapter Four, which covers this period during which organizational issues came to dominate, is divided into three primary sections. The first describes the growth of the state's community college system through the 1980's. The second covers the period during which Quincy Junior College renewed its attempt to affiliate with the state as an independent community college, and then fought off a threatened merger into nearby Massasoit Community College. The third section, called Control Wars, describes a period of transition and emergence for the college: all of the negotiations with the state had ended, the college had grown popular and financially stable, and the organizational strife was rising to a fever pitch. Key players during this period included:

- O. Clayton Johnson: Johnson was president of Quincy College from 1983 - 1993, the city's first black administrator, and the college's most influential president to date.
Robert Ricci: Formerly superintendent in Providence, Rhode Island, where he had risen from being a teacher (and before that a police officer), Ricci became Quincy’s first outside superintendent in more than 20 years, serving from 1987-1991.

Mary Collins: Now in real estate and active politically, Mary Collins was a self-described “housewife” when first elected to the School Committee in the late 1970’s. She became Vice Chair of the committee, and Johnson’s most frequent critic, during her tenure on the committee.

Frank Anselmo: Still active in his nineties, Frank Anselmo was said to be the oldest serving school board member in the country. Initially somewhat wary, Anselmo became a big Johnson supporter and donated funds to the college. The college’s library was re-named the Francis Anselmo Library during the 1980’s.

James Sheets: While not a native, James Sheets had lived in Quincy since graduating from Eastern Nazarene College in the late 1950’s. A teacher of government at QJC since 1960, Sheets ran successfully for city council, served for a time as a state representative, and was elected mayor of Quincy in 1989. As Mayor, Sheets also served as Chairman of the School Committee, which was the College’s governing board until 1994.

1. State of Turmoil -- The Massachusetts College System

By 1979, Ed King was governor. Having run as a “can-do” manager, he proposed an early demonstration of his budget cutting skills. One of his targets for cuts was higher education, where he proposed cutting $40 million, including merging two or more of Boston’s five colleges. King’s budget did not allow for increases due to inflation or collective bargaining. He also made it clear that he would “not support new construction on public campuses,” which apparently included the four projects on the drawing boards at that time: new facilities for Mass. College of Art, Roxbury Community College, Middlesex Community College and North Shore Community College. In April, Boston State College president Kermit Morrissey produced the first detailed proposal for the merger of state colleges and universities into a coherent system. He noted that the current system encouraged “duplication among programs with declining enrollments” and inefficiency, while failing to provide appropriate access to deserving students.
Morrissey also proposed aligning tuition costs so that students would pay 25% of the costs of their educations. Within days, the Board of Regents announced tuition hikes of $100 - $600 in order to begin that alignment. Despite pressure from the King administration, some individual college boards voted against tuition increases. By May, however, the Globe reports that UMass, which was considering the increase, would be the 30th of 31 colleges to approve tuition hikes.

**Super Board:** The following year, state legislators changed the face of public higher education in Massachusetts, creating the state's first higher education "super board." In so doing, they provided Governor King the authority to appoint all of the board's trustees and gave the new board almost complete statutory authority -- including the ability to close or consolidate any of the colleges. Because the action was taken through the budget conference process, unlike previous attempts to amend the state college governance structure, it was virtually impossible to defeat. Differing from the previous system, there were to be no regional boards, such as the one governing community colleges. Each college would have its own board, but these would be appointed by the governor and would derive their powers from the new Board of Regents. Termed "the most radical overhaul of the state's administration of higher education" since 1965, the new arrangement was not universally acclaimed. Nonetheless, it was seen by the governor and legislators as, finally, a way to centralize planning and rein in spending. It was also expected to "expedite proposed mergers between various institutions." While the higher education community railed against both the changes and the way they were accomplished, the Globe described the action as born of frustration over the chaos and competing demands emanating from the separate boards and constituencies, and from "seven years of inaction under three governors" and three special commissions. The new board was created "despite the political muscle of the higher education institutions."

**Proposition 2½:** Later that same year, bolstered by a similar frustration with perceived waste across the spectrum of government, the citizens of the Commonwealth enacted Proposition 2½, the tax-limitation measure patterned on California's Proposition 13. As communities struggled to cope with the effects of this local property tax limitation measure, community colleges took the opportunity to work with their communities and local schools, and to bolster both their own enrollments and their arguments for increased
funds. By early 1982, Massasoit was reporting that it had turned away 800 students in the previous fall and was estimating turning away 1,200-1,400 in the coming year -- not for lack of space, but for lack of funds. Other community colleges reported similar problems. Continuing education evening courses, for which colleges could set separate costs and retain earnings after expenses were covered, were also growing -- despite being more costly to students. In March of 1982, the Board of Regents announced a tuition increase of 17%. In 1983, Regents began discussions on raising the student portion of tuition from the previous 25% of cost to 33%, as well as reformulating the factors to be considered in determining the cost of particular programs. This was reaffirmed, along with a 13% tuition hike in 1984, and another 10% tuition hike in 1985. Each hike was preceded by headlines and discussions ranging over several months. Although most hikes were less than originally proposed by the time they were enacted, the message conveyed through the press was of constant, and large, tuition increases.

The Massachusetts Miracle: By 1984, Michael Dukakis was back in office as governor. Despite the austerity of the times, ground was broken in Roxbury for a new RCC campus in 1985, bringing to fruition the long battle by Boston's minority community to secure a permanent home for its own community college. Governor Dukakis threw the first shovelful. It was to be the last new community college facility opened in Massachusetts.

Massachusetts' economy warmed during the early 1980's, and by 1986 it was hot. Unemployment was low, revenue was high, business was booming. The "Massachusetts Miracle," which was to propel Gov. Dukakis to the democratic nomination for the presidency of the country, and which would begin to unravel just as the election was held in 1988, was in full swing. A new Chancellor, Franklyn Jenifer, was appointed at the end of the year to try to improve the "quality" of the state education system, an issue that the Globe had editorially excoriated the governor for ignoring earlier in the year. State college enrollments continued to increase into 1987. Overall, enrollment had quintupled since 1960, to 180,000 students statewide. With tax revenues flowing, the Globe urged the governor in a succession of editorials to endorse a $1 billion capital improvement plan for state colleges, and urged Jenifer to plan for giving the colleges "a fuller measure" of fiscal autonomy. Two days later, "to meet the extraordinary demand for public higher
education," the Governor endorsed a four year plan pending before the legislature. Of the $199 million budgeted for community colleges, all of it was for upgrades at existing institutions. In 1987, for the second year, the regents maintained tuition at current levels. While fees were set by individual colleges, Chancellor Jenifer said he “had assurances from the college presidents” that there would be no fee increases. 

The Miracle Collapses: Despite the high notes of 1987, 1988 might well be known as the “year of the troubles” for Massachusetts higher education. In the Spring, tuition was once again on the rise, with the regents recommending a 13% increase -- for each of the next four years -- to help make up for earlier budget cuts. Fees were to remain at current levels. This massive proposed increase generated a very public controversy and concern, until the final rate of increase adopted was approximately 8.5%. On top of these increases, as students were well aware, fees were also rising; fees on some colleges had been raised to the point where they were almost as high as tuition itself -- an average of 76% of tuition across all campuses. Finally, the plan called for gradually allowing the state colleges to retain the tuition income generated, with an offsetting reduction in direct state subsidy. 

Because tuition revenue was returned to the state, no campuses had, on their own, raised tuition in the previous three years. To compensate, however, they had raised fees substantially. They had also bolstered their Continuing Education enrollment, to the point where it, too, was beginning to be seen as a problem. In proposing to increase tuition, the Chancellor also proposed an offsetting increase in financial aid, but this did little to quell the revolt on campus. Nor did the oft-repeated statistic that Massachusetts students only paid about 18% of the cost of their educations, as compared to the 25% national average (or to the 33% proposed by the Carnegie Commission and previously adopted by the state). Following a month of negotiations between the chancellor and a group of college presidents, the numbers had changed little -- the students’ projected portion rose to 30% -- but the campuses had won the right to retain the increase for on-campus improvements. This concession appeared to win over the presidents to the new tuition structure. The final agreement limited annual increases to 9% until the 30% student share percentage was reached.
Total college enrollment also continued to increase. Much of the increase was due to continuing education students, however, while the numbers of day students dropped; thus revenue to the state decreased. Chancellor Jenifer described himself as “‘very concerned.’... ‘It was never the intention of the commonwealth to have continuing education serve as the primary methodology for educating students... If this continues into next year, this would be a serious blow.’”\textsuperscript{15} Many of the state colleges had already reduced course offerings and enrolled fewer students in day programs to reduce costs. When it was announced two weeks later that the colleges should begin to prepare for a budget cut of 3-5%, the number of colleges announcing plans to cut enrollment increased.\textsuperscript{16} In 1989, in keeping with the previous year’s plan, a 7.7 tuition hike was approved.\textsuperscript{17}

**Malfeasance:** Two other negative trends began to hit the press during 1988. In the first, it was reported that minority students were dropping out of public colleges at an alarming rate.\textsuperscript{18} The second and potentially more damaging revelation to the system’s image was the increasing number of reports of malfeasance on the part of education officials across the state. The most visible of these was former Dukakis advisor Gerard Indelicato, who had been named President of Bridgewater State in the mid-1980's and who was seen as highly influential in state education politics. Indelicato went to jail for a range of fiscal abuses and thievery that he had been involved in for several years. Other presidents were also arrested and convicted for misusing trust funds. In an editorial entitled “State-college scams,” the Globe opened with the comment that: “On the recent evidence, too many of the people who run this state’s public colleges are not astute enough to qualify for admission as students.” By 1989, when the regents adopted “voluntary” trust fund guidelines, public confidence in state higher education was very low. This was probably not helped when, in November, the college presidents sought, and were awarded, “retroactive pay increases” ranging from 5 - 12%.\textsuperscript{19}

**Costs Continue to Rise:** In 1988, the general public began to learn what students already knew: that colleges were increasing fees substantially even as the state raised tuition. In 1989, the Globe reported that average state college fees had risen “39 percent in the last 18 months and 145 percent since 1982.” The regents endorsed a resolution that would eventually bring student tuition up to 30% of cost, and would
limit fees to 30% of tuition, far less than the current level. The student association also announced that it was studying a resolution to cap fees, noting that the Regents’ request to colleges to keep fees down had clearly not worked. Further, as national studies showed increasing numbers of high school graduates unable to read at the high school level (60%), the Regents approved a plan requiring state colleges and universities to test all incoming students in reading, writing and math, and to provide appropriate remedial help. No additional funds were appropriated. This move brought more cries from college educators concerning the requirement to provide extensive additional services with ever-decreasing funds.

In July, budget cuts began forcing layoffs and the cancellation of classes. System wide, 9,000 students were turned away or found their programs canceled; 1,200 full and part-time positions were cut back, and 1,900 sections were canceled for the Fall. “Every kid we turn away here is a future trained worker for our area -- the very people we’re going to need to bring the economy back where it should be,” noted Gerard Burke, president of Massasoit Community College. He did not add, but might have, that at least some of the students turned away at Massasoit, plus others who were put off by the publicity and the likelihood of reduced services, found their way to Quincy College, where enrollment was booming.

The drumbeat of bad news continued. In September, 1989, the era of state “user fees,” the Governor proposed raising $40M for colleges statewide through increasing student fees, though fees had already risen sharply and tuition was rising 7.5%. This was followed by a plan to tie college funding to “performance,” a “revolt” against the layoff of another 700 faculty and staff, and the declaration of “fiscal emergency” in October. More than 10,000 students “swarmed over Beacon Hill” in protest. A week later, Quincy College reported a 16% increase in enrollment for Spring, 1990, to a record 1,449 full-time day students. College officials cited “affordability” and problems at the state institutions. A month after that, the Globe reported that Chancellor Jenifer, who had come to Massachusetts with a desire to dramatically improve the state system, was on the verge of leaving to become president of Howard University, his alma mater. As the year ended, the regents froze hiring across the system.

1990 and 1991 were not much better. The system started 1990 “beset by confusion, politics, [and] low morale,” with the budget and personnel problems creating an issue of “control” and an increasingly
public battle between government officials. As state budget cuts continued, politicians battled over what to cut and how. “And so it goes,” wrote the Globe’s Anthony Flint, “with higher education as with the rest of the budget: The governor cuts what he wants to cut and keeps what he wants to save; the Legislature restores funding for pet projects and suggests cuts in other places.”27 As the regents began to study more tuition increases, students once again rallied on Beacon Hill.28 And as 1,600 part-time faculty walked off their jobs in May in a dispute over pay, conditions, and the funding of continuing education, the regents publicly considered a 15% tuition increase, settling in June -- “reluctantly” -- on a “15-33% increase -- the highest in the state’s history.”29 By September, state officials were studying mergers, regional “grouping” of colleges, and “sharing” as ways to cut costs. While the regents and presidents agreed to hold the line on tuition and fees for the Fall semester, by October, they were already announcing an increase in fees of up to $1,000, based on “Draconian” budget cuts.30


The fiscal crisis at Quincy Junior College that followed Proposition 2 ½ and the college’s new independent status reached its most serious point in 1985. In April, the President had proposed laying off teachers and keeping tuition level to bolster the college’s declining enrollment. In a May editorial devoted to this topic, the Patriot Ledger made the case clear. Noting that the college was financially independent and that the state provided only $65,000 of its $3.3 million budget through some grants, the paper observed that there “is obviously a limit to what the college can charge in tuition before students of modest income will be unable to attend.” Never a “rich man’s school,” and with the an enrollment already in decline and the prospect of reduced federal student aid, the college needed help. Quoting Johnson as saying that “the day of reckoning is coming” and that “without state help ‘we’ll just sit here and wither away,’” it outlined several options under consideration -- from receiving more state money to becoming a state community college. The Ledger urged trying for state aid before ceding control of the college to state authorities. It did note, however, that state Board of Regents was studying the issues and would report to the Legislature’s Joint Committee on Education.31
Few people appeared to seriously consider the possibility of Quincy's merging with a state institution, or to notice the small article buried in the Ledger in May, in which the Blue Hills Technical Institute announced that it would explore merging with Quincy Junior College if its proposed merger with Massasoit Community College didn't work out. When the Regents issued their proposal in June, recommending the merger of QJC, Massasoit and the Blue Hills Institute, everyone was apparently taken by surprise. Johnson, for example, was "appalled." The Regents report, taking what the Ledger described as a "dim" view of the college's future, called building a new community college in Quincy "too expensive," and labeled large amounts of state aid a "temporary" solution. The report noted the declining number of high school seniors in Quincy, and described the college's long-term ability to provide viable services as "doubtful." But, noting that the region from South Boston to Duxbury was not being served by a community college, the Regents proposed a merger with Massasoit as the only viable option. Initial reaction from Quincy was not favorable. Johnson's response was typical of many: "I don't think they know what they're talking about," he was quoted as saying. "A guy who comes here and spends a half-day (evaluating the school) should be ashamed of himself."32

Newspaper reports see-sawed back and forth as to what would happen following the Regents' proposal. "Would 3-building campus lose identity in merger?" the Ledger wondered in a banner headline.33 Soon, it was reporting that the two colleges could be merged by the fall of 1986. The school committee unanimously rejected a merger "at this time," after hearing from a range of speakers, almost all against. "I beg you not to allow it to be swallowed up in an impersonal hierarchy where it will lose its identify," pleaded College Courses, Inc. founder, Charles Sweeny, who was no longer on the committee. School committee members were inclined to agree. "If there was a merger, I would guess in three years no one would ever remember Quincy Junior College," said one. The state "is awash in money," said Mayor and School Committee Chair Francis McCauley, and should use some of it to help the college. Of the committee, only Mary Collins expressed interest in at least considering the proposal, citing the "uncertainty" of the college's existence from year to year.34
Within a few weeks, Johnson, upset by the chancellor’s prediction that the merger could take place by the following Fall, was making headlines accusing state officials -- the chancellor and president of Massasoit -- of “empire building” and “playing power politics.” "They’re trying to create things for themselves. They’re not interested in democracy or in the needs of students. They’re talking about empire building." At the same time, Johnson also faced some internal trouble. Some college staff and faculty members came forward with charges of anti-faculty actions and favoritism at the college, plus the theft of folders related to union activity and other forms of harassment. A number of tenured teachers, and the union itself, called Johnson’s laying off of tenured teachers and hiring of adjuncts “union busting.” Johnson claimed that there was nothing improper being done, and that layoffs were being forced through declining enrollment. The school committee decided to investigate.35

The issues were muddled. Quincy Education Association president Buckley, who was on record favoring the college’s continued independence, observed, “I appreciate that Dr. Johnson is economizing; that’s his job... But I don’t know if it’s conscienable to replace good people with part-time employees.” Similarly, the school committee expressed, and acted, with some confusion. As one member noted, the committee put college administrators in a difficult position by such actions as “first removing the librarians’ jobs from the budget and then refusing to lay off the librarians.”36

The Ledger observed editorially that charges of harassment hardly helped the drive for the college’s independent support, but that the larger question was whether merger was best for the college and community. The “community has pride and tradition,” the paper observed, “on the other side, there is the promise of state money, lots of it, to free the college from its total dependence on tuition, to modernize facilities, to reduce student payments.”37 The year came to a close with the South Shore representatives filing a new bill for the state to take over QJC as an independent (from Massasoit) community college, and with the Ledger offering the opinion that a merger wouldn’t work because the city wanted to maintain its own identity. The harassment charges ended without resolution, although the librarian at the center of them remained in her job. But new charges were regularly lodged. Indeed, such charges were to continue through the rest of the president’s tenure.
In the first half of 1986, amid dire predictions of the college’s death by strangulation, the school committee formally requested once again that the state take QJC over as a state college. President Johnson wrote to his contacts in state government urging support for this proposal. By March, the Legislature’s education committee had approved the bill proposing Quincy as a separate college, over the reservations of the Regents. Quincy rejoiced that, as the Ledger put it, “The staff of the state Board of Regents has tried and failed to join Quincy Junior College to Brockton-based Massasoit Community College. That is a victory for QJC, for Quincy and for the South Shore.”

A week later, “after days of lobbying by Quincy legislators,” the entire legislature “opened the door” to approving the state takeover by authorizing the Regents to study three options. Three new plans were developed at the request of the legislature, including the regionalization of Massasoit, Quincy, and the Blue Hills as three independent campuses. As the Ledger editorialized for a state takeover, the Globe weighed in against. For the Globe, Quincy Junior -- “long noted as a makeshift substitute” for a much needed community college -- was a candidate for merger or extinction. Noting its “falling enrollment,” shaky finances,” and its “near total dependence” on a tuition “as much as five times higher than that at the state’s 15 community colleges,” the Globe believed the Regents had proposed the only prudent option. It also observed that QJC drew almost a quarter of its students from Boston, but only 15% from the towns south of Weymouth. The south shore needs greater educational opportunities, it concluded. Because a new community college would be too expensive, the Globe saw a QJC merger with Massasoit as the most viable option. Pains were taken to note that affiliation and merger were two different concepts, but Quincy refused to acknowledge the distinction. The year ended with the competing proposals under study, and the appointment Franklyn Jenifer as the new chancellor. As it waited, Quincy made arrangements to replace the old and decrepit former courthouse with a new building, through negotiations with the developer of a new office and retail complex next door.

But if Quincy legislators were pushing independence, Brockton’s were adamantly against state-sponsored competition, claiming that the most effective and efficient arrangement would be a merger. After listening to the competing proposals, the Education Committee deferred to Chancellor Jenifer, who
requested more time and appointed another team of consultants to study the proposals and report back to him. In May, 1987, the study team came back recommending, once again, a merger. President Johnson was “shocked,” the Quincy community vowed resistance, and the cycle began again.

**Faculty & Staff:** Through much of this period, the faculty was ambivalent. Some actively disliked Johnson and continued to file complaints and grievances. But many feared what might happen to them in a state takeover. The QEA president reported a 26-3 vote in favor of the merger “if there was no alternative and as long as they were guaranteed job security and existing academic programs were not jeopardized.” Seventeen faculty members did not vote, however, reportedly because they did not want to appear to endorse the takeover under any circumstances. Johnson warned the Regents that such a move would make “the largest community college in the state larger” and would thus risk its being out of touch with its community. Quincy officials offered to enter into a “co-equal” arrangement, such that some of the integrity of Quincy Junior, and the jobs, could be assured.

For many faculty, the merger proposal “seemed like a good idea,” according to one faculty member at the time. “The long term future of the college seemed very, very, very, very suspect. A merger with Massasoit, with state community college protections, revenues, financial assistance -- it was good.” "It looked really good,” agreed another staff member. “The teachers would teach less, the administrators would make more money. I mean, everything that was good, okay?... [But] what Massasoit wanted was a takeover, as opposed to a merger. They wanted to install their own administration here, put their own teachers here... If they had troubles over there, they could send all their people here and bump our people out.”

The controversy continued both on the front pages of the paper and in the various back rooms. Although the Regents were expected to support the recommendation of the chancellor for a merger, Quincy vowed to resist. Sen. Paul Harold of Quincy, one of the sponsors of the bill to make Quincy the 16th community college, complained of “institutional bias by the board and by the community college system” against QJC, something that has been noted by enough people to have some credence. “The report is an overreaction to stop Quincy Junior College from becoming the 16th community college,’
Harold said. ‘We are not out to compete (with Massasoit).’ The chancellor’s recommendation would have had QJC opening in a year as one campus of a new South Shore Community College. The Blue Hills Technical Institute was to be another, while Brockton was to be the main campus. But, as Johnson publicly stated, “They don’t have the authority to do it... The (Quincy) school committee has said they won’t accept it. I believe there will be some middle ground developed here that will be acceptable to the people of Quincy.”

But middle ground did not develop. Quincy officials -- the city council, school committee, legislative delegation, and Chamber of Commerce -- all ‘rallied around’ the college and urged the state to help finance the institution. The basis of the argument was one of control: Quincy was willing to share authority but not to be subservient, and Brockton, according to several college officials from that period, was unwilling to compromise on any issues -- not faculty tenure, not administrative positions, not control over Quincy-specific programs. Massasoit officials “clearly believed that Quincy would be forced to accept their terms or die,” according to one observer. Quincy, it appeared, would rather die. 1987 ended with the question still unresolved.

For many faculty and staff members, as well as some school committee members, the merger proposal also had another layer of significance: it was a way, as one official put it, “to gracefully move away from President Johnson.” Johnson tried to work the connections he had made both in Quincy and as a vice president at Worcester State College. He wrote letters to legislators and such figures as Gerry Indelicato, who was still in state government at that time, and attempted to lobby the new chancellor, Franklyn Jenifer, who paid a visit to Quincy during the controversy. Whether it was “pre-determined,” as one staff member felt, or whether “Clay offended him, which he went out of his way to do,” Jenifer recommended merger rather than accepting Quincy as either a separate institution or an affiliate of UMass. Another problem, too, according to one source, was that “Gerry Burke and Clay Johnson hated each other. That was part of the problem... I don’t know when that dated from, but probably he knew him from Worcester... There was a real animosity. Clay used to go on in private about Gerry Burke... There was a real hate.”
Changing Conditions and the Slow Death of Merger Talks: In early 1988, however, it appeared that a shift in opinion might be in the making. New Supt. Robert Ricci, a Rhode Island educator who had been appointed in the middle of the previous year and who had walked into the merger maelstrom, told the school committee that QJC was not fiscally sound, and that the merger with Massasoit was probably a good idea. Shortly thereafter, Massasoit President Gerard Burke was reported as saying that a majority of the Quincy School Committee favored the merger.

In fact, the committee was divided. Some felt that merger should be considered if it was "the only way the school can survive." "I'm very proud of Quincy Junior College," said [Mary] Collins. "I don't want to be accused of selling the college down the river. I think we have a very viable institution. But the City of Quincy has been subsidizing the education of people on the South Shore for 30 years." Others thought it was premature to consider the question of merger. But Collins, who was vice chairman of the committee (the mayor was chairman) was reported to be favoring the merger a week later in the Ledger, which also cited growing support among other members of the committee. Collins noted that students paying from $1,550 - 3,550 at QJC would have their tuition reduced by more than half. This announcement of support catalyzed the opposition once again. Even those favoring or considering a merger wanted some assurances: that the Quincy Campus would not be closed, that faculty would be protected, and so forth. Assurances were not forthcoming. Further, as Johnson pointed out, most of Quincy's students received financial aid, reducing their out-of-pocket expenses to about $900. This fact made the financial argument on behalf of students less persuasive.

To complicate matters further, State Sen. Paul Harold and later President Johnson accused Vice Chairman Collins and Supt. Ricci of "negotiating" merger conditions with Massasoit President Burke, an accusation denied by all three. Burke claimed that he was not pressing for the merger: "'Quite frankly, I don't need Quincy Junior College,' he said. 'We're bursting at the seams.'" But he claimed to support the merger on behalf of students. While a survey reported that Quincy faculty favored a merger as long as it included job security, Johnson called the survey a "'bogus survey' because of the way the questions were framed," denying its legitimacy.
But even as tempers frayed, a new realization seemed to be dawning on many of the Quincy players and observers, as captured in a 1988 Patriot Ledger editorial. Arguing for a reasoned debate on the merits of the proposal, the editorial noted that: “For the time being, Quincy Junior College seems perfectly capable of continuing to operate as an independent institution. Enrollments over the past several years have remained stable, and even increased slightly. The college now has 2,635 full and part-time students, 35 percent from Quincy, 20 percent from Boston, and most of the rest from Weymouth, Braintree and Milton. This student population is clearly oriented toward Quincy, not Brockton. And the fact is, they decided to attend QJC, with its higher tuition, rather than Massasoit... President Johnson says ‘There is no one who can look at the trends and say the institution is in financial trouble. It pays its own way. Why get rid of it?’” The editorial concluded: “A merger might someday be educationally and financially desirable, but there seems little need to rush into one now.”

Little more than a month later, the Regents announced their plan to hike state college tuition 15% a year for five years. The state college troubles were reaching their peak, and were highly visible. While Quincy College continued to push for state tuition assistance, merger talks were effectively dead; merger was never seriously discussed again.

“In a real sense,” according to one college staff member at the time, “Massasoit blew it. They had a chance to increase their enrollments by at least 50% in one year. The place was running fine then and was stable. If they could have gotten rid of Johnson, which was a given in the plan... they could have fine tuned it. They could have had a nice set up... But they were adamant... So anyway, in ‘88 when the state tanked, everyone was saying, ‘Well, thank God we didn’t go there.’ Because they were laying off all kinds of people and closing courses down. We would have been the first ones to go and everyone knew that. So it worked out.”

When the possibility of merger with Massasoit was finally put to rest, the college faced the prospect of continuing with the governance system it had always had. There remained, for the first time in 30 years, no potential for a state takeover or merger, and thus no possibility for change other than that which might be initiated from within. With no external change to focus on, the simmering organizational disputes within the college and school system blossomed into full-fledged battles. The main points of contention, and the events surrounding them, are described below.

**President / Superintendent Reporting Relationship:** President Johnson had been outraged, early in 1988, when Committeewoman Collins and Superintendent Ricci had appeared, in his eyes, to be selling out the college to Massasoit. Relations with the superintendent were strained from that point, despite Collins’ and Ricci’s protestations that there had been nothing more than a chance encounter with the Massasoit president. In 1989, Johnson went public at a school committee meeting in what the Ledger called a “simmering dispute over control” of the college. Johnson criticized the committee for holding up the college’s budget and calling for a public hearing, the first such hearing in years, noting that it was “not a Quincy budget,” and should not be subject to the same process as the school budget. The college had not, since just after Proposition 2½, received any significant funding from the city for its operations, and less than 30% of its students were Quincy residents. In addition, the college was required to purchase certain services from the city and school department, whether it wanted them or not. Thus, according to Johnson, college funds were not actually public funds and no public hearing was called for.

In particular, Johnson singled out committeewoman Mary Collins, and QEA president Thomas Walsh, both of whom were requesting budget hearings so that faculty could discuss the budget and, presumably, air their complaints. “I am not going to be in a debate with my employees.” Johnson said, charging Collins and Walsh with conspiracy and racism. The very next day, Johnson asked the mayor and city council president to support legislation removing him from the oversight of the superintendent. Both were amenable to the change, which required a Home Rule Petition from the city to the legislature. Such a petition needed to be passed by the council and signed by the mayor, but did not legally require a vote of
the school committee, although both the mayor and city council president wanted to check the school committee’s reaction first. Mayor McCauley, who as mayor was also chair of the school committee, said that “probably in all fairness (Johnson) should report directly to the school committee.” Vice Chair Collins, however, argued that the system had worked fine for 30+ years, a refrain she was to repeat regularly, and that she saw no reason to change it. Further, she reflected the fear of some faculty members that Johnson, if he were not controlled by the superintendent, would further mistreat them. Ricci called the issue a “major major disagreement in terms of the governance structure,” noting that it had caused friction and that the present arrangement “could be done better but he (Johnson) doesn’t see that.” Referring to faculty members who had complained about his management style, however, Johnson argued: “I don’t make the decisions... If QJC had a president who was free to work with faculty members...it would be different.”

Editorially, the Ledger tended to agree with Johnson on the merits of his position. “It is the only college in the state where the college president reports to the school superintendent, who then reports to the school committee. This unique chain of command gives Johnson little more authority than a high school principal. Johnson is absolutely justified when he questions the wisdom of having a public school superintendent supervise both the K through 12 population and a junior college.” Along with most others, the paper called on the school committee to “clarify” QJC’s role. A Globe article the following month summarized the respective positions:

- Pres. Johnson: “We really are a separate division, ... and we should be treated that way. This school serves 77 towns, so in effect, the Quincy School Committee is setting regional policy.”
- Supt. Ricci: “Quincy Junior College is still run for the city of Quincy. [Yet, the enrollment] is 70 percent outsiders, and I think we are not serving the population of the city... I'm very supportive of their proposals, but I was hired with a clear set of expectations. Dr. Johnson was hired under the same set of rules... I can envision a K-14 system,...it’s a rare opportunity. The city has to make a choice to keep letting in outsiders, or to expand programs for people in the city. I’m not fighting for power, but I’m not going to abdicate my responsibility. As long as it’s there, I’m going to do my job... I don’t think it is a personal thing between us, but just very strong differences in policy.”
- Mayor McCauley: “[T]he system should be changed, but the decision should come from the rest of the School Committee.”
- Vice Chair Collins: “‘The present system should not be changed. It has worked great for 31 years. Dr. Ricci is the CEO of the school system. He makes all the recommendations on personnel, budget, policy and bylaws to the School Committee. Dr. Johnson gives the appearance
of conflict... But he knew what the job was like when he took it.” Collins said she “harbored no prejudice towards [Johnson] and voted for his appointment.”

- QEA President Walsh: “I think the present system is fine. My feeling is that Dr. Johnson is anti-union. If there were no union, the faculty would be at his mercy. And I don’t just mean demanding more from them. He would terminate a number of teachers that have gone against him. Dr. Johnson is good at public relations. He’s intelligent... I guess he’s good for the college and bad for the faculty.”

Though these sentiments were expressed in 1989, the individual positions never changed. What changed was the relationships, the players, and surrounding events. Johnson lost the vote for a separate reporting structure in June, 1989, with Mayor McCauley and Frank Anselmo voting for the new reporting relationship, and the others against. After the vote, the cartoon below appeared in the Boston Globe. Johnson requested the original, had it framed, and hung it in his office.
Ricci summarizes his view at the time as: “I always thought it was a policy decision, that if the school committee wanted to make that decision, I would not fight it. Why would I fight it?” It would have made little difference to the battles that followed, he believes, although he would not have been in the middle. Describing his role as “buffer” between the committee and college, he thinks removing that buffer might have made the confrontations more direct: “The president would either comply or not comply, or he would do something and I’d do something, but it wouldn’t go through me.”

**Personality & Management Style:** For many, the president’s “authoritarian” management style was the main issue in his disputes with school committee. While there were few who would state that the president’s style was not authoritarian, the extent to which this was seen as a problem, or as the problem, varied considerably. Johnson claimed that the problem was the structure itself, noting that he enjoyed “a good relationship with many faculty members,” but was “hampered by a structure that invite[d] his employees to bypass his authority.” Collin’s initiation of meetings between school committee members and different employees in the school system may certainly have added to this impression, but faculty members regularly called committee members, complaining of harsh or unfair treatment. School committee members were also regularly rankled by Johnson’s remarks, such as his saying that Mary Collins had a “racist” attitude towards him. The committee was frequently divided over Johnson, many believing that he had done great things for the college, even “saved” it, but also wary of his authoritarian style and propensity for taking offense and turning on people.

During this period, the school committee was generally pursuing one or more complaints against the president -- some of his own creation, others of their manufacture. In late 1989, he considered an offer to become president of Hudson County Community College in New Jersey. Eventually he turned the job down, but signed on as a consultant for 1-2 days a week using accrued vacation time. Throughout its six month duration, this was a constant thorn in the side of some faculty and school committee members, and received much public notice and editorial ink. Because he enjoyed toying with the press, Johnson added fuel to this fire and others, feeding the press equivocal statements as to whether he was planning to take the New Jersey job full time. The Ledger editorialized, “It’s hard to believe Johnson would tolerate a four-
day-a-week commitment from one of his subordinates. Johnson is an intelligent man. Why is it so hard for him to understand these facts, and to act on them? And why is it so hard for him to speak plainly about what his long-term plans are? The trustees of Hudson County Community College are as confused as Quincy's mayor and school committee as to where Johnson will be come 1990.67 But the answer was fairly apparent to those close to him. He had no intention of taking the Hudson job but couldn't resist stringing the press and other officials along.

**Sale/Rent of College Buildings:** In January, 1991, Supt. Ricci proposed charging the college rent for the building it had occupied from its inception, citing budget difficulties and saying he needed the money for programs in elementary and secondary education. Ricci described the rental fee as "a legitimate way to raise funds...given that they use the building to raise revenue for the college and they're running a surplus and we're running a deficit." Johnson responded "It's an absolute unnecessary torture... I am disgusted." He further noted, in a letter to Ricci, that the college's budget was separate "to prevent such raids on the fund of either the college or the school system by the other." College officials believed a rental fee was unfair, because the college had already made, and paid for, extensive renovation of the old building, with more renovation in the planning stages. It was not hard to understand the superintendent's motivation: as this matter was proposed, he also recommended letting six teachers go. Still, as Johnson noted, the structure did allow the school committee to "order" the president to transfer money to the school system for essentially non-college business. Since college funds were provided through tuition, this was a violation, at least in spirit if not in fact, of the funding arrangement between the two institutions. After an extended battle, the President authorized the expenditure of $300,000 to pay for the transfer to the college of two wood frame houses used by the school department for offices, and for the use of Coddington Hall in perpetuity. The paperwork spelling out the exact nature of this transaction -- the understandings on both sides as to what it was to pay for -- can no longer be found.

**Trouble for the Superintendent:** In March, 1990, the school committee voted to give Supt. Robert Ricci a 3-year extension on his contract. "This man has proven himself in the time he's been with us," said committee member Frank Anselmo. 'He has honesty, integrity and drive...and it's not easy to be at
the top."

Two weeks later, led by Anselmo, the committee had a change of heart. The 91-year-old Anselmo asked the committee to fire the superintendent, saying, "I've been on the school board 29 years, been through seven mayors and six superintendents and he's the worst management and has made the worst mess." Ricci and Mary Collins accused Anselmo, who had been a long time Johnson supporter, of changing his vote at Johnson's behest. "I am the superintendent and Dr. Johnson is reporting to me as a principal," Ricci said. 'He's never accepted that. He won't accept it. But as long as I'm superintendent, whether its for tonight or three more years, I'm going to run [the college] more intently, because he's turning it into a political shambles.'" In the end, Ricci won a contract reduced to two years, and despite denials by Johnson and Anselmo, relations were seriously worsened. Ledger columnist Katy Corneel speculated that Johnson was the "big loser" as a result of this fight, quoting school committee members as being more wary of Johnson, with several saying they were more inclined to look more closely into college affairs. "The reason Johnson risked it was because he felt he had a shot at putting the superintendent away... But instead of ending a war, he began one." Even the superintendent vowed to audit the college more closely. This line of reasoning may have been wishful thinking on the part of the reporter, who had been called to task by Johnson on more than one occasion, or it may have been the prevailing attitude of the school committee. At the time of the second meeting, Anselmo cited the rental fee the school system was demanding from the college, and waved a letter from Ricci to Johnson, which he used to substantiate a charge of interference by the superintendent in college affairs. While Johnson steadfastly denied any involvement, most observers then and now believe that there is no other explanation for Anselmo's otherwise inexplicable behavior except some level of intervention by Johnson, including supplying the letter.

The Richest Institution in Quincy: At about the same time as the votes on the superintendent, banner headlines in the Ledger gleefully reported that the city had used the college's scholarship fund to pay bills when its general fund had dipped too low to meet payroll. In fact, as embarrassed city officials admitted, they had done just that. Johnson quickly stated that he saw "no problem here of any significance... It appears to be something that is accidental." Two days later, after Anselmo had turned on Ricci, the
Ledger quoted Johnson this way: “We have $2 million. We’re the richest institution in Quincy. So if anyone needs money...’ He trailed off, smiling.” As one informed source observed, “Of course, he would always throw up that surplus of two million something. You know: ‘We’ve got the money if you need it. Come to us, and we could help you out.’” Given Johnson’s tendency to tease or bait people on occasion, this may have increased his reputation for arrogance in some circles.

**Budget Woes, Personnel Problems:** It was not long before the threatened closer scrutiny of college activities turned up more problems. Midway through 1990, the school committee discovered that many of the renovation jobs performed on Coddington Hall had been through improperly let contracts -- primarily through a series of smaller contracts just under the bidding threshold -- and it was also discovered that senior college officials had obtained, and used, institutional credit cards -- something no other city official was allowed to do. The school committee, outraged, ordered an audit. These discoveries were followed in the Fall by a series of personnel disagreements between the president, superintendent, and school committee. According to school law at that time, superintendents were required to recommend personnel to fill any position, no matter how small, to the school committee. Only the committee had the power of appointment. At the beginning of each semester, accordingly, the college prepared and submitted pages and pages of names of individuals to teach as adjunct instructors. These included people who had been teaching as adjuncts for years, as well as those teaching simple one-shot non-credit courses. Day faculty teaching evening courses had to be similarly listed and appointed. In most instances, the superintendent simply presented the names forwarded by the college president, and most recommendations were approved by the committee. Occasionally, especially for those with the wrong connections, the appointment process broke down.

One such fracas occurred early in 1990 over the reappointment of an associate dean on leave. A more serious dispute arose later in the year, when the school committee re-appointed a full-time math instructor recommended for termination by the president prior to his fourth year -- the legal tenure year for school teachers. Typically, in school systems, only a history of serious offenses or incompetence brings the end of a tenured teacher’s employment. As Johnson used to say, once a teacher walked in the door on the first
day of his fourth year, "we own him." In this instance, the president was attempting to prevent automatic
tenure of this particular teacher of basic math. The college was required to annually evaluate non-tenured
faculty using the form for public school teachers, but one such evaluation for this teacher was missing.
Others evaluations were described by some committee members as not serious enough to warrant
dismissal. Johnson and Academic Dean Robert Downey produced memos "filled with typographical
errors," a classroom observation in which the instructor was "unable to set up a (math) equation using two
variables," documented filings of inaccurate test scores, and two charges of the instructor’s making racist
remarks. The committee ordered a "review" of the teacher's work, including interviews with a range of
faculty and staff members. The results of the review were equivocal. The issue did not die, however,
until the school committee and superintendent had publicly shared and responded to an anonymous letter
from "a concerned faculty member" alleging that college officials had directed staff members to write
backdated letters for the instructor's personnel file, a charge that was never substantiated. The teacher
remained employed.

Accreditation: The View from Outside: Fall, 1990, was the scheduled point of review for the
college's 10 year accreditation, which it had received in 1986. The committee was specifically looking for
"fault corrections" -- improvement in areas identified in the 1986 report. Because one such issue
concerned the relationship between the college president and the school committee, and begged the
question of who made personnel decisions for the college, the controversy over the rehired faculty member
was discussed extensively, as an example of school system interference, in the self study the college
prepared for the upcoming review. The college prepared and sent the self-study without sharing it with
the superintendent or school committee. One member of the self-study team remembers that "it was made
clear" to him that this issue was to be highlighted, and that Johnson "really sucker-punched" the
superintendent. According to the superintendent, "Clay was designated, but even a principal would
submit his accreditation report -- not for review but for information -- to the superintendent, and then to the
school committee." One School Committee member felt, more strongly, that the whole incident was "a
put up job" intended to involve the agency in the governance issue. "Of course it was," the committee
member said later. “It came from him. He met with them. He wined them and dined them, and he told them how unbearable we were and how we were interfering and all that. The school committee never interfered unless it was called for with him... And nobody will ever convince me otherwise.”

As the accreditation team was slated to visit, the school committee and superintendent publicly chastised Johnson and the college for an “inappropriate conclusion” in the self study with regard to the recent faculty disagreement. The school committee took Johnson to task for writing an unauthorized letter to the accrediting agency, especially since, in their view, he had overblown the incident and reported it inaccurately. The self study reported that “[t]he superintendent and school committee overrode the president’s decision and appointed a faculty member to tenure despite poor evaluations... This action speaks to the need for a valid and reliable instrument for use in establishing the competency of a college instructor. Moreover, the status and efficiency of the current external governance are brought into question.” After the discussion, Johnson agreed to strike the offending paragraph, even though (or possibly because) the accreditation committee had already seen it. The self-study showed improvement in the other areas of concern highlighted by the NEASC.

When the accreditation team’s report came back in May, 1991, it was highly laudatory -- with the one exception of governance. The report stated that, “Benefiting from strong and energetic leadership, the institution through the development of new programs, the improvement and expansion of its campus and through the enhancement of its image, has been able to attract and serve an enlarged student body... We commend the college for its recent successes.” It further noted that the primary concerns of 1986 -- its fiscal condition and physical plant, and the lack of standardization between day, evening and off-campus curricula, had been corrected. With regard to governance, the team wrote, “We do not wish to prescribe any structure” but it should include a chief executive officer with “requisite authority.” When contacted, both the head of the visiting team and the director of the commission were careful not to tell the college what it should do or comment negatively on the current structure. Rather, they said, their comments were made in relation to ongoing discussions of freeing the college from school committee control, which had been raised in accreditation reports as early as 1980. Another review was scheduled for Fall, 1992.
The College Thrives: Whatever the turmoil going on at the level of governance, the college thrived during this period. Students came in droves, partly in response to problems at the state schools, partly because of the growing strength of Quincy College itself. A branch campus further south was discussed for several years before a campus was established in Plymouth, but the Plymouth branch, opened in 1991, very quickly became a big success.

Tuition remained level from 1989 through 1992. In 1991, as he proposed another year with no increase, President Johnson noted that while some nearby state schools had doubled tuition during the previous seven years, Quincy’s had increased by only 15%. Further, at a time when the state schools were raising fees as much as $500, Quincy’s remained minimal. Highly laudatory articles in the Globe in January, and again in May, 1991, trumpeted the college’s successful transition into a fiscally strong institution, its increase in enrollment and expansion of programs, its recent name change (see below) and proposed bachelor’s degree, and, both by implication and direct attribution, the successful tenure of President Johnson. Announcing the opening of the Plymouth campus, the Globe’s front page story (Sunday South Edition) began: “While the state higher education system slashes programs and lays off teachers, the only municipal college in Massachusetts is getting ready to expand.”

Enrollment growth in the period between the mid-1980’s and 1991 was equally impressive. Bunker Hill Community College showed a net loss in enrollment, from 6600 in 1985 to about 6000 in 1991. Massasoit showed a very slight increase, from 6500 in 1987 to nearly 7000 in 1991. For Quincy, however, though its enrollment was lower, the rise was dramatic. From just over 2000 students in 1985, enrollment at Quincy rose to approximately 3,600 in 1991 -- an increase of about 70%. Budget increases were similar, allowing the college to renovate and plan expansion. This growth was a source of concern (or more) to faculty and staff who saw revenue flowing into the college’s coffers while salaries did not increase and few new faculty or staff (other than adjuncts) were hired. For staff particularly, in offices such as registrars, financial aid and finance, the increase in students meant a greater workload without either increased pay or increased help. While much of the blame for this was laid at the president’s door, that complaint was only partially true.
In some instances, the president could have provided raises, and certainly could have hired staff help, but he chose not to. He generally avoided bringing on new staff, and offered few raises. At the same time, it was an anomaly of the college structure that raises were tied more to the budget of the schools than of the college. The school committee and superintendent were unwilling to consider anything but the lowest raises for the faculty -- indeed they couldn’t -- because the faculty were members of the school teachers union, and the school department itself was having financial difficulty. The school system couldn’t afford to give teacher raises, so college teachers could not get them either. The same logic held sway for clerical workers. Although professional staff were not part of a union, the committee was also unwilling to consider administrator raises, for fear of antagonizing the faculty and other unions. While this did not lead to a call to separate the college faculty from the QEA, it did lead, ultimately, to the creation of a small professional staff bargaining unit, and to a complaint from the QEA concerning the over-reliance by the college on poorly paid adjunct faculty. At a ratio of 55% full time to 45% part-time, however, Quincy was beating the average on full-time staff, and this complaint went nowhere.85

Two other indications of the college’s success, which doubtless helped fuel the enrollment increase, were the initiation of a study of a bachelor’s degree program, and the dropping of the “Junior” from the college’s name. Dropping the Junior was accomplished in 1990, through a successful Home Rule Petition that had everyone’s approval -- school committee, city council, mayor, and state legislature. It received wide publicity in the Ledger and Globe, creating some great “photo-ops” as signs were changed, and was generally perceived as enhancing the college’s image. President Johnson also proposed a small bachelor’s program in 1991, which was reviewed by a faculty committee and by the school committee, and which also received favorable publicity. Although the proposed program was small and specialized, discussions and comments from students, the public and the press often simply spoke of “when QC becomes 4-year.” Indeed, some people confused the name change with the bachelor’s plan and thought that it already had become a four year college. Especially when compared to the kind of press received by the state college system, this publicity was extremely helpful. While there is no way of knowing the extent of its influence, it undoubtedly served to mitigate the negative stories of charge and counter charge between the president...
and school committee, and must have helped fuel the dramatic enrollment increase. Whatever the cause, the college entered 1992 on a strong economic and enrollment footing.86 (For a complete enrollment summary, see Appendix A.)

Enrollment Summary for Three Colleges87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quincy</th>
<th>Massasoit CC</th>
<th>Bunker Hill CC</th>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2090</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4559</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* No figures are available for 1991; FTE count indicates steady growth between 1990 and 1992.

Morale Morass: The enrollment increase and financial stability might have been expected to engender a better climate within the college community, but they did not. In 1991, although the players changed significantly, the dynamics continued on the same track. School committee member Anselmo resigned in January, citing age and lack of support. Superintendent Ricci resigned in March, effective by the end of the year, also citing lack of support and singling out the incident in which Anselmo had changed his vote. The Ledger reported, under its banner headline concerning the superintendent’s resignation, that “Ricci said he still believes that Anselmo’s change of heart was engineered by Quincy College President O. Clayton Johnson, who has often battled with Ricci over running the college... Johnson again denied today having any role in Anselmo’s change of heart. ‘I had nothing to do with it,’ he said.”88

Later in the year, concerns about faculty morale and tenure were brought before the committee by Mary Collins, leading to another investigation of Johnson’s management tactics. This round of arguments started as Johnson was negotiating with the school committee for a raise. In the process, he claimed life tenure under the laws of Massachusetts, noting that because of this, he could keep his job “unless he breaks the law or becomes incompetent as leader” of the college. “I don’t have something that’s unusual that nobody else has. I have what the law provides,’ Johnson said. ‘There’s no option for (the school committee) to continue with three- or four-year contracts.’” Under Massachusetts law, school faculty and
administrators, such as school counselors, were granted tenure automatically on the first day of their fourth year. The school committee had, in fact, granted Johnson tenure several years previously, without discussion, by approving a list of faculty members, school counselors and others on which his name appeared. His claim of tenure distressed some committee members, however, who questioned whether tenure applied to the presidency, or whether he had been granted tenure as an instructor. A range of experts was consulted on the issue of providing tenure for college presidents, all of whom said it was both highly unusual and probably a poor idea.89

This controversy led to a broader discussion of tenure at Quincy College, which, since it was conducted under laws applying to public schools, was very different from the norm for colleges. In Quincy College, as in the public schools, a faculty member who was not officially notified of his or her release by April of his/her third year was awarded tenure -- generally considered a lifetime appointment. While it was noted that such a system “is not uncommon among community colleges that once were extensions of secondary schools,” some school committee members thought the system should be more collegiate. Johnson himself observed that the peer-review component of tenure, central at most colleges, was entirely absent from the school system process. Agreeing that current faculty and staff, including himself, should be exempt from new standards, Johnson welcomed them. It is interesting to note that even though a new tenure system would not have affected faculty who already had tenure, most of the tenured faculty, along with the union, were against any change.90 A few months later, when Johnson proposed a revised plan to “professionalize” the faculty, the union refused to negotiate, claiming that any change would not be in conformance with state law. Some faculty expressed the fear that if they agreed to any plan not strictly in conformance with the law, they might lose the protection of the law altogether.91

The tenure issue gave rise to a discussion of faculty morale, raised by Mary Collins before the school committee. “Quincy College has been financially very successful, and for that we are very grateful,” Collins said. “But in terms of staff morale...the picture is not as pretty... Over the past several years, I and other members of the committee have received numerous letters, complaints and phone calls delineating the details of the incredibly inhumane treatment which they have received.” Among their complaints
were retribution for speaking out or for union activity, lack of resources such as copying privileges, and a memo reminding faculty that they had to be on-campus during scheduled on-campus hours, including lunch, or face loss of pay. Since faculty would not speak to the issue in the presence of the president, Collins requested a meeting strictly between school committee members and faculty members.

This issue simmered for a few months, but was raised again in November when the school committee decided to investigate “mounting complaints from teachers of harassment and intimidation by Quincy College President O. Clayton Johnson and his top staff.” Johnson, according to the Ledger, blamed the dissension on “chronic complainers who don’t like changes he has instituted to improve the college.” The mayor and school committee chair, James Sheets, a former college instructor on leave from the college, was well aware of the nature of both the faculty and the president. He stated that “the committee is becoming increasingly alarmed at the number of issues that are emerging out of faculty and administration at the college and may well be moving toward a point where collectively something has to be done.”

Noting a range of recent grievances that had surfaced -- including threatening letters and gestures -- the union presented figures indicating that college faculty, who made up 5% of the teachers union, had filed 62% of the grievances during the previous year, a figure Johnson disputed. While Johnson’s supporters pointed to his success in saving the college, past and present faculty used terms like “vindictive,” and described a campus “fraught with discontent.” Some faculty members even felt that Johnson purposely attacked faculty to create grievances, as a means of demonstrating that the current governance system did not work. In general, “the union thought that he was the anti-Christ,” according to one faculty member. “He [Johnson] was constantly, constantly pushing... He was a bully.” A former staff member, who had resigned in 1987, said “Johnson’s leadership style was: ‘You destroy people.”

Johnson, for his part, pointed “proudly to the college’s high percentage of women and racial minority students and his initiative that created a faculty senate for complaints to be aired and resolved. ‘My style of management must be pretty good to accomplish those things,’” he said. Describing him as “coming on like gang-busters” and “a little too thin skinned,” supporters -- including the former mayor and school committee chair, the trustees and the faculty senate chair -- noted that he had turned a $600,000 debt into a
surplus, fought off a merger with Massasoit Community College, and transformed the college into a major success.

At the end of the year, the non-profit “board of trustees” publicly proposed an idea that had been privately discussed for some time: removing the college from the purview of the school committee and forming instead a new 11-member board with the mayor as chair.
Summary

From the struggle for survival in 1984-85 through the rest of the decade, organizational friction, stress and conflict continued on many levels. Though it grew steadily as the threat of closure eased and its wealth increased, the conflict and stress became more pronounced after the merger talks ended -- a point that aligns closely with the realization that the college had not just survived, but had thrived.

Many observers attribute the increasing conflict primarily to Johnson, who had a tendency to engage in battles with allies in the absence of a convenient enemy. It is also true, however, that as the talks of merger finally ended in 1988, the college reached the first point in its existence when no governance change was in the works. What it had -- the structure, the organization, the culture -- was what it was going to have for the foreseeable future. Further, the college had become wealthy relative to the rest of the city, particularly its sponsoring organization, the school system.

These two factors created an atmosphere where conflict was likely to flourish. The increasing size, scope and wealth of the college made it harder for the president to maintain his span of control, though he continued to try to dominate all aspects of college life. The cultural differences and structural fault lines built into the organization, first identified long before Johnson arrived, produced great stress in this period of rapid resource transfer, with a strong and contentious President, and without the distraction of a merger or takeover to divert attention. In these ways, as discussed more fully in Chapter Six, organizational conflict and stress dominated college life throughout this period.

The resolution of these issues was still some years away, but the new wealth of the college relative to other city agencies, and the attempts to solve the problems through the intervention of external forces such as the accrediting agency and Board of Trustees, led the conflict from the organizational to the political stage, to be played out among separate political entities. This final period leading up to the implementation of a new governance system is described in Chapter Five.
Notes to Chapter Four


Andrew Blake, Board votes to restrict state college fund use, 10 May 1989, Boston Globe, 21.


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29. Laura Pappano, State colleges seek 15% higher tuition, 2 May 1990, Patriot Ledger, 1, 17.

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43. John Diamond, Bid to give Quincy school state status deadlocked, 1 April 1987, *Patriot Ledger*, 11.


45. Interview with L., conducted by the author, November, 1996, p. 92.

46. Interview with F., conducted by the author October, 1996, p. 104.

47. Dennis Tatz., QJC chief: Merger will be blocked , 10 June 1987, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 15.
   Helene Maichle, Two schools differ greatly, 10 June 1987, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 15.


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51. Interview with F., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 104.


58. Interview with F., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 105.


64. Interview with Robert Ricci, conducted by the author, January, 1997.


71. Interview with K., conducted by the author, January, 1997, p. 6-7.


73. Interview with K., conducted by the author, January 1997, p. 11.


77. Interview with I., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 166.


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   Chris Poon, Quincy College wants to offer bachelor’s, 7 Aug. 1991, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 8.


93. Interview with I., conducted by the author, October, 1996, p. 167.

CHAPTER FIVE

Introduction

During Johnson's tenure, the struggles at Quincy College shifted ground several times. Initially, survival was the goal. Organizational conflict that had begun to emerge under Creedon and Pierce was deflected by a cataclysmic event, Proposition 2½, and individual domination shifted from Creedon and McIntyre to Johnson as the college once again struggled for survival. As the college became successful, fought off merger attempts with Massasoit, and grew in students, funds and resources, organizational and structural issues came to dominate: the struggle for the president to maintain the level of control he wanted, the increasing friction between the president and the superintendent and school committee, and the increasingly divergent paths of the college and school system. These struggles might have been resolved, or submerged, in the absence of resources. But the existence of the college as a strong and relatively wealthy institution, where control was unclear but clearly desirable, made easy resolution impossible. Instead, the organizational struggles went public: the conflict played itself out in the papers, more and more outside players got involved, and one of the college's external boards (certainly with the president's knowledge) formally introduced a plan to transfer the college from the oversight of the school committee to another, newly created board. Decisions made through the interaction of a range of individual and organizational actors may best be described as political decisions. As the college reached this point in its history, the dominant influences -- and the field of play -- shifted into the political sphere.

Following a brief description of the state of the community college system, this chapter is divided into two sections: the resolution of the control wars and development of a new governance plan, and the implementation of that plan. In addition to other actors already described, several new actors played central roles during this period.

- Daniel Raymondi: A lawyer, politician, and Quincy native, Raymondi had served previously on the school committee and the city council, had run unsuccessfully for mayor, and had been Norfolk County Treasurer before being reelected to the school committee in 1991. Known as
smart and relentless, he rapidly became the president’s chief antagonist. He became vice chair of
the school committee, chair of the committee to select a new board of governors, and later
Chairman of the Board of Governors.

- **Gene Creedon**: Brother of Larry Creedon, Gene Creedon was also a product of the Quincy Public
  Schools before being named superintendent. He had previously been a teacher, principal and
central administrator. Unlike his brother, who was described as brilliant but forceful and
arrogant, Gene was well-respected and well-liked, and his appointment as superintendent was
widely praised.

- **Don Young**: A retired academic administrator from Eastern Nazarene College, Young was
teaching at Quincy when he was tapped to be the college’s first Interim President.

- **Linda Wilson**: A former dean of students at the college until 1985, Wilson had worked for the
  school system until she was named the college’s second Interim President.

1. **Massachusetts College System: A Continued State of Turmoil**

   By the end of the 1980's, the state college system was regularly in the news for its continuing budget
problems and the resulting tuition increases. These trends continued through the first few years of the
1990's with the same pattern of announcements, debate, and eventual enactment that kept the tuition and
fee hikes in the news for months at a time. Less regular but probably equally damaging were the repeated
lapses of a growing number institutional leaders, who seemed unable to resist the lure of their college’s
discretionary trust funds. Neither of these trends was to subside for some time. Little wonder, then, that
many students chose Quincy.

   A 1990 UMass study showed Massachusetts as “10th from the bottom” in per capita spending on
public higher education -- lower even than Mississippi -- and “dead last” in student instructional and
library materials. State appropriations for its higher education system had been cut 33%, adjusted for
inflation, according to the study, “a phenomenal cut for any institution.” Further, much of the cut took
place during a period of strong economic growth in the Commonwealth, and in the context of support for
students in *private* higher education institutions described as “robust.” A new round of tuition increases
proposed by incoming Governor Weld in 1991, as a part of his deficit reduction package, was projected to make Massachusetts public institutions “among the most expensive in the nation.” The new governor adopted a 33% cap for the student share of expenses, which, if put into place at once, would have brought about a tuition increase of 20%. A proponent of “privatization,” the governor and his staff also sought ways to increase college efficiency. Noting the resignations of three presidents and the chancellor, and the generally poor morale throughout the system, Harvard’s Arthur Levine wrote, “If Massachusetts had set out to damage its public system of higher education it could not have done a more effective job.” A panel was created to study closing some campuses, as the administration proposed yet another cut of $74M from the system’s budget. After a year of bickering over campus closings, staff furloughs, and other cost-cutting measures, colleges responded with the only weapon they believed they had in their arsenal: fee hikes. By August, the Globe was reporting fee increases from 14-135% over the previous year, to the point where, in some cases, fees were higher than tuition.

By 1992, the Governor was still attempting to get a handle on the budget, and still pushing efficiency and cuts. A divided Commission on the Future of State and Community College Systems issued a report in February recommending that colleges “consolidate services to eliminate duplication, but continue to serve the needs of their region.” The report proposed that state colleges specialize, and that community colleges become “joint servers” of their regions, pooling faculty and other resources and teaching basic skills to prepare students for transfer to four-year institutions. One specific recommendation: a “partnership” between Roxbury, Bunker Hill, and Mass. Bay community colleges. As turmoil continued, tuition rises did also: 4.5% in 1993. By the early 1990’s, however, Quincy College was embroiled so much in its own success, and its own problems, that the community colleges were rarely mentioned. The tuition hikes were duly reported, but the superior position of Quincy was no longer a novelty. And it had problems of its own to resolve.

2. **Struggle Towards Resolution: 1991-1993**

*Time for a New Order:* Though not an overt topic of discussion, governance was never far from the surface during 1991. In the summer of 1990, the school committee had authorized an outside study of
college governance, but no action had been taken. In April, 1991, following a formal request from Johnson for a legal opinion, Mayor Sheets announced that he was creating a study committee composed of a member each from the Association of Community College Trustees, the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. By Fall, that team had been appointed and scheduled its visit to the college, but scheduling difficulties forced postponement.

While awaiting this report, but during the investigation of management tactics, the Trustees chose to announce their plan for an 11-member appointed board, mentioned above, to be chaired by the mayor and representing both the existing college-related boards and, to a lesser extent, the broader region served -- especially Plymouth. Johnson was, of course, closely involved in the development of this proposal. "It's time for a new order," former Mayor and current Trustee Chair Frank McCauley said. "The school stands on its own two feet. It's expanding its operations, and it's an awkward situation having the (school committee) involved."

The current mayor, however, believed that such a move was premature. "Major change demands consensus," said Mayor James Sheets. "If there's no consensus, there's not going to be consensus in the Legislature, and I don't think that consensus will be built in the next month." Citing mounting tension between faculty and Johnson's administration, Sheets indicated that there would have to be a "clear reading from the faculty before the school committee would act." A home rule petition, a legal necessity for a governance change, would not require the vote of the school committee, but it would require a vote of the city council and the signature of the mayor. Neither was prepared to act without the support of the school committee. School committee members declined to discuss the matter or vote until the outside report was received, although some faculty members and some school committee members were heard to say privately that they would not approve a new governing structure as long as Johnson remained president. The "three-member team of college experts" was re-scheduled to visit the college in April, 1992.
The Battle Shifts Ground: Events continued in 1992 along the same (inevitable?) collision course.

As Mary Collins retired from the school committee, Daniel Raymondi, elected the previous fall, gradually took over her role as the president's chief antagonist. Johnson hired a former Raymondi lieutenant as his controller in March, but it was not long before he was sharply at odds with her, accusing her of carrying information and stories to her former boss. Also, while Johnson and other college and school staff cheered the appointment to the superintendency of Gene Creedon, long time school administrator and brother of former superintendent Lawrence Creedon, this relationship too began to deteriorate within a matter of months.

For some, the hiring of Mary Beth Gilmore as controller was seen as a deliberate attempt by the president to curry favor with a new school committee member. Gilmore had previously worked closely with Raymondi, but had been out of work since Raymondi lost reelection as Norfolk County Treasurer. "Clay put her in because he was brown nosing the new member of the school committee," according to one close observer. Then, "right after she got hired, Danny went pfft. Started sticking it to [Johnson]. I mean, it was very early on. And that's why she had the problems with him." Another view, circulated in an anonymous 17 page letter from "The Concerned Faculty and Staff of Quincy College," and generally regarded by both faculty and staff as highly accurate (although no one seems to know who the author is), describes Raymondi as "expecting favors from the president." "When the favors did not come as fast and furious as Mr. Raymondi's insatiable appetite could consume them, a rift began to grow." The initial recommendation of the screening committee was for a different candidate. Although the committee considered Gilmore qualified, she was third of the three finalists. The letter describes the hiring as coming about when Raymondi learned of that recommendation. Raymondi allegedly informed Johnson that "he would never get anything passed by the School Committee if Gilmore was not hired." According to the letter, Johnson returned the initial recommendation asking for three unranked final candidates (out of a finalist pool of three). When he received the list, Gilmore was on it. "Ms. Gilmore was selected by the President and awarded the job by the School Committee." While Raymondi's discussions with the president remain unconfirmed, the actions of and instructions to the committee reported in the letter are
confirmed as accurate by a screening committee member. "This act of capitulation," continued the letter, "proved to be the start of President Johnson’s undoing. Almost immediately, Ms. Gilmore started providing information directly to Mr. Raymondi without first providing it to the President. When incorrect information was given to the School Committee and President Johnson criticized Ms. Gilmore, the war had begun."

On the one hand, the newspapers continued to trumpet the good news: "College planning to shun tuition hike." "4-year degrees on horizon." On the other, control and governance were problems that would not go away. "Quincy College is thriving," announced the Ledger in an April editorial. While suggesting that the college not rush in to a plan for four year degrees, it also recommended that, "before further expanding the college’s services, the city should first settle the issue of who’s going to run" the college. It also thought it knew the answer: "The school committee has enough on its hands in making decisions on the city’s public schools; it is time to pass control over Quincy College to an independent governing board representing the community." In May, the long-awaited independent study result was announced: Quincy College should have an independent governing board. The study team also recommended that the school committee be involved in the selection process of the board, that the new board be strongly tied to the city, and that faculty members be provided with both job security and a clear definition of teachers’ rights.

Mayor Sheets welcomed and praised the report, saying he was "surprised at how well the two [team members] ‘picked up on all the currents of thoughts, all the fears, and all the jubilation’ at the college." He said he would immediately appoint a task force to discuss issues such as teacher compensation and contract conditions, and would begin the work of preparing a home rule petition. Even QEA president Thomas Walsh offered guarded praise of the report, calling it "a good start."

By August, the school committee had found new charges on which to investigate Johnson: two members accused Johnson of insubordination, in part because Johnson did not attend a special meeting called to discuss some particular college issues, and in part because of remarks he made at a committee meeting. For his part, Johnson called the charges “groundless.” "I don’t know how I can be charged with
insubordination to someone I do not report to. I do not report to the school committee,' Johnson said, 'The superintendent has never said I've been insubordinate.' While the new superintendent did support Johnson at this time, the school committee ordered Johnson to appear at a closed door meeting the following month on his conduct, with some members publicly vowing to 'rein him in,' and a transcript of the purportedly insubordinate remarks published in the newspaper. In September, the committee did 'rein in' the president with a 5-part resolution, including the requirements that he abide by the chain of command, seek the superintendent's advice on all college matters, address school committee members only in public meetings, forward all correspondence to the superintendent for review, and attend all school committee meetings containing college items on the agenda. The committee also agreed to hold a special hearing on complaints from college staff. While saying he would abide by the chain of command 'for now,' Johnson initially claimed that all he wanted was 'fairness' and that he was 'not out of line.'

The opening of school brought further strife. Within the month, school committee members had filed four more complaints against Johnson, including unacceptable conduct at a school committee meeting and improper leases for buildings the college was using. While school committee members claimed the complaints were 'not a personal attack,' Johnson felt otherwise. Calling the actions a 'lynching,' he announced plans to file discrimination complaints against the committee.

As Fall progressed, matters continued to deteriorate. In the first week of November, after a heated phone conversation about letters from the college to the NEASC Commission (see below), Superintendent Creedon suspended President Johnson for five days, citing 'threatening' language, 'intimidation,' and 'conduct unbecoming of an employee.' Within a week of his return, Johnson was notified that he was to report to a hearing on charges before the school committee, including two new complaints about his conduct, with the possibility of a second suspension. 'I can't do nothing but go there and let them whip me,' said Johnson... 'Obviously, you have a superintendent that has decided ahead of time to suspend again.' On November 24th, following its hearings, the school committee voted unanimously to suspend Johnson for a second time. While the superintendent expressed the hope that relations would improve, and called the event 'an internal matter...not a dismissal hearing,' some school committee members, according
to the Ledger, said it was “a warning to shape up or, as committee member Margaret King put it, risk losing his job.” Most of the issues were disputed. For example, a complaint against Johnson of inappropriate and intimidating behavior towards school department personnel director Marge Donovan was vigorously disputed by college Dean Patricia Ryan, who was in the room at the time. After the suspension, Johnson remarked that he wanted time “to think about my future, have my own peace in the comfort of my family.” But he added, “I think this matter will be in litigation,” indicating that he believed the superintendent had overstepped his bounds. “I’m not discouraged, man,’” he told the Globe. “I brought this place from a junkyard to a respectable institution... I haven’t really been angry about it. I really feel pity right now.”

Return of the Aliens (Accreditation Again): In March, 1992, NEASC Director Charles Cook wrote to President Johnson to remind him of the college’s 5-year interim report, due in the Fall. In addition to requesting an overview of college activities and status, he noted that the three areas of particular emphasis were policies for evaluating academic programs, new mechanisms for personnel evaluation (differing from school department forms that had been used previously), and “the results of ongoing considerations of the appropriate structure to govern the College at the board level (should a change occur in the institution’s form of control prior to Fall, 1992, the college is requested to inform the Commission upon its adoption).” In September, citing his authorization by the president to write, and the president’s having informed the city solicitor of the need to write in the presence of the superintendent, Dean Robert Downey wrote the Commission that “the progress toward independence from public school collegiate governance has formally been reversed” by school committee action -- specifically, the five requirements placed upon the president when the committee “reined him in.” Downey included a copy of the study committee recommendation of a separate governance structure. On October 26th, he wrote again, noting the failure of the committee to act on hiring requests in a timely fashion and the school committee directive to the president to “set aside $10,000 from the college fund for attorney’s fees for the school committee.” Citing specific standards maintained by the Commission, Downey implied that the school committee was appropriating college funds for non-college purposes. In a third letter dated October 30, 1992, Downey
wrote the Commission that the task force set up by the mayor to consider the creation of a new governing board consisted exclusively of members of the QEA and the School Committee, without representation from the college administration.\footnote{1}

Superintendent Creedon either did not respond immediately to Downey’s first letter, or did not receive a copy, although it was written in September. About a month later, Creedon wrote the Commission explaining that the actions of the school committee did not represent any change in policy, as the president had historically reported to the school committee through the superintendent. At this point the School Committee, having learned about Downey’s letters, erupted. At its November 4th meeting, committee member Raymondi “repeatedly grilled” Downey about the letter, accusing him of jeopardizing the college’s good standing. He also accused Downey of “lobbying” for a governance change. “By your misrepresentation in this letter,” Raymondi told Downey, “it was designed to force Mr. Cook to interject his credibility into this matter.” Downey, for his part, insisted at the time, and continues to insist, that he had the obligation, as “point of contact” on accreditation, to inform the Commission of substantive changes.\footnote{2} Johnson, who did not see Creedon’s letter until it was distributed at a school committee meeting, later called Creedon to complain. It was in this interaction that threatening language was used, in Creedon’s estimation, resulting in Johnson’s first suspension.\footnote{3}

While it is not clear what Director Cook or other Commission members thought of all of this correspondence, the action of the Commission, on December 9, 1992, was to inform President Johnson by letter that the Commission would be recommending to its executive committee in April 1993 that Quincy College be placed on probation. The College had the opportunity during the interim, the letter stated, to show cause why this recommendation should not go forward, with the show-cause response to be validated by a team from the Commission before the April meeting.\footnote{4} The Patriot Ledger editorialized: “There’s only one good thing about the ongoing dispute between Quincy College President O. Clayton Johnson and the Quincy School Committee: It provides a classic study in how not to run a college.” Noting the “absurdity” of the committee’s order to Johnson to forward correspondence through the superintendent, and calling the order forbidding the president to speak to them privately “ridiculous,” the paper concluded
“it’s no wonder the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education has questions about the administrative setup...” “To be sure, the commission’s interest is not exactly spontaneous,” the editorial noted, but it concluded that an independent governing board “more than anything, would remove the threat of probation and loss of accreditation.”

A team came to visit in March, four days after the president submitted his bias complaint to the Mass. Council Against Discrimination, and two days after the school committee complained that the entire accreditation problem was part of a Johnson strategy. “‘This is a question of pay raises, power and control (for Johnson),’ Raymondi said. ‘I think it’s outrageous when you have a college administration willing to run a risk of affecting the accreditation of a fine institution for the sake of politics.’” “‘It will not reflect on me,’ Johnson said. ‘This (undue influence by the school committee) has been going on for 20 years. I’ve only been here nine years. Anybody who says Clay Johnson created this issue has had their heads in the sand.’” The team met with the mayor, president, superintendent, school committee, and others, and left to prepare its report for submission to the Commission by April 9th. Shortly thereafter, President Johnson, Mayor Sheets, and Superintendent Creedon jointly sent a letter to the head of the team indicating their joint recognition of the governance problem and their joint intention to solve it. They stated their intention to present a Home Rule Petition to the legislature by June 1. In a separate letter, Johnson clarified the issues for Commission director Cook, citing legal precedent and noting that if the superintendent was the college’s CEO, the college failed to meet Commission standards by not having a CEO devoted exclusively to the college. The “situation now appears headed for change,” he added (emphasis in the original).

In May, the Commission notified the college that it had delayed action on probation until December, noting that it saw “good faith” in addressing the governance issue, but requiring status reports every other month. Mayor Sheets saw the commission’s message as clear: “resolve the governance issue or get put on probation.” But he predicted that if the Legislature acted quickly, a new board could be in place by January, 1994. A week later, the task force’s draft plan was submitted to the Mayor, who directed the city solicitor to draw up a Home Rule Petition based on it, and distributed it to the School Committee and City Council. Johnson sent a copy to the Commission. The report was generally well received in the...
college community, with the notable exception of the school committee. In particular, committee members complained about the Commission, claiming that it wouldn’t tell them what was wrong with the current arrangement. “It’s been successful... I don’t like being held against the wall by an organization that will not tell us what is wrong,” said one committee member. On the same day that the task force report was officially presented to the press, the President survived a dismissal attempt by one vote.

**Continuing Controversy:** While a consensus on governance seemed to be forming during 1993, it did not include the school committee. Nor did the string of controversies between Johnson and the committee lose any intensity. Johnson disagreed publicly with Sheets about the timing of the governance discussion, and accused Sheets of delaying the process, possibly for political purposes. But the most frequent and vociferous battles were between Johnson and the school committee, usually led by Raymondi. Having uncovered improperly bid leases in December (Johnson admitted that mistakes had been made in the way the leases were put together), Raymondi accused Johnson of hiding documents regarding some of those leases. Following the next school committee meeting, in early February, Johnson accused the committee of racism in one of six civil rights grievances he said he intended to file. Raymondi called the charges “outrageous and outlandish,” counter-charging that Johnson was attempting a “legal bribe” to force the school committee into giving him a pay raise. On March 3rd, just a few days before the arrival of the accreditation visiting team, Johnson dropped his racism grievances against the committee, saying that instead he had submitted his complaint to the Mass. Commission Against Discrimination. The school committee was outraged again, complaining that they had not had an opportunity to hear or respond to the complaints.

The governance task force presented its draft plan to the school committee on March 17th. With the accreditation team threatening probation unless the governance issue was resolved, the Ledger editorializing regularly for a separate college board, and now, with a new report recommending a newly structured board, many in the community were anxious the move forward. The school committee was not. Committee members wanted further study, plus the mayor’s official reaction to the report, before taking up the question. In mid-April, Johnson fanned the flames of dissension at a school committee meeting by
producing a fake red pepper which he showed to one Italian committee member during a break, and which (the Italian members of the committee said) he took out of his pocket whenever one of them spoke. Since, in Italian folklore, the red pepper signifies a “fool,” the Italian members professed to being highly insulted. “The deliberate mockery of my background is discriminatory and unprofessional,” said one. Johnson later apologized, calling the incident “an attempt at levity” that was misunderstood. He said that as a minority he understood how people might feel if they perceived an ethnic insult, and apologized “to the communities I serve and particularly those that I may have offended.” The school committee decided to hold another disciplinary hearing concerning the incident. When notified of the hearing, Johnson said he did not understand the purpose. “The fact of it is I have apologized. What else is there to say?” he said.

At the very end of April, Johnson asked the school committee for a settlement of $1.4M for the “pain and suffering” of his family, and the potential lost earning power resulting from the committee’s discrimination against him. In May, the school committee learned that the college had overspent its approved budget by $1.2M, through a study prepared by college controller Marybeth Gilmore. Once again, the school committee was outraged. As the details unfolded, the college disputed the numbers of its own controller, pointing out that grant-funded personnel were not separated from the regular budget. College officials also noted that while rapid enrollment growth had caused it to spend more than its original estimates, it was remaining well within its means. In fact, as they demonstrated, not only did none of the additional funds come from taxpayers, the college had accumulated a surplus of $3.4M, as soaring enrollment put it well in the black. The school committee was not appeased. Raymondi called it “a mockery” and complained that at it was another indication of “problems at the top.” “The buck doesn’t stop anywhere,” he complained. The committee voted to require quarterly budget reports, to disallow switching between line items without approval, and other budget restrictions. One committee member said that “before any move is made to transfer oversight of the college from the school committee to an independent governing board the college has to show it can be accountable for its finances.”

At its first June meeting, committee member Raymondi asked the committee to consider dismissing Johnson, calling the college “out of control.” Despite their unanimity on many of the complaints against
him, the move to dismiss lost on a 4-3 vote. "This doesn't warrant dismissal," said one member. "It warrants a look at the (budget) procedure." Two weeks later, after much squabbling about what was being spent and an independent audit that called the college's record keeping "inadequate and ineffective," the president was once again facing dismissal. This time, the committee voted 6-1 to schedule hearings. As school committee members used phrases such as "deeply troubled...regarding alleged misconduct," the president described the committee's action as a "vendetta" involving "racial discrimination, conspiratorial activities, and failure to reasonably carry out the public trust." Potential charges included:

Insubordination.

Misrepresentation.

Refusing to comply with school committee directives and policies.

Substandard performance.

Inappropriate and unprofessional behavior.

Inappropriate treatment of staff and students.

Mishandling of the college budget and finances.

Saying he had "nothing to hide," Johnson demanded that the hearing be held in public. After another two weeks, he filed a complaint with the district attorney charging that the committee had held private discussions about his dismissal without proper notice. State law allows committees to hold executive sessions only for a specifically stated purpose, and requires disciplinary hearings to be formally announced in advance.36

By this point, a revised governance plan, which had been amended to allow politicians to serve on the new governing board, was on the table. The city council, and the Ledger, were in a hurry to move it forward. The city council demanded action from the school committee during the summer, implying that they would make a decision without school committee approval if action wasn't forthcoming. The Ledger, citing continuing friction and highlighting an incident in which the school committee had interfered in a student's grade dispute, called the affair meddling and urged city officials to "move expeditiously" to create a plan and send it to the legislature.39
In August, as the college entered its fifth straight year without a tuition increase, the city council voted to endorse the new governance plan. “Six months after a mayoral task force unveiled the plan” as the Ledger noted, and despite “pressure from the council” the school committee voted to delay consideration until an unspecified date.18

Denouement: On September 8th, two days before classes started, Superintendent Creedon fired President Johnson, citing authority under the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993. His letter of dismissal listed “reasons including, but not limited to, your ineffective, inappropriate, and unprofessional management method and style; and/or insubordination; and/or misrepresentation; and/or substandard
administrative performance.” At that time, Creedon said he had sent a letter to Johnson on August 12th spelling out his intent to fire the president, and listing his reasons. He gave Johnson seven days to respond, a time period that was later extended. After meeting with Johnson and the school department lawyer, the superintendent said he decided to go through with the firing immediately. Johnson said he had not expected to be fired, calling the disputes political rather than professional.  

As school started, with most students “unaware” of the firing according to the Ledger, and with Creedon as temporary head of the college, reaction began to set in. The Ledger editorialized that the “unexpected firing...makes the need for self-governance plainer than ever.” City councillors and candidates for both the school committee and council were mixed in their reaction, but even as the superintendent appointed a respected educational administrator to be the college’s interim president, the school committee voted to charge the college an additional $217,000 a year to use three of its buildings -- the same buildings which had been “sold” or leased in perpetuity only a few years earlier. It is likely that, had Clay Johnson still been president, this school committee action would not have succeeded. Mayor Sheets vowed that the president’s firing would not disrupt the development of a plan to change the governance structure.


Interim Presidency: Two weeks after Clay Johnson was fired, Superintendent Creedon appointed Donald Young, a former vice president and academic dean at Eastern Nazarene College currently teaching at Quincy, to serve as interim president. As Young was known within the community, and as he had extensive previous administrative experience, this appointment was generally well-received.

Within the month, the school committee was ready to review the plan for a new governing board. It also wanted to speak to Charles Cook, Director of the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, and invited him to attend a committee meeting. When Cook arrived the following week, he was greeted by a skeptical committee and “grilled,” (according to one observer) by committee members who accused him of not giving them a chance to defend themselves against the charge of meddling, and who believed that the Commission acted only at the behest of Johnson. Raymondi debated with Cook asking, among other
questions, why Catholic Colleges led by nuns or priests clearly subservient to a religious hierarchy were not also attacked by the commission.\textsuperscript{41} While declining to criticize specific weaknesses, Cook said that the Commission's job was “to ensure that higher education institutions fall within broad standards.” As to the accusation that he was responding to Johnson's complaint, he noted that the problem had been “long-standing.” “It’s not something that we first investigated under President Johnson. It will not go away with him.” He further noted that when the system had worked it had been because of “the cordiality between superintendent and president. An institution of good governance should not [be] based on good will.”\textsuperscript{42} After the meeting, in response to questioning led by Raymondi and joined by several others, Cook was reported to have remarked to college officials that he now understood what they were dealing with.\textsuperscript{43}

Despite this controversy, however, plans for a new governing board moved ahead. Several committee members still questioned whether there were “any fundamental problems with the current oversight of the college.” But Sheets, noting problems between other presidents and superintendents, said there were “major and severe conflicts about who has the power to govern the college.” Committee member Linda Stice, who had been co-chair of the task force making the initial recommendation, joined the mayor in defending and explaining the proposal to other committee members. The College “‘is not an extension of the public school system,’ she said. ‘The issues in higher education are different...’”\textsuperscript{44} “‘The plan is genuinely the best for Quincy College and the Quincy public schools,’ Stice said.”\textsuperscript{45} Sheets indicated his intention to have the school committee meet weekly until the matter was resolved.

As the discussion proceeded, several additional proposals were presented. In October, committee member Raymondi offered a new proposal, with five seats each for school committee and city council serving as “transitional members.” By November, however, he was proposing a “compromise” which would keep the college under school committee control but provide the president with more authority. Saying that it was “the only realistic package I can support,” he proposed having the college president report directly to the committee. The committee decided to hold hearings on the idea, with several members stating the opinion that this change would address the NEASC's concerns.
A sticking point for some committee members was the status of college employees, who had always been employed by the school department. The task force proposal addressed this concern by having faculty and staff be employees of the city, retaining seniority and other protections they had earned. Sheets still expressed support for a new governing board. "I still support Linda (Stice's) proposal unless it can be proven that we can't protect the employees," Sheets said after the meeting. 'Then I would move away from it.' But generally, he called Raymondi's proposal "window dressing" rather than substantive change.  

Two weeks later, the committee voted 4-3 to retain control of the college, with Sheets and Stice voting against, Raymondi and his cousin, State Rep. Ron Mariano, voting for. But most city councillors, and many parents, were opposed to the school committee's continued control. After years of watching the committee wrangle over the college, several parents spoke forcefully before both the committee and the council that it was time for committee members to attend to the job they were elected for -- running the schools. When the school committee voted against relinquishing control, the city council was outraged. While the school committee had no formal vote on the needed home rule petition, both the mayor and council had repeatedly called for consensus before proceeding. Now the council, in particular, expressed disgust.  

Similarly, the editors at the Ledger were not impressed. "Good Grief!" they cried. "Hasn't the Quincy School Committee had enough headaches with Quincy College?... So much for Reform." After rehearsing the arguments for a change once again, they ended: "It's time for real change at Quincy College, not the illusion of change. Flunk the Raymondi plan and get on with the process of creating an independent college governing board." And so, 1993 came to an end with no resolution of the governance issue.  

In February, 1994, Sheets presented his own plan to the city council, which was based on the task force's original proposal but which spelled out employee rights more specifically. He called for the council to vote for one of the three plans before it -- the original, Raymondi's, or his own -- and said that whichever was approved would be sent to the legislature. Significantly, the chairman of the council's education committee indicated that whichever plan was chosen would not be returned to the school
committee for a vote. "We've got their input," he said, although he invited them to speak at the public hearing if they chose, "It's now the city council's ball game." Sheets offered the opinion that although it had been a year since the task force proposed its plan, and although action was needed because of the pending accreditation decision, a full debate had been needed. "It's a real classic case of the democratic process," he said. Not surprisingly, noting the ongoing threat of probation, the Ledger strongly supported the mayor's plan. With just a few days left before the Commission hearing, the city council voted 8-0 to endorse the creation of a new Board of Governors. Raymondi said that while he still believed in his own proposal, he would cooperate in getting legislative approval of the petition, and local legislators promised to push the petition as quickly as possible. Later in March, the Commission released its decision to postpone the question of probation until September, to give the city more time to proceed with the change. Noting that "significant progress had been made to resolve the governance issue," Director Cook said of the mayor's proposal: "Of all the proposals, this is to the commission's liking." By June, the bill had cleared the legislature. On July 5, 1994, Governor Weld signed a bill "transferring control of Quincy College from the school committee to an independent governing board."

**A Question of Cozy Politics:** Having reached this significant milestone, the next step was to implement the transfer process. Within the month, a selection team was set up to assemble the new board. It consisted of two school committee members (Dan Raymondi and Ronald Mariano), two city councilors (Thomas Fabrizio and Michael Cheney) and one member of the college's non-profit Trustees (Richard Hart). On the final board there were to be 13 members -- 11 chosen by the team plus one school committee member and one city councilor (who would be chosen by Raymondi and Fabrizio, heads of these two bodies, respectively). The team announced a plan to choose the new board on August 29th, after soliciting applications and hearing presentations from prospective board members.

When the new board was announced, Raymondi, Mariano, Fabrizio, and Hart were all members. The Ledger noted editorially that those on the new board represented "a range of talent and experience in various fields," but observed that only two were women, despite the fact that two-thirds of the students were women and that two dozen had qualified to serve. They also pointed out that there were no
minorities on the new board, although nearly 20% of the student body was minority. Further, while provision was made for four non-Quincy members, only three were chosen, "and none of them live anywhere near Plymouth where the college has a branch. Three candidates from Plymouth and three from Marshfield were inexplicably passed over."

The paper went on: "A place was conveniently found, however, for a veteran Quincy politician, Daniel Raymondi. As vice chairman of the school committee, he has been a prominent player in matters involving Quincy College. As the chairman of the trustees search committee, though, Raymondi should not have been a candidate for the new board even though there was no legal barrier to his appointment. If nothing else, this raises a question of cozy politics -- the kind that we thought the college independence plan was supposed to end." Shortly thereafter, Raymondi was elected chair on a 12-1 vote. To much of the college community, the appointment of governors was a sham and the election of chairman a foregone conclusion. A few with ties to the chairman may have been pleased, but by all reports, most were not. Many associated with the college reported that the board was mostly lawyers (which it was not, although several lawyers had been chosen), and that they were hand-picked to back Raymondi, which he denied. No explanation was offered as to why so many people who had long been associated with the college -- such as the members of the non-profit Board of Trustees and College Courses, Inc. -- were not chosen. Despite many having applied, only Richard Hart who was also on the selection committee, and Attorney Peter O’Neill, one of the newest members of the Trustees, ended up on the governing board. This was, and remains, an issue for the members of these boards.

At the end of September, the accrediting agency dropped its plan to place the college on probation. When this news was presented at a governing board meeting, Ron Mariano remarked, "I think it’s great that even though Daniel Raymondi is a member of the school committee, (the commission) didn’t see it as a problem." At the same meeting, the governors decided that they wanted "to get off to a fresh start.” Accordingly, they also announced that they would seek a new interim president. Saying that this move was not to be seen as a reflection on current interim president Don Young (although, they pointed out, he hadn’t been interviewed or screened for the position), they welcomed him to apply to continue in the post.
Mariano indicated that the interim president could become the permanent president: ""We appoint the interim president to a one-year term... Then eight to 10 months later we’ll evaluate things and, depending on our working relationship with the person in the interim position, decide whether to offer a permanent post."" A screening team consisting of three board members, appointed by the chairman, plus QEA and professional staff representatives, was formed.

Upset: The decision to choose a new interim president caused another upset. A movement to keep Dr. Young as interim president quickly sprang up, and on the night of the screening committee’s initial presentation of candidates, petitions signed by “nearly 100 college employees” were presented in Young’s favor. Of the five “semi-final” candidates, two had previously been administrators at other colleges, while three were local. In addition to Young, local candidates included Stephen Kenney, the college’s director of development and grants, and Linda Wilson, the director of the Quincy Public School’s Drop Out Prevention Program, who taught as an adjunct and had been an administrator at the college in the early 1980’s. When the board narrowed the list one more time, only the Quincy candidates remained. Once again cynics had been proven correct, and once more the board was on the defensive. Few could understand why the board was even searching for another interim president. As long-time faculty member Ed White put it, “What is this exercise? They should be searching for a permanent president now. At this point we need Don Young.”

City councilors, particularly council president Michael Cheney and councilor Tim Cahill, were also “saddened” and “perplexed,” raising questions as to the motives and effectiveness of the board of governors. Calling the council’s questions interference, Raymondi “lashed out angrily” at the council and Cheney. “How can he have the audacity in the 11th hour of this most serious decision to interfere politically in this process?” Councilor Timothy Cahill worried about politics “seeping in” to the college again, and its returning to “‘a place to put political appointees and serve as 13th and 14th grades...’” Raymondi countered: “‘The most important aspect of being on this board is selecting a president... It’s astounding that people are expecting a new board not to enter a process to select the very best person to
run the college." But most people seemed to be arguing for just that: choosing a president, and not expending time and effort choosing another interim.

Paul Hunt, chairman of College Courses, Inc., described his organization as "truly saddened," and asked, "Why interrupt things now? Why not let Young stay for another year if the board does not plan to search for a permanent president yet?" It is not clear that this latter question was ever answered. Over the next several days, the debate became more heated, to the point where the council passed a resolution in favor of keeping Young in place. Sponsored by Cheney and Cahill, who called the selection process "a sham," the resolution passed by a wide margin. In a dramatic finale, the council passed its resolution urging the board to retain Young on the same evening the governing board heard its final presentation from the three candidates and prepared to vote. The council's resolution was delivered by a uniformed policeman during the governing board's meeting. But it was at this governing board meeting that two different college staff members report having seen an appointment announcement for one of the candidates already written up -- indicating that the decision had been made before the candidates had been interviewed and before a vote had been taken. In the end, the board voted 11-2 to appoint Linda Wilson as the college's second interim president.

Back on the editorial page, the Ledger summed up what most people were reportedly thinking. "An independent board to govern Quincy College. A new era in which the two-year community school could thrive free of city politics and infighting. Was it really too much to expect? Obviously so, judging from the latest troubling episode... [U]nderneath, this is really a struggle for power between street-smart politicians on the school committee cum board of governors and their rivals over at city hall. The potential losers, of course, are none of them, but rather the students, the faculty and the college's reputation... Just like the days when the school committee and President Johnson had their duels! And how are such political contretemps going to help Quincy College? Not very much."

As Interim President Wilson got ready to take the helm, the issue continued to roil through the community for another month. The council passed, and the mayor signed, a Home Rule Petition that would restructure the college's board to keep politicians off of it. Given the nature of such petitions,
which are typically carried to the legislature by a united delegation, this one probably stood little chance. Governing board member (and school committee member) Mariano was also a state representative. Supporting such a measure would mean he would lose his seat on the board. Not surprisingly, Mariano said that he did not “see it as a conflict of interest for him to vote on the legislation. ‘I’m not taking it personally,’ he said. ‘I’m debating the merits of whether you want to have elected officials from the city of Quincy on the board.’” Seeing the handwriting on the wall, and admitting that they did not want to expend political capital in a losing effort, the mayor and some of the councilors who supported the petition decided not to push strongly for the change. Despite vigorous arguments from other councilors -- including a challenge to the delegation to find another well-run college that had elected officials on its board -- the petition died.\(^6\)

**Interim Presidency II:** Interim President Linda Wilson came to the interim presidency with a doctorate in counseling psychology and experience as an administrator at Quincy Junior College from 1979 until 1985, ending up as dean of students. She had left in 1985 citing “philosophical differences” with President Johnson, and took over the Quincy Public Schools Drop-Out Prevention program. She took a leave of absence from that program to serve as the college’s interim president. The entire appointment process which produced her presidency engendered significant controversy, as already noted. Much of the anger and animosity were directed at the board, since most viewed the move as unnecessary and disruptive. Also, since all three final candidates were local, and since many believed that Wilson lacked the experience and qualifications even to be an interim president, many also believed that the whole selection process had been “a bag job.” Undeterred, Wilson launched a long-range planning effort, put the 4-year degree program on hold, and set up processes to evaluate and then improve college programs and operations. Her unofficial approval rating with the college rose slowly but steadily during the first six months of her tenure.

In June, however, Wilson’s previously cordial relationship with the board took a sharp turn for the worse when she turned down a proposal from the board to upgrade the position of a staff member known to have close ties to the board chairman, Communications Director Sean Barry. Barry, raised in Quincy
and with no previous collegiate experience, was also a politician. On his second try, he had run
successfully for a seat on the school committee, managing to serve on this committee while it governed the
college, even though he was a college staff member. On the committee, he was a colleague, with
reportedly close ties, to Raymondi and Mariano. In what the Ledger described as “uncharacteristically
strong words” Wilson told the board that the chairman’s proposal “reflected a ‘seeming misconception of
the appropriate role of the board of governors versus the appropriate role of the president... One could
argue that going so far as to define a job name, an individual appointee, and to establish the upgrade salary
level and car allowance exceeds normal and acceptable board practice.” She questioned whether the
position was necessary, and cited problems it created. Her stance brought applause from the college staff
members in attendance. Raymondi responded that he “did not mean to step on the president’s toes.” He
added, “‘It’s only a proposal, that’s all... I didn’t pursue it, and I do not understand all the emotion about
it. But it ought not to have a chilling effect on coming up with ideas.’” He presented his vision of the
position, saying he would respect the wishes of the president, but he hoped she had “a plan of her own in
the works to stabilize personnel.”

At the same meeting, a member of the college’s professional staff announced her resignation, publicly
describing what she saw as the deteriorating attitudes of the management and the unprofessional fashion in
which college business, including personnel and contracting, were conducted. She said she was “‘shocked
and disgusted’ at the political manner in which many things, including hiring,” were being handled. As a
specific example, a second long time employee in the financial aid office asked why she had been passed
over for a position in her office in favor of someone who had neither a degree nor experience in financial
aid, despite a job description requiring both. While she got no response from the board, most staff
members believed they already knew the answer. Staff members privately related repeated instances of
stacked committees, the hiring of completely unqualified individuals -- not only unqualified, but in many
cases not interested in or able to perform the needed work -- the commonality among these appointees
being universally close ties to the board chair and his protégé, Sean Barry.
Whether the personnel recommendation was "just a proposal," as described, or something more serious, Wilson's relationship with board members deteriorated with remarkable speed. By August, the board publicly criticized Wilson for having "overstepped her authority by drafting a list of hiring procedures without board approval." After an argument in which Raymondi called Wilson's plans "a travesty," the board approved a hiring freeze, refusing to exempt the filling of a couple of newly approved positions the president argued for. Raymondi and cousin Mariano brought forth a series of criticisms and "concerns" regarding Wilson's actions, particularly related to contract negotiations, and the board voted "to order Wilson to stop communicating with the union and take matters to the board chairman or attorneys." 

Two weeks later Wilson resigned, citing "an increasingly difficult working relationship" with the board of governors. Raymondi would not comment on the relationship, but said: "We've talked on numerous issues, and I have given her advice freely in the spirit of cooperation... The decision she's made is personal." As the Ledger summarized the deteriorating relationship, "Board members have accused Wilson of trying to assert herself into the policy-making realm, and Wilson has claimed that board gets too heavily involved in the college's day-to-day operations." Commenting on the board's rebuke, Wilson said, "'It seems to me that logging in resumes as they come in is not a matter of policy, but is a clerical procedure.'" Wilson had made no secret of her interest in the permanent position from the beginning, and said she was disappointed. "'I have tried to conduct myself professionally and with integrity throughout this,' she said, 'and my judgment, after the last, very telling meeting, was to let them know that I would not be attempting to renew my contract. So they could look elsewhere.'" 

While most people involved with the college understood Wilson's reasons for leaving, they were profoundly upset by the circumstances that had brought it about, having come to respect Wilson for her integrity and her willingness to speak up for the college. City councilor Timothy Cahill spoke for many when he commented, "'Anyone who stands up to Dan Raymondi is history.'" Like others, he had not supported her appointment, having been one of the councillors who had wanted to remove politicians from the board. But, he said, "'I'm sad that she's leaving... I applaud that she stood up for herself. But it's
clear that the board is not comfortable giving someone so much power.” Frank McCauley, former mayor and school committee chair, and later chair of the college’s non-profit Board of Trustees, also faulted the board chairman. “He was clearly out of line,” McCauley said of Raymondi, who lost the 1980 mayoral race to McCauley. “Dan’s role is one of policy maker. Linda is the one who should be bringing up hiring recommendations.” Raymondi would not comment. Mayor Sheets was on vacation. As happened following each previous incident, board members insisted they looked to Raymondi for leadership, “because he has the experience,” but were not beholden, or subservient, to him.

**The Students are Finally Aroused:** The balance of 1995 saw a slow exodus of staff members and, reportedly, a continuing decline in morale, even as the board put together a process to choose a permanent president. Academic Dean Patricia Ryan left to become president of Harcum College in Pennsylvania; shortly thereafter, she recruited admissions director Lori Tomassetti to become Harcum’s dean of enrollment. College officials denied there was a pattern; privately, many faculty and staff believed otherwise.

To search for a permanent president, a job Raymondi called “the most important responsibility we, the board of governors, have,” a 13-member committee was appointed, consisting of five members of the board of governors, three contract faculty members, one member each of the professional and senior staffs, one student, and one member of the Plymouth Campus Council. The members were chosen by the governing board from recommendations of the respective constituencies. While the process seemed to start smoothly, by November the students of the college, normally a quiescent body, were up in arms about the selection of the student representative. A sign up sheet for interested students had been posted, with the Student Government Association (SGA) designated to vote for three candidates to be presented to the board of governors. Two weeks after submitting their list, they learned that a student not on that list had been appointed.

The students had been largely uninvolved and unconcerned through the Johnson era and before. This move, however, enraged them. “They asked us for names, we provided them. We voted, tied and then revoted. It was very important to us so we followed the rules to the tee,” said Claire Tyler, a Hanson
sophomore who serves on the SGA. ‘But they did not pick anyone we voted on. Why even go through the process?’"

As the story began to unfold, it turned out that the student eventually chosen, Nancy Dyer, had requested that administrator Steven Kenney include her in consideration. Kenney claimed that because all the other screening committee members had been chosen, he simply added her name to the list rather than returning the list to the SGA for a vote. ‘‘The deadline hadn’t passed, so I felt she should be considered,’” said Kenney. According to the Ledger, students blamed the board, not Kenney, for the ‘‘snafu.’’ They ‘‘lambasted Raymondi, alleging he solicited their help, then ignored all their recommendations in favor of his own pick.’’ Raymondi claimed that he didn’t know any of the students, and simply chose the one recommended by Kenney, but most believed Kenney had been forced to act as he did.70

In an angry confrontation at a subsequent board meeting, ten students demanded that Dyer be removed. When the board declined to remove her, the students stormed out. ‘‘Face it, they’ll never listen to us,’ said SGA president Ellen Serino, a sophomore.’’ Raymondi called the dispute ‘‘a serious matter which we must not take lightly.’’ He proposed adding a student to the board of governors, but the students called that action ‘‘a ploy’’ and maintained the grievance they had filed.71

As the screening committee went about its business, reducing the number of candidates to a manageable number to interview, the tangle of interpersonal relationships that had been well known around campus finally became public. Nancy Dyer was not just any student. Age 39, she had graduated from Quincy College years previously but was taking a special, late-starting, course. She was a long time friend and campaign worker for college administrator Sean Barry, who was also a member of the school committee, a friend and colleague of Raymondi’s, and the administrator whom Raymondi had attempted to promote in June (with salary increase and car allowance), leading to the confrontation with, and the eventual resignation of, president Linda Wilson. For his part, Barry called the charge ‘‘hogwash.’’ ‘‘I do not see what benefit her friendship to me has to do with her selection to the committee,’’ he said.

The Ledger noted that the students’ concern went beyond Barry to Raymondi, who was not only connected to Dyer through Barry but had also served with Dyer on a committee, despite having claimed
that he didn’t know any of the students on the list. According to one student leader, "The whole thing smacks of Tammany Hall. What stretch of the imagination is it to connect Nancy Dyer to Dan Raymondi, if Dan Raymondi and Sean Barry are so tied together?" He and 218 other students filed a grievance. As the Ledger described the confrontation: "students point to the ties between Barry, Dyer and Daniel Raymondi, chairman of the college board of governors, who picked all 13 screening committee members. Raymondi, recently elected to the city council from Ward 2, serves on the school committee with Barry and is a personal friend. Since last spring, he has also served with Dyer on a subcommittee preparing for the two-year college’s upcoming accreditation review. And despite earlier statements, Raymondi acknowledges he knew Dyer prior to naming her to the committee, because of her involvement in Barry’s campaigns.” The paper went on to note further that despite Raymondi’s having stated explicitly that he did not know any of the students in an interview two weeks earlier, he was now denying that he had said that, claiming the quote was “inaccurate and taken out of context.” “Of course I know Nancy Dyer, from serving with her at one or two meetings on reaccreditation and from her volunteering for Sean’s campaign... I didn’t put Nancy Dyer’s name on the list,” Raymondi said. ‘But I was not going to categorically reject someone because I knew them.’”

In addition to being upset about the way the episode was handled, students noted that Nancy Dyer had graduated from the nursing program “years ago” and was taking one course -- an accelerated course that did not work on the regular college schedule. As such, they did not think she was the best representative for students. Some faculty and staff claim that Dyer rushed to sign up for the off-cycle course at the last minute, just to be eligible for the appointment. Behind the public accounts, both students and staff claimed that Dyer was considerably more than a “friend” of Barry’s, having been seen sitting on his lap on more than on occasion. Other than the principals themselves, everyone spoken to was convinced that the appointment of Nancy Dyer was planned and orchestrated by Raymondi and Barry -- that because she could not have been elected, she would be put on the list after the SGA vote. Ultimately, Dyer’s appointment to the screening committee stood, since its work was almost over by the end of November, as
the complaints were being put forth. In December, two student slots were created on the board of
governors, one each for representatives from the Quincy and Plymouth campuses. 72

As the presidential selection process narrowed to two candidates, however, there was still time for one
more controversy before the year ended. During the first week of December, on the day before the
student-run Campus Chronicle newspaper was scheduled to come out, a computer file in the newspaper
office containing all but one of the stories for the upcoming edition was mysteriously erased. The paper’s
editor, along with other students, claimed that “someone deliberately erased the file in an attempt to
prevent publication of stories critical of college management.” One of the articles in particular sharply
criticized the leadership of the college’s board of governors. Dismissing the possibility raised by a college
official that the students might themselves have erased the file to attract publicity, the students also noted
that an anonymous caller earlier in the week had asked the date of the paper’s publication. Fortunately for
the students, the paper went to press a day earlier than the caller was told, the day before the erasure. No
one was identified as being responsible for the incident, but student (and faculty) cynicism, already high,
continued to increase.

As 1995 drew to a close, the paper also headlined two other milestones: O. Clayton Johnson settled his
suit with the school system for $250,000, and two school committee members -- Dan Raymondi and Ron
Mariano -- resigned from that body. 73

Winter of Discontent: In the beginning of 1996, the Ledger printed a long and prominent feature
article about the college entitled Winter of Discontent. It observed in this article that when the college’s
new board of governors was sworn in during the fall of 1994, “the college community brimmed with
optimism... But a year later, the hallways are no happier. High turnover continues and a culture of staff
mistrust, divided allegiances and fear of retribution -- part and parcel of the Johnson years, say employees
from deans to clerical staff -- has spread. ‘It is worse now than anytime I can remember,’ said Beth
Goreham, who resigned a month ago as director of financial aid after more than 11 years in the job. ‘It is a
very very difficult place to work. Some members of the new board seem driven by power, and I do not
know what their ultimate goal is. Me? I need to work some place that cares about staff and students.’” 74
While a few faculty and staff members supported the board, most blamed it for the problems being
experienced by the college, and all agreed that morale had never been lower. "I never thought I would
hear myself say it," one professional staff member said in an informal discussion, "but we were much
better off when Clay Johnson was here." In fact, this sentiment was echoed by many across campus, in
distinct contrast to the views these same people had espoused during Johnson's presidency. The Ledger
ascribed the poor morale and atmosphere to a range of factors: to many of the incidents cited above, to
"scathingly worded" and "vitriolic" fliers that were posted from time to time, to numerous instances in
which it is generally believed that unqualified candidates were appointed at the specific order of the
chairman, to high turnover, and to a general atmosphere of distrust. No one associated with the college
publicly criticized the board beyond a few tenured faculty members and a few staff who had recently left.

As the community awaited the appointment of a permanent president, with some consternation, neither
Mayor Sheets nor the city council expressed any willingness to intervene, despite requests. Sheets said it
was "not his place as mayor to watchdog the college," even though it remained technically a city
department. He also noted that he was officially on leave from the college, though few expect him to
return. He did say that, "in hindsight, people on the nominating committee should not have been allowed
to serve on the board, too." City councilor Cheney, having unsuccessfully fought to remove politicians
from the board a year earlier, said that he didn't see the council intervening, "unless the college fails
financially." The appointment of Jeremiah Ryan, an apparently qualified outsider, as president, was taken
by some as a sign that things might be changing for the better. As the college entered the Fall of 1996, it
finally had what it had been seeking for so many years -- an independent governing board, a new
President, and the freedom to act without artificial constraint.

Summary

With the final resolution of the college's conflicts taking place in the political arena, the political
nature of that resolution should perhaps not have been surprising. It did surprise and trouble many of those
involved with the college, however, perhaps because they still conceived of the governance change as an
organizational concern. But issues of control had become much more than internal organizational issues. Rather, they had come to involve the very essence of political disputes: control of resources, power, and patronage.

The following chapters consider the forces that shaped this momentous change, the progression of influence from the individual to the political sphere, and the broader implications. An epilogue, with the most recent steps taken by the college, serves as a conclusion to the study.

Notes to Chapter Five


9. Interview with G., conducted by the author, November, 1996, 82.

10. The author was a member of that committee.

11. Concerned Faculty and Staff of Quincy College, 11 Nov. 1995. An anonymous letter widely circulated within the college. There is a danger in paying heed to anonymous letters, but this letter is highly accurate in its account of information that can be verified, such as the actions of Johnson with regard to the screening committee and the committee’s response, indicating that it was written by a person with significant knowledge of the college’s activities. Also, as noted previously, it was constantly referenced by faculty and staff as providing a good and accurate assessment of why things
are as they are.

    Chris Poon, 4-year degrees on horizon, 13 April 1992, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 15.


32. Chris Poon, Johnson takes bias case to MCAD, 4 March 1993, Patriot Ledger, 1, 12.

Johnson will face disciplinary hearing, 29 April 1993, Patriot Ledger, 14.

34. Sandy Louey, Johnson seeks $1.4M settlement, 30 April 1993, Patriot Ledger, 1, 10.

35. Sandy Louey, College $1.2M over its budget, 20 May 1993, Patriot Ledger, 1, 10B. 
Jay Weaver, College officials: Budget report not a full picture, 24 May 1993, Patriot Ledger, 5. 
Jay Weaver, College has surplus of $3.4 million, 28 May 1993, Patriot Ledger, 9.

36. Sandy Louey and Jay Weaver, Audit: College didn’t keep adequate financial records, 16 June 1993, 
Patriot Ledger, 1, 35. 
Sandy Louey, Johnson faces dismissal, 17 June 1993, Patriot Ledger, 1, 12. 
Sandy Louey, Johnson: Committee broke law in meeting, 23 June 1993, Patriot Ledger, 10.

37. Sandy Louey, Council in a hurry to change college, 29 June 1993, Patriot Ledger, 10. 

Jay Weaver, College won’t raise tuition for 5th straight year, 20 Aug. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 6.

Patriot Ledger Staff, Four years of controversy, 9 Sept. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 1, 27.

40. Jay Weaver, Johnson rejected buyout, 10 Sept. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 1, 10. 
Patriot Ledger Staff, 2 councilors assail firing of Johnson, 10 Sept. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 1, 10. 
Sandy Louey, Most students unaware of firing, 10 Sept. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 10. 
Editorial: A sad battle over Quincy College, 10 Sept. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 10. 
Susannah Patton, Johnson: An uneven tenure, 13 Sept. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 1, 6B. 
Jay Weaver, Firing won’t change city’s plan, 13 Sept. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 1, 6B. 
Sandy Louey, School board seeks college rent increase, 23 Sept. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 11.

41. Interview with B., conducted by the author, November, 1996, 186-87.

42. Sandy Louey, Accreditation agency angers school board , 7 Oct. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 6A.

43. Interview with F., conducted by the author, October, 1996, 106.

44. Sandy Louey, Quincy College plan studied, 20 Sept. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 9.

45. Sandy Louey, Accreditation agency angers school board, 7 Oct. 1993, Patriot Ledger, 6A.

46. Sandy Louey, Continued board control of Quincy College proposed, 18 Nov 1993, Patriot Ledger, 12.
47. Sandy Louey, Board votes to keep control of Quincy College, 2 Dec. 1993, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 19.


53. Carolyn April, Bill signed shifting Quincy College control, 7 July 1994, *Patriot Ledger*, 9


58. Carolyn April, College’s search for chief questioned, 18 Nov. 1994, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 10B.

59. Carolyn April, College’s search for chief questioned, 18 Nov. 1994, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 10B.


61. Carolyn April, Quincy College governors defy city, name new president, 22 Nov. 1994, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 8.


    Sari Kalin, and Gerwin, C., College governors bill hits opposition already, 21 Dec., 1994, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 8B.


70. Carolyn April, College students upset over process to pick president, 18 Nov. 1995, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 48.


   Lane Lambert, Quincy College finalists now down to two, 22 Dec. 1995, *Patriot Ledger*, 1, 14.


75. Informal interviews with college staff members conducted by author.

CHAPTER SIX
Diverging Paths: An Analysis of Change at Quincy College

It’s not hard to see why the history of Quincy College is generally seen by participants, and portrayed in the press, as a battle of the titans. Beginning with Larry Creedon, who ruled with an iron fist and an iron will (and who had the political muscle to back up that will), the line of strong individuals runs through Clay Johnson, Mary Collins, Robert Ricci and Daniel Raymond in particular. But the development of the college was more complicated than a series of battles between strong leaders or a progression from one dominant individual to another. The college’s direction was also influenced by severe organizational stress accompanying the growth of the college and accumulation of resources, by the impact of significant, sometimes cataclysmic environmental factors which reshaped institutional reality, and by political activity related to the increase in institutional wealth and played out along unresolved organizational fault lines. Understanding the path the college followed -- the dominant interests and influences and their implications -- requires considering the interrelationship, and occasional ascendance, of individual, organizational and political/environmental factors.

The chapter that follows contains five sections. The first section sets forth a pattern of organizational development, an organizational life cycle, that is reasonably common and that closely parallels Quincy’s developmental path. This pattern also provides a framework for considering the interplay of individual, organizational, and political or environmental factors. The next three sections analyze the three stages of the college’s history in the context of this pattern of development, corresponding to and covering the same time periods as the historical narrative chapters of this study. Thus, Section II covers the same time period as and parallels Chapter 3, Section III similarly parallels Chapter 4, and Section IV parallels Chapter 5. The final section summarizes findings as to the influencing factors, and addresses the original research questions. What emerges for Quincy College is a path of development that moved from the dominance by powerful leaders, through a period of growing resources and related organizational stress, to political struggle brought on both by the accumulation of those resources and the use of political strategies to address organizational conflict.
The college's development was interrupted twice by cataclysmic events -- events that dramatically changed the structure of the organization -- each time returning it to a period of individual dominance. The first of these was Proposition 2½, which almost killed the college and led to a substantial restructuring. The second was the final implementation of the new governing board, which surprised and distressed many and departed substantially from the expected outcome. Similar to Clark's description of Antioch College, these events linked "crisis, charisma and abrupt transformation;" that is, the college's crisis paved the way for strong new leadership. As Pfeffer notes, "charismatic leaders often emerge in times of stress." Thus, although the developmental path of the college was generally linear, in that its separation from the public schools and the formation of a new governing board were linked directly to factors of its creation, the college's development was interrupted by major events that caused it to revert, for a time at least, to periods of individual dominance. This birth and rebirth cycle -- in which the college was reborn as a substantially different organization after a major institutional upheaval -- slowed movement towards the final separation of the college from the school committee and altered the result. Nonetheless, that separation was bound up both in traditional issues of organizational development, and in factors that had been in place for years, even decades, before it was completed.

I. A Framework of Organizational Development

The history of Quincy College presented earlier in this paper follows a basic pattern of organizational development that is outlined below.

A. Personal Dominance -- Strong, Charismatic Leadership: It is not unusual for a small, resource-poor organization, whether new or in a state of significant flux, to attract and then be strongly influenced by, a powerful leader with a strong vision. This may take the form of charismatic leadership, or may simply be a case of strong will and iron fist. The distinctive element of personal leadership was advanced by Weber, who described the effects of charismatic leaders, and has been reflected and extended by Clark and many others. Strong, charismatic leaders combine personal traits with formal organizational authority to shape the vision, growth, and development of an institution over a period of time -- often either at the formation of the organization or following a period of crisis. This form of
leadership is dominant and often domineering, with the leader exercising a large personal span of authority. As long as the institution remains small, it may remain within the purview of an individual to control, but an organization of size requires a formal structure, a bureaucracy. The growth of the institution may, therefore, lead away from the personal control of the leader and toward the formal ordering of authority -- through which the leader attempts to extend control using structural means.

B. The Emergence and Growth of Formal Organizational Structure: As the organization matures, especially as resources accumulate and staff and activities grow, the leader often cannot control the entire organization through strength of will and vision alone. Therefore, he or she must resort increasingly to the creation of bureaucracy: organizational structures such as departments or divisions, deputies in positions of authority within these organizational subunits, and rules and regulations for behavior within the organization. "Organizations generate power," as Perrow observes; "control and use of that power are vital organizational issues." The creation of bureaucracy extends organizational control and removes organizational uncertainty, ambiguity, or stress. However, if the individual leader cannot adapt to the more formal structure -- if he tries to extend personal control too far, for example -- organizational stress and conflict may increase.

In addition, contradictions that exist within the organization may grow as the organization grows, or may be introduced in the process of organizational growth and change. An organization where lines of authority are unclear and goals are contradictory may overcome such ambiguity while small or under strong personal leadership. As the institution grows however -- as it accumulates resources and particularly if the resource allocation changes significantly -- lines of stress that were present but blurred may become more pronounced and stark. The organizational need for legitimacy, order, or structural clarity may become more pronounced, producing stress and conflict until it is satisfied.

C. Environmental Change Leading to Organizational Change: Stress is introduced into even the most stable organization through significant environmental change. The ability of organizations to adapt to a changing environment has long been defined as a critical element to organizational success. Leaders, in such circumstances, may resort to strategies that have political roots, particularly when a
part of their success involves the accumulation of resources. Solutions may also be created through outside political sources beyond the control of the particular institution, or brought about by institutional actors using political strategies to achieve their goals. This third phase, therefore, is activity in the political domain that reacts, in part, to both internal and external stress, conflict, or uncertainty, and to the increase in organizational resources as a potential source of power. If resources accumulate significantly, as in the case of Quincy College, the institution's relationship with its immediate political environment (other city politicians) as well as with its academic environment (similar institutions), may change significantly. "The jurisdiction over resources is an important use of power," Pfeffer observes, "but only to the extent that one actually controls the resource and its use." The institutional need for legitimacy, the political need to control resources, and the increasing stress along organizational fault lines play themselves out in the political arena -- with consequences that may be both unexpected and undesired.

The analysis below presents Quincy Junior College as an institution that followed this pattern of development, roughly, with the interference of two cataclysmic events that altered the course of that development at significant historical junctures, and with a series of unique factors that influenced the shape of that development. (This development is also outlined in Appendix B, in chart form.) In particular, the development of Quincy College may be seen as a series of conflicts that emerged as the organization grew, and that changed in nature as the organization moved along the developmental path described above. The three eras described below overlapped by several years, as organizational factors gradually supplanted the dominance of President Johnson in the mid 1980's, and as the era of organizational struggle moved increasingly into the political realm.

II. An Era of the Individual Dominance: 1948 - 1986

The first and longest period in the college's history was dominated by a series of strong, sometimes charismatic individuals, who molded the organization according to their own visions and used it largely according to their own wills. Though dominated by individual leaders, this period also saw the emergence of many of the factors that would later bring about significant organizational stress. These factors were
submerged by the institution’s small size and lack of resources, but were beginning to grow in the 1970’s until the first cataclysmic event -- Proposition 2½ -- changed the very nature of the organization and returned it to a second period of individual dominance.

A. The McIntyre - Creedon Era: 1966 - 1980

After the formation of the college by a range of community leaders through various committees, college oversight was taken on by the school system. By the time the college had grown beyond a part-time evening program, the city was effectively controlled by James McIntyre, and during much of the McIntyre era, the school system was controlled by Lawrence Creedon, a Quincy native with close ties to McIntyre.

James McIntyre: By the late 1960’s, Mayor and Senator McIntyre was the major political figure in the city and the chief spokesperson for the college regarding state takeover. He championed the college’s cause with the state. He arranged for sites to be studied and for land to be purchased and later donated to the state for the purposes of building a new campus. And he lobbied for state aid. McIntyre was a politician in the Curley mold, becoming both powerful and popular at a young age and retaining much authority both in the city and at the state level. As Mayor, he was chairman of the school committee, which oversaw the college. By most accounts, it would have been largely his choice as to whether to retain the college, give it away, or close it down.

There is a clear trend in Quincy of politicians liking to be associated with the college, both to serve the community and to enhance their own prestige. It is likely that McIntyre was no exception to this rule. He was a supporter of the college from the early days, was actively involved in college issues as a politician, and was president of the college’s independent board of trustees, formed to raise funds when the college became self-supporting, until his death. Dougherty describes business and political leaders in communities considering community colleges as seeing the colleges both as potential engines of local economic development and as expressions of local pride. Local educators “favored the community college over other kinds of institutions because it was a route to garnering prestige as educational innovators.” As the city’s mayor and chairman of the school committee, McIntyre may be seen to have had a combination of
these interests. Whatever the reason, including a civic-minded interest in extending educational opportunities for the area’s youth, McIntyre was strongly attached to the college.

It was suggested in interviews that McIntyre chose to hold onto the college in the early days, when it might easily have been taken over by the state, because it generated nearly as much revenue as expense, and because he liked having it within his sphere of influence. He may have waited until it was too late, this scenario goes, to become serious about giving the college to the state. If the state chose to place conditions on the designation of community colleges, as described by Dougherty, it may be both that McIntyre was unwilling to meet those conditions and that state officials saw little to gain from bringing McIntyre’s personally-controlled college into the new state system.

There are also many who believe, as previously reported, that McIntyre ultimately chose to extend the public transit line to Quincy rather than create a new community college. No evidence has been uncovered to support these speculations, but it remains true that the fate of the college, at this stage of its history, was very much subject to McIntyre’s desires. Therefore, if the college’s unusual road was chosen by anything other than the machinations of state bureaucracy -- if anyone deliberately made the choice not to have the college taken over by the state, either through action or inaction -- it was probably either McIntyre himself or state officials in reaction to him.

Lawrence Creedon: Creedon was appointed to the superintendency in 1968. Bright and brash, and with the Mayor’s support, Creedon exercised tight control over his domain, including Quincy Junior College. He placed staff there (reportedly including both girlfriends and spies), he treated the college president as a department head, and he expected both loyalty and obedience. During the period from 1970-1980, the college grew slowly at first, then more rapidly. It offered more classes and attracted more students. It expanded to daytime classes and added its first full-time students and faculty. It hired its first academically oriented president and applied for accreditation as a college. Although the college had few resources and its leaders continued to pursue state takeover, organizational stress related to running a college within the purview of a school system was evident in the accreditation concern about governance and the frustrations of President Pierce. But even mild initiatives by the college towards greater freedom
of action were quashed. Creedon was known as a progressive educator as well as an autocrat. His vision of the college included growth of programs along the model of a 13th and 14th grade, and apparently did not preclude admitting students from outside of the city. But it did not include independence.

As time passed, and assuming that the college had continued to grow, these organizational stresses beginning to be seen under Creedon, and later to appear under Johnson, might have grown more pronounced sooner. As it was, the first cataclysmic outside event -- Proposition 2 1/2 -- intervened. This event caused the separation of the college from the school system’s budget, if not the entire system, and introduced an era of low expectations and maximum uncertainty and stress within the organization. Both those inside and outside fully expected that the institution would not survive. Even before California’s Proposition 13 was passed, the state colleges in Massachusetts were showing signs of trouble. By the late 1970’s, the state’s economic situation had deteriorated considerably, leading Massachusetts to be the second state in the nation to pass a strict tax-limiting referendum. This event threw public institutions across the state into turmoil, and placed Quincy Junior College in a environmental/political realm, where decisions were made on the basis of, and largely by, outside actors. The result of the decision about the future of the college -- a financial decision made by the city council -- was the city’s cutting the college loose from city support. The council also gave the college a fighting chance, through the creation of an enterprise account that allowed it to raise and use funds, and the transfer to the college of the school system’s existing revenue streams (vocational and adult education). Thus, the college entered the 1980’s in a considerably different state than anyone could have anticipated, and with a new leader at the helm.


Proposition 2 1/2: The “cutting loose” of the college from the school system’s budget without cutting it loose from the school system overall was a more momentous decision in the early 1980’s than it may appear today. At the time, most observers and many participants thought the resource-starved institution, which already charged tuition nearly twice as high as similar institutions, would die. The effect of this action was to change the nature of the discussion at the college from issues of control, educational goals, and the organizational issues that had begun to cause stress towards the end of the 1970’s, to a focus on
continuing to exist. Simultaneously, the collective wisdom of the political establishment was that there were no resources worth fighting for at the college. This cataclysmic event also created a context ideal for an entrepreneurial leader with vision, ideas, and the organizational authority to move an agenda forward. His authority was needed and desired to fend off collapse, and he was left relatively free to act with impunity -- there were no spoils to be had. In the context of the pattern of organizational development presented above, therefore, this event caused a break from the progression followed to date. In effect, the college was reborn, or at least partially reborn, as a new and different entity. It was the same -- with the same roots, the same culture, the same people, much of the same organizational culture. Yet it was different -- a different budgetary structure, a dramatically higher level of organizational (and individual) stress, and different (and much more focused) goal: to survive. This cataclysmic event, and the arrival on the scene of a tough and charismatic leader, erased the organizational concerns from the college's short-term memory and returned it to an emergent stage in the developmental progression: personal dominance.

Reshaping the Institutional Vision: Johnson is widely credited with “saving” the college, even by many of his detractors, during his early years. His actions were a combination of cutting fat and featherbedding, restructuring, and introducing collegiate policies and ideas (albeit tightly controlled). These included academic and administrative councils, and a college senate with faculty participation. As he took these steps, he made some friends and many enemies, but he cut costs and managed to keep the college afloat. Four significant factors contributed to the direction of the college’s organizational evolution during Johnson’s early years.

First, by 1984, the two dominant leaders of the previous era -- James McIntyre and Lawrence Creedon -- were no longer involved with the college. McIntyre died unexpectedly at the age of 53. Creedon was forced to resign as a result of a growing sex-related scandal involving students. While Johnson’s domineering attitude toward the faculty was controlled in the first year by Creedon, to some extent, this period of control was followed by a period of nearly three years with a wounded superintendent, a short-term superintendent, or no superintendent at all. The absence of strong leadership at the school system
level left the field open both for Johnson’s sometimes controversial steps to save the college and, according to reports, for his harassment and dominance of the faculty and staff to proceed unchecked.

Second, the college grew. As part of the new governance arrangement, the school system’s revenue streams were shifted to the college. Further, the council proposed and the state approved an enterprise account, through which the college’s funds could be kept and spent without reverting to the city. (This financial arrangement later allowed the college to amass a significant reserve fund, the envy of the rest of the city.) After sharp drops in enrollment and a year or two of stagnation, and assisted by the increasing and increasingly public tribulations of the community colleges, Quincy Junior began taking in more students and producing more revenue. Over time, both the enrollment and revenue growth became significant.

Third, while the city was prepared to cut the college loose from financial life-supports and let it die, it was not prepared to let it be taken over by a state college in a neighboring city. The fights to secure state funding but avoid takeover by Massasoit Community College served to focus city attention on the fact that the college had not died. In fact, by the end of these highly public takeover battles, it was doing nicely. “There is no one who can look at the trends and say that the institution is in trouble,” the Patriot Ledger opined. “It pays its own way. Why get rid of it?”

Fourth, the growth of the college in students and staff led to the re-emergence of the organizational issues that had begun to surface under President Pierce. The differences between the college and the schools became more noticeable, and the need for people to teach and staff the bureaucracy led to a larger staff (hired mostly from collegiate rather than public school ranks). The governance issues first mentioned in the accreditation report and later to become a major bone of contention became more pronounced. The president’s control, though still strong, was diluted.

These factors combined to create a transition from an era largely dominated by individual personalities to an era where organizational conflict and stress -- and the conflicts between people in conflicting roles, not just as individuals -- were to eclipse the era of individual dominance.
III. From Individual to Organizational Issues: (1984 - 1991)

A. Growth and the Emergence of Organizational Structure

President Johnson continued to dominate the college in many respects throughout his entire tenure. Departmental budgets did not exist, for example, except as he created them. Expenditures ran through his office before going to the school committee, and were approved or not with little regard for what was in the budget. Johnson's treatment of faculty and staff, much debated through most of his time in office, remained driven by personalities. Further, Johnson's relations with school committee members and others outside the institution, including some who might possibly have been allies, were often inexplicably tumultuous. At the same time, the college grew and changed in significant ways. These included:

Growth: The growth of the college during this period was remarkable. Having dropped to approximately 2000 students in 1982, the enrollment had doubled by 1990. Classes were filled both day and evening, non-credit and special courses (a significant income source) had expanded to six times their earlier level, and the students just kept coming. The growth started slowly in the mid-1980's, but by the end of the decade pre-registrations were packed and administrators struggled to find teachers for all of the extra sections created. With tuition income rolling in, Johnson was slow to hire additional personnel, reasoning that bad times would return at some point and he didn’t want to “own” unnecessary faculty or staff. By far the majority of extra sections were taught by adjunct instructors. On those occasions when Johnson did try to add personnel, his requests would be turned down, as often as not, by the school committee. Those few staff members who were added, including adjunct faculty, were almost exclusively from a higher education, rather than school system, background.

Development of Collegiate Structures: Though many faculty remained cynical, and though Johnson remained the decision-maker on all topics where he cared to make the decision, the new collegiate committees and bodies did function. While he retained the ability to overrule any of these committees at any time, he did not often exercise that power. In most areas related to the development of new academic programs, the updating of curricula and program requirements, and other areas of faculty and staff
concern, he was content to let their decisions stand. In many respects, through these committees, the various deans, and others within the division structure, the college functioned in an increasingly collegiate fashion.

*Shift of Resources:* The growth of the college’s student body was more than matched by the growth in the college’s financial assets. When it was cut loose in the early 1980’s, it had essentially no assets. By 1990 it had amassed a reserve fund of $2 million (that figure was to rise to $3.4 million by 1993). During the same period, the public schools and the city were both cash strapped. The state community colleges also continued to struggle. Quincy Junior College came to be seen as remarkably successful by the general public, and as strikingly asset rich by other figures in the city. While this realization was slow in dawning, it eventually led to new levels of interest on the part of city politicians.

*Quest for Legitimacy:* If the trauma of being cast loose by the city had caused the college to focus inward on its own struggle for survival, the growth and expansion caused it to look outward for legitimacy. To begin with, record enrollments and extra funds helped create an aura of legitimacy. While the college did not hire many new staff, for example, it was able to spend a considerable sum sprucing up its physical image. In the mid-1980’s, one of the college’s existing buildings, a dilapidated old courthouse, was torn down to make way for an office and retail development. To replace it, the city negotiated a new building for the college (Saville Hall). This new building, while far from plush, was considerably better than the courthouse. With the funds rolling in, Johnson completely refurbished the aging Coddington Hall, and purchased two houses from the school system. These, plus the new development next door, dramatically changed the college’s physical image.

In an additional step with significant symbolic importance, Johnson initiated action to change the college’s name from Quincy Junior College to Quincy College. What this required was the political backing of a home rule petition and the support of the legislative delegation. What it signaled was a new era for the college. Perhaps not content to lead one of the premier community colleges in the state, Johnson also initiated discussions on creating a four-year program, naming a committee to study the possibility. While this vision was not fulfilled, it was duly reported in the press and was enthusiastically
supported by the student body. In fact, a significant number of people in the community thought that the change in name signaled that a four year program had already been created. The increasing use of these highly public strategies began the movement of the college into the political realm, as described in section four. In the meantime, however, significant organizational issues were emerging.

These and other actions, coupled with the troubles of the community colleges, caused Quincy College to see itself as more collegiate. This view, in turn, caused many at the college to desire to act more like a traditional college. For despite the growth of college structures, the college was far from being free of school system influence.

Thus, the growth of the college in resources, prestige, and size created a number of organizational strains. In many instances, these played themselves out as conflicts between Johnson and his staff, on the one hand, and between Johnson and his organizational superiors on the other. While strong personalities, including Johnson's, were important in these struggles, the conflict centered around two primary areas of organizational function, institutional roles and institutional culture.

B. Institutional Roles:

The principal institutional conflict -- between the president, superintendent and school committee -- was cited as a potential problem by the New England Association in 1980, was described by James Sheets as a reason for dropping pursuit of the presidency in 1983, was covered in depth by the newspaper, and was frequently identified as the source of individual clashes. This institutional conflict was even predicted, in a fashion, by Clark (1960), who noted that in the public school-sponsored college, "district control was heavily constraining" and "the controls, orientations, and pressures of public school administration would inescapably shape its character."10

When the college was formed, its first director controlled a small adult education program, not unlike many existing public school adult education programs today. Even in the early days, the directors of such institutions often felt constrained, as Clark noted. To the extent that these institutions believed they were to function as colleges, the limitations of a ranking on the level of a school principal, and of attempting to act as a college in the context of a public school, prevented their leaders from acting as they deemed
appropriate. It is likely that the conflict of institutional roles was a significant factor in the winnowing of municipally sponsored colleges. A school-system-based college is, in many respects, poorly adapted to survive; it is constrained from adapting to student needs in a competitive environment where the student population has changed dramatically.

In the case of Quincy College, the potential clash between the superintendent and the president was predicted several times and in several ways before the clash took hold in the 1980's. It is not unlikely that the long-standing expectation of change -- first the formation of South Shore Community College, and later the fight to avoid merging with Massasoit -- postponed the inevitable problems. Institutional leaders anticipating (or fearing) imminent change would not have been inclined to address what were deemed temporary organizational issues. During this initial period of organizational stress, therefore, the conflict was muted by the dominance of McIntyre and Creedon, the relative youth of the college, and the expectation of impending change. This did not prevent the emergence of organizational issues at that time, and had the changes brought about by Proposition 2½ not intervened, it is possible that tension would have reached the point where it could not have been suppressed more quickly.

By the late 1980's, however, the college was fiscally independent and had grown substantially, merger and affiliation were dead issues, and the clashes began in earnest. The structure not only placed the president of the third largest community college in the state at the institutional level of a school principal, it produced a host of ancillary issues:

Legal: In most instances, the college was governed by state law on public schools, through both historical precedent and organizational structure. But there is also a substantial body of college-related law? Was QIC in loco parentis for its students? What legal responsibilities for the expenditure of college funds applied? When a transfer of funds and resources was made, such as the “sale” to the college of the buildings it had been using, how was this consummated legally? If regents requirements conflicted with school law, which took precedence? Was the college president to enjoy the legal protections of the school principal, his organizational parallel, such as tenure?
Faculty and Union: The city’s teachers’ union represented both school teachers and college instructors within the same bargaining unit and using the same contract. Given the differing roles of college and school teachers, this presented another level of confusion and constraint. Neither the union nor the contract were very understanding of or amenable to the normal function of a collegiate institution, though union leadership certainly made an attempt. While the union worked at representing college teachers, many contractual issues existed only because the contract was primarily for school teachers. Further, the college schedule was different from and shorter than the schedule for school teachers, requiring fewer hours per week and fewer weeks per year. Since college teachers were not in a separate bargaining unit, differences such as these had to be spelled out in a single contract. If additional clauses were inserted either for college or school teachers, but were not carefully worded, they applied to both groups -- whether they made sense or not. All this caused a moderate amount of confusion and resentment, and probably impeded the faculty from being more cohesive.

Student Enrollment and Representation: The school committee was elected by the voters of Quincy. By the late 1980’s, however, nearly 75% of the student body of the college lived outside of Quincy. While the school committee controlled the budget of the college, as it did the public schools, this budget was derived from student tuition, not tax revenues. This arrangement raised a host of concerns. Were three-fourths of the students disenfranchised? Should a publicly elected board be controlling private tuition funds? What prevented the school committee from directing that college funds derived from college students be used for non-college purposes, supporting Quincy school children, as occasionally happened?

Budgetary Confusion: College salaries for faculty were set according to the teachers’ contract, and were not altogether out of line with pay for faculty members at similar institutions, such as the state community colleges. Salaries for professional staff were artificially low, as the president’s salary had to be set with some attention paid to the salaries of the superintendent, the president’s superior in the hierarchy, and the mayor. Staff salaries were set at various levels below the president. One of the peculiarities of the budget process was that because of this arrangement, salaries bore little relationship to the college’s financial condition. When the college was struggling, college faculty and clerical staff benefitted, since
their pay was tied to system-wide bargaining. In the late 1980's, however, when college enrollment was soaring (along with workloads), no one at the college was given much of a raise. Faculty salaries were tied to the school teachers, and the school system could not afford to give teachers the increases they wanted. Professional staff members were denied raises, at least in part, because school committee members feared that raises, which they acknowledged would only bring staff closer to professional equity, might also be used by the various other unions -- teachers, custodians, clerical workers -- as bargaining chips in demanding additional increases for their members. The same logic applied to adding either faculty or staff. Despite a dramatic increase in revenue, student enrollment, and workload, staff could not be added at the thriving college because school-related unions might use the precedent to demand similar treatment from the poverty-stricken school system budget. Thus, budgets relating to staffing were largely divorced from college reality.

The Appearance of Impropriety: What constituted a conflict of interest? Was it a conflict of interest for the Mayor, a former college instructor on leave, to serve as president of the college’s governing board (James Sheets)? Was it a conflict of interest for an elected school committee member to be a line staff member at the college, while the school committee was the college’s governing board (Sean Barry)? Was it a conflict of interest for the school committee to decide, as the college’s governing board, to charge the college rent payable to the school department, when the money for the college was provided by private tuition and after the college paid for extensive renovations of its main building?

The organizational misalignment indicated by these examples became more pronounced as the college grew. Under such conditions, organizational confusion and strife could hardly have been avoided, no matter who was involved. When conflicts are built into organizational structure -- when individuals in institutional roles are brought into conflict in the fulfillment of those roles -- the organizational structure may be seen as working against the effective functioning of the organization.

C. Organizational Culture

As described above, the college had its genesis as part of the school system of the city of Quincy, at a time when this was a common form of junior college governance, perhaps the most common. At that point
it was not a college as now understood, but a small adult education program with a focus on bridging the gap for graduating seniors between high school and four year institutions -- whether this gap was financial or academic. This beginning provided the baseline for establishing the organizational culture of the institution.

Organizational culture has a range of definitions. Its use here embodies the underlying assumptions of the organization and those in it, including deep organizational values, beliefs and aspirations. Culture is not climate or surface values, but underlying beliefs or traditions that significantly influence action without being explicit, often without being recognized at all within the organization. Culture operates a level below such attributes as climate or corporate philosophy and largely determines them (Schein); it is the implicit understandings of the organization, the internalized standard operating procedure (Pfeffer). Organizational culture manifests itself in forms, practices, and content themes such as rituals, stories, jargon, humor and physical arrangements, but is more than all of these. It is the patterns of these manifestations that constitute culture (Martin), and these patterns substantially influence every aspect of organizational life.

The cultural gap between the college and its parent organization grew to exist on several levels. First, the municipal, public school origins of the college were sharply different from a typical collegiate culture, even for a community college. Second, community colleges have demonstrated, in their short histories, a remarkable adaptability to dramatic growth and demographic change. Public schools, by contrast, are known for their difficulty in bringing about even the most modest adjustments and improvements. Third, the different cultures are predicated on different institutional values. The resulting values clashes played themselves out both within the college and between the college and other institutions. By the time the college had come to embrace the collegiate values and structures embodied in its accreditation standards, the two worlds were so far apart that they could barely understand each other, as demonstrated by the school committee’s frustrating meeting with the head of the accrediting committee, and its lament that the accrediting committee wouldn’t tell it what was wrong with the current structure.
Municipal Culture: While no term exists for it, the municipal nature of an institution, in defining its culture, its work ethic and its values, is a very real concept. It is a description not generally applied in favorable terms. Of the many early community colleges born as municipal institutions, most often as part of school systems, most were seen as 13th and 14th grades -- as bridges to college for graduating seniors who could not, either intellectually or financially, move directly to a four year college. The genesis of these programs was not vocational; that came later. Instead, these "junior colleges" were oriented towards the liberal arts and were not seen as terminal programs. Because they were parts of public school systems, however, they took on a particular structure and attitude that was distinct from the start. Clark, writing in 1960, observed several differences between municipally sponsored junior colleges and those that were independent of municipal supervision. Among the attributes he notes are:

administrative dependency: the college was strictly subservient to the school district's central administration, which made many of the critical decisions (often without regard to student needs)

secondary school orientation: teachers tended to be recruited from the ranks of secondary school teachers, rather than from academe, and had, as a consequence, an orientation towards "teaching, counseling and local affairs" rather than scholarship

diffuse commitment: rather than a straightforward commitment to serving its students, the college's mission tended to include a duty to taxpayers and a responsibility to the school system as a whole. It was expected to be a political team player. 14

From the vantage point of 30 years, we can see additional attributes. Among these are unions, which hold a much stronger sway over public school affairs than in most colleges (although that may be changing), and the concept of the college "belonging" to the community as a political entity. While many community colleges belong to their communities in their orientation, the municipal nature of QJC gave "belonging" a much stronger meaning. To many Quincy political officials, the college was (and remains) an entity to be controlled and used for perceived political purposes, including patronage haven, and political football -- to be pointed to with pride or viewed with alarm depending on the political needs of the pointer or viewer. The municipal culture values loyalty, tight control, and, above all, winning. Public
schools also value loyalty, as well as (and related to) the protection of jobs; they place a premium on stability and predictability, and they resist change.

Further, the early work ethic at the college was highly individual: some faculty and staff worked very hard, while others maintained what is sometimes called a "DPW" attitude (for the Department of Public Works) where there is one supervisor for every two workers, coffee breaks are frequent and lengthy, and anyone who works too hard is ostracized (or worse). Some instructors worked hard; others worked very little. Johnson put an end to teacher work loads that consisted of teaching one or two courses with no research requirements, and cracked down on instructors skipping classes or playing recorded lectures while off attending to other business. But these practices were not uncommon at Quincy Junior, where some viewed their jobs as a right, not a responsibility. Such attitudes are much more common in the municipal culture than the academic.

Born as a municipal entity, the college had become much more than a small municipal department by the mid-80's. The strains that had begun to be felt in the earlier years became predominant themes almost as soon as the possibility of merging with the state had ended. These strains played themselves out as battles over separation from the school committee and the school system, but the cultural clash went beyond that. Whereas the expectation of most observers and participants was that the collegiate culture -- along with the appropriate prestige and status -- would be established with the ultimate separation of the college from the school committee, both the decision to separate and the implementation of the separation were played out within the city's slash and burn political culture. The expectation that politics would be largely removed from college governance was not realized; most observers consider the situation worse than ever.

*Culture of Stasis versus Culture of Change:* Another theme that emerges from the story of Quincy Junior College is stasis, as represented by the school system and city, and change, as represented by the college. For many reasons, including the general conservatism of the voting public, school systems are notoriously resistant to change. A standing joke in K-12 education is that an office worker from a century
ago who magically woke up now would be completely lost in today’s office, while a teacher from the last century would feel right at home.

While firmly grounded in the culture of the school department and city, however, the college could still not resist the need to adapt, to grow, to change. This need may be ascribed to a changing student body, to the gradual importation of faculty with experience at other colleges, to the constant comparisons with the state community colleges during QJC’s long struggle to join that system, to the quest for collegiate legitimacy, or simply to the financial need to attract more students. However it evolved -- and it is likely that all of these factors were elements -- organizational adaptation to a changing world was clearly a force for Quincy Junior. This need -- indeed, the seeming inevitability of change at the college -- butted up against the stasis that defines most public school systems, including Quincy’s. The growth of the college, and its attempt at organizational adaptation in the context of a static environment, continued to be a source of strain within both the college and the community.

During the 1980's and early 90's, the school committee fought mightily against change at the college, but it did not, probably could not, control the fuel of that change: dramatic growth. As the state community colleges suffered and Quincy College grew, its wealth increased. This fact alone brought change; the organizational tail, in many respects, began to wag the dog. But the school committee could not accommodate that change, and could not -- did not -- ever accept that reality. As the school system remained essentially the same, the college grew, expanded, and adapted to a much larger and different world, to an extent that the system could simply not accept or understand.

Colleges are often described as loosely coupled organizations, as described earlier. In such organizations, individual units within the whole adapt to particular aspects of their environment, but because the units are not closely tied to each other, the overall institution changes very little. Using this construction, the college and school system might be described as barely coupled, joined almost exclusively at the governance level. The institutions were bound by particular structural links that had long outgrown their utility. Thus, as the college adapted to its environment, changing and growing.
considerably, it moved further and further away from the school department culture, and clashed at the level where links remained.

Organizational Ambivalence: It seems clear that, with each succeeding year, the purposes and goals of the college grew increasingly apart from those of the school system. The college’s student body grew and changed, doubling several times, growing increasingly diverse and older, changing color, and becoming more adult -- with children, jobs, and the need for part-time, evening, and flexible schedules. The college adapted, to a greater or lesser extent, both its purposes and its methods.

The college itself was hardly monolithic, however. As it grew, faculty and staff were increasingly hired from the ranks of college teachers and administrators, who shared a generally collegiate view of the world, rather than from the city or a school system background. Even though most of the earliest faculty had not come from the ranks of school teachers, the college’s takeover of many vocational teachers during Proposition 2½ strengthened the school system connection. In fact, the wholesale importation of the school system’s vocational teachers just before the college was pushed to become more collegiate may have created the greatest period of academic - vocational stress (such as described by London) in the college’s history. In addition, there was a long period of time during which the faculty hardly changed; new faculty members were simply not hired. When the college did start to grow, fewer faculty and staff were hired than was probably indicated, but those who were, plus many of the numerous adjuncts who taught extra sections morning, afternoon, and evening, had a more collegiate orientation. The result was a schism of understanding and belief regarding the appropriate structure and role of the institution, creating an overall organizational ambivalence. On the one hand, a majority of the tenured faculty were wary of change, did not trust the president, tended to believe they needed the protection of the school committee and teachers’ union, and did not favor any shift of governance (at least while Johnson was president). On the other, the remainder of the faculty, plus most of the deans and professional staff members, favored a complete split from the school committee.

While this schism was not pronounced enough to cause major problems for the college, it did prevent the faculty from speaking with one voice on issues of governance, where they might have been expected to
take a stronger and more unified stand. Some faculty members were sufficiently anti-Johnson to align themselves closely with the union and school committee. Others were wary, somewhat fearful, and unwilling to get involved. As each year passed, however, as faculty adapted (gracefully or not) to the dramatic changes in their classrooms, and as long-time faculty members retired, the linkages in values and understanding between college staff and the public schools got progressively weaker.

IV. Political Conflict

A. The Struggle Enters the Political Domain

Although Johnson was not fired until 1993, the battles for control had become a political struggle involving the entire city by 1991, with the enlisted aid of the accreditation committee and a range of outside experts. The struggle was created in part by the cultural distance between the school system and college, and was dramatically enhanced by the desirability of the resource-rich college as a political trophy. Once the president was fired, clearing the way for structural changes that had become inevitable, the creation a new board and the naming of new trustees was largely politics -- a struggle to control resources. The college was the prize in this struggle, but no college or school department employee played a substantive role in determining its outcome.

As a public institution, Quincy Junior College had never been far from politics or issues of public concern. From Sputnik, which gave the college an early boost, to Proposition 2½, which set it on its new and ultimately prosperous course, political concerns were always present and had an impact. In addition, the rapid growth of the South Shore, the location of the public transit line virtually across the street, and the troubles experienced by the community colleges during the late 1980's, all had their impact on Quincy’s fortunes. It was not until the beginning of the 1990's, however, that the political environment began to emerge as the primary playing field for college activity. Although the college continued to admit and graduate large numbers of students, the politics of dealing with the city used up substantial amounts of time and resources, prevented needed improvements in college services from taking place, and sapped institutional morale. Two issues seemed to dominate the political landscape: the usual political issue of control of resources, power, money and the status conferred by that control, and the less visible but still
important issue of what place within the landscape the college was to hold -- extension of the City of Quincy and the Quincy Public Schools, or Regional Community College.

During the early 1990's, Quincy College’s struggles were almost daily fodder for the local press. Johnson’s regular battles with the school committee and others, the initial fight over the composition of the Board of Governors, and the alleged chicanery around the selection of a second interim president and later a permanent president, to cite a few examples, were discussed regularly on page one. The view of college governance issues from 1991 - 1995 that resonates is that of a classic political conflict over resources and control. Johnson’s taking of the college’s organizational struggles public, which was in part purposive and in part probably beyond his control, had the negative impact (for him) of interesting the rest of Quincy’s political community in the city’s preeminent institution. The culmination of these organizational struggles in a political standoff left him without a job and the college’s resources up for grabs. While many actors at the college breathed a sigh of relief at the departure of Johnson and, finally, the move towards a new governance structure, the struggle continued. The denouement, in which two of the reigning local politicians emerged as victors, stunned many. This result, a second cataclysmic event in the college’s history, caused a second rebirth of Quincy College -- the same institution but also dramatically different in leadership and direction -- and returned it once again, for a time at least, to a condition of individual dominance, where it remains today.

B. Struggles over Resources and Stature

Power and Money: It has already been noted that the growth of Quincy Junior College, a factor to which it adapted but which it did not create, allowed the college and its president to play a different role within the school system, the city, and even the state. As the reality of growth set in and was noticed, Quincy was fighting off the second takeover/merger attempt by Massasoit. Financial stability finally ended all plans and attempts, which had run through much of the college’s history, to affiliate with the state. The state’s slide into fiscal chaos at roughly the same time further assured the end of such discussions. The college’s growth relative to the school system also created tensions on several levels. The college’s student body grew to outnumber the school system’s. Johnson’s fiscal trickery came to
anger some school committee members, and was used as a vehicle for school committee attacks. What may have upset the committee as much as Johnson’s budgetary sleight of hand was that he had, despite overspending the approved budget, still earned a substantial surplus -- even as the school system struggled. Further, having these resources fairly well protected, he did not hesitate to call attention to the college’s relative wealth. In this context, his magnanimous gestures of beneficence, as when he offered to endow a class of elementary students with free college tuition when they reached the appropriate age, must have been particularly galling. While personal style enhanced the conflict, however, the resources -- the money and the power it created -- made the conflict possible, perhaps inevitable.

This endowment of resources also looked particularly enticing to patronage-minded city officials. The funds were especially appealing to funds-starved school officials, even if they were technically housed in another entity. Had the college continued to limp along through the 1980’s, or worse, had it been forced to come to the school committee to be bailed out from time to time, there would have been fewer and less intense battles for control, if there had been any at all. As it was, the school committee demonstrated in the forced “sale” of the college’s main building to the college, along with the two houses, that it could be pushed to find ways to shift college funds to school department uses. When the school system faced a financial need again, after Johnson had left, the documents related to this “sale” were not to be found (mysteriously?), and the school department decided to charge rent for buildings it had previously sold. Had the college remained poor and dependent, these kinds of maneuvers would have been pointless and the resulting governance strains would not have arisen.

Competing Conceptions of Status: Beyond the power of budgets and positions, the college has represented a form of status in the city for some time. In part, this may account for the school committee’s reluctance to relinquish control even when the college had no money. For school committee members and superintendents alike, being in charge of a college set them apart. For those from the municipal culture of Quincy, the college provided not only the status of overseeing a higher education institution, but also of being able to bestow jobs on friends and associates, a time-honored form of municipal munificence. Status was also part of the issue in the battles between Quincy and Brockton, both largely blue-collar cities, to
house their own colleges. These clashes were further exacerbated by the differences between municipal and academic cultures. The status sought by the collegiate-minded in the college was to be gained through accreditation and becoming more collegiate, not by providing jobs to locals. The prestige envy that is so strong in higher education cuts across the status of political control, creating a political tug of war that is separate from, but related to, the issue of resource control.

In discussing the social choice process in relation to city politics, Banfield observes that, "The distribution of influence may be viewed as the outcome (as of a given moment) of a continuing 'game' which has been going on under rules that a majority of the players have been free to change at any time. That the rules are as they are implies that they seem fair, over the long run, to most of the players." In this instance, however, it appears that different players believed they were playing a different game with different rules. This heightened the tension, acrimony and confusion, and made the game much more difficult. Different kinds of status earned through different cultures were to be achieved by controlling the institution. The political infighting this produced significantly shaped the progress of Quincy College.

C. Organizational Aspiration and Values:

While the need to change to attract students was certainly a driving force in the college’s growth (juxtaposed with the school system, which was not geared to “attracting” students), the college developed another characteristic common in higher education but largely missing from school systems: an aspiration to improve, to be better, to be more, particularly in terms of institutional legitimacy. This desire is often expressed as isomorphism, the tendency of institutions of higher education to attempt to imitate those institutions they see as slightly better than themselves, as described in Chapter Two. This kind of expression of organizational pride contrasts sharply with the expression of pride displayed by school systems, and more broadly cities, which may be characterized as parochialism. While high school football and basketball teams maintain bitter rivalries with near neighbors, and cities vie for bigger subsidies from the state legislature or even the highest test scores, colleges tend to look for a higher ranking on the prestige scale, as well as for more and better students. There is no evidence that Quincy Junior was intellectually inferior to the surrounding community colleges, but it had much to aspire to in both physical
facilities and prestige. As time went on, this aspiration grew, and the tension of the related cultural clash increased.

The college changed initially through growth. As it grew, it became richer and garnered more notice. But growth was not the only change. The college’s quest for accreditation, its hiring practices, and its attempt to affiliate with the state all demonstrated isomorphic tendencies. The change from Quincy Junior College to Quincy College was a modification which produced the possibility of substantial practical effect, in the attraction of students, but which sent an even greater symbolic message: QJC had grown up.

During this same period, the college also created a thriving Plymouth campus, taking it away from the parochialism of Quincy and adding to its scope and prestige. Forty-five minutes away from Quincy by road, and many more cultural miles, the Plymouth campus maintains a collegiate atmosphere that represents what the college would like to be. As these changes were taking place, proposals to add a four-year degree were also placed on the table. Both the likelihood and the advisability of creating a four year degree are a matter of some argument, but growth and change -- and an aspiration to do and be more -- were part of the college’s culture.

This view, however, has clashed consistently with the view of some members of the school committee and city governing structure, as well as the superintendents, many of whom saw their ideal for Quincy College as a 13th and 14th grade, populated largely by recent high school graduates exploring a more gradual transition to a four-year college. This notion of Quincy College as 13th and 14th grade, widely disparaged by most college staff members and largely out of fashion nationally, makes sense from the public school perspective, and was cited by Creedon, Ricci, and Collins as, at least potentially, a better model for Quincy. Ricci’s doctoral dissertation, completed in the 1970’s, was a study of this kind of extended school program, a popular model of that day.

Thus, even putting aside the questions of who would fill the college’s available positions and direct its spending, the aspirations of different players within the institution, and the overall institutional aspiration, remained ambiguous. Was it a college, existing in the collegiate world and functioning accordingly, or an extension of the public school system -- different from the mainstream of community colleges but more
true to their roots? It is even possible that had Quincy not chosen to label its tiny extended education program "a college" in the early years, the results would have been entirely different. Perhaps the label college transformed organizational aspirations from one sphere into another, causing it to seek accreditation, to imitate its more college-like neighbors, and to seek to serve a broader populace. Had it remained and been identified as a school program, those who attended and ran it might not have aspired to anything more. Certainly there are large and thriving adult education programs run by public schools in Massachusetts and elsewhere which provide a community service and earn income for their home institutions, but which make no pretense of being, and have no aspirations to become, colleges. If this is the case, the identification in the 1950's of this new program of the school system with the entirely different world of higher education may have been a leading cause of many of the choices that evolved, by shaping the aspirations of staff and students alike.

V. Summary: Evolving Decision-Making at Quincy College

The initial focus of research on Quincy College was designed to determine the personal, institutional and political factors that led the college to make a defining decision regarding institutional governance: the decision to leave the sponsorship of the city’s school committee to be governed by a semi-independent Board of Governors. This summary returns to the initial research questions in the light of the preceding analysis.

A. The Identification of Governance as a Problem:

The first research question considered how institutional governance came to be considered a problem - when and by whom. To this day, there is disagreement among close observers and participants as to whether governance was ever really the issue. For Sheets, Johnson, and Raymondi, for example, the change that the institution ultimately made was inevitable, in some form, at some time. As Sheets noted in an interview, "I don’t think personalities are the issue... I’ve known all the presidents, and they all were unique individuals in their own right. And I think the governance structure as it existed never allowed any of those presidents [to operate] as you would normally expect a college president to operate... And as I look back in retrospect, I don’t know how some of the presidents stayed as long as they did, given the fact
that they were really caught between two worlds. I think that is why you probably saw the personalities or
the emotions of the different presidents coming forth more than you normally would."17

But there are those who believe differently. For members of the school committee and school
administration, one individual is often identified as critical: Clay Johnson. The thesis these institutional
leaders put forth is that, had Johnson not been so combative and uncooperative, the system that "had
worked well for 30 years" would have continued to do so. According to one senior official, "when I look
at things that became issues of confrontation between the superintendent and the president, all of it had to
do with the fact that the president failed, would absolutely not follow the decisions of his board of
governors. Now I don't care who the board of governors was -- whether it be the school committee,
whether it be an appointed board -- every president of a college, every college president that I know gets
concerned about the dictates and directions he or she gets from the board of governors...and they do a
pretty darn good job of making sure that those things are carried out."18

A former school committee member is equally adamant. "Do you know what the problem was there?
Who was the president? That's the problem. If we had a different president, it never would have been a
problem."19 For Ricci, the terms of the job were clear to all concerned: the president reported to the
superintendent. Since that was they way it was, and everyone understood it, there should not have been
such confrontation. Separation "didn't have to be inevitable," but given a strong president who was
unwilling to abide by the agreements he had made, it became so.20 Had the president been willing to
cooperate and work with the superintendent and school committee, according to this view, such difficulties
as arose could have been worked out.

The record indicates that organizational issues including both governance and culture were, indeed,
perceived as a problem by at least some -- a problem dating back into the Lawrence Creedon era. That this
problem existed from the early days does not mean that it could not have been solved in other ways, or that
the college could not have existed indefinitely under school committee control. It is more likely, however,
that the kind of organizational mismatch that was identified in the early 1960's by Clark in California, and
was first recorded as an issue in Quincy in the 1970's through the (likely) efforts of President Pierce and
the accreditation team, would have continued to cause organizational stress until it was solved. In fact, as
the organization grew, both the organizational mismatch and the isomorphic and aspirational difficulties
would also have continued to grow, increasing the stress. Only a sharp downturn in the colleges fortunes,
or a cataclysmic event of a different type than occurred, would likely have defused this issue. Identified in
the 1970's by academically oriented actors such as President Pierce, cited by Sheets as a reason for not
pursuing the presidency, and raised by Johnson to a major source of contention, the issue of organizational
governance was a real problem that played a significant role in forcing institutional change.

B. Influencing Organizational Factors:

Additional research questions focused on which organizational factors contributed to the decision in
what ways, and on whether theory regarding organizational decision-making was useful in understanding
the governance decision.

As described above, the decision was a complicated set of actions that came at the end of a long period
of organizational development. At different times, individual, organizational and political factors seemed
to be ascendent -- following a common pattern of organizational growth and change -- but at all times the
college struggled with changing goals, roles, internal and external forces. The seeds of the organizational
and political factors that came to dominate at later points in the college's history were sown in the early
days, and had other historical forces acted differently -- such as the economic turbulence that brought
about Proposition 2 ½ and the troubles at the state colleges -- Quincy's history could be entirely different.
The college cannot be seen entirely as the Battle of the Titans despite how it is portrayed locally, nor as
one in which innocent individuals were trapped in roles that forced them into conflict. All these factors
combined, with different factors in the ascendancy at different times, to create the College's unique set of
circumstances.

Theories of decision-making in organizations seem often to be presented as an either-or proposition.
One institution is used to illustrate the extent to which organizational structure drives decision-making,
another indicates the dominance of strong or charismatic individuals, and a third describes how external
and often unseen forces dictate organizational action from afar. This study illustrates not only that each set
of factors was important in the development of the organization, but that each was dominant at a particular period of the college’s history. An attempt to focus on the motives and actions of individuals in the case, or on the organizational misalignment, would have been to deny the complexity of the interaction of forces that shaped this institution, and would likely have resulted in an incomplete or distorted analysis.

The analysis above is based on the use all three lenses, and on understanding how each set of forces exerted influence on the college. This amalgam helps to bring about as complete a picture of what happened at the college as the data will allow. It illustrates how changes in the organization related to its growth and accumulation of resources not only magnified structural problems, but influenced the roles of individuals, particularly those leaders who dominated during the colleges early years and in periods of rebirth. It demonstrates how external factors shaped the college’s development, from Sputnik to the national community college movement, to the state college’s economic fortunes. Finally, it highlights how politics continue to shape the institution, and how the ebb and flow of institutional resources influenced the ebb and flow of political interest. Thus, each point of view offers insight into the institutional decision; together they offer greater insight than any one framework could have separately.

C. The Uniqueness of Community Colleges:

The final set of research questions concerned the unique nature of institutions of higher education, particularly the community college, and the extent to which literature on these institutions increased the understanding of the college’s institutional journey to a decision. The answer to this question is yes, of course, with the caveat that some aspects of community colleges, as distinct from other institutions of higher education, demand further study.

Clark’s observations about the stress points at San Jose Community College resonate throughout this study and, despite the inaccuracy of his prediction, were acute observations of an organizational conflict that informed this work. London’s work on student cultures, although somewhat outside the scope of this study, helped create a context for understanding the limited role of the faculty and students, and connects closely with the understanding of cultural differences between the school system and collegiate culture explored in this paper. Many of the faculty and administrators who formed community colleges are just
now retiring, so that many of the cultural aspects of community colleges at their founding -- at least at the level of faculty and administration -- remain in place today. The range of work on the institutional purposes and goals of community colleges and whether the colleges actually accomplish these goals, though this research has a substantially different thrust (and somewhat different conclusions), does help to create a better understanding of the milieu into which Quincy Junior College was almost, but not quite, born. Some of these issues are discussed further in the final chapter of this work.

The differences between universities/four-year colleges and community colleges have been described in the literature to some extent but require further exploration. In an earlier section of this paper, the Quincy Public Schools were described as "barely coupled" to the college, rather than the "loosely coupled" description that is so often described. The college itself, however, was not loosely coupled at all. Power, authority, money, and decisions flowed through one office at all times. For a while, this was the superintendent’s office; later it was the president’s. But it was always one office. The description loosely coupled simply does not apply to Quincy College as distinct from the school system, and never has.

On the other hand, the value and power of institutional prestige, as described by Clark and many others, and the related concept of institutional isomorphism explicated by DiMaggio and Powell, and Youn and Loscocco, are extremely powerful concepts in understanding change and development at Quincy College. As already noted, the differences and similarities between community colleges and other institutions of higher education deserve further exploration. Too much of the literature on community colleges seems entirely divorced from that of other institutions. A conclusion from this case may be that, despite their differences, both practical issues such as the transfer of students and theoretical issues such as the institutional pull of isomorphism place these two institutions firmly within the same industry. Both their similarities and their differences should be further explored and described.

Beyond the specific analysis of action at Quincy College, the case provides a basis for drawing some broader implications as to why Quincy College traveled the path it did and why so few other community colleges developed along similar lines, as well as other organizational implications and speculations. These are presented in the following and final chapter.
Notes to Chapter Six


15. Howard B. London, *The Culture of a Community College*, (New York, Praeger, 1978). The history of City Community College which London describes was significantly different from Quincy’s. The differences between the academically ambitious and the vocationally oriented at Quincy was probably never as great. The distinction between college- and school system-oriented faculty members, however, was closely aligned with the academic/vocational schism, at least at first. Over time, perhaps because the vocational/technical track was never as large at Quincy as at many other community colleges, this distinction largely disappeared.


CHAPTER SEVEN
Implications -- The Road Not Taken

In the 1960's, the municipally-sponsored junior or community college, run by the city school board, was a fairly common organization. As already described, Clark anticipated that it would remain one of the common governance structures for community colleges indefinitely. Yet Quincy was the last school-controlled community college in the country. As such, Quincy College truly does represent the road not taken for community colleges. It also suggests why few institutions followed this path.

The study of Quincy College's evolution may also suggest broader points about organizational choice, change and development. These are not necessarily new understandings, but are reinforced through analysis of this case. In many respects, Quincy College reveals more about what might have been among community colleges than about what is. But in so doing, it presents compelling evidence as to why community colleges are not still parts of school systems, and why they may have adapted as they have. Implications that may be drawn from this case concerning community college development, as well as implications for organizational change and decision-making, are presented below. The chapter concludes with an epilogue, briefly describing relevant college activity occurring after the period of this study.

1. Organizational Alignment & Productivity

It is clear that the structure of Quincy College has never been aligned efficiently to achieve its primary purpose, if that purpose is described as serving typical community college students (as that population has changed over the years) with a typical (largely non-technical) curriculum. While organizational alignment is not wholly achievable, it is possible for organizational structures to be generally aligned to create either conflict or harmony, either to waste time and resources on non-productive activities or to be relatively efficient. To the extent that the control wars were non-productive activities, and to the extent that these wars were structurally imbedded, the organization was not structured effectively to achieve its educational goal. Just as quiet engines are the most efficient, since the creation of noise requires energy that could be directed into making the engine more powerful, the same holds true for organizations: those that spend
large amounts of time and energy in battles for control or other non-productive activities -- organizational noise -- are taking that time and energy away from productive activity.

The success of Quincy College throughout these battles (at least as measured in terms of growth) might seem to argue against this theory. After all, its most successful historical period occurred at the same time as the fiercest control wars. But the conflict created by the structure of the college started well before the Johnson years and lasted past them. The increase in conflict appears to be largely the result of growth: as the college generated more resources, there was more to fight over. The happy confluence of events that generated much of the college’s growth was mostly not of the college’s making. Quincy College capitalized reasonably well on the troubles of the state’s community colleges and a favorable location, taking some advantage of opportunity. In specific areas, like using the popularity of its allied health programs to create partnerships with leading Boston hospitals and the opening of the Plymouth campus, it made tremendous use of these opportunities. At the same time, it hid structural weakness in areas such as student services and registration, as well some inconsistent and out-of-date academic programs, because it had more students (and more money) than it knew what to do with. These represent opportunity wasted -- opportunity to improve in less flashy but more substantive ways.

Thus, the organizational mis-alignment generally drained energy and resources away from more productive activities. The college could have taken much more advantage of its opportunities than it did, given the externally generated increase in resources. Instead, it divided the benefits of this increase in resources between two sets of activities -- those that helped it grow and improve, and those that were directed at solving the structural misalignment. Organizational structures tend to channel the activities of workers in particular directions, which may be classified loosely as productive and non-productive. Internal conflict, which was an everyday affair at Quincy College, is a non-productive activity.

It may still be argued that the conflict was generated by personalities, which is at least partly true, or that the public battles served to prevent college leadership from spending time “messing up” the academic programs and other college functions. These points of view notwithstanding, organizational conflict is still
a non-productive activity. To the extent that conflict is generated by a misaligned organizational structure, that structure is counterproductive, as was certainly the case at Quincy College.

2. **Institutional Attributes, Institutional Culture**

   This study of Quincy College has made much of the different institutional attributes that shape the different cultures of colleges, public schools, and municipalities. The Quincy College case suggests that administrators ignore these attributes at their peril. Given the strength of isomorphic tendencies in academic institutions and the differing levels of and need for adaptability demonstrated in this case, it would appear that organizations creating new divisions or attempting mergers, transformations, or partnerships would do well to consider how different organizational attributes such as these may affect their operations. Are there implications for states which, like Massachusetts, are attempting to bring two- and four-year colleges into a direct feeder relationship with fully aligned curricula? Are there implications for community colleges attempting major industrial linkages? Many private two-year colleges have decided to become four-year institutions. Given isomorphic tendencies and the differing missions of these institutions, what are the implications of such a change? Are those who worry about loss of the two-year college's original mission likely to be right? The cultural attributes of institutions are powerful forces that shape both values and expectations. To ignore them is to swim against the tide of organizational momentum. The planners of such ventures as those above would be well-advised to attempt to understand their respective institutions, and to identify potential areas of cultural conflict.

   The incompatibility between the two types of culture -- school/municipal and collegiate -- was highlighted by the existence of both within a single organization. In fairness, however, it should be noted that there are many instances in municipalities in which organizations with different cultures exist side by side. Examples include public libraries, public hospitals, and sometimes municipally sponsored museums. The cultures of these institutions are significantly different from the municipal culture described above. How do they coexist? There are several possibilities. First, there is the question of how resources are distributed. Public libraries, museums and hospitals are often dependent on municipal funds. If a library
were to grow at the rate that Quincy College grew during a period when the city was financially strapped, similar battles might well ensue. Most libraries and museums have much less potential for generating such revenue than a college. Hospitals also tend to depend on city support to survive.

The second difference is that most such municipal institutions have separate boards, which may serve to insulate them (somewhat) from the culture of the larger municipality. In the case of Quincy College, the battles were exacerbated by the mixing of cultures, and the mismatch of resources, within the same organization controlled by the same board. The conflict between Quincy College and the public schools seems to have been heightened, if not created, not just because they were different but because of the structural attempt to house such different entities in the same organization. The evidence suggests that two such starkly different cultures cannot exist peacefully within the same institution. Where neither can change, as in the case of QC, conflict and strain appear to be inevitable. An organization complete with its own board can exist within the municipal culture, somewhat influenced but largely independent, but no single board can govern effectively according to two cultures, with two sets of values and aspirations and two different levels of adaptability.

A third possibility exists with the concept of loose coupling. Universities manage to embody schools of law, education, medicine, arts and sciences, business and others, and to run such entities as university hospitals and major sports programs. The cultural differences between some of these are sharp. The Quincy School Committee’s inability to manage two organizations with different cultures may come in part from the structural connection of the president through the superintendent, and from the cultural expectation of the school committee of a tightly controlled organization. The university’s evolution as loosely connected, disparate elements may allow a kind of organizational diversity that is foreign to public schools.

3. Isomorphism, Adaptability, and Early Cultural Identification:

As described above and in the previous chapter, major factors in the cultural divide between the college and the school system include the college’s tendency towards seeking to increase its legitimacy and prestige through isomorphic activity juxtaposed against the school system’s tendency towards stasis.
related factor was the varying interest in and levels of adaptability displayed by the college and the school system. One culture valued and needed change and adaptability, and made every effort to adapt. The other mistrusted and did not need change or adaptability, and resisted efforts towards either. Conflict seems inevitable in this context.

The evidence raises the possibility, mentioned in Chapter Six, that the *early identification* of the school system’s adult education program as a college may have contributed to the tendency towards isomorphism, the need for adaptability, the hiring of staff from the collegiate culture, and the resulting conflict.

Given the development of Quincy Junior College, this is speculation rather than supported theory. The movement to form a college in Quincy was, at least in part, external to the school system. The early Quincy Junior did not exist exclusively because the system chose to label an adult education program as a college. Rather, the school system was chosen as the home of the community’s new junior college. Thus, the identification of Quincy Junior College as separate was not just a decision by school leaders to add prestige to their adult education program. Because of this genesis, the college was never a simple adult education programs and provides only moderate support for this hypothesis.

Nonetheless, the power of labels and names -- of early identification of an infant organization as belonging to one particular species or another -- might be a fruitful area of study. Would a comparison of municipally sponsored adult education programs called colleges and those simply called adult education demonstrate that similar programs took different developmental paths because of their early identification in different cultures? Or were they substantially different in concept and design from the start?

4. Implementation

The Quincy College story strongly supports the central theme of Pressman and Wildavsky, who focus on the importance of implementation in their book of the same name. Implementation, by their definition, is “the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results.”1 “The great problem...” they state, “is to make the difficulties of implementation a part of the initial formulation of policy. Implementation must not be conceived as a process that takes place after, and independent of, the
design of policy. Means and ends can be brought into somewhat closer correspondence only by making each partially dependent on the other. To some extent, the designers of the new Quincy College governing board did this. They spent two years considering implementation issues such as the status of staff under a new controlling entity, and the political composition of the board. They did not, however, carefully define how the board would be selected. Possibly they assumed good will at critical stages in the choosing of the board. More likely, they confused the goal of the policy with its implementation, forgetting that the strength of that connection is only as strong as the desire and skill of the implementers to make it so and overlooking the political desirability of a seat on the Board of Governors. The point of the move from control by the school committee to control by a separate governing board was to place people with a long-standing interest in the college, and/or some expertise concerning colleges, onto an oversight board with the sole concern of college governance. In making the change, they sought to insulate the college from politics. The implicit assumption seems to have been that in making a policy decision with great deliberation and care, the implementation of that decision was somehow foreordained. This appears to have caused many key players, people who should have paid more attention, to neglect how their decision was being put into place. Early indications suggest that this failure, coupled with the opportunism of those involved, may yet be a significant factor in determining the college’s future. The lesson for decision-makers should be clear.

5. Controlling Expectations: Defining and Measuring Success

During the late 1980's and early 1990's, Quincy College was seen as extremely successful. Students were flocking to the institution and money was flowing into its coffers. But many areas of the college which were under-funded and weak to begin with, such as student services and placement, were not expanded at all during this time. The college did little to keep track of who dropped out and why, for example, or to understand how graduates fared. Was the college successful as an educational institution? The general perception is yes. If money and enrollment were the goals, this is indisputable. Educationally, however, it is hard to know. While it is not within the purview of this study to take on the issue of institutional accountability, it is clear that in the absence of educational measures of success, other means
of judging institutional success will be found. This helped the college (but maybe not the students) during the 1980’s, but neither enrollment increases nor enrollment declines demonstrate the quality of the educational services provided.

The ability to define what is meant by success, like the ability to define what is a problem and what is not, is a powerful tool. Quincy College has done what it tried for so long to do: create a separate governing board and remove the college from the auspices of the school committee. It is not clear, however, that it has accomplished the purposes this change was intended to create: the removal and insulation of the college from politics, and the creation of a more collegial institution. In January of 1997, Don Young, faculty member and the first of the college’s two interim presidents, remained optimistic that the collegiate culture would ultimately overwhelm the new board -- that the board would be forced, almost, to become more collegiate. “I think [the board of governors] shows some signs already of change and learning. And I expect that to continue... I think the future of Quincy College hangs on that being the case.” Dan Raymondi, Chairman of the board, takes a similar stance: that the board has some kinks to work out but is getting better, and that everything will be fine. There are others who do not share this optimism. In fact, what appears to be a majority of the faculty and staff continue to believe, at this writing, that the college is traveling downhill with breakneck speed. As internal problems get worse, student enrollment declines. So, has the college accomplished its purpose or not? College leadership says yes: a new governance structure, apart from the school committee, has been created. Many within the college, however, believe that the college has not accomplished its purposes -- removing politics and becoming more collegial. Given how the problem was defined, and without the ability to create a more educational or purpose-based definition, leadership was able to simply declare victory and move on.

Brint & Karabel observe that a significant key to the growth and success of community colleges in the 1950’s and 1960’s was finding a niche within the existing structure in their environment that was open for exploitation -- an “open space” between power centers. “Once community colleges became an accepted step in the academic procession, to use Riesman’s (1958) phrase, close scrutiny of their activities was rare. The key for the community colleges was to create an accepted meaning and place for themselves in a chain
of institutions with specified relations to one another that legislators could support without question."

For Quincy, despite the battles over control of the college and confusion about role, there seemed never to be any question that the college was fulfilling its function and meeting a need. All those students flocking to its doors proved that. No further proof was required, nor apparently was any sought. This surprising fact may have ramifications for Quincy College if the community college system successfully creates direct linkages and automatic acceptance into the state’s four year institutions, or stops charging tuition altogether (as has recently been proposed). A lack of definition that may have been detrimental to students, however, was likely a boon to those who struggled over control of the institution. To the extent that the good works of the college were assumed without question, administrators needed few reasons for promoting the changes they did. The arguments circled around organizational constraint (Was the president constrained by the school committee? Should he be constrained by the school committee?) without considering the impact of the college, as long as the students kept coming. Thus, the Quincy experience would appear to support Brint & Karabel’s contention that the shaping of the college was not a function of market forces (except in the broadest sense -- potential students thought that a college degree would help) and certainly not of organizational efficiency. The “degree of autonomy” that Brint and Karabel ascribe to colleges during periods of economic and fiscal prosperity certainly applied in Quincy, and may have left an open field for the political struggles that followed: enrollment equals achievement (a marketplace mindset), so the only thing that matters is who’s in charge. Without a better way to indicate achievement of educational or placement results, the lucky administrator of the popular college is not held to much account. If this is the case -- if the measures of success at the college are so amorphous as to be so easily manipulated -- leadership has a very powerful tool indeed.

6. Leadership Implications

Impact: The lessons for individuals hoping to have an impact in a community college are somewhat different from what might have been anticipated. Certainly it is clear that the institutional leader must understand the nature and strength of the institution’s culture and circumstance. He or she should seek to shape and define that culture -- the institutional aspirations and values. The Quincy College experience
also suggests, however, that much of institutional direction exists beyond the control of the leader, no
matter how powerful he or she may imagine himself or herself to be. As Cohen and March observe,
“presidents discover that they have less power than is believed, that their power to accomplish things
depends heavily on what they want to accomplish, that the use of formal authority is limited by other
formal authority, that the acceptance of authority is not automatic, that the necessary details of
organizational life confuse power (which is somewhat different from diffusing it), and that their colleagues
seem to delight in complaining simultaneously about presidential weakness and presidential willfulness.”
In other words, they soon discover that they have less power than others, and possibly than they
themselves, supposed.

The experience of Quincy College also suggests that a leader should look for, and be ready for, those
relatively few opportunities to make a decision that actually makes a difference, understanding all the
while that such an opportunity may never arise. The name of the game, on the mundane, everyday basis, is
working within constraints to accomplish, and to continually redefine, the institution’s mission, and to
create a positive institutional climate, not (for the most part) decisions to be made or incidents to be reacted
to. As Cohen and March put it, “A major part of [a president’s] responsibility is to lead the organization to
a changing and more complex view of itself by treating goals as only partly knowable,” and therefore
infinitely discoverable. The same is true for boards. While this does not negate the value of careful
analysis of the environment, or the importance of institutional alignment, it acknowledges the complexity
(and fickleness) of the overall environment and the frequent inability of the individual leader to control,
anticipate, or even react to major environmental trends to the extent that the leader can significantly shape
or change the institution’s future.

Opportunity and Cataclysmic Events: At the same time, opportunities to make the important decisions
-- to create a lasting change -- do arise. In Quincy, two such opportunities are clear in hindsight. Clay
Johnson had the opportunity, when city funding was cut and the college was given its own enterprise
account, to help the college change enough to function in a more competitive environment. He rose to that
occasion, and set the college on the route to stability and self-sufficiency (albeit at some cost). Dan
Raymondi also found himself with (or perhaps orchestrated) an opportunity to shape institutional character and direction, in the largely unspecified choice of new governors to take over governance of the college. His choice has already had an effect on institutional culture and direction; whether this is a permanent directional change or a short term aberration remains to be seen. Selznick's (1957) conception of the distinction between routine and critical decisions is a related point. Critical decisions, perhaps two-three per year according to Selznick, are those that infuse value into the institution. That the leader has the opportunity to make a few decisions in a given year that are critical, that infuse value, presupposes that this opportunity is not always seized. That is, perhaps, the lesson of opportunity. It is there to be seized, for good or for ill. Or not.

There have clearly been times in the history of the college where individual leaders have had more control. I have argued that two cataclysmic events have caused the college to revert to such periods. Both events grew out of political turbulence -- one entirely apart from the college but causing it to be reborn under considerably different financial conditions, the other the result of the moving of the control wars into the political arena and the (seemingly inevitable) decision to create a new governing structure. Both caused stark change, plus considerable disruption of organizational structure and routine, and both initiated periods where strong individuals have been able to exert considerable influence. As Kimberly notes, “the processes of initiation, innovation, and institutionalization are not the particular province of new organizations. Many organizations go through similar processes at various points in their biographies...” At Quincy College, these periods have been initiated by dramatic organizational upheavals, and carried out by strong individuals, creating a pattern of rebirth that simulates the organization’s early days even as it advances organizational development.

7. Adaptability Implications

Organizational Adaptability: The analysis of the differing levels of school and college adaptability in the previous chapter tends to sound like a morality play with regard to the relative adaptability of the college (good) and the school system (bad). This is not the intent.
An organization must attempt to position itself within its unique environment. Community colleges have needed to adapt to rapid changes in student population and demand (so far, at least), which has led to a structural ability to adapt. School systems may be better served by not adapting quickly, given that they are controlled by governing bodies elected by fickle and generally unknowledgeable voters, most of whom actually have no direct stake in the running of the school system itself. (In the average American city, only 10-15% of households tend to have children in the public schools. Voting percentages, naturally, differ widely.) With this structure, the absence of the need to attract students, the lack of direct interest in the educational quality of the schools on the part of most voters, the tendency in K-12 education towards the proliferation of educational fads, and the sometimes destructive whimsy of the electorate, it may be that school systems are best served by a structure that makes them slow to change. This line of reasoning parallels Lindblom's (1951) in describing the incremental response of public institutions generally considered poorly adapted, but which, in his analysis, were actually well adapted to their political realities. The point, therefore, is not that adaptability is either good or bad; rather, levels of adaptability must fit the institution and its environment. Failure to adapt, as well as willingness to adapt too quickly, may both imperil an organization.

*Individual Adaptability:* Further, it is not just institutions that must adapt. People, as well, must be able to change with changing circumstance. Johnson’s forceful style may have been just what was needed to shock the organization out of its publicly supported lethargy into one that recognized, and responded to, the need for dramatic change. Such a style seemed less appropriate when the institution was operating on an even keel, with no apparent enemies except itself. A skilled negotiator, rather than a fierce warrior, might have created less disruptive and equally substantive change under these circumstances. Johnson’s inability to change style or tactics had institutional repercussions that may not have changed institutional direction, ultimately, but that influenced the way it was accomplished, and possibility the overall quality of the result. As Pfeffer observes in a commentary on how power is lost, “Times change, people don’t.” The role of the presidency changed, the person did not.

8. **The Road Not Taken**
Quincy College's path -- municipal sponsorship and school-system governance -- has been described as the road not taken for community colleges. This raises questions about what might have been and conclusions as to why this road was not favored or chosen by most colleges.

*What Might Have Been:* If municipal sponsorship and school board control had continued as a major governance structure for community colleges, as Clark predicted, where might such colleges be today? As tax limitation measures have taken hold across the country, governments have sought ways to cut costs. School system funding has dropped nationwide, and even the flagship community colleges, such as those in California and Florida, have suffered financially from the parsimoniousness of the times. It is likely, given this circumstance, that had community colleges remained under the auspices of the public schools, the budget battles between the colleges and their sponsoring school systems would have been contentious indeed.

One of the factors that angered Quincy School Committee members, and presumably some of the citizens, was that the college served a broad region, not just the city itself. Even when the city was providing no funds to the college, this was a thorn in the side of some committee members and politicians. On the one hand, if Quincy or similarly situated colleges had chosen to serve only their own citizens, as Newton Jr. College did, they could not have supported themselves. On the other, if they had served non-city students, the route Quincy took, they would likely have felt the heat of taxpayer wrath during the past two decades of cutbacks and spending caps. It is hard to imagine that most communities would have supported a community college directly through their property taxes, given the environment for much of the last decade, unless that college was exclusively for the use of their students. Had colleges organized along the lines of Quincy, serving a regional student body, more epic battles would probably have ensued, and possibly many closures.

If states had missed the opportunity to create community colleges during the 1960's, it seems unlikely that these colleges would have been created in the 1980's and 90's. Further, if states had missed their 1960's opportunities, and if they had not, as a consequence, taken over many of the existing school district-sponsored institutions, would two-year colleges exist as public entities at all, or would the field be limited
to a small number of private institutions? If so, what would have happened to those students who attend community colleges today?

Given the budget experiences of states that have had the leading systems, it seems likely that there would be many fewer public two-year colleges. Given the population of these colleges, drawn in large part by low costs, it seems likely that a significant proportion of these students would simply not have been able to go to any college. Brint and Karabel, Riesman, and others might call this a boon to society, and it is possible that four year colleges, particularly the state colleges, might have picked up some of the slack.

Not all students are suited to academic work, after all, and many jobs that require a college education don’t have any substantive reason for doing so. It seems equally possible that the societal divide between the educated and the non-educated, a divide created significantly by finances, might have increased. Though there is limited utility to a “what if” study, it is nonetheless interesting to speculate about what might have happened if the two year college movement had followed the path of school system sponsorship. The Quincy experience suggests that the road might have been rocky indeed.

*Why the Road Not Taken was Not Taken:* The differences between the goals and aspirations of the directors of the emerging community colleges and their school superintendent bosses were apparent as early as the 1960’s, as Clark has indicated. It seems likely that clashes such as occurred in Quincy must have started taking place even then. Certainly the constraints of being a part of the city school system were already becoming apparent. Since most communities consider the presence of a college to be an asset, it is likely that various communities competed in various ways for the location of colleges in their communities. While the early colleges may have been city-sponsored, any hint of state funding would mean resources, as well as prestige, for the city that could create for itself a community college. School boards were likely competitors for these resources, arguing that their existing structures made the governance of colleges by school systems an efficient means of using state resources. On the other hand, others may have argued that school boards could not efficiently do both jobs (and that many could not even do one job well). Further, the funding of colleges through the cities would amount to giving state funds to these cities, leaving the state with very little control and non-city residents without a voice.
Whether these kinds of arguments existed, it seems likely that those who had become familiar with the colleges -- including college administrators who worked for the school departments and faculty and administrators from other colleges that were involved with the fledgling institutions -- would probably have argued, in the main, for some form of governance other than the school department. The constraints were real, the cultural differences at least somewhat apparent, and conflicts foreseeable. This line of argument is entirely speculative, but the case of Quincy College highlights the differences which began to appear in the early days, and which might have suggested to those involved that imbedding a college in a school system was a far-from-ideal arrangement.

It should also be noted that Quincy Junior College, from its earliest days, was looking outward to other forms of governance. I have argued that this outward orientation may have kept conflicts from developing to some extent -- why fight over a structural arrangement that you expect to change? It is also possible that many cities accomplished what Quincy failed to accomplish in the 1960’s and 1970’s -- giving away an institution that was perceived as a financial albatross. If the tax base could not support the college, the sponsoring city would either want state resources to help or to cut costs at the college, possibly to the extent of giving it away. In some instances, city and state officials may have agreed on new governing arrangements that took an expensive obligation away from cash-strapped cities, but which left them a college within their environs. Different states have different formulae for funding public schools, which may have affected the debate over, and the eventual structure of, the community college system in each state.

While these circumstances would have to be studied in different states, and at different institutions that actually made the transition from school-sponsorship to something else, the Quincy College story does indicate that school board control of a community college was not an attractive option from the inside. It would have been easy for an insider to predict, even 30-40 years ago, that the route to a more collegiate culture, and probably to a more pleasant, less confrontative and less controlled life, was the route of separation from the schools -- either self-determination as a separate community college district (which
seems the most attractive option), or the more distant control of the state. To the extent college leaders had influence in the decision, it is hard to believe that most did not support separation.

*The Roots of Confusion:* Community colleges are well known for mission confusion, mission blur, even mission creep, as discussed in Chapter Two. Quincy College has certainly been prey to at least some of that confusion. Although it never experienced major confusion over whether it was a technically oriented or academically oriented institution, it has never really been sure who its students were or were supposed to be, how to resolve the part-time/full-time dilemma, or how to bridge the town-gown gap. On top of these issues of mission and purpose, Quincy has grappled with all the additional questions of organizational identity described above. It seems possible that, at least in part, the mission confusion that so many identify as endemic to community colleges may have its roots in the organizational and cultural confusion that has been played out over the past decades at Quincy College. Again, the isomorphic tug of academe to attract and serve different students works against the monolithic civilizing or acculturating function of the school system.

What are community colleges all about? To some extent, community colleges have become what students have wanted -- or at least what administrators think students have wanted. As older students, immigrants and others have sought opportunities, community colleges have tried to respond. Brint & Karabel, Dougherty and others argue that several forces, primarily college administrators and various officials within cities and states, created a technological focus that neither students nor businesses wanted initially and sold it to both groups, creating the strong trend towards vocationalization that exists today. What community colleges have not become, however, is what many of them started out as being: 13th and 14th grades. Yet many still retain the "social service oriented faculty" that Clark described years ago. Quincy College allows a glimpse into how those competing viewpoints led to clashes, providing not only a look at how the colleges might have evolved and why college leaders might have tried to avoid this route, but also adding a level of insight into the cultural and mission confusion that remains today. The tug of the school system in Quincy, even through the 1980's, was for 13th and 14th grade. The tug of the broader community was for greater accommodation in scheduling, course selection, and the kinds of flexibility that
led to the growth of continuing education programs. The goals of transferring students and creating meaningful vocational programs each have their own implications for organizational emphasis. This not only helps uncover the roots of the community college mission blur, but suggests that if school boards had maintained control of colleges, and if these colleges had continued to exist and function today, the balance of mission/function in community colleges might be significantly different.

The Assimilation of Municipal Colleges: The study of Quincy suggests a strong strain of institutional (and individual) envy by Quincy Junior of its wealthier neighbors. It is not clear to what extent community college faculty and staff may have envied Quincy, if at all. Among the attributes of Quincy College that faculty and staff have appreciated are its relatively small size (in the earlier days), the relative ease of creating new courses or programs of study, and the lack of the bureaucratization that afflicts state-affiliated institutions. When Quincy wants to start a new program -- such as Environmental Technology -- it need only pass through the College Senate and the institution’s president and governing board. Several years ago, the college was able to develop a state-wide program for National Guard members that no community college was able to offer because the community colleges are geographically restricted. Still, the study suggests that the existence of the state system had more influence on Quincy than the reverse.

For colleges that were formed as municipal institutions and later became state-sponsored, the study suggests the need to pay attention to institutional policies and cultural attributes, and to consider how they might be changed. It also points to a major role for leadership in interpreting the meaning of the change and the day-to-day implications for members of the college community. Had Quincy joined the state in the 1980’s, for example, it would certainly have chafed at the institutional restrictions on creating new programs, such as described above, and there would likely have been friction over balancing the perceived needs of Quincy with the broader needs of the state. Are colleges that made that transition different today from those formed under state auspices?

Massachusetts does not provide a good laboratory for studying the assimilation of municipal colleges. In Massachusetts, only one of the existing community colleges had municipal origins -- Holyoke Community College. (Newton Junior College closed in the 1980’s, having limited its enrollment to
Newton residents, reportedly for lack of funding and support.) Holyoke may have confronted different
challenges than the others, but it is also possible that the foundation of an entire state system in a relatively
short time period created a state bureaucracy and culture that overwhelmed that of Holyoke Junior College.
In a state that incorporated a range of municipal colleges, the impact might be different. If nothing else,
the Quincy College story indicates the strength and resiliency of the different cultures. Any collegiate
institution significantly influenced by municipal politics or school system culture is likely to have
exhibited organizational stress lines and cultural and aspirational differences similar to Quincy’s. These
attributes of two-year colleges deserve greater attention at a minimum, if not further study.
Notes to Chapter Seven:


1996 saw some return to calm at Quincy College. Faculty continued to be upset about their lack of a contract, and some staff -- both professional and clerical -- maintained that morale was worse than ever. Appointments that came up were often hijacked, according to staff, causing serious resentment. Still, there was guarded optimism among many that the worst was over. The new president was in place; perhaps things would improve.

In January, 1997, the college completed an articulation agreement with UMass, Boston, an important recipient of Quincy College transfer students. There was also guarded praise from the accrediting committee, which noted the great strides made by the college in breaking away from the school committee, but which also believed that the jury was still out as to whether the college would become more collegiate. "It hasn't happened yet," said the head of the visitation committee. Among the "most serious deficiencies" was the issue of the "withdrawal of the board of governors from daily operations."

In March, the college was reaccredited for 10 years, with a visit scheduled in fall 1998 to check on progress in three areas of concern, including governance. In June, the faculty settled on a contract, after a two year wait. Perhaps the most significant action of the first half of 1997 took place in February. On February 25th, the board of governors announced the layoffs of two deans, the registrar, the director of student life, the director of research and planning, two instructors, and a clerk. This layoff represented all of the college's senior leaders who had been in place during the Johnson years. None of those laid off were the newer hires, those with reported connections. College officials differed over whether this move was for cost-saving purposes or a "restructuring" for greater efficiency. The action removed many of the most experienced professional staff, with no similarly experience replacements in the offing. How does a college function without professionals in admissions, financial aid, and registration? It remains to be seen.

In April, the college's financial aid department was cited for lack of adequate financial controls and a lack of qualified staff, no surprise to observers of the previous year's hiring processes. In April also, Massasoit Community College announced a tuition decrease of 5%. In May, however, Quincy College
posted a tuition increase -- the result of a 9% drop in enrollment and four successive years of deficits. The funds raised through the increase, and the February restructuring, were to be put toward a $400,000 marketing plan “aimed at increasing college enrollment.” This plan, observe insiders, will be overseen by college marketing director Sean Barry from his newly refurbished offices in Coddington Hall.

Notes to Epilogue

Selected Bibliography


______ *This is the Community College.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968.


Appendix A

Enrollment: Quincy Junior College and Community Colleges

<table>
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The statistics above are taken from five different sources. The period from 1958 - 1982 is from the Patriot Ledger, June 21, 1983, which lists no source. The chart is entitled: Quincy Junior College Enrollment 1958-1982. These figures match almost exactly a typed document found in the college archives listing full and part-time enrollment from 1958 - 1968. This document has no letterhead,
signature or identifying office. The figures from 1986 - 1990 are taken from a chart printed in the Patriot Ledger on August 6, 1991. The source given is college admissions and registrar officials, and the figures include full and part time, day and evening students. A 1990 accreditation self-study provides figures for five years of Fall enrollment that are not incompatible with those presented above (although they are different). The final figures are from the college's 1996 accreditation self-study. Here (and only here) they are labeled “headcount,” including both full and part-time students, and differentiated from the FTE count. Given the surprising and not entirely credible changes that appear to have taken place between 1982 and 1985, and the known unreliability of figures on enrollment provided by the college prior to the mid-80's (based on hand counts of student folders), the figures are presented here only as generally illustrative of trends. Among these trends are Quincy's sustained growth in the late 1980's, as the community colleges remained even or lost enrollment, and Quincy's own trend towards reduction or stagnation in the mid-1990's. For comparison purposes, the enrollment figures for the two most closely competitive community colleges -- Massasoit and Bunker Hill -- are provided for the period during which this competition was most intense. The source for these is the August 6, 1991 Patriot Ledger.
Appendix B.

The following chart illustrates the interplay of individual, organizational and political/environmental factors during each of the three historical periods identified. Shading indicates areas of more intense activity or control, helping to demonstrate the overlapping of significant factors. Although one set of factors is identified as predominating in each of the three phases, individual, organizational and environmental actors were always at play in some form.

### Phase I: Individual Leadership and Control -- 1948 - 1986

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Individual Factors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-1965</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1948-1965</td>
<td>Formation</td>
<td>College is acknowledged part of school system: grade 13-14 adult education program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1965</td>
<td>Slow growth</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1966-68</td>
<td>McIntyre pushes state takeover</td>
<td>Daytime classes begun (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-70</td>
<td>McIntyre protege L. Creedon named superintendent</td>
<td>Classes hit capacity (1969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-72</td>
<td>McIntyre continues to push takeover Brockton Sen. Burke opposes</td>
<td>College grows slowly Pierce first academic president (1972) Satellite courses offered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-74</td>
<td></td>
<td>QJC is “candidate” for accreditation Financial problems continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-76</td>
<td></td>
<td>Creedon domination leads to Pierce skiing Enrollment increase leads to 21% budget increase, which further strains school budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-78</td>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal Justice program created Nursing program created Computer program created School committee endorses state takeover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-80</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mass. college troubles become public Gov. Dukakis kills South Shore Community College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-82</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Gov. King proposes state college merger Declining enrollment leads to layoffs in Quincy School System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-84</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proposition 2 1/2 is approved by voters City Council separates college from city budget, leaves school committee as governing board CC tuition goes up 17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clay Johnson is hired as President McIntyre dies Creedon is forced to resign

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984-86</td>
<td>Johnson restructures departments, increases teaching loads, creates new faculty structures (Senate). Reshapes institution. Charges of harassment filed by faculty against Johnson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major tuition increases announced. Enrollment drops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quincy fends off merger attempt, continues to push state takeover or aid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Phase II: The Institution Comes of Age -- 1986 - 1991

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Johnson emerges as primary college figure, speaking against merger. Faculty accuses Johnson of favoritism, union busting, harassment.</td>
<td>Teachers cut, programs eliminated. Enrollment stagnant. School Committee investigates first charges against Johnson.</td>
<td>Problems continue for State Community Colleges. Reports continue to urge merger of QJC and Massasoit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Johnson continues to push state to takeover QJC.</td>
<td>New building for college included in downtown development plans.</td>
<td>Globe urges merger, calls QJC “too expensive” and “substandard.” Merger idea is proclaimed “dead;”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Anselmo changes vote on Ricci, Johnson accused of manipulation. Anselmo and Ricci continue to feud.</td>
<td>Johnson - Ricci “memo wars” over parking, reporting, other issues. highlight structural problem. Mayor Sheets “takes over” review of structural issues. QJC becomes QC. Board rehires fired teacher over Johnson’s objections. Supt. proposes charging college rent. Instead, College “buys” two buildings from school system. Johnson publicly flaunts college wealth.</td>
<td>Confusion and low morale reported at state colleges -- 1600 part time faculty walk off jobs, tuition goes up another 15 - 33%. NEASC reviews college for “fault corrections;” highlights governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ricci resigns. Sites lack of school committee support, plus Anselmo’s switched support at Johnson’s instigation.</td>
<td>Tuition remains at 1989 level. College to consider offering Bachelor’s degree. Mayor tries to sell city building to college. Johnson claims “lifetime” tenure. School committee formally discusses faculty morale.</td>
<td>Johnson asks Sheets for legal opinion on president reporting to superintendent. Sheets proposes study of governance. Accreditation board gives college “high marks” but questions governance. Trustees propose new governing board to “free” college from school committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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</table>
Continuing public battles between Johnson and members of School Committee  
Raymondi elected to school committee | Johnson’s practices and management style investigated (several times) by School Committee | Major battle over “unauthorized” letters by Johnson/Downey to NEASC  
Series of disciplinary reviews; Johnson complains of “lynching”  
Johnson “reined in” by School Committee  
NEASC warns of pending probation for QC over governance |
| 1993 | Johnson files bias case with MCAD  
Johnson waves red pepper at school committee meeting  
Raymondi proposes 5 seats on new board for school committee | College $1.2M over budget but still shows surplus of $3.4M  
Tuition remains level  
Enrollment soars to 5000+ students | Continuing public battles over harassment, budget  
Work on separation wins 2-month reprieve on probation  
Johnson fired  
Discussions on separation of college move forward |
| 1994 | Raymondi pushes for more school committee representation, then compromise of president reporting directly to school committee  
School Committee Raymondi appoints cousin Mariano and self to oversee selection of new trustees  
Raymondi and Mariano emerge as board members; Raymondi becomes chairman of the board | Enrollment continues to rise in spring, holds steady for fall | Mayor, city council endorse new board plan. School committee reluctantly accepts.  
After legislation is filed and signed, probation threat lifted  
School Committee Raymondi appoints cousin Mariano and self to oversee selection of new trustees (see also, individual action)  
Newly appointed board causes controversy  
New board defies city, appoints second interim president -- Linda Wilson  
Move by city council to remove politicians from board of trustees fails |
| 1995 |  | Search committee for new president is formed, but composition and selection process anger students. | Controversy over board  
Raymondi’s attempt to upgrade friend’s position leads to Wilson’s resignation, less than one year after her appointment |
| 1996 | Winter of Our Discontent article:  
Morale issues are severe, but new regime in place and functioning. Raymondi firmly in control.  
New era of individual dominance? | New President appointed  
Enrollment shows small decline |  |
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<tr>
<td>Author(s):</td>
<td>DONALD P. ERATZ</td>
</tr>
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<td>Corporate Source:</td>
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