The History section of the Proceedings contains the following 18 papers: "Pioneers in the State Freedom of Information Movement" (Jeanni Atkins and James A. Lumpp); "'Censorship Liberally Administered': Press, U.S. Military Relations in the Spanish-American War" (Randall S. Sumpter); "Two Tales of One City: How Cultural Perspective Influenced the Reporting of a Pre-Civil Rights Story in Dallas" (Camille R. Kraeplin); "'At Our House': A Case Study of Grace B. Freeman, Syndicated Columnist, 1954-1964" (Marilyn S. Sarow); "Journalism behind Barbed Wire: Two Arkansas Relocation Center Newspapers" (Edward Jay Friedlander); "Paving the Road to Hell: National Public Radio in the Lee Frischknecht Years" (Michael P. McCauley); "Hitting from the Left: The Daily Worker's Assault on Baseball's Color Line" (Chris Lamb and Kelly Rusinack); "The Lone Ranger Rides Again: Black Press Editorial Stands on the Vietnam War during the Johnson Administration" (William J. Leonhirth); "'Those Who Toil and Spin': Female Textile Operatives' Publications in New England and the Response to Working Conditions, 1840-1850" (Mary M. Lamonica); "Standing for the Rights of the Black Worker--But Not at Home. The Labor Policies of the 'Chicago Defender'" (Jon Bekken); "The Journalistic Function of Book Reviews: How Faludi's 'Backlash' Made News" (Priscilla Coit Murphy); "The Icons of Despair: A Comparison of World Series Coverage in Newspapers before and during the Depression" (John Carvalho); "Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education as Seen in Emery's 'The Press and America'" (Kristine L. Nowak); "Pioneering for Women Journalists" Sallie Joy White, 1870-1909" (Elizabeth V. Burt); "Wrestling with Corporate Identity: Television and the National Broadcasting Company" (Chad Dell); "Bridge to the Modern Era: 'Free Press' on the Wage Workers' Frontier" (David J. Vergobbi); "'The Feminine Mystique' and Mass Media: Implications for the Second Wave" (Patricia Bradley); and "The Chicago Television 'Holy War' of 1956-57" (Bob Pondillo).
HISTORY.

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HISTORY.
PIONEERS IN THE STATE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION MOVEMENT

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Pioneers in the State Freedom of Information Movement

Pioneers In The State Freedom Of Information Movement

Post World War II Climate

The conviction that the free flow of information is the foundation of all other freedoms and must be solidly grounded in law took root in the ashes of World War II when the forces of oppression threatened to stifle the voices of freedom across the face of Europe. The irrationality of the War not only shattered lives but also left cracks in the Enlightenment belief in the rationality of man. Carl L. Becker noted in 1945 in Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life the climate of disillusionment with human reason as an “infallible instrument for recording truth” and the realization that “men themselves are less amenable to rational persuasion” than had been thought prior to the War. The War had shaken that belief but had not disproved the basic proposition, as Becker put it, “that only through freedom of the mind can a reasonably just society ever be created.”(1)

Among men of thought who grappled with how to prevent another such full-scale effort to annihilate freedom of expression and civil liberties were the true believers who were convinced that a just society must be rooted in a clear global commitment to a free flow of information. The essential first step was to give freedom of information a central place in post-war United Nations discussions. The United Nations was chartered in 1945 to promote international cooperation “and assist in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms of all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religions.”(2)

Planning began the next year for an International Conference on Freedom of Information, to be held two years later, March 23-April 21, 1948. (3) This FoI conference
Pioneers in the State Freedom of Information Movement

spawned a decade of debate. Eleven years afterwards on December 7, 1959, Article I of the Declaration of Human Rights was adopted: "Each contracting state undertakes to respect and protect the right of every person to have at his disposal diverse sources of information."(4)

After the War, public officials continued to build walls of secrecy -- higher each year -- which threatened the free flow of information in the United States. The web of secrecy had been spun all across the country, and journalists began to realize organized action was necessary to counter the trend of denials of access to government meetings and records.

**Purpose of The Study**

Thus began a protracted struggle to dismantle the wall of government secrecy with federal and state access laws. Much scholarly research has focused on the Federal Freedom of Information Act, and numerous articles have studied access laws in one state. But there is a dearth of information on the origins of the state FoI movement. This paper provides an overview of those origins, describes the nationwide mobilization effort which involved forming committees, conducting research and establishing a national FoI clearinghouse. Pioneers who worked to enact access laws in their state are identified; the difficulties confronted are described, including the problem of convincing journalists and legislators of the need for legislation. The period of study selected covers the post-war climate in the '40s precipitating concerns about suppression of information and the intense state activity during the '50s which began to dissipate by the mid '60s.
Problems with legislation enacted in the ‘50s and ‘60s, which precipitated a second stage of the state FoI movement around 1967 of revising existing laws and replacing them with new legislation to plug loopholes, will be discussed. How the movement changed in the 1970s in terms of organization and education efforts and influx of other groups will be explained. The paper concludes with a discussion of the philosophy which has driven the FoI movement.

Assessing the Problem and Mobilization

As plans for an international FoI conference got underway, journalism organizations began establishing committees to monitor secrecy problems and seek solutions. (5) Sigma Delta Chi (SDX), the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), the Associated Press Managing Editors Association (APME) and the National Editorial Association (NEA) began discussing how they might prevent the flow of government information from being reduced to a trickle. (5)

By 1947, Harvard University legal scholar Zechariah Chafee noted as significant “the enormous recent expansion of the subjects which officials are seeking to hide from publication until they give the signal.” (6) Unfortunately, the signals were becoming dimmer as the monitoring of denials of access to information began to reveal. (7) Edwin D. Canham, *The Christian Science Monitor* editor and president of ASNE in 1948, returned from the international FoI conference and appointed Basil L. Walters, *Chicago News*, as FoI Committee chairman. Walters reported on international problems in 1949 but also on access skirmishes in this country; then in 1950, his report focused almost entirely
on the dangers on the home front. A 1950 ASNE national study of access problems, in fact, “found disquieting conditions” from the federal down to the local level. (8)

James S. Pope, Executive Editor of *The Louisville Times and Courier-Journal*, took over as ASNE FoI chairman. He asked the Board of Directors to acquire expert help and found it in the brilliant mind of a retired lawyer who became a champion of access and foe of secrecy. ASNE commissioned Dr. Harold L. Cross, Columbia University Professor of Law, to conduct a benchmark study of the status of statutory guarantees of access to government information. Three years later, Dr. Cross published his seminal findings in a book entitled *The People’s Right to Know*. (9) He “found that public and press had ample cause for concern.”(10) That Fall, Cross shared his assessment of the challenges to the public’s right to know with the Missouri Press Association.

Those challenges had arisen, he said, as a result of the “explosive expansion” in the power, activities and responsibilities of public officials, the “dynamic expansion in means of disseminating information” and “the burgeoning activities of the cults of secrecy” which “had gone far beyond the tussles experienced newspaperman expect and know how to win.” (11) The causes of secrecy Cross identified as “excessive apprehension about national security, perversion of the right of privacy philosophy, progressive loss of faith in publicity’s deterrent effect on wrongdoing, and preoccupation of newspapers with other things so that, too often, blandishments advanced in legislative corridors by lobbyists for secrecy went unchallenged.”(12)
Others had not been idle while Cross labored to discover the extent of statutory guarantees of access to government information. By the time his findings were released in 1953, freedom of information committees had begun to form at the state level.(13)

A National FoI Clearinghouse

Several FoI leaders were emerging. James Pope spoke at ASNE’s annual convention in 1952 of his hope that “between now and next April every state will have a committee to which all editors, daily and weekly, can turn for advice and assistance.”(14) He also urged close cooperation among ASNE, APME and SDX.

As problems were identified and the search for solutions continued, the need for a central place to gather and disseminate information began to be entertained. Hugh Boyd, New Brunswick (N.J.) Home News publisher, was the National Editorial Association (NEA) FoI chairman. He wrote Pope in May 1953, expressing his regret at the “absence of an exchange of FoI information between the various state press association committees.”(15)

Norman Isaacs also urged a national council. V.M. (“Red”) Newton, Managing Editor of the Tampa Tribune and SDX FoI chairman, wrote a letter to Isaacs in September 1953: “I heartily agree with you that a national newspaper Freedom of Information Council, embracing the entire profession, should be formed, and I’ll do what I can in Sigma Delta Chi to further this.”(16) Newton became a driving force in the FoI movement, urging press associations to lobby legislators to introduce SDX model laws and put pressure on governors to sign access bills. He kept his word to Isaacs.
In November 1953, SDX recommended forming a national council for the advancement of Freedom of Information composed of press and radio organizations. (17) Not only would the Council “keep a constant patrol of the governmental front and a complete record of all cases” but also raise “the voice of protest against abridgment of the rights of the American people.”(18) The next month, a meeting was held in the Washington Post office of APME FoI chairman J. Russell Wiggins, who had written extensively on government secrecy. (19)

Four years later in October 1957, the NEA met in Chicago. Among those attending was University of Missouri School of Journalism Professor Paul Fisher. (20) He had been editing NEA’s Freedom of Information digest for two years. Dr. Fisher returned to the campus and suggested to Dean Earl English that a good way to celebrate the Missouri School of Journalism’s fiftieth anniversary would be to establish an FoI clearinghouse. (21)

Dean English agreed to hold a Freedom of Information Seminar at the University of Missouri March 13-14, 1958. (22) The following year, a Freedom of Information Center was founded in the School of Journalism with Paul Fisher as director. In 1959, Fisher began an FoI Digest and monograph series which were published uninterrupted until 1986 under his direction. Also in 1958, SDX began to publish an annual report on access problems, “The Report of the Advancement of Freedom of Information Committee.” The Society for Professional Journalists (formerly SDX) continues to publish an annual FoI Report.
Pioneers in the State Freedom of Information Movement

Status of Open Meetings Laws Prior to the FoI Movement

The FoI pioneers assumed a formidable task after World War II to get access laws on the books in all states; only Alabama had a statewide open meetings law when the movement began. By 1956, SDX model records and meetings laws were being introduced in state legislatures around the country. (23) The terms used to describe this effort are apt descriptions of what FoI proponents faced: a struggle of endurance not unlike a state of war. The literature on open meetings, in fact, is sprinkled with warfare terms: “battles,” “victories,” “losses,” “fights”. The title of the first comprehensive law review analysis of meetings statutes was “Open Meetings Statutes: the Press Fights for the Right to Know.”(24) The FoI movement has been based on the presumption that access to government information requires continual vigilance in fighting back government efforts to control the flow of information.

Prior to the ‘50s, the few records laws that existed were scattered piecemeal in statute books; but they did little more than codify the common law right to inspect a record a government agency is required to keep. (25) The only existing state meetings law, Alabama’s 1915 statute, consisted of only a few sentences, requiring final action in a public meeting except for discussions of an individual’s character and reputation. (26)

The few other meetings statutes covered only a single agency and required voting, not discussion, to be conducted in a public session. (27) A 1905 Florida statute, not replaced until 1967, applied to city and town councils and boards of alderman. (28) Various North Dakota laws, dating from the 1800s, required a specified local agency or city council to post notices of meetings, publish proceedings and keep a journal; the
Constitution stated that the legislature should hold public meetings “unless the business is such as ought to be kept secret.” (29) That phrase, typical in these local laws, gave full discretion to public officials to decide when to close a meeting. Legislative sessions of city governing bodies were required to vote in public under a 1917 North Carolina statute; another applying to county commissioners simply stated: “Every meeting shall be open to all persons.” (30)

While there is a common law right to inspect records, there is no comparable common law right of access to meetings. (31) The lack of a common law right to attend government discussions of policy and the inadequate pieces of legislation -- allowing access only to votes on issues of public interest but not the deliberations leading up to voting -- were also factors in the organized push for open meetings laws in every state. While the need was crystal clear to advocates of access laws, they faced not only the daunting task of convincing legislators of that need -- but fellow journalists as well.

Opposition to Access Laws

“Newsmen in some number argued the press should stand and fight for the right to information on the rock of the First Amendment and not skirmish on the slippery slopes of statutes,” observed Missouri FoI Center Director Paul Fisher. (32) In fact, an FoI Center study in the ’50s reported a lack of widespread support for open meetings laws. (33) Opponents cited evidence that the access picture was not as dismal as proponents of legislation painted. For example, a Missouri Press Association 1959 survey described the access picture as “rosy and friendly.” (34)
Some Missouri publishers were dead set against an access law for several reasons. Viewing apathy of public officials as the root problem, some worried that a law would create hostility and worsen, rather than improve, relationships. Others objected to the SDX model law, which did not allow executive sessions. One journalist summed up the opposition this way: “We have too many damn statutes now. It is entirely unnecessary.” Missouri did not get a meetings law until 1973.

Iowa’s access situation also appeared good that last year of the ‘50s decade as the press association formed an FoI committee comprised of school of journalism representatives and journalists. A study conducted by the committee failed to garner support for a law. Iowa journalists remained unconvinced of the need for legislation six years later. Don Benson of the Des Moines Register and Tribune agreed to serve on the Missouri Freedom of Information Advisory Committee. In a March 11, 1965, letter to Earl English, University of Missouri School of Journalism Dean, Benson explained: “Most Iowa newspapermen, including the Register and Tribune and the Iowa Press Association, fear that such laws would do more to close recordings and materials than open them because things are pretty good here now without a law.”

The North Dakota SDX chapter discovered they would have to not only sell public officials on the value of access laws but journalists as well. A survey had indicated a lack of serious problems, and newspapers in areas where problems were known to exist had not replied. At the 1955 press association convention, a debate over access laws ensued. Proponents of an open meetings law permitting no executive sessions backed down.
The sentiment among some journalists seemed to be that denials of access occurred because newspapermen weren't aggressive enough. "The implication was," SDX reported, "that perhaps the blame for infringements lay as heavily on the newspapers as it did on the laws and public officials." (39) Subsequently, SDX established scholarships at the University of North Dakota to foster understanding of freedom of information among future journalists. (40)

In the first decade of the FoI movement to enact access laws, faith in the glare of newspaper publicity as a deterrent to closed meetings remained strong. For example, Kansas papers engaged in intensive successful campaigns to open legislative committee meetings. Journalists did not even bother to testify in 1957 hearings on a bill to require school boards to hold open discussions when hiring faculty; the bill was defeated. (41)

Journalists who had considerable faith in the power of publicity argued that monitoring government agencies and publicizing closed meetings was the solution to secrecy not legislation. In fact, the relationship between newspapers and public officials seemed very workable in some cases without laws. Michigan did not have an open meetings law, yet elected officials were considered "champions of the public's right to information about the government" who "have thrown up no serious roadblocks." (42) Journalists could not agree on the scope of open meetings legislation. Metropolitan editors opposed new laws, asserting that "vigorous editorial initiative alone is sufficient to keep doors of official bodies open. (43) Success in pressuring two state universities to stop holding secret meetings was cited as a case in point. (44) Yet Minnesota's 1957 law also was viewed as a "powerful psychological weapon" dependent upon "the glare of"
Alton F. Baker, Eugene (Oregon) Register-Guard, suggested that journalists were better off without a law than succumbing to compromises. He pointed to press successes in opening up school board meetings and the state board of higher education and warned that a danger in a law is that “exceptions would tend to grow rather than diminish.”(46)

Utah journalists also were inclined to rely on the public relations contacts by editors. Town board meetings in someone’s living room to meet an emergency, “such as a cow falling into the reservoir which holds the town’s culinary water supply,” was viewed as representing the greatest level of difficulty in small towns. Success in larger cities was credited to “our own public relations programs.”(47)

Yet while those who wanted to rely on pressure from newspapers to keep meetings open proffered some persuasive arguments, they failed to win over colleagues who were convinced that statutory guarantees of access were the answer to the problem of government secrecy. As Missouri’s Paul Fisher put it, “that solid American belief that if something is wrong a law can put it right prevailed.”(48) Indeed it did.

Legislator as FoI Pioneer

The year 1953 was significant in the Freedom of Information movement -- Harold Cross published his benchmark study, The People’s Right to Know, FoI committees were in place at both the national and state level, national FoI clearinghouse discussions were initiated, and seven state legislatures passed meetings bills. Louisiana was the first to enact a Sunshine Law in 1952, followed in 1953 by Arkansas, California, Idaho, Indiana,
Ohio, Utah and Washington. Most laws were only a few uncomplicated paragraphs requiring agencies to vote in a public meeting, but the California Brown Act was much more comprehensive. How did this law come about?

As the previous section reveals, not all journalists eagerly jumped on the access laws bandwagon. Conversely, not all legislators opposed legislation. Among the legislators who entered the FoI battle on the side of open government was California Assemblyman Ralph M. Brown who pioneered the breakthrough legislation that bore his name. The Brown Act contained language which other legislators copied; other state courts cited California decisions interpreting the law. By 1968, the California open meetings statute was referred to as “the most comprehensive public meeting law in the country.”

Brown, the chairman of the California Assembly Interim Committee, was inspired to take action by a series of articles in the San Francisco Chronicle in 1952. He commissioned a study of state laws allowing closed meetings “which suppress information, the property of the public.”

The 1952 Chronicle series “Your Secret Government,” written by Michael Harris, pointed out local government suppression of information. In 1962, Harris reflected on the access problems he had documented a decade earlier: “It wasn’t that members of an agency . . . were trying to do anything wrong. . . when they held their meetings in the superintendent’s office,” he said. “It was just that the philosophy of doing the public business in public was outside their perception,” which appeared to have been shared by many public officials across the country.
But Assemblyman Brown had a different philosophy, reinforced by the legislative interim committee he assigned to study secrecy problems in the '50s. They found "a genuine and compelling need for legislative action of a nature designed to curb this misuse of democratic process by public bodies who would legislate in secret."(54) The committee asserted that "the public has the right to be present and to be heard at all phases of legislative enactment by any governmental agency. This right is a source of strength to our country and must be protected at all costs."(55) With this ringing endorsement from the legislative committee, the bill became law in record time -- compared to the experience in other states where decades could go by without proposed access legislation being enacted. Brown introduced the bill in January, 1953 and Governor Earl Warren signed it into law on July 2, 1953 (56).

The Brown Act applied only to local agencies. Over the years it has been amended extensively, "chiefly in response to the attempts of local government agencies to evade it in spirit."(57) In the first fourteen years, for example, it was amended at every legislative session except one as government officials, attorneys, legislators and the media raised questions about the applicability of its provisions (58). And the Act is still being amended in the '90s.

California got off to an easy start with this Act, but Brown faced much rougher going when he introduced a statewide version. When multitudinous amendments to his single comprehensive bill covering both state and local agencies were proposed, he withdrew the bill.(59) A survey of state officials revealed support for the open meeting
principle; yet it took twelve years of introducing a series of bills in each legislative session before a statewide law was finally endorsed.(60)

Decades of Struggle: Journalism Educators Join the Battle

For the majority of states, seeds planted in the '30s, '40s, and '50s did not grow to fruition in the form of a state open meetings law for a decade or more as sponsors doggedly introduced bills year after year. Often, as was the case in California, there was one individual determined enough to weather the setbacks. The campaign for a comprehensive law in Arkansas stretched back to the '30s before the nationwide FoI movement began, spearheaded by Little Rock Associated Press Bureau staffer, Ed Campbell, who was described as a “one-man crusade against closed meetings.”(61)

The open meetings bill, drafted by a group of capitol reporters and introduced in the 1947 legislature, failed to pass. Instead, an open meetings requirement was added to a bill dealing with Senate confirmation of gubernatorial appointees. (62) The amendment forbidding closed sessions except to consider “the employment, discharge or investigation of an individual” failed to prevent closed meetings; and “by 1952 the act had become virtually useless.”(63) This 1947 law remained on the books when the General Assembly enacted a law in 1953 applying to both state and local bodies. (64) The Arkansas Gazette criticized the statute for allowing too many exceptions to the open meetings requirement and limiting penalties only to willful violations; however, this legislation was not replaced with a strong law until 1967. (65)

A Florida legislator responded to journalists’ dissatisfaction with the “backroom wheeling and dealing” of government officials; Rep. J. Emory “Red” Cross agreed to
Pioneers in the State Freedom of Information Movement

sponsor an open meetings bill in the House in 1957. It died. Two years later as a Senator, Cross again introduced a bill with the same result. But he continued to introduce the bill annually for ten years until it was finally enacted in 1967(66).

The same year Cross began to sponsor legislation in Florida, the Tennessee Press Association (TPA) agreed to sponsor both meetings and records bills in their legislature's next session. Members of the General Assembly, who wanted their committees exempt, refused to report the bill to the floor. Both legislators and the TPA refused to budge. School boards represented a powerful lobby seeking exemptions the press association was unwilling to accept (67). Tennessee was to wait seventeen years for an open meetings law.

The year before Florida and Tennessee began their efforts, Kansas initiated what turned out to be a sixteen-year battle to get access laws enacted(68). In 1956, The Kansas Press Association formed The People’s Right to Know Committee, comprised of journalists, an ex-college president, a businessman and judge, and within a year introduced access bills into the legislature (69). By 1958, the Committee began tracking cases of denial of access, and the press association began publishing FoI case histories compiled by the William Allen White School of Journalism in The Kansas Publisher. The next year, Governor Docking called for bills to require annual reporting of campaign contributions and an open meetings law (70). The open meetings bill was defeated, but The Kansas City Times reported that all legislative committees were opened for the first time (71). Two years of work had passed; five different bills were introduced over the next fourteen years until Kansas finally got an open meetings statute in 1972.(72)
Alvin Austin, University of North Dakota Journalism Department Chair, suggested to SDX president Ed Doherty that a Freedom of Information Committee be established to determine if access guarantees were on the books and asked attorney, publisher and legislator Ralph Beede to conduct a statute search. Beede found no comprehensive statute establishing the principle of a right to know (73). A digest of existing access provisions in North Dakota was presented at a 1954 SDX annual meeting in Valley City. At the North Dakota Press Association convention the next year, it was agreed that the proposed meetings bill would include exemptions. Legislators who met with newsmen in Bismarck were “cool to the idea” of a law and “saw as many reasons for closing records and meetings as for opening them.” (75)

After six years and many letters to the editor, public statements and editorials, meetings and record bills were introduced in the North Dakota legislature in 1957. They met opposition in the House Committee on Political Subdivision which marked them “do pass” but “indefinite postponement” and sent them to the Senate; both were finally passed four years after the proposal was first broached (76).

Reports of widespread secrecy by city, town and schools boards prompted formation of a Legislative Research council in 1956 in Massachusetts. David Brickman, chairman of the New England SDX FoI committee and the Massachusetts Newspaper Information Service, was instrumental in getting a bill passed two years later (77).

The New Mexico Press Association failed to get a meetings bill enacted in 1957, but the same bill in 1959 passed the House rapidly and unanimously. It met stiff
opposition in the Senate, however, but was passed by an almost equally divided body with a 15-14 vote (78).

Opposition in Oklahoma stemmed from requiring open discussions of appointments and firing of personnel. Sen. Jenkin Jones, who was also the editor of *The Tulsa Tribune*, led a strong editorial and floor opposition campaign. Only when an exemption for this purpose was approved did the press association sponsored bill pass in 1959 (79).

That year Maine media successfully concluded a push to enact a modified version of the SDX model access laws in a combined meetings and records act. A joint freedom of information committee, composed of the state press association, daily newspaper publishers and the association of broadcasters, was formed in 1957 to lobby the legislature (80). Brooks Hamilton, head of the University of Maine School of Journalism, served as the chairman (81).

In 1959, a Right-to-Know law, combining meetings and records, was enacted in Maine without dissent. (82) Sponsor of the law, Sen. Allen Woodcock, said it “protected and even strengthened” the public’s “inalienable right to know.” (83) A Bangor Daily News writer expressed the sentiment that government secrecy “is as insidious and as deadly to a democracy as cancer to a human.” (84) A Lewiston Daily Sun reporter noted, however, that the law did not represent “any emergency here” since officials were already cooperative. (85) Nevertheless, proponents of legal access guarantees believed in establishing the principle of open government in laws as “insurance against the temptation of public servants to conduct the public’s business in secret, on the theory that people do
not care, or that they are not entitled to know of every decision, or because secrecy is admirably suited to conceal mistakes.” (86)

By the end of the ‘50s, 29 states had open meetings laws; almost half (12) were enacted in the waning years of the decade. In 1957, APME’s FoI Committee reported that 14 state legislatures were considering legislation. In a burst of activity in 1957 and 1959, legislatures passed bills in 11 states: Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota and Vermont in 1957 and Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin in 1959. (87) Mason Walsh, Managing Editor of the *Dallas Times-Herald*, commented. “You couldn’t say the wall of secrecy was breached in all cases, and sometimes you could only detect a tiny crack.” (88)

The FoI movement lost steam as the ‘50s ended. From 1960-1965, only Arizona, Georgia, Nevada and South Dakota enacted laws. (89) In the first twenty years of the movement, however, almost every state introduced open meetings bills (90). The seeds planted during this time bore fruit as the remaining 21 states enacted statutes in only ten years from 1967 to 1977

**Sunshine Laws: Identifying Loopholes**

Public officials had discretion to determine when to hold an executive session since statutes did not identify subjects which could be discussed in closed meetings. ASNE FoI Chairman, Sevellon Brown, said in 1959 that this discretion “may also be the most dangerous” problem. (91) Executive sessions were identified as “the biggest and most criticized loophole.” (92) Michael Petrick, SDX FoI Chairman, acknowledged that in retrospect SDX silence on closed sessions was “not necessarily the
Pioneers in the State Freedom of Information Movement

most golden" (93). Specifying a limited number of exemptions allowing an executive sessions became the option widely adopted in subsequent legislation as well as procedures to close, requiring a vote, statement of the exemption allowing closure, keeping minutes of the executive session and reconvening in open session to vote. The SDX model law. Requiring only the meetings where formal votes were taken to be open was widely interpreted to mean that the deliberation process could be closed.

Lack of a requirement to notify the public when a meeting was called facilitated secret meetings; only 6 of the 29 meetings statutes in place by 1966 required notice. (94) Now all states require some form of notice; the stronger laws also stipulate that agendas be published and prohibit deviation from announced topics.

So-called "work sessions" proliferated, and small town editors complained that public officials had come to regard them as "unwanted spectators at meetings". (95) In addition to these sessions, public officials found ways to discuss business by phone, memo and in social gatherings. The need to define a meeting became clear when questions arose about whether a meeting occurs when a quorum convenes and the purpose of the meeting--whether prearranged, information gathering, formal voting or if public business is discussed at a social event or over the phone--became points of contention requiring changes in laws.

Lack of definitions of a public body allowed agencies to claim they were not covered by an open meetings statute. The public funds test of an agency was popular in the '50s and '60s; the majority of states today, however, define a public body in terms of policymaking functions. Legislatures exempted their committees, and government
agencies conducted the public’s business behind closed doors by appointing task forces, ad
hoc and advisory committees and subcommittees. Questions were raised about whether
bodies with quasi-judicial power and non-profit organizations receiving public funds fell
within the scope of coverage.

Enforcement difficulties increased as attorneys refused to enforce criminal
sanctions in the statutes. Fines, voiding actions in illegal meetings, and awarding court
costs and attorney fees to the plaintiff have replaced criminal sanctions as the means of
enforcement in most states.

The FoI Movement Changes

The process of revising statutes to close loopholes and replacing existing laws with
new legislation fell to those who entered the FoI after the ‘60s. Assessment and
discussion of access statutes in law review articles was limited in the ‘60s.(96) Then an
explosion of commentary occurred in the next decade.(97) How the movement changed
will be briefly discussed.

The influx of citizen groups bolstered the efforts of journalism organizations and
educators. Common Cause, founded in 1970 by John Gardner, took a leadership role in
government reform efforts, including drafting a model Sunshine Law (98). The Common
Cause model became the standard form of legislation enacted in the remaining 21 states,
with the exception of Florida’s Sunshine Law.

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press was also founded in 1970 and
ushered in litigation as a means to enforce access laws. Director Jack Landau, three
Pioneers in the State Freedom of Information Movement

attorneys and several law interns assumed the task of monitoring access problems
nationwide, issuing reports in *The News Media and the Law* and answering inquiries via a
hotline.\(^{(99)}\)

Ralph Nader founded the Press Information Center and FoI Clearinghouse in 1972
as part of The Center for Responsive Law "to provide legal and technical assistance to
members of the press in their struggle to obtain access to information." \(^{(100)}\) Center
Attorney Ronald Plesser directed a 1975 Southern Regional Monitoring Project study of
access laws in 11 states. \(^{(101)}\)

The education stage of the FoI movement also has been facilitated by handbooks
published by offices of attorneys general, press associations and state FoI groups. While
national journalism organizations continue to monitor state access issues, 26 state FoI
offices have been established to provide information and assistance, including hotlines and
conducting workshops.\(^{(102)}\) The National Freedom of Information Coalition of 12 state
groups was organized in 1992 to attack mutual problems, engage in education and hold
annual conferences; individual membership now stands at 37.\(^{(103)}\)

For their contributions to facilitating the nationwide FoI movement by providing
information in publications and conducting research to respond to individual inquiries,
former Dean of the University of Missouri School of Journalism Earl English and Paul
Fisher, Director of the Freedom of Information Center for 31 years, were inducted into the
national FoI Hall of Fame at the Freedom Forum in Arlington, Virginia, in 1996.
The FoI Movement Philosophy

At the First Annual Freedom of Information Conference at the University of Missouri in 1959, James Pope said “I feel quite sure that the birth and growth of the vital movement now identified universally as Freedom of Information will become recognized, in retrospect, as a phenomenon equal to the automobile or television, the rocket or rock and roll." He noted that while the “spiritual sire” of FoI was “a noble experiment called World Freedom of Information,” ASNE realized early on that “it was not possible to liberate information across the world until we had mastered the art in our own nation, our own States and cities.”

This noble experiment rested on a philosophical foundation of the evolving concept of a public right to know. The First Amendment theories of Madison, Milton, and Meiklejohn are well known and have been widely discussed. Perhaps not as widely discussed, however, are the theories of a constitutional basis for the concept of a right to know as embodied in access laws espoused by Harold Cross, Thomas Emerson and Wallace Parks. “It is not proper, Cross argued, that people have to appear before government “in the posture of supplicants praying, as if the matter were one of grace” in order to be granted access to information." In 1960, he said

I plead for recognition of freedom of information as a constitutional right as a constituent part--indeed as the very foundation stone--of freedom of speech and of the press. Without freedom to obtain information as well as the freedom to utter or print it and then to circulate it, we have but changed our kings, and a just heritage hangs by mere gossamer responsive to any fitful gust of rationalization.

Dr. Wallace Parks was Chief Counsel to the House Government Information Subcommittee, chaired by Rep. John E. Moss, and consultant to the Senate Constitutional
Pioneers in the State Freedom of Information Movement

Rights Subcommittee, chaired by Sen. Thomas C. Hennings; these committees were responsible for the federal Freedom of Information Act of 1966. Parks proposed that the right to know principle should be considered as part of the guarantees of the Constitution. In a 1957 article, “The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution,” Parks argued that the First Amendment “was intended as one of the guarantees of the people’s right to know.” Parks pointed out that denials of access to, and suppression of, information constituted an encroachment of rights the constitution was designed to prevent; the evils which should be prevented are not just prior censorship, he insisted, but also actions which stifle the exchange of ideas necessary to facilitate self-government and maintain a free society.

In a widely-quoted 1974 speech at Yale Law School, Justice Potter Stewart threw an incendiary log on the fire of debate about a constitutional recognition of a public’s right to know when he made this statement: “There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy.”

Thomas I. Emerson, whose book The System of Freedom of Expression was published in 1970, was not deterred from offering a contrary view. In a subsequent 1977 law review article entitled “Legal Foundations of the Right to Know,” Emerson wrote, “It is clear at the outset that the right to know fits readily into the First Amendment and the whole system of freedom of expression,” and this principle subsumes “the right to read, to listen, to see, and to otherwise receive communications,” as well as “the right to obtain information as a basis for transmitting ideas or facts to others.”
In my judgment the greatest contribution that could be made in the whole realm of law would be explicit recognition by the courts that the constitutional right to know embraces the right of the public to obtain information from the government. There is a firm, indeed overwhelming, theoretical base for accepting this position.”(114)

The meetings and records laws which had been enacted Emerson viewed as a "clear manifestation" that the concept of government information as public information has been recognized and that “the country has come to accept the notion that the ordinary citizen is entitled to access to government information.”(115) Consequently, he said, the concept of a right to know “is ready to be incorporated in constitutional doctrine.”(116)

In The Public's Right to Know: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment, David M. O'Brien acknowledged in 1980 that five Supreme Court Justices, a plurality, had approved a limited but constitutionally enforceable right to know.(117)

In a speech to the Second Annual FoI Conference at the University of Missouri in 1959, entitled “Harold L. Cross: Arch Foe of Secrecy,” James Pope paid tribute to the man who coined and popularized the “right to know” phrase and for whom the annual lectures on FoI would be named:

I believe, as I have told you here at Missouri before, the fight for free information is a key conflict of this century; and in this fight, I can tell you, Harold Cross was the source not only of legal guidance but of much of the fire and stamina on our side, and the dignity.(118)

And as his wife Elaine said of Cross: “He was intense about everything he did. He gave everything he could for the principles he stood for.”(119)

And the principle Cross stood for -- the public’s right to know -- fueled similar stamina and fire in FoI pioneers who worked to enact access laws in every state. The
principle of openness in government came to be so widely accepted by 1980 that an article entitled "'Sunshine' -- The Dubious New God" referred to "the almost religious sanctity of 'openness' in the political climate" which has elevated the principle to "the status of a 'new religion'."(120) Indeed, there was a sense of moral fervor in the FoI movement. And rightly so, for as legal scholar Richard Wasserstram argues to have a right "is, in short, to have a very strong moral or legal claim upon it. It is the strongest kind of claim that there is."(121) A right, in his view, is "an entitlement, a powerful moral commodity, possessed by all equally."(122)

So there was a kind of moral fervor which drove Cross and others who labored year after year to get access laws enacted. Those who shared that moral fervor and continued the FoI fight to keep the doors of government open have viewed access to government not as a privilege granted at the discretion of public officials but as an entitlement. While the principle of a free flow of information worldwide has not been fully realized, and may never be, FoI pioneers blazed a path through hitherto unknown terrain in this country, identified secrecy problems and laid a firm foundation in law to facilitate the right to know principle.
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Pioneers in the State Freedom of Information Movement

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"Censorship liberally administered": Press, U.S. Military Relations in the Spanish-American War

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Abstract
This study is a reappraisal of press censorship during the Spanish-American War. It examines government documents, newspapers, and accounts from correspondents and censors to answer two research questions: How did the censorship system operate? How did the press respond to it? The study concludes that leaks, quarrels among military leaders, and appeals by the press to policy-makers restrained attempts at censorship. For its part, the press incorporated successes in defeating censors or opposing them into the "New Journalism" framework. Explanations also are offered for why assumptions incorporated in earlier studies of censorship in the Spanish-American War should be re-examined.
Media historians remember the Spanish-American War of 1898 as a high-water mark for press sensationalism against which all other journalistic floods are measured. William Randolph Hearst's *Journal* and Joseph Pulitzer's *World* often are cited as indulging in the worst excesses to boost circulation.¹ Scholars frequently revisit the debate over whether these publishers' brand of journalism helped create the war,² but other equally important questions merit continuing examination. Historians still differ in their assessment of how military censorship affected Hearst's and Pulitzer's activism-oriented "New Journalism." Proponents of the "Golden Age" of war correspondents argue that the press generally had the upper hand in struggles with military censors between 1865 and 1914. Effective censorship systems developed slowly in this period, they claim, because nineteenth-century military leaders underestimated the power of the popular press to mobilize public opinion and to influence civilian policy-makers.³ As late as 1995, West Point students still were taught that this miscalculation permitted an unrestrained "yellow press" to add to the costs of the Spanish-American War and to delay its outcome.⁴ Others argue that while Hearst, Pulitzer, and their imitators irresponsibly reported troop and ship movements, U.S. military censorship was effective when need required.⁵

These conflicting viewpoints can be traced to several causes. How the U.S. military attempted to restrain the press differed by place and time during the war. The results varied, making scholarly generalizations risky. Major General William R. Shafter, who commanded the American army that
invaded Cuba and who dealt with the bulk of correspondents, relied upon a system of rules and reprimands to enforce censorship. His success, however, was mixed, and his relations with the press were poor. Commodore George Dewey, on the other hand, enjoyed a virtual honeymoon with the handful of correspondents and artists who covered naval operations in the Far East earlier in the war. Dewey had few rules, appealed to the correspondents’ patriotism, helpfully corrected their copy, and had no sure method of enforcing censorship on correspondents, who filed stories from telegraph stations controlled by neutral countries. In return, the correspondents willingly suppressed some unflattering details about the Battle of Manila Bay.

Scholars also approach studies of the Spanish-American War with assumptions that nineteenth-century censors likely would not share. For the censors, active suppression of the press was a lower priority than manipulating diplomatic and commercial messages originating in other countries. They also worked with a narrow, official definition of military secrets that required protecting information about harbor defenses and fortifications. Only at the conclusion of the war was this definition expanded to mean “censorship liberally administered” to suppress messages and press dispatches “obviously detrimental to the United States”.

This study attempts to avoid these pitfalls by re-examining the press control system in place only for the period of official U.S. military censorship, which began on April 25, 1898, and ended 110 days later. I consult a variety of primary sources to answer two research questions: How did the censorship system work? How did the press react? I argue that intervention by policymakers, leaks from government offices, and jurisdictional disputes among officials restrained censors when they infrequently dealt with the press. For
their part, correspondents and publishers incorporated attempts at censorship into stories that fit within the "New Journalism" framework.

Method

I reviewed issues of the New York Journal & Advertiser and the New York World published between May 6, 1898, and July 3, 1898, and a collection of officials papers, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition. I searched the newspaper editions for examples of stories and editorials in which correspondents and editorialists addressed military censorship, but I did not attempt a formal content analysis. For the collection of official documents, I counted, read, and categorized all telegrams, cables, letters, and memoranda for the dates April 15, 1898, to September 1, 1898, that dealt with communication and censorship. Where possible, I also consulted first-person accounts by censors and correspondents.

The two-month period represented by the newspaper editions spans most of the "shooting" war between Spain and the United States in the Philippines and Cuba, but not in Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rican campaign took place in the latter part of July and was covered sparsely by the press. Davis estimated that not more than eighteen correspondents reported from Puerto Rico while more than 100 covered the Cuban campaign. He blamed sickness among the press corps, which was subject to the same quarantine measures in Cuba as the military, for the difference. The official papers, compiled by the Adjutant General's Office, begins with documents issued ten days before official censorship began and ends about two weeks after the system was abandoned.
How Censorship Worked

The structure of censorship in the Spanish-American War roughly paralleled the system used in the Civil War. Press dispatches had to successfully negotiate two gates. Military commanders in the field constituted the first gate. They could limit access to nearby telegraph lines, revoke credentials, and imprison correspondents who did not follow whatever censorship rules were in place. The final gatekeeper, operating at a central location, decided what dispatches could be forwarded for publication. Publishers and correspondents informally could appeal censorship decisions to civilian policy-makers.

During the Civil War, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton managed the final gate from a “telegraph room” adjacent to his Washington, D.C., office. Stanton also was notorious for rejecting appeals from the press. For the duration of the Spanish-American War, the Army’s chief signal officer, General A. W. Greely, served as the central gatekeeper. He delegated actual censorship duties to a civilian deputy, Grant Squires, who controlled traffic on seven cable and telegraph systems connecting New York City with other points in the United States and in the Caribbean. The press usually appealed censorship decisions to the secretaries of War and of the Navy.

Although these censorship systems were similar in structure, they were marked by technological differences. A Civil War correspondent could communicate most rapidly by telegraph with his home office; Spanish-American War correspondents had other options including the telephone and commercial submarine cable that connected many points in the Western Hemisphere with Europe. Military authorities elected to cut cable lines directly connecting Cuba and other Spanish possessions in the Caribbean to foreign countries. Consequently, all diplomatic, military, commercial, and...
press dispatches moved along a more limited network connecting
Washington, D.C., and New York with Key West, Tampa, and eventually the
Army's headquarters in Cuba. Squires managed military or civilian censors
at all these locations except Washington, D.C.

On paper, this system appeared capable of censoring the press, but its
design and the military politics of the time produced several unintended
results. Some were fortuitous for the press; others favored the censors. First,
the communication system was speedy, but the volume of traffic,
particularly press dispatches, overwhelmed it even with 24-hour a day
operation. Squires, for instance, estimated that correspondents filed between
10,000 and 15,000 words after each skirmish on land or sea. This total is
nearly double the word count for an 1895 newspaper's front page and nearly
quadruple the equivalent for the front page of a modern daily. To handle
this deluge, military commanders sometimes limited correspondents to 100
words per dispatch or pre-empted them from using the telegraph and cable
lines. For his part, Squires instituted a priority system that moved press
dispatches after messages from government departments. These steps
generated a series of delays for correspondents that some scholars have
interpreted as deliberate suppression of specific stories. Secondly, the
absence of a censor in Washington, D.C., made it possible for reporters to
obtain stories from both political and military leaks and to transmit them by
telegraph to points other than New York City. The third unintended result
has to be understood in the context of nineteenth-century military history.
The Spanish-American War predates the Root reforms that instituted a firm
chain of command within the U.S. military. This lack of control in 1898
invited quarrels among many senior officers, who began their service during
the Civil War and saw the conflict with Spain as a last opportunity for
promotion. When it was to their advantage, these officers sidestepped Greely to release information to the press or quarreled with him about his policies. Civilian policy-makers mediated these disagreements and heard appeals from powerful publishers like Hearst and Pulitzer.

**Newspaper Content**

The *Journal* and *World* responded to censorship not as a barrier, but as an opportunity to elaborate the "New Journalism" formula. Correspondents who encountered censors incorporated those events into stories. Editorialists also used censorship as an opportunity to address the flawed character or efforts of military and public officials and of their competitors.

**The formula.** Correspondents incorporated tales of overcoming censorship or of accurately speeding important war news to policy-makers more quickly than the military into "stunt" stories. "Stunt" reporting was one of the six components of the "New Journalism" that Pulitzer used in the 1880s to revitalize the *World.* Hearst copied this approach at the *Journal.* According to Kroeger, "stunt" stories combined "the exploitation of crime, scandal or shocking circumstances with the spirit of a crusade, delivered into words by a clever and talented writer who donned a disguise to get the story." The point was to promote the newspaper and to increase circulation. In the case of the Spanish-American War, correspondents cared less about thumbing their noses at censors than portraying themselves as heroes who contributed as much to victory as any soldier.

Popular stunts included delivering important war news by telegram to prominent people, who then provided testimonials about the newspaper's coverage. For instance, when E. W. Harden cabled his account of Dewey's Manila Bay victory to the *World* at 4:22 a.m. on May 7, 1898, the editors
telegraphed a copy to the admiral's son, who lived in New York City. The telegram was delivered at 5 a.m.; World reporters interviewed the younger Dewey later the same day.

The World also later printed the commodore's reaction to the Harden account. Dewey validated the story's accuracy while implying censorship normally would have made it impossible:

... I congratulate the World on the excellence of its report. It was a graphic description, better, perhaps than could have been written by one on board any of the fighting ships. I congratulate the World on its enterprise in getting the first story as cabled by Mr. Harden before even my official reports reached Washington. I am still wondering how it got through, as I was under the impression I had control of the wires.26

The Journal earned a similar testimonial from President William McKinley for its speedy coverage. In a June 3, 1898, front page story, McKinley thanked the editors for a private cable the night before that included details about a naval engagement. An editorial in the same edition noted that only the uncommon daring of a Journal press boat crew made it possible to provide readers with the account read by McKinley. Meanwhile, the Journal noted, "The struggles of some of our beaten contemporaries to publish something like news were pitiable to see."27

The ultimate stunt, of course, involved correspondents who performed some act of valor involving personal risk or injury. The Journal's James Creelman, for instance, was wounded while participating in an infantry charge, a fact dutifully chronicled on his newspaper's Fourth of July front page. Another Journal correspondent, Edward Marshall, received similar treatment from the World after a bullet pierced his spine. The World, which
did not identify Marshall as a Journal reporter, praised his heroism: "That he was in the first rank with the Rough Riders at this daring charge proves Marshall's pluck. . . . he showed remarkable coolness in the action and great composure under the frightful strain of his wound." Both men survived.

Hearst found other methods of exploiting correspondents who participated in battles but came away unscathed. Journal illustrator G. A. Coffin, who accompanied a landing by Marines, received page one attention for discovering abandoned Spanish military cablegrams. A colleague, Honore Laine, received similar attention for picking through the battlefield at El Caney, locating the body of a Spanish general, and recovering other documents.

**Editorialists and censors.** Editorialists courted and scolded censors, whom they found to be powerful, inequitable, and not as competent as correspondents. World editorialists, who blamed McKinley for the "stray and straggle" tempo of the war and who often expressed a preference for a naval solution to the conflict, courted censors in a June 14, 1898, editorial:

Some of the censors of this newspaper, friendly and otherwise, seem to believe that our criticism of the Administration's method of carrying on the war is a criticism of the military and naval leaders who are entrusted with the command of operations. This is a mistake. There is not the slightest evidence that the military and naval commanders approve of the policy of kind-hearted war which they are compelled to follow.29

The Journal was less forgiving of Greely's attempt to censor news about the departure from Tampa of the Cuban invasion fleet. Greely embargoed publication of domestic stories, but the same prohibition did not apply to correspondents from foreign newspapers. The London Chronicle
received the story from one of its stringers and cabled it to U.S. newspapers participating in the Chronicle's news service. Greely tried to conceal his mistake by issuing a retroactive order covering foreign publications. The Journal lashed him: "...we believe the censor should bring intelligence and good faith to his work. General Greely has shown himself destitute of both and should be relieved of a post for which he is unfit." The World likewise criticized an Army censor in Cuba for authoring a needlessly "lurid" dispatch about an incident in which one soldier was killed and seventeen others wounded.

The "leaks". The World and Journal included officials' complaints about censorship violations in their news columns, but some of the same sources talked freely about sensitive issues. For instance, in the May 15, 1898, World, Nelson A. Miles, commanding general of the Army, told reporters who sought an interview he preferred not to talk too much for fear of alerting the enemy to future plans. In a later story, however, Miles candidly discussed the Army's logistics and mobilization problems. Greely also talked freely about Navy reconnaissance balloons, which were supposed to be a secret, during a World interview.

While military authorities might disagree about the necessity of keeping some of these stories secret, they agreed about others. They were anxious to prevent the press from using stories about War and Navy department missions to supply rebels in Cuba or the planned invasion. Preparations for the invasion could not be hidden. Troops, supplies, and a fleet of transports had streamed into Port Tampa in Florida for weeks, and a commander, Shafter, had been appointed. His destination, however, was a secret. Sources underscored this point for correspondents. For instance, the World's William Shaw Bowen reported on June 8, 1898, that "Intense
mystery overhung the War Department to-day. Secretary [R. A.] Alger
thought too much was printed this morning about the status of the
expedition." Nevertheless, Bowen reported the details in the same story:
"Doubts have been raised as to whether Gen. Shafter would not proceed to
Porto Rico [sic] and pass by Santiago. I have obtained from the best sources
in the War Department that the expedition goes to Santiago." In the
Sunday, June 8, 1898, World, Louis Seibold described embarkation activities,
which took the better part of a week, at Port Tampa, and a Monday, June 13,
1898, page one story reported the size of the resulting convoy and the number
and types of troops aboard.

The Censors' Response.

The most determined censors were commanders, like Shafter, who
were responsible for the success of specific military operations against the
Spanish. When they tried to punish correspondents for censorship violations,
either by banning them from using telegraph connections or revoking their
credentials, higher civilian authorities intervened. McKinley and Alger, who
routed their messages through Adjutant General H. C. Corbin and Greely,
appeared particularly willing to trade effective censorship for favorable
reporting of the war. As a result, commanders succeeded only in punishing
 correspondents for matters other than censorship violations.

Documents in Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain
illustrate this point. For the Cuban campaign, the archive includes 1,162
telegrams, letters, and memoranda for the dates April 15, 1898, to September
1, 1898. Of the total, 102 concern communication and censorship. Most
involve routine matters such as reports on how well telegraph and cable
systems were operating or who should be acting as censors. Of the
remainder, seventeen include inquiries and answers about the accuracy and
possible impact on public opinion of press reports; six explain punitive 
measures taken against correspondents. Three involve possibly useful 
intelligence gathered from the press, and only three include specific 
instructions for censoring stories.

**Censorship, punitive measures.** Leaders in Washington, D.C., 
instructed the military to deny the press access to only two stories. On June 
3, 1898, the secretaries of War and Navy authorized Shafter and Admiral 
William T. Sampson, his naval counterpart for the Caribbean Sea, to detain 
dispatch boats to prevent them from following the invasion fleet and 
reporting its activities. Press boats and correspondents, however, roamed at 
will after the Army disembarked in Cuba on June 22, 1898. On August 4, 
1898, well after the fighting ended in Cuba, Alger also directed Shafter not to 
release any official report on the campaign to the press. By then, Shafter had 
resolved his censorship problems by allowing the press corps to board troop 
ships headed for a quarantine camp in New York. Judging from other 
telegrams issued from Washington, D.C., that complained of civilians taking 
up space on northbound troop ships, the press essentially completed its 
exodus from Cuba in early August. In an August 6, 1898, reply to Alger’s 
cable, Shafter noted: “There are none [correspondents] now to be in the 
way.” Many likely were eager to go — the shooting was over and the army 
of occupation was riddled with cases of yellow and typhoid fever, malaria, 
dysentery, and other diseases.

Shafter expelled five correspondents from Cuba, most after the fighting 
ended and none, at least directly, for violating censorship rules. On July 1, 
1898, he arrested a one-armed correspondent he variously identified as Rains 
or Wirt. The charge was bad conduct and “exciting discontent among the 
troops. He was sent at the first opportunity to the United States.” World
Censorship liberally administered" correspondent Sylvester Scovel also was ejected. Scovel, who had found a good vantage point to view the surrender ceremonies in Santiago on July 17, 1898, argued with officers who told him to move. Shafter joined in, and Scovel tried to strike the general. Shafter cabled Alger that "I could have tried him and probably had him shot, if I desired, but I preferred to fire him from the island. A trial would only have given him the notoriety he seeks." Three Journal correspondents also were ejected. Shafter expelled them for "attempting to create disorder in the city by circulating and posting large pictorial posters headed 'Remember the Maine.'" Shafter explained that Santiago was crowded with prisoners of war at the time as well as Cuban revolutionaries. The correspondents' actions, he explained, were outrageous under those circumstances. In cables on July 23 and 24, 1898, Alger intervened on the Journal's behalf, but Shafter insisted that his decision not be revoked. He noted that "whenever the Journal sends respectable men here, they will be received and treated as all other correspondents." Alger, who was aware of the World's pro-Navy editorial stand and the keen competition between Hearst and Pulitzer, did not intervene on Scovel's behalf.

Policy-makers and the press. McKinley and Alger asked Shafter to rebut unfavorable press accounts about Cuban rebels killing Spanish prisoners, about shortages of food, tobacco, and clothing for the troops; about irregularities in the collection of customs from ships, about a breach in protocol between himself and a rebel general, about bandits roaming the newly liberated countryside, and the lack of water and proper medical attention on hospital ships returning wounded and sick soldiers to the United States. These stories appeared in several New York newspapers including the Sun, but Herald stories by Richard Harding Davis drew the most
attention, particularly his stories about shortages experienced by troops. Cables exchanged about these accounts typify the others. For instance, in a July 7, 1898, message to Shafter, Corbin noted:

Richard Harding Davis cables to New York Herald very severe criticisms of operations and exposure of men. He says that some of the men in the trenches have been without food for forty-eight hours and without tobacco. While the President believes it unjust, yet the country will of course be distressed by account he gives.40

Shafter rebutted the stories in two separate cables, one to Corbin and the other to Alger. In the last on July 23, 1898, he said that the Davis accounts were unjust, false, and illustrated the "folly" of the writer.41 Alger responded that Shafter's explanations "would do a great deal of good here."42

Discussion and Conclusion

In the evolution of the relationship between the press and the U.S. military, the Spanish-American War marks an important point on the learning curves of both institutions. The military produced a censorship system that articulated with the communication technology of the time, but not the politics. Leaks, quarrels, and appeals undermined its practical application. The Root reforms would plug many of the leaks and stop many of the quarrels. The generals and admirals also learned that their political masters favored good press relations over complete military secrecy. They may have disliked that lesson, but McKinley and his cabinet understood the implications of the World's and Journal's circulation numbers. Before the war ended, both newspapers would claim 1,250,000 daily readers for their various New York City editions.43 Hearst and Pulitzer clearly controlled access to a huge chunk of public opinion. Antagonizing them with strict censorship would invite more, not less criticism of government policy.
Greely's and Squires' World War I successors incorporated that lesson in their dealings with correspondents. They understudied France's integrated press management bureaucracy and combined it with Dewey-like appeals to patriotism and to self-censorship. The modern propaganda machine that resulted co-opted the war correspondent.

For the 1898 correspondents, censorship principally was a nuisance that provided them with more story material, not a serious threat that should be prepared for in the future. They were crusaders who embraced the "New Journalism" philosophy expressed in James Creelman's autobiography, On the Great Highway. This press philosophy emphasized participating in events, "sometimes as decisive agents when the progress of mankind is at stake," not informing public opinion and debate. Spain's occupation of Cuba, which represented "the incarnation of the surviving spirit of medieval Europe, desperately struggling to retain a foothold in the western World," qualified as such a threat. Sensationalism and occasional inaccuracies, Creelman argued, were a small and acceptable price to pay to preserve that progress.

Within this context, the press learned less from the events of 1898 about dealing effectively with military censorship than the military learned about controlling the press.
NOTES


13. I read 59 issues of the *Journal*’s Greater New York & New Jersey City edition and 59 issues of the *World*’s Late City Edition. This does not represent all the available items or necessarily the same items consulted by other researchers. Both newspapers published multiple extras during this period, and the press technology and typography used to produce these extras represent a formidable challenge to quantitative content analysis. For a keener appreciation of the hurdles, see Milton, *The Yellow Kids*, 294.

14. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain* includes two volumes originally compiled in 1902 from the files of Adjutant General H. C. Corbin, who functioned much as the present day Army chief of staff. Only the portion of Volume 1 between pages 5 and 258 is analyzed here. This section includes messages exchanged by military and policy leaders in Washington, D.C., and Army and Navy commanders performing assignments in the Caribbean and Philippines.


17. Adjutant General’s Office, *Correspondence Relating to the War*, 116. When things worked properly, messages routinely could be exchanged
between Washington, D.C., and Cuba within 20 minutes. This number, however, does not represent the true capability of the communication system. During the war, ships in Santiago harbor reset their chronometers to a single click transmitted three seconds earlier from the Naval Observatory in Washington, D.C. This signal traveled through 2,500 miles of telegraph and cable line. See Squires, “Experiences of a War Censor,” 432.

28. "New York Newspaper Correspondent Mortally Wounded at
"Censorship liberally administered"


32. Understanding the significance of pre-twentieth century military titles is sometimes difficult. The commanding general, who worked out strategic aims and policies with the Secretary of War, also might elect to take field command as Miles did in Puerto Rico. His attempts to do the same in Cuba were rebuffed by Shafter. Wooster's previously cited volume provides a good analysis of these practices and of how the personalities involved in the Spanish-American War interpreted them.


35. Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War, 207.

36. Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War, 147.

37. Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War, 176.

38. Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War, 174.

39. Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War, 174.

40. Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War, 106.
41. Adjutant General's Office, *Correspondence Relating to the War*, 172.

42. Adjutant General's Office, *Correspondence Relating to the War*, 114.


Two Tales of One City: How Cultural Perspective Influenced the Reporting of a Pre-Civil Rights Story in Dallas

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Throughout this decade, multiculturalists have been quite vocal in their criticism of the establishment press for what they perceive as its insensitivity to minority groups. They have condemned the mainstream media both for their failure to tell minority stories and for the way minority stories are told. Historically, ethnic minorities have not been “gatekeepers,” the media decision-makers who determine what information becomes “news,” in America’s newsrooms. Although minorities today comprise more than a quarter of the nation’s population, they represent only about 19 percent of broadcast newsroom employees and only 11 percent of the newsroom staff at the nation’s newspapers. Critics argue that this contributes to a distorted view of minorities and their concerns. As David Shaw reported in his Pulitzer Prize-winning series that appeared in the Los Angeles Times in the early 1990s:

If all one knew about real-life blacks and Latinos in particular was what one read in the newspaper or saw on television news -- one would scarcely be aware that there is a large and growing middle class in both cultures going to work, getting married, having children, paying taxes, going on vacation and buying books and VCRs and microwave ovens.

Only 15 percent of the poor people in the U.S. are black, but one would not know that from most press coverage. Nor would one know that most violent criminals, drug-users, prostitutes, drunks, illiterates, high school dropouts, juvenile delinquents, jobless and poor people in this country are neither black nor Latino but white. Or that the vast majority of blacks and Latinos are none of the above.

Marilyn Gist of the University of Washington offers one of the harshest critiques. She has suggested that negative media portrayals have an effect on the way individuals and institutions treat minorities: “To what extent do biased journalistic practices contribute to police practices in the war on drugs or crime? To what extent are the higher rates of....

Two Tales of One City

incarceration among African-Americans a function of subtle racism among judges and juries -- racism perpetuated by media bias?"4

Critics of minority coverage may have intensified their attacks in recent years. But the issue has been on the table for much longer. Nearly 30 years ago, the Kerner Commission blasted news organizations for contributing to the racial unrest of the 1960s.5 Specifically, the commission reported that although the press had covered incidents of unrest, these accounts failed to explain the underlying causes of the conflict.

Newspaper coverage of a series of racially motivated bombings that took place in Dallas, Texas, in 1950, just as the Civil Rights movement was taking its first tentative steps, offers some insight into these charges. African-American news photographer R.C. Hickman covered the city's black community for the *Dallas Express*, a weekly black newspaper, during the '50s. According to Hickman, the stories of black people at that time were not reported by the city's two metropolitan dailies:

They didn't want the history of integration recorded. The *Dallas Morning News* wouldn't carry a picture of us unless a black man raped a white woman or maybe if a preacher got run over. We did everything the white folks did. We died, got born, we got married. We went to school and got degrees, but no one was recording it.6

The bombings were an exception. No right-minded journalist could ignore an explosion, especially one loud enough to be heard for miles. Thus, both the *Dallas Morning News* and the *Dallas Express* covered the events, but each told a different story. The *Express* perceived the fight to end the bombings as a battle over civil rights. The *Morning News*, on the other hand, wanted the bombings stopped, but could not conceive of a solution outside of the segregationist status quo.

4Ibid., p. 59.
The First Bomb Attack

In the post-war years of the 1940s, Dallas began to experience growing pains as both black and white Texans, hungry for jobs, flocked to the cities. The result was a housing shortage and by 1950, most of the city's families lived in crowded West Dallas slums. Anxious to escape these conditions, blacks who could afford it started buying homes in working-class white neighborhoods. Many settled in the Exline Park area of South Dallas. And on Feb. 8, 1950, this is where the bombings began.

Horace Bonner and his wife had gone to bed that evening when a dynamite explosive tossed from a car landed beside their home at 2515 Southland. No one was injured, but the blast shook the house, shattering windows and ripping off strips of siding. Bonner, 57, who worked for a printing firm, told police that he had bought the house through a real estate agent in January for $6,000. The Bonner family, which included Mrs. Bonner's mother, Mrs. Ella Mays, was the third black family to move into the neighborhood. The Bonners' neighbor on the west side, a white man named J.E. Dugan, told police that another neighborhood resident had approached him a few days before the attack and suggested that the black families be run out of the area -- with bombs, if necessary. "I told him that wasn't the right thing to do," Dugan said. "I told him we should get out ourselves."8

Both papers reported Dugan's remarks. But the Dallas Express also placed the bombing within the context of the critical shortage of housing for black Dallasites. For instance, the Express' Feb. 18 story reporting the bombing noted that the explosion occurred in "an area where a large block of homes formerly occupied by whites before being sold to Negroes and others are up for sale." The story also suggested that this was not the first unneighborly display by the area's white residents: "This bombing followed a

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short while after molesting and threatening by white men of some white women salesmen who were showing the home to Negroes for purchase."9

The day after the bombing, Mayor Wallace Savage told the Morning News that police would make every effort "to find and punish the perpetrator." But Savage's explanation of the causes of the violence suggest he did not completely sympathize with the victims: "Actually neither the man who threw the bomb nor the Negro who moved into a white neighborhood is primarily responsible," Savage said. "The incident was a symptom of a serious condition in Dallas that must be remedied."10

Savage's conception of a "remedy" apparently did not include allowing blacks like the Bonners to buy the homes that represented their ticket out of the ghetto. The color bar still stood between these families and the post-war American dream -- a dream realized by many white middle-class families. Instead, Savage proposed asking the Dallas Housing Authority to build additional public housing to relieve the shortage.

In his book The Accommodation, Dallas author Jim Schutze writes about the history of race relations in the city during the 1950s and '60s. According to Schutze:

Mayor Wallace Savage, a liberal for the period, took the serious political risk of insisting the housing needs of the poorest of the city's poor black people be met with public funds. But the bombing of the Bonner family posed a different dilemma -- the issue not of poor blacks, who could be concentrated into small areas, but of black people who had as much money as white people, who could afford to buy and own homes. At the bottom of the bombings, Savage saw not an evil or maliciousness but the predictable consequences of a breakdown in apartheid. What was needed, he said, was more segregated housing for these inconveniently solvent black families.11

At the time, many Dallasites questioned whether public housing was the best answer. Not surprisingly, one such group was the Dallas Home Builders Association. On Feb. 11, H. Leslie Hill, the association's president, told the Morning News that Dallas

builders would be able to end the housing shortage within a year, once the City Council located a building site. He argued that the private sector offered the best hope for ending attacks on black homes in middle-class neighborhoods: “We don’t see the necessity of tying a Negro bombing into the public housing issue. Public housing is not the answer to a bomb being thrown. Any man who buys a $6,000 house is not a candidate for low-rent housing built by the government.”

Building the necessary housing would be the easy part. It was the council’s task, deciding where to build, that represented the political hot potato. As Councilman Jess S. Epps said in blunt Texas fashion: “Everybody wants more Negro housing, but they want it in some other part of town. The problem is to find a place.”

Racial violence did not upset the city’s precarious peace again until early March. On March 4, the Morning News reported that arsonists had set fire to a black-owned home only a few blocks from the Bonner house. According to a neighbor, the new owners had planned to move into the house the following weekend. They would have been the only black family on the street. Luckily, the blaze was caught before it could do much damage. The black owners of a South Dallas theater were not so lucky a few days later when a fire razed the structure, causing $25,000 in damages. Investigators told the Morning News that the origin of the blaze was unknown. But one of the proprietors said he believed “it was definitely set by someone.”

The Dallas Express quickly linked both fires to the bombing and to the city’s housing crisis. “Negro Housing Incites Bombing, Fires, Protest” exclaimed the banner headline across the weekly’s March 11 issue. A story about the house fire, which ran with a photograph of the damaged home, reported: “The menacing of Negro residents

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14Ibid., March 7, 1950, Part 3, p. 3.
Two Tales of One City

who move into areas formerly occupied by whites apparently took a new twist last week."\(^{16}\) While a story about the theater fire did not go so far as to allege arson, it did note that the blaze "followed by just a few days the burning down of a Negro home in South Dallas" and that the theater "had stirred a slight controversy in South Dallas which has been having racial troubles over housing."\(^{17}\)

Community Conflict: White Versus Black

The same issue of the *Express* carried the text of a petition, signed by ministers representing an interdenominational coalition of 162 black churches, protesting against City Council plans for a black "River Bottom City." Located in West Dallas, on the Trinity River flood levee, the site was unacceptable, the petition said. Representatives of the Negro Chamber of Commerce had already rejected it at an open council hearing. The ministers "pleaded" that the council ask the Dallas Housing Authority to proceed with immediate construction on other available land. They closed with an appeal to councilmembers to work with the black community "in the spirit of harmony, patience, democracy and devotion to the fundamentals of real Christian living" to find a solution that would be acceptable to all.\(^{18}\)

But white South Dallas residents were not waiting idly for a council decision. As the *Express* reported:

A group of white residents of South Dallas, aroused by the infiltration of Negro purchasers of homes, began a series of meetings. They were encouraged in these meetings by ten pastors of churches in the neighborhoods who finally staged a meeting attended by nearly 1,000 angry whites. It was the second such meeting in four days.\(^{19}\)

\(^{16}\)Ibid., March 11, 1950, p. 1.
\(^{17}\)Ibid., March 11, 1950, p. 1.
\(^{18}\)Ibid., March 11, 1950, p. 1.
\(^{19}\)Ibid., March 11, 1950, p. 1.
At the meeting, the Rev. John G. Moore, pastor of Colonial Baptist Church, read a list of resolutions forming the South Dallas Co-operative Association, the Express reported. The association "would act as a clearing house for people with property to sell" and "select and use a 'reputable' real estate agency which would refuse to sell such properties to Negroes."

In a final related article in its March 11 issue, the Express' editors added their own 2 cents to the clamor over housing. While firm, their front-page editorial hardly qualified as combative. Like other black leaders, they suggested that the land proposed by the city for black housing units was unfit, except perhaps for a community of waterfowl. It certainly was not fit for human habitation:

Many plots that would be ideal have been protested because whites object to having Negroes close to them. The 3,000-odd acres in the river bottom are protested by Negroes because they are presently death traps in the time of flood. It is difficult to see how the council can guarantee the drainage necessary to warrant the expenditure for homes in this area. To accept it without the knowledge that security will be placed there, through proper drainage, will put the Negro leader in a place to be repudiated by the masses of their people.

The Second Bombing

The second bombing came nearly two months after the first. Garland Mathis had just purchased the home at 2527 Exline, in an all-white neighborhood just a few blocks from the first bomb attack. So the two-story house was empty the evening of April 3, when a dynamite bomb thrown through the window reduced it to rubble. The powerful blast even shattered windows in nearby homes. A foot-long piece of copper wire, which police believed came from the bomb, was found amid the timber. The Dallas Morning News described the scene: "An outside stairway was blown askew and inside floor joists and flooring smashed into kindling by the force of the blast. A small depression was

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blown in the earth under the house. Doors were splintered and all the windows were shattered."\(^{22}\)

The *Morning News* story ran on the front page accompanied by a photo of what was left of the shattered structure. The saga offered elements no editor could resist: violence, destruction, emotion. The *News* found a (reasonably) sympathetic victim in Mathis and printed his response in typical disaster-story fashion. "I made the down payment and signed a mortgage for $5,444 at 7 percent interest," Mathis said. "I intended to move into the house, but I don't know what I'll do now."\(^{23}\)

The next day, the *Morning News* decried the violence in a short editorial titled "Dynamite Law." But the editors only criticized the bombers' means. They sympathized with the culprits' goal of maintaining racial segregation: "Bombing of Negro homes in Dallas is not the way to protect property lines of segregation. Gangster law cannot protect anything that is good and right. It can only make for deep and bitter wrong."\(^{24}\)

*Express* coverage conveyed a sense of crisis as well as growing disillusionment with police progress in the cases: "The bomb throwers, who as usual have not been apprehended, were bent on total destruction of the home."\(^{25}\)

**The Third Bombing**

A month later, on May 8, a dynamite bomb was tossed onto the roof of a house at 2638 Pine St., near the sites of the first two attacks. The explosion lit up the night sky like fireworks, attracting as many as 2,000 spectators, the *Morning News* reported.\(^{26}\) People from as far as five miles away reported hearing the blast. But this time the house was occupied. Robert and Marie Shelton were in bed when the bomb ripped through their


\(^{23}\) Ibid., April 4, 1950, p. 1.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., April 5, 1950, Part 3, p. 2.

\(^{25}\) *Dallas Express*, April 8, 1950, p. 1.

\(^{26}\) *Dallas Morning News*, May 9, 1950, p. 1.
ceiling, tearing the newspaper Robert Shelton was reading into pieces. Marie Shelton was
unhurt, but flying debris cut her husband’s face, shoulder and legs.

Both newspapers told the sensational story. Only the Express, however, addressed
the issue of most concern to Dallas blacks -- the failure of police to protect their lives and
property: “Police have declined to give what has been termed adequate protection for the
area -- as has been stated, this might encourage Negroes to move in this section, and also
encourage some whites to sell who otherwise would not.”

A few days later, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
presented a petition calling upon city officials to put an end to the bombings to Dallas City
Manager Charles C. Ford. Although similar petitions had been circulating in the
African-American community for months, they had generally escaped the notice of the
Dallas Morning News. This time the paper’s editors paid attention. According to a story
in the Morning News’ Metropolitan section on May 11, the petition “charged officials with
apathetic unwillingness to do anything about the bombings.” The story, which ran under
the headline “NAACP Demands City Stop Home Bombings,” quoted at length from the
petition:

It has been publicly attributed to the Mayor and city officials that they are
afraid to give protection to Negro residents of South Dallas lest the very act of
protecting them be understood as encouragement to them to purchase homes in
the area. If this be true, and it has not been denied or reputed, it is indicative of an
attitude which the petitioners believe to be wholly unworthy of men in public
office.

The News dutifully carried City Manager Ford’s response to the charges. He said
that “there had been no lack of interest in the bombings, and no lack of effort to find the
perpetrators.” Another section of the petition published in the story said that when
Mayor Savage had been questioned about the city’s response to the bombings once

Two Tales of One City

before, he had "casually observed that the bombing of homes of Negroes was but an incident (pointing) to the prevailing housing shortage for Negroes in the community, and hence a part of the prevailing crime wave that has come upon our city." Finally, the News wrote, "the petition said that its sponsors want to believe 'that the plight of Negro home owners in South Dallas is not a hopeless one. But we submit that vague and evasive promises will not be sufficient to reassure an abused public.'" \(^{29}\)

On May 12, the News reported that the NAACP had offered a $500 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the bombers.\(^{30}\) No similar offers of cash rewards from Dallas' white church or civic groups were reported. But the Morning News' Lynn Landrum offered an analysis of how best to approach the problem in his popular column "Thinking Out Loud." To start with, the bombers should target the people who were most responsible for the misdeeds: "Let's bomb the appropriate victim. Let's bomb the seller of white property rather than the Negro buyer who is seeking a roof for his wife and babies. Let's bomb the real estate man to blame for it. If there is to be terror and intimidation, let the vendor beware."\(^{31}\)

Of course, Landrum did not seriously believe that anyone should be attacked, he told his readers. The bombings were "utterly stupid" because endangering sleeping families and destroying their homes would not "vindicate anything." "It does not win sympathy or moral support for anything. Instead of making segregation more secure, it only endangers it more." The police were not entirely to blame for failing to stop the attacks. Nor was the sheriff or the Texas Rangers, or any other law enforcement agency that had been called in on the case: "Quite probably the trouble about law enforcement in such a case is that responsibility is divided. With many agencies charged with the duty to

\(^{29}\)Ibid., May 11, Part 3, p. 1.
\(^{30}\)Ibid., May 12, 1950, p. 2.
\(^{31}\)Ibid., May 12, 1950, p. 2.
Two Tales of One City

stop potential murder, there is hemming and hawing about who shall take the burden of the job."32

The Black Response

The nocturnal bombings had by now become a rallying point for the black community. Fearful and disillusioned, black homeowners were rapidly losing faith in the ability of police and city officials to protect them. Black citizens were instead taking steps to protect themselves. On May 27, the Dallas Express reported that the reward offered by the NAACP leadership for information leading to the bombers had been increased to $1,000. In addition, the Dallas NAACP leadership, together with community ministers, was considering “further steps to take.” Dallas’ normally conservative black clergy were “firmly in support of the militant position the NAACP has taken in the matter,” a Baptist church leader told the Express.33

The Express devoted the lead story in its May 20 issue to the NAACP petition. A banner headline read “NAACP Spearheads Move To Stop Bombings.” The story ran under the headline “NAACP Wants Equal Protection for Negroes.”34 Thus, while the Morning News emphasized black citizens’ demands in its coverage of the NAACP petition, the Express emphasized their rights. The Express printed what appeared to the entire petition. One section went so far as to suggest that some members of the Dallas police force might have been active participants in the bomb attacks.

Bomb Attacks 4 & 5

By late May, race relations in the city were at a boiling point. Events of the first week of June provided further fuel for the fire. Shortly after 9 p.m. on June 2, an

32Ibid., May 12, 1950, p. 2.
explosion literally shook the foundation of a frame home at 2628 Pennsylvania in South Dallas. Police said a tin container of dynamite had been left alongside the house, where it blew a gaping hole in the earth. A black taxi driver named Dennis Hoffman had purchased the home earlier that day but had not yet moved in, so no one was harmed. But one neighbor said the explosion threw him out of bed. Another said his home was rocked by the blast. Hoffman would have been the fifth black to move into the neighborhood. Less than 24 hours later, an empty house at 2515 Marburg was gutted by an explosion. Dynamite piled on the kitchen floor had blown out the kitchen ceiling, ripped away three interior walls and shattered all the windows. Neighbors said a black family had recently purchased the home.

The *Morning News* did not talk to the homeowners for its coverage of the fourth and fifth bombings. In the latter case, the homeowner was not even identified. The *Dallas Express*, on the other hand, identified both men and printed the reaction of one. Johnnie L. Staton, the owner of the Marburg home, was a World War II veteran with a wife and two daughters. He had recently sold his home of four years and planned to move into his new home the following Monday. When asked whether he intended to keep the gutted house, Staton told the *Express*, “I just don’t know what I am going to do now.” The *Express* also printed a reaction from the police: “Police officers said they were pressing investigations of the bombing but have no clues on any of the five bombings that have occurred in Dallas in recent months.”

Both newspapers placed the events in context by relating them back to earlier bombings. Only the *Express*, however, mentioned the housing crisis or NAACP demands for arrests and better police protection in the area.

In the wake of the back-to-back bombings, Dallas officials stepped up attempts at damage control. On June 5, the *Morning News* reported that Dallas police had doubled a bomb patrol of South Dallas and added more investigators “to probe the explosions that

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Two Tales of One City

have damaged five houses in the area.” On June 6, the Greater Dallas Planning Council urged the City Council to appoint a biracial commission “to look into disputes between Negroes and whites and recommend solutions to racial problems,” the News wrote. such a commission “would consider proposals for Negro housing as well as other matters affecting racial problems in Dallas,” a planning council official told the newspaper.

Black & White Media: Reporting Different Realities

The following day, a number of citizens groups appeared before the City Council to demand action to end the bombings and improve the housing situation. Both the Morning News and the Dallas Express covered the meeting. But the two reports could have described different events. The News account, which ran under the headline “Council Moves to Give Negroes Public Housing,” emphasized the council’s decision to ask the Dallas Housing Authority to build 1,000 public housing units for blacks within the next year. The council also “urged private builders to continue their efforts to solve the Negro housing shortage,” the News said. The council’s actions were prompted by demands from leaders “of a dozen groups, both Negro and white,” who appeared at the meeting. The News also carried Mayor Savage’s response to charges that city officials had instructed police to look the other way in the bombings:

That is not true. There is just one instruction that has been given police -- enforce the law. We want you to know there have been no secret instructions. The police are doing what they can.

We think we will find the perpetrators of the bombings, but it may take time. You seem to think that because we haven’t caught them that we are not doing anything. We try to put down robberies, but they haven’t been stopped.

Two Tales of One City

The *Dallas Express'* coverage of the same June 6 City Council meeting ran beneath the headline "Negroes and Whites Parade in Protest." The story's lead emphasized what the black community perceived as the most urgent -- and newsworthy -- issue: the bombings of their homes. Where the *Morning News* had reported that about a dozen local groups had taken part in the protest, the *Express* said that 31 organizations, both black and white, were involved. In addition, while the *News* reporter did not explicitly interject any opinions into his copy, the unsigned *Dallas Express* story sprinkled opinions throughout the description of the day's proceedings. And unlike any of the *News'* coverage, the story referred to a similar string of bombings in Dallas nearly 10 years ago in 1941 that had also gone unsolved:

Again the Mayor attempted to class the wave of bombing violence and destruction with ordinary crimes such as robbery, and burglars are caught, brought to trial and serve...terms but no bombers have [been] caught....

The only Councilman to respond was Mayor Pro Tem G. Stubbs. He said it takes time to catch criminals. But he was asked by a Negro spokesman if he did not think ten years was enough time. Not in ten years has a single bomber been caught and prosecuted. His answer appeared to invalidate his claim and that of the Mayor that these bombings are like burglaries or any other "run-of-the-mill" crime. The Mayor said they deplored these bombings and that they and police were doing the best they could.

**The Sixth Bomb Attack**

For more than a month, no explosions illuminated the dark Dallas nights, with the exception of the city's Independence Day fireworks celebrations. Then at approximately 9:40 p.m. on July 7, a dynamite explosion destroyed an unoccupied five-room frame house at 2410 Marburg in what police called the worst in a series of South Dallas bombings. The explosive, which police said could have been thrown through a window or placed inside, tore apart the east side of the house, caving in the roof and one wall. Investigators

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41Ibid., June 10, 1950, p. 1.
Two Tales of One City

estimated the damages at $3,500 to $4,000 and said the structure had been so weakened that the house could not be rebuilt. Neighbors said a white family had moved out on June 5 and the house was now for sale. Two black families had stopped to look at the home that afternoon.

The issue of whether police were providing sufficient security for the terrorized neighborhoods had by now become politically charged. Thus, the News as well as the Express reported that 12 police officers had been on duty in the neighborhood the night of the bombing. And 30 more officers would be called in to patrol the troubled area on a 24-hour basis. In addition, police had found their first clues in the cases: a burning mop that might have been used to place the dynamite and a set of tire tracks and footprints in the driveway.

The NAACP quickly responded to news of the explosions. On July 9, the Morning News reported that the group had appealed to Texas Gov. Allan Shivers for help. The newspaper reprinted part of the group's telegrammed message. It also carried Police Chief Hansson's response. Hansson told the News that he now had 40 men -- about 10 percent of the entire force -- assigned to the investigation and did not believe any state assistance was needed "at the present time." He admitted, however, that the investigation was moving slowly, but said that lack of cooperation from South Dallas was hampering police progress. According to one detective assigned to the case, "People who have information won't give it to us -- they either don't want to tell us, or they are afraid to."42

On July 10, the Morning News renewed its call for an end to the bombings. The editorial, titled "Halt Bombing Now With Prosecution," suggested that arrests in the cases were overdue. But at the same time, it appeared to downplay the seriousness of the crimes, noting that since they had so far caused "no deaths and little personal injury...credit can be given the perpetrators for a probable wish to intimidate and not kill

Two Tales of One City

or hurt. It is faint praise. For sooner or later the serious injury occurs accidentally if the bombings continue, or the desire to frighten flames into the lust to kill.™

Overall, the editors’ message remained unchanged. The violence must end. But white homeowners should not be expected to welcome blacks, even middle-class blacks, into their neighborhoods. Some other solution must be found.

Dallas is moving slowly, certainly right-heartedly, in the direction of more adequate available Negro housing. One deterrent is the objection of every area to the encroachment of Negro residence housing. This is understandable enough. Most whites prefer to continue segregation. Property values depreciate where two areas conflict and residence desirability decreases. But the expansion is necessary and certain, so much so that we will see it in many sections of Dallas. Our main duty is to stop the bombing outrages cold while we go about settling the larger problem of which these destructive acts are no solution except in the troubled minds of unhappy and misguided people.™

The July 15 issue of the Dallas Express ran with the banner headline “Governor Refuses to Help Stop Bombing of Homes,” a story that never made it into the pages of the Morning News. “Gov. Shivers, in effect, refused this week to help stop the bombing of Negro homes in Dallas,” the Express reported.™ In short, the governor referred the NAACP request for assistance to the State Department of Public Safety. That agency, in turn, followed the “usual course” of leaving the investigation in the hands of city police. Thus, Gov. Shivers had effectively side-stepped the problem, but could not actually be accused of fiddling away in Austin while homes in Dallas burned. This report ran as a “bulletin” above a second story with the headline “25 Homes Bombed in Dallas.” The second story reported that although this was the latest in a string of six bombings in as many months, another 19 had taken place in 1941, bringing the total to 25, none of which had been prosecuted.

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Conclusion

By late summer, the suspicions of many of Dallas’ black leaders had been confirmed. On Aug. 6, the *Morning News* reported that Dallas Police Chief Carl Hansson knew the identities of the bombers.46 But no arrests were made. It was not until 1951, after two more bomb attacks, one of which demolished four empty buildings, that police apprehended two suspects and charged them in connection with one of the home bombings. and in the end, the arrests may have been prompted more by white civic leaders’ concerns about the effects the continuing violence might have on the city’s business climate than by repeated demands for equal protection by the city’s blacks.47

On March 18, 1950, in the midst of the string of bomb attacks, the *Dallas Express* published an editorial with the headline “Why Negroes Risk the Bombing.” In answering the question implied in its head, this article also underscored a basic difference in perception between the city’s blacks and a white community that still clung to segregationist practices:

This, then, is the primary reason why Negroes are willing to risk the bombing of their homes in white neighborhoods: they have a *constitutional right* under decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to live wherever they wish to live and can pay their way, and when the decent housing which they wish is found in a neighborhood where other races happen to live, they are unwilling to forego decent housing even at the risk of bombing.48

Like the *Express*, the *Morning News* coverage reflected perceptions that were commonly held in the community which it served. However, a letter to the editor which appeared in the *News* on April 10, 1950, suggests that at least some whites had begun to question the morality, and enforceability, of racial separation, especially in an overcrowded housing market that left blacks few options:

47 Schutze, op. cit., p. 21.
Two Tales of One City

An editorial in the News expresses concern about “dynamite law,” but even as it deplores the bombing of Negro homes it indicates that something called “property lines of segregation” needs to be “protected,” and uses the words “mounting pressure of Negro population on white housing areas” to describe the apparently lawful acquisition of property by members of a minority group. And while the editorial talks hopefully about establishing a Negro “city within a city,” there is nothing in it to suggest that the Negroes who bought the disputed property had both a legal and moral right to do so and might, if properly encouraged or simply let alone, develop into fairly decent neighbors.49

The Kerner Commission’s charge that the mainstream press failed to adequately cover the social unrest of the 1960s due to cultural blinders certainly seems to hold true in this earlier case. At that moment in history, the majority of white Dallasites, like the majority of white Americans, simply could not conceive of the changes in race relations that the next two decades would bring. The journalists who reported the story of the 1950 bombings for the Morning News brought to the coverage a cultural perspective that limited their vision. As a result, they could not see the story for what it was -- a foreshadowing of the Civil Rights battle that was to come.

At Our House: A Case Study of Grace B. Freeman, Syndicated Columnist, 1954-1964

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At Our House: A Case Study of Grace B. Freeman
Syndicated Columnist 1954-1964

Abstract

The stereotypical woman of the 50s is dull and inconsequential. Some have suggested that the pen and the typewriter became the most powerful means women had to assert their individuality. This paper focuses on how the attitudes and values of the era shaped the writing of Grace B. Freeman, a highly successful southern freelance writer and syndicated columnist. Her column, At Our House, was distributed by King Features Syndicate for 10 years. The humorous column focused on the universalities in family life.

Though based in a small South Carolina town, Freeman also successfully marketed features and articles to newspapers and trade publications throughout the nation. This case study provides insight on the role of the freelancer in the 50s and the relationship the writer had with her editors.
At Our House: A Case Study of Grace B. Freeman, Syndicated Columnist 1954-1964

In the history of the Twentieth Century, the decade between the war-torn 40s and the civil strife and unrest of the 60s seems dull and trivial. The image of American women of the 50s possesses that same lackluster. Like her television counterpart June Cleaver, the 50s woman is pictured as a suburban housewife with a contented husband and a household full of children. A part of the image is accurate. The baby boom of the late 40s and the 50s, the flight to the suburbs, and the great shifts in American population shaped the lives of women.\footnote{The annual birth rates per thousand women, ages 15-44, was 85.9 in 1945 and 122.9 in 1957. See E. West. Growing Up in Twentieth Century America. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. p. 273. By the 1960s, the typical American family would move five times during one generation. West, Ibid., p. 177.} At the same time, politicians, business leaders and educators worried about the effects of the growing number of working mothers on family life.\footnote{See National Manpower Council. Work in the Lives of Married Women. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.}

The need for women to find fulfillment through work emerged as a hotly debated topic. Betty Friedan, an important leader of the feminist movement, blamed mass circulation magazines of the 50s with making educated, suburban women, in particular, into discontented “female monsters” who could only find fulfillment in “sexual passivity, male domination and nurturing maternal love.”\footnote{J. Meyerowitz. “Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946-1958,” Not June Cleaver, Meyerowitz, edit. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993, p. 229.} Later historians suggested that Friedan’s analysis of the fiction of the day was somewhat distorted. In fact, historian Joanne Meyerowitz’s analysis of nonfiction articles found that both domestic life and individual achievement were often highlighted in the same article.\footnote{Ibid., p. 227.} Though American women were outsiders in terms of economic and political power, they made significant contributions to the arts and literature. Paraphrasing the writer Virginia Woolf, the pen and the typewriter became the most powerful means...
women had to assert their individuality and their social imagination during the 50s.\(^5\)

In Rock Hill, South Carolina, Grace Beacham Freeman was using her pen and typewriter to assert her creativity and her talents. By the 50s, Grace B. Freeman was 34-years old, and had already published nine poems in the *Saturday Evening Post*, freelanced for the New Orleans paper, *Times-Picayune*; started a drama school for children, and briefly hosted her own radio shows. Her broad interest in any writing activity which could make money and satisfy her need for expression would be a pattern for the rest of her career.\(^6\)

This is a case study of how the attitudes and values of the 50s shaped Freeman's choice of subjects as a professional writer. As South Carolina's first nationally syndicated columnist, her story is about how one woman coped with literary success and failure while balancing the demands of marriage and family.

**Rhyming: The Beginnings**

A short, bespectacled plain woman, Freeman is described by her friends as full of energy with a radiant smile and lively eyes. Grace flowed with ideas, said a former colleague. “She thought faster than she could talk--and so she often became tied up in her ideas.”\(^7\) She was born Feb. 16, 1916, in Spartanburg, South Carolina, the only child of Grace Bailey and Henry V. Beacham. As a child of the Depression, her father worked at a hardware store and her independent mother opened a rooming house for war brides.\(^8\)

Even as a tiny child, she remembered thinking inrhymes. This ability helped shape her first poetry. Beacham's interest in writing took root while she was enrolled in Spartanburg High School and where she edited her high school literary magazine, *The Scribbler*. In 1933, she entered Converse College, a small, private women's college in Spartanburg. Her literary abilities were not immediately apparent


\(^6\) The material for this paper comes from the Grace Beacham Freeman Collection at the Winthrop University Dacus Library Archives Collection. The Freeman Collection contains 28 boxes of materials and 172 folders covering her career through 1977.

\(^7\) Interview with Dr. Richard Houk, Professor Emeritus of Biology, Winthrop University, March 30, 1998.

to college officials. She did not win a scholarship and her freshman English teacher did not appreciate her creativity. "Always before I made it on originality, but since this particular teacher was interested in technique and outline development, I made the lowest grades ever," she recalled. Beacham was stubborn and not put off by criticism--a talent she carried with her for the rest of her career. Eventually, she became editor of the campus literary magazine. She won four or five literary prizes during her junior and senior years, but never for her poetry.

Her ability to create rhyme led to her first paid writing assignment. Senior students had been assigned to write a four-line verse, so Beacham composed 75 verses in three days, and earned her one cent per verse from each student. During her life, two South Carolina poets--Archibald Rutledge and later James Dickey--influenced her poetry writing. In 1937, Rutledge, the South Carolina Poet Laureate, came to speak at Commerce. Rutledge believed poetry must rhyme. Beacham was terribly excited; here was a man who spoke her language. After his speech, she was first in line to seek his autograph. She later took the autograph home and showed her mother, who knew Rutledge's sister-in-law, and who, in turn, gave copies of Beacham's work to the poet. He was impressed, and a 20-year correspondence was begun.

Upon college graduation, Beacham began teaching English and drama at Boiling Springs High School in Spartanburg County. For the first time, she was living in the country, and learning to listen to its sounds and smell its odors. About a year after she began teaching, she was inspired to write poetry again. Her first poem was influenced by a student's comment that she would like to visit the city for several weeks and see what it was like, then she would return home. Beacham was surprised that the girl just wanted to visit, not to stay, and it became an inspiration for her first published poem in The Saturday Evening Post. on March 30, 1943.

The young poet had been helped by Rutledge, who had written a letter in 1939, to the editor of the Post telling him to watch out for Grace Beacham. From 1939-1943, Beacham sold nine poems to the magazine, three of which were


illustrated by the well-known artist Robert Forrest. When the Post’s literary editor changed, the magazine lost interest in her poetry. While she continued to write, she did not seek out new publications for her work. Later, several of these poems were reprinted in her first book of poetry, Children Are Poetry.\footnote{12 The Freemans paid $100 to Tulane University Press to print 500 copies of the book. It was later reprinted two times. Smith. \textit{Ibid.}}

In 1941, she married John Freeman, a zoologist, and doctoral student at Duke University. The influence of John on her writing and life cannot be underestimated. He strongly encouraged her writing, and was the willing subject of many of her columns and poems. While using both her maiden and married names on her publications, she nevertheless always signed her business correspondence, Mrs. John Freeman, even late into the 70s and long after it became fashionable to do so. Frequently, she would suggest that an article or subject was his idea, not hers. In media interviews, John Freeman is credited with being the inspiration for her work. Her praise of her husband seem almost solicitous to today’s reader but one suspects they were genuine and not spoken out of need to please him or to make him feel important. Though a partner in every sense of the word, Grace Freeman, was not a shy violet, a Southern belle, or a harassed housewife.\footnote{13 For an interesting perspective on how Southern women viewed men in terms of the women’s revolution, see L. M. Reynolds, “The Feminine Mystique...Style,” The Winthrop Alumnae, Fall-Winter 1973, p. 10-11. Grace Freeman was the editor of the publication.}

In one of her first published poems in The Post, “Confession,” she commented on housewifery. “I’m not domestic, dear. There’ll be/Raised eyebrows when the neighbors see/ the dishes stacked like Eiffel towers/While we spend heaven scented hours/ Astride a mountain top or walk/ Down gaily curling roads.”

In 1942, while still working on his degree, John joined the faculty of Wake Forest College and they moved to the Durham-Chapel Hill area. Their first child, John A. Jr., was born in 1943, and their second child, Katharine F. Parker, in 1945. Freeman may have been writing during this period but she did not publish. However her ambition to be known as a writer and poet was reflected in a letter from Louis Graves, the editor of The Chapel Hill Weekly, advising her on how to get invitations to speak to book clubs and other organizations. Graves urged her to put together a scrapbook of her poetry, “an ornamental affair, as impressive as possible,” and to include letters from Rutledge and the editors at the Post.\footnote{14 Letter from Louis Graves to Grace Freeman, June 11, 1947.} Whether she did so is
unclear; however, she was highly successful in receiving media coverage during her career.

Her growing interest in prose was illustrated in a letter from Rutledge to Freeman in 1948. She apparently sent him some poetry and prose pieces. Rutledge told her to “make your poems deeper, closer to the heart.” But he declined to comment on her prose, saying that he did not feel competent and did not have the time. However, his advice did not help the marketability of her poetry. “I decided to move on. I’ve found out that what you’ve done before is something to build on and that writing poetry is good discipline and training.”

She turned her talents to radio, the most popular medium of the day, and developed her own radio show called “Presenting Grace Freeman” for WDNC in Durham. The show, sponsored by a local retail outlet, featured an original script consisting of plays, poetry and sketches of particular interest to women. Her dedication to the job was real. She climbed two flights of steps to record the show until two weeks before the delivery of her son. Radio helped her understand how to write for a time slot, and proved helpful in her later script-writing. The two-day a week show lasted for two years until John Freeman completed his Ph.D. and accepted a job at Tulane University in New Orleans.

Freeman attempted to transfer her radio talents to the New Orleans market. The show, featuring the same format, was picked-up almost immediately by Porters, a local clothing store. A newspaper clipping, probably written from a media release, reported that the show “is unusual for a woman’s show because she (Freeman) gives no recipes, no news about other women--but instead a program of poems and original sketches and pertinent commercials, all built around a certain theme.” Unfortunately, the show lasted only two weeks. Later, Freeman said, “I thought I was good but not good enough for New Orleans.” It seems that during one show she was supposed to give away ties but not enough people called into the show. Her sponsor immediately canceled his support.

By 1948, another son had been born in the family, Henry, to be followed by a

15 S. Smith. Ibid.

16 “Grace Freeman inaugurates new woman’s show of WNOE,” probably in The Times Picayune., late 40s.

fourth child, David, in 1951. After hiring a domestic and renting a studio where she could write and coach drama, she turned her radio talents to script writing for the “Doctor Who Tells,” produced by the Department of Pediatrics at Tulane and aired on WSBM. She also sold 25 feature pieces to *The Times Picayune*’s Sunday rotogravure magazine. In a magazine piece about the writer, Freeman said she found the subjects for her stories in her unusual family and the neighbors around her apartment on the Tulane campus. For instance, John’s penchant for collecting animals and sharing them with the children of the neighborhood was the subject of one magazine piece.18 His odd collection of insects and animals was frequently the subject of her work over the next 15 years. Freeman told the *Times Picayune* reporter, “If I read John a story and he likes it, I know I can sell it every time.”

On a visit to Spartanburg in 1949, the local newspaper ran a story and a picture of the writer and her three children. The story illustrates Meyerowitz’s insight that much of the nonfiction of the day explored both the domestic and working side of women.19 It began with information on Freeman’s latest activity, an effort to teach dramatics to children; explored her charity work with the Junior League; elaborated on her current freelance project in playwriting—she eventually published eight children’s plays in *Child Life Magazine*—and discussed her programs for a church group. It did not mention her freelance writing for the *Times*. However, most of the article was dedicated to a discussion of how she managed to write and take care of her children.

“And how on earth can I do all these things and still have the brass to think I’m not neglecting my children?” she asked. “Well I have full-time help which lets me spend time on these things instead of my pots and pans. Then, too, I arrange my work so that I am with my older children at what I consider the three most important times of the day...The times in between are when I do my writing, my dramatics and my chatting with my husband—all of which are things, which combined with my children, help to give me what I consider a full, happy, completely satisfying life!”20


The Column

In 1952, John Freeman was offered the opportunity to teach in the biology department of Winthrop College, a state-supported women's institution, in Rock Hill, South Carolina. As was the practice in the 50s, when housing was in a shortage, the college rented out apartments and houses. The Freemans wrote to Winthrop asking whether the college had space for their family of six and whether the college rented furniture. A large house on the edge of the campus was eventually found for the family.21 Winthrop faculty were expected to live on campus, if possible. Housing costs often substituted for low salaries, and Winthrop liked to consider its faculty and its female students part of "a family."22 The family lived in University property until 1963 when the campus needed the house for a new building.

The move to Rock Hill marked the beginning of Grace Freeman's most productive period as a freelance writer. The literary market was no longer interested in poetry that rhymed, and she did not return to writing poetry for another 18-years.

Winthrop and Rock Hill provided the material for her writing. Located some 30 miles from Charlotte, North Carolina, Rock Hill was a small textile mill town with a fine women's college of approximately 1,200 students. Winthrop was a conservative institution dedicated to training South Carolina teachers and business women and building the character of its Southern women. It was in many ways an isolated institution, even though the campus attracted national women leaders and performers on a regular basis. The campus did not integrate until the late 60s, nor become coed until the 70s. In this protective environment, faculty and students had a close-working relationship, and the Freemans became active participants in college life.

In fact, her family and her husband's career at Winthrop provided the material for Grace Freeman's most successful freelance writing business, a syndicated column called "At Our House," distributed by the King Features Syndicate. The column grew out of her frustration with her lack of writing income. Freeman had sold some feature stories to The (Columbia) State but was looking for more writing opportunities. She credited John with giving her the idea for the column. She often recalled that John said, "You are always telling funny stories at our house--why don't we hire a full-time maid, and you go to writing."

21 Letter from C. B. Waters, Administrative Director, Winthrop College to John Freeman, April 17, 1952.

22 Interview with R. Houk.
Freeman spent almost six weeks holed up in the Winthrop College library, working at her typewriter on a potential column. What emerged was a short 150-200 word column about a family not unlike her own. The father was a biology teacher at a women's college. The family had three adventuresome children, Buddy, Penny and Skippy—she saved the possibility of adding another child to the family. The family had a houseful of pets including a chicken, a three-foot alligator that lived in the bathtub, and a large turtle that sometimes was found wandering the house. Grace, the Mother and narrator of the column, spent her time commenting on her children, her relationship with her husband, campus life, the neighborhood and church. The fact that she was a writer was understood. The subject of working women was never discussed in the column. With the encouragement of the editor of the Rock Hill Evening Herald, she submitted 52 columns to four syndicates before she approached any syndicates. After four rejections by other companies, she approached King. “John said only the biggest syndicate could afford an unknown,” she recalled. “So I put my pride aside and didn’t slap him for calling me an unknown...nine poems in The Saturday Evening Post—but still an unknown!” she joked.23

In just three weeks, Freeman joined Walter Winchell as one of King Features syndicated columnists. King sent Freeman a year-long contract for three columns a week and a request for 20 more columns immediately. As a female syndicated columnist, she was decidedly in the minority. There were few national women newspaper columnists and certainly no syndicated columnists from South Carolina. Esther Pauline Lederer began writing “Ann Landers” in the mid-1950s. And her sister soon joined the ranks writing a competing advice column under the pen name of Abigail Van Buren. Eleanor Roosevelt regularly commented on the condition of the world and women in “My Day.” However, even her columns ran on the women's pages considered less prestigious than the more prestigious op-ed pages which carried the voice of primarily male columnists. Frank Luther Mott in his history of American journalism, American Journalism (1962) reported that over 500 columns were available from newspaper syndicates—but the number written by women was small. This trend continued until the 60s when women began to enter journalism in more significant numbers.24

23 R. Chepsiuk. Ibid.

columns. Sylvia Porter gave investment advice and Dorothy Thompson, after a brilliant newspaper career, wrote a monthly column for *The Ladies Home Journal*. To be sure, there were serious women columnists writing for the magazine industry including Marya Mannes, who regularly reviewed the media for *The Reporter*; Diana Trilling, who wrote social commentary for the *New Leader*, and Aline Bernstein Saarinen, arts commentator for *The New York Times*, among others.\(^{25}\) Erma Bombeck, whose column subjects most resembled Freeman’s, left the feature staff of *The Dayton Herald* in 1953 to become a homemaker. Her famous column did not go into syndication until 1964.\(^{26}\)

Freeman’s column was edited by Marion Clyde McCarroll, King’s Women’s Editor and syndicated columnist. McCarroll was known professionally as Beatrice Fairfax, the author of a lovelorn column. Each “At Our House” column was illustrated with a thumbnail sketch by King’s New York artist, Jane Niebrugge. Her first contract promised 50 dollars a week for three columns. In the 10 years she wrote the column, her salary never changed. “I was never foolish enough to ask for more money,” she later said.\(^{27}\)

Eventually the column was syndicated to 50 or 60 newspapers throughout the United States and Canada and reportedly appeared in *The Spanish American Courier*, an European newspaper.\(^{28}\) In South Carolina, only the *State* carried the column and then for only three or four years. While Freeman was a frequent contributor to *The Charlotte Observer*, her column never appeared in the newspaper. The paper inquired about using it, but she asked them not to. “Everyone gets *The Charlotte Observer,*” she said. “As much as I enjoyed writing, it was important that my children not feel conspicuous about it.”\(^{29}\)

Her first columns took her hours to write. However, after several years she would sit at the typewriter and let the writing come. She could write the columns in an


\(^{28}\) For a fascinating discussion on how to write columns from a 50s’ perspective, see O. Hinkle & J. Henry. *How to Write Columns.* Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1952

\(^{29}\) Ibid.
hour and a half. From the beginning, Freeman kept track of her column subjects and titles on a manila file folder. Written three months in advance of publication, the titles and dates eventually filled three folders. For instance, a sample of the subjects for two week's of columns included the following titles: August 1: Miss MacDonald in Middle Ages; August 3: John and I bathe Taffy (the dog); August 5: Poor children have fun too; August 8: Went to beach but left stuff at home; August 10: Grandmother doesn't want only son to be a sissy; August 12: Perry picked first because John is the captain.

By 1954, the Freeman household included four children and her 82-year old father, who had moved in with the family after the death of his wife. All were fair game for her columns as were her neighbors and friends. The children in the column never aged; however, her own children were beginning to leave the nest for college. Consequently, Freeman was forced to use the anecdotes of her friends and others to keep her column fresh. She also kept a file of newspaper stories with unusual angles. As she often said, if a story happened to one person, it probably happened to others, and the audience can identify with the situation.

"I am the most popular person with mothers of young children," she told The Spartanburg Journal in 1954. "Since all mothers like to talk about their children and I am a willing listener." While the antics of neighborhood children became the subject of her columns, she did not share the column with her own children because she didn’t want them to "do clever things so I will write about it."

Freeman wrote about subjects whose universality could be appreciated by anyone raising a family in any part of the country--the column could not and did not reflect a southern sensibility. And indeed while the columns reflect a much simpler time--they could be appreciated by today’s audience. For instance, three columns focused on the loss of Buddy’s tooth and another on the fascination of the children with their grandfather’s false teeth. In another set of columns, she recalled the traumas of her next door neighbor who is coping with a 12-year-old daughter who is going to her first dance. The young girl wants to buy a strapless evening gown but her mother refuses her request. The daughter returns from the dance giggling about the three girls who wore strapless gowns and spent the night in the lounge trying to fix their gowns so they would stay up.

Through most of her columns focused on the children in the series, Freeman was never hesitant to make fun of herself. In a particularly charming two-part series, she told the story of her early morning nagging with her husband and how she
decided to remedy it. As John would not be at home at noon so she could offer her apology, she decided to write him a love note. So at noon, she sneaked into the biology building, and stuffed the note into the brown coat hanging on the office door.

She felt so proud of herself—until she got home and hung up her coat. John’s brown suit was hanging in the closet. “Into whose coat pocket had I stuffed my love note?” she asked in the last line of the column.

In the second column, John arrived home and she confessed her deed. John looked puzzled and then began to chuckle and finally to bellow with laughter. Surprised, then peeved by his reaction, she shouted, “Oh, stop it! It’s not so funny.” In the concluding paragraph, John confessed that the note had been placed in Professor Johnson’s coat. “He thought his wife wrote it! She was cross this morning too!”

In a ten-part series, scattered over three months, Freeman gave a wonderful account of her enrollment in a modern dance class at the College. The series says as much about the relationships between husbands and wives in the 50s, as it does about the subject. The real-life incident later became a feature story in the The Winthrop College Alumnae Magazine (Summer/Fall 1973). In the first column, Freeman introduced the idea of taking a modern dance class to her husband. Patsy Ogburn, a friend with five children, has enrolled in the class. John’s reply to the information: “You’re kidding! Patsy’s got five kids and, what’s more, Bill wouldn’t permit it.” But eventually he conceded that he “admires folks who go ahead and do what they want in spite of what folks might say.” Grace told him she is was pleased that he felt that way because she too had always wanted to take modern dance.

In the second column, she retells a conversation she overheard between John and Bill Ogburn concerning their wives and the modern dance class.

John: “It’s like I tell Grace, the exercise will probably be mighty good for her. But if she’d just give up having Eva clean for her, she’d probably get just as much... Bill...” We’re just chicken about what folks will say, but I found that when my wife gets set on doing something, it’s best just to give her her head....But I told Patsy that if there was any public performance where she’d be up there making like a Grecian urn in grey chiffon, she need not expect me to come.”

Grace signed up for the class. The next two columns found Grace teaching John some of the modern dance exercises. She hopes he will be sore and miserable the next day and, as a result, stop his teasing. But John took up to her challenge and arose
early the next morning without complaint. "You thought I'd be sore this morning! It just goes to show that what I've been saying all along is true. If women just took the right kind of exercise the way men do, they'd..." Freeman concludes her column with Grace challenging John to gardening chores.

By the sixth column, Grace confessed that men and women operate on different systems of logic. She told John that she will not do any more of the "fancy leaps in Modern Dance. This business of running up and down the gym, leaping into the air every few steps, simply exhausts the freshmen."

Baffled, John asked: "You're not going to leap because it exhausts the freshmen?"

"That's right," I explained logically. "If it exhausts people who are 17 and 18 years old, isn't it logical to think it would exhaust somebody my age?"

"I don't know," said John. "because I don't know what age you admit to being."

In the seventh through ninth columns, Grace and her friend Patsy are signed up to work backstage at the annual dance recital. They told their husbands that there is no need for them to come to the concert. Finally by the tenth column, the story reaches a predictable conclusion. Grace and Patsy were pressed into dancing in the final recital when two of the dancers were injured at the last minute. Though the dance teacher assured them that no one would recognize them as they would wearing veils and Egyptian wigs, their husband did.

"I was especially interested in those two dancers on the back row who seemed to move independently of the others," John commented.

She ended her column noting that she knew he wasn't too ashamed because someone else's name had been listed on the program.

After several years of column writing, Freeman gathered some of the columns into a prospectus for a book, called to "Hullabaloo at Our House." The proposed book was divided into four parts: there are three types of children at our house, people who can see on top of the mantelpiece, seasonings, and odds and ends. King Features initially offered some interest in the book but an offer never materialized. So without an agent, but at the suggestion of her editor at King, she sent the manuscript to E. F. Dutton in May 1956. She continued to send the publisher more columns but he was not interested. Meanwhile, she also approached The World Publisher believing that it published paperback books. The editor, Donald Friede, responded promptly that the publisher did not publish paper bound books and shied away from syndicated

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30 Letter from Frank McLearn, King Features, June 11, 1956.
material.

Freeman continued her efforts to get the book published writing to Follett and to several literary agents asking for their opinions. In 1964, Edith Margolis, a New York agent for the Lenniger Literary Agency, told her that the material is not the “kind of thing that lends itself to a book.

The book publishers are constantly being offered column material of this type and it’s the rare column that can be worked into a book, I’m, afraid. It doesn’t have enough point and substance, or a strong theme, or actually any unity--except that the same person is writing about the same family, and therefore I see no chance for it.”

Freeman’s letters to publishers were often hastily written and sometimes poorly organized. The proposed book manuscript lacked the spark of her columns. Although, she did send publishers copies of her columns, more care in seeking out appropriate publishers and in writing her query letters might have made her efforts more successful. By the early 60s, Freeman realized that the book was not to be and turned her energies elsewhere.

Her relationship with her editor appeared to be pleasant--she sent him the work, they edited it, and sent her a check. The correspondence that she saved seemed to be a reminder of how she needed to improve her work. For instance, in 1957, her editor sent her a strongly worded piece requesting--with a “please” in front of each request, that all pieces be able to stand individually as separate units; that she stay away from series, seasonal and otherwise timely mentions; and that she avoid any geographical mentions. Perhaps the 10-part series on the Modern Dance class had been the culprit. It seemed Freeman sent her columns to her editor with special notes as to when they were to be used, thus creating confusion in the back shop.³¹

Selling Features

Successful freelance writers must be enterprising, courageous and gutsy. Current writing assignments must be balanced with new marketing efforts. As Freeman’s column writing took less than two hours of her time each week, she had time to pursue other writing projects. A restless soul in many ways, Freeman continually tried to find projects where her flair for the dramatic could be mixed with her love of rhyme. She had dabbled in script writing, play writing, poetry, and

³¹ Letter from Marion Clyde McCarroll, King Features Syndicate, Jan. 30, 1957.
nonfiction--song writing was a natural next step. In 1959, she sent copies of some lyrics, “Little Joe,” “The Man Who Has Everything,” and several Christmas songs--to Arthur Smith at WBTV in Charlotte. In typical Freeman fashion, she worried about some of the auxiliary issues before finding out if her songs were even marketable. For instance, her letter made reference to her search for a pseudonym--"since most of the lyrists seem to be men." Sonny Smith, the business manager for the Cracker Jacks, a local group affiliated with the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company, sent Freeman a reply praising her writing while gently turning down her songs. The song-writing career seemed to come to a quick end.

The same year, she and John tried to syndicate an illustrated column on science for children. John Freeman was considered an outspoken but respected scientist. He frequently attended international meetings on hunger, and lectured on ecology. King Syndicate editors rejected the column idea because they did not believe it could be marketed to enough large newspapers to be profitable. The editor, Frank G. McLean, also suggested that the art was too abstract to attract a child. The Freemans continued to believe in the concept but they never could market it.

By the late 50s, Grace Freeman was making between three and four thousand dollars a year, good money for a freelancer. While the foundation of her income came from her column, she spent much of the rest of her writing time working on freelance stories for area newspapers and national magazines. Though the figures sometimes vary, Freeman wrote in a 1960 letter that she had sold 175 articles to three large dailies in the Carolinas (The Charlotte Observer, The State and The Greenville News) in a two-year period. In a resume, she claimed to have sold 200 human interest stories about people and places in the Carolinas during the early 60s. Many of the stories are on file in the Winthrop Archives.

Like any professional freelancer, she had a hefty clipping file in which she kept potential feature story or travel story ideas from newspapers and magazines. The Freemans spent their summers camping out of a Volkswagen bus, and sometimes they would take off for a weekend and explore strange towns looking for ideas. She liked the “small” features about common people.

“One weekend I came home with material for eight features just by going to filling stations and neighborhood grocery stories and asking the managers, ‘Who’s the most interesting person in your town?’ Usually they’d tell me they didn’t know anybody who was interesting until I’d keep inquiring. Then they’d say, “Did anybody tell you about the man who raises chinchillas? Or did you see
that triangle house on your way into town?"\(^{32}\)

Like any experienced working freelancer, she attempted to sell the same story with slightly different angles to multiple publications. Occasionally she was successful in marketing a story to King Features. For instance in April 1960, King syndicated a story about Miss South Carolina who had a hat made out of a real wasps nest. The hat had been shellacked and a flower added. She planned to take the hat to the Miss American Pageant.

Sometimes her efforts to interest multiple publications failed miserably. For instance, she sold a bizarre story and accompanying photograph--by the early 60s she was taking photos, too--on ash tray artists in New Orleans to the *Ford Times* for 35 dollars.\(^{33}\) However, the story was pointedly rejected by *The Reader's Digest*. In the rejection letter, the editor said, "Try to think out, before you send in things, just when we would use them. This New Orleans ceramics operation, for instance. Honestly, do you think that our readers--around the world--would really care..."\(^{34}\) In 1964, her literary agent, Edith Mangolis, was even harsher. It seems Freeman sent a story called "Mr. Wimberly's Thanksgiving" to her. She wrote:

You must realize that today's fiction market is sharply limited; there are only a handful of magazines left which use fiction of a general nature--and those magazines don't use stories about older people, for the most part...It's unwise Mrs. Freeman, to write a story which is, from a reader's point of view, rather flat, moralistic and preachy, and then tell the reader that the audience of the protagonist telling the story is spellbound by it...

Rejection letters never stopped Freeman. It took three tries to Nationwide Insurance, before she successfully found the right formula and sold several pieces to the company publication.

By 1964, Freeman's interest in selling features to newspapers seemed to be dwindling. She began writing fiction and sold her first piece, "My Father and the Big Camellia," to *Redbook* magazine on January 23, for $500. The piece was later included in a collection of "Young Mother's Stories," published by Pocket Books, Inc., for which she received $50. While her year started out profitably, February brought


\(^{33}\) *The Ford Times* was the magazine of The Ford Motor Company. Letter dated March 28, 1961.

bad news from King Features Syndicate.

I am sorry to inform you that the Syndicate is going to have to drop your little feature, “At Our House”, after the release of March 30, 1964. We have been carrying "At Our House" at a loss for some time now, and this is difficult to justify the reporting to the Finance Committee of the Corporation.

However, the letter from the Frank C. McLearn, resident vice-president, urged Freeman to continue submitting freelance features.

It arrived at a most difficult time for the Freemans. Grace was to enter the hospital for the removal of a breast tumor that day. Fortunately, the tumor was benign. In a return letter to McLearn, a week later, Freeman reported the inopportune timing of his letter, and then attempted to find out more information about the cancellation of her column. Was it the change in content and approach of the column, a lowering of the quality or interest in mass feature material, or the price? McLean's quick response assured her that it was not the quality of her writing or the attractiveness of the feature that forced the decision, nor changes in content and approach but the "need to evaluate a large number of features and dispense with those that we have been carrying at a loss." The feature market was beginning to dry-up for the Syndicate as newspapers began to add their own reporters to fulfill these functions. The interest in soft, friendly family features was dying.

In a particularly poignant letter, John Freeman asked the editor of Time to run a mention on the passing of the column.

Since I am the one who almost eleven years ago staked my wife to a full-time maid for six weeks (no stingy deal for a college professor with four children and a Ph.D. to be paid for) because I believed that she could come up with a feature that would pretty much hit at the heart of average Americans, I think the least I can do is give "At Our House" a decent burial.

His letter went unanswered.

Grace Freeman recalled that writing the column "was fun but there was no glory to it. I visualized myself rushing on call to give out autographs...But people always asked me to talk about my poetry."35

35 Chepsiuk. Ibid.
At Our House

The end of the column marked the close of an era for Grace B. Freeman. As the market for her early poetry had changed, so had the freelance feature business. The mood of the late 60s was more serious, less family-directed and certainly more turbulent. Two of her four children were on their own, and her youngest child, David, was 13. Her own life was changing. In an interview with The State in May 1964, Freeman summed up the era and her life during the nearly 11 years she wrote, "In Our House." "You know I believe we make time for what we want...I don't mind sacrificing some pleasures for writing. In fact I think writing is the perfect field for a mother, because it can be done in her own good time," she said.

Realizing that the market was indeed changing, Freeman took on the position of alumni editor of the Winthrop Alumnae Magazine, and later Converse College's magazine. While she continued freelance feature writing and wrote some instructional television scripts for South Carolina ETV, her love of poetry writing was returning. In 1970, she enrolled in a poetry workshop with James Dickey. This life-changing experience shifted Grace Freeman's writing focus. She became more introspective, and eventually authored three successful volumes of poetry, No Costumes or Masks (1970, 1975), Midnight to Dawn (1981) and Stars and the Land (1983). No Costumes went into its second printing when Stanford University adopted it as a text in its women's studies program. Her interest in the ability of poetry to open areas of the subconscious led her to become an active lecturer on poetry therapy throughout the United States.

Retrospection

Grace Freeman was successful as a columnist and freelance writer because she understood the female reader of the 50s. The subjects of At Our House have universal appeal. Though Washington was chasing communists, and issues such as racial unrest and women's rights were beginning to invade even sleepy Rock Hill, South Carolina, Freeman continued to write about simple, non-controversial subjects. She was, in fact, a master storyteller. It was her ability to find meaning in the uncomplicated aspects of life that made her column marketable for nearly 11 years. Sometimes she would introduce novel ideas. Composting, for instance, was a relatively new concept to the average backyard gardener, but it was not controversial. Her column never discussed political issues, current events, or popular culture. Even when she lightly touched on controversial issues, she did it subtly and with good humor. For instance in one column, she relates how she had complained to
her housekeeper about the bottles full of creepy, crawling things on the kitchen
countertop. The housekeeper reminds her that she ought to be thankful that the jars
are full of bugs and not something else. The point was made.

Why didn't she not write about more controversial subjects? First, her editors
and the syndicate wanted a column that could be marketed in every corner of the
United States as well as abroad. Second, her column was brief; each one had to stand
on its own. Nor was there time or space to develop complicated ideas. Furthermore,
the column had to be usable at anytime, and was usually prepared months in
advance. Finally, this was the standard material for women's pages in the 50s—it sold
newspapers. But while Freeman's columns and many of her feature stories centered
around families, family issues or unusual people, she touched on some of the subjects
which would later become the issues of the day. For instance, the columns
concerning the two older women who go back to college to take a modern dance class,
in spite of the objections of their husbands, touches on deeper issues of higher
education for returning adults and the rights of women to make independent
decisions.

Freeman's columns mirrored where she found herself. She liked being a
working mother. By the mid-sixties, she had begun to write about racial issues in
letters to friends and other writers. Particularly, one suspects her own children's
active involvement in the civil rights movement influenced her thinking. As an
introspective woman, her return to poetry seemed only natural as her own personal
independence blossoms and as the world, particularly the South, becomes much
more accepting of the woman as a professional writer. While Freeman's column
never became famous, perhaps because Erma Bombeck's superior wit surpassed it,
her life as a freelance writer is instructive. To evaluate her work as "material which
only appeared on the women's pages" and thus as insignificant is to miss its influence
in describing American family life in the 50s. At Our House was your house.
Journalism Behind Barbed Wire:
Two Arkansas Relocation Center Newspapers

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ABSTRACT

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Previous researchers have discovered great variation in the editorial quality and editorial freedom of newspapers operated by Japanese Americans at World War II-era War Relocation Authority (WRA) relocation centers. Editorial quality at the two WRA centers in Arkansas also varied, but—contrary to previously published research—the Denson Tribune at Jerome Relocation Center and the Rohwer Outpost at Rohwer Relocation Center apparently operated with little if any WRA interference.
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Previous researchers have discovered great variation in the editorial quality and editorial freedom of newspapers operated by Japanese Americans at World War II-era War Relocation Authority (WRA) relocation centers. Quality at the two Arkansas WRA centers also varied, but—contrary to previously published research—the Denson Tribune at Jerome Relocation Center and the Rohwer Outpost at Rohwer Relocation Center apparently operated with little if any WRA interference.

The Denson Tribune, edited for most of its existence by a university trained journalist, editorialized on controversial matters inside and outside the relocation center with few restraints. The nearby Rohwer Outpost, edited by individuals with little journalism training, provided residents with basic information and also editorialized on controversial matters, but ignored some significant stories and declined to editorialize on some issues of interest to the residents. Contrary to previous research findings, however, the Outpost operated with no WRA overt prior censorship or post-publication censure for its first year.
Journalism Behind Barbed Wire:
Two Arkansas Relocation Center Newspapers

Introduction

During the war years of 1942 through 1945, more than 110,000 Japanese Americans living in California and the western portions of Oregon and Washington were imprisoned initially in temporary government "assembly centers," then in more permanent "relocation centers" scattered across the United States. 1 The 10 centers were operated by a hastily organized agency, the War Relocation Authority (WRA). Each WRA relocation center had its own newspaper, which was supervised by a WRA reports officer. Editorial quality varied, from amateur to professional. Editorial freedom also varied, ranging from periodic WRA censorship to apparently complete editorial autonomy. 2

Although most of the centers were in Western states, two were in southeastern Arkansas. Two of the least studied but most editorially autonomous newspapers were the Denson Tribune, published for 16 months at Jerome Relocation Center, and the Rohwer Outpost, published for 34 months at nearby Rohwer Relocation Center. 3

The Arkansas newspapers are the focus of this study for two reasons.
The first reason is that all center newspapers lost editors as those individuals were relocated, but the primary editors of the Arkansas center newspapers were unusually influential. At Jerome Relocation Center, one man—Paul Yokota—edited slightly more than half of the Denson Tribune's issues, which was a long editorial reign by relocation center standards. Yokota also was a reporter on the Tribune's bulletin-like predecessor, the Jerome Communiqué, contributing in total to more than 100 of 174 Communiqué and Tribune issues. In addition, Yokota had university journalism training, an uncommon background at a center newspaper.

4 A 21-year-old 1941 honors journalism graduate from the University of Southern California, Yokota had been a publications supervisor there and was news editor for the Santa Anita Pacemaker, which was that assembly center's high quality newspaper. 5 In addition, Jerome was the last center to open and the first relocation center to close, shutting its doors after only 21 months, and thus Yokota's Tribune avoided the damaging attrition and variable quality that plagued most of the other center newspapers as staff members relocated. At Rohwer Relocation Center, Outpost editor Barry Saiki had an experience somewhat similar to Yokota's. Saiki, who was one of only two editors of the Rohwer Outpost, supervised nearly 100 of the approximately 300 Outpost issues. 6 In addition, Saiki, who was a University of California Berkeley economics graduate who had been editor of the Stockton assembly center newspaper El Joaquin, recruited the majority of what would become the Outpost's long-time core staff,
including the Outpost's city editor, Jim Doi, and the sports editor, the feature editor, the copy editor and the cartoonist.

The second reason Arkansas newspapers are of the focus of this study is that both center newspapers apparently functioned with no pre-publication WRA censorship or post-publication WRA censure during their formative years, making them among the most editorially autonomous relocation center newspapers. At least two scholarly articles have suggested incorrectly that the Outpost editor was threatened with termination, but primary source material demonstrates that was not the case. Although the Outpost lacked the quality of Yokota's Denson Tribune, in terms of editorial freedom it was at least as unfettered as the Tribune.

THE EVACUATION

When war was declared against Japan on December 8, 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation moved to arrest more than 2,000 Japanese Americans it thought suspicious. These individuals included priests, instructors, organizational leaders and newspaper editors.

As the war developed, pressure mounted to move all Japanese Americans from the West Coast. Of the nearly 130,000 Japanese Americans living in the United States, most were living in California, Oregon and Washington. Two-thirds of these people were Americans citizens by birth, the sons and daughters of Japanese citizens who were, for the most part, prohibited from applying for U. S. citizenship.
On February 19, 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which gave the military the power to remove any person from prohibited areas. By March, Japanese Americans living in western parts of the Pacific states had been advised to be prepared to move. By late March, 1942, the first groups of Japanese Americans were interned and moved first to assembly centers--often racetracks and fairgrounds--where they lived in makeshift buildings and sometimes horse stalls. As they were moved to these 15 temporary detention centers in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington, permanent camps were being prepared at 10 locations. These permanent camps were called relocation centers and were in California, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming and Arkansas.

The Japanese Americans sent to Arkansas, mainly citizens, went to two Jerome and Rohwer relocation centers. Jerome Relocation Center, located on about 10,000 acres of Farm Security Administration (FSA) land, opened officially on October 6, 1942. It reached a peak population about four months later, with 8,497 residents. The last residents left (mainly for other camps, including Rohwer, about the same size and only 27 miles away) on June 30, 1944, making Jerome the first of the centers to close. Rohwer Relocation Center, located on about 10,000 acres of FSA land near the hamlet of Rohwer, Arkansas, opened officially on September 18, 1942. It reached a peak population six months later, with 8,475 residents.
PRESS FREEDOM

The West Coast Japanese Americans found themselves in a confusing legal position in the months after the Pearl Harbor attack.

In 1942, the civil courts were operating normally, writs of habeas corpus were still required and there was no martial law in effect on the West Coast. However, Executive Order 9066 authorized any military commander to exclude any person from any area and Public Law 77-503 provided a prison term and fine for any civilian disobeying military authority. The Army interpreted "any person" to be all Japanese Americans living in most of California, Oregon and Washington and part of Arizona. Later Supreme Court cases, decided in 1943, ruled that a curfew based on military judgment could be imposed upon a group of citizens, and that an identifiable group of citizens could be expelled from their homes and incarcerated without trial. 9

Internment notwithstanding, the Japanese Americans imprisoned in the assembly centers in 1942 had Constitutional guarantees, including freedom of the press, although the guarantees were really protected at that time by the Wartime Civil Control Administration (the civilian branch of the Western Defense Command). Although the young editors of the newspapers at the WCCA assembly centers enjoyed freedom of the press, they also "had the assistance and guidance of the PR representative who saw that news
items were confined to those of actual interest to the evacuees."

10

After being deprived of liberty, due process and equal protection, and treated to internal news media under the "guidance" of WCCA employees, the evacuees had little reason to expect that the newspapers in the soon-to-built relocation centers would be editorially autonomous. Even the final report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians suggested that the relocation center newspapers might have been less-than-free when it said "...one must question whether censorship would be necessary where the seat of power was so obvious and the effective paths of protest so few." 11

Some relocation center newspapers, in fact, were little better than the assembly center papers. John D. Stevens, writing on freedom of the press in all of the relocation centers, noted that the Minidoka, Idaho, Relocation Center newspaper "enjoyed little independence. Minidoka administrators kept a tight reign on all evacuee activities, including the Irrigator." 12 The Topaz Times, published at the Central Utah Relocation Center, "...was not a very interesting publication, with few editorials..." and a pro-administration tone, Stevens noted. 13 The Tulean Dispatch, at Tule Lake Relocation Center in northern California, suffered from limited freedom, poor reproduction and wildly changing staffs, Stevens also noted. 14 Even the otherwise prestigious Free Press at the Manzanar, California, Relocation Center was plagued with charges of censorship. 15
Other newspapers, Stevens wrote, seemed to lack editorial direction because of staff inexperience and instability. The Poston Chronicle, at the Colorado River Relocation Center near Parker, Arizona, had 10 editors in 30 months, for example. The Gila River Relocation Center News Courier had several editors and—under the last editor—high school aged reporters. The Rohwer Outpost also lost more than one dozen staff members in one year.

However, there were strong relocation center newspapers edited by experienced journalists operating under virtually no censorship. The Heart Mountain Sentinel at Heart Mountain Relocation Center in northwest Wyoming was edited initially by Bill Hosokowa, a university journalism graduate and former newspaper editor. Although some historians disagree, the Sentinel "stood unchallenged among relocation center publications," Stevens noted. Close in quality were the Grenada, Colorado, Relocation Center Pioneer, and the Denson Tribune, published at Arkansas' Jerome Relocation Center.

YOKOTA AND THE TRIBUNE

Jerome Relocation Center, located on wooded land near the hamlet of Jerome but with a Denson, Arkansas, post office, opened officially on October 6, 1942. As was the WRA's custom, a newspaper was created almost immediately to keep evacuees informed about the center and resettlement programs. Most of these newspapers were mimeographed, and issued two or three times a
week. Most also were underwritten by the WRA, except at Minidoka, Heart Mountain and Manzanar, where community associations supported the publications. 19

The WRA initially created the typed, mimeographed, twice-weekly Jerome Communique on October 23, 1942, two weeks after the camp opened. The Communique--three columns wide with the right hand column justified by spacing typewriter letters--would be published for four months, until March 2, 1943, when the Denson Tribune would debut, with Paul Yokota as editor. The Communique's inaugural issue--two pages each mimeographed on both sides--clearly identified its purpose as the "official bulletin of Jerome Relocation Center." 20 The Communique said its purpose was "to make public timely information of value to Center residents." 21 The first issue also included a notice from the camp director warning evacuees against wandering outside the center boundaries and various other official announcements.

Two issues later, a name-the-newspaper contest was announced. Details followed in the next issue, which said the editors were seeking "a name with a jolt, a jiving title that our journal will live up to..." 22 The November 10, 1942, issue announced the camp's first death. 23 An extra appeared on November 18, announcing the names of block representatives. The next issue, in a story that suggested editorial autonomy, covered a half-day strike by a land-cleaning crew which had complained of poor quality lunches. 24

More editorial autonomy was suggested by the presence of the Communique's first editorial, published on November 26, which said
the war had allowed Japanese Americans to separate their friends from their enemies and focus on the "full meaning" of democracy. 25

The December 1 issue announced that 300 names had been received in the name-the-newspaper contest, which would be judged by veteran Arkansas editors. That issue also featured a long open letter from Communique editor Eddie Shimano, commenting on a recent incident in which a Japanese American soldier on leave had been shot and wounded in nearby Dermott, Arkansas. 26

On December 8, the Jiho, a Japanese language section of the paper, began. (The Jiho, which was hand-lettered, would continue for 157 issues, until Jerome closed.) 27 Few Communique staffers and WRA officials could read more than rudimentary Japanese. They had only the vaguest idea of what was covered in the Jiho, which, no doubt, contributed to the Jiho's editorial autonomy. 28

Issues in January dealt with a firewood crisis, a suicide and rumors that Heart Mountain evacuees were eating elk and deer meat while "white people in Boston have horse meat." 29 In February, the Communique expanded to an occasional 10 pages and in mid-month, switched to an unusual four-column front page format.

The Denson Tribune's 3,500 copy, 10-page inaugural issue on March 2, 1943, noted that the staff--headed by Yokota because Shimano had relocated--had picked the newspaper's name from 350 names. The submission was made by a Center social organization. The lead front page story featured a denial by the camp director that Jerome would be closed. Other stories included a warning from camp director that draft registration was compulsory, a story
warning evacuees not to wander from center grounds and, for balance, a story reporting the Community Council had voted to support block stewards in their request for improvement of kitchen and working conditions.

Other March issues featured strong editorials by Yokota and city editor Richard Itanaga. Yokota's editorials hammered away at two parallel themes—that camp life was leading to moral and intellectual decay, and that evacuees should leave the Center as soon as legally possible. A March 9 editorial, for example, urged residents to take adult education classes. The March 16 editorial was even tougher. Yokota complained that the relocation had produced children becoming "more irresponsible and uncontrollable."

In general, Yokota and Itanaga shared editorial writing duties, without consulting each other or the reports officer, former Arkansas Gazette reporter Charles Lynn, about the content. Both Yokota and Itanaga wrote columns for each issue, too.

In April, Itanaga and a reporter visited Little Rock, 100 miles away, and, mindful of earlier charges that evacuees were eating well while civilians were eating short rations, reported that "Horses seem to be safe in this locality. They are still in pastures, not featuring meat market displays." During the same month, Yokota editorially attacked Army Lt. Gen. John L. De Witt's opposition to the eventual West Coast resettlement of Japanese Americans. "The opposition of General De Witt to the return of anyone of Japanese descent to the West Coast seems to be a rather prejudiced stand," Yokota wrote. "Surely, it is safer to trust
those of proven loyalty among the evacuees than the untested allegiance of German and Italian nationals on the West Coast." 33

May brought even stronger editorials from Yokota. When a Tennessee Senator urged the citizenship be taken from Japanese Americans, Yokota ridiculed the Senator, saying he had confidence "in the sanity of your colleagues in the Senate." 34 Later that month, Yokota criticized relocation center life, charging that center life was damaging the positive attitudes evacuees held toward work.

The June 4 issue noted Yokota's wedding to a 22-year-old Los Angeles area kindergarten supervisor who was also interned at Jerome. In the same issue, he wrote perhaps his most eloquent editorial on camp life, headed "Period of Decay." "More than a year in the centers has been a period of decay for most evacuees," he wrote. "In a few exceptional cases, persons have overcome the general lethargy in the Center to develop their talents and to make constructive things. On the whole, however, this interval in the lives of the evacuees has been wasted..." 35

In hard-hitting editorials later that month, Itanaga urged citizen evacuees to be proud of their pioneering non-citizen parents, raged against the anti-evacuee Dies committee hearings and commented on the U. S. Supreme Court ruling validating the evacuation.

On July 2, Itanaga, in his column rather than in an editorial, noted that "This is the second Independence Day that we're going to spend behind barbed wire fences," adding that democracy seemed to be working "despite the jolt received when the
West Coast curfew and the exodus were ruled constitutional." 36 Shortly after that, Itanaga, who had joined the Army, departed Jerome, and left Yokota with a diminished staff. A few days later, Yokota noted editorially that evacuees leaving the camps "carry the burden of proving that those of Japanese descent in this country form an integral part of these United States," and thus kicked off a series of editorials urging evacuees to leave the centers proudly. In his column on the same page, he also noted that the 4-year-old son of a Center military policeman had cursed evacuee children, adding, "We don't think much of the upbringing he's getting in this land of democracy " 37

News coverage during this period was what one might typically expect of a small town newspaper, with coverage of accidents, social events, school activities and sports, in addition to coverage of WRA regulations. There was little war coverage, as the evacuees could learn of that from traditional news sources.

As the summer of 1943 passed, WRA officials began the task of separating loyal evacuees from those whose loyalty was in doubt. The segregants would be sent to Tule Lake Relocation Center in California. August brought many editorials on the wisdom of segregating Tule Lake bound evacuees, a touchy subject for Jerome officials, Yokota said. 38 Later that month, Yokota warned evacuees still receiving California newspapers not to assume that the continuing anti-evacuee coverage in the California newspapers was typical of other parts of the country.

On September 15, the Tule Lake exodus began and much news and editorial space was devoted to the hundreds of departing Jerome
residents. Yokota, in a September 24 column, noted that "While some nisei may be going to Tule Lake because it is their wish, a few will be leaving because it is the wish of their parents." 39

October would be Yokota's last month at Jerome as he would take his own advice and relocate to Ohio at the end of the month. Locally written editorials became more rare in October and guest editorials and reprints from other publications increased. October was a strong hard news month, with coverage of the evacuee combat team in Europe and a story on 20 people injured in a woodcutting accident. Yokota's last column appeared on October 22, 1943, after about one year of work on the Communique and the Tribune. A front page story on October 29 noted his departure.

After three issues without an editor, Harry Shiramizu, a native Hawaiian and University of Hawaii political science graduate with 14 years of newspaper experience, was named the Tribune's second editor. Perhaps coincidentally, the name of the reports officer, Charles Lynn, appeared for the first time on the masthead, above the editor's name. Despite that suggestion that Shiramizu was more ready to accept the authority of the WRA, the paper remained respectable if more sedate.

From November until the Tribune's last issue on June 6, 1944, when Jerome closed, news stories began to slowly return to the "bulletin" type that had characterized the Communique. Editorials, though frequent in number, tended to be significantly less controversial than Yokota's. On November 19, for example, the Tribune featured a front page editorial lamenting the transfer of the Center director. On December 24, Shiramizu ran a page three
editorial agreeing with an Arizona Senator who introduced a bill stripping citizenship from American-born Japanese who gave negative answers to government loyalty questions. "You are right, Mr. Senator," the editor wrote. "Let's keep America for Americans. Let's save her privileges for those who accept the responsibilities of citizenship." 40

Shiramizu later wrote editorials on leap year, youth, health, the March of Dimes drive, soldier's rights, spring and simplicity in marriages. Occasional front-page editorials would be slightly tougher, but in general the editorials and newspaper itself lost the seriousness found during Yokota's editorship.

The last issue, on June 6, 1944, D-Day, featured a front page editorial titled, "We Say 30." The final stories covered graduation exercises, transfer information and schedules of railroad cars for the sick and pregnant.

Saiki and the Outpost

The WRA created the typed, mimeographed, twice-weekly Rohwer Outpost on October 24, 1942, five weeks after the camp opened and one day after the Jerome Communiqué appeared. The Outpost, typically six pages with three columns that were justified by spacing typewriter letters, would be published until July 21, 1945, when it would be replaced by a WRA bulletin issued until November 9, 1945. Bean Takeda, from the Santa Anita, California, assembly center, and Barry Saiki, from the Stockton center, were named as co-editors, although the dual editorship lasted for only
three issues. The subordinate editors and reporters selected by Takeda and Saiki were from the Takeda’s Santa Anita Pacemaker assembly center newspaper and Saiki’s El Joaquin, published at the Stockton assembly center.

The front page of the Outpost’s inaugural issue included a story explaining the center’s various community programs, an article about how to vote and a story about a delay in the opening of the center schools. The first issue also featured a story about the Outpost, which noted that “the function of a good newspaper is to report the news fairly, accurately, simply.” 41 An editorial headlined “Now We Are One” in the same issue called for unity among Rohwer residents, who were drawn from two assembly centers in different parts of California. The editorial said the paper would “set the pace in its stories by avoiding any reference to the Santa Anita or Stockton assembly centers, except where it is absolutely necessary for identification purposes. Residents will be referred to by their home towns and cities, rather than by their assembly centers. Hence, people will be identified as hailing from Norwalk, Los Angeles, Lodi or Stockton....” 42

The Outpost’s second issue brought the appearance of an editorial cartoon called “Lil Dan’l” drawn by George Akimoto, who had performed similar chores for the Stockton assembly center newspaper. By the third issue, Takeda and Saiki had experienced differences of opinion and Saiki left the paper to teach salesmanship, commercial law, chemistry, American history and journalism at the center’s high school. 43
Coverage during Saiki's brief absence was unremarkable and there were few editorials, despite a series of events involving residents from Rohwer and nearby Jerome relocation centers that should have warranted coverage or editorial comment. For example, on October 28, the day on which the second issue of the Outpost was published, two Rohwer youths were fired upon by a contractor's guard while attempting to steal lumber. On November 12, Army Private Louis Furushiro was confronted by a 72-year-old local farmer, W.M. Wood, in a Dermott, Arkansas, cafe and was slightly wounded by a shotgun blast. Furushiro, who was stationed at Camp Robinson near Little Rock, had been visiting relatives at nearby Jerome Relocation Center. Although the incident involved a visitor to Jerome rather than to Rohwer, the incident occurred within 20 miles of Rohwer and would have been of great interest to the Rohwer residents. On November 13, two Rohwer center residents who were part of a group working outside the center perimeter were wounded by gunfire by M. C. Brown, a local farmer. At about the same time there was a brief fight involving relocation center truck drivers in the nearby town of McGehee, Arkansas, about 10 miles away, and on December 2, two girls from the Jerome center were assaulted by a contractor's employee. None of the events were covered by the Outpost.

The November 25 issue noted that Takeda was leaving the paper "to devote more time to the work of the Community council." The Outpost staff quickly asked Saiki to return. Although he began writing editorials immediately, he didn't rejoin the paper until he finished teaching his term at the high school. By December
16, Saiki's name was restored to the masthead. The same issue noted that a Japanese language edition of the paper--the Jiho--would soon appear. With Saiki's re-involvement, Outpost coverage improved somewhat and well-crafted editorials appeared on a much more regular basis.

Editors were employed by the relocation center reports officer. Although reports officers at other WRA centers occasionally or regularly controlled the contents of the center newspapers, numerous individuals who were at Rohwer agree that the Outpost was uncensored by the center administration during Saiki's editorship and probably later as well. Saiki and Doi said that they initially took a few pre-publication copies of the Outpost to reports officer Austin Smith Jr. for review, but Smith told them he did not need to see the paper prior to publication. 50 Saiki and Doi also said that they did not discuss Outpost coverage with Smith after publication. The decision to permit editorial freedom may have been made because of a enlightened Rohwer administration or because of a trusting relationship between Saiki, Doi and Smith, or perhaps because, as historian Lauren Kessler suggests, the WRA had little to worry about from its hand-picked editors. 51

Saiki's next test as editor occurred after the December 12 issue carried a reprint of an editorial from the Arkansas Gazette that called for the segregation of pro-Japanese from Japanese-Americans. Outpost readers apparently overlooked the source of the editorial and complained so much that the December 16 issue of the Outpost carried a box re-identifying the source of the earlier
editorial and explaining that the article did not reflect the view of the staff. 52

Two issues later the Jiho appeared as a four-page supplement to the Outpost. Although the Jiho staff was separate from the Outpost staff, the newspaper was supposed to be a faithful translation of the Outpost. 53 For Smith, the reports officer, the translation results were occasionally unsatisfactory. Translation difficulties beginning in 1943 and a lack of cooperation by Jiho staff beginning in late 1944 eventually resulted in minor criticism of a Jiho editor by Smith, which in turn resulted in several published but incorrect assertions that the WRA criticism was directed at an Outpost editor. 54

During January 1943, the Outpost covered the story of a man who disappeared while hunting mushrooms and another who was killed in a tree-cutting accident. The Outpost also published a story about a survey showing West Coast residents opposed the return of the evacuees. Saiki wrote an editorial cautioning camp residents to work hard to prepare for post-war life and another criticizing activities of a California group that was trying to block the return of the evacuees to California after the war.

February issues featured stories reminding residents to register for the draft and editorials condemning juvenile delinquency and encouraging residents to deal with rationing by "tighten(ing) our belt with the rest of Americans." Despite an announcement in the Outpost by center director Ray Johnston that voluntary registration for selective service registration had "failed" at the center and a reminder that compulsory registration
for all males over 17 was in effect, Saiki's lack of enthusiasm for the issue was apparent. His February 27 editorial addressed sacrifice and cooperation but it did not comment on the selective service registration problem. 55

By spring, Saiki began to flex the paper's editorial muscles more. He applauded New York Congressman Vito Marcantonio's bill that called for naturalized citizenship for all regardless of race, color, creed or national origin, noted the first anniversary of "concentrated living" and vigorously attacked Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commanding general of the Western Defense Command, for his remarks to a Congressional sub-committee about the untrustworthiness of Japanese Americans. 56 Of DeWitt, Saiki wrote: "...for such an important military leader to carry on Jap-baiting tactics and foster seemingly perverted political beliefs, the safety of not only the West Coast but the whole of the United States is endangered." 57

It was during April that the Outpost missed a story that probably should have been covered. On April 14, more than one dozen Hawaiian seamen were involved in a dining hall altercation about the availability of food in mess block 27. The men's request for food was denied by a mess steward and a fight began. The steward and a number of Hawaiians were taken to the hospital after being injured. The Federal Bureau of Investigation searched for the men the next day and arrested 16 of them. The men--all Hawaiians--were jailed in nearby Arkansas City and later released and sent to Kansas City. The Hawaiians were not held in high esteem by other Rohwer residents, camp officials noted: "For
various reasons, real and imagined, they were not readily accepted or, in some cases, entirely ostracized by the closely knit and provincial community groups. The Hawaiians did not, on the other hand, help themselves very much—making little effort to integrate themselves, they kept together and maintained a defensive attitude.”

Saiki and city editor Jim Doi said they did not know about the event, but Doi said even if he knew about it he might not have reported it because the Hawaiians “were outcasts. They had a wild reputation, drank a lot, played ukuleles a lot.”

Summer brought tough editorial stands from Saiki that continued to show autonomy as well as an increased appreciation of his duties as editor. Saiki reprinted an editorial in the University of California Daily Californian condemning anti-Japanese sentiment and wrote an open-letter editorial criticizing Arkansas American Legionnaires who passed a resolution asking for “repatriation and expatriation of all Japanese Americans” after the war. Tackling the American Legion in the summer of 1943 took courage, and doing so in a rural, conservative state no doubt caused consternation for Arkansas WRA officials. Risking reader wrath, he also approvingly reprinted an editorial from the McGehee Times that criticized center residents who came to the city of McGehee and who behaved in ways that caused “local citizens (to) regard them with disgust.”

As the summer of 1943 ended, WRA officials began the task of separating loyal evacuees from those whose loyalty was in doubt. The segregants were to be sent to Tule Lake Relocation Center in
northern California. The transfer of residents to Tule Lake began in September and much news and editorial space was devoted to the exodus, including several editorials lamenting the separation and the evacuation in general. On September 11, 1943, Saiki, summing up his view of the entire evacuation process, wrote: "Since the fate-determining day in December, 1941, and the temporary halt of the inevitable assimilation of the Japanese minority into the American society because of the evacuation in April (and) May of 1942, we have marked 16 months of wasted time in the relocation centers." Despite considerable coverage, the Outpost did not report or editorialize about a security breach that occurred during the separation process. 62

An October 9 editorial about the necessity of Japanese Americans proving themselves was apparently Saiki's last editorial contribution to the Outpost. The October 13 issue carried Saiki's name as editor but the October 16 issue did not. Before he left the center, however, he produced an 82-page magazine dated November 6, 1943, summarizing the residents' (and Saiki's) first year at Rohwer. 63 The November 17 issue of the Outpost revealed that Saiki had left Rohwer for Chicago and noted that his departure was the 13th Outpost staff loss in 1943. City editor Jim Doi also left the paper in the fall.

After the departure of Saiki and Doi, locally written editorials became more rare, and columns and reprinted editorials from other publications increased. Hard news often was covered in a non-traditional way. For example, the November 27 Outpost carried the story of a serious auto accident, but readers had to
beginning in December the name of Smith, the center reports officer, appeared at the top of the masthead with increasingly frequency, with Vicky Konman identified as the managing editor.

Coverage of selective service-related issues, the exploits of Nisei soldiers and stories about successful relocation experiences became more common during 1944. The February 26 issue revealed the nearby Jerome relocation would be closed by June 1944 and the April 29 issue announced that 2,500 Jerome residents would transfer to Rohwer. By the summer of 1944, Konman was listed as editor, although Smith's name still appeared on the masthead. The July 4 issue also featured the first editorial of 1944, though it was not written by Konman. Konman's paper was respectable but less vigorous editorially than Saiki's. Hard news was still being covered—a story about a boy killed by a truck appeared in July and a similar story was published in August—but most of the hard news material was war-related as casualties began to mount among the Nisei soldiers.

Coverage in 1945 continued to showcase war news but turned to relocation issues as the war in Europe wound down. The Outpost's last issue appeared on July 21, 1945, when the paper was transformed into the Rohwer Relocator, which was a bulletin-like WRA publication that focused on the closing of Rohwer and various relocation opportunities. Rohwer Relocation Center officially closed on November 30, 1945.
CONCLUSIONS

Previous researchers have found great variation in relocation center newspaper editorial quality and editorial freedom. The Denson Tribune, under Yokota's editorship, apparently functioned without overt censorship, both in terms of prior restraint and post-publication evaluation. Moreover, the absence of censorship at Jerome Relocation Center was not attributable to a weak editor or a poor newspaper with a non-existent editorial page. Yokota, and, to a lesser extent, Shiramizu, edited a consistent, thorough, balanced newspaper and editorialized freely on controversial matters both inside and outside the relocation center. If there were restraints on editorial freedom at the Tribune, the restraints were self-imposed, and there is little evidence of that. Most probably, the newspaper operated as least as freely as comparable commercial Arkansas newspapers of the period. The Denson Tribune probably avoided censorship because of one or more the following circumstances: a good editor with a high quality editorial staff, a benign center administration, a reports officer who had come from the field of journalism, and perhaps because the Tribune editor subscribed to what has come to be termed an "accommodationist" philosophy, as historian Kessler has suggested.

The Rohwer Outpost, under Saiki's editorship, provided center residents with basic information and also editorialized on many controversial matters both inside and outside the center, although the newspaper was written and edited by individuals with little
formal journalism training and lacked the qualities of the Tribune. The Outpost did not report a few significant stories and declined to editorialize on some issues of interest to the residents, but it is clear—contrary to the findings of previous research—that the Outpost during Saiki's tenure and perhaps afterwards operated with no WRA prior censorship or post-publication censure. It is less clear whether important news stories and editorial issues were not published because the staff did not know or care about them, or because key editors at the Outpost, subscribed to an "accommodationist" philosophy, as Kessler believes, or because of a combination of all factors. 68
2. Very few scholarly articles have focused on relocation center newspapers. The germinal analysis by John Stevens includes references to editorial quality and freedom for each newspaper at each relocation center: Gila and Poston (Arizona); Jerome and Rohwer (Arkansas); Manzanar and Tule Lake (California); Granada (Colorado); Minidoka (Idaho); Topaz (Utah); and Heart Mountain (Wyoming). John D. Stevens, "From Behind Barbed Wire: Freedom of the Press in World War II Japanese Centers," Journalism Quarterly 48 (Summer 1971): 279-287. Another major contribution is by Lauren Kessler, which focuses on the newspapers at the Rohwer, Tule Lake and Heart Mountain centers. Lauren Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese Internment Camps," Journalism History 15:2-3 (Summer/Autumn 1988): 70-79.


4. Paul Yokota, interview, Downey, California, July 14, 1984. Until 1984, when he retired, Yokota was an elementary school principal for the Los Angeles Unified School District. He had been warned by his college adviser that discrimination would make it difficult for him to find a newspaper job and so, after failing to find a journalism job after the war, he turned to teaching. For additional information about Yokota's tenure, see Jay Friedlander, "Journalism Behind Barbed Wire, 1942-44: An Arkansas Relocation

5. Yokota interview, July 14, 1984. Eddie Shimano, who edited the Pacemaker, was the first editor of the Jerome Communiqué. He relocated to New York.

6. Barry Saiki, telephone interviews, Stockton, California, November 29 and November 30, 1997 and correspondence dated December 9, 1997. Saiki was a 1942 graduate of the University of California (Berkeley) with a major in economics. He entered Rohwer Relocation Center in October 1942, was granted leave from the center in November 1943, relocated to Chicago and by 1944 was called to active military duty. From 1944 until 1966, when he retired, Saiki was a career officer in the U.S. Army. He became a counter-intelligence officer and was sent to Japan in March 1946 for occupation duty. For two decades, he was rotated between Japan and the United States in various intelligence assignments. He retired as a lieutenant colonel at the Presidio in San Francisco, after serving three years as a staff officer for the Sixth Army headquarters. During the 1960s, he was in charge of the security program for eight western states, including those that were part of the World War Two-era Western Defense Command.

7. Jim Doi, telephone interview, Seattle, Washington, December 2, 1997. It is significant that Doi was a member of the Stockton-based advance team of evacuees that visited Rohwer Relocation
Center when it was still under construction. During this trip he made the technical recommendations for the establishment of the Outpost.


13. Ibid., p. 286.


15. Ibid., p. 284.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 284-287. Stevens' observations made in the 1970s were not necessarily shared by the evacuees in the 1940s. For example, the minutes of the Japanese American Citizens League Special Emergency National Conference, which was held in November 1942, provide additional insight into the freedom of the relocation center newspapers as viewed by the evacuees. The JACL minutes indicate that there was "no strict censorship" of the newspapers at the Heart Mountain, Jerome, Manzanar, Minidoka and Rohwer centers, but noted that editorial copy had to be approved by the center reports officers and by the department heads whose units were mentioned in stories at those centers. The JACL minutes suggested that there was "no censorship" the Gila, Poston and Tule Lake centers, but said the Topaz center newspaper was checked by the center director. Grenada Relocation Center was not mentioned. Quite aside from the minutes, it should be noted that editorial policies at some of the 10 center newspapers were still being defined and refined in November 1942. At Jerome Relocation Center, for example, the center newspaper had not even been named in November and at Rohwer Relocation Center, editors were in transition. See "Minutes of the JACL Special Emergency National Conference: November 20, 1942," Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, Reel: 20, File: T6.121, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, as cited in an unpublished 1998 graduate student paper, "Happy Winter Holiday Greetings from the Evacuation Camps: The Dual Character
of the Japanese American Camp Newspapers' Reporting of the 1942 In-Camp Winter Holiday Celebrations," by Takeya Mizuno of the University of Missouri. Kessler, writing in the 1980s, also was unimpressed with the editorial freedom enjoyed by the newspapers at the Heart Mountain, Rohwer and Tule Lake centers. Lauren Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese Internment Camps," Journal of Journalism History 15:2-3 (Summer/Autumn 1988): 70-79.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., October 30, 1942.


24. Ibid., November 20, 1942. This was a top-of-the-fold story.

25. Ibid., November 26, 1942. Editorials usually ran on page two.

27. Denson Tribune, June 6, 1944.


29. Communiqué, January 22, 1943.


31. Yokota interview, July 14, 1984. Lynn, who had a bachelor's degree from Washington University in St. Louis and who had worked for the Gazette for eight years, "felt he could... rely on our judgment," Yokota said. "It seemed we had a fairly good working relationship. He attended to his job and let us run the internal publication without too much interference." Also see Charles Lynn, "Final Report of Reports Division," WRA Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, File N 1.15. City editor Richard Itanaga confirmed that Lynn "trusted our judgment" and that Yokota and Itanaga "had considerable freedom in the reporting of news" in a May 28, 1987, letter to journalism historian Kessler, as cited in the footnotes of Lauren Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese
Internment Camps," Journalism History 15:2-3 (Summer/Autumn 1988)

32. Tribune, April 2, 1943.
33. Ibid., April 20, 1943.
34. Ibid., May 14, 1943.
35. Ibid., June 4, 1943.
36. Ibid., July 2, 1943.
37. Ibid., July 20, 1943.
40. Ibid., December 24, 1943.
41. Rohwer Outpost, October 24, 1942, p. 1
42. Ibid., p. 6.
43. Saiki, telephone interviews, November 29 and November 30, 1997 and correspondence dated December 9, 1997.

132
44. The identity of the author of the diary is unclear, but the 77-page document appears to be the work for reports officer Austin Smith Jr. Diary, Rohwer Center, October 1942--January 1944. The Austin Smith-Amon Guy Thompson Papers, Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas, p. 1

45. The December 1, 1942, issue of the Jerome Relocation Center Communiqué featured a long open letter from Communiqué editor Eddie Shimano, commenting on the incident in Dermott, Arkansas.


47. Ibid.

48. Saiki, telephone interviews, November 20 and November 30, 1997 and correspondence dated December 9, 1997. Doi and Mary Yamashita, telephone interview, December 2, 1997. Saiki said he was unaware of any of the incidents. Doi and Yamashita, who was the newspaper's copy editor, also said they were unaware of these events.

50. Saiki, telephone interviews, November 29 and November 30, 1997, and correspondence dated December 9, 1997. Doi, telephone interview, December 2, 1997. Saiki and Doi separately confirmed that Austin Smith did not want to see Outpost issues prior to publication and did not discuss problems about Outpost coverage after publication. Doi, who served as a military censor in Japan after World War Two, was adamant that he knew "what censorship is" and that the Outpost "was not censored." Doi said of reports officer Smith and the newspaper staff: "We were all amateurs."

At the closure of the center, Smith wrote: "As far as possible a 'hands-off' policy was also followed in determining what should be printed and how it was to be written. The average person would be surprised at how much 'Freedom of the press' was permitted. This resulted in some material being used that the administration did not particularly like but with one exception no real trouble was caused and the advantages far offset the disadvantages." Personal Narrative of Austin Smith, Jr., Reports Officer, Reports Division, United States Department of Interior, War Relocation Authority, McGehee, Arkansas. The Austin Smith--Amon Guy Thompson Papers, Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas, pp. 6-7.

The official reunion booklet of the Rohwer residents also noted the lack of WRA censorship: "And contrary to what has been written by others during the past few years, there was no WRA
51. Kessler argues that even in relocation centers that were served by vigorous newspapers written and edited by seasoned journalists, the staffs were free "...to publish only the material the camp administrators would like to have disseminated anyway" and that freedom of the press existed only "in a very restricted sense." Editors, Kessler suggested, were selected by the WRA for "accommodationist" views. "Many of these 'accommodationists' undoubtedly felt that their incarceration was unfair, but they chose to overlook the injustice and instead become model inmates. Believing that the best hope of Japanese Americans was successful reintegration after the war, accommodationists concentrated on making improvements in camp life, encouraging military enlistment to prove their patriotism and working for early release and resettlement." Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese Internment Camps," Journalism History 15:2-3 (Summer/Autumn 1988): 71-72


53. In his final report, Smith was frank in his assessment of the freedom of the Outpost and its Japanese language cousin, the Jiho: "The editor of both the English and Japanese sections had
to exercise considerable judgement (sic) not to offend different factions within the center. They did not go as far as the administration would have liked in advocating voluntary registration, relocation and etc, but on the other hand there was little or not active opposition to these programs from this source." For details about Smith's supervision of the Outpost and the Jiho, see Personal Narrative of Austin Smith, Jr., Reports Officer, Reports Division, United States Department of Interior, War Relocation Authority, McGehee, Arkansas. The Austin Smith--Amon Guy Thompson Papers, Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas, p. 7.

54. Doi, telephone interview, December 2, 1997. Doi said reports officer Smith told him several times that the Jiho, the Japanese language edition edited by a separate staff, did not agree exactly with the English edition. Doi told him to expect translation differences, but apparently Smith believed that the situation deteriorated in late 1944 and early 1945 when Japanese language editors and staff became increasingly uncooperative. This difficulty with the Jiho editor has resulted in an erroneous conclusion by Bearden, and by Kessler, who relied on Bearden's work, that Smith experienced friction with the editor of the Outpost. In fact, it was the Jiho editor with whom Smith had difficulty. The problem was described by Smith in this manner: "Obviously the only supervision of the Japanese section possible was to explain the general policy, and there was never any real trouble with this group as long as there was a responsible editor.
During the last 8 or 9 months the Japanese section was published, a Kibei was editor who was too much under the influence of an anti-relocation and somewhat pro-Japanese Issei member of the staff but even then, there was no serious trouble. The Japanese section was somewhat reluctant to translate the Relocation Bulletin but they finally agreed to do this. There reluctance was due to two things. First, they were opposed to relocation and second, they did not consider it part of their job." See Personal Narrative of Austin Smith, Jr., Reports Officer, Reports Division, United States Department of Interior, War Relocation Authority, McGehee, Arkansas. The Austin Smith--Amon Guy Thompson Papers, Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas, pp. 6-7. Also see Bearden, "The False Rumor of Tuesday," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 41 (Winter 1982): 335-336, and Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese Internment Camps," Journalism History 15:2-3 (Summer/Autumn 1988): 77.

55. Saiki, telephone interviews, November 20 and November 30, 1997 and correspondence dated December 9, 1997. Saiki's lack of enthusiasm was not surprising. His father had been detained three times by the United States government in the days following Pearl Harbor. At the time of the selective service registration program, Saiki's father was incarcerated by the government in New Mexico.

56. The Rohwer Outpost identified Congressman Vito Marcantonio as Vito Marcantino.
57. Rohwer Outpost, April 17, 1943, p. 6.

58. The incident is confirmed by two reports dated April 15, 1943. For great detail, see Diary, Rohwer Center, October 1942--January 1944. The Austin Smith--Amon Guy Thompson Papers, Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas, p. 27. Also see Diary of an Evacuee, Name Unknown, Rohwer Relocation Center, April 15, 1943, Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas, p. 15. Both also are cited in Russell Bearden, "Life Inside Arkansas's Japanese-American Relocation Centers," Arkansas Historical Quarterly 48 (Summer 1989): 185.


60. Rohwer Outpost, August 4, 1943, p. 6.


62. This was the second major unreported incident that occurred during the editorial tenure of Saiki. On August 29, 1943, a note was almost secretly passed to an evacuee being taken to the Tule Lake segregation center. When guards intercepted the note, the evacuee reportedly ate it and was later jailed. Saiki and Doi said they were not aware of the event. The Austin Smith--Amon Guy Thompson Papers, Segregation, Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas, p. 3. Cited in Russell Bearden, "The False Rumor


65. The patriotic editorial was signed "S.H." The initials probably referred to Sus Hasegawa.

66. Saiki, telephone interviews, November 20 and November 30, 1997 and correspondence dated December 9, 1997. Konman died while at Rohwer Relocation Center, according to Saiki.


68. Some insight into the attitudes of the center administration can be gleaned from Austin Smith's personal narrative and the final public words of center director Ray Johnston. The final issue of the WRA-produced Rohwer Relocator, which was the successor to the *Outpost*, appeared on November 9, 1945 and featured a message from Johnston. He wrote: "In a very short time now, Rohwer Relocation Center will be only a memory to all of us. There will be good memories along with the bad memories, but there can be no doubt that the closing of the center is a good thing. It is not natural or right for people to live in communities such as this, and it is extremely important that everyone--especially the
children--get back to normal living as soon as possible. The whole evacuation program has been heart-breaking and has caused much personal inconvenience, but I can hope that the residents of this Center can leave here with a feeling that the War Relocation Authority and its staff members have made a sincere effort to operate this Center as fairly and as efficiently as possible."

Rohwer Relocator, November 9, 1945, p. 1. Also see Personal Narrative of Austin Smith, Jr., Reports Officer, Reports Division, United States Department of Interior, War Relocation Authority, McGehee, Arkansas. The Austin Smith--Amon Guy Thompson Papers, Arkansas History Commission, Little Rock, Arkansas.
NPR's Hell

Paving the Road to Hell: National Public Radio in the Lee Frischknecht Years

by

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Many observers agree that National Public Radio has grown and changed in ways that make it different from the network described in Bill Siemering’s 1970 mission statement. Siemering, NPR’s first Program Director, described a network that would typify what Ralph Engelman would call the community variant of public radio.¹

National Public Radio will serve the individual: it will promote personal growth; it will regard the individual differences among men with respect and joy rather than derision and hate... it will encourage a sense of active constructive participation, rather than apathetic helplessness...²

Yet Engelman and other observers contend that NPR has not lived up to this promise; that instead of building a force for independent, adversarial journalism, the managers of NPR have created a quasi-federal organ for social integration -- a national system of programming by and for members of upscale socioeconomic groups.³

Laurence Zuckerman typifies the charges often leveled by critics of the left who write, as he does, for publications like
Mother Jones. Zuckerman suggests that NPR, over time, has veered away from its normative mission as a broadcasting alternative while, at the same time, focusing more and more on the kinds of programming that will ensure good ratings in radio's contemporary environment of narrowcasting. In terms of content, Zuckerman maintains that NPR has grown "more uncomfortable with its liberal image, and more cautious..."

...Stories are shorter, more conventional, and more likely to be reported from a major city or foreign hot spot than from some small corner far off the beaten track. Interviews don't crackle and excite the way they once did. Humor has been almost completely forsaken...5

The media watchdog group FAIR has provided quantitative evidence to corroborate some of Zuckerman's impressions. Charlotte Ryan analyzed nearly 2,300 stories broadcast on Morning Edition and All Things Considered during a four-month period in 1991. She found, among other things, that NPR's regular news coverage focused on the same Washington-centered personalities and events that commercial broadcasters did, and tended to exclude independent or non-establishment points of view.6

Conservative critics have had their say as well, with one describing NPR as "a little Havana on the Potomac."7 But the
preponderance of evidence assembled to date tends to support Engelman and Zuckerman, who suggest that NPR has moved from the margins to the mainstream of American radio since its inception in 1970.

How did this happen? I argue that we can locate NPR's transformation in the first 13 years of its existence and, most importantly, in the period from 1973 to 1977 -- the tenure of its second president, Lee Frischknecht. To be fair, Frischknecht inherited a network that was somewhat weak and disorganized. But a significant vacuum of leadership during his watch made NPR vulnerable to unforeseen political transformations. As a result, the network came to value the dictates of the market over its original normative mission. On a wider scale, one might argue that NPR has come to address its audience as consumers rather than citizens -- a role that has long been practiced by commercial broadcasters.8

NPR's New Leader

Lee Frischknecht rose to NPR's top job at a time of significant turmoil in Washington. The public broadcasting community held its collective breath in 1973 as its sworn enemy -- Richard Nixon -- became more deeply embroiled in the Watergate scandal. Around that same time, the term of NPR's first
NPR's Hell

president came to a close. In some ways, Donald Quayle was made for NPR's top job. He had years of experience in public broadcasting and close ties with many important players in the field. He was also a gregarious man, one who could mend fences in an organization through sheer force of personality.

These skills were not lost on other key figures in Washington. Henry Loomis, the man Nixon picked to head the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), coaxed Quayle into joining him to manage the corporation's new Partnership Agreement with the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). To succeed him at NPR, Quayle recommended Lee Frischknecht, his lifelong friend and second-in-command. At first, Frischknecht didn't have the slightest interest in the job; he only accepted it because he felt the other candidates were unqualified. But Frischknecht, himself, lacked some of the important qualities required of a chief executive. He was not the outgoing, decisive leader that Don Quayle had been; he also lacked his old friend's ability to work a party and manage external relations on Capitol Hill. Frischknecht preferred to stay behind the scenes, to sit alone and weigh administrative options with great care. It soon became clear that his presidency would lack the paternal, even feudal tones of the Quayle years, and this proved disappointing for
NPR’s Hell

subordinates. When remembering Frischknecht, many people describe him as stiff, bureaucratic, and reclusive; a man who meant will, but made a series of bad hires and bad decisions. NPR was plagued with internal dissension throughout his presidency; indeed, some recall that the turbulence began almost immediately.¹²

Financial Problems

Personal quirks aside, Frischknecht actually inherited a number of difficult problems. First was the lack of money -- NPR got very little of it from CPB, then its only funding source. In FY 1973, NPR was funded at the level of $3.2 million; yet it ended the year with a deficit of more than $170,000. This was due, in part, to capital equipment expenses associated with a move to new facilities early in the year. It happened at an unfortunate time, though, as NPR’s network of affiliates expanded to 137 and its central staff to nearly 100.¹³

The tightness of the young network’s budget added to the background level of stress associated with rapid organizational growth. Invariably, people who worked in programming during NPR’s first few years say their jobs were very difficult and the pay very low. In 1974, the pay scale for one of NPR’s top
NPR’s Hell

Washington-based hosts or reporters ranged from $16,250 to $24,375 per year. By 1976, most reporters earned between $18,000 and $20,000, with ATC host Susan Stamberg pulling down $22,500 per year. These journalists knew their peers in commercial broadcasting made substantially more money, and they were none too happy about it.¹⁴

Frischknecht and his aides made some progress on NPR’s financial problems in 1974. In particular, they used increased payments from CPB to retire nearly all of the network’s debt by the end of the fiscal year.¹⁵ But other financial difficulties loomed on the horizon. Many public broadcasters cringed at the way NPR fared in the so-called “Level II” negotiations with CPB. In these talks, NPR and PBS haggled over what percentage of federal funds for public broadcasting should go to radio, and what percentage to TV. Since 1973, public television had managed to win about 83 percent of all funds appropriated, with the rest going to radio. Station managers were dismayed by this split, since the radio system truly needed an infusion of funds to start new stations, stimulate program ideas, and hasten the development of satellite interconnection.¹⁶

The Level II negotiations in August 1975 proved especially tough. First, the radio team at these talks consisted of
spokesmen from both NPR (including Frischknecht) and APRS. This need not have been troublesome; but representatives from the two organizations made it so by failing to coordinate their presentations. To make matters worse, the public television lobby presented a highly unified front under the leadership of PBS Chairman Ralph Rogers. In the end, Frischknecht and the other radio lobbyists did not manage to increase radio's share of federal money for FY 1977. This infuriated the managers of NPR member stations, and heightened the perception that Frischknecht was having enormous trouble doing his job.17

Interpersonal Problems

Frischknecht also faced an ever-deepening clash of cultures within his programming staff. Early on, many staffers embraced Bill Siemering's call to combine information, arts, and cultural programming in a way that celebrated the human experience. Over time, though, others came to see NPR as a conventional news organization; they wanted it to become America's radio news source of record.18 In FY 1973, news and information programming accounted for 59 percent of NPR's offerings, with cultural programming filling out the rest of the schedule. In the following year, the amount of news and information programming
NPR's Hell

rose to 70 percent -- at the direct expense of arts programs. These changes helped fuel a wave of dissension that rocked NPR over the next few years.19

As FY 1975 unfolded, Frischknecht announced a major corporate restructuring. He split the organization into two parts: a Corporate Division consisting of himself, the Board, and the Business Affairs department, and the Programming Division, which included all other functions. One important offshoot of this move was the founding of the National News and Information Bureau, headed by journalist Robert Zelnick (now with ABC News).20 In previous years, NPR management was concerned with the uneven quality of news reporting. Zelnick's job was to even things out; to coordinate the efforts of reporters, edit their work, and ensure that the overall product was of high quality. By most accounts he was quite successful at these tasks. But his presence also had another important effect. It legitimated the goals of hard-nosed reporters like Linda Wertheimer and Nina Totenberg, who wanted NPR to focus on the brand of conventional news offered by the Big Three networks.21

While this goal may seem reasonable, it also exacerbated the friction between NPR's conventional journalists and those employees who favored a more eclectic mix of informational and
NPR’s Hell

cultural programs. Jack Mitchell -- an early producer of All Things Considered -- says this friction had much to do with differing interpretations of the network’s mission.

It was pretty much common understanding that what public radio was about was to be an alternative. And Zelnick -- not by statement, but by action -- was saying... "you can be an alternative by doing a better job of what the other guys do, rather than doing something different." And that’s sort of the way he was operating. He was more conventional... and very good, very thorough. He was the only one that I would say was really a competent journalist, of all the people in the news area... And he was just really, really very, very bright. But disruptive to the organization, because he knew "exactly what ought to happen," and set out to do it.

In response to this deepening web of interpersonal conflict, Frischknecht began a top-to-bottom organizational analysis of NPR in early 1976. To perform the study, he hired consultants Al Engelman and Steve Symonds, both from the Antioch College branch campus in Baltimore. Engelman was then head of Antioch’s Center for Media and Social Research. He came to Frischknecht on the recommendation of an NPR employee who had done graduate work with him.

150
Symonds recalls that NPR was a tricky environment to navigate when he and Engelman entered the building in February 1976; clearly, he says, Frischknecht did not have control of the company. The two consultants launched into a series of interviews to find out what was going on; but many who took part say the process was confrontational in tone -- sometimes vulgar. Engelman came to be so hated at NPR headquarters that he was once known as "Lee's Rasputin." But Symonds says the abrasive tone that he and Engelman projected was a necessary part of the study design, since the NPR staff had become polarized into warring tribes. The consultants felt this approach might force people to talk more honestly about their feelings. That rationale aside, most who went through the process were repulsed by it, including producer Jeff Rosenberg.

The first thing that Engelman did was put himself in an office somewhere. And people went in to him one at a time and ratted on whoever they didn't like... It very rapidly became one of the nastiest episodes... I think it's the nastiest period we ever had at NPR.

Reporter Jim Russell says the interview process felt like taking a bicycle ride, with Engelman and Symonds trying to dismantle the bike in mid-stream. He argues the process brought
many latent feelings to the surface; feelings that should have remained buried in the absence of some skillful plan to manage them.\textsuperscript{29} Susan Stamberg remembers the trauma that resulted.

It was a bloodletting. He [Engelman] came in... and... Understand we were this tiny little band of people. We were desperately trying just to get an hour and a half on the air every night. I mean, the work itself was hard enough. And along came these folks who made individual appointments with all of us... And so we all sat and sort of poured our hearts out, and told all the things that were really on our minds -- and in the best faith. And it ended up being used against us.\textsuperscript{30}

On April 14, Frischknecht briefed the NPR Board on the results of the study, and announced plans that he and his consultants had developed. The most controversial item was a decision to merge the functions of Bob Zelnick's National News and Information Bureau with those of Cultural, Informational, and Special Interest programming. Frischknecht told Zelnick, Mitchell, and Stamberg about this decision, and asked that it be kept in confidence until he made a formal announcement in several days. He saw this move as a way to bring the network's programming effort more in line with the Siemering mission; to ensure that \textit{All Things Considered} and other programs offered
content that went far beyond the simple reporting of hard news.31

But Zelnick took a different view.

What got under my skin was this guy from Antioch [Engelman] who didn’t know dog shit about news, you know, making criticisms of the news department... because we were interested in being judged good newsmen by our peers, and doing CBS stuff better than CBS. I covered Washington. You know, nobody said, “Go to the Supreme Court and do a piece on Chief Justice Burger’s taste in chamber music.” I was supposed to do an incisive report, in a five minute spot, on the Supreme Court. When Linda Wertheimer was on Capitol Hill, you know, nobody said, “Go up to Capitol Hill and do a piece on mysticism.” They wanted her to cover politics insightfully... and dig deeper and be more analytical than a journalist could be in a one or two minute report.32

Soon after learning of Frischknecht’s plans, an outraged Stamberg shared the news with two other staff members. Word spread quickly through the building and, indeed, throughout the public radio system. Fifteen members of the National News and Information Bureau, led by Jim Russell, threatened to resign.33

Frischknecht’s study was designed to ease communication problems between himself and the rest of the NPR staff. But in the process, he and his consultants discovered that the real problem lay much deeper, at the level of mission. Engelman
clearly identified with Siemering’s desire to blend news and information programming with softer genres. His opinion was undoubtedly an important factor in Frischknecht’s decision to rein in an unruly news staff, and make it conform more closely to the network’s stated mission.\textsuperscript{34}

Zelnick left NPR after the Engelman study. Frischknecht then proceeded to split the network’s news function in two, creating a byzantine hierarchy in which problems of day-to-day news coverage required decision-making at unusually high levels of management. Mitchell was offered a chance to stay on in a supervisory role; but he objected to the new chain of command, and moved to Wisconsin to become station manager of WHA Radio in Madison.\textsuperscript{35}

Again, Lee Frischknecht thought Engelman and Symonds could help him manage the network better. However, Mitchell says the hiring of these consultants was also part of a deeper pattern.

Lee never could figure out what he was supposed to be doing [at NPR]. He was always looking for someone to tell him, you know. Quayle wasn’t there to tell him. And I was working directly for him on the research side... he was expecting that would tell him. And then he was essentially looking for Al Engelman to tell him.\textsuperscript{36}
External Problems

While Frischknecht tried to keep a lid on the cauldron that was NPR/Washington, another powerful figure began sowing the seeds of competition on the prairies of Minnesota. Since the mid-1960s, Bill Kling nurtured the dream of starting a classical music station, the kind of service he couldn't find on the radio dial at his home in Collegeville, Minnesota. Following graduate studies at Boston University, Kling returned to Minnesota to build his station. In 1967, he and a handful of associates began broadcasting on KSJR-FM, the cornerstone of a service that would later become Minnesota Public Radio (MPR).37

Though quite young (he was only 24 when KSJR went on the air), Kling was soon recognized as a leader in the talent-thin field of non-commercial radio. Over the next few years, he held a series of extraordinary leadership positions including seats on CPB's Radio Advisory Council and NPR's first Board, as well as a job with the CPB Radio Office in New York. These experiences whetted Kling's appetite to put the things he learned into practice. In 1971, satisfied that his training was complete, he returned to Minnesota to preside over KSJR and two other stations which had, by then, come together as Minnesota Educational Radio (later MPR).38
During his travels, Kling developed a close working relationship with Hartford Gunn, then head of WGBH Television in Boston. Gunn disdained the traditional university stations that dominated the field of educational radio and TV and sought, instead, to promote an entrepreneurial brand of community-based broadcasting. He turned WGBH into an independent force with a broad base of community support, particularly among Boston's well-to-do families. Kling took that vision for public broadcasting with him to NPR, CPB and, eventually, Minnesota Public Radio. He never wanted the singular, Washington-based production center that NPR became; instead, he and other like-minded colleagues wanted to build the system upon a skeleton of powerful regional production centers. Not coincidentally, he thought the news and public affairs arm of Minnesota Public Radio should be developed into one of these centers.

This belief that power in the public radio system should be spread more diffusely, and that individual stations should have a lobbying voice in Washington, prompted Kling and others to form a second public radio organization.

A number of us felt... that National Public Radio couldn’t be both a program producer and a representational organization; that it couldn’t fairly represent the needs of the stations and its own needs to Congress...
And so we said... "the logical way to do this is to have an organization that is representing all of the public radio stations... that goes to Congress and says, 'Here's the case for public radio. Include in that NPR and anybody else that's a part of the system, and then make a decision in terms of what is best for the American public, as to how that money ought to be distributed -- whether you build stations, build other programming resources, or whatever'."41

In May 1973 station managers voted overwhelmingly to form an organization that would later become the Association of Public Radio Stations (APRS). In theory, this group would stick to lobbying issues, while NPR handled programming. However, changes in the public radio system over the next few years would propel the leaders of APRS into roles that were much more prominent than originally envisioned.42

Chaos Reigns Supreme

The constellation of problems at NPR since 1973 -- and Frischknecht's track record in handling them -- produced three important results: an eventual merger between NPR and APRS, the departure of Frischknecht and his top aides from the network, and the advent of a new, high-profile management team headed by Frank Mankiewicz. Not surprisingly, many people working in the public radio system began to explain these events with a variety of
conspiracy theories. Some thought that Bill Kling and Ron Bornstein, then Chairman and Vice Chairman of APRS, wanted to take NPR and run it themselves (evidence suggests they did not). Others thought that Tom Warnock of CPB was bankrolling APRS for the explicit purpose of undermining Lee Frischknecht (indeed, Warnock campaigned vigorously, but unsuccessfully, to succeed Frischknecht as NPR president). While these rumors continue to find currency with many people, there is little in the way of hard information to substantiate them. Rather, it is more plausible to say that NPR lay at the confluence of several strands of tension that came together simultaneously, and in most unpleasant fashion, in 1976.

First of all, we must cite Lee Frischknecht's ill-fated attempt to tighten NPR's administrative controls. There's little doubt that such controls were needed, following the laissez-faire days of the Donald Quayle presidency. But Frischknecht's efforts were clouded by two problems. The first, mentioned above, is that he lacked the personal dynamism and breadth of vision needed to effect major change. Secondly, his desire to restructure programming assumed the notion that NPR had one unitary mission, a mission that he knew and was guided by. This was true only in part. Some people at NPR did carry with them an amorphous notion
of the Siemering mission; but others, like Bob Zelnick, resisted this notion mightily. They came to NPR to make it the best conventional radio news service in the nation. These conflicting goals at the level of rank-and-file show that Frischknecht tried to repair NPR's organizational structure before he fully knew what ends the repair job would ultimately serve.

At the staff level, NPR's National News and Information Bureau felt traumatized by the Engelman study and Frischknecht's subsequent reorganization. NPR News had, in recent years, won a collection of impressive awards. Whatever success the network had in attracting an audience, the news staff felt largely responsible. It boasted several members who went on, in later years, to roles of distinction in broadcast journalism; among them were Zelnick, Susan Stamberg, Nina Totenberg, and Linda Wertheimer. These people felt that Frischknecht's effort to blend their product with that of the Cultural and Special Audience Departments was a slap in the face.45

Finally, the managers of some important NPR member stations -- including Bill Kling -- actively agitated for change at NPR.

I was not enamored with the leadership at NPR, nor were the NPR Board members...we did not have the strength of leadership we could have had, or should have had, to move the company forward.
Now having not been there, I also don't know about the difficulties of the operational problems. But my guess is that Lee was consumed by the operational problems of the company, and was unable to get outside of it, and provide the outside leadership that needed to be done. And frankly, he was doing the job that he was best suited to do.46

Jack Mitchell, who later served for many years on the NPR Board, is more blunt in his assessment.

...Kling's criticism of NPR was that it didn't know where it was going... and that Frischknecht wasn't really running the place, and we needed a strong leader. And you're never going to get it out of Frischknecht and this [NPR] Board. And therefore they needed, essentially, to be overthrown... which caused Lee and his board.... first of all the board... to kind of rally behind Lee... and for Lee to demonstrate that he is a leader. And this whole thing [the Engelman study and re-organization] was Lee -- I think, in part -- responding to the pressure he was feeling from the outside to be a leader and take charge.47

By failing to maintain a dialogue with Kling, NPR's management team virtually ensured that he would go forward with efforts to build Minnesota Public Radio into a major regional network and, later on, a powerful competitor.48 CPB Radio Office chief Tom Warnock also sensed that all was not well with NPR - financially or administratively -- in 1976; therefore, he
NPR's Hell

withheld CPB's FY 1977 appropriation for 9 months, until he was reasonably certain that things were moving in the right direction.49

With pressures like this, it is not surprising that NPR and APRS joined into a single organization in May of 1977. On another level, though, it is startling to note that Lee Frischknecht went from king of the hill to persona non grata, all in the space of four years. Indeed, Don Quayle and the NPR Board would have done well to heed Frischknecht's trepidation about taking the presidency in 1973. Frischknecht was a good soldier with the purest of motives. But, by his own admission, he was not the best man to run NPR.

I am not a creative broadcaster. I am an administrator... I'm sure this is one of the reasons why the assessment and the reorganization, and the suggestions that came out of that ...came out the way they did. Because I sat there for the first three years and saw this organization try to move forward without a framework in which to make its decisions...

So I spent most of my time... until Quayle left... trying to structure those kinds of things. And those structures were perceived, particularly by the program staff, as impediments to the kind of freedom of expression that they thought they needed to have. And that doesn't surprise me. And if I were them, and had that point of view, I'd probably do the same thing.50
Discussion

It would be unfair to blame all of NPR's subsequent troubles on Lee Frischknecht. Again, he inherited a substantial number of problems including lax organizational structure, corporate growth that outstripped management's resources and capabilities, and problems with delivering an adequate radio service to affiliate stations over an antiquated phone line hookup.

Frischknecht's handling of financial, interpersonal and external problems was clearly a factor in the development of a "new NPR" -- an entity born of the NPR/APRS merger in May 1977. Mishandled opportunities were also a factor in Frischknecht's subsequent marginalization and departure from the network. But they are only one part of the reason why the years from 1973 through 1977 were crucial to NPR's transportation from the margins to the mainstream of American radio.

These changes paved the way for Frank Mankiewicz to take over as the network's top executive. Virtually all observers note that Mankiewicz -- a lawyer, journalist, and former press aide to Robert Kennedy -- made NPR much more visible by beefing up its news staff, starting Morning Edition, garnering more Federal money, and improving the network's public relations.\textsuperscript{51} Despite these strategic advances, the Mankiewicz regime soon
followed its own pathway to missed opportunity. Mankiewicz, the P.T. Barnum of noncommercial radio, was keenly aware that federal support for public broadcasting would wane in the Reagan years. Instead of planning for these cuts with prudence, though, he entered a period of significant corporate expansion. In the process, he bet the company's future on Project Independence, a series of speculative efforts to raise money from private contributors, new programming streams, and high-tech business ventures. Mankiewicz lost his bet in spectacular fashion in the Spring of 1983, and the network was nearly forced off the air because of it.52

NPR's next two presidents brought a period of bureaucratic stability to the network for the first time in its history. Douglas Bennet accomplished a number of impressive feats following the debt crisis of 1983 and his successor, Delano Lewis, has continued this era of stability. Under his leadership, NPR helped blunt the threat of zeroed-out Federal funding 1995, continued a relatively smooth transition to non-federal sources of money, and started a new program of profit-making enterprises.53

Any dispassionate observer would have to conclude that the bureaucratic stability NPR gained under Doug Bennet and Del Lewis
NPR's Hell

has been an important part of the network's survival in the face of continued financial threats. But this stability has exacted a significant price in another way -- namely, the continued mainstreaming of NPR's content and organizational structure. Under Lewis, NPR's program schedule is less diverse, focusing ever more on the maintenance of the two prominent magazine programs and Talk of the Nation (admittedly, other program vendors -- especially PRI -- are picking up the slack). NPR's news and information operation has responded to chronic funding pressures by competing even more keenly for the journalistic space that was formerly occupied by commercial network news (ex., NPR News has launched two minute "business news updates" during some of its afternoon newscasts).54

In terms of news and information content, as well as internal politics, NPR has clearly become gentrified.55 We may liken this process to a movement of elites into a downtrodden, yet character-rich section of a major city. Upon arriving, they pump in new money and begin to transform the neighborhood to their liking. On the corner where a fresh fruit stand used to operate, we now find an upscale bookstore and coffee shop. Upper class emigres gobble up old row houses and turn them into fashionable townhomes. And on every block we find an antique
shop filled with artifacts from the people who used to live in the neighborhood; only now, they are sold at prices that lie far beyond the reach of the typical working man or woman.

It is not far-fetched to compare NPR's early history to this process of urban gentrification. The "fresh fruit" that Robert Krulwich and Ira Flatow used to dish up in the form of feature stories has now been replaced by the cool, cerebral kaffeeklatsch of Robert Siegel and Linda Wertheimer on today's All Things Considered. Since NPR's discovery by American elites, it has changed from a boisterous row house of creative, sound-intensive journalism into an elegant audio townhome, one that fits perfectly with the taste of Georgetown and its policy elites. Accordingly, the discourse of NPR news has become too intellectually pricey for many ordinary people. Conversations that are largely by elites, for elites, and about elites cannot be of much use to members of other socioeconomic groups.

The process described above is not the result of simple, intentional activity by NPR journalists and managers. Instead, it stems from their reactions to a complex set of internal and external pressures on the organization. Research suggests that these mainstreaming pressures operated most powerfully on the young network between 1970, when it was founded, and 1983, when
NPR's Hell

it almost drowned in its own debt.

The history of NPR is still a work in progress. For now, though, we may view the Frischknecht years as an important point in its travels from the margins to the mainstream of American radio. In a society where the commercial ethic so dominates the field of broadcasting, it stands to reason that non-commercial services must be expertly managed in order to survive. To the extent that they are not, openings arise for further colonization of the non-commercial sphere by profit-oriented broadcasters. In the process, networks like NPR move further away from their normative mission of serving all segments of the population, and closer to the market-driven dictates of commercial broadcasting. Sadly, in the process, they also come to address their audiences as consumers of elite cultural fare, rather than active, curious citizens of a democracy.
NPR’s Hell

ENDNOTES


3. For more on the distinction between the federal and community variants of public broadcasting, see Engelman, esp. pp. 82, 106, 130, 276, and 286.


NPR's Hell


11. Lee Frischknecht, telephone interview by author, 4 August 1995, Transcript of tape recording, 34.


16. Frischknecht to Quayle, 5 November 1973; Henry Loomis to Hartford Gunn, 7 October 1974; Frischknecht to NPR Board, 13 September 1974; Gunn to Loomis, 19 September 1974; Michael Hobbs to Ralph Rogers, Memorandum on "Radio-TV Split" Decision, 11 October 1974; and Ron Bornstein to Scott Miller and Michael Hobbs, 3 April 1975 -- all contained in NPBA Mss, Lee Frischknecht Papers, Box 1, Folder 5.
NPR's Hell

It is important to note that until October 1979, NPR transmitted its programs nationally via phone line; indeed, this method led to poor transmission quality. NPR solved the problem in 1979 when it began beaming programs to affiliate stations via the Westar I satellite.

17. It is not difficult to see why many of the important players in public radio were dismayed by Frischknecht's performance in these talks. First of all, he circumvented proper channels when discussing the matter with CPB. His letters regarding the Level II talks were addressed to his old friend Don Quayle; they should have gone to Tom Warnock, who ran CPB's radio office. Some observers think this arrangement contributed to the demonstrably strained relations between these two men (for ex., see Jack Mitchell, interview by author, 19 September 1995, Madison, WI, Transcript of tape recording, 25-6).

Secondly, the tone of Frischknecht's letters was pedantic and confrontational. Many public radio officials agreed with his positions, but few had a good feeling about the way he communicated them.

For more on this, see Minutes, NPR Board of Directors Meeting, 22 August 1975, in NPBA Mss, NPR Board Minutes. See also Frischknecht to Quayle, 31 August 1973; Frischknecht to Quayle, 5 November 1973; Frischknecht to Quayle, 4 September 1974; and Ronald Bornstein to Thomas Warnock, 8 April, 1975 -- all contained in NPBA Mss, Lee Frischknecht Papers, Box 1, Folder 5.


NPR's Hell


Up until this point in time, Bob Zelnick had been working for NPR on a freelance basis. Zelnick reports that the decision to make him head of the National News and Information Bureau was motivated, at least in part, by NPR's desire to keep him on board -- even though he was earning more as a freelancer than NPR was permitted to pay its full-time correspondents. See Zelnick interview, 7-8.


The author tried repeatedly to contact Mr. Engelman for an interview, to no avail. People familiar with Engelman (ex., Symonds, Emanation) were not surprised by this. Because of an active background in leftist politics -- and his personal history as a concentration camp survivor -- Engelman now leads a reclusive life. Assertions made about Engelman in this dissertation are based, then, on a variety of other evidence (ex., primary documents, interviews with those who worked closely with him).


27. Symonds interview, 6-7.


29. Russell interview, 14.

NPR's Hell

31. Emanation interview, 21; Symonds interview, 11-12; Minutes, NPR Board of Directors Executive Committee Meeting, 14-15 April, 1976, NPBA Mss, NPR Board Minutes; Frischknecht interview, 4 August 1995, 21.


33. For more on this volatile situation, see a variety of documents contained in NPBA Mss, Lee Frischknecht Papers, Box 3, Folder 1: Frischknecht to NPR Staff, 16 April 1976; Mitchell, Stamberg and Zelnick to Frischknecht, undated memo on "Proposed Reorganization;" Mitchell and Zelnick to Informational Programming Staff, 19 April 1976; Information staff members to Frischknecht, Memorandum/threat to resign, undated; Jim Russell to Frischknecht, 20 April 1976; Mitchell to Frischknecht, 23 April 1976; Mitchell to Presley Holmes, Memorandum regarding "Sanctions Against Staff Members," 28 April, 1976; Mitchell to Presley Holmes, Memorandum on "Department of Program Content Resources," 29 April 1976; and Mitchell to Holmes, "Role of Mitchell, Zelnick, Russell, and Stamberg in Events of April 15 - 24."


36. Mitchell Interview, 19 September 1995, 13-14. For more on Frischknecht's lack of dynamism, see Bornstein interview, 4; Gwathmey interview, 8-9; Hulsen interview, 20-21; Quayle interview, 27-8; and Russell interview, 13-14.

37. Patricia Weaver Francisco, "The Life and Times of MPR;" "Little Jewels: MPR's Network Stations Unite the Region;" and "Two Decades at a Glance" -- all published in Minnesota Monthly 2(1) (January 1987) [copies made from collections at the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN].

38. Francisco, et. al., Minnesota Monthly. See also the biographical materials from candidates for new NPR Board, NPBA Mss, Lee Frischknecht Papers, Box 4, Folder 2.


41. Kling interview, 10.


43. Ronald Bornstein, interview by author, 3 July 1995, Madison, WI, Transcript of tape recording, 3-4; Kling interview, 10-12.
NPR's Hell

44. "Enough is Enough: An Open Letter To Those Who Care About Public Radio," NPBA Mss, Lee Frischknecht Papers, Box 4, Folder 2; Ronald Bornstein to Thomas Warnock, 10 July 1975, and Ken Kager to Joe Welling, 21 July 1975 -- both in NPBA Mss, Lee Frischknecht Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.

See also Gwathmey interview, 13; Quayle interview, 14 August 1995, 25-28; and Symonds interview, 10.

45. Mitchell interview, 19 September 1995, 23-24; Rosenberg interview, 20-22; Stamberg interview, 7-8; Wertheimer interview, 7-10; Zelnick interview, 10-14.


47. Mitchell interview, 19 September 1995, 27. See also Rosenberg interview, 24-25.


Kling and Minnesota Public Radio eventually formed -- and spun off -- American Public Radio (APR). This organization, in turn, spawned Public Radio International (PRI), a rival distribution system for programs produced outside the NPR system.


50. Frischknecht interview, 4 August 1995, 33-35.

51. Bornstein interview, 9-10; Hulsen interview, 26; Kling interview, 25-26; Mitchell interview (3), 12-13; Stamberg interview, 14-15.

52. For a comprehensive treatment of the Mankiewicz years at NPR, see McCauley, "From the Margins to the Mainstream," 189-260.

53. Ibid., 365.
NPR's Hell


Hitting from the Left:

The Daily Worker's Assault on Baseball's Color Line

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Hitting from the Left:

The Daily Worker's Assault on Baseball's Color Line

Abstract

On August 16, 1936, the Daily Worker, a Communist newspaper published in New York City, published a banner headline that called on readers to demand the end of segregated baseball. Between 1936 and 1947, the Daily Worker, a Communist newspaper published in New York City, openly and brashly challenged baseball's establishment to permit black players; condemned white owners and managers for perpetuating the color ban; criticized the mainstream press for ignoring the issue; distributed anti-discrimination pamphlets at ballparks; and let their readers know of the successes in the campaign to integrate the national pastime. This article examines the newspaper's role in the integration of baseball.

Historian William Simons called the integration of baseball the most widely "commented on episode in American race relations of its time." The Worker has thus far been neglected in the research on press coverage of the issue of segregation and ultimately desegregation in baseball. But without it, no story on the press and the integration of baseball is complete. The desegregation of baseball became a crusade for the newspaper against what it perceived as a morally objectionable idea: racism.
On Sunday, August 16, 1936, the *Sunday Worker* published a banner headline that read: "Fans Ask End of Jim Crow Baseball." The story began with the following pronouncement: "Jim Crow baseball must end." It included supporting comments from fans at Yankee Stadium and a photograph of Negro League stars Oscar Charleston and Martin Dihigo (Rodney, 1936a). The article continued on page 15 with an appeal to readers to demand that the national pastime admit black ballplayers. "Big league ball is on the downgrade. You pay the high prices. Demand better ball. Demand Americanism in baseball, equal opportunities for Negro and white stars. Demand the end of Jim Crow baseball" (p 15). Thus began the communist newspaper's campaign to end discrimination in the national pastime.

Over the next decade, its sportswriters, including notably sports editor Lester Rodney, Ted Benson, Charles Dexter, Dave Farrell, Nat Low, and Bill Mardo, openly and often brashly challenged baseball's establishment to permit black players; condemned white owners and managers for perpetuating the color ban; criticized the mainstream press for ignoring the issue; organized petition drives and distributed anti-discrimination pamphlets; publicized the exploits of Negro League stars; and let their readers know of successes in the campaign to end segregation in the national pastime. The *Worker* published stories not found in mainstream dailies. "We were the only non-black newspaper writing about it for a long time,"
Rodney said (Lester Rodney, personal communication, November 6, 1997). This is not entirely true -- a few other white sportswriters called on baseball to end its color ban -- but none more regularly and more emotionally than the Daily Worker.

The Daily Worker and its Sunday edition, the Sunday Worker, were published in New York City and espoused the beliefs and philosophies of the Communist Party. The U.S. Communist Party, or CPUSA, found it propitious to champion the cause of ending segregation, as part of an overall campaign to end discrimination against African-Americans in all phases of American life. The Communist Party realized the possibilities of increasing its popularity by appealing to blacks and sympathetic whites. The party seized the issue of segregation in baseball because it represented one of the more obvious evidences of discrimination (Tygiel, 1983). The Worker's journalists understood that ending discrimination in baseball could make a truly revolutionary change in American society (Rusinack, 1995).

The Worker did not have the circulation of other New York City newspapers, such as the Daily News, Daily Mirror, or the Times, but it also was not, strictly speaking a New York City daily. Its readership, which included foreign-language editions, peaked at about 140,000 in the 1930s and then after World War II (Klein, 1997). The Worker understood and exposed the hypocrisy of baseball's color ban. Its sarcastic and even belligerent articles often offended not just baseball's establishment but also those who supported integration, including black sportswriters. They may have agreed with the Worker in theory, but shunned its support as extreme, because they abhorred communism, or because, if they associated themselves with the newspaper, they might be perceived as communists by association. Others dismissed the newspaper's campaign because they strongly believed in keeping the game segregated; the fact
that communists wanted to do otherwise only strengthened their resolve to preserve the color ban.

The *Worker*'s critics included baseball commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis, the national sports weekly, the *Sporting News*, Brooklyn Dodgers president Branch Rickey, and New York Yankee president Larry McPhail, who denounced the newspaper's sportswriters as "agitators" (Tygiel, 1983, p. 37). In addition, Wendell Smith, sports editor of the influential black weekly, the *Pittsburgh Courier*, once wrote that the "communists did more to delay the entrance of Negroes in big league baseball than any other single factor" (Tygiel, 1983, p. 37). The participation of communists in the integration effort allowed the baseball establishment to downplay the protests (Tygiel, 1983). But Jules Tygiel, in his groundbreaking book on the integration of baseball, *Baseball's Great Experiment*, acknowledged that the contributions made by the communists far outweighed the negatives associated with their involvement. "The crusade waged by the communists, the black press, and a small coterie of white sportswriters helped to alleviate the apathy that nourished baseball segregation" (Tygiel, 1983, p. 37).

In recent years, much has been written about the role of the press during the segregation and ultimately desegregation of the national pastime (Lamb, 1997, Lamb & Bleske, 1997, Lamb & Bleske, 1996, Deardorff, 1990, Washburn, 1986b, 1981, Wiggins, 1983, Simons, 1985, Weaver, 1979, and Kelley, 1976). Yet these studies have focused on the black press or have compared how important events in the integration saga were covered differently in the black and white press. But the study of the American press and the integration of baseball is more than simply a black and white story. It requires an understanding of the coverage in the alternative press. The *Worker* has thus far been neglected in the research of press coverage of the issue of segregation and ultimately desegregation in
baseball. But without it, no story on the press and the integration of baseball is complete.

The *Worker*, for instance, not only published a vast number of columns and articles over more than a decade but its journalists personally thrust themselves into the fray. No other newspaper or magazine became more involved in the cause of integration. For purposes of this paper, the newspaper was examined from 1936 to 1947. In addition, *Worker* sportswriters Lester Rodney and Bill Mardo were interviewed – as was Sam Lacy of the Baltimore *Afro-American*, who campaigned for integration in the black press. Finally, it was necessary to put the newspaper in the context of the communist movement of the 1930s and 1940s; the context of society during the same years; and the literature on the press and the integration of baseball, which tells us that the story meant something different for the communist newspaper than it did for either the black press or mainstream press.

If the *Worker* did nothing more than crusade to integrate the national pastime for more than a decade, this alone would justify an examination of its part in the overall story of the press and segregation in baseball; after all, the newspaper published perhaps hundreds of articles on the issue. But the newspaper went beyond that, directly challenging the baseball establishment, confronting baseball teams, and organizing petition drives to enlist fan support. The newspaper's campaign to integrate baseball was an offensive one, not a conciliatory one as practiced by black sportswriters Wendell Smith and Sam Lacy, who preferred to work directly with sympathetic baseball executives like Branch Rickey, who eventually broke baseball's color line by signing Jackie Robinson in 1945. The desegregation of baseball became a crusade for the *Worker*, a crusade of self-righteous indignation against what it perceived as a morally objectionable idea: racism.
The race problem

This paper examines the Daily Worker's campaign to end segregation in baseball. Unrestricted by the journalistic constraint of objectivity, the capitalist constraint of commercialism, or even the constraint of public opinion itself, the newspaper took the offensive, attacking the baseball establishment with impassioned and sometimes bitter language -- a characteristic of communist propaganda. The newspaper's journalists began their campaign for integration before other reform-minded sportswriters, such as Smith and Lacy, and they continued with few interruptions until the big leagues became integrated in 1947. To understand the motives of the Worker, it is important to understand the motives of the Communist Party. But in addition, it is necessary for the sake of context to compare what was said in the Worker with what was said in other newspapers, whether black weeklies or mainstream dailies.

Historian William Simons called the integration of baseball the most widely "commented on episode in American race relations of its time" (Simons, 1985, p. 40). This should not infer that all American sportswriters embraced the story enthusiastically or even openly. They did not. Several studies of press coverage of the integration of baseball have concluded that the issue was covered widely by the black press but neglected or certainly underappreciated by the white press (Lamb, 1997, Lamb & Bleske, 1997, Lamb & Bleske, 1996). As one white sportswriter of the day, Washington Post columnist Shirley Povich put it: "I'm afraid white sportswriters thought like the owners ... that separate was better" (Shirley Povich, personal communication, July 8, 1996).

Segregation was institutionalized in the American consciousness in the decades prior
to the civil rights movement (Myrdal, 1962). White journalists, reflecting the views of their readers, opposed or feared integration of any kind -- especially in the South. For instance, a Richmond *Times-Dispatch* editorial once warned that any attempt to challenge segregation laws would result in violence that would leave "hundreds, if not thousands, dead" (Tygiel, 1983, p. 8). In general, the mainstream press covered the civil rights story as little more than a curiosity, rarely giving it the social or cultural context it deserved. The reporting was limited, both in content and context, by a mindset that kept white journalists, their newspapers, and their readers from appreciating the historical significance and meaning of the story. To most of America, the issue of civil rights was little more than a human interest story (Branch, 1988).

This also was true of the sports pages. White sportswriters, unsure or afraid of how their readers would react to the story, remained relatively silent on the issue (Deardorff, 1994). One analysis of press reaction to the signing of Robinson in 1946 suggested that white America had little awareness of the severity and extent of prejudice and racism in the nation's social fabric (Simons, 1985). The *Sporting News* downplayed the story's importance and said it had received far more importance than it was worth ("Montreal Puts Negro Player," 1946). Four years earlier, it had dismissed talk of integrating baseball by writing that no good would come from raising the race issue ("No Good From Raising," 1942, p. 4). The *Sporting News* criticized efforts to integrate the game. Its editor, J. G. Taylor Spink, called integrationists, such as *Worker* sportswriters, "social-minded drum beaters" (Ribowski, 1995).

For the black press, however, the news coverage of the Robinson story reflected a society in transition as equality on the baseball field became a metaphor for equality in civil rights. Black sportswriters used the success of blacks in sports to push for integration in all
parts of society (Bleske, 1993). To black sportswriters and their readers, the story symbolized the hopes and dreams of integration, not merely on a ballfield but in society (Lamb & Bleske, 1996). The black press -- unlike the white press -- made no attempt to be detached in its reporting; it was "a fighting press," largely circulated outside white America (Rose, 1948, p. 289). The black press was an advocacy press, calling for racial equality not only in its editorial columns but in its news stories. Black journalists were not only more aware of gains in civil rights than were white journalists, they helped make these gains possible.

The Pittsburgh Courier, for example, achieved prominence through a series of editorials and articles aimed at gaining civil rights for blacks during World War II. It was known as the Double V campaign: the first V stood for victory over Germany and Japan, the second for victory over racial prejudice in this country (Washburn, 1986b, p. 73). The black press, which served readers who had suffered a long history of racial discrimination, faced discrimination itself during the war. As Washburn pointed out, the U.S. government used tactics such as investigations, intimidation, and even cutting newsprint supplies to discourage or even silence the black press from urging desegregation in the armed services or society (Washburn, 1986a, p. 43). Ebony magazine defended black publishers who had been accused of disloyalty to the government by sympathizing with the Communists, writing, "Far from being parlor pinks, most Negro publishers are arch-conservatives in their thinking on every public issue with one exception -- the race problem" (Wolseley, 1971, p. 56).

Significantly, the issue of race relations would forge a mutual interest between black newspapers and the Worker, which campaigned for social equality, including specifically the integration of the national pastime. The newspaper, operated by whites and supported largely by membership dues, expressed its opinions on racial issues to a different audience than the
black press; primarily, it presented white Communist sympathizers an opportunity to rage against injustices against blacks to other social progressives. Unlike black newspaper publishers, communist journalists believed in communism in all ways of life, including the race issue.

Communists, too, suffered unrelenting discrimination in the United States. While membership in the CPUSA increased during the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution, the U.S. government sought to purge the country of radicals through sedition laws and other extreme measures during and after World War I. The CPUSA continued to find it difficult to achieve acceptability until the 1930s. It entered the decade with "a tattered remnant of seven thousand embittered members, a bad reputation as splitters, an unfavorable 'public image,' and an unknown, untried leadership" (Simon, 1967, pp. 218-219; Rusinack, 1995). However, a fear of fascism, the devastation caused by the Depression, and a failing faith in contemporary society served to facilitate a receptiveness to radical politics and progressive social reform (Howe & Cosar, 1974). It was out of this atmosphere of distrust in the established system, domestic social disorder, and a migration of foreigners that the U.S. Communist Party sought to achieve legitimacy.

The party devoted more effort to the recruitment of blacks than any other social group, except possibly industrial workers and trade unionists. Blacks, after all, were the most oppressed people in the country (Glazer, 1971). The international Communist Party, or Comintern, was aware that blacks were vital to the success of the CPUSA. The late Soviet Premier Lenin had a keen sense of focusing the party's efforts on the people where resentment and hatred were greatest. Josef Stalin, was interested in the discrimination of blacks in the United States (Glazer, 1971). This would, in turn, have an impact on an unlikely source:
The *Worker*’s effort to integrate baseball was part of the newspaper’s mission to spread the cause of communism throughout the United States. As early as 1933, the newspaper commented on the injustice of racial segregation in major league baseball. It described a scene at a Brooklyn Dodgers’ game at Ebbets Field as blacks worked at the stadium but none took the field. Ben Field, wrote in the *Worker*: “You spot a few Negro fans. Negro workers make good athletes. But where are the Negroes on the field? ... But the big leagues will not admit Negro players. This is something else to chalk up against capitalist-controlled sports” (Field, 1933, p. 2). This article set the tone for hundreds of columns and articles in the newspaper over the next fourteen years that rarely mentioned major league baseball without commenting on the exclusion of black ballplayers from organized professional baseball. Black ballplayers were restricted to the negro leagues, which lacked the prestige, salaries and attention of the white leagues.

In 1935, the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International encouraged the CPUSA to focus attention on the subject of capitalist sports in order to become more popular in American society. Communist sportswriters superimposed the capitalist hierarchy upon the U.S. professional sports establishment, declaring that professional athletes were workers, too, who labored but did not receive a fair share of the fruits of their labor, the same as any factory worker. Neither the athlete nor worker had unions to protect their interests (Rusinack, 1996). In both cases, their employers became wealthy off the profits of their work. By characterizing athletes in such a way, the communists could provide sports coverage and commentary without appearing to approve of capitalist values (Rusinack, 1996). Syndicated columnist Heywood Broun expressed his curiosity of a sports section in the *Worker*. “The *Daily Worker*
has begun a sports section. It will be interesting to observe what happens next, because, so far as I know, you can’t class-angle a box score” (Klein, 1997).

“Jim Crow must end”

The Worker began its campaign to desegregate baseball in earnest during the summer of 1936. The story on Sunday August 16, called for the end of jim crow segregation in the national pastime. It included supportive comments from black players, black managers, and white sportswriters, such as Jimmy Powers of the New York Daily News and Dan Parker of the New York Daily Mirror, two of the relatively few white journalists who publically supported the integration of baseball. A second article pointed out the successes of black teams against white teams in barnstorming exhibitions and also included testimony of the qualifications of black stars. It said negro league slugger Josh Gibson had once hit a 26th-tier home run in Yankee Stadium, surpassing a 21-tier home run by major league star Jimmy Foxx (“Fanning with negro baseball stars,”1938).

The newspaper’s campaign to desegregate baseball would posit three arguments. (Rusinack, 1996). First, it said that blacks had proven their worthiness to participate in American professional sports through their success in the recently completed Summer Olympics in Berlin. Adolf Hitler’s apparent snubbing of Jesse Owens, the black track star who won four gold medals, provided U.S. communists a bugle call for their campaign against discrimination in the United States, including major league baseball. Secondly, communists felt that racism was racism, regardless of whether it was perpetuated by Nazi Germany or by a democracy such as the United States. "There is not much difference between the Hitler who, like the coward he is, runs away before he will shake Jesse Owens’ hand and the American
coward, who won't give the same Negro equal rights, equal pay, and equal opportunities," the newspaper editorialized (Rodney, "Fans Oppose Jim-Crow," 1936a, p. 15). Thirdly, the newspaper's sportswriters argued that the addition of blacks would improve the level of competition in the big leagues. In short, it was not only discriminatory to prohibit blacks from organized baseball, it also detracted from the overall quality of play in organized baseball.

Once the Worker took on the issue of discrimination in major league baseball, it did not let up. Showing a sophistication for picking through decades-old jim crow rhetoric to expose the unfounded fears against signing blacks, the newspaper's sportswriters gained early rhetorical victories of their own in their quest to effect changes in the hiring practices of big league clubs. Its first victory, of sorts, came on August 23, 1936, when the newspaper published a statement from National League president Ford Frick that said there was no formal ban that prohibited major league teams from signing black ballplayers. Worker sportswriter Ted Benson quoted Frick as saying, "I do not recall one instance where baseball has allowed either race, creed or color to enter into the question of the selection of its players" (Benson, 1936, p. 14). Frick's statement was obviously false. But even if it were not, the implication that there were no blacks in professional baseball because there were none good enough for professional baseball was arguable. The Worker would repeat Frick's statement, asking: If there was no ban, why weren't there any blacks in the big leagues? (Rusinack, 1995).

A week later, Worker sports editor Lester Rodney, who would become the newspaper's most vociferous champion for the cause of ending jim crow in baseball, reprinted a letter from a reader in Philadelphia, who said there were 20 black ballplayers who could play better than many of the players on the roster of that city's teams, the Phillies and
Athletics. "I, for one, have always wondered why in a supposedly free and equal country such stupid discrimination must be shown," the letter said. Rodney told readers to contact baseball owners and demand that they make the national pastime "a real national pastime" (Rodney, 1936b, p. 14).

Rodney, whom one writer recently called one of the most influential sportswriters of the 1930s and 1940s, led the newspaper's campaign to desegregate baseball (Klein, 1997). A Jewish-American, Rodney was more interested in seeing justice done for African-Americans than in just seeing better baseball. Rodney had an instinctive sense of social justice and an articulate, yet passionate style of writing. When made sports editor in 1936, he had a forum to advance his ideals of racial equality and the true meaning of democracy in the American sports. He knowingly gave a voice to the opinions of athletes formerly considered to be stupid and shallow (Rusinack, 1996). More than that, Rodney and the Daily Worker devoted time and space to the issue of race, which went ignored or at least neglected by other white-owned newspapers.

Rodney and other sportswriters regularly quoted baseball executives, managers, players, and sportswriters on the issue – particularly if they praised the talents of black ballplayers. For instance, New York Yankee outfielder Joe DiMaggio told Rodney about his off-season barnstorming games against negro leagues players, openly admitting, "Satchel Paige is the greatest pitcher I ever batted against." (Rodney, 1937a, p. 8). Other white sportswriters heard DiMaggio's comment but did not print it. "I wasn't the only one he
mentioned it to. I was the only one who printed it," Rodney said (Lester Rodney, personal communication, November 6, 1997). Rodney also reported Paige's challenge to major league baseball in an article on September 16, 1937: "Let the winners of the World Series play (the negro league All-Stars) just one game at the Yankee Stadium -- and if we don't beat them before a packed house they don't have to pay us!" (Rodney, 1937b, p. 8). Paige's offer was neither accepted nor acknowledged by baseball's establishment.

The Worker also reprinted pro-integration articles from New York columnists Jimmy Powers and Dan Parker. In addition, the newspaper published pro-integration columns from other newspapers, including one by sportswriter Pat Gannon, of the Milwaukee Journal, who wrote that there were 10 or 12 black ballplayers in Cuba who could play in the major leagues if given the opportunity. They could not play -- not because they were excluded, he added sarcastically, but because major league baseball insisted that no blacks were good enough (Gannon, 1937). In 1939, The Washington Post quoted Walter Johnson, one of the greatest pitchers in history, as saying that negro league catcher Josh Gibson was superior to New York Yankee catcher Bill Dickey (Rusinack, 1995). Other sportswriters noticed that baseball's rhetorical argument had no basis in fact. The Worker's joy and evident surprise at reading such articles in other newspapers was tempered somewhat by the infrequency of these articles in the daily press (Rusinack, 1995).

Finally, the Worker also reprinted articles from the black press on the antiquated notion of the racial inferiority of African-American baseball players. According to Rodney,
the Worker and Courier had a mutual agreement where they would print one another's columns (Lester Rodney, personal communication, November 6, 1997). But the Worker found itself with few allies. This was not necessarily because nobody agreed with them, though this was a good part of it. In addition, communist, black, and mainstream sportswriters were divided on the issue by editorial, ideological, and racial differences.

A conspiracy of silence

The sports sections of white mainstream dailies kept integration at arm's length, publishing little or nothing about the lack of black players in the major leagues. Sportswriters and editors either personally believed in segregation or felt the issue was simply too sensitive and might offend readers or advertisers (Lamb & Bleske, 1996). Even if a sportswriter wanted to write about the issue, his newspaper would probably not publish it. Rodney remembered how sympathetic sportswriters would seek him out with certain stories on the issue of baseball's ban against black players. They knew they could not say anything about the story but Rodney could. "I can't tell you how many times they would say, 'Here's a little something. I can't use it, but I'd love to see it in print'" (Lester Rodney, personal communication, November 6, 1997).

In addition, while black newspapers agreed with the communist daily on the need for integration, they shunned its support because they did not want to be perceived as sympathetic to communism. Black sportswriters realized that this association could simply taint their
motives from the outset. This was not without cause. Because communists and blacks were united in the cause of integration, columnists, such as Westbrook Pegler, considered the black press guilty of siding with the communists. "In their obvious, inflammatory bias in the treatment of news they resemble such one-sided publications as the communist Daily Worker," Pegler wrote (Wolseley, 1971, p. 55).

Influential black sportswriters, such as Wendell Smith and Sam Lacy, distanced themselves from the Worker. According to Rodney, Lacy's differences with the newspaper were strictly political. Lacy did not want to associate himself with communists. Smith, on the other hand, had a working relationship with Rodney for several years. The Daily Worker would print articles from the Courier on the need for integration. That changed in the mid-1940s when Smith began working closely with Brooklyn president Branch Rickey, an anti-communist. At that point, Smith, too, began criticizing the involvement of the communist newspaper (Lester Rodney, personal communication, November 6, 1997).

But the Worker was not entirely alone in its crusade. It not only educated readers on what it was doing, it publicized its successes, and recruited others to its cause. By the end of February 1937, Worker sportswriters began to report the addition of other organizations to fight jim crow in baseball. One article noted that the communist-run Negro National Congress' Brooklyn branch sent a petition to the Dodgers to sign Paige. In addition, it told readers that the Youth Council of the Vanguard Community Center also sent a letter to the Dodgers making the same request ("Youth Fights Jim Crow Ball," 1937). A week later, a Worker
sportswriter repeated that the duty of the communists was "to help restore American sports to the American people" (Daugherty, 1937, p. 14). In 1938, the Worker, in conjunction with the Young Communist League, began to promote grass-roots support of the campaign. Anti-discrimination pamphlets were distributed at baseball games at New York City major league ballparks.

Beginning in 1939 and continuing for several years, petitions were circulated for signatures and periodically sent to Baseball Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis, National League president Ford Frick and American League president William Harridge. The communists attempted to shame baseball into ending segregation (Rusinack, 1996). The petitions read, in part: "Our country guarantees the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to all, regardless of race, creed, or color. Yet in our national sport we find discrimination against outstanding negro baseball players who are equal to or surpass in skill many of the present players in the National and American League" (Rusinack, 1996). Tens of thousands of signatures went ignored by the baseball establishment for years. (Rusinack, 1996, pp. 10-11).

In addition, seizing upon every opportunity to bring the injustice of jim crow to the forefront, the Worker covered such incidents as the uproar over the racist radio comments of New York Yankees. During a pre-game interview at Comiskey Park in Chicago on July 29, 1938, Powell replied that he was a policeman in Dayton, Ohio during the offseason, where he kept in shape by cracking "niggers" over the head with his nightstick. Commissioner Landis
suspended the ballplayer for 10 days for his racist comments (Daniel, 1938). Rodney recognized the irony of the suspension coming from Landis, "the high commissioner" of the "sport that continues the un-American practice of discrimination against the race that has given so much to the sports world." He called on the baseball establishment to suspend themselves. The newspaper called for a stronger punishment than a 10-day suspension (Rodney, 1938, p. 13). The Worker used the Powell incident to urge fans to demand racial equality from the national pastime. Specifically, Rodney wrote that the Powell incident proved that the baseball “magnates” did listen to the fans. If the fans wanted integration, integration would happen. “It’s a winning fight. Lift those voices again!” he implored (Rodney, 1938, p. 13).

“A winning fight”

As early as 1939, the Worker touted Robinson, a four-sport star at UCLA, as a potential major league baseball player. The newspaper was prescient. Not even Wendell Smith, who became Robinson’s publicist, imagined, at least in print in 1939, that Robinson would break baseball’s color line. On October 15, Dave Farrell wrote a column about Robinson as a major league prospect (Farrell, 1939). A year later, the Worker published a photograph of Robinson and an article calling him a shortstop of big league caliber (Rodney, 1940). But the integration of the sport would take several more years, countless articles and columns, the death of commissioner Landis, and several direct confrontations with the national
pastime (Lamb & Bleske, 1997).

In his January 1, 1941, column, Rodney vowed to continue the newspaper's campaign to end segregation in baseball by appealing to the fairness of its fans. "Americans are sportsmen who hate discrimination and phony equality. American fandom is much bigger than the handful of reactionary magnates and their stooge Judge Landis" (Rodney, 1941, p. 8). As baseball ignored the calls for integration, the Worker stepped up its rhetoric. Until this point, the Worker had asked Landis to assert pressure on baseball's establishment; now it publically identified Landis as the person singularly responsible for protecting segregation in baseball. It increased its criticism of the commissioner (Rusinack, 1995).

As the United States edged toward World War II, the Worker, like other newspapers, shifted its focus to international issues but it remained committed to integrating baseball. For most of the country, civil rights issues became even less important as the country went to war. The fact that the country was fighting totalitarianism abroad while denying racial equality at home seemed obvious and more than merely ironic to blacks and sympathetic whites (Barck & Blake, 1976). If most of the country made this connection, it did little about it. In addition, the draft depleted major league teams, leaving them with 4-F holdovers, aging veterans, and even players with severe physical liabilities such as Washington Senators outfielder Pete Gray, who only had one arm. Through the war years, organized baseball ignored healthy black ballplayers (Tygiel, 1984).

In the early 1940s, integrationists, however, began to directly challenge baseball's
policy against black players. In 1942, Brooklyn manager Leo Durocher said he would sign black players if allowed. Landis responded that major league baseball did not have any rule forbidding the signing of black ballplayers. The Worker called the statement progress toward the inclusion of blacks on major league roster (Low, 1942). In 1943, Landis and baseball owners agreed to listen to discussions on integration. But as soon as actor Paul Robeson, a communist, concluded his appeal, Landis ended any further discussion on the matter (Tygiel, 1984). Landis' death in late 1944 removed, in the words of one writer, "one of the most implacable and influential opponents of integration" (Tygiel, 1984, p. 41).

During the war years, communist and black sportswriters pressured major league teams to give tryouts to black ballplayers. In July 1943, Worker sportswriter Nat Low convinced the owner of the Pittsburgh Pirates, William Benswager, to look at two Negro League stars. Shortly thereafter, Low received a letter from Benswager, who canceled the tryout because of unnamed pressure (Tygiel, 1984). Then during spring training of 1945, Low, a Worker photographer, and black sportswriter Joe Bostic brought two ballplayers to the Brooklyn Dodgers' camp and insisted that Rickey give them a tryout. Rickey was indignant and fumed. If he did not agree, he would be criticized in both newspapers. The ballplayers were given a short tryout but the team never contacted them. According to a white sportswriter, the presence of a communist photographer and sportswriter added "a sickening Red tinge" to the moment (Roeder, 1950, p. 10).

Finally, in October 1945, the Montreal Royals, the top minor league team in the
Brooklyn organization, announced the signing of Jackie Robinson, breaking baseball's color line. The *Worker* prided itself and the Communist Party in characteristic language for their role in bringing about this breakthrough in both baseball and race relations: "We must crusade and fight for justice even if we are alone. We must never cease to be that 'nerve over which oppression's pains are felt, otherwise unrecorded.' We must keep on fighting until Jim crow is ruined, finished, destroyed in every dirty root and fibre" (Gold, 1945, p. 7).

The *Worker* then sent sports editor Bill Mardo to Florida to report on Robinson's first spring training in white baseball. (Rodney was in the U.S. Army during World War II). Communist and black sportswriters clearly understood the historic importance of the spring training of 1946, white sportswriters did not (Lamb & Bleske, 1996). Only a few sportswriters covered Robinson's first day of practice in Sanford, Florida; there were no journalists from any newspaper in the state. Mardo acknowledged this omission in a column, adding: "I suppose some people and some papers would need an atom bomb bursting about their heads before admitting that this world of ours does move on," he wrote (Mardo, 1946, p. 10).

The *Worker* continued to remind its readers that it was publishing information that could not be found in the mainstream press, specifically, that the world was indeed changing and the newspaper was indeed part of that change. The mainstream press, on the other hand, had willfully missed the story. The *Worker* closely followed Robinson's progress that spring and reported in depth the signings of other black ballplayers by the Brooklyn organization. On
April 11, 1947, the newspaper published a photograph of Robinson with a story, headlined, "Robinson on Dodgers." It informed its readers that the Dodgers had bought the ballplayer’s contract from the Montreal Royals ("Dodgers Sign Robinson," 1947). And with that simple announcement, eleven years of Worker campaigning had paid off.

**Conclusion**

From 1936 until 1947, Worker sportswriters openly challenged baseball’s establishment to end its ban against black ballplayers by stressing the unfairness of racism in a democracy. They condemned the national pastime’s commissioner and team owners for perpetuating the color ban; questioned the argument that blacks were inferior by publicizing the exploits of Negro League stars; reprinted pro-integration articles from other newspapers; organized petition drives and distributed anti-discrimination pamphlets; and reminded its readers that the mainstream press had refused the acknowledge the story. On the issue of civil rights, the Worker was years, perhaps decades, ahead of most newspapers in the country.

What role did the newspaper have in the integration of baseball? It is, of course, difficult to specify with all certainty. "I’m not silly enough to think that it wasn’t going to happen," Lester Rodney said. "I think we probably speeded up the process by a few years" (Lester Rodney, personal communication, November 6, 1997). Rodney is probably right. By writing so often about the issue, the newspaper kept the issue in the public. Black sportswriters also wrote about the need for integrating the national pastime but their readers,
for the most part, were other blacks, who were already convinced of the need for civil rights. White sportswriters, who worked for mainstream dailies, either saw nothing wrong with separate leagues for black and white ballplayers or simply remained silent on the issue, which provided aid and comfort to segregation. The Worker, by comparison, wore down the sense of apathy that surrounded baseball, shamed the sport into defending itself against racism, and educated -- and even convinced -- many readers about the need for change in the national pastime.
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The Lone Ranger Rides Again:  
Black Press Editorial Stands  
on the Vietnam War  
During the Johnson Administration

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Although black soldiers have participated in every US war since the American Revolution, their defense of a nation that denied them equal rights long has been an issue of contention among black opinion leaders. When the issue arose during the Vietnam War, the debate came at a time when both the role of the black press and goals of black advancement were in question. US military operations in Vietnam divided black opinion leaders as well as the rest of the country. Black soldiers were gaining commendation as they fought in fully integrated units for the first time, but their high casualty rates were disproportionate to their numbers in uniform. Demonstrations at home were helping to extend full legal rights to all citizens, but some civil rights leaders were charging the United States with imperialism in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnam War era was a time of challenges to the leadership role of the mainstream black press. Black newspapers had reached their highest circulation in 1947 after waging editorial battles during World War II for fair treatment of soldiers in segregated military units and for winning democracy at home as well as abroad. The newspapers had survived allegations of sedition that resulted from their journalistic zeal. By the 1960s, black newspapers were facing charges of complacency from "black power" advocates and were losing readers and reporters to the white-owned press recently engaged in expanded coverage of racial issues. "What is left for the Negro press?" Newsweek asked in August 1963. "It is now the society pages, the obituaries, and the inevitable classified ads that continue to draw readers to the Negro press."

Despite Newsweek's dismissal of the black press as "a victim of Negro progress," the newspapers continued to take editorial stands on issues such as the strategy of the civil rights movement and the impact of the Vietnam War on black Americans. Editorial stands on the Vietnam War during the years of the Johnson administration are of particular interest because of black newspapers' support of Johnson's civil rights leadership. Mainstream black newspapers also had to weigh their support for Johnson with support for Martin Luther King, Jr., whose opposition to the Vietnam War brought him into conflict with the president.
This paper examines the editorials and editorial cartoons in mainstream black newspapers, with national circulations, between 1963 and 1968 to assess editorial reaction to the Vietnam War when the Johnson administration was in office. After the inauguration of Richard Nixon in 1969, the mainstream black newspapers joined growing public opposition to the war in Asia. The paper also analyzes editorial reaction of the mainstream black press to the Vietnam War in the context of previous studies of black newspapers' editorial policies.

Mainstream black newspapers with national circulation under review included the Afro-American, with headquarters in Baltimore, the Chicago Defender, and the Pittsburgh Courier. The Afro-American consistently criticized US war policy. TheCourier was an early critic of the war, but after Sengstacke Publications purchased the newspaper in 1966, its editorials generally supported the war as did the editorials of its sister publication, the Defender. After 1966, the Courier and the Defender kept separate operations.

Predominant editorial topics in these newspapers during this period were conflict between black military service abroad and opportunities for and rights of black Americans at home, whether funding of the war reduced support for domestic programs to the detriment of black Americans, and whether war issues diverted attention from the civil rights movement. Central to these questions was how attitudes toward the Vietnam War reflected mainstream black newspapers' attempt to aid black Americans in efforts to enter or retain their standing in the middle class. Of particular interest is how these newspapers attempted to maintain and build their support for Johnson's civil rights policies, while questioning his war policies and addressing opposition to the war from Martin Luther King, Jr. Editorial cartoons of the era depicted Johnson as a "Lone Ranger" beset both by domestic unrest and international challenges. Black newspapers' editorial reactions to the Vietnam War have received little scholarly attention, but the reactions reflect a diversity of opinions inconsistent with previous views of a singular black perspective on political issues. The editorial stands also help to illustrate divisions about goals and leadership of the civil rights movement.
The black press

Despite some general reviews of the state of the black press,\(^5\) analyses of black newspapers' editorial stands and of the black press itself are few, particularly in regard to the period surrounding the Southern civil rights movement and the Vietnam War.\(^6\) Analysis of the role of the black press came in only one\(^7\) of two contemporaneous studies of the relationship between the media and the civil rights movement. The other study included a brief discussion of Vietnam War issues.\(^8\) Limited analysis of black newspapers' editorial stands have centered on the unity of black opinion, the focus of black newspapers on racial issues, how well the newspapers represent all black Americans, and classification of their ideologies.

Researchers disagree about the unity of black opinion. Political scientist Harold M. Barger supported the notion of "a relatively homogenous black perspective" in a 1973 study of "images of political authority."\(^9\) In a content analysis of community weeklies, urban weeklies, organization weeklies, and the militant ideological press during 1969 and 1970, Barger said he found substantial evidence that blacks have similar political orientations regardless of class or education and their orientations differ from those of whites. "There may be, in other words, a black perspective on politics that exists in and of itself."\(^10\)

Historians, however, have found diverse opinions in black newspapers. Lee Finkle, who studied the role of black newspapers during World II, said in including "all shades of opinion, the black feature page was unequaled by most white journals during World War II."\(^11\) Charlotte G. O'Kelly said the black press forum during World War II "far surpassed the white papers as a vehicle for differing opinions. Widely different stances were given attention and lively debates often ensued within the papers themselves."\(^12\) O'Kelly said all the viewpoints did include an underlying opposition to discrimination against blacks.\(^13\)

Readers of black newspapers can expect to find a focus on racial news. St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton in a 1945 study of the Chicago Defender said black newspapers had the dual function of reporting the news and promoting racial solidarity along with making money.\(^14\)
Drake and Cayton explained "race-angling" of news as not only covering issues and events of interest to blacks but also covering only those aspects of general issues and events that involved blacks. Henry Lee Moon, a NAACP spokesman, told a 1967 conference on the media and civil rights that black newspapers were advocates and not objective reporters of the news. "Their stories are unabashedly angled to the interests of their readers. This is what the readers of this press expect and what they cannot expect to get from even the most sympathetic and liberal white media." In a 1978 study of "race advocacy," T. Ella Strother conducted a content analysis of copies of the Chicago Defender from different eras to examine the importance of personalities rather than issues or events in reporting of news. Strother said that since the white media generally have ignored blacks, "the black press has developed a race-consciousness designed to present blacks' viewpoints, aspirations, and struggles in a positive way."

Researchers have differed, however, on how well the black press represents all aspects of black life. Critics of the black press have indicated both that sensational coverage of crime has not portrayed blacks in a good light and that the newspapers have focused too intently on middle-class interests. A 1959 content analysis of the black press indicated that black newspapers reflected white middle-class values. A 1973 study of black newspapers, however, indicated a generally negative perspective on political authority and "nearly universal skepticism in the black community of what it perceived to be the white power structure." O'Kelly argued in 1977 that most critics of the middle-class orientation of the black press "have based their conclusions, not on a range of black publications, but upon Ebony and other similar black magazines which are better known to the white public than are any other black media." Strother also argued that despite the apparent conservatism of black newspapers in the 1960s, the newspapers covered radical or revolutionary civil rights leaders and issues during the period.

Efforts to classify black newspapers themselves as "conservative," "radical," or "militant" have generated debate. O'Kelly said efforts to classify ideologies of black newspapers may depend more on the perspective of the researcher than the nature of the research subject.
asserted that an appropriate question for evaluation is whether the black press is "reformist," trying to change the system, or "revolutionary," trying to replace the system.26

A 1959 content analysis of the black press came as result of charges that the black press showed subversive tendencies. Sociologist Maxwell R. Brooks's research found that the black press "represented the American Tradition."27 Brooks examined five black newspapers with national circulations to determine if the newspapers contained recognizable symbols that represent American political ideas.28 Brooks found support for American ideals but dissatisfaction with second-class citizenship: "Editorial comment is very favorable to the American people, and to American ideals, but registers sharp disapproval of America as a social system."29

Despite assertions that the black press was militant or radical because of its challenges to segregation, Brooks asserted that such criticism was unwarranted in light of the American tradition of free criticism and reform. "Social reform and the idea of progress are complementary, and social reformers have played a significant role in the realization of the ideal."30 Brooks said black newspapers generally were conservative on issues other than racial democracy:

Negro newspapers reflect an unquestioned acceptance of the prevailing middle-class mores and values. Their criticism is directed against barriers that tend to restrict the Negro's participation in the social order, rather than against the nature of the social order itself. 31

Roots of unrest

Political turmoil in the 1960s brought several challenges to the social order including civil rights demonstrations and anti-war protests. Histories of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War provide several convenient benchmark years to frame analysis of their relationship. In 1954, France agreed to end hostilities with the forces of Ho Chi Minh after the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1953. A treaty partitioned Vietnam, pending national elections that never came. The United States, which supported France in the Indochina war, sought to contain Communist influence to North Vietnam amid Cold War pressures of the era. As a result, the United States did not sign the Geneva Accord on Indochina that year. Across the Pacific, the US Supreme
Court had issued the \textit{Brown v. Board of Education} that helped propel the Southern civil rights movement. The \textit{Brown} decision brought the authority of the Supreme Court and the federal government into the on-going battle to remove barriers to full legal rights for black Americans.

By 1963, the Southern civil rights movement had achieved victory in the Montgomery bus boycott, established Martin Luther King, Jr. as a national spokesman for the movement, and pushed for changes in public accommodation laws through "sit-ins" and "freedom rides." The movement had attracted the attention of the world with mass demonstrations that brought violent police reaction in Birmingham, a march of 250,000 civil rights supporters on Washington, and the oratory of King in his "I Have A Dream" speech. While the Kennedy administration attempted to deal with the domestic turmoil, political and military conditions in Vietnam worsened. The National Liberation Front, with the support of North Vietnam, was building its military campaign to overthrow the Diem regime in South Vietnam and oust the US military presence. A coup, with US support, in early November ousted the Diem regime. Within a few days of the coup, an assassin's bullet in Dallas would bring Lyndon Johnson to the presidency and to leadership roles both in the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement.

The circumstances of Kennedy's death, Johnson's leadership, and public reaction to civil rights protests helped to push Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that provided for open accommodations. Among guests at the bill signing was King, who campaigned for Johnson in his bid to win a full term.\textsuperscript{32} A landslide carried Johnson back to the White House, and King received more acclaim as he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Events in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, however, helped set a course that put Johnson and King at odds. In response to alleged provocation of the North Vietnamese navy in the Gulf of Tonkin, Congress approved a resolution to give Johnson almost unlimited authority to conduct military operations in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{33}

Attention to the Vietnam War in the editorial pages of the national black newspapers began after the House and Senate approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 1964, but the focus of that attention was the presidential race between Johnson and Republican Barry...
Goldwater. Despite early misgivings about Johnson's Southern heritage, the mainstream black press described the president as, at least, progressive. The Defender contended in August 1964 that the election should hinge not on foreign policy but on civil rights issues.

A Defender editorial that month also said disparate events in the Gulf of Tonkin and in Mississippi might undermine Johnson's candidacy. While the Vietnamese conflict might make Johnson vulnerable to foreign policy criticism, the newspaper said demonstrations in reaction to the murder of three civil rights workers could generate more white support for Goldwater.

Both the Defender and Courier questioned use of demonstrations as a civil rights tactic because of negative images of blacks that might result and the related concern about "white backlash" in political races. The Defender described demonstrations as "an unfortunate handicap in the present pattern of our struggles," and the Courier said protests were "dubious and dangerous to the Negro's future in America." Leaders of several civil rights organizations agreed to a moratorium on demonstrations before the election to promote Johnson's candidacy and limit "white backlash," but leaders of Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) opposed the proposal.

Another Defender editorial in August said the election would bring full debate on war and civil rights issues. The newspaper also said the president needed black support. "Mr. Johnson may emerge out of these crucibles of the campaign unscarred and victorious, not however without our support and the full support of all who believe in freedom and democracy."

Johnson's landslide victory failed to convince the Afro-American of the correctness of US policy toward Asia and particularly Vietnam. In a December 1964 editorial, the newspaper challenged contentions that "civilization" was a criterion for membership in the United Nations. The Afro-American questioned whether the United States could qualify with "the horrible atomic-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the most recent barbarous treatment accorded citizens of color in the old plantation states." The Courier in January 1965 indicated that the military situation in South Vietnam might require a Goldwater rather than a Johnson: "It would be very wonderful if he (Goldwater) or anybody else could find a way to bring the boys back home and
save all that money we've been spending on that benighted Southeast Asian country." The newspaper questioned whether US policy in Vietnam would be successful short of starting World War III. "It therefore makes no sense for us to continue to send men and money to South Vietnam. The wise thing to do would be to find some face-saving way to get out—yesterday."

Although Lyndon Johnson promised the United States both "guns and butter" during his administration, the mainstream black newspapers never quite accepted that prospect despite their support for him. They questioned whether black military service would result in equal rights and equal opportunities on the home front. Even with their support of the US war policy in Vietnam, the *Courier* and *Defender* questioned funding levels for anti-poverty and education programs, which aided black Americans, with the financial demands of the war. The *Afro-American*, which opposed the war, also criticized inequities in funding priorities for domestic and foreign programs.

**Black military service**

The *Defender* in March 1965 declared that black Americans had a stake in the war, particularly with the service of black soldiers in the conflict. The newspaper also declared its loyalty despite any reservations about the conflict. "For all that, we take our stand beside Uncle Sam."

The National Newspaper Publishers Association, a black publishers group, honored *Courier* political cartoonist Sam Milai for his May 1965 cartoon that showed a modern black soldier in a cemetery with crosses representing service in past wars. In the background was Crispus Attucks, a black victim of the Boston Massacre, telling the soldier to "Carry on Brother!"

Despite protests and unrest at home, cartoons early in the war showed a much different scene in Vietnam. A December 1965 cartoon in the *Courier* offered a "Question from Vietnam." A black soldier and a white soldier in Vietnam looked back home with prejudice, race hatred, and violence rising about a city. "One soldier asked the other. "How come those jokers can't get together? We do."

211
Courier cartoonist Milai linked images of the war and home front for black and white soldiers with cartoons in late January and early February 1966. Racial deaths in Alabama and Mississippi brought questions about war on the "second front," the United States.47 A cartoon on "Dreams of the Future" showed a white soldier with thoughts of security, a nice house, and promotions on his return home. A black soldier had only a question mark in this mind.48

The Defender continued its support for the war in March 1966 with an editorial that praised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for more information about the war and challenged criticism of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The editorial noted the sacrifices of black soldiers for the war:

While the Negro press hasn't been too articulate on the Asian issue, and Negro leadership, with the exception of Dr. Martin Luther King, too timid to give vent to its true feeling in the matter, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Negro masses are indifferent to the course US foreign policy is pursuing in Vietnam. After all, Negro soldiers represent a substantial percentage of the US combat forces in the theater of war where Negro casualties are reported to be proportionately high.49

In April 1966, the SCLC asked the United States to withdraw from Vietnam, and concern about the high casualty rate for black soldiers continued. A May cartoon in the Courier showed "Death" with a shroud of "lack of educational opportunities" digging graves in Vietnam.50 A Courier editorial said a Pentagon spokesman had explained that the casualty rate was not a result of discrimination in battle assignments but perhaps was "a measure of Negro valor in combat."51 The editorial said the death rate should be a warning that "Negrophobes should think twice about denying Negroes the full rights of American citizenship guaranteed under the Constitution."52

The Defender and the Afro-American also noted the discrepancies between defense of the United States and rights at home. Each in the summer of 1966 published a cartoon titled "Letter from Home." The syndicated cartoon in the Defender showed a black soldier reading a letter about the shooting death of his brother with the advice that "You are safer in Vietnam than you are here at home."53 The Afro-American reprinted a cartoon from the New York Post. A black soldier read: "Dear Son, Dad was put in the hospital trying to vote in Mississippi."54
By the end of 1966, however, the Courier and the Afro-American had varying degrees of reservations about the war. The Courier in November raised the issue of the Vietnam conflict as a racial war:

We've noticed that the news media in this country, which of course is white (as if you didn't know), has played up every reason for the difficulties America is encountering in Vietnam, but the major one, in our opinion. And the major one is color.55

Afro-American cartoonist Stockett showed black soldiers helping a wounded South Vietnamese peasant and asking, "I wonder who's protecting our castles."56 The newspaper's New Year's cartoon for Dec. 31, 1966 called for an end to "mass slaughter in Vietnam."57

As King in February 1967 delivered in Los Angeles his first public speech attacking US policy in Vietnam, even the Defender acknowledged the deep divisions from the war: "Our government for the first time in history is confronted with a disunited home front in a war which can hardly be defended on the basis of national peril."58

Inequities of black military service were the subject of March 1967 editorials in the Afro-American and the Defender. The Afro-American noted the high casualty for black servicemen. "Grim confirmation of the gnawing suspicion that the Vietnam combat death rate of colored Americans was proportionately greater than it was for other Americans came last week."59 The Defender noted that re-enlistment of blacks was "higher because of economic deprivation otherwise."60 The newspaper said the black soldier was "giving his all in the Viet war in the hope of coming home to a better and more civilized America."61

The summer of 1967 brought increased concern about home front conditions for returning black soldiers and more questions about King's anti-war stance. The Afro-American in June noted that "considering the high degree of combat housing and fighting togetherness in Vietnam which cause no difficulty, it is shocking and shameful that form of indignity and humiliation persists at home."62 The newspaper indicated that with the high death rate for black soldiers, returning servicemen would be in no mood for the status quo: "Hatchet-wielding members of the 90th Congress so busy cutting appropriations for Great Society programs such as the war on poverty, housing, demonstration cities and rent supplements, would be wise to take note."63
Guns or butter?

Despite support for US policy in the Vietnam, the Defender in September 1965 noted questions about equitable funding for military and domestic programs. A syndicated cartoon showed a candle with wicks burning on both ends on the top of the Capitol. One end of the candle was "Vietnam" and on the other end was "Great Society." The cartoon asked, "Can You?" 64

A Courier cartoon in January 1966 showed a must different image of Johnson as commander-in-chief. The "approved portrait" by "Negro America" showed Johnson in dress uniform. His combat ribbons included the "1964 Civil Rights Act," "1965 Civil [Voting] Rights Act, "Anti-Poverty Program," "Negro to US Supreme Court," and "The Great Society." 65 Within a week, however, the Afro-American questioned Johnson's funding priorities. Staff cartoonist Thomas Stockett showed LBJ carving a turkey. On one side of the table was a small child, the poverty program, with a scrap on his plate. On the other side was a large Mao-type character, the Vietnam War, gorging himself. Johnson told the child: "Just a moment, son, big brother has to be first." 66

An accompanying editorial questioned political bickering and partisan politics that diminished hopes for the "Great Society." Along with politicians who wanted to defend the status quo, the war was bringing cutbacks in funding: "No matter how long and how strenuously the administration defends the priority of Vietnam, the feeling will still persist in the ghetto, that another promise has been broken, and that it was foolish to hope in the first place." 67 The Defender dealt with the issue that week in a somewhat more gentle manner. A syndicated cartoon that showed LBJ as a physician giving a check-up to the federal budget with the Great Society as the thermometer and chest thumps for Vietnam. 68

The Defender used syndicated cartoons from Albert J. Buescher in January and February 1966 to show continued opposition to anti-war demonstrators but growing concern about funding for the "Great Society" in light of war expenses. A platform of "free speech" transformed "pacifist-fellow travelers" into a "distorted picture" of "Anti-US Vietnam Policy" for Ho Chi
Minh and Mao-Tse-Tung to observe. Another cartoon showed Johnson with a $112.8 billion budget machine that contained both the Vietnam War and the Great Society. A "tax boost" oil can sat near the machine. The cartoon asked, "It'll Come Out Even?" A similar cartoon showed LBJ with a $12.8 million measuring tape for Vietnam. A man with a Congress jacket held a shovel, and a Great Society lunch box was on a rock. LBJ told the congressman, "Dig, man!"

**Agenda setting**

The mainstream black press also viewed the Vietnam War in competition with the civil rights movement for political attention, and media attention. Politics were an early arena of competition. The Defender in 1964 had advocated civil rights as the top issue of political concern during the presidential campaign and downplayed foreign policy. The Courier continued that argument in 1968:

> The arguments for and against the war in Vietnam are forged by university professors and students as an intellectual plane that surpasses both the understanding and sensitivity of the man in the street. Whereas, the race issue, which involves in its catalogue of civil rights such matters as fair housing, job opportunities, school desegregation, and social recognition, inescapably partakes of the nature of personal relationships.

The mainstream black newspapers continued to be sensitive to any tactics of the civil rights movement or views of black leaders that might provide an opportunity for political opposition to civil rights or anti-poverty legislation. The Afro-American in 1967 expressed concern that Congress was using anti-war sentiment and black power advocacy as pretexts to oppose both civil rights legislation and funding for anti-poverty programs.

The black newspapers also took note of the disparity of media attention to and public interest in the war and civil rights movements. The Courier noted in the summer of 1965 that media attention already was shifting away from the civil rights to the Vietnam War. By July 1965, the Courier contended that national interest in the civil rights movement was waning as "news media have turned their attention to Vietnam and the Dominican Republic."

By 1967, a Newsweek executive, Karl Fleming, told a conference on the media and civil rights that "without question Vietnam has taken the lead and stolen the spotlight from civil rights
these days." Communication scholar Randall M. Fisher noted in 1985 that white student involvement in civil rights protests declined after the Berkeley free speech movement in 1965:

> From that point, the interests of white students in the black cause waned sharply, and in a few months America’s attention was to turn so fully to the Vietnam War that it dominated the news media, our political processes, and the nation’s energies to such a degree that interest in other causes became secondary for most citizens. 

The decision of the Georgia legislature not to seat newly elected Rep. Julian Bond because of his opposition to the war brought support for his right of dissent from the Courier in February 1966. The editorial backed US policy in Vietnam, but said the issue of Julian Bond was not one of foreign policy: "Mr. Bond is a Negro and they wanted him out. As an excuse Vietnam was a godsend." The Courier said most Negroes supported US policy in Vietnam and advised black leaders including King not to neglect the civil rights movement. "In spite of the fact that so many Negroes are being appointed to high positions today the position of the Negro masses is still very bad. There's a vast amount of poverty. And the attention of civil rights leaders should be centered on that."

The Lone Ranger rides again

Lyndon Johnson's support of civil rights issues remained centered for the black press. The mainstream black newspapers' support for Lyndon Johnson came despite questions about war policy and funding for social programs. Drake and Cayton in their 1945 study of the Chicago Defender developed coverage classifications of personalities in black newspapers that included "race hero," "race leader," and "friend of the Negro." The black press viewed Johnson as a strong friend. By the end of his term, the black newspapers had elevated Johnson past John F. Kennedy, past Franklin Roosevelt, and even past Abraham Lincoln as the president who had done the most to bring black Americans fully into full citizenship in the United States. Johnson may have sealed his place in the history of the civil rights movement when in his speech in support of the voting rights bill, after the violence on the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama, he repeatedly used the slogan of the movement, "We Shall Overcome."
Despite initial reservations about his Southern heritage, the mainstream black press consistently praised Johnson for his domestic leadership and either praised his Vietnam policy or failed to attach their disagreements with the policy to his leadership. Political cartoons in the national black press showed Johnson on a lonely mission or a lone vigil to deal both with domestic needs and war problems. Cartoons in the newspapers depicted inequitable funding for Great Society programs because of the war, but only the Afro-American, in one cartoon, portrayed LBJ as an agent of that distribution. As public opinion grew against US war policy and Johnson, even the Afro-American, despite its opposition to the war, backed the president.

Johnson in July 1965 announced more military build-ups in Vietnam, and the Defender used a syndicated political cartoon to show a besieged president. LBJ was a tree growing out of the United States and the globe. At one side was Vietnam and on the other side was the Dominican Republic, to which US troops had gone to intervene in a civil war. Lightning bolts of "appeasers," "home front," "liberals," "conservatives," and "critics" were striking the tree. Courier cartoonist Milai at the end of October 1965 showed Johnson back at work after surgery. He depicted the president as a cowboy "back in the saddle" atop a bucking bronco. In the dust below him were "Vietnam," "civil rights," "Red China," "Viet Cong," and "anti-draft protests." The Courier and Defender in February 1966 offered Johnson more support. A syndicated cartoon in the Defender portrayed LBJ as single-handedly searching through a haystack for peace while "Hanoi" and "Peking" sat under a tree. The Courier's Milai was more direct with his cartoon, "When a feller needs a friend." A pensive Johnson sat in a chair. On one side was a cloud of criticism over falling bombs. Behind the chair were a black soldier and a black civilian, who was holding books on "civil rights legislation," "important Negro appointments," and "justice for all." The black civilian told Johnson: "We're with you, chief." A March 1966 cartoon in the Defender showed "the left" biting at the ankle of LBJ and US policy in Vietnam. Also chasing the ankle were "Peace at any Price," "The Right," "Critics," Escalation," and "Pull Back."
The Defender supported Johnson in June 1966 with portrayals of the president as a "rugged individualist." In the "Lone Ranger," a cartoon depicted Johnson as a prospector with his pack mule carrying "Civil Rights," "Great Society," "War on Poverty," and "Vietnam." In "Get the Message," LBJ was using a jack to escalate military action in Vietnam. "Hanoi" was on top of the jack with a bloody sword. A dove of peace was flying above "Hanoi." The Defender continued support for Johnson with an October 1966 cartoon that showed the president building a tower "Dedicated to Peace and the Dignity of Man." His critics, the "kibitzers," were sitting at a table to the side.

As 1967 began, the image of Johnson as the "Lone Ranger" returned. Prospector LBJ was putting his finger in the air to check the political breeze. On his pack mule were the Vietnam War and the Great Society. Behind a rock was a GOP elephant with a "Toward 68" sign. In a similar vein, the Defender in October 1967 depicted LBJ as a sheriff in a showdown with the "bad guys," war critics, inflation, and budget.

The Defender continued to back Johnson even as Sen. Robert F. Kennedy added his voice to criticism of Vietnam policy. A March 1967 cartoon showed LBJ as a pilot flying through the flak of "suspend the bombing." A shell with "Bobby's verbal blasts" was ripping through the cockpit. An early April cartoon showed Kennedy on a park bench surrounded by pages of litter with "peace feelers," "negotiate," "Vietnam," and "suspend the bombing" written on them. LBJ was trying to police the area and offered a warning, "Don't Litter."

The anti-war Afro-American also supported Johnson. A September 1967 cartoon showed the president with an ax in front of a row of trees. The sun, the "1968 elections, "was shining. The trees included "white backlash," "Vietnam," "new taxes," "black power," "civil rights," "riots," and "payment balances." Johnson said, "There's still time if we keep working on all of them." The Afro-American praised Johnson in November for repudiation of the notion that the United States was engaged in a race war in Indochina to contain China. The newspaper criticized "black power disciples who have been leaders of the false outcry that the Vietnam conflict for some unexplainable reason was a race war."
The **Afro-American** indicated in December 1967 that despite editorial criticism of the US war policy, the newspaper supported the president since he "has chosen the lonely course of pursuing political righteousness." The editorial criticized the "open season" against the president. "Brickbat throwers notwithstanding, we take our stand with LBJ."96

**The issue of King**

They continued that stand for LBJ even as Martin Luther King, Jr., grew more vehement in his opposition to the war. Efforts of King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to move their strategy of mass demonstrations north to Chicago in 1966 had failed to win them the national support that they had received in their Southern initiatives.97 Conflicts between the direct-action tactics of the SCLC and the legal-action tactics of the older civil rights organizations, the NAACP and the National Urban League, continued as calls for "black power" and militancy challenged both approaches to the civil rights movement. New leadership of the SNCC and CORE, established to promote non-violent action in 1942, brought calls for militant "black power" into the national debate.98 SNCC leaders also began questioning the role of black Americans in military action against other people of color in Southeast Asia.99 Although King publicly had questioned US policy in Vietnam as early as 1965, the SCLC board in 1966 went on record against the war.100

Black opposition to the war brought diverse reaction from the **Defender** and the **Courier**. While the newspapers supported the right of Julian Bond,101 Muhammad Ali,102 and even King to oppose the war as individuals, they found no favor with anti-war protests or efforts to expand the civil rights movement into a broad human rights movement. The newspapers noted some qualms with the views of Bond and Ali, but they noted their First Amendment right to dissent. King's opposition proved a more difficult issue. While the newspapers initially supported his right of dissent, they expressed reservations and eventually opposition to King's stand.

Although the newspapers' editorials generally framed their opposition to King's stand in terms of dissipation of resources for the civil rights movement, the **Defender** eventually raised another issue: "His [King's] business is not to change America but to solve the problems of
living in it and save the black masses from prejudice and unwarranted discrimination." King aide Andrew Young indicated in 1970 that a key issue had become the role of blacks in the middle class. Young said the older civil rights groups such as the NAACP and the National Urban League had tried to be middle class without full evaluation of what that meant:

"There was never any judgment on the middle class white American culture. We saw our role as different. We saw white middle class culture as overwhelmingly racist, materialistic, and militaristic. While we were integrationists in the sense that we saw ourselves involved in the society with them, we were never trying to be like them."

Historian Charlotte G. O'Kelly indicated, however, that the black press was correct in its assessment of the political views of most black Americans: "The evidence gathered thus far indicates that only a small minority of black people support goals of revolutionary change. Rather they accept the basic contours of American society if it will only allow fuller participation and greater rewards for its black citizens."

King aide Andrew Young indicated in a 1970 interview that the White House had organized black editors against King and his anti-war efforts. Among Johnson's advisors was black journalist Louis Martin, who joined the Kennedy administration after serving as editor of the Michigan Chronicle. He became editor of the Chicago Defender after his service as deputy chairman of the Democratic Party during the Johnson administration. Martin in 1969 said he had attempted to maintain contact between Johnson and King, but that King declined two invitations to meet with Johnson at the White House. Young said King had talked on the telephone with Johnson about war policy in November 1966, but that was their last contact.

King in August 1965 had urged talks on the Vietnam War and offered to serve as a mediator. The Defender subsequently used a syndicated cartoon that showed protesters with signs, "Pull Out of Vietnam" and "Defend Freedom With Non-Violence," buffeting Uncle Sam. The cartoon's caption noted that "With Such Friends He Doesn't Need Enemies." King met with UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg in September and agreed to end his peace bid in early October. Johnson arranged the meeting between Goldberg, King, and other civil rights leaders,
but King's remarks about recognition of Communist China at a subsequent press conference created more tension between the president and the civil rights leader.\textsuperscript{110}

The \textit{Defender} in October 1965 supported King's right as an individual to oppose US policy in Vietnam, but the newspaper questioned whether the civil rights movement should be involved in the Vietnam debate. "For the civil rights movement, as an entity, to veer toward the crisis in Vietnam would result in much needed energy being siphoned away from our main objective." \textsuperscript{111}

The editorial noted opposition to the Vietnam War in Congress and on college campuses and said individual members of the civil rights movement should have no less of a right of dissent. The \textit{Defender} questioned why Sen. Jacob Javits of New York had criticized King for his views:

\begin{quote}
Such a limitation places a second-class citizen tag on the Negro. The Senator is not alone in this narrow conceptual rendering of full citizenship. A great many white liberals entertain the same thought about the Negro.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

The \textit{Courier} depicted King as a "dove" in a July 1966 cartoon about divisions in the civil rights movement. With representatives of SNCC, CORE, the NAACP, and SCLC around a pot, the caption was that "Too Many Cooks Ruin the Broth." King of the SCLC held olive branches.\textsuperscript{113}

In April 1967, King delivered a major address against the war, effectively severed any ties with Johnson, and brought criticism from the mainstream black newspapers. King's comparisons of the US military role in Asia to Nazi atrocities in World War II\textsuperscript{114} brought immediate rebuffs from media opponents of the war and from his fellow civil rights activists.\textsuperscript{115}

The \textit{Afro-American} provided the first mainstream national black press reaction to the speech April 8 but used the opportunity to criticize the decision of Massachusetts Sen. Edward Brooke to oppose the war rather than to question King's remarks. The newspaper noted that Brooke's decision was good for Johnson. "That his change of view came on the same day Dr. Martin Luther King was denouncing the war as 'a blasphemy against all that America stands for' was truly a stroke of good timing for the President."\textsuperscript{116}

The \textit{Afro-American} said Brooke had diverted attention from King's criticism of the war and Kennedy's opposition and "gives the president a helping hand in the delicate area of race relations, since there is widespread belief in our community that it has been called upon to make
proportionately greater sacrifices than the white." 117 An accompanying cartoon showed a small child with a platter of "Great Society" programs. A large warrior, the Vietnam War, with a pile of money on his tray was reaching for more money. "You'll Have To Pardon My Long Reach, Bud," the warrior told the child.118

The Defender and Courier did not respond immediately to King's speech. The Defender published the week of April 8 a syndicated cartoon that showed a pit with "Ho's rejection of LBJ's appeal for peace" and a sign, "Critics of LBJ's Vietnam policy," in it. The caption was "'ell of a 'ole."119 The Courier's editorial cartoon and editorial April 15 took somewhat different views on the issue of King's war opposition. The cartoon, "Draining the Barrel," depicted King asking Uncle Sam to "Hold it!" as Uncle Sam drained the last drops from "Funds for Domestic Programs for Fighting Poverty and Segregation" into his hat, the Vietnam War. 120 The editorial, however, addressed "Dr. King's Tragic Doctrine."121

The editorial praised King for his leadership in the civil rights movement, but in the context of foreign policy, "Dr. King is tragically preaching the wrong doctrine."122 The Courier said King should not seek unilateral US action to end the war and noted Brooke's change of heart after a visit to the war zone. 123 While the newspaper defended King's individual right to express his views on foreign policy, the editorial said King's prominence might wrongly indicate to some that he spoke for most blacks. "We believe Dr. King is sincere, but at the same time, we say that he does not speak for all Negro America and besides he is tragically misleading them."124

The Defender joined the fray in an editorial the next week. The newspaper also praised King's leadership but questioned his linking of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War:

As rational and perceptive a mentality as Dr. King unquestionably possesses, it is difficult to believe that he cannot assess the glaring incompatibility between two vastly disparate issues: civil rights and civil war. Perhaps he is driven by a hallucination of an America freed from the evils of poverty and inequality and blessed with all attributes of a perfect social order.125

The Defender also challenged King's perception of his mission. "His business is not to change America but to solve the problems of living in it and save the blacks masses from prejudice and unwarranted discrimination."126 The newspaper said participation in the anti-war movement
could dissipate energies for the civil rights movement which was unfinished and King's appropriate mission was political action for blacks:

Making the Negro masses realize that their complete freedom and ultimate salvation lie in the intelligent use of the ballot is the task to which Dr. King might devote his rhetorical talent, his tireless energy and persuasive reasoning.\textsuperscript{127}

Despite these harsh words from the \textit{Courier} and the \textit{Defender}, the Afro-American attempted to downplay any divisions in the civil rights movement. "[T]here can be no doubt that the common goal of all conscientious leaders is the same the same – the attainment of equal social, educational and economic opportunities."\textsuperscript{128} The \textit{Defender} and the \textit{Courier} however, continued to question King's action. A syndicated cartoon in the \textit{Defender} showed King, with a peace movement sign, thumbing a ride. To one side was a car, the civil rights movement, and on the side was Stokely Carmichael of SNCC with a "extremism" bomb in his hand. The caption was "Going My Way."\textsuperscript{129} Cartoonist Milai of the \textit{Courier} showed a "shrinking image." A black newsman and black soldier watched a miniature King carry protest signs.\textsuperscript{130}

The Afro-American charged May 20 that Republicans and Dixiecrats were trying to use anti-war statements from King and "black power" advocates to scuttle Great Society programs. The editorial also said Congress was using the cost of the war to neglect funding for the programs. King received praise for airing the problem: "This is the fear that Dr. King has been expressing for some time, and it is clear that he has had the aims of the politicians in positive perspective all the time."\textsuperscript{131} The \textit{Defender} that week again criticized anti-war protests. A cartoon showed a "rubbish" can filled with anti-war protest signs.\textsuperscript{132}

Within a week, however, the \textit{Defender} was questioning the disproportionately high death rate of blacks servicemen in Vietnam and discrimination at home. While the newspaper noted the sacrifice necessary for patriotism, the editorial cited discrimination on draft boards that were sending black men to fight and in housing for soldiers and their families. "The bullets in Vietnam know no color line. The packs on the backs of Negro soldiers are just a heavy as those on the backs of white soldiers, but the burden at home for the Negro people is heavier."\textsuperscript{133}
The Courier in May returned to King's opposition to the war. The newspaper again questioned the impact of King's anti-war statements because of his prominence in the civil rights movement. "Our criticism of Dr. King is specifically because he has mixed the matter of civil rights with the complex and confusing issue of foreign policy. And in so doing, he has caused some damage to the former, where the issue is so clear against the fuzziness of the latter."134

The Defender in May, however, addressed the issue of funding priorities. In a cartoon titled "Escalation," LBJ was a boxer beating on a rather bedraggled-looking Ho Chi Minh. In the corner were "reds," and tapping on Johnson's shoulder was a large pugilist, "poverty."135 The Afro-American that week was noting "Hectic Days at the White House." As Johnson with binoculars was watching the clouds of "Arab-Israeli Tensions," newspapers on his desk bannered "Long Hot Summer Predicted," "Draft Refusals Mount," "Vietnam Death Rate Rises," "Civil Rights Leaders Hit War Cost," and "King Joins Vietnam Protests."136

The Courier continued to criticize King for his anti-war stance – a cartoon showed King riding an "anti-war" escalator as civil rights documents fell out of his briefcase137 – but the newspaper supported a general right of dissent. An editorial said debate on bombing of North Vietnam was appropriate. "It is a sign of national strength that these issues can be aired. We shall be an enfeebled country only when we conclude that the time for suppression of dissent is at hand."138 The Courier offered a different image of war critic King in August 1967. A staff-drawn cartoon indicated "his status looms larger and larger." The cartoon showed a pensive King with thoughts that "Vietnam War unjust, brutal, wasteful in lives and money," "US symbol of violence and undisciplined power," and "social programs neglected." The cartoon indicated that King's anti-war comments had been "reiterated by some Congressmen and some senators."139

The Afro-American continued to support King:

As the weeks and months march on, our national memory recalls the early prophetic warnings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. that for the Johnson Administration to believe it could wage the Vietnam War on one hand and the domestic war on the other was pure delusion and fantasy."140
The middle class

Editorial criticism of King's anti-war stand had been a continuation of black press opposition to demonstrations and other tactics that they believed undermined the image of blacks. The criticism also was the result of concern that King not only was diverting attention away from the civil rights movement, but also challenging the political and economic order in which black Americans had been battling to participate. The Courier and Defender held white anti-war protesters in particularly low regard and had opposed demonstrations as a civil rights tactic because they believed them in effect and tarnishing to the "black image."

The Courier in October 1964 announced a new program of a black newspaper publishers group to create "a new and better image of the Negro citizen, which they felt has been damaged by certain aspects of the civil rights crusade." The editorial noted the desire for acceptance: "Much of the propaganda purported in the Negro's interest has been actually deleterious by representing him as ignorant, impoverished, backward and helpless, and scarcely conducive to that interracial fraternity and acceptance to which all Negroes aspire."

The Defender did not support anti-war protests. A syndicated cartoon in 1965 showed a goateed anti-war demonstrator carrying a sign, "Critics of US Policy," as Chinese leader Mao-Tse-Tung stood in front of his business, Communism, Inc., and beside a casket, Southeast Asia. Mao was looking toward the protester and saying, "Him velly good for business."

The Defender continued criticism of anti-war protests in an editorial later in July 1965. The newspaper justified US policy in Vietnam on the basis of Communist aggression against South Vietnam. "And what's more, American must honor her commitments if she is to justify her claim to world leadership." The Defender said US policy should contain but not isolate China. The Defender reinforced its editorial with a syndicated political cartoon that showed Mao-Tse-Tung using the anvil of Vietnam to forge control of Southeast Asia.

Despite support for dissent, the Defender continued to needle white anti-war protesters. A syndicated cartoon later in October 1965 showed a volcanic eruption of rising support for US
policies in Vietnam." The eruption had catapulted into the air a goateed demonstrator with anti-war protest signs. On an adjacent hill, a Mao-like figure used binoculars to watch the scene.147

Anti-war protesters found themselves in the company of the Ku Klux Klan and the Deacons for Defense and Justice, a black group that formed in Louisiana to provide armed defense for civil rights workers, in a Courier cartoon in November 1965. Cartoonist Milai had the press pouring hot water into a tub of public opinion as a Deacon, an anti-war protester, and a Klansman perspired.148

Although conservative columnist George Schuyler represented one extreme of black opinion, his 1966 analysis of the impact of the civil rights "revolution" on the image of black Americans showed concerns of many in the black press. He questioned use of the term "ghetto" to describe all areas of housing for blacks and portrayal of the black American:

[A]s an ignorant, lowdown, retarded, drug-using, anti-social, criminal being, because he was non-white. Not in sixty years had there been such a wave of Negro defamation in high places and low; and respectable newspapers and magazines vied with each other in printing doleful articles of poorly concealed disparagement under the guise of Christian interest, and illustrated by the most unflattering photographs to be found in the morgue. 149

The Afro-American in 1967 also opposed proposals for a new round of mass demonstrations that King and the SCLC were proposing for the North: "Dr. King, after raising his campaign funds, needs to back into a leadership huddle and come forth with something more mature and more in tune with the times than this program."150

1968

Diverse events in 1968 removed both King and Johnson from the national scene. The Tet offensive in January 1968 resulted in a military defeat for the North Vietnamese but was a turning point for US public support of the war. In March, Johnson surprised the nation when he announced that he would not seek re-election. In August, King went to Memphis to support striking sanitation workers, but his assassination ended both his civil rights leadership and his efforts to end US involvement in the Vietnam War.

King's assassination helped to win congressional approval of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which provided for open housing, but his death also removed the most widely recognized
spokesman for civil rights and the center of much of the organization of the movement.

Republican Richard Nixon won the presidency in November 1968 and the responsibility for the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia. Johnson retired to his ranch in Texas.

After the Tet Offensive in January 1968, Johnson faced increasing pressures of public opinion, and the Courier in February attempted to provide some historical perspective. A cartoon showed the "American Negro" in front of portraits of Abraham Lincoln and Johnson. "You started it Mr. Lincoln, but here's the man who really had done things about it."^{151}

Johnson's decision in March not to seek re-election brought more praise. The Courier said other officials could not provide better leadership for the Vietnam War and blamed Congress for funding cuts for the Great Society. The newspaper extolled Johnson's civil rights leadership:

"So far as the American black man is concerned, Johnson is the greatest president who has ever occupied the White House. He is greater than Lincoln. The freeing of the slaves by the Civil War President was the result of political pressure which Lincoln could not escape. He was more interested in the preservation of the Union than in freedom for the black slaves."^{152}

The war in Southeast Asia continued for five more years as opposition continued to grow throughout the country. Peace negotiations in Paris brought a cease-fire in April 1973. Although conduct of the Vietnam conflict generally stood as a measure of Johnson's presidency, the national black press refused to let the war policies overshadow Johnson's leadership in the civil rights movement. During the course of the Johnson administration, black newspapers tried to distinguish between support for the president's domestic policies and their views of war issues.

By a year after Richard Nixon's election, the Courier had ended support for the war. The newspaper said black Americans were concerned about the war, but they also worried about "the battle for survival and equal rights."^{153} The editorial found no reason to support the war: "We have determined that fighting the war will not give us first-class citizenship, nor will have any significant effect on the racist attitudes of whites. Nothing thus far has."^{154}

Johnson's death and the Vietnam cease-fire came within a week of each other in 1973. The Afro-American, which consistently had criticized the war, declined to let opposition to US military policy undermine Johnson's civil rights contributions: "So great were his contributions
on behalf of equal rights, justice and a better deal for all Americans that his regrettable role in the Vietnam War did not and cannot undo them." 155

Conclusions

While the Afro-American, the Courier, and the Defender maintained support for social order during the 1960s, their editorial positions on the Vietnam War did not have a single perspective. The Afro-American opposed the war, the Defender supported the war through the Johnson administration and the Courier opposed, supported, and then opposed the war again. The newspapers, however, viewed the war in the context of its relationship to the civil rights movement and other interests of black Americans. The newspapers also supported middle-class values as standards for first-class citizenship and sought reform rather than replacement of political and economic structures.

An irony of the 1960s, perhaps, is that while the national black newspapers criticized the militancy of the "black power" movement, notions of "black pride" and "black identity" have been marketing tools of the black press during years of segregation and of integration. The black press in the 1960s also supported middle-class values against which younger members of the white middle class were rebelling. Perhaps that is why the black press scorned young anti-war protesters who were fleeing the affluence that the newspapers were seeking for their audiences.


4 "Negro Progress" 50.


10 Barger 647.

11 Finkle 55.


13 O'Kelly 1982, 4.


15 Drake and Cayton 401.


17 Moon 139.


19 Strother 92.


22 Barger 672.

24 Strother 94.


26 O'Kelly 1977-78, 115.

27 Brooks 98.

28 Brooks 32.

29 Brooks 100.

30 Brooks 100.

31 Brooks 102.


35 "American Must Choose" 10.


39 Garrow 343.


43 "Doesn't Make Sense" 10.


45 Sam Milai, cartoon, Pittsburgh Courier 29 May 1965: 10.


50 Sam Milai, cartoon, Pittsburgh Courier 7 May 1966: 8.

"Negro Deaths" 8.

Sam Milai, cartoon, Pittsburgh Courier 18 June 1966, 8.


"Negro Soldier," 12.


Alfred J. Buescher, cartoon, Chicago Defender 4-10 Sept. 1965, natl. ed.: 11.


"Need to Keep the 'Great Society,' " editorial, Afro-American 20 May 1967, natl. ed.: 4.

"This Movement Is Not a Stage Drama," editorial, Pittsburgh Courier 3 July 1965: 10.

"This Movement Is Not a Stage Drama," editorial, Pittsburgh Courier 3 July 1965: 10.

Lyle 50.

231


"Bond Issue" 8.


Fairclough 283.

Fairclough 320.

Garrow 458.


"Bond Issue" 8.


"Negro Image" 14.


"Peace Efforts" 10.


Sam Milai, cartoon, Pittsburgh Courier 13 Nov. 1965: 10.


"We Are Concerned" 6.

"THOSE WHO TOIL AND SPIN": FEMALE TEXTILE OPERATIVES' PUBLICATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND AND THE RESPONSE TO WORKING CONDITIONS, 1840-1850

by

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"THOSE WHO TOIL AND SPIN": FEMALE TEXTILE OPERATIVES’ PUBLICATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND AND THE RESPONSE TO WORKING CONDITIONS, 1840-1850

In May 1846, the Lowell, Mass.-based Voice Of Industry admonished the Massachusetts Legislature after it failed to approve a ten-hour day for laborers. Factory workers, many of whom toiled twelve to fourteen hours per day in poorly-ventilated cotton mills with only brief meal breaks, had lobbied the legislature on several prior occasions without success. Despite this, workers redoubled their efforts, sending a 15,000-signature petition to lawmakers. It, too, failed to move legislators to action, causing a Voice Of Industry writer, known only as E.R., to state:

"The legislative Committee have recently told 15,000 of us, we are fools, --that the evils we have petitioned them to remove, do not exist, notwithstanding we have worked day after day and experienced all these evils-- that their valuable time is of too much importance to waste in that manner, and in fact, if some evils do exist, they are so very few that they are of not much consequence, and are just what we must expect; and further, the generous corporations will look after these things, so there is no fear but we shall have our just dues and they might have added (as they no doubt thought) that we were poor and consequently beneath notice."1

The article demonstrated that factory workers understood that important social, political, and economic shifts had occurred in antebellum society--the pre-industrial, once-egalitarian society of their parents’ and grandparents’ generations had disappeared, and in its place a class-based society emerged, many of whose members equated money with power.

These first generations of factory workers recognized that like artisans and mechanics before them, newspapers were a necessary vehicle to lobby for social, political, and economic goals.2 Such journals allowed workers to regularly publicize their agenda to broader audiences than lectures or broadsides could reach.

The majority of the nation’s first factory publications were established by those operatives who had the least power in society--women. These journals—which emerged only in New England’s large, planned textile cities in which female labor predominated—also appear to have
been the first labor publications for women. Labor publications for male artisans and mechanics first appeared in the late 1820s, the products primarily of unions and political parties.

Despite having only two to three free hours per day, New England's female textile operatives produced numerous of both literary and labor publications, the first and most celebrated of which was The Lowell Offering (1840-1845). Four other publications subsequently emerged in Lowell: The Operatives’ Magazine (1841-1842); The Operative (1843-45); The Voice Of Industry (1845-1848); and the New England Offering (1847-1850); one in Cabotville (Chicopee), Mass., the Olive Leaf and Factory Girls’ Repository (1843); one in Fall River, Mass., the Wampanoag and Operatives’ Journal (1842); and another, the Factory Girl’s Advocate (1845), possibly was published in Boston. Five other journals were published in New Hampshire: the Factory Girl (1841-43); the Factory Girl and Ladies’ Garland (1842); The Factory Girl’s Garland (1844); the Factory Girl’s Album and Operatives’ Advocate (1846); and, the Factory Girls’ Album and Mechanics’ Offering (1846-47), all based in Exeter.

The Lowell Offering gained acclaim when author Charles Dickens visited Lowell and was surprised to find the operatives both literate and literary. He praised The Lowell Offering, stating “it will compare advantageously with a great many English annuals.” Since then, contemporary historians studying the industrial revolution, women’s issues, and labor history frequently have cited the publication. The other factory publications have rarely been examined however, leaving them largely unknown to both scholars and the general public.

This research examines female operatives’ responses to working conditions in both the labor and the genteel publications. More specifically, the article examines arguments for the ten-hour day, concerns about wages, work speed-ups, the dignity of labor, and, relatedly, discontent about growing class distinctions and middle-class hegemony. The author sought to examine how the unique, gendered nature of these publications influenced the topics of discussion or the rhetoric
used. In order to do so, the author also sought studies of the predominantly-male labor press of the time to examine those publications' concerns and rhetoric. Unfortunately, few studies which focus specifically on the artisans' and mechanics' press prior to 1850 exist. Two studies (which examined several of the publications) have shown that the topics which concerned the early labor publications for mechanics and artisans included attempts “to unify the working classes in their struggle to become part of middle America,” free, tax-supported public schools, suffrage for all free men, free trade, abolishment of the armed forces, direct taxation, fully-equipped militias, an end to capital punishment, government protection of the working classes, repeal of chartered monopolies, and changes in lending and borrowing laws.8

The author examined the entire content of every existing issue of five of the publications. Those five journals include three labor-oriented—The Voice Of Industry, The Factory Girl's Album and Operatives’ Advocate, and The Factory Girl’s Album and Mechanics’ Offering, and two genteel literary magazines, The Lowell Offering and The New England Offering. These were chosen because all had lengthy publication runs and most of the issues are still available for study. Some publications, such as the Factory Girl and the Wampanoag and Operatives’ Journal, exist in only scattered or single copies. Others, such as the Factory Girl’s Advocate, no longer exist.

WOMEN AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Although the nation’s earliest textile mills established by Samuel Slater in Rhode Island in 1790 relied on whole families for their labor force, Slater’s model wasn’t followed by the larger industrial concerns which emerged in the next two decades.9 The leading textile corporation in antebellum America in the 1820s— the Boston Manufacturing Company—purposely recruited single farm women for the majority of its workforce. The Boston Associates, as the group became known, revolutionized textile production and urban industrialization in America through the creation of planned factory communities and textile operations which housed every step in cloth
production, from the raw materials to the finished, printed cloth, in one building. The Boston Associates furnished the capital, planned the communities, built the factories, recruited the labor pool, and marketed their finished goods.

The Associates, familiar with the grinding poverty, filth, and disease prevalent in Britain's textile cities, planned every aspect of their industrial communities, locating them in rural areas and along rivers to take advantage of the clean water power. The workforce was planned with particular care. Cognizant of the shortage of male labor, and wanting to avoid potential union activity, management recruited women. Single farm women, in particular, were sought by factory owners because they were available in large numbers, were used to working long hours, had some experience helping their mothers produce cloth via spinning and weaving at home, were literate, seen as highly virtuous, and most importantly, were viewed as deferential to patriarchal authority. Women were readily available and they needed the work since the goods they once produced at home—clothing and household items—were now being made more inexpensively and faster by industry. Despite these facts, other emerging industries had largely ignored women. Textile managers recruited the women by initially offering relatively high wages and clean, well-run boarding houses with female matrons and strict codes of conduct for occupants. City planners also built educational, cultural, and religious facilities for the workers. Their efforts paid off. The emerging mill cities, such as Lowell, had largely homogenous workforces that were almost eighty percent female, under thirty years of age, and from rural origins.

This group assumed that if they created a model city—one with clean, well-supervised housing, schools, lecture halls, cultural activities, churches, and a benevolently paternal system of overseers—a harmonious atmosphere would prevail. Initially, it did. The first wave of female operatives to live in that planned community—Lowell, Massachusetts—starting in 1823, appeared to have few grievances against the factory system. But as the 1830s and 1840s progressed,
operatives complained about work speed-ups, wage cuts, and increased boarding house charges and conditions, as well as the hours of labor.\textsuperscript{15}

The very fact that Lowell was largely a female city allowed operatives to develop a sense of labor and gender solidarity relatively easily. Given what the Boston Associates thought was careful planning, Lowell’s factory managers were taken by surprise in February 1834 when one-sixth of their female employees struck to protest wage cuts brought on by overproduction and a slow market.\textsuperscript{16} Rumors of the impending salary reductions were enough to cause the women to hold meetings, circulate petitions, and, in some factories, completely stop work. Rallies and pledges by the women that they wouldn’t return to work until the pay cut was rescinded were short lived. The strike collapsed within a week after the strikers found themselves financially drained and evicted from their boardinghouses.\textsuperscript{17} Most of the women returned to work while others returned home.\textsuperscript{18}

A financial panic in 1837 ended this first organizing effort. A more systematic effort wouldn’t appear until 1845, led by Sarah Bagley, who later served as editor of \textit{The Voice of Industry}, with the formation of the Female Labor Reform Association. Although the group’s concerns included health and safety issues, increasing wages, and boarding house conditions, the group’s primary goal was achieving a ten-hour day. By the 1840s, however, much of the labor agitation had shifted from street corners and meeting houses and into the pages of the press.

\textbf{VOICES OF REFORM}

The publications emerged as the textile cities fell into an economic decline, the victims of their own industrial success. Rapid overexpansion in less than two decades flooded the marketplace with cheap textiles, forcing drastic cost-cutting measures. Operatives denounced the long hours of labor, low pay, and subsequent health and educational concerns in their journals. They also used their journals to address their disenchantment with class divisions.

Labor historian Philip Foner has noted that the publications’ importance “cannot be
overemphasized. Workers smuggled them into the mills and they were eagerly read and passed along. These magazines stimulated and helped build the Female Labor Reform Associations of the 'forties [1840s].”

The publications were largely helmed by men, despite the fact that numerous women wrote for, and served as co-editors of, the publications. Initially, The Lowell Offering, The Operatives’ Magazine, and The Voice Of Industry were supervised by male editors, although women later ran the publications. The Voice Of Industry only devoted substantial space to women operatives’ issues during the year of 1846-47 when Sarah Bagley assumed the editorship. The Factory Girl and Ladies’ Garland and The Factory Girl’s Album and Operatives’ Advocate also were established and run by a man, Charles Dearborn. Despite Dearborn’s overall supervision, an early editorial in the Factory Girl’s Album and Operatives’ Advocate stated that it was “edited by an association of females who are operatives in factories, and consequently are well qualified to judge of the wants of those whose cause they will advocate; and having borne in common with them their burdens and afflictions, are proper judges to administer an antidote that will alleviate their wrongs, and prevent a relapse of those abuses which have so long been heaped upon them.” Dearborn changed the publication’s name in May 1847 to The Factory Girl’s Album and Mechanics’ Offering in an attempt to broaden its appeal and readership. The new publication billed itself as the “devoted champion, not only to the operative of the mills, but to the laboring classes generally.”

Circulation figures for most of the publications are largely unknown. Most had subscription agents throughout New England and some, such as The Lowell Offering claimed subscribers in most states and in several countries overseas. Who those subscribers were--other operatives, artisans and mechanics, early supporters of labor or women’s rights, or the simply curious--remains unknown as the publications never addressed the issue and no records exist on the topic. Similarly, most of the publications never listed their circulations. Of the two that did,
The Olive Leaf, And Factory Girl's Repository claimed a circulation of nearly one thousand copies by April 1843. In 1846, The Voice Of Industry claimed more than two thousand copies weekly.

Literature and poetry on non-labor topics predominated in the genteel magazines, although some editorials, stories, and poetry occasionally dealt with labor topics. The female labor reform journals stood in contrast to these literary publications by devoting virtually all of their space to labor issues and concerns. Like their genteel counterparts, the labor publications also offered readers serialized novels, short stories, and poetry -- yet virtually all of it focused on the plight of factory operatives, especially females.

It should be pointed out that even the pro-labor publications never opposed hard labor. Rather, they denounced what many considered to be the unhealthy conditions and poor treatment which resulted from such labor. Most of the operatives, writers and editors included, had worked from an early age on their parents' farms and were willing to doing the same textile work [i.e., spinning and weaving] that their mothers had done at home. Nor did they oppose the establishment of factories and subsequent mechanization of the nation. As historian Walter Licht notes, Antebellum Americans, unlike Europeans, welcomed machines with great enthusiasm: "Machines replaced few workers; with an expanding agricultural base and with labor therefore lured to the land, machines filled a vacuum. The machine did not emerge as a phantom in the midst of the new American republic, as a threat necessarily either to livelihoods or social order."

Like the artisans' and mechanics' press, the greatest concern of many of the female operatives journals, particularly the pro-labor publications, was achieving a ten-hour day. Labor agitation for the ten-hour day dated to 1791 when a group of Philadelphia carpenters struck demanding a shorter day. The demands did not become regular for three decades, however, until President Martin Van Buren approved a ten-hour day in 1840 for federal workers, thus giving
hope to other workers who increased their lobbying efforts. 28

As labor historians Philip Foner and David Roediger have noted, reducing work hours "constituted the prime demand in the class conflicts that spawned America's first industrial strike, its first citywide trade union councils, its first labor party, its first general strikes, its first organization uniting skilled and unskilled workers, its first strike by females, and its first attempts at regional and national labor organization." The issue unified "workers across the lines of craft, race, sex, skill, age, and ethnicity." 29

Both the labor and the genteel literary publications were uniform in their reasons why a ten-hour day was necessary--workers' health would improve and the extra time would allow operatives to better themselves educationally. The Voice Of Industry used both arguments in its quest to obtain the ten-hour day. The newspaper was the joint product of the New England Workingman's Association and the Female Labor Reform League. Virtually every issue, both under its male editor, William Young (1845-46), and later its female editor, Sarah Bagley (1846-1847), contained editorials, articles, and letters to the editor supporting the ten-hour day. The newspaper never minced words about labor conditions or its disenchantment with middle class hegemony, living up to its slogan--"Hearken to me, I also will show mine opinion."

A December 26, 1845 editorial, for example, stated that factory operatives labored longer than other members of the working classes, yet also played to a commonly-held belief that women were more fragile than were men: 30 "Day laborers in the fresh air only work ten hours the longest day in the year . . . But here are poor, tender girls, in a confined atmosphere, drawing into their lungs the floating fibres of the materials, forced to labor 13 hours in a day--rise in the dark and go to work amidst snow and sleet--and some of them children . . . ."

Later articles in The Voice Of Industry were even more pointed about health concerns. One said: "The human frame with its delicate machinery is more worn and broken by too many hours' labor, than by hard labor itself . . . It is the long hours of weary standing or sitting in the bad air of
the factories which destroy and slowly undermine the human constitution, and produce premature
debility and finally death." Another stated: "Children and young persons require considerable
recreation in the open air in order to produce a proper development of the physical structure.
Variety of motion is one of the principal agents in the establishment of good corporal health." The
article added that "extreme toil... has also a debilitating effect upon the mind..."33

The Voice Of Industry also made clear that reduced hours of labor would allow operatives
to devote themselves to educational improvement, thus elevating the working classes and society as
a whole. Artisans' and mechanics' publications made similar arguments, stating that education
would allow the working classes to enter the ranks of the middle classes.34 Voice of Industry
writer Huldah J. Stone said the ten-hour day would let operatives "cultivate all our faculties in that
way and manner which shall most increase our own usefulness--add to the good of our fellow
creatures and honor the great Creator."35

The newspaper also was highly critical of operatives who sped back to the factory gates
before meal breaks were over rather than spending their free minutes reading: "Have they been so
long accustomed to watching machinery that they have actually become dwarfs in intellect--and lost
to all sense of their own God-like powers of mind--yea, more, have they any minds more than the
beasts that perisheth? If so, why are they not in their rooms storing their minds with useful
practical knowledge which shall fit them high and noble stations in the moral and intellectual
world?"36 The issue was a personal one for Editor Sarah Bagley who was angered that long work
hours made her unable to improve her education.37 Bagley, like many of the operatives initially
found the mill cities attractive because they offered culture, something her rural town of Laconia,
New Hampshire could not. Libraries, evening classes, lyceum lectures, and literary circles
flourished in many industrial cities.38

The Factory Girl's Album and Operatives' Advocate also made health and education
arguments in supporting the ten-hour day, noting in February 1846:

"Look at the mere child not eleven years of age, that is . . . compelled to labor from five o'clock in the morning till seven at night, making fourteen hours for a day's work.--And I would ask what opportunity a person thus situated has of improving, and cultivating her intellectual faculties. While on the other hand, had they but ten hours to labor, they could secure for themselves a comfortable maintenance, without impairing their health, and a privilege of obtaining a good education, whereby they might become useful and respectable members of society."39

The publication noted that it “has heretofore been the unflinching advocate of the `ten hour system,’ and of all other measures of reform, which we have thought would tend to the alleviation of the present wrongs of factory operatives.”40

The Factory Girl’s Album and Operatives’ Advocate often used class rhetoric in it lobbying efforts for the ten hour day. For example, a September 1846 said: “Our cause is a just one . . . The ten hour system is already in successful operation in some parts of New England, and the day is not far distant when the corporations in New Hampshire will have to adopt it. This enlightened age will not admit of so much servility as now exists, and has existed for ages; and unless the tyrants speedily forsake many of their wicked ways, they will be left alone in their wickedness; and their shops of brick and stone will become desolate.”41

The Factory Girl’s Album continued to use working class rhetoric, but also drew upon the image of the frail female to lobby for shortened hours. For example, in an article titled, “The Evils Of The Factory System,” the author said: “The movers of our factory system, are without doubt, an enterprising class of men, and as such ought to be commended.” Yet, the writer added: “Shame on you ye devotees to gold, ye pretended lords of creation. Hang your heads, and blush with shame and confusion, when you reflect upon your wicked tyranny and oppression; and that oppression exercised upon poor and helpless females.”42

Although the pro-labor papers lobbied regularly for a shortened work day, New England’s factory operatives were far from being the leaders in the ten hour movement, however, and would
not see their goal achieved until the 1850s—after their publications had all ceased. Female operatives faced great difficulty in convincing the public, particularly the upper classes, that workers were both deserving of a ten-hour day and that they would make good use of their free time. The Voice Of Industry noted in 1846 that the middle and upper classes believed that reducing hours of labor and providing more leisure time would allow operatives to “give themselves over to all manner of wickedness and degradation.” The journal disagreed firmly and proclaimed factory workers to be virtuous and “free from vicious habits.” After fifteen minutes were added to meal breaks in 1847, another article made clear most workers used the time to better themselves: “And what horrible things do you suppose they were doing? Most of them were reading books or newspapers, others were chatting with their friends or greeting new comers . . .”

The middle and upper classes disagreed, however, and refused to support the petitions and calls for the shorter work day, particularly when mill owners claimed that free time would increase “crime, suffering, wickedness, and pauperism.” The Voice Of Industry issued calls for operatives to unite and remain united to achieve the resolution of their labor grievances: “Some say that `capital will take good care of labor,’ but don’t believe it; don’t trust them. Is it not plain, that they are trying to deceive the public, by telling them that your task is easy and pleasant, and that there is no need of reform? Too many are destitute of feeling and sympathy, and it is a great pity, that they were not obliged to toil one year, and then they would be glad to see the `Ten Hour Petition’ brought before the Legislature. This is plain, but true language.”

Despite factory women’s lack of franchise, New England’s textile operatives used legislative petitions as their main tool to gain the ten-hour day. The Voice Of Industry was the leader in publicizing petition efforts. Petition drives in 1843, 1844, 1845, and 1846 sent thousands of signatures to the Massachusetts legislature but failed to motivate the politicians, particularly the 1846 drive, because a large number of the signers were women.
persevered, however. The Voice Of Industry Editor Sarah Bagley, who also was a leader of the Lowell Female Labor Reform Association which sponsored the petition drive in 1845, and six other women defied the then-social taboo of public speaking and testified before a Massachusetts legislative committee investigating labor conditions. No legislative actions resulted, despite Bagley's testimony on the effects of long workday hours on operatives' health. The committee to whom Bagley spoke acknowledged that the legislature could regulate hours of labor, but insisted that "it could not deprive the citizen of [the right to make his own] contract." Operatives were outraged. A Voice Of Industry article accused the legislature of being unable "to break the chain of corporation influence, that now binds them . . .".

Operatives in New Hampshire had somewhat greater success. Similar petition drives were staged, led by Mehitabel Eastman, president of the Manchester Female Labor Reform Association and co-editor of The Voice Of Industry. New Hampshire's legislature passed the first ten-hour law in New England in 1847. Despite being hailed by the operatives' publications, however, textile workers quickly discovered that the law had so many loopholes that their hours of labor did not significantly decrease. An eleven-hour day eventually was adopted by most of New England's textile mills, but not until the 1850s.

The genteel publications, by contrast, took a passive approach to the issue, claiming they had no power to affect change and told operatives they should rely instead on patriarchal beneficence to change the system. A November 1842 editorial in The Lowell Offering said: "With wages, board, etc., we have nothing to do—these depend upon circumstances over which we can have no control." The New England Offering echoed Whig support of factory owners over operatives on the ten-hour day issue. "I have no doubt that in their own good time, they will introduce the ten-hour system; and will not this be a noble deed? — a noble deed?,” the magazine said. The article added that it was not "inherent corruptions of the factory system" that caused
workers’ ill health. Instead, the article blamed the workers themselves, claiming that directly or indirectly, they neglected themselves.  

Rather than lobby for workers’ rights, both The Lowell Offering and The New England Offering instead devoted most of their space to essays, poems, stories, and serialized novels. Neither magazine ever pretended to be anything but literary. The Lowell Offering’s sole purpose, according to its editors, was to demonstrate to the upper classes that factory operatives were educated, intelligent, literate, and refined. The periodical could not afford to be critical since a major source of its funding came from Lowell textile magnate Amos Lawrence. As a result, The Lowell Offering’s editors rarely lobbied for changes in operatives’ working or living conditions.

The journal also chose to say little about labor conditions because its editors were convinced that factory conditions were no worse than those at any other job. The Lowell Offering’s editors conceded that “there are causes existing here unfavorable to constant and perfect health,” then cited the long work days, the lack of ventilation, and the brief meal breaks in cold rooms, however, the editorial stated that textile workers were no less healthy than other workers throughout New England, “Because those physical laws which are violated in the mills, are almost equally violated throughout New England.” The Offering stressed, however, that factory work was actually better than other jobs available to women because operatives were paid regularly.

The few editorials which commented on working conditions that appeared in the Offering did just that—comment—not criticize. For example, the final editorial written by the Offering’s Editor, the Reverend Charles Thomas, did call for changes, including shorter work hours, better ventilation in boarding houses, the creation of a hospital fund to cover indignant workers’ bills, and the creation of mill libraries. The article laid no blame, however, and was not accusatory.

Both publications promoted the rights of women to work, yet did so genteely. The magazines attempted to work largely within the confines of the middle class image of the “true
woman,” and thus portrayed operatives as pious, pure, submissive, domestic, and imbued with a sense of duty to family. Women were regularly portrayed in both fiction and essays as working primarily to support parents and other family members back home. A Lowell Offering article said that “another great source of pleasure” for operatives was to send money home to their parents.

Similarly, an 1848 editorial in the New England Offering told the story of a mill operative from Ireland whose starting pay was much less than the more experienced operatives. Yet, in only a ten month period she managed to save fifty dollars which she dutifully sent home to her parents.

Neither journal supported labor agitation to improve conditions, however. The Lowell Offering’s editor, Harriet Farley, believed that factory rules and hours were not too demanding: “Neither have I ever discovered than any restraints were imposed upon us, but those which were necessary for the peace and comfort of the whole, and for the promotion of the designs for which we are collected, namely, to get money, as much of it and as fast as we can . . .” Similarly, The New England Offering told operatives that they could leave the mill and become teachers, or undertake “less influential positions” if they sought to improve their conditions.

The pro-labor journals were angered at the passive nature of the genteel publications. The Voice Of Industry severely criticized The Lowell Offering, stating:

“This unfortunate publication roves over the country, even to other lands, bearing on its deceptive bosom a continual repetition of notes, less valuable to the reader than to the writer, but destructive to both; leaving behind the abuses and downward progress of the operatives, the very part which becomes their life, liberty, and greatness to give to the world, even if they were compelled to write the record with blood from their own veins.”

For many operatives, the labor reform publications provided a more accurate view of factory conditions and workers’ economic realities. The labor journals viewed operatives as a distinct working class, whereas the genteel journals’ editors viewed such labor as temporary. The Lowell Offering’s editors frequently stated that factory work was a means to an end (such as to
earn money for an education) for most women, rather than an end in and of itself.66 The distinction was important for many operatives since changes in agriculture, particularly the transition from subsistence to market-economy farming, had increased the number of women and men during the 1840s who considered themselves members of the permanent laboring class. Although some women entered the factories to gain financial independence, other women had little choice but to take permanent positions in the mills. Conditions were different prior to the 1840s. Many female operatives worked only part of the year, or just for a few years in the factories. Others returned home for a few months of the year to help with harvests or berry picking.67

Female operatives also used their publications to react to the growing class distinctions, particularly the middle class’s attempts to dominate socially, culturally, politically, and economically. Mechanics and artisans also criticized middle-class hegemony in their publications, using Jacksonian language to denounce “the aristocracy of wealth” and exclusive privileges for the rich.68 The factory women of the 1830s and 1840s, only a few generations removed from their revolutionary war ancestors, stated that they were “proud daughters of freemen,” who viewed themselves as equals to all other members of society.69 Thus they were critical of members of the middle class who had cast aside the Puritan work ethic (with which the operatives were raised) for women and believed instead that proper women should embrace idleness and the sanctity of the home.70

The Factory Girl’s Album and Mechanic’s Offering promoted the dignity of labor and the nobility of the working class in a slogan in its masthead: “Honor and Shame from no condition rise--Act well your part--there all the honor lies.” Similarly, the first issue of The Factory Girl’s Album and Operatives’ Advocate denounced both class-based distinctions and the middle class’s feelings of superiority: “There is far too much of an aristocratic feeling existing among our people,” said Sarah, the article’s author. She added that there is “groundless prejudice” against
factory girls whom she commended as industrious. She called class distinctions a grievous wrong
"That is the difference in caste which the employers create between their sons and daughters and
the sons and daughters whom they employ to increase their wealth. We are opposed to this
distinction. It is wrong; it is unjust to give the latter a supremacy in society over the former."71

The publication was more pointed in later articles, denouncing both class distinctions and
the unequal distribution of wealth among classes. A March 1846 article noted "the laborer has
occupied too low and unworthy position in society . . . Those whose gains have generally been the
least, have been compelled to toil the hardest and longest, while others, who live in ease and
affluence, have upon their labors, amassed their immense wealth. Nature designs no such unjust,
onequal distribution of her blessings, and she has fearfully placed the seal of her disapprobation
thereon."72

Although they lacked the class rhetoric, both The Lowell Offering and The New England
Offering also voiced support for the dignity of labor and the women’s right to work. The Lowell
Offering, for example, defended women’s rights to work in factories after Orestes A. Brownson,
editor of the Boston Quarterly Review claimed factory girls had been “damn[ed] to infamy.” The
Offering framed its support of factory women by drawing on operatives’ Puritan heritage: “girls
who generally come from quiet country homes, where their minds and manners have been formed
under the eyes of the worthy sons of the Pilgrims, and their virtuous partners. . .”73 The New
England Offering also claimed that labor was dignified and did not make operatives any less
feminine, however, the magazine supported labor because work was “one of our great preparations
for another state of being.” The magazine added: “Work we all must, if we mean to bring out and
perfect our natures.”74

As the textile mills overproduced and the economy suffered downturns in the 1840s,
operatives also used their publications to denounce work speed-ups, increases in the long hours of
labor, and pay cuts. Production speed-ups were one of the biggest grievances. Between 1829 to 1841, fifteen minutes were added to the working day. Operatives viewed the increase not as an increase in the work day, but as a decrease in leisure time. More importantly, the faster pace changed working conditions by decreasing operatives' autonomy. The publications noted women had less time to converse and factory managers banned both the books operatives once brought in to read during free moments and the potted flowers that once adorned the factories' windows.

Speed-ups continued throughout the 1840s. Operatives who once tended two looms at a time were expected to tend four by the mid 1840s. The Voice Of Industry responded to the changes by demonstrating that far from losing money, the Boston Associates were increasing revenues at the expense of the operatives. The newspaper printed statistics on women's wages, factory dividends, yards of cloth produced, number of employees, and numbers of spindles in operation in 1844 and 1845. The Voice Of Industry claimed corporate dividends in the Lowell mills increased almost 200 hundred percent between the two years, then stated "This is the natural result of the state of things in New England. -- The more wealth becomes concentrated in a few hands, the poorer the great mass becomes." Mill records supported the newspaper's claim. Between 1840 and 1843, Lowell's mills had indeed suffered a downturn in profits, recording percentages of 4.2, 7.9, 3.2, and 2.3 respectively. The factories rebounded between 1844-46. Profits rose substantially to 19.1, 17.1, and 18.2 percent during those years.

Not surprisingly then, the two wage decreases which occurred between 1841 and 1845, angered workers. An operative named Sarah who wrote about operatives' wages in the first issue of The Factory Girl's Album and Operatives' Advocate, echoed the working class's concern that employers were profiting at the expense of workers: "Her industry is to be commended--she toils from morning until night at the loom, or on some portion of the work which goes to make up the whole. But does she receive an adequate pay for her services? Not so. Her pay is too little in comparison to the profits derived from the work; and when it is taken into consideration that
oftentimes the health is destroyed by over work, it must be acknowledged that the employer
receives too much, the operative too little.”79

The publication regularly spoke out about wages, often providing facts and figures for its
readers. A June 1846 article stated, for example: “Think of girls being obliged to labor thirteen
hours each working day, for a net compensation of two cents per hour, which is above the average
net wages, being $1.56 per week. Two cents per hour for severe labor!”80

Even the normally silent Lowell Offering found its voice on the wage issue. An October
1843 editorial noted: “... it is much easier to instill a feeling of self-respect, of desire for
excellence, among a well-paid, than an ill-paid class of operatives. There is a feeling of
independence, a desire to form and retain a good character, a wish to do something for others.”81

The Factory Girl’s Album and Operatives’ Advocate went further, lobbying for equal pay
for women: “The labor of one person ought to command the same price as the labor of another
person, provided it be done as well and in the same time, whether the laborer be man or
woman.”82

The publications also occasionally commented differences between factory and farm labor.
For the first time in their lives, these formerly rural women had their lives governed by the clock.
Many chafed at the system of factory bells which woke them, freed them for meal breaks, and sent
them home at night. Even The Lowell Offering, which rarely commented on labor conditions,
published an article, titled “The Spirit of Discontent,” in 1841 by an operative who stated: “Up
before day, at the clang of the bell--and out of the mill by the clang of the bell--into the mill, and at
work in obedience to that ding-dong of a bell--just as though we were so many living machines.”83

Similarly, The Factory Girl’s Garland reprinted a resolution from Peterboro, New
Hampshire workers who called for factory managers to end the practice of requiring workers to
arrive at their stations before dawn and continue until after dusk: “Resolved, That although the
evening and the morning is spoken of in Scripture . . . no mention is made of an evening in the morning. We therefore conclude that the practice of lighting up in the morning and thereby making two evenings in every twenty-four hours is not only oppressive but unscriptural.” The Factory Girl’s Garland stating “We trust the girls . . . will rise up against this outrageous custom.”

Behind the workers’ concerns was the reality that oil lamps polluted the air, increasing both the temperature in the mills and the fire risk.

DISCUSSION

The journals disappeared in the early 1850s as the mill towns went into protracted declines spurred by over production and native New Englanders left the mills in large numbers. Their Irish replacements did not continue the publications or start their own.

The nation’s first factory publications written and edited predominantly by women provided voices for women to express their disenchantment (and often anger) at a number of industry conditions. Behind the concerns was a growing awareness that class distinctions had emerged permanently in society, and, furthermore, that the working classes were governed for the first time by a system of wage labor based on supply and demand.

Like their counterparts, the artisans’ and mechanics’ press, the labor-oriented operatives’ publications tried to rally the working classes into a unified whole on issues such as wages, hours of labor, and working conditions. Editors also sought solidarity to unite workers against middle-class hegemony. Both the genteel and the labor publications told readers that the key to middle class acceptance was education for the working class as a whole.

Although the pro-labor operatives publications denounced the emerging class distinctions as in opposition to the nation’s egalitarian origins, many operatives viewed themselves as a separate and distinct class. Female factory operatives responded to their changing social, economic, and political environment with a mix of both rural and urban philosophies. While
welcoming the machine age and hoping to fit into the emerging urban industrial society, the factory girls clung firmly to their Puritan values and the Revolutionary War rhetoric of their fathers and grandfathers. They blended their rural beliefs with the realities of urban industrial life to argue that women who worked should be allowed entry into the middle class. Rather than viewing middle class entrance in financial terms, these operatives judged individuals based on character and ability. The pro-labor journal’s image of the acceptable woman—one who was employed, intelligent, physically fit, self-sufficient, and financially self-reliant was largely in opposition to the middle-class vision of true womanhood. Their portrayal of the acceptable qualities for women paralleled those of another emerging middle-class vision, that of real womanhood. Historian Frances Cogan has noted that literature, advice books, and many women’s magazines began putting forth a more active image of middle-class women beginning in the early 1840s. The image, she points out, largely was a survival ethic based on the reality that many women—factory workers, missionaries, charitable workers, and others—were employed.88

Operatives weren’t above using genteel rhetoric in their attempts to gain wage and hour concessions from industry. Publications invoked the “true womanhood” image of the fragile maiden in a bid to gain support for their cause.

The genteel publications’ largely hands-off approach on labor issues strongly suggests that not all of the factory girls perceived their labor as a permanent condition. These publications gave voice to a growing segment of the work force who, lacking the political franchise, had to attempt to achieve their goals and publicize their plight through publications instead.

Although these publications only lasted for a decade, their importance to labor history, women’s history, and communication should not be trivialized. Hopefully more scholars will discover these early female voices. A comprehensive study of all antebellum labor publications—produced by both males and females—is necessary to properly assess the role these early women’s publications had in establishing and promoting nineteenth-century labor issues and rhetoric.
NOTES


5. The Operatives’ Magazine was jointly published in 1845 in both Lowell and Manchester, N.H. Similarly, the Factory Girl was jointly published in New Market and Exeter, N.H. The Voice Of Industry began again briefly in June 1848 under the title, New Era Of Industry. Its exact publishing history is uncertain. Labor historian Philip Foner, in his work, Women and the American Labor Movement, also makes reference to a factory girl publication called the Factory Girl’s Voice. No record of it could be found in any library or research institute despite extensive searching.

Unfortunately, little is known of the women who wrote for the magazines, with the exception of those who wrote for The Lowell Offering. Offering writer Harriet Robinson’s biography, Loom and Spindle, discusses those women—approximately 70—in some length, particularly those who went onto literary careers after leaving the mills. The rest of the mill girl writers—even an actual count of their numbers—remain unknown. Fearful of losing their jobs, many wished to remain anonymous and signed their articles only by their initials or first names.


15. A number of the journals addressed boarding house issues. For one of the lengthier articles, see: “Factory Boarding Houses,” *The Voice Of Industry*, 25 September 1845, 2.


30. A commonly-held belief at the time—the ideal of “true womanhood”—held that women were more tender and delicate than men. See: Frances B. Cogan, *All-American Girl: The Ideal of Real Womanhood in Mid-Nineteenth Century America* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1989), 3.


47. “Ten Hours, Ten Hours!!” *The Voice Of Industry*, 26 December 1845, 3.
48. Roediger and Foner, Our Own Time, 55.

49. Walter Licht notes the 1845 petition had more than five thousand signatures. See: Industrializing America, 60.

50. Foner, Women and the American Labor Movement, 78.


52. “All Hail New Hampshire,” The Voice Of Industry, 9 July 1847, 2.

53. Roediger and Foner, Our Own Time, 78.


62. “Editor’s Table,” The New England Offering, June 1848, 71.


64. “Editor’s Table,” The New England Offering, July 1848, 95.


66. The Voice Of Industry regularly referred to operatives as a working class. See, for example, “The Editor of the Voice, and Ourself,” 15 May, 1846, 2. Compare this to “Editorial,” The Lowell Offering, September 1844, 262.


69. “To Our Friends And Readers,” The Voice Of Industry, 7 November 1845, 2.


76. Roediger and Foner, Our Own Time, 51.


78. Dalzell, Enterprising Elite, 52.


84. Roediger and Foner, Our Own Time, 51.

85. Roediger and Foner, Our Own Time, 51.


87. Bender, Toward An Urban Vision, 64.

88. Cogan, All-American Girl, 5.
STANDING FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE
BLACK WORKER – BUT NOT AT HOME.
THE LABOR POLICIES OF THE CHICAGO DEFENDER

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Founded in 1905, the Chicago Defender quickly established its position as the most influential of the city's — and indeed the country's — black newspapers. While Chicago had many black newspapers over the years, including at least three attempts to launch local black dailies (the Bulletin in 1921, the Mirror in 1932, and the Daily Post in 1952) before the Defender converted to daily publication in 1956, the Defender dominated local paid circulation; its strong national circulation ensured that the paper was influential nationally as well.¹

But while the Chicago Defender consistently portrayed itself as a vigorous defender of the race, and has been widely credited for its battles to integrate a wide range of institutions and to encourage black migration to Chicago, the paper's approach to labor issues was often ambivalent. While the newspaper vacillated between encouraging black workers to accommodate themselves to their employers, or to join together to fight for better conditions, the publishers never reconciled themselves to union conditions in their own operations. Robert Abbott, like John Sengstacke after him, resisted paying competitive wages and battled workers' efforts to organize with a tenacity usually reserved for the editorial columns.
The Chicago Defender's widespread influence was in large part due to its outspoken militancy and its determination to speak not to the relatively small black elite but to the mass of black workers, in Chicago and (through its national edition) across the country. Census data indicate that Chicago's black population surged from just 30,150 in 1900 (1.8 percent of the total population) to 233,903 by 1930 (6.9 percent of the total), a rate of growth that has continued to the present day. The influx of new residents flooded the city's segregated black neighborhoods with often desperately poor workers torn between patronal institutions and relationships and collective struggle in their efforts to establish an economic foothold and build their own social and communal institutions.²

By 1920, the Defender was consciously targeted to this rapidly growing working-class black population. But the paper largely ignored issues of class, instead addressing its readers almost exclusively in the language of race. "The Defender was not a working-class organ," historian Albert Kreiling notes, "for [founding editor Robert] Abbott was rather conservative on matters other than race."³

Many black papers responded to the racism and exclusion practiced by most American Federation of Labor Unions by urging black workers to rely upon the benevolence of their employers to advance their personal and collective interests (even going so far as to urge black workers to seek work as strike-breakers). But the Chicago Federation of Labor was officially committed to organizing black workers on an equal basis and often devoted substantial resources to the effort, especially in the mass production meatpacking and steel industries where large numbers of black workers worked alongside Chicago's largely immigrant working class.
Despite his tendency toward conservatism, Abbott's *Defender* often supported those unions willing to enroll blacks on an equal basis, and even showed some sympathy for the Socialist Party in 1913 and the Communists in the 1930s, when these parties were pressing issues that addressed real problems facing Chicago blacks. Abbott spoke of his admiration and support for the packing house union to the cheers of the assembled workers at a conference sponsored by the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen in September 1918. The Amalgamated aggressively sought to organize black workers even in the aftermath of the city's 1919 race riots. While competitors such as the *Broad Axe* rejected unions from the start, Abbott's *Defender* continued to back the union until a disastrous strike in 1921 convinced him that the packers were invincible.4

Similarly, the *Defender* originally backed the efforts of Pullman porters to improve their conditions. But by the late 1920s Abbott's *Defender* condemned even black-led unions such as the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, instead advising workers to "align themselves with the wealthier classes in America" and endorsing Pullman's company union. Brotherhood President A. Philip Randolph derisively termed the paper the "Surrender," and charged that it was taking pay-offs from the company. The Brotherhood responded with a circulation boycott and Abbott reversed course to enthusiastically embrace the union.5

By the early 1930s, the desperate struggles of Black workers for unemployment relief, jobs and living wages led the *Defender* to adopt a more supportive effort toward labor struggles. By the late 1930s, the *Defender* wholeheartedly endorsed efforts to organize black steel workers, and was even willing to work with groups tied to the Communist Party to aid the Spanish Republican cause.6
But while the *Defender* might flip flop in its editorial policies toward labor, it established a remarkably consistent record in its business operations. Because Chicago was a strong union town, the paper was initially obliged to turn to the Chicago Typographical Union for its workforce. (Indeed, Enoch Waters reports that workers refused to install the paper's presses until Abbott agreed to operate with an all-union crew in his mechanical departments. Abbott's biographer attributes the decision to the insistence of Abbott's plant foreman on a union crew and to a shortage of black workers with the necessary skills.)

For its first 28 years, the *Defender* employed a racially mixed (though predominantly white) union workforce. But in June 1934, the paper abruptly fired all 36 skilled union workers, replacing them with non-union black workers. Abbott's explanations varied; sometimes he claimed he wanted an all-black workforce, at other times he said he could not afford to pay the union scale. In October 1934, the National Labor Board upheld a decision by the Chicago regional board that the *Defender* had violated section 7(a) of the National Recovery Act, and ordered Abbott to reinstate the fired workers, reimburse their lost wages, and bargain a new contract. The Board noted that Abbott had never asked the union to replace white workers with blacks even though several black workers held union membership, that three of the discharged unionists were blacks, that Abbott had not fired his all-white delivery crew, and that Abbott had never sought to negotiate wages with the union.

The Board is compelled to conclude that the company's controlling motive in the extraordinary action which it took was to save money. The wages paid the new staff were two or three hundred dollars a week less than the wages paid the former staff. Three days after the discharges had occurred Mr. Abbott wrote the Chicago Typographical Union that "the reason for dispensing with union labor at this time is the inability of the firm to pay the union wage scale."
The chair of the CTU's Defender Chapel had a more nuanced interpretation of events, however:

It was the belief of every member of No. 16 who worked in the Defender composing room in the early days of the plant that we were there only until such time as competent negroes could be found or graduated from apprenticeship to fully man the plant, and every effort was made by chapel members to bring about such conditions. The drawback to the consummation of that laudable plan was the business management of the Chicago Defender...

Walter Longwell said that managers usually chose apprentices on the basis of their political or social connections, rather than their qualifications. These unqualified apprentices were generally unable to master the requirements of the job, while Abbott repeatedly intervened to fire the more promising apprentices. But despite this interference and the "parade of unqualified apprentices," the union did succeed in graduating two skilled printers, a third was among the discharged union members.9

(Abbott biographer Roi Ottley's claim that the union "turned a deaf ear" to Abbott's pleas to admit blacks so that the Defender plant could be staffed by black printers is simply false, as Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 had long admitted blacks to membership and had black members working in several union shops around the city. Ottley's claim that "Negroes were eventually brought into the mechanical departments as apprentices and today entirely man the plant" is similarly misleading, as is his claim that "The Defender eventually was sustained" in the controversy. Unfortunately, Ottley does not provide sources for these or other assertions in what remains the only book-length biography of the Defender's founder.)10

Despite the favorable labor board ruling, the Defender never rehired the locked-out workers — spared by the Supreme Court decision finding the National Recovery Act unconstitutional. But its replacement workers soon joined the union and were locked-out by
the Defender when they demanded to be paid union scale as they had been promised when they were recruited. A leaflet issued by the Chicago Typographical Union warned that scabs were being paid between 40 and 80 percent of union scale despite the paper's promises to pay scale, that many were fired shortly after relocating at the Defender's request (Abbott repeatedly complained about the quality of his workforce, and regularly disciplined or discharged workers he found unsatisfactory without regard to union contracts or individual agreements), and that many experienced printers were being obliged to put in unpaid "training time."  

Abbott repeatedly insisted that he could not afford to pay union wages. While the paper ran substantial profits in the 1920s, losses mounted throughout the Depression with only a brief return to profitability in the immediate aftermath of the mass firings of union printers in 1934. As an arbitrator in a subsequent dispute noted,

Some ten years ago this employer discontinued employment of white newspaper craftsmen, and put on its staff of colored help, at a considerably decreased cost. At about that time, in 1935, a profit of some $10,397.15 was shown, to compare with previous years of constant losses. Even this drastic method of reducing costs apparently kept the firm "out of the red" for only that and one more year.  

The Defender staved off bankruptcy in 1939 only with the help of a loan from the Metropolitan Funeral Association.  

But if the Defender felt it could not afford union wages or working conditions, successive generations of workers quickly learned that they could not afford to work for the low wages (typically about half the prevailing rate, and sometimes much less) and long hours Abbott preferred. Each time the Defender broke their union, their replacements established an independent union within a few years. And when these company unions proved too weak to
win the improvements workers wanted, workers turned to stronger unions such as the Chicago Typographical Union or the Chicago Newspaper Guild.

In a series of contracts with a company union established in the Defender plant in 1938, just a few years after the 1934 lock-out and the subsequent strike by the replacement workers, Abbott established pay scales well below the CTU scale and gave himself the unlimited right to penalize or fire workers on charges of incompetence. These policies continued even after Abbott's death in 1940. The Defender's 1942 agreement selected two workers for special treatment; while the contract provided for a $42 weekly wage, one named engraver received only $40 while a mailer was singled out to get only $30 a week.14

Workers joined the Chicago Typographical Union the next year, and went to arbitration when they could not agree on a contract. Arbitrator Clarence Updegraff rejected Defender claims that its workers were less skilled than those on daily papers, and so should be paid less, ruling that, "The colored employees ... are excellent craftsmen, and in their actual work measure up to the craftsmen in similar lines employed by the big Chicago daily newspapers." But he found that the paper had lost nearly $150,000 in the preceding decade (see Table I), and might have difficulty affording the union scale. Abbott's biographer suggests the losses were even larger, claiming that after years of drawing against the paper's funds for personal expenses Abbott transferred "exactly $261,751.40" from his personal bank accounts to the Defender between 1930 and 1935. However, it is difficult to reconcile this claim with the paper's sworn submissions to the U.S. Conciliation Service.16

Updegraff found that the Defender would have to increase salaries by 40 percent to meet the industry-standard wages paid union workers under the Chicago Newspaper
### TABLE I

Statement of Comparative Operating Profit or Loss for 10 Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Profit</th>
<th>Loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>$11,831.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>57,925.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>58,395.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2,625.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>$10,397.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>9,492.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>16,215.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>13,823.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>7,281.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4,949.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>22,971.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Publishers Association contract, but noted that the Defender's past efforts to increase profitability by breaking the Typographical union had resulted only in modest, short-term savings. He ruled that pay should be increased to 90 percent of scale over the next eight months. A few years later, in June 1944, the Defender adopted the full CNPA scale and publisher John Sengstacke requested permission to use the Allied Printing Trades label.

But the Defender locked out its production workers again four years later, as part of a full-scale war between the Chicago publishers and the typographers union. The dispute began on the typesetting side, when the Defender abandoned a short-lived agreement with the union a few days after the union and the publishers association entered the two-year struggle that ultimately destroyed the typographers union's control over its jurisdiction, leading to decades
of gradually declining membership as new technologies for production bypassed the typographers.

The CTU struck the daily newspaper publishers on Nov. 24, 1948, after five months of negotiations resulted in a stalemate in which publishers refused to discuss wage increases until the union acceded to their interpretation of the Taft-Hartley amendments (restricting union jurisdiction, closed shop, and control over work rules) to the National Labor Relations Act. The Defender and several smaller papers (including several foreign-language dailies) initially agreed to cost of living increases and were not struck, but the Defender changed its mind after a few days and locked the typographers out. Many newsboys then refused to carry the paper, and several black unionists and clergymen issued statements condemning the Defender's use of scabs and calling for a boycott of the paper. The dispute spread to the Defender mailing room in June 1948, when the Defender informed mailers (also represented by the Chicago Typographical Union) that it was increasing hours, cutting wages, and would no longer recognize union work rules.

While the 23-month-long strike never halted production of the struck papers, they were forced to turn to primitive justo-written type. When the Defender hired non-union typographers after months of barely readable type, the Typographical Union seized on the development to file unemployment claims for the strikers. (Similar claims were filed against all the publishers, but prevailed only against the Defender, where the Illinois Director of Labor ruled that the locked-out mailers had been immediately replaced and hence there was no "stoppage of work"; he similarly ruled that once the striking typographers were replaced the stoppage of work had come to an end.)
Nor was the Chicago Typographical Union the only union to run into trouble with the Defender. In 1943 the newspaper fired two Newspaper Guild members, though the Guild had a contract with the Defender by August 1945 and was seeking recognition for workers on the business side. In January 1945, editorial workers protested the installation of a time clock in the newsroom. And in February 1945 the paper fired four more Guild members who worked in its advertising department after they refused to sign a management-dictated contract including pay cuts. But the Guild's ability to take industrial action was hampered by the continuing presence of several volunteers who wrote up local news for (at best) expenses in hopes of breaking into the paid staff, and by the reluctance of many Defender journalists to insist on union conditions. "Not being union-minded," reporter Enoch Waters later recalled, "we operated on the principle that as long as we were on the staff we were on duty, obligated to be reporters any hour of the day or night." No one ever asked for overtime pay, Waters boasted, and reporters regularly worked evenings without pay after putting in a regular 8-hour day shift.

The Defender's conversion to daily publication in 1956 may have increased the paper's attractiveness to advertisers (especially given the collapse of the paper's national circulation), but it did little to smooth relations with the newspaper's workers.

The Newspaper Guild ran into trouble with the Defender again in 1960, after production workers voted to dissolve yet another of the paper's company unions and join the Guild local representing editorial and business employees. The Defender refused to negotiate a joint contract and challenged the production workers' decision to join the Guild. After the Guild won a NLRB representation election 72 to 2, the Defender refused to open the paper's books to
substantiate its claims that it could not afford pay raises. The Guild struck in April 1961, making an unconditional offer to return to work after eight days (during which it became clear that Sengstacke could continue production with nonstriking workers and subcontractors). But management refused to take any of the strikers back, explaining that it had reorganized its mechanical department and no longer had places for the 58 workers still on strike when the Guild offered to return. The Defender was ultimately ordered to reinstate the strikers and pay some $450,000 in back pay by the National Labor Relations Board, but publisher John Sengstacke continued refusing to pay competitive wages. In 1962, Sengstacke budgeted just $110,000 for the daily's 15-person reporting and editorial staff.23

The Defender's labor problems were hardly unique among black newspapers. When veteran black journalist P.L. Prattis was in New York when a strike broke out at the Amsterdam News, he volunteered to help get the paper out, being added to the payroll after a couple of days.24 Black newspapers and journalists alike were typically impoverished. The papers of the Associated Negro Press are filled with correspondence regarding the inability of subscribing papers to pay their bills for the news service, and requests that A.N.P. head Claude Barnett funnel G.O.P. money to them to compensate them for carrying articles urging blacks to support the Republican ticket.

There is extensive anecdotal evidence that potential news subjects sought to take advantage of black journalists' economic straits to influence coverage. When black conservatives became alarmed at a Defender campaign against a segregated air unit being organized under the auspices of the Tuskegee Institute, Barnett arranged to deliver cash payments to the Defender editor and reporter responsible for the articles in hopes of putting an
end to the campaign. Another Defender journalist was paid $10 to run a photo and article supporting the unit. As late as 1947, Defender reporter Enoch Waters was offered (and declined) an interest-free $10,000 loan by local numbers racketeers, while editor Ben Burns recalls that the advertising department continued to sell editorial space along with advertising contracts in the 1960s.25

But one cannot attribute the Defender's labor problems simply to the difficult economics intrinsic to publishing specialized newspapers. Chicago's Polish-language newspapers, for example, argued in 1914 that they could not afford to pay union scale. But a campaign of agitation in the Polish community by the Allied Printing Trades Council quickly led to decisions by the mutual aid associations that published the leading Polish papers to agree to union contracts.26 The Polish dailies negotiated joint contracts with the Chicago Typographical Union and other unions for decades which mirrored the wages paid by the leading Chicago dailies and at times actually offered shorter hours (for the same weekly pay) than those worked in other union shops. The Polish newspapers continued publishing under CTU wages and conditions throughout the 1948-1951 strike, paying the higher wages that the major dailies (and the Defender) had refused to concede.27

The Defender was willing to defend the rights of black workers to join unions, to publish sympathetic (as well as critical) articles about the Communist Party (even as McCarthyism was heating up) and the Soviet Union, to publish verbatim press releases from the CP-dominated International Labor Defense, and to allow a Young Communist League float in the Defender's annual Bud Billiken parade. The Chicago Defender praised the Congress of Industrial Organization's record of supporting equal rights, and urged black workers to support
unionization efforts in the 1930s. While bitterly skeptical of the policies of the American
Federation of Labor, it repeatedly urged black workers to refuse to work as scabs, and to join
those unions willing to admit them on an equal basis. "Capital has not played square with
us," the Defender noted; "it has used us as strikebreakers, then when the calm came turned us
adrift." 28

The workers who wrote and produced the paper might well have raised a similar
complaint. But whether because of the paper's economic interest in maintaining an ill-paid
workforce that could be compelled to work long hours under substandard conditions or
because of founding editor Robert Abbott's paranoia (tellingly illustrated in a 1930 article
where Abbott wrote of the "vicious conspiracy ... fostered by the people whom I had
considered to be my most intimate friends who had conspired not only to destroy the
Defender as an institution but also to bring about my death," going on to complain of stool-
pigeons in his office and attempts to commit him to an insane asylum) and his insistence on
unfettered control, neither Abbott nor his successor willingly tolerated a unionized staff. 29

Former editor Ben Burns concludes his memoir by noting his disenchantment at
realizing that the Defender "was as fully dedicated to profits as any other business venture." 30
As Sengstacke's heirs once again battle over control of the Defender properties, valued at $10 to
$12 million, daily circulation has fallen to 16,000 and many community activists say the paper
has little influence in Chicago's black community. 31 The paper's decline surely has several
causes, but the publishers' treatment of its staff was surely a contributing factor.
Notes:

1. A 1938 survey of southside newsdealers found that the Defender sold more than four times as many papers as its three leading competitors combined. In 1939, 23,470 copies of the Defender's 81,082 weekly circulation were sold locally. Ralph Davis, "The Negro Newspaper in Chicago" (M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1939), pp. 134-37; Claude Barnett to R. Bruce Jones (N.W. Ayer & Sons), Nov. 18, 1952, Claude A. Barnett papers, box 149, folder 1, Chicago Historical Society.


8. National Labor Relations Board decision, Chicago Defender Inc. and Chicago Typographical Union #16, Chicago Mailers Union #8, Chicago Web Pressmen's Union #7, Chicago Stereotyper's Union #4, Oct. 20, 1934. Copy in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 papers (Chicago Historical Society), Box 12, folder 6.

9. Walter Longwell to CTU President George Chiles, no date (summer 1934), CTU #16 papers, box 12 folder 6.


11. Enoch Waters, American Diary, pp. 147-55; Defender Strike Committee, The Facts (no date, 1936?), Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 papers, Box 12 folder 6.
In one of several cases over the years involving competence claims, the CTU won an arbitration decision in 1947 for four pressmen the Defender was claiming were incompetent. The CTU was representing the pressmen even though they normally would have been enrolled in the International Pressmen's and Printing Assistants' Union. However, that union refused to enroll black members. Thomas Canty to John Franks, Defender pressroom, April 14, 1947, CTU papers, box 13 folder 1.


The paper was widely regarded as being on the verge of collapse in the 1930s. When a group of white Republicans led by Alf Landon offered (through intermediaries) to buy a majority interest in the paper for $50,000 (keeping Abbott on the payroll as publisher) in 1938, Associated Negro Press owner (and Republican operative) Claude Barnett responded that while the paper was clearly in financial difficulty, Abbott did not seem inclined to give it up. Correspondence between P.L. Prattis and Claude Barnett, June 1938, Barnett papers, Box 139, folder 1.


17. Sengstacke to CTU President Thomas Canty, Oct. 31 1945, CTU papers, box 13 folder 1.

18. Chicago Typographical Union, Negro Leaders Blast 'Defender,' April 1948, CTU papers, box 13 folder 1.


20. Frank Annunzio, Decision in the matter of the Appeal of George Christly and Other Claimant-Employees of the Robert S. Abbott Publishing Company (No. 49-DL-134), Sept. 8, 1950, and in the matter of the Appeal of Truhart E. Branch and Other Claimant-Employees (No. 48-DL-1GI), Sept. 8, 1950, CTU papers, box 61, folder 1.

Boxes 60 and 61 are dedicated to the unemployment compensation cases. Although Illinois law barred payment of benefits where a stoppage of work stems from a labor dispute, the union contended that the strikers had been displaced by different production technologies and thus there had been no stoppage. In detailed testimony, the newspapers testified to the devastating impact the
strike was having on their advertising and editorial processes, while the unions argued that the strike had been wholly ineffectual. Each argued radically different positions in public.


Defender staffer Ben Burns states in his memoirs that there was no Guild unit at the Defender when he joined the staff in 1942. "I helped to recruit a handful of members into the union, even though I myself was ineligible to function openly in the Guild because I was in 'management.' When an attempt was made to win union recognition, publisher John Sengstacke balked...


22. Enoch Waters, American Diary, p. 160.


25. For examples of dunning letters see Claude Barnett to Illinois Plain Dealer, March 8, 1927, Barnett papers, box 149, folder 1, and to Al Benson (Chicago Chronicle), May 8, 1953, box 149, folder 2; for the Tuskegee affair see Claude Barnett to F.D. Patterson, Jan. 22, 1941, and Jan. 26, 1941, and Barnett to J.A. Kennedy, Feb. 27, 1941, Barnett papers, box 149 folder 7; the Barnett papers contain extensive documentation on Barnett's work for the Republican party, including several letters from editors complaining that they were not being paid properly for printing the party's material: see, e.g., L.E. Austin (Carolina Times) to National Feature Service, Sept. 27, 1932 Claude Barnett to L.C. Austin, Oct. 8, 1932, Barnett papers, box 334, folder 4; Waters reports the attempted bribe in his American Diary; Burns, Nitty Gritty, p. 213.


27. Copies of contracts and correspondence between the Chicago Typographical Union and the Polish-language publishers can be found in boxes 54 and 55 of the Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 papers.


THE JOURNALISTIC FUNCTION OF BOOK REVIEWS:
HOW FALUDI'S BACKLASH MADE NEWS

PRESENTED TO THE HISTORY DIVISION
ASSOCIATION FOR EDUCATION IN JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION
ANNUAL CONVENTION
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THE JOURNALISTIC FUNCTION OF BOOK REVIEWS: HOW FALUDI'S BACKLASH MADE NEWS
by Priscilla Coit Murphy

Book reviewing has a distinctly non-journalistic image in the world of mass media, residing in an environment of hushed libraries, egghead highbrows, and Sunday newspaper sections set aside for later reading that never happens. This reputation derives partly from an assumption that the book review is largely an exercise in literary criticism and concerned primarily with "serious" writings, primarily fiction. As such it is only a visitor to mainstream journalism from the rarefied world of academe, printed as a courtesy to publishers and "serious" readers. Similarly, the idea of a book as a news event seems unlikely in a world of sound bites, visual literacy, and orality. Yet since World War II the output of non-fiction has far outstripped production of fiction, and books have increasingly become news events, involving not only print but broadcast and even film media.

Characterizing the role of the book review as informative -- announcing the existence of a book -- easily places it within a simple definition of journalism as reportage: it reports the publication event. But book reviews have a much fuller and more significant role in public discourse, one situated within a broader concept of contemporary journalism. Using Susan Faludi's Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women¹ as case study, the role of a book review in the introduction and development of public debate on a controversial issue will be explored, and suggestions are offered toward a fuller understanding of the journalistic function of the book review.

BACKGROUND ON BOOK REVIEWING

A respectable literature exists on the subject of book reviewing, but much of it is located in literary and critical studies, with the perspective that book reviewing and literary
criticism are indistinguishable. Numerous writers either have given advice on how to write a review or criticized the contemporary quality of reviewing, typically focusing solely on reviews of fiction, poetry, or "serious" literary works. However, certain essayists on the point were at pains to specify the difference between critics and reviewers.

In his discussion, Granville Hicks coined the term "literary journalism" to refer to book reviewing as distinct from literary criticism. In her famous essay on "Reviewing," Virginia Woolf said, "the critic dealt with the past and with principles; the reviewer took the measure of new books as they fell from the press," while Victoria Glendenning, made the distinction more on practical grounds, referring to the time, space, and commercial constraints placed on reviewers and not on critics.

In her pivotal discussion of the founding of the New York Herald Tribune's "Books" in the 1920s, Joan Shelley Rubin confronted the dual traditions directly: "The question of whether attention to new books should take the form of 'news' or 'criticism' had shaped American book reviewing since the nineteenth century." The "'news' approach" was, according to her, in constant tension with other impulses, including pressure from advertising publishers. Eventually, following the British example of the reviewing quarterly or monthly periodical, reviewers "willingly became journalists--but they regarded their calling as 'higher' than that of the ordinary newspaper." In her subsequent discussion of taste, Rubin offered, in effect, a continuum between treatment of books as news and exercise of literary criticism, allowing for variations in degree but avoiding partition between the two.

The history of book reviewing, which according to Woolf "came into existence with the newspaper," is rather sparsely examined outside of histories of literary culture such as Rubin’s. Pat Rogers provided a concise sketch, noting that reviewing began in mid-eighteenth-century Europe, developed by London's Monthly Review, in particular. Rogers

231
outlined some of the political foibles of early reviewers, such as self-reviewing and reciprocity of good will among authors reviewing each other.8 Nina Baym, whose Novels, Readers, and Reviewers was concerned with responses to fiction in early America, noted that reviews tended to be quite lengthy synoptic discussions, becoming considerably shorter with the advent of the paperback.9 The role of reviewing in the professionalization of authors was also touched on by Baym and more thoroughly explored by Frank Donoghue, whose discussion of reviewers' ability to confer fame on named authors is resonant today.10

Much of the literature relevant to twentieth-century book reviewing in America is concerned with what might be called (after Coser et al) the culture of book reviewing: the economics, mechanics, and above all, the social politics of it. Coser, Kadushin, and Powell's 1981 sociologic study of book publishing provides a brief but very useful outline of how reviewing is conducted from screening processes to comparisons among the various reviewing vehicles,11 although the years since their study have seen economic changes in publishing that have wrought some shifts in the culture (e.g., the profound effects of the quest for "blockbuster" success). For the purposes of this study, it may be useful to discuss other literature organized in terms of the various functions that book reviewing may be said to have within that culture.

The first, and most obvious, is reportorial, i.e., to inform -- to announce the existence of the book and provide some information about it: "an amalgam of condensed plot plus evaluative tag. Relate, rate, and be done with it."12 Rubin quoted a late nineteenth century reviewer's definition: "To tell newspaper readers what books are published, and what sort of book each of them is, so that the reader may decide for himself what books to buy. His work is not so much criticism as description. It is in the nature of news and comment upon news, and the newspaper reviewer rightly omits much in the way of adverse criticism."13 For
contemporary American publishing, trade periodicals, notably *Publishers Weekly* (PW), *Kirkus*, and *Library Journal* (LJ) have been the early and pivotal heralds of most new books, announcing them to libraries and booksellers, as well as to reviewers in the general media. Reviews then beget other reviews, as the mass media pick up on titles "discovered" in the trade journals.

A concurrent and critical economic function of the review is to sell. The appearance of a review -- a positive one -- is the linchpin of the publicity effort, even beyond the basic advantage of exposure in newspapers or magazines or on television or radio shows. Quotes from favorable reviews, some elicited before publication, often form the basis for book jacket copy (which sells the book in the store) and advertising copy. The effect of this advertising function was frequently seen as undermining the credibility or "quality" of reviews, particularly when reviews were unsigned, as Rubin discussed.

Rarely discussed explicitly outside the trade is an additional, critical economic function: to sell the readership and the medium in which the review appears. Quoting reviewer Harry Hansen, Rubin touched on this: "they [the newspaper publishers] saw 'that there was a larger audience for books and reviews; they discovered that the [book] publishers had larger revenues to spend for book advertising; and they found that the book section could be used as a quality argument with other advertisers.' " That function puts a peculiar spin on the cultural effect of the reviewer's choices. Fogerty's description of the role of the review -- "to create an audience for a good work" -- begs a complicated question of whose tastes prevail in the market. Over time, many have addressed whether reviewers should follow or shape popular tastes. Straddling the informative and commercial aspects of reviewing, Michael Dirda of the *Washington Post Book World* observed, "At newspapers we are obliged to cover books as news, and so we review Stephen King, Jackie Collins, and a lot of high-
tech thrillers. Still, I do believe that book review sections should try to improve and shape literary culture.¹⁸

Thus the economic functions of book reviewing are not far from its cultural effect, intended or otherwise, in setting taste standards.¹⁹ Early writers²⁰ took for granted the reviewer's ability, indeed obligation, to do so; and that orientation is the basis of a number of studies of standards and quality in book reviewing, foremost among them Rubin's, who went on to situate book reviewing (in the slippery continuum between news and criticism) in the evolution of middle-brow taste.²¹ George Orwell made the parenthetical comment that reviewers, rather than being high-, middle-, or low-brow, might best adopt an "elastic" brow to best respond to both books and readership.²²

Taste-setting follows from two separate but concurrent aspects of book reviewing, that of screening or gate-keeping what is brought to the public's attention, and that of evaluation, in which the reviewer praises or pans the author's product. But questions about taste, not to mention the ethics and politics in reviewers' power, often revolve around who chooses the books to be reviewed, who is chosen to review the books, and what the impact of the review may be. Most observers acknowledged critical, if complex and sometimes inbred, relationships among reviewers, publishers, and authors; and a substantial amount of literature on the mid-twentieth century book review focuses on the politics of book reviewing.

Atop all is the powerful New York Times Book Review (NYTBR), as was acknowledged by Coser et al, Norman Podhoretz,²³ Katherine Dalton,²⁴ and myriad others. Joseph Deitch's interview with Christopher Lehmann-Haupt of the Times addressed the point directly, with Lehmann-Haupt's added observation that a review may itself be news, if it runs in the Times;²⁵ and other writers on the politics of book reviewing often level their analysis or criticism at the Times, indirectly or directly.²⁶ James Bowen, writing in the conservative
National Review, described the foibles of the Times' reviewing process from the point of view of a political conservative scornful of its liberal bias and the resultant "conga line of backscratchers snaking its way through all the major publishing houses." In his account of NYTBR reviewing, Edwin Diamond lay power directly at the feet of the chief editor, who may exercise "nudging power" in the selection of book, choice of reviewer, timing of publication, and even response to the book. Choice of reviewer, he says, may be conditioned by natural affinity in subject matter or by payback-time -- friendly or not. Celebrity reviewers rather than staff reviewers have become increasingly common in the last few decades, and using celebrities has proved sometimes dangerous. In 1994 Diamond quoted (then recently deposed) chief editor Rebecca Sinkler as saying, "We ask the reviewer, 'Will the author have any grounds for objecting to you as a reviewer?'"  

The question of contention among editors, authors, and reviewers brings us closer to the mid-century evolution of the cross-review debate. O'Sullivan offered a dramatic example of the retaliatory power of reviewing, or not reviewing, a book and said that book reviewers often have "bellicose political agendas." For Bowman, however, using "ideologic twins" -- like-minded authors reviewing each other's books -- renders reviews bland or worse. The illusion of consensus creates political bias within a semblance of objectivity.  

The issue of objectivity on the part of the reviewer leads back to the basic question of the journalistic function of the book review, particularly where non-fiction is concerned. To the extent that the simple fact of a book's publication is news, "a book-reviewer is partly a purveyor of news," said Clifton Fadiman succinctly, while Robert Kirsch defined the beat as "superior cultural reporting." In this conventional view, the reviewer's own views are not included: "You have done a job of reporting. And like the reporter you have kept yourself out of the story." Yet the informative function of the book review has almost
always been expected to be accompanied by a judgment, “thumbs up or thumbs down.”

That evaluative function is expected by some still to remain somehow objective -- on the premise that there is such a thing as an objectively “good” book or “bad” book: “The reviewer’s duty is to keep his eye on the book, on the whole of it, is faults and its virtues.”\(^{34}\) However, in Dalton’s worry about the noncommittal timidity of much mainstream book reviewers, she observed: “All this has something to do with the modern notion of journalistic ‘objectivity,’ with the idea that there is some way of reporting a story or providing cultural coverage that is ‘completely fair’ and ‘unbiased,’ and that this is done by presenting ‘both sides.’”\(^{35}\) She went on to note that “in American the only publications that will take a stand on a book are the ones that acknowledge their partisanship.”\(^{36}\) Some have been uncomfortable with the presence of reviewers’ own commentary, feeling it takes the review back into the realm of literary criticism\(^ {37}\) or, as Nina Balakian feared, subjects it to commercial pressures rendering it more advertising than journalism.\(^ {38}\)

More often, however, analysts accepted and even welcomed the idea that a book review could and should not only perform an evaluative pro-or-con function but also offer considered commentary. Said Francis Brown, long-time editor of the New York Times Book Review, “there are critics who are not afraid to hear their own voices, to speak their own minds.” In this view, the reviewer is not only understood to be a reader, (as Charvat would point out\(^ {39}\) or Hicks’ “reader [who] becomes a reporter,”\(^ {40}\) but -- as Orwell put it -- “needless to say . . . a writer.”\(^ {41}\) For Podhoretz, a review is not just a bit of cultural reporting, it is “an occasion to do some writing of [one’s] own, . . . responding to the issues raised by a book,” thereby constituting “a genre in its own right.”\(^ {42}\)

Significantly, the book review may even function as substitute for the book itself in discussion. Baym made the point glancingly, noting that early reviews were lengthy precisely
because readers of periodicals might not have access to the book itself. In Drewry's list of who reads reviews, his third group was "those who do not have the time to read books and who must therefore rely on reviews for their information." Similarly but more cynically, Howard observed a more social use of the review as stand-in for the original book's content:

>?Alongside their bare Siskel-and-Ebert consumer-guidance function, book reviews may also serve other ends. For one thing, they are marvelous guides to up-to-the-minute intellectual decor for people looking to appear au courant with minimum time and effort. Richard Rosen in New York Magazine coined the phrase "bullcrit" to describe the use of reviews as cheat sheets for dinner and cocktail party chatter among the cosmopolitan set, for whom being caught with the wrong opinion (or worse, no opinion at all!) about the latest hot book du jour can have devastating social consequences.

Coming full circle, Drewry placed reviewing back into the journalistic tradition:

"The review is like the editorial in that it is interpretative and explanatory." This editorial function, then, places the book review along with other journalistic opinion and commentary into the arena of public debate and exchange of ideas, but perhaps a step further, as boiling stone or agenda-setter in that debate. Thus, book reviews bear the same range of journalistic relationships to a book as item of news -- whether read or not -- as other journalistic efforts might have to other news events -- informing, interpreting, commenting, and inserting into public discussion. Yet few have really examined the relationship between books, book reviews, and general news coverage. Coser et al simply remark in passing that "on occasion, Time or Newsweek will use recently published books as springboards for a wider discussion in sections other than the book section," but their interest in that role is primarily for its significance as profitable publicity.

The interest of this study is to begin examination of those relationships, which have not been well considered to date, by looking at the relationship of reviews of a specific book to issue-oriented news, specifically news about the resurgent feminist debate in 1991-1992.
With specific reference to Faludi's *Backlash*, the questions to be asked are: 1. what was the relationship between the book and the media controversy? what role did the book play in initiating or continuing that controversy; 2. what was the evidence of awareness of the book and/or the book reviews as part of the controversy? 3. what was the role of the reviewer -- reading reporter, responding writer, or something else?

**Method**

Reviews of *Backlash* were collected from the print media -- major daily and weekly newspapers, weekly news magazines, and monthly magazines. The non-review material was collected similarly from mainstream media, albeit somewhat less systematically given the scope of the study (one database search on "Faludi and Backlash" yielded over 950 "hits" for a few months' period) and is meant essentially to indicate the kind, timing, and quantity of burgeoning response in the media. Where possible, letters to editors in response to a review were collected, and otherwise database and reference "mentions" were retrieved for the months the book was on the bestseller lists.

The diaspora of the reviews, responding comments, and mentions fell into a pattern of five phases. Table 1, by no means exhaustive of what was found in database searches, illustrates in a summary way the timing and sequence. The first period, "Early Warning," covers August and September of 1991, prior to release in the bookstores. The next, "October Debut," refers to the flurry of activity in the first month of release to the public. November through February of 1992 are collected under the heading "Spreading Discussion." March and April constitute "Replay and Reply." Finally, "Playout" refers to the six months thereafter, as references to the book itself finally thin out (yielding to references to Faludi alone), and the release of the paperback in October of 1992 -- a year after the debut of the hardcover edition.
BACKGROUND ON BACKLASH

Faludi's Backlash appeared in fall of 1991, and it quickly became focus of considerable debate across the media, not only on the issue of feminism but also concerning the news media themselves, notably the phenomenon of what she termed "trend journalism" (reporting the existence of a trend on the basis of one or two anecdotal reports). The thesis of the book was that there had been, as the subtitle states, an "Undeclared War Against American Women" -- a backlash, like others in history, after an era of gains by women made toward social, political, and economic equality. The work was provoked by a "Harvard-Yale" study that claimed that college-educated women had drastically and decreasingly poor chances of marrying after age thirty. Faludi discussed how this and similar studies had been presented as part of a backlash against the feminism of the 1970s, even though the reports themselves might have been highly flawed or outright inaccurate and their presentation in the media might have been distorted or biased. Along with unsubstantiated assertions of general social phenomena based on anecdotal stories, they formed part of what Faludi referred to as "trend journalism." The backlash against feminism was evident in the trend-journalism of the 1980s and played out in pop culture and in political, commercial, and economic arenas -- not a concerted conspiracy but what she referred to as a "closed system" in which feminism became the scapegoat for social ills and the target for unrelated agendas.

Responses to her book on the part of both reviewers and readers were quite often to the concept of the backlash itself. But responses were also to the several aspects of it she questioned: social research, such as the Harvard-Yale study; the media and its practice of trend journalism; the emphases and messages of pop culture; men or antifeminist women for their roles; marketing practices; or the political and economic motivations at the core of the backlash. Reviews rarely took the form of straight synopsis but rather were typically
evaluation/criticism of parts or the whole of the book, criticism of the author herself, or an opportunity for the reviewer to enter the debate with his or her own views.

One event in contemporary history must be considered. Almost concurrent with the publication of *Backlash* was the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, and discussion of *Backlash* without reference to the Hill-Thomas controversy would be bad methodology, not to mention impossible to do. However, the degree to which the two were related in press discussion will be seen to be an important question itself: was one more clearly the news event than the other? Certainly, in the era of the Hill-Thomas controversy, the William Smith trial, and national discussion of sexual harassment, feminism had had revived relevance in the cultural discourse. And it is a journalistic truism that controversy sells. But a book is not usually expected to become the center of attention.

**Early Warning - August and September 1991**

Publication date for Susan Faludi's *Backlash* was set vaguely to be "November 1991," but review copies were obviously available by early September. As early as the end of August, the *Christian Science Monitor*’s Nancy Gardner refers to the "forthcoming book" in a piece discussing misuse of statistics in social reporting. On September 10th, the Atlanta *Journal and Constitution*, for whom Faludi had worked, mentioned that fact in connection with her "forthcoming" book, which it announced had been "reviewed glowingly" in the current (September 16th) issue of *Newsweek*. Similarly reporting on the magazines for the month, the *Boston Globe* noted on the 11th that *Glamour* and *Mother Jones* were running excerpts of the book. Thus the media were already aware of the book and, in the cross-media comments, of their own response to the book, even before formal publication and release.
Simultaneously, the trade journals, *Kirkus* and *Library Journal*, flagged the book as being of special note. Meanwhile, *Newsweek*, whose later feature-cum-review would be a major part of the October explosion of attention, actually previewed the book in its September 16th issue (as noted above regarding the Atlanta paper), which featured the Clarence Thomas nomination as cover story. The pre-publication review was indeed "glowing." According to Laura Shapiro, who was then general editor for *Newsweek*, book critic Peter Prescott had already identified the book as a major work and included it in a blind (no byline) preview of cultural events for the fall. The two-paragraph preview set up great expectations for the book:

This being the season for counterrevolutions to fail, there's a solid chance that Susan Faludi's *Backlash* will strike a blow for that bedeviled movement, feminism. Sure to be controversial, the Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter's polemic won't appear until the end of next month, but it's already being proclaimed as the "Feminine Mystique" for the '90s."

At the end of the pre-review, he said, "It will cause talk." Actually, it already had. According to Shapiro, the book was already part of the "buzz," a vibration among book publishers and review editors who lunch together and who in turn may also lunch with publicists or magazine editors or general assignment reporters. In this preview, *Newsweek* seemed to be laying the groundwork for a news event in which it would figure prominently -- perhaps yet another episode of trend journalism. Moreover, the fact that both Faludi's book and many of its reviewers spotlighted *Newsweek* as major media culprit in the Harvard-Yale study ballyhoo suggests that there might have been a belated effort to offset its error and embarrassment. Yet Shapiro insisted that both she and Prescott as well as others who read the review copies as they became available were deeply impressed with its scope, quality, insight, and relevance. The Hill-Thomas hearings were to intensify its pertinence, as will be seen.
By the end of September, review copies had probably reached and been read by reviewers of most of the major regional papers. The Chicago Tribune's lengthy review-plus-interview appeared on the 29th, written by Jane Ayres, unidentified beyond the San Francisco dateline. Within her piece, the distinction between what Faludi wrote, what came out of the interview, and what Ayres herself provided by way of additional information was often quite blurred.

The October Debut

Backlash was officially released in early October, just as Anita Hill's allegations against Clarence Thomas were forcing national focus on the issue of sexual harassment. Faludi herself has wondered whether release at a different time might have meant much less attention to her book. While the concurrence of the two events is important, and while the Hill-Thomas controversy most likely potentiated public interest in Faludi's subject, her book had already commanded considerable notice -- "buzz" -- that was propelling reviewer response in advance of the Senate hearings. In fact, sexual harassment is not a focal point of Backlash; and reviewers, while often compelled to mention Anita Hill, were generally unwilling or unable to relate the two thoughtfully, with an exception to be noted.

Publishers Weekly's review had appeared unusually late in the book's history, at roughly the same time as release to booksellers, suggesting that Crown had relied more on the "buzz" than on exposure in PW for promotion within the trade. Over the course of the month, reviews appeared in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times (LA Times), Newsweek, USA Today, New York Times Book Review (NYTBR), and the San Francisco Chronicle, among others across the country. Faludi appeared on talk shows, including National Public Radio's All Things Considered, a critical vehicle for book publicity. Excerpts were published in Glamour and Mother Jones and were included
alongside reviews in the Atlanta and Los Angeles (in the "Opinion" section) papers. The book was well launched. Reviews in regional papers reflected awareness of the book's potential for attention, and many seemed sensitive to Faludi's journalistic background if not method. Some seemed at pains to present some opposing or elaborating views from other authors or "experts," thus taking the review out of the realm of summary and evaluation into forum for debate.

Identified in her LA Times review as author and Princetonian professor to establish her credentials as meeting Faludi's on equal footing, Elaine Showalter weighted the review with considerable historical and economic material of her own. Referring to the currency of its subject, she wrote "Backlash is the right book at exactly the right time." In the "Perspectives" section of the October 14th Chicago Tribune, Joan Beck also referred by timing but not by name to the Hill-Thomas controversy. Through critical of the book for its angry tone, she explicitly expected it to have a role in public debate: "Never mind that it's a bitter, exaggerated diatribe . . [it] could supply the subtext for much of the outpouring of feminist rage that has caught the U. S. Senate so off guard."

The Denver Post was the exception to the general failure to connect the book to the Hill-Thomas controversy more than passingly. In a Wednesday edition featuring Jane Ayre's review (already run in the Chicago Tribune), Diane Eicher offered a boxed, 12-paragraph commentary on the backlash-type reaction to Anita Hill's testimony, which was placed alongside comment on Ollie North's book and jumped to a page discussing television character Murphy Brown's unwed pregnancy. She asserted that Faludi "couldn't have asked for a better real-life example" and included extensive quotes from an interview with Faludi on the subject.
The two most influential reviews that October were those in *Newsweek* and the *New York Times Book Review*, appearing on the 21st and the 27th respectively.62 Laura Shapiro's feature-plus-review appeared in a *Newsweek* devoted to the politics of gender relations. Cover and cover story were devoted to Hill and Thomas, and according to Shapiro:

The Anita Hill timing was crucial to the way *Newsweek* handled the book. 'Backlash' would have been a big book at any time, but the Anita Hill coincidence really sent it over the top, as a feature-book for *Newsweek*. Later we considered going back to the book -- when the "Backlash" backlash got going -- but never squeezed it in. That would have been unusual for *Newsweek* but shows just what a continuously newsworthy book this was considered to be.63

*Newsweek* readers were treated to an extended discussion of Faludi's topic by an in-house journalist, in which Shapiro's review of *Backlash* was embedded in "Why Women Are Angry," a three-page feature in that section with summary line, "An explanation from a *Newsweek* writer--and a call for a fresh look at feminism." Shapiro wrote that it had "just arrived in bookstores and seems certain to rouse both controversy and acclaim."64

Ellen Goodman, high-profile social commentator with an orientation known to be feminist, was chosen by the *NYTBR* to review *Backlash*. Their choice clearly reflects the intention that Goodman go beyond simple synopsis and assessment of whether the author succeeded in her purpose. She focused on the role of the media in the backlash, citing *Newsweek*'s treatment of the flawed Harvard-Yale study as well as similar episodes in *Forbes* and *Fortune*. Like Ayres and others, she criticized the book for being "sometimes guilty of the sort of trend reporting that it criticizes." But shortly thereafter, Goodman added her own momentum to the trend the book itself may have been part of: "It portends the next set of trend stories. The women's movement is just about due for a media resurrection."65 A letter was to appear four months later, perhaps in response to Goodman's review, or perhaps in response to the book, as will be discussed below.
Many other reviews presented the book quite literally within a debate. Patricia Carr of the *Atlanta Journal & Constitution*, having noted that it was "already being referred to as the watershed work of the 90s much as the *Feminine Mystique* by Betty Friedan was in the 60s," offered her review in the company of others’ responses. Several passages from the book were included alongside responses from former National Organization for Women (NOW) president Eleanor Smeal, antifeminist Phyllis Schlafly, and a local professor in women's studies.\(^66\) Three days later, the paper continued the debate with letter to the editor emphasizing "the importance of meaningful dialogue between men and women -- dialogue that can bring an end to the adversarial stance in which society places us."\(^67\) At the national level, *USA Today*’s Kim Painter similarly synthesized a debate. Patching together book excerpts with responses from Peg Yorkin of the Feminist Majority Foundation and conservative Beverly LaHaye, Painter created a seamless and seemingly immediate discussion. Concluding in a motif of contention and anxiety, she quoted Faludi as saying backlash proponents "fear that women will wake up and strike back."\(^68\)

In this phase the discussion had moved from trade journals into national-level news organs and primary book review media, on through into the daily press. As the book's notoriety gathered life, three of the major characteristics of the reviews' role in it were already well evident. With few exceptions, reviewers were female,\(^69\) and they were often identified so as to position them as Faludi's counterpart-participants in a debate. Reviews were often combined into features or opinion-pieces, even as they included publication information (price, publisher), thus inviting reception as part of a larger discussion -- not just about the reviewer's evaluation of the book but on the content itself. And cross-media consciousness was frequently a feature of the reviews and response -- in part with justifiable reference to Faludi's description of "trend journalism," but just as much with awareness of
The four months following the book's debut and initial bruit saw a flurry of discussion in dailies and weeklies in November, followed by a relative lull in December, although announcements of nominations and awards such as at the National Book Critics' and the Feminist Majority Foundation's swell the number of "mentions" in database searches for the period. Notices in the monthly publications were more clustered into January (with a few stragglers).

Eleanor Clift, writing for the Post papers in early November, embedded her review in commentary on the negative connotations of the term "feminist" ("I am not a feminist, but..."), to explain in part the Senate's surprise at women's angry reaction to the Hill-Thomas hearings. Clift was listed as congressional and political correspondent for Newsweek, and she acknowledged the impact of its "Marriage Crunch" reporting of the Harvard-Yale study, which she said "accelerated the media's search for the trends of tomorrow." Interestingly, she also seemed to have internalized both the September and October Newsweek pieces on the book, picking up parallel phrasing about Faludi's book being for this generation what Friedan's was to the 1960s and describing Faludi's strength in Shapiro's terms -- as "reportage, not visionary analysis."

Walecia Konrad's relatively balanced review for Business Week began by observing that Faludi's focus on the leaders of the New Right had "help from the trend-hungry and credulous media." In another relatively balanced review, Florence King of the conservative Washington Times took on Backlash not so much explicitly from the conservative agenda but largely on its own terms. Observing that the book was seductive and, more, a "tricky book to review," she questioned the possibility of true debate, "for to disagree with any aspect of it is
to join an anti-feminist backlash that puts the Hydra to shame."

Also in November, *People* magazine ran a feature on Faludi reminiscent of October's rather fluffy *USA Today* piece. Again melding synopsis of the book together with her own commentary, staff writer Kim Hubbard featured an interview with Faludi -- but with a peculiarly co-opting twist. Focusing on Faludi's personal history, the feature/review was wrapped around photos of her with bicycle and boyfriend, captioned: "Having it all means having both a personal and public life" and "I stopped worrying about the man shortage because there isn't one."71

*Ms.* and the *New York Review of Books (NYRB)* each used a multiple-review format, dealing with *Backlash* alongside other books and creating in effect a panel discussion among the authors. In part, *Ms.* was making the point that Faludi was "not the only feminist taking stock of where women stand today,"72 itself testament to the status *Backlash* already had gained in general public perception. *NYRB*’s Diane Johnson wrote her own three-part essay looking first at what authors of the "men's movement" had to say and then what the women authors were saying, concluding with a section on the question of whether men and women "are enemies."73

Like Goodman and others, *Atlantic Monthly*’s Wendy Kaminer was herself an author with whom Faludi might have been compared, and her review for the December 1991 includes substantial amounts of her own information and perceptions.74 Later, in a review for the *Nation* in February of 1992, Gayle Greene expressed the wish that Faludi had acknowledged a debt to Kaminer, or at least the congruence of their work. Again, an author herself (of a book on feminist fiction), Greene's own commentary was combined with her comparison reviews of *Backlash* and Naomi Wolf's *The Beauty Myth*. With praise for both, she concluded with recognition of inter-media activity surrounding the books: "I'm delighted
that these books . . . are being marketed enthusiastically, . . . and that the authors are appearing widely on talk shows," expressing the hope that it "will help re-ignite the women's movement."75

Incidental references to the book or its author outside of reviews proliferated during this period, from commentary on the resurgence of sexist "hot ads"76 to applications of Faludi's discussion of women's lingerie to the William Kennedy Smith case.77 A letter to the St. Petersburg Times exhorted the editors to "read the book before you give us any more garbage such as that front-page story" and tell "what's really happening" to men and women.78

February saw a general resurgence in discussions of feminism, and Backlash continued to be mentioned often, frequently with cross-referencing within the media. On the ninth, the New York Times Book Review published a letter from Barbara Lovenheim regarding Ellen Goodman's October review, in which she faulted several instances of Faludi's use or misuse of information, as cited in the review.79 Faludi, rather than Goodman, responded three weeks later and identified Lovenheim's place in the discussion: "I can't help wondering at possible motives of the letter writer who is author of a book called Beating the Marriage Odds."80 Meanwhile, in her column, Ellen Goodman noted published comments by the Washington Post's Sally Quinn and US News and World Report's John Leo to the effect that feminism was dead, at the hands of the feminists themselves. She refuted the thought, saying "we are in for another wave of analysis, another chapter in the running commentary."81

The discussion had now expanded to cover most mainstream national and regional daily papers and monthly magazines; and the book was discussed now as often outside of reviews as it was within them. Consciousness of a national debate on the current state of
women and feminism was fully evident -- not only in the reviews but in commentary in which the book was passingly named or Faludi quoted as source-of-choice, as in an *Washington Post* opinion piece by Richard Cohen, one of the few men evident in the debate. The choice of women as primary reviewers-commentators was consistent and by now established, sometimes in a sophisticated forum conducted among credentialed women authors, sometimes with overtones of editorial efforts to pit women against each other in a print cat-fight.

Replay and Reply -- March and April 1992

In March the publication of Gloria Steinem's book, *Revolution from Within*, stimulated a second wave of publicity for Faludi and her book. Formal reviews were also still appearing, some of which had probably been commissioned months before, including a stronger if delayed showing from the conservative and/or antifeminist quarter.

References in the general press to the book continued to multiply, particularly as other books on both feminism and men's issues were published and reviewed. A late entry in the group of daily newspaper reviews was the *Christian Science Monitor*’s fairly balanced treatment presented in combination with a review of Flora Davis' new book. In Boston, Camille Paglia provocatively told the Harvard community that *Backlash* was "a piece of crap." Working Woman's March cover story on whether "women make better managers" included mention of *Backlash*, but a full review did not appear until April. In it, Carol Pogash’s balanced approach manifested full awareness of the media's response to the book, with references to Goodman, Anna Quindlen, and others peppered through the piece.

An odd but highly illustrative ripple in the waves of attention involved Wendy Kaminer's December *Atlantic Monthly* review. Letters criticizing Kaminer appeared in both April and May issues, with replies from Kaminer included after each letter -- a micro-
demonstration of the public discussion. The two letter-writers each noted explicitly that they had *not read* the book but rather were responding to Kaminer's views as they appeared in the review—an unusually vivid view of the review standing in for the book.

*Time* magazine had neither noted publication nor reviewed *Backlash* during the fall or winter, but its March 9 cover showed Gloria Steinem and Susan Faludi together behind the red, headlined word, "backlash." Nancy Gibbs wrote in deft circularity, "Not only has her book become an unexpected best seller; it has also become a staple topic on the op-ed pages, one of those landmark books that shape the opinions of America's opinion shapers." The piece cited the media coverage of the book as well as its timing, bringing in additional information and references to other authors (but curiously not to Steinem in any depth). Three weeks later seven letters in response to Faludi's ideas and the article appeared, including ones from Frances Lear (of the now defunct *Lear's* magazine) and the National Organization for Women's Patricia Ireland.86

The conservative response to *Backlash* dominated this period, however, and was frequently characterized by florid language and heavy condemnation. Karen Lehrman's review in the *New Republic* was a measured, thoughtful, and rather carefully analytical exception, despite the magazine's lurid cover featuring an up-thrust female fist sporting pearls and a studded leather cuff.87

Neither Gretchen Morgenson of *Forbes*88 nor Maggie Gallagher of the *National Review*89 were nearly so restrained as Lehrman. In Morgenson's *Forbes* review, "A Whiner's Bible," she provided an interesting view of the media as an actor in the furor. Untroubled by the inconsistency, she ridiculed Faludi's paranoia about "media conspiracy," then noted that "true believers infest the media," such that "book reviewers, also part of the echo chamber, have been kind to Faludi." Mentioning by name the *NYTBR*, the *New Yorker* and the *Atlantic*
Monthly, she followed her review of the reviews with a pointed refutation of Faludi's treatment of a Forbes story concerning female business-school applicants. Attention to the book in this phase of its "hot year" had now shifted out of media in which timeliness is an issue (with the exception of Time), and it is intriguing that anti-feminist and/or conservative reaction should have been so delayed and still so fervent. Clearly, the news of the controversial issue raised by the book was still compelling long after the publication event.

Playout -- Parting Shots and the Paperback

The Backlash "backlash" percolated again four months later in the August Esquire, with Elizabeth Kaye's first-person essay on myths about women's interrelations, which incorporated a review of Backlash. The antifeminist parting shot was the unflattering cartoon-portrait cover and derisory cover story, "Wake Up, Little Susie" in the October American Spectator. Mary Eberstadt's piece chronicled the debate in the year since publication, saying "the speed with which Backlash and its message became ubiquitous in the mass media almost defies description."92

As the summer ended, the paperback edition was in preparation and Faludi's fall book tour for it sparked renewed press interest in her, largely in the regional and local press for book signings. In the year between the first mentions of Backlash and the release of the paperback, the hardcover had seen ten printings and been on the bestseller lists for much of that year. The paperback was to spend almost as much time on the paperback bestseller lists.

Conclusion

That the book was a media event is irrefutable, and that the media was aware of itself in that event is also evident in many of the reviews as they criss-crossed reference to each other. What cannot be so easily asserted is either that the reviews prompted the debate or that the debate prompted the reviews -- or whether outside events like the Hill-Thomas affair
were determining factors. Certainly the fact that other books on gender and feminism were appearing -- and therefore had to have been in progress long before Backlash's release -- suggests that something was happening in the culture itself. But the news event of the Hill-Thomas affair was, as discussed, not often linked directly or explicitly with Backlash. And even if the early "buzz" Laura Shapiro spoke of worked with the subsequent rise of the Hill-Thomas affair to raise the profile of the book, the compulsion felt by later letter-writers and reviewers (especially the conservatives) to join the fray and respond to preceding reviews attests to the impact of this particular book. The reviews were indeed used as a vehicle for entry into public debate, at whatever juncture. Not only was Backlash a newsworthy publication, but the reviews of it were clearly used as Coser's "springboard" for reporting on the issues and public response to it.

The reviewers were readers, not only of the book but of each other. They were reporters; and they were writers. But they were above all discussants, going beyond editorializing about Faludi, her book, or her point of view. They entered actively into a discussion among other reviewers in other media, and with the public at large. An issue had been placed on the agenda of public debate as much by their reviews as by the book they reviewed.

The experience of Backlash is empirically not unique. The journalistic function of book reviews could and should be investigated through the public career of many other news-making books in history, from political (Conscience of a Conservative, Why Not the Best?) to consumer and environmental (Unsafe at Any Speed, Silent Spring) to self-help and cultural commentary (I'm OK, You're OK, Men Are From Mars, Women Are From Venus), and even fiction (Uncle Tom's Cabin, Lady Chatterley's Lover). Such study promises to reveal important relationships among the media, from books to broadcast and other print
media, and offer new perspectives on the role of the media collectively in forming public awareness. Finally, it would further research on the least-studied area of mass media research, book publishing.

Notes

14. It should be noted, however, that the "heavy-hitters," such as reviewers for the New York Times and the weekly news magazines, are likely to be sent review copies early, even before the PW or Kirkus reviews appear.
17. R. S. Fogerty, Editorial, Antioch Review 49 (Fall 1991), 483.
21. Joan Rubin's discussion in The Making of Middlebrow Culture provided a solid theoretical base for consideration of taste- and agenda-setting, since "middlebrow culture" depends on acquisition of tastes and agendas set by the "highbrows" and modulated by "lowbrow" culture.
26. Edwin Diamond's account is perhaps the most extensive and energetic concerning the mystique and intrigues surrounding Times reviewing: "Ethical failures were alleged, vendettas uncovered, mutual admiration societies espied; logrolling and back-scratching, paybacks and careerism, conflicts of interest, political correctness, you name it, someone already had, and attributed it to 'Times' book reviewers, though seldom on the record." E. Diamond, "The Last Word," New York 27, no. 2 (10 Jan. 1994), 30.
Book Reviews

28 Diamond, "Last Word," 34.
40 Hicks, "Journalism of Book Reviewing," 16.
42 Podhoretz, "Book Reviewing," 262.
43 Baym, Novels, Readers, and Reviewers, 21.
44 Drewry, Writing Book Reviews, 11.
45 Howard, "Cultural Ecology," 95.
46 Drewry, Writing Book Reviews, 11.
48 Coser et al, Books, 328.
49 Identified through Book Review Digest, Book Review Index, and Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, as well as Nexis "mentions."
50 Though it would have been desirable to include some of the broadcast media, one admitted difficulty is the lack of indexing and easy retrieval of broadcast material. But it must be observed that actual book reviews, per se, rarely occur in the broadcast media; much more often the format is the combined book announcement and interview. Faludi appeared on many, many talk shows such as NPR's All Things Considered and C-Span's Booknotes, as well as popular shows like Donahue (mentioned in a couple of the reviews or print commentary); but the format of such shows is geared to the publicity-minded book tour and does not usually feature a reviewer's assessment but so much as casual, personal conversation between author and host and audience.
56 Ironically enough, as some reviewers point out, the Wall Street Journal, Faludi's employer, was actually the first to report the study, later found to have serious if not fatal methodologic flaws.
57 Shapiro, personal communication, 25 April 1995.
58 Quoted in the March 9 Time magazine story on her and raised in the Booknotes interview on C-Span.
62 They were actually in the same publication week, although Newsweek's issues come out a week before their publication date.
63 L. Shapiro, personal correspondence, 31 March 95.


John Elvin of the *Washington Times* was the only male reviewer noted, although Richard Cohen of the *Washington Post* offered commentary, as noted below.


By contrast, *Newsweek* had printed no letters in response to its coverage.


A strange side trip in Eberstadt’s discussion of Faludi is her careful treatment of accusations that Faludi’s Pulitzer-winning piece was replication of another published earlier in Texas, in which she vindicated Faludi for what had long since been discounted already.
## BACKLASH TABLE 1

### Early Warning -- August and September 1991

- **Reviews:** 9/1 *Kirkus*; 9/16 *Newsweek*; 9/29 *Chicago Tribune*, plus interview
- **Comment:** --
- **Mentions:** 8/27 *Christian Science Monitor*; 9/10 *Atlanta J&C*; 9/11 *Boston Globe*, 9/15 *Kirkus*
  - Also: Excerpted September/October *Mother Jones* (cont'd. November/December)

### October Debut

- **Reviews:** 10/4 *Publishers Weekly*; 10/7 *Atlanta J&C*; 10/14 *Chicago Tribune* plus comment; 10/20 *LA Times*; 10/21 *Newsweek* plus feature.; 10/23 *USA Today*, *Denver Post*; 10/24 *Wall Street Journal*; 10/27 *NYTimes Book Review*, *San Francisco Chronicle*
- **Comment:** 10/23 *Denver Post*, *Washington Times*
- **Mentions:** regarding *Newsweek* story, book tour.
  - Also: Excerpted October *Glamour*; *LA Times*, *Atlanta J&C* with review; *NPR All Things Considered* interview.

### Expanding Discussion -- November 1991 - February 1992

- **Comment:** 11/5 *Boston Globe*; 11/11 *People* feature; 2/23 Goodman column; 2/23 *LATimes*
- **Mentions:** General notice of awards, appearances at awards functions
  - Also: letters - 1/20 *St. Pete. Times*; 2/9 *Lovenheim* and 3/1 *Faludi* reply, *NY Times Book Review*; 2/10 *Atlanta J&C*

### Replay and Reply -- March - April

- **Comment:** General re: feminism
- **Mentions:** in other book reviews
  - Also: letters — March and April *Atlantic Monthly*

### Playout -- May and Beyond

- **Reviews:** October *American Spectator*; winter-spring *Media Studies Journal*
- **Comment:** August *Esquire*
- **Mentions:** general regarding paperback, new book tour

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1. This table is intended to reflect general trends in frequency, type, and source of responses to Backlash and is far from an exhaustive compilation.
THE ICONS OF DESPAIR

A Comparison of World Series Coverage in Newspapers

Before and During the Depression

John Carvalho, Ph.D. Student, University of North Carolina

Presented to the History Division

Association of Education in Journalism and Mass Communication

August 8, 1998
THE ICONS OF DESPAIR
A Comparison of World Series Coverage in Newspapers
Before and During the Depression

INTRODUCTION

The Great Depression was a time of severe social and economic upheaval for the United States. The hardships precipitated by the stock market crash and subsequent bank and business closings resulted in widespread unemployment, disillusionment, and turmoil.

Though newspapers proved a surprisingly resilient industry during the late 1920s and early 1930s, even they were not immune to the harmful effects of economic decline\(^1\). Average circulation (and thus newspaper readership) dipped only slightly, but as businesses closed, newspapers lost advertising revenue -- 45 percent over the four years following 1929\(^2\).

Even today, newspapers in similar situations, to compensate for the advertising revenue shortfall, often reduce production expenses by decreasing the number of pages they print. The decisions on how to cut content, however, do not come easily. Certain sections are preserved at the expense of others -- an agonizing decision-making process that can anger both journalists and readers.


One likely victim of cuts would seem to be the sports section, with its emphasis on diversion and escape over hard news. Previous studies have attested to the popularity of the sports page in the years preceding the Depression—particularly the 1920s. But that decade was a period of economic prosperity, both for the nation and its newspapers. How well did the sports section survive the economic disaster of the years that followed? Did readers lose their appetite for sports coverage during harsh economic times? Did the growing need for so-called “hard news” during a critical point in history relegate sports to a smaller portion of the newspaper?

Previous research has not addressed such questions. This paper will help remedy that shortfall, by presenting research that examines sports coverage from eight newspapers in 1927 and in 1932. Coverage of a specific sporting event of high public interest, baseball’s World Series, will be compared, to see whether major newspapers from a variety of geographical regions devoted less space to that sporting event, and to sports in general, when the Depression’s effects were being fully felt. Such data can help to determine the priority assigned sports during a period when most of the hard news, while bad, was in fact arguably more important news.

More than merely quantifying editorial decisions, however, this paper will

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3John R. Tunis, “Gas and the Games,” Saturday Evening Post, 25 Jan. 1930, 12. Tunis gave the example of an unidentified newspaper whose sports section grew from 1,000 column inches a week in 1910, to 1,500 inches a week in 1920, and 2,000 inches a week by 1925.
also seek to interpret Depression-era culture by using newspapers as a cultural text. As one sports researcher acknowledged, “American newspapers are a mirror in which the nation is reflected in all its complex cultural diversity”. Sports heroes were popular (though perhaps not as well-paid) cultural icons in the 1930s as much as in the 1920s. A sustained level of sports coverage would demonstrate that, even in the midst of economic depression, newspaper readers valued the diversions of the sports page and newspaper editors obliged them.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The development of sports journalism -- starting in the 19th century and climaxing in the “Jazz Age” 1920s -- has been the subject of extensive previous research. In many ways, the evolution of the newspaper sports page paralleled the evolution of modern sports, reflecting their symbiotic relationship.

By the early nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution provided Americans with more leisure time, and they began to turn their interest toward sports. The earliest sports journals originated in Great Britain, the first being Pierce Egan’s Life in London and Sporting Guide, which began publication in 1824. It was retitled Bell’s Life in London four years later. Under that title, it gained in

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popularity, reaching a circulation of 75,000 by the mid-1800s.6

Similarly, in the United States, magazines reached enthusiasts more successfully than did newspapers. While James Gordon Bennett's New York Herald reported on horse races and prize fights from the 1840s on, most newspaper publishers looked down on such pursuits and left sports reporting to magazines such as Spirit of the Times. However, when Richard Kyle Fox parlayed coverage of sports (among other, more lurid topics) in his National Police Gazette into a nationwide circulation of 150,000, the newspaper industry began to take notice.7

The New York World, published by the aggressive Joseph Pulitzer, is credited as establishing the first separate department of sportswriters, in 1883.8 From a cultural perspective, sports journalism met an important need for readers within growing metropolitan areas: "The increasing impersonal quality of city life created a greater need for vicarious personal contacts and for humanized materials which would permit the illusion of sharing an emotional experience." Such vicarious emotional experiences were provided by the sports page, with its gaudily written accounts of on-the-field heroics.

Media researchers from the critical/cultural perspective have also


8Ibid, 60.

9Ibid, 64.

10Cozens and Stump, 115.
acknowledged this symbiotic sports-media relationship. Sports journalism provided the masses not only the vicarious emotional experience described above, but also a release from the pressures of work: “Commercialized sports grew rapidly in the expanding urban centers as a release from the social problems that accompanied capitalist urbanization, and also as a result of the lack of leisure and recreational facilities which might have eased the burdens of rapid industrialization.”

Progressive historian Frederick L. Paxson agreed, describing sports as a “safety valve” that steered American energies after the New World frontier had disappeared.

Even the sports themselves, as they developed, reflected the tensions caused by industrialization. For example, during the 1880s, the game of college football was undergoing profound changes as it evolved from British rugby to a more American game. As Michael Oriard’s cultural history of the game demonstrates, both the sport and the newspapers that covered it can serve as cultural texts for the decade. The emerging industrial society engaged its members in a debate, as the rising middle class intruded into domains traditionally populated by the privileged class. In the same manner, a struggle was occurring within college football -- between “scientific” middle-class proponents like coach Walter Camp, who sought a

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game that would develop the next generation of industrial leaders, and upper-class traditionalists like magazine publisher Caspar Whitney, who emphasized the virtue of play for its own sake. Within this debate -- which influenced society as much as sport -- the sports page helped to interpret the game of football to different audiences, thus providing an important cultural function.

During the 1890s, the involvement of publishers like Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst, wedded sports journalism and yellow journalism in the minds of many. Hearst was credited with developing the first separate sports section, and with such innovations as hiring sports celebrities to write guest columns. His and Pulitzer's contributions, however, also lowered the status of sports journalists within the profession.

During the early twentieth century, newspaper sports sections experienced phenomenal growth: "Sporting columns grew overnight from one-man jobs to big and dignified and semi-independent departments." That independence manifested itself in an editorial autonomy that allowed sports editors to send their pages directly to composing rooms, bypassing copy desk scrutiny. In addition, sports journalists would accept financial compensation from sporting promoters.

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14 Betts, 67.

15 Cozens and Stumpf, 114

16 *Problems of Journalism*, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: American Society of Newspaper Editors, 1927), 97. To distinguish this report from a subsequent one, it will be identified as ASNE 1927 in future footnotes.
that took several forms: free tickets to events, extra money as official scorekeepers and game officials, and even direct payments in appreciation for free publicity. Such actions seemed to reinforce the profession's perception that sports journalists lacked the ethical sensitivity crucial to professionalism.

By the 1920s, coming out of World War I, the nation was experiencing a surge in sports interest that continued the growth in popularity of sportswriting. The surge has been attributed to several factors: the postwar economic boom; returning World War I soldiers who had participated in sports as part of their military training; and colleges' and universities' attempts to capitalize on the popularity of football to attract new students and reinforce alumni support.

That surge, however, paralleled a continuing debate on the nature of sport and its contribution to society. The debate had changed in focus from the Camp vs. Whitney battles at the end of the nineteenth century. By the 1920s, most of society's elite adopted the sport ethic held by the middle class in the previous century -- that sports could be used as "a technology for ordering communities confronted with the dislocations fostered by industrialism."

For the masses, however, the purpose of sports was to provide entertainment -- a different slant on the concept of sport for its own sake. That ethic offended the Progressive mind at the same time it was fueling increased interest in sports. To

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18 Cozens and Stumpf, 118-119
19 Dyreson, 265-268.
them, 1920s society’s love affair with automobiles and sports -- coined “gas and the games” by one author -- undermined sports potential as a source of good.20

During the 1920s, athletes had begun to replace industrialists and even government leaders as the heroes of youth. The 1920 and 1924 elections had begun to forge a new campaign strategy, in which candidates were judged more by image than by accomplishment or rhetoric. Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge “offered the public no coherent platform beyond a hazy vision of ‘normalcy,’ an amorphous idea which meant many things to many people at a very superficial level.” 21 Within that political environment, the Jack Dempseys and Babe Ruths, who had overcome opposition in forging their athletic destinies, provided new heroes, and these icons survived even economic depression.

Such heroes also served an important cultural purpose during the 1920s. In one sense, they served a “compensatory function,” “compensating for the passing of the traditional dream of success, the erosion of Victorian values and feelings of individual powerlessness” 22 so characteristic of the Jazz Age. Athletes seemed to personify the possibility of success without yielding to the demands of “the system.”

One way that sports heroes like Dempsey gained popularity was through extensive newspaper coverage of their fights, especially before the event.

20Tunis, 12.

21Dyreson, 277-278.

Dempsey’s promoter, Tex Rickard, was skilled at gaining pre-match publicity for his boxer and his events. Baseball club owners also did what they could to promote coverage; many paid the travel expenses of the reporters who covered their teams.

The problem facing newspaper publishers was that the symbiotic relationship between media and sports was taking on more of a business arrangement than mere event reporting. Newspapers provided readers daily reports on their favorite teams, which drew fans to games, and sports promoters extended journalists courtesies that went beyond facilitation to financial compensation. Such self-interest by sports promoters and journalists would seem to ignore the newspapers’ commitment to their readers over their sources, even as the sports journalists themselves argued that newspapers were following, not leading, the public’s changing attitude toward sports.

That cozy relationship, however, concerned many newspaper editors because of the ethical pitfalls. Concern among editors reached the point that in 1926, the American Society of Newspaper Editors appointed a committee to study the problem. The committee, in its report at the 1927 ASNE convention, recommended that sports sections stop giving away free publicity for upcoming sports events, that

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25W. O. McGeehan, “Our Changing Sports Page,” *Scribner’s*, July 1928, 56. McGeehan, former sports editor of the New York *Herald* and a popular broadcaster, also argued that the increased coverage had brought about positive changes – for example, increasing women’s interest in sports.
sports sections come under the same editorial supervision as other departments, that sports journalists not accept fees for providing services at sports events (with corresponding pay raises to compensate), and that newspapers commit their sports departments to increased coverage of amateur athletics.26

The newspapers' ethical concerns seem ironic, even inconsistent, when compared with their actions. When Rickard was seeking a site for a world heavyweight championship fight between Dempsey and Gene Tunney, established newspapers like the Chicago Tribune and Herald and Examiner, the Philadelphia Inquirer and Evening Bulletin and New York Times and Daily News all campaigned ardently for their own cities to be chosen. Thus, while these same editors criticized tabloid "yellow journalism" practitioners such as Hearst and Pulitzer, the tone of their coverage changed when a heavyweight championship fight was at stake.27

All that enthusiasm waned, of course, after the stock market crash of 1929, which initiated nearly a decade of economic depression. Communication historians have not studied the 1930s as extensively as the Jazz Age, particularly where sports coverage is concerned. But several studies have offered perspectives on sports coverage during that time.

In one study of World Series coverage in the 1920s, two effects of the 1929 stock market crash were noted. Attributed to the crash were the psychological

26ASNE, 1927, p. 102.

effects of grim reality replacing “Jazz Age” ebullience. But more direct and measurable was the reduction in story length caused by fewer pages. The research did not include content analysis, but nonetheless did provide a vivid picture of a baseball-crazy New York City in the 1920s.

During the Depression, however, newspaper sports sections continued to serve an important social function, according to an study by the University of California. Not only did newspapers sponsor sports events for charitable purposes, but they also addressed race relations (arguing against the banning of African-American baseball players) and public morality issues such as the serving of alcohol at athletic events.

In the absence of sports journalism studies, other communication studies can be consulted to gain some understanding of the Depression-era media audience. One such study of popular culture claimed that those who attended sporting events “were not escaping from the real world; they were partaking of some of its essential features.” To these audience members, popular culture -- movies, radio programs, and newspapers, as well as sporting events -- empowered them to face their culture, rather than escape from it.

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But did newspapers continue to offer sports coverage during the Depression? By looking at coverage of an annual event like baseball's World Series, we can see indicators of whether sports continued to find coverage within the pages of American newspapers, even as the society changed drastically. The 1927 and 1932 World Series offer a promising point of comparison.

THE 1927 AND 1932 WORLD SERIES

In the 1920s and 1930s, one of the most popular teams in baseball was the New York Yankees of the American League. Between 1921 and 1933, the Yankees appeared in the World Series seven times, winning four “world championships.” Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig were the best-known Yankees in both World Series, but newspaper coverage would highlight other team members as well. In 1927, Ruth set a single-season record by hitting 60 home runs.

The Yankees’ opponent in 1927 was the Pittsburgh Pirates, who had won the World Series two years earlier. The Pirates were led by the young Waner brothers -- “Big Poison” Paul and “Little Poison” Lloyd. According to baseball folklore, when the Waner brothers and their teammates watched Ruth, Gehrig, and their Yankee teammates take batting practice, the sight caused them to lose their confidence. As one anecdote noted, after Ruth finished his turn, he called to the

Pirate players, "If you chase down any of those balls, I'll autograph them for you." The Yankees beat the Pirates in four consecutive games, two at Pittsburgh followed by two at New York.

In 1932, Ruth, Gehrig, and a greatly changed roster of teammates faced the Chicago Cubs. The Yankees' manager, Joe McCarthy, had been fired by the Cubs two years earlier after his team failed to repeat as National League champions, finished second. McCarthy's team earned a measure of revenge for their coach, beating the Cubs, as they had the Pirates five years earlier, in four straight games.

In what would prove to be his final World Series appearance, Ruth also provided a memorable addition to baseball folklore. While facing Cubs pitcher Charley Root in the fifth inning, Ruth supposedly pointed to the center field fence, predicting a home run (which he subsequently hit).

METHODOLOGY

To examine World Series coverage, this paper will incorporate a content analysis of eight daily metropolitan newspapers: the Atlanta Constitution, the Boston Globe, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Washington Post.

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33 Cohen and Neft, 142.

34 Ibid. This legend will be discussed in more detail in a separate section, following the content analysis of newspaper content.
The dates included in the study were October 5-9, 1927, and September 30-October 3, 1932\(^35\). These dates marked the first day of the World Series, allowing for a preview, through reports of its final game.\(^36\) For this study, morning editions of newspapers were analyzed\(^37\).

The 1927 and 1932 World Series provide relevant comparison for two reasons. First, the two Series occurred over a four-year span, before and after the stock market crash in October 1929, that precipitated the Depression. That chronological distance would allow the effects of the Depression to be more fully manifest themselves. Second, because both Series were four-game “sweeps,” coverage was not affected by intervening factors -- such as increased, extended drama in one World Series -- that could be expected to precipitate additional audience interest and corresponding newspaper coverage.

The newspapers were coded according to several criteria. First, the length of the newspaper sports section was measured by the number of pages. The total

\(^35\)The 1932 World Series included an extra day for travel between New York and Chicago (Sept. 30, 1932). The 1927 World Series did not give players a day off for travel: The two teams played in Pittsburgh on October 6 and in New York on October 7. Thus, the 1927 study incorporates five days of coverage, while the 1932 study incorporates six.

\(^36\)Within this sample, all newspapers were available on microfilm, with the exception of the Sunday edition of the Boston Globe. Since the purpose of this study was comparison of the same newspaper at two different points in time, the Globe was included, since the exclusion of Sunday editions probably did not affect the comparison.

\(^37\) Many of the newspapers included in the study printed “afternoon-extra” editions to capitalize on World Series interest, some of which were available on microfilm. Since not all of the newspapers were available on that basis, however, the study was limited to morning editions.
number of pages in the newspaper were also recorded\(^{38}\), to determine whether newspaper sports sections were given a smaller share of the available news hole in 1932.

Newspaper articles covering the World Series were also measured according to paragraph length. Several journalism historians have attributed to the Depression a move toward a “leaner,” more concise writing style. That should be reflected in shorter articles. Articles were coded in two ways: by the categories “short article” (up to five paragraphs) and “long articles” (at least six paragraphs) and by average article length. For the purpose of this study, sidebar boxes containing statistics -- such as box scores, composite statistics, predicted line-ups, schedules of games -- were coded as short articles. Since their paragraphs could not be counted, however, they are not included in calculations of average article length.

Finally, the number of World Series photographs -- both head shots and action photos -- was recorded in each newspaper. Photographs are an important vehicle to attract readers, but require the resources of both space and technology, which might have been in smaller supply during the Depression.

RESULTS

Every newspaper in the study decreased in its average number of pages

\(^{38}\)Measuring overall newspaper length presented problems concerning Sunday newspapers. The author included only broadsheet-size sections in his calculation of Sunday newspaper length. For the newspapers included in this study, that meant the exclusion of comics pages, along with literary and magazine supplements.
between 1927 and 1932. The number of pages allotted to sports also decreased, but the percentage of pages devoted to sports did not. Newspapers continued to devote the same proportion of their news hole to sports. Thus, the sports section was not depleted, with its pages given to other sections, to compensate for the decrease in space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta Constitution</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Globe</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Inquirer</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of newspapers devoted fewer pages to sports. World Series

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39 Throughout both periods measured in this study, the Chronicle ran four pages of sports coverage each day (even Sunday), in a section titled "The Sporting Green."
coverage showed a similar decrease. Of the newspapers studied, only two, the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune, ran more stories about the 1932 World Series -- and the increased Tribune coverage can easily be explained by interest in the hometown Cubs. Even the New York Times ran fewer World Series articles in 1932 than in 1927, though the Yankees played in both. In most of the newspapers studied, the main competition was the opening of college football, which generated much more local interest than World Series games featuring teams from distant cities. Professional football, still in its infancy, did not receive the same level of coverage as the college game.

Table 2
Average Number of World Series Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th></th>
<th>1932</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total no.</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Total no.</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta Constitution</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Globe</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Inquirer</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though newspapers ran fewer World Series articles, the proportion of longer articles (more than five pages) did not increase or decrease in any discernable pattern. Every newspaper except the New York Times ran more longer articles.
One kind of longer article that proved popular with magazine readers was guest columns written by baseball players and managers. In 1927 and 1932, the San Francisco Chronicle ran syndicated columns by John McGraw, manager of the New York Giants. (The Washington Post also ran McGraw's columns in 1927.) In 1932, the New York Times ran daily columns by two opposing players: third baseman Joe Sewell of the Yankees and third baseman/team captain Woody English of the Cubs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta Constitution</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42.4 (14)</td>
<td>57.6 (19)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50.0 (16)</td>
<td>50.0 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Globe</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37.7 (20)</td>
<td>62.3 (33)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45.5 (25)</td>
<td>55.5 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45.2 (19)</td>
<td>54.8 (23)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>45.3 (29)</td>
<td>54.7 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47.8 (22)</td>
<td>52.2 (24)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>31.6 (18)</td>
<td>68.4 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>60.9 (67)</td>
<td>39.1 (43)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>61.6 (45)</td>
<td>38.3 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Inquirer</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>51.2 (41)</td>
<td>48.8 (39)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40.0 (30)</td>
<td>60.0 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46.7 (21)</td>
<td>53.3 (24)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41.9 (18)</td>
<td>58.1 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48.1 (25)</td>
<td>51.9 (27)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40.8 (20)</td>
<td>51.2 (29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although most newspapers ran fewer World Series articles, average article length increased for all of the newspapers in the study. If sports journalism were moving toward a leaner writing style, it was not reflected in World Series articles.
### Table 4

**Average World Series Article Length**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Total no. of articles</th>
<th>Total para. length</th>
<th>Avg. length</th>
<th>Total no. of articles</th>
<th>Total para. length</th>
<th>Avg. length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta Constitution</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Globe</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>12.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Inquirer</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most sports pages also featured more photographs in 1932 than in 1927. That can be attributed to improvements in technology that made such photographs more cost-effective. The photographs ran on both the sports page and the rotogravure sections that were popular Sunday sections in both 1927 and 1932.

Although the number of photographs appears to have held steady from 1927 to 1932, the entire decrease in the San Francisco *Chronicle* can be attributed to the layout on its October 5, 1927 edition. To preview the 1927 World Series, the newspaper framed its front sports page with twenty head shots: the nine starting players and manager for each team.

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40For this study, head shots and action shots were counted equally in determining the number of photographs.
Table 5
Total (Average) Number of Photographs Published

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1932</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta Constitution</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>5 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston Globe</td>
<td>17 (4.2)</td>
<td>23 (4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
<td>17 (3.4)</td>
<td>32 (5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>7 (1.4)</td>
<td>3 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>20 (4.0)</td>
<td>14 (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Inquirer</td>
<td>14 (2.8)</td>
<td>21 (3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>25 (5.0)</td>
<td>5 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>19 (4.8)</td>
<td>15 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE BABE RUTH LEGEND: DID HE POINT?

Along with the content analysis reported above, coverage was consulted more in-depth to study the newspaper reporting of one legend that has survived from the 1932 World Series. The narrative from the third game, mentioned earlier, described Ruth pointing to the center field fence before hitting a home run.

Neither the New York Times nor the Chicago Tribune, reported the event. The Times report did acknowledge that Ruth was the target of booing and jeering by the Chicago fans, many of whom threw lemons at him. During his fifth inning at-bat (when the famed pointing incident was supposed to have occurred), the Times reporter covering the game noted that “Ruth signaled with his fingers after each pitch to let the spectators know exactly how the situation stood.” To the Times reporter, Ruth was signaling the count of strikes and balls, not predicting a home
The sportswriter covering the game for the Chicago Tribune likewise noted that "Ruth held up two fingers, indicating in umpire fashion. Then he made a remark about spotting the Cubs those two strikes" before hitting his home run. Sports columnist Westbrook Pegler, however, described the scene in greater detail. He noted that Ruth was trading insults with Cubs pitcher Guy Bush on the Chicago bench. Pegler reported that Ruth was pointing toward Bush, though Pegler vaguely refers to a signal that said, "Now, this is the one. Look!" But he does not specifically mention Ruth pointing toward the center-field fence.

That the story has been handed down in its present, mythic form reflects the nature of cultural icons such as Ruth. Extensive coverage notwithstanding, his exploits fueled the interest of Depression-era audiences starved for inspiration. Their receptivity to such legends is crucial to understanding their culture.

DISCUSSION

While newspapers did print fewer pages as a result of the Depression, the sports section made no more of a sacrifice than any other section. Apparently,


43 Westbrook Pegler, "Gehrig Hit 'Em; Foxx or Hoover Might Have -- But Not Like the Babe," Chicago Tribune, 2 October 1932, sec. 2, p. 3.
publishers were not willing to risk losing readers at the same rate they had lost advertisers. Sports content had proven an effective means of attracting readers. Even in a time of national crisis, then, readers still found sports content an important coping mechanism that accompanied the “hard news” reporting on national affairs.

Even an event of nationwide interest such as the World Series could not sustain the level of coverage it had received before the Depression. But that does not mean it was ignored, or that editors cut the length of World Series articles. Instead, sports pages continued to provide the longer, detailed articles that fans demanded.

Perhaps sports articles did provide a form of escape from the harsh reality of the Depression. That escape, however, met an important cultural need, as did the athletes as cultural icons. The trend of “athlete as hero,” which began in the 1920s, continued into the 1930s. In the late 19th century, with the increase in industrialization, participation in sports might have been the “safety valve” for society. By the 1930s, in dealing with the stress of the Depression, sports spectating seems to have served that same purpose. The public still desired a connection with their sporting heroes -- whether during the celebratory Jazz Age or the melancholy Depression -- and looked to newspapers to provide it.
Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education
As Seen in Emery's
The Press and America

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Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education
As Seen in Emery's The Press and America

Introduction

Knowledge of the activities and contributions of women in history helps to define socially
appropriate roles for women now and in the future. In everyday interactions, people subconsciously
create expectations of appropriate roles for women in society (Biddle, 1979).

There are two main levels involved in the concept of what is “appropriate” for women in
society. The most basic level involves a simple awareness of what women can do. This may be as
simple as knowing that women can be successful in professional roles and hearing about the important
contributions they have made (O'Connell and Russo 1983). The second, and perhaps more critical
level, is to expect and encourage women to pursue strive to reach their full potential; to believe they are
capable of succeeding at whatever they choose to do. The widespread stereotypical views of the roles
and capabilities of individuals affect the lives of women and men (Foschi, 1992; O'Connell and Russo,
1983).

Women have been active in various professions for generations, but their contributions
have been ignored, unnoticed and devalued (Deaux and Emswiller, 1974; Furumoto, 1985). As
historians uncover these contributions and teach students about them in classes, students
increasingly hear about women who have succeeded in these roles and it becomes acceptable for
women to strive to succeed in similar ways. In other words, young women are provided with the
role models they need to encourage them to reach for the stars (O'Connell and Russo, 1983).
Recognizing the contributions of women to journalism education is important to both women and
men. Women tend to give attention to areas that most men would not see as newsworthy.
Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education As Seen in Emery's The Press and America

Simpson (1996) points out that, “Women journalists, through their reporting, often illuminated issues in society that had been given short shrift before. They legitimized issues, by their coverage… As editors, they assigned reporters to look into stories that the male editors had not even considered stories” (p. 295). This article examines the treatment of women and their contributions to the history of journalism education over time by looking at the history of journalism with specific attention to the way the Emery textbook covered these contributions. This is done both qualitatively and quantitatively. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of this treatment and points to important areas for future research.

Significance of perceived contribution

It is important to acknowledge the struggles, successes and contributions of women who were the pioneers; those women that somehow succeeded in fields that were thought to be off limits to women by many (O'Connell and Russo, 1983; Peterson, 1994). Girls and young women need strong role models to look up to. “The lives of these distinguished role models can serve as a source of insight into how to sort options and develop survival strategies. Their separate and cumulative stories expand our vision of the possible” (O'Connell and Russo, 1983, p. 4).

The implications of passing over the contributions of women to journalism extend beyond whether or not women are seen as capable journalists. It extends into the general perception of the abilities of women in our everyday interactions. Foschi (1992), found that, “when there is no objective criteria for performance evaluation, men’s contributions to the task solution are often judged to be better than women’s” (1992, p. 202). Even in situations when the objective criteria clearly demonstrated that women’s performances are as good as those of men, gender often
results in a devaluation of women's performance. Deaux and Emswiller (1974) found that equivalent performance by a male and female on a task was perceived differently by both male and female subjects. It was found that regardless of the task, the males were perceived to be more skillful, whereas the female's performance was attributed to luck. Miller and McReynolds (1973) found that, holding all other source qualifications (i.e., audio/visual cues were eliminated; only cue was the name) and the message constant, receivers will rate a male communicator as more competent than a female communicator. Not only are female successes more likely to be attributed to unstable factors, such as luck or effort, their performances are usually evaluated lower than those of men, even when the performance is identical.

The Influence of Women in Higher Education

Furumoto (1985) argued that until quite recently, the absence or invisibility of women “has been true of historical accounts in general. Within the last 15 years, calling attention to this oversight, women’s history has emerged as a distinct field” (p. 203). Women have frequently been the ones to uncover the contributions of women to history (Simpson, 1996). The influence of these women and changes in the way history is presented has been influential. The influence of these powerful women extends beyond providing role models for young women (Pauldi, 1991). They have created courses dedicated to celebrating the contributions of women, altered the way students are educated (Lerner and Sklar, 1989; Maher and Rathbone, 1986), changed the way the history of psychology is presented (Bohan, 1993; Furumoto and Scarborough, 1986; Pauldi, 1991), and altered the presentation of the history of academe in general (DeSole and Butler, 1994; George, 1975; Lerner, 1979 Peterson, 1994). As Pauldi (1991) pointed out,

"Exposure to many women can contribute to students' growth, self-
concept development, self-definition in terms of feminism, and pursuit of career options" (p. 172).

As the number of women in academe has grown, the interest in the contributions of women in history has also increased (DeSole and Butler, 1994; Simpson, 1996; Lerner, 1979). The focus on the contributions of women has influenced not only who is discussed in history courses, but the criteria used to decide which contributions are considered important (Furumoto, 1985; Furumoto and Scarborough, 1986; Lerner, 1979; O’Connell and Russo, 1983). The dialogue regarding who and what is important and how to present the stories has influenced not only how the past is perceived, but also may influence the direction we take in the present and future. “We look to history for many things: for guidance, for inspiration, for trends that help us understand the present and predict the future, for links that help establish self-identity” (O’Connell and Russo, 1983, p. 3).

Showing how the treatment of women by others has evolved over time does more than just change things on the surface. It also shows that the position of women and gender in society is a social construction (Bohan, 1993; Ochshorn, 1994). O’Connell and Russo (1983) perceived stories that focus on women’s contributions to history¹ as a step toward providing needed role models by increasing their visibility. Further, they argue that “In addition to providing a sense of history and purpose and serving as a source of inspiration to students and faculty, the reflections, we believe, will widen people’s conceptions regarding options for women and how to exercise them” (O’Connell and Russo, 1983, p. xii).

At about the same time women began joining the ranks of faculty members and administration, historical textbooks began to include the historical contributions of women to journalism education.

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¹ Many feminist writers prefer the term "herstory," this author made a decision to use history, the more universally used and understood term. Although herstory makes an important point it is biased in the opposite direction of the
Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education As Seen in Emery's The Press and America

Women have questioned the historical treatment of women’s contributions to journalism education (Beasley, 1985) and the way journalism’s past is presented (McGlashan, 1986). The stories they have uncovered are then available for inclusion in historical accounts such as the Emery textbook examined here (S. Chaffee, personal email communication, June 8, 1998).

Understanding our Past

History can be thought of as a collection of stories, interpretations, or constructions of events from the past. Like fables told around a fireplace, historical textbooks represent a compilation of interpretations of different events. History textbooks are just a collection of articles that discuss the past. The editors of history textbooks decide what to include, and just as importantly, what to leave out (Russo 1983).

The Potential Influence of Textbooks

Course textbooks can be influential in defining what criteria are used to determine what makes an important contribution as well as who is credited with making any particular contribution. Introductory textbooks and courses are believed to have a very broad influence on students. Many students take only one course in a field, as part of their general education, so the basic text contains the majority of the information they will be exposed to about the history of the field. (Peterson, 1994). The same is true for journalism courses. Most students do not go on to more advanced studies and will take at most one introductory course. The way these introductory courses treat women and their contributions is important to the way students think about and perceive the makeup of the field and the contributions and abilities of women (Furumoto, 1985; Peterson, 1994).

term history. Neither term is ideal in the sense that neither celebrates the contributions of both men and women.
The importance of these issues extends beyond whether or not students learn about women's contributions to history (Furumoto, 1985). There are larger issues than whether or not students learn, for example, that Jane Gray Swisshelm is believed to be the first woman to sit in the Congressional Press Gallery (Emery 1978; Emery 1984; Emery 1988 and Emery 1992)\(^2\). It extends to whether or not these jobs and roles are considered appropriate for women in our society. Peterson (1994) pointed out,

“In the relatively literate culture of the United States, books play a significant role in shaping the development of human beings... Readers learn about the world through their books and learn who, what, and how they are expected to be in that world. Moreover, a large part of the ‘who, what, and how’ is determined by the reader’s gender, as books tell readers about ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ gender-related roles and behavior” (p. 59).

The concern regarding perception of the contributions of women and their treatment in textbooks has been raised in several areas and disciplines (Bohan, 1993; Furumoto, 1985; Furumoto and Scarborough, 1986; Pauldi, 1991). As discussed above, people's perceptions of women and their contributions are defined by what they are taught almost as much as what they see for themselves. If the contributions of women are not included in the textbooks or in classes, then students are left with an incomplete and many times incorrect picture of history. They are missing significant information regarding how the field of study evolved over time, including the contributions of several of the individuals who were influential. Students come away from these courses erroneously believing that women played no part in the history of the discipline (Furumoto, 1985). Learning of the successes and contributions of women to the field, provides people with a more complete and accurate picture of history and it makes it seem natural and more acceptable to accept women in similar roles in the

\(^2\) Note, this fact is not included in the 1954, 1962 or 1972 editions.
Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education As Seen in Emery's The Press and America

present and future (Furumoto, 1985; Lerner 1979; O'Connell and Russo, 1983).

Including Women's Contributions in the Story

Maher and Rathbone (1986) argued that, “In the beginning stages of women’s studies, it was thought sufficient to just ‘add on’ information about women to the content of courses to produce a more complete picture. Since then, however, the inclusion of material based on women’s experiences has led to challenges of the guiding generalizations in the fields themselves” (p. 215). Furumoto and Scarborough (1986) argued that it is important to not only point out what is missing from history but also to ‘fill in the gap’ by providing an understanding of the lives of the women who were influential in the development of a discipline.

The first step in recognizing and celebrating the contributions of women is to identify women who made contributions in a field and to insert them in the discussion about the past. This is an important step in that it will call attention to what has been missing, but is only the beginning. The next step is to describe the women, comparing them to some of the influential men in the field. This can help to place the contributions in context, but is not quite enough. The final step may be the most important. Here the experiences of the women are discussed with a focus on how ‘gender influenced their careers.’ Approaching history this way requires an understanding that history involves a process of accumulating knowledge and each piece adds insight to the piece before and after it. It requires an acknowledgement of the importance of context in history.

Lerner (1979) extends this analysis by providing three potential ways to approach women’s historical contributions. One is compensatory history. In this type the historian uncovers women’s contributions and places them into the history where they belong. The second approach she calls contribution history. This approach describes “women’s contribution to, their status in, and their
oppression by male-defined society” (Lerner 1979, p.146). Lerner (1979) points out that, in this approach, “The way in which women were aided and affected by the work of these ‘great women,’ the ways in which they themselves grew into feminist awareness, are ignored” (P. 147). Although Lerner (1979) notes that this may be an important stage in understanding women in history, this method uses male-determined criterion to select contributions. The third approach has been called reconstruction history (Pauldi 1991), which acknowledges that the past has been presented to us through the perspective of men, including our perception of women. It encouraged the construction of a new history to reflect the feminine perspective as well. Lerner (1979) explained,

“What we know of the past experience of women has been transmitted to us largely through the reflections of men: how we see and interpret what we know about women has been shaped for us through a value system defined by men. And so, to construct a new history that will with true equality reflect the dual nature of humankind-its male and female aspect—we must first pause to reconstruct the missing half—the female experience: women’s history” (p. 160).

This approach allows women to be judged by criteria that acknowledge and celebrate this dual nature of humankind. Given that men and women see different things as newsworthy (Simpson 1996), it is not surprising that fewer contributions of women would meet criteria set by and for men. There is no one correct perspective, but to give credit to all who contributed to history requires a broader selection process when deciding what stories to include in our collection of stories that compose our understanding of the past, also known as history.

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3. Lerner (1979) discusses this approach but does not title it.
Research Questions

This examination looks at if and how the content of Emery's The Press and America has changed over time with regard to its treatment of the contributions of women to the history of journalism. This analysis is guided by Lerner's (1979) three approaches to history (discussed above), and compares each of the editions to each other to see if the text has evolved to reflect compensatory, contribution and/or reconstruction history. The Press and America has changed over the seven editions in more ways than in just updates to include recent events. In the discussion of each of the three approaches to history, the meaning of women's contributions takes on a slightly different operationalization. This analysis was conducted in several ways to create a better picture of how the content of the text changes over the course of the seven editions. This analysis reached beyond the question of how the text was evolved to account for new contributions and instead focused on the evolving frame given by the editors and authors to stories about the contributions of women that occurred prior to 1954, the time of the first edition.

Research Question I

Over the course of these seven editions, did the content of The Press and America evolve according to a compensatory analysis? Specifically, were the contributions of women uncovered and placed in the text where they "belong"? This was examined by looking at whether or not women's voices and contributions to journalism history prior to 1954 received more space in later editions of Emery's The Press and America than in earlier editions. Also, were there more stories about the contributions of women and did these stories take up more space in the text?

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4 Edwin Emery is the only person on all editions, but each edition has a variety of co-authors and editors. The first edition was authored by Edwin Emery and Henry Ladd Smith and edited by Keneth E. Olson; the second edition was authored by Edwin Emery and edited by Kenneth E. Olson; the third edition was both authored and edited by Edwin Emery alone, the fourth and fifth editions were authored by Edwin Emery and his son Michael.
Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education As Seen in Emery's The Press and America

The evaluation of the text on the compensatory history approach involved counting the number of pages listed in the index in references to woman's contributions that included stories about things that women had done in the field. First, the numbers of pages listed in the index under women were counted. When a block of pages were listed, those pages were examined to see if all pages dealt with women, or just a few. For example, the Sixth Edition references pages 551-557 (seven pages), yet only four pages actually contain information about women. If a page contained even one sentence providing information about a woman and her contribution, it was included in the analysis. Next, to ensure that the same things are being compared, each page listed in the index was examined. Only references to contributions of women that occurred prior to 1954 (the first edition) were counted. In other words, if a page was indexed in the 1992 edition discussing the equal rights amendment movement, this page would not be counted because it could not have been covered in the first edition. The event or contribution discussed had to have occurred prior to the first publication. This was done to account for the evolution of the field since 1950. For example, if the 7th edition has more references to women than the 2nd, but all of the additional references are to events that occurred after the 2nd edition was published, then this is not reconstructing history, but comparing different things altogether.

Research Question II

Over the course of these seven editions, did the content of The Press and America evolve according to contribution analysis? Specifically, was there a discussion of women's contributions from the perspective of a male-dominated society? This is looked at here in terms of the categories considered important enough to be listed in the index.

In the analysis of the contribution approach to history, each page listed in the index under...
"women" in each edition was counted. This was a very detailed index and included all (or most) of the references to women's contributions that were included in the text. Then each page listed in the index was examined to ensure that it indeed referenced a woman’s contribution.

Research Question III

Over the course of these seven editions, did the content of The Press and America evolve according to a reconstruction analysis? Specifically, does the content include the issues that may be of more importance to women than men? Are issues that have traditionally been ignored when the criterion used was male included in the text? Whether the criteria used to evaluate information allowed in the text was altered to encompass more contributions of women is judged based on whether the stories were included and whether they were framed as important and significant contributions. This analysis was done in an examination of the qualitative differences between the topics and subjects. When an issue is indexed, how is that same issue treated across the various editions? What are the differences and do the later editions frame women's contributions in a more positive light?

This analysis examined each section in the index and looked at how the same or similar issues and topics were treated differently over the course and evolution of this text. Giving more space to a topic is one indicator that women's contributions are being included. However, the frame of the story, the way the topic is included, and how the woman is discussed as a person is very important in an evaluation of whether or not this represents a new history that "reflects the dual nature of humankind" (Lerner, 1979, p. 160). Thus, the coverage of the same issues and events was examined and a
comparison was made regarding the differences found.

**METHODOLOGY**

The following is a single case-case study design examining whether or not the references to women in *The Press and America*, have increased as the number of women in journalism education have increased. Edwin Emery has edited this standard textbook on journalism education since the 1950's. There are seven editions, the most recent used in this examination was published in late 1992. This text was chosen because it was really the only textbook available to journalism instructors in the 50's and 60's. It is believed to have been the most widely used as the primary textbook for undergraduate journalism courses at universities across the country.

Given the potential influence of any textbook as discussed above, a text so widely read is likely to have a broad influence on common perception of journalism students about the history of journalism. Historical changes regarding women’s contributions were analyzed to see which, if any of the approaches were utilized in updating the edition. The examinations were on several levels, in an effort to provide both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the evolution of the text. This will help us understand how women’s contributions have been treated over the course of these seven editions.

**Organizing the Analysis**

Each edition was analyzed individually and compared to the other editions. A clear divide between early editions (First, Second and Third) and the later editions (Fifth, Sixth and Seventh) became immediately apparent. Much of the analysis was therefore discussed in terms of comparing the differences between the early and later editions. Where meaningful differences

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5 This edition is quite different and actually shows reduced numbers of references to women. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to make a conclusion as to why it is so different. This edition was the only edition to be edited and authored by Edwin Emery alone.
between editions were evident, they were mentioned by edition. Thus, the results below were generally discussed in terms of the differences between the early and later editions. The Fourth Edition does not fit in either category. The Fourth Edition had features that made it similar to the later editions (for example, it contained more pages listed in the index that reference contributions of women, and it listed more contributions). It also had some of the defining characteristics of the early editions (for example, it included fewer categories in the index discussing women's contributions). Thus, the fourth edition does not fit in either category and was handled separately.

Results

Research Question 1, Compensatory Analysis

These results were consistent with the hypothesis that more space was given to women's contributions in the later editions than in the earlier editions. Specifically, there were more pages in the index that mentioned the contributions of women. See Figure 1 and Figure 2. This tells us that the editors of the text did use compensatory history, contributions were uncovered and placed in history.

Insert Figure 1 Here

To discover if and how women's contributions that were included in the textbook may have been framed, or treated differently across the various editions, the subcategories listed in the index under the main category "women" were counted (See appendix for number of index categories and a list of them). The fact that the later editions have more categories than the early editions is an indication that there were differences between the treatment of contributions in the early and later editions.
Women’s Historical Contribution to Journalism Education As Seen in Emery’s *The Press and America*

The results of counting the number of references to women in the index was consistent with the hypothesis that women’s contributions had been given more space, that their contributions have been placed in history. At least they have been placed in this textbook’s version of the events of the past. For example, later editions had more listings of references, which was consistent with the notion that changes have been made. The extent and nature of the differences between editions was further evidenced by Figure 2. This shows that, when we consider only the contributions of women prior to 1954, there were more pages dedicated to the contributions of women in either the 4th, 5th, 6th or 7th edition than there were in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd combined.

**Insert Figure 2 Here**

From the information above, we can see that there was more information about women and their contributions in the later editions than in the early editions. This reflects Lerner’s (1979) compensatory approach to women's history. The historians have uncovered the contributions of women and placed them in the text.

**Research Question II, Contribution Analysis**

*The Press and America* evolved to consider the contributions of women's contributions worthy of mention in accordance with the standards of Lerner’s (1979) contribution approach to history. Looking only at the subcategories can tell another part of the story: later editions have more subcategories and were more likely to cover issues of equality and parity, and issues more traditionally considered women’s issues. This may serve to legitimize them and to make them seem more important and worthy of discussion. This analysis approached this question by examining the subcategories that
 existed in all editions and evaluating how these sections were different, then by examining the
subcategories that were added in the later editions.

**Insert Table 1 Here**

First, what are the differences between the content of the categories that exist in all
editions? In all editions, Woman's Day and Woman's Home Companion refer the reader to pages
that discuss the circulation of popular woman's magazines. The frame of stories about women's
magazines is very different in the later editions. All editions have a listing in the index for various
magazines, however, in the early editions, pages on women's magazines included only the fact
that there were a few with perhaps some detail about circulation or economic pressures. In the
later editions, these magazines are also discussed in the context of the 'women's equality
movement.' Here the textbook provides the names of editors and what issues the magazines
covered. Also, in the early editions' coverage of women's magazines, there may be a reference to
a woman editor, but only a name would be listed, nothing more, not even a mention that the
editor was a woman. The later editions included a discussion about the female editor, the issues
covered, and the struggles endured to become successful. For example, the discussion of The
Woman's Journal in the later editions includes the following:

"Dismayed by the exclusion of women from the protection of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Lucy Stone and other more
conservative leaders formed the American Woman Suffrage
Association in 1869. Its weekly, The Woman's Journal, focused
only on the suffrage issue. It was edited by Lucy Stone until 1893”

6 Except the Seventh Edition where these subheadings are included in the subheading 'magazine editors.'
Columnists was another subheading that was included in the early editions. In the first edition, the index lists only one page that contains only a few sentences. In the second edition, the same few sentences were presented and a few other contributions of women were listed including a story about Eleanor Roosevelt as a columnist. This section also included a few other women journalists who played a role in early journalism, many that existed after 1954. This selection is not included in the third edition. In the fourth edition, many of the contributions of women columnists are included in a section on Women in Journalism. This section includes several pages with stories of the contributions of women, including a section on colonial women printers (5 paragraphs) and stories about several of the pioneers of women in journalism.

The fifth, sixth and seventh editions reflected a dramatic change in the way women's contributions were reported. Noting that there are more categories is one way to see the evolution, but there is more to it than that. There were pages dedicated to women and the struggles they endured to be successful. There was recognition that women had many obstacles to overcome prior to becoming journalists. There was a description of the women that made the contributions and how their struggles effected their personal lives. There was even a subheading on women in the nineteenth century and how they contributed their journalistic talents even then. Giving women's contributions to the nineteenth century its own section was the beginning of recognizing its legitimacy and that it was important to history. All of these changes in the later editions were indicators that the later editions reflect Lerner's (1979) contribution history.

There are several other differences between and within the editions. This analysis provides support for the conclusion that the contributions of women were more than just inserted. The Press and America did evolve in terms of contribution history. Women's contributions were included where
they fit the standards set by our male dominated society. This reflects the notion that the editors of this text and those contributing to it have recognized that the contributions of women were important and ought to be included in the text, which served to legitimize them as important for discussion.

Research Question III, Reconstruction Analysis

The later editions of the text represent a recognition and acknowledgement of the dual nature of humankind. It does appear, as Lerner’s reconstruction analysis would require, that the criteria for content in the textbook allowed for inclusion of issues that would traditionally be important to women as well as issues traditionally more important to men. One way this text has been modified according to criteria traditionally more important to women can be seen in the increased sensitivity to gender exclusive language in this journalism text. Using gender inclusive language is an example of reconstruction history in that it recognizes that women are a part of humankind and includes them in the ongoing dialogue about society. Examples of the difference between the early editions and the later editions in use of gender neutral language can be seen in an examination of the Foreword. In the early editions, the foreword began,

"Journalism history is the story of man's long struggle to communicate freely with his fellow men-to dig out and interpret news, and to offer intelligent opinion in the market place of ideas" (Emery 1954 p. vii; Emery 1962 p. v; Emery 1972, p. iii).

However, in the later editions, the foreword began,

"Journalism history is the story of humanity's long struggle to communicate with each other-to dig out and interpret news and to offer intelligent opinion and entertaining thoughts in the marketplace of ideas" (Emery 1978, p. xv; Emery 1984 p. v; Emery 1988, p. v; Emery 1992, p. vii).
Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education As Seen in Emery's The Press and America

These few words are the only changes in this part of the foreword, so it was an obvious attempt to be sensitive to gender exclusive language. Other examples of this sensitivity exist throughout the editions, with early editions consistently using gender exclusive language that is absent in later editions. Examples of an increased sensitivity to including females in language usage were found throughout the later editions.

Other examples of reconstruction history were seen in the evaluation of the titles of subcategories and by looking at whether or not they are included in the text. Examples could also be seen by comparing the contents of these subcategories to see how they treated the same or similar historical "facts." The first of these "facts" discussed here is the treatment of the first woman to sit in the Press Gallery, Jane Grey Swisshelm. In the early editions, she was discussed only in the paragraph on the 'influx of women staff members' below. There was not even a complete sentence about her, only a mention that she was one of three woman journalists of note. In the later editions, there were several paragraphs dedicated to the accomplishments and struggles she endured both as a reporter and as a female. Although she was mentioned in several places, the following paragraph exemplifies the way her accomplishments were treated in the later editions.

"...Holding the honor of being the first woman to sit in a congressional press gallery was Jane Grey Swisshelm, editor of the antislavery Saturday Visitor in Pittsburgh. Swisshelm came to Washington to send her columns to Horace Greeley's New York Tribune, at $5 a week. On April 17, 1850, she sat in the Senate press gallery, but then decided not to return. Nationally known as a crusader and feminist, she became a Minnesota editor in 1857, escaping an unhappy marriage and seeking quiet. Her combative style led a mob to sack her press and throw the type into the river. Undaunted, she made her St. Cloud Democrat a voice of the newly founded Republican Party, a fierce opponent of slavery, and shrill advocate of women's rights" (Emery 1978 p. 138; Emery 1984, p. 160; Emery 1988 p. 133; Emery 1992, p. 109).
Also included in the later editions was a discussion of the struggles women faced in dealing with male editors. Specifically, it states that the woman's movement had difficulty getting serious coverage from male editors of newspapers. This fit in well with this application of Lerner's reconstructive approach to history, in that it recognized the challenges women faced and provided the woman's perspective in the description of events.

Another useful comparison was in the "pioneers in journalism" section. The early editions had an index subcategory for women 'influx in 1880-1900' that consisted of one paragraph:

"A rapid influx of women staff members was another development of the 1880's. Women were entering into the business offices of America as the industrial boom brought them new opportunities; they were working in the expanding retail stores; they were graduating from women's colleges and coeducational universities; they were winning some battles for recognition of women's rights. There had been women journalists of note before the Civil war-Margaret Fuller of the New York Tribune, for example, and Jane Grey Swisshelm as a Washington correspondent and newspaper editor-and the New York Sun had employed Mrs. Emily Verdery Bettey as a general reporter as early as 1868. Now in the late 1880's several hundred women were in newspaper work and some of them became leading reporters and feature writers. Others by the 1890's became the first specialists in women's news, and as newspapers began to run fashion articles, recipes, and other women's interest news in conjunction with society items" (Emery 1954, p. 389; Emery 1962 pg. 389; Emery 1972 pp. 327-328).

In contrast, the later editions had an entire section dedicated to 'Colonial Women Printers.' The significance extends beyond the fact that this topic had its own subcategory in the index. There were more pages dedicated to the topic, and a difference in the way women's contributions were discussed. The first paragraph was,
"Recent research has shown that women played significant roles in the story of early journalism. Many of the seventeen known colonial women newspaper printers took up and carried on the trade after the death of their printer husbands, a common colonial practice" (Emery 1978, pp. 70-71; Emery 1984 pp. 439-40; Emery 1988, pp. 66-68; Emery 1992, pp. 56-57).

This section ends with the sentence,

"From Dinah Nuthead, the first woman printer (Maryland, 1969), to the present, women did and continue to do their jobs" (Emery 1978, pp. 70-71; Emery 1984 pp. 439-40; Emery 1988, pp. 66-68; Emery 1992, pp. 56-57).

In the later editions, the praise of the contributions of women continued throughout the 'Women in Journalism' section. In fact, there was a consistent recognition of accomplishments followed by an explanation of the circumstances that made it difficult for women to have had the successes they had due to their own abilities and talents. For example,

"Women correspondents in Washington multiplied after Jane Swisshelm took her seat in the Senate press gallery in 1850. Among 166 correspondents the 1879 Congressional Directory listed 20 women with Gallery privileges. The women were dropped because each paper was limited to three names on the list, and the women correspondents were not breaking-news reporters. In the years 1866 to 1880, the foremost women Washington correspondents were Mary Clemmer Ames, whose column appeared in the weekly New York Independent, and Emily Edson Briggs, columnist for the Philadelphia Press. Sara Carke Lippincott did liberal-oriented columns for the New York Times in the 1870s (she was also Grace Greenwood by pen name). Mary Abigail Dodge did conservative articles for the 1877 to 1878 New York Tribune" (Emery 1978, pp. 228-229; Emery 1984, p. 265; Emery 1992 p. 181).

The difference, as stated above, between early and later editions was more than the fact that there were more pages, more than the fact that there were more subcategories in the index. There was
Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education As Seen in Emery's The Press and America

With a different feel, a different frame to the issues, and the contributions of women were given more attention, legitimacy and credibility in a multitude of ways. The early editions gave a paragraph discussing the fact that women wrote society items and were feature writers. The later editions provided a better understanding and explanation of where women fit into the times and how difficult it was for women to be anything but feature writers. These editions also recognized the strong and influential few women who were able to overcome these obstacles and be influential and successful.

Conclusion

The content of the textbook evolved in ways that acknowledge the significance of the contributions of women to the history of journalism. The analysis consistently found that not only was more space given in the later editions, but also the contributions of women were given more attention and framed in a more positive and interesting light when compared to the early editions. Thus, this analysis found that the later editions of The Press and America had evolved beyond the earlier editions and began to reflect the contributions and interests of women. Future research could ask if the editors made conscious attempts to add the contributions of women and, if so, why. It is quite possible that the changes noted were simply driven by the market. From the time of the first edition to the seventh edition, the makeup of the field of Journalism had changed radically and a large percentage of the population reading the later editions was women. It is possible that the changes were made to get the attention and interest of this new and growing population of students. Although Edwin Emery is the first editor on all editions, he had different co-editors. Future research should also examine how each of these authors and editors contributed and influenced the outcome of the text. Other interesting questions surround what is left out of these textbooks that perhaps would have
been included had historians reconstructed history through the perspective of women. The entire textbook would be presented in a different light and different parts of history would have been emphasized.

Future research should address the question of whether male editors are more likely to give less space or attention to the contributions of women than female editors are, but that is beyond the scope of this investigation. Future research ought to compare the editorial decisions and the content of the Emery text to the Folkerts and Teeter (1989) text. The longitudinal single-case study design is only comparing how the various editions of the same text evolved to increasingly include the contributions of women. It would be interesting to examine how differently this text, whose lead author is a woman, would treat these same issues.

As indicated above, it has been primarily women who have asked questions designed to uncover the contributions of women. As a result of this and other similar findings, Peterson (1994) concluded that existing texts do not adequately represent women and that women should write and publish books if books are to adequately represent the contributions of women. She argued that instead of complaining about the inadequacy of existing texts,

"We must write and publish appropriate textbooks ourselves. Fewer than 20 percent of the authors of the current textbooks we surveyed are women. If existing textbooks are seriously flawed (which indeed they are), we must replace them with better texts. That is not an easy task, however. Traditionally, in all fields, women have had more difficulty getting their work in print than men have had. Nonetheless, it is essential that we create new texts if we wish to alter the current gross misrepresentation" (p. 74).
However, one must be careful not to make assertions, positive or negative, about others based on gender, race, age or social class. Further, believing that women have a better ability, or are better able to set appropriate criterion than men is in violation of Lerner's (1979) goal to "construct a new history that will with true equality reflect the dual nature of humankind-its male and female aspect" (p. 160). We must be careful not to assume that men are unable to recognize the importance of women's contributions any more than we can assume that a woman will automatically recognize their importance. The lesson here is that progress is being made, but true progress must include both men and women in a continued effort to uncover history.

Based on the information here, we can conclude that there has been an increased importance and focus placed on the contributions of women to Journalism. This may be a reflection of the fact that there are now more women in the field looking for role models. It may be that the editors made more of an effort to include the contributions of women in their textbooks because there was more of a demand for it. We may never know why, but we should ask.

What makes something worthy of discussion? Who decides what students learn and what topics are emphasized? This analysis should show us that we ought to think about it. A teacher of using the 1970 edition would not have a section about the women's equality movement, the first Washington women and the struggles they endured, or women magazine editors or press associations. The same textbook published in 1984 would. What else have we left out and how do we make sure the essential things are included in our standard textbooks? These questions may be just as important if not more important that decisions regarding what courses to teach and how to teach them.
Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education As Seen in Emery's *The Press and America*

Although it is believed that the presence of women in journalism education influenced the changes seen between editions, there are other potential contributing factors. Future research should map the changes in society and evaluate how, when and why the contributions of women began to be perceived as more prominent and when they began to meet the editor's criteria for inclusion in the textbooks.
Women's Historical Contribution to Journalism Education As Seen in Emery's The Press and America

References


Figure 1
Index of Women's Contributions

Total Number of pages in the Emery text that include a discussion of women's contributions

- 1st Ed
- 2nd Ed
- 3rd Ed
- 4th Ed
- 5th Ed
- 6th Ed
- 7th Ed
Figure 2
Pages of Women's Contributions in the Emery text

Number of pages discussing contributions of women that occurred prior to 1954
Table 1
Sub-Categories in Index under "Women" Category by Edition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edition</th>
<th>Sub-Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Edition</td>
<td>Woman's Home Companion, Women in journalism, Columnists, Foreign Correspondents, Influx in 1880-1900, with Press associations, and War Correspondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Edition</td>
<td>Woman's Day, Woman's Home Companion, Women in Journalism, Columnists, Foreign correspondents, influx in 1880-1900, with press associations, and war correspondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Edition</td>
<td>Women in Communications, Inc., women in journalism, colonial period, columnists, foreign and war correspondents, in advertising, in books, in broadcasting, in nineteenth century, magazine editors, newspaper and press associations, photographers, public relations, woman's equality movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pioneering for Women Journalists: Sallie Joy White, 1870-1909

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Pioneering for Women Journalists: 
Sallie Joy White, 1870-1909

Sallie Joy White, who wrote for Boston newspapers from 1870 until her death in 1909, was a pioneer in several respects. She was the first woman staff reporter on a Boston newspaper, she was a founding member of the influential New England Woman's Press Association as well as an officer in several national press groups, and she acted as mentor and guide to countless women seeking career opportunities during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. White was an active member of the woman's movement and used the many ties she developed over the years to create a supportive network of women that sustained her both in her professional and her personal life. Despite the influence she had on journalism, Sallie Joy White has been largely ignored by historians. This paper attempts to correct that. It examines White's life and work through her personal correspondence and records, her newspaper work, and material published in trade journals and other publications during her lifetime. This study provides a key to understanding the professional experience and development of women journalists during this period.
Sallie Joy White was the first woman staff reporter on a Boston newspaper, a founding member of the New England Woman's Press Association, an officer in several national press groups, a member of the woman's movement, and acted as mentor to women seeking career opportunities during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This study of White's life and work provides a key to understanding the professional experience and development of women journalists during this period.
Pioneering for Women Journalists:
Sallie Joy White, 1870-1909

When Ishbel Ross published *Ladies of the Press* in 1936 it was perhaps fitting that she began her story with a description of Boston newspaperwoman Sallie Joy White.¹ Ross’s book, the first published history of women journalists, was a pioneering work, just as Sallie Joy White, who in 1870 became the first woman staff reporter on a Boston newspaper and in 1885 helped found the New England Woman’s Press Association, was also a pioneer.² But Ross, who was writing at a time when the number of women working at newspapers and magazines had grown to more than twenty-three percent of the country’s reporters and editors, used her description of White to illustrate not how much White had accomplished but rather how far women had come since.³

Ross saluted White’s ambition, evidenced in her desire “to be treated like a man,” and her gumption in convincing a Boston editor to let her cover a suffrage convention, but then discounted these very accomplishments by comparing her to “modern” women reporters. White, she said, had been treated as a novelty by her male colleagues and superiors who had assigned a youth to accompany her to evening assignments and had lined the office floor “with papers to keep her white satin ball gown from picking up the dust.” A modern woman reporter, wrote Ross, could never “take the time to wonder why someone does not find her a chair,” or “change the ribbon of her typewriter.” The modern woman reporter, instead, “must be free to leap nimbly through fire lines, dodge missiles at a strike, board a liner from a swaying ladder, write copy calmly in the heat of a Senate debate, or count the dead in a catastrophe.” Sallie Joy White had never covered fires, labor disputes, or political news, she pointed out. White had, instead, written columns on society, fashion, and the home. “In due time,” Ross concluded somewhat inaccurately, “she married and faded into the mists.”⁴

Ross’s attitude toward Sallie Joy White is an example of what historians call present-mindedness, that is, the tendency of “projecting the present back
into the past." By judging Sallie Joy White by the journalistic standards of the 1930s and by comparing her record to those of the most successful women who had followed her, Ross painted a picture of a woman, who though perhaps of interest during her own time, had nothing to say to future generations. She was an anachronism, nothing more than a figure from the past who, perhaps rightly in Ross's view, had "faded into the mists."

Ross's present-mindedness was most likely strongly influenced by her agenda in publishing Ladies of the Press. At a time when women journalists were still facing extreme difficulties in establishing their professional legitimacy, it was important that she prove through this work that women could do just as well as men in journalism. Thus, as she traced the evolution of female journalists from colonial printers to "literary ladies" of the 1800s to the stunt reporters of sensational journalism to the political correspondents, Ross repeatedly measured them against contemporary standards. Women who were the most memorable and successful, in her account, were those like herself who were at the right place at the right time, who were aggressive, persistent, and enterprising, who could quickly collect the facts and report them accurately and with style, and who could meet any challenge, mental or physical, to accomplish their task.

By measuring Sallie Joy White against these standards, however, Ross failed to capture those characteristics that made the Boston newspaperwoman so influential during her own time. Ross's description, for example, failed to explain why, in 1894, White was described by a contemporary as "first as well as foremost of 'all-round' women journalists in New England... known not only throughout New England but throughout the United States." It failed to explain why White was perceived as a leader and was repeatedly elected to office in both women's and mixed-sex press organizations as well as women's clubs from the 1880s until shortly before her death in 1909. It failed to explain why, upon her death, her funeral was attended by more than 100 Boston and New England journalists. And it failed to give her credit, as did the Boston Globe in her obituary, for the help and encouragement she gave to younger newspaper women, "for whom she had blazed the journalistic pathway." As historian James Startt points out,
present-mindedness "blurs the search for truth about the past..., fails to reflect the true past and becomes an expression of a fixed idea."10

Ishbel Ross, perhaps, set a standard for the way in which both journalism history and woman's history would regard Sallie Joy White, for in the more than sixty years since *Ladies of the Press* was published, White has been mentioned only in passing in a few histories of women journalists.11 The usual explanations given for the failure to produce individual women's histories -- the paucity of documentary records and the lack of recognition in their own time -- do not seem valid in this case. Documents and evidence of recognition abound. For example, although White's newspaper stories and columns followed the custom of the times and were rarely bylined, she did write a regular column for several years under the penname "Penelope Penfeather." Second, she was prominent in local and national organizations and often appeared on their programs as an officer or speaker. Third, unlike many women journalists, her papers are preserved in a collection, which although not inclusive, provides a picture of her personal and professional life. Finally, many of her articles and columns, although it is not always altogether clear when and where they were published, are included in this collection.12

The question, therefore, is: why has the story of Sallie Joy White been ignored and consequently excluded from journalism histories? Perhaps the explanation lies in Ross's evaluation of White, colored by her desire to promote the coming new breed of woman journalist: "Sally [sic] was neither the first nor the best of the early women reporters. She was merely the symbol of a point of view that has changed surprisingly little in the last half century."13 This pronunciation that White represented the past and had not even been very influential in that past may have sent a message to future historians that White's story was not a fertile field for inquiry and they would do better to examine instead those women Ross had identified as pathbreakers.

This historian, instead, believes that the story of Sallie Joy White is rich with possibility. It provides a poignant picture of the challenges faced by a woman attempting to first enter and then succeed in journalism during a time
when few women could gain entry to the newsroom. It illustrates how women who were professionally isolated networked through women’s organizations where they eventually created a culture of professional as well as emotional support. It shows how one generation was able to encourage and mentor the next. The story of Sallie Joy White shows how one woman especially took advantage of the woman’s movement to promote women’s place in her chosen profession. Through this story, Sallie Joy White emerges as more than the symbol described by Ross. She becomes, instead, a key to understanding the evolution of women journalists of the nineteenth century.

Beginnings

Sarah Elizabeth Joy was born in Brattleboro, Vt. in 1847, the only child of Rhoda and Samuel Sargent Joy. She attended the Glenwood School for girls and during her years there discovered the urge to write. While still a teenager, she followed the example of the "literary ladies" of the time who published under alliterative flowery bylines poems, short stories, sketches, and "observations" as contributors for the copy-hungry periodicals of the day. She published her work in Vermont newspapers as well as some journals such as Wide World under her own name as well as under the pen name "Flora Forrest." After her graduation and the death of her father in 1865, Joy moved to Charlestown, Mass. and lived with family friends while she sought to establish herself in a satisfying job. There were not many options for "satisfying work" available, and like many educated young women of the time, she began work first as a teacher, then as a librarian. She was lucky here, for she became an assistant at the Loring Circulating Library, which was something of a rendezvous for New England authors, intellectuals, and reformers. During these years she continued to dream of supporting herself with her pen and published numerous pieces in New England publications, including the Home Journal, the Vermont Record and Farmer, and the True Flag. It was clear from her letters, however, that she was eager to move on and when her employer extended her hours at the library without raising her pay in winter of 1869, she wrote her mother that she would leave the job as soon as she found something else, concluding, "I will not be bullied by any man."
But as frustrated as Joy was with her job at the library, it was here that
she met some of the established women of the older generation who would become
her mentors. A Mrs. Bingham, an editor for the juvenile publication Myrtle, for
which she had written a series of short stories, introduced her to suffragist
Mary Ashton Livermore, who was in the process of putting out the first edition
of the Woman's Journal. Livermore apparently recognized the young woman’s
frustration as well as her potential and offered her a job as her clerk and
assistant at the new suffrage publication. "[The job] is at the same salary [as
Loring’s Circulating Library] but shorter hours and I will have time for outside
work," a jubilant Joy wrote her mother shortly after. "Mrs. Bingham says it was
God’s way of showing me where my true life work lay."

Livermore apparently saw Joy’s job at the Woman’s Journal as only a
temporary measure, however. She believed the young woman would be of more use to
the woman’s movement as a reporter for the general circulation press, which was
generally hostile toward women’s rights and either refused to cover the movement
at all or ridiculed it. Livermore and Bingham began to lobby for Joy’s entry
into journalism, and shortly after starting her work at the Woman’s Journal, Joy
wrote her mother:

Dear mama. I’m going with [Mrs. Mary Livermore] to see
Black of the Commonwealth and some other editors. She
and Mrs. Bingham have got it into their heads that I
would make a grand reporter and they are trying what
they can do. I know I should like that. It is what I
have had on my mind for some time. There would be great
change and variety [and] enough labor to suit me.... Oh
dear, I wonder if I shall find my niche by and by. Mrs.
Livermore says she thinks if I am once put in
the way
that I shall make a better reporter than Miss H. [Nellie
Hutchinson of the New York Tribune] because she thinks
I’m more in earnest... [O]f all the reporters at the
Friday’s convention, not one, even the Boston Post,
which is so bright, could begin [to compete] with Nellie
Hutchinson’s. They have a way of giving dry detail
and make them so terribly matter of fact and statistical
that people don’t care to read them. But her’s [sic] are
so fresh, breezy bright and enthusiastic that people
can’t help reading them. I wish one of the city papers
would give me a chance at Vermont, I know I’d write a
good report for them."

It is unclear whether her two mentors actually made the necessary
introductions or simply provided the support and encouragement she needed, but
within the month Joy had been hired by the Boston Post (all expenses paid and seven dollars a column) to cover the Vermont convention. In the following months, she travelled with the suffragists throughout New England, wrote frequent articles for the Post and quickly became caught up in some of the controversies within the movement. She was the only woman reporter at the Brattleboro convention, and her presence did not remain unnoticed, but rather was treated by other newspapers as an event in its own right, for in those days the existence of a woman reporter was still a novelty. One article, for example, described her physical and girlish charm as well as her comportment as a reporter, declaring that she had "made a reputation as a newspaper correspondent and reporter of which any man may well be proud. And this is 'saying a great deal for a woman.' Miss Joy is as independent as she is self-supporting and she votes for woman suffrage." Another praised her writing, which it described as "entirely free from the 'slang-whanging,' slap-dash, dare-devil character of reports made in the New York Tribune and can be relied upon as truthful." Even the Woman's Journal sang her praises, describing her as "the bright particular star" of the convention, and the "young, beautiful, and accomplished reporter of the Boston Post.... that old Popular New England Democratic Organ."

Joy's stories were popular because they were infused with color and anecdotes, and often revealed a wry sense of humor. They were far from the dry and statistical stories she had noted in the Boston papers, as can be seen by the following example:

Brattleboro has had a fire and a flood, and now it has a Woman Suffrage convention. I saw an old farmer yesterday with the inevitable blue woolen frock and cart whip snugly stowed away under his arm, reading one of the posters announcing the meeting. Patiently he waded through it, then turned on his heel and wondered "What in the thunder'll come next." That no one could tell him. An earthquake, somebody suggested. The Millennium, say the interested women. But whatever is to come, the convention and the attended spirits are here now....

Joy's coverage of the woman suffrage conventions of that spring secured her a permanent position on the Boston Post. She was soon publishing articles on prominent women, women's clubs, suffrage meetings, and political conventions. She also wrote "letters of correspondence" from vacation spots along the New England
coast, some of which appeared in a regular column, "At Home-Matters." In addition, she published letters and articles in a half dozen other newspapers, including the New York World and Our Society, earning more than $160 between September 1870 and April 1871 from these extra jobs. Her work, which often bore her byline, Sarah E. Joy, her initials, SEJ, or the pen name, "Joyeuse," frequently poked fun at upright and stodgy Boston. In one story published in the World under her nom de plume "Joyeuse," for example, she reported that not all Bostonians limited their "social lives" to church, but that some were even known to attend the theater. In another, she lampooned the so-called Radical Club, which she described as oscillating, "pendulum-like," between the parlor of two upright ministers.

At the same time she wrote articles for the Post that revealed some of the more serious aspects of life. In 1871 and 1872, her series on Boston's North End Mission were praised as brilliant and descriptive. "[Her articles] are so different from the chronic dryness and pointlessness of essays on the poor," wrote one admirer in a contemporary newspaper. "They are so readable and suggestive when contrasted with the habitual deliverances and have done much to make people understand the wretchedness of the poor in Boston." Her work was apparently so well received that the Portsmouth (New Hampshire) Gazette mistakenly reported that "Miss Sarah L. [sic] Joy of the Boston Post and perhaps the brightest lady reporter in the country" had been hired by Our Society and was to be paid an annual salary of $2,600. The report that Joy had accepted the offer was quickly refuted by the Post, which happily announced that she had preferred to retain her position at the Post and that her many personal friends would no doubt "rejoice at this decision."

Joy maintained her connection with the woman's movement. She occasionally published poems and articles in the Woman's Journal, continued to cover state and local conventions and meetings, and in 1871 became the secretary of the newly organized Middlesex County Suffrage Association. She did not forget her own struggle in getting established in Boston and devoted many of her articles to the difficulties facing women striking out on their own that provided solutions to...
such practical problems as finding housing and getting appropriate training for jobs. Women reading her articles knew they were hearing advice from someone who had been there.

Although she was just at the beginning of her career, Joy was already being upheld as an example for other women -- not only as a successful and independent woman, but as one who was opening the way for her sisters in a promising new field. "Miss Joy has one qualification necessary to work upon a daily paper. She is quick, she writes rapidly, her thoughts flow freely, and her pen keeps up the pace," stated one article under the headline "A Woman in a New Field." "Miss Joy's position is one that many women can fill and one for which they are particularly adapted." A sketch, probably published in the Woman's Journal, described Joy as a woman often referred to as "the lady reporter" at the conventions and public meetings held in Boston. "[Just] as Lydia Maria Child has been called the grandmother of feminine journalists, so one day Miss Joy may be styled the pioneer among women Boston reporters," it predicted.

Creating Her Niche

Sarah Elizabeth Joy left her position with the Boston Post in 1874 when she married musician Henry K. White, Jr. The marriage brought the birth of two daughters, a few years of connubial happiness during which she helped her husband establish the short-lived Artists' Guild in Boston, and then years of frustration, separation, and financial hard times. Henry was apparently near the end of his singing career when they married and after their first few years together he was increasingly absent from the family's home in Dedham, Mass. They separated following the birth of their second daughter in 1879, and he drifted from place to place, eventually settling in California. He occasionally sent letters and small amounts of money to his wife, leaving her to take over the financial responsibility of herself and their daughters.

Despite, or perhaps because of, her domestic responsibilities, Sallie Joy White, as she now called herself, did not remain away from her beloved newspaper work for long. She called on the assistance of her widowed mother, who came to Dedham to keep house and care for her two small daughters, and was soon working
again. She published regular columns for both the Boston Sunday Times ("Woman’s Kingdom" and "Household Chat from a Happy Housewife") and the Detroit Free Press ("House and Home Papers") as well as "letters of correspondence" and articles on fashion in the Boston Daily Advertiser. These columns and letters covered a wide variety of topics, from "The Woman’s Suffrage Convention in Boston" and "How Female Suffrage Works in Wyoming," to "Househunting" and "In the Suburbs." In addition, she wrote a series of sketches on prominent women such as Phoebe Cousins, the "first lady lawyer," and actress Maud Granger, for the Boston Sunday Times under the byline S.J.W. She also published a series of articles in the Boston Sunday Chronicle, "Women I Have Known," which profiled prominent women such as suffragist Susan B. Anthony and reformer Eleanor Kirke.37

Building on this base, White concocted a scheme in 1878 to publish letters on "fashion and general matters of interest" in more than forty newspapers in New England, New York, the midwest, and the south. To the New England papers she offered the letters at no or only partial charge. She recognized that this was a somewhat "peculiar" proposition, she wrote in her proposal, but explained that she was offering it because she knew these papers could not afford to pay her in full because of the general "hard times." She hoped, nonetheless, that by publishing her work they would make it familiar to the New England public and create a demand that would prove profitable to her at some future and more prosperous time. "You need not fear that in my fashion articles I shall drop into senseless puffery," she assured the editors of the two dozen newspapers. "I shall give reliable information, which I am sure will interest your lady readers." To the fifteen other newspapers in the south and midwest, instead, she offered the letters at two dollars each. At a time when few women received set salaries for their newspaper work, publishing a constant flow of material in a number of publications was the only way they could earn a living wage. In the next six months, White’s account book shows, she received at least $310 from thirteen of these newspapers.38

By the early 1880s, metropolitan newspapers that had long been geared toward male readers were beginning to recognize the value of women readers who,
advertisers had discovered, made the majority of household purchases. Although Boston papers were slow to label specific women's pages or sections as such, they had certainly begun to court this untapped market and were beginning to publish a clearly recognizable page devoted to women readers. Here they gathered stories on fashion, food, home furnishing, and advice of all kinds as well as stories about women's events, women's clubs, and the occasional profile of a prominent woman. White was not about to let this opportunity pass her by and took an important step that provided her a new opportunity and secured her position in newspaper work. She attended and completed a program in home economics so that she would be able to add to her repertoire all those recipes and household hints for which women readers were apparently clamoring."

By early 1885, White had parlayed her expertise into a fulltime position at the Boston Herald, where she was to remain for the next twenty-one years. Here she poured out rivers of copy on women's fashions, cooking, sewing, and decorating advice, as well as articles on the woman's movement, issues affecting women, and women who had become leaders through their social and professional contributions. She also regularly wrote general interest articles based on speeches, lectures, concerts, plays and current literature and about the celebrities who produced them."

Creating a Network of Women

In 1885, Sallie Joy White was, to all practical purposes, a single working mother supporting herself and her two young daughters by her work in an industry that could hardly be called friendly to women. She had been called a pioneer in 1873 and now, twelve years later, was still an anomaly in a male-dominated profession. True, she was no longer the only woman working on the staff of a Boston newspaper, but the number of her female counterparts could be counted on one hand."

As is almost always the case, being in the minority was not as much about numbers as it was about power, or rather the lack of power. In the 1880s, professional women were not only a minority because of their numbers, but because of the general customs, mores, and traditions that permeated American life during
the 1800s. Following the years of the early Republic, woman's sphere had
contracted to the home, where her primary duty became to provide comfort, counsel
and moral guidance to husband and children. The world of work, politics, and
independence belonged to the male sphere and women who sought to enter it were
perceived not only as "unwomanly" but as a threat to male dominance and security.
Thus it was only with great difficulty that in the last quarter of the century
women began to break down the barriers blocking their way to education, work, and
financial independence. And their actions were rarely welcomed or encouraged by
the male half of society.  

In *Ladies of the Press* Ishbel Ross noted humorously how White had been set
apart from her more rambunctious cigar-smoking, whiskey-drinking male colleagues
by her white satin dress and some of the societal expectations held by those very
colleagues -- responses that could be described as gentlemanly at best and
patronizing at worst.  Despite White's comparative success in achieving
acceptance, it would be more accurate to say that she and other women working for
newspapers at this time were typically greeted by ridicule and even hostility.
"Young ladies who dared to lift their heads in the sea of journalism immediately
became the targets for envenomed shafts of small men," wrote one woman journalist
about the general climate of the period. "Their abilities were questioned, their
intentions suspected, their reputations bandied from sneering lip to careless
tongue, and on every hand they were met with discouragements, until the waves of
disappointment and all the billows of despair rolled over them."  

Not only were women isolated in the newsrooms where they worked, they were
also isolated in their chosen profession. Press clubs, which had started
organizing during the 1860s, were all-male organizations that mixed business and
pleasure and routinely excluded females from membership. Although these clubs
were largely social, they also provided occasions where professional issues were
discussed and important contacts made. To exclude women from these professional
fraternities prevented them from experiencing a sense of community and
legitimacy. Their exclusion further accentuated their identity as what feminist
scholars have come to call "the other."
In November 1885, White and five other Boston newswomen took a step to change this. At the instigation of Marion A. McBride, a special editorial writer for the Boston Post, the six women met in White's office at the Herald to establish the New England Woman's Press Association. Earlier that year McBride had participated in the organization of the Woman's National Press Association, which was founded to act as an umbrella organization for state and regional associations it hoped would follow. The New England Woman's Press Association was the second of these to be established, for the Illinois Woman's Press Association had been founded in Chicago that June. The primary purpose of NEWPA was a practical one -- "to promote acquaintance and good-fellowship among newspaper women [and] to elevate the work and the workers." A secondary purpose was to "forward, by concerted action through the press, such good objects on social, philanthropic, and reformatory lines as may from time to time present themselves." This second purpose was an indication of how rooted this professional woman's organization was in the broader woman's club movement of the day.

Of the six founding members of NEWPA, White, at thirty-eight, was the oldest as well as the most experienced newswoman, with fifteen years of regular newswork behind her. This seniority was recognized by the group in their unanimous vote that she be president of the fledgling organization. Estelle M. Hatch, who was thirteen years White's junior and had written for the Boston Globe under the pen name "Jean Kincaid" since the early '80s, was elected secretary. The other members were: Cora Stuart Wheeler, five years White's junior and with just three years experience in newspaper work; Helen M. Winslow, who had been a contributor to the Boston Advertiser and Transcript for two years, and Grace Weld Soper, who was in her early twenties and had only recently started work at the Boston Journal as its first and only woman on staff.

White was no stranger to women's clubs. Indeed, she was already a founding member of the Middlesex County Woman Suffrage Association, the Daughters of Vermont, and the Fortnightly Study Club of Dedham as well as a member of the New England Woman's Club, which all had no doubt prepared her for taking on the
leadership role in the press organization. But NEWPA was the first woman's professional organization to which she belonged and it was here that she devoted her greatest energies. She remained president until 1890, held various positions on the executive committee for the next eighteen years, and then held the presidency again from 1908-1909.

Under White's leadership, NEWPA, which grew to a membership of 134 by the end of the century, held both social and professional meetings. At its social meetings, prominent members of the community were invited both as guests and as speakers and entertainers, giving women journalists a chance to rub elbows with some of the influential people of the day. Some of these speakers were nationally known journalists, such as Jane Cunningham Croly, "Jennie June" who in 1887 was honored for her thirty years in journalism and spoke on that occasion of her first unsuccessful attempts to secure a permanent position on a New York paper. Others were advocates of women's advancement such as Lucy Stone, founder of the American Woman Suffrage Association, and Mrs. A.M. Palmer, founder of the Woman's Professional League of New York.

NEWPA never ignored its responsibilities as a press organization and during its professional meetings, topics in journalism were addressed as well as purely organizational issues. Members often read papers and participated in debates on woman's role in journalism, and White was a frequent speaker at these events. In 1896, for example, she delivered a paper on "The All-round Newspaperwoman," a phrase that had earlier been applied to her.

After 1890, the New England association expanded its horizons by affiliating with several national press groups and participating in their conventions. In 1891, for example, NEWPA joined the International League of Press Clubs, a mixed-sex organization, as well as the newly formed International Federation of Women's Press Clubs. In 1892 it voted to send delegates to the convention of the National Editorial Association (NEA), a mixed-sex organization, in San Francisco. White became prominent in each of these groups. She was elected president of the Federation in 1891, vice president of the League in 1892, and served as delegate to the National Editorial Association several times.
also participated in more general women's endeavors, and in 1893 joined the Massachusetts Federation of Women's Clubs. In the same year, it participated in the congress of literary women at the Chicago World's Fair, where White was one of seven New England women to read a paper on the role of women in the press.38

Almost ironically, as NEWPA was growing and branching out, White sought to maintain the close connections she had established among the Boston newspaper women. In 1891, after completing her five-year NEWPA presidency, she established the Boston Woman's Press Club, whose membership was limited to women active in that city's newspaper work. Although the move could be seen as one attesting to the continually growing interest among women journalists to find a venue for their professional networking, the move attracted some derision in the Journalist, which represented it, instead, as a sign of conflict within the NEWPA.39

Claiming Her Place

The 1890s must have been years of heady satisfaction for White. Now in her forties, she had achieved recognition among her colleagues, both male and female, which was evidenced in her frequent election to office in national press organizations and invitations to speak before the public.40 She began to travel to attend the conventions of the many organizations of which she became an officer and representative. In 1891, for example, she travelled by train through Canada to the Pacific Northwest and California. Her journey, which was concluded by her attendance at the annual convention of the National Editorial Association in San Francisco, was punctuated by a string of letters to her younger daughter and a series of signed articles that ran in the Herald between September 1891 and April of the following year.41 During this trip, she frequently gave lectures on women's role in journalism and in August 1891 was the principal speaker for a meeting of the Pacific Coast Woman's Press Association. In a review of the event published in the San Francisco Call, White was described as "that pioneer of newspaper women," and her listeners (women journalists) were described (a bit patronizingly) as "listening with breathless attention to her clear ringing words."42
In 1893 White once again travelled westward, this time to attend the convention of the International League of Press Clubs in St. Paul, Minnesota. As one of the League’s five vice presidents, she was its only female officer and was surrounded by prominent male journalists such as John A. Cockerill, former editor-in-chief of the New York World, and Charles H. Taylor, publisher of the Boston Globe. At a dinner sponsored for the League by the St. Paul Press Club, she was one of five speakers. "I was the one woman to make a speech at the banquet," she bragged in a letter to her younger daughter Grace. "And was said to have made the best speech of the evening. When I tell you that Murat Halstead [liberal editor of the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette], Col. De Long, and two members of Congress made the other speeches, you may imagine that I felt proud." Her topic was "The Woman in Journalism." As for the trip, which concluded with a stay in Chicago where White participated in the Women’s Congress at the World’s Fair, she said it was "one long delight," with good companionship, fruitful discussions, and frequent entertainments and sightseeing tours.

White also travelled for her women’s clubs and the suffrage movement. In 1900, for example, she attended the biennial convention of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs in Milwaukee. Here, in a session on the press, she spoke on the "growing comradeship between the club woman and the newspaper woman." Times had changed since she first started as a reporter, she said, and club news was now welcomed by newspapers. As for opportunities for women in journalism, she reported somewhat optimistically, their position on the pay roll was "just the same as that of the newspaper man." And to girls starting out in journalism who were being pressured into stunt reporting, she urged them to do only what felt right. "There is no power that can compel you to accept an assignment that you feel to be wrong for you. No matter if it result in the loss of your position."

It was during this period also that White began to publish books on homemaking and careers for girls. The first of these, Housekeepers and Homemakers, published in 1888, gathered up much of the material she had offered over the years in her newspaper columns for the Boston Advertiser and the Boston
Post. A second book in this genre, *Cookery in the Public Schools*, published a
decade later, offered practical advice for including the home economics program,
which until that time had only been offered in finishing schools or adult
education programs such as the one she had attended, in public schools. In 1897,
her attention turned to careers for women in her next work, "Newspaper Women,"
a chapter in Frances Willard's *Occupations for Women*. The book, for which White
along with Helen M. Winslow was listed as an assistant, covered the gamut of
careers open to women at the end of the century, from stenography to medicine.
In addition, it offered them practical advice, such as how to get the best
training and education for their chosen career and how to pay for it. In 1899
White published her own book on this topic, *Business Openings for Girls*, which,
of course, included a chapter on "Newspaper Workers." 68

These two chapters, "Newspaper Women" and "Newspaper Workers" are
especially interesting because they reveal so much about White's view of her life
work. She is practical and down to earth and immediately sets out to smash any
false illusions. She takes pains to make a distinction between literary workers
("those who write for magazines and story papers" and "those who in the shelter
of their own home write letters for daily or weekly newspapers") and newspaper
women ("those who go into the newspaper office, have regular desks there, 'take
assignments,' and go out to attend to them, going to their work as the young men
go to theirs and working side by side with them.") Next she pointedly explains
the difference between the journalist (the "dilettante" who thinks "more of his
title than his achievement") and the newspaper worker (an "honest worker" with
"no make-believe about him or her.") White praises the girls who would go after
a job at a newspaper with persistence and imagination, just as she had. The girl,
instead, who stood hopeful and ladylike outside the newspaper office "with folded
hands, waiting for someone to die or resign, and so leave an opening for her"
would always be passed by those who had instead won the position, she warns. And
while newspaper work is rewarding in that "it catches and holds the enthusiasm
of the workers as nothing else does.... [and] opens possibilities of attainment
that are undreamed of when the first steps are taken," White warns that it is
hard and demanding work and not an easy way to earn a livelihood. "The number of women who are earning less than a thousand dollars a year in newspaper work is very much greater than those who are earning that amount," she says, deflating illusions that riches are to be gained in this line of work.° Like Ross, who would publish her own work on women journalists thirty-seven years later, White exhibited her own brand of present-mindedness by thus distinguishing between literary workers and newspaperwomen. She was, in a sense, dismissing the women who had been publishing in newspapers when she got her own start in the late 1860s. In fact, she was dismissing her own experience as a newspaper writer before being hired by the Post.

After thus weeding out the women from the girls, so to speak, White proceeds to list the requirements for newswriters that are still valid today: quickness, alertness, and aliveness; the ability to write well, clearly, and concisely; the versatility and ability to write on any topic; a broad background of knowledge, and impartiality. "Above all things, do not try to enhance your own value by writing about yourself and your own affairs and accomplishments," she warns. "It is simply the most palpable and laughable kind of self-laudation, and no girl of refinement or good breeding will show such a lack of taste as to permit herself to make this pitiful bid for notoriety."°

White practiced what she preached. As she settled into her writing style, she never forced her own personality upon the reader, a technique used by some women writers like the flamboyant Nellie Bly to make themselves major actors in their own stories.° The great bulk of her newspaper work, which was published in the Herald between 1885 and 1905, in fact, carries no byline and today can only be positively identified by the fact that it is collected in White's own scrapbooks. But in examining these articles, certain story types or themes as well as a specific writing style become apparent so that in perusing the Herald of these years, it becomes possible to spot White's stories with some assurance.

One group of stories, often appearing under the heading, "Among Working Women" or "The Working Girls," dealt with working women, the issues they faced, and how they resolved them. At a time when society still believed women should
remain in the home and be supported and protected by their male relatives, White took pains to establish that many women instead had been forced by circumstances to support themselves and that for many, the necessity of a job was not just a stopgap measure but a permanent situation. In "The Working Girls: Necessity of a Business Preparation for Them," she reiterated this theme, then interviewed a prominent Boston businessman, Eben Jordan, and a woman's rights advocate, Mary A. Livermore, for details on how girls could be prepared for a life's work. According to Livermore, the first step was to provide training and employment opportunities, and then to provide girls with training in the areas where they were most able. The next step, according to Jordan, was to allow girls to move up in their jobs, advancing from beginners to fully trained workers with no limits on their possibilities anymore than there were limits for the boy working his way up.⁶⁷

White was optimistic that women's professional horizons were broadening. In "Woman's Widening Ways in the World," published in 1901, she revealed herself as part nineteenth-century woman who believed in duty and part twentieth-century woman who believed she could do anything she set her heart on. The subtitle of the article's headline was "Avenues Constantly Being Opened to Her as a Bread-Winner -- Her Duty to Find What She Can Do Well."⁶⁸ Over the years she wrote about the women working in a variety of fields, including the shoe girls of Lynn, shopgirls, newspaper women, women in medicine, and women pastors.⁶⁹ She often addressed practical concerns facing working women, such as the difficulty they had in finding proper and affordable housing, and described some of the solutions offered by social agencies such as the YWCA, or experience, which suggested co-operative housing.⁷⁰ But she also pointed out problems that were not so easily addressed, such as the patronizing attitude of male colleagues toward women professionals and the double burdens of professional as well as domestic demands placed upon working women.⁷¹

White often profiled prominent women and female celebrities, and her letters to her daughter Grace during the 1890s and early 1900s often mention interviews she had just completed or concerts, plays, or lectures she had just
attended. No matter who the woman, diva or reformer, White typically played up her independence and expertise in her chosen field. At the same time, she attempted to reassure her readers that there was nothing unwomanly in such attributes. Thus, in 1885, she described French novelist Mme. Greville, who had come to America for a series of lectures, one of which was given before the New England Women's Club. Greville, she wrote, was "a woman who is not only able to command herself, but to rule others.... There is nothing half-hearted in her ways of expressing herself, and though she has the masculine element in some degree, there is NOTHING UNWOMANLY in her manner or conversation." In a similar vein, she described Emily Blackwell, the first woman to receive a medical degree in the United States, as "diffident and retiring but [with] a firm and determined expression of face."

In 1904, probably as part of its campaign to attract women readers, the Herald gave White a regular column with a byline. Following the tradition of other women writers who had taken alliterative pen names, she started publishing under the name "Penelope Penfeather." The column, which first appeared during the week under the heading "As Penelope Sees It," ran anywhere from two to three full columns and dealt with anything from women's clubs to tidbits of gossip on fashion and local celebrities (rarely named) to anecdotes to general observations on life. Here White abandoned her habit of removing herself from her work, wrote in the first person, and freely indulged in some of the topics that interested her the most. She frequently used the rhetorical device of antagonist dialogue to support her narrative, as in this example from early in 1905:

I can always tell when the 'pointed paragraph' aimed at women's clubs is written by one of the young men on the newspaper staff. Not because it is ill-natured, it never is that; not because it pokes fun at them, because it is more often given to seriously commenting, but because it shows such a lack of acquaintance with the personnel of these clubs and also of their aims. In many of them there is the accusation by implication, that by belonging to these clubs, women are neglecting their homes, permitting their husbands to live lonely... and shirking altogether the duties of motherhood. Sometimes these young men get positively pathetic in their pictures of homes desolated by the woman's club. I see only one cure for them, and that is to marry a good capable club woman and see how companionable she is and how sensibly she manages her home.
In another column that employs the same rhetorical device, White uses the comment made by a male guest at a club meeting to discuss women's employment in the so-called male domains of finance, statesmanship, and war. He had said these were three areas where women had still not made their mark, she wrote. "Instantly the statement was taken up by one woman, followed by another and still another, until the women really convinced him that even these professions were not entirely free from the pervading female presence." She then went on to recount the history and present status of women in these fields.

The column presented White with a new freedom she had never fully enjoyed in all her years of newspaper work. The situations she described were clearly the type of situations that came up every day, but here she was clearly employing a certain poetic license to create composite characters whom she could set up and then knock down at will. Besides having conversations among themselves, some of these characters often had imaginary conversations with her also, addressing her as "Miss Pen" and asking her advice on topics as varied as the geographic location of "table d'hote" to the best way to get out of an awkward situation. With a gentle touch of humor and a wry wit, she could expose ignorance, snobbery, and prejudice at will.

The Penelope columns generated a deluge of fan letters from both men and women asking for advice on a range of topics. They were such a success that the Herald announced it would also give White a regular chat column in its Sunday Magazine to answer her readers. "I have tried to reply personally to all the letters that have come to me since I opened this column, but they have reached a point now where I could not write the column itself if I stopped to answer the letters," she explained to her readers in announcing the imminent column. Ever serious about her work, she told them she would pay attention to all "reasonable and serious queries, which convey a genuine desire for information, but I shall not trouble myself at all with those that outrage common sense and are sent 'for fun.'"

The Sunday column ran from January 29, 1905 until Aug. 5, 1906 under several headings with elaborately designed illustrations: "In Confidence With
Penelope," "When in Doubt Ask Penelope," and "Ask Penelope." White responded to questions ranging from how to preserve squirrel skins for coats to whether a girl should consider becoming a governess to the meaning of the phrase "hoi polloi." Under the headings "In Confidence With Penelope" and "When in Doubt Ask Penelope," the column filled a full page in the magazine. After a few months, its heading was changed to "Ask Penelope" and it was reduced to the top half of a full page. After nearly a year, it was bumped to the bottom half of a page by a new column, "Aunt Mary's Talks," and finally was limited to the bottom quarter, sharing the page with the "Aunt Mary" quarter page and half a page of fashion illustrations. Then, abruptly, on August 5, 1906, both the Penelope and the Aunt Mary columns were replaced by a more general interest feature, "Things You Don't See Every Day."#

Shortly after, White left the Boston Herald and resumed her weekday "As Penelope Sees It" column at the Boston Advertiser, for which she had worked thirty years earlier. This she continued to publish until shortly before her death from cancer in March 1909 at the age of 62.##

Conclusions

Sallie Joy White was remembered by her contemporaries for three accomplishments: her success as a newspaper woman; her role in providing support and guidance for women following in her path, and her unswerving dedication to the field she had chosen while still a teenager. Her heartfelt wish expressed to her mother in 1870 that she might someday find her niche and earn her living by her pen had been fulfilled, though not without struggle. As she told the girls who read her book on careers for women, newspaper work was a demanding and not always financially rewarding job; only the dedicated and talented would succeed.

Through her many articles and personal letters, the late twentieth century observer gets a sense especially of this dedication, or perhaps determination would be a better word. For although her career from 1870 to 1908 may appear smooth and inevitable to a casual observer, there were many difficult moments when she had to test her courage and conviction that newspaper work was the best place in the world for her. After her marriage she showed fortitude and ingenuity.
in convincing newspapers to use her work and making a name for herself before the New England public. Throughout the years she deflected criticism and hostility from male colleagues by doing her job and doing it well and insisting that women could do the job as well as men. Even after twenty-seven years in the business, the job did not get easier. In 1897, she was reduced to space rates by the Herald and returned to the tactics she had used as a novice. She laid siege on the editor’s office to get assignments, returning home empty-handed when he was out of town on business, but always going back the next day. And when she did succeed in getting an assignment she was as jubilant as she had been at the age of twenty-three when she got her first assignment to cover the Vermont suffrage convention. She wrote her daughter, “I am going to have an article in Sunday’s Herald -- a column and a half!!!”

Although White’s personal documents make few mentions of her commitment to other newspaper women, a few letters asking her to help someone publish their work or find a job indicate the esteem in which they held her and the faith they had in her willingness to help. This commitment is further illustrated in her consistent encouragement to girls to find their own path and prepare themselves for a future in which they would be satisfied and fulfilled. This was a message she expressed in her speaking engagements, her published books, and in her newspaper writing, whether through interviews with women who had the power to serve as role models or the rhetorical devices of the Penelope columns. This encouragement was certainly extended through her activities in the press organizations, in which she played a leadership role, as well as her women’s clubs, where woman’s advancement was the number one item on the agenda.

Ishbel Ross was right when she said Sallie Joy White had never leaped through a fire line, dodged missiles at a strike, or climbed the swaying ladder of a ship at sea. White had never grown wings and flown either. (Nor had she ever voted.) But she had played an active part in the process that made not only crime, catastrophe, and "action" reporting possible for newspaper women of future generations, but also investigative reporting, political analysis, and all the other kinds of reporting and editorial work in journalism. Following the path
broken by the literary ladies who had proceeded her, she had continued the tradition of laying the groundwork so women journalists who followed her would have valid role models upon whom to build their own careers.

Through her work, both as a newswoman and as an organizer, White contributed to creating a climate that allowed the women who followed her to blaze their own trails. That these trails might be different than the one she had taken would have surprised Sallie Joy White least of all.
NOTES


4. Ross, 2. Ross’s breezy account of Sallie Joy Whites’ career contains several inaccuracies. First, Ross spells her name incorrectly ("Sally" rather than "Sallie"). Second, White’s first major assignment was to cover a suffrage convention in Vermont and later she wrote on a wide variety of subjects. Third, White did not retire from journalism upon marriage as Ross implies, but returned to journalistic work within five years, supported herself and her two daughters on her earnings, and continued until her death in 1909.


7. Ross, 17, 22, 23, 25, 26. Ross had excelled by these standards, and before her retirement after fourteen years of active newspaper work at the New York Tribune in 1933, had covered some of the biggest newspaper stories of the day such as the Lindbergh kidnapping and the Halls-Mills Murder trial. (Beasley and Gibbons, 131-32.)


10. Startt, 18.

11. See for example: Marion Marzolf, Up From the Footnote (New York: Hastings House, 1977), 19-20; Maurine Beasley and Sheila J. Gibbons, Taking Their Place: A Documentary History of Women and Journalism (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1993), 111. Both of these cite Ross’s work as their source. A profile of White actually preceded Ross’s by eight years and she might have used this as her source. See Huldah M. Johnson, "Sally [sic] Joy White -- the First Woman Reporter," The Matrix 13:3 (28 Feb. 1928), 1, 6. White is mentioned in her role as an organizer of women’s press clubs in: Elizabeth V. Burt, "A Bid for Legitimacy: The Woman’s Press Club Movement, 1880-1900," Journalism History 23:2 (Summer 1997), 75-75. Beyond these references, White is not included in any of the recent histories of women journalists nor is she mentioned in standard journalism histories. A database and library catalogue search of other titles failed to produce any works dealing specifically with her.

24 336
12. The collection, which is in the Schlesinger Library archives at Radcliffe College, although extensive, poses problems in that little of the material is dated. Several scrapbooks contain White's clippings, but these were all cut out and pasted down so that very often neither the name of the newspaper, the date of the article, nor the page number on which it appeared are visible. Many articles cited in this paper, therefore, are identified only as "undated newspaper clipping," although the scrapbook in which each clipping is contained is identified by volume number. The author will attempt to identify these articles by date and publication as well as whether a byline was used whenever possible. In addition, the author was able to identify many of White's articles in the Boston Herald by putting them into the context provided by her manuscript collection. As for letters in the collection, most of them were collected either by her mother, Rhoda Joy Hanson (hereafter RJH), or her younger daughter, Grace Elinor Joy White (hereafter GEJW). As for the organizational records of the New England Woman's Press Association, of which White was a founder and the first president, those of its first twenty-three years, from 1885-1908, were destroyed in the great Chelsea fire of 1908 (Myra B. Lord, History of the New England Woman's Press Association [Newton, Mass.: Graphic Press, 1932], 205).

13. Ross, 2.

14. Two of those who preceded her were Grace Greenwood and Fanny Fern.


18. Sarah Elizabeth Joy (hereafter SEJ) to RJH, January [1870], SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 5.

19. SEJ to RJH, January [1870], SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 5. The first issue of the Woman's Journal, the publication of the American Woman Suffrage Association, was published 8 January 1870.


21. SEJ to RJH, January 30th, (1870), SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 5.

22. SEJ to RJH, February 24, [1870], SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 5.

23. She quickly adopted the "party line" espoused by the American Woman Suffrage Association, led by Lucy Stone and Mary Livermore and expressed in the Woman's Journal, and rejected the broader and more radical platform of the National Woman Suffrage Association, led by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton. This stance is apparent in a letter in which she wrote her mother that she didn't
"like Susan Anthony she is too partial and too broad in her missionary way. Her belief in regard to the marriage law is enough to [word crossed out] her" (SEJ to RJH, 30 January [1870], SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder). Later that year she joined the newly formed Middlesex County Suffrage Association and became its secretary (SJW Papers, A126, box 2, volume 2).


27."We Must Not Forget," undated clipping from the Woman’s Journal, SJW Papers, A126, box 2, volume 2.


32."Miss Joy and ‘Our Society,’" undated clipping, SJW papers, box 4, volume 3.

33. Results of Election, Middlesex County Suffrage Association, SJW Papers, A126, box 2, volume 2.

34. Undated news clippings, SJW Papers, A126, box 5, volume 4.

35. "Artists’ Guild," Boston Times, June 1880, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 2 "Biographical Essay," written by granddaughter Sallie P. Talbot, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 1; Sallie Joy White (hereafter SJW) to GEJW, September 1891, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 9; SJW to GEJW, 8 May 1894, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 10; SJW to GEJW, 29 April 1896, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 11.


39. Lord, 12.
40. These articles will be discussed below.

41. Between 1885 and 1887, for example, she wrote a series of articles on a lecture series given by historian John Fiske. In order to satisfy the demanding lecturer, who wanted to see the proofs of her articles before they were published, she interviewed him, read his lectures, read his lecture abstracts and attended his lectures before writing each article (John Fiske to SJW, 4 Jan. 1885 and 10 Nov. 1887, SJW Papers, A126, box 1 folder 14; "The Idea of God," Boston Herald, 22, Nov. 1885, 18; "New Orleans to Stone River: The Second Lecture in Mr. Fiske's Civil War Series," Boston Herald 25 Nov. 1885, 8; The Siege of Vicksburg: The Overthrow of Gibraltar," Boston Herald, 2 Dec. 1885, 3).

42. In 1880, just 288 women -- less than three percent of all working journalists -- were identified as full-time journalists by the U.S. census. Perhaps three times that number were working as part-time correspondents and contributors (Beasley and Gibbons, 10; Elizabeth V. Burt, "A Bid for Legitimacy: The Woman's Press Club Movement, 1881-1900," Journalism History 23:2 (Summer 1997): 73).


44. Ross, 1-2.


47. Marion A. McBride, "Report to the 1890 Convention of the National Editorial Association," Journalist, 5 July 1890, 12; Lord, 51. The Woman's National Press Association changed its name to the Woman's International Press Association in 1887.

48. The first women's clubs were organized in the late 1860s and grew to have a national membership of more than one million by 1890, when the General Federation of Women's Clubs was formed. For discussion of the woman's club movement, see: Karen J. Blair, The Clubwoman as Feminist: True Womanhood Redefined, 1859-1914 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980 and Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1975), 182-196.


51. Lord, 1-209, passim.

52. "Boston," Journalist, 13 Oct. 1888, 4; "The Club Women," Fourth Estate, 10 Dec. 1898, 5. Members came from the New England states as well as Nova Scotia. Membership was not limited to newspaper women, and many members were authors who published elsewhere.
53. Lord, 24-25, 76, 105.

54. Lord, 105; Sutherland, 24.


56. Lord, 65; SJW to GEJW, 21 May 1893, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 10.

57. Margherita Arlina Hamm, "Among the Newspaper Women," Journalist, 30 April 1892, 6. Hamm was generally supportive of women journalists and their organizations but was often torn between the desire to be supportive and the urge to be entertaining.


60. Quoted in Di Vernon, "What is a Newspaper Woman?" Journalist, 15 Sept. 1891, 7. Unfortunately, the original article published in the San Francisco Morning Call used the event to ridicule the women journalists attending the event, mistakenly labelling them as “blue-stockings” with no experience in newspaper work.

61. "International League of Press Clubs," Journalist, 15 1893, 12; Program for International League of Press Clubs Dinner, St. Paul, Minnesota, 19 May 1893, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 29; SJW to GEJW, May 1893, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 10; "Columbia Exposition: Chicago and the World’s Fair, Women at the Fair," Boston Herald, 30 April, 1893, 8. White brought along her sixteen-year-old daughter, Bessie, and travelled in the "official" car with Helen and Harold Winslow, where the party was "royally fixed."


63. Sallie Joy White, Housekeepers and Homemakers (Boston: Jordan Marsh and Co., 1888); Frances E. Willard, assisted by Helen M. Winslow and Sallie Joy White, Occupations for Women: A Book of Practical Suggestions for the Material Advancement, the Mental and Physical Development, and the Moral and Spiritual Uplift of Women (New York: Success Company, 1897); Sallie Joy White, Business Openings for Girls (New York: The Werner Company, 1899). This last work was dedicated to "my dear little daughters, Bessie and Grace, who have been such an inspiration in my work for other girls." She also published "Letter to American Girls," in George James Bayles’ American Women’s Legal Status (New York: Collier, 1905).

66. Nellie Bly of the Pulitzer's World is the prime example of a woman writer who used this technique, but it was widely imitated by others, including Zona Gale, who wrote for the World between 1900 and 1902. These writers took an active part in the stories they reported, and sometimes their exploits became the story, as in the case of Bly's trip around the world in 1889. The result was that these women not only had bylines at a time when few bylines were used, but also frequently saw their names featured in headlines. They had huge fan clubs and were credited with increasing their newspapers' circulation. See: Brooke Kroeger, Nellie Bly: Daredevil, Reporter, Feminist (NY Random House, 1994); Elizabeth V. Burt, "Rediscovering Zona Gale, Journalist," American Journalism 12:4 (Fall 1995), 444-461.


72. SJW to GEJW, various letters, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folders 9-14.


74. Boston newspapers were stodgy in comparison to their more competitive brethren in New York, and were typically a full decade behind papers like the New York World and the New York Journal in both their appearance and their makeup. In 1894, the Herald started running an illustrated advertisement on its editorial page that claimed it was widely read by women because it provided them the kind of information they wanted in a newspaper. And it gradually adapted its content and layout to accommodate those interests. During that decade, for example, the Herald began publishing syndicated women's columns, such as Max Eliot's (Anna Mai Ellis) "Chats About Folks" and M. E. W.'s column on women's interests. In 1893, the Herald started publishing a weekly column, "Among the Women," which soon became "Among the Women's Clubs." The Herald did not label its women's pages until 1904, when it introduced its "Editorial and Women's Section." This became the "Women's Section" later that year (Boston Herald, 1885-1909, passim.)
75. This author has not discovered how this ludicrous name was chosen. It may have contributed to historians' failure to take White seriously.

76. This rhetorical device stages a confrontation between two antagonists who hold opposing points of view and allows the author's view to prevail through persuasion, logic, and evidence (Shelley Fisher Fishkin and Carla L. Peterson, "'We Hold These Truths to be Self-Evident': The Rhetoric of Frederick Douglass’s Journalism," in New Literary and History Essays, ed. Eric J. Sundquist and Fred Doug (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 191.


80. Penelope Penfeather, "As Penelope Sees It," Boston Herald, 23 Jan. 1905, SJW Papers, box 1, folder 5.


82. Various clippings, Sallie Joy White Papers, M129, box 2, folders 9-10.

83. SJW to GEJW, 15 March 1897, 18 March 1897, 21 June 1897, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folders 12 and 13.

84. See for example, Lucy Stone to SJW, n.d., SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 21; Mary E. Blake to SJW, 20 April 1890, SJW Papers, A126, box 1, folder 15.
"Wrestling with Corporate Identity: Television and the National Broadcasting Company"

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Abstract:

Why did professional wrestling disappear from the National Broadcasting Company’s program schedule, at a time when it may have helped the corporation weather a fiscal crisis? This paper examines the formative stages of NBC’s television operations (1945 to 1950), including a little-known financial crisis in 1949, to explain why this crisis led to a solidification of the company’s programming strategy toward expensive entertainment programming and away from popular, inexpensive genres such as professional wrestling. The paper argues that substantive decisions regarding the direction of network television programming, and the groundwork for a significant shift in the relationship between network, sponsor and program, were made in this formative period, much earlier than had been proposed by many television historians.
Media organizations and occupations lie right at the heart of any study of mass communications, for they embody the processes through which the output of the media comes into being.

-Margaret Gallagher

Conventional historical accounts of the “early years” of television broadcasting generally begin in earnest in the post-“television freeze” period of the early 1950s with the emergence of the so-called “Golden Age” of live television drama. While historian William Boddy correctly points out that the broad social decisions about television broadcasting were in fact solidified in the 1930s and 1940s, he too only begins substantive discussion of television programming with the period of the 1950s.

These historical approaches overlook a series of fundamental influences that emerged in the 1940s that contributed to the shaping of television programming as we know it. This paper examines the preparation for and the initial stages of commercial network television broadcasting operations in the years 1945 to 1950, with particular emphasis on the corporation seemingly in the best position to dominate the field: the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). I argue that several self-imposed, often conflicting constraints operating within NBC, combined with compelling outside forces, guided the fledgling television network toward a series of programming and market strategies, strategies that in 1949 contributed to a crisis within the corporation. This crisis ultimately led to a solidification of the direction the corporation was to take with regard to programming, moving decisively away from sports, and toward a fuller
commitment to studio-based entertainment forms. This movement in turn allowed NBC (and the other networks) to begin to wrest control of prime time network programming from advertisers and their agencies, sponsors who had dictated the content of much of radio network programming for the previous twenty years.

In researching this historical episode, I am interested less in the program choices NBC made than in those it ultimately passed over. For it was these neglected yet popular, inexpensive, advertiser-supported program types—professional wrestling and roller derby among them—that may very well have been in the organization's best business interest to program, were it not for the fact that they conflicted with NBC's corporate self-image. It is this sort of conflict I intend to illustrate.

For the purposes of this paper, I bracket much of the discussion of these program types—particularly with regard to class issues—in order to focus primarily on the economic factors affecting NBC's decisions. Quasi-sports programs such as wrestling and roller derby were comparable to other sports program types in terms of production costs; the talent fees and broadcast rights were normally significantly lower than their "legitimate" sports counterparts. Such programs would therefore have been fiscally, if not programmatically, attractive.

The research presented here is drawn from a number of sources. Primary research comes from the collection donated by NBC to the Wisconsin Historical Society; as such it must be understood to be a necessarily partial and self-selected view of the time period—not all factions are equally represented, nor is any particular dialogue necessarily complete. As a prominent focal point for broadcasters and media advertisers, Broadcasting Magazine provided access to a detailed view of the discursive positions taken publicly by the participating companies—whether or not they were indicative of corporate interests. On the other hand, documentation from
professional wrestling and roller derby organizations is virtually nonexistent; no doubt such papers—if they were retained at all—would have been of little interest to most “creditable” archival collections.

Organizational Constraints

Corporations—particularly large ones such as NBC—cannot be analyzed as singular, homogeneous, univocal corporate bodies. Rather, organizations are divided into various divisions of activity, spheres of influence, and thus into coalitions of individuals who represent a varied, sometimes shifting set of interests. These interests are manifest in the form of internal constraints placed on the organization. As an organization increases in size, the constraints placed upon it—both from internal and external interests or sources—may become increasingly inconsistent or conflicted.4

As NBC prepared to compete as a television network in the 1940s, three types of internal constraint were readily apparent, either from NBC’s public actions or from the tenor of its inter-office discourse:

1) Corporate Self-Image. No doubt as a result of its dominance in the field of radio, NBC saw itself from the outset as the “number one” broadcast network in America. NBC’s dominance in the area of network radio operations was so successful that it prompted some at rival network CBS to suggest that it cede the mass audience entirely, and target a smaller, more educated niche (a suggestion rejected by its president, William Paley).5 Not surprisingly, this was the image NBC wished to project for the emerging television network, both to maintain its corporate image, and to differentiate itself from competing networks. By 1948, the slogan “NBC... America’s No. 1 Television Network” appeared in its full-page advertisements in Broadcasting magazine.6 One
result of this self-image was an apparent conservatism with regard to programming: seeing itself in a dominant position in its field, NBC was less willing to take chances on program types, preferring to let others develop programs which NBC would lure away once they were sufficiently "seasoned." For example, DuMont's first successful program, *The Original Amateur Hour*, was coaxed to join NBC in 1949.7

In launching the television network, a second, related discourse emerged: NBC increasingly described its television programming strategy in terms of "quality telecasting," presenting "the best television shows available." Because the word "quality" played an integral role in NBC's public definition of its radio network, it is not surprising to see the image applied to NBC's televisual efforts as well. However, as I will demonstrate shortly, this rhetorical strategy ran counter to the market strategy seemingly crucial to their success, as network strategists attempted to reconcile, in their words, "the conflicting elements of high-quality telecasting and comparatively low costs."8 In the formative stages of network broadcasting, NBC would struggle to resolve these contradictory aims.

2) Corporate Strategy. Since its creation in 1926, NBC had been acutely aware of any competitive organization or movement perceived as a threat to the company's market position, a sensitivity demonstrated as well by its managing corporation, the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). This awareness manifested itself in two ways. First, NBC continually sought to eliminate competition, often through government intervention and regulation.9 Robert McChesney's work on the efforts of educators and union leaders to gain a portion of the radio spectrum demonstrates the forcefulness of NBC's reaction, and its mobilization of industry and government resources against the "threat." This reaction follows the example of RCA and its corporate partners a decade earlier in their ultimately successful effort to insure the adoption of a
private, for-profit radio model in America, as Susan Douglas' work illustrates. Secondly, as I argued above, NBC was willing to take what it could not eliminate, happily using the "lesser" television networks (particularly ABC and DuMont) as training grounds for programs it would later expropriate.

3) Market Strategy. Success of NBC's television network depended on a number of factors, including the continued profitability of their radio network, from which the initial financing of television's operation would come. But the cost of television programming alone promised to be many times that of radio. With little chance of reaching profitability in the early years, NBC was forced to keep program costs to a minimum, a strategy that constrained NBC's expressed desire for "quality" programming, which tended to be more expensive.

In addition to these internal influences, NBC was also constrained by interests outside the organization, not the least of which was the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC's) insistence that station licensees broadcast a minimum of 28 program hours per week. Additional demands accrued from NBC affiliates seeking low cost and popular programs, and national advertisers seeking both nationwide and inexpensive advertising venues. Pressures rose as competing networks and program producers found popular and commercial success with inexpensive "low quality" program types—such as wrestling and roller derby. Finally, NBC was at times under considerable pressure from RCA to show a profit—or at minimum an "acceptable" deficit. It was within this context of internal and external constraints that NBC television program strategies were formulated.

Post-War Preparations—1945 and Beyond

In the early post-war years, NBC circulated an internal report detailing a proposed five-
year master plan for NBC's efforts in television, entitled "Financial Prospects for NBC Telecasting, 1946-1950." This document proposed a careful strategy not only for launching a national television network, but also for guiding it to profitability and recovering 80 percent of the losses sustained, all by the year 1950. Initial losses would be covered by anticipated profits from the NBC radio network, expected to amount to $20.9 million between 1946 and 1949, or about two and one-half times the anticipated capital requirements for station and network operations. Thus NBC's television operation would be dependent on the fortunes of its radio network operations, or, failing that, on equity capital provided by RCA, rather than on a stable pool of borrowed capital.\textsuperscript{12}

The long-range goal for NBC and the other networks was an advertiser-supported national network operation. However, as William Boddy points out, while the networks pressed advertisers and their agencies to participate in television, the networks were determined not to lose control over network programming as they had with radio. A 1945 article appearing in \textit{Televiser} observed that the networks were opposed to outside program production, preferring to keep control of production in house. While many early programs in fact were produced by outside agencies during the first few years of commercial television operation, regaining network program control was clearly a part of NBC's plans.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite this long-term goal, the networks' early prosperity was tied to the construction and operation of network "owned and operated" television stations (O&Os). NBC's strategy for profitability depended heavily on the significant revenues and profits generated by these stations.\textsuperscript{14} NBC planned to anchor its television network with WNBT in New York, the only NBC television station in regular operation in 1946. Construction permits had been granted for stations in Washington, D.C., Cleveland and Chicago, and an application was pending for a fifth
station (then the legal limit) in Los Angeles. NBC anticipated that by 1950 all five stations would be operating at a profit.15

Immediate external constraints—FCC regulations and as-yet-unavailable AT&T technology—combined to threaten the profitability of NBC’s O&Os and compel the network to make decisions regarding programming. As a station operator, NBC was bound by the FCC under Sec. 3.661 to maintain a regular program schedule of not less than two hours per day nor less than 28 hours per week, within a few months of commencing operation.16 However, AT&T—which controlled and operated the coaxial land lines linking the stations—could not furnish the interconnections necessary for NBC to distribute network-originated programming to its affiliated stations. Though NBC did arrange for microwave interconnections with stations in Philadelphia and Schenectady, New York, the company was quick to point out these were temporary links to be abandoned when coaxial lines were available. NBC stated publicly that it had “no plans for entering the network facilities business on a permanent basis” in competition with AT&T.17 To compound the problem, there was as yet no reliable method of recording televised programs for distribution; the kinescope would not be a viable option until 1948. Thus, without coaxial lines each station would be forced to produce a substantial portion of its own programming—a costly endeavor. Ignoring any repercussions from the FCC with regard to “public service,” NBC chose to delay the start of station operations in each city outside New York for as long as the FCC would allow, waiting until it could draw the bulk of network programming from WNBT when interconnections were established. In order to contain costs, NBC intended to limit locally-originating programs to “films, remote pickups, and the minimum number of low-cost studio programs needed to serve the community needs.”18

Network operations were thus seen as crucial, due primarily to the high cost of program
production and concomitant with FCC constraints. NBC’s “Financial Prospects” report noted:

Except for lower production by certain stations during the early months of operation, the 28-hour schedule represents a MUST for NBC. Therefore, the costs involved at this level of telecasting represent the expenditures which NBC will have to meet, regardless of how many programs are sponsored. Expansion beyond 28 hours will result from the addition of sponsored programs and the costs will be covered by the charges made to advertisers.¹⁹

Network operations were also, in NBC’s view, where the real profits lay. With network radio operations serving as a precedent, the organization could confidently predict that “revenue from national advertising will be the principal source of income to NBC from telecasting.”²⁰

Compelled to provide a minimum number of program hours, NBC had to reconcile the conflicting goals of “high quality telecasting and comparatively low cost.”²¹ Cost containment could best be achieved through “remote” telecasts of sporting events, political functions, and the like. Unlike studio productions, where settings and costumes had to be constructed, scripts written, and performances staged, remote broadcasts of sporting events could depend on performances staged in their natural environment.

However, though there was no explicit description of what constituted “high quality telecasting” in NBC’s “Financial Prospects” report, it is clear that most within NBC equated quality with studio production. While the radio network made use of remote broadcast material, the foundation of its program schedule was grounded in studio-based entertainment genres: comedy, variety, drama, serials and the like. And the report fully expected television programming to echo radio’s programming style, arguing: “[I]n programming concepts, it must be constantly emphasized that television is an outgrowth of radio and not of motion pictures. The economic limitation on telecasting simply will not permit operations to follow the lavish Hollywood pattern.” Thus planners at NBC anticipated that network program offerings would follow programming precedents set in radio, offering, not filmed materials, but rather: “high
Assuming that the latter program type would comprise sporting events, political conventions, and other one-time events, the remaining “high quality ‘live’ shows” would doubtlessly be produced in NBC’s studios. Thus it seems clear that at NBC, “quality” and “studio” were commensurate.

The course initially set out by NBC would necessarily be an expensive one. NBC’s hourly studio production costs in 1946 were more than four times the cost of remote broadcasts ($715.00 and $175.00 per hour, respectively), and NBC executives expected this ratio to widen:

Increased studio-program costs during the next few years anticipate improved programs and higher talent costs. Since the other NBC stations as well as the affiliates will depend on New York for the ‘quality’ programs they telecast, WNBT will have to furnish the ‘top notch’ shows.

While remote broadcasts would have provided an ample number of low-cost programming hours, the corporation’s commitment to “quality” programming necessitated higher-cost studio programs.

However, this position was neither entirely univocal nor completely defensible. Beyond the obvious fiscal argument, some within NBC argued that sporting events were “quality” programming. A 1947 report on the status of television commented that:

Public and special events, especially sporting events, are important factors in television programming. Columbia is making a great bid for prestige by trying to secure rights for numerous [sporting] events.

Others, including NBC’s own Department of Research, pointed to the “quantity” of audience such events attracted. A 1945 NBC survey of 1,070 New Yorkers found that 87.7% had seen a boxing program on television in the previous month. While the survey itself is problematic, it at least is an indication of the information that was being gathered and considered by NBC executives. Thus, while most equated the notion of “quality” with studio programs, and thus with a desirable corporate self-image, there were also dissenting positions being expressed,
advocating the value of sports programming.

It is clear from public positions the company took in 1946 that NBC took its 5-year plan seriously. 1946 marked the NBC radio network’s 20th year in operation, and the company announced in Broadcasting magazine that the year would also be “marked by the launching of television on a national scale.” However, NBC took care to reassure its AM affiliates that the radio network would not be overlooked or abandoned, as Broadcasting observed:

[W]hile nursing the two big infants [television and FM], NBC planners will keep a paternal eye on the adult service—AM—to see that it stays healthy. AM radio must provide the economics to support FM and television in their growing years, says NBC.

NBC president Niles Trammell conducted a series of conferences across the country early that year to assure affiliates of the company’s commitment to radio, to outline NBC’s plans for television, and presumably to garner interest in television station operations among radio affiliates. Furthermore, Trammell held a press conference in Hollywood, detailing NBC’s planned investment schedule for its O&Os across the country. He announced with a good deal of optimism that NBC “hopes to break even by the end of the third year, and put television on a paying basis within five years.”

Programming

If NBC was relatively clear as to what constituted “quality” television programming, its sponsors were considerably less so. Though nine commercial sponsors joined NBC in its first years of television experimentation, nearly a decade later sponsors were still admittedly unsure as to what constituted appropriate programming for its newfound advertising medium. For example, the promotions director for Commonwealth Edison reported in 1946 the company had tried five different program types in the previous two years; Telequizicals was but the latest in “a
series of experimental ideas being tried out by the company.” Standard Oil, which began its involvement with television in 1939, reported it continued to experiment in 1946 to gain knowledge about the medium, “to learn by doing...and to gain an appreciation of what people like.”

Even CBS demonstrated indecision regarding its programming direction. In the spring of 1947 the network announced it was closing its television studios, laying off studio production personnel and discontinuing all studio broadcasts, declaring its intention to “concentrate our efforts for the time being on actuality broadcasts, such as sports and special events.” Broadcasting reported the network’s decision

aligns CBS with that part of the industry which believes that television’s main appeal, at least for the immediate future, lies in its ability to bring into the homes of set owners visual reports of news and sports events while they are actually happening.

Less than a year later CBS made yet another abrupt turnaround, announcing its intention to “immediately” begin construction of the “largest television studio plant in the United States,” in an effort to reintroduce studio programming to its schedule. Needless to say, there was considerable debate as to just what type of programs would be appropriate to and successful on television.

**Sports Programming**

It was clear to some—often vocal—advocates of television that sports programming would and should dominate the medium—at least in its formative stages. One proponent argued sports was “a natural for television,” predicting that sports would comprise “about 60% of the program load of television for many years to come.” In its assessment of expanding advertiser interest in television in the fall of 1946, Broadcasting magazine asserted:
Programwise, the immediate emphasis will be on sports, for several reasons. First, sporting events are today television’s most professional entertainment. Second, with RCA rapidly catching up on its orders for image orthicon tubes, television can now bring these out-of-studio programs into the home with a clarity and detail that makes home viewing in many cases as good as or better than in the hall or park where the event is staged. Also, a ball game or fight card provides several hours of video program fare far more easily for the broadcaster than the same amount of time devoted to studio programs.

The article went on to describe the popularity of televised sports programs with audiences, which in turn, Broadcasting argued, accounted for the genre’s attraction to sponsors.32

There is little question why broadcasters would have been drawn to the genre, as the lengthy quote above indicates. Boxing and wrestling events were particularly easy to produce: the action takes place in a limited area, and could be televised with only two cameras. Furthermore, many of the costs associated with studio production—including sets, props and rising talent fees—could be avoided or minimized.

Not surprisingly, sports ranks among NBC’s earliest programming efforts.33 There is, however, disagreement as to the extent of NBC’s actual involvement in sports programming during the period. Historians such as Stan Opotowsky, writing in 1961, maintained that because of its early interest, NBC was the dominant network in sports. On the other hand, Ron Powers, examining the relationship of sports and television, concedes NBC was the first network for sports programming, but argues the real impetus came not from NBC but from one of its earliest sponsors: the Gillette Safety Razor Co.

Though Gillette was the inventor of the safety-razor at the turn of the century, by 1939 it faced its lowest profits in 25 years; controlling only 18 percent of the market, the company was in competition with 3,000 rival brands. That year, Gillette advertising director A. Craig Smith staked nearly one fourth of the company’s annual advertising budget on the Mutual Network’s radio broadcast of the 1939 World Series—to that point a marginal advertising opportunity at
best. Still, the World Series drew a sizable male audience, the target consumer for Gillette’s product line, which no doubt lessened the perceived risk. Though the Series only went four games, the sales response was four times greater than anyone at the company had imagined, and sealed Gillette’s commitment to sports programming.34

Gillette continued sponsoring sporting events on radio in the following years, and in 1944 initiated the Gillette Cavalcade of Sports boxing program on WNBT television in New York. In 1946 the program was among the first included in NBC’s debut network broadcast schedule. Airing on Monday and Friday nights, the Cavalcade of Sports accounted for about half of NBC’s weekly network broadcast schedule. The program was created and produced by Smith and his associates; in fact, it was Gillette, and not NBC, that owned the broadcast rights to most of the sporting events—and all of the “prestige” events—on NBC’s schedule throughout the 1950s.35 While NBC no doubt was pleased to have Gillette as a paying sponsor, company executives no doubt chaffed at the lack of control over its programming.

To NBC, Gillette’s sports programs apparently represented but one aspect of its efforts to fill their 28 hour-a-week schedule with sponsored programming—with one notable exception. In the summer of 1946, the joint efforts of NBC and Gillette culminated in a televised event that served as a catalyst for the emerging television network. In early May the two companies signed a contract for the television rights to the Joe Louis-Billy Conn heavyweight championship boxing match, to occur on June 19th, 1946. Gillette had already acquired exclusive sponsorship of the radio rights to the fight, which would air on the ABC radio network nationwide, and over the CBC radio network in Canada.

NBC planned to televise the event over WNBT in New York and WPTZ in Philadelphia (owned and operated by Philco), and arranged to send the program to a select number of
receivers in Washington, D.C., via coaxial cable. For its part, RCA provided the only three image orthicon cameras in existence for the event, building two of them in the weeks prior to the fight. The corporation also placed a full-page ad in Broadcasting to publicize the roles RCA and NBC played in televising the match.

In the week following the event, the impact of the broadcast was splashed across Broadcasting’s pages, where headlines announced: “Doubters Kayoed By Fight Telecast,” and “Dignitaries Liked The Title Fight.” The journal published nine separate stories concerning the broadcast, including descriptions and photographs of the “400 members of Congress” and “more than a quorum of the FCC membership” who attended the special broadcasts in Washington. In all, the event proved an effective sales pitch to advertisers and legislators alike regarding the viability of television in general, and RCA & NBC’s black-and-white version of it in specific.36

By the fall of 1947, WNBW in Washington, D.C. was on the air three evenings a week, and affiliation agreements had been signed with stations in Philadelphia, Boston and Schenectady, New York. Still, full network programming was a year away. For example, local field production for WNBT in New York accounted for over 60 percent of the station’s programming—more than 90 hours per month, or one or two sporting events per day, included New York Giants baseball and horse racing. However, of these programs, only boxing was offered through the network.37

NBC collected considerable data on its competitors during this period, particularly on the actions of CBS and DuMont. The monthly progress reports filed with top management contained detailed discussions of the activities of the competition, focussing in particular on the success its counterparts were experiencing with sports programming. NBC’s competitor activity
report for December 1947 noted that CBS “continue[s] to cover all big events in [Madison Square] Garden exclusive of boxing... events sponsored by Ford, General Foods, and Knox Hats,” while DuMont was offering “boxing and wrestling on Tuesday and Friday evenings for American Shops (menswear), [and] boxing on Monday evening for [a] local television set dealer.” While wrestling did not contain any of the characteristics of “quality” programming befitting NBC’s self-image, competitive interest (as well as industrial necessity) caused the organization to consider wrestling as a program option.

The 1948 fall season marked the beginning of NBC’s first year of full network program service. But earlier in 1948 NBC already showed signs of interest in the sporting events with which its competition was finding success, including wrestling and roller derby. NBC executive Doug Rodgers submitted a report stressing the profitability of roller derby which, he argued, was “fast becoming one of the largest sporting events.” Furthermore, the Sales Department, anxious to secure advertising revenue, reported that R&H Beer had expressed some interest in sponsoring a professional wrestling program.

Unlike its competitors, NBC had not produced a weekly wrestling program prior to 1948. However, a confluence of opportunities were presented to NBC as it sought to fill its program schedule, which the company acted on during the 1947-48 season. Gillette was sponsoring a boxing program on Monday nights from St. Nicholas Arena in New York (along with the Cavalcade of Sports on Fridays from Madison Square Garden), for which NBC was providing remote production facilities. Though most published directories of prime time network television programs do not indicate as much, there is evidence that NBC began airing the program Wrestling from St. Nicholas Arena on Tuesday nights in January or February 1948. This was a fiscally prudent decision, particularly as the NBC Remote Unit equipment was
already in place from the previous evening's boxing telecast. Furthermore, the cost of the series was attractive: while the cost of 26 hour-long boxing programs amounted to $44,790, the cost for the equivalent number of wrestling programs was $27,690, nearly half the expense. And both were a bargain when compared with studio programs: the half-hour program *Author Meets the Critics* ran $71,760 for 26 episodes, while estimates for the *NBC Television Music Hall* ran as high as $457,600 per season.\(^4^1\) For an industry in the initial—and very costly—stages of development, faced with an inability to charge advertisers sufficiently to recover program costs, programs such as wrestling seem the more tactical and judicious choice.

This programming genre ran counter to other plans under consideration at NBC. In April of 1948, two months after CBS announced plans to build new television studios in New York, NBC reported the opening of its newly constructed studio facility, Studio 8-G. Three times larger than its existing studio, NBC announced that the facility was "the world's most modern and best-equipped television studio," able to accommodate up to four programs produced in direct succession.\(^4^2\) Perhaps not coincidentally, in keeping with its self-image, in the summer of 1948 NBC considered offering affiliates what they called "feature service programs," a supplementary offering of "quality" programming above and beyond NBC's regular service. This proposal was immediately met with resistance by affiliates, who contended program costs were already higher than they could afford. Easton C. Woolley, Head of Station Relations, argued:

> The cost of the feature service must be reduced to the individual affiliation; otherwise, this merchandise will continue to remain on the shelves. The affiliates generally tell us that the program costs are beyond their reach and are so high that they cannot be resold locally. The stations do not question the fact that we are putting the money into the productions. What they want is a lower grade production at a lesser figure at this stage.\(^4^3\)

Much like the networks, most individual stations, faced with enormous start-up expenses, were
losing money.\textsuperscript{44} And like a select few at NBC, affiliates longed for cheap programming to help them fill their 28-hour broadcast quota. NBC, apparently responding to the complaints, announced at its fall affiliates convention it was dropping the proposed service, explaining it “had not worked out satisfactorily.”\textsuperscript{45}

Looking back at the fledgling 1947-48 television season, \textit{Broadcasting} reported advertisers had demonstrated a strong interest in sports, sponsoring 376 hours of sports programming in the month of February alone, nearly sixty percent of all broadcast time. In June, televised sports programs claimed half the spots in the top ten list published by Pulse. From the standpoint of both broadcasters and advertisers, boxing and wrestling programs were becoming “standard video material the year round.”\textsuperscript{46}

Heightened competition had some within NBC worried about the company’s market position in television. In his monthly television report, NBC Sales Manager Reynold Kraft reported: “Competition is a thorn in our sides and will be more so as time goes on and additional stations come into the market. DuMont has shown higher Hooper ratings in its programs, than has either CBS or NBC, but advertisers do not believe this condition will obtain when NBC can expand its program service and schedules.”\textsuperscript{47} Similar worries were circulating in the Station Relations Department. In a July 1948 memo to NBC President Niles Trammell, Frank Russell told of a station owner in Baltimore that was securing program services from more than a half dozen sources, including CBS, ABC and DuMont. He reasoned that this example was “a very clear indication of what a large number of stations will do as soon as they have an opportunity to receive programs from more than one source. It is a development absolutely contrary to the interests of a single network such as NBC.” Russell warned that unless NBC’s television programming changed markedly, both its television \textit{and} radio operations could be at peril: “It
stands to reason that NBC can only maintain its position of eminence by being the leader in television. Our position in radio will be determined by the results of our work in this new field, and whether we are to succeed can be decided within the next year or eighteen months. Unless we come up with a program of action which will result in our clearing time on our affiliates immediately, we will be in real trouble before the end of the year. Clearly, all was not well in the television programming area at NBC.

The 1948-49 Season

A. Craig Smith and Gillette renewed their sponsorship of both Monday and Friday night boxing series’ for the 1948-49 season, programs which had regularly rated in the top five by Hooper TV Ratings in the New York area, and which were consistently NBC’s highest-rated programs. Again, while even NBC viewed such numbers with some skepticism, it is significant that NBC Research consistently produced the information for top management. NBC also committed to a full season of Wrestling from St. Nicholas Arena, no doubt due in part to its continued proximity to Gillette’s Monday boxing program. Furthermore, the program was now sponsored on WNBT in the New York area by John F. Trommer, Inc., a regional brewery, which agreed to contract for sponsorship of the entire 26-week season. By spring the program had found a second sponsor—Gunther Beer—in Washington, D.C., which was paying $1,000 monthly for its participation. NBC’s prime time schedule was not yet at capacity, but executives expected to have a “reasonably full schedule” by spring.

Discernable sponsorship patterns began to emerge during the 1948-49 season, as more sponsors entered the field, and as the results of programming decisions became clearer. Two trends emerged from the period: first, sponsored sports programming continued to dominate
commercial television, accounting for over 50 percent of sponsored programming during the year. But as more television stations began operation across the country, and more advertisers clamored to tie their advertising to sports events, sports programs became increasingly localized. Regional broadcasting rights for home games of area professional baseball and football teams were granted to local television outlets, and sponsorship of such programs by national, regional, and local advertisers increased measurably, though increasingly on a station-by-station basis. For example, the Ford Motor Co. sponsored local broadcasts of five major league baseball teams during the 1948 season, along with a slate of largely local athletic events. Sponsorship of network sports programming continued, but was increasingly dwarfed by regional advertising placement.51

A second trend emerged with regard to advertisers, this concerning network program sponsorship. National advertisers continued their experimentation with program types, leading to the solidification of two increasingly prevalent genres on television: drama and comedy/variety. In December 1948, Broadcasting observed: “Though there is still heavy emphasis on sports programming—other and more widespread forms of television entertainment are going on the air... Dramatic programming, particularly, is on the increase.” Sports programs for the previous month accounted for 222 broadcast hours nationwide—51.6 percent of the total commercial time. However, local and spot sponsorship amounted to nearly three-fourths of that time; network sports programming still lead the field with 66 hours, but dramatic programming, accounting for 42 network broadcast hours, was not far behind.52

NBC’s Research Department offered a further reason for reevaluating sports programming, based on preliminary studies of television audiences. The department reported that while “the desire to see sports telecasts has been one of the chief reasons for the purchase of
sets, there are increasing signs of more varied preferences on the part of the television audience.” Examining the preliminary ratings performance of sports programs, the department concluded that while sports such as baseball perform well on their own, when competing against “outstanding variety or dramatic programs, or with telecasts of well-known radio shows, their ratings suffer sharp decreases.”

Comedy/variety programming, as it was called, lagged in total network hours, but the genre’s popularity with audiences was rapidly being established by the nascent rating services at the time. The 1948-49 season marked the start of Milton Berle’s *Texaco Star Theatre*, which by the end of the season had emerged as a runaway “hit” with set owners, regularly garnering 50 ratings or better. Though sports programming still dominated the ratings charts, perhaps due to the sheer aggregate of program hours, the popularity of other program types was emerging.

### The Crisis

Maxon Advertising, which represented Gillette, had warned NBC since the fall of 1948 that its client would likely drop the Monday night bouts due to budgetary constraints, though this was not likely to occur before early 1949. Thus it came as no surprise when Gillette concluded its sponsorship of *Boxing from St. Nicholas Arena* with the May 9, 1949 broadcast—this despite the fact that ratings for the Monday evening program were regularly outdistancing the Friday edition. NBC’s contract for the Tuesday wrestling broadcasts elapsed the following evening, and NBC did not renew it. Both were replaced the following season with studio-based programs.

A month after the cancellations, a crisis erupted at the National Broadcasting Company. In a report to RCA, executives at NBC estimated that overall profits for 1948 would be down by nearly sixty percent from the previous year—from $5 million to $2.1 million. NBC anticipated
sustaining a loss in total company operations in July and August 1949, for the first time since August 1935. Anticipated losses, NBC reported, were due to a larger number of program cancellations by radio sponsors than anticipated, coupled with larger-than-expected deficits in television operations—an estimated deficit increase of $1.35 million over 1948, and an increase of nearly $750,000 over the loss budgeted for the year. The television division now anticipated a total deficit for 1949 of $4.5 million.\textsuperscript{56}

NBC executives moved quickly to reverse the course and keep the television division’s losses below the $4 million mark by eliminating daytime programming and proposing to eliminate or fiscally restrict a number of “rather expensive sustaining programs,” replacing them with less expensive live shows. RCA also reorganized the Program Department in an effort to streamline the chain of command and gain better control over program budgets.\textsuperscript{57}

Given the serious fiscal constraints being experienced, it perhaps is significant that the summer of 1949 was also the last time that roller derby and wrestling were seriously considered as program options.\textsuperscript{58} NBC received information that Chesterfield had expressed an interest in sponsoring roller derby nationally during the upcoming 1949-50 season. Assistant Sports Director James Dolan approached New York promoter Leo Seltzer in hopes of luring his organization away from ABC. NBC Director of Sports Bill Stern reported:

Jimmy Dolan is exploring the possibilities of securing Roller Derby for the 1949-50 season. Leo Seltzer, the promoter, will be in New York either today or tomorrow, and he will find out from him what he desires in the way of coverage, price, etc. We hear that Chesterfield is interested in sponsoring the Roller Derby next year.

However, while Seltzer was interested in moving the program to NBC, he was bound to a five-year contract with ABC, with little hope of release.\textsuperscript{59}

Dolan was also contacted about renewing Wrestling from St. Nicholas Arena, but his
response was initially negative. In a memo to NBC Director of Television Operations Carleton Smith, Dolan reported: "I just wanted to be sure that we all agreed that wrestling has no place in our program schedule." Smith’s response was handwritten and unexpected: "What day of wk? Saturday? How much? I’m interested— ." Surprised no doubt by the reply, Dolan inquired further into the matter. Finding that the event was available in its previously-scheduled Tuesday time period, Dolan queried: "Should I check further on this for you?" The response came a week later, this time from Operations Manager Fred Shawn: "You are right. We are not interested in wrestling." Though the issue was revisited periodically throughout the fall, wrestling never returned to NBC’s prime time schedule.60

Conclusion

NBC might have seriously considered wrestling and roller derby as program options in the summer of 1949. The company had reached a critical point in its efforts to dominate a new entertainment distribution system, precisely at a point when it was in need of inexpensive programming as a means of cutting costs. However, several factors prevented such an occurrence. On the one hand, I believe NBC’s corporate self-image was, in the main, stronger than a market strategy that might have included such “debased” entertainment forms. Undoubtedly, by 1949 wrestling as a performance genre was too far outside NBC’s corporate self-image and commitment to “quality programming” to be reconsidered as a viable program option. NBC’s prime-time schedule was filled to capacity for the 1949-1950 season, with Gillette Cavalcade of Sports the single prime time sports entry. Though the other three networks continued to schedule sports programming in prime time—totaling over 13 hours of boxing, wrestling and roller derby each week—NBC continued to move aggressively toward studio
production, despite the significantly higher costs associated with it.\textsuperscript{61}

Additionally, in pressing forward with studio programming, NBC sought to distinguish itself from its competitors. While ABC and DuMont were achieving ratings success with wrestling and roller derby, NBC had committed to product differentiation, in an attempt to establish itself as the "leader" in television programming.

However, other factors no doubt contributed to the course NBC chose to pursue. NBC ignored both its own growing group of affiliates—who continued to ask for less costly programming they could more successfully market to local advertisers—and program suppliers—who could offer just that type of inexpensive programming at a time when NBC had a genuine need for it. Instead, NBC gambled that it had more successfully defined the interests of the one group the company perhaps could not ignore: national advertisers. Though sports sponsorship continued to dominate aggregate television advertising across the nation, network advertisers were moving away from sports as a national programming option, in favor of more expensive studio and filmed programs. Variety, comedy and dramatic programs were emerging in 1949 as generic forms well-suited to television and popular with audiences, and the nation's top sponsors were supporting them in increasing numbers. By the fall of 1949, drama and comedy/variety programming surpassed sports as the program types dominating the rating charts; during the 1950 season, NBC's \textit{Gillette Cavalcade of Sports} was the sole network sports program entry in Nielsen's Top 25 for the year, where it ranked sixth.\textsuperscript{62}

Moreover, NBC's commitment to expensive studio programming ultimately served another company goal: to break with the radio model of sponsor control over prime time programming. By moving resolutely to expensive program genres, and building or leasing studio production facilities, NBC was bidding to retain control over the process of production, and keep
a measure of control over its schedule. As the “Future Prospects” report pointed out, NBC knew that production and talent costs would continue to rise precipitously, eventually becoming prohibitively expensive for all but a few sponsors. While sponsors would doubtlessly be drawn to the popular programming, they would no longer be able to afford to individually sponsor, and thus control, an entire television series.

This in turn puts the hiring of Sylvester “Pat” Weaver, long pointed to by historians as an “innovator” in television, in clearer perspective. Two weeks after the budget crisis erupted at NBC, the company announced that Weaver had been retained to fill the position of Vice President in charge of Television, to begin on August 1st, 1949. In his first major memorandum to his staff, Weaver proposed that NBC should move away from the radio model of single sponsor programs and toward what he called a “magazine” style of advertising, with multiple advertisers purchasing time adjacent to NBC programming. NBC would be responsible for attracting viewers, through its “program ingenuity.” It then would be up to sponsors to “prepare advertising that will maintain the viewing during the commercial periods.” Weaver’s proposals, not surprisingly, were remarkably consistent with the direction NBC had taken over the past four years. Weaver may not have been the initiator of many of the innovations with which he is credited, as, for instance, Michele Hilmes’ insightful critique points out. Nevertheless, he was perfectly suited to champion NBC’s goal of program autonomy and its commitment to “quality” programming.

NBC chose a long-term view in responding to its fiscal crisis in the summer of 1949, electing to maintain its investment in the type of expensive studio-based programs to which advertisers were beginning to gravitate, rather than resorting to inexpensive program types that would have eased the company’s fiscal difficulties in the short term. While sports programs
were popular with both advertisers and audiences at the time, as I have established, national advertisers were beginning to take a different course, one that NBC recognized and chose to invest in despite its fiscal constraints. Finally, the timing and duration of the FCC’s 1948 “Television Freeze” no doubt bolstered NBC’s decision: artificially limiting the pool of potential affiliate stations in turn reduced the number of television networks that could survive, while creating near-monopoly conditions for the survivors. And the pre-freeze television licensees doubtlessly were attracted by NBC’s commitment to expensive programming—much as NBC’s radio affiliates were in the 1930s—elevating NBC’s market position. The freeze could not have come at a more fortuitous time for NBC.

Hindsight easily demonstrates the success of NBC’s strategy: though the network posted a deficit again in 1950, reporting a net loss of $3,894,000, NBC reported a profit of $8,645,000 in 1951 on billings of over $59 million. In 1952, gross billings rose more than 40 percent to $83.2 million, twenty percent higher than CBS, their nearest competitor. Though profitability came two years later than had been predicted in 1945, in most other ways the master plan was quite accurate. Moreover, I believe NBC’s decision during the crisis of 1949 solidified the direction the network would take with entertainment television, one that the other networks would quickly follow. By 1951, network prime-time sports programming dropped 50% to 5½ hours a week. Professional wrestling disappeared entirely from network prime-time schedules in 1954; and by 1955 prime-time sports programming stood at 2 hours weekly, with the three remaining commercial television networks now firmly committed to studio-based programs. Finally, over the course of the decade, NBC and the other networks successfully wrested control over most sponsor-produced programming. NBC opened its West Coast studio facility in Burbank in 1952, the same year the company told a house subcommittee it was producing 59
percent of its entire program schedule. In the wake of the quiz show scandals at the close of the decade, NBC and the other networks quickly achieved hegemony over their program schedules.

A number of conflicting discourses, factions and constraints affected and guiding one entertainment corporation in its bid to compete successfully in the emerging commercial television market. Unlike the television historians who argue that the significant decisions regarding television programming emerged in the decade of the fifties, I have demonstrated that these decisions were made at NBC in the 1940s as a result of the discourses and constraints I have outlined, decisions that helped to chart the course of television for decades to follow.
Endnotes


3. Wrestling typically has been thought to attract a primarily working class, immigrant audience. However, the composition of the wrestling audience was changing and expanding dramatically in the post-war era, as my work on wrestling audiences in this period demonstrates (Chad Dell, “Researching Historical Broadcast Audiences: Female Fandom of Professional Wrestling, 1945-60.” Diss. U of Wisconsin-Madison, 1997). In terms of class composition, wrestling was very popular among early set owners in the middle and late forties. Wrestling programs were available in most television markets nearly every evening, and research on set ownership revealed that the majority of purchasers were upper- or upper-middle class families, a fact that calls into question traditional audience classifications. Reported by Pulse, Inc., New York. “Telefacts,” *Broadcasting* 35, no. 24 (December 20, 1948): insert.


6. The slogan was repeated a number of times in NBC’s twelve-page advertising spread which coincided with the National Association of Broadcasters annual convention. *Broadcasting* 34, no. 20 (May 17, 1948): insert, pp. 86B-M.

7. For further discussion of *The Original Amateur Hour*, see Gary Newton Hess, *An Historical Study of The DuMont Television Network* (New York: Arno Press, 1979). This tactic was demonstrated as well in NBC’s treatment of roller derby. NBC was perfectly happy to have ABC and DuMont develop roller derby as a sub-genre, preferring to use its position as the dominant network at the point when roller derby demonstrated its profitability. See James Dolan Papers, NBC Collection, box 341, folder 1; Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, Madison, WI; and William Stern Papers, NBC Collection, 346/4 for further discussion.

9. Interestingly, NBC’s attitude toward CBS seems to be the only exception to their competitive “search and destroy” philosophy.


11. Estimates of the cost differential between television and radio programming have run as high as ten-to-one, a not-entirely-surprising estimate when one considers the considerable expense of adding visual images to aural reproduction.


15. The call letters for NBC’s O&O television stations followed the theme of “WNB_”: WNBT-New York, WNBW-Washington, WNBH-Hollywood, and so on. Hess (p. 49) mentions a second NBC station, W3XPP in Philadelphia, operating in 1946. However, this was an experimental license, and was not included in NBC’s stated network plans. “Financial Prospects,” p. iii.


17. “NBC Installing Alternate Video Route.” *Broadcasting* 34, no. 2 (January 12, 1948): p. 17. By the mid-1940s NBC had established a microwave interconnection with General Electric’s station, WRGB in Schenectady, New York, and used this method frequently in advance of AT&T’s coaxial efforts.

18. “Financial Prospects” p. viii, vii (emphasis in the original). The report pointed out (p. 17) that the Los Angeles station could begin operations as early as June 1947, but that they would delay as
long as possible. However, they noted that “it was assumed that the FCC would not permit a delay beyond September 1947.” The report also suggested delaying operations in Cleveland and Chicago until January 1948.

19. Ibid., p. 16.

20. Ibid., p. 15.

21. Ibid., pp. 93-94.

22. Ibid., p. x, 14.

23. Ibid., pp. 93-94.


27. “NBC Affiliates Discuss Effect of Television, FM on Future.” Broadcasting 30, no. 10 (March 11, 1946): p. 32. “Television’s Future Discussed By Trammell at Chicago Meet.” Broadcasting 30, no. 13 (April 1, 1946): p. 79. The seriousness of the conferences was indicated both by Trammell’s presence and by the personnel that accompanied him, including three NBC vice presidents and at least five other executives. The conferences were held in New York, Atlanta, Fort Worth, Chicago, and Los Angeles.

28. While Trammell’s publicly-announced hopes of breaking even by the close of 1948 were a year earlier than predicted in NBC’s report (which anticipated a $0.2 million loss in 1949), his latter assertion was consistent with it: the report predicted a cash surplus of over $7 million in 1950. “Financial Prospects,” Chart 3, p. v-b. “Video Operations Deficits Will Range Up to $150,000 Monthly, Says Trammell.” Broadcasting 30, no. 14 (April 8, 1946): p. 69.


television, announcing that studio 8-G, as it was called, was "the world's most modern, and best-equipped television studio." "NBC's TV Studio 8-G Called 'Most Modern,'" *Broadcasting* 34, no. 17 (April 26, 1948): p. 27.


33. In 1939, NBC's first year of experimental station operation, the company's programming consisted primarily of remote pickups of "bicycle races, a baseball game, a tennis match, a football game, a hockey game, Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade, etc." "TV Milestone," *Broadcasting* 36, no. 17 (April 25, 1949): p. 54.

34. Opotowsky, pp. 202-203; Powers, pp. 23-28. Exclusive sponsorship of the series, including production costs, amounted to a commitment of $203,000 for the seven-game series, and the New York Yankees swept an uninspired Cincinnati Reds ball club in four games. But in the following months, Gillette sold nearly four million razor sets, four times as many as they had hoped.

35. Powers, pp. 54-55; Brooks and Marsh, pp. 101, 888. Brooks and Marsh's NBC schedule for 1946 reveals that *Cavalcade of Sports* accounted for three and one-half hours of programming weekly; the balance of the weekly schedule amounted to an additional three hours and forty-five minutes.

36. The demonstration was a direct counter to CBS's efforts to convince the FCC that its proposed UHF-band color system was superior. "Doubters Kayoed By Fight Telecast," "Dignitaries Liked the Title Fight," *Broadcasting* 30, no. 25 (June 24, 1946): pp. 15, 16.

37. NBC Report—August, 1947; filed September 29, 1947. TV Files, NBC Collection, 105/24. The programming division for WNBT produced 146 hours of programs—31 hours of it sponsored.


40. Brooks and Marsh, admittedly a less-than-entirely-reliable source, only list NBC's *Wrestling from St Nicholas Arena* during the 1948-49 season. The "NBC Monthly Operation Analysis—January 1948" (Kraft Papers, NBC Collection, 398/17) lists no programs for Tuesday, January 20, 1948. *Wrestling from St. Nicholas Arena* appears on WNBW's advance program schedule each Tuesday in April, and appears on WNBT's May program production schedule though May 11, 1948. Apparently the contract expired on that date; an interoffice memo from Reynold R. Kraft to Noran E. Kersta dated March 2, 1948, states: "As you know, wrestling only runs until about the
middle of May; after that we can probably take on [horse] racing from Roosevelt Raceway in order to have program material.” Thus NBC’s wrestling program began sometime after Jan. 20 and before March 2, 1948. “Advance Program Schedule—WNBW—April 1948,” “Program Schedules, 1948,” Kersta Papers, NBC Collection, 585/53; Kraft Papers, NBC Collection, 398/17. It is not clear whether the program had a sponsor during the 1947-48 season.


44. The FCC reported that in 1948 the four networks lost a total of $6.4 million. Network expenses for the year totaled $11.2 million, whereas total revenue came to $4.8 million. The 40 stations not owned by the networks lost $8.6 million for the year; total expenses were $12.4 million on revenues of $8.7 million. “Network Financial Report, 1948,” Federal Communications Commission. Cited in Hess, p. 58.


48. Memo to Niles Trammell from Frank N. Russell, July 9, 1948. Station Relations, NBC Collection, 574/15.

49. Television ratings have never been an exact measure of actual viewership (Cf. Eileen Meehan, “Why We Don’t Count: The Commodity Audience”). Ratings were, however, a regular part of the information flow at NBC, which as Pfeffer and Salancik point out, is significant in understanding how the organization defines what information is important. “Top Ten Programs,” February & March, 1948, TV Files, NBC Collection, 106/5.


52. "Telestatus," Broadcasting 35, no. 24 (December 20, 1948): p. 37. Comedy and variety, which at the time were regularly lumped into one category, accounted for 28 broadcast hours, nearly half of it local.


56. Letter to J.H. McConnell from John H. MacDonald, June 27, 1949. Carleton Smith Papers, NBC Collection, 214/32. The letter reported that NBC television operations projected a 1949 deficit increase of $1,348,831 more than the previous year, $734,776 over the amount budgeted for the year.

57. Ibid. Interoffice memo, Carleton Smith to Niles Trammell, July 21, 1949. Carleton Smith Papers, NBC Collection, 214/28. There is evidence that sponsored programs were often exceeding their budgets as well, and efforts were made to keep spending under control.

58. While both program types were proposed through the mid-fifties, they were never given the sort of serious consideration evidenced in 1949. Wrestling would not return to NBC until the mid-1980s, with the World Wrestling Federation’s Saturday Night Main Event.


60. James Dolan to Carleton Smith, July 21, 1949; James Dolan to Carleton Smith, August 4, 1949; Fred Shawn to James Dolan, August 12, 1949. James Dolan Papers, NBC Collection, 344/12. Professional wrestling found its way back into NBC’s schedule in the 1980s, though a series of monthly late-night specials entitled Saturday Night Main Event, produced in conjunction with the
World Wrestling Federation.


64. “Memorandum Number One,” September 26, 1949. Weaver Papers, NBC Collection, 118/5.

65. Michele Hilmes, Radio Voices: American Broadcasting, 1922-1952 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), especially chapter 5 and conclusion. Hilmes argues that the “magazine format” show (exemplified by Today, Tonight and Home), as well as the concept of multiple sponsorship, had been a familiar to American radio listeners since the 1930s. It is also interesting to note that another Weaver “innovation,” the oft-touted “Operation Frontal Lobes” project, initiated in the early 1950s, mirrored NBC’s failed “feature service” efforts from 1948.


Bridge to the Modern Era:  
Free Press on the Wage Workers' Frontier

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ABSTRACT

This pilot case study delineates how the editors of the 1887-1889 Wallace, Idaho, Free Press began the evolutionary process of journalism from a partisan frontier booster press to an emerging Western independent commercial style by acting upon and reacting to the societal transformation of their community. It does so by considering three socio-economic catalysts that rapidly transformed North Idaho’s Coeur d’Alene mining district society from a pioneer self-sufficiency to the corporate dependency of a wage workers’ frontier. The catalysts of development capital, labor, and transportation thus become portals into the development of the mining district's journalism, a development that helped usher it into the modern commercial era. The study suggests the need and potential of analyzing wage worker frontier journalism on a broader scale of time and geographic location.
In exchange for one dollar, a rent free office, and six months patronage, John L. Dunn and his brother Alfred agreed with "Colonel" William R. Wallace on May 28, 1887, to leave Portland, Oregon, purchase a printing press and publish a newspaper to promote the "general welfare of the town of Wallace, Idaho, the mining operations...and the camps of the Upper South Fork of the Coeur d'Alene river." The deal sealed the brothers' future as publicists for a land swindler.

Whatever the Colonel's personal agenda, his timing was propitious. He brought the first newspaper to Wallace as the deep, rich South Fork veins of galena silver-lead ore erased the unfulfilled dreams of North Fork gold country (see map). Prospectors soon discovered nearly all of the silver-lead mines that have since made North Idaho's Coeur d'Alene mining district famous. But the most significant fact was that these mines produced right from the surface and a few month's work revealed large underground ore bodies that only the proper development capital/mining technology, labor, and transportation facilities could exploit. These catalysts would help transform Coeur d'Alene society from a pioneer self-sufficiency to the corporate dependency of a wage workers' frontier. By 1889, the transformation was complete and transient mining camps such as Wallace become permanent company towns. This pilot case study argues that these wage worker frontier catalysts are portals not only into the transformation of Coeur d'Alene society, but also into the transformation of its press.
Bridge to the Modern Era

At its founding in 1884, the initial Coeur d'Alene society was a pre-industrial pioneer setting whose newspapers, while perhaps more selective in their booster activities, did reflect mining camp booster newspapers of an earlier era. The present study's thesis is that the later Free Press of 1887-1889, though representing a final blush of frontier-style journalism in the United States, more importantly exemplified that moment of transition from partisan frontier boosterism to an independent commercial style of journalism. The impetus for this journalistic transition rested in the district's transformation into a wage workers' frontier.

To support the thesis, the study first establishes the Coeur d'Alenes of 1887-89 as a wage workers' frontier and the Free Press as a frontier booster newspaper. It then uses the late-19th century commercial press business values established by David Nord as analytical tools to suggest that the Dunn brothers began to combine characteristics of both press styles in a transitional journalism of their own. This is revealed in the Dunn's editorials and news articles that reacted to the wage worker frontier catalysts of development capital, labor and transportation. These catalysts thus provide the portals to ascertain the values that helped evolve the Dunn's journalism. As such, this pilot study establishes a key to analyzing the journalism of other wage worker frontiers. For when corporate control thrust isolated pioneer settlements into early industrialism, the rapid transition also helped usher in that region's modern newspaper era.
BACKGROUND

While numerous works consider the economic boosterism and permanency crusades of earlier agricultural and mining frontiers, no study specifically analyzes such activities within the wage workers’ frontier concept. Much historiography, in fact, encourages us to see the concepts "frontier" and "wage work" as mutually exclusive. Urbanization, industrial development, and a labor pool supposedly evidenced that a region’s frontier phase had passed. Historian Carlos Schwantes, however, clarified that the classic pioneer West and the early industrial West frequently overlapped "and one such conjunction was the wageworkers' [sic] frontier..., [a] predominately male community of manual labor dependent upon others for wages in the extractive industries of the sparsely settled Rocky Mountain and Pacific regions." This concept provides a framework for exploring an era in transition and defines the Coeur d'Alene mining district from 1884 to 1889.

Five years had indeed altered the Coeur d’Alenes. Perhaps the most dramatic indicator came from two Idaho territorial governors. In October 1884 Governor William M. Bunn reported that the Coeur d’Alene district had neither roads nor trails. Five years later, Governor George L. Shoup informed the secretary of the interior that the South Fork area alone was producing "a cash value of $9,030,000...a clear profit of from $25 to $30 per ton...[and] that another two years will double the number of mills and the production of ores and concentrates."
Bridge to the Modern Era 4

Shoup then informed the secretary that "in consequence of this great output of mineral wealth," a number of flourishing towns sprung up, some of which would "quickly assume metropolitan proportions" when the railroads arrived, which would "greatly increase" mining production and "encourage the full development of the thousand valuable mining prospects now lying dormant." But reality overshadowed Shoup's optimism for when the railroad did arrive in 1889 it could not furnish enough ore cars to handle the production.

The key to this rapid transformation from prospector (self-employed) to wage worker (employee) society rested in the type of mining that opened the Coeur d'Alenes. While the first rush of prospectors started working surface gold placer mines on the Coeur d'Alene River's North Fork in late 1883, they soon discovered that the significant wealth rested underground in silver-lead ore along the South Fork. Coeur d'Alene mine owners thus faced three costly problems that drove them to corporate partnership. First, the need to mechanize their underground mines, for extraction demanded hoisting, pumping, drilling, and tunneling. Second, the need for smelting and refining. Complex low grade Coeur d'Alene ore resisted amalgamation and had to be heated and chemically or mechanically treated to separate commercially valuable metals from less marketable companion metals. Third, the need to reduce the ore's bulk, permitting economical transport to distant smelters. So opening up this frontier meant capital outlay for mining technology and railroads, and procuring a large labor pool to sustain it.
These problems made large-scale business inevitable, for only corporate organization had the capital and the business skills to turn an isolated frontier into an industrial center. Thus, within five years of the mining district's initial gold rush of winter 1883-84, corporations had purchased and were developing every Coeur d'Alene lead-silver mine. The Free Press entered this arena in 1887.

**ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BOOSTERISM**

Centrally located amidst the galena-rich tributaries of the Coeur d'Alene River's South Fork, between the Coeur d'Alene and St. Joe mountain ranges, on the primary road linking Missoula, Montana, with Spokane Falls, Washington, and the eventual terminus of east and west railroad lines, Wallace, Idaho, became the South Fork's business, transportation, and political center. To exploit this geographic advantage, town site founder Colonel William R. Wallace sought a newspaper to promote land sales and enhance the region's business aspects. John L. Dunn and his brother Alfred J. Dunn answered the call.

The Dunns arrived in Wallace with a Washington hand press and began the first Wallace, and second South Fork newspaper, The Free Press, on July 2, 1887. Colonel Wallace enticed the brothers from editing jobs with the Portland, Oregon, News and Morning Oregonian by promising six months' free rent and a guaranteed $1800 in ad patronage from local business. John and Alfred, originally from Missouri and aged twenty-seven and twenty-five
respectively, immediately stated their journalistic philosophy and personal goals:

no better way is known to place before the outside world the resources of a new section than through the columns of a local press. That THE FREE PRESS will benefit every branch of industry represented here, and in time prove a good investment to those directly interested, is the belief of the publishers; nothing more is necessary to explain the appearance of a new business in a new camp.21

The Dunns' immediately exerted a frontier-style economic boosterism. Created when capital began to trickle, then pour, into the Coeur d'Alenes, the four-page Free Press became its champion and claimed that the "dark days of its early settlement drove the aimless vagabonds from her camps, and in their place came men with a purpose and means to mature it [into] the grandest mining section of the great Northwest."22 The Free Press supported all capital investment and its outcome -- development of the Coeur d'Alenes -- by assuming a civic role of community promoter. The first issue proclaimed a partisan intent adhered to throughout the paper's two-year run, its "ambition and aim" to represent the interests of the South Fork and Wallace.23

To entice capital, and land buyers for Colonel Wallace, the Dunns promoted the concepts of permanence and opportunity, the idea that the Coeur d'Alenes were not the boom and bust mining situation of old, but that the mineral resources beneath those mountains promised long-term prosperity.24 The Dunns maintained this permanence promotion throughout their newspaper's run, as in early 1888 when they proclaimed that "progress from now on must be of a permanent
and substantial nature" and that the Coeur d'Alene mines "are sufficient to place this among the great mining districts of the West," with Wallace as its business center.25

By the start of their second year, the Dunn brothers claimed the "whole section has moved forward" and reported that no business enterprise had yet failed. They then revealed a "liberal" source of income and support from both Coeur d'Alene businessmen and residents and proclaimed that as "the country advances THE FREE PRESS will improve."26

For the Dunns, community support went beyond advertising and subscription revenues. If Coeur d'Alene citizens doubted their own promotional duties, for instance, the Free Press supplied instructions, which also indicated its editors' intention to reach readers -- and potential investors -- outside the mining district. "Send a copy of THE FREE PRESS to your friends," said the Dunns, "Copies can be procured at the office, wrapped ready for mailing, for 10 cents each [because]...signs of prosperity are seen on every side [and the] boom is sure to come."27

As part of the contract that created the newspaper, local businessmen also contributed to outside distribution and publicity by purchasing extra subscriptions to "broadcast over the United States."28 That the Free Press reached outside readers, and that those readers recognized the Dunns' promotional efforts, was seen in numerous reprinted letters.29

The Dunn's permanency crusade also brought attention to the unusual year-round mine production schedules in place by late 1888.
Tied to underground lode mining technology that was unencumbered by seasonal change, this new work schedule exemplified the Dunns' use of technology as a banner to rally investors to the Coeur d'Alenes. Surface placer mining had played out and the Dunn's understood that the region's economic existence depended on mining technology that would ensure cost-effective lode-based production. Thus statements such as "More Mines will Work and Far More Business will be Done than in Any Previous Year," due to the technology-driven schedules, were particularly appealing to potential investors.

To corroborate Free Press booster reports, the Dunns also provided "EXPERT OPINION" to promote the Coeur d'Alene district, as in February 1888 when Professor J. E. Clayton addressed "The Great Silver-Lead Region of the South Fork and Its Output." Clayton believed that the mines of Canyon creek, Nine Mile creek, and Mullan would increase the market output of Coeur d'Alene ore by $3,500,000 annually. Other "experts" offered similar reports.

Besides their frontier-style economic boosterism, the Dunn brothers exhibited two of the three levels of partisan political journalism Thomas Heuterman discerned in the frontier press. The notable exception arises in level two: political party partisanship. The Free Press professed political independence. This independence was most apparent in equal coverage of Democratic and Republican meetings, candidates, and platforms and it suggests a more economic approach to the Dunns' journalism. While Barbara Cloud noted that frontier editors needed "to appeal to as many
people as possible to ensure adequate support" and that a moderate voice indicated a more successful long-term publisher, this broad appeal was a benchmark of the emerging metropolitan commercial press of the late 19th century.36

But though a common initial refrain in frontier journalism, political independence was difficult to maintain as editors gained opportunities to exercise political influence, fought against poverty by accepting political party investments, or feared opposing the strongest candidates, which could dry-up future ad revenue and job printing.37 The Dunns began to follow this frontier pattern toward partisanship as their coverage of county party conventions in April 1888, the November election, and recurring editorial themes revealed criticism of the Democratic Party and favoritism toward the Republican Party.38 While claiming, for example, "that independence...leads to the support for public service of those men only whose integrity and honesty are known," it seems the Democrats consistently failed on both points for the Dunns always endorsed Republican candidates during elections.39

Political influence driven by economic boosterism might best explain the Dunn's Republican leanings. They claimed continued "liberal support from business men" in the county and were themselves committed to capital interests beyond their newspaper, investing in mines and other local businesses.40 The Dunns' attachment to business and their pro-business editorial policy discussed above is significant, for Republican was the party of
choice for businessmen and mine owners in the Coeur d'Alenes. The brothers thus gravitated to the Republican Party. The party elected John chairman of the Republican committee at its regional convention in April 1888 and in September he served as Wallace poll judge for Shoshone County's Republican primary election. Four years later, voters elected John to the Wallace Board of Trustees as a Republican and he ultimately became mayor. Alfred, meanwhile, became Wallace postmaster in October 1889. Thus, while the Dunns editorial partisanship was not overt, they did take the ultimate step of becoming political or civic leaders in their community, which is Heuterman's third level of frontier-style partisanship.

The Dunns also engaged in Heuterman's first level of partisanship: by publishing court reports, political party meetings, town meetings, county business updates, and territorial government reports, the Free Press fulfilled the primary role of establishing and transplanting laws and customs to the West in building new governments. County print jobs and advertising also supplemented the Dunn's business advertising and subscription revenues. The local mining camps also supported the Free Press with advertising, subscription, and as their newspaper of official notices.

After selling the Free Press in 1889 to Adam Aulbach, the Dunn's returned to journalism one year later with their second paper, the Wallace Coeur d'Alene Miner, which was founded as the official Republican Party organ for Shoshone County. This event helped verify the Dunn's political bias suggested in their Free
Press and strengthened their frontier-style approach to journalism, for Cloud's study of Washington Territory newspapers established just such a pattern of booster-to-partisan development.48

DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL CATALYST

The Dunns' booster/business role first deviated from earlier frontier newspapers because its community was by 1887 firmly established as an early industrial or wage workers' frontier. The earlier Rocky Mountain mining frontier, for instance, was primarily comprised of boom town gold rushes and few developed into permanent silver-lead or copper based industrial centers. Those societies and needs differed from the rapidly developing Coeur d'Alenes.49 Likewise, while Pacific Northwest agriculture was commercial-based as well as subsistence-based from its beginning in the late 1840s, it did not develop into a wage workers' frontier until the late 1870s and 1880s when the railroads began to arrive.50

This altered the Dunns' journalistic agenda for, instead of aiming at the needs of some future community for which they desperately hoped, the Free Press aimed at the known needs of an existing community.51 The Dunns' Free Press became more than just a frontier community booster intent on attracting development capital and a labor force. It answered the rapid restructuring of Coeur d'Alene society by exhibiting the commercial press characteristics of a commitment to public interest consumerism and a concern for commercial order and social harmony.

Nord defined the business of newspapers as "'publication' -- making information and issues public."52 He concluded that, in
the late 19th century, newspapers evolved into a consumer product
designed for broad circulation. To "sell the product, newspapers
sought to understand and to broaden shared public interests." Nord called this the newspapers’ commitment to public interest
consumerism. He defines a concern with commercial order and social
harmony as an abhorrence of community conflict. While newspapers
might choose sides in a social conflict, Nord wrote, at a "deeper
level... conflict subverted the newspaper’s social world, and they
opposed it." Late-19th century commercial-style papers wanted to
do business with the whole public, so they sought broad consensus.

An 1889 land scandal most distinctly exemplified the Free
Press’s commitment to these business values. The scandal threate-
ned to invalidate the fledgling Coeur d’Alene district’s most vital
and tentative commodity, a trustworthy reputation. The Free Press
based its journalistic agenda, and thus integrity, on a style that
campaigned for and promoted the region’s growing stability and per-
manence. This capital development campaign was founded on Colonel
Wallace’s town site company. The Dunns claimed that the town site
patent was "the main inducement" for local businesses to commit to
the district because businessmen believed the town site "would
bring others" and "make their present investments profitable." When word broke that Colonel Wallace perhaps did not own the land
he sold in the Coeur d’Alenes, people, especially outsiders, began
to question the region’s honesty and legitimacy. By implication as
the Colonel’s newspaper, the Free Press suffered as well.
Problems arose on February 19, 1889, when news reached the Coeur d'Alenes that the U. S. secretary of the interior invalidated Colonel Wallace's June 1886 title to the Wallace town site because he purchased it with nontransferable scrip that the federal government issued to Native Americans as compensation for taking away their lands. The government had canceled the Colonel's town site location on January 24, 1887, and notified him by February third. The Colonel, however, never informed his customers.  

From their first issue, which debuted five months after the federal government informed Wallace that it had canceled his town site location, the Dunn brothers based their contracted relationship with Colonel Wallace on trust. They ran his town site ads and plugged his business, never realizing the irony of their statements. "A perfectly clear and direct title is given upon transfer of all building lots," they wrote. "This is of importance when it is considered how much trouble sometimes occurs in towns built on unsurveyed government land."  

When the scandal broke, the Dunns accepted the federal government's decision and sided with the claim jumpers, stating it was an American right to locate the public domain. Reaching for sympathy, Colonel Wallace retaliated swiftly, publishing letters in the Murray, Idaho, Coeur d'Alene Sun and the Spokane Falls, Washington, Chronicle that defended his position and vilified the jumpers and their "organ," the Free Press. He sent a similar article to the western and eastern Associated Press offices.
The *Free Press* reprinted the letters as front-page news, with rebuttal, over the next two issues. To be fair, the Dunns tried to interview the Colonel, who turned them down. The brothers then defended the "so-called jumpers," the businessmen of Wallace, and then defended themselves, stating they owed "no debt of gratitude to Colonel Wallace." Starting the *Free Press* was purely a business arrangement, they said, and one fulfilled honorably.60

Meanwhile, the Colonel filed thirteen suits against Wallace citizens for jumping town site land, although all were eventually dismissed.61 And his Associated Press dispatch began to pay off as news of lot jumpings spread throughout the nation.62 The Dunn brothers, however, believed the A. P. release was "S L I - G H T L Y E X A G G E R A T E D" and considered the increasing coverage a potential harm to the Coeur d'Alenes' future.63 So the brothers rhetorically transformed the claim "jumpers" into "the re-locators of the town site" who acted correctly with "justice and fairness, and [who] are not...a hungry horde of renegades and robbers."64 This article, appearing over two months after the news broke, presented the events, animosities, attacks, defenses, and rebuttals of the land scandal in a manner that made it a moral triumph of citizen over swindler. And, by showing that the "jumpers" were just, the article, by extension, exonerated their organ, the *Free Press*.65

Eighteen months later, after Colonel Wallace had left the state, the federal government ruled against the Colonel's appeal in the town site case. The decision vindicated the Dunns' choice of
the news business -- making information and issues public -- over
loyalty to their original patron. In other words, the Dunns adhe-
red to public interest consumerism. The public interest of their
community was at stake in this land scandal. The entire community
could have suffered negative socio-economic repercussions if the
outside world of potential investors and workers turned their backs
on the Coeur d'Alenes as too problematic. The Free Press thus
fought for the citizenry and in so doing broadened the community's
shared interests and provided a greater understanding of those in-
terests. And while this pragmatic and economic choice helped sell
the Free Press by presenting news of vital impact to the community,
it also established the paper's credibility with its consumers.

This self-imposed moral, legal, and economic guardianship
of the public's interest also exemplified the Dunns' concern with
commercial order and social harmony. While their actions might
have successfully distanced themselves from the taint of Colonel
Wallace, at a deeper level the Dunns stood for the primacy of law
and order by leading the fight against their own patron. They kept
their legal contract with Colonel Wallace until the federal govern-
ment discredited him. They then championed those carrying the legal
rights to land claims. Regardless of whether it was simply econo-
ic common sense, the brothers sought and attained a broad social
consensus concerning the land scandal. They looked to the broader
public, a defining characteristic for modern commercial newspapers.
LABOR CATALYST

The Dunn brothers' reaction to the wage worker frontier catalyst of labor produced a complex journalism of overlapping frontier and commercial press characteristics. While exhibiting a frontier-style pro-business bias for mine owners/management by often ignoring the Coeur d'Alenes' fledgling labor unions, the Dunns frequently used the business values of commercial order and social harmony to promote that bias. They were, in effect, trying to suggest and maintain a capital-over-labor status quo.

Coeur d'Alene lode mines were labor intensive from their outset and, by 1887, with the railroads' help, the district attracted a growing worker pool. Miners from Montana, Colorado, and California, who journeyed north only to make valueless claims, remained to work for those who struck bonanzas. But as absentee owners bought the mines, labor and capital divided and never reconciled.66

The Bunker Hill & Sullivan mine precipitated the first labor/management battle in summer 1887 when it reduced wages for underground workers. The miners struck against the mine and, since local labor was still relatively scarce, the Bunker soon abandoned the reduction.67 But the miners saw it was necessary to protect themselves against another reduction, and, on November 17, 1887, organized the first union of working men in the county, since known as the Wardner Miners' Union.68

On this, and future, labor/capital confrontations, the Dunns remained silent. There were no reports on wage reductions,
no reports on unionization. Their first mention of local union activity appeared five months later on April 7, 1888, a page-four news brief that announced the organization of a Wardner Miners' Union. The Dunns did not ignore labor, they just did not concern the Free Press with local organized labor and the reasons that provoked it. On November 12, 1887, for instance, the Free Press headline reported "A MINERS' STRIKE [was] PROBABLE" in Nevada City, California. The Dunns made this California labor confrontation front-page news. Yet, they ignored the same scenario of their own struggling Coeur d'Alene miners.

The Dunns' editorial position on Chicago's Haymarket riot of 1886 provides insight into their perspective on local labor and indicates that their deepening pro-business attitude would, of necessity, produce an anti-union bias. First, with ironic placement, they ran the Nevada City strike story beneath a first-column headline that announced "FOUR ANARCHISTS HUNG" in Chicago. Second, the Dunns ignored, or perhaps did not realize, that labor called the Haymarket Square meeting to protest the previous day's police brutality that killed four workers and wounded many others during a peaceful strike demonstration against scabs at the McCormick Harvester factory. Third, the Dunns espoused the side of capital and attacked the anarchism believed inherent in the labor class: "The hanging of the anarchists met approval from three-fourths of the American people.... The legal execution of these men will have a wholesome effect on that class which advocates the overthrow of all law."
The Dunns' acceptance of labor "anarchists" tied into and reflected the "outside agitator myth" promoted by Coeur d'Alene mine owners and mining company managers who, as historian Stanley Phipps stated, "rather than acknowledging that conditions in the industry caused discontent... blamed union 'agitators' for stirring up men who were satisfied with working and living standards."72 This anarchy myth, used by capitalists throughout the late-19th century, distorted Coeur d'Alene mine management's attitudes toward labor for decades.73 Committed to capital's cause, the Free Press used and perpetuated the myth to capital's benefit.

The Dunns thus exhibited a clear commitment to commercial order and social harmony in their labor coverage. First, they did not acknowledge Coeur d'Alene miners unions as legitimate so chose not to report their activities; "organized labor" equalled illegal anarchy. Second, when the Dunns' labor commentary did appear it emphasized the illegality derived from the lawless violence of strikes. In furthering the idea that strikes equated to a lack of law and order, they did not consider or discuss the reasons that induced the workers to strike. Third, the concept of social harmony was inherent in the Dunns' reaction to labor problems as caused by "anarchists" and "outside agitators," for they portrayed such outsiders as "aliens, violators of the natural, peaceful equilibrium of the consensus community."74 For the Dunns, "consensus community" translated as a Coeur d'Alene society of capital and labor striving together toward the same goal of creating one of the
great western mining districts. They believed the Coeur d’Alene miners were orderly; it was the outside agitators, those beyond the legitimate community, who came in and caused the problems.

The Dunn brothers’ commitment to commercial order and social harmony concerning labor issues did not, however, lead to Nord’s third business value of late-19th century metropolitan commercial newspapers. Where the metropolitan papers were reaching for "a pragmatic commitment to an organizational approach to conflict resolution," the Free Press used its reaction to the Haymarket affair, its perpetuation of the outside agitator myth, and its general ignoring of labor unions as a means to elevate a corporate culture and demote the wage worker. Also, by investing in the region through the variety of business and civic enterprises mentioned above, the Dunns also lived their pro-business beliefs, which perhaps blinded them to growing labor tension/activity and eventually made them strong pro-mine owner/management advocates. The Dunns, it seems, were just not interested in organizational modes of conflict resolution. In the midst of their journey toward commercial business values, they abruptly reverted to a frontier-style pro-capital/Republican party partisanship.

Thus, the Dunns reported even labor events in a style that enhanced the Coeur d’Alenes’ economic attractiveness. Unpleasant, negative publicity from socio-economic conflict, for example, did not fit a newspaper designed to promote the business potential of a burgeoning new industrial arena. So, when they did cover labor,
the Dunns reported it from a positive perspective. Numerous reports detailed, for instance, the progressive aspect of increased employment in district mines. The Dunns’ pro-business, lack-of-conflict presentation of news evidenced the promotional intent behind Free Press journalism. To the Dunns, for example, rising employment figures reflected growth and permanence. Their labor-related news briefs only served to update business activities and display the intensity of interest and success in the Coeur d’Alenes.78

**TRANSPORTATION CATALYST**

The Dunn brothers carried their frontier promotional style to their final issue of June 22, 1889, where they continued to push the district’s expanding technological development, writing that the "effect of the meeting of railroad magnates in Portland [OR] last Monday seems favorable to Coeur d’Alene in that it promises to give us a standard gauge railroad as soon as it is possible to build it."79 Technology, in fact, led by the railroad, opened the Coeur d’Alenes to its prosperous future. And while the Free Press provided the welcome mat, the Dunn’s pro-business boosterism again provided a natural segue into a market-oriented commercial press style of journalism for it again reflected a commitment to public interest consumerism.

To make their low-grade ore mines pay, owners had to find a constant labor source, mechanize their production, reduce the bulk ore for transport, and then smelt and refine out the impurities. These business and technological steps depended on economical,
efficient, reliable transportation. In 1884, the U. S. Geological Survey reported that railroads provided the answer. Three years later, North Idaho proved it. Without railroads, the Coeur d'Alenes would not have opened. With railroads, the district produced some $7 million in silver from 1887 to 1891 and even more lead. By 1891 Coeur d'Alene mines employed 3,000 miners and the top eight mines produced nearly 320 tons of ore each day, worth over $25,000. Railroads were the technology that made Coeur d'Alene mining cost effective and thus possible.

Daniel Chase Corbin, a Coeur d'Alene railroad magnate and mine investor, admitted he built the first railroads for one reason, the mines. The primary need was a direct connection between mines and smelter. Corbin's plan involved a three-part route to carry ore by rail from Wallace to the Mission landing, by lake steamer to Coeur d'Alene City, and finally by his Spokane Falls & Idaho Railway to meet the Northern Pacific at Rathdrum, Idaho.

By July 1887 Corbin's narrow gauge Coeur d'Alene Railway & Navigation Company reached Wardner, twelve miles short of Wallace. While there is no evidence that railroads subsidized Coeur d'Alene newspapers, the Dunn brothers recognized the economic urgency of the lines and sensed the great promotional opportunities. Accordingly, the newly opened Free Press anticipated when "it will be a pleasure instead of a hardship" to travel to and from the Coeur d'Alenes and when the district "will be in easy communication with the outside world and...freight can be landed...at a low rate and
The railroad defined the public interest, said the Dunns, because it "will give an impetus to business...within a reasonable time." The railroad will give an impetus to business...walls before. It will cause [Wallace] to be the shipping point for a large section of country, rich in minerals."87

The coming railroad preoccupied South Fork residents. The Free Press started running news of the planned "CELEBRATION" in early September. The Dunns then dedicated half of their October 1, 1887, front page to recounting the previous day's arrival of the first train into Wallace, concluding that the "first attempt of the people of Wallace to celebrate an important event may...be set down as a complete success." But while the celebration succeeded, so did a court injunction that delayed the second train for a month.

The Union Pacific Railroad, through the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, took control of the Washington & Idaho Railway in autumn 1887, although legal ownership did not transfer until May 1888.88 Meanwhile, the Northern Pacific, which assumed legal control of Corbin's Spokane Falls & Idaho Railway on October 1, 1887, considered Corbin's CR&N its line to the Coeur d'Alenes.89 As the Union Pacific's W&I built toward Wallace, in September 1887 it enjoined the Northern Pacific's CR&N from operating over 1.5 miles of track laid on the W&I survey line through Wallace. The month-long delay after years of waiting for rail service caused the Dunns to lash out at the rival railroads in frontier-style front-page editorials presented as straight news reports. And they did it with a clear statement of public interest consumerism:
The people are the main sufferers by this detention....The doubt and uncertainty caused by the stoppage of work have prevented that activity in various enterprises which would otherwise have been felt.... Very large interests are at stake in this matter. The delay has already proved very damaging. We hope it has little longer to continue.90

The Dunns, in effect, spoke for the district’s community of consumers whose interests were more important than those of the railroads. The first train in over a month arrived five days later.91

With D. C. Corbin’s Coeur d’Alene Railway a reality, the Dunns resumed their campaign for branch railroads into Wallace and renewed their public interest consumerism. They viewed the branch roads as economic life lines, as keys to economic progress and development.92 Similarly, when the Washington & Idaho Railway finally obtained its long embattled right of way across the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation in October 1887, and when the Northern Pacific began building between Wallace and Mullan the following month, the Dunns’ hailed the "glorious news for all the people of the Coeur d’Alene."93 In their typical mix of front-page report/editorial, they predicted another town boom.94

Again, though no evidence suggested any railroad subsidy of the Free Press, the railroads had set the stage for Coeur d’Alene prosperity, and the Dunn brothers put them to use. From the start, the Dunns made railroad access the prime selling point of their Wallace and South Fork public interest campaign. They began by dispelling one of the Coeur d’Alenes’ lingering negatives, isolation, by claiming that "within a few years, possibly months, no producing district, however isolated at present, will lack the
means of transporting its precious metals to a profitable market... [and] the fullest prosperity [will] be realized."\textsuperscript{95} Over the next two years, in fact, the Dunns headlined "Various News Items Indicative of Progress" that touted the South Fork's potential based on railroad service. And they paid special attention to Wallace with its prime terminus location, for "[t]wo transcontinental railroads...[and four] branch roads will all center at Wallace" making it the "Future Great of [the] Coeur d'Alene."\textsuperscript{96}

The cost-effective rails carried other vital technology into the Coeur d'Alenes that further transformed the district from pioneer to early industrial society. With machinery arriving daily, the Dunns were quick to advance the public interest value. They reported fact or rumor of any impending enterprise from new concentrating mills and sampling works to shipping docks, mining equipment, and talk of local ore smelters and refineries.\textsuperscript{97} The railroad also prompted a new communications network in May 1888 by permitting use of its right of way for a telephone connection to the outside world.\textsuperscript{98} Linkage to national transportation and communication systems became the attraction and public benefit that the \textit{Free Press} anticipated. Capital now moved quickly into the district and its development attracted a skilled work force.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Like many frontier real estate promoters before him, Colonel Wallace conceived a newspaper to promote the burgeoning corporate-economic atmosphere of his region, and the Dunn brothers
The Dunns' *Free Press* championed the goals and dreams of the Coeur d'Alenes' pro-development business contingent. Its economic agenda prompted a journalistic presentation of events that implied a Coeur d'Alene of progress, permanence, and potential. But the brothers' reactions to the wage worker frontier catalysts of development capital, labor, and transportation often produced a journalism more akin to market-based metropolitan newspapers of the era than the expected journalism of a frontier booster press. A concentration on local news items concerning these catalysts reflected Nord's business value system of the late-19th century commercial press, including a commitment to public interest consumerism, commercial order, and social harmony.

But absent in the *Free Press* was Nord's final "shared value" of commercial newspapers, a growing faith in organizational modes of conflict resolution. The Dunns did not reach beyond their economic and political power based in a loyalty to the corporate mine owners and management. In this sense they remained a partisan frontier pro-business booster newspaper. Such a hybrid combination of journalistic styles indicates a press in transition. Bridging the frontier/commercial cusp, the Wallace *Free Press* was the beginning of Coeur d'Alene journalism's evolution into the modern newspaper era. More generally, this pilot case study suggests the need for and potential of analyzing wage worker frontier journalism on a broader scale of time and geographic location.
NOTES

1Wallace, Idaho Territory, Free Press, 16 March 1889, 1. The Dunn’s first published on July 2, 1887.


9Schwantes, "Concept," 41.


12Ibid, 44-45.

13Robert W. Smith, History of Placer and Quartz Gold Mining in...
the Coeur d'Alene District (Fairfield, WA: Ye Galleon Press, 1993), 26-27.


19Adam Aulbach established the Wardner News in June 1886.


21Ibid., 2 July 1887, 2.

22Ibid., 2 July 1887, 1.

23Ibid.

24Ibid., 2 July 1887, 1; 23 July 1887, 2.

25Ibid., 11 February 1888, 1.

26Ibid., 30 June 1888, 2.

27Ibid., 2 July 1887, 4.

28"A LETTER From Colonel W. R. Wallace Regarding the Townsite [sic]," Murray, Idaho, Coeur d'Alene Sun, 1 March 1889, as reprinted in the Free Press, 16 March 1889, 1.

29E.g., a Butte, Montana, Inter-Mountain letter reprinted in Free Press, 12 November 1887, 1.

31 Headline, Free Press, 27 October 1888, 1.

32 Ibid., 18 February 1888, 1.

33 Ibid., 12 May 1888, 4; 30 June 1888, 4.


35 Free Press, 2 July 1887, 2.


38 Free Press, 7 April 1888, 1; 14 April 1888, 1; 19 May 1888, 2; 30 June 1888, 3; 1 September 1888, 2.

39 Ibid., 2 July 1887, 2; 5, November 1887, 2; 3 November 1888, 2.


42 Free Press, 14 April 1888, 1; 1 September 1888, 4.

43 Shoshone County Courthouse Clerk's Office, Wallace, Idaho, Commissioners' Journal, Shoshone County, Idaho Territory, Book D: 10 November 1892; 8 November 1894; Book C: 15 October 1889; Magnuson, Coeur d'Alene Diary, 184, 74.


45 Commissioners' Journal, Shoshone County, Idaho Territory, Book C: printing, 10 January 1888, 16 December 1888; advertising, 9 April 1888, 8 April 1889.

46 Free Press, generally; 31 December 1887, 2.

47 Wallace Coeur d'Alene Miner, 5 March 1892, 4.

49 Halaas, *Boom Town Newspapers*, generally.


53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.


56 Ibid., 9, 16, 30 March 1889, 1; 13, 27 April 1889, 1.

57 Ibid., 2 July 1887, 1.


59 "ANOTHER LETTER from Colonel W. R. Wallace," 1.

60 *Free Press*, 16 March 1889, 1.


62 E.g., Chicago *Tribune* editorial 1 March 1889, 4.

63 *Free Press*, 16 March 1889, 2.

64 Ibid., 27 April 1889, 1.

65 Ibid.


69 *Free Press*, 12 November 1887, 1.


75*Free Press*, 11 February 1888, 1; 30 June 1888, 2.


78*Free Press*, 12 May 1888, 4; 5 November 1887, 4; 12 November 1887, 1; 24 December 1887, 4; 30 June 1888, 4; 30 March 1889, 1.

79Ibid., 22 June 1889, 4.


83*Wallace Press*, 9 January 1891, 1.


86*Free Press*, 2 July 1888, 1.
87Ibid.


89Ibid. The NP took legal control of the CR&N October 1, 1888, Free Press, 1 September 1888, 4.

90Free Press, 22 October 1887, 1; 5 November 1887, 1.

91Ibid., 5 November 1887, 1.

92Ibid., 7 April 1888, 1; 2 July 1888, 1; 1 September 1888, 1.

93Ibid., 27 October 1888, 1.

94Ibid., 17 November 1888, 1.

95Ibid., 9 July 1887, 4.

96Ibid., 22 November 1888, 1.

97Ibid., 16 July 1887, 1; 10 September 1887, 1; 12 May 1888, 4; 7 July 1888, 2; 9 March 1889, 1; 30 March 1889, 1.

98Ibid., 19 May 1888, 1.

99Boorstin, Americans, 128.

MAP 1 - Coeur d'Alene Mining District.
The Feminist Mystique and Mass Media:
Implications for the Second Wave
by

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The Feminine Mystique: and Mass Media:
Implications for the Second Wave

by

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In 1962, the editor-in-chief of the New York publishing house, the Norton Company, was skimming Harper's magazine in a routine trolling for possible Norton writers. What caught George Brockway's eye was an article predicting the consequences of a meltdown of the arctic ice cap—not such an odd subject for a nation poised for nuclear annihilation. "The piece was well organized and well written," he recalled. "I thought Betty might have a book in her, although perhaps not on this particular subject. So I wrote her."

What later arrived on Brockway's desk was the prospectus for Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, initially titled, "The Togetherness Woman." "I fell in love with it at once," Brockway recalled. "The title, of course, traded on The Organization Man, which then was, or had recently been, a best seller; and one of the women's magazines had been running an ad campaign about the Togetherness Woman. I don't remember anything extraordinary or important that I did," Brockway said. "Betty knew what she wanted to say, and she said it well" (Brockway 1996).

She knew it well enough, of course, to make The Feminine Mystique the founding document of the second wave of feminism, far outstripping Norton's ambition for the book considering that it was published in the middle of a New York newspaper strike, received no important reviews, and was turned down by the Book-of-the-Month Club because it had already done a woman's book. Friedan's book was able to come...
to the public's attention because Friedan and her husband, Carl, an advertising businessman, insisted Norton hire a publicist, Tania Grossinger, in a bitter episode that Friedan did not forget and led to a break with Norton (Wilkes 1970). Thanks to Grossinger, Friedan was booked on "Girl Talk," one of the first nationally syndicated daytime talk shows, and was interviewed for a Life magazine spread. Parts of the book were excerpted in Mademoiselle, McCall's, Saturday Review, and the Ladies Home Journal (Friedan 1962-64).

The importance of the marketing aspects of The Feminine Mystique is not simply to footnote the historiography of a landmark publication, but to suggest that, with Friedan's book as the opening salvo, the second wave of feminism was made possible by, and was inextricably mounted to, the needs of twentieth century American mass media. This was a result of the intersection of several factors: the readiness of the postwar female audience, a belief by many feminist leaders in the efficacy of mass media to promote change, and the influence of the early feminist movement, in radical and establishment circles, by women who were media professionals. But it was the success of The Feminine Mystique that undergirded the intersection, suggesting that feminist concerns could be legitimately addressed in the mass media marketplace and could be a major lever in achieving change. Beginning with The Feminist Mystique, mass media introduced millions of women to feminist ideas. Thanks to mass magazines, news and television coverage, and the introduction of feminist leaders by those venues, feminist organizations took hold across the nation. Because of those efforts, local and national opportunities for women enlarged in dramatic ways.

But there were consequences to the role of mass media in the second wave. While there is no doubt that The Feminist Mystique deserves its place as a benchmark event, to examine the book as a mass media product is to begin an examination of the influence of mass media on the second wave of feminism. I suggest these influences

2
were several. As a commercial product, *The Feminist Mystique* served to confine the second wave by connecting it to the transitory mode of popular ideas, many of which looked back rather than forward. Further, when *The Feminist Mystique* became a commercial success, the second wave found itself set on a trajectory that encouraged feminism to be defined in the simple characterizations that fit the needs of mass media. The news tradition that calls for balance, for example, encouraged the presentation of oppositional points of view so that second-wave feminism often seemed to be an either-or choice. Such shaping of feminism by mass media was further encouraged by Friedan as she moved from bestselling author to feminist leader. She became the first in a phalanx of feminist leaders who emphasized mass media to achieve feminist goals despite their recognition of the institutional biases of mass media. Meantime, her aggressive personality helped establish stridency as a second-wave characteristic as defined by the media and led to the ascendancy of Gloria Steinem, whose views, thanks to her celebrity, came to dominate feminism in American media.

Media appetite for feminism waned at the onset of the new conservative era, and second-wave feminism disappeared from the public agenda. Indeed, even the history of the second wave seems in danger of being lost to collective memory. Memoirs of the era’s newsmen, for example (Bradlee 1995; Brinkley 1995; Cronkite 1996; Smith 1996), who delineate their coverage of civil rights, the anti-war movement, and the assassinations at length, pass over the women’s movement in silence. Not surprisingly, the National Organization for Women has written its own history (Carabillo, Meuli and Csida 1993; hereafter Carabillo), and the Veterans of Feminism organization was established to maintain links to an era of just 25 years ago (Ceballos 1998). One way to understand the short crest of the the second wave, both in memory and influence, is to consider the role of mass media in the dispersal of the feminist message. Beginning with *The Feminist Mystique*, mass media
accommodated feminism on the basis of well-established principles of American mass media. The search for new markets to expand profits was the first of these.

The welcome Norton gave the prospectus illustrated the company's effort to replicate the success of the mass media women's magazines in reaching the women who had settled in the suburbs following the post-war building boom, a market, except for cook books, largely untapped by major book publishers. Doubleday Company was on the same track, having hired a longtime magazine editor, Margaret Cousins, to find entry by way of a collection of magazine fiction. But the book failed to attract the intended audience as women were turned away from formulae stories and even fiction editors spoke despairingly of their field: "[T]he love stories we have published have been so happy and sappy that I can't remember them after I have sent them to be copied" (Bradley 1995:84). In the wake of the decline in women's magazine fiction, non-fiction took on new importance.

Joanne Meyerowitz argues that Friedan's book did not present alternatives to what the women's magazines offered as much as it expanded upon themes that were already present. Articles in postwar women's magazines, she writes "presented a wide variety of options open to women and praised the women who had chosen to assert themselves as public figures" (Meyerowitz 1993:237). Such options were not unmitigated. In Life's special double edition in December 1956, "The American Woman: Her Achievements and Troubles," prominent women approvingly marked the place career women had made for themselves. In the same issue, a male writer addressing the "Changing Roles in Modern Marriage: Psychiatrists find in them a Clue to Alarming Divorce Rise," gives evidence of the anxiety that accompanied the challenge to domesticity.

As a magazine writer, Friedan herself was part of this challenge, as illustrated in
her 1955 article in Charm magazine, “Why I Went to Work” (Friedan 1955). And although Friedan claimed she had to write the book because she could not say what she wanted to say in the women's magazine (Friedan 1997:7), her 1961 article in Good Housekeeping, “I say women are people too” abstracted its themes, even the idea that a name did not exist to explain women's discontent (Friedan 1961).

Moreover, the excerpts of the book by several of the women's magazines indicated both its style and substance were consonant with other editorial matter (Friedan 1963-64).

Friedan not only expanded upon the themes already present in the women's magazines, but she did it ways that were familiar to readers. Like the branded goods dominating the Fifties' supermarkets, The Feminine Mystique culls evidence from recognizable sources--mass media, institutional icons, government reports, extracts from newspapers, and her famous Smith College survey. Friedan's work was far from sociological or scientific, but it presented the kinds of proofs that readers of service magazines had come to expect and trust. Friedan's Smith College survey, for example, would have a familiar ring to readers of women's magazines and their long tradition of reader surveys. Indeed, the book often seems to represent a compilation of magazine strategies--the professional voice of the advice columnist; the anecdotal and other “proofs” of the non-fiction articles; the small but achievable steps presented by the self-help articles, and the epiphany of realization that routinely climaxed romantic fiction. Overarching it all was Friedan's didactic tone, as authoritarian as any taken by Edward Bok in addressing Ladies' Home Journal readers a half century before.

However, The Feminine Mystique was most like the magazines because it pointed to solutions on the basis of individual resolution rather than systemic correction. Friedan could be both expert and front-line crime fighter, but in the end, like the authors of The Organization Man, The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, and Marjorie
Morningstar, she could only point to individual roads for salvation. As in so much of magazine non-fiction, the book ended with a series of recommended "steps" for readers. In this approach, Friedan reflected the merging of the traditional self-help articles of the magazines with the popular interests in psychology. This characteristic also looked back to a 1950s Cold War ideology that substituted personal regeneration for schematic change.

In fact, legal perpetrations of female inequality go unquestioned in The Feminine Mystique. The silences of the book are considerable. Political activity is mentioned briefly in the historical terms of the first wave--the "passionate journey" in Friedan's language, rather than the ongoing activities of the National Women's Party to pass the Equal Rights Amendment or the activities of the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs and the Commission on the Status of Women to activate the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission on behalf of women. Despite the blossoming civil rights movement, issues of race and class are ignored. Similarly passed over are the benefits of inexpensive female labor to American business, a major denial of Friedan's work as a labor journalist. Nor does The Feminist Mystique reflect the optimism that emerged with the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy. In retrospect, the book seems hinged to the previous decade, not the one in which it was written.

These silences must be considered as strategic as any other part of her commercial skills and help account for the attraction of the book to women who had been shaped by the previous decade. Despite her barrage of words, her stage is sparsely furnished, presenting a world of limitations, like a voluble actor in front of a ever-present backdrop. We might consider that for audiences the backdrop is as much a player as stage activity.

As in her article on the arctic ice cap, Friedan's brilliance as a commercial writer
was demonstrated not only by her ability to introduce feminism by way of a familiar journalistic framework, including strategic silences, but also in the way she gathered up the themes of the period. Those themes included women’s empowerment as Meyerowitz notes, but also needing recognition is the book’s backdrop, the hovering, silent presence of Cold War ideology. Most telling is the organizing principle of the book: feminism as a reaction against the antifeminist, the difficult-to-define and only slowly understood, "mystique." The framing of the book was not only familiar in the way it gathered up emerging strains already existing in mass media, but in the way Friedan put into service a variety of Cold War fears that were marginally related to twentieth-century feminism but were meaningful to the readers of the time.

According to Brockway’s account, the book was originally called “The Togetherness Woman,” a title that would have reflected McCall’s magazine slogan, “the magazine of togetherness.” Apart from avoiding McCall’s objections, Friedan’s final title was also the better choice. In fact, its very vague exoticism, a matter of concern to Carl Friedan who played a role in the book’s promotion (Wilkes 1970) may be thought to represent the Cold War undertow simmering below the surface of the Fifties’ prosperous security. As we know, fear of the bomb was translated into a number of popular culture venues in the white America of the period, from alien invasion movies to the “invasion” of open sexuality in the music emerging from the black underclass. The astonishing success of Mickey Spillane’s novels has been to connected to Mike Hammer, Spillane’s hero, as the “ultimate Cold War warrior” who battled the evil of Communism with “a blast from his forty-five, a kick that shattered bone on impact, strangulation from Hammer’s meaty hands.” After the 1960 U-2 spying incident, the anti-Communism theme was carried forth by a new paperback hero, James Bond, “a high-tech Mike Hammer” (Davis 1884: 182, 286). In both cases, the anti-Communist fighters were also sexist, racist, homophobic, and anti-Semitic,
further representations that the anti-Communist culture in the 50s carried with it overtones that had little to do with Soviet domination but played a role in the anxiety of the age. "For all their comforts," Todd Gitlin writes, "the middle-class parents were afflicted by 'insecurity,' to use another of the decade's code words" (Gitlin 1987: 17).

Friedan was to identify the amorphous dread that characterized so much of the Fifties' decade as the "feminist mystique," although the unsettledness of female suburban readers may have had to do with a multitude of factors that included but was not limited to the role of women in U.S. society. What may have accounted for the life-changing experience that the book provided to so many readers (Friedan 1976:xiii) was how Friedan took on the "mystique," a virtual one-woman dismantling of the ultimate weapon. In hyperbolic prose (notably when she drew an analogy between American housewives and Nazi concentration camps, certainly one example where her style did not mesh with the service magazines), Friedan deconstructed and defused the "mystique" with as much confidence and with the same meat-cleaver approach as Mike Hammer. The mystique had taken hold because of a confluence of circumstances, she wrote: Sigmund Freud and his followers; missteps in sociology; the anthropology of Margaret Mead; women's magazines; advertising; the glorification of housework. The damage was already considerable and could be seen in women's passivity and suicidal tendencies, altogether a kind of virile sickening of American women in yet another translation of a Fifties' great fear, polio. Friedan, ever the authority, was also a diagnostician: "As a magazine writer I often interviewed women about problems with their children, or their marriages, or their houses, or their communities. But after a while I began to recognize the telltale signs of this other problem" (Friedan 1963:20). Like the domestic Communist threat, the mystique was insidious and unexpected and needed an expert with special training.

Friedan's ability to frame her book in the Cold War motif is probably not
surprising when it is considered that Friedan not only came of age in the post-war period but was a member of the left. Her own anxiety in the 1940s and early 1950s was likely not so much the dread of Soviet domination as the fear of discovery of her political affiliations in her own country. As a leftist and, and, as a Jew, a member of a group often associated with postwar left thought, the Cold War as an oppressive, shuddering presence would have provided a personal metaphor of entrapment.

As is now beginning to be made clear, Friedan's history was unlike those of most of the women who so eagerly read her book. Although there was nothing in the book that reflected the depth of her education, Friedan was a summa cum laude graduate of the eastern "seven sisters" Smith College. But she was most different from the suburban readers to whom the book was marketed because of the dozen years, from 1941 to 1952, that she had spent as a radical political activist and labor journalist. She was first a paid writer for the Federated Press, a left-wing news service, and then wrote for publications sponsored by the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, the most pro-Communist of all American unions in the postwar period (Horowitz 1996).

In her biographical writing, Friedan has characterized the late 40s and early 50s as a time when she was happily confined by domesticity. "Having babies, the Care and Feeding of Children, according to Doctor Spock, began to structure our lives. It took the place of politics" (Friedan 1976:14). However, in 1946, during her period as a labor journalist, the newly organized Congress of American Women, composed of Party women, met in New York to set out a platform for women's rights, an event, noted in The New York Time (NYT 6/7/47:11), that Friedan must clearly have been aware. In 1952, at the height of her supposed domestic period, she wrote the pamphlet under her unmarried name Betty Goldstein, UE Fights for Women Workers, calling to an end to wage discrimination. Every indication of her early adulthood,
beginning with her study at Smith College, followed by her years as a labor journalist, give evidence that by the time she wrote *The Feminist Mystique*, Friedan was not the emerging, tentative feminist of "the problem that has no name" that she portrayed in *The Feminine Mystique* and in the promotional interviews for years afterwards. Friedan never has denied those years and has made references to Marxism in her writings, although in dismissive terms that characterized her interest as a young person's phase: "[W]e had considered ourselves part of that vanguard of the working-class revolution, going to Marxist discussion groups and rallies at Madison Square Garden and feeling only contempt for dreary bourgeois capitalists like our fathers--though we still read Vogue under the hair drying and spent our salaries on clothes at Bergdorf's and Bendel's, replacing our college Braemer sweaters with black cashmeres and Gucci gloves on sale" (Friedan 1976:26).

Friedan was one of several feminist authors with left associations who later wrote for wider circles (Weigand 1995), but of all the feminists who emerged from the labor and political left, Friedan's voice would be most amenable to mass media. This may be explained by her skill as a professional mass market writer that reflected the tensions of the period but rejected the Marxist ideas of her youth. We might also consider that she tilled the common ground between certain left ideas and mainstream thinking of the time.

Her left influence can be particularly seen in the role she assigns mass media, primarily women's magazines, in the construction of the "mystique." Friedan never tired, both in the book and in later works, of bringing attention to the artificial life that magazines constructed for women. "I helped create this image," she wrote. "I have watched American women for fifteen years try to conform to it. But I can no longer deny my own knowledge of its terrible implications. It is not a harmless image. There may be no psychological terms for the harm it is doing. But what happens when
women try to live according to an image that made them deny their minds? What happens when women grow up in an image that makes them deny the reality of the changing world?” (Friedan 1963:59).

The assumption underlying Friedan’s view of media image was media power. What women read and see about themselves--she would later expand her view to television in a two-part article for TV Guide (Friedan 1976: 48-71)-- play a pivotal role in women’s sense of identity, although there was no “psychological name” for it, any more than there she could find a name for the general discontent of the age. But if we take into account Friedan’s left background, it can be seen that there was a theoretical construct for the role of media as Friedan saw it. It was known as the Frankfurt School, a belief that media is so influential that its consumers will adopt positions even when they are contrary to their own best interests.

The Frankfurt School became popular in American academic circles in the 1960s and 1970s, as exemplified by the work of Todd Gitlin (Gitlin 1987), but it first came to the U.S. in the 1930s when its founders, Max Horkeimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Leo Lowenthal, fled Germany and re-established their Institute for Social Research at Columbia University in a period when intellectuals, including those outside of the left, were examining World War II propaganda (Marcus and Tar 1984). Outside of Marxist circles, media researchers and popular writers emphasized a “powerful effects” theory, although without its attachment, as in the Frankfurt School critique, to underlying flaws in bourgeois culture. In her criticism of women’s magazines Friedan adopted the powerful effects theory, in line with the common thinking of the time, and related it, by way of the journalistic framing already noted, to the Frankfurtian idea that media was so powerful that consumers unwittingly fashioned themselves in the images they promoted. Such views of the insidiousness of mass media
also bore connections to the fear of the Communist threat.

Friedan was not the first to adopt the Frankfurt School to a non-academic setting. On the assumption that media could be instrumental in positive as well as negative ways, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in the 1940s and 1950s mounted a public relations campaign that sought to encourage tolerance along racial and religious lines.. Ironically, by the end of the 1950s, the League concluded that the task was too enormous, too expensive, and might not work anyway, and turned to other activities (Svoknin 1997: 41-61). However, for Friedan and other leaders of the women's movement who came of age in a time of powerful effects theory, Frankfurtian or otherwise, the die was cast. Friedan and her colleagues took into their organizational work media beliefs that had been part of the 1940s. By the time of the founding of NOW in the mid-Sixties, the premise had been strengthened by the civil rights movement, whose successes could only have seemed related to attention from mass media.

In 1952, for reasons that are unclear, Friedan closed out her life as a labor journalist and turned to mass-market writing. By 1955, now using her married name, Friedan put her writing skill to the uses of freelance sale, producing a variety of articles, including the one on the melting arctic cap that caught Brockway's eye. She also addressed women's concerns, but in a style that was designed for the mass market in articles in Coronet, Redbook, Cosmopolitan, Family Circle, Parents' Magazine and others. In her efforts to succeed as a professional writer, Friedan procured an agent and set herself a writing schedule as she, her husband and three children settled in a large Victorian house in suburban Rockland County outside of New York City. At the same time as excerpts from The Feminine Mystique were appearing in the mass press, Friedan also published the article, "How to Find and Develop Article Ideas," for the magazine, Writer (March 1962), an indication that initially, as least, she
may not have seen *The Feminine Mystique* as a call to social reform, but as a good writing idea along a continuum of good writing ideas. During this period, she put her political radical activism behind her, and while her life was never the typical suburbanite world that was portrayed in interviews and in print, it seems clear that Friedan found many of the characteristics of domestic life attractive.

*The Feminine Mystique* sold well in hardcover, 70,000 copies by 1970, but achieved best-seller status when it moved to paperback sale—1.5 million copies by the end of the decade (*Current Biography* 1970:144-147). The quick publication of the book in paperback also represented the intersection of the book with changes in the paperback market. No publishing house was more involved in the paperback revolution than Friedan’s paperback publisher, Dell, which had begun as a house publishing standard romance, mysteries, westerns and comic books, but like other houses was finding new profits in subjects that had once been in the purview of hardback houses. This was no rush into academic publishing. Dell titles were “carefully edited to make exciting and understandable presentations that would interest the average readers” (Lyles 1983: 20). Friedan’s book easily met this standard. Nonetheless, the book was primarily selected, according to editor Don Fine, because of pressure “from every woman in my office.” At Dell, “every women in the office” carried some weight; the women included Arlene Donovan, former receptionist who had risen to be editor of Dell’s First Editions, Marcia Nassatir, assistant editor at Del Books, and, most formidably, the company’s chief executive officer, Helen Meyer, once a file clerk herself but by this time the powerful, imperious and demanding chief executive officer who was exerting new control over Dell’s paperback roster. Under Meyer, Dell paperbacks had already broken new ground in publishing books by women who were not shy about writing about women’s sexuality, as in Francois.
Sagan's *A Certain Smile*, and conclusively demonstrated by Grace Metalious' ninemillion bestseller, *Peyton Place*. Friedan's book was not expected to compete in the *Peyton Place* arena, although it could be considered Dell's answer to Bantam, which had already published Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*. Despite Fine's claims to be "bulldozed" into the decision to publish Friedan's work, the book's purchase price indicated that the house recognized the book's commercial possibility. "We didn't pay much, but it was considered a lot for a book of its kind," Fine recalled. The judgment quickly proved sound. "Within months after it was published, there was an interesting sign. I think it was Vassar that bought copies of the Dell edition for its freshman kits for the incoming class. That's a hell of a tip-off. It had already become something for young, intelligent women. And then it just spread. Garden clubs started calling to talk to Betty. She was all over the country. Again it was the exposure of the book. It sold millions of copies" (Davis, K. 104).

It was not garden clubs that gave Friedan the initial edge, however, but a marketing plan that utilized the emerging talk show formats, none more important that Friedan's appearance promoting *The Feminine Mystique* on a forerunner of today's daytime talk shows, Virginia Graham's "Girl Talk."

Beginning in 1961, "Girl Talk" was syndicated by ABC Films, a distribution system in which individual stations purchased the show and could make their own decisions about how to showcase it rather than having network rather than having an obligation to carry as in network shows. Syndication was a profitable compromise for networks uncertain if a show's acceptability, protecting them from the chance of offending affiliates, yet provided affiliates the opportunity to carry the show and situate the show according to their particular needs. While syndication could be slow to build an audience, the process also gave the program a longer time to demonstrate its appeal, and probably contributed to "Girl Talk's" eight-season run from 1961 to 1968 and a
more than 800-station syndication. As the first successful television program to have a female host and female guests, the format was designed to be gossipy and informal, its spark generated by bringing unlike women together. As Graham described it, her guests were "people who would never meet in life, never sit next to each other at a dinner party, never glare at each other in contempt or purr silken insults at each other" (Graham 1966:196). This concept led to a varied mix of guests, most celebrities, but also writers and professional women—the primary necessity being able to talk easily and wittily (Graham 1978:106-108). Graham's job was to bring out opposite points of view in a lively, entertaining way, while she took on a moderate or conservative road, presumably representing the point of view of her viewers. Subjects for the show were often imitative of what was appearing in the mass magazines of the day, and, like them, sometimes had an undercurrent that questioned accepted practices as demonstrated in the choice of subject of its first show: Should husbands and wives take separate vacations? Primarily, there was a mix to the daily shows, from the purely frivolous—the Gabors were frequent guests—to the timely, as a program on LSD, each subject with a pro and con represented in a chatty, conversational style from a comfortable, living room set. The program's subject and style was consistent with the postwar mass media that had provided such fertile ground for the publication of The Feminine Mystique. For Friedan and her publisher, the show offered a way to reach the suburban female market they sought.

Friedan appeared on the show in 1964, three years into the show's run, when the concept of spark by way of opposites was well established. Friedan was paired with the English comic actress, Hermione Gingold, as her foil. Graham prodded to instigate the spark, as she did with all her guests, and was delighted when "Hermione and Betty went after each other tooth and claw." In her memoir, she remembered the program in terms of its entertainment values—"one of our funniest shows" (Graham
Friedan recalls Graham promoting confrontation by asking her audience, "Girls, how many of us really need bylines? What better thing can we do with our lives than do the dishes for the one we love?" In response, Friedan recalled she turned to the camera, "Women, don't listen to her. She needs you out there doing the dishes, or she wouldn't have the captive audience for the television program, whose byline she evidently doesn't want you to compete for" (Friedan 1976:40). In terms of the program, Friedan's response was not any more confrontal than many on a program that sought lively and oppositional discussion. In collective memory, however, this early representation of feminism became an example of what would be viewed as Friedan's confrontal personality. The "Girl Talk" episode set out feminism as confrontal and Friedan as its early standard bearer.

What is interesting is how quickly Friedan's personality segued into the establishment of feminism as an issue to be confronted. In a 1964 Life magazine story, Friedan was characterized in its headline copy as an "Angry Battler for her Sex" accompanied by an unflattering photograph. Interestingly, the other photographs in the article, in which Friedan is in settings that nodded to domesticity (dusting a bust of Lincoln) show her at her best (Life 11/63). Another early example of oppositional framing came in the television "documentary" in 1963, "Philco Presents The World Over: The World's Girls" (ABC 10/25/63), purporting to examine women's power around the world. Accompanied by jolly music, a male commentator, and many shots of women in bikinis, the ABC "special" found women's power not wanting. As in the Life article, Friedan was characterized in negative ways. Utilizing film clips from her speech to the National Women's Press Club, where, slim and well-groomed as appropriate to the suburbanite woman whom she sought to represent, Friedan spoke clearly and calmly about closing opportunities for young women.
Again defining feminism in terms of the magazines' therapeutic sensibility, Friedan said: “The terrible thing we are doing in the name of femininity. We are preventing them from their growth as human beings.” These comments, hardly revolutionary, were nonetheless abutted to an interview with Simone Signoret, who seemed to be answering Friedan directly when she said, “It’s too complicated for me” as she affirmed her own satisfaction with womanhood. “I’d rather be a woman,” Signoret said, in an common framing of the feminist movement as disaffection with female gender rather than the status of female gender.

There is no disagreement that Betty Friedan could be difficult to work with. When invited to take part in the remake of the Ladies' Home Journal in 1964, her battles over the content led to charges of “stridency” by supervising editors (Friedan 1976:30). In a 1970 interview when Friedan's reputation for stridency was well established, Friedan's early publicist, Tania Grossinger, was quoted in a New York Times Magazine interview, “There were few stations that asked her back because she was a tough interview. I can remember her confronting, Virginia Graham on 'Girl Talk' and screaming, 'If you don't' let me have my way I'm going to say 'organism' ten times (Wilkes 1970: 30). Muriel Fox, who directed the initial public relations efforts for the National Organization for Women, found one of her jobs was to make amends to those whom Friedan had alienated. "Betty was so hostile [that] I was sort of her ambassador to the rest of the world. That was an important part of what I did in the early days, not just to the press but to other NOW members who Betty was so rude to that they'd say, 'It's not worth it.,' and some of them quit and I talked them into staying or cooperating or whatever it was" (Fox 1998). By the late 1960s, when radical women moved into the media spotlight, stridency was already established as a second-wave identifier and became the most often described characteristic that put off non-feminist women (McCalls 4/76: 91).
It also set the stage and promoted the rise of alternatives, as news media, framing feminism in the confrontal model, sought opposites. As a glance at the books reviewed in the *New York Times* can attest, the flood of women's advocacy books of the 1970s, was accompanied by a powerful stream of antifeminist books. As in Friedan's model, books were routinely marketed in mass media venues that provided dispersal for their ideas beyond the sale of the book itself. Most especially, Phyllis Schafley was sought out as a spokeswoman for the opposition, particularly since the publication of her 1977 book, *The Power of the Positive Woman*, coincided with the National Women's Conference in Houston Texas and final attempts to pass the Equal Rights Amendment. Schafley's message of feminism as militant was encouraged when she received a pie in the face from a five-member feminist group that called itself "The Emma Goldman Brigade" (*NYT* 4/17/77:38).

As Friedan moved from a writer on a social reform issue to a leader of the movement by the establishment of the National Organization for Women, it was clear the new organization would have a central role for mass media. At a 1966 meeting, Friedan brought together her friend, the actress, Betty Furness, the ABC reporter and documentary producer, Marlene Sanders, and the public relations expert, Muriel Fox, to a meeting in her apartment--Friedan having now giving up suburban living for accommodations in the famous Dakota building. Fox remembers the purpose of the meeting as one "in which Betty and Marlene were used to put pressure on me to head the pubic relations. I think that's all that happened at that meeting, not any strategy" (Fox 1998).

As it turned out, the choice of Fox as the first public relations chair was a strategic decision because it shaped NOW's initial entry into the media. Fox brought to the founding of NOW her establishment expertise as a high-ranking woman in the
in the nationally known public relations firm of Carl Byoir & Associates, Inc., as well as her experience as a political campaigner for Claude Pepper's senatorial race (Fox 1998).

The campaign for equal pay for equal work that instigated the founding of NOW (Davis F. 1991:52-68), began with letters to President Johnson, the attorney general, and to members of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In Fox's hands, the letters were important not so much from the responses they might garner, but from their public release, providing the news media a national news hook. Moreover, Fox's initial news releases were filled with the influential names of members of the Commission on the Status of Women that mainstream media was not likely to ignore. One measure that Fox's work met journalistic standards was that her news release on the NOW founding was used in Joy Miller's Associated Press story with only minor changes. "The media got it. We were on the front pages of a lot of newspapers around the country. The only major story that didn't carry it was The New York Times (Fox 1998).

In November, 1966, Fox arranged a New York press conference for Friedan to announce NOW's EEOC campaign. Thanks to Fox's special letter to Clifton Daniel, editor of the the New York Times, a reporter from the nation's most eminent paper had interviewed Friedan beforehand. It was published in the food, fashion, family furnishing section of the paper under an article on how to carve the thanksgiving turkey and under the ironic headline, "They Meet in Victorian Parlor to Demand 'True Quality'-NOW" (NYT 11/22/66:1:44). Nonetheless, an organization that had a few dozen members—not the hundreds Fox routinely claimed in her news releases—had found a place on the national agenda in ways that were more affirmative than not.

Fox was only the first of many women with high-level media experience that NOW attracted. In a less public way, Marlene Sanders, who was at that time anchoring
the ABC network program, "News with a Woman's Touch" and would later prepare documentaries favorable to the movement, also provided, sub rosa, her mass media expertise. Sanders and her husband, in fact, were entertained, along with other media professionals, by the Friedans at parties in the Dakota, giving further evidence of the media-savvy word in which Friedan moved (Sanders 1998).

Given the Friedan's view of the importance of media, the media women whom she attracted, and the general belief of the time that a woman's civil rights campaign could be assisted by mass media, the NOW Statement of Purpose not surprisingly drew attention to the mass media: "In the interests of the human dignity of women, we will protest and endeavor to change the false image of women now prevalent in the mass media." (Carabillio 1993:163). A Task Force on the Image of Women was established as one of the eight original committees with the New York Committee on Image targeted as its "nucleus" "because of its geographical location in relation to the centers of the communication media" (Carabillio 1993:176). Friedan warned that to achieve its goals NOW would use every lever available, including media: "We don't even exclude the possibility of a mass march on on Washington" (Friedan 1976:98), a telling comment in its implication that media attention was the penultimate political tactic.

In addition to its task force on the image of women, NOW also included a public relations component for the organization that Fox chaired. In its first report, the public relations committee reported its successes in terms of mass media: Friedan's appearance as part of a two-hour program devoted to the subject by NBC's "Today Show"; an article favorable to NOW in the Sunday newspaper supplement, This Week; major stories quoting NOW. Local NOW chapters were urged to provide local angles to national NOW events but with cautions: "Don't let the press lure you into a battle-of-the sexes approach...Don't participate in a discussion that pokes fun at..."
women" (Carabillo 1993:215-16).

The use of media to further NOW aims was soon demonstrated with the decision to advance the EEOC campaign by having the EEOC find it illegal for newspapers to segregate "help wanted" advertisements by gender. Here was a subject related to equal employment practices that affected many women and was surely recognizable enough to attract media attention. Under the leadership of Dolores Alexander, a reporter at Newsday and member of the New York Task Force on the Image of Women, NOW members picketed EEOC offices. Outside the The New York Times picketers chanted "The New York Times is a sex-offender" (Carabillo 1993:52). Early the next year Friedan threatened to sue the government on the issue at an event at which television crews had been invited. The publicity worked, a congressional hearing was called, and segregated "help wanted" advertisements were eventually banned (Davis F. 1991:59-61).

From its first success with the EEOC campaign, few NOW goals did not have a media component. A "Public Accommodations Week" was designed to draw attention to restaurants, bars, and other public areas that barred women. The "action" also served to be a training ground for its national coordinator, Karen DeCrow, who held an undergraduate journalism degree and whose later administration as a NOW president (1974-1977) depended heavily on mass media actions. Chapters in Syracuse, Colchester (CT.), Pittsburgh, Washington, Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles served up media events. New York was the most active of all, center of national media as well as professional women in media, in events that have been often summarized (Davis, F. 1991:110-133; Beasley and Gibbons 1993: 143-262).

When Friedan stepped down from the NOW presidency, it was with the announcement of an event that promised to dwarf all others, the "Women's Strike Day for Equality" scheduled for August 26, 1970 in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of
women's suffrage. In the style of her labor past, Friedan called on a work stoppage to protest wage differentials between men and women: "[T]he women who are doing menial chores in the office as secretaries put the covers on their typewriters and close their notebooks and the telephone operators unplug their switchboards, the waitresses stop waiting, cleaning women stop cleaning and everyone who is doing a job for which a man would be paid more stop" (Hole and Levine 1971:92).

But not all feminists were pleased with the proposal. By the planning time of the strike day, the splintering of the women's movement had led to the first regional conference, the Congress to Unite Women, that included varied oppositional women's groups. Many activists were not eager to support an idea from Friedan who was, in many feminist circles, a "persona non grata," given her remarks about the "lavender menace" (Ceballos 1998). Although Friedan had not initially proposed the strike day as a day to bring oppositional women's groups together for show of unity, as the strike day approached clearly this became the focus. By the end of the summer, attempts to overcome political divisiveness had transformed the strike day from a day when women withheld their labor, with its clear connections to Friedan's labor past, into a rite of intensification aimed at celebrating female solidarity for the benefit of the news media. Three goals--abortion on demand, 24-hour day care and equal opportunity in employment and education--were put forward as a flag behind which women could demonstrate their unity. The size of the demonstration became all important in this construct of solidarity--the fear being that a small turnout would indicate women's commitment was not widespread enough to warrant political action (Davis, F. 1991:115).

There was plenty of advance publicity, some of it prompted by activists themselves, as in the unfurling of a banner from the Statue of Liberty (Ceballos 1998). And for all its recalcitrance in providing equal opportunities for its own women
employees (Robertson 1992), the New York Times was not stingy with its space. On the day itself, the Times gave it a front-page story with a photograph of exuberant marchers as well as several sidebars, including one about Friedan's visit to the hairdresser (NYT 8/27/70). But as Douglas notes in her survey of the coverage, the extensive media coverage in print and broadcast did not include interviews with any of the women marchers in favor of "balancing" the march with remarks from individuals who were not supporters, turning what had attempted to be an inclusive event into one of win and loss (Douglas 1994:184). Writing in 1972, the advertising executive Midge Kovacs recalled: "With my own eyes, I had seen a cross-section of women at the march, including establishment types, career women and many old citizens. But none of these women were represented that evening on TV (Kovacs 1972:73).

Despite the success of the march in attracting widespread coverage, the march marked Friedan's decline as a movement leader. But on both the establishment and radical sides, the emphasis on media continued. In her 1972 memoir, Bella Abzug sounded a cautionary note: "What distresses me most is that I know deep down that Betty understands politics in the same way I do. This is why I can't understand what she's up to. It doesn't add up." She concluded: "I'm beginning to wonder .. if she realizes that forming a political movement is a more complicated thing than giving lectures, writing books, having one-shot demonstrations, and press conferences and appearing on the Dick Cavett Show. It takes a lot more than that. It takes organizing and a real knowledge of how the political machinery works" (Abzug 1977:160-161).

By the time Abzug was writing, manipulated events seemed to be at epidemic levels even as Friedan was pulling away from them: the Miss America and other protests mounted by the Women's International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell, better known at WITCH; the sit-in of the Ladies Home Journal; the picketing of The New York Times (Beasley and Gibbons 993:210-217); the the sit-in of CBS by Florynce
Kennedy's Media Workshop (Kennedy 1976:57), as well as the various actions promoted by NOW and its chapters. Writing in *The New York Times*, Robin Morgan, a founder of WITCH (and, as a child actress and and editor for Grove Press, another former media professional), defended the movement's use of mass media: "Leafletting on New York's Lower East Side for two years would not reach the housewife in Escanaba, Mich. but thirty seconds on the six o'clock news would. We were forced to use a medium which we knew was in the control of the enemy, which we knew would distort and truncate and ridicule our issues and politics. Even now, I am writing this in the context of *The New York Times* in order to reach still more women. By any means necessary means just that" (Morgan 1970:33).

As the new decade began, there could be no doubt that feminism had found a place on the public agenda. "Women's liberation is hot stuff this season, in media terms," Susan Brownmiller wrote in a *New York Times Magazine* article (Brownmiller 1970:27). What is less clear is the ultimate success of the strategy. Indeed, a quarter of a century later we might consider that the role of mass media in the women's movement as cautionary tale about the limits of mass media, one that began in 1963 with the publication of Betty Friedan's *The Feminist Mystique*. 
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The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

Introduction

*Martin Luther*, a film about the life and times of the 16th century Augustinian priest who sparked the Protestant Reformation, was to be shown on WGN-TV, Chicago, in December, 1956. Although the film was scheduled and promoted in the newspapers, the telecast never came to pass. WGN-TV management canceled the movie at the last moment, Lutherans said because of pressure from the Chicago Catholic Archdioceses. The Catholics denied the allegation, the Lutherans persisted, and WGN-TV was caught in an angry three month legal and public relations nightmare so serious that the station was about to be investigated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the United States Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.

The black and white film is well crafted by 1950s standards. Often the Roman Catholic clerics in the movie are portrayed as caricatures of themselves. For example, Medici Pope, Leo X, is played as a conniving, self-centered adolescent intent on building St. Peter's Cathedral by the sale of indulgences. John Tetzel, a Dominican monk, representing the Pope, is shown as a carnival-like hawker, asking peasants to "step right up" and "as soon as the coin in the alms box rings, a soul from purgatory upward wings." Catholics admit to abuses in the Church at the time of the Reformation but insisted the film went too far with such deceptive characterizations; the Lutherans claimed the movie was historically accurate.

Because the film was a polemic for the Protestant faith no one should be surprised that the Catholics were made to look superstitious and cunning or that Luther was portrayed in a triumphant, favorable light. But Chicagoans did not see it that way in 1956. Instead, the incident was framed as a case of suppression of religious freedom and first amendment rights by one side, and the righteous squelching of a story perceived to be full of damaging half-truths and blasphemy by the other.
The Beginning

On Wednesday, November 7, 1956, Robert E. A. Lee, executive secretary of Lutheran Church Productions, telephoned WGN-TV in Chicago, from his 42nd. Street, New York city office. Lee was about to consummate a deal that would give the Lutheran Church Production's motion picture *Martin Luther* its "world television première." Earlier in the week, Lee had spoken with Clifford Dahlin, executive secretary of the Lutheran Council of Greater Chicago, who told Lee he thought the film should be shown on WGN-TV rather than on rival WKBK-TV. The Lutheran Council had offered the movie to both stations and the Chicagoland Lutheran Evangelism Mission committee had recommended WGN-TV over its rival because WGN-TV's 10 p.m. Sunday night time slot "enjoy[ed] the prestige of having the highest ratings anywhere in the country for its feature film presentations." Lee dealt with Elizabeth Bain, director of films at WGN-TV, who confirmed that "the station had cleared the film for programming" and would pay the Lutheran group $2700 for the one time right to telecast the movie in February of 1957.

Because of concerns over historical accuracy, there was some discussion about WGN-TV editing the movie for television. The half million dollar production of *Martin Luther*, paid for by six Lutheran groups, began as a simple "church film," however, the movie, produced by Louis De Rochemont Associates, was technically excellent and its Lutheran sponsors thought it would be commercially viable as well. And indeed it was. *Martin Luther* was shown in over 4,000 cinemas in the United States -- including a successful 13 week, record-breaking run at Chicago's Lyceum-Loop cinema and in theaters in 25 other countries after its release in the late spring of 1953. It is estimated that 60 million have seen *Martin Luther* world-wide. Moreover, *Martin Luther* was chosen as among the top 10 best films of 1953 by the *New York Times*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and the National Board of Review of Motion Pictures and was nominated for two Oscars by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences. Nonetheless, its religious content was quite controversial to some and it was banned from movie houses in Quebec, the Philippines, Peru, and Egypt.

When the film was first running in theaters, the Legion of Decency, a Roman Catholic
The Chicago Television “Holy War” of 1956-1957

censorship board which classified motion pictures for Catholic viewers, wrote:

This picture offers a sympathetic and approving presentation of the life and times of Martin Luther, the sixteenth century figure of religious controversy. It contains theological and historical references and interpretations which are unacceptable to Catholics.\(^{15}\)

The Legion of Decency did not condemn the movie outright (which is the lowest rating the Legion could give) but instead gave *Martin Luther* a “Separate Classification,” reserved for films which are “not necessarily morally offensive to Catholics [but] require, for their interpretation, specialized training.”\(^{16}\) The Legion of Decency also asked Catholic parishioners, including school children, to sign pledge cards and take an oath not to see the movie.\(^{17}\) Given the film's stormy history, Lee was clearly anxious over the possibility of WGN-TV editing the picture, even to the point of saying, “if a problem arose[with edited scenes] in this connection, we would have to weigh in the balance whether to proceed to release the film [to television] or not.”\(^{18}\) Bain promised Lee to not alter the film in any way without first discussing it with him.\(^{19}\)

WGN-TV Changes the Plan

On November 19, 1956, Bain anxiously called Lee at his New York office about the possibility of switching the broadcast date of the film from “sometime in February” to a firm December 21, 1956. She needed an immediate answer since she had missed a newspaper promotion copy deadline “which apparently involved [the] listings of films for showing [on WON-TV] over a 30 day period.”\(^{20}\) Bain also said she had just received sponsor clearance on the film making her request for an immediate decision that much more urgent.

Although it is unclear from the detailed memoranda kept by Lee, it appears that WGN-TV, through Bain, was prepared to pay not $2700, but $3000 for the right to broadcast the film *but only* if Bain could secure the earlier date.\(^{21}\) Still, Lee could not unilaterally approve any change of plans, and explained that Clifford Dahlin and the local Chicagoland Lutheran Evangelism Mission (CLEM) committee had to approve the change since it was that group’s project in the first place.

Then, on November 27th, Bain called Lee with the news that the television station had second thoughts about broadcasting the film and, even though WGN-TV “had cleared* Martin
Luther, for television over its facilities, this clearance had been... rescinded... as a result of certain opposition pressure."22 Bain said she was lobbying to "convince the station management that the film should be cleared."23 She had arranged private screenings of the movie and was having "urgent conferences with [management] about it."24 The reason for her call was to make certain the Lutheran committee would permit the showing on December 21, should she be able to iron things out with her supervisors. Again, Lee was unable to make such a decision on his own.

During the next 24 hours Lee and Bain, acting as de facto liaisons between the television station and the CLEM committee, had several anxious telephone conversations. Finally on November 28, the word came forth that WGN-TV had, indeed, agreed to broadcast the program on Friday, at 10 p.m., December 21, 1956, with the blessing of the CLEM committee in Chicago.25

Anticipation Builds

*Martin Luther* would be shown as part of WGN-TV's "Community Theater" and would eventually be sponsored by Community Builders of Skokie, Illinois. The president of Community Builders, Robert Kendler -- an avowed Christian Scientist -- said that WGN-TV promised him "a spread of religious films."26 Kendler had sponsored the WGN-TV Friday night movie slot for eight years up to that point, at a cost per show of between $7000 and $10,000. Kendler said:

I regard... [the showing of religious films] as a new facet of advertising and at the same time a force for good in the community... I want... to spread knowledge of whatever religious position... I [will] remove all commercials from such programs -- [I] offer this for the *Martin Luther* film, too.27

The Lutherans, indeed the entire Protestant community, were ecstatic over the prospect of finally getting a chance to present their version of religious truth, uncut and without interruptions.

Lately, Protestant church leaders felt that their followers had to suffer in silence though several Roman Catholic focused WGN-TV broadcast programs like, "Behold, thy Mother," -- a story about the Virgin Mary -- and a continuing Sunday evening program entitled "Interesting People." On the later, a Roman Catholic bishop, clad in clerical garb, would interview only other Roman Catholics, subtly suggesting, as one religious magazine observed, that the only interesting people
in Chicago were Roman Catholic. Promptly after WGN-TV scheduled Martin Luther for broadcast, the local Lutheran Evangelism Mission committee, which initially began the television project, sought help to publicize it. The Lutheran Council of Greater Chicago, which represented 8 separate Lutheran denominations, and the Church Federation of Greater Chicago, 24 denominations strong, began an unprecedented publicity campaign to its 1500 churches. Word of the broadcast of Martin Luther quickly began circulating throughout greater Chicago’s various religious communities.

On December 6, Lee received the formal contract from WGN-TV to cover the telecasting rights of the feature film Martin Luther, and the next day the television station “officially announced” the December 21, showing date.

The Mysterious Visitor

Seven days later, Ward L. Quall, vice president and general manager of WGN-TV, was visited by someone -- it is not clear at this point by whom -- who lodged a serious protest against the showing of the film. The objection by this single mystery person seems apparently so powerful, and he or she had evidence and arguments so compelling, that it caused Quall to reevaluate his judgment on programming the movie. The Hollywood based Daily Variety newspaper reported a rumor which said: “the local Catholic hierarchy also threatened to rescind permission for [the] station to telecast Christmas Eve Mass from Holy Name Cathedral as planned if ‘Luther’ was beamed.” As noted, just a few days earlier WGN-TV had screened and cleared the film, then reversed itself saying “no” to its broadcast, then reversed itself again and re-cleared the movie after previewing it for a second time among an audience of “at least five Roman Catholics.”

Quall, now 75 and still active in broadcasting as a television consultant, did not recollect anybody coming to his office that Friday in late December of 1956. In fact, Quall said, “there were no calls, no letters, and nobody from the Catholic Church came to see me or forced me to make the decision I was contemplating.” Yet, the evidence found in the press and both the Catholic Archdiocese archives in Chicago and the Lutheran Chicago archives suggests otherwise. A Roman Catholic
Catholic cleric did, in fact, visit Quall's office, a person Lee called a "representative of" then Chicago's Catholic spiritual leader, Cardinal Stritch. As for not receiving any phone calls or letters, *The Christian Century* magazine wrote that "a telephone blitzkrieg, organized by Roman Catholics to keep WGN telephones humming with protests" meant the station's switchboard operators that Friday took about three calls per minute throughout the entire business day. The *Chicago Daily News* reported that the television station "received what was described as a 'flurry of protests.' Most of those who protested, according to a WGN spokesman, felt that the film was 'anti-catholic, and attacked the Catholic Church.'" The *Christian Science Monitor* said, "The quantity of the Roman Catholic protest has never been disclosed precisely by WGN-TV. Jack Mabley in the *Chicago Daily News* gave an estimate of 1500 letters."

Despite the pressure, Lee and the other Lutheran Church Production officials felt WGN-TV's resolve to broadcast the film would hold. Lee wrote:

The station's decision to select *Martin Luther* for sponsorship of one of its prime viewing hours was not made rashly. [Station officials] deliberated carefully, screening the film on at least two occasions and reviewing the distinctive pattern of its theatrical distribution history. [WGN-TV] found one of its regular sponsors eager and willing to show the picture. The film was booked through a license contract on the basis of its merits as a dramatic feature. The possibility of "fireworks" from a certain obvious source was even discussed with us quite frankly.

Those "fireworks" began on Friday, December 14, at WGN-TV and would not relent until April, 1957. A person identified by Lee as "a station official" telephoned him early in the day and confirmed that a "representative of the Roman Catholic chancery office" was coming to visit Quall. Lee writes that the WGN-TV "official" was:

confident that the station would not let this cause it to renege [on] its previous assurances that the film would show. He even marshaled arguments why WGN-TV felt it had an obligation to the total audience to proceed with the schedule.

On December 16, the Sunday *Chicago Tribune* 's "TV Week" magazine, a supplement which included all local station's scheduled programs for the coming week, under the heading "TV Week Movie Guide" for Friday, December 21, printed a listing which read: "This week's best: 10 p.m., Channel 9, *Martin Luther*, with Niall McGinnis. Religious film based on the life of Martin
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

Luther and his eternal search for the truth.” Quall, “the Tribune was always at the doorstep, and I, of course, turned almost immediately to the television section, saw the listing and knew of the controversy the film was causing in Chicago. I was on the phone to the station within the next fifteen minutes. My story is this, my position was this, throughout the whole debacle, I knew that the film was in the house -- and we had an awful lot of [movie] titles in the house -- but I did not dream they had scheduled it at this time. I had nothing to do with the clearance of it.”

Monday and Tuesday, WGN-TV received more phone calls, letters and telegrams; by the afternoon of Wednesday, December 18, rumors of the impending cancellation of the Martin Luther film were flying “throughout Chicago and the nation.”

Coincidentally a group of fifty Lutheran ministers were gathered in Chicago that same day and, after hearing the story, voted unanimously to send a telegram to Quall at WGN-TV which read in part:

We respectfully point out that 1500 churches representing . . . a constituency of 3,000,000 people have given wide publicity to this telecast. Cancellation at this late date will be interpreted as surrender to sectarian censorship, and we fear will undoubtedly bring most serious repercussions. . . .

WGN-TV Changes the Plan Again

Late that night a WGN-TV informant contacted Lee at his New York home and confirmed that the film would, in fact, be canceled and be replaced by the motion picture Christmas in Connecticut, starring Barbara Stanwyck, Dennis Morgan, and Sidney Greenstreet. The press would be told of the changes the next morning, December 19.

Within four hours Lee was back in Chicago to join “a vigilance committee, representing the broadest possible sweep of Protestantism in Chicago.” The meeting began at 8 a.m. and its prime objective was to “reach the top level of responsibility at the station in order to delay the public announcement long enough to have all viewpoints . . . heard by the station.” Because WGN-TV was owned by the Chicago Tribune newspaper, a telephone appointment was hastily arranged so that the president of the Church Federation, acting as spokesman for the committee,
could talk with “a top echelon executive of the Tribune organization.” Representatives of the group anxiously waited by the telephone, ready to plead their case for secular religious freedom. They waited. And waited. And, in yet another misstep in a series of public relations errors made by WGN-TV and the Tribune Company in this issue, the call never came.

Instead, WGN-TV alerted the wire services to the cancellation. In his press release Quall said in part:

After the announcement of the scheduled showing [of the film], it became apparent that there was an emotional reaction to the plan. In view thereof, the station has elected to cancel the showing, not wanting to be a part to the development of any misunderstanding or ill will among persons of faith in the Chicago area. The decision was one of station policy and not a move on the part of the sponsor, Community Builders. As general manager of WGN-TV, I am genuinely and properly proud of the great record which we have made in the matter of service to the three major religious faiths and denominations therein.

Chicago Daily News columnist, Jack Mabley, correctly pointed out that WGN-TV “has been a national leader in presenting religious programs.” He reported:

[WGN-TV’s] schedule right now contains 14 programs a week on religious theses, running from 5 to 30 minutes, presented with the help of such diverse groups as the Lutheran Missouri Synod, the Knights of Columbus, and the Church Federation of greater Chicago... It is ironic that WGN-TV should be a victim of this misunderstanding...

In fact, Quall claimed that before the cancellation, WGN-TV made a search to “find other films of other faiths of comparable controversial nature to balance the Luther film showing but that none could be located.” Quall said the station even considered a sermon by Bishop Fulton J. Sheen or one of the currently running WGN-TV religious programs but none offered “implied or actual criticism of another religion that stirs up controversy.” Quall also reasoned this was “not the time of year, when all Christians of all denominations celebrate the birth of Christ, to put something that controversial on the air.”

The Lutheran group bought none of this argument and drafted a strongly worded, carefully considered protest and called an emergency press conference that same day. The protest requested WGN-TV to “declare their independence [from] any sectarian censorship” and televise the film *Martin Luther*. And it asked Chicagoans of all faiths “to view the film and see with their own eyes how groundless are the fears of those who seek to suppress it.”
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

The Escalation

Meanwhile the reaction to the cancellation was swift and deafening, echoing both in Chicago and around the nation. The Chicago Daily News reported "a WGN-TV spokesman said the decision to drop the film had evoked the greatest response from viewers in the station's history,"57

Monsignor E.M. Burke, chancellor of the Chicago Catholic archdiocese said:

The chancery office here made no protest over the showing of the film, nor did Cardinal Stritch. We have not made any representations to WGN-TV in any way. As far as the 1,800,000 Catholics here [in Chicago] are concerned, it was an individual matter if they saw fit to protest against a film they considered historically inaccurate, if not downright insulting.58

Time magazine wrote:

The TV show that made the biggest splash in Chicago last week was one that nobody got to see ... The National Council of Churches called the cancellation "a blow to religious liberty." Cried an American Civil Liberties Union Spokesman, "This thing is outrageous! If people don't like a TV movie they can turn it off, but they have no business trying to coerce a TV station into keeping others from seeing it. . ."59

Newsweek magazine reported:

WGN-TV, a subsidiary of the often-outspoken Chicago Tribune, canceled a scheduled showing of "Martin Luther" . . . The reason given by the . . . Tribune: an "emotional reaction" allegedly coming from Roman Catholics in the city. Chicago Protestants preferred to call it censorship. . .60

The lead editorial in the Chicago Daily News on that cold, December, Friday suggested an "excessive timidity" on the part of WGN-TV,61 and, as the dispute wore on, Chicago columnist Mabley became more and more incredulous over events. He wrote:

The controversy is ... developing into virtually a religious holy war. And what is the basis for the whole dispute? The stupidity of one television station, a station that booked this film without giving a thought to its potential explosiveness.62

As the Christmas holiday drew closer, a "yule truce"63 between WGN-TV and the Lutheran protest committee went into effect. Clifford Dahlin, spokesman for the group, disclosed that a meeting was scheduled between WGN-TV officials and the committee sometime in early January and he said, "We interpret the station's agreement to meet with us an indication it will reconsider [broadcasting] the movie."64 Then, in what appeared to be more a gesture of damage...
control than good-will, WGN-TV extended an invitation to televise the Christmas Day Service at St. Andrew's Evangelical Lutheran Church on Addison Street in Chicago. A spokesman for WGN-TV said, "the station had been trying for six weeks to schedule a Protestant service."65 The Reverend Doctor Martin Pithier, executive secretary of the Northern Illinois District of the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod, said, "We told WGN-TV [that] the televising of the Christmas service would not influence our protest [of the cancellation of Martin Luther] in any way."66 WGN-TV's Quall said, "We have made an agreement with the Protestant committee not to discuss the issue any further during the holy season."67 But agreeing to no public discussion did not prevent the Lutheran committee to engage in private discussion by way of correspondence, phone calls, telegrams, and organizational meetings.

The Lutheran protest committee grew, literally, within just a few days, from 27 to 45 members including a two deans of the Federated Theological Seminary of the University of Chicago, a representative of the McCormick Theological seminary, a rabbi, and officials from African Methodist Episcopal, Unitarian, Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Congregational, and Evangelical Mission Covenant churches.68 In addition, a 16 mm copy of Martin Luther was secured by Bethany Union Church, a non-denominational church on Chicago's west side, and on Christmas Eve, at 8 p.m. there was a free, open to the public viewing of the picture. The Pastor of the Bethany Union, Reverend James Gordon Gilky, Jr., said, "We are making this a spiritual message for the New Year. A little historical accuracy will more than counterbalance our suffering under Catholic bishops and masses on the airwaves."69 Other neighborhood churches also began running the "banned" film.70 The Christian Science Monitor reported, "hundreds of people are [coming] see the picture -- at meetings where relatively small numbers of people normally would be expected. At least half of these viewers are strangers."71

WGN-TV Vs. the Protest Committee

The Chicago Christmas of 1956 came and went without incident in the matter, and as 1957 began, the Lutheran Action Committee readied themselves for the scheduled January 8, meeting with WGN-TV management. There was genuine speculation that WGN-TV was going to reverse
The Chicago Television “Holy War” of 1956-1957

its decision and allow the film to be shown some time in January or February. The entertainment
ewspaper, Variety, said in part:

There is a strong possibility that WGN-TV will air the Martin Luther bio-pic after all . . .
Although no official confirmation is forthcoming, it’s understood WGN-TV execs are
seriously considering beaming the film as a public service to set the record straight on several
of the points that have been [raised] in the whirlwind of controversy stirred up by the
cancellation . . . [I]t’ll be accompanied by a statement outlining the stations position . . .72

Various members of the Lutheran Action Committee and other church representatives were
invited to WGN-TV that cold Wednesday morning to reason together. What the churchmen
thought would be a rational, give-and-take discussion, did not happen. Instead, Lee, who was in
attendance, wrote “a more amazing session we have never experienced.”73 WGN-TV’s Quall was
on the defensive at the meeting’s outset and, “completely missing the point,”74 believed the
Protestants were there to challenge the stations current religious programming. The committee
tried to clarify that the reason they were there was to discuss getting the the film Martin Luther
broadcast, and for no other reason. The then 34 year old Quall, who had taken over the general
management of WGN-TV only five months earlier,75 made it clear to the committee that he was
raised in the Lutheran faith and “claimed he had been abused and affronted by segments of the
public since the announcement of the cancellation.”76 Quall also explained, “There was no
pressure put upon me by anybody except certain individuals in the Christian movement on the
ultra-conservative side who got angry with me when I said I was going to pull this [movie] during
the season of the year when we celebrate the birth of Christ.”77 Quall next proclaimed to the
committee that in Chicago there was a “deep well of religious bitterness and hate”78 and because of
that sense, the station had already decided not to telecast Martin Luther now or at any time in the
future.

Lee’s recollection of the next few minutes is priceless:

As an exhibit in support of their position, an aide wheeled in a steel-wire market basket full
of letters and telegrams. The [Lutheran] group argued vainly that these messages, if they
could be audited, would reveal an aroused public motivated by freedom rather than bitterness.
Somewhere in the midst of this animated meeting, a public relations man was called upon to
quote a tribute to Mr. Quall that had appeared last summer in the Congressional Record.
The meeting broke up as an obvious impasse has been reached.79
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

This pivotal meeting confirmed that the decision to ban the movie was made before the church committee got there, and that there would be no further debate regarding the broadcasting of the film through the facilities of WGN-TV. However, that certainly did not mean the discussion was over. It was, in fact, just beginning.

The Quickening

Reaction to the behavior of WGN-TV was swift. Dr. Paul C. Empie, executive director of the National Lutheran Council and president of Lutheran Church Productions, producer of Martin Luther, said: "Instead of contributing to the religious traditions of mutual respect and tolerance, [WGN-TV] has slapped the face of Protestant America and has indeed heightened the tensions between religious groups."80

In a press release by the News Bureau of the National Lutheran Council, Lee said:

The meeting demonstrated an astounding duplicity on the part of station management, who while admitting [privately] they had made a mistake in canceling the film, were unwilling to rectify the matter. They have thus compounded a controversy they precipitated when they first surrendered their own carefully considered judgment of the public interest ...

Frustrated by its dealings with WGN-TV management, the action committee drafted a new strategy. Topping the list was committee authorization to lodge a formal protest with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) against WGN-TV for banning the film after a full review of the controversy. The formal complaint "would be based on the violation of the station's public interest responsibility by its act of permitting de facto censorship."81 The committee next retained Washington attorney, Frank Ketcham, as its counsel before the FCC and to act as consultant to a battery of lawyers in Chicago working on the case. Finally, the committee changed its official name to the Action Committee for Freedom of Religious Expression (ACFRE).

Press releases regarding the cancellation were hastily written and sent to local and national media outlets from the news bureau of the National Lutheran Council (NLC). The NCL's conscious strategy was to put public pressure on WGN-TV by keeping the issue alive in the secular press, and by framing the controversy as one of a threat to individual freedom and liberty. In one release, the Clifford Dahlin, executive director of the Lutheran Council of Greater
The Chicago Television “Holy War” of 1956-1957

Chicago, is quoted as saying: “...no one will likely soon forget that freedom-loving Chicagoans treasure deeply their American liberties and will actively resist every effort to curtail them...

[They] will be constantly vigilant against any threatened curtailment of our liberties.”

In the same press release Lee said,

We simply cannot understand the vacillation of the management of WGN-TV in this issue. When the showing was summarily canceled just before Christmas the station said it was acting to avoid ill will during the “Holy Season.” [Yet] it had already privately told us it was at the receiving end of pressure from high Roman Catholic sources.

More Missteps by WGN-TV

In another in what can only be described as a series of public relations blunders, Quall and his WGN-TV management team wrote and had mimeographed hundreds of “Dear Viewer” letters. The idea being to send one of these standardized, impersonal responses to any viewer-at-large who wrote with a comment about the Martin Luther issue. The letter, on WGN-TV stationery, was cordial in tone but verbose and self-congratulatory, first thanking the viewer for his or her opinion then saying:

The station elected to cancel the showing of the film, not wanting to be a party to the development of any misunderstanding or ill-will among persons of the Christian faith in the Chicago area. We are genuinely proud of our great record of service in religious programming. The citations and commendations received by this company for its religious broadcasts are proof positive of the efforts put forth to program in behalf of all the people we are licensed by the Federal Government to serve.

Unfortunately, dozens of churchmen, ministers, reverends, and executive directors of large and significant Protestant organizations had their thoughtful letters and urgent telegrams to the station answered with the same WGN-TV form letter. This caused Henry Endress, an official of the Lutheran Church in America, to write back angrily to Quall:

Your letter I must confess irritated me for it tried to appease without coming to grips with the real issues before us. Such a letter insults another man's intelligence...

Your letter, to be more exact, should be reworded to read that you do not want to be “a party to the development of any misunderstanding or ill-will among persons of the Roman Catholic faith in the Chicago area.” All Protestants of the Chicago area (and they are Christians, too) have a “misunderstanding,” or, understand only too well. You have generated much ill-will... I don't think you ought to be proud or boast of other religious use of public service time on WGN. Both of us are fully aware that this represents a fulfillment of the terms of your license set down by the FCC... [T]he real question is “What did you, your station, and newspaper do when
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

put to the test on the freedom of religion and speech?" I also want to add that we feel the Christmas "cease fire" request was a rather shoddy maneuver on the part of WGN-TV to take off the heat. And it is greatly resented by all concerned.87

As the letters and phone calls continued to pour in to WGN-TV, ACFRE's Washington attorney, Ketcham, was trying one last maneuver to get the station to rescind cancellation of the film before serious legal proceedings began. He would try to get officials of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters (NARTB),88 the broadcasters lobby, to reason with Quall. Ketcham explained the situation to Harold Fellows, NARTB president, and Fellows called Quall at WGN-TV on January 14, while Ketcham listened in.

Fellows told Quall that because of the way the controversy had been handled, the ACFRE was prepared to take steps before the Magnuson committee89 in Congress and the Federal Communications Commission. Quall said he was sorry he had "got into this mess with the Martin Luther film and that he did not know the movie had been booked until his wife read about it in the paper."90 He also said the film was scheduled, "without his knowledge"91 by Bain.

In addition, Quall indicated that the management of the Chicago Tribune, parent company of WGN-TV, was "very much aware"92 of the situation and felt "that they had been in trouble before and they could ride this one through,"93 too. Fellows reminded Quall of the potential legal costs, the bad public relations being created, and "expressed his feelings very strongly."94 Fellows also suggested Quall call Ketcham and "work something out."95 Quall seemed to agree and said he would "do what he could"96 with the Tribune organization and would call Ketcham or Fellows by noon of the next day.

Ketcham heard nothing from Quall the next day and found out later Quall had talked with Ed Bronson, another official of the NARTB, about getting an extension on the deadline until Thursday, January 17, at 6 p.m. Bronson said he could not speak for the ACFRE in Chicago but was willing to pass along Quall's question to the group, which he did.97 The ACFRE, now completely frustrated by WGN-TV's stall tactics and past duplicity, felt as though it had no option but to proceed with the formal complaint to the FCC and to also explain the turn of events to
Formal Legal Action Begins

Despite all the behind the scenes machinations and numerous face-saving options, the vice president and general manager of Channel 9, Ward QuaI, would not change his decision: the Martin Luther film would not be shown on WGN-TV. On February 6, 1957, in simultaneous announcements made in Chicago, Washington and New York, word was released from the Lutheran Action Committee of its plans to petition the FCC, asking that WGN-TV’s license to broadcast be revoked because it was acting contrary to the public interest.

Senator Magnuson and his chief of staff were promptly contacted and, in a session taking two hours, were thoroughly briefed on the controversy by attorney Ketcham. Magnuson considered this “a very serious incident” and planned to “express to the FCC that he feels they have ample authority to act in this matter.” Magnuson asked the FCC for a further investigation of the issue and wanted to be appraised of the result. To underscore the seriousness of the controversy, the Magnuson committee told the FCC that it would “watch the whole operation with a careful eye.”

The Commonweal, a Roman Catholic weekly, published a most powerful and damning editorial in its February 15, issue against perceived Catholic interference in banning the film. So passionate was its argument, the editorial was used as Exhibit B in the ACFRE’s FCC petition. In comments that are surprisingly similar to the arguments currently being heard regarding censorship on the Internet and world wide web, the editorial said in part:

[A few misguided] Catholics have damaged the fabric our our society because they have place in jeopardy the still undefined “freedom” of the TV screen. Television does not yet enjoy the guarantees that have been defined for speech, the press, and increasingly for the screen. TV stations have shown that they are particularly susceptible -- all too susceptible -- to pressures from the audience. Those Catholics in Chicago who objected to the showing of Martin Luther took advantage of these weaknesses to deprive other citizens of the film. . . .Whether the Catholics were organized or not, their pressure caused a television station to cancel the showing of Martin Luther.

On Wednesday, February 19, 1957, the ACFRE filed a formal pleading in Washington with the Federal Communications Commission saying in part:
[WGN-TV] acted in an authoritarian, paternalistic way and has set itself up as the supreme arbiter of what is in the public good. It has turned its back on freedom . . . We assert, that a broadcast licensee cannot refuse to telemcast a program of religious or controversial nature because in its opinion it might offend people who have contrary opinions. To condone such behavior would be to strike a body blow at our democratic institutions.

The pleading was filed together with petitions signed by 150,000 Chicagoans urging the FCC to act on the case. The petitions were coming in at the rate of 50,000 per week and were so voluminous could not be physically brought to Washington and shown as exhibits. The documents were instead stored in a large, empty office on Dearborn Street in Chicago.

In light of the gathering storm, Chicago Daily News columnist Jack Mabley said WGN-TV should “admit that a mistake was made” and called for the “voluntary rescheduling” of Martin Luther. He then observed:

The fight over the banning of this movie no longer is pitting faith against faith. Rather it is uniting people of many faiths against one television station they believe is guilty of abridging freedom of religious expression.

“The World Television Premier,” in Milwaukee

Sometime during the swirling controversy, archival records do not pinpoint exactly when, Lutheran Church Productions was contacted by the Lutheran Men in America of Wisconsin to see if it could make arrangements to broadcast the film in Milwaukee. Lee was concerned that such a move would hurt the public relations strategy of the the committee and may even have an impact on the pending FCC complaint. He brought the question before the Chicago committee and after a lengthy discussion, approval was given. If a station and sponsor could be found, Martin Luther would have its world television première in Milwaukee, Wisconsin -- a town only 72 miles south of Chicago.

Television station WISN-TV, Channel 12, agreed to show the film on Friday, March 8, 1957 at 10:30 p.m. WISN-TV general manager John B. Soell identified the broadcast as “a programming and commercial venture [which] we feel will make interesting television fare.”

The American Research Bureau (ARB), headquartered in New York, did a telephone coincidental survey of about 700 Milwaukee area homes during the broadcast. ARB determined that of all the television sets turned on that evening, which was a little more than 47 per cent of the
The Chicago Television “Holy War” of 1956-1957

total, the movie *Martin Luther* attracted a remarkable 56.1 per cent share of the audience, garnering a 26.6 rating -- numbers unheard of for late-night (10:30 p.m.-12:00 m.) viewing. Suffice it to say, WISN-TV was pleased with the film’s ratings performance, the sponsor, Joseph Zilber of Towne Realty, received 62 new business prospects and said “the expenditure on *Martin Luther* was the best money [I] spent for advertising,” and Lutheran Productions were relieved to finally learn that “the movie would pay for itself on TV.”

About a week after the announcement of the “world première” of *Martin Luther* on Milwaukee television -- a story widely reported in Chicago newspapers -- Monsignor Edward M. Burke, chancellor of the Chicago Roman Catholic Archdioceses, issued his second statement on the controversy. In *The New World*, the “official paper of the Archdiocese of Chicago and the Diocese of Joliet,” Burke said, in part:

The recent cancellation of ... the film *Martin Luther* has resulted in ... protests implicitly suggesting the Archdiocese of Chicago was responsible for its cancellation. This false assumption persists despite our denials. That some Catholics have exercised their democratic right as citizens to protest the showing of a film which, in their estimation, is historically inaccurate and in part derogatory, is not surprising or unexpected. ... What ... is surprising is that the protests of individual Catholics should be interpreted ... as the action and policy of the Archdiocese ... If a television station deems that the *Martin Luther* film is a positive presentation of religious beliefs, and then decides to show it, we will not protest the decision in any way whatsoever. We of course, reserve the right to express ourselves on the film’s historical accuracy and the manner in which it portrays the Catholic Church.

In the same issue, *The New World* ran a front page editorial condemning the film and describing it as a “controversial and hate-provoking movie ... [featuring] material that could not fail to create or increase tension.” *The Chicago Sun-Times* reported the editorial went on to “further criticize ... elements of the biographical film itself and the means by which its supporters have sought to get it rescheduled by WGN-TV.”

Then, in a surprising release made on the same day as Burke’s statement, Sterling C. “Red” Quinlan, vice president and general manager of WKBK-TV, said:

I see no reason why [WKBK-TV] should not run this film ... [Should Roman Catholic objection] through the church arise, [WKBK-TV would be happy to give] equal time [to the church] for discussion.
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

The Telecast in Chicago

The events leading up to these intriguing new developments are more than a little coincidental. What appears to have happened was, while the controversy raged in Chicago, Lutheran Productions had quietly reached an agreement with Quinlan and WKBK-TV to telecast the controversial film on April 23, 1957 -- two days before Easter. By positioning WKBK-TV as the community sensitive television station, by "taking the high road" in the controversy, and "doing the fair thing" by extending "equal time" to the church for Catholic rebuttal and discussion, Quinlan scored a marketing and public relations coup. *The Christian Science Monitor* also pointed out that this "seemed to indicate . . . that the only kind of protest [WKBK-TV] would recognize would have to come from the Roman Catholic [Archdiocese] . . . By implication, [Quinlan] leaves no loophole for cancellation of the movie."118

When the rescheduling of the film was announced, the Action Committee for Freedom of Religious Expression withdrew their FCC petition against WGN-TV. Action committee chairman, Dr. John Harms said the group would not disband but would continue on a permanent basis to "exercise vigilance that such censorship does not happen in the future."119

So, after three tortuous and contentious months, Chicago viewers would finally have the chance to watch the motion picture *Martin Luther* on television and decide for themselves what all the fuss was about. However, the controversy did not end. In *The New World* a week before the telecast of the motion picture on WBKB-TV, another front-page editorial appeared. The editorial was crafted as a public service announcement; it did not directly challenge WBKB-TV's "right" to show the film based on the Lutheran's perspective of the 16th Century Reformation leader. It did, however, at length and in great detail, cite the NARTB television Code for handling religious programs. The editorial further congratulates WGN-TV for having "observed the Code with excellent judgment."120 The inferred accusation being WKBK-TV is doing quite the opposite and thereby breaking the code by showing the picture.121 In addition *The New World* presented a full page review of the movie in what it termed an attempt to show "falsifications, misrepresentations and omissions" in the film.122
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

Finally, after all the hype and gnashing of teeth, on April 23, 1957, at 10 p.m., after paying $10,000 for the "privilege" to sponsor it, Robert Kendler of Community Builders sat before the WKBK-TV cameras and presented the movie Martin Luther to the viewers of Chicago.

For the next 105 minutes the film played without commercial interruption. Just as it had done in Milwaukee the month before, ARB conducted a special telephone coincidental rating survey the night of April 23, 1957 and found that 55% of all sets-in-use were tuned to Martin Luther, which garnered a huge 28.2 rating. WKBK-TV received 182 phone calls of which 121 were favorable to the film, and 61 protested the picture. The station also received a total of 263 letters, all but nine of which praised the film or the station for carrying the film. Such was the case for Martin Luther wherever it was telecast.

The Catholic Mystery Visitor

The question of whether the Catholic church intervened at the highest levels still remained unanswered. Who was that mystery person that visited Ward Quall? What was his or her relationship to the the Catholic Archdiocese and why would that visit strike fear in Quall's heart?

As best as it can be determined, based upon archival information at the Chicago Catholic Archdiocese, the person who visited WGN-TV to complain on December 14, 1956, was probably the Right Reverend Monsignor Edward J. Kelly, executive director of the Archdiocesan Union of Holy Name Societies. A letter was sent by Kelly to Burke in perhaps a response to an investigation by the Chancellor's office inquiring who might have touched-off the Luther film controversy. The missive was attached to another letter, copies of which were mimeographed and sent to the presidents of all Holy Name Societies in parishes throughout the Chicago Archdiocese. The letter looks quite impressive and full of the authority of the church; it is printed on the "Archdiocesan Union of Holy Name Societies of Chicago" letter head, and Cardinal Samuel A. Stritch's name is printed in the top middle of the page. Ostensibly, the letter asks for help to protest the showing of Martin Luther, giving the phone number and address of WGN-TV and suggesting "the letter or phone message... be brief and to the point, namely that the film is offensive because of its theological and historical errors, and as such, is an affront to the Catholic population in the Chicago area." It also says:
The Chicago Television “Holy War” of 1956-1957

The tremendous influence for evil and the confusion that the showing of this film on TV could create in this Catholic archdiocese, places upon each of us, and particularly the leaders of our Holy Name Societies, the obligation of making an immediate protest to W.G.N.-T.V. ... From the Catholic viewpoint, this film ... [is] not only inaccurate but completely unacceptable.127

However, it is Kelly’s cover letter which is more intriguing. In it Kelly wrote to Burke:

You will note that [the attached] letter in no way implicated the Chancery Office or the top officials of the archdiocese. It was an individual project inspired by the lay members of our executive committee. I hope this will remove any doubt as to where this action was initiated.128

Was Kelly “explaining” the chain events to the Chancery, or was he “covering up” what really happened by conjuring a paper trail? I would suggest, one’s interpretation may depend entirely upon one’s religious affiliation. In a personal letter Burke did confirm “that a priest called upon the [television] station a day or so before they (sic) canceled the showing of Martin Luther.” Burke said, “the priest however was merely an assistant in the parish [having] no authority from ... the Chancery Office to make an official protest.”129

Although Burke appeared to be above the fray he clearly knew and disapproved of the proposed broadcast of the film and worked behind the scenes to squelch the showing. Records indicate Burke believed “it was shameful that such a movie should play in Chicago [which he viewed as] a Catholic city.”130 Burke even called to complain to Green, Kirkland, and Ellis, the law firm which represented both the Tribune and the Archdiocese. The law firm passed the word that the “chancery office is very unhappy”131 about the coming broadcast and the pressure was on. In a telling exchange between Burke and Chicago labor leader Saul Alinsky, with whom he had a close, almost brotherly relationship, Burke reportedly said, “Saul ... [m]y mind’s made up. You’re a great guy, I love you, but you’re not a Catholic and don’t understand it ... furthermore, your Jewish, so it isn’t even your fight. It’s strictly between us and the goddamned Protestants.”132 In fairness, one should be mindful that this was an era of tough-talking Big Business, Big Labor, Big Government, and Big Religion. In a “corporate” sense, Burke could be viewed as a mid-level manager of a powerful concern doing what he had to do to protect the interests of the business. In this case “the business” was the Chicago Catholic church.
What Really Happened

Whether or not the priestly visit to WGN-TV actually bore the full authority of the Chicago Archdiocese is less an issue than how general manager Quall perceived and reacted to the visit. In an off-the-record conversation with Lee, Richard B. Philbrick, the religion editor of the Chicago Tribune, told Lee that he had investigated the situation and “knew exactly what had happened.” Philbrick’s behind-the-scenes illumination of the Martin Luther ban is one of chaos, indecision, and fear at WGN-TV. According to Philbrick, Quall did not know the film had been scheduled and the Monday after Quall’s meeting with Monsignor Kelly is when the angry phone calls began to pour into the station. It was at this point “Mr. Quall became emotionally upset.” Philbrick recalled, Quall “was ill prepared for such an occurrence and made no effort to identify the person[s] calling [the TV station, nor did he] arrange in any way for the calls to be routed” to other managers for disposition. As the pressure grew, “Quall was unwilling to face the decision himself and went to the top management of the Tribune organization.”

At that time a triumvirate ran the vast Tribune newspaper and broadcasting empire: Chesser M. Campbell, president of the Tribune organization; J. Howard Wood, vice president/general manager; and W.D. Maxwell, managing editor of the Chicago Tribune. On August 1, 1956, Wood had hired Quall to run WGN-TV after the station “had been evidently deteriorating in earning power and influence.” Apparently Quall’s brand of management was working because by “November, 1956, WGN-TV was enjoying the best [financial] year in its nine year history.” Clearly, Quall was an experienced, trusted, major player -- highly regarded by the Tribune. Moreover, one of Quall’s conditions for assuming the general managership at WGN-TV “was that he would have complete authority over the station.” Quall, therefore, could have decided unilaterally on the Martin Luther controversy but he “became upset over facing this decision” and contacted Wood “to ask what to do.” It is not clear why, but Wood “passed the buck to Maxwell” and it was W.D. Maxwell, the Chicago Tribune’s managing editor, not Quall, who made the decision that the film would not be telecast by WGN-TV. As the incident mushroomed, Quall is said to have even telephoned Illinois Senator Everett Dirkson to ask what to
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

Before the January 8, 1957, Lutheran protest committee meeting at WGN-TV, Quall "had gone on record indicating to the group that [the Luther movie] would be shown and had worked out such an arrangement with the sponsors."142 But, when Quall "checked back with Maxwell about this, Maxwell was not prepared to reverse his decision and order[ed] that it stand as he had originally made it."143 This left Quall appearing utterly duplicitous when he met with the Action Committee.

In an extraordinary memo, Lee recounted the conversation between him and Philbrick:

The three men who are in control of the Chicago Tribune ... do not understand the real principals involved in this matter. Mr. Philbrick himself has tried to point out to them that whether they say so or not, the conclusion is clear that the film was canceled to yield to Roman Catholic Pressure. Never the less, he says that the three gentlemen involved have really no understanding of the principles as such, and are motivated by pure business judgment. He reiterated that all three men are Protestants and [that] their position could not be explained on ... religious ground[s].144

A business decision indeed. At that time Chicago was the site of the largest concentration of Catholic faith followers anywhere in the United States. In 1955 the Archdiocese of Cardinal Stritch claimed "2 million practicing Catholics, 400 parishes, 2,000 priests, 9,000 nuns, roughly 300,000 parochial school pupils. Between 1948 and 1958, the archdiocese opened an average of six new parishes a year."145 Other estimates say "half of Chicago's 3.5 million people were Catholic in 1956."146 The point being, WGN-TV/Tribune management saw any alienation of the massive Catholic television audience as possibly having an impact on its bottom line. Although this controversy prompted heated public debate of first amendment freedoms across the nation, such issues were not even considered in the WGN-TV/Tribune decision to cancel the motion picture. When it came to running the TV business, these managers did not live with a top of mind awareness of the principles of democracy. Clearly, their prime objective, their key motivation was not some amorphous concept of freedom and liberty, but profit. Any program which even potentially could upset the audience/advertiser relationship was likely to be eliminated.

Discussion

I have no doubt that the primary reason the film was pulled was economic, but, for the
purposes of this specific discussion, there seems to be a deeper question: What was it about the mid-1950s which caused men and women of faith to behave with such passion over this film? What was it about the cultural and religious Zeitgeist that caused this volatile environment?

Such answers, I suggest, might be found woven within the fibers of the great transitional decade of the 1950s itself. The period was marked by the "inertia [and] timorous conformity [of] an entire generation."\textsuperscript{147} Alan Ehrenhalt called it "a world for which Wonder Bread and Black and White TV are appropriate symbols."\textsuperscript{148} In fact, Ehrenhalt sketches a most descriptive sociological picture of Chicago in the 1950s. He writes:

\ldots most people [of the time] believed, as many of us have ceased to believe, there were natural limits to life. They understood, whether they lived in a bungalow, tenement, or suburb, that choice and privacy were restricted commodities, and that authority existed, in large part, to manage the job of restricting them. Most people were prepared to live with this bargain most of the time, And they believed in one other important idea that has been lost in decades since: they believed in the existence of sin. The Chicago of the 1950s was a time and place in which ordinary people lived with good and evil, right and wrong, sins and sinners, in a way that is almost incomprehensible to most of us. \ldots \textsuperscript{149}

In this remarkable time of conformity and unexpected postwar prosperity, which saw the beginning of the three martini lunch, interstate highways and suburban Levittowns, the Cold War, and the so-called "baby boom" (76.4 million born between 1946 and 1964),\textsuperscript{150} Americans of the 1950s seemed to be losing many of their old reference points. These were the people that found their life's anchors "in the familiar places: family, religion, patriotism of the hokiest and most maudlin variety \ldots in the Holy Name Society \ldots in Bishop Sheen and Walt Disney."\textsuperscript{151}

There was, in addition, a powerful kind of anticommunist religious revival happening after the war and throughout the 1950s. This was not only the era of Joe McCarthy's red-baiting, it was also the time of Dwight Eisenhower's presidential prayer breakfasts along with his assertion that "our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith."\textsuperscript{152} During President Eisenhower's 1953 inaugural parade "wealthy contributors showed off their jewelry and mink coats while riding in limousines lined up behind 'God's Float' at the head of the procession."\textsuperscript{153} Even postwar roadside billboards announced "the family that prays together, stays together."\textsuperscript{154} And pray America did with the evangelistic crusades of Billy Graham, Norman
Vincent Peale's mass call to the power of faith, and Catholic Bishop Fulton J. Sheen's popular TV program in which he frequently equated Christianity (and anticommunism) with Americanism. This was also the decade in which a majority in the United States Congress approved stamping on all currency the phrase "in God we trust." and inserting the words "under God" into the pledge of allegiance. George Lipsitz identifies this mixing of popular religion with the state as an "important ideological justification for consumer capitalism . . . anticommunism, and . . . moral authority in the fifties." Clearly, God was a major strand of the dominant ideology in mid-twentieth century, and belief in religious faith was the key to access the almighty. Lipsitz further argues that the states' incorporation of well-known anticommunist religious leaders into the "corporate-liberal consensus" was an example of clerics promulgating a kind of community or civil religion.

Because "Communists" stood for atheism, the U.S. government could be portrayed as an agent of God, while support for its foreign and domestic policy interests could be presented as part of a divine obligation beyond question or debate.

Socioreligious scholars Eugene Lipman and Albert Vorspan did a study of the three major religions in ten American cities in the 1950s and they concluded: Protestants, Catholics, and Jews were "in unblushing competition with each other, [not so much] for the individual souls of Americans, but for the soul of America itself." This distinction is quite profound; the big three religions, as well as ministering to their flocks, were in the hunt for political power in order to have a hand in configuring the domestic and foreign policy of a nation. Clearly, there is political strength in numbers and, says religion historian, Martin E. Marty, with more true believers in a given faith comes a greater "opportunity to shape American culture in the image of the religious ethic of each." Marty observes that such behavior is not new, "mainstream Protestants behaved in the exact way during the founding of the nation, and now, with American Catholics accounting for about fifty million believers, it was their turn."

In addition, there has been an invariable historic friction between Catholics and Protestants. Marty posits that this obvious class tension existed between the religions because Protestant had been the religion of the most privileged group "from 1607 until at least the middle of the
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

twentieth century," whereas Catholic had been the faith of the poor, the uneducated, the
superstitious. Also, explains Marty, Protestants were afraid of the monolithic Catholic church,
since "Protestantism itself had never been monolithic or homogenized. It was broken into scores
of denominations, a fact Catholics brought up whenever the issue of true faiths arose."  

In describing portions of Paul Blanchard's incendiary book, *Communism, Democracy, and
Catholic Power*, John T. McGreevy said Blanchard:

...defined Catholicism and Soviet communism as parallel threats to America
democracy ... Blanchard described nuns as belonging to "an age when women allegedly
enjoyed subjugation and reveled in self-abasement," professed shock that any sensible
individual could acknowledge an apparition of Mary, blamed Catholics for producing the
bulk of white criminals, and termed the parochial school "the most important divisive
instrument in the life of American children."

Revered liberal thinkers of the day such as John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, McGeorge
Bundy, even Albert Einstein, commented favorably on Blanchard's work. Such was the
intellectual mood of the country at the time.

The same contemptuous tone found in Blanchard's work can be revisited in some of the
letters written to Lee and Burke during the *Martin Luther* controversy. One missive, for example,
sent to Lee, dated February 4, 1957, and signed by "A. Lutheran" read:

[I fought] the Roman Catholic Church [and] their contemptible business of shaking
down the working man at the paymaster's window. I, a Lutheran, won that fight. W.L.
Quall and his gang do not possess the courage to fight this Roman Catholic monster, or else
they are of the same breed. Station WGN should be given the boycott treatment so
effectively used by the Roman Catholic Church in milking the businessman of large sums
of money ... Mr. W.L. Quall, words cannot express the contempt [I have] for you
and your rotten outfit.

Or this letter of April 20, 1957, from Frances Armstrong of Kankakee, to Burke:

The prompt action of Chicago's gallant laymen effectively banned the film from TV. But
now, you, Chancellor, [have] abdicated [your] apostolic duty and invited any TV station ... to bring the enemies of the Church into every home in the area ... This incompetence and
deplorable bungling is an embarrassment to self-respecting Catholics everywhere ... WBKB-
TV has graciously consented to grant the Chancery office equal time if [it] requests it. If the
Chicago Chancery office is too cowardly to defend their church in public, I suggest [it] turn
the "equal time" over to Knights of Columbus.

Anger, distrust and cynicism between Catholics and Protestants ran deep during the days
prior to the sweeping changes and *aggornimento* of Vatican II. Lee now believes the legacy of
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

the Luther movie can be summed-up by the thoughts of his colleague Dr. Paul C. Empie.\textsuperscript{171} Empie saw the film as "catalytic in bringing Lutherans and Roman Catholics together."\textsuperscript{172} Martin Luther is now "being used at Roman Catholic high schools, colleges and seminaries to introduce"\textsuperscript{173} the teachings of Luther, Lee explained and added, "after Vatican II the theologians worked through many of the issues" with which the film dealt.\textsuperscript{174} He also points out that during the summer of 1997 the Assembly of Congregations of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America "voted resolutions of . . . reconciliation and agreement with the Roman Catholic Church. . ."\textsuperscript{175} Lee graciously accepts this as a fitting and satisfactory conclusion to the bizarre story of the Chicago television "Holy War" of 1956-1957.
The Chicago Television “Holy War” of 1956-1957

Notes:

1. The film starred Niall McGinnis as Martin Luther. McGinnis was a well known English stage and movie actor of the era. Other cast members were international actors, some French, some German, but largely character actors from the legitimate British stage.

2. An indulgence is the remission of temporal punishment of a sin after the guilt has been taken away by the Catholic sacrament of Penance. Think of it as a “pardon,” a way to do less time in purgatory, and thereby, get to heaven faster. See: Kevin Orlin Johnson, Why do Catholics Do That: A Guide to the Teachings and Practices of the Catholic Church, (New York: Ballantine, 1994), 92-95.


4. The Catholics were not only upset by the way the actors portrayed key church figures of the time, they were also piqued by how their beliefs and rituals were “distorted” by the film. The litany of Catholic complaints include: the perversion of the Catholic veneration of relics (i.e., the remains of holy persons or their possessions); the Catholic use of statues; Luther’s “wrongful” teachings (i.e., the “incorrect” way Luther interpreted the bible) as well as Luther’s political relationship with the German Princes and with Luther’s “lifestyle”; the “exaggerated” conditions of the Catholic church in Luther’s time. For a detailed Catholic refutation of the film see: Reverend Edward A. Miller, The Martin Luther Motion Picture: Unhistorical, Unbiblical, Unfair (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, 1953), 1-32. The Catholic Legion of Decency (LOD) gave the film a “Separate Classification;” the first time that category was used since 1938. For an excellent account of how Martin Luther was critically received upon its debut at the cinema see—Gregory D. Black, The Catholic Crusade Against the Movies, 1940-1975 (New York: Cambridge, 1997), 128-132. It should be made clear other than the LOD’s “rating” there was no “official” Catholic stance on the film but many bishops and other individual priests issued refutations on one point or another (e.g., the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Lacrosse, Wisconsin labeled the film “communist propaganda” and accused the producers of being either communists or fellow travelers.) Letter: Robert E. A. Lee to Bob Pondillo, 27 January 1998. Author’s personal correspondence.

5. Lutheran Church Productions was organized as a not-for-profit corporation whose members at the time of the WGN-TV/Martin Luther controversy were the National Lutheran Council, American Lutheran Church, Augustana Lutheran Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church, Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod, and United Lutheran Church in America. It was this group which raised the $500,000 that financed the film Martin Luther. Press release: “Martin Luther Movie Banned in Quebec,” Religious News Service, 29 December 1953, Lutheran Church Productions/Martin Luther -- 1956-1957, box 6 folder 2. Helen Knubel Archives of Cooperative Lutheranism, Chicago, Ill.


7. WKBK-TV would later change its call letters to WLS-TV.

The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


13. The film was nominated for (black and white) Best Cinematography, and Best Art Direction. Contact <http://www.abc.com/oscar/archives/index_archives.html> Also: Flyer: TV sales presentation, no date. Lutheran Church Productions/Martin Luther -- 1956-1957. Box 6, folder 3.

14. The motion picture had many stormy moments. Upon its theatrical release, Martin Luther was banned in Quebec, Canada by the Provincial Premier after a request from an "ecclesiastical authority." Censors banned the movie in the Philippines saying, "No picture which touches on the fundamental beliefs of any religion and at the same time ridicules another, is permitted to be exhibited ..." It was also banned in Lima, Peru by the Catholic Archbishop (or so said the censor who refused to talk about the matter), as well as the country of Brazil but, because of worldwide protests, the government reversed itself and the film was finally shown to enthusiastic crowds in Sao Paulo. See: Robert E. A. Lee, "Censorship: A Case History," The Christian Century, 6 February 1957.


17. The text of the Legion's pledge reads: "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. I promise to promote by word and deed what is morally and artistically good in motion picture entertainment. I promise to discourage indecent, immoral, and unwholesome motion pictures especially by my good example and always in a responsible and civic-minded manner. I promise to guide those under my care and influence in their choice of motion pictures that are morally and culturally inspiring. I promise not to cooperate by my patronage with theaters which regularly show objectionable films. I promise as a member of the Legion of Decency to acquaint myself with its aims, to consult with its classifications and to unite with all men of good will in promoting high and noble standards of motion picture entertainment. I freely make these solemn resolutions to the honor of God, for the good of my soul, and for the welfare of my country, Amen."


19. Ibid.

The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

21. Ibid.


23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 36.

29. Ibid., 34.


33. Ward L. Quall telephone interview with the author, recorded 19 September 1997, at Madison, WI.


The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

39. The "station official" to which Lee referred in his notes was probably Elizabeth Bain. Although from time to time Lee may have also been referencing a Mr. Faragan, program director of WGN-TV. Based on the copious memos kept by Lee it appears Bain was Lee's "eyes and ears" at WGN-TV. She was embarrassed by the indecision of station management and was quite sympathetic to the ACFRE. After the Martin Luther fiasco, it is not clear whether Ms. Bain quit or was fired from her post at WGN-TV but she quickly found work in the film and clearance department at rival Chicago station, WBBM-TV.


42. Ward L. Quall telephone interview with the author, recorded 19 September 1997, at Madison, WI.


44. Ibid., 3-4.

45. Ibid., 4.


48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. "Luther Film Ban Explained by WGN-TV, The Chicago Tribune, 20 December 1956, 5.


53. Ibid.

54. Ward L. Quall telephone interview with the author, recorded 19 September 1997, at Madison, WI.
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957


56. Ibid.


60. *Newsweek*, 4 March 1957, 6.


66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. About 3500 16 mm. copies of the film had been entrusted to churches and other educational institutions throughout the country. From: FCC petition: Lutheran Action Committee against WGN-TV, 19 February 1957, 3, par. 5. Office of the Chancellor, Edward Burke, box 445-45.02 (subject files), folder: Martin Luther.


71. Ibid.

72. "Looks Like WGN To Slot 'Luther' Despite Yowls, Variety, 2 January 1957, 17.


74. Ibid.

75. Ward L. Quall telephone interview with the author, recorded, 19 September 1997, at Madison, WI.
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957


77. Ward L. Qua 11 telephone interview with the author, recorded, 19 September 1997, at Madison, WI.


79. Ibid., 8.


81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid, 10.

84. Ibid., 2.


86. Henry Endress was an official of the United Lutheran Church in America as Director of Stewardship. He preceded Robert E.A. Lee as executive secretary of Lutheran Church Productions. Endress was one of the earliest moving forces to get the Luther film financed and produced. Letter: Robert E. A. Lee to Bob Pondillo, 27 January 1998. Author's personal correspondence


88. NARTB would later become the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB).

89. Warren G. Magnuson was a Democrat from Washington State who served in the United States Senate from 1944-1981. He chaired the Senate Commerce Committee from 1955-1978. The Committee changed its name several times during this period: it was called the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee from 1855-1961, The Commerce Committee from 1961-1977, and the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee from 1977-1978.


91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.
The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.


104. ACFRE petition application to challenge WGN-TV license, 19 February 1957, 8. Office of the Chancellor, Edward Burke, box 445-45.02 (subject files), folder: Martin Luther.


106. ACFRE petition application to challenge WGN-TV license, 19 February 1957, 8. Office of the Chancellor, Edward Burke, box 445-45.02 (subject files), folder: Martin Luther.


108. Robert E. A. Lee telephone interview with the author, recorded, 23 September 1997, at Madison, WI.

109. "WISN-TV To Telecast 'Luther' Film," The Milwaukee Sentinel, 27 February 1957, 15. Note: a later evening start time for the movie (i.e., 10:30 p.m.) was considered less desirable for advertisers. Usually, as the night wears on, audience decreases. However, such was not the case for Martin Luther.

110. "WISN-TV To Telecast 'Luther' Film," The Milwaukee Sentinel, 27 February 1957, 15.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.


118. Ibid.


120. “A Review of the Film ‘Martin Luther,’” The New World, 19 April 1957, 1.


122. “A Review of the Film ‘Martin Luther,’” The New World, 19 April 1957, 1.


124. Ibid.

125. “Monsignor” is only a title given to a priest in the Catholic church. It is sometimes used to distinguish a cleric “between the two sacramental orders of bishop and priest,” but its meaning is “parallel to the English Milord of the French Monseigneur. It is a title of courtesy rather than rank given to some priests to recognize exceptional service to the church.” It can be likened to being knighted by a secular monarchy, it does not involve “any specific duties,” nor does it have any bearing on the sacrament of Holy Orders. The only difference between a priest and a priest with the “honorary title” of Monsignor, is that he’s permitted “to wear a purple sash and purple piping . . . on his cassock, a sign of his distinctive proximity to the princely rank.” See: Kevin Orlin Johnson, Why do Catholics Do That: A Guide to the Teachings and Practices of the Catholic Church, (New York: Ballantine, 1994),125, 183.


127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.


The Chicago Television “Holy War” of 1956-1957

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.


134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.


140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.


149. Ibid, 32.


The Chicago Television "Holy War" of 1956-1957


155. Ibid.


163. Ibid.

164. Ibid., 434.

165. Ibid., 419.

166. John T. McGreevy, “Thinking on One’s Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960,” *The Journal of American History*, 6 (1997): 97. Marty also explains that, “while being free of the charge they were ‘soft’ on communism, Catholics had to defend themselves against the notion that they were communist-like, because their system was accused of being totalitarian and aggressive. In every generation, some attack prevailed over others, and some front line attacker of Catholics emerged to make the case...[At mid-century [that attacker was] Paul Blanchard.” See: Martin E. Marty, *Modern America Religion, Volume 3 - Under God, Indivisible: 1941-1960* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996), 158.

167. Ibid.

The Chicago Television “Holy War” of 1956-1957


170. The Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) opened in Rome on October 11th, 1962, 92 years after the close of Vatican I. Such Councils convene to clarify the basic principal of the Catholic Church. Vatican II was most significant in that Pope John XXIII wanted, among other things, the Church to reach out in true ecumenical spirit and meet non-Catholic Christians in faith and love. Pope John realized a genuine ecumenical movement would not work without a change in attitude between the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church and the Western non-Catholic Christian communities. The Council recognized the central theological differences between Christians in the interpretation of God's truth, as well as a powerful unity of purpose connecting the religions, and said such power must be used for the benefit of all humankind. Any practice of faith in an overzealous or impudent manner is considered a hindrance to Christian unity, not a help. For more information on Vatican II, contact: <http://www.christusrex.org/www1/CDHN/v1.html>

171. Empie, who died in the 1970s, was co-chair of “Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue,” with Roman Catholic Auxiliary Bishop T. Austin Murphy of the Baltimore Archdiocese. Both also served as co-chair on the U.S. Roman Catholic Bishops’ Committee for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs. Although this committee was not an official part of Vatican II “there is no doubt that [its work] was inspired . . . encouraged and empowered to go forward as a result of the sweeping [reforms] of Vatican II . . . .” From e-mail: Robert E. A. Lee to Bob Pondillo, 13 March 1998. Author’s personal correspondence.


174. Ibid.

175. E-mail: Robert E. A. Lee to Bob Pondillo, 13 March 1998. Author’s personal correspondence.
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Bob Pondillo
Madison, WI
March, 1998
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