Managerialism is an ideology with two distinct claims: (1) efficient management can solve almost any problem; and (2) practices that are appropriate for the conduct of private-sector enterprises can also be applied to the public sector (Rees, 1995). This paper examines these claims in relation to education as a public service. Specifically, the paper contrasts the practices of managerialism with the requirements of the message systems of schools: curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment. Outcomes of managerialism include decreased local control, increased control of the labor force, the measurement of efficiency in economic terms, less emphasis on equal access and quality, and the disempowerment of teachers. The hyper-rationalization and overburdening of schools that are introduced by accountability measures may close the system down, reducing performance by lessening the time and effort that teachers can spend teaching. Moreover, the effects of market forces and competition for resources are already creating cultural and social differences--by punishing need through the withdrawal of resources and rewarding lack of need. (Contains 27 references.) (LMI)
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Managerialism is an ideology with two distinct claims: a) efficient management can solve almost any problem and b) practices which are appropriate for the conduct of private sector enterprises can also be applied to the public sector (Rees, 1995). This paper examines these claims in relation to education as a public service and in particular, contrasts the practices of managerialism with the requirements of the message systems of schools: curriculum, pedagogy and assessment.
As Rees (1995:15) suggests 'Managerialism is an ideology with two distinct claims; a) efficient management can solve almost any problem and b) practices which are appropriate for the conduct of private sector enterprises can also be applied to public sector services. Rees goes on to argue that such claims are fraudulent and fictional. Nonetheless such claims are persistent and pervasive, not only within management culture, but also within the media and certain political cultures. The result, as Pusey (1991) so clearly points out, is the subversion of any notion of public service within the Public Service and the abandonment of any notion of the social and cultural responsibilities of government. Specifically, the redefinition of the state as a mechanism for facilitating the operation of market forces is advocated through an ideological attack on the social responsibilities of government mounted by governments themselves through their embrace of economic rationalism.

The 'carrier' of economic rationalism is indeed a notion of 'strong management' through which public and private, individual and collective interests are managed through competition in various markets. As Rees (1995:15-16) puts it:

Economic policies have nurtured the ideology of managerialism and the rise of managers who advocate its precepts. More specifically, it is the policies of economic rationalism which the new breeds of managers are employed to implement even if they only comprehend those policies in terms of cliches and prescriptions: cut back on the responsibilities of government and rely on market forces; introduce private competition into public sector services; promote independence as a means of ridiculing the welfare state, and question the existence of 'society'.

The invasion of government by such ideologies and their articulation into the 'public' sector contributes to the pathological reduction of any terrain on which governments can be held accountable for cultural and social responsibilities. Yet these responsibilities are all the more crucial in societies increasingly dominated, not by traditions of community and solidarity - even at the level of the nation state- but by notions of global markets (Horsman and Marshall:1994). But, as Touraine (1984, quoted in Pusey 1991:196) reminds us:

Only the state can integrate social actors who are separated by the market, opposed to each other by class relations, atomised by rational individualism.

Managerialism, however, is an ideology and a practice that is blind to such imperatives, even while managers themselves may bewail the decline of family values, morality , duty, loyalty and responsibility which their organisations both depend upon and simultaneously undermine. Managerialism is not then simply a technology, but also a set of practices which carry heavy ideological baggage and which undertake significant work in the diminishing of structural and social practices which have historically served purposes of cultural and social integration. As Rees (1995:16) puts it:

Managers are not neutral technocrats. They derive their cues and their scripts from a set of policies which contend that an economy needs to be run like a market with as little interference as possible, that human effort can be counted a commodity, and that in the conduct of organisations financial accountability is the criterion to measure performance.

The results of such an ideology and its accompanying practices are argued by Rees (1995) typically to be the intensification of work, increased stress, lowered morale and decreasing commitment to professional or organisational goals.
If these are the internal results of organisational managerialism then they are matched by external outcomes where increased focus on managerialism is accompanied by increasing social and economic inequalities and a resulting diminution of social solidarity and integration (Rees 1995, Raskell, 1993, Stillwell, 1993). Unsurprisingly the internal practices of management, especially the pursuit of efficiency through more intensive 'human resource management' (i.e. shedding staff) and the appropriation of resulting profits to themselves and to shareholders involve very considerable human costs:

The human costs of greed are multiple. The humaneness of those who accept such rewards, believing they are merited, is diminished. Costs endured by those subjected to managerialist practices include unemployment and associated poverty; part-time work and accompanying insecurity; stress, anxiety and loss of morale among employees; a persistent sense of powerlessness; and illnesses which may lead to premature death.

(Rees, 1995:209).

The human costs are not unrelated to organisation costs. While there may be short term (essentially financial) 'benefits', longer term costs are incurred.

While short-term gains to company profit and redistribution of social product away from the employee and towards the employer have been made, there are natural human limitations to the methods of increasing productivity adopted by the managerialists; limitations made obvious by the virtual epidemic of occupational stress-related illness.

(Solondz, 1995:213)

Moreover, within the practices of managerialism the notion of efficiency is a very restricted one, related only to the internal costs of the organisation. Thus, by displacing costs elsewhere (on to other organisations, government, employees, clients, the environment etc) the particular 'efficiencies' of the organisation may be increased even if the collective cost of the practice increases through increases in unemployment, social welfare or health related costs, reduced standards of living, destruction of the quality of life or the environment.

For example:

...technical efficiency can also be increased by displacing costs 'off-budget', so that they are not taken into account in the cost-benefit calculations through which they are measured. An example of this is the practice of state public hospital systems shifting costs from themselves to the Commonwealth by bulk billing public hospital patients for medical and diagnostic services so that the costs are borne by Medicare, instead of the hospital's budget. This costs the Federal Government at least $300 million a year (Ferrari, 1995), while making state hospitals 'more efficient' by reducing their costs as measured by their own budgets. This practice apparently increases the total national health bill (because bulk billing costs more than providing the same services through salaried hospital medical staff), so that increasing the efficiency of state public hospitals may actually decrease the efficiency of the total national health system.

(Meutzelfeldt: 1995:99)
Again, costs can be displaced on to clients in ways which increase organisational 'efficiency' while simultaneously making clients 'responsible' for the diminished quality of services.

In Victoria, early childhood education services were restructured in 1993, with kindergarten teachers and committees of management carrying more responsibilities and with funding based on enrolments rather than salary and associated costs. As a result, costs to government were reduced by 20-30 per cent. A survey of teachers found that there were reductions in the six major quality indicators of: curriculum; staff-child ratios; staff-child relationships; staff-parent interactions; physical environment, and administration.

(Meutzelfeldt: 1995:99)

Such procedures are common in the private sector but are becoming pervasive in the public sector which raises serious questions about the social and cultural effects of such practices and the mechanisms by which managerialism appears to relieve government of social and cultural responsibility. As Muetzelfeldt (1995:103-4)) puts it

...any increase in narrowly defined efficiency can actually increase the displaced and hidden costs by more than the 'on budget' savings....That is, increased technical efficiency (as measured by the organisation's budget) may go hand in hand with decreased social effectiveness. As well, costs are displaced onto less organised and less powerful groups (which is why they are singled out to carry the extra costs), so the displacement also increases inequality. In the private sector technical efficiency ('the bottom line') may be an end in itself- for better or for worse But in the public sector the end should be social effectiveness, and managerialism does not deliver this.

But one of the prime characteristics of managerialism (and one of the reasons it is so attractive to governments) is its apparent ability to convert social, cultural and political problems into technical problems. As Buchanan (1995:55) suggests

One of the hallmarks of contemporary managerialist discourse is its tendency to define social, economic or political issues as management problems. In the field of labour management (i.e. managing people at work) the 'problem' no longer involves addressing the complexities of 'personnel' or 'industrial relations' issues. Rather, labour related issues are seen as a special case of managing resources to achieve particular outcomes, the only difference being that the resources are human. Unsurprisingly, this branch of management is commonly referred to as 'human resource management'.

Human resource management directs much of its attention to increasing the 'flexibility' of human resources as a crucial contribution to the strategies required to produce flexible responses to increased global competition and rapid change. Storey (1989 in Buchanan 1995:56) summarises the four major concerns of this doctrine.

- personnel and industrial relations functions that are not integrated with the mainstream management of the enterprise
- approaches to personnel management that are too centralised within the enterprise
neglect of workers as individuals arising from 'collectivist' approaches to labour management such as industrial relations; and

worker estrangement and alienation arising from all these 'inefficiencies'.

Solutions to these concerns are advocated along the following lines.

- human resources must be managed 'strategically' alongside other (physical, financial, capital) resources and treated in the same way rather than as a different order of resource.

- line managers are best placed to determine specific labour needs and should have hiring and firing authority largely free of central restrictions.

- individual contracts with employees are preferable to collective contracts with employee organisations so as to allow greater flexibility and reward of high performing individuals.

- workers must be empowered in ways which encourage initiative and commitment within team based forms of work organisation.

The introduction of such mechanisms is claimed to bring considerable benefits to both worker and firm as Buchanan (1995:58) suggests.

The benefits purported to be associated with this new approach to labour management are considerable. These include greater flexibility and hence competitiveness for firms in the marketplace, and more challenging and interesting jobs for employees. The BCA (Business Council of Australia) has gone as far as to assert that if changes inspired by this agenda are introduced, labour productivity should increase by over 25 per cent.

The facts of the matter are, however, somewhat different. Buchanan (1995) reports that there is little evidence of key decisions being devolved. Indeed the introduction of information technology has allowed increased surveillance and central control of essential parameters. 'The rhetoric of devolution and decentralisation is yet to make a real impact in practice at most workplaces' (1995:60).

There is also failure to match the rhetoric of employee involvement and local management flexibility in workplace practices. Again, central control over workforce size and structure and capital investment invalidates local management and worker autonomy. Thirdly, it is clear that the substitution of individual for collective contracts seldom results in increased rewards to significant numbers of workers whatever productivity gains are achieved by the shedding of labour.

The impact of human resource management policies is, in practice, quite different from its ideological claims.

Far from contributing to the development of an exciting new world of increased opportunities at work, what is actually occurring is the restoration and legitimization of managerial prerogatives under the guise of an allegedly new approach to labour management (Buchanan, 1995:62).
Managerialism in Education

If managerialism in the private sector insists that 'human resources' be treated strategically - that is in the same manner as other inputs into the production process- then the translation of such doctrines into the public sector can be expected to have similar rationale and utilise similar practices in the pursuit of managerial prerogatives.

The context for such changes is one of a major shift in economic paradigm in Australia as elsewhere. As Karmel (1995:170) suggests:

Until the early 1970's the accepted view of the Australian economy was one of a mixed economy in which the public sector played an important role in the production of goods and services, and in which government intervention was accepted as a norm. This view of the economy has now been left behind. The role of the public sector has been de-emphasised; much greater weight is being placed on the private sector with an insistence on individualism, private enterprise and the market...Symptoms of this paradigm shift include emphases on market forces, deregulation, privatisation, user pays and best practice corporate styles. Lower taxation, and therefore reduced government expenditure, has become a goal of economic policy, as has the promotion of efficiency in the use of inputs to produce outcomes and effectiveness in the production of outcomes to meet goals.

The market is seen as the prime mechanism for the imposition of discipline in the pursuit of efficiency. Accountability through competition is the slogan now imposed upon public as well as private organisations particularly at the behest of the business community.

The change in the economic paradigm has not only stressed the instrumental role of education but has brought with it an emphasis on accountability. A characteristic of market forces is that they exercise a discipline on the suppliers of goods and services and are seen to do so. The freedom of customers to shop around and the search for profit promotes the efficient and effective production of goods and services...[even though] markets do not always produce optimum results: monopoly, imperfect competition and externalities all distort market outcomes.

The problems of market theory and practice are rather more serious than this, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Bates 1995). However, despite major difficulties with both the market model and its operations, the economic rationalists and business leaders who now dominate most governments in the English speaking world continue to insist that market 'discipline' be applied to the public sector.

[Market] discipline applies to a much lesser degree to services produced in the public sector, of which educational services are a prime example. The push for accountability, which has gathered impetus over the last decade, reflects a recognition of this. Its development has mirrored the shift in the economic paradigm towards market forces. It aims to institutionalise processes for keeping pressure on educational institutions, their staff and students to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the interests of economic performance.

(Karmel, 1995:171)
In education such market discipline is being artificially created in two ways. Along with other government trading and service enterprises 'benchmark' exercises are being created which provide yardsticks against which the relative cost of the provision of goods and services can be measured (Scales 1994,1995). Thus states whose cost of 'producing' a primary school student are higher than the national average can justify cutting their financial inputs. Such comparisons, among other things, have justified Victoria in reducing its educational expenditure by 10.3% since 1992 while Australia as a whole increased educational funding by 3.8%. Retention rates in Victoria have fallen by 8% over the same period and class sizes have increased to become the worst in Australia with over 62% of classes bigger than the Government's own business plan target of 24.5 students per class (against an Australian average of 17.9 students per teacher). No doubt there have been efficiency gains, if those efficiencies are measured solely in monetary terms. It seems also that there may well have been some educational losses, measured in social or cultural (let alone personal) terms.

Moreover, these losses are unevenly distributed throughout Victoria. Of the 260 schools closed during this period the majority were in rural and working class areas. Of the 10,700 students who dropped out of school during this period the majority were in working class (western metropolitan and rural) areas. Currently students in western suburbs are at least 10% more likely to dropout (whether male or female) than students in eastern suburbs despite youth unemployment rates in the west being four times as high as those in the east. Again, while baseline funding may be structured so as to marginally advantage working class schools one comparison of special purpose grants shows that Footscray City Secondary College (in a western working class, multi cultural suburb) receives $147,000 for special learning needs while Balwyn College (in the Minister for Education's comfortable upper class western suburb) receives an additional $306,200 in specific program grants, a difference that more than redresses the $10 per capita advantage enjoyed by Footscray. Moreover, schools in eastern suburbs report receiving up to $522 per pupil per year from non compulsory fees and fundraising while schools in the western suburbs raise as little as $19 from similar sources (Centre for Democratic Education, 1996).

It seems clear from such information that market discipline is doing little to ensure that traditional goals such as equity in access and provision (a 'level playing field') are achieved. Theoretically, of course, sensible parents, interested in their children's welfare and aware of public information on the relative resources and performance of schools will simply remove their children from Footscray City College and transfer them across town to enrol in Balwyn College. The fact that they do not seem to be doing so is presumably because they are not well informed or that they are not interested in their children's welfare, or perhaps, some 'imperfection' in the market. Nonetheless such imperfections do seem to be present in most of the educational quasi-markets established at the behest of the economic rationalists whether in England, Australia or New Zealand (Whitty, 1996).

The governmental response to such differences in 'outcomes' has largely been to create national criteria against which performance can be measured or 'benchmarked' against 'best practice'. In Australia and New Zealand as in England national curricula have been established, national assessment regimes established and considerable pressure brought to bear for the publication of 'league tables'. In many cases auditing and accountability mechanisms are also imposed. Such mechanisms are very clearly spelt out for schools, but similar, though more ambiguous, 'performance indicators' are applied to other educational sectors such as universities.
As Karmel suggests even here the emphasis on outcomes produces some major difficulties.

- the labelling and grading of institutions in rank order has serious consequences for those low in the order, threatening their market standing and their ability to attract students and resources.

- inability to attract resources and students reduces rather than increases the ability of the institution to improve its performance.

- performance indicators often omit consideration of extraneous variables (for instance the socio-economic context of the institution) thus making comparisons between institutions invalid.

- performance is often measured according to quantitative indications of single variables which omit non-measurable attributes of performance and which cannot be aggregated except by making invalid assumptions.

- the costs of measurement and audit are high both internally and externally and may outweigh the benefits.

- the atmosphere of compliance generated by such procedures may well distort institutional priorities and reduce diversity.

- institutional attempts to present performance as high may well negate arguments about the inadequacy of resources even where such a lack and its deleterious effects can be clearly demonstrated.

(Karmel, 1995:177)

If such caveats apply to universities, how much more do they apply to schools who are located in a much greater diversity of contexts, with much greater diversity of composition and much greater diversity of resources?

For the truth is that schools and universities operate in a diversity of contexts and with a variety of purposes which are always contested. Some of these conflicts are historical in character. As Grace (1995) has argued in his study of school leadership, current attempts to reimpose on schools in England their moral responsibility for social integration conflict with the simultaneous demands for entrepreneurial leadership in a competitive market.

Many [head teachers] found themselves in difficult and contradictory situations. At a national level they were being informed by a Secretary of State for Education that the traditional spiritual and moral values transmitted in English schooling must be maintained for the good of the moral cohesion of society as well as for the good of individual pupils. At a local level they were encountering new conditions for schooling which seemed to negate those messages with an emphasis on individual competitive survival, visible and measurable success, and a market culture in which ‘winning’ was the ultimate value.

(Grace, 1995:139)
The processes by which such changes are constructed also produce significant conflicts.

...contemporary school leadership is locked into a network of contradictory possibilities and shows both confidence and doubt about the future direction of schooling. This network consists of contradictions between the democratic potential of some reforms, for example: empowered school governors; greater accountability to parents; decentralised local management of schools; and, the centralist and controlling tendency of other reforms, e.g., national curriculum and assessment prescriptions, publication of hierarchical league tables of 'results', differential funding according to school status approved by the government.

(Grace, 1995:195)

Such conflicts affect teachers in quite specific ways as their role is restructured through governmental attempts to shift conceptions and practices in each of the key message systems of schools: curriculum, pedagogy and assessment. Such shifts also imply a reconstruction of the sense of self - or professionalism- enjoyed by teachers.

Shifts towards a highly prescriptive, atomised curriculum have taken place in England, Australia and New Zealand. School knowledge has variously been structured into eight (Australia) or ten (England) curriculum areas which are then arbitrarily assigned hierarchies of outcomes (competencies) ordered into units which become the building blocks from which teachers construct the work of themselves and their pupils. Only subsequently (in Australia) were projects set up to provide epistemological and historical justification for both curriculum areas and lists of competencies. Collins (1994) has provided a trenchant critique of the processes and products of this initiative in Australia. However, some of the most interesting empirical research into the effects of such curriculum structures has come out of England. Recently, for instance, Helsby and McCulloch (1996) have reported an empirical study of teachers responses to the imposition of the content and form of the National Curriculum.

Findings...suggest that the fixed content and recording procedures and short timescales implied in modular approaches are likely not only to create additional work pressures but also to limit teacher flexibility to respond to needs which arise during the course of teaching: in other words their freedom to make professional judgements within the course of their practice is constrained by prior, self imposed curricular prescriptions.

(Helsby & McCulloch, 1996:62)

One of the arguments for the national curriculum was, of course, that its prescription would free teachers to concentrate upon their real area of professional expertise - helping children to learn. What appears to be happening through the prescription of an overloaded curriculum full of more 'objectives' and 'competencies' than could reasonably be covered in the school timetable, is that the work of both teachers and pupils is becoming intensified and overdetermined. The result is not the release of professional energy into a new pedagogical practice, but rather a sense of professional restriction in both pedagogy as well as curriculum.

Thus, far from being a site of professional creativity, the evidence suggested that many teachers felt disempowered by the developments which they were legally, if reluctantly, forced to implement.

(Helsby & McCulloch, 1996:63)
The relationship between teacher professionalism and centralised curricular control of the kind being implemented through the various National Curricula seems fairly clear and substantially negative. The more detailed the centralised prescription the lower the level of professionalism experienced by teachers.

...the introduction of a centralised and prescriptive National Curriculum appears to have weakened [teachers] professional confidence, lowered morale and left them uncertain both of their ability to cope and of their right to take major curriculum decisions. These findings are consistent with the view of increased state control of curriculum undermining teacher professionalism. Indeed, many of these teachers appear almost as victims of government policies, adopting a largely reactive, rather than proactive, role in their responses.

(Helsby & McCulloch, 1996:68)

Similar responses are reported in New Zealand where

The NZCER surveys show a steady decline in teacher morale; they also show what seems to be a quite high turnover rate for principals (42% in all the schools in the sample between 1991 and 1993). One is left with the troubling though that [such initiatives] in education may produce only a small gain for the substantial cost of foregoing attention to teaching and learning, within positive, supportive relationships.

(Wylie, 1995:163)

Popkewitz (1996), in his discussion of changes in the governmentality of various national education systems emphasises the commonality of the model currently being employed.

General curriculum goals are set by the central government to provide local school districts with flexibility and a certain degree of autonomy in developing implementation plans. In return, the central state bureaucracy monitors outcomes and content through psychometric measurements rather than processes.

(Popkewitz, 1996: 30)

Such programs are frequently accompanied by calls for a renewal of professionalism on the part of the teacher.

The call for professionalism relates to a re-visioning of occupational identity. It gives value to school work that includes greater teacher responsibility and flexibility in implementing goal governed approaches of the state.

(Popkewitz, 1996:30)

Such approaches emphasise the role of professional associations in opening up and altering the perspectives teachers have towards their work and their pupils, bringing them significantly into line with the purposes of the state.

...current...reforms seek to regulate by opening up the 'minds' of teachers through reworking the notions of teacher competence, skills and knowledge about school subjects. the central focus is [on] teachers' and students' capabilities and dispositions towards knowledge.

(Popkewitz, 1996:38)
In this process, teachers are to be persuaded that their own personal interests coincide with the benevolent interests of the state.

The significance of the strategies of reform in the problem of governing are in their intrusive qualities. The potential of constructivist discourses results from their linking people's knowledge of the world with institutional 'goals' in a manner which enables them to feel satisfied that the process will effectively realise personal as well as social ends. Inscribed in the concrete technologies of pedagogy are the correct dispositions and capabilities to be self-regulating and policing, so that the individual teacher is...not only 'able' but also 'inclined. (Popkewitz, 1996:43)

The strong emphasis on inservice education which accompanies the current moment of reform is indication of the importance placed on changing teachers' subjectivities- even to the point of excluding traditional concerns of teaching and learning strategies and pupil welfare and focussing exclusively upon the content, structure and pedagogical strategies implied by the specification of centralised curriculum through outcomes and competencies. As Robertson (1996) suggests

The teacher is now constituted as the 'manager' of resources which might lead to pre-specified learning outcomes and targeted performances. And while learners are to be enterprising, self-directed, work in multi-level groups, and progress on an individualised basis (Schools Council, 1992), their endeavours within school are almost exclusively directed towards their 'flexible' participation in the world of work rather than participation within the wider society. (Robertson, 1996:47)

And here the links back to the position of the economic rationalists of the corporate and governmental worlds become clear again. Such pedagogical production of personal and cognitive attributes needs verification. Yardsticks must be established by which to judge competition between schools and individuals within schools so that 'market discipline' can be imposed, Programs of national testing must be constructed through which system, school and individual performance can be compared. It is not enough to prescribe a national curriculum and reconstruct teachers' work and identity. These initiatives, the Business Council of Australia insists

...should be accompanied by a rigorous system of accountability for performance targets based upon a clear set of educational objectives for the systems themselves and for the nation. (Loton, 1991 in Watkins, 1995:76)

Despite the hurried introduction of national testing it seems that such systems of measurement and accountability are far less easy to construct in ways that produce useful information, than the corporate leaders suggest. For instance the National Foundation for Educational Research in England has had this to say in response to the compilation of league tables based upon schools relative examination successes.

Effectiveness indicators such as the total number of examination passes or a school's position in a league table are seriously flawed and unfair, taking no account of the quality of the intake in terms of either ability or special circumstance.
Such indicators are unfair to pupils and parents as they could be led to choose schools less successful than they seem. They also mislead schools with a high quality intake as there is little incentive to improve results or know whether they need improving and they are of dubious value to administrators as little indication is offered about which schools are performing successfully.


Testing according to performance on the National Curriculum as well as examination results will, however, continue, but dispute over the meaning and relevance of such results shows signs of appeal to further testing so as to get measures which are more 'comprehensive' and 'relevant'. As Gray and Wilcox suggest:

There is widespread agreement that exam and test results are not sufficient to do justice to schools' efforts. With the introduction of testing at all four stages of the National Curriculum, however, schools will probably be deluged by information pertaining to their pupils' cognitive performance. Some effort will be devoted to constructing further measures to place alongside these kinds of outcomes, if broader views about the nature and purposes of education are to be given credence.

(Gray and Wilcox, 1994, in Vann, 1995:189)

The result of such increased measurement is already being reported by teachers. There is so much to be measured that there is little time to teach it! As Walsh comments:

Systems in which everything is measured are also likely to be systems in which there is reduction in learning, especially learning through mistakes. A system of specified services, defined standards, and measured performance is likely to be one in which experimentation and risk are likely to be avoided.

(Walsh, 1994 in Vann 1995:188)

Thus while accountability purposes may be addressed by such processes, the hyperationalisation (Wise, 1979) introduced by such minute specification and overburdening of schools, teachers and pupils, may indeed have the effects of closing the system down, of reducing performance by reducing the time and effort that teachers can spend teaching—especially in ways which are innovative, related to pupil needs and capable of relating to the immense array of differences with which schools are faced. Moreover, the effects of market forces and competition for resources are already increasing not only legitimate cultural and social differences but also illegitimate differences where need is punished through withdrawal of resources and where lack of need is rewarded.

It would seem that the educational costs of managerialism may be high indeed.
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